

**COHERENCE AND INCLUSIVENESS
IN UNITED NATIONS POST-CONFLICT ENGAGEMENTS**

THE DEPRESSION OF THE LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING PROJECT.
THE CASES OF SIERRA LEONE, BURUNDI AND
THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

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SUPERVISOR

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To my Catalan and Bosnian families

“Man shall never learn
As man against man
Reverberates through the spine
With every quaking step
As the brilliant sun shows the way”

Abdulai Walon-Jalloh

Declaration

Date: 14 September 2017.

I certify that the work contained within has been composed by me and is entirely my own work. No part of this thesis has been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

Small parts of chapters Three have been published in Torrent, I. (2016): “Application of an Analytical Frame for Armed Conflicts. A Comparison of the Cases of Burundi and the Central African Republic”, ICIP Working Papers 2016. Web Access: http://icip.gencat.cat/web/.content/continguts/publicacions/workinpapers/2016/WP2016_1.pdf

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Ignasi Torrent

Abstract

This dissertation seeks to examine the United Nations (UN) political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements within the frame of the liberal peacebuilding project. Through a comparative analysis of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) post-conflict engagements utilizing the cases of Sierra Leone, Burundi and the Central African Republic (CAR), this research examines two major strategic goals. On the one hand, it analyses coherence, a technical aspect meaning first, the synergy between the New York-based UN headquarters and field missions and second, intracoordination amongst UN teams in the field. On the other hand, it examines inclusiveness. This means the extent to which these post-conflict engagements have included different stakeholders in peacebuilding processes, specifically the local civil society and regional actors. The dissertation then addresses explanatory factors and implications of the DPA and PBA failure in reifying coherence and inclusiveness within the frame of UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements as well as how this unfulfilled challenge has contributed to the current depression of the liberal peacebuilding project.

Resum (Catalan)

Aquesta tesi pretén analitzar els processos polítics i de construcció de pau postbèl·lics de l'ONU en el marc del projecte liberal de construcció de pau. Mitjançant una anàlisi comparativa dels processos postbèl·lics liderats pel Departament d'Afers Polítics (DAP) i l'Arquitectura de Construcció de Pau (ACP) desplegats a Sierra Leone, Burundi i la República Centreafricana, aquesta investigació examina dos objectius estratègics concrets. D'una banda, s'analitza la coherència, un aspecte tècnic que fa referència, en primer lloc, a la sinergia entre la seu de Nova York i les missions operant als països i, en segon lloc, la coordinació interna entre equips de l'ONU desplegats sobre el terreny. D'altra banda, s'examina la inclusió, és a dir, fins a quin punt aquests processos postbèl·lics de l'ONU han inclòs diferents actors al procés de construcció de pau, concretament la societat civil local i els actors regionals. La tesi aborda els factors explicatius i les implicacions del fracàs del DAP i l'ACP a l'hora d'assolir la coherència i la inclusió en el marc d'aquests processos polítics i de construcció de pau postbèl·lics de l'ONU, així com aquest fracàs ha contribuït a la depressió actual del projecte liberal de construcció de pau.

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I also want to thank the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies of the Graduate Center of the City University of New York for giving me the opportunity to develop a visiting research fellowship. I want to mention in particular the wise advice and comments provided by professor Tom Weiss. The support of the staff of the Institute eased the development of interviews with United Nations officers based at headquarters, as well as with other experts on the research topic.

I feel truly indebted to the 26 people I interviewed for the research (see interviewee list in Annex 2). These individuals really provided the most substantive results of my dissertation. Similarly, I also want to thank those experts with whom I spoke to over the last four years about my research and who provided fruitful and constructive comments, amongst others, Pol Bargaés-Pedreny, Oscar Mateos, Itziar Jiménez-Gutiérrez, Albert Caramés, Rob Jenkins, Graciana del Castillo, Mary Clare Lennon, Richard Alba, Michael Doyle, Cedric De Coning, Michael Gaouette, Patty Chang, Thomas Hill. And to David Chandler for his inspiration.

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FOREWORD

During my primary school years, I underwent a life-changing experience, particularly affecting my future academic and professional paths. It was in 1996 when my school promoted a solidarity campaign for the war-torn children of Bosnia and Herzegovina. My fellow pupils and I wrote letters to a pen friend from a school in Tuzla, a north-eastern town in Bosnia. Tuzla is located very close to the border with the Republika Srpska and was one of the most devastated areas during the bombings. After about one month from having sent the first letter, we all began receiving responses from our pen friends from that school in Tuzla. My new pen friend was called Admir and we were both nine years of age. At the time that I first wrote him, I had barely heard of this thing called war. It was through Admir's words and pictures in his letters that I started identifying some concepts and figures, creating with a vague and unclear idea of what war was. Tanks, soldiers, peace, love and family were some of the images he was reproducing over and over in every single letter. Our friendship is now twenty years old, we have exchanged dozens of letters (over the last decade, e-mails), I have visited him in Tuzla a few times, him and his family has also visited us in Catalonia and I love his family and friends as much as I love mine. This was how, thanks to that solidarity campaign, I first became interested in the phenomena of war and peace, and over time, how to better understand both.

From my undergraduate studies in Political Science at the University of Barcelona, which I concluded in 2009, I began a master's degree in International Relations and Security at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. During that time, I took one academic course within an Erasmus program at Charles University in Prague (Czech Republic), where I focused on Eastern European Politics and where I achieved a richer knowledge about conflicts which stemmed from the fade of the communist world in the early 1990s. Perhaps paying tribute to Admir and his family, I wrote my master's thesis on the post-conflict reconciliation process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Shortly after defending my master's dissertation I moved to Flensburg (Germany)

where I worked for one year for the European Center for Minority Issues as the co-responsible for the conflict and security research cluster. From there, in 2013 I moved back to Barcelona to engage with a doctoral program in the field of peace and conflict studies at the Department of Public International Law and International Relations at Pompeu Fabra University.

During the development of my PhD, I developed a 3-month research stay in Freetown (Sierra Leone), where I completed part of the data collection phase for my research on United Nations post-conflict engagements. I also lectured at the Peace and Conflict Department at Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone. Afterwards, during the first term of 2017, I completed a 3-month research stay at the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies of the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, through which I had the opportunity to interview United Nations officers based at headquarters, thus completing the data collection phase.

By and large, my academic and professional career has always touched on themes of war, conflict or peace. Indeed, that solidarity campaign in my primary school was my formative encounter with the butterfly effect, which is at the core of the chaos theory that we all live embedded in.

Freetown, 19 August 2016
(Updated: Saldet, 11 August 2017)

Ignasi Torrent Oliva

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

- AGE (Advisory Group of Experts)
- AMIB (African Mission in Burundi)
- AMISOM (African Union Mission to Somalia)
- APC (All People’s Congress)
- APRD (*Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et la Démocratie*)
- AFRC (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council)
- APSA (African Peace and Security Architecture)
- AU (African union)
- BINUB (United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi)
- BINUCA (United Nations Integrated Office in the Central African Republic)
- BLTP (Burundi Leadership Training Program)
- BNUB (United Nations Office in Burundi)
- BONUCA (United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic)
- CAR (Central African Republic)
- CDF (Civil Defence Force)
- CEB (Chief Executive Board)
- CEMAC (Central African Economic and Monetary Community)
- CENI (*Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendant*)
- CNDD-FDD (*Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie*)
- COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa)
- CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement)
- CPJP (Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace)
- DaO (Delivering as One)

DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration)
DfID (Department for International Development)
DFS (Department of Field Support)
DPA (Department of Political Affairs)
DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping Operations)
EAC (East African Community)
ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States)
ECGLC (Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries)
ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council)
ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group)
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States)
ERSG (Executive Representative of the Secretary General)
EU (European Union)
EUFOR RCA (European Union Force in the Central African Republic)
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (European Union Force in the Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic)
FDPC (*Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricaine*)
FNL (*Forces Nationales du Libération*)
FOMUC (*Force Multinationale de la Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale*)
FRODEBU (*Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi*)
FROLINA (*Front de Libération Nationale*)
FUNDS (Future United Nations Development System)
GA (General Assembly)
HIPPO (High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations)
HLP (High Level Panel)
ICC (International Criminal Court)

ICGLR (International Conference on the Great Lakes Region)

IMPP (Integrated Missions Planning Process)

IPBS (Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy)

Iramuteq (*Interface de R pour les Analyses Multidimensionnelles de Textes et de Questionnaires*)

JVMM (Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism)

MAPROBU (French acronym for African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi)

MEUNB (*Mission d'observation électorale des Nations Unies au Burundi*)

MICOPAX (Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic)

MINURCA (United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic)

MINURCAT (United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic)

MINUSCA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic)

MISAB (Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Bangui Accords)

MISCA (International Support Mission to the Central African Republic)

MRU (Mano River Union)

MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières)

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)

NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia)

OAU (Organization of African Unity)

OCDE (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development)

OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights)

ONUB (*Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi*)

ONUC (*Opération des Nations Unies au Congo*)

ONUMOZ (United Nations Operation in Mozambique)

ONUSAL (United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador)

PALIPEHUTU (*Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu*)
PBA (Peacebuilding Architecture)
PBC (Peacebuilding Commission)
PBF (Peacebuilding Fund)
PBSO (Peacebuilding Support Office)
PDC (*Parti Démocrate Chrétien*)
PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper)
PSC (Peace and Security Council)
RC (Resident Coordinator)
RCI-LRA (Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army)
RSLAF (Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces)
RUF (Revolutionary United Front)
SC (Security Council)
SG (Secretary General)
SLA (Sierra Leonean Army)
SLPP (Sierra Leone People's Party)
SRSG (Special Representative of the Secretary General)
SSR (Security Sector Reform)
TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission)
UCDP (Uppsala Conflict Data Program)
UFDR (*Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement*)
UFR (*Union des Forces Républicaines*)
UN (United Nations)
UNAMSIL (United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone)
UNCI (United Nations Commission for Indonesia)
UNCT (United Nations Country Team)
UNDAF (United Nations Assistance Development Framework)

UNDG (United Nations Development Group)

UNDOCO (United Nations Development Operations Coordination Office)

UNDP (United Nations Development Program)

UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force)

UNFSO (United Nations Field Support Office)

UNFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus)

UNIC (UN Information Center)

UNICEF (United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund)

UNIOSIL (United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone)

UNIPSIL (United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone)

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)

UNMOGIP (United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan)

UNOCA (United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa)

UNOMSIL (United Nations Observation Mission in Sierra Leone)

UNOWA (United Nations Office for West Africa)

UNPO (United Nations Peace Operations)

UNSF (United Nations Security Force)

UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia)

UNTAG (Namibian United Nations Transition Assistance Group)

UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization)

UNSCOB (United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans)

UPC (*Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique*)

UPRONA (*Parti de l’Unité et du Progrès National*)

WANEP (West African Network for Peacebuilding)

WHO (World Health Organization)

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

War is one of the most self-destructive inventions of humankind. Although armed conflicts have been decreasing in terms of absolute number over the last 10 years, the number of fatalities has increased (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015), revealing that war practices are becoming more brutal in human costs terms. Structural changes in the international context over the last three decades have remarkably transformed the way war and peace is understood (Dayton and Kriesberg, 2009). This gradual process has been fundamentally marked by rapid technological progress of communication facilities and military techniques. On the one hand, the consolidation of affordable transport across the globe as well as the impact the internet has had on the nature of communications has blurred traditional borders of the Westphalian State. On the other, current highly technified military progress has brought violent conflict to an uncertain terrain where the classic state struggles to maintain its dominant position on the international stage.

These and further structural transformations have encouraged the international community to adopt new paradigms more suitable for coping with challenges that this post-Westphalian society poses for current armed conflicts. The United Nations (UN) has become, at the discursive level, the world leading international organization in the maintenance of peace and has headed the conceptualization and institutionalization of cutting-edge approaches to peace engagements. Nonetheless, the results of operationalized UN missions in the field are often rather limited and interrogated (Weiss, 2016). In this changing period post-conflict peacebuilding, a multidimensional process designed to overcome the roots of conflict and establish durable peace, has turned out to be the dominant operational policy framework in UN-led post-conflict contexts.

Rooted in the democratic peace theory, which posits that democracies are expected to not fight each other (Doyle, 1983), and the claims of expansive liberal cosmopolitanism, which aims for the construction of

a global civil society (Kaldor, 2003), peacebuilding strategies have become throughout the last three decades highly associated with a behind-the-scenes intention of the international community, including the UN. This intention is described as being focused on the export of liberal democracies in conflict-affected countries around the world. The ultimate goal is to homogenize a Western-mirrored peaceful world system, what has been known among critics as the “Liberal Peacebuilding Project” or, put more simply, the “liberal peace” (see Richmond, 2005).

The almost 30-year liberal peacebuilding project is, at the time of writing, in profound crisis (see Chandler, 2017). Most assisted contexts under the UN peacebuilding framework have not been pacified and, furthermore, violent outbreaks are (re)emerging in different parts of the world, as case studies of Burundi and the Central African Republic show in the third part of the dissertation. Liberal democracies have not been settled through UN-led engagements in conflict affected countries and, surpassing this, non-liberal forms of social and political organization seem to (re)emerge not only in the developing world, but also at the heart of the West.

My dissertation aims to be an account of the rise and fall of the liberal peacebuilding project through the analysis of the starring character, the UN. The research attempts to critically reflect on the failure of UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements led by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the new Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA)¹. I intend to argue that the UN’s failures in implementing peacebuilding processes along with its recent attempts to abandon the peacebuilding framework and operationalize a new approach to peace engagements, namely sustaining peace (see Advisory Group of Experts, 2015), reinforces the current depression of the liberal peacebuilding project.

¹ The PBA comprises the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), which is the main organ and is assisted by the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF).

Throughout the dissertation I intentionally use the concept “depression” to describe the current state of the liberal peacebuilding project. This is so for two reasons. The first reason being, in this thesis I understand a "depression" as being a protracted crisis, and the liberal peacebuilding project has been described by critical scholars as being in crisis for over a decade. Second, depression, along with despair, exhaustion and weariness, is the state of mind that I perceived most perspicuously during interviews. In many whom I interviewed, both from within and outside the UN system, I distinguished a depression which seemed to be caused by the impossibility of the international community, particularly the UN, to pacify and bring durable peace to conflict-affected societies.

1. Research questions, value, objectives and hypothesis

The over-arching question that has motivated my research is why the UN has failed in its pursuit of establishing lasting peace in conflict-affected countries through political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements, and what are the implications this failure has had on the liberal peacebuilding project². In an attempt to narrow and focus this question, I was required to identify strategic goals which resulted as suspiciously unsuccessful in the frame of these UN post-conflict engagements. I was then made to analyze them in depth and, based on the empirical results, draw on explanatory factors for this failure and critically reflect on implications for the liberal peacebuilding project as a whole.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a first wave of highly political UN-led post-conflict engagements in countries including Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique were successful, to a certain extent, in supporting these nations from a state of violence or non-democratic regime to a peaceful democratic system. Throughout the second half of

² Whenever I mention UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements, UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict missions or simply post-conflict engagements or post-conflict missions, I refer to UN peace engagements led by either the DPA or the PBA.

the 1990s, however, the UN experienced a retraction of member states, causing a shift away from peace engagements as a result of disastrous missions in countries such as Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda and Angola.

In the context of this first major crisis in the late 1990s, peace-oriented engagements received harsh criticism. Critical literature of the liberal peace was especially elaborated upon within two major critiques (Chandler, 2010a). On the one hand, the so-called “policy” critique argues that externally led interventions in conflict-affected contexts need to enhance technical expertise, strengthen the standardization of strategies and focus on rebuilding host institutions before accommodating a liberal democratic system (Paris, 1997). On the other, the so-called “radical” critique advocates for the transfer of the agency of the peacebuilding processes to move from an external actor, like the UN, to local actors (Pouligny, 2006), thus breaking the hierarchy imposed by externally-led engagements.

These two critical trends have contributed to reshaping international peacebuilding policy frameworks. Firstly, the authors arguing for the technical standardization of peacebuilding processes contributed to the emergence of the technocratic turn, reified through statebuilding processes (Paris, 2004). This has consisted in focusing on the (re)building of state structures in war-torn societies, as the cases of Iraq, Afghanistan or the Democratic Republic of Congo illustrate. Secondly, the radical critique, vindicating the breach of the hierarchical relation between the intervenors and the intervened, contributed to the emergence of the local turn (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). This local turn consisted of the empowerment of host societies and a more context-sensitive and bottom-up approach in the frame of externally led peacebuilding processes, enabled through the operationalization of principles such as local ownership.

Alongside this context of crisis, criticism and policy turns, the UN has struggled to reshape and re-address the efficiency of its peacebuilding policy framework. During the turn of the century, the UN responded to the crisis through the deployment of DPA-led integrated special

political missions and the creation of the new PBA in 2005³, which has led to the narrow research question of this thesis. Through a comparative analysis of DPA and PBA post-conflict engagements in the cases of Sierra Leone, Burundi and the Central African Republic (CAR), this research examines two major strategic goals. On the one hand, it analyzes coherence, a technical aspect meaning first, the synergy between the New York-based headquarters and the field mission and second, intracoordination among UN teams in the field⁴. On the other, it also examines inclusiveness, meaning the extent to which these UN-led engagements have included different stakeholders in the peacebuilding processes, specifically the local civil society and regional actors⁵. In all, the dissertation addresses explanatory factors and implications of the UN failure in achieving coherence and inclusiveness in the frame of political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements. Furthermore, it analyzes whether these factors have contributed to the depression of the liberal peacebuilding project.

I consider that the value of this research to be twofold. Firstly, this dissertation has been developed between 2014 and 2017. This is valuable to note as it coincides with the emergence of the critiques of the policy and radical critiques and, more in particular, of their policy outcomes, namely the technocratic turn and the local turn. In other words, the argument of this thesis seeks to contribute to the so-called critiques of critiques (Millar, 2016), which identify hindrances presented by the local turn in its ability to bring success to peacebuilding frameworks. My perspective calls for an awareness aimed to avoid

³ The focus on the work of the DPA and the new PBA does not mean that other UN departments, agencies or programs such as the DPKO, the UNDP, the OHCHR or UNHCR, *inter alia*, do not perform tasks that could be framed in the conceptual and operational structure of the UN peacebuilding endeavor. This limitation of the scope of the study simply responds to resources and time constraints.

⁴ Coherence is included in Art. 97 of the resolution establishing the PBC (General Assembly, 2005a). For literature on coherence and peacebuilding, see Campbell, 2015; De Coning and Starnes, 2016.

⁵ Inclusiveness of stakeholders is included in Art. 98 of the resolution establishing the PBC (General Assembly, 2005a). For literature on inclusiveness of local civil society and peacebuilding, see Mac Ginty, 2011; Nilsson, 2012; for literature on inclusiveness of regional actors and peacebuilding, see Clement and Smith, 2009; Kaminsky, 2011.

reproducing the failed steps taken by the preceding policy and radical critiques, as well as their policy outcomes. By “failed steps”, I refer to, for example, the problem of radical critiques and resulting local turn, which, instead of genuinely empowering local actors, perpetuated the binary intervenors-intervened framework, based on an essentialized difference and a hierarchy encouraged between liberal Western intervenors and a different local (Sabaratnam, 2013). Thus, the thesis seeks to contribute, along with further critiques of critiques, to the set of explanatory factors that account for the failure of local-oriented policies, and therefore the overall liberal peacebuilding project.

Secondly, the timing of this dissertation is valuable to note because during the development of this research the new PBA celebrated its 10th anniversary (2005-2015). It has, therefore, undergone its first major evaluation and revision process (Advisory Group of Experts, 2015). For this, I consider this dissertation as being uniquely timed, an opportune moment to address this research topic.

To address the research question, the dissertation attempts to fulfil four major objectives. Firstly, the research intends to analyze the extent to which DPA missions and PBA engagements have been coherent in the frame of political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements. The thesis secondly seeks to examine to what extent PBA engagements have included local civil society and regional actors in post-conflict engagements. Thirdly, in light of evidence that the DPA and the PBA have had limited success in fulfilling these two strategic goals, the dissertation aims to identify explanatory factors of the UN failure in fulfilling the challenges of coherence and inclusiveness in the frame of examined post-conflict engagements. Finally, from a critical reflection on the implications of these fruitless results, the research intends to argue that this UN failure has contributed to the current depression of the liberal peacebuilding project. Beyond these objectives, the dissertation also lays the foundation for future lines of research on UN peace engagements in conflict-affected societies thus encouraging reflection on the catch-all liberal peace.

My initial hypothesis determined that the UN failure in avoiding relapse into violence in post-conflict contexts despite the deployment of political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements has reinforced the overall failure of the liberal peacebuilding project. Specifically, I focused on the failure of the DPA and the PBA to meet its strategic goals of coherence and inclusiveness in post-conflict programs. These foci were identified on the basis of preliminary results of phase 1 of the analysis, described later in this introduction, which consisted of software-assisted content analysis of UN documentary data. Defining hypotheses through preliminary results of the ongoing analysis has been described by social scientist Howard Becker under the term “analytical induction” (Becker, 1953). After identifying a lack of coherence and inclusiveness of local civil society and regional actors in the frame of UN post-conflict engagements, my work resulted in an analysis in a disaggregate form of why, on the one hand, DPA integrated special political missions and, on the other, the PBA, could not fulfill these two strategic goals and, ultimately, how this contributed to the current state of depression of the liberal peacebuilding project.

2. Methodology

This thesis is framed in the critical peace and conflict studies research agenda, based on an epistemological approach that critically reflects on the precedents, purposes and implications of peace engagements, thus enhancing the understanding of these phenomena. I assume that the result of UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements is constrained by the beliefs and endeavors of those who attempt to establish world peace through the spread of liberal democracies all around the globe, what has been described by critics as the liberal peacebuilding project. Therefore, the standing methodological point is framed in a post-positivist approach, which sustains that values and beliefs affect cause-effect relationships.

The empirical outcomes of the research stem from a qualitative comparative analysis of UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements in the cases of Sierra Leone, Burundi and the Central

African Republic. Through this comparative analysis, the dissertation identifies shared explanatory factors and implications of the DPA and PBA failure in the pursuit for coherence and inclusiveness in these engagements. This then reveals primarily inductive observations that could be tested in further cases. As described in the following sections, during the analysis I developed software-assisted content analysis, including basic quantitative techniques such as statistical analysis or factorial analysis. Mixed methods, which consists of the combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques, enhance the comprehensive understanding of complex social reality and rewards scholars with empirical outcomes useful for theory testing and development (Thaler, 2015). Indeed, although some authors view quantitative and qualitative methodologies as inherently irreconcilable (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012), many others have effectively combined both methodological approaches in the field of peace and conflict research (Brandom 2008, Varshney, 2008; Collins, 2008).

2.1 Case selection

George and Bennett (2005) define a case as an instance of a class of events taken to be analyzed in order to develop theory (general knowledge) or test an existing theory about the causes of similarities or differences amongst instances of that class of events. Moreover, they argue that a case study approach, consisting of a detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations, may be extrapolated to other events. Establishing the general applicability of a new or modified explanation of a case requires showing that it accurately explains other cases. Nonetheless, these authors also highlight that through a case study comparison the researcher will never achieve full representativeness, meaning that findings will never be applicable to all populations. Furthermore, they highlight that judging the validity of an explanation requires a deep knowledge of the nature of the cases.

In this research, the three cases are selected based on two major criteria. First, all three countries have suffered an armed conflict in the post-

Cold War era and second, the chosen cases have been locations of assistance over last two decades by both the DPA, through integrated special political missions, and the PBA. This illustrates that the UN has made the greatest efforts in terms of political and peacebuilding post-conflict assistance, both discursively and operationally, in these selected countries. For each selected case, Sierra Leone, Burundi and the CAR, three political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements are analyzed (see table 1).

Table 1. Examined UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements.

	t1	t2	
	Department of Political Affairs	Peacebuilding Commission	Department of Political Affairs
Sierra Leone	UNIOSIL (2005-2008)	2007-currently	UNIPSIL (2008-2014)
Burundi	BINUB (2007-2010)	2007-currently	BNUB (2011-2014)
Central African Republic	BONUCA (2000-2010)	2008-currently	BINUCA (2010-2014)

On the one hand, the first wave of missions (t1) includes DPA’s UNIOSIL (United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone), BINUB (United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi) and BONUCA (United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic), all deployed and concluded between 2000 and 2010. On the other hand, the second wave of engagements (t2) includes missions deployed and concluded between 2007 and 2014⁶, namely the three PBC-led engagements in each country as well as DPA’s UNIPSIL (United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone), BNUB (United Nations Office in Burundi) and BINUCA (United Nations Integrated Office in the Central African Republic), all described in chapter Four.

⁶ In the case of the PBC, the three engagements are still on at the time of writing (August 2017).

2.2 Data

This dissertation poses two major methodological challenges. The first concerns the collection, systematization and analysis of a vast amount of secondary documentary data about examined UN post-conflict engagements for comparative text analysis. The second involves access to conflict-affected areas to collect primary data, such as interviews, for comparative discursive analysis. In order to address this, I developed a 3-month fieldwork stay in Sierra Leone, where I interviewed (former) UN officers and external experts knowledgeable of the UN-led post-conflict recovery phase. As I did not have the opportunity to go to Burundi and the CAR, I conducted the interviews with experts on missions deployed in these countries via skype. Moreover, I developed a 3-months research stay in New York, where I had the opportunity to interview UN officers based at the UN headquarters as well as external experts familiar with examined UN post-conflict engagements. Beyond documentary data and interviews, I also collected fieldnotes during my stay in Sierra Leone. Although this ethnographic data has not been systematized for comparative analysis (I do not have ethnographic data for Burundi and the CAR), it aided in capturing a more comprehensive understanding of the local context, thus enriching my overall research approach.

The research thus draws from two main sources of data. First, the thesis analyzes historical documentary data, specifically UN official documents and external documentary data about examined missions. This is in order to ensure that both the UN and external perspectives are taken into account (see table 2. For detailed analyzed documentary data, see Annex 1).

Table 2. Collected and analyzed documentary data.

	United Nations data			External data		
	t1	t2		t1	t2	
Sierra Leone	UNIO-SIL	PBC	UNIP-SIL	UNIO-SIL	PBC	UNIP-SIL
	SC Resolutions SG reports	Instruments of Engagement Reviews and reports	SC Resolutions SG reports	Academic articles Reports	Academic articles Reports	Academic articles Reports
Burundi	BINUB	PBC	BNUB	BINUB	PBC	BNUB
	SC Resolutions SG reports	Instruments of Engagement Reviews and reports	SC Resolutions SG reports	Academic articles Reports	Academic articles Reports	Academic articles Reports
Central African Republic	BONU-CA	PBC	BINU-CA	BONU-CA	PBC	BINU-CA
	SC Resolutions SG reports Letters of the SG	Instruments of Engagement Reviews and reports	SC Resolutions SG reports Letters of the SG	Academic articles Reports	Academic articles Reports	Academic articles Reports

In regard to UN data, for the DPA missions, the analyzed texts are Security Council (SC) resolutions, Secretary General (SG) reports and letters of the SG to the SC. For the PBA, texts analyzed comprise Strategic Frameworks for Peacebuilding and periodic progress reports. Concerning external data, the dissertation analyzes both reports from independent evaluators and articles from scholars assessing examined UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements.

Secondly, I analyze the 45-minute semi-structured interviews that I conducted with 26 individuals working (or formerly working) for the DPA or the PBC as well as other experts from outside the UN

framework. This is, again, in order to include both the UN and the external perspective (for interview and interviewee details, see Annex 2). Specifically, interviewees were asked questions concerning three major topics: the conceptual and theoretical framework of peacebuilding, the UN peacebuilding system in general and examined UN post-conflict engagements' specificities (see table 3).

Table 3. Topics and subtopics analyzed in interviews.

Topics		Subtopics	Interviewee	
			United Nations expert	External expert
Theoretical and conceptual framework for peacebuilding		Peacebuilding definition		
		Statebuilding definition		
		9/11 effect on international interventions		
UN peacebuilding		UN peacebuilding core tasks		
		Integrated offices		
		PBC effect on UN peacebuilding		
UN post-conflict engagements specificities	Elements tackled by the missions (coherence)	UN assert in tackling roots of the conflict		
		UN major success		
		UN major failure		
		Transition from last DPKO-led mission to first DPA-led mission		
		Achievements of t1 peacebuilding-oriented mission		
		Achievements of t2 peacebuilding-oriented mission		
		Achievements of PBC		
		UN intra-coordination		
	Relationship between UN and	UN relationship with host Government		

	stakeholders (inclusiveness)	UN relationship with civil society		
		UN relationship with regional actors		
		UN relationship with International actors		
	Speculative thoughts	Current peacebuilding situation and future prospects for UN peacebuilding- oriented task		
Final comment				

As illustrated in the table above, the third part of the interviews addressed two main subtopics aimed at examining coherence and inclusiveness as strategic goals. This third part of the interviews covers elements that deployed missions tackle on the ground. This part also addresses the relationship between the UN and different stakeholders on the ground. These two issues were useful in complementing the analysis of documentary data for examining coherence and inclusiveness, respectively.

2.3 Phases of analysis

Aiming to examine coherence and inclusiveness as strategic goals in the frame of UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements, the analytical process followed four phases. This included first, the identification of conceptual classes and groups of classes through software-assisted content analysis of documentary data; second, the design and development of interviews; third, the identification of lack of coherence and lack of inclusiveness through software-assisted content analysis and discursive analysis of interviews; and fourth, the analysis of the contribution of DPA integrated special political missions and the new PBA to coherence and inclusiveness of local civil society and regional actors through content analysis of documentary data and discursive analysis of interviews. Phases 1 and 2 of the analysis provide preliminary results that were used to identify further hypotheses through the previously described process of analytical induction. The

empirical results of phases 3 and 4, which comprise the analysis of coherence and inclusiveness, are described in chapters Five and Six, respectively.

a) Phase 1: Identifying conceptual classes and groups of classes through software-assisted content analysis of UN documentary data

Phase 1 consists of a software-assisted content analysis of UN documentary data on examined post-conflict missions to identify and name conceptual classes. In this first phase, I also grouped these classes into groups of classes, specifically three: security, governance and positive peace. This was done in order to facilitate later comparative analysis.

During this first phase of analysis I processed all UN documentary data for each engagement with Iramuteq software (French acronym for R Interface for Multidimensional Analysis of Texts and Questionnaires) to identify conceptual classes. The better-known R software is a free software that allows researchers to do statistical computing and graphics for large amounts of documents, whereas Iramuteq free software uses R to develop text analysis based on the lexical classification method of Max Reinert. The Reinert method allows the researcher to derive different conceptual classes from a given text corpus⁷. These conceptual classes stem from intra-text correlation, meaning that each class contains highly correlated concepts in terms of intra-text frequency and proximity (the software does not call them “concepts” but “active forms”). Iramuteq thus distributes a text corpus in conceptual classes on the basis of intra-text frequency and proximity. In a similar way to the Alceste software, Iramuteq is useful in bridging the gap between quantitative and qualitative methods for text analysis (Hohl et al. 2012).

Once the nine UN post-conflict engagements had been processed through Iramuteq and conceptual classes had been identified through the Reinert method, the subsequent task was to name the resulting

⁷ For further information on Iramuteq and the Reinert method, see: <http://www.iramuteq.org/>

classes on the basis of the conceptual meaning of included concepts (see table 4. In bold, see names given to conceptual classes by myself). From the nine UN post-conflict engagements, Iramuteq identified up to 12 different conceptual classes which I identified as “Security”, “Elections”, “Justice”, “Transitional justice”, “Human rights”, “Development”, “Mission name”, “Peacebuilding strategy” and “Peacebuilding vision”⁸.

This table illustrates three main pieces of information. First, it provides the top 10-used concepts in each conceptual class for each examined engagement. Second, it illustrates the name I provided each conceptual class (in bold). Third, the percentage indicates the intra-content weight or relevance of the class in the frame of all analyzed content for each post-conflict engagement. For example, the first class identified by Iramuteq software for the analysis of all documentary data on the UNIOSIL, which I termed “Human rights”, represents 20% of all UNIOSIL analyzed content.

Table 4. Iramuteq-assisted content analysis of UN documentary data on examined political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements in Sierra Leone based on the Reinert method.

t1			t2					
UNIOSIL			PBC			UNIPSIL		
Class	Most used active forms	%	Class	Most used active forms	%	Class	Most used active forms	%
1. Human rights	Right Woman Human Law Reconciliation Child Gender Truth Action Rule	20	1. Peacebuilding strategy	Framework Present Meeting Commitment Partnership Stakeholder Mutual Government Relevant Peace	33	1. Peacebuilding strategy	Team Vision Agenda PBC Transition Residual Joint Sierra-Leone Prosperity Change	17

⁸ When a class includes concepts that could be framed in more than one class, this class takes the name of the two classes, as in the case with the Sierra Leone PBC which includes the class “Transitional justice and Human rights”.

2. UNIOSIL	Department UNIOSIL Police Officer UNDP Train Adviser Unite Public Office	18	2. Transitional justice and Human rights	Commission Youth Reform Employment Reconciliation Truth Justice Empowerment Capacity- building Woman	38	2. Corruption	Peace Challenge Corruption Effort Conflict Prevention Socio- economic Industry Progress Risk	17
3. Elections	Registration Electoral Party Election Political Voter Conduct Assistance Code Commission	15	3. Peacebuilding vision	Joint Agenda Change Fund Vision Welcome UNIPSIL Effectiveness Team Communiqué	29	3. Elections	Party Political Registra- tion Electoral Dialogue Medium Tolerance Code Association Election	22
4. Peacebuilding strategy	Peace Consolida- tion PBC Peace- building Framework Government Engagement Cooperation Priority Sierra Leone	13				4. Justice	SLPP APC Koroma President Incident Presidential Rule Opposition Attack Freetown	17
5. Security	Force Arm Condition Growth Rate Water Fragile Unemploy- ment Republic Private	21				5. Human rights	Program Right Train UNDP Depart- ment Service Fund Human Technical Support	27

6. Justice	President Taylor Court Special Trial Request APC Secretary-General SLPP Koroma	13						
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In this particular case of UNIOSIL, this 20% represents the highest intra-content weight, meaning that “Human rights” takes the top position, in terms of content analysis, within all documentary data analyzed for this mission. Beyond these three pieces of information, table 4 also indicates, on the basis of the number of classes that each engagement has, whether the scope of the mission focuses on just a few areas or whether it is more multidimensional. Furthermore, through the comparison of the three columns, the evolution of UN post-conflict engagements is also observable in the post-conflict context of the country across time.

Once that was completed, I placed these 12 conceptual classes into groups of classes aiming to simplify the comparative analysis across cases (see table 5).

Table 5. Classes and groups of classes.

	Groups of classes			
	Security	Governance	Positive Peace	Cross-class ⁹
Classes	Security	Elections	Human Rights	Mission name
		Justice	Development	Peacebuilding strategy
		Transitional Justice		Peacebuilding vision
		Corruption		Regional approach
				Humanitarian aid

⁹ This cross-class group has been excluded from the analysis as the conceptual content of its classes is shared by the rest of groups of classes.

The names given by myself to the groups of classes were, again, based on the conceptual content of classes. The result was the definition of three groups of classes, namely Security¹⁰, Governance and Positive Peace, described in Chapter Five.

b) Phase 2: Designing and developing interviews

Phase 2 comprises the design of interviews, a 3-month fieldwork stay in Sierra Leone and a 3-month fieldwork stay in New York developing the interviews, covering, on the one hand, aspects of the host society that were coped with by post-conflict engagements on the ground, and, on the other, the relationship between the UN and examined stakeholders (the Government, the local civil society and regional actors).

Based on the findings of the software-assisted content analysis, I designed semi-structured interviews. These interviews covered, on the one hand, achievements and failures of missions on the ground aiming to explore security, governance and positive peace groups of classes in each mission, and, on the other, the relationship between the UN and different actors, namely the host Government, the local civil society and regional actors. The decision to pick these three actors also stems from the preliminary results of the previous phase of analysis, where I identified that these were the most relevant actors in the frame of examined post-conflict engagements. By basing the content of the interviews on the preliminary software-assisted results of phase 1, the research is able to triangulate the outcome of the qualitative discourse analysis of interviews and the software-assisted results, thus gaining an empirical foundation for the final research outcomes.

Once the interview was designed, I developed a 3-month fieldwork stay in Sierra Leone to interview UN experts and external experts about the examined engagements. For Burundi and the CAR, I conducted

¹⁰ Although the class “Humanitarian aid” could have been framed in the group of classes “Security”, I decided to dedicate this group of classes exclusively to military security issues, that is why this group of classes only includes one class, named alike.

interviews via skype, also including both UN experts as well as external experts with knowledge on the Burundian and CAR cases. In New York, I developed interviews with UN officers based at UN headquarters who had worked for or close to examined post-conflict engagements.

c) Phase 3: Identifying lack of coherence and inclusiveness through software-assisted content analysis and discursive analysis of interviews

Phase 3 examines coherence and inclusiveness as strategic goals based on UN documentary data analysis and discursive analysis of interviews. For analysis of UN documentary data, I distinguish between two different levels of analysis, the normative level, including the mandates of missions, and the operational level, including reports and periodic reviews of tasks developed in the field. To examine coherence, the three groups of classes, Security, Governance and Positive Peace, are taken as an analytical framework to contrast the two levels of analysis and observe whether there is a synergy between the normative and the operational levels, therefore coherence. To examine inclusiveness, the relationship between the UN and different stakeholders, the host Government, the local civil society and regional actors, is also taken as an analytical framework to contrast the two levels of analysis. For both analyzes, I complemented the analysis of UN documentary data with the discursive analysis of interviews with both UN and external experts.

In order to examine coherence (epigraph 2.1 in Chapter Five), I distinguished two levels of analysis. On the one hand, the normative level, including SC resolutions establishing the mandates of the DPA integrated special political missions and PBC frameworks of engagement¹¹, and on the other hand, the operational level, including field reports and periodic reviews of ongoing developments of the

¹¹ Although these strategic frameworks of engagement are not normative in nature, for the sake of the research I took them as so. Thus, the normative level of analysis comprises those documents establishing the mandates of the engagements both for the DPA and PBA missions.

missions on the ground. By contrasting what is planned at the normative level and what is eventually developed in the field, I could examine the synergy between the New York-based headquarters and the operational level, which is a key aspect of coherence. Regarding the second aspect of coherence, meaning intracoordination on the ground, I focused on the analysis of UN documentary data at the operational level. Both aspects of coherence were complemented with discursive analysis of interviews.

I started the analysis on coherence by taking Security, Governance and Positive Peace groups of classes as an analytical framework to compare how different missions across cases dealt with these groups at two levels of analysis, normative and operational. Firstly, at the normative level, it was simple to draw a matrix and organize mandates' references to the three conceptual groups of classes (see Annex 3). As Annex 3 illustrates, at the normative level mandates of examined engagements seem quite multidimensional, dealing evenly with examined security, governance and positive peace groups of classes. Secondly, due to the large amount of analyzed UN documentary data at the operational level, at this point I was again assisted by Iramuteq, which allowed me to use quantitative techniques such as the class-based Reinert method, statistical analysis or factorial analysis as well as conceptual graphs (see Annex 4).

Annex 4 comprises two parts. The first part includes, on the one hand, comparative tables with the class-based Reinert method of analysis of examined engagements for the three countries (see tables 1, 2 and 3) and, on the other, comparative tables with 10 top-used concepts in each examined engagement also for the three countries (see table 4, 5 and 6). Tables 7 and 8 show the same information as the first six tables but classes have been grouped within the previously defined Security, Governance and Positive Peace groups of classes. Through tables from 1 to 8 I argue that, among examined groups of classes, security becomes a priority for UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements at the operational level.

The second part of Annex 4 illustrates further analytical techniques that reinforce the results of the class-based Reinert method of analysis and the top 10-used concepts analysis. Specifically, this second part presents four different analytical techniques assisted by Iramuteq, which are used to examine all UN documentary data for the UNIOSIL, as an example, including first factorial analysis (figure 1), second a class graphic (figure 2), third a word graphic (figure 3) and fourth, a similitude-based analysis (figure 4)¹². As illustrated by these figures, concerning the UNIOSIL operational level, either concepts included in the class “Security” or the class “Security” itself (in comparison to the rest of the classes) are more relevant than concepts and classes included in “Governance” and “Positive peace” groups of classes, thus reinforcing the results of the analysis of the first part of Annex 4, which states that the Security group of is prioritized at the operational level.

In examining inclusiveness (epigraph 2.1 Chapter Six), i.e. the relationships between the UN and stakeholders (such as the host Government, the local civil society and regional actors), I also distinguished between the normative level and the operational level. While at the normative level I manually observed how mandates refer to the Government, the local civils society and regional actors, for the operational level, I used Iramuteq software to explore these relationships.

For the analysis of both strategic goals, coherence and inclusiveness, I complemented the analysis of documentary data with the discursive analysis of interviews. As described in chapters Five and Six, respectively, during phase 3 of analysis I identified first that, while at the normative level mandates are multidimensional, at the operational level security is prioritized. In other words, there is a lack of coherence in the frame of examined post-conflict engagements (epigraph 2.1 Chapter Five). Furthermore, I identify the predominance of the UN-Government relationship and thus the lack of inclusiveness of the local

¹² The results of UNIOSIL are representative of six out of eight remaining examined post-conflict engagements, including BINUB, Burundi PBC, BNUB, BONUCA, CAR PBC and BINUCA (see tables 7 and 8 in Annex 4).

civil society and regional actors (epigraph 2.1 chapter Six). These preliminary findings led me to phase 4 of analysis.

d) Phase 4: Examining the contribution of the Department of Political Affairs' integrated special political missions and the new Peacebuilding Architecture to coherence and the inclusiveness of local civil society and regional actors through content analysis of documentary data and discursive analysis of interviews

Phase 4 examines in a disaggregate form how DPA integrated special political missions and the new PBA contributed to coherence and inclusiveness as strategic goals. This phase focuses on the analysis of documentary data at the operational level and on discursive analysis of interviews. Different to the phase 3 of analysis, which placed emphasis on the distinction between the normative and operational level of analyzes, this phase 4 makes the key distinction between UN and external resources. From this analysis, I draw on explanatory factors for the failure of DPA integrated special political missions and the PBA on coherence and inclusiveness, and I critically reflect on implications of this failure.

Having observed lack of coherence and inclusiveness of local civil society and regional actors in the frame of examined post-conflict engagements, phase 4 of analysis focuses on examining in a disaggregated form how both DPA integrated special political missions and PBA engagements have contributed, respectively, to coherence (epigraphs 2.2 and 2.3 in Chapter Five) and inclusiveness (epigraph 2.2 in Chapter Six) as strategic goals¹³. Besides documentary data, phase 4 also develops the discursive analysis of interviews. While for previous phases of analysis the distinction between the normative and operational levels of analysis was prime, in this phase 4 the focus is on the operational level, that is to say, on the content of major assessment

¹³ As the inclusion of the local civil society and regional actors in the frame of UN post-conflict engagements was fundamentally an endeavor of the PBA, epigraph 2.2 in Chapter Six only examines the task of the PBA, excluding from the analysis the task of DPA integrated special political missions.

reports, field reports and periodic reviews of ongoing developments within the ground. Instead, the key distinction made is between UN and external sources of data.

Once examined the limited results on coherence and inclusiveness of DPA integrated special political missions and the PBA, in this final phase of analysis I also identify explanatory factors that might account for the failure in pursuing both strategic goals (epigraph 3.1 in chapters Five and Six). Finally, I critically discussed implications that this failure has had on the overall UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements (epigraph 3.2 in chapters 5 and 6), and how it contributed to the current state of depression of the liberal peacebuilding project.

3. Structure

The dissertation is divided into three parts. The first part comprises two chapters that frame the theory on the liberal peacebuilding project and examine the role the UN has had in the emergence and the decay of this project. Chapter one introduces first the concept of peace as a source of knowledge production and the consolidation of the peacebuilding concept. Second, it draws on structural changes that the international scenario went through during the turn of the Cold War and examines how the UN conceptualized, institutionalized and operationalized the peacebuilding framework. Third, it analyzes the effects that the early UN peacebuilding framework had on the emergence of the liberal peacebuilding project, or liberal peace.

The second chapter examines, first, the crisis of UN peacebuilding in the late 1990s and resulting criticism. Second, it analyzes how the UN responded to the crisis in the early 2000s introducing the two strategic goals that will be the key objects of analysis in the dissertation, namely coherence and inclusiveness. Finally, it critically draws on the implications this response has had on international peacebuilding policy frameworks and, in particular, how the UN performance has contributed to the current state of depression of the liberal

peacebuilding project. This will then be reinforced through the empirical analysis of chapters Five and Six.

The second part of the dissertation is dedicated to the case studies. It comprises a description of recent armed conflicts of selected countries, Sierra Leone, Burundi and the Central African Republic (chapter Three). It analyzes the UN missions, including political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements, that these countries have hosted over the last fifteen years (chapter Four). Chapter Three distinguishes conflict precedents, the type of conflict and the conflict resolution phase of selected cases. Then, it identifies shared conflict dynamics through comparative analysis. Chapter Four defines first, the precedents of African peacebuilding, the emergence of the new AU African Peace and Security Architecture and the AU-UN peacebuilding cooperation framework. Secondly, it describes UN missions, including post-conflict engagements led by the DPA and the PBA, deployed in these countries during their post-conflict stage.

The third part of the dissertation develops on the results of the research, based on the comparative analysis of coherence (chapter Five) and inclusiveness (chapter Six) as strategic goals of UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements in selected cases. Chapter Five and Six have a similar structure. They introduce first how the UN, and particularly the DPA and the PBA, has attempted to bring coherence and inclusiveness of the local civil society and regional actors in the frame of UN post-conflict engagements. Second, they present the empirical outcomes from the analysis to argue that the DPA and the PBA have failed in these endeavors. Finally, they identify explanatory factors that might account for this failure and draw on critical implications for UN peacebuilding and for the overall liberal peacebuilding project, thus reinforcing the conclusions of the first part.

PART I

**THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE LIBERAL
PEACEBUILDING PROJECT**

CHAPTER ONE. THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE RISE OF THE LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING PROJECT

This chapter seeks to argue that the emergence of the UN peacebuilding endeavor is at the core of the liberal peacebuilding project. It therefore analyses links between the UN peacebuilding framework and the spread of liberal democratic forms of political and social organization. With this aim, the chapter defines first the academic and conceptual origins of peacebuilding; second, it examines the conceptualization, institutionalization and operationalization of peacebuilding in the UN framework; and third, it examines the critical debate on the liberal peacebuilding project.

1. Precedents

Peace as a human state has been scientifically studied by many academic disciplines. International Relations, for example, takes peace and war as foundational pillars¹. Nonetheless, although peace and war were at the roots of this discipline at the end of World War I, International Relations was consolidated overtime with the core objective of studying the behavior of states. It was not until the 1950s when a group of scholars proceeding from a varied range of academic disciplines configured an area of studies whose ultimate goal was the study of peace and its consolidation all over the world, namely peace research². Johan Galtung, considered one of the founders of this field of studies, introduced in the 1970s the concept in which this dissertation is rooted, namely peacebuilding, described in this first section.

¹ This dissertation does not aim to define the concept of peace, but rather to examine how the humans understand it.

² At the start of the field, peace research was attributed with different names according to the approach adopted by researchers (see Boasson, 1971). In this dissertation I will use the up-to-date term peace and conflict studies (see Webel and Galtung, 2007). For a detailed historical revision of peace and conflict studies see Dunn (2005) or Grasa (1990).

1.1 Peace as a source of knowledge production

This section aims to contextualize the reader in an academic area whose nature has been contested since its origins. Peace and war have been a source of inspiration to many authors³ and object of study to many disciplines⁴ across history. During the first half of the twentieth century, a few researchers started studying the causality of war and the phenomenon of peace from a very scientific and quantitative approach⁵. The book *A Study of War* by Wright (1942) became a milestone for the coming area of peace research studies. In the mid-1950s, a few young researchers such as Kenneth Boulding and Anatol Rapoport started using peace and war as their core academic endeavor. Adopting an epistemological approach, and very much influenced by their predecessors as well as the dominant behavioral trend in social sciences led by psychologists such as Burrhus Skinner and Charles Fetscher, the work of these early peace researchers was based on a positivist approach and a quantitative and empirical methodology⁶. Similar to the early stage of the International Relations discipline, behind the outcomes of peace research there was a highly normative and prescriptive nature aimed at shaping human behavior for the establishment of peace⁷. The academic background of these early protagonists was varied (political science, economy, biology, anthropology) so that since the very beginning, this nascent field of studies was very interdisciplinary⁸.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, peace research took important steps towards its institutionalization. In 1957, the *Journal of Conflict*

³ From the *History of the Peloponnesian War* by Thucydides to *The Prince* by Machiavelli, *On War* by Clausewitz, *War and Peace* by Tolstoy, *International Law: Peace* (volume I) or *International Law: War and Neutrality* (volume II) by Openheim.

⁴ Particularly *History of diplomacy*, *Psychology*, *International Law* and *International Relations*.

⁵ Among other authors, Lewis Richardson, Pitrim Sorokin, Quincy Wright, Adam Maslow or John Burton.

⁶ See, for example, Rapoport (1960) or Boulding (1962).

⁷ Some authors of this consolidation period even described a “moral commitment” of the researcher (see Deutsch, 1975).


⁸ For a discussion about the definition of the academic nature of peace and conflict studies see Alger (2007).

Resolution was founded by the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution based at the University of Michigan with the purpose of studying international conflicts. In 1964, the Norwegian sociologist and mathematician Johan Galtung founded the Journal of Peace Research with the goal of collecting peace-related academic work in a single journal. A year later, in 1965, a few scholars from this early stage of peace research met at a conference on international peace and security in Geneva and founded the International Peace Research Association.

Johan Galtung is the researcher who consolidated the theoretical basis of modern peace and conflict studies. Contrary to the radical positivist approach adopted by peace researchers in the early stages of this field, Galtung received the influence of critics from the Frankfurt School. Habermas, for example, casted doubt on hitherto dominant positivist assumptions on some fundamental epistemological aspects of social sciences such as, for example, the objectivity of the researcher or the deterministic behavior of human being subject to rational choice (Habermas, 1990). In the particular field of peace research, Galtung had also become familiar with the work by Ole Olsen and Martin Jarvard, who warned the epistemic community in the field of peace research against excessive confidence on quantitative methods and highlighted the ideological and transformative function that research might have (Olsen and Jarvard, 1970). This early critical approach deviant from the radical positivism adopted by Galtung in the late 1960s and the 1970s is at the core of the origins of critical peace and conflict studies, whose theoretical debates are analyzed in this first part of the dissertation.

Galtung's main theoretical contributions in the early stage of peace research can be summarized in two parts. First, Galtung's idea of peace is divided into two stages: while negative peace is simply referred to as the mere absence of violence, positive peace implies a constructive relationship amongst people and the non-existence of potential causes for conflict to emerge (Galtung, 1964). In the second part, he describes the triangle of violence, within which the three types of violence are defined (see figure 1).

Figure 1. Galtung's triangle of violence. Source: Galtung (1969).



Firstly, structural violence refers to a form of non-visible violence reproduced by violent social structures such as an unjust economic system. He describes in particular four different causes through which structural violence is ultimately rooted: the denial of basic needs, well being, freedom and identity. Secondly, Galtung identifies cultural violence, which consists of a group of practices rooted in society over time and practices that are considered profoundly unjust. A few examples of cultural violence are the presence of racism and gender inequality in a society. Finally, he states that from structural and cultural violence stems direct violence, which is visible violence (Galtung, 1969), embodied in displays of physical aggression and active purposeful pain. This particular definition of violence is fundamental to understanding the conceptualization of peacebuilding, which is presented in the next section.

1.2 Conceptualizing peacebuilding

The term peacebuilding was first conceived of by Galtung (1976) during the 1970s. Since then, many scholars from different disciplines have conceptually approached it⁹. Although authors within academic debates on peacebuilding may differ in some conceptual assumptions, most of

⁹ For major revisions of peacebuilding literature see Cousens and Kumar (2000), Jett (2000), Lederach and Moomaw (2002), Smith (2004), Jeong (2005), Barnett et al. (2007), Lederach et al. (2007), Call and Cousens (2007), Dayton and Kriesberg (2009) or Richmond (2010a).

them share the idea that this concept embraces an endless state of positive peace, the existence of structural causes of conflict to be overcome and a transformative intention at its core.

Galtung found a correlation between the denial of access to physical and social well being (structural violence) and the (re)emergence of direct violence. He described the creation of peacebuilding structures to promote sustainable and lasting peace¹⁰ by addressing the “root causes” of violent conflict and encouraging the support of indigenous capacities for peace management and conflict resolution¹¹. His analysis of the root causes of conflict is consequently fundamental for the understanding of peacebuilding in the post-Cold War era. In terms of his earlier theoretical contribution, peacebuilding is the process through which negative peace turns into sustainable positive peace. Peacebuilding neither focuses on the conflict itself nor on the parties. It rather focuses on the creation of a new context in a war-torn society where incompatible interests and root causes, which bring about conflict, can be overcome. It is therefore an integrated and multidimensional process aimed at the creation of a radically lasting peaceful structure. As exposed below, this idea of peacebuilding is mostly operationalized in the early 1990s within the UN framework through the mandate of Secretary General (SG) Boutros-Ghali.

¹⁰ This long-term approach to a state of peace has also been proved to be a cross-cultural concept similarly expressed in many civilizations. “Eireinei” (ancient Greek) denotes harmony and justice as well as peace. Also “Salaam” (Arabic) and “Shalom” (Hebrew) connote not only the absence of violence but also the presence of well-being, wholeness and harmony within oneself, a community and amongst all nations and peoples. In Sanskrit, “Shanti” refers to not only peace but also to spiritual tranquillity, an integration of outward and inward modes of being. The word “Ping” (Chinese) denotes harmony and the achievement of unity from diversity. And in Russian, “Mir” means peace, a village community and the entire world (Barash and Webel, 2009).

¹¹ Galtung was not the first to advocate for the removal of causes of war to ensure durable peace. Kant exposes:

“No conclusion of Peace shall be held to be valid as such, when it has been made with the secret reservation of the material for a future war. For, in that case, it would be a mere truce, or a suspension of hostilities, and not a Peace. [...] All existing causes for a future war are to be regarded as entirely removed” (Kant, 2010).

During a later stage of his academic career, Galtung defined three stages through which previously confrontational parties of a post-violence context must pass in order to overcome conflict and therefore ensure a lasting peace. These stages are: reconstruction of the damage caused by the struggle, reconciliation amongst previously confronted parties and resolution of incompatibilities that brought about direct violence (Galtung, 1998). Linked to this new approach, he presented an updated perspective on peacebuilding. This was a transcendent approach (see Galtung, 2000), which aims at the transformation of conflict through peaceful means in order to achieve the consolidation of lasting peace. He highlights that violence is always a relational fact and therefore the resolution of conflict must also be based on a relationship. In other words, conflict comes from an incompatible or contradictory relationship between two or more parties and therefore the resolution of the conflict must envisage the transformation of this relationship (Galtung, 1996).

On the basis of the pillars that Galtung set, many authors have acknowledged the relevance of peacebuilding processes in the aftermath of conflict in order to avoid a relapse into violence. Given that post-conflict societies face an alarmingly high risk of reversion to violence¹², identifying areas where levels of violence and socio-economic deprivation have been highest during conflict and creating stakeholders in these areas in return for public support can be considered as a valid preventive approach (Atashi, 2009). Barnett *et al.* (2007) agree that the term peacebuilding has taken root because it represented a seemingly neutral concept around which the appearance of consensus could be built.

One major contribution to the field of peacebuilding studies was made by John Paul Lederach (1997), who describes peacebuilding as an on-going social and non-static process. According to his arguments, peacebuilding is defined as a structure-process concept: it consists of

¹² About half of the conflicts that experienced a ceasefire relapse into violence within the following ten years (Collier, 2003), hence the importance of a long-term peace perspective when implementing peace processes.

the creation of a new context (structure) through which structural conditions for lasting peace are founded. Within his approach, the process of reconciliation is of vital importance, which is the key process through which negative peace is turned into positive peace. He thus considers reconciliation as fundamental for the consecution of peacebuilding and, specifically, stresses four major steps within the reconciliatory process based on a retributive justice model: A truth telling process where facts which occurred during conflict are clarified, a sincere apology is provided by perpetrators, forgiveness is given by the victims, and reparation the damage caused by the perpetrators is conducted (Lederach, 1997).

Dayton and Kriesberg's (2009) contribution to the understanding of peacebuilding is also of particular interest. They argue that conflict is not necessarily bad in nature, that it simply is an incompatibility of perspectives towards a given reality, and that peace means facing inherently conflictive human nature in a constructive way. Linked to this idea, the absence of a comprehensive understanding of conflictive human nature or the incapacity to face it constructively may potentially lead conflict to be expressed through violence. The key question is thus how to wage conflicts in ways that are constructive. These authors also state that sustainable peacebuilding requires improving economic conditions of communities, re-humanizing one's enemy identity, reinforcing alternation of opposing political parties in power, therefore deterring the use of violent tactics and encouraging the fulfilment of externally-assisted peace agreements. In sum, peacebuilding requires transformation across multiple fronts, including modifying attitudes, perceptions and behaviours, and changing the structural inequalities that provide uneven benefits within political systems.

On the other hand, Jeong (2005), argues that, when the peacebuilding approach is merely technical, institutional reforms fail to take into account the specific cultural and historical needs of individual societies such as postcolonial ethnic hierarchies. His analysis therefore focuses on how various dimensions of peacebuilding can contribute to behavioural changes and structural transformations. The specifics

aspects with transformative potential which he interrogates are the improvement of public security, the promotion of economic recovery, facilitating a process of social recovery and the promotion of democratic institutions. Similarly, Pugh (2000a) argues that peacebuilding needs to be conceptualized as an integrated social process with the ultimate goal of creating mutually accepted frameworks of rules and institutions which must constrain the behaviour of previously peace disrupters.

In conclusion, these scholars share some premises of what the idea and act of peacebuilding consists of. The first commonality across scholars refers to the endless durability of positive peace. The second shared definitory aspect applies to the method through which peacebuilding can be fulfilled, which defines a process aimed at overcoming the root causes of conflict, in Galtung's terms, structural and cultural violence. It is therefore a highly prescriptive approach, that is to say it provides post-conflict societies a path to successful peacebuilding. Finally, different definitions define peacebuilding as a transformative process, meaning that a post-conflict society moves from one societal state (negative peace) to another societal state (positive peace).

2. The United Nations and peacebuilding

This section analyses, first, the redefined international scenario that stemmed from the fading of the USSR and, second, the role the UN played in conceptualizing, institutionalizing and operationalizing peacebuilding during the late 1980s and the 1990s in this changing international context.

2.1 Historical context: Structural changes in the aftermath of the Cold War

By the turn of the twentieth century, major structural transformations gradually re-shaped the nature of the international context¹³. On the one

¹³ The changing nature of international relations in the aftermath of the called were has extensively been analysed by authors such as Beck (1992), Fukuyama (1992),

hand, in the context of the fading of the presence of the USSR and the consequent end of the Cold War, there was a shift from a West-East ideology-based worldview to a North-South socio-economic-based worldview (Baile, 2006). On the other hand, the world experienced great technological progress, in particular in communications and transport facilities as well as in military techniques (Hirst, 2002). These transformations are examined in turn.

While experiencing these two major transformations, some authors note the resistance to a dichotomized division of the world¹⁴, which during the collapse of the Second World gradually changed from a West-East holistic conception of the international context to a North-South based one¹⁵. The consolidation of two political and ideological blocks during the second half of the 20th century legitimized realist discourse, which interpreted the international stage as a balance of power system. It also exalted the most traditional and conservative conception of security¹⁶, consisting of the simple care of the state's own security through military means.

The end of the Cold War brought an interpretative gap to international relations theorists. The world was not bipolar anymore, the liberal capitalist worldview emerged triumphantly from the struggle with socialism (Fukuyama, 1992) and new reasoning was needed to interrogate and interpret the international stage. The West has, for a long time period, interpreted reality on a dichotomous basis as a way of avoiding complexity and reducing facts in order for a clearer

Roberts and Kingsbury (1993), Lebow and Risse-Kappen (1995), Finnemore (1996), Buzan et al. (1998), Kaldor (1999) or Held et. al (1999).

¹⁴ Descartes in the 17th century raised the dualist philosophy and designed the so-called Cartesian coordinates graph, using a simple division with the X and Y axes. It was the beginning of modern geometry and, at the same time, the establishment of dichotomization as a frame of understanding for Western knowledge (see Descartes, 2003).

¹⁵ Foucault described in this regard the idea of a “disciplinary technology”, by which relatively stable societies usually have a common narrative that holds them together (Foucault, 1977), in this case, a dichotomic world division.

¹⁶ Buzan (1991) describes security as “to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change”.

understanding for human beings. In the pursuit of a new dichotomous or binary logic, soon after the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the discourse based on the North-South world division, which had already begun gaining popularity since the mid-20th century with the growth of development and environmental movements, took a dominant position amongst international relations scholars. If during the second half of the 20th century the division of the world was defined on an ideological basis, since the 1990s on this division has turned out to be based on a non-ideological (socio-economic and cultural) cleavage.

The second major transformation consisted of great technological progress, specifically in communication, transport facilities and advances in military technology, which influenced the way war is nowadays understood. The increase of accessibility to affordable international transportation and the emergence of the internet radically transformed the classic idea of communication, notoriously blurring the conception of distance. Beyond the improvement in transportation and communication, the international community witnessed unprecedented military technology progress led by the United States. Paul Hirst (2002) exposes a comparison between the pre-1914 political spectrum, mainly characterized by the dominance and hegemony of the British Empire (*Pax Britannica*), and the post-Cold War scenario, where the United States concentrates the heaviest economic and military weight (*Pax Americana*). Hirst goes on to describe the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs, as the high-tech modernization of regular armies and its implications for the nature of armed conflicts. He identifies, for instance, the appearance of Military and Private Security Companies¹⁷ and their role in contemporary wars. Cases such as the Iraq or Afghanistan wars exemplify the effects of this phenomenon, highlighting the loss of the monopoly of legitimate violence by the state. These two major transformations, ideological and technological, had two particular implications that affected the evolution of international relations. First, the process of globalization (see Held and McGrew, 2007) that provoked the blur of barriers between domestic and foreign

¹⁷ For further information on this phenomenon see Greenwald (2006), Leander (2007) or Garcia and Pareja (2013).

policy as well as the emergence of new risks for people (see Beck, 1992) and second, the transformation of contemporary conflict (see Kaldor 1999). On the one hand, the rapid and worldwide spread of globalization since the 1990s has fostered a wide range of literature¹⁸. However, it should be clarified that the interconnectedness of states and the internationalization of economy and social and political movements is not specific or particular to the current context. The singularity of today's version of globalization is its rapidness, due to technological innovation, and its vocation of worldwide inclusion. This on-going changing nature of the international scenario has many consequences, including the increasing need for new forms of global governance, the blur of domestic and international spheres, the need to face and challenge new risks and the adaptation of national economies to the global market. All these processes have been remarkably visible since the end of the Cold War and they need to be necessarily considered to build a new framework of understanding for the new nature of the current international society.

Enriching the understanding of the nature of conflict, the description of the emergence of the “new wars” concept accurately described by Kaldor (1999)¹⁹, is especially productive. By “new wars”, Kaldor refers to the new nature of war²⁰ as one where, first, conflicts take place in the context of the disintegration of states, second, wars are fought by both

¹⁸ See Held et al. (1999), Dillon and Reid (2000), Duffield (2001), Held and Mc Grew (2007) or Kaldor (2007).

¹⁹ The next section discusses different critiques that Kaldor’s theoretical contribution received.

²⁰ Other authors similarly described a transformation of contemporary conflicts. Miall (2004) described that, firstly, most contemporary violent conflicts are asymmetric, that is to say, parties are unequal in power and structure. Secondly, many contemporary conflicts are protracted and are based on a two-phase vicious cycle: into violence – out of violence. Hence the importance of a long term and lasting peace approach. And thirdly, this prolongation encompasses societies, economies and regions giving place to local struggles and global realities like arms trade or support for regimes or rebels by outside states. Similarly, authors such as Goodhand and Hulme (1999) described the emergence of complex political emergencies, as a further conceptualization of a changing conflict nature based on the proliferation of intrastate conflicts, the ethno-nationalist causal factor and the shift in the distribution of suffering towards civil population.

state and non-state actors, third, there are many civil casualties stemming from ethnic cleansing tactics, fourth, the aim is to build new sectarian identities (religious, ethnic or tribal), fifth, the scope of conflict is blurred (local, intrastate, interstate, regional), and sixth, the border between private and public is also made opaque (increase of private armed actors).

The most significant contribution by Kaldor (1999) was the categorization of a new type of violent conflict, rooted in post-political and post-ideological factors such as ethnicity, religion or tribal identity. This new causality of violent conflict, usually framed in non-Western contexts, was opposed to the emergence of the liberal, cosmopolitan and pacifying process of globalization. This is fundamental in understanding how the spread of liberal values became the dominant strategy in post-Cold War international peacebuilding policy frameworks in order to overcome this new type of violent conflict in non-Western contexts. This is discussed in the next section through the analysis of the liberal peace debate.

2.2 The early stage of United Nations peacebuilding: The role of the Department of Political Affairs

Different authors describe emerging challenges that have reshaped the nature of UN missions in the post-Cold War era²¹. Gareis and Varwick (2005) stress two new phenomena which were expected to constrain the nature of UN missions in this early post-Cold War period. Firstly, by

²¹ Berdal (2009) asserts that UN-led international peacebuilding in the post-Cold War era was made to face wider challenges. Amongst these novel challenges, it should first be mentioned the need to re-think the state-centric and process-oriented approach of dealing with the peacebuilding challenges within member states. Secondly, there was a need to address a lack of analytical capacity within the UN system for strategic direction and specification of peacebuilding goals. Thirdly, the UN institutional network was meant to overcome the international division based on the global North versus the global South dichotomy, which implied a complexity in achieving a common and effective response to emerging peacebuilding challenges. Kareem (2009) asserts that since the end of the bipolar world, the UN has undergone a significant reorganization around peace operations that promote formal pluralism and liberal human rights within Southern states.

witnessing the wave of new states generating from the former Soviet sphere, the UN widened its conception of nation-states' territory, sovereignty and national self-determination. Secondly, the entry in the political agenda of issues such as environmental protection, poverty, health or lack of education as potential sources of conflict implied that security was conceived of no longer as primarily a military problem, but instead a multidimensional concept.

Thus, since the late 1980s on, UN missions widened the scope of their mandates addressing the peacebuilding multidimensional theoretical framework²². In order to face the new challenges posed by emerging new forms of conflict, such as intra-state conflicts, and multidimensional threats in the context of the fading of the Cold War, the UN began to design wider strategies and missions. UN missions became overarching frameworks for intervention where military measures were no longer sufficient, as well as political, economic, social and development policies avoiding a relapse into violence in post-conflict contexts.

a) Conceptualization and institutionalization: From Secretary General Boutros-Ghali to Secretary general Anan

Shortly after taking office in January 1992, the SG Boutros-Ghali took the first step of enhancing UN capacities for the implementation and consolidation of peace around the globe through a major internal institutional reform (Kareem, 2009: 56-61). The reform was not only focused on transforming the internal machinery of the UN itself but went beyond this, on transforming the programmatic lines. As illustrated in the General Assembly resolution A/46/882 (see General Assembly, 1992), he began an attempt at effective action through the creation of three new departments dealing with peace activities: the


²² Tardy (2015) defines three characteristics of the evolution of these multidimensional peace operations. First, he describes a process of hybridization of these operations based on the increase of number of types of actors. Second, this author mentions the effects of the emergence of civilians' protection as a newly mandated task within peace operations. Finally, Tardy touches on the complexity stemming from the increasing tendency to authorize missions for a robust use of force, which weakens the role of civilians.

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which was formed out of the Office of Special Political Affairs and later incorporated the Field Operations Division and was intended to focus on planning, deploying and implementing peacekeeping operations broadly conceived; the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, aimed at the provision of humanitarian assistance where needed; and most important to the dissertation, the DPA, described in the subsequent sections. This reform fundamentally aimed to create a functional division of labor between the UN's various peace activities.

Despite a usual convergence of activities in the field, at the institutional level there is still a marked distinction between a widened form of peacekeeping operations, led by the DPKO, and the special political missions (see figure 2), formerly called political and peacebuilding missions, led by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). As exposed in the following lines, over the 1990s the DPA would become the core body within the organization aimed at political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements. Nowadays, these DPKO-led widened peacekeeping missions and DPA-led Special Political Missions together form what is known as the United Nations Peace Operations (UNPO)²³.

²³ Jenkins (2013) classifies the process through which peacebuilding became a guiding policy for UNPO in three stages. Firstly, when peacebuilding was not yet called as such within the UN, this started involving relatively successful post-conflict operations, therefore distinct from classic peacekeeping operations, as was the case for the Namibian United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) (1989-1990), the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) (1991-1995), the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (1991-1993) and the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) (1992-1994). Beyond mere military-based mandates, these missions included political- and peacebuilding-oriented tasks for the first time such as, inter alia, the support to a political transition and free elections in the case of Namibia, the reform of the judiciary system as in El Salvador, the protection of human rights during the transitional period as in the Cambodian mission, and monitoring an entire electoral process as was the case in Mozambique.

Figure 2. Current UN DPA special political missions. Number of Years Active.
Source: Centre on International Cooperation (2016).



The DPA assumed the responsibility for new activities such as supervision, validation and organization of electoral processes as part of their comprehensive domestic peace settlements; the political negotiations and diplomacy of UN Special Representatives with “contracting parties” and the international donor community; the pursuit of any human-rights provisions that a mandate might include; political relations with the SC; and the collection of resources for “preventive diplomacy”. By and large, new dimensions of action within the UN framework described in the following elaboration were fundamentally expanded, regularized and consolidated in the DPA, focusing its resources on the “needs of good internal governance” within the Southern hemisphere (General Assembly, 1992). In summary, there was an attempt to centralize political activities in one mega-department, the DPA. There is also the introduction into the programmatic agenda of the UN an emphasis on features of peace operations directly linked to domestic governance: elections, human rights, institutional capacity-building and preventive diplomacy.

Even though the new DPA incorporated activities and UN administrative bodies hitherto led by the Secretariat, such as the former Office for Political and General Assembly Affairs and Secretariat Services, the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, the

Office for Research and the Collection of Information, the Department for Special Political Questions, Regional Cooperation, Decolonization and Trusteeship, and the Department of Disarmament Affairs, the DPA was originally designed to be the core UN structure for preventive diplomacy. To this end, the DPA incorporated an internal apparatus split into geographical divisions: Africa I, Africa II, Americas and Europe, and Asia and the Pacific. This new institutional activity and programmatic action, in its roots contrary to the principle of sovereignty and non-interference enshrined in the UN Charter, fostered a widespread suspicion by a large number of G-77 states²⁴.

In regard to the nature of the DPA, it is worth describing the transformation that this department went through in the 1990s, shifting from preventive action to wider multi-dimensional post-conflict operations. This was a gradual process with multiple causes. Firstly, the DPA had since the beginning a tendency to politically penetrate contexts at risk of evolving into violent conflict. Good examples of this emerging trend can be seen in the rise of the DPA-led Special Representatives and political and peacebuilding missions usually framed within “good offices” (see General Assembly, 1994: Paras. 10-11). These “good offices” manifest themselves within varied functions, for instance to shore up political settlements between previously confronted groups, to bring domestic groups to negotiated agreements and to consolidate power-sharing models of conflict resolution including commitment to democratic elections, respect for human rights and forms of governance in accordance to the principles of transparency and accountability. In other words, the international community witnessed how the UN began becoming more involved in state-society relations in contexts emerging from or at risk of falling into violent episodes, especially in Southern States, where this DPA role consisting of promoting good internal governance was implemented most.

²⁴ Confidential interviews Kareem had with senior UN official, New York, 1 December 2000, and with senior UN DPA official, New York, 18 September 2000 (Kareem, 2009:58).

Along with this internal institutional reform, in 1992 the SG Boutros-Ghali introduced through “An Agenda for Peace” the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding, defining it as the UN commitment to support the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and the strengthening of new democratic institutions to reduce the risk of relapsing into conflict and laying the foundations for sustainable peace (Secretary General, 1992). Boutros-Ghali expressed that the UN should be ready,

“...to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war;

And in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression. It is possible to discern an increasingly common moral perception that spans the world's nations and peoples, and which is finding expression in international laws, many owing their genesis to the work of this Organization” (Secretary General, 1992: Para. 15).

At the very core definition of peacebuilding, as well as in the subsequent definitions below, Ghali makes reference to liberal-rooted concepts, namely the form of the liberal state and the institutions of a liberal democracy. The whole text is organized in different parts. Firstly, it describes the changing nature of the international context, thus justifying the adoption of a new paradigm for UNPO. Secondly, Boutros-Ghali describes, one by one, the different stages of intervention that ultimately aim at the establishment of lasting peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding. After having developed in detail these terms, the text concludes with shedding light on other issues of relevance such as the cooperation with regional arrangements and organizations, the safety of personnel and financial aspects. Since then and up until the creation of the new UN peacebuilding architecture in 2005, described in Chapter Two, the concept of peacebuilding has constantly evolved within the framework of the international organization (see table 6). Three years later, in 1995, the “Supplement to An Agenda for Peace” stressed that

the development of national institutions and the capacity to operate them impartially were necessary for peace to withstand the disruptions that arise in the life of any society (see General Assembly, 1995). This is fundamental for understanding the technocratic turn UN missions gradually experienced during the turn of the century towards statebuilding-based missions. This is more elaborately described in Chapter Two, within which the core issue of peacebuilding became the (re)building of state structures in conflict-affected areas.

Table 6 Evolution of the definition of peacebuilding within the UN in the early stages. Source: Author based on Peacebuilding Support Office (2010).

Year	Source	Key information
1992	An Agenda for Peace	Peacebuilding is first institutionalized in the UN framework.
1995	Supplement to an Agenda for Peace	Emphasis on post-conflict institution (re)building.
1994	Human Development Report	Link between peace, security and development.
2000	Brahimi report	Tools to build foundations of sustainable peace.
2001	No exit without strategy	Strategy to accompany countries in a post-UN setting.
2004	A more secure world: Our shared responsibility	Stress on the interdependence of peace and security issues across the globe.
2005	In larger freedom	Identification of institutional gap hindering the assistance to countries to transit from war to peace.

At this early conceptual stage, different agendas and reports were developed in a short period of time, all of which somehow influenced the way peacebuilding became nestled into the UN system. The 1994 UNDP “Human Development Report” defined for the first time the concept of human security in the UN framework, and narrowly intertwined the concepts of peace, security and development (UNDP, 1994). As described below, the theoretical debate on human security constrained the operationalization of the peacebuilding processes, in particular within the UN system. A few months later, the SG placed on his 1994 report “An Agenda for Development” (Secretary General, 1994) the concept of peace as the first and foremost foundation for

development, thus unifying even further the triad of peace, security and development, fundamental to the birth of peacebuilding in the UN. Finally, in the 1996 report “An Agenda for Democratization”, Ghali stated that “democracy contributes to preserving peace and security, securing justice and human rights, and promoting economic and social development” (Secretary General, 1996).

In 1996, in the book *An Inventory of Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities* (United Nations, 1996a), the organization established a UN inter-departmental Task Force aimed at producing an inventory of potential peacebuilding activities for the UN system. A year later, in the 1997 SG’s report “Renewing the UN: A program for Reform”, Annan placed the peacebuilding task under the DPA umbrella, which had hitherto been the core of prevention action within the UN architecture. In this report, in Action 5, he clearly states that,

“With immediate effect, the Department of Political Affairs, in its capacity as current convenor of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, will be the focal point within the United Nations for post-conflict peace-building. The Executive Committee on Peace and Security, in collaboration with other executive committees as appropriate, will be responsible for the design and implementation of post-conflict peace-building initiatives, including the definition of objectives, criteria and operational guidelines for post-conflict peace-building by organizations of the United Nations system” (Secretary General, 1997: Para. 121).

In the 2000 report “We the Peoples” submitted to the General Assembly before the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals, Annan placed the core issues of human security and the protection of human rights as an active responsibility for States, further arguing for a legitimation for intervention in those cases where the State is unwilling or incapable of guaranteeing so (see Secretary General, 2000). That same year, the resulting report of the UNPO panel, better known as the Brahimi Report (named after its chairman Lakhdar Brahimi) defined peacebuilding as all activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of

war (General Assembly and Security Council, 2000). This report pointed out, on the one hand, the UN system's extremely limited ability to collect, process and analyse information globally and, on the other hand, the need for the international community to develop rapid-response capacities across the full spectrum of post-conflict activities (Jenkins, 2013). The Brahimi report also promoted the later creation in 2007 of the UN Department of Field Support (DFS), framed in the UN DPKO to provide peacekeeping operations with logistics and human resources on the ground through the United Nations Field Support Offices (UNFSO).

When describing in detail post-conflict peacebuilding, the Brahimi report places the responsibility primarily within the DPA with the support of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Furthermore, it states that post-conflict peacebuilding should first “be given the capacity to make a demonstrable difference in the lives of the people in their mission area, relatively early in the life of the mission (...); second, free and fair elections should be viewed as part of broader efforts to strengthen governance institutions (...); third, United Nations civilian police monitors are not peacebuilders if they simply document or attempt to discourage by their presence abusive or other unacceptable behavior of local police officers (...); fourth, the human rights component of a peace operation is indeed critical to effective peace-building(...); fifth, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants (key to immediate post-conflict stability and reduced likelihood of conflict recurrence) is an area in which peace-building makes a direct contribution to public security and law and order” (General Assembly and Security Council, 2000: Paras. 35-47).

In 2001, SG Annan published the “No Exit Without Strategy” report, where he made explicit the necessity for the UN to deepen its method of consideration in order to decide when to implement, close or alter operations, as well as how and when to accompany and support countries towards the post-UN intervention phase (see Security Council, 2001a). Two years later, the High-Level Panel (HLP) on

Threats, Challenges and Change appointed in 2003 by Annan took place amidst two struggles hampering the UN's efforts to promote sustainable peace. The first struggle involved the constant conflictual relationship between the UN DPA and the UN DPKO to achieve the primary role of peacebuilding actor. The second struggle involved the fault line between all UN entities, such as the already mentioned departments, and the UNDP, amongst others, all of which are partly assigned peacebuilding goals. This panel admitted the need to revise the concept of security in the on-going and changing contemporary era leaving behind the old idea of security as a term strictly and uniquely associated with the military and physical aspects.

In all, these changes throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s fostered the consolidation of the discourse of the so-called Boutros-Ghali's "post-conflict peacebuilding", which was institutionally assigned to the aegis of the DPA thanks to the efforts made by Kofi Annan during the late 1990s.

b) Operationalization: The liberal democratic content of engagements

The dimensions tackled by peacebuilding strategies on the ground have extensively been studied, for both non-UN-led processes (see Pugh, 2000b; Cousens and Kumar, 2000; Lederach *et al.*, 2007; Jeong, 2005; Barnett *et al.*, 2007; Dayton and Kriesberg, 2009) as well as for UN-led frameworks (see Barnett *et al.*, 2007; Browne and Weiss, 2015; De coning and Stamnes, 2016). In their comprehensive analysis of peacebuilding strategies, with particular emphasis on the UN-led peacebuilding endeavor, Barnett *et al.* (2007)²⁵ stress that the operational form of peacebuilding on the ground involves three major strategies,

²⁵ Barnett *et al.* (2007) explored up to 24 different agencies empowered to carry out peacebuilding policies to find that the operationalization of such concept varies in accordance to the nature of the actor. In their study, they took in considerations different types of stakeholders: international and regional organizations, states and NGOs. The conclusion they came to is that the implemented version of a peacebuilding process responds, on one side, to the organization's core mandate (extending it to the ideology, discourse, interests, etc.) and, on the other side, to the efficiency of different actors in nesting a structured net aimed at the distribution of resources and exchange of information.

namely stability creation, restoration of state institutions and addressing socioeconomic dimensions of conflict. They propose the fulfilment of these strategies across four sectoral dimensions, namely security and military; political and diplomatic; social, economic, developmental and humanitarian; and justice and reconciliation. As Knight puts it, through these dimensions there are different tasks to be accomplished:

“These elements include disarming warring factions, restoring law and order, decommissioning and destroying weapons, repatriating refugees, reintegrating internally displaced persons into their communities, providing advisory and training support for security personnel, improving police and judicial systems, monitoring elections, de mining and other forms of demilitarization, providing technical assistance to fledging states coming out of conflict, advancing efforts to protect human rights, repatriating refugees, reforming and strengthening institutions of governance, promoting formal and informal participation in the political process, and facilitating social and economic development” (Knight, 2008: 26).

By looking at the particular operational content of widened UN post-conflict missions deployed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it is possible to identify the previously described discursive conceptualization of peacebuilding and how it has been rooted in liberal forms of political organization such as liberal state structures and liberal democratic rule. Through specific processes, for example democratic elections, the UN attempts to establish a post-war system mirroring liberal Western states (Greener, 2011). The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) deployed in Namibia from April 1989 to March 1990 was primarily aimed at supporting and securing free and fair elections during the first electoral process in Namibia after the independence from South Africa (see Security Council, 1989). The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONSUAL) established in 1991 aimed to supervise the peace agreement ending the decade-long civil war. This included the reform of the armed forces and police, the reform of judicial and electoral systems, the guarantee of human rights, and socioeconomic issues such as land tenure (see Security Council, 1991). Similarly, in February 1992, the UN established the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), aimed at supervising the peace

agreements and accompanying the country through the transition from a non-democratic to democratic rule. The mandate included aspects related to human rights protection, the organization of free and fair elections, armed forces reforms and the rebuilding of public administration, among other activities (see Security Council, 1992a). As a final example, the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) deployed in December 1992 was also aimed at assisting the country in implementing its own peace agreement. The mandate included the monitoring of the withdrawal process of foreign forces, the provision of security and technical assistance and monitoring during the entire electoral process (see Security Council, 1992b).

One of the best-known initiatives from Ghali's period is the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants, whose policies aim to empty the streets of weaponry and to ensure that ex-combatants are not ignored during the peace process, therefore potentially encouraging them to find opportunities to return to their pre-conflict lives. According to the UN's DDR Resource Center, the DDR "contributes to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin" (see UNDDR, accessed 2017). Knight (2008) describes the three phases of DDR as follows. Firstly, disarmament consists of obtaining and maintaining control over weaponry of combatants and of groups of civilians in the conflict zone. Secondly, demobilization induces conflicting armed groups to disband their military organizations and structures, shifting from combatant to civilian status. Finally, reintegration refers to a long-term social and economic process aimed at the assimilation of ex-combatants into a socially productive civilian life, integrated into their communities, in order to avoid the possibility of restoring back to violent activities.

A second strategy also emergent in the 1990s within the UN framework, Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a process aimed at the reform of the state's security network. This may include a wide range of activities, from trainings of new police forces to the reorganization of the judiciary system and the re-establishment of the rule of law. Interestingly,

Bellamy (2003) argues that the conceptualization and subsequent implementation of SSR programs has had three specific cognitive implications. First it prompts a renewed focus on the importance of civil-military relations, in particular on the role of military in domestic affairs. Secondly, it raises the discussion on the complex relationship between the concepts of security, development and democratisation, showing whether there is indeed interconnectedness. Finally, it deepens and enhances the question about the effectiveness of externally sponsored development programs deployed in insecure zones.

Finally, a third well-known strategy includes the guarantee of a process of transitional justice. Transitional justice may involve three different forms, each established on the basis of how parties are treated and what measures are taken (Rodríguez, 2013). Firstly, the forgetfulness model consists of ignoring what happened in the past, exchanging general amnesties for peace accords. This model was implemented in post-conflict Angola and Mozambique in the early 1990s. The second model, the forgiveness model, is based on the process of reconciliation as a means for retributive justice. The state organizes Truth and Reconciliation Commissions for victims to be heard and perpetrators to be acknowledged as such. A narrative of the past is collectively built by the civil society, prompting the healing of the victims. This model was implemented in South Africa and Sierra Leone during the 1990s. The final model, the justice model, includes the judiciary processes, which is taken as a means for restorative justice. It is usually the international community through the International Criminal Court (ICC) that intervenes. The goal is to hold perpetrators accountable for their crimes. This model was used by the UN in Bosnia and Rwanda. In the last two decades, judiciary processes in UN-led post-conflict engagements have been embodied principally in the ICC, and its ad-hoc international tribunals.

3. The debate on the liberal peacebuilding consensus

The history of international peacebuilding policy frameworks implemented by the international community over the last twenty-five

years, particularly in the UN framework, can be summarized as a process which shifted from a primarily Western, liberal and externally-led top-down set of policies in the 1990s and early 2000s (see Doyle, 2005; Richmond, 2005) to a more context-sensitive, locally-focused and bottom-up approach from the late 2000s on (see Richmond, 2010a; Campbell et al. 2011). Throughout the 1990s, the idea of peacebuilding was agreed upon amongst the international community as a generally accepted response to war-torn societies' demands for conflict resolution and lasting peace. Under the leadership of the UN, the international community progressively modelled a peacebuilding strategy initially implemented in the late 1980s and early 1990s in post-conflict scenarios such as Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador or Mozambique.

During the 1990s the international community consolidated an international peacebuilding policy framework highly associated with the spread of liberal democratic values and the reconstruction of Western-mirrored governmental and state structures in post-war societies. This was done with the goal of establishing lasting peace. This became commonly known within the academia as the liberal peacebuilding project or, more simply, the liberal peace (Paris 1997; Dillon and Reid, 2000; Duffield, 2001; Richmond, 2005)²⁶. Paris argued in 1997 that,

“A single paradigm -liberal internationalism- appears to guide the work of most international agencies engaged in peacebuilding. The central tenet of this paradigm is the assumption that the surest foundation for peace, both within and between states, is market democracy, that is, a liberal democratic polity and a market-oriented economy. Peacebuilding is in effect an enormous experiment in social engineering -an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of social, political and economic organization into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict: in other words, pacification through political and economic liberalization” (Paris, 1997:56).

Taylor (2010) states that intergovernmental organisations more or less accepted as common-sense the self-evident virtuosity and truth of this

²⁶ For a detailed revision on liberal peace literature see Dillon and Reid (2000), Doyle (2005), Richmond (2005), Campbell et al. (2011) or Tadjbakhsh (2011).

liberal peace project. This broad consensus on what peacebuilding is fosters an intellectual climate at the policy level within in which basic assumptions of the liberal peace go unproblematised and are hegemonic.

Among other factors, the consolidation of this international liberal peacebuilding project was influenced by two particular trends. The first factor, considered more philosophical, responds to new contributions to the democratic peace theory, highly linked to traditional liberal principles such as the association between the preservation of freedom and human rights with a state of peace and well being. It is defended by traditional liberal philosophers such as John Locke, Immanuel Kant²⁷ or John Stuart Mill (see Doyle 1983). Influenced by this line of thought, Doyle expositis,

“Even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another” (Doyle, 1983: 213).

Thus, in the context of the emergence of international liberalism, peacebuilding processes in the 1990s became processes rooted in establishing liberal democracies and neoliberal economies within post-conflict contexts, aimed at establishing an international peaceful order. Beyond the expansion of international liberal postulates in the 1990s, reinforced not only by the re-conceptualization of the democratic peace theory but also by the fade of the communist world, the second key factor for the consolidation of the liberal peace refers to the above mentioned theorization of new wars.

²⁷ In his 1795 work *Perpetual Peace*, Kant defines three definitive articles of a liberal pacific union. The first holds that the civic constitution of the state must be republican; the second definitive article argues that liberal republics will progressively establish peace amongst themselves by means of a pacific union; and the third definitive article establishes a cosmopolitan law to operate within the pacific union limited to conditions of universal hospitality (Kant in Doyle, 1983).

Kaldor's contribution generated an intense discursive debate²⁸. This debate encouraged significant empirical changes for the subsequent analysis and interpretation of the so-called “new wars”. One criticism points to the inaccuracy of attributing novelty to contemporary wars and argues that the “new wars” discourse had insufficient empirical consistency (Brzoska, 2004). Another criticism highlights the overarching and vague conception of the term, which ambiguously embraces all forms of conflict and violence not even distinguishing whether it is a legally declared war or an act of unilateral violence. Some authors refer instead to the lack of comprehensiveness of Kaldor's analysis regarding the causes of “new wars” based uniquely on identity traits, and argue the impossibility of unlinking ideology from identity (Berdal, 2011). Finally, another critical trend explores the underlying discourse behind the conceptualization of “new wars”, which simplifies reality and hides structural causes of conflict (Duffield, 2001)²⁹.

This extensive debate on the reconceptualization of contemporary conflicts and a hypothetical new type of violence had a major influence on the policy frameworks implemented by the international community in conflict-affected areas. Therefore, the goal of overcoming these “new wars” in these non-Western contexts was identified with and linked to the spread of liberal values, including democratic systems and process of economic liberalization. This then became a dominant approach in the frame of international peacebuilding policies through the 1990s and early 2000s.



In sum, early UN post-conflict engagements share a highly liberal democratic component, reflected in the establishment and approved functioning of democratic processes, such as elections. Thus, the

²⁸ See Berdal, 2003; García, 2013, Hoogvelt, 2000; Melander et al., 2006; Mundy, 2011; Bello, 2010; Brzoska, 2004

²⁹ To see the response to the critics, see Kaldor (2013).

operational form of UN peacebuilding indeed seems to be in accordance with the previously described “democratic peace”, which strengthens the idea that liberal democracy is conducive to peace. In other words, democracy becomes a source of legitimacy for these engagements to establish lasting peace. Beyond this, mandates also include the rebuilding and reproduction of state structures such as army, police, judicial systems or public administration, mirroring Western state structures. Appreciating this, it is conclusive that in the late 1980s and up to mid-1990s, UN post-conflict engagements, particularly in the frame of the DPA, reinforced the rise of the liberal peacebuilding project.

CHAPTER TWO. THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE FALL OF THE LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING PROJECT

While Chapter One attempted to argue that the UN was at the core of the emergence of the liberal peacebuilding project, Chapter Two attempts to identify how the UN was also at the core of the project during its decay. With this goal, the chapter examines how the UN failed to respond to the peacebuilding crisis from the late 1990s on. The chapter first describes the crisis and resulting criticism of the liberal peacebuilding project during the late 1990s. It then goes on to present how the UN responded to this crisis by implementing reforms, which are examined in more detail in the third part of the dissertation. Finally, the chapter draws on the implications of these failed reforms for the liberal peacebuilding project.

1. Fall and criticism of the liberal peacebuilding project

Certain success in a few of the widened and multidimensional UN missions deployed in the late 1980s and the early 1990s such as the cases of Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia or Mozambique, brought about some enthusiasm. This was reflected in the increase in the the number of missions which subsequently unfolded. A second wave of missions with disastrous humanitarian consequences in the early and mid-1990s, however, dampened this enthusiasm. A few of the more embarrassing episodes include the UN withdrawal from their military mission in Somalia (1993), whose leadership was then transferred to the US; the UN outright failure in the Rwandan mission (1994), unable to control the Rwandan genocide; the demise of the Angolan peace process (1995-1996), whose UN mission eventually departed in 1998 amidst the ongoing violent struggle; and the UN operation in the Balkans, which was unable to prevent atrocious events, including the genocide in Srebrenica, Bosnia, in July 1995. This resulted in significant discussion and debate about the potential and limits of UN missions and by the late 1990s many member states decided to turn away from UN peace engagements. These cases prompted, in the late 1990s, a major crisis of

liberal peacebuilding, calling into question its validity as an international policy framework for dealing with conflict-affected societies.

Since late 1990s and early 2000s, different authors have problematized the implications of the liberal peace project. These critics are divided into different groups depending on their critical approach¹. The following two sections are based on the classification established by Chandler (2010a), in which two groups of critiques are defined. The first group consists of an idea-based or policy critique, describing a more technical and institutionalist approach towards the problematics that stem from liberal peacebuilding. The second trend is defined as a power-based or radical critique, and includes an approach based on the unequal relational process between the intervenors and the intervened, and a diagnosis of the fundamental nature and intentionality behind the liberal peacebuilding project.

1.1 The policy critique and its results: The technocratic turn and the rise of statebuilding

In the context of major international community-led failures in the 1990s such as the cases of Somalia, Rwanda or Srebrenica, some authors discussed the implications for international peace appreciating the existence of “collapsed states” (see Zartman, 1995) or “failed states” (see Helman and Ratner, 1999), considering that those states hold responsibility for threatening international security and enabling the emergence of agents of terror. Rotberg (2002) argues that the root cause of state failure is the impossibility of the state to deliver positive political goods to their people: security, education, health services, economic opportunities, environmental surveillance, a legal framework of order and a judicial system to administer it, and fundamental infrastructural requirements such as roads and communication facilities. When these political goods are not provided, states lose legitimacy and the nation-state itself therefore becomes illegitimate. As Rotberg elaborates, a

¹ See Goetze and Guzina, 2008; Chandler, 2010a; Tadjbakhsh 2011; Campbell *et al.*, 2011; Ruiz-Jimenez, 2013.

failed state is then defined by the presence of intense violence against the existing government and the vigorous character of the political or geographical demands for power sharing of the political structures. The US-led War on Terror in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks was notoriously influenced by the conceptualization of the failed states discourse. Rotberg (2002) states that because failed states are hospitable to non-state actors like warlords or terrorists, understanding the dynamics of nation-state failure is central to the war against terrorism². During the beginning of the present century, the failed states doctrine was fundamental in shaping the nature of Western-led international interventions, the most paradigmatic cases occurring in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The failed states debate theoretical contribution resembles Kaldor's "new wars" definition in the sense that both conceptual approaches identify a "bad" or "different" external actor or phenomenon which must be readjusted in order to preserve international peace and security.

In line with the failed states discourse, certain authors within the liberal peace debate stress the need to focus on (re)building state structures in conflict-affected societies in order to prepare them for the liberal peacebuilding process (Paris 1997, 2004.). These authors are proponents of expanding liberal international peacebuilding missions and defend peacebuilding as a valid formula for spreading sustainable

² From a critical point of view, Duffield (2001) asserted that paradigms like "failed states" lack sensitivity to alternative forms of social organization that arise within different historical processes of state formation and conditions of capital accumulation (see Williams and Young 1994). In this same line of argument, Call (2008) suggests that the "failed states" concept, and related terms like "failing", "fragile", "stressed" and "troubled", has ended up, through funding efforts from foundations and think-tanks, in a proliferation of multiple, divergent and poorly uses usages of the term. He identifies six particular pitfalls of the notion of "failed state": the problem of definition or super-aggregation of very diverse sorts of states, as this tends to lead to a single prescription for diverse maladies, its focus on building states obscures regimes and their nature and avoids thorny issues like democratization, representation, horizontal accountability and transparency; its growing predominance had a policy impact on institutions such as the UN which had been hitherto focused on peacekeeping and peacebuilding rather than the construction of state institutions; the value-based idea of what a state is, and a patronising approach to scoring states based on those values; and the obfuscation of the West's role in the contemporary condition of the alleged "failed states".

peace across the globe. This first trend is considered a policy critique or problem-solving trend (hence “problem-solvers”) and aims to improve peacebuilding strategies from the most technical perspective (see Paris and Sisk, 2009).

During the turn of the century, the peacebuilding narrative shifted to stress the need for consolidating liberal and democratic state structures in post-conflict contexts (Ghani and Lockhart, 2009; Chesterman *et al.*, 2005). Roland Paris (2004), one of the most acknowledged authors of this policy critique, argues that liberalism is a broad canvas with the ability of accommodating a wide range of political and economic structures as well as diverse methods for engaging with the inhabitants of war-shattered societies. Nonetheless, he claims that the liberal peacebuilding model needs to be revised. He defined the concept Institutionalization before Liberalization, through which peacebuilders should delay liberalization and limit political and market freedoms in the short run in order to create conditions for a smoother and less hazardous transition to market democracy and durable peace in the long run. In this regard, he states,

“The peacebuilding strategy I propose would preserve the Wilsonian goal of transforming war-shattered states into liberal market democracies in the long run, while minimizing the destabilizing effects of the liberalization process in the short run. I call the strategy Institutionalization Before Liberalization because the central recommendation is that peacebuilders should concentrate on constructing a framework of effective institutions prior to promoting political and economic competition. What is needed in the immediate post-conflict period is not democratic ferment and economic upheaval, but political stability and the establishment of effective administration over territory” (Paris, 2004: 187).

As Paris (2004) raises it, a process of “institutionalization”, with emphasis on the rule of law and the strengthening of formal institutions, guarantees the stability of liberal democracy and market-oriented economies. This thereby offers the surest formula for peace, both in relations between states and within their borders. The assumption is that institutionalisation contains the destabilising effects of political and

economic liberalisation. This debate contributed to the emergence of the technocratic turn of international peacebuilding frameworks, embodied in highly institutionalized interventionist processes such as statebuilding. According to Paris and Sisk,

“Statebuilding is not synonymous with peacebuilding. Post-conflict peacebuilding refers to efforts to create conditions in which violence will not recur. Statebuilding, by contrast, is a sub-component of peacebuilding. Support for post-war statebuilding should thus not be misconstrued as an attempt to supplant peacebuilding, but rather, as a call for paying greater attention to strengthening or constructing effective and legitimate governmental institutions as an important element of peacebuilding” (Paris and Sisk, 2009:14).

Indeed, during most of the 2000s, international peacebuilding activities -undertaken either by International Organizations or individual state donors- focused on the creation or recreation of state institutions as a conciliatory process and as a key to peace and stability (see Richmond, 2013; Finkenbusch, 2017). Some even stated that since the post-Cold War context, peacebuilding had become synonymous of statebuilding (Goetze and Guzina, 2008). The rise of statebuilding-oriented practices in the peacebuilding framework was thus prompted by an eagerness to include technical improvement, the creation of best practices units, the professionalization of personnel, the efficiency of operating procedures and, in general, the standardization of peacebuilding (Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016). Indeed, in the last twenty years, many actors of different nature (states, NGOs, International Organizations, the academia) have produced, from a variety of perspectives, vast literature on technical aspects to plan, implement and improve peacebuilding projects³. On the basis of the evaluation of such projects some technical discussions arose about the lack of coherence between different programs, referencing the lack of coordination or which state structures should be rebuilt.

³ See Austin et al. 2003; Bloomfield et al., 2005; Church and Shouldice, 2002; Lederach et al., 2007

1.2 The radical critique and its results: The local turn

As Newman (2013) states, from a historical approach, the twenty-first century statebuilding processes which need to be included within the framework of peacebuilding activities, have not pacified post-conflict contexts and remain excessively coercive. The reality of current conflictive contexts such as the Democratic Republic of Congo or Iraq confirms this argument. As some scholars state, peacebuilding should not be taken as a recipe through which a structural change within a system can be achieved from the outside, what some call the “Ikea-peacebuilding” way (Smith, 2004; Lederach, 2005; Richmond, 2007), or through a “one-size-fits-all” model. Similarly, other authors argue that liberal peace approaches are too technical and depoliticized, ignoring the role of particular values and identities of host societies (Ruiz-Giménez, 2013; see Sending 2010, 2011; see Adler, 1997). Even those proponents in favor of standardizing a highly technical and liberal peace acknowledged some dilemmas and contradictions within their approach such as the excessive intrusiveness of external actors, the technical challenge of giving host countries a protagonist position in the process or the universal validity of certain liberal values as well as social and political practices (Paris and Sisk, 2009). Chandler (2010a) elaborates on this criticism of institutionalist approaches,

“Institutionalization reduces law to an administrative code, politics to technocratic decision-making, democratic and civil rights to those of the supplicant rather than citizen, replaces citizenry with civil society, and the promise of capitalist modernity with pro-poor poverty reduction” (Chandler, 2010b: 154).

Also critical of the institutionalist approach to peacebuilding, and on the basis of the Foucauldian concept of biopolitics, referring to a process of modelling life through social and political power, Mateos (2011) highlights the inefficiency of developing biopolitical and governmental methods to carry out peacebuilding operations. Deepening this concept of biopolitics, Dillon and Reid (2009) argue that human suffering is instrumentalized within biopoliticalization of human life, causing human life to become the referent object of rule and war.

Also from a Foucauldian point of view, Zanotti (2006) distinguishes two post-cold war international regime trajectories. On one side, she describes institutional disciplinarity, which concerns the reform of institutions within potentially disorderly states. This process is developed mainly by international organizations and alliances, specifically the UN. The ultimate goal is to implement reforms aiming at the transformation of pre-modern modalities of government into orderly, predictable, disciplinary and disciplined administrations. The second trajectory is defined as governmentalization and operates through the proliferation of mechanisms of international knowledge and control. As Zanotti states, more and more international rules pertain to the way states govern their citizens and international organizations institute mechanisms of control, reward and punishment in order to assess and guide state's performance.

Since the mid-2000s on, this trend of critical authors providing critiques towards statebuilding and highly standardized peacebuilding processes, the so-called radical critique, has questioned the underlying assumptions and norms that peacebuilding strategies are based on (Körppen et al., 2011). Beyond the technical critique, these authors questioned how host societies are affected by the hierarchical relationship between the interveners and the intervened (see Chandler, 2006: and Mac Ginty, 2008)⁴. This radical critique has argued that there is an unjust hierarchical relationship based on the intervenors exerting power over

⁴ This critique is influenced by the consolidation in the 1980s of the reflectivist paradigm, as opposed to dominant positivist paradigms such as neoliberalism, neorealism or structuralism, highly associated with the catch-all rational system of Enlightenment. This new reflectivist epistemological approach, born to erode the rationalist hegemony, denies any taken-for-granted overarching truths and questions the fundament of liberal traditional thought. Among others, critical theory and gender studies have made key contributions in this reflectivist paradigm. Gender studies emerged with new epistemological conceptions that enriched new approaches to cross-sector knowledge and challenged the fundament of masculinity and man-centered IR (see Cohn, 1987), similar to the way critical theory had already casted doubt on positivist rationality (Habermas, 1990). For a detailed revision of this critical trend see Tadjbakhsh (2011), Campbell et al. (2011) or Ruiz-Jimenez, (2013). Sabaratnam (2011) states that the intellectual source of the liberal peace criticism is the 20th century anti-colonial thought from authors such as Césaire (see 1972), Cabral (see 1980) or Fanon (see 1986).

the intervened (see Zurcher, 2011), usually referred to in the literature as “the locals”⁵.

The diagnosis of this criticism given to the international peacebuilding strategy is fundamentally based on the assumption that peacebuilding processes attempt to reproduce modern Western models such as Westphalian state sovereignty, liberal conception of human rights, winner-takes-all-elections and neoliberal economy in non-Western contexts (Chandler, 2010b; see Richmond, 2008, 2009). Therefore, the radical critique is implicitly casting doubt on Western assumptions such as liberalism, democracy and free market (Newman et al., 2009). Up until now, there has been a certain type of account of peacebuilding as being able to aid in the avoidance of relapse into violence, but there is no evidence that it is also conducive to a successful liberal democracy (Barnett et al., 2014). To these authors, peacebuilding reinforces the *status quo* of the modern-liberal state, rather than calling for a deep transformation of structural injustices.

Some authors point out the hegemonic power relations and interests involved in international interventionist missions and the expansion of western-liberal imperialism⁶. This novel form of imperialism does not imply physical territorial occupation but the expansion of the Western liberal culture and the underestimation of non-Western values and

⁵ Over the last decade, this debate has brought up a conceptual confusion worth clarifying. Although “local” literally corresponds to everything comprised within domestic barriers, in the local turn theoretical debate “local” is usually associated with grass-roots local actors or practices such as inclusion of civil society organizations, traditional indigenous forms of social and political organization, community-based projects, etc. Therefore, local actors such as the Government are usually excluded when scholars refer to “the local”. As a further conceptual clarification, “the local” is usually presented as the opposite of “the international”. This is also conceptually confusing because while, as just stressed, “local” defines a geographical delimitation (within domestic barriers), international has to do with the impact an actor has. For example, a civil society organizations based in a small town could be an international actor if it had an international reputation and the capacity to exert influence on an international scale. Therefore, categories (geographic delimitation and impact) become confused. A more accurate dichotomy would be “the local” and “the external”, instead of “the international”.

⁶ See Chandler, 2006, 2010b; Bendaña, 2003, 2005; Pugh, 2004; Richmond, 2010a.

cultures (see Liden et al., 2009; Jabri, 2010). Taylor (2010) states that it is in post-conflict spaces where the imperialist nature of neoliberalism, via the imposition of the liberal peace project, might be most observed.

The common proposal of this radical critique is the empowerment of the affected local population to counter the hegemonic power of the intervenors⁷. This propositional trend was influenced by authors such as John Paul Lederach, Kevin Avruch and Morgan Brigg based on the idea that local peculiarities, such as the culture of non-Western societies, matter for conflict resolution and make it difficult for localities to accommodate Western liberal state structures (see Avruch, 1998). The radical critique points out the notable inadequacy of neoliberalism and the free market economy as dominant ideologies in the frame of the exportation of the liberal peace project abroad. Often, host societies are so unfamiliar with liberal tradition that such model of the Western modern state would require decades to be successfully established. Therefore, they argue for a more local, culture-focused, context-sensitive approach to peacebuilding (see Lederach, 1997; Lederach and Moomaw, 2002). In line with this perspective, Brigg argued,

“Culture matters for peace and conflict studies. The way in which individuals and groups make meaning of their social and physical world, and the values, beliefs and processes that are reproduced through this meaning-making, have implications for how conflicts are waged and resolution pursued, and for the ideas and practices that constitute peace (Brigg, 2010: 329).

Deep-rooted critical voices have thus argued for a real context-sensitive, bottom-up and local approach, highlighting the relevance of the nature of the context where policies will be implemented. In other words, historical and cultural sensitivity within peacebuilding processes is

⁷ Lederach (1997) classifies local actors in three tracks. Track 1 refers to the top leadership comprising military, political and religious leaders with high visibility. Track 2 involves middle-range leaders such as academics, intellectuals or religious figures. Their close links to government officials allow them to influence political decisions. With their reputation, they are also respected at the grass-roots level. Track 3 includes local community or indigenous leaders, who are most familiar with the effects of violent conflicts within the population at large.

crucial. Therefore, regarding peacebuilding implementation action, decisions are encouraged to be based on a case by case basis with no need for them to be applied all at once. According to these radical critical voices, peacebuilding should acknowledge difference, support local agency, allow autonomy and keep social engineering from entering the process. As others put it, there is a consensus that increasing local individuals and groups' preferences is a necessary element for peacebuilding (Barnett *et al.*, 2014).

Many have also focused on the study of the complexity and diversity of “the local”⁸. Pouligny (2005) highlights that Western peace practitioners undermine the plurality of the views of “the locals” in conflict-affected zones. Some authors have proposed a focus on the weak or the minority, appreciating all the problematic aspects this might imply. This is what Mac Ginty and Richmond define as local-local, meaning people at the bottom in their everyday struggles and concerns (not those who do not really represent the local population) (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). Similarly, others stress Western biases such as the tendency to focus the peacebuilding endeavour on urban areas (Autesserre 2010; Shepherd, 2015:898), leaving rural zones of post-conflict societies forgotten. This then captures a mistaken nature of the local, therefore becoming unrepresentative. Linked to this exploration of the nature of the local, authors such as Sewell (1999) or Brigg and Muller (2009) have warned against the impossibility of categorizing local culture as a closed, static and generalizable reality.

This approach has fostered the emergence of ethnographical methodologies. Pouligny (2005, 2006) highlights the need for much more comprehensive ethnographic efforts, based on reflexive methodology, to write the stories from the community level. She stresses the need for knowing the language of local populations or living with and like them, as well as other elements required when attempting to produce knowledge on post-conflict contexts. In this vein, some authors (see Autesserre, 2014; Finlay, 2014; Millar, 2014) have

⁸ See Hyden, 2015; Lee and Özerdem, 2015; Mac Ginty, 2015; Paffenholz, 2015; Randazzo, 2016; Richmond and Pogodda, 2016

interrogated the suitability of the anthropological approach and ethnographic data in order to generate a more comprehensive understanding of local realities in the peacebuilding processes. Similarly, the concept of everyday peace refers to a form of agency that defines the ability of individuals and communities to cope with stressful situations. This concept relies on present opportunities and context, as well as the ability of individuals and groups to exploit them (Mac Ginty, 2014:550).

This radical critique contributed to the emergence of the local turn, which consisted of a shift within international policy frameworks towards empowering local agents, encouraging the transformation of the hierarchical relationship imposed on them by external actors. To a large extent, the local turn was a reaction to the technocratic turn, the rise of statebuilding-oriented peacebuilding which overlooked the implications on host societies of a hierarchical relationship between the interveners and those being intervened upon.

2. The United Nations response to the fall: The role of the new Peacebuilding Architecture

In the context of crisis and criticism to the liberal peace project during the turn of the century, the UN carried out an evaluation and revision of the operations deployed, introducing subsequent reforms. This section distinguishes between two different types of reforms, which are then developed alongside the two critical trends and turns examined above, namely the technocratic and the local turn. The first set of reforms aims at a technical improvement of the internal functioning of UN missions and focuses on the dimension of coherence, analyzed in Chapter Five. The dissertation defines coherence as a two-fold strategic goal. On the one hand, coherence responds to the relationship between New York-based headquarters and the field missions, and, on the other hand, it responds to field undercoordination within different UN bodies. The second reform aims to encourage inclusiveness of UN-led post-conflict engagements by incorporating local and regional actors into the peacebuilding processes, analyzed in Chapter Six. These

reforms unfolded through the emergence of DPA-led integrated missions but, above all, they were made possible through the creation of the new Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) in its goal to operationalize and fulfil mandates of articles 97 (on coherence) and 98 (on inclusiveness) of the foundational resolution, described in subsequent sections⁹.

2.1 The establishment of the new Peacebuilding Architecture

Aside from the proposal of a peacebuilding unit within the DPA, which was impossible to be established, there have been a few other instances of failed attempts to institutionalize peacebuilding within a specific body of the UN such as the international Strategic Recovery Facility (SRF) and the UNDP Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Recovery (BCPR). Nonetheless, it was not until the celebration of the 2003 HLP (High Level Panel) when the PBC was first mentioned. The resulting 2004 report of the SG's HLP "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility" addresses in paragraphs 221 to 230 the issue of post-conflict peacebuilding (see Secretary General, 2004a). Within this formal mechanism, experts express their perspective that the UN "has not succeeded in generating crucial resources to assist fragile transitions" from war to peace. The need for a "single intergovernmental organ dedicated to peacebuilding, empowered to monitor and pay close attention to countries at risk, ensure concerted action by donors, agencies, programs and financial institutions and mobilize financial resources for sustainable peace" is then subsequently suggested. The formal proposal for the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission with as Peacebuilding Support Office hosted within the Secretariat is found in the last sections of the report, from paragraphs 261 to 269. In these paragraphs, the panel identifies a "key institutional gap", expressing that "there is no place in the United Nations system explicitly designed to avoid State collapse and the slide to war or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace". To this goal, the report

⁹ For detailed information on UN peacebuilding, see <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding>

proposes the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission whose core functions involve,

“...to identify countries which are under stress and risk sliding towards State collapse; to organize, in partnership with the national Government, proactive assistance in preventing that process from developing further; to assist in the planning for transitions between conflict and post conflict peacebuilding; and in particular to marshal and sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding over whatever period may be necessary” (Secretary General, 2004a:83).

In its initial design, as outlined in the HLP context, the PBC was originally defined as being distinct from what resulted to be formally adopted by the GA (McCann, 2014). Regarding its composition, the PBC planned to have had representation from the UN SC, the ECOSOC, national authorities only from the countries under consideration, the IMF, the World Bank, regional development banks, donor countries and regional organizations. Representation from different groups, however, was not specified. On the other hand, the PBC's functions should have been first and foremost preventive so as to identify countries at risk of sliding toward collapse, and in order to organize assistance to prevent these types of processes from developing further (Secretary General, 2004a). The PBC was then envisioned to generate resources for post-conflict countries on its agenda by galvanizing donor countries and encouraging them to contribute funding. The PBSO, as proposed by the HLP, should have not been a cause for struggle between the DPKO and the DPA but should have been established as the right-hand of the SG. Furthermore, its functions should have been reduced to a small office responsible for “conference serving” of the PBC. Finally, the PBF should have been able to access only a small part of the global funds available for peacebuilding activities. Many HLP members and research staff confirmed in interviews with Mc Cann that the PBC proposal was the least controversial amongst the HLP proposals, as well as the one with the broadest support (Mc Cann, 2014).

In September 2005, compiling the impressions and criticisms put forth by the panel and within the frame of the early progress of the Millennium Development Goals, Annan launched, by request from Heads of State and Governments, the report “In Larger Freedom: Towards development, Security and Human Rights for All”. Within it, he stressed a gaping hole in the UN institutional machinery as no part of the UN system was effectively addressing the challenge of helping countries through a productive transition from war to lasting peace (see Secretary General, 2005). The document, which was given to the GA six months before the 2005 World Summit, was divided into four main parts. The first two parts covered the two approaches the human security debates were built on. The first approach, the “freedom from want” approach unfolds those relevant aspects related to development. The second, the “freedom from fear” approach, deals with security-related issues such as the evolution of collective security or the appearance of new threats. The third part of the report covers all aspects of human rights protection, including the respect for democratic institutions and the rule of law. The final part of the text proposes a reform and strengthening of UN organs, with the goal of pursuing the already mentioned challenges.

Annan's main contribution was the removal of the PBC's preventive character. This character had generated significant resistance amongst developing countries who feared the PBC had become a means for the West to penetrate developing countries. The SG therefore opted to remove the preventive functions, leaving only the option for countries to voluntarily seek assistance from the Commission. Another idea raised in the “In Larger Freedom” report was the inclusion of a broader range of actors such as development actors, countries with recent peacebuilding experiences or the World Bank, who eventually refused the formal seat it was offered, resulting in thus one observer more. The report also established a practice of sequential reporting of the PBC to the UN SC and ECOSOC, depending on what stage of conflict a country was in (Secretary General, 2005).

Berdal (2009) describes three main phases during the preceding months of the creation of the PBC. The first stage is comprised of reports ranging from the HLP to the publication of “In Larger Freedom” in late March 2005. During this stage, Annan called on member states to “create an intergovernmental PBC, as well as a PBSO” (Berdal, 2009). He included key functions of the PBC envisaged by the HLP: an early-warning and monitoring role in relation to countries that are “under stress and risk sliding towards state collapse” (Berdal, 2009). This position was very much criticized by the Non-Aligned Movement and the G77, resulting in the limiting of their support to the PBC simply as a post-conflict intervention body. This line of argument was expressed by the ex-Foreign Minister of India, Muchkund Dubey. He denounced the identification of risky states as based on broad and subjective assumptions, with the ultimate goal behind the UN peacebuilding efforts being to bring independent sovereign states from the developing world under a new form of colonization. The second stage refers to the period lasting from the 2005 World Summit in September to the formal establishment of the Commission three months later, in December. As mentioned above, the outcome document requested the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body, signaling its non-operational role. The outcome also included the *modus operandi*, namely decisions made on a by-consensus basis of its members which, according to Berdal, is a recipe for paralysis. A range of other issues, however, were left open-ended in this document, such as the specific role and institutional location of the PBC within the UN, its size and composition, the internal relationship between the Commission and Country-Specific Configurations, and reporting lines and the relationship with the PBSO. Finally, the third described stage includes the period lasting from the formal establishment of the Commission in December 2005. This phase was very much influenced by political tensions caused by Annan's attempt to reform the UN. Furthermore, a lack of success was noted in defining what the PBC would do and how it would achieve its goals. Attitude towards the PBSO included a degree of skepticism about its ability to secure the necessary cooperation from UN agencies and departments, including offices in the field. One notable struggle the PBSO most significantly

dealt with was the bureaucratic force militating against its office, preventing it from assuming a truly effective role.

The eventual decision dictating the final nature of the new PBA was eventually adapted and decided upon in the 2005 World Summit Outcome. Held in September, the World Summit remarked on the need to establish a Peacebuilding Commission, with the aim consisting of coordinating international peacebuilding efforts establishing the UN as a common platform. In conclusion of these discussions, the General Assembly passed the resolution A/RES/60/1, better known as the 2005 World Summit Outcome, where it states in its articles 97 and 98 that,

“97. Emphasizing the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace, recognizing the need for a dedicated institutional mechanism to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict towards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in laying the foundation for sustainable development, and recognizing the vital role of the United Nations in that regard, we decide to establish a Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body.

98. The main purpose of the Peacebuilding Commission is to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery. The Commission should focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development. In addition, it should provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, develop best practices, help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and extend the period of attention by the international community to post-conflict recovery. The Commission should act in all matters on the basis of consensus of its members” (General Assembly, 2005a).


Already in the definition of the core functions of the PBC, we can distinguish between the two dimensions analyzed in this dissertation,

namely coherence (art. 97) and inclusiveness of stakeholders within the process (art. 98), in Chapters Five and Six, respectively.

Three months later, on December 20, and reaffirming the 2005 World Summit Outcome, the Security Council passed Resolution S/RES/1645 in its 5335th meeting. The General Assembly also passed Resolution A/RES/60/180, thus founding the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)¹⁰. This resolution also requested in its Articles 23 and 24, the creation of a PBSO and a PBF, respectively (see General Assembly, 2005b). The resulting triad, namely the PBC, the PBSO and the PBF, became known as the new PBA. The document specifies the already highlighted purposes of the Commission, as well as its intergovernmental composition of 31 states proceeding from the SC, the ECSOSC, top contributing countries to the UN budget and top troop contributing countries. Elaborating upon the nature and functions of the three bodies, the PBC was created as an intergovernmental advisory body with three operational formats. First involves the Organizational Committee, the Country Specific Configuration, in which the PBC operates, and the meetings held by the PBC at the Working Group on Lessons Learned. Secondly the PBSO is organizationally located within the Executive Office of the Secretary General (EOSG), with two main responsibilities. Its first responsibility involves working as the PBC's secretariat and the second involves performing a combined professional-networking, knowledge-consolidation and information-dissemination role. And third operational format, the PBF, is based on voluntary contributions from countries, aiming to respond to changing conditions on the ground (see figure 3), fill “critical peacebuilding gaps”, disburse funds quickly and prioritize catalytic interventions (Jenkins, 2013).

¹⁰ Hirschmann (2012:378) reports that, in an interview with Francesco Mancini from the International Peace Institute, this stated that the PBC emerged from one of the “off-the-record” thematic dinners organized by the International Peace Institute with members of the UN SC and other states.

Figure 3. Recipient of UN Peacebuilding Fund (2005-2010). Source: UNDP (2010).



This consolidation stage of the UN peacebuilding system also included certain noteworthy internal tensions. On the one hand, as the PBC took over the DPA role as the main UN organ in charge of peacebuilding processes, not all actors within the DPA were satisfied with the creation of the PBC itself. The DPA had reasons to distrust a newly-developed UN body whose goal was the same one that the department had long been struggling for. On the other hand, the DPKO accepted the creation of the PBC because of its ability to deprive the DPA of its domination of the peacebuilding field (Jenkins, 2013). This institutional complexity was something the Commission had to struggle with and address during its early stages. Even though the PBC had no operational capacity of its own and arrangements were marked by political tensions (Berdal, 2009), two positive outcomes regarding the founding of the PBC are worth highlighting. Firstly, its mere creation reflects the fact that there are issues of concern common to all peacebuilding actors (either UN, regional organizations or individual states/donors). Secondly, the complexity of unfolding and implementing the PBC within a network like the UN ensures a more coordinated and systematic approach to peacebuilding. Beyond this, De Coning (2010:14) argues that the PBC was produced as the only UN body solely focused on peacebuilding-oriented actions, representing a neutral space within which the North and the South are able to interact to discuss shared issues of interest.

In reference to the priorities of peacebuilding operations, the guideline (Peacebuilding Support Office, 2010) establishes five major challenges to be faced on the ground. Firstly, peacebuilders are requested to support basic safety and security issues, including mine action, protection of civilians, strengthening of the rule of law as well as supporting the DDR and SSR processes, originally consolidated in Ghali's period, as described in the previous chapter. Secondly, the UN peacebuilding endeavor is required to support political processes, including electoral processes, promoting inclusive dialogue and reconciliation, transitional justice processes¹¹ and developing conflict management capacity at national and subnational levels. Transitional justice seeks to redress wrongdoing but, inevitably, in the face of resource, time and political constraints, this is a selective process, and thus involves a delimiting narration of violence and remedy (Nagy, 2008). In the last two decades, judiciary processes in post-conflict contexts have been embodied principally in the ICC, and its ad-hoc international tribunals. Thirdly, different UN agents interacting and included in the field should guarantee the provision of basic services such as water, sanitation, health, primary education as well as the safe return and reintegration of internally displaced people. Fourthly, the support to restoring core government functions such as basic public administration and public finance is also considered a key element during the peacebuilding process. The results of this ensure that basic democratic structures, such as the parliament, the government, political and administrative buildings, are (re)built. To some extent, "democracy" indicates legitimacy to the point where it has been

¹¹ Transitional justice may manifest itself in three different forms on the basis of how parties are treated and what measures are taken (Rodríguez, 2013). Firstly, the forgetfulness model consists of ignoring what happened in the past and exchange general amnesties for peace accords. This model was implemented in post-conflict Angola and Mozambique in the early 1990s. Secondly, the forgiveness model is based on the process of reconciliation as a means for retributive justice. The state organizes Truth and Reconciliation Commissions for victims to be heard and perpetrators to be acknowledged as such. A narrative of the past is collectively built by the civil society prompting victim's healing. This model was implemented in South Africa and Sierra Leone during the 1990s. And finally, the justice model, where the judiciary processes are taken as a means for restorative justice. It is usually the international community through the ICC that intervenes. The goal is to make perpetrators pay for what they did. This model was used for Bosnia and Rwanda.

suggested or implied that a “right to democracy” or a kind of “democratic entitlement” is at play in international affairs (Franck, 2000). Finally, the UN system is also expected to support the economic revitalization including employment generation and livelihoods, with special emphasis on youth and demobilized former combatants, and rehabilitation of basic infrastructure. Again, as with democratic institutions, and as described in Chapter One, there is a clear assumption that capitalist market economies with liberalized trading practices are desirable end-states and that liberal economic policies that promote this free trade contribute to peace between states (Greener, 2011). Above all the UN peacebuilding system ensures that priority-setting reflects the needs of the conflict-affected country rather than being externally-driven.

2.2 Towards coherence: A technical approach to peacebuilding

In the context of the crisis of the UN peacebuilding endeavor in the late 1990s, the UN attempted to improve the results of its post-conflict engagements through a process of reforms aimed at a more technical and standardized form of peacebuilding. These reforms were adopted specifically through the increasingly used action of integrating missions under the DPA umbrella as well as the creation of the new PBA.

As described in Chapter One and analyzed in Chapter Five, the DPA, as well as the DPKO, increasingly tends to enact integrated special political missions, based on a common strategic plan, priority-setting process and a shared set of programs to jointly address a conflict-affected context, thus maximizing obtained results. As it will be argued in Chapter Five, the key reasoning behind integrated mission is that it is usually ambiguous and difficult to draw a line between what should be addressed by the DPKO and what should be addressed instead by the DPA. Reality in local contexts is often so complex that an integrated action is required.

In addition to DPA-led integrated missions, one of the key tasks of the PBA was a technical improvement in coherence, namely the

relationship between the NY-based headquarters and the field missions, as well as intracoordination of the missions on the ground. The 2005 World Summit, which produced the PBC, already indicated a necessity for a separate body aimed at enhancing strategic coherence in conflict-affected areas. Accordingly, the resulting AG resolution, which established the PBC, stressed in its article 97 the necessity for a coherent and coordinated approach, as well as strengthening of efforts on integrated strategies in post-conflict peacebuilding processes (see General Assembly, 2005a)¹². The particular task of the new PBA is thus strengthening the relationship between, on the one hand, the NY-based headquarters and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), and on the other, to strengthen the intracoordination of UN actors in the field through the support to the UNCT (Peacebuilding Commission, 2013).

According to the PBSO (2010), in order to successfully develop a peacebuilding process, up to three levels of coordination should be carefully achieved. Firstly, coordination within national actors such as local institutional representatives, political leaders, civil society or the private sectors. Secondly, coordination amongst all international actors, including international and regional organizations, international NGOs as well as states is necessary. The final level of coordination involves coordination within the UN peacebuilding system itself, or intracoordination, discussed in Chapter Four. Beyond this last level of coordination, this dissertation also analyzes in Chapter Four the coordination between the UN team and external actors, specifically regional actors.

The guideline (PBSO, 2010) also states that, in regard to a more coordinated strategic planning, there are two major stages within which different strategies are implemented. In the first stage, during the immediate aftermath of conflict (see Secretary General, 2009a), the UN should develop a plan on the basis of available tools and mechanisms, including those in the Integrated Mission Planning Process toolkit, such as the Strategic Assessment and the Integrated Strategic Framework (see

¹² The Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy is the framework through which PBC engagement is operationalized in a post-conflict peacebuilding context.

Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2013)¹³, and also taking into account the intervention by the rapid response-oriented Post-Conflict Needs Assessment of the United Nations Development Group. In the second stage, the resulting early strategy should be agreed upon by national and external stakeholders and should provide both a macro-level strategic approach for international support as well as a limited action plan addressing high priority needs.

The PBC, as it has been described above, is fundamentally responsible for first, marshalling resources for this peacebuilding process through the PBF and second, coordinating all external actors involved in the process as well as UN agents, which are numerous. The early peacebuilders are usually the peacekeepers (see Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008, 2010), which are deployed under a DPKO-led UN peacekeeping operation when the violence might be still ongoing. They are responsible for security- and military-oriented programs such as the DDR or SSR. Beyond these tasks, peacekeepers might also assist civilian staff of DPA-led Special Political Missions, which are usually deployed once violence has been overcome. They also address tasks such as support to electoral processes or to the re-establishment of local governmental institutions. In principle, if there is a UNCT as an umbrella for all UN agents, the strategy is framed within an Integrated Strategic Framework; if there is no UNCT, the peacebuilding strategy is then instead framed in the Development Assistance Framework.

2.3 Towards inclusiveness: A locally-focused approach to peacebuilding

In addition to the technical reforms of the PBA, since the late 2000s on, UN post-conflict engagements introduced an endeavor of including and

¹³ An integrated strategy necessarily means that the processes within it are interconnected. For example, if measures such as the DDR do not go with social and economy-based development policies such as investment in rebuilding infrastructure, ex-combatants will not have the possibility to reinsert in the labor market and it will facilitate their access to criminal networks and political violence (Jeong, 2005).

empowering stakeholders in the process, such as local agents or regional actors, as provided in article 97 of the PBC founding resolution (see General Assembly, 2005a). During the mid-2000s the UN added to the technical, top-down and standardized form of peacebuilding, including a focus on the particularities and potentialities of the host context (see Secretary General, 2009a). International peacebuilding policy frameworks increasingly began including context-sensitive, bottom-up approaches aimed at achieving better results in the endeavor of consolidating lasting peace.

One of the most popular policies within the UN was known as the national or local ownership principle, framed in the PBA framework. This policy established that the ultimate responsibility of peacebuilding processes should be of the host society. Local ownership was initially conceived of in the development field, particularly in the frame of the OECD¹⁴ in the late 1990s, but primarily popularized as a policy in the frame of the UN peacebuilding system, in particular within the PBC, which included national ownership as one of its core principles¹⁵.

In 2010 the PBSO also agreed upon an operational form of UN peacebuilding based on the local ownership principle (Peacebuilding Support Office, 2010). This document fundamentally set, amongst other aspects, the principles, priorities and strategic planning that all UN peacebuilding processes were expected to face and fulfil in the field. Concerning the principles, the guide establishes that local ownership, national capacity or common strategy are essential for the success of the process. By local ownership it is assumed that citizens of countries where peacebuilding is underway take responsibility for laying the foundations of lasting peace. National capacity is also central to the

¹⁴ In 1996, the OECD established that development policies should be primarily driven by societies in need (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1996).

¹⁵ The PBC defines national ownership as a process for which “peacebuilding is primarily a national challenge and responsibility. It is the citizens of the countries where peacebuilding is underway, with support from their governments, who assume the responsibility for laying the foundations of lasting peace” (Peacebuilding Support Office, 2010).

development of peacebuilding efforts, expected to ensure the empowerment of local agents in order to facilitate the decrease in need of external assistance. Finally, a common strategy was outlined as being expected to guarantee that all stakeholders be included in the process and therefore both the international community and national partners are able to allocate resources.

In regard to the more inclusive strategic planning, the guideline (Peacebuilding Support Office, 2010) states that, after six months of the arrival of the PBC in the country, both national and international stakeholders should design a more substantive, inclusive and long-term peacebuilding strategy. This should result first, in a nationally owned common strategy based on the conclusions of the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment, which is occasionally presented at an International Donors' Conference, and second, in a strategic framework specifying the UN's involvement with the peacebuilding process and the specific task of each UN actor.

Indeed, since the establishment of the PBC, the definition of peacebuilding has evolved towards a more inclusive process (see table 7). In the context of the early phase of the new PBA, the SG led a few Policy Committees. The first Committee constrained the definition of peacebuilding to a highly political activity based on national ownership and aimed at supporting a country in the transition from conflict to sustainable peace (Policy Committee, 2006). A year later, the SG stressed in a subsequent Policy Committee the need for a coherent and context-sensitive UN action in post-conflict societies, as well as the need to narrow down more specifically the priorities for an efficient peacebuilding strategy (Policy Committee, 2007).

Table 7. Evolution of the definition of peacebuilding within the UN since the creation of the new PBA.

Year	Source	Key information
2005	World Summit Outcome	Establishment of PBC.
2005 and 2006	Policy Committee	Focus on national ownership and context-sensitive approach.
2009, 2012 and 2014	Report of the SG on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict	Conceptual contributions to peacebuilding.
2015	High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations report	Stress on the primacy of politics, partnership and the local.
2015	The Challenges of Sustaining Peace	A holistic approach towards peace without pre-, during or post-conflict.

A few years later, the SG 2009 Report on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict consolidated the principle of national ownership as a peacebuilding priority, placing particular emphasis on the role of the PBC in this endeavor (see Secretary General, 2009a). As a follow-up, in 2012 and 2014, the SG published two further-developed reports on Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict. In the first one, Ban Ki-Moon touched on issues such as effectiveness, support and UN leadership of the UN ground teams; early agreements on priorities and alignment of resources; international support and national capacity development; cooperation with international community; the engagement of the PBC; and a gender perspective. Moreover, he stated that priority directions for peacebuilding should be: inclusivity, institution-building and sustained international support and mutual accountability (Secretary General, 2012a). In 2014, however, the SG reported on the progress made within these described areas, emphasizing the need for greater engagement of the international community, more coherent support to re-establish State institutions and a more coordinated action within the UN system on the ground (Secretary General, 2014a).

More broadly, this policy shift towards “the local” resonates with resilience-oriented engagements, an approach that became popular in the late 2000s and which attempts to strengthen the local context to

overcome potential adversities such as conflict¹⁶. Chandler (2013a) defends that resilience-oriented interventions could indeed become an actual move away from neoliberal governance. He argues this is centered in the complexity and potentiality of host contexts, and fosters an inter-subjective and self-reflexive process of empowerment in host societies facilitating thus a process of emancipation. He also argues that resilient approaches do not necessarily fall into cultural relativism supporting local potentially illiberal or exclusive practices (Chandler, 2014b).

Beyond local actors, the UN system, and particularly the PBA, faces the challenge of partnering with different stakeholders in order to maximize the results of the peacebuilding process¹⁷. This dissertation, as also elaborated upon in Chapter Six, focuses on the relationship between the UN and regional stakeholders in post-conflict scenarios. In other words, Chapter Six develops an empirical analysis of how the UN has attempted to adopt a regional approach in peacebuilding contexts. Due to selected cases of study, the regional actors that are analyzed are mainly the African Union as well as those subregional organizations of which the country case studies are a part, namely the ECOWAS, the EAC and CEMAC, among others.

Since the creation of the PBC in 2005, over the last decade the new PBA has intensified the work towards a sound relationship between the UN and regional actors in these particular settings. Depending on the particularities of the context, the UN engages in different forms with regional actors, including sequential deployment, co-deployment, hybrid or integrated missions, compacts or coordinated structures (Clement and Smith, 2009). The careful management of these complex

¹⁶ For a detailed revision of literature on the resilience debate see Haldrup and Rosén (2013) and Chandler (2014a; 2014b)

¹⁷ De Coning (2015) argues for the importance of a regional approach for peacebuilding processes on the basis of three considerations: First, he argues that conflicts are rarely isolated within domestic borders. Second, regional stakeholders usually are in a better position to understand and influence conflict settings. And thirdly, regional actors are physically close enough to ensure a long-term interest in the outcomes.

engagements is essential for the success of the partnership and, by extension, for a positive impact on the peacebuilding process.

In 2013 the SC stressed the critical need and conditions for a sound cooperation between the UN and regional actors in post-conflict engagements. Among other aspects, the resolution highlights the fact that a productive and positive cooperation could minimize duplication of efforts. This can be expressed by how the UN has the capacity to strengthen the role of regional actors through training and capacity building, how a cooperative framework of engagement can facilitate the overcoming of root causes of conflict through knowledge and experience sharing, or how current threats to international peace and security cannot be addressed by a state-based response, but rather require regional and global answers (see Security Council, 2013).

Furthermore, the 2015 report by the Advisory Group of Experts develops in detail one complete section on the necessity to enlarge efforts for partnership between the UN and regional actors. The report points out a valuable addition concerning the values and pitfalls of regional stakeholders:

“92. It generally holds true that the regional and sub-regional partners are well placed to have a detailed understanding of the situation on the ground in their member states, and presumably some leverage to influence outcomes. One important caveat, however, is that precisely due to proximity and interdependence, regional and sub-regional actors may also be indirectly involved in the conflict, especially when neighboring states are involved. That is why a case-by-case analysis is warranted before concluding that the perceived comparative advantages outweigh any potential negative aspects. The generally acknowledged comparative advantages of the United Nations remain its impartiality, its universality, its global reach, the responsibilities bestowed on the Organization by the Charter, and its comparative access to resources (both financial and human)” (Advisory Group of Experts, 2015:36-37).

Indeed, both the UN and regional actors have constructive assets as well as challenges to face in order to reach a sound partnership framework, thus having a positive impact on the peacebuilding context.

The report also illustrates lessons learned from past experiences in which the UN is expected to better specify the scope, content and rules that frame the relationship with major regional actors. All these aspects, and so forth, are critically discussed in detail in Chapter Six.

3. Implications of the local turn and a critical response

The third section initially highlights how the local turn affected international peacebuilding frameworks and the liberal peacebuilding project, providing space for concepts such as the post-liberal peace. It then analyzes the critiques that the radical critiques and the local turn received, namely the critiques of critiques.

3.1 Post-liberal peace

The shift towards a locally-focused international peacebuilding framework, reified in principles such as the local ownership principle, prompted an attempt for the empowerment of local actors. On the basis of the growing interaction between the interveners and the intervened in the context of resilience-oriented international peacebuilding policies, particularly since the end of 2000s, Richmond (2010b, 2011) describes the post-liberal peace. This term defines a hybrid peace which arises from the combination of the global-level liberal and cosmopolitan internationalism, and the local-level contextual forms. Through concepts such as post-liberal or hybrid peace, other authors argue that peacebuilding operations are comprised of local and external actors, and that these interactions produce post-war orders that are a mixture of Western liberal and non-liberal indigenous elements¹⁸.

A number of authors have elaborated upon and analyzed the nature of this post-liberal peace stage, where the local and the external collide. While “the external” is highly associated with the establishment of a Western-based liberal democratic State in post-conflict societies, in

¹⁸ See Boege et al., 2009; Mac Ginty, 2010, 2011; Richmond and Mitchel, 2011, Belloni, 2012

opposition, “the local” becomes associated with a focus of resistance, a process against the liberal invasion¹⁹. Through the concept “local resistance” to peacebuilding, authors refer to those idiosyncratic characteristics of some local actors or practices that hinder the establishment of externally-driven liberal measures²⁰. More recently, certain authors have defined the idea of friction as an analytical tool to explore the unpredictable and emergent nature of interactions between agents at different locations on both the local and international spectrum²¹. Furthermore, in the frame of the interactions between the external and the local, peace formation (Richmond, 2013:276) defines the relationship and networked processes within which indigenous or local agents of peacebuilding, conflict resolution, development or in customary, religious, cultural, social or local political or local government settings find ways of establishing peace processes and sustainable dynamics of peace. Linked to peace formation, Richmond and Pogodda (2016) describe post-liberal peace transitions as the processes through which the peace formation framework might contribute to state formation.

Stemming from this hybridity of post-liberal peace based on the interaction between the intervenors and the intervened, certain authors have defined the relational turn. This debate argues that more and more international engagements in post-conflict scenarios tend to embrace the complexity of these settings by pursuing a deeper understanding of the relational processes between different stakeholders, which are taken as non-essentialized and internally-diverse realities²².

¹⁹ See Bellamy et al., 2004; Pouligny, 2005; Roberts, 2008; Richmond, 2009; Lidén et al., 2009; Paris and Sisk, 2009; Chandler, 2010b; Mac Ginty, 2011; Campbell et al. 2011; Tadjbakhsh, 2011; Sabaratnam, 2011; Björkdahl and Höglund, 2013; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013

²⁰ See Roberts, 2008; Lidén, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2010, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2010, Chandler 2013b.

²¹ See Björkdahl and Höglund, 2013; Björkdahl et al., 2016; Millar et al., 2013

²² For a detailed literature on this relational process see Chadwick et al (2013).

3.2 Critiques of the critiques

As exposed in the empirical analysis of Chapter Six, the attempt of embracing local stakeholders, especially in the UN framework, has had rather limited success. In other words, the kind of context-sensitive, bottom-up approach dominant in the last decade has failed to successfully address post-conflict contexts. In practice, local ownership has represented a win-win process for the international community. This has ensured an international presence in post-conflict contexts, as well as being presented as a non-neo-colonial approach that respected diversity and thus had a higher level of domestic acceptability. The claim made by international agencies such as the UN to implement local ownership-oriented policies, however, is only rhetorical. It has, thus far, not actually been reified on the ground (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013; Donais, 2009). In other words, by proposing local ownership, self-government is deferred in post-conflict contexts (Bargués-Pedreny, 2014). Similarly, concerning the resilience policy framework which stemmed from the local turn, some authors critically argued that the resilience approach was a façade measure, in effect simply a continuum of externally-led neoliberal governance (Haldrup and Rosén, 2013) or that it still reproduces the Western division between liberal and a culturally different local (Sabaratnam, 2013).

Due to this limited success, local ownership, and the local turn in general, has been subject to extensive criticism (see Millar, 2016:3). This criticism can be divided into three major groups (see Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015). The first group involves a support for the moderate policy critiques who defend liberal peacebuilding as a valid formula and point out the negative effects of “over-promoting” the role of local actors for sustainable peace. This first trend is based on three fundamental ideas. The first sheds light on the fact that by promoting non-liberal indigenous forms of organization unconnected to democracy, free market or human rights, there is a high risk of reproducing structures of marginalization or inequality that brought about the conflict (Doyle, 2005; Paris 2004). The second argument states that local actors usually lack capacity to govern themselves (Does,

2013:5). The third, and final idea, draws on the difficulty of scaling up locally-led peacebuilding initiatives in order to make a significant impact (Hayman, 2010).

In the second major group, some authors stemming from the radical critique have criticized their own critical perspective on the basis of poor and weak propositional measures potentially implementable on the ground. Chandler (2010a) reflects that, while there is a consensus amongst the critiques of the liberal peace in which Western policies are problematic in post-war contexts because they are too liberal, there is much less attention paid to how problems of the post-colonial world might be alternatively addressed.

In the third, and final, critical group, post-colonial scholars critically argue that the radical critiques of the liberal peace and promoters of the local, bottom-up approach have not gone far enough. There is the perspective that this “radical” position has essentialized the difference and the hierarchy between Western intervenors and the localized Other. Instead of flattering these local-oriented practices, these critics aim to defy the hegemonic dichotomization of peacebuilding frameworks between the intervenors (external actors) and the intervened (local actors). In 2002, Friedman (2002) illustrated that hybridity perpetuates a dichotomy sustained on two sides with judgemental attributes such as good vs bad or cosmopolitan vs ethnic nationalists (see also Heathershaw, 2008). Some of these authors have further argued that scholars discussing “the local” tend to inappropriately construct the external and the local as binary opposites, which oversimplifies the diverse nature of those sources of power that interact within the complete spectrum of a peacebuilding framework (Paffenholz, 2015:858). Ahmad (2008) argues that the intervened are asked to emancipate themselves from their pluralistic reality and join the hybrid experience, perpetrating thus a hierarchical distinction between the external (those who tell the locals what to do) and the locals. Anthias (2010) argues that hybridity has not been able to move away from old homogenized notions of culture and ethnicity. That is to say, away from an essentialist stand in which these concepts are taken as static realities.

The radical critiques of the liberal peace still take for granted that “the locals” are ontologically “something out there”, something to be potentially reached and studied. Sabaratnam (2013) argues that this hierarchical and dichotomized conception of hybridity is still very liberal and Eurocentric, which is precisely a core argument the critiques of the liberal peace are attempting to use themselves.

This line of argument proposes to deconstruct the liberal assumptions of universalizing progress towards a simple form of modernity and hegemonic forms of sovereignty. The point to make here is that the content of these (post-colonial) critiques of the liberal peace is very similar to the content of the (radical) critiques of the liberal peace: the unsuitability to address conflict-affected zones from essentialized, homogeneous and static frameworks such as the intervenors-local binary frame. The main difference is, again, that post-colonial authors argue that the critiques of the liberal peace did not go far enough in understanding the particularities of host societies beyond Western ways of knowing (Brigg and Muller, 2009), and in breaking the hierarchy between the intervenors and the intervened. Richmond reflects on this argument,

“...while it may be possible to go beyond them through the use of post-positivist and ethnographic approaches – enabling external intervenors to have a greater access to the knowledge of “everyday life” in non-liberal societies being intervened in – any attempt to know, rather than merely to express “empathy”, is open to hegemonic abuse” (Richmond, 2008: Conclusion).

Chandler (2010a) states that the alternative to the post-colonial is not that of emancipatory social transformation but of speculative search for different, non-liberal forms of knowledge or of knowing. As an example of what this abstract and highly speculative theoretical debate could come to, Drichel (2008) points out a potential post-colonial form of representation describing the concept of “post-other”, attempting to foster an analysis out of alterity frameworks.



Summarizing, alongside the context of crisis and criticism towards UN peace engagements and the liberal peacebuilding project in general, since the mid-2000s the UN has implemented reforms, particularly through DPA integrated special political missions and the creation of the new PBA. The two above mentioned reforms look for coherence, a more technical aspect of engagements, and inclusiveness, which responds to a locally-focused shift within peacebuilding programs. The limited results of these reforms, particularly the local turn, in the frame of examined UN post-conflict engagements, as further examined in Chapters Five and Six, reinforce and contribute to the current state of depression of the international liberal peacebuilding project.

PART II

THE CASES OF SIERRA LEONE, BURUNDI AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UNITED NATIONS POST-CONFLICT ENGAGEMENTS

CHAPTER THREE. OVERVIEW OF CONFLICTS: SIERRA LEONE, BURUNDI AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

This chapter aims to identify shared conflict dynamics of the selected countries in order to enhance the understanding of examined conflicts. With this goal, the chapter first comparatively analyzes the three conflicts through an analytical framework based on conflict precedents, the type of conflict and the conflict resolution stage. It then underlines patterns shared by these conflicts, thus synthesizing and simplifying their understanding.

1. An analytical frame for selected conflicts

This section describes in detail the dimensions, variables and categories of the analytical frame used to introduce the cases of Sierra Leone, Burundi and the Central African Republic (CAR) (for general information of the countries, see table 8 and figure 4. For details of the analytical framework, see table 9).

Table 8. General country information. Source: UNDP (accessed 2017).

	Population (millions)	GNI x cap. PPP (international \$)	Adult literacy rate (%)	Life expectancy at birth (years)	HDI	Gini Index
Sierra Leone	6.2	1,780.4	44.5	50.9	0.413	35.4
Burundi	10.5	758.2	86.9	56.7	0.4	33.3
Central African Republic	4.7	580.7	36.8	50.7	0.35	56.3

Figure 4. Geographic location of Sierra Leone (top left), Burundi (bottom right) and the Central African Republic (center).



The methodological reason behind the design of this analytical structure corresponds to the fact that, instead of using a descriptive register and listing the nature of conflicts case by case, by framing them in different dimension and categories it becomes much easier to identify common patterns and conflict dynamics. Transferring descriptive explanations into analytical explanations transforms the descriptive-narrative core into concepts and variables of a general theoretical framework (George and Bennett, 2005).

Data on the type of conflict and conflict resolution phase belong to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The UCDP makes public all collected data on an annual basis, and has created a database on a large number of issues linked with armed conflicts. The datasets of the UCDP focus on aspects such as the typology of conflicts, actors, external support, conflict termination, peace agreements, quantitative data on particular indicators, for example on battle-related deaths, and so forth. The most widely recognized conceptual contribution of the UCDP is a popularly accepted definition of armed conflict as a social phenomenon which consists of “a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 2001). The conceptual and methodological standards of the UCDP are widely acknowledged throughout the academic community, in particular in the field of peace and conflict studies. The datasets provided to the public constitute some of the most reliable sources for developing analysis and research on conflict-related topics.

While the second and third dimensions are designed by the UDCP, the first dimension is derived from my own historical evaluation of each conflict, as I consider fundamental for looking into the roots of a conflict to better understand which factors contributed to the violent strife. This first dimension sheds light on the precedents or causes of the conflict through the identification of three variables: the political, economic and sociocultural. Through the second dimension cases are analysed on the basis of the type of conflict experienced. To do so, two different variables are highlighted: the nature of the dispute or incompatibility between confronting parties and the singularity of the actors involved.

Table 9. An analytical frame for armed conflicts.

Dimension 1: Conflict precedents					
Political		Economic		Sociocultural	
Dimension 2: Type of conflict					
Nature of incompatibility			Actors involved		
Government	Territory	Government and territory	State-based conflict	Non-state conflict	One-sided conflict
			Extra-systemic		
			Inter-state		
			Intra-state		
			Intra-state internationalized		
Dimension 3: Conflict resolution					
Scope of peace agreement			Inclusiveness of peace agreement		
Comprehensive	Partial	Peace process agreement	Comprehensive	Dyadic	

In the third dimension, the three conflicts are distinguished by the type of peace agreement they reached or are in the process of achieving. This

last dimension distinguishes between two variables which describe the scope of the agreement, in terms of the societal aspects covered by the final outcome, and the level of inclusivity regarding the parties involved. Through the analysis, and later comparison, of the three dimensions for each case, the ultimate goal of this section is to explore and highlight shared conflict dynamics for a better understanding of the examined cases.

Jumping into the specifics, the first dimension describes in detail the roots of the conflict, namely those historical precedents which aid in understanding why an inter-group relationship eventually resulted in violent strife. Specifically, three different types of precedents are analyzed. During the first step, the political context of the country is traced from pre-colonial times to recent history, describing the political facts and dynamics which may provide reliable explanations for the development of the conflict. Once this has been established, economically-rooted disputes are then highlighted as important factors for the emergence of response within certain segments of the population. The text then revises social and cultural traits and practices inherited within the society over time which may help in understanding, for example, inter-group dynamics based on ethnic cleavage. This first dimension on the precedents of the conflict plays a key role in the presented analytical frame. As mentioned above, causation is considered by the author as fundamental in understanding the development of conflict in the selected case studies, and is also added on an ad-hoc basis to an already existing set of conflict- and post-conflict-related indicators designed by the UCDP. Accordingly, the comparative analysis of the following section places particular emphasis on the dimension of root causes of conflicts.

The second dimension involves an analysis of the three country cases on the basis of the type of conflict undergone. Specifically, the classification of the conflict depends on two different criteria. The first includes three different types of conflict depending on the nature of the dispute or incompatibility: those whose struggle in response to a claim for a territory, for a government or for both. Within the second

criterion, the conflicts are divided into three types on the basis of the actors involved: state-based conflicts, non-state conflicts and one-sided violence. Within the state-based conflicts group, the UCDP distinguishes between four different sub-types: extra-systemic armed conflicts, which occur between a state and a non-state actor outside the state territory; interstate conflicts, which occur between two or more states; intra-state or internal conflicts, which occur between one state and an internal opposition group always within the state territory; and internationalized intrastate or internal conflicts, which occur when a struggle between one state and an internal opposition group is intervened in by other states or international or regional organizations. The second type of conflicts determined by type of actor involved are the non-state conflicts, which consist of the use of force by two or more non-state groups resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. Finally the third type, namely one-sided violence, occurs when one state attacks a group of unarmed civilians resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one year.

The third and last dimension according to which the cases are defined refers to conflict resolution, specifically the type of peace agreement reached or in progress. In this regard, two different criteria are established. The first classification identifies three types of peace agreements based upon the scope of the agreement, namely the aspects embraced by the content: a full or comprehensive peace agreement, where one or more dyad agrees to settle the entire issue of incompatibility; a partial peace agreement, where one or more dyad agrees to settle part of the issue of incompatibility; or a peace process agreement, where one or more dyad agrees to initiate a process that aims to settle the issue of incompatibility. The second criterion regarding the type of peace agreement consists of measuring the level of inclusivity of the peace agreement, that is to say, whether all or just certain specific conflicting parties are included in the agreement. Therefore, two types of peace agreement stem from this criterion: a comprehensive or inclusive peace agreement, which includes all actors, and a dyadic peace agreement, where at least one of the warring parties in the conflict is excluded.

1.1 Conflict precedents: Political, economic and sociocultural aspects

Coping with conflict precedents in order to reach a comprehensive understanding of the origins of the struggle implies digging into the root causes of the violent conflict¹. Many authors have studied causality in conflict analysis from a logical positivist perspective, reducing causation to Humean linear and regular occurrences (see Gurr, 1970; Sandole, 1999; Levy 1998). From a post-positivist approach, Rothbart and Cherubin (2009) argue that no single conception of causation fits all modes of social scientific inquiry and that different conceptions of causation are suitable for different epistemic purposes and ontological categories. In other words, causation in social sciences cannot be categorized within a one-size-fits-all variable. Furthermore, the in-depth study of causes in conflict analysis varies on the basis of the researcher's purpose. The complexity of causation in social sciences enriches the potential understanding of a social phenomenon. This chapter addresses causation on the basis of this post-positivist approach.

While rational paradigms share the epistemological conviction that causal inferences of a conditional or probabilistic kind are possible, post-positivist approaches openly challenge the notion of linear causality or the possibility of prediction (Lebow and Risse-Kappen, 1995). For example, as Heazle and Clarke (2012) put it, the current world order's identity remains conceptually stranded in an ongoing climate of “post-Cold War” uncertainty that has resisted its own single

¹ Bunge (1959) argues that for a cause-effect relationship between two phenomena to exist, it must be shown that the effect is not merely accompanied by the cause, but is engendered by it. In social research, in order to empirically corroborate a causal relationship between two variables, three empirical elements are needed: co-variation between independent and dependent variables, direction of causality and control of other variables (Corbetta, 2003). For reasons of methodological constraints, this thesis does not take the concept of cause in such a comprehensive meaning, but rather in a more narrative manner. By causes, the thesis describes those historical precedents of each case that might have contributed to the development of subsequent events. Similarly, Gerring (2006) asserts that case studies may allow peering into the box of causality to locate the intermediate factors lying between some structural cause and its purported effect.

narrative and has bled over to define the beginning of the new century in the absence of something (the Cold War), which says more about what the current period is not, rather than what it is. Again, it is in this context of conceptual ambiguity where post-positivist approaches are required to be more flexible and adaptable to complexity and change.

By deepening the precedents of conflict through the analysis of the first dimension, Chapter Three links historical studies to both the International Relations and Peace and Conflict Studies fields. Bridging academic domains and approaches enriches the understanding of social phenomena. The lack of interdisciplinarity in some specific fields of study such as Political Science, Sociology, Anthropology, History, International Relations, Psychology, Peace and Conflict Studies, Economics, Philosophy and so forth, is particularly unproductive in terms of enhancing the general knowledge of the human being and its social context. In other words, approaching social phenomena from a specific academic approach in isolation from other disciplines hinders the comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted and multidimensional nature of societal processes.

Concerning precedents of conflict at stake, colonial rule had a determining impact on the post-independence history of the three countries; Sierra Leone, Burundi and the CAR. The partial behavior of the colony in the treatment of different ethnic groups established a previously non-existent hierarchy, fostering the deep-rooted incompatibilities, resulting in violent conflict. Despite the attempts of establishing a democratic system, the three countries suffered authoritarian regimes, military coups or found themselves immersed in military regimes which hindered long-lasting political stability.

a) Sierra Leone

The modern history of Sierra Leone, as that of many African countries, is marked by three main phenomena: the arrival of the first settlers from America and Europe in the late XVIII century, the colonial period from the late XIX century to mid XX century and the post-colonial era from the Sierra Leone independence in 1961. The relationship between the

newcomers to the country, both the first settlers and later the British, and the local population, including a large proportion of indigenous people, has shaped the nature of the country politically, culturally, socially and economically throughout the last two centuries. In other words, the ethno-cultural origin of its people constitutes a fundamental cleavage when reaching a comprehensive understanding of the modern history of Sierra Leone. In this subsection, these different periods are presented, aimed at shedding light on the root causes of conflict and drawing a close context for the later understanding of the civil war which devastated the country during the turn of the XX century.

The arrival of the first black settlers from America and Europe in Sierra Leone dates to around 1790. Although the majority were freed slaves, they had been raised and educated in Western societies and some had witnessed the early stages of the process of industrialization in Europe. Therefore, they imported a Western life-style based on values such as individualism or meritocracy. Furthermore, they socially organized themselves on the premises of the Western state, i.e. limited territory, sovereignty, liberal democracy and private-public spheres. The indigenous practices were totally ignored from the very beginning. The geographic location where these first newcomers concentrated was named Freetown, now the capital of the country, and their largest ethnic group later became known as the Krio, concentrated in Freetown and whose territory was named the Colony. The hinterland, with native inhabitants, would be later named by the British as the Protectorate. For the most part of the XIX century the relationship between the creoles and the indigenous was merely based on trade issues.

Harris (2013) develops in his work on the political history of Sierra Leone an in-depth description of the Krio identity. This author highlights different traits of this settling group such as the influence of Christianity², Western-oriented education, the nuclear version of family,

² The majority of Krio were Christian and a very small part were Muslims, known as the Oku. The Oku were commonly the product of an intermarriage between a Christian Krio and a Muslim Yoruba, a minority ethnic group originally from southwest Nigeria which settled in Freetown in mid XIX century. Having said that, it

the diverse range of professions, and even certain cultural aspects like the English origin of names and modern dress code. Despite barely interacting with the indigenous population of the Protectorate, the creoles did receive some influences from the Yoruba (originally from Nigeria), for instance the dialect of the English language they ended up speaking, which was a language stemming from English but incorporating Yoruba vocabulary. The Krio saw themselves as importers of the Western way of living and thinking and, to a certain extent, adopted a paternal role and felt responsible for educating the local population on the benefits of a more appropriate way of living (Caulker, 1976). In comparative terms though, as Harris follows, the Krio were never as determined and aggressive within their host country, relative to the creoles of other parts of Africa such as South Africa or Liberia.

The Krio political dominance lasted for the most part of the XIX century. Nonetheless, the situation started gradually changing after the Berlin Conference in 1884, when the most powerful and influencing European States, led by the British Empire and France, split and occupied the African continent. The British colonizers took Sierra Leone in 1896 and established, what they named, the Protectorate. During the first half of the XX century, the British colonizers began providing the indigenous people and their traditional social structures an importance and validity they had never before experienced with the Krio. Suddenly, the Krio became less important and the hinterland chiefs, at the top of the tribal hierarchical structure, took on a vital role in the creation of order and stability for the expanded colonial state (Harris, 2013). Although there was a process of Krio exclusion, they did remain the dominant group relative to the rest of the Sierra Leonean population during this first part of the XX century.

On the basis of this turn promoted by the British, the Colony-hinterland relationship strengthened, especially in regard to trade, as illustrated by

should be noted that religion, contrary to ethnicity, never represented a cleavage Sierra Leoneans struggled for.

the construction of the first railway in the British West Africa in 1914. This trade-based relationship was enhanced by the discovery of diamond pockets around 1930, which captivated the attention of the British government and private companies eager to acquire this valuable natural resource. Since the 1920s, the British fostered a process of integration between the Colony and the Protectorate, aiming to establish a modern liberal state. Despite the complexity of adapting tribe-based traditions of the indigenous people to a Western and liberal form of social organization, and dealing with anti-colonialist protests led by the Krio who had been witnessing the deterioration of their dominant role in society, by 1951 the concept of a single liberal Sierra Leonean State had been successfully introduced.

During the 1950s, while the political system was dominated by interests of people from the Protectorate, the Krio dominated the inherited state apparatus from the Colony (Clapham, 2003). Harris (2013) asserts that Krio elitism from the Colony and chiefly elitism from the Protectorate combined and reinforced one another to produce a conflictive political environment. In 1957, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), composed of two organizations from the Protectorate and one party of the Colony, won the elections and took power over the hitherto ruling party, the Krio-led National Council of Sierra Leone, founded in the early 1950s. A year later, SLPP's Milton Margai, partly educated in Great Britain, became the first Sierra Leonean Prime Minister. For the first time, in the 1951 elections, the nation-wide Sierra Leonean Legislative Council had an African majority. Amidst the wave of processes of decolonization of the African continent, in 1961 Sierra Leone declared independence from the United Kingdom.

After the death of Milton Margai in 1964, his brother Albert Margai became Prime Minister. The Margais' grandfather was a member of one of the largest African ethnic groups, the Mende, and was a Paramount Chief, the highest position in the traditional Sierra Leonean hierarchy. Therefore, considering their mixed background, the Margais received education within Krio and British circles. Because of their African background, however, these two prime ministers generated a reputation

of being amidst modernization and conservatism, hence their large public support. During the 1960s, however, the All People's Congress (APC), led by an African also educated in the Colony circle, Siaka Stevens, denounced Margai for furthering the interests of his ethnic group, the Mende, while undermining other minority ethnic groups such as the Temne and the Limba, causing a rise in political tension (Mateos, 2011). In the 1967 legislative elections, the APC won the majority in the Council. Despite an attempt by the pro-SLPP military to repose Margai in the aftermath of the elections, and the imposed establishment of the National Reformation Council, a year later the country returned to civil rule and Siaka Stevens became Prime Minister, leading a national coalition composed of members of the APC, the SLPP, some independents and Paramount Chiefs. Political tensions in Sierra Leone then shifted from Colony-Protectorate to intra-Protectorate.

This political alternation from the late 1960s revealed a tendency in Sierra Leonean politics that lasts until now. On the one hand, the SLPP received the support of most of the Mende population, which was concentrated in the south and east of the country and represented the most traditional value of Sierra Leoneans, primarily that of chieftaincy. On the other hand, the APC received the support of other groups concentrated in the north and west of the country such as the Temne, the largest group along with the Mende, and the Limba, the third largest ethnic group, where the chieftaincy influence was not as strong as in the Mende-dominated areas. Harris (2013) asserts that underpinning this apparent ethnic cleavage was the inter-ethnic struggle for the distribution of state resources, which became an efficient way of building constituencies in a post-independence setting. In other words, those with posts in the State felt obliged to use their position in order to benefit their community.

Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, Stevens suffered several *coup d'état* attempts by the military, which he could not trust due to its pro-SLPP inclination and Mende-dominated composition. In reaction, Stevens militarized APC manners, creating in 1971 the Internal Security Unit

and in 1979, stemming from this, the Special Security Division. During this decade Stevens entered the Cold War-based geopolitical game and took the classic communist regimes as inspiration for creating his own state apparatus. Gradually, the SLPP and other parties began being pushed outside of the political system. After an electoral emergence of the SLPP in the 1977 elections, Stevens celebrated a referendum through which he legitimated the establishment of a one-party system in 1978. He favored the northern ethnic groups like the Temne and the Limba, as well as the Krio elite from Freetown, and marginalized the Mende in the south and east. Stevens economically sustained his system through the diamonds trade, a source which allowed the country to achieve notorious progress in infrastructure, education centers and health facilities since the 1930s. Stevens organized a patron-client system, exchanging diamonds benefits for political support. Nevertheless, the economic crisis in the late 1980s brought about disastrous economic and social consequences for Sierra Leoneans.

The severe economic crisis generated an unprecedented youth unemployment rate. This fact triggered a deep sense of discontent amongst youth and students, both from rural and urban areas. Along with the politically excluded Chiefs from the south, the youth constituted the main source of opposition against Stevens' regime and, more specifically, the APC militias. Fearing this climate of political tension, Stevens appointed General Joseph Momoh as his successor in 1985, who celebrated parliamentary elections again after almost a decade in 1986 in an attempt to re-establish democracy. In 1988 Stevens died. Despite the late attempts to diminish political tension in the country, the animosity between APC militias and anti-APC protesters increased. Many of the anti-APC youth went into exile in Liberia, which then hosted the birth of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in the late 1980s, composed of these young exiled Sierra Leoneans, who received the support of Charles Taylor, the leader of the rebel group National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). On the 23rd of March 1991, the RUF, led by the Sierra Leonean former Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) corporal Foday Sankoh and supported by a contingent of the NPFL, launched an attack against the government of Sierra Leone and entered

the country from the east. A civil war that lasted for ten years had just begun.

b) Burundi

Burundian modern history has been fundamentally marked by the discriminatory treatment under European rule, and the colonial authorities who favored the Tutsis within all layers of society, thus generating an inter-ethnic tension with the Hutu people (Takeuchi, 2013), the largest ethnic group of Burundi with over 85% of the population. This inter-ethnic conflict degenerated into a brutal civil war which broke out in the early 1990s and lasted over a decade.

Located in the Great Lakes region, Burundi has about 10 million inhabitants, including 85% of which are Hutus, 15% are Tutsis and just over 1% are Twas. By the end of the XIX century, amidst the European race for taking African territory, Burundi and its twin country, Rwanda, were colonized by German East Africa. A few years later, in the frame of World War I, Belgian troops from the former Belgian Congo –later Zaire and today the Democratic Republic of Congo- took Burundi and Rwanda from the Germans and, in 1923, unified both countries in a single unit, thus facilitating the colonial administration. Burundi and Rwanda were under European rule until the beginning of the 1960s, when both countries became fully independent.

As mentioned above, under the colonial rule the Tutsis received privileged treatment while the Hutus suffered discrimination within many sectors of society, such as administration or education. Some argue that the reason behind this unequal treatment can be found in a Eurocentric ideology known as the Hamitic ideology, which argued that the Tutsis were a superior race, with a European origin, whereas the Hutus were considered an inferior race of African origin (see Sanders, 1969; Chrétien, 2000). The dominant Tutsis were actually separated into two different categories, a lower caste named the Tutsi-Hima group

which dominated the political sphere³, and a higher caste named the Tutsi-Banyaruguru, literally meaning “those who come from the north”. However, although over time many attributed a northern origin only to the Banyaruguru, the reality is not necessarily so, as neither the Hima nor the Banyaruguru have a unique geographical origin (Lemarchand and Martin, 1974).

Lemarchand and Martin (1974) developed an analysis within which they pointed to the impact of colonial rule on the Tutsi-Hutu relationship. The Tutsi were always seen by the Europeans as proverbially tall and wiry, while the Hutu were considered of medium-size and an ideal shape for hard work. Nonetheless, as these authors assert, a more accurate analysis is needed in order to achieve a more complete understanding of Burundi’s traditional social system. The main consequences of simplifying Tutsis and Hutus in this way are, firstly, the suppression of intra-group differences and, secondly, the exaggeration of the depth of cultural discontinuities between groups. Thus, neglecting intra-ethnic cleavages obscures the basis for cross-ethnic links and reduces their respective physical characteristics to a false reality. Furthermore, it is also argued that before European rule social differences were more accentuated than ethnic ones. Accordingly, one cannot view Tutsi-Hutu conflict as an extreme case of the old African problem of tradition (Williams, 1972).

During the years preceding independence, Burundi witnessed the emergence of new political platforms of self-expression such as political parties, trade unions, social platforms, etc. This institutionalization of civil society eased the population into joining in with different organizations from which Tutsi-Hutu tensions started growing gradually. The two main parties during that time followed the clan-based intra-Ganwa rivalries of the pre-colonial era, one being the *Parti*

³The Ganwa, or the princes of blood, were an ethnic sub-group within the Tutsis, and were the only ones who had access to political power during the pre-colonial times. They therefore had a clearly distinct identity from the rest of the Tutsi population. The dynastic families belonging to the Ganwa and the other elites, such as the Brezi and the Batare, were constantly in conflict, which eventually brought about their disappearance as an ethnic subgroup during pre-colonial times (Takeuchi, 2013).

de l'Unité et du Progrès National (UPRONA), which dominated the political scene until the 1990s, led by the Ganwa family Bezi, and the other one the *Parti Démocrate Chrétien* (PDC) led by the other main Ganwa clan, the Batare. In 1961 the UPRONA won the legislative elections but its leader, Prince Rwagasore, the eldest son of King Mwami Mwambutsa, was assassinated by a PDC-supported gunman. A few months later, in 1962, Burundi declared independence from the Belgians and became the Kingdom of Burundi, with Mwambutsa IV its first post-colonial King.

From independence the Tutsi elite leadership began deteriorating, particularly after the loss of Rwagasore. This gradually transformed the constitutional monarchy into an absolute leadership, worsening Hutu conditions. The crown consolidated its hold on the political system by ignoring the emerging Tutsi-Hutu rivalry (Lemarchand and Martin, 1974). In 1965 the Hutus won the legislative elections. Nonetheless, aiming to appease the Tutsi minority, King Mwambutsa appointed a Ganwa as Prime Minister, Leopold Biha. This was followed in October 1965 by the Hutu-led coup, which had fatal consequences for Hutu population. After the coup Mwambutsa fled to Europe and never returned. In order to consolidate their influence in the political system, the Tutsi promoted, as a new head of state, Prince Charles, Mwambutsa's youngest son. A year later, in 1966 the Tutsi-dominated army drove Prince Charles from power and declared Burundi a Republic, allowing the military Micombero to become the new head of state.

In the early 1970s there emerged a group under the label Banyabururi, also known as the Bururi lobby, a sub-group of Tutsis originally from the province of Bururi. Some members of this ethnic sub-group, for example Albert Shibura, Arthémon Simbanye and André Yanda, were very well positioned politically and were crucial to generating a Tutsi solidarity network against the Hutu population. Another failed Hutu-led coup in 1969 was used by the Tutsi elite to raise the Hutu problem as a significant issue, and to justify the removal of the remaining Hutus in political and military positions. Amidst an environment of security

deterioration, Micombero established in October 1971 the *Conseil Suprême de la Révolution* as an advisory body, aimed at the restoration of stability.

In April 1972 Micombero decided to dismiss all members of the cabinet and impose a military rule. This was followed by a Hutu rebellion, leading to a response by the Tutsi-dominated army with an inhuman repression, causing the deaths of around 200.000 Hutus. This brutal governmental response against the Hutu rebels was justified by the Tutsis by accusing the Hutu population of an unfounded large-scale conspiracy, with the ultimate goal of physically eliminating all Tutsis (Lemarchand and Martin, 1974). The 1972 Hutu genocide forced over a million Hutus to flee the country, mainly to Tanzania and Zaire, where the insurgency built its base camps. This group of exiled Burundians in Tanzania and Zaire, as described below, was a key component for the creation of pro-Hutu political and rebel organizations, which had a primordial role during the resulting civil war.

In 1976 the Tutsi Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza led a bloodless coup, driving Micombero from power. He proclaimed himself head of state in 1984. Bagaza's period was marked by strong repression, not only against the Hutu population but also against Tutsi opponents to the regime. The established 1981 Constitution actually shielded the state as a one-party state. In 1987 the leader of UPRONA, Major Pierre Buyoya, organized a successful coup against Bagaza, suspending the constitution and establishing a military rule under what was known as the Military Committee for National Salvation- in principle aimed at national reconciliation. In order to achieve this goal, one of the most significant measures he took was to appoint a cabinet with an equal number of Tutsi and Hutu ministers, including Hutu Prime Minister Adrien Simbana.

In response to this deteriorating situation, by the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, a section of the Burundian Hutu insurgency living in the Tanzanian refugee camps organized itself into the *Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu* (PALIPEHUTU), becoming a key part of

the conflict against the government. In 1988 the PALIPEHUTU perpetrated a series of killings in the northern provinces of Burundi, fueling the fear amongst the Tutsi population of a Hutu conspiracy against them. In an attempt to redirect and diminish inter-ethnic tensions, Buyoya, the head of state, promoted the approval of a new constitution in 1992 through which the State became a multi-party system. A year later, in June 1993, the leader of the Hutu-dominated *Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi* (FRODEBU), Melchior Ndayaye, defeated Buyoya in the elections and became the first Hutu head of state, forming a pro-Hutu government. Despite his attempts, Buyoya failed to quell Tutsi-Hutu tensions and democratize the country. Four months later, in October 1993, Ndayaye was assassinated by Tutsi insurgents, leading to the breakout of a civil war which lasted for more than ten years (Escola de Cultura de Pau, accessed 2016a).

Utilizing a similar historical analysis and integrating political causes for the emergence of the conflict in Burundi, Lund *et al.* (1998) refer to institutions and the political process as key factors leading to the civil war. In their work, they mention certain problems which may arise from ethnically based political parties, namely; an unclear distribution of power, which may lead to authoritarian attitudes endangering stability; or the lack of a legitimate monopoly on the use of violence, particularly when one of the confronting parties is linked to the army. The text goes further to include specific types of performance of protagonists. For example, having divisive leaders may bring about a conflictive dialectic based on demagogic rhetoric, unilateral provocations or coercion leading to a forceful fulfilment of their own interests.

Feasible causes of the conflict are inextricably intertwined with the economic political history. In both cases, inter-group economically-based disputes and disparities respond to the political hierarchies inherited from the decolonization process. Regarding the causes of the Burundian civil war, Lund *et al.* (1998) establish a relationship of different layers of causation which provide a reliable explanation for the emergence of the violent conflict. Specifically, they highlight the received legacies and socioeconomic conditions, including factors such

as historical discriminatory treatment, usually from a colonial origin; competition for scarce resources in the same territory; or the weakness of State institutions, easing a lack of control and fostering the emergence of bad practices such as a patrimonial utilization of resources.

And finally, within the sociocultural sphere, in addition to the discriminatory treatment under European rule which resulted in inter-ethnic disputes in Burundi, the dynamics of the country, particularly up to the independence in 1962, were dominated by social cleavages encouraged by clans, families and lineages. This brought about tension mainly within the Tutsi population, the second largest ethnic group of the country with around the 15% of the population. Lund *et al.* (1998) highlight on the one hand the effects of long-lasting violent struggle and its weight in history, having the potential to generate a strong culture of violence and a general feeling of distrust, and on the other the low levels of education, implying that people are more easily manipulated by political elites.

c) The Central African Republic

The CAR, however, presents the most complex case. The level of political instability as a result of repeated military-led power-induced struggles and a permanent war-fare state in neighboring countries such as Sudan or Chad, has prevented the country from enjoying stability. Protracted conflicts warp societies, economies and regions in which they are located, creating complex emergencies fueled on the one hand by local struggles and on the other by global factors such as arms trade and support for regimes or rebels by outside states (Miall, 2004). Therefore, countries such as the CAR get trapped in vicious cycles of violence, making the transition from conflict to peace much more complex.

The CAR, a country located in the heart of the African continent, has about 4,5 million inhabitants and more than 80 ethnic groups. In the pre-independence period, the country was known as Ubangi-Shari and was part of the *Afrique Equatoriale Française*. Although France paid little

attention to this central African colony, they did always disproportionately support two small ethnic groups from the Ubangi river area, the Ngbaka and the Yakoma (Berman and Lombard, 2008). The largest groups in CAR are the Gbaya, the Banda, the Mandja and the Sara, which live in the savannah areas in the north of Bangui, the capital, comprising over 80% of the total population. The largest remaining group is the Mboum, concentrated in the southeast. Despite this ethnic diversity, the recent history of the country shows that ethnicity has not been a major source of conflict; instead, it is the desire for power.

The French-supported pre-independence Prime Minister David Dacko was the first president of the CAR after independence in 1960. Two years later, he suspended the constitution and established a one-party system. Amidst growing political instability and fragile economic situation, Dacko was ousted from power through a military coup led by his cousin Jean-Bédél Bokassa in 1965. Bokassa's period was strongly oppressive and marked by governmental corruption, plundering of natural resources and chronic economic problems. Despite his arrogant behavior and sever attitude against political freedom, specifically political opponents, he was supported by France and nominated emperor (Escola de Cultura de Pau, accessed 2016b). In 1979, Bokassa's regime became involved in a massacre of student protesters, causing France to begin pressing Bokassa to leave the office. Eventually, a French-supported military coup brought Dacko back to power. Despite Dacko's attempts to establish a multi-party system in the early 1980s, the country would be ruled by the military for more than a decade.

In 1981, André Kolingba drove Dacko from power and established a military government based on a one-party system. Under widespread pressure, he passed a constitution in 1986 and, one year later, a semi-democratic legislative election took place. With significant pressure by the international community, Kolingba legalized all political parties in 1991 and in August 1993, the CAR celebrated the first fully democratic elections, which were won by Ange-Félix Patassé. Patassé had been Bokassa's prime minister and thus became the first non-military head of

state in the country for long time. Throughout the last twenty years, violence in the CAR has been hardly reduced. On the contrary, as described in the following sub-section, in addition to the clan- and ethnic-based conflict, a new religious-based struggle arose in the country, worsening the peace process even further.

In regard to the economic causes, the level of economic stagnation since its independence from France in 1960, brought the country to drop to the bottom of most world rankings of human and socioeconomic indicators⁴. In the beginning of the XX century, as Berman and Lombard (2008) point out, Central Africans suffered from the Arab slave trade, forcing many to work in infrastructure elsewhere in the AEF. This fact had two main consequences. On the one hand, Ubangi-Shari barely benefited from French investment in the African continent, relegating the colony to a protracted underdeveloped socioeconomic status. The wave of Central Africans who were mobilized for forced labor also resulted in a decrease of the population. This demographical impact changed the population distribution in the country and, to a certain extent, encouraged the growth of certain ethnic and religious tensions. As mentioned above, however, neither ethnicity nor religion were the main cause of conflict during the second half of the XX century.

The 1990s were again a decade of marked political instability and even greater economic crisis. Patassé introduced a series of economic reforms which caused a devastating effect for the CAR (Mc Farlane and Malan, 1998). Aiming to balance this deteriorating economic situation, the IMF intervened in the country in 1994, but removed its support just a year later accusing Patassé's government of corruption and mismanagement.

⁴ In the 2014 Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Program the CAR scored 0.365 (being 1 the highest score) in the Human Development Index thus ranking 185 out of 187 listed countries (UNDP, 2014).

1.2 Type of conflict

The three armed conflicts need to be understood within the context of the post-Cold War. After the fade of the Second World, certain structural transformations took place in the international arena, reshaping the nature of contemporary conflicts, as described in Chapter One. Some post-Cold War armed conflicts were theoretically framed by Kaldor (1999) in the “new wars” doctrine, fundamentally arguing for an asymmetric nature of contemporary conflicts. This new paradigm, described in Chapter One as well, overcame the classic frame of the Clausewitzian inter-state conflicts and provides a new analytical frame for contemporary forms of conflict, for instance in intra-state wars. It also stresses post-ideological roots of new conflicts such as ethnicity or tribe. All Sierra Leonean, Burundian and Central African conflicts can be framed by Kaldor proponents within this “new wars” theoretical framework.

a) Sierra Leone

The Sierra Leonean civil war, from 1991-2002, showed the world one of the most atrocious violent episodes in the post-World War II era, along with Rwanda and Srebrenica. The brutality of practices used by both sides during the conflict had devastating consequences, not only for the dignity of those who were recipients of the violence, but also for the UN and the international community in general who, despite a reasonably successful performance at the end of the conflict and in the post-conflict stage, reacted late to the committed atrocities against Sierra Leoneans during the 1990s.

Interviews conducted with experts on the Sierra Leonean conflict found that there is one major factor which prompted the breakout of the civil war- the exclusion of certain social groups from the consolidation of the democratic process. In particular, the exclusion of youth. Again, a segment of youth living in exile in Liberia formed the RUF, leading to the beginning of the violent struggle. In addition to youth, other groups were also notably excluded, such as women, civil society and the rural population in general. Beyond the issue of exclusion, experts also

highlighted triggering factors such as the deep division of the country on the basis of four cleavages (politics, region, ethnicity and religion), rampant poverty, corruption and inefficiency of the justice system and lack of transparency and rule of law.

At the beginning, not much attention was provided by the Momoh-led government to the RUF occupation of eastern parts of the country. Sankoh and his guerrilla claimed to want to remove a corrupt government that had centralized most of the decision making in the capital, Freetown. Initially, RUF based its ideology on a large agrarian reform with more local decision-making authority (Melrose, 2009). In 1992, a group of military officers led by Captain Valentin Strasser drove Momoh from power, establishing the National Provisional Ruling Council. Strasser, who became head of state, was determined to lead the SLA to defeat the rebels by any means necessary. One of the most problematic measures he took was in 1995 contracting the private security company Executive Outcomes, later named Sandline International, to assist the government in its struggle against the RUF⁵. The mercenaries of this company were fundamentally originally from South Africa and Eastern Europe and their performance was crucial in countering the rebels during the early stage of the war. Strasser overexploited diamond areas as well, to cover the costs of these services and sold rights of extraction to the British company Branch Energy (Mateos, 2011). Another form of support Strasser had against the RUF attack was the Mende traditional hunting militia from the south, the Kamajors, led by Hinga Norman. As described below, this militia had a very important role during the mid stages of the war.

In 1996, a strong popular demand for democratic elections pushed Brigadier-General Maada Bio to take over power from Strasser. Elections took place in February amidst an extremely violent

⁵ The emergence of Military Private Security Companies was a remarkable phenomenon of the post-Cold War era. These companies, aimed at the provision of security to states in conflict, had their most distinctive role in the 2003 Iraq war. The gradual erosion of the monopoly of legal violence of the state, as many authors named it, had determinant implications for the re-conceptualization of issues such as security and accountability (see Greenwald, 2006; Leander, 2007; García and Pareja, 2013).

atmosphere as illustrated by the famous and inglorious episodes of RUF combatants chopping off the limbs of voters. The SLPP's Ahmad Tejan Kabbah won the elections and became the third President of Sierra Leone. Except for a one-year period, during which he was taken out of power by the military, Kabbah held the presidency for more than a decade, playing a key role in the development of the war during the mid and late stages of the conflict, as well as in the early stage of the post-conflict scenario.

In November 1996, Kabbah, assisted by the UN Special Envoy Berhanu Dinka, signed a peace agreement with RUF's Sankoh known as the Abidjan Peace Accord. Amongst other aspects, the treaty included the creation of a National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, the formation of a Neutral Monitoring Group and a process of disarmament for rebels. In article 12, the accord also demanded the exit of the Executive Outcomes mercenaries from the country (Security Council, 1996), which actually was one of the only provisions fully accomplished. The other goals, however, remained on paper and never came to fruition.

In May 1997, an insurgent segment from the SLA led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, in partnership with the rebels, ousted President Kabbah and established a military junta, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). This was a regime led by Koroma and based on military rule. In a clear declaration of intentions, the junta invited the RUF to join the government. The AFRC/RUF rule was widely denounced by the international community. In Resolution 1132, the UN SC approved a total arms embargo against the government of Sierra Leone, urgently demanding in its first article that "the military junta take immediate steps to relinquish power in Sierra Leone and make way for the restoration of the democratically-elected Government and a return to constitutional order" (Security Council, 1997). Furthermore, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also imposed a total embargo on the junta, banning any supply of oil or weapons as well as the possibility of traveling.

There is a further fact which took place in 1998 which is key in understanding the future development of the war. The democratically elected reinstated government, in an attempt to gain effectiveness in the struggle against the rebels and reinforce the SLA, formalized the Kamajors and other civil forces, including the Tamboros, the Gbethis, the Kapras and the Donsos under the umbrella of the Civil Defense Forces (CDF). The mandate of the CDF was to fight the RUF alongside the ECOMOG. Unfortunately, the Special Court for Sierra Leone later revealed inhuman atrocities committed by the CDF against Sierra Leoneans and condemned its leader Hinga Norman, amongst others.

As described in Chapter Four on peace engagements, with an emphasis placed on the UN missions, the deployment of the ECOWAS's Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in August 1997 as well as the UN-led United Nations Observation Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) in July 1998 and the following DPKO-led and DPA-led UN missions in this country played a key role for the end of the direct violence, prompting the signature of the final Lomé Peace Accord in July 1999 and the return to democracy.

b) Burundi

The root causes which triggered the escalation of violence in the Burundi context, as has been already introduced above, was fundamentally an ethnic tension, long rooted in a process of exclusion by the Tutsi-led Government and elites towards the majority Hutu population. As experts commented during the interviews, this was aggravated by an increasing sense of ineffective governance and corruptive practices and the consequent incapacity to consolidate an inclusive democratic process.

Regarding the primary conflicting parties during the Burundian civil war, the PALIPEHUTU, which founded its military wing in 1985 as the PALIPEHUTU-*Forces Nationales du Libération* (PALIPEHUTU-FNL), was a Hutu rebel group which commenced operations in neighbouring Tanzania and Zaire in the late 1980s. Some argue that the actual breakout of the civil war can be dated back to 1991, when the

PALIPEHUTU-FNL, led by Cossan Kabura, launched an attack against the government leading to a large-scale violent confrontation (Cunningham, 2014). In 1990, the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FROLINA), a minor Hutu rebel group, split from the PALIPEHUTU. Despite this, the largest Hutu rebel group was founded in 1994, the *Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie* (CNDD–FDD), with the CNDD being the political wing and the FDD the military. The CNDD-FDD concentrated its political elite in the southern province of Bururi, and was led by Leonard Nyangoma, who had been close to Ndadaye. The CNDD-FDD is still nowadays one of the most popular political parties in Burundi. The PALIPEHUTU-FNL and CNDD-FDD constituted the main poles of resistance against the Tutsi-led government and military throughout the course of the war.

In April 1994, the successor of the Hutu president Ndadaye, Cyprien Ntaryamira, was killed in the same plane crash as the Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana, causing an increase in tension and institutional instability in Burundi. Two years later, in 1996, Buyoya re-established his presidency through a military coup. Soon after, in 1997, the Burundian government and the Hutu parties in conflict started the first peace talks in Arusha, Tanzania, facilitated by the former Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere, who died in 1999 and was replaced by Nelson Mandela. By late 1997, the political wings of both parties split from the military wings, thus naming themselves the CNDD and PALIPEHUTU, respectively. Once the talks began, Nyerere decided to ban the CNDD-FDD led by Pierre Nkurunziza, who later became president of the country, and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL, at that point led by Agathon Rwasa, from participating at the negotiations, accusing them of consisting of illegitimate factions (Cunningham, 2014).

As also presented in the chapter on UN missions, aside from local actors, the Burundian case also needs to be analyzed from both an international and regional perspective. This is vital in order to understand the role external actors played during and after the conflict. Shortly before the signature of the Pretoria protocol, in 2003, the

African Union (AU) deployed its first peacekeeping mission, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB). This mission, along with the *Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi* (ONUB) and subsequent UN missions, was a key factor that fostered the end of the major violent strife, the final Arusha Peace Agreement and the re-establishment of certain political stability.

c) The Central African Republic

Regarding the complex root precedents which brought about the emergence of major violence in the country, as it has been broadly described above, experts underlined during interviews a continuous lack of Government capacity in providing the population with basic services, particularly in rural areas. This incapacity was worsened by a clear public sense of governmental malpractice and corruption, and the inability to diminish insecurity in the country, protracting in violence for decades.

Since its independence in 1960, excluding Patassé in 1993, all CAR's heads of state came to power through a military coup, besides the three military mutinies which took place in 1996. During Kolingba's rule, he gradually fuelled the top layers of the military with fellow Yakomas, members of his ethnic group, hence Patassé's lack of trust in the military. Arguing presidential protection, in 1993 Patassé created his own Presidential guard and a parallel police force with members of the *Mouvement de Libération du Peuple Centrafricain*, aiding in understanding the military discontent and the subsequent military-led coups against Patassé which took place in the country in 1996. Paranoid about his personal security, Patassé went even further and created three Bangui-based militias: the Karakos, based in Boy-Rabe, where mostly Gbaya reside (Leaba, 2001); the Balawas, based in the Combattant quartier and comprised chiefly by members of the Kaba ethnic group; and the Sarawis, concentrated in the Sara quartier. Eventually, in 1999 and 2000 the President created a private security company, the *Société Centrafricaine de Protection et de Surveillance*, and the *Batallion de Sécurité Frontalière*, also known as "Abdulaye Miskine" after his leader, aimed at reinforcing further his personal security.

This mobilization of guards and soldiers led by Patassé in the pursuit of furthering his own personal security had its consequences. 1996 is widely known in CAR history as a period in which up to three military-led mutinies against Patassé occurred, which always had the support of France. In April, a segment of unpaid military from the southern region entered Bangui to fight the presidential guard, mainly composed of French-supported northerner troops. The government quelled the rebellion by promising the demanded wages. Shortly after, in May, another military mutiny forced Patassé to concede certain demands to the military, thanks to which a ceasefire agreement was reached. An initial peace accord was finally agreed on the 2nd of June, followed by the formation of a government of national unity. The third military rebellion took place in November. A substantial group of soldiers based in the Camp Kassai barracks entered Bangui to fight and disarm Patasse's supporters, receiving the assistance of French troops. This third episode encouraged the peace process a bit further, which was eventually reached in June 1997, known as the Bangui Accord. This accord was aimed ending military rule and establishing political stability. By mid-1997 almost all rebel soldiers had returned to the Camp Kassai barracks.

Eventually, in March 2003, François Bozizé, supported by Chadian soldiers (Boisbouvier, 2004), took Bangui and ousted Patassé from power through a successful military coup. A year later, in 2004, a new constitution was passed and in May 2005 presidential elections took place, confirming Bozizé as the head of state. Bozizé was initially determined to strengthen efforts for a real process of DDR, which up to date has proved unsuccessful to a significant extent. However, instability and violent tensions remained between the government and several armed groups mobilized by Patassé or people from within his circle, including as the north-central-based *Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain* (FDPC), whose main representative was Abdulaye Miskine; the *Union des Forces Républicaines* (UFR), led by Florian Ndjadder; or the north-eastern-based *Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement* (UFDR). The only rebel group not directly linked to Patassé's circles was the north- and central-based *Armée Populaire pour la*

Restauration de la République et la Démocratie (APRD), led by Jean-Jacques Larmassoum, constituting the largest focus of opposition against Bozizé (Escola de Cultura de Pau, accessed 2016b).

The CAR has recently witnessed the emergence of a new source of conflict: religious cleavage (see Kane, 2014). The Séleka and later ex-Séleka committed serious atrocities against Christian populations. In response, a pro-Bozizé self-defense group called the anti-balaka started fighting the northern Muslim militia and defending the Christian population (IRIN news, 2016). The anti-balaka, formed in 2009, had been initially a focus of force against the so-called “highway bandits”, a group of individuals who would stand alongside roads and wait to attack and loot random victims. Anti-balaka means “anti-machete”, named after the most common killing weapon used by these bandits. The rise of anti-Balaka to allegedly defend Christians resulted in attacks on Muslims who were mistakenly seen as Séleka supporters, notoriously worsening the security situation, particularly in northern towns such as Bossangoa, Zere, Gbakora and Bandorok (Kane, 2014). In July 2014 a ceasefire agreement was reached between the ex-Séleka and the anti-Balaka in Brazzaville, the Republic of Congo. The pretext of the agreement, however, was markedly poor, not even including a DDR true determination or a specific route for implementation. Therefore, tension and violence continued between the two groups, who accused each other of breaking the ceasefire (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014).

One other major problem is the competition for live-stock, specifically cattle (see International Crisis Group, 2014). As a consequence of this fierce struggle between the ex-Séleka and the anti-balaka militias, the International Crisis Group (2014) identified in a policy briefing inter-communal clashes in rural areas of the west and center of the country between pastoralists, many of them transhumant, and farming communities. The ex-Séleka and the anti-balaka principally finance themselves, amongst other methods, by looting pastoralists' cattle, which is the wealth of the poor in the CAR. The pastoralists responded to this theft of live-stock with brutal retaliations. As a result of this

emerging struggle many pastoralists have fled to Chad, Cameroon or other regions in the CAR, thus generating the collapse of the farming sector in certain areas, the radicalization of some pastoralist groups who respond with violence to the thefts and the blockage of transhumant movements between Chad and the CAR by local groups, particularly Chadian. In addition to this, the behavior of some young, reckless ex-Séleka Fulani, a Muslim group from the north, predominantly pastoralist, has brought about, on the one hand, the stigmatization of the whole Fulani community as responsible for the violence and, on the other hand, caused the anti-balaka militias to view pastoralists as allies of the ex-Séleka (International Crisis Group, 2013). This current confusing situation causes confrontation and tension between the ex-Séleka non-Fulani, who consider their image tarnished by this reckless young group, and the ex-Séleka Fulani, who have formed their own armed groups, as for example the *Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique* (UPC), led by Baba Laddé. While the transitional government and international community focus and concentrate efforts on the tensions in Bangui, the new conflict within the conflict that is devastating the rural areas of the country seems to be ignored.

As with the cases of Sierra Leone and Burundi, the CAR conflict also requires the international and regional perspectives to comprehensively understand the evolution of the violent episodes. This is partly elaborated upon in the chapter on international interventions. In this regard, the CAR is notoriously considered a particular case due to the wide range of international and regional actors who intervened in the country one way or another, with the purpose of diminishing the effects of the conflict. Indeed, missions led by the AU, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the EU and the UN had a determinant impact on the evolution of the violent struggle and the eventual signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

1.3 Conflict resolution

In a context of ongoing violent episodes and political instability, the process of signing a peace agreement was an arduous challenge for the three countries, in particular for the cases of Burundi and the Central African Republic. Regarding these two specific cases, on the one hand the inclusion of all actors was gradual and some insurgent fractions remain reluctant to join the peace process. And on the other hand, breaches of the peace agreements have been recurrent and, in fact, during the time of writing both countries are still suffering from grave violent inter-group confrontations. Concerning the Sierra Leonean case, a significant extent of peace and stability has been achieved after the signature of the 1999 peace agreement.

a) Sierra Leone

Understanding the peace agreement as well as the post-conflict stage requires an in-depth look at the role played by international actors. Key aspects of this are described in the following chapter on UN missions. The Lomé Peace Accord signed in July 1999 by the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF included six major areas of action: cessation of hostilities, governance, other political issues, post-conflict military and security issues, humanitarian, human rights and socioeconomic issues and international support (Security Council, 1999). The comprehensive scope of the Sierra Leonean peace agreement and the resulting willingness to entirely re-establish a democratic state is clearly explicit in its preamble,

“...guided by the Declaration in the Final Communiqué of the Meeting in Lomé of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of ECOWAS of 25 May 1999, in which they stressed the importance of democracy as a factor of regional peace and security, and as essential to the socio-economic development of ECOWAS Member States; and in which they pledged their commitment to the consolidation of democracy and respect of human rights while reaffirming the need for all Member States to consolidate their democratic base, observe the principles of good governance and good economic management in order to ensure the emergence and development of a democratic culture which takes

into account the interests of the peoples of West Africa...” (Security Council, 1999).

Concerning the involvement of actors, the May 2000 crisis after the withdrawal of ECOMOG troops, an episode which is described in more detail in the next chapter, made explicit the UN weaknesses, highlighting as well the weakness of RUF commitment to the peace agreement in the early post-conflict stage. Afterwards, the growing involvement of the UK in Sierra Leone undoubtedly eased the imposition of the UN troops over the RUF and accordingly encouraged a more reliable attitude from this rebel group towards the disarming process outlined in the peace accords. Moreover, the adoption of a regional approach and the inclusion of Liberian President Taylor’s role to design a renewed peace strategy was also a key element for the growing engagement of the RUF in the peace agreements.

b) Burundi

Within the frame of the Burundian civil war, in 1997 the Burundian government and the Hutu parties in conflict started the first peace talks in Arusha, Tanzania, facilitated by the former Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere. The first success of the Arusha peace talks took place on the 28th of August 2000, when a peace agreement was signed between the government and the Hutu parties, except for CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL (see Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 2000). The agreement consisted, among other measures, of the establishment of a national transitional government built on power-sharing structures between the Tutsis and the Hutus. More specifically, the so-called Arusha peace and reconciliation agreement for Burundi provided in Article 1 that all parties were to accept as binding five main issues: the nature of conflict, problems of genocide and exclusion and their solutions; the democratization process and the establishment of good governance; the necessary measures to guarantee security and lasting peace in the country; and multidimensional policies aimed at socioeconomic development and the improvement of the Burundians’ standard of living. These issues were further discussed and addressed in a different commission (Bentley and Southall, 2005).

After the signature of the peace agreement, the authorities began making a more concerted effort in trying to include in the accords the Hutu-led armed insurgency of the CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL. As Cunningham (2014) asserts, both parties had intense issues of disagreement. On the one hand, the CNDD-FDD claimed to be able to fully participate in the power-sharing of political structures and in integrating into the regular army. On the other hand, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL demanded a stronger and deeper effort to address long-lasting latent ethnic tensions between the Tutsis and the Hutus. In 2003, Buyoya stepped down from the transitional government and the Hutu Domitien Ndayizeye took office. In November, Ndayizeye, supported by Mandela, led the transitional government and the CNDD-FDD to sign the Pretoria Protocol, which resulted in the abandonment of armed fighting from the insurgent group. In the following months, the ex-combatants of the CNDD-FDD were integrated into the army.

During the 2003 Nairobi workshop, a new initiative emerged, the Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP). The BLTP was intended to provide training through collaborative decision making to a strategically selected group of Burundian leaders drawn from all social and institutional sectors. Specifically, BLTP aimed at helping build a socially cohesive network of 100 leaders capable of working cross ethnic and political divisions in the country, and secondly, to advance the country's post-war economic reconstruction. The BLTP became better known as the Ngozi Process, after the name of the place where most of the initial trainings took place (Wolpe *et al.*, 2004).

A new constitution was passed in 2005 attempting, amongst other issues, to overcome the ethnic-oriented agendas of political forces. The constitution consolidated Burundi as a multi-party system with one president as head of state. The inter-ethnic power-sharing structures were granted within a few specific legal provisions. For instance, in its Article 124, it is explicit that there will be no prime minister but instead two vice-presidents, one belonging to the Tutsi group and the other to the Hutu. Moreover, article 129 mandates that the cabinet will be

composed of a maximum of 60% of Hutu ministers and a maximum of 40% of Tutsi ministers. Finally, regarding the composition of the national assembly, the constitution states in its Article 164 that Hutus will have a maximum of 60% of members of parliament and the Tutsis will have a maximum of 40% (Burundi's Constitution, 2005).

In the August 2005 general elections the former insurgent group CNDD-FDD, at that time a political party, won the elections. Its leader Nkuruziza became president. This political alternation meant the end of the UPRONA- and FRODEBU-led politics, characterized by violent means, widespread corruption and economic mismanagement (Escola de Cultura de Pau, accessed 2016a). In 2006, after long and heavy negotiations, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL also signed an initial peace agreement with the government. After a one-year violent break, in 2008 the last remaining Hutu insurgent group signed the final peace agreement. A year later, in April 2009, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL transformed into a political party, keeping the name FNL. Even though DDR programs were directed to reintegrate former FNL combatants into the army, intra-party tensions caused Rwasa to seek refuge in the DRC in 2010, from there reorganizing the FNL as an armed group causing confrontations with the government, continuing up until now. Takeuchi (2013) argues that,

“...in Burundi ethnicity is no longer the determinant of antagonism amongst political elites, which is a remarkable positive change. Nonetheless, power has been gradually concentrated in the former rebels of the CNDD-FDD...” (Takeuchi, 2013:58).

This fact fosters the growth of institutional corrupt networks and the rearming of opponent groups, specifically the FNL. Therefore, even though the high-intensity inter-ethnic conflict had been notoriously diminished and there had not been major violent confrontations since 2012, the recent relapse into violence in the context of the 2015 elections between the supporters of the re-elected President Nkurunziza and supporters of the opposition party led by Agathon Rwasa, who claimed the electoral process to be a fraud, prove the power-induced struggle remains unresolved.

c) The Central African Republic

Regarding the CAR, in January 2007 a peace agreement was signed between Miskine and Bozizé in Sirte, Lybia (Berman and Lombard, 2008). A year later, in June 2008 the government signed a peace agreement with the APRD and the UFDR, which lasted less than three months due to amnesty disagreements. In December 2008 the government, political opponents and rebels signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and Bozizé established a new government. The CPA was primarily focused on military aspects such as the respect of the ceasefire, laws of amnesty, reinstatement of ex-combatants, the DDR process, and so forth (see Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2008). In August 2012, the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP) acceded to the CPA, being the last rebel group to join the peace process.

The 2011 presidential elections were won by Bozizé but were questioned by the general public, thus generating greater political instability, particularly in the northern areas, where the main population of opposition to Bozizé resided. In March 2013 Bozizé was ousted from power in a coup led by a coalition of five northern rebel groups known as the Séléka (“alliance” in the Sango language). This group was made up predominantly Muslims, who accused the president of renegeing on the 2007 peace agreement (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2013). Despite the support received from neighboring countries, Bozizé was defeated and in April 2013 the coup leader Michel Djotodia secured the presidency. Although in September Djotodia mandated the integration of the Séléka into the regular forces, some combatants remained armed autonomously, from then on known as the ex-Séléka. Continuous political instability caused Djotodia to resign in January 2014 and a transitional government led by the former mayor of Bangui, Catherina Samba-Panza, was established. However, recent violent episodes between Muslim and Christian communities in the country have weakened security and hindered the accomplishment of the CPA, thus hampering the consolidation of peace.

2. Shared conflict dynamics

On the basis of a comparative analysis of different dimensions of the Sierra Leonean, Burundian and Central African conflicts, this section identifies shared conflict dynamics. As emphasized in the previous section, this comparative analysis allows the researcher to identify common conflict-related patterns, thus enriching the understanding of individual cases as well as providing potentially explanatory factors for other instances with similar characteristics as the selected countries.

2.1 Conflict precedents

Concerning conflict precedents, the fundamental aspect of the three cases is the legacy of colonialism and the effects this has had on post-colonial local societies. A few particular facts illustrate the common yoke of the colonial period the three countries still endure. On the one hand, the unequal treatment that ethnic communities received during the colonial period, especially during the transitional period towards independence, consolidated an inherited political hierarchy which encouraged the formation of confronting parties, ending in violent strife. As an example, during British rule, indigenous people from Sierra Leone received an amount of attention they never had under Krio rule. In addition, during European rule the Tutsi status was favored in Burundi as opposed to the mistreated Hutus, who comprised over 85% of the population. In the CAR the French always disproportionately supported two small ethnic groups from the Ubangi river area, the Ngbaka and the Yakoma, relegating to a secondary status larger communities such as the Gbaya, the Banda, the Mandja and the Sara, which comprised over 80% of the population.

On the other hand, this inherited political hierarchy induced a permanent desire for a greater political role of mistreated groups, which was often expressed in violent rebellion insurgencies against the government, as was the case of the emergence of the PALIPEHUTU by exiled Burundian Hutus in Tanzania or the creation of the RUF in Liberia by a segment of excluded Sierra Leonean youth. The military

was composed in its majority by one single ethnic group, most often the dominant one. The national army constantly feared the growing role of ethnic minorities and thus organized military coups, even consolidating military rule so as to secure a dominant position. These episodes were especially notorious in the case of the CAR, which suffered up to three military coups in a single year, in 1996. Military-led rebellions and the consequent response of rebel parties, or vice versa, prevented these countries from consolidating political stability and therefore hindered (and still do) the establishment of a democratic system.

Another particular fact that reflects the legacy of colonialism involves the ethnicization of the party system. During the emergence of the first political platforms in the 1950s in the three countries, the groups politically organized the ethnic cleavages. Soon after independence, different political organizations were identified and linked to one particular ethnic group. This division was a response to imposed differences by colonial forces during European rule. In Sierra Leone, while the SLPP has historically received the support of the Mende people, concentrated in the south and east of the country, the APC has been supported by the Temne, located mostly in the north and west. Similarly, in Burundi, Tutsi-led and Hutu-led political parties were always supported by the Tutsi and Hutu population, respectively. Up to the emergence of the recent religiously-based conflict in the CAR, none of the countries have had a greater cleavage leading domestic politics than ethnicity or communal identity. The social and economic cleavages were always relegated to a secondary position, though not necessarily meaning that they did not have an impact on the development of inter-group tensions completely.

Within the economic domain, as stated above, disparities were tightly intertwined with political precedents. The political hierarchies inherited from the decolonization process also reproduced economic inequalities, contributing to the increase of inter-ethnic rivalries. In particular, the most determinant effect of this inheritance was illustrated by a patrimonial and inefficient management of resources, having a devastating economic effect on the countries. In the three cases, the

non-democratic long-lasting regimes, such as Strasser's military rule in Sierra Leone, Bagaza's regime in Burundi and Kolingba's military rule in the CAR, exploited natural resources for their own interests and implemented fatal economic policies for their societies. In the CAR, the International Monetary Fund even withdrew its financial assistance, accusing Patassé of mismanagement and corruption. Finally, in sociocultural terms, due to a protracted violent context suffered by citizens throughout the last decades, examined countries socialized their citizens into a culture of violence, with resulting instability in many fields preventing a strong education system from being consolidated, thus generating and perpetuating low levels of education (see table 1 above).

2.2 Type of conflict

Regarding the type of conflict within the examined cases, a comparative analysis focuses on two key aspects: the nature of the conflict and the incompatibility behind the struggle and type of actor involved. In terms of incompatibility, all three countries have witnessed similar power-induced conflicts. On the one hand, both the RUF in Sierra Leone and the Hutu-led movement of resistance in Burundi, namely the PALIPEHUTU-FNL and the CNDD-FDD, repeatedly targeted during the civil war their respective governments and military. On the other hand, the two main poles of opposition in the CAR in the 1990s were the Yakomas-dominated military and its supporters on the one side, and the Patassé's own security bodies and his supporters on the other. Therefore, the desire for government has been in all cases what has eventually driven the pace of the conflict.

In terms of actors involved in the strife, it must be first said that the three instances belong to a state-based conflict category provided by the UCDP. In the three countries the government and its regular army were always one of the conflicting parties. However, analytical evaluation indicates a subcategory within state-based conflicts. Regarding the country cases included here, all countries fall well into the subcategory of internationalized intra-state conflicts. This external dimension is two-

fold. On the one hand, parties to the conflict did receive support from neighboring countries at some point. In Sierra Leone, the RUF received the support of Liberian President Charles Taylor. In Burundi, the Hutu-led movements originated from the exiled Hutu population in Tanzania, which did not intervene in preventing the Hutu rebel movement from organizing into an armed group. Regarding the CAR, the Chad always has played a key role in Central African domestic affairs, for example in 2003 when the Chadians supported General Bozizé in ousting Patassé from power.

On the other hand, the internationalization of the conflict in the three cases is also evident on the basis of the international interventions they hosted. While Sierra Leone and Burundi received support from the AU, the ECOWAS and the UN, specifically from the Department of Political Affairs and the Peacebuilding Commission, the CAR hosted missions from up to five different international and regional organizations, namely the AU, the CEMAC, the ECCAS, the EU and the UN. This phenomenon is indicative of the fact that parties directly involved in the conflict as well as external parties realized that a regional approach was needed in order to resolve the conflict.

2.3 Conflict resolution

The last dimension identifies similarities between the cases regarding the nature and evolution of the peace agreements, on the basis of the definitions provided by the UCDP. In terms of the scope of the agreement, while the Sierra Leonean Lomé Peace Accord and the Burundian Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement were multidimensional and cover different societal reforms, hence being very comprehensive, the Central African Comprehensive Peace Agreement is only partial, meaning that it targets one particular dimension, specifically military and security issues.

Finally, concerning the extent of inclusiveness, all cases ultimately managed to include all actors in their peace agreements. While it took the UK and the UN a couple of years to encourage the Sierra Leonean

RUF to truly commit to what they had agreed on in the peace accord, in Burundi the last conflicting parties to join the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation agreement were the CNDD-FDD in 2003, with the PALIPEHUTU-FNL finally agreeing in 2008. In the CAR, the last group to sign the CPA was the CPJP, which eventually joined the peace process in 2012. In sum, the three cases have gradually achieved a comprehensive peace agreement in terms of level of inclusivity, namely number of actors involved.



In conclusion, this chapter provides evidence that the selected conflicts, whose UN-led political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements have been analyzed, are similar enough that comparative analysis can bring up shared conflict patterns thus enhancing the comprehensive understanding of conflicts. The key shared pattern amongst the cases has been argued to be the legacy of colonialism, characterized in the cases at stake by unequal treatment of ethnic communities during the colonial period, an inherited political hierarchy catalyzing insurgencies from mistreated groups and the ethnicization of the party system.

CHAPTER FOUR. UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL AND PEACEBUILDING POST-CONFLICT ENGAGEMENTS: THE CASES OF SIERRA LEONE, BURUNDI AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

This chapter aims to examine UN post-conflict engagements deployed in Sierra Leone, Burundi and the Central African Republic since the end of their armed conflicts. These engagements cannot be comprehensively understood outside of the context in which they were deployed. The chapter therefore first outlines the African approach towards peacebuilding, describing how African institutions interact with the UN. It then goes on to describe the missions conducted by the UN, including DPA and PBA engagements.

1. African peacebuilding: The African Peace and Security Architecture

This section first describes the precedents of the African approach to peacebuilding, the creation of the African Union (AU) and the resulting establishment of the African peace and security architecture as well as the particularities of the AU-UN peacebuilding cooperation framework. The origins of all Africanist political movements are to be found in the pan-African phenomenon (Jeng, 2012) which began in the late XIX century and was consolidated in the mid XX century coinciding with the secessionist wave occurring in many African colonies. The roots of pan-Africanism date back to the 1893 Congress on Africa held in Chicago and the creation of the African Association in London in 1897. These episodes consolidated the notion of pan-Africanism as an ideology based on the promotion of solidarity amongst all Africans. During the first half of the XX century pan-Africanism gradually merged with African nationalist movements, as illustrated by the content of the various pan-African conferences which took place around the world, particularly the congress held in Manchester in 1945. In terms of the nature of the movement, Murithi (2005) asserts that

pan-Africanism was always unified, however simultaneously preserving its internal diversity.

In the 1958 All-African People's Conference in Accra, the Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, playing a key role during the politicization and institutionalization of pan-Africanism, established four main stages for the pan-Africanist movement: national independence, national consolidation, transnational unity and community, and economic and social reactivation. Shortly after, in 1963, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established in Addis Ababa with the prime goal of dealing with identity issues, namely the liberation of white-ruled Africa and the integration of African nations (Makinda *et al.*, 2008). The second article of the OAU Charter established that the main drive and motivations of the organization were to promote the unity and solidarity of African States, coordinate and strengthen their cooperation, defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, eradicate colonialism and promote international cooperation (see Organization of African Unity, 1963).

The emergence of Cold War dynamics since the 1950s radically transformed the original of pan-Africanism. As Makinda and Okumu assert, this over-arching African movement shifted “from a movement of peoples to a movement of governments” (Makinda and Okumu, 2008:19). Many African countries were absorbed by the bipolar rivalry and competing interests between the US and the USSR, which had a great political and socioeconomic effect on the African continent. The end of the Cold War and the arrival of globalization made evident the OAU's inability and weaknesses. The fading of the Cold War exposed the scale of dependency of many African states on either US or USSR financial assistance, notoriously illustrated in those countries which were home to proxy wars. Additionally, the growing process of globalization revealed the inability of the African continent to be competitive in the Global system, thus being relegated to a position of outcast in the international scenario (Jeng, 2012).

During the 1990s, the performance of three strong African leaders played a formative role for the eventual formation of the African Union. In 1998 the South African President Thabo Mbeki led the Africa Renaissance Conference, which addressed issues of democracy, development, human rights and conflict resolution in the African context. Mbeki's goal was to update the essence of pan-Africanism and enable the resurgence of Africa. The role of Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo should also be highlighted, as he was also determined to modernize pan-Africanism and promote progressive values for the new Africanist movement. When elected President in 1999, Obasanjo made major efforts in implementing the policy lines adopted by the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, designed during the May 1991 Kampala forum and eventually established in the Lomé Summit, Togo, in July 2000. The architecture of this policy framework became a pillar element within the later formation of the AU. Finally, Muammar Ghaddafi also showed his willingness to play a key role in the transformation of the OAU, particularly when he led the 1999 Sirte Summit in Lybia. The purpose of this summit was to explore potential new strategies in order to make the OAU more effective. Nonetheless, Ghaddafi's proposals were rejected by most African leaders, labeled as too extremist.

1.1 The African Union and the new African Peace and Security Architecture

The July 2000 Lomé Summit issued the Constitutive Act, providing productive grounds for the AU, which was established in May 2001 in Addis Ababa and eventually launched in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002, thus replacing the OAU (see African Union, 2000). As its Constitutive Act expresses, the AU aims, *inter alia*, to “achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa; defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States; accelerate the political and socioeconomic integration of the continent; promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples; encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter

of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; promote peace, security, and stability on the continent” (African Union, 2000). Among the several principles upon which the AU is premised, the most challenging is the achievement of peace and security in the continent, which has been for decades devastated by many protracted and long-lasting violent conflicts.

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the AU's body¹ established in the Constitutive Act charged with the responsibility of promoting peace, security and stability. It is also at the core of the so called new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The PSC was established through the “Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU” signed in 2003 (see African Union, 2002). As the protocol makes explicit in its article 3, the PSC aims firstly to “promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development” (African Union, 2002). Among several specific functions also stated in the protocol, the AU highlights the responsibility of the PSC to perform functions in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. The main policy frameworks the PSC is founded upon, in order to promote and implement its goals, are the Common African Defense and Security Policy, the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, the Policy Framework on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and

¹ The rest of the AU's organs are the Assembly, which is the supreme organ and comprises heads of State and government or their representatives; the Executive Council, comprised of the foreign ministers or any other minister designated by the member States; the Pan-African Parliament, to approach African people within the AU institutional network; The African Union Commission, the AU's secretariat; the Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Court of Justice, aimed to protect and guarantee human rights of all Africans; the African Peer Review Mechanism, to monitor member States in issues such as democracy and political governance, economic governance, corporate governance and socioeconomic development; the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, providing African civil society organizations a role in policy formulation and decision-making in the AU framework; several specialized committees; and the financial institutions.

Development and a few international conventions and treaties on arms control and disarmament.

The protocol also describes in detail in its Articles 11, 12 and 13 the main structures of the PSC for the implementation of this new APSA. The first main structure is the Panel of the Wise, in charge of the assistance to both the PSC and the Chairperson of the AU's Commission in the conflict prevention strategy as well as the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa. Secondly, the Continental Early Warning System is designed with the specific goal of anticipating and preventing conflicts, in coordination with regional and international mechanism such as the UN. Finally, the African Standby Force is the military-oriented organ established to enable the PSC in performing its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and interventions. Among others, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and the AU-led Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) are two of the currently AU-led peace operations.

Due to the acceptance of the new APSA by not only the AU, which promoted its establishment, but also by other actors such as regional organizations, member states and civil society organizations, Engel and Gomes Porto (2010) point out that the African strategy is shifting from a security architecture, based on legal provisions and policy frameworks, to an AU-led security regime, sustained on the participation of several institutional bodies. In this endeavor, these authors highlight three challenges the AU is expected and encouraged to face: the minimization of African states influence to the system, thus encouraging African interests to prevail over national interests; the struggle against any breach of principles, such as the violation of fundamental human rights by some African states; and the reinforcement of the APSA institutional capacity in order to proceed with the accomplishment of its strategy (Engel and Gomes Porto, 2010).

1.2 The United Nations-African Union peacebuilding cooperation framework

The African continent has been a key target region for the UN since its peacekeeping-oriented early ages (see Adebajo, 2011), as well as since the early 1990s from the adoption of the peacebuilding concept in its institutional framework (see Ruiz-Giménez, 2014). Presently, the UN DPA is leading 14 peace-building oriented missions in the African continent. Additionally, the UN PBC has so far uniquely deployed its peacebuilding strategy in African countries: Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and the Central African Republic. Some authors, however, state that the PBC's impact on African security is marginal. In this sense, Olonisakin and Ikpe (2012) state that powerful states still have a disproportionate influence on the PBC. They go on to claim that African elites and governments are often co-responsible for the imposition of Western neoliberal models in African societies.

Ruiz-Giménez (2014) classifies in a comprehensive analysis the UN peacebuilding strategy in Africa into three main stages. The first stage runs from 1989 to 1995 and is particularly characterized by two primary features. The first involves the nature of certain UN missions, describing them as going beyond their scope of simple peacekeeping military-oriented tasks, thus widening the scope of action to domains such as political action, the justice sector or socioeconomic issues, namely peacebuilding-oriented tasks. she also claims that the UN has consolidated itself as a key actor for the establishment of lasting peace in the African continent, deploying up to 23 peace operations in barely 6 years, including its missions in Namibia, Angola or Mozambique. The second stage covers the period from 1995 to 1999 and is highlighted by major UN failures on the ground, including cases in Somalia and Rwanda, leading to the subsequent gradual withdrawal of the UN from the African continent. This disengagement prompted the emergence of African regional mechanisms, in particular the ECOWAS, as peace guarantors in the African context, as well as the general positive acceptance of the doctrine "African solutions to African problems" promoted by the APSA. Finally, the third stage, since the late 1990s

onwards, relies on evidence of African incapacities to cope with peace and security issues on its own. In the September 11 context and consequent consolidation of the statebuilding doctrine, African conflicts are presented to the international community as a potential source and fertile ground for international terrorism, thus turning African conflicts into a global problem. This period witnessed the deployment of ten new UN missions in Africa.

The UN-AU cooperative legal framework is provided in Chapter VIII of the UN charter, in which it is established that the UN should promote regional arrangements and cooperate with regional agencies in the pursuit of its mission (see United Nations, 1945). Furthermore, the design of the AU-led APSA encourages and supports a tight cooperation with international actors such as the UN, despite the efforts of African authorities to preserve ownership of missions deployed under this dual strategy.

A few of the mechanisms of cooperation the UN and the AU have designed to effectively and efficiently deploy peace missions in the field are the Regional Consultative Mechanism, established when the AU came into force and aimed at the fluent communication between the AU and other agencies such as the UN in peace and security matters; the Joint Task-Force on Peace and Security, aimed at enhancing strategic cooperation between the two organizations; the UN Liaison Office to the AU, established in 2006 by the UN DPA, and the UN Office to the AU, established in 2010 in Addis Ababa, both aimed to further strengthen cooperation between the UN and the AU. Specific countries hosting UN-AU missions are Sudan (Darfur) and South Sudan.

The relationship between the UN and the AU has been, thus far, difficult to coordinate and considered highly complex, as episodes such as the UN-authorized NATO-led intervention in Libya illustrates. On that occasion, the AU strongly opposed the UN decision to intervene in the North African country. Makinda *et al.* (2008) highlight three characteristics of UN-AU cooperation. They first describe a phenomenon considered a syndrome of superiority, portraying the UN

as tending to act without previous consultation with the AU. Secondly, as the Libyan case shows, there is a persistent lack of complementarity and mutual respect between both organizations, which could have a long-term negative effect for the implementation of APSA. The authors also stress shared frustrations stemming from misconceptions pertaining to the nature of partnership, division of labor and the sharing of responsibilities.

2. United Nations political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements

This section describes pre-UN international attempts to maintain international peace and security. Once this is described, an analysis of the three phases of UN missions during the Cold War times is conducted and described². This section analyses in detail UN missions deployed within the countries, including political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements led by the DPA and the PBC over the last 15 years. As introduced in Chapter Two, the dimensions of coherence and inclusiveness of these DPA- and PBA-led engagements are analyzed in Chapters Five and Six.

2.1 Precedents: United Nations missions in the Cold War era

Prior to the establishment of the UN as the main worldwide peace-preserving international actor, there were a few international attempts aimed at maintaining international peace and security. The Concert of Europe could be considered the first major effort tasked with this purpose. Established after the 1815 Congress of Vienna, in which victorious parties against France fostered the European Restoration and the consequent return to the pre-Napoleonic Europe, its ultimate goal was to maintain stability in the continent. This European Restoration

² Although these three phases of UN missions are particular to the Cold War era, this does not mean that these types of missions did not unfold at all during the aftermath of the fall of the Second World. This chronological distinction is made because examined missions in this dissertation belong to a fourth type of mission that emerged in the post-Cold War era.

regime was based on Christian values and traditional monarchism. Another attempt, under the League of Nations, was born within the frame of the 1919 post-World War I Paris Conference, aimed at the establishment of a collective security³ and disarmament regime. This attempt, however, struggled to set an international disputes resolution mechanism based on negotiation and arbitration. The League of Nations constitutes the most direct precedent to the present UN.

The Wilsonian idealism⁴ reigning during the inter-war period vanished with the outbreak of World War II. The international community unearthed in such a destructive event the opportunity to bring together the nations of the world in order to reach an overarching agreement, fostering worldwide peace. This process was institutionalized and embodied in the UN, replacing the League of Nations. The UN thus was established in 1945 in San Francisco, under the leadership of the victorious parties after Second World War. Reflecting a universal determination to prevent a world war from occurring once again, under


³ Roberts and Kingsbury argue that collective security includes:

“Defining which territories and land boundaries are included within the system; reaching agreement on whether the system covers effectively certain types of threat (e.g. acts of terrorism, environmental despoliation, genocide within state); assuring participating states that the system protects them all equally; coping with severe power imbalances within the system, especially the presence of superpowers; defining the role of alliances; assuring that the system effectively deters rather than simply responds after the fact; developing a decision-making procedure to reach effective and consistent determinations that threaten or breach peace requiring a response has occurred and to decide what action is necessary; agreeing and effectively establishing a system of force-maintenance, command and control; deciding whether all participant states must maintain standing forces and provide them upon request with extra-territorial enforcement actions; maintaining some space for established practices of neutrality in peace and war; working out an effective system of finance, compensation and burden-sharing; ensuring that states do not abuse the protection of the system or their indispensable role within it, to pursue unnecessarily confrontational policies towards other states; and determining how far collective security depends upon an effective system of disarmament and arms control, especially as regards weapons of mass destruction” (Roberts and Kingsbury, 1993: 30-31).

⁴ The former President of the US Woodrow Wilson issued 14 points to negotiate peace in the aftermath of the World War I. This document included diplomatic and territorial issues, and set the foundations for the creation of the League of Nations. The process through which the UN guides its performance still nowadays combines the consolidation of what is known as the Wilsonian triad: peace, democracy and free markets (Mandelbaum, 2003).

the agenda set within the preamble and mandate of Article 1 of the foundational Charter, the organization was established to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and “maintain international peace and security”, to that end taking “effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace” (United Nations, 1945). The underlying prompt regarding the establishment of the UN is then, as Richmond (2004) asserts, the concept of peace as a source of legitimation for intervention. Accordingly, since the end of World War II the UN began deploying different types of peace missions all around the globe (see figure 5).

Figure 5. Current peacekeeping missions, political missions and peacebuilding offices. Source: Department of Field Support (accessed 2017).



The first and second waves⁵ of UN missions⁶ were aimed at addressing conflicts breaking out as a result of decolonization processes (Urquhart, 1993) and overcoming the deadlock and inoperative stance of the UN SC due to US-Soviet rivalry (Johansen, 1998). The first wave was deployed in the late forties and was fundamentally aimed at the observation and control of unstable contexts at risk of conflict, hence the name “observation missions”⁷. The first mission to be deployed was the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB), aimed at monitoring violations of the Greek border by northern communist neighbors, lasting from 1947 to 1952. Also in 1947 the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) was deployed to observe the Indonesian cease-fire and Dutch troop withdrawal, operating until 1951. Besides the first two missions, the UN deployed two further and much larger missions in the late 40s which are still unfolding. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established in May 1948 through SC Resolution 50 (1948) in the Middle East, under the mandate of monitoring ceasefires, supervising armistices agreements and preventing isolated incidents from escalating in the region after the first Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1949 the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was deployed in Kashmir through SC Resolution (47) 1948 in order to supervise the ceasefire between India and Pakistan in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

⁵ There are few criteria upon which UN missions may be classified in (see Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Hanhimäki, 2008; Jett, 2000; Debiel, 2003). Some describe generations of peacekeeping operations, such as Doyle and Sambanis (2006).

⁶ For a detailed historical revision of UN missions see Roberts and Kingsbury (1993), Childers and Urquhart (1994), Alger (1998), Doyle and Sambanis (2006), Gareis and Warwick (2005), Kareem (2009) or Koops (2015). For detailed characteristics of UN missions visits www.unmissions.org

⁷ These missions were deployed under the mandate of Chapter VI of the Charter “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”, through which the UNSC was provided with a peaceful dispute settlement mechanism and entitled to make recommendations to states to seek a solution for any struggle between parties posing a potentially hazardous risk for international peace and security. This chapter VI of the Charter states in its Article 33 that “the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice” (United Nations, 1945).

The second wave of UN missions became known as peacekeeping missions⁸. The UN defines peacekeeping as an “operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict” (United Nations, 1996b). Peacekeeping was formally proposed by Lester B. Pearson, the Canadian secretary of state for external affairs, at the height of the Suez crisis in 1956 as a means for securing the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli forces from Egypt pending a political settlement (Mingst and Karns, 2007). For the purpose of this goal, the UN established in 1956 the first peacekeeping operation in strict UN terms, the so-called United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I). After the withdrawal, the mission was responsible for serving as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces. Aside from the UNEF I, other early stage major peacekeeping operations include the United Nations Security Force (UNSF) in West New Guinea, deployed from 1962 to 1963 to maintain order during the transfer of authority from the Netherlands to Indonesia; the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) deployed in 1964, and still ongoing, aimed at the prevention of internal conflict in Cyprus and averting outside intervention; the UNEF II deployed from 1973 to 1979, with the goal of supervising cease-fire and troop disengagement as well as controlling the buffer zone between Egypt and Israel after the Yom Kippur War.

Third wave of interventions produced the concept of peace enforcement⁹. The first major UN-led peace enforcement operation

⁸ As clearly stated by the former UN SG Dag Hammarskjold, peacekeeping was nestled in a non-existing chapter, the “six-and-a-half”, placing it between traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully, such as negotiation and mediation under Chapter VI, and more forceful action as authorized under Chapter VII (United Nations Information Service, accessed 2017).

⁹ These missions are mandated under chapter VII “Actions with respect to threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”. Meaning that under the existence of any threat to peace, the UNSC is empowered to take any measures, including the use of force, to maintain or restore international peace and security. In Article 42 it is stated that should initial peaceful and persuasive measures not be enough, the UNSC “may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may

was the *Opération des Nations Unies au Congo* (ONUC), deployed from 1960 to 1964 and aimed at expelling foreign forces, preventing secession and outside intervention within the country. Besides the Congolese case, other operations had been mandated under chapter VII. Among others, it is worth highlighting SC Resolution 678 (1990), which gave legal authorization to the US-led first Gulf War after the denial of Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwait. Furthermore, through SC resolution 1973 (2011) the UN provided a legal basis for a Western coalition-led military intervention in the Libyan civil war, demanding an immediate cease-fire, a no-fly zone, and to use all means necessary to protect civilians.

2.2 Examined political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements: Sierra Leone, Burundi and The Central African Republic

Examined UN missions in this dissertation need to be framed in the post-Cold War international scenario, whose fundamental transformations have been described in Chapter One. This new type of missions was designed to operationalize multidimensional political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements. The following section describes UN missions in the three country cases, Sierra Leone, Burundi and the Central African Republic, including political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements, whose dimensions of coherence and inclusiveness are the object of analysis in Chapters Five and Six. For each country, the dissertation analyses three different engagements (see table 10).

include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations” (United Nations, 1945).

Table 10. Examined UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements

	t1	t2	
	Department of Political Affairs	Peacebuilding Commission	Department of Political Affairs
Sierra Leone	UNIOSIL (2005-2008)	2007-Currently	UNIPSIL (2008-2014)
Burundi	BINUB (2007-2010)	2007-currently	BNUB (2011-2014)
Central African Republic	BONUCA (2000-2010)	2008-currently	BINUCA (2010-2014)

The first set of missions includes missions from the first wave (t1), namely DPA’s UNIOSIL (United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone), BINUB (United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi) and BONUCA (United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic), all deployed and concluded between 2000 and 2010. The second set includes missions deployed and concluded between 2007 and 2014¹⁰ (t2), namely the three PBC-led engagements in each country as well as DPA’s UNIPSIL (United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone), BNUB (United Nations Office in Burundi) and BINUCA (United Nations Integrated Office in the Central African Republic).

a) Sierra Lone

In August 1997, the ECOWAS, under UN authorization expressed in UNSC resolution 1132, deployed the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The ECOMOG played a decisive role during this mid-to-late stage of the war. Supported by a large group of personnel and resources from the Nigerian Armed Forces, the ECOMOG was determined to respond to the RUF at a time when the government of Sierra Leone was in its weakest state. After an unsuccessful attempt to reach a cease-fire agreement with the AFRC in October 1997, the ECOMOG, backed by popular pressure against the junta, drove the Koroma’s AFRC/RUF government from power and re-established the democratically-elected government headed by Kabbah. The city of Freetown was taken back by the ECOMOG-

¹⁰ In the case of the PBC, the three engagements are still on at the time of writing.

supported democratic government in February 1998 and Kabbah was reinstated as President in March of that year. In gratitude to the Nigeria-led ECOMOG, Kabbah appointed the Nigerian Maxwell Khobe as chief of defense of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA).

In July 1998, the UN established through UN SC Resolution 1181 the United Nations Observation Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), aimed at monitoring military and security activities in Sierra Leone, as well as the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants. The UNOMSIL mandate, under the DPKO, also provided the guarantee of respecting international humanitarian law (Security Council, 1998a). The UN commitment to position itself alongside the Sierra Leonean civil war had a disappointing impact from the beginning, as it was limited in number of personnel as well as being under-resourced. This tendency was amended by the early 2000s and the role of the UN mission in Sierra Leone, further developed in the following sub-section, ended up being key during the final stage of conflict and, more specifically, for post-conflict goals aimed at the eradication of root causes of conflict and the establishment of lasting peace.

The return to democracy, the deployment of ECOMOG, the formalization of the CDS and the establishment of the UNOMSIL generated a climate of optimism within government circles. Unexpectedly, on 6 January 1999, a faction of AFRC/RUF rebels overwhelmed the government and ECOMOG troops and penetrated the city of Freetown using extreme violence against the population, claiming thousands of lives in no more than two weeks. As a consequence, the UNOMSIL retreated to exile, leaving the country in uncertainty. Many foresaw a resulting military coup and a return to military rule but, eventually, the rebels did not take control of the government. When the atmosphere had calmed down after the events of January 1999, Kabbah and Sankoh signed a new cease-fire agreement in Lomé, the capital of Togo. It seemed for the first time that negotiations were headed in the right direction, illustrated by the signature of the final Lomé Peace Accord in July 1999, which included power-sharing arrangements between the government and the RUF.

Sankoh was nominated as vice-president, provisions were placed on the DDR and the RUF was transformed into a political party, amongst other agreements (see Security Council, 1999).

The establishment of UNOMSIL, deployed a year before the Lomé Peace Accord, came to fruition, and was intended to supervise measures adopted by both parties in order to end the conflict, including the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants. The lack of military means prevented the UN from expecting a greater and more formative involvement in the process. Three months after the signature of the peace accords, in October 1999, the UN DPKO decided to replace UNOMSIL with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) through the UNSC resolution 1270. The UN provided this new mission with chapter VII-based military means, i.e. peace enforcement capacities, becoming the first UN force to include the protection of civilians explicitly included in its mandate (Olonisakin, 2008).

UNAMSIL meant the full determination of the UN in facilitating and guaranteeing the accomplishment of the Lomé Peace Accords across all stakeholders. In its eighth article, the mission is mandated, *inter alia*, “to cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and the other parties to the Peace Agreement in the implementation of the Agreement; to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan; to encourage the parties to create confidence-building mechanisms and support their functioning; to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; to provide support, as requested, to the elections, which are to be held in accordance with the present constitution of Sierra Leone” (Security Council, 1999).

The initial deployment of 6.000 UNAMSIL troops was perceived with mistrust by ECOWAS countries, in particular by Nigerians, who had hitherto made a concerted effort through the ECOMOG to fight the rebels sided with the government of Sierra Leone. Nigerian leaders interpreted the arrival of UN troops during that stage in contempt of

the performance ECOMOG had developed in Sierra Leone. The accumulation of resentment and distrust within this situation catalyzed the full withdrawal of Nigerian forces from the scenario which, taking into account that 90% of ECOMOG's troops were Nigerian, meant the full withdrawal of ECOMOG from Sierra Leone, concluding by early May 2000. To appease Nigeria and acknowledge its crucial role in the conflict, the UN Secretariat appointed the Nigerian Oluyeni Adenji as the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), and head of UNAMSIL.

Perhaps willing to shed light on UN weaknesses, or simply willing to show off its strength in the context of the final stages of the war, in May 2000 the RUF kidnapped over 500 Zambian UN peacekeepers, initiating the so-called May 2000 crisis. Indeed, UNAMSIL proved themselves to the population as not being sufficiently equipped to counter the rebels without the assistance of the recently dismantled ECOMOG. On the other hand, it also proved that the RUF was not proceeding as expected regarding the disarmament and demobilization process. Within this tense context, the UK decided to unilaterally deploy a mission to Sierra Leone. The early UNAMSIL-UK relationship was complex, particularly concerning troop coordination. Moreover, they differed in certain key issues, such as the RUF, against which the UK proved to be much more relentless and less tolerant. Again, the arrival of the UK in Sierra Leone caused suspicion concerning the UN's capability in dealing with the situation independently.

The role of the UN took a defining turn in regard to its approach towards the conflict by the mid-2000. As Olonisakin (2008) asserts, the May 2000 crisis persuaded the UN to acknowledge that, to end the war in Sierra Leone, dealing with the regional dynamics of the Mano river area was a *sine qua non*. Taylor's key role in resolving the hostage issue made clear the regional scope of the strife. All the unpredicted attacks of the rebels led by Sankoh against governmental and UN positions during the post-agreement period would have not been possible without Taylor's NPFL support from Liberia. Therefore, the UN understood that in order to resolve the conflict it was necessary to weaken or

eliminate the RUF-NPFL relationship. To this goal, two measures were taken by the UN. In July 2000 the importation of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone was banned and, almost a year later, Liberia was banned from their export (see Security Council 2000, 2001b).

After the summer of 2000, the context and situation of UNAMSIL began changing. Internally, major changes in terms of strategic organization and coordination occurred. The US Permanent Representative to the UN, Richard Halbrooke, worked alongside the UK to mobilize the UN SC to provide enhanced support, and also encouraged troop-contributing countries to provide more military personnel. These demands came to fruition, leading to an increase in the number of UNAMSIL troops, reaching its highest number in March 2002, with a 17.500-large military. Benefiting from this reinforcement and favorable atmosphere, in November 2000, the government of Sierra Leone managed to sign a cease-fire agreement with the RUF in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria, encouraging a true DDR process for all combatants.

In May 2001, in what was known as the Kambia Formula, Adeniji negotiated with the RUF and agreed that the process of disarmament would proceed simultaneously for both non-state forces on each side of the conflict, the RUF itself and the CDS. This strategy was crucial in achieving the final and true disarmament of the RUF (Koops, 2015). By the end of 2001, UNAMSIL had indeed undergone a shift in its performance. Militarily, the mission became more competent and empowered; politically, a high-level of dialogue had been achieved and the open and inclusive attitude towards the RUF had helped move the peace process forward; finally, the public opinion of UNAMSIL was no longer considered suspicious or disappointed (Olonisakin, 2008).

In a much quieter, secure and more optimistic climate than that of 1996, parliamentary and legislative elections were celebrated in May 2002. The former President Kabbah was re-elected with large public support and sworn in. The RUF, turned into the RUF Party (RUFPP), only received 2% of the popular support in the polls, illustrating the firm intention of

Sierra Leoneans to end the civil war. The EU declared the election completely fair and transparent. UNAMSIL accepted this successful electoral process as a victory and reward for their work. When Kabbah assumed the presidency, he claimed the opportunity to solemnly declare the end of the Sierra Leonean civil war, which had lasted for almost eleven years.

In January and July 2002, respectively, two fundamental structures for the peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone were created with the support of the UN. Deemed a hybrid court of the second generation of international criminal justice, the SCSL was established to prosecute those who, during the war, had committed serious violations of international humanitarian law since November 1996. Amongst other indictments, the SCSL convicted Foday Sankoh of the RUF, who died in prison in July 2003, the AFRC leader Johnny Paul Koroma, the CDF leader Hinga Norma and the president of Liberia and leader of the NPFL Charles Taylor. The government also assisted in the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), aimed at investigating the extent to which human rights were violated and determining the causes of the atrocities. It was also designed to help restore the dignity of the victims and, ultimately, to achieve national reconciliation. The TRC final report, which was submitted in 2004, was criticized for being too brief and imprecise (see Harris 2013).

The UNAMSIL, whose head Adenji was replaced by the Tanzanian Daudi Mwakawago until the end of the mission, completed the DDR and SSR processes by the end of 2004. According to some, this process concluded successfully (see Graben and Fitz-Gerald, 2012). Through the Adjustment, Drawdown and Withdrawal plan, UNAMSIL gradually transferred security responsibilities to Sierra Leone's new army, which Kabbah had named in January 2002 the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), and to the Sierra Leonean police. The success of the UN mission in Sierra Leone depended to a large extent on how successful former combatants were in disarming and reintegrating into new security structures, due to the large amount of non-military combatants (Malan *et al.*, 2002).

One of the first measures the UN took in post-conflict Sierra Leone was to unify all UN actors deployed in the country under the UN Assistance Development Framework (UNDAF) for Sierra Leone. This remains active as a guide to the UN Country Team, which includes 19 different agencies, funds and programmes.

In the context of the 2003 HLP on Threats, Challenges and Change, through which the PBC was first conceived, the UN experienced a growing awareness of the importance of peacebuilding in preventing relapse into violence. The UN SG expressed in its 12th paragraph of the December 2004 24th report on Sierra Leone,

“UNAMSIL and the United Nations country team have continued to coordinate closely to ensure a seamless transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. To that end, UNAMSIL and the country team are jointly developing a transition plan, which identifies priority tasks to be implemented during 2005. The plan focuses on national capacity-building, strengthening national ownership and ensuring the Government’s lead in the formulation and implementation of policies and programs in key areas. The plan also aims at ensuring the Government’s focus on addressing the root causes of the conflict, which would require further far-reaching reforms in critical areas including the justice sector and the penal system” (Security Council, 2004b: Para. 12).

Furthermore, this report of the SG mandated the UN Country Team in Sierra Leone to design a transition plan to replace the peacekeeping-based UNAMSIL by a new peacebuilding-oriented mission. This transition plan included five key areas: security, including the strengthening of the capacities of the RSLAF; consolidation of peace and stability, including the promotion of national reconciliation through facilitation of dialogue between political actors and civil society; consolidation of state authority and governance, like the establishment and strengthening of an Anticorruption Commission framed within a national anticorruption strategy; the reintegration of former combatants, such as the promotion of community-based reintegration programs at the local level; and national recovery and economic and

social development, including the promotion of job creation and the inclusion of women in political structures.

In August 2005, through resolution 1620, the UN SC established the creation of the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) which took over tasks by the UNAMSIL in January 2006. The deployment of UNIOSIL was coordinated with the withdrawal of UNAMSIL, a complex and controversial peacekeeping operation which had largely absorbed resources and efforts from the UN as well as attention from the international community. Due to the fact that UNIOSIL was led by the DPKO during its early stages before being handed over to the DPA, the transition was smooth, in spite of the substantial transformation in nature from one mission to another.

UNIOSIL covered five major issues, including peace and governance, human rights and the rule of law, civilian police, military and public information. Amongst others, goals established for the emerging mission set by the resolution included to assist the government of Sierra Leone in building the capacity of State institutions in order to further address the root causes of the conflict, to develop a national action plan for human rights, to build the capacity of the National Electoral Commission in conducting a free, fair and credible electoral process in 2007, to enhance good governance, transparency and accountability of public institutions, to strengthen the rule of law, including by developing the independence and capacity of the justice system and the capacity of the police and corrections system, to strengthen the Sierra Leonean security sector, to promote a culture of peace, dialogue, and participation in critical national issues through a strategic approach to public information and communication, including through building an independent and capable public radio capacity, and to develop initiatives for the protection and well-being of youth, women and children (see Security Council, 2005).

In an attempt to strengthen all peacebuilding efforts made in Sierra Leone, the country was placed within the PBC agenda in June 2007. The PBC identified six priorities, challenges and risks concerning the

implementation of peacebuilding in Sierra Leone: youth employment and empowerment, justice and security sector reform, consolidation of democracy and good governance, governmental capacity-building, the energy sector and the regional dimension of peacebuilding efforts (see Peacebuilding Commission, 2007). Only two months later, in August 2007, presidential and parliamentary elections were held. The victory of the APC led by Ernst Koroma and the defeat of SLPP's Kabbah brought about two substantial conclusions. It can be argued that the first conclusion, as alternation came to fruition, was that democracy had been, at least to certain extent, consolidated. The second claim is that it can be determined that the geographical distribution of votes indicated the continuance of old patterns of politics (Harris, 2013). In November 2012, Koroma was re-elected.

Three years after the UNIOSIL was deployed, in August 2008, the UNSC established, through Resolution 1829, the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), replacing the UNIOSIL. With approximately 70 staff, UNIPSIL became a political mission aimed at providing political advice to foster peace, offering support and training to the national police and security forces and building the capacity for democratic institutions, guaranteeing good governance and the promotion and protection of human rights. In March 2014, the UNIPSIL formally closed and transferred responsibilities to the UN Country Team which, as mentioned before, included different UN agencies, funds and programs, and is still based in the UNDAF.

The UN-led adaptation of a peacebuilding-oriented approach to the Sierra Leonean post-conflict scenario aimed to transform the short-term presence of peacekeepers into a broad societal transformation (Olivier *et al.*, 2009). These transformations, which were sustained on the importation of the Western liberal democratic system in Sierra Leone, encountered resistance within a society based on strong local traditions, thus bringing about social consequences worth highlighting. The struggle between chieftaincy and modern councils arose again. While Western donors were keen to impose liberal institutions, they also

knew that chiefs were necessary in order to maintain stability in rural areas (Harris, 2013). Although Sierra Leoneans had generally maintained respect for traditional roles, some evidence suggests that alternative dispute mechanisms created by donors were becoming more trusted (Vincent, 2012). As Spagnoli (2003) asserts, this societal shift requires move away from communalist obligations and traditional structures towards individualist thinking and respect for a modern state and modern social structures, what this author terms the *homo democraticus*. Nowadays Sierra Leone functions on the basis of a hybrid system, struggling to find the balance between the traditional and modern *modus operandi* (Harris, 2013).

The UNAMSIL undoubtedly provided a favorable environment in the country for peacebuilding actors to develop their tasks (Hazen, 2007). Nonetheless, socioeconomic reality calls for further critical analysis. For some authors, the impact of the international presence in post-conflict context is not as distinct. Solà-Martín (2009) argues that,

“The country’s hard-won peace has provided business opportunities for transnational extractive industries which show scant attention to local people’s human rights. Some of these companies, for example Koidu Holdings Limited, are closely connected to mercenary forces who played a determinant role during the civil war. Whilst some aspects of the liberal peace project, namely the promotion of human rights and democratization, contributed to the peaceful resolution of social disputes in post-conflict Sierra Leone, neoliberal economic policies still in vogue feed patrimonial networks, particularly in the vital extractive industries sector; thus reproducing structural inequalities which were root causes of the civil war” (Solà-Martín, 2009:307).

Regarding the UN-led peacebuilding mission in Sierra Leone, it is clear that it was a key factor for successfully establishing the efficient coordination between peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, namely due to the transfer of mandate from UNAMSIL to UNIOSIL and UNIPSIL. Beyond this, although the country still experienced distinctly poor economic progress, there are no clear signs indicating a relapse into violence in the near future.

b) Burundi

In 2003, the AU deployed its first peacekeeping mission, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB). The signature of the peace agreement between the transitional government and the CNDD-FDD was followed by the transferring of the peacekeeping responsibility from the AU to the UN, which established its first peacekeeping mission in Burundi, the ONUB, under the DPKO mandate. Without undermining the success of the AMIB mandate while undergoing the post-conflict stage, the UN, which deployed up to three different operations in Burundi, played a key role in the post-conflict peacebuilding process.

Approved in February 2003, the AMIB was the AU's first deployment of armed forces, lasting 15 months. The mission's mandate was to supervise, monitor and verify the implementation of the Arusha agreement, the ceasefire protocols and the DDR program. With about 3.300 personnel (Peen Rodt, 2012), with South Africa being the leading country in terms of troop contribution, the AMIB had different specific operational goals: to establish and maintain a liaison and relationship between the parties; to monitor and verify the implementation of the ceasefire agreements; to facilitate the activities of the Joint Ceasefire Commission and technical committees for the establishment and restructuring of the national defense and police forces; to secure identified assembly and disengagement areas; to facilitate safe passage for parties during planned movements to designated assembly areas; to facilitate and provide technical assistance to the DDR process; to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, including with refugees and internally displaced peoples; to coordinate mission activities with the UN presence in the country; and to provide VIP protection for designated returning leaders.

Considering the timing of the process, some consider the AMIB as one of the biggest success of all AU activities (Boshoff *et al.*, 2010). By the time the AMIB was replaced by the ONUB, the African mission had quite successfully managed to provide a secure environment and had proceeded with the DDR program. This, however, could be considered as less successful, due to lack of resources provided for the reintegration

of ex-combatants (Peen Rodt, 2012). The ONUB was deployed to take over the AMIB in June 2004 through SC Resolution 1545. Only the South African segment remained on the ground as the African Union Special Task Force. Amongst different tasks, the ONUB's mandate included to ensure the respect of ceasefire agreements, through monitoring their implementation and investigating their violations; to promote the re-establishment of confidence between the Burundian forces; to carry out the disarmament and demobilization portions of the national DDR program; to contribute to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced people; and to contribute to the completion of the electoral process.

Adebajo (2011) highlights as the main achievement of the ONUB the disarming and demobilization of about 21.700 fighters at the end of its mission. He also highlights the support provided to the electoral process, the protection of the returning refugees and humanitarian convoys and the provision of training to Burundi's integrated national police. Following the FNL's ceasefire agreement, in December 2006 the ONUB was replaced by the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), initially led by the DPKO and later by the DPA. The SC established, through resolution 1719, BINUB's mandate as split into four different areas. The first domain of the mandate involved peace consolidation and democratic governance, which included, amongst other tasks, the strengthening of the capacity of national institutions and civil society to address the root causes of the conflict, and the promotion of good governance based on transparency and accountability of public institutions. The second area referred to the DDR process and the SSR, including support to the implementation of ceasefire agreements, and support for the development of a national plan for reform of the security sector. The broad task of promoting and protecting human rights and measures to end impunity, specifically, building national institutional capacity in this area, and the establishment of a transitional justice mechanism to avoid impunity was the third area included in the mandate. The fourth and final field expressed in the mandate was related to donor and UN agency

coordination, including tasks such as strengthening the partnership between the Government and donors, and developing effective strategies for UN agency coordination.

In 2007, Burundi was put on the agenda of the recently created UN PBC, a process which is elaborated upon further in the chapter covering PBC performance in each of the case studies. Following the strategic framework for Burundi designed by the commission, in November 2007 the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM) was established, aimed at monitoring the implementation of the recent ceasefire agreement with the PALIPEHUTU-FNL and the DDR program. The task of the JVMM reached its zenith in early 2008, when the security conditions worsened due to large-scale hostilities between the government and the FNL (Center on International Cooperation, 2009). In January 2009, the FNL dropped the “PALIPEHUTU” ethnic prefix from its name in order to be accepted and legitimized within the official register as a political party for the coming 2010 elections. In April, a national independent electoral commission was created in order to prepare the country for the 2010 elections, which re-elected Nkurunziza despite strong boycotts by the opposition parties.

In December 2010, before a clear reluctance of the Nkuruziza Government to collaborate with or facilitate the UN, the BINUB was replaced by the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB). In resolution 1959, the SC established the BNUB as the UN mission in charge of strengthening the independence, capacity and legal framework of key national institutions; promoting and facilitating dialogue between national actors and supporting participation in political life; supporting efforts to fight impunity; promoting the protection of human rights; and ensuring that all strategies remained focused on peacebuilding and equitable growth. On the basis of the mandates of the different UN missions deployed in Burundi, one may distinguish a smooth evolution from pure peacekeeping-oriented tasks such as DDR or SSR to a broader peacebuilding-oriented mandate, with goals consisting of solidifying the foundations of the State in order to encourage lasting peace.

The Institute for Security Studies describes in a report from that the CNDD-FDD took steps to arm and train its youth, information allegedly leaked by BNUB (Bouka, 2014). The CNDD-FDD subsequently called for the expulsion of Paul Debbie, the head of BNUB's security. The BNUB completed its mandate on 31 December 2014, and its responsibilities were transferred to the UN Development Assistance Framework - specifically to the Country Team for Burundi. In addition to this, the UN deployed in January 2015 the *Mission d'observation électorale des Nations Unies au Burundi* (MENUB), which was tasked in assisting the country in coordinating and supervising coming elections.

The deterioration of the security situation in Burundi during the time of writing (March 2017) is troublesome. The UN-led transition from a mission to non-mission setting in Burundi has failed to provide security. UN envoys are continuously rejected by the Government. The intentions of President Nkuruziza to unconstitutionally hold the third term is a potential cause for instability. The UN SC supported the AU-led initiative to deploy the African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU), considered an unprecedented move as it was refused by the Burundian Government. The disagreement of the AU's Assembly of Heads of State hampered the eventual deployment of the mission. The notorious institutional weakness of the EAC and the persistent regional instability in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo further encourage an unstable and insecure context.

c) The Central African Republic

As with the cases of Sierra Leone and Burundi, the CAR conflict also requires the international and regional perspectives to comprehensively understand the evolution of violence. Since the crisis of mutinies in 1996, the CAR has hosted up to 13 international peace missions (see table 11), which, overall, have intended to mitigate political instability and violence both in the country and in the region of Central Africa. From African organizations such as the AU, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) or the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to the EU (European

Union) or the UN, all have deployed, at some point, a mission, either to guarantee the signature of peace or ceasefire accords or to support the host government in proceeding with the resolution of conflict processes, such as DDR or SSR. This subsection sheds light on the main characteristics of each of these international or regional peace missions.

Table 11. Peace missions deployed in the Central African Republic, 1997-2014.

Name	Duration	Agency	Scope
Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Bangui Accords (MISAB)	February 1997 - April 1998	Regional (Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali, Senegal and Togo) UN-authorized	CAR
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)	April 1998 - February 2000	International (UN)	CAR
United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA)	February 2000 - January 2010	International (UN)	CAR
<i>Force Multinationale de la Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale</i> (FOMUC)	October 2002 - July 2008	Regional (CEMAC)	CAR
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCAT)	January 2008 - December 2010	International (UN)	Regional (CAR/Chad)
European Union Force in the Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA)	January 2008 - March 2009	Regional (EU) UN-authorized	Regional (CAR/Chad)
Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX)	July 2008 - December 2013	Regional (ECCAS)	CAR
Peacebuilding Commission	June 2008 (still on)	International (UN)	CAR
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding	January 2010 - April 2014	International (UN)	CAR

Support Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA)			
United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA)	Marc 2011 (still on)	International (UN)	Regional (ECCAS)
International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA)	December 2013 - April 2014	Regional (AU)	CAR
“Operation Sangaris”	December 2013 - April 2014	France	CAR
European Union Force in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA)	February 2014 (still on)	Regional (EU) UN-authorized	CAR
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)	April 2014 (still on)	International (UN)	CAR

The African response to the high level of political instability in the CAR in 1996, including the three military mutinies, was in the establishment of the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Bangui Accords (MISAB), which was aimed at restoring peace and security in the country. MISAB was deployed in February 1997 under President Patassé's request, with participating states being Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali, Senegal and Togo. Their main tasks were to disarm the ex-rebels, the militia and all other unlawfully armed individuals. In August 1997, through UN resolution 1125, at Patassé's request the MISAB was officially approved as a UN-authorized force.

The UN also responded to the political crisis in the CAR during the late 1990s. In April 1998, the DPKO deployed through SC Resolution 1159 the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA). Its purpose was to “assist in maintaining and enhancing security and stability in Bangui and the vicinity; supervise, control storage and monitor the disposition of weapons retrieved in

disarmament exercise; assist in capacity-building of national police; provide advice and technical support for legislative elections” (Security Council, 1998b:3), amongst others. The MINURCA, which was comprised of MISCA, was replaced by the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), which had been authorized in December 1999 by the UN SC and was eventually deployed in February 2000 by the DPA after the withdrawal of the MINURCA.

The transitional process from the DPKO-led mission MINURCA to the first DPA-led peacebuilding-oriented mission began in 1999, notably earlier than in the cases of Sierra Leone and Burundi, which occurred in 2006 and 2007, respectively. Although the transition was developed without major drawbacks, the assertiveness implied through the early timeframe caused skepticism on behalf of stakeholders concerning the potential for peacebuilding. As this expert on the CAR puts it,

“...maybe it was too early to leave the country only after peacebuilding mission, in the sense that, in that time, and the first attempt of coup by Bozize was in 2001 already, there was an underestimation of the potential instability in the country. I don’t think that BONUCA during its first years would have really worked on some peacebuilding objectives. Pattassé was really worried about staying in power and really worried about the intentions from Bozizé. And there was a big defiance of regional forces from Chad, from Congo, from Libya, France... that ended up in the 2003... but I think honestly, it was too early take out the peacekeeping part. And in this sense BONUCA was somehow left alone in the beginning”¹¹.

The BONUCA was tasked with “supporting the Government of the CAR's efforts to consolidate peace and national reconciliation, strengthening democratic institutions and facilitating the mobilization of international political support and resources for national reconstruction and economic recovery” (Secretary General, 1999:2). This mission lasted for almost a decade, when it was then replaced by

¹¹ Picco, E. (2016, June 29). Skype interview.

the later described United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA).

The security situation notoriously deteriorated again in 2002 (Center on International Cooperation, 2009). This time the response was regional. The CEMAC deployed in October 2002 the *Force Multinationale de la Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale* (FOMUC), which was composed of around 400 troops aimed at supporting political stability and reconstructing the *Forces Armées Centrafricaines*. The FOMUC was eventually replaced in 2008 by the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX), elaborated upon further in the subsequent sections. Because of their wide and multidimensional scopes, the BONUCA and the FOMUC became, in the early 21st century, the main actors for peacebuilding in the CAR.

Shortly after the approval of the 2005 Constitution under Bozizé's government, and a timid attempt to direct the country towards real democracy, in 2008 the ECCAS established the MICOPAX, which co-existed with the FOMUC for a considerable amount of time during a period of transition, eventually being replaced in July 2008. During this time of co-existence both organizations also collaborated closely with the BONUCA. The MICOPAX was composed of over 2,500 military and police officers, including people from Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Gabon, Guinea Equatorial and Chad. Principally aimed at the protection of civilians in distinctly violent areas such as Bossanga, the MICOPAX witnessed in 2009 the renewal of activities of armed groups, which accused Bozizé of not implementing and following through with the agreements reached with the rebels (Center on International Cooperation, 2010). The MICOPAX was eventually replaced in December 2013 by the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA), described further below.

In June 2008, the CAR became the fourth country after Burundi, Sierra Leone and Guinea to be placed on the agenda of the UN PBC. This expressed the firm determination of the UN to implement a peacebuilding approach within the Central African case. One of the

primary tasks the PBC carried out in the CAR was the transfer from the BONUCA to a fully peacebuilding-oriented mission, eventually coming to fruition in the BINUCA. This mission therefore fundamentally represented the expansion of the UN mandate in the CAR. In a statement by the President of the Security Council in December 2009, the UN welcomed the establishment of BINUCA, eventually deployed in January 2010 to support national and local efforts to consolidate peace, enhance governance and complete the DDR process. The BINUCA also contained the mandate to focus on LRA-related activities, originally a Ugandan rebel group operating in the Central African region, claiming the representation of democratic principles but in reality operating as a criminal group with no clear political goals. After almost four years of work, the BINUCA was subsumed in April 2014 by the newly established United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), described below.

The security deterioration in the CAR, as a result of the increasing tensions and fights between the ex-Séléka and the anti-balaka under the Djotodia administration, caused the UNSC to authorize the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) in December 2013 through its resolution 2127, simultaneously replacing the MICOPAX. Promoted by the AU's Peace and Security Council and supported by a robust French deployment known as the "Operation Sangaris" (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2013), the MISCA was mandated to contribute to the protection of civilians and the restoration of security, the stabilization of the country and the restoration of State authority, the creation of conditions conducive to the provision of humanitarian assistance, the DDR process and the SSR, amongst others, all conducted in close collaboration with transitional authorities and BINUCA. As with the BINUCA, the MISCA and the "Operation Sangaris" were eventually absorbed by the MINUSCA.

Towards the goal of reinforcing the MISCA and providing support to African-led efforts of containing the CAR conflict (International

Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014), in February 2014 the UN authorized through Resolution 2134 the establishment of the European Union Force in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA). The EUFOR RCA is responsible for providing temporary support in order to achieve a safe and secure environment in Bangui, contributing to international efforts to protect most at-risk populations. The EUFOR RCA was initially planned to be handed over to MISCA within a maximum six months. However, in April it was agreed that MISCA would transform into a stronger UN peacekeeping operation, the MINUSCA. This, in effect, marked the beginning of a new chapter in EU-UN cooperation in crisis management (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014).

Until now the only remaining UN-led mission deployed solely in the CAR is the MINUSCA, which was established in April 2014 due to the worsening of the security situation in the country, absorbing the BINUCA, the MISCA and the French “Operation Sangaris”. Through resolution 2149, the SC established the MINUSCA as a peacekeeping operation aimed principally at protecting civilians, supporting the implementation of the transition process, facilitating humanitarian assistance, protecting UN personnel, promoting human rights, supporting the national and international justice, and supporting the DDR. This newly established mission conclusively represents response to a prolonged spate of inter-communal fighting, particularly between Muslim and Christian militias. Additionally, the struggle in the north between the pastoralists and the rebels described above, which also contributed to the deterioration of security, further encouraged the deployment of the MINUSCA.

Aside from struggles in the CAR between the government, the military and armed civilians fighting for different causes, the Central African border with the Chad has also undergone major tensions and violent episodes, principally because of the opposition of some Chadian from the south-east of the country to the arrival of both Central African refugees escaping from the war in the CAR and Sudanese refugees escaping from the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. As the security

situation gradually worsened in this area, the UN presented a proposal for a regional peacekeeping mission. However, the Chad refused it, fearing it was being exploited by the UN due to its geography, positioning it as a rear base from which to launch operations in Sudan. This then explains the French pressure placed on the EU to deploy a mission along with the UN, allowing the Chad to accept the deployment of both missions (Center on International Cooperation, 2010).

That is how, in this conflict-ridden border region, two peace missions were deployed through the same UNSC resolution 1778, passed in late 2007. On the one hand, the UN established the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCAT) and, on the other, the UN authorized the establishment of the European Union Force in the Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA) for a period of one year. Both missions were deployed in parallel to each other in early 2008. These missions were primarily mandated to deal with security issues and the protection of civilians in the border area, as well as to guarantee human rights, the provision of humanitarian assistance and the prevalence of the rule of law. Even though both missions were deployed in both the CAR and Chad, their presence in the CAR was much more limited, concentrated in the north-eastern border with Chad. After a year of its deployment, in 2009 the EUFOR TCHAD/RCA transferred responsibilities to the MINURCAT, whose responsibilities were eventually assumed by Chadian security and justice bodies in December 2010.

Fearing a further deterioration of stability in this border area and a resulting major regional crisis, the UN launched in March 2011 the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), which included the ten members of the ECCAS. Amongst other goals, the UNOCA was mandated to strengthen regional conflict prevention mechanisms, cooperate with ECCAS and other stake-holders in the promotion of peace and security in the broader Central African sub-region, strengthen the DPA's capacity to advise the UN SG on different matters, enhance linkages in the sub-region to promote an integrated sub-regional approach and facilitating coordination and information ex-

change, and to report to the headquarters on developments of subregional significance.

The current situation in the CAR is not very encouraging. De Carvalho and Lucey (2016) argue that the CAR continues to be plagued by violent conflict. The religious tension between the Muslim-dominated Seleka and the Christian-dominated Balaka continues to be strong and often catalyzes an eruption of violent episodes. Beyond religion, the lack of political stability and institutional capacity is also considered in the report as a source of violence and instability. The recently elected Faustin-Archange Toudera Government is intended to extend its authority across the country and thus spread and consolidate a continued attempt at peacebuilding in the country.



In summary, the division of UN departments based on temporal stages of conflict (during the conflict the DPKO takes the lead, whereas in the post-conflict stage, the DPA and the PBC lead the engagement) is highly problematic on the ground, and often detached from local reality. In light of the remaining violent outbreaks in the cases of Burundi and the CAR, the UN has failed to identify when to transfer missions from the DPKO to the DPA, often forcing the DPA and the PBC to perform in highly insecure contexts, which they are unprepared for, as discussed in the following part of the dissertation. This also has contributed to the failure of the UN in the frame of political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements.

PART III

COHERENCE AND INCLUSIVENESS IN UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL AND PEACEBUILDING POST- CONFLICT ENGAGEMENTS: THE CASES OF SIERRA LEONE, BURUNDI AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

CHAPTER FIVE. COHERENCE IN UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL AND PEACEBUILDING POST-CONFLICT ENGAGEMENTS: THE CASES OF SIERRA LEONE, BURUNDI AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

This chapter seeks to argue that the failure of UN attempts for coherence in UN post-conflict engagements has contributed to the current depression of the liberal peacebuilding project. To do so, the chapter first describes how the UN has approached coherence in post-conflict engagements; second, it examines the practical results of coherence by the DPA and the PBA in the examined cases; and third, it identifies explanatory factors for the failed attempt and the implications this failure has had for the overall liberal peacebuilding project.

1. Towards coherence: A United Nations discursive endeavor

Since early operations in the aftermath of World War II, the UN has struggled to define a coherent strategy to first, efficiently implement at the operational level on the ground what is designed at the normative level within New York-based headquarters and, second, to enhance field intracoordination¹. Coherence between the content of the mandates passed at UN headquarters and the tasks eventually operationalized in the field has been long discussed by many scholars and experts on the UN. In regard to the UN system, Childers and Urquhart (1994) have stated that “the orchestra pays minimum heed to its conductor”². The Future United Nations Development System

¹ Therefore, coherence includes, first, the synergy between the mandates resolved at the New York-based UN headquarters and the tasks developed by UN teams leading the missions on the ground, and, second, field intracoordination, meaning the interaction between different UN teams at the field level.

² Regarding the inefficiency of the hierarchical UN structure when attempting to implement field tasks, Weiss (2016) illustrates the internal UN functioning by comparing it to the complex relationship between feudal kingdoms (the individual organizations) and feudal barons (their executive heads), arguing that “the coalition of

(FUNDS) project acknowledges lack of coherence as an “urgent need for radical reform to address” (Browne and Weiss, 2015: Foreword). This lack of coherence between UN headquarters and agencies on the ground, and how to overcome issues of incoordination, poses a major challenge to both UN staff as well as UN experts studying the organization externally³. The first major internal evaluation of the PBC, conducted during its fifth anniversary, argues in Article 37 that “the first and essential step in achieving coherence of approach is improving coordination in the field” (General Assembly and Security Council, 2010: Art. 37). Indeed, one of the core issues related to coherence, as it is widely exposed in this chapter, is intracoordination, constituting a fundamental condition for coherence⁴.

This dissertation thus defines coherence as a relational process between different “framework levels”, leading to an efficient implementation of a “multidimensional action” in the pursuit of a common goal⁵. Breaking

state interests that oppose an integrated UN system has helped cripple it by maintaining this feudal structure of separate organizations”. For further academic writing on this relationship between the normative or strategic level of the UN and the field level, and in particular in the area of recent UN peacebuilding, see Campbell (2015), Picciotto (2014), Van Beijnum (2016) or De Coning and Stamnes (2016).

³ Ironically, the former MSF country director in the CAR assured during an interview for this thesis that the UN spends half of its time on coordination (Picco, E. (2016, June 29). Skype interview).

⁴ As De Coning (2007:8) states, “if coherence is the aim, then coordination is the activity through which coherence is pursued. (...) However, whilst coherence and coordination are interlinked, one should not assume a linear or causal relationship, as the one does not necessarily lead to the other. Each needs to be independently considered in order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the interlinkages between the two”. For the sake of the research, in order to overcome this chicken or egg question, the dissertation does not take for granted any causal relationship between both concepts, but it assumes a mutual reinforcement instead.

⁵ De Coning (2010:20) defines four elements of coherence in the whole spectrum of the peacebuilding context: “(1) agency coherence, i.e. consistency among the policies and actions of an individual agency, including the internal consistency of a specific policy or program; (2) whole-of-government coherence, i.e. consistency among the policies and actions of the different government agencies of a country; (3) external coherence, i.e. consistency among the policies pursued by the various international actors in a given country context (harmonization); and (4) internal/external coherence, i.e. consistency between the policies of the local and international actors in a given country context (alignment)”. This thesis is focused on the first element, namely UN intracoordination.

down this definition and applying it to the issue at stake, the dissertation looks in detail at two different “framework levels”. First, the research analyzes the normative level, which is understood as the New York-based UN headquarters level, and second, the operational level, which is understood as the field level where the New York-based strategy is operationalized. Concerning the “multidimensional action”, this chapter examines the implementation of multidimensional political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements in three different cases, Sierra Leone, Burundi and the Central African Republic⁶.

1.1 Coherence: A United Nations system-wide concern

The UN has long been attempting to overcome the challenge of the disconnection between the headquarters and field missions through the improvement of field intracoordination. De Coning (2007:5) points out that the fundamental underlying issue of UN coherence is that it seeks to be system-wide, hence the high complexity of these processes. This author follows by classifying this UN system endeavor as facing three major challenges, namely, facilitating its own internal coherence⁷; supporting and encouraging coherence among all international or external actors; and facilitating and supporting coherence between the external and internal actors.

Annan made significant attempts in facilitating further coherence within the relationship between UN headquarters and the field. In his 1997 report “Renewing the UN: A program for Reform”, Annan suggested addressing issues such as an enhanced relationship between New York-based headquarters and field missions, improving the effectiveness on the ground level, approaching civil society or emphasizing the necessity for merging concepts such as peace, security, development and human rights (see Secretary General, 1997). In 2005, he appointed a High-Level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence, causing structural changes within the Chief Executive Board (CEB). The CEB is an instrument composed

⁶ As described in the methodology section of the introduction, the analyzed dimensions are security, governance and positive peace.

⁷ This dissertation focuses on this challenge.

of all executive heads of the UN system, aimed at enhancing intracoordination. Furthermore, he promoted the Triennial Comprehensive Policy framework, consisting of a comprehensive 3-year strategic and monitoring plan to enhance coordination within the UN system. In addition to these, Anan's most acknowledged milestone achievement in the area of UN coherence was the 2006 "Delivering as One" (DaO) report, which was intended to coordinate humanitarian aid systematically across the entire UN system (see General Assembly, 2006).

More recently, the UN system has made further efforts for increased coherence through, for example, the DaO pilot countries or the UNADFs (UN Assistance Development Framework). On the one hand, the eight DaO pilot countries (Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay and Vietnam) are experimenting with an intended new form of coherence, including the implementation of the "Four Ones": One leader, one program, one budgetary framework and one office. The first evaluations of this initiative are underway and the results will surely be taken as lessons learnt for future strategic planning. On the other hand, the adoption of a UNDAF for about 90 developing countries from 2009 to 2011 indicates a firm step taken by the UN to increase its operational coherence through the gathering of the entire UN action into a single document framework coordinated within the unified UNCT office (UNICEF, 2015).

One of the core UN agencies responsible for UN coherence is the undg (United Nations Development Group), in charge of enhancing intracoordination on the system level. Sally Fegan-Wyles, the former director of the undg, expressed her insights into the headquarters-filed relationship when she was appointed to office in 2001,

"When I came from the field to New York I realized how different the Specialized Agencies are compared to the Funds and Programs, how independent they are and how little power ECOSOC or the Secretary General holds over them (...). Some seemed to be waiting for Kofi Annan's departure and the end of his many reform attempts

(...). There was a whole different governance structure at headquarters than at country level that I was unaware of. I thought we were all in the same organization, but there are huge differences” (Center for UN Reform Education 2008).

One of the major UNDG-led initiatives fundamentally established in order to improve coherence on the ground was the creation of the Resident Coordinator (RC), as described in this chapter for the Sierra Leonean case with the deployment of UNIPSIL. This position represents the whole system of the UN within an assisted country. Specifically, the RC’s primary function is to bring together different UN agencies to improve the efficiency of operational activities in the field such as coordination of country-level security, support to national efforts in disaster risk reduction, leading humanitarian assistance or final arbitration on the UNDAF. In January 2017, the number of RC’s distributed around the world surpassed a hundred, with the largest number being located mainly in the Asia-Pacific region, Africa and Latin America⁸. In addition to this, the UNDG is in charge of the UN Development Operations Coordination Office (UNDOCO), aimed at uniting the various UN agencies and programs in the field so as to deliver a coherent and coordinated thrust within the sustainable development framework.

Concerning field work in conflict-affected countries, the UN has gradually positioned itself as the main implementing actor for improving intracoordination through a gradual process of integrating different UN bodies within a single framework. This process of integration has been developed over the last decade through different stages and processes. In 2004, the DPKO issued an Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) for peace operations aimed at integrating the planning, programming and budgeting processes used within the UN. This was in order to maintain operational readiness and allocate resources for peace operations (see Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2004). Specifically, the IMPP involves a common,

⁸ See further information on the Resident Coordinator on the website <https://undg.org/home/resident-coordinators/>

integrated and systemic approach dealing with different and successive levels of integration. The first level of integration dealt with the pre-planning level, and consists of regular monitoring and analysis of developments in a given territorial area containing the potential for conflict. The second covers the deployment of the UN strategy, that is to say, from the decision to plan for further UN involvement to the development of an overarching strategy including both means and ends. The third level deals with the operational process and refers to the definition and integration of appropriate functional strategies, providing more detailed guidance on operationalizing the UN strategy as a whole. The fourth level defines the design of a specific and ad-hoc plan, revealing precise information on who, what, where and how the strategy will be implemented. Finally, the fifth level of integration consists of the development of mandate implementation plans, during which the Head of the Mission and other actors are required to fulfil tasks requested and established by the mandate.

Regarding the goal of providing further guidelines for the integration of broad and multidimensional missions on the ground, the SG issued in 2006 an extensive guideline on the IMPP (see Secretary General, 2006a). This guideline included two major aspects. It first presents general planning principles and assumptions, including the establishment of integration as the prime principle for complex UN operations in post-conflict scenarios, done as an attempt at maximizing efficiency and effectiveness of the UN presence on the country level as well as to enhance the coordination between the New York-based headquarters and the field. The second aspect of the guidelines, details a highly complex planning process, distributed across several stages, including setting the stage, operational planning, and review and transition planning.

Furthermore, module 4 of the 2011 “Introduction to UN Peacekeeping Pre-deployment Specialized Training Materials for Staff Officers” elaborates in detail the development of the Integration Mission Planning Process (see Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2011). Among other aspects, this document touches, first, on the coordination

between the New York-based headquarters and the field missions and, second, on the intracoordination issue. Regarding New York-based headquarters, the module specifies that the responsible body at headquarters level for the IMPP is the Integration (Mission) Task Force, asked with ensuring the implementation of coherent and consistent support and policy guidance throughout the integration process of the field mission. Once the strategy has been designed at headquarters level, the prime responsibility of the IMPP then shifts to the field, namely the field missions and the UNCT. Field-based bodies are expected to achieve sound coordination through Strategic Policy Groups, Integrated Strategy and Planning Teams as well as Integrated Strategic Frameworks. These then define the partnership between the mission and the UNCT in the pursuit of joint peace consolidation priorities.

In 2013, the SG endorsed the “Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook” developed by the Integrated Assessment Planning Working Group. This handbook describes in detail the integration of four major stages in an attempt to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN in conflict and post-conflict scenarios (see Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2013). The first stage involves guidelines for an integrated assessment, emphasizing aspects such as timing, leadership or authority of the processes. The second stage is guided by the integrated mechanisms, namely the frameworks available at the headquarters level and at the field level which enable the unfolding of the integrated plan. The handbook then presents the details of the integrated plan, through which the whole process of integration is operationalized. Integrated planning includes a description of the role of institutions such as the Special or Executive Representative of the Secretary General, the Resident Coordinator or the Humanitarian Coordinator. It also details the purpose of the Integrated Strategic Framework or the partnership with national and international stakeholders. The last stage develops the integrated monitoring and reporting process, aimed at assessing the entire process of integration, learning from good practices and eventually mainstreaming integrated plans into UN reporting mechanisms.

1.2 Coherence in the frame of United Nations political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements

In the current context of a growing complexity of contemporary conflicts and multidimensional missions, coherence becomes a *sine qua non* condition for the UN in order to have a minimum impact on the international scenario, and particularly in dealing with conflict-affected areas⁹. Petrie and Morrice (2015:46) describe coherence as meaning “it is no longer possible to dissociate operational activities for development from political, humanitarian, human rights, peacekeeping and peacebuilding functions”. Early UN civilian-based political post-conflict operations which took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s in countries such as Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia or Mozambique were, to a certain extent, successful in accompanying these societies through a process of transition from a warfare state or a non-democratic regime to a peaceful democratic stage. A considerably more complex set of missions deployed shortly after, in countries such as Somalia or Bosnia, generated evidence highlighting the necessity for integrating both military-based and civilian-based operations, processes requiring a coherent strategy. As Tardy (2015) puts it, “civilian actors, be they from the humanitarian, development or political affairs community, acknowledge that a certain level of security is necessary for them to operate (...) and that a certain degree of coordination/cooperation with military actors is therefore indispensable”.

In the particular field of political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements, efforts towards strengthening UN coherence have also been notorious. Campbell (2015:86) argues that greater coherence amongst different components of the UN has to potential to lead to more effective operations in post-conflict contexts. As the SG Ban Ki-Moon expressed in the 2009 report on Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict, coherence is critical to peacebuilding processes, as these require a tight coordination between security, political and development

⁹ There are numerous studies discussing problems of coherence and coordination in the UN peacebuilding framework, see Donini (2002), Dahrendorf, (2003), Dobbins et al. (2005) or De Coning (2007).

stakeholders, within and outside of the UN (see Secretary General, 2009a). In a statement of commitment proclaimed in 2016, the UN System CEB stated that coherence amongst actors in the UN system in the areas of peace, security, human rights and development represent a milestone in the process towards the 2030 Agenda, aimed at achieving effective responses to emerging complex situations, ensuring durable peace (see Chief Executive Board for Coordination, 2016). At the operational level on the ground, the two most significant steps the UN has taken thus far to enhance coherence in the frame of political and peacebuilding post-conflict operations are through the implementation of DPA-led integrated missions and in the creation of the PBA, both described below.

Recently, the emerging approach for sustaining peace has been to remind actors of the necessity for bringing more overall coherence to the UN system, as a method of comprehensively supporting prevention and peacebuilding alike (see Advisory Group of Experts, 2015). Sustaining peace therefore establishes a new framework for UN peace engagements, the process itself consisting of two main features. First, peace engagements under the sustaining peace approach are not implemented based on stages of violence, meaning that conflict would not be “temporalized” and divided into pre-, during and post-conflict. In practical terms, this implies the merging of different departments at the institutional level, such as the DPKO and the DPA. Within the second main feature, the UN family is expected to engage with conflict through a holistic approach, meaning that all UN programs are encouraged to share the ultimate goal and mission of durable peace. These two particular characteristics indeed have the ability to enhance coherence within the frame of UN peace engagements. Sustaining peace, although it is too early to develop any assessment or framework for evaluation, might be consolidated as the post-peacebuilding framework for UN peace engagements. Therefore, this “detemporalized” and holistic sustainable peace approach can be understood as an indicator of the UN going beyond the 30-years post-conflict peacebuilding framework.

a) Coherence and the Department of Political Affairs integrated special political missions

The phenomenon of integrated missions has been vastly discussed throughout its conceptual and operational evolution¹⁰. De Coning (2010) provides a clarifying point on the reason behind this emerging form of integrated operations,

“Most peacebuilding-related programs only make sense as part of a larger system of related programs. Disarmament and demobilization programs, for instance, rely on the assumption that others will provide a series of reintegration programs, and they all rely on the assumption that there are other programs in place that will create security, improve opportunities for education and healthcare, and create employment for ex-combatants or alternative opportunities for sustainable livelihoods” (De Coning, 2010:9).

As described in Chapter One, the DPA leads Special Political Missions, whose operationalization in the field is most often expressed in an integrated form¹¹. In 2006 Kofi Annan affirmed that “an integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of program interventions that

¹⁰ See De Coning (2007 and 2010), Choedon (2010), Hirschman (2012) or Philipsen (2014).

¹¹ This growing tendency of implementing integrated operations is also visible in the DPKO framework whose missions have also been operationalized, to a large extent, in an integrated manner. The 2000 Brahimi report (see General Assembly and Security Council, 2000), whose content largely relied on early outcomes from the DPKO Lessons Learned Unit, stressed that peacekeeping exit strategies should not be restricted to post-conflict electoral processes anymore. Instead, peacebuilding, which had been thus far constrained in the DPA umbrella, should start playing a greater role in DPKO-led peace operations. Similarly, the 2001 “No exit without strategy” report (see Security Council, 2001a) also focused on the role of peacebuilding in emerging multidimensional peace operations. In order to accomplish this, the DPKO created the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, which absorbed the Lessons Learned Unit (see Hirschmann, 2012). The adoption of the 2008 DPKO “Capstone Doctrine” expressed a clear determination that modern peacekeeping should go hand in hand with long-term sustainable peace goals (see Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008). Stemming from this doctrine, two resulting documents consolidated this integrative tendency within the DPKO, namely the 2009 New Partnership Agenda (see Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2009) and the different Guidelines for Integrated Missions (see Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2010, 2013).

need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner” (Secretary General, 2006b). In sum, integrated missions, either led by the DPKO or the DPA¹², are thought of as integrating peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts in conflict-affected areas. If the integration of United Nations missions goes according to plan, the prospects of peacebuilding will be greatly enhanced (see General Assembly and Security Council, 2010). Elaborating on this idea, the former country director of MSF in the CAR has stated that the integration of missions is logical as, in most cases, it is not possible to draw a line between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, causing both to be inextricably linked¹³. As a UNICEF resource puts it,

“Over the last years there have been significant developments in the peacekeeping architecture as well as peace-building and political missions. Integration has been reaffirmed by the UN Secretary-General as the guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the UN has a country team and a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission. The main purpose of integration is to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN’s response through a strategic partnership between the UNCT and the UN mission, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace” (UNICEF, 2015:68).

Indeed, and particularly in light of the examined cases, since the beginning of the twenty-first century there has been an increasing tendency to integrate missions on the ground, providing them with a multidimensional nature. Beyond the prime goal of achieving coherence, these integrated missions aim at more grounded objectives,

¹² The Secretariat’s interdepartmental Executive Committee on Peace and Security established in 2005 the Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, which, after discussions on the link between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, argued the necessity to include other UN actors in the process. It was at that point when, for the first time, the integration process between the peacekeeping and peacebuilding frameworks became a responsibility across the UN system (Hirschmann, 2012).

¹³ Picco, E. (2016, June 29). Skype interview.

expected to eventually bring coherence to the whole UN system, as several interviewees expressed. A few experts on the Sierra Leonean case pointed out coordination as one of the key reasons underlying DPA-led integrated missions¹⁴; a scholar with expertise on the Burundian case pointed out that the UN uses integrated missions to overcome failures of duplication and to present itself as united when engaging with the Government¹⁵; a former MINUSCA officer stated during an interview that the reason behind the integration of missions is operational due to the fact that the DPA, for example, only guarantees political action however sometimes causing a need to protect the population and guarantee security, provided by the DPKO¹⁶; or even, as an expert on the CAR case revealed, that acting unified enhances the accessibility of the UN to the local community¹⁷.

As described in Chapter 4, over the last fifteen years Sierra Leone, Burundi and the CAR have been assisted by at least one DPA-led integrated mission, meaning that they have been empowered to coordinate efforts across a range of UN agencies represented in the country (Wyeth, 2011). In Sierra Leone, after six years of the DPKO-led UNAMSIL, in 2006 the UN implemented the first integrated special political mission in the country, UNIOSIL, which was initially under the DPKO umbrella but was eventually transferred to the DPA¹⁸. As illustrated below, UNIOSIL's mandate was multidimensional, including security, governance and positive peace issues. The SC Resolution 1620 (2005) establishing UNIOSIL underlined, amongst others,

¹⁴ Sankaituah, J. (2016, July 7). Personal interview; Lawrence, M. (2016, March 7). Skype interview; Jackson, P. (2016, April 12). Skype interview; Edwin, V. (2016, July 8). Personal interview.

¹⁵ Wilén, N. (2016, March 14). Skype interview.

¹⁶ Caramés, A. (2016, June 13). Skype interview.

¹⁷ Faria, F. (2016, March 16). Skype interview.

¹⁸ For detailed information on intra- and inter-departmental transitional processes, see Sens (2004) and the Working Group on Transition Issues website: <https://undg.org/home/undg-mechanisms/un-working-group-on-transitions>. This Working Group is part of the UNDG.

“(...) the importance of establishing a fully integrated office with effective coordination of strategy and programs between the UN agencies, funds and programs in Sierra-Leone” (Security Council, 2005).

A former UNIPSIL officer defined the DPKO-DPA transition as a necessary action for transitioning from the violence phase to a post-violence phase¹⁹. Similarly, when speaking on the growth of utilizing integrated missions, a DPA officer formerly involved in the Sierra Leonean case expressed during an interview that when there is no risk of violence, the DPA takes the lead²⁰. Identifying a point beyond a post-violence phase, the head of the Freetown-based local NGO Campaign for Good Governance expressed that the reason behind a DPKO-DPA transition is in order to aid and support the country in its transition towards the development phase²¹. Similarly, a scholar knowledgeable on the Sierra Leonean case stated during an interview that this transition process occurs when there is a need for working on building institutions, meeting humanitarian needs and working with civil society²².

UNIOSIL resulted in a rather short and small transitional mission before the deployment of a larger integrated special political mission in 2008, the UNIPSIL, whose approximately 70 staff were mandated to coordinate alongside the recently deployed PBC in the country. The SC resolution establishing UNIPSIL provided significant efforts within field coordination by establishing that the mission “should be headed by an Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG) who would also serve as the Resident Representative of the UN Development Program and UN Resident Coordinator” (Security Council, 2008). Elaborating on this new trend, the resolution also underlined,

“(...) the importance of establishing a fully integrated office with effective coordination of strategy and programs among the UN

¹⁹ Moikowa, R. (2016, August 4). Personal interview.

²⁰ Anonymous I. (2016, March 11). Personal interview.

²¹ Edwin, V. (2016, July 8). Personal interview.

²² Lawrence, M. (2016, April 12). Skype interview.

agencies, funds and programs in Sierra-Leone, and emphasizes the need for the UN system to support and cooperate fully with UNIPSIL, in accordance with the Executive Representative's function as Resident Representative and Resident Coordinator" (Security Council, 2008:2).

One of the key instruments UNIPSIL utilized to improve intracoordination was the Joint Vision for Sierra Leone shared by the UN family as a whole, which was intended to be a document bringing coherence to the entire UN strategy in the post-conflict Sierra Leonean context. Eventually, in 2012, UNIPSIL transferred authority to the Freetown-based UNCT, which is comprised of and coordinates all UN agencies and programs in Sierra Leone.

In terms of these transitional processes from one mission to another, Burundi underwent a similar experience. In 2007, after two years of the DPKO-led ONUB, the UN deployed a much smaller special political mission in the country, the BINUB. This, like UNIOSIL, initially was incorporated under the DPKO umbrella and eventually would be transferred to the DPA. BINUB's mandate was also multidimensional and included tasks tackling security, governance and positive peace issues. Through the SC resolution establishing BINUB, the SC requested the mission ensure "coherence and coordination of the UN agencies in Burundi, under the leadership of the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General" (Security Council, 2006). During an interview with a former ONUB staff member and current DPA officer it was mentioned that they considered it foolish to try to conduct peacebuilding efforts in an unintegrated way due to two reasons. First, because some actions involve dealing with sectors which go beyond the DPA scope, and second, because the DPA operates under the host government's consent and with more limited resources, forcing the UN to collaborate with other agencies in order to achieve success, such as the DPKO or the UNDP. In that same interview, the UN officer recalled,

"(...) the interesting thing to be aware of, is that the transition in 2007 from ONUB to BINUB is a re-constitutional engagement on the ground without a change in lead department of secretariat. The first

years of BINUB it continued to be led by the DPKO, not DPA. (...) it used to be common and it's been a while (...). So bureaucratically we don't know the answer to your question other than yes, it was the way it used to be done. Then there was some pushback on both Sierra Leone and Burundi which led to those missions becoming DPA missions... That did not happen in Burundi till 2010, and so BINUB became our responsibility, actually my direct responsibility in New York, only I the final year before it transitioned into BNUB. Part of the reason for that... for DPA pushing for it, was to say "it's a peacebuilding mission, and we are the peace builders", there were more bureaucratic arguments, still which is... it's how those missions are budgeted and therefore categorized. One is a PKO and it's a peacekeeping budget and the other one is special political mission and it's under the regular budget. (...) this was looked at by the High-Level Panel on Peace Operations, which is to say, this is a nonsense, we shouldn't have this binary world in which if you got blue helmets, you are budgeted in one way, and if you don't have, then you are budgeted and managed another way, particularly because one budget is much more flexible than the other... anyway, that's another area. But to get back to your main questions, all of that did mean that in 2007 when we went from ONUB to BINUB it was a relatively well managed transition, because it is managed on the ground by one lead entity, which was DPKO"²³.

A scholar with expertise in the Burundian post-conflict setting pointed out that the most significant adjustment occurred in terms of various missions, going from 5.000 to 500 hundred and from a military component to a completely civilian mission²⁴. Furthermore, the change was also substantial in the mandate's content, transforming from a military to civilian-based mission. Despite being a small mission, BINUB's head took on responsibility for four additional roles, including Executive Representative of the SG, RC, Humanitarian Coordinator, and head of the UN Information Center.

In 2011, due to reluctance on behalf of the Nkuruziza-led Government as well as a deterioration in security in the country, BINUB was replaced by a smaller special political mission also led by the DPA, the BNUB.

²³ Anonymous II. (2016, April 7). Skype interview.

²⁴ Wilén, N. (2016, March 14). Skype interview.

As in the case of UNIPSIL, BNUB was also led by a “Special Representative” of the Secretary-General, assisted by a Deputy Special Representative who would serve as UN Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, as well as Resident Representative of the UN Development Program (Security Council, 2010), making evident a will to enhance intracoordination. Furthermore, the SC resolution also underlined,

“(…) the importance of establishing a fully integrated office with effective coordination of strategy and programs among the UN agencies, funds and programs in Burundi, and emphasizes the need for the UN system to support and cooperate fully with BNUB” (Security Council, 2010:3).

Regarding the transition from BINUB to BNUB, a former external auditor of the UN post-conflict mission in Burundi expressed,

“They shifted because the government wanted. Because the head of BINUB was kicked out by the government because they felt he was aligning with the, as far as I understand, with the CENI (in French, Independent National Electoral Commission). So, the government required the shift. And the UN went along with it”²⁵.

As a former ONUB SSR Unit officer stated during an interview about the integration of missions, UN tools naturally adapt to their contextual environment²⁶. By the end of 2014, BNUB finalized its mandate and the Burundi UNCT took over responsibility for all UN agencies in the country.

In 1999, the CAR became the first of the three countries to deploy a special political mission, with the deployment of the DPA-led BONUCA, inspired by the DPKO-led MINURCA. The change represented a shift from a rather limited type of action based on military and security issues to a more comprehensive type, aimed at tackling structural issues in the CAR such as peacebuilding-oriented tasks or lack

²⁵ Campbell, S. (2016, March 22). Skype interview.

²⁶ Vanheukelom, J. (2016, March 16). Skype interview.

of governance, particularly outside Bangui. Through a letter to the SC, the SG established that, amongst other activities, BONUCA should,

“Support the efforts of the Resident Coordinator and those of the UN system, including the Bretton Woods institutions, in promoting an integrated approach in the development and implementation of post-conflict peace-building programs aimed at national reconstruction, economic recovery, poverty alleviation and good governance” (Secretary General, 1999).

In the context of BONUCA, in 2008 the DPA created an Inter-Agency Working Group in the CAR tasked with undertaking a review of UN presence and operational mandates (see Secretary General, 2008). In addition to this, the SG also defined a complex integrated structure providing evidence of an attempt to enhance coherence and coordination in the CAR. This structure, headed by a Special Representative of the SG, would include, amongst others, an Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General supported by the Deputy Special Representative of the SG, the Resident Coordinator, the Humanitarian Coordinator (D-2) and a Chief of Staff (D-1) (Secretary General, 2009b).

In contrast to UNIOSL and BINUB, BONUCA lasted for ten years, at which point it was replaced by the BINUCA in 2010, a process strongly supported by the PBC CAR configuration. BINUCA’s mandate was multidimensional, tackling different issues in the country such as peace consolidation, governance, and even security issues. In another letter from the SG to the SC, it was established that BINUCA should,

“(…) coordinate with and support the work of the PBC, as well as the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding and projects supported through the Peacebuilding Fund” (Secretary General, 2009b:2).

Due to the worsening security situation, the BINUCA was absorbed by a new DPKO-led mission in 2014, MINUSCA. Amongst analyzed cases, the CAR is the only country where the UN deploys a DPKO-led mission taking after a DPA-led mission, from BINUCA to MINUSCA.

This inverse process is more rare, and usually stems from both the deterioration of the security context and the willingness on behalf of the government to host a larger intervening UN mission²⁷. Therefore, while in early 2000 DPA-led peacebuilding-oriented missions became a common exit strategy for DPKO-led missions (Hirschmann, 2012), the more recent tendency, as illustrated with the case of MINUSCA, consists of integrating key aspects of peacebuilding into DPKO-led missions (Barnett et al., 2007). In fact, the DFS describes nowadays peacekeepers as early peacebuilders (see Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2010), providing evidence of this growing tendency within the UN to deploy integrated missions, either under the DPA or DPKO.

b) Coherence and the new Peacebuilding Architecture

As examined in Chapter Two, behind the creation of the PBA there existed the necessity to create a separate body tasked exclusively with peacebuilding-oriented endeavors. Among other previously failed attempts, in 2001 some experts proposed the creation of the Strategic Recovery Facility, which already included its central goal the enhancement of coherence in the implementation of actions (Jenkins, 2010:9)²⁸. The 2005 World Summit widely recognized the need for new institutions which would strengthen strategic coherence by addressing the needs of conflict-affected areas. Doing so would involve bridging dimensions tackled on the ground such as security, politics and development. This initial approach led to the creation of the PBC (see Hearn *et al.*, 2014). The GA resolution which established the PBA stressed the necessity for a “coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding (...) and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding” (General Assembly, 2005a: Arts. 97-98).

²⁷ In Burundi, despite a similar security deterioration, the Nkuruziza Government seemed unwilling to be more receptive with the UN.

²⁸ See Forman *et al.* 2001.

Indeed, since its origins, the PBC was conceived of to enhance coherence in the UN political and peacebuilding framework²⁹, particularly between donor States, the UN headquarters and the field missions. During a workshop hosted in 2013 by the Permanent Mission of Norway fulfilling its capacity as coordinator of the Peacebuilding Commission's workstream on the "PBC-field interface", participants highlighted that the role of UNCT resident embassies (offices of resident coordinators in New York), which were expected to be supported by the PBA, assumed particular significance as a mechanism for strengthening the link between the field and headquarters. In this regard, as, most often, international attention wears off once missions withdraw and the UNCT stays, the PBC can play a key role in strengthening the UN headquarters-UNCT relationship and, if necessary, aid in preparing the country for a post-UN mission setting (see Peacebuilding Commission, 2013a).

In Sierra Leone, the Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework mandated that the roles and responsibilities of the UN in support of the framework, amongst others, should be,

“Enhance coordination within the United Nations system on peacebuilding priority issues; ensure coordination among all actors and programs in peacebuilding to ensure coherence and avoid duplication of efforts” (Peacebuilding Commission, 2007a:13).

In the Burundian case, the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding established the so-called Partners Coordination Group as one of the three components of the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism, aimed at dialogue, coordination and monitoring for the Poverty Reduction Strategy paper and the Strategic Framework itself. The Partners Coordination Group is composed of three structures, the sectoral clusters (base), the Strategic Forum of Partners Coordination Group

²⁹ Jenkins (2010:14) describes three levels of coherence the PBA should achieve. First, the structural level refers to institutional reforms to address the root cause of conflict. Second, the systemic level faces transnational phenomena such as trade, refugees or climate change. Finally, the operational level refers to the first-hand means used on the ground to manage crises.

(second level) and the Political Forum of the Partners Coordination Group (third level). This Political Forum serves as counterpart to the PBC Burundi configuration in New York, therefore aimed, among other tasks, at enhancing coherence between the field and headquarters. In particular, this Political Forum issues quarterly deliberations of high-level meetings of the Partner Coordination Group in Bujumbura which are then sent to New York for the PBC's consideration.

The CAR PBC constitutes an even clearer example PBC's determination to enhance coherence within the UN. Initially, the PBC was expected to achieve its goals by following the principles of local ownership, national capacity or common strategy, as it is always stressed on the peacebuilding frameworks of engagement the PBC designs for each country included in its agenda. Moreover, the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in the CAR provided a few new principles in addition to those, including, among others, coordination, specifying that "activities planned under this strategic framework must build on recent peacebuilding actions and successes, without duplicating existing peacebuilding activities and strategies" (Peacebuilding Commission, 2009a:2). Furthermore, the CAR Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding also stresses that the PBC should lobby in favor of coordinated action by the UN agencies.

2. Coherence in practice: The results

The analysis of the DPA and PBA efforts to enhance coherence is based on the examination of the three groups of classes mentioned in the introduction, namely security, governance and positive peace. These have, in turn, been defined on the basis of the outcomes of the preliminary quantitative analysis of UN documentary data³⁰. First, security includes any action or process aimed at diminishing eruptions of inter-party violence, such as talks with government and rebel factions, the handover of weaponry or ensuring the fulfillment of a ceasefire agreement. Moreover, it also describes initiatives oriented

³⁰ This process is widely exposed in the methodology part of the introduction.

towards and directed at the combatants, such as, for instance, demobilization programs or measures aimed at the reintegration of former combatants into society. Linked to this last element, security efforts also contain attempted endeavors designed to reform the security sector, including both the regular army and the police. The restructuring of the security sector has represented a pillar and common pattern for almost all UN post-conflict political missions. Finally, security also refers to any practice or measure aimed at securing fragile or unstable contexts, done with a specific purpose, such as the delivery of humanitarian aid in needed in specific zones or for the safe return of refugees and their guarantee of continuing their lives in their place of origin.

The governance group of classes were established in order to further the UN post-conflict political missions intended to shape the nature of the host societies political system. To the UN, the stability of state political institutions is a *sine qua non* condition for sustainable peace and development, as illustrated in the SC resolutions and the PBC frameworks of engagements for the countries. Governance thus describes two fundamental processes, namely actions to consolidate the productive functioning of political institutions as well as the judiciary system. On the one hand, concerning the intervention made on political institutions and procedures, the UN has been progressively reproducing the key elements constituting a liberal democracy. In particular, the celebration of democratic elections in post-conflict contexts has been the backbone of all UN-led state (re)forming processes. Other than the electoral process, governance has also included initiatives such as the promotion of inter-party dialogue, assistance to the host government in the political agenda setting, and the inclusion of stakeholders, such as, for example, the civil society or regional organizations included within a national dialogue platform. On the other hand, governance also includes attempts by the UN to (re)build an independent and effective judiciary system, based on the liberal principle of the rule of law.

Measures and reforms addressed to the justice sector are two-fold. Firstly, they contain endeavors guaranteeing a sound judiciary process

in order to deal with episodes of armed conflict. They also include a processing of its individual protagonists, formally known as transitional justice. This implies in some occasions the intervention of the ICC, the creation of an ad-hoc special court or even a truth and reconciliation commission, depending on the transitional justice approach adopted. And secondly, justice reform also refers to those specific initiatives intended to shape the nature of the judiciary structures, such as training programs for judges and magistrates. Both the political and judiciary systems are affected by the good governance principle, from which state institutions are expected to be held accountable to the population in their efforts to actively combat corruptive practices and the mismanagement of resources, among other illegitimate actions.

The third and final group of classes are focused on positive peace, investigating issues aimed at the consolidation of lasting peace. The key element of positive peace-oriented activities is that, while security and governance measures are designed to be developed during a specific period, coinciding with the immediate end of direct violence, the efforts implemented towards positive peace are expected to last for the long term. This is in opposition and contrast to, for example, demobilization processes and special courts. Two key processes are included within this third group of classes, namely the promotion and protection of human rights and the implementation of programmers for economic recovery and sustainable development. In regard to human rights, the UN provides technical support, develops training programs and assists in the creation of ad-hoc mechanisms to enhance local capacity in monitoring and enforcing human rights. In recent years, the protection and promotion of women and children's rights have been pivotal in war-torn areas in which the UN has intervened. In actuality, a human rights-based approach was introduced as a new PBC principle in the CAR configuration framework.

UN political missions also attempt to bring together domestic and external stakeholders, principally the government and international financial institutions. This inclusion is conducted in order to design an over-arching framework for development aimed at the reduction of

poverty, the guarantee of basic services delivery to the most vulnerable segments of the population, the adoption of structural economic reforms, the reactivation of key local economic sectors and the sustainability of the development process.

2.1 Identifying a lack of coherence

These three groups of classes, security, governance and positive peace, have been used as the analytical frame in examining UN documentary data from the New York-based normative level and from the field operational level. By analyzing the normative level, namely SC resolutions as well as PBC strategic frameworks of engagement³¹, all security, governance and positive peace, to a large extent, are evenly mentioned (see tables 1, 2 and 3 in Annex 3). Excluding the security group of classes in the case of UNIPSIL, tables show that at the normative level missions address strategic aspects of all security, governance and positive peace. In other words, at the normative level, UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements have a multidimensional nature. However, by examining the operational level through the software-assisted analysis of UN documents, in which field reports or periodic reviews of engagements are included, among other evaluative documents, the data illustrates that, contrary to the normative level, at the field level the security group of classes becomes more relevant than the remaining others (see tables from 4 to 9 in Annex 4)³². Tables 1, 2 and 3 in Annex 4 illustrate a class-based classification³³ of actions performed at the operational level by UN post-conflict engagements, whereas tables 4, 5 and 6 in Annex 4 illustrate a statistical classification of the 10 top-used concepts analyzing all documentary data from the operational level for each mission.


³¹ As described in the methodology section of the introduction, although PBC peacebuilding frameworks of engagement are not of a normative nature, for the sake of the research these texts are taken as such.

³² This quantitative analysis is widely described in the methodology part of the introduction.

³³ Based on the Reinert method described in detail in the methodology section in the introduction.

Table 7 in Annex 4 groups classes from the class-based classification in the previously described groups of classes, namely security, governance and positive peace³⁴. Following the same process, table 8 in Annex 4 groups words from the top-ten used concepts list also included in the previously described groups of classes. By examining the operational level for the nine missions, six out of nine present security as a priority either on the class-based classification or on the statistical classification of most-used concepts. While this security group of classes is clearly prioritized in the cases of Burundi and the CAR (see figure 6), in Sierra Leone the only mission that clearly focuses its efforts on security aspects is UNIOSIL (see table 1 in Annex 4).

Figure 6. Peacebuilding Fund in the Central African Republic by priority areas in 2011. Source Peacebuilding Fund (2011).



Indeed, during the data collection and development of interviews phases in Sierra Leone experts gave evidence of UNIOSIL’s security-oriented tendencies. A former UNIPSIL officer highlighted that UNIOSIL ensured disarmament and the monitoring of the security situation, among other tasks³⁵. Within this same frame, the head of the peacebuilding-oriented NGO Search for Common Ground provided

³⁴ The process through which classes are transformed into groups of classes is detailed in the methodology part of the introduction.

³⁵ Moikowa, R. (2016, June 29). Personal interview.

this reaction when asked about the essence and key achievements of UNIOSIL in Sierra Leone, clearly referring to security-related themes,

“I think one of the things they were... First, to end the war, to make sure that there was DDR, even though integration was still problematic. That’s number one. Two, to provide access to the entire country so people could move around. That was two. The third was security, to make sure that people is secured, to have confidence in the country. I think these are the issues that are convenient”³⁶.

A potential explanatory factor for the abandoning of the security dimension of subsequent post-conflict engagements in Sierra Leone such as the PBC or UNIPSIL might be that, contrary to the Burundi and CAR cases, Sierra Leone went through a process of stabilization beginning in the mid-2000s. Providing evidence of this increasingly secure context in the country, the UNIPSIL is the only mission of the nine that does not include security-oriented goals at the New York-based normative level (see table 1 in Annex 3). To date, while Burundi and the CAR are suffering from major violent outbreaks, Sierra Leone continues to experience a defined sense of stability. Further reinforcing this claim, regarding the cases of Burundi and the CAR, where the security situation has not improved throughout the last decade, tables illustrate how security-oriented actions are present at the normative level (see tables 2 and 3 in Annex 3) and represent a priority for 5 out of 6 missions at the operational level, by examining either the class-based classification or the statistical classification of the most-used concepts (see tables 7 and 8 in Annex 4).

In sum, contrary to the multidimensionality of the normative level, security becomes the dominant group of classes used at the operational level, which reveals that UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements, at least in the examined cases, have not contributed to enhancing the UN headquarters-field lack of coherence. As the 2015 report by the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations states, the UN support to conflict-affected countries lacks strategic

³⁶ Sankaituah, J. (2016, July 7). Personal interview.

planning, coordination and integration (see General Assembly and Security Council, 2015).

2.2 Results of the Department of Political Affairs integrated special political missions

This section presents the results of the discursive analysis of UN and external documentary data, as well as interviews conducted with UN staff and external experts, providing evidence of the limited achievements of the efforts of the DPA-led integrated missions, aimed at improving coherence in the frame of UN-led post-conflict engagements³⁷. The outcomes of the analysis illustrate a divergence in the assessments of varied sources, indicating a lack of consensus on the results in the pursuit of coherence of examined post-conflict engagements. This divergence in assessments proves additionally difficulty within the UN on agreeing on reforms in order to overcome their challenges and barriers for effectiveness, in this particular case in the DPA endeavor for coherence.

a) United Nations Self-assessment: Informal criticism

Utilizing a discourse analysis approach on available UN data, including UN official documentary data as well as interviews with UN officers, one may ascertain that criticism arises more effortlessly in informal contexts, such as interviews, than in official self-assessment reports. While specific country reports and periodic reviews generally stress positive results, a few interviewed UN officers, particularly in the Burundian and CAR cases, express a perspective acknowledging deficiencies and limited results.

Sierra Leone exemplifies a case in which the UN appears optimistic about achieved results in the area of coherence. In the final UNIPSIL report, one of the issues the SC evaluated regarded the impact of the Joint Vision. The SC reported that the UNIPSIL “coordinated closely

³⁷ Because of their short-term life, neither the UNIOSIL nor the BINUB present vast evidences in terms of their impact.

with UN agencies, funds and programs through a strategic framework known as the Joint Vision for Sierra-Leone of the UN Family” (Secretary General, 2014b:2). The Joint Vision strategy used in Sierra Leone was indeed a milestone in the struggle for coherence within the DPA framework. This final report also mentions the development of the UNDAF as a successful tool in easing the transition from the UNIPSIL’s Joint Vision framework to the return of a Resident Coordinator-based UN system. A PBSO Policy Coordination Officer familiar with the Sierra Leonean case illuminated the fact that Special Political Missions help field intracoordination and the headquarters-field relationship. In particular, she highlighted aspects including an exchange of staff, effective information sharing and holding formal and informal discussions³⁸. A former UNIPSIL officer and another UN officer previously involved in the UN peacebuilding task in Sierra Leone emphasized an excellent relationship between UNIPSIL and the UNCT because both were led by the same person, as well as having a good relationship between the PBC and UNIPSIL³⁹. Similarly, another former UNIPSIL officer stated that UN intracoordination improved with the creation of the UNIPSIL⁴⁰. A PBSO officer also argued that strong leadership is key for integrated missions⁴¹.

Concerning the Burundian case, a 2009 report by the SG stated that in the humanitarian field BINUB successfully coordinated UN agencies in developing multi-sectorial programs (see Secretary General, 2009c). On the other hand, in a report on BNUB performance, the SG stated in 2011 that “in coordination with the UN country team, BNUB has developed integrated common services in the areas of security, medical facilities and public information, to be funded through cost-sharing arrangements” (Secretary General, 2011:15). This report also applauded the efforts of the BNUB in coordinating with UN agencies based outside Bujumbura. The former BNUB Chief of staff stated that, in

³⁸ Pak, J. (2017, March 1). Personal interview.

³⁹ Vincent, C. (2016, March 11). Skype interview; and Moikowa, R. (2016, August 4). Personal interview.

⁴⁰ Lamboi, P. (2016, August 10). Skype interview.

⁴¹ Knott, L. (2017, February 3). Personal interview.

general, UN internal functioning in Burundi was well coordinated and coherent⁴². Regarding the presence of a Resident Coordinator, according to a DPA Senior Political Officer, it was, along with the Sierra Leonean case, a successful attempt at bringing the UN family together⁴³. However, from a more critical point of view, a former SSR Unit Officer from ONUB mentioned that the UN has found it difficult to engage as a family partly because there is no clear protocol⁴⁴.

In the CAR, the SG expressed in a report on BONUCA performance that “with regard to the revision of the UN presence in the CAR, the national and international stakeholders underscored the need for the UN to speak with one voice and act in a coherent and coordinated manner” (Secretary General, 2008:11). In the same report, he highlights the necessity of building on existing achievements to encourage UN support of CAR in seeking a more coherent. The SG stated in a 2012 report on BINUCA that the efforts to design a joint action plan strengthened strategic integration for greater coherence of the UN presence in the country. Furthermore, in order to elevate this coherence to the programmatic level, BINUCA and the UNCT focused on short-term peace consolidation goals, thus managing to reach quick outcomes during the early stage of BINUCA (see Secretary General, 2012b). According to a DPA Senior Political Officer, the CAR was a unique context for experiencing the Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment program, which became a mechanism agreed upon between the UN, the World Bank and the EU aimed at encouraging disciplinary actors to share a common view of what the problem was, a common analysis and a common project on how to deal with it⁴⁵. A former PBSO officer for the CAR case acknowledged that the transition from BINUCA to MINUSCA was “not a bad transition”⁴⁶. Nonetheless, from a more critical perspective, the former Chief of the DPA in the CAR expressed that UN missions shift back and forth from PK to PB without a

⁴² Anonymous II. (2016, April 7). Skype interview.

⁴³ O’Brien, D. (2017, March 1). Personal interview.

⁴⁴ Vanheukelom, J. (2016, March 4). Skype interview.

⁴⁵ O’Brien, D. (2017, March 1). Personal interview.

⁴⁶ Anonymous III. (2017, January 17). Personal interview.

coherent method, when they should facilitate avoiding the overlap of tasks or enhancing coordination⁴⁷. Even more explicitly, a former MINUSCA officer described UN intracoordination as a “nightmare”⁴⁸. This harsh criticism from within the UN system over coherence has been repeatedly noticed during field work in informal contexts, including interviews.

b) External assessment: Consensus on stressing failure in the Central African Republic

Concerning external data analysis on the impact DPA-led integrated missions had on coherence in the frame of post-conflict engagements, while Sierra Leone and Burundi show mixed results, generally more negative than UN data, the CAR case clearly indicates a deficient and limited outcome. In the case of Sierra Leone, Philipsen (2014) acknowledges great efforts from the UN to achieve an integrated approach. This is exemplified through the merging of all security and development measures in order to facilitate a transition towards peace. M'Cormack (2012) argued that various transitions within Sierra Leone, namely from UNAMSIL to UNOISIL and UNIOSIL to UNIPSIL were successful for the following reasons. First, careful planning occurred which eased the transition to be conducted without major obstacles and unforeseen turns. There was also an early effort at extensive awareness-raising and information sharing that prepared the local population for the transitional period. Third, the UN had clearly defined the content of the mission, thus enabling a sound and focused strategy. Fourth, within the organization, there was an integrated post-peacekeeping approach and a firm determination to shift towards a subsequent phase, namely peacebuilding, in order to aid in the progression of the country. Finally, the appropriateness of concentrating all responsibilities in one person, the ERSG, also helped in streamlining the focus, succeeding in progressing towards the integrated mission, UNIPSIL.

⁴⁷ Coutinho, S. (2016, July 28). Skype interview.

⁴⁸ Caramés, A. (2016, June 13). Skype interview.

Despite this, McCormack also outlines limitations during transitional periods such as the lack of funding or the inexperience of the organization in implementing an integrated approach. In this critical vein, the head office of Fambul Tok, a peacebuilding-oriented local NGO, expressed that the DPKO-DPA transition was a New York-led process, causing inter-departmental tensions between the DPKO and the DPA, who played a behind-the-scenes role⁴⁹. Also from a more critical perspective, the head of the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) said it was too early for a political- and civilian-based mission⁵⁰.

Regarding intracoordination, three experts mentioned improvement with the implementation of integrated offices⁵¹. The head office of the Campaign for Good Governance mentioned that the deployment of UNIPSIL enhanced the distribution of mandates and the coordination with civil society⁵². The country director of Search for Common Ground expressed that, thanks to the integration of missions in Sierra Leone, coordination improved as bureaucratic barriers were surpassed. This caused the UN to become more responsive and accessible for the people. He also added, however, that UN intracoordination was effective within the UN itself, but not with civil society⁵³. Another more critical, and explicit, perspective was provided by a former advisor to the UK Government on the SSR process in Sierra Leone, who expressed that UN intracoordination is characteristically “terrible”⁵⁴. Similarly, the executive director of the Center for Accountability and Rule of Law described UN intracoordination as a major problem⁵⁵. In the same frame, the head of WANEP described UN intracoordination as problematic, confusing and opaque. He added that efforts to avoid

⁴⁹ Caulker, J. (2016, July 27). Personal interview.

⁵⁰ Jombla, E. (2016, August 1). Personal interview.

⁵¹ Sankaituah, J. (2016, July 7). Personal interview; Lawrence, M. (2016, March 7). Skype interview; and Edwin, V. (2016, July 8). Personal interview.

⁵² Edwin, V. (2016, July 8). Personal interview.

⁵³ Sankaituah, J. (2016, July 7). Personal interview.

⁵⁴ Jackson, P. (2016, April 12). Skype interview.

⁵⁵ Tommy, I. (2016, July 18). Personal interview.

duplication and competition are scarce⁵⁶. The former chair of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission did acknowledge that integrating offices brings about centralization and, therefore, polarization. As a result of this, he continued, resources are not equally distributed across stakeholders⁵⁷.

Concerning the Burundian case, Candless and Tschirgi (2010:33) admit that the integration approach had positive impact in Burundi. On the one hand, they argue that BINUB served as a bridge between the PBC and the Government and, on the other, the headquarters-based Integrated Mission Task Force resulted in a productive sharing of information and advising in the case of Burundi. Similarly, Campbell (2015:86) also argues for the positive impact BINUB had on UN intracoordination. Further supporting that claim, she argues that a coherent action at the field level by the UNDP, the BINUB, local actors, the host Government and feedback from other stakeholders was key in achieving certain early peacebuilding goals. An external evaluator of the PBF in Burundi expressed that, while intracoordination is generally disconnected across the UN, it was fairly strong between PBC-BINUB-BNUB, with the PBC as intermediary⁵⁸. From a critical perspective, another scholar with expertise on the UN-led post-conflict operations in Burundi argued that when BINUB arrived, intracoordination became problematic because each UN program had a different “hat”⁵⁹. Concerning the development of DPA-integrated missions in Burundi, a former Africa Director of the International Crisis Group highlighted that DPA-integrated missions in Burundi aided in coordinating and monitoring the situation. She went on to stress two contributing factors, stemming from an internal motivation, with a drive to overcome interdepartmental tensions, and an external consequence, as access to the UN is increased when operating in the field. In sum, she described

⁵⁶ Jombla, E. (2016, August 1). Personal interview.

⁵⁷ Humper, J. (2016, July 23). Personal interview.

⁵⁸ Campbell, S. (2016, March 22). Skype interview.

⁵⁹ Wilén, N. (2016, March 14). Skype interview.

two reasons; namely internal coordination and a projection of an external image as a single and coordinated UN⁶⁰.

In regard to the case of the CAR, Bellamy and Lupel (2015) argue that the lack of a coordinated system-wide approach of the UN in the CAR caused the organization to fail in maintaining control over the deterioration of security conditions in late 2012. Indeed, none of the experts from outside the UN framework positively assessed the impact of DPA-led integrated missions in the CAR. The former MSF country director in the CAR argued that it was too early for the PK mission to leave; BONUCA was ill-equipped to address the peacebuilding process on its own⁶¹. An academic familiar with the case mentioned that, although in general intracoordination was not particularly strong, BONUCA brought about a more comprehensive strategy based on information and knowledge sharing⁶². Regarding BINUCA, the MSF country director adds that attempts by BINUCA to reintegrate the UN presence in the country failed due to accountability and management scandals⁶³.

2.3 Results of the new Peacebuilding Architecture

Following a similar process as the DPA-led integrated missions, this section focuses on the results of the PBA in its endeavor for coherence within the frame of post-conflict engagements. Results are based on a discursive analysis of UN and external documentary data as well as interviews with the UN and external experts. The outcomes of the analysis illustrate a divergence in assessments, dependent on the nature of the data (documentary data and interviews). This illustrates how the source, the nature or means through which data is released have the potential for constraining the data itself.

⁶⁰ Hara, F. (2016, September 23). Skype interview.

⁶¹ Picco, E. (2016, June 29). Skype interview.

⁶² Faria, F. (2016, March 16). Skype interview.

⁶³ Picco, E. (2016, June 29). Skype interview.

a) United Nations Self-assessment: An uncelebrated 10th anniversary

Despite a partly positive assessment from certain reports and reviews, as well as from some UN officers' statements made during the interviews, the two major reviews of the PBC engagements from 2010, during its fifth anniversary, and 2015, during its tenth anniversary, stress that lack of coherence and intracoordination in the frame of post-conflict engagements still largely persists. The first major internal evaluation process that the PBC underwent was in 2010, coinciding with the fifth anniversary of the commission. Among other factors, the report assessed how the PBC was addressing the issue of coherence and coordination in the field and, more broadly, how internal development towards a UN system-wide coherence has a particular relevance for a multidimensional process such as peacebuilding. Acknowledging the early stages of the PBC, the report appreciated that, in its early stage of existence, the PBC failed to fulfill the coordination and coherence goal, despite efforts. The report highlights internal procedural hindrances, inability of the Organizational Committee to assume responsibility and the inability of the PBSO to operationalize its role as an effective intracoordinating body (see General Assembly and Security Council, 2010).

Furthermore, the report also addressed the issue of the UN lacking coherence on the ground, requiring a sound joint planning and responsibilities distribution in order to avoid duplication. The relationship between the Peacebuilding Commission and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) or the ERSO required substantial strengthening and a decision made on who to take the lead in order for more streamlined coordination. The report also highlights the inability of the PBSO to take leadership and distribute peacebuilding efforts across departments (see General Assembly and Security Council, 2010).

“The Challenge of Sustaining Peace” report of the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) for the 2015 Review of the UN PBA, coinciding with its 10th anniversary, states that “the multidimensional nature of sustaining peace is unavoidable and poses major challenges to achieving

coherence” (Advisory Group of Experts, 2015:13). The report states that, despite recognized efforts, such as the establishment of the CEB and the Integration Steering Committee and the DaO initiative, fragmentation and a lack of clarity in distribution of responsibilities within the UN peacebuilding system persists. The report cites issues of miscommunication between different levels and a lack of a culture of coordination from the top as key obstacles to system-wide coherence. The assessment concludes that fragmentation within headquarters mirrors arguments in the field, stating that “the mind-set of UN leaders and staff on the ground too frequently still reproduces the same tectonic divide seen at the level of the intergovernmental organs, and at the level of the UN system globally” (Advisory Group of Experts, 2015:26). The AGE pointed out pitfalls of the UN peacebuilding action, such as internal fragmentation of the organization, hindering successful and effective fieldwork, consistency of delivery, a gender approach, credibility and clear leadership, cooperation with other stakeholders, efficiency of the PBC and PBSO relationship, among other issues.

Examining the three cases specifically, in regard to Sierra Leone as the first UN internal evaluation of the PBC, the implementation of a common Agenda for Change improved overall coherence towards the peacebuilding endeavor in the country, although this came after marked institutional tensions within the UN causing the PBC to create its own strategic framework for peacebuilding (General Assembly and Security Council, 2010). “The Challenge of Sustaining Peace” report, acknowledges that the deployment of an ERSG also serving as an SRSG, RC (head of the UNCT) and Resident Representative of the UNDP, as well as the importance of a fully integrated office, facilitated seamless UN action on the ground (Advisory Group of Experts, 2015).

In an informal meeting of the PBC Sierra Leone configuration, after a delegation visited the country in November 2016, Fernandez-Taranco recalled the value of the sustaining peace resolutions. He emphasized the value of the Sierra Leone PBC’s uniting role between security, development and human rights engagements and with UN principal organs, intergovernmental bodies, and the UN system; in achieving

coherent and coordinated action within the UN; and the PBC-PBF synergy (Peacebuilding Commission, 2016a). A former UNIPSIL officer stated that the PBC provided a more coherent direction to peacebuilding missions. Expanding on this, he stressed that the PBC aided in convincing all UN agencies of the importance of peacebuilding⁶⁴. A PBSO officer working on the Sierra Leonean case further stated that, while the PBC did help organize and coordinate donor support through a catalytic methodology, it barely had a transformative impact⁶⁵.

As in the Sierra Leonean case, in Burundi the task to design a common strategic framework was tedious. The final single strategy document reflected, to a large extent, national priorities (see General Assembly and Security Council, 2010). The progress report reviewing implementation of the PBC Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi acknowledges the need for enhanced efforts to harmonize the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding and the new Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (formerly just PRSP) (Peacebuilding Commission, 2011a: Art. 139). In an informal meeting of the Burundi Configuration of the PBC, the RC Mr. Paolo Lembo emphasized that “efforts to address the humanitarian needs were urgently needed; they would, however, not be able to address the root causes of the crisis which required a broader and coherent humanitarian, socioeconomic, peacebuilding and resilience approach. Both efforts should run in parallel” (Peacebuilding Commission, 2016b:2). In the context of the current crisis in Burundi, “The challenges for sustaining peace” report states that the UN mission in Burundi failed in their attempt at a transition towards to a post-mission stage, led by the RC and UNCT structure, which was marked by the absence of clear leadership⁶⁶. This had a negative impact on the UN’s credibility and influence in Burundi (see Advisory Group of Experts, 2015).

⁶⁴ Lamboi, P. (2016, August 10). Skype interview.

⁶⁵ Knott, L. (2017, February 3). Personal interview.

⁶⁶ After BNUB, the UN deployed in Burundi the MENUB, a small electoral observation mission.

Finally, regarding the CAR case, as the first major UN internal report on the PBC expresses, “the country specific configurations for the CAR went down the road of separate peacebuilding strategies” (General Assembly and Security Council, 2010:13). The report identifies a prolongation in drafting the processes and a duplication of strategies (overlapping with the existing poverty reduction strategy) as a source of frustration for actors on the ground. The report stresses that due to the administrative incapacity of post-conflict societies, a sound and coordinated adoption of strategic frameworks by the UN in this area is vital (General Assembly and Security Council, 2010). A report of the PBC mission to CAR acknowledged that BINUCA increased the coordination in political, development and humanitarian UN bodies on the ground, achievements strongly supported by the PBC. Additionally, BINUCA’s mandate included support of the activities of the PBC, facilitating interaction between New York-based headquarters and field missions in the PBA framework (Peacebuilding Commission, 2009b: Art. 23).

Another report acknowledged the need in the CAR for strengthening coordination and collaboration mechanisms on the country level between the PBC and UN family (see Peacebuilding Commission, 2011b). In a discussion amongst members of the CAR configuration, Under-SG Feltman and SRSG Gaye, it was expressed that there is a need for increasing the PBC’s capacities in order to exercise its role in strategic problem-solving as well as promote a coherent engagement amongst all UN efforts. In this same meeting it was stressed, however, that the PBC should be guided by the needs on the ground and should aim to focus on productively supporting the efforts of the SRSG (Peacebuilding Commission, 2013b). A former PBSO officer for the CAR stressed that the PBSO has been successful in bringing departments closer to the headquarters level, thus enhancing intracoordination⁶⁷. A former MINUSCA officer expressed his disappointment about the limited impact of the PBC on the CAR in the

⁶⁷ Anonymous III. (2017, January 17). Personal interview.

last decade. Nonetheless, he acknowledges the positive role the PBC played in the UNDP integration process⁶⁸.

b) External assessment: The absence of coherent action

There are numerous external reports and articles written by scholars attempting to assess the impact the PBA had on internal UN coherence. Despite positive results highlighted by external experts during interviews, the two most acknowledged external reports, by the New York University Center for International Cooperation and the International Peace Institute, stress a weak and limited impact of the PBC on issues of coherence and intracoordination within the frame of post-conflict engagements. Murithi (2008:90) analyzed the impact of the PBC during its earliest stage and made an assurance that, although country-specific configurations were created to bring coherence to peacebuilding processes, there is evidence that this coherence has not been achieved. He refers to the Ki-moon-described lack of a culture of coordination, preventing operational actors from coordinating on the ground in areas such as political, security, development or human rights, all occurring under the PBC umbrella. Jenkins (2010:22) also develops an early assessment of the PBC, arguing that, while PBC's integrated peacebuilding strategies have been useful for raising awareness about coherence, it has had a poor impact on specifics such as what activities are performed and who performs them. Jenkins also points out that the UN has failed in providing mechanisms for the peacebuilding architecture in order to encourage coherence.

The 2008 report by the International Center on Cooperation and the International Peace Institute analyzing the early performance of the PBA argued that the realization of the coherence and coordination objective remained largely elusive. At the level of implementation, it reports, the current approach to peacebuilding continues to be compartmentalized. Furthermore, the report states that the implementation of processes have been cumbersome both at the headquarters and field levels, with any improvement in coherence on

⁶⁸ Caramés, A. (2016, June 13). Skype interview.

the ground coming at a substantial cost in spent time (Center on International Cooperation and International Peace Institute, 2008).

The 2014 report by the Center on International Cooperation on the PBA performance throughout its first decade applauds “a widespread view that its (the PBC) impact had been as a diplomatic forum intended to advocate for greater international attention, and to foster coherence” and highlight the particular efforts of the PBF on coherence (Hearn *et al.*, 2014:8). It also remarks important gaps in peacebuilding priority-setting as illustrated by the relapse into recent violent breakouts in the CAR. Rugumanu (2009) stresses the need to strengthen the cooperation between UN peacebuilding-oriented actors at the headquarters level and those in the field. He argues that,

“some key members of the PBC, especially the Permanent Members on the Security Council, rarely attended scheduled PBC meetings. Worse still, their respective representatives who participate actively in the field, in New York and via their capitals, have not always engaged with a single, coherent voice but instead have taken contradictory positions in different venues. Equally disturbing, some PBC members from developing countries who are neither donors nor represented in the field have always missed the opportunity to meaningfully and objectively add their views. The videoconferencing facility, an institutional arrangement to improve coordination and communication between actors in headquarters and the field, was not perceived by developing countries to be as interactive as physical meetings” (Rugumanu, 2009:6).

In the particular cases of Sierra Leone and Burundi, the 2008 report expresses that, despite the adoption of agreed frameworks of engagement for coordination, the processes were confusing and frustrating in both countries. Furthermore, both were distinctly recognized as lacking in a coherent voice from actors at varying levels, such as UN headquarters and on the ground. Rugumanu (2009) states in his report for the Frederich Ebert Stiftung that the PBC failed to have a positive impact on coherence and coordination because it lacks operational capacity. Nonetheless, others sustain that the PBC enabled the ERSG to bring UN actors on board through the Joint Vision, thus

enhancing coordination and establishing a more coherent in-country approach (Slotin, 2009). A few experts on Sierra Leone also point out the augmentation of UN inter-agency coordination due to the deployment of the PBC⁶⁹.

Concerning the Burundian case, Street *et al.* (2008) discuss the lack of coherence between the PBC and the PBF when facing peacebuilding challenges in Burundi. Similarly, Iro (2009:78) discusses the lack of clarity in distribution of field responsibilities. In this vein, Candless and Tschigiri (2010) comment on the ill-defined goals different missions on the ground were tasked with in post-conflict Burundi,

“By the time the PBC engaged in Burundi, there were other important strategic processes at work. For example, BINUB had developed a UN ‘Common Action Plan’ as the basis for its operations. The plan’s short-term priorities were aligned with the government’s emergency program while its medium- and long-term priorities were linked to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Based on the UN Common Action Plan, the government and the UN prepared a ‘Joint Roadmap’ from January 2007-December 2008. The 2005-2007 UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) was revised and extended to 2008 to align it with the Common Action Plan and BINUB’s mandate. These country-based processes coincided with the PBC’s efforts to develop an Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy (IPBS) and created considerable frustration on the part of the UN country team, since they did not see the difference between the IPBS and the ‘UNDAF Plus’ titled ‘Integrated Strategy for UN Support to Peacebuilding in Burundi’. (...) Indeed, at the country level, there was little understanding of the relationship between BINUB, PBSO, the PBC, the Peacebuilding Fund and the government. Moreover, developing the IPBS put considerable strain on both the government and BINUB, which were already engaged in the work around the PBF Priority Plan and the PRSP” (Candless and Tschigiri, 2010:33).

⁶⁹ Lawrence, M. (2016, March 7). Skype interview; and Edwin, V. (2016, July 8). Personal interview.

From a more optimistic point of view, a commentator expressed that, although intra-coordination is generally characterized as substandard across the UN, the Burundi PBC helped improve the DPA-PBA relationship⁷⁰. Wilén and Chapaux (2011) also elaborate on this claim, highlighting how the PBF had a positive impact in the Burundian case, improving UN internal coordination.

Finally, in the case of the CAR, the 2014 report argues that the PBF has been able to bridge gaps in peacebuilding priorities and rapidly progress in response to crisis contexts (Hearn *et al.*, 2014). Comparably, the former MSF Country Director in the CAR held that the PBC helped bridge the gap between the goals from the headquarters and the impact on the ground. Providing a more critical perspective, one academic stressed that the PBC in the CAR showed deficient clarity regarding who was supposed to take the lead, causing a negative impact on coordination and, therefore, coherence⁷¹.

3. Failing in the pursuit of coherence in political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements

The account provided in the previous section exhibits evidence of the lack of sound coherence between the New York-based UN headquarters, on the normative level, and field missions, on the operational level. This section discusses the root causes preventing the amelioration of this coherence in the frame of political and peacebuilding post-conflict missions⁷². Beyond this, the section critically

⁷⁰ Campbell, S. (2016, March 22). Skype interview.

⁷¹ Lombard, L. (2016, July 21). Skype interview.

⁷² Discussing the causes for UN lack of coherence, Choedon (2010) distinguishes between systemic and specific reasons through an in-depth study of the UNMIK. Regarding structural causes, he asserts that while there is a general understanding and agreement on what needs to be done, there is no profound thinking and cooperation to design a shared plan of action. Another structural factor he touches on is the over-bureaucratic and hierarchical nature of the UN, slowing decisions and in general internal channels of communication within the organization. Concerning specific causes, this author mentions the, often, changes of personnel in the field as well as a lack of skilled hired locals, or the fact that it is in the interest of locals to prolong the mission as they will surely be unemployed once the operation withdraws, not aiding

reflects on implications of this lack of coherence in the frame of these operations.

3.1 Explanatory factors

This section discusses three core roots of incoherence in the framework of the examined missions, namely the existence of turf battles both in the New York-based headquarters and on the field level, caused by ill-equipped institutional capacity and the highly fragmented, bureaucratic and decentralized operational apparatus of the organization. The first major explanatory factor for the lack of coherence concerns the conflict of interests as well as leadership and personality traits, often resulting in competition and turf battles. The precedents of the creation of the PBC, described in Chapter Two, provide a clear example of a conflict of interests in the UN framework (see Jenkins, 2013). To a large extent, due to the efforts made by Kofi Annan, in the late 1990s the DPA became the UN body responsible for peacebuilding, requesting and requiring an allocation of extra-resources. The DPKO expressed discontent over this strategic reform, claiming that the DPA would be taking resources from a task which could be completed by the DPKO. In brief, this inter-departmental tension caused the SG to identify an institutional gap and a necessity for the creation of a separate organ specifically aimed at peacebuilding endeavors. As early PBC assessments express, this turf battle rooted in a conflict of interests represented a widely recognized operational inability of the PBC during its early stage of deployment, particularly in Sierra Leone and Burundi. Similarly, and also using the PBC as an example, Rugumamu (2009:6) states that member states comprising the PBC contained contradictory national interests, values and priorities. Wyeth (2011:5) elaborates on the same issue, describing turf battles between the DPA, the DPKO and the UNDP in the early 2000s, preventing sound intracoordination, amplifying the gap between fields of operation, causing a duplication of

in improving internal issues such as coordination. Carayannis (2015) summarizes major obstacles preventing a sound deployment of integrated missions, such as mistrust and turf battles, silos of information sharing, conflicting approaches, over-bureaucracy, institutional incapacity, idiosyncratic factors and personality traits.

efforts. A post-doc research fellow at the University of Brussels, writing her dissertation on the UN post-conflict intervention in Burundi, highlighted turf battles as an explanatory variable for the lack of coordination on the ground in her interview,

“I think there was problem in the beginning when it became a multilateral peace operation, when BINUB arrived. Because then, all these heads of BINUB had five different hats I think, I don’t remember all of them. It was like one person in several different roles. And there were still turf battles under the same headings, so they did not really diminish the turf battle at least in the beginning”⁷³.

A former MINUSCA officer based in Bangui described UN intra-coordination as a “nightmare”, identifying obstacles such as inter-agency disputes and a lack of leadership⁷⁴. Regarding the issue of leadership, the 2008 report by the Center for International Cooperation and the International Peace Institute stated that effective leadership and staff capacity within the UN mission in a PBC country is crucial in achieving a coherent strategy (Center on International Cooperation and International Peace Institute, 2008). Moreover, in the 2009 report on Peace-building in the Aftermath of Conflict, the SG states that stronger, more effective and better-supported leadership in the field, enhances a collective impact amongst UN entities as well as facilitates the relation between the UN and external stakeholders (Secretary General, 2009a). Also, during a workshop hosted in 2013 by the Permanent Mission of Norway in its capacity as coordinator of the Peacebuilding Commission’s workstream on the “PBC-field interface”, it was highlighted that the PBA should support a centralized UN leadership in either the S/ERSG or the Resident Coordinator in the field, aimed at establishing a more coherent headquarters-field approach (Peacebuilding Commission, 2013a).

Personality traits are also a critical factor affecting sound coordination and, therefore, coherence. As Choedon (2010:52) puts it, while some

⁷³ Wilén, N. (2016, March 14). Skype interview.

⁷⁴ Caramés, A. (2016, June 13). Skype interview.

field officers might be enthusiastic and very active in attempting to achieve a close perspective of the situation in the host country, so as to efficiently tackle problematic issues, others may perform activities for personal and professional growth. During the interviews conducted for this research, experts expressed their belief on personal incompatibilities with charges of responsibility being a cause for operational dysfunctionality on the ground. Illuminating this, a former advisor of the UK Government on the SSR program in Sierra Leone stated that,

“UN coordination within its own offices is usually terrible. I think if... a very good example is the Rwandan example. I worked there after the genocide and in the same UN compound the head of UNICEF did not talk to the head of UNDP, and it was all down personality clashes. And I think UN agencies were blinded with the same kind of things. So at some points they got on, and at some points they did not, but it was all down to personalities running the offices at one time”⁷⁵.

Similarly, a DPA Policy Coordination Officer working on Sierra Leone recalled that usually coherence and coordination rely on personal relationships⁷⁶. Along this lines, a professor of anthropology at Yale University with extensive experience on the CAR stated that UN intracoordination depends highly on individual characteristics. As she expressed,

“I think a lot depends on particular individuals we talk about. Some people get along and we’ll work well together, and some people don’t get along and don’t work very well together, and some people don’t get along but are still able to work together during emergencies... Overall it’s all really difficult”⁷⁷.

The second major explanatory factor for the UN headquarters-field incoherence points to ill-equipped institutional capacity, including a lack of guides or protocols which might aid in shaping the relationship, the

⁷⁵ Jackson, P. (2016, April 12). Skype interview.

⁷⁶ Pak, J. (2017, March 1). Personal interview.

⁷⁷ Lombard, L. (2016, July 21). Skype interview.

sometimes excessively hierarchical relationship and the lack of channels of communication between the two levels. As a former ONUB officer for the SSR unit expressed, the lack of protocol on how to engage on the ground as a UN family is a major barrier for UN intracoordination. Moreover, he added that achievements in coordination usually depend very much on the area (programs such as SSR or DDR have long been implemented by the UN, so they might achieve better results)⁷⁸. Another academic commented on UN performance in the CAR, stating that intra-coordination is complicated because of hierarchical- and protocol-oriented issues⁷⁹. Furthermore, often sound and effective communications channels between the headquarter and field offices are absent, or even lack support from headquarters to sustain institutional support to candidate countries. Elaborating further on the absence of sound communication channels, Bellamy and Lupel (2015:10) stated from interviews with UN officials working in the CAR that there is little evidence of consolidated cooperation between country teams and headquarters to identify potential risks and appropriate strategies. There have, furthermore, been reports from officials based in headquarters complaining that field-based personnel do not provide timely information on potential atrocities.

The third explanatory factor hindering a coherent operationalization of strategies on the ground is the highly bureaucratic, decentralized and fragmented nature of the UN (Weiss, 2016), having to do with the tendency of large international organizations to self-replicate and enlarge. Murithi (2008:91) builds on this, arguing that the UN system, like all major bureaucracies, tends to self-replicate, multiply and expand. Going further, once a new organ has been created, it is difficult to eliminate it, even if its original mandate has been fulfilled. Due of this, many UN agencies replicate the activities of other UN bodies, what this author describes as the UN-building phenomenon. The failure for coherence within the UN system, as attempts for “Delivering as One” initiatives indicate, is symptomatic of a bureaucratic system that has persisted through 70 years without any major institutional reform. Both

⁷⁸ Vanheukelom, J. (2016, March 16). Skype interview.

⁷⁹ Lombard, L. (2016, July 21). Skype interview.

the DPA and PBC are negatively affected in their search for coherence by this bureaucratic and institutional hindrance. In regard to the issue of a decentralized nature, Jenkins (2010:20) asserts that excessive concentrations of power are not generally desirable, but this is sometimes the price to be paid in order to achieve coordination⁸⁰. Linked to the centralization issue, the 2008 report by the Center for International Cooperation and the International Peace Institute argued that one of the key challenges for the PBC consists of facing multiple centers of deliberation and decision-making poles (Center on International Cooperation and International Peace Institute, 2008). In this vein, fragmentation amongst United Nations actors as well as international organizations and donors generally are corrosive, critically undermining the peacebuilding effort (General Assembly and Security Council, 2010).

3.2 Critical implications for the liberal peacebuilding project

The above described lack of coherence, including between headquarters and the field as well as within field teams, contributes to a stress of the current state of depression the liberal peacebuilding project is undergoing. The UN, proven to be the main stakeholder in this project, has not been able to build and present a coherent action for its peacebuilding endeavor. This failure has some implications which negatively affect the action of peripheral actors working towards peacebuilding, host societies and, overall, recovery from this depression is hampered.

This section identifies two major implications of the UN lack of coherence, including the difficulty of external actors to engage in the UN in post-conflict engagements and the impossibility of having a deep understanding of the local reality at the headquarters level. First, a lack of coherence in approach causes an increased difficulty in the ability of the UN to cooperate with other stakeholders⁸¹. As Wilén and Chapaux

⁸⁰ See also Paris, R. and Sisk, T. (2009).

⁸¹ Similarly, De Coning (2007) identifies potential negative effects of pursuing coherence. First, in some cases short-term political and security considerations may

(2011) put it, stakeholders from post-conflict countries find it difficult to approach the UN because of its internal complexity. Therefore, the internal coherence of the UN not only affects the results of its operationalized programs, but furthermore affects the potential cooperation with stakeholders (see also Grady, 2005; Action Aid et al., 2007). In addition to a lack of coherence, the cooperation with other stakeholders such as local authorities or local civil society might also be affected by attitudes presented by the UN which have the potential to be considered hostile by the local population. Vanheukelom criticizes the UN presence in Bujumbura as being too visible, with UN officers insensitively displaying wealth, creating distrust and dislike amongst locals⁸². Wilén and Chapaux (2011) quote a part of an interview with a volunteer based in Bujumbura,

“Perhaps this could be disregarded as a particular problem of collaboration between the ONUB mission and the Burundian government, but even with the small BINUB mission, there appears to be a tension between the UN personnel and the local actors. One BINUB officer described for example the Burundians as conservative, introverted, paranoiacs, while local actors complained that the UN personnel did not have any real contact with the population, because of their abundance of security rules for the personnel and the distant location of their headquarters. Even other international actors in Burundi voiced complaints over the UN’s security standards which distanced them from the local population. For example, the UN officers are given orders on which bars and restaurants to visit – bars that mostly are in the city center and only frequented by internationals, which automatically distances them from the local population” (Wilén and Chapaux, 2011: 539).

Second, this lack of coherence further prevents officers at New York-based headquarters from establishing a comprehensive and in-depth

over-ride longer term development considerations and this may undermine the very socio-economic rehabilitation on which sustainable peacebuilding depends. Second, undue pressure on internal actors may materialize when external actors form a coherent block on certain issues. Third, the neutrality, impartiality and independence of humanitarian action may be negatively affected when integrated with political and security activities.

⁸² Interview with Vanheukelom.

understanding of the local context. In other words, the capacity of external actors to obtain knowledge of the internal complex reality of post-conflict societies is inherently limited (De Conning in Does, 2013:4). Not having a comprehensive understanding of the local reality hinders the peacebuilding process. Carayannis (2015:58) highlights the need for the UN to obtain a “knowledge acquisition of local context and a deeper understanding of the causes, dynamics, histories and actors of a conflict”. Similarly, Campbell (2015:86) makes an interesting point about the positive effects BINUB had on UN intracoordination by expressing that “for efforts at coherence to lead to more effective international intervention in conflict-affected states, they need to be driven by particular events and needs in the countries in which they intervene”.



In sum, this chapter demonstrates the failure of the attempt for coherence by the DPA and the PBA in post-conflict engagements. It also highlights how the implications of this failure, including the issue of external stakeholders finding it difficult to engage with the UN as well as the difficulty of headquarters to completely understand local reality, contribute to the current depression of the liberal peacebuilding project. Additionally, the chapter suggests that the emergence of the sustaining peace approach aimed at enhancing, among other strategic goals, coherence in the frame of UN peace engagements, can be considered an approach designed to subsume the post-conflict peacebuilding framework, reinforcing the current decay of the liberal peacebuilding project.

CHAPTER SIX. INCLUSIVENESS IN UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL AND PEACEBUILDING POST-CONFLICT ENGAGEMENTS: THE CASES OF SIERRA LEONE, BURUNDI AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Similarly to chapter Five, this chapter attempts to argue that the UN failure in the pursuit for inclusiveness of local civil society and regional actors in post-conflict engagements has reinforced and continues to reinforce the current depression of the liberal peacebuilding project. With this goal, the chapter defines, first, the UN attempt for inclusiveness of different stakeholders in post-conflict engagements; second, it examines the practical results in the field led by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA); and third, it develops explanatory factors for this failed attempt, drawing on implications of this failure for the overall liberal peacebuilding project.

1. Towards inclusiveness: A United Nations discursive endeavor

This section analyzes the relationship between the UN and three specific actors, the host Government, local civil society and regional actors. It goes on to describe how the PBA especially has made attempts to include local civil society and regional actors in peacebuilding processes, in an attempt to gain legitimacy and efficiency¹. Including non-state actors into International Organizations-led processes legitimizes the action of the latter (Barnett and Finnemore, 2005) and, linked to this, this section elaborates on the idea that an International

¹ Does (2013) distinguishes between two dimensions of inclusiveness or two different ways of gaining inclusivity in a process, reflecting the strategy that the UN has used so far to approach both civil society and regional actors. The first dimension refers to the physical inclusion and participation of relevant actors in a specific peacebuilding context and the second one points to how local perspectives are included and how much of the local resonates at the international level.

Organizations-led² peace process will not thrive unless they are able to generate a critical mass of domestic legitimacy (Arnault, 2014). Similarly, studies have shown that peace accords which include civil society are at least 50 per cent more likely to endure (Nilsson, 2012). The 2015 “The Challenge of Sustaining Peace” report argues that partnering with multilateral, regional, sub-regional actors and civil society is essential in making peace sustainable (Advisory Group of Experts, 2015).

The examined actors include the Government, local civil society and regional actors. First, it is in the interest of both the UN and the Government, a member of the UN family, to maintain at minimum a cordial and stable relationship. On the one hand, DPA-led political missions as well as PBC configuration are deployed in the country at the Government’s invitation, with the end of the mission being determined by the Government. As illustrated in Chapter Five through different examples, this dependency of the UN on the Government’s will has cause to be problematic for the UN whenever there is strong criticism against Government performance³. The Government, however, is the main recipient of funding and resources provided by the international community, hence its interest in maintaining a relationship with the UN.

Second, civil society has been a contested concept since its origins, particularly since its expansion in the Western world, in the context of the May 68 student movements, the mobilizations against the Vietnam War in the 1970s and the opposition movements during the 1980s in Eastern and Central European communist regimes. Considering that context, civil society became a social sphere composed of active citizens resisting political systems, even precipitating the fall of the Second

² Other than the UN, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCDE)-promoted New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States establishes five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals. The first of these principles expresses that legitimate politics require inclusive political settlements. See website: <https://www.pbsbdialogue.org>

³ In 2012 the head of UNIPSIL Michael von der Schulenberg was forced to leave Sierra Leone after being declared *persona non-grata*, accused by the Government of siding too closely with the opposition.

World and contributing to building liberal democracies in most former soviet countries. Still, nowadays, the only consensus concerning the definition of civil society is its “ambiguity” (Young, 1994; Williams and Young, 2012)⁴. Rather than presenting a broad definition of civil society, this section attempts to draw on a conception of civil society framed within peacebuilding processes. In Vogel’s words,

“Peace-oriented civil society describes the type of civil society that attempts to support an inclusive settlement of a conflict. International NGOs and donors tend to have ‘peace-oriented civil society’ in mind when referring to civil society in peacebuilding and conflict resolution. This group includes, as the name suggests, those citizens that actively engage in resolving the conflict in a multitude of forms; but it spells out the underlying conjecture of the peace cause that has been implicit in many assumptions made about ‘civil society’” (Vogel, 2016:475).

Contrary to the liberal and cosmopolitan belief of a local civil society as a constitutive and constructive actor for the expansive liberal peacebuilding project (see Kaldor, 2003; Lidén, 2009), the reality of non-Western war-torn societies shows how this externally-driven peacebuilding project has the potential to be resisted by local civil society, some defining this section of the public as “uncivil society” (Boyd, 2004) or “less-civil society” (Mac Ginty, 2011)⁵. The results of the analysis presented in this chapter show that indeed there is a resistance to a UN-led process of inclusiveness of local civil society in post-conflict engagements.

Finally, the third analyzed stakeholder corresponds to regional actors. The examined cases, Sierra Leone, Burundi and the Central African Republic, belong to three different regions, West, East and Central Africa, respectively, therefore belonging to their corresponding regional organizations (see figure 7 and table 12).

⁴ For a detailed revision on conceptual approximations to the concept of civil society see Lipschultz (2000), Chambers and Kymlicka (2002), Alexander (2006) or Edwards (2009).

⁵ For further critical literature with the liberal definition of civil society in the frame of peace engagements see Williams and Young (2012) or Íñiguez de Heredia (2012).

Figure 7. Regional organizations in Africa. Source: International Telecommunication Union (accessed 2017).




Table 12. Regional organizations by examined country.

Sierra Leone	Burundi	Central African Republic
ECOWAS	EAC	ECCAS
MRU	COMESA	CEMAC
	ECCAS	
	ECGLC	

In West Africa, Sierra Leone is part of the ECOWAS. Due to its position within the region, Sierra Leone is also a member of the Mano River Union (MRU), along with Guinea and Liberia. Burundi is located in between Eastern and Central Africa, as well as in the Great Lakes region, making it a member of the four regional organizations, including the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC). Finally, the CAR is in the Central Africa region, thus belonging to the ECCAS and Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (*CEMAC*, in French).

1.1 Inclusiveness in United Nations peace engagements

Over the last two decades, the UN has shown an increasing tendency to transfer prime agency and responsibilities to local actors, such as the host Government and, more recently, to local civil society and regional stakeholders in the frame of peace engagements. Major UN documents have broached the issue of how vital it is to bring inclusiveness into peace-oriented processes. Beginning in 1992, *An Agenda for Peace* stressed that, as global governance trends progress, peace in its most complete sense should be accomplished with cooperation amongst UN, governments and civil society actors such as NGOs, academic institutions, businesses, the media and the public at large. Beyond this, the agenda includes an entire chapter focused on UN cooperation with regional actors in the frame of building peace (Secretary General, 1992). Moreover, the 2000 Brahimi report expressed that “the Secretary-General has consistently emphasized the need for the United Nations to reach out to civil society and to strengthen relations with non-governmental organizations, academic institutions and the media, who can be useful partners in the promotion of peace and security for all” (General Assembly and Security Council, 2000: Art. 269). Regarding the regional approach, the Brahimi report described a need for UN peace operations to undertake active political, logistical and/or military support of great or regional powers to overcome conflict in conflict-afflicted areas (General Assembly and Security Council, 2000: Art. 23).

In the SG’s report on *Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*, Ki-Moon stated that civil society actors, including marginalized groups, play a critical role as driver of post-conflict recovery and development. Concerning the regional approach, the SG states that,

“Given the regional dimensions of many contemporary conflicts (including refugee movements, cross-border ethnic networks, flows of natural resources and arms, financial transactions and pandemics), regional organizations are increasingly at the forefront of peace processes, including in mediating and guaranteeing peace

agreements, and monitoring their implementation” (Secretary General, 2009a: Art. 13).

The 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report reinforced the UN commitment to include civil society in its peacebuilding endeavors. First, the report stresses that broadening community engagement, making women and youth the key actors, is fundamental to preventing relapse into conflict. In this vein, the panel points out that working closely with local communities enables the UN to assess more accurately the impact peace missions have on the local society and community. Additionally, the report states that civil society, women and religious leaders should be at the forefront of sustaining peace-oriented processes. It elucidates that UN peace operations should serve as a bridge between local communities and host authorities, facilitating the inclusiveness of the process and therefore lending strength to the likelihood for peace to endure. This 2015 HIPPO report further stresses that UN collaboration with national and international civil society organizations is necessary for countering violent extremism and that, in the field, UN missions should seek objective feedback from independent experts and civil society in order to ameliorate their results (General Assembly and Security Council, 2015).

Both the HIPPO and the AGE reports agree on reasons why and how the inclusion of these civil society actors contribute to peace. First, by bringing civil society closer to the process, the UN can have a more accurate picture of the local context, strengthening aspects such as early warning mechanisms. Second, the UN considers that the participation of local women civil society organizations in post-conflict engagements enhances processes such as conflict mitigation and prevention, recovery and reconciliation. Third, the reports also document that women and religious leaders can play a positive role in countering the emergence of violent extremism, particularly amongst youth. Fourth, positive civil society agents can have a positive influence in eradicating peace-disrupting challenges such as corruption. Therefore, the UN advocates strengthening civil society-led efforts which will increase transparency and accountability. In addition, the UN has recently used civil society as

an evaluation source, through developing local perception surveys on the role and impact of peace operations.

Regional approaches are also important, and the HIPPO report stresses that UN consultancy with regional stakeholders is crucial for the success of early response to conflicts that would otherwise escalate. This report dedicates one entire section to the necessity of a regional approach to overcome current conflict. In the particular case of Africa, this section states that “the African Union and its sub-regional partners, in particular, have become increasingly operational. Whether in preventing conflict or responding to it, the UN’s regional partnerships in Africa must be intensified and made more predictable through mechanisms for collaboration and by optimizing the use of limited resources. The United Nations and African Union must strive for common approaches through shared assessments, sound consultative mechanisms for decision-making and tools for collaborative planning and operations across the conflict cycle. This is a partnership that should be made deeper and more collaborative. The UN should take the decisive step to invest in and commit to the success of the African Union as a partner in addressing shared concerns” (General Assembly and Security Council, 2015: Art. 57). In a similar vein, “The Challenge of Sustaining Peace” report underlines that inclusion of stakeholders is critical for peacebuilding process given that “regional and sub-regional partners are well placed to have a detailed understanding of the situation on the ground in their member states, and presumably some leverage to influence outcomes” (Advisory Group of Experts, 2015: 36).

As described in the following two sections, the UN’s strongest commitment to inclusiveness is reflected in the development of the new PBA. In this regard, one of the essential features of the new PBA is national ownership⁶, which states that peacebuilding is primarily a

⁶ The national ownership principle might also be reflected in the DPA framework. In particular, the mandates of UNIOSIL, UNIPSIL, BINUB and BNUB “emphasize the primary responsibility of the Government of Sierra Leone for the consolidation of peace and security in the country, and urges continued support from international donors for the Government’s efforts in this regard (...)”. See mandates available on www.unmissions.org

national challenge, with the responsibility of the citizens of a country, with the support from their governments, being to establish the conditions for durable peace. However, and in the context of the local turn debate described in Chapter Two, the UN principle of national ownership has shifted towards a more local and bottom-up form of ownership, where the local Government sees its role eroded, replaced by other stakeholders such as civil society or regional actors⁷.

1.2 Inclusiveness of local civil society and regional actors in political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements: The role of the new Peacebuilding Architecture

This section focuses on the role of the PBA towards discursive efforts for inclusiveness of local civil society and regional actors. The dissertation analyzes the operationalization of national, in UN terminology, or local ownership processes⁸, which have been primarily developed within the frame of the PBA. Indeed, the PBC engagement in the CAR was the first one to include an “inclusive approach” as a prime principle (see Peacebuilding Commission, 2009a).

a) Inclusiveness of local civil society

One of the key stakeholders that the UN has attempted to get closest to is local civil society⁹, a term which was introduced in the UN conceptual framework during the World Summit on Social Development in 1995. The UN’s concept of “civil society” has evolved over time from consultant to implementing actor (Shepherd, 2015:904). Street *et al.* (2008) argue that consensus over peacebuilding priorities needs to be an inclusive process in which civil society plays a critical

⁷ This new form of national ownership is sometimes referred to as “inclusive local ownership” (see Advisory Group of Experts, 2015: Art. 44).

⁸ The term “local ownership” was popularized in 1996 when the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development called for the respect of local ownership in development processes (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1996).

⁹ Civil society is here defined as those political, cultural and social organizations of modern societies that are autonomous of the state, but part of the mutually-constitutive relationship between state and society (Lipschultz, 2000).

role. The milestone framework establishing UN-civil society relations was the Panel of Eminent Persons on UN-Civil Society Relations, which met between 2000 to 2004. This Panel's final report, known as the Cardoso Report, received notorious criticism from the NGO community, which accused it of underestimating the role of civil society in the UN framework (see General Assembly, 2004).

In the post-Cardoso report context, different stakeholders stressed in a SC debate the positive key role which civil society has played in building peace in countries emerging from conflict (Security Council, 2004). Appreciating this, the new PBA has attempted to make substantial efforts to include civil society in the framework of political and peacebuilding post-conflict operations. In its founding resolutions, the PBC is mandated among other functions, to “serve as a platform to convene all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, including from Member States, national authorities, United Nations missions and country teams, international, regional and subregional organizations, international financial institutions, civil society, women's groups, youth organizations and, where relevant, the private sector and national human rights institutions, in order to provide recommendations and information to improve their coordination, to develop and share good practices in peacebuilding, including on institution-building, and to ensure predictable financing to peacebuilding” (General Assembly, 2005a: Art.98).

The PBA has made significant efforts to involve civil society over the past 10 years. The aspects that the PBC refer to when mentioning civil society are varied. First and foremost, civil society is mentioned in terms of national and local ownership, and inclusive approach principles, illustrating an intention, at least discursively, to include the civil society, among other stakeholders, and build its capacity and its level of participation in the different areas of post-conflict process: supervision of security-oriented reforms, political dialogue, electoral processes, good governance, equitable access to justice, transitional justice mechanisms, promotion of human rights, gender issues, socio-economic recovery and development.

Among other strategies, the PBA has attempted to involve civil society into the post-conflict engagement through experiences such as the Partners Coordination Group, established in Burundi in 2007 by the Government and its partners. The main goal of this mechanism was to serve a dedicated framework for dialogue. One of the components of this mechanism were the strategic forums for discussion, which were spaces for debate which included civil society (Peacebuilding Commission, 2007b).

During its early engagements, the PBC promoted a few initiatives shared by both Sierra Leone and Burundi. The first involved a south-south learning process in which Sierra Leonean civil society representatives as well as election officials engaged in structured dialogue about the electoral processes with their Burundian counterparts, aiming to enhance the electoral contexts of 2007 and 2010, respectively. The second initiative involved the creation of a PBF National Steering Committee, where the PBA sought active participation of the civil society.

Examining the particular case of Sierra Leone, there are numerous initiatives the PBA has promoted in order to incorporate civil society further into the process. For example, the PBC promoted civil society participation in the joint progress report on the Government-led Agenda for Change (2008-2012) and the successor Agenda for Prosperity (2017), both strongly assisted by the UN. Moreover, the PBA also supported civil society engagement in the whole truth and reconciliation process and, in particular, in the work of the TRC, chaired by Bishop Joseph Humper of the United Methodist Church in Sierra Leone.

In the Burundian case, the top two PBA-supported initiatives which served to bring civil society closer to the peacebuilding process were the *Cadre de Dialogue et Concertation* and the *Justice de Proximité*, the former a platform to institutionalize dialogue mechanisms and unite further the Government and civil society, and the latter an initiative to bring civil society closer to the justice system. Also, the PBA supported the

creation of a Tripartite Steering Committee, a unique platform tasked with addressing the Burundian peacebuilding process, composed of the Government, the UN and the civil society. Beyond this, the Partners Coordination Group was a PBC-supported forum of discussion composed of different stakeholders, including civil society. Furthermore, the PBA supported the inclusion of civil society in other frameworks, such as the design of the new Land Code or the draft of the Libre Blanc and Defense review.

In the case of CAR, the same Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding established that the follow-up and coordination committee would be composed, among other stakeholders, of two civil society representatives. Another PBA-supported initiative in which civil society was widely-recognized to be involved was the voluntary partnership agreement, created by the Government and the EU and aimed at dealing with issues such as forest law enforcement, governance and trade timber products.

b) Inclusiveness of regional actors

The UN has also long attempted to highlight the regional approach in order to overcome conflict. The UN charter actually devotes all Chapter VIII to regional cooperation as a *sine qua non* condition for the establishment of peace and security (see United Nations, 1945). Beyond this, Chapter VIII, the New York office of the UN Regional Commissions illustrates the institutionalization within the UN system of the prime relevance the UN provides the regional approach in dealing with global, national and local issues.

The PBA has made great efforts to bring regional actors on board, being, according to the PBC, a key aspect to include in peacebuilding processes for the consolidation of sustainable peace (see General Assembly, 2005a). The 2010 UN assessment report on the PBC underlines the necessity of adopting a regional approach and including regional actors in the peacebuilding process, highlighting evidence of the potential spill-over effect of countries on the PBC agenda. This could lead to frustrating PBA-led peacebuilding efforts and eventually

destabilizing (even further) their respective regions. Issues such as illicit drug trafficking are undoubtedly of a regional nature. Besides this, further phenomena that might be domestic in nature such as unemployment or youth exclusion, might eventually have regional effects such as economic migration (see General Assembly and Security Council, 2010).

This goal has especially been attempted in the African Continent. In 2008, the UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, Carolyn McAskie, reiterated to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union the significance for the PBC of African issues (Murithi, 2008). Setting an example of this clear determination, the CAR PBC strategic framework for peacebuilding includes a new principle, the “inclusive approach”, stating that “the various stakeholders in the Central African Republic, including civil society, women’s organizations, the private sector, political parties, regional organizations, as well as international, regional and subregional institutions and bilateral partners, must play their key roles in peacebuilding” (Peacebuilding Commission, 2009a:2). More recently, stakeholders at a SC meeting in 2016 expressed that “as needs in Africa varied, peacebuilding interventions must be tailored to specific situations. Success stories had the common thread of inclusive national ownership, which must be kept in mind when devising future programs. The Commission’s quick refocus during the early stages of the Ebola crisis had demonstrated its agility, and emerging crises should continue to receive such attention. Further, institutional capacity-building, training and skills development should be directed at supporting local stakeholders and engaging external actors in peacebuilding activities. Enhancing the capacity of regional and subregional organizations for conflict resolution and the maintenance of regional peace and security was vital” (Security Council, 2016).

By looking specifically at the case studies, on the normative level, while in the DPA-led missions frameworks there barely reference regional stakeholders, in the PBC strategic frameworks for the three configurations references to regional organizations are many. The Sierra

Leone PBC configuration mentions in its strategic framework the ECOWAS, the Mano River Union and even the AU; the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi refers to EAC, ECGLC and COMESA; and the CAR configuration mentions the CEMAC and the EU. These references cover issues such as regional efforts for regional dialogue, addressing cross-border issues, strengthening regional cooperation for economic development and strengthening regional integration. Moreover, the PBC Sierra Leone, by mentioning the Department for International Development (DfID) of the UK, and the PBC CAR mentioning the CEMAC and the EU, calls on these organizations for enhanced efforts on programs within the security field, such as DDR or SSR. The CAR case, as described below, shows most clearly a determination to tackle the post-conflict scenario from a regional approach as well (evidence from the class-based, statistical and similitude-based analysis).

In Sierra Leone the second annual review of the PBC describes the support given by the PBC to the Government to develop the ECOWAS-designed regional action plan on addressing illicit drug trafficking, fundamental for the stability of the region (Peacebuilding Commission, 2008a). A later PBC review, adds the necessity of the PBC to also support the AU and the Mano River Union in this struggle against illicit drug trafficking (Peacebuilding Commission, 2010a). Furthermore, the PBC assisted the ECOWAS and the Mano River Union in strengthening cooperation mechanisms, particularly in areas such as gender equality and human rights (Peacebuilding Commission, 2009c). Since the deployment of United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), this DPA-led mission has been in charge of coordinating regional relations in West Africa¹⁰.

Sierra Leone has also historically maintained a positive relationship with its former colonial power. As part of the commonwealth, the UK has a high commissioner in the country. The post-conflict role of the UK with Sierra Leone was defined by a 10-years memorandum of

¹⁰ Moikowa, R. (2016, August 4). Personal interview.

understanding signed between the Government of Sierra Leone and the DfID, still nowadays funding the country in many areas through a bilateral relationship. Furthermore, the work of the UN in the country is partly financed by the UK (bilaterally) and by the EU (multilaterally).

In Burundi, the PBC supported the implementation of the peacebuilding process through the Regional Initiative for the Burundi Peace Process, the South African Facilitation, the African Union, the BINUB and other members of the Political Directorate (Peacebuilding Commission, 2009c). Beyond this, the PBC also repeatedly recommended the Government of Burundi to strengthen participation and take a leading role in sub-regional organizations such as the AU, the EAC, the ECGLC and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) (Peacebuilding Commission, 2009e). Beyond regional actors, the PBC also attempted to establish a long-term and closer strategic engagement with the EU and the African Development Bank (Peacebuilding Commission, 2010b). The PBC also recommended that the Government take steps towards integration into the EAC (Peacebuilding Commission, 2009d). In this vein, the PBC also attempted to strengthen links between the Burundian Parliament and the legislative institutions of the EAC and the AU. The PBC has also stated that the integration of Burundi into regional organizations such as the Tripartite Plus Commission, the ECCAS and EAC is beneficial to the country from a security standpoint (Peacebuilding Commission, 2008b). The PBC also promoted a Common Plan of Action to support the media in the context of elections, designed by the EU in partnership with local NGOs (Peacebuilding Commission, 2010c). Conclusively, the PBC encourages Burundi to meet all the requirements for full membership in regional institutions such as the COMESA, the ECCAS, the ECGLC, the EAC and the ICGLR (Peacebuilding Commission, 2009f). The PBC also supported a solution to the Rwanda-Burundi border conflict under the African Union Border Program (Peacebuilding Commission, 2009f) and the PBF funded AU human rights in Burundi. Street et. al (2008) argue that the PBC's initiatives towards good governance in the country were complemented by the fact that Burundi entered the EAC in 2007, while also holding the

International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, welcomed by the UN.

The PBC CAR has made the most concerted effort to adopt a regional approach and, in particular, the PBC routinely engaged with CEMAC, ECCAS and the AU in its activities (Peacebuilding Commission, 2011c). Besides these, the PBC, and more specifically the PBF, also conducted meetings with the EU, France and the International Organization of la Francophonie to enhance the support of the international community (Peacebuilding Commission, 2011c). The PBC also encouraged the Government to strengthen its capacities in coordinating regional and international actors in the three peacebuilding priorities (Peacebuilding Commission, 2011c). For example, the PBC welcomed the development of regional needs assessment monographies conducted by the UN Human Settlement Program in order to identify intervention packages (Peacebuilding Commission, 2010d). Furthermore, the PBC, together with the World Bank, organized high-level meetings aimed at generating and maintaining international attention and support of the country where regional actors such as CEMAC and ECCAS played a key role (Peacebuilding Commission, 2011c). In December 2009, The PBC supervised an agreement signed between ECCAS and BONUCA in order to strengthen the DDR process (Peacebuilding Commission, 2009b). Linked to this, the PBF, with the financial support of the CEMAC, the EU and other stakeholders, secured the DDR process (Peacebuilding Commission, 2009b). In 2014 MINUSCA subsumed the AU-led MISCA, after which the only non-UN presence in the country was a French peacekeeping force and the AU-led country office, the MISAC. Carvalho and Lucey (2016) argue that current experiences in the CAR identify that closer cooperation between the PBF and the AU on peacebuilding is critical in ensuring a more dominant role of the latter in such matters.

2. Inclusiveness in practice: The results

This second section analyzes to what extent the PBA has managed to bring inclusiveness to political and peacebuilding processes over the last

decade in the three case studies. By developing an exhaustive analysis of the relationship between the UN and the actors at stake, namely the Government, civil society and regional stakeholders, the research highlights evidence of the still predominant role of the Government. This section also enhances the depth of the results of PBA efforts in integrating civil society and regional actors further into the peacebuilding process.

2.1 Identifying the priority of the United Nations-National Government relationship: The role of elections

This section highlights evidence of the predominance of the UN-Government relationship in the frame of UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements, drawing on the celebration of elections as the pivotal area of cooperation between these actors.

At the normative level, the role of the Government is essential for UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict missions. The mandates of the missions exhort a strong unity with the government. There is a systematic, repeated terminology within the mandates constraining the UN-Government relationship. The following two forms are shared by most of the nine analyzed missions and are placed at the beginning of each resolution,

“Emphasizing the importance of the continued support of the United Nations and the international community for the long-term security and development of Sierra Leone, particularly in building the capacity of the Government of Sierra Leone (...)” (Security Council, 2005:1)¹¹.

Requests the Secretary to establish UNIOSIL (...) to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in (...) (Security Council, 2005:2)¹².

¹¹ This statement is shared by missions’ mandates for the cases of UNIOSIL, PBC SL, UNIPSIL, BINUB and BONUCA.

¹² This statement is shared by missions’ mandates for the cases of UNIOSIL, UNIPSIL, BINUB, BNUB, BONUCA and BINUCA.

Furthermore, within the frame of the PBC, strategic frameworks also point to the UN-Government relationship by expressing that “the present Framework is a flexible document which can be modified jointly by the Government of Sierra Leone and the Peacebuilding Commission in response to developments in the peace consolidation process in Sierra Leone” (Peacebuilding Commission, 2007a:3)¹³. At the operational level, from a simple statistical analysis, it is clear the concept “Government” sustains a key relevance within all documentary data analyzed within each case, figuring steadily in a high position within the top-ten most used concepts list (see tables 4, 5 and 6 in Annex 4).

Reinforcing the claim of the key role of elections in this relationship, the class “Elections” comes up in the majority of the nine studied missions, thus illustrating the relevance that electoral processes have in the frame of the engagements. A few authors further support the claim that after the UN missions’ failures in the early 1990s in countries such as Somalia, elections became the key criteria necessary in order for withdrawal to be possible (Hirschman, 2012: 369). Indeed, during the 1990s, research in the area of peace studies and post-conflict governance regarded elections as a key element for democratization and the establishment of durable peace (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995). Once again, the UN political and peacebuilding endeavor is prone to the consolidation of Western democratic forms of political organization, in this case, electoral processes¹⁴. However, as some authors point out (see Hirschmann, 2012), since the growing tendency within the UN to develop integrated missions, the popularity of electoralism and the role elections previously played as a peacekeeping exit strategy has gradually been substituted by broader institution-building approaches and multidimensional longer-term peacebuilding endeavors, as examined post-conflict missions in this dissertation illustrate.

¹³ This statement is shared by strategic PBC frameworks for peacebuilding in the cases of Sierra Leone and the CAR.

¹⁴ A former MINUSCA officer emphasized during the interview that the UN focuses on general and presidential elections, forgetting about local elections thus underestimating the local dimension (Caramés, A. (2016, June 13). Skype interview).

In the case of Sierra Leone, the UN has assisted the Government in all elections held in the 21st century: UNAMSIL in 2002, UNIOSIL in 2007 and UNIPSIL in 2012. UNAMSIL fundamentally assisted the National Electoral Commission with logistical support and provided security. In addition to active assistance, UNIOSIL also encouraged Sierra Leonean institutions to take the lead in the electoral process and ensure free, fair and transparent elections. The UNIPSIL focused on assisting in the technical aspects of the electoral process, such as guaranteeing the productive functioning of the voter registration system (McCormack, 2012). Two former UNIPSIL officers state that one of the major achievements of the operation in the country was ensuring successful elections in 2012 and therefore democratic governance¹⁵, successfully managing democratic institutions towards effective functioning¹⁶. Similarly, the country director of Search for Common Ground stresses the consolidation of the 2012 democratic process as one of the key achievements of the UN¹⁷. A scholar with expertise on the UN peacebuilding endeavor, however, has criticized the UN in Sierra Leone for conducting activities with too much emphasis placed on elections and a democratic process¹⁸.

In regard to Burundi, a DPA chief of staff with extensive experience in the country highlighted the careful management of the 2010 elections as a key achievement of BINUB, stressing that, despite violent outbreaks, the country did not collapse. He also states that BINUB managed the key political track and persuaded the opposition to be involved in 2013 elections¹⁹. Another UN officer also indicated support of the Government, celebrating elections as a major contribution of the UN in post-conflict Burundi²⁰. An academic expert also mentions the 2005 elections as a success of the UN, though highlighting the UN

¹⁵ Lamboi, P. (2016, August 10). Skype interview; and Moikowa, R. (2016, August 4). Personal interview.

¹⁶ Moikowa, R. (2016, August 4). Personal interview.

¹⁷ Sankaituah, J. (2016, July 7). Personal interview; and Tommy, I. (2016, July 18). Personal interview.

¹⁸ Lawrence, M. (2016, March 7). Skype interview.

¹⁹ Anonymous II. (2016, April 7). Skype interview.

²⁰ Vanheukelom, J. (2016, March 16). Skype interview.

failure in not including all political parties in the 2010 elections, or the fruitless efforts to ensure their inclusion²¹.

Finally, regarding the CAR, a DPA officer formerly involved in the CAR, as well as a former MINUSCA officer, stated that one of the major achievements of the UN in the post-conflict stage was the celebration of elections²². The latter further pointed out the specific role of the later DPKO-led MINUSCA in securing the electoral process. Similarly, an anthropologist from Yale University with experience in the CAR case also acknowledged that the UN achieved relative calm during electoral periods²³. A report from the International Crisis Group (2008) states that the peace agreements and the General Amnesty Law were to be the cornerstones for establishing an Inclusive Political Dialogue in preparation for the 2010 presidential elections. From a more critical perspective, an independent consultant linked to the European Center for Development and Policy Management stated that the UN was critical towards the Government, due to its lack of assertiveness when anticipating the 2010 elections²⁴. Regarding the scope of elections, both the Yale-based anthropologist and the former MINUSCA officer emphasize that the UN should have focused on municipal elections, rather than presidential²⁵, reinforcing the subsequently described argument on how rural populations are often forgotten in UN post-conflict engagements.

2.2 Results of the new Peacebuilding Architecture

The previous section highlights evidence of how, in relative terms, the UN-Government relationship prevails over any relationship with other stakeholders within the frame of studied political and peacebuilding post-conflict operations. This section examines in a disaggregate form

²¹ Campbell, S. (2016, March 22). Skype interview.

²² Coutinho, S. (2016, July 28). Skype interview; and Caramés, A. (2016, June 13). Skype interview.

²³ Lombard, L. (2016, July 21). Skype interview.

²⁴ Faria, F. (2016, March 16). Skype interview.

²⁵ Lombard, L. (2016, July 21). Skype interview; and Caramés, A. (2016, June 13). Skype interview.

the results the PBA has obtained in its attempt to unite further UN-led processes with local civil society and regional actors.

a) **Inclusiveness of local civil society:** The need for institutionalization As a few authors have pointed out (see Graben and Fitz-Gerald, 2013), the three cases support the theory outlining that the institutionalization of spaces or programs for the participation of local civil society is fundamental for these actors to be included in the UN-led post-conflict engagement process. While Sierra Leone and Burundi present some examples of this institutionalized co-participation (in Sierra Leone, initiatives include the Joint communique, the Agenda for Change, the TRC and women civil society organizations; in Burundi, the *Cadre de Dialogue et Concertation*, and the *Justice de Proximité*), efforts in the CAR for any sort of institutionalization were fruitless.

Major reports, both from UN and external sources, agree on the failure of PBA efforts towards including local civil society in the peacebuilding process. The discursive analysis of further documentary and interview data, however, show mixed results of this endeavor. Some UN sources, including documentary data as well as interviews with UN officers, stress positive results in the cases of Sierra Leone and Burundi, whereas non-UN sources, documentary data as well as interviews to external experts, stress the failure of these efforts in the cases of Burundi and the CAR.

United Nations Self-assessment: Stressing success in Sierra Leone and Burundi

Despite country reports reporting in a positive fashion on the inclusiveness of local civil society in post-conflict engagements, especially in the case of Sierra Leone and Burundi, major UN reports stress that this goal has been largely unfulfilled. While the Sierra Leonean and Burundian cases also illustrate mixed results of the DPA action on inclusiveness of the local civil society in these processes, interviews with UN officers engaged in the CAR highlight major hindrances.

The PBA attempted to bring civil society closer into the peacebuilding process through, among other strategies, the frame of the Strategic

Forum discussions, spaces for debate including members from civil society. The core ideas generated by these sessions were later transferred to Strategic Framework sectoral groups, which in turn also comprised a large part of the civil society. However, in the 2010 evaluation report on the performance of the PBC in its first half decade of existence, the General Assembly and the Security Council admitted an uneven involvement in the peacebuilding process by national stakeholders and that in some cases civil society organizations felt marginalized (General Assembly and Security Council, 2010: Art. 41). The 2015 HIPPO report also highlighted that civil society representatives had expressed difficulty in interacting with the UN, who appeared remote and aloof. In addition to this, the local Government might sometimes be reluctant to support UN-civil society engagement unless the relationships are carried out with full transparency. With regards to including women,, the report commented that outreach to women civil society organizations is often irregular and informal (General Assembly and Security Council, 2015).

Sierra Leone, along with Burundi, is a case where enthusiasm regarding the inclusivity of local civil society in the process at the ground level is well documented. The 2009 outcome of the PBC High-Level Special Session on Sierra Leone acknowledged the efforts made by civil society and NGOs, *inter alia*, in promoting peace and stability throughout the country (Peacebuilding Commission, 2009c). In a 2010 report, the PBC applauds the contribution of civil society to peace consolidation and, in particular, to the development of the joint progress report on the Agenda for Change (Peacebuilding Commission, 2010a). A later report in 2012 praise the specific contributions of civil society group such as religious and traditional leaders, women and youth in all aspects of peace consolidation in Sierra Leone (Peacebuilding Commission, 2012). In 2015, “The Challenges of Sustaining Peace” report acknowledged the key role civil society played in the post-2008 peacebuilding phase in Sierra Leone, and in particular its strong engagement and commitment to the Truth and Reconciliation process (Advisory Group of Experts, 2015).

A DPA Policy Coordination Officer concluded that the relationship between the UN and civil society in the country was “good in general terms”²⁶. Two former UNIPSIL officers state that one of the major successes of the operation in the country was empowering local people in the peace process and building their confidence in the peacebuilding process²⁷. A DPA senior political officer highlights women’s participation as one of the major PBC achievements²⁸.

Regarding the Burundian case, the 2008 annual review stressed the importance of civil society engagement in bringing corruption, a major hindrance to the peacebuilding process, to the attention of the Government and population (Peacebuilding Commission, 2008c). A report of progress further stressed in 2008 that inclusion of civil society was a key factor in issues such as justice, promotion of human rights and actions to combat impunity. In a 2009 progress report, the PBC also stressed the critical role civil society plays for the preparation of the campaign for 2010 elections and, in particular, potential risk factors which could hamper the process (Peacebuilding Commission, 2009d). A 2010 progress report also highlighted efforts made by civil society in conducting civic education (Peacebuilding Commission, 2010c). Furthermore, the PBC comments on another review highlighting the valuable role of civil society in the prosecution of agents accused of major violations of human rights, including the cases of the massacre in Gatumba, the assassination of the WHO and UNICEF representatives and further crimes (Peacebuilding Commission, 2011d).

In a later progress review, the UN emphasized the challenge of strengthening dialogue amongst political partners, including civil society, while alleviate concerns of consolidation within the democratic process. This same review applauded the impact of a co-promoted “naming and shaming” campaign by BINUB, civil society and international community as an attempt at diverting attention from the

²⁶ Pak, J. (2017, March 1). Personal interview.

²⁷ Moikowa, R. (2016, August 4). Personal interview; and Lamboi, P. (2016, August 10). Skype interview.

²⁸ Anonymous I. (2016, March 11). Personal interview.

public on charges of torture during the elections and afterwards. This same report also commented on the progress made by formal national consultations on transitional justice issues conducted by the Tripartite Steering Committee, composed of the Government, the UN and civil society. The report also describes the creation in April 2010 of a Partners Coordination Group, a forum for discussion on peacebuilding issues for all stakeholders, including civil society organizations. The review also mentions the success of information workshops on the new Land Code in which civil society also played a key role. The review also touches on progress made by including all partners, including the civil society, in the drafting of a Libre Blanc and the Defense review, as well as the draft of an integrated plan for reform of the security sector (Peacebuilding Commission, 2011a). The last progress review stressed BINUB cooperation with Switzerland in respect to national consultations on transitional justice mechanisms, providing support to the initiative aimed at raising awareness of this issue established by civil society and NGOs (Peacebuilding Commission, 2009f). A former ONUB SSR Unit officer stated that the post-conflict UN task in Burundi was successful in supporting the political process in a more inclusive way, emphasizing how civil society benefited from UN infrastructural services²⁹.

Regarding the CAR case, the first annual review of the PBC in 2010 stressed that civil society is deeply involved in the implementation of the shared Strategic Framework, though it does admit weaknesses in terms of institutional capacity and low flow of resources from local NGOs and civil society organizations (Peacebuilding Commission, 2010d). In a later report in 2011, the PBC underlined its engagement in the pursuit of seeking financial support, with the ultimate goal being to further integrate civil society into the peacebuilding process, thus strengthening the inclusivity of the process. The review also highlights the limited cooperation with civil society in the development of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding. A description of the inclusive approach of the CAR is also included, highlighting how involved civil

²⁹ Vanheukelom, J. (2016, March 16). Skype interview.

society has been. This inclusivity was particularly enhanced by the creation of the voluntary partnership agreement on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber products, initiated by the Government and the EU and supported by the PBC. Finally, the review also indicated operational weaknesses of civil society in terms of the existence of clearly defined participation mechanisms (Peacebuilding Commission, 2011c).

In a report of progress in 2009, the PBC mentioned that a delegation had visited the CAR to assess the progress of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding, making extensive contacts with a wide range of actors, including civil society (Peacebuilding Commission, 2009b). In a report from 2011, the PBC claimed that civil society representatives had expressed dissatisfaction that their priorities had not been heeded when deciding PBF's priority projects. However, these complaints were responded to by highlighting the fact that they were not organized and lacked capacity to unite their complaints into one united voice (Peacebuilding Commission, 2011b).

A former MINUSCA officer highlighted confusion between local ownership and the process of peacebuilding³⁰. The former chief of the DPA in the CAR remarked on the difficulty in approaching civil society, due to the highly politicized organizations³¹. Beyond this, a former PBSO officer for the CAR stressed that civil society is typically weak, lacking capacity and therefore being difficult to work with. He adds that, whenever a civil society-based organization is strong enough to engage with the UN, they are often too close to the Government and, therefore, too politicized³². As described in the next section, this has key implications in terms of the ability of civil society to exhibit impartiality, independence and its ability to represent itself when engaging in post-conflict processes.

³⁰ Caramés, A. (2016, June 13). Skype interview.

³¹ Coutinho, S. (2016, July 28). Skype interview.

³² Anonymous III. (2017, January 17). Personal interview.

External assessment: Stressing failure in Burundi and the Central African Republic

By and large, major external reports defined the UN attempt to include civil society a failure. Regarding interviewees, while some experts on the Sierra Leonean case express a positive perspective regarding the impact of the PBA in approaching and including local civil society, Burundian and CAR experts are reluctant to confirm positive results, continuing to stress major challenges that persist.

This section assesses the impact the PBA had in its endeavor to bring civil society closer to the political and peacebuilding post-conflict process on the basis of non-UN documentary resources. Relative to the Government, Shepherd (2015) states that, at the normative level, civil society has been “textually” far removed from the PBA. In addition to quantitatively underestimating the concept, in terms of content the three strategic frameworks mention that “informal” civil society meetings are meant to take place before “formal” meetings dedicated to country configuration, thus relegating civil society to a framework of informality and a secondary position.

In a policy paper concerned with the civil society perspective of the PBC’s five-year review in 2010, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict found two challenges for engagement in the field, challenges the PBC failed to fulfill. The first was to ensure PBC relevance on the ground and to have timely, relevant information feed into PBC activities in New York. The second was to ensure genuine local ownership and an internationally-led peacebuilding policy. In this regard, the consistency and continuity of engagement, as well as managing partnerships with actors on the ground (including but not limited to civil society) becomes vital (Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, 2010). The 2014 report by the Centre for International Cooperation on PBA performance stresses; “wider insights could also be gleaned from consultation with civil society actors involved in peacebuilding, especially at the country level” (Hearn *et al.*, 2014:11).

Jenkins (2010) describes a PBSO-promoted initiative which aided in increasing the inclusive role of civil society in Sierra Leone and Burundi in the electoral contexts of 2007 and 2010, respectively. This consisted of “South-South” learning processes in which Sierra Leonean civil society representatives as well as election officials engage in structured dialogue about the electoral processes with their Burundian counterparts. Wyeth (2011:6) argues that the 2010 SC and GA’s assessment of the PBC was “unusually consultative”, including field visits and discussions with civil society. This helped generate a renewed appreciation of UN political engagement. Nonetheless, Rugumamu (2009) describes in the report that, although the PBC initially took decisive steps and consulted a handful of civil society organizations in Sierra Leone and Burundi within the frame of the PBF National Steering Committee, it struggled to find legitimate representatives from host societies. This is attributed to the issue of communities and community leaders being too urban-based and state-appointed, causing difficulty for international actors to engage. The ActionAid *et al.* (2007) report also stresses a strong and highly critical urban bias on behalf of the UN when approaching civil society in Sierra Leone and Burundi.

In Sierra Leone specifically, the ActionAid *et al.* (2007) report described how, initially, civil society regarded the PBC as a potential catalyzer of national dialogue between the Government and citizens. The report then goes on to describe, however, that while there had been sound technical assessments of challenges in designing strategies and programs, the PBC had not yet achieved inclusive national dialogue when addressing the roots of the conflict. Furthermore, it was also reported that both national and international civil society members protested, claiming a lack of shared information about the work of the PBC in country, as well as not being included in the peacebuilding process. This was due to a feeling of exclusion, reminding many of the initial cause of conflict. In addition to this, the PBF National Steering Committee’s selection of two civil society representatives, namely the WANEP and the Mano River Women’s Network for Peace, was highly controversial. Some argued that those chosen were primarily urban-based actors, not representative of the grass-roots level, and that they

had also been hand-picked by the Government. Aiming to overcome this, civil society agreed to establish the Civil Society Peacebuilding Engagement Committee, a 19-member committee responsible for monitoring and evaluating PBF impact. The report, however, commented that Civil Society Peacebuilding Engagement Committee's forms of engagement with the PBC were unclear. Furthermore, the report also described how civil society repeatedly complained about its institutional incapacity to implement PBF-funded projects.

The country director of the Freetown-based NGO Search for Common Ground positively assessed the impact the PBC had in integrating civil society further into the peacebuilding process,

“Even today the PBC is still supporting several civil society organizations in the country, which is quite important, because what it does is that it increases the role of civil society in the governance of the country. Because imagine a government without civil society. It's a challenging thing to achieve. But the PBC like most other donors are helping to keep that alive. And I think that's quite important. And even rebuilding civil society capacity, like I said”³³.

He continued to highlight that the PBC, by including civil society within funding projects, has dealt with a wide range of actors, therefore managing to include a wide range of perspectives. In general non-UN interviewees, mainly civil society representatives, emphasized the positive impact of the PBC in supporting civil society, enhancing the UN-civil society relationship³⁴. The head officer of WANEP mentioned that the PBC's main role was to engage different stakeholders in an inclusive process, particularly civil society. Continuing in this vein, he claims the PBC intended to improve UN-civil society relationships³⁵. Similarly, the Country Director of Campaign for Good Governance stated that the PBC worked closely with non-state actors³⁶ and the

³³ Sankaituah, J. (2016, July 7). Personal interview.

³⁴ Sankaituah, J. (2016, July 7). Personal interview; Edwin, V. (2016, July 8). Personal interview; Tommy, I. (2016, July 18). Personal interview; Caulker, J. (2016, July 27). Personal interview; and Jombla, E. (2016, August 1). Personal interview.

³⁵ Jombla, E. (2016, August 1). Personal interview.

³⁶ Edwin, V. (2016, July 8). Personal interview.

former chairman of the TRC recalled the PBC's task in obtaining reports from the ground level, therefore gaining a closer view of the local³⁷.

However, certain interviewees pointed out weaknesses or pitfalls of the UN-civil society relationship. The former chair of the TRC specified how the PBC failed to make itself attractive and inclusive to locals³⁸. More specifically, the Executive Director of the Center for Accountability and Rule of Law Tommy highlighted a lack of women's participation³⁹. Similarly, the head office of Fambul Tok defined the PBC mandate as narrow and not visible, claiming it dealt mostly with state actors, leaving minimal space for others⁴⁰. Finally, the Country Director of Search for Common Ground highlights a UN-civil society relationship still presenting a challenge, as power relations continue to be uneven, indicating a big gap between theory and practice⁴¹.

Regarding the Burundian case, the Action Aid *et al.* (2007) report highlights that the PBF held numerous meetings with civil society in order to come to an agreement on peacebuilding priorities and further specified strategies. The report indicates successful achievements of the PBC in approaching civil society, such as increasing trust between civil society and the Government, specifically through the creation of the *Cadre de Dialogue et Concertation*, aimed at institutionalizing mechanisms of dialogue and interaction between these two local actors, within which civil society played a key role. A further example is the PBC-promoted *Justice de Proximité* initiative, thought to integrate civil society further into the justice system. However, the report also describes that this relationship deteriorated over time due to the fact that, on the one hand, PBC meetings were often announced at short notice, causing consultation with a wide range of actors to be more difficult, and, on the other, civil society organizations are usually project-dependent and

³⁷ Humper, J. (2016, July 23). Personal interview.

³⁸ Humper, J. (2016, July 23). Personal interview.

³⁹ Tommy, I. (2016, July 18). Personal interview.

⁴⁰ Caulker, J. (2016, July 27). Personal interview.

⁴¹ Sankaituah, J. (2016, July 7). Personal interview.

generally unable to engage in protracted policy discussions. The report also noted that the PBC initially failed to approach civil society in an inclusive way. This was due to those civil society organizations being approached being Tutsi-led, reflecting an appreciation of the old status quo rather than a new political context. The report concludes that, in general, civil society has been excluded from the peacebuilding process.

The former Burundian Director of Doctors of the World expressed that, although the PBC tried to engage Burundian civil society, people were ultimately disappointed with the UN as they viewed the organization as bending under pressure from the Government⁴². A research fellow from the Institute of Development Policy Management in Antwerp with expertise on the Burundian case highlighted that the PBC was initially successful in engaging civil society and adopting a bottom-up approach suitable for local actors to participate in the process. She adds that one of the key reasons for this was that civil society was motivated by remuneration⁴³.

Regarding the CAR, by and large, all interviewees with expertise in the country were reluctant to acknowledge PBC impact in the country, one of them pointing out that this was due to the responsibility being of only one technical person⁴⁴. In particular, as an independent consultant at the European Centre for Development Policy Management put it, civil society was frustrated due to a lack of influence in decision-making. As she expressed,

“In that meeting I attended of the PBC, civil society was quite frustrated because they were seen as sort of being co-opted just to inform about decisions. And to sort of say “Yes, we did inform civil society”. They were present in this meeting, sort of taking the box. Others... I think it depended a lot on the areas. (...) But it must also be said that at that time civil society in the CAR was poorly organized and rather poor in terms of capacity. So it was also very difficult for the international community side, although there was indeed an effort to try

⁴² Hara, F. (2016, September 23). Skype interview.

⁴³ Wilén, N. (2016, March 14). Skype interview.

⁴⁴ Picco, E. (2016, June 29). Skype interview.

to engage with them, and involve them, and try to support them, and including for example the church... provably the best network as in many other countries. And they did try to track on that mediation processes, dialogue. So I think there was a good knowledge on the context and a good understanding of the context, but also the capacity to try to do more, and the funding... funding for CAR was never much and at time it was really the international community to act"⁴⁵.

In sum, with the exception of the Sierra Leonean case, in which both UN and external interviewees seemed enthusiastic about the level of inclusion of civil society, most relevant UN and external assessment reports, as well as most interviewees, acknowledge that the UN still faces major challenges in its pursuit of including civil society within peacebuilding processes.

b) Inclusiveness of regional actors: The need for institutional capacity
By assessing the PBA aspiration for securing engagement between regional stakeholders and establishing a regional approach, this section illustrates how the PBA struggles to engage with regional organizations in the peacebuilding process, particularly those with weak institutional capacity. In other words, the institutional development of regional African organizations enables innovation and encourages further possibilities for the management of conflict-affected areas (see Kaminski, 2011). While Sierra Leone and Burundi benefited from the relative strength of the ECOWAS and the AU, respectively, and the role played by these actors in post-conflict engagements, the ECCAS and CEMAC have barely contributed to the UN-led post-conflict engagement in the CAR.

United Nations Self-assessment: Stressing success in Sierra Leone and Burundi

Typically, UN documentary data and interviewees describe positive results of the PBA endeavor in including regional actors in the post-conflict process, specifically for the Sierra Leone and Burundi cases. However, some UN officers stressed limited results of the UN in trying to engage regional actors in the CAR.

⁴⁵ Faria, F. (2016, March 16). Skype interview.

In the case of Sierra Leone, the 2015 “The Challenges of Sustaining Peace” report stressed the successful adoption by the PBC of a regional approach, including the ECOWAS and the Mano River Union, when addressing the Ebola crisis, contributing greatly to fostering strategic regional coherence for peacebuilding (Advisory Group of Experts, 2015: Art. 101). As a DPA senior official highlighted, although the involvement of ECOWAS was not necessary during the peacebuilding phase, both UNIPSIL and UNOWA developed positive relations with this regional organization⁴⁶. Similarly, a PBSO officer working on Sierra Leone stressed the key role UNOWA played in UN post-conflict engagement⁴⁷.

In the case of Burundi, the holding of sub-regional PBC-supported meetings contributed to improved cooperation amongst ECCAS and EAC. Furthermore, engagement of partners such as the Executive Secretariat of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Tripartite Plus Once Commission contributed to improved relations between the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. Furthermore, the EU, through the Political Directorate and in support of the PBC, Switzerland and the USA have aided in the progress of political dialogue (Peacebuilding Commission, 2009d). The PBC-supported Regional Peace Initiative in Burundi, including South Africa, Uganda or Tanzania, made crucial contributions to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Peacebuilding Commission, 2009d). The PBC also acknowledged as positive the progress made within the EAC by rejoining the East Customs Union and adopting the common external tariff (Peacebuilding Commission, 2011a).

As a the BNUB Chief staff put it when asked about the relationship between UN political missions and regional actors in the Burundian context,

⁴⁶ Anonymous I. (2016, March 11). Personal interview.

⁴⁷ Knott, L. (2017, February 3). Personal interview.

“I think with the AU very, very good. ECCAS to be honest it was cordial but they were not very visible at all. Until perhaps this presence phase. But it is much more the EAC. Once Burundi joins the EAC that becomes really the sub-regional organization that it’s much more influential. Because of course ECCAS is of Libreville. And so many of the member states like Gabon are unaffected by Burundi. But for Tanzania, for Rwanda and to some extent for Kenia and Uganda, if Burundi goes wrong really matters. The EAC was much more the central actor. The EAC is honestly less a regional organizational than a collection of powerful member states. So to some extent the relationship with the EAC is really the relation with bilateral member. And with all those we worked very closely”⁴⁸.

As a former ONUB SSR Unit officer expressed, the UN has historically maintained a positive and fruitful relationship with South Africa, which played a key role during the conflict and post-conflict stages. In addition to South Africa, the UN was also able to keep the AU on board during the post-conflict process⁴⁹.

Regarding the CAR, it is relevant to mention that it is the only case of the three case studies which, from class-based analysis, includes the class “Regional Approach” in the analysis of the three missions, which illustrates the importance the UN afforded to its regional approach (see table 3 in Annex 4). This “Regional approach” class includes in the three missions almost all region-oriented analyzed concepts for the CAR case, namely ECCAS, CEMAC, AU and EU. This class also includes other concepts which have the potential to be framed in the regional approach, such as “FOMUC” and “Chad” in the case of BONUCA; “MICOPAX” in the case of the PBC strategic framework and BINUCA; and “MISCA” in the case of BINUCA. Moreover, the “EU” concept in the PBC strategic framework is also in the class “Security”, illustrating the competition in the SSR domain between the UN and the EU. As a DPA officer formerly involved in the CAR stated, the PBC managed to bring international visibility to the case⁵⁰.

⁴⁸ Anonymous II. (2016, April 7). Skype interview.

⁴⁹ Vanheukelom, J. (2016, March 16). Skype interview.

⁵⁰ Coutinho, S. (2016, July 28). Skype interview.

Despite the recognized effort towards a regional approach, a former MINUSCA officer highlighted that the relationship between the UN and regional actors such as the ECCAS and the AU was rather tense, with the UN not knowing how to profit from ECCAS regional mediation⁵¹. Also in this critique, a former PBSO officer working on the CAR highlighted the weakness of regional actors, such as ECCAS or CEMAC, their lack of capacity and resources, as well as their underdevelopment. He specifies that ECCAS mediation was discontinued and the AU eventually withdrew⁵².

External assessment: Stressing failure in Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic

According to external evaluative reports and periodic reviews as well as interviewed external experts, neither in Sierra Leone nor in the CAR did regional stakeholders have a fluid relationship with the PBA. On the contrary, in the Burundian case the UN kept a fluid relationship with the AU, the key regional actor in the Burundian peacebuilding process.

In the Sierra Leonean case, Murithi (2008) describes that after the first two years of the deployment of the PBC in Sierra Leone, marked by an initial optimism, there were political and structural limitations hindering PBC and AU collaboration. Murithi argues that the AU participation in the PBC country-specific meetings in New York was minimal. Similarly, the general opinion of civil society experts was that the UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict missions deployed in the country did not pay much attention to regional dynamics, despite the key role regional actors such as Charles Taylor, Nigeria or the ECOWAS through ECOMOG played during the conflict and its immediate aftermath.

Beyond this, some of these experts pointed out the discredit paid to the ECOWAS by the UN during the peacebuilding process⁵³. A former advisor of the UK Government on the SSR process in Sierra Leone

⁵¹ Caramés, A. (2016, June 13). Skype interview.

⁵² Anonymous III. (2017, January 17). Personal interview.

⁵³ Edwin, V. (2016, July 8). Personal interview; Tommy, I. (2016, July 18). Personal interview; and Caulker, J. (2016, July 27). Personal interview.

admitted that, since the end of the direct violence and the beginning of the UN-led post-conflict stage in Sierra Leone, the ECOWAS has played a secondary role, maintaining a diplomatic relationship with the UN⁵⁴. Despite a degree of cooperation expressed by the head office of WANEP such as the UN providing funding, training and different kinds of support to the AU, the ECOWAS and the MRU, he also acknowledged that the UN need to make more concerted effort, such as harmonizing polices within this complex institutional network⁵⁵.

Regarding UK involvement in the conflict and post-conflict stages in Sierra Leone, a former UK Government advisor on the SSR process in the country stated that the UK was actually consistently taking the lead within the UN frame, even occasionally taking the lead unilaterally. The UK had greater capacity than the UN, to the extent to which at certain points the UN used the UK to distribute funding within the country⁵⁶. The former chair of the TRC stated that UK intervention, occurring during a point of high violence, actually paved the path for the UN to develop its post-conflict tasks⁵⁷.

In the Burundian case, a former external evaluator of the PBF in the country commented that the PBC had a positive impact in attempts at gaining international attention and intermediating between the Government, regional and international actors. She also highlighted a positive relationship between the UN and South Africa in the peacebuilding framework⁵⁸. The former Burundi Director of Doctors of the World expressed that, although the UN tried to coordinate as much as possible with regional actors, it was South Africans and the AU who fundamentally took the lead. She also admitted a strong relationship between the UN and the EU in the Burundian post-conflict context⁵⁹.

⁵⁴ Jackson, P. (2016, April 12). Skype interview.

⁵⁵ Jombala, E. (2016, August 1). Personal interview.

⁵⁶ Jackson, P. (2016, April 12). Skype interview.

⁵⁷ Humper, J. (2016, July 23). Personal interview.

⁵⁸ Campbell, S. (2016, March 22). Skype interview.

⁵⁹ Hara, F. (2016, September 23). Skype interview.

Regarding the CAR, Cinq-Mars (2015) argues that constructive regional engagement was a crucial missing ingredient in the CAR context. UN sanctions and actions against President Bozize and further regional measures have been often infringed upon, causing negative effects on peace efforts. Chad and Sudan played particularly negative roles in initiating conflicts at different stages, such as during the Seleka Rebellion in 2012. Chadian troops integrated in MICOPAX and MISCA were accused of serious abuses against civilians. Holding parallel peace talks and ignoring regional efforts, the Congolese President Denis Sassou Nguesso exacerbated the situation. Furthermore, De Carvalho and Lucey (2016) argue that the process of MINUSCA taking over the AU-led MISCA in 2014 was highly discussed, as it required a complex shift from a peacebuilding mindset to a peacekeeping mindset. The same report expresses that interviewed stakeholders felt the PBC had very limited impact in the country due to scarce funding from the PBF. It also argues that there was strong potential for closer interaction between the PBA and the AU-led MISAC.

An independent consultant associated with the European Center for Development and Policy Management commented that the UN made attempts to assist and coordinate regional actors, in particular during peace talks, encouraging regional actors take the lead in supporting the UN. According to her, because of personality sympathies, the UN could initially bring regional actors together, but a successful outcome was doubtful. At a certain point, the UN shadowed the work of regional actors such as MICOPAX. She emphasized that regional organizations conducted their own activities, regardless of UN attempts to set a common agenda, and that the AU in particular was rather absent. In contrast, she claimed that BONUCA did cooperate well with the EU, in particular in the SSR areas⁶⁰. Two other external experts on the CAR case also mentioned the key role France played, or the EU as a proxy

⁶⁰ Faria, F. (2016, March 16). Skype interview.

for France, in many issues⁶¹, one admitting that France is usually more critical of the Bozizé government than the UN⁶².

3. Failing in the pursuit for inclusiveness in political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements

As exposed above, inclusiveness in the frame of UN political and peacebuilding operations still remains a challenge to be fulfilled. In terms of the UN establishing positive relations with different stakeholders, the host Government plays a key and dominant role, more so than other actors such as civil society and regional organizations. This section draws on explanatory factors for the DPA-led failed goal of including local civil society and regional actors, as well as on the implications this lack of inclusivity brings about.

3.1 Explanatory factors

The relationship between the PBA and different stakeholders in post-conflict societies is constrained, amongst others, by general conditional factors such as the degree of military security. As the cases of Burundi and the CAR clearly illustrate⁶³, military security is key for the relationship between stakeholders, namely the host Government, civil society and regional actors, and UN political and peacebuilding operations, which have proven to be unable to cope with security issues⁶⁴. As the 2015 report by the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations states, the UN support to conflict-affected countries is particularly weak in the security sector (General Assembly and Security Council, 2015). One UN officer clarified when asked about PBC activities in Burundi,

⁶¹ Picco, E. (2016, June 29). Skype interview; and Lombard, L. (2016, July 21). Skype interview.

⁶² Lombard, L. (2016, July 21). Skype interview.

⁶³ Wilén, N. (2016, March 14). Skype interview.

⁶⁴ As an exception, two interviewees commented that BINUB had positive results in containing the military and assisting the Government in the DDR process during the early stage of BINUB, which was also initially framed in the DPKO umbrella (Campbell, S. (2016, March 22). Skype interview; and Wilén, N. (2016, March 14). Skype interview).

“I was still there when the PBC was created and then when I went back, because I continued to work on Burundi. One of my assignments was to develop the support program of donors in support of the Burundi national police. And then I must say I was not impressed at all by the PBC in that particular setting. The PBC tried to support it but they don’t have the capacity nor the knowledge, nor the tools, nor the attitude, nor the incentives to do the work they promised to do. That was 2006. I think that it got the mandate that was perhaps incentivizing a bit top-down behavior, so I think they had to go on to look for funding and resources (...). (...) in such a fragile environment, you don’t have the institutions on which to build whatever it is you want to develop”⁶⁵.

Contrary to DPKO-led peace operations, these political and peacebuilding post-conflict missions do not have neither the means nor the capacity to accomplish objectives in the security dimension. In reality, it is worthwhile to note, they were not created for this purpose. These missions are unable to pursue goals that their foundational mandates do not provide them with resources to fulfill, especially in the security arena.

Beyond general conditioning factors such as security, both civil society and regional actors face two particular kinds of hindrances in political and peacebuilding post-conflict process. The first refers to external factors, having to do with the intrinsic nature of the UN. The second set of explanatory factors embraces those particular characteristics of the host society or region, making it difficult for the actor to get closer to the UN.

a) Failing to include local civil society

As described above, the PBA has attempted to make the political and peacebuilding post-conflict process more inclusive by approaching local civil society and by setting up a more bottom-up approach to the process, what has been described as the transition from the national ownership principle to local ownership. However, and in light of

⁶⁵ Vanheukelom, J. (2016, March 16). Skype interview.

analyzed primary and secondary data, civil society still remains comparatively excluded from the process, at least for the examined cases.

External factors

This paper highlights three external factors hindering the inclusion of local civil society, including the prevalent will of donor states, ill-equipped institutional capacity and Western biases. The first major explanatory factor of the PBA's failed attempt for including civil society in political and peacebuilding post-conflict processes refers to the prevalence of donor states' will over the PBA. This means that the PBA has not been entirely independent, but, instead, tends to follow donor decisions and pressure within strategic planning. As Philipsen (2014) argues, using Sierra Leone as an example, donor states usually fund the PBA in order to assist the host Government in fulfilling its peacebuilding agenda, reasonably including, first and foremost, rebuilding governmental and State institutions as a priority. Under a form of state "brotherhood", state donors prioritize the rebuilding of basic state structures. Therefore, the PBA finds itself very close to the Government, resulting from the pressure placed by state donors, leaving other stakeholders, such as civil society, out of the process.

Secondly, the ill-equipped institutional capacity of the UN system, also highlighted as a factor contributing to a lack of intracoordination and coherence discussed in Chapter Five, hinders PBA efforts for inclusiveness of civil society in the process. As Does (2013:7) describes, there are no formal mechanisms of engagement in the UN internal institutional system such as protocols, guidelines or channels of communication to consult and consolidate a sound relationship with local peacebuilding actors. As an example of this, Action Aid et al. (2008) reported that the PBA-civil society relationship deteriorates over time because the PBC announces meetings at very short notice, hindering a wide consultation with civil society, as they often depend on the timing of projects and therefore are unable to engage in protracted or periodic policy discussions.

The third external factor corresponds to Western biases that the UN has when attempting to capture local civil society in post-conflict contexts. Many civil society organizations have critiqued the PBC for failing to comprehensively include the local civil society of conflict-affected countries as its approach is too urban-focused and, often, only centered in the capital of the country. Indeed, the PBA fails to identify, capture and address the complex and diverse nature of the local civil society, as the head office of a Freetown-based NGO expressed⁶⁶.

Internal factors

The dissertation highlights two internal factors affecting the inclusion of civil society, namely the weakness of local civil society and Government officers' international background. Aside from PBA particularities hindering civil society from being included in the political and peacebuilding process, civil society itself faces issues worth describing which also obstruct the inclusiveness of the process. The first factor is the weakness, division and poor organization of local civil society, which has been reported on by both the UN itself and external experts in peace operations (Advisory Group of Experts, 2015: Art. 44). This implies that, on the one hand, the UN finds it difficult to approach civil society representatives due to a lack of civil society-led vehicles of expression at different levels. The head office of WANEP stated that the difficulty the UN faces when approaching civil society and finding out who does what, particularly in reference to issues at the national level such as human rights or electoral processes, causes the PBC to approach the Government⁶⁷. In this vein, a former PBSO officer and former chief of DPA for the CAR stressed that civil society is often so politicized⁶⁸ and weak⁶⁹ that it makes it difficult for the UN to approach them. On the other hand, it makes it more likely for local peacebuilding actors to be manipulated by local elites.

⁶⁶ Jombla, E. (2016, August 1). Personal interview.

⁶⁷ Jombla, E. (2016, August 1). Personal interview.

⁶⁸ Coutinho, S. (2016, July 28). Skype interview.

⁶⁹ Anonymous III. (2017, January 17). Personal interview.

Secondly, there are certain characteristics host governments possess which keep the DPA and civil society distant, such as the fact that some Government officials or even the President himself might have a certain background in international organizations, familiarizing themselves with internal functioning of the UN or with UN officers. A former advisor of the UK Government on the SSR process in Sierra Leone emphasized the capacity of President Kabbah when dealing with the UN,

“I think they (the UN and the Government) were quite good at setting relationships. Certainly, in the early days. Kabbah had worked with international agencies before. He was very aware of the role of the UN, the capabilities of the UN, the issues to do with the UN. And relationships with the UN were excellent, really very good. I think also the fact that the Sierra Leonean government had been largely reconstructed and supported by a lot of internationals, I think also helped it relate quite closely with international organizations like the UN. Because I think that in some strange way there was an unusual understating of the nature of the UN from a number of Sierra Leonean officials, partly because some of them had been repatriated back to Sierra-Leone from international organizations”⁷⁰.

Similarly, a DPA Policy Coordination Officer, as well as a PBSO officer working on the Sierra Leonean case, stated that, in regard to the UN-Government relationship, it depends to a large extent on personality traits and personal sympathies⁷¹. Furthermore, the Government does not show significant excitement about the UN being close to civil society in post-conflict contexts, as this tends to encourage the consolidation of mechanisms holding the Government accountable and in general to be critical to its performance⁷². Inversely, as the former BNUB Chief staff put it, the UN is usually not popular within civil society, as it is often too close to the Government⁷³.

⁷⁰ Jackson, P. (2016, April 12). Skype interview.

⁷¹ Pak, J. (2017, March 1). Personal interview; and Knott, L. (2017, February 3). Personal interview, respectively.

⁷² Lawrence, M. (2016, March 7). Skype interview.

⁷³ Anonymous II. (2016, April 7). Skype interview.

b) Failing to include regional actors

Besides civil society, the PBA also has made attempts to adopt a sound regional approach in facing political and peacebuilding post-conflict processes. As has been presented, this is particularly the case of the CAR. Similar to factors hindering the inclusion of civil society within operations, regional actors also face particular issues obstructing full inclusivity in the process.

External factors

The thesis points to three external factors affecting the inclusion of regional actors, including personality traits, swaps of staff and lack of capacity building. Once again, personality traits seem to be a key factor leading to either successful or failed relations between UN political and peacebuilding missions and regional stakeholders. The former BNUB Chief staff expresses this idea as follows,

“I think they’re pretty good over the years. The AU and the mission (BNUB)... The AU had excellent leadership for a very critical period. You might have heard of ambassador Bah who was absolutely legendary and so influential in the course of peace in Burundi. He was a wonderful partner and his successive SRSG. I mean, I am not being diplomatic here. This is absolutely sincere. The partnership there was extremely close, similar optic I’d say. And it continued with Bah”⁷⁴.

Furthermore, individuals working for either an international or regional organization might often swap, notoriously enhancing relations between these two types of actors. A clear example is Patrick Lamboi, a former UNIPSIL officer who is currently working for the ECOWAS in Abuja.

Also on the UN side, some have criticized a lack of funding, meaning that the PBA does not invest enough to effectively include regional organizations in the political and peacebuilding process (De Carvalho and Lucey, 2016). This does not aid regional organizations, particularly in the Central and Eastern African context, in overcoming protracted

⁷⁴ Anonymous II. (2016, April 7). Skype interview.

institutional weakness, hindering their relationship with the UN. A former MINUSCA officer highlights the well-known institutional incapacity of ECCAS, which undoubtedly causes obstacles for any potential relationship with other stakeholders, such as the UN⁷⁵.

Internal factors

On the regional organizations side, two internal factors hinder their inclusion, including the reluctance of some regional organizations and the complexity of the regional organizational network. The first factor, appreciating the reluctance of regional organizations to get closer to the UN, appreciated reasons which vary from, one, a sense of pan-African nationalism against foreign intervention to two, the discredit paid by the general public to previously region-led operations. A clear example is the case of Sierra Leone, where it is said that the UN never applauded enough what the ECOWAS's predominantly Nigerian ECOMOG did to overcome the conflict, later addressed by nominating a Nigerian as the head of UNAMSIL. The country director of the Campaign for Good Governance narrates a story illustrating this argument,

“We are very pleased that the ECOMOG played such a significant role. Unfortunately, researchers like yourself, and even others who have come, do not give enough emphasis on the role of ECOMOG. Most literature I read talk about the abuses or human rights of EMOCOMG. And even at the time the UN had peacekeepers who were doing the same. They requested for sex. I mean there is not enough evidence. Because not many people have investigated that. They say that ECOMOG shot rebels but I am sure were the UN troops in the same position, they would do the same. So unfortunately the focus on EMOCOG has not been significantly on the very important role they played, even more than the UN itself. Because when the flames were there, when the rebels were killing all of us, we never saw any blue helmet. It was just the ECOMOG soldiers, and so many of them died, were tortured, betrayed, and they kept on, and they were able to ensure that the UN could come in. But unfortunately that it is not well reflected in a lot of research work. And I always try to find the opportunity to tell that story, because that is the true story of the conflict. It was

⁷⁵ Caramés, A. (2016, June 13). Skype interview.

ECOMOG that created the space for the UN peacekeepers to come in. So yes, they also do have a relationship, because even if you take that as an example, the ECOMOG had the UN endorsement, even though again there might be some arguments about whether they got the endorsement before they came in or whether they got it after. (...) So I think ECOMOG came in time to save the situation⁷⁶.

The second factor refers to the complexity of the regional institutional network. For example, regarding regions in the cases of study, West Africa hosts the ECOWAS and the Mano River Union; East Africa hosts EAC, the ECGLC and COMESA; and Central Africa hosts ECCAS and CEMAC. Additionally, all case study countries are part of the AU. This extensive net of regional organizations, which are rather weak⁷⁷, is usually very poorly coordinated, hindering even further extra-regional organizations such as the UN from establishing a sound relationship. Beyond this institutional complexity, some countries are located in bordering areas between regions, proving it difficult for countries to address a comprehensive strategic regional approach. This is the case of Burundi, which is part of ECCAS and EAC simultaneously.

3.2 Critical implications for the liberal peacebuilding project

The PBA failure to focus too much on the Government and set aside local civil society and regional actors contributes to the depression of the liberal peacebuilding project. This is illustrated by some implications of this failure which the UN faces in host societies.

First, being close to the Government might generate problematic issues in post-conflict contexts. Sierra Leone, Burundi and the Central African Republic present notoriously bad results in the Global Corruption Barometer of Transparency International⁷⁸. Therefore, distributing large amounts of resources to these Governments might lead to

⁷⁶ Edwin, V. (2016, July 8). Personal interview.

⁷⁷ Anonymous III. (2017, January 17). Personal interview.

⁷⁸ See Transparency International website, available from: <http://www.transparency.org/country/>

corruption and a misuse of resources (Wilder and Gordon, 2009), affecting the focus of peacebuilding on socioeconomic development and the reform of political and administrative structures (Cheng and Zaum, 2009). Moreover, as a former UNIPSIL puts it, regarding timing, the UN-assisted constitutional review has not been fully successful due to lack of Government impartiality. For example, the heads of key rebuilt state institutions on corruption (Anti-corruption Commission), judiciary, police, human rights (Human Rights Commission) or elections (Independent Electoral Commission) are appointed by the President, therefore becoming highly politicized⁷⁹. This hinders the independence of these institutions from the government and poses in turn a challenge to transparent, accountable and efficient results. Finally, this close relationship between the UN and the Government in post-conflict contexts implies that sometimes the UN is not critical enough with the performance of Governments, with mechanisms of accountability being rather dubious⁸⁰. Regardless, DPA-led and PBA missions are hosted at the local Government's will, which questions independence between both⁸¹. Similarly, the independence between the UN and civil society is questionable. As the head of the Campaign for Good Governance and the Executive Director of the Centre for the Accountability and Rule of Law stressed, the UN is actually the main source of funding of civil society, implying the potential of the UN to shape this relationship⁸².

Second, concerning the failed inclusion of local civil society, Western biases and the resulting exclusion of a large part of the local civil society, particularly in rural areas, reinforces the existence of an elite within local civil society⁸³. Thus, targeted actors of local civil society are usually a non-representative minority elite, thus establishing a sense of rejection

⁷⁹ Lamboi, P. (2016, August 10). Skype interview.

⁸⁰ Tommy, I. (2016, July 18). Personal interview.

⁸¹ Caulker, J. (2016, July 27). Personal interview.

⁸² Edwin, V. (2016, July 8). Personal interview; and Tommy, I. (2016, July 18). Personal interview.

⁸³ Iro (2009) discusses this urban bias in the case of the UN peacebuilding task in post-conflict Sierra Leone.

of the UN from the majority of local civil society⁸⁴. However, attempting to approach local civil society in its integrity might also be problematic. For example, the adult literacy rate for Sierra Leone, Burundi and the Central African Republic is 44%⁸⁵, 60%⁸⁶ and 36%⁸⁷, respectively, and often local population outside the capital cannot speak English or French, for which institutionalizing UN-led mechanisms of cooperation is rather difficult.

Finally, regarding the failed inclusion of regional actors, there is a similar feeling towards the UN. As the UN fails to engage them in the post-conflict processes, they may become reluctant to participate in the process. The lack of inclusion of regional actors indicates a missed opportunity for empowering regional powers. Similar to the deferral of local ownership, it seems the UN is also reluctant to transfer authority to regional powers. This presents an oxymoron: major UN reports stress the necessity to take a regional approach in peacebuilding processes, but, again, it seems merely discursive and rhetorical, as the reality shows otherwise.



In conclusion, this chapter argues that the DPA and PBA, with neither the locally-focused reform nor an attempt to include regional actors,

⁸⁴ As an example of this minority elite, DPA-led missions usually hire a quota of locals to work for the field mission. Some of these locals become deeply integrated in the UN system on the ground but, at the same time, they might also be involved in local community-based NGOs. In these cases, it is hard to categorize the nature of these individuals, which are partly involved in an external actor and partly in an internal actor, but surely do not represent faithfully either of them.

⁸⁵ See UNDP website, available from: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data> (rate from 2012).

⁸⁶ See UNDP website, available from: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data> (rate from 2000).

⁸⁷ See UNDP website, available from: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data> (rate from 2010).

contributed to enhancing the results of DPA and PBA led post-conflict engagements. Additionally, it confirms implications of the failed PBA endeavor for inclusiveness of local civil society and regional actors in the frame of political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements, including, first, problems which might stem from a too close relationship to the Government, second, Western biases and the resulting consolidation of a local civil society elite and, third, the reluctance of regional actors to partner with the UN, reinforcing the current state of depression of the liberal peacebuilding project.

CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER SEVEN. CONCLUSIONS

The outcomes of this research respond to the initial objectives and demonstrate the hypothesis of the dissertation, confirming that the United Nations (UN) failure in its pursuit contributes to and reinforces the current state of depression of the liberal peacebuilding project. In this final Chapter I present twelve conclusions categorized into four groups, including, first, the results of UN DPA (Department of Political Affairs) and new PBA (Peacebuilding Architecture) endeavors for coherence in the frame of UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements; second, the results of the endeavor for inclusiveness of local civil society and regional actors; third, explanatory factors of UN failure; and, fourth, the implications of these results. From these conclusions, I argue why the initial hypothesis is confirmed and, finally, I raise future lines of research on the topic.

1. Conclusions regarding coherence in UN post-conflict engagements

In the endeavor for coherence, the DPA integrated special political missions and PBA settings presented mandates of a multidimensional nature, including facets of security, governance and positive peace. Through the use of software-assisted analysis of UN documentary data at the operational level, however, the failure of these post-conflict engagements in maintaining a coherent strategy across planning at the New York-based headquarters and what is put into practice in the field is elucidated. Despite an equitable multidimensionality of mandates at the normative level, empirics show how at the operational level in the field, security was prioritized significantly over governance and positive peace, thus causing a loss in coherence. Furthermore, analytical outcomes also confirm that DPA-integrated missions failed to adequately secure post-conflict contexts, thus enabling a relapse into violence- particularly evident in the cases of Burundi and the Central African Republic (CAR). Several interviewees stressed that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) often fails to identify

appropriate timing for withdrawal and transfer of mandate to a DPA mission which, despite the potential for integrated structure, is composed of a much smaller number of people and fewer means to address security.

In regard to the particular results of the DPA in the endeavor for coherence, primarily attempting to contribute to coherence through the deployment of integrated special political missions, outcomes of the analysis illustrate a divergence in assessments from different sources. This indicates a lack of consensus amongst results in the endeavor for coherence across the examined post-conflict engagements (see table 13). This divergence in assessments contributes to increased difficulty for the UN to agree on reforms for overcoming the remaining challenges in its endeavor for coherence. While UN official documentary data partly points to positive results of these integrated missions towards the goal of coherence, UN officers interviewed in more informal contexts have proven to be more critical, specifically for the Burundian and CAR cases. When appreciating external documentary data and interviews with external experts, results generally point to a significantly more negative assessment than UN data and, specifically, major failures are stressed in the coherence endeavor for the CAR case.

Table 13. Results of the DPA integrated special political missions in coherence.

		Data	
		Documentary	Interviews
Source	UN	Partly positive	Stress criticism for Burundi and CAR
	External	Generally negative. Stress CAR failure	Generally negative. Stress CAR failure

In regard to the particular results of the PBA in the endeavor for coherence, the outcomes of the analysis illustrate that there is a divergence in assessments based on the nature of the data (documentary data and interviews) (see table 14). This illustrates how the source, the nature or means through which data is released have the potential for

constraining the data itself. Despite a partly positive assessment from country reports and reviews, as well as from some UN officers during interviews, the two major UN assessments during the fifth and tenth anniversaries of the PBC, in 2010 and 2015 respectively, highlighted deep deficiencies in the area of coherence in post-conflict engagements. When appreciating data gathered from external documentary and interviews held with external experts, results of the UN sources analysis are reflected. Despite positive results highlighted by external experts during interviews, the two most acknowledged external reports, developed by the New York University Centre for International Cooperation and the International Peace Institute respectively, stress poor and limited results occurring from Peacebuilding Commission efforts for coherence in the frame of post-conflict engagements.

Table 14. Results of PBA engagements in coherence.

		Data	
		Documentary	Interviews
Source	UN	Generally negative	Partly positive
	External	Generally negative	Partly positive

2. Conclusions regarding inclusiveness in UN post-conflict engagements

In the pursuit of inclusiveness of different stakeholders in UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements, the software-assisted analysis of UN documentary data as well as discursive analysis of interviews, both with UN officers and external experts, implies that the UN prioritizes the relationship with the host Government over other stakeholders, such as local civil society and regional actors. The research also highlights the role of elections, identifying this public process as a fundamental aspect that this relationship is predominantly sustained on.

In regard to the analysis of the PBA endeavor of including local civil society in peacebuilding processes, the research reveals that the institutionalization of processes aimed at encouraging participation of local civil society has the potential for contributing to the inclusion of

this type of stakeholder in UN post-conflict engagements (see table 15). While Sierra Leone and Burundi present examples of these institutionalized processes (in Sierra Leone, the Joint communiqué, the Agenda for Change, the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions or women civil society organizations, and in Burundi, the *Cadre de Dialogue et Concertation*, and the *Justice de Proximité*), successful examples are not found in the CAR of any sort of institutionalized process for partnership. Major reports, both from the UN and external sources, generally agree that inclusion of local civil society in political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements remains an unfulfilled challenge. Through the analysis of further UN data, both documentary and interviews conducted UN officers, it follows that Sierra Leone and Burundi have reached a relatively higher level of inclusion of local civil society, whereas external documentary data and interviews with external experts stress, instead, the failure in the cases of Burundi and the CAR. Again, there appears to be consensus on the failure of the CAR case.

Table 15. Results of PBA engagements in inclusiveness of local civil society.

		Data	
		Documentary	Interviews
Source	UN	Generally negative. Better in Sierra Leone and Burundi.	Better in Sierra Leone and Burundi.
	External	Generally negative. Stress failure in Burundi and the CAR.	Stress failure in Burundi and the CAR.

In regard to the particular results of the PBA endeavor in including regional actors in peacebuilding processes, the research identifies that the PBA struggles to engage regional organizations in the peacebuilding process when these regional actors lack institutional capacity (see table 16). While Sierra Leone and Burundi benefited from the relative strength of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU), respectively, and the role they have played in the post-conflict engagement, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) or the Economic and Monetary

Community of Central Africa (*CEMAC*, in French) have minimal activity in the peacebuilding process in the CAR. UN documentary data and UN officers highlight positive results of PBA efforts in including regional actors, particularly in the cases of Sierra Leone and Burundi, whereas external reports and interviews with external experts emphasize that regional actors in Sierra Leone and the CAR were not successfully included in the peacebuilding process. Once again, the CAR is deemed a case of failure by both UN and external data sources.

Table 16. Results of PBA engagements in inclusiveness of regional actors

		Data	
		Documentary	Interviews
Source	UN	Positive results in Sierra Leone and Burundi.	Positive results in Sierra Leone and Burundi.
	External	Negative results in Sierra Leone and the CAR.	Negative results in Sierra Leone and the CAR.

3. Conclusions regarding explanatory factors for DPA and PBA failure of coherence and inclusiveness in UN post-conflict engagements

The dissertation also concludes that several factors contribute to explaining the limited results of the DPA and PBA endeavors for coherence and inclusiveness of local civil society and regional actors. In addition to the particular factors identified below, the degree of military security in the assisted context is presented as a general conditional factor with the potential of constraining the results in these two strategic goals. In comparative terms, documentary data and interviews, both from the UN and external sources, point to improved results in the Sierra Leonean case, particularly when contrasted with Burundi and the CAR. I argue that UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements require a secure context in order to address their challenges. 15 years after the end of the war, Sierra Leone presents a relatively secure context, whereas Burundi and the CAR are still currently witnessing major violent episodes. Whenever the UN fails to

identify when a relapse into violence is likely and mistakenly determines the timing for the DPKO to transfer the mission to the DPA or the PBA, as in Burundi and the CAR, the DPA or the PBA are unexpectedly forced to address security aspects, for which they neither have the means nor the capacity.

Concerning lack of coherence, the thesis has identified three factors which may account for the failure, namely the existence of turf battles both at the New York-based headquarters and on the field level, the ill-equipped institutional capacity of the DPA and the PBA, and the highly fragmented, bureaucratic and decentralized operational apparatus of the organization. The first factor refers to different aspects of the UN related to internal clashes of interest. In particular, the dissertation draws on inter-departmental tensions and turf battles, problematic episodes stemming from leadership issues and personality traits. The second factor describes the ill-equipped institutional capacity of the UN, including lack of guidelines, protocols and communication channels, hindering a sound coherence. Thirdly, the analysis sheds light on the institutional and organizational nature of the UN, which is highly fragmented, bureaucratic and decentralized, thus preventing an improvement towards a coherent approach to peace engagements.

Concerning lack of inclusion of local civil society, the dissertation distinguishes between external and internal explanatory factors which hindered the task of inclusiveness. On the one hand, external factors are comprised, first, of the determining will of donor states over the PBA, in order for the to not be completely independent. Other factors include donor states feeling more comfortable working with the Government; the ill-equipped institutional capacity of the PBA, specifically the lack of standardized mechanisms for engagement of local civil society actors; and finally, Western biases such as the urban or ethnic biases preventing the PBA from faithfully identifying a representative group within local civil society. Internal factors, however, include, first, the weakness, division and poor organization of local civil society in post-conflict societies, causing the UN to struggle to identify who to approach amongst those stakeholders; and second, the

professional background of some politicians of assisted countries who have worked for international or regional organizations facilitate a smoother UN-Government relationship. In contrast, local civil society is commonly unfamiliar with the internal functioning of international organizations such as the UN.

Concerning the lack of inclusion of regional actors, different external and internal factors account for the unsatisfactory results of the PBA endeavor. External factors include, first, personality traits, for example, the impressive ability of the AU's ambassador to Burundi Mamadou Bah to engage with the UN allowed for the inclusion of the AU in the process; second, swaps, cases when individuals working for an external international organization such as the UN jump to a regional organization, or vice versa, thus easing channels of communication between both; and third, the lack of resources, support and capacity-building measures provided by the UN to regional actors in order to prevent that relationship from being unequal and dependent. Internal factors include first, the reluctance of some regional organizations to collaborate with the UN due to political or ideological reasons such as pan-Africanist beliefs; and second, the complexity of the regional institutional network, which hinders coordination within themselves and with the UN.

4. Conclusions concerning the implications of DPA and PBA failures in coherence and inclusiveness in UN post-conflict engagements

The dissertation identifies two specific implications for the lack of coherence in the frame of UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict. Firstly, the research highlights the difficulties presented to external actors when engaging with an incoherent UN in post-conflict engagements. The second highlights the impossibility of developing a deep understanding of the local reality at the headquarters level, thus hindering the design and planning of effective UN peacebuilding strategies. Both factors are barriers to successful results of the UN

peacebuilding endeavor, reinforcing the current state of depression of the liberal peacebuilding project.

The dissertation goes on to identify three implications of the lack of inclusiveness of local civil society and regional actors in the frame of UN-led peacebuilding processes. First, having too close of a relationship with the host Government and placing this actor at the center of the peacebuilding process has the potential of being problematic, due to high levels of corruption, impartiality issues or accountability mechanisms. Second, when appreciating the lack of inclusion of local civil society, due to certain sectors of the populations, such as in rural areas, being systematically neglected and forgotten, an elite is established within the local civil society. This understandably results in a reluctance on behalf of the excluded peacebuilding actors towards collaborating with UN projects. The final implication, regarding the failed inclusion of regional actors, contributes to regional organizations becoming reluctant to participate in UN peacebuilding processes. These implications hamper the positive development of UN peacebuilding, thus reinforcing the current state of depression of the liberal peacebuilding process.

5. Demonstrating the initial hypothesis

These conclusions support the initial hypothesis of the dissertation. In sum, the dissertation has concluded, first, that the DPA and the new PBA have failed in their endeavor of fulfilling the strategic goals of coherence and inclusiveness of local civil society and regional actors in UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements. Second, the results of the analysis unravel certain explanatory factors, accounting for this failure. Coherence becomes elusive due to the existence of turf battles both at New York-based headquarters and in the field, the ill-equipped institutional capacity of the DPA and the PBA, and the highly fragmented, bureaucratic and decentralized operational apparatus of the organization. Inclusiveness of local civil society has, furthermore, been unsuccessful due to external factors (the prevalent will of donor states over the PBA, the ill-equipped institutional capacity of the PBA and

Western biases such as urban or ethnic biases preventing the PBA from faithfully identifying a representative group within local civil society) as well as internal (the weakness, division and poor organization of local civil society in post-conflict societies, and the professional background of certain politicians of the assisted countries who worked for international or regional organizations). Similarly, inclusiveness of regional actors has also been hindered by external factors (personality traits, swaps of individuals working for external and regional organizations, and lack of resources, support and capacity-building measures provided by the UN to regional actors) as well as internal (the reluctance of certain regional organizations to collaborate with the UN, and the complexity of the regional institutional network).

Third, the implications of the failed attempts at coherence (difficulty of external actors to engage with an incoherent UN, and the impossibility of having an in-depth understanding of the local reality at the headquarters level) as well as for inclusiveness of local civil society and regional actors (being too close to the host Government may be problematic, the consolidation of an elite within local civil society, and the reluctance of regional organizations to participate in UN peacebuilding processes) hinders the results of UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements. Therefore, these implications contribute to the current depression of the overall liberal peacebuilding project, within which, as argued in the first part of the dissertation, the UN peacebuilding effort has played a prime role over the last three decades.

6. Future areas of research

This dissertation first highlights the failure of the DPA and PBA in fulfilling mandates of coherence and inclusiveness in the frame of UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements. It then goes on to identify how issues reinforce the current depression of the liberal peacebuilding project, in an attempt to contribute to the critiques of the policy and radical critiques and, more in particular, of their policy outcomes, namely the technocratic turn and the local turn. In other

words, the argument of this thesis seeks to contribute to the so-called critiques of critiques. This perspective calls for an awareness aimed to avoid reproducing the failed steps taken by the preceding policy and radical critiques, as well as their policy outcomes. By “failed steps”, I refer to, for example, the problem of radical critiques and resulting local turn, which, instead of genuinely empowering local actors, perpetuated the binary intervenors-intervened framework, based on an essentialized difference and a hierarchy encouraged between liberal Western intervener and a localized Other. With the goal of challenging this, I propose further lines with the potential to enrich and contribute to the critical peace and conflict studies research agenda, directed specifically at the critiques of critiques theoretical debate:

i. In order to assess the UN peacebuilding framework, this thesis has analyzed the role the DPA and PBA have played. However, as clarified in the introduction, this does not imply that other UN bodies, such as the DPKO, the UNDP, the UNHCR, the HRC, *inter alia*, solely develop activities which could be framed within the UN peacebuilding endeavor. Therefore, in order to enhance and support a growth in understanding UN peacebuilding, it is valuable to develop research on these UN bodies which might also contribute to the outcomes of UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements.

ii. As local turn-oriented UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements neither effectively broke the hierarchical binary of the intervenors-intervened framework empowering local populations, nor avoided relapse into conflict in assisted countries, we should strengthen directions of research which interrogate non-binary peace engagements.

iii. Beyond the failure of this local approach to break the hierarchical binary framework, the liberal nature of UN political and peacebuilding post-conflict engagements did not contribute to establishing lasting peace in war-torn societies. In fact, universal and universalizing liberal democratic systems have not been successfully accommodated within examined non-Western countries. Therefore, research concerned with

examining appropriate political and social forms of organization for particular conflict-affected society should be strengthened.

iv. The emerging sustaining peace approach has been presented in chapter Five as a new framework for UN peace engagements based on two main characteristics; namely a non-temporal and holistic approach to peace engagements. This new concept presents certain possibilities which should encourage us to strengthen research in its potential conceptual and operational forms. This should be done in order to avoid a regression into a vicious cycle, such as the one of the peacebuilding framework: conceptualization-institutionalization-operationalization-failure-reconceptualization.

I find these two characteristics of the sustaining peace approach of particular interest for two reasons. First, because the transfer of missions in the field from the DPKO to the DPA based on temporal phases of conflict (pre-, during and post-) has been proven to be problematic. Secondly, because personality traits, inter-departmental clashes and institutional disputes have been highlighted as potential explanatory factors for the DPA and PBA failure and this holistic approach to peace engagements could bring about the unity of UN departments responsible for dealing with armed conflicts. Beyond this, the emergence of this new concept might be taken as a sign of the arrival of a post-peacebuilding phase of UN peace engagements. Looking into whether the core content of the sustaining peace approach comprises a liberal democratic root or if we could, instead, be witnessing a post-“liberal peacebuilding project” phase, I find of particular interest to examine.

CAPÍTOL SET. CONCLUSIONS (CATALAN)

Els resultats d'aquesta investigació responen als objectius inicials i demostren la hipòtesi de la tesi, confirmant que el fracàs de l'ONU contribueix i reforça l'estat actual de depressió del projecte liberal de construcció de pau. En aquest capítol final, presento dotze conclusions categoritzades en quatre grups, incloent, en primer lloc, els resultats de les missions polítiques especials integrades del Departament d'Afers Polítics (DAP) i els processos dirigits per l'Arquitectura de Construcció de Pau (PBA) de l'Organització de les Nacions Unides (ONU) en assolir coherència en el marc dels processos polítics i de construcció de pau postbèl·lics; segon, els resultats d'aquests dos òrgans en assolir la inclusió de la societat civil local i dels actors regionals en aquests mateixos processos; tercer, els factors explicatius del fracàs de l'ONU en assolir aquests dos objectius estartègics; i quart, les implicacions d'aquests resultats infructuosos. A partir d'aquestes conclusions, argumento perquè es confirma la hipòtesi inicial i, finalment, plantejo futures línies de recerca sobre aquest tema.

1. Conclusions en referència a la coherència en els processos de construcció de pau postbèl·lics de l'ONU

Pel que fa a l'esforç per a la coherència, primerament s'observa que el DAP i l'ACP presenten mandats de caràcter multidimensional, incloent aspectes de seguretat, governança i pau positiva. Tanmateix, a través de l'anàlisi assistit per Iramuteq de les dades documentals de l'ONU, en l'àmbit operacional, queda reflectit el fracàs d'aquests processos de construcció de pau a l'hora d'assolir una estratègia coherent entre la seu central de Nova York i el que s'acaba implementant sobre el terreny. Malgrat una multidimensionalitat equitativa dels mandats en l'àmbit normatiu, els resultats empírics mostren que a nivell operacional, la seguretat es prioritza significativament per davant la governança i la pau positiva, evidenciant així una manca de coherència. A més, els resultats de l'anàlisi també confirmen que les missions del DAP no han aconseguit garantir la seguretat en els contextos postbèl·lics on ha assistit, cosa que facilita un retorn a la violència, especialment evident en els casos de Burundi i la República Centreafricana. Diversos entrevistats van destacar que el Departament d'Operacions de Manteniment de la Pau (DOMP) sovint no identifica el moment adequat per retirar-se i transferir el mandat a una missió postbèl·lica sota la direcció del DAP que, malgrat desplegar-se sobre el terreny d'una

forma integrada, opera a través de missions d'un nombre molt menor de persones i amb menys mitjans, sobre tot per gestionar de seguretat.

Pel que fa als resultats del DAP en concret en l'objectiu estratègic de la coherència, principalment mitjançant el desplegament de missions polítiques especials integrades, els resultats de l'anàlisi il·lustren una divergència en les avaluacions de les diferents fonts d'informació. Això indica una manca de consens sobre els resultats en la coherència en les missions analitzades (vegen la taula 1). Aquesta divergència en les avaluacions contribueix a augmentar la dificultat perquè l'ONU acordi reformes per enfortir el repte que suposo aquest objectiu estratègic. Si bé les dades documentals oficials de l'ONU apunten resultats parcialment positius d'aquestes missions pel que fa a la coherència, el personal de l'ONU ha demostrat ser més crític en un context més informal com el de l'entrevista, específicament en els casos de Burundi i la República Centreafricana. En referència a les dades documentals externes i entrevistes amb experts externs, els resultats generalment apunten a una avaluació significativament més negativa que les dades de l'ONU i, en concret, es destaca el fracàs en el cas de la República Centreafricana.

Taula 1. Resultats de les missions polítiques especials integrades del DAP en l'objectiu estratègic de la coherència.

		Dades	
		Documentals	Entrevistes
Fonts	ONU	<i>Parcialment positius</i>	<i>Accentuen les crítiques cap als casos de Burundi i la República Centreafricana</i>
	Externes	<i>Generalment negatius. Accentuen el fracàs a la República Centreafricana</i>	<i>Generalment negatius. Accentuen el fracàs a la República Centreafricana</i>

Pel que fa als resultats de l'ACP en concret en l'objectiu estratègic de la coherència, els resultats de l'anàlisi il·lustren que hi ha una divergència en les avaluacions basada en la procedència de les dades (dades documentals i entrevistes) (vegen la taula 2). Això il·lustra com la font o el mitjà a través del quals s'obtenen les dades tenen una incidència potencial en la naturalesa de les mateixes dades. Malgrat una avaluació parcialment positiva dels informes i avaluacions de les missions, així com d'alguns oficials de l'ONU entrevistats, els dos principals informes avaluadors de l'ONU

publicats en el cinquè i desè aniversari de la Comissió per a la Construcció de Pau (CCP), al 2010 i 2015 respectivament, van destacar profundes deficiències en l'àmbit de la coherència en els processos de construcció de pau postbèl·lics liderats per l'ONU. En l'anàlisi de dades documentals externes i entrevistes realitzades a experts externs, mentre algun d'aquest menciona resultats positius, els dos informes externs més reconeguts, desenvolupats pel Center on International Cooperation de la Universitat de Nova York i l'International Peace Institute, destaquen resultats limitats de la CCP en la coherència en el marc dels processos postbèl·lics de l'ONU.

Taula 2. Resultats de l'ACP en l'objectiu estratègic de la coherència.

		Dades	
		Documentals	Entrevistes
Fonts	ONU	Generalment negatius	Parcialment positius
	Externes	Generalment negatius	Parcialment positius

2. Conclusions en referència a la inclusió en els processos de construcció de pau postbèl·lics de l'ONU

Pel que fa a la inclusió de diferents actors en els processos polítics i de construcció de pau postbèl·lics de l'ONU, l'anàlisi de les dades documentals de la organització assistit per Iramuteq, així com l'anàlisi discursiva de les entrevistes, tant a personal de l'ONU com a experts externs, il·lustra que l'ONU prioritza la relació amb el govern amfítrió per davant altres actors, com ara la societat civil local i els actors regionals. La investigació també destaca el paper de les eleccions com un aspecte fonamental sobre el qual es basa aquesta estreta relació entre l'ONU i el govern.

Pel que fa als resultats del DAP en incloure la societat civil local en els processos de construcció la pau de l'ONU, la investigació revela que la institucionalització de processos encaminats a fomentar la participació de la societat civil local té el potencial de contribuir a la inclusió d'aquest actor en aquests processos (vegen taula 3). Mentre que Sierra Leona i Burundi presenten exemples d'aquesta institucionalització (a Sierra Leona, el Joint communiqué, la Agenda for Change, les comissions de la veritat i la reconciliació o les organitzacions de dones de la societat civil, i a Burundi, la Cadre de Dialogue et Concertation, i la Justice de Proximité), no es troben exemples reeixits en el cas de la República Centreafricana de cap tipus de procés institucionalitzat orientat a la inclusió de la societat civil local. Els principals informes evaluadors, tant de l'ONU com de fonts externes, generalment accepten que

la inclusió de la societat civil local en els processos polítics i de construcció de pau postbèl·lics continua sent un desafiament incomplet. A través de l'anàlisi d'altres dades de l'ONU, tant documentals com entrevistes realitzades a personal de l'organització, es dedueix que Sierra Leona i Burundi han assolit un nivell relativament més alt d'inclusió de la societat civil local, mentre que les dades documentals externes i les entrevistes amb experts externs a l'ONU subratllen el fracàs en els casos de Burundi i la República Centreafricana. De nou, sembla que hi ha consens sobre el fracàs en el cas de la República Centreafricana.

Taula 3. Resultats de l'ACP en l'objectiu estratègic de la inclusió de la societat civil local.

		Dades	
		Documentals	Entrevistes
Fonts	ONU	<i>Generalment negatius. Millors resultats a Sierra Leona i Burundi.</i>	<i>Millors resultats a Sierra Leona i Burundi.</i>
	Externes	<i>Generalment negatius. Accentuen el fracàs a Burundi i a la República Centreafricana.</i>	<i>Accentuen el fracàs a Burundi i a la República Centreafricana.</i>

Pel que fa als resultats de l'ACP en incloure actors regionals en els processos de construcció de pau de l'ONU, la investigació identifica que l'ACP té dificultat per incloure les organitzacions regionals en aquests processos quan aquests actors no tenen capacitat institucional (vegeu la taula 4). Mentre que Sierra Leona i Burundi es beneficien de la relativa fortalesa de la Comunitat Econòmica dels Estats d'Àfrica Occidental (en anglès, ECOWAS) i la Unió Africana (UA), respectivament, així com del paper que han tingut en els processos postbèl·lics, la Comunitat Econòmica de l'Àfrica Central (en anglès, ECCAS) o la Comunitat Econòmica i Monetària de l'Àfrica Central (en francès, CEMAC) tenen una activitat mínima en el procés de construcció de pau a la República Centreafricana. Les dades documentals de l'ONU i el personal de l'organització entrevistat destaquen resultats positius de l'ACP en incloure agents regionals, especialment en els casos de Sierra Leona i Burundi, mentre que els informes externs i entrevistes a experts externs subratllen que els actors regionals de Sierra Leona i la República Centreafricana no s'han inclòs amb èxit. Una vegada més, la República Centreafricana es considera un cas de fracàs tant per fons de dades de l'ONU com externes.

Taula 4. Resultats de l'ACP en l'objectiu estratègic de la inclusió dels actors regionals.

		Dades	
		Documentals	Entrevistes
Fonts	ONU	Positiu a Sierra Leona i Burundi.	Positiu a Sierra Leona i Burundi.
	Externes	Negatiu a Sierra Leona i la República Centreafricana.	Negatiu a Sierra Leona i la República Centreafricana.

3. Conclusions en referència als factors explicatius del fracàs del DAP i l'ACP en la coherència i inclusió en el marc dels processos polítics i de construcció de pau postbèl·lics de l'ONU

La tesi també conclou que són diversos els factors que contribueixen a explicar els resultats limitats del DAP i l'ACP en la coherència i inclusió de la societat civil local i els actors regionals en el marc dels processos de construcció de pau de l'ONU. A més dels factors concrets que es detallen a continuació, el grau de seguretat militar en el context assistit es presenta com un factor condicional general amb el potencial de incidir negativament als resultats en aquests dos objectius estratègics. En termes comparatius, les dades documentals i entrevistes, tant de l'ONU com de fonts externes, apunten a millors resultats en el cas de Sierra Leona, sobretot quan es contrasta amb Burundi i la República Centreafricana. Argumento que les missions de construcció de pau postbèl·liques de l'ONU requereixen un context de seguretat per assolir els seus reptes. 15 anys després del final de la guerra, Sierra Leona presenta un context relativament segur, mentre que Burundi i la República Centreafricana encara avui dia pateixen episodis notables de violència. Quan l'ONU no identifica quan és probable el retorn a la violència i determina erròniament la sortida del DOMP transfereint la missió al DAP o a l'ACP, com a Burundi i la República Centreafricana, aquest dos òrgans es veuen forçats inesperadament a fer front a problemes de seguretat, pels quals no tenen els mitjans ni la capacitat.

Pel que fa a la manca de coherència, la tesi ha identificat tres factors explicatius: l'existència de disputes personals tant a la seu central de Nova York com sobre el terreny, la falta de capacitat institucional del DAP i l'ACP, i una aparell operacional altament fragmentat, burocràtic i descentralitzat de l'organització. El primer factor fa referència a diferents aspectes de l'ONU relacionats amb els conflictes

d'interès interns. En particular, la tesi es basa en tensions interdepartamentals i disputes per càrrecs, problemàtiques derivades de qüestions de lideratge i trets de personalitat. El segon factor descriu la falta de capacitat institucional de l'ONU, incloent-hi manca de directrius, protocols i canals de comunicació, que dificulten una estratègia coherent. En tercer lloc, l'anàlisi argumenta que la naturalesa institucional i organitzativa de l'ONU està marcadament fragmentada i és excessivament burocràtica i descentralitzada, impeding així una millora de la coherència en el marc dels processos de pau postbèl·lics.

Pel que fa a la manca d'inclusió de la societat civil local, la recerca distingeix entre factors explicatius externs i interns que obstaculitzen aquest objectiu. D'una banda, els factors externs inclouen, primerament, la voluntat dels estats per sobre la voluntat de l'ACP en el seu conjunt, que no és completament independent. Altres factors són el fet que els estats que configuren l'ACP se senten més còmodes treballant amb el Govern que amb altres actors; la falta de capacitat institucional de l'ACP, específicament la manca de mecanismes estandarditzats per a la inclusió dels actors locals de la societat civil; i finalment, els biaixos occidentals com ara el biaix urbà o ètnic, que impedeixen que l'ACP identifiqui fidedignement un grup representatiu de la societat civil local. D'altra banda, els factors interns inclouen, en primer lloc, la debilitat, la divisió i la mala organització de la societat civil local en els contextos postbèl·lics, donant lloc a una notable dificultat per part de l'ONU per acostar-se i identificar aquesta societat civil local, i segon, l'experiència professional d'individus dins el govern que han treballat per a organitzacions internacionals o regionals, facilitant així una relació més fluïda i fructuosa entre l'ONU i el govern. En canvi, la societat civil local sol desconèixer el funcionament intern d'organitzacions internacionals, com ara l'ONU.

Pel que fa a la manca d'inclusió dels actors regionals, la recerca també planteja factors externs i interns per argumentar els resultats insatisfactoris de l'ACP. Els factors externs inclouen, primer, trets de personalitat, com per exemple la capacitat que mostrà l'ambaixador de la UA a Burundi, Mamadou Bab, a l'hora de tractar amb l'ONU, permetent així la inclusió de la UA en el procés; segon, intercanvis de càrrec, en referència a aquells casos en què persones que treballen per a una organització internacional, com ara l'ONU, passen a treballar per una organització regional, o viceversa, facilitant així canals de comunicació entre ambdues organitzacions; i en tercer lloc, la manca de recursos, transferència de capacitats i mesures de suport

proporcionades per l'ONU als actors regionals, accentuant així la relació de desigualtat i dependència entre l'ONU i els actors regionals. Els factors interns inclouen, en primer lloc, la reticència d'algunes organitzacions regionals a col·laborar amb l'ONU per raons polítiques o ideològiques com ara el corrent panafricanista; i segon, la complexitat de la xarxa institucional regional, que dificulta la coordinació entre si i amb l'ONU.

4. Conclusions en referència a les implicacions dels fracassos del DAP i l'ACP en la coherència i inclusió en el marc dels processos de construcció de pau de l'ONU

La tesi identifica dues implicacions de la manca de coherència en el marc dels processos polítics i de construcció de pau postbèl·lics de l'ONU. En primer lloc, la investigació posa en relleu les dificultats que enfronten els actors externs a l'hora de relacionar-se amb una ONU incoherent en els marc de les missions post-bèl·liques. En segon lloc, la falta de coherència entre la seu i les missions sobre el terreny dificulta l'assoliment d'una comprensió exhaustiva de la realitat local per part dels oficials establerts a Nova York, obstaculitzant així el disseny i la planificació d'estratègies eficaces de construcció de pau. Tots dos factors són barreres al reeiximent dels resultats dels processos de construcció de pau de l'ONU, reforçant així l'estat actual de depressió del projecte liberal de construcció de pau.

Seguidament, la tesi identifica tres implicacions de la manca d'inclusió de la societat civil local i dels actors regionals en el marc dels processos de construcció de pau de l'ONU. En primer lloc, posicionar el Govern amfitrió en la centralitat del procés de construcció de pau és potencialment problemàtic, a causa d'elevats nivells de corrupció, imparcialitat o falta de mecanismes de control. En segon lloc, en relació a la manca d'inclusió de la societat civil local, a causa de l'exclusió de certs sectors de la població com ara les zones rurals, que sovint són sistemàticament oblidades, s'estableix una elit dins de la societat civil local. Això es tradueix en una reticència dels sectors exclosos a la seva participació en el procés de construcció de pau dirigit per l'ONU. Finalment, pel que fa a la falta d'inclusió d'actors regionals, aquest fet també contribueix que les organitzacions regionals es mostrin reticents a participar en els processos de construcció de pau de l'ONU. Aquestes implicacions dificulten el desenvolupament fructuós dels processos de construcció de pau de l'ONU, reforçant també així l'estat actual de depressió del projecte liberal de construcció de pau.

5. Demostració de la hipòtesi inicial

Aquestes conclusions confirmen la hipòtesi inicial de la tesi. Resumidament, la tesi ha conclòs, en primer lloc, que el DAP i la nova ACP han fracassat en la seva tasca de complir els objectius estratègics de coherència i inclusió de la societat civil local i actors regionals en els processos polítics i de construcció de pau postbèl·lics de l'ONU. En segon lloc, els resultats de l'anàlisi revelen certs factors explicatius que argumenten aquest fracàs. La falta de coherència respon a l'existència de disputes personals tant a la seu central de Nova York com sobre el terreny, la manca de capacitat institucional del DAP i l'ACP, i l'aparell operacional altament fragmentat, burocràtic i descentralitzat de l'organització. La inclusió de la societat civil local no ha tingut èxit a causa de factors externs (la voluntat predominant dels seus estats membres per davant l'ACP en el seu conjunt, la manca de capacitat institucional de l'ACP i els biaixos occidentals com el biaix urbà o ètnic, que impedeixen que l'ACP identifiqui fidedignement un grup representatiu de la societat civil local), així com interns (la debilitat, divisió i mala organització de la societat civil local en els contextos postbèl·lics, i l'experiència professional de determinats membres del govern que han treballat en el passat per a organitzacions internacionals o regionals). De la mateixa manera, la inclusió dels actors regionals també s'ha vist obstaculitzada per factors externs (trets de personalitat, intercanvis d'individus que treballaven per a organitzacions internacionals i passen a treballar per a organitzacions regionals, o a la inversa, i manca de recursos, transferència de capacitats i suport proporcionat per l'ONU als actors regionals), així com interns (la reticència de determinades organitzacions regionals a col·laborar amb l'ONU i la complexitat de la xarxa institucional regional).

En tercer lloc, les implicacions del fracàs en la coherència (la dificultat dels actors externs de relacionar-se amb una ONU incoherent i la impossibilitat dels oficials establerts a la seu de Nova York d'assolir un coneixement profund de la realitat local), així com en la inclusió de la societat civil local i els actors regionals (les problemàtiques generades per un excés de protagonisme del govern, la consolidació d'una elit dins de la societat civil local i la reticència de les organitzacions regionals a participar en els processos de construcció de pau de l'ONU) obstaculitzen resultats fructuosos dels processos polítics i de construcció de pau postbèl·lics de l'ONU. Per tant, aquestes implicacions contribueixen a la depressió actual del projecte liberal de

construcció de pau, en el qual, tal com s'ha discutit a la primera part de la tesi, l'ONU ha tingut un paper destacat durant les últimes tres dècades.

6. Àrees de recerca futures

La tesi destaca en primer lloc el fracàs del DAP i l'ACP en l'assoliment de la coherència i inclusió en el marc dels processos polítics i de construcció de pau postbèl·lics de l'ONU. A continuació, argumenta com això reforça la depressió actual del projecte de construcció de pau liberal, en un intent de contribuir a les crítiques a la policy critique i a la crítica radical i, més en concret, als resultats de la seva operacionalització, és a dir, el gir tecnocràtic i el gir local. En altres paraules, l'argument d'aquesta tesi pretén contribuir a les anomenades crítiques de les crítiques. Aquesta contribució posa èmfasi en la necessitat d'evitar la reproducció de mesures fallides promogudes per les precedents policy critique i la crítica radical, així com els resultats de la seva operacionalització. Per mesures fallides, em refereixo, per exemple, al problema de la crítica radical que, en comptes d'empoderar els actors locals han perpetuat el marc binari interventors-intervenguts, basat en una diferència essencialista i una jerarquia entre uns interventors occidentals liberals i uns intervenguts locals "diferents". Amb l'objectiu de qüestionar-ho, proposo les següents àrees de recerca per tal d'enriquir i contribuir a l'agenda crítica de recerca per la pau i conflictes, concretament al debat de les crítiques de les crítiques:

i. Per tal d'avaluar el marc de construcció de pau de l'ONU, aquesta tesi ha analitzat el paper que han jugat el DAP i l'ACP. Tanmateix, tal com es clarifica a la introducció, això no implica que altres òrgans de l'ONU, com el DOMP, el Programa de Desenvolupament de Nacions Unides o l'Alt Comissionat de Nacions Unides pels Refugiats, entre altres òrgans, no desenvolupin activitats que puguin estar emmarcades en els esforços de l'ONU per a la construcció de pau. Per tant, per enriquir la comprensió dels processos de construcció de pau de l'ONU en el seu conjunt, caldria desenvolupar investigació sobre aquests altres òrgans de l'organització que també contribueixen als resultats de la construcció de pau post-bèl·lica de l'ONU.

ii. Atès que les polítiques enfocades a l'empoderament local promogudes per l'ONU en el marc de la construcció de pau ni han trencat la relació de jerarquia entre

interventors i intervinguts ni han evitat el retorn a la violència, caldria ampliar la recerca sobre nous marcs de processos de pau basats en relacions no binàries.

iii. Més enllà del fracàs d'aquest enfocament local per trencar el marc binari jeràrquic, la naturalesa liberal dels processos de pau postbèl·lics de l'ONU no ha contribuït a l'establiment d'una pau duradora en les societats afectades per la guerra. De fet, els sistemes democràtics liberals universals i universalitzadors no s'han consolidat amb èxit en els països no occidentals examinats. Per tant, caldria reforçar la investigació relacionada amb formes alternatives d'organització política i social per als països no occidentals.

iv. En el capítol 5 es planteja l'emergent enfocament "el sosteniment de la pau" com un nou marc per als processos de pau de l'ONU basat en dos trets principals: el caràcter atemporal i holístic dels processos de pau. Aquest nou concepte presenta possibilitats potencials de noves formulacions conceptuals i operacionals en l'àmbit de la gestió dels processos de pau. Caldria doncs ampliar la recerca sobre aquest nou concepte per tal d'evitar una regressió a un cicle viciós com el que experimenta la construcció de pau: conceptualització-institucionalització-operacionalització-fracàs-reconceptualització.

Aquestes dues característiques del nou marc del "sosteniment de la pau", atemporal i holístic, són d'especial interès per dos motius. En primer lloc, perquè s'ha demostrat que la transferència de mandats de missions del DOMP cap al DAP basada en fases temporals del conflicte (pre-, durant i post-violència) és problemàtica. En segon lloc, perquè els conflictes d'interès, personalismes i tensions interdepartamentals s'han posat de manifest com a possibles factors explicatius del fracàs del DAP i l'ACP i, precisament, aquest enfocament holístic cap als processos de pau inclouria la fusió dels departaments de l'ONU responsables de la gestió de conflictes armats, millorant així el funcionament intern. Més enllà d'això, l'aparició d'aquest nou concepte es podria considerar com un senyal de l'arribada d'una nova fase en el marc de l'ONU posterior a la construcció de la pau. Considero d'especial interès investigar si el contingut d'aquest nou enfocament també es fonamenta en el projecte liberal o si, en lloc d'això, estariem davant d'una fase post-"projecte liberal de construcció de pau".

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1. COLLECTED AND ANALYZED DOCUMENTARY DATA

a) Sierra Leone

United Nations documentary data	t2	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Security Council Resolutions: 1829 (2008), 1886 (2009), 1940 (2010), 1941 (2010), 2005 (2011), 2065 (2012), 2097 (2013). - Secretary General reports: 1st (30/1/2009), 2nd (22/5/2009), 3rd (1/9/2009), 4th (15/3/2010), 5th (17/9/2010), 6th (9/3/2011), 7th (2/9/2011), 8th (14/3/2012), 9th (31/8/2012), 10th (27/2/2013), 11th (12/9/2013), final report (17/3/2014).
		Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in Sierra Leone	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework - Biannual reviews: 1st (20/6/2008), 2nd (16/12/2008). - High-level special sessions: Outcome (12/6/2009), 1st (1/10/2010), 2nd (2/10/2012).
	t1	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Security Council Resolutions: 1620 (2005), 1688 (2005), 1734 (2006), 1793 (2007) - Secretary General reports: 1st (28/4/2006), 3rd (28/11/2006), 4th (7/5/2007), 5th (4/12/2007), 6th (29/4/2008).

External documentary data	t2	UNIPSIL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Paper (2014): “United Nations Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone: Toward Vertical Integration?”, Michael Lawrence, Center for International Governance and Innovation. - Philipsen, L. (2014): “When Liberal Peacebuilding Fails: Paradoxes of Implementing Ownership and Accountability in the Integrated Approach”, <i>Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding</i>, 8:1, 42-67.
		PBC in Sierra Leone	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Report (2007): “Consolidating the Peace? Views from Sierra Leone and Burundi on the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission”, ActionAid, CAFOD and Care International. - Briefing paper (2009): “Does the UN Peacebuilding Commission Change the Mode of Peacebuilding in Africa?”, Severine M. Rugumau, Frederich Ebert Stiftung. - Street, A. M., Mollett, H. and Smith J. (2008): “Experiences of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission in Sierra Leone and Burundi”, <i>Journal of Peacebuilding & Development</i>, 4:2, 33-46. - Mc Candless and Tschirgi, N. (2010): “Strategic Frameworks that Embrace Mutual Accountability for Peacebuilding Emerging Lessons in PBC and non-PBC countries”, <i>Journal for Peacebuilding and Development</i>, 5:2, 20-46. - Thesis: “The UN Peacebuilding Commission: Lessons from Sierra Leone”, Andrea Iro, Universität Potsdam.
	t1	UNIOSIL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Report (2012): “UN peace support mission transition in Sierra Leone”, Governance and Social Development Resource Center. - Neethling, T. (2007): “Pursuing sustainable peace through postconflict peacebuilding: The case of Sierra Leone”, <i>African Security Review</i>, 16:3, 81-95.

b) Burundi

United Nations documentary data	t2	United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Security Council Resolutions: 1959 (2010), 2027 (2011). - Secretary General reports: 30/11/2011, 31/7/2014.
		Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in Burundi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strategic Framework for Cooperation in Burundi. - Biannual reviews: 1st (24/6/2008), 2nd (9/2/2009), 3rd (19/10/2009), 4th (25/3/2010), 5th (26/4/2011). - Reviews of progress: 9/7/2008, 5/2/2009, 31/7/2009, 11/3/2010, 26/3/2011.
	t1	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Security Council Resolutions: 1719 (2006), 1791 (2007), 1858 (2008), 1902 (2009). - Secretary General reports: 1st (17/5/2007), 2nd (23/11/2007), 3rd (15/5/2008), 4th (28/11/2008), 5th (22/5/2009), 6th (30/11/2009), 7th (30/11/2010).

External documentary data	t2	BNUB	Central Africa Report (2014): “Status and dynamics of the political situation in Burundi”, Yolande Bouka, Institute for Security Studies.
		PBC in Burundi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Report (2007): “Consolidating the Peace? Views from Sierra Leone and Burundi on the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission” by ActionAid, CAFOD and Care International. - Briefing paper (2009): “Does the UN Peacebuilding Commission Change the Mode of Peacebuilding in Africa?”, Severine M. Rugumau, Frederich Ebert Stiftung. - Street, A. M., Mollett, H. and Smith J. (2008): “Experiences of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission in Sierra Leone and Burundi”, <i>Journal of Peacebuilding & Development</i>, 4:2, 33-46. - Mc Candless and Tschirgi, N. (2010): “Strategic Frameworks that Embrace Mutual Accountability for Peacebuilding Emerging Lessons in PBC and non-PBC countries”, <i>Journal for Peacebuilding and Development</i>, 5:2, 20-46.
	t1	BINUB	Wilén, N. and Chapeaux, V. (2011): “Problems of Local Participation and Collaboration with the UN in Post-Conflict Environment: Who ‘Are the Local?’”, <i>Global Society</i> , 25:4, 531-548.

c) Central African Republic

United Nations documentary data	t2	The United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishment: S/2009/128 - Mandate: S/PRST/2009/5 - Extension and focus: Security Council Resolutions 2031 (2011), 2088 (2013), 2121 (2013), 2134 (2014). - Secretary General reports: 10/6/2010, 19/11/2010, 16/5/2011, 28/11/2011, 29/5/2012, 3/5/2013, 5/8/2013, 31/12/2013.
		Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in the Central African Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in the Central African Republic. - Biannual reviews: 1st (11/2/2010), 2nd (18/11/2011). - Reports of the Peacebuilding Commission to the Central African Republic: 17/12/2009, 4/11/2011.
	t1	The United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proposition and mandate: S/1999/1235 - Establishment: S/PRST/2000/5 - Focus activities: I (S/2006/934), II (S/2007/702). - Changes to mandate: Security Council Resolution 1861 (2009). - Secretary General reports: 5/12/2007, 23/6/2008, 26/12/2008, 12/6/2009, 8/12/2009.

External documentary data	t2	BINUCA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Report (2015): “Why we fail: Obstacles to the Effective Prevention of Mass Atrocities”, Bellamy, A. J. and Lupel, A., International Peace Institute. - Occasional Paper Series: “Too little, too late: Failing to prevent atrocities in the Central African Republic”, Evan Cinq-Mars, Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect.
		PBC in Central African Republic	Policy Brief (2016): “Fractured peacebuilding in the Central African Republic”, Carvalho, G. de and Lucey, A., Institute for Security Studies.
	t1	BONUCA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Policy Briefing (2008): “Central African Republic: Untangling the Political Dialogue”, International Crisis Group. - Report (2008): “Central African Republic. Déjà-vu: Peace (dis)agreements that are detrimental to victims”, International Federation for Human Rights.

ANNEX 2. INTERVIEWEE INFORMATION AND INTERVIEW CONTENT

Interviewee information

Interviews were conducted between March 2016 and April 2017 in Sierra Leone, New York and via skype.

1. Sierra Leone

a) United Nations officers

Anonymous I. Senior Political Officer, West Africa Team Leader, Africa II Division, UN Department of Political Affairs, New York, USA.

Knott, L. Peacebuilding Support Office Officer for Sierra Leonean configuration.

Lamboi, P. Former Program Officer managing the Peacebuilding Fund, UNIPSIL, UN Department of Political Affairs, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

Moikowa, R. Former Civil Affairs Coordinator, UNIPSIL, UN Department of Political Affairs, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

Pak, J. Peacebuilding Support Office Policy Coordination Officer for Sierra Leonean configuration.

b) External experts

Caulker, J. Executive Director, Fambul Tok, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

Edwin, V. Executive Director, Campaign for Good Governance, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

Humper, J. Bishop of the United Methodist Church of Sierra Leone, former Chairman of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Jackson, P. Former Advisor on Decentralization and Security Sector Reform program in Sierra Leone, Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the UK Government.

Jombla, E. National coordinator, West African Network for Peacebuilding, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

Lawrence, M. Researcher, Balsillie School of International Affairs, University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada.

Samura, K. Head of Programs Department, Centre for the Coordination of Youth Activities, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

Sankaituah, J. Country Director, Search for Common Ground, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

Tommy, I. Executive Director, Centre for Accountability and Rule of Law, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

2. Burundi

a) United Nations officers

Anonymous II. Former BNUB Chief staff, UN Department of Political Affairs, Bujumbura, Burundi.

Denise O'Brien, former Department of Political Affairs Chief staff.

Vanheukelom, J. Former senior adviser to ONUB Security Sector Reform Unit.

b) External experts

Campbell, S. Former Project Officer, UNICEF Burundi Country Office, and former Principal Investigator for a multi-method evaluation of the UN Peacebuilding Fund in Burundi.

Hara, F. Former Team Leader, Doctors of the World, Burundi.

Wilén, N. Post-doctoral Research Fellow, Institute of Development Policy Management, University of Antwerp.

3. Central African Republic

a) United Nations officers

Anonymous III. Former PBSO Officer for the Central African Republic configuration.

Caramés, A. Security Sector Reform Officer, MINUSCA, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Bangui, Central African Republic.
Coutinho, S. Former Head of Political and Civilian Affairs, BINUCA, Bangui, CAR.

b) External experts

Faria, F. Independent Consultant and Associated at European Center for Development Policy Management, Maastricht, The Netherlands.

Lombard, L. Expert on the Central African Republic, Assistant Professor, Yale University.

Picco, E. Country Manager and Humanitarian Affairs Officer, Médecins Sans Frontières, Bangui, CAR.

Interview content

1. General questions: From peacebuilding to statebuilding

How would you define peacebuilding, in theory and in its operationalized way?

Since the introduction of the concept by Johan Galtung in the 1970s, peacebuilding has evolved significantly (conceptually and in the field). A breaking point is perhaps the consolidation of the concept in the United Nations (UN) framework through Boutros-Ghali's 1992 "An Agenda for Peace". What would you highlight from this evolution in the last 25 years?

How do you think 9/11 attacks and the consolidation of the War on Terror and the "collapsed states" discourses affected peacebuilding processes?

How would you define statebuilding?

2. United Nations peacebuilding

As just mentioned, Boutros-Ghali introduced peacebuilding to the UN in 1992 through "An Agenda for Peace". This came along with an

institutional reform, marked by the creation of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). Thanks to the efforts made by Kofi Annan, in 1997 the DPA became the depositary organ within the UN responsible for peacebuilding. However, because of institutional tensions between the DPKO and the DPA, amongst other reasons, the UN created in 2005 the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) as the prime responsible UN body for peacebuilding processes. From 2005 on, the UN has two main bodies in charge of peacebuilding: the DPA (special political missions) and the PBC. According to you, what are the key characteristics of UN peacebuilding engagements? What is their essence?

Do you notice any changes in the nature of UN peacebuilding throughout last 25 years? Which factors do you think that fostered this transformation?

How is the relationship between DPA-led missions and the PBC on the ground?

The UN tends more and more to integrate field offices, such as the absorption of the DPA-led BINUCA by the DPKO-led MINUSCA in the Central African Republic (CAR). According to you, what is the reason behind this integrative tendency?

How has the appearance of the new Peacebuilding Architecture, namely the PBC, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund, affected the UN peacebuilding endeavor?

3. Case specificities

a) Shared questions for all cases

Do you think the UN has been assertive in tackling the roots of the conflict in the country? Why?

Could you mention major failures/successes of the UN in terms of peacebuilding in the case? Which factors do you think these failures/successes respond to?

b) Sierra Leone

What would you highlight concerning the transition from UNAMSIL (DPKO-led) to UNIOSIL (DPA-led)?

According to you, which are main characteristics/achievements of UNIOSIL?

According to you, which are main characteristics/achievements of UNIPSIL?

According to you, which are main characteristics/achievements of the PBC?

How is UN intra-coordination (amongst different UN bodies in the field)?

How is the relationship between the UN and the host Government/domestic actors (political parties, rebel groups, civil society/regional actors/external actors)?

Would you highlight any major transformation in the evolution from first wave of UN peacebuilding missions (UNIOSIL) to the second wave (UNIPSIL and PBC)?

c) Burundi

What would you highlight concerning the transition from ONUB (DPKO-led) to BINUB (DPA-led)?

According to you, which are main characteristics/achievements of BINUB?

According to you, which are main characteristics/achievements of BNUB?

According to you, which are main characteristics/achievements of the PBC?

How is the UN intra-coordination (amongst different UN bodies in the field)?

How is the relationship between the UN and the host Government/domestic actors (political parties, rebel groups, civil society/regional actors/external actors)?

Would you highlight any major transformation in the evolution from first wave of UN peacebuilding missions (BINUB) to the second wave (BNUB and PBC)?

d) Central African Republic

What would you highlight of the transition from MINURCA (DPKO led) to BONUCA (DPA-led)?

Why do you think the CAR hosted the first UN DPA-led peacebuilding mission, long before the rest of the cases?

According to you, which are main characteristics/achievements of BONUCA?

According to you, which are main characteristics/achievements of BINUCA?

According to you, which are main characteristics/achievements of the PBC?

According to you, which are main characteristics/achievements of MINUSCA (since 2014. MINUSCA is DPKO-led but it absorbed BINUCA)?

How is the UN intra-coordination (amongst different UN bodies in the field)?

How is the relationship between the UN and the host Government/domestic actors (political parties, rebel groups, civil society/regional actors/external actors)?

Would you highlight any major transformation in the evolution from first wave of UNPB missions on the ground (BONUCA) to the second wave (BINUCA and PBC)? And from BINUCA (DPA-led) to MINUSCA (DPKO-led)?

4. Final questions

How would you evaluate the current state of UN post-conflict engagements?

What are the perspectives for the future of the UN peacebuilding engagements and the role of the DPA and the PBC?

How would you evaluate the current peacebuilding state in the cases of the (“name of the case”)?

5. Personal information

Full name

Nationality

Sex

Current place of living

Current occupation

Academic expertise

Career related to peace engagements or similar

Publications related to peace engagements or similar

ANNEX 3. UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTARY DATA ON THE NORMATIVE LEVEL OF EXAMINED POST-CONFLICT ENGAGEMENTS DISTRIBUTED BY GROUPS OF CLASSES (SECURITY, GOVERNANCE AND POSITIVE PEACE).

Table 1. Content of Security Council Resolutions and Peacebuilding Commission strategic frameworks for engagement relative to Security, Governance and Positive Peace in de the frame of United Nations post-conflict engagements in Sierra Leone.

	UNIOSIL	PBC SL	UNIPSIL
Security	“(a) to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in: (vi) strengthening the Sierra Leone security sector, in cooperation with the International Military Advisory and Training Team and other partners; (b) to liaise with the Sierra Leonean security sector and other partners, to report on the security situation and make recommendations concerning external and internal security threats” (Security Council Resolution 1620, 2005).	“16. Since the end of the conflict, successful security sector reform initiatives have been undertaken to transform and restructure security institutions to effectively respond to threats to the State and citizenry of Sierra Leone. Further consolidation of those reforms is needed, with a focus on making the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces effective and affordable (...) (PBC Sierra Leone configuration, 2007).	
Governance	“(a) to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in: (iii) building the capacity	“17. Democratic governance and the establishing and strengthening	“(a) Providing political support to national and local efforts for

	<p>of the National Electoral Commission to conduct a free, fair and credible electoral process in 2007; (iv) enhancing good governance, transparency and accountability of public institutions, including through anti-corruption measures and improved fiscal management; (v) strengthening the rule of law, including by developing the independence and capacity of the justice system and the capacity of the police and corrections system” (Security Council Resolution 1620, 2005).</p>	<p>of national institutions are indispensable for durable peace, economic and social progress and promotion of human rights and the rule of law (...). 18. Further support is also needed to enhance the capacity of national institutions such as the Parliament, the National Electoral Commission, the Political Parties Registration Commission, the Anti-Corruption Commission, the National Commission for Democracy and the Human Rights Commission (...)” (Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework, 2007).</p>	<p>identifying and resolving tensions and threats of potential conflict, whatever the source; (b) Monitoring and promoting human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law, including efforts to counter transnational organized crime and drug trafficking; (c) Consolidating good governance reforms, with a special focus on anti-corruption instruments such as the Anti-Corruption Commission; (d) Supporting decentralization, reviewing the 1991 Constitution and the enactment of relevant legislation” (Security Council Resolution 1829, 2008).</p>
<p>Positive peace</p>	<p>“(a) to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in: (i) building the capacity of State institutions to address further the root causes of</p>	<p>“10. The marginalization and political exclusion of youth was identified by the Truth and Reconciliation</p>	<p>“7. Calls upon the Government of Sierra Leone and all other stakeholders in the country to increase their efforts to (...) promote the</p>

	<p>the conflict, provide basic services and accelerate progress towards the Millennium Development Goals through poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth, including through the creation of an enabling framework for private investment and systematic efforts to address HIV/AIDS; (ii) developing a national action plan for human rights and establishing the national human rights commission; (vii) promoting a culture of peace, dialogue, and participation in critical national issues through a strategic approach to public information and communication, including through building an independent and capable public radio capacity; (viii) developing initiatives for the protection and well-being of youth, women and children” (Security</p>	<p>Commission as one of the root causes of the civil war and is widely perceived to be a threat to peace consolidation today (...). 11. (...) The Government of Sierra Leone has also developed a National Youth Policy and is setting up a National Youth Commission to promote youth empowerment and greater participation in decision-making. 12. The challenge of addressing youth unemployment is closely linked to the creation of long-term economic growth, reviving agricultural production and marketing, and creating an enabling environment for private-sector development and domestic, diaspora and foreign investment (...).</p>	<p>development of the private sector to generate wealth and employment opportunities, in particular for young people; (...) and advance human rights, including through implementation of the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; 8. Emphasizes the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding, as recognized in resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008), underlines that a gender perspective should be taken into account in implementing all aspects of the mandate of UNIPSIL, and encourages UNIPSIL to work with the Government of Sierra Leone in this regard” (Security Council Resolution 1829, 2008).</p>
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	<p>Council Resolution 1620, 2005).</p>	<p>22. Sierra Leone's energy sector, particularly its electricity subsector, is in a state of crisis. The country's energy crisis is one of the main challenges to its economic growth and recovery and it impedes continued progress on peace consolidation (...).</p> <p>23. (...) The Framework will prioritize (...) the generation, distribution and management of electricity supply to Freetown and its surrounding areas" (Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework, 2007).</p>	
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Table 2. Content of Security Council Resolutions and Peacebuilding Commission strategic frameworks for engagement relative to Security, Governance and Positive Peace in de the frame of United Nations post-conflict engagements in Burundi.

	BINUB	PBC Burundi	BNUB
Security	<p>“(…) focuses on and supports the Government in the following areas (...): Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and reform of the security sector: (e) Support for the implementation of the Dar-es-Salaam Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement of 7 September 2006; (f) Support for the development of a national plan for reform of the security sector (...); (g) Support for the completion of the national programme for the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; (h) Support for efforts to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (...)” (Security Council Resolution 1719, 2006).</p>	<p>The configuration identified in this document as its second priority the implementation of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL. Moreover, the third priority included in the strategic framework referred to the reform of the security sector and the disarmament of the civilian population, with the effective involvement of all stakeholders.</p>	<p>“8. Underscores the importance of security sector reform and urges all international partners, together with BNUB, to continue supporting the Government of Burundi’s efforts to professionalize and enhance the capacity of the national security services and the police, in particular in the fields of training on human rights and sexual and gender based violence, and with the view to consolidating security sector governance” (Security Council Resolution 1959, 2010).</p>
Governance	<p>“(b) Strengthening good governance and</p>	<p>“compliance with the Constitution</p>	<p>“(a) Strengthening the independence,</p>

	<p>the transparency and accountability of public institutions; (d) Consolidation of the rule of law, in particular by strengthening the justice and corrections system, including independence and capacity of the judiciary” (Security Council Resolution 1719, 2006).</p>	<p>and the law, additional space and mechanisms for consultation and dialogue on the principal issues related to peacebuilding, action against corruption, building public administration capacity and strengthening the decentralization process, preparing for future elections through the establishment of an independent national electoral commission” (PBC Burundi Configuration, 2007). Priority number 4 highlighted the necessity to ensure equitable access to justice, take action against impunity and establish transitional justice mechanisms.</p>	<p>capacities and legal frameworks of key national institutions, in particular judicial and parliamentary institutions, in line with international standards and principles; (b) Promoting and facilitating dialogue between national actors and supporting mechanisms for broad-based participation in political life, including for the implementation of development strategies and programmes in Burundi; (c) Supporting efforts to fight impunity, particularly through the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms to strengthen national unity, promote justice and promote reconciliation within Burundi’s society, and providing operational support to the</p>
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			functioning of these bodies” (Security Council Resolution 1959, 2010).
Positive peace	<p>“(c) Promotion of freedom of the press and strengthening the legal and regulatory framework for the media and communications, and enhancing the professionalization of the media;</p> <p>(i) Promotion and protection of human rights, including by building national institutional capacity in that area, particularly with regard to the rights of women, children and other vulnerable groups, by assisting with the design and implementation of a national human rights action plan including the establishment of an independent national human rights commission;</p> <p>(k) Strengthening the partnership between the Government and donors for the implementation of priority, emergency and longer-term activities, within the</p>	<p>The Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi provided, amongst others, promoting human rights (priority 4), finding sustainable solutions to the land issues and the socio-economic recovery of populations affected by the war and conflicts (priority 5) and mainstreaming the gender perspective throughout the peacebuilding process (priority 8) (Burundi PBC configuration, 2007).</p>	<p>“(d) Promoting and protecting human rights, including strengthening national capacities in that area, as well as national civil society;</p> <p>(e) Ensuring that all strategies and policies with respect to public finance and the economic sector, in particular the next Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), have a focus on peacebuilding and equitable growth, addressing specifically the needs of the most vulnerable population, and advocating for resource mobilization for Burundi” (Security Council Resolution 1959, 2010).</p>

	framework of the Government's Emergency Programme and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which is being finalized" (Security Council Resolution 1719, 2006).		
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Table 3. Content of Security Council Resolutions and Peacebuilding Commission strategic frameworks for engagement relative to Security, Governance and Positive Peace in de the frame of United Nations post-conflict engagements in the Central African Republic.

	BONUCA	PBC CAR	BINUCA
Security	In a letter addressed to the president of the Security Council in December 1999, Kofi Annan requested the establishment of the BONUCA following the withdrawal of MINURCA with the mandate, among other aspects, to track the host government-led security-related reforms as well as the implementation of the reforms of the national police and to follow up the training programs initiated by	As expressed in the CAR Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding by the CAR PBC configuration, the first strategic priority in the country was the reform of the security sector as well as the DDR process. Specifically, the document refers to measures such as the reorganization and deployment of well-trained and equipped Security Forces or the strengthening of enforcement and monitoring mechanisms to ensure sound	"(b) To assist in the successful completion of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process and the reform of security sector institutions, and support activities to promote the rule of law (...)" (S/PRST/2009/5, 2009).

	MINURCA (S/1999/1235, 1999).	management of the security sector (Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding, 2008).	
Governance	In a letter addressed to the president of the SC, Koffi Annan pointed out as a prime task that BONUCA should accomplish to assist national efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and mechanisms for fostering reconciliation and dialogue (S/1999/1235, 1999).	<p>“32. The major challenges in the specific areas of governance, the rule of law and the promotion and protection of human rights involve:</p> <p>(a) Democracy and strengthening the institutional and legal framework.</p> <p>(b) Reform and modernization of the State, including deconcentration, decentralization and local governance.</p> <p>(c) Governance and the fight against corruption (including the management of natural resources, the management of public finances and decentralization).</p> <p>(e) Access to equitable justice and the fight against impunity.</p> <p>(f) Promotion of an ongoing dialogue among the actors based on interactive and transparent</p>	“calls on the Government of the Central African Republic and all political stakeholders to ensure the timely, effective and transparent preparation for the 2009 and 2010 municipal, legislative and presidential elections” (S/PRST/2009/5, 2009).

		communication with regard to actions to implement the priorities mentioned above” (Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in the CAR, 2009).	
Positive peace	“(d) Contribute to national capacities for the promotion and protection of human rights (...); (g) Support the Resident Coordinator and those of the United Nations system in promoting an integrated approach in the development and implementation of peace-building aimed at national reconstruction, economic recovery, poverty alleviation and good governance; (h) Facilitate the mobilization of international political support and resources for the security-related reforms and for socio-economic programs” (S/1999/1235, 1999).	“1. Ensure that people have equitable access to administrative services and to high quality basic social services; 2. Support the revival of economic activities and promote income-generating activities” (CAR configuration, 2009).	“(d) To support efforts to enhance national human rights capacity and promote respect for human rights (...); (g) To help ensure that child protection is properly addressed (...)” (S/PRST/2009/5, 2009).

ANNEX 4. RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS OF UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTARY DATA ON THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF EXAMINED POST-CONFLICT ENGAGEMENTS

1. Results of software-assisted (Iramuteq) comparative analysis based on the Reinert method

Table 1: Comparative analysis of examined post-conflict engagements in Sierra Leone based on the Reinert method.

UNIOSIL (t1)		Sierra Leone PBC		UNIPSIL (t2)	
Class name	%	Class name	%	Class name	%
1. Security	20,7	1. Transitional justice and Human rights	37,7	1. Human rights	27,5
2. Human rights	20	2. Peacebuilding strategy	32,9	2. Elections	21,9
3. UNIOSIL	18,3	3. Peacebuilding vision	29,4	3. Justice	17,2
4. Elections	14,5			4. Peacebuilding strategy	16,8
5. Peacebuilding strategy	13,2			5. Corruption	16,6
6. Justice	13,2				

Table 2: Comparative analysis of examined post-conflict engagements in Burundi based on the Reinert method.

BINUB (t1)		Burundi PBC		BNUB (t2)	
Class name	%	Class name	%	Class name	%
1. Security	36	1. Peacebuilding strategy	32	1. Human rights	16,9
2. Peacebuilding strategy	33,1	2. Security	29	2. Development	16,2
3. Human rights	30,9	3. Justice	23,3	3. Justice	14,6
		4. Human rights	16	4. Peacebuilding strategy	14,2
				5. PBC	13,7
				6. BNUB	12,2
				7. Transitional justice	12,2

Table 3: Comparative analysis of examined post-conflict engagements in the Central African Republic based on the Reinert method.

BONUCA (t1)		CAR PBC		BINUCA (t2)	
Class name	%	Class name	%	Class name	%
1. Peacebuilding strategy	20,6	1. Human rights	34,2	1. Human rights	28,7
2. Elections	19,4	2. Peacebuilding strategy	30,1	2. Peacebuilding strategy	17,4
3. Security	18,4	3. Security	21,7	3. Elections	16,9
4. BONUCA	16,7	4. Regional approach	14	4. Regional approach	15,2
5. Regional approach	12,9			5. Humanitarian aid	11,5
6. Human rights	12			6. Security	10,4

2. Results of software-assisted (Iramuteq) comparative analysis based on most-used concepts

Table 4: Most-used concepts in examined engagements in Sierra Leone.

UNIOSIL (t1)			Sierra Leone PBC			UNIPSIL (t2)		
Active forms	No. active forms (total active forms =3588)	%	Active forms	No. active forms (total active forms = 4040)	%	Active forms	No. active forms (total active forms =2391)	%
Sierra Leone	471	16	Sierra Leone	235	17	Sierra Leone	939	30
UNIO-SIL	288	10	Support	157	11	Commission	584	14
Government	262	9	PBC	113	8	Support	562	14
Support	258	9	Government	93	7	Political	534	13
Commission	243	8	National	92	7	Government	534	13
National	235	8	Commission	84	6	National	489	12
Security	213	7	Framework	72	5	Country	462	11
Election	188	6	Peace	71	5	UNIPSIL	459	11
Police	185	6	International	69	5	Party	417	10
Continue	182	6	Youth	68	5	Development	385	9

Table 5: Most-used concepts in examined engagements in Burundi.

BINUB (t1)			Burundi PBC			BNUB (t2)		
Active forms	No. active forms (total active forms= 3588)	%	Active forms	No. active forms (total active forms= 4040)	%	Active forms	No. active forms (total active forms= 2391)	%
Burundi	513	14	Burundi	609	15	Burundi	231	10
National	465	13	Government	483	12	National	124	5
Government	417	12	National	449	11	Government	124	5
BI-NUB	354	10	Support	373	9	BNUB	117	5
Support	316	9	Partner	365	9	Support	105	4
Security	269	8	Political	324	8	Security	94	4
Political	252	7	International	301	8	Right	89	4
Peace	239	7	Security	295	7	Political	79	3
Process	224	6	Framework	286	7	Human	75	3
FNL	218	6	PBC	275	7	Continue	75	3

Table 6: Most-used concepts in examined engagements in the Central African Republic.

BONUCA (t1)			Central African Republic PBC			BINUCA (t2)		
Active forms	No. active forms (total active forms =3588)	%	Active forms	No. active forms (total active forms= 4040)	%	Active forms	No. active forms (total active forms =2391)	%
CAR	389	12	Security	200	8	CAR	542	13
Security	234	7	CAR	189	8	Security	418	10
Support	219	7	PBC	163	7	National	370	8
Government	200	6	National	162	7	Support	368	9
Country	192	6	Reintegration	151	6	Country	333	8
National	161	5	Government	150	6	Include	306	7
Political	152	5	Country	150	6	Government	274	7
Continue	132	4	Support	123	5	BI-NUCA	249	6
BO-NUCA	132	4	Development	123	5	International	246	6
Include	131	4	Sector	120	5	Child	245	6

3. Aggregated results of analyses based on the Reinert method and most-used concepts

Table 7: Comparative analysis of examined post-conflict engagements based on the Reinert method with classes grouped in groups of classes (Security, Governance and Positive Peace). Top-down, from most intra-content relevant to least.

UNIOSIL	PBC Sierra Leone	UNIPSIL	BINUB	PBC Burundi	BNUB	BONUCA	PBC CAR	BINUCA
Security	Governance + Positive peace ¹	Positive peace	Security	Security	Positive peace (x2)	Governance	Positive peace	Positive peace
Positive peace		Governance (x3)	Positive peace	Governance	Governance (x2)	Security	Security	Governance
Governance (x2) ²				Positive peace		Positive peace		Security

¹ This indicates that most intra-content relevant class is composed of two classes belonging to two different groups of classes (Governance and Positive Peace).

² (x2) indicates that there are two classes stemming from the analysis based on the Reinert method that belong to the group of classes Governance.

Table 8: Comparative analysis of examined post-conflict engagements based on most-used concepts with classes grouped in groups of classes (Security, Governance and Positive Peace). Top-down, from most intra-content relevant to least.

UNIOSIL	PBC SL	UNIPSIL	BINUB	PBC Burundi	BNUB	BONUCA	PBC CAR	BINUCA
Security (x2)	Positive peace	Governance (x2)	Security	Governance	Security	Security	Security (x3)	Security
Gover-nance		Positive peace	Governance (x2)	Security	Positive peace (x2)	Governance	Positive peace	Positive peace
					Gover-nance			

4. Results of software-assisted (Iramuteq) techniques for all documentary data on the operational level relative to UNIOSIL.

Figure 1. Factorial analysis of classes (navy-blue=security; purple=justice; pale blue sky=peacebuilding strategy; red=human rights; green=elections; grey=UNIOSIL).




Figure 2. Class graphic of “UNIOSIL” (in previous figure 1, in grey).





Figure 4: Similitude-based analysis including all classes.



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