

**Analyticity and Systematicity in Anglophone Aesthetics**

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Submitted for the examination of the MPhil Stud degree

September 2016

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I, Taylor D. Enoch, confirm that the work presented here is my own.

Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated throughout the dissertation.

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## Abstract

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The scope of this project is threefold. Firstly, it is *metaphilosophical*, as it concerns a question of method. Secondly, it is *aesthetical*, as it concerns a question of method in aesthetics and the philosophy of art. Thirdly, it is *historiographical*, as it draws from the corpus of the philosophy of art, aesthetics and art history, and considers these texts not only by way of their ideas but also by way of their history.

This dissertation entertains a significant organizational shift by adopting and adapting a narrower scope of anglophone aesthetics (AA). This shift renders AA as biphasic, admitting of earlier (EAA) and later (LAA) phases, the ‘early-late distinction’, categorized by exemplary texts per phase. Upon investigation of these texts, the EAA-LAA shift poses a constitutive methodological shift, the Problem of Systematic Inconsistency (PSI), from non-systematicity to systematicity. This inconsistency, it is argued, is merely apparent, and is explainable as a swapping of priority between analytic and systematic methods from EAA to LAA, which holds *systematicity of some sort* to be implicit in EAA. To elucidate this, various modes of analysis and models of system are presented.

From a formalist outlook, an historiographical examination of cubism is used to concretize the proposed solution to the PSI. Of particular focus is the shift from analytic (AC) to synthetic (SC) cubism, wherein it is diagrammatically shown that cubist ‘*signs*’ played an implicit role throughout AC like that described of systematicity throughout EAA. Comparison between realist and idealist art yields a key distinction, the ‘unitary-plenary distinction’, between two definitions of system in terms of the presence or absence of a privileged ‘kernel’.

That both EAA and LAA entertained a realist *plenary* rather than idealist *unitary* systematicity, implicit in the former and explicit in the latter, is the solution to the PSI.



## Acknowledgements

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This dissertation was inspired by a passing comment within an essay titled *Method and Metaphysics in the Philosophy of Art*, published in October 2014, not one month after I had arrived to London from America. Thank you to Professor Sebastian Gardner for authoring that paper and for your supervision over the past two years; likewise to Dr James Wilson. Thank you to my fellow MPhil Studs for abiding my babbling on cubism in seminar -- *thrice*; likewise to Drs Fiona Leigh and Han Van Wietmarschen. Thank you to the Rockefeller Archive Center, especially to Mary Ann Quinn, for her help with the Isenberg archives. I have found a new genius to love in him.

My grandest thanks, perhaps, go to Professor Richard Kamber, my gadfly, an instructor, sponsor, colleague, and friend, who inspired my entry into philosophy and aesthetics. And finally, thank you to my Family, who have shipped this American to England to think and to write on the Americans and the English and their arts.





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*I believe we may say that the best work in the field is to be done, if it is done at all, by young and unknown people. These people will appear if and when graduate students become convinced that aesthetics is worth studying.*

*The subject, analytical aesthetics, remains largely to be created.*

Arnold Isenberg, 1950:  
Analytical Philosophy and the Study of Art



### 1.1 The Anglophone Aesthetics Programme

*Analytical* or *anglophone aesthetics* (AA) names a philosophical programme which sought to reform traditional aesthetics and philosophy of art from its so-called wooliness and dreariness.<sup>1</sup> It is exemplified by works published in the US and UK<sup>2</sup> during the mid-to-late twentieth century. These constitute a modest asterism of papers collectivized through a constellation of references, citations, and bibliographic entries.<sup>3</sup> What drives this collectivization is a common push against idealism in aesthetics, with its essentialist, metaphysical, and systematizing biases (among others). Like the more general trends throughout twentieth-century philosophy, AA was influenced by two key developments: the integration of philosophy with formal logic, an upshot of the analytic turn (AT), and the integration of philosophical logic with language, an upshot of the linguistic turn (LT). Its itinerary was therefore one of argumentative clarity and accuracy.<sup>4</sup> Its contrasts, the Passmorean errors of so-called traditional aesthetics, were perhaps not quite so wooly and dreary as they might *prima facie* seem, however. In his essay *Analytic Aesthetics* (2013), Lamarque reminds us that prominent journals published aesthetical papers well throughout the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s,<sup>5</sup> all with the proper analytical-mindedness demanded by the new tradition; the establishment of *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* (1942) in the US, and the *British Journal of Aesthetics* (1960) in the UK, were and are testament to the existent and persisting quality of aesthetical scholarship throughout this time.<sup>6</sup> Instead, the characteristics of AA are perhaps more appropriately acknowledged through the provisos that Lamarque offers: (1) the division between aesthetics proper and the philosophy of art, and (2) the subdivision of the philosophy of art into the various art forms, thereby generating the philosophies of the arts.<sup>7</sup> To these, I add a third: (3) the transliteration of the ‘philosophy of art’ into the ‘philosophy of art criticism.’ The first, emerging quite late in the programme, was explicitly and perhaps firstly recommended in Isenberg et al *Aesthetics* (1954), the second in Passmore’s oft-quoted *The Dreariness of Aesthetics* (1951), and the third in Isenberg’s seminal

<sup>1</sup> Passmore (1951): 325, 335. Note that I do not here include ‘dullness’, cf. Wisdom (1948), or ‘pretentiousness’, cf. Isenberg (1952).

<sup>2</sup> I shall refer to this programme as *anglophone* rather than *analytic(al)* aesthetics, though shall generally use the abbreviation ‘AA.’ This dissertation entails examination of the concept of analysis (among others) and its various modes; to talk of ‘analytical aesthetics’ without first specifying the mode or modes of analysis involved is to talk imprecisely. I shall therefore opt to use the programme’s geo-historical (‘anglophone’) rather than its historio-philosophical (‘analytical’) name, since I find the former to be less prone to such errors.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Silvers (1987): 137, endnote 3; Mothersill (1973): xix-xx.

<sup>4</sup> Shusterman (1987, 1989): 121, 13: “Descriptive clarity versus prescriptive accuracy was [AA’s]...dilemma.”

<sup>5</sup> Lamarque (2013): 770; Tilghman (1973): 1.

<sup>6</sup> Lamarque (2013): 770-772. (Cf. Isenberg et al. (1954); cf. §3.1.1.)

<sup>7</sup> Lamarque (2013): 772-773.

*Analytical Philosophy and the Study of Art* (1950). It was in these papers (and the collections that subsequently contained them) that AA found its first light.

In a special issue of *JAAC* titled *Analytic Aesthetics: Retrospect and Prospect* (1987), which later derived the collection titled *Analytic Aesthetics* (1989), Shusterman brought together ten new essays<sup>8</sup> on the then-current status of AA. In his editor's introductions to each of these collections, Shusterman (1987, 1989) identifies eight typical features and themes characteristic of AA, by which the programme is to be understood. The characteristics are:<sup>9</sup>

- 1 *Analytical*: consequential of the Moorean-Russellian-Wittgensteinian approach to philosophy;
- 2 *Anti-idealist*: rebellious against transcendental and idealistic aesthetic theories, then dominated by Crocean romantic-idealist aesthetics;
- 3 *Anti-essentialist*: rejective of essentialism in and across the arts, distinctively through occupation with language and usage;
- 4 *Asocial*: neglectful of art's social context;
- 5 *Ahistorical*: neglectful of art's historical context;
- 6 *Metacritical*: fundamentally second-order, in occupation with the critical clarification of first-order concepts (e.g.) art and art criticism;

Where two consequences follow from this lattermost characteristic:

- 7 *Anaturalistic*: neglectful of natural beauty, in preoccupation with art;
- 8 *Non-evaluative*: abstinent in evaluation, generally opting to transfer such issues to first-order criticism itself.

Admittedly, the most crucial and influential of these characteristics are 1, 2, 3, and 6. It is from these that Silvers (1987) identifies three guiding theses -- one positive and two negative -- for the reformation due of aesthetics, and by which she characterizes AA as proceeding. These are what I shall call:<sup>10</sup>

- 1 The clarity thesis: "Aesthetics must be reformed by replacing its typically obscure and confused ideas with clear ones."
- 2 The non-generality thesis: "Aesthetics must be reformed by prohibiting the practice of generalizing insights gained from experience of particular artworks and then expecting the generalizations to function as rules in aesthetic arguments."
- 3 The anti-essentialism thesis: "Aesthetics must be reformed by recognizing that art admits of no essential properties."

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<sup>8</sup> This is not entirely accurate. The 1987 *JAAC* issue contained eight new papers, including Shusterman's introduction, as well as an abridged reprinting of Isenberg's 1950 report. The 1989 collection contained ten revised papers, excluding Isenberg's (and others), and including four not in the *JAAC*; cf. Acknowledgements.

<sup>9</sup> Shusterman (1987, 1989): 116, 4; 117, 5; 117, 6; 120, 10; 120, 11; 118, 7; 118, 8; 119, 9; respectively.

<sup>10</sup> Silvers (1987): 138-139.

While the first is no doubt contributive to the second and third, it is the latter two that find particular centrality within AA. This is because they share a key misunderstanding, namely, “the traditional cause of misguided generalization -- the desire to be definitive about art,” where ‘definitive’ is to be read as ‘definitional,’ that is, seeking a *definition* for what art is.<sup>11</sup> Traditionally, aesthetic theory itself was the attempt to make such a definition explicit. Orthodox formulations of this endeavor take the form of a closed *essential* or *real* definition: an enumeration of the properties or necessary-and-sufficient criteria for a thing to fall under the concept ART, thereby characterizing *all* and *only* the things denoted by the term ‘art’ as art-objects or artworks.<sup>12</sup> Unorthodox formulations, however, may take various other open forms, including: cluster-concepts, art-type, and hybrid theories of various sorts.<sup>13</sup> According to proponents of the anti-essentialism thesis -- the so-called anti-essentialists<sup>14</sup> -- the definability of ART is an upshot of the *essentialist fallacy*: that in order to define something, an object or event, one must know its unitary nature or essence.<sup>15</sup> Weitz’s neo-Wittgensteinian account of art as an indefinable open-concept (as opposed to a definable closed-concept) thereby exemplifies a new distinction: that between so-called *definability* and *conceptuality* (or concept-type), where the former follows from the latter.<sup>16</sup>

Shusterman’s characteristics 1 and 2 (analyticity and anti-idealism) combine to give AA its place within the philosophical landscape, and this contributes to Silvers’ clarity thesis. Characteristic 3 (anti-essentialism) obviously contributes to the anti-essentialism thesis. These likewise indicate Lamarque’s first and second provisos, respectively: the first involved the initial steps in delineating the domain of aesthetics from the domain of the philosophy of art, and thus, disentangling and clarifying the concepts they subsume; and the second involved the denial of some single essence among the various forms of art, thereby permitting their categorical subdivision. Characteristic 6 (metacriticism) indicates the third proviso: the formation of the philosophy of art criticism. Together, these points constitute the crux of AA, at least as it was initially envisioned.<sup>17</sup>

The texts I have so far considered are external to or retrospective of AA; they are neither primary texts from its heyday nor contemporaneous commentary. One may expect that, given their hindsight and piecemeal mention of both earlier figures (e.g. Isenberg, Passmore, Gallie, and Weitz) and later figures (e.g. Danto, Goodman, and Wollheim), these texts would be inclusive of AA’s *entire* history. This, however, seems not to be the case. Though fundamental to a contemporary understanding of AA, these texts are not without their exceptions and disclaimers, where great analysts are excluded on account of some

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<sup>11</sup> Silvers (1987): 139.

<sup>12</sup> Davies (2013): 213; Weitz (1944, 1950): 3, 111.

<sup>13</sup> This is hardly exhaustive; cf., e.g., Weitz (1956), Gaut (2000), Lopes (2008), respectively.

<sup>14</sup> Diffey (1973): 103; Gallie (1948), Weitz (1956), Kennick (1958) are here identified as exemplary anti-essentialists.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Diffey (1973): 103.

<sup>16</sup> Weitz (1956); cf. §3.1.3.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. §1.1.2.

stipulation or another; e.g. Moore, Wittgenstein, Dewey, Beardsley. It seems, therefore, that we are in need of a proper demarcation of scope.

I take my initial cue from Shusterman (1989), who holds what I take to be the proper point of departure in determining the scope of AA:<sup>18</sup>

“Certainly we want at least to start with a conception of the field that is wide enough to include the aesthetic writings of Goodman, Danto, and Wollheim, even if their more reformatory and speculative aesthetic doctrines make them less paradigmatically analytic aestheticians than the likes of Weitz, Isenberg, or Sibley.”

As noted by Shusterman (1987, 1989), there are three construals of scope applicable to AA, both historically and philosophically considered:<sup>19</sup>

- 1 Broad scope: The inclusion of all aesthetical texts by analytic philosophers throughout the twentieth-century; this is the scope offered by Wolterstorff.<sup>20</sup>
- 2 Narrow scope: The inclusion of all aesthetical texts by analytic philosophers who do not engage in constructionist definition; this is the scope offered by Urmson.<sup>21</sup>
- 3 Narrower scope: The inclusion of some aesthetical texts by analytic philosophers who do not engage in constructionist definition and are situated within a given timeframe; this is the scope offered by Silvers.<sup>22</sup>

Whereas broad scope affords AA breadth and variety, narrow scope affords it precision and argumentative focus, and so for narrower scope, still. Yet, the third construal of scope affords something that the first and second do not: the conception of AA as a specific programme.<sup>23</sup> Despite its constellatory organization, and considering the manifesto-like spirit of its earliest texts, I find that this is the proper conception of AA to have. However, it, as presented by Silvers, is exclusionary to many, including some of the most influential aesthetic analysts of the twentieth century. I shall therefore, in my adoption and adaptation of narrower scope, entertain a significant organizational shift.

### 1.1.1 Statement of the Early-Late Distinction in Anglophone Aesthetics

All three of the scopes noted above make the same assumptive error. This is the assumption that AA was a *monophasic* programme, consisting of a single movement without internal reform. I shall argue for AA as an (at least) *biphasic* programme, consisting of two movements, internally reformed by factors generating out of the analytic and linguistic turns, and yet consistent in their methodological pushes against idealism.

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<sup>18</sup> Shusterman (1989): 3.

<sup>19</sup> Shusterman (1987, 1989): 116, 3.

<sup>20</sup> Wolterstorff (1987, 1989): 152-153, 34-35.

<sup>21</sup> Urmson (1989): 22.

<sup>22</sup> Silvers (1987): 137-138.

<sup>23</sup> Shusterman (1987, 1989): 116, 3.



I take my cue also from Silvers (1987), who firstly identifies the whole of AA as exemplified by a shortlist of collections (Isenberg (1950), Elton (1954), and Margolis (1962)) throughout a stipulated span of sixteen years (1946-1962).<sup>24</sup> This, I shall consider the *early* phase of AA. She then secondly identifies AA as a failed programme, replaced by ‘more substantive developments’ exemplified by Danto (1964) and Goodman (1968) throughout the 1960s on.<sup>25</sup> This, I shall consider the *late* phase of AA. Like Silvers, I shall largely characterize the phases of AA according to the texts exemplary of them; my conception of a biphasic AA may therefore be outlined as follows:

- 1 Early Anglophone Aesthetics (EAA): The first phase of AA, exemplified by works published 1946-1965, specifically (but not limited to) Isenberg’s report *Analytical Aesthetics and the Study of Art* (1950) and its associated texts, the Elton collection *Aesthetics and Language* (1954), the Margolis collection *Philosophy Looks at the Arts* (1962), and the Barrett collection *Collected Papers on Aesthetics* (1965). Extension is perhaps permitted to include the Tilghman collection *Language and Aesthetics* (1973).
- 2 Late Anglophone Aesthetics (LAA): The second of AA, exemplified by works published 1964-1988, specifically (but not limited to) Danto’s paper *The Artworld* (1964) and its associated texts, Goodman’s *Languages of Art* (1968) and, by extension, *Ways of Worldmaking* (1978), Wollheim’s *Art and Its Objects* (1968) and, by extension, *On Art and the Mind* (1972) and *Painting as an Art* (1987), as well as Walton’s *Mimesis as Make-Believe* (1988).<sup>26</sup>

Where Silvers marks the failed end of AA *in toto*, I mark the shift from EAA to LAA.<sup>27</sup> What constituted and contributed to this shift is the topic of this dissertation,<sup>28</sup> and so shall not be considered presently. EAA, its texts and its issues, are discussed in chapter 3; LAA, its texts and its issues, are discussed in chapter 4. A final statement is then given in chapter 5. Yet now that scope has been properly demarcated, I turn to a preliminary account of what I shall designate *pre-AA* aesthetics, including primers on EAA and LAA themselves.

### 1.1.2 A Primer on Anglophone Aesthetics and Analytic Philosophy

The AA programme, both historically and philosophically, constitutes a lesser moment within the greater context of the tradition called ‘analytic’ in philosophy. Likewise an upshot of the AT and LT, the analytic tradition entailed a common push against idealism through an adoption of a metaphysical realism that followed from enquiry into the logical structure of

<sup>24</sup> Silvers (1987): 137-138; endnotes 3-7. Silvers quietly extends this to Barrett (1965) also; endnote 10.

<sup>25</sup> Silvers (1987): 137, 148.

<sup>26</sup> I exclude Walton from this dissertation, given that he is noted among LAA figures less and by fewer, as compared to Danto, Goodman, and Wollheim; Walton is included here simply on account of his mention by Gardner (2014) (cf. §1.1.5).

<sup>27</sup> It has not escaped my notice that there is overlap (1965/1964) between the phases; indeed, this is intentional on two counts. Firstly, it is intended to account for a gradual rather than sudden shift from EAA to LAA. Secondly, it is intended to account for the historio-philosophical genealogy of AA. The dates, per phase, are determined according to the publication years of its principle texts; this one-year overlap permits my inclusion of Danto’s 1964 text within LAA and Barrett’s 1965 collection within EAA, where each is better philosophically fit. The EAA-LAA distinction is therefore not historically-based, but philosophically-based, such that the projects and approaches of EAA are rendered prior to the projects and approaches of LAA.

<sup>28</sup> This should entail a defense of why AA is improperly characterised as ‘failed’ c. 1962, and how contemporaneous work is more properly characterised as ‘LAA’ than (e.g.) ‘post-AA’.

language and reality as constituted by a new catalogue of entities, external to and distinct from the mind -- and thus objectively *real* rather than subjectively *ideal*. Of note are the figures:<sup>29</sup> Moore, Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein; however, as only Moore<sup>30</sup> and Wittgenstein<sup>31</sup> wrote explicitly on aesthetics, I will limit any discussion to them, with Moore being of immediate concern (as Wittgenstein shall permeate much of this dissertation).

Twentieth-century analytical philosophy is said to have begun with Moore's seminal *The Nature of Judgment* (1899). Here he concludes the idealist doctrine -- i.e. that the content of a judgment is itself partly ideational -- to yield infinite regress, requiring for each primary judgment secondary and tertiary judgments, *ad infinitum*,<sup>32</sup> and so offers instead a realist metaphysics wherein the content of a judgment is something fully non-ideational. According to this *common sense* or *naïve realism*, the contents or objects of judgments are to be propositions, propositions to be complexes of concepts in relations, and concepts to be the stuff of reality:<sup>33</sup>

“A *proposition* is a *synthesis* of *concepts*; and, just as concepts are themselves immutably what they are, so they stand in infinite relations to one another equally immutable. A proposition is constituted by any number of concepts, together with a specific *relation* between them; and according to the nature of this relation the proposition may be either *true* or *false*.”

In his *Refutation of Idealism* (1903a), Moore iterates this through his discussion of ‘*blue*’ as being not the content of the sensation or consciousness of blue but rather a separately existent non-ideational concept, BLUE.<sup>34</sup> In *Principia Ethica* (1903b), Moore reiterates much the same through his discussion of ‘*yellow*’ as YELLOW,<sup>35</sup> which he identifies to be logically simple and as such indefinable and unanalyzable; likewise for ‘*good*’ itself.<sup>36</sup> The indefinability and unanalyzability of GOODNESS is symptom of its logical simplicity, given that “the most important sense of ‘definition’ is that in which a definition states...the parts which invariably compose a certain whole; and in this sense ‘good[ness]’ has no definition because it is simple and has no parts.”<sup>37</sup> It is by the metric of unanalyzable goodness that one determines a thing’s *intrinsic value*, as an end-in-itself, as opposed to its *instrumental value*, as a means-to-an-end, according to what may be called the *method of absolute isolation*: “to consider what things are such that, if they existed by themselves, in absolute isolation, we should yet judge their

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<sup>29</sup> Throughout this dissertation, discussion of particular figures has been informed and aided by Guyer (2014): *A History of Modern Aesthetics*, specifically volume III, *The Twentieth Century*; this shall be implicitly maintained, unless explicitly cited otherwise. Reference to primary texts has been cited as such; conclusions unique to Guyer have been cited as such.

<sup>30</sup> On Moore, cf. Guyer (2014): 110-115.

<sup>31</sup> On Wittgenstein, cf. Guyer (2014): 432-448.

<sup>32</sup> Moore (1899): 178.

<sup>33</sup> Moore (1899): 180; formatted.

<sup>34</sup> Moore (1903a): 447, 450.

<sup>35</sup> Moore (1903b): 10.

<sup>36</sup> Moore (1903b): 9-10. Note, however, that this does not preclude the definability of ‘*the good*’, i.e. ‘that which is good’, as some definition of this is ‘the fundamental question of Ethics’. (8-9; 184)

<sup>37</sup> Moore (1903b): 9.

existence *to be good*.”<sup>38</sup> Here, we find inspiration for the non-contextuality characteristic of AA; however, despite his isolationist methodology and the atomism it prompts, Moore’s metaethics, indeed his metaesthetics also, entails a fundamental holism, given the import of his *principle of organic unities*.<sup>39</sup>

The intrinsic value of a whole bears no regular proportion to the sum of the values of its parts, must not be assumed to do, and thus differs in amount

where an *organic unity* is such a whole.<sup>40</sup> Accordingly, Moore offers a hierarchical ontology, wherein (1) beautiful objects, being first-order organic unities, complex in (2) consciousness with certain other constituents -- (3) *appropriate* emotions and (4) *true* beliefs, particularly in response to (5) *representational* content depictive of (6) *real* objects -- to yield greater second-order organic unities, collectively called (7) aesthetic enjoyments.<sup>41</sup> Given that the beautiful and the aesthetic are themselves organic unities, so defined by their intrinsic value, Moorean aesthetics, indeed ethics also, becomes indexed to ‘good’. We therefore come to Moore’s definition of ‘*the beautiful*’, which he links with his definition of the predicate ‘is beautiful’, and thus the concept BEAUTY:<sup>42</sup>

“[T]he beautiful should be *defined* as that of which the admiring contemplation is good in itself [...] if our definition be correct...it leaves only one *unanalysable* predicate of value, namely ‘good,’ while ‘beautiful,’ though not identical with, is to be defined by reference to this, being thus, at the same time, different from and necessarily connected with it. In short,...to say that a thing is beautiful is to say, not indeed that it is *itself* good, but that it is a necessary element in something which is: to prove that a thing is truly beautiful is to prove that a whole, to which it bears a particular relation as a part, is truly good.”

Moore maintains the anti-essentialist position that “there can be no single *criterion* of beauty”, given that no beautiful object (*qua* organic unity) may be so defined by a part of its whole<sup>43</sup> -- beauty and thus art does not *contain* goodness, so much as it functionally *indexes to* goodness.

\* \* \*

Moore’s aesthetics finds interesting contrast with Croce’s,<sup>44</sup> whose idealist aesthetics largely constituted the target against which AA pitted its common push. I shall present its organization and theses here, generally, as a function of the distinctions of which the Crocean ‘Philosophy of the Spirit’ admits.

In *Aesthetics* (1902), Croce adopts and adapts the Kantian distinction between (1) *theoretical* and (2) *practical* epistemic domains, which admit of a ‘double degree’ paralleled

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<sup>38</sup> Moore (1903b): 187.

<sup>39</sup> Adapted from Moore (1903b): 27, 28, 36; three various formulations.

<sup>40</sup> Moore (1903b): 36.

<sup>41</sup> Admittedly, this prompts Moore to draw a number of striking conclusions; cf. Guyer (2014): 111, 114.

<sup>42</sup> Moore (1903b): 201-202.

<sup>43</sup> Moore (1903b): 202; formatted.

<sup>44</sup> On Croce, cf. Guyer (2014): 128-149.

between them.<sup>45</sup> The former involves the distinction between: (1) *intuition*, immediate knowledge of particulars, and (2) *concept*, mediate knowledge of universals;<sup>46</sup> the latter involves the distinction between: (3) self-regarding action, and (4) others-regarding action. This begets Croce's division of the four philosophical domains: (1) *aesthetics*, concerning particulars, (2) *logic*, concerning universals, (3) *economics*, concerning self-regarding action, and (4) *ethics*, concerning others-regarding action.<sup>47</sup> These are exhaustive;<sup>48</sup> a fifth does not exist, though may perhaps be manufactured out of combinations of the four fundamentals (e.g. the representation of universals in art as the *aesthetico-logical*).<sup>49</sup> Given these strict distinctions, art admits neither of *theses* (rules) nor of *types* (kinds),<sup>50</sup> as such would entail transmutation from the domain of aesthetics to logic. Thus, it is on account of his assignment of the matters of aesthetics to *theoretical* (not practical) *intuitive* (not conceptual) *particular* (not universal) knowledge that Croce identifies art as *expression*, given the identity of intuition with expression and thus its particularity:<sup>51</sup>

“To intuit *is* to express; and nothing else (nothing more, but nothing less) than to express. [...] Every expression is a *single* expression. Activity is a fusion of the impressions in an *organic whole*...the work of art should have *unity*, or, what amounts to the same thing, *unity in variety*. Expression is a *synthesis* of the various, or multiple, in the *one*.”

The Crocean notion of *unity in variety* is the same as the Moorean notion of *organic unity*,<sup>52</sup> that is, it describes a certain part-whole relation such that the value of the whole differs from that of its summed parts. For Croce, as for Moore, this difference is not merely an ‘other-than’ relation, but a ‘greater-than’ relation, such that some element is *added* to the multiplicity for its organization into a unity. This element is *form*, as distinct from *content*; “the aesthetic fact, therefore, is form, and nothing but form.”<sup>53</sup> *Beauty*, so defined, is this (successful) expression, given that ‘*the beautiful*’ presents as the unity produced by expressive action;<sup>54</sup> as such, beauty then becomes the signifier of art. Like Moore’s ‘good’, Croce’s ‘beautiful’ (and by extension, expression) is logically simple and unanalyzable, not admitting of degree or distinction.<sup>55</sup> Surely, per Croce, artworks (as artefacts) admit of *empirical* classes,

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<sup>45</sup> Croce (1902): 55.

<sup>46</sup> Croce (1902): 1.

<sup>47</sup> Guyer (2014): 129.

<sup>48</sup> Croce (1902): 61-62.

<sup>49</sup> Croce (1902): 33. Croce offers numerous admixtures of epistemic domains: e.g. the juridical as *economico-logical* (62), the religious as *ethico-historio-logical* (63), etc.; likewise, whereas art is the product of intuition (*qua* aesthetic) thereby granting the phenomenon, and science or philosophy is the product of concept (*qua* logic) thereby granting the noumenon, history is the product of intuition-plus-concept (31).

<sup>50</sup> Croce (1902): 33-34.

<sup>51</sup> Croce (1902): 11, 20; formatted.

<sup>52</sup> Guyer (2014): 135.

<sup>53</sup> Croce (1902): 16; formatted.

<sup>54</sup> Croce (1902): 79.

<sup>55</sup> Croce (1902): 79, 67; Guyer (2014): 138-139.

but this is an upshot of the *'physical fact'* (viz. *d*) of art which merely accompanies the *'aesthetic fact'* (viz. *b*):<sup>56</sup>

“The complete process of aesthetic production can be symbolized in four stages, which are: (*a*) impressions; (*b*) expression or spiritual aesthetic synthesis; (*c*) hedonistic accompaniment, or pleasure of the beautiful (aesthetic pleasure); (*d*) translation of the aesthetic fact into physical phenomena [...] [T]he only one that is properly speaking *aesthetic* and truly real, is in *b*...”

Attempts at analysis of such empirical classes within the aesthetic domain -- e.g.<sup>57</sup> theories of the ‘artistic and literary kinds’, ‘elementary forms of the beautiful’, ‘objective conditions of the beautiful’, ‘classification of the arts’, or ‘union of the arts’ -- or within the linguistic domain -- e.g.<sup>58</sup> theories of ‘elementary linguistic facts’ or ‘unity of the language’ -- fail, as they entail confusions between these two facts, namely: of the former for the latter. Given that they take a common object, expression (*qua* aesthetic fact), Croce claims identity between Aesthetic and Linguistic, i.e. that the science or philosophy of art and that of language are in fact *synonymous*.<sup>59</sup> Thus, by Croce’s conclusion that “the work of art (the aesthetic work) is always *internal* [ideal, ‘aesthetic’]; and what is called *external* [physical, ‘artistic’] is no longer a work of art,” we come to the crux of Croce’s idealist aesthetics: the ideality, not only of *art*, but of the *artwork* itself.<sup>60</sup> By eliminating the import of the physical artwork, Croce denies the realist attitudes that are to take prominence throughout twentieth-century aesthetics, as well as the hallmarks of AA,<sup>61</sup> most notably the Passmorean subdivision of the philosophy of art itself, according to art’s empirical classes.

### 1.1.3 A Primer on Early Anglophone Aesthetics

In his introduction, Elton (1954) names the task of his collection to be clarificatory, specifically of confusions in aesthetics said to be “mainly *linguistic* in origin”,<sup>62</sup> and identifies four sources of these confusions within then-current aesthetics. The sources are:<sup>63</sup>

- 1 *Generality*: that neither ‘art’ nor ‘aesthetics’ names *one* thing, necessarily;
- 2 *Essentialism*: that the arts themselves differ greatly;
- 3 *Misleading analogy*: that analogy with (e.g.) ethics and science mistakes aesthetic judgments as comparable to non-aesthetic judgments;
- 4 *Tautology* or *apriority*: that the exclusive emphasis of one aesthetic feature renders a theory tautologous and irrefutable.

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<sup>56</sup> Croce (1902): 96; formatted.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Croce (1902): 35-36, 108, 108-109, 114-115, 115-116 (resp.).

<sup>58</sup> Croce (1902): 149, 150.

<sup>59</sup> Croce (1902): 142-143.

<sup>60</sup> Croce (1902): 51.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Elton (1954): 6-7.

<sup>62</sup> Elton (1954): 1; formatted.

<sup>63</sup> Elton (1954): 3-4.

Notice that Elton's sources 1 and 2 hold closely together, with 1 reflected in Silvers' second thesis, and 2 reflected in her third thesis as well as Shusterman's characteristic 3. A diagnosis of this sort finds inspiration in the collections by Flew titled *Logic and Language*, first series (1951) and second series (1953), with third series titled *Conceptual Analysis* (1956), as well as the influential collection by Stevenson titled *Ethics and Language* (1944). Of course, of grandest influence was the late-Wittgenstein (1953), which Tilghman (1973) does well to emphasize explicitly,<sup>64</sup> though all EAA editors somehow note by identifying their content with the philosophical analysts: Moore, Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. Whereas Elton does so more generally,<sup>65</sup> Margolis (1962) attributes this to *methods*,<sup>66</sup> and Barrett (1965) to *questions* rather than to methods or conclusions,<sup>67</sup> said to be distinctly analytical. In fact, such questions are often deemed "logical, conceptual, and epistemological" rather than uniquely aesthetic.<sup>68</sup> A general trend among these collections which characterize EAA is a rethinking of the very *possibilities* of details thought fundamental to pre-AA aesthetics, including: the aesthetic domain itself,<sup>69</sup> the aesthetic point-of-view,<sup>70</sup> and definitions of 'art' or 'artwork'.<sup>71</sup> In fact, Margolis concedes "no simple *logical* differences" among the (e.g.) scientific, ethical, and aesthetic domains, instead offering "*clusters or classes of reasons* that would be relevant to each of these sorts of judgment" as that which facilitates the demarcation of 'neat categories', to whatever degree this might be possible.<sup>72</sup> Nevertheless, commonalities indeed arise, oftentimes stated as negative theses, as is noted by Barrett:<sup>73</sup>

"It is assumed, therefore, that the proper course to take in aesthetics is to avoid generality and the pursuit of 'laws of art', such as the '*unities*'. [...] This has been the most significant development in the aesthetics of this group..."

Such rejection of 'unities' (in whichever sense) is perhaps most adamantly phrased in terms of a rejection of philosophical-aesthetical systems (in whichever sense):<sup>74</sup>

"[A]estheticians, and, for that matter, philosophers generally, should declare a *moratorium on all-embracing systems*, and tackle particular problems [...] in so far as they are *not system-builders* and are more concerned with clarifying ideas than with constructing elaborate theories..."

Likewise, distinction between AA and pre-AA aesthetics is facilitated by rejecting the use of aesthetical writings to, per Margolis, 'round-out' philosophical systems,<sup>75</sup> and per Tilghman,

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<sup>64</sup> Tilghman (1973): 1, 5.

<sup>65</sup> Elton (1954): 11.

<sup>66</sup> Margolis (1962): 3.

<sup>67</sup> Barrett (1965): viii.

<sup>68</sup> Barrett (1965): viii.

<sup>69</sup> Margolis (1962): 12.

<sup>70</sup> Margolis (1962): 46.

<sup>71</sup> Margolis (1962): 47.

<sup>72</sup> Margolis (1962): 12; formatted.

<sup>73</sup> Barrett (1965): ix.

<sup>74</sup> Barrett (1965): vii; formatted. Clarification of these terms is a topic of this dissertation.

<sup>75</sup> Margolis (1962): 6.

construct metaphysical systems.<sup>76</sup> For the EAA editors, the proper use of aesthetics is *discursive*, involving the clarification of conceptual problems that arise through aesthetical language and the formulation of precise and analytically-minded questions by which such aesthetical discourse may be had.

#### 1.1.4 A Primer on Late Anglophone Aesthetics

Danto (1964), Goodman (1968), and Wollheim (1968) subvert the moratorium described by Barrett, each devising systems -- by which particular aesthetic problems or questions could be clarified and investigated. In this way, contra Barrett, LAA figures are indeed ‘system-builders’ as such, but per Barrett, their systems are not ‘all-embracing’; rather, they are qualified by the same interests that informed the methods and questions characteristic of EAA, namely, those that are distinctly analytical *as a function of language* and its entailments: (e.g.) meaning, reference, use, and logical ontology or epistemology; again, of grandest influence was the late-Wittgenstein (1953).<sup>77</sup> Despite this sort of commonality, the systems that these figures devise differ greatly among themselves: Danto’s being *historically-narrative*; Goodman’s being *symbolic*; and Wollheim’s being *psychological*. I shall note each in turn.

Danto (1964) identifies his project with an attempt to make sense of *pop art*, then, the latest artistic modernist idiom. For Danto, to make sense of a *new art form* was to make sense of a *new art theory*, conceived as a *new art definition*,<sup>78</sup> and therefore notes his “aim has been *essentialist* -- to find a definition of art everywhere and always true,” consisting in “a real definition...laying out the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to fall under a concept”, i.e. ART.<sup>79</sup> Adopting an historicist framework, he locates this new definition in *relational* rather than manifest properties, as would traditionally be done, thereby devising a historio-cultural system called ‘*the artworld*’.<sup>80</sup>

Goodman (1968) identifies his project with an attempt to devise “an approach to a *general theory of symbols*,” where the term ‘symbol’ includes (e.g.) letters, words, texts, pictures, diagrams, maps, models, (etc.), and ‘language’ constitutes a ‘symbol system’.<sup>81</sup> For Goodman, *to symbolize is to refer*, and so, his theory of symbols is a theory of reference, where the system generated through the interaction of those symbols is governed by both syntactic and semantic rules. This is not a function particular to art, but is common to both the aesthetic and scientific domains, given that symbol systems are means by which we construct the world (viz. worldmaking), in ordinary, not only aesthetic, experience.

Wollheim (1968) identifies his project with an attempt to reconcile the conflict of simultaneously attributing representational properties to an artwork while considering that

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<sup>76</sup> Tilghman (1973): 4.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. Guyer (2014): 427, 482, 508.

<sup>78</sup> Danto (1964): 572.

<sup>79</sup> Danto (1998): 128-129.

<sup>80</sup> Danto (1964): 580.

<sup>81</sup> Goodman (1968): xi-xii.

artwork to be a physical object. Wollheim's representationalist outlook is demonstrated through his theory of *representational seeing*, described as a capacity of our perceptual apparatus to visualize, within the two-dimensional *picture plane*, three-dimensional *pictorial space*, wherein depicted objects are seen.<sup>82</sup> This psychological capacity has the dual-character of "attend[ing] simultaneously to object and medium," called *twofoldness*.<sup>83</sup>

### 1.1.5 A Problem in Anglophone Aesthetics

There are many trends that one may observe between EAA and LAA. Among these, and of particular importance and interest, are the shifts in methodology pertaining to: essentialism, metaphysics, and systematicity. It appears that, for all three of these notions, their explicit reprobation in EAA waned unto their explicit approbation in LAA. If AA is to be viewed as a consistent albeit biphasic programme, then something seems amiss; a problem arises with respect to the attitudes concerning essentialism, metaphysics, and systematicity.

This problem has not passed unnoticed, however. In his introductory essays, Shusterman (1987, 1989) identifies this shift, from reprobation to approbation, toward essentialist methodologies. His conclusion is that EAA entailed an implicit essentialism by way of "the idea that there is or must be one essential or proper interpretive logic (whether objectivist, relativist, noncognitivist, etc.) which underlies all good criticism."<sup>84</sup> What follows is that this emerged within LAA. Likewise, in a recent paper titled *Method and Metaphysics in the Philosophy of Art* (2014), Gardner identifies the same shift, from reprobation to approbation, toward metaphysical methodologies. His conclusion is that EAA entailed an implicit general metaphysics by way of "a position of passive acquiescence in, if not active subscription to, naturalism."<sup>85</sup> Again, what follows is that this emerged within LAA (thereby contributing to adjacent disciplines such as empirical aesthetics and neuroesthetics).

It is in this paper that Gardner identifies the same shift, yet again, from reprobation to approbation, toward systematic methodologies:<sup>86</sup>

"The outlook of analytic aesthetics dictates...that issues in aesthetics be approached without reliance on a comprehensive and systematic set of general, substantive philosophical principles and doctrines...

[Yet] analytic aesthetics now includes in its own history several striking attempts at system building or at any rate comprehensive systematic elucidation of the arts: Nelson Goodman, Richard Wollheim, Arthur Danto, Kendall Walton."

Here, however, he attempts no resolution of this problem. I take the first portion of this quotation to concern EAA and the second portion to concern LAA. We are, in effect,

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<sup>82</sup> Wollheim (1968): 16, 17; (1980b): 209.

<sup>83</sup> Wollheim (1980b): 213.

<sup>84</sup> Shusterman (1987, 1989): 122, 14-15.

<sup>85</sup> Gardner (2014): 238.

<sup>86</sup> Gardner (2014): 235-6, 235.



reminded of Shusterman's claim concerning the point of departure for the demarcation of scope. Again, if AA is to be viewed as a consistent biphasic programme, then an explanation for this shift is required. Whether this explanation (for systematicity) is to share the same kind of conclusion made by Shusterman (for essentialism) and Gardner (for metaphysics), namely, that EAA entailed an implicit systematicity that emerged within LAA, is the topic of this dissertation.

## 1.2 Statement of the Problem and Thesis

**Problem.** As it stands, the above quotation exposes a problematic methodological tension between the early and late phases of AA. Paraphrasing Gardner's formulation yields the following shift -- from non-systematic to systematic methodologies:

The outlook of EAA dictates that issues in aesthetics be approached, philosophically speaking, *non-systematically*...

Yet LAA includes in its own history several attempts at approaching issues in aesthetics *systematically*: Goodman, Wollheim, Danto, Walton.

This tension between EAA and LAA may manifest with various possible strengths, including: as an *inconsistency* (in its weaker sense) or as a *contradiction* (in its stronger sense) between the two phases.<sup>87</sup> Given the paradoxical 'S and *not-S*' structure of this formulation, a stronger reading of the tension as contradiction seems arguable; however, given that this dissertation concerns AA as a *consistent* programme, it is sufficient to argue a weaker reading of the tension as mere *inconsistency*. Call this the Problem of Systematic Inconsistency (PSI) in anglophone aesthetics. It is this problem that I aim to investigate and resolve as an apparent problem, resolving it as neither contradictory nor inconsistent, despite its *prima facie* appearance as so. I shall accomplish this through comparative elucidation of the concepts ANALYTICITY and SYSTEMATICITY, as contextualized within the early and late phases of anglophone aesthetics.

Yet, a preliminary issue arises. Upon first-glance, the paraphrase seems innocuous enough. Upon second-glance, however, it may seem that this shift itself has, in error, metamorphosed away from its original formulation. It is my preliminary duty, then, to provide a third-glance which shows this to be an appropriate metamorphosis.

Gardner's claim (call this G) entails a reprobative-approbative shift w.r.t. some entity, namely systematicity (call this *s*); i.e. EAA poses a negative claim, and LAA poses a positive claim, w.r.t. *s*. G is therefore an *evaluative* shift w.r.t. a single entity, *s*. Gardner's paraphrased claim (call this G') entails an approbative evaluation w.r.t. the entities constituting the non-systematicity/systematicity shift (call these *s\** and *s*); i.e. EAA poses a positive claim w.r.t. *s\** and LAA poses a positive claim w.r.t. *s*. G' is therefore a *constitutive* shift w.r.t. two

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<sup>87</sup> This is hardly exhaustive. Varying readings of principal AA texts yield varying possible strengths of its tensions; these are not considered here. The formulation considered here is a *minimal* PSI.

different entities,  $s^*$  and  $s$ . It therefore appears as though the first-order shifts noted by  $G$  and  $G'$  undergo a second-order shift (call this  $G''$ ) from evaluative to constitutive matters, skewing the discussion. This is our view from the second-glance.

AA was not merely a diagnostic programme,<sup>88</sup> however, and so must entail some corrective if it is to be properly contextualized within the analytic tradition. For this reason,  $G$  is mistaken to limit EAA as *merely* claiming a negative evaluation of  $s$ , and  $G'$  is mistaken to limit EAA as *merely* claiming a positive evaluation of  $s^*$ ; rather, the methodological claims of EAA in  $G$  and  $G'$  are to be supplemented with a replacement methodology (call this  $m$ ) or set of methodologies (call this  $M$ ). The negative claim of  $G$  w.r.t.  $s$  is therefore synonymous with the positive claim of  $G'$  w.r.t.  $s^*$ , such that the target of both is a positive claim w.r.t.  $m$  or  $M$ . In emphasizing this, we therefore iterate the implicit claim of  $G$  that a reprobation of  $s$  entails an approbation of  $m$ , and reiterate the explicit claim of  $G'$  that an approbation of  $s^*$  also entails an approbation of  $m$ . Both  $G$  and  $G'$  (and thus  $G''$ ) are therefore fundamentally constitutive, not evaluative, shifts -- despite both also involving an evaluative dimension;  $G''$  no longer skews the discussion. This is our view from the third-glance.

It is the task of this dissertation to show that the two entities  $s^*$  and  $s$  in  $G'$ , which *prima facie* present the tension noted above, are in fact not the same but different entities -- i.e. different conceptualizations of systematicity (call these  $s_1^*$  and  $s_2$ ). Yet, at present this tension (as inconsistency) stands.

**Thesis.** Formally stated, the thesis of this dissertation is taxonomical. It entails both generic and specific theses, where the former implies the latter. The generic thesis is that the problem of systematic inconsistency in anglophone aesthetics is merely an apparent problem, which is to say, is resolvable. The specific thesis is tripartite: (1) that the call to *non*-systematicity in early anglophone aesthetics was mistaken; (2) that this was actually a call for a *new* systematicity; and (3) that this emerged in late anglophone aesthetics. Fundamental to these theses is the notion of a Shusterman-Gardner type conclusion, namely, that EAA entailed an implicit systematicity that emerged within LAA. It is in virtue of this implicit systematicity within EAA, and its mere emergence in LAA, that the shift in phase is rendered neither inconsistent (on the weaker reading) nor contradictory (on the stronger reading), and thus PSI rendered resolvable.

This dynamic may be iterated in the following way: both the early and late phases of AA entailed both analytic and systematic elements; yet whereas EAA positioned analysis as primary and system as secondary, LAA positioned system as primary and analysis as secondary. The shift in phase was merely a swapping of priority between these two methods. In the following chapter, I shall turn to a case-study as a means to illustrate and so concretize the thesis of this dissertation and the dynamic it involves.

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<sup>88</sup> Cf. §3.1.1.

### 1.3 Analysis, Synthesis, and System in Analytic Philosophy

What follows is a preliminary catalogue of the major modes of analysis, synthesis, and system characterizable of the tradition called ‘analytic’ in philosophy; these shall serve as the means by which the analytic and systematic methods of AA, throughout both EAA and LAA, are to be elucidated.

Perhaps most fundamental is analysis as regression; this is presented by Beaney (2002) as an introduction to analysis as such.<sup>89</sup> In this most general formulation, analysis entails, for any given  $x$ , the tracing of a sequence of conditionals, such that if  $x$  be positioned at step 5, steps 1-4 may be regarded as the concomitants of 5 unto 1; likewise, synthesis entails, for any given  $y$ , the same tracing, such that if  $y$  be positioned at step 1, steps 2-5 may be regarded as the concomitants of 1 unto 5. This is shown below:

$$\Leftarrow \textit{analysis} \quad y = \textcircled{1} \rightarrow \textcircled{2} \rightarrow \textcircled{3} \rightarrow \textcircled{4} \rightarrow \textcircled{5} = x \quad \textit{synthesis} \Rightarrow$$

For each *analytic* step, i.e. working backward to each antecedent, there exists a *synthetic* step, i.e. working forward to each consequent. Thus, wherever one notes a method of (e.g.) ‘*regressive analysis*’, perhaps one may also note a method of (e.g.) ‘*progressive synthesis*’; no doubt synthesis admits of varieties also, and one might well suspect that they, at least partly, correspond to the varieties of analysis, as converses. *System*, however, concerns interrelations of the sequence itself, both part-part and part-whole (etc.), rather than the analytic-synthetic means by which it is devised; it therefore relates to analysis more obliquely. It is for this reason that I shall, at present, not differentiate between analysis and *synthesis*, but rather between analysis and *system* -- or perhaps our targets: analyticity and systematicity.

#### 1.3.1 A Primer on Analysis

Regarding the varieties of analysis, I take my cue from a series of texts by Beaney, including: *Decompositions and Transformations* (2002), from which derived *Conceptions of Analysis* (2007b) and *The Analytic Turn* (2007a), both in a collection of the same name; as well as a lecture titled *The Analytic Revolution* (2015).<sup>90</sup> Throughout these sources, Beaney distinguishes three modes of analysis at play throughout twentieth-century analytic philosophy. The modes are:<sup>91</sup>

- 1 *Regressive analysis*: the derivation of something by way of its premises, principles, causes, etc.; this may involve a genealogical strategy.
- 2 *Resolutive analysis*: the identification of the elementary or structural constituents of something; this may involve a *reductivist* strategy.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. Beaney (2002): 55-56.

<sup>90</sup> The titles listed here are abridgments; cf. bibliography for full titles.

<sup>91</sup> Beaney (2002): 55; (2007a): 1, 2, 6; (2007b): 197-198. Where Beaney offers multiple names per mode, I have opted to select and present one; e.g. the Russellian mode is also called ‘*decompositional*’ analysis, and the transformative mode is also called ‘*interpretive*’ or ‘*explicatory*’ analysis; likewise for new- and same- level analyses, also called (e.g.) ‘*metaphysical*’ and ‘*logical*’, resp.

- 3 *Transformative analysis*: the translation of something into a new specified scheme; this may involve an *eliminativist* strategy.

Where mode 2 admits of further distinction:<sup>92</sup>

- 1 *Whole-part (Russellian) analysis*: the decompositional resolution of a complex (whole) into its atomic constituents (parts).
- 2 *Function-argument (Fregean) analysis*: the resolution of a complex into an argument, (rather than subject) and a function (rather than predicate) that acts as the logical operator (rather than introducing a copula, e.g. 'is').

And admitting of two general methodological classes, with mode 2 (and perhaps 1) privileged by the first, and mode 3 privileged by the second:<sup>93</sup>

- 1 *Reductive analysis (analysis-as-reduction)*: analysis which aims to identify the deep-structural elements of a given complex that are logically or metaphysically primitive; this reflects '*new-level*' analysis.
- 2 *Paraphrastic analysis (analysis-as-rephrasal)*: analysis which aims to clarify surface-structural grammatical form and in so doing correct the problems it generates; this reflects '*same-level*' analysis.

Distinguishable as the above though they may be, Beaney maintains that all three analytic modes (and their distinctions) are, in practice, typically to some degree mixed, and that it is only where one mode is determinably dominant that one may speak of that mode of analysis; thus, in theory, these fundamental modes admit of various combinations and realizations, prompting other varieties of analysis throughout the movement called 'analytic' in philosophy.<sup>94</sup> Nevertheless, one may indeed identify the analytic mode(s) characteristic of the AT, as first provided in Beaney (2002):<sup>95</sup>

"What, I think, was genuinely new around the turn of the twentieth century... was the deliberate and extensive use of *paraphrastic analysis* [and t]he *interpretive or transformative mode of analysis* that this involves..."

And second provided in Beaney (2007a):<sup>96</sup>

"[R]ebellion against British idealism...led to the *more complex form of analysis... combining transformative logical analysis with decompositional metaphysical analysis*. What characterizes the analytic turn in giving rise to analytic philosophy, then, was *this synthesis of two forms of analysis*, and what has characterized analytic philosophy ever since is the continually developing *syntheses of forms of analysis...*"

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<sup>92</sup> Beaney (2002): 70; (2007a): 4; (2007b): 201.

<sup>93</sup> Beaney (2002): 69; (2007a): 5; (2007b): 200.

<sup>94</sup> Beaney (2002): 55; (2007a): 25; (2007b): 197.

<sup>95</sup> Beaney (2002): 70; formatted.

<sup>96</sup> Beaney (2007a): 25; formatted.

Here, Beaney presents a rather telling shift. In the former, he identifies a simpler assessment of the AT, as characterizable by a single general mode: the transformative mode of analysis-as-rephrasal (mode 2); yet, in the latter, he identifies a more complicated assessment of the AT, as characterizable by the *synthesis* of two general modes: the transformative mode of analysis-as-rephrasal *and* the resolute (as whole-part) mode of analysis-as-reduction (modes 2 *and* 3). Given the admixture of analytic modes in general, a number of points arise: (1) the transformative-paraphrastic analysis noted in (2002) would involve the resolute-reductivist analysis noted in (2007a), though not to the same degree, i.e. the former being dominant over the latter. (2) The synthesis emphasized in (2007a) is either (2a) *equal* or (2b) *unequal*; in the former, both modes are co-dominant, and in the latter, one mode is dominant over the other. (2a) is inconsistent with (1), but (2b) may be either consistent or inconsistent with (1) depending upon the mode considered to be dominant, i.e. consistent if transformation-paraphrasis is dominant, or inconsistent if resolution-reduction is dominant. Chronology of the statements aside, I turn elsewhere in an attempt to settle these issues.

In *Analytic Philosophy: Beyond the Linguistic Turn and Back Again* (2007), Hacker identifies four (perhaps five) phases of analytic philosophy, properly so called. The phases are:<sup>97</sup>

- 1 The *logical atomist* phase: characterized by the dominance, first, of resolute (as Russellian whole-part) analysis, and second, of transformative (as Fregean function-argument) analysis; for Russell, transformation reinforced resolution (in an eliminativist manner), for Frege, transformation was self-important (in a reductivist manner).<sup>98</sup>
- 2 The *Cambridge analysis* phase: characterized by the explicit distinction between paraphrastic and reductive analyses; this permitted logical ('same-level') analysis without metaphysical ('new-level') analysis and its concomitants, and "became the hallmark of the phase (or phases) of analytic philosophy that followed".<sup>99</sup>
- 3 The *logical empiricist* (Vienna Circle) phase: characterized by further non-reductive paraphrastic alternatives, generally for 'the logic of scientific language'.<sup>100</sup>
- 4 The *Oxford analysis* phase: characterized by further non-reductive paraphrastic alternatives, generally through the analysis of grammar, 'rules-of-use'.<sup>101</sup>
- 5 The *logical pragmatist* phase: characterized by the search for a new theory of meaning for natural language.<sup>102</sup>

Given the paraphrastic-reductive distinction devised in phase 3, Hacker maintains that the LT, rather than the AT *tout court*, characterizes phases 3 and 4 (and 5),<sup>103</sup> and defines it according to the following propositions:<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> Hacker (2007): 126-127.

<sup>98</sup> Beaney (2007a): 1-2, 4; (2015).

<sup>99</sup> Beaney (2002): 70; (2007a): 5; (2007b): 200.

<sup>100</sup> Beaney (2007a): 5; Hacker (2007): 126.

<sup>101</sup> Beaney (2007a): 5-6; Hacker (2007): 128.

<sup>102</sup> Hacker (2007): 127.

<sup>103</sup> Hacker (2007): 132.

<sup>104</sup> Hacker (2007): 133; formatted.

“(1) that the goal of philosophy is (a) the understanding of the structure and articulations of our conceptual scheme, and (b) the resolution of the problems of philosophy (to be specified by paradigmatic examples)...; (2) that a primary method of philosophy is *the examination of the uses of words* in order to disentangle conceptual confusions; (3) that philosophy is not a contribution to human knowledge about reality...but to a distinctive form of understanding.”

Reading through the lenses of Beaney and Hacker (whose distinction Beaney endorses),<sup>105</sup> I conclude with a position intermediately between Beaney (2002) and Beaney (2007a), stated above as (2b): the synthesis noted as characterizing the AT is ‘unequal’, involving a slight *relative dominance of the transformative mode of paraphrastic analysis*. This holds especially with regard to AA, for two reasons, one historical and one philosophical: (1) historically, EAA and LAA each coincide with phases 3-5 (and beyond), after which non-reductive modes of analysis were emphasized over reductive ones; (2) philosophically, EAA figures took themselves to be reprobative of the metaphysical interests that resolutive modes of reductive analysis entail,<sup>106</sup> regardless of whether this was mistaken. For these reasons, at present, I shall categorize AA figures among the ‘second generation of analytic philosophers’, for whom non-reductive paraphrastic analysis was key.<sup>107</sup>

### 1.3.2 A Primer on System

A brief interjection. In order to describe what ‘system’ or ‘systematicity’ is to mean throughout this dissertation, I shall begin with a description of what it is *not* to mean. I shall call this ‘systematicity in the *ordinary sense*’, or:

1\* *Ordinary systematicity*: some element or set-of-elements is maintained as the system guide; the system is defined in terms of some procedure or classification that is to be followed regularly and methodically according to this guide; rule-following.

Systematicity in the ordinary sense admits of (at least) two variants or moments: (1) a dynamic *procedural* systematicity, whereby a system is devised according to some stepwise activity, and (2) a static *organizational* systematicity, whereby a system is devised according to some hierarchical or chronological ordering. (I call these ‘moments’ because, oftentimes, the latter is a result of the former.) One is said to be ‘systematic’ in the ordinary sense when one follows a certain methodology, often according to a set-of-rules, thereby defining the ‘system’ as either (1) the methodical *product*, or (2) the set of methodical *steps* themselves, or (3) the methodical *doing* itself, or (4) some such combination; procedural systematicity defines the system according to 2 or 3, whereas organizational systematicity defines the system according to 1. As I shall soon demonstrate, I intend ‘systematicity’ in neither a procedural nor an organizational sense, but rather in a *form-functional* sense that is

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<sup>105</sup> Cf. Beaney (2007a): 5-6.

<sup>106</sup> Cf. §1.1.5 and Gardner (2014).

<sup>107</sup> Beaney (2002): 70, cf. endnote 31; (2007b): 200, cf. endnote 6.

indicative of the *type of functionality* maintained by the parts of a system in relation to the system whole. In ordinary systematicity, indeed in both its procedural and organizational variants, the onus is on relationships between parts, particularly immediate parts -- they entail '*part-part relations*' only; in the systematicity I shall soon introduce, indeed in each of its variants also, the onus is rather on relationships between parts and wholes, as well as among parts -- they entail '*part-whole relations*'. Given the topic of this dissertation, it is the latter that interests us.

\* \* \*

Regarding the varieties of system, I take my cue from Winfield, who, in *Systematic Aesthetics* (1995), offers a neo-Hegelian defense of so-called 'systematic' aesthetic theories, thereby detailing what may constitute a system as such. He distinguishes three fundamental models of aesthetic theory at play throughout its history, defined according to the locus and function of 'the standard of beauty' within each. The types are:<sup>108</sup>

- 1 *Metaphysical aesthetics*: search for '*first principles*' via appeal to '*privileged givens*' as non-derivative and unconditioned standards; this locates beauty in antecedent objective reality, whereby aesthetics becomes *mimesis*.
- 2 *Transcendental aesthetics*: search for '*conditions of knowing*' via appeal to '*privileged determiner(s)*' as that which derives and confers validity upon other terms; this locates beauty in consequent subjective or intersubjective processes of reception, whereby aesthetics becomes a '*critique of taste*'.
- 3 *Systematic aesthetics*: appeal to '*self-determination*' whereby the system's form and content are simultaneously generated through *immanent categorical development* and *rational reconstruction*, which together inform art criticism; this defines beauty as "the most general idea of aesthetic worth" and recognizes the '*autonomy of art*'.<sup>109</sup>

Winfield concludes that the metaphysical and transcendental models fail, and do so on the grounds that appeals to privileged givens (model 1) or determiners (model 2) are self-defeating with the latter reducing to the former.<sup>110</sup> At fault is what Winfield describes as a "fundamental stumbling block of any *foundationalism*", namely, the normative discrepancy between conferrer and conferred-upon.<sup>111</sup> In fact, per Winfield, the failure of models 1 and 2 is attributable to their foundationalist tendencies of privileging some entity and organizing their theories around it; whereas, the success of model 3 is attributable to the *absence* of any foundationalism (or *anti-foundationalism*) and its replacement with *non-foundationalist* self-determination.<sup>112</sup> As noted above, this involves two resources: rational reconstruction adopts terms from past aesthetic theories or traditions and rethinks them by determining their constituents, and antecedent and consequent elements,<sup>113</sup> and adapting them into an

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<sup>108</sup> Winfield (1995): 4, 7; 7-8; 6, 9 (resp.).

<sup>109</sup> Winfield (1995): 70.

<sup>110</sup> Cf. Winfield (1995): 4-5.

<sup>111</sup> Winfield (1995): 5; formatted.

<sup>112</sup> Winfield (1995): 4-5.

<sup>113</sup> Winfield (1995): 64-66.

immanent categorial development, wherein terms follow one another according to their respective content, with prior terms providing sufficient conceptual prerequisites for the posterior terms that incorporate them; the development closes when one such term incorporates *all* prior terms, thereby comprising a totality or unity, free of extraneity.<sup>114</sup> These together generate, and are defined by, what Winfield calls a “thoroughgoing systematicity”, whereby:<sup>115</sup>

“[N]o term gets introduced until all its preconditions and constituents have already been established. As a consequence, the order in which topics are addressed is tied to their content, reflecting their constitutive position in the subject matter...”

To initiate this, the ‘first task’ of any systematic aesthetics is to determine the starting point or *minimal feature of art* by identifying the *minimal term* that is incorporated by all subsequent terms and establishing its *primitive role* within the system.<sup>116</sup> To qualify, this minimal term must contain no aesthetic constituents, that is, must be unanalyzable unto other aesthetic factors.<sup>117</sup> Per Winfield, this term is ‘aesthetic worth in general’ *qua* beauty.<sup>118</sup>

I take Winfield’s account, as reiterated here, to constitute *a general or standard account of systematicity*, against which we might compare alternatives, and by which we might emphasize a final point regarding varieties of system: all models 1, 2, and 3 constitute systems in a standard philosophical sense; however, only model 3 is characterized by Winfield as ‘systematic’. This is because his use of ‘systematic’ is *procedural*, such that aesthetics is systematic when its formulation *proceeds* systematically through systematic *processes* (viz. immanent categorial development). This begets a difference in classification among the models: model 3 is classified by way of its process, and so is systematic in a way that tends toward the procedural (though not merely in the ‘ordinary’) sense; models 1 and 2 are classified by way of their organization, w.r.t. privileged entities, and so are systematic in a way that tends toward the organizational (though not merely in the ‘ordinary’) sense. Yet, per the ‘interjection’ above, when viewed from the outlook that interests us -- form-functionally -- this difference in classification dissolves. The privilege attributed to givens and determiners in models 1 and 2 and primitiveness attributed to the minimal term in model 3 are functionally equivalent, acting as the kernel around which each system fixates. In effect, this anticipates the key systematic distinction made in the following chapter.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> Winfield (1995): 63-64.

<sup>115</sup> Winfield (1995): 6.

<sup>116</sup> Winfield (1995): 64-66, 67-68.

<sup>117</sup> Winfield (1995): 67-68.

<sup>118</sup> Winfield (1995): 70.

<sup>119</sup> Cf. §2.1.4.



#### 1.4 Conclusion to Chapter 1

In adopting and adapting a narrower scope, I entertain a significant organizational shift; namely, that AA is (at least) biphasic, and admits of earlier and later phases characterized by their exemplary texts -- Elton (1954), Margolis (1962), and Barrett (1965) characterizing EAA, with Isenberg (1950) being a special case, and Danto (1964), Goodman (1968), and Wollheim (1968) characterizing LAA. Upon investigation of these texts, the EAA-LAA shift poses a constitutive methodological shift, the PSI, from non-systematicity to systematicity, which must be accounted for if AA is to be considered a consistent programme. This inconsistency, it shall be argued, is merely apparent, and explainable as a swapping of priority between analytic and systematic methods from EAA to LAA.

To help elucidate this, per Beaney, three modes of analysis -- regressive, resolute, and transformative -- which admit of two classes -- reductive and paraphrastic -- characteristic of analytic philosophy were presented, with the AT being characterized by a synthesis of the paraphrastic-transformative and reductive-resolutive modes, with slight dominance of the former over the latter. Likewise, per Winfield, three models of system -- metaphysical, transcendental, and systematic -- characteristic of aesthetic philosophy were presented, with all three tending toward 'systematicity in the ordinary sense', which admits of two moments -- procedural (characterizing the systematic) and organizational (characterizing the metaphysical and transcendental). None of these interest us from a form-functional perspective, given that each contains a kernel around which the system fixates and to which its elements index, this being a mark of pre-AA.

The modes of analysis and models of system presented here provide the tools by which we are to investigate the PSI throughout (1) EAA, (2) LAA, and (3) Cubism, which shall serve as a case-study to concretize the thesis and dynamic posed within this dissertation.



## Analysis, Synthesis and System in Cubism

## 2.1 Cubism

*Du «Cubisme»* (1912, 1947)<sup>1</sup> by cubist painters Gleizes and Metzinger is the text which -- perhaps with cubist poet Apollinaire's *Les Peintres Cubistes, Méditations Esthétiques* (1913) and cubist art dealer Kahnweiler's *Der Weg zum Kubismus* (1915) -- is deemed the cubist manifesto. Here, the cubists admit to take inspiration from the realist Courbet and the post-impressionist Cézanne who demonstrate through their respective *oeuvres* a genealogy, reprobativ of idealist tendencies and approbative of realist ones:<sup>2</sup> Courbet's was an art of *realism* in that it ended the *secular idealism* of romanticism;<sup>3</sup> impressionism was an art of *optical* realism and Cézanne's post-impressionism was an art of *perceptual* realism; cubism was an art of *conceptual* realism.<sup>4</sup> Thus, we observe a stepwise shift evermore into the subjective, yet only insofar as the subjective relates to the objective:

“And this is, precisely, the revolutionary character of cubism,...«the most important pictorial revolution since the Renaissance.» [...] The Renaissance, the apotheosis of the SUBJECT, forces the predominance of the OBJECT... Categorically, cubism calls into question the rights of the object.”

Here the cubists turn Moorean: though complexed subjectively, the constituents of thought are not defined as such, and thus the cubists, like Moore, maintain their realism through their adamancy of the objective existence of their concepts. The idealist outlook holds the content of thought to be so defined, as subjective and ideational; the realist outlook holds the content of thought to be *not* so defined, but as objective and non-ideational, that is, existent independently of thought and its complexing. It is of the latter that we ascribe the cubists.

According to Fry in his introduction to *Cubism* (1966), a seminal anthology of select primary texts on the subject, cubism shared a fundamental revolutionary feature with the philosophical and scientific trends of the twentieth century: a deliberate break from the idealist outlook.<sup>5</sup> In painting, if the monocularism of traditional techniques suggests the so-called unitariness characteristic of idealism, then the binocularism (or rather multiocularism) of modernist techniques suggests the so-called plenitude characteristic of cubism.<sup>6</sup> Fundamentally, the cubist project was *to depict the object, in painting, as it is in reality*; i.e. viewed

<sup>1</sup> Published in French in 1912 with an English translation in 1913; republished in French in 1947 with a critical preface by Gleizes and epilogue by Metzinger, untranslated. All are my own translations, with deference to Antliff & Leighten (2008) on the former.

<sup>2</sup> Gleizes & Metzinger (1912): 38-41.

<sup>3</sup> Gleizes & Metzinger (1912): 38.

<sup>4</sup> Fry (1966): 14.

<sup>5</sup> Fry (1966): 9.

<sup>6</sup> I borrow these terms from Hockney (2001): 189, who offers an alternative art-history based on the use or disuse of optics in painting; cf. footnote 62.

not from a single perspective but from a multiplicity of perspectives, simultaneously, given that real objects are themselves multi-perspectival. Metzinger's *Tea Time* (1911) (Figure 17), is perhaps the purest example of this, given the dual-perspective with which the teacup is depicted: simultaneously viewed from the top and side, Metzinger depicts both (e.g.) its sloped body and elliptical rim because he knows, does not merely see, the real teacup to have both features. It is a more thorough, more real, depiction of the *teacup as real object*, impossible through single-perspective. The cubist outlook therefore marked a new pictorial language<sup>7</sup> of non-imitative depiction by establishing a new self-sufficient relation between abstraction (form) and representation (content), requiring analytic and synthetic faculties by the artist and audience, to yield *panoptically* a depiction of the object as visual-*cum*-conceptual reality. It is these premises that derive the primary cubist aphorism: *cubism as (conceptual) realism*<sup>8</sup> -- or perhaps rather a *nouveau réalisme*.<sup>9</sup>

Before proceeding, however, a brief enquiry into the major cubist methodologies is required. I shall iterate these as '*technics*', properly so called, as they shall here be presented both as formal techniques and formalist studies of those techniques.

### 2.1.1 Cubism: a History and Philosophy

What follows is a chronology of the major technics characterizable of the cubist idiom in painting; they are here nine in number and admit of three general classes that anticipate the division of the cubist movement (CM) into two phases, including a transitional period:<sup>10</sup>

- 1 *Passage*: the intersection of planes otherwise spatially separated as appearing both in-front-of and in-back-of adjoining planes.
- 2 *Faceting*: the 'cubification' of figures as appearing lapidarian.

Cézannean in origin, *passage* is rendered as repetitious uniform brushstrokes which flatten three-dimensional space and ambiguate the contours that delineate two-dimensional forms; in effect, it emphasizes the surface of the painting rather than the depth it depicts.<sup>11</sup> Faceting is rendered as geometric angles and shapes which disambiguate surfaces and contours by monochromic light-shade contrasts like the facets of a cut gem; in effect, it emphasizes volume and the tangibility of space.<sup>12</sup>

- 3 The notion of the *tableau-objet* or 'picture object'.

Paintings were now to be considered both depictive of reality and additional to that reality,

<sup>7</sup> Gleizes & Metzinger (1912): 74; (1947): 23; Golding (1959): xv; Fry (1966): 20; Cooper (1971): 107.

<sup>8</sup> Golding (1959): 17, 198; Fry (1966): 36; Cooper (1971): 264.

<sup>9</sup> Gleizes & Metzinger (1947): 79; Cooper (1971): 263.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Figures 10-15.2 for exemplary works, generally per Cooper (1971): 45-59, 183-194.

<sup>11</sup> Cooper (1971): 18-19; Fry (1966): 14.

<sup>12</sup> Cooper (1971): 45.

related and yet coequal.<sup>13</sup> This marked a key shift in the conceptualization of the ontological status of artworks and the role they were to play in adopting a realist attitude.

4 *Trompe l'oeil*: the painting of illusorily-real figures as appearing existent.

5 *Lettering*: the stenciling of text, often with associative relevance.

*Trompe-l'oeil* is rendered in two paintings by Braque as (e.g.) a nail painted with regular shadow, upon which (in the first) the eponymous palette and (in the second) the painting itself appear to hang; in effect, here, it emphasizes the stylistic differences between traditional and cubistic means of representation.<sup>14</sup> Lettering is rendered as stenciled text; in effect, being necessarily two-dimensional, it emphasizes planarity and, like reverse-*repoussoir*, differentiates between spatially-situated and spatially-non-situated figures.<sup>15</sup> Braque's 1909-10 nails and 1911 lettering play similar ontological roles:<sup>16</sup> emphasis of the schism between representation (*qua* picture) and reality (*qua* object) -- a technic generative from the notion of the painting as *tableau-objet*.

6 The notion of *signs*.

Paintings were now to be composed with a repertoire of abbreviated and identifiable features that facilitated the navigation of the composition *in toto* through a condensed sub-composition; this extricated cubism from total abstraction and non-figurativism. Signs thus signified the first cubist attempts at "a comprehensive system of spatial notation".<sup>17</sup>

7 *Collage*: the introduction of facsimile readymades into an otherwise painted canvas.

8 *Papier collé* or 'pasted papers': the introduction of paper *collage*.

9 *Impasto*, etc.: the introduction of thickened paint, appearing textural or relief-like.

*Collage* is rendered by Picasso as (e.g.) a textile print of, rather than actual, caning; in effect, it challenges the realness of 'real-objects' by giving them a false reality within 'art-objects'.<sup>18</sup> This was the first type of sign proper. *Papier collé* is rendered as monochromic, printed, or textured paper, overlapped and drawn-upon; in effect, it emphasizes the cubistic

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<sup>13</sup> Cooper (1971): 183.

<sup>14</sup> Cooper (1971): 45.

<sup>15</sup> Cooper (1971): 54-56.

<sup>16</sup> This is, admittedly, a minimal description of their roles, though sufficient for the chronological device they are here purposed, as any further discussion shall lead this dissertation too far afield. Properly, such would note the ontological import of (e.g.): (1) artworks that partly seem to be real objects but are *not* (*viz. trompe l'oeil*); (2) artworks that partly seem to be real objects but are *different* real objects (*viz. collage*); (3) artworks that partly *are* the real objects they seem to be (*viz. combines*); (4) artworks that *wholly* are the real objects they seem to be (*viz. readymades*); and (5) artworks that wholly seem to be real objects but are *not* (*viz. indiscernibles*), or (6) artworks that seem to be *other* artworks, in whatever combination of (1)-(5), as either (a) a copy, (b) a forgery, or (c) a different artwork entirely. Cf. §4.1.1.

<sup>17</sup> Cooper (1971): 49-50.

<sup>18</sup> Cooper (1971): 58.

'*surface-realism*' incipient in *passage*.<sup>19</sup> This was the second type of sign proper. Picasso's 2012 *collage* and *papier collé* play similar ontological roles, even to Braque's nail and lettering: emphasis on the representation-reality schism -- a technic regenerative of the notion of the painting as *tableau-objet*.

Throughout, we observe a general trend toward "real fragments of a non-pictorial world...play[ing] unreal roles in a pictorial world";<sup>20</sup> a diametrical contrast to traditional painting, where 'unreal fragments of a pictorial world play real roles in a non-pictorial world'. Of course, the latter being the natural role of art in reality, cubism tended toward this as well. The cubist revolution was that it did each, in turn, through an analytic-synthetic methodological shift:<sup>21</sup>

"Whereas previously Braque and Picasso had *analyzed*...the appearance of objects to discover a set of forms which would add up to...the formal elements of a composition, now they found that they could begin by composing with purely pictorial elements [...] and create their own pictorial reality by building up towards it through a *synthesis* of different elements."

Owing to the formalist reading of cubism's development that traces through the reports of Kahnweiler (1915), Golding (1959), Fry (1966), and, in part, Cooper (1971),<sup>22</sup> among Fry's key contributions to both the art-history and the art-philosophy of cubism was his maintenance of cubism as biphasic, given a stylistic division into *analytic* and *synthetic* phases. This division generated out of the subject-object distinction:<sup>23</sup>

- 1 *Analytic cubism* (AC) (1906-1912): A matter of the relation between the painter (as subject) and painted (as object). Of focus was the way in which the painter is able to render figures in accordance with cubistic technics; this entailed a process of analysis.
- 2 *Synthetic cubism* (SC) (1912-1920s): A matter of the relations among the painted objects themselves, through the mediation of *signs*. Of focus was the way in which the audience is able to navigate the work and discern the figures rendered in it; this entailed a process of synthesis.

AC is characterized by technics 1 and 2, though extends to 3 (*tableau-objet*) and its proximal manifestations, 4 and 5. Thus 1 and 2 constitute a first class, Class I. SC is characterized through technics 7, 8, and 9, these being proximal manifestations of 6 (*signs*), though perhaps distends to 3 (including 4 and 5), making them distal manifestations of 3, given that the *sign* was a consequence of the *tableau-objet*. Thus 6, 7, 8, and 9 constitute Class III. Owing to technic overlap, 3, 4, and 5 constitute Class II. I therefore offer an altered chronology of cubism: Class I (technics 1-2) and Class II (technics 3, 4-5) constitute the analytic phase, with II being a transitional period; Class III (technics 6, 7-9) constitutes the synthetic phase.

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<sup>19</sup> Cooper (1971): 183-185.

<sup>20</sup> Cooper (1971): 188.

<sup>21</sup> Cooper (1971): 188; formatted.

<sup>22</sup> Antliff & Leighten (2008): 2-3, 4-5.

<sup>23</sup> Fry (1966): 18, 24, 33.

The signs noted here are defined by Fry as “the formal qualities of an object... ‘synthesized’ into a single characteristic, but highly conventionalized, new form.”<sup>24</sup> The impetus for this shift being the introduction of new media -- *collage*, *papier collé* -- into painting, Fry defines them both formally and functionally: *papier collé* was the first cubist tool for *signifying* objects by way of colour or texture rather than merely by way of line or plane. Absolutely flat yet capable of depicting the spatial relations of planes and volumes through overlapping, as well as the representational details of still life through over-drawing, *papier collé* individuated the functions of various pictorial elements (e.g. line and color), permitting line to define formal structure, and color to fulfill a dual-function of descriptive local color and formal monochromic shading.<sup>25</sup> As such, per Fry, it was *papier collé* that defined the shift from AC to SC, thus characterizing the *sign* as the determiner of SC.

In the following case-study, I shall argue this to be incorrect given Fry’s formalist-functional definition of signs. Rather than characterize signs as unique to SC (viz. Class III), I shall show the role of the sign to be not only present but imperative in AC (viz. Class II), prior to the shift. This shall also argue the case for my altered chronology, emphasizing the import of Class II and thus the notion of the *tableau-objet* as precursory to that of the *sign*.

### 2.1.2 Cubism: a Case-Study

To reiterate, I introduce cubism here as a means to concretize my thesis and general approach in resolving the PSI. The idea is that, according to Fry’s stylistic division, the shift from analytic to synthetic cubism is like<sup>26</sup> the shift from early to late anglophone aesthetics, such that AC implicitly entailed synthetic elements just as EAA implicitly entailed systematic elements, and that these elements were precisely those which prompted the shift to SC and LAA, respectively. My approach shall be to illustrate the presence of signs -- the determiner of SC -- in AC. In so doing, I shall show, visually, the sort of thing that I aim to explain, conceptually, throughout the remainder of this dissertation. This is what I mean by utilizing cubism as a case-study.

To help accomplish this, I shall utilize a diagrammatic style that I shall call the Loran Diagramme (LD), after the art historian who developed the technique in his seminal analyses of Cézanne. Loran’s (1963) thesis was that Cézanne defined spatial relations in his paintings through the use of planes, lines, and contours, rather than through the use of colour modulation and gradation, as traditionally believed.<sup>27</sup> According to Loran, Cézanne’s genius was most notably realized through his composition, the self-contained organization that his

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<sup>24</sup> Fry (1966): 33.

<sup>25</sup> Fry (1966): 33-34; Cooper (1971): 183, 194.

<sup>26</sup> One may take ‘like’ in three possible senses or strengths: as an *isomorphism* (in its strong sense), as an *analogy* (in its weak sense), or merely as a helpful *heuristic* (in its weaker sense); I maintain the weaker sense here.

<sup>27</sup> Loran (1963): 32; Wollheim (1994): 22. Cf. Loran’s ‘An Illustrated Glossary,’ parts 1 and 2 (pp 17-24), for explanations of these terms and those that follow.

planes and volumes provide and the ‘*return out of depth*’ that results from their movement.<sup>28</sup> This *return* is the specific sort of relation mastered by Cézanne and transformed by the cubists; it consists of, firstly, movement *into* depth by the overlapping of objective planes, and, secondly, movement *out of* depth by their merging with subjective planes.<sup>29</sup> The effect is, as Loran notes, “the modern rebirth of the classical ideal of pictorial space, which is *three-dimensionality conceived in relation to the two-dimensionality of the picture plane.*”<sup>30</sup>

His Illustrated Glossary, in combination with his Introductory Analysis of Cézanne’s *Still Life with Faience Jug* (Figure 1), are crucial sources for understanding Loran’s technique. Diagrammes from the latter, but not the former, are reprinted here in Appendix 1 as Figures 1.1 to 1.9, though my focus will be almost exclusively on Figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 (per Loran (1963), DIAGRAMS I, II, V): the depiction of outlines, planes, and carry-through lines, and their contribution to the return out of depth that is so crucial to a formalist understanding of cubism. Before proceeding, however, I turn momentarily to a note on formalism and some of its possible distinctions, in order to hone my project. In so doing, I shall defend Loran’s diagrammatic technique from Wollheim’s critique and objection.

**A note on Formalism.** Formalism<sup>31</sup> is the general thesis that the defining elements of an artwork are its plastic or *formal* elements: e.g. line, colour,<sup>32</sup> mass, space, light-shade, plane,<sup>33</sup> volume, tension, shape, gradation, vector,<sup>34</sup> texture, configuration, etc. These are often distinguished from the *subject-matter* or *content* of the work.<sup>35</sup> The modern formalist paradigm is perhaps the *Bell-Fry thesis*, a portmanteau of the aesthetics offered by Bell in *Art* (1914)<sup>36</sup> and Fry in *An Essay in Aesthetics* (1909, 1920)<sup>37</sup> which holds the criterial (essentialist, definitional) element in art to be ‘significant form’ and the ‘aesthetic emotions’ that it prompts. Although the onus on emotion here makes this thesis something of a ‘formalist-expressionist’ aesthetics rather than ‘formalist’ *simpliciter*, the onus on form (viz. Fry’s ‘*elements of design*’) makes it anticipatory of those like Wollheim’s *physical-object hypothesis*.<sup>38</sup> that works of art are physical objects rather than non-physical esoterics, as in *aesthetic-object theory*.<sup>39</sup> It is this hypothesis that is at work throughout Wollheim’s analysis of formalism.

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<sup>28</sup> Loran (1963): 20.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Loran (1963): 103; reprinted below in §2.1.2.2.

<sup>30</sup> Loran (1963): 32; formatted.

<sup>31</sup> This note on formalism proceeds with an intentional omission of other types of aesthetic theory -- most notably perhaps being variants of expressionism; this must be assumed outright, as a proper defense of formalism against these would take this dissertation too far afield. In the first instance, cf. Bouwsma (1950) and Ryle (1951) in Elton (1954), Tomas (1952) in Margolis (1962), and Hepburn (1961) in Barrett (1965).

<sup>32</sup> Bell (1914): 17.

<sup>33</sup> Fry (1909, 1920): 22.

<sup>34</sup> Loran (1963): 40-43.

<sup>35</sup> Isenberg, however, rejects this as a logically inconsistent vestige of the Fechnerian distinction between the *Formaesthetiker* and *Inhaltsaesthetiker*, rather distinguishing subject-matter as a *subclass* of form, admitting of degrees (1944: 562, 1955: 25; Mothersill (1973): xxxiii; Guyer (2014): 382, 383-384, 386).

<sup>36</sup> On Bell, cf. Guyer (2014): 115-123.

<sup>37</sup> On Fry, cf. Guyer (2014): 123-128.

<sup>38</sup> Wollheim (1968): 4; (1980a): 177.

<sup>39</sup> Wollheim (1980a): 177-178.



In *On Formalism and Its Kinds* (1994), Wollheim provides a cross-classification of the formalist thesis by making two broad and independent distinctions within it, thereby yielding four kinds of formalism. The first distinction is between:<sup>40</sup>

- 1 Normative or Prescriptive Formalism: a theory of how works *ought* to be; that the composition of a work (e.g. painting) ought to be a certain way, and is both necessary and sufficient for evaluating the work.
- 2 Analytic or Descriptive Formalism: a theory of how works *are*; that the composition of a work (e.g. painting) necessarily is a certain way, and is both necessary and sufficient for understanding the work.

And the second distinction is between:<sup>41</sup>

- 3 Manifest Formalism: the forms fundamental to a work (e.g. painting) are observable across its surface; in principle, they are isolable and diagrammable through some surrogate means of depiction.
- 4 Latent Formalism: the forms fundamental to a work (e.g. painting) are unobservable across its surface; in principle, they are not diagrammable but formulable only abstractly.

This latter distinction is further emphasized by the analytic methods most appropriately befitting each, with manifest formalism favoring geometrical, and latent formalism favoring grammatical, methods.<sup>42</sup> Yet, because “form is basically a perceptual, not a lexical or linguistic, concept,” Wollheim claims that the former, and not the latter, is the proper approach for the formalist.<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless, this methodological distinction echoes an earlier distinction made by Wollheim in determining the analytic methods open to the analytic/descriptive formalist in her project of providing an adequate description of an artwork. The distinction is between:<sup>44</sup>

- 1 The lexical method: appeal to the language that the critic uses in description.
- 2 The operational method: appeal to some operation that the critic could, at least imaginatively, administer directly to the work.

Yet, these methods are not equally appropriate. Whereas the latter will successfully accomplish the two-part task of (1) articulating what form is by (2) disentangling the formal and non-formal features of a work, the former will slunk either into circularity -- when the critical vocabulary is itself formal -- or arbitrariness -- when the critical vocabulary is anything else.<sup>45</sup> According to Wollheim, then, despite the admitted “under-development” of the manifest-latent distinction, the formalistic approach with which he is currently concerned is

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<sup>40</sup> Wollheim (1994): 8. Per Wollheim, Isenberg’s unpublished lecture manuscript titled *Formalism* (1955) is an implicit critique of normative formalism and his *Perception, Meaning, and the Subject Matter of Art* (1944) is an implicit critique of analytic formalism. Per Mothersill (1973), the former is a good introduction to the latter.

<sup>41</sup> Wollheim (1994): 14.

<sup>42</sup> Wollheim (1994): 14.

<sup>43</sup> Wollheim (1994): 13; 26, 30.

<sup>44</sup> Wollheim (1994): 12.

<sup>45</sup> Wollheim (1994): 12-13.

an analytic, manifest formalism, and operational methodology.

In the following subsections, I shall undertake a case-study of cubism from an analytic-manifest standpoint, by way of the operational method. I am therefore so far in agreement with Wollheim's formalism. The method that I shall adopt and adapt -- the diagrammatic method developed by Loran -- is a version of one of two operations explored by Wollheim as applicable to an analytic-manifest approach. The two operations are:<sup>46</sup>

- 1 The 'extractive' (two-dim.) operation: trace, perpendicular to the line-of-vision, what is visible on the picture through a sheet of glass; the work's form is then identifiable with this traced depiction.
- 2 The 'projective' (three-dim.) operation: construct, according to some rule, what is visible in the picture -- first a ground-plan and second representational figurines; the work's form is then identifiable with this constructed model.

Yet, again, these methods are not equally appropriate. Whereas the latter integrates *seeing-in*<sup>47</sup> within the analytic operation, the former remains susceptible to a Janus-faced practical problem: (1) how the extraction is to be done, and (2) what instruction is to be followed for its doing. Wollheim offers two rules as a preliminary attempt to answer these problems:<sup>48</sup>

- 1 The 'inclusive' rule: "Trace *all* the lines visible through the glass."
- 2 The 'exclusive' rule: "Trace *only* the lines visible through the glass."

Yet both of these instructions are problematic. The former is supersufficient, as it requires even the tracing of lines that do not constitute forms (e.g., thorns); the latter is insufficient, as it requires the tracing of untraceable forms (e.g., clouds).<sup>49</sup> This leads to Wollheim's objection to the extractive operation, namely: "that there is an inconsistency between what recommends the operation to us in the first instance and what can be expected from it when put into practice."<sup>50</sup> This inconsistency is, according to Wollheim, an effect of the implicit assumption operating within the extractive operation, namely: "the belief that the form of a painting is something inherently two-dimensional."<sup>51</sup> He remedies this, as noted above, by appealing to our proclivities for 'seeing' the three-dimensional *in* the two-dimensional:<sup>52</sup>

"[I]t is a feature of our perceptual apparatus that, whenever we look at a surface marked to any degree of complexity, we shall, while continuing to observe the marks on the surface, at the same time see one thing in front of, or behind, another...I call this perceptual capacity '*seeing-in*'..."

The crucial and subversive point here is that, per Wollheim, the identification of the form of

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<sup>46</sup> Wollheim (1994): 15-16, 19-20.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. §4.1.3.

<sup>48</sup> Wollheim (1994): 16.

<sup>49</sup> Wollheim (1994): 16. The example referred to here is Breughel (1564): *Christ Carrying the Cross to Calvary*.

<sup>50</sup> Wollheim (1994): 17.

<sup>51</sup> Wollheim (1994): 17.

<sup>52</sup> Wollheim (1994): 17-18.

an artwork requires reference to the *representational content* of that work; what is more, it requires not merely reference to what is represented, but to how it is represented.<sup>53</sup>

Given this importance attributed to representational content and three-dimensionality by Wollheim for the analysis of pictorial form, I conclude this ‘note on formalism’ with a brief defense against Wollheim. Recall that he is here occupied with, and in some respects endorses of: analytic/descriptive (not normative/prescriptive) formalism, manifest (not latent) formalism, the operational (not lexical) method, and the projective (not extractive) operation. It is against the lattermost point that I shall defend. Wollheim concludes the extractive operation to be insufficient for its purposes, and uses Loran to do so:<sup>54</sup>

“[T]hough, through the use of diagrams, he can analyze, on the one hand, [1] how the artist organizes the picture-plane and, on the other hand, [2] how he organizes the represented space, what, in the nature of things, Loran cannot present diagrammatically is [3] the meeting-point of the two, which is, for him, precisely where...pictorial achievement in general, lies. The reason is this: that any diagram that Loran might construct can, at any one moment, function either as [1] a depiction of the two-dimensional picture-plane or as [2] a depiction of the three-dimensional scene represented on the picture-plane. What it cannot do is [3] to function simultaneously as both.”

For Wollheim, the navigation of Loran’s text, indeed the navigation of his diagrammes themselves, requires a return “back to the painting itself” to “experience the fusion” between (1) the two-dimensional picture-plane and (2) the three-dimensional pictorial space.<sup>55</sup> I take no issue with this. Loran makes no claim that his diagrammes are to be taken in isolation; in fact, he not only accompanies his diagrammes with copies of their paintings, but with photographs of the motifs after which the paintings were modeled.<sup>56</sup> Wollheim’s claim to the insufficiency of diagrammes without their originals, then, seems not to apply to Loran. Yet, the Janus-faced practical problem remains. Wollheim thwarted this by rejecting the extractive operation in favor of the projective; however, since such a move is inconsistent with Loran’s project, I shall object. To solve this, I offer a third rule:

- 3 The ‘selective’ rule: Trace *some of* the lines visible through the glass; justify the selection with an accompanying narrative, etc.

This instruction requires neither the tracing of untraceable forms (per rule 2), nor the tracing of non-forms (per rule 1); what it does require is an explanation to accompany the diagramme and original work (and motif photograph, if possible). The explanatory narrative provided justifies the selection of lines traced and forms extracted from the picture-plane. This permits the formalist to trace (1) *all* the lines, and (2) *only* the lines, visible through the

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<sup>53</sup> Wollheim (1994): 18-19, 20.

<sup>54</sup> Wollheim (1994): 25.

<sup>55</sup> Wollheim (1994): 25.

<sup>56</sup> E.g. Loran (1963): Plate XVI, *Maison Maria at Château Noir*.

glass, that are *form-contributive* (3) for the purposes of the diagramme presently undertaken. She may then trace different form-contributive lines indexed to a different diagramme which depicts different elements of the original's overall form; collectivized, the diagrammes then constitute a diagrammatic *set*.<sup>57</sup> The narratives link those elements of each particular diagramme with those elements of its original, resulting in an analytic/descriptive formalist triad: (1) the original, (2) its set of diagrammes, and (3) their narratives. Given the many ways by which a work may be diagrammed (*viz.* Figs.1.1-1.9), it is not *one*, as Wollheim presumes, but a *set* of diagrammes that may adequately describe the form of a work. This is, in fact, what Loran provides and is also consistent with Wollheim's anticipation for the operational method.<sup>58</sup>

Applied to an individual painting, it will, for each turn...separate off its formal from its non-formal features. And, as it does this, diagramme by diagramme, it will, over time, and in an intuitively plausible fashion, come to articulate what *that* painting's form is.

Yet note the import of 'adequacy' here. Procedurally, I borrow from Richards and Ogden (1925) their practical attitude toward the sixteen types of aesthetic theory that derive their attempted general synthesis of aesthetics: namely that "there are plainly different parts of the situation on which emphasis can be laid" and that "we may begin where we please" so long as where we begin and what we emphasize betters our understanding of the overall 'situation'.<sup>59</sup> An *adequate* description of the form of the work, then, shall be one which betters the work's understandability (or, as I shall call it, navigability) to some degree.

The set of diagrammes and narratives therefore operate according to a principle of *asymptotic approximation* toward an exhaustive depiction of the form of the work. This, per Wollheim, maintains the import of the original artwork and yet, contra Wollheim, rescues the extractive operation (and Loran's project) from outright rejection; thus, one need not reject, as Wollheim does, the extractive operation and with it Loran's project. I shall therefore, in the following sections, adopt and adapt Loran's diagrammatic method by providing, for each noted artwork, a triad of original, set of diagrammes, and set of narratives, and shall do so from an analytic-manifest, operational, extractive, selective formalist standpoint.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> E.g. Loran (1963): Plates x, xxii-xxvi, xxxvii, *Sainte Victoire* (various).

<sup>58</sup> Adapted from Wollheim (1994): 12-13. I have here shifted Wollheim's original statement from the general to the particular. The quotation concerns form *in general*, and takes as its focus the articulation of what form is, across paintings; this paraphrase instead concerns form *in a particular work*, and takes as its focus the articulation of what a painting's form is, across diagrammes. What permits this shift is precisely the admission of more than one diagramme within the set that articulates a work's form; Wollheim's quotation implicitly assumes one diagramme per painting, whereas the paraphrase explicitly does not. I find that such a process of particularization better befits the aims of AA -- *viz.* Lamarque's second proviso (Cf. Hampshire (1952)).

<sup>59</sup> Richards & Ogden (1925): 18-19, 20-21; cf. Figure

<sup>60</sup> The merits of this standpoint, and a general defense of diagramation arguments (in painting) such as that presented here, can perhaps be best demonstrated through a particular genealogy of empirical enquiry into the compositional methods of the Baroque and Dutch Golden Age painter, Vermeer. This concerns the long-standing hypothesis that Vermeer, in composing his twenty-three domestic interiors, utilized *optics* -- i.e. (convex) *lens*, *camera obscura* or *camera lucida*, (concave) *mirror-lens*, and (angled) '*comparator mirror*'; of particular focus is Vermeer's *The Music Lesson* (1662-1665) (Figure 9.1).

**Analytic Cubism.** Analytic cubism began with Picasso's *The Maidens of Avignon* (1906-07) (Figure 16), abandoned in 1907. Despite it being more properly characterized as *proto-cubist*,<sup>61</sup> this painting presents three characteristics that are fundamentally cubist: (1) multi-point perspective, evident especially in the lower-right figure, (2) primitivism reminiscent of so-called '*art nègre*', evident stylistically in the three left figures and literally in the right two figures, and (3) non-imitative representation.<sup>62</sup> The revolution in this painting, then, was Picasso's break from two key characteristics of traditional occidental painting: the classical human figure and one-point linear-perspective.<sup>63</sup> I shall focus on the latter.

Since its discovery during Renaissance painting, the portrayal of depth within pictorial space was accomplished through the use of one-point linear-perspective and a vanishing-point. The paradigmatic example of this is Da Vinci's *The Last Supper* (1494-9) (Figure 2.1). From its accompanying Loran Diagramme (Figure 2.2) it is evident that the converging lines formed by elements in the environment contribute to a feeling of depth behind the seated figures; what makes this painting so powerful is that the vanishing-point, that toward which the lines converge, is positioned directly on Jesus' face, marked with an X. Since Jesus' body-plane is positioned in front of (i.e., overlapping) the body-planes of his adjacent diners, as indicated by the small *arrows which point into depth*, the combination of X as both proceeding toward and receding away from the picture-plane generates a return out of depth, at X, as indicated by the arrows marked I and II. This technique relies upon the environmental elements to establish depth and return out of it. Compare this to the Caravaggio (Figure 3). Instead of environmental elements, this tenebrist portrait utilizes exaggerated *chiaroscuro*, the 'light-dark' spotlight effect, to bring the figure out of pictorial space and toward the picture-plane. A similar effect is achieved by the Courbet (Figure 4), though through different means. In this realist portrait, the figure is brought out of depth by way of similarity in painterly style between the background and foregrounded figure; this generates a feeling of compression within the painting, a lessening-of-depth between the picture-plane and the back

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Swillens (1965), Steadman (2001), Hockney (2001), and Jenison (2013) demonstrate a genealogical development of Wollheim's projective operation and, in so doing, explicate a potential rule (or set of rules) by which the operation may be executed (cf. Appendix, Figures 20, 21.1-21.2). Swillens and Steadman employ reverse-geometrical perspective analysis of the paintings' pictorial spaces to generate diagrammes in plan-, side-, and axonometric- views; Hockney employs analysis of lens-prompted distortive artefacts on the paintings' picture-planes or surfaces; Steadman and Jenison construct doll- and life- sized models of the painting, which Jenison then uses to recreate it (Figure 9.2). Wollheim's present construal of the extractive and projective operations dictate that the former (*viz.* Loran) is confined to the frame of the picture-plane of the original's viewpoint, whereas the latter (*viz.* Swillens-Steadman) is not, admitting of other views; as such, it may be said that the diagrammes suffice for at least a *minimal* projective operation, as they are not generated solely through means of extractive tracing, and that the models suffice for a *maximal* projective operation. Whether a three-dimensional model requires a two-dimensional diagramme as its blueprint, and whether any projection must entail some emergent information -- adequate to better understandability -- not entailed by the blueprint in order to avoid redundancy or reducibility to the diagramme, requires further enquiry. Perhaps what Wollheim requires, rather than his operational distinction, is the following caveat: that the extractive method need not be confined merely to the frame of the picture-plane of the viewpoint of the original painting.

<sup>61</sup> Cooper (1971): 24.

<sup>62</sup> Penrose (1974): 125.

<sup>63</sup> Fry (1966): 13.

wall which, in turn, lessens the depth of the figure as well.

I shall call this *'two-dimensionalization'* or *'two-dimensionalizing'* pictorial space. It is this effect that is accomplished by, as per above, *passage* and *papier collé*, cubist technics 1 and 8.

The Ambroise Vollard Portraiture series illustrates this further. Compared to Régis Courbet, and, yet, to Saint Jerome, Vollard is two-dimensionalized between the picture-plane and background even moreso in the impressionist portrait by Renoir (Figure 5.3), and moreso still in the post-impressionist portrait by Cézanne (Figure 5.4). Compare these to his seated photograph (Figure 5.1) and Picasso's neoclassicist sketch from it (Figure 5.2) in the style of Ingres. As evident in the accompanying Loran Diagramme (Figure 5.5) Vollard's dynamic body-plane makes a return out of depth, away from planes A and C, as indicated by the arrows marked I and II. This, in combination with Cézanne's colour modulation and distortion (viz. the off-set from M to N), two-dimensionalizes the pictorial space, bringing the entire scene up to the picture-plane. The Lorian dynamic of *'returning out of depth'*, reaches new exaggeration, however, in the cubist portrait of Vollard by Picasso (1909) (Figure 5.6). Its accompanying Loran Diagramme (Figure 5.7) indicates movement into depth on both sides of the face, on his right to plane C, which forms part of the bottle sitting in the background, as well as on his left; however these overlapping objective planes are *'brought back'* to the level of the face-plane by merging with the large subjective plane marked A. A similar, though more exaggerated composition (Figure 6.3) is evident in Picasso's subsequent portrait of Uhde (early 1910) (Figure 6.2); compare with the photograph (Figure 6.1). And a similar, though more exaggerated composition, still (Figure 7.3) is evident in his subsequent portrait of Kahnweiler (late 1910) (Figure 7.2); compare with the photograph (Figure 7.1). Loran's narrative for this portrait is iterated below:<sup>64</sup>

“Starting with the plane of the left cheek bone, marked with a large numeral 1, a series of planes marked, 2, 3, and 4 overlap and move into depth. Plane 4, however, is *'brought back'* to the level of plane 1 by being merged with the large *'subjective'* plane defined by broken lines and the double-pointed axis bars marked A. The planes on the right side of the head, quite to the contrary, combine in such a way as to build up a solid-volume structure that is inconsistent with the rest of the painting. Starting with the nose, the planes move downward and to the right, as indicated by arrows in the diagram, constructing objectively recognizable planes for nose, cheek, and jaw. The movement continues downward and into the deeper layer of the plane, marked B, with vertical and horizontal axis bars. The volume of the head remains solid on the right and the planes of the nose and cheek are not fused with plane B as they are with plane A on the left side of the head. Part of the head thus comes out as a recognizable volume. In fact, it separates rather disturbingly from the rest of the space, and it may be said that the two-dimensionality of the picture plane is not nearly so well maintained...”

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<sup>64</sup> Loran (1963): 103.

This lattermost work is what Loran uses to exemplify his diagrammatic technique, as applied to AC.

**Synthetic Cubism.** Synthetic cubism reached its apogee with Picasso's *Three Musicians* (1921), of which there are two versions, the later shown here (Figure 18). The revolution in this painting was Picasso's mimicry of *papier collé* not with paper, but with planes of colour. The bodies of the three figures -- stock characters of the *Commedia dell'arte*: Harlequin, Pierrot, and Monk -- are composed of planar *passages* that require tracing throughout the composition, not according to line, but according to colour (e.g. the white planes of the Pierrot); each is thereby depicted by means of conventionalized and condensed, that is, 'synthesized' signs in their purest form.<sup>65</sup> The *papier collé* wineglass in Picasso's *Still-life with Violin and Fruit* (1912) (Figure 15.2), however, better illustrates Fry's definition of a sign as 'synthesized'. Like Metzinger's teacup, (Figure 17) it is viewed simultaneously from the top and side, but unlike Metzinger's teacup, depicts other more telling features, like (e.g.) the refractive properties of the glass by diagonally offsetting the newsprint. This, in relation to the violin and fruit-bowl, being signs themselves, aids in representing a tablecape where there isn't one depicted, but only hinted at by woodgrain *papier collé*. The still-life, *as* still-life, thereby becomes more navigable once the sign's double-purpose is fulfilled: first, the formal elements of each sign are synthesized, and second, the relations amongst signs are synthesized, to yield, third, the artwork as a system.

### 2.1.3 Conclusion to 'Cubism: a Case-Study'

The general trend throughout Figures 2.1, 3, 4, 5.3, 5.4, 5.6, 6.2, 7.2, (and 8) -- though specifically the Picasso portraits, 5.6, 6.2, 7.2, (and 8) -- epitomizes the increasing exaggeration of the 'return out of depth' or 'two-dimensionalization' that AC brings to its extreme in its later works. Evidently, the two-dimensionalization of a three-dimensional figure, as rendered by the cubists, decreases in its comprehension as it increases in its thoroughness. The shift from Figure 5.6 to Figure 6.2, from Figure 6.2 to Figure 7.2, and from Figure 7.2 to Figure 8 illustrates this. It also illustrates something about the way by which we navigate works of high two-dimensionalized thoroughness. In navigating such works, we descry discrete, condensed, and informationally-rich elements by which we orientate ourselves through the artwork. This functions as a bipartite process:

- 1 Local synthesis: first, local formal elements are synthesized, per sign, to yield a set-of-signs.
- 2 Global synthesis: second, global formal elements are synthesized amongst signs as they interrelate, to yield the artwork *in toto*.

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<sup>65</sup> Fry (1966): 34.

Picasso's *Man with a Violin* (1912) (Figure 8), recommended by Fry as apogee of AC,<sup>66</sup> perhaps illustrates this process even better than his portrait of Kahnweiler (Figure 7.2), recommended by Loran. Note the *f*-holes present at the bottom of Figure 8; identifiable as the *f*-holes to a violin, they, perhaps in conjunction with the *c*-shaped scroll and *s*-curved waist of the violin (local formal elements), facilitate the navigation of the work by virtue of the relations among them and other signs throughout (global formal elements), e.g. the ear-shape and nose-shape, hinted at by the title.<sup>67</sup> These are, in effect, the *signs* -- or perhaps *proto-signs* -- that Fry notes as determining the shift from AC to SC. Given that Fry defines the sign form-functionally, and given that these (proto-)signs fulfill both Fry's formal and functional definitions, I conclude that these elements are, too, *signs* in their own right, on account of the formal role they play in the composition of the artwork and its navigability. The sign, technic 6, can therefore be deemed a fundamental form-functional compositional element throughout both phases of cubism. Thus, the shift in phase, from AC to SC, is not to be attributed solely to the *presence* of the sign, as determiner of SC; rather, this shift entailed a swapping of the *priority* of the sign between phases as a key compositional element.

#### 2.1.4 Statement of the Unitary-Plenary Distinction in Cubism

The mythic etymology of the term 'cubism' derives from an alleged description made by the fauvist Matisse to critic Vauxcelles, that the early-cubist landscapes of l'Estaque appeared as having been painted '*avec des petits cubes*', and in an attempt to canonize these '*bizarreries cubiques*', to the Cézannean fundamentals of the *cone*, *cylinder*, and *sphere*, was added the *cube*.<sup>68</sup> Much like the term 'impressionism', 'cubism' originated as a pejorative requiring correction, such as that stated in the opening lines of *Du Cubisme*, for the cubist project extended well beyond the mere act of 'cubification':<sup>69</sup>

"The word *cubism* is used here only to [indicate]...the object of this study, [though]...the idea it evokes, that of *volume*, could not in and of itself define a movement tending toward the integral realization of painting."

"To compose, to construct, to draw, can be reduced to this: *to regulate... the dynamism of form*. Some...locate the ends of our technique exclusively in the study of *volumes*. If they added that, surfaces being the boundaries of volumes and lines being the boundaries of surfaces, to imitate a contour suffices to represent a volume, we might agree with them, but they are thinking only of the '*sensation of relief*', which we judge insufficient. We are not geometers...for us, lines, surfaces, and volumes are nuances of the notion of *plenitude*."

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<sup>66</sup> Fry (1966): 24.

<sup>67</sup> Kahnweiler (1915): 13.

<sup>68</sup> Kahnweiler (1915): 5-6; Apollinaire (1913): 16; Golding (1959): 3-5; Fry (1966): 17; Cooper (1971): 37; cf. esp. Fry (1966): 51.

<sup>69</sup> Gleizes & Metzinger (1912): 37, 51-52; formatted.



As such, Gleizes and Metzinger (1912) name composition as fundamental to painting, and outline two general compositional methods for their art:<sup>70</sup>

“[T]here are two ways to understand the division [of the canvas]. [1] According to the first, all the parts are linked by a[n]...artifice determined by *one* of them. The latter part -- whichever point it occupies on the canvas -- gives the painting a center [...]. [2] According to the second, in order for the spectator...to be able to apprehend all elements...the properties of each part must be left *independent*, and the plastic continuum shattered into a thousand surprises...Thus the two methods appear antithetical.”

It is here that we find the inception of a key distinction I shall apply to AA throughout the remainder of this dissertation. It is a distinction between two senses of ‘system’ or ‘systematicity’ as applied to artworks -- where an artwork is to be considered a *system* insofar as it is *compositionally complex*, i.e. *has two or more compositional or sub-compositional elements (e.g. signs) related through some determinable relation*, and where *systematicity* is, quite plainly, *the quality of being a system or systematic*; this is a *minimal* sense of system. It is the distinction between systematicity defined by a central element (per method 1), and systematicity defined by a continuum of independent elements (per method 2), hence, systematicities whereof system is established, in the former, by a *unit*, and, in the later, by a *plenitude*. The systematic distinction is therefore:

- 1 *Unitary systematicity*: some single element is maintained as the system kernel; the system is defined in terms of how its parts relate to this element, with it necessarily privileged. This is the systematicity of idealism.
- 2 *Plenary systematicity*: no single element is maintained as the system kernel; rather, the system is defined in terms of how its parts relate mutually, like a network, with no part necessarily privileged. This is the systematicity of realism (*qua* cubism).

The difference in compositional perspective noted at the start of this chapter corresponds: the monocular perspective characteristic of traditional techniques illustrates the unitary systematicity characteristic of idealist aesthetics; whereas the multiocular perspectives characteristic of cubist techniques illustrates the plenary systematicity characteristic of realist aesthetics, such as in cubism. In the former, the composition is defined in terms of how its parts relate to the single vanishing point, necessarily privileged as that which depicts (e.g.) depth within pictorial space; in the latter, the composition is defined in terms of how its parts, rendered as signs, interrelate to one another, with no part privileged as that which depicts (e.g.) depth, given that depth and return out of depth, is an effect of *passage*, the interplay of objective and subjective planes (Figures 5.7, 6.3, and 7.3), and thus the relations which hold among mutually independent sub-compositional parts and the composition as a whole. What remains is a brief comment as to the *nature* of these relations.

I take my cue from Moore (1903b), who outlines four types of relation -- three failing and one succeeding -- to properly characterize the relationship between parts-and-wholes in

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<sup>70</sup> Gleizes & Metzinger (1912): 59-60.

an organic unity. These are what I shall call:<sup>71</sup>

- 1 The *reciprocity* relation: part-part causal dependence; parts are mutually means and ends to one another.
- 2 The *purposivity* relation: part-whole causal dependence; parts are means to the whole, which is an end.
- 3 The *analyticality* relation: part-whole/whole-part predication; parts are defined as predicated of the whole (i.e. part *x* 'is a part of whole *y*'); the whole is part of the predicate used to predicate the part as part of the whole.
- 4 The *com-valuation* relation: part-whole valuation difference; "a whole has an intrinsic value different in amount from the sum of the values of its parts."

This lattermost relation is Moore's principle of organic unities; of the above, the relations at play in systematizing cubist artworks, as described, are perhaps nearest to this relation. Recall that the process of navigating a cubist artwork entails, first, a step of local synthesis, and second, a step of global synthesis. Neither does the local synthesis of any sign influence the local synthesis of any other, contra relation 1; nor do the local syntheses of any set of signs necessitate only the global synthesis of the artwork, contra relation 2; nor is any sign defined as predicated of the artwork, contra relation 3; for signs are mutually independent rather than means-and-ends of one another, means-to-an-end other than themselves, or limited only to their significance within the artwork. Rather, it is merely maintained, per relation 4, that the navigability of an artwork, as a whole, becomes 'different in amount' -- that is, *bettered* -- on account of the summation or interrelation of its sub-compositional parts.

The relations at play in systematizing cubist artworks are not the relation of Moore's organic unity, however. This is because relation 4 is valuational, with 'good' being the predicate of value. Given that the beautiful and the aesthetic are themselves first- and second- order organic unities,<sup>72</sup> Moorean aesthetics itself, an ethico-aesthetics, becomes indexed to 'good'. This situates Moorean aesthetics quite nearer to Crocean aesthetics than it might *prima facie* seem: per Croce, the parts of 'unity in variety' are defined by their relation to *beauty*; likewise, per Moore, the parts of 'organic unity' are defined by their relation to *goodness*. Although devised in bidirectional means -- which is to say that Croce builds-to beauty, whereas Moore builds-from goodness -- given that both the Crocean 'beautiful' and Moorean 'good' are unanalyzable *par excellence*, they constitute the privileged kernels around which their respective systems fixate, thereby categorizing both Croce and Moore as *unitarily*-systematic, rather than *plenarily*-systematic. (The same may be said of Winfield's three types of aesthetic theory, wherein the privileged givens (type 1) or determiners (type 2), or primitive minimal term (type 3), likewise constitute each system's kernel.) In this respect, Moore retains a vestige of traditional aesthetics, and thus, despite being a great analyst of the

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<sup>71</sup> Moore (1903b): 32, 32, 33, 36 (resp.); I derive the names from the terms Moore uses to describe them.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. §1.1.2.

tradition, is excluded here from among the AA. We might therefore opt to remove this valuational element altogether, and adapt the Moorean formulation of relation 4 to yield a generalized version:

4' The Gestaltist relation: mere part-whole difference; the whole is (merely) *other than* the sum of its parts.

Surely, if one opted to formulate this in terms of a sort of magnitude, as Moore does, and talk of difference in amount rather than (e.g.) type, then one may, and in the above I do. Such an adaptation serves to shift the part-whole relation at play here away from the idealist (or *quasi*-idealist) unitary systematicity and toward the realist (or cubist) plenary systematicity, for this, I submit, is the general nature of the relations at play in cubism, as well as in AA.

Precisely how these distinctions -- 'monocular-multiocular', 'idealist-realist', and 'unitary-plenary' -- apply to AA throughout its shift from EAA to LAA is the topic of following chapters.

## 2.2 Conclusion to Chapter 2

To reiterate again, I introduce cubism here as a means to concretize my thesis and general approach in resolving the PSI in AA. In so doing, the usefulness of cubism as a case-study has proven to be twofold.

Firstly, it has aided my parallel between the shifts internal to CM and AA. The argument goes as follows: The shift from AC to SC is *like* the shift from EAA to LAA, such that: (1) both CM and AA entailed some element -- for the former, the notion of the *sign*; for the latter, the notion of *systematicity* (in general) -- that, (2) despite presumed as the determiner of each shift -- *absent* in each earlier phase and *present* in each later phase -- is in fact *present throughout*, and that (3) the shifts were rather a swapping of the *priority* of this element -- from *secondary* in each earlier phase to *primary* in each later phase, and thus present *implicitly* in each earlier phase and *explicitly* in each later phase. Thus, as applied to CM, both the analytic and synthetic phases of cubism entailed signs, as form-functionally defined by Fry; yet whereas AC positioned other technics (1-5) as primary and the sign (technic 6) as secondary -- that is, as a merely compositional tool for navigating the artwork despite the other technics -- SC positioned the sign (*qua* technics 7-9) as primary and the other technics (1-5) as secondary, if at all. The shift in phase was therefore merely a swapping of priority of the sign.

Secondly, it has introduced a key distinction between two senses of systematicity -- unitary and plenary -- that I shall use in elucidating points 2 and 3 above regarding the EAA-LAA shift. That is, per the specific version of the thesis: that (1) the call to *non*-systematicity in EAA was rather (2) a call for a *new* systematicity (3) which emerged as explicit in LAA, though implicit in EAA. The new systematicity was the cubist notion of systematicity, i.e. a realist plenary-systematicity, as opposed to the idealist unitary-systematicity.



## Early Anglophone Aesthetics

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### 3.1 Introduction to Early Anglophone Aesthetics<sup>1</sup>

This chapter, like the one after, is a survey of the aesthetic philosophies of EAA figures, particularly as per the texts noted in §1.1.1, the statement of the early-late distinction in AA, according to which the early phase was there characterized. Its task is to present the analytic and systematic methods by which the aesthetic philosophies of EAA figures function, especially in comparison to those of LAA. This shall be accomplished in a piecemeal fashion, by which, first, an overview of each figure's philosophy (as per the essays noted here) shall be presented, then, second and third, the analytic and systematic methods employed throughout that presentation shall be examined using the tools offered by Beaney in §1.3.1, a primer on analysis, and Winfield in §1.3.2, a primer on system, as well as myself in §2.1.4, the statement of the unitary-plenary distinction. A general conclusion shall follow.

#### 3.1.1 Isenberg (1950)<sup>2</sup>

Isenberg perhaps best befits the title of initiator of AA as a philosophical programme. It is through an asterism of citations throughout both EAA and LAA that his early work, much in correspondence with the Rockefeller Foundation (RF), establishes its influence. There are, generally, four sets of materials that may be taken as fundamental to Isenberg's role within AA, these are what I shall call: (1) The *Isenberg interview* (1949) conducted in November by Gilpatric, the then RF Assistant Director of the Humanities; (2) The *Isenberg report* (1950)<sup>3</sup> commissioned in June 1948 by resolution of the RF Executive Committee as part of an appraisal programme concerning the obscurity of scholarship in aesthetics and art criticism; (3) The '*Aesthetics*' *journal prospectus* (1954) submitted in September to the RF for subsidy funding; and (4) Isenberg's published essays (1944-1965). I shall emphasize the first three, with special emphasis on the 1950 report.

In the *interview* (1949), Isenberg diagnoses the main errors in aesthetics at the time -- quantity without clarity -- and prescribes three steps for correcting them. The steps are:<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Given that the texts noted within this section (§3.1.1-§3.1.4) are almost exclusively collections, I have opted to focus on two exemplary essays per collection, supplemented by some of the other contents. Where an essay was published prior to its inclusion in the collection noted, I have cited it according to its original publication.

<sup>2</sup> On Isenberg, cf. Guyer (2014): 381-389.

<sup>3</sup> This paper is unpublished in full. It is a 48-page report submitted to the Rockefeller Foundation in April 1950; full title: *Analytical Philosophy and the Study of Art: A Report to the Rockefeller Foundation*. There are two abridged publications of this paper: (1) pages 5-6, 14-28, 39-41, and 43-46 are published as Appendix A to Callaghan et al. (eds.), with excerpting by Mothersill; (2) pages 1-28 are published by Shusterman (ed.) in a *JAAC* special issue, with excerpting by Shusterman. Where there is need for distinction, I shall call these the 'Mothersill publication' (1973) and the 'Shusterman publication' (1987), respectfully; otherwise reference is to the original unabridged 'Isenberg report' (1950).

The 1949 interview, 1950 report, and 1954 prospectus are provided courtesy of the Rockefeller Archive Center.

<sup>4</sup> Isenberg (1949): 1-2.

- 1 to identify and describe important topics or directions of aesthetic study; this shall entail a 'general survey' of work recently and currently underway. The aim is to correlate existing theories and methods;
- 2 to encourage active communication and collaboration among top aestheticians; this shall entail the establishment of judgments and criteria through which existing work may be sorted according to use (or uselessness);
- 3 to combine the theory and analysis done in philosophy with the criticism done in the arts.

The first is demonstrated through the 1950 report, the second is demonstrated through the 1954 prospectus, and the third is a general attitude representative of AA *in toto* and contributive to both 1 and 2.

In the *prospectus* (1954), Isenberg and his associates propose the need for a new journal specific to philosophical aesthetics (hence the title *The Need for a New Journal of Aesthetics*) as distinct from both the 'fine arts' and the 'philosophy of art'; in fact, 'aesthetics' here begins to garner a psychological bent,<sup>5</sup> or perhaps less strongly, a Deweyan<sup>6</sup> emphasis of the experiential. The impetus for this, so their proposal claims, is to fill a scholarly niche that needed filling, since only the *JAAC* then published specialized writings in aesthetics, yet it remained insufficient, as it catered to an array of subjects far wider than their scope:<sup>7</sup>

“Aesthetics, too, needs some degree of concentration along lines of its own. [...] [I]n the English-speaking world today [1954] there is no organ<sup>[8]</sup> devoted primarily to philosophical studies in aesthetics...But a well-managed journal of aesthetics would furnish something that does not exist, [‘a new intellectual forum’], and bring out energies which are now scattered or frustrated.”

Given that “Aesthetics is the study of the *theoretical* aspects of art and aesthetic experience”, the journal is proposed in order to bring specifics in the 'fine arts' and the 'philosophy of art' “into connection with the problems and issues of the field [of aesthetics] or used to illustrate some *theoretical thesis*”,<sup>9</sup> the inclusion of which reflects one of Isenberg's key points within the report, directly out of which this prospectus derived. It was denied by the RF in a letter of October 1954.

In the *report*, *Analytical Philosophy and the Study of Art* (1950), Isenberg adopts an interesting intermediary standpoint regarding the mutual benefit of analytic and systematic methodologies:<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> This is emphasized by a curious letter submitted to the RF by Beardsley (September 1950) in response to Isenberg's report: “I agree completely with its main thesis. [...] I should have liked to see more stress on the importance of collaboration with *psychologists*. One of the functions of the analytic philosopher, I believe, is to help turn vague and confused questions...into *experimental questions*: that is, to help prepare them, and sort them out, so that they are susceptible of *some sort of empirical, that is, psychological, investigation*. [...] We ought to have in mind, as one of our goals, that of transforming these issues into more manageable ones, where we can point out more directly what sort of psychological evidence, if we could obtain it, would help us.” (formatted)

<sup>6</sup> Guyer (2014): 382.

<sup>7</sup> Isenberg et al (1954): 4.

<sup>8</sup> The sense of this word is unclear; note that the *JAAC* is named the 'official *organ*' of the American Society for Aesthetics, and *Ethics* is named the 'special *organ*' of the field of ethics.

<sup>9</sup> Isenberg et al (1954): 3; formatted.

<sup>10</sup> Isenberg (1950): 13.

“We have, then, a first question as to the methods of the art studies and the subject (called ‘methodology’...) that studies those methods. [...] The line of inquiry is ‘metalinguistic’: it is about criticism or art history or stylistics; it does not fall within any of these domains. It belongs in fact to philosophy.”

Here, Isenberg describes a shift in level: from the first-order content of (e.g.) some *art-form*  $x$ , to the second-order content of the *methods of*  $x$  (perhaps including the *criticism* or *history of*  $x$ ), to the third-order content of the *methodology of*  $x$  (the study of the subject of method of  $x$ ). It is from this standpoint that the analytical-aesthetical work is to be done; his conception of analysis is:<sup>11</sup>

“Philosophical analysis is a method of clarifying ideas by revealing their *essential constituents*...to study a thing by *breaking it up into its parts*. [...] A distinguishing feature of philosophical analysis (though there are others) is that it analyses concepts or ideas. [...] [We] are not looking for information so much as for an explication of meaning. Analysis is supposed to satisfy their queries by providing acceptable *definitions*. Ideas have logical relations with other ideas; hence the analysis of one idea is apt to involve the analysis of others. [...] A really successful analysis of any important concept would result in a *whole theory* or *system* of a subject.”

“Philosophical aesthetics is an analysis of the concepts and principles of criticism and other aesthetic studies, such as the psychology of art.”

Here, Isenberg presents an analytical -- that is, a logical and metaphysical -- outlook borrowed directly from Moore. Yet his definition of ‘system’, as a whole theory deriving from analytic methodologies is perhaps something new -- the question remains as to what establishes or maintains this ‘system’, and whether it is something like a Moorean unanalyzable kernel. Seven works are noted by Isenberg as displaying “powers of critical appreciation” which are, themselves, empirically verifiable powers that Isenberg attributes to the presence of some *particular theoretical element*.<sup>12</sup>

“[O]ver and above its collection of facts and insights, each work is built around a *theory*, a *hypothesis*, a *general idea*. [...] I have classed these works together because of the presence in each of *this theoretical element* together with the commoner critical and historical motives.”

“Now in even the most backward of the sciences, general ideas...would attach themselves to earlier ideas as *corollaries*, *generalizations*, *revisions*, or *refutations*. [...] There is, indeed, an appearance of continuity and progress...[but] no real advance towards truth. Ideas, instead of being incorporated within a persistent intellectual effort where other ideas can be mounted upon them, fall into a miscellaneous ‘tradition’ where they affect each other by invisible shoves and electric shocks. [...] The *hybridity* of these works is at the very opposite pole from a genuine *synthesis* of methods or subject matters...”

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<sup>11</sup> Isenberg (1950): 4, 9; formatted.

<sup>12</sup> Isenberg (1950): 21-22, 24; formatted.

It appears, then, that the mere presence of some central element is insufficient for analysis to yield a ‘whole theory’ or ‘system’ or ‘synthesis of methods’, given that so-called ‘*hybridity*’ results when the parts of the *analysandum* interconnect in aggregative and disintegrative ways. It is precisely the incorporation within an intellectual effort and the mounting of ideas that yield a synthesized system in Isenberg’s relevant sense and saves its elements from merely hybridizing and becoming traditional. For Isenberg, then, it appears that the onus must remain where it began: on methodology, and its explicit and internal articulation and collaborative development:<sup>13</sup>

“Now it is certainly true that no philosophical analysis can devise methods which it imposes on a science from the outside. Every idea of method must come from the study of methods already employed in the field. An explicit formulation of method, then, can lead to a greater awareness of direction or aim. [...] We can at once draw a conclusion for the theory and practice of criticism. A good theory of criticism should not and *could not reform critical practice from the ground up.*”

This includes himself. We therefore come to Isenberg’s ‘double-project’:

- 1 An internal, negative project: a project internal to *APSA* which negatively criticizes the then-current errors of aesthetics; primarily prescriptive, this project details what aesthetics ought to do or be like but is not, and describes it so.
- 2 An external, positive project: a project external to *APSA* which positively undertakes the then-current issues of aesthetics; primarily descriptive, this project details what aesthetics really is when properly undertaken, and prescribes it so.

Isenberg engages in each of these projects, detailing the first through his report and the second through his other published essays.

### 3.1.2 Elton (1954)<sup>14</sup>

In *The Function of Philosophical Aesthetics* (1948), Gallie lists six statements which abbreviate the main tenets of idealist aesthetics, and attributes to them the idealist commitment of reducing the “triadic situation” of (1) artist, (2) artwork, and (3) appreciation to “unity -- to a monadic act”, namely, imagination or Spirit.<sup>15</sup> He calls this a ‘one-act’ idealist aesthetics.<sup>16</sup> This, per Gallie, indicates a misunderstanding of how to appreciate artworks (or language or symbolism), and provides an alternative theory which demonstrates much of the best art to be not of the ‘one-act’ sort, thereby collapsing that version of idealist aesthetics.<sup>17</sup> Integral to Gallie’s alternative is the notion of the ‘*interpretant*’, its ubiquity in art and entire neglect by idealist aesthetics.<sup>18</sup> In light of the idealist tendency to commit the essentialist fallacy,<sup>19</sup> Gallie offers

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<sup>13</sup> Isenberg (1950): 19-20.

<sup>14</sup> On Gallie, cf. Guyer (2014): 455-457; on Passmore, cf. 450-452.

<sup>15</sup> Gallie (1948): 306.

<sup>16</sup> Gallie (1948): 309.

<sup>17</sup> Gallie (1948): 308-309.

<sup>18</sup> Gallie (1948): 311.

<sup>19</sup> Gallie (1948): 302.



three further alternatives to idealist (and naturalist) aesthetics, what I shall call: (1) *the attitude of informed scepticism*, according to which art will be denied a common usage and art criticism will be used to identify art's uniqueness rather than its so-called essence;<sup>20</sup> (2) *the 'card-index' approach to criticism*, according to which critical tools (e.g. analogy) are investigated to determine the point at which they become contradictory or confused;<sup>21</sup> and (3) *the journeyman's aesthetics*, according to which one "tak[es] up work where work is to be done, whether at the explicit request of criticism or no", such that no critical claim is to be made as applying to all particulars of a given art-form, and certainly not art itself.<sup>22</sup>

In *The Dreariness of Aesthetics* (1951), Passmore, in response to and agreement with Wisdom (1948), declares contemporary aesthetics to be 'dull' and 'dreary' on account of a 'wooly' subject-matter, concealed by idealist artists and theories of art.<sup>23</sup> To undo this 'wooliness' and the 'dreariness' it brings, Passmore suggests "ruthlessness in making distinctions", that is, in distinguishing, rather than a subject-matter called 'philosophy of art', only the 'philosophies of the arts', given that there is no such thing as philosophical aesthetics (in general), as there are no aesthetic properties unique to all art (in general).<sup>24</sup> The error, for Passmore, is in generalization, as it is for Hampshire, who ends *Logic and Appreciation* (1952) with the aphoristic: "when in aesthetics one moves from the particular to the general, one is travelling in the wrong direction".<sup>25</sup>

### 3.1.3 Margolis (1962)<sup>26</sup>

In *The Role of Theory in Aesthetics* (1956) Weitz adopts the Wittgensteinian notion of 'family resemblances' which he used to deny an essentialist definition to 'game':<sup>27</sup>

"Consider for example the proceedings that we call 'games'. [...]What is common to them all? -- Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games'" -- but *look and see* whether there is anything common to all. -- For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. [...] And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities that '*family resemblances*'...And I shall say: 'games' form a family."

in order to deny an essentialist or real definition to 'art'. To do so, per Weitz, as in aesthetic theory, is to improperly conceive the concept of ART as *closed* rather than logically *open*.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Gallie (1948): 313.

<sup>21</sup> Gallie (1948): 316.

<sup>22</sup> Gallie (1948): 317.

<sup>23</sup> Passmore (1951): 320, 325.

<sup>24</sup> Passmore (1951): 330-331.

<sup>25</sup> Hampshire (1952) see (1954): 169.

<sup>26</sup> On Weitz, cf. Guyer (2014): 457-460.

<sup>27</sup> Wittgenstein (1953): 31<sup>e</sup>-32<sup>e</sup>; formatted.

<sup>28</sup> Weitz (1956): 30.

An *'open concept'* is one which is emendable, requiring a decision on one's part to extend the use of the concept; as such, it admits of no necessary nor sufficient conditions.<sup>29</sup> He therefore replaces such a notion with *'criteria of recognition'* and *'criteria of evaluation'*, none of which are *defining* as such, but permit of Wittgensteinian resemblances and justification by reasons.<sup>30</sup> Weitz concludes:<sup>31</sup>

“Thus, the role of theory [in art] is not to define anything but to use the definitional form...to pin-point a crucial recommendation to turn our attention once again to the plastic elements in [e.g.] painting”.

Later, in *Wittgenstein's Aesthetics* (1973) and *The Opening Mind* (1977), Weitz notes that open concepts as such admit of categories, and distinguishes: (1) perennially flexible, (2) perennially debatable, (3) irreducibly vague, and two type of criterial -- (4) necessary but not sufficient, and (5) sufficient but not necessary -- logical kinds of open concept. Gallie's *Art as an Essentially Contested Concept* (1956b), an application of an earlier essay titled *Essentially Contested Concepts* (1956a), comes to a similar conclusion, characterizing the concept ART as 'essentially contested' because of how its nature alters with socio-cultural changes, rather than because of the openness of its logical nature.

In *What Makes a Situation Aesthetic?* (1957), Urmson asks whether aesthetic judgment can be distinguishable from judgments of other kinds (e.g. moral, personal, economic, intellectual, religious, etc.), and offers an account whereby these “should all be understood as being appraisals distinguished by their concentration on...*some special subset of criteria of value of a certain sort of thing*”, rather than by some *fundamentum divisionis*.<sup>32</sup> Urmson concludes with a functionalist aesthetics, offering two aesthetic criteria whereby an aesthetic situation could be judged to be aesthetic: (1) sensible qualities, and (2) attempt to possess some non-aesthetic property; both of these are cases of 'seeming somehow'.<sup>33</sup> That the point of view from which a situation is judged matters, emphasizes a specific type of relation within that situation, thereby making each a *logical* situation.<sup>34</sup>

### 3.1.4 Barrett (1965)<sup>35</sup>

In *Does Traditional Aesthetics Rest on a Mistake?* (1958), Kennick describes two ways by which to answer in the affirmative: (1) essentialism,<sup>36</sup> and (2) that criticism presupposes standards.<sup>37</sup> Regarding the former, Kennick borrow the Wittgensteinian argument that by *looking and seeing*

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<sup>29</sup> Weitz (1956): 30-31.

<sup>30</sup> Weitz (1956): 33-35.

<sup>31</sup> Weitz (1956): 35.

<sup>32</sup> Urmson (1957): 83.

<sup>33</sup> Urmson (1957): 89.

<sup>34</sup> Urmson (1957): 79.

<sup>35</sup> On Kennick, cf. Guyer (2014): 460-462; on Sibley, cf. 499-506.

<sup>36</sup> Kennick (1958): 319.

<sup>37</sup> Kennick (1958): 325.

we are incapable of finding Art in some unitary sense;<sup>38</sup> this is a problem with the concept, rather than with the extension, of ART, namely, its ‘complex logic’ and ‘variety of uses’.<sup>39</sup> Yet he offers the so-called ‘warehouse thought experiment’ whereby someone is instructed to remove all the artworks contained within a warehouse full of miscellanies; Kennick maintains that this would be accomplished “with reasonable success” despite having “no satisfactory definition of Art in terms of some common denominator”.<sup>40</sup> He maintains also that instructing to remove all the works with some definitive feature (e.g. significant form) would be less successful. Kennick concludes that: “there is no one use which we make of all works of art, nor is there any one demand or set of demands which we make on them”.<sup>41</sup>

In *Aesthetic Concepts* (1959), Sibley contrasts aesthetic with non-aesthetic concepts, according to whether the concepts require *taste*, such that the former do and the latter do not.<sup>42</sup> Sibley argues that aesthetic concepts are not rule- or condition- governed, and that this is a *logical* feature of aesthetic judgment in general.<sup>43</sup> He argues also that aesthetic terms are applied because of discernible features that are themselves *non-aesthetic*,<sup>44</sup> and often attributable on account of samples, examples, and precedents.<sup>45</sup> Sibley then provides seven methods by which the critic directs our attention to the specific aesthetic qualities she intends.<sup>46</sup>

### 3.2 Analysis in Early Anglophone Aesthetics

The varieties of analysis at play throughout EAA vary among its figures; I shall take each in turn, beginning with Isenberg’s double-project.

Isenberg’s internal project is of the regressive mode. Analytic regression is evident by his search for fundamental principles or premises, particularly of kinds of criticism (i.e. aesthetic criticism, criticism in the arts, etc.), which includes the class of ‘theoretical’ elements that Isenberg attributes to the systematicity that he considers so imperative to proper theorizing. His external project is of the resolute-*cum*-transformative mode, made clear by his conceptions of analysis reiterated above.

Gallie’s, Passmore’s, and Sibley’s analytical methods are, likewise, primarily of the resolute mode. Analytic resolution is evident in each by, per Gallie, his dissolution unto and limitation to particulars according to his ‘journeyman’s’ aesthetics; per Passmore, his eliminativist whole-part analysis of philosophical aesthetics into the philosophies of the arts,

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<sup>38</sup> Kennick (1958): 319.

<sup>39</sup> Kennick (1958): 320.

<sup>40</sup> Kennick (1958): 322.

<sup>41</sup> Kennick (1958): 333.

<sup>42</sup> Sibley (1959): 421-422.

<sup>43</sup> Sibley (1959): 436-437.

<sup>44</sup> Sibley (1959): 424.

<sup>45</sup> Sibley (1959): 431.

<sup>46</sup> Sibley (1959): 442-444.

according to art-form; and per Sibley, his individuation of concept-types and elucidation of relation-types between them.

Weitz's, Urmson's, and Kennick's analytical methods are, likewise also, primarily of the transformational mode. Analytical transformation is evident in each by, per Weitz and Kennick, the re-conceptualization of the concept of art as one that logically admits of no definition being 'open' or having a 'complex logic' (Gallie, on account of his 'essentially contested concept' is included here as well), and per Urmson, the contextualization of criteria of value as dependent upon the point-of-view from which a judgment is made.

### 3.3 System in Early Anglophone Aesthetics

The variety of system at play throughout EAA is indeed a *plenary* systematicity. Each of the accounts noted above entails resolute analysis to some degree, whether noted as such or not (often by way of rejecting essentialism and generalization in favor of particularity), thereby yielding mutually-independent constituents logically related in some way. That their philosophies are taken to be systems in the minimal sense that paintings are said to be,<sup>47</sup> and that none is defined in terms of the relations of its parts to some privileged kernel or indexes to some unanalyzable element, the figures of EAA, as presented here in brief, may be said to be *plenary*-systematic (and not *unitary*-systematic).

A brief note on Isenberg, however. Though it may *prima facie* seem that Isenberg's internal project tends toward unitary systematicity on account of his search for some (single) 'theoretical element', it does not. This is because, what Isenberg locates at this position is not an unanalyzable element, but *a collaborative, explicit, and internal articulation of method*. This is, by definition, analyzable and logically complex. Given also Isenberg's conception of 'system' as a 'whole theory' resulting from analysis, I find his use of 'system' to be more like than unlike 'synthesis', which has already been characterized as the converse entailment of analysis. That he, in the quotations above, limits his conception of philosophical analysis to the resolute mode is inconsequential, as it is his philosophy itself that concerns us here.

### 3.4 Conclusion to Chapter 3

The task of this chapter was to present the analytic and systematic methods by which the aesthetic philosophies of EAA figures function, especially in comparison to those of LAA. This was to be investigated in light of the dynamic proposed in §1.2, the statement of the problem and thesis of this dissertation: that the resolution of the PSI is explainable by a swapping of priority between EAA and LAA concerning the notions of analyticity and systematicity; it was hypothesized that EAA positioned analysis as primary and system as secondary. This appears to have been a proper assessment of EAA, given that the figures noted above *systematize only incidentally in order to formulate their analyses*, rather than vice versa.

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<sup>47</sup> Cf. §2.1.4.

It has been shown that the major analytical methods at play throughout EAA are identifiable as those at play throughout analytic philosophy after the AT and LT, according to Beaney's set-of-modes and the assessment that analytic philosophy (including EAA) is characterizable as a synthesis between paraphrastic-transformative and reductive-resolutive modes of analysis, with slight dominance of the former over the latter. This is our conclusion of secondary importance.

It has also been shown that the major systematic method at play throughout EAA is identifiable as a *plenary* systematicity. This is our conclusion of primary importance.



## Late Anglophone Aesthetics

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### 4.1 Introduction to Late Anglophone Aesthetics<sup>1</sup>

This chapter, like the one before, is a survey of the aesthetic philosophies of LAA figures, particularly as per the texts noted in §1.1.1, the statement of the early-late distinction in AA, according to which the late phase was there characterized. Its task is to present the analytic and systematic methods by which the aesthetic philosophies of LAA figures function, especially in comparison to those of EAA. This shall be accomplished in a piecemeal fashion, by which, first, an overview of each figure's philosophy (as per the texts noted here) shall be presented, then, second and third, the analytic and systematic methods employed throughout that presentation shall be examined using the tools offered by Beaney in §1.3.1, a primer on analysis, and Winfield in §1.3.2, a primer on system, as well as myself in §2.1.4, the statement of the unitary-plenary distinction. A general conclusion shall follow.

#### 4.1.1 Danto (1964)<sup>2</sup>

In *The Artworld* (1964), and much since, Danto's aesthetics concerns the metaphysical and epistemological commitments of a new artistic modernist property: *indiscernibility* between art-objects and real-objects. This property involves various species, including:<sup>3</sup> (1) artworks that appear to be other artworks, despite being separate art-objects;<sup>4</sup> (2) artworks that appear to be real-objects, despite not being so (*indiscernibles*);<sup>5</sup> (3) artworks that have real-objects as part of themselves (*collage* and *combines*);<sup>6</sup> and (4) artworks that were or are unaltered real-objects (*readymades*).<sup>7</sup> Danto describes indiscernibility as follows:<sup>8</sup>

“Clearly, there were no manifest overarching similarities in this partial class of artworks [indiscernibles]. But equally clearly, neither could we pick out which was the artwork in an indiscernible pair, and which was not. But this was in principle perfectly general: *for any non-artwork, an artwork could be imagined which resembled it as closely as might be required*. And for any artwork, a non-artwork could be imagined like it to whatever degree... The answer was that one could not tell by *looking*.”

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<sup>1</sup> Exegetical material within this section (§4.1.1-§4.1.3) has been revised and reprinted here from previous essays, with permission by the Graduate Tutor; all work presented is my own, unless otherwise cited.

<sup>2</sup> On Danto, cf. Guyer (2014): 464-468, 481-498.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. §2.1.1, footnote 16.

<sup>4</sup> E.g. Danto (1964): 577; (1981): 121-123: ‘*Newton's First Law*’ and ‘*Newton's Third Law*.’

<sup>5</sup> E.g. Warhol (1964): *Brillo Box[es]*.

<sup>6</sup> E.g. Rauschenberg (1955): *Bed*. Cf. Danto (1964): 576. “[N]ot every part of an artwork *A* is part of a real object *R* when *R* is part of *A* and can, moreover, be detached from *A* and seen *merely* as *R*. The mistake thus far will have to mistake *A* for *part* of itself, namely *R*, even though it would not be incorrect to say that *A* is *R*...”

<sup>7</sup> E.g. Duchamp (1917): *Fountain*.

<sup>8</sup> Danto (1998): 129-130; formatted.

Danto's earliest attempt to elucidate what came to be called '*the problem of indiscernibles*' was to specify a new type of logical copula, an identifier called *the 'is' of artistic identification*.<sup>9</sup>

In 'that *a* is *b*,' "the *a* stands for some specific physical property of, or physical part of, an object; and, finally, it is a necessary condition for something to be an artwork that some part or property of it be designable by the subject of a sentence that employs this special *is*."

This is not the 'is' of identity, predication, existence, or simple identification, but rather the identifier in statements about art and artworks, as well as marginal and mythical statements; it is perhaps nearest to the 'is' of symbolism, and as such, indeterminable by way of the manifest features of the object(s) to which it applies, but requires something else, like context or narrative or stipulation -- something *relational*. This led to Danto's aphorism:<sup>10</sup>

"To see something as art requires something the eye cannot decry -- an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an *artworld*."

It is therefore the artworld that determines both artistic identification and definition, and as such, the difference between art-objects and real-objects, thereby solving the problem posed by the new pop art idiom. Danto's later attempts at formulating an historicist, artworld-based definition of art may be principally found in two publications -- essay (1974) and book (1981) -- both titled *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace*. Danto consults the artworld to determine the status of three indiscernibles: (1) one about nothing, (2) one not about anything, and (3) one neither about nothing nor about anything.<sup>11</sup> He thereby defines two crucial considerations for a general definition of art: *aboutness* and *embodiment*;<sup>12</sup> aboutness is what artworks possess when they are treated representationally, i.e. the art-object has meaning that an indiscernible real-object does not have, and embodiment is what artworks express when they are treated interpretively, i.e. the art-object embodies meaning when it is so interpreted. Per Danto, then, a proper 'philosophy of art history' entails three levels:<sup>13</sup>

- 1 *General definition of art*: a real or essentialist definition of art true at all times and at all places; concerns art *in general*.
- 2 *Particular theories of artworks*: theories of how the art of a particular time or a particular place satisfies the general definition of art; concerns *this* artwork.
- 3 *Interpretation of artworks*: an interpretation of meaning within the particular theory of artworks; concerns *this* artwork.

This 'triple cognitivist' conception therefore frames the artworld as a class of members who understand level 1, know the means by which level 2 may satisfy 1, and act of level 3 in light

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<sup>9</sup> Danto (1964): 576-577.

<sup>10</sup> Danto (1964): 580; formatted.

<sup>11</sup> Danto (1974): 140.

<sup>12</sup> Danto (1974): 148; (1981): 165; (1998): 130; (2013): 48, here 'embodied meaning' becomes 'wakeful dreams'.

<sup>13</sup> Guyer (2014): 482, 485.



of such knowledge.<sup>14</sup> This was originally schematized when Danto (1964) first sketched the beginnings of a matrix that would come to depict the predicative contents of the artworld:<sup>15</sup>

“I am now interested in the *K*-relevant predicates for the class *K* of artworks. [The class of pairs of opposites that sensibly apply to the ( $\phi$ )*K* I shall designate as the class of *K*-relevant predicates. And a necessary condition for an object to be of a kind *K* is that at least one pair of *K*-relevant opposites be sensibly applicable to it. But, in fact, if an object is of kind *K*, at least and at most one of each *K*-relevant pair of opposites applies to it.]<sup>16</sup> And let *F* and non-*F* be an opposite pair of such predicates...[A]ll works up to a given time might be *G*, it never occurring to anyone until that time that something might both be an artwork and non-*G*; indeed, it might have been thought that *G* was a *defining trait* of artworks when in fact something might first have to be an artwork before *G* is sensibly predicable of it -- in which case non-*G* might also be predicable of artworks, and *G* itself then could not have been a defining trait of this class.

Let *G* be ‘is representational’ and let *F* be ‘is expressionist’. At a given time, these and their opposites are perhaps the only art-relevant predicates in critical use. [An object must first be of a certain kind before either of a pair of opposites applies to it...If *F* and non-*F* are opposites, an object *o* must be of a certain kind *K* before either of these sensibly applies; but if *o* is a member of *K*, then *o* either is *F* or non-*F*, to the exclusion of the other.]<sup>17</sup> Now letting ‘+’ stand for a given predicate *P* and ‘-’ for its opposite non-*P*, we may construct a style matrix...:

<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>
+	+
+	-
-	+
-	-

The rows determine available styles, given the active critical vocabulary: representational expressionistic...; representational nonexpressionistic...; nonrepresentational expressionistic...; nonrepresentational non-expressionist...[S]uppose an artist determines that *H* shall henceforth be artistically relevant for his paintings. Then, in fact, both *H* and non-*H* become artistically relevant for *all* painting, and if his is the first and only painting that is *H*, every other painting in existence becomes non-*H*, and the entire community of paintings is enriched, together with a doubling of the available style opportunities...The greater the variety of artistically relevant predicates, the more complex the individual members of the artworld become; and the more one knows of the entire population of the artworld, the richer one’s experience with any of its members.

In this regard, notice that, if there are *m* artistically relevant predicates, there is always a bottom row with *m* minuses. This row is apt to be occupied by purists. Having scoured their canvasses clear of what they regard as inessential, they credit themselves with having distilled out the essence of art. But this is just their fallacy: exactly as many artistically relevant predicates stand true of their[s]...stand true of any member of the Artworld, and they can *exist* as artworks only insofar as ‘impure’ paintings exist.”

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<sup>14</sup> Guyer (2014): 482, 485.

<sup>15</sup> Danto (1964): 582-584.

<sup>16</sup> Danto (1964): 582.

<sup>17</sup> Danto (1964): 582. These are neither *contraries* nor *contradictories*, but *opposites*.

The matrix is composed of ‘artistically relevant predicates’ (columns) and artistic ‘styles’ (rows) determined by the interplay of the predicates. The predicates themselves denote artistic developments by predicating of their constituent artworks particular features of the artworks themselves, historically assigning the predicate as the ‘defining trait’ of its corresponding movement; (i.e. the predicate *G*, ‘is representational,’ introduced by representationalist artworks, viz. representational features, defines representationalism; likewise, the predicate *F*, ‘is expressionist,’ introduced by expressionist artworks, viz. expressive features, defines expressionism; and so forth.) As per art history, artistic styles result from the ways in which the movements compare. Danto codifies this by introducing the opposite predicates of *P* and *non-P*, denoted by ‘+’ and ‘-’ respectively. The role of these signs is not only to differentiate the predicates of artistic styles, but also to identify a final row of so-called ‘purist’ artworks. For however many artistically relevant predicates (call this *n*), there will be an equal number of minuses in this bottom ‘purist’ row (call this *m*), and the total number of artistic styles available will be calculable as  $2^n$  (call this *s*), hence: for every *n* predicates,  $m = n$  and  $s = 2^n$ . This is shown below:

$(n = 2)$	<table style="border-collapse: collapse; width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="border-bottom: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"><i>F</i></td> <td style="border-bottom: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"><i>G</i></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">+</td> <td style="padding: 5px;">+</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">+</td> <td style="padding: 5px;">-</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">-</td> <td style="padding: 5px;">+</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">-</td> <td style="padding: 5px;">-</td> </tr> </table>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	<table style="border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">← ‘rep. exp.’</td> <td rowspan="4" style="font-size: 2em; padding: 0 10px;">}</td> <td rowspan="4" style="padding: 0 10px;">‘impure’</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">← ‘nonrep. exp.’</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">← ‘rep. nonexp.’</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">← ‘nonrep. nonexp.’</td> </tr> </table>	← ‘rep. exp.’	}	‘impure’	← ‘nonrep. exp.’	← ‘rep. nonexp.’	← ‘nonrep. nonexp.’
<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>																	
+	+																	
+	-																	
-	+																	
-	-																	
← ‘rep. exp.’	}	‘impure’																
← ‘nonrep. exp.’																		
← ‘rep. nonexp.’																		
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← ‘nonrep. nonexp.’	}	‘pure’																
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	<table style="border-collapse: collapse; margin: 0 auto;"> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">EXP.</td> <td style="padding: 5px;">REP.</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;">‘is exp’</td> <td style="padding: 5px;">‘is rep’</td> </tr> </table>	EXP.	REP.	‘is exp’	‘is rep’	$(s = 4)$												
EXP.	REP.																	
‘is exp’	‘is rep’																	

This matrix is the initial way in which Danto diagrammatizes the artworld. Although his historical theory of art is dichotomic insofar as it specifies two main stages of art -- the first *imitative*, and the second *non-imitative*, thereby categorizing art’s history into *representationalist* (*G*) and *expressionist* (*F*) stages -- Danto does retain the possibility of expanding the matrix, concluding that “[a]n artistic breakthrough consists...in adding the possibility of a column [a new artistically relevant predicate] to the matrix”;<sup>18</sup> however this expansion is not infinite. Danto’s conception of art history is a (neo-Hegelian) *historical narrative*. It progresses through two *historical* stages, where the second is an inversion of the first, followed by a third *post-historical* stage, whereof progression is necessitated by inconsistencies that arise in each:<sup>19</sup>

- 1 *Imitation (or mimetic) theory*: a representationalist approach, defines art-objects as perfect imitations of non-art-objects; however, this also makes them aesthetically and metaphysically redundant, so fails.

<sup>18</sup> Danto (1964): 584.

<sup>19</sup> Danto (1984): 86-99, 104-109, 111.

- 2 Non-imitation (or real-thing) theory: an expressionist approach, defines art-objects as entities distinct from non-art-objects, being real-objects themselves; however, this merely reabsorbs them back into reality, so fails.
- 3 Transfigurative (or art-concept) theory: a conceptual approach, requires interpretation of artworks as contextualized within the artworld; necessitated and exemplified by artistic modernism.

The conceptualization of art required here marks the final stage of art's narrative history of realizing what art *is*; after, this becomes the duty of philosophy. The post-historical stage, marked by the artworld, exemplifies the Hegelian-Dantoan notion of the *end of art* as 'the end of art history as such', that is, the end of any single metanarrative for art's future history.<sup>20</sup> Per Danto, then, in *After the End of Art* (1997), the end-of-art thesis describes the mutual divergence of art from philosophy,<sup>21</sup> rather than, per Hegel, the transmutation of art into philosophy, suggesting that "philosophy itself may just be the disenfranchisement of art."<sup>22</sup>

#### 4.1.2 Goodman (1968)<sup>23</sup>

In *Languages of Art* (1968), Goodman's aesthetics concerns the syntactic and semantic rules governing symbolization, properly defined. I shall confine myself, with exception, to the second part of the text, titled *The Theory of Notation* (§IV). His first priority is to divide the landscape of a *symbol system* into two domains:

- 1 The symbol scheme: a collection of symbols (*'characters'*) with rules for their combination into compound symbols (*'compound characters'*), where the instances of a character are, generally, *marks* of that character.
- 2 The field of reference: the class of objects (*'members'*) that comply with the symbol scheme (*'compliance class'*) with rules for their compliance.

The rules which govern the symbol scheme are *syntactic*, and those which govern the field of reference (and its relation to the symbol scheme) are *semantic*; a general rule of *unambiguity* applies throughout. Goodman uses the term 'compliance' synonymously with 'denotation' and maintains that it "requires *no* special conformity," so anything whatsoever that is denoted by a symbol complies with that symbol.<sup>24</sup> Recall that, for Goodman, *to symbolize is to refer*, and that reference is a necessary condition for the depiction or description of an object;<sup>25</sup> thus, reference remains imperative for the symbolization and depiction that occurs in the arts. For Goodman, there are two modes of direct<sup>26</sup> reference:

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<sup>20</sup> Danto (1998): 140.

<sup>21</sup> Danto (1998): 134.

<sup>22</sup> Danto (1985): 176.

<sup>23</sup> On Goodman, cf. Guyer (2014): 411-427.

<sup>24</sup> Goodman (1968): 143-144.

<sup>25</sup> Goodman (1976): 40.

<sup>26</sup> This is to be differentiated from *indirect* reference (i.e., *metaphor* (II,8)).

- 1 *Denotation* (§I,1): reference *simpliciter*; the relation between a *predicate*, and the *object* that it predicates; here, it is the predicate which denotes.<sup>27</sup>
- 2 *Exemplification* (§II,3): reference plus possession; a relationship between a *predicate*, and the *object* that it predicates, where that object demonstrates *possession* of that predicate; here, it is the object which exemplifies.<sup>28</sup>

In the final section, Goodman reiterates his objective throughout the chapter, as well as a comprehensive definition of a *notational system* and the five properties required of one. Ultimately, Goodman's objective is classificatory, to elucidate "features that distinguish *notational* systems -- good or bad -- from *non-notational* systems,"<sup>29</sup> and he does so according to the argument that *artistic* symbol systems are generally non-notational,<sup>30</sup> despite notational systems being theoretically possible.<sup>31</sup> In a notational system, the onus is on the (theoretical) ability to draw clear lines between the inscriptions of a character to members of that character's compliance class, without committing a lateral move into another character or compliance class. This is to be accomplished by appealing to five necessary requirements, characterized as syntactic and semantic. Hence, Goodman requires one-to-one correspondence and equivalency, per his definition of a notational system:<sup>32</sup>

"A system is *notational*, then, if and only if all *objects* complying with *inscriptions* of a given *character* belong to the same *compliance class* and we can, theoretically, determine that each *mark* belongs to, and each object complies with inscriptions of, *at most one* particular character."

Goodman uses 'notation' synonymously with 'notational scheme' and 'notational system'; however, this interchangeability does not extend to the terms 'symbol', 'symbol scheme', and 'symbol system'. This is on account of the unidirectional relation between that which makes something symbolic, and that which makes it notational, as Goodman notes that "[t]he symbol scheme of every notational system is notational, but not every symbol system with a notational scheme is [notational]";<sup>33</sup> thus schemes are notational, but systems are not necessarily so. This seems to be a result of the relationship that obtains between the scheme and application of that scheme to the field of reference within the overarching system.<sup>34</sup>

Goodman's point of departure is the so-called *primary function* of score-like systems. He begins by providing a functionalist account of a score, and how it differs from other systems, e.g. sketch or script. His focus is not limited to musical scores (or sketches or scripts), as it is concerning symbol systems that are organized *like* scores. The function of a score, according to Goodman, is one of *identity*: the score of a work is the authoritative

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<sup>27</sup> Goodman (1968): 5.

<sup>28</sup> Goodman (1968): 53.

<sup>29</sup> Goodman (1968): 156.

<sup>30</sup> Guyer (2014): 421.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Goodman (1968): 194-198, e.g. painting.

<sup>32</sup> Goodman (1968): 156; formatted.

<sup>33</sup> Goodman (1968): 130; formatted.

<sup>34</sup> Goodman (1968): 130.

identification of that work among performances of it.<sup>35</sup> This is the so-called primary function of a score *as* a score, and is from which the properties of a score, that it: (1) *defines*, or marks off the performances that do comply with the work from those that do not, and (2) *uniquely determines*, or relates scores and performances to one another, as well as to the work.<sup>36</sup> The distinction between the ‘pointing-out’ facilitated by a score and the ‘pointing-out’ facilitated by everyday ostension is that a score points without any ‘latitude’ permitted. Ostension might lead from an object (O<sub>1</sub>) to a label (L<sub>1</sub>) denoting that object, to another object (O<sub>2</sub>) that exemplifies L<sub>1</sub>, to another label (L<sub>2</sub>) that denotes O<sub>2</sub>, to another object (O<sub>3</sub>) that exemplifies L<sub>2</sub>, and so on, permitting a shift in latitude from O<sub>1</sub> → O<sub>2</sub> → O<sub>3</sub> that is both misguiding and ambiguous semantically.<sup>37</sup> Symbolization by way of a score avoids this by having every performance (P) exemplify every instance of the score (S), and every S exemplify the work (W), as well as having the W denote every S, and every S denote every P. That some forms of art lend themselves to systems of symbolization similar to that of a score -- *allography* -- and some do not -- *autography* -- prompts Goodman to devise a continuum upon which different forms of art (e.g. painting, sculpting, etc.), or symbolism (e.g. diagramming, mapping, etc.), may be placed.

The hallmark of a character is that its various marks pose *syntactic equivalency*, that is to say, members of a character may be freely exchanged for one another, so long as this exchange has no syntactical effect.<sup>38</sup> In light of this, Goodman names five necessary conditions, which admit of two (perhaps three) general classifications:<sup>39</sup>

- 1 General requirement: *unambiguity*: one-to-one relations among instances of marks and: (1) the characters to which they belong (syntactically), or (2) the compliance classes of the characters to which they belong (semantically); Goodman defines *unambiguity* as a lack of ambiguity, in which these one-to-one relations change with context or time.
- 2 Syntactic requirement 1: *syntactic disjointness* or *indifference*: one-to-one relations between marks and characters, such that characters are disjoint or non-overlapping.
- 3 Syntactic requirement 2: *syntactic differentiation*: a measure of *density* between marks and characters, such that any two adjacent symbols are differentiable, with no third symbol between them to undifferentiate them.
- 4 Semantic requirement 1: *semantic differentiation*: a measure of *density* between compliants and compliance classes, such that any two adjacent objects are differentiable, with no third object between them to undifferentiate them.
- 5 Semantic requirement 2: *semantic disjointness*: one-to-one relations between characters and the compliance classes of the members they denote, such that compliance classes are disjoint or non-overlapping.

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<sup>35</sup> Goodman (1968): 128.


<sup>36</sup> Goodman (1968): 128-129.

<sup>37</sup> Goodman (1968): 129.

<sup>38</sup> Goodman (1968): 131.

<sup>39</sup> Goodman (1968): 147-148; 132, 135-136; 152.

Syntactic disjointness may be phrased in two directions: character ‘indifference’ applies to two marks that *are* of the same character (i.e. they are indifferent), whereas character ‘disjointness’ applies to two marks that are *not* of the same character (i.e. they are disjoint); both of these views comments on the same property -- syntactic equivalency -- of the marks and the characters to which they comply. Both syntactic requirements 1 and 2 may be illustrated by the mark ‘d’.<sup>40</sup> If the mark ‘d’ belongs to both the first (‘a’) and fourth (‘d’) letters of the alphabet, such that “a” = “d” = “d” and every ‘a’ and ‘d’ are equivalent to ‘d’ and, therefore, to one another, then the two letter-classes (i.e. the ‘a-class’ and ‘d-class’) collapse into one character (i.e. ‘d’ and its ‘d-class’), permitting syntactical equivalence among them. The letters would no longer qualify as characters in a notation; syntactic requirement 1 would fail. If, however, the mark ‘d’ belongs to the letter ‘a’ (or ‘d’) as equivalent to its miniscule and majuscule forms, such that “a” = “d” = “A” (or “d” = “d” = “D”), then the consistency of the marks ‘a’ and ‘A’ (or ‘d’ and ‘D’) across points in time is what differentiates them, regardless of sameness in shape, size, etc. The letters would no longer qualify as characters in a notation; syntactic requirement 2 would fail. Remaining loyal to the same notation throughout both time and space (*qua* unambiguity) prevents departure from these requirements, and as such, departure from the use of a notational system. Semantic requirement 2 may be illustrated by Goodman’s Figures 9<sup>41</sup> and 10<sup>42</sup> (below), which illustrate two instances of overlap: (1) *complete* overlap, and (2) *partial* overlap between compliance classes (A’) and (B’) characters (A) and (B):



Note how Goodman explains the interrelations among the parts:<sup>43</sup>

“[Where] two different compliance-classes intersect [viz. Figure 9], some inscription [i] will have two compliants [k and h] such that one belongs to a compliance-class that the other does not; and a chain from compliant [k] to inscription [i] to compliant [h] will thus lead from a member [k] of one compliance-class [A'] to something [h] outside that class [in B']...Where neither of two intersecting compliance-classes is included in the other [viz. Figure 10], a chain from compliant [h] to inscription [i] to compliant [k] to inscription [i] to compliant [m] may connect two objects [h and m] that do not even belong to any one compliance-class [common to neither A' nor B'].”


<sup>40</sup> Cf. Goodman (1968): 133, Figure 3.

<sup>41</sup> Goodman (1968): 149; adapted.

<sup>42</sup> Goodman (1968): 150; adapted.

<sup>43</sup> Goodman (1968): 150-151.

What we see here is a shift in latitude that results from everyday ostension, but is safeguarded against in the function of a score. Therefore, Goodman concludes that “any intersection of different compliance-classes defeats the primary purpose of a notational system,” that of identification.<sup>44</sup> In conclusion, proper reference is therefore made between a character ( $A$  or  $B$ ) and its compliance class ( $A'$  or  $B'$ ), marks ( $q$  or  $s$ ) and compliants ( $r$  or  $t$ ), by the following one-to-one organization:



It is by this model that a system is indeed notational: all objects ( $r$  and  $t$ ) complying with inscriptions ( $q$  and  $s$ ) of a given character ( $A$  and  $B$ ) belong to the same compliance class ( $A'$  and  $B'$ ), and it can be determined that each mark ( $q$  and  $s$ ) belongs to, and each object ( $r$  and  $t$ ) complies with inscriptions of, *at most one* particular character (viz. *no* intersection).<sup>45</sup> Yet, given that artistic or aesthetical systems are generally *non-notational*, the question remains as to what model they correspond. Reiterated in the essay titled ‘*When is Art?*’ in *Ways of Worldmaking* (1978), Goodman provides five ‘*symptoms of the aesthetic*’:<sup>46</sup>

- 1 *Syntactic density*: a measure such that between any two adjacent symbols there is a third (or an infinite many) undifferentiating them; a difference in symbol results from the finest of syntactic difference.
- 2 *Syntactic or relative repleteness*: a symbol has comparatively many significant aspects.
- 3 *Semantic density*: a measure such that between any two adjacent objects there is a third (or an infinite many) undifferentiating them; a difference in object results from the finest of semantic difference.
- 4 *Exemplificationality*: symbolization plus possession, specifically of the properties the symbol literally or metaphorically possesses; expression.
- 5 *Reference, multiple and complex*: a symbol has several referential functions, some direct and some indirect.

Per Goodman, “[a] symptom is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for, but merely tends in conjunction with other such symptoms to be present in, aesthetic experience” and

<sup>44</sup> Goodman (1968): 151.

<sup>45</sup> Goodman (1968): 156.

<sup>46</sup> Goodman (1968): 252-253; (1978): 67-68.

“call for maximum sensitivity of discrimination”.<sup>47</sup> The commonality toward which these symptoms tend, however, is a refocusing from the referent via the symbol to the symbol itself; this, the nontransparency of the artwork and the artwork as symbol, Goodman offers as a suggestion for defining art in terms of symbolic function.<sup>48</sup>

#### 4.1.3 Wollheim (1968)<sup>49</sup>

In *Art and Its Objects* (1968), Wollheim’s aesthetics concerns the distinctive kind of visuo-aesthetic experience one has when viewing a differentiated surface, demonstrated through his theory of *representational seeing* (1968), first called *seeing-as* (1968)<sup>50</sup> and later called *seeing-in* (1980b).<sup>51</sup> In short, seeing-in is a capacity of our perceptual apparatus to visualize three-dimensional pictorial space within the two-dimensional picture plane; it is within the pictorial space that depicted objects are seen, likewise, three-dimensionally despite their two-dimensionality.<sup>52</sup> (It is this capacity that was of focus throughout the case study in chapter 2.) This is initially introduced through the anecdote of a task asked by Hans Hofmann of his pupils. First, Wollheim provides Hofmann’s instruction to mark a canvas with black paint and observe how the black is *on* the white. (Call this the *Hofmann Case*.) Then, Wollheim provides a revised instruction to mark a canvas with blue paint and observe how the blue is *behind* the white. (Call this the *Revised Hofmann Case*.) The revision is provided to emphasize Wollheim’s contention that “what Hofmann’s pupils were asked to observe was not the fact that some black paint was physically on a white canvas,” but rather the representation-contributive properties that the physically-black or physically-blue on the physically-white pose to our capacity for seeing-in:<sup>53</sup>

“The sense in which ‘on’ was used in the original example and ‘behind’ in the revised example give us in an elementary form the notion of what it is to see something as a representation, or for something to have representational properties.”

Iterated in *Art and its Objects* (1968) and reiterated in *A Note on the Physical Object Hypothesis* (1980a), Wollheim uses the ‘physical object hypothesis’ as his entrée into discussing art in physical, plastic terms. It is this that prompts his initial bifurcation of art forms into those where no physical object can be plausibly identified as the work of art (representationalism) and those where one can (presentationalism).<sup>54</sup> Recall that Wollheim’s central problem is the simultaneity of attributing representational properties to a work of art *and* considering that work of art a physical object. It is to emphasize this problem that he revises the Hofmann Case, since the ‘behindedness’ of the blue mark more clearly illustrates the representative

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<sup>47</sup> Goodman (1968): 252.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Goodman (1978): 69-70.

<sup>49</sup> On Wollheim, cf. Guyer (2014): 506-524; cf. *A note on formalism* (§2.1.2.1).

<sup>50</sup> Wollheim (1968): 16.

<sup>51</sup> Wollheim (1980b): 209.

<sup>52</sup> Wollheim (1994): 17-18.

<sup>53</sup> Wollheim (1968): 15.

<sup>54</sup> Wollheim (1968): 4-5.



character of artistic depiction than does the ‘onness’ of the black mark.<sup>55</sup> This is part of Wollheim’s general argument against a version of idealist-expressivist aesthetics, called the *Gombrich argument*. In short, this holds that a particular plastic feature of an artwork is significant only if regarded as an intended selection from a set of alternatives -- the artist’s ‘repertoire.’<sup>56</sup> The idea is that, for instance, the black mark in the Hofmann Case or the blue mark in the Revised Hofmann Case have no significance in themselves, but that black-*rather-than*-blue or blue-*rather-than*-black has.<sup>57</sup> The error of conceptualizing the role of formal qualities in artistic depiction in this way may be illustrated through the following case: to mark a canvas with red paint and observe that it is neither black nor blue. (Call this the *Extended Hofmann Case*.) This mark could indeed be seen representationally in the same way as either the Hofmann Case or the Revised Hofmann Case, that is, with the red *on or behind* the white. Knowledge of the repertoire, that is, that the Extended Hofmann Case is red-*rather-than*-black or red-*rather-than*-blue is irrelevant. And, I maintain, would remain so, were the ‘rather-than’ relation used here (e.g.) morphologic and not chromatic (i.e. horizontal-*rather-than*-vertical or circular-*rather-than*-linear). The expressive features of a work are, in this way, inapplicable to the features contributive to representation or representational seeing, and since it is representation that gives artistic *depiction* significance, the Gombrich argument fails.<sup>58</sup> Maintaining adamancy on the physicality of the artwork while also maintaining that artworks cannot be *merely* physical distinguishes Wollheim’s ‘psychological’ aesthetics from contemporaries who locate the artwork in (e.g.) linguistic meaning.<sup>59</sup> In *Painting as an Art* (1987), Wollheim identifies three fundamental perceptual capacities (in the spectator) from which the three basic powers of painting (in the artwork, from the artist) derive:<sup>60</sup>

- 1 A representational aspect: the capacity for *seeing-in* derives the power to *represent* external objects;
- 2 An expressive aspect: the capacity for *expressive perception* derives the power to *express* internal phenomena;
- 3 A pleasurable aspect: the capacity for *visual delight* derives the power to induce *pleasure* of a special sort;

This threefold aesthetics reflects a synthesis of three themes prominent throughout modern aesthetics, including: the cognitivist, the expressionist, and the imaginative (play) theories of art.<sup>61</sup> Yet part of what individuates his work is the import he maintains of the medium.

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<sup>55</sup> Wollheim (1968): 21.

<sup>56</sup> Wollheim (1980b): 213; (1968): 57.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Wollheim (1968): 57-58.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Wollheim (1968): 58-59; (1980b): 213-214.

<sup>59</sup> Guyer (2014): 509.

<sup>60</sup> Wollheim (1987): 45.

<sup>61</sup> Guyer (2014): 513.

*Twofoldness* or the *twofold thesis* is a principle of “attend[ing] simultaneously to object and medium.”<sup>62</sup> Wollheim introduces this principle as a requirement for appropriate representational seeing, and to distinguish seeing-in from seeing-as, despite his initial conflation of the terms. The two things between which visual attention is (perhaps unequally) distributed are: (1) the *medium* or thing representing ( $=x$ ), and (2) the *object* or thing represented ( $\equiv y$ ); in short, the distinction to be made is that, in seeing-as,  $x$  is seen *as*  $y$ , whereas in seeing-in,  $y$  is seen *in*  $x$ .<sup>63</sup> The difference may be *prima facie* subtle, but Wollheim holds to a crucial phenomenological asymmetry, since “what the representation is *seen as* is never the same as what is *seen in* the representation.”<sup>64</sup> In *Seeing-as, Seeing-in, and Pictorial Representation* (1980b), Wollheim notes three considerations for differentiating the Wollheimian notion of seeing-in from the Wittgensteinian notion of seeing-as: (1) whereas seeing-as entails particulars, seeing-in entails particulars and states-of-affairs;<sup>65</sup>

“If I am looking at  $x$ , and  $x$  is a particular, I can see *f* in  $x$ , and I can also see in  $x$  that an *f* is *g*-ing: but, whereas I can see  $x$  as an *f*, I cannot see  $x$  as that an *f* is *g*-ing.”

(2) whereas seeing-as entails a localization requirement, seeing-in does not;<sup>66</sup>

“If I see  $x$  as  $y$ , then there is always some part (up to the whole) of  $x$  that I see as  $y$ . Further, if I claim to see  $x$  as  $y$  -- and I may see  $x$  as  $y$  without claiming to do so, indeed without knowing that I do so -- then I must be able to specify just which part of  $x$ , or whether it isn't the whole of  $x$ , that I allegedly see as  $y$  ... I may see  $y$  in  $x$  without there being any answer to the question whereabouts in  $x$  I can see  $y$ , and consequently without my being obliged to produce any such answer in support of the claim I might make to see  $y$  in  $x$ .”

and (3) whereas seeing-in permits twofoldness, seeing-as does not;<sup>67</sup>

“If I see  $x$  as  $y$  there will be certain features of  $x$  that permit me to see it, or explain my seeing it, as  $y$ . These features, I shall say, are the sustaining features of my seeing  $x$  as  $y$ , and the restrictions upon simultaneous attention in the case of seeing-as may be expressed by saying that I cannot simultaneously see  $x$  and  $y$  and be visually aware of the features of  $x$  sustaining this perception. [...] I may very well be able to see  $y$  in  $x$  and yet there be no delimitable features of  $x$  that can be looked upon as sustaining features of my doing so. However, in those cases where there are sustaining features of my seeing  $y$  in  $x$ , then seeing-in contrasts with seeing-as in that I can simultaneously be visually aware of the  $y$  in  $x$  and the sustaining features of this perception.”

The exemplar of seeing-as is Jastrow's *duck-rabbit*, which may be *seen as either* a duck *or* a rabbit, *tertium non datur*. Wittgenstein depicts this in *Philosophical Investigations* (1953) in the

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<sup>62</sup> Wollheim (1980b): 213.

<sup>63</sup> Wollheim (1980b): 209.

<sup>64</sup> Wollheim (1980b): 226; formatted.

<sup>65</sup> Wollheim (1980b): 210, cf. 222; cf. 210 re: '*nominalization argument*': 'to see  $x$  as the *f*'s *g*-ing' or 'an *f* *g*-ing.'

<sup>66</sup> Wollheim (1980b): 211, cf. 222.

<sup>67</sup> Wollheim (1980b): 213, cf. 223.

following manner, through a series (at least 12) of what I shall call ‘moments’:<sup>68</sup>

“I am shewn the duck-rabbit and asked what it is; I *may* say ‘It’s a duck-rabbit’...The answer that it is a duck-rabbit is again the report of a *perception*; the answer ‘*Now* it’s a rabbit’ is not. Had I replied ‘It’s a rabbit’, the ambiguity would have escaped me, and I should have been reporting my *perception*. [...] Of course we can say: There are certain things which fall equally under the concept ‘picture-rabbit’ and under the concept ‘picture-duck’. And a picture...is such a thing. -- But the *impression* is not simultaneously of a picture-duck and a picture-rabbit. [...] The duck and rabbit aspects could not be described in an analogous way. You only ‘see the duck and rabbit aspects’ if you are already conversant with the shapes of those two animals...”

Much can be said about the variant combinations of what is shown (e.g. rabbit, picture-rabbit, duck-rabbit) and what is responded (e.g. ‘a rabbit’, ‘a duck-rabbit’, ‘*now* it’s a rabbit’) among the moments; however, the key point at present is that a response which implicitly acknowledges the ambiguity of the ‘duck-rabbit’ whole while reporting on *one* of its appearances entails *thinking* about the visual experience, not merely perceptively but conceptually:<sup>69</sup>

“This shews the difference between the concepts. ‘Seeing as...’ is not part of perception.”

The disjunctivism here (noted most explicitly in moment 9) is due, at least in part, then, to the role of concepts: to see  $x$  as  $y$  -- a duck,  $y_1$ , or a rabbit,  $y_2$  -- is to place  $y_{1,2}$  under a concept -- DUCK or RABBIT, respectively; since neither entails the other, this is done at their mutual exclusion. Per Wollheim, Wittgenstein’s crucial point in utilizing this exemplar is that seeing-as entails the introduction of a concept,  $f$ , into perception, since “for any  $x$ , whenever I perceive  $x$ , there is always some  $f$  such that I perceive  $x$  as  $f$ ”.<sup>70</sup> Seeing-in, conversely, does not introduce an  $f$ . It is a more primitive species of non-conceptual, perhaps pre-conceptual, perception, and so operates without identifying or individuating features contributive to the representation itself (viz. non-localization, per (2)), including and especially the medium-object distinction (viz. twofoldness, per (3)), since such a process entails conceptualization of those features. Perhaps a formal expression would be: ‘for any  $x$ , whenever I perceive  $x$  representationally, I perceive some  $y$  in  $x$ , and only then may perceive  $y$  as  $f$ ’. Ultimately, the distinction between seeing-in and seeing-as may be couched in terms of their relation to ‘*straightforward perception*,’ “the capacity...of perceiving things present to the senses.” Whereas seeing-as is directly related to this, seeing-in is related to what may be called ‘*non-straightforward perception*,’ “a special capacity...to have perceptual experiences of things that are not present to the senses” (e.g., the absent or non-existent).<sup>71</sup> This no doubt includes  $y$ .

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<sup>68</sup> Wittgenstein (1953): 195<sup>c</sup>, 199<sup>c</sup>, 205<sup>e</sup>; formatted.

<sup>69</sup> Wittgenstein (1953): 197<sup>c</sup>.

<sup>70</sup> Wollheim (1980b): 219, 220.

<sup>71</sup> Wollheim (1980b): 217.

## 4.2 Analysis in Late Anglophone Aesthetics

The varieties of analysis at play throughout LAA vary among its principle figures; I shall take each in turn.

Danto's analytical method is, firstly, of the regressive mode, and secondly, of the resolute-*cum*-transformative mixture. Analytic regression is evident through his use of historically-minded theories of art to derive contemporary aesthetics as premises or causes derive conclusions or effects, as in his three-stage development of art history as historical narrative. Analytic resolution-*cum*-transformation is evident through his rewriting of art history as the style matrix (transformative), itself devised from classes of *K*-relevant predicates, the logical constituents of the various movements comprising art history (resolute).

Goodman's analytical method is wholeheartedly of the transformational mode, evident through his rewriting of standard linguistic elements as notational (or non-notational) symbol systems.

Wollheim's analytical method is, firstly, of the resolute mode, and secondly, of the transformational mode. Analytic resolution is evident through his account of seeing-in and twofoldness to dissolve the picture plane into pictorial space and the objects seen in it, as well as in the three perceptual capacities into which he analyzes aesthetic experience. Analytic transformation is evident through the very principle of seeing-in, by which (e.g.) marks on canvas become psychologically transformed either in space or in identity.

## 4.3 System in Late Anglophone Aesthetics

The variety of system at play throughout LAA is indeed a *plenary* systematicity. In short, this is because neither Danto's nor Goodman's nor Wollheim's system is defined in terms of the relations of its parts to some privileged kernel or index to some unanalyzable element.

Danto's system is a historical narrative. Though it may *prima facie* seem to tend toward procedural systematicity in the ordinary sense, it does not. This is because what drives the historical 'procedure' is the matrix layout, itself a composite of mutually-interrelating predicates. One could (as I have, elsewhere) draw a timeline above the matrix to coordinate periods in art history with the artistically relevant predicates or styles, but it would then be the matrix of predicates determining the sequence of the timeline, rather than vice versa.

Goodman's system is a symbol system; its set of syntactic and semantic requirements ensure, within the system, that one-to-one correspondence between characters and compliance classes are maintained. Such rules safeguard against global indexing toward a unitary element of the system. Were this to happen, it would not only fail to be notational, but fail to be a system, per Goodman.

Wollheim's system is a two- or three- fold psychological system; at its most unitary it requires bifurcation. That identity may never hold between the medium representing and the object represented prevents a convergence of the system into a unity.

#### 4.4 Conclusion to Chapter 4

The task of this chapter was to present the analytic and systematic methods by which the aesthetic philosophies of LAA figures function, especially in comparison to those of EAA. This was to be investigated in light of the dynamic proposed in §1.2, the statement of the problem and thesis of this dissertation: that the resolution of the PSI is explainable by a swapping of priority between EAA and LAA concerning the notions of analyticity and systematicity; it was hypothesized that LAA positioned system as primary and analysis as secondary. This appears to have been a proper assessment of LAA, given that the figures noted above *analyze in order to formulate their systems*, rather than vice versa.

It has been shown that the major analytical methods at play throughout LAA are identifiable as those at play throughout analytic philosophy after the AT and LT, according to Beaney's set-of-modes and the assessment that analytic philosophy (including LAA) is characterizable as a synthesis between paraphrastic-transformative and reductive-resolutive modes of analysis, with slight dominance of the former over the latter. This is our conclusion of secondary importance.

It has also been shown that the major systematic method at play throughout LAA is identifiable as a *plenary* systematicity. This is our conclusion of primary importance.



## Analyticity and Systematicity in Early and Late Anglophone Aesthetics

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### 5.1 General Conclusion

The following restatements shall constitute a general conclusion to this dissertation.

#### 5.1 Restatement of the Early-Late Distinction in Anglophone Aesthetics

By adopting and adapting a narrower scope of anglophone aesthetics, a significant organizational shift was entertained which established AA as biphasic, admitting of earlier (EAA) and later (LAA) phases, with each characterized by its respective exemplary texts.

This was the early-late distinction.

#### 5.2 Restatement of the Unitary-Plenary Distinction in Anglophone Aesthetics

By utilizing the art-history of cubism as a case-study, a distinction between two (three) senses of 'system' or 'systematicity' as applied to artworks was made; this distinction defined an artwork to be a system or systematic insofar as it is compositionally complex. Unitary systematicity privileges some single element as the system kernel, with the system so defined. Plenary systematicity privileges no single element as the system kernel, with the system defined rather by some other means.

In analytic philosophy, this was applied to figures of both EAA and LAA.

In painting, the monocularism of traditional techniques was suggested to align with the unitariness characteristic of idealism, and thus the unitary systematicity characteristic of idealist aesthetics; the multiocularism of modernist techniques was suggested to align with the plenitude characteristic of cubism, and thus the plenary systematicity characteristic of realist aesthetics.

This was the unitary-plenary distinction.

#### 5.3 Restatement of the Problem and Thesis

The Problem of Systematic Inconsistency (PSI) in anglophone aesthetics was presented as a problematic methodological tension between EAA and LAA that arises from establishing AA as biphasic through the early-late distinction. Namely, the PSI concerns a shift from reprobation in EAA to approbation in LAA toward systematic methodologies in philosophical aesthetics. The PSI originally stated by Gardner (2014) as G was paraphrased as G' (§1.2). It was the task of this dissertation to show that the two entities  $s^*$  and  $s$  in G',

which *prima facie* present the tension noted above, are in fact not the same but different entities,  $s_1^*$  and  $s_2$  in  $G'$ , making it a constitutive rather than merely evaluative shift. Their difference is a difference in conceptualization of systematicity, namely, a difference between unitary and plenary conceptions of systematicity, as established through the unitary-plenary (and ordinary) distinction(s).

That EAA explicitly reprobates *unitary*-systematicity ( $s_1$ ), thereby emphasizing analytic methods as primary, whereas LAA explicitly approbates *plenary*-systematicity ( $s_2$ ), thereby emphasizing systematic methods as primary and analytic as secondary, *and* that EAA implicitly approbates plenary-systematicity, thereby emphasizing systematic methods as secondary, is the solution to the PSI. The EAA-LAA shift was so characterized by this swapping of priority between analyticity and systematicity in anglophone aesthetics.










Figure 1. Cézanne (1900): *Still Life with Faience Jug*



Figure 1.1, indicating outer contours or *outlines* of large areas.




Figure 1.2, indicating flat *planes* and their axes; arrows point into depth.



Figure 1.3, indicating '*carry-through*' lines, objective (solid) and subjective (dotted).



Figure 1.4, indicating *volume movement* and the creation of space and depth.



Figure 1.5, indicating *tension* by way of a tension path among plane axes.




Figure 1.6, indicating *geometric shapes*, objective (solid) and subjective (dotted).




Figure 1.7, indicating *rhythmic curved lines*, both dynamic (curved/diagonal) and static (vertical/horizontal).




Figure 1.8, indicating *gradations* or planes of colour, including proceeding (warm) and receding (cool) planes.




Figure 1.9, indicating *closure* among positive (black/white) and negative (gray) areas.



Figure 2.1, Da Vinci (1494-1499): *The Last Supper*







Figure 2.2, Loran Diagramme, Da Vinci's *The Last Supper*




**Figure 3.** Caravaggio (1606): *Saint Jerome in Meditation*




**Figure 4.** Courbet (c. 1871): *Portrait of Régis Courbet*



**Figure 5.1,** Bonney (1915): *Ambroise Vollard*, Photograph



**Figure 5.2,** Picasso (1915): *Ambroise Vollard*, Sketch (Ingres)



**Figure 5.3,** Renoir (1908): *Portrait of Ambroise Vollard*



Figure 5.4, Cézanne (1899): *Portrait of Ambroise Vollard*




Figure 5.5, Loran Diagramme, Cézanne's *Portrait of Ambroise Vollard*




Figure 5.6, Picasso (1909-10): *Portrait of Ambroise Vollard*






Figure 5.7, Loran Diagramme, Picasso's *Portrait of Ambroise Vollard*







**Figure 6.1**, Unknown (1906): *Wilhelm Uhde*, Photograph




**Figure 6.2**, Picasso (1910, Sp.): *Portrait of Wilhelm Uhde*




**Figure 6.3**, Loran Diagramme, Picasso's *Portrait of Wilhelm Uhde*




**Figure 7.1**, Picasso (1910): *Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler*, Photograph



**Figure 7.2**, Picasso (1910, Au.): *Portrait of Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler*




**Figure 7.3**, Loran (1963): *Diagram for Figure 3 (Detail)*,  
Picasso's *Portrait of D. H. Kahnweiler*



**Figure 8.** Picasso (1912): *Man with a Violin*




**Figure 9.1,** Vermeer (1662-1665): *The Music Lesson*



**Figure 9.2,** Jenison (2013): *The Music Lesson*, recreation.




**Figure 10.** Cézanne (c. 1906): *Mont Sainte-Victoire*.  
Exemplar of *passage*, technic 1.



**Figure 11.** Picasso (1909): *Seated Female Nude*.  
Exemplar of *faceting*, technic 2.



**Figure 12.1**, Braque (1909): *Violin and Palette*.  
First instance of *trompe l'oeil*, technic 4.



**Figure 12.2**, Braque (1910): *Violin and Pitcher*.  
Exemplar of *trompe l'oeil*, technic 4.



**Figure 13.** Braque (1911): *The Portuguese*.  
First instance of *lettering*, technic 5.







**Figure 14.** Picasso (1912): *Still Life with Chair Caning*.  
First instance of *collage*, technic 7.




**Figure 15.1,** Braque (1912): *Fruitdish and Glass*.  
First instance of *papier collé*, technic 8.




**Figure 15.2,** Picasso (1912): *Still Life with Violin and Fruits*.  
Exemplar of *papier collé*, technic 8.



**Figure 16.** Picasso (1906): *The Maidens of Avignon*.



**Figure 17.** Metzinger (1911): *Tea Time*.



**Figure 18.** Picasso (1921): *Three Musicians*.

Figure 19

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**THE SENSES OF BEAUTY\***

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*Anything is beautiful<sup>1</sup> --*

A	{	I <i>which possesses the simple quality of Beauty.<sup>2</sup></i>
		II <i>which has a specified form.<sup>3</sup></i>
		III <i>which is an imitation of nature.</i>
		IV <i>which results from successful exploitation of a Medium.</i>
		V <i>which is the work of Genius.</i>
B	{	VI <i>which reveals (1) Truth, (2) the Spirit of Nature, (3) the Ideal, (4) the Universal, (5) the Typical.<sup>4</sup></i>
		VII <i>which produces illusion.</i>
		VIII <i>which leads to desirable Social effects.<sup>5</sup></i>
		IX <i>which is an Expression.</i>
		X <i>which causes Pleasure.</i>
		XI <i>which excited Emotions.</i>
C <sup>6</sup>	{	XII <i>which promotes a Specific emotion.</i>
		XIII <i>which involves the processes of Empathy.</i>
		XIV <i>which heightens Vitality.</i>
		XV <i>which brings us into touch with exceptional Personalities.</i>
		XVI <i>which conduces to Synaesthesia.</i>

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Adapted from Richards, Ogden, Wood (1925): 20-21.

<sup>1</sup>“The fields reached by these various approaches can all be cultivated and most of them are associated with well known names in the Philosophy of Art. [Ft:] As this discussion is throughout concerned with the theory of Beauty, we are not called upon to examine the various senses in which the word Art has also been used. [...]” (22)

<sup>2</sup> *Intrinsic beauty.*

<sup>3</sup> “*Objective beauty as certain relations, etc., in a physical complex.*” (23)

<sup>4</sup> *Revelation, generally.*

<sup>5</sup> *Uplift doctrines (i.e.).*

<sup>6</sup> *Psychological theories.*




Figure 20.

Swillens (1965): *Plate 43(b)*, diagramme of Vermeer's *The Music Lesson*

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The perspective constructions, which are exceedingly accurate, can be reduced to flat projections, and from them it is possible to determine the proportions of the space... In these spaces are objects...amongst other things, of which we know the measurements, and with the help of which it is possible to determine the length, width, and height measurements of the rooms... It is equally possible to decide accurately the places of people and things, whereby we obtain an exact picture of the reality as observed by Vermeer.


\* \* \*

The diagonal of the marble squares of the floor is parallel to the *basic line* in every picture and is always in the same proportion to objects, of which we know the measurements... The point of vision [*vieuypoint*] -- and therewith the level of the *horizon* -- can be accurately determined in all the pictures. O—H (O'—H') is the distance between the painter's eye and the wall farthest away from him (i.e. the side wall of the room). O'—P' is the distance between the ground level and the painter's eye (i.e. the place where he was painting from). The part of the rooms which is depicted in the paintings is outlined with thick lines. [...] On some projections it is indicated...what distance from the eye the scene (T'—T" the canvas or panel) is intended to be.

From the following considerations it will become evident that Vermeer has depicted five different rooms. All the paintings having one of these rooms as subject, will be discussed in groups marked A, B, C, D, E.

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<sup>1</sup> Swillens (1965): 69-70, 76.



**Figure 21.1**  
Steadman (2001): *Figures 33 & 40*, diagrammes of Vermeer's *The Music Lesson*


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The original methods for constructing measured perspective views...were essentially techniques for setting out images of gridded horizontal surfaces -- such as, precisely, tiled floors. The painter, knowing the true three-dimensional shape of any object, figure, or building that he wanted to depict, and knowing its position on this ground surface, could derive a perspective image of the object by reference to the grid. I followed a procedure that essentially reverses this process: to infer, from the two-dimensional perspective image, the three-dimensional forms of the room and furniture that the image represents. [...]<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Steadman (2001): 73, formatted.





**Figure 21.2**

Steadman (2001): *Figures 29-32*, diagrammes of Vermeer's *The Music Lesson*

There are four steps in the process of three-dimensional reconstruction. 1

1. The first step involves finding the central *vanishing point* [V] of the picture...and drawing a horizontal line through this point to mark the theoretical horizon... 5

All of Vermeer's interiors are '*frontal*' or '*central perspectives*: that is, the plane of the picture is set precisely parallel with the far wall of the room. [...] The result is that in each painting...there is a single vanishing point, at which the images of lines receding away from the viewer converge. [...]'<sup>1</sup> 10

2. The next step is to draw in the images of the diagonal lines made by the patterns of floor tiles, and continue them to meet the horizon line. These diagonals also converge, in two points to the right and left of the picture, which lie, like the vanishing point, on the horizon. These are the distance points [D]. The distance points are spaced equally on either side of the vanishing point. [...] These values provide information with which to determine the position -- in space, in front of the painting -- of the picture's theoretical *viewpoint* [V].\* [...] The viewpoint in this type of perspective lies on a line perpendicular to the picture plane, passing through the central vanishing point. The distance of the viewpoint from the plane of the picture is equal to the distance between the vanishing point and either of the distance points. [...] 15 20

The precise position of the theoretical viewpoint -- the notional point in space at which Vermeer placed his eye -- can be determined in each case. Everything which is visible in the painting itself must be contained within a 'visual pyramid', whose apex is at this viewpoint. It is possible to determine the positions of the sloping lines that form the edges of this pyramid. Suppose that these lines are continued back, through the viewpoint, to meet the back wall of the room, 25

behind the painter. They then define a rectangular area on that wall. In at least half a dozen cases this rectangle is the precise size of the painting in question.

30

My explanation for this very curious result is that Vermeer had a camera obscura with a lens at the painting's viewpoint. [...]<sup>2</sup>

3. Once the position of the viewpoint is established it is possible to move to the next step, that of working out a *plan view* [top-view] of the room and furniture. The plan of the tile pattern is determined first of all. This is done by extending the pattern back from the line where the floor cuts the plane of the picture... The sizes of the tiles can be measured directly at this floor line (labelled FF).

35

There are then two ways of finding the position in plan of some chosen point on any other object or feature appearing in the painting. Either the position can be found by means of its 'grid reference' in relation to the pattern of tiles... Alternatively a line can be carried from the viewpoint through the image of some feature in the picture plane to meet the position on the floor or wall surface where that feature is located. A line of this kind is called a projector [AA']. If the picture plane is imagined as a sheet of glass, then the projector can be thought of as a ray of light reflected from the object, passing through the picture plane, to meet the artist's eye at the viewpoint. Our process of reconstruction follows the path of this ray backwards, from eye, through picture, to object.

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Thus the point A' ... is the image in the painting of the point A at the edge of the floor in the room itself. We draw a straight line, the projector, joining the picture's viewpoint to this point A' in the picture. We continue the projector beyond the picture to meet the floor plane, in order to determine the exact position of the point A in the scene. ...[T]wo more projectors BB' and CC' [are] used to find points B and C. With these the whole outline shape of the visible part of the floor can be determined.

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4. The final step, that of drawing a *side view* of the room, is very similar to that for the plan. Again the positions of objects are determined by drawing projectors. [...]<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Steadman (2001): 74-75; formatted.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*: 2-3; formatted. Cf. *Figures 49-51* (and 71), not reproduced here.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*: 75-79; formatted.





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