

participatory research plays an important role. The associated organizations have established long-term active collaboration with farmers, producers, consumers and research networks. RSR also represents a seed network including different stakeholders. This presentation will share experiences from RSR related to the construction of such a seed exchange network and will offer suggestions for improving the functioning and structure of this kind of network. More and more processes have been actively addressing the development and strengthening of social systems related to seeds. The emergence of new informal seed systems and the sustainable use of agricultural biodiversity are closely connected to the emergence of new social relationships. The heterogeneous membership of RSR facilitates the connection and partnership of social actors and encourages the emergence of informal seed systems.

Key words: agricultural biodiversity, conservation, informal seed systems, institutions, seed network

Incentive mechanisms to conserve agricultural diversity for private and public benefit, communities' livelihoods, climate-change adaptation and other ecosystem services

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A fundamental conundrum is experienced in most developing countries today: How to safeguard the biodiversity maintained in the fields of the rural poor—which constitutes a national and global good for adapting to climate change and maintaining future options, food security and ecosystem health—whilst meeting those same people's development needs and rights? As many of the benefits of agricultural biodiversity management are public goods, markets alone are limited in the extent to which they can adequately reward farmers for managing levels of diversity needed by society. This has led to a call for the development of positive incentive schemes being specifically mentioned by the Convention on Biological Diversity's Strategic Plan for 2011–2020, Aichi Target 3.

While value chain development can facilitate the maintenance of threatened genetic resources, such a strategy has limitations in how much it can achieve. Challenges include a tendency to focus on a narrow range of traditional crop species with high market potential but not particularly at risk, high initial investment costs and uncertain long-term success rates, as well as displacement of other threatened genetic resources where successful.

A recently tested innovative solution to the public good provision dilemma is implementing 'rewards/compensation for agricultural biodiversity conservation services' (PACS) incentive schemes. Through the use of competitive tenders and in-kind, community-level rewards, these schemes have been shown to be a potentially effective complementary instrument for promoting the cost-effective maintenance of threatened genetic resources. They are capable of building on (rather than undermining) existing pro-social collective behaviour, as well as accounting for participatory justice and social equity considerations – such as facilitating the participation of women, poor and younger farmers. Up-scaling nevertheless requires urgent consideration of accompanying prioritization protocols ("what to conserve?"), conservation goal setting ("how much to conserve?"), participatory monitoring schemes and identification of agricultural biodiversity-relevant ecosystem service indicators (including climate change adaptation and nutrition), as well as the establishment of a funding dialogue with potential private and public sector service purchasers and beneficiaries.

Keywords: incentive mechanisms, public good benefits, rewards for agricultural biodiversity conservation services, value chain development