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Survivability Strategies for Epidemic Failures in Heterogeneous Networks

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Abstract: - This paper presents the implementation of a failure propagation model for transport networks under GMPLS control when multiple failures occur resulting in an epidemic. We model the Susceptible Infected Disabled (SID) epidemic model and evaluate its behaviour and impact by adapting the signaling functionality of GMPLS to support epidemic failure propagation. Our results provide important input to epidemic connection recovery mechanisms.

Key-Words: resilience, transport networks, failure epidemics, modelling, GMPLS, performance evaluation

1 Introduction

Nowadays, transport networks, carry extremely large amounts of network traffic, and are widely spread across multiple geographical locations. As a result, any possible connectivity failure could directly impact the service delivery of a vast amount of users. Therefore, the network should be able to recover fast from a failure in order to provide service continuity to the user. Several recovery techniques have been employed by the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) such as adding redundancy to network equipment (e.g. routers, optical cross-connects, etc.), or by provisioning alternate paths (path protection, path restoration) [1]. Hence, assuming sufficient resources, network resilience can be achieved when a single failure occur (e.g. fiber cut). However, when it comes to simultaneous failures such as cascading and epidemic failures, the available solutions are expensive [2]. For Generalized Multi Protocol Label Switching (GMPLS) transport networks, network survivability under multiple failures has been discussed in [3]-[5]. Virus propagation models from the field of epidemiology have been altered for simulating network failure scenarios and the failure propagation probability within the network [6][7].

This paper evaluates the reliability of a GMPLS transport network under epidemic failure scenarios. Thus, the aim is to increase the fault tolerance of the GMPLS technology when simultaneous failures occur impacting a large number of network nodes across an optical transport network (OTN) in order to ensure the service delivery.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the GMPLS framework. Section

3 deals with epidemic failures. The simulation study and its results are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2 GMPLS Architecture

GMPLS is an enhanced version of the MultiProtocol Label Switching (MPLS) architecture. MPLS uses labelled packets instead of using IP addressing for its forwarding decisions. In this way high switching performance is achieved, and at the same time requirements for traffic engineering are satisfied. The path from source to destination is called Label Switched Path (LSP). The network nodes, which support labelled paths, are called Label Switch Routers (LSR). MPLS LSRs have been designed to support only packet switching. GMPLS is extending the concept of label switching in order to enable it to work with optical networks [8]. Thus, switching technologies such as Time Division Multiplex (TDM), Lambda Switch Capable (LSC) and Fibre Switch Capable (FSC) are supported by GMPLS. The support of those additional switching types in the optical domain has driven the extension of the GMPLS control plane, which is now logically separated from the data plane. TDM, LSC and FSC introduce new constraints to IP addressing and to the routing models due to the fact that several hundreds of parallel physical links (e.g. wavelengths) are possible to exist between two interconnected nodes [9]. This separation of the control plane and the data plane introduced extra constraints, as additional control plane signalling techniques are required for managing the data plane failures. On the other hand failures on the control plane are not necessarily a result of data traffic

connection failures. GMPLS details are discussed in the following sub-sections.

2.1 GMPLS Routing

GMPLS networks typically use extended versions of the Open Shortest Path First-Traffic Engineering (OSPF-TE) algorithm for their routing decisions. Usually rerouting is required when a failure occurs along the already established LSP. Under certain conditions it might also be necessary for a LSP to return back to its original tunnels, if the failed resource becomes re/activated (reversion) [13].

2.2 GMPLS Signalling

In order to set up and tear down LSPs, GMPLS is making use of the Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) extensions. RSVP was initially designed to support Integrated Services (IntServ) in IP networks for reserving resources on the router in order to satisfy receiver initiated requests for Quality of Service (QoS). Therefore, when a sender wants to set up a connection, it is advertising its status by transmitting a Path message. This Path message traverses the network on a hop by hop basis in the downstream direction to one or more receivers as shown in Figure 1. The Path messages traverse the network towards the destination via intermediate RSVP-capable routers. Once a path message reaches its destination, the recipient node sends a Reservation (Resv) message. While the Resv message traverses the reversed path in the upstream direction to the sender, it is causing each intermediate node to reserve the traffic characteristics advertised in the Resv message.




Figure 1: RSVP operation

The development of MPLS required that RSVP should be extended to allow the support for Traffic Engineering (TE) by requesting and distributing label bindings [10]. This resulted to a modified version of RSVP, known as Resource Reservation Protocol-Traffic Engineering (RSVP-TE). RSVP-TE messages must include the following extra information:

- A Label Request object: It is included in the Path message and informs the downstream LSR that it requests a label. In the path

message an Explicitly Route Object (ERO) can be included. The ERO objects consist of the route of the nodes until the final destination.

- A Session Attribute object: Indicates the priority of the requested LSP. The downstream node will compare this attribute with the holding priorities of the already established LSPs in order to decide if a new LSP should be established. The session attribute is included in Path messages.
- A Label object: It is included in Resv messages and informs the upstream LSR which label should be used as unique identifier for the forwarding decisions.

The LSP tunnel is established in the same fashion as previously described and data can flow via this path. In order to avoid adding extra load to an already congested path, each node in the LSP tunnel is using the above information also in refresh messages; even if there has been no change in the tunnel's state. In case an intermediate node does not support Label requests or has no resources available it sends a Path Error (PathErr) message back to source node. When all the data has been transmitted to the receiver, or the sender has no more data to send, they can delete the created state by respectively using a message for releasing the allocated resources (ResvTear) and a message for tearing down the path (PathTear). Support for Hello messages has been defined in RSVP-TE extensions for node failure detection between neighbour nodes [10].

2.3 Link Management

The Link Management Protocol (LMP) is a point to point protocol which was defined in [12]. It provides a mechanism for creating and managing multiple control channels between adjacent GMPLS nodes. It supports neighbour discovery fault management, thus takes part in the protection and restoration mechanisms of GMPLS optical networks.

3. GMPLS Survivability under Epidemic Failures

Network survivability is defined as the set of capabilities that allow a network to recover from failures in a timely manner [14][15]. In GMPLS transport networks the failures can be split into two groups:

1. Control plane failures: for example a controller misconfiguration or a channel failure that results making the service delivery unmanageable.
2. Data plane failures: directly impact the service delivery and could be caused by the failure of an element across the transmission line i.e. a fiber cut.

3.1 General Failure Mechanisms

In general terms failures could occur as a consequence of software or hardware defects, power outages or natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, etc. Since the early start of the transport networks, service recovery processes have been defined under the term fault management as a key factor for improving the service availability and reliability. In GMPLS, fault management is taking place in the following 3 steps:

1. Fault detection
2. Fault localization and isolation
3. Fault notification and recovery

Depending of the recovery type defined by a Service Level Agreement (SLA) with the service provider, there are certain actions to be performed in order to switch over the traffic to alternate paths for recovering the service. The time it takes for switching the traffic to a working path is the recovery time T , which is calculated as follows:

$$T = T_f + T_l + T_r \quad (1)$$

where

- T_f is the fault detection time,
- T_l is the fault isolation time,
- T_r is the fault recovery time.

In case there are not any service recovery guarantees (unprotected service), then no actions are performed. In GMPLS networks service recovery can be achieved by the so called protection and restoration mechanisms. The former defines a service recovery class where support for one or more alternate routes is required. An alternate route assumes that at least one redundant path has been provisioned and resources have been allocated proactively; before a failure is detected. The restoration mechanism is taking place after a failure occurrence, when for the recovery of the service a new path needs to be calculated, or has already been calculated. Thus, after a failure notification is received it is decided, if resources should be dynamically allocated for serving this new path.

3.2 Epidemic Failures

Epidemic failure propagation has its roots in medical virology and relates to models on how diseases are spread [11]. The Susceptible Infected Disabled (SID) model was proposed as an extension to the SIS model in order to model the behaviour of an epidemic in GMPLS transport networks [17]. The SID model was proposed for dealing with failures, which tend to propagate over the network. The states listed below represent the possible GMPLS node states according to the SID model:

1. Susceptible (S): State where both the control plane and the data plane are operational.
2. Infected (I): State where the control plane fails, but the already established LSPs continue to function, i.e., data forwarding is not impaired. After a given period the node either recovers (going to S state) or completely fails (going to D state).
3. Disabled (D): Both control plane and data plane fail representing a complete nodal failure. Thus any provided service stops.

A susceptible node can be infected with probability β . When a node is at the infected state the restoration process starts and lasts a given amount of time, which is proportional to the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR). After this time has expired, the node becomes susceptible with probability δ_1 or disabled with probability τ . In case the node becomes disabled another restoration process will take place, which has a success probability of δ_2 . If the restoration process is successful the node will transit to the susceptible state; otherwise, in case of a failure the node will remain disabled [17]. The possible transitions according to the relevant probabilities are depicted on **Figure 2**.




Figure 2: SID Model [17]

The average number of infections produced by an infected node, called basic reproduction number R_0 , is calculated using the following formula [5]:

$$R_0 = \frac{\beta}{\delta_1 + \tau} \cdot \lambda_1 \quad (2)$$

where $\lambda_1 > 0$ is average nodal degree when a homogeneous network is considered. In case the network is not homogeneous, it has been proven that the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency topology matrix (spectral radius) is a more suitable property for epidemic modelling [16]. If $R_0 < 1$, the infection dies out over time. On the contrary, if $R_0 > 1$ the epidemic sustains while impacting a large amount of nodes. In this case the proportion of susceptible (S) nodes is

$$S = \frac{1}{R_0} \quad (3)$$

and the proportion of infected (I) and disabled (D) nodes is given by equations (4) and (5) respectively:

$$I = (1 - S) \frac{1}{1 + R_1} \quad (4)$$

where $R_1 = \frac{\tau}{\delta_2}$ and

$$D = (1 - S) \frac{R_1}{1 + R_1} \quad (5)$$

3.3 Application to GMPLS Control and Data Plane Failures

Failure detection is a vital part of the service recovery. Once a failure is detected it needs to be reported to the involved nodes along the LSP. Two control plane failures detection methods have been used in our work:

1. By using a Path timer message for refreshing the LSP state.
2. With the use of a Hello protocol.

Data plane failures can be detected almost instantly by the LoL or by monitoring the Bit Error Rate.

4 Simulation Study and Results

We evaluate the SID epidemic propagation model using the OPNET Modeler [18] simulation software, in both a homogeneous and a heterogeneous network topology.

For initializing the SID model a node is selected randomly from the network topology map and is set as infected. This node is the starting point for

spreading the infection to its neighbor nodes. If the selected node has a high node degree it is expected that the infection will spread further. Whenever a node is entering the infection state the SID algorithm is executed in order to determine the time period a node will remain infected until it transits to the next state.

During the period of time a node is infected and the control plane is failing, the node is stopping the transmission of any signalling messages. Consequently, when a node is entering the Infected state it performs the following actions:

- Stop responding to any signalling messages by dropping all incoming messages.
- Stop generating new connection requests and also stop any control plane signaling.
- Keep the already established connections active.
- Transmit the infection to its neighbours.

When the node is entering the Disabled state the following actions are taken:

- Release the resources which have been allocated for serving any active LSPs'.
- Stop transmitting the infection.

It is worth noticing that in both cases when a node is Infected or Disabled there is no guarantee that the node will return to Susceptible state after the recovery timer expires. This is one of the main differentiators of the SID model in comparison to previous network epidemic models.

As a first step, we verify our model against analytical results for a homogeneous network networks given in [17]. The selected homogeneous network topology is shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Homogeneous random mesh topology

The network type is random mesh and consists of 20 nodes. In order to verify the model the epidemic should persist in terms that the basic reproduction number R_0 is greater than 1. Hence, the epidemic is spreading over time impacting a large amount of nodes.

Due to the fact that the average nodal degree (λ) is highly impacting the infection propagation it has been used as simulation parameter for comparing the simulation results against the analytical values. Therefore, the infection and the recovery probabilities have been kept as constant parameters with the following values: $\beta = 0.169$, $\tau = 0.1$, $\delta_1 = 0.3$, $\delta_2 = 0.3$. The values of the average node degree are the result of adding more links between the network nodes. The expected fraction of Susceptible, Infected and Disabled nodes has been calculated by using the formulas (2)-(5). The simulated results have been derived by 140 simulation experiments simulating a 2 week period. Both infection recovery and the disable recovery period have been set 2 minutes. Those values are intentionally kept low due to the fact that longer recovery times will result in a pandemic when a homogeneous network is considered. The results correspond to the percentage of nodes over time for each state.

Both analytical and simulation results are displayed on Table 1. As can be seen on the table, adding more links to the network increases the probability that an infected node will successfully transmit the infection to one of its neighbours. As a consequence the number of susceptible nodes declines while the value of λ increases. The analytical results have been calculated using the formulas for homogeneous networks given in [17].

Avg. Nodal Degree (λ)	Num of Links	Reproduction Number (R_0)	% Susceptible Nodes		% Infected Nodes		% Disabled Nodes	
			State (S) Analyt.	State (S) Simul.	State (I) Analyt.	State (I) Simul.	State (D) Analyt.	State (D) Simul.
3	60	1.267	79	81	16	14	5	7
4	80	1.69	59	65	31	26	1	11
4.9	98	2.07	45	52	39	36	13	16

Table 1: Comparison of analytical values and simulation results




Figure 4: Pan European Network Topology

The evaluated heterogeneous network topology is the Pan-European optical network shown in Figure 4. The network consists of 28 nodes and 78 links interconnecting major cities located in Europe with average nodal degree $\lambda = 2.7$. The eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix have been calculated and the largest value is equal to 3.232. The time periods of the recovery timers are related to a complete node failure, where it might take one full working day (8 hours) for repair. The MTTRi and MTTRd correspond to the different recovery times for the infection and the disabled state respectively. The value of R_0 is adjusted by increasing the value of the infection probability β . Thus, starting from $R_0 < 1$ (the epidemic dies over time) the basic reproduction number increments by increasing the infection probability as shown in Table 2.

	Analytical Values									
	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0
β	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0
R_0	0.8	1.6	2.4	3.2	4.0	4.8	5.7	6.5	7.3	8.1
S	100%	62%	41%	31%	25%	21%	18%	15%	14%	12%
I	0%	29%	44%	52%	56%	60%	62%	63%	65%	66%
D	0%	10%	15%	17%	19%	20%	21%	21%	22%	22%

Table 2: Analytical values as function of beta β

The percentage of the nodes for each state is presented as function of the basic reproduction number (R_0). The recovery probabilities have been kept as constant parameters with the following values: $\tau = 0.1$, $\delta_1 = 0.3$, $\delta_2 = 0.3$. The results are presented against the analytical values for each state with a 95% confidence interval over 100 simulation experiments simulating one month timer period. The selected MTTRi and MTTRd are 2 and 8 hour respectively. Figures 5-7 illustrate the percentage of nodes in states S, I and D respectively, compared against their analytical values. Please not that the same formulas for the analytical values were used, but as the work in [17] considers homogeneous networks we expect some deviation between the simulated and the analytical values.




Figure 5: Percentage of S states as function of R_0

We observe in Figure 5 that the simulation results for S state present a minor deviation compared to the analytical values however they follow the analytical curve.

By looking at **Figure 6** and Figure 7 where state I and D are shown, the simulation results considerably deviate from the analytical ones. The deviation becomes wider for higher values of R_0 . The reason for this deviation is related to the characteristic of the network. The average nodal degree, the connectivity density, the network diameter and size etc. affect the simulation results, including the heterogeneity of the network topology.




Figure 6: Percentage of I states as function of R_0




Figure 7: Percentage of D states as function of R_0

A node that becomes disabled could possibly remain in Disabled state during the simulation period. Another important factor is the fraction of time where a node remains infected.




Figure 8: Analytical values against the simulation result for the I state for different MTTRi

Figure 8 illustrates that the chosen MTTRi has a significant impact on the average percentage of infected nodes in the simulation. By using only the MTTRi as a single simulation parameter the experiment took place for 4 different MTTRi while the MTTRd was kept to 8 hours. At an MTTRi of 4 hours the average percentage of infected nodes resulted in 42% with an 95%-confidence interval

between [39;45]. Thus the analytical value of 44% lies in the confidence interval given an MTTRi of 4 hours.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we analyze the dynamics of epidemic failure spreading in a Pan-European heterogeneous network. We extend the GMPLS framework to accommodate epidemic failure messages and model the SID epidemic model in OPNET. Our results show that the dynamic simulation follows the analytical values for the S and I states, whereas we observe some deviation in the D state due to the topological characteristics of the network topology.

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