Some observations on "Issues of Economic Development: the Sub-Saharan African Countries" with a view to designing comparative research on related issues

Some observations on
"ISSUES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
THE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES"
with a view to designing
COMPARATIVE RESEARCH ON RELATED ISSUES

by Professor Ann Seidman

I. ON METHODOLOGY:

This little book provides a useful overall survey of the issues of Sub-Saharan African economic development, and presents several more detailed case studies relating to specific countries. I will not here try to make a detailed evaluation of all the issues raised. Instead, I will focus on key debates which suggest areas for future possible collaborative comparative research needed to formulate more appropriate strategies for development to overcome the crisis that today engulfs most African, and for that matter, most Third World countries.

In this connection, I would like to make an observation concerning the method of analysis employed throughout the book. Obviously, this is an issue for discussion, but it is one which will inevitably become important if we are to work together to design collaborative research to learn from the last several decades of African experience compared to that of China.

As has no doubt become obvious from our earlier discussions, I am convinced that a problem-solving approach provides an important foundation for assessing alternative explanations and proposals for solutions to the kinds of development problems the Third World faces today(1). From this perspective, it seems to me necessary, first, to adequately identify the scope and nature of the crisis currently confronting African countries; and then-- and more important -- to explicitly and critically consider all the alternative theories, widely debated in third world countries, that purport to guide explanations and proposals for solution of that crisis. These range, of course, from neo-classical IMF/supply side analyses through various pragmatic institutionalist/basic needs approaches to socialist/historical materialist outlooks. The critical assessment of all the available explanations for the crisis suggested by each set of theories must aim to determine which seems most consistent with the objective evidence available. Only this will provide a sound basis on which policy makers can propose a strategy logically designed to addresses the causes of the crisis. Only this will neable them to weigh the benefits and costs of their proposal in light of a thorough knowledge of the objective factors it must overcome, as well as the resources which it may utilize. Policy makers can then analyze the consequences of efforts to implement similar strategies in other countries to identify, in advance,

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1. This methodology is described in D. Kalyalya, K. Mhlanga, A. Seidman and J. Semboja, Aid and Development in Southern Africa: Evaluating a Participatory Learning Process (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1985), especially Chapter 2. (I have given a copy of that book to Prof. Ge Ji for the Institute library, and would be happy to discuss the methodology in depth).

the possible pitfalls(2). Only in this sense can comparative research facilitate the formulation of improved development strategies.

In "Issues of Economic development: The Sub-Saharan Countries," however, the authors for the most part have not explicitly identified the theoretical explanations that guide their research. Yet their choice of facts to describe suggests they may have implicitly adopted as a guide a kind mixed supply-side/pragmatic approach significantly influenced by the availability of evidence provided by IMF-World Bank sources. This may explain why so few of the chapters discuss in any depth the role institutional structures, class relationships, and characteristics of the state that many Africanists elsewhere conclude have fostered the distorted resource allocation patterns they picture. It may also explain the seemingly wide divergence of several of the authors' conclusions from those of the recent UN ECA Report on alternative strategies which sharply criticises the consequences of the IMF-World Bank type structural adjustment programs and urges research to formulate an alternative

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2. It should be underscored that no country can simply transfer development policies that appear successful in another country and expect the same results. Inevitably, the circumstances that make those policies "succeed" in country A will differ from those in country B (see, eg, Ann and Robert B. Seidman, A Methodology for Law and Economic Development in China, paper presented at Shandong Univesity, May 14, 1989)

development strategy(3).

If valid, this observation underscores the potential benefits of collaborative research to explore the comparative experiences of post World War II African and Chinese efforts to create new institutions to help overcome the poverty and powerlessness characteristic of most Third World countries. Because of their qualitatively different historically and geographically shaped social, economic and political characteristics, the people of one country can never simply adopt development strategies that appear successful in another. They may, however, learn what issues are most important, and what mistakes to avoid. In other words, they may utilize theories, developed and tested in one context to guide research as to the kinds of difficulties they may expect in another.

My observations on specific chapters, below, are presented in the hope that, as US and Chinese scholars working together with our African colleagues, we can design and conduct collaborative participatory and problem-solving research which may facilitate formulation of more effective Third World development strategies.

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3. See Report recently adopted by the Ministers of Planning and of Finance in Addis Ababa, entitled African Alternative to Structural Adjustment Programmes (AA-SAP): A Framework for Transformation and Recovery, 1989 (E/ECA/CM.15/6/Rev.2).

Chapter I: MACRO ISSUES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA by Chen Zongde:

As an overall review, this chapter encompasses many important issues. Written in 1984, however, it seems to gloss over widespread criticisms that African and other scholars have raised concerning the kinds of analyses endorsed by the IMF and the World Bank (4). Even mild praise (p. 3) for the Cameroun, Ivory Coast and Kenyan development policies hardly appears justified, even from a careful reading of the case studies the book includes. Furthermore, although Tanzania's per capita income remained among the lowest on the continent, the Tanzanian people benefitted from a relatively high -- if not the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa -- Physical Quality of Life I ndex (PQLI) (The chapters on these countries are discussed below). This raises questions as to the criteria researchers should adopt for evaluating development "success."

Several of the issues Chen discusses might benefit from extended participatory research in collaboration with Africans. For example, the expansion of export agriculture, fostered by institutions inherited from the colonial era, utilized the best

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4. The Swedish International Development Association, for example, hosted a conference in 1983 that explicitly documented evidence supporting the already wide-spread crticism of the Berg Report. The proceedings of the conference have been published in English, but I don't have a copy or the reference here. I suppose it could be obtained from the Swedish Embassy.

lands near available transport networks. Colonial regimes had deliberately disrupted pre-existing subsistence agriculture to coerce Africans, mainly men, to work as low-cost labor in mines and on cash crop farms (in West Africa as sharecroppers, typically getting about a third of the crop's value, compared to two-thirds for the land owners; in East, Central and South Africa, on settler owned commercial farms.) Continuing after political independence, this institutionalized process marginalized food crops and those who cultivated them--primarily women, old folk, and children using outmoded technologies. To integrate agriculture into a balanced national (and ultimately regional) economy capable of providing increasingly productive employment and rising living standards for all Africans, requires research into the functioning of these historically-shaped institutions. Perhaps much could be learned from research comparing that experience to China's relating to various forms of collective and individual productive agricultural institutions.

Research could also explore how, in Africa, the population problem presents itself as compared to that in China. Although the objective conditions differ considerably, some parallels seems apparent in the attitudes of rural populations, especially in the case of individual peasant families cultivating the land on their own, who tend to view children as essential farm labor and a guarantee of security in their future old age. In Africa, at least, this suggests the key to achieving population planning rests in attaining development of agriculture and industry in ways required to reduce hand farm labor and provide social security. Can anything be learned here from a comparative study of the consequences of China's shift from collective to individual peasant production about the factors affecting population control in Africa?

In Africa, uneven development persists not only between countries, but -- as is true even in the much larger territory of China -- within natinal boundaries. In Africa, this reflects the pattern of colonial capitalist penetration perpetuated and even aggravated by continued post-independence reliance on export-oriented, rather than integrated national (and regional) development strategies. A comparative study might help discover the role of political economic institutions in perpetuating this process, andproposing alternative approaches.

Chen correctly emphasizes the necessity of improving agricultural policies. I wonder, however, it there is not a need to explain why African industrialization has worsened, rather than helping to solve, the problems confronted. Numerous studies suggest that existing institutional structures -- particularly the transnational corporate manufacturing firms that own shares, provide management and technologies,and control the external markets, as well as state planners and enterprises -- have influenced the post independence industrialization patterns that have played the negative role Chen describes(5). Studies of the African state (and regional) industrialization policies and the institutions developed to implement them compared to those adopted in China might contribute significantly to industrial strategies more likely to foster balanced integrated development.

The discussion of government intervention notes the reduction of "unnecessary government's intervention in economic activities and paying attention to the role of market system and private sector"(p. 15). It fails, however, to note that in Africa this "reform" has been a condition of IMF and World Bank assistance. This, as the UN Economic Commission for Africa Report points out, has thwarted government efforts to restructure externally dependent economies and in some cases contributed to deindustrialization. As the current African crsisi illustrates, n/ international "market forces" are far from the competitive model assumed by those who urge abandonment of state intervention in foreign trade and payments; and turning banking and finance over to private, profit maximizing institutions everywhere in Africa has not only tended to increase foreign domination, but also to aggravate distorted investment patterns and inflationary pressures. It is true that nowhere can government supervise and

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5. See A. Seidman, "How Southern African industrialization undermined peasant agriculture" in Journal of African Studies, 1987; this will appear as a chapter in a forthcoming book, A. Seidman, ed., Rethinking Agricultural Transformation in Southern Africa (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1989).

administer aspects of development in every sector; the cultivation and marketing of cabbages, for example, appear better left to individual peasant initiative. Yet the state constitutes the only instrument by which politically organized societies can shape development policies. If third world countries seek to build key industries like iron and steel or chemicals, government must play a role. A careful comparative study of how government institutions have worked in Africa in different sectors of economic development compared with those in China might contribute much to a better understanding of the institutional changes needed to ensure that, in the quite different circumstances prevailing in each country, government plays its essential role in critical sectors.

Chapter 2: SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT SEVERAL ECONOMIC ISSUES OF AFRICA by Tan Shizhong.

This chapter explores in more detail some of the important issues mentioned above. Again, I will focus on some of the questions it suggests that seem to require further research. First, I wonder if section A isn't misleading when it implies a primary task confronting the newly independent countries was the transformation of "the pre-capitalist economic component." Many scholars have shown that the colonial rulers had fundamentally altered the pre-capitalist economies to coerce Africans into a capitalist commodity economy, primarily to serve as a lowcost labor reserve for settler mines and farms. Even in West Africa, Uganda and Tanzania, where peasant agriculture produced export crops, colonial tax and other policies pushed hundreds of thousands of Africans into the migratory labor force that, for a strata of wealthy peasants, made export farming very profitable. In East, Central and Southern Africa, land alienation, coupled with taxes and discriminatory marketing and credit policies, broke up previously self-sufficient agricultural communities and forced millions of Africans to work for below-poverty-line wages in mines, on farms, and eventually factories. The real need was (and is) toprovide African working people and peasants with the skills and resources required to participate fully in balanced, integrated national (and regional) development.

The primary task confronting the new governments, then, was (and remains) to exert control over the commanding heights of the modern export enclaves which enriched a tiny minority of (usually settler) managers-owners or siphoned locally-generated investable surpluses out of the African economies. Only by capturing these surpluses, and reinvesting them to provide skills and resourceds to the mass of the people in a more balanced, nationally integrated industrial and agricultural development could the governments hope to provide increasingly productive jobs and rising living standards for their populations. In some East, Central and Southern African countries, this neccessitated land reform which, for the most part, remained unrealized. All of this points to the need to assess the effect on efforts to integrate agriculture and industry into nationally-oriented development of alternative institutional structures like: a) marketing and production cooperatives, marketing boards, processing and storage activities, b) cooperatives, state farms, etc.; c) state versus private methods of providing credit; and so forth. This might provide a fruitful field for comparative studies.

Section B on "state-owned economy" likewise raises important questions which would benefit from comparative study. In reality, few African states fully "nationalized" much. For the most part, they acquired shares -- sometimes more, sometimes less than 51% -- to esatblish what in China, today, are called "joint ventures." Without adequate plans or institutional controls to guide the relationship to these enterprises to national development, these seldom played the hoped-for roles. Adopting the "autonomous" characteristics typical of state enterprises in capitalist countries (often on the British or French models), the governments left the foreign partners, bent on maximizing their own global profits, to control management, marketing, technology and financial decisions. Incidentally, top government and political personnel holding posts in these enterprises often emerged as a new "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" that increasingly exercised state power, not in the interest of the mass, but to enhance their own positions of power and privlege. In this area, too, comparative studies of the African and Chinese experiences might prove useful.

On page 35, Tan mentions a "unitary economy," a concept which is not generally used in the African literature. If he means a country dependent on one or a few exports, it would be inaccurate to say that it has a history of "several thousand years." More important, however this point emphasizes the need to research the way existing institutions perpetuate the dominant role of one or a few exports, and to assess experiences with alternative metnods of exerting control over the commanding heights in order to achieve more balanced integrated national development. A comparative analysis of African and Chinese foreign trade institutions might prove illuminating.

Chapter 3: ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT by Wu Zhaoqi

Wu's analysis of African development tends to focus on GNP growth, rather than to examine the distorted pattern of resource allocation fostered by the institutional structures inherited from the colonial past. This sort of statistical review, however, fails to reveal the increased dependence on the competitive expansion of crude or semi-processed exports, instead of attainment of integrated national and regional development. Unfortunately, African countries have not increased their economic independence as a result of nationalization, as Wu suggests. Instead, the transnationals have, for the most part, simply reduced their direct investment in ownership, while retaining their grip on management, technology and marketing, which facilitated their drain of the investable surplus locally generated. In other words, the form, but not the essential content, of the exploitative relationships persisted. Since the 1980s, as a result of their distorted externally dependent pattern of development and worsening terms of trade, almost every African country found itself engulfed in crisis.

The assertion that some African governments "blindly pursued socialism" (p. 43) tends to neglect teachings of the historic experience of colonial and neo-colonial capitalism that impoverished the African peoples6. Nevertheless, it does underscore the need to make careful comparative studies of the relationships between existing institutions and prevailing forces of production (including "human capital") as the foundation for implementing a step-by-step transformation towards socialist development. Here, again, a comparative analysis with China's experiences might provide valuable insights.

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6. Note that, because of this experience and to retain legitimacy, almost every African government, including Kenya's, declared it sought to implement socialist policies. In reality, the government leaders often mouthed socialist rhetoric, but showed little concern for any scientific meaning of the word or the essential process of building a new social system.

In light of the UN ECA Report (and a great deal of other evidence) Wu's discussion of "readjustment" programs appears too rosy. These typically still emphasize agricultural exports and fail to analyze the objective role of existing institutions in light of the objective conditions. The role of foreign capital has generated major debate in Africa. Many studies show that creation of "hospitable investment climates" that not only welcome, but even subsidize (through tax credits, infrastructure expenditures, etc.) any and all transnational corporate activities makes their impact on development negative. This suggests the need for careful planning of national and regional resources to determine criteria for admitting investments designed to make specific contributions of technologies, access to markets, etc. Research should help identify the appropriate forms and roles of state enterprise, rather than simply dismantle all government efforts to intervene to build increasingly industrialized nationally and regionally integrated economies. As for the possibilities of arousing the "enthusiasm of domestic private capitalists," a more detailed study of the these groups' skills, capital, and motivations in Africa might lead to more realistic expectations as to their potential contribution to development. A comparative study of the characteristics of the newly emergent private sector in China might prove instructive.

Wu's discussion of inter-regional cooperation opens another important area of study. He rightly emphasizes the SADCC cooperation as a fruitful example. But his discussion of the strictural adjustment programs, especially those fostering competitive devaluation of national currencies, fails to note their destructive consequences in imposing the burden of national crises on the poor. Research here could focus on existing trade and payments institutions in Africa and among China and its Asian trading partners in order to to contribute to proposal for strengthened south-south and regional economic cooperation.

Chapter 4: PROBLEMS CONFRONTING AFRICAN AGRICULTURE by Chen Zonge

I wonder whether it is true that the core of Africa's current crisis lies in agriculture (p. 73) I would argue, rather, that the core of the crisis lies in the way the ruling "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" continued after independence to gear the entire structure of the typical African economy to the export of crude agricultural or mineral products, the import of manufactures and the drain of investable surplus. This perpetuated neglect of food producing areas (7), food production

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7. The Zimbabwe "success story," discussed below, reflects the development of agriculture, not to provide food for the people -- many of whom suffered malnutrition even after indpendence -- but for the mining sectors of southern Africa.

technologies, and food producers (primarily women(8). The negative consequences of industrial development in most African countries reflected, as well as fostered, the post-independence governments' failure to alter this model.

It is essential to distinguish between the agricultural problems affecting, not only North and Sub-Saharan Africa, but also between regions in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially between the peasant cash cropping areas as differentiated from colonial settler agriculture. Incidentally, estimates of investment in agriculture (p. 81) typically neglect the peasants' "human capital" investments, although these contribute a major share of the total agricultural investment in Africa.

As for governments' role in marketing boards, transportation, and processing, this was typically introduced in the colonial era because the private sector either failed to provide the necessary services at all, or charged so much for them that the settler farmers called for government assistance to enable them to profit from their cash crop production, while peasants simply refused to enter into cash crop production at all. This also held true for introduction of marketing cooperatives. Settler farmers established markeing cooperatives for their own crops, excluding Africans. In West Africa, Uganda

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8. For evidence relating to the special problems of women in agriculture and the whole economic development process, see Kalyalya et al, op. cit., pp.106 ff.

and Tanganyika (now Tanzania), peasant farmers seeking to escape middleman exploitation, began to introduce them with government assistance before independence(9).

The problems of agricultural pricing policy require careful research in each case. The effects of worsening terms of trade characteristic of agricultural exports in the 1970s and 80s inevitably reduced returns to peasants, reducing their incentives to expand production. These must be distinguished from the consequences of inadequate domestic price policies. Lack of adequate transport and storage also hinder expanded output. Unfortunately, IMF advisors typically assume government pricing policies, alone, without regard to other operative factors, discourage peasant agriculture. On the other hand, they also automatically tend to assume that balance of payments deficits arise because of overvalued currency, (rather than worsening terms of trade). Hence, they press for devaluation. Because of oversupply on the world markets, however, devaluation does little to increase a country's world sales. Instead, it simply reduces real returns to the peasants as rising costs of imports stimulate inflationary pressures. Competitive devaluation among African countries also tends to thwart efforts to increase intra-African trade. Comparative study of African experience with Chinas as

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9. Lord Lugard called these an essential feature of "indirect rule"; see his introduction toDuSautoy, "Community Development" cited in R.B. Seidman, Law, State and Development (New York: Croom Helms, 1978)

the yuan's value has steadily declined since 1978 might prove fruitful.

The issue of technology in Africa, too, requires study. In part, the question is how to increase the education, skills and capital of small peasants to facilitate a transition to the use of modern inputs while avoiding stratification that would limit the simultaneous expansion of the domestic market required to reduce dependence on exports. In other words, here, too, the issue is not simply how to acquire the appropriate technology, which requires determination of the appropriate industrial strategy; but also what kinds of institutions will facilitate its use and simultancously contribute to more balanced, integrated national development. A comparative study of the kinds of institutions used to introduce new technologies in China and Africa might help to find answers to critical questions in this area.

Chapter 5: ON THE PROBLEM OF AFRICAN DEBTS by Li Qiling

Li formulates the problem well here. However, it may be argued that he neglects one aspect of the underlying explanation an understanding of which would facilitate formulation of appropriate solutions. He argues African countries lacked funds (p. 92), but fails to point out that in fact their economies generated significant amounts of investable surplus. Some

Africanists argue the cause of the apparent lack of capital lay in the new governments' failure to take measures to halt the drain of investable surpluses in the form of profits, interest, dividends and negative terms of trade. To claim that such measures frighten away foreign investment ignores the harsh reality that foreign investment declined sharply in the 1970s and 80s anyway as transnational corporations reduced their direct holdings. Instead, they depended largely on loans, typically guaranteed by African and foreign governments, to finance the infrastructure required to expand lowcost exports and third world markets required to maximize their global business profits. The drain of investable surplus shifted from the form of profits to the high interest rates that Li describes (p. 95). Furthermore, African countries' currency devaluations, while reducing the real returns from their exports, tended to increase the cost of their foreign debts (as well as all other imorts) since these were typically denominated in external 'hard' currencies.

Li describes the other external and internal factors that have aggravated Africa's debt problems in recent years. It may be argued, however, that most of these reflect African governments' failure to capture and redirect their own national investable surpluses to restructure their distorted internal resource allocation and reduce their external dependence. Their vigorous efforts compete to attract foreign investments seriously undermined the contribution those investments might have made to their economies. But, in the continent-wide competition to create a hospitable investment climate, South Africa's minority-ruled militry industrial complex won; it attracted roughly two times as much manufacturing investment as all the rest of sub-Saharan Africa put together. All of which suggests the need to study how and with what institutional controls Third World countries should seek to obtain foreign investments that effectively complement their own efforts to capture their own locally generated investable surpluses to finance their own plans.

CASE STUDIES:

The case studies raise questions of detail that suggest the potential richness of comparative research directed at the critical development issues identified above. They also again raise methodological questions. For example, why does Dong start with Lewis' theory which, in typical neo-classical style, tends to ignore the historically-shaped class structures, and the role of the state and the legal order that coerced Africans into a migratory labor force? Doesn't starting with such a theory tend to obscure essential institutional questions that must be answered to evaluate Benin's development strategy, such as why agricultural cooperatives work in some cases, but not in others? or why one government bank works, but not others? or whether

Benin can really depend on expanded agricultural exports, or should it seek to develop regional cooperation with neighboring countries? These and many more institutional issues would provide fruitful ground for comparative research.

Again, in the case of Cameroun, wouldn't Zhuang's study have benefitted from an analysis of the class structures and the distribution of benefits resulting from exploitation of oil. In recent years,oil -- not better development policies-- provided the key source of increased GNP and revenues which he suggests reflect "successful" development. Zhuang mentions that the emirs continued to govern the peasants (p. 159), but does not provide evidence as to the consequnences for peasant participation in the nation's alleged "success." He mentions the role of the French (p. 164) and transnational corporations (p. 112), but provides little data to reveal either the share of Cameroun's investable surplus they drained away or the consequences for Camerounian investment.

Gao states Kenya's development is "considered one of the best" but he does not evaluate the criteria used for that assertion. Later, his own data reveals the growth of inequality and poverty, but he doesn't show why or how the strategy adopted by the Kenyan government contributed to it. His discussion of Kenya's agricultural strategy ignores its role in fostering stratification and growing unemployment. He does not explain that a significant factor in Kenya's industrial growth was its status as a East African regional transnational corporate subcenter. Nor does he discuss how the shift to labor intensive manufactured exports (if successful, given Third World competition in this field) would simply constitute a new way of extracting investable surplus produced by low cost Kenyan labor. He discusses joint ventures, but doesn't show how the form they took fostered the emergence of a "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" that, together with Africanization of commerce, contributed to a significant new African ruling class. In short, his analysis does not identify the causal factors that inevitably culminated in Kenya's 1980s crisis, or how the government's "adjustments" tended to throw its burden on the poor.

Qian's analysis reveals the importance of oil in Nigeria's development. However, he doesn't explain how the evolving class and state structures contributed to the the nation's failure to capture and reinvest the resulting investable surplus in balanced national development. As a result, when oil prices plummeted, Nigeria, too, found itself engulfed in a pervasive crisis.

He characterizes Zimbabwe's development as "quite successful," but again neglects to provide criteria for that assessment. It might be noted that, under conditions of UDI, the pre-liberation government had ended all profit remittances (a policy quickly reversed by the newly independent government which pursued conventional western wisdom to attract foreign capital). The resulting reinvestment of 25% of the GNP led to a 8-10% growth of industry from 1966 to 75. This made Zimbabwe, next to South Africa, the most industrialized country in sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, the 6000 (white) commercial farms that owned the most fertile, well-watered half the nation's farm land (of which they only used about half productively) employed African labor for a pittance to produce 90% of the country's marketing crops. Meanwhile, the real living standards of the African population fell.

One may question whether post-independence reconstruction of Zimbabwe was "more difficult" than elsewhere, and whether the whites' role was as important as He suggests. In the past, land alienation and government sponsored discrimination had prevented African peasants from competing with white farmers; and denied them entry into managerial posts in industry and commerce. Nevertheless, there were far more Zimbabwe university and secondary school graduates at independence than elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as a more skilled industrial labor force.

Whatever the reality, despite the new government's socialist rhetoric, fear of losing white skills provided the rationale for the government adoption of a state capitalist policy of of sharply limited land reform and a form of collaboration with the transnational corporations which actually fostered deindustrialization. He's evaluation overstates the extent of agricultural resettlement, which provided land to less than 10% of the 900,000 peasant families struggling to survive on the communal areas (former tribal trust lands <10>). The alleged "success" of communal land peasants in reality related only to the 15% somewhat larger peasants who lived on relatively fertile lands and receive the credit provided by the state Agricultural Bank(11). Education expanded rapidly, but failed to relate adequately to the technical and productive structures, so that by the mid 1980s nine out of ten high school graduates failed to find jobs appropriate to their acquired skills. The cause of unemployment did not, however, lie in excess population (compare, p. 256). Rather it reflected industrial and agricultural growth, not to meet the needs of the population, but to maximize the profits of the transnational corporations and domestic commercial classes (now including members of the emerging African bureaucratic bourgeoisie<12>).

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10. The pre-independence government's experts had said that at least a third of those families must be removed from the reserves to end the overcrowding and overuse that rendered them incapable of supporting their inhabitants.

11. For details see Dan Weiner's chapter in Seidman, ed., Rethinking Agricultural Transformation in Southern Africa, op. cit.

12. It is unclear why He uses sources like the Whitsun Foundation for this evaluation, since it constitutes a "liberal" capitalist (largely white) consultant group which aimed to persuade Zimbabwe's new rulers to adopt the Kenyan model to ensure implementation of typical British "going in order to stay" policies.

Failure to alter the inherited institutional structures to retain the existing locally generated surpluses led to rapid expansion of foreign debt, and eventually to IMF intervention, austerity and devaluation. The resulting limited "economic growth" did not benefit the mass of the population: imported high tech machinery and equipment (replacing previously locally produced labor intensive technologies) aggravated unemployment; rising inflation wiped out the initial wage increases; and real living standards fell below 1980 levels(13).

Nan tends to overlook the extent to which the Europeans' invasion of Tanzania (then Tanganyika) imposed institutions that coerced Africans into a cheap labor force. They forced Africans to work on foreign owned coastal sisal estates and peasant owned coffee and cotton farms as well as migrating to mining and farm areas in neighboring colonies. In the mid 1960s, Tanzania's new government initially sought to adopt policies incorporating the conventional western wisdom of attracting foreign investment, but, in competition with Kenya, these failed. At the same time, the government encouraged the peasants to multiply cash crop exports, but worsened terms of trade reduced their anticipated earnings. These factors contributed to the 1967 Arusha Declaration which sought to increase national control over the inherited institutions governing the commanding heights.

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13. See Robert Davies article in Review of African Political Economy, approximately 1985 (I don't have the exact citation here)

Unfortunately, however, the government did not exercise its partial control toformulate and implement an adequate industrial strategy to reduce the economies' dependence on exports. In evaluating the consequences of the Arusha Declaration and ujamaa villagization, Nan may not have adequately considered the consequences of the war with Uganda, the early 1970s drought, and the worsened terms of trade which deprived Tanzania of much needed foreign exchange earnings to import the essential goods required by its still externally dependent economy. While the evaluation of the adjustment to the resulting crisis seem fair, further research into the details of the institutional changes introduced seems necessary to assess the underlying causes of the difficulties Tanzania confronted.

III. CONCLUSION:

In short, this overall survey raises many key issues relating to problems of development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Debates over details of the analysis, however, can really only be settled by further research relating, in particular, to the basic institutional changes made and their consequences for efforts to achieve national and regional integration capable of providing increasingly productive employment opportunities and rising living standards for the majority of Africans. In this sense, the book suggests a fruitful research agenda for comparative studies, not only of African countries' post-independence experiences, but those in China. For this purpose, I would suggest we discuss the possibility working together with our African colleagues to utilize a participatory, problem-solving methodology to conduct comparative research.