

More meat, milk and eggs by and for the poor

Governing Shared Resources in Multi-Level Systems: It's Not Just About Property Rights

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Shared governance in complex multi-level systems: 4 key principles

- There are different scales and levels of resources,
 SESs, and governance mechanisms
- 2. There are a multiplicity of actors, institutions, and deliberation processes for the scales and levels
- Property rights may be allocated by type of right and timing of right to different governance mechanisms
- These actors, institutions, and deliberation processes may use different causal pathways (property rights being only one)



Four-fold categorization of tenure

Private State Open Access Commons

- Influenced CBNRM, CBC, etc.
- Simple, communicative concept



Reality, however, is often more...

complex, nuanced, messy

- Simplistic application of the idea of the four categories of tenure can lead to simplistic, misguided policy choices
- There are different <u>types</u> of property rights, and these are not always allocated in a bundle
- Schlager and Ostrom (1992)
 - Operational property rights (access and withdrawal)
 - Collective choice property rights (management, exclusion and alienation)
- Sikor et al. (2017)



Different types of property rights

| Type of Right | Explanation |
|----------------------|--|
| Use rights | The rights to enjoy benefits, incl |
| Direct benefits | The right to obtain benefit directly from the resource |
| Indirect benefits | The right to obtain indirect benefits associated with the resource |
| Control rights | Rights to determine the scope of use rights, incl |
| Management | The right to regulate use and transform the resource |
| Exclusion | The right to define who has use rights |
| Transaction | The right to handle the activities required for the realization of benefits |
| Monitoring | The right to monitor the use of benefits and state of the resource |
| Authoritative rights | Rights to determine control rights, incl |
| Definition | The right to define the discretionary space for the exercise of control rights |
| Allocation | The right to assign control rights to particular actors |



Also <u>timing</u> and <u>scale</u>

Timing

- SEASONAL. Rainy season, property rights allocated to one actor; dry season, to another
- CONDITIONAL. In "normal" years, local common; during drought, open to regional users.

Scale

- Actors, institutions, and deliberative forums pertaining to different scales and levels
- Property rights allocated to these various actors, institutions, and forums from the different scales and levels



Complex property rights regimes

- <u>Different types</u> property rights, may be allocated to different actors, institutions or deliberative forums
- At <u>different times</u>
- To institutions from <u>different scales and</u>
 <u>levels</u>



Simple commons mosaic landscape

Use rights:


Commoners

Control rights:

Commons institutions

Authoritative rights:

 Government tenure system



Simple multi-tenure mosaic landscape

Use rights:


- Commoners, or
- Private land owners, or
- Authorized visitors (e.g. Park visitors)

Control rights:

- Commons institutions, or
- Private land owners, or
- State

Authoritative rights:

 Government tenure system





Complex tenure landscape

Use rights:


- Local users (private or commoners), or
- Local users and landscape users,
 or
- Local, and landscape, and regional users

Control rights:

- Commons institutions, and
- Private land owners, and
- Landscape institutions, and
- State

Authoritative rights:

- Government tenure system, and
- Customary system, and
- Negotiated agreements





Property rights are made complex by

- Disentangled <u>types</u> of property rights
- Differential <u>temporal distribution</u> of rights
- Allocation of rights at different <u>scales and levels</u>
- Degree of *fuzziness* and contestation of rights



How to account for the multiple dimensions of complexity?

| | Authoritative rights | | Control Rights | | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------|--------|------------|
| | . - | _ | | nent | uc | නි |
| | tior | 1 ⁵ | ^t Dimensior | n: Types of | rights | Ę |
| Land Resource | Definition | Alloca | Exclu | Mana | Trans | Monitoring |
| Village exclosure | | | | | | |
| Exclusive community area | | | | | | |
| Community managed shared area | | | | | | |
| Community managed drought reserve | | | | | | |
| Landscape shared | | | | | | |

How to account for the multiple dimensions of complexity?

| | Authoritative rights | | Control Rights | | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|--|-------------------------------|--|------------------------|
| Land Resource | Definition | Allocation | Exclusion | Management | Transaction | Monitoring |
| Village exclosure | | | n: Temporal n: Allocatio | | | .I. #1 |
| Exclusive community area | N.L. #1 | from d | lifferent sca | les and lev | els | .l.: #1 |
| Community managed shared area | R.I. #1 | L.I. #2 | Dry: C.I. # 1 Rn: L.I. #2 Drt: R.I. #1 | Nrml: L.I. #2 Drt: R.I. #1 | Dry: C.I. # 1 Rn: L.I. #2 Drt: R.I. #1 | L.I. #1 |
| Community managed drought reserve | R.I. #1 | L.I. #1 and L.I. #2 | Nrml: C.I. #1 Drt: L.I. #1 | C.I. #1 | Nrml: C.I. #1 Drt: L.I. #1 | L.I. #1 and L.I. #2 |
| Landscape shared | R.I. #1 | R.I. #1 | L.I. #1 | L.I. #1 | L.I. #1 | L.I. #1 |



How to account for the multiple dimensions of complexity?

| | Authoritative rights | | Control Rights | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|------------------------|--|-------------------------------|--|------------------------|
| Land Resource | Definition | Alloc | Excidsion | Management | Transaction | Monitoring |
| Village exclosure | C.I.: #1 | C.I.: #1 | | V.I. #1 | V.I. #1 | C.I. #1 |
| Exclusive community area | N.L. # 4 ^t | h Dimensio | on: Fuzzinez | z/clarity of | frights | C.I.: #1 |
| Community managed shared area | R.I. #1 and/or N.L. #1 and/or R.I. #3 | L.I. #2 | Dry: C.I. # 1 Rn: L.I. #2 Drt: R.I. #1 and/or N.I. #1 | Nrml: L.I. #2 Drt: R.I. #1 | Dry: C.I. # 1 Rn: L.I. #2 Drt: R.I. #1 | L.I. #1 |
| Community managed drought reserve | R.I. #1 | L.I. #1 and L.I. #2 | Nrml: C.I. #1 Drt: L.I. #1 | C.I. #1 | Nrml: C.I. #1 Drt: L.I. #1 | L.I. #1 and L.I. #2 |
| Landscape shared | R.I. #1 | R.I. #1 | L.I. #1 | L.I. #1 | L.I. #1 | L.I. #1 |



Governance is not only about property rights, regulations, and rational calculation of utility




Causal pathways for goverance

| Pillar | Causal Pathway |
|-----------------|--|
| Regulative | Modify utility/coerce compliance |
| Normative | Bestow authority |
| Cognitive | Define roles and possibilities |
| Dialogic | Facilitate learning and shared |
| | understanding |
| Programmatic | Spend money |
| Procedural | Define procedures |
| Complex systems | Facilitating changes to the wider system |



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References

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