

The Local Political Elite in Spain

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1. MODERNITY OR BACKWARDNESS

The renewed interest in local political leaders (Garraud 1988 and 1989, for example) is something more than a trend suitable for reviving the tradition of studying elites. The research on elected representatives in the sub-state sphere and the analysis of their policies are the result of verifying that in a Europe without borders, some new political realities are imposing their logic both from above and, in this case, from below the states.

However, if the new political significance of local politicians justifies the greatest theoretical attention, it is also true that the reference to Europe plays a paradoxical role. In view of European integration and in the new framework of inter-regional conflict and collaboration relationships, the analysis of 'the local' cannot be carried out as a study of a determined level of 'the national' but must be seen from a broader perspective.

In this sense, our study intends to establish a comparison of Spanish data with that of other traditionally democratic countries, especially in the Mediterranean area. To compare the formation of the local Spanish elite with that of other countries with a greater democratic tradition may serve to clarify the general patterns for local representation in any circumstances or country, and those which are particular and specific to the present Spanish context. The first steps in this direction would have to be complemented subsequently with information relating to other countries, including those of northern and central Europe.

A comparison of this kind should obviously start with a compulsory question: Are Spanish local government leaders identical to those of other consolidated democracies? To those of France?

Although the question may be compulsory, the answer is not of small importance. Behind it lies a more basic question concerning the modernity of the Spanish political system. Has Spanish democracy jumped stages, arriving directly at the political situation of the other European countries; or on the contrary, does it find itself in some initial phase which will go on evolving later?

You should not be baffled by this question of modernity or backwardness. At this moment, electoral analyses are suggesting that the fluctuations in the party system, the lack of party political identification and the electoral volatility which characterize the party system in Spain may be the result of an accelerated assumption of post-modernist political culture. If this is true -and we cannot enter into this debate at present-, Spain would have jumped historical stages to advance, perhaps in an exaggerated fashion because the compensatory factor of the parties' historical roots has not existed, the tendencies which other countries will go through.

Placing it at the level of municipal representation, modernity or backwardness will have to be measured by the similarities and differences in the social categories present in the town councils. For example, comparing the strength of emerging movements such as the feminist one which, spanning all the parties, may contribute to the increase in female representation. Additionally, by the impact of the educational revolution of recent years, with the huge growth in further and higher education. And last but not least, the changes in the conception of the function of local politics, in their professionalism, etc.

On the other hand, to raise the question of identity or similarity between local political elites may lead us to discover the differences. And supposing that this might be the essential information, supposing that French and Spanish municipalities are run by different types of mayors and councillors, it would be therefore be appropriate to put forward two hypotheses explaining the differences.

The first would make municipal representation depend on a socio-economic variable. Compared to Europe, could the Spanish peculiarities derive from a lower level of industrial development or services? Introducing the socio-economic variable in the analysis seems to reject the supposition of Spanish modernity: under-development during the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century, a late incorporation into the international post-war economy (the E.E.C. for example), ...

In any case, a second supposition based on political variables is possible. In this case, the under-development would be attributable to the effects of Francoism on the political culture (especially in the sphere of participation and management) of the different social groups.

Abandoning more socio-demographic lines of the kind noted above, that would lead us to the sphere of the continuity of representation, of the ruptures between the authoritarian political system and the democratic one, of inter-generational modifications, and so on.

Following this hypothesis, the differences would be explained by the continuity between Francoism and democracy, continuity both through the sectors which are excluded or exclude themselves from municipal representation as through those who consider it their own particular domain.

Thus, in the first sense, electoral analyses of non-competitive elections demonstrated that certain social groups, in spite of the pressures of the Francoist system, were more unwilling to participate in the voting. Some fragmentary observations note the withdrawal of the better educated sectors, the middle classes or liberal professionals from the institutional political activity of Francoism (Botella

[1980] phrases it as a withdrawal of 'the intelligentsia'). Could we be up against -and afterwards we will look at the current situation- a continuation of this withdrawal?

And on the other hand, wouldn't forty years of Francoism have been enough to consolidate a social type of political personnel who would have acquired, without electoral competition, all the means of power to stay in office after the arrival of the democratic system?

Modernity, backwardness, political variables, socio-economic variables, ... these are the issues which, in my judgment, suggest a comparison between Spain and France. However, stating these problems, does not mean we are already in a position to answer all these comparative questions. Our aim is more modest and we will just present some research results on municipal representatives elected throughout Spain in 1983, based on information from the Ministry of Territorial Administration¹. In some cases, it will be complemented with information relating to 1979, 1983 and 1987 in the Autonomous Region of Catalonia² (This has been studied in more detail in Capo et al., 1988).

However, before proceeding to this explanation of the socio-demographic characteristics of the Spanish local political elite, it is important to raise a few questions, because from the answers obtained, we will conclude whether the comparative method is adequate or, on the contrary, whether we are analyzing very diverse realities, even though they may be grouped together under the same name.

2. THE LOCAL POLITICAL ELITE IN DEMOCRATIC SPAIN

Studying councilors and mayors, the elected local leaders, means starting from a previous assumption: the importance of the local sphere in the understanding of the political system. Is this really true in Spain's case? Is the local sphere significant to our political system or, on the contrary, could our scientific interest be suffering from an effect of imitation? In this case, we would have allowed ourselves to get carried away by the prestige of the French mayor-parliamentarians or by the political and administrative weight of Italian municipalities.

Faced with this danger of contagiousness, we can argue that the local political class in Spain cannot be left out from a scientific study of elites for one reason, perhaps fundamental and basic but irreplaceable, and even if there were no other reasons the same argument would still apply: municipal offices are important because they are elected. And here there would be room for all kinds of ideologies, from the mystical liberal "à la Tocqueville" who insists on de-centralization, to the determination of the Left -remember what was happening in France or Italy with the Communist parties- to present the municipal level as a mirror, as an alternative

model of management.

Municipal elections are therefore one of the phases of the political struggle; but if desired, other more concrete, less ideological references can be added to argue the importance of this level.

The starting point is that the local political elite is numerous -69,339 elected members, 8,142 mayors- By their large numbers, they make up for the lack of concentration and unity that can take place as opposed to what happens with smaller nuclei such as members of parliament or those holding high office in the Administration. This means that, in a population of somewhat more than 38 million inhabitants, one in every 1,000 citizens holds a position of municipal representation, thereby making local leaders the true link between civil and political society.

On this point, our situation does not coincide exactly with either French or Italian figures. In France, local representatives are more numerous, 463,408 (according to the figures of Becquart-Leclercq, 1976) elected in 36,385 municipalities. In Italy, the figure is double to that of Spain, even though the number of municipalities is approximately the same. In reality then, it seems that the numerical factor makes the Spanish political establishment weaker in relation to other countries. (In France there would be eight elected members per one thousand inhabitants and in Italy, two, in relation to their respective populations).

However, whatever these differences are, the first point to emphasize is the numerical strength, although on the other hand we must not forget that this is coupled with an element of weakness, as is the over-representation in the most under-populated areas of the country. Through the representation of small communities, the municipal structure does not duplicate but distorts the social structure (Table 1).

Table1

We are well aware of the fact that the number of councilors is in inverse proportion to the distribution of the population. We will not at the moment delve into the inequalities which this provokes in the representation of the political parties, details of which are shown in the second table.

The explanation for these distortions can be found in the combined effects of the territorial distribution of the population and the elected members (Table 1), and in the electoral standard which determines it (Table 3), statistics which we reproduce without further comment on comparative effects with other countries.

Table2

Table3

These references could lead us to weaken the affirmation that we were making above about the numerical strength of municipal representatives. Doesn't their territorial extension, their division, their representation of small localities demand therefore, that we cease to talk about the municipal political class as a homogeneous group?

Following this strategy, we would have to concentrate only on representatives of large municipalities, on the 4% of elected representatives in towns and cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants who would represent four out of every ten voters, because only in the large municipalities would political conflict be generated and only these authorities would have the capacity to undertake large transforming projects such as, for example, the Olympic Games in Barcelona.

This would undoubtedly be too radical a vision. The relevance of the argument requires segmentation at the time of the political study, but the fact that the small towns and villages are important can also be seen in other examples, such as the difficulties experienced by the Government of the Generalitat of Catalonia with the Plan for Industrial Waste or the location of a private amusement park.

Furthermore, there is another argument for returning to the larger numbers, for not forgetting even one councilor, however small the village he may represent. To compensate for the weakness which territorial distortions may produce, we must point out that although the level of activism in Spanish political parties is very low, we suppose that the level of municipal representation becomes more relevant to internal party matters.

Spanish parties have a very low affiliation rate (Montero, 1981) and in this context, local elections have been especially outstanding for the parties' territorial expansion and the attraction of party members.

Referring to Catalonia -although the conclusions would be generally applicable to the whole of Spain-, we have said that "given the existence of this strong political-administrative local network, combined with an initial lack of party activism, municipal leaders had to become one of the most significant core elements of party political affiliation. And although figures cannot be furnished for all the Catalanian parties, the following ones related to PSC serve as an example: 35% of the delegates in the third and fourth Congress were councilors or mayors; 23% of the members of the National Council and 15% of the members of the Executive Commission were also delegates. For this reason, the formation of a local democratic political elite in Spain should not be regarded as being isolated from the attempts to consolidate an incipient party system. This is so in such a way that, with no doubt,

the relationships of autonomy-dependency between town halls and parties and their respective elites -which exist in all countries-, started to take shape with certain particular characteristics in the Spanish system (Capo et al.)”.

In this sense one could interpret the curious inclusion of the imperative mandate established by the Law of 1978 that regulated the election of members of City Councils in such a way that it favored party organizations to the detriment of those elected. Although now revoked by the Constitutional Court, this rule permitted the consolidation of parties in a domain where they had little influence.

Thus, although it might appear paradoxical in a country of parties without mass membership, the presence of independent groups in local elections has been diminishing considerably. In 1983 in Spain, the lists of those representatives with no party identification accounted for 16.79% of the total. (In Catalonia, more detailed figures allow us to see a reduction from 42% in 1979 to 27.5% in 1983 and to 17.6% in 1987, from which we can infer that party predominance appears to be growing throughout the country). The Spanish figure is very similar to the Italian one in 1987, also 16.7% (Barberis, 1988), although in this case, independent candidates elected on party lists are included. And it is a long way from the French figure which in 1965 still showed 200,523 representatives from Local Action lists and from municipal interests (Becquart-Leclercq).

Thus, there proves to be a notable interdependence between the party system, party elites and local elites: local political life has found itself shaped by parties, but these at the same time have a highly pro-municipal composition.

Although the data may not be conclusive -owing as much to the difficulties of knowing the level of party affiliation³ as to the fact that in the calculation of officials, the independent candidates elected on party lists also figure-, table 4 expresses the approximate influence which local representatives could have in the large parties as a whole.

Table4

Up to this point, we have developed an argument that could be defined as quantitative, to show the interest in researching on the local political elite despite their dispersion and over-representation in small towns. We could add to this argument that the weight of municipalization-ruralization also contributes to the way the political system as a whole functions.

This is because of the coexistence of two levels of sub-state administration in Spain, the autonomous communities and the provinces, the latter formed institutionally by a representative organization of municipal management, the

Diputación or Provincial Council, which has general although not legislative responsibilities and which therefore can be an opposition power to the autonomous governments.

It has, in fact, happened. The fall of Garaicoechea as President of the Basque Government was a reminder of the incidence of the periphery (town councils and provincial councils) in the central powers, whether they act as an alternative power or a pressure group.

Finally, we have not mentioned at all another reason which may justify the study of local elites: their characterization as an obligatory step, advisable and feasible in the "cursus honorum" which leads to national political distinction.

This is a time-honored subject about which, however, we still have little information. In any case, it seems that there are noticeable differences, as for example with France, where the way for local representatives to get promoted has been restructured.

Although exceptions can be found, for example the former Mayor of Madrid, Mr. Barranco, who accepted the post of senator after losing the mayoralty by a censor motion, everything seems to indicate that in fact, if not according to law, a certain incompatibility exists between national parliamentary representation and local representation.

The reasons for this must be found in the Law on electoral regulations of March 18, 1977 which established ineligibility and partial incompatibility for mayors (at that time, non-elected). The survival of this regulation, as much as for the central government as for the regional parliaments, until its modification in the Law of Electoral Regulations of 1985 -together with the extraordinary dedication which the town councils required in the first years of their democratic operation- explains, in our opinion, the scarce presence in our system of the mayor-parliamentarian.

This functional separation could evolve in the future and figures allow us to think that the autonomous parliaments will be the first affected by these transformations⁴. However, we must take into account that, in the context of blocked and closed lists (very different therefore, from the French system), parties will not only have to consider candidates because they can attract votes, but also because of a possible loss of the hierarchical control that rests within the parliamentary group, as these parliamentarian-mayors would have relatively autonomous sources of power.

It is therefore premature to indicate how the significance of local political careers could evolve in the training program for the national or regional political class, and everything will depend on the form in which these two aforementioned

tendencies, which initially seem antagonistic, are combined. In any case, however, making the jobs of mayor and parliamentarian compatible is not the only way of using a municipal post to obtain access to a greater share of power. It is for this reason that we should not ignore the importance of the first level of representation in the political career of future elites, especially in light of the municipalization of the aforementioned parties.

All these different arguments lead us to believe that the local political elite constitutes an interesting subject for research in our country, although it may present some peculiarities in relation to other systems in neighboring countries. Comparatively, its numerical weakness but greater party political weight, its differing function in the formation of the national political class, together with its institutional position, are the aspects which should not be forgotten.

3. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

In this section, we will not carry out a comparison with similar research done in Italy, apart from other studies of a regional kind, by Baberis (1988) or Bettin and Magnier (1989), in addition to the French references already mentioned. Despite that, we are obviously not forgetting our initial comparative aspirations but, as we understand it, it is not for us to furnish that data at this moment.

Finally, our figures for the whole of Spain are limited to only the 1983 local elections, for which reason we cannot offer the comparative series we would like to³. Neither will we enter into a differentiation by parties or regions (Baras; Colomé 1991). However, given that for the Autonomous Community of Catalonia we have the complete lists of those elected since the first democratic municipal elections of 1979, on occasions we will refer to this complementary contribution to indicate possible guidelines for interpretation of the Spanish system in general⁴.

Table5

The first point to emphasize is the scarceness of women among local political officials. 95.5% of municipal representatives are men, which means the proportion of women does not even reach 5%.

We will not insist in the significance of this fact because it is obvious; however, it is important to point out that the qualifications of these women, either academically or professionally, are superior to those of men. Consequently, this means that the requirements which the parties 'unconsciously' demand of female representatives for their presence on the lists are greater. Discrimination arises in a double sense, in women's sparse electoral presence and the high requirements

demanded of them for their participation when it happens.

Moreover, the evolution in Catalonia between 1979 and 1987 is not very notable; the participation of women rises from 4.6% to 7.4%. It does not seem then, that the municipal sphere is good ground for the political advancement of women, for whom it is possible that the momentum of growth comes from the center of the political system. In this sense, it is foreseeable that the figure resulting in the next municipal elections of 1991 will be different, because in the most recent PSOE and PCE congresses, measures of positive discrimination in favor of women have been adopted. Women will have to fill 25% of the internal and external lists of the party. If this regulation is fulfilled, female representation will increase in the near future.

More surprising, perhaps, are the figures relating to the composition by age of the town councils. It is known that the political class which has appeared since the disappearance of Francoism is young, and the President of the Government, Mr. Felipe González, may be a good example; however, it is even younger still at a municipal level, as shown in Table 6.

Table6

There is no need to stress the youth of this group of councilors. In the Spain of 1983, more than 30% were younger than 34 years old. Almost half were younger than 39, and if those up to the age of 44 are included in this young group, it comprises 60.9% of the total. On the other hand, those older than 55 comprise less than 15%.

The extraordinarily young composition of this group justifies, in our opinion, two types of reflection. One -on which we do not have more precise data-, is in relation to the change of elites during the transition from the Francoist system to the democratic one. The other, to its true significance in the process of formation and establishment of the democratic elite.

In the first sense, it seems obvious that the continuity of the local Francoist elite is slight, given the generational rupture which these figures suggest. It is worth asking, at any rate, if the change in people has meant a change in the social groups which held the privilege of representation during Franco's time.

In the second sense, the pertinent question is whether these figures correspond to a foundational stage or lay down a more permanent guideline. It might seem, in effect, that the change in the political system coincides with or is provoked by the presence of a new generation which, established in power, would continue monopolizing it and ageing in their jobs.

It is still early to answer this question if we look at the data provided by Catalan evolution. The percentages referring to Catalonia show that between 1979 and 1983 there was, in general, no increase in the average age in town councils because almost all mayors over sixty-five disappeared, and the number of councilors under 25 years old grew from 3% to 12%. Moreover, this rejuvenation was not the result of changes in the electoral strength of the parties, but a common phenomenon repeated in all groups.

On the other hand, the figures of 1987 show a strong change in the tendency, and although municipal representatives can still be classified as young (about half are less than forty), their increasing age is evident in relation to 1983 and also to 1979.

Can anything relevant to Spain as a whole be inferred from this data? Will this be the keynote for the future? The questions remain open. The first could be the subject of empirical verification; however, the second brings us to the heart of municipal leaders' problems of representativity-professionalization.

The trend of permanent renewal and rejuvenation responds to an electoral strategy especially directed to capture the young vote; in this sense, the councilor, the mayor, is a representative. On the other hand, the maintenance and progressive ageing of municipal personnel seems to influence their management ways, ways that require a professionalization only obtained by remaining in their positions.

Naturally, to clarify these aspects requires, on the one hand, that representatives go on establishing themselves in the Spanish political system and establishing stable guidelines which can allow the interaction between representativity and professionalization, at present embryonic. But naturally, it also requires a deepening of the analysis, by introducing other categories on which we are now starting to work in Catalonia. We not only take age into account, but also personal continuity in office⁵.

In any case, the figures relating to Spain, the same as the more extensive studies on Catalonia, seem to suggest that the factor of representativity has prevailed over that of professionalization, given the educational level (Table 7) and the socio-professional composition of representatives (Table 8).

In fact, from an education point of view, municipal representatives in general are not highly qualified, although they are more so than the population as a whole. Thus, the officials with university degrees in the entirety of Spanish town councils does not even reach 10% (and for that reason we mentioned that certain social groups may have maintained the pattern of withdrawal from political activity during Franco's time as well as at present), whereas 21.8% only have elementary education

and 44.3% have only completed their education up to the age of fourteen.

Table7

Obviously, these figures vary according to the size of the town, the level of education increasing in proportion to the size of municipality. But in any case, taken in their entirety, they seem to demonstrate that there is the belief that it is not necessary to have advanced technical training to hold municipal office. However, as Catalan evolution shows, municipal lists are increasingly acquiring a more highly-educated profile.

To a certain extent, the socio-professional categories correlate with the preceding results. The number of liberal professionals, technicians, civil servants and teachers (groups which in other countries have often dedicated themselves to political action) is not high, neither is that of self-employed workers, shopkeepers, executives or businessmen. All these groups together slightly exceed a quarter of the total number of councilors.

Table8

On the other hand, there are numerous councilors who come from social categories in decline, such as agricultural workers (36.6%), or from the employed (11.3%) or unskilled sectors (18.1%). Thus it would seem that the least-favored social groups find in municipal office a certain kind of advancement and representation, although the latter may, in some sense, be understood as vicarial.

Apparently, political municipal society and civil society do not coincide, and as a further proof we will make one last point regarding the origin of representatives. According to our information, 73.6% were born in the municipality they represent, 16.5% in the same province and only 9% in other provinces⁶. However, the Spanish internal migratory flow has been very high during this century, and particularly during the last few decades. Thus, "census information on the number of emigrants per judicial district shows that 10,868,725 Spanish nationals abandoned their town of origin between 1900 and 1970, although the present figure may probably exceed 14 million. To be more specific, in the period between the census of 1960 and that of 1970, no less than 4,473,000 abandoned their municipality of origin; 4,180,371 changed their municipality of residence between 1971 and 1982, and 1,445,196 did so between 1982 and 1986" (Tezanos).

Municipal representation appears then to be dominated by local factors, disconnected from the socially dominant economic sectors which are representative of numerous traditional social categories. In this sense, one might ask whether, next to the figure of the representative/promoter which may exist in large cities, one can

imagine municipal representation in its entirety -that is to say, with the predominance of the small and medium size localities- as a refuge for certain sectors in face of the current socio-economic changes.

However, it may seem that with this affirmation we are contradicting the previous hypothesis of a vicarial representation. Accept the two suggestions then, as the extreme poles which may guide our research in the future, but do not think that they are contradictory. Groups aiming social transformation may cede to others the cost (in terms of time, dedication and conflict) of municipal management, in exchange for benefits (symbolic and of control) which these groups would obtain.

Thus, local representation could be an instance of compensation: much unemployment among young people but many young people among the councilors; a reduction in the availability of agricultural work but a strong presence of farm laborers in town councils; a radical renewal of village population, but conservation of representation by those native to the area; a growth in self-employment but representation on the part of workers.

This hypothesis of the compensatory function of municipal representation may perhaps be too bold; but we dare to express it in the hope that comparing it at an international level will be useful to better understand our own society.

Table 1

TABLE 1
Distribution of the population and elected municipal representatives according to the size of municipality (population information in Tezanos, 1989)

| | Municipal posts | Population |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| To 250 inhabitants | 14.33 | 8.2 |
| -2.000 inhabitants | 41.89 | |
| -10.000 inhabitants | 27.76 | 17.9 |
| -20.000 inhabitants | 7.17 | |
| -50.000 inhabitants | 4.86 | 31.9 |
| -100.000 inhabitants | 1.93 | |
| +100.000 inhabitants | 2.08 | 42.0 |

Table 2

| TABLE 2 | | | |
|------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------|-----------------|
| Distribution by candidature | | | |
| | % votes | % councillors | % mayors |
| PSOE | 43.0 | 35.0 | 33.0 |
| AP-PDP | 26.4 | 31.1 | 30.9 |
| PCE | 8.1 | 3.6 | 2.1 |
| CIU | 4.1 | 4.8 | 5.4 |
| PNV | 2.2 | 1.9 | 2.1 |
| CDS | 1.8 | 0.9 | 2.1 |
| Independent | 5.7 | 12.7 | 14.8 |

Table 3

TABLE 3
Number of councillors by size of municipality,
according to Electoral Law

| | | |
|----------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|
| | -250 inhabitants | 5 |
| 251- | 1.000 inhabitants | 7 |
| 1.001- | 2.000 inhabitants | 9 |
| 2.001- | 5.000 inhabitants | 11 |
| 5.001- | 10.000 inhabitants | 13 |
| 10.001- | 20.000 inhabitants | 17 |
| 20.001- | 50.000 inhabitants | 21 |
| 50.001- | 100.000 inhabitants | 25 |
| | +100.000 inhabitants | 25 + 1/100.000 |

Table 4

TABLE 4
Municipal representation and party affiliation

| | No. municipal representatives | No. party affiliations | % |
|--------|----------------------------------|---------------------------|------|
| AP | 21.219 | 150.905 | 14.0 |
| PSOE | 23.948 | 150.586 | 15.9 |
| IU/PCE | 2.603 | 85.460 | 3.0 |
| CIU | 3.266 | 8.870 | 36.8 |
| PNV | 1.314 | 58.053 | 2.2 |

Table 5

| TABLE 5 | | | | |
|---|-----------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|
| Distribution according to gender | | | | |
| | Spain 1983 | 1979 | Catalonia 1983 | 1987 |
| Women | 4.5 | 4.6 | 6.6 | 7.4 |
| Men | 95.5 | 95.4 | 93.4 | 92.6 |

Table 6

| TABLE 6 | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------|--------------|----------|------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Distribution by age | | | | | | |
| years | No. | Spain | | Catalonia | | |
| | | 1983 | % | 1979 | 1983 | 1987 |
| | | | | % | % | % |
| -25 | 3.051 | 4.4 | 3.2 | 12.4 | 3.4 | |
| 25-29 | 8.235 | 11.8 | 33.6 | 37.0 | 10.4 | |
| 30-34 | 10.435 | 15.0 | | | | |
| 35-39 | 11.195 | 16.1 | 29.6 | 28.0 | 34.9 | |
| 40-44 | 9.462 | 13.6 | | | | |
| 45-49 | 8.953 | 12.9 | 21.2 | 16.5 | 28.8 | |
| 50-54 | 7.875 | 11.3 | | | | |
| 55-59 | 5.374 | 7.7 | 8.0 | 5.4 | 16.2 | |
| 60-64 | 3.055 | 4.4 | | | | |
| +64 | 1.731 | 2.4 | 4.5 | 0.6 | 10.2 | |

Table 7

| | Spain | | Catalonia | | |
|--------------------------------|--------|------|-----------|------|------|
| | 1983 | | 1979 | 1983 | 1987 |
| | No. | % | % | % | % |
| No education | 223 | 0.3 | - | - | 0.1 |
| Basic education (to 13 yrs) | 45.899 | 66.1 | 63.5 | 55.1 | 10.8 |
| Technical secondary schooling | 2.177 | 3.1 | 2.4 | 5.6 | 5.7 |
| Academical secondary schooling | 11.455 | 16.4 | 18.0 | 26.3 | 31.2 |
| 3 year degree | 4.537 | 6.5 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 8.6 |
| 5 year degree | 5.142 | 7.3 | 10.0 | 9.3 | 13.1 |

Table 8

| | Spain | | Catalonia | | |
|--|--------|------|-----------|------|------|
| | 1983 | | 1979 | 1983 | 1987 |
| | No. | % | % | % | % |
| Managers and company directors | 5.843 | 7.6 | 6.3 | 6.9 | 7.1 |
| Small businessmen | 1.840 | 2.6 | 5.5 | 4.0 | 6.7 |
| Professionals and high-level technicians | 2.971 | 4.2 | 7.9 | 10.0 | 9.0 |
| Civil servants & skilled technicians | 4.556 | 6.5 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 6.4 |
| Teachers | 3.882 | 5.5 | 3.6 | 4.5 | 5.6 |
| Employees | 7.912 | 11.3 | 15.5 | 16.6 | 15.6 |
| Agricultural workers | 25.559 | 36.6 | 31.8 | 27.6 | 24.4 |
| Unskilled workers | 12.669 | 18.1 | 23.4 | 23.5 | 17.9 |
| Others | 267 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.7 |
| Unemployed | 4.348 | 6.2 | 3.4 | 4.5 | 6.4 |
| Unclassified | 451 | 0.6 | - | - | 0.4 |

NOTES

- (1) The figures for Spain as a whole in 1983 come from the Ministry of Territorial Administration. Their codification and analysis has been achieved thanks to the support from the Center for Sociological Research, and would not have been possible without the personal interest of its President, Rosa Conde and her Vice-President José Ramón Montero. The research group is formed by Montserrat Baras, Joan Botella, Gabriel Colomé and Lourdes López Nieto, as well as the author of this article.
- (2) The specifically Catalan research has been done in collaboration with the Jaume Bofill Foundation for information relating to 1979, and the Institute of Political and Social Sciences of Barcelona, and especially its director Isidre Molas, for information relating to 1983 and 1987.
- (3) We have used data from 1984, even though the relative figures for councilors are from 1983. However, this survey, originating from the media (El País, October 14, 1984), does not have the methodological accuracy of the academic works (in any case written before the radical transformation of the party system in the general election of 1982 and, as such, unusable). Thus, the figures can only be considered as an indication.
- (4) After the local elections of 1987, the third legislature of the Catalan Parliament shows that 15.5% of delegates have municipal representation responsibilities.
- (5) According to Catalan data of 1987 and the measure in which it is possible to extrapolate them for other regions in Spain or for other elections, it seems that the renewal rate is high, because only 39.4% of those elected in 1983 continued their term of office.
- (6) The analysis of immigration in Catalonia and its political repercussions deserve specific treatment which we cannot give here. See Botella, J. and Marcet, J. "La inmigración en Cataluña: electores, partidos y representación política". Sistema. 1981. num. 45.

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