



**IGAD
Livestock
Policy
Initiative**

The Role of IGAD in Shaping Livestock Policy in the Horn of Africa: Understanding the International System, International Actors and Implications for Reform

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 **A Living from
Livestock**

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CONTENTS

PREFACE	ii
ACRONYMS	iv
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	vi
The Role of the IGAD Secretariat	vi
The Role of Other International Actors	vii
Regional and National Reform Options	viii
Specific Issues	viii
Strategic Recommendations for the IGAD LPI	ix
1. INTRODUCTION:	1
Sources and Methods	1
2. SITUATING IGAD WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM	2
Understanding IGAD	2
Historical Evolution	2
Organizational Structure, Decision Making Processes and Project Governance	3
Key Issues for IGAD	3
Challenges	4
Opportunities	4
Tensions	5
IGAD in the Context of the African Union	8
AU Agenda Setting in the Livestock Sector	8
The Role of the Regional Economic Communities	9
Rationalisation of Regional Economic Communities: IGAD, COMESA and the EAC	9
The Role of AU Technical Offices: The Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (IBAR)	10
International Actors with Regional Livestock Mandates: Where do the OIE, FAO and ALive fit in?	12
The Role and Influence of International Donors	15
The Role of the CGIAR Centers	19
The Contribution of International Civil Society	20
3. POLICY OPPORTUNITIES AND PRIORITIES:	22
Orientation: Cross Border or National Focus?	22
Issues with Explicit Cross-Border Characteristics	23
National Issues of Mutual Concern	29
4. RECOMMENDATIONS	32
National Livestock Policy Issues	32
Regional Livestock Policy Issues	33
Recommendations for IGAD	34
Recommendations for the IGAD LPI	36
5. BIBLIOGRAPHY & REFERENCES:	39

PREFACE

This paper is part of a series of political economy Working Papers prepared for the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development's Livestock Policy Initiative (IGAD LPI) and the Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative (PPLPI) of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. The purpose of these papers is to explore strategic political economy issues that would facilitate or inhibit livestock policy reforms in the IGAD region that would benefit poor producers.

Specifically, this paper seeks to understand how the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development's Livestock Policy Initiative (IGAD LPI), a project jointly managed by IGAD and the Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative of FAO (PPLPI), can assist the poor livestock producers in the greater Horn of Africa to improve their livelihoods through strategic policy or institutional interventions. Unlike many policy papers, however, this report specifically and explicitly examines the political context in which livestock are produced, and aims to identify entry points that are truly feasible given these political realities. The report identifies key national and international actors, institutions and processes that surround formal and informal policy-making relevant to livestock production, the institutional bases of existing policies, and finally, strategies and resources required to make the politically feasible changes and creations possible. The recommendations made in this paper are therefore based on strategic choices, and not the technical or economic merits of various policy options.

Livestock is vital to the economies of many developing countries, and especially those of the Horn of Africa. Animals are a source of protein for human diets and can serve to provide income, employment and foreign exchange within a country. For many low income producers, livestock also serves as a store of wealth, provides draught power and organic fertilizer for crop production, acts as a means of transport, and serves as a vital component of social functions and exchange. Consumption of livestock and livestock products in developing countries, though starting from a low base, is growing rapidly. This sector growth could provide opportunities for the livestock-dependent poor to improve their livelihood, and this report aims to recommend politically feasible policy and institutional changes that can allow this to happen.

To arrive at its recommendations, this report uses the analytical tools of political science to determine policies that will be truly feasible in a particular real-world political context. The author is neither an economist nor a specialist in livestock production and is not using the criteria of those disciplines in its suggestions. The report instead seeks to select on the grounds of political feasibility from among the recommendations that local and international experts have made on technical or economic grounds. Thus, the report identifies key national and international actors, institutions and processes and their role in policy-making relevant to livestock, the institutional bases of existing policies, and finally strategies and resources required to make selected changes and creations possible.

Methodologically, the paper is based on several weeks of field work in the area, supplemented with a thorough review of government documents, newspapers and recently published research. The author relied foremost upon the informed observer method of research, conducting interviews with individuals and groups of people in a position to understand the political economy of the livestock sector, including the processes that shape its policies and their reform. Thus interviews were held with those in the government, the donor community, non-governmental organizations, academia, and the leadership of relevant livestock and other civil society organizations. These interviews were not a 'random sample' nor even necessarily 'representative'; the author sought those who had knowledge drawn from their own work and experience.

Due to the sensitive political nature of this research, interviewees were offered anonymity and confidentiality for their statements, and very few people chose to waive this right. Even though this report cannot cite their names, the author subjected informants' statements to high standards of rigor. The author sought to be conscious of any partisan bias or rumor that informants might have had in their report and whether they were actually in a position to know on personal or very strong secondary authority what they reported. In most cases corroboration for key analytic points was sought as well, either from other informants or through quotable statements from academic literature. Where corroboration was impossible and the point was important the author generally has indicated the number of people who supported the point, so the reader can judge for him/herself the strength of the evidence. On occasion, the use of corroboration via academic literature may give the paper a 'desk study' veneer, but it is the understandings of the informants - analyzed with the theoretical tools of political science - that drive the conclusions.

I hope this paper will provide useful information to its readers and any feedback is welcome by the author, IGAD LPI, FAO PPLPI and the Livestock Information, Sector Analysis and Policy Branch (AGAL) of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

Disclaimer

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of either the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations or the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or its authorities concerning the delimitations of its frontiers or boundaries.

The opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not constitute in any way the position of the FAO, IGAD, the Livestock Policy Initiative nor the governments studied.

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ACRONYMS

ALRM	Arid Lands Resource Management Project
AU	African Union
AU DREA	African Union Directorate for Rural Economy and Agriculture
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program
CAHW	Community-Based Animal Health Worker
CAPE	Community-Based Animal Health and Participatory Epidemiology Project
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWERU	Conflict Early Warning and Response Units
CGIAR	Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
EAC	East African Community
EC	European Commission
EXCELEX	Examination and Certification of Livestock Exports
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
IBAR	Inter Africa Bureau for Animal Resources
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IFPRI ESSP	International Food Policy Research Institute Ethiopia Strategy Support Program
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IGAD LPI	IGAD Livestock Policy Initiative
ILRI	International Livestock Research Institute
IOC	Indian Ocean Commission
IPF	IGAD Partners' Forum
IRCC	Inter-Regional Co-coordinating Committee

LICUS	Low Income Country Under Stress
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NEPDP	North-East Pastoralist Development Project
OIE	International Animal Health Organization
PACE	Pan-African Programme for the Control of Epizootics
PAN-SPSO	Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organizations
PARC	Pan-African Rinderpest Campaign
PCDP	Pastoral Community Development Project
PLP	Pastoral Livelihoods Program
REC	Regional Economic Community
REFORM	Regional Food Security and Risk Management Program
RSLTC	Red Sea Livestock Trade Commission
SERECU	Somali Ecosystem Rinderpest Eradication Coordination Unit
TFG	Transitional Federal Government

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study forms part of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Livestock Policy Initiative (IGAD LPI) series of working papers, linked to the Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative (PPLPI). The seven other papers in the series provide an analysis of national policy making and institutional dynamics and propose priority areas for reform. This paper places those findings within the context of the system of international actors impacting on livestock policy formulation in the region. This comprises an investigation of five broad issues:

- the role of the IGAD Secretariat within the region
- the competing and complementary roles of other international bodies with explicit regional livestock mandates
- the role of other powerful international actors in the region
- the potential for reform in particular policy and institutional areas, especially with regard to cross-border issues
- strategic recommendations for IGAD and the IGAD LPI about how to pursue reform effectively in the context of this international system

The Role of the IGAD Secretariat

The IGAD Secretariat was founded in 1986 to help member states address the challenges of drought and desertification by mobilizing resources and expertise to support project implementation and harmonization in the region. Since then the IGAD Secretariat has become increasingly involved in peace and security initiatives, while its role in regional development has been eroded by major capacity constraints and difficulty in mobilizing funds. Owing largely to donor concerns about capacity limitations the 2003 IGAD Strategic Plan stipulates that the role of the Secretariat should remain limited to “harmonized policies, information, capacity building, and science and technology”.

The IGAD Secretariat reports to the Council of Ministers, comprised primarily of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, who are in turn advised by technical committees of experts from each member state. The Secretariat enjoys significant autonomy in proposing projects to the Council, which presents a significant opportunity for new initiatives (though it has not always been fully utilized). IGAD projects are generally implemented through semi-autonomous project offices, which are primarily situated in individual member states.

Despite being plagued by extremely limited capacity and continued conflict in the region as well as only modest donor funding, IGAD has the potential to play an important role. It has maintained significant goodwill among member states, which translates into continued effectiveness as a regional convener, and corresponding access to the highest-ranking political officials in the region. That said, the IGAD Secretariat must address significant capacity constraints as well as three ongoing tensions: the need to play a harmonization, rather than implementation, role, the need to balance involvement in peace and security versus development efforts, and the need to improve coordination between projects and the Secretariat.

The Role of Regional Livestock Organizations

The Horn of Africa is home to a variety of organizations with potentially complementary, but frequently overlapping and sometimes contradictory, mandates to work in the livestock sector. This has had negative consequences for efficiency, and has undermined the development of sustained and complementary local capacity. Recent years have seen some progress, beginning at the African Union (AU) level, in clarifying respective mandates along the following lines:

The AU Directorate of Rural Economy and Agriculture has developed the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP), and a companion document on livestock development, and is expected to provide an overarching policy framework.

The ALive Platform was founded under the guidance of the World Bank, International Animal Health Organization (OIE) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) animal health service with the goal of acting as a multi-stakeholder priority setting body for African livestock policy. There remain concerns that it is usurping national priority setting roles, but if leadership is effectively transferred to African authorities it may become a valuable venue for linking African and international stakeholders.

The InterAfrican Bureau for Animal Resources (IBAR) is the coordinating body for the livestock component of the CAADP, and is expected to assume the leadership of the ALive Secretariat. It has a mandate to provide technical support in the livestock sector through cooperation with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

The RECs are to be the direct link with member states, acting as regional coordinating bodies for all livestock projects and priority setting. Where RECs and their member states lack capacity to implement projects, they are expected to look to IBAR, FAO or outside consultants for technical assistance. Within the Horn of Africa, IGAD is expected to deal with food security and peace and security issues, while COMESA is to address trade issues. Trade in livestock and grain, which relates to both food security and trade, seems to fall within IGAD's priorities, though there remains some degree of uncertainty on this question.

Finally, the FAO is to act as the global normative organization for the purposes of standards setting and best practices dissemination, but should generally not dictate an independent agenda in the region. At the level of implementation, the FAO has valuable technical capacity to offer, but should act as a technical support and implementation agency only where such support is welcomed by, and coordinated with, IBAR and the RECs.

The Role of Other International Actors

Donors: Donors have played a powerful priority-setting role in the African livestock sector, and are widely accused of having pushed inappropriate western models. Regional bodies need to play an increasingly assertive agenda-setting role, while also engaging pragmatically with international actors where their priorities coincide. Donor priorities include: security, marketing, vulnerability, natural resource management and community participation.

ILRI: ILRI research is targeted at creating international public goods in the livestock sector. This research serves as a crucial input to setting the policy and funding agenda for international donors and, to a lesser extent, for national governments. Although ILRI is a largely western-funded organization, the staff comes from very diverse backgrounds

and is often well grounded in local realities. As such, making effective use of their well-respected research is likely to be an important reform strategy.

International Civil Society: INGOs generally work in partnership with local NGOs and seek to provide technical, financial and political support. INGOs can be valuable allies for the IGAD LPI by being conduits for linking local voices and experiences to the higher level activities of the IGAD LPI.

Regional and National Reform Options

A key issue for the IGAD LPI is whether to focus primarily on national policy areas, or to focus on issues with explicit regional characteristics. Although the distinction is not absolute, and the politics of reform for regional issues will still be driven largely by the mobilization of national political interests, a general distinction is possible: regional issues broadly include both cross-border issues and issues that demand regional coordination to be successful, while national issues are those which can be pursued independently by individual countries and for which the success of reform is relatively less affected by the activities of other member states.

A focus on regional issues would be justified by several factors. First, IGAD's formal mandate is explicitly focused on addressing regional issues. Second, IGAD has a comparative advantage in addressing such issues due to its ability to convene high-ranking officials within the region. Third, most stakeholders immediately associate IGAD, and thus the IGAD LPI, with work on cross-border issues. Finally, other national and international actors have been particularly unsuccessful in addressing regional issues, owing both to the nature of the issues and to institutional factors which make it difficult for most actors to address regional issues effectively.

On the other hand, cross-border livestock issues inevitably intersect with concerns about security and sovereignty, and are thus more controversial and less likely to be easily amenable to reform, especially in the short-term. By contrast, a focus on national issues may allow for: a) more immediate, and more significant, poverty reduction benefits; b) a greater likelihood of success; c) the potential to demonstrate immediate success and build momentum; d) greater correspondence with established national priorities; and e) the potential to provide a solid foundation on which to build regional harmonization.

An ideal strategy is likely to seek opportunities to initiate reform processes on one or two regional issues while simultaneously adopting a set of national reform objectives that are likely to yield more immediate and visible results.

Specific Issues

This study provides guidance as to particularly important areas for reform around regional issues, while national issues are dealt with in greater detail in the national case studies in this series.

Animal Health and Livestock Exports: A growing number of observers feel that disease eradication is not a viable strategy for facilitating livestock and livestock product exports from the IGAD region. The IGAD LPI could help promote alternative approaches to disease control and livestock exports in two ways:

- 1) participate in regional forums of African negotiators to the OIE in order to ensure the consideration of alternatives and to strengthen the unity of African negotiating positions.

- 2) if and when initiatives emerge to promote strengthened trade links with the Middle East, IGAD should provide support with the goals of ensuring the full engagement of member states and of improving inter-organizational cooperation.

Pastoral Conflict: The issue of pastoral conflict is already being addressed by a major IGAD project, CEWARN, and as such the IGAD LPI probably has relatively little to add in this domain.

Facilitating Intra-Regional Movement and Trade: There is an urgent need to facilitate cross-border intra-regional trade. This should involve:

- 1) supporting those calling for the creation of a “Transhumance Certificate” to formalize and facilitate the movement of pastoralists across borders.
- 2) investigating the relative poverty reduction impact of intra-regional versus international trade and advocating for a greater emphasis on intra-regional trade if it is appropriate.
- 3) initiating conversations at the regional level regarding the liberalization of intra-regional livestock trade. An appropriate first step might involve seeking out potential allies within ministries of foreign affairs who can be accessed through IGAD.

Strategic Recommendations for the IGAD LPI

Regardless of the specific reform focus, several *reform strategies* are likely to make success more likely.

Supporting Capacity Building: The most basic challenge facing the project is a significant lack of capacity within member states, and at both IGAD and IBAR. Reforms will only be sustainable if sufficient capacity can be built within member states, while the sustainability of regional reforms will equally demand the development of new capacity at the level of IGAD and IBAR. At the national level, this means maintaining close contact with technical staff in ministries dealing with livestock issues, as well as maintaining contact with political officials within those ministries. At IGAD this means working consistently in partnership with the director for agriculture and environment, and with the program manager for agriculture, livestock and food security. At IBAR it means keeping in contact with the director, as well as maintaining close cooperation with relevant program staff.

Linking Local Voices to National Processes: It is essential to link grassroots voices, including civil society, producers’ associations and local government, to national and regional policy processes. This will strengthen the existing work of civil society while providing the IGAD LPI with invaluable political support.

Participating in Priority Setting: Success will demand sufficient involvement in major agenda setting processes to ensure a reasonably supportive overall policy environment. This means paying particular attention to priority setting at the AU and the ALive platform.

Extending beyond the “Livestock Community”: Addressing livestock issues, and cross-border issues in particular, demands an effort to engage diverse policy actors within member states, including ministers of foreign affairs, and the IGAD LPI is uniquely placed to do so.

Engaging with Official Institutions: International projects often attempt to circumvent official channels, especially in situations where they may resist project aims. Experience suggests, though, that sustainable reform will only occur through patient and continuous engagement with official channels and member states.

The Value of a Regional Approach: A regional approach to reform can support inter-regional learning, discussion and experience sharing and consequently diffuse tensions, build trust and enhance the credibility of proposed reforms. Regional convening is also a comparative advantage of IGAD.

Progressive Reform Strategies: It may often be useful to build momentum for reform by first working with relatively more supportive member states, and then using that experience to help engage more reticent members.

1. INTRODUCTION:

Livestock occupy a vital position in the economic and social life of much of the Horn of Africa, and are in many cases particularly vital to the welfare of the poor. Yet, by the admission of regional governments themselves, policy has consistently failed to meet the needs of those same livestock owners. The weakness of livestock policies has been a reflection both of a general lack of policy-making capacity, and of the marginalization of livestock owners from policy processes which affect them.

These policy dynamics at the national level have been the subject of separate country case-studies within this Intergovernmental Authority on Development Livestock Policy Initiative (IGAD LPI) series, which forms part of the Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative (PPLPI) series of working papers. This research seeks to contextualize the recommendations of those papers by studying the system of powerful international actors that impact on livestock policy formation in the region. This involves two primary components.

The first is investigating the activities of the major international actors in the region, and the political economy driving those activities. The activities of these powerful international actors, including donors, regional organizations and civil society, can present important opportunities, and constraints, for the IGAD LPI.

The second is to understand the particular role and functions of IGAD. The fact that the IGAD LPI is an IGAD project, and is accountable to the IGAD Secretariat and member states, will shape the opportunities available, as well as the expectations of other actors in the region. Focusing on the IGAD LPI *as an IGAD project* emphasizes the regional dimensions of livestock policy, and highlights particular policy areas, and particular reform strategies, that are likely to be particularly relevant to the project.

The goal of this research is to inform efforts by the project team a) to identify priority areas in which policy support is likely to yield positive results, b) to make their efforts complementary with ongoing activities in the region, and c) to develop successful reform strategies. Whereas the country case studies that comprise the remaining reports in the IGAD LPI series focus particularly on identifying *priority areas for policy reform*, this paper focuses to a much greater extent on the way that the international context should shape *reform strategies*, while also highlighting explicitly regional issues affecting livestock producers.

The report is divided into three sections. The first contextualizes the work of the IGAD LPI, beginning with a detailed overview of IGAD. It then provides an analysis of the primary livestock-related activities of the major international actors in the region, and how those activities affect IGAD and the work of the IGAD LPI. The second section looks at specific policy areas with which the project might engage. The third section provides recommendations regarding priority areas for engagement and appropriate reform strategies.

Sources and Methods

The findings presented here are based on a secondary literature review, a review of primary project documents, and interviews conducted in the region.

The literature review provided background on the particular policy issues in question, as well as general frameworks for analyzing the role of international actors in national policy processes. However, specific literature on the role of international actors in the region, outside of the security sector, is relatively sparse, leaving most of the specific information to be compiled through primary research.

The documentary evidence was of two kinds. First, project documents detailing the activities of different international actors in the region and, second, documents related to the internal organization, governance and functioning of organizations in the region.

Finally, interviews represent the most important source of information. Over 50 interviews were conducted over the course of eight weeks from September-November 2006. Interviews were conducted in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, reflecting the preponderance of international organizations in those countries, and the limits of time. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with national government officials, representatives from the African Union (AU) and IGAD, international donors, international bodies, including the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), international civil society organizations, and academics.

2. SITUATING IGAD WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Contextualizing IGAD within the international system in the region is essential in order to: understand the project's comparative advantage relative to other regional actors, identify appropriate reform strategies, and highlight potential synergies and conflicts with existing projects.

This section begins with an investigation of IGAD's history, structure, decision making processes, strategy and capacity. It then proceeds to investigate the role of IGAD within the context of the African Union, followed by an examination of the respective roles of the FAO and OIE, major international donors, international research institutions, and international civil society.

Understanding IGAD

Historical Evolution

IGAD was founded in 1986 as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), with a narrow mandate to focus on drought and desertification. The next decade saw limited success for IGADD in addressing drought, though it became increasingly involved in peace and security issues. In 1996 IGADD was renamed the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and was granted an expanded development mandate, as well as a formalized role in coordinating peace processes in the region. This also saw the establishment of the IGAD Partners' Forum (IPF), a coordinated funding body for IGAD, based in Addis Ababa and composed on donors, the IGAD Secretariat and member states (IGAD 2003).

More recently, while IGAD's involvement in peace and security issues has continued to expand, involvement in development activities has been widely viewed as ineffective, prompting the development of a new strategic plan in 2003 (ESAMI 2001, IGAD 2003). Whereas IGAD had previously been involved in a combination of project implementation, mobilization of resources for national projects, and harmonization of projects between

countries, the new IGAD strategy specifically dictates that the role of the IGAD Secretariat should be limited to “harmonized policies, information, capacity building, and science and technology” (IGAD 2003).

Organizational Structure, Decision Making Processes and Project Governance

The IGAD Secretariat reports directly to the Council of Ministers, which is comprised of the Minister of Foreign Affairs from each member state, along with one other relevant Minister. The second minister is expected to be from the Ministry under which agriculture falls, reflecting IGAD’s food security mandate, but in practice both Ethiopia and Sudan are represented by the Ministry of Finance, while Kenya relies exclusive on the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This may reflect the differing priorities of the governments in question. The meetings of the Council of Ministers are always preceded by meetings of relevant technical committees who advise the Council of Ministers on the viability of proposed projects.

In principle, the Secretariat enjoys significant autonomy and initiative in proposing new projects to the Council of Ministers, though this initiative has reportedly not always been fully utilized (EC 2006). The Secretariat is empowered to commission research into potential project areas, which is then presented to the Council of Ministers for approval. Approval opens the way for applying for donor funding through the IPF.

Once approved and funded, IGAD projects are generally implemented through semi-autonomous project offices. Thus, some projects are housed in Djibouti but implemented by consultants (*e.g.* Regional Food Security and Risk Management Program (REFORM)), while other projects are implemented on a contract basis *and* located in other IGAD states (*e.g.* Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in Addis Ababa). These remotely located programs appear to enjoy extensive operational autonomy relative to the IGAD Secretariat, while they tend to interact directly with member states through technical focal points in relevant line ministries.

Key Issues for IGAD

Several issues directly influence the effectiveness of IGAD projects, and the strategies that they employ. For ease of illustration they are divided into challenges, opportunities and tensions.

Challenges

Capacity

Several institutional assessments conducted over the past five years have pointed to significant capacity limitations within the IGAD secretariat, and this concern is almost unanimously shared by stakeholders within the region (ESAMI 2001, EU 2006). This suggests that the new project will need to be realistic about capacity constraints in setting their agenda for action and will need to overcome negative perceptions about IGAD both among partners and donors. It also makes a case for developing strong partnerships with other organizations with complementary objectives.

Funding

Since its inception, the IGAD Secretariat has repeatedly proposed projects that have remained unfunded by donors (Mohamed and Zziwa 2005). Individuals within IGAD contend that donors have preferred to support projects related to a peace and security agenda, while almost totally neglecting development objectives (ESAMI 2001).

For their part, donors argue that as conflict escalates in the region peace initiatives are increasingly a precondition to meaningful development. More importantly, donors argue that the lack of capacity within the IGAD Secretariat, and its lack of initiative in proposing projects consistent with a strategic focus on harmonization, information and capacity building, has made funding the organization unfeasible. Many donors continue to insist that they are eager to support IGAD development initiatives if and when the Secretariat demonstrates improved performance.¹

Conflict Between and Within Member States

Conflict within the region continues to be a major barrier to development initiatives, as well as to efforts to achieve cooperation between the IGAD member states. The particular constraints imposed by these conflicts are dealt with in more detail in the next section of the report.

Opportunities

Continued Effectiveness as a Regional Convener

Despite continuing military conflict in the region, the difficulty of achieving effective cooperation among member states, and the failure of some member states to reliably make financial contributions to the Secretariat, IGAD continues to enjoy considerable legitimacy and good will among member states. The IGAD Secretariat continues to be able to convene regular meeting of Heads of State, the Council of Ministers and technical committees. At the very least this continued goodwill and convening capacity present tremendous opportunities for the Secretariat to play a more effective role in the region (ESAMI 2001, EC 2006).

Access to Ministers of Foreign Affairs

The ability of the IGAD Secretariat to convene Heads of State and Ministers of Foreign Affairs presents particular opportunities, as livestock projects have often struggled to gain traction and attention beyond the relatively narrow "livestock

¹ Italy, Canada and the Nordic countries were mentioned as particularly supportive at different points during the research.

community.” It has become increasingly clear that a strategy for addressing cross-border livestock issues in particular demands an ability to reach out to Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and IGAD presents a unique vehicle for doing so. That said, the benefits of this convening role will depend on developing effective communication between ministries of foreign affairs and those dealing with livestock issues within member states.

Tensions

Hard and Soft Development Projects

At the time of its founding, IGAD was widely viewed by member states as a vehicle for raising donor funds, and as a partner for implementing these projects. These so-called “hard” projects offered additional implementing capacity in a context of limited government resources, while also producing projects with visible benefits to local populations. In response to limited IGAD capacity in these areas, donors have increasingly preferred to see IGAD play a “soft” role, focused on policy harmonization, information and capacity building, and donors played an important role in the creation of a new strategic plan in 2003 that formalizes these priorities. Continued tension between donors and member states on this question may well be contributing to the lack of funding for IGAD project proposals.

Balancing Peace and Security and Development Objectives

Most stakeholders think of IGAD first and foremost as an organization that deals with peace and security concerns in the region. Some view this as an important advantage, which presents the possibility of linking security and development in a mutually reinforcing manner. Others consider it a liability, with the highly politicized role of the Secretariat in peace building making it difficult to engage member states around development concerns. Ultimately, the challenge for the IGAD LPI is to be aware of these connections in developing a plan of action.

The Relationship between Projects and the Secretariat

Because IGAD’s projects are implemented on a semi-autonomous basis there is a temptation for projects to operate largely in isolation from official channels due to capacity constraints, conflicting visions or political resistance to project aims. Accusations that donor projects often attempt to circumvent official channels are common (Birdsall 2004). Yet, evidence from other projects, including CEWARN (see Box 1), suggests that working through the Secretariat to engage the member states is an essential component of a successful strategy, while failure to do so introduces a strong likelihood of projects becoming derailed by official opposition. That said, projects have advantageously exploited their relative autonomy by using it to engage civil society as both technical and political allies.

The Implications of Regional Conflict

As noted earlier, persistent conflict and mistrust within the region has contributed to making policy harmonization and cross-border cooperation elusive. While mistrust within the region is widespread owing to a long history of conflict, the Somali, Sudanese and Ethio-Eritrean conflicts have a particular relevance to current development efforts.

Somalia

The internationally recognized government of Somalia is the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which receives strong support from IGAD and from the

international community. Yet, in practice the TFG controls very little territory within Somalia, and has extremely limited capacity on the ground to govern. Local authorities in the north have declared an independent state of Somaliland, while local authorities immediately to the east of Somaliland have established the state of Puntland to exist as a semi-autonomous province of a future Somalia.

Conditions in the south have been particularly volatile. In late 2006 the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) established military control over most of the southern territories, only to be driven out of southern Somalia by Somali and Ethiopian troops in early 2007. The temporary rise of the ICU raised fears within the international community of a terrorist threat in the region, which has led to increasing US involvement and support for Ethiopian military operations. Meanwhile the specter of conflict has increased tension, and Ethiopian military mobilization, along the Ethiopia-Somalia border. This has merely exacerbated longstanding tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as within the Somali region of Ethiopia, which has been the site of a longstanding separatist movement.

Continued instability presents a major challenge to reform efforts. First, IGAD remains formally restricted in its ability to engage with Somali authorities other than the internationally recognized, but largely ineffective, TFG. Second, even at an informal level governing capacity is extremely limited, even in the more stable north.

One approach has been to work with a combination of government and non-government bodies to build viable operational coalitions. The Somali Ecosystem Rinderpest Eradication Coordination Unit (SERECU) is seeking to eradicate the last remaining pocket of rinderpest in the region. Working in southern Somalia where there is no effective veterinary authority in existence, the project has consulted with the TFG at an official level where possible, but in practice has worked directly with the local veterinary association in implementing the project.

The other approach has been informal government-to-government cooperation, primarily between Ethiopia and the local authorities in Puntland and Somaliland. The Ethiopian government has reportedly established security agreements with the Somaliland authorities, while also establishing a Somaliland trade office, which has facilitated the renewed flow of some goods through the port at Berbera. Organizations working in the region also report semi-regular meetings between both regional and federal Ethiopian officials and their counterparts in Somaliland.

Box 1: Successful Institutional Arrangements at CEWARN

The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) formally came into force in July 2003, with a mandate to address cross-border pastoralist conflict through the collection and dissemination of information on conflict and potential responses at the national level. The central office in Addis Ababa coordinates information collection and dissemination in partnership with Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERUs) in each of the member states, which are composed of a combination of government, civil society and academic representatives. The CEWERUs spearhead information collection and analysis, as well as providing a space for coordinating responses where necessary. While the project still faces significant challenges in expanding coverage and the quality and timeliness of responses, it is widely considered to have made a valuable contribution to conflict resolution in the region.

Those close to the project attribute much of this success to a commitment to constant engagement with the member states during project formulation, which ensured a relatively high degree of support when the project was launched. Project development began in 1995 when the IGAD Heads of State expressed a desire to develop institutions to deal with conflict in the region. It took a further five years to secure the "Khartoum Declaration" in which the heads of state formally endorsed the formation of CEWARN. It took a further two years to develop the CEWARN protocol, which mandated a focus on cross-border pastoralist conflict, and carefully specified stakeholder responsibilities and information sharing requirements and protections. Even then it took another year and a half to finalize the methodology, hire staff and assemble the Committee of Permanent Secretaries (CPS). While an extremely time consuming task, most people agree that such a sensitive issue could not have been tackled without this commitment to an inclusive process.

The second indispensable component of success was an emphatic commitment to the inclusion of civil society groups in the CEWERUs. On the one hand, this exploited the fact that NGOs tended to have far greater experience, and far stronger ties to communities, than national authorities. As importantly, civil society indirectly represents communities within the CEWERUs, they were thus able to demand accountability from security forces in their responses to conflict. This has proven to be a much more effective approach to generating accountability at the national level than relying on centralized monitoring by CEWARN.

These initiatives are not without severe limitations, as they are *ad hoc*, subject to Ethiopian whims, and have as yet done little to facilitate the livestock trade. Yet, the existence of official meetings suggests that progress, while challenging, is not impossible. That said, one must be realistic about the severe difficulties of operating in Somalia, and about the risks posed by any future changes in the security situation.

Sudan

Conflict between north and south Sudan has made work in southern Sudan, and along the southern Sudanese border, difficult, as IGAD has been forced to work through the official government in Khartoum in the north. The formal signing of peace accords on January 9, 2005 has seen the Sudanese government provide greater leeway for border agreements between the south and its neighbors, but this freedom remains constrained by continued north-south tensions.

Perhaps the greatest asset that IGAD possesses in addressing cross-border questions is the eagerness of neighboring states to strengthen bilateral ties with southern Sudan. This seems to reflect a general interest in new economic opportunities in the region, and particularly the prospect of new oil resources.

Eritrea

Since the Ethio-Eritrean war from 1998-2000 relations have remained hostile, with diplomatic ties broken and Eritrea refusing to send officials to meetings in Ethiopia. This has largely excluded Eritrea from the African Union (AU), and from some activities of IGAD. This makes even national activities in Eritrea challenging, and severely limits prospects for cross-border cooperation, although CEWARN does hope to establish an Eritrean office in the near future. There are also unofficial suggestions that Ethiopia is concerned about the possibility of Eritrean guerillas operating from within Sudan, and that this could be a potential source of conflict between Sudan and Ethiopia.

IGAD in the Context of the African Union

The genesis of the African Union (AU) in 2002, the heir to the former Organization for African Unity (OAU), marked an important watershed in a progressive push to reinvigorate pan-African integration efforts. Coming on the heels of the establishment of New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001, this push to strengthen African institutions has received significant international attention and donor support. This process has witnessed increasingly assertive efforts by the AU Secretariat to play a leading role in formulating development plans and objectives, and to define more clearly the roles of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and AU Technical Offices. While this effort for long-term integration remains in its early phases, and still has many skeptics, the institutional decisions taken by the AU shape the governance of development projects on the continent in important ways (De Wall 2002, Gottschalk and Schmidt 2004).

AU Agenda Setting in the Livestock Sector

The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP), produced by the NEPAD Secretariat in partnership with the FAO and member states, was ratified by the AU in 2002 (NEPAD 2002). The original document largely neglected the livestock, forestry and fisheries sub-sectors, leading to the development of a CAADP Companion Document

which was ratified in 2004 (NEPAD 2004). Collectively, the CAADP is meant to support member states in setting priorities and identifying courses of action for improving agricultural productivity.

The CAADP is meant to provoke action, provide technical guidance and experience sharing, ensure policy harmonization across the continent and provide a mechanism through which to raise international funding to support implementation. Yet agenda-setting at the continental level also carries the risk that pan-African concerns will trump regional specificities, and that politics will trump expertise. The neglect of livestock issues in the original CAADP document is indicative of this risk, reflecting the broader political marginalization of the livestock sector. In this sense, the increasing assertiveness of the AU, and NEPAD in particular, can act as both a constraint and an opportunity.

As it stands, the livestock companion document to the CAADP specifies a very general agenda for action, and thus seems to present opportunities for increased technical expertise, mutual learning and funding without imposing major constraints. That said, there is interest within the AU Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture (AU DREA) in developing a much more detailed livestock strategy. Should this go forward the IGAD LPI should be actively involved, as a poorly conceived plan of action could hinder the development of regionally appropriate reform efforts.

The Role of the Regional Economic Communities

Central to the revitalization of the African Union is a belief that the RECs should be the building blocks of pan-African integration. Thus the NEPAD Secretariat is expected to “focus on its role as a facilitator in the implementation of CAADP by RECs and member countries” (NEPAD 2004b). It is the RECs that are expected to be the primary interface with member states, and to coordinate and manage implementation of AU programs. This places an enormous responsibility on the hitherto rather weak RECs, and there is an expectation that the RECs will see a corresponding expansion of funding and capacity moving forward (UNECA 2006).

Rationalisation of Regional Economic Communities: IGAD, COMESA and the EAC

One of the primary challenges facing African RECs is the massive overlap in membership, with consequent risks of duplication and inefficiency. The 2006 African Union Summit in Banjul, Gambia sought to address this issue. While it succeeded in affirming the existence of eight “official” RECs, there remains significant overlap. Nowhere is this more true than in the Horn of Africa: All of the IGAD states except Somalia are members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), while Kenya and Uganda are also members of the smaller East African Community (EAC) (UNECA, 2006).

Following the lead of RECs elsewhere on the continent, IGAD and COMESA have reached a formal understanding to focus on their respective areas of strength: IGAD in regional food security and peace and security issues, and COMESA in economic cooperation and integration. This, though, is not without ambiguity, as the trade in food products and livestock, apparently COMESA’s domain, is also vital to food security in the region. Thus, the 2003 IGAD Strategy states that “IGAD will...foster an increase in trade among the Member States in two areas - grains and livestock” (IGAD, 2003).

There is no self-evident technical resolution to this conflict. COMESA is better positioned to deal with the livestock trade in so far as the livestock system in East Africa extends beyond the IGAD states, and because assessments have indicated that COMESA has greater capacity (EC 2006). On the other hand, the barriers impacting the livestock trade,

including domestic taxation, security concerns and animal health concerns, are largely distinct from more conventional trade liberalization challenges, and are particularly politically charged. This provides a case for a focused sub-regional approach through IGAD.

Ultimately, the challenge is to ensure effective cooperation, and this should be a matter of negotiation between IGAD, COMESA and the EAC. The Inter-Regional Co-coordinating Committee (IRCC), founded in 2003 and comprising IGAD, COMESA, EAC and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) formally provides such a forum, but the inconsistent allocation of donor funds is indicative of continued uncertainty among both donors and RECs. The EC has sought to coordinate its funding through the IRCC, but nonetheless reflects this institutional complexity. It has funded the IGAD LPI through IGAD, while the Regional Food Security and Risk Management Program (REFORM) will have its Coordinating Unit based at the IGAD Secretariat, with the exception of the cross-border trade component, which will be housed at COMESA (Landell Mills 2003). USAID has shown greater inconsistency in dealing with organizational mandates. As recently as ten years ago USAID was preparing to support major livestock programming at IGAD. It subsequently withdrew support for IGAD in favor of funding a wide-ranging Pastoral Livelihoods Program (PLP) through the African Union Inter-Agency Bureau for Animal Resources (AU IBAR). USAID sources claim that it is now in the process of finalizing a comprehensive livestock program for the region to be handled *entirely* by COMESA, though details have yet to be finalized. Aside from the risk of project overlap and inefficiency, this inconsistency is felt by many to be undermining capacity development within the relevant bodies.

The Role of AU Technical Offices: The Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (IBAR)

The implementation document for the CAADP indicates that the RECs and member states taking the lead in implementation, while looking to a combination of international actors (led by the FAO) and national agricultural research organizations (NAROs) to mobilize technical expertise. In the livestock sector this model is complicated by the existence of the African Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (IBAR), an AU Technical Office explicitly expected to provide technical support to RECs and member states for projects within the livestock sector.

IBAR dates to the colonial period, and since its incorporation in the OAU in 1965 has existed as a semi-autonomous body with a relatively poorly defined mandate, and limited core capacity. The organization came to comprise of a number of donor projects with little connection to one another, limited capacity for organizational learning, and a powerful donor influence over priority setting.

The largest such project was the Pan-African Rinderpest Campaign (PARC), launched in 1986 with the aim of eradicating Rinderpest on the continent. PARC has since been followed by the Pan-African Programme for the Control of Epizootics (PACE) in 1999, and SERECU in 2006, and the three projects combined have received slightly over Euro 200 million in funding over twenty years, primarily from the EC.

A second major project has been the Community-Based Animal Health and Participatory Epidemiology Unit (CAPE), funded by DFID from 2000-2005. Designed to support improved veterinary services, the project has been notable for its relative focus on policy and institutional reform. It gained particular notoriety for its reasonably successful advocacy in favor of Community-based Animal Health Workers (CAHWs) (AU/IBAR no date, Wolmer and Scoones 2005).

Finally, IBAR more recently (2004) initiated the North-East Pastoralist Development Project (NEPDP) with USAID funding. The project is a comprehensive pastoral regions

development project for North-East Kenya, and is being touted by IBAR as a possible model for corresponding projects elsewhere in the region, and particularly in the contiguous border areas of Ethiopia (AU/IBAR 2004).

Despite the fact that IBAR has enjoyed some meaningful successes, it has continued to be plagued by a poorly defined mandate and limited capacity. The 2005 appointment of a new director, along with a fundamental organizational restructuring, points to efforts by the AU to revitalize the organization by strengthening core capacity and clarifying its mandate.

Strengthening Capacity Development and Agenda Setting

Historically, IBAR staffs were almost exclusively linked to specific donor-funded projects, with only a tiny core staff. This implied that donors largely drove agenda setting within the organization, that the projects operated in relative isolation from one another and were subject to very little internal oversight, and that projects, once completed, left little in the way of sustained capacity development behind.

In response, the reorganization at IBAR has seen existing projects assembled under three core project divisions (Animal Health, Animal Production, and Trade and Marketing), each of which is being equipped with a core IBAR staff to complement the project staff. This improved organizational structure is viewed almost universally positively, and should imply improved capacity development and more centralized programmatic control.

Clarifying AU IBAR's Mandate

Operational Partners: RECs or Member States

IBAR has often worked directly with member states, as exemplified by the CAPE and NEPDP projects, but a new AU directive has mandated that IBAR should henceforth work only with the RECs, who in turn engage with member states. This seems to reflect a desire within the AU to increase the centrality of the RECs, while it may also be an effort to establish greater control over AU projects like CAPE, which had been accused of uninvited political engagement in member states.

In practice this probably does not completely exclude IBAR's involvement in providing technical support to member states. Instead, the expectation is that IBAR will remain free to provide technical support directly to member states at the request of the relevant RECs. Thus IBAR will continue to play a prominent technical role, but only through formal cooperation with the RECs. The IGAD LPI should figure prominently in making this relationship work effectively.

Technical Support vs. Policy and Institutional Reform

A debate has emerged over whether IBAR should work on strictly technical issues, or also be involved in supporting policy and institutional reform. Recent reforms initially pointed to a move away from potentially more controversial policy and institutional work, as the CAPE project expired in 2005 and the IBAR leadership offered virtually no support to proposals to fund a new Institutional and Policy Support Team (IPST). This is said to have reflected a combination of a technical bias among classically trained veterinarians, and a backlash against the sometimes controversial work of CAPE.

Recent events, though, suggest that IBAR is taking a significant renewed interest in policy and institutional reform. But unlike earlier work that engaged directly with member states, future work will need to be pursued in close partnership with the RECs, as described above. This model sits well with the fact that the IGAD LPI is

based at IGAD. The IGAD LPI is well positioned to interact directly with the member states, while looking to build a close partnership with IBAR in order to take advantage of hoped for improvements in IBAR's technical and policy capacity.

Agenda Setting vs. Implementation

One can detect two conflicting visions for IBAR's future role in pan-African agenda setting. In one vision IBAR acts primarily as a coordinating and implementing agency for mandates established by the AU Secretariat. Thus, for example, IBAR has been named the coordinating agency for the implementation of the CAADP. The alternative vision sees IBAR playing a more active role in shaping agenda setting at the level of the AU Secretariat, contributing both ideas and technical guidance throughout the process. Supporters argue that without such involvement, livestock policy at AU level will reflect political interests rather than technical realities, while livestock issues will continue to be marginalized, as occurred with their exclusion from the initial CAADP document. Many observers expect IBAR to attempt to play a significant agenda setting role in the future, suggesting that the IGAD LPI should work closely with IBAR in advocating for the inclusion of livestock issues on the AU agenda.

International Actors with Regional Livestock Mandates: where do the OIE, FAO and ALive Fit in?

Who Sets the Regional Agenda? The Role of the ALive Platform

Formed in 2004, the ALive platform aims to bring together African governments, donors and other stakeholders in order to develop "a common vision on the most important policies for pro-poor and sustainable livestock development in the African region and its sub-regions" and improve "capacity building and knowledge management" (ALive 2004).

While admirable goals in principle, ALive has been widely criticized for being a top-down process, dictated in particular by the World Bank, International Animal Health Organization (OIE), FAO Animal Health Service and parts of the EC in Brussels. Not only is the secretariat currently based in Washington D.C., following a project launch in Paris, but there is evidence that a prominent role for the AU was only established after significant protests from African actors as well as some donors, led by DFID. Some critics further contend that regional priority setting is a task best left to the existing AU DREA.

That said, the ALive platform has gained the endorsement of the AU, and plans are in place to move its secretariat to IBAR. Yet, there remains significant skepticism about the willingness of international actors to relinquish significant influence to African stakeholders. African actors appear to be becoming increasingly vocal in their demand for ownership, and this effort is likely to be helped by the ability of the member states, and particularly the RECs, to establish clear priorities and goals. Much of the ALive priority setting is expected to take place at the level of the RECs, and as such the IGAD LPI should seek to play a major role (ALive 2004b).

International Standards and best Practices: The Role of the OIE and FAO

The OIE is the official international animal health standards-setting body, while the FAO also plays an important role in establishing international standards and best practices related to animal health and livestock exports. Both have been widely accused of inappropriately imposing western models in an African context, reflecting the more general weakness of African representation in international bodies owing to a lack of

technical capacity, the exercise of power by developed countries, and procedural inequalities (Scoones and Wolmer 2006, Perry et al 2005, Nelson 2005, Stiglitz 2004

In particular, both bodies are accused of unduly emphasizing disease eradication as an approach to maintaining animal health and livestock exports, and of supporting OIE standards consistent with this bias (see Box 2). This perspective has been increasingly challenged in recent years by African institutions, like IBAR, and by constituencies within the FAO itself. Thus, while the FAO Animal Health Service in Rome has often frustrated local actors in its adherence to western models, staff working at the country level, as well as in particular projects like PPLPI, often hold very different views and can be valuable reform allies. For example, PPLPI research has openly criticized the FAO focus its near exclusive focus on disease eradication in Africa (Perry et al 2005). Similarly, an FAO Somalia program to support livestock exports, funded under the World Bank's Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) program, is explicitly predicated on the unfeasibility of disease eradication in the short-term, and the consequent need for alternative approaches to enabling exports.

Implementation: What is FAO's Role?

The implementing role played by the FAO has been controversial. The FAO is widely respected for its technical expertise, and even its most passionate critics acknowledge that it can play a very important role in the region. Yet, the FAO is, at present, often accused of being ineffective at the level of implementation, while also imposing western models, undermining local institutions and overstepping its mandate. It is widely held that an ongoing Independent External Evaluation of the FAO has been motivated by growing donor frustration with the ineffectiveness of the FAO in implementing projects (FAO 2006).

There is a broad concern that in some cases the FAO has intruded on roles best performed by local organizations, like IBAR and IGAD, and in so doing undermined project coordination and capacity development. According to one highly placed African official: "Some international organizations have historically been involved in doing everything in

Box 2: Conflicting Approaches to Maintaining Animal Health for Export

Traditionally in Africa, as elsewhere, countries have sought to eradicate major livestock diseases as a guarantee of animal health and a precondition to exporting livestock and livestock products. Increasingly, though, critics have contended that this approach is exceedingly costly and ultimately unfeasible due to a combination of local capacity constraints and the existence of a wide range of endemic diseases in Africa. These critics have supported a movement towards exports of lower-risk commodities, such as cut meat instead of live animals, and the adoption of new disease monitoring approaches to ensure export safety to markets in the Middle-East. These same critics have generally supported a greater focus on intra-regional trade, which does not require disease eradication, as well as community health approaches, which may do more to maintain animal health even if not ensuring export certification (Scoones and Wolmer 2006, Wolmer and Scoones 2005, Thomson et al. 2004).

These alternatives have increasingly gained the support of African stakeholders, particularly at IBAR, but supporters claim that in this area donors have been particularly aggressive in imposing their views. These stakeholders report donor unwillingness to fund those who support alternatives to disease eradication, along with explicit efforts to undermine African cooperation at the OIE. They further fear that the ALive platform may be a forum for maintaining donor hegemony on this issue.

Africa, even though this is not the case elsewhere. We have explained to them that we are the ones who should be responsible. Maybe some of our partners think things should continue as they are. We want change.” This is consistent with research finding that international actors often lack the patience to support long-term capacity development, and have often favored using internationally controlled parallel structures for project implementation (Birdsall 2005).

There have been cases of obvious tensions between the FAO and local bodies. For example, from 2003-2005 FAO and IBAR were operating parallel projects, both aimed at facilitating livestock exports to the Middle East, but with very little direct interaction, and suggestions that the two bodies were at times actively undermining one another (see Box 3). Such resource competition and overlap can lead not only to inefficiency, but can also complicate efforts to ensure ownership by national governments. While donors often turn to FAO as an implementing agency in search of short-term efficiency, this has the consequence of detracting from long-term capacity building within local organizations.

The IGAD LPI is well placed to strengthen communication and coordination among the FAO, IGAD and IBAR with the aim of improving local ownership and capacity development. FAO is a hugely diverse organization, and the IGAD LPI should seek to build strong partnerships with supportive individuals and projects.

Box 3. Conflicting Projects: EXCELEX, LICUS and RSLTC

In 1998, and then again in 2000, the Gulf states banned live animal imports from the Horn of Africa in response to outbreaks of Rift Valley Fever. This was a major blow for livestock producers in the region, for whom the Gulf is the primary and most lucrative export destination.

In response governments, donors and regional actors sought to develop programs to restart the livestock trade and reduce the risk of future disruption. Early on there was broad consensus that a successful program would involve facilitating dialogue between exporters and importers in order improve transparency and trust, along with some form of quarantine or disease monitoring to minimize disease risk.

Yet, this initial consensus quickly gave way to conflicting visions, conflicting personalities and inter-organizational politics. Ultimately, AU/IBAR, funded by USAID and led by American project staff, launched the Red Sea Livestock Trade Commission (RSLTC), while the FAO, with funding from Italian Cooperation and the World Bank, launched the closely linked Examination and Certification of Livestock Exports (EXCELEX) and LICUS programs. Both initiatives sought to increase live animal exports, and both sought to do this by increasing dialogue and developing quarantine facilities. But the IBAR program, influenced by US foreign policy interests, supported a single-stage quarantine at the port of Djibouti, while the FAO program sought a staged quarantine beginning in Ethiopia and leading to the port of Berbera in Somaliland.

Both EXCELEX and RSLTC have since been terminated, and are almost unanimously viewed as failures. Furthermore, there is lingering bad feeling about the projects within regional governments, between donors and the implementing agencies, and between the implementing agencies.

The Role and Influence of International Donors

Recent years have seen resurgent interest in livestock programs among donors, with all of the major donors involved in significant projects in the region either specifically targeting livestock, or looking more holistically at livelihoods in arid regions. This has significant implications for the IGAD LPI, as donors can be potential supporters of new IGAD and regional projects, potential allies in pushing particular policy and institutional reforms, and partners in strengthening capacity for livestock projects in the region. On the other hand, donor priorities may make reform in non-priority areas more difficult, while sudden changes in donor programs can sometimes complicate existing institutional arrangements and undermine capacity development. This section considers three general dimensions along which to evaluate donor behavior, and then considers specific donor priorities in the region and their relationship to IGAD.

Types of Projects: Technical Projects, Policy and Institutional Reform Projects and Direct Budget Support

Donor funding in the livestock sector has historically been heavily inclined towards technocratic solutions, but these projects have been very unsuccessful by almost all accounts (AU/IBAR 2004, Leonard 2006). There has consequently been a progressive shift towards projects with a stronger emphasis on policy and institutional reform, mirroring a growing emphasis on these issues in development thinking more broadly. Thus, donor projects in the IGAD region include several that are largely based on policy and institutional reform, such as the IGAD LPI, CAPE and the Pastoralists Communication Initiative (PCI), while almost all major donor projects now highlight support for community participation and policy reform. This suggests that the IGAD LPI should be able to find allies within the donor community.

That said, emphasis on policy and institutional reform is often stronger in theory than in practice. Incentives within donor agencies still do not support policy and institutional focus; such projects are likely to produce outputs that are both less immediate and less quantifiable, and that are likely to be more controversial with national governments. Thus formal performance indicators often remain highly technical in character, while donors often shy away from politically controversial issues, including cross-border issues and land issues (Birdsall 2005, Oxby 1999).²

The move among many donors towards direct budget support (DBS), further complicates this picture. DBS seeks to expand partner country ownership and control by replacing funding for specific projects and initiatives with general funding to government budgets coupled with certain forms of aid conditionality (IDD and Associates 2006, Barder and Birdsall 2006). The important issue for the IGAD LPI is that DBS reduces the availability of donor funds for specific reform initiatives. A key example is DFID, which is a leader in moving towards DBS, but as a consequence has had to reduce funding for policy and institutional reform projects, with this apparently contributing to the end of the CAPE project.

² There are exceptions to this rule. For example, the World Bank PCDP project is clear in its opposition to the Ethiopian government's preference for the settlement of pastoralists. Studies suggest that in a very difficult political environment the project has been among the stronger voices for change (Halderman 2003, World Bank 2003).

Capacity Development, Institution Building and Local Ownership

In 2005 the major donors finalized the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which emphasized the need for capacity development and institution building through increased local ownership, and the development of “partnership” and “mutual accountability” between donors and recipients (OECD 2005). While universally acknowledged as worthy goals, the ability of donors to make good on this commitment has been criticized on two grounds: The lack of patience among donors to build relationships and support real institutional development, and the unwillingness of donors to relinquish ultimate priority setting power (Eyben 2006, Birdsall 2005). Both issues have been apparent in the livestock sector in the IGAD region.

Within the IGAD region donor impatience and failure to build lasting, long-term, relationships is reflected in the movement of projects among IGAD, COMESA, IBAR and FAO. Donors have often completed livestock projects with one organization, only to complain of capacity limitations and pursue future projects with a different organization. Meanwhile, the FAO has remained an alternative for donors who prefer to largely bypass local organizations. Several examples of this lack of consistent donor engagement with regional bodies have already been noted in this report. A further example emerges from the genesis of the IGAD LPI: the EC initially discussed the possibility of a livestock project directly with IBAR, before ultimately funding an IGAD project implemented by FAO, despite the fact that IBAR had already conducted background research for the PPLPI project of which the IGAD LPI is a part.

Donors contend that their changing allegiances have reflected a major lack of capacity within the relevant organizations and changing realities on the ground with respect to the mandates given to AU IBAR and the RECs. There is no question that there is significant validity to this claim: IGAD suffers from significant capacity limitations, while IBAR has only recently completed a major process of reorganization. Yet many stakeholders are adamant that personal relationships, constantly changing staff and inter-organizational politics have figured prominently as well. Ultimately, the challenge is to find ways for donors to build more enduring and stable relationships with local bodies, while recognizing the major capacity limitations that exist. As a body capable of improving communication and coordination between donors and local bodies, and of providing institutional and policy support, the IGAD LPI should aspire to support the strengthening of these relationships.

Donor Coordination

The final area highlighted in the Paris Declaration is the need for improved donor coordination. This is motivated by three related concerns: that project overlap leads to inefficiency, that project proliferation imposes major administrative costs and occupies scarce government capacity, and that proliferating donor projects often “poach” the best staff from within governments (Eyben 2006).

At the national level there are clear examples of increasing donor coordination in the livestock sector, particularly in Kenya, Somalia and Southern Sudan (see, for example, FAO, World Bank and EU 2004). The IGAD LPI should seek to engage with these forums

At a regional level donor coordination is much more poorly developed, with country representatives from within the same donor agency often very poorly informed about activities in neighboring countries (see Box 4). This largely reflects the reliance of donors on country funding mechanisms and country offices (Birdsall 2004).³ Aside from

³ There are exceptions, as USAID has a regional office, while the EC has several regional projects, including the IGAD LPI and REFORM, although regional EC projects seem to be heavily influenced by Brussels during the

inefficiency, a major consequence of the lack of regional coordination is that agencies like IBAR find it difficult to operate regional programs due to the difficulties of fundraising, and of coordinating projects with multiple donors (see Box 4).

While noting the clear need for greater coordination in the region, it is important to note that coordination can be a mixed blessing for recipients. While the efficiency gains are clear, it can also generate excessive donor control over priority setting. Multiple projects can also be an efficient approach where the optimal response is unclear. The issue for member states and IGAD, then, is to support greater coordination where it reduces inefficiencies, but also to maintain strong local voices within coordination forums, and to support multiple approaches where it may be appropriate. One potential venue for pursuing this goal is the ALive platform, as it has made the development of sub-regional action plans a priority, though concerns about excessive donor influence within this forum should be borne in mind.

Box 4: The Limits of Regional Donor Coordination

Enhancing complementarity among projects in neighboring countries can be undermined by the isolation of one country office from the next within a given donor organization, and by the isolation of one donor from the next. An example of the first case is the World Bank's pastoral regions development projects in Ethiopia and Kenya. Despite being two projects funded by the same agency, the World Bank ultimately recruited the Pastoralist Communication Initiative to facilitate learning and coordination between the two projects. An example of the second problem is efforts by IBAR to expand the Kenya-specific NEPDP project into a regional initiative. Because funding is primarily conducted through country offices, they need to apply separately for funding for each country they hope to include in the project. Not only does this make fund raising more challenging, but it also implies more complex, and potentially contradictory, reporting requirements, as well as the risk of differing donor imposed components in each country.

Donor Priorities

The Security Agenda

Security concerns have figured increasingly prominently in the region. This reflects a feeling among donors that the prevalence of conflict in the region implies that sustainable development must begin with the resolution of conflict. Thus, for example, the past five meetings between IGAD and the IPF have focused exclusively on peace and security issues. This points towards the likelihood that clearly establishing links between development projects and peace building may be a valuable strategy. In this regard, earlier work by IBAR, which linked community peace building among pastoralists in the Karamojong region to sustainable development initiatives, is an important example (Wolmer and Scoones 2006, AU/IBAR no date).

development phase. In the case of the EC this regional focus reflects a mandate under the 9th European Development Fund (EDF) to work with regional bodies.

Donor behavior is further being shaped by the so-called “Global War on Terror” (GWOT). Concerns about the presence of Islamic forces in the region, and in Somalia in particular, have brought renewed concern with securing militarily allies, and controlling “high-risk” areas (Woods 2005). This has three major implications for the livestock sector. First, further potential benefits to emphasizing the connections between development and security. Second, there is at least one case in which development funds have been diverted towards securing security allies: the US made the construction of an animal holding facility in Djibouti, a key ally in the GWOT, a key component of the Red Sea livestock Trade Commission (RSLTC) project. Finally, it further complicates efforts to open trade along the Somali border with Ethiopia and Kenya, as donor agencies continue to support this objective, but western security officials wish to seal the border and are believed to be pushing the Ethiopian government in that direction.

Priority Livestock Areas: Marketing, Vulnerability and Natural Resource Management

Over the past four decades vastly different “narratives” about the future of livestock production, particularly in pastoral areas, have emerged, each bringing with them very different policy prescriptions (Scoones and Wolmer 2006, Oxby 2006, de Haan 1994). The present trend is towards a focus on a combination of improved marketing, decreased vulnerability and improved natural resource management, along with an emphasis on community participation and an ongoing concern with disease eradication (ALive 2004). Each of these issues has received widespread donor support. Underlying these particular areas of focus is a broader trend towards holistic development in pastoral areas, as opposed to programs targeting livestock in particular (e.g. the EC funded REFORM, the World Bank funded Arid Lands Resource Management (ALRM) Project in Kenya or the World Bank funded Pastoral Community Development Project (PCDP) in Ethiopia). These programs tend to integrate marketing, safety nets and environmental components, along with support for areas such as alternative livelihoods, community empowerment and improved social services. One risk in this approach is that the focus on holistic projects may overlook fundamental tensions between settled agricultural livelihoods and pastoralist livelihoods, and thus be liable to exclude certain pastoralist concerns (Oxby1999).

Donors, Regional Issues and IGAD

Researchers suggest that donors universally under-fund regional organizations and programs despite potentially high returns to such investment. This is attributed to a combination of coordination, attribution and bureaucratic difficulties. Coordination is an issue because funding regional programs demands coordinating multiple governments, all of whom are expected to “own” the project. Attribution is an issue because donors tend to prefer to work with individual governments both in order to demand accountability, and in order to gain geo-strategic and political advantages. Finally, bureaucracy is an issue because donors tend to be organized into country units, thus making multi-country coordination difficult (Birdsall 2004).

Funding for regional initiatives in the IGAD region has been further undermined by donors’ acknowledged inclination towards peace and security concerns, and a general aversion to working on highly politicized issues, a category into which virtually all of the cross-border issues in the region fall. This lack of funding has been exacerbated by already noted tensions between IGAD and donors: Donors have major concerns about the lack of capacity at IGAD while there remains a

largely unspoken tension between the desire of member states for ‘hard’ development projects, and a donor commitment to ‘soft projects’.

These factors suggest that donor support for regional initiatives could be strengthened in four ways: Increasing the capacity of the IGAD Secretariat, drawing connections between development and security, improving the correspondence between project proposals and donor preference for “soft” projects, and effectively demonstrating the support of member states for projects which deal with highly politicized issues.

The Role of the CGIAR Centers

Lying somewhere in between donors and civil society are the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) centers, which conduct internationally funded agricultural research geared toward the production of international public goods. Among the sixteen such centers world wide, the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) focuses on livestock issues and is based in East Africa, with large offices in both Nairobi and Addis Ababa.

ILRI conducts research on all elements of livestock production and marketing in order to support improved livelihoods for livestock producers. The focus is generally on technical questions, rather than more political questions related to policy making, institutions, and implementation. However, there has been a growing interest in policy research since it was initiated in 1992 (Ehui et al 2003). Further, as part of the broader CGIAR system, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) has established “Strategy Support Programs” in Uganda and Ethiopia, both of which incorporate some livestock questions and have a much more explicitly policy focused mandate (see Box 5).

Research conducted at ILRI serves as a crucial input into setting the policy and funding agenda for international donors and, to a lesser extent, for national governments. Thus, to take one example, the priority areas identified by the ALive platform are derived directly from ILRI’s research priorities (ALive 2004, ILRI 2000).

Box 5: IFPRI-ESSP, Producers Associations, iNGOs and the Ethiopian Dairy Industry

While it is part of the CGIAR network of research bodies, the IFPRI-ESSP is more explicitly committed to supporting policy reform. Among its projects are efforts to improve marketing conditions for dairy producers in Ethiopia. Their strategy has encompassed a research component, partnership with other civil society groups, and high-level political contacts. The strategy has revolved around convening regular meetings of producers and relevant government officials in order to allow producers themselves to advance their concerns. Lacking direct project ties to producers, the project has instead partnered with iNGOs, including Dutch NGO SNV and US organization Land O’Lakes, to convene the meetings. The added value that IFPRI has brought to the relationship is a small research capacity, but, more importantly, a respected international name and high-level political access within the government through the well-connected IFPRI-ESSP director.

Understanding the process by which ILRI sets priorities is thus of some importance. Generally, ILRI is charged with generating “international public goods” to contribute to poverty reduction, and thus is compelled to focus most of its resources on topics of relevance to the greatest number of poor people *globally*, while devoting rather less focus to regional priorities. Thus, based on the findings of a global poverty mapping exercise, the ILRI strategic plan states clearly that research will prioritize work on mixed agriculture-livestock systems, as such regions are home to the largest number of poor livestock keepers globally (ILRI 2000). Consequently, although pastoral regions in IGAD member states are disproportionately larger, prone to crisis, and afflicted by unsupportive policy regimes, policy and institutional challenges facing pastoral regions comprise only a relatively small, though still significant, part of the overall ILRI research program.

At a micro-level, ILRI is composed of five “themes”, of which the “Targeting R&D Opportunities” theme is formally charged with priority setting. This occurs through a negotiated process between ILRI and the donors who support it. At present the ILRI budget is roughly 50% core budgetary support, and 50% tied directly to specific research projects, making it one of the most financially independent of the CGIAR centers. Thus ILRI sets its own priorities based on an extensive and systematic research agenda, but, within the boundaries of those broad priorities, must seek to be flexible in meeting the needs and interests of donors, ultimately giving both parties some role in establishing priorities. These priorities are not only reflected in ILRI outputs, but also in the future behavior of donors.

Because ILRI falls within the remit of the global CGIAR Secretariat, which is headquartered at the World Bank in Washington, some observers claim a western bias within the organization. While likely true in some cases, it is important to remember that staff are from very diverse backgrounds and have often spent long periods based in developing countries. They consequently seem to often be more likely than most international bodies to criticize western perspectives that do not fit the local context.

In very specific instances it may be possible for the IGAD LPI to influence ILRI’s prioritization of core research funding, but in general ILRI priorities should likely be treated as given. The more valuable strategy is probably to make use of ILRI research in dealing both with national governments and international actors, as they are highly respected and likely to be better grounded in local conditions than many alternative international bodies are.

The Contribution of International Civil Society

There are a wide range of international NGOs (iNGOs) and civil society organizations active in livestock initiatives at the national and regional level. This includes groups working specifically on livestock issues, on issues affecting pastoral communities, on conflict issues, and on emergency response efforts. While many of these NGOs have projects in many of the IGAD countries, they generally do not have a regional program as such, and thus lack close coordination of projects across national borders. One exception to this rule is Oxfam GB, and as such they may be a useful ally, as well as offering insight into strategies for coordinating cooperation between IGAD and iNGOs across borders.

iNGOs generally work in partnership with local NGOs and seek to offer technical and financial support, as well as strengthening policy voices at the national and international level. This model means that these iNGOs often have very strong ties to local projects

and local communities, but less strength at national level, particularly in the more politically closed countries of the region.

iNGOs can thus be extremely valuable allies for the IGAD LPI by being conduits for linking local voices and experiences to the higher level activities of the IGAD LPI. Further, where policy and institutional reform demands some degree of political mobilization to be successful, iNGOs and their local partners are likely to be much more effective agents for demanding accountability than the IGAD LPI itself, which is directly accountable to the IGAD member states. The formal inclusion of both iNGOs and local NGOs within the CEWARN decision making process seems to be a valuable example in this respect, as it sought to maximize the relative strengths of the IGAD project and civil society.

3. POLICY OPPORTUNITIES AND PRIORITIES:

This complex international system provides the context in which the LPI will establish priority areas for reform, and strategies for addressing those issues. This section seeks to outline key technical and political considerations relevant to several policy areas on which the IGAD LPI may choose to focus. The analysis is divided between issues with a clear cross-border component, and issues that are of mutual concern to member states but are essentially national in character. Much greater analysis is devoted to regional issues, but this does not imply that they are necessarily more important, but instead reflects the fact that the country case studies that comprise the remaining reports in this IGAD LPI series all deal with national issues in great detail. Before turning to particular policy areas, the report first considers arguments in favor of a primary focus on either cross-border or national issues.

Orientation: Cross Border or National Focus?

While the separation between explicitly cross-border issues and national issues of regional concern is not absolute, there is nonetheless an important distinction which impacts on the feasibility of reform, the comparative advantage of an IGAD project and the relevant strategies to be adopted. The project need not focus exclusively in one area or the other, but a general inclination towards either national or regional activities will be an important strategic choice, and will likely shape the identity of the project in the eyes of other stakeholders.

IGAD's formal mandate is explicitly focused on addressing regional issues, while IGAD also has particular comparative advantages in addressing such issues: it has a significant ability to convene high-ranking officials to discuss regional issues, and it primarily engages member states through ministries of foreign affairs, which are essential to resolving cross border issues but have rarely engaged meaningfully with livestock issues. Consistent with this mandate, most stakeholders immediately associate IGAD, and thus the IGAD LPI, with work on cross-border issues

Other authorities in the region have been particularly unsuccessful in addressing cross-border issues. Tensions between member states have been a consistent barrier to bilateral initiatives, IBAR and FAO have struggled to effectively engage member states, donors have been encumbered by bureaucratic constraints and an aversion to highly politicized issues, and civil society lacks the capacity to move beyond successful local initiatives. Meanwhile, the surge in donor interest in livestock has meant that national livestock policy forums are increasingly crowded. Thus, a focus on cross-border issues is attractive because it fits with IGAD's mandate and represents a clear comparative advantage for the project.

On the other hand, there are also clear disadvantages to adopting a cross-border focus. Cross-border livestock issues inevitably intersect with concerns about security and sovereignty, and as such tend to be significantly more politicized, and to confront more powerful vested interests. This reflects the long history of conflict and tensions in the region, and long standing concerns about sovereignty within Ethiopia in particular (Woodward 1996). As a consequence policy change in these areas is likely to be significantly more difficult to achieve.

There are also clear advantages to a focus on national issues of mutual concern to member states. Many countries in the region face similar challenges in formulating policies on everything from veterinary services to resource management, and while work on such issues is not as explicitly consistent with the IGAD mandate, interviews in the region suggest that participation by the IGAD LPI would be welcomed in many such areas. Furthermore, apparently national policies may only be fully effective when implemented on both sides of the border, particularly those affecting mobile pastoral populations. Given the widespread absence of well formulated and implemented national livestock policies, a focus on such policies may have several advantages relative to a cross-border focus: a) more immediate, and more significant, poverty reduction benefits; b) a greater likelihood of success, due to less politicization and a smaller number of more accessible key decision makers; c) the potential to demonstrate immediate success and build momentum; d) greater correspondence with established national priorities; and e) the potential to provide a solid foundation on which to build regional harmonization.

Ultimately, it is only the program staff who will be able to make this decision based on a further evaluation of the political environment, and of looming opportunities, in consultation with the member states.

Issues with Explicit Cross-Border Characteristics

Promoting International Trade: Alternative Approaches to Disease Control

Recent years have seen a growing interest among both governments and donors in promoting international trade in livestock and livestock products. The ability to achieve this goal is largely constrained by the ability of local livestock and livestock products to meet international standards for safety from disease. This challenge has traditionally been conceived as a technical challenge, with most projects aimed at the creation of 'disease free zones' through the eradication of major livestock diseases. Within the region this approach is exemplified by rinderpest eradication efforts pursued in turn by the PARC, PACE and SERECU projects (Scoones and Wolmer 2006, Thomson 2004). Because these projects are part of global disease eradication programs, and are housed in powerful international organizations committed to a particular approach, the IGAD LPI is unlikely to have a particularly large role to play in shaping disease eradication projects.

By contrast, the IGAD LPI may be in a position to play a prominent role in the development of alternative approaches to achieving export product safety. Interest in such projects is on the rise due to growing skepticism regarding the medium-term viability and practicality of disease eradication approaches in Africa. At a practical level, this report has already detailed the RSLTC, EXCELEX and LICUS projects in some detail, while at the level of research there is increasing attention to the nature of international standards, and possibilities for commodity-based trade (Thomson 2004, Nelson 2005).

Advocacy for alternatives to disease free zones must first persuade national governments, as well as donors, of the merits of alternative approaches generally. Among both governments and donors there remains a significant attachment to disease eradication approaches. For governments this probably reflects the fact that veterinary officers have been trained in that tradition, that governments have always operated that way, and that international actors continue to wield significant influence. Donor commitment to disease eradication seems to reflect a combination of a legitimate practical and academic debate, a longstanding history of investment which is difficult to turn away from, and self-interest, as disease eradication is the most effective means to protect northern herds and acts as a non-tariff barrier to trade. Many observers also feel that both governments

and donors have been excessively focused on international exports. Overcoming the shared weight of technocracy, history and international influence will require mobilizing the best research, facilitating strategic experience sharing, and building alliances with supportive parties within international organizations (Scoones and Wolmer 2006, Thomson 2004).

Even then, the identification of viable and effective alternative strategies is both technically and politically complex.

Technically, such alternatives may include commodity-based trade, quarantine, improved surveillance, and a more selective use of disease eradication, each of which is likely to be most appropriate in particular circumstances. Thus, those focused on international exports may need to rely on lengthy quarantine and stronger relationships between importers and exporters. By contrast, the export of niche products may be fully amenable to commodity-based trading, while regional trade may be strengthened through improved communication and better monitoring of disease outbreaks and environmental conditions.

Politically, the viability of these different alternatives relies on the ability to reform international standards, improve relationships between exporters and importers, and gain the support of all of the relevant regional actors. Each of these areas has proven to be intractable to date.

Reforming International Standards

International standards set at the OIE are meant to define a maximum level of risk for the export of livestock and livestock products. The present OIE code specifies particular diseases that should be eradicated before animal products can be exported. Yet critics contend that because different livestock products carry different levels of risk, the code should be organized by product, thus making it possible to export certain livestock products even where diseases remain endemic (Scoones and Wolmer 2006, Wolmer and Scoones 2005). While the code as written does not entirely preclude commodity-based trade, as illustrated by various existing examples around the world, it undeniably makes such trade more precarious due to the lack of regulatory clarity.

The current structure of the code is widely felt to reflect prevailing conditions in the west, where disease eradication is the standard method for ensuring product safety. The persistence of this state of affairs reflects the relative powerlessness of African voices within OIE negotiations, owing to a lack of technical capacity, the exercise of power by developed countries, and procedural inequalities. Yet, there are reason to believe that reform may be possible. First, the OIE is a national membership organization in which the African delegation possesses 53 votes, thus granting it potentially formidable influence if it can present a unified position. Second, despite a general preference for existing standards there are important pockets of support for reform among donors and international organizations, including the FAO. Some individuals report that the OIE membership may also gradually be becoming more open to discussions of reform.

In support of possible reform, the EC has recently funded the "Participation of African Nations in Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard-setting Organizations" (PAN-SPSO) project. It aims to enhance African participation in standards setting bodies by a) strengthening the technical capacity of African negotiators to the OIE and b) improving coordination among African negotiators by supporting regional meetings of African negotiators prior to OIE meetings. This new project presents an opportunity to empower African negotiators to push for changed standards, better

suited to the African context. Yet, some observers report that initial project activities seem geared towards building African capacity to meet existing standards, rather than empowering negotiators to press for change. The IGAD LPI is uniquely positioned to participate in regional meetings organized under this project, and ensure that ideas about alternatives are heard.

Relationships between Importers and Exporters

While commodity-based trade may facilitate entry into narrow livestock product markets, much of the livestock trade from the IGAD member states is in live animals. Experience from the export trade from Somalia to the Gulf states suggests that in the absence of disease eradication a central challenge is to generate dialogue between exporters in the Horn of Africa and Middle-Eastern importers as a way to build mutually acceptable export standards. This was the principle underlying the RSLTC, as well as the FAO LICUS project.

The LICUS project reports meaningful success in continuing to facilitate unofficial exports in this way. By contrast, negotiations at an official level have been unsuccessful, with the consequence that current arrangements remain informal and uncertain. This failure seems to reflect both the absence of profit incentives for the Gulf states to engage, as they have simply substituted livestock imports from Australia and New Zealand, and an inability to create a forum in which all parties are content to engage. The inability to convene member states was in part driven by their relative exclusion from planning processes, and in part by unclear regional mandates: IGAD and IBAR were said to lack the mandate to convene a forum involving Middle-Eastern states, while the FAO lacked credibility with member states of IGAD.

Developing Approaches which are Politically Acceptable Within the Region

Perhaps the most telling factor undermining efforts to develop alternative export platforms in the region has been the failure to secure the support of all of the countries in the region. Along with Somalia, Ethiopia is the country in the region with the greatest export capacity, accounting for a large share of the animals that pass through Somali ports, and the vast majority of any prospective trade through the port of Djibouti (Devereux 2006, Halderman 2004). Thus having the support of the Ethiopian government is essential to maintaining the regular flow of trade. Yet the RSLTC, EXCELEX and LICUS projects all failed to secure the active support and participation of the Ethiopian government (see Box 6). This ultimately undermined the projects, and is a reminder that attention to high-level political processes is essential to arriving at an acceptable solution.

Cross-Border Pastoralist Conflict

Cross-border conflict among pastoralists is an issue that has had major negative impacts on pastoral livelihoods, and has contributed to tensions among states in the region (PCI 2005). The issue has nonetheless tended to be largely ignored by central governments due to a lack of government capacity, and interest, in remote areas where conflict has occurred (Wolmer and Scoones 2005).

Box 6: RSLTC, LICUS and EXCELEX Revisited: Getting Buy-In From Member States

RSLTC is notorious for its failure to secure support from member states. Originally founded on the premise of supporting exports by improving communication between importers and exporters, and by improving disease monitoring, the program ultimately oversaw the construction of a quarantine facility in Djibouti. By all accounts this was an effort to 'reward' Djibouti for their support of US military interests, but the project was ultimately undermined by the high cost of quarantine in Djibouti and political opposition from Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government was officially angered at being excluded from project planning, unfairly denied a share of the revenue associated with quarantine and medical certification, and at having so-called "Ethiopian cattle" certified by foreign authorities. Unofficially, some suggest that they were also upset by the prospect of a project that seemingly endorsed the idea of unitary Somali livestock export region spanning parts of both Ethiopia and Somalia. Ultimately, as Ethiopia's complaints became more vocal, IBAR, which was the local project implementation agency, withdrew support. USAID cancelled its involvement soon after, with the Djiboutian government initially taking over sole control of the quarantine facility which has now reportedly come under the control of a private investor from the gulf.

The EXCELEX project encountered similar political opposition as it sought to establish a staged quarantine process beginning in Ethiopia and ending in Somalia. Despite placing part of the quarantine within Ethiopia, the Ethiopian government continued to undermine the project, largely by inaction. While official decision making in Ethiopia is rather opaque, several explanations for their continued resistance are suggested: Resistance to increased movement of people and animals across the Somali border, a continued desire to share in port fees when animals are exported from Berbera, and a generalized preference for meat exports as opposed to live animal exports. This last possibility is said to reflect the fact that meat exports by air would reduce cross-border traffic, along with unofficial suggestions that highly influential people within Ethiopia control abattoirs, which are currently operating below capacity.

This has recently begun to change through the combined efforts of civil society and the CEWARN project (see Box 1). While not without areas for improvement, the success of CEWARN to date suggests that the IGAD LPI is not likely to play a leading role in this area. It also highlights the extent to which IGAD projects can play a very important role in addressing cross border issues. As noted earlier, this success has reflected strategic partnerships with civil society, a deliberate effort to include member states throughout project development, the ability to diffuse bilateral tensions through multilateral forums, and persistent sensitivity to the centrality of questions of security and sovereignty when dealing with cross-border issues.

Cross-Border Movement and Intra-Regional Trade

Cross-border intra-regional movement and trade is of major importance to the livestock dependent poor. Indeed, many experts contend that while donors and governments have tended to focus on international exports, the expansion of intra-regional trade may be both more attainable, and of greater significance to the livestock dependent poor, who may be relatively excluded from international markets (Scoones and Wolmer 2006, Otieno and Kimenyi 2003). Unlike international trade, for which animal health has been the largest constraint, intra-regional trade is strongly influenced by prohibitive government regulations, informality, the lack of market infrastructure, livestock seizures and the closing of borders (Little et al. 2001, Little and Mahmoud 2005, AKlilu 2002, Devereux

2006). Analytically, it is helpful to distinguish the more straight-forward question of cross-border mobility for grazing purposes, from the more complex issue of cross border trade.

Cross-Border Movement

The issue of mobility is of fundamental importance to pastoral livestock keepers, whose traditional transhumance routes often cross national borders. For the most part, pastoralists are, in practice, able to move relatively freely across borders for grazing purposes. This freedom, though, is not absolute nor ensured, as there is no formal system in place in order to ensure that livestock keepers' rights are fully protected. This is a problem that has afflicted pastoralists throughout Africa, and the countries of the ECOWAS region have recently developed a Transhumance Certificate, which acts as a "Livestock passport" and ensures free mobility across borders for grazing purposes. This provides a potentially valuable model for IGAD, and is likely to gain legitimacy from having been an African initiative. Further, members of the Pastoral Affairs Standing Committee in Ethiopia have publicly expressed their support for developing such a program, offering a ready entry point and set of allies (Guleid 2005, Gebru et al. 2003).

Cross-Border Trade

At present, the vast majority of intra-regional livestock trade is conducted informally, with both livestock and livestock keepers moving back and forth across borders. Continued informality reflects the high taxation and regulatory costs of trading through formal channels, many of which are difficult or impossible for small traders to meet. Informality implies three major costs. First, the relative absence of infrastructure for facilitating trade and maintaining animal health and weight during transport and marketing adds significantly to costs. Second, informality increases the vulnerability of the weakest members of the supply chain, who are most often small producers, while benefiting the most powerful actors, who are generally the buyers in urban centers (Aklilu 2002, Little and Mahmoud 2005). Finally, informality increases the risk of police and military seizures, most notoriously reflected in efforts by the Ethiopian government to restrict so-called "contraband" trade (Devereux 2006). As a consequence, pastoral groups have actively called for more modest and effective regulation of cross-border trade, and the end of punitive government action (PCI 2005). Progress in this regard will demand navigating a complex political economy within which several factors figure prominently.

Sovereignty, Revenues and Ethiopian Resistance

While all of the governments in the region have at times over taxed and over regulated the livestock trade, including involvement in livestock seizures, the activities of the Ethiopian government seem to have had the most dominant impact in the region and are indicative of issues elsewhere.

Ethiopia is geographically central and a major source of regional trade, but has been responsible for the majority of regulation and seizures and seems most hostile to the live animal trade. Officially, Ethiopian efforts to constrain the "contraband" trade, and to impose significant regulation and taxation, are aimed at securing revenue, and at maintaining control over "Ethiopian livestock." This latter idea seems to include interests in continued control over certification, as well as sharing in tax revenues from the export or slaughter of Ethiopian livestock in neighboring countries.

In practice, these official explanations are coupled with three unofficial motives that seem to be of significant importance. First, concerns about sovereignty in border regions, and particularly in the Somali region, have led to a desire for

control, and for a strong, and visible, government security presence. Second, there is a widely held belief that the Ethiopian government supports a move towards meat exports by air, as opposed to live animal exports by sea (see Box 6). Third, there appears to be a general hostility towards free intra-regional trade, with Ethiopia accused of restricting both outward and *inward* trade. This likely emerges from the legacy of a centrally controlled economy.

The Absence of International Involvement

The involvement of international actors in this area has been very modest. This apparently reflects the fixation of international organizations on international exports rather than inter-regional trade, and the reluctance of international actors to become engaged in highly sensitive border issues. The few positive examples are from civil society groups. Oxfam has been a leader in this respect, having worked to develop local cross-border trade ties in the Harshin region, on the Ethiopia-Somaliland border, with some success. Yet civil society groups have relatively limited influence at the federal level, particularly in Ethiopia, and this restricts efforts to facilitate cross-border trade given the prominence of federal issues of security, sovereignty and the military.

The Absence of Effective Authority in Somalia

Because a large portion of this trade occurs along the Ethiopia-Somalia border, the absence of a functioning official government in Somalia poses a significant challenge. That said, there have been expanding trade talks between the Ethiopia government and authorities in Somaliland, while there are indications that continued uncertainty regarding conflict in the south is encouraging Ethiopia to further strengthen those ties. Thus there may be relatively unofficial openings to progress in this region, though the political climate is likely to remain volatile.

Prospects for Reform

In principle arguments for reform are persuasive: the status quo of high taxes, high regulation and police and military interventions has failed to induce greater formality, and as such has raised costs to both traders and government without resulting in higher revenues or other benefits of formality. More modest taxation and regulation may well lead to greater formality, which benefits traders, and to higher tax revenues and more effective monitoring, which benefits governments.

The difficulty is that reforming cross-border relationships demands engaging with ministries of foreign affairs, while security concerns imply the involvement of security interests as well. These groups have rarely shown much interest in livestock issues. Yet, interviews suggest that while security forces remain opposed to greater opening, there is significant sympathy for the cause of reform within ministries of foreign affairs in the region. They may be able to serve as important allies.

Finally, it is worth noting one modest example of success, though details are limited: Ethiopia and Sudan have maintained an Ethio-Sudanese Joint Border Development Commission at the level of states in border regions that has enjoyed very gradual success in freeing cross border movement and trade. This may be a model to build on.

National Issues of Mutual Concern

The country case studies in the IGAD LPI series provide extensive details on national policy issues. Thus, this section simply offers brief reflections of the value of engagement with national issues. It also addresses two issues of national policy that may be particularly amenable to a regional approach.

Improving National Policy and Policy Making Capacity

The Need for National Policy and Institutional Reform

A review of livestock policy, institutions and capacity in the region, conducted by IBAR in 2003 and originally commissioned by the PPLPI, found that throughout the region there was a distinct absence of livestock policy, and of policy making capacity. They also reported that relevant officials were generally open about these deficiencies, and in search of support in the development of effective policy. As such, the IBAR research recommended that the PPLPI Horn of Africa Hub, which has since emerged into the IGAD LPI, should focus on supporting the development of basic policy making capacity and institutional structures. It was felt that this would best correspond with the desires of member states, while also providing the greatest impact given the potentially large gains from getting relatively straightforward programs operational. The calculus is somewhat different for the IGAD LPI, because IGAD, unlike IBAR, is an explicitly regional body, but the conclusions of the IBAR study are nonetheless highly relevant.

Without delving into the details of particular policy areas, it is also worthwhile to echo one major conclusion of the IBAR studies: the IGAD LPI is likely to be most effective where it supports ongoing processes of policy and institutional reform within member states, including in relation to national development plans, rather than *a priori* identifying priority areas and seeking to develop policy prescriptions from the outside. This means working with and training policy makers, but also seeking to strategically connect policy makers to other actors, among them civil society groups, researchers and local political actors who are likely to make reform sustainable.

The Value of a Regional Approach

There is evidence that efforts to support national policy and institutional reform may often be most successful when pursued using a regional approach. This means working with multiple member states facing similar challenges in order to support inter-regional learning, discussion and experience sharing. A regional approach is likely to diffuse tensions, build trust and enhance the credibility of proposed reforms. While such an approach is not without logistical and technical costs, the possibility of playing a regional convening role is an important comparative advantage enjoyed by IGAD and should be exploited.

One example is the CEWARN project, which used a regional forum as a means to get individual countries to address previously overlooked and uncomfortable issues, and to gradually encourage the collection and sharing of data on the basis of shared progress. In a similar vein, the CAPE project made extensive use of regional experience sharing among both governments and civil society bodies in advancing the case for CAHW's. More recently, the Pastoralist Communication Initiative has pursued similar strategies of regional experience sharing at a local level, for example bringing Kenyan pastoralists who were challenging discriminatory land policies in Kenya to meet Ethiopian pastoralists confronting similar challenges.

Box 4: The Introduction of Community-Based Animal Health Workers (CAHWs)

The provision of veterinary services in Sub-Saharan Africa has been plagued by the difficulty of providing access in areas with few resources, limited infrastructure, mobile populations and risks of conflict. It has long been suggested that the solution is to equip livestock keepers themselves to diagnose and treat common livestock diseases. This possibility has faced resistance from established interests, led by official Veterinary Associations.

The CAPE project set out to overcome this resistance and employed a wide array of political strategies to this end, including:

- developing projects at a local level in collaboration with NGOs and government projects. These projects allowed for the introduction of IBAR-trained CAHWs who both illustrated the impact of the approach and became a constituency for change.
- identified well placed allies within government, within academia and within the Veterinary Associations
- played an active convening role, facilitating meetings among policy makers, practitioners and researchers, a participatory impact assessment involving policy-makers, and a trip for policy-makers to see privatized veterinary services in action in Zambia
- having built a critical mass of practical experience, academic research and political support the project pushed for the institutionalization of support for CAHWs within government bureaucracies.
- the project initially pursued policy change in Ethiopia, due to a group of supportive allies, but then drew on the Ethiopian experience to motivate progress elsewhere in the region (Wolmer and Scoones 2005)

Emergency Livestock Interventions

The IGAD LPI may be able to play an important regional role in improving emergency livestock interventions. Emergency response has traditionally focused on preserving human lives, but with changing understandings of drought and famine interventions have increasingly focused on the need to preserve livelihoods as well (Oxfam 2006, Barrett and Maxwell 2005). In response to these concerns the SPHERE project, initiated in 1997 by a civil society consortium, developed guidelines for better integrating emergency response with long term development needs (Sphere Project 2004).

A civil society consortium is now seeking to develop similar guidelines in the livestock sector, dealing with issues like supporting de-stocking and stocking activities, and ensuring that the provision of emergency veterinary services does not undermine local veterinary services and pharmacies (Aklilu 2002). The Feinstein Center for International Affairs, which has an office in Addis Ababa and is largely led by staff previously involved with the CAPE project at IBAR, is involved with these efforts and is also working with the Ethiopian government to develop a national plan for emergency response in the livestock sector.

While such guidelines are valuable, the largest single challenge facing emergency response efforts is the dominant role of donors, and their continued tendency to respond too late to emergencies, and to do a poor job of integrating emergency response with

ongoing development objectives. This is a long-standing problem, with connections to domestic politics in the north, and is unlikely to experience a revolutionary change overnight. However, there may be a positive role for the IGAD LPI to play in sharing the experience of Ethiopia's development of a national plan for emergency response in the livestock sector with other member states in the region. Over the longer term stronger guidelines in recipient countries may help to improve donor responses

The Land Question: Ways Forward?

The question of land policy is of huge importance for pastoralists, due to their reliance on access to common property and resources, and increasing conflict with agriculturalists over access to those resources. Yet, the land question is very politically controversial, and international organizations have almost entirely shied away from the issue, with the few exceptions like PCI working very delicately (PCI 2005). It is thus an issue that demands the support of international projects like the IGAD LPI, but it is equally an issue that may be intractable for such a small project. Indeed, one government official interviewed for this report emphatically stressed that land policy was an issue of strictly national concern and not suitable for outside intervention.

That said, some observers suggest that if there is any platform for addressing this politically charged issue, it may through experience and best practice sharing at the regional level. Such a context *may* be able to reduce the sense of defensiveness that governments seem to feel around this issue, with opportunities to then gradually expand the scope of those discussions. Some observers have noted that discussions around land policy are ongoing (albeit hesitantly) and somewhat more advanced in Kenya than elsewhere, and this may provide a plausible entry point.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations that follow deal with both what issues to work on and how to work effectively on those issues. The country case studies that comprise the remaining papers in this IGAD LPI series seek to provide detailed analysis of which issues at the national level are most important for poverty reduction and most likely to be amenable to reform. While this paper does this to a certain extent, it is more concerned with situating those more detailed recommendations within the existing international context, and thus providing insight into how the international context should shape the *reform strategies* employed. This includes identifying strategies for approaching particular areas of livestock policy reform, as well as highlighting the need for institutional reform in order to make reform sustainable. This makes the recommendations which follow somewhat less quantifiable, but no less important.

National Livestock Policy Issues

General Considerations

This paper has generally not sought to point to particular areas of national policy warranting reform efforts, as this has been the focus of the country case studies in the IGAD LPI series, but has instead considered the general case for working on national, as opposed to cross-border, issues.

Given the widespread absence of well formulated and implemented national livestock policies, a focus on such policies may have several advantages relative to a cross-border focus: a) more immediate, and more significant, poverty reduction benefits; b) a greater likelihood of success, due to less politicization and a smaller number of more accessible key decision makers; c) the potential to demonstrate immediate success and build momentum; d) greater correspondence with established national priorities; e) the potential to provide a solid foundation on which to build regional harmonization.

While the decision regarding a general orientation towards national or regional issues can only be made by the project staff, it would be wise to include at least a narrow set of national issues in order to increase the likelihood of registering some highly tangible and visible successes.

Specific Issues

Land Issues

Land issues demand much greater attention from international actors than is currently the case and are of major importance to pastoralists in particular. However, given the political sensitivity of the issue and the limited resources of the project, the IGAD LPI should probably only enter into this arena if particular circumstances facilitate such an intervention. Even then political sensitivity will be a necessity.

Emergency Response

There is significant ongoing work in this area, most notably efforts, led by the Feinstein Centre, to develop a national emergency response plan for livestock in Ethiopia. There may be an important and easily accessible role for the IGAD LPI to play in helping to share this experience with the other IGAD member states. As such, the IGAD LPI should contact those involved in the project to investigate possible collaboration.

Regional Livestock Policy Issues

General Considerations

IGAD's mandate is explicitly focused on addressing regional issues, and most stakeholders immediately associate IGAD, and thus the IGAD LPI, with work on cross-border issues. Conversely, other authorities have been notably unable to effectively address regional issues. Meanwhile, the surge in donor interest in livestock has meant that national livestock policy forums are increasingly crowded. This provides a very strong case in principle for adopting a focus on cross-border issues.

In practice, though, cross-border livestock issues inevitably intersect with concerns about security and sovereignty, and as such tend to be highly politicized, implying that policy change in these areas is likely to be both gradual and difficult to achieve. This suggests the need to a) adopt incremental reform objectives when working on cross-border issues and b) combine work on these relatively 'high risk' issues with other more easily achievable reform efforts.

Specific Issues

Promoting Alternative Approaches to Disease Control and Livestock Exports

- 1) the IGAD LPI has a clear opportunity to support the strengthening of African voices in the negotiation of international animal health and livestock product safety standard. The EC funded PAN-SPSO project provides technical support for member states and convenes regional forums of African negotiators. Within regional forums the IGAD LPI should act to ensure that alternative ideas are fully considered, while seeking to act as a unifying voice in developing strong negotiating positions.
- 2) the IGAD LPI on its own lacks the capacity and authority to convene forums of member states and importing countries that could seek to negotiate mutually acceptable export standards and monitoring arrangements. Thus, initiative will likely have to emerge from member states or the AU. If this occurs, the IGAD LPI could play an important role in ensuring that the lessons of past projects are learned, in improving coordination among relevant bodies, and in ensuring continued engagement with all member states.

Pastoral Conflict

- 1) the issue of pastoral conflict is already being addressed by a major IGAD project, CEWARN, and as such the IGAD LPI probably has relatively little to add in this domain.

Facilitating Intra-Regional Movement and Trade

- 1) the IGAD LPI should support those in the region calling for the creation of a "Transhumance Certificate" to formalize and facilitate the movement of

pastoralists across borders. A useful first step may be to identify allies within individual member states and then seek to insert this issue on to the agenda of a future meeting of the IGAD member states.

- 2) the IGAD LPI should investigate recent research on the relative poverty reduction impact of intra-regional versus international exports. If there is strong evidence in favor of greater emphasis of intra-regional trade then the IGAD LPI could usefully publicize these findings in relevant forums.
- 3) while controversial, there may be an opportunity for the IGAD LPI to initiate conversations at the regional level regarding the liberalization of intra-regional livestock trade. An appropriate first step might involve seeking out potential allies within ministries of foreign affairs who could conceivably bring this issue to the level of IGAD. Discussions regarding trade with Somalia may need to be dealt with on a bilateral basis, building on existing informal linkages.

Recommendations for IGAD

The recommendations in this section imply fundamental reform of IGAD's relationship to member states and donors. Such institutional reform is inherently slow, but is an indispensable element of making IGAD an effective body for addressing regional livestock issues in the long-term. The IGAD LPI should thus be involved as far as possible in promoting these reform processes, though with the clear recognition that success will be incremental, and that not all of the progress that might be desirable will be possible over the limited time frame of the project.

Clarifying Regional Mandates

Each of the AU DREA, ALive platform, IBAR, IGAD, COMESA, and FAO have, at different times, adopted important roles in addressing livestock issues in the region. There is no absolute right or wrong answer regarding the appropriate role of these bodies, as all have a role to play. What is important is that improved communication allow for the development of more consistent roles, complementary projects, and greater capacity.

While interpretations of precise roles differ, the prevailing views, as understood by this research, are as follows:

The AU DREA provides the overarching framework under which the other bodies operate. It has developed the CAADP, and a companion document on livestock development, and these provide general priorities for AU IBAR and the RECs, though at a fairly general level.

The *ALive platform* seeks to act as a multi-stakeholder priority setting body for African livestock policy. There remain concerns that it is usurping national priority setting roles, but if leadership is effectively transferred to African authorities it may be a valuable venue for linking African and international stakeholders.

IBAR is the coordinating body for the livestock component of CAADP, and has a mandate to provide technical support to the RECs, and to engage in strategic planning, policy harmonization and best practice dissemination. IBAR is to pursue its technical support mandate by working closely with the RECs, rather than directly with member states, except where the RECs explicitly request technical or policy support at the country level. At the time of writing, the ALive secretariat was in the process of being relocated to IBAR, formally giving IBAR a leading role in livestock specific priority setting.

The RECs are to act as the direct link with member states, acting as regional coordinating bodies for all livestock projects, as well as feeding regional preferences to the AU level

for priority setting and strategic planning. Where RECs lack capacity to implement projects, they are expected to look either to IBAR, FAO or to outside consultants for technical assistance. Within the Horn of Africa, IGAD is officially expected to deal with food security and peace and security issues, while COMESA is to address trade issues. There remains some ambiguity about how to deal with trade in livestock and grain, both of which relate to food security and are thus identified as IGAD priority issues.

Finally, *the FAO*, in partnership with organizations like OIE, is to act as the global normative organization for the purposes of standards setting and best practices dissemination. At the level of implementation, the FAO has valuable technical capacity to offer, but the general feeling within the region is that FAO should act as a technical support and implementation agency where such support is requested by either IBAR or the RECs. By the same token, FAO should play a less assertive role than previously in driving an independent agenda in the region.

These roles are ideal types: not yet reflected on the ground, and likely to be subject to continuous negotiation, reflecting both vested interests and the development of technical capacity within African organizations. What is clear is that IGAD has been given an extensive official mandate, including a role in defining the appropriate activities for IBAR and FAO in the region. As such, the IGAD LPI should be actively involved in supporting IGAD to play a more effective coordinating role in the region, and thus in more consistently defining the roles of the many organizations discussed here. There is, unfortunately, no blueprint for more effectively defining organizational mandates and improving their coordination. Instead, this process will rely on a commitment to the progressive development of regular dialogue, continuous negotiation and closer working relationships.

Formalizing Intergovernmental Cross-Border Institutions

When dealing with any cross-border issue trust is critical. Given the long history of conflict, this is particularly true in the IGAD region. Those projects that have managed to secure cooperation across borders, such as CEWARN and PACE/SERECU, have found that establishing official and non-threatening forums for discussion and information sharing can be a valuable strategy in building this trust. While sometimes rightly derided as forums for conversation but not for action, such forums, when carefully assembled and with progressively expanding mandates, can be effective.

Where there is support from member states for doing so, IGAD is in an ideal position to facilitate the establishment of such forums. The Ethio-Sudanese Joint Border Development Commission may be able to act as a useful example, though available information on this initiative is quite limited.

Working with Donors

Donors have historically played a more dominant role in Africa than in other parts of the world. As such IGAD should continue to demand local ownership of priority setting. There is also value in pragmatically designing projects to correspond with donor priorities to some extent. Many donors, among them Italy, Canada and the Nordic countries, seem ready to support IGAD in principle, if capacity concerns can be overcome and project proposals can be tailored somewhat more closely to donor priorities. The EC and DFID also emerge as potential partners, as the EC has committed itself to working with the RECs under their new funding guidelines, while DFID has been a consistent innovator in supporting policy and institutional reform projects. By contrast, the relationship between USAID and IGAD seems particularly strained at present, though there is still value in

seeking better coordination with USAID projects even where funding for IGAD is not forthcoming.

In considering donor priorities, certain guidelines should be borne in mind. First, donors are highly concerned with security and peace making in the region, implying that where livestock programs can be seen to contribute towards this goal they may have a funding advantage. Second, the three most prominent recent priorities in donor funded livestock programs have been marketing, the reduction of vulnerability and natural resource management. Projects which encompass these elements are likely to be well received. Third, most donors, led by the EC, have continued to support disease eradication as the predominant strategy for facilitating livestock trade, while a growing number of local voices have pressed for a greater consideration of alternatives. Managing this politically tense dynamic may be relevant to maintaining donor support. Finally, with particular reference to IGAD, donors have expressed a clear preference for “soft” programs focused on policy harmonization, information and capacity building on a regional basis.

A final challenge lies in seeking to improve coordination among donor projects. The inability of donors to coordinate projects across borders, and to design regional projects, has been particularly problematic, and this is an area in which IGAD is particularly well placed to play a convening role.

Recommendations for the IGAD LPI

The recommendations in this section offer strategic guidance to the IGAD LPI in devising effective *reform strategies* that will improve the likelihood of achieving successful and sustainable reform in any policy areas that are ultimately selected.

Supporting Capacity Building at IGAD and IBAR

The most basic challenge facing the project is a significant lack of capacity at the IGAD Secretariat and at AU IBAR, though there are particularly encouraging signs of progress in the latter case. The long-term aims of this project can only be achieved if sufficient capacity is developed within these two bodies to sustain and continue reforms initiated by the IGAD LPI.

How to achieve effective capacity building is a very large and challenging topic far beyond the scope of this paper. Two general comments are possible with regard to IGAD. First, effective capacity building requires the development of a close working relationship between the IGAD Secretariat and the project staff. This has often not been the case with other IGAD projects, and as such will require concerted effort by those involved. Second, given significant limitations of both capacity and funding at IGAD, it will be necessary to prioritize particular types of capacity over others. It would seem that IGAD’s comparative advantage lies in its ability to convene governments and other important policy actors to promote dialogue, learning and experience sharing. Thus, this would seem to be the most appropriate focus for capacity building efforts, with greater technical capacity to be concentrated at IBAR.

Linking Local Voices to National Processes

Fundamental to the work of the IGAD LPI should be efforts to link grassroots voices, including civil society, producers’ associations and local government, to national policy processes. This will benefit civil society groups that often have very strong local programs, but limited access to national policy makers. It will also be necessary if the

IGAD LPI is to achieve its own priorities: as a relatively small project which lacks an independent grassroots presence, civil society allies can provide the project with invaluable political support, without which official bodies may find little incentive for reform.

Participating in Priority Setting

Success in pursuing specific areas of reform demands that the IGAD LPI maintain sufficient involvement in major agenda setting processes to ensure a reasonably supportive overall policy environment. This means paying particular to priority setting at the AU DREA and the ALive platform.

At the level of the AU DREA, the current livestock companion document to the CAADP provides a relatively supportive policy framework, while being sufficiently vague to allow substantial freedom to regional bodies and national governments. However, there have been discussions about developing a more detailed livestock policy at the AU level, and should such an initiative move forward it is essential that the IGAD LPI be involved in this process directly or through the IGAD Secretariat.

The ALive platform similarly presents an apparently positive trajectory of activity, with the Secretariat set to move from the World Bank to IBAR. That said, there are still widespread concerns that this process will continue to be dominated by the World Bank, OIE and FAO Animal Health Service. Because the ALive platform is organized around the development of regional action plans there is an obvious opportunity for the IGAD LPI to be involved and to support regional interests.

Extending beyond the 'Livestock Community'

Work on livestock issues has often been confined to livestock experts, often with production and veterinary backgrounds. As a consequence livestock reform has been able to make some progress on relatively technical questions, such as the introduction of CAHWs, but has lacked the political networks to address more politicized issues, such as cross-border trade. To be successful in addressing cross-border issues the IGAD LPI should seek to engage with a wide range of government bodies, including ministries of foreign affairs and finance, as well as the security establishment. Through its attachment to IGAD, the IGAD LPI has institutional links to ministries of foreign affairs and other high level political actors and should seek to exploit this comparative advantage.

The Importance of Official Institutions

For any policy project, and particularly one implemented by an international organization, there is a temptation to seek to circumvent official decision making processes, which may work slowly or be initially resistant to change. In practice, though, a strategy that seeks to circumvent official decision-making bodies may make rapid progress in the early stages, only to be derailed by national governments in the long-term. While a strategy that deals only with official channels, to the neglect of building wider political support, is likely to stagnate, the IGAD LPI is uniquely positioned to effectively engage official institutions and should make efforts to do so.

The Value of a Regional Approach

There is no *a priori* reason why the issues detailed here need to be addressed regionally. National issues can be addressed at a national level, while cross-border issues have historically been dealt with through bilateral negotiations. In practice, though, a regional approach can support inter-regional learning, discussion and experience sharing and

consequently diffuse tensions, build trust and enhance the credibility of proposed reforms. Regional convening is also an IGAD comparative advantage. This is not to suggest that all activities should happen at regional level - that would impose logistical costs and challenges, and may also raise concerns about confidentiality and sovereignty - but there are likely to be many cases in which a regional approach can be an effective strategy for reducing resistance to reform.

Progressive Strategies for Reform

Linked to the value of a regional approach, is the possibility of building momentum for reform by first working with relatively more supportive member states, and then using that experience to influence more reticent members. The case of the introduction of CAHWs is instructive in the sense that it is illustrative of the different pace of reform in different countries, and the possibility of using success in some countries, Ethiopia in this case, to build momentum for success elsewhere. In the realm of cross-border issues, some borders, such as Kenya-Ethiopia, Kenya-Uganda or Ethiopia-Sudan, have been relatively less tense in the recent past, and thus may open doors to building momentum for reform.

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