Postwar Issues in 23 Democracies

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Working Paper n.44 Barcelona 1992

Summary

The paper starts by considering problems in the definition and measurement of political issues -in particular, whether issue-creation involves all parties and both leadership and electors; or whether issues can be "created" by only one of these. Confrontational approaches to the handling of issues are contrasted with saliency theories. The choice of a conceptual approach affects the way issues and change are measured and represented, whether this is done through typologies or by spatial analysis of party movements.

Spatial analysis presents two possibilities in regard to issue change: parties may change positions over time within the space; but the space itself (defined in terms of issues relevant at each time-point) may change. Both are considered on the basis of codings of sentences in party election programmes across a number of democracies, since the war. This is supplemented by trends in newspaper reports of campaign issues over the same period, which seem to indicate that, in the long term, issues are generated by the objective problems facing governments at the time. The discussion ends by briefly considering consequences of issues for government formation and action, and how far commitments to take action on issues are put into effect, as party mandate theory would imply.

The question of issue change is so vast, extending from party competition and government change through media and communication studies to election studies and voting behaviour, that it is narrowed down here to comparative research done over the last 15 years on party interrelationships in elections and governments, in roughly the same group of-democracies -Western Europe, North America, Australasia, Japan and Israel. Within these constants a variety of data -surveys, documents, reported events- have been used and analysed by various techniques, including spatial analysis. The distinction between party leaders and electors has always been central and where possible their mutual influence on each other has been examined.

Use of different sources, techniques and subjects for analysis throws into relief questions usually neglected at a purely abstract level -such as: how do we identify issues in the first place?- and how do we put them into the same frame of analysis for comparative purposes? These are the first questions the paper takes up, before going on to more theoretical points, (which still affect measurement and operationalisation however).

1. DEFINING ISSUES

While it is possible to think of issues being defined and discussed

independently of political parties (in the media for example) they are for purposes of political analysis usually related to what the parties say and do. What do we mean by parties however? -leadership or electoral base or both? Bearing in mind this potential ambiguity we could define an issue variously as:

- a) a point "at issue" or anyway discussed by all parties, so that in terms of a spatial analysis the concurrence of all is necessary to define the space,
- b) a point or topic emphasised by only one of the parties (each can contribute independently to defining any space, so that a dimension of concern to one may not interest another -this has consequences for the kind of metric one might want to use in measuring distances within a space)
- c) a point or topic or "position", whether or not stressed by leaders, important in:
- i) defining party support among electors (in which case it could presumably include the "permanent issues" of class, religion, ethnicity or urban-rural divisions stressed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) or
- ii) moving support between the parties -a narrower and more dynamic concept, within which issues are more likely to be short term.

These are very different conceptions with strong bearings on what one might identify as issues and therefore how one might identify change in relation to them. There is little basis for deciding in the abstract which definition is better: presumably it all depends on one's research purposes. As my interest has been primarily in the interaction of issues as defined by the party leadership with those important in consolidating party support among electors (and sometimes in moving electors between parties) I would want to be as inclusive as possible and define issues as topics raised by one or more party leaderships and/or important among electors. Part of the research interest then lies in estimating the extent to which issues defined in each of these ways coincide, not simply assuming that they do as in most theories of the Downsian tradition (Downs, 1957). In discussing issues in this sense it is important, obviously, to specify their provenance and source (in which party leadership and/or electorate do they originate or exert influence for example?).

2. **DOCUMENTING ISSUES AND TRACKING CHANGE**

In tracking issues one may draw on various data-sources. Again what one discovers is fairly heavily dependent on the source used, so it is worthwhile to comment briefly on these in passing:

a) By far the commonest source for identifying issues are election surveys

-indeed so common are they that many analysts use surveys with the implicit assumption that their questions define the universe of issues that existed for a given election. While these questions usually represent the best guesses of the investigators about what would be issues at a point 2-3 months before the election, they are informed guesses by experts using polls and similar sources as evidence. Surveys have two other features. One is that certain questions get carried on from previous years because of a long term interest in electors' reactions to them, not because they were necessarily prominent in that particular election. The other is that electors are often invited to talk about politics generally, in response to "open" questions, though so far as I know no one has ever used this issue material to check on the "closed" questions included by the designers of the questionnaire.

- b) An alternative source for tracing issues are media descriptions and analyses, especially as summarized in compendia like "Keesing's Contemporary Archives" or in retrospective accounts of campaigns like the Nuffield General Election Series in Britain; the Making of the President or the Enterprise Research Institute series in the USA; dealing with elections in a variety of countries. Media accounts are clearly biased by the position of the observers and are unlikely to be based on any very systematic sampling of opinions. Nevertheless they do comprehend the whole campaign and reflect opinions and events both at elite and electoral levels in a way no other source does.
- c) One can also base oneself on party documents, particularly the election programmes (in the US the "platforms") of the parties. Though these are directed at electors they clearly originate with the leadership and reflect its opinions or strategies. They are also written at varying times before the campaign opens and in many countries are read by few electors. As against this they are read by commentators and media people, who use them as a basis from which to begin their discussions. In this indirect way they reach the general public and shape many of the themes of the campaign. They thus constitute a major source for the analysis of issues change (Sections 6-8 below).
- d) One should also mention legislative sources and proceedings, such as roll calls, bills and other outputs and debates. These differ from the sources mentioned above in that they are non electoral, falling generally between campaigns. They tell you a lot about the questions which preoccupy party leaderships at a particular point in time: these often of course precipitate the fall and rise of governments and could provide issue-information highly relevant to coalition-formation. In theory such information could also be related to polling information about electoral opinions.

Clearly the different source-materials may give rather different pictures of what issues are relevant at any one point in time. An attempt at comparing

judgements based on surveys, media and party documents for the 1960 Presidential election in the US and the 1964 General Elections in Britain is made in Tables 1 and 2.

Obviously themes culled from each of the sources often coincide: when they do they are listed on the same line, parallel to the corresponding issue among electors as ascertained from survey sources (column 4). Some themes stressed by politicians were not asked in surveys (presumably because their resonance among electors was not apparent). Some survey questions which divided electors very effectively into partisan groups were not stressed at all by politicians according to our sources, e.g. for Britain in 1964, the question of entry to the Common Market. These are listed in column 5 of the tables. It will be noted that only one trivial issue appears in this column for the U.S. in 1960, as compared to three issues of some weight for Britain in 1964. This contrast holds generally for British and American elections. Generally in the United States for all elections examined, all issues could be seen as originating with leaders. For Britain most do, but there are usually two or three questions, important and divisive among electors, about which leaders seem to have said nothing.

Two additional aspects of leaders' influence on electors need to be noted. First politicians must be credited with putting up particular Presidential and Prime Ministerial candidates, who make some impact on electors. Candidate reactions are therefore listed in both tables at the top of column 4 as an effect attributable to leaders' cues. Secondly, leaders can at times give considerable weight to long-standing issues (such as nationalisation in Britain) which are not very prominent among electors.

In spite of discrepancies between leaders and electors and between sources, there is perhaps more convergence on characterisations of issues in these Tables than one might have expected. So far as I know no one has done a systematic comparison of this kind over an extended series of elections. This simple validation is obviously a first step to be undertaken in a more comprehensive study of issue change. The encouraging results of the limited comparisons for 1960 and 1964 encourage some substitution of one source for another in the general tracking of issues, though it also appears from the Tables that leaders are likely to nominate many more issues than electors actually take up.

3. HOW DO ELECTORS AND PARTIES REACT TO ISSUES-CONFRONTATION VERSUS SALIENCY

The way in which parties and electors react to issues has considerable implications for the way we measure them. The conventional picture of party

competition is one in which the parties endorse opposing positions on the same set of issues; and electors estimate the agreement between their own position and those of the parties and vote for the alternative which is closest. This kind of picture is very familiar from Downs' classic treatment (Downs, 1957) and from the many spatial analyses in the Downsian tradition.

However when one actually studies electoral programmes it is hard to find much evidence for confrontation, at least at the leadership level. If one examines the number of references to other parties it is on average about 10 per cent of all sentences in the documents and party-related issue references are even lower – about 5 per cent. Clearly this minority of sentences does not contain the main thrust of what is being said -which we must take as the party leaderships' attempt to attract electors to vote for them (Budge, Robertson, Hearl, eds., 1987, pp. 389-391).

What do these documents contain? For the most part assertions of the importance of various problems (unemployment, social services, strong defence, law and order, the erosion of freedom, the environment, etc. etc.)... in the form of rather rambling analyses of past history and of the current state of affairs, with a view to stressing the urgency of action in the particular area. These analyses do not give great prominence to other parties or what they have done. But they do talk a lot about the originating party's record and attitudes.

The importance of party documents of this kind is that, unlike survey questionnaires or media reports, they come directly and unmediated from participants in the struggle for votes. They must therefore be taken as direct evidence for the way parties handle issues and for the way in which the leadership at any rate thinks electors will react.

How do they think of issues in this context? Clearly not primarily as direct confrontation, since so few of their references are dedicated to contrasting party policies. Rather they seem to be engaged in stressing the priority of certain topics, which they discuss at great length, in comparison with others, which they discuss in passing or hardly at all.

Why should parties present themselves in this way? It seems that party leaders have a picture of the way electors react to parties which differs somewhat from the one prevalent among survey analysts. Party leaders stress certain issues more than others because they think they would benefit if those they favour become prominent in the campaign. This in turn seems to assume an almost automatic linkage between the prominence of a certain type of issue and party advantage (in terms of votes).

The most plausible explanation of why politicians present themselves in this

way, is that they endorse a "saliency" rather than a confrontational theory of voting. They think that the majority of electors see different parties as having the obviously "correct" policy for particular areas. Thus "left" or reformist parties will expand social services; right wing parties will be tough on offenders in the field of law and order; left or reformist parties will generally intervene more where intervention is needed; while right wing parties are more likely to reduce government activity and implement tax cuts.

There seems little doubt in politicians' minds about most electors endorsing one "obvious" course of action in each area and clearly identifying the party most likely to carry it through. In view of this, they seem to think that elections will be won by the party most of whose proprietary issues assume prominence in the election. So, much party effort seems to be devoted to making "their" issues prominent and down playing those of the opposition. (For a similar interpretation of issues effects, which he terms the dominance principle, see W.H. Rikers's discussion in Riker, ed. 1922, Chaps. 1 and 2).

These tendencies are reinforced by the difficulty parties have in dissociating themselves from their own history and actions in government, which give them an indelible association with certain policy stances. This implies in turn that they are able to shift their policy positions only gradually, so they are far from enjoying unlimited mobility over the entire policy field. Clearly again they must find it difficult to leapfrog as it would be quite impossible for a Labour party to pretend it was more conservative than the Conservatives. They would lose many longstanding supporters to no avail as nobody would believe they had changed radically in any case.

All this has considerable implications for the way one operationalises and codes issues, pointing to the importance of the space or attention devoted to a topic, rather than the nuances of what is said about it. And in fact one striking empirical finding in coding party documents is that remarks about any area are usually of one kind. One does not discuss defence for example to attack military expenditure but only to support it. The same goes for social services.

Proof for the assertions of saliency theory comes above all from the very plausible results, including spatial maps, obtained when one applies it to documentary data (Robertson, 1976; Budge and Farlie, 1977, Chap. 12; Budge, Robertson, Hearl, eds. 1987). This supports the general impression you have from reading party documents or following political discussions in the media, that party spokesmen rather than discussing a problem (say crime) on some common ground, will switch: the more right-wing emphasises conventional law and order, the more reformist the fact that crime breeds in poor social conditions, which call for more intervention and services.

One further piece of specific evidence, apart from the low rate of programmatic references to other parties and their issue-positions, is the fact that specific commitments and pledges are so limited in party documents and confined almost exclusively to marginal areas (Rallings, 1987). One simply cannot code and election platform in terms of specific stands without throwing away most of the material: but surely everything that is written has some purpose? If so, saliency theory is the only explanation that makes sense of 90% of the sentences in the election programmes.

4. CHARACTERISING ISSUE POSITIONS; SCORES AND TYPOLOGIES

It is possible to characterise party and electoral positions by simply recording stances on every conceivable issues. For most purposes however one needs to summarise and estimate the overall issue position. This is particularly necessary when one wants to estimate distances between parties, and between parties and electors, to operationalise voting and coalition theories.

Again, there are a number of ways of doing this. It is salutary to reflect that many -perhaps most- summary characterisations are not spatial in nature. I review these here, going on in Section 5 to consider the spatial characterisations that may be applied.

- a) A first, heroic solution is to concentrate only on the most important issue and characterise parties and electors in regard to that. (In terms of a saliency characterisation this would be the contrast between each party's leading topics). A specific example of this is where Budge and Keman (1990, p. 83) -partly from paucity of data as well as from a desire to simplify-hypothesise that parties agreeing on the most important issue would be more likely to enter into governmental coalition with each other than those that did not, where no obvious structural impetus to coalition existed. Given the difficulty of getting data from newspaper accounts, the hypothesis had a fair degree of success: 58 per cent of relevant cases.
- b) From the point of view of trying to predict the direction of vote in elections, summary scores for each party may do very well. The simplest solution was suggested by Kelley and Mirer (1974). For elegance and parsimony it has never been bettered. They simply took advantage of the "open" questions about issues and candidates included in practically all national election surveys, and added up positive and negative references to each candidate algebraically (each counting one). Electors were then postdicted to vote for the party with the highest score -a characterisation which seemed to fit the data for the US very well.
 - c) More directly related to the discussion of issues as such, rather than

vote-prediction is the idea of typing specific issues into long term "clusters" or "areas" as in Table 3. The advantage of doing so is that the "types" are relevant over all elections whereas specific issues appear and disappear. In line with saliency ideas one can assign most of these types to one party or another (in terms of their prominence in an election causing a net inflow of votes to one of the parties). Election failure or success can then be explained in terms of more of one parties' issues than another's predominating at an election.

The advantage of such a characterisation is that it can be applied over all elections for which newspaper accounts of prominent issues are available i.e. in practice, over all elections in democracies since the second world war. Not only that, it can be used to predict <u>election</u> results in advance on the basis of such accounts. Predictions on this basis have had a fair degree of success (Budge and Farlie, 1983, pp. 84-114). The advantage of this approach in the present context is that it can be used to survey the incidence of issues of the various types in elections since the war: Tables drawn from this study form in fact the centrepiece of Section 8 (Table 10 below).

5. SUMMARIZING ISSUE POSITIONS: DIMENSIONS AND SPATIAL ANALYSES

The power and flexibility of non-spatial analyses are much greater than is commonly credited. But spatial analyses have well-known advantages of direct, intuitive representation and openness, to mathematical analyses and formal modelling, which render them very appealing. This is even truer of one-dimensional representations which have the advantage, usually, of avoiding cyclical voting problems. A pervasive problem with many analyses, however, has been that in their eagerness to utilize the power of a spatial approach they have been unselfcritical even unconscious- of the operational assumptions necessary to produce it and on which their results depend just as much as on the highly refined mathematical postulates which they use explicitly (cf Budge and Keman, 1990, pp. 2130). This is even more true when theoretical analysts have availed themselves of empirically derived spaces, for there it is even clearer that what goes in determines what comes our -and that is not always an issue-space! I illustrate these points below:

a) The commonest type of space used to explain and predict government coalitions is a judgmentally derived Left-Right space, where country specialists have been asked to order and space out parties along a continuum between (usually undefined) Left and Right ends. Usually this puts communist and radical left parties as well as extreme Right parties way out at each end of the line, so it is not hard to predict that the coalition will form from those parties of the Centre which are closest to each other. This kind of judgmental placement often leads to an implicit tautology. It is difficult to specialists making this kind of judgement to confine themselves to

pure issue-stands (which they are often not very conscious of anyway). So quite naturally, one of the most important factors entering into estimates of closeness is parties' previous experience in government together. Distances at least partly based on this are then used to predict future coalitions! The specialists might just as well have been asked directly to say what parties would join in government, without going through elaborate intervening procedures.

The other disadvantage of such "judgmental" spaces particularly relevant for the current discussion, is that specialists cannot be retrospectively asked to reconstruct party locations over a period in time, as judgements about one set of positions tend to contaminate others. If experts have themselves been asked to make estimates at different time-points and these recorded, then of course this objection would not hold, though one would like to know that they had the same understanding of Left and Right at each point.

b) Much the same objections apply to the kinds of space commonly obtained by survey analysts in the early "70s, based on electors" rank-orderings of the parties in terms of closeness to them. First, these are not clearly issue-spaces, since who knows what may have influenced the judgements of closeness? And secondly, since the nature of the dimensions is inferred from the positioning of parties on them, rather than from independent evidence, any movement by the parties changes the inferred nature of the dimensions, rendering it impossible to trace party change within the same space (Budge and Farlie, 1978).

In the 1970s Farlie and Budge experimented with a "party defined" space, derived either from issue-responses or social characteristics of party supporters or both. This was based on Bayesian likelihood ratios and produced a space varying in dimensionality with the number of parties (1-dimensional with 2 parties, 2-dimensional for three etc.). The ends were "pure party positions" which actual parties could approach more or less closely but never attain. The space was used for relating party positions, as defined by British manifestoes and US platforms, to survey data on electors, with a view to checking Robertson's (1976) hypothesis on party competition (Budge and Farlie, 1977, Chap. 11). There are obvious problems in applying this representation to multi party systems however, as the space cannot be represented directly with more than three parties. The demonstration that the odds against the nearest Democratic and Republican platforms being mistaken for each other are 200 to 1 does lend some force to the idea that parties rarely leap-frog and keep close to their own segment of issue-space, in contradiction to Downsian ideas of unlimited free movement.

d) The natural technique to apply to any scoring or issue positions, whether survey or content-analytic in nature, is factor-analysis. Provided that the input does relate to issues this will give you a policy-space as assumed by most theoretical

models. However the resulting space will differ from the pure issue space of free party movement, assumed by most theories, as it will be one in which parties do not and cannot venture into certain areas: it will be a policy space with certain parts reserved to particular parties (Budge and Farlie, 1977). This should be borne in mind with the factor-analytic spaces examined below.

Although the more or less straightforward factor-analytic spaces are the main ones I use to trace issue-change below, two other approaches have been used, particularly to examine coalition formation and relationships between party and coalition policy (Laver and Budge, eds., 1922, Chap. 2).

e) A "forced" left-right dimension. Having drastically reduced our original 54 category coding of party programmes e.g. by leaving out thinly populated categories, we combined those we thought intuitively belonged together as a left-right dimension and checked this by factor analysis. Subsequently we put the "left-right" variable in factor analyses with the remaining ones to see if any "fitted" with it across 12 countries. This was in a sense a "forced" dimension as we were using it to mop up all of the variation in the data-set that we possibly could, being guided rather than determined by the factor-analysis.

The dimension which we obtained opposed right-wing emphases on "capitalist economics", "social conservatism", "freedom and domestic human rights", and "support for military"; to left emphases on "State intervention", "peace and co-operation", "democracy", "support for social services", "support for education", and "support for labour". Left-right positions of parties were computed by subtracting percentages of "leftist" references from percentages of "rightist" references.

f) No other general comparative dimension emerged from these data. This meant that the forced left-right dimension was in some ways our best summary representation of party positions (on a comparative basis). To catch the other tendencies present in the data there was no alternative to using our (reduced) 20 variable coding framework as a whole -in effect a 20- dimensional representation of the parties in issue space. This lost the advantage of concise presentation but did allow us to form alternative estimates of distance between parties, which is all that is necessary, for some theories at any rate, to make predictions of coalition membership and policy. However the best metric for these measurements turned out to be city block rather than Euclidian, a point that has considerable relevance for formal modelling of issue spaces.

6. PARTY MOVEMENT WITHIN (LEADERSHIP) ISSUE-SPACES OBTAINED BY FACTOR ANALYSES OF PARTY PROGRAMMES

If we were concerned only with changes of party position within issue spaces which we could assume to be invariant for the whole postwar period, I would present estimates of this, based on party electoral programmes, in terms of the last two spaces described, as these are the latest to be evolved from our continuing analysis of the programmatic data.

However change within a given space is not the only type of change with which we should be concerned. There is also the question of whether the relevant dimensions of the space are stable or themselves change at some point. It is not unreasonable to think they do, given the political record of most countries in the sixties an early seventies: the growth of new social movements since then; and the impact of environmental considerations and detente in the 1980s. This can be illustrated through Table 4, taken from an unpublished secondary analysis of the election programmes of Hofferbert and Inglehart (1990) which shows interesting correlations between post materialist issues and time. Use of the Right-Left dimension or of an original coding frame, both made invariant by definition, confines us to examining party changes of position within definitionally fixed parameters. So I shall base discussion on our original two-stage factor analyses, based on 54 categories, into which were counted all sentences of all available electoral programmes for all significant parties in 19 democracies for the postwar period. The categories (Budge, Robertson Hearl, eds., Appendix B) are based on the saliency ideas described in Section 3, rather than on coding directly opposing positions of parties. Saliency ideas in turn gain some validity from the plausible results produced by the factor analyses.

The major findings (Budge, Robertson, Hearl, eds., 1987, Chap. 18) were:

- a) The optimal spaces for each country were never less than three dimensional, and sometimes four or five dimensional. Generally, the leading dimension, and less often the second, were generalisable across countries; the others were country-specific.
- b) In 14 out of 19 countries the leading dimension that emerged was interpretable as a Left-Right one, broadly along the lines of the "forced" dimension described above.
- c) In 9 countries, of the 14 which generated a leading left-right dimension, a second dimension emerged which could be interpreted in broad terms as a "New Politics" dimension, where some concern with "new issues", particularly the environment and democracy, is contasted with older emphases. Although we forced orthogonality on the dimensions, an inspection of the two dimensional figures produced in these cases shows that collapsing the space to one dimension still gives a reasonable representation at least of the major parties, relative positions. This

explains the success of our "forced" left-right dimension which in some ways combines these two sets of concerns.

A summary of these findings over all countries analysed is given in Table 5.

d) Although the nature of the dimensions is important to interpret what kind of change is taking place, it is change itself we are concerned with -in this case the movement of the parties over various points in these dimensions. For predicting alliances or coalitions what is needed of course are the exact scores at each point in time, which can hardly be presented here. A general interest is in the general convergence or divergence of parties over the postwar period, particularly in view of theses of the "end of ideology" (Bell, 1962) or of the emergence of the totally pragmatic "catch-all" party (Kircheimer, 1966). In part, of course, judgements of convergence and divergence rest on arbitrary decisions about which years to compare. Inspection of individual graphs of party movement on the main dimension shows that in most countries there is no steady movement to convergence or divergence; parties come together and move apart presumably in response to imperatives of party competition, not to secular trends towards de-ideologisation.

Taking party positions in the first postwar election and comparing it with the last for which we have data (the early 80s) we get the results summarised in Table 6. In the limited sense used above most countries experienced convergence. The extreme case is Italy (Figure 1) -curiously, as it is so often described in terms of "polarised pluralism" with irresistible "centrifugal" tendencies (Sartori, 1972). In fact in the latter period the tendency to convergence is so strong that it even produces some leapfrogging which (exceptionally) goes against some of the points made earlier. The results also illustrate the point that Communist parties are often close, in policy terms, to the other parties in the system even though permanently excluded from government coalitions. There are two footnotes to these findings which must be stressed. One is that the factor analysis is of emphases on issues (as measured by percentages of sentences falling into the categories). Thus convergence must be interpreted as putting less stress on traditional issues, not taking up the same positions on them. And of course these stresses are the party leaderships', addressed to electors certainly, but not emanating from them and therefore not necessarily reflecting their thinking. In the absence of more direct information one might of course wish to use these documents as a surrogate indicator of electoral opinion, but it is only a surrogate.

7. <u>NEW DIMENSIONS AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE SPACE OF PARTY</u> COMPETITION

The findings presented in Section 6 rest on the assumption of an invariant

issue space over the postwar period, within which party emphasis and de-emphasis of the issues take place. What if the space itself changes over this period however, in terms of its politically important dimensions, making different issues relevant to party relationships at different points in time? There are dramatic turning points in most countries' political history which at least point to this possibility: the Bad Godesberg conference and renunciation of Marxism by the SPD in Germany (1959), the Schools Pact in Belgium of roughly the same date, the dramatic influx of new parties to Parliament in Norway and Denmark in 1972-13. In terms of our own data the prevalence of the New Politics dimension may be a covert indicator of change over time, as these issues become prevalent in the late sixties and seventies. Of course we can show it as a dimension over the whole postwar but it might be more accurate to represent it as creating a different space.

To test the possibility, separate factor analyses were run of the documentary material before and after a break-point identified for each country in terms of historical events. The results are summarised in Table 7. Obviously some caution needs to be exercised since breaking the postwar into two periods attenuates the number of cases for factor analysis quite seriously: some simply cannot be done. However a general impression is that the Left-Right dimension is the leading one in most countries both in the earlier and late periods. It emerges explicitly in the earlier postwar period in seven out of ten countries shown in the Table. One also has the impression from examining the analysis in detail that it would take very little to "tip" dimensions given other interpretations (for example, the Secular versus Religious clash in Belgium and the Netherlands) into a Left-Right confrontation, which is presumably what happened in these countries anyway.

With the later period we find that the dimension emerges in some form in six out of nine countries (very unstable solutions emerged for Italy which caused the second period to be excluded from the table). No other general dimension emerges to challenge it in the Table. It is certainly clear that there is no "end of ideology" in the later period. On the contrary the entry of the "new politics", whether of the New Left or Green variety, make for a reassertion of ideological conflict rather than a diminution of it.

The basic finding from the methodological point of view is, that we are justified in condensing these data into a single left-right dimension. This emerges spontaneously as the leading, and only generalizable one, from the nearest we can get, statistically, to a purely inductive approach, whether for the whole postwar or for its earlier and later periods. Breaking the whole period into two substantially increases the possibility of idiosyncratic and time-bound dimensions emerging, as they can predominate over a shorter period whereas over the long term they are likely to give way to the more enduring and stable organization of conflict underlying them. This is not, of course, to say that using one or the other time period is "wrong".

Each is a summary which leaves out certain aspects of these quite complex data. I have already noted that the Belgian dimensions could easily tip over into a Left-Right form: this is what indeed, happened when the whole postwar period was analysed together.

The Old Left and New Politics dimensions are reasonably related to each other. The old Left-Right distinction opposes peace and disarmament, social welfare and government economic intervention to economic freedom and orthodoxy, traditional values and support for military alliances. The new Left puts less emphasis on welfare and more on participation, democracy and rights of non-economic groups. The Greens add to this their concern with environmental issues. None of these are incompatible with old left positions, and indeed, might positively call for more Government intervention and welfare support. So we can envisage a consolidation of Left-Right opposition in the future rather than its replacement and indeed this seems to have happened in the eighties after most of our data were collected.

An interesting additional point which emerges from Table 7 is that the "New Politics" of environmental concern, protection of minorities, and greater participation was already making its way in the first part of the postwar period. These concerns were often carried by the New Left parties, particularly in Scandinavia. Issue change was certainly not absent in the earlier postwar period as compared to the second. We can examine this at a more specific level in Section 8.

8. SPECIFIC ISSUE-CHANGE OVER THE POST-WAR PERIOD

i) Changes in Programmatic Issues

Whether or not one thinks of issue-change primarily in terms of parties changing position within the same space, or of the dimensions of the relevant space themselves changing and in that sense imposing a qualitative change in relationships, it is relevant to ask at a more detailed level what specific issues are changing and how. This is also of concern to some of the non-spatial approaches summarized in Section 4. Table 8 summarizes overall results in terms of change in specific issues, from the same comparison of countries before and after a crucial turning point in their postwar history.

The Table not only gives an overall judgement on whether change in specific issues had taken place (in 6 out of 11 it had, up to the beginning of the 1980s) -it also identifies most of the issues which are rising or declining in prominence or remaining stable. This gives us an opportunity to see if some issues share the same fate across developed democracies, and thus to get some clues about the factors that make for their entry on to the political agenda ("Agenda"

however, may be a misleading analogy for issues, as one gets the impression both from party try-ons in their programmes, and from the way in which issues bob up and down in elections, that they are never fixed enough to be on a definite agenda: it is rather a process of constant change, and party competition to push others' issues out and your's in).

It is difficult to generalize very much on the basis of Table 8. The same broad topics clearly appear among leading issues in all countries, for example, "social issues", "economic orthodoxy", etc. However, they do not show the same pattern of rise and decline. In the Netherlands and Britain the attention paid to social services (up to the early 'eighties) was stable: in Belgium it was declining, as also in Sweden (but from a very high base there). Economic orthodoxy and free enterprise, which in retrospect one might have expected to be consistently rising, were instead declining in Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands, but certainly rising in Australia and Denmark.

The few general tendencies which emerge are:

- a) questions connected with traditional morality (which in party programmes is more the virtues of the family and Christian values rather than the minefields of abortion and divorce) are in general decline. This may reflect deconfessionalization, particularly in the Netherlands
- b) attention to agriculture is generally declining, reflecting the migration from country into town which has taken place in practically all these countries
- c) attention to the military seems to be declining to the early 'eighties (apart from the United States) -running in parallel with the reduction of international tensions. The difference between the United States, where the attention the topic gets is stable, and other countries, is interesting because of course the U.S. was more heavily involved in military ventures during the later period than its allies
- d) along with the military and defence, there seems a general decline in attention to international affairs in the later period, again perhaps reflecting the more reassuring atmosphere as detente proceeded.

Issues to which more attention was paid in the later period are:

- a) technology -rising in the US, UK and Italy and stable elsewhere
- b) a cluster of "new politics issues" -democracy, decentralization, social justice and environment- not always the same in every country but recognizably related. The most consistent issue to enter in is the environment, although only in

Sweden does it jump to almost the most prominent role. Mostly the entry of new issues is signalled by modest increases in attention to a topic which brings it to the bottom of the leading ten.

There is a hint from the evidence on party programmes that issue change is a function of economic, social and "external" political changes, particularly in international affairs. This would be a reassuring conclusion as it would demonstrate that parties do function as transmitters and debaters of real problems, which governments may then be stimulated to take action on. It would be nice if it were so, since it would buttress our faith in the ability of democracy to cope with contemporary problems. There is, however, one piece of counter-evidence from the programmes which we ought to consider; and two general points to make on the way in which the "real world" gets reflected in issues.

The counter evidence is the general absence of references to the European Community in most of the countries directly affected by it. Only in Italy and Belgium does it appear as a rising issue. Perhaps, however, this is because it is not controversial in many places -though this would not be true for Britain and Denmark in the 1970s.

The reflection I want to add on the genesis of issues, is how far the environment is really an "objective" problem creating immediate difficulties for people, and how far it is an issue created by some scientists and the media. Objectively, in the countries considered, most people probably suffer less, directly, from pollution than in the smoke and smog-shrouded cities of 50 years ago. Yet it is clearly a "rising" issue. Declining international tension is also not experienced directly -though it is true that in the earlier postwar period wars were actually being fought. And environmental change also seems to be a real process happening "out there", as well as a subject of concern for scientists and media. The media do presumably, most of the time, reflect the "real world"?

Another general aspect of issue-generation at the international level is the effect of imitation and transmission. Although they may be insulated to some extent, no national politics takes place entirely in a vacuum. In particular what is said and debated in the United States has an enormous impact elsewhere -probably it is an asymmetric relationship. Thus it may be that the environment issue was touched off by objective conditions in the United States where the big cities probably are more polluted than 50 years ago; and then spread as an issue to Western Europe even though the cities are cleaner than they were. Whatever the plausibility of this particular speculation, there is no doubt that imitation and transmission effects need to be reckoned with.

ii) Changes in Newspaper Accounts of Campaign Issues

Further evidence on the processes behind issue-change comes from another study, of campaign issues mentioned by newspapers over 23 countries in the postwar period, up to 1980 (Budge and Farlie, 1983, pp. 35-41). Codings here were made on a different (though broadly compatible) categorization to those of electoral programmes (also based on saliency ideas) into 14 broad categories, including candidate reactions (see Table 3). They are not directly comparable with the programmatic issues discussed earlier but do give an alternative estimate of postwar trends to compare with them.

Table 9 first of all gives an overall summary of the issues that emerged in elections over the whole postwar period within each country. From this we can see (always constrained by the type of classification made) that the most widespread type of issue which enters into the great majority of elections in all countries, in nerwpaper terms, is government records. This is hardly surprising, since elections are designed to choose a government and the most immediate ground for choice is how well the contestants have performed in the past or seem likely to perform in the future. The record has always been assessed primarily in economic terms but there is an increasing concentration on this in the later postwar period.

In most countries government record is as predominating a concern as it is overall. In Belgium, however, it enters into only six out of ten elections -buried very often by the disruptive linguistic divisions of the 1970s. Switzerland is the other country where government record is not prominent, but this is a reflection of the absence of national issues from many Swiss elections rather than a downgrading of government record in relation to other types of issue.

The personal characteristics of candidates (usually for the chief executive office) enter into slightly more than half the elections. Again it is unsurprising that the qualities of potential leaders should form such a widespread basis of assessment. Being less widespread than government record, however, there is more room for variation between countries. The United Kingdom, West Germany, India and Sri Lanka have candidates entering as a major considerational into all elections, followed by Australia (eleven out of thirteen), Canada (ten out of thirteen), Ireland and Israel (nine our of ten) and the United States (six out of nine). On the whole it seems that countries with a broadly Anglo-Saxon parliamentary tradition and tendencies to a two-party system tend to focus attention on candidates (however, West Germany does not follow the Anglo-Saxon tradition and Israel has not until very recently had anything like two-party competition),. Democracies with least stress on candidates are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Switzerland and the Low Countries. These are on the whole the smaller North European countries, with the significant exceptions of Italy and Japan. Perhaps the factionalism of the dominant

party in the last two countries prevents national leaders appearing as more than nominees of special interests. The institutionalization of the parties, and traditions of collective leadership in the smaller North European democracies, may inhibit assessment through individual personalities.

Foreign relations appears as an important issue in rather less than half the elections. It is particularly important in the United States -naturally, in a country at the centre of a world system of alliances which has been engaged in two major conflicts within the last thirty years. The United Kingdom (six out of ten) and France (there out of seven) have been in a similar situation. Foreign relations are also important to smaller countries next to a powerful threatening neighbour, such as Finland vis a vis the USSR (eight out of eleven elections), West Germany (five out of seven), Japan (six out of nine), India (three out of seven) and Norway (six out of eight). Iceland (six out of twelve) and Canada (five out of thirteen) have been particularly concerned over relations with the United States.

The last leading issue type again cropping up in nearly half the elections is socioeconomic redistribution, at the core of which stand welfare policies. In Australia these were debated in eleven out of thirteen elections, attaining almost similar prominence in the United Kingdom (seven out of ten). They were raised also in more than half the elections held in Italy, India and, rather surprisingly, the United States. Elsewhere they appeared in a significant number of elections, except in Canada (one out of thirteen) France (two out of seven), Sri Lanka (one out of five) and Switzerland (no elections at all). Possession either of a Socialist party or strong two-party competition appears to contribute to the raising of this issue, although the exceptions indicate that the relationship is not strong.

All remainings issue types appear in the range between fourteen and forty-five elections (i.e. between about 8 per cent and 20 per cent of the total). In all cases, low general representation stems from their uneven distribution within different countries. All are raised frequently in one or two countries, but do not appear at all elsewhere. Thus civil order has been a recurring concern in France and West Germany (three out of seven elections) and peculiarly -because of fears about communist subversion- in almost a third of Australian elections. Constitutional changes have been debated a great deal in Belgium (six out of ten elections), primarily because of the need to conciliate Flemish speakers by bestowing greater autonomy. Defence has been of particular concern in Canada, where it unleashes tensions between francophones and anglophones, and towards the United States; in Denmark and the United Kingdom debate has revolved around the overall level of defence expenditures within a precarious economy. Religion has entered into politics in Italy, Netherlands and Luxembourg through the Christian parties there and in Sri Lanka through the fears of the Buddhist priesthood about its position. Ethnic rivalry has dominated Belgian politics over the last ten years, and has emerged in Britain and Israel through problems of assimilation posted by recent immigration. Regional issues are related to ethnic tension in Belgium, while in Canada the position of French-speakers is symbolised by the power of Quebec. Farming problems are important to Finland, not only because of the relatively greater number of the rural population, but because of the pivotal position of the Agrarian Party. Nationalisation and associated powers of government control have been particularly controversial in the United Kingdom, but also in Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands, while its converse -an emphasis on individual freedom and initiative-was prominent in Denmark even before the dramatic emergence of Glistrop's anti-tax party in 1973. Government regulation has emerged in about a quarter of elections in Finland, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, mainly in relation to strikes. Since these are an endemic problem in modern economies, we may expect this type of issue to become increasingly prominent in future. Even generally under-represented issue types thus emerge as important for the analysis of elections in at least one country.

Issue types vary not only across countries but over time -some recurring more frequently in later elections, some declining in saliency. Table 10 traces the incidence of issues in each election "period" of the postwar years. Such periods have been selected simply to group contiguous elections, without any deeper theoretical justification. They seem short enough to capture significant changes.

Government record is such a ubiquitous type of issue that no particular trend can be traced; if anything it appears to have become an even more widely used basis of assessment in recent years than formerly. The same can be said the more strongly of candidates -from a third of elections in the late 1940s to three-quarters since the mid-1970s. Foreign relations appear more sensitive, as one might expect, to the state of international affairs -relatively more prominent in the late 1940s with the Cold war, then in the late 1950s and early 1960s with detente, then from 1565 to 1974 with Vietnam and its aftermath. Socioeconomic redistribution appears in a quarter to a half of the elections in each time-period, attaining most prominence in the early 1950s during the first wave of postwar prosperity; and least prominence more recently.

Of the less generally recurring issues, civil order comes to much greater prominence in the politically disturbed periods after 1965, with student demonstrations and terrorism. Constitutional issues come to prominence earlier, from 1955. Defence shows a rising trend to the early 1960s, and a slow decline thereafter. Religious-moral questions remain at a low level throughout, with a slight peak in the late 1950s. Reflecting the growth of separatism and autonomist movements in Europe, and the increasing numbers of foreign workers in all countries, ethnic issues show a distinct rise over the postwar period. Regionalism reached a sudden peak in 1965-74 but an indication of decline is seen in the thirty-three elections out of thirty-

six in which it failed to appear in 1975-79. Urban-rural questions, on the other land, show no distinct tendencies, though they reached their highest in 1970-74.

The three non-redistributive class issues all show a tendency to grow in prominence over the postwar years. The extent of government control (involving such questions as nationalisation) as much debated during the postwar reconstruction, slipped almost out of sight in 1960-64, then returned to prominence in the 1970s with the breakdown of Keynesian approaches to economic management and the advent of neo-capitalist modes of thought. A broadly similar pattern, though different in detail, ca, be seen for the antonym of government control -individual initiative and freedom. Regulation, increasingly discussed in relation to industrial unrest and strikes, again rises sharply to prominence in the 1970s.

Most of these tendencies are understandable in terms of a postwar history which in most countries involved initial reconstruction, followed by a relaxed enjoyment of restored prosperity from about 1955 to 1965, succeeded in turn by the increasing problems of a complex economy and intergroup tensions connected with this (foreign affairs proceeding, meanwhile, from a consolidation of Cold War alliances, through detente, to a concern with American involvement in Vietnam, and further dissolution of previous alliances). That the appearance and disappearance of election issues can be related to general tendencies, outside the control of politicians in any one country, carries implications for analyses of campaign strategies. For if politicians have only a limited ability to emphasise or deemphasise issues, which become independently salient in elections, one can attribute only a partial influence over victory or defeat to their actions. Rather than seeing their strategy as determining the outcome, we must ask instead whether they made the most of their appeal under given circumstances which they could not wholly (or perhaps even substantially) affect.

The inference that salient election issues relate broadly to significant events in the outside world and are not sham debating topics designed to divert attention form real problems, is consistent with the evidence and is a cheering conclusion for the democrat, if somewhat daunting for ambitious politicians.

iii) Future Research

It must be said that all the evidence reviewed above is inferential and highly circumstantial. We look at changing patterns of issues (or more exactly, of various categorizations of issues) and interpret them in terms of changing conditions in the world around them. That is quite suggestive but can only be a first cut at the problem of issue generation. Further efforts need to be made in regard to the systematic collection of indicators of political and socioeconomic change (both national and

international) in order to relate them through regressions to changes in programmatic content. This should answer more conclusively some of the questions raised by the analysis reported here.

9. THE CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL ISSUES

Strictly speaking, the question of what effects issues produce is beyond the remit of this discussion, whose major focus is on the way in which one type of issue succeeds another. To leave it at that however is to leave many questions hanging in the air. We should not after all consider issue change important did we not think it carried further consequences for election outcomes, party strategies and government activity. Each of these is considered briefly, in turn:

a) Election outcomes

There was a great debate in the field of American voting studies about the extent of "issue-voting" compared to voting on the basis of "Party Identification", in the early 1970s (reviewed by Margolis, 1977). This partly derived from the fact that explanations of voting have to cope with two phenomena:

- i) the large number of voters who vote t he same way from election to election
 - ii) the smaller, but possibly increasing number who vote differently.

In many studies i) is associated with voting on the basis of a basic identification with the party uncontaminated with issues and ii) with voting under the influence of issues (cf, among many others, Pomper, Brody, Page and Boyd, 1972). Obviously, however, one could associate both effects with issue voting. From both spatial and non-spatial perspectives, if a party makes only marginal adjustments to policy and voters do not substantially change their opinions, most of its previous supporters will end up voting for it in the next election. Explaining all voting in terms of reactions to issues is neater and more internally consistent than using one type of factor to account for stability and quite another to account for change. All rational choice accounts make issue based assumptions.

Budge and Farlie, 1983, made an attempt to develop a thorough-going issue-based account of voting which (unusually) generated, advance predictions of 10 national elections which performed reasonably well. Current predictive "economic" models of elections (Tufte, 1975, 1978; Sanders, Ward and Marsh, 1987, 1991) are also, of course, issue-based though emphasising effects of only one type of issue (economic). Thus, there seem strong grounds for assuming that issues have a determining, if not exclusive, influence over election outcomes: and that election change is the effect of issue-change.

b) Party Strategies

If this is the case then what parties do about issues strongly affects their electoral fortunes and participation in government. The whole tradition of modelling and spatial analysis which relies exclusively on issue spaces and issue effects seems to be on the right lines. Above I have suggested one direction that such analyses could take, in terms of saliency theory. As government record is itself a major issue, what governments do in office will affect their electoral fortunes, and vice-versa.

c) Governement Formation

Most models of coalition-bargaining have moved ever closer to using pure policy-factors rather than office-seeking ones to explain government formation. Recent research using election programmes to measure party policy positions and government programmes to represent government policy, have given only limited support to the idea that policy-proximity or strategic positioning in issue-space provide a basis for coalitions. Of 10 different policy-based models tested (two indirectly median-legislator ones) the most successful attained only a 50 per cent success rate and 50 per cent efficiency rate over postwar governments in 12 countries. Moreover, party programmes related only inconsistently to government programmes -only in 4 out of 8 countries were there correlations of any magnitude between the two (Laver and Budge 1922, Chapter 14).

d) Government Outputs

These negative results could be explained, however, by government programmes not being good indicators of policies actually pursued by government. Much stronger relations are discovered between parties' programmatic stands and actual government outputs, as measured by percentage expenditures (Budge and Hofferbert, 1990: Hofferbert and Klingemann, 1990). Parties in coalitions may well affect outputs through their tenure of specific ministries for which they have a strong preference linked to their particular policy concerns (Budge and Keman, 1990: Chapter 4). Specific ministries may thus be an intermediate goal for parties as a means to affecting policy outputs (Budge and Keman, 1990, Chapter 5). This undermines established perceptions of ministries as interchangeable coinage (Browne and Franklin, 1972) in favour of certain ministries having a particular value for a party (Budge and Herman, 1978).

Besides saving the idea of a reasonably pure policy space as the venue within which coalition parties operate, the more general findings on the linkage between emphases in election programmes and the expenditures made by

Governments, support mandate theories of democracy (cf Downs, 1957) in which electors choose between parties on the basis of their alternative programmes for government; and parties carry through the programmes in office, thus effecting majority or at least plurality preferences.

10. CONCLUSIONS

We have, therefore, the promise from this line of research of a totally issue-based empirically-grounded theory of the functioning of party democracy, from party strategies through election outcomes to government functioning. Not only does this provide us with the prospect of a more exact and testable account of the processes involved, it is also in line with philosophical and popular justifications of the greater choice offered by democracy as a political system. It helps to emphasise the importance of studying the emergence of issues along the lines undertaken here, as they constitute the agenda for government action on societal problems at a particular conjuncture.

All this underlines the basic importance of better definitions and measures of political issues themselves, of their effects, and of the influences which shape them and change them. It is this last aspect of issues which is currently the least studied and yet potentially the key to the ability of democratic political processes to respond to their environment and keep themselves and their populations going. It is this which makes studies of issues and agenda-setting particularly valuable at the present time, when vast new populations are turning to democratic methods of tackling and resolving the major problems which threaten to overwhelm them.

<u>Table1</u>

TABLE 1 Correspondence between issues emphasized by leaders and issues important among electors united states presidential election 1 960

Leading Issues of Campaign noted by T.H. White, The Making of the President New York, Atheneum 1961	Specific Topics selected because significant percentage of platform given to them	Broad Categories selected on basis of high number of references made to them	Corresponding Issues among electors and from election survey	Topics Important among electors but not stressed by Leaders
1	2	3	4	5
			Reaction to Kenedy	Attitude to union-
			Reaction to Nixon	endorsed candidate
			Most important problem	
te man de la			facing the governement	
Kennedy's Catholicism			Catholic question	
Californism		Freedom	School integration	
Civil Rights	Civil Rights	Minority Groups	Equality for blacks	
Peace		Peace	Likelih ood of war	
Prosperity	Economic growth		Personal financial prospects	
Foreign Policy Formosa	Foreign Policy	Internationalism	Isolationism	
General US standing re				
Soviet Union			Maria California de California	
Federal Tax Role			Governement role in	
			housing and power Government guarantee for	
			Employment	
Farm Policy	Agriculture	Agriculture	Employment.	
	Social Policy	Social Services	Medicare	
	Overseas Aid		Foreign Aid	
	Science	Technology		
	Education		Governementaid to education	
	Governement Admin Fiscal Policy	Governement Efficiency		
	Natural Resources	Conservation		
	Labour Groups	Labour Groups		
	Defence	Military	Retaining Troops	
		Regionalism	Overseas	
		Social Justice		

TABLE 2 Correspondence between issues emphasized by leaders and issues important among electors general election Great Britain 1964

Leading Issues of Campaign noted by Butler and King The Brissh General Election of 1964 (London, Macmillan 1965)	Specific Topics selected because significant percentage of platform given to them	Broad Categories selected on basis of high number of references made to them	Corresponding Issues among electors and from election survey	Topics Important among electors but not stressed by Leaders
1	2	3	4	5
			Reaction to Wilson Reaction to Hume Differences between Parties	Common Market Importance of Monarchy Death Penalty
Defence Balance of Payments	Defence	Military	Nuclear Deterrent Closeness of party policy to own preferences on	
Nationalisation Trade Unions			Nationalisation Trade Unions ties to Labour	
Housing (Land Prices)	Housing Social Security		Closeness of party policy to own preferences	
Pensions Health	Social Services Health	Social Services	on Social Services Spending	
Education Imigration	Education	Imigration Policy		
	Disarmament Commonwealth Prices		Nuclear deterrent	
	Economic Planning Redundancy & retraining Regions Transport Taxes	EconomicPlanning		
	Leisure and Recreation Overseas Aid	Culture		
	Agriculture	In ternational ism Technology	Ties with USA	
		Economic Stability Peace	Personal Prosperity	
Government Waste		Productivity	Attitude to strikes	

TABLE 3 Broad Groupings for Newspaper Accounts of Issues

road grouping	Specific Campaign Issues within Each Broad Grouping	General Topics in Party Document Analysis found
		in Each Broad Grouping
. Civil order	Law and order: measures against	Law and order. Defence
	crime: death penalty: rioting: strikes and demostrations; anti-system parties	of the way of life.
	and demostrations; anti-system parties and problems caused by their strengh.	water and a second
2. Constitutional	Questions involving established institutions (e.g. monarchy, presidency,	Constitutionalism. Democracy.
	parliament and relations between them):	Democracy.
	democracy; civil rights.	
l. Foreign	Membership of NATO and other foreign alliances; detente; attitude to	Foreign special relationships. colonies; decolonisation.
elationships	comunist powers; entry to EEC;	Peace: internationalism:
	colonies and decolonisation	isolationism.
	overseasaid; attitudes to war and	
l. Defence	peace (rietnam). Military spending increases, reduction	Defence, Military.
	importance visa vis other policy	,
Candidate reactions	areas; nuclear arms.	
5. Candidate reactions	Likes and dislikes about candidates; leading candidates' performance.	
. Government record	Current financial situation and prospects,	Government efficiency.
	expectations; economic prosperity,	Government corruption.
	depression. Incidence of inflation and unemployment; government corruption,	Economic stability
	inefficiency; satisfaction with government	
	in general and in any specified areas in	
	ways not stipulated in other categories. Istax money spendwidely? Desirefor	
	majority government, strong government.	
7. Moral-religious	Support of traditional/christian morals	Support of morality.
	and church; abortion and birth control; temperance; anti-clericalism - danger	National effort.
	from clergy/church; religious schools	
and the second s	and education.	
l. Ethnic	Immigration and foreign workers;	Underprivileged minority
	attitudes to minority groups and their advancement; discrimination;	groups; culture.
	school and housing integration;	
Peninnal	language questions. National unity	Pagionalism: national
i. Regional IO. Urban rural	Farmers and rural interests;	Regionalism; national Agriculture
	agricultural subsidies.	
1. Socioeconomic	Social service spending importance	Social justice; social services;
edistribution	of social welfare; housing as a problem; housing subsidies; rent	Labour and other under- privileged demographic
	control; food subsidies; health and	groups
	medical services; social reform;	
	pensions; aid to other services such as education; action in regard to	
	unemployment; employment guarantee.	
2. Government	Nationalisation; state control of the	Controlled economy;
ontrol and Janning	economy; general governmental power; and control; management and	economic planning; conservation.
a arming	protectionism of enviroiment.	construction.
3. Government	Action against monopolies; big	Regulation pretotectionism
egulation in avour of the	business power, trade union power: protectionism and free trade.	and free trade.
avour of the ndividual.	Closed shop and action in relation	Frredom, enterprise,
4. Initiative and	to it; incentives; level of tax ation;	in centives, productly ity,
reedom.	support for free enterprise economics.	technology, economic orthodoxy.

Table 4 Regression and Correlation analysis of post-materialism trends in party programs and public values, by country.

Country	Party	Time Trend	Val vs Progs	Note to Table:
Belgium	BI-socialist	.29*	.28	Post-Materialism in Party Programmes: Index
	BI-Ch. Social	26*	73*	Construction (The Index is composed of the sum of the percentatge of quasi-sentences in each
	BI-Liberal	34"	.61*	party's electoral program concerning the following
Denmark	Dn-Communist	39*	70	items:)
	Dn-Social democrat	.15	53	
	Dn-Conservative	07	71*	Peace: Declaration of belief in peace and peaceful means
	Dn-Radical Liberal	.15	.51	of solving crises: need to international disarma-
	Dn-A grar, Liberal	.37*	54	ment and desirability of relevant country joining in
France	Fr-Communist	01	62*	negotiations with hostile countries.
	Fr-Socialist	.27*	.56	Fredom and Human Rights:
	Fr-Gaullist	.22*	41	Favourable mentions of importance of personal
Germany	Gr-Social Democrat	31*	.08	freedom, civil rights: freedom of choice in educa-
T. T. S.	Gr-Christian Democrat		46	tion: free dom from bureaucratic control: free dom
	Gr-Free Democrat	60*	.47	of speech: freedom from coercion in industrial and
Great Britain		26*	.42	political sphere: individualism.
	GB-Conservative	.19*	41	Democracy:
	GB-Liberal (all)	32*	.47	Favourable mention of democracy as method or
Ireland	Ir-Fine Gael	40*	.85*	goal in national and other organizations: support for worker participation: for involvement of all citi-
	Ir-Fianna Fail	01	53	zens in decision making, as well as generalized
	Ir-Labour	32*	.92*	support for symbols of democracy.
Italy	It-Communist	-34"	.48	
	It-Socialist	-21*	44	Environmental Protection: Preservation of countryside, forest, etc.: general
	It-Christian Democrat	32*	28	preservation of natural resources against selfish
Luxembourg	Lx-Communist	.49*	23	interest; proper use of national parks; soil banks,
	Lx-Socialist	.27	.24	et c.
	LX-Christian Democrat	49*	.24	Art, Sport, Leisure, and Media:
	Lx-Democrat	41*	05	Favourable mention of leisure activities, need to
Netherlands	NI-Labour	.42*	31	spend money on museums, art galleries, etc.:
	NL-Christian Union	.15*	32	need to encourage worthwhile leisure activities,
	NL-Cath. People	.67*	31	and to provide cultural and leisure facilities; to en- courage developement of the media, etc.
	NL-Anti-Rev	.72*	25	courage development of the media, etc.
	NL-Lib eral	04	15	

Social Justice:

Need to fair treatment of all people: for special protection for exploited: fair treatment in tax system: need for equality of opportunity: need for fair distribution of resources and removal of class barriers: end of discrimination.

Education:
The need to expand and /or omprove education at all levels (exclusive of technical training)

Source:
Richard I. Hofferbert and Ronald Inglehart "Post-Materialist values and party programs in democratic Europe". Paper deli-vered to Midwest Political Science Convention, Chicago, April 1990.

Significant at. 10 level

Table 5 The two leading dimensions from factor analyses over 20 postwar democracies

Country:	First Dimension	Second Dimension
United Kingdom	Leftvs Right	Liberalism vs Class Conflict
		Concerns
New Z eland	Leftvs Right	Internationalism and
		Welfare vs Isolationism
Australia	Leftvs Right	Discipline and Restraint
		vs Free Pursuit of Goals
United States	Leftvs Right	Interventionism vs New
	(in a modified sense of	In terventionism
	Con servatism v s	
	Interventionist Liberalism)	
Canada	New Leftism	Old leftism
Sri Lanka	Urban vs Rural	Old Leftvs Right
Israel	Nationalism and	Modernisation vs Democracy
	technological progress	(Associated with y new issues)
Ireland	Authoritarism vs ability	Capitalist Economics and
	to govern	Irish Unity
Northen Ireland	Pro- and anti- status quo	Socio-economic concerns vs
		section alism
Sweden	Left vs Centre	Left vs Right
Denmark	Old Leftvs Right	New Left vs Right
Finlan d*	Socialistys, Capitalist	Contrast between group norms
	Organisation of the economy	and individual values
Netherlands	Leftvs Right	New Left issues vs Social
		Con serv atism
Belgium	Left vs Right (but left includes	Progressive vs Clerical
	francophone orientations)	Con servatism
Luxembourg	New Issues vs. Isolationism	Social Justice and Freedom
Austria	Socioeconomic	New Issues and Interventionism
	Leftvs Right	vs Social Conservatism
West Germany	Organisation of (world) society	Degree of concern with the social
		market economy
France	Left vs Right (Economic,	Populism vs Bourgeois
	Social and Foreign Affairs)	Liberalism
Italy	Leftvs Right	Social Harmony (Subsume:
		Catholicism)
Japan	Left vs Right	New Issues vs Concentration
Professor.		on Economic growth

^{*} Based on Borg's Study of Finnish election programmes 1945-1966. This was a first stage rather than a second stage analysis, based on programmes to the mid-1960s, and on a somewhat different categorisation from ours, but seems generally compatible with your approach

Source: Budge, robertson, Hearl, p. 390-391

Table 6

Convergence or divergence of parties in dimensions of second stage factor analysis

Country:	Left-Right Dimension	Two Leading Dimensions
United Kingdom	D	Little change
New Zeland	D	Little change
Australia	С	C
United States	D	Little change
Canada	С	C
Sri Lanka	D	D
Israel		Little change
Ireland		c
Northen Ireland		Irrelevant (two parties
		ceased to exist)
Sweden	D	Little change
Denmark	D	D
Netherlands	C (in 1970s)	C (in 1970s)
Belgium	C	C (in 1970s)
Luxembourg		C (All parties but communist
Austria	C	c
West Germany		C
France	Limited C	Limited C (within but not across tendencies)
Italy	С	c
Japan	C	
C=Convergence		

Table 7

A comparison of the two leading dimensions in the earlier and later postwar periods in selected countries; produced by factor-analysis of the original 54-category coding scheme for party electoral programmes

	Earlier P	Period	Later Period	
DIMENSIONS	1	2	1	2
Canada	Old Left-Right	New Leftism	New vs Old Left	New left vs old right
Nether land s	Secular vs Religious Traditional values	Social Interests vs Government efficiency	Secular Left vs religious Right	Left vs Social Christian Values
Belgium	Political vs Social Concerns	Secular vs Religious traditional values	Nationalism vs Economic Infrastructure	Modernization vs Decentralization
Luxembourg	Secular vs Religious Traditional values	Leftvs Right	Leftvs Right	International vs National Concerns
France	Leftvs Right	National Populism vs Sectional Interests	National vs International values	European vs french Nationalism
taly	Secular Left vs traditional Right	Religious vs Sectional values		
Sweden	Leftvs Right	New Leftism	New righty's new left	Old left vs new left
Denmark	Leftvs Right	New Leftism	Old left vs new right	Old left vs old right
Austria	Defence of Nation vs Sectional Interests	Right vs Left	Defence of postwar Settlementvs Nationalism	Leftvs Right
Germany	Degree of concern with Social Market Economy		Social market economy vs New Politics	Interested groups vs New politics

Country	Great change?	Decline	Rise	Issues wich stay the same	
Australia	YES	Military	Econ orthodoxy	Labour groups	
		social services	government effectiveness specific econ goals	Agriculture Social Harmony Free enterprise technology incentives education	
Ca na da	NO	social services agriculture decentralization military	technology specific economic goals	non-economic groups Social Justice	ш
United States	NO	decolonization	technology law and order education	Non-economic goals Internationalism Agriculture Labour Economic orthodoxy Envirolment Foreign relations Social services	Change and and
United Kingdo	mNO	internationalism peace agriculture	social justice decentralis'n Gov. efficiency law and order	Social services Specific economic goals education economic orthodoxy	
Netherlands	SOME	Trad. morality free enterprise communalism agriculture	environment education democracy environment internationalism	planning social services social justice non-economic groups technology economic orthodoxy freedom	stability in leading issi later postwar periods.
Belgi um	YES	communatism social justice social services free enterprise trad, morality agriculture econ orthodoxy	non-econ groups decentralisation specific economic goals arts, leisure environment european community	labour non4abour groups economic groups	iss ds.
Luxembourg	YES	Trad. morality agriculture labour groups social justice national way of life	education arts, leisure technology environment	non-labour groups economic groups democracy freedom controlled economy	8 ver 12 party
France		social justice freedom education constitution peace: labour groups	minorities	democracy regulation of capitalism	Table 8 ues over 12 countries betwee From party election program
taly	YES	democracy labour groups peace agriculture Gov. effectiveness productivity	specific economic goals european commun. Gov. afficiency technology	freedom social services economic planning	3 š
Sweden	YES	social services agriculture free enterprise in centives	social justice democracy environment decentralisation	Economic orthodoxy education freedom traditional morality	the earlier es
Denmark	YES	non-econ groups anti-military education regulation of capitalism foreign special relations peace	social justice econ orthodoxy specific economic goals	social services free enterprise	lier
Austria	YES	freedom in centives constitution national effort foreign relations	econ orthodoxy technology non-econ groups social services education	democracy social justice free enterprise agriculture Quality of live	

Table9

		-100000	OH		enance:		able								
Types of iss	ue s												ree (lem ocra o	cie
			from	ne	wsp	aper	acco	ou nt	s of	elec	tion	S			
Country	-1	2	3	- 4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13		
Australia (13)	4	2	3	2	11	13	1	0	2	2	11	2	2		
Austria (9)	2	1	1	1	5	7	1	0	0	1	11	2	0		
Belgium (10)	1	6	1	2	3	6	1	6	3	0	3	0	0		
Canada (13)	1	3	5	3	10	13	0	0	6	0	1	2	0		
Denmark (13)	0	2	2	3	3	13	0	0	0	1	7	0	0		
Finland (11)	1	1	8	0	3	11	0	0	1	4	5	2	3		
France (7)	3	4	3	0	5	6	0	0	0	0	2	2	0		
Iceland (12)	0	2	6	0	3	10	0	0	0	0	1	4	0		
India (7)	2	1	3	1	7	7	0	1	0	0	4	1	1		
Ireland (10)	1	1	3	0	9	9	0	0	3	0	3	0	0		
Israel (10)	2	4	6	3	9	10	1	3	0	0	2	3	2		
Italy (8)	3	1	4	0	3	6	4	0	1	0	5	0	0		
Japan (9)	2	2	6	3	4	9	0	0	1	0	1	1	0		
Luxembourg (6)	0	1	0	1	1	6	3	0	0	2	2	0	1		
Netherlands (11)	2	0	3	1	2	11	2	0	0	0	5	5	3		
New Zealand (10)	2	0	4	0	6	8	0	1	0	0	2	1	1		
Norway (8)	0	0	6	0	1	8	0	0	1	2	2	3	0		
Sri Lanka (5)	1	2	1	0	5	4	2	1	0	0	1	0	1		
Sweden (11)	0	0	2	0	4	8	0	0	1	0	5	4	1		
Switzerland (10)	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0		
UK (10)	1	- 1	6	3	10	10	0	2	0	ō	7	7	4		
USA (9)	2	o	7	1	6	9	1	1	1	0	5	0	1		
W. Germany (7)	3	1	5	1	7	6	0	0	0	0	2	1	o		
Total (217)	33	35	85	25	118	193	16	16	20	12	81	40	20		
1. Civil Order			6.	Gov.	recor	d and	pros	ects		11 . S	iocioe	cono	mic re	distribution	
2. Constitutional			7.	Mora	l-relig	ious				12. 6	ov. c	ontro	and	lanning	
3. Foreign Relations	hips			Ethni										favour	
4. Defence			9.	Regi	onal						div idu				
5. Candidate Reacti	one				an-ru	ral							d free	form	

Table10

Table 10 Differences in the types of issues salient over twenty-three democracies for each postwar period, from newspaper accounts of elections

Election period	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	10	11	12	13	14	Total
1945-49 (14)	2	1	9	1	5	13	1	0	1	5	6	2	2	50
1950-54 (28)	4	3	7	2	11	21	1	0	2	14	5	2	7	79
1955-59 (31)	3	5	12	4	16	28	4	1	3	10	6	1	5	99
1960-64 (31)	2	6	12	5	11	27	2	3	2	12	1	1	5	90
1965-69 (34)	8	6	16	4	18	30	2	3	0	13	3	2	6	117
1970-74 (34)	5	6	19	4	23	33	2	4	4	15	6	4	5	136
1975-79 (36)	7	7	9	2	24	33	4	4	0	10	9	8	11	131
1980-81 (9)	2	1	1	3	10	8	0	1	0	2	4	0	4	37
Total (217)	33	35	85	25	118	193	16	16	12	81	40	20	45	739

- 1. Civil Order
- 2. Constitutional


- Source: Budge and Farlie, 1983, p. 35

- Gov. record and prospects 11. Socioeconomic redistribution
 Moral-religious 12. Gov. control and planning

 - 13. Gov regulation in favour of individual

 - 14. Initiative and freedom

Figure1



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