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An Epidemiological Approach to Opinion and Price-Volume Dynamics

Dong Hong Harrison Hong Andrei Ungureanu*

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Abstract

We develop a simple and tractable model of opinions and price-volume dynamics based on a word-of-mouth communication process widely used in epidemiology. Risk-averse investors have different opinions depending on whether they heard the news from a friend. Opinions initially diverge and then converge over time as news spreads, which leads to price adjustment and trading volume. News released to many leads to an expected diffusion rate (the change in the fraction of investors with the news) that declines with time. But news initially released to few leads to an expected diffusion rate that initially increases in time and only then decreases. The serial correlation of stock returns and trading volume are proportional to the diffusion rate. The term structure of the serial correlation of non-overlapping returns can be declining or hump-shaped in time depending on whether the news was widely released. We test and verify these predictions and show that this model is useful for understanding news and price momentum and the dynamics of investor and analyst expectations around media events.

1 Introduction

In this paper, we study how word-of-mouth communication affects opinions and price-flow dynamics in the context of asset markets. Scientists have long recognized its importance in influencing the spread of disease, the adoption of new technologies, and search in labor markets and developed models of such social processes. A key feature of many such network models is the famous S-shaped plot of the fraction of the population

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affected against time. The diffusion rate (or the change in the fraction of people affected) is non-linear in time: low in the near term when there are few potential senders, high in the medium term when there are more potential senders, and low in the long term when most everyone is already affected. Yet, systematic studies of how this important channel of non-market interaction affects opinions flow in economies are still limited.

Our focus on the stock market is motivated by a growing body of work on word-of-mouth communication and gradual diffusion of information in asset markets.¹ First, many of these studies suggest that the word-of-mouth mechanism is relevant for the financial decisions of both retail and professional investors, though they do not point to the equilibrium impact of this mechanism on the dynamics of information flow. Second, there is wide agreement that there is price drift or momentum in markets (Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 1990; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993): firms with recent positive earnings surprise or good price performance significantly outperform firms with recent negative surprise or poor price performance over the next six to twelve months. Third, there is also growing evidence to suggest that this price continuation phenomenon is due to the gradual information diffusion hypothesis or the under-reaction of price to news (Hong and Stein, 1999).²

We develop a model of opinions and price-volume dynamics based on a word-of-mouth communication process that is widely used in epidemiology. In this model's network set-up an initial group of friends get the "news" and each period, there is some probability one runs into a friend and passes on the information—independence is assumed across friends at a point in time and over time. (We initially think of the news as real information as in an earnings announcement but in an extension we will also consider potentially false information as in a rumor or a fad.) We begin by proving a few results regarding the non-linearity of the gradual information process. This model can generate an S-shaped plot of the fraction of friends with the news against time. The intuition is the familiar one. If the initial fraction of friends with the news is small, the diffusion rate (the change in the fraction of friends with the news) is low initially (since there are few initial senders). Diffusion rate picks up as more friends have information (since more potential senders in population). But the rate slows down over time as

¹Surveys report that investors get ideas from friends (Shiller and Pound, 1989). Retirement plan decisions are influenced by co-workers (Dufflo and Saez, 2002; Madrian and Shea, 2000). Stock market participation depends on friends and neighbors (Hong et al., 2004). Trades of managers and retail investors from the same city or zip code are correlated (Hong et al., 2005; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2007; Kaustia and Knupfer, 2009). Managers' best picks are companies whose CEOs went to same college (Cohen et al., 2008)

²A striking example is (Huberman and Regev, 2001) on the gradual diffusion of news regarding Entremed. Stocks with less analyst coverage (and perhaps less outlets to get the news out) are more apt to exhibit price continuation (Hong et al., 2000). There is cross-firm or cross-industry price continuation related to customers and suppliers (perhaps because of slow diffusion across markets or clienteles) (Menzly and Ozbas, 2009; Cohen and Frazzini, 2008; Hong et al., 2007). The latter findings might be interpreted as the slowness of news to travel across networks. Verardo (2009) find that there is more momentum or drift in high analyst disagreement stocks.

every one has information.

More importantly, we embed this word of mouth model in a simple model of stock trading and pricing. Risk-averse investors have different opinions depending on whether they heard the "news" from a friend. We take a disagreement approach in which investors agree to disagree and trade as the cross-sectional distribution of opinions change.³ Our model can be given several interpretations. The first is as a form of limited attention in which investors really get their news from friends. The second is in the form of model based learning in which news is only understandable or interpretable when a friend explains it you. So what gets passed along is not so much the news but the interpretation of any given piece of news. The empirical evidence on the gradual diffusion of information (cited in footnote 2) give ample support to both interpretations.⁴

Opinions initially diverge and then converge over time as news spreads, which leads to price adjustment and trading volume. Investors who initially receive good news buy since price is below their forecasted terminal value for the asset. As they spread the good news to their friends who then buy, the price rises and the trading occurs between the new buyers as they buy shares from those who did not receive the news yet and from those who already had received the news. There are only two groups of opinions at any point in time: those with the news and those without. The cross-sectional dispersion in opinion weighted by population weight is maximized when half the population has one opinion and half has the other. After this threshold, opinions begin to converge again with time as everyone at the end has the same opinion by the time news has spread to all. Because investors are risk-averse (think of them as small with limited wealth), the degree of price adjustment depends on the fraction of investors who have received the news.

In this setting, we show that the serial correlation of stock returns is proportional to the diffusion rate of information. Intuitively, suppose that a small fraction of investors receive good news and they buy at time 1. Price adjusts partially to this buying and we see that price has gone up between time 0 and time 1. Price continues to go up at time 2 as more investors receive the news and buy. The degree to which it increases at time 2 depends on the diffusion rate. If the diffusion rate is large then price adjusts quicker since a large fraction of investors buy at time 2 and the greater is the correlation between the price change between 0 and 1 and the price change between 1 and 2. If the diffusion rate is very small and few investors buy, then there is little price change

³Early models of trading due to disagreement include Varian (1989); Harris and Raviv (1993); Kandel and Pearson (1995) and pricing-volume dynamics have been explored in Hong and Stein (2003) model of market crashes and Harrison and Kreps (1978); Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) models of bubbles.

⁴See Hong and Stein (2007) for a review and interpretations of the disagreement approach to modeling asset prices and trading volume. See Hou et al. (2009); Hirshleifer et al. (2009) for evidence that attention plays a role in price and earnings momentum.

between time 1 and 2 and little serial correlation between these consecutive returns.

Since serial correlation is proportional to the diffusion rate, the term structure of serial correlation of non-overlapping returns inherits the non-linear properties of the diffusion rate. This non-linearity is reflected in the following two testable implications regarding price continuation. The first prediction is that for news not widely disseminated (and hence there are few potential senders), the serial correlation of a stock return at time t is highest for a non-overlapping return occurring at the medium term compared to the near- and long-term. The second prediction is that for news widely disseminated (and hence there are already many potential senders—the critical threshold is at around half the population), the serial correlation of non-overlapping consecutive price changes declines monotonically with time.

Another key feature of our model is that when a new release is not seen by too many people, trading volume can be a measure of the degree of public-ness of the news. (In the extreme, a news release seen by all will have no volume and only price adjusts). As such, a third key prediction is that the hum-shaped term structure of the serial correlation of non-overlapping returns is more prominent conditioned on returns unexplained by news (earnings announcements) and accompanied by low turnover.

We confirm these three predictions using stock market data. We decompose stock returns into a component based on earnings releases (public news) and a residual (private news). We then follow some standard empirical methods in the large literature on cross-sectional stock return predictability. Each month, we sort stocks into portfolios of recent winners and recent losers (based on both the component due to public news and the residual). The profits associated with buying the winners portfolio and selling the losers portfolio is proportional to the serial correlation of returns due to public news and to private news. For the returns due to public news, we find that the price continuation profits decline monotonically with horizon. That is, this strategy's profits come mostly from the near term months and decline over time. In contrast, for the returns due to private news, the profits are the greatest in the medium term.

We have to be careful that our private news residual may actually still contain a public news component since we do not have data on all available public news, only some proxies for earnings and analyst forecast reversions. As such, a clean measure of our theory is to consider a difference-in-difference estimate in which we look at the difference in the profit distributions across different months for the portfolio sorted public news and the portfolio sorted on private news. There is an economically and statistically significant difference that is consistent with our predictions. We also confirm the third prediction that the hum-shaped term structure in the serial correlation of stock returns is more prominent for initial price changes that occur with little turnover.

In this paper, we work with the explicit network model in which we model individual friends as opposed to using the reduced form Bass model for a few reasons. We do so for a few reasons. First, we are able to prove some new useful results. Second, the model is simple and tractable. We provide some useful methods for solving the model. And

third, this model yields trading or turnover implications that would not be possible if we did not model individual friends and their trading behavior.

Our paper is closely related to Hong and Stein (1999) who originally proposed the gradual diffusion mechanism as an explanation for price earnings drift and momentum. Their paper assumed a constant diffusion rate and do not look at trading volume implications. Our paper considers a more flexible and potentially non-linear diffusion mechanism related to word-of-mouth and looks at equilibrium price and trading volume implications simultaneously. But the models share a similar prediction that news that is more widely seen or more quickly spread lead to less price of news drift or momentum.

Our work is also closely related to Carroll (2003) who argues that a similar epidemic model fits macro-economic expectations better than a standard rational expectations model. In a very interesting work by Shive (2008), she tests a similar epidemic model in the context of holdings using detailed data from investors in Finland and she finds support for the model. Both papers suggest that the mechanism is plausible at the level of beliefs. Our model looks at the equilibrium price and trading implications of such diffusion of opinions.

Finally, while we interpret and test our paper in the context of the spreading of information, the model can as easily be interpreted as the spreading of rumors or fads. As we discuss below, this yields additional testable implications. In this vein, our paper contributes to a growing literature on the economics of social networks or non-market interactions, including peer effects, multiple equilibria (tipping points), and information cascades (Bikchandani et al., 1992). While this literature has yielded great insights on the theoretical side, the empirical side has been plagued by identification problems. In other words, when we see friends make the same investment decisions, are they engaging in word of mouth or did they just get the same news. Our paper resolves to some degree this problem by testing the dynamic price implications and hence of information flow in a word of mouth model.

Our paper proceeds as follows. We develop the model in Section II. In Section III, we discuss how to calculate relevant outcomes. In Section IV, we discuss the empirical work. In Section V, we conclude with remarks on future research.

2 The Model

2.1 Communication Process

In describing this model and the results, most of the details are relegated to the Appendix. Suppose we have n friends who each have a probability p of running into another friend each period. We assume that this chance is i.i.d. across friends and time. Let $G = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ denote the set of friends. Suppose n_0 of the friends initially get the "news". We want to calculate the distribution over the set of friends with the news at time t .

Let Π be power set of G : $\{\{1\}, \{2\}, \dots, \{n\}, \{1, 2\}, \{1, 3\}, \dots, \{1, 2, 3\}, \dots\}$. An element A of Π is the set of people with the news at t . Assume that the initial distribution of friends with news is uniform over the sets A with size n_0 :

$$\pi_0(A) = \frac{1}{\binom{n}{n_0}} \quad (1)$$

Our i.i.d. assumptions imply that the elements of Π correspond to the states of a Markov Chain. For simplicity we denote $q = 1 - p$ (this is the probability that a friend does not run into another friend). We can then write the transition probability from a set A to a set B as:

$$\Pr(B, A) = \begin{cases} (1 - q^b)^{a-b} q^{b(n-a)} & B \subset A \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

The transition matrix P has these probabilities as its entries. Note that the dimension of the matrix is given by $\dim(P) = |G| = 2^n - 1$. We can now compute the distribution over the set of people with news at time t by:

$$\pi_t = \pi_0 \cdot P^t \quad (3)$$

With this, we can calculate the expected number of friends with news at time t (which we denote by e_t). This involves multiplying transition matrix. The expected fraction of friend with the news at a given time is our variable of interest. Its change across a period is the diffusion rate: a high diffusion rate means that this expected fraction has increased a lot from one period to the next.⁵

2.2 A 3 Friends Example

The basic elements of the model can be simply illustrated with the following simple example. Suppose there are three friends. So in our notation above, this corresponds to $n = 3$, $G = \{1, 2, 3\}$, and $n_0 = 1$. Then the power set is given by

$$\Pi = \{\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}, \{1, 2\}, \{1, 3\}, \{2, 3\}, \{1, 2, 3\}\} \quad (4)$$

and the prior distribution is given by

$$\pi_0 = \left[\frac{1}{3} \quad \frac{1}{3} \quad \frac{1}{3} \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad 0 \right] \quad (5)$$

⁵And using Markov Chain Theory, we can compute the expected diffusion time (i.e. the time when everybody has the information). This is the variable of interest for the literature but is less interesting for us.

Some simple probability calculations yield the following transition matrix:

$$P = \begin{bmatrix} q^2 & 0 & 0 & q - q^2 & q - q^2 & 0 & (1 - q)^2 \\ 0 & q^2 & 0 & q - q^2 & 0 & q - q^2 & (1 - q)^2 \\ 0 & 0 & q^2 & 0 & q - q^2 & q - q^2 & (1 - q)^2 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & q & 0 & 0 & 1 - q \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & q & 0 & 1 - q \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & q & 1 - q \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad (6)$$

We provide some intuition for the transition probability entries in the first row. The first row of this matrix denotes the set in which friend indexed by 1 has the information this period. The first column of this matrix denotes the set in which friend 1 has the information the next period. The probability of this occurring is that he did not meet either friend 2 or friend 3 this period. Since these are independent draws, it is given by the probability of not running into a friend (q) squared.

Continuing with this example, the second column denotes the set in which friend 2 has the information next period. The probability that friend 1 has the information this period and that only friend 2 has the information next period is 0 since we assume information once obtained cannot be lost. A similar logic explains how the third entry in the first row is 0. The fourth entry is the situation in which only friend 2 gets the information from friend 1 but not 3. The probability that friend 3 doesn't get the information is q and the probability that friend 2 gets the information is $1 - q$. Since these are independent events, the probability is $q(1 - q)$. Similar calculations yield all the other entries.

We can calculate the updated probability distribution for the sets of friends with the news by multiplying the P matrix with the prior distribution vector, which yields

$$\pi_t = \left[\frac{q^2}{3} \quad \frac{q^2}{3} \quad \frac{q^2}{3} \quad \frac{2(q - q^2)}{3} \quad \frac{2(q - q^2)}{3} \quad \frac{2(q - q^2)}{3} \quad (1 - q)^2 \right] \quad (7)$$

With this updated distribution, we can calculate the expected number of friends with the news by simply multiplying the probability of each of the sets with the number of people in each set.

$$\begin{aligned} e_1 &= 1 \cdot \frac{q^2}{3} + 1 \cdot \frac{q^2}{3} + 1 \cdot \frac{q^2}{3} + 2 \cdot \frac{2(q - q^2)}{3} + 2 \cdot \frac{2(q - q^2)}{3} + 2 \cdot \frac{2(q - q^2)}{3} + 3 \cdot (1 - q)^2 \\ &= 3 - 2q \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

This model can potentially deliver non-linear diffusion rates over time. To see this, we prove three theorems (all details are in the Appendix).

Theorem 1 *For certain set of values for p and small enough n_0 : $d_1 > d_0$ (i.e. serial correlation of returns at medium-horizon higher than at short-horizon)*

This proof relies on us calculating in closed form solutions for e_1 and e_2 . The intuition is simply that as more friends get news, diffusion rate is higher.

Theorem 2 *Keeping the same assumptions as in Theorem 1 and for t big enough: $d_s < d_1$ and $d_s < d_0$ for all $s > t$ (i.e. medium horizon serial correlation higher than short- and long- horizons)*

Here, we use inequalities to prove that the expected number of people converges to n as t is high. The intuition is that when everyone has information, the diffusion rate is low.

Theorems 1 and 2 basically yield the non-linear (hum-shaped) diffusion rate result, which we test. Note that this result relies on a small initial group of investors having the news and that the transmission probability is small.

What these results also suggest and we make clear in Theorem 3 is that when the number of people with the news exceeds a critical threshold of $n/2$, then the diffusion rate declines in time.

Theorem 3 *For certain sets of values for p and for $n_0 \geq \frac{n}{2}$: $d_{t+1} < d_t$ for all t (i.e. serial correlation declining over time)*

Here the recursion formula for the expected number of people allows us to prove this theorem. The intuition is that if a high initial number of people get the news, similar to everyone having information in the previous setting.

2.3 Computation Method

Since we cannot derive closed form solutions for the fraction of people with news, it is helpful to calculate the model for various parameters to confirm our Theorems and develop a feel for comparative statics. This turns out to be non-trivial for large networks. The reason is that $\dim(P) = |G| = 2^n - 1$ and hence computation becomes very difficult. To deal with this issue, we make an observation that the transition probability depends only on cardinality of the set. This will allow us to reduce the dimensionality of the problem.

First, group all sets of the same cardinality together. Define the analog of Π to be

$$\Pi^* = \{S_a | a = 1, \dots, n\} \quad (9)$$

where

$$S_a = \{A : |A| = a\} \quad (10)$$

Then define the new initial distribution over Π^* as

$$\pi_0^*(S_{|A|}) = |S_{|A|}| \pi_0(A) \quad (11)$$

The transition probability then becomes:

$$\Pr(S_b, S_a) = \binom{n-b}{a-b} \Pr(B, A) \quad (12)$$

where the new transition matrix P^* has these as its elements.

Going back to our example, we can show that we obtain identical results for the expected fraction of investors with the news at any given time are the same but the setup is different. Using the method that we just outlined for the example with three friends, let $S_1 = \{\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}\}$, $S_2 = \{\{1, 2\}, \{1, 3\}, \{2, 3\}\}$, and $S_3 = \{\{1, 2, 3\}\}$.

Then the power set is defined as

$$\Pi^* = \{S_1, S_2, S_3\} \quad (13)$$

and the prior distribution is given by

$$\pi_0^* = [1 \quad 0 \quad 0] \quad (14)$$

The new transition matrix is then given by

$$P^* = \begin{bmatrix} q^2 & 2q - 2q^2 & (1 - q)^2 \\ 0 & q & 1 - q \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad (15)$$

With this transition matrix and the prior distribution, we can calculate the probability distribution at time 1 as

$$\pi_t^* = [q^2 \quad 2q - 2q^2 \quad (1 - q)^2] \quad (16)$$

and the expected fraction of investors as

$$e_t = 1 \cdot q^2 + 2 \cdot (2q - 2q^2) + 3 \cdot (1 - q)^2 = 3 - 2q \quad (17)$$

Notice that the result is the same as before. This computation method greatly simplifies computations and makes the model tractable.

2.4 Equilibrium Price and Trading Volume

With this analysis in hand, we now embed our word-of-mouth model in a simple asset-pricing model. Assume that the stock pays a liquidating dividend of the form

$$D = \epsilon + \mu \quad (18)$$

where ϵ , the news that is released to some at time 0, is normal, $N(0, \sigma_\epsilon^2)$ and μ , the remaining fundamental uncertainty, is normal, $N(0, \sigma_\mu^2)$ and independent of ϵ . Note that $E[D] = 0$, $E[D|\epsilon] = \epsilon$, $\text{Var}(D) = \sigma_\epsilon^2 + \sigma_\mu^2$, and $\text{Var}(D|\epsilon) = \sigma_\mu^2$.

Assume that we have mean variance investors who either have news or they don't and they agree to disagree. They also have the usual static mean-variance demand functions with a risk-aversion parameter of γ . As such, there are two groups of investors

or opinions in the market: those with the news and those without the news and their demands are given by the following equations:

$$\frac{E[D] - P_t}{\gamma \text{Var}(D)} \quad (19)$$

and

$$\frac{E[D|\epsilon] - P_t}{\gamma \text{Var}(D|\epsilon)} \quad (20)$$

We assume that there is one share of stock outstanding.

Then the equilibrium condition to solve for the price each period is given by

$$(1 - k_t) \frac{E[D] - P_t}{\gamma \text{Var}(D)} + k_t \frac{E[D|\epsilon] - P_t}{\gamma \text{Var}(D|\epsilon)} = 1 \quad (21)$$

where k_t is the fraction with the news at time t . Note here that k_t is the realization for a given path (or draws of the i.i.d. word-of-mouth distribution), which we denote by ω . The equilibrium price for a given path is then given by

$$P_t(k_t) = \frac{k_t \epsilon - \gamma \sigma_\mu^2}{\sigma_\mu^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2 k_t} (\sigma_\epsilon^2 + \sigma_\mu^2) \quad (22)$$

The expected price is calculated by averaging across the different paths

$$E_\omega [P_t(k_t)] = \sum_{i=1}^n \pi_t^*(i) P_t(i) \quad (23)$$

This expected price is easy to calculate since we have a simple formula for π_t^* given above.

Notice that the expected price is non-linear in k_t . But when σ_ϵ^2 is small relative to σ_μ^2 , it is approximately linear in k_t (we will make this precise below). Suppose ϵ was positive news, then price gradually adjusts to the right fundamental value over time as the fraction of people with news approaches 1. It turns out that this intuition will hold true for most parameter values when we fully solve the model below.

Now let $m_t = k_{t+1} - k_t$ be the realized diffusion rate and then $d_t = e_{t+1} - e_t$ be the expected diffusion rate. Then it follows from simple calculations that

$$R_t(k_t, k_{t-1}) = P_t(k_t) - P_{t-1}(k_{t-1}) = \frac{m_{t-1} \sigma_\mu^2 (\epsilon + \gamma \sigma_\epsilon^2) (\sigma_\epsilon^2 + \sigma_\mu^2)}{y_t} \quad (24)$$

where $y_t = (\sigma_\mu^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2 k_t) (\sigma_\mu^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2 k_{t-1})$. Note that $P_{-1} = -\gamma (\sigma_\mu^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2)$ and so

$$R_0 = \frac{d_{-1} (\epsilon + \gamma \sigma_\epsilon^2) (\sigma_\epsilon^2 + \sigma_\mu^2)}{\sigma_\mu^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2 d_{-1}} \quad (25)$$

We can then calculate the expected return at any time t conditioned on R_0 by the following:

$$E[R_t(k_t, k_{t-1}) | R_0] = \frac{m_{t-1} \sigma_\mu^2 (\sigma_\epsilon^2 d_{-1} + \sigma_\mu^2)}{d_{-1} y_t} R_0 \quad (26)$$

Let $\Delta = \frac{\sigma_\epsilon^2}{\sigma_\mu^2}$, which is the ratio of the variance of the news shock to the remaining fundamental variance. We can rewrite equation 39 as:

$$E[R_t(k_t, k_{t-1}) | R_0] = \frac{1 + \Delta d_{-1}}{d_{-1}} \frac{m_{t-1}}{(1 + \Delta k_t)(1 + \Delta k_{t-1})} R_0 \quad (27)$$

The serial correlation of non-overlapping returns is given by the regression coefficient

$$\beta_t = \frac{1 + \Delta d_{-1}}{d_{-1}} \frac{m_{t-1}}{(1 + \Delta k_t)(1 + \Delta k_{t-1})} \quad (28)$$

We can compute the expected serial correlation across the paths ω as we did for the expected price:

$$E_\omega [E[R_t(k_t, k_{t-1}) | R_0]] = \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \pi_{i-1}^* (i) p_{ij}^* E[R_t(i, j) | R_0] \quad (29)$$

Notice again that when Δ is near zero (the variance realized by news is small relative to remaining fundamental variance), the serial correlation coefficient is proportional to diffusion rate. In other words, the serial correlation coefficient given in equation 41 inherits the non-linear properties of the diffusion rate.

With these equilibrium prices and calculations in hand, we turn towards calculating the equilibrium trading volume. Notice that at the equilibrium prices, we have two groups. Those with the news per capita have a demand given by

$$\theta_t^\epsilon(k_t) = \frac{\epsilon(1 - k_t) + \gamma(\sigma_\mu^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2)}{\gamma(\sigma_\mu^2 + k_t \sigma_\epsilon^2)} \quad (30)$$

and those without the news per capita have a demand given by

$$\theta_t(k_t) = \frac{-\epsilon k_t + \gamma \sigma_\mu^2}{\gamma(\sigma_\mu^2 + k_t \sigma_\epsilon^2)} \quad (31)$$

The turnover in this market is given by the following formula:

$$T_t = \frac{1}{2} [k_{t-1} |\theta_t^\epsilon - \theta_{t-1}^\epsilon| + m_{t-1} |\theta_t^\epsilon - \theta_{t-1}| + (1 - k_t) |\theta_t - \theta_{t-1}|] \quad (32)$$

The formula has an intuitive interpretation. Trading can come from three groups: guys with news at $t - 1$ and who still have news at t (this is in fraction k_{t-1}), guys

without news at $t - 1$ and who get the news at t (this is in fraction m_{t-1}), and guys without news at $t - 1$ and still without news at t (this is in fraction $1 - k_t$). We can then calculate the equilibrium expected turnover across the paths given by

$$E_\omega [T(k_t, k_{t-1})] = \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \pi_{i-1}^*(i) p_{ij}^* T_t(i, j) \quad (33)$$

Intuitively, turnover will also be proportional to the diffusion rate. When a lot of investors get the news, there will be more trading. So turnover should also inherit the non-linear structure of the diffusion rate process. But one thing to keep in mind is that at the extreme of everyone getting the news at the same time there will be little turnover and lots of price adjustments. For a more gradual diffusion scenario, this is less relevant.

We next prove that our intuition derived from the case where Δ is small is a good one. In Theorem 4, we show that the solution of the model is close to the solution of the model in which Δ is small when Δ is small.

Theorem 4 : *Let us denote the following $c = \frac{\epsilon}{\gamma\sigma_\mu^2}$. The following approximations hold:*

1.

$$\left| \frac{E[R_t(k_t, k_{t-1}) | R_0]}{\bar{E}R_t(k_t, k_{t-1}) | R_0} - 1 \right| \leq 2\Delta + \Delta^2 \quad (34)$$

2.

$$|T_t(k_t, k_{t-1}) - |c| m_{t-1} (1 - m_{t-1})| \leq \Delta (1 + |c|) \quad (35)$$

where \bar{E} is the conditional expected return that is linear in the diffusion rate.

Theorem 4 tells us that when Δ is small, the solution for the model will be close to the solution in which the expected price is linear in the expected fraction of investors with the news.

2.5 Calculations

We now calculate the expected fraction of people and the diffusion rates in Figures 1-4 to get some feel for the key predictions of our model and then calculate equilibrium quantities for serial correlation and trading volume in Figures 5-6. For these calculations we set $n = 100$ friends. We consider two scenarios. Suppose $n_0 = 1$, so that only one person initially has the news. We call this the private news scenario since few initial friends get the news. The second scenario we consider is $n_0 = 50$ (in other words, half the population has the news). We this case the public news scenario. In Figure 1, we consider the private news case. We plot e on t (for various values of p — the transmission probability — ranging from a high of .01 to a low of .0005). Notice that

the S-shape is most apparent for intermediate values of p . For p very small, the fraction of people with the news rises very slowly. Even after 120 periods, a large fraction of the population still does not have the news. For p very large, the fraction of investors with the news increases very quickly and the S-shape gets compressed into a short time interval since the entire population gets the news very quickly when p is large enough. It is as if the S gets compressed. For intermediate values, we see the nice S-shape.

In Figure 2, we plot the diffusion rate d_t over time. Notice that we see the non-linear diffusion rate as we discussed earlier. The diffusion rate peaks somewhere in the middle periods for all cases. It is a bit hard to see the case with the smallest p since the diffusion rate peaks at the very end of the 120 periods. Figure 2 makes clear that the S-shaped pattern in levels that we see in Figure 1 corresponds to a non-linear hump shaped pattern in the diffusion rate.

In Figures 3 and 4, we plot the fraction of people with the news and the diffusion rate against time for the case second scenario of public news, respectively. For each of the transmission probabilities, we do not see an S-shape any longer in Figure 3—now we only see that the fraction increases most dramatically in the beginning and declines as everyone eventually has the news. Indeed, in Figure 4, we see that diffusion rate is highest in nearest term and monotonically declines in time, consistent with what is observed in Figure 3.

In Figure 5, we plot the expected diffusion rate, equilibrium trading volume and serial correlations over time. We focus on the case where $n_0 = 1$, $p = .001$ and $\Delta = .25$. In contrast to the Figures 1-4, we also plot here the initial change when the first person gets the news (that's why we see a spike at time 0). Notice that when the first guy gets the news, there is a discrete jump in trading volume and also the diffusion rate. We plot the expected serial correlation coefficient given above (but here we normalize it by d_{t-1}). Hence the initial jump in the serial coefficient is artificially induced by our normalization to get the expected serial correlation and the expected diffusion rate into the same scale. Notice that the serial correlation of non-overlapping returns and trading volume follow the same hump-shaped pattern as the diffusion rate.

In Figure 6, we plot the same quantities except that we now consider the solution for $n_0 = 10$. We see a bigger turnover spike in the beginning but we now see a more moderate hump-shaped pattern exactly because a larger fraction of investors had initially already received the news. In sum, these plots provide numerical calculations for the results in Theorems 1-3 and also for the equilibrium price (serial correlation) and volume patterns. We will next look to the stock market data on price continuation to see if indeed these predictions hold true.

3 Empirical Work

We test the predictions of the model by re-examining the well-known price continuation patterns associated with past price changes and earnings announcements. The key facts about these two phenomena are well known: at a given point in time, a portfolio of recent winners (past 1 to 12 months) or good news firms (whether measured with earnings surprises or analysts forecast revisions) outperforms a portfolio of recent losers or bad news firms over the next year by about 10%. There is no price continuation pattern after a year. What is not known is how this 10% is distributed over the year. Are the profits uniformly accumulated for each month up to a year as in the theory of Hong and Stein (1999)? Or as our theory would suggest, the patterns should differ depending on how widely released is the news: monotonically declining for more widely disseminated news like earnings announcements and hump-shaped for less widely disseminated news?

We test our predictions using a sample of all domestic common stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ from January 1976 to December 2007, excluding real estate investment trusts (REITs), American Depository Receipts (ADRs), stocks with market capitalization in the bottom quintile using NYSE-AMEX breakpoints, and stocks priced below \$5. We obtain daily and monthly stock returns and market capitalization data from Chicago Research in Securities Prices (CRSP), the actual earnings announcement dates and earnings from Compustat, and analyst earnings forecasts from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (IBES) summary file.

We utilize three pieces of public earnings news in the empirical implementation, which we obtain from the literature on price continuation following earnings announcements. The first is the cumulative market-adjusted stock returns from day -2 to day +1 around each earnings announcement date (which we denote by ABR). The idea is that the stock price reaction on an earnings date is a pure measure of the market's surprise at the release. If the market is not surprised at the firm's release, then there is no price change. The second is standardized unexpected earnings or SUE, where SUE is the earnings this quarter minus the earnings from four quarters ago divided by the standard deviation of this same unexpected earnings measure in each of the previous eight quarters (not including the current one). This earnings surprise measure adjusts for well-known seasonal patterns in corporate earnings. The downside of this measure is that one requires a total of 12 quarters to calculate this measure. The third is analyst forecast revision in month t defined as $\frac{F_t - F_{t-1}}{P_t}$, where F_t is forecast consensus for fiscal year end (FY01) in month t and P_t is the price of the stock. We denote the cumulative revision in the past J months as $REV(J)$, which is the sum of the monthly forecast revisions from month $t-J+1$ to month t . ABR and SUE are measures of actual announced earnings, while REV is a measure of forecasted future earnings.

At the end of each month, we want to decompose a firm's price change into a part

that is explained by public news (which we measure with earnings releases or analyst revisions) and a residual component, which is not explainable by public news, which we will call private news. Here, we want to note that we use the term public versus private in that public news is known to relatively more people, not necessarily to all. There is a lot of anecdotal evidence cited in the introduction that lots of public news is not received by all market participants at the time of release. In this set-up, we view price changes or returns as being driven by a mix of public and private news. This is a simplification since some of these price changes might be due to liquidity shocks. As it turns out, we require fairly stringent data requirements to be able to perform this decomposition that only fairly large stocks are able to satisfy. We will deal with how the potential of liquidity shocks influencing price changes affects our interpretations below.

More precisely, to perform this decomposition, we run a cross-sectional regression of past J-month stock return on earnings news and forecast revisions to decompose this price change (which we call totInfo) into the portion explainable by public information (pubInfo) and a residual which is not explainable or the private information (privInfo) component. For example, if we use past J = 6 months returns, then we run the following cross-sectional regression:

$$\text{Ret}(J)_{i,t} = a + b_1 \cdot \text{ABR}(1)_{i,t} + \dots + b_{J/3} \cdot \text{ABR}(J/3)_{i,t} + c \cdot \text{REV}(J)_{i,t} + e_{i,t} \quad (36)$$

where $\text{Ret}(J)$ is the J-month return, $\text{ABR}(1), \dots, \text{ABR}(J/3)$ are the ABR's within the J-month period, and $\text{REV}(J)$ is the cumulative analyst forecast revision in the same period. Note that for J=1,2, this regression will only have one ABR. Alternatively, the ABR's can be replaced with SUE's. We obtain qualitatively identical results using SUE.

Each month we construct information portfolios (P1 to P5) after sorting stocks into quintiles based on totInfo, pubInfo and privInfo respectively. Table 1 summarizes the firm characteristics for portfolios (P1 (recent losers or bad news), P3, and P5 (recent winners or good news)) for formation periods of J = 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, and 12. For brevity, we do not report results for P2 and P4 since they do not factor into calculations. Take J = 3 for example. Let's first consider the total information portfolios. The first column reports the number of stocks for each portfolio. There are 408 in each. The second column reports the formation period returns for each of the portfolios. We will focus on discussion on P1 and P5 portfolios since they are the ones with which we calculate the profits from momentum and post-earnings drift strategies or equivalently, the price continuation patterns. The spread between P1 (-20.79%) and P5 (33.96%) is 55%. The third column reports the return predicted by public news from the above decomposition regression for each of the portfolios. The spread between P1 (0.69) and P5 (7.78) is about 7%. The third column reports the residuals from the regression for each of the portfolios. The spread between P1 (-21.48%) and P5 (26.118%) is 48%. Roughly, we can think of the 55% spread in returns as being decomposed along the lines of 7% being due to earnings information and the remaining 48% as unexplained.

Of course, we have to caveat that we do not have all sources of public information and our private news measure is necessarily contaminated by public news. This observation will be critical later on as we will need to look at a difference-in-difference estimate between the reactions of price to public versus price news to test our hypotheses.

Continuing with the summary statistic table for total information portfolios for $J=3$ month returns, we also report for completeness the characteristics of the earnings data (SUE, ABR and REV) for each of the portfolios and also the LogSize of the company and the number of analyst estimates. Notice that P1 has on average poorer SUE, ABR and REV statistics compared to P3 or P5. Also notice that companies in each of the portfolios are very large due to our data restrictions. For $J = 3$, on average in each month 2041 stocks are included in our portfolios, 5264 stocks are in the crsp universe. So 61% of the stocks are excluded. Median market cap of the 2041 stocks is 267 million on average, which places them at the 76 percentile of the whole CRSP universe in terms of market cap. The mean market capitalization of the 2041 stocks is 1662 mil, which is the 91 percentile of the whole CRSP universe in terms of market cap. Finally, not surprisingly, these companies have on average around 7 analyst estimates each month which is much larger than the typical stock which has little to no coverage.

Notice a few other key things regarding this summary statistics table. The first is that for $J=1$ and 2, we have fewer stocks because to do our decomposition, we need earnings information in that month or in those 2 months and this is much less likely to occur for all stocks than within a quarter. In other words, firms are reporting their numbers at different months within a quarter and hence in any given month, we are picking up only one-third of the firms. Hence, $J=3$ is in some sense our preferred focus of stocks since we have a larger sample to reduce measurement error. So it should not come as a surprise that the $J=1$ and 2 results might be a bit noisier.

Also notice that we group together $J=6, 9, 12$ into a separate group of longer horizon past returns. The logic of our model is most easily applied to short horizon returns like one month or a quarter because one can plausibly think that these sorts of price changes may reflect private news not noticed by many investors. In contrast, stocks that have done extremely well or poorly for a longer horizon like 6 to 12 months, one might worry that we are now actually capturing the end of a gradual diffusion process rather than the beginning. In this instance, it is likely that perhaps many participants already have the information — so here the diffusion rate even for what we call private news will be high initially and monotonically declining. This is a testable prediction we examine below with the $J=6, 9, 12$ decompositions.

Table 2 reports the return drift to past information for different formation period $J=1, 2, 3$. Panel A, B, C reports the drift to public information, private information and total information portfolios, respectively. After forming the information portfolios, we skip one month, then hold them for twelve months. The reported numbers are the average monthly return difference between P1 and P5 (the drift) in each of the twelve months and the corresponding t-statistics in brackets. We can think of the return each

month as being proportional to the diffusion rate of our model.

We begin by looking at the drift patterns for the public information portfolios. Notice that for $J=1,2$, and 3 , for the return drift to public information, the drift is always the strongest in the first couple of months and then it weakens gradually over the 12-month period. This is consistent with the prediction of the word-of-mouth model to the extent that we view public news as being received by a large fraction of investors. (In our Theorem 3, the critical fraction is half of the investors.) According to our theory, the diffusion rate should be high initially and gradually declines. This is roughly what we see. Now consider the return drift patterns to private information. Here the monthly returns are actually highest somewhere in months 5-8. They are lower in the first few months and in the last few months. Again, this is consistent with our model since for news that is not widely released, we expect a non-linear hump shaped diffusion rate or drift pattern in the data. The final panel reports the results for the total information sort. We still see a bit of a hump shaped pattern but it is not as pronounced as for the private information portfolios, which is very much to our point that the total information portfolios is a mix of reactions to public and private news and these reaction patterns are very different. But when combined, the total price reaction patterns seem more constant over time than is reality.

Table 2 Panel B presents the formal tests on the downward sloping drift to public information and the hump-shape drift to private information. As we argued earlier, it is likely the case that the private information portfolio is still contaminated with public information. One way to purge out these effects from the point of view of inference is to consider the difference in the returns each month for the public and the private information portfolios. One can think of this as a difference-in-difference estimate in which we use the shape of the public information portfolio as a control group of what the price reaction to a pure public news shock would be. We report the results for $J=1,2$, and 3 . To economize on space, we only report a few key statistics for the public information portfolio and the private information portfolio: the month 6 ($M6$) return minus the month 1 ($M1$) return, the month 12 minus the month 6 return, and the month 12 minus the month 1 return. We then report the difference in these differences for the private versus public portfolio. We also report the month with the largest return for the private information portfolio (which we denote by $Peak$) and take the difference with $M1$ and then look at the difference between $M12$ and $Peak$.

Starting at $J=1$, we see that $M1 > M6 > M12$ — in other words, there is a monotonically declining return pattern for public information. Also, we report the difference in $Peak - M1$ and $M12 - Peak$ and draw the same conclusion. In contrast, for private information, we see that $M6 > M1$ and $M6 > M12$ while $M1$ is basically equal to $M12$. More importantly, we see that $Peak > M1$ (a difference of 71 basis points a month with a t-statistic of 2) and $Peak > M12$ (with a difference of 62 basis points a month with a t-statistic of 2.71). In other words, there is a hump shaped return pattern to the private information portfolios. These differences are all the more

stark when we consider the difference-in-difference estimate. Relative to what a pure public shock reaction would have been, $M6 > M1$ by 87 basis points with a t-statistic of 3.26 and $M6 > M12$ by 96 basis points with a t-statistic of 3.4. A similar conclusion applies for $Peak - M1$, though the effect is smaller for $Peak - M12$.

Looking at $J=2$ and $J=3$, we come to pretty similar conclusions. If anything the effects are much stronger and nicer for $J=2$ and 3 than when compared to $J=1$. In part, this is because we have far fewer stocks when we look at $J=1$ results due to fewer firms reporting earnings in any given month. We view the results in Table 2 as providing some support for our model.

In Table 3, we worry about the following alternative hypothesis. Suppose that the residual component of returns we are calling private news isn't just driven by private news but may also be capturing some liquidity component. A liquidity effect typically gives rise of reversals in the short horizon. A poor performance this month reverses itself the next month. Then what might be happening is that the returns for the private information portfolio may have low returns the first few months because of this reversal effect playing itself out. Our prior is that this effect is implausible for our sample since we are essentially looking at the largest stocks in the CRSP universe due to our data restrictions. Nonetheless, in this table, we report the results contained Panel B of Table 2 but cut by firm size. That is, we divide our sample into three groups, which we label small, medium and large firms and re-run all our analyses from Table 2 and see how the diffusion patterns vary across these sub-groups. The idea here is that we worry that liquidity effects are only a concern for smaller stocks. So if we do not see striking differences across the sample, then we can be assured that our results are not due to liquidity reversals in the short horizon.

Panel A reports the cuts for $J=1$. Results are noisier here not surprisingly but we can discern similar patterns across all three groups. Looking at public information portfolios, we see the monotonically declining pattern across all three cuts. Looking at private information portfolios, we also see that the middle months yield higher returns than the earlier months though the results look less stable when we compare the middle or peak months to the M12 for small and medium size stocks. Things look more stable and in the direction of our hypothesis when we look at large stocks. This is very reassuring since it is telling us that our effects are unlikely to be due to liquidity issues. In Panel B, we report comparable results for $J=2$ and in Panel C the results for $J=3$. $J=2$ results also look supportive in that there doesn't seem to be much variation across size cuts. The $J=3$ results in Panel C look less stable but are also generally in the same direction as our hypothesis.

In Table 4, we examine the results from Table 2 but now for $J=6, 9, 12$ month returns. For $J=6$ month results, it is surprising that they look similar to those of $J=1, 2$, and 3. In other words, even for returns up to 6 months, it appears that there is still a non-linear hump shaped pattern in the diffusion rate. But for $J=9$ and 12, as we suspected, there is not discernible difference between public and private news reactions.

The diffusion rates are all monotonically declining in time.

In Figure 5, we now report the results for the case of $J=3$ by sub-groups of abnormal turnover. That is, we see how the decompositions vary across low, medium and high abnormal turnover sub-groups. We find that the hump-shaped pattern in the returns for the private information sort are much more prominent for the low abnormal turnover sub-group. This result is consistent with the model's prediction that turnover is to a degree a measure of whether the information that drove the price change was widely observed. Information that is less observed is more likely generate the hump-shaped pattern. And consistent with the model, there is no discernable difference for public information cut presumably because this information has already been widely seen.

4 Extensions: Rumors and Fads

Up to this point, we have interpreted our model and the tests of it as the spreading of news. But our model can as easily be used to explore the transmission of rumors and fads. There are a couple of ways to model this. One route is to allow for some probability that the news released be false. In this scenario, if revelation regarding whether the news was real or a rumor occurs at a lower frequency than the diffusion of the information, then the model can generate a reversal in long-horizon returns. Another way to model this is to follow Demarzo et al. (2003) in which boundedly rational agents fail to account for repetition in the information they hear. In our context, agents who already have the news and hear it from a new friend do not change their expectations. But one can allow for an agent who update even more strongly on his beliefs. This additional layer of bounded rationality can lead to over shooting of price to news. Indeed, there is well-known evidence that price momentum reverses at longer horizons. To see this, notice that the returns at around 12 months after the formation period for private information returns show negative average returns. This is the beginning of the reversal phenomenon. Our model can naturally be extended to provide an account of this reversal in the manner described above.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we develop a simple and tractable model of the diffusion of opinions and price-volume dynamics in asset markets that builds on a canonical model of word-of-mouth with connected friends who have i.i.d. transmission probabilities. We derive a number of novel predictions regarding the non-linearity of price drift and trading volume for public versus private information. We tested these predictions in US stock market data and find some support for these predictions. A novel finding is that conditioned on price moves due to public news, the diffusion rate of information is highest in the near term and declines gradually over time. In contrast, for price moves due to private

news, the diffusion rate is low initially and peaks somewhere in the medium term of 5 to 9 months and then is low after.

We now suggest some avenues for further research. Other key parameters that are important for understanding information flow in this model is the size of networks n , how tight the network is (or the transmission probability p) and the initial fraction of people with the news. Further empirical work to measure these key parameters can yield potentially useful insights. In particular, earlier work by Hong et al. (2000) showing that there is more momentum in stocks with greater analyst coverage (which can be interpreted both as a measure of the tightness of networks or of the initial fraction of people with the news) is example in this direction. Our own work has focused on very large stocks and paid more attention to the nature of initial news releases in our tests. But these two strands can perhaps be combined to yield additional insights.

Moreover, many of the empirical papers up to this point only test to see whether there is more or less drift or momentum depending on stock characteristics related to analyst or media coverage (as a sort of proxy for attention or disagreement) but our model points a way toward understanding potentially richer patterns in the data that will provide a deeper understanding of markets.

Finally, this model can also be used to study the dynamics of investor expectations (perhaps as proxied by analyst forecasts as in Diether et al. (2002)). For instance, the model generates interesting dynamics for the cross-sectional dispersion of opinions that vary conditioned on public new releases that are widely seen versus those that are less public or private, which can be tested. More generally, there is now rich data on newspaper or broader media releases more generally that can be used to perform event studies to understand how these releases affect the dispersion of opinion in markets (see, e.g., Chan (2003)). In sum, the preliminary evidence in this paper suggests that this simple and highly stylized model can provide a very useful lens to understand the diffusion of opinions and price-volume dynamics in asset markets.

6 Appendix

6.1 Calculating the Transition Probability Matrix

For two sets A and B in Π , we denote the transition probability from a set B to a set A at time t by $\Pr(B, A, t)$. Note that $\Pr(B, A, t) = 0$ if $B \not\subset A$. We will now calculate the transition probabilities for the case $B \subset A$. Unless otherwise specified we will use $a = |A|$, $b = |B|$ and $q = 1 - p$. Let us denote the probability that information travels from a set X to a set Y at time t by $P(X \rightarrow Y, t)$. We also denote by $P(X \nrightarrow Y, t)$ the probability that information does not reach any person in set Y at time t , given that the people in set X have the information at time $t - 1$. Note that X and Y do not have to be states of the Markov Chain. By the i.i.d. word-of-mouth assumption, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
Pr(B, A, t) &= \prod_{i \in A-B} P(B \rightarrow \{i\}, t) \cdot \prod_{j \notin A} P(B \nrightarrow \{j\}, t) \Rightarrow \\
Pr(B, A, t) &= \prod_{i \in A-B} [1 - P(B \nrightarrow \{i\}, t)] \cdot \prod_{j \notin A} P(B \nrightarrow \{j\}, t) \Rightarrow \\
Pr(B, A, t) &= \prod_{i \in A-B} \left[1 - \prod_{k \in B} P(\{k\} \nrightarrow \{i\}, t) \right] \cdot \prod_{j \notin A} \prod_{k \in B} P(\{k\} \nrightarrow \{j\}, t) \Rightarrow \\
Pr(B, A, t) &= [1 - (1-p)^{|B|}]^{|A-B|} \cdot (1-p)^{|B| \cdot (n-|A|)} \Rightarrow \\
Pr(B, A, t) &= [1 - q^b]^{a-b} \cdot q^{b \cdot (n-a)}
\end{aligned}$$

These transition probabilities form the elements of the transition matrix, denoted by \mathbf{P} , of dimension $|\Pi|$. Let π_t be the probability distribution over the power set at time t . We know from the theory of Markov Chain that $\pi_t = \pi_0 \mathbf{P}^t$. One of the things we are interested in, is the expected proportion of people who have the information at time t , denoted by e_t , which is given by $e_t = \sum_{x \in \Pi} \pi_t(x) \cdot |x|$.

6.2 Computationally Efficient Solution Method

A problem which arises in computing solutions to our model is that the dimension of the transition matrix is exponential in the number of friends ($\dim(\mathbf{P}) = |\Pi| = 2^n - 1$), which makes computation difficult for a large n . As a solution, we will consider a new Markov Chain which takes advantage of the fact that we are predominantly interested in keeping track of the number of people having the information at time t and not in the exact set of people. We define the state space for this new Markov Chain to be $\Pi^* = \{S_a | a \in 1, \dots, n\}$, where $S_a = \{A | A \in \Pi; |A| = a\}$. If at time t the people in the set A have the information, then the corresponding state of the Markov Chain is $S_{|A|}$. Furthermore the initial distribution π_0^* over the states in Π^* can be seen as being induced by the initial distribution π_0 on Π , with $\pi_0^*(S_{|A|}) = \pi_0(A) \cdot |S_{|A|}|$.

Notice that the transition probability from the previous Markov Chain: $\Pr(B, A)$ depends only on the cardinality of A and B . The probability distribution over states at time t is $\pi_0 \cdot \mathbf{P}^t$. Since both π_0 and P are function of sets only through their cardinality then conditioned on being in a state S_a at time t each set $A \in S_a$ is equally likely to be the one with exactly those people who have the information at time t . We are interested in computing the new transition probability $\Pr(S_b, S_a)$.

$$\Pr(S_b, S_a) = \sum_{A \in S_a} \sum_{B \in S_b} \frac{1}{|S_b|} \Pr(B, A) = \sum_{A \in S_a} \sum_{B \in S_b; B \subset A} \frac{1}{|S_b|} \Pr(B, A) \Rightarrow$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr(S_b, S_a) &= \sum_{|A|=a} \sum_{B \subset A; |B|=b} \frac{1}{|S_b|} \Pr(b, a) = \frac{\Pr(b, a)}{|S_b|} \cdot \sum_{|A|=a} \sum_{B \subset A; |B|=b} 1 \Rightarrow \\
\Pr(S_b, S_a) &= \frac{\Pr(b, a)}{|S_b|} \cdot \sum_{|A|=a} \binom{a}{b} = \frac{\Pr(b, a)}{|S_b|} \cdot \binom{n}{a} \cdot \binom{a}{b} \Rightarrow \\
\Pr(S_b, S_a) &= \binom{n-b}{a-b} \cdot \Pr(b, a) = \binom{n-b}{a-b} \cdot [1 - q^b]^{a-b} \cdot q^{b \cdot (n-a)}
\end{aligned}$$

Since people do not forget information once they receive it $\Pr(S_i, S_j) = 0$ for all $i > j$. The transition matrix \mathbf{P}^* is: $p_{ij}^* = \Pr(S_i, S_j)$ if $i \leq j$ and $p_{ij}^* = 0$ otherwise, $\forall i, j \in \overline{1, n}$. It is worth noticing that the dimension of the transition matrix is now n , linear as opposite to exponential in the number of agents of the network. We can now write down the formula for the distribution over the states of the new Markov Chain at time t : $\pi_t^* = \pi_0^* \cdot (\mathbf{P}^*)^t$. It follows that the expected number of people who have the information at time t , denoted by e_t^* , is: $e_t^* = \sum_{S_a \in \Pi^*} \pi_t^*(S_a) \cdot a = e_t$.

6.3 Results need for proofs of Theorems 1-3

We now prove some results which will be used in the proofs of Theorems 1-3. Since we are only interested in computing the expected number of friends with the information at a particular time, we will use the framework for the computational efficient Markov

Chain model. Let π_0^* be the initial distribution as above and: $g = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \\ \vdots \\ n \end{pmatrix}$

Let us define $a_m(t)$ as the expected number of people that do not have the information at time t given that m people do not have the information at time 0. Notice that $a_0(t) = 0$, trivially for all t since when everybody has the information at time 0, everybody will have the information at any other time in the future.

Proposition 1: For all $m \in \{1, \dots, n-1\}$ there exist positive real number u such that the following recursion holds:

$$a_m(t+1) = \sum_{k=0}^m u^{m-k} \cdot v^k \cdot \binom{m}{k} \cdot a_{m-k}(t)$$

where $v = 1 - u$.

Proof. Using the definition of the Markov Chain and that of $a_m(t)$ we have:

$$(\mathbf{P}^*)^t \cdot g = n \cdot \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ \vdots \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} - \begin{pmatrix} a_{n-1}(t) \\ \vdots \\ a_0(t) \end{pmatrix}$$

Because \mathbf{P}^* is a transition matrix for a Markov Chain the following holds:

$$(\mathbf{P}^*)^t \cdot \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ \vdots \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ \vdots \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

We can now try to derive a recursive formula by looking at the one step update in this matrix notation:

$$\begin{aligned} n \cdot \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ \vdots \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} - \begin{pmatrix} a_{n-1}(t+1) \\ \vdots \\ a_0(t+1) \end{pmatrix} &= (\mathbf{P}^*)^{t+1} \cdot g = \mathbf{P}^* \cdot \left(n \cdot \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ \vdots \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} - \begin{pmatrix} a_{n-1}(t) \\ \vdots \\ a_0(t) \end{pmatrix} \right) \\ &= n \cdot \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ \vdots \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} - \mathbf{P}^* \cdot \begin{pmatrix} a_{n-1}(t) \\ \vdots \\ a_0(t) \end{pmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

But the above equality simplifies to:

$$\mathbf{P}^* \cdot \begin{pmatrix} a_{n-1}(t) \\ \vdots \\ a_0(t) \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} a_{n-1}(t+1) \\ \vdots \\ a_0(t+1) \end{pmatrix} \Rightarrow \mathbf{P}_i^* \cdot \begin{pmatrix} a_{n-1}(t) \\ \vdots \\ a_0(t) \end{pmatrix} = a_{n-i}(t+1)$$

where we have denoted by \mathbf{P}_i^* the i^{th} line of the matrix \mathbf{P}^* .

Writing explicitly the formulas for the entries of \mathbf{P}^* we get:

$$a_{n-i}(t+1) = \sum_{k=0}^{n-i} (q^i)^{n-i-k} \cdot (1-q^i)^k \cdot \binom{n-i}{k} \cdot a_{n-i-k}(t)$$

Finally we can make the notation $u = q^i$, $v = 1 - u$, $m = n - i$ and the desired recursion formula is proven:

$$a_m(t+1) = \sum_{k=0}^m u^{m-k} \cdot v^k \cdot \binom{m}{k} \cdot a_{m-k}(t)$$

□

Corollary 1: *The recursion stated in the previous proposition holds for the following sequences as well: $d_m(t) = [n - a_m(t+1)] - [n - a_m(t)]$ and $dd_m(t) = d_m(t+1) - d_m(t)$.*

Proof. The proof is straight forward. All we need to do is to explicitate $d_m(t)$ using the recursion for $a_m(t+1)$ and $a_m(t)$. Once the first claim is proved we use the same method for the second claim. □

Proposition 2: The following close form formulas hold $\forall m \in \{1, \dots, n-1\}$:

1. $a_m(0) = m$
2. $a_m(1) = m \cdot q^{n-m}$
3. $a_m(2) = m \cdot q^{2(n-m)} \cdot [q^{n-m}(1-q) + q]^{m-1}$

Proof. Since we know that $g = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ \vdots \\ n \end{pmatrix}$ we can immediately derive $a_m(0) = m \forall m \in \{1, \dots, n-1\}$.

We will use the recursion formula and the fact that $a_m(0) = m$ to derive the equality for $a_m(1)$.

$$\begin{aligned}
 a_m(1) &= \sum_{k=0}^m u^{m-k} \cdot v^k \cdot \binom{m}{k} \cdot a_{m-k}(1) \\
 &= \sum_{k=0}^m u^{m-k} \cdot v^k \cdot \binom{m}{k} \cdot (m-k) \\
 &= \sum_{k=0}^{m-1} u \cdot u^{m-1-k} \cdot v^k \cdot \binom{m-1}{k} \cdot m \\
 &= u \cdot m \cdot (u+v)^{m-1} = m \cdot q^{n-m}
 \end{aligned}$$

Let us now try to compute $a_m(2)$ in the same manner:

$$\begin{aligned}
 a_m(2) &= \sum_{k=0}^m u^{m-k} \cdot v^k \cdot \binom{m}{k} \cdot a_{m-k}(2) \\
 &= \sum_{k=0}^m u^{m-k} \cdot v^k \cdot \binom{m}{k} \cdot (m-k) \cdot q^{n-m+k} \\
 &= \sum_{k=0}^{m-1} u \cdot u^{m-1-k} \cdot (q \cdot v)^k \cdot \binom{m-1}{k} \cdot m \cdot q^{n-m} \\
 &= u \cdot m \cdot q^{n-m} \cdot (u+qv)^{m-1} = m \cdot q^{2(n-m)} \cdot [q^{n-m}(1-q) + q]^{m-1}
 \end{aligned}$$

□

Remark 1: Given our assumptions about the initial distribution, the expected number of people having the information at time t is increasing in t . In our notation this amounts to $d_m(t) > 0$ for all m and t , which is obviously true because

$d_m(0) = m(1 - q^{n-m}) > 0$ and the recursion coefficients are positive. In the next proposition we prove this result for a general π_0^* .

Proposition 3: *Given any initial probability distribution π_0^* over the number of people having the information at time 0, the expected number of people having the information at time t is a strictly increasing function of t .*

Proof. Let us define $a(t) = \begin{pmatrix} a_{n-1}(t) \\ \vdots \\ a_0(t) \end{pmatrix}$ and $d(t) = \begin{pmatrix} d_{n-1}(t) \\ \vdots \\ d_0(t) \end{pmatrix}$. All we need to

prove is that $\pi_0^* \cdot d_{t+1} > 0$ for all t . Using the definition of $d(t+1)$ this is equivalent to $\pi_0^* \cdot (a(t) - a(t+1)) > 0$ for all t and for all initial distributions π_0^* . We know that:

$$a(t+1) = \mathbf{P}^* \cdot a(t) \Rightarrow a(t) = (\mathbf{P}^*)^t \cdot a(0) \Rightarrow a(t) - a(t+1) = (\mathbf{P}^*)^t \cdot (a(0) - a(1))$$

Using proposition 2 we have $a_m(0) - a_m(1) = m \cdot (1 - q^{n-m})$ which is strictly positive for all $m \in \{1, \dots, n-1\}$ and 0 for $m = 0$. On the other hand \mathbf{P}^* is an upper triangular matrix with strictly positive entries. This readily implies that $(\mathbf{P}^*)^t$ is also an upper triangular matrix with strictly positive entries. Simple matrix multiplication leads to the fact that the vector $a(t) - a(t+1) = (\mathbf{P}^*)^t \cdot (a(0) - a(1))$ has strictly positive entries, except for the last one which is 0.

Since π_0^* is a probability distribution it has only nonnegative elements and since $\pi_0^*(n) = 0 \exists i \in \{1, \dots, n-1\}$ such that $\pi_0^*(i) > 0$. This implies that $\pi_0^* \cdot (a(t) - a(t+1))$ is strictly positive. □

6.4 Proof of Theorem 1

We want to show that: given k a positive integer, $dd_m(0) > 0$ for all $m > n - \bar{n}_0$ (where $\bar{n}_0 = \left\lceil \frac{n-1}{k+1} \right\rceil$) assuming that: $q^{n_0-1} < \frac{k-1}{k}$ and $q^{\bar{n}_0} + q^{2\bar{n}_0} > 1$

First, using Proposition 2, observe that:

$$dd_m(0) = 2q^{n_0} - 1 - q^{2n_0} [q^{n_0}(1-q) + q]^{n-n_0-1}$$

where $n_0 = n - m$. Now we want to show that $[q^{n_0}(1-q) + q]^{n-n_0-1} < q^{n_0}$. Initially we will prove that $[q^{n_0}(1-q) + q]^k < q$

Let $x^k = q$, where $x > 0$. Let $y = \sum_{i=0}^{k-2} x^i$. Since $q < 1 \Rightarrow x < 1$, we have

$$y > (k-1)x^{k-1} \Rightarrow ky > (k-1)(y + x^{k-1}) \Rightarrow \frac{1-x^{k-1}}{1-x^k} > \frac{k-1}{k}$$

Using $q^{n_0-1} < \frac{k-1}{k}$ we have:

$$\frac{1-x^{k-1}}{1-x^k} > q^{n_0-1} > x^{kn_0-1} \Rightarrow x^{kn_0}(1-x^k) < x-x^k \Rightarrow [q^{n_0}(1-q)+q]^k < q$$

Observe that $n_0 < \bar{n}_0 \leq \frac{n-1}{k+1} \Rightarrow kn_0 < n-n_0-1$. Since $q^{n_0}(1-q)+q < 1$ we derive: $[q^{n_0}(1-q)+q]^{n-n_0-1} < [q^{n_0}(1-q)+q]^{kn_0} < q^{n_0}$.

Finally we can go back to our target quantity:

$$\begin{aligned} dd_m(0) &= 2q^{n_0} - 1 - q^{2n_0} [q^{n_0}(1-q)+q]^{n-n_0-1} \Rightarrow \\ dd_m(0) &> 2q^{n_0} - 1 - q^{2n_0} q^{n_0} = (1-q^{n_0})(q^{n_0} + q^{2n_0} - 1) > 0 \end{aligned}$$

The last step follows from $q < 1$, $n_0 < \bar{n}_0$ and $q^{\bar{n}_0} + q^{2\bar{n}_0} > 1$

6.5 Proof of Theorem 2

We want to show the following inequalities hold for any $m \in \{1, \dots, n-1\}$ and $t > 0$:

1. $a_m(t) \leq m \cdot q^{(n-m) \cdot t}$
2. $a_m(t) \geq m \cdot q^{(n-m) \cdot t} \cdot q^{(m-1) \cdot (t-1)}$

The proof goes by induction on t . From Proposition 2 we know that the two inequalities hold for any $t = 1$, $t = 2$ and $\forall m \in \{1, \dots, n-1\}$. Now suppose the inequalities hold for a given t and all $m \in \{1, \dots, n-1\}$ and let us prove that they hold for $t+1$ as well.

We start from the recursion formula and we will use the first inequality for each $a_{m-k}(t)$.

$$\begin{aligned} a_m(t+1) &= \sum_{k=0}^m u^{m-k} \cdot v^k \cdot \binom{m}{k} \cdot a_{m-k}(t) \\ &\leq \sum_{k=0}^m u^{m-k} \cdot v^k \cdot \binom{m}{k} \cdot (m-k) \cdot q^{(n-m+k) \cdot t} \\ &\leq \sum_{k=0}^{m-1} u^{m-1-k} \cdot (v \cdot q^t)^k \cdot \binom{m-1}{k} \cdot u \cdot m \cdot q^{(n-m) \cdot t} \\ &\leq u \cdot m \cdot q^{(n-m) \cdot t} \cdot (u + v \cdot q^t)^{m-1} \end{aligned}$$

But $v = 1 - u$ and $q < 1$ so this implies $u + v \cdot q^t < 1$. Furthermore $u = q^{n-m}$ so we get the first inequality for $t+1$.

$$a_m(t+1) \leq m \cdot q^{(n-m) \cdot (t+1)}$$

The idea for the proof of the second inequality is the same: start with the recursion formula and apply the second inequality for $a_{m-k}(t)$.

$$\begin{aligned}
a_m(t+1) &= \sum_{k=0}^m u^{m-k} \cdot v^k \cdot \binom{m}{k} \cdot a_{m-k}(t) \\
&\geq \sum_{k=0}^m u^{m-k} \cdot v^k \cdot \binom{m}{k} \cdot (m-k) \cdot q^{(n-m+k)t} \cdot q^{(m-k-1)(t-1)} \\
&\geq \sum_{k=0}^{m-1} u^{m-1-k} \cdot (v \cdot q^t)^k \cdot \binom{m-1}{k} \cdot u \cdot m \cdot q^{(n-m)t} \cdot q^{(m-1-k)(t-1)} \\
&\geq q^{n-m} \cdot m \cdot q^{(n-m)t} \sum_{k=0}^{m-1} (u \cdot q^{t-1})^{m-1-k} \cdot (v \cdot q^t)^k \cdot \binom{m-1}{k} \\
&\geq m \cdot u \cdot q^{(n-m)t} (u \cdot q^{t-1} + v \cdot q^t)^{m-1}
\end{aligned}$$

But we know that $u = q^{n-m}$, $v = 1 - u$ and $q < 1$ so it follows that:

$$\begin{aligned}
a_m(t+1) &\geq m \cdot q^{(n-m)(t+1)} (u \cdot q^t + v \cdot q^t)^{m-1} \\
&\geq m \cdot q^{(n-m)(t+1)} q^{(t+1-1)(m-1)}
\end{aligned}$$

This completes the induction step for the second inequality.

The inequalities derived above assure that the expected fraction of people that have the information at time t converges to 1 exponentially fast as t goes to infinity for any initial distribution π_0^* and a fixed number of agents n : $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \pi \cdot e_t^* = 1$. This assures a nonlinearity of the function e_t^* in t .

6.6 Proof of Theorem 3

There are two facts we need to show to prove this theorem.

Fact 1: If $dd_m(0) < 0$ for all $m < \bar{m}$ then $dd_m(t) < 0$ for all t and $m < \bar{m}$

The claim is easy to prove by induction. Assume the conclusion hold for t and let us look what happens at time $t+1$. The recursion formula says that $dd_{m_0}(t+1)$ is a linear combination of $dd_m(t)$ with m 's less then m_0 . Knowing that the coefficients are positive and that $m_0 < \bar{m} \Rightarrow m \leq m_0 < \bar{m}$ we can use the induction step to reach $dd_{m_0}(t+1) < 0$ for any $m_0 < \bar{m}$.

Fact 2: Given that $q^n + q^{n/2} < 1$, $dd_m(0) < 0$ for any $m < n/2$.

Using Proposition 2 the following formula holds $dd_m(0) = 2q^{n_0} - 1 - q^{2n_0} [q^{n_0}(1-q) + q]^{n-n_0-1}$, where $n_0 = n - m$. We need to prove that $2q^{n_0} < 1 + q^{2n_0} [q^{n_0}(1-q) + q]^{n-n_0-1}$.

First let us show that $[q^{n_0}(1-q) + q]^{n-n_0-1} > [q^{n_0}(1-q) + q]^{n_0}$. This follows immediately from the following two observations $q^{n_0}(1-q) + q < (1-q) + q = 1$ and $m < n/2 \Rightarrow n_0 = n - m > n/2 \Rightarrow n_0 > n - n_0 - 1$.

We are left to prove that $2q^{n_0} < 1 + q^{2n_0} [q^{n_0}(1-q) + q]^{n_0}$. Notice that $1 + q^{2n_0} [q^{n_0}(1-q) + q]^{n_0} > 1 + q^{2n_0} q^{n_0} = 1 + q^{3n_0}$. Since $n_0 > n/2$ and $q < 1$ we have $q^{n_0} + q^{n_0/2} < q^n + q^{n/2} < 1 \Rightarrow (1 - q^{n_0})(q^{n_0} + q^{n_0/2}) < 1 - q^{n_0} \Rightarrow 1 + q^{3n_0} > 2q^{n_0}$. This concludes the proof of the second fact.

These two facts imply: given that $q^n + q^{n/2} < 1$, $dd_m(t) < 0$ for any $m < n/2$ and for all t . This is a restatement of our theorem

6.7 Proof of Theorem 4

Now let $m_t = k_{t+1} - k_t$ be the realized diffusion rate and then $d_t = e_{t+1} - e_t$ be the expected diffusion rate. Then it follows from simple calculations that

$$R_t(k_t, k_{t-1}) = P_t(k_t) - P_{t-1}(k_{t-1}) = \frac{m_{t-1}\sigma_\mu^2(\epsilon + \gamma\sigma_\epsilon^2)(\sigma_\epsilon^2 + \sigma_\mu^2)}{y_t} \quad (37)$$

where $y_t = (\sigma_\mu^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2 k_t)(\sigma_\mu^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2 k_{t-1})$. Note that $P_{-1} = -\gamma(\sigma_\mu^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2)$ and so

$$R_0 = \frac{d_{-1}(\epsilon + \gamma\sigma_\epsilon^2)(\sigma_\epsilon^2 + \sigma_\mu^2)}{\sigma_\mu^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2 d_{-1}} \quad (38)$$

We can then calculate the expected return at any time t conditioned on R_0 by the following:

$$\mathbb{E}[R_t(k_t, k_{t-1}) | R_0] = \frac{m_{t-1}\sigma_\mu^2(\sigma_\epsilon^2 d_{-1} + \sigma_\mu^2)}{d_{-1}y_t} R_0 \quad (39)$$

Let $\Delta = \frac{\sigma_\epsilon^2}{\sigma_\mu^2}$, which is the ratio of the variance of the news shock to the remaining fundamental variance. We can rewrite equation 39 as:

$$\mathbb{E}[R_t(k_t, k_{t-1}) | R_0] = \frac{1 + \delta d_{-1}}{d_{-1}} \frac{m_{t-1}}{(1 + \delta k_t)(1 + \delta k_{t-1})} R_0 \quad (40)$$

The serial correlation of non-overlapping returns is given by the regression coefficient

$$\beta_t = \frac{1 + \Delta d_{-1}}{d_{-1}} \frac{m_{t-1}}{(1 + \Delta k_t)(1 + \Delta k_{t-1})} \quad (41)$$

We can compute the expected serial correlation across the paths ω as we did for the expected price:

$$\mathbb{E}_\omega[\mathbb{E}[R_t(k_t, k_{t-1}) | R_0]] = \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \pi_{i-1}^*(i) p_{ij}^* \mathbb{E}[R_t(i, j) | R_0] \quad (42)$$

Notice again that when Δ is near zero (the variance realized by news is small relative to remaining fundamental variance), the serial correlation coefficient is proportional to

diffusion rate. In other words, the serial correlation coefficient given in equation 41 inherits the non-linear properties of the diffusion rate.

With these equilibrium prices and calculations in hand, we turn towards calculating the equilibrium trading volume. Notice that at the equilibrium prices, we have two groups. Those with the news per capita have a demand given by

$$\theta_t^\epsilon(k_t) = \frac{\epsilon(1 - k_t) + \gamma(\sigma_\mu^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2)}{\gamma(\sigma_\mu^2 + k_t\sigma_\epsilon^2)} \quad (43)$$

and those without the news per capita have a demand given by

$$\theta_t(k_t) = \frac{-\epsilon k_t + \gamma\sigma_\mu^2}{\gamma(\sigma_\mu^2 + k_t\sigma_\epsilon^2)} \quad (44)$$

The turnover in this market is given by the following formula:

$$T_t = \frac{1}{2} [k_{t-1} |\theta_t^\epsilon - \theta_{t-1}^\epsilon| + m_{t-1} |\theta_t^\epsilon - \theta_{t-1}| + (1 - k_t) |\theta_t - \theta_{t-1}|] \quad (45)$$

The formula has an intuitive interpretation. Trading can from three groups: guys with news at $t - 1$ and who still have news at t (this is in fraction k_{t-1}), guys without news at $t - 1$ and who get the news at t (this is in fraction m_{t-1}), and guys without news at $t - 1$ and still without news at t (this is in fraction $1 - k_t$). We can then calculate the equilibrium expected turnover across the paths given by

$$E_\omega [T(k_t, k_{t-1})] = \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \pi_{i-1}^*(i) p_{ij}^* T_t(i, j) \quad (46)$$

Intuitively, turnover will also be proportional to the diffusion rate. When a lot of investors get the news, there will be more trading. So turnover should also inherit the non-linear structure of the diffusion rate process. But one thing to keep in mind is that at the extreme of everyone getting the news at the same time there will be little turnover and lots of price adjustments. For a more gradual diffusion scenario, this is less relevant.

We next prove that our intuition derived from the case where Δ is small is a good one. In Theorem 4, we show that the solution of the model is close to the solution of the model in which Δ is small when Δ is small.

Theorem 4

Let us denote the following $c = \frac{\epsilon}{\gamma\sigma_\mu^2}$. We can write the demand as:

$$\theta_t^\epsilon(k_t) = \frac{c(1 - k_t) + 1 + \Delta}{1 + \Delta k_t}$$

$$\theta_t(k_t) = \frac{-ck_t + 1}{1 + \Delta k_t}$$

Now we will approximate these quantities with their values for $\Delta = 0$. Let us define the following approximations:

$$\bar{\theta}_t^\epsilon(k_t) = \frac{\epsilon(1 - k_t) + \gamma\sigma_\epsilon^2}{\gamma\sigma_\mu^2} = c(1 - k_t) + 1$$

$$\bar{\theta}_t(k_t) = \frac{-\epsilon k_t + \gamma\sigma_\mu^2}{\gamma\sigma_\mu^2} = -ck_t + 1$$

$$\bar{\mathbb{E}}[R_t(k_t, k_{t-1})|R_0] = \frac{m_{t-1}}{d_{-1}}R_0$$

Using these quantities, we can show the following:

1. $\left| \frac{\mathbb{E}[[R_t(k_t, k_{t-1})|R_0]]}{\bar{\mathbb{E}}[R_t(k_t, k_{t-1})|R_0]} - 1 \right| \leq 2\Delta + \Delta^2$
2. $\left| \frac{\theta_t^\epsilon(k_t)}{\bar{\theta}_t^\epsilon(k_t)} - 1 \right| \leq \Delta \left(1 + \frac{1}{|1 + c(1 - k_t)|} \right)$
3. $\left| \frac{\theta_t(k_t)}{\bar{\theta}_t(k_t)} - 1 \right| \leq \Delta$
4. $\left| T_t(k_t, k_{t-1}) - \frac{1}{2}(k_t - k_{t-1}) \right| \leq \Delta(1 + |c|)$

The proofs are quite straight forward. Throughout we will use the following fact:
 $0 \leq k_{t-1} \leq k_t \leq 1$

1.

$$\begin{aligned} \left| \frac{\mathbb{E}[[R_t(k_t, k_{t-1})|R_0]]}{\bar{\mathbb{E}}[R_t(k_t, k_{t-1})|R_0]} - 1 \right| &= \left| \frac{1 + \Delta d_{-1}}{(1 + \Delta k_t)(1 + \Delta k_{t-1})} - 1 \right| \\ &= \left| \frac{\Delta(d_{-1} - k_t - k_{t-1}) - \Delta^2 k_t k_{t-1}}{(1 + \Delta k_t)(1 + \Delta k_{t-1})} \right| \end{aligned}$$

We can now use $1 + \Delta k_t > 1$ and $1 + \Delta k_{t-1} > 1$ to get:

$$\left| \frac{\Delta(d_{-1} - k_t - k_{t-1}) - \Delta^2 k_t k_{t-1}}{(1 + \Delta k_t)(1 + \Delta k_{t-1})} \right| \leq |\Delta(d_{-1} - k_t - k_{t-1})| + |\Delta^2 k_t k_{t-1}|$$

We know that $d_{-1} = m_{-1} \leq k_{t-1} \leq k_t \leq 1$, which gives the desired result:

$$\left| \frac{\mathbb{E} [[R_t(k_t, k_{t-1})|R_0]]}{\overline{\mathbb{E}} [R_t(k_t, k_{t-1})|R_0]} - 1 \right| \leq |\Delta (d_{-1} - k_t - k_{t-1})| + |\Delta^2 k_t k_{t-1}| \leq 2\Delta + \Delta^2$$

2.

$$\left| \frac{\theta_t^\epsilon(k_t)}{\overline{\theta}_t^\epsilon(k_t)} - 1 \right| = \left| \frac{c(1 - k_t) + 1 + \Delta}{(1 + \Delta k_t)(1 + c(1 - k_t))} - 1 \right| = \left| \frac{\Delta(1 - k_t - ck_t(1 - k_t))}{(1 + \Delta k_t)(1 + c(1 - k_t))} \right|$$

Which gives:

$$\left| \frac{\theta_t^\epsilon(k_t)}{\overline{\theta}_t^\epsilon(k_t)} - 1 \right| \leq \left| \frac{\Delta k_t}{1 + \Delta k_t} \right| + \left| \frac{\Delta}{(1 + \Delta k_t)(1 + c(1 - k_t))} \right| \leq \Delta \left(1 + \frac{1}{|1 + c(1 - k_t)|} \right)$$

Notice that if c is positive (ϵ is positive) the last bound simplifies further to $\left| \frac{\theta_t^\epsilon(k_t)}{\overline{\theta}_t^\epsilon(k_t)} - 1 \right| \leq 2\Delta$

3.

$$\left| \frac{\theta_t(k_t)}{\overline{\theta}_t(k_t)} - 1 \right| = \left| \frac{1}{1 + \Delta k_t} - 1 \right| = \left| \frac{\Delta k_t}{1 + \Delta k_t} \right| \leq \Delta$$

4.

It is easy to derive the following

$$\begin{aligned} \left| \theta_t^\epsilon(k_t) - \overline{\theta}_t^\epsilon(k_t) \right| &= \left| \frac{c(1 - k_t) + 1 + \Delta}{1 + \Delta k_t} - (1 + c(1 - k_t)) \right| \\ &= \left| \frac{\Delta(1 - k_t - ck_t(1 - k_t))}{1 + \Delta k_t} \right| \leq \Delta(1 + |c|) \end{aligned}$$

We can use part 3 of this theorem and the fact that $|\overline{\theta}_t(k_t)| = |-ck_t + 1| \leq 1 + |c|$ to get the following inequality $|\theta_t(k_t) - \overline{\theta}_t(k_t)| \leq \Delta(1 + |c|)$

Finally we can prove the desired result:

$$\begin{aligned}
T_t &= \frac{1}{2} [k_{t-1} |\theta_t^\epsilon - \theta_{t-1}^\epsilon| + m_{t-1} |\theta_t^\epsilon - \theta_{t-1}| + (1 - k_t) |\theta_t - \theta_{t-1}|] \\
&\leq \frac{1}{2} k_{t-1} [|\bar{\theta}_t^\epsilon - \bar{\theta}_{t-1}^\epsilon| + |\theta_t^\epsilon - \bar{\theta}_t^\epsilon| + |\bar{\theta}_{t-1}^\epsilon - \theta_{t-1}^\epsilon|] \\
&\quad + \frac{1}{2} m_{t-1} [|\bar{\theta}_t^\epsilon - \bar{\theta}_{t-1}| + |\theta_{t-1} - \bar{\theta}_{t-1}| + |\bar{\theta}_t^\epsilon - \theta_t^\epsilon|] \\
&\quad + \frac{1}{2} (1 - k_t) [|\bar{\theta}_t - \bar{\theta}_{t-1}| + |\theta_t - \bar{\theta}_t| + |\bar{\theta}_{t-1} - \theta_{t-1}|]
\end{aligned}$$

So:

$$\begin{aligned}
T_t &\leq \frac{1}{2} [k_{t-1} |\bar{\theta}_t^\epsilon - \bar{\theta}_{t-1}^\epsilon| + m_{t-1} |\bar{\theta}_t^\epsilon - \bar{\theta}_{t-1}| + (1 - k_t) |\bar{\theta}_t - \bar{\theta}_{t-1}|] \\
&\quad + \frac{1}{2} (k_{t-1} + m_{t-1} + 1 - k_t) 2\Delta (1 + |c|)
\end{aligned}$$

and

$$T_t \geq \frac{1}{2} [k_{t-1} |\bar{\theta}_t^\epsilon - \bar{\theta}_{t-1}^\epsilon| + m_{t-1} |\bar{\theta}_t^\epsilon - \bar{\theta}_{t-1}| + (1 - k_t) |\bar{\theta}_t - \bar{\theta}_{t-1}|]$$

Since

$$\begin{aligned}
&\frac{1}{2} [k_{t-1} |\bar{\theta}_t^\epsilon - \bar{\theta}_{t-1}^\epsilon| + m_{t-1} |\bar{\theta}_t^\epsilon - \bar{\theta}_{t-1}| + (1 - k_t) |\bar{\theta}_t - \bar{\theta}_{t-1}|] = \\
&= k_{t-1} |c| (k_t - k_{t-1}) + m_{t-1} |c + c| (k_t - k_{t-1}) + (1 - k_t) |c| (k_t - k_{t-1}) \\
&= |c| m_{t-1} (k_{t-1} + 1 + k_{t-1} - k_t + 1 - k_t) \\
&= |c| m_{t-1} (2 - 2m_{t-1})
\end{aligned}$$

we have

$$|c| m_{t-1} (1 - m_{t-1}) \leq T_t \leq |c| m_{t-1} (1 - m_{t-1}) + \Delta (1 + |c|)$$

which implies

$$|T - |c| m_{t-1} (1 - m_{t-1})| \leq \Delta (1 + |c|)$$

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


Figure 1: Plot of the expected number of people with the news against time: $n_0 = 1$.




Figure 2: Plot of the expected incremental number of people with the news against time: $n_0 = 1$.




Figure 3: Plot of the expected number of people with the news against time: $n_0 = 50$.




Figure 4: Plot of the expected incremental number of people with the news against time: $n_0 = 50$.




Figure 5: Plot of the expected turnover, diffusion rate and serial correlation (regression coefficient scaled by the diffusion rate at time -1): $n_0 = 1, p = 0.001, \Delta = 0.25$.




Figure 6: Plot of the expected turnover, diffusion rate and serial correlation (regression coefficient scaled by the diffusion rate at time -1): $n_0 = 10, p = 0.001, \Delta = 0.25$.

Table 1: Information Portfolio Characteristics

This table summarizes the firm characteristics for each information portfolio using various formation periods ranging from one month to twelve months. At the end of each month, we use the past J-month stock returns to proxy for total information (totInfo), which is then decomposed into public information (pubInfo, stock returns that are explained by earnings news in the past J-month) and private information (privInfo, stock returns that are orthogonal to earnings news in the past J-month) components. The stocks are then assigned to quintiles according to totInfo, pubInfo, or privInfo. The numbers reported are the time series means of the characteristics for each portfolio each month. numStks is the average number of stocks in each portfolio. SUE is the average standardized unexpected quarterly earnings in the formation period. ABR is the average abnormal returns from day t-2 to t+1 for each earnings announcement in the formation period. REV is the average monthly revision in the analysts' FY0 forecast consensus in the formation period, deflated by the stock price. logSize is the log of the stock market capitalization (in thousands of dollars). And finally numEst is the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts for each stock. The sample period is from January 1972 to December 2007.

			numStks	totInfo	pubInfo	privInfo	SUE	ABR	REV	LogSize	numEst	
J=1	Total Info	P1	157	-14.62	-2.94	-11.68	-0.48	-4.81	-1.0352	11.89	5.84	
		P3	158	1.05	1.90	-0.85	0.16	0.38	-0.1904	12.52	7.13	
		P5	157	20.30	6.37	13.93	0.43	5.19	-0.0976	12.25	6.00	
	Public Info	P1	157	-6.64	-6.78	0.14	-0.54	-9.08	-1.3271	11.96	5.91	
		P3	157	1.66	1.73	-0.08	0.16	0.17	-0.1851	12.54	7.12	
		P5	157	10.75	10.68	0.07	0.48	10.02	0.0799	12.14	5.95	
	Private Info	P1	157	-11.66	2.36	-14.02	-0.24	0.82	-0.4904	11.91	5.76	
		P3	157	0.78	1.46	-0.68	0.13	-0.08	-0.4424	12.53	7.21	
		P5	157	18.02	2.21	15.81	0.24	0.75	-0.4327	12.22	5.97	
	J=2	Total Info	P1	306	-18.28	-0.77	-17.51	-0.40	-2.94	-0.0124	11.99	6.40
			P3	306	1.98	3.29	-1.30	0.18	0.36	-0.0020	12.70	7.84
			P5	306	27.93	6.90	21.03	0.42	3.44	-0.0002	12.40	6.45
		Public Info	P1	306	-5.70	-5.75	0.05	-0.44	-7.11	-0.0166	12.07	6.34
			P3	306	3.07	3.13	-0.05	0.20	0.19	-0.0016	12.74	7.91
			P5	306	12.29	12.25	0.04	0.46	8.02	0.0027	12.26	6.39
Private Info		P1	306	-15.86	3.77	-19.64	-0.20	0.73	-0.0061	12.01	6.35	
		P3	306	1.73	2.83	-1.10	0.17	-0.01	-0.0027	12.71	7.88	
		P5	306	26.16	3.57	22.58	0.28	0.76	-0.0049	12.38	6.42	
J=3		Total Info	P1	408	-20.79	0.69	-21.48	-0.35	-2.21	-0.0191	12.05	6.76
			P3	408	2.83	4.56	-1.74	0.23	0.34	-0.0030	12.85	8.45
			P5	408	33.96	7.78	26.18	0.46	2.72	-0.0005	12.54	6.89
		Public Info	P1	408	-5.08	-4.90	-0.18	-0.41	-6.11	-0.0257	12.14	6.67
			P3	408	4.36	4.42	-0.05	0.27	0.20	-0.0021	12.88	8.54
			P5	408	13.85	13.70	0.14	0.50	6.94	0.0039	12.37	6.81
	Private Info	P1	408	-18.55	5.02	-23.57	-0.16	0.64	-0.0096	12.08	6.77	
		P3	408	2.57	4.05	-1.48	0.21	0.01	-0.0037	12.85	8.46	
		P5	408	32.38	4.81	27.57	0.33	0.76	-0.0075	12.52	6.88	

Table 1 Cont'd

			numStks	totInfo	pubInfo	privInfo	SUE	ABR	REV	LogSize	numEst
J=6	Total Info	P1	375	-26.86	1.93	-28.79	-0.46	-1.86	-0.0401	12.01	6.98
		P3	375	5.72	9.10	-3.38	0.27	0.31	-0.0045	12.94	8.82
		P5	375	52.84	14.84	38.00	0.62	2.45	0.0034	12.69	7.27
	Public Info	P1	375	-7.05	-6.68	-0.37	-0.52	-5.11	-0.0509	12.12	6.78
		P3	375	8.71	8.99	-0.28	0.30	0.22	-0.0036	13.01	9.07
		P5	375	24.72	23.66	1.06	0.59	5.91	0.0100	12.44	7.00
	Private Info	P1	375	-22.55	10.38	-32.94	-0.19	0.95	-0.0176	12.10	7.10
		P3	375	5.17	7.92	-2.75	0.23	-0.08	-0.0078	12.92	8.78
		P5	375	49.98	9.59	40.39	0.46	0.71	-0.0113	12.66	7.23
J=9	Total Info	P1	347	-30.75	3.09	-33.84	-0.55	-1.61	-0.0596	11.99	7.14
		P3	347	8.56	13.95	-5.40	0.28	0.31	-0.0066	13.02	9.20
		P5	347	70.69	22.24	48.45	0.71	2.23	0.0061	12.81	7.57
	Public Info	P1	347	-8.31	-8.03	-0.28	-0.56	-4.28	-0.0719	12.11	6.94
		P3	347	12.97	13.78	-0.81	0.32	0.23	-0.0049	13.10	9.46
		P5	347	36.09	33.61	2.48	0.64	5.08	0.0130	12.52	7.26
	Private Info	P1	347	-24.14	16.39	-40.53	-0.21	1.11	-0.0246	12.12	7.37
		P3	347	7.62	11.81	-4.19	0.21	-0.15	-0.0118	12.98	9.10
		P5	347	66.44	14.54	51.90	0.54	0.68	-0.0153	12.76	7.51
J=12	Total Info	P1	348	-33.92	4.08	-38.00	-0.59	-1.42	-0.0790	11.95	7.14
		P3	348	11.11	18.77	-7.66	0.30	0.30	-0.0088	13.07	9.43
		P5	348	88.77	29.94	58.83	0.78	2.08	0.0083	12.90	7.82
	Public Info	P1	348	-9.65	-9.52	-0.13	-0.58	-3.73	-0.0913	12.10	6.99
		P3	348	17.03	18.68	-1.65	0.33	0.24	-0.0075	13.15	9.72
		P5	348	47.85	43.70	4.15	0.69	4.52	0.0154	12.59	7.47
	Private Info	P1	348	-24.82	22.81	-47.63	-0.21	1.22	-0.0316	12.13	7.48
		P3	348	9.83	15.69	-5.86	0.22	-0.16	-0.0161	13.02	9.28
		P5	348	82.91	19.49	63.41	0.59	0.64	-0.0184	12.84	7.72

Table 2: Return Drift to Short-term Information

This table reports the drift to short term public, private and total information. I.e. formation period = 1, 2 and 3 months. After forming the information portfolios, we skip one month, then hold them for twelve months. In panel A, the reported numbers are the average monthly return of the hedged portfolio where we long the top information quintile and short the bottom quintile, and the corresponding t-statistics in brackets. Panel B tests the shape of the drift to public information and private information. Namely, we investigate the differences of the returns of the hedged portfolio in month 1, 6, 12 and the peak month when the maximum is obtained in the drift to private information. Such differences are calculated for both the drifts to public information and to private information. Then we calculate the corresponding difference-in-difference to test the difference of the shapes of the two drifts. The differences in panel B are serially correlated and we use Newey-West t-statistics to adjust for the serial correlation.

Panel A: Return Drift to Total, Public and Private Information

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Return Drift to Public Information												
J=1	1.07 (7.12)	1.08 (7.19)	0.20 (1.36)	0.35 (2.15)	0.63 (4.12)	0.66 (4.44)	0.47 (2.99)	0.46 (2.90)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.04 (-0.27)	0.20 (1.25)	0.20 (1.67)
J=2	1.09 (9.21)	0.71 (6.51)	0.26 (2.15)	0.43 (3.84)	0.56 (4.82)	0.55 (4.61)	0.39 (3.40)	0.16 (1.50)	0.08 (0.78)	0.17 (1.64)	0.24 (2.47)	0.08 (0.81)
J=3	0.84 (7.71)	0.44 (4.19)	0.46 (4.13)	0.55 (5.14)	0.51 (4.95)	0.43 (4.17)	0.25 (2.38)	0.12 (1.23)	0.08 (0.95)	0.2 (2.32)	0.15 (1.81)	0.05 (0.57)
Return Drift to Private Information												
J=1	-0.04 (-0.17)	0.50 (2.22)	0.21 (0.98)	0.35 (1.73)	0.64 (3.01)	0.42 (1.90)	0.66 (3.25)	0.64 (2.93)	0.32 (1.74)	0.33 (1.99)	0.14 (0.60)	0.04 (0.25)
J=2	0.29 (1.02)	0.44 (1.70)	0.32 (1.42)	0.33 (1.51)	0.72 (3.32)	0.57 (2.48)	0.54 (2.46)	0.63 (3.01)	0.38 (2.03)	0.65 (3.38)	0.21 (1.14)	-0.34 (-1.94)
J=3	0.33 (1.06)	0.39 (1.39)	0.59 (2.28)	0.61 (2.58)	0.56 (2.24)	0.57 (2.28)	0.70 (3.02)	0.56 (2.51)	0.71 (3.38)	0.40 (2.04)	0.04 (0.23)	-0.36 (-1.84)
Return Drift to Total Information												
J=1	0.42 (1.60)	1.04 (4.31)	0.31 (1.37)	0.43 (1.98)	0.79 (3.53)	0.53 (2.33)	0.83 (3.89)	0.85 (3.49)	0.30 (1.47)	0.29 (1.61)	0.07 (0.28)	0.05 (0.31)
J=2	0.70 (2.36)	0.64 (2.41)	0.43 (1.75)	0.42 (1.86)	0.88 (3.84)	0.73 (3.01)	0.62 (2.64)	0.68 (3.03)	0.37 (1.89)	0.68 (3.36)	0.27 (1.44)	-0.28 (-1.56)
J=3	0.57 (1.81)	0.55 (1.93)	0.69 (2.51)	0.74 (2.98)	0.68 (2.59)	0.67 (2.55)	0.74 (3.01)	0.62 (2.63)	0.70 (3.25)	0.41 (2.06)	0.09 (0.48)	-0.36 (-1.61)

Table 2 Cont'd

Panel B: Difference in the Drift to Public Information and to Private Information

		Public Info		Private Info		Private-Public	
		profit	t-stat	profit	t-stat	profit	t-stat
J=1	M6-M1	-0.41	(-2.31)	0.46	(1.52)	0.87	(3.26)
	M12-M6	-0.46	(-2.38)	-0.38	(-1.33)	0.09	(0.31)
	M12-M1	-0.87	(-5.05)	0.08	(0.26)	0.96	(3.40)
	Peak-M1	-0.60	(-2.79)	0.71	(2.00)	1.31	(4.93)
	M12-Peak	-0.27	(-1.37)	-0.62	(-2.71)	-0.35	(-1.31)
J=2	M6-M1	-0.54	(-3.96)	0.28	(1.05)	0.82	(3.52)
	M12-M6	-0.47	(-3.71)	-0.91	(-3.72)	-0.43	(-1.98)
	M12-M1	-1.01	(-7.56)	-0.63	(-2.13)	0.39	(1.64)
	Peak-M1	-0.93	(-6.30)	0.34	(1.14)	1.27	(4.94)
	M12-Peak	-0.09	(-0.73)	-0.97	(-3.78)	-0.88	(-3.69)
J=3	M6-M1	-0.42	(-3.03)	0.25	(0.83)	0.67	(2.48)
	M12-M6	-0.38	(-3.43)	-0.94	(-3.05)	-0.56	(-2.05)
	M12-M1	-0.80	(-5.89)	-0.69	(-2.19)	0.11	(0.43)
	Peak-M1	-0.76	(-5.74)	0.38	(1.23)	1.14	(3.87)
	M12-Peak	-0.04	(-0.31)	-1.07	(-3.63)	-1.03	(-4.18)

Table 3: Return Drift to Short-term Information - Size Subsamples

This table reports the drift to short term public, private and total information. i.e. formation period = 1, 2 and 3 months within each of the Large, Medium, Small subsamples according to the stock market capitalization. The results for each subsample are reported in Panel A, B and C, respectively. After forming the information portfolios, we skip one month, then hold them for twelve months. Panels tests the shape of the drift to public information and private information. Namely, we investigate the differences of the returns of the hedged portfolio in month 1, 6, 12 and the peak month when the maximum is obtained in the drift to private information. Such differences are calculated for both the drifts to public information and to private information. Then we calculate the corresponding difference-in-difference to test the difference of the shapes of the two drifts. The differences in panel B are serially correlated and we use Newey-West t-statistics to adjust for the serial correlation.

Panel A: Difference in the Drifts to Past 1-month Public and Private Information

		Public Info		Private Info		Private-Public	
		profit	t-stat	profit	t-stat	profit	t-stat
Small	M6-M1	-0.03	(-0.08)	0.15	(0.32)	0.18	(0.30)
	M12-M6	-0.69	(-1.68)	0.36	(0.76)	1.05	(1.53)
	M12-M1	-0.72	(-1.89)	0.51	(1.01)	1.23	(2.04)
	Peak-M1	-0.70	(-1.73)	0.67	(1.31)	1.38	(2.25)
	M12-Peak	-0.02	(-0.05)	-0.17	(-0.47)	-0.15	(-0.35)
Med	M6-M1	-0.63	(-2.42)	0.60	(1.38)	1.23	(2.69)
	M12-M6	-0.43	(-1.58)	-0.65	(-1.60)	-0.22	(-0.51)
	M12-M1	-1.05	(-4.24)	-0.04	(-0.12)	1.01	(2.79)
	Peak-M1	-0.38	(-1.34)	0.81	(1.97)	1.18	(3.23)
	M12-Peak	-0.68	(-2.49)	-0.85	(-3.11)	-0.17	(-0.48)
Large	M6-M1	-0.49	(-1.78)	0.58	(1.43)	1.07	(2.40)
	M12-M6	-0.29	(-1.02)	-0.72	(-1.77)	-0.43	(-0.98)
	M12-M1	-0.78	(-2.54)	-0.14	(-0.32)	0.64	(1.41)
	Peak-M1	-0.62	(-1.90)	0.73	(1.71)	1.35	(2.79)
	M12-Peak	-0.16	(-0.58)	-0.87	(-2.86)	-0.71	(-1.89)

Table 3 Cont'd

Panel B: Difference in the Drifts to Past 2-month Public and Private Information

		Public Info		Private Info		Private-Public	
		profit	t-stat	profit	t-stat	profit	t-stat
Small	M6-M1	-0.86	(-3.62)	0.02	(0.07)	0.89	(2.26)
	M12-M6	-0.49	(-2.43)	-1.03	(-4.04)	-0.55	(-1.71)
	M12-M1	-1.35	(-6.23)	-1.01	(-3.23)	0.34	(1.14)
	Peak-M1	-1.06	(-3.98)	0.20	(0.59)	1.27	(3.50)
	M12-Peak	-0.29	(-1.29)	-1.22	(-4.58)	-0.93	(-2.78)
Med	M6-M1	-0.47	(-2.78)	0.43	(1.26)	0.90	(3.08)
	M12-M6	-0.65	(-3.85)	-1.05	(-3.72)	-0.40	(-1.41)
	M12-M1	-1.13	(-6.05)	-0.62	(-1.81)	0.50	(1.63)
	Peak-M1	-0.94	(-5.24)	0.48	(1.33)	1.42	(4.37)
	M12-Peak	-0.19	(-1.21)	-1.10	(-3.85)	-0.92	(-3.17)
Large	M6-M1	-0.30	(-1.55)	0.34	(0.87)	0.64	(1.93)
	M12-M6	-0.22	(-1.09)	-0.58	(-1.69)	-0.36	(-1.13)
	M12-M1	-0.52	(-2.83)	-0.24	(-0.68)	0.28	(0.82)
	Peak-M1	-0.59	(-2.77)	0.72	(1.84)	1.31	(3.83)
	M12-Peak	0.07	(0.35)	-0.96	(-2.77)	-1.03	(-2.96)

Panel C: Difference in the Drifts to Past 3-month Public and Private Information

		Public Info		Private Info		Private-Public	
		profit	t-stat	profit	t-stat	profit	t-stat
Small	M6-M1	-0.89	(-5.50)	0.14	(0.41)	1.04	(3.18)
	M12-M6	-0.32	(-2.03)	-1.00	(-3.35)	-0.68	(-2.26)
	M12-M1	-1.22	(-6.92)	-0.86	(-2.69)	0.36	(1.32)
	Peak-M1	-1.00	(-6.28)	0.24	(0.63)	1.24	(3.35)
	M12-Peak	-0.22	(-1.37)	-1.10	(-3.66)	-0.88	(-3.03)
Med	M6-M1	-0.33	(-2.08)	0.22	(0.61)	0.55	(1.77)
	M12-M6	-0.43	(-3.41)	-0.81	(-2.42)	-0.38	(-1.17)
	M12-M1	-0.76	(-4.69)	-0.59	(-1.77)	0.18	(0.64)
	Peak-M1	-0.60	(-4.19)	0.40	(1.04)	1.00	(2.99)
	M12-Peak	-0.16	(-1.26)	-0.99	(-3.07)	-0.83	(-2.80)
Large	M6-M1	0.22	(1.25)	0.31	(0.83)	0.08	(0.23)
	M12-M6	-0.33	(-1.75)	-0.76	(-2.09)	-0.43	(-1.25)
	M12-M1	-0.10	(-0.71)	-0.45	(-1.21)	-0.35	(-0.97)
	Peak-M1	0.04	(0.19)	0.41	(1.05)	0.37	(1.06)
	M12-Peak	-0.11	(-0.65)	0.47	(1.11)	0.59	(1.52)

Table 4: Return Drift to Med- to Long-term Information

This table reports the drift to med to long-term total, public, and private information. I.e. formation period = 6, 9 and 12 months. After forming the information portfolios, we skip one month, then hold them for twelve months. In panel A, the reported numbers are the average monthly return of the hedged portfolio where we long the top information quintile and short the bottom quintile, and the corresponding t-statistics in brackets. Panel B tests the shape of the drift to public information and private information. Namely, we investigate the differences of the returns of the hedged portfolio in month 1, 6 and 12. Such differences are calculated for both the drifts to public information and to private information. Then we calculate the corresponding difference-in-difference to test the difference of the shapes of the two drifts. The differences in panel B are serially correlated and we use Newey-West t-statistics to adjust for the serial correlation.

Panel A: Return Drift to Total, Public and Private Information

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Return Drift to Public Information												
J=6	0.84 (6.80)	0.69 (5.65)	0.58 (4.51)	0.56 (4.37)	0.35 (2.85)	0.31 (2.85)	0.27 (2.51)	0.14 (1.43)	0.11 (1.14)	0.09 (0.97)	0.02 (0.16)	-0.03 (-0.34)
J=9	0.82 (5.63)	0.55 (4.02)	0.46 (3.43)	0.48 (3.77)	0.35 (2.84)	0.15 (1.21)	0.14 (1.18)	0.03 (0.25)	-0.01 (-0.06)	-0.01 (-0.13)	-0.04 (-0.38)	-0.10 (-0.94)
J=12	0.67 (4.84)	0.50 (3.94)	0.40 (3.11)	0.34 (2.62)	0.25 (2.03)	0.11 (0.88)	0.08 (0.66)	-0.04 (-0.37)	-0.05 (-0.51)	-0.01 (-0.12)	0.02 (0.17)	0.12 (1.21)
Return Drift to Private Information												
J=6	0.68 (2.12)	0.67 (2.19)	0.86 (2.96)	0.85 (3.16)	0.90 (3.58)	0.86 (3.56)	0.58 (2.57)	0.45 (2.10)	0.14 (0.66)	-0.02 (-0.08)	-0.23 (-1.14)	-0.52 (-2.56)
J=9	0.93 (2.92)	0.89 (2.95)	0.99 (3.50)	0.81 (3.15)	0.75 (3.05)	0.48 (1.99)	0.22 (0.94)	0.13 (0.59)	-0.05 (-0.22)	-0.26 (-1.24)	-0.40 (-1.91)	-0.57 (-2.68)
J=12	0.80 (2.62)	0.77 (2.70)	0.59 (2.14)	0.48 (1.83)	0.41 (1.61)	0.18 (0.75)	-0.05 (-0.21)	-0.11 (-0.49)	-0.25 (-1.10)	-0.38 (-1.80)	-0.49 (-2.29)	-0.44 (-2.10)
Return Drift to Total Information												
J=6	1.00 (2.94)	0.89 (2.76)	1.03 (3.27)	1.02 (3.46)	0.95 (3.46)	0.89 (3.40)	0.62 (2.56)	0.45 (2.04)	0.13 (0.60)	-0.03 (-0.14)	-0.23 (-1.06)	-0.49 (-2.01)
J=9	1.22 (3.46)	1.13 (3.44)	1.07 (3.41)	0.93 (3.26)	0.78 (2.95)	0.48 (1.80)	0.24 (0.95)	0.16 (0.65)	-0.09 (-0.39)	-0.22 (-0.99)	-0.41 (-1.89)	-0.57 (-2.27)
J=12	1.04 (3.09)	0.94 (3.04)	0.63 (2.05)	0.54 (1.90)	0.44 (1.60)	0.16 (0.62)	-0.08 (-0.32)	-0.13 (-0.52)	-0.31 (-1.31)	-0.39 (-1.68)	-0.43 (-1.88)	-0.39 (-1.74)

Panel B: Difference in the Drift to Public Information and to Private Information

		Public Info		Private Info		Private-Public	
		profit	t-stat	profit	t-stat	profit	t-stat
J=1	M6-M1	-0.54	(-3.77)	0.18	(0.71)	0.71	(2.77)
	M12-M6	-0.34	(-2.30)	-1.38	(-4.08)	-1.04	(-3.92)
	M12-M1	-0.88	(-6.30)	-1.20	(-3.75)	-0.32	(-1.26)
J=2	M6-M1	-0.67	(-4.08)	-0.45	(-1.23)	0.22	(0.78)
	M12-M6	-0.24	(-1.50)	-1.05	(-3.03)	-0.81	(-3.01)
	M12-M1	-0.91	(-5.98)	-1.50	(-4.70)	-0.59	(-2.35)
J=3	M6-M1	-0.56	(-3.49)	-0.62	(-1.70)	-0.06	(-0.21)
	M12-M6	0.02	(0.10)	-0.62	(-1.80)	-0.64	(-2.55)
	M12-M1	-0.55	(-3.21)	-1.24	(-3.42)	-0.69	(-2.52)

Table 5: Return Drift to Short-term Information (J=3) sliced along Formation Period (3 Months) Abnormal Turnover Subsamples

This table reports the drift to short term public, private and total information for formation period = 3 months within each of the Low, Medium, High subsamples according to the stocks abnormal turnover in the formation period. We first calculate monthly turnover C monthly trading volume divided by total shares outstanding. Abnormal turnover is the average monthly turnover in the formation period relative to the average monthly turnover in the 12 months prior to the formation period. After forming the information portfolios, we sort the stocks into low, medium, high turnover sub-samples (T1, T2, T3) within each information quintile according to their abnormal turnover in the formation period. We skip one month, then hold them for twelve months. In panel A, the reported numbers are the average monthly return of the hedged portfolio where we long the top information quintile and short the bottom quintile, and the corresponding t-statistics in brackets. The drift for low abnormal turnover stocks is the difference of the returns of portfolio P1T1 and portfolio P5T1, and similarly for medium and high abnormal turnover stocks. Panel B tests the shape of the drift to public information and private information. Namely, we investigate the differences of the returns of the hedged portfolio in month 1, 6, 12 and the peak month when the maximum is obtained in the drift to private information. Such differences are calculated for both the drifts to public information and to private information. Then we calculate the corresponding difference-in-difference to test the difference of the shapes of the two drifts. The differences in panel B are serially correlated and we use Newey-West t-statistics to adjust for the serial correlation.

Panel A: Return Drift to Total, Public and Private Information

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Return Drift to Public Information												
Low	0.85 (5.89)	0.45 (3.45)	0.52 (3.22)	0.56 (3.71)	0.41 (2.92)	0.38 (2.73)	0.33 (2.20)	0.01 (0.05)	0.06 (0.42)	0.18 (1.43)	0.27 (2.11)	0.21 (1.64)
Med	0.68 (5.08)	0.27 (2.10)	0.33 (2.46)	0.43 (3.30)	0.55 (4.24)	0.36 (2.82)	0.14 (1.13)	0.14 (1.18)	0.13 (1.17)	0.20 (1.74)	0.09 (0.87)	0.05 (0.40)
High	1.07 (6.80)	0.69 (4.53)	0.65 (4.67)	0.76 (5.44)	0.60 (4.10)	0.57 (4.23)	0.41 (3.10)	0.28 (2.07)	0.07 (0.55)	0.21 (1.77)	0.11 (0.88)	-0.02 (-0.17)
Return Drift to Private Information												
Low	0.05 (0.15)	0.22 (0.72)	0.50 (1.75)	0.28 (0.98)	0.36 (1.18)	0.50 (1.66)	0.71 (2.60)	0.47 (1.83)	0.65 (2.76)	0.48 (2.27)	0.21 (1.03)	-0.21 (-0.97)
Med	0.27 (0.79)	0.36 (1.17)	0.58 (2.02)	0.71 (2.69)	0.61 (2.24)	0.55 (1.98)	0.64 (2.42)	0.61 (2.42)	0.54 (2.14)	0.37 (1.58)	-0.10 (-0.46)	-0.44 (-1.97)
High	0.74 (2.31)	0.63 (2.03)	0.79 (2.80)	0.84 (3.35)	0.72 (2.76)	0.68 (2.62)	0.73 (3.06)	0.47 (1.97)	0.61 (2.54)	0.24 (1.10)	-0.02 (-0.09)	-0.43 (-1.92)
Return Drift to Total Information												
Low	0.40 (1.10)	0.32 (1.02)	0.55 (1.75)	0.38 (1.25)	0.40 (1.28)	0.60 (1.89)	0.74 (2.55)	0.50 (1.88)	0.64 (2.54)	0.43 (1.93)	0.25 (1.21)	-0.27 (-1.20)
Med	0.46 (1.35)	0.48 (1.55)	0.67 (2.24)	0.82 (2.99)	0.79 (2.76)	0.67 (2.33)	0.67 (2.45)	0.64 (2.38)	0.52 (2.16)	0.41 (1.77)	0.03 (0.15)	-0.41 (-1.79)
High	0.96 (2.96)	0.91 (2.87)	0.95 (3.27)	1.03 (4.02)	0.82 (3.10)	0.72 (2.65)	0.78 (3.06)	0.63 (2.60)	0.61 (2.53)	0.27 (1.25)	-0.10 (-0.42)	-0.42 (-1.85)

Table 5 Cont'd

Panel B: Difference in the Drift to Public Information and to Private Information

		Public Info		Private Info		Private-Public	
		profit	t-stat	profit	t-stat	profit	t-stat
Low	M6-M1	-0.47	(-2.66)	0.45	(1.19)	0.92	(2.71)
	M12-M6	-0.17	(-1.10)	-0.72	(-2.12)	-0.54	(-1.68)
	M12-M1	-0.64	(-3.43)	-0.27	(-0.74)	0.38	(1.20)
	Peak-M1	-0.52	(-2.84)	0.66	(1.57)	1.18	(3.01)
	M12-Peak	-0.12	(-0.79)	-0.92	(-2.80)	-0.80	(-2.39)
Med	M6-M1	-0.33	(-1.68)	0.29	(0.75)	0.61	(1.71)
	M12-M6	-0.31	(-1.88)	-0.99	(-2.92)	-0.68	(-2.11)
	M12-M1	-0.64	(-3.77)	-0.71	(-1.98)	-0.07	(-0.23)
	Peak-M1	-0.26	(-1.64)	0.44	(1.25)	0.70	(2.21)
	M12-Peak	-0.38	(-2.29)	-1.15	(-3.57)	-0.76	(-2.64)
High	M6-M1	-0.50	(-2.64)	-0.06	(-0.16)	0.44	(1.29)
	M12-M6	-0.59	(-4.23)	-1.11	(-3.10)	-0.52	(-1.65)
	M12-M1	-1.09	(-5.95)	-1.17	(-3.32)	-0.08	(-0.26)
	Peak-M1	-0.31	(-1.63)	0.11	(0.33)	0.41	(1.36)
	M12-Peak	-0.78	(-5.21)	-1.27	(-3.90)	-0.49	(-1.68)