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Stereotype Reactance at the Bargaining Table: The Effect of Stereotype Activation and Power on Claiming and Creating Value

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Two experiments explored the hypothesis that the impact of activating gender stereotypes on negotiated agreements in mixedgender negotiations depends on the manner in which the stereotype is activated (explicitly vs. implicitly) and the content of the stereotype (linking negotiation performance to stereotypically male vs. stereotypically female traits). Specifically, two experiments investigated the generality and limits of stereotype reactance. The results of Experiment 1 suggest that negotiated outcomes become more one-sided in favor of the high power negotiator when masculine traits are explicitly linked to negotiator effectiveness. In contrast, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that negotiated outcomes are more integrative (win-win) when feminine traits are explicitly linked to negotiator effectiveness. In total, performance in mixed-gender negotiations is strongly affected by the cognitions and motivations that negotiators bring to the bargaining table.

Keywords: stereotype; gender; negotiations; reactance; threat; power

L he current zeitgeist is one of political correctness, which touts equality between various races, genders, ages, and sexual orientations. Individuals and institutions that are insensitive to this cultural movement are subject to negative consequences, ranging from ostracism and scorn to potential litigation. Although it has been well documented that people are affected by cultural stereotypes (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald et al., 2002), the spirit of political correctness mandates that discussion of the content of these stereotypes remains muted. Explicit acknowledgements of gender differences stand out saliently against the background of social correctness. Given this cultural climate, an interesting question to consider is how the explicit linkage of gender to ability affects the thoughts, motivations, and behaviors of individuals.

In this article, we build on previous research that documented the ironic effects of explicitly and blatantly linking gender to negotiation ability (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001). In general, when individuals perceive a threat to their freedom, they tend to react against it by exerting their freedom more forcefully than they otherwise would (Brehm, 1966). In the negotiation domain, this reactance process has been shown to occur through the activation of negative gender stereotypes. Specifically, Kray et al. (2001) found that informing negotiators that stereotypically masculine traits predict performance at the bargaining table and that these traits differ by gender led to a counterintuitive outcome: Female negotiators outperformed their male counterparts. Thus, instead of confirming and validating the connection between gender and negotiation ability, women vitiated the negative stereotype by reacting against it. More

Authors' Note: This research was supported by two grants from the National Science Foundation (SES-0073682 awarded to Laura Kray and SES-9870892 awarded to Leigh Thompson). The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of David Levine on an earlier version of this article. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Laura Kray, Haas School of Business, 545 Student Services Building, #1900, Berkeley, CA 94720; e-mail: kray@haas.berkeley.edu. specifically, women who were told that it is men who have the upper hand at the bargaining table identified with counterstereotypic traits and set higher and more aggressive goals. The ability to marshal empowering cognitions in the face of what might seem to be the worst performance conditions is all the more surprising given that under most conditions, men do outperform women at the bargaining table (Kray et al., 2001; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998).

Kray et al. (2001) suggested that it is the explicit endorsement of negative gender stereotypes and the subsequent reactance against this proclamation that leads women to outperform men. Indeed, when the endorsement was implicit, men reaped better outcomes than did women. An important question that we address in more detail in this article is how the explicit activation of gender stereotypes affects performance. The findings from Kray et al. (2001) suggest that explicitly activating the masculine stereotype in mixed-gender negotiations prompts negotiators to assess their strengths and weaknesses and, in so doing, become more focused on their relative power within the negotiation context. More generally, we propose that negotiators attend more to the content of an activated stereotype when it is explicitly linked to gender, resulting in a concomitant increase in the display of the stereotypical traits positively associated with performance, compared to when the connection between gender and performance is left implicit. For the negotiator disadvantaged by the stereotype this involves acting in a counterstereotypic manner. The mention of gender serves as a trigger that guides subsequent behavior. Therefore, when the masculine stereotype is explicitly activated, negotiators should become more aggressive, contentious, and focused on claiming resources. But when the feminine stereotype is explicitly activated, negotiators should become more cooperative and focused on creating resources.

To test these hypotheses, we varied whether a gender stereotype was activated implicitly versus explicitly within mixed-gender dyads in two experiments. We also manipulated the power distribution within the dyads, varying whether the male or the female negotiator had the power advantage. If the content of an activated stereotype matters, then the extent to which power is exercised at the bargaining table should vary after the explicit connection of a masculine stereotype compared to a feminine stereotype. In Experiment 1, we varied the manner in which stereotypically masculine traits were linked to negotiation effectiveness and measured the extent to which outcomes mirrored power asymmetries, a gauge of stereotypically masculine behavior. In Experiment 2, we varied the manner in which stereotypically feminine traits were linked to negotiation effectiveness and measured the extent to which negotiators constructed integrative agreements, a gauge of stereotypically feminine behavior. Another advantage of introducing a power asymmetry to the bargaining table is that it allowed us to explore the limits of stereotype reactance, which we describe in greater detail below.

Stereotype Threat Versus Stereotype Reactance

Stereotype threat describes the concern a person feels about confirming, as self-characteristic, a negative stereotype about one's group (Steele, 1997). This threat becomes reality because concern over confirming the stereotype produces anxiety, lowers expectations, and reduces performance; thus, it unwittingly confirms the stereotype (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999; Steele & Aronson, 1995). Kray and colleagues found that simply describing a negotiation as diagnostic of ability was enough to produce a male advantage at the bargaining table.

Because many of the traits associated with effective negotiators are stereotypically masculine in nature (Kray et al., 2001), subtly activating the masculine stereotype tends to lead to outcomes that confirm the stereotype of male dominance at the bargaining table; that is, when people are told that effective negotiators are rational, assertive, unemotional, and have a high regard for their own interests (stereotypically masculine traits), male negotiators have an advantage over female negotiators (Kray et al., 2001). Despite the fact that gender was not mentioned in connection with these traits, the resulting difference in aspirations, opening offers, and profits across gender was significant.

The male advantage can be reversed when men and women are told that stereotypically feminine traits are important determinants of negotiation success. Proclaiming that effective negotiators "express their thoughts verbally, have good listening skills, and possess insight into the other negotiator's feelings" leads to a female advantage at the bargaining table. More specifically, Kray, Galinsky, and Thompson (2002) found that subtly linking these stereotypically feminine traits with effective negotiating led women to have higher aspirations, make more aggressive opening offers, and negotiate more profitable agreements for themselves than did men.

These findings suggest that stereotype threat processes apply to both men and women in negotiations; implicitly activating negative stereotypes about one's group leads to decrements in performance for the stereotyped group. In general, stereotype threat appears not to be limited to traditionally disadvantaged groups; when traits that are stereotypically connected to a target's social category are linked to negative performance expectations in a domain, the target will tend to feel stereotype threat and confirm the stereotype (see also Leyens, Desert, Croizet, & Darcis, 2000; Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling, & Darley, 1999). The above pattern is consistent with assimilation effects, whereby the implicit and subtle activation of a stereotype tends to lead to behaviors that are consistent with the stereotype (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Wheeler & Petty, 2001). These findings suggest that the linkage between stereotype activation and performance depends on the content of the activated stereotype, that is, whether the activated traits suggest a masculine or feminine advantage.

But stereotype activation does not always lead to the assimilation effects characteristic of stereotype threat. Kray et al. (2001) also demonstrated that explicitly and blatantly acknowledging that the association between stereotypically masculine traits and effective negotiating is linked to gender differences can ironically produce a female advantage at the bargaining table in mixedgender dyads. Kray et al. argued that the explicit activation of the gender stereotype was perceived as a limit to the female negotiator's freedom and ability to perform, thereby invoking stereotype reactance. Kray et al. defined stereotype reactance as the tendency to behave in a manner inconsistent with a stereotype. Explicitly activating a negative stereotype resulted in stereotype reactance. This finding is consistent with previous research regarding contrast effects: When a perceiver's attention is blatantly drawn to the link between a stereotype and a social category, it can produce behaviors that are inconsistent with the stereotype (for a related discussion of blatant activation and contrast effects, see also Dijksterhuis et al., 1998; Martin, 1986; Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kuebler, & Waenke, 1993). It appears that the manner in which stereotypes are activated determines whether they create an assimilation effect (stereotype threat) versus a contrast effect (stereotype reactance), which suggests that the linkage between stereotype activation and performance depends on the manner in which stereotypes are activated.

Building on results from previous research on stereotype reactance (Kray et al., 2001), we contend that the explicit activation of a gender stereotype leads negotiators to engage in behaviors consistent with the content of the activated positive stereotype. In an effort to avoid being pigeon-holed, the negotiator disadvantaged by the stereotype may engage in counterstereotypic behaviors. By realizing that the stereotypical perception of their ability is invalid, negotiators who are the target of a negative stereotype may adjust their goals and strategies accordingly. For example, Kray et al. (2001) found that the explicit activation of the masculine stereotype led female negotiators to identify with stereotypically masculine (counterstereotypic) traits as their key strengths and disidentify with stereotypically feminine traits. Furthermore, explicit masculine stereotype activation led

women to set higher aspirations than implicit masculine stereotype activation (Kray et al., 2001, 2002).¹

This finding supports the notion that the explicit activation of the masculine stereotype focuses attention toward one's strengths and power in the negotiation. Reactance processes likely result from stereotypically disadvantaged negotiators' awareness that the stereotypical perception of their ability is invalid in the current context, that both negotiators are actually on a level playing field, or that they themselves hold a power-based advantage. If our understanding of the process through which reactance occurs is accurate, then it suggests that negotiators should only react when they possess sufficient power in the situation to stand their ground at the bargaining table. In all of the examinations of stereotype reactance to date, both negotiators had reasonably strong alternatives to the negotiation and thus could leverage their power. However, reactance against the explicit activation of negative stereotypes may not occur when negotiators lack power. Manipulating the power distribution across the bargaining table, or creating a situation in which the stereotypically disadvantaged negotiation is at a power disadvantage, allows us to test this hypothesis.

EXPERIMENT 1

The purpose of the current experiment was twofold. First, we aimed to deepen our understanding of how the explicit activation of the masculine stereotype affects negotiation performance. Second, we sought to identify a boundary condition for stereotype reactance. To achieve these goals, we created a power asymmetry at the bargaining table by manipulating the attractiveness of negotiators' options apart from the current negotiation.

Although there are various sources of power relevant to negotiations (French & Raven, 1959), the ability to walk away is regarded as the key source of bargaining power (Raiffa, 1982; Thompson, 2001). On average, the negotiating party with a better BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement) reaps more beneficial outcomes from the negotiation; the strength of a negotiator's BATNA positively influences aspirations, and the amount of resources created and claimed at the bargaining table (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994). Given that we contend that the explicit activation of gender stereotypes prompts negotiators to examine their bargaining strengths, it also should lead them to examine their power by focusing on their BATNA when it is salient. Therefore, the explicit activation of a masculine stereotype should magnify the relative advantage of the negotiator with the stronger BATNA compared to the negotiator with the weaker BATNA. If the female negotiator who is disadvantaged by the stereotype is also at a power disadvantage, then this should limit her ability to react against the negative stereotype.

To test the above hypotheses, we examined two factors-the relative power advantage within the dyad and the manner in which masculine stereotypes were activated (i.e., explicit vs. implicit). We hypothesized that the explicit activation of stereotypes would lead negotiators to engage in behaviors consistent with the content of the activated masculine stereotype. Because stereotypically masculine behavior at the bargaining table involves being assertive and focused on one's own interests, we predicted that the tone of negotiations would be more contentious in the explicit activation condition. For women, this would involve engaging in counterstereotypic behaviors. With both negotiators behaving competitively, we expected the explicit activation of gender stereotypes would lead to more one-sided outcomes in favor of the high-power negotiator. To explore how the behavior of negotiators was affected by the experimental manipulations, we videotaped the negotiations.

Method

Participants and design. Our participant sample was composed of 94 undergraduate students in a business school at a large, southwestern university who participated in this study in exchange for course credit and the chance to win a monetary prize based on negotiation performance.² To test our hypotheses, we used a $2 \times 2 \times 2$ mixed-model design, with manner of masculine stereotype activation (explicit, implicit) and gender power advantage (female, male) as between-dyad factors and power (high, low) as a within-dyad factor. The task consisted of a negotiation of an employment contract between a recruiter and a job candidate. Role assignments (female recruiter/male candidate vs. female candidate/male recruiter) were counterbalanced. Because no differences were observed for any of the dependent variables across role assignments, we collapsed across this variable. Dependent measures included both negotiation outcome and negotiation process measures.

Procedure. Negotiators were randomly assigned to a mixed-gender dyad and to a negotiator role. Each dyad negotiated in a private room. All participants were informed of the importance of negotiations to everyday life and that their performance on the task would be diagnostic of future negotiation success. The experimenter read the general instructions to participants, which indicated that the goal of each negotiation. Several monetary prizes were offered to provide a performance incentive. Participants were given private role information that indicated their preferences in the negotiation. After reading their role instructions,

negotiators completed a prenegotiation questionnaire that included measures of the negotiator's goal and reservation price. On 5-point scales, participants also indicated their perceived power based on their role and their BATNA (ranging from *very powerless* to *very powerful*) and the attractiveness of their BATNA (ranging from *very unattractive* to *very attractive*). Upon completion, the video camera was turned on and the negotiators were given up to 30 min to negotiate.

Negotiation task. The negotiation task was the New Recruit simulation (Neale, 1997). The task consisted of an employment negotiation in which a job candidate and a recruiter had to settle on several issues relevant to both parties (i.e., salary, benefits). The negotiation included eight issues in total. Preferences were induced by assigning points to issues and instructing participants to achieve as many points as possible. Negotiators could earn between -8,400 and 13,200 points. Two issues were purely distributive, meaning that the parties' preferences were in complete opposition. Two issues were compatible (i.e., the parties' preferences were identical). The remaining issues formed two pairs of issues with integrative potential, meaning that one party cared more about issue A and the other party more about issue B. If both parties conceded on the issue they cared less about, they both could benefit and reach the maximum number of points.

Masculine stereotype activation manipulation. As part of the general instructions, the experimenter informed participants in all conditions,

As researchers, we are interested in examining the various personal factors that affect people's ability to perform in important negotiations. For example, previous research has shown that the most effective negotiators in negotiations like the one that you'll do today are rational and assertive and demonstrate a regard for their own interest throughout the negotiation, rather than being emotional and passive.

Participants in the explicit activation condition were further told, "Because these personality characteristics tend to vary across gender, male and female students have been shown to differ in their performance on this task."

Power manipulation. The manipulation of power advantage occurred through an "urgent message" attached to the negotiators' private role information. The high-power negotiator had a message that stated that another party (i.e., employer or candidate) was willing to settle on a contract worth 4,500 points and that therefore the negotiator can "rest assured now that you can always achieve an agreement worth 4,500 points." The alternative offer was described as "quite favorable." The low-power negotiator was told that another party

		Female H	ligh Power	Male High Power				
	Explicit (N = 6)		Implicit (N = 5)		Explicit ($N = 9$)		Implicit (N = 5)	
	М	SD	М	SD	М	SD	М	SD
Male	4,200	1,244	4,640	1,894	7,067	1,850	5,700	878
Female	6,017	1,148	5,200	245	3,667	1,083	4,980	950
Joint pay-off	10,217	1,898	9,840	2,017	10,733	1,389	10,680	1,073

TABLE 1: Negotiator Performance by Gender, Masculine Stereotype Activation, and Gender Power Advantage

was willing to settle on a contract worth 2,200 points, which was described as "not favorable." Both negotiators were informed that the average agreement was worth 3,000 points. To manipulate gender power advantage, half of the dyads were composed of women in the highpower role and men in the low-power role and the other half of dyads were composed of women in the low-power role and men in the high-power role.

Dependent measures. The primary outcome measure was the number of points the negotiators achieved (i.e., their pay-offs). Although we did not have any specific hypotheses about whether our experimental manipulations would affect the integrativeness of the negotiation, we also examined joint pay-off, or the sum of the two negotiators' pay-offs. Joint pay-off represents the degree to which negotiators logrolled (Froman & Cohen, 1970), or traded off issues to capitalize on different strengths of preferences and the degree to which negotiators identified compatible issues.

The purpose of the video-coding was to examine how power and stereotype activation affected the negotiation process. Two different judges reported their overall impressions of the negotiation and the negotiators. This type of coding was meant to capture both verbal and nonverbal communication between negotiators (Porter & Geis, 1981). Ratings were made for the first half and the second half of the negotiation separately. Correlations between the ratings for the two halves of the negotiation were generally high (average r = .72); we therefore averaged across periods. The interrater reliability was also high (Cronbach's $\alpha = .85$) so analyses were conducted on the average scores of the two coders. Judges were blind to our hypotheses and manipulations. To avoid cueing judges to gender differences, they were instructed to rate the behavior of the recruiter and candidate roles, not of male and female negotiators. The overall negotiation was rated as to the extent that it was contentious and cooperative. For example, a cooperative negotiation was one in which negotiators made explicit references to compromise regarding an issue. In contrast, a contentious negotiation was one in which the same issue would be dealt with by threatening to resort to one's BATNA or accusing the other negotiator of being uncompromising. Judges also coded whether negotiators made reference to their BATNA and, if so, how often. Negotiators were evaluated in the extent to which they exhibited the following stereotypically masculine traits: assertive, passive (reverse scored), controlling of the negotiation, and powerful. All ratings were made on a 7-point scale (ranging from 1 = not at all characteristic to 7 = extremely characteristic). Finally, we recorded the length of the negotiation as a gauge of its difficulty.

Results

Manipulation checks. Consistent with our expectation that the manipulation of BATNAs would affect perceptions of power, high-power negotiators regarded their BATNA as more attractive (M = 3.52, SD = .96) than did low-power negotiators (M = 2.24, SD = .93), t(48) = 4.79, p <.001. High-power negotiators also believed they derived more power from their BATNA (M = 4.12, SD = .44) than did low-power negotiators (M = 3.24, SD = 1.05), t(48) =3.86, p < .001. As a result, high-power negotiators set higher reservation prices (M = 4,930, SD = 1,151) than did low-power negotiators (M=3,672, SD=1,953), t(48) = 2.78, p < .01. High-power negotiators perceived a greater advantage through their role (M = 3.92, SD = .64) than did low-power negotiators (M = 3.40, SD = .87), t(48) =2.41, p < .05. Role assignment, however, did not affect perceptions of power, F < 1.

To determine the salience of the power asymmetry, we also coded whether negotiators made reference to their BATNA during the negotiation. Overall, 84% (n = 50) of negotiators mentioned their BATNA at least once during the negotiation, and this frequency did not differ by experimental condition. In sum, our manipulation of power based on each negotiator's alternative to the current negotiation was successful.

Performance. Because negotiation outcomes depend on the two parties forming an agreement, the unit of analysis was the dyad. To compare the relative performance of the two negotiators, we conducted a mixedmodel ANOVA of the pay-off score with power as a within-dyad factor and manner of stereotype activation and gender power advantage as between-dyad factors (see Table 1 for average pay-off scores of male and




Figure 1 Experiment 1: Mean performance by masculine stereotype activation and power asymmetry.

female negotiators). Consistent with our expectation that power would be associated with better performance, high-power negotiators (M = 6,168, SD = 1,450) performed better than did low-power negotiators (M = 4,252, SD = 1,316), F(1, 21) = 14.47, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .41$.

Consistent with our hypothesis that the extent to which the high-power negotiator would outperform the low-power negotiator would depend on the type of stereotype activation, the main effect for power was qualified by an interaction with manner of stereotype activation, F(1, 21) = 5.31, p < 05, $\eta^2 = .20$. As shown in Figure 1, the high-power negotiator outperformed the low-power negotiator in the explicit activation condition, F(1, 14) = 20.67, p < .001; however, the difference between the high- and low-power negotiators' performances was not statistically significant in the implicit activation condition, F(1, 9) = 1.70, *ns*. No other effects emerged as statistically significant.

Joint pay-off. Consistent with previous research, joint pay-off was assessed by summing the individual outcome scores of the two negotiators. A two-way ANOVA with manner of stereotype activation and gender power advantage as between-dyad factors showed no significant effects (all $Fs \leq 1.1$).

Negotiation process ratings. To examine the tone of the negotiation, we conducted separate analyses of variance for each measure with stereotype activation and gender power advantage as between-dyad factors. Only one effect emerged as statistically significant. The negotiation was perceived to be more contentious under explicit stereotype activation (M= 3.75, SD = 1.54) than under implicit stereotype activation (M= 2.38, SD= .85), F(1, 20) = 7.37, p < .05. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that explicitly activating gender stereotypes led negotiators to engage in behaviors consistent with the content of the masculine stereotype, thereby raising the level of perceived contentiousness of the negotiation.

To examine the extent to which negotiators engaged in stereotypically masculine behaviors, we conducted a mixed-model ANOVA with power as a within-dyad factor and stereotype activation and gender power advantage as between-dyad factors. Before doing so, we formed an index indicating the extent to which behaviors were stereotypically masculine by averaging responses to the following negotiator assessments: assertiveness, reversescored passivity, control of the negotiation, and power. Reliability of the index was high, $\alpha = .95$. Consistent with the hypothesis that the explicit activation of masculine stereotypes would lead negotiators to act in a manner consistent with the stereotype, a three-way ANOVA showed only a significant main effect for stereotype activation, F(1, 20) = 8.17, p < .01. Negotiators of both sexes were perceived as more stereotypically masculine after explicit stereotype activation (M = 5.77, SD = .56) than after implicit activation (M=5.14, SD=.60). No other significant effects emerged.

Duration of negotiation. We expected negotiations to take longer when stereotype activation was explicit rather than implicit, which is consistent with the negotiation process ratings that suggest the level of contentiousness was higher after explicit activation. This expectation was confirmed by a main effect for stereotype activation, F(1, 19) = 4.88, p < .05. Negotiations took longer on average after explicit (M = 28 min 28 s, SD = 10 min) than after implicit stereotype activation (M = 19 min 36 s, SD = 7 min 30 s).

References to BATNA. To assess the degree to which the negotiation was focused on power, we coded the number of references made by negotiators to their BATNAs. A significant two-way interaction effect between power and gender power advantage emerged for this measure, F(1, $(21) = 6.01, p < .05, \eta^2 = .23$. High-power male negotiators made reference to their BATNA more often (M = 2.64, SD = 2.59) than did low-power male negotiators (M = .64, SD=1.03, t(23)=2.42, p<.05, but this difference did not reach significance for female negotiators (M=1.73, SD=1.80 vs. 1.07, SD = 1.59, t(23) = .97, ns. In the female/ low-power condition, men mentioned their BATNA more frequently than did women (M = 2.64 vs. 1.07), t(13) = 2.24, p < .05. The opposite was the case in the female/high-power condition, in which women referred to their BATNA more often than did men (M = 1.73 vs. .64), t(10) = 1.83, p < .10.

Discussion

We predicted that the manner in which the masculine stereotype was activated would affect the use of power. In addition, we expected that explicitly linking gender to performance would lead negotiators to engage in behaviors consistent with the content of the activated positive masculine stereotype to a greater degree than when the connection of gender to performance remained at an implicit level. Note that for women, this would lead to behaviors that are inconsistent with the classic female stereotype and consistent with the classic male stereotype. Because the current experiment linked stereotypically masculine traits to performance, we predicted that negotiators in the explicit condition would focus on and leverage their power to a greater extent than they would when the masculine stereotype was implicitly activated. With both negotiators focused on power, we expected women to be ineffective at reacting against the negative stereotype about their gender when men had the power advantage over them.

The results of the experiment support our hypotheses. The high-power negotiator obtained more of the resources when the masculine stereotype was explicitly activated. The content of the activated stereotype implies that having a high regard for one's own interests and acting assertively are important for negotiation success. The pattern of data suggests that both negotiators in this mixed-gender context exhibited these traits to a larger degree after explicitly mentioning the relevance of gender to performance. For women this involved acting in a counterstereotypic fashion. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that explicit masculine stereotype activation leads to more attention to and use of power in the negotiation than implicit masculine stereotype activation.

By using an integrative bargaining task with multiple issues, the current experiment enabled us to examine the performance of each negotiator individually. The results suggest that across the board, both genders excelled when they were in a position of power. The pattern of data also is consistent with our understanding of stereotype reactance processes. When masculinity is explicitly brought to the forefront of negotiators' minds, female negotiators react against the negative implications of the stereotype by increasing their focus on behaviors that are consistent with the content of the positive stereotype and counterstereotypic of their gender. However, reactance only occurs for women when they have sufficient power through which they can react.

In addition to the evidence garnered by examining negotiated agreements, the process measures we obtained also provide support for our hypothesis that the negotiations would ultimately become more aggressive and contentious after explicit stereotype activation. First, our coding of negotiators' verbal exchanges revealed that high-power negotiators were more likely to make reference to their BATNA than were low-power negotiators. Second, judgments of the tone of the negotiation suggest that it became more contentious after the explicit linkage of gender to negotiation performance than when the linkage was made on an implicit level. This finding, in combination with the outcome measures, is consistent with previous research that has shown negotiation outcomes tend to be more one-sided as they become more contentious (Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle, 1998). Third, negotiators' behaviors were perceived to be more stereotypically masculine after the explicit activation of the masculine stereotype than the implicit activation. Finally, reaching an agreement took longer after the explicit activation of the masculine stereotype, suggesting it was more difficult under this circumstance.

We expected the manner in which stereotypes were activated to moderate the relationship between power advantage and performance. More specifically, we expected the degree to which high-power negotiators made more references to their BATNA compared to lowpower negotiators to be magnified after explicit stereotype activation. Instead, we observed a pattern suggesting that across the board, high-power negotiators made more references to their BATNA than did low-power negotiators, without any consideration of the manner in which stereotypes were activated. Noting the high proportion of the negotiators who referenced their BATNA at least once suggests that negotiators may have adjusted their behaviors in the explicit activation condition by making more extreme demands rather than repeatedly making mention of their BATNA.

In sum, the findings of the current experiment support the hypothesis that explicitly mentioning a gender advantage leads to behaviors that are consistent with the stereotype of the advantaged gender and counterstereotypic of the disadvantaged gender. Because the current experiment connected stereotypically masculine traits to performance, the explicit linkage of gender to performance led to more masculine behaviors. Although these results support our hypotheses, the current findings do not allow us to address an important alternative explanation; that is, it is possible that simply mentioning gender in connection with performance in a mixed-gender negotiation leads negotiators to be more competitive. If this is so, then the content of the stereotype should not matter. To rule out this alternative explanation, it is necessary to connect stereotypically feminine traits to performance and show that it has a differential impact on performance. We conducted Experiment 2 for just this purpose.

EXPERIMENT 2

Experiment 1 showed that when stereotypically masculine traits are explicitly linked to performance, women and men who have power use it to their advantage to a greater degree than when the connection between gender and performance is implicit. This use of power comes at a disadvantage to the party who is low in power. Our fundamental hypothesis is that explicitly activating stereotypes increases the display of behaviors that are consistent with the stereotype. In the case of claiming resources in competitive negotiations, it is masculine stereotypes that are most efficacious. In addition to the amount of resources claimed at the bargaining table, another gauge of negotiation success is the amount of resources created. The results of Experiment 1 showed that explicitly activating a masculine stereotype, which seems most relevant to the competitive component of negotiations, did not affect the creation of resources.

The fact that the explicit connection of masculine traits to performance in Experiment 1 did not affect joint profit is not surprising when one considers that, to reach mutually beneficial, integrative trade-offs in multiissue negotiations, a certain degree of cooperation is necessary (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975); that is, a high degree of concern for the outcomes of the other party is critical for formulating integrative agreements (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Because the masculine stereotype speaks solely to a concern for one's own outcomes and is consistent with the view that negotiations are a win-lose, competitive endeavor, the explicit activation of the masculine stereotype should not improve integrative outcomes. In contrast, the classic feminine stereotype, characterized by generosity, attending to interpersonal relationships, and fluid communication, is certainly consistent with the skills thought to be important for the effective creation of integrative agreements (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975).

What does it mean for an outcome to be integrative and how does one achieve such integrativeness? An agreement is considered more integrative than another one when the integrative agreement makes at least one negotiator better off and neither of the negotiators worse off (Thompson, 2001). The construction of integrative agreements typically involves sharing and soliciting information with one's negotiating partner regarding priorities among issues. Both negotiators can improve their outcome by conceding on a low-priority issue in exchange for their most preferred outcome on a high-priority issue, a technique called logrolling. By logrolling instead of splitting all of the issues down the middle, negotiators can expand the pie (Froman & Cohen, 1970). Because logrolling requires negotiators to concede on low-priority issues, a certain degree of cooperativeness is needed.

As described above, we expect the explicit connection of gender to performance to increase behaviors that are consistent with the content of the stereotype. More specifically, we hypothesized that explicitly linking stereotypically feminine traits to performance should lead to more cooperative negotiations, resulting in more integrative outcomes. By demonstrating that the explicit connection of feminine traits to performance increases joint pay-offs, we can rule out the alternative hypothesis that explicitly mentioning gender in mixed-gender negotiations simply leads to more competitiveness, without regard to the content of the activated stereotype.

Method

Participants and design. Our participant sample was composed of 68 MBA students in a business school in the western United States who participated in this study as part of a classroom exercise.³ To test our hypotheses, we used a $2 \times 2 \times 2$ mixed-model design, with manner of feminine stereotype activation (explicit, implicit) and gender power advantage (female, male) as between-dyad factors and power (high, low) as a within-dyad factor. Role assignments (female buyer/male seller vs. female seller/male buyer) were counterbalanced.

Negotiation task. The negotiation task was the Player simulation (Schroth, 1997). The task consisted of a negotiation between a motion picture director and producer. The two parties had to agree on 11 issues pertaining to the production of a motion picture (i.e., male lead, director's salary). As in Experiment 1, preferences were induced by assigning points to issues and instructing students to strive to achieve as many points as possible. In theory, individual negotiators could earn up to 16,200 points and the maximum joint pay-off was 14,000. Three issues were purely distributive, six issues had integrative potential, and two issues were compatible. The six issues with integrative potential were constructed so that the negotiators could concede on a low-priority issue to get their preferred outcome on a high-priority issue. Therefore, the size of the negotiating pie, the amount of resources created at the bargaining table, is a direct function of how well the negotiators logrolled on the issues with integrative potential.

Feminine stereotype activation manipulation. Embedded in the task instructions was the manipulation of stereotype activation. Following Kray et al. (2002), negotiators in all conditions were told,

This negotiation serves as a helpful diagnostic tool for students to assess their negotiating skills at the beginning of the course. In the past years, this negotiation has provided a revealing measure of negotiating ability based on personal bargaining style. As we will discuss throughout the course, highly skilled negotiators have a keen ability to express their thoughts verbally, good listening skills, and insight into the other negotiator's feelings. Negotiators who display these skills tend to achieve higher outcomes than those who are unexpressive, poor listeners, and lack awareness of the other negotiator's emotions.

		Female H	Iigh Power	Male High Power				
	Explicit (N = 9)		Implicit (N = 9)		Explicit ($N = 5$)		Implicit (N = 8)	
	М	SD	М	SD	М	SD	М	SD
Male	5,022	1,469	5,022	927	7,120	719	7,106	1,171
Female	7,611	1,316	6,717	598	5,590	1,440	4,750	1,429
Joint pay-off	12,633	822	11,739	850	12,710	1,056	11,856	1,731

TABLE 2: Negotiator Performance Across Gender, Feminine Stereotype Activation, and Gender Power Advantage

In the explicit condition only, the following statement was added to the end of the paragraph, "Because these personality characteristics tend to vary across gender, male and female students have been shown to differ in their performance on this task." All participants were reminded that negotiating effectively is a difficult skill to master and not all students would achieve the highest outcome possible.

Power manipulation. As in Experiment 1, we manipulated power through an "urgent message" attached to the negotiators' private role information. The highpower negotiator had a message that stated that another party (i.e., director or producer) was willing to settle on a contract worth 6,000 points and that therefore the negotiator can "rest assured now that you can always achieve an agreement worth 6,000 points." The alternative offer was described as "quite favorable." The low-power negotiator was told that another party was willing to settle on a contract worth 3,000 points, which was described as "not favorable." To manipulate the gender power advantage, we varied whether the female or the male negotiator received the high-power role.

Dependent measures. As in Experiment 1, the primary outcome measures were the scores for the male and female negotiators and their joint pay-off. The amount of joint pay-off is a direct function of how well the negotiators logrolled on the issues with integrative potential. Prior to the negotiation, participants also completed a questionnaire in which they indicated their BATNA, reservation price, and target.

Results

Manipulation checks. As a check of the efficacy of the manipulation of power, we asked negotiators to indicate their BATNA prior to negotiating. Consistent with our power manipulation, high-power negotiators indicated a more attractive BATNA (M= 5,804, SD= 798) than did low-power negotiators (M= 3,103, SD= 557), F(1, 49) = 206.89, p < .001. Likewise, high-power negotiators (M = 6,254, SD= 1,523) set higher reservation prices than did low-power negotiators (M= 3,977, SD= 1,278), F(1, 49) = 28.11, p < .001. The degree to which negotiator targets

differed across experimental conditions was not statistically significant.

Performance. To compare the relative performance of the two negotiators, we conducted a mixed-model ANOVA of each negotiators' pay-off scores with power as a within-dyad factor and manner of stereotype activation and gender power advantage as between-dyad factors (see Table 2 for a summary of the means). Consistent with our expectation that power would be associated with better performance, high-power negotiators (M = 7,110, SD = 1,008) performed better than did low-power negotiators (M = 5,076, SD = 1,273), F(1,27) = 28.14, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .51$. However, as predicted, the manner in which the feminine stereotype was activated did not qualify this main effect for power. Other than a main effect for stereotype activation, noted below, no other statistically significant effects emerged.

Joint pay-off. To analyze joint pay-off, we conducted an ANOVA, including stereotype activation and power as between-dyad factors. Consistent with the hypothesis that the explicit connection of stereotypically feminine traits with negotiation performance would lead to more integrative outcomes, joint pay-off was higher in the explicit activation condition (M=12,661, SD=907) than the implicit activation condition (M = 11,794, SD =1,294), F(1, 27) = 4.03, p = .05, $\eta^2 = .13$; that is, the explicit activation of the female stereotype led negotiators to be more effective at logrolling those issues with integrative potential. In fact, by breaking down the joint score into the three types of issues, it is clear that the stereotype activation manipulation only affected joint pay-off through the integrative issues, F(1, 29) = 5.30, p < .05, and not for distributive issues, F(1, 29) < 1, ns, and compatible issues, F(1, 29) < 1, ns.

Discussion

This experiment contributes to our understanding of how the content of stereotypes and the manner in which they are activated affect agreements. Consistent with our expectations, explicitly linking stereotypically feminine traits to negotiation effectiveness in an integrative bargaining task affected the degree to which negotiators crafted an agreement reflective of the feminine stereotype; that is, negotiators created more integrative agreements after explicit stereotype activation than implicit stereotype activation. Specifically, explicit activation of the feminine stereotype led negotiators to be more effective logrollers, more capable at conceding on lowpriority issues for their preferred outcome on highpriority issues. Explicit activation of the feminine stereotype created resources and expanded the pie. The findings of the current experiment support the hypothesis that the explicit activation of gender stereotypes leads negotiators to engage in behaviors that are consistent with the content of the positive stereotypical traits linked to negotiator effectiveness.

The current experiment replicated the effect of power from Experiment 1. On average, the negotiator with more power was able to claim more resources at the bargaining table than the negotiator with less power. Although Experiment 1 observed an interaction between power and manner of stereotype activation, this pattern of data did not emerge in the current experiment. Instead, we observed a significant effect of stereotype activation on joint pay-off. A comparison across experiments suggests that the content of the stereotype determines its impact at the bargaining table. Whereas explicitly linking stereotypically masculine traits to performance led to greater competitiveness in Experiment 1, explicitly linking stereotypically feminine traits to performance led to greater cooperativeness in the current experiment.

An interesting question that arises from an examination of the means in Table 2 is whether men and women were differentially affected by the manner in which the feminine stereotype was activated. The pattern of means suggests that women's point totals varied depending on how the stereotype was activated, whereas men's point totals were relatively stable across conditions. Although the inferential statistics do not support the reliability of this proposition, the experiment clearly suffers from low-power. As a result, the question of whether the greater joint gain in the explicit activation condition resulted solely from the behavior of women as opposed to both women and men is open. With the current data, it is impossible to determine whether women were both more proactive in creating and claiming value in the explicit condition. To address this question, future research will need to involve an analysis of the negotiation process, not unlike what we conducted in Experiment 1.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The purpose of the current set of experiments was to gain a deeper understanding of how the explicit linkage of gender to performance affects negotiating behavior. The current experiments suggest that performance is intimately linked to the content of gender stereotypes and the manner in which they are activated. Of importance for understanding gender differences in negotiations as a situational phenomenon, this research shows that both men and women are sensitive to the content of an activated stereotype and adjust their behaviors accordingly.

We hypothesized that the explicit activation of gender stereotypes leads negotiators to engage in behaviors consistent with the content of the activated positive stereotype; for the disadvantaged negotiator, this leads to counterstereotypic behaviors. Because focusing on power is stereotypically masculine, we expected agreements to reflect a greater power struggle after the explicit activation of masculine stereotypes. Consistent with this hypothesis, the explicit activation of masculine stereotypes led to more one-sided outcomes in favor of the high-power negotiator (Experiment 1). This was true for men and women alike. When the traits that were linked to effective negotiations were stereotypically feminine, evidence of a heightened power struggle after explicitly mentioning gender was absent. Instead, negotiators seemed to act in accordance with the feminine stereotype and behaved more cooperatively, with the explicit activation of feminine stereotypes leading to higher joint pay-offs (Experiment 2). In total, this set of results suggests that the manner in which stereotypes are activated affects the salience of viable alternatives to the current negotiation and the degree to which those alternatives determine the division of resources.

This research advances our understanding of the process through which stereotype reactance works. Kray et al. (2001) defined stereotype reactance as the tendency to behave in a manner inconsistent with a stereotype. This definition suggests that when the stereotype is explicitly activated, the negotiator subjected to the limiting stereotype will engage in counterstereotypic behaviors. We found evidence of this process across two experiments. Because the content of the masculine stereotype is related to aggressiveness, concern with one's own interests, and overall competitiveness, to react against the stereotype is to claim and secure a profitable division of the pie. In contrast, the feminine stereotype includes attributes related to insight and concern for the other side, such that reacting against the stereotype involves creating and expanding the pie.

By manipulating the relative power of the negotiators, we also investigated the limits of stereotype reactance. In both experiments, a power asymmetry was made salient and negotiators with more power claimed the lion's share of resources for themselves. Power is indeed a crucial predictor of negotiated outcomes. In the first experiment, however, when the masculine stereotype was explicitly activated, low-power women did not reverse the gender gap and achieve superior outcomes. This finding suggests that reacting against the masculine stereotype and achieving an advantage at the distributive bargaining table only occurs when the stereotypically disadvantaged negotiator is not also crippled by tangible power deficiencies. Although necessary for overcoming power deficiencies, engaging in counterstereotypic behaviors does not appear to be sufficient for reversing the gender gap.

Thus, the explicit activation of stereotypes does not automatically lead to a reversal of the gender gap in negotiations (Kray et al., 2001) but does so only in contexts in which the stereotyped negotiator possesses some initial power and leverage in the negotiation. Blatantly telling women that they lack the attributes necessary to prevail at the distributive bargaining table produces stereotype threat in the absence of power and stereotype reactance when sufficient power is possessed. On a practical note, these findings suggest that an effective way of circumventing the negative consequences of stereotypes is to increase more objective sources of power. If the power of the stereotyped person is weak, an explicit confrontation with the stereotype is even more threatening and results in greater performance decrements than the implicit activation of the stereotype. Female stereotype threat can only become stereotype reactance when sufficient power is possessed.

Our understanding of performance differences as resulting from contextual factors is consistent with previous theorizing regarding stereotype threat. Work on stereotype threat suggests that differences between social groups in stereotype-relevant performance domains are not the product of inherent, invariant deficiencies of a group but that underperformance by stereotyped groups is a situational phenomenon. When individuals fear that their performance may confirm a negative stereotype about their social group, they tend to live down to the negative expectations and show performance decrements. These effects can occur for men (Kray et al., 2002; Leyens et al., 2000) and women (Kray et al., 2001, 2002; Spencer et al., 1999); for Caucasians (Aronson et al., 1999; Stone et al., 1999), African Americans (Steele & Aronson, 1995; Stone et al., 1999), Latinos (Gonzales, Blanton, & Williams, 2002), and Asians (Cheryan & Bodenhausen, 2000); and even for social class (Croizet & Claire, 1998). These findings demonstrate clearly that stereotype threat is not limited to one stereotyped group but occurs whenever negative performance expectations exist for a social group that are based on the possession of stereotypical traits.

This research also enriches our understanding of how power affects negotiation agreements. How negotiators responded to the salient power asymmetry that existed in both experiments depended on the manner in which stereotypical traits were linked to performance. We have argued that the explicit activation of stereotypes increases behaviors that are consistent with the positive traits linked to performance. Depending on the content of the stereotype, power asymmetries were either emphasized or deemphasized in the negotiation. When masculine traits were explicitly linked to performance, the negotiation process became more competitive and the negotiator with the power advantage prevailed to a larger extent than when masculinity was implicitly connected to performance. When feminine traits were explicitly linked to performance, power asymmetries were not emphasized; instead, agreements became more integrative in comparison to when femininity was only implicitly linked to performance. In total, this research suggests that the degree to which power is attended to and exercised depends on the negotiation context.

Limitations and Future Directions

We have shown that when negotiators possess sufficient external resources, in the form of attractive alternatives to a negotiation, they will be able to react against the constraints of negative stereotypes. Across both experiments, the division of resources was driven by the relative attractiveness of negotiators' BATNAs rather than the relative advantage implied by the stereotype. Future research should explore whether there are psychological resources, such as self-esteem or self-affirmation (Steele, 1988; Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993), that can increase the likelihood that the blatant activation of stereotypes will lead to stereotype reactance. Only when stereotypes are explicitly activated and when the stereotyped individual possesses sufficient resources, physical or psychological, with which to react is stereotype reactance expected to occur.

Although stereotype reactance is not specific to one social group, it has only been demonstrated within the context of negotiations. Future research should explore whether explicitly telling someone that their social group will prevent them from attaining greatness will ironically lead them to strive for and achieve excellence in other performance domains and with other stereotypes. Because we define stereotype reactance (see Kray et al., 2001) as the tendency to behave in a manner inconsistent with a stereotype, it may not always be possible for a person affected by a negative stereotype to engage in counterstereotypic ways. Behavior in negotiations is somewhat malleable (deciding to be more assertive is something that most people can do) and counterstereotypic behaviors have real consequences on negotiated outcomes. In contrast, it is not clear that performance in intellectual (Steele & Aronson, 1995), quantitative (Spencer et al., 1999), or athletic (Stone et al., 1999) tasks, domains in which stereotype threat has been implicated, is similarly malleable. Thinking quantitatively or jumping higher may not be so easily accomplished. The domain of performance might well be another limit to stereotype reactance.

It also should be noted that our manipulations of stereotype threat and reactance in the domain of negotiation specify the traits (and hence the behaviors) necessary to succeed at the bargaining table. Indeed, we selected specific masculine traits (Kray et al., 2001) and feminine traits (Kray et al., 2002) that are actually connected to negotiator effectiveness (Raiffa, 1982). In doing so, we specified how negotiators could react. Perhaps explicitly specifying counterstereotypic behaviors in these other performance domains (e.g., related to intellectual and athletic ability) would enable reactance to take place. Until such effects have been demonstrated, a tentative conclusion to draw is that the stereotype threat process is more ubiquitous and common than stereotype reactance.

Because the content of the masculine stereotype is related to distributive tactics and dividing the pie, power moderated the ability to react against that stereotype when it was explicitly activated. However, because the content of the feminine stereotype is related to integrativeness and the ability to expand the pie, power does not appear to moderate the effect of manner of stereotype activation (i.e., implicit vs. explicit) on performance. Future research should explore possible moderators of the ability of men to react against their limiting stereotype, to look at what limits men from acting in counterstereotypic ways following explicit stereotype activation. For example, accountability to constituents has been shown to make negotiators more rigid and less integrative in their bargaining (Carnevale, Pruitt, & Seilheimer, 1981). It might be the case that men who are accountable will resist being integrative due to a fear of appearing weak to their constituents, thereby confirming the negative stereotype rather than reacting against it.

Another direction for future research is to explore whether the impact of stereotypes on negotiation performance differs depending on the degree to which negotiators identify with the domain. Indeed, stereotype threat processes have been shown to be larger for participants identified with the performance domain (for a metaanalysis of this effect, see Walton & Cohen, 2003). Similarly, one could expect that reactance would be more likely to occur in people who strongly identify with the negotiation domain compared to people who do not regard negotiating ability to be highly self-relevant. By measuring domain-identification prior to the manipulation of stereotype activation, this hypothesis regarding a potential boundary condition could be tested.

Conclusions

Across two experiments, we have demonstrated both the pervasiveness and limits of stereotype reactance. Stereotype reactance can occur for both sexes at the bargaining table. However, whether stereotype reactance occurs will depend on the power and available resources possessed by the stereotyped negotiator. Although a gender gap has been documented in negotiations (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999), our research approach focuses on properties of the negotiation that are not inherent to the individual negotiator. We show an interaction between the person, whether it be a male or female negotiator, and the situation, as determined by the relative power and set of cognitions that each negotiator brings to the bargaining table. A key message of this research is that by focusing on improving objective alternatives to the current negotiation and harnessing cognitions that are advantageous to their particular gender, negotiators are able to leverage the negotiation to their advantage.

NOTES

1. A complementary finding was obtained with respect to men, who were more likely to identify stereotypically feminine traits as their key negotiating weaknesses after masculine traits had been explicitly linked to effective negotiating compared to a control condition. Kray et al. reasoned that the positive stereotype identity bestowed on men in the explicit activation condition might have created a psychological burden, a concern about living up to the high standard expected of them (see also Brown & Josephs, 1999; Cheryan & Bodenhausen, 2000; Shih, Ambady, Richeson, Fujita, & Gray, 2002).

2. We excluded from the analyses impasses, situations in which an agreement could not be reached that was equal or superior to the BATNAs (best alternatives to a negotiated agreement) of both negotiators, which resulted in a final sample of 50 participants. Impasse rates were not affected by any of our experimental manipulations. To determine whether the dyads that were excluded differed from the dyads that were included in the degree to which they exhibited stereotypically masculine traits, we compared the process ratings from the videotapes across groups. The degree to which included and excluded dyads differed on stereotypically masculine traits was not statistically significant.

3. Once again, we excluded dyads who impassed from the analyses, which resulted in a final sample of 64 participants. Impasse rates were not affected by any of our experimental manipulations.

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