

Wilfrid Laurier University

Scholars Commons @ Laurier

---

Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive)

---

1989

## A new mandate for UNFICYP the Canadian Contingent in Cyprus, July-August 1974

Robert J. Gravelle  
*Wilfrid Laurier University*

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholars.wlu.ca/etd>



Part of the [Military History Commons](#)

---

### Recommended Citation

Gravelle, Robert J., "A new mandate for UNFICYP the Canadian Contingent in Cyprus, July-August 1974" (1989). *Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive)*. 16.  
<https://scholars.wlu.ca/etd/16>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive) by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [scholarscommons@wlu.ca](mailto:scholarscommons@wlu.ca).



National Library  
of Canada

Bibliothèque nationale  
du Canada

Canadian Theses Service    Service des thèses canadiennes

Ottawa, Canada  
K1A 0N4

## NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

## AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.

**A NEW MANDATE FOR UNFICYP**

**The Canadian Contingent in Cyprus**

**July-August 1974**

**by**

**ROBERT J. GRAVELLE**

**B.A. Trent University 1973**

**THESIS**

**Submitted to the Department of History  
in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the Master of Arts degree  
Wilfrid Laurier University  
1989**

**© Robert J. Gravelle 1988**

Permission has been granted to the National Library of Canada to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author (copyright owner) has reserved other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her written permission.

L'autorisation a été accordée à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de microfilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur (titulaire du droit d'auteur) se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation écrite.

ISBN 0-315-50090-5

## Table of Contents

i	Preface . . . . .	i
I	The Cyprus Dispute . . . . .	1
II	The United Nations and Cyprus . . . . .	17
III	The Greek Coup and the Turkish Invasion . . . .	34
IV	The Canadian Contingent and the New United Nations Mandate . . . . .	57
V	Conclusion . . . . .	90
VI	Bibliography . . . . .	95
VII	Appendix . . . . .	102

## MAPS

I	<b>The Eastern Mediterranean</b>	<b>opposite</b>	<b>p. 6</b>
II	<b>Cyprus After the Turkish Invasion</b>	<b>opposite</b>	<b>p. 49</b>
III	<b>Nicosia</b>	<b>opposite</b>	<b>p. 56</b>
IV	<b>Nicosia International Airport</b>	<b>opposite</b>	<b>p. 63</b>

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my appreciation to the following persons who assisted me in the formulation and writing of this thesis. To Marilyn Rutherford, whose patience in editing and whose belief in this topic was an inspiration. To Brigadier-General C. Beattie, without whom this research topic could not have been completed and, to whom Canada owes its gratitude. To Professor Terry Copp, whose encouragement was ever present. To Dr. B. Gough, who also believes that history is alive and well. To David Barnhill, for his friendship and suggestions. Also, to Ellie Muir for her assistance.

Especially, to all the Canadians who served in UNFICYP.

Robert J. Gravelle

## PREFACE

The idea of writing a thesis on the role of the Canadian Contingent in the United Nations peacekeeping force on Cyprus developed from my own service in that force during the 1970's. My tours of duty in 1974 and 1979, provided the opportunity to learn a great deal about the problems of peacekeeping on the divided island nation. My long term intention is to prepare a study of the history of the Canadian Contingent in the Cyprus dispute, but for purposes of a Master of Arts thesis, one particular set of events surrounding the Turkish military invasion of Cyprus in the summer of 1974 was selected for investigation.

There are many problems confronting the historian who attempts to write contemporary history. Too often such history has to be based on newspaper accounts, memoirs and official government or United Nations publications. All these sources are used in this study but they are used to supplement a quite different body of source material. The core of this thesis is based upon the Headquarters Nicosia District Daily Operational Log for July and August 1974.

An operational log is a record of all the communications to and from an operational headquarters, in this case the United Nations headquarters for the entire Nicosia District. All United



Nations Posts and mobile patrols in the Nicosia area reported regularly and had their radio messages logged. Similarly the orders of the Contingent Commander and his Second in Command are recorded as they were issued. United Nations liaison officers, attached to the headquarters of the Greek National Guard and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, radioed information which was faithfully recorded at the Joint Operations Centre in Nicosia. This information, which in 1974 allowed the responsible officers to obtain an overall view of a rapidly changing situation, offers the historian a unique opportunity to understand what happened and why it happened.

In order to fully appreciate the amount of detail the Operational Log Sheet provides, attached as Appendix A is a copy of the Log Sheet for 0724 hours to 0842 hours, 20 July 1974. This detailed radio reporting during the early hours of the invasion on 20 July, is an example of the type of information received by the Joint Operations Centre. The author has relied on these Operational log Sheets to verify information on these events. Newspaper articles were only used to supplement the log. For example the evacuation of three hundred and eighty-six civilians from the Ledra Palace Hotel on 21 July 1974, was recorded in the Daily Operational Log Sheet in this manner:

0627 hrs- 81A directed by C/S 0 to start to place civilians in  
in basement of Ledra Palace

0905 hrs- 9 reported that he was faced with a problem  
of when and how evac is going to be made

1005 hrs- 81A was told by the DO of the JOC that a convoy  
was coming to pick-up and evacuate the hotel  
guests to bring them to the Hilton Hotel

1119 hrs- CO directed Sgt. Decaire to evacuate Ledra

1150 hrs- 81A- reported to C/S 0 that Sgt. Decaire at Ledra  
until further orders.

1215 hrs- British Ambassador- requested CO to call  
about civilians. British  
Ambassador at Ledra.

1300 hrs- C/S 0 to 81A- Convoy on way from Hilton under  
our escort 17A and 17B.

1325 hrs- 17A to 0- At Ledra

1330 hrs- 17A to 0- Loading pers.

1331 hrs- 81A to 0- Greeks won't let pers go.  
must confirm with embassy

1414 hrs- 17 to 0- Move all pers out of Ledra

1435 hrs- 86 to 0- Ledra all clear, convoy on way.

The above gives a detailed account of the constant radio contact that the Ledra Palace had with the Joint Operations Centre, and how each phase of the evacuation was carried out.

This action was described by Paul Martin of The Times (London) on July 21st 1974. He wrote that, "the evacuation of civilian guests from the Ledra Palace Hotel was accomplished when a Canadian UN Force commanded by a Colonel arrived. This Colonel (Beattie) gathered a list of names of tourists and proceeded to talk with the Greek irregulars...The Canadian UN Contingent

arrived on the scene wearing Blue Berets and carrying a UN flag."(1) The New York Times of July 22 1974, carried a Reuters press release under the headline, "380 Rescued From Hotel", which described the details of a Canadian UN foot patrol in the evacuation of the hotel.(2) Although not totally accurate, it does provide further details about the role of the Canadian Contingent in the safe evacuation of the Ledra Hotel.

The other major source used in this thesis are the notes and tapes obtained by the author during an interview with Brigadier-General C. Beattie. Although the author was unable to receive any photocopies of the General's papers which dealt with the events at that time, Beattie's recollections and personal tapes were substantiated by the Operational Log Sheets, United Nations Documents and newspaper articles. One such example is as follows: While serving as the Canadian Contingent Commander and Deputy Chief of Staff of the UN Force, the then Colonel Beattie, was responsible for securing the Nicosia International Airport as a United Nations protected area. Through his negotiations, the Canadian Contingent prevented the Turks from overrunning the airport on 23 July and again on 25 July 1974. This action was substantiated by UN Security Council Report S/11353/Add.5, dated 24 July 1974. The report stated that the airport was unde. United

---

(1) Paul Martin. "British Units Escorts 1000 Car Refugee Convoy to Safety" The Times (London) July 21 1974. p.1 and 6.

(2) The New York Times "380 Rescued From Hotel" July 22 1974. p.13.

Nations control, and that both sides had agreed to withdraw to at least 500 metres outside the airport perimeter. United Nations Document S/11353/Add.6 para 4, on the same date, further confirms Beattie's information on the anticipated Turk attack on the airport to gain control of the facilities. The report states in part:

In Nicosia District, Nicosia airport remains under United Nations control. Canadian troops are deployed around the perimeters...The Turkish forces however continue to threaten to occupy the airport.(1)

The author will attempt to describe in the following pages, the role which the United Nations Force, and in particular, the Canadian Contingent, played in the events of 15 July to 30 August 1974, which led to the altering of the original mandate of the Force.

This thesis will focus directly on the United Nations Force in Cyprus and specifically on the Canadian Contingent. It will attempt to establish the following:

- a. the effectiveness of the United Nations mandate for peace observation missions but its ineffectiveness when faced with a direct assault;
- b. the Canadian Contingent's response to the coup of 15 July 1974, and the subsequent

---

(1) United Nations Security Council Document S/11353/Add. 5 and 6, 24 July 1974.

invasion of Cyprus by Turkey on 20 July 1974,  
the stated purpose of which was to restore  
the Cypriot Constitution of 1960, under its  
obligation of the London and Zurich Agreements of  
1959-1960; and

- c. that the United Nations Force mandate was  
altered by the Force Commander, and this change  
was later supported by the Secretary-General  
in order to legitimize it.

Once these points have been established, the thesis will examine  
the implications and lessons of the Canadian Contingent's actions  
as they apply to future peacekeeping missions.

In order to understand why the United Nations became involved  
in the Cyprus issue, it is necessary to review the historical  
developments of the island, which led to the overthrow of the  
Cypriot Presidency on July 15 1974, by the Greek officers of the  
National Guard and the subsequent invasion by Turkey.

## Chapter One The Cyprus Dispute

In September 1988, it was announced that the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces had been awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace. After thirty-two years of dedicated service, the efforts of the Peacekeeping Forces to diffuse potential global conflicts was fully recognized. Canada, as a leading contributor to peacekeeping operations, has served in more than ten such operations with distinction, but so far no detailed study of its role in a particular operation has been undertaken. However, with the receipt of the Nobel Peace prize, new interest in United Nations Peacekeeping operations and Canada's role will no doubt develop.

The utilization of an international force to secure peace and order is not a post-World War II phenomenon. The first such use in the twentieth-century was the establishment by the League of Nations on 5 December 1934, of an international force which was dispatched to the Saar, with headquarters situated in Saarbrücken. The force consisted of 3300 officers and men ( 1500 British; 1300 Italian; and 500 from the Netherlands and Sweden ) and was under the command of Major-General J. Brind of Britain. Its authorized function was to be ready at the request of the Plebiscite Commission; "for the intervention ( by force ) for the

purpose of maintaining or restoring order. "(1) The Plebiscite Commission was to monitor and ensure that a fair and honest vote was undertaken to determine if the Saar was to be partitioned to France or remain under the League governance.

The assigned task of the force was carried out effectively. Its efficiency, discipline and impartiality were well recognized. At the end of its mandate, Major-General Brind submitted his report to the League and made several recommendations as to the improvement of any future force, which in part stated:

- a. an adequate intelligence organization be established in the country concerned before the troops arrived and before the situation becomes untenable; and
- b. that it was important to draw the force from countries that had no direct interest in the issue and could be neutral at all times.(2)

Although other recommendations were made, Brind's suggestions would prove to be the most significant in United Nations operations. Although the League of Nations, as an international organization, did not survive long, the principal of using an international force for the maintenance of order remained.

The Second World War re-emphasized the requirement for a method of ensuring international order and peace. Once hostilities ceased, this philosophy was embodied in the Charter of the United Nations Organization. Article I, Para 1; of the

---

(1) David Wainhouse, International Peace Observation ( Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1966 ) p.26.

(2) Ibid. p.27.

United Nations charter defines one of the organization's fundamental principles as:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.(1)

The structural organization was set up to accommodate two authoritative bodies. The first was called the Security Council, comprised of five permanent members, China, France, Great Britain, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as ten non-permanent members. Only the permanent members held veto power. The other functioning body was the General Assembly, made up of all member states. The one great distinction between the Council and the Assembly was that the Council was designated to decide when peace was threatened and what action was to be taken. To facilitate this role, a Military Staff Committee, comprised of the Chiefs of Staff from the permanent members was organized. Its function was to design plans for the deployment of military personnel which all member states were to place at the disposal of the Security Council.

The uniqueness of the Security Council was also recognized and

---

(1) H.G. Nicholas, The United Nations as a Political Institution ( New York: Oxford University Press, Fourth Edition, 1971 ) Appendix I; p.214.



a further provision was incorporated into the Charter to strengthen its mandate. Article 24 of the Charter states:

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on its behalf.(1)

Article 34 of the Charter gave the Security Council the right to " investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute..."(2)

As well, Articles 36 and 37 empower the Security Council to recommend measures to establish peace, which included the deployment of peace observers.

The General Assembly, in its own right, has the authority to review any disputes which threaten peace or international order.

Article 11, para 2 states:

2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council...(3)

This authority to review and make recommendations is further enhanced under Article 14.

---

(1) Nicholas, The United Nations, Article 24 para 1, p.221.


(2) Ibid. Article 34, p.229.

(3) Ibid. Article 11. para 2, p.217.

These references to the United Nations provisions are necessary in order to appreciate the intricacies and difficulties involved in the maintenance of peace and security at the international level. Even though the major peace observation missions and peacekeeping operations have been undertaken under these provisions, they have usually not started without the express consent of the parties involved in the dispute.

Despite some set-backs in the late 1940's, the 1950's and in the early part of the 1960's ( the United Nations involvement in the Congo as an example), observation and peacekeeping missions have gradually evolved into a primary responsibility of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Although Security Council and/or General Assembly approval is required for such undertakings, it has become practice to have a United Nations force come under the direction of the Secretary-General who reports to the Security Council and the General Assembly on the forces requirements and operations. In this manner, peacekeeping missions have been under the control of the Secretary-General. Force personnel are usually made up of states other than those of the permanent members of the Council. It is the responsibility of the Secretary to request troops from members states. This was the case when the United Nations became involved in Cyprus.

The island of Cyprus is strategically located in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea. It lies 40 miles south of Turkey and 500 miles southeast of Greece. Due to its close proximity to



EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

the Levant, it has been conquered by powerful nations since the time of the Pharaohs. The sequence of conquerors include the Phoenicians, Egyptians, English, Venetians, Turks and again the English. Polyvios Poliviou provides a typical assessment of the importance of the island when he quoted the German archaeologist Hirschfeld who stated, "he who would become and remain a great power in the east must hold Cyprus in his hands."(1)

It is the third largest of the Mediterranean Islands. In 1974 its population of approximately 600,000 was 80% Greek, 18% Turkish and the remainder of mixed ancestry.(2) The population statistics have shifted somewhat. It presently stands at 75% Greek and 23% Turkish due to the influx of Turks after the island was effectively split in two in 1974.

Although Cyprus was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in 1571, the majority of the population remained Greek in origin and was still so when the island was handed to the British, by treaty with the Ottoman Empire, in 1878. After Turkey supported the Central Powers in 1914, Britain annexed the island and the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, gave Britain sole possession of the island while Turkey relinquished any claims. During World War II, the Cypriots supported the British, for Britain was allied with Greece. Although a colony, the Greek Cypriots after the war

---

(1) Polyvios G. Polyviou, Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation 1960-1980 ( New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc. 1980 ) p.1.

(2) Ibid.

began to call for self-government and union with Greece ( enosis ). Britain began to consider gradual self-government for Cyprus. This however, was not satisfactory to the Greek-Cypriots, and by 1950, open rebellion surfaced. The leader of the struggle for enosis was Archbishop Makarios, the head of the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus. The enosis movement was perceived as a threat to the Turkish-Cypriot minority who looked towards Turkey for support and to the British administrators for sympathy.

The Greek reaction to the idea of enosis with the Greek-Cypriots was not initially positive. Richard A. Patrick points out in Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict:

Despite formal Greek-Cypriot demands for union with Greece since the British occupation of 1878, Greece itself had never made a diplomatic request that enosis be fulfilled.(1)

Patrick goes on to write, that even when in 1951, a petition was presented to Greece which demonstrated that 97% of the Greek-Cypriots wanted enosis, Greece did not respond. This was due to a possible negative reaction of her NATO partner, Turkey. Although enosis was part of the Greek foreign policy by 1954, its inclusion was due more to internal appeal than to pressure from Cyprus.

The other interested party in Cyprus was Turkey. There was a two-fold reason for this interest. First, the need, or more

---

(1) Richard A. Patrick, Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict 1963-1971 ( Waterloo: University of Waterloo, 1976 ) p.6.

correctly, the wish to defend Turkish-Cypriot interests. As a minority, the Turk-Cypriots regarded Turkey as their ancestral homeland. They entertained ideas of partitioning Cyprus and coming under Turkish authority in response to the Greek demand for enosis. Second, and more importantly Cyprus was only 40 miles from Turkey's southern shores and was concerned over the island's strategic location. If enosis was achieved, then there was the possibility of an anti-Turkish regime using it as a base to launch an attack against their traditional foe. Also, if the Greek government was to shift to the political left, they might allow the Soviets access to port facilities, thus exposing Turkey to the threat of a Soviet attack.

Another factor involved in this equation was Britain, which continued to station troops on Cyprus, at Dhekelia (army) and Akrotiri (airforce). After Britain had been forced out of Egypt by Colonel G. Nasser in 1954 and after the creation of CENTO with the signing of the Baghdad Act in 1955, Cyprus provided Britain with vital base of operations. Also, after the Suez crisis of 1956, the bases in Cyprus enabled Britain to protect its own interests in ensuring an oil supply from the Middle East. Although Britain did not wish to weaken NATO's southern flank by taking sides on the Cyprus issue, it did lean towards Turkey's view of the danger of enosis. Also, as Turkey was deemed the strongest of the two NATO allies in the area that bordered the Soviet Union, Britain was more sympathetic towards Ankara. This attitude was aptly spelled out in a statement given by Anthony

Eden in 1955:

...It is equally unrealistic to lecture Turkey as to the view she ought to take about an island no farther from her coast than is the Isle of Man from us...Our duty if called on...is to safeguard the strategic needs of our country and of our ally (Turkey)...(1)

The Greeks and Greek-Cypriots viewed the British attitude as one of a self-centred policy. It was becoming evident to them that Britain was prepared to put aside its traditional friendship with the Greeks to secure its own interests. Michael Attalides, in Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics, gives further evidence of this view, when he quotes Eden:

...Her Majesty's Government must be concerned...to protect the vital interests of its own citizens. The welfare and indeed the lives of our people depends on Cyprus as a protective guard and staging post to take care of those interests, above all, oil.(2)

As has been pointed out, there were three parties interested in the future development of Cyprus and due to divergent viewpoints as how to resolve this problem, internal strife began emerging in 1955.

It is not the intent here to delve into specific details of the internal conflict of Cyprus which began at this time, for R.R. Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle, Dr. P.N. Vanis, Cyprus: The Unfinished Agony, Stanley Mayes, Makarios: A Biography and Thomas

---

(1) Michael A. Attalides, Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics ( New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979 )p.6.

(2) Attalides, Cyprus: Nationalism. p.6.

Ehrlich, Cyprus 1958-1967, give detailed attention to this topic. However, in order to understand the events which led to the independence or semi-independence of Cyprus, which then led to United Nations involvement, it is necessary to describe the problems which surfaced at this time.

By 1955 enosis or union with Greece had become the rallying point for the Greek-Cypriots. The Turkish-Cypriots however, refused to consider this. If enosis was ever to be carried out, they as a distinct community, wanted partition or Tekism (union) with Turkey.(1) In view of this, and the belief of the Greek-Cypriots that Britain sided with the Turkish-Cypriots, it now appeared that violence was inevitable. From 1955 until independence in 1960, the EOKA-B, a Greek anti-British terrorist organization, headed by General George Grivas ( a Greek officer and National Guard Commander), harassed the British Cypriot administration through acts of violence. Archbishop Makarios, the Entarch of the Greek-Cypriot Orthodox Church, and the Greek government supported this tactic. This terrorist action was intended to force the British to seek a quick solution. Stanley Mayes, in Makarios: A Biography, quotes Makarios on his determination, " The rulers realise we have entered upon a serious stage of the struggle."(2) With this show of force it was thought that the British would become demoralized and find a

---

(1) Attalides, Cyprus: Nationalism. p.84.

(2) Stanley Mayes, Makarios: A Biography, ( New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981 )p.63.



quick solution. What resulted however, was that Grivas was forced to leave Cyprus in 1960 and Makarios was exiled to the Seychelles, until independence was secured. Coincident with this, due to British support, The Turkish-Cypriots themselves became targets of the anti-British groups. To counter this, the Turkish-Cypriots began to organize themselves into anti-EOKA-B groups and began to retaliate against the EOKA-B.

During this internal struggle, the Greek government publicly defended Grivas's actions and openly supported Makarios's call for enosis. It was at this time that Turkey became actively involved with the Cyprus issue and began to send arms to the Turkish enclaves. In September of 1955 there were anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir, due to a bomb explosion at the Turkish consulate in Salomika. This was viewed in Ankara as the opportune time to display Turkish support for the Turkish-Cypriot community in Cyprus. In Istanbul, violent demonstrations were held where thousands of people paraded in the streets, chanting "Cyprus is Turkish."(1)

The uneasy alliance between Greece and Turkey as NATO allies was beginning to break down. The Greeks meanwhile saw this as further proof of Britain's sanctioning of the Turkish response. To counter this, the Greeks began to escalate their activity for gaining self- government for Cyprus and eventual union with Greece. By 1959, Cyprus had become an international issue, as Greece was successful in getting the Cyprus problem on the agenda

---

(1) Mayes, Makarios. p.71.

of the United Nations for debate and resolution. In order to forestall a United Nations debate, Britain agreed to negotiations. After many meetings between the British, Greeks and Turks, an agreement was reached on the question of Cypriot self-government. This was achieved by the signing of the Zurich and London Agreements by the three parties involved and the acceptance of them by the Cypriot representatives.

The constitution of 1960, which gave Cyprus its independence, is an elaborate and complicated document which, in the end, could not prevent communal strife between the two Cypriot communities. The three agreements signed by Greece, Turkey and Great Britain, in theory, gave the Cypriots the independence they sought. But it also ensured that both the Greek and Turkish governments would have an indirect voice in the administration of Cyprus. The system of government would be republican in nature, with a President and Vice-President. The President was to be the head, and elected by the Greek community. The Vice-President was to be elected by the Turkish community. The Constitution stated that the Vice-President could not act as President when the President was out of the country or was unable to perform his responsibilities.(1) This function would pass to the President of the House of Representatives. This restated the principle that no Greek could represent a Turk or vice-versa as the leader in the House of Representatives was always a Greek-Cypriot. Further provisions called on a ten member Council of Ministers to assist

---

(1) Poliviou, Cyprus: Conflict. p.18.

them. The ratio of these ministers was to be 7:3 (Greeks-Turks) and the President and Vice-President were to appoint members from their own community.(1) The President and Vice-president each had a partial veto power over the other's actions.

The veto power specifically states in Articles 48, 49 and 57, that the President or Vice-President can veto any decision of the Council of Ministers when it pertains to, "Foreign Affairs, Defence or Security."(2) Also, Articles 50 and 51 state that veto power can be used against laws which affect those items above passed by the House of Representatives. As to the election of the House of Representatives, the same 7:3 ratio applied to the Greek and Turkish communities respectively. This ratio was also established for the civil service and the security forces. However, in the armed forces, the ratio was set at 6:4, and each commander had a deputy that was from the other community. Appointments for command were made by the President and Vice-President respectively.(3) This reinforced the loyalty of the armed forces along communal lines rather than to the Republic.

At the same time, Communal Chambers were established whereby religious, educational and cultural affairs were handled on a communal basis rather than a national one. No common grievance

---

(1) Thomas Ehrlich, Cyprus: 1958-1967 (London, Oxford University Press, 1974)p.37.

(2) Dr. P.N. Vanejis, Cyprus: The Unfinished Agony ( London: Abelard- Schuman Ltd; 1977 )p.11.

(3) Vanejis, Cyprus. p.13.

affecting the above was to be jointly handled. The most potentially explosive article was 173, that provided for the establishment of separate Turkish municipalities in towns like Nicosia, Larnaca, Paphos and Limassol.(1)

The above is a description of the London and Zurich Agreements which Britain, Turkey, Greece and Cyprus signed in 1960. The Zurich Agreement outlined the constitution of Cyprus and the London Agreements produced two treaties which all parties recognized. The first was the Treaty of Guarantee which stated that Greece, Turkey and Great Britain would guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Cyprus and that the three parties had a right to intervene in Cyprus if the constitutional arrangements were ever abrogated. The second, was the Treaty of Alliance which allowed the stationing of foreign troops on Cyprus. The Greeks were allowed to keep 950 troops on Cyprus and the Turks were allowed 650 troops. The British were formally given Sovereign Base Areas and they were designated British territory.(2)

Charles Foley and W.I. Scobie in The Struggle for Cyprus, argue that Archbishop Makarios had no alternative but to sign the Zurich and London Agreements. They write:

The archbishop felt certain that to reject the agreements would be to bring partition upon the island, in one form or another. The British

---

(1) Polyviou, Cyprus: Conflict, p.34.

(2) Charles Foley and W.I. Scobie, The Struggle for Cyprus (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975) pp.155-156.

ministers had given him until mid-morning of the following day...he [Makarios] telephoned his submission to the Foreign Office in London...(1)

The acceptance of the constitutional accord and the London Agreements can in some measure be said to have been made under a form of duress.(2) However, Makarios understood the agreements and the provisions they carried and he agreed to their terms. Mayes in Makarios: A biography, points out that there was hesitation on the part of Archbishop Makarios in accepting the terms of the Agreements. The reason for this hesitation was that Makarios wanted to negotiate with the British as to the size of the of the Sovereign Base Areas, and he was successful in reducing the area given them.(3)

Once all had been signed, the Zurich Agreement became the Cypriot Constitution of August 16, 1960. What was thought of as independence by the Greek-Cypriots became in reality a dependence on the goodwill of the three major signatories. The Zurich Agreement established the constitution of Cyprus, while the Treaty of Guarantee legalized future intervention by one of the parties in consultation with the others if the constitutional framework were ever to be set aside. The Treaty of Alliance empowered Greece, Turkey and Great Britain to retain troops on Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish troops were stationed on the island

---

(1) Foley, Struggle. p.157.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Stanley Mayes, Makarios, p.130.

to maintain a continuity of dual-communities while the British were there to protect their interests in the area.

The Zurich Agreement and the London Agreements effectively institutionalized community differences. The internal strife which continued during 1960-1963 made the Cyprus problem an international one.

## Chapter II The United Nations and Cyprus 1964-1974

Dimitri S. Bitsios, in Cyprus the Vulnerable Republic, states that the first clash between the communities after independence was over the issue of unity versus segregation in matters pertaining to municipal authority. Archbishop Makarios, he argues, wanted to unify public services such as water and electricity.(1) However, he states that any conciliatory approaches on this issue was rejected by Rauf Denktash, who was the Chairman of the Turkish Communal Chamber who he quotes as stating:

I shall be satisfied only when everything will be divided at the percentage provided for our participation in the administration. And I mean commerce, industry, everything.(2)

The Turkish-Cypriots did not wish to be dominated by the Greek-Cypriots ever if it meant a duplication of services. Rauf Denktash was a strong willed Turkish-Cypriot who wanted to ensure that his community would not be abused . Denktash accused Makarios of opposing a bi-national state. He insists, in The Cyprus Triangle, that Makarios was not interested in sharing power but was determined to bring about enosis with Greece. He writes of Makarios: "... on 5 September 1963 Makarios had said to a correspondent of Uusi Suomi of Stockholm: " It is true that the

---

(1) Dimitri S. Bitsios, Cyprus The Vulnerable Republic (Thessaloniki: Institute For Balkan Studies, 1975) p.117.

(2) Bitsios, Vulnerable Republic. p.118

goal of our struggle is to annex Cyprus to Greece. "(1)

In November of the same year, Makarios, believing that the constitutional set-up was ineffectual, offered thirteen proposed amendments to the Turkish-Cypriot Leadership.(2) The amendments covered a range of topics but the most controversial was the annulment of the veto power of the President and vice-President. It is not certain whether he knew beforehand what the reaction would be but both Ankara and the Turkish-Cypriot Leadership rejected the proposed amendments. What is certain is that his constant referrals to enosis pitted the two communities against each other. The antagonistic feelings unleashed themselves on 21 December 1963, when armed Greek-Cypriots attacked Turkish-Cypriot towns, villages and property resulting in much damage and casualties. It was at this point that Makarios openly stated that, "the Cyprus agreements were no longer valid."(3)

Turkey, as a signatory of the Treaties, requested Greece and Great Britain to assist in putting an end to the violence in Cyprus. Greece refused and Britain stated that it would not get involved in any internal conflicts. In response, Turkey sent planes to overfly Nicosia as a show of force. Archbishop Makarios sensing that Greece would not assist, agreed to halt the violence

---

(1) R.R. Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle (London: K. Rustem and Bro. and George Allen and Unwin, 1982) p.26.

(2) P. Polyviou, Cyprus: Conflict, pp.25-34.

(3) R.R. Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle. p.27.



and stated he would attend a conference of all parties involved to seek a settlement. The conference was held in London on 15 January 1964, but it failed to achieve any positive results and attacks on the Turkish-Cypriots resumed. At this juncture, Makarios accused the Turkish government of interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state but did not see any problem with receiving assistance from Greece. He was playing politics with a double-edged sword which would in the end engulf his country in civil strife and eventual invasion. In mid-February, Britain brought the Cyprus issue before the Security Council for resolution.

On 4 March 1964, the United Nations adopted resolution S/5575 which called for the creation of a peacekeeping force for Cyprus with the consent of the Government of Cyprus. An exchange of formal letters of agreement was made and resolution S/5634 was passed setting up the operational force.(1) The mandate of the force was written out clearly in document S/5575 which stated the objectives of the force:

- a. To prevent a recurrence of fighting;
- b. To contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order;
- c. To contribute to a return to normal conditions.(2)

Along with the objectives there was a programme of action for the

---

(1) United Nations Security Council Document S/5634 dated 4 March 1964.

(2) Ibid. Para 1.

United Nations force which established how the mandate would operate and this plan included:

1. Achievement of freedom of movement on all roads
2. Achievement of freedom of movement for all communities within the whole town of Nicosia and other cities; under conditions of security;
3. The progressive disarming of all civilians other than the regular police gendarmerie and the Cyprus army ...
4. The control of extremists on both sides.(1)

The freedom of movement provisions would play a major role during the next ten years and at the time of the Turkish invasion.

On 27 March 1964 the force became operational. Lieutenant-General P.S. Gyani of India was appointed Force Commander with Major-General R.M.P. Carver of Britain as his deputy. The force headquarters was established near the Nicosia airport. In his first order, Lt. Gen. Gyani stated to his officers and men:

We shall function as an integrated force under an integrated headquarters. Our aims and objectives will be...to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance of law and order.(2)

What General Gyani attempted to establish was an integrated force under one command. Previous forces, although theoretically under UN authority, were made up of individual contingents and would contact their respective home governments if orders issued by the

---

(1) United Nations Monthly Chronicle (New York: United Nations Office of Public Information, Vol.I number 1, May 1964) p.8.

(2) United Nations Monthly Chronicle, May 1964. pp.8-9.

UN were contrary to government policy. In practice on Cyprus, only Canada and Great Britain would carry out the orders issued without contacting their governments for approval.(1)

When the force was commissioned, the first troops to arrive were the contingents from Canada and Great Britain. They were on the ground and patrolling by the end of 27 March. The government of Canada had been requested by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to provide men and materiel for this endeavor. As Canada had been and was involved in United Nations operations, the government of Canada assented to this request. On 28 March, the advance parties from Sweden and Finland had arrived on Cyprus, while contingents from Ireland and Austria were en route. The following is a breakdown of contingent strength as of 31 March 1964:

#### MILITARY

Austria	10
Canada	1087
Finland	1000
Ireland	636
Sweden	889
United Kingdom	2719
Total	6341

#### POLICE

---

(1) Anthony Verrier, International Peacekeeping (Harmondsworth England; Butler and Tanner Limited, 1981) p.84.

## United Nations Force in Cyprus Total 6369(1)

Canadian involvement in this United Nations operation began in January of 1964, after Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson stated to the House of Commons, that Canadian troops would assist in a United Nations sponsored solution. This assistance however, would be conditional on two points. First, that the Force would be under United Nations Command, and second, that a political solution would be forthcoming so that the United Nations troops would not be in Cyprus indefinitely.(2) Once assurances had been received from the Secretary-General of the United Nations that a functioning Force mandate would be developed, and that proper financial support was available, Canada agreed to participate. The Royal 22nd Regiment was the first Canadian unit to come under the United Nations Force in Cyprus command (henceforth UNFICYP).

By 29 April, the Force had been deployed and was somewhat successful. The Canadian Contingent was given as its area of responsibility, what became designated as the Nicosia District. Other contingents were deployed as follows:

Nicosia Zone.

UNFICYP Headquarters (international)

Nicosia Zone (Basic organization Canadian, with

---

(1) United Nations Monthly Chronicle, May 1964. p.9.

(2) Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, House of Commons, February 19, 1964. External Affairs, XVI (March 1964)p.127.

representative staff drawn from contingents  
under command)

Austrian Field Hospital and Austrian Civil Police

Canadian Contingent;

Danish Contingent and Danish Civilian Police

Finnish Contingent

Famagusta Zone

Swedish Contingent

Swedish Civilian Police

Limassol District

United Kingdom Contingent

New Zealand Civilian Police

Paphos District

3rd Infantry Group Irish Contingent

Australian Civilian Police (one section)

Morphou District

41st Infantry Group Irish Contingent

Australian Civilian Police (one section)(1)

The Canadian Contingent, due to the prior United Nations experience of some of its members, was well organized and well disciplined. What became quickly evident was, however, that United Nations authority was being challenged by the Cypriot

---

(1) Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) pp.167-168.

insurgents. With this in mind, the safety of the Canadian soldier was of concern. This was partially due to the fact that past United Nations participation had always been in a support function. Now, for the first time, actual combat troops were in the field, and the positioning of these troops between conflicting parties could result in casualties. During the first months of operation, Canadian troops were indiscriminately fired upon by both sides and, as a result, they returned fire in self-defence. This quick action and tactical use of force earned them a reputation of steadfastness and restraint. It also identified them as professionals whose impartiality in settling disputes was said to be acknowledged by both sides.(1)

At the same time, UNFICYP as a whole, had begun to establish a good working relationship with local authorities. This was the result of UNFICYP assistance to local farmers in the harvesting of their crops under United Nations protection. This assistance was enabling the Force to execute one of its primary functions which was to return the island to normal conditions. However, by mid-1964, the Force's first priority was still not accomplished. Lieutenant- General Gyani stated in his report to the United Nations, that one of the greatest difficulties facing UNFICYP was:

...the irresponsible and senseless conduct of armed men of both communities who did not appear to be responsible to any established authority but who had been acting on their own reckless initiative, regardless

---

(1) The Toronto Globe and Mail, April, 1964.

of the unfortunate and serious consequences of their acts.(1)

General Gyani also stated that in order to bring about a sense of security to the civilian population, the above individuals must be disarmed. He appealed to the leaders of both communities to inspire anti-terrorist allegiances in order to make their actions less heroic. On 20 April, the United Nations Force suffered its first fatal casualty. A Finnish soldier was killed by Turk Cypriot Fighters who thought that a Turkish village was under attack and had fired on the United Nations soldier.(2)

Due to the unsettled military and diplomatic situation in Cyprus, the Force's mandate was extended for a further period of three months.(3) At the same time, Lieutenant-General Gyani informed the Secretary-General that he would not continue in his capacity as Commander UNFICYP beyond the original mandate due to personal reasons. General Kodenera Thimaya of India was nominated to replace Lieutenant-General Gyani.

One of the major problems facing the Canadian Contingent and UNFICYP, was the control of arms smuggling to both communities. The government of Cyprus insisted that the import of arms was necessary for its defence, should Turkey decide to invade the island. The Turkish-Cypriots responded by stating that arms from

---

(1) United Nations Monthly Chronicle. (New York: United Nations Office of Public Information, Vol.I Number 2, June 1964) p.19.

(2) Ibid.

(3) United Nations Security Council Document S/5575 (1964)

Turkey or sympathizers, were necessary for self-protection against attacks by the Greek-Cypriots. This problem would haunt UNFICYP for decades to come.

By August, inter-communal violence had flared up again and the Security-Council met in emergency session at the request of Turkey and Cyprus. On 9 August the Security-Council adopted a resolution co-sponsored by Great Britain and the United States calling for a cease-fire. This resolution was the fourth cease-fire order since the Force had arrived on Cyprus and it was accepted by Turkey and Cyprus. The resolution in part stated:

#### The Security Council

concerned at the serious deterioration of the situation in Cyprus...

1. Reaffirms the appeal to the President of the Council to the Governments of Turkey and Cyprus...makes an urgent appeal to the Government of Turkey...and to the Government of Cyprus to order the armed forces under its control to cease firing immediately...(1)

Even though the cease-fire was accepted by the parties concerned and a resumption of patrolling was undertaken by the United Nations Force, the freedom of movement provision of the mandate was called into question. The Cypriot government, although a signatory of the United Nations resolution creating the United Nations Force, began refusing UNFICYP access to certain areas, particularly into Turkish enclaves. This action was protested by the United Nations personnel and Headquarters

---

(1) United Nations Security Council Document S/5868 (1964).



UNFICYP. The Secretary-General delivered an address to the Security Council in regard to this matter, and, in November of 1964, it was reaffirmed that freedom of movement was essential if the Force was to be effective in carrying out its mandate. The Cypriot government acquiesced in this matter and United Nations personnel were allowed freedom of movement.

Meanwhile, UNFICYP was now beginning to quietly enlarge its mandate. This additional responsibility came under the heading of humanitarian assistance. This was not a deliberate action to overstep its mandate, but one which developed under abnormal operating conditions. United Nations troops through necessity began to escort, and in some instances deliver, medical supplies and foodstuffs to Turkish enclaves.(1) This was a result of Greek-Cypriot soldiers not allowing freedom of movement of civilian populations out of, or into, the enclaves. This topic will be dealt with more fully in the next chapter, but it is essential to note that this humanitarian assistance programme was a gradual process.

One factor was becoming clear fairly quickly to the Secretary-General and to the Force Commander. The United Nations Force on Cyprus was in a very precarious position, one which no other United Nations Force had encountered. The Force was now involved in an undeclared civil war and it found itself in the middle of the two feuding factions. The main thrust would now be to

---

(1) Interview with Brigadier-General C. Beattie, by author, 8 September 1988, Ottawa.

demonstrate fairness and impartiality if it was to be effective. In view of this, the new United Nations Secretary-General, U Thant, wished to expand the mandate of the Force. It was recommended that the United Nations Force be utilized to separate the two combatants who were in close contact with each other in order to allow the two communities to have the opportunity to discuss possible solutions to their common problems. This recommendation was not supported by the U.S.S.R. The Soviets stated that the mandate, as agreed to on 4 March 1964, was the only legitimate reason as to the operational function of the Force. Thus, if the mandate was expanded it would not be within the guidelines of the original mandate. For the Soviets, the Force was established:

...to assist the Government of Cyprus in various measures taken by it as the government of a sovereign state which was fully responsible for the maintenance and restoration of law and order in the country.(1)

As well, the Soviets further claimed that the Force's function was, "to protect the Republic of Cyprus from any foreign threat."(2)

If the above was the case, then why was this provision not incorporated in the original mandate, if all members of the Security Council agreed with the Soviet viewpoint? Also, if the Force was to protect Cyprus from a foreign threat which

---

(1) United Nations Monthly Chronicle, October 1964, p.14

(2) Ibid.

presumably encompassed a possible invasion, why was the force utilized only to separate the two opposing communities? These issues would surface a decade later and it will be demonstrated that the mandate, as it existed, was incapable of protecting the sovereignty of Cyprus.

During 1965, the situation remained tense and uncertain and because of this, the mandate period was once again extended. The latter part of the year saw relative calm restored to the island and the size of of the Force was reduced. Also, the period of June to December saw a redeployment of United Nations troops. This was due to the withdrawal of the 4th Infantry Group, the 42nd Infantry Battalion (Irish) and the phasing out of Nicosia Zone Headquarters. The areas of responsibility were revised to include the Commands of the Kyrenia Zone as well as the Nicosia West and East Districts. The Canadian Contingent was reassigned to the Kyrenia Zone.(1)

On 10 December 1965, U Thant expressed his concern over the continuing conflict in Cyprus. He did state however, that the situation was relatively quiet as compared to December 1963. He also stated that UNFICYP was still required, but that a political solution was a necessity. The Council was also informed that the Force would be reduced by 740 officers and men in 1966.(2) At this time the mandate for the Force was extended for another

---

(1) Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping. p.169.

(2) Secretary-Generals Report to the United Nations Security-Council, 10 December 1965, Document S/7001.

three month period.(1)

The situation in Cyprus remained at a stalemate. This was due to two factors. First, Mr. Garlo Plaza, the United Nations mediator, delivered a report which was unfavourable to the Turkish side in the Cyprus issue. Second, because of the report it became prudent for him to resign, as an impasse in political negotiations existed. The Turks were adamant in their stance that Mr. Plaza had overstepped his mandate in negotiating a settlement and it was believed that they would not return to the negotiation talks if he continued to serve as mediator. At the same time, it was becoming apparent that the United Nations Force would be required for an indefinite period of time. Because of this, the problem of financial viability of the Force began to surface. It was becoming clear that the contributing contingent countries were bearing the brunt of the financial responsibility for the Force. By March 1966, only one million of the twelve million required for operational costs had been pledged.(2) This was a problem which had faced the United Nations operation since its inception.

By April 1966, due to a resumption of near normal conditions, the Force was reduced to a strength of 4500. This reduction was for two reasons. First, the Force had won the respect required from both sides. Thus it was effective. Second, the cost of

---

(1) United Nations Security Council Resolution S/Res/219 (1965)

(2) United Nations Monthly Chronicle, March 1966, pp.12-13.

maintaining the Force was becoming prohibitive and a reduction was required if the Force was to continue. This retrenchment left the Force undermanned and this could become dangerous if the situation was to deteriorate. In June 1966, the Force's mandate was extended for a six month period. This would now be the normal extension time frame for the Force. The extension was in response to reality setting in. In January of 1967, the mandate was extended as little was being achieved in regards to a political settlement.(1)

Between 1964 and 1968 the personnel of the Canadian Contingent was reduced to a total not exceeding 595, and UNFICYP was reduced to only 3533 men of all ranks. During the years 1967-1971, the Secretary-General continued to report to the Security Council on the requirement to extend the mandate in order to ensure that communal violence would be held in check. He also reported that, although no major political issues were being solved, the Force's presence made the discussions between the two communities less antagonistic.(2)

In December of 1971, U Thant was replaced as Secretary-General by Kurt Waldheim. The same year witnessed a redeployment of troops on the island. The Canadian Contingent was re-assigned to Nicosia. It took over Nicosia West District from the UN and

---

(1) United Nations Security Council Resolution S/Res/231 (1966).

(2) United Nations Security Council Resolutions S/Res/274 (1969) and S/Res/281 (1970)

most of Nicosia East District from the Finns.(1) This concentration of one contingent in the area made it more efficient and effective.

As mentioned earlier, the Canadian Contingents assigned to United Nations duties in Cyprus had gained the respect and admiration not only of the Cypriots, but of the other United Nations contingents as well. During the ten years of United Nations service on the island the following Canadian regiments had rotated to Cyprus:

The Royal 22nd Regiment  
1st Battalion, Canadian Guards  
Lord Strathcona Horse (Royal Canadians)  
The Royal Canadian Regiment  
The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada (1st and 2nd)  
3 Royal Canadian Horse Artillery  
Princess Patricia Canadian Light Infantry  
1 Commando Group  
The Canadian Airborne Regiment

Each contingent was on a six month rotation basis which ran from September to March and again to September. In May 1964, the Canadian Contingent stood at a strength of 482 all ranks. It was to remain so until July 1974, when the Turks invaded the island of Cyprus in response to the Greek officer led coup against the Makarios government. At that time the total UNFICYP compliment

---

(1) Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping. p.183.

stood at 2341 men.(1) This reduction left the Force unprepared to secure a cease-fire and unable to protect the two communities from factional violence.

The ten year period from March 1964 to July 1974 saw an uneasy peace with only sporadic fighting. The mandate of the Force and the work of the troops made it effective for its designated tasks. The result was that the United Nations troops had become a permanent fixture on the island. They were only capable of settling minor factional disputes, acting as escorts for humanitarian purposes, and upholding the status quo as stipulated in the 1964 mandate. No room to manoeuvre existed should the situation change dramatically. The routine had led to a political solution not being agreed to on the part of the Cypriots themselves and on the part of the United Nations Secretariat who did not insist on a political solution. The events between 15 July 1974 to mid-September 1974, would change the complexion of the Force permanently. As part of UNFICYP, the Canadian Contingent would play a leading role in this change; a change which would effectively alter the mandate of the Force itself.

---

(1) Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping. p.195.

### Chapter III The Greek Coup and the Turkish Invasion

The situation on Cyprus became extremely tense during the first part of July 1974. On 6 July, President Makarios publicly charged the ruling Military Junta in Greece of attempting to either overthrow his government or have him assassinated. In the Toronto Globe and Mail, Makarios was quoted as stating: "Athens bears great responsibility for what has been happening in Cyprus."(1) At the same time, he repeated his charges that the Greek officers in the National Guard were sympathetic towards the EOKA-B, the successors to General Grivas' enosis movement. Although he himself had stated that enosis was his goal, he had begun to remove himself from the faction which declared enosis or nothing. With the Greek officers being sympathetic towards the EOKA-B, Makarios demanded that Athens recall all Greek officers serving in the National Guard. This was due to his belief that the Greek officers were acting against him on instructions from the Athens government. To substantiate these allegations he stated that he was in possession of written evidence.(2) Makarios was in effect stating that he wanted Greece to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Cyprus.

During this period, the tensions between Greece and Turkey were escalating due to a territorial dispute over oil rights in

---

(1) Toronto Globe and Mail, 6 July 1974. p.12.

(2) The Times (London) July 8 1974. p.1.



the Aegean Sea. Greece had sent a message to Turkey stating that the islands in the Aegean were Greek and as such the offshore rights were in their domain. Turkey refused to accept this claim and dispatched an oil exploration vessel to contest the Greek claims. Turkey publicly announced that the area in question was under international law and therefore not under Greek sovereignty.(1) Meanwhile, on 14 July preparations were underway to topple the Makarios government by the National Guard. As UNFICYP was in Cyprus at the specific request of the government, it would become involved in the events. The Canadian troops, as the United Nations contingent in the Nicosia District, would be caught up in the coup and the resulting invasion by Turkey.

On 15 July 1974, there began an unsuccessful coup against the Makarios government by the National Guard. The first reports of the attempted coup began to arrive at the Joint Operations centre UNFICYP at 0830 hours. Automatic fire and explosions were reported at the Paphos Gate Police Station in Nicosia. This information was passed to UNFICYP Headquarters. It was also reported that tanks were assembling in the area of Camp 23, a National Guard Camp in the east of Nicosia, and that explosions were heard in the vicinity of the International Airport. As the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Canadian Contingent Commander, Colonel C. Beattie was away on holiday, Lieutenant Colonel D. Manuel, as Acting Commander, ordered the Observation Company to complete a reconnaissance of the city in order to clarify what in

---

(1) The Times, July 11 1974. p.1.

fact was taking place. The Acting Commander also called for a helicopter in order to do an aerial reconnaissance to get an overall view of the situation in his sector.(1)

After a quick aerial survey established that there was a heavy attack occurring at the Presidential Palace, plus the fact that loyal Makarios police and security personnel were being rounded up, it was determined that a coup was indeed taking place. This information, as well as the National Guard positions, was passed to Headquarters UNFICYP. Once UNFICYP had been apprised of the situation, these details were then relayed to Mr. Hassan, the United Nations Liaison Officer with the Vice-President's Office. It was also reported that all major roads had been blocked off by the National Guard and movement of traffic was being strictly controlled. The Canadian Contingent's stationary observation posts (OP) in the city, were fired upon indiscriminately. By mid-morning, Observation Company, the Company headquarters in charge of OP's, reported to the Joint Operations Centre that they were withdrawing OP Paphos Gate due to extreme danger and heavy fighting.(2) At the same time, OP Maple Leaf Manor, in southern Nicosia, was under threat of fire. (see map #3)

Headquarters UNFICYP, although mandated to keep the violence between the two communities at a minimum, was now faced with a situation it was not prepared to handle. The Canadian Contingent,

---

(1) Headquarters Nicosia District, Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 15 July 1974.

(2) Ibid.

the UN force in the capital city, was caught in the middle of a coup with no clear direction as to how it should respond. Meanwhile, Colonel Beattie, who was in the Kyrenia district, north of Nicosia, secured a direct line to the Finnish command post in Chiklos. He then requested a vehicle equipped with communications in order to return to Kyrenia, allowing him to keep abreast of the developing situation. At the same time, he ordered a helicopter be sent in order to return him to the capital city. The rendezvous point was to be just east of Kyrenia Castle. When the helicopter arrived, it was fired on by Greek National Guardsmen and it failed to land. Colonel Beattie returned to Chiklos by Landrover.(1) At Chiklos, a helicopter was able to land and Colonel Beattie returned to the capital where he was briefed on the situation.

During the early morning hours the United Nations Observation Posts reported that large numbers of vehicles were moving in the direction of the Presidential Palace. It was also confirmed that a roadblock was in place at the traffic circle on the road leading to Blue Beret Camp and UNFICYP Headquarters. The Joint Operations Centre then ordered the Green Line to be patrolled and for Observation Post Roccas Bastion to be manned by three personnel who were to report the activities in their areas.(2)

It was at approximately 1030 hours that the Joint Operations

---

(1) Interview with Brigadier-General C. Beattie by author, September 8, 1988, Ottawa.

(2) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 15 July 1974.

Centre received a call from Mr. Hassan, the Liaison Officer at the Vice-President's Office, stating that it was believed that Archbishop Makarios was dead. This report proved to be false.(1) According to Colonel Beattie who received his information from Mr. George Palagious, an aide to the Archbishop, the coup itself was unsuccessful as the Greek officers did not have Makarios.(2) A Greek National Guard Commander had gone to the palace to place Makarios under arrest. Makarios informed the officer that he was entertaining guests, but would dismiss them and return momentarily and place himself in custody. He then slipped out of the back entrance to the palace and crossed the Pedhieos River where he flagged down a vehicle. He reached Paphos, where the Bishop of Paphos gave him sanctuary. The National Guard discovered this and sent gun boats to the town to capture him. At this time, he decided to seek the protection of the United Nations. He presented himself to the British Commander in Paphos District, and as he was an elected Head of State of a Commonwealth country, he was not turned away. The British Commander then contacted the United Nations Force Commander stating that he had a gentleman who described himself as the President of Cyprus seeking asylum. As Makarios had shaved his beard off and was not in his customary clothing, there was some question as to his identity. General Prem Chand, the United

---

(1) The Times, July 16 1974. p.1.

(2) Beattie op cit.

Nations Force Commander, flew to Paphos by helicopter on 16 July and confirmed Makarios' identity. Makarios was then given asylum and taken to the British Sovereign Base of Akrotiri, where he was flown to Malta and then on to London.(1)

The escape of Makarios was substantiated when Headquarters UNFICYP received a report that the Bishop of Paphos had a message from Makarios. This message asked him to forward the following to New York for the Cyprus Representative in the United Nations, Mr. Zenon Rossides:

Request by the President of the Cyprus Republic to call forthwith the Security Council of the United Nations to condemn the Military Government of Greece for the scandalous military intervention against the lawful government of the Republic of Cyprus which took place this morning and to ask the United Nation to take immediate measures to stop (this) intervention.(2)

The Turkish-Cypriot response at this point was to man positions in the Nicosia enclave at the Kyrenia Gate and declare that the Turkish-Cypriot fighters would remain in an alert status. The Turkish-Cypriot fighters informed a Canadian mobile patrol that they did not wish to become involved, as they saw this coup as, "solely a Greek-Cypriot intra-communal Affair."(3) This message was passed on to the Joint Operations Centre.

- 
- (1) Interview with Brigadier-General Beattie, by author, 8 September 1988, Ottawa; and Dr. P.N. Vanezis, Cyprus: The Unfinished Agony (London: Abelard-Schuman Limited, 1977)p.60.
- (2) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent UNFICYP, 15 July 1974.
- (3) Ibid.

By mid-afternoon, patrolling along the "Green Line" which separated the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus resumed. The United Nations patrols reported that their freedom of movement had not been interfered with. By early evening there were reports of sporadic fire in the capital and mortar fire which had inadvertently hit the Vice-President's office. The Vice-President's Office requested the Canadian Contingent to get the National Guard to cease firing on this position. As the Joint Operations Centre was unable to contact the National Guard Commander to halt this action, the Turkish-Cypriot fighters began preparations for action. On the evening of 15 July, the Canadian Contingent patrols were denied access through the Golf Course area to reach their OP by the Turks. They were forced to use the southern road to reach their destination. Not only were the United Nations patrols being fired on, but now the Turkish-Cypriot fighters were harassing the United Nations patrols.(1)

On July 16, Nikos Sampson declared himself the President of Cyprus with the backing of the National Guard and the consent of the Greek Military Junta. Sampson was a former member of the EOKA-B and had been sentenced to death by the British for murdering British troops. He was released in 1960 as part of the British agreements with the Cypriot authorities. Sampson stated that the reason for the overthrow of the Makarios government was:

---

(1) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 15 July 1974.

...the result of Cyprus diverting from the natural course of harmony of spirited peace and unity between the people and the army.(1)

It was also stated that the coup was internally orchestrated with no external assistance. In response, Turkey placed its troops on alert and stated that any attempt to annex the island would not be tolerated. The government of Turkey, led by President F. Koruturk, met in emergency session to discuss the Cyprus situation. They determined that Turkey had the legal right to intervene in Cyprus as a guarantor of the Zurich and London Agreements. As to when it would intervene it was assumed that it was only a matter of time.(2)

During 17 July, the Canadian Contingent reported that sporadic fire was still continuing and that the Turkish-Cypriot fighters were strengthening their positions as were the National Guard. At this time, many security personnel were being threatened by the National Guard because of their loyalty to Archbishop Makarios. One such incident was reported by Observation Company. The National Guard was positioned to attack the Ormophita Police Station but it was abandoned when a Canadian United Nations officer intervened. This unnamed officer informed the National Guard Commander that he had been assured that the police chief had indicated that he and his men were in support of the new regime. In further discussions, the National Guard Commander

---

(1) The Times, July 16 1974. p.1.

(2) The New York Times, July 16 1974. p.1.

agreed not to attack the station.(1) The reason for this intervention was not to take sides in the events, but rather to stop further bloodshed in the capital.

The Turkish government put its forces on alert. The Government of Greece responded in kind. The Turkish navy sent two warships out to sea and units of the Turkish Second Army had moved from inland bases to Iskenderun and Mersin situated on the Turkish coast, fifty miles from Cyprus. It was also reported that the Turkish 29th Armoured Division had joined up with units of the Second Army.(2)

On 17 and 18 July, both Turkey and the Soviet Union accused the Greek government of engineering the coup in Cyprus. The Greek government denied this action and blamed it solely on Makarios.(3) NATO meanwhile, had called on Greece to withdraw its officers from Cyprus to reduce the tension. The main focus of this appeal was, "that Greece and Turkey, the twin pillars of the Alliance's southern flank should not fight each other."(4) In essence, the situation as it now stood, could potentially lead to a split in the alliance, thereby weakening the southern flank.

As the tension in Cyprus escalated, the mood in Turkey

---

(1) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 16 July 1974.

(2) The Times, July 17 1974. p.1.

(3) The Times, July 18 1974. p.1.

(4) Ibid.p.7.



intensified. The resulting war fever was best described in the Turkish newspaper Gunaydin. Its' headline read as follows: "We are making an invasion of Cyprus."(1) At the same time, the Turkish newspaper reported that the Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr.B. Ecevit, after meeting with his military commanders had flown to Britain for urgent consultations.(2) Mr. Ecevit met with Mr.H. Wilson, the British Prime Minister, in London to ascertain how the situation in Cyprus could best be resolved. After the meeting, Mr. Ecevit was quoted as saying:

Whether we decide to return to the status established by the London and Zurich Agreements, or we establish a new status, we must know where we stand. We intend to test all possible peaceful solutions.(3)

On 19 July, Greece acquiesced to NATO pressure and agreed to replace its officers in the Cypriot National Guard. Although Greece was prepared to replace these officers, it emphatically denied any complicity in the coup of 15 July. Mr. Chorafas, the Greek Ambassador to NATO declared:

...that Greece rejects with indignation the allegations according to which they might have had the slightest responsibility for the recent events in Cyprus. They also considered as without foundation the accusations which have been levied against the Greek officers at present put at the disposal of the Cypriot Government...Nevertheless, they wish to give entire satisfaction to the request made by most members of the Council and thus to provide an additional proof of their good faith as well as their

---

(1) The Times, July 18 1974, p.1.

(2) Ibid.p.1.

(3) Ibid.

peaceful intentions to all. They have taken the decision of replacing the above mentioned officers and hope that this gesture will be appreciated at its proper value."(1)

On July 19th, Headquarters UNFICYP informed the Canadian Contingent that the airport was again open to traffic and that a roadblock which had been established at the entrance to Blue Beret Camp had been removed. However, the situation was not returning to normal as Observation Company reported to the Joint Operations Centre that during the day the Turkish-Cypriot fighters had heavily fortified their positions and had called out reserves. A report of a warship off the Cyprus coast was also alarming.(2)

As Turkey was mobilizing its forces, the new President of Cyprus, Nikos Sampson, held a news conference to assure the Turks and the Turkish-Cypriots that no action against the Turkish-Cypriot community was being contemplated. He also stated that he was puzzled as to why the Turks were threatening to invade the island as the constitution, as set up in 1960, was still valid. On the other hand, the Turkish-Cypriot community, led by Rauf Denktash, was apprehensive and he stated that, "only a return to the status quo could prevent war."(3) Meanwhile, in the Turkish held regions of the island, preparations for military defences were undertaken, led by Turkish officers who were

---

(1) The Times, July 19 1974. p.1.

(2) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 19 July 1974.

(3) The Times, July 19 1974. p.1.

stationed on Cyprus as part of the London Agreements.

During this week (15-20 July) the Canadian Contingent was beginning to write for itself a fourth provision of the original mandate. This was in the area of humanitarian assistance. According to Colonel Beattie, Canadian Contingent had been approached by members of the government of both communities for assistance. This assistance was in the nature of rescuing civilians from possible death as the National Guard was strengthening its positions and would tolerate no interference from any quarter. Also, the Canadian Contingent was requested and, at times, took it upon itself to convoy civilians to safety and deliver medical supplies and foodstuffs to outlying villages of both communities.(1)

As the 20 July approached, the situation in Cyprus was still tense and confused. The threat of invasion by Turkey was real and the Greek reaction to such an invasion was unknown. Colonel Beattie described the feeling at Headquarters UNFICYP, "it wasn't a question of whether the Turks would come, it was a question of when."(2)

At 0330 hours, 20 July 1974, Brigadier-General F. Henn, Chief of Staff, told the Canadian Contingent Commander, Colonel Beattie, "that he had information that visitors were coming from

---

(1) Beattie, op cit.

(2) Ibid.

the north."(1) He also stated that he wanted the Canadian Contingent to be ready for action. Headquarters UNFICYP issued the order that Operation Tulip was in effect.(2) Operation Tulip was the code word for United Nations action in case of invasion by Turkey. By 0400 hours, all United Nations Observation Posts were ordered to be double manned and were instructed to report all activity in their area of responsibility. At the same time, Canadian Liaison Officers were appointed to be in contact with the Leadership of both communities and with the Finnish Contingent, in order to report the movement of Turkish combat troops. The Liaison Officers were:

Liaison Officer Finnish Contingent-Captain Anderson  
Liaison Officer 3HMC (National Guard)-Captain Mathieu  
Liaison Officer Leadership (Turkish-Cypriot)  
Lieutenant Langlois(3)

By 0455 the Finnish Contingent reported that they had sighted three ships north of Kyrenia and that one cruiser was also in the immediate area. Observation Post Flour Mill, in Nicosia, radioed the Joint Operations Centre that a Turkish military jet had been spotted flying above the Kyrenia Mountains and that in all probability it was on a reconnaissance mission. Meanwhile, the

---

(1) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 20 July 1974.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

Turkish-Cypriot fighters in the Paphos II area (Nicosia) assembled with weapons at the ready.(1) While this was transpiring, UNFICYP was caught in the middle of the unfolding events. Its mandate did not envisage that it would be facing invasion troops nor what its responsibilities would encompass in such a situation. One premise was a certainty, UNFICYP would remain in its positions. Colonel Beattie remarked, "We, UNFICYP, were a force at its lowest strength since 1964. There was no thought given to withdrawing from the island or pulling back into some kind of neutralist position."(2) General Prem Chand, the Force Commander decided that UNFICYP would attempt to control the amount of fighting and the violence that would ensue. It was now evident that UNFICYP would increase the provisions of its mandate by coming between two opposing armies.(3)

During the early part of the morning of the 20 July, reports came into the Joint Operations Centre that the Turkish Airforce had struck the National Guard Camp west of Kyrenia. A further report indicated three Turkish aircraft had overflown Nicosia and the airport had been hit by rocket attacks. Lieutenant Langlois, Liaison Officer with the Turkish Leadership, relayed a message to Headquarters UNFICYP that radio Ankara had carried a brief but

---

(1) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 20 July 1974.

(2) Beattie, op cit.

(3) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 20 July 1974.

distinct message. It stated, "Turkey coming to liberate Cyprus."(1) The Turkish Airforce was now sending C-30 Hercules transport planes to the west of Nicosia and dropping para troops and equipment in the Kyrenia Plain. While this was happening, the National Guard opened fire on a United Nations jeep patrol. The United Nations personnel involved reported that in all probability, they had been fired on out of the Greek frustration of the developing events. No casualties were reported.(2)

All along the Green Line the Turkish-Cypriot fighters and Greek National Guard were fortifying their positions and awaited further instructions. Meanwhile UNFICYP reported that the Greeks had dispatched three Armoured Personnel Carriers, and two tanks to the area of the International Airport at Nicosia. Captain Mathieu, Liaison Officer National Guard, reported that the Commander had stated that the Turkish Airforce had attacked the National Guard in Karavas and Kyrenia. He further advised that a Turkish Airborne Force was in the process of landing in the area of the Turkish Contingent, north of Nicosia.(3)


During the morning of 20 July, the airport had been bombed and the men of the United Nations Observation Posts began to evacuate their positions due to heavy fighting. By late morning the

---

(1) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 20 July 1974.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.



**CYPRUS AFTER THE TURKISH INVASION**

Turkish objective was recognized. That being to secure a corridor from Kyrenia to the capital city of Nicosia, The Deputy Chief of Staff (Canadian Contingent Commander) directed the Liaison Officers to inform their respective headquarters that although an invasion was in progress, the United Nations (Canadian Contingent) would still continue to patrol the Green Line. This was done in order to initiate local cease fires between the National Guard and the Turkish-Cypriot fighters should the occasion present itself. The Liaison Officers were given the United Nations patrol route which was between Observation Post Maple Leaf Manor and Observation Post Beaver Lodge so that both sides would be aware that the United Nations would still remain visible. In order to demonstrate that the United Nations would continue its presence, the Canadian Contingent sent representatives to both leaderships. A Canadian officer went to the National Guard to inform the commander, Major Soulis, that a cease-fire along the Green Line was to be in place immediately. This order was refused and the Liaison Officer was told that cease-fire orders could only originate from the National Guard Headquarters. Thus, the Deputy Chief of Staff (Canadian Contingent Commander) was requested to establish co-operation in matters pertaining to cease-fires at his level.(1)

Throughout the Nicosia District, the Canadian Contingent Observation Posts continually reported that heavy firing between the Turks and National Guard was taking place and that some

---

(1) Beattie, op cit.



Observation Posts were under fire. During the first day of the invasion, the Canadian Contingent attempted to negotiate local cease-fires but, in most instances, their efforts failed. It was becoming clear that cease-fire arrangements were not being met.

During the next two days, the Turkish regulars began fortifying their advance positions around the city of Kyrenia, but as yet, did not control the entire area. In Nicosia, there was heavy fighting. The Ledra Palace Hotel came under constant fire from both the Turks and the Greeks. It was in a strategically important position, for whoever controlled the hotel could overlook the Turkish enclave and bring fire to bear on opposing gun positions. The Greek National Guard fired mortars and small arm rounds into the hotel in belief that the Turkish-Cypriot fighters were in position. The National Guard was informed by the Canadian Contingent that there were no Turkish-Cypriot fighters in the hotel and that only guests and journalists occupied the premises. After discussions with the National Guard, they were requested to refrain from firing on the hotel.(1)

In the other part of the city, the Canadian Contingent had a base at Wolsely Barracks, which was in the middle of a fire zone. On the first day of the invasion, the Canadian Contingent received its first casualty. A shell from an undetermined source had landed in the United Nations complex resulting in five United

---

(1) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 21 July 1974. New York Times, July 22 1974, p.13 and UN Security Council Report S/11353, 20 July 1974.

Nations casualties. Though they were only wounded, it became evident that United Nations property would not be respected by either side. This was further evidenced by the fact that Camp Kronberg (United Nations camp in Nicosia) was receiving shell fire resulting in one more Canadian being wounded. The casualty, Private Casse was evacuated to Blue Beret Camp. On route to Blue Beret Camp, the ambulance carrying Casse was fired upon by the Turkish-Cypriot fighters. The officer on the scene returned fire, and the Turkish-Cypriot Fighters withdrew.(1) This was the first occasion that the Canadian Contingent had returned fire. At the same time, along the Green Line, individual attempts in negotiating cease-fires were in progress. The Canadian Contingent was now involved as a force in the conflict and was using its own initiative, even at the lower command levels to attempt cease-fire negotiations. Meanwhile, in Limassol, the Turks were reported to be landing troops.

On the 21 July, the Canadian Contingent began its leading role in humanitarian assistance which enlarged the original mandate. The Ledra Palace Hotel had come under fire from both the Greeks and the Turks. Both the Turkish-Cypriot fighters and National Guard were informed that the only occupants in the hotel were tourists and journalists. Both sides were requested to refrain from firing on the hotel. Despite this, it was confirmed that a patrol of six to eight troops of the National Guard were setting

---

(1) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 21 July 1974.

up mortar positions in the Ledra Palace Hotel's parking lot, and that a reinforcement section had been dispatched to the area around the Ledra Hotel. In response to this, the Canadian Contingent sent a section of men to occupy the hotel and persuade the National Guard to withdraw from the area. The Greek officer in charge stated he would not withdraw his position until the United Nations could get the Turks to stop firing at their position. The Turks responded by stating that they would cease firing only on the condition that the National Guard would do the same. This resulted in a stalemate. During the early hours of 21 July, machine gun fire was brought to bear on the hotel and the civilian guests were evacuated to the basement of the hotel. It was at this point that some journalists began to work their way out of the hotel against United Nations advice. Headquarters UNFICYP directed the Canadian troops to inform those who were leaving that they did so under their own accord and that, "it is their own problem if they leave the hotel." (1) By 1100 hours, orders were issued by the Canadian Contingent to prepare to evacuate the hotel with all civilians. At this time the National Guard Commander at Ledra was informed of the Canadian Contingent's intentions, but the Greek officer responded by stating that he had not received any instructions from the Ministry of the Interior to allow any evacuation. The Canadian Contingent Commander had by then arrived on the premises with a

---

(1) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 21 July 1974.

convoy of 54 trucks, 1 bus, 2 mini-buses and 10 civilian cars. After further negotiations by the Canadian Contingent Commander, the 386 civilians were evacuated and under United Nations protection, the convoy made its way to the Nicosia Hilton Hotel where the civilians were handed over to the International Red Cross.(1)

Another humanitarian mission occurred on the same day. Colonel Beattie received a call from the Councillor at the British High Commission, Mr.Derek Day. Colonel Beattie was informed that a pregnant woman and five children were pinned down under fire close to the High Commission because of fighting in the area. The Councillor requested the Canadian Contingent to render assistance. It was also revealed that there were families belonging to the British High Commission delegation in the area who required evacuation. The Canadian Contingent Commander ordered Canadian United Nations personnel to the area with vehicles to effect an evacuation. This was accomplished without incident. This type of assistance would become commonplace during the next month of hostilities.(2)

During the first two days of the Turkish attack there were many attempts at a negotiated cease-fire by the United Nations troops caught in the middle of the struggle. The events of 20 to

---

(1) The Times, July 21 1974. p.1 and United Nations Security Council Report S/11353, 21 July 1974.

(2) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent 21 July 1974.

23 July, displayed the increasing role the United Nations had to take in order to minimize the destruction which was taking place. It is not possible to fully detail the actions of 1 Commando group or the Canadian Airborne Regiment during July 1974. What will be presented, is the reaction of the Canadian Contingent to the events which were to develop at the Nicosia International Airport, Camp Kronberg, the Race Course, and the Nicosia Club, which led the United Nations to declare United Nations Zones of occupation. This declaration would be the first time a United Nations mandate would be extended on the ground by the local Commander and later ratified by the United Nations Secretariat in order to justify the nature of United Nations involvement in a conflict.

During the first two days of fighting, UNFICYP had been able to safely evacuate approximately 4000 people from areas of intense fighting and deliver them to the British Sovereign Base Area of Dhekelia for passage to the UK.(1) Although a truce and cease-fire were established along the Green Line in Nicosia on 21 July, at 0630 hours, this lull in the fighting ended at 1100 hours with the resumption of hostilities by both sides.(2) In the Kyrenia District, heavy fighting was taking place and some units of the National Guard were retreating towards Bellapais in United Nations Landrovers carrying United Nations flags. These

---

(1) The Times, July 21 1974. p.1.

(2) United Nations Security Council Report S/11353, 21 July 1974.

had been taken from United Nations Finnish soldiers at gunpoint.(1) In the Famagusta District there was sporadic small arms fire and reports still stressed that National Guard artillery and Turkish bombing was taking place in the city. Larnaca District was the scene of heavy fighting and Danish police along with UNFICYP personnel were withdrawn from United Nations Observation Posts. An attempted United Nations cease-fire was unsuccessful as the National Guard resumed artillery and mortar barrages.(2) The main Turkish objective, the Nicosia International Airport, was still not in their hands and, as a result, it was recognized by UNFICYP that a full scale assault would be forthcoming in the very near future.

To make matters worse, Greece declared that, "If Turkish Forces are not withdrawn from Cyprus within 48 hours, Greece will declare war on Turkey."(3) Greece also declared that a cease-fire would be accepted if the Turkish forces returned to the Turkish enclaves so that negotiations for a solution could be sought. Turkey refused.

The Toronto Globe and Mail reported that although Canadian Contingent had suffered nine casualties, the government was not prepared to withdraw Canadian troops as, "it (Canadian

---

(1) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent 21 July 1974.

(2) Ibid.

(3) The Times, July 21 1974. p.1.

Contingent) was performing a useful function on the island."(1)

Also, Defence Minister James Richardson stated:

...that the presence of the Canadian Contingent continues to provide a degree of stability to the situation on Cyprus and the Contingent has the respect of both the Turkish and Greek Cypriots.(2)

By the end of 22 July, a report by the Secretary General of the United Nations in part stated :

UNFICYP Canadian troops resumed patrols of the Nicosia Green Line using Scout cars to facilitate a shaky cease fire and in returning calm to the area. By 1100 hours, UNFICYP (Canadian Contingent) had established an Observation Post at the Ledra Palace Hotel...(3)


At the same time, the United Nations called on all participants to observe a cease-fire throughout the island. This cease-fire would not last.

---

(1) The Toronto Globe and Mail, July 22 1974. p.1.

(2) Ibid.

(3) United Nations Security Council Report S/11353/Add.2, 22 July 1974.



NICOSIA

Archbishop's  
Palace

Mitro Mabel

Ledra Hotel

race course

Nicosia  
International  
Airport



Chapter IV The Canadian Contingent  
and a New United Nations Mandate

The period from the 23rd to the 25th of July, involved the heaviest fighting of the invasion. The Canadian Contingent, instead of withdrawing began to return fire on the two combatants. This meant that the Force was beginning in earnest to change its original mandated function in Cyprus. The following events are taken from the from the Canadian Contingent Daily Operational Log Sheets and Brigadier-General Beattie's interview. The shift in emphasis towards an active role for the United Nations force is clearly demonstrated.

At 0740 hours, 23 July, a Canadian Contingent mobile patrol relayed information that it had observed one Turkish platoon with an armoured car moving south west from Yerolakkos towards the Nicosia Airport.(1) At the same time, Brigadier-General Henn (Chief of Staff), informed the Deputy Chief of Staff (Colonel Beattie), of the situation. He stated that not only were the Turks headed towards the airport complex, but that reports had confirmed the fact that Turkish forces had been sighted in the area adjacent to Camp UNFICYP. In response, Colonel Beattie directed his Operations and Administration Officer, to form up a protection party of five soldiers with two jeeps. One of the jeeps was armed with a .30 calibre machine gun. The Canadian

---

(1) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 23 July 1974.

Contingent patrol then headed down the lower road which ran parallel to the Morphou Road into the airport area. (map # 3) This road was chosen for it provided the best cover, as firing was evident in the immediate vicinity.(1)

The patrol made its way to the old traffic control building, in the south-east area of the airport. After surveying the area, the patrol headed for Camp UNFICYP which lay north-east of their position, and, once in the camp contacted the commander on the spot. Major Barker, a British officer, informed the Deputy Chief of Staff that earlier in the morning the Turks had cut the Morphou Road and that they had advanced south down the valley in what was believed to be company strength. He also stated that the Turks had come under fire from Greek positions adjacent to the airport. It was also reported that a few vehicles had attempted to proceed on the airport road but that most of them had been stopped by the Turks who controlled the area.(2) The only vehicle which had not stopped when ordered, was a Cyprus Airways van. It had been fired upon before coming to a halt. After making their way to the scene where the vehicle was reported to have been fired upon, the Canadian Contingent patrol confirmed that the twelve passengers in the van had been killed. It appeared that the van had attempted to travel from the southern end of the airport north to the secondary road leading into

---

(1) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 23 July 1974.

(2) Ibid.

Nicosia when it was fired upon. At this point, Colonel Beattie evaluated the situation. He determined that a real possibility existed that the Turkish forces were going to attempt to overrun the airport in order to secure it for troop and equipment landings.(1)

While this was taking place, the Joint Operations Centre was informed that the movement of one Turkish Battalion with a tank and an Armoured Personnel Carrier, was observed in the airport area. It was also stated that there was one Greek Infantry Company approaching the airport from the south as well as a bus load of Greek soldiers headed in that direction. By 1052 hours, it was confirmed that the Greek National Guard was in control of the airport buildings. As Colonel Beattie was in contact with the Joint Operations Centre, he was informed of this development.(2)

At this juncture, Colonel Beattie moved forward to determine the intentions of the Turks and requested Major Barker to accompany him in order to give the United Nations an international representation. As Major Barker was the Officer Commanding of the area, it was decided that Captain Miles of the Great Artillery, would accompany Colonel Beattie and his driver, Corporal Bergoff. The three United Nations personnel then proceeded forward disarmed and quickly headed for the wooded area west of Camp UNFICYP. Once under cover, they made contact with a

---

(1) Beattie, op cit.

(2) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 23 July 1974.

company of Turkish National troops who had assembled in the area on the previous night under cover of darkness. Colonel Beattie demanded to speak to the Commander of the Turkish forces, as the Turks did not understand either English or French, this approach was unsuccessful.(1)

At this time, the Turkish forces and United Nations personnel came under fire from the Greek positions and took cover. Once firing had ceased, Colonel Beattie sighted what he believed to be aerial antennas which would signify a Company Command Post. The United Nations party quickly made its way to the area known as Luna Park. Once there however, it was discovered that it was not a Company Headquarters, but a staging area for prisoners. The Turks had thirty-five prisoners of varying ages, sitting on their haunches, with their hands behind their heads. These prisoners were being guarded by the Turk national troops. At the same time, two more vehicles approached and were stopped. The vehicles carried two women, a child and two old men. The Turkish Captain in charge was advised by Colonel Beattie, that the holding of women and children would not be regarded in a favourable light. After some discussion, the Turkish officer agreed to their release. They were escorted out of the area by Captain Miles under United Nations protection.(2)

After locating a telephone in the Luna Park complex, Colonel

---

(1) Beattie op cit.

(2) Ibid.

Beattie contacted UNFICYP Headquarters in order to obtain the telephone number of the Turkish Embassy. Once this was received, he contacted Mr. Kirsja, the Councillor, and requested him to inform the Turkish Captain to take the United Nations Commander to the Turkish Battalion Commander. Once this request was complied with, Colonel Beattie was escorted to the Battalion position. Upon arrival, he discovered that there were three Rifle Companies preparing to attack the airport complex. Within a few minutes the United Nations protection team, accompanied by Captain Miles and a British Sergeant-Major, arrived at his location. The Regimental Sergeant-Major spoke German and, after locating a Turkish soldier who also spoke German, translation of the United Nations Commander's message to the Turkish Battalion Commander began.

Colonel Beattie advised the Battalion Commander that on the previous evening of 22 July, there had been declared a cease-fire and that the United Nations was attempting to maintain it until a solution could be reached. As the Turkish Battalion Commander was unsure of the situation, the attack was held off for a further four hours. At this point, Colonel Beattie contacted UNFICYP Headquarters and requested that an officer be sent to the airport building being held by the Greeks, in order to have a communication network in place should the time arise to contact the Greek National Guard.(1)

As previously stated, there were approximately 600 National

---

(1) Beattie, op cit.


Guardsmen in the airport buildings and Greek elements were also positioned in the air traffic control tower. Therefore, in order to attack, the the Turks would have to move south out of the wooded area, over open ground, and turn a dog leg right to reach the buildings. With Greek snipers in place, and troops deployed in various buildings, this attack would result in fierce fighting and many casualties. Although attempting to delay the Turkish attack, the Turk Battalion Commander decided to proceed. Colonel Beattie was informed of this decision. He then ensured that communications with the United Nations officer stationed with the National Guard was functioning. (see map # 3)

The attack began at approximately 1130 hours. When the Turkish forces reached the open ground, they immediately came under heavy direct fire and suffered many casualties. Although it was evident that the Turks had a tank for support, it was not used. The majority of casualties resulted from sniper fire. The wounded were burned to death as ricochets started a grass fire and the winds from the south engulfed the wounded soldiers lying in the open field. Witnessing this slaughter, Colonel Beattie attempted to negotiate a cease-fire. After three attempts, Beattie finally told the Turk Battalion Commander, "If you can, if you stop your attack, we can stop all this killing."(1)

Once the Turk Battalion Commander agreed to a cease-fire, negotiations were undertaken between the two combatants to ensure it would hold. Colonel Beattie and Regimental Sergeant-Major

---

(1) Beattie, op cit.



Camp UNFICYP

Turkish Forces

Greek National Guard

Nicosia International  
Airport

Birch impressed upon the Turk Battalion Commander that the area chosen for negotiations was safe and under United Nations protection. As a result of the negotiations, it was agreed that the Greeks would evacuate the airport building and that the United Nations would take over. The boundary for withdrawal was set for the Greeks and Turks. The Greeks would withdraw 500 metres south of the airport perimeter and the Turks would withdraw 500 metres back to north of the Morphou Road. This was to take place immediately upon agreement.(1)

After contacting Headquarters UNFICYP at 1300 hours, the Joint Operations Centre informed Colonel Beattie that the Canadian Contingent had been dispatched to take control of the airport facility. The officer in charge of this takeover would be Major Dave Harries, Officer Commanding, Blue Beret Camp.(2) Once the takeover had been accomplished, the Canadian Contingent set up roadblocks at the perimeter limits of both combatants. The casualties were then retrieved by Canadian Contingent personnel and dispatched to the Nicosia hospital. At 1700 hours, a stray round from an undetermined source landed in the area and the cease-fire broke down. Colonel Beattie along with Regimental Sergeant-Major Birch, drove a United Nations vehicle between the two forces and demanded that the firing stop. This tactic was effective and the cease-fire was once more restored. By 2100 hours

---

(1) Beattie, op cit.

(2) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 23 July 1974.



the airport area, for the present, had been neutralized effectively by the Canadian Contingent.

However, in the early hours of the 25th of July, the Turkish High Command realized that their forces did not physically control the airport. In the meantime the Canadian Contingent Commander, Colonel Beattie had been appointed co-ordinator of the defences of all the United Nations complex, including the airport, Kykko Camp and Blue Beret Camp. Lieutenant-Colonel D. Manuel, Officer Commanding 1 Commando Group (Canadian), was designated local district Commander, in charge of the airport defences. Reports began coming into Headquarters UNFICYP that the Turks were re-examining their position vis-a-vis the airport, and were again preparing to launch an attack against it.(1)

It was at this point that the UNFICYP mandate would be dramatically altered and the United Nations Force would enlarge its responsibilities. Upon being informed of the Turkish plans, Colonel Beattie returned to the airport and held discussions with Lieutenant-Colonel D. Manuel. Colonel Beattie described the conversation which ensued:

Look, if they (Turks) come at us, they're going to come here, (main building) and I don't want to interfere with your command responsibility, but, if anybody has to open fire (orders) and there are Canadians involved, then I'd rather it be me than have a subordinate (give the order)...When you think the thing through, in a peacekeeping operation, the Commander better be up front at the crucial time...(2)

---

(1) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 25 July 1974.

(2) Beattie, op cit.

After informing Lieutenant-Colonel Manuel of his position, Colonel Beattie returned to Headquarters UNFICYP to meet with the Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General Henn, to make his position on the subject very clear. He reportedly stated to the Chief of Staff:

...look, if you can do anything with your authorities and get them to put pressure on the Turks to stop this... prevent it from even happening, my intention would be the same. But I'll tell you one thing, I didn't come to Cyprus to surrender Canadian soldiers... and that's it!(1)

With this information, the Chief of Staff held discussions with the Force Commander, General Prem Chand, and it was decided that the airport would remain a United Nations zone. To reinforce the airport, the British 16/5th Lancers from Dhekelia were deployed with a 76 millimetre gun and Harrier aircraft were requested for support. The Canadian Contingent had on hand, four 106 recoilless rifles and four heavy machine guns. During the night, these weapons were moved to various airport locations in order to give the impression that the United Nations Force had more weapons than the Turkish forces realized.(2)

To give credence to the United Nations resolve, the Force Commander called a press conference and publicly declared that there would be representation from all contingents from UNFICYP at the airport. He also stated that any operation from either the

---

(1) Ibid.

(2) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 24 July 1974.

Greeks or the Turks to take the airport, would be viewed as a hostile measure and that the United Nations would defend itself. The credibility of the Force was at stake and, with this declaration, it forced the two combatants to realize that a United Nations protected zone would be defended against any who wished to attack.(1) Once the decision had been made by the ground force Commander, the Secretary General of the United Nations declared the airport a United Nations protected zone. Although he did indicate that the airport was part of a United Nations area, it was not until 25 July, that he declared the airport would be defended by the Canadian Contingent.(2)

The events at the Nicosia Airport were not the only incidents which evidenced the willingness of the Canadian Contingent to consider the use of force to protect a United Nations designated area. In the north-east part of the city of Nicosia, the Canadian Contingent had another base area known as Camp Kronberg. On the same day as the airport crisis was being resolved, another confrontation was developing near Camp Kronberg. At 1136 hours, Camp Kronberg reported that a Turkish platoon was running south along the camp perimeter. At the same time, there was a Greek National Guard platoon at the front gate of the camp. Within a few minutes, the Turks were sighted by the Greeks moving rapidly

---

(1) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 24 July 1974.

(2) United Nations Security Council Report S/11353/Add.6, 25 July 1974.

towards the British High Commission area, just north of Kronberg and west of the Pedhiecs River. By 1217 hours it was reported that ten National Guard troops who held a position overlooking the river were observing this movement. Once the Turks had been sighted, the Greek troops opened fire on their location. After firing had started, the Turks began to pull back towards the river and attempted to cross through Camp Kronberg which led into their own area of safety.(1)

This action by the Turks brought fire to bear on the United Nations camp. In order to relieve the fire being aimed at this position, Captain Blacquierre, the camp commander, decided that the only course of action was to ensure the Turks were out of the area. In order to achieve this goal, they would have to be escorted through the United Nations camp, over the river bed and back to their own lines. As the camp was strategically located near a bridge by Nelson street, it became quickly evident that whoever held this position, had control over the entire area. As such, it was imperative that the United Nations remain in its position. With this in mind, Captain Blacquierre thought it wise to remove the Turks so as not to provide the Greeks with the excuse or opportunity to mount an attack on the United Nations complex. Captain Blacquierre moved forward to the Turk patrol and advised them that he would lead them out of the area. While this was transpiring, the National Guard overlooking the area in

---

(1) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 23 July 1974.

question, opened fire. Four Turks were killed immediately and Captain Blacquierre was severely wounded in both legs. Private Paraplouffe, who had accompanied the United Nations officer to the river bed, was also shot while attempting to administer first aid to his commander. Paraplouffe was struck in the face by a bullet which had ricocheted off his helmet.

This incident was reported to the Joint Operations Centre at 1325 hours and the troops in the camp were ordered to rake the area with automatic fire and effect a rescue. The camp was also informed that two scout cars with automatic weapons were being dispatched immediately to their location to protect them and to prevent the Turks and the Greeks from interfering with this medical evacuation.(1) Once the report of Canadian casualties had been given, Lieutenant-Colonel Manuel attempted to contact the National Guard Battalion Commander Headquarters to demand that the firing on Camp Kronberg cease. He dispatched an officer, Lieutenant Forant, to the area to evaluate the situation. Once at Kronberg, Forant established a covering fire position in order to protect his rescue mission. While rescuing the Canadian casualties, his party was fired upon by the National Guard. Lt. Forant then called down covering fire and the Greek troops ceased this aggressive action. Once the rescue had been accomplished, Lieutenant-Colonel Manuel went directly to the National Guard Battalion Commander to vigorously protest. A cease-fire was

---

(1) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 23 July 1974.

agreed to and the Battalion Commander apologized for this incident.(1)

Within a few days, the Turks again attempted to gain access to the camp area. In response to this attempt, the Canadian Contingent Commander, Colonel Beattie, contacted the Turkish Embassy and stated to the Councillor:

I know what your forces are trying to do,  
please do not put me in the position where  
I have to open fire, because I am going to,  
if you come.(2)

This message was also relayed to the Greek National Guard Commander. It had been established that, should Canadian Contingent ever withdraw and allow either the Greeks or Turks to occupy a United Nations base area, United Nations credibility would be completely lost. Therefore, the United Nations position had now shifted to mean that United Nations designated protected areas would not be allowed to be overrun by either side. Armed resistance would take place should any forced entry be contemplated. This order was issued to all call signs at 1430 hours.(3)

On 24 July, news that the ruling Military Junta in Greece had been replaced by a civilian government was announced. Mr. C.

---

(1) United Nations Secretary General Report S/11353/Add.5, 24 July 1974.

(2) Beattie, op cit.

(3) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 23 July 1974.

Karamanlis, a former conservative Prime Minister, returned to Athens after an 11 year self-imposed exile to head the government. Due to the situation in Cyprus, the military leaders decided that a political, rather than a military solution was warranted. In Cyprus, Mr. Glafkos Clerides, the President of the Cyprus House of Representatives, had replaced Nikos Sampson, as the interim President of Cyprus until the return of Archbishop Makarios. Clerides would act in this capacity until Makarios returned in December of 1974.(1) The new Greek and Greek-Cypriot leaders now agreed to attend a Peace Conference in Geneva within the next few days to discuss a possible solution with the Turkish authorities.(2)

On 25 July, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada, replied in writing to the United Nations Secretary General's request for additional troops for Cyprus. In his letter the External Affairs Minister Stated:

I am pleased to inform you that the Canadian Government has today decided to augment the size of the Canadian Contingent to the United Nations Peacekeeping force in Cyprus.(3)

The size of the force was to be that of an Infantry Battalion, which would bring the total strength of the Canadian Contingent to 950, all ranks. It was to be commanded by Colonel Lessard,

---

(1) The Times, July 24 1974. p.1.

(2) Ibid.

(3) External Affairs Canada Document, 25 July 1974.

Commander of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. The airlift of this augmentation was to begin within 96 hours. What was also made evident to the United Nations Secretary General was the fact that;

...the situation as it now stood, spelled out new implications for the roles and tasks that the Force as a whole, and the Canadian Contingent in particular, would be asked to carry out, and that hopefully, the necessary clarification of this role would be obtained as quickly as possible.(1)

The above statement also gives evidence that the role and mandate as laid out in the provisions of March 1964, were not considered adequate by the Canadian Government. New roles and tasks would have to be decided upon if the Force was to be effective.

With this Canadian augmentation, and in addition to other countries expanding their forces, the total strength would be 4128 men. The breakdown is as follows:

	APPROXIMATE STRENGTH AS OF 9 JULY 1974	APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF REINFORCEMENT
Austria	240	60
Canada	490	460
Denmark	235	200
Finland	223	400

---

(1) External Affairs Canada, Document, 25 July 1974.



Ireland	3	---
Sweden	225	211
United Kingdom	781	611
Total	2197	1931

Total 4128(1)

Although the size of the Force was doubled, it was not strong enough to be considered an international army capable of impeding an advancing Turkish army. It was however, a force of sufficient strength to maintain a presence between to opposing forces in order to allow the politicians an opportunity to assess the situation and bring about a political solution.

At this time, Colonel Beattie, as the Canadian Contingent Commander had requested General Dextaze, the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff, to ensure proper weapons and equipment were dispatched along with the troops being sent.(2) His request included armoured reconnaissance vehicles with armoured anti-tank capability. The augmentation troops from the Canadian Airborne Regiment included; the Airborne Battery, A Field Squadron, Service Group, Medical Officer, 8 Signals and a reconnaissance troop from the Lord Strathcona Horse (LDSH).(3) The equipment

---

(1) United Nations Security Council Report S/11353/Add.7, 25 July 1974.

(2) Beattie, op cit.

(3) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 26 July 1974.

which was requested and sent, was as follows;

- a. 101 millimetre recoilless rifle, lightweight weapons designed for anti-tank and anti-personnel roles can be fitted on trucks or APC's,
- b. M-72 anti-tank launchers (rocket) that can be carried by infantrymen,
- c. M-113 armoured personnel carriers equipped with .50 calibre machine guns and radio equipment,
- d. N-577a1 command post carriers,
- e. 84 millimetre Carl Gustav anti-tank weapons, and;
- f. Lynx command and reconnaissance vehicles, with .50 calibre machine guns.(1)

With the new augmentation and equipment that UNFICYP had received, it was becoming clear to both sides that the United Nations was prepared to remain on Cyprus in order to attempt to diffuse the current situation.

Between 26 July and 31 July 1974, the situation in Cyprus remained tense and volatile. The Turkish forces had repeatedly fortified their positions and had on numerous occasions moved up their forward lines in clear violation of the cease-fire arrangements.

One of these serious violations occurred in the area of the Nicosia race course, in the east end of the city on 27 July. Due to these aggressive forward movements, Mr. Clerides, the acting Cypriot President, had declared his troops would take "effective counter-measures if Turkish troops did not halt their aggressive

---

(1) The Toronto Globe and Mail, July 26 1974. p.1; and Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 26 July 1974.

moves on Cypriot territory."(1) General Prem Chand, the United Nations Force Commander was also contacted by Mr. Clerides who stated that the Turkish forces had advanced to an area south of Geunyeli during the night of 26 July. Geunyeli, was a village just north east of Nicosia. He stated to the United Nations Commander that, if the Turkish forces were not stopped, he would order his troops to open fire.(2) General Prem Chand then directed the Canadian Contingent Commander to investigate this violation of the cease-fire agreement.

The Canadian Contingent Commander, along with a protection team, discovered the forward elements of the Turkish advance in the area of the Nicosia race course. He ordered that a section of United Nations troops from Finnish Contingent be dispatched to his position. Once on the scene, the United Nations Commander discovered Turkish troops and Greek National Guards facing each other and preparing for contact. At this point, Colonel Beattie, stated to the Greek Battalion Commander that, should he receive assurance that they (Greek National Guard) would not open fire, the United Nations would remove the Turkish forces from the area. The Greek officer agreed to hold his fire and the United Nations Commander advanced towards the Turkish position. Upon reaching the Turks, he proceeded to emphasize that the cease-fire which their government and military headquarters had agreed to, was

---

(1) The Times, July 27 1974. p. 1.

(2) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 27 July 1974.

being violated. In order stop the Turkish advance, he stated to the author that he said to the Turkish Platoon Commander:

I'm going to have you shot if you don't stop this (advance) right now! Also I demand to see your Commander, and you stop right here until your Commander tells you what to do.(1)

Although the above gives the appearance of theatrics, according to Brigadier-General Beattie, these tactics were required in order to demonstrate that the United Nations Force was in command of cease-fire arrangements and would not condone any violations. A United Nations flag was then planted in the ground to emphasize that they had been stopped by the United Nations. Within a few minutes, a vehicle arrived and transported Colonel Beattie to the Turkish Battalion Commander, He in turn escorted him to the Turkish Contingent Commander in Geunyeli.(2) Once there, the United Nations Commander informed him of the cease- fire violation. He then stated that, if the Turks were prepared to halt their advance, the United Nations would erect a United Nations OP to keep the Greeks and and the Turks from coming into contact with each other. This, he stated, would allow politicians to work out differences without any distractions. This proposal was accepted by both sides and the area remained quiet until the second phase of the war erupted on 12 August.(3)

---

(1) Beattie, op cit.

(2) The Toronto Globe and Mail, August 1 1974 p.1

(3) Beattie, op cit.

On July 30 1974, a cease-fire agreement was reached between Turkey and Greece in Geneva. It was agreed that Turkish forces would remain static and that a United Nations buffer zone would be established between the two opposing forces. It also stated that British, Greek, Turkish and United Nations officers would meet in order to establish a line between the two armies.(1) However, the Turks also demanded that the UN be withdrawn from Turkish controlled areas. They deemed that they controlled the situation and that the United Nations presence was irrelevant. The United Nations refused to withdraw from Turkish held territory as there were Greek-Cypriots who would be in need of assistance and protection.(2)

The Military Representatives of the Cease-Fire and Demarcation Committee met on 3 August to attempt to delineate forward defence lines of both sides. As previously stated, the fluidity of the advance troops made it extremely difficult to correctly establish where the Turkish forward areas existed. As an example, it was reported in the Globe and Mail by James Anderson, that the establishing of any forward positions was problematic. He wrote that Canadian United Nations troops were attempting to identify, and move up to, the lines between the Turks and the Greek National Guard. One such section was under the command of Captain Alain Forand. He had encountered 29 Turkish soldiers who who were

---

(1) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 30 July 1974; and The Times (London) July 30 1974. p.1.

(2) Time Magazine, July 29 1974. pp.28-36.

making their way forward. When confronted, the Turks stated they had been in that location since the previous day. As the Canadian Contingent had been patrolling the area during that past 24 hours, and, as no Turks had been reported in the area, Captain Forand refused to accept their statement. At this point, the Turks ordered the United Nations patrol out of the area. Captain Forand stood firm. The United Nations then set up an Observation Post at the location, the Nicosia Club, to demonstrate a United Nations presence in the area.(1) This incident was indicative of others in the Nicosia area. Colonel Beattie described the situation in the Globe and Mail:

It is obvious from what I have seen of the position previously that the Turks had moved forward, but they claim they were there before the standstill yesterday.(2)

Helicopter spotting had been agreed to as a means of sighting forward lines. This would enable the Military Committee to accurately fix forward positions as of 31 July, and report back to the Geneva representatives on their findings. The Turks claimed that they held most of the north coast, including Kyrenia and points east. In order to establish this fact, a helicopter reconnaissance was ordered. The representatives of Turkey and the United Nations flew into the areas of Karavas and Lapithos to verify the forward lines. The United Nations military

---

(1) The Toronto Globe and Mail, August 1 1974. p.i.

(2) Ibid.

representative was the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Turkish officer was Major Chakar. According to the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Turks were adamant about the location of their forward positions. In reply, the Deputy Chief of Staff stated:

Major, if you hold this area as you claim, then take us in, for we will have safe passage with you.(1)

The Turkish officer agreed to escort them into northern Cyprus. They flew into the area, and were promptly surrounded by the National Guard, which proved that forward lines, as indicated by the Turks, were not as concrete as believed. According to Brigadier-General Beattie, this example demonstrated the difficulty in establishing specific lines on the island. However, according to the Turks, who claimed to control all the territory they could see, this was not the case. In the end, there was agreement on the following principal: wherever the troops stood, became the area of control for both sides. This enabled the demarcation lines to effectively set.(2)

Contrary to the cease-fire arrangements, the Turks continued to reinforce their defensive and forward positions. Between 1 August and 11 August 1974, there were advances by the Turkish army in the Kyrenia range as well as in Nicosia. At the same time, a munitions and troop buildup was taking place on the Turkish side. This was a violation of the Geneva Agreements. On 7

---

(1) Beattie, op cit.

(2) Beattie, op cit.

August, the Turks began a 10 hour mortar and artillery barrage. They captured the villages of Lapithos and Agridaghi. The Turks and the Greeks were also fighting in the area of Famagusta. Brigadier-General Henn, the Chief of Staff, dispatched a United Nations force to the area to separate the two combatants. Although a cease-fire and buffer zone was not established, the two sides agreed to let the city of Famagusta remain in its present status.(1)

In Geneva, the Greeks and the Turkish representatives threatened to withdraw from the negotiations. Greece wanted the Turks to pull back to the 30 July lines. Turkey refused and declared that Greece was stalling the talks in order to gain world support for their political position and enable them to shore up their defensive lines. Turkey demanded that a plan be created to unify a Turkish zone from the Turkish settlements on the island. In addition, they demanded that this zone be given its own authority and military force. These demands were initially refused by the Greek representative.(2) But by 11 August an agreement was reached between Turkey and Cyprus. Turkey was granted its demands which provided for a Turkish military presence on the island. Also the territory that the Turkish troops had occupied since the invasion was given to them.

---

(1) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 7 August 1974.

(2) The New York Times, August 10 1974. p.10.



This doubled the size of the enclaves under Turkish control.(1)

Due to a build up of Turkish forces and the weakening of the National Guard positions in the northern part of the island, UNFICYP began preparations to deal with a potential second Turkish offensive.(2) This offensive was believed to be coming as during the previous two days most United Nations Observation Posts had noted heavy traffic movement in the Kyrenia Range. It was also reported that T-34 and T-35 tanks were taking up forward positions on the Turkish side of the cease-fire lines.(3) On the political side, the Turkish government had given Greece a 24 hour ultimatum to accept its demands for a separate Turkish-Cypriot administration.(4)

On 14 August 1974, phase II of the war in Cyprus erupted. At 0030 hours, the Joint Operations Centre was informed that there was a vehicle build up north of Geunyeli and that vehicles were moving across country headed east and south. By 0700 hours, 11 Turk tanks were in the area of United Nations Observation Post Corona, north east of the Nicosia race track. Heavy Turkish artillery fire was reported in the western part of Nicosia. In the village of Mia Milea, Turkish tanks were observed heading

---

(1) Newsweek, August 12 1974.

(2) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 13 August 1974.


(3) Daily Operational Log Sheet, 11-13 August 1974.

(4) The Times, August 13 1974. p.1.

# 2

# OF/DE

# 2



east while planes were bombing north of the village. In the Lefka District, fighting was reported. Off the northern coast of Kyrenia, Turkish warships were shelling the Cypriot coastline. Simultaneously, planes were bombing Nicosia. Due to heavy shelling, many United Nations Observation Posts in Nicosia were temporarily withdrawn. The United Nations casualties numbered thirteen.

By 1100 hours, seventeen more United Nations personnel were wounded in Kykko Camp. In addition, five British were wounded in an air attack and three Austrians were killed in the Larnaca District by Turkish airplane fire. At Ledra Palace, one Canadian was wounded by mortar fire. By 1400 hours the Turks had advanced on Famagusta. A Turkish armoured column, consisting of fifteen tanks was observed moving south east from Chatos (NE of Nicosia) towards Marathovouno. Another column of three tanks was reported moving east from Aphanis (east of Nicosia).(1) In the Kyrenia area, the Turkish Commander ordered United Nations Observation Posts at Kyrenia, Bellapais and Martin's Mound, out of the Turkish enclave. The United Nations withdrew under protest to its camp at Tjiklos. By 1800 hours a cease-fire was arranged in Nicosia. In other parts of the island however, Turkish advances continued. At Kykko Camp, the Finnish United Nations force of 115

---

(1) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent 14 August 1974.

men were still under direct fire.(1)

At Ledra Palace, Canadian United Nations troops were forced to evacuate the hotel after it came under heavy shell and mortar fire. They withdrew to Blue Beret Camp. At the same time, Camp Kronberg was evacuated due to shelling.(2) Within 24 hours, the Turkish forces had established a presence in more than 30% of the island and were surrounding Famagusta. The Greek National Guard were rapidly withdrawing from the northern part of Cyprus towards Nicosia. The only area not directly threatened, was the United Nations occupied airport facility which had been declared a United Nations Zone on 24 July 1974.

In response to this Turkish offensive, Greece pulled its forces out of NATO. The Greek government declared:

After the Atlantic Alliance demonstrated its inability to prevent Turkey from creating a state of conflict between two allies, the Prime Minister ordered that the Greek armed forces should be withdrawn from NATO. Greece shall remain a member of the Alliance only in connexion with its political aspects.(3)

On 16 August, the battle continued and Greek forces were withdrawing from their defensive positions due to mass attacks by the Turkish forces. By 1500 hours it was evident that the Greeks were retreating en masse. As Colonel Beattie had been appointed

---

(1) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 14 August 1974.

(2) United Nations Security Council Report S/11353/add 26/27 13-15 August 1974.

(3) The Times, August 15 1974. p.1.

to the post of Acting Chief of Staff, the Acting Canadian Contingent Commander, Colonel Lessard, issued orders to the Contingent. He stated:

Due to the present situation, i.e. the possible withdrawal of Greeks en masse possibly through United Nations ground, prepare defensive positions, barbed wire, Loc. .30 cal., 106 RR. Nobody, Greek or Turk armed are to go through United Nations ground. Surrend. s will be accepted. Persons will surrender their weapons and be under United Nations protection from then on...(1)

This statement re-emphasized the United Nations position that United Nations areas were not to be shared or given up to either side. United Nations troops were to defend against all comers. At Camp Kykko, heavy shell fire had pinned down approximately 300 United Nations Finnish soldiers. At 1300 hours, the Canadian Contingent ordered an Armoured Personnel Carrier force to rescue the United Nations soldiers at that location. This rescue mission was commanded by Captain R. Plajon. While attempting to relieve the United Nations Finnish troops, his rescue force came under fire and was subject to napalm strikes. After securing his immediate area the rescue mission was accomplished by 1430 hours. At 1800 hours, one platoon of Finnish United Nations soldiers were ordered by Headquarters UNFICYP to re-establish a United Nations Observation Post in the camp. This was done by 1930 hours.(2)

---

(1) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 16 August 1974.

(2) Ibid.

On 17 August, a cease-fire was once again agreed to by the Turks and Greeks. This cease-fire left the Turks in control of one third of the island including control of the ports of Kyrenia and Famagusta.(1) The terms of the cease-fire were accepted and announced by Mr. Clerides, the President of Cyprus. The line of the Turkish forces, called the Attila Line, now stretched from Famagusta in the east, to Morphou in the west. With the Turkish troops in control of this territory, Turkey announced it was willing to return to the negotiation table to discuss the future of Cyprus. Even though a cease-fire had been established, Turk advances continued south of the cease-fire line. By 19 August, the Turks had consolidated their positions and now controlled 40% of the island. During this time, Turkish advances were protested by the United Nations Force Commander, but each protest was rejected. The Turks refused to recognize the United Nations Force authority and continued its advances. It was clear, that although they would agree to a cease-fire line, their agreement was nothing more than a bargaining tool, for they would advance on positions not contested. However, when challenged or threatened with retaliation, should they advance, as in the case of the airport, they would withdraw to their previous position. This was evidenced after the cease-fire agreement of 19 August. James Anderson of the Toronto Globe and Mail, reported that such an incident occurred on the outskirts of Nicosia. A Canadian patrol under the command of Major Keith Courbould, came upon a Turkish

---

(1) The Times, August 17 1974. p.1.

patrol which was attempting to secure a new position. After futile negotiations, a United Nations flag was placed on the disputed position. The Turks threatened to overrun this this United Nations area. Major Courbould ordered his subordinate, Corporal Mackenzie to say put. The Turks finally withdrew. The Canadians, as Anderson reported, were aware that their role was being redefined. He quoted Cpl Mackenzie: " We are doing our job for a change."(1)

As previously mentioned, one of the additions to the mandate was in the area of humanitarian assistance. This resulted because of the need to provide in some instances, protection of civilians in gathering crops, or in the delivery of medical supplies and foodstuffs to both Cypriot communities.

One of the guidelines of the original mandate was that the United Nations Force could not become involved in internal politics. However, at the same time, humanitarian assistance was becoming a part of the United Nations task. This resulted in requests from both communities to assist in relieving tensions or in rescuing those in need. One example of this developed on 19 August, at 1242 hours. It was reported that there were demonstrations occurring at the American Embassy complex. The Canadian Contingent was requested to dispatch an armoured vehicle to the area to maintain a United Nations presence. It was specifically ordered that they not become involved with the

---

(1) The Toronto Globe and Mail, August 19 1974. p.1.

demonstrators. By 1300 hours, it was reported that the American Ambassador had been wounded and that one civilian employee had been killed.(1) At this time, two Armoured Personnel Carriers and a medical assistant were deployed to the Embassy. The riot crowd was estimated to be 2000 persons. The evacuation team was ordered to evacuate the residents of Embassy. By 1400 hours it was confirmed that the American Ambassador had been mortally wounded, but that the Americans from the Embassy had been safely evacuated.(2)

Again on 23 August, another demonstration was held in Nicosia. After the hostilities had ceased, the Greek-Cypriots focused their frustration of the events on the United States of America. They denounced the Americans for a US-Turkish conspiracy in relation to the de facto partitioning of the island as a result of the invasion. The crowd of approximately 6000 people marched to the embassy and began to burn flags, set cars on fire and shoot in the air. The Americans, headed by Mr. Brown, who was in charge of the embassy while the Ambassador was away, requested assistance from the Canadian Contingent. The Deputy Chief of Staff replied that assistance could only be forthcoming if the government of Cyprus requested such action. However, events moved quickly and gas was thrown into the embassy. The Deputy

---

(1) United Nations Security Council Report S/11353/Add.32, 19 August 1974; and The Times, August 20 1974. p.1.

(2) Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 19 August 1974.



Chief of Staff then contacted a member of the Cypriot Department of the Interior and was assured that the situation was under control. In reality, the Cypriot police did not have control of the demonstrators. After some discussion, it was agreed that the Cyprus government would request the Canadian Contingent to render assistance on humanitarian grounds to help the government re-establish order. Canadian troops were dispatched to the area and they, along with the police, restored order, thereby diffusing a potential insurgency. Once the situation had calmed down, the Canadian Contingent evacuated the Embassy and brought the Americans to Camp Maple Leaf for security. The Americans sent a classified message to the Canadian Contingent to express their appreciation for their efforts. Officially however, the request was made by the government of Cyprus to the Canadian Contingent.(1)

Other areas for humanitarian assistance came in the form of delivering supplies to villages. In the Nicosia District there were many areas desperate for assistance. In some villages United Nations patrols were threatened should aid not be forthcoming. In the area of Mia Milea, there was urgent need for food and baby milk. At the main park in Nicosia, where refugees had gathered, there was a desperate need for food and water. In Kambina, there were 1200 people who required food, blankets and medical supplies. At the request of UNFICYP, foodstuffs, medical supplies and blankets began to be delivered by United Nations personnel to

---

(1) Beattie, op cit.

villages requiring assistance throughout the island. Although at times, as in Mia Milea, Turkish forces refused the United Nations entry, most areas were given humanitarian assistance by the United Nations.(1) Examples of the Canadian Contingent assistance were as follows; the village of Ayios Epiphantos, Canadian Contingent escorted the International Red Cross to deliver cots; in Anayia, Canadian Contingent delivered five tents and one hundred and sixty blankets and at Politika, seventy cots and two hundred blankets were distributed. At Para, Canadian Contingent delivered eighty blankets, sixty cots and twenty tents.(2) As to the effectiveness of the Canadian Contingent participation in humanitarian assistance, it was confirmed by 30 August, that the refugee problem had stabilized. Most of the refugees had been absorbed into villages. Only one significant camp remained. With Canadian Contingent assistance and help from local authorities, the inhabitants of this camp were comfortable. To cite an example of the Canadian Contingent relief efforts, a United Nations Humanitarian Situation Report stated:

We have a close and co-operative relationship with the IRRC and the results are rewarding. When Major Courbould, whose patrols do much work with refugees, visited one particular camp, he received a standing ovation and an invitation to a camp party in his honour.(3)

- 
- (1) Nicosia District Economic/Humanitarian Situation Report 38/74, August 22 1974.
  - (2) Nicosia District Economical/Humanitarian Situation Report 41/74, August 25 1974.
  - (3) Nicosia District Humanitarian Situation Report (Joint Operations Centre:3350-8)

In effect, it was the United Nations troops on the ground who were able to get the Red Cross established and headquartered in the Nicosia Hilton Hotel along with the United Nations Development Plan. These organizations were established to assist both communities. Although both sides disliked the United Nations for one reason or another, particularly the Turkish forces who tended to deprecate the United Nations efforts, an abundant amount of assistance was rendered to both communities. As well, UNFICYP dispatched troops to the southern part of the island to ensure that Turkish villages were not harassed by Greek forces in retaliation for the invasion. Also, prisoners on both sides were treated humanely due to the efforts of UNFICYP. Colonel Beattie summed up the effects of this humanitarian assistance stating: "This greatly enhanced (Canadian Contingent and UNFICYP as a whole) the United Nations reputation for fairness, sympathy and quick action."(1)

Humanitarian assistance which had begun slowly prior to 20 July, was now a full fledged responsibility of the United Nations and the Canadian Contingent led the way in this endeavour. Although the mandate has never officially been changed, humanitarian assistance had become a fourth provision of the 1964 mandate of UNFICYP.(2)

---

(1) Beattie, op cit.

(2) Ibid.

## CONCLUSION

The Cyprus conflict was the first instance in which a United Nations Force was, in some measure, transformed from a buffer between two communities, to a barricade between two opposing armies. The United Nations Force did all it could, within its power, to ensure that cease-fires, as implemented or called for by the Security Council, were observed.(1) With the demand for a cease-fire and the calling of all interested parties to co-operate with UNFICYP in carrying out its mandate, the Security Council was changing the political nature of the original mandate. The Force Commander now had the sanctioned authority of the United Nations to attempt to ensure and supervise, legally called for cease-fire settlements. What transpired however, was that both parties would frequently choose not to honour cease-fire agreements. It was left to the individual contingents, such as the Canadian Contingent, to negotiate cease-fires at the local level.

The Canadian Contingent took the unprecedented action of declaring its willingness to use force to maintain its position in what was a United Nations area of occupation. The airport incident of 23 July 1974, was diffused by the Contingent Commander who then made the airport a United Nations zone. Colonel Beattie gave ample notice to both sides, that the United

---

(1) United Nations Security Council Resolution 353 (1974) 20 July, para.2.

Nations Force would not be pushed aside or retreat in the face of open aggression against it. The Ledra Palace hotel incident, again re-inforced United Nations involvement in the humanitarian assistance role when three hundred and eighty-six persons were evacuated. But more importantly, the Canadians took the initiative to ensure that this strategically located building did not fall into the hands of either side. Although the Canadian Contingent personnel were forced to evacuate the hotel temporarily, they did return to demonstrate a United Nations presence. On 23 July, after the Turkish forces had threatened to blow up the hotel, they were escorted through the premises in order to convince them that the National Guard were not in possession of the hotel. Once the Turks were satisfied, the Canadian Contingent took over the complete hotel and the immediate surrounding area. To date, the Canadian Contingent is still in possession of this strategically located position on the Green Line.(1)

This type of the the initiative and firmness on the part of Canadian Contingent and UNFICYP, not only saved countless lives, but also demonstrated to both sides, the resolve of the United Nations Force to minimize hostilities. The Commander's designation of Liaison Officers to both leaderships and, his determination to continue patrolling the Green Line during the invasion period, stood out as proof that UNFICYP would continue to play a role in the events on the island. That role would be

---

(1) Beattie, op cit.

that or an impartial organization ready to fulfill its original mandate but, at the same time, willing to extend its responsibilities in order to effect local cease-fires and control United Nations designated zones.

In the area of humanitarian assistance, the Force extended help to both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. This was accomplished through efforts to provide for their safety and to ensure that mistreatment of civilians by either side was minimal. UNFICYP also escorted thousands of civilians to safety into the British Sovereign Base Areas. As well, it provided protection to citizens of both communities when required. During the period of 15 July to 30 August 1974, the Canadian Contingent, as part of UNFICYP, delivered medical supplies, foodstuffs, etc; to all areas in need. It also carried out inspections of areas where civilian detainees were being held, to ensure fair and humane treatment was being administered.(1) During the first weeks of hostilities, there were approximately 800 persons reported as missing from both the Greek and Turkish communities. By 20 August, UNFICYP had located more than 300 missing persons and most were returned to their respective communities. This was accomplished by prisoner exchanges. One of the main exchange points was located at Ledra Palace which was under supervision of the Canadian Contingent.(2) This type of assistance was possible

---

(1) Beattie, op cit.

(2) Ibid.

through the efforts of UNFICYP Headquarters and the International Red Cross, who negotiated this arrangement with Turkish and Cypriot authorities.

On 4 August 1974, the Turkish Embassy passed the following message to UNFICYP in this regard, to be forwarded to the Cypriot authorities:

...Turkey states its readiness to release all civilian Greek and Greek Cypriots who are in the Turkish controlled areas without regard to equality of numbers. Turkey seeks a similar statement from the other interested parties...(1)

Although phase II of the invasion was begun later, this type of persistence by UNFICYP for the exchange of civilian and military prisoners precipitated the return of these to their own communities.

The evacuation of the United States Embassy personnel and their dependents who were threatened with violence by the Greek-Cypriots was another example of the United Nations humanitarian role as was the evacuation of British dependents from the High Commission area. With the Canadian Contingent assistance, many civilians were saved from harm. In most instances, it was the Canadian Contingent which initiated this action.

Throughout the month of hostilities, UNFICYP was constantly in the forefront of events. Its quick response and determination did in fact, have a significant impact on the events as they

---

(1) United Nations Security Council Report S/11353/Add. 15, 15 August 1974.

developed. Although not an overwhelming force in its own right, it did prevent massive bloodshed against the civilian population of both communities.

The Canadian Contingent's determination not to be pushed aside or to retreat to a secure base, enabled the Force to secure local cease-fires and establish United Nations protected zones. It was the first time that a United Nations Force had openly declared United Nations protected areas and, that incursion into these areas by either side was met with armed resistance. The "Thirty Hot Days of Summer", as Brigadier-General Beattie described it, was a time which the United Nations Force not only re-affirmed its presence in Cyprus, but re-defined its original mandate.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Primary Sources

National Defence Headquarters.

United Nations Force In Cyprus, Headquarters Nicosia District,

Daily Operational Log Sheet, Canadian Contingent, 15 July 1974 to 30 August 1974.

Interview With Brigadier-General Clayton Beattie by author, 8 September 1988, Ottawa.

United Nations, Security Council, 22 May 1974, Report by the Secretary General on the United Nations Operations in Cyprus (S/11294)

### External Affairs Documents

Department of External Affairs Canada. "Canadian Answer To The Secretary-General of the United Nations Concerning the Increase of the Canadian Contingent in Cyprus. July 25, 1974.

Department of External Affairs Canada. "Two Urgent Problems: Peacekeeping and the Control of Nuclear Profileration." Secretary of State For External Affairs, at the 29th Session of the United Nations General assembly, September 25, 1974, Pubn. No.74/11.

Department of External Affairs Canada. "Canadian Participation in the United Nations Emergency Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) Communiqué No.79, December 24, 1974.

Department of External Affairs Canada. "Canada's Financial Contribution to the United Nations Family of Organizations." Reference Papers No.93 Appendix B, November 1974.

MacEachen, Allen, J. Peace-Keeping and Cyprus: The Canadian Experience. United Nations Seminar at Mount Allison University, Sackville, New Brunswick, July 4, 1974.

Rae, Saul F. "The Question of Cyprus." Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at the 30th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, November 13, 1975.

"Canada Doubles Number of Peacekeeping Troops in Cyprus." Canada Weekly, Volume 2, No.32, August 7, 1974, p.2.

"Extended Period For Canadians in United Nations Force in Cyprus." Canada Weekly, Volume 2, No.25, June 19, 1974, p.3.

Dobell, William M. "Cyprus: The Politics of Confrontation." International Perspectives, November/December 1974, p.p.3-8.

Jackson, Robert J. "Tragedy Out of Intransigence." International Perspectives, November/December 1974, p.p.9-12.

Leslie, E.M.D. "The Success and Failure of UNFICYP." International Perspectives, November/December 1974, p.p.13-15.

Legault, Albert. "Mediterranean Strategic Triangle."

International Perspectives, November/December 1974, p.p.16-18.

Newspapers

The Globe and Mail June 10, 1974-September 30, 1974. Editorials and Correspondent Reports on the continuing conflict in Cyprus with emphasis to the Canadian participation in UNFICYP and government reaction.

The London Times June 10, 1974-September 1974. Editorials and staff correspondence on the conflict in Cyprus.

The New York Times June 10, 1974- September 1974. Editorial and comments from reporters as to the situation in Cyprus and American reaction.

Amfitheatrof, E. "Bitter Lemons in a Lost Paradise." Time, January 13, 1975, p.24.

Buenham, J. "Out of the Barrel of a Gun." National Review, October 11, 1974, p.1157.

Douglas, J.D. "Cyprus: A Long and Winding Road." Christianity Today, April 12, 1974, p.p.11-13.

Karnov, S. "Cyprus Crisis." New Republic, August 10, 1974, p.p.17-19.

Karnov, S. "Foul Up in the Mediterranean." New Republic,

September 7, 1974, p.p.6-7.

Karnov, S. "Indispensable Man?" interview with Archbishop Makarios, New Republic, September 14, 1974, p.p.11-13.

Karnov, S. "Tough Turkey: Premier Ecevit's Perspective on Cyprus." New Republic, October 5, 1974, p.p.12-15.

Kroon, R. "Blunt Voice From Turkey." Time, August 26, 1974, p.38.

Proffitt, N.C. "Bullets in a Bar." Newsweek, August 5, 1974, p.p.44-45

"Big Troubles Over A Small Island." Time, July 29, 1974, p.p.28-32.

"Cyprus: The Guns of August." Newsweek, September 2, 1974, p.p.32-33.

"Tense Aftermath of a Three Day War." Time, August 5, 1974, p.p.34-35.

U.S. Department of State. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference August 19, 1974. Bulletin 71, September 9, 1974 p.p.353-358.

United Nations. Security Council Documents

United Nations, Security Council, 31 March 1974, Report by the Secretary-General on the Organization and Operation of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (B/5634)

United Nations, Security Council, 16 July 1974,

Identical Telegrams Dated 15 July 1974 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the Acting Permanent Representative of Greece and to the Permanent Representative of Turkey (S/11336)

United Nations, Security Council, 21 July 1974, Report of the Secretary-General on Developments in Cyprus (S/11353-S/11353 Add.1,5-34)

United Nations, Security Council, 21 July 1974, Letter Dated 21 July 1974 From the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11354)

United Nations, Security Council, 22 July 1974, Letter Dated 21 July 1974 From the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General (S/11355)

United Nations, Security Council, 22 July 1974, Exchange of Messages Dated 21 and 22 July 1974 Between the Secretary-General and the Governments of Greece and Turkey (S/11356)

United Nations, Security Council, 22 July 1974, Letter Dated 22 July 1974 From the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General (S/11359)

United Nations, Security Council, 23 July 1974, Letter Dated 23 July 1974 From the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11365)

## Secondary Sources

Attalides, Michael, A. Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979.

Bitsios, Dimitri, S. Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1975.

Enrlich, Thomas. Cyprus 1958-1967. London: Oxford University Press, 1974.

Foley, Charles, and Scobie, W.I. The Struggle for Cyprus. Stanford California: Hoover Institution Press, 1975.

Home, Gordon, C. Cyprus: Then and Now. London: J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1960.

Mayes, Stanley. Makarios: A Biography. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981.

Patrick, Richard, A. Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, 1963-1971. Edited by James H. Bater and Richard Preston, Published by the Department of Geography, Faculty of Enviromental Studies, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, 1976.

Polyvios, Polyvios, G. Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation 1960-1980. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers Inc., 1980.

Polyvios, Polyvios, G. Cyprus: The Tragedy and the Challenge. London: John Swain and Son Ltd., 1975.

Wainhouse, David, W. International Peace Observation. Baltimore:  
The John Hopkins Press, 1966.

Xydis, Stephen, G. Cyprus- Reluctant Republic. The Hague: Mouton  
and Co. N.V. Publishers, 1973.

**National Library  
of Canada**

**Canadian Theses Service**

**Bibliothèque nationale  
du Canada**

**Service des thèses canadiennes**

**NOTICE**

The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the thesis submitted for microfilming.

Please refer to the National Library of Canada target (sheet 1, frame 2) entitled:

**NOTICE**

**AVIS**

La qualité de cette microfiche dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage.

Veillez consulter la cible de la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada (microfiche 1, image 2) intitulée:

**AVIS**



SERIAL	DTC	FROM	TO	EVENT	ACTION
69	0724	CBSN LOG	JOC	HERMES II holding with CONSTANTINE II Loading ramps put into posn by Pers unidentified at AIRFIELD	Note
70	0725	LOG	JOC		Note
71	0723	19	JOC	a. Para drop - Elms re-org appear to be mov North b. TK from TCF circle PAPHOS GATE has moved c. Anti A/C .50 CAL has moved from ELECTRA HOUSE d. No vis contact with HEL from FLOUR MILL	HQ UNFICYP Advised
72	0725	HQ UNFICYP Ngt	084	4 War Ships parked 2 1/2 miles N of KYRENIA Note	
73	0725	HQ UNFICYP	084	GKs mobilizing Reserves PAPHOS Area	Note
74	0730	84	HQ UNFICYP	<u>SITREP</u> - Appears intention of invading force is to secure corridor from KYRENIA HAIROUR	Sent by OPS A
75	0731	PAPHOS II	JOC	a. Harter Bomb fall on house South of (Adjacent to PAPHOS II b. 3 GK civ with them asking for protection. Call passed to CO - note later in LOG	PAPHOS II had to mov slightly due to fire
76	0732	FC	CO CARCON		NOTE
77	0733	OPS A	ALL STM	SITREP : RE SER 74	
78	0735	19	OPS A	HERMES II ;CONSTANTINE II-Re-established	NOTE
79	0740	OPS	JOC LOG	From CO - OPS PLAN-	

000389



SERIAL	TIME	FROM	TO	EVENT	NOTICE
87	0813	1		Flour 0810 hrs fire, light GN & TR. Loc of <del>Flourmill</del> Small area mortars being used (TK NAT COIT into FROCK area)	Loc CC to be adv
88	0814	1	0	11 COY LO prob <del>adv</del> 22 COY LO now in contact with Division.	Passed to CG for SWEAT.
89	0820	1	0	TCF COY CGIDS unhappy with <del>UN</del> Inlet-ventilation. Have we orders from their HQ ref stop firing	Passed to B.A. RCG reply. TCF HQ to dir COY CGIDS.
90	0829	HQ UNIT- CIP	Monitored	9 tanks, 4 M. RH. H. DIRECTORS 7 30' <del>was</del> <del>note</del> April A/B, Plus 100 M. gun, 200, 7 30R 152' 5, 5 more tanks, heading to airport.	Note
91	0830	1	0	11 COY LO advised COY CGIDS. <del>Note</del> stop firing until NAT G. stops mortar firing into his area. (Mortar fire confirmed by LO).	Note
92	0830	81	0	TKS firing 327 929 RL into GN sector 3300 9245.	Note
93	0835	OPS A	9	Complete SITREP discussion of events and OP Plan. - Report to 3 HIC. - Req LO visit to CC TK NAT COY CGIDS	Note - Not done to set up visit by tel.
94	0840	1	0	LOS 22 & 11 COY report check with higher HQ reveals the stop of their stop attitude. Will to ve LO's in position for now	- SAC advised HICCO attempting to send Lt. 11 morning. - SWEAT will not make LO visit to TK NAT COMMAND
95	0842	RECE	0	TK vs GK area MHI .30 cal, .303 are <del>turn</del> <del>again</del>	Note

000393