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Models of reliability of fault-tolerant software under cyber-attacks

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Abstract — This paper offers a new approach to modelling the effect of cyber-attacks on reliability of software used in industrial control applications. The model is based on the view that successful cyber-attacks introduce failure regions, which are not present in non-compromised software. The model is then extended to cover a fault tolerant architecture, such as the 1-out-of-2 software, popular for building industrial protection systems. The model is used to study the effectiveness of software maintenance policies such as patching and "cleansing" ("proactive recovery") under different adversary models ranging from independent attacks to sophisticated synchronized attacks on the channels. We demonstrate that the effect of attacks on reliability of diverse software significantly depends on the adversary model. Under synchronized attacks system reliability may be more than an order of magnitude worse than under independent attacks on the channels. These findings, although not surprising, highlight the importance of using an adequate adversary model in the assessment of how effective various cyber-security controls are.

Keywords— probabilistic model, software reliability, software fault-tolerance, on-demand software, adversary.

I. INTRODUCTION

Cyber-security has affected everyday lives: cyber-fraud is widely spread, serious accidents with safety-critical systems caused by cyber-attacks have been reported. Cyber-security has become a topic affecting even politics¹.

Cyber-security *assessment* has matured in the last decade². Yet, recommendations to deploy specific security controls are often made with no quantification of the benefits these are likely to bring about to a *particular system*. The assessment results, especially when *qualitative* assessment techniques are used, are often difficult to reproduce. Decision makers have difficulties to answer rationally practical questions such as: "How much should I invest in improving cyber-security?", "After spending the available budget on additional cyber-security controls how much better is my system? Have I done enough to secure my system?"

¹ There have been reports of a foreign state attempting to affect the results from the referendum for Scottish independence in 2014, the presidential elections in the US in 2016 and in France in 2017.

Software reliability engineering, on the other hand, has been a mature discipline for several decades. The concept of software reliability and the factors that affect it are well understood. In many industries, high software reliability is achieved following a well-understood process for software reliability assessment.

Software faults (e.g. buffer overflow, etc.) make software vulnerable. Technical literature offers in abundance ingenious tricks that researchers have found to work in specific cases, e.g. obfuscation [1], which can help with a class of vulnerabilities. Often these solutions are taken and applied to a *different context* without proper analyses of how the new context will affect the effectiveness of the solutions that worked well elsewhere. For instance, in [2] the authors use software diversification via obfuscation at compilation time to produce *unique replicas*. This makes the same attack "unlikely to succeed on any two variants". Obfuscation is also used in intrusion tolerant solutions based on software replication, in which Byzantine agreement protocol [3] among replicas is used. This protocol is guaranteed to work correctly only if certain sufficient conditions on the number of simultaneously compromised replicas are met. Obfuscation is seen often as a way of meeting these sufficient conditions with high confidence. Such a belief, however, may be illfounded. As pointed out in [1], variants, obfuscated differently, may crash on the same attack. This, in turn, may lead easily to a violation of the sufficient conditions for the Byzantine agreement protocol to work correctly.

Dealing adequately with cyber-threats requires credible assessment of the effectiveness of cyber-security controls deployed in a particular system. In this paper we develop probabilistic models and use them to analyze the relationship between software reliability and the properties of the anticipated cyberattacks. Our models are built deliberately to operate at a relatively *high level of abstraction*, which makes them applicable to a large class of systems, irrespective of the specific technology used in system design, and suitable to *compare the benefits* that different cyber-security controls can bring.

Probabilistic model for assessment of software reliability and

² A range of standards deal with the assessment of risk from cyber-attacks on industrial control systems, e.g. IEC 62443, ISO/IEC 15408, ISO 27005, etc.

system safety are widely used today. All major international safety standards recommend the use of probabilistic models. Probabilistic modelling has been useful not only in quantitative reliability assessment, but also in addressing some serious misconceptions. A well-known example is the N-version programming. Many believed at the time that a separation of development teams would result in independent failure of software channels. Using probabilistic modelling Eckhardt and Lee [4] showed the fallacy of this belief. Independent development does not guarantee failure independence. Using a similar style of probabilistic modelling in own work [5]we studied how different testing regimes – with individual oracles or back-to back – compared when applied to fault-tolerant software.

These past successes motivated the work presented in this paper. We apply a similar style of *conceptual probabilistic modelling* to both accidental failures and to the effects of cyber-attacks on a *specific* software system and compare the benefits for fault-tolerant software of several popular software maintenance policies.

The modelling approach presented in this paper was developed with cyber-physical systems (CPS) in mind. In such systems software interacts (controls, monitors, etc.) with tangible assets in circumstances, which typically provide *no scope for data theft*. We hope, despite the focus, that some elements of the work might be useful for a broader class of software systems.

The contributions of the paper are as follows:

- A *conceptual model* of software reliability in adverse environment, which accounts for the effects of successful cyber-attacks on software reliability. The model is extended and applied to a 2-channel software system.
- A study of how different *maintenance policies*, such as software patching and software "cleansing" [6], also known as "proactive recovery" [7], (i.e. periodically restoring software to a clean copy, eliminating the consequences of successful cyber-attacks) compare under different scenarios of cyber-attacks.
- A SAN model (Stochastic Activity Networks), used in the studies, is released in the public domain. This can be used by others to analyse practical scenarios of interest.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces informally the problem that we study in the paper. Section 3 formulates a stochastic model of how cyber-attacks affect software reliability. Section 4 presents the main results from the comparison of the efficacy of software patching and cleansing under a range of attack scenarios. In section 5 we discuss the implications of our findings. Section 6 summarizes the related research. Finally, section 7 concludes the paper and outlines directions for future research.

II. INFORMAL PROBLEM STATEMENT

Consider "on-demand" software, i.e. software, which receives demands for processing from its operational environment. Typical examples of on-demand software are various *protection systems*, e.g. of a nuclear power plant or of any other process control plant. In such systems safety is typically achieved by defining a *safe-state*, which the system can enter should the controlled process deviate from the intended safe envelop of operation. The sole purpose of a protection system (typically implemented in software) is to react to such deviations. Demands, processed correctly, will bring the plant to the predefined *safe state*.

Processing a demand by a protection system may involve a very complex sequence of inputs coming from the operational environment – from the initial signal (e.g. that the pressure in a nuclear reactor has exceeded the normal/acceptable level), followed by software reading multiple sensors until the anomaly is established with certainty (or high degree of confidence) and then a transition of the plant to a safe state is executed as needed. We call this entire sequence of sensor readings and transition to a safe state a *demand*. Typically, a complex plant may deviate from its safe operation in many different ways, hence, many different demands on the protection system are possible. Each demand is processed either correctly or may result in a failure³.

Now consider the space of cyber-attacks on on-demand software. Attacks, or *malicious demands*, on a computer platform target various assets that have some value for the attacker, e.g. stealing personal details, such as a bank account, private information such as documents, photos, etc. Examples of malicious demands closer to the particular context of industrial applications would be causing malfunction of equipment, disrupting a protection system, eliminating a safe-state, etc. Providing an exhaustive enumeration of malicious demands is outside the scope of the paper.

Outside the scope of this paper are also malicious demands, which cause the attacked software (or the computer platform) to fail *immediately*. In some cases, defense mechanisms, e.g. the above mentioned obfuscation at compilation time, can block the attack by causing software to crash. Our main concern are successful attacks which *do not lead to immediate failures* but make the software *less reliable*. In other words, our interest centers upon situations, in which successful attacks cause software failures in the future, which without the malicious demands would not have occurred. The *advanced persistent threats* (APT) which seek to compromise software, remain invisible and cause harm in the future, fall within this category.

Malicious demands differ enormously in the *delivery mechanisms* used to reach a target. Exploiting vulnerabilities in a piece of software or its execution environment (operating system, other software components deployed on the same platform/network, etc.) is often combined with aid from human operators – malicious insiders or careless users (e.g. in the case of spear phishing). Malicious demands also vary in terms of the

³ We ignore the complication that processing a demand may result in a *partial* failure. We believe, that with a suitable definition of a test for correctness, this difficulty usually can be overcome.

payload that they deploy to harm the targeted assets⁴. Many malicious demands include carefully crafted routines to erase any traces of a successful malicious demand [9]. Payloads of attacks on specialized process control software lead to lasting alterations of the operation of targeted software. Examples of such threats seen in the past have been documented for different versions of Stuxnet: i) the well documented version 1 of the worm [8] caused harm to the centrifuges used in Iranian enrichment plants by providing incorrect readings about the rotation speed of the centrifuges; ii) an earlier version of the worm - v0.5 [10] - wouldperiodically force various valves in installations to close temporarily, which would cause a pressure rise in pipes. This in turn would affect the production output and even cause physical damage.

Modelling the consequences of malicious demands on the failure behavior of targeted application software is *the main focus of this paper*.

Corrective software maintenance (often referred to as *patch-ing*) fixes bugs that cause software failures irrespective of whether software has been subjected to successful malicious demands or not. In some cases, maintenance is focused on eliminating bugs which may cause failures in operation; in some other cases patching targets specifically known vulnerabilities, which could be exploited by malicious demands. A special form of maintenance is software "self - cleansing" [6] (referred to as *cleansing* for short), in which application software (or the entire platform) is restored to a system state believed to be clean from the effects of malicious demands. Cleansing has been adopted in "proactive intrusion-tolerance" solutions. We model these maintenance policies and study the benefits from them when they are applied to software either in isolation or together.

III. FORMAL MODEL DEFINITION

A. Software Reliability

Let us consider the space of demands, $D = \{x_1, x_2, ..., x_n\}$, for a particular on-demand software product, π , with a probabilistic measure, $Q(\cdot)$, defined on D. $Q(\cdot)$, known as the *operational profile*, captures the likelihood of demands being submitted to π .

The failure process of π in operation is captured by a score function, defined on demands as follows, [11]:

$$\omega(x,\pi) = \begin{cases} 0, if demand x is processed correctly by \pi\\ 1, otherwise \end{cases}$$

Probability of failure (*pfd*) of π on a randomly chosen demand, *X*, is then:

$$P(\pi \text{ fails on } X) = \sum_{x \in D} \omega(x, \pi) Q(x)$$
(1)

B. Model of malicious demands

Now consider the space of malicious demands, $\Lambda = \{\mu_1, \mu_2, ..., \mu_n\}$ that can be submitted to π by adversaries at *random moments in time*. Each malicious demand either succeeds or fails in

⁴ Different attacks may use similar delivery mechanism – Stuxnet and Flame are examples – but deploy very different deploying its payload. We capture this outcome by defining another score function:

$$\varphi(y,\pi) = \begin{cases} 1, if y succeeds to affect \pi's failure behaviour \\ 0, otherwise \end{cases}$$
(2)

The score function of π compromised by a successful malicious demand y, denoted by $\omega_v(x, \pi)$, becomes:

$$\omega_{y}(x,\pi) = \begin{cases} 1, if \ \pi \ fails \ on \ x \ post \ successful \ demand \ y \\ 0, otherwise \end{cases}$$
(3)

 $\omega_{\phi}(x, \pi)$ could be used to denote the score function of software before it has been affected by a malicious demand. We expect that the values of $\omega_{\phi}(x, \pi)$ on some demands will be altered by a successful malicious demand. More specifically, we assume that some scores will change from $\omega_{\phi}(x, \pi) = 0$ to $\omega_{y}(x, \pi) =$ 1. We do not expect, that a malicious demand will lead to a failure compensation, i.e.:

$$\omega_{\nu}(x,\pi) \ge \omega_{\emptyset}(x,\pi) \tag{4}$$

The reader will have noticed that this formulation of the impact of a malicious demand on π extends naturally to any sequence of malicious demands applied to π . Indeed, for a sequence, $\mu_1, \mu_2, ..., \mu_m$ we could define a set of score functions:

$$\omega_{\emptyset}(x,\pi), \omega_{\mu_1}(x,\pi), \omega_{\mu_1 \wedge \mu_2}(x,\pi), \dots, \omega_{\mu_1 \wedge \mu_2 \wedge \dots \wedge \mu_m}(x,\pi)$$
(5)

where $\mu_1 \wedge \mu_2, ..., \mu_1 \wedge \mu_2 \wedge ... \wedge \mu_m$ are labels used to signify the combined effect of a sequence of malicious demands, $(\mu_1, \mu_2), ..., (\mu_1, \mu_2, ..., \mu_m)$.

We will use $\omega_{\mathcal{C}}(x, \pi)$ to denote the score function of π at any stage, \mathcal{C} , of software operation, where \mathcal{C} can take values from the set $\{\emptyset, \mu_1, \mu_2, \dots, \mu_n, \mu_1 \land \mu_2, \dots, \mu_1 \land \mu_2 \land \dots \land \mu_n\}$. The evolution of π 's state, as a result of successful malicious demands, is illustrated in Fig. 1.



Fig. 1. Evolution of software state as a result of successful malicious demands and in the absence of maintenance. There is a one-to-one mapping between the score function, $\omega_c(x,\pi)$ and the state, S_c , shown in the diagram. The transitions between the states are labelled with $h(\mu_i)$ to signify the hazard rates, [12], associated with the respective transitions.

payloads: Stuxnet targets industrial controllers [8], while Flame delivers a spying payload [9].

We do not discuss whether the order of malicious demands in a sequence is important. Our chosen notation, however, does allow one to account for it, if necessary.

C. Failure regions.

The demand space of any non-trivial software is typically astronomical. Empirical studies, e.g. [13], have demonstrated that software faults are projected on the demand space as *failure regions*. That is, the same fault can be triggered by a number of *different demands*, which together form a failure region of demands, on which software fails.

We are not aware of systematic studies to establish whether the concept of failure regions applies to cyber-security attacks. We see no reasons, however, why it should not apply. The analyses of Stuxnet [8] and of Flame [9] suggest that malware does indeed create *new failure regions* in the compromised software.

Now we will use the concept of failure regions to model the effect of malicious demands on compromised software. We first introduce a number of additional notations. Let $FR = \{fr_1, fr_2, ..., fr_n\}$ be the set of *all potential failure regions* that *might* be activated in a piece of software, π , as a result of at least one malicious demand. Each failure region is a collection of *normal* demands, $fr_i = \{x_1^{(i)}, x_2^{(i)}, ..., x_{k_i}^{(i)}\}$, on which software fails. In our model failure regions do not overlap, i.e. $fr_i \cap fr_i = \emptyset, i \neq j$. This assumption is made for *convenience* – and builds upon our previous work [14]. Later, in section Fig. 7, we discuss ways of relaxing the assumption. We characterize a failure region, fr_i , by its size, $P(fr_i)$, which represents the probability of selecting at random a demand $X_i^{(i)}$ that belongs to this failure region, fr_i .

D. Malicious demands.

We define a set $MD(\mu_i) = \{fr_1^{(\mu_i)}, fr_2^{(\mu_i)}, \dots, fr_{\mu_i}^{(\mu_i)}\}$ where $fr_j^{(\mu_i)} \in FR | j = 1 \dots l_{\mu_i}$ and use it to model the effect of malicious demand μ_i on target software should μ_i be applied successfully to software.

In a non-compromised software, none of the regions in FR is active. If a malicious demand μ_i is successfully applied to software, then *all* failure regions in $MD(\mu_i)$ become *active* in this software (Fig. 2).

We characterize the sets FR and Λ via model parameters. The size of FR is explicitly defined as a model parameter and so is the max number of failure regions, *max*, per malicious demand: the actual size of each set, $MD(\mu_i)$, is a *random number*, uniformly distributed in [1, *max*], where max is a model parameter. A probability distribution over FR is defined, which governs the allocation of failure regions to the sets, $MD(\mu_i)$.

Each malicious demand, μ , is also assigned a probability of success, $P_{success}(\mu)$ and a distribution $X_{\mu}(T \le t)$ of time between the occurrences of instances of μ in operation.

Finally, with more than one malicious demand we need a model to define how the malicious demands occur: for this we use the competing risks model [12]. The joint distribution of the competing risks – the risks can be independent or non-independent – at any moment in time defines the adverse environment.



Fig. 2. Relationship between failure regions, malicious demands and the state of the compromised software. Active failure regions increase the pfd of compromised software. In the particular example shown in the figure, two malicious demand, $MD(\mu_1)$ and $MD(\mu_2)$ consist of 3 and 4 failure regions, respectively. The failure region, fr_3 is common for the two malicious demands. Therefore, when both, $MD(\mu_1)$ and $MD(\mu_2)$, are applied successfully to software, the total number of active failure regions will be 6. The failure region fr_5 , which is common for both demands, is activated by the malicious demand which is *first* to succeed.

E. Software Maintenance

The effect of maintenance on the maintained channels is summarized as follows:

- *Cleansing*: cleansing removes all failure regions activated by successful malicious demands. The channel's *pfd* is thus restored to the value it had before malicious demands. Cleansing has no impact on the probability of success of future malicious demands: these probabilities remain the same as before cleansing, since cleansing does not fix any exploitable vulnerabilities. Clearly, since cleansing does not fix the exploitable vulnerabilities, cleansing may be faced with an increasingly adverse environment: once an exploitable vulnerability has been discovered and exploited once by a malicious demand, it could be exploited again and again, possibly with an increasing rate.
- *Patching*: the model allows for the channel's *pfd* to decrease as a result of some faults, unrelated to exploitable vulnerabilities, being fixed. The magnitude of this decrease is a model parameter. Patching may also affect the probability of success of some malicious demands in the future, possibly reducing it to 0, as a result to fixing exploitable vulnerabilities. We use another model parameter to capture the specific assumptions related to this reduction of the probability of success by malicious demands.

Patching and cleansing occur at random points in time $\Xi = \{t_1, t_2, ..., t_n\}$. The state of software, captured by the corresponding $\omega_{\mathcal{C}}(x, \pi, p)$ and summarized by its *pfd*, changes at these points defining a new stochastic process, as illustrated in Fig. 3. In many cases, cleansing is applied periodically or at fixed times during the day. Such arrangements impose constraints on some

of the transitions between the states (transitions to S_{downC}) in the stochastic process defined in Fig. 3.



Fig. 3. Illustration of the stochastic process describing the evolution of a channel under maintenance. Software state changes as a result of successful malicious demands applied to it (shown as solid arrows in the figure) and due to maintenance (cleansing/patching). Maintenance itself is completed in a state S_{downC/P}, (for cleansing and patching, respectively): in these states the software is not operational. After maintenance the channel operation is resumed from a clean state (S_{clean}, S_{clean3}, ...).

The models of cleansing and patching are similar: they are described by respective stochastic processes, which define the distribution of the intervals between the successive applications of maintenance, $X_p(T \le t)$ and $X_c(T \le t)$, for patching and cleansing respectively.

These processes can be constrained, e.g. *simultaneous maintenance of more than one channel may not be allowed* to guarantee that at least one channel is always operational, as recommended by some standards, e.g. [15].

Maintenance duration may vary significantly depending on the size of the software state (i.e. useful data used by software) that needs to be migrated after maintenance to a clean copy. Some authors, e.g. [16], report that this may take seconds, minutes and even hours. Examples of techniques to minimize this duration are: i) on-the-fly patching [17]; ii) adding spare channels before some channels are taken down for maintenance [18], [16], etc. In our model the duration of maintenance is defined as a model parameter, which we varied in different studies.

F. The 1-out-of-2 system

The model of 1-out-of-2 on-demand software adds complexity since the system now consists of two channels. Let us denote the channels used in the 2-channel system as π_A (channel A) and π_B (channel B), respectively. The probability of failure of such a system can be expressed as, [11]:

$$P(\pi_A, \pi_B fail on X) = pfd_A pfd_B + cov_Q (\omega_A(X, \pi_A), \omega_B(X, \pi_B))$$
(6)

The covariance term, $cov_Q(\omega_A(X), \omega_B(X))$, is a measure of failure dependence between the two channels. The covariance is 0 if the channels *fail independently*.

 $P(\pi_A, \pi_B f ail on X)$ represents the *system pfd* and will be affected by the malicious demands and the maintenance of the channels. At any point in time, the failure behavior of the 2-channel software system is characterized completely by the tuple $(pfd_A(t), pfd_B(t), pfd_{system}(t))$.

During a channel maintenance, the system operates as a *single channel system* and the system *pfd* is reduced to the *pfd* of the operational channel. As soon as the channel maintenance is complete, the system *pfd* is restored to the value it had prior to a successful malicious demand being applied to the channel whose maintenance has just been completed.

Malicious demands, via their respective, $MD(\mu_i)$ sets, affect the channel *pfd* and may also affect the system *pfd*. If the same failure region, *fr_i*, is activated in both channels (by respective malicious demands applied to the channels), this region becomes a "common failure" region for both channels and its size is added to system *pfd*.

With 2-channel software, there is scope for variation in how malicious demands occur. We consider two important cases: the set of malicious demands on the channels may be either identical, i.e. $\Lambda_1 \equiv \Lambda_2$, or different.

- Synchronised attacks ($\Lambda_1 \equiv \Lambda_2$). This case would be an appropriate model if the *adversary is aware of the underlying* 2-channel architecture. This adversary will be aware that attacking a single channel will have no immediate effect: even if an attack on the channel is successful, the system may remain unaffected, if the second channel is non-compromised. The Adversary, therefore, will seek to *compromise both channels* by attacking the system with malicious demands *crafted specifically* for each of the channels.
- Independent attacks. The model with different sets of malicious demands ($\Lambda_1 \neq \Lambda_2$) would be appropriate to model the behaviour of an adversary unaware of software architecture and who would attack one of the channels, e.g. selected at random. Common failure regions with different sets of malicious demands may still occur (e.g. if malicious demands μ_i and μ_j are applied to channel A and channel B, respectively, and a failure region fr_k exists which happens to belong to both $MD(\mu_i)$ and $MD(\mu_j)$. The system *pfd* thus will be increased by the size of the common failure region, fr_k . Such common failure regions are generally less likely with different sets of malicious demands than with the same set of demands.

With a 2-channel system a reasonable policy would be to subject to maintenance at most one channel at a time [19], which in our model of cleansing/patching is achieved by implementing a *maintenance mutex*.

IV. RESULTS

In this section we use the model described in Section III to answer a number of questions:

 Is an architectural solution based on periodic "cleansing" of software, i.e. restoring software from clean copies, a sound defence of vulnerable software? The proponents of "proactive recovery", e.g. [1] [6], [16] and [18], would argue that it is, while some may argue that such practice may in fact reduce dependability. Indeed, the benefits, of cleansing are questionable: an advanced persistent threat (APT) that has successfully compromised a piece of software once is likely to persist and likely to compromise it again and again, probably taking increasingly shorter time to compromise a replica after cleansing.

To patch or not to patch? Again, patching is a standard policy adopted for consumer devices, data centres and "enterprise" solutions. Patching industrial control systems, however, is a very expensive operation. Problematic patches, too, are not uncommon and some standards prescribe rigorous procedures to address this concern [15]. In practice, many operators of critical infrastructures are reluctant to patch [19]. Often operators are prepared to postpone patching as long as they can. We compare the reliability of unpatched and patched software to illustrate the risks of not patching. We also look at the impact of different patching policies: i) patching as soon as a patch becomes available (implicitly assumed so far), and ii) *deferred patching*, e.g. when a channel is only patched when the channel has been detected as compromised. In our study the detection of a channel compromise is delegated to an intrusion detection system (IDS) with imperfect intrusion coverage.

In this section we present a number of results obtained with a probabilistic model(s) built with Mobius [20] using the stochastic activity networks (SAN) formalism. We solved the model(s) via Monte-Carlo simulation. The structure of the model(s) is shown in Fig. 4. It consists of a number of atomic models and a composite model, which links instances of the atomic models using the mechanism of *shared places*.



Fig. 4. Structure of the SAN model.

For lack of space we omit the implementation details of the model. However, the entire SAN project is available online [21]

and the interested reader can analyze the model in detail.

The project includes extensive custom C code, necessary for model initialization: i) creation of the set of failure regions (100 failure regions were used in the conducted studies), ii) creation of a number of malicious demands applicable to a channels using a set of parameters explained below, etc.

The initial *pfds* of the channels and of the system are also defined to represent a realistically reliable on-demand software: the channel *pfd* is assumed 2×10^{-3} for both channels; the system *pfd* is assumed 10^{-4} . These values define a system with a high positive correlation of channel failures, which is not uncommon.

A. Model parameterisation and studies

The essential model parameters together with the values used in the studies are provided in TABLE I.

Malicious demands on each channel are run as *competing risks* – the winner (i.e. the malicious demand that occurs first) is applied to the respective channel by activating the failure regions in the demand space of that channel, thus increasing the channel's *pfd*. System *pfd* may also be affected due to new common failure regions that may occur as a result of the latest successful malicious demand. The competition between the risks (i.e. malicious demands) is then resumed until the next winner occurs, etc.

We utilize the built-in capability of Mobius to design a "study" [20], i.e. a number of experiments with different values assigned to model parameters.

We use a set of *global variables*, which allow us to change the logic of the simulation as necessary so that different scenarios - with or without patching and/or cleansing - are enabled or disabled.

The experiments conducted can be grouped into the following 4 categories:

- A 2-channel system with *no maintenance* (NC NP). Both cleansing and patching of channels are disabled.
- A 2-channel system with cleansing *only* (C NP). Cleansing of channels is enabled, their patching is disabled.
- A 2-channel system with *patching only* (NC P). Patching of channels of enable, cleansing is disabled.
- A 2-channel system when *both patching and cleansing* are enabled (P C).

In all scenarios we *simulated* a mission of 350 days of operation, almost a year of calendar time, and looked at two related "rewards": the system *pfd* (as a "time averaged" mean) and the probability to survive a mission of up to 350 days – in intervals of 10 days. We show estimates of the average system *pfd* calculated over intervals of 50 days to illustrate trends in system *pfd* over time. Each study was repeated 300 times and all rewards calculated with confidence level of 95% and a relative confidence interval of 10%. In a very few cases we increased the number of runs to 500 to achieve the required confidence level.

This demand rate (normal_demands_rate) in TABLE I. is chosen somewhat arbitrarily. It may be too high for some applications (e.g. protection systems) and too low for some other applications (e.g. processing demands from sensors, etc.). TABLE I.

THE ESSENTIAL SAN MODEL PARAMETERS AND THE VALUES ASSIGNED TO THEM IN THE STUDIES

Name	Description	Value
FR_size [day ⁻¹]	Failure region sizes (uniformly distributed). Each newly activated failure region (due to a successful malicious demand) will increase the channel's pfd by this random number.	1.00E-04 - 2.00E-4
attackRateIncrease [day ⁻¹]	Sets the rate increase of malicious demands over time. The change to attack rate is applied upon patching (a modelling assumption). The rationale here is as follows: once a vulnerability has become a "public knowledge" (or known to the adversary), it is likely to be exploited with an increased rate.	0.001
attackSProb_reduction	Coefficient of reduction of malicious demand probability of <i>success</i> . Captures the effect of patching on the probability of success of malicious demands.	0.95
ch1_pfd	Channel 1 initial pfd (before any malicious demand sufcceeded to compromise software).	0.002
ch2_pfd	Channel 2 <i>initial</i> pfd (no malicious demands)	0.002
cleansing_interval [day]	Interval between cleansings of channels (if cleansing enabled). Fixed value.	1
common_pfd	System pfd (before any channel has been compromised).	1.00E-04
delay_sync_attack [day]	Delay between channel attacks in case of synchronised attacks.	0.05
demand_rates [day ⁻¹]	Malicious demands rates (exponential distributions).	0.01-0.07
demand_types	Number of different malicious demands to channel 1 and channel 2. In the studies the same number	10
	is assumed for both channels, but the implementation allows differerent values to be assigned to channel 1 and channel 2.	
m_demand_max_FRs	Maximum number of failure regions per malicious demand. The model assumes the same value for	10
	both channels. The actual number of failure regions per malicious demand is a random number chosen from the range [1, m_demand_max_FRs] using a uniform distribution.	
normal_demands_rate [day]	Interval between normal demands on system	1
patchingInterval [day]	Interval between patches (exponential distribution)	0.15
patch_ch_pfd_reduction	Channel <i>pfd</i> reduction coefficient after patching. This parameter captures the effect of fixing bugs,	0.9
	other than exploitable vulnerabilities. Fixing such bugs may improve the operational reliability of the respective software channel(s)	
patch_CC_pfd_reduction	System pfd reduction coefficient after patching a channel which leads to fixing bugs that are not exploited authority in the system pfd reduction coefficient after patching a channel which leads to fixing bugs that are not exploit the system pfd reduction coefficient after patching a channel which leads to fix pfd reduction coefficient after patching a channel which leads to fix pfd reduction coefficient after patching a channel which leads to fix pfd reduction coefficient after patching a channel which leads to fix pfd reduction coefficient after patching a channel which leads to fix pfd reduction coefficient after patching a channel which leads to fix pfd reduction coefficient after patching a channel which leads to fix pfd reduction coefficient after patching a channel which leads to fix pfd reduction coefficient after patching a channel which leads to fix pfd reduction coefficient after patching a channel which leads to fix pfd reduction coefficient after patching a channel which leads to fix pfd reduction coefficient after patching a channel which leads to fix pfd reduction coefficient after patching a channel which leads to fix pfd reduction coefficient after patching a channel which leads to fix pfd reduction coefficient after patching after patchin	0.95
upgrade duration [day]	Maintenance duration (fixed interval)	0.01
"Poruse_uurunon [uuy]	multional and the more and the second	0.01

B. Cleansing vs patching

We start with a set of results conducted under the assumption of *independent attacks* and that maintenance takes 0.01 days (i.e. almost 15 min), a plausible number recorded by some, e.g. [18]. Patches are applied as soon as they become available.

The results (Fig. 5) confirm that all forms of maintenance, including cleansing alone, improve system reliability very significantly. Without maintenance, system *pfd* rapidly grows.



Fig. 5. System pfd and mission survival of a 2-channel system under independent attacks.

Interestingly, for the chosen parameterization, cleansing may outperforms patching (compare "C-NP" and "NC-P" plots), which is *surprising*. The trends of system *pfd* for the different scenarios provide further insight. We see a clear trend downwards for "NC-P", and an increasing trend for cleansing "C-NP" (due to the simulated increase in the rate of repeated attacks). Up to 250 days of operation, the system *pfd* with cleansing only is lower (i.e. the system is more reliable) than the *pfd* with patching only. The two curves cross over in the interval 250 - 300 days of operation. After the 300^{th} day of operation the system with patching only becomes more reliable.

When both cleansing and patching are used, not surprisingly, system pfd is the lowest (i.e. the system is the most reliable). The lower left plot demonstrates the effect of *cleansing duration* (T) on system pfd. T was assigned values from the range [0.001, 0.1] days. Not surprisingly, long T eventually make cleansing universally inferior to patching. Shorter T makes cleansing more effective.

The last curve (bottom, right) shows the probability of surviving a mission (PS) for different maintenance policies. Cleansing only eventually becomes inferior to patching only: there is a *clear stochastic ordering* between $PS_{cleansing}$ and the $PS_{patching}$ towards the end of the mission (250+ days). The modes with patching – with and without cleansing (P-C and NC-P, respectively) – are practically indistinguishable.

C. Independent attacks vs. coordinated attacks

In this section we compare system *pfd* of a 2-channel system placed in two different environments: i) *independent attacks*, and ii) *synchronized attacks* on the channels.

We modelled the synchronized attacks by making an additional assumption: once a malicious demand is successfully applied to one of the channels, the same demand is applied to the second channel with a *short delay*, the value of which is defined by an additional model parameter, delay_sync_attack. In the studies we set this parameter to 0.05 days (i.e. slightly over an hour) – a somewhat arbitrary value, chosen to be significantly smaller than the intervals of cleansing (a day) and the average interval of patching (once a week). Thus, a synchronized attack has a good chance of compromising both channels despite the adopted maintenance.

The results for synchronized and independent attacks for all 4 regimes are given in Fig. 6. The plots of system pfd show that synchronized attacks make the system much worse: stochastic ordering is established for both measures - system *pfd* and PS. Without maintenance (the plots in the upper half of the figure) under synchronized attacks system *pfd* eventually becomes more than an order of magnitude worse than under independent attacks. The plots in the lower half of Fig. 6 show how the two environments compare when maintenance is applied. Stochastic ordering is preserved here, too: the curves representing synchronized attacks are above all curves representing the independent attacks. In other words, irrespective of the maintenance policy, synchronized attacks make the system *pfd* worse than the independent attacks. Under synchronized attacks the effect of maintenance policy is similar to what we observed with independent attacks: combined maintenance is best, second best is cleansing only. The worst performing policy is patching only. The crossover between the curves representing cleansing and patching only occurs between 300 and 350 days.



Fig. 6. Independent vs. Synchronised attacks.

The plot with PS is also quite clear: when either cleansing or patching only are applied, the PS for sync attacks is noticeably lower than under independent attacks, irrespective of the maintenance policy. A clear stochastic ordering exists between the PS curves for independent and synchronized attacks after 200+ days. A combination of patching and cleansing is sufficient for a system under sync attacks to behave comparably to how it would behave under independent attacks: the corresponding PS confidence intervals overlap (i.e. the simulation does not show a clear ordering). This observation seems to suggest that, *cleansing appears a very useful* as a complementary control to patching, especially under synchronized attacks!

D. Deferred patching

Finally we present results from a study, in which patching a channel is *deferred* until the channel has been diagnosed as compromised.

Clearly, deferring a patch will avoid some of the periods when the system operates as a 1-channel system, hence this regime may potentially improve system *pfd*. On the other hand, deferring a patch relies on *detecting reliably* that a channel has been compromised. If detection is poor, a compromised channel may remain unpatched even if a patch has become available, which may reduce system reliability. Our study sheds light on this interesting tradeoff.

The study of deferred patching is conducted for synchronized attacks only under *additional assumptions*: i) the checks/diagnosis if a channel has been compromised are undertaken at the time the particular channel is subjected to a *malicious demand*; and ii) the success of the check/diagnosis is not affected by whether the malicious demand has been successful or not. The intuition behind these modelling choices are that the intrusion detection/prevention system (IDS/IPS) will be triggered by a malicious demand, an assumption which may not hold true in some cases. In this study the channels were not subjected to cleansing. We model checks' *imperfection* with a single parameter, compromise_detection_prob (CPD), applied to both channels. We study the effectiveness of deferred patching by assigning CPD different values from the range (0, 1).



Fig. 7. Deferred vs immediate patching under synchronized attacks.

In the model implementation we also adopted the policy of *cumulative patch*, that is, the effects of *all* deferred patches, such as a possible reduction of channel and system *pfd* and of the probability of success of the future malicious demands (due to removing/mitigating some vulnerabilities), are applied *at once* when the channel is eventually patched. This approach seems consistent with the industrial practice.

The results from the study are summarized in Fig. 7.

Again, for the sake of brevity, we only show the results related to system *pfd* and the probability of surviving a mission (PS) of a given length.

Clearly, CPD has a significant impact on system *pfd*. For values of CPD = 0.8 and 0.5, system *pfd* is practically indistinguishable from system *pfd* for the case with immediate patching – the three curves shown in the left hand plot of Fig. 7 are within the confidence intervals. Further statistical tests also provided *no evidence* to reject the null hypothesis that the mean values of the respective system *pfd* calculated over 500 simulation runs (used in this study) are different. The same similarity is observed with respect to PS for missions of up to 350 days. We confirmed that the recorded differences between PS for missions of 200 and 350 days for CPD = 0.8 and 0.5 and immediate patching were *statistically*

insignificant. When CPD drops to 0.2, however, system *pfd* increases noticeably – there is a clear stochastic ordering between the curves for CPD = 0.2 and with the other 3 cases (CPD = 0.5, 0.8 and immediate patching). With respect to PS, the effect of CPD is less clearly pronounced in Fig. 7: the confidence intervals associated with the PS with different CPD clearly overlap. Using statistical tests we checked the null hypothesis "the PS with deferred patching with CPD = 0.2 and with immediate patching are equal" for mission lengths of 200 and 350. For significance level 0.05 this hypothesis was *rejected*. Thus, we confirmed that a system with deferred patching with low CPD = 0.2 has lower chance to survive a mission than a system, in which the policy of immediate patching is used.

V. DISCUSSION

Our findings offer a number of interesting observations.

Model behavior under synchronized attacks is *significantly worse* than under independent attacks. While this observation is not surprising, its *implications are quite serious*. It reiterates that selecting an adequate model of adversary is an essential part of assessment. Selecting the "wrong" adversary model may lead to gross errors in assessment: i) if synchronized attacks are likely but a model of independent

attacks is used in assessment, the assessment results may lead to dangerous overconfidence in system reliability; ii) undertaking assessment under the assumption of synchronized attacks, on the other hand, may lead to *too pessimistic assessment results*, in case synchronized attacks are made unlikely in the particular system, e.g. by deploying additional controls which make synchronized attacks difficult.

Synchronized attacks *raise doubts* about the benefits that one should expect from some intrusion-tolerant systems built on assumptions, which rule out multiple channels being compromised simultaneously. The proposed style of modelling allows one to study the realism of an assumption that only a small number of channels can be compromised simultaneously.

Our findings support the view that *cleansing may be quite effective* in countering attacks, especially the synchronized attacks. This is particularly attractive, since the frequency of cleansing can be tuned to fit the needs of a particular system. In contrast, the frequency of patching depends on software vendors and cannot be adapted to the needs of a particular system.

Our results suggest that *deferred patching* of fault-tolerant software may be a reasonable alternative to the dominant practice today – patch as soon as possible. Deferred patching *may* deliver a comparable system reliability even when an IDS with relatively modest coverage is used. This is particularly relevant given the additional delays recommended by some standards [15] to validate patches before their deployment. The final decision whether to deploy deferred patching or not for a particular system may require further, more detailed, analysis.

We already acknowledged that in our model malicious demands' success is modelled as a "binary" outcome; *partial success* by a malicious demand has not been modelled. The implications of such a modelling choice are that either all failure regions associated with a particular malicious demand are activated or none is. The model could easily be extended to address this limitation. A partial success might imply that only a subset of failure regions is activated. The effect of such an extension is conceptually clear – partially successful malicious demand will make the situation *no worse* than the fully successful malicious demands. Thus, the results one obtains with the current model can be seen as *conservative bounds* on channel/system *pfd* of software under attack.

The model presented in this paper belongs to the category of "conceptual" models. Similarly to [4, 5], which motivated this work, and provides *useful insight* to support decision making when design choices, e.g. alternative maintenance policies, are analyzed and compared. This model helps improve one's understanding, not least by applying sensitivity analysis to model parameters.

Some of the modelling choices, e.g. modelling malicious demands as sets of failure regions, were taken due to the *convenience* they offer to build the model extending our previous work. The underlying concepts, however, can be captured making alternative modeling choices. We intend to work on models, suitable for practical assessment, which rely on parameters *estimable via feasible measurements*.

VI. RELATED RESEARCH

In addition to the references we used earlier in the paper to motivate the work and the modelling approach taken, we would like to outline a number of related sources.

A number of publications apply software *reliability growth models* to vulnerabilities, e.g. [22-24]. These authors acknowledge the fundamental difference between software reliability predicted for a "stable" operational environment and the profile defined by the adversaries for security. For the latter, the profile is unlikely to be stable. These models follow the tradition of reliability growth modelling and are focused on predicting the time to discovering the next vulnerability. Instead, in our models we are primarily interested in the consequences of successful attacks on software reliability of a particular system. The predictions of time to next vulnerability are *related* to the time a new patch is released, which is used in our model as a set of model parameters.

There have been studies applying different modelling techniques to *known* attacks. A couple of examples are [25, 26]. The first reference applies a probabilistic technique to define a model of Stuxnet and demonstrates how the model parameters can be assigned plausibly. The second example, instead, uses a non-probabilistic formalism. These authors claim that documenting itself of the particular malware is an important contribution. Neither of the two models, however, is used by the respective authors for an analysis of open research problems. Our focus is quite different: instead of merely constructing a plausible model, we use the model as a tool to study practical problems such as the effectiveness of maintenance policies in adverse environments.

A somewhat related to this paper is our own previous work on modelling the effect on cyber-attacks on the reliability of an embedded device with fault-tolerant software [27]. The style of modelling there and in this paper is similar, but the scope of the analysis is different. In [27]we developed a detailed model of a specific device to study a specific attack – on the safe-state of the device. In the current paper instead we develop a model, which operates intentionally at a much higher level of abstraction and is used to compare different maintenance policies.

Synchronized attacks that we studied in detail are *conceptually similar* to common mode/cause failure, a topic which has been studied very extensively in the context of system/software safety and highly available computer system.

We would like to acknowledge the ADVISE formalism, a part of the Mobius tool used to implement our models. The ADVISE formalism captures probabilistically the motivation of an Adversary, the assets of a particular system and the rewards that successful attacks will bring to an Adversary should an attack succeed. Although ADVISE is applicable to any system and assets, the level of abstraction this formalism uses is significantly higher than the level we chose in this paper – failure regions in demand space. We believe that modelling synchronized attacks on multi-channel software systems with ADVISE will be more difficult than with the approach to modelling that we have adopted.

Finally, [7, 28] are examples of studies that model and verify the effectiveness of cleansing (proactive recovery).

VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

We presented an approach to modelling the effect of cyber-attack on software reliability and applied it to a 1-outof-2 on-demand software. We established a number of results:

- We provide a *new insight* about the role of Adversary models in the assessment of benefits from software fault-tolerance. We recorded an order of magnitude difference in system *pfd* of a 2-channel software between adverse environment with independent and synchronised attacks on the channels.
- Cleansing, despite being a relatively simple method of defence against cyber-attacks, can be quite effective, especially against synchronised attacks.
- Finally, we report on the existence of an *interesting phenomenon* related to a deferred patching of the channels of a 2-channel software system. Deferred patching is an attractive alternative to immediate patching even with a modest probability of detecting a compromised software channel.

This work can be extended in a number of ways.

First of all, most of the results that we presented are obtained with a complex model, which depends in a large number of parameters. We did not explore systematically the space of model parameters and only scratched upon sensitivity analysis (Fig. 7). Ideally, we would have liked to be able to state some of our results as "theorems", e.g. statements about the relationships between maintenance policies that are true irrespective of the values of the model parameters. Whether this is achievable or not is yet to be seen. We plan to extend the research effort in this direction.

Second, we left some aspect of the analysis incomplete. This is mainly due to the limited space a conference paper can offer. We envisage several important extensions of the work:

- We limited our work to the simplest fault-tolerant architecture – the 1-out-of-2 software – but referred several times to systems of significantly higher complexity such intrusion-tolerant architectures based on Byzantine agreement protocol [1, 16, 18]. The proposed style of modelling seems applicable to such systems, too. These systems are said to be intrusion tolerant under a number of assumptions, which may hold true or be violated in operation. Applying the proposed method of modelling, especially with synchronised attacks, will *provide insight* about the likelihood that the conditions necessary for the intrusion-tolerant solutions to work correctly are satisfied in the adverse environment anticipated in operation.
- Our model crucially depends on the view that malicious demands activate new failure regions, not present in software prior to successful malicious demands. This view is *quite plausible*, and consistent with the empirical evidence we have analysed. Further empirical studies may provide *additional insight* and lead to further *refinement* of the modelling approach adopted in this work.
- We used the probability of system failure as one of the main measure of interest and limited our analysis to the *mean value* (calculated over a number of simulation runs). It is clear that system *pfd* changes over time (as

Fig. 6 illustrates). We did not scrutinise the implications of the recorded trends systematically, and consider this direction of future research worthwhile.

As indicated in the discussion section, we plan to extend this work towards models suitable from practical security assessment. A less detailed description of a 2-channel system evolving over time, e.g. using the triad (*pfd_A*(t), *pfd_B*(t) and *pfd_{sys}*(t)), seems a promising candidate, more aligned with realistic measurements and with the statistical techniques we developed in the past, e.g. [29] and [30].

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