


MUSLIM IDENTITY AND ISLAMIC
FAITH IN SARAJEVO



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Among the dominant themes in contemporary world affairs are the political role of Islam and the problem of national minorities in socialist states. The present thesis seeks to examine these issues through the anthropological investigation of a Muslim minority within a multi-national, federated socialist state - the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav state is a constitutional federation of several diverse nationalities, all of which seek to preserve, assert and develop their distinct political identities within the fragile power balance system of Yugoslavia. The republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is dominated by three such nationalities - the Serb, the Croat and the Muslim. These three correspond to three religious faiths; the Serbs are Orthodox, the Croats are Catholic and the Muslims are of the Islamic faith. Whilst the state does not officially recognise this correspondence, for ordinary Bosnians it is fundamental; national and religious identity are seen as inextricably linked. It is the nature of this link which forms the focus of my study, the fieldwork for which was carried out in the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo.

For Sarajevo's Muslims Islam provides a "double identity", two ways of conceptualising collective identity. On the one hand Islam distinguishes Muslims from their Serb/Orthodox and Croat/Catholic neighbours, whilst on the other it gives them membership in a worldwide religious community transcending the bounds of Yugoslavia. Both aspects of identity find expression in Muslim religious life. Thus male death rituals assert Bosnian Muslims' identity as members of the Islamic Umma, whilst mortuary rites performed by women are seen as distinguishing Muslims from their non-Muslim neighbours. In this and other ways religion becomes a medium for identity assertion. At the same time the discourse of identity is one through which rivaling religious orientations may compete. For example, the state authorised Muslim establishment promotes a rapprochement of Islamic and socialist ideologies and of Muslim and Yugoslav identity, whilst a new, semi-clandestine Islamic tendency looks constantly to the outside Muslim world, seeking to ally Bosnian Muslims with it.

As an ethnographic study the thesis examines a number of issues including the perception of town and neighbourhood as separate conceptual spaces, the role of ritual, gender relations and the nature of religious rivalry. Through this approach to Sarajevoan Muslim society it attempts to illuminate some broader questions concerning the political role of Islam in the modern world, the development of nationalisms and the nature of relations between minorities and the socialist state.

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PREFACE

This work is about the role of religion in creating and expressing group identity within a Muslim minority in socialist Southeastern Europe. It touches on subjects such as Islamic fundamentalism, sufi mysticism, nationalism, socialist society and the relationship between the state and minority groups. These themes are of potential interest to an audience wider than the anthropological one but the present work is essentially an anthropological monograph, the research for which was conducted principally through the traditional ethnographic method of participant observation during fifteen months of 1985/86.

Access to the facilities of Sarajevo's Oriental Institute, Ethnographic Museum and excellent Gazi Husrevbeg library allowed me to conduct a certain amount of historical research but statistical or questionnaire based study presented a problem. This problem lay in the need for me to have both a persona acceptable to those whom I counted as informants and a purpose and plan acceptable to the authorities. In the end I was faced with a choice. Either to be a fully fledged, high powered foreign scholar doing archival research, interviews with public figures and questionnaires, or to attempt to find my own quiet niche in the ordinary life of the Sarajevan Muslim population. The two were incompatible since pursuing the former course would have cut me off from a public which tends, whenever possible, to avoid contact with officialdom and authority. As an anthropologist I therefore chose the latter course. My affiliation to the Oriental Institute gave me a legitimate status and the chance to read and to converse with Orientalists, but left me sufficiently free and anonymous to conduct other research.

Even in my role as participant observer the research was, perforce (with many informants), low key as a result of their unease with formality. Thus my few attempts to tape conversations and interviews were met with suspicion or reluctance. People were happy to converse and explain things to me within the framework of a personal relationship, but if they realised that I was attempting anything even approaching a questionnaire (an informal series of questions, notebook in hand, about the informant's childhood, family, marriage etc.) they grew embarrassed or cagey or evasive. Other factors also imposed restrictions on the nature of my fieldwork. For example, before leaving for Bosnia I had been particularly interested in the dervish orders. It transpired, however, that these orders did not reciprocate my feeling; they were not interested in me and not very forthcoming. At the same time I formed few relationships with non-Muslims or with hard line atheist Muslims. This was partly due to lack of time but more importantly it was the result of a need to be seen by my principal informants as being part of their world and loyal to it, not flitting about with divided loyalties.

The constraints and limitations associated with fieldwork in Bosnia entail that this thesis cannot be an attempt at an exhaustive analysis of every aspect of the Bosnian Muslim situation. Rather it is offered as an anthropological examination of a certain aspect of it: popular Muslim conceptions of collective identity and Islamic religion, and the uses thereof.

My research has been financially supported by grants from the Economic and Social Research Council of Great Britain and from the General Board of the University of Cambridge. To both benefactors I am most grateful. During my stay in Bosnia I was affiliated to the Oriental Institute of Sarajevo where every kindness was extended to me. In particular I would like to thank the Institute's

president, Professor Sulejman Grozdanić, and Dr Džemal Čehajić for all their help. Naturally neither man is responsible for the opinions put forward here.

I am indebted to my supervisor, Ernest Gellner, whose pertinent criticisms and ever useful suggestions have been of immense value and whose own work is a constant inspiration. Basim Musallam read various drafts of the thesis and through his specific comments and his knowledge of Islamic society in general has widened my own understanding. The kindness, encouragement and suggestions of Alexandre Popovic have also helped me considerably.

Pascal Boyer, Chris Hann, Nancy Tapper, John Barber and Steve Hugh-Jones read versions of the thesis at various stages and I have benefited greatly from their comments and encouragement.


Finally I would like to thank all those Sarajevans who made the research possible by welcoming me, tolerating my linguistic and social inadequacy and trying to teach me what I wanted to know. They are too numerous to mention individually but I would like to record my particular thanks to the Karakaš family without whose kindness, patience and care my stay in Sarajevo would have been far less pleasant and fruitful.

The thesis does not exceed 80,000 words in length and is the result of my own work, including nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration.

NOTE ON PRONUNCIATION

In Yugoslavia both a Latin and a Cyrillic script are employed. The former has been used for Serbo-Croatian terms in the present work. In spite of its broad similarity the Serbo-Croatian Latin alphabet does contain some letters which do not form part of the English Latin alphabet. At the same time some identical letters are pronounced differently.

C c	like the <u>ts</u> in:	Cat <u>s</u> up
Č č	like the <u>Ch</u> in:	<u>Ch</u> arm
Ć ć	like the <u>T</u> in:	<u>T</u> une
Đ đ	like the <u>J</u> in:	<u>J</u> am
Dž dž	similar to Đ/đ but somewhat softer	
H h	like the <u>ch</u> in:	Lo <u>ch</u>
J j	like the <u>Y</u> in:	<u>Y</u> ellow
Š š	like the <u>Sh</u> in:	<u>Sh</u> oes
Ž ž	like the <u>s</u> in:	Plea <u>s</u> ure




INTRODUCTION

Among the dominant themes in contemporary world affairs are the political role of Islam and the problem of national minorities in socialist states. One aim of the present work is to examine these issues through the investigation of a Muslim minority within a socialist state - the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Yugoslavia.

Islam has generally been studied in the context of the Muslim dominated societies of North Africa and the Middle East. In spite of the fact that almost a third of the world's Muslims are members of minority populations within states as diverse as India, China, Malawi, Fiji, the Soviet Union and the U.S.A., these minorities have either been neglected or treated as marginal to the Islamic world. Thus their religious practice has been a focus of interest only when it is viewed as syncretic, deviational or somehow "unIslamic". This is surprising in view of the fact that scholars of Muslim society frequently note the all-pervasive nature of Islam, a faith which is not merely practised in the mosque but informs every aspect of social and economic life; Islam tells the believer not only how to pray but how to trade, marry, inherit and greet people in the street. If its influence is indeed so pervasive, even the remotest Muslim minority with the most syncretic rituals must have some Islamic blood in its social veins.

Treating the Muslim minorities as wholly distinct from the rest of the Islamic world may therefore be a mistake in itself. Furthermore, to ignore these societies is to ignore cases which should be of particular interest for the study of Islam's political role. This interest derives from the fact that, in the minority context, Islam is central to the Muslim community's identity.



As the major and in some cases (including the Bosnian) the sole source of the minority's cultural specificity, Islam is crucial to that minority's self-definition of identity and thus likely to be instrumental in its political behaviour. This is rarely the case in the Muslim majority society because here Islam is but one of many characteristics which citizens have in common; most Egyptians have Islam in common but they also share a language, a social structure and a common history. Islam is not then crucial (although it may, ofcourse, play a political role) and becomes so only in cases where the Muslim majority finds itself under the domination of foreign, non-Muslim powers. Thus Iranians and Afghans turned to Islamic fundamentalism and an idea of themselves as specifically Islamic peoples only in their respective struggles against American interference and Soviet invasion.

In the Muslim minority a self-perception as a specifically Islamic society is almost inevitably present. Religion is therefore of importance to the group's political identity and may become the medium through which political claims and statements are made. Clearly the constraints imposed by existence as a minority make the emergence of Islamic fundamentalist movements seeking changes in the nature of the state unlikely (and in the Yugoslav case a near impossibility) and thus we will not expect to find Iranian style Islamic activism in Bosnia. Here the political role of Islam is more muted, but nevertheless exists. Thus there has emerged in Sarajevo a puritanical and scripturalistic Islamic tendency which opposes, albeit quietly, both the official Muslim establishment and the idea that Bosnia's Muslims are but one of the many populations which make up the brotherly and united socialist federation of Yugoslavia (see chapter five). These facts make the study of the Muslim minority central rather than peripheral to an understanding of Islam's contemporary political role.

The socialist Eastern bloc is currently chequered with nationalisms. Yugoslavia provides a particularly interesting context for the study of this phenomena because here incipient nationalism is endemic both for historical reasons and, paradoxically, because it is encouraged by a state which at the same time fears its consequences. The federal nature of the Yugoslav state and the Constitution's recognition of ethnic groups as political entities (nationalities with guaranteed collective rights) fosters the desire of these groups to preserve, assert and develop their specific identities, for without them they have no legitimate claim to political advantage. The incipient nationalisms of the various groups are sometimes activated resulting in open conflict between them. The cohesion of the federated state is thus constantly at risk and the threat is one that its own Constitution has fostered. It is in this context that the case of the Bosnian Muslims (whose nationalistic tendencies as yet remain incipient) must be considered.

Official nationalities policy plays an important role in conditioning the relationships between Yugoslavia's peoples but official policy is not the whole story; nationalisms are shaped not only from above but from below by popular perceptions of the nature of collective identity. The former may influence the latter but official policy and popular perception may also differ or conflict and this is so in the case of the Muslim population. The Muslims constitute one of Yugoslavia's nationalities. Their cultural specificity derives solely from their religious affiliation for in no other important respect do they differ from their Serbian and Croatian neighbours within Bosnia. When the state granted them the status of a nationality it therefore created a political community from a religious one. Nevertheless, it attempts to deny the religious character of this nationality and in official eyes there is no connection between membership of the Muslim nationality and affiliation to the Islamic faith. In the popular

conception, however, religious and national affiliation are inextricably linked. It is the nature of this link which forms much of the focus of the present work.

The anthropological concern with ethnicity should allow light to be cast on the nature of popular perceptions of identity. It is the case, however, that anthropologists have tended to study ethnic identity through an examination of the boundaries existant between various neighbouring groups. Ethnic group X is studied in relation to ethnic groups Y and Z. Yet such groups do not define their identity merely in relation to neighbours, other criteria also form part of their conceptualisation. In the case of the Muslim minority one such criteria is a self-perception as a specifically Islamic group and thus as a community which not only has boundaries with local non-Muslim groups but also membership of the worldwide Islamic *Umma*. This is certainly the case in Bosnia and the theme of multiple identity will be pursued in the pages to follow.

The themes of Islamic religious organisation and the conceptualisation and assertion of collective identity form the focus of the present work. More specifically, three questions are addressed:

1. How does the political context of Yugoslavia affect religious life? Secular authorities inhibit religious expression both directly and indirectly. Direct inhibition occurs through the threat of persecution. Indirect inhibition is the result of the state's policy of authorising official religious establishments to organise the religious life of believers. These religious establishments are unwilling to have their authority, already limited, eroded yet further by competition from rivalling religious leaders or orientations. Bosnia's Muslim establishment thus attempts to monopolise control of Islamic religious practice and to combat potential rivals. Under the eye of the state such religious

rivalry and dissent as exists is often of a secretive and subdued nature.

2. On what sources can the Muslim minority draw in its construction of identity? To what extent do the Bosnian Muslims consider themselves Yugoslavs/members of an identity group distinct from others in Yugoslavia/members of a worldwide Islamic community transcending the boundaries of the Yugoslav state?

3. What is the relationship between religious organisation and the assertion of identity? The answer to this question lies in the fact both that religion is a medium for identity assertion and that the discourse of identity is one through which rivalling religious orientations may compete. Thus, for example, in Bosnia male and female death rituals express different aspects of collective Muslim identity. At the same time competing religious leaders promote varying visions of Islam and of Bosnian Muslim identity. The official Muslim establishment, mindful of the need to allay any fears on the part of the state, suggests the compatibility of Islam and socialism and the fact that Muslims are and must be loyal Yugoslavs. On the other hand a new religious orientation is emerging which stresses the association of Bosnian Muslims with the outside Muslim world.

In chapter one I discuss the historical background and current political situation of the Bosnian Muslims. Through this examination the origins and evolution of the contemporary Muslim conception of group identity are illuminated. Bosnian Muslims see themselves as both a) an identity group distinct from their Serbian (Orthodox) and Croatian (Catholic) neighbours within Bosnia, and b) as a group which forms part of the worldwide Islamic *Umma* outside the bounds of the Yugoslav state. They thus have a double identity.

Chapter two looks at the social structure and everyday life of Muslims in the town of Sarajevo. For their inhabitants, Sarajevo's Muslim neighbourhoods are not only geographically distant from the town centre but conceptually so. Whilst the neighbourhood is seen as the domain of Islamic values and customs, the town centre is the realm of anonymity in which religious and national affiliation are played down and members of different identity groups interact at work and school. Whilst the former is the realm of women, the latter is that of men. In contrast to the pattern typical of Middle Eastern Muslim societies, the ties of kinship are of relatively little weight amongst Bosnian Muslims whilst the social, economic and ritual ties between neighbours are strong. It is thus principally through the interactions of women that the most important social unit above the level of the nuclear family (ie. the neighbourhood community) is held together.

The third chapter focuses on the folk evaluation of various religious practices. Whilst a sharp contrast between Orthodoxy and un-Orthodoxy is sometimes drawn (usually in the context of personal accusations) Sarajevan Muslims typically view religious actions as positioned on a scale of acceptability to God rather than as lying on one side of a deep moral or theological divide. The polarity of Orthodox vs. Popular Islam frequently employed by anthropologists is not, ofcourse automatically invalidated by this fact, yet in the Sarajevan context it becomes redundant. In the absence of a strong social divide, whether urban/tribal, landowner/peasant or *ulema*/layman, the Orthodox and Popular labels cannot be affixed to particular distinct social groups and thus their potential analytical value is diminished.

In chapter four I examine the state authorised Muslim establishment, the *Islamska Zajednica*, and its dual attempt to monopolise religious authority and to ally socialist ideology with Islamic faith. The popular reaction to the

religious bureaucracy's first aim is mixed; factors such as age, sex and residence seem to condition its acceptance on the part of the Muslim population. Reaction to the Zajednica's rapprochement of socialism and Islam is unsympathetic; Muslims cannot accept their identity as being bound up with Yugoslav socialist identity.

Chapter five considers two potential rivals of the Islamska Zajednica for religious authority. The first, the dervish orders, have an unrealised potential for whilst the brotherhoods form an obvious possible focus for those dissatisfied with the leadership of the Zajednica, in practice they have few affiliates. This is partly because their acquiescence to the Muslim establishment's rule does not allow them to offer an alternative to its vision of Islam or of Bosnian Muslim identity.

The second is a new tendency which is at the same time mystical and scripturalist. It is not a formal organisation but a fluid and somewhat secretive network which is loosely focused around a number of charismatic male religious leaders who call themselves sheikhs. Their adherents find inspiration both in the Arab world and in the rapid growth of Islam in the West. They thus associate themselves as Bosnian Muslims with the outside Islamic world. Whilst sharing characteristics with the fundamentalists of Muslim dominated societies, the tendency does not call for the recognition of *Shari'a* law by the state but concentrates on transforming the values and behaviour of Muslims in their personal and familial lives.

The final chapter considers male and female death rituals. Sarajevan Muslim men differ from many of their Muslim counterparts in the high value they place on the rituals of women. I suggest that this is because the women's death ritual expresses one aspect of the Muslims' double identity, that of distinction

from other identity groups in Yugoslavia, whilst the male ritual asserts another, the association with the wider Islamic world.

Through an ethnographic approach a number of questions concerning Bosnian Muslim society are then addressed; the perception of town and neighbourhood as separate conceptual spaces, the character of gender relations, the folk evaluation of religious rituals, the nature of religious rivalry. However, because the themes of incipient nationalism and of the co-extension of national and religious identity pervade the consciousness of all and strongly affect everyday life in Bosnia, the micro-level of social interaction and the macro-level of political process are closely intertwined. It is therefore hoped that the present study, as well as providing an analysis of the social and ritual life of Sarajevan Muslims themselves, may cast light on some broader questions concerning the development of nationalism, the position of minorities in the (socialist) state and the political role of Islam.

1. DOUBLE IDENTITY

Telling jokes has never been something at which I've had much success but in Bosnia I found that even I could raise a laugh with the ones that begin: "There's an Englishman, an Irishman and a Scotsman...". The variations and conflicts between members of different ethnic groups is something readily understood by Bosnians and many of their own jokes make fun of the stupid Albanian, the proud and lazy Montenegrin, the liberated Slovene and so on. (Some of these jokes appear in an appendix at the end of this thesis.)

The discrete identities of these groups are recognised by the Yugoslav constitution itself which proclaims the state a federation of several nationalities (including the Albanian, the Montenegrin and the Slovenian). Yet within Bosnia the popular conception of group identity differs from the official conception of the state. The state recognises identity as based solely on nationality whilst the popular view is that identity is based both on nationality and on religious affiliation.

The republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is predominantly inhabited by members of three officially recognised nationalities - the Serbian, the Croatian and the Muslim. Each of the three nationalities corresponds to one of three religions - Serbian Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism and Islam. Whilst the state officially ignores this correspondence, in popular parlance terms of national and of religious affiliation are taken as co-extensive; thus a Serb is Serbian Orthodox and vice versa, a Croat is Catholic and vice versa and a Muslim is a member of the Islamic faith and vice versa. Bosnians thus view the identities of the three groups as both national and religious.

Bosnia's three identity groups may be described as ethnic groups, however, there are two reasons for avoiding this term here. The first is simply that the term is vague and inadequately defined. Can ethnic groups be discerned objectively on the basis of religious, linguistic, racial and other differences or do they exist merely in virtue of the subjective feelings of their members? Have ethnic groups always been with us or are they a relatively recent phenomenon? What definition of ethnic groups can exclude groups such as castes or classes which are endogamous, share cultural values and forms and consider themselves to be distinct from other such castes or classes? The term is a vague one but the basis on which Bosnian Muslims distinguish themselves from their non-Muslim neighbours is not vague. The Muslim, the Serb/Serbian Orthodox and the Croat/Catholic see themselves as distinct groups in virtue of their distinct nationalities and religions (or religious origins). For this reason the specific idea of a "national/religious group" is preferable to that of an "ethnic group".

The second case for avoiding the term "ethnic group" rests on one of the propositions of this work. The Bosnian Muslims define their group identity partly in terms of their religious and national distinction from the other two groups resident in Bosnia. However, they also have a second source of identity on which to draw. They are not only *distinct* from their Bosnian (and other Yugoslav) neighbours but also *members* of a wider Muslim world outside Yugoslavia. Muslims define their group identity both in terms of *distinction* at home and in terms of *association* abroad. This is the double identity of the Bosnian Muslims. Double identity is not unique to Bosnian Muslim society; American Jews may feel themselves to be both distinct from non-Jewish Americans and members of a worldwide Jewish community, Yugoslav Gypsies feel themselves to be distinct from other Yugoslavs and have recently begun

to stress their unity with the Romany world at large, organising international conferences and pushing for the rights of Gypsies everywhere. But the double identity of Bosnian Muslims is impressive in the extent to which it permeates social and religious life. The two aspects of identity are expressed in different religious rituals and asserted by different religious leaders and organisations. Studies of "ethnicity" and "ethnic groups" tend to focus on the boundaries between neighbouring groups (an approach formulated by Barth, 1970) rather than examining all the components of their self perceptions of identity. In Bosnia, the perceived differences between Muslim and Serb/Serbian Orthodox, and between Muslim and Croat/Catholic, are but one component of the Bosnian Muslims' self perception of identity. Another is the relationship perceived between Bosnian Muslims and the wider Islamic world or *Umma*.

This view of identity is at variance with that of the Yugoslav state.

Republics and Autonomous Provinces

Yugoslavia (literally meaning "South Slav Land") is composed of six republics and two autonomous provinces. The republics are those of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In the fifteenth century Bosnia had been a feudal kingdom periodically dominated by the Hungarians. In 1463 it was invaded by the Ottomans who ruled the province for the next four hundred years. In 1878 the Austro-Hungarian Empire occupied the region. The Ottomans remained the titular rulers of Bosnia but the region was administered by the Austro-Hungarians who annexed it in 1908. Austrian rule ended with the First World War after which Bosnia was incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. During this period of its history

the region was officially partitioned between Serbia and Croatia. It was with the aim of scotching the competing claims of Serbia and Croatia over the territory that the socialist government of the post World War Two Yugoslavia proclaimed Bosnia-Herzegovina a separate republic.

The two autonomous provinces are those of Vojvodina and Kosovo, both of which form part of the republic of Serbia.

Each of the republics and autonomous provinces has its own governmental assembly which is autonomous to a high degree, though the provincial assemblies are less so than the republican assemblies (1). Four fifths of Yugoslavia's total public sector budget are spent by the regional (republican and provincial) assemblies.

The Assembly of Yugoslavia, deals with matters of general economic administration (for example the distribution of resources between regions), national defense, foreign affairs and the security police. It is composed of two chambers, the chamber of republics and provinces and the federal chamber. The former consists of 8 delegations, one from each republic and autonomous province. The latter is composed of 220 members, 30 from each republic and 20 from each autonomous province. This imbalance between republican and provincial representatives means that the provinces wield less authority in federal decision making than do the republics. (For a fuller description of government in Yugoslavia see Nyrop 1982)

(1) In 1988 certain sections of the Communist Party of Serbia are demanding greater restrictions on the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina.

Narod and Narodnost

Yugoslavia is a federation. Whilst the republics and autonomous provinces are the administrative units of the state, the federation of Yugoslavia is constitutionally one of peoples or nationalities rather than of regions. It is the nationalities of Yugoslavia rather than the regions which have the theoretical right to secede from the federation. The state distinguishes two categories of nationalities - *narod* and *narodnost*.

Six *narod* are recognised; the Serbian, the Croatian, the Slovenian, the Macedonian, the Montenegrin and the Muslim. The first five are obviously based on five of the six republics, although there are Serbs who live outside of Serbia (in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example), Croats who live outside of Croatia and so on. The sixth category, Muslim, has a complicated history which will be discussed below.

A number of *narodnost* are recognised including the Albanian, the Turkish, the Hungarian, the Romi (Gypsy) and others.

It is difficult to provide a good translation of the terms *narod* and *narodnost* since no clear criteria seem to distinguish the nationalities designated by the two terms. In general it is the case that a *narod* is a group the majority of whose members live within the borders of Yugoslavia whilst a large percentage of the members of a *narodnost* live outside the country (thus, most Turks live in Turkey and most Hungarians in Hungary). This equation is not, however, universally applicable: many Macedonians live in Bulgaria and Greece. The state's ascription of *narod* or *narodnost* status to different nationalities seems to be based on political and diplomatic considerations rather than those of pure logic.

This becomes clear when we examine the case of the Muslim *narod*. In the censuses of 1948 and 1953 respondents were required to state both their

national and their religious affiliation (see Singleton 1976). The category "Muslim" was not at the time taken as denoting either a *narod* or a *narodnost* but could be given only in answer to the census question about religion. Bosnian Muslims thus gave their national affiliation as "Serb", "Croat" or "Undeclared" and their religious affiliation as Muslim. In 1961 the census changed in two ways. Firstly, no question as to religious affiliation was asked, and secondly, the term "Muslim" was permitted as an answer to the question as to nationality: Muslims were allowed to account themselves "Muslims in the ethnic sense". Two years later the 1963 Constitution accorded them the status of a *narodnost*. Finally, in 1971, the Muslim *narodnost* was upgraded to the status of a *narod*. The motivation of this upgrading was threefold: a) to put a final end to age-old disputes between the Serbs and the Croats as to whether the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina were *really* Serbs of the Islamic faith or Croats of the Islamic faith (such disputes were related to the age-old territorial ambitions of Serbia and Croatia within Bosnia-Herzegovina), b) to satisfy the demands of Bosnian Muslims (these had grown louder since the 1966 fall of Ranković, the Serbian head of Secret Police whose reign involved the repression of the non-Serbian nationalities and who was widely viewed by these nationalities as a Serbian expansionist), and c) to curry some favour with the largely Arab and Muslim non-aligned world of which Tito was a figurehead. The motivation was thus a political one. (For a detailed account of the history of census taking see Petričević 1983.)

Official membership of a *narod* or *narodnost* is on the basis of self-ascription. Filling in the census form is not a question of ticking the appropriate box but of writing down one's answer in full, with the help of an elaborate set of instructions. (In 1981 it became permissible not to answer

the census question on nationality at all, however, less than 1% of Bosnians choose this option.) Citizens may write down whatever they like and will be noted accordingly in the statistics except in the case of those individuals who give an answer that is not seen as denoting any nationality at all, for example individuals who describe themselves by regional terms such as "Dalmatian" or "Hercegovinan". These individuals will be counted in the statistics as "Yugoslavs".

The category "Yugoslav" came into being in 1961 as an alternative for those who did not wish to define themselves as members of any particular *narod* or *narodnost*. This alternative has fluctuated in popularity over the years. It is impossible to be certain of whom exactly it appeals to but it was my impression that children of nationally mixed marriages or people especially committed to the Communist Party, for example Party officials, were likely to define themselves in this way. (By no means all Party members do so.)

In 1981 almost 90% of the population of Bosnia-Hercegovina described themselves as belonging to one of three *narodí*, the Muslim, the Serb or the Croat. The exact figures are:

Muslim	39,52%	(1,630,033)
Serb	32,02%	(1,320,738)
Croat	18,38%	(758,140)
Yugoslav	7,91%	(326,316)

(A more detailed breakdown of the population's national affiliation from 1953 to 1981 is given in appendix b.)


The distinction between republics and autonomous provinces is of great importance in terms of political power. The basic demand of the Albanian nationalist movement in Kosovo is thus that their region be upgraded to the

status of a republic rather than that their *narodnost* be upgraded to the status of a *narod*. The material relevance of belonging to a particular *narod* or *narodnost* is less. Republican and provincial governments do try to keep the political representation of the various nationalities in proportion with the size of these nationalities, but no quota system is employed and thus, for example, in 1971 Serbs formed 14.2% of the population of Croatia but 24.7% of the Republic's Communist Party. In the same year Serbs dominated the Bosnian party, in spite of being only 37.19% of the population, whilst Muslims, and especially Croats, were under-represented within it (see Carter 1982 p.35). Again, the Constitution formally guarantees the proportional representation of nationalities within the officer corps of the army, yet in 1970 Serbs were found to form 57.4% of the corps whilst Albanians formed only 1.2% of it. Their respective proportions of Yugoslavia's population were 36.3% and 7.7% (see Ramet op cit. p.39). There are no official quotas based on national affiliation for the recruitment of government officials, university students, policemen, company employees or any other group. An individual's national affiliation therefore affects his or her opportunities only in exceptional cases (2).

- (2) One such exceptional case is the result of the current disturbances in Kosovo. A man whom I knew lived and worked in Kosovo but had been born in the Montenegrin Sandžak and was a Muslim by faith. He wanted to exchange both job and apartment to move to Sarajevo. In his transferral application he misguidedly stated that he was a Montenegrin by national affiliation, thinking that this would help his cause. As it turned out, this was the worst thing he could have done. Had he described himself as a member of the Muslim nation he would have been allowed to transfer whereas current policy in Kosovo aims to stop the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from the region.

The symbolic importance of nationality status is, however, enormous in a federated state such as Yugoslavia. The Muslims fought hard for their recognition first as a *narodnost* and then as a *narod*. The appearance in 1972 of a textbook, "The History of Yugoslavia", which treated the Muslims of Bosnia merely as a religious rather than as a national group provoked outrage amongst Muslim intellectuals. The contribution of such intellectuals to the presentation of Bosnian Muslims as a group with a cohesive national identity rather than simply a religious identity has been large. Some Muslim historians have written the history of Bosnia in such a way as to suggest that the roots of the Muslim population's cohesiveness extend back even further than the arrival of the Ottoman Empire and Islam to the days of the mediaeval kingdom of Bosnia. They further stress the distinction of Bosnian Muslim art, architecture, literature and music from that of the Turks, thus to an extent denying the relationship of the Bosnian Muslim group to that of other Muslims and playing down the Islamic content of Bosnian Muslim culture. (See, for example, Hadžijahić 1977).

In the most recent census (1981) 8.9% of the Yugoslav population described themselves as members of the Muslim *narod*. Of these the vast majority lived within Bosnia-Hercegovina or the Sandžak region. In Ottoman times the latter formed part of the pashluk of Bosnia and although it is today partitioned between the republics of Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina, its Muslims still see themselves as sharing an identity with those of Bosnia. As one Muslim woman of Sandžaklian origin told me in her Sarajevan home: "The Sandžak to Bosnia is like from here to the town square". Members of the Islamic faith who live within the Serbian or Montenegrin Sandžak are unlikely to describe themselves on the census as



members of the Serbian or Montenegrin *narod* or as anything other than "Muslims".

However, not all Yugoslav citizens of the Muslim faith belong to the Muslim *narod*. Many are of Albanian, Turkish, Macedonian or Gypsy origin and describe themselves on the census as belonging to these nationalities. Thus the Islamic religious community of Yugoslavia is divided into several different nationality groups. These separate fragments of the Islamic religious community are by no means in harmony with each other. Thus Bosnian Muslims tend to think of their Gypsy counterparts as lazy, shiftless and untrustworthy, whilst the Albanians are branded as troublemakers who, if unhappy in Kosovo, should take themselves and their political demands off to Albania. This lack of harmony tends to inhibit the rise of any Pan-Islamic political movement encompassing all Yugoslav Muslims.

It need not, however, necessarily inhibit the rise of a specifically Bosnian Muslim nationalism which relies on religious faith to make political claims. Whilst Macedonians, Albanians and Gypsies may be Muslims by faith, members of the Muslim *narod* are necessarily so since neither Christians nor Jews would consider accounting themselves "Muslims". In contrast about 4% of Kosovo's Albanians are Christians, as are many more within the state of Albania. The result is that the Albanian nationalist movement of Kosovo seems to have little or no religious element. By stressing their Islamic identity the Albanian nationalists would simply divided themselves from their Christian counterparts and weaken their own claim. The Bosnian Muslims, on the other hand, would alienate none of their fellow nationals by stressing their religious identity in the context of a nationalistic movement, since all of these fellow nationals share the Islamic faith ⁽³⁾. It is for this reason that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the LCY, so fears the identification

of religion and nationality among Bosnian Muslims, and as Ramet neatly puts it:

"wants to have it both ways: viz., to derive a new nationality from a religion but yet to deny that derivation and suppress demands that are based on it." (Ramet 1984 p.155)

For various diplomatic reasons the state is happy to have a Muslim *narod* so long as that *narod* does not start claiming status and priveleges on the basis of its religion.

The Co-extension of National and Religious Identity

It has been noted that Bosnia-Hercegovina is inhabited by members of three religious communities; the Serbian Orthodox, the Roman Catholic and the Islamic. The three faiths correspond to the three *narodí* of Bosnia; the Serbian, the Croatian and the Muslim. This correspondence, as has been pointed out, is not officially recognised by the secular, socialist state which deems religion a private affair and has not, since 1953, asked any census questions about religious affiliation. In the state's view religion and nationality are separate. Thus in official terminology the capitalised "Muslim" (*Musliman*) denotes something quite different from the lower case "muslim" (*musliman*). The former refers to an individual of a particular *narod* whilst the latter describes a person of a particular religious persuasion or background. In the state's view then, it is possible to be a "Muslim" without being a "muslim", and vice versa⁴.

(3) The Turkish nationality, like the Muslim, includes only individuals of Islamic religious origin. However, the existence of a Turkish state outside Yugoslavia and the possession of a language distinct from that of other citizens offers Yugoslav Turks a more obvious basis on which to claim national identity than would Islam.

In the popular view, however, national and religious affiliation are taken as co-extensive. Thus when someone told me a story about a "Serb" and I questioned the speaker as to the meaning of this term, the answer was that the person was of the Serbian Orthodox faith. My suggestions that the person in question was of Serbian origin or family were rejected as not being the defining characteristic of a Serb. Conversely, a person of Serbian Orthodox faith was defined as being a Serb rather than someone whose allegiance lay with the Serbian Orthodox Church. In a similar manner a Croat simply is a Catholic and a Muslim is a Muslim.

In general, the terms used to refer to the three identity groups are "Serb", "Catholic" and "Muslim", and this usage will be adhered to here. The terms "Serbian Orthodox" and "Croat" are uncommon. In the Serbo-Croatian language "Serb" is *Srbín* and "Serbian Orthodox" is *Pravaslav*. The etymological distance of the two terms suggests that the term "Serb" (*Srbín*) is not merely a linguistic shorthand for "Serbian Orthodox" (*Pravaslav*).

The co-extension of national and religious identity is so strong that it spills over into non-Bosnian contexts. The first time I met a particular woman she asked me what my nationality (*nacijsa*) was. I said that I was English but she replied that she knew that but it wasn't what she meant. Misunderstanding, I explained that my nationality was indeed English, it was my citizenship that was British. However, that was apparently not what she meant either, she kept stressing that she wanted to know my nationality. After several rounds of fruitless question and answer she helped me: "Are

- (4) Throughout this thesis only the capitalised form, "Muslim", will be employed. This is in adherence both to the popular Bosnian conflation of religious and national identity and to standard English usage.

you a Catholic or a Serb?". I explained that I was neither one nor the other but a Protestant and was then deemed to have answered the question correctly. There was still a small problem since the woman didn't know what a Protestant was so she asked me whether Protestants had Christmas and whether it was on the seventh of January (as is the Serbian Orthodox Christmas). I told her the correct date, to which she remarked: "Ah, like the Germans".

It has been seen that 7.91% of the Bosnian population described themselves on the 1981 census as "Yugoslavs". This fact, however, has no impact on day-to-day conception or speech. Nobody refers to anybody else as a "Yugoslav" except when distinguishing them from Russians, Australians or other foreigners. Occasionally a person was referred to as a "Communist", but only in the case of those who were exceptionally committed to the Party (many Party members are not) and even then the speaker might qualify the statement by explaining that the Communist in question was at the same time a Muslim, Serb or Catholic.

I do not suggest that the idea of "Yugoslavness" is a meaningless one for the country's citizens or that they all consider themselves as 100% Muslims, Slovenes, Croats etc. and 0% Yugoslavs. Yet the way in which they account themselves Muslims, Slovenes or Croats seems to differ from that in which they consider themselves Yugoslavs. In this context it is interesting to consider the Communist Party's changing views on nationality since the war. In the 1950s the idea of "Yugoslavism" and the existence of a "Yugoslav culture" was prevalent within the Party. Of course the various nationalities were politically recognised as separate entities but there was some feeling that an increasingly homogeneous society would emerge as socialism progressed, that there was a Yugoslav nation in the process of formation.

This climate was unwelcome to Croats and Slovenes who felt that "Yugoslavism" was simply a mask for Serbian expansionist unitarism. In 1964 the Eighth Congress of the LCY disowned the concept of Yugoslavism. Tito condemned "the confused idea that the unity of our peoples means the elimination of nationalities and the creation of something new and artificial" and the Congress declared that the idea "that it is necessary to create a unified Yugoslav nation [is an] expression of bureaucratic centralism and unitarism" (see Ramet op cit. p.56 & 57).

In place of Yugoslavism came the idea of "Yugoslav socialist patriotism":

"the identification with, feeling for, and love of the socialist self-managing community...a moral force for the unity of the socialist self-managing of nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia" (Miladinović 1976, quoted in Ramet op cit. p.58).

Yugoslav socialist patriotism is fostered in a number of ways - through the celebration of all-Yugoslav holidays, Yugoslav competition in international sporting events, school trips to other republics, the mixed national composition of army conscript regiments and the deployment of conscripts in republics other than their own ⁽⁵⁾. And citizens do indeed identify, at one level, with the Yugoslav community. Yet Yugoslav socialist patriotism does not exclude, and in some sense even presupposes, national patriotism. Thus one writer has urged that it be understood as the *combination* of a) devotion towards one's narrow homeland, and b) devotion towards the wider homeland of Yugoslavia (Nikolovski 1976, cited in Ramet op

(5) This type of deployment is not unique to Yugoslavia. Turkey, for example, employs the same method in the hope of encouraging Turkish patriotism. In Yugoslavia, however, it has a second important motive - if, for example, all Albanian conscripts were deployed in their homeland of Kosovo, trouble could reasonably be expected.

cit. p.58). Yet again the secular authorities seem to want to have it both ways and find themselves caught in paradox. Whilst fearing the outbreak of nationalist movements within Yugoslavia, they allow and even encourage the nationalistic sentiments of its citizens. The historical development of the nationalities and the contemporary political system of federation mean that these sentiments in any case need very little encouragement to thrive and it is national rather than Yugoslav identity which seems to hold pride of place in the feelings of most citizens.

In contemporary Bosnia, as has been seen, national identity is seen as co-extensive with religious identity, but this has not always been the case. To understand why it is necessary to take a brief glance back through the history of Bosnia.

Conversion to Islam

The mediaeval Kingdom of Bosnia was a feudal state periodically dominated by the Hungarians. It accomodated three faiths, that of the Roman Catholic Church, that of the Eastern Orthodox Church and that of the Bosnian Church. For many years scholars supposed Bosnian Church members to have been Bogomils, adherents of a dualistic heresy originating in Bulgaria, however, more recent work (Fine 1975) has challenged this hypothesis.

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Ottomans began to expand into the Balkans. Kosovo was taken in 1389, Constantinople (hereafter Istanbul) in 1453, the Kingdom of Bosnia in 1463 and the neighbouring Duchy of Hercegovina in 1482. Two changes in the religious life of Bosnia occurred after the Ottoman arrival. The first was the death of the Bosnian Church which is scarcely referred to in fifteenth and sixteenth century documents. The second was large scale conversion to Islam. This conversion was gradual

at first but had increased in pace by the end of the fifteenth century. Sixty years after the Ottoman invasion whole villages had converted to Islam. The level of conversion varied from region to region, in 1528 the Sarajevo region contained 19,619 Christian (Catholic and Orthodox) households and 16,935 Muslim households whereas the Zvornik region contained 13,112 Christian households and only 2,654 Muslim households (Fine 1975 p.384)

The reasons for and manner of conversion to Islam have been a matter of speculation for decades. For a long time the most widely held view was that members of the Bosnian Church/Bogomil sect and of the aristocracy converted en masse (see, for example, Solovjev 1949 and Dvornik 1962). The reasons given for the wholesale conversion of the former are either that the Bogomils turned to Islam in reaction against previous persecution by Catholics or that the Church's doctrine was close enough to that of Islam to facilitate conversion. (The latter view is that propounded by some contemporary Bosnian Muslim intellectuals in an attempt to prove the pre-Islamic origins of Bosnian Muslim society.) The aristocracy are said to have converted to the conquerors' faith in order to retain their economic and political advantage under the new Ottoman regime.

The work of John Fine Jnr. (op cit.) casts strong doubt on such theories. Fine shows that none of Bosnia's three churches had commanded strong loyalty before the Ottoman invasion, and that the Bosnian Church, in particular, was in a state of decay. Its monastic clergy had failed to establish a preaching order or to forge close ties with the populace and when King Stefan Tomas, a convert to Catholicism, exiled a number of its clergy in 1460, the Church was weakened yet further. Furthermore, conversions from faith to faith had been common throughout the fifteenth century; records from the 1450's show that the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches were competing for converts in a

particular area of Bosnia. The 1450s and '60s saw a number of forcible conversions to Catholicism.

Furthermore, Fine shows that the Ottoman invasion was followed by conversions not only to Islam but also to the Orthodox Church. He also points out that the mass conversion of Bosnian Church members is supported by little written evidence: whilst there are definite records of Catholic and Orthodox conversions to Islam there are no unambiguous records of the conversion of Bosnian Church adherents to the new faith.

The "Bosnian Church" theory does not then seem to hold water. According to Fine, the theory of wholesale conversion on the part of the aristocracy is little better supported by the evidence. The author shows that the written sources do not suggest a mass conversion on the part of any single group. Records from the 1480s prove the existence of households in which the father had a Slavic name and the son a Muslim one. Records of mixed marriages are also to be found. This evidence suggests that conversion, where it happened, was on an individual rather than a group or family basis.

Such conversion would have been facilitated by the fact that, historically, Bosnians did not have long-standing loyalties to particular churches. Its motivation is, ofcourse, harder to explain. Vucinich (1963) suggests that individuals might have converted to avoid the *devshirme*, the system through which the Ottoman Empire recruited its civil and some military officials. Every five to six years a certain number of Christian boys were removed from their families and taken to Istanbul to be converted to Islam and trained for service. Although such boys often made very good careers for themselves, one can understand that a family might not think this sufficient inducement to part with its sons. There are, however, two reasons for which avoidance of the *devshirme* seems an unlikely motive for

conversion. The first is that Christian Bosnians anxious to keep their sons could, and often did, resort to the less drastic strategy of marrying these sons off at an early age - no married boy could be taken in the *devshirme* (see Filipović 1982). The second problem with the hypothesis is provided by the example of those Bosnians who did convert to Islam and did so only on the condition that their sons would not be excluded from the *devshirme* (see Jelavich 1983 volume 1, p.41.)

Economic considerations may have played a part in inducing Bosnians to convert to Islam; it is certainly true that all the wealthy landowners of Ottoman Bosnia were Muslims rather than Christians.

Group Identity in the Ottoman Period

Late fifteenth century Bosnia contained three loose groups, the Orthodox, the Catholic and the Muslim, between which intermarriage and conversions were not uncommon. In the sixteenth century the boundaries between these three groups hardened. Three points must be made about Bosnian Muslim identity in the Ottoman period. The first is that Ottoman Bosnia was a society conceptually divided along religious lines, not along national lines. The second is that the Muslim group was strongly divided along class lines. Finally, no single and exclusive term of reference was used by anyone to refer to the Muslim group.

Ottoman Bosnian society was conceptually divided along religious rather than national lines. This conception of social division was realised in the *millet* system of the Ottoman Empire (see Sugar 1977 p.44). Both the Catholic and the Orthodox population were organised into official religious communities known as *millets*. Conceptually, all the Catholics of the Empire were members of a single Catholic *millet* whilst all the Orthodox Christians

were members of a single Orthodox *millet*. At the local level, Catholic and Orthodox communities had their own local officials, the priests, bishops and patriarchs. (Bosnia's small Jewish community also had its local officials.) These local religious leaders were authorised to perform marriages and to adjudicate on matters of Church law for the benefit of members of their own religious community. (Although see Filipović 1982 on reasons for which Bosnian Christians sometimes preferred to appeal to a Muslim *kadija* than to one of their own *millet* authorities.) The Muslims of Bosnia, whilst having their own local *kadijas* (judges who administered *Shari'a* and secular, *kanun*, law) and regional muftis (juriconsults who made legal decisions or *fetvas*), were not then conceptually distinguished from other Muslims of the Empire, including the Ottomans themselves. All Muslims were taken as belonging to the single Islamic *Umma*.

The Muslims were a group divided by strong class boundaries. In theory the Ottoman system accommodated two categories or classes of subject; the *askeri* and the *raya*. The *askeri*, or "professional Ottomans" as they are sometimes called, included all military and civil officials and members of the *ulema* such as the *kadijas* (Islamic judges) and *mufti* (juriconsult). The *raya* ("protected flock") was composed of the peasants, traders, merchants, professionals, and minor religious figures such as hodjas (or imams) and priests. *Raya* could be Christian, Muslim or Jewish. They paid taxes and were subject to restrictions on their mode of life and dress. The *askeri* had to be paid for their services and the payment was the grant of land through fief from the Sultan. (See Sugar 1977 and Jelavich 1983 for a fuller account.) In Bosnia there were two categories of landowner, the *begs* and the *agas*. The *begs* had larger land holdings and peasants living on *begliks* had higher obligations in terms of labour and payments than did those living on *agaliks*.

The most reliable extant figures on class division are to be found in the census of 1878. This was the year in which Austro-Hungarian Empire occupied the region and it was the occupiers who compiled the census. The figures do not then strictly apply to Bosnia-Herzegovina under the Ottomans, however, they were taken so soon after the Austro-Hungarian occupation that they may be considered valid for the late Ottoman period. Moreover, the Austro-Hungarian presence over forty years (1878 - 1908) made very little difference to the class structure or land tenure patterns of Bosnian society which were radically altered only after the Second World War.

The 1878 census shows:

6,000 - 7,000 *begs* and *agas* (All Muslims.)

77,000 free peasants. (The vast majority Muslims.)

85,000 peasants bound in duty to landlords (60,000 Serbs, 23,000 Croats, 2,000 Muslims.)

(Taken from Lockwood 1975 p.26)

In addition to this there were ofcourse the urban traders and craftsmen, many of whom were janissaries (Ottoman infantry), and the minor religious figures, hodjas and priests.

No single and exclusive term was used to refer to the Muslims. Within the Empire they were sometimes referred to as *Bošnjaci*. By Bosnian Christians they were called "Turks" and thus identified with the Ottomans themselves. Bosnian Muslims in fact sometimes used the term "Turks" self referentially. (Lockwood 1979).

Changing Conceptions: The Mid Nineteenth Century Onwards

Throughout most of the Ottoman period the Muslims were a group internally divided by class and conceptually distinguished from their

Orthodox and Catholic neighbours on the basis of religion. In the 1980s the Bosnian Muslims are a relatively cohesive group which is conceptually distinguished from others on the basis of both religion and nationality. In order to understand the process through which this change came about it is necessary to look, however briefly, at the complicated history of Bosnia from the mid nineteenth century onwards.

The nineteenth century Ottoman Empire was beset with troubles. In 1830 Serbia (which neighboured Bosnia) had, with the support of Russia, gained from its Ottoman masters the status of an autonomous principality. In 1869 it became completely independent in all but name. The Empire lost lands in Croatia and Hungary. This loss resulted in a number of unemployed janissaries (cavalry officers) gathering in the towns of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The *begs* and *agas* of Bosnia had, by this time, come to regard the lands they held as theirs by right rather than as grants from the Sultan. They imposed increasingly heavy and arbitrary taxes on the Christian peasants who, in 1875, rebelled. The Empire attempted a programme of agrarian reform but was vigorously opposed by the Bosnian Muslim landowners.

It was partly in order to solve these problems that the European powers agreed, at the 1878 Congress of Berlin, to the occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1908, after an unofficial deal and in contravention of the Berlin treaty, Austria-Hungary annexed the region. This illegal action was contested by none of the European powers. The initial occupation had not been welcomed either by the Serbian population or by the Muslims, many of the latter resisting with arms or fleeing to Istanbul. The *begs* and *agas* had been fearful that the new regime might alter the system of land tenure to their detriment. In fact, whilst reducing the level of exploitation of the peasantry, the Austro-Hungarians left the system

very much intact. The Empire's main contribution to Bosnia was the introduction of modern technology, roads and railways rather than agrarian reform. In the political field, the Empire introduced a system of electoral colleges based on the three way religious division of the area. Thus the Serbian Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim populations each had its own electoral college. The system led to the creation of political parties based on religious affiliation; in 1906 the first Muslim political party, the Muslim National Organisation, was founded in embryonic form (see Donia 1981). At this stage most of its support came from the Muslim elite rather than from the peasantry.

(In the Sandžak region it was only after the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 that Ottoman rule came to an end. This end was immediately followed by widespread Christian looting and massacring of Muslims.)

In 1918 European negotiations in Corfu led to the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) which included the Sandžak and Bosnian regions and most of the contemporary territories of socialist Yugoslavia. The Kingdom was ruled by a Serbian dynasty, a fact which aroused dissatisfaction amongst the Croats who wanted Serbia and Croatia to share power equally. Bosnia was a particular bone of contention between them since both thought that the region was historically a part of its own territory. During the days of the Kingdom the region of Bosnia was partitioned between Serbia and Croatia. Until the dictatorship of 1929 the Kingdom had a system of government including various political parties, one of which was the Muslim National Organisation, now renamed the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation. Its support now came from Muslim peasants as well as from the elites.

During the Second World War the Kingdom was divided and chaos reigned. Various parts of the country were occupied by different Axis powers; Croatia and Bosnia by an Italian puppet state, Serbia by the Nazis and Macedonia by the Bulgarians who were allied with Germany and the Soviet Union. In addition to foreign occupation the country was riven by inter group tensions which had been present throughout the interwar years and which now broke out into a bloodbath. The Croatian fascists, the Ustashi, in alliance with the Italians massacred Serbs in Bosnia. The Serbian Chetnik movement which hoped to establish a Serbian ruled state including the lands of Croatia and Bosnia massacred thousands upon thousands of Muslims, particularly in the Sandžak region. I met no Sandžaklian Muslim who did not have horrific stories to tell about Chetnik atrocities; the Germans are considered to have been mild in comparison.

The Partisan movement, led by Josip Broz Tito, attempted to include all Yugoslavs in a concerted effort against the occupying forces. Initially the Partisans' support came mainly from Serbs living under the fascist Croatian state (the Bosnian Muslims were not strong supporters) but later the movement drew in people of non-Serbian affiliation. The fascists were eventually defeated and it was through this liberation war, rather than a through internal class revolution, that the Communist Party came to power. The almost universal affection that is felt for Tito seems to be largely based, not on his social policies or Communism but on his leadership of the movement which put an end to the horrors of World War Two. As one elderly woman explained: "without Tito I doubt that there'd be anyone left alive in the country."

In the initial post-war years the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslav followed a Stalinist line but after the 1948 break with Moscow

policy changed. It does not lie within the scope of this work to dwell extensively on the nature of contemporary Yugoslav socialism but it is necessary to underline four points about it.

1. Yugoslavia is nonaligned. It does not form part of the Warsaw pact and considers its own brand of socialism fundamentally distinct from that of other socialist states.
2. Political power is decentralised, the republics and provinces having a high degree of autonomy.
3. Whilst there are few private businesses (and those which do exist are small concerns - cafes and boutiques) the Yugoslav economy is a market economy, a socialist market economy. The state does not plan and regulate economic affairs in the manner of its Soviet counterpart, it is the individual business enterprises and co-operatives which set their own targets. This system involves...
4. Self-management. Enterprises and agricultural co-operatives have workers' councils and, if large enough, managing boards, whose members decide the policies, plans and goals of the organisation. Self-management is not confined to the economic sphere but also present in local government and other institutions. Thus local commune assemblies are self-managed, as are educational, cultural and social welfare organisations. The system of self-management therefore provides the form of most communal endeavour and offers citizens the chance of democratic participation in political and economic decision-making. (It is, however, the case that certain classes of citizen are over represented in the self-managing councils and boards; Party members are vastly more in evidence than non-members, men are disproportionately present.)

Four hundred years of Ottoman rule were followed by one hundred years of rapid and immense social change, all of which affected the self perception of the Bosnian Muslim group. Donia and Lockwood identify two processes of change in the years following the initial arrival of the Ottomans in 1463:

"transformation of religious converts into ethnic group members...has been a slow and gradual process extended over hundreds of years...Two distinct processes may be identified within this Bosnian Muslim ethnogenesis: first, differentiation of the Muslims from Christian South Slavs; and, second, amalgamation of the Muslim converts so that they acted and thought as a single people. We contend that the latter process took longer and that a 'national consciousness' was not achieved until after World War Two." (Donia & Lockwood 1978 p.187)

Leaving aside the question of "ethnogenesis" and "ethnic group" I want to look at the first of these two processes, that of differentiation from the Christians. Lockwood rightly sees the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as times of great change in Bosnia, and particularly of great change in the conception of group identity. He states that:

"the development of South Slav nationalism in the nineteenth century... undoubtedly had the effect of...*emphasising* the boundary between Muslim and Christian....After the Austrian annexation, the process of ethnic differentiation quickened. This was a period of heightened ethnic consciousness for the Bosnian Muslims." (Lockwood 1979 p.215. My italics)

Christian rebellions of the nineteenth century and the collegiate electoral system established by the Austro-Hungarians did indeed alter the ways in which inter-group boundaries were conceptualised, but the word "emphasising" is an unspecific one which does not sufficiently indicate the nature of this alteration. Long before the nineteenth century Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox had recognised and marked differences between the three groups in ways which are still evident today. Thus, for example, intermarriage became extremely rare after the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries and remains unusual in contemporary Bosnia. Christian women sometimes married Muslim men (after having converted to Islam) but the

reverse was not the case. In contemporary Sarajevo all the young Muslims whom I met reported that their parents would be very upset were they to marry Christians, however, the exogamous marriage of Muslim sons seemed to cause less concern than that of Muslim daughters. (I knew of one case in which a Muslim man had married a Serbian woman who did not convert to Islam.) One young Muslim woman whom I met told me that her parents would be unhappy if her brother married a Serb or Catholic but would eventually accept it. They had, on the other hand, told their daughter that they would not want her to marry a non-Muslim under any circumstances. The logic of this discrimination was that a woman and her children came more under the control of her in-laws than did a man and his children and thus the former might lose their religion.

Friendships and other social relationships were and are almost as internal as marriage is endogamous. In the past this was particularly true in the case of women, and in rural Bosnia, was emphasised by the use of the veil. Rural Bosnia is dotted with small villages, some Muslim, some Catholic, some Serbian but very few mixed. These villages often stand within view of each other, on neighbouring hills and in neighbouring valleys. Muslim peasant women did not veil within their own villages but only when walking past those of non-Muslims or when journeying to town where they would come into contact with non-Muslims. The veil was thus used less as a means of sexual segregation than as a boundary marker between different identity groups.

In two cases social ties might be formed across group boundaries. The first was that of *šišano kumstvo*, a type of fictive kinship established between parents, a child and a *kum* (godparent) who cut a lock of the child's hair when it attained the age of one. (*Šišano kumstvo* will be discussed more

fully in chapter two.) Muslims occasionally requested non-Muslims to be *kum* to their child. However, the bond formed by this type of *kumstvo* was weak; there was no expectation that it would engender lasting friendship or obligate mutual aid and it was not believed to create a spiritual tie between the parties involved.

The second case was that of friendships created in the marketplace, and in contemporary Bosnia at the place of employment or study. The Muslim and the Christian who buy, sell, work or study together may form friendships. In the case of men these are necessarily limited to the physical space of the market, factory, firm or school since men do not invite their friends home. Women may invite their friends home but during my stay in Sarajevo I rarely witnessed a Muslim woman inviting a non-Muslim colleague to her home, whereas (female) Muslim friends were frequent visitors ⁽⁶⁾. My own visits to Muslim homes were exceptions to this general pattern, but exceptions which seemed to be based on two important criteria. Firstly, I had high status as an interesting foreigner from a country which was seen as *kulturni*, civilised, in comparison with Yugoslavia. Secondly, although not a Muslim, neither was I a Serb or Catholic and thus did not fall into one of the local groups from which Muslims stress their distinction. In general then, friendships were and are internal to the group. Those that are not tend to be physically confined to the space outside the home and neighbourhood.

- (6) The one regular (female) non-Muslim visitor to the homes of the Muslim neighbourhood in which I lived in Sarajevo, was the Serbian milkwoman who served the neighbourhood (she was a private rather than a public sector milkwoman). Every other morning she journeyed into Sarajevo from her village, with her donkey and milk pails, and was occasionally invited in for a coffee by one of the housewives.

Names always were, and remain today, indications of the affiliation of individuals. Certain surnames (Imamović, Hadžijahić, Mujezinović, Begović, Spahić etc.) are distinctively Muslim but it is above all the forename that bears witness to the individual's affiliation. Bosnian Muslim names are of Arabic, Persian or Turkish origin, although sometimes rendered in Serbo-Croatian form (Abdullah may become Avdo, Fatima may become Fata). Male names thus include Muhamed, Adnan, Džemal, Alija, Selim; women bear names such as Mevla, Fikreta, Amina, Hatidža and Rabiya. Those who convert from Christianity to Islam take new, Muslim names. The eighteenth century Sarajevan Muslim chronicler, Mula Mustafa Bašeskija, in 1784/85 noted the conversion of a Christian and a Jew to Islam; the two men took the names Osman and Salih. A young woman whom I met had converted from Catholicism to Islam and taken the name Azra. Catholics have their own distinctive forenames (Ivan, Marija...) as do Serbs (Jovan, Milka...)

The Muslim, the Catholic and the Orthodox always differed in their style of dress. Items of clothing such as the fez, for men, and *dimije* (flowing, baggy trousers) for women were distinctively Muslim. Only elderly Catholic women dressed in black. In eighteenth century Sarajevo official attempts were made to enforce a dress code. Thus in 1769/70 Bašeskija notes: "The town crier announced in the square that Jews and Christians can no longer wear yellow leggings and slippers but only red ones." Such rulings did not always produce the desired effect for in 1778/79 the *kadija* was forced to restate that yellow slippers were forbidden to Jews. However, whilst particular details seem sometimes to have been ignored, the three groups did dress in recognisably distinct styles. Lockwood notes that traditional peasant dress in rural Western Bosnia in the mid 1960s was basically the same for Muslims, Catholics and Serbs but that the three groups used different trimmings and

headgear to mark their distinct affiliations (Lockwood 1975).

The three groups were ofcourse distinguished by their religious practices. Muslims tend to know little of Christian belief but are aware of the rituals performed by both Serbs and Catholics. Thus few of the Muslims I met knew that Christmas celebrates the birth of Christ but many were aware that Catholics celebrate it on the twenty fifth of December whilst Serbs do so on the seventh of January. Few knew that Easter (Catholic *Uskrs*, Serbian *Vaskrs*) celebrates the resurrection of Christ but all knew that sometime in the spring the Serbs and Catholics held a "coloured eggs festival". In the countryside Muslim villagers may be able to hear the loud wailing of a funeral service from a neighbouring Serbian village and are thus aware of (and amused by, as will be seen in chapter six) the nature of this service. For Bosnians, the type of rituals and religious customs followed by any individual place that individual firmly within an identity group. Thus the woman who wanted to know what I meant by saying that I was a Protestant asked me whether and when I celebrated Christmas. Others asked me whether I crossed myself with three fingers, as do the Serbs, or whether my people wept loudly at funerals.

Clothing, names, rituals and a lack of intermarriage and inter-group friendships marked and reinforced group boundaries. So too did the use of certain different linguistic items (see chapter two). The boundaries between Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox were then felt, marked and clear long before the nineteenth century. The emergence of South Slav nationalism did not merely *emphasise* these boundaries, as Donia and Lockwood suggest, what it did was to politicise them. Osman and Fatima had already known that Ivan and Marija bore an identity different from their own. Nineteenth century nationalism, Christian rebellions and the creation of an autonomous Serbia

showed them that Ivan and Marija belonged to a group which not only expressed its identity through clothes, names, rituals and so on, but could use it to gain political advantage and recognition in a rapidly changing world. The rest of Europe was watching the Balkans, the tinderbox of Europe, and supporting the newly created nation state of Serbia ("Gallant little Serbia") and the struggles of the Christians against Ottoman rule. The idea of peoples or nationalities as the basis of political units prevailed. In this atmosphere Osman and Fatima realised that their own identity as Muslims was not merely religious and cultural but also a basis for political unity in the face of perceived threat, whether from Christian rebels, Ottoman reforms or Austro-Hungarian innovations.

The arrival of the Austro-Hungarians and a governmental system in which political parties were based on religious and cultural identity groups fostered the idea of religious, cultural and political identity as intertwined. It was yet more strongly enhanced in the interwar period when the Yugoslav parliament was (until the dictatorship of 1929) dominated by a coalition of three parties: the Serbian, the Croatian and the Muslim. In contemporary Yugoslavia the concept of nationality, of identity groups as political units, is underwritten in the very constitution.

From a Bosnia conceptually divided along religious lines there emerged a Bosnia conceptually divided along both religious and national lines. Inter group boundaries, which had been firm since the sixteenth century, were not only *emphasised* in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they were *politicised*.

The second process in Bosnian Muslim ethnogenesis was, according to Donia and Lockwood, that of amalgamation as a single people. The arrival of

the Austro-Hungarians had little effect on the class structure of Bosnian Muslim society which remained strongly divided between landowners, traders and peasantry. In the interwar period, however, the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation drew together both members of the Muslim elite and the Muslim peasantry. The advent of socialism and the federated state after World War Two diminished yet further the gulf between peasants and elite.

Fieldwork in an urban environment suggested that whilst divisions of class and status do endure within the Muslim group (these will be discussed in chapter two), they are far less important than those that exist between the three identity groups; the Muslim, the Serb and the Catholic. I once walked along the main street of Sarajevo with a couple of unmarried female friends, Zumreta and Amra. We ran into an elderly male acquaintance of Zumreta's who was a muezzin at one of the central mosques. We stopped to chat for a while, then turned to go our own ways.

"Salaam Aleikum", said the muezzin in Islamic farewell.

"Ciao!", replied Zumreta in the fashionable young style borrowed from Italy.

As we made off Amra said to Zumreta:

"Listen to you! The man tells you 'Salaam Aleikum' and you say 'Ciao!'. What kind of farewell is that to give to a muezzin?"

Zumreta replied:

"It doesn't matter. We're only *raya*."

She meant, ofcourse, that we, as ordinary folk, were not expected to speak in the same way as a religious personality. Her use of the term *raya* did not, however, indicate any feeling that Muslim society is radically divided between the *raya* and the elite, the comment was made merely in the spirit of a jest. The term *raya* is today often used by young people to mean

simply "people/friends/my crowd". Thus an answer to the question "Who did you go to the cinema with?", is "with *raya*".

Eighteenth century Bosnian Muslims formed a religious group in the *millet* system and were socially divided along class lines. The contemporary Bosnian Muslims are a cohesive national/religious group which distinguishes itself from, and is distinguished by, the other two national/religious groups of the region. This change in self perception of identity has been accompanied by linguistic changes. It has been seen that in Ottoman times the Muslims sometimes referred to themselves as "Turks", thus identifying themselves with the Ottoman Empire. It seems likely that this association began to break down towards the end of the Ottoman period. Avdo Mededović was "The Singer of Tales" made famous through the works of Milman Parry and Albert Lord. He was a Sandžaklijan Muslim who lived through the partition of the Pashilik of Bosnia in 1878 (when the Austro-Hungarians took Bosnia-Herzegovina but not the Sandžak) and the 1918 creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. For many years he served in the Ottoman army but speaking of his circa 1890 experiences in it seems to distinguish himself from the Turks:

Question Were you all Bosnians in your company?

Avdo Not at all. Four hundred of us all went off together from Senica, all Bosnians. Senica, we call that the Sandžak. We left from Senica and Bijelo Polje. All the Bosnians were put together in one camp; all the others were Albanians and Turks. We call those Anatolians Turks. ((Parry & Lord p.45)

This period had seen the Empire crumbling, the Christians (who associated indigenous Muslims with the Turks) rebelling and the Muslim landowners claiming land as their own, rather than recognising it as a grant from the Sultan. Linguistic disassociation from the Turks seems to have been the result. Contemporary Muslims, of Bosnia and the Sandžak, refer to

themselves only as "Muslims" (a term with both religious and national reference) rather than as Turks or Bosnians.

Bosnian Muslim Identity as Wider Islamic Identity

The Muslims are not only a group distinct from the Serbs and Catholics of Bosnia and from the Albanians, Slovenians and others of wider Yugoslavia, but a group which forms part of the Islamic world. This association has been stressed or played down at different times during the historical period under consideration. For the immediate pre-Austrian period Donia & Lockwood (op cit. p.192) note:

"As they increased their opposition to Ottoman reforms the Bosnian Muslims lost some of their intimate cultural contact with other parts of the Islamic world. They became increasingly alienated from the sources of cultural and religious activity in Asian parts of the Ottoman Empire and in Istanbul itself."

Again, the words of Avdo Mededović demonstrate this alienation. Avdo is explaining the occasion on which he struck a fellow officer.

Avdo He was swearing at me in a way that wasn't right. He was an Anatolian and he said 'Fuck your faith!' It's going too far to say a hard thing like that.

Question Was he a Turk?

Avdo Oh yes. He was a Turk too.

Question Then how could he say such a thing?

Avdo That's why I don't like them. All their talk about Asia, Asia and Turkey, but they're just a pack of infidels.(Parry & Lord p.44)

The Austro-Hungarian occupation brought about a reversal of this self disassociation. Many Muslims emigrated to Istanbul - Popovic suggests a figure of at least 65,000 (Popovic 1986 p.272). Those who remained in Bosnia began to emphasise and reactivate their religious links with the outside Islamic world. Donia and Lockwood note that:

"In the Austro-Hungarian period the Bosnian Muslim elite also promoted a revival of cultural ties with the East. Pilgrimages to Mecca were common...Wealthy Muslim landlords sent their sons to school in Istanbul. Muslim intellectuals...founded newspapers to publish the serialised translations of Arabic classics and publicise the sayings of the Prophet." (Donia & Lockwood op cit. p.194)

In contemporary Bosnia both aspects of Muslim identity - distinction from Serbs and Catholics within Bosnia and membership of the Islamic world - are given substance in standard rituals. In chapter six I will discuss the ways in which two Muslim death rituals, one performed by men and the other by women, express these two different aspects of identity.

Beyond the sphere of standard ritual, differing aspects of group identity are stressed by different religious philosophies and authorities in contemporary Bosnia. Whilst there has always been rivalry between different religious groups (for example, the dervishes and the puritans of the eighteenth century, see chapter five) the religious rivalry of today has an element which is new. Competing religious philosophies may include competing views of the nature of Bosnian Muslim group identity. Thus Sarajevo's new mystics and their charismatic leaders emphasise the membership of the Bosnian Muslims in the wider Muslim world whilst the official Muslim establishment stresses the alliance of Bosnian Muslim identity and Yugoslav socialist identity (see chapter five). For the moment it suffices to note that the Bosnian Muslims have more than one source on which to draw in their self definition of identity.

2. TOWN AND NEIGHBOURHOOD

My first "homes" in Sarajevo were various rooms in the town centre obtained through the tourist office. Some of the buildings were Austrian, some post-war, and none of the landladies were Muslims. There were mosques in the town, impressively attended on Fridays, but their Oriental impact was diluted by that of the Loto stalls, western clothes and fading advertisements for the 1984 Winter Olympics. The only Muslims I met were a band of academics, poets and publishers who frequented (along with their Christian colleagues) a smoke filled bar in which alcohol and conversation about James Joyce flowed equally freely. A Serbian, Communist acquaintance told me that she had friends who were Muslim believers. Whenever they were with her they seemed perfectly "modern" but she was sure that they were different at home. However, those were things one just didn't discuss with them.

When I moved out of the tourist rooms and into one of the Muslim districts I realised that she was right, life in the "home" environment was different from life outside in the town, there was something "Islamic" about Sarajevo after all. Although many of the houses in the district contained the domestic equivalents of the Loto stall - pine kitchen fittings, tiled bathroom, washing machine and television - the world of the neighbourhood was felt to be, and in some ways preserved as, a world apart from that of the town outside.

The Town and Townspeople

Sarajevo grew up on the site of the small mediaeval village of Vrhbosna. Originally it served the Ottomans only as a military base but later a court (*Saraj*) was built and Muslim converts from the countryside began to settle in the urban area. In 1520/30 the town's population seems to have been entirely Muslim (Sugar 1977 p.51) but in 1556 a group of Sephardic Jews arrived from Spain and were welcomed as healthy additions to the merchant community. Christians were also resident in the town in this period - *Shari'a* court records show that most household servants were of Christian background (see Čelebi 1973 p.117 fnote 137) In 1660 the town contained 104 *mahalas* (Turkish; residential districts) of which two were Jewish and ten inhabited by "Serbs, Bulgars and Vlachs", all Christian (Čelebi p.105). A census of 1788 shows the existence of twelve Christian *mahalas*, one of them, the "Frenkluk" or "Latinluk", inhabited by a colony of Catholics from Dubrovnik. The Catholic population of the town swelled after the Austro-Hungarian occupation of 1878.

Situated as it was on an important trade route to the Adriatic, Sarajevo became a thriving centre of trade and commerce and the heart of the province of Bosnia. The seventeenth century Turkish traveller, Evlija Čelebi, was greatly impressed with the town:

"The world contains many towns by the name of Saraj: Ak-Saraj in Anatolia, Tabe-saraj...Sehir-saraj...Vize-saraj...and others. But this Bosnian stone town of Sarajevo is of all of them the most advanced, the most beautiful and the most lively." (ibid. p.122)

Čelebi notes the existence of 17,000 houses, five public baths, 177 places of worship, 700 wells, 110 fountains, 176 watermills and 1,080 shops in which "one can buy, very cheaply, all manner of garments from India, Arabia, Persia, Poland and Czech land." Whilst Čelebi's enthusiasm sometimes

results in exaggeration - the number of mosques and *mesdžids* ("mosques" without a minaret) was in fact about 104, one for each *mahala* - the picture he paints of a wealthy and bustling business and religious centre is undoubtedly an accurate one.

Sarajevo is no longer a centre of trade and commerce; foreign goods are prized and hard to come by, usually obtained on the black market or from friends and relatives who travel or work abroad.

The town's population is today almost half a million. Like other Yugoslavian towns, Sarajevo has grown rapidly since the war as a result of urbanisation. Nationwide, the urban population increased by 80% between 1953 and 1971 and in the early 1970's one third to one half of the population of Yugoslavia's major urban centres (including Sarajevo) had been born elsewhere (Nyrop 1982). Some of the Muslims I knew and worked with were native Sarajevans but many were migrants or the children of migrants who had arrived from rural Bosnia and the Sandžak anything from thirty to five years ago.

The rural life in Yugoslavia is a hard one and most of those who live it would like to escape, or at least hope that their children will escape to a better life in the town. Those who have already left the countryside may extol the beauties of the landscape, the freshness of the air and so on, but in practice often want little more to do with these than the odd holiday. (The Belgrade marriage bureau, *Živa*, apparently has great difficulty in finding girls willing to wed a rural boy, however wealthy, handsome and otherwise qualified. *Oslobodjenje* 31.3.86)

Particularly but not exclusively amongst young, second generation migrants there is a feeling of superiority in comparison with rural dwellers. Thus in Sarajevo the term *seljak/seljanka* (m/f), meaning peasant or villager,

is generally one of mild derision. If one has relatives living in the countryside one says that they live *na selo*, "in the village", but not that they are *seljaci*, "villagers/peasants". The *seljak* in Sarajevo is that crude mouthed, rough-handed chap over there, gawping at the wonders of the city. The *seljanka* is that woman in the dowdy *dimije* (flowing, baggy trousers for women) and sturdy boots shouting at her country companions to come at a look at something in a shop. Sarajevans may criticise the dress and manners of their urban acquaintances as being those of a peasant. One muddy winter day I popped out to the shop (one minute away from the house in which I lived) in a pair of rubber galoshes. As I approached the bakery I heard a neighbour hailing me from a parked car. "What on earth are you doing?", she asked, springing out of the dry and warm front seat. "Galoshes? Just like a peasant!" She told me, jovially but firmly, never to go out like that again and later reported the incident to various other neighbours, all of whom found it amusing but were equally adamant that I should not wear the galoshes again. "This is Sarajevo", they explained.

Another revealing incident was sparked off by a row between a 23 year old girl, Samira, and her mother's brother's son's new wife. Samira had lived most of her life in Sarajevo and considered herself a Sarajevan. Her cousin, the young husband, had been brought up in the country but sent to school in Sarajevo and his wife had lived all her life, until marriage, in a Bosnian village. The substance of the dispute is not relevant here but the way in which Samira argued her case is interesting. She vented her indignation partly by stressing that the wife was new to the family but more importantly by stressing that she was new to Sarajevo. "We've been here for ages and she just arrived yesterday!", she fumed. Later I accompanied her on her mission to confront this newcomer. The same point was raised again and again. "We've

lived in Sarajevo for years and we know how to behave. No-one's ever said a word against us here. I came here as a baby and I went to school here, you've just arrived and you have to learn what's what. You'll see how it is here and how to behave."

The rules of Sarajevo are deemed by Sarajevans (whether native or migrant) to be different from, and better than, those of the country. Whilst Sarajevans of rural background are not exactly ashamed of their origins, they do like to make it clear that they are only origins, and that they themselves have become true Sarajevans. Those of pure Sarajevan origin are by no means ashamed to state this loudly and clearly. I once inadvisedly joked to a group of friends that I had hoped to come to Sarajevo to learn about Sarajevan Muslim customs but had found myself surrounded by Sandžaklians (many of the Muslim migrants to Sarajevo are of Sandžak origin). The only person who found this amusing was a girl who had been born in Sarajevo and whose mother was from an old and well-known Sarajevo Muslim family. The others did not.

The depth of a family's history as dwellers in Sarajevo effects its status. So too does its wealth. The word "class" is not used, those who have learnt it at school think of it as a Western phenomenon, but it is clear to all that some families are "*stara, bogata*", old and rich, whilst others are not. During my fieldwork I came into contact with two unusually wealthy, old families. On both occasions I had been taken to meet them by a *bula* (female religious functionary) who was performing a ritual for them. One family owned a huge farm and lovely house just outside Sarajevo, several cars and a smaller house in the town itself. They were said to live like the Carrington's in "Dynasty" (Dynasty, Love Boat and other American television programmes were popular in 1986). The other family owned homes in Sarajevo

and two nearby towns, ran a successful business and had been on Hajj twice. The woman through whom I met them was herself of an old Sarajevo family but a less wealthy one. Several members of her family had been hodjas, *bulas* or dervishes, her own children were studying to earn high status jobs in engineering and computers. This woman belonged to what might be called the middle class, a class of professionals and, at least in the past, religious functionaries. Many of my other informants were people who had moved into Sarajevo from the country within the past 30 years. The middle-aged men tended to be involved in labour, skilled or unskilled, or trades such as plumbing and electrical work. For their children they often aspired to something of higher status and lucrativeness.

Sarajevo may be described as having two main residential areas divided by an area of shops, businesses, university faculties and governmental buildings. The latter includes, at one end the *Čarsija* (Turkish; merchant's quarter) with its shops, cafes and some of the largest and oldest mosques which are used by the Muslim establishment for important Islamic festivals. It also contains Austro-Hungarian and some post-war buildings and a central street inaccessible to traffic and used in summer for a sort of *korzo*. At the south-west end of this area begins Novo Sarajevo, New Sarajevo, a vast and growing expanse of apartment blocks built in the post-war period. The blocks are built by firms, companies and workers organisations and apartments are available only to employees of the building company. Occupants pay a small rent but have permanent tenure and the right to pass the apartment on to descendants. Every company employee has the right to put his or her name on the firm's housing list, if it has one, but the waiting period may last for many years. The size of a worker's family or the standard of their current accommodation is not taken into account; flats are

allocated in order according to the list (or, I was told by some informants, in order according to the *veze*, connections, one has). Because of Sarajevo's serious housing shortage these flats are in great demand and even in days of high unemployment people may not apply for jobs in firms which, whilst otherwise suitable, are not building new apartment blocks.

The second residential area lies at the north-east end of town on the two steep slopes rising up from the Miljačka river. Most of its neighbourhoods are purely Muslim and it was in one of these, on the northern bank of the river, that I lived and carried out much of my research. In Ottoman times the area was officially divided into named *mahalas*, each with its own local mosque, and whilst these are no longer administratively recognised units, the term *mahala* is still commonly used to refer to them. Most of the *mahalas* still have their own local mosque although these may function only during the month of Ramazan. The area is a mass of steep, winding streets, many of them cobbled and inaccessible to traffic. The houses, some old but many newly renovated or rebuilt, are situated within gardens or courtyards, their front doors hidden from the street by a high fence and gate.

The Household

The residential form most commonly associated with Yugoslavia in anthropological literature is the *zadruga* '1'. The *zadruga* was a corporate, legally recognised agricultural collectivity including anything from 10 to 100 members, although the incidence of the larger *zadrugas* was rare. *Zadrugas* were based on a patrilineage (ideally including a man, his wife, his unmarried daughters, his sons, daughters-in-law and son's children) but unrelated individuals could join the *zadruga* by means of a contract. Land was

owned and worked jointly by all members of the collectivity but the discrete existence of separate elementary families was recognised both in proverbs and by the fact that each elementary section had its own sleeping room.

The zadrugas began to disappear in the nineteenth century, fragmented through division along elementary family lines. This division was legally recognised and resulted in truly separate households which did not, like the segments of African lineages, join together in the face of other lineages. It was certainly encouraged by urbanisation and the consequent movement of individual men with their elementary families into towns. Alternatively, division might be the result of resentments and ill-feeling between nuclear families whose varying stages in the domestic life cycle entailed varying contributions to the upkeep of the property and livestock. Again, division might be the result of a zadruga's owning an area of land too vast to be efficiently worked by members all resident in one place (see Barić 1967 for a discussion of the disappearance of the zadruga).

Whilst the zadruga is the institution that springs immediately to mind when Yugoslavia is mentioned, there are reasons for thinking that the Muslims of Bosnia were always far less associated with it than were their Christian neighbours. Even before the nineteenth century the elementary family household had been common in urban areas and since Muslims formed

(1) "Zadruga" is not a folk term, having been coined by the ethnographer and linguistic reformer Vuk Karadžić in his Serbian language dictionary in 1818. It was later incorporated into legal codes, adopted by anthropologists and, after the second world war, applied to marketing co-operatives. No-one whom I questioned knew what a zadruga was, though many suggested that it must be some sort of shop/firm/organisation.

the bulk of the urban population many of them would have lived in such households.

Even in rural Bosnia it is doubtful that the zadruga was widespread amongst Muslims. In his study of the Muslim village of Planinica in Western Bosnia in the mid 1960's, Lockwood suggests that 18 of the 39 village households are zadrugas of some sort. The suggestion is made on the grounds that the 18 ⁰ households in question contain members of more than one nuclear family (Lockwood 1975). Barić (op cit.) has, however, pointed out the necessity of distinguishing the zadruga and the *velika kuća* (literally; "big house"). The latter was composed of one segment of a patrilineage, for example, a man, his wife one son, daughter-in-law and unmarried grandchildren. The *velika kuća* was then likely to have fewer members than the zadruga, but Barić stresses that the important difference between the two was not that of size, but that of the criteria of membership and the concept of property ownership. The zadruga could be joined, by means of a contract, by individuals who were neither kin nor affines. Its members owned land and livestock collectively. The *velika kuća* could not be joined by contract and was jurally exogamous. Its property was not collectively owned by the members.

Hadžijahić (1982) notes that the zadruga was rare amongst Bosnian Muslims, both rural and urban, the majority of whom lived either in elementary family households (common in the urban environment) or in limited patrilaterally extended households. He suggests that the reason for this was the incompatibility of Shari'a inheritance laws (legally valid before the second world war) and collective ownership of land. Land and livestock within the Muslim extended household was the property of the head of household. On death this property was distributed according to Shari'a law, the widow, sons

and daughters each taking their share. In practice a daughter often relinquished her share in favour of her brother (this still happens in contemporary Bosnia), sometimes receiving a cash payment, depending on the relative wealth or need of her marital nuclear family. One woman whom I knew told me that she and her three sisters had let their brother keep all the property (rural land and livestock) and sought no payments since all four women were well married with adequate homes and finances of their own and the brother had lived on the land with his parents till the day they died. The important point is that property was conceived as belonging to individuals, first to the head of household and later to his descendants. It was not thought of as collective property.

This patrilaterally extended household without collective ownership of property sounds very much like Barić's *velika kuća* and may well correspond to the "zadruga" which Lockwood has in mind. (Lockwood defines zadrugas as "extended-family households, each producing and consuming the means of its livelihood communally" and thus ignores the question of property ownership.) It is certainly the sort of household described to me by elderly informants of rural origin, most of whom had lived in households including a husband, wife, one son and his wife and children. The death of the head of household lead to division of the property.

The ideal of contemporary Sarajevan Muslims is the elementary family household. Their ideal of the elementary family is a husband, a wife and two children (the average household size in urban Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1981 was 3.4, somewhat above the national urban average of 3.2). Many of those who espouse this ideal themselves come from rural families in which they were one of six to twelve siblings. As one middle-aged woman explained to me: "You needed them there. One to watch the sheep, one to look after the cows,

one to clean the house..." Today, Muslims tend to eschew the freely available artificial contraceptive methods, thinking them unhealthy, but limit their families with naturally contraceptive practices or with the more drastic method of abortion which is available on request up to the tenth week of pregnancy. One woman was rumoured in my neighbourhood to have had ten abortions, others themselves admitted to having had one. Of the thirteen housewives in the neighbourhood, one had had no children (for which she was pitied), one had had one (but was still young), nine had had two, one had had three and one, a rural woman of about 87 years, had had five.

HOUSEHOLD.	H.	W.	CHILDREN	OTHERS
1	1	1	1	2 (weekdays, children of daughter)
2	1	1	2	-
3	dead	1		-
4	1	1	2	-
5	1	1	2	1 (husband's mother)
6	1	1		-
7	dead	1		-
8	1	1	1	-
9	1	1	2	1 (husband's father)
10	dead	1		-
11	1	1	1	3 (dead son's wife and 2 children)
12	in Iraq	1	2	-
13	1	1	2	-

Table 1: Household composition in a Sarajevo neighbourhood

As can be seen in table 1, most of the thirteen households were of the ideal elementary family type. Three, however, (5, 9 and 11) included combinations of a daughter-in-law (*snaha*) and her mother-in-law (*svekrva*) or father-in-law (*svekar*). This was not a recommended arrangement since *snaha/svekrva*, and to a lesser extent *snaha/svekar* relations are

traditionally tense or even hostile. (The relationship between son-in-law, *zet*, and mother-in-law, *punica*, is also supposed to be a difficult one, but to a lesser degree.) Many folk songs are based on the theme of the cruel *svekrva* and women always told me to be careful when I married not to live with my in-laws. (Although to turn away an elderly and feeble *svekrva*, as one woman had done, was universally deemed to be a bad thing.) Nevertheless, as a result of housing difficulties it is not uncommon for a newly-married couple to live with a set of parents, although it is hoped that such arrangements will be temporary. It is more common for a young couple to live with the husband's family than with the wife's, but if the latter are wealthier or have more space then they will house the young people. The eldest daughter of family 1 had lived with her parents for two years after her marriage until she and her husband obtained their own apartment in New Sarajevo. After the move her two children spent the weekdays in household 1 because both she and her husband were working. In this case then, a grandmother had assumed responsibility for the weekday care of her grandchildren. Not all potential grandmothers were so obliging; many told me that they would neither expect their daughters-in-law to live with and work for them, nor to be saddled with the care of their children's children.

Households 1 to 4 were patrilaterally related and all lived in one courtyard, though in separate apartments. The same is true of households 5 and 6. Households 7 and 8 were that of a mother and her married daughter.

Related or not, all households in the neighbourhood are autonomous and attempt to keep their internal disputes, arrangements and organisation secret from that of other households. During most of my fieldwork I lived with one elementary family the mother/grandmother of which lived in a separate establishment on the other side of the courtyard. I never owned a front door key,

it was scarcely necessary since the housewife of the family was always either at home or very nearby, however, on one occasion a problem arose over the possession of a key. My suggested solution involved giving a key, for safe-keeping, to the mother/granmother for half an hour. This was not regarded by the family as being a solution at all. They replied that they had never left their key with the old woman and never would.

Household members regularly lie or conceal truths from other households and people who "mora sve da zna", who have to know everything, are roundly condemned. On their departure visiting neighbours were sometimes accused by their hosts of having come only to snoop, to estimate the value of the new curtains or to see what the family members were up to. The importance of keeping household secrets (how much things cost, who was going on holiday where, who prayed and how regularly they did so) ~~secret~~ was impressed on me very early and I learned to be guarded in my speech and evasive when directly questioned by outsiders, as I frequently was.

Households are thus autonomous and tend to present a united and secretive front to other households. Yet even within a single household individuals are autonomous and secretive in certain respects, most notably the financial and the social. Thus the husband who asks his wife how much money she has is likely to be told to mind his own business. Such a response may well provoke a slanging match but no husband, or wife for that matter, feels it is their right to know the state of their partner's personal finances. The slanging does not then have as its aim the discovery of the relevant sum of money, but rapidly takes the form of criticisms of ill manners and bad temper. The parent who seeks to learn with whom a child has spent the evening, or whom the child has been telephoning, may well receive a similar rebuke about the impropriety of nosiness.

It is necessary but difficult to say something about household economics in contemporary Muslim Sarajevo. The difficulty arises from the fact that people are extremely unwilling to divulge the details of their financial situation. From the outside the survival of many households seems almost an impossibility. For example, a household may contain a single employed member, the husband, and a wife and two children. In 1986 a not atypical salary for a skilled worker was 65,000 dinars a month (approximately £110) and this sum alone could never be adequate for food, clothing, furniture, heating, bills, television licence, paying back loans for the building of a house and so on. It is hard to see how such families manage, yet there are a number of factors which help. A low income household may have close kin, usually married sons or daughters, whose relative wealth allows them to offer parents some aid. At the same time many households have offspring working abroad, in Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, Iraq, Libya or other countries, and these gastarbeiter bring back precious foreign currency and goods. Workers with particular skills - electricians, plumbers, mechanics - may earn extra money through moonlighting. Unemployed women may bring in money through making and vending items such as rugs and socks (selling either to the tourist shops or, more frequently to acquaintances) or by selling fresh produce such as eggs within the neighbourhood. Many households have their own vegetable gardens which provide a certain amount of food. In these ways a household's basic income may be supplemented.

Kinship and Marriage

The formal kinship system of the Bosnian Muslims is almost identical to that of Bosnian Christians. Its terminology includes terms for mother, father, grandmother, grandfather, son, daughter, grandson, grand-daughter, brother and

sister. A single term is used for the FZ and MZ whereas the FB and MB are linguistically distinguished. Immediate affines (fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, sons and daughters-in-law) have specific names as do some of the immediate affines of one's spouse (for example ego's spouse's sibling's spouse, but not ego's offspring's spouse's parents). All other affines are simply "prijatelji", the basic meaning of which is "friends".

The sole variation between Muslims and Christians is that the former do not distinguish linguistically between the children of the FB, MB, FZ or MZ; all are *rodak* (male) or *rodica* (female). Christians, on the other hand, have separate terms for the children of FB, MB and F or MZ.

The system is thus largely the same for Muslims and Christians but the words used to describe particular kin or affines sometimes vary. For example, Christians call the FB *stric*, the FBW *strina*, the MB *ujak* and the MBW *ujna*, whereas Muslims use the Turkish terms *amidža*, *amidžica*, *dajdža* and *dajdžica*. Christians refer to their grandmothers as *baba* whilst Muslims use the term *nana*. The familiar term used by Christians for father is *tata* whilst that used by Muslims is *baba*.

However, the emphasis placed by Bosnian Muslims on kinship relations contrasts both with that of Bosnian Christians and with that of Middle Eastern Muslims. Halpern (1967 p.156) tells of a Serbian villager who traced his genealogy back to the late eighteenth century, identifying over 500 members of his kin group. Milovan Djilas, the Montenegrin who rose to high rank in the Communist Party before his expulsion in 1956, wrote in his autobiography:

"My forebears were drummed into my head from my earliest childhood, as was the case with all my kinsmen. I can recite ten generations without knowing anything in particular about them." (Djilas 1958).

Such feats are not paralleled by Sarajevan Muslims, few of whom have

genealogical memories stretching back further than their own grandparents (in some cases not even this far). Lockwood notes the same lack of interest in genealogies in rural Bosnia.

In contrast to the Middle Eastern pattern, the kin group is not seen as the ideal source of spouses. First cousin marriage is illegal in Yugoslavia but Muslims (and Christians) prohibit marriage with more distant kin as well. Filipović was told by a Muslim villager that one could not marry even one's ninth cousin and that if a young couple should discover that they are even distantly related a marriage could not take place (Filipović 1982 p.152). He notes that cousin marriage was practised in the past only occasionally and within beg and aga families when no non-related spouse of the same social class could be found. In other cases:

"The attitude is that anyone who does this does so from greed for property. 'Such a person would marry his own first cousin' is an oft used expression of disapproval." (op cit. p.152).

In my own experience, surprise and distaste are the usual Muslim reactions on learning of the possibility of cousin marriage in other parts of the world, including the Middle East.

Muslims' lesser emphasis on genealogies presumably results in a higher incidence of inter-kin group marriages than is found among Christians. Lockwood further suggests that Muslims are less consciously fastidious in prohibiting marriages within the kin group. In the village of Planinica the view was that if no direct relationship could be traced between a couple bearing the same surname and belonging to the same agnatic "collateral" group, they were allowed to marry. In Sarajevo I knew a young woman who went to visit friends in another town. On the korzo she met an attractive young man about whom she was sufficiently excited to mention the matter to her sister. On hearing the boy's name, the

sister decided that it was a familiar one and that the boy might be a relative. The girl's mother was applied to and set her mind to work to discover whether any relationship existed. After long deliberation the mother decided that the young man was indeed a distant cousin and that, consequently, the relationship had no future. The young woman grumbled a bit: "But it's so distant. What if you hadn't been able to work out the connection? What if no-one had?" Her mother replied that that would be a different case but since she had, she had. The relationship went no further.

Sarajevan Muslims neither marry their kin nor place emphasis on genealogies. Furthermore, the kin group is not for them the field of important social, ritual or material interaction. One would not seek a loan from one's non-immediate kin (parents, children and siblings), nor does one visit them very often (the occasions of *Kurban Bajram* and *Ramazanski Bajram* are exceptions). Non-immediate kin are not people whose *tevhid* women are likely to feel a moral obligation to attend.

In this regard, Bosnian Muslim practice corresponds closely to the legal duties of the Yugoslav citizen. Yugoslav law makes it both a right and a duty to materially support all lineal ascendants and descendants, brothers and sisters, who are unable, through age, ill health or unemployment, to provide for themselves. The law thus covers only an individual's closest kin, excluding individuals such as the FB, MB, FZ and MZ or their children. These are the only kin with whom Sarajevan Muslims are likely to have much interaction anyway.

Two exceptions should, however, be noted. The first concerns the case of kin ties between rural and urban dwellers. As Barić (op cit.) points out, rural and urban kin tend to offer each other mutual aid, the latter accomodating rural kin who come to town or helping them to find work in the city, and the rural

dwellers providing country produce to their urban kin. These seem to be cases in which a kin tie is activated in order to obtain a specific good. Kin living within Sarajevo are likely to have only infrequent social interaction and to give each other no material and little ritual assistance.

The second exception concerns kin who live close to each other, usually because two related elementary families have agreed to build a house together and each inhabits one section of the building. In these cases there is social and ritual interaction between the two related families because the kin have been made into neighbours, the people with whom social interaction is most important.

If kinship is relatively little stressed by Bosnian Muslims as a social tie, the same can be said of fictive kinship. Serbian *kumstvo* is a form of fictive kinship which creates strong social bonds (Hammel 1968, Pitt-Rivers 1976). Bosnian Muslims traditionally practised two forms of fictive kinship but the ties created by them were far weaker than those created through *kumstvo* amongst Serbs. The first of these two forms is *ebstvo*, a tie formed at the cutting of the umbilical cord (see Lockwood 1975 p.74). *Ebstvo* seems to have died out in Sarajevo with the increase of hospital births. The second form, *šišano kumstvo*, is still practised. Lockwood notes that it is often used either to re-inforce existing ties or to form ties with non-Muslims or Muslims of a socially superior class, outsiders (op cit. p.75). At around the age of one a child's parents choose a *kum* for it. The *kum* clips a bit of the child's hair and gives it a gift (clothes, jewellery), the parents give the *kum* a gift either of clothing or of money. The child is supposed to grow up like his or her *kum* (although Muslims take this idea with a grain of salt) and should therefore, ideally, have desirable qualities such as successfulness, physical attraction and moral integrity. After the creation of the *kumstvo* the child, parents and *kum* are supposed to remain on

amicable terms but it is not believed that there is any spiritual tie between them, nor is it expected that they will see each other often or assist each other materially.

These points are illustrated by my own, and sole, experience of *šišano kumstvo*. A friend of mine had a child who was about nine months old when the subject of a possible *kum* arose. The child's grandmother suggested that I might be the *kum*. Misapprehending the institution of *kumstvo* I protested on the grounds that I had no idea when I'd be able to return to Bosnia and would be unable to offer help or advice to the child. Nobody seemed to think this mattered. Months passed and the child was assigned no *kum*. My friend, who thought of me as an impoverished student, decided that it would be too expensive for me to be the *kum*. By the time I left Sarajevo the child was over 18 months old and still had no *kum* although the favourite for the post was her young aunt, my friend's sister. This aunt was already the *kum* of the child's elder sister. She, like myself, was an impoverished student but the proposed solution was that my friend would give her the money to buy the necessary piece of gold.

My only other experience of fictive kinship was the casual suggestion of a good friend that we should become sisters *po krv*, by blood, something which she had heard of from an older relative. The idea was given up as unsavoury when we learned that we'd have to cut our fingers with a knife and rub the wounds together. Fictive kinship just wasn't as important as all that.

The mode age of marriage for Bosnia-Hercegovina as a whole is 20 -24 (see table 2). Hadzijačić (1982) suggests that in the pre-socialist period Muslim girls married much earlier than their Christian neighbours, the norm for women being 14 - 20, for men 20 -26. It is the popular opinion of Muslims themselves that in the past they married younger. However, I once heard this disputed by a middle-

aged woman of rural origin who pointed out that she had married at 22, her sisters around 25, her mother-in-law at 27 or 28 and her mother-in-law's sister-in-law at over 30. It seems possible that in the past, urban women married younger than their rural counterparts.

AGE	MALE	FEMALE
15 - 19	1,470	11,495
20 - 24	17,536	16,591
25 - 29	11,348	5,082

Table 2: Marriages in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1981

Source: *Statistički Godišnjak Jugoslavije 1984*

Divorce appears to have been relatively uncommon in Ottoman times and Bašeskija's chronicle suggests that it may have been viewed in a dim light. Thus he notes that a woman committed suicide out of shame when her husband divorced her and in 1784/85 that a man who divorced his wife gave her not only the *mehr* (deferred dowry) which was legally due to her, but also the marital home. After the arrival of the Austro-Hungarians divorce became steadily more common. In 1885 it stood at 3%, in 1898 at 8.28%, in 1909 at 11.2% and in 1938 at 17.45% (2) and Hadžijahić (op cit.) states that today, Muslims are more likely to divorce than members of any other nationality. Yet the figures do not, in my experience, reflect the moral light in which Muslims view the dissolution of marriage.

(2) The same author suggests that the increasing frequency of divorce relates to the economic decline of Bosnian Muslims during the post-Ottoman period, noting that Herzegovinan Muslims, whose economic status presumably declined less, experienced no such increase. The mechanics of this decline/increase are not, however, clarified.

Speaking of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Hadžijahić notes that most Muslim divorces were of newly-married, childless couples. During my time in Sarajevo two young women of my acquaintance separated from their husbands within weeks of marriage. One had been emotionally battered by a spouse who spent most of his time with other women whilst the other had been physically assaulted, and this in spite of her pregnancy (later terminated). Both returned to their natal families and both wanted divorce. Neighbours were sympathetic and hoped that the women would come to forget their sorrows and their husbands in time. A very different attitude was apparent in the case of a man whom I knew as the husband of a neighbourhood woman and father of two children. It was some time before I learnt, through whispering and gossip, that this man had previously had another wife and child. His desertion and divorce were widely viewed as rather shameful episodes in his life. At the same time an unhappy wife with two small children contemplated divorcing a husband who spent his whole time out drinking, but was strongly advised against it by her family. The attitude is thus that whilst there is nothing inherently wrong with the break up of a couple, the break up of a nuclear family must be avoided. This is partly due to the perceived interests of the children, and of the wife whose motherhood will make it hard for her to re-marry. At the same time, however, it reflects the high importance of the nuclear family as a unit which is autonomous, cohesive and trustworthy in a way that the wider kin network is not.

The Islamic permission of polygamy is a fact of which not all Bosnian Muslims are fully aware. As in the case of cousin marriage it is something that, even during the Ottoman period, was practised only rarely, by begs and agas, and then usually in the case of a first marriage's failure to produce children. Polygamy is illegal in contemporary Yugoslavia. I met no Muslim who was

unreservedly in favour of it, however, different individuals did express different attitudes. The first and most common was that of those Muslims who, like the villagers studied by Lockwood (1975 p.64), found the notion rather odd and even humorous. The second type of response implied no value judgement but was phrased simply as "we don't do that here". The third response was that of some young and enthusiastic Muslim believers who stressed that many women liked having co-wives and that a man couldn't take a second wife without the consent of the first. These three response patterns do not relate to levels of piety or religious observance; those who found polygamy a topic of humour were often devout and practising Muslims. What they do relate to is different levels of conceptual association of Bosnian Islam with the wider Muslim world. The young apologists of polygamy moved in circles which placed high value on learning Arabic and reading the translated works of Arab and Persian writers, (this social milieu will be discussed in chapter five) whilst those who found polygamy humorous were Muslims who had less knowledge of or interest in the non-Bosnian Muslim world.

Muslims do not marry kin but the category of *prijatelj*", distant affines, was traditionally considered a source of acceptable spouses. (The primary meaning of the word *prijatelj* is "friends".) Lockwood's Planinican informants said that such *prijatelj* marriages were very common and that often a single marriage between two groups of mutual *prijatelj* led to further marriages between the same two groups. I once visited an old village woman who felt that it was high time for her two sons, aged 28 and 35, to wed. Since neither had yet found a girlfriend she asked my opinion about two girls whom she had never met, her husband's brother's son's wife's brother's daughters. The girls were her *prijatelj*, which was the reason she gave for thinking of them as suitable potential daughters-in-law.

However, *prijatelji* marriages are uncommon in contemporary Sarajevo where most young people find their own spouse at the place of work, at college or school or through mutual friends. Most, but not all, state that love is a large factor in their choice of spouse, but other attributes are also looked for. Most important of these are being from a respectable family ("who has s/he got?") and having a job and a flat ("what has s/he got?"). Courtships are secretive affairs and parents are supposed to have no knowledge of them until the wedding is imminent. Parents who question their children as to their girlfriends or boyfriends are often told not to be nosy, a criticism which they accept. Ideally, a young man or woman should give no hint of their involvement until a few weeks before the wedding. Two cases in which this ideal was ignored gave rise to disapproval and gossip within the neighbourhood. The first was that of a girl who brought her boyfriend home before any proposal of marriage had been made and was consequently deemed to be lacking in propriety. The second was that of a girl who in September announced her intention of marrying in January. The gap was felt by parents and neighbours to be indecently long and the wedding was rescheduled for November.

The finding of one's own spouse and the secrecy of courtship are not innovations in Bosnian Muslim society. *Ašikovanje*, from the Turkish word for lover, was a traditional custom whereby a young woman sat in the wooden slatted veranda of her home and was visited by young men. The couple could talk freely although there was no touching and the woman's face could not be clearly seen. *Ašikovanje* sometimes led to formally arranged marriages about which both sets of parents were consulted. In other cases it led to *ukrasti*, stealing. *Ukrasti* marriages were those in which the girl simply climbed out of her window late one night and rode off with her young man to his family home where wedding

celebrations were held for several days. Later the newly-married couple came to visit the bride's parents *na mir*, in peace. They brought gifts of coffee and sugar. If these were accepted, as they usually were, the couple were forgiven. If not, they tried again later. (Hangi 1908.) Lockwood notes that 90% of marriages in Planinica were by *ukrasti* and I was aware of a small number of such weddings in Sarajevo. Even in cases of non-*ukrasti* marriage the bride leaves her home and goes to her wedding without her parents.

Parents do not then have direct influence over their children's choice of spouse. If they object to the prospective spouse (and they are more likely to object to potential sons-in-law than daughters-in-law) they may threaten to disown the couple. I knew of one such case where a young woman wanted to marry a man some ten years her senior. The man was both a divorcee and the father of an eight year old son, and the girl's parents threatened to disown her if she married him. In spite of the threat she eloped with him and within a few weeks the parents had forgiven the couple. This reunion was closely followed by the groom's expulsion of the bride from his home. Her family took her back and encouraged her to forget all about him. One night, not long afterwards, the woman slipped out of her house and rejoined her husband. This time her family swore that they'd never take the girl back, she must lie in the bed she'd made for herself. Nevertheless, when the groom ejected his wife for the second time, the family did take her in.

The Komšilik

The thirteen households shown in table 1 form one *komšilik* (Turkish; neighbourhood). Whereas the term *mahala* is today used loosely to designate a district without official boundaries, the boundaries of the *komšilik* are clear.

One knows who ones *komsije* (neighbours) are. The story is told of how Abu-Bakr, father-in-law of the Prophet, sold a house worth amount X for the sum of X multiplied by two. When asked why he had done so his answer was that the extra value derived from the quality of the neighbours. The telling of this tale underlines the importance of the neighbourhood group for Sarajevan Muslims, an importance which pertains in spite of the need for household autonomy and secrecy. Households may accuse each other of an excess of curiosity, or indeed of downright spying, but nevertheless the social, economic and ritual interactions between them are frequent and important.

Neighbours lend each other household items and tools and exchange small amounts of food, both cooked and uncooked. Neighbours help each other with tasks such as wood chopping, sewing and coffee roasting. It is from neighbours that one can seek a loan in times of necessity.

They are also important in the ritual sphere. Thus the annual festival of *Kurban Bajram* is seen principally as a neighbourhood affair and the majority of the meat from the sacrificed sheep is distributed within it. Neighbours are important in death rituals, principally in the *tevhid* which will be discussed in chapter six but also in the process of *halal'ing*, mutual forgiveness at the death bed. Customs surrounding the birth of children may also be noted. A newly born infant must be kept in the house for forty days but at the end of this period the baby is taken to visit neighbours who sprinkle it with sugar to make it sweet (*sladak*, which also means beautiful) and with flour to make it white (ie. beautiful).

Neighbours are thus important both economically and ritually. For married women they are also the main source of social life.

This seems to be as true of rural as of urban areas. Lockwood (1975 p.65)

notes that in the Muslim village the cohesiveness of the *komšilik*:

"is readily apparent upon examination of co-operative work patterns, visiting patterns, who helps whom entertain a guest, who make the trip to market together, who lends to and borrows from whom..."

In the village of Planinica he also found a tendency towards neighbourhood exogamy. (This, however, was not confirmed by information gathered from ex-rural Muslims in Sarajevo.) In Planinica neighbours are often at the same time patrilineal kin but Lockwood states that: "exceptions... make plain that the organizing principle of both larger and smaller neighbourhood groups is residence, not kinship." For the Serbian village of Orašac, on the other hand, Halpern makes almost the opposite observation. Whilst Serbian neighbours give mutual aid and interact socially:

"There is a greater degree of visiting and exchanging of labour among relatives living in the same area than among neighbours ...underlying the reciprocal relations between neighbours is the idea of mutual help. When this concept becomes less important... the degree of neighbourliness also begins to diminish correspondingly. This is not the case when clansmen are neighbours." (Halpern 1967 p.160)

It is clear that for Muslims the *komšilik* group is an important one, two further points must be made about it. The first is that it is principally the realm of women. Men are employed in firms, factories and other urban jobs. Married women with children are almost invariably employed only in the home where their tasks include cooking, cleaning (although this will be done by daughters if there are any), gardening (a task which may be shared by the men), child care, roasting coffee, chopping wood (this may also be done by men) and all the other responsibilities of running a house which lacks many of the conveniences of the Western European home. Women also do most of the shopping which generally involves a weekly visit to the market in town and several trips to the local shop. Whilst the husband has a veto on important decisions of

household economy (for example, whether to buy a new cooker or couch that year) it is the housewife who is responsible for the day-to-day running of the house. Thus, in both of the houses in which I stayed it was the housewife who, without reference to her husband, proffered the invitation. As has been said, some women earn money by selling produce - rugs, socks, eggs. Unmarried daughters tend either to work or study in the town.

In the sphere of social relationships and friendships the picture is similar. Men spend much of their free time in the cafes or bars of the town. They are neither expected nor desired to hang around the house themselves and do not invite their friends home. The only male visitors to the home are the occasional relative or worker (electrician, plumber). The latter are often family connections called on to do repairs informally and rewarded with money but also with coffee, food and, very often, alcohol. The social life of married women is conducted almost entirely within the *komšiluk* and they may spend up to three hours a day visiting their neighbours or being visited by them. This is not to suggest that they are confined to the neighbourhood - women go, without their husbands, to the market, the central mosques or, occasionally, to visit relatives on the other side of town but should not "hoda" - "walk"/"go gadding about". Unmarried girls are involved in the *komšiluk* visiting network but also conduct their social life in the town where they meet friends, male and female, to go to the cinema, to a cafe or simply to stroll.

The world of men and the world of (married) women should not be seen as the "public" and the "private" or "domestic" worlds. Women are not confined to their homes and prevented from seeing any but their closest kin and affines. On the contrary, they are the links of the very public world of the neighbourhood. The distinction is rather between the local, purely Muslim community of the

komšilik and the wider, mixed society of Sarajevo.

This brings us to the second point to be made about the *komšilik*: it is felt to be a world apart from that of the town. Different styles of dress, behaviour and even speech are appropriate to the two worlds. In the town one uses the standard Serbo-Croatian greetings "Dobar Dan!" (Good-day), "Do Videnja!" (Good-bye). In the neighbourhood one uses the Arabic "Merhaba!" and "Alahemanet!".

Young people never bring their girlfriends and boyfriends home - romantic relationships are for the town, not the neighbourhood.

People have two types of clothes; those for "going out" are not worn at home or in the mahala because "they would be ruined". Thus leaving the neighbourhood involves a purposeful change of clothes and image, the point of which is to look more attractive. Looking good is highly valued by both men and women, care is taken that outdoor clothes are always clean and pressed, certain items are reserved only for the most important occasions and visits to the mosque require the donning of fine garments. This was one of my problems in Sarajevo for, having arrived with only my economy fare twenty kilos of luggage, I never had enough clothing to cut a consistently fine figure.

In the neighbourhood men wear an older and more comfortable version of their normal trousers, shirt, jumper and jacket (depending on the weather). With women the dress code is more complicated and varies with the age and marital status of the individual. The oldest women wear *dimije* (flowing, baggy trousers) and a headscarf concealing all but the face. They rarely leave the neighbourhood but when having their photo taken (a form of publicity) always insist that the photographer waits while they readjust their scarves so that no stray locks of hair are showing. Middle-aged women tend to do the opposite. In the neighbourhood they wear *dimije* or a long skirt and often have a scarf loosely

tied over their hair. When going out they don a kneelength skirt, remove the scarf, arrange their hair and may also apply lipstick. To walk about the town in *dimije* is, as has been said, to be a peasant. Unmarried girls may wear track suits, house robes or slightly old or outmoded skirts and dresses at home. When going out they take infinite pains over their hair, makeup and costume.

Islam in the Komšilik

The *komšilik* is purely Muslim whilst the town is not. Yet the town contains the oldest and largest mosques, those which Sarajevan Muslims feel to be part of their history and those on which the Muslim establishment, the Islamska Zajednica (see chapter four), focuses much of its attention. These central mosques house rituals such as the burial service (*dženaza*), Quranic recitation during Ramazan (*mukabela*), the ritual and prayer for new *hafiz* (*hafiz dova*) and the celebration of *Lejletul-Kadr*. Whilst the central mosques are packed for the friday service of *džuma*, the neighbourhood mosques, those that function outside of Ramazan and other Islamic festivals, are unlikely to be full of friday worshippers.

Yet the *komšilik* is not a mere secular, residential area from which the inhabitants sally forth to perform their Islamic duties in the town. *Kurban Bajram* and the *tevhid* death ritual are both religious occasions celebrated in the neighbourhood. Neighbours also attend each others *mevlud* rituals which are held in private homes to mark the building of a new house or the return of a son from military service or the anniversaries of a relative's death. The month of Ramazan is a time at which neighbours join together for religious observance. Although the breakfast meal, *iftar*, is not shared with neighbours, after it they will go together, often to the local neighbourhood mosque, to pray *teravija*.

Aside from these specific rituals, everyday life in the neighbourhood is felt to be specifically Muslim in a way that life in the town outside is not. Of course families and individuals living within the neighbourhood vary in the degree of their religious observance. In my existence within the *komšiluks*, as opposed to my contact with various academics and authorities, I never met any Muslim who denied the existence of God (although there must be some such). The spectrum runs from those families or individuals who strictly observe all five "pillars" of the faith and more, and ends with those who whilst professing a belief in it, neither pray, fast, give alms or aspire to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. Many lie somewhere in the middle of this range and, whilst not performing their daily prayers regularly, make special efforts during the month of Ramazan to pray *teravija*, to give alms and to fast for at least some of the days.

Lack of outward observance should not be taken as a sign that these individuals are not real Muslims. As Akiner puts it:

"no religion, and least of all Islam, is an army whose strength can be judged by the number of men on active service...In fact, the only way in which a Muslim can sever himself from his community is by a conscious and voluntary rejection of Islam." (Akiner 1983 p.2).

This is certainly the attitude of most Sarajevan Muslims; if one is born into a family who think of themselves as Muslims then one is oneself a Muslim unless one positively rejects the faith, for example by insisting on one's identity as a firmly atheist Communist.

I was initially surprised at the number of people I met who, as well as professing a belief in Islam or even being strict observers of its obligations, were at the same time card-carrying members of the Communist Party. Official state policy about dual affiliation to the Party and to a religious community is interesting. Whilst the ideologies of Communism and of

religion are seen as contradictory, practising believers are tolerated within the Party so long as they do not emphasise their faith too publicly. The reason for this toleration seems to be associated with the problem of maintaining inter-regional and inter-nationality equality. Some areas of the country contain more atheists than others; according to figures in Večernje Novine (The Evening News) 9.6.86 Montenegro contains the lowest percentage of believers, 12.8%, and Kosovo the highest, 47.3%. Thus excluding non-atheists from the Party would result in whole areas of the country, and whole nationalities, being under-represented within it, a situation which the federal government would rather avoid ⁽³⁾. The following extracts, written by a Party member well-known for his insistence that religious leaders collaborated with fascists and monarchists during the Second World War and for his opposition to the idea of the state financing religious communities, illustrate the point:

"The criterion of the League of Communists is quite clear but it must be creatively applied...We must have organisations of the League of Communists everywhere because they are the ones whose obligation and duty it is to fight for socialist transformation...wouldn't we be following stereotypes if we failed to take a somewhat more elastic approach...Here and there believers should be tolerated and given the possibility of remaining in the League." (Kurtović 1977)

In Sarajevo believers do just that. Some have joined the party simply in the hope of furthering job prospects and gaining promotion. Others join for more positive reasons and of these some suggest, when asked, that Islam and Communism are not incompatible; both instruct one not to steal, cheat, lie,

(3) The problem, however, remains. Thus in 1982 Montenegrins formed 2.6% of the Yugoslav population and 5.4% of the LCY membership whilst at the other end of the scale Albanians formed 7.7% of the population but only 3.8% of the LCY. Muslims were represented in more fitting proportion - 8.9% of the population and 8% of LCY membership.

murder, to respect other people and so on. Yet it is clear to everyone that, from the state's point of view, the two are not logically compatible. For the young, this is made clear in state education with its obligatory lessons in Marxism. One biology teacher singled out the son of a hodja to impress on him the impossibility of a spider, such as the one in the school laboratory, spinning an enormous web within a matter of minutes. (The Prophet is said to have been concealed from the enemies who pursued him by a spider who spun such an instant web.) All are aware that it is inadvisable to discuss religious matters too conspicuously in public places, and particular events such as the occasional imprisonment of religious functionaries bring the question of compatibility to the fore ⁽⁴⁾. However, in daily life the abstract question of the compatibility of the two ideologies does not often arise; Islam and Communism are two facts of life and people's complaints about the system generally focus on inflation, unemployment and the poor quality of goods rather than on religious matters. The point to be made here is simply that whilst religious believers may tend to avoid Party membership, such membership is no guarantee of atheism or even of negligence in fulfilling religious duties.

It has been said that the *komšiluk* is a place of social, ritual and economic interaction and a place where gossip and secrecy abound. It is important that a household present a good face to the neighbours and that its reputation stands high. In seeking to present such an image it is quite

(4) One such event occurred in 1986 when a hodja was imprisoned for stating in his Friday sermon that a Muslim should marry another Muslim (ie. rather than a Christian). This was taken as being contrary to the principle of the equality of all nationalities within Yugoslavia.

acceptable to state one's virtues plainly in the course of conversation: "We/I would never do X, Y, Z...We/I always try to help others...We/I don't like to gossip...". The reply to such assertions is: "You're quite right, We/I also never do X, Y, Z..." Such exchanges are not considered to show a want of modesty.

The image that a family wants to present is, in short, that it is a *dobra porodica* (good family) whose members are *fini* (nice, good, beautiful). The terms are Serbo-Croatian and of wide reference; a film may be *doobar*, a dress may be *fina*. Praise and criticism of families and individuals rarely involves overt references to Islamic standards. People do not suggest that a neighbour's negligence of an elderly parent is *haram* (Arabic; strictly forbidden by Allah), or even that it is *grehota* (Serbo-Croatian; a sin) but simply that the behaviour *ne valja* - is not good - in the same way that soup without salt may be said to *ne valja*. Comments specifically about other people's level of religious merit tend to be made only across social divides. One family I knew included a mother from a well-known Sarajevo family, and two children who were on course to obtain high status jobs in engineering and computers. This family was strictly observant of the Islamic duties of prayer and fasting. They often criticised their neighbours, beginning with comments that the children weren't properly brought up, that the adults were crude and peasant-like in their manners, that the houses were disorderly, and ending with the explanatory remark that the neighbours were not properly observant of their religious duties and (this was tentatively suggested) were not good Muslims. The neighbours, many of them of working class ex-peasant origin, retaliated with their own criticism of this family's organisation and manners, noting that whilst they were religiously observant one could never know who was the true Muslim, only God knows what's in a

person's heart.

Whilst such overt comparisons of people's behaviour with Islamic standards are rarely made, a less direct connection between being a good household and being a good Muslim household is perceived. A good household should have a certain appearance and be run in a certain manner which is associated with the values of Islam. Perhaps the three most important aspects of the good (Muslim) household are that it is well-appointed, that it is hospitable and that it is clean and tidy.

Islam is not a religion in which the meek shall be rewarded only in the hereafter; God bestows his blessings on the good Muslim in the here and now. A poor household is often seen as a slightly less reputable one unless the inhabitants redeem themselves with unusual religious piety: the category of the pious poor to whom *zekat* may be given is an important one in Islam. On the other hand, the unusually wealthy are not always esteemed the most deserving. Wry comments about so-and-so's many gold bracelets have a faintly critical tone. When I asked how one particularly wealthy family came to be so rich the reply, from a friend of theirs who was proud of being the only one in her neighbourhood to know them, was that they did things for God so God gave to them. Others gave more material answers: they own a shop, they own land. Whilst unusual wealth can cause mixed reactions, to be comfortably off is taken by all as a sign of a good family. Wealth should be displayed in the home and householders are always quick to show visiting neighbours the new curtains, cake dishes, sofa or other items. Families that are rumoured to have money but do not furnish and decorate their homes accordingly are branded as mean.

In order to keep possessions in pristine state they are sometimes not used at all. One family invested in a new electric cooker which they proudly

enthroned in the kitchen and showed to all the neighbours. For practical purposes, however, they continued to use the old cooker so that the new one would not get brown and dirty. The sharp knife I once gave a housewife was similarly "saved".

Details of decoration and furnishing display the fact that a household is Muslim. Every Muslim home contains an Arabic Quran with page-by-page Serbo-Croatian translation. Often this is one of only three or four books in the house, one of the others frequently being a large illustrated life of Tito. Other objects may also bear witness to the faith and identity of the inhabitants; embroidered pictures of Mecca or the first chapter of the Quran (the *fatiha*), woven prayer mats or sheepskins from the annual sacrifice of *Kurban Bajram*. All Bosnians drink Turkish coffee but whilst Christians tend to drink from tiny cups (*šolja*), no Muslim home is complete without a set of *fildžani*, small drinking bowls without handles. Occasionally, when I made a first visit to a home the hostess would offer all other (Muslim) guests present a *fildžan* and myself a *šolja*.

Some wealthier families keep one room of the house entirely furnished in the *starinski* (old, with the sense of traditional) style. The room is carpeted with many woven rugs and the walls fitted with padded benches, also covered in rugs. Wooden chests are used for the storage of clothes and linen, and when visitors call they eat at a large, round, metal tray (*sofra*) placed on a low stool in the centre of the room.

Whilst most people admire this style and many have certain *starinski* items of which they are proud (rugs, embroidered cloths), the majority of families themselves aspire to a more modern style. The most important room in the home, the one towards which most effort is directed, is the sitting room which is used by the family and for the reception of guests. Ideally a

family hopes to have it furnished with modern chairs and couches and a factory made carpet, long net curtains, a table and a *regal*, a set of wooden cupboards with shelves for linen, a wardrobe, drawers, display cupboards for items of glassware (usually wedding gifts) and a space for the television. Depending on the size of the family and the amount of available space this room may also serve as a kitchen (in which case the cooking facilities may be hidden behind a curtain) or as a sleeping area (in which case couch-beds are folded up and hidden during the day).

The sitting room is important because it is the place in which outsiders are received and the virtue of hospitality displayed. In the neighbourhoods of Sarajevo, offering hospitality in the appropriate way is a large part of being a good household. Most visitors arrive unannounced since to forewarn a prospective host of one's arrival would impel them to prepare special refreshments (if the visitor is an infrequent guest the housewife will anyway produce a plate of cheese, pickled peppers and some sort of meat, followed by cake or biscuits). The essential aspect of any visit, whether between women who see each other every day or between those who see each other only rarely, is the drinking of coffee. One woman whom I visited several times offered me only tea which she liked herself and believed to be the favourite drink of the English. Her failure to produce coffee was deemed shocking by the neighbours (some of whom had questioned me minutely as to the details of my visit). A friend of mine visited a young woman in the neighbourhood and came back reporting that her hostess had said she had no coffee in the house, her implication being that the woman was lying, and an inhospitable cheapskate to boot.

Visits follow a pattern. The guest arrives and is seated. The hostess remains standing and converses for a minute or two before beginning to grind

the coffee and heat the water. If it must be brewed in a separate room then another family member must be found to sit with the guest who can neither be left alone for a minute nor follow the hostess from room to room.

Fildžani, the coffee pot and the sugar bowl are arranged on a tray. With a long spoon the hostess places a little of the coffee foam into each *fildžan*, then pours the coffee itself. Some cake or biscuit is placed on a dish in front of the guest who insists that she couldn't eat a bite. Cigarettes are lighted, conversation begins and the coffee is drunk. Those who drink coffee must sit nicely (*fino*); even if the guest lives next door and visits every other day, even if there are many people present, it is uncouth of the householders to get up or leave the room to make phone calls, fetch things or see to any business of their own.

At some point the hostess notices that her guest has not touched the cake:

- "Eat! Try it!"
- "I can't, really"
- "Yes you can. Eat!"

The logic behind the cake dispute is said to be that a guest is certain to be shy/ashamed (*stiditi se*) and must be encouraged to eat. The guest may eat some of her cake or she may really not be able to in which case when she rises to leave the combative exchange is resumed in addition to the standard debate over her departure:

- "Try the cake"
- "I can't. I'm off"
- "Where are you going? Sit down."
- "I can't, I have to go"

(I give these exchanges in abbreviated form in the interests of space.)

Finally the guest leaves, followed, but never shown to the door by the householders who exhort her to come again. The guest says she will and insists that they also visit her.

Slavic hospitality and the way in which it preserves a distance between host and guest has been noted by many scholars (Rheubottom 1985). In Sarajevo's Muslim neighbourhoods where households attempt to maintain a certain level of secrecy over their internal workings, hospitality has this effect. The formalised nature of the coffee visit helps to ensure that a visitor sees the host household only at its best, as it would like to be seen.

In the Muslim context, hospitality has another significance; it is taken as a peculiarly Islamic virtue. The housewife of the first home in which I stayed (in a smaller town outside Sarajevo) told me that she had invited me because Muslims should help and be hospitable to strangers and then God would help them.

One of the most striking things about Muslim homes is that they are spotlessly clean and tidy. This was something I learned from a Serbian friend even before I set foot in a Muslim household; my informant told me to expect the Muslim house I was to visit to be spick and span and to remember to take my shoes off at the front door because "Muslims don't allow a speck of dirt in the house." In fact the removal of ones shoes before entering the home is also characteristic of Christian households but is more strictly observed amongst Muslims who find the wearing of shoes in the home almost as unthinkable as the wearing of shoes in the mosque. Only once did I witness a guest who entered a house in the new high-heeled shoes of which she was obviously inordinately proud. The requirements of hospitality prevented the hosts from speaking out (as would ofcourse have happened in a

mosque) but they shook their heads and raised their eyebrows meaningfully behind her back and launched into a full scale character assassination the moment the guest had left.

For women who live in unrenovated old houses, some of which have no indoor running water, life can be a constant struggle against dirt and damp. Things are somewhat easier in modern apartments but endless pains are still taken to ensure cleanliness and order. These are always important but receive their strongest affirmation as values in spring. Spring-cleaning can take up to one month and becomes the major topic of conversation between neighbourhood women during this time. Walls are whitewashed, carpets lifted and hand washed in the garden, floors scrubbed, all cutlery and crockery is washed and shelves and cupboards cleaned and re-lined with paper. The wood and coal burning winter stove must be removed for the summer and replaced with the electric cooker, winter net curtains must be replaced with summer ones. In 1986 Ramazan began on the 10th of May and ended on the 8th of June. Women were anxious to have their cleaning done before Ramazan since to do such heavy work during the month of fast "ne valja", but the house had to be clean for the *Bajram* celebrations at the end of it.

A hadith attributes the idea that "cleanliness is half the faith" to the Prophet, Muhammed. Whilst many Sarajevan Muslims do not know this hadith (and many do not even know what a hadith is) the feeling that to be clean is an Islamic virtue is universal. Most do not know the hadith that says that an angel will not enter a house in which dogs are allowed to live, but all agree that dogs are dirty and that it is not "good" to keep them indoors. Few know why a woman should not have long nails, but all agree that *po Islamu* (according to Islam) she shouldn't.

In the realm of personal as opposed to household hygiene Islamic standards are more frequently referred to overtly. Many Muslims note as a major difference between Islam and Christianity that adherents of the former are always clean when they go to prayer whereas adherents of the latter are not. Apart from ritual washing for prayer (*abdest*) by those who do pray regularly, the day begins and ends with the washing of hands, face, probably feet and teeth, and 'down there'. Bathing and showering present a problem for whilst it is important to be clean, it can be dangerous to indulge in such a full scale wash. I was often told off for over-washing, particularly for washing my hair when the weather was not absolutely fine. I was told that I'd catch cold, that my face would skew to the side and remain there, even that a person could die from the shock to the system of an all over wash. Washing during menstruation is considered particularly risky and likely to prolong the period (washing after it is, on the other hand, essential). Young people tend to bathe about once a week (depending on the weather), the middle-aged perhaps less frequently and the elderly not at all since their health is more delicate. However, personal cleanliness is seen as vital and as something that sets Muslims apart from non-Muslims. Christian use of toilet paper is compared unfavourably with the Muslim practice of washing and Christians are in general deemed to be less clean than Muslims.

The evaluation of a household's worth does not involve the notions of honour and shame as these are typically conceived in Muslim societies of the Middle East and North Africa. Educational books published by the Muslim establishment instruct children that Muslims have the duty: "To preserve their [neighbours'] *ĉast* (honour/virtue), family and property" and that wives have the duty "to preserve [the husband's] *ĉast* and property" (*Ta'limul - Islam* pp. 140, 143). However, the word "*ĉast*" was not one that I ever heard

applied either to families or to individuals in conversation.

The literal meaning of "*obraz*" is "cheek". Erlich notes the high significance of the term, used to mean "face" or honour, in the Montenegrin context: "*Obraz* is the highest value, for *obraz* one may perish (or kill)."

(Erlich 1971 p.373) She quotes the eighteenth century writer Nenadović

"Montenegrin *obraz*, that's the Montenegrin constitutional system...for each of one's actions one must consider what the *guslar* will say" (The *guslar* sang ballads and oral epics on the one-stringed *gusle*).

Whereas amongst Muslims: "It's not so important what others will think... 'what the *guslar* will say.'" (op cit. p.367.)

I never heard the term "*obraz*" used in Sarajevo although its converse, the term "*bezobrazna*" (literally; "without cheek"), is a frequent criticism. However, its implication is not that the individual lacks honour or face, but simply that they are impudent and brazen. Thus a naughty child or a shopkeeper who overcharges is *bezobrazna*. To be without cheek in Sarajevo is thus similar to, though more reprehensible than, "having one's cheek" in England.

Sramota (disgrace/shame) is a more serious matter. The concept differs in two respects from that associated with Middle Eastern societies. Firstly, female family members are not more likely than males to be the route through which *sramota* enters a family. The young woman who eloped with an unsuitable man, returned, stole back to the husband and finally came back to her parents (see p.66) was said to have shamed or disgraced her family. However, the homosexual son of a different family and the alcoholic husband of another were equally the cause of *sramota* for their families. (Attitudes to occasional drunkenness will be discussed in chapter three. It is important to note that the man in question here was publicly blind drunk and unable to walk on several occasions.)

Secondly, *sramota* differs from Middle Eastern concepts of shame because it is not linked to a notion of honour but to ideas of morality. A family may be *dobra* and *fina* but there is no elaborated notion of it having honour. Because there is no honour to defend, a family can not be put into a state of shame or dishonour by the actions of outsiders. Bourdieu tells the tale of a peasant who was robbed by his share-cropper and, after threats and complaints had failed, took the matter before the assembly. The peasant was a victim of *elbahadla*, the action of *bahdel* meaning: "to cast someone into shame, dishonour him" (Bourdieu 1979 p.96). In the Sarajevan context an act of theft would cause *sramota*, but the *sramota* would fall on the head of the perpetrator, not on that of the victim. One can only bring *sramota* on oneself and one's family, it cannot be cast onto others.

In certain respects then, Bosnian Muslim society differs strikingly both from that of Bosnian Christians and from that of much of the Muslim Middle East. It lacks, for example, certain particular institutions and values characteristic of them. Thus, as compared with Bosnian Christian society, little weight is placed on fictive kinship and, in contrast to the Middle East, elaborated notions of honour and shame are absent, women are not closeted in a "private" or "domestic" world and polygamy is disowned.

The principle difference lies, however, in the relative lack of importance of kinship ties. Bosnian Muslims take little pride in their genealogies and do not see the kin group as a source of potential spouses. Neither do they treat it as the most important arena of social, economic and ritual interaction. It is the neighbourhood rather than the kinship network within which individual nuclear families interact most intensively.

The life of the Muslim neighbourhood is conceived of as separate and

distinct from the life of the town outside and it is within the neighbourhood that the expression of collective Muslim identity is most consistent and pervasive. In this context safe and separate from that of the town, the Serbs, Catholics and secular authorities, values seen as Islamic are uniformly extolled and preserved and Muslims confidently affirm their identity as members of the worldwide religious community of Islam but also, more importantly, as a community distinct from that of non-Muslim Bosnians. It is because the neighbourhood is a social network which is both exclusively Muslim and highly interactive that it is particularly associated with the assertion of Bosnian Muslim identity as distinct from that of Serbs and Catholics.

3. RELIGIOUS ACTION

In studies of Muslim society a comparison between "Orthodox" and "Popular" Islam is frequently drawn. On the first side of this anthropologist's polarity are placed practices such as daily prayer and Quranic recitation. On the other lies all that does not fit into the first, an assortment of dervish rituals, tomb cults, evil eye beliefs and much else. I arrived in Sarajevo with this two part classification in mind and hoped to be able to see Muslim society through its lens, to pronounce Bosnian Islam basically "Orthodox" or basically "Popular", or to find Orthodox and Popular elements in heated conflict with each other. In this frame of mind it was not hard to identify Orthodoxy - *ezan* (the call to prayer) could be heard five times a day from my bedroom window, many Muslims had the aspiration to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, and whether or not they performed the actions all knew that one should pray five times daily and fast during Ramazan.

I was more disappointed in my efforts to discern Popular Islam. There was one tomb site in Sarajevo, that of the "seven brothers", at which passing Muslims sometimes prayed a *fatihah* (the first chapter of the Quran and the most frequently recited prayer) and dropped a few coins into the boxes provided for that purpose. However, there was no real cult around the seven tombs; prayer and offering was something to be given in passing rather than something for which one might make an express journey. The recitation of the *fatihah* was said to benefit the souls of the dead and was, in some unspecified way, a good thing to do, but prayer and offering could not cure one's ills or cause one's wishes to be granted. There were no evil eye beliefs and I searched in vain for a widespread

concept of *baraka*. In North Africa *baraka* is a sort of power or grace associated with *walis* (Arabic; saints) and their tombs. Contact with such a saint or tomb allows *baraka* to be passed to the contacting individual. In Sarajevo my questions as to *baraka* tended to provoke blank faces although a few people suggested that I must mean *bereket*. This apparently meant: "When you sit down to dine at a full table you say: 'What *bereket* we have' or 'God grant us always such *bereket*'". It thus appeared to denote a direct blessing from God rather than a grace or power transferable between mortals, whether saints or no. It was not, however, a term that I ever heard used in normal conversation; it had been recalled by my informants only to oblige me. It was, moreover, always associated by informants specifically and exclusively with sitting down to dine and never, for example, with the blessing of a well-furnished home, of wealthy and successful offspring or of any other good. My highest hopes of finding Popular Islam lay with the dervishes. Did they whirl or drink alcohol in the *tekija* (Turkish; dervish lodge)? No, they did not. Did they ignore the Ramazan fast and obligatory prayer? On the contrary, they were meticulous in observing these rites.

I concluded that Sarajevan Islam was extremely Orthodox and, with the anthropological polarity fixed firmly in my mind, felt that it would be impertinent and offensive to pose questions about, or to suggest even remotely, the existence of Popular religious practices and beliefs in the town. It was for this reason that I raised the subject of *walis* and miracles with a friend (who was a strict observer of her religious duties) in the following manner. I told her, as was the case, that I had read an article about the Albanian dervishes of Kosovo who, as well as ignoring the fast and drinking alcohol, believe in the supernatural powers of certain individuals and the healing power of their tombs.

Knowing the typically ambivalent sentiments of (Bosnian) Muslims towards Albanians I thought this approach an acceptable one and fully expected the remark to provoke a firmly-worded comparison of the heretical and superstitious ways of the Albanians with the Godly customs of Bosnia. The friend, however, merely encouraged me on with an interrogative "Yes?", so I put the question more clearly, and more leadingly.

- "Well, why do they have such beliefs in Kosovo and not here?"
- "But we have that here aswell. *Evlije*, they're called *evlije* - people who can read your thoughts and have special powers."

My devout friend went on to astonish me with the fact that there are some *evlije* in Sarajevo today and that an extremely well-known female *evlija* had died quite recently. As I recovered from this surprise she dealt me another. She was a university student in the middle of taking some examinations and from a cupboard produced her means of ensuring good luck in the undertaking. It was a large paper loop printed with symbols and inscriptions through which she passed her body and her books three times before sallying forth to be examined. It had come from Turkey, was called a *tvrđava* (Serbo-Croatian; fortress) and the designs on it were "Islamic".

I was later to learn more about *evlije* and to realise that the belief in them is particularly associated a new mystical tendency in religious life (see chapter five). I was also to learn that many Muslims possess or carry on their persons protective amulets, usually in the form of tiny copies of the Quran. At the time I was simply perplexed. This friend of mine prayed, fasted, gave alms, studied the Quran and generally appeared the epitome of Orthodoxy, yet here she was stepping through a paper hoop that seemed to be a manifestation of the most Popular and un-Orthodox variety of Islam. Yet she saw no contradiction in this.

What then is the status and value of the Orthodox/Popular distinction? Firstly, it is one that may be recognised within the society itself, it may be an emic as well as an etic classification. At a minor level this is almost inevitable for certain people at certain times will always criticise the actions of others as un-Orthodox, and compare them unfavourably with their own supposed Orthodoxy. Sometimes this becomes a matter not simply of individual opinions but one of generally accepted views. Thus there are situations in which a strong urban *ulema* pronounces itself the epitome of Orthodoxy and condemns the rural practice of Islam as un-Orthodox, and the rural population for its part accepts this characterisation without wanting to do anything to alter its validity. Thus of the Berber tribesmen of the Atlas, Gellner notes: "They recognise standards of purity in terms of which their own society fails, yet at the same time wish to remain as they are, indefinitely" (Gellner 1972).

This brings us to the second importance of the analytical polarity, that it can offer the anthropologist a way of thinking and talking about social divides. Thus Gellner's distinction of the "Scripturalist" Islam of urban, and the "Sufistic" Islam of tribal society draws a contrast not only between religious styles but also between two social groups (Gellner 1981). Some *people* (urbanites) belong to one category and other *people* (tribals) to another. It is *people* and forms of social organisation, not only rites and beliefs, that are categorised here.

In the Sarajevan context, however, no such social divide can be located and linked to a religious divide between the Orthodox and the Popular. This is a purely urban society, not a combination of tribal and urban or of landowners and peasants. Furthermore, the Muslim establishment, the *Islamska Zajednica*, is not a strong *ulema* which can succeed in having an exclusive claim to knowledge of what

is Orthodox widely recognised. It can and has criticised the dervish orders for practices and beliefs contrary to the spirit of true monotheism and consequently un-Orthodox, but the dervishes deny the charge, emphasizing that their philosophy is based on the holy word of the Quran and that (although some may lack sufficient spirituality to recognise the fact) it is therefore perfectly Orthodox. Within the general public there are mixed and unformed views on the question. Whilst the Orthodox/un-Orthodox framework is then used in debate, there is little general agreement as to who and what is and is not Orthodox.

What the Orthodox/Popular distinction can not offer the anthropologist is a reliable way of distinguishing and classifying particular rituals and practices as such. Certain rituals are simply unamenable to such classification. One such is the *mevlud* (Arabic; *mawlid*) which is performed in many parts of the Muslim world in honour of the Prophet. Nowhere is it prescribed in the Quran and the texts of the *Mevlud* poems are not Quranic. However, the ritual itself may include Quranic prayers as well as the recitation of the *mevlud* poem and although it is contrary to Quranic teaching to honour any being as highly as the Godhead, Muhammed, the Seal of the Prophets, is worthy of love and reverence. Is the ritual then Orthodox or Popular?

Beyond the problem of placing particular rituals on one side of the polarity is that created by the fact that the Popular category seems to subsume too many and various phenomena - evil eye beliefs, saint cults, Islamic medicine, many women's rituals, fortune telling practices, amulets and charms. These are not all regarded by the actor's themselves as belonging to a single category; the friend who used the *tvrdava* for good luck was at the same time strongly opposed to the practice of fortune telling. Grouping them all together under a single "Popular" banner need not necessarily be theoretically invalid, but neither will it yield

much insight into the ways in which actors perceive the varieties of religious practice.

It is with the ordinary perception of religious practice that this chapter is concerned. Some common practices are of course stigmatised by some Sarajevan Muslims as un-Orthodox and unIslamic so that the notion of Orthodoxy versus non Orthodoxy does have relevance for the actors. In general, however, religious practices are seen as located along a sliding scale of merit rather than as members of polarised classes of action. The idea of a scale of religious acceptability is in fact one propounded by the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence to which Bosnian Muslims belong. According to the formal Hanafi classification (as expounded in *Ta'limul-Islam*, an educational book published by the Bosnian Muslim establishment) there are seven types of action:

- 1) *Farz*. For example, daily prayer. God has commanded these practices. He who doesn't believe in them is no Muslim and he who neglects them will be punished.
- 2) *Vad'ib*. For example, the annual sacrifice of a sheep. God has commanded these practices but less strongly than those which are *farz*. He who does not believe in them does not cease to be a Muslim but he who neglects them will be punished by God.
- 3) *Sunnet*. For example the call to prayer (*ezan*) and washing one's hands before and after meals. These are practices which were followed and recommended by the Prophet.
- 4) *Mustehab*. For example, drying oneself with a towel after ritual washing. These practices are considered worthy ones since they were followed by the Prophet. They were not, however, directly recommended by him.
- 5) *Mubah*. Practices which are religiously neutral; neither good nor bad. For

example, sleeping or strolling in one's spare time.

- 6) *Mekruh*. Actions which are not in accord with *Sunnet* practice, for example, neglecting to wash hands before and after meals. He whose actions are *mekruh* runs the risk of losing the Prophet's good word on the Judgement Day.
- 7) *Haram*. For example, murder, disobedience to parents, eating pork. God has strictly prohibited these actions and punishes those who pursue them. He who does not believe this is no Muslim.

The formal classification is, however, scarcely known in Sarajevo except to those who have received higher education at religious establishments. It is never invoked by ordinary Muslims with the exceptions of the two terms at opposite ends of the scale - *farz* and *haram*. Even these two are used very infrequently; as has been seen in chapter two, an action is more likely to be labelled simply "*ne valja*" (Serbo-Croatian; not good) than *haram*. Similarly, the Serbo-Croatian word "*obavezna*", meaning duty or obligation, is usually substituted for the term *farz*. The term *farz* tended to be employed only by particularly well educated informants who were trying to explain to me, not the whole Hanafi classificatory system, but the status of different specific rituals and sections of rituals. Thus certain sections of the five daily prayer rituals were said to be *farz* and certain *sunnet*. The term was thus used only by those with a high level of Islamic education and in the context of a technical explanation of the details of a particular rite.

The majority of Sarajevan Muslims are not then aware of the formal Hanafi classification. Their own folk classification is, however, also based on a sliding scale. It must be emphasised that this classification is not one overtly propounded by Muslims and that in using the word "classification" I do not mean

to suggest that ordinary Muslims strictly categorise religious actions in the way that they classify birds or animals. Nevertheless, the steps of the scale are implicitly recognised in comments and attitudes. In the folk classificatory system of Sarajevan Muslims there are practices which:

- a) Should be followed. For example, daily prayer and circumcision for males.
- b) Are meritorious, desirable or "beautiful" but not necessary. For example, learning the Quran by heart, making the pilgrimage to Mecca. The concept of *sevap* is often involved in such practices.
- c) Are neither obligatory, prohibited, desirable nor frowned upon. For example, the possession of amulets.
- d) Are condemned by some and felt, even by their practitioners, to be dubious. For example, fortune telling. Such practices are often followed with some secrecy.
- e) Should not be followed. For example, eating pork.

The folk classification applies to actions, not to beliefs. According to the scriptures one must hold six true beliefs in order to be a Muslim: the existence, uniqueness and oneness of God; his all-powerful nature and the fact that all that happens is according to his will; the existence of heaven, hell and the Judgement Day; the existence of angels (*melek*); the Prophets (not only Muhammed but also Adam, Abraham, Moses, Solomon, Jesus and others); and the holy books (*kitab*) of which there are 104 including the Quran.

The importance of these six *beliefs* is far less widely known and emphasised in Sarajevo than is that of the *actions* of prayer, fasting, Quranic recitation and so on. It is assumed in a general way that anyone who professes to be a Muslim must automatically hold the six beliefs, *even if they are not conscious of them*. A person thus knows that he or she is a Muslim and accepts any necessary beliefs

whether they know their content or not. Many Muslims do not know that they should, according to scripture, believe in holy books other than the Quran, and certainly not that there are 104 of them altogether. However, this ignorance and consequent lack of conscious belief is not deemed to make the person any less a Muslim. On the question of heaven and hell there is often confusion and diversity of opinion. Bosnian Muslims speak of the Quranic *dženet* (heaven) and *džehenna* (hell). Bosnian Christians, both Serb and Catholic, use the Serbo-Croatian terms *raj* (heaven) and *pakao* (hell). One informant told me that only the good Muslim, and possibly a good non-Muslim who lived in some remote tribe and had never heard of Islam, could get to *dženet*. Another said that only good Muslims went to *dženet*, the good Christian, Jew or Hindu would go to *džehenna*, although to a more temperate zone in that fiery furnace. A third said that any good person, Muslim or no, might get to *dženet*. Others suggested that the good Muslim goes to *dženet* and the bad to *džehenna*, whilst the good Christian goes to *raj* and the bad to *pakao*. All of these views were given in response to my questions rather than offered spontaneously. The respondents themselves were less interested in what a Muslim should believe than in how a Muslim should act. I do not mean to suggest that it is deemed adequate simply to go through the motions of prayer without believing in the faith that lies behind the ritual. Belief is not dispensable; thus, as seen in chapter two, individuals who perform all the necessary religious actions may still be criticised for not being true Muslims at heart. It is simply that a person's beliefs and good intentions are usually assumed to exist and are not a focus of much interest. The same is not true of actions.

It is for this reason that I myself, although known to be a non-Muslim, was able to gain approval for following religious practices. On the first few occasions on which I accompanied friends to the mosque for daily prayer I

attempted to make myself as small and inconspicuous as possible in a corner and to witness the ritual without disturbing the worshippers. It was embarrassing to be such an obvious non-participant but I felt that it would seem blasphemous for me to join in the prayers. I was soon told that this was not the case and encouraged to join the ranks of worshippers, to watch carefully and to imitate their actions. Having mastered the physical actions I began to learn some of the Arabic prayers and was then able to pray more or less properly, although I never learnt all of the necessary words. At the same time I learnt to participate in the *mevlud* and *tevhid* rituals and when Ramazan came round I fasted for ten of its thirty days. For all of these actions I received wide praise and approval. Only once during my stay did someone (a young man who spent most of his time working as a chef in Switzerland) suggest to me that: "You can't put your bottom on two chairs"; you can't act both as an Protestant and as a Muslim at the same time. Those of his friends who heard him express this opinion did not support it and it was certainly not in accordance with anyone else's view. Sometimes praise of my conduct was directed as criticism or encouragement towards others: "If she, a non-Muslim who hasn't been brought up to it, can fast, why can't so-and-so?", "If she can learn Arabic prayers, you see that it wouldn't be difficult for you to do the same". However, my actions were not only transformed into sticks and carrots for others, but really deemed to reflect great credit on myself. My prayer and fasting made me "*fina*" (nice, good, beautiful).

Actions Which Should Be Done.

It is important to note that not all of the practices considered as belonging within this category are obligatory according to the scriptures. Male circumcision and the Ramazan prayer service of *teravijsa* are not *farz*. Sarajevan

Muslims do, however, consider them practices which should be followed by Muslims. This is not to say that all Muslims in fact follow all of the practices which fall within this category since individuals vary in their level of religious observance.

One of the actions that should be done is that of daily prayer made at five specific times. Muslims may be scathing of Christians who are said to pray haphazardly or only when they want something particular from God. The exact times of these daily prayers depend upon the precise position of the sun in the sky and consequently vary day by day. The correct times may be ascertained by listening for *ezan* (either live or tape recorded) from the mosque or by the annual purchase of a calendar in which the times have been calculated for the whole of the year in advance. They are based on the position of the sun as seen from Sarajevo; Muslims in other Bosnian towns must add or subtract stipulated numbers of seconds or minutes to these times. (The calendar also contains the dates of Islamic, State, Serbian and Catholic holidays.)

To perform prayer before the appropriate time is unacceptable under any circumstances. To perform it later than the appropriate time is deemed less efficacious and pleasing to God than prayer on the dot, however, individuals vary as to the extent to which they find late prayer acceptable. During the summer months the first prayer of the day may be timed as early as 5.00 am. but many Muslims will not rise specifically for it, instead performing the ritual upon waking at the normal time. Those who find themselves unavoidably in some public place (train, place of employment, school) at the time of prayer will wait to pray later, although some may perform a sort of temporary prayer, saying the words only internally and omitting the physical actions so as not to attract attention. I knew one young man who, during his military service, had prayed every night in

bed. Religious observance is not allowed in the barracks so he lay flat in the dark, surreptitiously making the actions and mouthing the words of prayer. The importance of hospitality is such that the arrival of guests at prayer time, if these guests are not themselves inclined to pray, will be sufficient to postpone the ritual.

Each of the five prayer rituals or *namaz* is formally composed of a section that is *farz* and a section (or sections) that is *sunnet* (ie. a section the performance of which God has commanded and a section the performance of which the Prophet has recommended). The order in which these types of prayer are made at any one *namaz* depends on which of the five *namaz* it is. The words and actions of *farz* and *sunnet* prayer do not differ. However, when *namaz* is made communally in the mosque the *farz* section will be vocally led by the mosque's *imam/hodja*.

The distinction between *farz* and *sunnet* sections of *namaz* is not known to all Muslims and those who do know it tend to treat the two sections as equally necessary. The *sunnet* section will be omitted only in exceptional circumstances. No prayer may be performed without *abdest*, ritual purity through washing. The place of prayer must itself be clean and Muslims praying at home may spread a prayer mat, sheepskin or even a cardigan on the floor in front of them. (Men are more likely than women to pray in the mosque but women are not prohibited from this and men do also pray at home.) In those households in which only some members pray, these worshippers will find a place as far away as possible from distracting televisions, radios and chatter. Fascinated toddlers sometimes become over-enthusiastic about the interesting prayer game being played by an adult and themselves feel the need to pray - right in the middle of the adult's prayer space. Juvenile interest is tolerated to quite an extent since it is supposed to acclimatise the child to the idea of prayer as a standard, everyday pursuit, but

children are not allowed to disrupt worship.

Those who do not pray regularly remain respectful of the prayer habits of others, do not suggest that they themselves have no need to pray and, if they offer any justification at all for their own omission, it will be to remark that in modern times so many people ignore the duty of prayer. Some find the subject of their own negligence an embarrassing one and turn the conversation to the fact that some close relative (mother, father, grandmother, grandfather) does pray regularly, or subtly express a hope that God will understand and forgive.

For such people the month of Ramazan may be a period of compensation for eleven months of omission. Some will fast for the whole month and many make the effort to fast for the first day or two and on the 27th, the festival of *Lajletul-Kadr*. At the end of each Ramazan day the lamps of Sarajevo's minarets are illuminated in signal that it is time for *iftar*, the breakfast. The meal, an especially delicious one, will have been prepared in advance and the minaret lights provoke instant response and rapid consumption of its many courses. *Iftar* is a family rather than a neighbourhood affair, but after it, neighbours often gather together to go to the mosque (either a local or a central one) for the prayer service of *teravija*. They may then attend *mukabela*, all night Quranic recitation, at the town's largest central mosque.

The final days of Ramazan are the occasion for the payment of *zekat* and *sadekatul-fitr* (1) (Islamic alms) which will be discussed in the following chapter. Members of a household who fast and attend *teravija* are

(1) *Sadekatul-fitr* is distinct from *sadaka*, the alms which may be given to the poor (often to Muslim gypsies at the gates of the mosque) on any occasion.

likely to make these payments not only on their own behalf but on that of other, less observant members of their household.

Ramazan is followed by the three day festival of *Ramazanski Bajram*, an occasion on which Muslims pay visits to kin and neighbours. Such visits begin with the traditional Turkish/Arabic congratulatory greeting:

Visitor: "Bajram Mubareć Ola!" (Happy Bajram to you!)

Host: "Alah Razula" (As God wills it)

The inevitable coffee is served along with sweet, heavy Turkish pastries prepared for the occasion - baklava, kadaifa or ružica. Both visits and cakes are made even by those who have not fasted and prayed.

About two months after *Ramazanski Bajram* falls the festival of *Kurban Bajram* at which sheep are ritually sacrificed. For the week or so before this occasion the hill at the north-east end of town is alive with animals which have been driven into Sarajevo by shepherds from the surrounding countryside. Here they graze and are prodded, appraised and bargained over by potential purchasers. Once vendor and purchaser have shaken hands on a deal, the latter must somehow get the unwilling beast home and there feed and shelter it until the day of slaughter. The presence of so many sheep in so many neighbourhood gardens provokes much discussion of and, because of the pervasive spirit of inter-household competition, deception about, the relative size, quality and price paid for various sheep.

A butcher is invited to kill the animal. Its throat is slit, it expires through loss of blood and is fleeced and quartered. The butcher's work is now done and the carcass is left to its owners who chop it into smaller pieces. Of these, some, including the head and internal organs, are retained for household consumption. Others are given to kin living within Sarajevo. The majority is

distributed to neighbours with the formula:

Distributor: "Bajram Mubareć Ola!" ("Happy Bajram to you!")

Receiver: "Alah Razula. Kabulosum." ("As God wills it. May God witness/accept this good act of yours". I.e. the gift of meat.)

Distributor: "Halalosum" ("My forgiveness on you". *Halaliti* = to forgive.

A single street or neighbourhood area will be crisscrossed all day long by the bearers of these small parcels. The meat is said to be given to the male head of household but it is women (or young girls) who make the actual door-to-door deliveries. Thus, as in everyday life it is the economic and social interaction of women which unites the neighbourhood, at *Kurban Bajram* it is their ritual interaction which does so.

The sacrifice is an expensive business - in 1986 an average sized sheep cost the equivalent of £100 which for some households was most of a month's income. For this reason many households sacrifice only one sheep rather than one for each adult as is the practice of wealthier families. Other households do not sacrifice at all, stating that they are not obliged to since they can't afford it. Yet even those who do not sacrifice receive meat, exchange the *Kurban Bajram* greeting and participate in the pre-sacrificial excitement and conversations. Thus the "should" of *Kurban Bajram* seems to be located not in the need for households to sacrifice but in the need for the neighbourhood to be united in the ritual festivities.

Actions Which Are Meritorious, Desirable Or Beautiful

The majority of religiously inspired practices fall within this category. I lost count of the number of times I was told that to do X, Y or Z "is beautiful" (*lijepo*). To say a *fatiha* when passing a grave, to fast the ten days of *Muharem* (Islamic New Year) and many other actions are considered beautiful ones. One extremely important action that falls within this category is the making of the pilgrimage, or Hajj, to Mecca. The Hajj is one of the five "pillars" of Islam and, according to scripture, is obligatory for all Muslims who are able to perform it. Yet in Sarajevo it is treated more as a desirable than as an obligatory act. To go on pilgrimage is so expensive and so far out of the reach of most Sarajevans that there is scarcely occasion to begin to think of it as a necessity. Yet many have the desire, however unrealistic, to perform the Hajj. Returned pilgrims speak of the experience with great feeling, describing the joy and tears of the moment of arrival in Mecca in moving terms. The title of *Hadži* is pre-fixed to their names, or they may simply be addressed as *Hadžija*. They become objects of great respect, their hands are kissed by others on the occasions of the two *Bajram* and their opinions sought and valued on all religious matters. Both men and women may go on Hajj, however, a married woman is unlikely to go without her husband, thus gaining a status which he lacks. Hence the joke:

"What do you call the wife of a Hadži?"

"Hadžinica" (an honorific title)

"What do you call the husband of a Hadži?"

"An ass!"

Knowledge of the Quran is desirable. The Quran is God's final and perfect message to mankind. The Prophet was not "inspired" with it but taught each and every one of its words precisely by the angel Džibrail (Gabriel). Although he did

not himself transcribe these words he was bidden by the angel to learn to read and write and the Quran places great value on literacy - the slave who teaches ten Muslims to read and write gains his freedom. The Quranic words as revealed to Muhammed were transcribed after the Prophet's death by his followers.

Sarajevan Muslims revere not only the message contained in the Holy Book but the very form of the book itself and each of its phrases in spoken or written form. In Ottoman times the art of calligraphy was highly prized and contemporary mosques, and sometimes homes, are adorned with pictures of particular Quranic words, notably "Allah", "Muhammed" and "Hu" (one of the 99 names of God). Although contemporary Qurans include a page-by-page Serbo-Croatian translation (or interpretation, since the divine word can never be adequately translated), they do not omit the original Arabic.

It is for this reason that Sarajevan Muslims do not simply read the Quran (*čitati Kuran*), they speak it aloud (*učiti Kuran*), thus reproducing each word in its revered verbal form. In standard Serbo-Croatian the verb *učiti* means to teach or learn. With regard to the Holy Book it means to speak or recite it. I was sometimes asked whether I had read the Quran in English by those who wanted reassurance that I was a sincere scholar and had an idea of the book's contents. However, the fact that I had did not reflect any special religious merit on me - reading the Quran in English (or Serbo-Croatian) has none of the value of speaking it in Arabic.

The person who completes one act of speaking the whole Quran is said to have completed one *hatma*. At the *mekteb* (Islamic school for children) pupils learn the Arabic alphabet in order to be able to say *hatme*. The completion of a child's first *hatma* is a time of celebration for that child and its family. The Ramazan service of *teravija* is based on the completion of a *hatma*: for each of

the thirty nights *teravija* prayers include the recitation of a section of the Quran so that by the end of the month the entire book has been recited. Ramazan is also a time at which individual Muslims may say *hatme* for their dead relatives.

These acts (individual completion of *hatme* and participation in the *hatma* of the *teravija* services) bestow *sevap* on the performer. *Sevap* (Arabic; tawab) may be roughly translated as a sort of religious credit which God may take into account on the day of judgement. Some actions are *sevapnije* than others.

(*Sevapnije*: an adjective formed in the typical Serbo-Croatian manner and meaning "more full of *sevap*.) During the *tevhid* ritual (see chapter six) it is said to be *sevapnije* to sit close to those who recite the Quran than to sit more distantly. After a *teravija* service one woman I knew remarked on how hot and stuffy the mosque had been that night. The much respected Sheikh of the Kadiri *tekija* told her jovially: "Oh well, it's *sevapnije* for us".

Sevap is incurred only by non-obligatory but desirable religious actions. Thus the giving of alms or the fasting of Ramazan do not bestow *sevap* on the performers. It is not the defining characteristic of desirable actions since, for example, making the pilgrimage does not incur *sevap*. (It does, however, clean the pilgrim of all previous sins.)

Speaking the Quran, or sections of it, is meritorious, but the ability to recite the Quran from memory is yet more highly valued. The person who has memorised the entire book is known as a *hafiz*. The process of studying *hifz* (memorisation and the ability to recite the Quran) may take one to three years, largely depending on the age of the student. The Quran is learnt section by section, at the foot of one who is already *hafiz*. As each new section is acquired the student must continue to practise those sections which have already been

committed to memory. It is clear that learning *hifz* is hard work. Muslims say that no other book of its length could be so learnt; the Quran can be acquired only by virtue of the help given by God to the sincere student. One *hafiz* explained to me that the Quran has its own *mudisa* or miracle. Just as each of the Prophets had a *mudisa* (for example, Jesus could bring the dead to life) so the Holy Book has the *mudisa* of enabling the sincere and strong willed to learn it.

The student of *hifz* must satisfy his or her own master before being examined by a Sarajevo committee of *hafizi*. Success is followed by the performance of a prayer service known as *hafiz dova* in the town's largest central mosque. The student is now pronounced a *hafiz* and the title prefixed to his or her name. From 1878 to 1978, 186 Muslims have become *hafiz* in Sarajevo. Of these, a growing percentage have, in recent years, been female. It is during Ramazan that the *hafizi* are most publicly on view, leading the special Ramazan prayer service of *teravija* and performing *mukabela*, all night Quranic recitation. Many *hafizi* are at the same time hodjas or bulas (male and female religious functionaries whose role will be discussed in chapter four) but the respect and admiration with which they are regarded springs not from this fact but from their ability to reproduce the holy words from memory.

The *mevlud* ritual seems to fall within the category of desirable actions. Certainly it is a ritual from which participants can draw *sevap*. The earliest documentation on mevluds dates from 1531 when the founder of the town's largest mosque, Gazi Husrevbeg, stipulated that a mevlud should be said annually within the mosque and provided funds for the purpose. Today some mosques and *tekije* (dervish lodges) hold annual mevluds. A mosque may also host a mevlud in celebration of its renovation or refurbishment. Mevluds are also held by

individual households in celebration of a wedding, the building of a new house, the circumcision of a young son, the return from military service of an older son and for many other occasions. Mensur Brdar estimates that 10,000 mevluds are held annually in Bosnia-Hercegovina (Brdar, *Islamska Misao* October 1986).

These household mevluds are conducted by specialist women known as *bulas*, and attended only by women. The central part of the ritual is the *bulas'* recitation of mevlud poems describing the birth, life and deeds of the Prophet. These are interspersed with Quranic prayers said by the whole company. In former times the mevlud poems were in the Turkish language and of Turkish provenance. Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century mevlud poems have been written in Serbo-Croatian (sometimes in the Arabic or "Turkish" script, as it is often called). Today, many mevlud rituals will commence with a section of a Turkish poem and continue with sections of various Serbo-Croatian ones. The skill of the *bulas* lies in their adroitness in combining verses from different poems to form a whole in which there is no repetition of episodes of the Prophet's story.

Actions Which Are Neither Obligatory, Prohibited, Desirable Nor Frowned Upon

Not surprisingly perhaps, there is less to be said about actions of this type than about others since Muslims themselves do not feel particularly strongly about them. They include the use of charms such as the *tvrdava* and protective amulets. The owners of such items brought them to my attention only in an offhand fashion and had little more to say about them than that they existed. In a village outside Sarajevo there was said to be an Islamic doctor who said Quranic words over his patients or wrote them out on pieces of paper to be worn close to the afflicted part of the body. No-one I met had actually visited this doctor and none spoke out either for or against his practice.

The practice of sprinkling a forty day old baby with flour and sugar (see p.70) falls in this category, as does the tradition of *sísano kumstvo* (a type of fictive kinship) which is not deemed to be of any great spiritual importance.

Also to be noted is the telling of certain stories involving religious elements. Hangi notes such a tale as told in turn-of-the-century Bosnia (Hangi 1900). A poor but pious girl had the God-given ability to see whether, at the moment of their deaths, certain people had God's mercy or not. This girl had two brothers, one bad but successful, the other good. As the bad brother lay dying the girl saw how an ugly and frightening figure, with sharp black teeth, removed something black and smelly from his body with a knife and flung it out the door. To the amazement of those gathered round the deathbed she cried for her brothers soul. Later she saw the good brother die amidst flowers, shining angels and the beauty of God. This time she smiled, again to the amazement of the company who could see nothing but a dying man.

A similar tale was related to me in 1986 as I sat drinking coffee with a woman (the hostess on this occasion), her mother-in-law, her HFBW and her HFBWSD. The latter told us the tale which again concerned a poor but Godly woman who was granted, this time by the angel Asrail, the ability to see how others died. She saw the hodja's deathbed surrounded by pigs and his soul drawn out with a nail by Asrail who then wiped his hands. The next day she saw Asrail preside over the death of a humble old woman whose soul he drew out with a flower.

This tale was said by the teller to be "*Živa istina*", the living truth. Its audience listened with the sort of attention and interest often accorded to ghost stories and other tales of the supernatural in Britain. It was a good story, well told, and those who heard it tutted and shook their heads for some moments before turning their attention to matters closer to home.

Actions Which Are Frowned Upon

Most common of these are fortune telling practices. Some Muslims believe fortune telling to be "unIslamic" and a "sin". One muezzin told me that he who believed in the predictive power of such practices was no Muslim and that the prayers of those who indulge in them simply for fun, and without believing, would not be accepted for forty days. Those who practise them do so covertly, although the extent of this covertness varies with different fortune telling techniques. In general, the fortune teller is not deemed to possess any special power; anyone can tell fortunes although some are said to "know" fortune telling better than others. One exception to this rule, associated to a non-traditional form of fortune telling, will be noted.

Fortune telling is done by and for women, principally for young women. Most of its predictions concern love and marriage, although they also deal with matters of employment, finance and health. One practice, followed only by unmarried girls and in the spirit of fun, involves hanging a golden ring on a piece of thread held over a glass of water. The number of times it sways back and forth indicates the age at which the woman will marry. The ring is then suspended over the pulse of the woman's wrist, its subsequent movements indicating the number of sons and daughters she will bear. This simple method of prediction requires no elaborate preparation or skill and is pursued more in the spirit of a parlour game than in that of serious prophecy.

The most common technique is certainly that of reading the fortune in the coffee cup. On any occasion when women who know each other well are gathered together to drink coffee, they may read fortunes in the cups. However, the presence of a relative stranger or of one who is known or felt likely to disapprove, will inhibit the fortune telling. Certain times and places, those of

religious significance, are inappropriate ones for fortune telling which will consequently be avoided or accomplished in great secrecy. I once attended a *tevhid* death ritual at which one of the women present was rumoured to have great knowledge of fortune telling. Along with the *tevhid* hostess's young niece, I had my fortune told by this woman, very discreetly and behind locked doors. That she told our fortunes at all was unusual in this context and the lack of respect it showed for the occasion seemed to be due to the fact that the *tevhid* holder was poor and the ritual itself rather slipshod and unimpressive.

After the coffee has been drunk the dregs are allowed to settle in the cup which is then inverted onto a saucer or tray and left to stand. When these dregs have dried to a stain inside the cup, fortunes may be read therein. One side of the cup is the male side, one the female. On these two sides the teller searches for certain symbols - dark men and blond men, dark women and blond women, the bird which means one will receive a message, the horse for strength, the rabbit for speed, the question mark for some unforeseeable but important event or for a hint of doubt. All of these symbols are standard and thus anyone may learn to read fortunes. On one occasion I sat drinking coffee with two women I knew well. I asked if one of them would read my fortune but the first said she wasn't in the mood and the second claimed not to "know". She had had her own fortune told countless times and was familiar with all the symbols but was squeamish about reading fortunes herself since the practice is considered a dubious one. Instead she told me to read my own fortune. I protested that I didn't "know" it either but she told me: "You've heard it all before, bird, horse, rabbit...You just have to look for it."

Yet whilst anyone can read a fortune in some manner or other, certain individuals are said to be better at it than others. Their superior knowledge is

judged by their ability not only to discern the relevant symbols in the coffee stain but to weave them all into a coherent picture. Thus, anyone who is so inclined can see that:

"You have a message...and there's a horse here, that's some sort of strength...a number three, maybe you'll get three messages..."

But only those who know fortune telling well will tell one things along the lines of:

"There's a blond man in your life, he's far away but he's trying very hard to send some message. He's hindered by a dark woman who's jealous and likely to cause problems in some devious way..."

Those who have the reputation of really "knowing" fortune telling usually meet the request for a reading with at least a brief display of reticence before complying. There is no question of offering payment to the teller, one is not even supposed to thank them for their pains. Such thanks *ne valja*.

Coffee reading is performed by Christians as well as Muslims but other techniques belong exclusively to particular national/religious groups. Palm reading and prediction through the cards are practised only by Gypsies. Others may have their fortunes read in this way by Gypsies but do not themselves employ the technique. I was sometimes asked about English fortune telling practices and suggested the method of peeling an apple, throwing the peel over one's shoulder and taking the shape it formed on the ground as the initial of one's future husband. This went down well with the unmarried but, like the gold ring practice, was taken more as a game than as a predictive technique.

One fortune telling practice is said to be an exclusively Muslim one in that it is not practised by Serbs, Catholics or others. Further, it is said to have an Islamic religious basis and thus to be the truest of all techniques. This

practice is fortune telling with beans which is said to have been done by the Prophet's daughter, Fatima, and thus to come "from God". (Some Muslims denounce this as a mistaken belief but it is a widely held one.) Fortune telling with beans is carried out in secrecy and talked of in whispers. The fortune teller holds forty dried, white navy beans in her hands and murmurs a Quranic verse into them. They are then thrown onto a cloth and arranged into three columns of small bean clusters. As in the coffee cup, one side is the male, the other the female. The beans are thrown and arranged three times and the fortune told from them. After the third arrangement the subject of the fortune leaves the room with a bean in each hand and one in her mouth. The first word she then hears is interpreted by the teller as having a certain significance for the future. In contrast to the coffee reading technique which I witnessed numerous times and was able to learn the details of, I witnessed the bean reading only twice and found it difficult to learn the details of the process from the teller who treated it with some secrecy. As in other traditional techniques, the teller is not deemed to possess any particular power although she may have greater or lesser ability or "knowledge".

Mention must be made of a non-traditional method of fortune telling which some Muslims took seriously. I was told of it by a friend, an unmarried woman, in great secrecy and behind locked doors. This friend had dialled a number in Kosovo - the number of a fortune teller. She was asked her name and that of her mother and had her fortune told over the phone. Its most noteworthy point was that the woman would be married within six months. Two young married friends of hers also phoned. One was told to drink a certain tea to induce pregnancy, the other to stop worrying about her husband who was faithful and committed. All three were asked to send donations (not payment) to a certain address in Kosovo. (This is

illegal, a fact which increased the need for secrecy felt by my friend.) Since the fortune teller used no known technique of divination, the three women considered that, if the predictions turned out to be true, it would be the result of some peculiar and incomprehensible knowledge of the fortune teller's. Such an idea is, as has been seen, not generally associated with the ability to read fortunes and others who had heard of the existence of this telephonic fortune teller dismissed her as a probable charlatan.

Practices designed to predict the future are then considered somewhat dubious. So also are practices which seek to influence it in any way more specific than the procuring of general good luck and health through the possession of charms and amulets. One such was that of speaking a particular Quranic passage seven times over a sweet, cake or flower. This item is then given either to an enemy, in which case the enemy will not harm the giver, or to a person of the opposite sex, in which case that person will fall in love with the giver. The manner in which I learnt of this practice is interesting. I had gone to visit a middle-aged woman with a high level of Islamic education and antipathy for fortune telling which she considered unIslamic. I was accompanied on this visit by a young woman interested in all forms of fortune telling. For a variety of reasons there was animosity between the younger and the older woman. Our hostess showed us many books, pamphlets and handwritten documents on religious topics. Amongst these was a copy of the above mentioned Quranic passage. The hostess said that this had been given to her by someone else and treated it in a light hearted fashion, as if to show that she herself did not believe in such nonsense. Nevertheless, perhaps somewhat spitefully, she suggested that the younger woman might try saying the Quranic spell in order to get a boyfriend.

Later I asked the young woman about the incident but she wordlessly urged me to silence, gesturing at the people in the corridor outside the room in which we sat. I asked her in more private circumstances later but again she felt it ill-advised to talk. Finally, on an occasion when the whole house was empty but for we two who sat in a room with doors and windows shut, I succeeded in extracting a response. The woman said that she had not wanted to speak before because if anyone overheard her, even her mother or father, they might think that she herself engaged in such practices. This, she said, she would never do. She offered three reasons.

Firstly, even if a man fell in love with you from taking the sweet, cake or flower, you would never know whether it was a true love or an artificially created one.

Secondly, such an action would eventually and inevitably "turn back on you in the worst possible way".

Finally, this practice, and others which seek to manipulate events unnaturally "*ne valja*". I asked her if she meant that the practice was *haram*. She considered for a while, said that it probably was, and then continued to stress its *ne valja* and dangerous character.

Both women, in their different ways, thus denied the possibility that they themselves would perform such an action whilst implying that the other might do so.

Actions Which Should Not Be Done

Of the actions which should be avoided, one is most decidedly the consumption of pork. Not only do Muslims not eat it but they are convinced that it is of all foods the most loathsomely fatty, unhealthy and nauseating. The full

strength of this opinion was brought home to me one evening when I visited a family whose small son was ill with a fever. Another visitor, a neighbouring woman, said that she had a remedy to be rubbed onto the sufferer's chest and that she would go and fetch it from her own home. Since it was dark she asked me to accompany her. I went and, from a cupboard, the woman produced a small pot of some white paste. She pulled off the lid to reveal the smooth goo of pure lard. "Pig's fat," she said, waving it under my nose, "You Christians eat that". She seemed as certain that this revolting mess was a Christian delicacy as she was that she herself would never pollute her body with the stuff.

The consumption of alcohol seems to be another member of this category although a rather ambiguous one. It is likely that male and female attitudes to alcohol differ, however, I have less insight into the former since my fieldwork did not include, and could not possibly have included, frequenting the all-male bars of the town. It is unusual for women to drink although some of the younger generation may take the occasional glass, secretly from their families and in the homes of close friends on special occasions such as birthday gatherings or New Year. Unmarried women who frequent the young people's bars (*kafić*) of Sarajevo order only soft drinks in these public places. Their male companions may, on the other hand, be drinking alcohol and indeed, excepting those men who reject it completely on religious grounds, male consumption of alcohol seems to be quite common.

The general female attitude to male drinking is that it is wrong but only to be expected from men (although note that the complete alcoholic is the cause of *sramota*, shame, for his family. See p.83) Thus when a workman who is also a family connection is requested to fix the household's electricity or boiler, he is likely to be offered either beer or *rakiya* by the housewife, although that same

housewife does not like her own son or husband to drink. The woman whose husband comes home drunk may maintain a superior silence, make wry jokes about his pathetic state or become irritated and critical. The husband tends jovially to accept his wife's criticism, to turn his attention to the children, newspaper or television in order to avoid it, and to express defiance only through a vague implication that it is not really her business whether he drinks or not. This may seem to be simply a clever technique to quench a spouse's disapproval, and one that might be successfully applied the world over. In Sarajevo, however, it is an unusual one. In general, criticism between spouses, siblings or parent and child, whether overt or implied, provokes heated argument, powerful scorn and shouted counter accusations. The frequency of such high-pitched but short-lived family quarrels unnerved and embarrassed me before I grew accustomed to it. In contrast, the drunken husband's response to a critical wife is a relatively tolerant one which suggests that even men feel the consumption of alcohol to be something which should not be done.

Fluidity

The five categories, whilst not overtly recognised or referred to, are distinguished by the attitudes of Muslims towards them. Those who fail to perform actions in the first category offer no justifications for what is felt to be an omission. Those who perform actions in category two tend to be especially respected and admired and may earn *sevap*. Actions of the third category provoke little reaction of any type, those of the fourth tend to be performed secretly or criticised and those of the fifth are widely condemned. However, it is clear that the classificatory boundaries are more fluid than those involved in the formal distinction of *Farz....Haram*. In some cases different individuals place different

actions in different categories. Thus, whilst the consumption of alcohol was, in my experience, treated as an action which should not be performed, it seems possible that a different attitude prevails in the context of an all-male bar.

Most Muslims treat fortune telling merely as a dubious pursuit but some consider it an action which should definitely not be performed.

One particularly disputed question in contemporary Sarajevo is that of suitable clothing for women. The veil was made illegal in 1952 and is not worn, or considered necessary, by anyone today. In the pre-socialist period it had been common in towns whereas rural women tended to veil only when they came into contact with non-Muslims, for example, when going to market in town. Female veiling as an identity marker rather than as an aspect of sexual segregation is also noted by Pillsbury for Chinese Muslim society (Pillsbury 1978).

Sarajevo's elderly women keep their heads, arms and legs covered at all times whereas many young women are happy to wear tight fitting jeans and sleeveless blouses and to look as "Western" as possible. Whilst their elders may not take warmly to the extremes of such a style, neither do they feel that their daughters and granddaughters should cover their heads (except, ofcourse, during religious rituals). The value placed upon looking attractive is high and above all others it is the young who should look well. The wearing of a headscarf is not (in general) taken, by young or old, as attractive.

There is, however, a section of the younger generation which feels differently (see chapter five). Amongst the young and enthusiastically devout some women have, in recent years, taken to dressing in long skirts, long sleeved blouses and headscarves covering all but the face. This, they say, is in obedience to a Quranic imperative. Other young women of this religiously active social circle admire their scarved peers but believe such covering to be an Islamically

recommended rather than an obligatory practice. Young men who move in these circles often support such covering as Islamically prescribed, in spite of the fact that their own girlfriends or wives may not cover their heads.

There is thus disagreement as to whether or not women should be so dressed. There is further disagreement as to the contexts in which women should be covered. Most feel it to be appropriate only in the presence of non-related men. Some support the practice of covering even in front of non-Muslim women and thus see it as a marker both of sexual and of national/religious boundaries. One young man even suggested that it was necessary for women to be covered in the presence of non-related Muslim women in order to inhibit the possibility of lesbianism. His companions, both male and female, thought this was going a little too far.

The sharp contrast between Orthodox and un-Orthodox is one that is occasionally drawn by Sarajevan Muslims, usually in the context of criticism of someone else's behaviour. In general, however, actions are seen not as lying on one side of a deep moral chasm but as located somewhere along a scale of religious acceptability. Individuals may vary as to where they place particular practices on this scale, but the idea of the scale itself is implicit in attitudes and behaviour.

The existence of the sort of loose emic classificatory system outlined above does not, of course, in itself invalidate the anthropologist's use of Orthodox/Popular terminology. Yet in Sarajevo such a polarisation seems redundant for two reasons. The first is that there are no great social clefs (urban/tribal, landowner/peasant) which might correspond to any religious ones. The second is that no landmark for Orthodoxy, for example an *ulema*, can be identified. (Why the

Muslim establishment, the Islamska Zajednica, does not provide such a landmark will become clear in the following chapter.) In this context no clues or principles point the way and, short of creating or adopting some theology (which is not the business of the social scientist), one cannot know where to begin dividing the Orthodox from the Popular.

4. RELIGIOUS BUREAUCRACY

In many of the Muslim majority societies today a question is being posed. The question is this: What should be the relationship between Islamic law and state law? It had been there for the asking in the days of the Muslim empires and city states but in the absence of modern style police forces it was less pressing. Law was something which the citizen could appeal to, it was not something systematically enforced by people paid to do so. Twentieth century states must confront the question and have answered it in different ways, from Turkish secularism to the Iranian Islamic Republic. Some countries are riven by conflict over the issue, thus the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt emphatically and sometimes violently denies the legitimacy of the existant state and legal code.

Within the Muslim minority the scope of the realistically possible is small; India's Muslim minority recently succeeded in having a literary work (Rushdie's "Satanic Verses") officially banned, but cannot hope to transform the country into an Islamic Republic enforcing Islamic law. The question becomes restricted and Muslims do not ask "What should be the role of religion within the state?", but "What should be the role of religion and of religious authorities in maintaining and developing our political identity as a minority within this state?" The question is cut down to the realm of the possible. Providing an answer is not simply a matter of theological interest since religion is the major, and in many cases the sole source of their discrete identity and thus of any claims to political status; without its faith the Muslim minority would be a political nonentity.

Bosnia's Muslims are not only a minority but a minority within a state which makes comparatively strong attempts to regulate religious expression and organisation (although these attempts entail far less restriction than is the case in other socialist states; the Soviet Union and Albania, for example). This fact constricts the scope of the possible yet further. In this chapter I want to consider the response of the official Muslim establishment, the Islamska Zajednica, to the question of the role of religious authority in maintaining and developing Bosnian Muslim identity within Yugoslavia. This response is affected by changes in the political climate and thus is itself changeable. At the same time it must be said that the Zajednica is not a wholly monolithic and ideologically homogeneous authority but a complex bureaucracy containing various currents of opinion and for this reason it is not always easy to discern clear direction and motivation in its behaviour. Nevertheless, two general points may be made about it:

1. The Zajednica sees itself as the only truly legitimate religious authority of Muslims. It attempts to present itself as such to the Muslim population, to obtain this population's allegiance, to monopolise the control of the practice of Islam and to combat rivalling religious leaders and orientations. The monopolising tendency of Muslim establishments is apparent in much of the world today and in Yugoslavia is exacerbated by the fact that, in a socialist state, there is but a limited amount of religious authority to go round. The Zajednica wants as much of this as possible.
2. Whilst the Zajednica is certain that it is the only legitimate Muslim religious authority it is uncertain and changeable on the question of how to represent the Bosnian Muslim population in the political context of federated Yugoslavia. There is evidence that until the late 1970s the

Muslim establishment quietly but consistently tried to advance Bosnian Muslim claims to higher status as a nationality within Yugoslavia. Action by the state in the late 70s and early 80s put a curb on these endeavours and the Zajednica now places more emphasis on Yugoslav socialist patriotism (see p.22).

In all its endeavours the Zajednica must avoid antagonising the secular authorities and this necessity is a two edged sword. If the Zajednica fails it may expect trouble from above, from the state. If it succeeds too obviously it may create trouble below, from Muslims who see it as hand in glove with the atheistic secular authorities. Before considering how the Zajednica attempts to walk this fine line it is necessary to look at its organisation and historical development.

In Ottoman times the ultimate religious authority of the Bosnian Muslims was the Shaikh-al-Islam who was appointed by the Ottoman Sultan. The Sultan also appointed Bosnia's mufti (juriconsult) who was empowered to pronounce *fetve*, rulings concerning religious life in the province and based on Shari'a law. The mufti in turn appointed kadijas, Muslim judges who applied the law. The building and upkeep of mosques and medresas and the payment of those who ran them was largely funded by *vakufi* (Arabic sing; waqf), tax exempt endowments. The administrators of the vakufs were known as *mutevlije*. The mufti, kadijas and *mutevlije* formed part of the *ulema* (group of learned Muslim scholars) the ranks of which also included medresa professors. Whilst individual *alim* (members of the *ulema*) wielded specific powers, as a group the *ulema* did not have official membership or a strictly defined role.

With the Austro-Hungarian occupation matters changed drastically and the process of bureaucratisation began. Bosnian Muslims were administratively cut off

from the Empire and the Sultan's role became that only of a spiritual figurehead. The occupiers wanted a Muslim establishment independent of Istanbul, its officials to be chosen and supervised by the Austrians themselves. The position of *Reis-ul-Ulema*, the leader of the whole Muslim community, was created by the Austro-Hungarians and still exists today. For the next thirty years Bosnian Muslims negotiated with, and occasionally revolted against, their Austrian rulers in an attempt to gain independence in the organisation of religious matters (see Donia 1981). In 1909 Emperor Franz Josef signed the *Statute for Autonomous Rule of Islamic Religious and Vakuf matters in Bosnia-Hercegovina* which granted Bosnian Muslims the right to organise their own religious establishment and to elect its officials. Bosnia-Hercegovina was divided into six muftihoods (one of them that of Sarajevo) under the authority of the *Reis-ul-Ulema*.

The inter-war Kingdom saw the establishment of four separate Muslim bodies, those of Serbia, of Macedonia, of Montenegro and of Bosnia-Hercegovina with Croatia and Slovenia. In 1930 an all-Yugoslavia Muslim establishment, the Supreme *Starešinstvo* (Board of Elders) of the Islamic Religious Community, was created under the leadership of the *Reis-ul-Ulema*. Sarajevo and Skopje were the seats of two lesser authoritative bodies known as *ulema-medžlis*.

During the Second World War many Muslims supported the Nazis and Ustashi rather than the Communist Partisans. It was not until 1943 that the first Muslim Partisan battalion was formed and this included no more than 240 fighters whilst Muslim participation in Nazi and Ustashi units was, according to German records, in excess of 42,000 (see JIMMA 1986). During the war the Communist Party made no attacks on the Muslim establishment and attempted to assure Muslims that their religion would not suffer under a Communist government (pamphlets about the liberal treatment of Muslims in the Soviet

Union were handed out. See Popovic 1986 p.342). After the war the new regime launched a vigorous anti-religious campaign. In 1945 and 1946 the Muslim establishment had elected various strongly anti-Communist leaders. The government closed the Shari'a courts and the Sarajevo school of Shari'a law and prohibited the collection of voluntary donations to fund the medresas. The measures had their effect on the Muslim establishment which adopted a new statute ensuring that its leaders were more amenable to socialist ideology (Bartlett 1979 p.59). In 1950 the veil was abolished (the Muslim leadership in fact agreed to this), and in 1952 the mektebs and the Sarajevo women's medresa were closed. In 1958 most *vakuf* property was nationalised.

Although some of these measures were taken in the 1950s, Belgrade's 1948 break with Moscow had seen the beginning of a tendency towards greater liberalism and tolerance of the Yugoslavian religious communities. In 1953 the Basic Law on the Legal Status of Religious Communities was passed, making the following provisions:

Guarantees freedom of conscience and faith; makes religious worship a

private concern; gives citizens the right to belong to any or no religious community.

Gives citizens the right to found religious communities and gives

equality to all religious communities.

Allows the religious communities to publish and distribute religious

printed matter in the context of the general laws on the press.

Separates schools from the church and allows religious instruction in

churches and other designated places; it also allows religious communities to found religious schools for the education of the clergy.

Prohibits the abuse of religious functions etc. for political ends...

prohibits the hindering of religious gatherings...prohibits anyone from

being either forced to or prevented from exercising his religious freedom in any way.

Protects the rights of citizens from being infringed because of their religious convictions or activities; but no religious community or believer may...be exempt from the general civil or military duties of the citizen.

States that religious communities are legal persons; allows the clergy to found clerical associations.

Gives the government (later altered to social-political communities) the possibility (but not the obligation) to give material assistance to the religious communities.

Prohibits anyone from either forcing or preventing the giving of alms for religious purposes; allows alms to be collected in churches and other specified places.

Allows baptism and circumcision at the demand of one parent or guardian; the consent of a child over ten years of age is also required.

Allows a religious marriage ceremony only after civil marriage.

(Quoted from Alexander 1979 p.222)

In drawing up this law the government sought the suggestions of religious leaders but rejected them on two particular matters: prisoners do not have the right to be visited by religious functionaries and men doing military service are not allowed to practise their faith.

Each of Bosnia's three main religious groups, the Roman Catholic, the Serbian Orthodox and the Islamic, is headed by a state-authorized organisation. (For an account of the religious establishments of the two Christian churches see Alexander 1979.) The state delegates authority in religious matters to the organisations which are answerable for their actions. It also provides health and other benefits for the clergy and partially finances the religious

establishments (see appendix C for details of the Islamska Zajednica's income).

Since the war the Islamska Zajednica has had three separate constitutions, those of 1947, 1957 and 1959. Today it is a complex bureaucratic organisation made up of various different national, regional and local bodies.

At the local level, each town or group of small villages has its own Islamska Zajednica Committee (*Odbor*). These committees appoint hodjas, or imams as the Zajednica prefers to style them, to the mosques in their area. Depending on the size of the parish (*džemat*), the hodja/imam's duties may include any or all of; leading prayers in the mosque, preaching the friday sermon, washing male corpses for burial, performing the *dženaza* funeral service for the dead, giving Islamic instruction to the children of the parish. Some committees (including that of Sarajevo) also employ bulas, female religious functionaries whose duties may include; conducting *tevhid* and *mevlud* rituals, giving Islamic instruction to children, washing female corpses, preaching to women during Ramazan. Some committees, usually those more remote from urban areas and the influence of Sarajevo, are reluctant to employ bulas officially, as will be seen below.

At the regional level there are four Islamska Zajednica Synods. They are those of:


1. Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia and Slovenia
2. Serbia (including Kosovo and Vojvodina)
3. Macedonia
4. Montenegro

Each of the Synods has its executive body, the regional *Starešinstvo*. These regional authorities organise the Hajj, the collection of Islamic taxes and alms and other large scale religious matters within their territory. Members of the four Synods and *Starešinstvos* are elected every four years.

At the national level is the Supreme Synod, the members of which are elected from the regional Synods. Its executive body is the Supreme *Starešinstvo*

which has its seat in Sarajevo. This is headed by the Reis-ul-ulema and also includes his personal team of advisors and six members of the Supreme Synod, chosen by themselves. All of these members are Bosnian, a fact which underlines Popovic's point that "The Muslim community of Bosnia-Hercegovina is the largest and most important Muslim community of Yugoslavia" (Popovic 1986 p.360).

Diagram One: Organisation of the Islamska Zajednica.



The Supreme Synod and Starešinstvo and the Reis-ul-ulema, control the Islamic Theological Faculty of Sarajevo and all of Yugoslavia's medresas. They are also responsible for liaising with the outside Muslim world.

In 1950 employees of the Zajednica founded their own association, *Ilmijska*; "the most powerful organisation of its type in Yugoslavia" (Popovic op cit. p.348)

The organisation of the Islamska Zajednica is thus a complicated one which, like the country's secular political system, includes both regional and national authoritative bodies. Those Bosnian Muslims who are not themselves involved in the organisation do not distinguish between its different bodies and levels and speak simply of the "Islamska Zajednica" en masse. This usage will be followed here except in cases where greater clarity is necessary.

The scope of the realistically possible is limited for the Muslim minority but the extent of this limitation varies from case to case and a comparison may therefore be useful. In another part of the socialist world, the Soviet Union, the Prophet has been denounced as "a member of the feudal, trading classes of Mecca with the object of providing a religious pretext for the plundering expeditions organised by the Arab aristocracy" (quoted in Bennigsen & Lemerclier-Quelquejay 1967). Only the highest Muslim dignitaries are permitted to make the Hajj and the working day cannot be interrupted for the purpose of prayer. Fasting is "a barbarous, degrading and reactionary custom which prevents the workers from taking an active part in the building of socialism" (op. cit p.178). It is obvious that the Soviet Muslim establishment must have considerable obstacles to overcome if it is to keep Islam alive and well and to encourage Muslims to think of themselves as a community with its own identity. Under these difficult circumstances Carrère d'Encausse notes that it is: "facilitating the practice of Islam by adapting it to the needs of modern life" (Carrère d'Encausse 1979 p.231). Thus it has announced that, if necessary, Muslims may reduce their prayers to one a day or say them at any convenient time. Instead of sacrificing a *kurban* sheep they may make a cash offering to the mosque. Instead of fasting the whole month of Ramazan they may fast a single token day or replace the fast with a special effort in their spiritual life or work. By

such means the Muslim leadership hopes to prevent the fracturing of the population into two separate groups - the believers and the non-believers. In order to maintain the unity of the Muslim population the leadership stresses the communal nature of various Islamic festivals. Thus *iftar*, the breakfast at the end of the Ramazan day, is not only for those who have fasted but for all Muslims, and the *Kurban Bajram* celebrations are not only for those who have sacrificed.

The Bosnian secular authorities are far more liberal in their treatment of religion than the Soviet, and in the case of the Muslims an additional measure of protection is afforded as a result of Yugoslavia's membership of the non-aligned world - the state does not want to offend its many Arab allies by harsh treatment of Islam within Yugoslavia. Fasting is regarded with suspicion by the secular authorities but no official pronouncements have been made against the practice. Citizens are free to make the Hajj, just as they are free to spend their summer holidays in Greece or to be *gastarbeiter* in Germany. (Perhaps "free" is the wrong word in this context; to go on Hajj with the 1987 *Islamska Zajednica* party cost the equivalent of £1,800, a phenomenal sum for most Bosnians.) The *Zajednica* then has little need to permit Muslims not to fast, pray or sacrifice in the proper way, and does not do so. The problem it faces is less that of combatting the effects of religious negligence on the part of the Muslim population, than that of obtaining and retaining control of its religious practice, monopolising religious authority and combatting potential rivals for this authority. Such rivals must be subdued or incorporated into the *Zajednica's* own organisational structure. Thus the traditional *tevhid* death ritual performed by women (see chapter six) was in 1952 recognised by the *Zajednica* as a permissible customary rite and the specialist women who conduct it, the *bulas*, incorporated into the *Zajednica*. The dervish orders, as will be

seen in chapter five, have also been subjected to the firm control of the official Muslim establishment.

At the same time the Zajednica seeks to exert an ever greater influence over religious practice in general. Three main areas may be identified: the Islamic educational system and its production of religious personnel; the "targeting" of women as a potentially increasingly active group of Muslims; the control and sometimes centralisation of various rituals previously performed by individuals or families without the involvement of the Muslim establishment. The three are closely inter-related. Thus the targeting of women involves a stepping up of the level of education available to them and an increased control over their rituals (principally the tevhid), and educational institutions stress the need for certain rituals to be centrally controlled.

Education and the Religious Cadre

The majority of the Zajednica's income is poured into education and the Muslim Press concentrates much of its energy on directly educational material. By increasing the number of educational establishments, appointing the teachers, supervising the education given within them and selecting employees from them, the Islamska Zajednica promotes its own version of Islam and can hope to do so to the near exclusion of all other possible competing versions.

The power of Islamic education as a tool in the struggle to propagate one specific version of Islam is connected to the general rise in educational standards during the socialist period. Pre-socialist Yugoslavia had no national system of compulsory education and in contemporary Sarajevo many elderly people and middle-aged women of rural background are illiterate. Such is not the case of the under-40's who were brought up in an age when education was officially compulsory. All Yugoslav children are supposed to attend eight years of primary

schooling during which they should become literate and study such subjects as history, geography and a foreign language. Rural children take buses into the nearest town to obtain an education (1). All of the Sarajevan Muslim parents I met, literate or not, were keen that their own children should attend not only primary school but also four non-compulsory years of secondary schooling. Education is highly valued for its own sake (people were impressed and approving of my own level of education) and as a means to obtaining a good job in days of high unemployment.

	<u>1953</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1981</u>
without schooling or with 1 -3 years	67.1%	51.3%	36.4%	25.1%
4 -7 years of primary schooling	26.1%	37.4%	40.5%	24.3%
graduates of primary school	2.4%	4.1%	10.5%	24.2%
secondary school	4.1%	6.3%	10.8%	21.7%
higher education	0.3%	0.9%	1.8%	4.7%

*Table 3: Educational levels in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
Source: Enciklopedija Jugoslavije 1982*

Religious instruction in Sarajevo begins in the *mekteb*. It was impossible to do a formal survey since Sarajevans are suspicious of such overt forms of information gathering, but it is my impression that a large number of Sarajevan

(1) In remote villages parents may be lax or even opposed to the idea of sending children, especially daughters, to school. Some rural children attend school officially but in fact rarely present themselves in the classroom and after eight years leave school as functional illiterates. However, such cases are becoming increasingly rare and are unheard of in Sarajevo except among the Gypsy population.

Muslim parents living in the old districts send their children to *mekteb*. Mekteb schools are held in neighbourhood mosques and taught by *efendiye* (usually the *imam of the mosque*) or by *bulas*, female religious functionaries.

The educational techniques used in the mekteb in many ways mirror those of the state educational system. Even the vocabulary used to describe the education is similar - in both secular and Islamic education there are *razredi* (grades) and at regular intervals children are required to *odgovoriti*, to answer formal questions orally. Secular schooling begins at the age of seven or eight. School is taught in two shifts and each child spends alternate terms attending the morning or the afternoon session. There is no use of written examinations but each child is questioned orally at regular intervals. The answers a child gives are marked on a scale of one to five and the combined mark achieved over the course of the year determines whether the child will rise into the next grade (2).

Children usually begin their mekteb education at the same time as starting their secular schooling and attend a mekteb shift, morning or afternoon, which does not collide with the latter. The mekteb has a system of grades in the first of which one studies *Ilmihal*, the pillars of the faith, the words and actions of daily prayer and Islamic ethics. The teacher questions the children on this and, if satisfied at their achievement, passes them up into the next grade. This is the grade in which one learns how to read and write the Arabic

(2) The similarity of religious and secular educational techniques in Yugoslavia is not unique to the Muslim community. Thus a Catholic priest from Dalmatia was prosecuted and fined for using "school methods"; keeping attendance registers and giving marks to the children. He appealed successfully on the grounds that this was not illegal under the terms of the 1953 Basic Law on the Legal Status of Religious Communities. See Alexander 1979 p.224.

letters, although not the Arabic language itself. Letter by letter the alphabet is learned and, as at school, a mark of one to five given for each child's ability to write the letter in its various forms. Children are also questioned orally and must satisfy the teacher before moving up into the third grade. Here the pupil begins to "učiti Kuran", to read the Arabic Quran aloud (see chapter three). A child who has read the entire Quran aloud is said to have completed one *hatma*, the *hatma* being the complete recitation of the holy book. A child may continue to complete further *hatme* but it is the completion of the first which is a time of family celebration.

It has been said that children are not taught the Arabic language and indeed very few Bosnian Muslims know it either in its classical or modern form. Learning the Arabic alphabet and prayers does not entail that children understand what they are reading or praying, however, the contemporary Islamska Zajednica does stress the importance of comprehension to a greater degree than did its predecessors.

Writing of the Ottoman period Ćurić states that: "Of all places in Bosnia-Hercegovina Sarajevo had the most notable number of mektebs" (Ćurić 1983). In 1856 there were 35 which catered for 1,223 male pupils and 304 female. Six of the 35 were for girls only, four of them were mixed but pupils of different sex were seated separately. The course offered was the same in structure as it is today, beginning with the study of the basic principles and beliefs of the faith and the memorisation of Arabic prayers, continuing with the acquisition of the Arabic alphabet and finally moving on to the completion of *hatme*. Ćurić notes that the standard of education in Sarajevan mektebs tended to be higher than in those of other towns:

"However, children learnt by heart...things that they didn't understand. They read the Arabic text of the Quran without comprehension and grew in the belief that scholarly learning was something incomprehensible, something that only a hodja could have, and that for the rest it was enough for

people to believe that that was the way things had to be." (op cit. p.39)

Educational primers were all written either in Arabic or in Turkish until 1868 when the first primer in the "Bosnian language" appeared. This was written in the Arabic script and contained many Arabic and Turkish phrases but was nevertheless more comprehensible than its predecessors.

Today religious primers are written in Serbo-Croatian using the Latin alphabet and are thus accessible to all schoolchildren. These textbooks are one arena in which the Zajednica can present its own version of Islam (see, for example, the quote from *Ilmihal* p.144 below).

The words of prayers are given first in the original Arabic, then in Latin transliteration so that children may learn to pronounce them, and finally in Serbo-Croatian translation. The need to understand holy writ is thus given a greater importance in contemporary Sarajevo, however, mekteb children are still not tested on their comprehension of prayers but only on their ability to memorise and repeat them. Completing a first *hatma* is still seen as the most important stage in a child's mekteb career and does not require that the child understands what he or she is reading. In practice I found that few young people were any more knowledgeable than their parents about the meanings of certain prayers and Quranic passages. Everybody has some idea of the meaning of the *fatiha*, the first chapter of the Quran and the most frequently recited prayer. All know the meanings of certain oft-repeated phrases such as "*La illahe illa la*" (There is no God but God), "*Bismillahir Rahmanir Rahim*" (In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate) and "*Allahu Ekber*" (God is the most great). Few, however, know more than this.

The majority of Muslims abandon their religious education after the mekteb but further education, at the secondary school level and undertaken as an alternative to secular secondary education, is offered at the Sarajevo male and

female medresas. A large number of medresa students are from rural backgrounds; Bartlett notes that the first year's intake at the girl's medresa in 1978 included only ten young women of urban background, the remaining 22 being from the countryside (Bartlett 1979). The preponderance of rural students was something that I noted myself and was told of in Sarajevo, although again it was impossible to do a formal survey. For rural youngsters medresa training in Sarajevo has obvious advantages over secular secondary education since the medresa offers free meals and accommodation and most of its students receive an Islamska Zajednica stipend. This sort of material aid is not available to rural students of secular secondary schools who must either travel into town every day or find accommodation with non-nuclear family urban kin, if they have any. Some rural families with several children may buy a house in town as a base for their children's secular education and as an eventual home for one or more of them when they find employment. This is, of course, expensive.

Having graduated from the medresa a student may move on to higher education in the Islamic Theological Faculty. In 1983 this had 60 full time students, nine of them female, and 37 part time students, three of them female. Two thirds of the full time students receive an Islamska Zajednica stipend and all receive free meals in the medresa canteen.

However, most medresa graduates seek immediate employment with the Islamska Zajednica. Such employment may be far more lucrative than that to be expected after a secular secondary education. Men may be employed as *imams* and women as *bulas*. The *imam* is attached to a particular mosque and its parish (*džemat*). His duties include the leading of prayers within the mosque, the preaching of a Friday sermon, the burial of members of the parish, the marriage of that small number of parishioners who desire a religious ceremony, and, very often, the mekteb instruction of children of the parish and the washing of male

corpses for burial. The imam receives a salary from the Zajednica and a pension, of which 50% is contributed by the state, on retirement. The size of this pension depends on his level of religious education. Imams may also receive free accomodation in their parish and both imams and *bulas* receive informal payments from individuals for ritual services such as the performance of funeral services and weddings (imams), of *mevlud* and *tevhid* rituals (*bulas*).

The *bula* is a religiously educated woman whose duties may include the conducting of *tevhid* and *mevlud* rituals, the washing of female corpses for burial and, possibly, the mekteb instruction of children. Traditionally she was very often the wife of a *hodja* who found employment through family and neighbourhood connections. Today she has been integrated into the Islamska Zajednica's bureaucratic structure

In spite of the strict control exercised over the education of religious personnel, it cannot be said that the religious cadre is uniformly in agreement with the aims and outlook of the Islamska Zajednica. In a 1986 speech to the Bosnian Synod the Reis-ul-ulema emphasised the need for highly educated and "capable" imams but added: "I have to admit here that we havn't fully succeeded". This lack of success is clearly a matter of concern to the Zajednica which, for example, in its annual report of 1984 threatened the dismissal of certain Macedonian imams accused of laziness and not having the interests of the Zajednica at heart.

One reason for it is simply that many imams and *bulas* are older people who have not been trained in the new Zajednica institutions. In the case of *bulas* it is precisely these older women who perform the most highly respected and potentially influential roles. Older *bulas* perform *mevlud* and *tevhid* rituals whereas younger ones tend only to be mekteb teachers.

Of those young imams and bulas who have been trained in the new Zajednica institutions, some tend towards a brand of Islam more mystical and less socialist than that espoused by the Muslim establishment. This tendency will be discussed in chapter five.

A third obstacle in the Zajednica's path is that Islam is not a faith which strongly stresses the hierarchy of the Church. There is no ordination of imams, as there is of priests, and indeed any man with enough knowledge of the Arabic can lead the congregation in prayer. In Sarajevo bulas and the imams are Islamska Zajednica employees but there are a number of other religious personalities who command the respect of believers, and who may not have been educated in Zajednica institutions. The hafizi and hajjis who have been discussed in chapter three are examples of this unofficial religious cadre. So too are the muezzins who announce *ezan* from the minaret at the time of prayer. Muezzins are not, in Sarajevo at least, employees of the Zajednica assigned to particular mosques. They are unofficially employed in mosques through their personal connections and are respected figures as a result of their pious devotion and the vocal skills which they use in the service of Islam. The existence of this unofficial religious cadre offsets the impact of the Zajednica trained religious personnel.

Targetting Women

Unlike her Albanian and Macedonian counterparts, the Bosnian Muslim woman has never been prohibited from mosque attendance except at the Friday *džuma* service, the time at which the weekly sermon is preached, and at the two *Bajram* prayer services. Many Sarajevan mosques have special galleries for the use of women. Traditionally, women have studied *hifz* and bulas have been responsible for the performance of the important *tevhid* death ritual and for that of *mevlud*.

Over the past ten years the Zajednica has made attempts to involve women in the official religious structure and in new forms of religious activity. In 1978 the female medresa was re-opened and the Reis-ul-ulema declared:

"The opening of the female section of the Gazi Husrevbeg medresa in Sarajevo, and later, God willing, of the medresas in Priština and Skopje, is evidence that the process of involving women in all the activities of religious life is underway. Before us stands the very important task of speeding up that process. This is an urgent duty because the role of the bula in the religious life of Muslims is very great." (Quoted in *Preporod* 15.4.86)

The Zajednica renovated the mosque nearest to the medresa in order that students, who live a relatively cloistered life, could easily attend friday *džuma*. Attendance of this weekly service is not, according to the *Shari'a*, an obligation for women as it is for men, and women have only started attending in Sarajevo over the last ten years. Their attendance is encouraged by the Zajednica authorities and they tend to go to the town's important central mosques rather than to its local neighbourhood ones which may be presided over by less progressively minded imams. Of the women who attend many (but not all) are young and there is a marked difference of opinion between the young and the old (both female and male) as to the propriety of female *džuma* participation. When I mentioned that I had been to *džuma* eyebrows were raised amongst the older generations who viewed this with some suspicion, nodding their heads and remarking that "women don't go to *džuma*". The subject was to come up several times. On one occasion it caused a dispute between a young woman and her mother. On hearing of my attendance at the friday service the mother shook her head sadly and made the usual negative remarks. There was a pause before her daughter, who also went to *džuma* broke out: "What do you know? In the time of the Prophet women went to *džuma*, they're allowed to go". The older woman was not convinced.

The Bosnian Synod and Starešinstvo want educated women to be employed as bulas by Islamska Zajednica committees throughout Bosnia. Before graduation, third and fourth year students may be employed "in the field" during Ramazan to preach to women in mosques. Some local Zajednica committees, however, are unwilling to accept this innovation. A small number of graduates go on to study at the Theological Faculty and a few others to further education in the Islamic institutions of the outside Muslim world. Most hope to gain jobs as bulas within Bosnia. Again, however, some local committees, particularly those of rural areas, are reluctant to employ them. They continue to see the bula's role as an unofficial one.

Such reluctance is not characteristic of Sarajevo although, as has been said, some older Muslims are unhappy about women's involvement in an area of religious life previously restricted to men, that of *džuma*. The young welcome these changes, stressing both that they are necessary in the modern world, and at the same time, that they are not innovations without basis in Islamic teaching.

Women are the most obvious group to have been targetted by the Zajednica, but they are not the only one. It has been said that a large number of medresa students are of rural background and this represents another innovative act on the part of the Zajednica and one designed to enlarge its sphere of influence.

Controlling Religious Ritual

Traditionally the Hajj, the giving of *zekat* and *sadekatul-fitr*, the Ramazan fast and the sacrifice of *Kurban Bajram* were all individual, family or neighbourhood matters accomplished without the intervention of any Muslim establishment. This is a state of affairs which the Zajednica seeks to alter. The Hajj is now organised by the Zajednica which is sharply critical of those

Muslims who attempt to make the the pilgrimage privately. (The Zajednica's annual report for 1984 notes that 120 Macedonian Muslims went on pilgrimage to Mecca but regrets that many of these did not travel with the official Zajednica party and thus forfeited the benefits of good organisation and sanitary facilities. The implication is that the pilgrimage made by these Muslims was a dirty, disorganised an unGodly affair.) *Zekat* and *sadekatul-fitr* are centrally collected by the Islamska Zajednica in the mosques during Ramazan (the same report deploras the fact that the collection of *zekat* and *sadekatul-fitr* in Montenegro yielded only 20% of the possible total income, and hopes that the Montenegrins will do better next year). The Zajednica publishes the appropriate sums to be given in the Muslim Press. Collectors receive some payment for this work and donators are issued with guaranteed non-forgable receipts. All of the money thus collected in Bosnia-Hercegovina is poured into the medresas and the Theological Faculty. The introduction of this system was accompanied by a spate of articles in the Muslim Press stressing two main points: that centralised tax and alms giving dates back to the days of the Prophet and the first two Caliphs whereas the non-centralised system is a decadent, later innovation; and that Islamic educational institutions are permissible recipients of tax and alms. Husein Đozo, president of the Sarajevo Zajednica committee in the mid 1970s thus wrote in *Glasnik*:

"It is quite indisputable, as far as Islamic ordinances are concerned, that the collection of *zekat*, the organisation and regulation of the manner of this collection and the organisation of the whole activity fall exclusively within the authority of the Islamic organs...The Quran itself tells us this." (*Glasnik* 1976)

A second *Glasnik* contributor notes that the question of centralised collection:

"Is in fact nothing to do with any innovation (*bīd'a* [Arabic])...but exclusively to do with the amending of a mistaken practice which began in an era of decadence..." (ibid.)

Đozo notes that, according to the Quran, *zekat* may be given for eight purposes, among them the relief of the poor, the freeing of slaves, the paying of debts and others. Having discounted seven of the eight for various reasons (the state now helps the poor, there are no slaves...) he suggests that all money be given to the category "*fi sebilillah*", literally meaning "on God's path" but translatable as "the general good". The author remarks that road building and railways might also be for the general good but that the education of the religious cadre is more important and thus that it is appropriate that all *zekat* be given to the medresas and the Theological Faculty. *Sadekatul-fitr* raises a more difficult question and in fact some members of *Ilmija*, the Zajednica employees association, did object to the new system of its collection and distribution on the grounds that it should only be given to the poor and always directly by individuals. Those at the higher levels of the Zajednica disputed this, again suggesting the influence of a decadent tradition and claiming that there are few paupers today. The outcome is that *zekat* and *sadekatul-fitr* are included together on a single non-forgable coupon obtainable in the mosques on the last days of Ramazan.

Some Muslims continue to give either tax or alms or both, directly to members of the deserving (pious and practising) poor but the majority have fallen in with the new Zajednica centralised system, possibly because of the difficulty of finding deserving poor willing to accept donations. (One elderly woman in my neighbourhood lived alone, was worse off than her neighbours and extremely devout. She, however, refused to accept *zekat*)

The case of *Kurban Bajram* is different. The Islamska Zajednica has made attempts to centralise this by encouraging Muslims to bring their sheep for sacrifice, for storage in the medresa freezers and for eventual consumption by the medresa students. Some Muslims do respond, particularly, I was told, those

who live in the apartment blocks of New Sarajevo and have no garden in which to kill and butcher the sheep. Many, however, continue to have the animal slaughtered privately by a local butcher and to distribute its meat around the neighbourhood.

The traditional *mevlud* has been mentioned in chapter three. Under the influence of the medresas a new phenomenon, the "*mevludski program*" (*mevlud* programme) has arisen. These are held in mosques and performed by groups of medresa students and other interested young people sitting in a circle near the front of the mosque. The performers encourage the participation of their audience at certain points but are not always successful since many older people do not know the words appropriate to this modern style *mevlud*. Instead of combining bits of different known *mevlud* poems, whether Serbo-Croatian or Turkish, the *mevludski program* is a mixture of many different elements. Its basis is the interspersal of Arabic chants and Serbo-Croatian prose readings about the life of the Prophet and/or, depending on the time of year, Islamic festivals, principles and ethics. The latter may be accompanied by the quiet chanting of a phrase such as "*La illahe illa la*". Serbo-Croatian hymns of recent date are also sung - "*Daj mi snaga*" (*Give me strength*), "*Putuj vjernik*" (*Travel on, believer*) - but these are unlikely to be known to those who have not had a recent mekteb or medresa education so that the older generations find it impossible to join in.

These *mevlud* programmes are self-consciously modern. Their aspect is less that of a ritual than is that of the traditional *mevlud*. Thus while one is said to obtain *sevap* by attending the traditional *mevlud*, I never heard such a thing said of the *mevludski program*. Although the congregation attending the latter are encouraged to join in at certain points the *mevludski program* is essentially an event involving performers and an audience whereas the traditional *mevlud* is

a communal ritual involving conductors and conducted. Thus those who recite the *mevlud* poem or poems at a traditional *mevlud* ritual may be congratulated on their achievement but the event is also judged as a whole - "lots of people came", "it was well organised", "the *mevlud* was *fin*". The performers of a *mevludski program*, on the other hand, are always congratulated by their audience and their achievement seen as the most important part of the event.

The creativity involved in the *mevlud* programme is of a less spontaneous type than is that of the traditional *mevlud*. The latter is never rehearsed beforehand, its details being worked out during the actual recitation either by intuition or by whispered conversations between the conductors (*bulas*). The creativity lies in judiciously combining sections of different *mevlud* poems to compose a whole ritual recitation. Performers of a *mevlud* programme are not constrained to the use only of pre-existing poems but may use any prose passages, whether from printed texts or of their own composition. The programme itself will have been worked out in detail and rehearsed in advance, and will be performed in exactly the same way on several occasions. It is thus didactic and controlled in a way that the traditional *mevlud* is not.

The Zajednica and Bosnian Muslim Identity

The Islamska Zajednica then attempts to spread its influence over new aspects of the religious life. In some respects (for example the centralisation of *zekat* and *sadekatul-fitr*) it is successful, in others (for example, the centralisation of *kurban*), it is less so. Some innovations succeed more with certain sections of the Muslim population than with others. Thus the Zajednica's policy on women is more welcomed by the young and urban than by the elderly and the rural. Yet acceptance of particular innovations need not imply acceptance of the Zajednica's vision of Islam or of Bosnian Muslim identity. In

the pages to follow I will outline what this vision consists of and its reception by Muslims.

The Zajednica's stance on the place of Islam and the Bosnian Muslims within Yugoslav society appears to vary over time according to the political climate of the moment. It contains two elements each of which is more or less strongly promoted at different times. The first, which is currently in high profile, is the strong assertion that Islam and Yugoslav socialism are wholly compatible and that Muslims must be loyal and happy members of the federation. The second element, apparent in the 1970s and early 80s but currently in abeyance, is an attempt to promote the political interests and elevate the status of the Bosnian Muslim nationality vis-a-vis the other nationalities of Yugoslavia.

During the 1970s there flourished side by side in Bosnia what Popovic terms "laic Islamic radicalism" and "religious Islamic radicalism", two forms of Muslim nationalism (mild forms in comparison with that of the Albanians or Serbs in 1988). As the author points out, the two could not be wholly distinguished since each relied on and supported the other (Popovic 1986 pp. 360-364). In the early 1970s there were calls for the establishment of Muslim cultural institutions comparable to the Croatian *Matica Hrvatska* and the Serbian *Matica Srpska* (organisations intended to promote Croatian and Serbian arts and literature). Some Zajednica leaders supported these and *Preporod* ("Renewal", the fortnightly newspaper published by the Bosnian Starešinstvo) complained that:

"Neither as Muslims in the ethnic sense nor as Muslims in the religious sense do we have any specific institutions through which we might develop our Islamic and Muslim activity, other than the existing organs of the [Islamska Zajednica]" (*Preporod* 15.6.70 quoted in Ramet op cit. p.154)

This complaint is interesting in that it suggests the willingness of the Zajednica at this time to countenance the existence of Islamic/Muslim

organisations other than itself, and this willingness seems to contradict its fierce monopolising tendencies. In part this may be explained by the fact that in the early 70s, after the state's recognition of the Muslims as a *narod*, some further elevation of the Muslim political unit seemed a possibility. In a context of increased political strength, the existence of other organisations may not have appeared such a threat to the Zajednica's own authority. If there was to be more authority to go round in general, the Zajednica had less to fear. Beyond this it must be pointed out that the cultural organisations which the Zajednica had in mind would not have been true rivals. The Croatian and Serbian *Matica's* promote literature and the arts, they do not attempt to take over or provide alternatives to Catholic and Orthodox religious worship and practice. A Muslim *Matica* would not have attempted to collect *zekat*, to educate a religious cadre or to offer alternative religious services and would therefore not have infringed on the Zajednica's sphere of influence. In any event, calls for a Muslim cultural organisation were thwarted by the Communist Party which saw them as a dangerous step towards a divisive brand of nationalism.

At the same time as supporting the cultural development of Muslims on a par with Serbs and Croats, some Zajednica leaders attempted to claim a political role for the Muslim religious establishment. As Ramet says:

"Certain of the Bosnian *ulema* have tried to draw a line between 'positive political activity' and 'negative political activity' on the part of religious organizations and thus to claim for [the Islamska Zajednica] a legitimate role in the political constellation" (Ramet op cit. p.155)

This atmosphere was a cause of concern to the state and in 1983 matters came to a head when the secular authorities prosecuted eleven Bosnian Muslims (two of them imam/hodjas and all actively religious) for "counter-revolutionary activities of Muslim nationalist inspiration". All were sentenced to prison terms ranging from five to fifteen years. This proved a shock both to the Muslim

population at large and to the Islamska Zajednica which has since this time concentrated more on the promotion of a rapprochement of Islam and Yugoslav socialism than on the overt support of Muslim claims to higher status or political power.

"We greatly value [our] position...in our self-managing socialist society...and want to fight for the socialist revolution of our *narod* and *narodnosti* - brotherhood and unity of all nationalities who live in our country without regard to their national and religious affiliation."

This statement was made, not by a fervent workers or youth organisation, but by the Islamska Zajednica in its annual report of 1984 - "four years since the death of that great son of our people, Marshall Josip Broz Tito". Such assertions of loyalty and the ability of Islam and socialism to co-exist are commonplace today; similar speeches are often the preface to large religious gatherings organised by the Zajednica. Furthermore, Islamic educational primers for children all contain a section on duties towards one's homeland. Thus:

"It is an Islamic and also a civic duty of all Muslims to love their people (*narod*) and their homeland. A Muslim must be ready to sacrifice everything, if necessary even his life, for the good and happiness of his homeland...defending it from enemies, respecting its laws...It is especially important that all citizens participate in safeguarding and spreading brotherhood and unity, regardless of religious and national affiliation..." (*Ilmihal* p.146)

If the Zajednica loudly professes its loyalty to Yugoslavia it is at the same time adept at using the law of the land to defend itself from criticism and to counter-accuse the critics of illegality. One illustration of this loyaler-than-thou technique dates from the summer of 1986. It is an interesting case because it also illustrates the Zajednica's attempt to attract religious allegiance through education and to court female religious activity. *Preporod* reprinted an article from the secular press concerning the Albanian dominated town of Kumanovo in Eastern Macedonia. Traditionally, Albanian women do not attend mosque but in May, at the beginning of Ramazan, 300 of them arrived at

the mosque to participate in the prayer service. When the town council heard of this it decided to ban women from mosque attendance. The council's president said:

"What interested me and the whole socio-political structure in Kumanovo was the question of what's behind all this. It is a precedent. Never until now have Albanian women in Kumanovo entered the mosque." (*Vjesnik* 8.7.86)

What the council thought was behind it all was an insidious growth of Islamic influence in the region. There had already been fears about the growing number of mosques in the area; the secretary of the Macedonian presidential council told the newspaper: "I can tell you there were fewer [of them] even during the days of the Ottoman Empire". It was believed that these mosques were being used principally for the religious education of schoolboys rather than for the performance of religious ritual. Apparently one boy had contradicted his geography teacher, assuring him that rain came from God, not simply from the clouds. Women going to mosque was the last straw, particularly since the president of the town's *Islamska Zajednica* committee admitted that this action had been inspired by the teachings of the Skopje medresa. As the secretary of the Macedonian presidential council put it:

"I'm saying that some forms of today's Islam are ideologies of the most aggressive and militant type and so the religious instruction of boys, and now even of women, presents a great danger."

Alongside this article *Preporod* printed its own indignant and scornful comment pointing out that every citizen has the legal right to learn about and practise his or her faith and that using the mosque as a place of religious instruction is not illegal.

"We assume that if the representatives of the Socialist League of Macedonia had even once read the statute passed by their own republic concerning the legal position of the religious communities, they would not let their absurd attitudes and declarations collide with its regulations..."

The claim that the religious instruction of boys and women was "a great

danger" was denounced by *Preporod* as "unacceptable and unfounded" and it was noted that:

"Such an opinion is in our view not only prejudiced but also tendentious and *contrary to the law*, and it is incomprehensible that a much read...[newspaper]...gives it such widespread publicity and thus indirectly contributes to the dispersal and popularising of twisted attitudes which our socialist society neither has nor can have." (*Preporod's italics*)

The Zajednica does then attempt to expand its influence over the Muslim population but in doing so sticks firmly to the letter of the law which it then uses to silence its critics.

Beyond the statements that a Muslim can and should live loyally and happily in Yugoslavia there is the suggestion that Islam and socialism share the same basic goals. In Islam all men are equals and brothers just as in Yugoslavia all nationalities are such. Islam is a religion of justice and equality and isn't *zekat* a form of wealth redistribution such as socialism now promotes? Superficially it seems that such sentiments must be only too welcome to the secular authorities, and indeed it is true that they are more welcome than calls for Muslim cultural institutions and a political role for the religious establishment. Yet they are of potential concern to the state in as much as they subtly promote the idea that socialism is somehow a spin-off or by-product of Islam. This proposition is not unique to the Zajednica but characteristic also of the Soviet Muslim establishment. Thus Soviet Muslim dignitaries are wont to make such statements as that:

"Soviet leaders who believe neither in God nor his Prophet... nevertheless apply laws that were dictated by God and expounded by his Prophet... (We) admire the genius of the Prophet who preached the social principles of socialism. (We are) pleased that a great number of socialist principles implement the orders of Muhammed." (Carrère d'Encausse 1979 p.239)

In this picture socialism appears as the poor cousin of Islam, and the same is true of the picture painted by the Zajednica. Whilst the mode of life prescribed by the two ideologies is said to be largely the same, Islam is

presented as scoring a point over socialism for having had the ideas first and for possessing a spiritualism which socialism lacks. For this reason the conversion to Islam of the French Marxist, Roger Garaudy, was especially welcome to the Muslim press which is always keen on the conversions of Western personalities such as Jacques Cousteau, Cat Stevens, Anthony Quinn and Boney M. Garaudy, who arrived at Islam via both Christianity and Judaism, is a man after the Zajednica's own heart. He continues to believe in Marxist principles but is at the same time a Muslim. *Preporod* (15.9.86) reprinted an article on the intellectual convert from the secular press (*Danas* 26.8.86). As one might expect, this article was not entirely favourable to its subject but the editors of *Preporod* felt no need to add their own comment; it was clear to them and to their readers what message should be drawn from Garaudy's conversion.

The Zajednica then hints at the spiritual and chronological superiority of Islam over socialism whilst at the same time professing the fundamental similarity of the two ideologies. Yet it does not, at present, seek to promote the political interests of Muslims vis-a-vis those of Serbs, Croats and other nationalities. Rather it supports Yugoslav Socialist Patriotism, the love of all Muslims for Yugoslavia and its self-managing socialist system. What is the reception of this view on the part of the Muslim public? We have seen that Muslims accept some of the innovative policies of the Islamska Zajednica, the centralisation of *zekat* and *sadekatul-fitr*, for example. Yet this acceptance does not, in the Bosnian context, imply wholesale acceptance of the views propounded by the policy making body. This fact is an indirect result of the extreme bureaucratisation of the Zajednica and its consequent perceived functional similarity to the secular authorities.

All Bosnians have learnt to understand and cope with the various highly complicated bureaucratic procedures surrounding the systems of education,

employment, taxation and health benefits in socialist Yugoslavia. Even the elderly seem to have a good grasp of these matters. People know what they must put into the system, for example military service for men, and they know what can be got out of it, for example medical care. The state and its various agencies are taken as outside forces to be reckoned with in a number of ways.

The Islamska Zajednica is a bureaucratic establishment the internal organisation, election procedures and employment policies of which appear to the general public every bit as complicated as those of the state. Indeed, it is treated by Muslims very much as they treat secular authorities. Thus when one asks what the Islamska Zajednica is or what it does, no-one suggests that it provides guidance in matters of faith, that it protects or represents Islam in Bosnia or that its members are the wisest and best of Muslims. Instead, answers are likely to be along the lines of: "It organises the payment of *zekat* and *sadekatul-fitr*", "When someone dies you can arrange a funeral and *tevhid* through the Zajednica", "You can buy special plastic bags for wrapping *kifla* at the Zajednica shop" (*Kifla* is a type of bread handed out at the *tevhid*). Like the secular authorities the Islamska Zajednica is seen as a body to be contributed to, benefited from and otherwise dealt with; it is not taken as the spiritual or social centre of religious life, just as the secular authorities are not taken as embodying the political will of the people. Acceptance of the duties imposed from above, whether those of military service or of the payment of alms, does not therefore entail acceptance of the philosophy of the authoritative body.

Yet it is the case that some Muslims make statements similar to those of the Zajednica which suggest a rapprochement between Islam and socialism. Thus I have been told by individuals that the socialist system of redistribution of wealth is based on the same principles as Islamic alms-giving. In a recent article, Richard Tapper and Nancy Tapper discuss the rapprochement, or indeed

the merging, of secular and religious ideologies in the Turkish town of Egridir (Tapper R & Tapper N 1987) and this example provides an interesting comparison to the Bosnian case.

Egridir is a small, prosperous and homogeneous town. Almost all of its inhabitants are Turks who consider themselves to be middle class and who are linked through a "dense and continuous network of kinship and marriage". The townspeople are staunch republican nationalists. They are also staunch Muslims. In this context the authors suggest that:

"Ideas about Turkey as a nation state and ideas about Islam are mutually reinforcing.....republican and Islamic values and forms are juxtaposed in complex ways such that they can best be understood as parts of a single ideological structure...This ideology...is fundamentalist in character"

It is not possible here to outline fully the argument for considering this ideology to be fundamentalist. One important point must, however, be noted. The ideology is said to be fundamentalist partly because of its *oppositional* character. *Oppositional* ideologies tend to emphasise the existence of, and threat posed by, those who do not share the ideology. In Egridir the small local population of supposedly transient Kurdish labourers is taken as precisely such a threat. Supporters both of the mystical religious sects and of the political far right and left (ie. those who dissent from the unitary centralising value system) are felt by townspeople to be extremists and fanatics. "Dissidents of left and right who created the terror of the late 1970s were seen as agents of outside [non-Turkish] powers."

Republican nationalism and Islam are drawn together through a number of "accommodations". One example cited is the suggestion frequently made by townspeople that certain republican institutions, for example the payment of taxes towards hospitals and schools, function in exactly the same way as did Islamic ones, for example, Islamic alms and tithes given to the poor and for

education.

Another is the rationalisation of religious practices through an appeal to modern secular values. Thus the Ramazan fast is said to be an extremely healthy purge for the body.

Both types of statement are also made in Bosnia. I have mentioned the parallels drawn between socialist redistribution and *zekat*. Both articles in the Muslim Press and individuals use modern, secular arguments to rationalise Islamic practice; it is said that the fast has been scientifically proved to be healthy, pork has been scientifically proved to be unhealthy, homosexuality has been proved to be wrong by the arrival of AIDS.

Yet in Bosnia the import of such statements is different from that which they have in Egridir. In the Turkish town the authors noted a tendency for people to apologise for religious allegiance by emphasising that it is possible to be both a good Turk and a good Muslim. In Bosnia the emphasis is the other way round. Thus Communist Party members may justify their membership by suggesting similarities between socialist and Islamic ideology.

Statements of the first type noted by the authors (ie. parallels drawn between Islamic and modern secular institutions) are made in Bosnia but are not popular opinion as they seem to be in Egridir. Furthermore, this type of statement always includes an implication that whilst Socialism has the right ideas, it got them several hundred years later than Islam.

Statements which rationalise Islam by means of modern science are very much more common, if not universal. Yet here we must ask the question of what is being accomodated with what. In Egridir all that is modern, science and medicine included, tends to be associated with the Republican period of history:

"In effect, the notion of republicanism has expanded, and is often treated as more or less synonymous with anything and everything that is thought new and different."

In this context, suggestions that the fast is scientifically proved to be healthy may be said to be accommodations not only of Islam with modernity but also of Islam with republicanism.

Such is not the case in Bosnia. Whilst everyone feels that socialist Yugoslavia is "modern" in comparison with pre-war Yugoslavia, the socialist period is hardly taken as synonymous with modernity, for which there are other yardsticks. Western Europe is, for example, seen to be "modern" in comparison with Yugoslavia. Modernity is highly valued and I was surprised at the number of contexts in which the term was used. People like to wear "modern" clothes, a bula praised a particular mevlud poem as being the most "modern", young Muslims suggest approvingly that it is now "modern" to be devout. Suggestions that the eternal truths of Islam have now been proved by modern science therefore "accomodate" Islam with the general value of "modernity", rather than with contemporary, modern Yugoslav socialism.

If it is the case that Bosnian Muslims cannot strongly espouse a rapprochement of Islam and Yugoslav socialism whilst the Muslims of Egridir can and do espouse a rapprochement of Islam and Turkish republican nationalism, why is this so? The atheistic element of socialism provides a partial answer; it is unsurprising that a religious and an atheistic ideology will not mix well. Yet this cannot be the whole solution for it is clear both that Islam and socialism can be combined, as in Libya and in the Muslim National Communist Movement of the USSR in the 1920s (see Bennigsen & Wimbush 1979), and that socialist states do not have a monopoly on repressive antagonism towards religion. In secular but non-socialist Turkey the veil was abolished, private religious gatherings forbidden and even the sporting of a beard taken as a sign of Islamic subversive tendencies. Nevertheless, Tapper and Tapper suggest that Islam and republican nationalism co-exist harmoniously in the hearts and minds of

Egridirians and that, "Turkish Islam and Turkish republican/nationalism today are both expressions of a single underlying ideology of social control".

The additional explanation lies in the heterogeneity of Yugoslav society as compared to the basically homogeneous character of Turkey. Whilst the people of Egridir are Turks living in a Turkish nation state, the Muslims of Bosnia are but one of several nationalities living within a multi-national, federated state. In this context the state ideology purports to represent many peoples or nationalities, not just the Muslims. For these Muslims their identity cannot but be bound up with the Islamic faith and thus the rapprochement of Islam and Yugoslav socialism would be a rapprochement of an ideology A, allegiance to which makes one a Muslim rather than a Serb, Albanian, Slovene or other, and an ideology B, which specifically seeks to include these Serbs, Albanians, Slovenes and others. Such a rapprochement would create a sort of identity crisis.

This is not because most Bosnian Muslims hate and resent their non-Muslim fellow citizens or feel no identification whatever with the Yugoslav community. Naturally this is not the case. But all that is feasible in the Yugoslav context is that Muslims identify with their national group and, separately and simultaneously (and in practice less strongly), with Yugoslavia as a whole. What is not feasible is the merging or rapprochement of the Islamic ideology from whence springs the Muslims' specific identity with the multi-national ideology of the state. In the same way no Croat, however well-disposed towards non-Croats or content to exist within Yugoslavia, can actually merge an identification with Croatian tradition and an identification with Yugoslav society.

Officials at the higher levels of the Zajednica tend to promote a rapprochement of Islam and Yugoslav socialism and for this they may be criticised, in semi-jocular manner in the company of close friends. Thus one

answer I received to the question of who was in the Zajednica, was that one had to be a Party member to land the job. This witticism was received with much mirth by the company. On enquiring further I was told that whilst a Zajednica official did not actually have to be a Party member, he had to be "morally and ideologically sound", a common euphemism in Bosnia (3).

Hand in hand with the implication that Zajednica officials are too closely associated with Communism goes the criticism that they lack piety and Islamic learning. One eccentric, a man of about forty who habitually dressed in the Ottoman style baggy black trousers and sported a great black handlebar moustache, was unusually forthright about this. I met him early one morning during Ramazan on my way home from *mukabela* (all night Quranic recitation) and dawn prayer at the mosque. We were introduced by a mutual acquaintance, he asked me what I was doing in Sarajevo and I told him I was studying "Muslim culture". His reply was simply: "There's none of that here, they closed it down in 1945". I asked what he thought of the *mukabela* we had just attended and he told me that that was nothing to what had happened in the old days, that Islam in Bosnia was a pale shadow of its former self and that the Zajednica had no idea of the way things should be done. At the same time there is a feeling amongst some Muslims that religious functionaries are too concerned with their

- (3) Anti-clerical feeling as a result of the perceived over-eagerness of religious establishments to co-operate with secular authorities is not confined to the Muslim community. In the 1950s Catholic and Orthodox Bosnian bishops became subjects of violent demonstrations. Some were forced to leave their dioceses and one was nearly lynched. (See Alexander 1979 p.251). The relative mildness of Muslim anti-clericalism is perhaps related to the fact that Islamic religious functionaries play a less crucial role in the religious life than do their Christian counterparts. They lead prayers and give sermons but do not offer absolution of sins or the cleansing body and blood of God.

own well-being and the joke that:

"Hodže i popovi su najvećiji lopovi"
"Hodjas and priests are the biggest thieves"

was one I heard more than once.

Various criticisms were made about particular well known Zajednica personalities. The Reis-ul-ulema himself was laughed at for having an attendant to look after his shoes during prayer - something which, it was pointed out to me, the Prophet never had. He was also censured for having suggested that Bosnians are better Muslims than Arabs since, on a visit to Saudi Arabia, he had noticed a copy of the Quran laid carelessly on the floor. His daughter, a teacher at the women's medresa, was criticised for saying that, whilst the Prophet ate only with his right hand, it was more civilised to use the fork in one's left. (This is, in fact, normal practice when both knife and fork are used but people objected to the overt suggestion that "bon ton" was more important than following the Prophet's example.) The president of the Bosnian Starešinstvo was berated for his general ignorance of Islam and, his name being Šeta, he was nicknamed Šteta, meaning "What a pity!".

The Islamska Zajednica is then a bureaucratic organisation which, whilst relatively successful in its attempt to monopolise control of religious practice, is not widely held by Muslims to have a monopoly on religious knowledge. Whilst the view it presents of Islam as a modern faith finds general acceptance with the Muslim population, its (currently) relentless promotion of Yugoslav Socialist Patriotism and its alliance of socialist and Islamic ideology is less popular. That this is the case is partly due to Yugoslav socialism's hostility to religion, but also due to the fact that it is the ideology of a multi-national, federated state.

5. RIVALLING RELIGIOUS ORIENTATIONS

DERVISHES AND MYSTICS

Where the authority and philosophy of the official Muslim establishment are not wholly palatable to the Muslim population it is unsurprising that rival religious authorities and outlooks should find a role and a following. In view of the pattern typical of the Muslim world, past and present, the most promising directions in which to search for such rivals must be that of Sufi mysticism and of Islamic fundamentalism. In the present chapter I will consider one potential and one actual rival to the Zajednica; on the one hand the dervish orders and on the other a new brand of mysticism which is at the same time strongly scripturalist in flavour. Whilst the former is in some respects the obvious source of opposition to the Muslim establishment (not least in that the dervish orders have been established in Bosnia since the very beginning of the Ottoman era) it is in fact the latter which provides a dynamic alternative to the Zajednica's authority and philosophy. This, I will suggest, is because the latter seeks to associate Bosnian Muslims with the worldwide *Umma*, thus providing them with a coherent identity as members of a vast religious community not bounded by Bosnia, whilst the former is seen as a compliant subject of the Zajednica.

The Dervish Orders

The mutual hostility of Muslim establishments and dervish brotherhoods is well known. In the modern world, with the rise of nation states and political centralisation, the scripturalistic establishments have tended to gain the upper hand and the dervishes to be forced to moderate their position. Yet Gellner

notes:

"It is interesting that Balkan Muslims constitute one of the fairly rare cases in which the spokesman of the 'cult-of-personality-and-mediation' type of Islam dares to polemicise vigorously with the representatives of 'Reform'" (Gellner 1981 p.59)

This is certainly the case of the Albanian Muslims of Kosovo. Historically, Albanian Islam has been dominated by the Bektashi order of dervishes. Today, Kosovo is the region of Yugoslavia with the highest number of dervish orders and tekijas (lodges). In 1973 the Albanian dervishes set up their own organisation, ZIDRA (*Zajednica Islamskih Derviških Redovi Alije*: Community of the Islamic Dervish Orders of Ali), which openly flouts the authority of the Islamska Zajednica. Gellner continues:

"The explanation of the Balkan idiosyncrasy is easy: these Muslims were in any case minorities within their national communities, whether they were Sufi or scripturalists; hence the puritans could not intimidate their opponents by the implicit or overt threat of branding them as national traitors." (op cit p.59)

Muslims are not a minority amongst Yugoslav Albanians; in 1953 (the last occasion on which religious affiliation was a census question) 95.6% of Yugoslav Albanians were found to be Muslims by faith. They are, however, a minority within the overall population of Albanians (including those of the state of Albania) which also includes Catholics and adherents of the Orthodox Church. Since Albanian nationalism began well before the creation of Yugoslavia and the consequent political severance of Kosovo from Albania proper, it is not surprising that Albanians have never located their national distinctiveness in religion. At the end of the nineteenth century the Bektashi order of dervishes was strongly associated with Albanian nationalism. A Bektashi pamphlet printed in 1896 prescribes that Bektashis:

"Love as themselves their neighbours, both Muslim and Christian...But more than all they love their country and their countrymen because this is the fairest of all virtues...Let them strive night and day for the nation to which the father calls them...for the salvation of Albania and the Albanians, for the education and civilisation of their nation...let not the

Muslims be divided from the Christians... but let both work together."
(Hasluck 1929 p.553)

Whilst the Bektashi brotherhood was specifically Islamic, in its espousal of Albanian nationalism it therefore set the "fairest of all virtues", love of Albania, apart from the love of Islam and preached the unity of all countrymen without regard to religious faith. In contemporary Kosovo the nationalist movement of the Albanians is a secular one. The Albanians of Yugoslavia locate their national distinctiveness not in their faith but in their language, history and traditionally tribal social structure.

Two factors, both related to Yugoslav state policy, seem to favour the possibility of "vigorous polemic" between sufis and the Muslim establishment. The first is that the state does not (overtly) recognise religion as the basis of any of its constituent nationalities; it certainly doesn't recognise any religious authority as the representative of any nationality. This inhibits any suggestion on the part of the Muslim establishment that dervishes are national traitors rather than simply religious heretics.

The second point is that, unlike their Soviet counterparts, the Yugoslav secular authorities have not outlawed the dervish orders. The policy is rather to legitimate a religious establishment and to leave it to keep its own house in order. The fact that the Islamska Zajednica has been unable to put a stop to the activities of ZIDRA does not seem to concern the state which views the dervishes as no more misguided than their non-dervish Muslim brethren and becomes concerned only when it senses that religion is being put to some directly counter-revolutionary use. In such a situation ZIDRA is free to indulge in vigorous polemic with the Muslim establishment.

In view of state policy and of the open hostility shown by the Kosovan dervish orders towards the Zajednica, the Bosnian case seems a puzzle. The

Bosnian dervish orders have 500 years of history behind them. Some tekijas and hanikahs (dervish guest houses) were set up even before the arrival of the Ottomans - Sarajevo's Gaziler tekija of the Naqshbandi order in 1459 and Isabeg's Mevlevi hanikah in 1462. Yet they lack the widespread allegiance and popularity of their Kosovan counterparts. Furthermore, they do not dispute or flout the authority of the Islamska Zajednica; on the contrary, they recognise it as legitimate and accomodate themselves to its rulings.

Dervish practices have had influence on the religious practice of Bosnia. The *tevhid*, to be discussed in chapter six, has its origins in dervish ritual. The Arabic derived term "zikr" means "remembrance of God in one's heart" and the zikr ritual, involving repetition of the names of God, is the central one of the dervish orders. A form of zikr is also, however, traditionally performed after each of the daily prayers and this practice is even prescribed by the Islamska Zajednica. After prayer the worshipper takes a rosary (*tesbih*) and recites "Subha-nallah" (Praise God) 33 times, "El-hamdu lill-lah" (Thank God) 33 times and "Allahu Ekber" (God is the most great) 33 times. Furthermore, on the occasion of *Lajletul-kadr*, the 27th day of Ramazan when the Angel Gabriel began the revelation of the Quran to the Prophet, Sarajevo's central mosque hosts a zikr meeting similar to those held in tekijas. Rituals associated with the dervishes thus find many niches in standard Muslim practice in Sarajevo.

It should be mentioned that of all the Muslims I met, the dervishes were probably the most unwilling to speak with a non-Muslim about their faith. It was a tekija sheikh who, when I was introduced as a student of Islam by a member of a well know family of Sarajevo dervishes, hodjas and bulas (usually a good credential) stared into my eyes and spoke in Arabic. He then translated into Serbo-Croatian: "Knowledge is in the heart, not in books". With this he got up and left the table to greet some friends. Not all dervishes were quite so

uncommunicative but rarely did they show the enthusiasm to tell me about Islam that I met with in others.

Until the 1930s relations between the ulema and the Bosnian orders were good, or at least tolerant ⁽¹⁾. In Ottoman times the orders were generally seen as an integral part of Islam; Gazi Husrevbeg, three times governor of Bosnia in the sixteenth century built three religious institutions in Sarajevo under his own name; a mosque, a medresa and a hanikah. Dervishes sometimes used a mosque rather than a tekija as their meeting place. The Naqshbandi tekija of Oglavak was visited by every new governor of Bosnia and granted tax exemption by the Sultan. Sheikhs sometimes held, and still do hold, religious positions outside the orders. Sheikh Hussein Baba Zukić, eighteenth century founder of the Naqshbandi tekija of Živčić, was at the same time a professor at the medresa in Fojnica. The contemporary sheikh of this tekija is also the hodja of a mosque in a nearby village. Husnije efendija Numanagić, sheikh of the Fojnica tekija

- (1) On two occasions, in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, representatives of dervish orders spawned movements of resistance or protest against Ottoman secular authorities. The Hamzevi, usually considered a branch of the Bajrami order, were active anti-Ottoman propogandists in many parts of the Ottoman world in the sixteenth century. Their followers were even to be found in the ranks of the Istanbul janissaries. In 1573 Sheikh Hamza Bali was secretly executed in Istanbul. His Bosnian followers continued their anti-Ottoman activities and in 1582 formed their own "government". All were immediately executed and the Hamzevi became extinct in Bosnia.

In the eighteenth century one Sheikh Muhamed of Užice, believed to have been of the Halveti order, sent three strong letters of protest to the Pasha accusing him of maltreating the Bosnian Muslim peasantry and

threatening him with the Judgement Day. The Pasha had him executed in 1750. (Musić 1951 & 1958)

Both protests were directed against secular rather than religious authority.

and founder of the Visoko tekija, was in 1914 appointed mufti of Travnik. Furthermore, as has been noted in chapter three, Bosnian dervishes have always been observant of religious obligations such as prayer and fasting. Those whom I met were insistent that in order to understand the dervish path I had first to have a comprehensive knowledge of the Quran and hadiths.

Officially the tekijas were always under some form of external supervision; that of the muftis and kadijas during the Ottoman period and that of the Reis-ul-Ulema during the Austro-Hungarian. These religious authorities did not, however, attempt to limit the influence of the dervish orders, the relationship was rather one of mutual recognition and respect.

This is not to suggest that there was never opposition to the dervishes. The chronicle of Mula Mustafa Bašeskija, the eighteenth century Sarajevan Muslim, hodja, official writer, sometime medresa professor and dervish, bears witness to the turbulent nature of religious life in the town. In 1779/80 he recorded that:

"The acrobats came, but in our town there are Kadićevci who, superficially, in their speech, are real wise men but in truth are...rabble. They went to court and, ofcourse, the permission was not given for the acrobats to perform. Sarajevo is really that sort of town. There are Kadićevci here who, if the Prophet himself allowed something, would raise hell out of pure spite."

The Kadićevci were puritans inspired by Kadizade Mehmed of Istanbul. Kadizade was a reformist preacher who wanted a return to the ways of the Prophet not only in spirit but in every small detail; he forbade the use of coffee and cutlery, since the Prophet knew neither, and was dubious about the existence of minarets which had been no part of the earliest mosques (see Zilfi 1986). His particular ire was reserved for the sufi orders which he saw as the major source of heresy. Kadizade died in 1635 and his Istanbul following ended with the seventeenth century, but in Sarajevo his influence continued well into

the eighteenth. Yet it was extremely localised. In the nearby town of Visoko the Kadićevci had little influence and Bašeskija notes that the acrobats moved on to this town and were followed by a number of Sarajevans anxious to see the fun.

The Kadićevci were strongly opposed to the dervish orders and sometimes resorted to violence against them. Over the fifty or so years for which Bašeskija kept his chronicle he often noted the doings of one Emir-Vaiz, a medresa professor and Kadićevac who "attacked the sheikhs, dervishes, tekijas...dervish orders". In 1770/71 Emir-Vaiz made an attempt, first to take over and then to disrupt a mosque which was the meeting place of Mevlevi dervishes.

"After the death of the Mevlevi sheikh...the fanatic...Emir-Vaiz, applied for the post. However, the kadija refused him and gave the sheikhhood to the muezzin of the Tabačka mosque, old Dervish Mustafa...who had performed his duties at this mosque without payment. Later, one day around ikindiya [the third prayer of the day] as Sheikh Mustafa began the zikr, several troublemakers (*jaramaz*) suddenly appeared with the intention of disrupting the zikr. That provoked a quarrel and the dervishes eventually won. The hodja of this mosque, a brother of Emir-Vaiz, was replaced and so the troublemakers and protestors stopped coming to the mosque."

The quarrel here was between Kadićevci and dervishes; it is important to note that the kadija took the latter's side in his refusal of the sheikhhood to Emir-Vaiz. The ulema was not then wholly hostile to the orders as one might expect. In 1780 Bašeskija lists eleven members of the ulema including the himself, the mufti, a kadija, a writer at the legal court, a librarian, three medresa professors and one professor of the Gazi Husrevbeg hanikah. Two, including Emir-vaiz, are said to be hostile to the orders and a third is implied to be so. Two, including Bašeskija himself, are said to be dervishes and a third to "like dervishes". Of three, no hint is given as to their opinions. Of the remaining two, one was the professor of the hanikah, a dervish institution, and the other was later to become the sheikh of this hanikah.

The opinions of the ulema were then diverse; it seems that such diversity could even exist within a single family. Thus in 1780 Bašeskija notes the death of "the son of the Mevlevi sheikh...said to be a Kadićevac".

The 1930s saw the first blow to good relations between the Muslim establishment and the dervish orders. In 1934 the *Islamska Zajednica* journal *Glasnik* ran a series of critical articles aimed at the dervish orders. The tekijas were condemned as heretical and un-Shariatic, the sheikhs as parasites and the form of zikr they practised as an abomination. Grudgingly, it was conceded that some sheikhs were not wholly unobservant of the *Shari'a* but the journal drew unfavourable comparisons between the contribution made to Islamic learning by Yugoslavian dervishes and that made by the Kadiri and Sanusi of West Africa. Several of the critics quoted the works of the great sufi writers Al-Ghazali and Ibn-al-Arabi. Some branches of the Muslim Press were less scathing but all seemed to share the view that some sort of reform was necessary. *Islamski Svijet* (Islamic World) thus stated;

"The tekijas have always been and still are considered one of the most important Islamic cultural institutions because they are the source of sheikhs and *evlije* [walis], people who don't work for their own personal interests and positions but who, with their whole beings, are devoted to God...It is our duty to...preserve this religious institution and so, in the new decree concerning the tekijas, all necessary regulations will be made in order that the tekijas become an active element in the work of Islam...[as they were]...in the first centuries of Islam." (*Islamski Svijet* no.114 p.8)

The decree referred to was that expected from the Sarajevo *ulema-medžlis* (Islamic religious authority, see p.121) and was to deal with the questions of tekija property, the qualifications necessary to become a sheikh and which orders could be officially recognised. In 1934 the *ulema-medžlis* of Skopje brought out such a decree for the tekijas within its territory. In Bosnia, however, no decree was forthcoming until 1952 (ie. after the establishment of the socialist state), but when it came its impact was severe. Under its

provisions all tekijas were to be closed and their property to fall to the Islamska Zajednica (no closures had been ordered in the Skopje area). The Kadiri tekija of Sarajevo, was to be used as a museum for dervish artifacts, the others were to be employed as mesdžids. It must be underlined that this measure was ordered by the Islamska Zajednica and not by the state. Its harshness was related to the new organisation of religion in socialist Bosnia. When the Zajednica realised that in such a state there was only so much religious authority to go round, they were anxious to have as much of it as possible (as has been suggested in chapter four) and to quell any potential competitors.

Bosnian dervishes continued to meet secretly, in private homes, for the performance of zikr and leading sheikhs and dervishes wrote letters of protest to the Zajednica. However, at no point did they set up any organisation in defiance of the Zajednica, the aim was always to win back the right to exist through negotiation. Not until 1977 did this strategy pay off, and then to a limited extent. The Zajednica agreed to the conditional re-opening of the tekijas (one had been destroyed in the meantime) but did not officially lift the 1952 ban. The tekijas remain under the authority of the Zajednica which may send its representatives to visit them at any time and may close any or all of them if it sees fit to do so. One of Bosnia's leading dervishes, the sheikh of the Sarajevo Kadiri tekija, did not dispute this arrangement. As he put it:

"with us it is unthinkable that the tarikat be separate from the Islamska Zajednica...Islamic dervish orders cannot be independent of the religious community...That is unfeasible in terms of the *Shari'a*" (Hadžibajrić 1979)

The Bosnian orders now have their own organisation, the Tarikat Centre, but it exists only subject to the consent of the Zajednica. Šamić (1985) suggests that the Centre is extremely bureaucratic, being composed of several sub committees and unconsciously falling into administrative jargon which seems foreign to the nature of the dervish path. It is certain that the Tarikat Centre

is an organisation of a type very different from its Macedonian/Kosovan counterpart, ZIDRA, which exists in defiance of the Islamska Zajednica. The Centre's job is to liase with the Zajednica and between the different orders within Bosnia.

These orders are three in number; the Naqshbandi, the Kadiri and the Mevlevi. All three are closely linked in a number of ways and those who are not themselves directly involved in the tarikats tend not even to be aware of the existence of different orders; to such people it is all just "tekija" and "dervishes". Those who are involved stress that the particular order one belongs to is less important than the stage of development one has reached on the dervish path. This feeling may well not be a new one; in 1780 Bašeskija expressed no surprise or disapproval when one Sheikh Osman-dede "son-in-law of the sheikh of Hadži Sinanova tekija and until this time a member of the Kadiri order, became a Mevlevi". In urban, non-tribal Sarajevo particular dervish orders seem not to have been associated with particular social groupings (clans, lineages, tribal segments), affiliation to an order was more a matter of personal religious preference ⁽²⁾ and for this reason a change of allegiance was not viewed as a betrayal in the way that it might be in some parts of the Muslim world. In contrast to standard Naqshbandi practice, the zikr of Bosnian Naqshbandis is not performed silently but aloud and Algar suggests that this is the result of the traditionally close relationship between this order and that of the Kadiris in the region (Algar 1973).

- (2) Bašeskija speaks of his own experience very much in these terms:
"After I had mastered the concrete sciences I immersed myself in the science of mysticism and, contemplating day and night, made a great effort, refusing to be exhausted while the doors remained closed...I put everything else to one side because the secret was being revealed to me."

It seems likely, however, that the orders have drawn yet closer together in recent years. Of the five regularly functioning tekijas in Bosnia one is Kadiri and four Naqshbandi but of the latter four, one houses Kadiri zikr alternately with its own and the other (in Sarajevo) Mevlevi. Large annual gatherings held at particular tekijas, for example mevlud gatherings, are attended by affiliates of all orders and not only of the order to which the host tekija belongs. In Sarajevo affiliates of the two tekijas frequently visit and sometimes participate in zikr at the other tekija. It is not uncommon for dervishes to have secondary ties to other orders; the Kadiri sheikh of Sarajevo is himself an affiliate of six separate dervish orders, some of which he was initiated into in Istanbul.

The system of "authorisation" of sheikhs illustrates both this closeness and a new attitude to the administrative organisation of the orders. The Naqshbandi tekija of Živčić stands deep in the countryside and can be reached only on foot. It was established in 1780 by Sheikh Hussein Baba Zukić who had studied with Naqshbandis in Istanbul, Samarkand and Bukhara, the home of the original founder of the order, Bahaudin Naqshband. Zikr is held here twice weekly but, due to the tekija's remote situation, is not as impressively attended as the zikr of the urban tekijas. Nearby, also in a rural setting, stands the Naqshbandi tekija of Oglavak, founded by Sheikh Hussein's only pupil, Sirri Baba. Today it opens only once annually for the performance of a mevlud. Nevertheless, these two tekijas hold a symbolically important place; both are associated with the rise of the Naqshbandi order to predominance in the eighteenth century.

The sheikhhood of Oglavak has always been passed down in the male line of descent from its founder, Sirri Baba. The sheikhhood of Živčić has been passed down in the male line of descent from Hadži Mejli Baba, a pupil of Sirri Baba's who married the daughter of the founder of Živčić and became sheikh there. (The

founder's own sons decided against taking up the position.) The two families, the Sikirić and the Hadžimejlić, have sometimes provided the sheikhs of other tekijas. The Naqshbandi tekija of Sarajevo (founded at the turn of the century) has had three Sikirić sheikhs, the tekija of Visoko has had Hadžimejlić sheikhs. Those Naqshbandi sheikhs who were not members of either of the families have nevertheless stood in a chain of "authorisation" from them. Thus Husnije ef. Numanagić, who established the Visoko tekija in the early twentieth century and the Travnik tekija in the 1920s, had been "authorised" by a Hadžimejlić. All authorisations thus lead back, via Sheikh Hussein of Živčić, to the founder of the Naqshbandis, Bahaudin Naqshband. This chain of authorisation is known as the *silsila*. (The Kadiri tekija of Sarajevo never had hereditary succession to the sheikhhood and Bašeskija's chronicle makes it clear that most Sarajevo tekijas did not.)

The system of authorisation has become increasingly formal in nature. The current sheikhs of the Naqshbandi tekijas of Sarajevo and Visoko were initially appointed for a probationary periods as *vekil*, guardians of the tekijas. In December 1983 a joint ceremony for the "declaration of sheikhhood" was held for the men. Both were granted diplomas and appointed as true sheikhs.

The diplomas were given by two sheikhs. One, as might be expected, the Naqshbandi sheikh of Živčić, the other, more surprisingly, the Kadiri sheikh of Sarajevo. The latter was himself authorised as sheikh of his own tekija by the former. This inter-authorisation between different orders suggests the extent to which the orders have drawn closer in recent years.

Sheikh's have absolute spiritual authority over their dervishes and must be respected and obeyed. However, this authority extends only over religious matters. Dervishes do not perform personal services for their sheikhs, something I realised when attending a mevlud held at a disused tekija outside Sarajevo. A

Naqshbandi sheikh who was present called one of his dervishes over and ordered him to fetch a number of religious books. Hand on heart, the dervish bowed and left. On his return, accompanied by another bow, he was brusquely ordered to place the books in the sheikh's car. Another bow, and the dervish moved off. At that point the sheikh's wife remembered that she wanted her cardigan and bag fetched from the car and asked her husband to recall his man and give the order. The sheikh refused with the explanation: "Those are personal things". He did not feel that his authority extended beyond religious matters (3).

Furthermore, the role of the Bosnian sheikh is not felt to necessitate his leadership of the zikr rituals held in his own tekija. In the tekija of Visoko the sheikh and his vekil lead the ritual on alternate occasions.

Zikr is the central rite of the dervish orders and the focal activity of Bosnia's five tekijas. Every meeting includes a zikr performance. Other practices, which seem to have been followed in Bašeskija's time, have dwindled in importance. Bašeskija notes that he learnt *vefk*, a method of fortune telling still practiced by the Albanian dervishes, from the sheikh of the Kadiri tekija. Today such practices are considered out of the question by the tekija's dervishes. A document of 1832 notes the existence of 74 tomb cults in and around Sarajevo (see Bejtić 1982). Of the cult places 42 were the tombs of dead sheikhs and dervishes to which pilgrims came in the hope of being cured by the power of the saintly dead. Of these, only one is still known today and can hardly be said to be the centre of a cult (see p.86). Unlike their Albanian counterparts, contemporary Bosnian dervishes do not appear to indulge in

(3) In this respect the Bosnian situation may differ from the Kosovan where: "In many cases one would not undertake a serious matter (eg. the marriage of one's son, the building of a house or any important transaction) without having asked the sheikh for advice." (Popovic 1985 p.247)

practices such as standing on sabres and piercing the cheek with needles (although certain evidence suggests that the practice continues in great secrecy and with low frequency in the countryside). At the turn of the century, however, such practices were performed in the Kadiri tekija (see Hangi 1900). Šamić states that they have died out as a result of Islamska Zajednica pressure (personal communication). Zikr is then the focus of all dervish activity.

At Sarajevo's Kadiri tekija zikr is performed every Thursday night (see appendix d for an account of a zikr gathering). The sheikh and *vekil* (deputy) preside over ten to fifteen dervish affiliates (*murids* who are bound to the sheikh through vows), occasional guests from other tekijas (particularly the Sarajevo Naqshbandi tekija) and perhaps a few followers who have not yet made any vows (*muhibs*). In Sarajevo both *murids* and *muhibs* are male, although the Visoko tekija has some female *muhibs* who participate in the zikr from a separate room.

Occasionally participants of the zikr fall into trance; one particular dervish did so regularly. This was not especially encouraged by the sheikh who sometimes indicated that the trancing dervish be removed from the room or made to sit outside the zikr circle until the fit passed. The trance indicated that the man was in some mystical union with God, he was not, however, believed to be closer to God than those other dervishes who, without falling into trance, were concentrating their whole beings on the Almighty during the ritual.

On occasions such as the Prophet's birthday and other annual festivals the tekija was impressively full. Twenty to twenty five men participated in the zikr but another 150 to 200 were spectators. From the womens' gallery we craned our necks to peer down at the spectacle through the wooden grill. Those men who sat downstairs outside the zikr circle were equally fascinated by the proceedings. There was much whispering and pointing and excitement reached a peak whenever

one of the dervishes fell into a trance. It was always a good show but for most people that was all it was.

Amongst the young in particular there is a strong interest in the orders, as they themselves claim. Their appeal lies in the promise of a mystical alternative to the Zajednica's Islam. Bašeskija remarked of those ulema members who knew nothing of the dervish path: "the [religious] sciences are not enough without mysticism...Just as the bird cannot fly with only one wing, so these learned people cannot reach their goal". A young, devout and highly educated woman who studied Oriental languages at the University of Sarajevo expressed the same opinion to me in her own way: "The orthodox go by foot, the dervishes go by aeroplane".

The promise of a second, mystical Islamic path is what attracts interest but this promise is not fulfilled to the satisfaction of many potential affiliates for two reasons. Firstly, the strong focus on a single ritual, zikr, leads many people to see the tekija simply as a "theatre" in which dervishes gather to give a weekly performance. As one young Muslim, himself the second cousin of a sheikh, told me: "Today the tekija is just a hobby". Secondly, as a result of its submission to Zajednica authority and its increasingly bureaucratic structure, the tekija does not seem to offer a real *alternative* to Islam as presented by the Zajednica.

It may also be said that the orders lack links with the outside Islamic world. In the eighteenth century Bosnian orders had strong ties with dervishes elsewhere, particularly in Istanbul. Bašeskija's own sheikh, a Kadiri, had travelled as far as India whilst Sheikh Hussein Baba Zukić had spent thirty years studying with a Naqshbandi sheikh in Istanbul, a Mevlevi sheikh in Konja and with the Naqshbandis of Samarkand and Bukhara. Such ties are now uncommon and the orders tend to appear introverted. They thus fail to offer Bosnian

Muslims any model of identity associated with the outside *Umma*, and at the same time forfeit the possibility of outside support which might offer a measure of protection from the Zajednica.

In this regard it is interesting to compare the dervishes with the Franciscan Catholic priests of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Ottoman times the Franciscans were paramount but after the war the Diocesan priests gained the upper hand by striking a deal with the secular authorities and espousing a rapprochement of Catholicism and socialism in a manner similar to that of the Zajednica. In 1981 the situation altered as a result of the famous apparition of the Virgin of Medjugorje (a case widely publicised in the Sunday Times, Reader's Digest and on the BBC). The Franciscans took control of the Marian devotion and consequently gained strength in their struggle to regain power from the Diocesans (see Bax 1987). In this struggle they have enlisted the support of the Catholic community abroad, many of whom arrive in Medjugorje on pilgrimage, and thus allied themselves with the outside Catholic community. As has been seen, the Bosnian dervish orders have failed to enlist such outside support and remain subservient to the Muslim establishment.

The Zajednica's rapprochement of Islam and socialism and of Muslim and Yugoslav identity finds little support within a population whose discrete national/religious identity is of both symbolic and real political importance to it. In such a situation the climate is favourable to the emergence of alternative religious orientations. Why the Bosnian dervish orders have failed to play host to such an alternative is a question hard to answer, particularly in view of the action taken by Albanian dervishes in creating ZIDRA. A clue is, however, provided by the history of the Bosnian orders and their relationship with the *ulema*. Whilst individual Bosnian dervish sheikhs at times opposed the secular authority of Ottoman officials (see footnote p.159) the relations

between *ulema* and orders were generally good in Ottoman times. Unlike the orders of Kosovo, those of Bosnia never indulged in practices deemed beyond the pale - the drinking of alcohol, the neglect of the Ramazan fast or the holding of orgies (see Halimi 1957 on the heterodoxy of Kosovan orders). They were thus not frowned upon by the *ulema* and never constituted a substitute authority for it. In this context their contemporary submission to the Zajednica becomes easier to understand for the continuance of a tradition needs less explanation than a break with it. At the same time it may be noted that perhaps the most influential order of Kosovo, the Bektashi, was historically associated with Albanian nationalism. No Bosnian order has such a tradition of political involvement which might facilitate its contemporary espousal of a movement of religious dissent.

Those Sarajevan Muslims who seek an alternative to the Zajednica version of Islam therefore tend to look in another direction...

The New Mystics

In Sarajevo and some other Bosnian towns there is emerging an Islamic religious tendency which is at the same time strongly scripturalist and mystically inclined. The notion of scripturalist mysticism or mystical scripturalism has an oxymoronic flavour but this should not lead to any idea that the Sarajevan tendency is simply a Balkan freak. The intellectual mystics of Cairo described by Gilsehan (1982) seem to bear some similarity to those of Sarajevo, as do the Nurçus of Turkey (see Dumont 1986, also Mardin 1982). But as I hope to show, the Bosnian Muslims' status as a minority affects their intellectual mysticism by creating a desire to identify with the worldwide *Umma*, a desire which might be less relevant within a Muslim dominated society.

It is in the mystical aspects of this new tendency that some loose structure of religious authority may be discerned. Any fully-blown religious organisation or movement distinct from the Zajednica would be opposed by it, and, if it seemed in any way threatening to the social order, by the state. The new mystics, as they will be termed here, do not constitute such a movement. They have no publicly recognisable leaders, organisation, membership or meeting places. Sympathisers may meet in each others homes, in cafes or in the mosque after prayer. Some such gatherings are by appointment but many are simply the result of a number of sympathisers being in the same place at the same time. These sympathisers do, however, form loose networks around charismatic leaders; men who call themselves sufis and who are deemed by their followers to be sheikhs. In these loose networks lie the faint outlines of a religious movement.

The appeal of the new mysticism is not confined to any particular social group or groups within the Muslim population yet certain common characteristics may be noted amongst its sympathisers. Perhaps the most obvious is that many of them are young, below the age of thirty. Often these young people are members of families more traditional and less radical than they themselves, they are enthusiastic rediscoverers of Islam rather like the 'Born-again's of Western Christianity. A tiny percentage are converts from Orthodoxy or Catholicism. Some study or have studied at the medresa or the Theological Faculty. Some are employed by the Islamska Zajednica as imams or act as muezzins in the mosques of Sarajevo. It has been said that there is little room in the dervish orders for women. At the Visoko tekija a few elderly women participate regularly in the zikr (from a separate room) and are *muhibs* (uninitiated followers) but not *murids* (initiated followers bound by oath to the sheikh). In Sarajevo women are allowed to attend the zikr of the Kadiri tekija ⁽⁴⁾, though not of the Naqshbandi, but none are even *muhibs*. In contrast, the new mystical tendency has

many female sympathisers. It is difficult to estimate the number of new mystics since, as has been said, there is no official membership or organisation. It is probable that the number of firm, convinced and active mystics is not great. However, the percentage of Muslims admiring and empathising with the aims and ideals of the tendency is, in my impression, much larger. Whilst few individuals will personally undertake to follow the new mystic lifestyle, many esteem and respect it and the situation is thus unlike that of the Turkish town of Egridir where religious enthusiasts are seen as extremists and fanatics (see p.149).

The sphere of influence of the new mysticism is not wholly discrete from that of the dervish orders or the *Islamska Zajednica*. Some young male mystics attend the *tekijas* occasionally and participate in the *zikr*. Both male and female mystics may be products of the *Zajednica*'s educational establishments. All of them attend prayers at the mosques which are of course run by the *Zajednica*; there is no attempt to set up separate mosques, *mesdžids* or places of prayer. The new mystics do not believe themselves to have aims wholly other than that of the dervish orders and the *Islamska Zajednica*, yet neither is their attitude to them wholly favourable. On the contrary.

The common criticisms of the *Zajednica* noted in chapter four (p.153/4) are most strongly voiced by the new mystics. Believing that my aim in Sarajevo was to learn about Islam as a religion ⁽⁵⁾, and hoping to educate me about it, they

(4) But this only during the warm summer months when the dervishes gather in the *tekija*'s large *semahana* which has a special gallery for women. During the cold weather they meet in a smaller room which cannot accommodate women.

(5) Many Muslims found it hard to understand that I was principally interested in Muslim society rather than in Islamic religion. This was particularly true of the new mystics.

felt my interest in the Islamska Zajednica to be misplaced. When I asked one young mystic about the organisation and teaching of the Zajednica she was first uncomprehending and then disappointed. She told me that she had no interest in the Zajednica but supposed that I could buy some books about it at their shop.

As for the tekijas, they were criticised for their "formalnost" (formality) and felt to be over-concerned with ritual practice and wanting in spirituality. Some new mystics openly criticised the spectacular sabre and skewer piercing practices of the Albanian dervishes, saying that these had nothing to do with true sufism at all. The subdued zikr of the Bosnian tekijas was not so outrightly condemned and the mystics had nothing against it in principle, indeed they sometimes attended the tekija or engaged in zikr within their own circles. It was felt, however, to be of potential danger since those who frequented the tekija might be led into thinking of the ritual experience of zikr as an end in itself. They might thus mistake a bit of the path's paving (the zikr) for the path towards God itself. The tekija's emphasis on ritual was therefore not to their taste for, as one new mystic put it: "In sufism all is spiritual and nothing is practical".

This concern with the distinction between the spiritual and the practical also influences their view of the authority of sheikhs. It has been seen that tekija sheikhs are "authorised", after a period of probation, by their peers and that those of Fojnica (and historically of Oglavak) are hereditary sheikhs. To the new mystics such routes to sheikh-hood seem insufficiently spiritual. For them, sheikh-hood is a gift of God, to be revealed to the recipient in a dream or by some other message and not to be attained through such practical means as genetic inheritance or probation.

The charismatic leaders of new mysticism are created by no such practical means and are consequently more elusive than the tekija sheikhs. Within a few

weeks of my arrival in Sarajevo I knew the names of the sheikhs of the town's two tekijas and had been introduced to one of them in his capacity as sheikh. On the other hand it was months before I learnt the identity of two other men known by their new mystic followers as sheikhs. Neither had a tekija or had been formally authorised. Both were imams of mosques and I had thought of them simply as such until I was told otherwise. One of them, sheikh Abdullah efendiĵa, I was to speak with several times, the other I never met but heard much of from his admirers.

The elusiveness of the mystical sheikhs is related to a belief in *evlije* (see p.88 above). *Evlije* are people with God given supernatural powers and the belief in them is particularly, though not exclusively, associated with the new mystics. *Evlije* are forbidden by God to publicise their status and it is thus deemed impossible to know with certainty whether or not any given individual is an *evlija* ⁽⁶⁾. Certainly nothing in their outward personality provides proof for, as Abdullah ef. explained to me, all the Prophets were *evlije* yet Moses (Musa) was strict and stern in character whilst Jesus (Isa) was gentle and quiet. The second mystic sheikh was, however, widely believed to be such, the evidence lying in the miracles he performed. For example:

1) A young man went to visit this sheikh but didn't pay attention to what he was told. He was daydreaming instead about Mostar, the capital of Hercegovina. Immediately the sheikh began to talk of Mostar; he had read the young man's mind.

2) Another young man had to leave for Switzerland the next day but had no

(6) The sheikh whom I knew did, however, give me a clue. "Look for someone who's hated, look at Khomeini, for example, because the unGodly cannot stand the *evlija*"

money. In the street he met the sheikh who gave him 4,000 dinars (about £8 at the time I was told the story). The man found that after he'd bought his ticket and food for the journey he still had 4,000 dinars in his pocket. It had lasted all the way to Switzerland.

3) One day after friday *džuma* I stood in the courtyard of the mosque with some new mystic friends who claimed that the sheikh was an *evlija*. I asked for evidence and they explained: "A minute ago he was inside the mosque but now he's gone, yet no-one saw him come out and this is the only exit".

Of sheikh Abdullah ef., none whom I met would affirm a positive belief in his being an *evlija* but many suspected that he was so.

For the new mystics there is a relationship between being a sufi, being a sheikh and being an *evlija*. One mystic put it to me that all real sufis are *evlije*. In this regard it must be noted that whilst sheikh Abdullah ef. claimed to be a sufi none of his admirers made such claims of themselves. New mystical sympathisers said that they were interested in sufism or would like to be sufis but not that they were such.

Theoretically it is impossible to clearly identify an *evlija*. In practice in Sarajevo it is not easy to identify a mystic sheikh. One must be apprised of a man's sheikhly status by those who believe in it. The mystic sheikh's elusiveness then affords him a resemblance with the *evlija*. This resemblance is important for the *evlija* has powers directly granted by God and, according to the new mystics, the true sheikh has his status directly from God, through spiritual and not through practical means. By resembling the *evlija* in elusiveness the mystic sheikh may be taken by his followers as resembling the *evlija* in having directly God given power. The *tekija* sheikhs who are known to the Zajednica, the Oriental Institute and the secular authorities and who may be known by anyone who takes the trouble to ask, lack the *evlija*'s aura of secrecy.

It has been said that the new mystics are less concerned with ritual practice than are the frequenters of tekijas. Their meetings rarely involve zikr, although at one gathering I witnessed, after several hours of talking those present did perform a short zikr. But the goal of coming closer to God is by them achieved more through talking and teaching than through ritual. When new mystics met without a sheikh they would frequently exchange explanations of the symbolic and hidden meanings of things in the everyday world. For them everything in the world has a meaning and a purpose and I was often told to remember that "nothing is coincidental". They would point to the fact that the lines on the palm of the left hand spell the number 18 in Arabic whilst those on the palm of the right spell 81. Now $18+81=99$ and at the same time $1+8=9$ and $8+1=9$ and 9 and 9 together make 99. It is not coincidental that the names of God are 99 in number. The positioning of the hands in prayer had its meaning too. Hands raised in the phrase "Allahu Akbar" mean "I am poor, I have nothing". Hands crossed over the breast (female) or waist (male) mean "I am powerless, I can do nothing". Such meanings were said to exist in everything and on such occasions it was only regretted that the sheikh was not present to explain them properly.

When Abdullah ef. was present his role was precisely to explain and instruct through speech. In the mosque or in someone's home followers would listen as he spoke on a variety of theological topics. On the question of the influence of prayer on God he explained that it could have no influence since God was not a separate person to be affected by human pleas. Rather we should think of prayer as having three aspects: prayer, praying, prayed for, or wisher, wishing, wished for, or lover, loving, loved. All three go together and are one thing because God is in some way within us and we reflect him if we lead a "čist" (pure) life.

On the significance of dreaming he taught that the difference between dream and waking life is great and may reflect the vast difference between this earthly life and the life of the hereafter. On the existence of pain and suffering on earth he explained that its purpose was that we might later understand the meaning and feel the good of heaven. Good is meaningless unless it is contrasted with bad.

These and other philosophical thoughts were interspersed with more concrete points and stories. For example, the sheikh told us of how his own sheikh had, by virtue of a God given power, known of the "UnIslamic sin" which he and his wife had committed in absolute privacy. He said that both silent and voiced zikr were Islamic but that the Prophet had practised the silent variety whilst Ali had performed zikr aloud.

During long sessions of the sheikh's teaching and expounding such matters his followers remained relatively quiet, listening and attempting to take in all they heard. Occasionally they asked questions with great deference and politeness - "Forgive me, but may I ask..." Although not bound to the sheikh by oath, followers were strongly influenced by him in their private lives. One man introduced his potential bride to the sheikh to ascertain the latter's opinion. Abdullah ef. decided that the girl's name (Mirsada, a common one) was not a good Islamic name and suggested that it be changed. It duly was and the groom publicised the new name to all who knew the couple.

The sheikh's attitude to me affected that of his admirers. One of these was initially rather hostile towards me, thinking my enterprise a mistaken one and myself incapable of understanding Islam or sufism. Another, whilst perfectly polite and amiable, was clearly not especially interested in me or my work. When Abdullah ef. decided and stated that I was a sincere person and "one of us", both of these men's attitudes changed. The hostility of the former was softened

to the extent that, whilst still unsure that I could learn much, he did engage in conversation with me and once even visited me. The attitude of the second man changed even more decisively. For mere courtesy he exchanged great attention and enthusiasm, apologising for not having had much time to see me before, asking about my family, work and future and introducing me to his relatives. He said that because the sheikh liked me he also liked and wanted to know me.

The sheikh called himself a sufi and his followers professed an interest in sufism. But theirs is less the sufism of experience, of trances and zikr, than of the intellect (7). Neither was their sufism in general in dischord with the scriptures (8). They did see a difference between sufism and standard Islam. At my first interview with Abdullah ef. (which had been brought about by some friends who hoped that the sheikh would enlighten me in a way which they felt themselves unable to do) my first question to him was about the nature and meaning of dreams. Before answering he asked me whether I wanted his reply as an imam or as a sufi. Clearly he saw a distinction between the two types of

- (7) During the ten days of *itikaf* in the month of Ramazan the sheikh introduced myself and others briefly to a young "sufi" who was spending the period in a tiny room curtained off inside a mosque in a town outside Sarajevo. He spent his whole time praying and each day ate less and less. The young man kissed the sheikh's hand and cried. These, the sheikh told us approvingly, were tears of joy, and he added that within a few days the sufi would begin to go into a trance. It must be noted, however, that this act was deemed worthy not simply for itself but because the sufi was already close to God. On its own such an act of asceticism would have meant nothing.
- (8) The young mystic who was intially hostile towards me was something of an exception. He told me that he had once seen God during a zikr gathering, and been terrified at the sight. He also said that this claim of his was in contradiction with the *Shari'a* and punishable by death and asked me not to tell anyone of it because they wouldn't understand.

understanding. However, this distinction did not amount to anything approaching a divorce and as one mystic told me no-one who does not pray, fast and fulfill all the Quranic requirements can be a sufi.

The sheikh said that he was of the Naqshbandi tarikat although he did not attend the Naqshbandi (or any other) tekija. Like all mystics, and indeed like the tekija dervishes, he believed the tarikat to which one belonged to be of little importance; it was seen as a matter of personal taste. For his taste the Naqshbandi was the most appropriate order because, he said, it was the most scripturally inclined.

This emphasis on scripture was apparent in all his thought. One day, after I had asked many questions about God, he explained to me that love is more important than understanding and that this was why the heart is placed right at the centre of the body whilst the brain lies at an extremity. In order to get close to God then, and to have true closeness to him, one has to stop asking philosophical questions and let love take over. I asked him whether this wasn't a bit dangerous. If we don't use our minds how can we distinguish the state of true closeness to the one true God from the state of a shaman or the user of hallucinogenic drugs.

Abdullah ef.'s answer was that whilst it was indeed hard to be certain that one was experiencing the real thing, there were two important ways in which the likelihood could be increased, two external checks on the possibility of mistake. One was the criticism and guidance of a sheikh. The other was adherence to the *kitab*, the Holy Book: if you're not living in accordance with this you're bound to be wrong.

In new mystic circles great emphasis is laid on the inerrancy and perfection of the Quranic revelation. Many mystics make efforts to learn Arabic in order to read and comprehend the Holy Book in its original form and some

study long and hard to become *hafiz* (see p.103). The hadiths (sayings and actions of the Prophet and his companions) are also quoted in support and complement of contemporary behaviour. This is interesting in as much as many ordinary Muslims do not even know what a hadith is (those who told me the tale of Abu-Bakr didn't know it was a "hadith"). I once sat with a young woman and her mother whose conversation reminded me of a hadith I'd been told by a mystic friend. I quoted it, saying that it was a hadith, but the mother looked bemused. The young woman told me that her mother didn't know what a hadith was and promptly demonstrated that she herself didn't know either by explaining: "You know, mother, a hadith, like they have in the Quran".

It has been noted (in chapter four) that many Muslims claim that modern science has proved the truth of Quranic teaching on pork, fasting and homosexuality. New mystics make yet more intricate claims on the basis of less clear and unequivocal hadiths and Quranic verses. Thus a hadith in which Muhammed claims that God knows each individual down to the very fingertip is said to have been proved by twentieth century fingerprinting techniques. The Quranic statement about a mysterious boundary placed in the world by God is said to have been obscure in meaning in the seventh century but later clarified by science which shows that salt and fresh water do not immediately mix where rivers run into the sea ⁽⁹⁾.

This interest in and reliance on scientific explanation may seem to contrast oddly with the new mystics belief in the hidden meanings of lines on the palms and that "nothing is coincidental". The cohabitation is explicable in

(9) Jacques Cousteau's realisation that fish will not cross salt/fresh water lines at river outlets is said to have been the reason for his conversion to Islam.

terms of a desire to combine twentieth century science's invention of aeroplanes, kidney machines and light bulbs with the revelation of Islam. The discoveries of science are so powerful and pervasive that Muslims throughout the world seek to incorporate them within the Islamic vision.

For most Bosnian Muslims, and many new mystics, this combination is simply the mixture of bits and pieces of science with an assortment of other ideas. Yet it is not wholly self-contradictory and Bašeskija's chronicle for the year 1779//80 provides an interesting illustration of how scientific discoveries may be accommodated with religious truths. For about three months there had been no rain so it was decided that special prayers should be made in the mosques and by mekteb children. After a month the rain came and was greeted by the townsfolk as an answer to their prayer. Bašeskija, however, said that the prayer had not brought about the rain - "to pray for rain is simply a sign of submission and service to God". He said, furthermore, that through his study of astronomy he had already known that there would be rain at the end of the month. For this he was criticised by those who thought he was suggesting that the rain was governed by the material world rather than by God. But Bašeskija points out that his conclusion on the basis of the science of astronomy does not disprove that God causes the rain for "things will be as God wills, whether we know of it [in advance] or not". Scientific investigation is merely a way of gaining knowledge about God's will and scientific discoveries do not disprove that this will is the cause of earthly phenomena.

Sarajevo's new mystics seem to be in accord with Bašeskija. Bosnian Muslims believe that individual dreams have meanings not only for the dreamer but for those who are dreamt about. The new mystics are particularly interested in dreams which they feel a sheikh is most capable of being able to interpret. One night I dreamt that the sister of a mystic friend of mine had married a

Cambridge anthropologist and had a baby. I went to ask my friend the meaning of this dream and she told me that babies usually meant trouble and anxiety but that if I wanted a more detailed explanation I should ask the sheikh. So I asked her a larger, more general question: "How can we know what our dreams mean?". Her immediate reply was: "Well, you know what Freud says about it".

This woman had learnt about Freud at school and believed him to be a modern scientific psychologist. Through my question I had hoped to learn something about the Islamic interpretation of dreams but to her it did not seem out of place to raise the psychologist's name, and she did so to prove neither science's inadequacy in comparison with Islam nor Freud's inadequacy in comparison with the sheikh. The "scientific" explanation was not seen as disproving that the dreams were messages caused by God, for both the Freudian and the Islamic interpretation of dreams, although different, seemed to her to be true.

For the new mystics both interpretations gave the meaning of a dream which is the product of the unconscious mind which is created by God. The root of both meanings is therefore God and the meanings are joined in God's will. An example from Islamic philosophy of the 14th century illustrates this idea of the co-existence of scientific and hidden religious meanings. Ibn Qayyim posed the question of why the newborn baby cries and answered that there were two true explanations. One was the apparent reason, *sahab zahir*, (the scholar implies that this is the fact that the baby is delivered into a cold, new environment and is shocked), the other a hidden reason, *sahab batin*, which is that every human has its own demon and this demon stabs the child at the moment of its birth. (See Musallam note 75 p.142).

Islamic Revival?

In many parts of the contemporary Muslim world dissatisfaction with secular and religious leadership has led to the emergence of new, religiously inspired tendencies or movements, and thence to the widespread observation that some 'Islamic Revival' is underway. Sarajevo's new mysticism bears a relationship to these other tendencies and movements but it is necessary to mention two *caveats*.

The first is that whilst it may be said that there is Islamic Revival in Sarajevo, there is not Islamic Revivalism. A number of the town's Muslims, after years of comparative religious laxity, have become inspired by the Islamic faith and now attempt to live their lives in what they see as strict accordance with its teachings. Always Muslims in name, they feel that they have now rediscovered Islam. A smaller (far smaller) number of individuals born into Christian families have taken on the Islamic faith. These people speak of themselves not as converts but as having "returned" to Islam since they believe that all humans are born as Muslims and only later diverted from the true path. The consequent increase in highly self-conscious and strict adherence to Islam objectively constitutes some sort of revival. At the same time, the individuals in question feel the increase to be a revival since they see themselves as rediscoverers or returners, not as discoverers or converts.

Yet the tendency is not revivalist in nature. In Muslim dominated societies Muslim activists often insist on the need for a return to the ways of the past, of the Prophet, his companions and the early Muslim community. This, as has been seen, was the case of the eighteenth century Kadićevci. In modern Sarajevo too the early days are taken as a model but a desire for a return to the past is not the main thrust of the tendency. Rather than looking to a former *time*, the Muslims in question look to another place. This place is the Arab and Turkish

world. Far more than seeking to identify with a bygone era, they seek to identify with the outside Islamic *Umma*, a community to which the Kadićevci legally belonged but from which contemporary Bosnia is politically cut off.

The second caveat concerns the term "fundamentalism". The beliefs of the revived Muslims of Sarajevo share many features with those of Islamic fundamentalist movements in other parts of the world. There is a strong emphasis on the scriptures and on Islam as a universally and timelessly applicable religion, as true in twentieth century New Zealand as in seventh century Arabia. For this reason, and because the term fundamentalism has no clear or clearly agreed upon definition, it is tempting to include the Sarajevan tendency under the broad banner of fundamentalism. There are, however, two reasons for avoiding such a course.

The first lies in the common disassociation of fundamentalist and sufi or mystical trends. It is frequently the case that the proponents of fundamentalism are hostile to mysticism and the sufi brotherhoods. This is not always so and a hatred of mysticism or sufism can form no proper part of any definition of fundamentalism. However, because it is often the case, the term "fundamentalism" to many readers implies an antagonism towards sufi mysticism. The Sarajevan tendency is not, as has been seen, opposed to such mysticism and to style it 'fundamentalist' would therefore be a source of confusion.

Secondly, and more importantly, those movements commonly identified as fundamentalist tend to have political aspirations with regard to the status of Islamic law. They aim to establish *Shari'a* law as state law. In Sarajevo there is no movement pressing for changes in the law, there is a tendency pressing for changes in the values and behaviour of Muslims in their personal and familial lives. This focus on personal behaviour rather than on legal change is a

response to Muslim status as a minority in a socialist state which will tolerate no overt political demands from religious communities.

New Mysticism and Identity

At this point I want to return to the question of identity. For most Bosnian Muslims religious and national affiliation are closely linked and therefore the woman who asked what my nationality was could not be satisfied until I told her my religion (see p.20). These Muslims tended to accept me as a member of another group, an English "Protestant", whatever that was. They were occasionally interested in the rituals and customs of my people and the differences between these and their own. Their enquiries as to whether I would consider conversion were light hearted and usually based on the joke about my marrying some nice Muslim boy and settling in Sarajevo for good. The idea was thus that I would convert only if I joined their society through marriage.

For the new mystics being a Muslim is less a matter of nationality or family origin than one of personal choice. They respected the fact that I had my own faith and many thought that "the most important thing is to believe" rather than be an atheist. They did not, however, feel my religious identity to be fixed in consequence of my birth and provenance. I might be English but they knew that there were Muslims in England and there was always the possibility, and often the hope, that I would convert to Islam out of personal conviction. For them Islam was a universally applicable faith to be joined by choice and it was for this reason, and not only because of the frequent similarity in our ages, that they tended to be particularly eager and loquacious informants.

If non-Muslim birth and provenance are not seen as a strong barrier to Islamic faith it is also the case that Muslim birth and provenance are not seen as a guarantee of it. Even the person born into a Muslim family must choose

Islam in order to be a true Muslim. This fact explains the strange conversation I heard between a new mystic friend and his nine year old cousin. The cousin had asked whether he himself was a Muslim. The ordinary answer to such a question from a child would be a simple yes, but my friend asked the boy whether he thought he was a Muslim. Either out of curiosity or mischief the child said no, and received the reply: "Well then you're not". Naturally this small boy had neither converted from Islam nor insisted that he was an atheist so that for most Bosnians there would be no question but that he was a Muslim. For the new mystics, however, a person must choose and believe in Islam to be a true Muslim.

The Islamic community is seen as a community of choice. Those nominal Muslims who do not positively choose their faith are therefore no closer to the Islamic community than are Christians to whom Islam is potentially open if they choose to embrace it.

For the new mystics then, the three way divide between Muslim, Serb and Catholic is of lesser importance than the two way divide between those who have chosen Islam and are therefore part of the true Islamic community, and all other Muslims plus Christians, Jews, Hindus etc. (The category of atheists is perhaps a third, and the lowest ranking of all.) From those other Muslims new mystics feel a distance which in some respects they accentuate in their behaviour. Some mystic women mark this distance by dressing in long skirts, sleeves and headscarves. This outfit is said to be adopted in obedience to Quranic prescription but one obvious effect is to distinguish the true Islamic believer from the general public for in a town where Western style is the general ideal of the young, the abundantly clothed young woman is a conspicuous oddity.

Sometimes marking distance amounted almost to a rejection of those on the other side of the divide. This became clear with regard to their attitude

towards a close female friend of mine. Her family were of peasant origin, her father a skilled worker who did not practice his faith, her mother a housewife who fasted and occasionally prayed but who was illiterate and relatively ignorant of the scriptures. The friend herself believed in God but was at the same time a Communist Party member who neither prayed nor fasted. My new mystic friends were extremely sceptical of this woman and of her influence on me. Some were openly rude about her, many were impolitely dismissive and all were unwilling to meet her.

This friend of mine could be shunned by the new mystics but it was not possible for them to treat their own families, many of whom were little different from that of my friend, in the same way. Only one new mystic, a woman who had converted from Catholicism had actually broken off relations with her family. Amongst the others, however, some desire to create distance between self and family was apparent. Many new mystics had married young or were impatiently awaiting the man's acquisition of a job in order to do so. They supported the ideal of early marriage by quoting a hadith in which the Prophet says that only five things should be done with speed - paying debts, praying, burying the dead, serving guests and marrying. Yet it was clear that part of their impatience for marriage was related to a desire to break away from their natal families and establish their own autonomous nuclear family units; units within which the children would be brought up in true piety and religious observance, as members of the true Islamic community.

This community is of course conceived of as one adhering to the principles of Islam, hence the new mystics reliance on Quran, hadiths and sheikhly guidance to justify their behaviour and beliefs. At the same time it is seen as community, membership of which lifts the Sarajevan Muslim beyond the bounds of Bosnian Islam and into the worldwide *Umma*. Westerners like Cousteau and Quinn

form part of this *Umma* but it is above all Arabia and Turkey which figure in the new mystics' vision of the Islamic community.

In their ordinary conversation topics such as the beauty of Turkish mosques and the spirituality of Ramazan in the Arab world are frequently raised. The idealisation of Arabia may go to the extent of asserting, as did one new mystic, that Saudi women wear the veil aswell as a head covering because they are so beautiful that men would otherwise be distracted in the streets.

It has been said that new mysticism does not seek the enstatement or recognition of *Shari'a* law in Bosnia but to promote values seen as Islamic within personal and family relationships. Chief among these virtues are modesty and respect. Thus, for example, they are against seaside holidays (because of the scanty clothing) and physically expressed affection of any sort before marriage (other Muslim girlfriends and boyfriends may kiss and caress, the new mystics do not). Any mention of the need for modesty and respect is frequently followed by some reference to Muslim practice in the Arab or Turkish world.

One recently married woman told me of the promise that her husband had made on their wedding day. The groom said that now he had married her he would love her just as much tomorrow "without arms, without legs, without a nose". This, she concluded, was "Pravi Islamski Ljubav" - the True Islamic Love - and, she added, a love of the type so lacking in modern Yugoslavia but existant in Muslim countries. A great admiration was felt for the fact that young Turkish boys are adept recitors of the Quran. This was felt to be the result of proper relations of respect and obedience between parent and child, the former guiding the latter in the service of God. Conversations about modest clothing for women might be followed by observations that such covering explained low rates of adultery and sexual harrassment in Muslim countries.

Such examples are just indications of the new mystics' interest in, reverence of and wish to be identified with those places which seem to them to be the heartland of the Muslim world. This wish was such that they were sometimes bemused by my own desire to study in Sarajevo. Other Muslims might wonder why I was interested in Islam or Muslims at all; the mystics could understand that but wondered why I chose Bosnia rather than an Arab country.

The new mystics are intellectuals rather than sensationalists. They appear similar, in certain respects, to the contemporary Islamic fundamentalists whilst in others they seem close to the sufi thinkers of old. Why has such a revival come about in this form? It cannot be overlooked that, to some extent, the young Sarajevo enthusiasts simply resemble other young people of the West who turn to Hare Krishna, Baghwan Shree Rajneesh and charismatic Christianity. Indeed one of the young male mystics had previously had a Buddhist phase, was fascinated by the mysticism of Carlos Castaneda and believed firmly in a worldwide conspiracy of Freemasons. He sought the mysterious and colourful everywhere and perhaps Islam provided the best version of this for him. Islam is fashionable and as one mystic put it: "it's modern to be Muslim". At the same time it is the case that the Iranian revolution and the Afghan war have proved an inspiration for Muslims in Bosnia and throughout the world, at least to the extent of demonstrating that Islam need not be a waning force in modern times.

However, the scale and intensity of the revival call for some more specific explanation, for whilst the numerical strength of the mystics themselves is not great, their aims and beliefs inspire admiration and respect on the part of many Muslims. Even the friend of mine who was shunned by them was somewhat awed, thought the mystics good Muslims and would not criticise them as she had been criticised. In part we may seek such an explanation in the failure of Bosnia's

existing formal religious authorities, the Islamska Zajednica and the dervish orders, to present Islam as sufficiently separate from Yugoslav socialism, the ideology of a multi-religious, multi-national state. The Zajednica (and the dervish orders by virtue of their acquiescence and submission to Zajednica authority) present Bosnian Muslim society simply as one component of the brotherly and united federation of Yugoslavia. In this regard it is of significance that the new mystical tendency has sprung up in the 1980s, a period in which the Zajednica has espoused the notion of Yugoslav Socialist Patriotism with particular vigour.

Those Muslims who seek a more compelling identity must also seek an alternative religious orientation. A nationalistic Islamic fundamentalist movement such as exists in some Muslim majority societies is not currently a realistic alternative in Bosnia. The religious alternative that has emerged in this Muslim minority is not fundamentalist, but it is scripturalistic and puritan. It is not nationalistic in the usual sense of the term, but it does provide a strong model of identity, that of unity with a vast and powerful worldwide Islamic fraternity.

Yet this identity might be asserted without the mysticism, the sheikhs and the miracles. It is principally in their strict adherence to Quranic prescription and values seen as Islamic that the mystics distinguish themselves from ordinary Muslims and from the Zajednica, and identify with the outside *Umma*. The importance of mysticism and sheikhs lies elsewhere. To discover where, it is instructive to consider the case of another Muslim minority in a socialist context; the case of the Soviet Muslims. Bennigsen and Wimbush speak of "Fundamentalist Sufism" in the Soviet Union and state that:

"Contrary to the situation in other countries which have Sufi orders...where fundamenatalist currents and organisations are independent and often opposed to Sufi activity, in the Soviet Union fundamentalist and radical Sufi tendencies are often, but not always, in harmony...It is logical that

these two trends, the poorly organised fundamentalist-intellectual and the highly structured Sufi-popular, should meet and, at critical junctures, merge." (Bennigsen & Wimbush 1985)

The Soviet recipe is then Sufi organisation plus fundamentalist thinking, and this basic recipe seems to hold good in Sarajevo. It is through their firm scripturalism that the new mystics make some sort of opposition to the Zajednica. Sufi mysticism alone could not do this since it has never historically been seen in urban Sarajevo as a substitute for the practice of standard *ulema* and *Shari'a* prescribed Islam. At the same time it is the scripturalist trend that provides the possibility of identification with the wider Islamic world.

It does not, however, provide any sort of organisation. As has been said, no formal fundamentalist or scripturalist movement is practically possible in Sarajevo and in the absence of such a movement scripturalism has no leaders, authorities or structure.

It is this structure which Sufi-related mysticism provides. Through their reverence for and obedience to the unofficial sheikhs, Sarajevo's new mystics create loosely structured networks revolving around these charismatic leaders. They do not, of course, constitute a formally bounded group or association and are far less organised than their Soviet counterparts. Nevertheless, mysticism provides some level of organisation within which the mystics' aims and ideas may be expressed.

6. MEN, WOMEN AND DEATH RITUALS

This chapter examines the role of one particular class of religious rituals, death rituals, in the assertion of group identity. Sarajevo Muslims perform two rites for their dead. The burial service, *dženaza*, is performed by men in the town's central mosque. Women perform a series of five *tevhid* rituals in the home of the deceased. I will suggest that in contemporary Sarajevo these two rituals express Muslim identity as, on the one hand, a subset of wider Islamic identity, and on the other, distinction from the Serbs, Catholics, Albanians and other identity groups of the local environment.

If it is the case, as suggested in chapter one, that these two aspects of identity have become both more salient and more consciously recognised as distinct, since the nineteenth century (and particularly in twentieth century socialist Bosnia) then one would expect the *dženaza* and the *tevhid* to have had different significances in pre-nineteenth century Bosnia. This, I propose, is indeed the case. Documentary evidence suggests that in Ottoman Bosnia the *tevhid* was primarily associated not with ordinary women, as it is today, but with male dervishes. Its significance at that time was primarily as an aspect of mysticism and the dervish path rather than as an expression of Muslim identity as distinct from Serb, Catholic and other local identities. That it has lost that significance today reflects both the general decline of the dervish orders and the rise of new conceptions of identity.

I will further suggest that examination of the women's *tevhid* casts light on two important questions. The first is the broad question of the role of women in funerary rites in monotheistic societies. Recent studies of the

treatment of death in non-monotheistic societies based on traditional authority suggest that death is the occasion for the creation of an ideology which legitimates authority (held by men rather than women) within that society (Bloch & Parry 1982). Here death rituals carry the message that the holders of temporal authority, who are male, are at the same time the regenerators of life. Women's roles in funerary rites do not (as proposed by Huntingdon & Metcalf 1979) suggest their association with fertility and regeneration, rather, women are associated with the polluting and sorrowful aspects of death. For monotheistic societies Bloch and Parry state that:

"funerary rituals only consist of the first of the two sides we have mentioned, the polluting and sad aspect of the funeral; the second half, the ideological creation of timelessness and fertility, is largely absent."

For the Bosnian Muslims the authors would then hold that whilst death rituals do not assert that the holders of temporal authority are the source of the regeneration of life (fertility lies with God, not with men), the death rituals of women do stress the polluting and sorrowful aspects of death. I hope to show that this is not the case. On the contrary, in the attempt to assert distinct identity, Bosnian Muslim women stress the sobriety, prayerfulness and lack of sorrow of the *tevhid* as compared to the funerary rites of Serbian, Catholic and Albanian women.

Secondly, I will suggest that the case of the Bosnian womens' death ritual casts light on an important but little examined question about gender relations in the Muslim world. In recent years a large amount of anthropological research has been conducted into the religious role of Muslim women in various parts of the world. This research has questioned the idea that: "Muslim men are expected to be more devout than women... religious work is chiefly entrusted...to men" (Davis 1984, quoted in Tapper, N & Tapper,

R 1987) by demonstrating the fact that Muslim women, as well as performing standard rituals such as daily prayer, often conduct their own religious rituals and have their own, female religious leaders. However, a question remains. This is that of the male attitude to women's religious practices. Some of the research into female religious practices has been content merely to show that they exist (Fernea E & Fernea R 1972). Some has stressed the ways in which women's religious behaviour effects that of men, thus Dwyer notes the ways in which women's choice of saints and sufi orders in the Taroudannt region of southern Morocco effects that of their sons and husbands (Dwyer 1978). Little, however, has adressed the question of men's overt attitude to women's religious behaviour; do they denigrate, ignore or value it, and why? Thus Dwyer notes that men are disdainful of women's sufi cults but does not suggest why this should be so. The Bosnian women's death ritual is deemed, by men as well as women, to be one of religious significance and value. I will suggest that this evaluation is related to the fact that it is a vehicle for the expression of group identity.

In Sarajevo, in the midst of life one is in death. As one Muslim woman put it: "We're all dead already, it's just that we get picked off one by one". Muslims find death an absorbing topic of conversation, it is certainly their favourite aspect of the daily news. Hardly anyone showed interest in watching television news about political events, what stirred them were reports of multiple car crashes, aeroplane disasters and loss of life on a grand scale (1992). The daily newspaper of Bosnia-Hercegovina, *Oslobodenje*, includes at least four whole pages listing recent deaths and displaying the photographs of the deceased, Muslim, Serb and Catholic. Many readers turn straight to these pages which may provide the starting point for a

conversation on the topic of death. The consensus in these conversations is, amongst Muslims, that death is inevitable and likely to strike at any moment. Such conversations are not considered in the least ghoulish, even when they refer to the physical details of particular deaths. Thus, when one of my own relatives died during my fieldwork, Muslim acquaintances were surprised that the burial took place several days after the death and questioned me as to what was done with the body in the intervening period. Was it frozen? Left in the house? It was not considered that I might be disturbed by such a conversation because, whilst people are ofcourse upset about the death of their relatives, the corpse is only a corpse, a thing to be washed, buried and forgotten as quickly as possible (usually by the following day). The ensuing death rituals focus on the fate of the soul and the grave is little tended (2).

Death has such a high profile in Sarajevo that it is hardly surprising that it becomes an occasion on which all three groups make assertions of their identity. The city graveyard includes five separate sections for Muslims, Serbs, Catholics, Jews (of whom a tiny number remained after the Second World War) and "Communists". The latter section in fact houses the remains of only a small percentage of Communists, the committedly atheist. Even some atheist Communists will not be buried in the "Communist" section, preferring on death to stress their group identity than their ideology.

(1) One exception to this rule was the American bombing of Libya. Muslims found American (and British) conduct unacceptable and were interested in the political dimensions of the event aswell as in the loss of life.

(2) This is in contrast to the Serbian tradition. Serbs hold a series of graveside banquets on fixed dates after a death. See Ribeyrol & Schnapper 1976.

The assertion of identity is made in another way by the *smrtovnica*, a paper handbill which Bosnians print and have posted on fences and telegraph poles to announce the deaths of their loved ones. The Muslim *smrtovnica* has a green border and is adorned with a star and crescent. The Serbian *smrtovnica* has a cross and either a black or a blue border depending on the age of the deceased (Ribeyrol and Schnapper op cit.) Many Muslims were unsure of the exact significance of these non-Muslim *smrtovnice*. Some told me that the black denoted a Serb and the blue a Catholic. Others believed that both were for Serbs but that the blue denoted an atheist Serb. All, however, understood the most important thing: that the deceased person referred to in the handbill was not a Muslim.

Assertion of identity through the choice of graveyard plot and assertion of identity through the *smrtovnica* differ in that the former is more "exclusive" than the latter. In deciding where to lie in the city graveyard atheist Communist Sarajevans must make an exclusive choice as to whether they want to stress their group identity or their ideological affiliation. A single body cannot rest both in the Communist section and in the Muslim/Serb/Catholic/Jewish section at the same time. The *smrtovnica* does not pose this problem since it is possible to combine different decorative elements. Thus the Communist Muslim may choose a *smrtovnica* with a green border and a Communist Party red star.

The fact remains that some assertion of identity is made at death. This is not true of the other major event celebrated by all Bosnians regardless of their group identity, the event of marriage. In the case of death, only the most committed atheist and Communist will choose the graveyard's Communist section. At marriage, on the other hand, only a few of the the most devout and meticulous individuals choose to follow the obligatory civil

ceremony with a religious one, be it Islamic, Catholic or Orthodox (3).

Weddings take place at the town hall and are purely secular in character.

Muslim newly-weds follow this ceremony with a celebration held at the home of the groom's parents. This is devoid of any overt assertions of group identity or religious affiliation, although naturally most of the guests, family and friends, are also Muslims. Even practising believers are unlikely to supplement these arrangements with a religious ceremony. Death and death rituals then hold a privileged place in the arena of identity assertion.

When a Muslim lies dying those whom he or she has known in life should come to the bedside to *halaliti* (*Halaliti* is a verb formed in the Serbo-Croatian manner and deriving from the Arabic term *halal*, forgiveness), to forgive and be forgiven. Neighbours, as people who live nearby, are particularly important in this process. As one turn-of-the-century Muslim put it: "a neighbour is more valuable than a first cousin, if he lives far away, because while a kinsman is arriving a person could die waiting!" (Hangi 1900).

As the end draws near those present should pray with the dying one, encouraging him or her to join in if possible. A woman whom I knew told me of the death of her father-in-law. In his last moments he called out for his mother so she gently advised him: "No, not like that. *Eshedu en la illahe illa la, eshеду enne Muhammeden resulullah...*" (I believe and bear witness that there is no God but God, I believe and bear witness that Muhammed is his Prophet...) After death the body is immediately laid on the floor with its

(3) In Islam marriage is a civil contract rather than a religious sacrament, a fact which may make the Muslim, if not the Christian, lack of adherence to religious wedding ceremonial more comprehensible.

right side facing Mecca. It must be prepared for burial as soon as possible. If the survivors have personal friends who are *bulas* (for a female corpse) or *imams* (for a male corpse) they will call them in to perform the ritual washing of the corpse which must be scrubbed three times all over with soap. Otherwise they send the corpse to the Muslim mortuary for washing. After this purification the body is wrapped in a white shroud and a *tesbih* (rosary) is laid upon it. It is then put into an open coffin. In Sarajevo Muslim burials are performed at midday so unless the deceased has died early in the morning the body is likely to remain unburied until the following day. In this case it must be watched over all night either by employees of the mortuary or, if the corpse remains in the home, by poor Muslims paid by the survivors for the task. The deceased's family must also arrange for the printing and posting of the *smrtovnice*.

Graves are very little tended or visited although close kin may make an annual visit on the occasion of *Kurban Bajram*. The rituals which follow death focus on the fate of the soul and involve prayer to God for that soul. Indeed, every mention of the dead one's name in the years to come will involve a prayer for the soul. This prayer consists of adding the prefix *rahmetli*, "God's mercy on him/her", to the deceased's name. (*Rahmet*; Arabic, mercy.) Thus one does not say: "My grandmother/father always told me...", but: "My *rahmetli* grandmother/father always told me..."

Two types of death ritual follow the demise of any Muslim, male, female, child or adult. These are the *dženaza*, the burial service performed by men, and a series of five *tevhid*, performed by women.

The Dženaza

As a female I did not have the opportunity of attending a *dženaza* and this description of the ritual relies on oral accounts given by male participants and on educational literature published by the *Islamska Zajednica*. As a *Sharī'a* prescribed ritual the *dženaza* is dealt with in such publications alongside topics such as the correct way of performing daily *namaz*, the giving of alms, the Ramazan fast and so on.

In Sarajevo *dženaza* are performed in the town's central mosque and attended by male friends, relatives and neighbours of the deceased. Atheist work colleagues may show their respect by gathering in the mosque's forecourt but will not join in the service. This begins at 1 o'clock, after the midday prayer. The coffin will already have been brought, in a white van which serves as a hearse, from the mortuary or from the deceased's home. It is laid on the floor at the eastern end of the mosque with its right side facing Mecca. The imam stands facing the coffin at the level of its finger tips. Behind him stand the all male congregation in orderly rows (however small the congregation, at least three rows must be formed). Apart from the presence of the coffin the scene thus resembles that of daily *farz namaz* as conducted within the mosque. Indeed the *dženaza* itself is formally accounted a prayer of the *namaz* category.

The service is a short one conducted entirely in Arabic. It begins with the joint recitation of the *dženaza nijjet*, the decision and commitment to perform the *dženaza*. Some form of *nijjet* is the preface to all *namaz*, to the taking of *abdest* (ritual purity through washing) which precedes prayer, to the performance of the Hajj and to other religious rites.

After the *nijjet* all proclaim the *takbīr*, "Allahu Ekber", God is the most great". This is followed by the *subhaneke*, a second *takbīr*, *salavat*, a third

takbir, *dženaza dova* (the form of which varies according to the age and sex of the deceased), a fourth *takbir*, the *selaam* and, finally, the *fatīha*. This ends the service and the coffin is taken in the hearse to the city graveyard where it is buried.

I do not intend to give details about the *subhaneke*, *salavat*, *dova* and *selaam*, what is important is that each of these elements is also present in standard daily *namaz*. Informants say of the *dženaza* simply that it is the Islamic funerary service. This sounds trivial, but in the light of their attitudes to the women's *tevhid* it is not so. The *dženaza* is seen as the standard Muslim funeral service which is performed by Muslims the world over. The fact that it is performed in the central mosque in which standard Islamic services such as those of the two *Bajrams* and of *Lejletul-Kadr* are celebrated, emphasises the idea that the *dženaza* is a standard Muslim ritual akin to these. Through their own performance of the *dženaza* Bosnian Muslims then link themselves with the wider Muslim world.

The Tevhid

While men are performing the *dženaza*, women are holding the first of five *tevhids* which follow the death of any individual, male or female. The word *tevhid* is the Serbo-Croatian version of the Arabic *tawhīd*, meaning the perfect uniqueness and oneness of God. The concept of *tawhīd* is expressed in the *shahada*, the phrase *la illahe illa la*, there is no God but God. The repetitive chanting of the *shahada* forms one section of the *tevhid* ritual.

The ritual is held in the home of the deceased and hosted by the deceased's wife, daughter, daughter-in-law and/or other close female relatives. Most of the women who participate in the *tevhid* are neighbours and close relatives. It is not unusual for more distant kin and affines, even

those who live within Sarajevo, not to attend, whereas for a woman to absent herself from a tevhid held by a neighbour would be seen as wrong, unless the absentee had some good justification. Such a justification might be severe illness or the need to look after very young children. Children from about the age of three (ie. those who are capable of sitting still) may accompany their elders to the tevhid.

The five tevhids are held on: the funeral day (the *žalosni* or sorrow tevhid. *Žalost* is a Serbo-Croatian word), the seventh day after death (the *sedmina* tevhid, another Serbo-Croatian term), forty days after death, half a year after death and one year after death ⁽⁴⁾. The "year" in question is that of the Islamic lunar calendar, not the state calendar. The first, third, fourth and fifth of these three dates (calculated, however, by the state calendar) are also times at which Serbs perform rituals for their dead. Bosnian Muslims are aware of this coincidence of dates but treat the fact as an irrelevant one and emphasise how very different their own death rituals are from those of non-Muslims.

The five tevhids differ from each other in some respects, in particular the *žalosni* tevhid differs from the other four, but the prayers, chants and Quranic recitations are essentially the same in all cases. These are in Arabic and, as has been said in chapter three, few people understand their meanings, with the exception of such frequently repeated phrases as "Allahu Ekber" and "La illahe illa la". The stated purpose of the tevhid is prayer for

(4) The Muslims of Montenegro and the Sandžak, on the other hand, hold rituals for the dead only on the day of burial, the seventh day after death and the 52nd, the day on which the soul is said to depart from the body. These timings correspond to those celebrated by Turkish Muslims.

the soul of the deceased; such prayer is believed to have some influence with God ⁽⁵⁾.

The tevhid ritual is led by two or more specialist women, known as *bulas*, who are educated in Quranic recitation, the Arabic alphabet and the recitation of Turkish and Serbo-Croatian *mevlud* poems. At two points in the service, which lasts for between one and a half and two hours, the *bulas* may choose to speak in Serbo-Croatian, to preach about Islamic teaching on heaven and hell or to inform women of imminent Islamic festivals and the behaviour appropriate to them.

As the women arrive (between 50 and 100 of them) they are given coffee (except at the *žalosni* tevhid) which is prepared and distributed by daughters or young neighbours or relatives of the tevhid holder. Bowls of cigarettes are laid out on the tables but few women smoke before the ritual. There is quiet gossiping and rearranging of chairs and cushions, the *bulas* arrive, are given coffee and then begin the chant of "Allahu Ekber". On hearing this the participants, who are distributed about different rooms of the house, stop their conversations and don their headscarves if they have not already done so. All have made their ritual ablutions (*abdest*) before leaving home. The *bulas* take turns in reciting sections of the Quranic chapter known as *Ya Sin* which speaks of heaven, hell and the Judgement Day. After this a *bula* may, at her discretion, choose to comment on the chapter in Serbo-Croatian.

After these Quranic teachings the women may jointly chant one or two *salavats*. Again, whether or not they chant is decided by the *bulas*.

(5) It is not a tenet of the Hanafi School, as it is of the Hanbali, that prayer for the souls of the deceased always has influence with God. The belief is, nevertheless, held by Bosnian Muslims.

The *bulas* hand out giant *tesbihs* (rosaries) of 1,000 or 2,000 beads and each woman holds part of the rosary. If there are not enough to go round some women may bring out their own individual 33 or 99 bead *tesbihs*, but it is considered more desirable for women to share in a large *tesbih*. Counting off the beads the women repeat the *shahada*, "la illahe illa llah", there is no God but God. It is stated that the phrase should be repeated 1,000 times, however, an exact one thousand is never counted. During the *tesbih* section of the ritual each of the *bulas*, one at a time, will stop her own chanting, pick up a book of Quranic passages and read silently to herself. The *tesbih* chanting is more likely to finish when each of the *bulas* has finished her reading than when any particular number of *shahada* has been repeated.

The *tesbih* chanting is brought to a close when one of the *bulas* recites a short Quranic passage. This is followed by the women passing the *tesbih*, but this time in great handfuls rather than bead by bead. The action is accompanied by the chanting, three or four times, of a hymn or *ilahiya* (such *ilahiya* are also characteristic of the *zikr* meetings of dervishes and others). This sequence of a *bula* reciting from the Quran followed by joint passing of the *tesbih* is repeated three times.

The *tesbih* are now gathered up and there is a noticeable relaxation of the women's concentration. At this or some later point (except in the case of the *žalosni* *tevhid*) one or more of the *bulas* may speak in Serbo-Croatian about any impending Islamic festival and the prayers and rituals appropriate to it. *Bulas* may also use this opportunity to promote publications or events organised by the *Islamska Zajednica*, the official Muslim establishment..

The *bulas* now recite short Quranic chapters, any women who know them joining in. This is followed by joint recitation of some of the more well-known chapters, including the *fatiha*. The *bulas* then call on individual women

to recite a chapter alone. After this comes the *bulas* enjoinder to, for example, say three *fatihah* for the deceased's parents, seven *sura ihlas* for the deceased, three of some other well-known Quranic chapter for all the recently dead etc. The final section of the *tevhid* is the "Amins". The *bulas* pray for forgiveness of sins, the women responding "Amin". This is considered an important part of the ritual and the women gather their strength and readjust their headscarves for it. (One *bula* I knew complained of a *tevhid* she had been at where one of the hostesses relatives, a non-believer, did not join in the Amins. Whilst finding it strange that the woman should attend at all, the *bula* was not upset by her refusal to join in most of the prayers, she was, however, scandalised at her refusal to say the Amins.)

Whilst the Amins are being said the young women in charge of coffee-making distribute *kifla*, a type of bread loaf which, although eaten at other times is especially associated with the *tevhid*. Each of the women present receives the gift of a *kifla* which is said to be given by the *tevhid* holder in return for the woman's prayers.

The formal ritual is now over and the women take off their scarves and relax. If it is a *žalosni* *tevhid* most will say a few words to the hostess and leave fairly promptly. At later *tevhids* coffee is handed out again and the women settle down to cigarettes and conversation. As the *bulas* leave the hostess hands each an envelope containing money. The money is said to be given not for the *bula's* Quranic recitation, which must be given free of charge, but for her time. However, the sums involved are well above the average rate of pay for two hours of labour.

Following Bloch and Parry's surmise we would expect the *tevhid* to be a ritual stressing the sorrow and pollution of death. Pollution, however, is a

concept which seems to have little place in the Muslims' view of death. It is true that the corpse must be washed for burial but this is taken as a routine ablution similar to that of the taking of *abdest*, ritual purity before prayer. The corpse is not a ritually contaminating object and those who wash it need not perform any ablutions or safeguarding prayers and rituals before or after they do so. The body is buried quickly and the grave largely ignored.

Sorrow does hold some place in the customs surrounding death. The distress of the bereaved is socially recognised and women of the deceased's household are, for this reason, not expected to prepare meals for their family for the few days following a death. Instead, food will be prepared and brought by neighbours. Bereaved women should leave off their jewelry and wear a headscarf for a week after the death in token of their mourning. To do so for longer is seen as unnecessary, ostentatious and a level of lamentation unacceptable to God by whose will the death has occurred.

Private grief is recognised and accepted but open and emotional displays of it are not. During the fortnight following a death, relatives and female friends and neighbours visit the home of the bereaved woman *na žalost*, in sorrow. They bring small gifts of coffee and sugar which the bereaved woman will serve to those who attend the *tevhids*. The expression *na žalost* belies the tone and purpose of these visits. The bereaved woman is expected to discuss the circumstances of the death but should she cry her visitors will encourage her to stop. They make no expressions of regret, instead offering remarks such as: "S/he was dear to you but must have been dearer to God". If the deceased had suffered a painful illness visitors may comment that it is better for them to be out of their misery. When an old person dies they may tell their hostess: "At least your son/daughter/any young relative is

alive". In the early days of fieldwork I made the mistake of offering the bereaved English-style expressions of sorrow. My remarks were met with somewhat blank faces until I was informed by a friend that mine was not the correct approach. The emphasis of the visits is thus on suppressing rather than expressing sorrow.

Islam forbids lamentation and weeping for the dead (6) and at the tevhid, as at the dženaza, displays of sorrow are strongly discouraged. Of course some women do cry at tevhids. I saw one middle aged woman weep at the seven day tevhid of her husband; she was politely ignored by most of the participants and discreetly comforted by one close friend and a bula, who advised her that she'd do better to pray than to weep. At one forty day tevhid a woman wept for her father but was reprimanded for this by her own daughters who eventually made her leave the room.

In their death rituals then, women do not emphasise the sorrowful nature of death, they attempt to ignore and overcome it and to concentrate on prayer for the benefit of the dead soul. This they are proud of and this, very importantly, they contrast with the rampant emotionalism displayed on death (so they assert) by women of other identity groups. Serbian women lament their dead at the graveside with wailing dirges (*Kukati*; to wail/lament loudly). Halpern (1967 p.228) records one such dirge as heard in a Serbian village:

*Kuku mene što ostavi tvoju djecu
Ko će nji gledati kad njima majka nema?...*

(Woe is me that you have left your children
Who will look after them when they have no mother?...)

(6) See, for example, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1351) *Zad al-Ma'ad* vol.1.

Sarajevan Muslims are aware of this Serbian custom (many Muslims of rural background have heard funereal wailing emanating from the graveyards of neighbouring Serbian villages) and find them a subject of mirth. Children are sometimes encouraged to amuse the adults by screwing up their faces and moaning in imitation: "Kuku mene...oči moji...Kuku mene" (Woe is me...Oh my eyes...Woe is me). As has been noted in chapter one, Muslims know little of the doctrines and beliefs of their Christian neighbours but do know details of certain of their rituals, for example, that coloured eggs form part of the Easter celebrations. Details of the Serbian funeral with its women's dirges are particularly well known and came up often in conversations. They were almost invariably contrasted with the decorum of the tevhid. Conversely, abstract discussions of the tevhid ritual usually included a favourable comparison with the ludicrous and unseemly funereal wailing of Serbs. Whether the initial topic was the tevhid or the Serbian funeral, a comparison, favourable to the former, was almost inevitably drawn.

The number of Catholics in Bosnia is about half that of Serbs and they form a but a small percentage of the population of the Sandžak from whence originate many Sarajevan Muslims. Most of the Muslims whom I met therefore knew less of Catholic funerary rites, and indeed of Catholics in general. Nevertheless they tended to assume that Catholic funerary rites included the same type of emotional lament as the Serbian funeral. Thus they too could be classed in the category of laughable non-Muslim rituals.

The Albanians (who are also of the Islamic faith) fell victim to the same criticism, although phrased in a less humorous and more condemnatory style. Albanian women are said by Muslim women to mourn loudly and uncontrollably, making no efforts to pray for the dead. This, I was told, was "unislamic", a sin and of no use to the soul of the departed. When I

brought up the fact that certain other Muslim women, Bangladeshis, for example, also wailed for the dead I was told that these women were then in error.

The Muslims are thus aware not only that the *tevhid* is not performed by their Serbian and Catholic neighbours, but also that it is not performed as a standard ritual by Muslims the world over. A few are in addition aware that it is in fact a ritual unique to the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina. What is important is that the *tevhid* ritual is always spoken of in relation to the death rites of other groups, and distinguished from them. The *tevhid* is then seen as distinguishing the Bosnian Muslims from other local groups.

In contrast, the significance of the *dženaza* is that it links the Bosnian Muslims with the wider Islamic world. In the sense that it is a Muslim rather than a Serbian or Catholic rite, it does of course, in the Bosnian context, say something about Bosnian Muslim identity vis-a-vis the other groups. (In the same way, the fact that the *tevhid* involves prayers to Allah and praise of the Prophet makes it a rite which is consciously felt to belong to and be in accordance with the Islamic faith.) However, its main import lies not in the fact that it is not performed by Serbs and Catholics, but in the fact that it is a *Shari'a* prescribed ritual performed by Muslims throughout the world. Thus discussions of the *dženaza* do not include comparisons with the funeral services of Serbs, Catholics and others, what is said about the ritual is that it should be performed by all Muslims in accordance with the scriptures.

That it is the women's ritual which expresses group identity as distinction at home, and the men's ritual which identifies Bosnian Muslims with the outside Muslim world, is comprehensible in the light of social relations in Sarajevo. As has been said in chapter two, women exist in and

hold together the purely Muslim neighbourhood group whilst the mixed world of the town is principally the sphere of men. In social and economic life it is thus women who form the basis of the most cohesive and the most highly interacting social group above the level of the nuclear family - the neighbourhood. (The kin group, as has been seen, is of relatively little importance in terms of social and economic interaction.) It is men through whom families and neighbourhoods are linked to the wider life of Sarajevo. The two sorts of identity assertion made by the male and the female death ritual then accord with gender roles in the wider field of social and economic life in Sarajevo.

If the strong distinction between the two aspects of identity as they are currently conceived in Muslim Sarajevo is a relatively new phenomenon, what significance did the *tevhid* have in earlier times? Documentary evidence suggests that it was strongly associated with the dervish orders. The first written reference to the ritual is found in a document dated 1612 which lays down the obligations of the sheikh and dervishes of the Naqshbandi hanikah of Mostar. The document states that the sheikh and dervishes must perform *tevhid*, to prolong the life of the hanikah's founder and to benefit his soul after death, every day following morning prayer. Using a *tesbih* each of the participants must say 1,000 *shahada*, 100 *salavat*, three *sura ihlas* and one *fatiha* (Čehajić 1986).

In his chronicle for the year 1779/80 Bašeskija notes that he and some friends got together every Thursday evening to perform *tevhid* "like in the *tekija*". In 1782/83 he notes the death of the son of the sheikh of the Sarajevo Kadiri *tekija*. As the body was carried away from the *dženaza* to be buried:

"the Mevlevi sheikh Osman-Dede loudly recited tevhid...Mula Omer, imam of the Kebkebirove mosque, attacked sheikh Osman and screamed 'Why are you shouting like that? Bringing in innovations!' However, in an instant, sheikh Osman grabbed him by his huge beard and tugged him to the ground...The people began to recite *salavat* to the Prophet and to rebuke the *Kadićevci*." (The *Kadićevci* were a puritanical sect strongly opposed to the dervishes. See chapter five.)

Bašeskija does make one mention in the chronicle he kept for over fifty years of the fact that women performed tevhid. In 1780/81 he notes the death of:

"old dervish Mujo who never married. Very pious and poor, he was feminine in character. He liked to associate with old people and especially with women with whom he'd recite tevhid."

However, the tevhid seems, in Ottoman times, to have been primarily associated with the dervish orders. Today it has lost this association. Women who perform tevhid are unaware of its origins and many do not even know what the term "dervish" means, even those who live within a few minutes walk of the Sarajevo Kadiri tekija.

It is true that a *muški tevhid*, male tevhid, is sometimes performed for and by dervishes. This occurs not on five separate occasions after a death but only on the anniversaries of a death and only for particularly distinguished and well known dervishes. The *muški tevhid* may be performed in a mosque, tekija or private home. It may be attended by both men and women but the two will sit in separate rooms of the house or areas of the mosque or tekija. The basis of the ritual is the *hatma*, the complete recitation of the Quran. Each of the men present quietly recites to himself a certain number of pages of the Quran, the net result of their joint efforts being a *hatma*. The women may recite Quranic chapters to themselves, sit silently or even gossip quietly. The *muški tevhid* does not include the repetition of the *shahada*, *la illahe illa la* which is characteristic both of zikr, the central rite of the dervish orders, and of the women's tevhid. Furthermore, it is

seen very much as an optional ritual which need not be performed. This is not true of the *tevhid*. The word *tevhid* itself is commonly taken as referring to the women's ritual, and not to the men's.

The decline of the association of dervishes with the *tevhid* is related to the general decline of the orders. The fact that the *tevhid* has gained a new significance is related to the emergence of new conceptions of Bosnian Muslim identity.

At this point some mention should be made of the *Islamska Zajednica's* influence on the *tevhid* ritual. In 1952 the Muslim establishment officially pronounced the *tevhid* an acceptable customary death ritual. As has been seen in chapter four, it has also taken *bulas* into its own employee structure; those who require a *bula* to conduct a *tevhid* now contact her through the *Zajednica* rather than through personal connections. Both actions may be seen as aspects of the *Zajednica's* attempt to control an ever greater sphere of Muslim religious activity. In this case the strategy has been to bring both the ritual and its conductors, the *bulas*, under its wing, whereas in the case of the dervish orders the initial tactic was to crush them completely.

At the *tevhid* *bulas* may choose to speak in Serbo-Croatian on the subject of impending Islamic festivals and *Islamska Zajednica* organised events, or to sell copies of newspapers and magazines published by the *Zajednica*. In this way the establishment spreads its message into spheres which were previously immune to it. However, certain of the *Zajednica's* attitudes to the *tevhid* are resisted by women. I once attended a *tevhid* to which the *Zajednica* office had sent not only two *bulas* but also a male imam who gave a sermon. Although neither the *tevhid* hostess nor the participants complained openly, all grumbled about this innovation behind the man's back and derided the *Zajednica's* action.

Both the *tevhid* and the *dženaza* are viewed, by women and men, as being rituals of religious significance and value. It is true, however, that whilst the *dženaza* is seen as a ritual which must be performed for all Muslims, the *tevhid* is not. Only the most committed atheist Communist of Muslim origin will choose a secular funeral ceremony instead of the *dženaza*. On the other hand, economic and other factors may dissuade a household from hosting *tevhids* for their dead. If the house is not large enough to hold the potential participants, or the family can not afford to pay the *bulas*, they may not perform the *tevhid*. Instead they pay a small sum to the *Islamska Zajednica* in order that a *hatma* be performed for the deceased's soul in the local mosque during *Ramazan*. This, however, is viewed as a vastly inferior option and only those in the most straightened of circumstances will resort to it. Many *tevhid* holders complained about having to host the ritual, saying that women came only to pry into the running of the household, the number of coffee bowls, the quality of the furniture and so on, rather than out of respect for the dead and to pray sincerely for the soul. Sometimes they remarked that they would rather have paid for a *hatma* to be made in the mosque. That most do not in fact choose this alternative is due to the need for households to present a good image to the world, an image of orderliness and material well being. In this regard it is interesting to note that Muslim Gypsies who have settled in Sarajevo and hope to improve their status (Gypsies are typically viewed in Bosnia as lazy and thieving) have begun to perform the *tevhid* ritual (Softić 1984).

Although not a necessary one then, the *tevhid* is universally regarded as a rite of religious importance. Men do not see it as peripheral or religiously irrelevant. In this respect it differs from many of the rituals performed by women in other parts of the Muslim world.

Historically, the Muslim society most closely related to the Bosnian Muslims is, by reason of four hundred years of Ottoman rule, that of the Turks. It is therefore instructive to look at the death rituals performed by Turkish women in an attempt to understand what it is about Bosnia that allows women's rituals to be so highly regarded by men. In the Turkish town of Egridir, women perform *mevluds* for the dead (Tapper, N 1983, and Tapper, N & Tapper, R 1987). The ritual is based on the recitation of a long, Turkish language *mevlud* poem about the birth and life of the Prophet. The men of Egridir perform *mevluds* on three types of occasion; for death, for marriages and circumcisions, and for the five annual *kandil* festivals. These male *mevluds*:

"vary little in style. They are short and formal, allow little display of emotion, and offer little scope for the cantors or sponsors to manage or vary the impact of any particular service." (Tapper N & Tapper R op. cit)

Women's *mevluds* are almost always performed in the context of death and occur on the the funeral day and any or all of the following occasions: the seventh, the fortieth and the 52nd day after death and on the anniversary of death. They are held in private homes and attended only by women. They are longer, more emotional and more complex in structure than the *mevluds* of men. Further, the women who lead the ritual, known as *hoças*, may improvise and innovate in order to vary the content of particular different *mevlud* rituals. The section of the poem which deals with the confinement and delivery of the Prophet's mother is performatively the most elaborate of the women's ritual. Nancy Tapper (op. cit) has argued that the women's *mevlud* is an intense religious experience which focuses on birth and motherhood and emphasises the equality of all women as mothers. In this it is opposed to the secular "reception days" hosted by women of high social standing and in which women come together, not as equals, but as adjuncts of their husbands

or fathers and thus as competitors for social status.

In many respects the Bosnian women's *tevhid* and the Egridirian women's *mevlud* are similar. Both are performed for the dead and both are attended only by women and conducted by female specialists. Both are longer and more complex in structure and involve a higher level of improvisation than the male rituals with which they are associated (Bosnian *dženaza* and Egridirian male *mevlud*). In an important respect, however, they differ. Bosnian Muslim men have a high regard for the religious value of the *tevhid*. Egridirian men, on the other hand, whilst admitting that the women's *mevlud* is broadly "spiritual" (*manevî*) as opposed to "worldly" (*dunyevî*), deny that it has any religious significance and criticise its over-emotionalism.

How can we account for this specific difference and, looking beyond Bosnia and Turkey, what conditions seem to be associated with those Muslim contexts in which men overtly recognise women's rituals and religious pursuits and leaders as worthwhile? Initially, a clue seems to lie in the fact that the Egridirian women's ritual emphasises motherhood and the equality of all women rather than more general values. It seems a possible hypothesis that men will undervalue those rituals which are not only exclusive to women but appear to concentrate on issues specific to women. This is certainly not the case of the Bosnian women's *tevhid* which consists of prayer for the soul of the dead and not of any specifically feminine traits.

Yet such a correlation will not provide a broad explanatory framework. Turning back to Dwyer's work on the Muslims of the Taroudannt region of southern Morocco (see p.195 above) we see that this is so. In the Taroudannt a large percentage of both men and women are involved in saint cults and sufism. Dwyer suggests a figure of 92%. Whilst women may have loyalties to

saints who are specifically believed to offer help and protection in matters of fertility and childcare (ie. saints whose powers are deemed to be of particular value in women's lives), they are at the same time members of sufi orders which are also adhered to by men. In some cases these orders have separate male and female sections, each with its own hierarchy of religious officials. For example, the Jilaliy, ben Nasriy and Derqawiy orders all have female sections which are formally organised and have their own female leaders. Members of these female sections meet to worship at their own shrines. The female sections initiate their own new members. However, members of the male and female sections of, for example the Jilaliy order, are still conceived as belonging to the same order and bearing loyalty to the same saint-founder of the order. Beyond the fact that the female section is composed of and lead by women, there is nothing specifically female about it. Nevertheless: "From a male perspective, these groups are peripheral" and are "ignored and scorned by men" (op. cit p.594). It does not thus seem to be the case that female religious groups or rituals will be respected by men when their aims do not appear to be specifically related to female concerns.

Perhaps an obvious place to look for explanations of the difference between male evaluation of the Sarajevan tevhid and of the Egridirian mevlud, is the general field of gender relations in the respective towns. Sarajevan Muslim women are not closeted in the private sphere of the home and inhibited from meeting any but their closest kin and affines, they are the basis of the social world of the neighbourhood. They are not felt to be dangerous in that they are the route through which shame may enter a family, for example, through premarital loss of virginity. In contrast, Turkish society segregates the sexes more rigidly, ideas of honour and shame prevail

and women are seen as having a propensity for bringing the latter upon their families.

However, the hypothesis that the general field of gender relations conditions the view that men take of female religious activities is confounded by the case of the Mزاب of Algeria. The Mزاب are a group of Ibadī Muslims surrounded by Sunni populations (see Farrag 1969). In Mزابite society men and women are strictly segregated. Women veil in public to the extent that only one eye is visible and even this one eye may be turned to the wall when a man passes by. During the Ramazan fast a post-pubescent woman must not be seen (even when veiled) by any non-related male or the fast will be considered as broken. The premarital loss of a woman's virginity is a shame which can only be expunged by her death at the hand of her father or brother. Men see this shame as the result of the woman's unrestrained sexual desires whereas women take it as caused by a combination of the woman's foolishness and the man's evil passions. Both sexes, however, agree that it is through women that shame is brought upon a family.

One might then expect that this would be a society in which female religious activities and leaders would be ignored or denigrated by men. This is not, however, the case. Traditionally, each of the seven Mزابite towns in the region had its own *Ozzaba*, a council of elected men who oversaw the religious and moral life of men, punished offenders and presided over rituals at which the offenders came to repent publicly. A women's council, the *Azzabat*, performed the same functions with regard to women. In post-independence Algeria the *Ozzaba* began to lose its authority over men who flouted its rulings to the extent that some would drink within the walls of the town - previously a grievous offence. The *Azzabat* did not find its authority slipping in this way (at least not amongst all but the wealthiest

of women). It was not simply that women continued to recognise the authority of the *Azzabat* as legitimate; men also continued to do so, even when its rulings ran counter to their own personal interests. Thus when the *Azzabat* forbade women to listen to the radio (which caused problems for men whose wives would run out of the house if the radio were switched on) the men did not instruct their wives to ignore this ruling but went to their own council, the *Ozzaba*, and requested it to reason with the *Azzabat*, the women's council. Negotiations between the two councils began but the *Azzabat* was adamant and women continued to refuse to remain within hearing of a radio. Eventually the *Azzabat* did change its ruling when it decided that it might result in Mzbite men marrying non-Mzbite women who were not averse to the radio. The motivation was thus to prevent the out-marriage of Mzbite men. Many of the *Azzabat's* other rulings had a similar intent, for example, the ruling that a woman could not leave the Mzab region was intended to prevent them from accompanying their husbands when they went to do wage labour in the north of Algeria. It was felt that this would eventually lead to the permanent settlement of whole Mzbite families outside the Mzab region and the acculturation of Mzbite children into Algerian society. The women's *Azzabat* thus sought to preserve the distinct collective identity of the Mzab. This point is an important one.

The prevalence of notions of honour and shame or of strong sexual segregation does not then seem to govern the light in which men view the rituals and religious leaders of women. I suggest that the occurrence of a positive male evaluation of women's religious activity is associated with Muslim societies which are minorities and define their identity (at least partially) in terms of distinction from other neighbouring groups. The Bosnian Muslims obviously fit this description; so too do the Mzab. As has

been said, the Mzab are Ibadī Muslims who are immediately neighboured by Sunni populations and who exist within the Algerian state. They characterise their Sunni neighbours as lazy and shiftless and are concerned to protect themselves as a group from acculturation into wider Algerian society. In this context, the women's *Azzabat* is respected by men as a religious body because it emphasises and seeks to maintain boundaries between the Mzab and their non-Mzab neighbours and fellow countrymen. In contrast, the question of group identity and inter-group boundaries is of little importance in the Taroudannt region of Morocco, and the Turkish Muslims of Egridir are staunch Turkish nationalists and supporters of the republican state and do not define their identity in terms of distinction from neighbouring groups ⁽⁷⁾. (See chapter four and Tapper R & Tapper N 1987)

(7) The Egridirian population do distinguish themselves from the local and supposedly transient population of migrant Kurdish labourers whom they characterise as lazy and troublemaking. However, the Turks clearly have the upper hand economically, politically and numerically, in Egridir as throughout Turkey, and cannot be said to *define their identity* in terms of distinction from the Kurds.

CONCLUSIONS AND SOME COMPARISONS

Throughout the world stateless minorities are pressing for various forms of political recognition and in many parts of it Islam is taking on new political roles. In the Bosnian Muslim case both themes are accentuated for the historical and political context of Yugoslavia makes the necessity of asserting identity and the centrality of religion to it, inevitable. Thus whilst Bosnia's Muslims have spawned neither a fierce and outspoken nationalism nor an Islamic fundamentalist movement (although increasing instability in Yugoslavia makes the former a possibility and the latter, at least in a modified form, not wholly implausible), their example nevertheless offers insight into the roots of these phenomena. It is these roots, the popular understanding and use of ideas of national identity and of Islam, that I hope to have illuminated.

It should by now be clear that Islam is crucial to the Bosnian Muslim minority's self-perception of collective identity, just as Catholicism is central to that of the Croats and Orthodoxy to that of the Serbs. *Nema Srpstva bez tri prsta* - there's no Serbian'ness without the three fingers (a reference to the Orthodox manner of crossing oneself), and there's no Croat without Catholicism or Muslim without Islam. But a question remains. Islam may be of importance to the Muslims identity, but is there anything we could call "Islamic" about the social, political and religious trends discernible in Muslim Sarajevo? Is there anything about these processes here which allows us to see them as sharing meaningful features with those of other Muslim societies, or should we see this case merely as another example of ethnic assertion (like that of the Sikhs, Bretons, and Palestinians), albeit opportunistically pursued under the banner of Islam? I suggest that there is something peculiarly Islamic here, that the organisational

forms and the philosophies which have developed in Muslim Bosnia share something fundamental with those of the Muslim world in general, both past and present.

The history of Islam is the history of societies in which a variety of religious styles have always co-existed and sometimes competed. Voll (1982) outlines four such basic orientations:

1. The adaptationist which implies pragmatic adjustment to new circumstances. The early Empires (Umayyad, Abbasid), the Sultanates and the religious syncretism of India's Akbar provide examples.
2. The conservative. Typically espoused by the *ulema*, conservatism checks the rise of serious deviations and compromises springing from adaptationist styles of leadership. Conservative forces may accept change once it is firmly established and in this differ from...
3. The "fundamentalist" orientation, intent on drawing the community back to the original revelation, to the Quran, the hadiths and Sunna (Sunnis) and the traditions of Ali and the Imams (Shi'ites). The Kharijites, the eighteenth century Wahhabis and the contemporary Iranians provide examples. (It should be pointed out that whilst twentieth century fundamentalism shares the the ideals of its forebears its potential for social effectiveness is much greater. Whilst the dissenting Kharijites merely separated themselves from the Sunnis, Iranian fundamentalists may draw on police forces, military and civilian technology and the modern state structure to encourage or impose fundamentalism.)
4. The individualist which relies on charismatic leadership and mediation between God and man. The Shi'ites early split from the Sunnis was the result of the former's insistence that Ali was divinely and specifically ordained as leader of the Islamic community. The popular belief in *mahdīs*

(for example, in Sudan) and the sufi orders tradition of spiritual guidance between sheikh and follower also embody this style.

In Bosnia these orientations, particularly the first, third and fourth, are evident. The Islamska Zajednica is clearly adaptationist in outlook whilst the new mysticism (like the Parallel Islam of the Soviet Union) combines both individualist and fundamentalist traits. Bosnia's Muslims thus appear to draw on the common pool of forms available to and characteristic of Muslims throughout history.

But is this observation trivial? It may be objected that adaptationism, individualism and fundamentalism are such obvious and basic reactions that they are common not only to Islam but to all world religions. In the case of adaptationism this certainly seems true; it is hard to imagine a religion without adaptationist trends and we have seen that Bosnia's Christian establishments are as amenable to allying socialism with religious ideology as is their Islamic counterpart. The picture is less clear for individualism and fundamentalism. The Roman Catholic Church is frequently held up as an example of the mediationist variety of Christianity. In Martin Luther's Protestantism and in some contemporary Protestant sects - Plymouth Brethren, Amish, "Born Again" - we may see fundamentalism. Yet the fact that the two trends are found on opposite sides of the Catholic/Protestant divide is revealing in that it suggests their inability to co-exist within a single Christian Church. In Islam the presence of diverse orientations within a single society has sometimes led to schism, as for example in the cases of Kharijite and Shi'ite. However, the doctrinal distance between Shi'ite, Kharijite and Sunni is far less than that between the Catholic and the Protestant Churches, a fact which at least suggests that both individualism and fundamentalism are somehow contained within a basic menu of Islamic action shared by all Muslims. Furthermore, in

those more common cases where no schism has occurred, Muslim societies have simultaneously, or in frequent turnover, hosted adaptationist, individualist and fundamentalist trends. Thus an adaptationist society may spawn a *mahdi* movement followed by a reformist/fundamentalist tendency followed by another *mahdi* movement, and all at the same time as the local sufi orders carry on promoting their mediationist version of Islam. Christianity has experienced occasional but severe and lasting schisms. The distinctiveness of Islam lies in the co-existence and turnover of varying religious styles.

In saying this I do not wish to deny or diminish the fact that Bosnia's Muslims are a minority group comparable to many others, and that like those others they attempt to preserve and assert collective identity in order to gain political advantage. It would be wrong to see them only in an Islamic framework or to imagine them uniquely propelled by some internal Islamic motor. The form of their action is indeed Islamic but its motivation is not wholly so.

Much of socialist Europe and the Soviet Union is now experiencing nationalistic tensions and Yugoslavia is no exception. But in Yugoslavia the problem is not so much one of individual nationalisms but of a whole *system* of nationalisms. By this I mean that nationalistic action on the part of any one nationality is bound to trigger the incipient nationalism of other nationalities, and the net effect is to threaten the very fabric of the federated state. That this is so is due to the historical fears of each group with regard to the others, and the highly decentralised nature of political power.

To take one example we may consider the problems that followed the granting of *narod* status to the Muslims in 1971. The Macedonians feared that those members of the Islamic faith living within Macedonia, individuals who had previously styled themselves "Macedonians", would now want to be "Muslims". The

concern was thus that a Muslim *narod* would start eating away at the Macedonian *narod*. Macedonia thus insisted that religion and nationality were totally distinct and that the Muslims of Macedonia were inalienably Macedonian. The Bosnian reaction to this was to feel that Macedonia was undervaluing the development of Muslim national consciousness and treating the Muslims merely as a religious group. At this point Albanian dominated Kosovo waded into the debate insisting that membership of any nationality was a matter of personal choice and conviction; if individuals living within Macedonia considered themselves members of the Muslim *narod* then they were such. The dispute spread to Croatia where an eminent economics professor published an article stating that Muslim national consciousness was underdeveloped and implying that the Muslims were really just Croats of the Islamic faith. The president of the Central Committee of the Bosnian Communist Party replied immediately with accusations that the Croatian attitude undermined the principle of equal status for all nationalities. Finally, Serbia supported the Bosnians and Kosovans, declaring that all Yugoslavs were free to account themselves members of whatever nationality they pleased (see Ramet op cit. p.150-152). Eventually this particular issue was settled without too much damage to the credibility of the state but the triggering effect is clearly a potential threat. In 1988 its possible consequences are more disturbing. The conflicting nationalisms of Albanians and Serbs have led to a) Serbian demands for increased power over Kosovo and Vojvodina, b) the Slovenes and Croatians, who have their own grievances against the Serbs, opposing them, and c) the Montenegrins supporting the Serbs. Each of the groups has its own demands and desires, the expression of which may be triggered off by the actions of others. Yugoslavia is a system of interactive centrifugal nationalisms which tear and strain away from this state.

In the Soviet Union this is less the case. The Estonians current requests

for greater autonomy may *inspire* other nationalities to make similar demands but do not seem to trigger incipient nationalisms as in Yugoslavia. In this highly centralised political Empire a single nationalism may be of concern to the state but does not necessarily let loose the fears and demands of other nationalities. Ofcourse there are limited cases of triggering between pairs of neighbouring nationalities - the Armenians and Azerbaijanis and, certain evidence suggests, the Tajiks and Uzbeks. Yet in these conflicts we have not seen the Lithuanians joining the fray or the Ukrainians taking sides and making their own demands. This is due to the centralisation of political power which has two effects. Firstly, centralisation facilitates the repression of nationalism - too many rampant nationalisms here would almost certainly lead to a general crackdown on them all, whereas in Yugoslavia the outcome is less predictable (an army coup? the disintegration of the state? a stand-off between various allied nationalisms and the consequent continuance of the shaky federated system?). Secondly, centralisation means that Lithuanians have less to fear from Armenian nationalism than do Slovenes from Serbian nationalism. Since most power lies in the hands of central government, the success or failure of Armenian demands for Nagorny Karabakh will have little direct effect on Lithuanians, it will not alter the balance of power. In Yugoslavia this is not the case and the incipient nationalism of the Bosnian Muslims must therefore be considered not simply in terms of minority/state relations but as part of a system of interactive nationalisms.

At the beginning of this work I addressed myself to three specific questions concerning the Muslims of Sarajevo (p.4). In concluding I want to summarise some of the answers that have emerged and, very briefly, to note some revealing parallels and divergences within comparable societies.

How does the political context of Yugoslavia affect religious life?

Yugoslavia's system of socialist self-management regulates the fields of education, employment and government but is also felt to be out on the very streets. For this reason, although freedom of religious expression is granted, ordinary Muslims feel the necessity of keeping it apart from the public and officially visible world. Thus the Muslim neighbourhoods, which were already of high social importance even in the pre-socialist period, come to be seen as the home base of Islam, domains in which its influence is deemed wholly legitimate and its principles are overtly relied upon. Within the neighbourhood Muslims can feel confident that Islamic values are shared whilst in the town this is not the case and, except in the context of specific services held in mosques, religious affiliation is played down.

The psychological atmosphere created by socialist self-management therefore affects Islamic religious life. At the same time the state's policy with regard to the religious communities has far reaching consequences. These communities all have officially authorised leaderships which must fight a battle on two fronts. On the first front they must endeavour not to antagonise the state and this endeavour entails tactical efforts to ally religious and Yugoslav socialist ideology. In the case of the Muslims, such efforts make it impossible for the community, and irrelevant for the anthropologist, to see in Muslim Sarajevo a sharp divide between the Orthodox and the Popular. Since the religious establishment cannot hope to have any claims to privileged knowledge of Orthodoxy widely recognised by the public, the source of Orthodoxy cannot be located, or at least cannot be agreed upon.

The Orthodox/Popular polarity is not, however, redundant in all Muslim minorities and that it is so in Bosnia is due not to minority status itself but to the Muslims' social structure and political situation. A comparative case may

clarify this point. Malawi's Yao Muslims form a minority to the Christian majority. Here there is a sharp distinction between urban, educated Muslim society and the village life of rural Muslims. Conflict has arisen between Arab financed urban Islamic intelligentsia who claim Orthodoxy, and villagers who, whilst admitting the superior learning of their accusers, still want to retain the traditional customs which they realise are generally deemed to be un-Orthodox (see Thorold, forthcoming). In this case there is then a recognised social divide (urban/rural) corresponding to a recognised religious divide. In Sarajevo this is not the case and the Orthodox/Popular classification loses its descriptive and analytical value.

The Zajednica's Islamic/socialist line leads to the possibility of religious dissent which in turn leads to the Muslim establishment's second battle front; the attempt to preserve or gain control of the population's religious practice and to combat potential rivals for its allegiance. This is as characteristic of Christian as of Islamic Yugoslavia; the Catholic Diocesans (see p.170) made every effort to discredit the Franciscan priests whose championship of the Marian devotion of Medjugorje has afforded them influence over the Catholic population of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The Yugoslav secular authorities do not in general outlaw alternative religious tendencies and associations, preferring to let the official religious establishments deal with them (secular authorities have not, for example, outlawed ZIDRA, the dervish organisation). However, they will not countenance the existence of any religious movement seen as potentially politically disruptive. Thus the champions of the Virgin of Medjugorje were initially deemed to be nothing but Croatian nationalists using religion for political ends and some were arrested. This fact places a constraint on the scope of Islamic revival in Sarajevo. In many parts of the Muslim world fundamentalist movements

aggressively seek changes in the social order (the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, for example). In Bosnia such a movement is not currently a realistic possibility. Religious dissent such as that of the new mystics does not then take an open or highly organised form and dissenters do not call for changes in the law. Rather they form a secretive and loose tendency and direct their efforts towards transforming personal and familial values.

Yugoslavia's political context therefore affects Islamic religious life in a number of ways. It is important to underline that this is not simply the result of the atheistic element of its ruling ideology. The state seeks to regulate religious expression not only because it disbelieves and disapproves religion as such, but also because it fears the use which nationalists may make of it (in Croatia in the late '70s and early '80s, for example, the Catholic Church came to be seen as the guardian of Croatian tradition and became a figurehead of Croatian nationalists). If Bosnian Muslims cannot accept the Zajednica's rapprochement of Islam and Bosnian Muslim identity with Yugoslav socialism and Yugoslav identity, this is not only because the state's ideology is atheistic but also because it is multi-national. The fact that Yugoslavia is a federation, and one pervaded by incipient nationalisms and currently racked by active ones, is of as much consequence for religious behaviour as is the fact that its ideology is atheist. The ability of Turkish Muslims to ally Islam and Turkish republican nationalism (see chapter four), in spite of the state's fierce secularism and historical repression of religion, emphasises that the attitude of secular authorities towards religion is not the only factor conditioning the popular acceptance of rapprochements of religious and state ideologies.

On what sources may the Muslim minority draw in its construction of identity?

I have spoken of the Bosnian Muslims as possessing a double identity; an identity as a group distinct from that of the Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins etc. and an identity as members of the worldwide Islamic *Umma*. In a sense both were present in the Ottoman era but the nature of the first, and the relationship between the two, has altered in modern times. In Ottoman Bosnia Muslims saw themselves as distinct from their Christian neighbours; they belonged to a different millet. With the arrival of the Austro-Hungarians the political importance of the three way Orthodox/Catholic/ Muslim divide heightened. Muslims not only had taxes and civic duties distinct from those of non-Muslims, they also found themselves capable of exerting political influence through the electoral college system. During the inter-war period the status of ethnic/religious groups as political units grew, and in contemporary Yugoslavia the federated system creates a situation in which the possession and assertion of distinct national identity is vital to the political well-being of the community. Today's Muslims therefore see themselves as a group distinct (both religiously and nationally) from Serbs and Catholics and this distinction must be maintained and underlined.

As members of the Ottoman Empire Bosnia's Muslims were conceptually members of a vast Islamic community extending to Anatolia and beyond. Linguistically they did not always distinguish themselves from the Ottomans, using the term "Turci" self-referentially. The mental picture was this: within the Empire there are Muslims (us), Catholics, Orthodox, Jews and others. After the creation of a Yugoslav state the picture became: within Bosnia there are Muslims, Catholics, Serbs/Orthodox, Jews and others. Politically cut off from the Empire, the Muslims view of themselves as members of the *Umma* and as distinct from non-Muslim neighbours separated. The birth of the Socialist Federated

Republic furthered this separation for the state treated religion as irrelevant to (national) identity and the Muslims' association with worldwide Islam as irrelevant to their status within the Yugoslavia. Although official policy does not ofcourse determine popular perception, and Muslims did not come to see their membership of the *Umma* as irrelevant, in this political context they could not help but view their identity as non-Serb/Catholics and as members of the *Umma* as separate.

If Bosnian Muslims have a double identity, why not a triple? Why does membership of the Yugoslav community have so little influence on their self-perception? In fact in this Yugoslavia's Muslims differ little from their non-Muslim counterparts and this is comprehensible in view of Yugoslavia's history and current political situation. Initially the Communist Party had hoped that the Muslims, who were seen merely as a religious group, would take a lead in embracing a new Yugoslav identity. However, the diversity of languages, traditions and religions and the fact that the various Yugoslav peoples had so frequently made war on each other made the idea of a single Yugoslav nation an unrealistic one, a fact which the Party itself eventually recognised. Yet the idea of Yugoslav socialist patriotism which was put in its place did nothing to discourage the narrower patriotisms of the various nationalities and in a sense even encouraged them since Yugoslav socialist patriotism was founded on the notion of nationalities living together in brotherhood and unity. National identities were thus implicitly put before Yugoslav identity and most citizens, including Muslims, follow up the implication wholeheartedly. The country's disastrous economic situation and the gross regional inequalities in living standards serve but to reinforce adherence to narrow national identity at the expense of Yugoslav identity.

The double identity of the Bosnian Muslims has been shaped by historical and political circumstances. Under different circumstances similar minorities may evolve other varieties of multiple identity. For example, in Soviet Central Asia the post-revolutionary government attempted to create a number of new nationalities, each with its own national literature and heroes, out of the clay of tribal societies. Although little is known of identity perception in this region we may speculate that Muslims see themselves in any or all of the following ways: members of the nationalities to which they legally belong, members of traditional tribal groups, members of the worldwide *Umma* (this perhaps particularly since the nearby Iranian revolution and Afghan war), and members of the Soviet federation.

For a clear case of the triple identity which Bosnian Muslims lack, we may turn to the example of America's indigenous "Black Muslims". There are a number of Afro-American Muslim communities in the USA but the largest is the American Muslim Mission which stresses its identity on three levels:

- a) as a group culturally and spiritually distinct from decadent non-Muslim America (with the emphasis on white America).
- b) as a group which forms a true part of the worldwide Islamic *Umma*. (The AMM has made great efforts to bring itself doctrinally in line with the Muslim world and to forge contacts with it.)
- c) as a community which, whilst morally superior to the majority of the state's inhabitants, is loyal to and integrated within the USA. (This loyalty is such that in 1984 the organisation's annual conference was rounded off by the singing of "America, the beautiful".)

Triple identity then seems possible in the USA, but not in Yugoslavia. The reason for this discrepancy may lie in the respective benefits to be gained by Bosnian and American Muslims through wholehearted integration, as a group.

within the state. In America it is both possible and acceptable for ethnic/religious groups to wield disproportional economic or political power, for example, through block-voting or economic empire building. There may be complaints about the Jewish lobby or WASP economic domination but these are not actually seen as threats to the state. The AMM makes full use of these facts, for example, in the 1984 elections its leadership spoke out against voting for Jesse Jackson, the high-profile black candidate. The community has also made attempts to enhance its economic status, opening businesses and gaining catering contracts with the US Army. Whilst assimilation with white, non-Muslim America is rejected, integration as a group within the system is a goal for such integration may benefit the community. In this context the third string of a triple identity becomes palatable (1).

In Yugoslavia the situation differs. Because economic life is regulated by the federal state, the extent to which any nationality may wield economic power is limited. Thus Slovenia's economic strength affords Slovenians a standard of living above the average, but does not allow them to exert disproportional influence within the federation as a whole. In the political field, the attempts of individual nationalities to increase their influence always sets off alarm bells within other nationalities and within the federal government. In this context the Muslim minority cannot see integration as a group within Yugoslavia (and consequent triple identity) as a route to self-preferment, whilst the AMM can and do do precisely that.

(1) These observations are based partly on research which I undertook in 1984 in New York, Chicago and Washington. For a published analysis of the contemporary AMM see Lincoln 1983.

What is the relationship between religious organisation and the assertion of identity?

For all Bosnians the relationship between national and religious identity is fundamental. Given this fact it is unsurprising that the fields of religious action and of identity assertion overlap.

It has been seen that for Muslims the neighbourhood is the most important social unit above the level of the nuclear family. This unit is nationally pure in that all or the vast majority of its members are Muslims. At the same time it is the domain in which "Islamic" principles and values are overtly relied upon and referred to. Through this reliance and through the persistent use of Muslim/Islamic cultural behaviours - Arabic greetings, coffee fildžani etc. - the inhabitants gently but consistently create and reinforce their own identity.

Muslims have a double identity and this duality is of relatively recent date. As the conceptualisation of identity has changed, so too have traditional rituals such as the tevhid and dženaza been reconceived by Muslims and assigned new significances. Thus where the tevhid was once seen principally as a mystical and sufistic rite, it is now seen as one distinguishing Muslims from Serbs, Catholics, Albanians and others. Conversely, its counterpart, the dženaza, is popularly stressed as a ritual through which Sarajevan Muslims assert their membership of an Islamic world transcending the boundaries of Yugoslavia. I have further suggested that it is because the tevhid bears a burden of identity assertion that, although it is performed by women, men value and esteem it in a manner largely unparalleled within Muslim majority societies.

In Sarajevo rivalling religious orientations promote varying attitudes to Bosnian Muslim identity. The Zajednica stresses the Muslims' loyal membership of the Yugoslav community whilst the new mystics look constantly to the outside Islamic world, seeking to ally Bosnian Muslims with it. It is easy to identify

forms of religious rivalry within other Muslim minorities. In the Soviet Union, for example, the outlawed dervish orders form a "Parallel Islam" to that promoted by the official Muslim establishment (see Bennigsen & Wimbush 1985). However, the extent to which Soviet dervishes and legally recognised Islamic authorities promote different visions of Soviet Muslim identity is not known. Turning again to the American case, however, we may see the Bosnian style correspondence between alternative religious orientations and alternative conceptions of identity. The AMM's biggest and bitterest rival is the Nation of Islam, led by the headline hitting Louis Farrakhan. The two Muslim communities are in open conflict (it was in fact largely due to Jesse Jackson's ties with Farrakhan that the AMM leadership spoke out against him in 1984). The Nation places most of its eggs in one identity basket, that of distinction from white, non-Muslim America, and may properly be termed a black nationalist movement (for example, it sometimes claims that one or more of the united states should be turned over to the rule of the Afro-American population). The AMM, as has been seen, has a very different view of Afro-American Muslim identity. (For an account of this schism see Mamiya 1983.)

This work has considered one specific Muslim minority living within one specific state, yet some of the themes which have emerged are, I suggest, of relevance to Muslim minorities in general. Most notable among these is the perceived possession of multiple identity and its relationship to religious organisation. It may be objected that multiple identity occurs only occasionally and as the result of specific, local circumstances, that it is not the norm for Muslim minorities. Thus it may be said that most Muslim minorities have traditionally seen themselves as somehow distinct from their non-Muslim neighbours but not as sharing an identity with the distant Islamic community

beyond their own locality. Further examination of such minorities would clarify this point but in its absence it seems a plausible conjecture that the circumstances which lead to multiple identity are not in fact so unusual or unlikely. With the possible exception of the remotest and most isolated communities, the world's diverse Muslim populations have always, I would suggest, identified at some level with the Islamic world in general, an identification fostered through the common ritual use of Arabic, the idea of the Hajj, notions of Islamic hospitality and other shared cultural traits. I do not want to make too much of this point or to suggest any romantic, intangible Islamic unity created through common customs. However, the traditional existence of this low level identification in combination with modern and widespread political circumstances - the rise of nationalism throughout the world and the success of Islamically inspired political action in certain parts of it - leads to the strong possibility that contemporary Muslim minorities will seek to emphasise and activate their previously low profile identification with the *Umma*. Thus multiple identity becomes more significant and apparent in the modern world. The themes which have emerged in the Bosnian case do not then appear peculiar or unique, although further research on other Muslim minorities would be necessary to illuminate their importance and functioning elsewhere. The present thesis is then, amongst other things, one contribution to a potentially larger study.

Appendix A: Bosnian "ethnic" jokes

Note: Mujo and Fata are the names given to male and female Muslims in these jokes, just as the joke Irishman is known as Paddy.

1. Mujo leaves Bosnia to work and earn money. He writes back to Fata: "Life is great here, lots of money and an easy time. I'm not coming back". Fata turns over the envelope to check the postmark and see where her husband is. It says "Slovenia".

(Many Bosnians work abroad to earn money and this is where we expect Mujo to be. The joke is that for Bosnians Slovenia is abroad - rich and progressive.)

2. A Muslim, a Serb and a Croat each get granted a wish by God. The Serb asks for all Croats to be annihilated. "What?", says God, "even though your friend here is a Croat?" The Serb says yes, even though his friend is a Croat.

The Croat requests that God exterminate all Serbs. God asks him: Are you sure? Even though your friend here is a Serb?". Yes, in spite of that the Croat is sure.

Then God asks the Muslim what he wants. Mujo answers: "Now they've both had their turns I've nothing left to wish for."

3. Mujo is asked "What are our three national colours?" He answers: "Green, light green and dark green".

(The Yugoslav flag is red, white and blue. Green is the colour of Islam.)

4. A Bosnian, a Russian and an American are in a coach going to Sarajevo. The American takes out a pack of original Marlboro cigarettes, smokes one, then throws the box out of the window. Everybody asks him: "What are you doing? Why throw away a full pack of Marlboro?" He answers: "It doesn't matter, we have loads of them."

A few miles up the road the Russian pulls a bottle of genuine Russian vodka from his pocket, takes one swig and tosses the bottle through the window. "What are you doing? Why waste a whole bottle of vodka?" The Russian answers: "It's not important, we have plenty of it."

The coach drives on a bit and the Bosnian turns to his Hercegovinan neighbour, grabs him by the lapels and hurls him out the window. Everyone is aghast: "What are you doing? You can't throw that Hercegovinan out the window!" The Bosnian answers: "It doesn't matter, we have lots of them here."

(Many Hercegovinians now live and work in Sarajevo and are not always popular with Bosnians.)

5. Q. What's the best place to hide something from a Montenegrin?

A. In a field.

(Montenegrins are too lazy to plough their fields.)

6. Q. What's the best place to hide something from a Bosnian?

A. In a book.

(Bosnians are too stupid to read a book.)

7. A mocking Slovenian asks Mujo: "Do you know how you were born?" Mujo says he does not and the Slovenian explains that his mother was sitting under a honey tree and got pregnant from it.

"Aha, so that's it", says Mujo, "and do you know how you were born?" The Slovenian says no and is told: "You're mother had a fuck and got you".

(The Slovenian takes the Bosnian Muslim for a fool but is outwitted.)

8. An Albanian goes to the cinema, buys a ticket and presents it at the door. The doorman tears it in half so he goes back to buy another. Again he presents it to the doorman who tears it in half so the Albanian decides to sneak into the auditorium instead.

He settles down to watch the cowboy film but when the baddy creeps up behind the goody he calls out: "Look behind you!". The man in the next row taps him on the shoulder and tells him to be quiet.

The next time the baddy approaches the Albanian shouts: "Watch out!". Again the man behind him complains.

The third time this happens the Albanian is ejected from the cinema and leaves complaining: "Those people must be in league with the baddy."

9. How do Montenegrin soldiers count off?

Not "First, second, third, fourth etc." but "First, the one next to him, the one next to him, the one next to him..."

(The Montenegrin male is too proud to admit himself less than first in anything.)

Appendix B: Population of Bosnia-Herzegovina 1953 - 1981

	<u>1953</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1981</u>
Muslim	31.32%	25.69%	39.57%	39.52%
Serb	44.39%	42.89%	37.19%	32.02%
Croat	22.98%	21.71%	20.62%	18.38%
Montenegrin	0.26%	0.39%	0.35%	0.34%
Slovene	0.22%	0.18%	0.11%	0.07%
Macedonian	0.07%	0.07%	0.05%	0.05%
Romi	0.08%	0.02%	0.04%	0.18%
Jewish	0.01%	0.01%	0.02%	0.01%
Albanian	0.06%	0.11%	0.10%	0.11%
Yugoslav		8.42%	1.17%	7.91%
TOTAL POP.	2,847,459	3,277,948	3,746,111	4,124,256

The confusing rise and fall of the figures for Muslims and Yugoslavs requires some explanation. The 1953 figure of 31.32% Muslims is a backdated official estimate on the basis of the responses given to the census question on religious faith - at this time "Muslim" was not accounted as either *narod* or *narodnost*.

In 1961 Muslims were allowed to style themselves "Muslims in the ethnic sense" but were still not seen as constituting either *narod* or *narodnost*. They were, however, for the first time allowed to style themselves "Yugoslavs" rather than "Serbs" or "Croats" and many chose this option which accounts for the high percentage of "Yugoslavs" in 1961.

In the 1971 census this percentage fell as dramatically as that of the Muslims rose. The category "Muslim" had been accounted a *narod* and many therefore chose to call themselves Muslims.

In 1981 the percentage of Yugoslavs rises sharply. It is difficult to explain why but the 5% fall in Serbian nationals suggests the possibility that many of the new Yugoslavs had previously styled themselves Serbs.

Appendix C: Income of the Islamska Zajednica

Before the Second World War the greater part of the Muslim establishment's income derived from its *vakuf* property. After the ravages of the war and the 1958 nationalisation of much of the still existant *vakuf* property, new sources of income had to be found. Today its income may be classified as being of seven types.

1. Income from remaining *vakuf* property.
2. Donations made by individual Muslims. It is particularly common to donate money in memory of a deceased relative. Memorial donations are announced, usually along with a photograph of the deceased, in the fortnightly Muslim newspaper *Preporod*. They are often designated by the donor for specific purposes, most frequently for the Islamic Theological Faculty, the Sarajevo medresas, for *Preporod* itself or for the deceased's own parish.
3. Payments made for specific religious works. For example, the payment made for a *hatma* (complete recitation of the Quran) to be performed for a dead relative.
4. A voluntary annual tax on Muslim households. In 1986 this stood at 1,500 dinars (approximately £3 at the time it was collected).
5. Income from the collection of *zekat* and *sadekatul-fitr*. The donation of *kurban* to the Islamska Zajednica is also a type of income, the meat going to feed medresa students.
6. Contributions from the outside Muslim world.
7. Contributions from the state. In 1977 this was said to provide 10% of the Zajednica's total income (Hadžijahić 1977).

Much of the Zajednica's income is poured into education. In 1977 the Islamic Theological Faculty was opened and in 1978 the women's medresa (closed in 1952) re-opened. The rebuilding and renovation of mosques and *mesdžids* ("mosques" without minarets) is another area of expenditure. After the war 1,022 mosques and *mesdžidi* stood in Bosnia-Hercegovina, about 200 of them dilapidated and unusable. By 1970 the number of places of worship had risen to 1,473, by 1976 to 1,661 and by 1980 to 1,818. Islamska Zajednica income is also spent on a number of publications including the fortnightly *Preporod* (Renewal, a Bosnian publication), monthly *Glasnik* (Bulletin), monthly *Islamska Misao* (Islamic Thought, again a Bosnian product), monthly *Zem-Zem* (produced by the students of the Sarajevo medresas) and annual *Takvim* (produced by *Ilmiya*, the association of Zajednica employees, and containing a calendar of the Islamic year and times of prayer).

Appendix D: A zikr meeting at the Kadiri tekija

Lefletul-Berat is the day on which the angels begin to write man's fate for the forthcoming year. In 1986 it fell on the 23rd of April and was also the day on which a dervish of the Kadiri tekija got married in a ceremony held at his home. (He had previously been married in a secular ceremony in accordance with legal requirement.) On the evening of this day, a Wednesday, a special zikr was held at the tekija. The final prayer of the day (*jacija*) was scheduled for 9.21 pm. During the forty five minutes before this the dervishes began to arrive in the *semahana*, the main room of the tekija. Those who had not yet prayed the fourth prayer (*akšam*) did so. They then sat in a horseshoe on white sheepskins facing the portal at the eastern end of the tekija. Here the horseshoe was closed off by a row of six elders including the sheikh and *vekil*. On this occasion no guests from other tekijas were present as they frequently were at other times. The horseshoe was joined by more men, some of them dervish *murids* in grey or beige fez's, others *muhibs* and sympathisers in white skull caps. One of the latter, a man of about fifty, was shooed from the semicircle by the sheikh. Eventually there were twenty three men in all, plus the six elders. They sat reciting *salavats* (salutations to the Prophet) and repeating *zikr* chants many times over. At 9.21 *ezan* was heard and the fifth prayer made by all present, including the spectators. As usual, the prayer ended with 33 repetitions of "Subhan-allah", of "El-hamdu-lillah" and of "Allahu Ekber".

Those in the horseshoe now rose to their feet and sang a Serbo-Croatian hymn to the accompaniment of the tambourine played by the son of the *vekil*, a dervish in his thirties who organises the musical component of the zikr meetings and handles the microphone.

Now the central part of the meeting began. The *vekil* began the rhythmic chant of "La illahe illa la" which was taken up by the participants and accompanied by movements of the head to left and right. On the *vekil*'s pronouncement: "Qalbi!" ("From the heart"), the chanting grew more intense, the first and second words being particularly emphasised. The *vekil* now stood in front of the sheikh and bowed to him with his hand on his heart. He then progressed around the inside of the horseshoe, bowing to each of the men he passed and receiving their bows in return. At this point, one of the dervishes well known for his trances began shouting incoherently, one finger held out before him. The finger denotes the uniqueness and oneness of God expressed in the phrase "La illahe illa la", there is no God but God. He was supported by the men on his left and right and did not fall. When the *vekil* had completed his circle he returned to his place and soon brought the chant to an end by saying, rather than chanting, the phrase in a loud voice.

A Serbo-Croatian song about the dervish path was sung and was followed by the rhythmic chanting of "Allah", again with physical movements of the head and body. Percussion instruments were played by certain of the dervishes. The elder who had started this chant made his way round the inside of the horseshoe bowing to the participants as the *vekil* had done. This time the trancing dervish shouted wildly and dropped. He was caught before hitting the floor and laid gently face down by his neighbours. The sheikh signalled to the men to let him lie. Throughout this trance his finger remained pointing in witness to the unicity of God. About a minute later he recovered and stood up again.

Another Serbo-Croatian song and another rhythmic chant, that of "Allah, hoi, hoi, hoi!". This time no-one circled the horseshoe. The trancer shouted, spun and

dropped. He remained down so long that the sheikh moved to his side, laid a hand on his heart and recited *salavats* to revive him.

After another Serbo-Croatian song came the final chant, that of "Hu!, Hu!". This is always the last and the least repeated of chants, as "La illahe illa la" is always the first and the most repeated.

Everyone sat down and the sheikh said a few words about the meaning of *Lejletul-Berat*, warning the younger members of the horseshoe: "You young ones, remember this!". He then requested several of the participants to recite verses from the Quran, prompting one who forgot some of the words. He then spoke of marriage and congratulated "the loyal member" of the order on his own recent nuptials. Prayers of the type known as *dove* were said.

The groom was invited by the sheikh to be photographed with him by another dervish. The photo was taken and the sheikh congratulated the groom who kissed his hand several times. He then kissed the hands of the *vekil* and other elders. Upstairs in the women's gallery the bride, who had been watching the *zikr*, was congratulated by the women.

This was the end of the meeting and, after greetings and conversation, people made their way home. It was after 11 o'clock.

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