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
## 2.1 Conflict Diamonds: Roles, Responsibilities and Responses

Mike Bourne

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## **2.1. Conflict Diamonds: Roles, Responsibilities and Responses**

**Mike Bourne**

**January 2001**

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## **Introduction**

In recent years consumers, NGOs, and governments alike have become increasingly concerned about the problem of 'conflict' or 'blood' diamonds in relation to on-going armed conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Allegations by NGOs, governments and the UN that many conflicts are fuelled by illicit exports of diamonds have begun to be acknowledged by the diamond industry. Diamonds, and the money they generate, have been used to purchase arms, ammunition, uniforms and other equipment, as well as to pay soldiers and to cultivate strategic alliances for those armed groups in control of territory rich in this lucrative resource. This has facilitated the intensification and protraction of violent conflicts in Africa. Additionally, the wealth to be gained from the illicit extraction and sale of diamonds has contributed to the prominence of economic agendas in many civil wars that motivate faction leaders to continue the conflict in order to protect their businesses.<sup>1</sup> For example, the Angolan rebel group UNITA (União Nacional para a Inedepência Total de Angola) is believed to have received US\$3.7 billion in a six year period during the 1990s - a far greater amount than the foreign aid received from patrons like the United States and South Africa during the Cold War. This money has both funded large scale arms purchases and swelled the personal coffers of UNITA leaders, thereby contributing to the intransigence of those leaders in agreeing and implementing peace and facilitating continued violence.<sup>2</sup> In Sierra Leone the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) has funded its arms acquisitions with illicit diamond revenues and the extraction of diamonds is seen as one of the main factors behind the lack of implementation of the Lomé peace accord and the subsequent resurgence of violence. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) both the government and rebel forces have financed their war efforts through the diamond trade, as have some of the intervening regional powers. As a result the fighting around diamond rich areas and trading centres has been particularly intense. For example, in spite of a unilateral ceasefire declared by Rwanda on the 29th of May 1999, it is believed to have sent 7,000 fresh troops to the DRC in June as the battle for the diamond rich area of Mbuji-Mayi escalated.

However the prominence of 'conflict diamonds' in the policy discourse related to these conflicts and their resolution has served to obscure a range of other issues which are equally, if not more, central to finding lasting solutions to these wars. In spite of the fact that the arms flows which sustain these conflicts are only partly financed by 'conflict diamonds' they are often only mentioned as one aspect of the illegal diamond trade rather than as a core issue. Even more concerning, perhaps, is that the discourse of 'greed' rather than 'grievance' as the foundation and driving force of conflicts obscures the complexity of political, social, and other economic dimensions of these wars. Thus, while efforts to reduce the conflict diamond trade may be an essential element of the resolution of these conflicts, other factors of potentially greater import are pushed down the agendas of many of the governments and NGOs whose input into those processes may be the key to success. In short, therefore, the issue

of conflict diamonds is one aspect of the complex dynamics and processes of ongoing African conflicts, not vice-versa.

## **What Are ‘Conflict Diamonds’?**

The working definition of ‘conflict diamonds’ is that suggested by De Beers as those “diamonds which originate from areas in Africa controlled by forces fighting the legitimate and internationally recognised government of the relevant country.” This definition explicitly restricts the application of the term to diamonds that fuel *African* conflicts. However, the NGO Global Witness, which has spearheaded the campaign against conflict diamonds, has noted that while most concern related to conflict diamonds stems from African conflicts, the problems associated with illicit diamond trading could conceivably occur in any conflict country with extractable diamond resources. Therefore, they suggest a non-Africa specific definition which states that: “Diamonds that originate from areas under the control of forces that are in opposition to elected and internationally recognised governments, or are in any way connected to those groups, should be considered as conflict diamonds.”<sup>3</sup>

While the definition provided by Global Witness is an improvement on that suggested by De Beers, it still restricts the application of the term to those diamonds that stem from *rebel* forces. This is problematic: if we are concerned about conflict diamonds because they fuel conflict, then there is an imbalance generated by focusing solely on rebel forces fighting against governments.<sup>4</sup> Governments and their allied factions in civil wars may also bear a degree of responsibility, for the escalation of violence may also fund such violence through diamond sales. Thus, at the abstract level, it makes little sense to exclude governments and pro-government forces from the definition of conflict diamond trading. At the practical level, however, one can see the reasoning behind this exclusion in two of the main conflicts of concern. In both Angola and Sierra Leone it is the rebel forces, UNITA and the RUF (Revolutionary United Front) respectively, that are generally seen as responsible for ongoing violence after elections designed to consolidate peace were held, and who dominate illicit diamond extraction. Nevertheless, if one looks at the third African conflict over which concerns about conflict diamonds have been raised, that in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the responsibility for violence and associated human rights abuses lies both with the various rebel groups, backed by Rwanda and Uganda, and the government of Laurent Kabila, backed by Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and others under the auspices of SADC (Southern African Development Community). Thus, since the actors involved in the extraction of conflict diamonds in Angola and Sierra Leone are different from those in the DRC, and if we are concerned with the role played by diamond trading in fuelling conflict, we must define ‘conflict diamonds’ according to the direct roles played in fuelling conflicts irrespective of the status of the actors.

Any examination of the problem of conflict diamonds, and therefore of possible solutions, must be rooted in the wider context of war economies. It is not unusual for warring factions, both pro-government and anti-government forces, to engage in resource extraction or criminal predation in order to finance their war efforts and enrich the faction leaders.

### **War Economies, Resource Extraction and Globalisation**

Commodities for arms transfers are a common feature of ‘warlords’ (faction leaders in control of territory, resources, and associated trade) in many conflicts who control natural resources such as gold or diamonds, or illicit goods produced in their territory, such as drugs. Such transfers may be direct (commodities for arms barter), but more commonly are indirect, with non-state armed forces relying on the earning power of war economies in which commodities are exchanged for hard currency to provide the finances for the arms deal.<sup>5</sup> In the case of conflict diamonds, however, the bartering of gems for arms is commonplace, particularly when a neighbouring state offers both access to diamond markets and a ready supply of weapons by acting as an intermediary in the international networks of war economies.

Some analysts point to the growth of a global illicit economy in parallel with the globalisation of legal trade. Improved transport and communications infrastructure has facilitated the growth of commercial interactions across the globe regardless of their legality. The nexus between the globalised illicit economy and the arms black market is closely related to the war economies established by conflict protagonists during protracted wars. Mark Duffield has recently claimed that:

Political actors have been able to control local economies and realize their worth through the ability to forge new and flexible relations with liberalized global markets. Manuel Castells, for example, has argued that deregulation has prompted the emergence of a globalized criminal economy. This economy is internationally networked, expansive, and supremely adaptive.<sup>6</sup>

Regional illicit networks have increasingly overlapped as the illegal trades in drugs, precious stones, minerals, metals, ivory, hardwoods, and arms, have been linked by the expansion of key actors, such as transnational criminal organisations, into numerous illicit markets. Naylor has claimed that:

it is no longer the operation of this or that individual black market...This does not add up to a monolithic criminal conspiracy. Modern black markets are complex, but they are not integrated into neat monopolies or cartels. If they were, they would be easier to control. Instead of a organizational hierarchy one finds a series of arms-length commercial relationships...*The result is that a modern covert arms deal is likely to take place within a matrix of black market transactions.*<sup>7</sup> (Emphasis added).

In spite of this overlapping, the degree of globalisation of illicit trade appears to remain linked to regional situations. Thus, illicit drug production is still dominated by a few regions such as the golden crescent and the golden triangle. The trafficking networks of these drugs expand outwards as

corridors of impunity develop as traffickers develop relationships with corrupt customs officials or adapt routes to flow through the most porous borders, or away from crackdowns on their activity. Similar dynamics have characterised the flow of conflict diamonds from UNITA in Angola and the RUF in Sierra Leone in which regional transnational networks and neighbouring governments form the key link between warlords and the international diamond market.<sup>8</sup>

The war economies of many conflicts, including, but not only, those aspects that involve 'conflict diamonds', form the heart of co-operative commercial relationships between warring factions, regional political leaders, and multi-national companies which form the basis of this regionalised parallel trade. These actors utilise the opportunities of an increasingly globalised world to foster the exploitation of criminalised war economies and to engage in international commerce. Thus, regionalised illicit economic alliances are increasingly significant actors in the global economy as the forces of globalisation, such as increasing freedom of international financial flows, blur the boundaries between legal and illegal trade resulting in greater opportunities and impunity for those profiting from war. The international attention paid to conflict diamonds is a response to one particular aspect of this, but it is one that fails to acknowledge the blurred boundaries sufficiently, thereby dissociating the 'conflict diamond' trade from the full range of structures of power and profit from which it results.

Similarly, insufficient attention has been paid to the links between 'conflict diamonds' and other aspects of war economies and illicit trades. For example, the links between the illicit trade in arms and that in other commodities are more than analogous. They very often flow through the same networks with the same traffickers exchanging arms for these other commodities. In the case of conflict diamonds, UNITA is believed to have actively sought out arms dealers willing to take diamonds in exchange for weapons. Likewise, numerous shipments of arms to the RUF from and through neighbouring states such as Liberia and Burkina Faso in return for diamonds, and the commercial networks between the governments of DRC and Zimbabwe have facilitated arms transfers with payment off-set by mining concessions.

It should be noted that diamonds are not the only commodities in the war economies of the conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, and DRC. For example, UNITA in Angola have also sold gold, coffee, timber and ivory to generate funds for arms purchases, the RUF in Sierra Leone have engaged in co-operative predation with government forces against civilians, and the RCD rebels in the DRC, as well as their Rwandan and Ugandan allies, have profited from the sale of gold, timber, coffee, ivory, and palm oil.

Nevertheless, the nature of the trade in conflict diamonds is different to the trade in some other illicit goods that fuel conflicts in the same way. The illicit trade in drugs, and some illicit arms transfers,



remain wholly outside of legal supply channels. The trade in conflict diamonds, however, is predicated on the ability of those involved to insert the illicitly extracted stones into the legal wholesale and retail markets. (Sales of gold, timber, ivory, and other commodities that have also fuelled conflicts often also need to enter legal markets). It is this nexus of the legal and illegal trades that has raised awareness of the issue since consumers can buy illicit diamonds unknowingly on the legal market. This nexus also presents the key opportunity for control. It is generally accepted that if conflict diamonds can be denied access to the legal market, the illicit trade will be marginalised and reduced. At least this is the argument put forward by the diamond industry as it is faced with a possible consumer boycott of its products much like that which occurred with the fur trade. However, it must be noted that for such marginalisation to occur, universally accepted and enforced controls must be put in place – any gap in the regime will almost certainly become a channel for conflict diamonds.

To put this nexus between the legal and illicit trades into perspective, De Beers estimate that the trade in conflict diamonds, as defined above, accounts for approximately four percent of the annual global trade. Others, such as the US and UK governments expect that the true figure is higher. Certainly the gross inadequacy of existing regulation and monitoring of international transfers of diamonds, resulting in great difficulty in ascertaining the origin of diamonds, must cast doubt on the reliability of this estimate. With global diamond production at US\$6.8 billion in 1999, even this low estimate results in a total value of conflict diamonds of US\$272 million.

Most of the international diamond trade is relatively concentrated, with over half of the global output coming from just five countries (South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Canada, and Australia) that have a good level of regulation and monitoring. Russia is also a major diamond producer, but information on its regulatory capacity is limited. Cities such as Antwerp, London, and Tel Aviv are the major centres of trade for diamonds from the 26 producing countries. However, little legal regulation of this trade occurs, with most deals done on trust and ‘honour’ rather than through legal contracts, thereby making it substantially easier for conflict diamonds to enter the ‘legal’ wholesale and retail markets. Additionally, the role of monitoring imports and exports of diamonds from the markets in Antwerp is filled by the HRD (Hoge Raad voor Diamant / Diamond High Council), the same organisation that represents and lobbies for the diamond industry. This results in a conflict of interests in which the interests of profit appear to be the stronger. Thus, it has been claimed that:

In recent years there have been a number of judicial inquiries which have shown that the overall system violates almost any definition of neutrality, and is an invitation to corruption. Cases of fraud in the Antwerp diamond trade are legendary and Antwerp has become one of the primary world centres for Russian organized crime.<sup>9</sup>

Undoubtedly, in the majority of cases of conflict diamonds entering the Antwerp markets the key aspect was not corruption but rather inadequate monitoring which, as a matter of procedure, records the origin of diamonds as the last country from which they were exported. This inadequacy allows, for instance, Sierra Leone diamonds to be registered as coming from Liberia and Burkina Faso.

## **Who Is Responsible?**

Mark Duffield has claimed that:

Today's so-called warlords or failed states may act locally, but to survive they have to think globally. In this respect, a high level of complicity among international companies, offshore banking facilities, and Northern governments has assisted the development of war economies. There is a growing symbiotic relationship between zones of stability and instability within the global political economy.<sup>10</sup>

Responsibility for the trade in conflict diamonds, and particularly for the access to markets afforded to warring factions by the existing system, is the key issue. Consumers, be they governments, industries, or individuals, wishing to avoid indirect responsibility for fuelling conflicts in Africa are at the heart of the current momentum against conflict diamonds. If consumers discriminate over the diamonds they purchase on the grounds of this potential indirect responsibility, it follows that, to some degree, they must hold the international diamond industry responsible for the entry of 'blood' diamonds onto the market - at the very least it reflects a growing crisis in public trust for the industry.

### **The Diamond Industry**

The diamond industry is concentrated in a handful of large companies each of which may bear an individual responsibility for some conflict diamonds transfers, and bear collective responsibility for the phenomenon in general. Among the largest of these companies is De Beers, which mines 50% of rough diamonds, and also part owns, with the respective governments, much of the diamond industry in Botswana and Namibia. Numerous medium sized companies also operate the extraction of diamonds from particular mines. In most cases of conflict diamonds these large companies do not operate the mines held by rebel factions. They may, however, purchase diamonds from the rebels, thereby providing access to legal markets. For example, De Beers is known to have purchased large amounts of diamonds from UNITA. However, De Beers maintains that it has never directly purchased diamonds from the Angolan rebels, but as Global Witness claim:

this is a complete abdication of corporate responsibility, and it further raises the question of whom exactly the De Beers staff, who were based in DRC along the Angolan border, thought they were paying for the diamonds that flooded across that border up until the fall of Mobutu in 1997.<sup>11</sup>

Most conflict diamonds appear to have entered the 'legal' market before or on arrival at the main trading centres. Indeed De Beers admits that it has purchased diamonds that originated from UNITA, unknowingly, on the markets of Antwerp and Tel Aviv. This is eminently plausible, since Belgium is the biggest market for rough diamonds with 80% of rough, and more than 50% of polished diamonds being traded through Antwerp. Additionally, because diamonds from UNITA held areas are distinctive when raw, and since the imposition of the UN Security Council Embargo on UNITA diamonds passed in 1998, they are often routed through Israel and/or Ukraine where they receive a first polish which masks their origin.<sup>12</sup> It has also been claimed that most conflict diamonds are transported in packets mixed with those from legitimate sources, thus rendering identification, under existing procedures, close to impossible.

From Antwerp diamonds are transferred through Switzerland, for tax purposes, to the London based Central Selling Organisation (CSO) through which 70% of all diamonds mined are sold. By this point conflict diamonds are sold alongside, or amongst, those legally produced.

The diamond industry as a whole bears much of the responsibility for the ease of entry of conflict diamonds into legal markets. While in many transactions Certificates of Origin are required, they are easily forged and not yet standardised globally. It is interesting to note that similar problems beset the illicit flow of arms back to the warring factions, with end-use and end-user certificates easily forged or obtained through corrupt officials. Legal exports of arms require the provision of an end-user certificate and other official documentation issued by the government of the ostensible end-user as proof to the export licensing body. In illicit transfers which pervert legal channels, as opposed to those which avoid them altogether, such documentation is either forged, made easier by a lack of standard formats of these certificates, or acquired from corrupt officials in other state bureaucracies. It has been claimed that most end-user certificates used in such illicit arms transfers are genuine but corruptly issued.

A similar problem might beset even a universal scheme of certificates of origin, particularly in the case of conflict diamonds, where neighbouring states may provide such certification either through the actions of corrupt officials or as covert state assistance to the warring faction. Thus, for example, given the porousness of Sierra Leone's borders with Liberia, in addition to established smuggling routes and networks of traffickers, brokers, and officials, the establishment of a universal certificate of origin regime would do little to stem the laundering of conflict diamonds through complicit neighbours. Such a system is currently under discussion amongst diamond industry organisations and governments. If it is to be successful, it will have to be accompanied by stringent measures for the investigation of apparent disparities between production capability and exports, and punitive measures for laundering

conflict diamonds, such as restricting the ability of the illicit exporters to sell diamonds on the legal market. The International Diamond Manufacturers Association has proposed that a new international body, the International Diamond Council, be established with the power to remove the rights of countries to export diamonds if they exceed known production or verified official imports. Likewise, countries found to be importing uncertified diamond packages would also lose the right to import any diamonds legally. This regime would greatly enhance mechanisms such as UN embargoes, but may generate concerns from legitimate exporters who may find themselves subject to such sanctions because of the actions of a handful of corrupt officials. Such concerns might be assuaged if, when a possible abuse of the legal trade is detected, an investigation is triggered into the nature and scale of complicity, throughout the duration of which some exports would be allowed, but limited to a quota of certainly no more than apparent production capability, thus rendering engagement in laundering diamonds costly rather than profitable. Further sanctions could then be imposed, or not, when the investigation was completed, with automatic bans resulting from a lack of co-operation with the investigators.

As noted above, however, if support is not universal, gaps in the regime are likely to arise which could become channels for conflict diamond flows. Nevertheless, if the necessary monitoring is stringent enough, such channels would remain small for fear of detection. Even though the legal trade in diamonds is relatively concentrated the levels of monitoring required to have this effect would be far greater than any in place for other commodities and thus, while potentially politically successful, this certification scheme is unlikely to attain the required level of effectiveness.

Peter Meeus, the director of the Antwerp High Diamond Council, has complained that the diamond industry has been singled out as a culprit by Western governments who themselves do not do enough to end the African conflicts they have been charged with fuelling. This complaint is akin to arguing that because others also do things that fuel conflict, the diamond industry should not be held to account for its role, at least until such time as all other activities and actors are equally accountable. International opprobrium over the fuelling of violent internecine conflicts is not restricted to diamonds, and in fact issues such as small arms and landmines have been on international agendas for far longer than the diamonds issue. Nevertheless, the complaint is valid in the sense that a far greater range of commodities than diamonds have the potential to fuel conflicts in the same way. Although the flow of conflict diamonds is a significant problem, stemming that flow will not end the conflicts or prevent others. While those governments that push for an end to the conflict diamonds trade must accept this simple fact, it should not detract from efforts to limit the problem.

The diamond industry has also claimed that, even if it were possible to determine the origin of diamonds to be from a conflict area, if they didn't buy them, somebody else would. This claim, also

used by those selling arms, is anachronistic and although used in order to guard against blame, is no excuse for complicity in trading in 'blood diamonds'. This claim will also become less pertinent as regulation of the global diamond trade grows.

While the diamond trade has been largely unregulated in the past, major diamond industry players such as De Beers, the International Diamond Manufacturers Association (IDMA), and the World Diamond Congress, have proposed mechanisms that are essentially self-regulatory but with the back-up of national legislation and a new international body, the International Diamond Council. The key aspects of the plans proposed by each of these inter-related bodies emphasise the need for standardised documents, including certificates of origin, to be enhanced by various legal and self-regulatory transparency measures. There is also an emerging consensus that there is a need for the governments of all exporting, processing and importing states to enact legislation that makes it illegal to participate in the trade of uncertified diamonds.

Measures related to particular conflicts are already being put in place. For example, Sierra Leone has now instituted a new certification scheme involving tamper proof certificates of origin for sealed packets of diamonds. These certificates are produced in the UK and paid for by the British government. They are to be issued by the diamond and gold office in Freetown and diamonds can only be exported by four international dealers. De Beers was approached for being a fifth but declined until the system has been proven to run smoothly. To its credit, De Beers is providing samples of Sierra Leone diamonds to importers for comparison with imported packets to help guarantee that conflict diamonds are not exported. Nevertheless, the success of this system depends heavily on the co-operation and commitment of officials in importing states. While officials in Antwerp are fairly proactive in this regard, thanks to international pressure, Alex Yearsley of the NGO Global Witness claims that "In Tel Aviv they are patently not interested." This creates the potential for conflict diamonds to enter legal markets regardless of the new scheme, particularly when there are concerns over the probity of the process within Sierra Leone itself. This dilemma illustrates the fact that until there is a universal and legally binding mechanism for denying conflict diamonds access to legal markets, the most that can be hoped for is a contraction in the range of potential trading routes. This is echoed by the Kimberley Technical Forum during the Ministerial Conference on Diamonds in Pretoria on the 21st of September 2000, at which Peter Hain claimed that:

Although there are relatively few major producers and importers of rough diamonds, the effectiveness of the new regime in blocking market access to 'conflict diamonds' depends on all diamond producing, exporting and importing states agreeing to participate. An inclusive process under UN auspices would make this possible.<sup>13</sup>

### **Governments of Exporting, Importing and Transit States**

Governments of exporting, importing and transit states also bear some responsibility for allowing conflict diamonds to enter legal markets. This responsibility is either through direct involvement in the illicit trade, or poor monitoring of ostensibly legal transfers. Direct involvement is restricted to neighbours and allies of the rebel groups, or the government of the conflict state itself. Indirect responsibility is a more general phenomenon and may implicate any trading or importing state.

Criminalised war economies create opportunities for building covert strategic alliances between warlords, politicians, regional leaders, multinational companies and even peacekeepers. These alliances form the networks that allow the trading in diamonds and the return trade in arms and ammunition. They operate at different levels from within the conflict state to regional or global networks.

Within the conflict state tacit alliances may be generated between enemy factions, government officials and peacekeeping forces. For example, Kenema in the eastern region of Sierra Leone, while under government control, has been used as a trading post for RUF diamonds which combatants sell to dealers in the city. The value of Kenema as a market for illicitly mined diamonds has prevented attacks by rebels. In Angola there have been persistent rumours that government forces, particularly FAA generals, have been involved in selling diamonds on behalf of UNITA, although it is not clear whether they merely use the same middlemen. These networks may involve direct co-operation between ostensibly opposing sides, or tacit agreements whereby the two, or more, sides avoid interfering with each other's economic activities. In some cases both may take place, for example, the Nigerian-led ECOMOG (ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group) forces in Sierra Leone are believed to be engaged in a wide range of economic activities including the illicit extraction of diamonds. Indeed several ECOMOG force commanders and other high level officers have profited from RUF economic activities. For example, former force commander Brigadier General Maxwell Khobe was commonly known as the "Ten Million man" because of allegations that he received up to 10 million dollars in return for permitting the activities of the RUF.<sup>14</sup> The commander of the UN peacekeeping forces in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, has alleged that this tacit alliance remains between Nigerian contingents of the UN force and the RUF. Conflict diamonds can also be used by governments to support the costs of their war efforts. In Sierra Leone, for example, when President Valentine Strasser was overthrown by his deputy, Julius Maada Bio in January 1996, Maada Bio continued the arms build-up begun by Strasser, purchasing a large number of arms from Russia and other sources using revenues from the sale of diamonds. It is also likely that revenues from a recent US\$700 million diamond deal between the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Israeli diamond company IDI Diamonds will be channelled into the on-going war.

The regional dimensions of war economy networks are often linked to governments or companies in neighbouring states such as Liberia, in the case of Sierra Leone, DRC, Zambia, Namibia, and South Africa in the case of Angola. Many conflict diamonds enter legal trade channels through neighbouring states. In the case of the RUF in Sierra Leone, the involvement of President Charles Taylor of neighbouring Liberia, and other members of his government, has been a prominent feature of the continued violence by the RUF, though denied by the Liberian government. During Liberia's own civil war Charles Taylor, as leader of the NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia), was the main patron of the RUF, and funnelled arms to the Sierra Leonean faction for both strategic and economic gains, including control over diamond areas in Sierra Leone.<sup>15</sup> Recent allegations regarding the role of Charles Taylor's government in arms-for-diamonds trading with the RUF also extend to the governments of Burkina Faso, led by Blaise Compaore, and Libya, under Gaddafi, both of which have long been instrumental in the flow of weapons to the RUF. States neighbouring Sierra Leone, and those with links to the RUF, have benefited from, and facilitated, the transfer of conflict diamonds. In many cases these transfers have been poorly shrouded by official exports. Thus, in recent years, Liberia has exported more than 40 times the amount of diamonds that its reserves are capable of producing per year. This anomaly is largely explained by the trading in RUF diamonds. Likewise, neighbouring Guinea has exported 2.8 times its annual production, and Côte d'Ivoire has exported 8 times its capability.

To illustrate the close relationship between these governments and the diamond trade, on the 5th of June 2000 Charles Taylor reportedly accompanied high-ranking RUF commanders to a meeting with President Compaore in the Burkinabé capital Ouagadougou. One RUF leader, Gibril Massaquoi, was allegedly collected from the Kono diamond area of Sierra Leone (currently under RUF control) by a Liberian helicopter. Massaquoi was carrying a consignment of diamonds to pay for Burkina Faso's "military support", of predominantly Bulgarian weapons. Likewise, five days later he flew to the Liberian capital Monrovia to pay for Liberian supplies of arms, six truckloads of which were delivered across the Sierra Leone border. Additionally, Charles Taylor is believed to have instructed his company to establish a subsidiary for Sierra Leone operations, to be based in Monrovia, and with offices in Ouagadougou.

Similarly, the late Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire aided UNITA in Angola until his overthrow in 1997. This aid took the form of arms-for-diamonds barter and payments of diamonds and cash to Mobutu by Savimbi as a means of strengthening their relationship and in exchange for various favours. After Mobutu's overthrow by Laurent Kabila, and the subsequent Angolan intervention in the DRC conflict, Zambia's importance for the laundering and transit of conflict diamonds has increased substantially, and much of UNITA's diamond for arms trading shifted to the West African states of Togo, Burkina Faso, and Côte d'Ivoire.

The case of the DRC conflict is somewhat different, in the sense that the regional dimensions of the war economy are far stronger. Indeed governments and businesses in the intervening states have profited directly from the extraction of various natural resources such as diamonds, gold, and numerous others. In the cases of Zimbabwe, intervening on the side of Laurent Kabila's government, and Rwanda and Uganda, intervening and assisting different rebel RCD factions, the military officers involved have often been alleged to be extracting natural resources. Indeed in the DRC the role of neighbouring and other regional governments and companies has been one of direct engagement and profiteering rather than collusion with the war economies of rebel forces. This involvement, and the potential nexus with arms flows, is particularly well documented in the case of the Zimbabwean intervention. Firstly, the Zimbabwean state-owned arms producer, Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI), provided Kabila with large quantities of small arms ammunition and mortar bombs as well as food-rations, uniforms, and boots. Zimbabwe is also believed to have acted as a conduit for arms imported by the DRC from China and North Korea.<sup>16</sup>

The war in DRC has indeed yielded significant commercial benefits for Zimbabwe. For example, in November 1998 Billy Rautenbach, a white Zimbabwean, was appointed Executive Chairman of Gécamines (the DRC state mining company).<sup>17</sup> Rautenbach and a Zimbabwean arms dealer, John Arnold Bredenkamp, are believed to have supplied munitions to Congolese and Zimbabwean armed forces in deals financed through schemes in which Zimbabwe would be able to invest in Congo's mining sector in order to defray the costs of arms procurement. Intervention in the DRC has opened up economic opportunities for Zimbabwean businesses, particularly those associated with Robert Mugabe's friends and family; for example, there are rumours of a Zim\$200 million (£3.4 million) commercial contract between Mugabe and Kabila; various mining interests; and allegations of a lucrative cobalt deal with members of Mugabe's clan.<sup>18</sup>

Other African transit states may also be used, such as the role of Burkina Faso in UNITA diamond shipments and the return flow of arms. In his report on the UN Sanctions against UNITA, Robert Fowler claimed that:

The panel heard testimony from a source close to Savimbi that with the exception of the President of Burkina Faso the UNITA leader regarded his political friendships with African leaders as being essentially business relationships. Certain services were provided and in return certain payments were made. In the case of Togo, the source recalled an incident in October 1998 when Savimbi had refused to pay what had been asked of him by President Eyadema, and Eyadema has as a result refused to allow the



release to UNITA of a missile system that had been delivered to the airport at Kara for UNITA, and that was to be sent to Andulo.<sup>19</sup>

Governments of major importing states also have some indirect involvement in the conflict diamonds trade. In the same way that individual consumers have become concerned with the implications of 'blood diamonds' so have some major importing states. The USA, for instance, imports approximately 48% of the wholesale diamond jewellery trade each year. In response to growing concern about the origin of diamonds the US government recently announced a ban on diamond imports from six African nations suspected of involvement in the trade in conflict diamonds. However, it should be noted that while many western governments, such as Britain and the United States, have led the campaign against conflict diamonds, their reasons for doing so may be mixed. The threat of a consumer backlash against the diamond industry as whole threatens major markets in these states. Also, by focusing attention on to this particular problem they can be seen to be pursuing solutions to African conflicts while avoiding the more difficult, yet fundamental, problems at the heart of those conflicts.

It is also important to note the role of the numerous dealers and middlemen that facilitate the movement of conflict diamonds from illicit sources to the diamond processing and trading centres. These middlemen are often key parts of the smuggling infrastructure of war economies and provide the essential link between warlords and the legal markets. According to a recent report in *Le Monde*, "The laundering circuits via neighbouring countries are well organized. Lebanese in West Africa, Belgians in the Great Lakes region, and Israelis in Southern Africa."<sup>20</sup> Effective controls of illicit resource extraction and related arms procurement are unlikely until such infrastructure is dismantled and those dealers marginalized.

## **What Is Being Done?**

In response to growing concern about the trade in conflict diamonds numerous policies have been initiated. It appears that the diamond industry, while initially reluctant to acknowledge the scale or nature of the problem, has become more convinced of the need to reform, and to do so publicly, in order to avoid the prospect of a consumer boycott. Thus the 2000 meeting of the World Diamond Congress resulted in a plan, to be implemented by the end of 2000, to allow the certification of the origin of diamonds and requiring that all countries importing diamonds enact legislation that requires that all diamonds arrive in registered and sealed packets. This move was welcomed by NGOs such as Global Witness, but nevertheless addresses the problem rather late in the supply chain, long after conflict diamonds have often entered legal channels, particularly when supplies are from conflict-wracked states that may lack the regulatory capacity to ensure that diamonds are conflict-free. In addition, De Beers, the Diamond High Council, the Israeli Diamond Exchange, and India (a major

centre for the processing of diamonds), have threatened to ban any member who knowingly trades in diamonds obtained from rebel groups in Africa. The aforementioned proposals for an International Diamond Council (IDC) appear to be progressing well and, if imbued with sufficient investigative and punitive powers the IDC will go a long way towards isolating the conflict diamonds trade. However, for the IDC and associated mechanisms to be successful, a great deal more commitment is required from the diamond industry and governments.

Some governments have also taken steps, such as the import ban imposed by the United States, to target conflict diamonds. The French government, for example, at the recent G-8 summit in Japan, proposed a permanent UN panel to help target sanctions and oversee “the imposition of bans on illicit trafficking in diamonds and other raw materials that fund wars.”<sup>21</sup> However, the same French government was critical of the Fowler report on UN sanctions against UNITA and exerted diplomatic pressure on the UN prior to the release of the report in order to protect its former colonies from the degree of opprobrium contained in the draft report.

Within the UN, a two day hearing of the UN Security Council’s Sanctions Committee on Sierra Leone led to the announcement by Kofi Annan of the creation of a five-person panel of experts, to report by the end of October. Also the European Commission has announced an 18-month ban on the import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone in line with the UN Security Council embargo adopted earlier in July.

These actions are encouraging and both the diamond industry and governments should be applauded for these efforts. The concerns raised by De Beers, and others, concerning the impact of possible boycotts of diamonds on the economies of Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa, which are dependent on legal diamond trading, should remain an important element of the development of policy mechanisms. Such concerns should be used as added momentum for change rather than an obstruction to it.

While no mechanism is ever likely to eradicate the illicit trade in diamonds, such transactions can be made much more difficult so that the profitability of illicit trading decreases beneath the critical mass which makes illicit extraction and the violence it perpetuates profitable for warring factions. For this to occur the momentum of change established by campaigns against ‘blood diamonds’ must continue. Nevertheless, just as the problem of conflict diamonds cannot be understood outside of the context of war economies and related arms transfers, the conflicts associated with ‘blood diamonds’ cannot be understood or resolved without dealing with a far wider range of issues than the diamond trade.

## Notes

- 1 See Keen, David, *Adelphi Paper 320: The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars*, (London, IISS, 1998); and Berdal, Mats, & Malone, David M., (Eds), *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).
- 2 Global Witness, *Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification and Control of Diamonds*, (London, Global Witness Ltd, 2000), p 1.
- 3 Global Witness, *Conflict Diamonds...*, *op – cit*, p 1.
- 4 It should be noted that a similarly problematic definition of illicit arms flows is used by some governments, much to the chagrin of concerned NGOs.
- 5 Naylor, R.T., Loose cannons: Covert commerce and underground finance in the modern arms black market, pp 1- 57 in *Crime, Law & Social Change*, Volume 22, 1995, p 45.
- 6 Duffield, Mark, *Globalization, Transborder Trade, and War Economies*, pp 69 - 89 in Berdal, Mats, & Malone, David M., (Eds), *op - cit* , p 72.
- 7 Naylor, R.T., *Ibid*, p 20.
  
- 8 See for example, Fowler, Robert, Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA, (New York, United Nations, March 2000), paragraphs 83 - 88, Global Witness, *A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict*, (London, Global Witness, December 1998), p 12; and Smillie, Ian; Gberie, Lansana; & Hazleton, Ralph, *The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security*, (Ottawa, Partnership Africa Canada, 2000).
- 9 Smillie, Ian, et-al, *op - cit*.
- 10 Duffield, Mark, *op – cit*, p 84.
- 11 Global Witness, *Conflict Diamonds...*, *op – cit*, p 9.
- 12 Gamba, Virginia, and Cornwell, Richard, *Arms, Elites, and Resources in the Angolan Civil War*, pp 157 - 172 in Berdal, Mats, & Malone, David M., (Eds), *op - cit*, p 166.
- 13 Speech by Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister of State Peter Hain to the Ministerial Conference on Diamonds, Pretoria, South Africa, Thursday 21 September 2000.
- 14 Major-General Vijay Jetley's confidential report on problems within UNAMSIL written in May 2000 and leaked to the press in September 2000. See Sierra Leone website.
- 15 See Bourne, Mike, *Tracking the Trade: Weapons Flows in West Africa*, (London, International Alert, 2000), *Forthcoming*.
- 16 Amnesty International, *Democratic Republic of Congo: A long Standing Crisis Spinning out of Control*, (London, Amnesty International, September 1998), section 4.
- 17 *The wages of war*, pp 1 - 3 in *Africa Confidential*, Volume 39, Number 23, 20 November 1998, p 1. The project through which Rautenbach was appointed Chairman and CEO of Gecamines ended in failure and he was dismissed from the position and his company, Central Mining Group (CMG) folded in early 2000.
- 18 International Crisis Group, *Congo at War: A Briefing on the Internal and External Players in the Central African Conflict*, 17 November 1998 at <http://www.crisisweb.org>.

- 19 Fowler, Robert, *op - cit*, paragraph 101.
- 20 Roche, Marc, *How 'Blood-stained Diamonds' Finance African Wars*, in *Le Monde* (Paris), 2<sup>nd</sup> June 2000.
- 21 UN Wire, *DIAMONDS: Paris Proposes Permanent UN Diamonds Panel*, 12 July 2000.

**2.2. Engendering the Field of Conflict Management:  
Why Gender Does *Not* Matter! Thoughts from a  
Theoretical Perspective**

**Cordula Reimann**

**January 2001**

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“Silences are the loudest voices.”<sup>1</sup>

Steve Smith

## Introduction

Just a glance through the literature and current debates in the field of conflict management will suffice to show that the field of conflict management – like the discipline of International Relations (IR) until the end of the 1980s – remained by and large silent about “gender”. As a result, sophisticated gender-specific or gender-related in-depth analysis of conflict management is still strikingly missing.

Yet, by the end of the 1990s some policy-related institutions of *conflict management practice* started slowly but surely focusing on a more “gender-sensitive” approach: IGOs like the UN<sup>2</sup>, OSCE<sup>3</sup> and EU<sup>4</sup> have produced a substantial body of wide ranging policy recommendations on the position of women in violent conflicts and on the *mainstreaming* of “gender” into policies related to post-conflict rehabilitation, development and peace-building.<sup>5</sup> By the same token, NGOs like OXFAM<sup>6</sup>, International Alert<sup>7</sup>, etc., have begun stressing the “gender” dimension of conflict and its implications for the peace-building process and their own work for the last couple of years. However, *conflict management as theory* remains resistant to gender-related issues, not to mention a gender-sensitive analysis of its theoretical implications.

Hence the intriguing question that pops up is not so much why gender actually matters<sup>8</sup>, but *why it still does not (appear to) matter* in the overall field of conflict management. In other words, what are the main reasons for the persistent and pertinent gender-blindness in conflict management as theory (and practice)? For the sake of clarity, I will distinguish between more conflict management-related reasons on the hand and more feminism-related reasons on the other hand. Finally, the paper tries to develop some preliminary lessons for the engendering process of the overall field of conflict management.

Before we venture further into the task set, several comments are in order for the sake of clarity. First, as theorising on “gender in conflict management” is in its infancy, the intention here is to paint in rather broad strokes and to offer some initial provocations for further debate and research. Second, as the main area of interest is conflict management in the international arena, much of the argument that follows has an analytical focus derived from feminist critiques of international relations. Third, there has to be a word or two about definitions. What does “engendering” mean, how do we define “conflict management” and the “field of conflict management”?

“Engendering” refers - in varying degrees - to both ongoing projects of feminism, the *deconstruction*<sup>9</sup> of gender-biased knowledge claims (i.e. revealing androcentrism in fundamental categories, in empirical studies and in theoretical perspectives, locating “invisible” women, and incorporating women's activities, experience, and understanding)<sup>10</sup> and the *reconstruction* of a gender-sensitive theory and practice (i.e. exploring theoretical implications of taking gender seriously).<sup>11</sup> Gender should be defined as the social construction of social relations between “women” and “men”. (In the following I will use “men” and “women” without quotation marks. I do so without posing the “gender” categories as fixed, permanent and essential. Rather, I consider both terms as socially constructed and manipulated subject statuses that emerge from a politicisation of slightly different anatomies in labour, work etc.). As such gender must be seen in terms of the *individual gender identity* (social norms and the socially constructed individual identity), the *symbolism of gender* (classification of stereotypical gender-dualisms<sup>12</sup>) and the *structure of gender* (the organisation and institutionalisation of social action in the public and private sphere.)<sup>13</sup>

The use of the term “conflict management” is inconsistent throughout the literature in the field of conflict management. In fact, the field of conflict management consists of a plethora of different theoretical approaches and conceptual frameworks that may be, especially for newcomers to the field, rather irritating if not confusing at times. To keep it simple, the paper uses a rather broad definition of “conflict management” which embraces all pro-active forms of conflict handling including conflict settlement, conflict resolution and conflict transformation approaches. For the purpose of this paper, all three approaches to conflict management will be used interchangeably.<sup>14</sup> However, when the analytical focus is put on the process-oriented approach, one finds the term “conflict resolution/transformation”. When the emphasis is more on an outcome-oriented approach, one comes across the term “conflict settlement”. The overall “field of conflict management” should be best understood as a rather complex, multidisciplinary area study of different disciplines such as (international) law, psychology, philosophy, international relations, conflict/peace research, political science, economics, social anthropology etc.

## **The Problem: The Male/Mainstream<sup>15</sup> of Conflict Management and its Gender-Blindness**

First of all, one could argue that given its multidisciplinary nature the gender-blindness of conflict management should not come as a surprise, as it “just” reflects the gender-blind spots of the underlying disciplines mentioned above. However, in the last two decades or so in most disciplines feminists started *deconstructing*, and, yet to a lesser degree, *reconstructing* the discipline-specific gender-blind spots.<sup>16</sup>



Why the engendering process of conflict/peace research and the field of conflict management especially in contrast to development studies has been somehow marginal is another intriguing question, which cannot be tackled here in any great length. What seems to matter most here is that by the end of the 1980s/early 1990s, gender has been a central category in Development Studies.<sup>17</sup> Since there has been a huge theoretical and empirical body of evidence on the “gendered” nature of development aid/policy and its implying “male bias”<sup>18</sup> - both at the conceptual level of structural adjustment programmes and in their operation and outcome. As the vast majority of structural adjustment programmes turned out to be insufficient in alleviating poverty and achieving sustainable economic and social development in developing countries by the mid 1980s, “...the *efficiency concerns* of the *practitioners in development planning and policy-making* [...] could no longer afford to ignore women or gender relations...”<sup>19</sup> In other words the imperative for an engendering process came very much from policy-related concerns. To achieve a self-sustaining development process in development countries (more) efficiently, gender inequality had to be addressed in all areas of development like the informal sector, formal sector, the household, etc. In IR, conflict/peace studies and the field of conflict management, by contrast, a clearly defined and agreed on policy-arm, which is concerned with pressuring efficiency concerns and social change is clearly missing. Along those lines, *the very lack of a legitimate and clearly defined policy-arm* constitutes a straightforward and unobjectionable reason for the slow and marginal engendering process of conflict/peace research and IR.<sup>20</sup>

This argument has great surface plausibility. However, it is also deceptive for obscuring the distinctiveness of the engendering process of IR compared with that of conflict/peace research and conflict management. In contrast to the - albeit slow - engendering process of International Relations of the last couple of years, conflict/peace research's and conflict management's overall silence on “gender” has remained striking - even more so in the light of conflict management's and conflict/peace research's focus on both “high” and “low politics” in contrast to IR's (earlier) main emphasis on “high politics”.<sup>21</sup> Clearly, the focus on macro- and micro-level suggests conflict/peace research and the field of conflict management to be more conducive to theorize about gender as related to “low politics”. So, why is the gender-blindness of conflict management rather persistent and pervasive?

The most obvious area to look for gender-blind spots seems to be the *specific research agenda* of conflict management.<sup>22</sup> A great deal of attention in conflict management as theory has been devoted to the analysis of the contextual and process variables of inter-personal/social to international conflicts, such as the sources and nature of the conflict, third-party characteristics etc., which lead to conflict management.<sup>23</sup> The very little empirical, but not necessarily feminist, research related to “gender” in the field of conflict management put the main emphasis on the mediator “sex” difference and style matter and their relation to the effectiveness of conflict management.<sup>24</sup> Gender in its three-fold

dimension (individual gender identity, symbolism of gender and structure of gender) is neither an analytical category nor an integral part of different approaches to conflict management.

To illustrate and exemplify the gender-blindness of conflict management as theory, I would like to examine three distinctive approaches to conflict management, i.e., conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation.

Like early IR, the realist approach to conflict management, conflict settlement à la Zartman and Bercovitch was heavily preoccupied with the notion of “negative peace” (peace without social justice), or precisely the “cult of power” from which women have been excluded. The world of the IR scholars Zartman and Bercovitch is one of international conflicts defined as results of *incompatible interests* and *competition over rare resources*.<sup>25</sup> Their analytical focus is an *outcome-oriented one*. The “ripe moment”<sup>26</sup> decides when there is a “mutually hurting stalemate”<sup>27</sup> between two parties to end the violent conflict and agree, for example, on a cease-fire. Official third party-interventions in the form of arbitration, negotiations, “power mediation” or “carrots-and-sticks” (use of leverage or coercion in form of promised rewards and threatened punishments) indeed represented and reflected “male hegemony” in so far as most practitioners like diplomats and scholars of conflict management were (and still are!) men.

Given the focus on the rational and autonomous male selves, social relationships in general and hence women in particular were denied agency in this approach. One could therefore, like Jacqui True did for the IR context,<sup>28</sup> stress that in conflict management the understanding of human agency is imposed by taking the standpoint of men as somehow generic. Women and their social interests, ideas and experience were considered simply *irrelevant* to the analysis of conflict management and, in turn, were “hidden”<sup>29</sup> or made “invisible”.

John Burton's pluralist, transnational approach to IR set the terms of reference for his more *process-oriented*, conflict resolution approach.<sup>30</sup> In contrast to W. Zartman and J. Bercovitch, Burton stresses that conflicts in international relations primarily arise out of the dissatisfaction of human needs. Along those lines, the conflict origin can be found in the underlying *needs* (like security, identity, participation, recognition, distributive justice etc.) of the conflict parties. The aim is to eliminate the violent and destructive manifestations of conflict which are based on the dissatisfied needs and fears of the conflict parties. Along those lines, the key is to translate the interests and positions of the parties involved into the underlying needs for identity, security, and participation. To facilitate and promote “controlled communication”<sup>31</sup> between the conflict parties, he introduced the concept and tool of the “problem-solving workshop”: an academically based, unofficial third party approach, bringing together representatives of parties in conflict for direct communication. Based on the human needs theory, a

problem-solving workshop aims at reframing the conflict as a shared problem with mutually acceptable solutions.<sup>32</sup> As such, the aim of a “problem-solving workshop” is the satisfaction of both parties, and hence, increased co-operation and improved communication between the parties involved. Burton's broadening of the agenda of conflict management (and IR) with regard to questions of distributive justice and needs' satisfaction makes his approach rather more conducive to theorize about gender than its realist counterpart. However, the hierarchical power structures, women's needs, the allegedly non-political “private sphere”, and, most importantly here, the gendered notion of international conflict are “neutralized”. Violent conflict *and* its management in particular are basically seen as “gender neutral”, that is they are viewed as having no effects on the position and role of “women” and “men” in society. Yet, women may be discussed and “brought in” as an additional category next to other ethno-national, religious groups joining the problem-solving workshop. Structural notions (like the gender-specific distribution of labour in most conflict situations) and the symbolic features of gender (like questions of shifting identities of masculinity and femininity in conflict situations) are excluded and hence indirectly re-enforced.

John Paul Lederach and his idea of conflict transformation move far beyond ideas of conflict resolution and conflict settlement. According to him, peace-building has best to be understood as a *long-term, multi-dimensional and dynamic process*.<sup>33</sup> Not only is the aim to include a multiplicity of peacemakers from the grassroots level to top leadership, but also to create an infrastructure for social empowerment. In contrast to theorists in conflict resolution and conflict settlement, the scholar-practitioner Lederach challenges the notion of simply transferring conflict management techniques across cultures with little or no understanding at all of the cultural knowledge and resources in the conflict setting.<sup>34</sup> The underlying assumption is that the potential for peace-building already exists in the particular region or community and hence is rooted in its “traditional culture”. To build on local struggles then means to be aware of the already existing traditional ways of conflict handling in a given society. Along those lines, Lederach has stamped his mark on recent conflict management discussion as he has criticized most conflict management - both in a realist and pluralist vein - for its culture-blindness that is its theoretical and practical bias to a Westernized model of conflict handling.

Lederach's focus on social empowerment and transformation seems most favourable to theorize about gender. However, I would argue that in Lederach's model *women* seem mainly of *empirical interest*. Women qua women's groups may be an integral part of grassroots groups or local peace constituencies - with what gender-specific consequences and in which gendered conflict context remains, however, unknown. The diverse and even shifting identities and roles of women (and men) are dismissed. In other words, gender as “women's issue” may be *subordinated to* the culture question. This becomes strikingly obvious when Lederach discusses local peace-making NGOs and their “indigenous” peacemaking techniques and methods. Lederach dismisses the fact that most

indigenous customs of conflict handling are based on notions of gender inequality (like stereotypical notions of masculinity and femininity) and as such may be understood as the reasons for conflict among the society. An illustrative example may here be the system of the elders in Somalia who, as all-male members of the community, have the traditional authority to coerce the conflict parties into settling a conflict and accepting an agreement.

Given that all three approaches are much more complex in theory and practice than this snapshot may suggest, any attempt to classify various approaches to conflict management must fall short of their diversity - my attempt here is no exception. However, the brief analysis of the three approaches above highlighted some of the gender-blind gaps of conflict management as a whole. The male social character seems hegemonic, in a Gramscian sense, insofar as the absence of women seemed somehow “natural”.<sup>35</sup> In this context, what V. Spike Peterson and Jacqui True attested the of mainstream/malestream IR research community may also hold true with conflict management, that it is a “simultaneous reliance on and refusal to theorize hegemonic masculinities.”<sup>36</sup>

This leads us to another reason for the persistent gender-blindness in conflict management that is “*academic machismo*”. The “added value” of a gender dimension still seems to be somehow unclear to most “male-/mainstream” practitioners and scholars in the field of conflict management. It seems fair to say that there is marginal, if any, understanding of feminist theory within conflict management.<sup>37</sup> Under the “veil of ignorance”, most of them claim their work has “no gender dimension”<sup>38</sup> as women - if invisible or not - simply do not matter for their analysis of “hard core” questions on high-profile negotiations, deprived human needs or culture-sensitive bottom-up approaches. The point here is not so much that most scholars and practitioners ignore the gender dimension of their work on purpose - more importantly, it seems to be that gender is not purposefully included. One could argue that this form of “gender-blindness” reflects in one way or another a bias towards “academic machismo”<sup>39</sup> in the form of academic and disciplinary paternalism and hence “a deep fear of looking at the microstructuring of masculinity/ies”.<sup>40</sup> Related to this reason is the fear of loss of competence and control over academic resources, agendas and policies as the advocacy of gender issues seems to be somehow considered as a “win/lose” scenario. It seems safe to say that feminist interventions into conflict management, like in IR, are often portrayed as mainly interested in “male-bashing”.<sup>41</sup> This misunderstanding refers to the misinterpretation of the meaning and concept of “gender” defined as “women's issues”. Gender defined as the social construction of social relations should be of as much interest and concern to men as it is to women. The rather limited and half-hearted understanding of feminism has to be seen in the wider context of the dismissal of recent discussions in social/political theory in the field of conflict management like Critical Theory, Postmodernism/Poststructuralism and Social Constructivism.<sup>42</sup>

This, in turn, leads us to *the role of theory and theorizing and notions of self-reflexivity* in conflict management. The field of conflict management is far away from the theoretical and methodological discussions that have taken place in IR for the last forty years or so. In contrast to conflict management, IR as a discipline, especially in the Anglo-American research community, has come a long way from the analytical and “practical” backwardness of a research community which was virtually silent on questions of ontology (what is being analysed) and epistemology (how it is analysed) in the early days. Not only did the so-called 4<sup>th</sup> debate<sup>43</sup> foster questions on ontology and epistemology, it also promoted “critical perspectivism”<sup>44</sup> as a form of critical self-reflection of the discipline. It brought home a stronger impetus for dialogue with social/political theory such as Critical Theory<sup>45</sup>, Historical Sociology<sup>46</sup>, Post-Structuralism/Post-modernism<sup>47</sup>, and feminism, etc., to avoid methodological and theoretical closure and incarceration<sup>48</sup>.

By contrast, a study of the relevant literature in the field of conflict management suggests that dominant approaches are “theory-light”, i.e. they remain rather shy of “theorizing” both with regard to conflict and conflict management. In fact, the field of conflict management seems to have “significantly surpassed theory building.”<sup>49</sup> Most “realities” of theory and practice of conflict management are imposed by a rather implicit theoretical framework of conflict.<sup>50</sup> Most of the little theoretical territory guiding conflict management approaches falls into two ontological strands: a subjectivist versus an objectivist approach to conflict.

As far as the subjectivist approach to conflict is concerned, it puts centre-stage the perceived incompatibility of goals. The very focus on the subjective awareness has various essential implications. First, many goals may only be perceived as incompatible but, in fact, may be compatible. This may be due to misinformation, cultural misunderstanding, and misperception like stereotypes, mistrust, or emotional stress. Second, structural, unfair and unjust relationships tend to be dismissed as long as, for example, one of two involved parties may not perceive its dependence and unequal treatment as such (the phenomenon of the “happy slave”).

It is exactly the latter with which an objectivist approach is concerned: it looks for the origin of conflict in the social and political make-up and structure of society. The crucial point is that conflict may exist independent of the perceptions of the parties involved. The conflict/peace researcher Schmid gives the example of a class conflict which “...is not a conflict because the classes have incompatible goals, fight each other, and hate each other. It is a conflict because the social structure is such that one class loses what the other class wins.”<sup>51</sup>

The very distinction of subjectivity/objectivity says, in the end, very little of analytical value. In considering the structure of a system as conflictual and violent, even though the parties involved do not

perceive a conflict of interests, the observer and his/her values do decide whether a conflict exists. This is to say, too, that the objectivist approach itself is not value-free as it just reflects “another subjective assessment of the situation [...] by some third party rather than by the participants.”<sup>52</sup>

A glance through the conflict management literature will suffice to suggest that most conflict management approaches or strategies are not based on a broad theoretical concept of conflict or an explicit theory of conflict.<sup>53</sup>

Along those lines, one could argue that in most conflict management literature there is “...no real theoretical justification for *when (who)* and *why* to use conflict intervention techniques”.<sup>54</sup> By contrast, one may find “...a number of processes which are dependent upon the idiosyncratic expertise of the individual practitioner”.<sup>55</sup> Most of them turn out to be rather static models which are “...inductive descriptions of core components of practice, with some prescriptive guidelines for interventions”.<sup>56</sup> The most predominant example may here be the work of the Harvard Negotiation project.<sup>57</sup>

Others, like Bercovitch, aim at developing regularities, if not causal explanations about “effective” conflict management. Along these lines, research may come in the form of large-scale systematic studies on “effective” conflict management or more experimental and laboratory approaches to third party intervention. Large-scale systematic studies à la Bercovitch are given particular analytical attention as they are considered to produce the most policy-relevant findings for political decision-makers.<sup>58</sup>

As a result, the understanding of theory adopted in the field of conflict management is very much reduced to the explanation of observable or personal experience defined in cause-effects logic or policy recommendations. The ultimate test of theory is suggested to be its usefulness and technical applicability in guiding and orientating policy towards given ends, like the settlement of violent conflicts. Now, I hear time and again a lot of scholar-practitioners of conflict management half in self-defence, half in despair, saying “Our focus is on practice, the real world out there, why should we care (so much) about theory?” Apart from anything else, this points to a rather limited understanding of *theory* in the field of conflict management. Most conflict management research seems (more implicitly than explicitly) to work exclusively with the understanding of theory as an *empirical tool*.<sup>59</sup> That is, theory should first and foremost offer a framework to analyse and describe (and sometimes predict) the “real world”. The “real world” of conflict management consists of and is set by, for example, certain criteria of third party characteristics, the behaviour of conflict parties and intervening variables like third party resources (like coercion, expertise, reward), etc.<sup>60</sup>

While it is beyond the scope of this paper to spell out the (striking) methodological differences between the work of, for example, Ronald Fisher, Roger Fisher and Jacob Bercovitch, what seems to matter most here is that all of them subscribe to *objectivism*. That is, the view that objective knowledge of the “real world out there” is possible whether or not this knowledge is grounded in subjective experience. Based on a (strict) subject-object and values-facts distinction, scientific, “objective” findings do not only sharply contrast with value judgements, which are considered to be highly subjective, but are given epistemological priority. Only a few scholars like Adam Curle may reject such kind of understanding and subscribe to Galtung's definition of “objectivity as an inter-subjective dialogue based on explicit premises *i.e. values*”.<sup>61</sup> This is to say, too, that the prime analytical focus of conflict management research is on empirical evidence, without explicitly considering that theoretical notions already inform the practice of conflict management itself. Most of the past research in the field of conflict management, especially in the Anglo-American research community, largely focused on the detached analysis of third parties' strategies and behaviour, nature of conflicts, etc. Burton's credo to get “from subjectivity to theory-based objectivity”<sup>62</sup> turns out to be “...inappropriate because any analysis of the social world will be infused with the values of the analyst. In a world of competing values, the merits of any particular model, therefore, are not self-evident. No model is free from ideology. Since John Burton wishes to change the world, he has no alternative but to make the argument for change in ideological terms. It is counter-productive to dress one's values in natural science garb. A non-ideological model of social order is a chimera which it is a mistake to claim or pursue.”<sup>63</sup>

By subscribing to *theory as empirical tool* most theoretical or conceptual approaches to conflict management turn out to be - what Robert Cox called - “problem-solving approaches”,<sup>64</sup> that is, they work with and within a given dominant framework of institutions and social relations.<sup>65</sup> This is important as, by definition, a “problem-solving approach” “...takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action.”<sup>66</sup> Further, a “problem-solving approach” does not reflect critically on the very framework of social order/status quo like its gendered nature or its androcentric (male-centered) universality and objectivity. This may also explain why most of the existing conceptual and explanatory frameworks work with implicit or taken-for-granted agreement about the notions of (social) justice and hence (negative and positive) peace.<sup>67</sup> What is strikingly missing is an explicit, normative, theoretical founding essential for evaluating and understanding conflict management “success”.<sup>68</sup> Lewis Rasmussen, Nadim Rouhana and Joy Rothman stress that most evaluation is done poorly, or is completely ignored, mainly because “the theoretical grounds on which an intervention has been built have not been clarified”.<sup>69</sup>

That is to say, too, that the largely unstated and “hidden” values of the scholars define what is “success” in conflict management. The idea of, for example, an “effective” outcome of conflict management then looks more like a highly subjective value construction than an objective description: to label a conflict management effort as success is itself a value judgment.<sup>70</sup> This critique is partly taken up in the ongoing discussion on current discussions on “Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment” (PCIA) in the field of conflict management and development. To keep it simple, PCIA aims at offering a conceptual framework for systematically anticipating and evaluating the potential and actual peace-building (or peace-inhibiting) impact of development projects in war-prone areas, and vice versa.

The conclusions of the above analysis for the discussion on the gender-blindness in conflict management are as follows:

The gender-blindness was the final straw in the overall refusal of ontological and epistemological considerations in conflict management. Due to a rather limited understanding of theory, it was possible to focus on the “reality” of conflict management practice without acknowledging how far the practice was already informed by highly normative but taken-for-granted assumptions in terms of, for example, the legitimacy, power and “neutrality” of the third party, universal and generic human needs, unequal distribution of power among the parties, the “successful” and “impartial” conflict management process, etc. The reason being that most of the research in conflict management was based on flawed dichotomies such as objectivity/subjectivity, fact/values, etc. One could argue that most research in conflict management does not rise above the fact-value dichotomizing in the form of a theoretically rigorous reflection on the underlying conceptual frameworks of its research.<sup>71</sup> In social science, as in the field of conflict management, dualist dichotomies tend to appear as rather fixed, and even “necessary” and natural categorical oppositions.<sup>72</sup> Naturalizing and normalizing dualist dichotomies seem to go hand in hand with making them “invisible”. As such, the very structure of dualist dichotomies suggests resisting and easily slipping any kind of critical theorizing. This, in turn, explains not only the overall reluctance of the field of conflict management to address the value/fact split in any meaningful way, but also the rather persistent resistance to the engendering process. Feminists of different persuasions showed in how far the Western culture in general and Western epistemology in particular are derived from the “female”/“feminine” and “male/masculine” dichotomies and hierarchies.<sup>73</sup> Indeed, Western science is first and foremost genderized “...through a belief system that equates *objectivity* with *masculinity* and a set of cultural values that simultaneously (and conjointly) elevates what is defined as *scientific* and what is defined as *masculine*.”<sup>74</sup> This is to say that “...gender hierarchy is not coincidental to but in a significant sense constitutive of Western philosophy's objectivist metaphysics”.<sup>75</sup> To invent and impose knowledge was therefore built on and associated with the controlling and subordinating of “nature” which was metaphorically associated



with the “female”/“feminine”. “To be natural” suggests to be non-political and as such, calls for little, if any, analytical attention. The assumption that something is “natural” and not dependent on human construction has straightforward effects in terms of reproducing existing power structures.<sup>76</sup> Women and their “typical” social life, like homework, birth, raising of children, were defined not power-laden and as such were considered “non-political” and “natural”. While the “private sphere” was outside the jurisdiction of state authority, men in the “public sphere” were in power and rule in politics, military, law and economy. At the same time, the “private sphere” was heavily controlled and shaped by the “public sphere”: To secure the hegemony of men and the functioning of the “public sphere”, men restricted women's civil and political rights. This was justified by women's very “nature” which was considered unsuited for social, political and economic responsibilities outside the “private sphere”. As such, “...the masculinity of the public sphere is privileged *at the expense* of feminine activities in the private sphere.”<sup>77</sup> In other words, the public/private split may be understood as the inherently ontological fundament of any idea of politics based on *dependence and dominance* on the one hand and *inclusion/exclusion* on the other hand.

Therefore, it seems fair to say that the field of conflict management became, via its underlying gender-blind disciplines like IR, philosophy, psychology, economics, etc., complicit in constructing the dichotomy between “inside” and “outside” in conflict management. The implicit commitment to the public-private split has rendered the private sphere and women at its centre “non-political” and “invisible”. This, in turn, may explain the reluctance to address the “gendered”, somehow “natural” features of violent conflict like (the increase in) domestic violence, rape, changes of family structures and social structure, etc. in conflict/peace research and the field of conflict management. Along those lines, the “gendered” nature of international and “internationalized” conflict management remains invisible. Most conflict settlements and many bottom-up approaches take the form of “gendered deals”;<sup>78</sup> that is formal and informal peace negotiations and initiatives tend to *exclude* women in the implementation process and the relevant decision- and policy-making bodies. By the same token, other “gendered” features of conflict management processes, for example, forms of increased domestic violence in the post-settlement phase, radical changes of family and social structures were made invisible as allegedly “non-political”.

## **The Solution? Feminism and its Tricky Relationship with Conflict Management**

Given the overall absence of women and feminists in international conflict management, the silence on gender in conflict management seems less striking, but still particularly ironic in the face of feminism's longstanding association with pacifism.<sup>79</sup>

In the anglophone research community most female scholars and feminists who got involved in “gender and conflict” have a background (academic or practical) in development studies/co-operation.<sup>80</sup> That should not come as surprise for two reasons:

First, as mentioned earlier, there has been a huge body of evidence in development studies on the “gendered” nature of development aid and its implying “male bias”,<sup>81</sup> both at the conceptual level of structural adjustment and in their operation and outcome since the mid 1980s.

Secondly, many current development co-operation projects take place in violent conflict situations and hence have to deal, in one way or another, with the social and economic effects of crisis escalation and post-settlement peace-building.<sup>82</sup>

Both the empirical and theoretical body of evidence on “women/gender and conflict”<sup>83</sup> in the 1980s and 1990s concentrated very much on the emergency situation but with little reference to the post-settlement peace-building process *and* an explicit non-“gendered peace deal”. This is to say too, that conflict management as theory and practice in its different facets was not the primary analytical concern of most of these scholars. By the same token, the terms “conflict analysis”, “peace-building” and “conflict resolution” (all interrelated but yet distinctive areas of interests both in substance and emphasis) were often used interchangeable if not synonymously.<sup>84</sup> While one may argue that this may reflect a lack of a coherent conceptual and theoretical rigour in some feminist work, I would argue that it misses a more general problem already touched upon earlier: Given the multidisciplinary and complex nature of the field of conflict management as theory and practice, it seems safe to say that feminism may seem to find it somehow difficult to situate itself. One could argue that feminist approaches to the underlying disciplines of conflict management like law, psychology, philosophy, international relations, politics, economics etc. are still preoccupied with the *reconstruction* and *deconstruction* of these gender-blind disciplines. One could also make the point that feminist approaches which are busy with *deconstructing* and *reconstructing* the discipline-specific gender-blind spots of the underpinnings of conflict management *implicitly* engage in conflict management. Yet they are simply too busy to *explicitly and deliberately* focus on the “gender-blindness” of conflict management as theory and practice. At the same time, however, the distinctiveness of the “gender-blindness” of conflict management as theory and practice seems to be part and parcel of the rather limited feminist interest in conflict management.

On the one hand, the co-operative and non-adversarial features of the theory and practice of conflict resolution/conflict transformation run in tandem with the essentialist notion of “women as peacemakers”. Indeed, the essentialist equation of women with peace *and* its building fit - somehow too - nicely into Herb Kelman’s and John Burton’s idea of the mediator associated with patience,

empathy, non-violence. Some feminists, therefore, might argue that the practice of conflict resolution just incorporates and practices inherently female characteristics such as compassion, empathy, cooperation etc. Along those lines, conflict resolution as theory and practice stresses the stereotypical female attributes “to sustain life”. And women become the “female mediators”<sup>85</sup>. So why be critical of conflict resolution which is based on allegedly inherent female characteristics and implicitly seems to support the equation of “woman with the peaceful sex”? This, in turn, goes back to the old debate in feminism on questions of war and peace and women’s involvement in them.<sup>86</sup> It seems here to pop up in the disguise of *conflict management*.

On the other hand, international conflict management did not do much in the last thirty years to portray itself as an exciting “new” enterprise - distinctively different from mainstream/malestream IR. In fact, until recently, introductory textbooks on conflict management either did not exist or failed, indeed, to stress its multidisciplinary approach.<sup>87</sup> Apart from an exclusively psychological perspective, most of the academic literature in conflict management was either written from a realist or institutionalist/pluralist IR. A case in point is that most of the theorists in international conflict management are still either IR scholars or psychologists. Many feminists may have read conflict management in the international arena as a prime example of another form of “masculine hegemony”<sup>88</sup> and the perpetuation of the “cult of power” in early-IR. From a feminist perspective the whole “enterprise” of international conflict management appears first and foremost as one of domination. International conflict management conflict management on the conceptual and more practical level remains a “man's world”. In contrast to the domestic and local level, most of the practitioners and academics involved in international conflict management are still men.

Therefore, one could argue that the field of conflict management in the international arena perpetuates and indirectly enforces the exclusionist power structures and power hierarchies among a patriarchal society. Some feminists may argue that most third-party interventions tend to reduce or suppress social conflicts like gender inequality. Along those lines, one has to ask how far there is the danger that in the push for privacy of most third-party interventions women's interests are once again marginalised or co-opted. This goes to the heart of the problem: is there a “wolf in sheep's clothing”, that is, do we change the symbols but subscribe to the “old” principles and practices of patriarchy in the “new” post-settlement social order?<sup>89</sup>

By managing or “continually resolving conflicts”<sup>90</sup>, *conflict management* remains caught in the logic and practices of *management* and, as such, neglects the underlying power arrangements of conflict management initiatives like the gender inequality. This idea carried further suggests that most international conflict *management* turns a blind eye to an understanding of violent conflicts as positive moments of radical social change. During violent conflict situations, many women take over

traditionally male-defined responsibilities and tasks and - despite gross human rights' violations and everyday brutality - break with the old social order.

Or as Esmeralda, a woman from El Salvador, puts it: “(...) I feel we have learnt something about what living in this country is about...how some people have more opportunities than others and how people from poor classes live. (...) I also learnt how to work(...). I have stopped being scared. [I've learnt] to speak out in front of people, to know more things, about others as well as myself.”<sup>91</sup>

In the light of their survival of violence and social and economic deprivation, women may challenge traditional gender stereotypes by taking on non-traditional roles like becoming combatants, heads of households and by gaining (more) self-confidence and new economic and political skills. In Sri Lanka, Tamil women actively participate in the war between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE as LTTE fighters and suicide bombers. Due to the ongoing war many households turned into female-headed households, where women became the dominant breadwinners and took over “traditional” male roles and duties.

This is to say, too, in some protracted social conflicts women who were subjected to social and cultural restrictions, sexual abuse and/or domestic violence in the pre-violent conflict situations may perceive violent conflicts as moments of empowerment and true liberation. Hence, the ending of a violent conflict promotes, for example, not only changes in the division of labour, in the political (trans)formation and women's involvement in them, but may also lead to (radical) changes in gender relations. However, one cannot stress strongly enough that all these changes need not be necessarily permanent and empowering for women in the long-term. And one should keep in mind that civilians, and here predominantly women and children, are both targets and the most *vulnerable victims* of all protracted social conflicts like in Sri Lanka, Liberia or El Salvador. What seems to matter most is to see the ambiguous character of violent conflicts for most women. While some violent conflicts may indeed represent intermediate catalysts for women's empowerment, wars are first and foremost experienced as devastating human tragedy, gross atrocities and large-scale (“gendered”) human rights violations (like sexual violence, and rape, forced prostitution). Hence, while discussing women's agency in violent conflict and its management process, one has to keep in mind the uneasy tension between women's “vulnerability/victimhood” on the one hand and “empowerment/emancipation” on the other, without prioritising one over the other.

Following the line of argument above, one may assume that it would be a straightforward and crucial task to decode conflict management's “gender-blind” spots both on a conceptual and empirical level. Yet, violent conflicts *and* their management as “gendered” social phenomena have remained by and large unquestioned and rather under-theorised in feminism. In fact, in the past, most current NGO

work and academic research mainly focused on the *impact of conflict on women (and on men and gender relations)*. A case in point here may be the growing body of evidence, which analyses the diversity of women's activities and “new experiences” in the course of a conflict that may have social, political and economic consequences for the post-settlement peace-building process.<sup>92</sup> While portraying the great variety of *active* roles played by women during violent conflict and in the wider peace-building process, this approach obscures the complex nature and dynamics of “gender” and its relevance to international conflict in general, and to the theory and practice of international conflict management in particular.

Most of the work has until now fallen short of an analysis of the *impact of gender relations on conflict in general and on conflict management in particular*. This is to say that most research neglected that, for example, local methods or customs of conflict resolution which are based on gender inequality might even foster conflictual patterns among society. In fact, most indigenous customs of conflict handling are based on stereotypical notions of masculinity and femininity. An illustrative example may here be the system of the elders in Somalia who, as all-male members of the community, have the traditional authority to coerce the conflict parties into settling a conflict and accepting an agreement. This not only raises the culture/gender “double bind” crucial questions on the notions of (im)partiality, power and a more partisan approach to conflict transformation, but it also poses some serious challenges as to how to get the culture and gender-dimension of conflict management sufficiently and equally considered in theory and practice. On a more positive note, one has to keep in mind that gender (identity) is made up of the other important variables class, age, religion, ethnicity, etc. and, hence, any analysis of peace-building activities in a specific region and at specific time has to been seen against this background. Or to put it the other way round, a gender analysis has always to take into account the wider constraining social, economic and political forces of rebuilding society after a violent conflict. This, in turn, clearly speaks to the importance of more contextualized in-depth analyses, comparative case studies and “lessons learned” studies of *gender relations and their impact on post-war peace-building activities*: How far is international and inter-group conflict and its management based, even dependent on, certain gender arrangements? How far are different theoretical and practical approaches to conflict management based on similar (or even the same) gendered concepts, underlying gendered imagery and symbolism found in mainstream IR? What is discussed, what is left out in the gender-neutral language in the field of conflict management? How are masculinity and femininity defined in the broader peace-building process compared with wartime?

## **From Gender-Blindness to Engendering Conflict Management?**

In a field as heterogeneous and dynamic as conflict management, the above discussion does not represent an exhaustive account of the rich tradition and complexity of different approaches and their theoretical and empirical interpretation - in/outside the anglophone research community. Such a brief analysis could not do more than highlight the most crucial aspects of the gender-blindness of conflict management. However, focusing on the issue of gender-blindness the following analytical gaps and disjunctions became evident as the most predominant reasons for the gender-blindness of conflict management:

- “Gender-blindness” as the inherent fundament of other disciplines
- Lack of a legitimate and clearly defined policy-arm which is concerned with efficiency pressures
- Gender-neutral understanding of conflict and its management
- Early focus on the cult of power from which women have been excluded
- Half-hearted or limited inclusion of feminism within/by the mainstream suggests “academic machismo” on the one hand and academic paternalism on the other
- Misunderstandings encountered about feminism in conflict management
- Limited understanding of theory and refusal of normative considerations
- General poor attention paid to wider debates of social/political theory
- Predominance of “problem-solving” approaches within conflict management in the light of limited self-reflexivity
- Research community's very failure to re-address the fact-value split
- Tricky and ambiguous relationship of feminism with conflict management

Given that most conflict management as theory remains gender-blind, the most crucial impetus should be to avoid a theoretical and empirical framework which continues to be couched in gender-neutral terms. Therefore, what seems to matter most is the gender-sensitive *deconstruction* and *reconstruction* of the used gendered imagery, categories and institutions - both in positivist and in latest postpositivist approaches to conflict management. This, in turn, must include the addressing of misunderstandings about feminism (and the meaning of gender!) commonly encountered in the field of conflict management.

A more thorough engendering process of conflict management will be highly dependent on the openness of conflict management practitioners and scholars, and here most likely of the very few feminists among them, to bring into the open the gender-blindness of conflict management as theory. The underlying assumption - albeit highly controversial among some feminists - is that there *is* indeed a place for a gender-sensitive analysis in such an extremely androcentric field as conflict management. I would argue that a gender analysis with its three-fold definition of gender (individual gender identity,

symbolism of gender and structure of gender) is an important entry point for understanding and situating the complex, internal power dynamics of conflict management activities and promoting social justice in peace-building activities. Apart from anything else, this is mainly due to three distinctive reasons that point to three rather neglected areas in the field of conflict management.

Firstly, most analysis of conflict management works with a rather simplistic and static notion of identity. While John Burton and E. Azar, among others, stressed the identity group as the most relevant unit of analysis in the study of “protracted” or “intractable” social conflicts, their work does not account for the fact of shifting and constructed identities and their connections with violence in most violent conflicts.<sup>93</sup> Due to its explicit emphasis on the individual, a gender analysis encourages the scholar/practitioner to focus on the individual and his/her changing identities, roles, needs and interests in the pre- and post-conflict situation.

Secondly, by its very definition a gender analysis intermediates between the individual and the structural level. It addresses essential linkages between the micro-level (the individual) and the macro-level (the organisation of social action in the private and public sphere) by taking into account the meso-level (symbolism of gender like certain notions of masculinity and femininity). At the same time, it synthesises the analysis of the private (the individual and the household) and the public sphere (the community, the state and the international arena). A gender analysis enables us to analyse the impact of violent conflicts on individuals, how they suffer, what underlying constraining *and* enabling factors (like violent forms of masculinity or femininity) may drive them to use or incite them to use violence. In fact, a gender analysis has the potential to generate closer-knit linkages between different levels of analysis and different categories of actors.<sup>94</sup> It addresses in how far the individual motivation may be shaped and constrained or fostered by the (gender) symbolism and structure of the community level and beyond. By the same token, it may help us to throw light on male and female violence, with neither being the result of purely individual motivations, but generated by a particular configuration of gender symbolism and structure (embodied in social institutions which promote certain notions of femininity and masculinity). In a word, looking at conflict management through “gender lenses” may bring into the open the shifting identities of women and men, the underlying symbolism of femininity and masculinity and its structural manifestation, i.e. the organisation and institutionalisation of social action in the public and private sphere, during and after conflict management processes.

Thirdly, a gender analysis is a tool to directly address dichotomous, dualist theorizing in the field of conflict management. Gender, by its very definition, informs about and criticizes the very organisation and institutionalisation of social action based on the “colonizing dichotomies”<sup>95</sup> of masculinity (associated with objectivity/reason/power/violence/fact, etc.) and femininity (equated with subjectivity/feeling/powerlessness/non-violence/value, etc.). The argument carried further suggests

that with the ongoing analytical lack of attention to gender in conflict management as theory, any kind of dichotomous, dualist theorizing cannot be successfully challenged and transformed, but, on the contrary, will be further reinforced.

At the same time, there is still a great need for sophisticated gender-specific or gender-related in-depth analysis of conflict management, for example, with regard to the culture/gender “double bind” in most conflict management processes or women's inclusion in and exclusion from formal negotiations. The very exclusion of women from, for example, the UN-organised, -facilitated and -sponsored peace conferences in Somalia, helped to enhance the legitimacy and authority of the warlords, who are often strangers to the local communities. But what would have been different if women had been included in the formal and informal negotiations from the very beginning? Would women have made a difference in the peace conferences?

If one makes the point that the impetus (albeit slow) for a stronger analytical focus on gender issues in the field of conflict management comes very much from the more engendered field of development<sup>96</sup>, the question then is how to apply gender-sensitive “lessons learned” studies of development aid to the field of conflict management. This also seems highly timely, given the current debates on “Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment” both in the field of conflict management and development co-operation.<sup>97</sup>

The field of development co-operation has produced and developed a great deal of gender frameworks and gender-sensitive tools over the last ten years or so. These are, among others, the Harvard Analytical Framework/Gender Roles Framework (GRF) and derived from it Capacities and Vulnerabilities Analysis (CVA), the Development Planning Unit Framework (DPUF) and Social Relations Framework (SRF). While all conceptual frameworks are not specifically developed to address and explain the conflict situation and its distinctive pre- and post-crisis features, all of them were, however, applied in emergency/crisis situations. The intriguing challenge, then, is to show how far the field of crisis prevention and conflict management can actually learn from the field of development. *How, to what extent, and which* gender frameworks of the development field may, *if at all*, be successfully applied to and integrated in the field of conflict management?

I am led to my final conclusion. Without any more additional steps to embed and institutionalise the benefits from feminist and non-feminist “cross-fertilisation” in the form of journals, working groups, etc., the conflict management community will repeat and re-create discussions on “women or gender *and* conflict” and on a lucky and sunny day even “women or gender *and* conflict management” on a rather ad-hoc basis which may not go beyond academic paternalism and good will declarations. This is to say, too, that the engendering process will always remain partial and marginal if gender-aware



analysis and research is considered as “surplus work” on “women's issues” by the malestream research community or is highly dependent on the “tyranny of the urgent” in the form of policy pressures!

## Notes

- 1 Steve Smith (1995), “The Self-Image of a Discipline”, in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today*, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 2.
- 2 See for example United Nations (1995), *Platform for Action*. Beijing, New York: United Nations Publications; UNIFEM (1995), *African Women for Peace. Activities of the African Women for Conflict Resolution and Peace Project of UNIFEM/ AFWIC* (July), Nairobi: UNIFEM and (1996), *Looking at Peace Through Women's Eyes* (June), Nairobi: UNIFEM.
- 3 See OSCE (1999), *Gender Issues*. Final Report of OSCE Supplementary Implementation Meeting (14-15/6/1999), ODIHR.GAL/24/99/ (24/6/1999) Vienna and OSCE (2000), *Action Plan for Gender Issues*. Preamble (1 June 2000), SEC. GAL/12/00/Rev. 7 and <http://www.osceprag.cz>.
- 4 See European Commission (1996a), *The European Union and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa. Peacebuilding, Conflict Prevention and Beyond*, Brussels: European Commission Publications and European Commission (1996b), *Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development*, Brussels: European Commission Publications.
- 5 Gender mainstreaming shall be best understood as a strategy to promote gender equality. It has a two-fold dimension: on the one hand, the inclusion of a gender analysis as an integral part in any design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of all policies, projects and programmes and, on the other hand, initiatives to consult women and men equally and integrate their needs, views and concerns in all decision-making processes across all issues in question.
- 6 See Judy El Bushra and Eugenia Piza Lopez (1993), *Development in Conflict. The Gender Dimension. Report of a Workshop Held in Thailand*. Oxfam Discussion Paper 3, Oxford: Oxfam Publications.
- 7 See International Alert (1997), *Capacity-Building Workshop for Women in Decision Making in Rwanda* (9-13/1/1997) (co-organised by Forum des Femmes Parlementaires du Rwanda and International Alert. Report, London: International Alert (1998a), *Training of Trainers on Gender and Conflict Transformation. Capacity Building for Women's Peace Movements in Burundi* (7-12/4/1997) (co-organised by Search for Common Ground, UNIFEM and International Alert), Report, London: International Alert. International Alert also initiated the international campaign “From the Village Council to the Negotiating Table. Women in Peace-building” in October 1999 with the aim to strengthen the role of women in peace-building and conflict transformation processes. See [www.international-alert.org](http://www.international-alert.org) and International Alert (1999), *Women, Violent Conflict and Peacebuilding. Global Perspectives*. International Conference, 5-7/5/1999 in London, London: International Alert.
- 8 I discussed the question why gender *does* matter elsewhere. See Cordula Reimann (1999), *The Field of Conflict Management - Why Does Gender Matter? AFB-Report* (October), Bonn: Information Unit Peace Research Bonn.
- 9 Note that the use of “deconstruction” designated to this feminist “project” is specifically not of Jacques Derrida and has as such no postmodernist or poststructuralist reference
- 10 V. Spike Peterson (1992), “Introduction”, in V. Spike Peterson (ed.), (1992), *Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory*, Boulder/CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 6, (emphasis there).

- 11 Ibid., p. 2. The feminist reconstruction is based on the results of the deconstruction project. At their best, feminist deconstruction and reconstruction shall be best understood as complementary and interrelated. As such, engendering constitutes the first initial step in the wider “gender mainstreaming” approach
- 12 Stereotypical gender-dualisms are classified by different dichotomies, which have little in common with sexual difference. Masculinity is, for example, associated with objectivity/reason/autonomy/subject/production/culture, in contrast to femininity which is equated with subjectivity/feeling/dependency/object/value/reproduction/nature. To be feminine is to be not masculine.
- 13 Sandra Harding (1986), *The Science Question in Feminism*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, pp. 16-17.
- 14 Yet, I am aware that the term “conflict management” is a rather unhappy one as, for example, conflict transformation approaches move far beyond the “logic of *management*”. In the light of lacking a “better” alternative I use the term conflict management as an umbrella term while being aware of its definitional pitfalls. In my reading of the literature, the term “conflict resolution” - especially in the anglophone research community - is too heavily associated with the work of John Burton, Herb Kelman and Ronald Fisher.
- 15 The term “malestream” defines the male-dominated discipline of conflict management. “Malestream” need not necessarily be mainstream (think of, e.g. gender-blindness of critical theory) and vice versa (think of, e.g. female scholars doing mainstream research). If “mainstream” can be used interchangeably with “malestream” it is obvious and indicated as such.
- 16 By the mid-1990s a reasonable amount of feminist articles and books brought new insights and conceptual frameworks to the discipline of International Relations. For an excellent, comprehensive introduction to feminist encounters with International Relations see Jill Steans (1998), *Gender and International Relations*, London: Polity Press.
- 17 See, for example, Tina Wallice and Candida March (eds.) (1991), *Changing Perceptions. Writings on Gender and Development*, Oxford: Oxfam Publications; Ramya Subrahmanian (1996), *Institutions, Relations and Outcomes. Framework and Tools for Gender-Aware Planning*, Brighton: University of Sussex (Institute of Development Studies) and Caroline O.N. Moser (1993), *Gender Planning and Development. Theory, Practice and Training*, London: Routledge.
- 18 See Diane Elson (ed.) (1995), *Male Bias in the Development Process*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- 19 Donna Pankhurst and Jenny Pearce, “Engendering the Analysis of Conflict: A Southern Perspective”, in Haleh Afshar (ed.) (1998), *Women and Empowerment. Illustrations from the Third World*, London: Routledge, p. 156, (emphasis C.R.).
- 20 See *ibid.*
- 21 The term “high politics” refers to questions of national security, particularly the strategic interests of the states. “Lower politics”, by contrast, points to questions of social welfare and socio-economic issues.
- 22 The categorisation does not pretend to be definite or exhaustive.
- 23 See e.g. Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.) (1992), *Mediation in International Relations. Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management*, London: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 1-29.
- 24 See H.R. Weingarten and E. Douvan (1985), “Male and Female Visions of Mediation”, *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 4, pp. 349-358; N.A. Burrell et. al. (1988), “Gender-Based Perceptual Biases in Mediation”, *Communication Research*, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 447-469; Victor D. Wall and Marcia L. Dewhurst (1991) “Mediator Gender. Communication Differences in Resolved and Unresolved Mediations”, *Mediation Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 63-85; David Maxwell (1992), “Gender Differences in Mediation Style and Their Impact on Mediator Effectiveness”, *Mediation Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 353-364; Linda Stamato (1992), “Voice, Place, and Process. Research on Gender, Negotiation, and Conflict Resolution”, *Mediation Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 375-386 and Patrick S. Calhoun and William P. Smith (1999), “Integrative

- Bargaining. Does Gender Make A Difference?" *The International Journal of Conflict Management*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (July), pp. 203-224.
- 25 See I. William Zartman (1985), *Ripe for Resolution. Conflict and Intervention in Africa*, New York: Oxford University Press; William Zartman (1987), *Positive Sum. Improving North-South Negotiations*, New York: Transaction Publishers; Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.) (1992), op. cit., and Jacob Bercovitch (ed.) (1996), *Resolving International Conflicts. The Theory and Practice of Mediation*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
  - 26 I. William Zartman (1985). Critiques of "ripeness" can be found in the work of for example C. Mitchell (1995) *Cutting Losses. Reflections on Appropriate Timing*, Fairfax/VA: George Mason University and Marieke Kleiboer (1994), "Ripeness of Conflict. A Fruitful Nation?" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 109-116.
  - 27 I. William Zartman (1985), op. cit., p. 232.
  - 28 See Jacqui True, "Feminism", in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater et al. (1996), *Theories of International Relations*, London: Macmillan Press, p. 228.
  - 29 See Fred Halliday (1988), "Hidden from International Relations. Women and the International Area", *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 419-428.
  - 30 See John W. Burton (1972), *World Society*, London: Macmillan.
  - 31 See John W. Burton (1969), *Conflict and Communication. The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations*, London: Macmillan.
  - 32 See John W. Burton (1987), *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflicts: A Handbook*, Lanham, MD: University Press of America; (1990a), *Conflict. Human Needs Theory*, London: Macmillan Press; John W. Burton (1990b), *Conflict: Resolution and Prevention*, Macmillan.
  - 33 See John Paul Lederach (1997), *Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.
  - 34 See John Paul Lederach (1995), *Preparing for Peace. Conflict Transformation across Cultures*, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
  - 35 For Gramsci's notion of hegemony in the context of international relations see Robert W. Cox (1983), "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations. An Essay in Method", *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 162-175.
  - 36 V. Spike Peterson and Jacqui True, "'New Times' and New Conversations", in Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart (eds.) (1998), *The "Man" Question in International Relations*, Oxford/Boulder CO: Westview Press, p. 15.
  - 37 I am aware that in conflict/peace research some male peace researchers actually try to include feminist perspectives into their academic work. See Ekkehart Krippendorff (1988), "Militaer und Geschlecht. Haben wir genuegend Erkenntnisarbeit geleistet?" *DIAOG. Beitrage zur Friedensforschung*, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 7-21 and Johan Galtung (1996), *Peace By Peaceful Means. Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*, London/Oslo: Sage Publications/PRIO. However, their encounters with feminist theory take more the form of academic good-will declarations than of a thorough analysis of feminist theory.
  - 38 See, e.g., Terrell Carver (1996), *Gender is not a Synonym for Women*, London: Lynne Rienner, p. 4.
  - 39 Marysia Zalewski, "Introduction", in Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart (eds.) (1998), op. cit., p. 7.
  - 40 Craig Murphy, "Six Masculine Roles in International Relations and Their Interconnection. A Personal Investigation", in Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart (eds.) (1998), op. cit., p. 103. To demonstrate this assumption conclusively tends, of course, to be difficult. As a matter of fact, biases tend to be assumed

rather than explicitly argued for. However, a cursory look at the literature will stress that such a bias is indeed implicit in most writings of scholars referred to.

- 41 For a similar observation in the IR discipline see J. Ann Tickner (1997), "You Just Do Not Understand. Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR Theorists", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, pp. 611-632.
- 42 Exceptions may here be the work of Vivienne Jabri (1996), *Discourses on Violence. Conflict Analysis Reconsidered*, Manchester: Manchester University Press; A.B. Fetherston and A.C. Parkin, "Transforming Violent Conflict. Contributions from Social Theory", in Lee-Anne Broadhead (ed.), *Issues in Peace Research 1997-98*, Bradford: University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, pp. 19-57 and A.B. Fetherston (2000), *From Conflict Resolution to Transformative Peacebuilding: Reflections from Croatia*. Working Paper 4 (April 2000), Bradford: University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies.
- 43 The anglophone research community mainly refers to the three "Great Debates" based on a chronological view of the evolution of IR: the 1st debate between Idealism and Realism; 2nd debate between Traditionalism-Behaviouralism; 3rd debate between Neo-realism-Pluralism-Globalism. I prefer to speak of four debates, the 4th debate being the one between Positivism-Post-positivism (like parts of Feminism, Critical Theory, Postmodernism, etc.) The enumeration difference matters in so far as otherwise the fourth debate is merged in the third debate and gives a rather different ontological and epistemological twist to the self-presentation of IR. I am aware this classification is tentative and contentious at best.
- 44 Yosef Lapid (1989), "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 241-243.
- 45 See for example Andrew Linklater (1990), *Beyond Realism and Marxism. Critical Theory and International Relations*, Basingstoke: Macmillan and Jim George and D. Campbell (1990), "Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference. Critical Social Theory and International Relations", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 269-295.
- 46 See, for example, Michael Mann (1993), *The Sources of Social Power. Vol. 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States 1760-1914*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 47 While some scholars explicitly refer to Poststructuralism, others prefer the term Postmodernism. However, one has to stress that there are striking differences between Postmodernism and Poststructuralism, which are beyond the scope of this paper. See for example Jim George (1994), *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner and Robert B.J. Walker (1993), *Inside/Outside. International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 48 See Jim George (1994), *op. cit.*, pp. 197-234.
- 49 J.A. Wall and A. Lynn (1993), "Mediation. A Current Review", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 37, No. 1. p. 182.
- 50 See also Joseph P. Folger, "Evaluating Evaluation in Ethnic Conflict Resolution. Themes from, and Commentary on, the Haverford-Bryn Mawr Conference", in Marc Howard Ross and Jay Rothman (eds.) (1999), *Theory and Practice in Ethnic Conflict Management. Theorizing Success and Failure*, London: Macmillan Press, pp. 209-239 and Joseph A. Scimecca, "Theory and Alternative Dispute Resolution. A Contradiction in Terms?" in Dennis J.D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (eds.) (1993), *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice. Integration and Application*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, pp. 211-221.
- 51 Herman Schmid (1968), "Peace Research and Politics", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 226.
- 52 Chris Mitchell, "Recognising Conflict", in Tom Woodhouse (ed.) (1991), *Peacemaking in a Troubled World*, Oxford: Berg, p. 221.
- 53 See, e.g., Joseph A. Scimecca, "Theory and Alternative Dispute Resolution. A Contradiction in Terms?", in Dennis J.D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (eds.) (1993), *op. cit.*, pp. 211-221.

- 54 Ibid., p. 217, (emphasis and brackets C.R.). The promotion of universal, handy techniques of conflict resolution without any theoretical basis whatsoever is most striking in the work of R. Fisher and W. Ury. See for example Roger Fisher and William Ury (1981), *Getting to Yes. How to Negotiate Without Giving In*, London: Arrow Books.
- 55 Joseph A. Scimecca, op. cit., p. 214. See, for example, I William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman (1982), *The Practical Negotiator*, New Haven: Yale University Press; John Burton (1987), John Paul Lederach (1995), op. cit., and John Paul Lederach (1997), op. cit.
- 56 Ronald J. Fisher, "Interactive Conflict Resolution", in I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (eds.) (1997), *Peacemaking in International Conflict. Methods and Techniques*, Washington/DC: United States Institute for Peace, p. 261.
- 57 See for example Roger Fisher and William Ury (1981), op. cit.
- 58 Jacob Bercovitch, "Mediation in International Conflict", I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (eds.) (1997), op. cit., p. 133.
- 59 See also Marysia Zalewski, "All these theories yet the bodies keep piling up: theories, theorists, theorising", in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds.) (1996), *International Theory. Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 341-344.
- 60 See for example Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.) (1992), op. cit., pp. 14-29.
- 61 Johan Galtung (1996), op. cit., p. 16, (emphasis C.R.). See, for example, Adam Curle (1971), *Making Peace*, London: Tavistock, p. 5.
- 62 John W. Burton, "Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy", in Dennis J.D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (eds.) (1993), op. cit., p. 57.
- 63 Richard Little, "The Decision Maker and Social Order: The End of Ideology or the Pursuit of a Chimera?" in Michael Banks (ed.) (1984), *Conflict in World Society. A New Perspective on International Relations*, Brighton: Wheatsheaf, p. 95.
- 64 One should not mistake Robert Cox's idea of a "problem-solving approach" for John Burton's idea of a "problem-solving approach/workshop" or the Harvard School's understanding of a "problem-solving approach". In fact, John Burton is one of the few who takes up and discusses in some length the shortcomings of what Robert Cox calls "problem-solving approaches" - John Burton just calls them "puzzle-solving approaches". See John Burton (1979), *Deviance, Terrorism and War. The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems*, Oxford: Martin Robertson, especially pp. 3-6.
- 65 Robert Cox (1981), "Social Forces, States and World Orders. Beyond International Relations Theory", *Millennium*, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 129.
- 66 Ibid.
- 67 William Zartman et. al. (1996), "Negotiation as a Search for Peace", *International Negotiation*, Vol. 1, pp. 79-98.
- 68 See also Marieke Kleiboer (1996), "Understanding the Success and Failure of International Mediation", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (June), p. 377. See also Bush and Folger (1994), *The Promise of Mediation. Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
- 69 Joseph P. Folger, op. cit., p. 214.
- 70 Ibid., p. 219.

- 71 See also A.B. Fetherston and A.C. Parkin, op. cit., and Gavin R. Beckett, "Social Theory and the Theory and Practice of Conflict Management", in Lee-Anne Broadhead (ed.) (1997), op. cit., pp. 59-85.
- 72 See V. Spike Peterson and Jacqui True, op. cit., p. 19, (emphasis there).
- 73 V. Spike Peterson (1992), "Transgressing Boundaries: Theories of Knowledge, Gender and International Relations", *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1992), pp. 183-206.
- 74 Evelyn Fox Keller (1985), *Reflections on Gender and Science*, New Haven/CT: Yale University Press, p. 89, (emphasis C.R.).
- 75 V. Spike Peterson, "Introduction" in V. Spike Peterson (ed.) (1992), op. cit., p. 13.
- 76 See *ibid.*, pp. 14-15.
- 77 V. Spike Peterson and Jacqui True, op. cit., p. 18, (emphasis there).
- 78 Donna Pankhurst and Jenny Pearce, op. cit., p. 161.
- 79 Ellen Ziskind Berg (1994), "Gendering Conflict Resolution", *Peace & Change*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (October), p. 326.
- 80 Scholars with a development background among others may here be Judy El Bushra, Eugenia Piza Lopez, Donna Pankhurst. See for example Judy El Bushra and Eugenia Piza Lopez (1993), op. cit.; Judy El Bushra (1998), *Gendered Interpretations of Conflict: Research Issues For Cope*, London: ACORD (RAPP); Judy El Bushra and Jennifer Abuah (1999), "Digging In: Why Aren't Gender Analysts and Conflict Analysts Speaking to Each Other and What Might They Learn If They Did?" Paper presented to the conference on "NGOs in a global future" at Birmingham University (January 1999); Judy El Bushra, "Transforming Conflict. Some Thoughts on a Gendered Interpretation of Conflict Processes", in Jacobs, Susie; Jacobson, Ruth and Marchbank, Jennifer (eds.) (2000), *States of Conflict. Gender, Violence and Resistance*, London: Zed Books, pp. 66-86, and Donna Pankhurst and Jenny Pearce, op. cit..
- 81 Diane Elson (ed.) (1995), op. cit.
- 82 See also Mary B. Anderson (1996), *Do No Harm, Supporting Local Capacities for Peace Through Aid*, Cambridge, MA: Development for Collaborative Action and Mary B. Anderson (1999), *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - or War*, Boulder/CO: Lynne Rienner.
- 83 See, for example, Rosemary Ridd and Helen Callaway (eds.) (1987), *Women and Political Conflict. Portraits of Struggle in Times of Crisis*, New York: New York University Press; Cynthia Cockburn (1998), *The Space Between Us. Negotiating Gender and National Identities in Conflict*, London: Zed Books; Bridget Byrne (1996), "Towards a Gendered Understanding of Conflict", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 31-40; M. Cooke and A. Woollacott (1993), *Gendering War Talk*, Princeton: Princeton University Press; Maja Korac (1998), *Linking Arms, Women and War in Post-Yugoslav States*, Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute; Meredith Turshen and Clotilde Twagiramariya (eds.) (1998), *What Women Do in Wartime*, London: Zed Press and Stephanie Urdang (1989), *And Still They Dance. Women, War, and the Struggle for Change in Mozambique*, London: Earthscan; World Vision (1996), *The Effects of Armed Conflict on Girls*, Geneva: World Vision and Helen O'Connell (ed.) (1993), *Women and Conflict*, Oxford: Oxfam Focus on Gender 2.
- 84 See, for example, GOOD (1998), *Gender Perspectives in Conflict Prevention and Resolution*, Report of 1997 Annual Conference (24-25/9/1997 in Lyngby/Denmark); Judy El Bushra and Jennifer Abuah (1999), op. cit., and Judy El Bushra, "Transforming Conflict. Some Thoughts on a Gendered Interpretation of Conflict Processes", in op. cit..
- 85 See J. Ann Ticker (1992), *Gender in International Relations. Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security*, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 139-141.
- 86 The feminist literature on the war/peace topic is rather elusive. For one of the classic, perhaps most influential and impressive writings, see Jean Bethke Elstain (1987), *Women and War*, New York: Littlefield.

- For an excellent reader see Lois Ann Lorentzen and Jennifer Turbin (eds.) (1998), *The Women and War Reader*, New York and London: New York University Press.
- 87 For one of the few exceptions see Hugh Miall; Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse (1999), *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, Cambridge: Polity Press. This gap may also be filled by *the Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management (ed.) (2000), *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*, <http://www.b.shuttle.de/berghof/>.
- 88 This expression is borrowed from Robert W. Connell. See Robert W. Connell (1987), *Gender and Power. Society, the Person and Sexual Politics*, Palo Alto/CA: Stanford University Press, especially chapter 8 and Robert W. Connell (1995), *Masculinities*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- 89 Terrell A. Northrup (1996), *The Uneasy Partnership Between Conflict Theory and Feminist Theory*, Syracuse University. Unpublished paper, pp. 13-15 and p. 19.
- 90 Carolyn Nordstrom, "Contested Identities/Essentially Contested Powers", in Kumar Rupensinghe (ed.) (1995), *Conflict Transformation*, London: Macmillan, p. 106.
- 91 See Olivia Bennett, Jo Bexley and Kitty Warnock (eds.) (1995), *Arms to Fight. Arms To Protect. Women Speak Out About Conflict*, London: Panos, p. 203, (emphasis there).
- 92 See for example Cynthia Cockburn (1998), op. cit.; M. Cooke and A. Woollacott (1993), op. cit.; Judy El Bushra and Eugenia Piza Lopez (1993), op. cit.; Ruth Jacobson (1999), op. cit.; Ronit Lentin (ed.) (1997), *Gender and Catastrophe*, London: Zed Press; Rosemary Ridd and Helen Callaway (eds.) (1997), op. cit.; World Vision International (1996), op. cit. and International Alert (1999), op. cit.
- 93 See also Donna Pankhurst and Jenny Pearce, op. cit., p. 157.
- 94 See Judith El Bushra and Jennifer Abuah (1999), op. cit., p. 14 and Judith El Bushra, "Transforming Conflict. Some Thoughts on a Gendered Interpretation of Conflict Processes", in op. cit.
- 95 I borrowed this term from Mies. See Margaret Mies (1986), *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale. Women and the International Division of Labour*, London: Zed Books, p. 210.
- 96 See Donna Pankhurst and Jenny Pearce, op. cit., pp. 161-162.
- 97 To keep it simple, Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) or Conflict Impact Assessment (CIA) aims at offering a conceptual framework for systematically anticipating and evaluating the potential and actual peace-building (or peace-inhibiting) impact of development projects in war-prone areas. See Manuela Leonhardt (2000), *Conflict Impact Assessment of EU Development Co-operation with ACP Countries. A Review of Literature and Practice*, London: International Alert and Saferworld.