

How to Continue Kant's *Perpetual Peace* with Addams' *Newer Ideals of Peace*

Axel Mueller

Northwestern University
muell@northwestern.edu

Abstract

This article examines some arguments in favor of taking peace as a political obligation that can be found in one of the most important founders of the pacifist movement, Jane Addams. The main focus is on her 1907 book *Newer Ideals of Peace*, which has often been read as idealistic and outdated, and above all, as more of an activist's manifesto than a serious contribution to either political philosophy or political theory. I point out that this owes much to an ambiguity of Addams' criticisms of the traditional and Kantian cosmopolitan defense of peace as a political ideal, the ambiguity between practical-political and conceptual problems. However, Addams succeeds in identifying one profound problem for traditional, even enlightened institution-centered ideals of peace, the collapse of the very ideal in cases of breaches of explicit peace-agreements among nations, because breaches of agreements are tantamount to the loss of all commitment to the other nation's rights. It reveals that the conditions imposed by such ideals are at most necessary, but not sufficient for peace, and hence that the concept based on them is not a complete concept of lasting peaceful conditions among humans. Once it is seen as dedicated to resolving the problems entailed by this fundamental problem, Addams' work, and in particular her focus on resources of solidarity and right-granting practices beyond and outside explicit agreements between governments can be understood as the development of a more adequate, coherent and comprehensive, while also a more actionable conception of peace. In the course of this development, Addams can also be observed to make use of crucial epistemological and more technical philosophical tools that are most closely associated with classical pragmatism, but which partly appear (albeit largely obliquely in the course of their application to a particular case) for the first time Addams' treatise. Addams' work is therefore of more than merely political activist interest for philosophers. Nonetheless, the article also explains her status as an important contributor to proper conceptions of world peace and the understanding of certain phenomena in the organization of public will formation precisely by pointing out that without some of her future-oriented proposals, like the inseparability of peace-policies and development, or the need to institutionally protect and foster spontaneous solitary action, the best contemporary work on peace would not have been possible.

Keywords: Jane Addams; pragmatism; Kant; peace; cosmopolitanism; normative role of affective states and solidarity.

Resumen. *Cómo continuar la Paz perpetua de Kant con los Nuevos ideales de paz de Addams*

Este artículo examina algunos de los argumentos a favor de considerar la paz como una obligación política que se puede encontrar en una de las fundadoras más relevantes del movimiento pacifista, Jane Addams. El foco principal se encuentra en su libro de 1907, *Newer Ideals of Peace*, que a menudo ha sido leído como idealista y obsoleto y, sobre todo, más como un manifiesto activista que una contribución seria tanto a la filosofía como a la teoría política. Aquí argumento que esto se debe principalmente a una ambigüedad de las críticas de Addams a la defensa tradicional y kantiano-cosmopolita de la paz en cuanto a ideal político, a la ambigüedad entre problemas práctico-políticos y conceptuales. Aún así, Addams consigue identificar un profundo problema en los ideales de paz tradicionales, o incluso en los ideales ilustrados centrados en las instituciones, a saber, el colapso de este ideal en casos de violaciones de tratados de paz explícitos entre naciones, puesto que las violaciones de estos acuerdos equivalen a la pérdida de todo compromiso con los derechos de la otra nación. Esto revela que las condiciones impuestas por tales ideales son como mucho necesarias, pero no suficientes, para la paz, y por lo tanto el concepto basado en ellas no es un concepto completo de las condiciones para la paz duradera entre humanos. Una vez que se haya considerado el trabajo de Addams (y en particular su atención a los recursos de solidaridad y a las prácticas de concesión de derechos más allá y fuera de acuerdos explícitos entre gobiernos) como dedicado a resolver los problemas que entraña este problema fundamental, su labor puede ser entendida como el desarrollo de una concepción de la paz más adecuada, coherente, comprensiva y a la vez más práctica. En el curso de este desarrollo también se puede ver cómo Addams hace uso de herramientas epistemológicas cruciales y filosóficamente más técnicas que están más estrechamente relacionadas con el pragmatismo clásico pero que aparecen en parte (aunque mayormente de forma oblicua a lo largo de su aplicación a un caso particular) y por primera vez en el tratado de Addams. Para los filósofos, pues, el trabajo de Addams tiene más que un simple interés activista y político. Sin embargo, este artículo también explica el estatus de Addams como una contribuyente importante a concepciones adecuadas de paz mundial y la comprensión de ciertos fenómenos en la organización de la formación de la voluntad pública precisamente indicando que sin alguna de sus propuestas orientadas hacia el futuro, como la inseparabilidad de políticas para la paz y el desarrollo o la necesidad de proteger y promover institucionalmente la acción solidaria espontánea, la mejor obra contemporánea sobre la paz no hubiera sido posible.

Palabras clave: Jane Addams; pragmatismo; Kant; paz; cosmopolitismo; papel normativo de los estados afectivos y la solidaridad.

Summary

- | | |
|--|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Addams on the content, function and political consequences of new ideals 2. New Ideals: radical or supplementary to the old ones? 3. The problem of the old ideals: no lasting peace 4. Practically articulated New Ideals: a sample solution to a practical-political problem of older ideals | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. How affective attitudes contribute to a solution of the theoretical problem of older ideals 6. Consequences for our understanding of the ideal of lasting peace <p>References</p> |
|--|---|

In this article, I will examine some of the arguments in favor of taking the strife after peace as politically obligatory that can be found in one of the most important founders of the pacifist movement, Jane Addams. Born in 1860 to a well-to-do family, and raised in the small town world of the mainly protestant American Midwest, she soon decided to use her access to education to actively engage in improving the living conditions, opportunities and political rights of women, immigrants, the urban poor, and other groups that found themselves living in the paradox situation of living in a large democracy and yet being deprived of the most essential rights, equipments and opportunities to partake in this society. Women without vote, beaten up by drunk husbands after long work-days in factories without workers' safety, immigrant families without dwelling and even language to voice their suffering, and children of the poor condemned to work instead of going to school and have a chance to lift themselves out of this condition —such were the phenomena Jane Addams primarily reacted to, and the phenomena that she demanded to be changed. Comparable to Rosa Luxemburg in Germany and La Pasionaria in Spain, Jane Addams grew into one of the most important activists and theorists for the classical progressive causes at the beginning of the 20th century. She founded and fought in associations for the female right to vote (accomplished in 1919 in the US), invented the modern form of safe houses for the education, nourishment and protection of the poor and victims of domestic violence in Chicago we nowadays take for granted as social centers, and also untiringly until the end of her life in 1935 fought for the abolition of war within the framework and as the leader of one of the earliest and oldest NGO's, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), the organization that drafted the essential outlines of Woodrow Wilson's proposals for a league of nations for the prevention of another World War after WWI. In this sense, Addams can count as one of the conceptual grandmothers of the United Nations. These efforts were recognized with her reception of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931. Nonetheless, and astonishingly enough, Jane Addams has not made it into the European consciousness, which is one of the secondary motivations for this article, namely, to introduce the name and thought of one of the most important feminist, pacifist and pragmatist thinkers of the early 20th century as a voice that still has some interesting things to contribute to contemporary discussions of war, peace, and international relations. Jane Addams herself acted more often as a public intellectual and engaged activist for her causes than as an ambitious theorist, and this is how most of her contemporary readers still treat her —as an exemplary personality to be emulated in today's still urgent fights for women's rights, against poverty and war at the level of NGOs. Many of those, for example, who admire Addams' work as feminists, social and political theorists or historians of ideas, mainly have her in mind as a person who always refused to take up an academic position, in spite of repeated attempts of John Dewey (no less) to make her professor of sociology in Chicago, and who stressed the power of emotions, community organization, self-empowerment and the standpoint-related insights of women for the practical and polit-

ical realization of certain agendas. However, in most of these sympathetically intended accounts of Jane Addams, the power of her challenging ideas to transform, e.g., Dewey's and Mead's psychological and sociological ideas is completely forgotten. It is forgotten, for example, that Dewey's metaethical theory and moral psychology changed profoundly under explicit recognition of Addams' challenges to account for the affective as well as intellectual parts and consequences of behavior. Dewey's mature views, as they appear for example in his brilliant little book *Theory of Valuation* (1939)¹, but also his conversion from a defender of war to a radical pacifist in the treatise *The Outlawry of War* (1921)² are to the largest degree a consequence of his academic interaction with Addams and her circle. In other words, Addams' influence cannot be limited to the passing historical merits of an active political life with intellectual views that are, at best, naive and well-meaning (which is how friends and foes uniformly end up taking her when they stress her activism). Instead, as I will argue in this paper, Jane Addams' indeed often very straightforward and unadorned admonitions to account for the fundamental importance of phenomena —I will call them «solidary practices»— that are not in the traditional canon of ideas when it comes to do political theory and philosophy are still today of a very high value when it comes to properly assess and understand the very idea of «lasting peace», be it as an aim of international relations, or be it as a concept in political philosophy.

My essay will proceed in the following way: First, I will present some basic arguments and criticisms that Addams develops in her 1907 book *Newer Ideals of Peace*³ vis-a-vis the traditional and Kantian cosmopolitan formulation and defense of peace as a political ideal (1). A closer inspection of the real differences with Kant's cosmopolitan project will allow me to point to and address a certain ambiguity in the understanding of the sort of criticism Addams seems to have in mind, the ambiguity between practical-political and conceptual problems generated by remaining wedded to the old ideals (2). I will then distinguish one problem raised in Addams' criticism as fundamental. This is the problem that traditional and even enlightened and democratic ideals of peace that are exclusively couched in terms of the explicit juridified regulation of international relations collapse in cases of breaches of explicit peace-agreements among nations (3). This problem is fundamental because it reveals that the conditions imposed by the traditional, even enlightened institution-centered ideal are at most necessary, but not sufficient for peace, and hence the concept based on them not a complete concept of lasting peaceful conditions among humans. Once the problem is identified, I will present an example from her post WWI work in *Peace and Bread in Time of War* (4) that outlines in which ways Addams' insistence on the fundamental and indispensable role of developing active policies in favor of extra-gubernatorial and interpersonal

1. Dewey, John (1972). *Theory of Valuation*. Chicago: Chicago University Press (orig. 1939).
2. Dewey, John (1927). *The Outlawry of War*. Chicago: Willett, Clark & Colby.
3. Addams, Jane (2007). *Newer Ideals of Peace*. Chicago/Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

relationships and associations across national boundaries, as well as the removal of social and economic discrimination and exclusion *for the very ideal of peace* can help in the development of a more adequate, coherent and comprehensive, while also a more actionable conception of peace (5). The analysis of the consequences of this re-conception will shed light on the degree to which Addams makes use of epistemological and more technical philosophical tools that are most closely associated with classical pragmatism (6), and thus support the view that Addams' work is of more than merely political activist interest for philosophers.

In this final assessment, I will also point out how Addams' additional requirements on such a coherent peace-concept also yield a potent argument in favor of the political obligation for socio-economical as well as human rights policies for discriminated individuals in all parts of the world that only recently (after the cold war) have found active defenders among theorists and, more importantly, the actors at the level of, e.g., the UN. At the level of political theory, such a deepened understanding of what the ideal of peace ought to contain to count as an actual idea of peace can moreover help understand, for example, why precisely at a time at which civilizing international by reaching regulations and agreements seems more likely and easier than ever before, the number and variety of advocacy-organizations and NGOs does not decrease, but to the contrary, we observe a more than proportional increment of ever more and more vociferous structures of self-organization across national, ethnic and other boundaries. Why is this so? Isn't regulation a success, and often enough for peace? Aren't regulations following one demand after another? And shouldn't we expect such numbers to go down, at least a bit, at least somewhere, when the UN «works down the list»? Addams' political theory can be of great help in seeing how it is that precisely when regulation and communication increase, a precisification of the actual needs and organizations for advocating them require more and more articulate expression, and what role extra-institutional practices have in such ongoing processes of articulation. Addams' insight in the relatively elementary structures behind this might help vindicate her not only as a historically admirable figure and an important contributor to the tradition of pragmatist thought, but also as an important contributor to proper conceptions of world peace and the understanding of certain phenomena in the organization of public will formation.

1. Addams on the content, function and political consequences of new ideals

In her famous essay *Newer Ideals of Peace*, Jane Addams sets out, in her words, to «present the claims of the newer, more aggressive ideals of peace, as over against the older dovelike ideal» (3). According to Addams, «these newer ideals are active and dynamic, and it is believed that if their forces were made really operative upon society, they would, in the end, quite as a natural process, do away with war» (3). Given that the older ideals also *aspired* to do away with

war, her claim is that the newer ideals would be more likely to succeed where the older ideals fail their own aspirations. This could either mean that the older ideas were *wrong* and need to be replaced, or that the newer ideals are necessary conditions for peace left out in the older ideals, but not both. In *Newer Ideals*, Jane Addams herself is not always clear which of the two options she wishes to take. My following remarks will suggest that Addams' work on peace makes its most original contribution when we see her as *completing* the traditional understanding of peace and continuing the agenda of explicating the possibility of a political obligation to seek lasting peace outlined by authors like Kant. To set the stage, let me briefly outline the content and function, as well as the political consequences of the newer ideals.

The main content of the newer ideals is the development of a «cosmopolitan interest in the wider affairs of humanity» (9), awareness of which grows naturally under conditions of precariousness in which human beings «must shape their life with some reference to the demands of social justice» (17) and thus undergo «the discovery of a new vital relation —that of the individual to the race» because the satisfaction of common needs «overcome[s] arbitrary boundaries» (19). Her paradigmatic examples of the contexts of the emergence of affectively mediated associations that are indifferent to nationality or differences in culture are the spontaneous collective practices of self-help in the precarious and multi-cultural innercity immigrant communities who are, by virtue of this precariousness, «reduced to the fundamental equalities and human necessities of human life itself» (14), the global effort for the elimination of tuberculosis (24), the emergent mutualities and publicly financed retirement funds in European countries and Australia (25), the emergence of international union and labor movements as agents of collective bargaining (144, 217), the peasant movement against military service in Russia (232), as well as the experience of women in wartime⁴ and the cooperative necessities in and of what she calls «Bread Labor» (234)⁵.

The key functions of the newer ideals are basically two. First, they would facilitate combining and harmonizing as much the affections for one's fellows within one's historically given community and those for one's fellow human beings outside the community as they would enable harmonizing «our common law» and international law (11). She claims that «until society manages to combine the two we shall make no headway toward the newer ideals of peace» (11). The claim is that, without increasing, supporting and taking as our responsibility the solidary practices among ourselves and towards the people in other nations, the older ideals do not improve the chances that nations and people in situations of urgency, threat or need can come to regard war as the

4. Addams, Jane (1916). *The Long Road of Women's Memory*. New York: MacMillan), 136-137, as well as 126, where she stresses the internationally shared and basic character of the natural response to WWI on the part of the individual women in every country who have to care for the consequences of total war.

5. This is, of course, the main theme in *Bread and Peace in Times of War*.

most reasonable action to take. The second function of the new ideals would be that of offering a source of pervasive social and, ultimately, universal human *affective* resistance against the actions required for such reversals.

Consequently, the political commitment to these new ideals would entail taking the empirical knowledge of «social conditions which make possible this combination» (11) as a «foundation [...] not in speculation but in action» (20) for institutionalizing the cultivation of practical habits that produce, reproduce and explicitly manifest the public support and need for «solidarity of emotion and action essential to the life of all» (12) by fostering and promoting the emergence of interpersonal and trans-communitarian commitments and affections⁶. In the long term, the social effects of harnessing natural solidarity in this way and making its production a matter of social and political concern would tend to spread attitudes capable of revising the priorities of policy-making by the «substitution of nurture for warfare» (26) and even «the attainment of [an] all-absorbing passion for multiform life» (10) throughout a «social order [that] would not suppress the least germ of promise, of growth and variety, but would nurture all into full and varied life» (213).

Addams pits these newer ideals «against the old dogmatic peace» (7) and portrays her work as a criticism as much of «philosophers [...] who have been the first to sigh for negative peace which they declared would be eternal» (23) and suffered from «the eighteenth-century tendency to idealization» (29), as of institution-centered ideals of «universal peace» that are promoted by «international lawyers [...] who formulate into codes the growing moral sense of the nations» (7). Compared with the enthusiastic hopes for peace inspired by the new ideals, she finds both «discouraging». After the short indication I gave before, let me now consider with some more detail why Addams thinks this.

2. New Ideals: radical or supplementary to the old ones?

Some of Addams'⁷ readers suggest that this is her view because these older ideals are static, abstract and remote from actually succeeding in what she calls «extinguishing the possibility of battle» (7). Her point would be that the newer ideals *conflict* with the older ideals. The conflict would be, as suggested in these readings, that older ideals are merely moral, while Addams' newer ideal is political. A standard way of arguing the point might go like this: One of her main contentions, that «social morality is developed through sentiment and action»

6. It seems apt that Addams would call this way of attending to the causes and politically relevant contents of affectively constituted social movements at the sub-institutional level a «new humanitarianism» and not, as some have suggested, a new communitarianism. The resources she insists on are in fact exemplifications of the existence of a «gravitation toward the universal» (17), which universality makes it obviously a candidate for yielding reasons that are normatively relevant in moral and political deliberation. For a recent communitarian reading of Addams, cf. Carroll and Fink (2007), lxi. More differentiated, see Whiggs (2004).

7. Carroll and Fink (2007), xviii.

(213), applied to the ideal of peace, would yield that the newer ideals portray peace as a value developed through political action and its commitments, while the old ideals would not, presumably because they would treat the ideal of peace as the outcome of moral reasoning alone. In a neo-pragmatist Rortyan vein, one could think that the contrast of new and old ideas is one between seeking a change in our practices or ideas and seeking justification. Suppose someone guided by the older ideas were one who seeks moral justification of the peace-idea. Given the actual militarist workings of the real world, contemplating the older ideal's superior justification to that of the actually action-guiding principles of politics would only allow one to passively accept that political success in the real world is not available by what moral reason commands. This would demonstrate the weakness of the older ideals, since it offers good news for cynics and those called «realists» in political science because it shows that moral reflection on international politics is nothing but *mere* idealism with no political pull. In contrast, the argument would conclude, those guided by the newer ideals would actively seek ways of «discovering social bonds better fitted to our requirements» than warfare and understand their work as targeted at propagandizing the exchange of militaristic and competitive attitudes by a fascination with the rich and varied fabric of humanity and the avid interest in others' well-being. However suggestive and exciting, I think that this reading cannot be right.

To begin with, this would require attributing a major incompetence with her predecessors in peace theory to Jane Addams. Although I can only briefly indicate this here, it was Kant himself, a representative of older ideals if anyone is, who drew attention to the fact that the ideal of peace between nations and among human beings irrespective of their national identity is a «task» with no guaranteed outcome, such that we have to take it as our responsibility to choose peaceful policies wherever possible. That this is so is relatively unsurprising, because the *moral* justification of peace and the moral inadmissibility of war is, within Kant's system, relatively obvious (and therefore barely mentioned in *Perpetual Peace*⁸): one cannot perform war without resorting to some form of violence or coercion against the legitimate will of others. Secondly, wars require enlisting persons as executioners of the precepts of military and political strategies and ends that they usually do not choose or even have the competence to influence. For both reasons, war is impossible without using others as means, not at the same time as ends in themselves with their own will and rights and therefore ruled out directly by the second formulation of the categorical imperative to use others never only as means alone, but to consider them always as ends in themselves. Recognizing a prohibition to want war as a *moral* ideal and thus the intention to avoid war as *morally* obliging or at least a *moral* ideal is therefore boring to the degree of almost not requiring further thought or justification. According to Kant's arguments, this covers our plans

8. Kant, Immanuel (1991a). *Political Writings* (ed. by Hans Reiss). Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 93-130.

and considerations directly at least with regard to so-called wars of aggression, but in light of the instrumentalization of soldiers and the tacit calculation of «collateral damages» to civilians Kant also mentions, probably most wars whatsoever. What Kant clearly saw is that it is the justification of peace as a legitimate *political* ideal that has to answer questions because of the long history of structuring international relations by means of war and armed threat and the attendant skepticism for the possibility of peace.

It was also Kant who gave an excellent reason how someone might argue successfully that seeking peace, while demanded by moral principles, is not necessarily a political obligation: if peace were *impossible* (i.e., utopian), then there could not be an obligation to produce it⁹. Suppose, for example, it turned out that «war is in human nature» just as reason is; then, according to Kant, there might be a moral ought, but not a possible obligation to seek peace. Seeking peace would be, rather, a matter of moral heroism. For Kant, this possibility is a special case of a general fact about moral freedom: if it is true that we are moral beings only because we are free to act out of the recognition of the mandates of moral laws that we rationally acknowledge, then, as those same free agents, we can also decide in fact to not follow these same mandates. This is so simply because as free agents acting according to moral laws, it has to be true of us that we might have done otherwise every time we did in fact aim at realizing the moral law. The possibility of radical evil *in nature* is thus the flipside of Kant's notion of moral autonomy¹⁰. This is far from a demonstration that warfare is a part of human nature, but it is sufficient to show that Kant was neither naive nor unaware of the need to make a case for the possibility of peace in a two-part argument: a) against the impossibility-claim involved in the radical evil alternative, and b) in favor of a political, i.e., action-demanding obligation to seek peace.

The argument in Kant's *Perpetual Peace* (and the rest of his political philosophy¹¹) consequently aims at establishing why the historical record cannot offer conclusive proof of such an impossibility, at illustrating what in the historical record offers evidence for the ability of human beings and nations to effectively pursue peaceful international relations, and how the institutional structures would have to be set up to make such achievements last. The key to Kant's proposed solution is to show that the historical record is not telling because it does not establish an *incompatibility* between the moral demand for peace and the conditions of political decision-making. Moreover, it also does not establish that peace is unlikely *when finally seriously pursued* and humanity equips itself with adequate national and international institutions, such as

9. Cf. *Perpetual Peace*.

10. Paul Guyer has made this exemplarily clear in Guyer (2006), 294-303.

11. Mainly, «On the Common Saying "This May Be True in Theory, but it Does Not Apply in Practice"». In: Kant, Immanuel (1991b). *Political Writings* (ed. by Hans Reiss). Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 61-92; «Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose». In: Kant, Immanuel (1991c). *Political Writings* (ed. by Hans Reiss). Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 41-52.

the global extension of self-government, international laws based on legitimation by the principles of liberty and justice that also legitimize the national laws, and a cosmopolitan regime of individual rights towards any whatever state irrespective of citizenship. Since humanity has not yet been observed under such favorable circumstances, the alleged empirical generalization that there have been no periods in the history of mankind without war cannot establish a connection between human nature and warfare, but only between human nature under strained, unjust and oppressive conditions and warfare. It was Kant's basic idea that under the abolition or at least reduction of such conditions, peace would not only become much more likely than in the past, but also, on the whole, much more likely than war.

In fact, Kant's awareness of the obstacles was so keen that he famously called for a set of institutional structures and manners of enforcement of the mandates of global justice that «even a population of devils» would, through their actions according to the corresponding regulations, finally end up progressing towards lasting global peace¹². Kant also observed what we today are perhaps more sorely aware of than he could ever have been, i.e., he observed that, while a unified international legal order in the form of a global republic would be «the only rational form» of abolishing war between nations in which nations subject themselves to the verdict of humanity at large about their political actions and decisions¹³, such a regime could not be hoped for and would encounter legitimation problems as long as «the people don't seem to want it»¹⁴. Thus, it would have to be the «mechanism of nature», captured in the right kind of regulations of behavior, that produces, as it were, behind the backs of the agents, an ever more peaceful condition of humankind.

It is for this very reason that Kant comes to defend two very important claims regarding the realizability of progress towards peace (which, as we saw, is needed to make the moral norm politically obliging). On the one hand, since a population of devils that does not want international cooperation would also choose war if the decision-making procedures of their community were maximally democratized, Kant rejects «bottom-up» approaches as dangerous and counterproductive¹⁵. On the other hand, since most politicians and leaders would rather tend to improve their own fate in stead of that of humanity, even the «top-to-bottom» procedures of re-structuring the individual nation states and later the cooperative structures between them in terms of a cosmopolitan federation of states would require to broaden the political decision-making procedures in a particular way: namely, *philosophers* or *moral*

12. Kant, Immanuel (1991a), 112-113.

13. *Ibid.*, 105.

14. *Ibid.*, 105.

15. *Ibid.*, 117-118, where he states that a state «will gradually come to the stage where (...) the people can be influenced by the mere idea of the law's authority» (118). The future tense here betrays Kant's mistrust in progress driven by the people as they are. Without the instruction of «moral politicians», the people might as well, he suggests, not reach this stage of subjecting self-interest to moral insight and what is right.

experts would have to become the «guiding voice» of what he called «moral politicians»¹⁶.

Given this temporary help from the top, and given incrementally progressing democratic reforms, expecting peace and making it one's responsibility to work on its realization is nonetheless not unreasonable because, according to Kant,

- a) in democratic procedures in which those who take the risks make the decisions, the decision to go to war would be unlikely¹⁷,
- b) the increasing prevalence of conflict-solutions by way of negotiated and mutually agreed non-violent means would make war less and less attractive¹⁸, and
- c) the increasing legally regulated commerce and intercourse among people of different nations with possibly conflicting interests would spread the respect towards people of different cultures and nationalities¹⁹.

Kant's basic idea was this: (only) if humanity embarked on a history of policies of progressive global juridification and democratization, and (only) if humanity became habituated to civilized forms of conflict resolution first on a national, and then progressively on a trans-national level, peace *could be*, even would *have to be* the outcome²⁰.

So, if one of the most prominent representatives of old ideals already argued that the ideal of peace is political and not moral, and that demanding peace requires a commitment to social progress (even though Kant's own account is clearly blind to the dangers of imperialism and colonialism²¹), then attributing exactly the same point to Addams as her main achievement must either attribute a blunder to her or miss the novelty of her «new ideals». The same is true of interpretations that regard Addams' indubitable commitment to «critical pragmatism» in the sense of a stress on such tenets as «the centrality of education, democracy, and the achievement of economic and social equality»²² or on «social progress through mutual agreement and tapping into communal intelligence»²³ as the source of originality for her new ideals. In light of Kant's quite sophisticated conception, identifying such

16. *Ibid.*, 117-124.

17. *Ibid.*, 100.

18. *Ibid.*, 104, where Kant explains that, once some pair of republics is joined by a peaceful accord, then this model spreads until all republics are part of a global federation. The reason for this is, according to the passage, that the peoples themselves see the advantages and appreciate the superior rationality of «joining right and politics».

19. For a critical analysis of these Kantian theses, cf. Habermas (1996), 199-208; for an excellent discussion of the problems for Kant's thesis of «democratic peace» and other aspects of his peace theory, see Kleingeld, Pauline (2006).

20. Cf. Kant, Immanuel (1991a), First supplement, where Kant somewhat emphatically writes «Nature *irresistibly wills* that right should eventually gain the upper hand» (113).

21. McCarthy, Tom (2009), ch. 2, 5, 6.

22. This is Jo Deegan's view as aptly summarized in MacMullan (2001), 93.

23. Cf. Hamington (2007), §4.

commitments as central for explicating the ideal of lasting peace must seem odd hat.

I would therefore suggest against this popular radical reading of Jane Addams' contribution to peace-studies that her impatience with old ideals is better interpreted as the expression of the view that, while the older ideals and practices guided by them like moral reflection and international negotiations and the juridification of international relations are necessary conditions for making peace possible, they are not and cannot be sufficient as a foundation for the defense of an effective *political* ideal of peace as a guiding principle of real politics²⁴. This reading is also more faithful to Addams' own modesty, as it is expressed in frequent remarks to the effect that «the newer humanitarianism [...] substitutes emotional stimuli *as well as* codes of conduct»²⁵ and in the way in which she explicitly presents her work on peace *as a contribution to* an existing and emergent political infrastructure aimed at guaranteeing peace. Thus, she delineates the scope of her claims as follows:

assuming that the [...] lines of appeal [...] to sensibility [...] and [...] prudence will persist, and that the international lawyers [...] will continue to formulate into codes the growing moral sense of the nations, the following pages hope to [...] point out the development of [...] newer social forces which [...] will at last [...] extinguish battle at its source²⁶.

I take for granted that Addams did not think that we could guarantee *de facto* the extinction of hostilities among nations by merely adopting her new ideals. The extinction of battles she reclaims is rather a question of conceptual coherence: it is only once we have fully appreciated the conditions under which peace is possible in their entirety that the conception we have then developed deserves to be called one of peace (as opposed, say, to minimally violent long-term conflict-management, or highly armed stand-offs that increase the mutual risks when broken). Only armed with such an improved understanding of what we have to commit to when accepting the normative authority of the ideal of peace would we then be in a position to design better policies to actually obtain it. Addams' claim is then that the older ideals do not

24. In fact, her use of the non-violent practices of spontaneous mutual help in precariousness developed among poor and marginalized inner-city immigrants from all sorts of nationalities and cultures, practices in which such differences fade away under the evidence of the equality under the problems to be solved as paradigmatic of the presence of newer ideals that warrant raised expectations for the prospects of peace is most compelling when we see it as deepening and expanding Kant's defense of the contention that peace is not only morally mandatory but also empirically possible among people of different nationalities. The argument is straightforward: if peace is a moral ought, and if every political ought implies an empirical can, then the demonstrable existence of non-violent practices of conflict-resolution and the satisfaction of basic needs that don't even take note of national or cultural boundaries supports the contention that the concern for peace is not just a moral but also a political obligation, since it is false that it is empirically impossible.

25. Addams (2007), 26.

26. *Ibid.*, 7.

offer a satisfactory account of the full significance and normative entailments of the ideal of peace because, without adding the new ideals, these conceptions are still compatible with the rational expectation (or even the tacit acceptance) of an arbitrarily large number of armed conflicts²⁷.

If we take this line, then Addams' newer ideals supplement or complete moral and institution-centered conceptions of peace by elements without which these conceptions alone don't adequately capture the actual normative commitments we have to accept when we conceive of a genuinely peaceful global human condition. The question is then, given the older ideals' content, what exact substantive contribution Addams' reflections make to an improved or deepened understanding of the significance of the ideal of peace that we do not get from the older ideals as delineated in Kant. But before we can address this question, we need to see what exactly the problem of the institutionalist enlightenment ideal is that Addams' approach is to help us first identify and then solve.

3. The problem of the old ideals: no lasting peace

To answer this question, we need to come back to what Addams regards as the second function of the newer ideals, namely that they should offer an additional *affective* obstacle against war to the political decision between war and peace, *assuming* that the institutionalization of structures such as those described in Kant's ideal is in place. As I will try to outline later, the particular phenomena that Addams identifies as practical manifestations of a basic commitment to peace, as well as her appeal to the normative structures underlying nurturing as opposed to warrior practices mentioned before indeed enable us to discern a further dimension of the ideal of peace that Kant's conception of peace virtually overlooks. But why does Addams see the need for such a complement? In what sense is the enlightenment conception of lasting peace defective or incomplete *as a unique concept of peace*? In other words: admittedly the enlightenment ideal is focused on institutional and legal aspects of a possible global peace regime and thus leaves many aspects of international relations (like trade, cultural exchange, tourism, etc.) to one side, but why would it be *necessary* to pay attention to other relationships of an affective nature like the solidary practices Addams seems so keen on? In what sense are they more significant than as a display of a type of admirable, affection-based but non-required generosity?

27. Attributing this position to Addams immediately undermines the «realist» criticism of the expectations for peace raised by Addams' new ideals as having been *disproved* by the barbarism of WWI and WWII and the de-humanizing forms of warfare of the 20th century from nuclear war to ethnic cleansing (cf. Elshtain 2002, esp. 217ff.). Given that Addams' point is to reveal the importance of *additional* conditions on possible peace, facts about war only show that much less than what is needed has been accomplished in politics or that we have not been very successful at the global level to live up to our ideals.

At a decisive point in *Newer Ideals of Peace*, Addams observes that a peace regime founded merely on a «common moral consciousness» (and we could add, in light of her inclusion of international laws and agreements, a common legal world order) is exposed to the constant threat that «reversion to [...] brute struggle may at any moment cost the destruction of the painfully acquired [...] ties of mutual principle, which are wrought with such effort and loosed with such ease» (23), such that no constant progress towards an increase of peaceful relations can be rationally expected. Kant's conception of peace specifies the political realization of liberty and justice in the form of legal institutions that are able to universally guarantee both as necessary for the gradual emergence of a global peace regime. What Addams' realizes is that, unless consciousness of the demands of justice and liberty is supplemented by the politically effective use and development of informal and affective resources like solidarity and an uncompromising commitment to and identification with cooperative non-violent problem-solving as the unique means of settling conflicts, humanity might be successful at designing democratic national and international institutions and yet not have come closer to living under peaceful conditions²⁸. If this were true, then it is clear in what sense the purely institutionalist enlightenment ideal is defective. Since the complete satisfaction of all the constraints it imposes on international relations is compatible with persisting warfare, it cannot count as what it claims to be, namely a conception that uniquely specifies what it is for global conditions to be peaceful. The question is whether Addams is right. To consider this question, it is useful to distinguish between two dimensions in which Addams places the new ideals—that is, the affective relations and potentials she vindicates as indispensable complements to the enlightenment ideal—to play a decisive role.

On the one hand, she endows these relations with the *theoretical* task to develop a better theoretical concept of peace. In particular, she claims they are needed as additional components in the analysis of international relations to dispel the problem of utopianism, viz., that peace cannot be politically obliging because it is, as a matter of fact, impossible. At this theoretical level, the attitudes, affections and relationships she averts to serve her as indis-

28. That this is behind the problem I just quoted becomes clear when we add her apparently skeptical observation that «it remains to be seen whether or not democratic rule will diminish war», since, precisely *when* popular sovereignty is exercised under *militaristic* or success-by-elimination-of-competitor based cultural conditions, «it becomes easy to deny the moral basis of self-government and to substitute militarism». She concludes that, for democratically constituted social conditions to count as seeking peace, «this *attitude* must disappear». It is quite remarkable that an author who was writing these lines in 1907, under the impression of general enthusiasm of the power of democratically constituted nations like the US, France and the British Empire to conquer the world and, nominally, acquire the ability to «democratize» the imperialistically added territories, that such an author already then was clear-sighted enough to discern the grave dangers and conceptual shortcomings of what political scientists much later would call the (erroneous) idea of «democratic peace», which many take (erroneously) as, e.g., Kant's main argument. For a discussion of this with respect to Kant, cf. Kleingeld (2006).

pensable additional evidence against this impossibility-claim and in support of the expectation of possible peace. To the degree that these attitudes successfully supply such evidence, and the expectation of peace remains unlikely without them, the practices in which these attitudes are articulated become tangible as indispensable additional elements of any ideal set of conditions that could, for all we know, sustain lasting peace. Theoretically, Addams' new ideals aim at showing why peace is not impossible if the affective and solidary relations she calls attention to are acknowledged as part our conception of peace.

On the other hand, as we saw, Addams also claims an important role for the new ideals at the *practical-political* level of making and legitimizing decisions between war and peace, and therefore for the pursuit of policies aimed at establishing a lasting global peace-regime. Her argument here is this: Given that the traditional conception views mutual agreements and legally codified relations as the only constitutive condition for non-violent international relations, breaches of such agreements and relations yield a *prima facie* legitimation for assuming non-non-violent reactions, that is, for the use of force to coerce compliance. But this is, as Addams' quote shows, equivalent to giving war and the use of force the status of a default option for political decision-making in cases of international conflict. Going to war, as opposed to attempting non-violent conflict resolution, is *de facto* treated as the standard option not in need of special legitimation. At the practical-political level, it is therefore of paramount importance for the success of actually pursuing peace to uncover additional reasons that counterbalance this bias in favor of the use of force or even are able to permanently remove it from its position as the option of choice in case of conflict. Addams accordingly is at pains to portray her new ideals at supplying additional political resources in favor of non-violent management of international conflicts. In the long term, the ability to continuously appeal to these resources by political decision-makers ought to help replace the war-bias of the traditional conceptions by its opposite. Being available to citizens and decision-makers, adequate attention to the beliefs, values and attitudes embodied in solidary practices seems to Addams to amount to offering a fountain of rational resistance against decisions to go to war that is erroneously left aside by reliance on stated opinions of citizens as the standard form of possibly decision-making reasons.

It is instructive to distinguish Addams' point here from sheer idealism, with which Addams' position has occasionally been associated or even confused²⁹. The normative point of the seemingly practical concern within Addams' view is fairly obvious. Should it turn out that the ideal of peace thus

29. Elshstain (2002) is a representative of this tendency. For a recent, more differentiated appreciation of the complexities of Jane Addams' own developmental progressivism that accounts for, while also relativizes and correctly situates whatever may appear «idealist» in her philosophy of peace as ultimately *naturalistic* in opposition to a problematic idealism such as Kropotkin's, cf. Eddy, Beth (2010).

augmented does, while the old ideal does not at least cohere with, or even warrant the expectation of *generalized peaceful conflict management*, then it follows that, *if* we ought to seek peace (as the agreed upon moral standpoint demands), *then* we ought to foster, support, legally protect and furnish the means to perform the solidary practices. Solidary action becomes an *imputable part* of whatever moral ideal is at the basis of our commitment to peace. Thus, Addams' appeal to attention to such practical realizations of «humanism» is in fact a pointer to *implied obligations*, not to good-will or even the good in human nature. She dismisses policy proposals based solely on the dubitable fact of sane human feelings as «sentimentalism», which dismissal we ought to take extremely seriously even if it appears confusing at first in a philosopher who so much insists on the systematic role that emotions and affectively articulated attitudes play in *justification and conception*³⁰. Addams takes these practices and their content as *data* for the *missing normative substance*, i.e., the rights of those benefiting from the outcomes of solidary activities, the institution of which is as mandatory as the institution of the already recognized «human rights» if international organizations are to be expressive of a commitment to peace remains mere lip-service for being based on an incoherent conception.

Let me now consider whether Addams is right on each of the levels I mentioned: whether conceptually the enlightenment ideal is compatible with persistent use of force, and whether politically, it incorporates a systematic bias in favor of the use of force. We saw that Addams identified the problem for the enlightenment ideal that the complete satisfaction of all the constraints it imposes on international relations is compatible with persisting warfare. When we follow Addams in making use of the probabilistic and interaction-analytic framework developed in the pragmatist tradition to unpack the mutual expectations that are warranted under the conditions established by the enlightenment ideal, both of her points quickly become evident³¹. For, as

30. Thus, I believe it at best preliminarily useful to subsume Jane Addams under philosophical agendas that stress the emotional *against* the rational articulation of practical attitudes, as can often be found in the feminist literature that favorably reacts to her work. In our context, one example of such an approach can be found in Poe, Danielle (2008).
31. Admittedly, Addams seems to smudge matters in many places by merely exploiting the pragmatist *genetic* account of the role of practices in canvassing social sentiments as effective reasons in decision making. Thus, she repeatedly insists that the moral code grew out of solidarity and emotion» (12), or «that in the progress of society sentiments and opinions have come first, then habits of action and lastly moral codes» (8). But that would not clarify how moral sentiments could act as *rational* impediments once the reflective stage of decision-making by weighing reasons is reached. Unless we are given *rational* constraints on decision-making that are more stringent than those explicated in traditional theories (or «older ideals») of peace, we cannot come to understand why Addams' newer ideals should make it more reasonable to expect a progress to peace. After all, in acquiring the ability to make reflective and reasoned decisions, people can override all sorts of feelings, so why should solidary feelings not be capable of being overridden by presumed insights in the way the real world works in the same way as, say, hostility to large men is overridden by the insights in the irrelevance of stature to moral character?

long as civic and international relations are seen as based merely on the trust evidenced by mutual agreements and the shared acceptance of common laws, possible breaches of such agreements directly and irreversibly offer direct evidence against the attribution of a commitment to these institutionalized social relations to the other party. In such cases, and on the (theoretical) assumption that mutual agreements are the only constitutive condition for presuming social responsibility to others or other communities, the (practical-political) rational basis for the belief that oneself or one's community has *any* ties, duties or cooperative responsibilities from relating to the other is undermined. Under the disappearance of mutual trust, however, the other is under this model demoted to the status of a natural threat, which may, if it appears to be efficient, warrant military action. In any event, the evidence in question always supports decisions in favor of the use of force as *legitimate*, given that only agreements could present demonstrative evidence indicting them. This is equivalent to taking the use of force as the default legitimate option in cases of broken or unavailable agreements. The older, institution-based ideals therefore face the problem of explaining how it is *reasonable* to expect progress to peace and how, once decision-makers have run out of reasons based on existing and followed agreements by other nations, non-violent actions can be rationally legitimized against instrumentally more efficient competing courses of action that imply the use of force. Just as Addams observes, this challenges the institutionalist conception of peace at the theoretical level because the evidence from interaction-constraints it admits is not sufficient to exclude the rational, pervasive and persistent choice of policies of using force against other nations in case of conflicts. It challenges the older ideal at the practical-political level because in construing contingent breaches of agreements by other nations as sufficient reason to justify the use of force, this ideal places systematically higher burdens of proof on the political defense of non-violent solutions and thus promotes if anything, then not the pursuit of peace, but the acceptance of the use of force. Addams' claim that the older ideal of peace is *conceptually* and *politically* incomplete thus seems well motivated. In this sense, she is also right in saying that it cannot count as offering a full grasp of the significance of the full range of entailments of the ideal of peace. The key point in this argument is to re-direct the focus from moral foundations to interactional biases (a very typically pragmatist movement), and then to show that the normative significance of the concept of peace is not exhausted by fully spelling out its moral and juridical foundations. Even if we granted Kant, as the representative of old ideals, to have achieved the latter, there would still be a need for new ideals to solve the problem of the irreversibility of breakdowns in peaceful conflict resolution.

4. Practically articulated New Ideals: a sample solution to a practical-political problem of older ideals

Let me now turn to the question what exactly the contribution of Addams' new ideals to an improved understanding of the entailments of a commitment to a genuine ideal of peace is. How can the solitary practices and affective attitudes articulated in them complete moral and institution-centered conceptions of peace? Given that it is evidence for demonstrating that the alleged factual impossibility of peace is a figment, I first want to explain how Addams' appeal to practices of tendentially global solidarity and the affective resources that are articulated in them helps to reveal political reasons for the view that even societies at war have to favor *in fact by necessity* non-violent conflict-resolution over the use of force against other nations. To repeat, her argument here is that practical (as opposed to, say, transcendental) conditions sometimes are able to constrain normative decisions and deliberations by the fact that following the (proposed, or alleged) norms (like the permission to use force as a means of politics) requires the satisfaction of these conditions in the *first place*. In this limited sense, her argument excavates practically «prior» conditions, in this case, inevitably peaceful and cooperative conditions at the basis of norms the realization of which entails military activities. If such conditions are required for the successful performance of military activities, then it is wrong to assume that mere breaches of agreements by other nations alone already offer sufficient reasons for the use of force to coerce compliance, because there remain many other relationships of (required, even if not realized as such, for whatever ideological and propagandistic reasons) mutual solidarity among the *citizens* of these nations. It is incorrect, according to Addams, to take the breakdown of institutionalized agreements as a sufficient reason to permit war (because peace would be impossible otherwise) because in addition, there are commitments on the side of each of the potentially warring parts that are articulated in the nurturing practices that are even required by the functioning of the armies, and these commitments are shared by those whose needs are satisfied by the performance of these practices—that is, by the citizens of *both* nations. Therefore, even if there is a disagreement or even a breakdown of agreements, it is not the case as if there were no entitlement to being treated and respected as someone needing nurture and care on the side of the citizens. Such entitlement, in turn, could be sufficient to trump the considerations that support the alleged entitlement to go to war.

I want to exemplify Addams' point with a view on practices of producing nurture and care that occupied the better part of her post WWI theorizing, *Peace and Bread in Time of War*³². Her argument is as simple as it is compelling. According to the institutionalist ideal, given a breach of an agreement and assuming that this is equivalent to the absence of mutual obligations, war is permissible to coerce compliance. In case of a chance for a nation

32. Addams, Jane (1945).

to win more from another nation in a war than by any negotiated solution, the institutionalist conception of peace is compatible with the conclusion that it is sometimes more advantageous to respond with war to breaches of agreements than in terms of non-violent solutions. Indeed, the institutionalist ideal even allows identifying certain conditions in which, *under observation of all constraints the ideal imposes*, war is (*ceteris paribus*) rationally the uniquely best political action. Since this decision covers all the available relevant reasons, it has to count as legitimate, too. On this background, Addams argues as follows: for every war, it is a necessary empirical condition that each of the fighting parts of the population in the warring nations be provided with basic goods like nutrition and healthcare, because as soldiers, they do not contribute to the production of basic goods like bread and shelter. Thus, where there is war, it presupposes ongoing non-violent and cooperative practices of nurture and care by the non-fighting parts of the population (at the time, mostly women). The decision for using force and non-cooperative conflict resolution thus always presupposes sustenance by a broader and in fact more prevalent background of non-violent, co-operative practices and values that are sensitive to the needs of others in virtue of their being all equally vulnerable. Moreover, given the similarity of nutritional and healthcare needs among members of different nations, the corresponding activities and thus the purposes, values and beliefs involved in these productive practices are by and large the same in all nations who are involved in armed conflict. Thus, wherever there is war, there necessarily is a large set of shared beliefs, values and non-violently articulated nurturing attitudes and problem-solutions on the part of all the non-fighting parts of the nations involved in this war. Therefore, the decision to go to war always necessarily rests on a tacit background of actually existing, functioning and ongoing relationships of objectively shared concern and purposes between the individual members of warring nations in point of satisfying the basic needs of the fighting and the non-fighting parts of each population. Hence, any defense or legitimization of going to war as opposed to attempting non-violent solutions can *never* count as a demonstration of war as the *uniquely best and most essential policy* of a given community if it is not at the same time a defense of the *de facto* common practices articulating trans-nationally shared basic interests. As a consequence, it is simply *false* to regard the use of force as default-legitimate in case of breaches of agreements once we pay attention to the practices that are sensitive to and built around the production of nurture and care for those in need. We might as well take the objectively existing and practically articulated and expressed shared needs as a basis for the opposite decision. Likewise, and for the same reason, it is also simply *false* to regard relations based on explicit and legally codifiable relations as the only relevant relations among nations *considered as compounds of individuals with such needs* as are at issue in the corresponding practices.

A possible objection to this line of reasoning from what is known as the «realist» standpoint in political science actually helps to enhance and generalize its point. The objection is this: How about going to war *in order to supply*

food for one's own population in a situation where such supply would be possible without war as well but, in the view of the government, more costly, or more difficult to organize (e.g., with an unwilling population)? Suppose, that is, that going to war is, in the view of those with the authority to make the decision between war and peace, less costly overall than to provide the social services by peaceful means. Wouldn't the bias for care and nurture likewise favor war in this case? In response, let us suppose for a moment that this is in fact true in a given case, and based on sound accounting (which is, at least for the usual case, false). Even so, this scenario serves to show that even such a «war of the hungry» presupposes that there exists, somewhere, a functioning, non-violent, productive set of cooperative relations for the production of food, healthcare, etc. «Non-violent» does not, incidentally, mean that it has to be «voluntary», as commissioned war production illustrates. But even this requires more than military equipment and practices. You can't eat guns and bombed terrain. The simple fact is that, for there to be food at all somewhere, there cannot be war everywhere. Thus, it is impossible to generalize the relevant policy recommendation («whenever you need nurture, go to war»), since universal warfare and nurture are pragmatically incompatible. But, and this is the important point, the reverse is coherent. Universal nurturing cooperation is a coherent ideal, and as such, it already underlies a great many «naturally occurring» practices (i.e., we don't need to invent anything here). It thus forms a *de facto* default position even for those societies that decide to go to war, even though it may not be recognized as such by the decision-making processes. By way of this asymmetry, Addams' argument is able to demonstrate (in a next-to-transcendental fashion) why the militarist bias *cannot* be sustained but must always count as parasitic, or at least exceptional.

Given the content and paradigmatic examples of Addams' newer ideals mentioned before and the problem of the older problems just outlined, we can now see the basic idea behind the claim that raising our expectations with regard to lasting peace requires attention to *affective* elements in the process of political decision-making. It arises out of the second function of newer ideals, that of offering a source of pervasive social and, ultimately, universal human *affective* resistance against the actions required for the reversals that hold our expectation of lasting peace based on the resources of the older ideals of peace hostage. The acknowledgment of the *content expressed in* beliefs, values, attitudes and deliberate actions involved in nationality-neutral, topic-oriented solidary *practices* as described by Addams' «New Ideals» would, as it were, further peace by adding to moral and legal beliefs and international agreements an element of *aversion* against violence and warfare. These practices articulate, as their content, compound affective wholes that sustain each of these practices, and which are responsive to and thereby implicitly acknowledging and endorsing shared basic human needs in each community. Making these needs available to decision making would enable an awareness of such an aversion by *giving those engaged in these practices and the affectively encoded relationships among populations proper hearing in deliberations*. In this sense, Addams'

insistence on the importance of paying attention to these practices reckons with, but also adds to the necessary condition of stably peaceful transnational relations that Kant identified as the global adoption of democratic procedures; what this attention adds are *standard* constraints without which these necessary conditions are not genuinely advancing the cause for peace. For only once such dispositions were accorded their proper weight in political decision-making, war would not just be the least efficient, most risky and most wasteful and the least morally desirable option (although Addams assents to all of the above, too) but at the outset the least plausible. In this way, proper attention and promotion of empirically existing solidary practices and their objective sources in trans-nationally shared needs and granted individual entitlements (such as to food, shelter and healthcare) would enable the recognition of previously disqualified reasons —being also even if not foremost implicit acknowledgments of rights of those whose needs these practices addressed— and practically expressed and thereby universally accessible *evidence* in decisions between war and peace. Given that what these formerly unattended reasons exploit are non-violent coordinative structures and values that are *presupposed* by any realization of war *and peace*, and demonstrating actual collective commitments to their moral significance by pointing to ongoing solidary practices rationally should revise the bias in favor of the use of force that was built into the impoverished conception of international and social relations of the institutionalist ideal.

5. How affective attitudes contribute to a solution of the theoretical problem of older ideals

With these considerations regarding the justificatory function of the background of affective attitudes towards others as fellow human beings in place, the solution to the theoretical problem left over by the institutionalist conception is almost obvious. As mentioned before, the theoretical task of Addams' emphasis on solidary practices and the affective attitudes they articulate is to supply additional constraints to this conception of peace that warrants the assumption that peace is not impossible, in order to develop a concept of global peace that is incompatible with an arbitrary number of rational decisions to resort to armed hostility and the systematically higher likelihood of war as compared to peace. If these additional constraints were to succeed better in delineating conditions that satisfy these requirements than the institutionalist view, then we could conclude that Addams' additions are indeed an integral part of a concept of global peace. By showing that peace is not impossible under the conditions required by this concept, Addams' additional evidence would also contribute to the defense of peace as a political obligation and spell out what *other* commitments following this obligation entails.

As we saw in our discussion of the example of bread-work at the practical-political level, Addams' new ideals are to function as an obstacle to the inevitable

degeneration of occasions of distrust into fight by complementing the trust articulated by mutual agreements between nations and their governments by something like the existing information about an affective, culturally encoded bias against war that is relatively independently carried by a background of primarily practical, local and informal relationships of concrete mutual concern. Addams thus broadens, in typically pragmatist fashion³³, the range of available information in reasoning, belief-formation, justification and decision making from the contents that are available via articulate propositional beliefs to those available in other forms of expression, like the performative achievements of actually ongoing interpersonal practices. Given this additional information, even when we have reason to distrust other nations or individuals on the level of propositionally articulated beliefs, we would still by default not regard war as an option. Theoretically, this is equivalent to integrating the information afforded by the existence of these practices, or even by their practitioners into our estimates regarding the likely outcomes of the series of political decision-making that makes up human history. In other words, it is equivalent to correcting the implicitly assumed bias towards violent or at least not peaceful conflict resolution that lead to the problems for the old ideals by another, empirically *and* systematically *prior* bias or baseline³⁴.

We can now present a probabilistic argument with the conclusion that was theoretically needed, namely: that peace is not impossible, that contrasts the evidence available to those who decide between war and peace in a given case under attention to solitary practice and the evidence available without such attention. If the population of potentially warring nations is made aware of the beliefs presupposed in these solitary practices, and thus of the reasons guiding their own actions as a society at large, then these beliefs can become a (previously unattended) relevant *deliberative* factor in the choice between war and peace. Now, insofar as society is the ultimate source of political decision-making, that is, to the degree that political decision making is democratic, these beliefs offer a previously unexploited resource of evidence against violent conflict-management, or at least a resource of evidence that is independent of the agreements and legal obligations accepted by the adoption of international

33. That Addams relies on the pragmatist background is indicated in her references to substituting «the scientific method of research for the a priori method of the schoolmen» (Addams 2007, 28), and that «the social point of view be kept paramount, realizing at the same time that the social sentiments [...] must be enlightened, disciplined and directed by the fullest knowledge» (Addams 2007, 11).
34. Even so, I think it is taking things too far in this direction to attribute to Addams an anticipation of so-called «standpoint-epistemologies» (as §3 of Hamington (2007) suggests), but she certainly was after additional evidence that was suppressed in a male-dominated, militaristically spirited mainstream culture. If the point of this attribution is to say that Addams not only had a human concern, but extremely good and valid epistemological arguments, then what I outline is further material for stressing this. Two Addams-interpreters who share my view that Addams' peace-theory (as well as her theory of cultural democratization) is best understood when taken as making a serious epistemic point are MacMullan (2001) and Pratt (2004).

conventions. Thus, in proportion to the prevalence of democratic decision-making within each nation and to the awareness of reasons to act underlying solitary practices among the people that would tip the balance against war, the expected frequency of rationally considering war as an option in the case of broken contracts is no longer close to 100%, as in the case where every breach presented a breakdown of mutual obligations, but lower to the degree that these other considerations are given their proper weight. Thus, in the case of broken contracts, the overall probability of resorting to war decreases. Since broken agreements are the most egregious instance of conflicts among nations, the same reasoning applies to lesser conflicts as well. Therefore, an overall increase in peace becomes more likely than under conditions in which the main support for non-violent social and international relations is derived from the behavior towards agreements.

In summary, notwithstanding much of her rhetoric, the real contribution of Addams' use of paradigmatic cases of solitary action to peace-theory is neither that of offering these practices themselves as models for international conduct (as if we could naively read off the solidarity within inner-city immigrant colonies recipes for global politics)³⁵. It is also not that of appealing to the softness of heart and the moral sentiments that dwell supposedly beneath the surface of aggressive and competitive behavior in industrialized capitalist societies. Her highly original contribution is rather that of discovering the epistemic role of the cognitive entailments of *enacting* moral sentiments in collective practical and institutional ways of confronting social and economic basic needs. By changing the focus from natural history as hoped for and the participation of the wisdom of experts in moral philosophy in politics to the microstructure of how history is made by spontaneous responses to actual and universally recognizable human needs and precariousnesses and the contribution that local activists make to bringing them into the open by giving them an articulation in the form of nation-blind, non-violent solitary practices (which in due course can themselves become institutionalized), Addams discovers the needed resistance to the problem of radical evil, or the rational degeneration of breaches of agreements into the inevitable likelihood of armed conflicts that threaten as much Kant's as the institutionalist conception with impossibility proofs for peace. Armed with this additional resource, she can thus offer a coherent concept of peace, avoid the threat of inevitable degeneration and thus more successfully defend the view that it is a political obligation and part of our moral point of view to seek peace.

35. This is the, correctly ridiculed, position attributed to Jane Addams' use of her paradigms in Elshstain 2002, 202, as well as 218-20. However, as Carroll and Fink in their criticism of Elshstain in the «Introduction to the Illinois Edition» (2007) equally correctly observe, it is not a position held by Addams (cf. lv-lx). My remarks give another reason why this also *should* not be Addams' stance.

6. Consequences for our understanding of the ideal of lasting peace

The consequences of Addams' often implicit arguments are threefold. They concern a) rather technical philosophical lessons that align Addams' thought with ideas that we find in the pragmatist tradition, and, insofar as her writings predate the writings of other pragmatists, qualify her as anticipating these thoughts, b) the conceptual coherence of the particular traditional understandings of the ideal of peace, and c) the structure of practical-political justification and evidence in making decisions between war and peace, as well as in motivating the expectation of possible global increments of peaceful relations among nations. While a) is of mainly philosophical-historical interest, b) and c) yield direct insights into political obligations accruing from a commitment to peace as an ideal as well as elements of a political theory apt to formulate better criteria for global peaceful conditions.

- a) We saw that Addams sets out from the discovery of a serious flaw in the explanation of the significance of the ideal of lasting peace along traditional, institution-based conceptions of international relations. In order to appreciate Addams' philosophical originality with regard to developing a characteristically pragmatist approach to history and political justification, it may be helpful to remind ourselves of the already quite well prepared philosophical landscape in which her discovery is embedded. In spite of Kant's rejection of the definition of peace as the absence of armed hostilities between nations, the content of the traditional ideal of peace remained limited to the vision of a network of treaties and agreements among nation states. However, it turns out that in cases of the mere possibility of breaches of agreements, it was conceptually difficult to understand the state of affairs that would realize this vision as presenting a condition of lasting global peace. Kant himself saw such a problem when considering the possibility of radical evil and attempting to put his conception of cosmopolitanism on a footing that was apt to lead even a «people of devils» to a more peaceful state of global affairs. According to him, if it is to be rational to expect and to be obliged to work for peace, we have to add the anticipation of a natural history of progress and development towards peace. This history would be driven by moral politicians whose political decision-making is inclusive of and limited by the insights of philosophers who see beyond the appearance of constant warfare and who are able to design and carve out the right kinds of structures and agreements to break the legal permissiveness regarding armed conflict. Only under these *empirical conditions* would the moral ideal, when coupled with an institutionalized and juridified set of cooperative agreements among individually democratized nations, allow expecting the *possibility of peace*. But, as Kant clearly saw, peace as an ideal can only be politically *obliging* if the latter expectation is warranted, for only such an expectation (or an equivalent) undermines the indirect justification of warfare as a means of international relations that results from the consistent possibility of holding that peace might

be a moral ideal but not a political obligation since, as a matter of fact, it is not possible.

The important feature of this argument for understanding the point of Addams' reasoning is that it acknowledges in an oblique way that our understanding of peace is not purely *a priori*, and that the *content* of the concept —above all, the fact that it is not empty— is sensitive to the empirical conditions under which it is applied. Addams' reasoning can then be understood as exercising typically pragmatist insights of two sorts: epistemological and conceptual. On the one hand, Addams' very idea of reconstructing, renewing and to a degree revising the «old ideal» itself carries the pragmatist conviction on its sleeve that purported conceptual justifications for actions, norms, decisions are sensitive to revisions in light of the empirical conditions and consequences of their application. Such a position only makes so much as sense if we accept that there is no belief, even if it is either apparently or actually *a priori*, that could be assumed to be guaranteed not to come under critical appraisal and eventually rational revision in light of experience, application, the empirical realization of what the belief says. In our case, this would be the belief that whatever *a priori* moral philosophy warrants as normative commitments of peace is all there is to understanding what the required policies and actions are to be driving at. On the other hand, in a related way Addams' insistent and passionate investigation renders a brilliant example of the so-called pragmatic maxim, which in this case would minimally imply that the content of the concept of peace cannot be fully spelled out without reference to the practical consequences that adopting it as a guiding principle for policy making has. For, it is in light of the incoherence of these practical consequences that Addams is able to discern that traditional, institution-based explications of the concept were lacking a decisive further set of conditions, the conditions of peace-generating, or at least paradigmatically non-violent needs and practices of a nation-blind sort, which could anchor structures of mutual commitments even in the absence of, or under the breach of agreements. Thus, the other typically pragmatist feature without which Addams' arguments cannot be understood is the assumption that conceptual content is sensitive to empirical information, and thus the «meaning» of a concept neither fixed once and for all, but also not fully determinable unless we add information about the paradigmatic samples that fall under them, and the typical contexts in which applying the concept would yield a correct statement. In our case, the statement about world affairs, or the relations among two nations to the effect that «nation A and nation B are at peace». Of course, it is then a small step to argue that it is only knowing the meaning of the term «peace» that we know, first, whether or not we are obliged to seek peace and second, if we are so obliged, what counts as fulfilling our duties under this obligation, or at least trying to do so. One final but not entirely unimportant pragmatist feature of Addams' approach is her acknowledgment that propositionally structured, potentially verbalizable attitudes are not the only, and

not the only relevant source of justificatorily relevant information even in the arena of political decision making. Larger practical involvements of collectively active individuals like food-aid work can articulate needs, just as empathetically perceived pictures of suffering can correct the assumption that everything is, as far as we see, well-ordered. But it is not only as *data* that such *affective* attitudes are relevant, but, as we saw, also as a bias-forming *prior of decision-making*. In both ways, cognitive units that are either larger than propositions or smaller enter crucially into our normative assessments. Counting such affective states as such as possible sources of justificatorily relevant information is, if anything, the most fundamental insight and plight of classical philosophical pragmatism.

- b) With these rather technical aspects as a backdrop, it is now easy to see that, as regards the conceptual analysis of the ideal of peace, Addams' «New Ideals» argue that this ideal offers a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of the circumstances under which lasting peace is to be expected. As she sees, even under such conditions, there is a coherent possibility for an arbitrary number of individually justifiable military confrontations from minimal breaches of agreements. Thus, the very idea that such conditions *alone* would allow the expectation of a *continuous practice of international peace* becomes problematic. As soon as Kant's «natural history» is viewed as Addams sees it, as a series of political decisions and actions, at every node of the decision tree making up the series, there is a non-zero probability of breaches of agreements, each one of which conceptually entails the breakdown of non-violent relations and thus the possibility of justifiable warfare. In short, even equipped with the set of institutions and agreements, as well as the expertise of philosophers in government, it is rational to expect war to be much more likely than peace under the traditional conception because of the inevitable presence of judgment-calls in a series of interlocking decisions and interactions between nations that are conceived of as individual agents. Now, if this were right, then Kant's own reasoning that there cannot be a political ought where there is an empirical impossibility would apply in probabilistic form. Given the high likelihood of decisions to go to war that are nonetheless rationalizable *under full observance of Kantian constraints*, even if there is a moral ought, the attendant expectation that a comprehensive and lasting global peace is possible comes under the serious strain to appear highly utopian. By Kant's own lights, this immediately means that the corresponding political obligation to seek peace is in trouble, too. In this way, the project to explain the content of a politically obliging ideal of peace along traditional institutionalist lines *alone* fails. Whence Addams' thesis that, if any expectation of lasting peace is to be warranted at all, additional moral, motivational and evidential resources need to be integrated in the very conception of what conditions are like that would allow the expectation of lasting global peace. In a way, her arguments correct our understanding of what additional constraints

we need to meet and work under when we commit ourselves to the moral ideal of peace. Her «New Ideals» claim to identify some of these additional resources and constraints, such as are expressed in what we would call nowadays NGO-activism and other forms of spontaneous solidary action.

- c) If we accept this reasoning and Addams' conclusion, then we accept the normative significance for the pursuit of the political obligation to seek lasting inner and outer peace of spontaneously emerging, non-violent social practices that are concerned with and receptive to the satisfaction of basic needs. Their normative significance resides at least in part in their capacity to bring to the fore otherwise suppressed and unattended reasons for political action and for lacunae in our success of institutionally securing that others are treated as equals. Another important part of their significance stems from their particular structure of presenting nationality-blind non-violent cooperations among individuals with shared needs, and thus tend to undermine the simplifying assumption that modern, multi-ethnic or at least multi-cultural nation states are individual collective agents, instead of organized wholes of individuals whose needs and therefore also entitlements to rights tend to transcend national boundaries quite easily. Solidarity with respect to such basic needs of *human beings as individual organisms* thus possesses a transnational tendency that the traditional conception of international relations overlooks, as much as a potential to build from as a reason-giving constraint on the justification of decisions to go to war. In promoting peace, we therefore also ought to promote and vindicate the conditions and successful pursuit of solidary action, as well as the investigation of the grounds for the emergence of such practices. On the one hand, the fact that such trans-national spontaneous solidary action exists among people of varied nationalities and cultural backgrounds presents empirical counterevidence to the implicit presumption that, generally, war is the human reality where peace is a mere ideal. On the other hand, the fact that the corresponding interactive commitments and affective structures of mutual assistance can be developed and, in certain cases, are already in place on a sub-institutional, interpersonal level in the international context provides an, admittedly initially very small but potentially incremental affective potential against violence upon those we are related to as companions and fellow human beings, a potential that could amount to enabling a continuation of non-violent conflict management even under conditions of breaches of agreements. Promoting the voices of such extra-governmental and sub-institutional agents is thus a much more significant additional piece of information for the decision to go to war than Kant's dream of leaders being influenced by moral philosophers.

In a slogan, we could say that we are driven to recognize the inseparable connection between support for the strife for social justice and egalitarian practices on the one hand, and the measure of an expectation of success for our commitment to peace on the other. While it would be

absurd to claim that every need articulated in a spontaneous non-violent practice of mutual assistance in the satisfaction of this need constitutes the germ of potential entitlement for humanity at large, it does not seem absurd to say that it is only under optimally supported conditions of cultural, social and economic development possible to excavate as many needs as humanity can articulate. As Addams' arguments teach us, we cannot claim, by providing agreements and international regulations among national governments, to have captured all the potential of whatever needs might turn out to be universal and basic. In order to be closer to that claim, there is an irreducible informative value to solitary practices for judging which of the needs taken care of in them warrant the institution of proper rights, namely the right of only suffering the need that the corresponding practice responds to if it is inevitable that every human being suffers the same need in the same way. For very basic needs like food, clothing and shelter, Addams has made that case, and has been heard by a large community of peace theorists until today who include as a matter of course policies of economic and social development in the catalogue of the requirements for the pursuit of global peace³⁶. If, as Kant argued, the pursuit of lasting global peace is part and parcel of our moral point of view, arguments like those of Jane Addams can show that this pursuit is only coherent when the rights that are required by the procedures of legitimation for legal norms are supplemented by *all practical pursuits* that carry information about what the rights of each human being ought to be. As we saw, without such added information, we are left with formulating necessary but definitely insufficient reasons for believing that peace is possible, and hence hostage to the militaristic bias that breaches of agreements at the transnational level tend to directly justify military intervention. Once we factor in the commitments articulated in solitary action, breaches of agreements are not the last peaceful word and the first step into violent confrontation. This is the positive, conceptual side of her arguments. However, this also clearly serves to show that our commitment to peace, which stems from our commitment to the moral point of view, is not as cheap as traditionally thought. This is the negative upshot of Addams' arguments, and a characteristically pragmatist one at that. In a nutshell, her arguments show that it is only in the context of a maximally fostered world of ongoing, practically performed solitary activities that such commitments erstwhile can acquire some articulation. We therefore, in pursuing peace, are impossibly done with thinking things through and making a one-time decision to adopt certain rules. Rather, we have to set in motion and take charge of an ongoing process of development and active detection of needs. For, if our pursuit of peace and the attention to the substance of solitary practices demanded by it bring to the fore

36. Cf., as one example among many, Senghaas (2007).

needs without the satisfaction of which classical political human rights would be not worth having, or a shallow equipment to have in view of one's needs, then averting the persistence of such needs by granting the right to have them equally satisfied whenever they are satisfied *somewhere* on the planet and committing to policies of lending such entitlements empirical force would be equally part and parcel of our pursuit of peace, and thereby of our moral point of view. As Addams' pragmatist arguments can be taken to show, success in solidarity is not only reason for humanitarian joy, but also the source of probabilistically relevant reasons in support of the pursuit of higher and more difficult aims like global peacemaking. Addams' passionate arguments remind us that, whether we like it or not, and whether we see it or not, we can no longer deny having future-directed commitment and task to seek global peace with all its entailments once we embark on charitable and remedial policies at all. Once we become aware of ourselves and our spontaneous actions that are apparently fueled by moral sentiments, there may be fewer reasons for joy and self-contentment than reasons to take on the incomparably harder and more arduous task to really practically work, vote for and advocate a better and more peaceful world. This call for practical work, engagement and public intervention is definitely «more aggressive» than traditional forms of humanitarian concern and peace theorizing. There is not only a lot to learn from Addams, but above all, a lot left to do for us who claim her lessons.

References

- ADDAMS, Jane (2007). *Newer Ideals of Peace*. Chicago, Urbana: University of Illinois Press (orig. 1907).
- (1916). *The Long Road of Women's Memory*. New York: MacMillan.
- (1945). *Peace and Bread in Time of War*. New York: King's Crown Press.
- CARROLL, B.A. and FINK, C.F. (2007). Introduction to the Illinois Edition of *Newer Ideals of Peace*. Chicago, Urbana: University of Illinois Press (orig. 1907).
- DEWEY, John (1927). *The Outlawry of War*. Chicago: Willett, Clark & Colby.
- (1972). *Theory of Valuation*. Chicago: Chicago University Press (orig. 1939).
- EDDY, Beth (2010). «Struggle or Mutual Aid: Jane Addams, Petr Kropotkin, and the Progressive Encounter with Social Darwinism». *The Pluralist*, 5 (1), 21-43.
- ELSHTAIN, Jean Bethke (2002). *Jane Addams and the Dream of American Democracy*. New York: Basic Books.
- GUYER, Paul (2006). *Kant*. London, New York: Routledge.
- HABERMAS, Juergen (1996). «Kants Idee de ewigen Friedens-aus dem historischen Abstand von 200 Jahren». In: HABERMAS, J. *Die Einbeziehung des Anderen*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 192-236.
- HAMINGTON, Maurice (2007). Jane Addams. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/addams-jane/>. Accessed: 09-22-2010.
- KLEINGELD, Pauline (2006). «Kant's theory of peace». In: GUYER, P. (ed.). *The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 477-504.

- MACMULLAN, Terrance (2001). «On War as Waste: Jane Addams' Pragmatic Pacifism». *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, 15 (2), 86-104.
- MCCARTHY, Tom (2009). *Race, Empire and the Idea of Human Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- POE, Danielle (2008). «Replacing Just War Theory with an Ethics of Sexual Difference». *Hypatia*, 23 (2), 33-47.
- PRATT, James (2004). «Jane Addams: Bread and Patriotism in Time of War». *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*. Volume XXVII, 102-118.
- SENGHAAS, Walter (2007). *On Perpetual Peace*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- WHIGGS, Judy (2004). «Jane Addams's Social Thought as a Model for a Pragmatist-Feminist Communitarianism». *Hypatia*, 19, 118-133.

Axel Mueller is a senior lecturer at Northwestern University. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Frankfurt and specializes in philosophy of language and American pragmatism. He also has interests in the philosophy of science and Kant. He is the author of the book *Referenz und Fallibilismus* (DeGruyter, 2001), a study of Hilary Putnam's thought. He has published articles on the normative structure of inductive concepts and on the relations of scientific practice and realism. He is currently working on an extended analysis of the semantic basis of mental content externalism in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, as well as on the manuscript for a book on Pragmatism (Acumen Press). A longer standing project (within which he has forthcoming work on Quine's and Putnam's views of analyticity) is an investigation of the degree to which contextual elements in referring and scientific practice can disarm underdetermination arguments in the philosophy of science and of language.

Axel Mueller es profesor en la Northwestern University. Recibió su doctorado de la Universidad de Fráncfort y es especialista en filosofía del lenguaje y pragmatismo americano. También se interesa por la filosofía de la ciencia y Kant. Es autor del libro *Referenz und Fallibilismus* (DeGruyter, 2001), un estudio sobre el pensamiento de Hilary Putnam. Ha publicado artículos sobre la estructura normativa de los conceptos inductivos y sobre las relaciones entre práctica científica y realismo. Actualmente está trabajando en un extenso análisis de la base semántica del contenido mental externalista de la *Crítica de la razón pura de Kant* así como en el manuscrito de un libro sobre pragmatismo (editorial Acumen). Un proyecto de mayor alcance (dentro del cual se publicarán trabajos sobre las consideraciones de Quine y Putnam sobre analiticidad) es una investigación sobre el grado en que los elementos contextuales en prácticas referenciales y científicas pueden desarmar argumentos de infradeterminación en la filosofía de la ciencia y del lenguaje.