

Zanzibar's Street Entrepreneurs: How Cooperative Social Relations are Formed in the Informal Street Economy

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Abstract

This thesis explores processes of relationship formation between entrepreneurs of the informal street economy. The research presents an ethnographic account of the daily routines, spatial practices, and interactions of Zanzibar's street entrepreneurs to determine whether participation in the street economy can facilitate cooperative social relations between them instead of antagonistic ones. As Zanzibar has long been the site of intense identity politics – where political and cultural views divide islanders and Tanzanian mainlanders – the fact that multiple identities operate in the street economy presents an intriguing puzzle as to what sort of social networks exist amongst them. Evidence is taken from interviews, a questionnaire, and participatory observation with tour guides (official and unofficial), vendors, and fishermen who work on the streets of Stone Town, predominantly in informal tourism sector activities. Along with the sharing of space, positive connections were also formed along the lines of mobility, shared understandings of struggle and the necessity of interdependence in their work.

Keywords: informal economy; street economy; Zanzibar; entrepreneurs; networks; social relations

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Acronyms

ASP	Afro-Shirazi Party
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CUF	Civic United Front
ILO	International Labour Office
LO/FTF	Danish Federation of Trade Unions and Danish Confederation of Salaried Employees and Civil Servants
RGZ	Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WIEGO	Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing
ZNP	Zanzibar Nationalist Party
ZPPP	Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party

Chapter 1.

Introduction and Literature Review

I was sitting with Juda in the middle of a quiet and beautiful garden – where tall coconut trees stood behind us, blossomed leaves shaded us from above and a soft breeze came in from the still, vibrant blue ocean – and he said, “We don’t see the paradise here. We see the struggle and the hustle.” In that moment, I envisioned a kind of fog over this ‘paradise’ of beaches and sunshine that so many tourists come to Zanzibar to see. “We don’t want to be out on the street hustling tourists. But we are here and you eat what you get; you don’t eat what you want. So, what do you do? You become a tour guide on the street or you sell ‘Jambo Jambo’ CDs on the street. You hustle tourists but you don’t want to be doing that.”

Later, we walked to his van he uses for tours and sat inside. He cracked open the windows to let some air in while he paid a woman wearing a bright yellow vest over her dress. She had been seated on a chair in the shade, holding a booklet of receipt slips. Juda thanked her and paid a small parking fee. But I noticed he didn’t take a receipt, and remembered a friend telling me that if the parking lot women don’t write up a slip to report back to the municipality, they can keep the money for themselves. A thoughtful gesture. Before we could pull out, an older man came walking up to Juda’s window. He wore a ballcap and a faded, oddly-placed Christmas sweater with shorts tattered along the bottom. They had a brief exchange in Kiswahili and then the man, known as Captain Ged, greeted me in English and told me Juda was his friend. Juda smirked and handed him a folded-up bill through the crack of his window. Captain Ged thanked him and went on his way, back towards the garden. Juda looked at me and said, “Papasi. They are known to cheat and hustle or play dirty games. But it is not always negative. I can sometimes make money with them off tourists. It’s a profit game.”

Introduction

During my time with Juda, one of Zanzibar's many street tour guides, and with other entrepreneurs of the street economy there, I found that many spoke through a collective means; where it was not about 'I', but about 'we'. So, who does 'we' include? 'We' are the guides who stand together on the street corners or in the park; the fishermen who nap and wait, or wander and look for somebody to hire their boat; the vendors who use their bodies as display boards, draped in sarongs, sunglasses, jerseys and jewellery; the 'Jambo Jambo' men who desperately sing the chorus to the infamous song, pushing a CD towards any passerby; or the young men who can be heard down the road shaking change in their hands, calling customers to buy their cigarettes. The actors of the street economy in Zanzibar are diverse, but they see each other as the same. While there exists a kind of hierarchy in activities – *papasi*, after all, translates to 'tick' – street entrepreneurs see one another as hustlers who are surviving by their own means.

Where tour guides can offer up exciting packages of days spent on the ocean or indulging in sites and stories of the rich history of Zanzibar, the fishermen have the boats to get them there. Within the informal economy, actors must rely on one another and strategically cooperate by knowing others who work in the street economy and what kind of resources they are useful for. Juda knows Captain Ged, who is a fisherman that also hires his boat to tour guides and tourists he finds on his own. While he might be wary of *papasi* who seek any opportunity to make money off others, Juda can look past their differences and find value in working with Captain Ged. As well, doing favours for others, like the woman working in the parking lot, opens up the possibility of her returning the favour someday when Juda needs it; she might not charge him if he is low on money. These kinds of reassurances between individuals – of knowing who you can count on when you need it – are what help establish relational networks between the various entrepreneurs who work on the street in Zanzibar. Each of them live a life of hustle – walking up and down the street soliciting tourists or peddling their cigarettes and sweets. Nobody wants to do it, but they have to make do; and that perseverance is shared amongst all of the street entrepreneurs.

Paying attention to how informal economic actors relate to one another in Zanzibar is the focus of this thesis. It was prompted by a series of questions including: where Zanzibar has been a site of heated identity politics between islanders and those coming from mainland Tanzania, do interactions in the informal economy in Zanzibar challenge or reflect the political, religious and identity group tensions that exist in other

realms of Zanzibar's society? And moreover, could the informal economy be understood as a medium through which such conflict can potentially be mitigated between individuals instead of antagonized?

This thesis research has been driven by such curiosities and developed into a project which explores the daily functioning of the informal street economy on Zanzibar's island of Unguja. Utilizing the ethnographic approach, I inquired into the activities happening on the streets of Stone Town by observing and engaging closely with various entrepreneurs who informed me of their work, daily hardships and relations with one another. The focus of the study regarded two key areas of questioning: firstly, were there certain kinds of social networks existing between these informal actors and what constituted those connections; and second, where did my informants stand on Zanzibari-mainlander relations and did their attitudes influence specific relations within their street economy. The findings of this thesis come from three months of field research through conducting in-depth, unstructured and semi-structured interviews, repeated participant observation, and informal conversations with various entrepreneurs operating in the street economy. I also administered a questionnaire to some informants. Along with considering literature on informal economies as important sites of research to understand social networks and trust-formation, my findings further highlighted the importance of routines and spatial practice. Further, a comparison was drawn between segments of the informal and formal economy to note how group perspectives (regarding Zanzibari-mainlander relations) are affected by levels of cooperation and shared networks of space, understanding and marginalization.

The first chapter of this thesis will begin with a statement and justification of the research question. Following is an introduction to Zanzibar's history of identity politics, which is founded in four identity dichotomies that have been in conflict over the years. The literature review will then introduce scholarship that views the informal economy as a means of studying social relations between actors and their collective identities, and also which views the informal economy as a possible mechanism through which to challenge pre-existing oppositional relations between groups. Finally, through existing literature, this chapter seeks to define what the informal economy is.

Statement of Research

This research looks at whether engaging in informal economic activities in Zanzibar's street economy serves as a means for people of different identity groups to form

cooperative, friendly, and even trusting social relationships instead of antagonistic and distrustful ones. Further, it explores the role informal entrepreneurs have in existing political, class and identity conflicts in Tanzania. It studies how people of different identities are operating together in the informal economy through networks of shared space, movement, struggle and cooperation. The research question guiding this study is as follows: through informal economic activities, do people from Zanzibar and people from mainland Tanzania engage in cooperative relations that challenge pre-existing conflictual relations between them? I argue in my research that informal economic activities can foster the organization of new networks which can generate solidarity and trust-formation.

Justification of Research

This research question is being explored in order to fill a gap in research regarding how informal economic activities affect social relations between actors whose political, national, and religious identities have been in conflict with one another. The guiding perspective which justifies this question views the informal economy and its entrepreneurs functioning by depending on diverse networks of individuals who participate in trade (Ilahiane and Sherry 2008), who look out for one another (Thieme 2013), and base many exchanges on a level of trust or mutual understanding (Burbidge 2013; Di Nunzio 2012). By viewing the informal economy in this way, I aim to engage with arguments that move away from simply comparing the informal economy to the formal economy on an economic level (see Roitman 1990; Odera 2013), and seek to more deeply understand the social implications of participation in the informal economy. As Mary Njeri Kinyanjui points out (2010), there has been a tendency in research to disregard the complexities of networks and relationships between informal entrepreneurs:

Research on the informal sector tends to pay little attention to the evolution and dynamics of social institutions and social relations. Most institutional analysis compares the informal sector with the formal sector but does not deeply analyse the institutions of the informal sector in their own right. (Kinyanjui 2010:iv)

Instead, informal actors are commonly deemed “deficient in entrepreneurial practice,” participants in criminal activity (Mutongi 2006), and lacking direction economically (Kinyanjui 2010:3). Hsain Ilahiane and John Sherry (2008) also see that informal actors are too commonly “mythologised as pimps, drug dealers, counterfeiters and pirates”

(2008:244). As well, they tend to be looked down upon by “urban elites” who view informal actors as “prominent elements of disorder” (Bromley 2000:9). This research seeks to check these representations against personal accounts of informal entrepreneurs and close study of their relations with one another. The focus will not be upon why or how the informal economy exists alongside the formal one, but instead explores the unique networks of actors who interact in a system of relationships.

In her own study on wageless labourers at a garbage dump in Rio de Janeiro, Kathleen Millar (2014) also finds that existing understandings of the informal economy fail to consider the lived experience of those working in it:

for different reasons, the concept of the informal economy...also implies this sense of finality, a last resort (Denning 2010). Such a conceptualization of wageless work, however, fails to capture tensions in the ways social and economic precariousness is experienced and lived in Rio’s periphery. (Millar 2014:33)

In Millar’s study, she discovers that precarity in the everyday lives of Rio’s wageless labourers is experienced both socially and subjectively – where individuals have more difficulties balancing their social lives (not their working lives) and must rely on any employment opportunity that comes up, even if it appears to be an unreliable one. Her findings demonstrate that vulnerabilities in the informal economy are experienced differently than is often portrayed. Millar also recognizes that the “difficulties of studying a largely unrepresented sector of the population may have discouraged more research on the topic,” (2007:3) but her work along with others (Meagher 2010; Lindell 2010) highlight the possibility and need of uncovering deeper social aspects of the informal economy.

Further, very little research exists on networks in informal economies that play out between different identity groups who have a history of conflict between them. Informal economy networks are studied for their potential to bring about policy change or advocate social movements (Meagher 2010; Lindell 2010; Kinyanjui 2010), but they have not been looked at for their possibility of conflict mitigation between diverse identity groups.

Zanzibar: A Brief History on Identity Politics

Zanzibar is a semi-autonomous archipelago in the Indian Ocean that makes up the United Republic of Tanzania, with the mainland being about 45 miles from the islands. Unguja and Pemba, the two largest islands, are populated with over 1 million people and

the capital city, Stone Town (or Zanzibar Town), is located on Unguja. Zanzibar has deep roots as a Swahili Coast region – noted as being the “nerve centre” of Swahili culture (Vander biesen 2009:310) – and is known as the birthplace of the Kiswahili language, where Arabic, German, Portuguese, English, Hindu and French have all had linguistic influences due to Zanzibar’s history as an intercontinental trade centre. This meeting of many different cultures has meant that even the true meaning of the term ‘Swahili’ is debated, as it represents a “multi-ethnic” culture which came to be through “coastal travelling...across the Indian Ocean” that has changed over time (Vander biesen 2009:310).

The overlapping of identities and races in Zanzibar has occurred through “long-time social interactions among Arabs, Indians, Persians and Africans” (Killian 2008:102) who immigrated and partook in the trading of, especially, spices and slaves. Zanzibaris are a hybrid of sorts, and with more than a thousand years of “racial intermarriage and assimilation,” where identities are further “complicated by colonization,” the fluidity of race and ethnic origins means that “racial categories are themselves socially-defined” (Brents and Mshigeni 2004:61). Today, Zanzibaris mostly identify themselves as African (from the mainland) or Arab, and some others as Shirazi (claimed to be indigenous Zanzibaris of Persian decent), as well as Indian and Comorian (Moss and Tronvoll 2015:94; Killian 2008:106). The majority of the population practice the religion of Islam, where some 95 percent on the islands are Muslim, while most of those coming from mainland Tanzania are Christian (Brents and Mshigeni 2004:61).

Zanzibar’s complex and disruptive history saw it under Omani rule from 1698 to 1861 (Moss and Tronvoll 2015:92); a period that “turned Zanzibar into a slave society,” as the growth of clove plantations and slave trade meant “about two-thirds of the island’s total population of 300,000 by the end of the 1850s were slaves” from mainland Africa (Killian 2008:104; Bennett 1978:28). Zanzibar became a British protectorate from 1890 when colonialists established control of the islands due to their “strategic position” and the “need to put an effective end to the slave trade,” while the Omani Sultan Sayyid Said remained as the head of state (Killian 2008:104; Vander biesen 2009:311). One influence colonial rule had over Zanzibar was a strategically constructed ‘tier’ of identities: Africans were at the bottom as labour, Asians were middle-level and Arabs were at the top ruling under the British (Killian 2008:104). This racial division instilled tensions between, especially, Africans and Arabs. Africans became marginalized and

forced into labour as the Arabs were favoured and put in positions of power. Further, Shirazi viewed mainlanders as “enemies and foreigners” in their land (Killian 2008:105).

The 1950s saw the formation of two key political parties: the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) – and later, the Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party (ZPPP) which remained in coalition with ZNP. Where the ZNP was made up of Arabs and Shirazi from Pemba (until 1959 when some Pemba Shirazi formed the ZPPP) who desired independence from the British, the ASP was organized by Africans from the mainland and Shirazi from Unguja (Killian 2008:107-108; Mpangala 2006:64). Besides the agenda of independence from colonialism, these two groupings – which almost evenly divided all of Zanzibar – also aimed to avoid losing control of the islands to the other: “Just as the ASP’s appeal was based on fear of Arab domination, the ZNP’s appeal was based on the fear of domination by mainlanders” (Killian 2008:108). During this period, political party support was drawn across ethnic and religious lines as the ZNP, who were representative of the minority population, in their campaigning “maintained that a vote for the ASP meant christianizing Zanzibar, destroying Islam, and Tanganyika taking over” (Killian 2008:108; Lofchie 1965:207). Sentiments came from both sides in order to alienate supporters of the other party. From this point forward, election violence, and ethnic and religious divisions would mar the social relations of Zanzibar’s population and politicize much of daily life – especially around Zanzibari and mainlander identities.

During the election in January of 1961 when ASP won more seats, the ZNP and ZPPP coalition together equalled the same. Another election was held in June, where the ASP fell behind the seat count of ZNP and ZPPP even after receiving more votes (Mpangala 2006:64). In response to the results, “riots erupted, with eight dead, 400 injured and 1000 arrested in Unguja” (Mpangala 2006:64). The scenario repeated itself in 1963 and ASP claimed the coalition again had taken their victory, and riots led to the deaths of 68 people and hundreds of injuries (Mpangala 2006:64). With Arabs holding power, the African majority anticipated that independence for Zanzibar would mean “Arab independence” and the question was asked: “when we talk of independence what exactly do we mean. To whom? To one-third of the population of our country... When two-thirds of the country have no say in it?” (Aboud Jumbe at the Legislative Council debate in 1961) (Killian 2008:110). The Zanzibar Revolution was sparked on January 12, 1964 when the Arab oligarchy was overthrown and replaced with an African-led government – during which, “more than 5000 Arabs were [estimated] killed, many more

were detained and their property confiscated or destroyed” (Killian 2008:110; Yeager 1989). This period saw the African majority ensuring control of the state and the instilling of a new state identity, as “Arab and Shirazi (especially Pemba Shirazi) identities came under severe attack... [and] the state became categorically defined as African” (Killian 2008:110-111).

Instability characterized the mere three months Zanzibar held independence, as groups in the ASP were divided and seen to be highly radical (Killian 2008:111). To address these issues, it was decided that Zanzibar form a union with Tanganyika – creating the United Republic of Tanzania – on April 26 in 1964, and give up sovereign power as a “micro-state under the Union government,” opening up new questions of state identity and state sovereignty (Killian 2008:111; Moss and Tronvoll 2015:92). Tensions only grew, and from the 1970s “a growing number of Zanzibaris began to view the 1964 Union with Tanzania mainland as an instrument to preserve the economic status quo by keeping the Isles politically prostrate” (Cameron 2002:313).

Post-Revolution Zanzibar has seen repeated instances of multiparty election violence and divisions in society across political party lines – where again, two major parties have split Zanzibaris and mainlanders. The ruling party of the Union, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), has remained in power ever since the multiparty democracy system was introduced and essentially took the place of the ASP. The Civic United Front (CUF), as the main opposition party, is representative of the ZNP/ZPPP. Still today, CCM is equated with Africans (especially mainlanders) and CUF is more typically equated with Arabs (especially Zanzibaris) (Moss and Tronvoll 2015:95). Severe violence followed the 1995 and 2000 elections, which are widely known for having been far from “free and fair,” as voting was rigged and political corruption was heavily apparent (Mpangala 2006:64). In 1995, delayed results noting a CCM win (by a mere margin of 0.4 percent) followed a reported CUF win for Zanzibar’s Presidential election by media, two days prior (Mpangala 2006:65). The votes were claimed to be falsely counted. Similarly, in 2000 the vote count was abruptly stopped when CUF was seen to be leading, and final results of another CCM victory came a week later. As a result, observers called for a cancellation of the elections and the decision was made by CUF to boycott the House of Representatives and Parliament meetings (Mpangala 2006:66). Intense clashes occurred between Zanzibar’s police and CUF demonstrators in 2001, when between 31 and 70 people were killed (reports vary from the Presidential Commission and the CUF),

600 were wounded and over 2000 were forced to flee Zanzibar for other mainland countries as refugees (Mpangala 2006:66; Cameron 2002:313).

The Union has been a source of tension among Zanzibaris and mainlanders, where many question its “legitimacy” and “structural defects,” (Killian 2008:112) and see it as a means to suppress the “organizational life on Zanzibar” (Cameron 2002:314). The way, over history, Zanzibaris came to differentiate themselves through socially constructed group identities has spilled over into Union matters today. Identity politics have played a significant role in Zanzibar’s political history and the archipelago’s instances of violent conflict. The current situation can be understood through four key identity dichotomies: political (CCM-CUF), regional (Unguja-Pemba), racialized (mainly African-Arab) and national (Tanganyika-Zanzibar) (Moss and Tronvoll 2015:94). Each of these groupings represent different communal identities that people attend to, sometimes overlapping with one another (Moss and Tronvoll 2015:94). The political identity dichotomy refers to supporters of CCM and CUF, which has carried on from the ASP and ZNP/ZPPP divide among the population. Opposition supporters tend to view themselves in a disadvantaged position in their own country, where the CCM government continually refuses to give up power and further erodes any sense of autonomy Zanzibar has left. Second, the regional identities concern those living on Unguja and on Pemba: an initial division was established between the Pemba Shirazi and Unguja Shirazi (who were divided across the ZPPP and ASP parties), and further escalated when Pemba residents were targeted by police during election periods as a CUF stronghold. Pemba residents have also claimed that the government strategically minimizes development on the smaller island to “punish” them for their oppositional support (Moss and Tronvoll 2015). The third, racialized identities, refers to the African and Arab divide that has been discussed related to Zanzibar’s history under colonial rule, which carries on today. It also points to any religious tensions which come up between the majority Muslim population and the mainland Christian migrants. The final identity dichotomy, national, includes Zanzibaris who call for an end to the Union and a reclaiming of their sovereignty, and who wish to be officially divided from the mainland. Further, anyone born in Zanzibar tends to identify first as Zanzibari and not Tanzanian, connecting themselves to their families’ past national identity.

Within this environment of conflict and inequalities between these identity groups, entrepreneurs in the informal street economy are working in activities that see a mix of both Zanzibaris and mainlanders hustling by their own means. Zanzibar, a major tourist

hub, is regarded as a place of opportunity and sees many entrepreneurs migrating to the island in hopes of making work for themselves. The street economy in Zanzibar represents multiple identity groups who have been in conflict with one another for a long period of time – and tensions continue today. This research seeks to understand these relationships between islanders and mainlanders working in the informal street economy in Zanzibar.

Literature Review

Informal Economy, Social Relations and Collective Identities

A number of anthropologists have begun to emphasize the important role the informal economy has as a subject of research because of how it helps in studying and understanding social relationships, especially among vulnerable and marginalized groups of society (Kinyanjui 2010; Sexsmith 2009; Di Nunzio 2012). There is value in its complexity of networks and reliance on cooperative exchanges between diverse people (Burbidge 2013; Ilahiane and Sherry 2008; Brown 2004). Kate Meagher (2010) is among those scholars who recognizes the need for such a focus and notes:

cluster scholars argue that a dense web of socially-embedded inter-firm networks create a novel form of governance described as ‘cooperative competition’ or ‘collective efficiency’ in which the organization of economic relations tends to be intertwined with social relations. (2010:18)

Ilda Lindell (2010), too, focuses her work on informal economies from this perspective:

Research on capacities [of the informal economy] is generated through provisional connections and new and diffuse forms of collaboration among people of highly diverse cultural and social backgrounds ... Indeed, a diversity of groups today make use of the informal economy for a wide range of purposes, from survival to accumulation ... The collective identities of organized informal workers are not pre-given or stable, but are rather continuously constructed and re-constructed through multiple struggles and relations and in response to wider societal change. (2010: 2-14)

While different actors may make use of the informal economy for their own unique purposes or goals, they are still connected along the lines of how they orient themselves in such an environment (Lindell 2010; Di Nunzio 2012). The common struggle as informal entrepreneurs, and the perceived advantages and disadvantages of either competition or cooperation, can impact the relations between actors in the informal economy (Lindell 2010). To explore these relationships is to also understand the “web of transactions” (Di Nunzio 2012) taking place between these actors. In Marco Di Nunzio’s

(2012) research on the street economy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for example, he found that many of his informants “knew each other because they had been bonded together by shared experiences, common locations and memories, and past and present antagonisms” (2012:437). He saw that a common “tension” existed among the various informal entrepreneurs of the street to both get by and aspire to a better life, and that “the street economy ... consists of a particular terrain for making sense of, and, at the same time, navigating this tension” (2012:441).

Informal entrepreneurs thus utilize their connections that they find in one another as they relate on levels of ‘getting by’ in their difficult life. Kinyanjui explains how individuals may find themselves in informal work for a variety of reasons, but it is their experience as informal actors which then connects them all to one another:

Numerous factors can push people into the informal economy – but once there, they mobilize social relations and associations to fulfil multiple tasks and functions. These social relations and associations are guided by particular norms and values that help in addressing fundamental concerns, such as organizing society and coordinating markets. (Kinyanjui 2010:iv)

These factors are what make up the collective identities they share in the street, and networks of individuals form as “people depend on each other” to pursue “social, economic and political transactions” in the environment of the informal economy (Kinyanjui 2010:2). The skills and adaptability required to manage in life on the street are where individuals, such as in Di Nunzio’s research, noted common identities as “hustlers” or “soldiers” in this life together – as one informant told him: “We are soldiers of life; you have to work and struggle to survive and move up” (2012:438).

Relations and identities form around this “two-dimensional social space: a situational work location on the horizontal plane and a vertical position within the society’s social hierarchy” (Burbidge 2013:86). Actors of the informal economy thus connect in their work activities, and also make social connections as a result.

Challenging Oppositional Relations in the Informal Economy

Street actors and local businessmen do not always and easily communicate with each other ... “I know the thugs, but I never do business with them. Doing so would make the police come and I don’t want trouble. But, of course, I respect them and they respect me. If there is no respect, things do not work here.” (Di Nunzio 2012:445)

Recognizing the informal economy as a potential mechanism through which pre-existing oppositional groups can mitigate tensions between them, is a perspective less

explored in scholarship on informal economies. As discussed above, informal entrepreneurs are commonly portrayed as individuals who tend to be associated with crime, disorder, and precarity. Through that representation, informal economic actors are also assumed to function in a survivalist manner as individuals in fierce competition. Di Nunzio attempts to demonstrate that even though there are differences and tensions that come along with working with certain actors, the functioning of the street economy relies on respect. The operation simply will “not work” if hustlers do not carry on and put aside their hostilities towards other street hustlers. Similarly, in Zanzibar, my informant Juda associated his *papasi* friend with being a dirty businessman out to make money off him, yet was willing to work with him in a kind of partnership. By respecting other groups who share the street, informal actors also show a willingness to cooperate.

Dominic Burbidge (2013), in his study on plastic bag sellers in Mwanza, Tanzania, argues that, “the structure of an economic setting neither ensures nor excludes cooperative behaviour in and of itself,” and that, “social dilemmas can be turned around by agents as opportunities for signalling trustworthiness” (2013:103). Through Burbidge’s perspective, the informal economy itself may not necessarily promote cooperation but when the actors involved operate inside of it, they have the potential to form trust relations instead of oppositional ones. The ‘structure’ of the informal economy allows its entrepreneurs to negotiate shared space and discover opportunities for working alongside and in interaction with one another (physical space in this light will be discussed in the following chapters).

Burbidge’s case looks at key relationships of trust between bag sellers and goods sellers in the market, and between bag sellers themselves. The relations can be “tense because of the poor reputation of the unknown bag seller ... Saving grace lies in the interdependence between the two professions” (Burbidge 2013:96). When goods are sold, customers require a bag to carry them, so goods sellers rely on bag sellers to provide their business. Thus, identity relations are put aside in favour of cooperative business relations. As well, Burbidge found that the borrowing of small change between actors helped established feelings of trust – when a sale was made but the seller did not have enough change for the customer, another bag or goods seller would provide the necessary change. One of his informants explained this: “If we both cooperate in making trust available to each other we can both trade with ease. If you refuse to reciprocate my giving change to you, I lose out and you gain for now, but I will likely refuse you next time you ask” (Burbidge 2013:101). Burbidge’s findings demonstrate that individuals who

could be in competition or in tension with one another, are able to adapt to generate cooperative and trusting relations instead of oppositional ones through their activities.

Further, Ilahiane and Sherry's study of street vendors in Morocco also offers a case to consider how potential conflictual relations are avoided among informal economy actors. Here, they explain how business relations tend to come before any social relations and that street vendors are able to differentiate between the two:

Many studies, also on peasant and traditional markets, underscore the fact that traders are able to shield commercial ties from social relationships with partners, friends, and kin obligations; that is, they treat partners, friends, and kin on a strictly business basis. This phenomenon is evident among the street vendors: 'we are Muslims; we are brothers; we help each other; but at the end of the day we do our calculations'. Good-natured conflict, teasing relations, and competition among partners seem to maintain the accountability and the right conduct of individuals to one another and, if need be, for the application of sanctions. (2008:252)

The point here is to see that members of the informal economy first consider their business and work activities – in other words, their priority lies in their work and not in their social relations or obligations. When it came to religion, Ilahiane and Sherry's informants noted a willingness to help others who practiced the same, but only to a point.

Thus, these cases offer examples of how potentially conflicting relations between individuals in the informal economy can be put aside in favour of surviving or getting by in the street economy. Street vendors and hustlers alike tend to not place importance on one's identity, but instead on their partnerships or trustworthiness related to work.

Defining the Informal Economy

Actually defining what the 'informal economy' is varies across literature and between schools of thought. It is debated as comprising of marginal economic activities (including illegal and hidden activities) of the poor who evade costs of labour or taxes (Chen 2012). Keith Hart was first to coin the term in 1971, related to his research in Ghana, to refer to "economic activities that lie beyond or circumvent state regulation." Since its inception as a concept, suggestions have been made that there should be a more precise definition that can be situated in the specific contexts of where it is occurring (Lindell 2010:5). As well, scholars who study informal economic practices more recently have worked to redefine the term to include more actors. The International Labour Office (ILO), along with the Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) network, developed the following, more broadened definition:

the informal sector refers to the production and employment that takes place in unincorporated small or unregistered enterprises (1993 ICLS); informal employment refers to employment without legal and social protection (2003 ICLS); and the informal economy refers to all units, activities, and workers so defined and the output from them. Together they form the broad base of the workforce and economy, both nationally and globally. (Chen 2012:8)

It can be difficult, however, to truly pinpoint or see all of the informal activities taking place because they are so connected to all aspects of daily life, operating as a network that also blurs with formal market activities (Millar 2007; Sumich 2001). As Akin Fadahunsi (2000) notes on his research on the informal economy:

one was as likely to find entrepreneurs in the informal sector operating out of modern office blocks as one was to find them on street corners, in traffic, at purpose-built markets, at home, in air and seaports, on farmlands, alongside rivers; literally everywhere ... The different actors combined to form a complex, vibrant, but often misunderstood network of production and distribution of goods and services. (2000:4)

In further specifying what the informal economy looks like in the African context, Martha Chen (2012) and Kinyanjui (2010) outline visible activities, including those doing business in city streets like barbers, cobblers, cart pushers and bicycle peddlers; invisible activities including shops, small factories, homeworkers and garment stitching; and manufacturing, trade, agriculture, transport and services (Kinyanjui 2010:14). Di Nunzio (2012) highlights the 'street economy' in Addis Ababa and focuses his examination on parking guys, minibus touts, street touring guides and street hustlers as actors in the informal economy; and Burbidge's (2013) case study looks at plastic bag sellers in Tanzania. These activities are all examples of what takes place in the informal economy.

As the informal economy covers a very wide range of spaces and activities, for the purpose of this research it is vital to offer a definition of the 'street economy'. Those who participate in the street economy are part of an "inter-connected economy that benefits from street trade, including not only street traders themselves, but also those who service the street economy – suppliers, moneylenders, renters, porters, importers and a host of others" (Brown 2004:1). Some scholars on the street economy suggest treating it as separate from the umbrellaed category of 'informal economies', such as Ray Bromley (2000), who defines 'street vending' as "the retail or wholesale trading of goods and services in streets and other related public axes such as alleyways, avenues and boulevards" (2000:1). One key difference, that is also very much explored in my own research, is the significance of mobility among street entrepreneurs. Where many in the

informal economy remain fixed in a location with a shop or with one specific service, street vendors tend to move around because they do not have a structure to do business from. Though this can vary, I particularly focus on the strictly-mobile vendors who:

may push stalls on wheels, carry their merchandise on their persons, or operate a stall off a cart, a tricycle, or a motor vehicle. Some mobile vendors sell to passers-by, some do door-to-door delivery, and still others hawk from building to building. (Bromley 2000:2)

Bromley further notes the importance of interaction among street entrepreneurs: “Street vending is a laboratory for entrepreneurship, family business and social interaction, linking vendors and clients into the broader economic and social system” (2000:5).

Chapter Summary

This chapter has introduced the research which will be discussed in the rest of this thesis, and provided background on the topic of the informal economy and recognizing it as an environment of social relations, collective identities and diverse networks. Zanzibar’s history of identity politics was discussed in order to set up the discussion ahead regarding how the social relations between Zanzibar’s street entrepreneurs have the potential to mitigate tensions, and promote cooperative and positive social relationships instead of antagonistic ones. A literature review presented existing research which has both inspired my own research, as well as brought up questions which I have aimed to explore in the rest of this thesis. With this scholarship as a foundation, the remaining chapters will demonstrate how I conducted my study, what I found during my field research, and what that research ultimately adds to theory on social relations and cooperative networks among entrepreneurs of the informal street economy.

Chapter 2.

Methodology

The following chapter will discuss the reasoning used in selecting Zanzibar as a case study, the research methodology I employed – including literature highlighting the use of ethnographic approaches in studying informal economies – and the details of my own field research. The chapter will conclude with an introduction of the analytical framework I used when conducting my research and analysing my findings.

I argue that the characteristics which make Zanzibar a key case study for my research include: (1) the significant scope of its informal economy; (2) the movement of people from the mainland to the island for work opportunities; (3) its tourism economy which attracts more skilled labour and comes into tension with Islamic practices; and (4) the existing identity politics at play between mainlander and islander groups. With the majority of Zanzibar's population operating in the informal economy, and Unguja being recognized as a place for opportunity for those from outside the island, many people are migrating from the mainland to work there. The significant reliance on informal work and the intermingling of identities has the potential to either intensify competition or promote networks of individuals. As well, new business coming in does not align with the more traditional values of the majority Muslim population, yet mainlanders are seizing up opportunities for themselves, intensifying the tension which has been part of Zanzibar's society since before the Union existed. So, these kinds of relations and changes taking place in Zanzibar offer a unique environment to study social relationships among very vulnerable members of society.

In this chapter, I will also outline the details of my research methodology by first identifying the benefits of ethnographic approaches when studying human behaviour and social practices. Particularly, I will demonstrate why field work, participatory observation, in-depth interviews, and the combining of ethnographic methods proved to be very useful in my study. This discussion will outline the importance of immersing myself as a researcher into an environment which is very natural and routinized for my informants – where it is important to be able to observe and ask questions, seek out descriptive interpretations, and find meaning in how individuals interact with their space and with one another. I also will introduce who my informants were and how I interacted with all of them, so as to provide a background for my findings chapter that will follow.

Finally, the last section will briefly introduce the analytical framework that I had in mind while conducting my research, and that I employed upon analysing my findings later on. Specifically, theories around ‘trust’ and ‘hustle’ will be discussed. These perspectives helped to guide my research question, as they suggest specific kinds of relations that exist between street hustlers that do not exist outside of the street economy. What these theories suggested to me in this case, was that identity in the ‘hustle economy’ is perceived differently than it is outside of it, and trust-formation exists around how you act in this environment. Thus, I relate this perspective to my argument that in the street economy, one’s ethnic identity or cultural background does not factor into their relationships with other street entrepreneurs. Instead, a collective identity is shared and is unique to the relations among other members of society.

Zanzibar as a Case Study

Why Zanzibar makes an important and interesting case to study identity relations in the informal economy relates to: (1) the scope of the informal economy and level of participation in informal activities by both Zanzibaris and Tanzanian mainlanders; (2) the movement of people between the mainland and Unguja for work opportunities; and (3) the growth of the Zanzibar tourism sector and an opening up of the economy to foreign business, giving rise to inequalities between local and mainlander identities. The way in which tourism and identity politics – which, as explained previously, evolved through colonialism to present-day multiparty tensions – are intertwined in Zanzibar, overall, offers a significant environment to observe social relations on both the formal and informal level. As Barbara Brents and Deo Mshigeni (2004) put it, “Zanzibar ... certainly represents an interesting case study in examining the intersections of political institutions and politics, race and religion in the construction and mobilization of identity” (2004:72).

The first point of discussion on why Zanzibar was vital as a case study for this project and my particular research interests, regards the scope of its informal economy. Labour reports between 2006 and 2016 note that 80 to 88 percent of Zanzibar’s working population (those aged 15 to 60 years old) work in the informal sector (National Bureau of Statistics 2006; ILO 2010; LO/FTF 2014:15; LO/FTF 2016:15). Unemployment on the islands was cited at 34 percent in 2012 (LO/FTF 2014) and the majority of the population resort to seeking out opportunities in the informal sector when work is not available or attainable at a formal level. A 2010 International Labour Office (ILO) report highlights the high degree of “informality” that exists in the labour market of Zanzibar (both inside and

outside of formal work), saying that as more people are moving from rural areas to urban areas – 39.6 percent of the population were urban dwellers as of 2002 (ILO 2010:17) and 46.3 percent by 2014 (UNDP 2015:20) – unemployment rates are increasing and precarity is very common. Even where employment might exist among the adult population, the ILO notes that “most of them work in a highly informal environment with irregular incomes, in precarious conditions and with no access to social protection” (ILO 2010:23). So-called ‘formal’ employment in Zanzibar does not necessarily ensure a sense of security and many are turning to their own creative measures and establishing jobs for themselves as informal entrepreneurs. As a 2014 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report on Tanzania says, “a lack of formal ‘good’ jobs has also pushed people to diversify their economic activities” (2015:41). With all of these statistics in mind, the UNDP report recognizes there may even be an “under-representation of the true level of informality in the [Zanzibar] economy” (2015:41); but it is clearly greatly significant.

Tanzania, in 2014, had a total population of 49.6 million “with 66 percent living for under US\$1.25 a day and 88 percent for under US\$2” (LO/FTF 2014:12). With the 2016 population cited at 51.1 million (LO/FTF 2016: 10), larger populations of young Tanzanians are entering the labour force and not finding work to absorb their numbers, so they are resorting to work in the informal economy (LO/FTF 2014:13; LO/FTF 2016). It was reported in 2014 that Tanzania’s informal economy can “employ 63 percent of the yearly increasing labour force in urban areas while the formal sector is 8.5 percent” (LO/FTF 2014:13). A 2016 labour report states:

around 850,000 young people enter the country’s job market annually, but only 50,000 to 60,000 formal sector jobs are created each year ... In Zanzibar the labour market is estimated to hold 70,000 public and private workers from the formal sector. The informal economy is expanding [due to] high unemployment. (LO/FTF 2016:11)

So, with Zanzibar’s significant percentage of informal work and with growing numbers of unemployed mainlanders, many are migrating to Zanzibar to search for other opportunities.

This brings me to a second characteristic which makes Zanzibar an important site for this research: the movement of people from the mainland into Zanzibar to work in the informal economy. A 2002 census noted the archipelago having a population of 981 754 with 26.8 percent being born outside the islands and 25.8 percent were reported to have left Zanzibar for the mainland. These numbers have unquestionably

grown, with reports since 2014 putting Zanzibar's population at 1.3 million (LO/FTF 2014:12; UNDP 2015; LO/FTF 2016). One very significant reason mainlanders migrate to Zanzibar is related to the tourism sector, which alone accounts for over half of the economic activity in Zanzibar, and over 80 percent of the workers in tourism are self-employed and working on their own account (Meyer 2013). Zanzibar is heavily dependent on tourism, as it has been estimated to account for "80 percent of Zanzibar's export earnings, and the direct and indirect tourism economy contributes 44 percent of GDP" (Meyer 2013:781; RGZ/UNDP 2009). Tanzanians from the mainland (as well as many Kenyans) see Zanzibar's tourism as a pull to migrate for labour opportunities (LO/FTF 2014:15). Migrants, Stefan Gössling and Ute Schulz (2005) note, "account for about three quarters of the informal sector workforce in Zanzibar engaged in the souvenir trade" (Meyer 2013:786). They also argue, that "where tourism growth outpaces local labour supply or where rumours about income opportunities contribute to the attractiveness of regions, immigration will usually be the consequence" (Meyer 2013:785; Gössling and Schulz 2005:44). Dorothea Meyer (2013), upon interviewing Kenyans who worked in Zanzibar, found them to view it "as an employment location where they would be able to earn 'hard currency' relatively fast" (2013:785).

People have been moving from the mainland to work in Zanzibar, especially, in the growing tourism sector. Where identity tensions have emerged in this sector since its inception on the archipelago, is around mainlanders who are coming into the economy with more experience, training and expertise than local Zanzibaris. Tourism and identity have become entwined in Zanzibar in this way; a third key aspect which makes Unguja, especially, a valuable environment to study group tensions and relations in the informal economy. Tourism, immigration and emigration were discouraged in Zanzibar up until 1985 when "the government abandoned its socialist, isolationist tendencies" (Sumich 2001:1) and chose to liberalize its economy. This development into tourism came later to Zanzibar than it did to mainland Africa, like Kenya for example, which saw many Kenyans investing in hotels and restaurants on the island (Meyer 2013:780). Mainlanders moving to Zanzibar came with more experience and specialized training in management and tour operations, giving them the qualifications to do well. Less-experienced Zanzibaris, who had little to no access to training, did not see themselves as successful in their own tourism economy.

As well, favouring of mainlanders or foreigners for more specialized work in the tourist sector has contributed to negative impressions of mainlanders among Zanzibaris, who see themselves being uninvited in their own economy.

The tourism industry in Zanzibar is characterized by a serious lack of skilled personnel due to the absence (until recently) of relevant training institutes, the restrictions of Muslim tradition, adversarial attitudes towards the tourism industry, and generally low levels of entrepreneurial initiative. (Meyer 2013:786)

Even Zanzibaris themselves have noted that they lack the “knowledge, entrepreneurial spirit, and aggressiveness” (Meyer 2013:783) that more mainlanders possess. Some of my informants told me that Zanzibaris are “less visionary” or are “less willing to put in the effort for the reward,” so they also do not reap the benefits of the tourist economy as mainlanders do.

A further aspect of identity issues related to tourism in Zanzibar regards culture and religion. With Zanzibar opening its borders to foreigners and boosting tourism, along with that came the influx of mainland and European tourist culture which was often in opposition with the practices of Islam that most islanders valued. Many considered tourism to cause problems of “cultural pollution” (Sumich 2001:1) in Zanzibar. Meyer (2013) identifies how religion and tourism in both Kenya and Tanzania have given rise to inequalities in the sector:

The Swahili coast in both Kenya and Tanzania is culturally and religiously influenced by a more or less strict Islamic tradition. The tourism industry, having to cater for the needs of mainly European holiday-makers (e.g. alcoholic drinks, sun-bathing, pork consumption) was seen to conflict with local traditions and depended on the influx of migrant, non-Muslim, workers. In Kenya, the majority of jobs in the tourism industry were initially taken up by newly migrated employees from ‘up-country’ while the Swahili residents acted as suppliers to the tourism industry or worked in the informal sector (Vorlauffer, 1979). This in-migration is said to have led to the dilution of the Swahili culture and increased tensions. (Meyer 2013:784-785)

Due to the assumption that Zanzibaris are less qualified for work in the tourism sector, “most foreign hotels bring with them their own middle management and Zanzibaris are only employed in low-paid jobs with limited opportunities for growth” (Meyer 2013:786). As well, Jason Sumich (2001), in his research in Zanzibar, noted that one hotel explicitly “only employed Zanzibaris in the most menial positions, such as cleaning staff. All other positions are held by European expats and employees from the mainland, including Kenya” (2001:38).

The significant dependence Zanzibar has on the informal economy, and the tensions that have existed – and continue to grow – between mainlanders and islanders, make for an interesting space to explore social relations among some of the most vulnerable members of society. In my research, I was interested to find out how street entrepreneurs viewed one another within this context and how their social networks are impacted by the activities they engage in every day.

Research Methods

Ethnographic Method

In conducting this research, I employed ethnographic methods to engage deeply with my informants, their activities and their experiences with one another. Specifically, I conducted in-depth, unstructured and semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and informal conversations (more on these in the discussion below). I also administered a questionnaire to some informants. My research question regards perceptions of identity, trust and social relationships, and using ethnography allows for researchers to explore the “natural setting” of subjects in order to make sense of the meaning that people give to their experiences (Emerson et. al. 2011; Geertz 1973). Ethnographic researchers focus on the ‘local’ in order to understand and “situate local experience” against “broader socioeconomic and political contexts” (Schensul 1999). I particularly wanted to explore patterns of behaviour occurring among a very specific population and to compare those findings to that population’s broader experiences in their society and in their position as a marginal population. My desire to be physically present as well – to truly see and experience the daily functioning’s of the street economy in Zanzibar to localize the research practice in that setting – made an ethnographic approach very necessary. Ethnographic methods are useful for these kinds of in-depth explorations of a phenomenon, human activity, as well as human emotion or thought processes.

As well, a key aspect of my research interests regarded social relationships and social experiences. Robert Emerson et. al. (2011) notes that ethnographers “enter into a social setting” to participate, develop relationships, and observe the people involved in it (2011:1), so as to interpret what is going on. As he says, “social worlds are interpreted worlds” (2011:2) and that they “are created and sustained in and through interaction with others” (2011:2). Thus, it was important to immerse into the social world of the street

entrepreneurs and experience for myself the processes and interactions taking place to then “render meanings” from them (Emerson et. al. 2011:3).

Furthermore, studying the informal economy calls for less structured approaches because without engaging with the people closely, it can be very difficult to ‘see’ what is really going on. Fadahunsi (2000) points out the necessity of adaptability in researching on informal economies:

Entrepreneurs in the informal sector are an especially mobile group. They operate in fluid and diverse networks and socio-political contexts that make them difficult to identify or verify, particularly when using highly regimented survey methods that are unable to adapt quickly to changes in the informal entrepreneurs’ environment. (Fadahunsi 2000:4-5)

In order to make the ‘invisible’ informal entrepreneurs ‘visible’, Fadahunsi argues that less structure in the research approach is best; such as being inside the networks themselves and tracing the paths of people and their daily routines; or following around a street vendor and meeting his customers, connections and middlemen along the way, who otherwise would have remained unseen.

In my own research, I utilized methods which allowed me to connect with my informants and to become very acquainted with their daily lives as entrepreneurs on the street. In my fieldwork, I allowed my discoveries to guide the research process and did not limit myself to a particular way of learning or collecting data. By combining fieldnotes, observations, interactions, interviews, and questionnaires together, I was able to collect a comprehensive story of Zanzibar’s street economy and adapt to any opportunities which came up, as I will explain in more detail below.

Ethnographic Fieldwork

I chose to travel to the site of research to conduct an ethnographic study on members of the informal economy there. In order to pursue questions which were lacking exploration in research, it was necessary to physically immerse myself into this environment and be present and engaged among members of the informal economy in Zanzibar. I spent three months in Stone Town (sometimes known as Zanzibar Town) and briefly spent time traveling to the north and east sides of Unguja. The majority of my time was spent between three core locations in Stone Town: Forodhani Gardens (a park in the town centre), Kenyatta Road (a central hub for tourist shops and restaurants) and Darajani Market (a busy local food and goods market).

Upon arriving, I anticipated narrowing my focus to more specific activities, as the informal economy is vast and it was not feasible to examine all possible networks of these entrepreneurs in the time frame I had. I allowed myself a few days to settle and simply walk around Stone Town as a very neutral observer to see what kinds of patterns I picked up, questions that arose, or which intriguing individuals sparked my attention. I found myself drawn to individuals who were either always standing in the same place or walking about because of how they appeared to be interacting with other people in a very visible network. Their activities shared mobile characteristics, as these informal entrepreneurs did not have shops or fixed structures to do business from, and instead sold their products and services from their hands. So, by being present at the site of research I was able to determine a visible and mobile network of entrepreneurs who worked on the street and decided to focus on these individuals for the remainder of my study.

Recruitment

Initially, my informants approached me by means of their own will. Because Stone Town is a major tourism hub, I was automatically assumed by locals to be a foreign tourist who was a potential customer. I deliberately placed myself at Forodhani Gardens – a hub for tourist activity – in the beginning of research, knowing that I would not only see activity, but would also likely be pulled into the centre of it. I figured I could utilize my perceived identity (as a tourist) to my advantage and make contact with potential informants. So, recruitment for the first couple weeks involved tour guides, souvenir vendors, and fishermen approaching me to sell their products or services, when I would flip the conversation to recruit them for interviews. On multiple occasions, individuals approached me not knowing I was conducting research and upon talking with them for a few minutes and asking them some simple questions, I was able to determine if they would be a useful informant to interview or spend more time with.

Once I had an 'in' with a certain individual, our relationship would open up the possibility for others to form; often when I was sitting with someone, their friends or other guides, for example, would come over out of curiosity and introduce themselves. As I spent time with one informant, I would get to know the people they worked alongside or who they greeted in the street, and could follow those leads to recruit others for my research. And of course, word spread as quickly as you might expect in a small park in Zanzibar that the woman with an orange scarf who hangs around everyday was doing

interviews. So, as I became known in the research site, people were eager to talk with me and share their stories.

Another means of recruiting involved approaching someone myself (whom often interested me due to the activity I could see they were engaged in) to ask if they would mind me asking them some questions. I would identify my curiosity about their work, and we would sort out a time to do an interview or questionnaire. If there were ever any language issues – as some of the street entrepreneurs only spoke Kiswahili – I had assistance from another informant who helped me translate where I was unable to. However, the majority of my informants spoke English and in order to avoid potential miscommunications, my Kiswahili-only speaking informants were recruited for the questionnaire. It was more difficult to recruit participants in Darajani, as these entrepreneurs did not sell as often to tourists and were always moving. In addition to not understanding English, they were incredibly busy and constantly walking around selling to locals. I was able to reach a group of them by spending time where they hung out together during their down-time, however, only one offered up his time for an interview (which was translated from Kiswahili to English).

I intentionally made the attempt to find participants who would offer representation across the street economy (i.e. entrepreneurs who worked in each of the main activities of the street economy) so that multiple perspectives were given. I sought out a cohesive narrative from inside these networks of entrepreneurs, so it was important to hear from various individuals who all could paint a true picture of what working in the informal economy in Zanzibar is like. And in order to compare that narrative to others (especially regarding Zanzibari and mainlander relations), I also utilized perspectives from some informants in the formal economy (when they came along). I did not actively seek out these individuals and instead would happen upon them during my time living in Stone Town in very casual and unplanned settings. We would make conversation and I used those opportunities to ask a few questions of them.

Participatory Observation

The method I utilized most frequently was participatory observation. Kathleen and Billie DeWalt (2002) define participant observation as “reacting to and interacting with others in the events and situations that unfold before him or her” (2002:20). There are different levels of participation which can be practiced and the two which relate to my own research are defined by DeWalt as: ‘passive participation’, where “the researcher does

not interact with people. It is as though the researcher uses the site as an observation post” (2002:23); and ‘moderate participation’, where “the ethnographer is present at the scene of the action, is identifiable as a researcher, but does not actively participate or only occasionally interacts with people in it” (2002: 23). Where I practiced passive participation was during my initial days at the sites of research when I sought to simply take in the activities and remain separated from what was going on. My intention was to use this method to begin to develop my own perceptions about informal activities, interactions, and movement taking place and to develop questions about what I was seeing. I spent several hours either seated in or walking through a particular location until I felt I had a general idea about what kinds of activities and people frequented that space.

Upon making connections with my informants throughout the process, I began to employ moderate participation. I became known among them (as well as others in the spaces) as a researcher and they went about their days while I sat nearby, occasionally asking questions or seeking clarification about something I had observed. While I never participated in the actual business or activity of my informants, I *did* participate in their movements and engaged with their physical spaces. On this point, I would add that along with moderate participation I also used what Margarethe Kusenbach (2003) calls the “go-along” method, which involves:

fieldworkers [accompanying] individual informants on their ‘natural’ outings, and – through asking questions, listening and observing – actively [exploring] their subjects’ stream of experiences and practice as they move through, and interact with, their physical and social environment. (2003:463)

As Kusenbach notes, this approach offers a more “systematic” or “outcome-oriented” way of hanging out with informants (2003:463) as you can ‘go-along’ on their outings with them. Observations and casual interviews can occur at the same time, so as to see what individuals do in their space and to still access “their experiences and interpretations at the same time” (Kusenbach 2003:463). What made this methodology extremely useful for my study was how it places importance on physical space and everyday action – seeing as I wished to understand how the street economy as a space might facilitate relationship formation. I often spent my days following my informants around in their physical spaces of work, watching as they conducted their business or joked with friends; or I would hear them refer to one another by their nicknames and talk together about their daily hardships; and I asked them questions while all of their work and social activities took place in these spaces. Being present and involved with my

informants' days in such a way brought up curiosities and revealed patterns I would not have recognized had I relied solely on interviews or passive observation.

Kusenbach suggests that this method is meant to explore spatial practices and social realms (2003:456) which are aspects of daily life that occur "naturally"; and "people usually do not comment on 'what is going on' while acting in 'natural' environments" (2003:459). As she says, observations and fieldnotes alone do not demonstrate an informant's perception or interpretation of their natural environment, and interviews can remove informants from their natural routine (2003:459-462). When seeking to understand naturally occurring processes in a space, certain aspects may be "unintelligible" if the informants "overlook issues that do not figure prominently in their awareness" (Kusenbach 2003:462) (because they are natural or even unconscious actions). Thus, by both witnessing and participating in the interactions, as well as interviewing and "going along" with the natural actions of your informants, the go-along method "can help ethnographers reconstruct how personal sets of relevance guide their informants' experiences of the social and physical environment in everyday life" (Kusenbach 2003:466).

An additional aspect to my participation was assuming a "peripheral membership" (Adler 1987) role among my informants. Patricia and Peter Adler (1987) note that the use of this method is to "seek an insider's perspective on the people, activities, and structure of the social world" (1987:37) under study, and that it involves "daily or near-daily contact" (1987:38) with informants. The goal of taking on peripheral membership is to "become part of the scene, or one group within it," (Adler 1987:38) but to still remain removed from the core functioning of the group. This method allows for relationships to form so that you as a researcher are welcomed into the space, are deemed trustworthy and can participate in the social setting; yet it also prevents one from becoming "overly drawn in" to the extent where data interpretation could be compromised (i.e. unable to detach oneself from what they observe) (Adler 1987:38).

With the informants whom I spent the most time with, I was able to develop a degree of friendship with them. By listening to them, learning from them and showing a genuine curiosity in their daily lives, I was respected by my informants. They happily obliged to assist me, and through those personal connections made, I was able to gain access into their social worlds – where they gave me a nickname just as they give one another, greeted me and joked with me, and they also opened up about their very honest struggles as street hustlers.

Part of being a peripheral member, however, is “being aware of the differences” (Adler 1987:39) between yourself and those you are researching. This distance that remains tends to be a “conscious effort to limit ... involvement and commitment” (Adler 1987:39) in group life, so not to affect the data being collected. For example, there are very few (almost none that I came across) female street entrepreneurs, so, that factor alone, separated myself from my informants and also, at times, brought me more attention. It is both known and a very visible part of life in Zanzibar that intimate relationships often form between visiting women (usually from Europe or North America) and local men (who most often come from the group I was researching). Thus, certain relationships with informants had to be minimized due to their mixed intentions, as some men I spoke to assumed if they befriended me, that they might benefit from that (i.e. pursuing an intimate relationship with a foreign woman for status in their community or monetary gain, which is commonly what occurs). As well, it became known that certain informants were identifying myself as their “girlfriend” to their peers because of how much time we spent with one another at the research site. Upon encountering these situations, I would distance myself from those individuals and spend more time away from that location to focus on another – what Adler and Adler note as a “disengagement” from the role after gathering enough data and wishing to minimize involvement with respondents (1987:44).

Another dilemma I faced as a peripheral member was the requests for help, work, opportunities in Canada or Europe, and money. The population I spent my time with were hustlers who try to make money through any means they can find. As a white, Canadian woman, I was viewed as a privileged individual who could be a gateway to an opportunity or a ‘getting out’ of this life. This aspect of my physical appearance could not be separated from my membership and, at times, put me in a position where my informants expected something from me; an answer about how they will change their lives, a handing over of cash, or even an investment in a business with them. It was important that I treated all my respondents equally and not demonstrate that certain individuals gained more or less from our relationship, so I had to repeatedly remind some informants (a difficult and rather awkward task) that I was there only to learn from them and nothing else.

Interviews

In addition to participatory observation and informal interviews through using the go-along method, I also conducted interviews which were scheduled and done away from the informant's activity (but still occurred in the general location where they worked). A total of 11 in-depth, unstructured interviews were conducted – of which eight were with Zanzibaris and three were with mainlanders. On that point, informants identified themselves as 'Zanzibari' if they were born on the island and had lived there with their families, while mainlanders identified themselves as 'Tanzanian' if they had grown up off the island and had come to Zanzibar without their families for work. Those interviewed included three tour guides, two fishermen (who also engaged in tourism), one beach boy (or unofficial tour guide), three street vendors, one taxi driver and one shop owner. Their ages ranged between 18 and 40 years, with 30 being the average age among them and all but one were male (discussion of women in the informal economy later on).

Laurie Bauman and Elissa Adair (1992) define in-depth, unstructured interviews as:

[containing] no predefined set of questions or topics and [imposing] no order upon the flow of information. Respondents are encouraged to talk about a topic that the researcher has selected, but the specific themes, areas, and orders of discussion are determined by the respondents and their perception of priorities. (1992: 9)

I did not have a question guide or set plan for my interviews, and instead kept the possibility for free-flowing conversation quite open. However, I did have some general themes and direction in mind that I kept written in my notebook. This way, if there was ever a lull in conversation or if it veered too far from the subject of my research, I could refer back and spark up another topic. Here is the list I would refer to during the interviews:

- i. Age and background of the informant (i.e. where they are from, if they came to Zanzibar from elsewhere, if they have family here or elsewhere, etc.);
- ii. Explanation of their activity (i.e. what do they do in the street economy and what kind of services or products do they sell, and to whom);
- iii. Why and how they came to do this work (i.e. what did they do before, did someone help them get into their activity, why did they leave the mainland, etc.);
- iv. What their relations are like with other tour guides/vendors (i.e. is there competition or cooperation, are they friends with one another, do they know one another, etc.);
- v. Thoughts on Zanzibari-mainlander relations (i.e. do they see tensions between groups or not, are these relations positive or negative, how do

- they experience life in Zanzibar as a mainlander, what it is like working alongside one another, etc.);
- vi. Feelings toward the government (i.e. have there been changes since the last election, are people still divided or is there cooperation, do they like or dislike the government, etc.).

With ethnography, the researcher approaches the research site as “genuinely ignorant, thus, their informants are free to take on the role of expert” (Bauman and Adair 1992:12). The intention behind this approach is to allow “material to emerge naturally” (Bauman and Adair 1992:13) as guided by the informant, where the ethnographer might only probe for further detail on something that is said. These kinds of unstructured interviews allowed me to gain detailed ‘glimpses’ into the lives of each of my informants, where each respondent had something unique to offer to the greater narrative I was collecting. The flexibility and open-endedness of this style of interviewing also reassured me that the patterns and repeated comments I was noting across multiple interviews were naturally brought up – and my method had not forced certain answers out.

Most interviews lasted between one to two hours and tended to flow very conversationally. I used these more planned interactions to set up a kind of personalized base for the rest of research – I would refer back to these 11 interviews during my observations or encounters with other individuals and compare what had been said to what I was then seeing. Over the course of my study, I had repeated encounters and continued conversations with five of the 11 interviewees and closely observed each of them in their work on a regular basis. This aspect of my research relates back to the go-along method discussed above. The interviews that took place while I followed these five informants around were much more randomized and fluid, as I would simply chime in when I wanted to clarify something that happened. I continued to spend time with these five informants based on how open they were in their interviews; they had demonstrated a strong sense of trust in me and were very willing to continue welcoming me into their environment on a daily basis.

Aside from these more planned encounters, I also collected data from informal conversations with an additional 14 individuals. Most of which were single encounters, with the exception of three whom I had multiple conversations with. Among them were 10 individuals whose employment ranged across formal economy enterprises such as guesthouses, hotels, restaurants and various businesses. The remaining four encounters were with a fisherman (who also used his boat for tours), a street vendor selling both cell phones and tours, a beach boy, and a musician from the mainland.

Further, some notes come from casual conversations or encounters with various locals along my way. These informal encounters were had with 10 Zanzibaris and four mainlanders (see Table 1 below). While they mostly resembled conversations, I at times would specifically ask certain questions to guide the discussion or determine their stance on a particular issue.

Questionnaire

As has been mentioned, combining multiple methods of research can be very beneficial when they complement one another and fill gaps where one may fall short. I chose to develop a questionnaire near the end of my research when I decided I wanted to reach out to a group of street vendors who had been less accessible due to language barriers and their constant movement. I also knew that most of these vendors were from mainland Tanzania, and I wished to have a few more non-Zanzibari perspectives in my data.

Bauman and Adair suggest that ethnographic interviews can be useful for questionnaire construction in multiple ways. The first involves the benefit of avoiding assumptions, as ethnographic interviewing, in their experience, “[increases] the legitimacy of anticipated findings” because of how they emerge without asking the informant specifically about them (1992:15). As well, “unanticipated issues and topics” may come up through the interviews, which can be included in the questionnaire later on (1992:16-17). Another benefit to ethnographic interviewing is its descriptiveness: “Descriptive questions ask about the informant’s world to elicit unprocessed description of daily activities, routines, and interpersonal relationships” (1992:18). Otherwise known as ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973), interviews allow for human behaviour to be described, which can help inform questionnaire development.

The questionnaire I developed did not have fixed, multiple-choice answers, but were somewhat open to discussion (there was a small box for respondents to write in their answers). The questions were fixed and deliberate, but offered opportunities to respond to a particular question over another. Eight additional individuals participated in the questionnaire where they were asked to write brief answers to 13 questions (on a sheet of paper which I brought directly to them, wherever they were working). Among these participants were one Zanzibari and seven mainlanders. Those who participated in the questionnaire were all street vendors whose ages ranged from 19 to 30, with 22 years being the average. All vendors were male. The questionnaire was written in both

English and Kiswahili, and any answers not in English were translated. This is the list of questions that were asked of the respondents:

- i. What is your age?
- ii. Where are you from? Do you consider yourself Tanzanian or Zanzibari, or both?
- iii. When did you come to Zanzibar, and why?
- iv. Have you had any other jobs in Zanzibar or do you do any work on the side?
- v. How did you get into this work? Were you helped by a friend/family member?
- vi. What is your typical day like? (i.e. where do you look for customers; do you take breaks or meet with your friends?)
- vii. Are you friends with the people who do the same work as you? Or do you know each other?
- viii. Do you help each other in your work ever? Or do you help each other in daily life? Can you give an example or a story of when this happened?
- ix. Do you have friends who work in the market or in the shops? Did you meet them through your work? Do they ever help you out? How?
- x. Are there certain people who you trust in your work? What do you trust them with and why do you trust them? (i.e. how did they gain your trust)
- xi. Why did you choose to do this work? Are you happy with it, or do you hope to do another kind of work in the future?
- xii. Did anyone teach/mentor you in this work, or did you learn everything yourself?
- xiii. Will you stay in Zanzibar, or do you plan to go to the mainland? What are the relations like between local Zanzibaris and mainlanders who come here to work? Good or bad?

For a summary of the kinds of informants I interacted with, refer to Table 1.1 below:

Table 1.1: Breakdown of Informants

Type of Interaction	Informant's Activity	Number of Informants	Number of Zanzibari	Number of Mainland/ Other
Unstructured, In-Depth Interviews	Tour Guide (Official Guide)	3	3	
	Fisherman	2	2	
	Beach Boy (Unofficial Guide)	1	1	
	Street Vendor	3	1	2
	Taxi Driver	1	1	
	Shop Owner	1		1
Questionnaire	Street Vendor	8	1	7
Informal Conversations	Formal Economy Enterprise and Other Locals	14	10	4
TOTAL		33	19	14

Note on Women in the Informal Economy

On the lack of women represented in my research, it was rare to meet any female tour guides or vendors who were mobile in their activities. This was due to multiple reasons; the most significant being that in most traditional Muslim families in Zanzibar, the women of the household are expected to be at home and not out on the street working. As multiple informants explained to me, men often prefer their wives to be cleaning and cooking rather than partaking in tourism or looking for customers outside. While more recently their degree of participation has been changing, Muslim women in Zanzibar generally work in jobs outside the public sphere due to Islamic practices and traditions there (see Corrie Decker 2014; Nelly Samson Maliva 2016; Thembi Mutch 2012). Of the female shop owners I did meet, most of them were from mainland Tanzania. One of them said she was able to have her own shop and sell henna freely on the street because of “different cultural practices” between mainland and Zanzibari women. She explained that especially unmarried Zanzibari women do not have their own shops and that even though she was unmarried it was a custom which was not applicable to non-Muslim mainlanders. Where women were more commonly visible as actors in the informal economy were at food stalls in the markets, in agricultural trade and as fish traders.

In a study on fish traders in Zanzibar (Fröcklin et. al. 2013), women were found to be increasingly active in fish auctions and markets but men have always played a more significant role. The researchers found that while women were entering fish trade, even through the support of their husbands or relatives, they tended to be disadvantaged in their access to resources and having to balance their time with household duties (Fröcklin et. al. 2013). Further, they found Zanzibari women to be commonly considered unfit for such an environment: “a common statement among men traders was that women should not interact with men inside the main markets, which was based on social and traditional norms and values about what a ‘respectable’ woman should or should not do” (2013:956). Also, that “the cultural setting and common perception in Zanzibar [is] that tourism-related work is unsuitable for women” (2013:957).

So, while women do pursue informal entrepreneurship, Islamic cultural norms in Zanzibar tend to limit the amount of them who are visibly participating in the street economy. I never came across a female tour guide or mobile vendor, and the women of the fish trade had extremely limited time and were unwilling to spare any potential time for interviews. Also, recognizing myself as a foreign, female researcher, men were very

easy to approach and were comfortable to speak with me. Women tended to be more reserved and closed-off, while also having less time to spare, making it more difficult to form any relationships between myself and female informal entrepreneurs.

Analytical Framework

Trust-Formation in the Hustle Economy

Theoretical perspectives around the 'hustle economy' understand it as an environment of manipulation, creativity, resourcefulness, and survival. Loïc Wacquant (1998) defines what it means to hustle:

The verb to hustle denotes a field of activities that have in common the fact that they require mastery of a particular type of symbolic capital, namely, the ability to manipulate others, the inveigle and deceive them, if need be by joining violence to chicanery and charm, in the pursuit of immediate pecuniary gain. (1998:3)

The hustling world is linked to scarce conditions and uncertainty where you are solely responsible to live for yourself "and take care of your own" (Wacquant 1998:4). Nothing is guaranteed to you and yet you must persevere. Those who find themselves in this economy live along lines which are blurred between illicit and licit as they will do anything to get by, "carving out opportunities against the backdrop of extreme daily realities" (Thieme 2013:397).

It takes very particular skills to make it in the hustle economy, and everyone in it is struggling with what they have. Hustlers are willing to take risks and know that at least they are trying. As Wacquant explains, risks are worth it when you find yourself in a marginalized position in society anyway: "What good would it be to take the 'legit route' when the resulting rewards are so meager and almost as uncertain as those, more immediate and palpable even if they come at high risks, offered by the street economy?" (1998:14).

The mentality which is shared among hustlers is where I place my argument that a particular collective identity exists in the street economy that does not exist elsewhere. The specific circumstances a hustler finds himself in – the necessity of survival and to simply get by – means he does not have the time or the option to lose out on any opportunity that comes about. Where I have already discussed the networks at play in informal economies, I also suggest that trust is formed within those networks through repeated interactions and reciprocal actions. Through this perspective, I conducted my

research and findings analysis, and argue that members of the street economy share a collective identity based on their shared struggles and daily hardships, and solidify social relations through predictable interactions (i.e. trust-formation).

On trust, Francis Fukuyama (1995) says that it is generated through personal networks and asserted in the predictability of actions. Other theorists on trust also note its relation to 'obligation' and 'expectation' or 'prediction' when looking at social networks specifically (Odera 2013:128). Further, in informal institutions, networks are held together "through interpersonal trust that actors have in the rules that govern the interactions they establish," (Odera 2013:128) and "reciprocal relationships" (Coleman 1998; Radaev 2002; Lyon 2005). These perspectives on trust-formation in informal social networks are what have driven much of my argument in this research – that actors in the informal economy are part of a set of daily interactions that require an earning of trust which goes beyond one's identity, but are related to their actions instead. Thus, hustlers of the street economy find themselves in a space where they must adapt and negotiate alongside one another as survivalists on an 'equal playing field'; and in doing so, must rely on one another in their activities.

Going forward, it is important to note that trust within informal economies is not always positive and that it can be related to conflict or even violence. To clarify, I use Carolyn Nordstrom's (2007) discussion of trust among organized criminal networks (or shadow networks). She finds that for criminal systems to work, trust is an utmost necessity. When talking to drug smugglers, they told her that violence can be replaced by trust if it is maintained. An infamous former smuggler explained it to work like this:

The criminal has to rely more on trust and a handshake than on the 'contracts' of the straight world ... In the criminal world, there is no recourse if you encounter problems – you can't take your complaints to a formal outside authority. There has to be decent systems of business trust to get the work done. (2007:141)

Another informant of Nordstrom's identified how he knew he needed to remain trustworthy out of fear that something bad would happen to him if he did not (such as losing his income or perhaps something more extreme):

I sell good drugs and people come back. What do you think will happen to me if I sell bad pharmaceuticals? People will say, 'That Lucas is not to be trusted, his goods are bad,' and they will not come back. If someone gets sick from my drugs, they will be angry with me, and that is worse. (2007:134)

Nordstrom finds her research to match what Ernest Gellner (1988) said about the paradox between anarchy and trust: where it is assumed in the "absence of

enforcement” there is “distrust and social disintegration”, but really “it is precisely anarchy which engenders trust” (Nordstrom 2007:140; Ernest Gellner 1988:147). People in these informal systems of crime (or even outside of crime) rely on trust because there is nothing else to uphold the system. A detective told Nordstrom that, “Trust puts a face, and face-to-face interactions, to the system. Without this, the system fails” (2007:151). This perspective of trust in, say, criminal or hustle economies should be considered throughout the remainder of my thesis to recognize that trust does not always play out as a positive feature (i.e. such as a we-are-all-in-this-together kind of attitude), but can be linked also to conflict or the management of conflict.

Overall, this brief discussion on the hustle economy and trust-formation through repeated and reciprocated actions, will provide the analytical framework going forward. I present my empirical research findings in the following chapter, and discuss them against broader theoretical perspectives, as well as similar existing case studies, in the final chapter of this thesis.

Chapter 3.

Research Findings

The purpose of this research study was to examine the relationships between entrepreneurs in the informal street economy of Zanzibar, specifically between islanders and Tanzanian mainlanders. The following research question informs this study: through informal economic activities, do people from Zanzibar and people from mainland Tanzania engage in cooperative relations that challenge pre-existing conflictual relations between them?

This chapter begins by presenting findings obtained from the research on who my informants were and I offer explanations of the key informal activities that were investigated. Upon beginning the field research, my focus of informal economy entrepreneurs narrowed to, what I refer to as, mobile street entrepreneurs. These included individuals who were specifically mobile in their daily activities; they did not have a shop or market stall and sold their product or service on foot. Clarifications of my informants' 'mobility' and of local terminology used among street entrepreneurs – which help define actors from one another – are also provided below. Following this, I will begin a discussion of the themes which I established based on my informants' overall perspectives in the research findings. These themes offer a means of analytically illuminating what the individual experiences of my informants informs about the more general context of working – and relating to others through that work – in the informal economy.

The analytical themes are subsequently divided into two major sections: (1) 'networks in the street economy' and (2) 'Zanzibaris, mainlanders and a culture of tolerance'. The first of the themes regards findings which demonstrate that various kinds of networks are at work connecting mobile street entrepreneurs via their physical locations and relational or circumstantial cohesions. This section is further separated into three more specified themes; the first being (1.1) 'mobility and shared space', which highlights the importance of movement and the significance of shared, public spaces in encouraging and maintaining social relations among street entrepreneurs. The second theme, (1.2) 'shared experiences and understandings of struggle', presents findings that reveal a network of understanding and of a mutual sense of struggle amongst all the

street entrepreneurs I interacted with. Third, (1.3) 'trust-formation through interdependence and cooperation in work' will demonstrate findings which identified how certain informal actors rely on other actors in order to do their work, they choose to work with one another or their activities cross over with each other's. Further, through repeated favours and cooperation, actors formed trusting relations with particular individuals.

The second key analytical theme of the chapter, 'Zanzibaris, mainlanders, and a culture of tolerance', outlines findings which demonstrate any notions of inequalities or tensions that do or do not exist between Zanzibaris and mainlanders – where overall, any differences were tolerated by my informants. The three subheadings of this section include: (2.1) 'Zanzibari and mainlander identities', which notes findings that demonstrated how Zanzibaris and mainlanders identify themselves and each other; (2.2) 'working relations in the Union', where my informants noted their willingness to work together as members of the Union; and (2.3) 'perceptions of mainlanders outside the street economy' notes how, contrastingly, in conversations with members of the formal tourist and business sectors, the divide sparked more tension and discussion. These findings suggested that the informal economy differs from the formal one in their attitude and perspective.

The chapter will conclude with a summary and will introduce the discussion to be had in chapter four, where the literature will be revisited and a more substantial theoretical analysis will take place.

Summary of Findings

Overall, the findings revealed that actors in the street economy in Zanzibar do participate in positive and cooperative relations and they do not base their perceptions towards fellow street entrepreneurs on whether they are from the mainland or the island. Street entrepreneurs who do not have a shop of their own and who are mobile in their activities often come from similar socioeconomic backgrounds; they have struggled to find work and they have had to make do for themselves in this setting of the street economy. They each recognize one another as being in a similar situation where the 'hustle' is very difficult and most expressed their displeasure in doing this kind of work. While their activities vary, each of them play a role in the day-to-day functioning of the street economy, and often find ways to work together and help one another. The topic of there being any kind of Zanzibari-mainlander divide had to be brought up by myself in all

interviews and questionnaires with members of the street economy, as it was not volunteered as a central tension or issue among these actors. However, in conversations with members of the formal tourist and business sectors, the divide sparked more tension and discussion, suggesting that actors of the informal economy do not share a similar view with those of the formal economy.

Sites and Mobile Activities of the Zanzibar Street Economy

The range of activities in the informal economy of Zanzibar is vast and diverse, but those who were interviewed engaged in the most visible activities that were specifically mobile in nature. My informants worked by moving both their physical locations and products or services so they could be seen by many people during multiple times and in multiple places. They were not fixed in place and reliant on customers coming to them, but rather could move freely and search for business. They made themselves known, visible and heard by potential customers and fellow street entrepreneurs through their daily, routinized movements. In my observations, I began to note patterns related to these entrepreneurs and their mobility, where every day I saw the same individuals in the same locations, and I also came to know who I would see them with.



Figure 1. Map of Unguja Island (free map handed out by tour guides)



Figure 2. Map of Stone Town (free map handed out by tour guides)

There were mainly three core locations that these mobile street entrepreneurs moved between in Stone Town: Forodhani Gardens, Kenyatta Road and Darajani Market. Upon my regular and daily passing between these three sites, which all connect to one another via the main roads in town, I would find tour guides who gathered along the entrances of Forodhani Gardens (a central park along the water and a hub for both tourists and locals to gather), street vendors lining Kenyatta Road (a popular strip of shops and restaurants for tourists), and fishermen lounging along the beach beside Forodhani (if they were not selling their fish at the town market, Darajani). Tour guides also moved through each of these areas on their city walking tours with customers, so I would see them making their rounds regularly. Street vendors targeting tourists and vendors targeting locals in their sales (more on this in a moment) shared spaces and passed by one another, but those selling to tourists remained mostly on Kenyatta Road or in and around Forodhani. Vendors selling more to locals spent much of their time within Darajani, but also passed through Kenyatta Road and Forodhani throughout the day.



Figure 3. Aerial view of Forodhani
(downloaded from zanzibarhostel.com/gallery/)



Figure 4. Inside Forodhani
(photos taken by myself inside Forodhani)



Figure 5. Darajani Market
(photo taken by myself in Darajani)



Figure 6. Kenyatta Road
(downloaded from cecilimages.photoshelter.com/)

While similar actors are moving within and between these three sites, each of the spaces are very different and cater to particular activities. They also are unique in how they each offer their own kind of physical and sensory experience to those 'inside', as you can see in some of my observation fieldnotes:

I have grown comfortable with the stillness and orderliness of Forodhani. Three main walkways that cross the park steer everyone along their way, and the city workers with their bright vests will scold you if you try to veer off onto the grassy patches in-between. Only the cats are free to roam. Anyone walking through seems to suddenly switch their speed dial to 'slow' – others turn it right off and take a satisfying nap in the shade. The ice cream vendors and tour guides also maintain a relaxed pace ... At night, things liven up as the sun lowers and the heavy heat creeps away; groups of boys put on a show as they run and dive off the wall into the high-tide waters; others join in a breakdancing circle; and families and tourists come to indulge in the food market, eating into the late hours of the night.

...
Entering into Darajani today felt a bit like being hit by a wave – a wave of systematized chaos. To someone who is still getting acquainted, such as myself, it can be a kind of sensory overload. The lingering odour of fish and durian fruit, teamed up with the closeness of people can be claustrophobic – a boy with reusable bags hanging from his arms didn't leave my side in hopes of me needing one ... The market spans over a large area just outside of the old Stone Town and is sectioned off into areas based on the products being sold ... I often found myself having to turn and walk sideways through narrow walkways and masses of people, duck under clothes hanging from their displays, or tap on the hood of the car which crept at my ankles as we both tried to fit through an opening... Shops and stalls are crammed together along one side of the street, tarps and small wooden displays take up the opposite side, and the gap in the middle is crowded with vendors who are without the luxury of a 'structure' and selling their products from their hands.

...
"Helloooo, how are youuuu today my friend? You are welcoooooome." Everyday I am welcomed to visit this fixed-price tourist shop by that same deep voice, after also having been offered some wooden carvings, beach wraps, CDs and spices along my way by the vendors who prowl Kenyatta Road for business. Security guards and soldiers sit outside the high-end, air-conditioned shops as tourists look about inside, sometimes entering simply to avoid the persistence of the vendors waiting outside on the street. And for those who attempt to access the beach at the end of the road, just past the dive shop, they are swarmed with offers to make plans with guides who will take them to out snorkeling with dolphins.

These sites were utilized by street entrepreneurs in different ways and each space demonstrated very diverse characteristics. As one travels between all three, the pace and atmosphere changes. I will cover more details on spaces and mobility further on in the chapter, and at a greater length in the final chapter. For now, I will continue on and

identify the main activities of my informants to note the key differences and similarities between them, as well as clarify the local terminology used among street entrepreneurs in identifying one another.

Tour Guides

Tour guides offer informational walking tours around Stone Town and arrange trips around the island for tourists. Those whom were visible on the street were freelance tour guides who worked independently. Other tour guides work for tour companies or hotels, and they are simply called up once a customer formally books a tour through those companies or hotels. The freelance guides see value and opportunity in their ability to be free in their business where they can walk around and look for customers themselves, make their sales pitch, and keep all the profit instead of having to give up a significant portion to an agency or hotel. However, those I spoke to did mention that there can be an element of 'hustle' involved that is tiresome. And when there are no tourists, there is no work.

Among the freelance guides there is also an interesting divide; there are official guides who have paid an annual fee to the government to maintain their Tour Guide ID (which they wear so it is visible to tourists), and there are those who are unofficial who either have never registered as a guide or who have chosen not to renew their old ID to avoid payment. Also, some individuals work as guides on the side of their other income generating activities, such as fishermen, street vendors and beach boys. From my observations and based on what my informants told me, the freelance guides are all from Zanzibar. They grew up on the island and could do the tours with their eyes closed simply because they know how everything works by just being from there. The guides working for hotels and agencies are more often from the mainland. As mentioned before, I did not encounter any female guides myself, but was told that there can be. Tour guides ranged from their late 20s to late 30s.

Street Vendors

Street vendors are all very different in their approaches and in the products they sell. However, my research focused specifically on mobile vendors who walked around to find customers and sold their products from their hands or on some means of a portable display. Others had a bicycle with a large basket fixed to it or a wooden cart they would park somewhere and move around when they needed to. Street vendors who looked for

tourists sold items from their hands and used their bodies to display their products, which could include: wooden carvings, sarongs, clothing, jewelry, CDs, spices, football jerseys, woven baskets, bags and sunglasses. Vendors who were selling to locals more so than tourists carried baskets with cigarettes and peanuts inside or had a cart or bicycle and sold fruits, coconuts, bread, coffee or tomatoes. Vendors could range between their early 20s to their 30s, and while women could be seen selling handcrafted products or foods, they were rarely mobile in their work and instead remained at a fixed shop, stall or place on the ground.

In my research, I found that most street vendors are from the mainland. It was difficult to find many who were from Zanzibar and my informants also explained that vending jobs like theirs are usually ones mainlanders can pursue most easily once they arrived. Many of my Zanzibari informants even said that they believe Zanzibaris are too 'lazy' or 'shy' to do jobs like that which are very tiresome and require a great deal of effort to get customers and make sales (more on this later on). Mainlanders, supposedly, are more willing to do this kind of work.

Each street vendor had a distinct pace and rhythm to their approaches, distinguishing certain vendors from others. Those selling cigarettes and peanuts (known as *machinga* – and explained below) were especially known around town because they have a signature sound they make to let potential customers know they are near: they hold loose change in their palms and shake it as they move quickly and steadily between streets. Other street vendors included souvenir vendors, who were often seen following after groups of tourists and gathering closely around people. They could be extremely persistent in their efforts, holding out their product long after being turned down. In comparison, tour guides usually remained relaxed and were calmer in their approaches.

Fishermen

Fishermen obviously did their work out on the ocean catching fish and later bringing it in to sell to fish traders, hotels or right in the market. However, days could be slow and fishing at times saw little reward. So, many fishermen used their boats and boating skills as an added advantage to make more money. Through speaking with multiple fishermen engaged in tourism, it was apparent that they provided all the boats for tours and would work with guides who had customers needing transport to the small islands or sand banks. They would not go fishing during the day if they had already made plans with a guide or if they decided to spend their day looking for tourists instead. Others skipped

the guide altogether and would offer trips to various islands themselves. I met multiple fishermen who were walking around selling tours as unofficial guides, and one even handed me a laminated business card that read, "Captain Aly: The Boat Guy."

The majority of fishermen were from Zanzibar. Many joked that you can see who the mainlanders are when they are around the water; they just hadn't grown up with the ocean the same way Zanzibaris had, who 'are born swimming in the ocean' they say. Many mainlanders simply never were taught how to fish (or even swim in some cases), so it is less common for them to be fishermen in Zanzibar. However, I did meet a few fishermen who had mainlanders on their 'fishing teams' (a group that shares a boat and have been fishing together for many years). These were mainlanders who had lived in Zanzibar for a long time and their teams of men were very close, like brothers.

Machinga, papasi and beach boys

Within the street economy activities, a few local terms would come up regularly in interviews and conversations which took me some time to properly understand their meaning. They were used very casually in some cases, and other times were deemed to be negative or offensive terms. Otherwise, there were mixed definitions given to me about who these terms described and what they really meant. The three most common that I came across were '*machinga*', '*papasi*' and 'beach boy'. In Kiswahili, *machinga* actually means 'street vendor' but not all vendors were referred to as *machinga*, so I attempted to differentiate this term.

A number of tour guides explained to me that *machinga* are from the mainland and they work very tirelessly in difficult jobs. They do not have a shop and usually sell things on the ground or they walk around with a basket. From my observations, they were young men, around 19 or 20 years old, who often did not speak any English and most told me they had come alone to Zanzibar to find work. While the boys I met were comfortable referring to themselves as *machinga*, a few guides I spoke with preferred that we did not use the term because they considered it to be demeaning to those vendors, as if it put them down or made them seem below them. To some, the term was associated with being poor.

The second term, *papasi*, translates to 'tick' in Kiswahili. This is meant to be a more negative label for someone who is dirty or who plays tricks and tries to cheat people or take money from them. A *papasi* might not have a particular activity they do, but instead engages in many different activities according to where they see an

opportunity. A number of informants explained to me that *papasi* might find some tourists and bring them to a guide they know and then demand a commission. Or similarly, they could bring tourists to a restaurant and ask the same. While some informants seemed to feel very negative towards *papasi*, claiming they were stealing customers or trying to make money off them, most showed sympathy for these individuals who are very poor and just trying to make any kind of opportunity for themselves. From my observations, *papasi* were all men and were older – in their 30s or 40s.

Lastly, 'beach boy' proved to be a term especially up for debate. Among tourists and foreigners, the term is quite well-known to refer to young men in their 20s to early 30s who are either Rastafarian or claim to be (by sporting dreadlocks and Bob Marley t-shirts), and who spend time on the beaches looking for tourists who want to have a good time. It is known that they mostly seek out opportunities to make money off of especially older female tourists and commonly are seen with a European 'companion' on their arm. Beach boys tend to be associated with drugs, partying and sex tourism, and thus are viewed negatively by many in Zanzibar – especially those who strictly follow Muslim practices.

However, according to a few of my informants and based on my own observations, Maasai working in Zanzibar – often as hotel security or as a kind of 'tourist attraction' even though Zanzibar is not where the Maasai are from (more on this later) – can also be beach boys. They too were seen with usually older, European women walking around town or in a local club. I also met some young men who similarly would seek out women, but those who were closer to their own age – they might invite them to party and do a tour with them. For the most part, beach boys targeted women travelers and either engaged in relations with them or entertained them in various ways in hopes of making money.

Of those I interviewed who called themselves beach boys though, they were more engaged in arranging tours for people and seemed less involved in the intimate relations or drugs and partying aspect. So, based on who my particular informants were, I have considered those beach boys to be unofficial guides who work similarly to tour guides but either meet their customers on the beach or aim to appear more as local friends instead of guides looking to book a tour. While it did not become entirely clear as to why some referred to themselves as beach boys even if they were not engaged in the same activities, the term itself is very much known among tourists and perhaps serves as a kind of attraction or 'experience'.

Analytical Themes: Networks of Shared Space, Understanding and Interdependence, and a Culture of Tolerance

Going into my research I knew that I had two major areas to investigate. The first was related to the informal economy: does participation in the informal economy affect the ways in which people from different backgrounds relate to one another, and how and why? And the second area of investigation was the Zanzibari-mainlander divide; where my initial research and literature review identified to me that a division existed and there was both a history and continued instances of conflicts between these groups, I had to explore whether these actors of the street economy recognized such a divide.

Upon investigating this first question around the informal economy, I began to pick up patterns and behaviours that were most visible in the street economy between entrepreneurs, and in both my observations and interviews I learned about a network that was operating. My research found that different actors in the street economy were all connected in some capacity, no matter where they were from, and these connections – be they work-related or attitude-based – are what encouraged cooperation between street entrepreneurs. Thus, the first major section in this chapter revolves around networks in the street economy, as per introduced as an analytical framework in chapter one.

The first network discussed is related to mobility and shared space: how street entrepreneurs who are specifically mobile in their activities are sharing space and utilizing it together. The second network is rooted in what I refer to as, shared experiences and understandings of struggle: street entrepreneurs ranging across activities demonstrated that they knew about the difficult daily hardships and socioeconomic backgrounds of other actors on the street and they could relate to those circumstances personally. The final network is often most tangibly demonstrated through interdependence and cooperation: there was a crossing over of activities where certain actors would rely on others to do their business, or they identified that all the street entrepreneurs cooperated even if competition existed between them.

The second major section in this chapter explicitly addresses the inquiry into the Zanzibari-mainlander divide. When interviewing my informants, I quickly realized that it was up to me to bring up the topic as it otherwise was not being discussed. I had to directly ask if certain street entrepreneurs were from the mainland or Zanzibar, and

whether there were any problems or tensions between them. Some informants had a lot more to say on the matter than others, so details in responses varied but overall, they each noted the importance of Zanzibar's culture of tolerance; meaning there were either no tensions or there was a peaceful acceptance of any difference. Thus, I have labeled the second major theme 'Zanzibaris, mainlanders and a culture of tolerance'. Further addressed are the ways in which Zanzibaris and mainlanders identified themselves as well as each other, how they work well together in the Union, and how perceptions of mainlanders differed among those outside the informal street economy.

(1) Networks in the Street Economy

The following discussion will demonstrate my research findings which revealed various kinds of networks existing between all actors of the mobile street economy I interacted with. I first will reiterate what was briefly mentioned in the introductory chapter, that most of my informants spoke through a collective means; where it was not about 'I', but about 'we'. Throughout my findings there is an apparent language of inclusiveness and collectivity where various street entrepreneurs refer to themselves as part of a group rather than as isolated individuals when they describe their activities, environments, struggles and society. This pattern signified an inherent connection existing between the actors of the street economy and was demonstrative of a kind of network in and of itself; a network of inclusivity.

(1.1) Mobility and Shared Space

"We look out for each other here on the street and in Forodhani. We know who we share this area with and we know who we work beside. Other guides and vendors are here everyday working." I wondered then, if these feelings extended beyond the street economy. I asked Haji, "so, you are seeing and helping one another here in your work. But would you ever ask for help at home or entrust in any vendors to do you a personal favour?" He shook his head and said, "no. We do things for one another in this space, here. And in this place we trust each other. But outside or at home it is not the same because I don't know them. If we ever meet vendors outside of working, it still happens in the street. We might debate or discuss work and life, and it happens in the same area where we work."

The importance in which Haji, an official tour guide from Zanzibar, placed on the street as an actual space where relations are formed and where they remain, brings me

to the networks of shared space among mobile actors of the informal economy. The importance of movement and of shared, public spaces in encouraging and maintaining social relations among street entrepreneurs is highlighted through these findings. Importantly, Haji explained that he 'knew' those who worked alongside him in that physical environment where he worked each day, but did not truly *know* them outside of it. The street as a space plays a significant role in identifying entrepreneurs to one another and ensuring a sense of familiarity among them. Those working on the street know about the work and activities of others based on regularly seeing or working with them in the same spaces.

Similarly, Captain Ged, who is a fisherman and what some refer to as *papasi*, commented that "there is trust between us because we know where to find one another." Entrepreneurs associated one another with a particular space, and they had come to know each other via their locations. There was a kind of reassurance that Captain Ged expressed in knowing where someone would be at a given time, especially "if they do something that you need to give them shit for," he said, laughing. If everyone knows where everyone is, one might be more wary of their own actions and words and trust others to do the same.

Vendors referred to as *machinga*, often selling cigarettes and peanuts, explained that they had become acquainted with others who worked in shops or in the market because they always passed by that area in their work. Muha told me, "Yes, I am part of the *machinga* group. These are people who put things on the ground to sell or carry them. We are similar with the business we do. And I walk around the market selling, so I get to know many people there." Also, Hassami, who was selling oranges on a wooden cart that he pushed through the streets, said, "I have a friend who I met in the shops. I met them through my work." The spaces where informal entrepreneurs were working and that were being shared between them also served as a means of identifying actors to one another.

Not only the sharing of space, but the movement between spaces distinguishes certain street entrepreneurs from others. Shops, curio stalls or even sheets of tarp on the ground fix vendors to a single space where they must remain. Tour guides, street vendors and beach boys are not fixed to a designated space or structure and can move about the spaces which they choose. The mobile actors of the street economy operate in multiple places, moving to find business. Being free to move also means being free from

fees, as a street vendor, Rames, explained: “Street guys don’t pay taxes on a space or shop, so they are free to move around and use the space how they want.”

As Captain Ged said, “there is much less opportunity when you are working in an office. There is more value in what I do; walking around and looking for business myself.” As a fisherman, Captain Ged had a boat to also offer tours to anyone who wanted to travel to the smaller islands. He told me that he regularly moved between three key locations – Forodhani, Kenyatta Road, and a popular restaurant on the beach beside Forodhani – where he knew his friends or tourists would be. I saw him almost every day, and he was always on the move. He understood his mobility in his work to benefit him and he did not have to “sit like a beggar in a shop, waiting” as he said. Tausi, a curio shop owner in a fixed stall tucked in the back corner of the Old Fort (a defense base turned community centre for events and artisan shops) also chose not to always wait for customers to come to her – and also did not count herself a ‘beggar’. Aside from her products for sale inside, she also made herself available on the street by walking outside selling henna and massages, and invited customers back to her shop. So, Tausi also saw value in making herself mobile and it was apparent she knew many of my other informants from her time spent on the street, as she would often pop by for a quick greeting. Similarly, by traveling between spaces Captain Ged noted how he came to know so many other vendors, guides, and beach boys: “they come to know you when you look for business and you get to know them.” In other words, being mobile in his work allowed him to connect with other entrepreneurs he may have otherwise not known, just like Tausi.

A couple of the guides who were freelancers compared their situation with guides who worked for hotels or agencies instead of on the street like them. Sahir mentioned that perhaps it would be nice to make a salary, but “it is not much and there is not always work. You have to wait for [the hotel] to call you and give you work. We can stand here and look for our work and also keep the money.” Their mobility gave them a sense of opportunity and independence like it did for Captain Ged. However, Sahir also pointed out that working as a street guide meant sharing that space with competition: “it is difficult with freelance because there are so many guides and fewer tourists. There are around 50 guides.” Another guide, Juda, put it like this: “we all have to look for the same food.”

Yet, the sharing of space also encouraged partnerships or friendships between entrepreneurs to form. Sahir had met Haji six months ago, when they were both walking

through Forodhani looking for tourists. The two began to help one another in their businesses by sharing customers and eventually grew close as friends. “We are like brothers. I can talk to him about anything,” Sahir told me. Returning, though, to Haji’s remarks earlier about knowing other vendors or guides only within the environment where they work, I found this to hold true even in his and Sahir’s relationship. They remained side by side each day; relaxing on a curb chatting or sitting on a bench with me during slow days; negotiating a deal with groups of tourists or hopping in a *dhow* (wooden boat) together to take their customers snorkeling. But as the sun would begin to set on the day, Haji and Sahir parted ways until returning to their posts in the morning. Their friendship remained in the space where they worked and did not extend outside of it – besides the occasional venture to a local club when their tourists wanted a proper night out, and yet those outings still counted as ‘work life’.

Certain activities maintained a kind of designated space where, depending on the products or services or even individuals a potential customer was looking for, there was a way to find them. My friend with the laminated business card, Captain Aly, gave me a tour of the ‘offices’ of the fishermen beside Forodhani. He chuckled to himself as he walked me along the beach, pointing to a makeshift ‘front desk’ and a ‘lounge area’ made from car tires partially buried in the sand. This was where boats were repaired, there was where the tourists gathered their snorkel gear and boarded their boats, and here was where the captains laid out on their backs awaiting the next round of guides and travelers needing a ride to Prison Island. I had met Captain Aly while sitting under a tree in Forodhani. I met Salum, another fisherman, in the exact same spot a few weeks before when he sat down to tell me about his boat and the same story about going to Prison Island or the Sand Bank for a picnic. Once I got to know him it was easy to predict where to find him during the day, if he was not out fishing.

Not far from this apparently infamous spot to meet fishermen who want to put you in their boats was another key space. At any given time of the day on one of the main paths in Forodhani, a group of five to 10 men (usually) were sitting on the curb where the free wifi was the strongest. The group mostly included younger tour guides, in their 20s, who sat and waited for their ‘prey’, as some liked to call their customers. Others were in charge of ice cream coolers fixed to three-wheeled bicycles and some were just friends of theirs hanging around. A group of older guides in their 30s or so, had their own designated space just a few steps away along another path. Directly across from the guides was a parking area in front of the Old Fort for taxis and cars for hire. Kinda, one

of the drivers I spoke to, said he always parked in the same spot and had come to know many of the people who worked around Forodhani and was friends with a lot of them. His closest friend was the man who parked beside him each day. And, just inside the Old Fort, you would find Tausi inside her shop. Beside her place was a bar area where they showed football matches, where I often found Salum and some of the tour guides relaxing together.

Down the road, where Kenyatta Road began, were where vendors like Rames worked selling to the tourists walking by. "I have worked with the same street guys for a long time. Been selling these carvings for 15 years. I buy from the same wholesale shop," he told me, "and I know a lot of people and how the business works here." Every day, Rames and other street vendors walked up and down the length of Kenyatta Road, following the gaggles of tourists who often marched through. The *machinga* who are rarely seen sitting still were more difficult to pinpoint, but upon asking where they would be, I was told by multiple informants: "I know that *machinga* hang out in Darajani," and that was where I found them. In one case, a group of these boys were huddled by a tree playing a game with stones, while all their baskets sat in a pile beside them.

Having traced the maze of Stone Town and its network of mobile street entrepreneurs, my observations uncovered the significance of mobility and shared spaces in encouraging cooperative relations between actors. The spaces in which entrepreneurs worked and the spaces in which they moved played a part in identifying my informants to other vendors and guides. Being mobile in their work was what connected them and sharing physical spaces encouraged friendships or partnerships to develop. Shared spaces helped to identify mobile entrepreneurs to each other, and designated spaces gave reassurance and ensured trust in knowing where to find someone. But, as Haji had discussed with me, the physical environment where their work activities took place was where relations were formed and where they remained: "We look out for each other here on the street and in Forodhani. We know who we share this area with and we know who we work beside... We do things for one another in this space, here. And in this place we trust each other." He and my other informants identified to me that it was their work which connected them, their physical spaces which bonded them and their mobility which allowed them to work together.

(1.2) Shared Experiences and Understandings of Struggle

I'm not surprised when I see Rames' rainbow striped beanie sticking out in the distance as I walk down Kenyatta Road. This is his regular spot anyway. But I have never seen him sitting there before; on the small wooden bench, right in front of the infamous Freddie Mercury house (a tourist attraction in Stone Town, claiming to be the house where the Queen singer was born). Once he sees me he offers me a seat by patting the space beside him gently. I can tell he is unhappy today. About a week before I had seen him sitting further down the road and he was upset about the lack of customers. That day he had no sales and he wasn't sure how he would eat that evening. Today he had similar news and he seemed fed up with it all. I noticed that he didn't have his regular paper bag with carved wooden figurines inside, but instead was holding a small sealed package of spices which were each labelled. When I asked about this he said, "the spices are the cheapest thing to buy at the wholesale shop, and I was not selling any carvings. But [the spices] are so difficult to sell. I want to buy [football] jerseys instead. For TSH 20 000 [\$12.00 CAD] you can buy four jerseys and the tourists really like them. I always see the guys selling jerseys and the tourists buy them. But I don't have the money. I wish I could have the money, and I could show you how quickly I would sell them."

As we talked about vendors selling different products, Rames got into a story about missing out on a fishing opportunity. Apparently, a Norwegian who got to know him and another vendor (who was from Kenya) had offered to buy them a boat so they could fish and support themselves with some income from selling fish. Somehow, the other vendor got hold of the boat and money and fled town without Rames, who was left with nothing and had no choice but to keep selling in the street. His head is heavy and he pauses. He looks exhausted. "It is hard. My family [in Tanga, mainland Tanzania] doesn't know I don't have money. They call me to ask for money to help them."

While Rames has been telling me about his struggles I look up to notice quite an irony. We have been surrounded by a circle of Italian tourists as their guide brings them over to stand in front of the Freddie Mercury house. We are seemingly invisible to them as they pay us no mind and stand mere feet from us. They are pulling out iPads, iPhones and cameras to take photos of the building before their guide can even explain what they are looking at. Rames and I are seated in the middle of the mass. Just as they easily ignore the two of us, Rames doesn't bother with them either. Maybe it all is too much today. Two other vendors come rushing over to join the circle and display their products. One has sarongs draped over his shoulder and holds one fanned out that reads 'Hakuna Matata' (made famous by a Disney movie to mean, 'no worries') and is brightly coloured with an image of figures dancing. Another has 10 hangers of elephant pants (patterned pants that are all the rage with the tourists) cleverly attached together so he can carry them all with one arm. Two more arrive with the same sarongs draped all over them. Rames looks up and points out one of the vendors. "I know him. He has a wife and four children. He has to support his family too. It can be a struggle. So many people to feed."

Rames had been a street vendor since arriving to Zanzibar over 15 years ago. His days are difficult and he is often left frustrated as the day finishes and he is still holding onto the same packages of spices or wooden carvings, not having made a single sale. But every day he returns to the street and tries again. Seeing that he was selling spices instead of the wooden carvings indicated that he was struggling to make sales, and he switched products even though he knew that most customers would not buy the spice packages either. Whenever I noticed vendors selling the *Jambo Jambo* CDs or spices instead of artisan products or clothing, I understood it to mean they were especially struggling with money and business. Vendors buy their products to sell from a wholesale shop where they are given special prices or from a 'middleman' who also buys wholesale. Among the least expensive of products are round cardboard displays with a variety of local spices arranged inside, labeled and sealed. I regularly observed vendors being turned down by tourists as they held out the package, trying to explain how they should buy this from the 'famous Spice Island of Zanzibar'. The sales pitch sometimes turned to a plea of desperation when they did not get a positive response: "please, just support. I have not sold any today. I need money," I would hear them say.

All of the informal street entrepreneurs I interacted with revealed through our discussions, that a network of shared experiences and understandings of struggle exists amongst them. Each of my informants conveyed the difficulty of their work in that it required them to 'hustle' for customers and that they had been up against difficult socioeconomic circumstances for much of their lives. Importantly, while they shared their personal stories and struggles, they also spoke of the *collective* struggle amongst others who they shared the street with. By conveying empathy for other street entrepreneurs, they recognized that between them they shared disadvantages and hardships and were in 'this world' together, highlighting a commonality of experience and understanding. The discussion to follow is broken up into two categories; first, findings which speak to the hustle of the street economy; and second, findings which are demonstrative of a shared experience of socioeconomic marginalization.

The Hustle of the Street Economy

As Rames put it in one of our conversations: "We are just trying to survive. But this is not enough. This is shit." He spoke of the collective pursuit of simply getting by in this kind of work, even when it was unforgiving and unrewarding. He did not like trying to push

tourists to buy something he knew they did not really want. He found it tiresome and largely unprofitable. His remarks mirrored what Juda said earlier:

We don't want to be out on the street hustling tourists. But we are here and you eat what you get; you don't eat what you want. So, what do you do? You become a tour guide on the street or you sell '*Jambo Jambo*' CDs on the street. You hustle tourists but you don't want to be doing that.

Street entrepreneurs like Rames and Juda are 'survivors' on the margins of society who have had to make do with the work they have found for themselves. And both of them acknowledged that they were not alone in that; Rames spoke of the collective 'we' who were working but not reaping enough of a reward, and empathized with a fellow street vendor who also had family to support; and Juda denoted the collective displeasure street entrepreneurs had with their work. Similarly, one of my beach boy informants, Hassan, expressed how the hustle was hard and it was not enough to get those who were working as he was, where they needed to be. During our conversation, he was visibly unhappy as he spoke: "We are busy in life. We do enough to stay here [in Zanzibar] but not enough to go outside... Many people are living under five dollars a day. We are struggling... We say, *hakuna raha*, which means no enjoyment, only a hard life." Again, Hassan spoke to the collective struggle and identified the obstacles against them; earning just enough to keep going but not enough to get out. This collectivity among those working on the street was reiterated by Rames when he noted that, "Vendors look out for each other sometimes ... We are not really friends but we are connected by the struggle. I like to buy my cigarettes from them instead of from shops to support their business." I witnessed this myself the first day I met Rames. Within mere minutes of learning his name he handed me his paper bag of carvings to hold while he went over to buy a couple of cigarettes from a *machinga* who was passing by. I stood there for about five minutes while he searched for smaller change from a man inside a shop and from another *machinga* walking past.

Sahir, who recognized that being a tour guide sometimes was more rewarding than being a street vendor, still could connect to their difficult way of life: "I know that life is hard for [street vendors]. I come from a poor family. I understand." Yet, days on the street in Zanzibar were often difficult for any of the entrepreneurs when success depended upon the hustle; as could be seen during my time spent with the tour guides:

Haji is walking slowly and leisurely back and forth along one of the narrow-paved walkways in Forodhani Gardens. It is a hot day and the sun feels incredibly bright this afternoon. I am seated on the ground on a path to the left of the one where he is, joined by various young men who sit in the

shade and check their phones. The wifi is strongest here, so it is a common sight for this walkway to be littered with social media fiends. Haji holds a folded paper map of Stone Town in his hand and has a small bag hanging across his shoulders. Around his neck his Tour Guide ID swings from the lanyard; the card safely stowed inside a transparent case. It is an especially quiet day and I don't see much action in the way of tourists. So far, low season in Zanzibar has been that way.

Earlier when Haji was sitting next to me during a lull in the day, he finally sighed and said, "time to go catch some prey!" I looked at him and smiled while he clarified; "we have to be like lions, and hunt for our tourists!" I watch him now, as a couple are walking towards us. He greets them with a friendly gesture and holds the map out to ask if they are interested in any tours. Using their sunglasses as a shield of sorts, they keep their eyes forward and say, "no thanks" and continue walking. I know they will be met by another guide who will also give it a try as they cross Forodhani. A similar exchange with two more couples. Haji makes a final attempt as two girls pass. He finally looks at me, shrugs, and comes to join the crew seated in the shade.

The observation here of Haji during his 'hunt' was one I made quite regularly while spending time with the tour guides in Forodhani. Most of their time was spent being turned down or ignored by tourists, but they persisted. I had watched as the guides would almost take shifts – a couple at a time, rising up from the curb where all of them were seated – and take a few shots at those passing by. If unsuccessful, they returned to their group to joke and laugh together. While there was not necessarily a vocalized reassurance or encouragement that occurred, the simple act of joining other street guides after failing to secure a customer was itself demonstrative of a network of understanding. The men who sat together each day were witnesses of each other's struggles as they hustled in their work and also acted as a support system. Sahir and Haji would look on as the other made his attempts, and then make eye contact to laugh and shake their heads at the missed opportunities.

Another aspect that comes along with hustling as street entrepreneurs is the insecurity they face every day, especially against local authorities. Every one of my informants could tell me about a time the police had either asked them for money or bribes, had confiscated their product from them or even arrested them. Working on the street means not paying any taxes, so the police in Zanzibar enforce a kind of tax of their own where when caught or confronted, vendors must give a bribe to them to avoid being arrested. Informants explained that working on the street was not really illegal, but it was heavily monitored by authorities to ensure a sense of control over them. Each of my

informants who worked on the street recognized this regular 'corruption' they had to face, but some had it worse than others, as Haji once explained:

There are good and bad relations between guides and street vendors. Some vendors will ask for commission from guides if they bring tourists... But we look out for each other. We especially look out for them when they are being targeted by police. We are all doing the same things together and they are people who employ themselves. It is hard to see them get arrested... We might sometimes lend money too to one another.

Those who get arrested are usually guides who do not have an official and up-to-date Tour Guide ID and vendors who do not have any money to pay the bribes to police. As Haji said, street entrepreneurs come together when their own kind are being targeted and unfairly reprimanded. Even though he had an official ID, Haji viewed other street vendors as his equal, doing the same work and deserving of the same treatment as he. Many guides shared Haji's view, and they noted that they had warned other street vendors when the police were coming and told them to leave. Juda could also relate to this insecurity in his work. When he was starting out as a tour guide, he did not have the time or money to go through the process of getting his ID, so he began working without it. The police caught him and forced him to pay a bribe, as well as the fees to get an official ID.

Rames, while visibly frustrated, told me that "everyday the police are coming down on the street guys," and other informants reiterated that the police would approach them every day. "Police will sometimes take the things [vendors] are selling or will ask for money instead," he said, as he shook his head and hissed. Salum, who also grumbled when he stated, "I am not happy with the police here," said that taxes take the form of bribes for street vendors.

Unfortunately, much of the time these actions by the police are not because they wish to end or control street vending and business, but simply that they themselves are struggling. Rames claimed that the police get jealous of others who are making money and take action: "police don't even make enough to support their families, so they have to look for other ways." Another informant of mine said the same thing as we were driving around the island and our car was stopped multiple times at very indiscrete 'police check points'. He laughed loudly, throwing his head back when we reached the third police stop where there was not even a barricade set up. He exclaimed, "I know that policeman! He has four daughters and doesn't make enough money to feed them. He is standing there on the road on his own terms! Nobody has ordered him to be there.

He just is wearing his uniform, asking cars for money!” So, the police in Zanzibar had a tendency to take advantage of their position of authority for their own personal benefit.

Further, if it is not the police who are jealous, it may be the shop owners. A few of my informants noted that shop owners who must pay property taxes are often complaining about street vendors and beach boys because they do not have to pay the same overhead costs, and call on the police to take action. Sahir, Juda and Salum each told me that police corruption was just part of life in Zanzibar, and especially for those working on the street. Everyone knew that you would have to pay the police, and as Haji said, “you don’t have a choice and have to pay them, even if it is just TSH 1000 [\$0.60 CAD].”

In summary, my findings demonstrate what my informants were up against on a daily basis, and how they recognized the struggle and hustle that each of them faced in their activities. They spoke of their collective hardship as street entrepreneurs and their need to survive amongst insecurities and limited reward. As hustlers they were disadvantaged and consequently targeted by authorities, but this obstacle brought them closer and they established a network to watch over one another. Overall, my informants had shared many experiences of adversity and also witnessed the struggle of others around them, and could empathize with those who they shared the street with every day.

Socioeconomic Marginalization

A number of my informants spoke about how they came to be working on the street and findings related to this reflected on their socioeconomic marginalization and the structural obstacles they had faced in life. This category demonstrates the shared socioeconomic status among most street entrepreneurs and highlights that as they come from similar backgrounds, they have shared in such experiences and were understanding of their marginal status as a whole. Most commonly, they would relate their current disadvantaged positions to their experience (or lack there of) with education.

Hassan told me that he went to a government school, and explained why that puts others like him in a troubling position:

The poor go to government schools. The teachers there are not paid well so they do not teach well. Sometimes they didn’t even come to school. They do not give you enough knowledge so, many struggle to find work after school... I was fishing for a few years but the money was not enough.

Just as Hassan identified the lack of effort that was put into his own education, Sahir had similarly shared such an experience. He complained that during his time at a government school, “the teachers would usually not show up, or they would say they didn’t have any chalk.” The system which ultimately failed Hassan and Sahir, Juda also spoke to. He said that in Zanzibar, there are many who “are not aware of the importance of education and who only come to realize it much later on. Even my mother,” he continued, “didn’t worry about my schooling. She trusted in fishing and farming instead.”

In Juda’s opinion, the structure of the education system in Tanzania was what put people on the street to work: “All of us working on the street have been failed by the education system.” He said that it strategically disadvantaged those who did not do well in all aspects and caused him, and others, to be left without any opportunities:

Everybody is born with something to do; a purpose or a skill. But there is this pyramidal system of education in place where the majority of students do not make it to the top – where the top equals jobs, success or secondary school even. If you fail or drop out, you cannot make it to the top. My dream was to get a degree but I missed out on that opportunity because of how I struggled in certain subjects. But I excelled in languages. I was in school until standard four and then had to drop out. And what happens? We end up on the street instead.

As Juda explained, those who failed to reach the ‘prescribed’ top of the pyramid ended up with no path to follow. The path is only clear for those who do well in the system and who can go on. But those who struggle are left behind and forced to find their own way.

For Captain Ged, as well as others, it was about the school fees. He had made it to secondary level education in biology but could not go on. “I came from a poor family and we couldn’t afford my studies any longer, so I had to find my own opportunity in tourism and fishing,” he told me. And for Sahir, who was given money to go to school for marine engineering, said his struggle came once he went looking for work:

It was very difficult. When I applied to work I had to pay a large fee or deposit and I couldn’t afford it. I had interviews and they went well, but I didn’t get the job because of the money and the fee I couldn’t pay. I had to think what I have in my life and what I can do with it. I had English. So, I could be a tour guide.

While talking to me about *machinga*, Rames said that most of them do not go to school at all because they cannot afford it. But he also noted that, “they are young and do not care as much about education. They don’t speak English.” As mentioned previously, *machinga* come from the mainland to find work in Zanzibar. Without English they are unable to work in the informal tourist sector, so they resort to selling small

products to locals. Juda once told me that many of them will work incredibly hard for two or three years in Zanzibar to make enough money to return back to the mainland and try to open their own shops. Muha, one of the *machinga* who came to the island to work said, "I came to Zanzibar [from mainland Tanzania] for a better life and to find work. I didn't ever go to school. I came here on my own and had to make work for myself... I hope to build up my business. Here there is more opportunity than back home." Home for Muha was in a rural village near Arusha and he said he was not able to work for himself like he could in Zanzibar as a street vendor. On the mainland there are few securities for those limited to informal work, and Zanzibar, while similarly lacking, has a smaller population (so, less competition) and more room to operate as an entrepreneur.

Any of the mainlanders I spoke to who came to work in Zanzibar told me they had come for a 'better life' or 'better future' than what they had been facing previously. They had been disadvantaged by the system and remained in a marginal position, forced to make a future for themselves out of what they could find. Each of the vendors who participated in the questionnaire noted that they 'do not like this work', that they 'work morning until night, struggling', and that their 'life is very hard but this work is my only option'.

Overall, the entrepreneurs of the street economy in Zanzibar represent a marginal population who have been especially disadvantaged by the education system, or who have missed out entirely on such opportunities. Their lack of funds and human capital have put them in a situation where they are forced to make do and create their own jobs on the street. While there was less collective discussion regarding their socioeconomic status and economic hardships, these findings are meant to highlight how the actors of the informal street economy have shared various experiences of marginalization which have played a part in placing them on the street for work in the first place. Thus, the socioeconomic marginalization they face plays a significant part in connecting them to the network of shared experiences and understandings of struggle.

(1.3) Trust-Formation Through Interdependence and Cooperation in Work

I always park my taxi in the same spot each day. So, I am friends with many of the people who work in this area. And I see how tour guides share tourists between them and work together. This is the same with beach boys and vendors. I am friends with some of them, and we share business. We all do work to cooperate. For example, maybe a guide wants to go someplace with

his tourists and they come to me. He maybe doesn't know where the place is. Then I will be the driver but if I don't know the place I will ask a papasi to tell me, and he will say 'yeah, I know.' We work like this.

From his stand where he waited each day for customers who needed a taxi, Kinda himself would witness the interdependence at work between entrepreneurs of the street economy. Vendors, guides, beach boys and *papasi* all operated together and lent their resources to one another where it was needed. By knowing one another, building friendships and networks of cooperation, the street entrepreneurs knew how to also help one another. As Kinda explained, certain knowledges were shared between actors, as well as customers and business. He could trust that a guide would work with him and also that a *papasi* would offer his help if he needed. Being able to rely on this network of interdependence was what made the street economy work for each actor who had a role in it.

The findings presented here identified to me that certain informal actors commonly relied on other actors in order to do their work, they chose to work with one another to make more money or their activities crossed over with each other's. But beyond the visible interdependence I witnessed daily between activities, the term 'trust' repeated itself in conversations with my informants when talking about the cooperation between informal entrepreneurs. The concept was not directly given meaning by my informants, but notions of trust-formation most often came up regarding the act of doing favours for one another, or was said to be established after repeated interactions regarding business (i.e. working together in some capacity). Related to this was also an element of predictability – actors feeling like they could anticipate the actions of particular individuals who had previously proven themselves as reliable, and trusting in being able to count on them again in the future in the same capacity. A greater deal of discussion on trust as a concept, and what fosters it between informal entrepreneurs will continue in the following chapter.

Where trust or friendships had not blossomed as much for some, my informants still noted a willingness to cooperate with other street actors and could see a benefit from working with them. Even Kinda, who at times found himself needing to ask a *papasi* for some information, also joked with me that he never liked to give money to them because they are "troublesome and like robbers." Yet, sometimes they could provide him with something and he saw value in their expertise when he needed it. Juda too, as

noted in the first chapter, had told me *papasi* “are known to cheat and hustle or play dirty games. But it is not always negative. I can sometimes make money with them off tourists. It’s a profit game.” He had gone on to explain how they worked together to get more out of the customers: Juda as a tour guide did not have his own boat but he told tourists that he did. He knew a *papasi* could find a boat for him, so he would bump the price of his tours up to compensate for his help and give the *papasi* a cut. So, Juda also recognized the value in cooperating with another street entrepreneur in order to benefit in his own business.

Sahir, another tour guide, could understand the distaste some of the guides had towards *papasi* and street vendors but he recognized them as being rather similar to himself in their work: “Some guides hate street vendors or *papasi* because they ask for commission... But they walk around like us and do the same thing, only they are not legal. I am okay if I get associated with *papasi*. It is just about making connections and respecting each other.” Sahir was referring to how all street vendors who walk around looking for business can get lumped together and called ‘*papasi*’ by those outside their street economy. Similarly, Captain Ged had once said, “we are all *mzungu* hunters anyway!” In Kiswahili, *mzungu* is the term used to refer to, usually, white tourists. Many of the street entrepreneurs are ‘hunting’ for the same customers but doing it through their own means. At the end of the day, Sahir, Captain Ged and the *papasi* were all after the same rewards and it was about making those connections between each other in their work, as Sahir said, to benefit from one another.

In choosing to work together with others in the street economy, Captain Ged saw opportunities open up for his own business as partnerships grew and relations of trust formed. He explained this to me during his interview:

I arrange transport for my customers with always the same four private drivers. I get commission from them and from travel companies if I bring tourists to them. Plus, I often am working with the tour guides, and I know them all well... I am like a middleman between all the official and private operators, the beach boys, and the freelance guides. They often come to me to arrange boats for island tours and they all come to me because they trust me.

Captain Ged had come to rely on a small group of drivers, when he managed to find some customers for them, who would reward him for the business. Further, by making himself known among the guides and beach boys, they also knew they could go to Captain Ged for their own needs. The favours he carried out and partnerships which developed overtime ensured a sense of trust between himself and those street

entrepreneurs who he interacted with regularly. In this way, I came to find what trust *could* look like in the street economy involved doing, even, small favours for others and proving that you could be counted on if needed – and, importantly, one would repay the favour when they could.

My informants often shared stories about someone in particular, who had come to their side during difficult times, and how they continued to trust them in their work because of it. Muha, who was selling peanuts and cigarettes at the time, had struggled before in another street business and had this story about receiving help:

There are certain people who I trust. There are those of us [*machinga*] who are living like siblings. We care about each other in the same way. If I am ever sick and need to leave my basket [of peanuts and cigarettes] somewhere I know someone who will keep it safe. There are special people I know who will help me. I met them through work... Before, I was selling hair clips but business was so bad. I did not have money anymore and was stuck. One of my friends with a stall in the market gave me TSH 15 000 [\$9.07 CAD] so I could change my work, and I started selling peanuts and cigarettes then. Now I am working and making money to soon pay him back.

Muha spoke about the other *machinga* he worked with being ‘like siblings’ who he could count on. By this, he meant that he could go to these people if he had some sort of problem – perhaps with money, work or even a personal struggle. As I had come to understand, *machinga* usually were in Zanzibar on their own so, often their ‘family’ became those whom they worked with daily on the street. I compare the relationships between *machinga* to that of the fishing teams like Salum and Captain Ged told me about: there is a kind of brotherhood where the bond extends beyond work activity. However, I will address again Haji’s comment, where he said relationships with other street vendors and guides did not extend outside their work spaces into their private lives. Where fishing teams and *machinga* may share stronger ties – fishermen who risk their lives on the job together and who spend years sharing close quarters, and *machinga* who all are young men, traveling alone to Zanzibar away from their families – their relations, in my observations, still remained within the space where they worked: in the physical environment of the street. If Muha needed help with a personal problem, he knew where to find it by looking for his entrusted work ‘siblings’ where they were everyday.

So, instead of competition between *machinga*, they had developed a kind of bond to watch over one another and be of help when it was needed. Through his work, and selling to people in the markets, Muha also established a partnership with an

individual who assisted him in his business. Now he was more successful in his work and after reaping the benefits, would soon repay his debt to this trusted individual. As I came to find, through stories like Muha's, another element of trust in the street economy was based on how entrepreneurs knew one another and was solidified through doing favours.

Of the eight street vendors who participated in the questionnaire, five of them also expressed that trust in their work came through helping and cooperating with others (the other three had started their work only two weeks prior or had expressed they only trusted themselves). Ali, who sold coffee, Rajab, who sold coconuts, and peanut vendors named Saidi and Omari all said of other vendors they worked with: "we help in life and in work." This kind of 'help' referred to money that was lent between one another. Ali also explained, "they trust me because we don't want to do work alone" and Rajab expressed the same. Vendors, as they identified, appreciated having someone to count on when in need and also expressed wanting to work with others. Saidi noted, "it has happened to me before that I was scammed in my business. Sometimes I lend money or products and get my money back. But twice I did not, so I no longer trust those people." Those who did not return the favour thus were undeserving of Saidi's trust and he would no longer help them out in the future. Omari had someone in particular he trusted who had helped him to get into his work by lending him the money. Fruit vendor, Hassami, said, "I trust some people and they trust me. Trust goes both ways. I have friends that I help and friends that help me," again noting that trust is fostered between particular individuals who can be counted on based on their reciprocal acts of assistance.

Overall, I found that the actors of the street economy depended on one another in their work – whether it be for information, business or money when they needed it – and worked at establishing cooperative relationships which resulted in trust-formation between particular individuals. The interdependence between activities was visible on a daily basis, as tour guides looked to fishermen for boats and drivers for vehicles, and *papasi* sought out guides or vendors to do business with and make some commission. Where some tensions existed around having to share the profits made, all my informants recognized the value in working with someone to gain from their resources or services. Further, my informants identified their own notion of trust relating to how they could anticipate the actions of particular individuals who had previously proven themselves as reliable, and could count on them again in the future in the same capacity. So, trust was important in establishing partnerships that they could rely upon and it was solidified

through performing and repaying favours for others, or repeatedly working together. To my informants, being dependable as a fellow street entrepreneur was what mattered when cooperating with others. On this point, I found that through this network of interdependence and cooperation, trust was formed between street entrepreneurs in the work they did with one another. As I had aimed to explore, it did not come down to whether you were a mainlander or islander. Haji reflected this discovery in his words: “we are trusting others because of the work we do. It is not about where you are from” – a point of discussion to be further addressed in the following section.

(2) Zanzibaris, Mainlanders and a Culture of Tolerance

I am sitting along the road across from the Old Fort where I have become a regular among the tour guides, ice cream vendors and their friends. They expect to see me here the same way I expect to see them. I see that a few familiar faces are missing so I ask the group where they are. Apparently, there is a football match on in the Old Fort and they are inside watching. I remembered I was meant to catch that game with Salum when suddenly we hear shouting coming from inside. Noise is never very alarming during a football match but it sounded like people were arguing and pushing each other. A table or chair is maybe knocked over. A man stumbles out the large wooden doors and starts running off. In seconds, he is followed by about six or eight men, who run after him. Some of the guys I am sitting with stand up to watch where the chase is heading, a couple of them join in without a bat of an eye, and others are laughing and shaking their heads.

I spot Salum in the crowd, and he chooses not to run. I have never seen him move very fast. He is laughing and walks slowly over to me and the guides I am sitting with. For some reason he pays what just happened no mind, and only says, “Lulu, vipi [Lauren, what’s up]?” I look at him, puzzled and have to ask, “what happened?” He explained that during the match one man was drinking a lot and making comments about being a mainlander. “He started talking shit and saying, ‘fuck all Zanzibaris!’ We weren’t happy with what he was saying. We told him he didn’t need to say those things. We are all one and peaceful. He didn’t need to talk about being a mainlander, and some of the other guys weren’t happy so they told him to stop. He started pushing others, and was drunk. So, we all told him to leave and he wouldn’t so we had to push him a little bit.” The group who chased him off, a jumble of guides and vendors who were both Zanzibaris and mainlanders, reported him to the police.

The tussle in the Old Fort that I witnessed was the first and last time during my research that I had encountered any kind of visible or verbal conflict related to Zanzibari-mainlander relations. And, as mentioned before, it was a topic I had to initiate myself during my interviews. The way Salum reacted to the event in the Old Fort that day,

where I had to probe him about what had happened because he did not immediately explain, was quite demonstrative of the general attitude towards the topic among many of my informants. The Zanzibari-mainlander divide was present, but it was not at the forefront of discussion, nor was it given much attention among the street entrepreneurs. They knew who among them were from the mainland but this made no difference to whom they worked with and alongside or whom they spent time with. The men who had been inside, listening to this inebriated and disruptive individual trying to upset the others, would not tolerate such language aimed at dividing them. They instead defended their views that in Zanzibar there is equality, peace and a collective of different people living well together. They did not stand by and let the man go on, and stood against his intolerance together. As I had found among the street entrepreneurs, the perception or treatment of others was never about where someone came from, but rather was based on your character and values as a person – as well as being a part of the different shared networks which have been discussed. So, when this man was speaking about being a mainlander and cursing Zanzibaris, he was no longer welcomed in the space which is, on a given day, frequented by a diverse group of street entrepreneurs (both Muslim and non-Muslim men spend time at this locally run bar).

The following findings demonstrate any notions of difference, inequalities or tensions that do or do not exist between Zanzibaris and mainlanders, and identify to me that among the street entrepreneurs, being Zanzibari or a mainlander had no influence on how one perceived other individuals. Most significantly, all of my informants in the street economy noted a culture of tolerance that existed among Zanzibaris which has helped maintain peaceful relations between islanders and mainlanders. This section is further divided into the subcategories, (2.1) Zanzibari and mainlander identities – which highlights findings that expressed how Zanzibaris and mainlanders identify themselves and each other – and (2.2) working relations in the Union – which includes findings that identified the willingness among informants to work together and how they positively viewed the union between Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania. A final section, (2.3) perceptions of mainlanders held outside the street economy, points out how, contrastingly, in conversations with members of the formal tourist and business sectors the divide sparked more tension and discussion. These findings suggested that the informal economy differs from the formal one in their attitude and perspective.

(2.1) Zanzibari and Mainlander Identities

When I asked each of my informants if they considered themselves to be Tanzanian or Zanzibari, none of them answered that they identified as both; it was always one or the other. Although residents of Zanzibar are recognized as Tanzanian citizens, those born on the islands did not view themselves as 'Tanzanian'. In exploring these identities further, both Zanzibari and mainlander informants gave similar responses regarding how the two differed from one another – in other words, they tended to be in agreement. Their responses ranged across the following subject areas: religion, language, character, work ethic and experience, and ethnic identities.

Religion

One of the key differences was related to religion and culture. As my informants explained, most Zanzibaris are Muslim and many are of Arab or Indian backgrounds. In comparison, mainlanders are more Christian with a smaller percentage being Muslim, and many are of African descent. On the culture of Zanzibar, Haji said: "There are many different cultures that make up Zanzibar, but it is more Indian, Arabic and Muslim with how people dress, what they eat and their languages." Juda also spoke to the diversity of Zanzibaris, and joked that it is very hard to tell who is of Arab or African descent. He laughed and said, "even the people themselves have been so mixed, they look at themselves and they don't know!" Representing diverse and mixed backgrounds as Zanzibaris, my informants told me, also meant they were open to living with others different from themselves. Despite (often) religious differences, Haji noted that "it is easy to live together [with mainlanders]. People who come here respect the culture." What Haji pointed out to me, as well as others, was that for Zanzibaris it was important that those coming to the island show respect for the traditions and values practiced. For some, this could include not playing loud music during *mwathani* (the call to prayer which occurs five times during the day), not drinking alcohol or partaking in recreational drugs in public, or avoiding excessive displays of affection between couples. Such behaviour was especially expected among non-Muslims during the holy month of Ramadan – also during this time, restaurants with outdoor seating will either close entirely or fix a fabric around any open areas to minimize the sight of people eating while Muslims fast.

Further, while there is diversity in people's backgrounds, Zanzibaris are more aligned regarding the distinct dress which comes along with being Muslim there. Haji

added that “some [who come to Zanzibar] wear clothes which are not always seen as appropriate.” Of course, individuals differ in their practices and how they choose to express themselves or their faith, but Zanzibar’s population tends to be more on the traditional side. As Haji had pointed to, there is a concern about people coming into the island who do not respect the conservative practices; like women (especially) exposing their legs and shoulders. A reason for this, Juda told me, was “in the Muslim faith in Zanzibar there is a feeling of a need to preserve religion. There are some issues with tourists who don’t respect the culture.” This, multiple informants mentioned, included wearing clothes which are more revealing. Some informants also talked about mainlanders ‘dressing like the tourists’, saying they are more ‘influenced’ by them and want to embrace ‘Western culture’. Because there is such a large percentage of the population in Zanzibar who are Muslim, many Zanzibaris distinguished themselves in this way; through their religious practices. Just two of my informal entrepreneur informants (a street vendor and taxi driver) mentioned that, to them, Zanzibar was ‘losing its culture’ to tourism and mainland migration. However, when I tried to understand what exactly Zanzibari culture was to them, both spoke again about the clothing – which to most others was not necessarily an issue rather, simply a sign of difference. Also, they were quick to add that they ‘welcomed’ mainlanders and that having mainlanders in Zanzibar was good for the ‘economy’ and ‘the Union’.

Language

Another point of differentiation that some informants brought up was language. Where both mainlanders and Zanzibaris speak Kiswahili, the way in which they communicate is different – I myself made this observation upon beginning to learn the language and was also informed by multiple individuals. Zanzibaris joked that mainlanders spoke more harshly and often mixed their speech with English; what some identified as ‘Sheng’ (see Mokaya Bosire, 2006; Iraki Kang’ethe, 2004) or ‘Swenglish’. One man told me a story about being on a bus on the mainland and asking, (translated roughly) to ‘please make a stop here’. But as the bus kept on, he became confused and addressed the driver again. Upon realizing what this ‘*pemba*’ – what some mainlanders refer to Zanzibaris as – was trying to say, the driver informed the man to simply tell him to stop and to not (again, roughly translated) ‘bother being so polite’. The difference between mainland and Zanzibar Kiswahili did not necessarily mean that communication was difficult among

people, rather it simply was a means of identifying where you were from to others: “I can tell who is from the mainland by just listening to them,” one of the street vendors told me.

Character

While there are differences in religious practices, cultural values and language between Zanzibaris and mainlanders, my informants noted that an important quality of the Zanzibari identity was being open, welcoming and tolerant of difference. One way in which that was visible on the island was, as Salum pointed out, the ability to practice various religions right in Stone Town: “There are no tensions here. Only peace and love. Different cultures are put together and we learn from one another’s practices. In Stone Town there is a Hindu temple, a few Christian churches and many mosques. We have a shared culture here.” As he told me, there are not tensions between identities but rather an intermingling of cultures. To most of my informants, Zanzibaris prided themselves on being peaceful and non-discriminatory, and this was an important aspect that made up their Zanzibari ‘identity’. This same notion of tolerance was reiterated by Juda:

There is tolerance. Those practicing Muslim religions are very tolerant. While they can be crying or struggling, they will still tolerate any inequality or unfairness to them. We are not violent... The religious backgrounds of people in Zanzibar helps them to be tolerant and not violent, like during elections.

And similarly, Sahir noted this:

A lot of Zanzibaris despise mainlanders, usually because of cultural issues like not being Arab. But I don’t feel like this. There might be tension but there is no fighting. Sometimes there is tension in the heart but they have no desire to act on it. Being Arab is also about being tolerant.

Many of my informants shared these views, and explained that while difference might exist and sometimes cause tensions, Zanzibaris did not wish to act on such tensions and would remain peaceful – both because of their character and values of their religious backgrounds. So, Zanzibaris recognized themselves as being a tolerant people who aim to live by and respect their values, especially in how they treat others.

Even many of the street vendors I spoke to who were from the mainland had similar perceptions of what Zanzibaris were like compared to mainlanders when noting their character. Two of them used the term ‘*shwari*’, which translates to ‘tranquil’: Jakob, who sold bread, said, “I will stay in Zanzibar because it is tranquil”; and Immanuel who also wished to remain on the island said, “I think people from Zanzibar are more calm

and tranquil than us from the mainland.” One vendor from the mainland and a beach boy from Zanzibar each told me the same story to distinguish what things are like in Dar es Salaam (just a 90 minute ferry ride or 30 minute flight from Unguja) compared to Zanzibar. They told me that when you are at the ferry port in Dar es Salaam you must be very mindful of your belongings because they likely could be stolen. And, if you become a victim of robbery in Dar es Salaam, not to expect anybody to help; “they will only just watch,” Ali told me. In Hassan’s telling of this scenario, he said there is no need to worry when you are at the port in Zanzibar, and that, “the island is very small so people look out for you. Many people will help you in Zanzibar if something of yours is stolen.” I myself watched as a large group of men and children followed in a mass along the narrow passes of Stone Town behind a man who had reportedly stolen something from a tourist. Together, they ‘guided’ him towards the police station – where *guiding* was more along the lines of pushing and hitting him as they walked.

Because of this kind of solidarity between people in Zanzibar, Ali told me he had “no need to go back to the mainland because people in Zanzibar are united. People live together.” My informants from the mainland spoke of Zanzibar like it was a kind of ‘escape’ and that the people operated at a slower, more relaxed pace, which was very welcomed by them.

Work Ethic and Experience

Additionally, work ethic often came up in my findings among my informants of the street economy as a marker of ‘difference’ between Zanzibaris and mainlanders. This topic arose when I was talking to them specifically about mainlanders who come to Zanzibar for work – most often in the tourist sector. First, Juda pointed out that aside from the efforts being different, the experience differed. Mainlanders, he said, tended to have more experience and knowledge in tourism because of the training they had received or that they had lived with tourism longer. As tourism was opened up to Zanzibar, it “allowed many to come from the mainland. They felt they had expertise and Zanzibaris did not.” Juda identified to me four key differences between Zanzibaris and mainlanders that gave mainlanders the ‘upper-hand’ in tourism work on the island: linguistic, where mainlanders often had more languages useful for tourism; cultural, where some Zanzibaris were focused more on preserving their own culture; experience, where Zanzibaris lacked tourism experience; and effort, that mainlanders were hardworking and Zanzibaris could be more laid back in their labour performance. On effort, he went

on to say, “Zanzibaris are more lazy and less visionary. They are less willing to put in the effort for the reward.” I was surprised to hear a few others, Zanzibari themselves, say that they tend to be more ‘lazy’, comparatively. Sahir shared this perspective also: “Zanzibaris are lazy and don’t want to work but mainlanders wish to work very hard and that’s why they come.”

The perspective that mainlanders coming to Zanzibar to work had a stronger work ethic and potentially more experience, was what some of my informants said contributed to a tension around the subject. Juda told me that one of the opinions among Zanzibaris was that mainlanders are coming onto the island and the employment is being taken by “outsiders, who have their degrees and languages.” It was explained to me by most of my informants that there is a common view in Zanzibar that mainlanders are taking all the formal tourist sector jobs away from Zanzibaris. Some locals feel upset by this, especially when mainlanders are getting hired on as managers of large hotels. Hassan said he believed it was easier for mainlanders to get work in Zanzibar than it was for Zanzibaris to get work on the mainland because of how they are seen to be less qualified or able to work, and thought that was not fair.

Important to note, however, was that what my informants explained to me about mainlanders coming to work in Zanzibar was the view around, specifically, formal tourist sector jobs and not informal ones. Regarding the street economy, the view was shared between all of the street entrepreneurs that mainlanders work as *machinga* and vendors usually, and they are extremely hardworking. There were no negative feelings expressed about mainlanders taking these positions. Salum once joked that “local men are too shy to do those jobs, where they make noise and walk around like *machinga* can. Mainlanders are better to do that.” As well, they are known to be “willing to do the work that most locals won’t do,” Sahir said.

None of my informants took issue with mainlanders taking positions in their street economy and had expressed to me what the more general perception was among Zanzibaris – where mainlanders were coming in with more qualifications and experience and were willing to put in the effort, whereas Zanzibaris were missing out on the opportunities.

Ethnic Identities

A few informants noted that sometimes mainlanders were unfairly treated due to the ‘cultural gap’ that existed between groups. One example that came up multiple times

was the Maasai. Juda said that they often were “not very welcomed here by people... because nobody trusts them. They are seen as being stuck in their old ways and are dangerous because they don’t have a religion.” Maasai coming from the mainland most often were hired by hotels for security, or quite honestly, as a kind of ‘display’ or ‘performance’ for tourists (see John Akama, 2000; Kibicho Wanjohi, 2000; Edward M. Bruner and Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 1994; Edward M. Bruner, 2001). Maasai tend to dominate security positions across Tanzania and Kenya because of how they are associated with being strong, brave and attentive (see Akama, 2000; Wanjohi, 2000). Juda joked that they are feared by some in Zanzibar because “we believe they can kill lions!” He also once said to me how Zanzibaris do not connect or associate with ancestral tribes like many from the mainland do – as another informant put it, “this is an island and we are all foreigners, really” – so their attitude towards more ‘ethnic’ identifications or traditions is impartial. Thus, Maasai as ‘tribesmen’ does not always invite so much understanding among Zanzibaris.

While I did not explore so deeply into this issue, I did speak to one Maasai who was working in Nungwi at a large beach resort. He told me that the Maasai working at this resort were all assigned to their own living quarters together, and other staff resided in separate ones. When I asked him about this, he said that “we speak a different language and practice a different culture that many here do not understand. [The managing staff] seem to want to keep us separate, and grouped together.” To stress, however, this particular resort was owned and managed by a European, not a Zanzibari. But I noted in my own various observations how the Maasai in town would usually stick together. They traveled around in pairs and worked as security teams. Salum also shared a story that he had a couple friends that are Maasai and upon introducing them to his Zanzibari friends, they expressed a negative feeling towards “these outsiders,” as they had said. He told me they were asking the Maasai why they wore their traditional clothing and why they smelled a certain way.

This perception of Maasai being untrustworthy outsiders was not necessarily common among Zanzibaris. But, enough of my findings gave me the impression that these particular mainlander identities are sometimes less welcomed than others and perhaps a source of tension among certain local Zanzibaris. These findings point to how not all mainlanders are lumped into a homogenous bubble of sorts by Zanzibaris, and that certain unique ethnic identities also exist and tend to be seen as purposeful to fill certain areas of the tourist economy.

Summary

Differences between Zanzibaris and mainlanders came down, mostly, to religious, linguistic and cultural practices, as well as perceptions of character and work ethic. The Zanzibari identity was equated with: valuing openness and respect for others, but still preserving important traditions; being tolerant of difference; having peaceful and unified character; and a more laidback attitude and work ethic. Mainlanders were identified by Zanzibaris as being very hard working, sometimes more qualified in their work experience and usually respectful of Zanzibari culture. Where any doubtfulness about mainlanders was apparent was only related to those still living on the mainland (specifically in Dar es Salaam) – who might steal or be unreliable in certain circumstances – and Maasai who might be feared or misunderstood. Those of my informants who were born on the island identified as ‘Zanzibari’ and not ‘Tanzanian’. Individuals who came from the mainland considered themselves ‘Tanzanian’ and expressed respect and appreciation for the character of Zanzibaris whom they worked and lived alongside. Where any differences were noted, the only tensions remained around two aspects: mainlanders who were being hired in the formal tourist sector over Zanzibaris; and those who failed to respect certain practices such as dressing conservatively, as is done by many Muslims in Zanzibar. However, none of my informants expressed any issues with mainlanders working in the street economy.



Figure 7. CUF party flags in Stone Town (photo taken by myself)



Figure 8. Graffiti on wall in Stone Town (photo taken by myself)

(2.2) Working Relations in the Union

While walking through the maze of narrow and quiet streets of Stone Town, we came to a large opening where a group of kids were kicking a ball around and chasing each other. They were laughing and shouting as they slid in to

one another. Hanging above them, strewn across the space from one side to the other, were strands of blue and red banners which marked support for CUF – the opposition party of Tanzania. As we passed by the chaos of kids, I looked ahead to see a wall of a building with words graffitied over it. I stopped and read them over a few times. There were three separate messages written in all capital letters, faded and bleeding slightly from time and weather. The first read: “FREEDOM. WE NEED TO SEPARATE ZANZIBAR WITH TANZANIA. IT UP TO US.” The second message read: “ZANZIBAR WE NEED TO SEPARATE [sic] WITH TANZANIA. IS UP TO US. YES WE WANT PASSPOTE [sic] ZNZ NOT TANZANIA AND FLAGE [sic] OF ZNZ. SO U.N. HELP US. WE LIVE SAME LIKE PRISON.” The third message read: “ZANZIBAR. WE SICK AND TIRED OF THIS. WE NEED FREEDOM.”

Salum, who had been walking with me, was laughing while he watched my face change upon seeing the wall. I really was surprised to come across such words after speaking with Zanzibaris who had not expressed quite the same call for change. Salum apparently could tell what I was thinking and explained, “these are here from the election.” He continued: “election time is when people get passionate about the problems with the government, and when they say these kinds of things. It’s not normally what people are saying.” Just as the letters on the wall had dulled and faded, I thought, so too had the cry for the end of the Union and for change as another election passed; yet another defeat for the opposition party was enough to settle the fire.

Zanzibaris were very open in expressing their opinions of the government, and most had plenty of negative things to say. Many called for a change in power, as the opposition party has never won an election (even though many will say they have, but were not allowed the win by CCM). While I had heard about people wanting to separate from the Union and allow Zanzibar to be independent, seeing the words written on a wall was the first real cry for change I had encountered. But, as Salum told me, those passions seemed to come and go with elections – where there is hope and excitement for change until the realization hits that the results are the same, yet again. Zanzibar, though, remains a political place, where people are often engaging in political conversations. Throughout the island there are areas marked with either red and blue banners or green and yellow ones, noting areas of support for either CUF or CCM. The infamous ‘Jaws Corner’, was a space created by the community, initially meant to instigate debate and discussion between people: in an opening within the narrow streets of Stone Town, a mural of the *Jaws* movie poster is painted on a wall which groups of men sit against; and others sit in front of a small television usually showing the news. Here, mostly men gathered to discuss local politics (but overtime, the space has come to serve simply as a place to relax). So, Zanzibaris tend to be quite involved and interested

in politics, but many complain that their voices are still not heard by their government. They must find their own ways of communicating their concerns – be that through graffiti or meetings at Jaws Corner – but for now they live together in the Union and work together as a people.

Whenever I asked my informants about what relations were like between local Zanzibaris and mainlanders in the street economy, all of them answered positively. They respected the Union and that it meant Zanzibar was an open island for mainlanders to come in, and all expressed that they are “working together.” As Juda said, “Zanzibar has a free and open border, so it is easy for people to come in. And so, there shouldn’t be a reason to hate those coming in. Zanzibaris are also free to go to the mainland.” The very same was expressed by Salum, who said, “there is a union so they are respected here. It is a free and open border – an island. We respect whoever comes.” Tausi, who comes from the mainland, also felt positive about how the Union allowed for people to move and work between the mainland and the island: “they are bringing life here and there in different ways and it is a good thing.” So, the actors of the street economy expressed a positive attitude towards the Union in how it allows mainlanders to come to work in Zanzibar. They recognized that as mainlanders move to work, so do Zanzibaris and this exchange of work is good for the Union.

The mix of both groups working together in the informal economy in Zanzibar could be seen across most activities. Tausi, who sold paintings in her curio shop, said she bought from both mainlander and Zanzibari artists, and that mainlanders worked inside the Old Fort, and Zanzibaris outside. She also had said, “in the tourism business here, it is very mixed. We are all working together.” As well, the co-owner of her shop – and a friend – was a Zanzibari woman. The fishermen I spoke to, like Salum and Captain Ged, told me about their fishing teams which had a mix of men from both the mainland and Zanzibar. They worked together in risky conditions on the ocean and had become close after sharing a boat for many years. Salum shared that he and his team of eight had sat together and made the sail for their boat and often they went out to the bar for drinks; “we know each other like brothers” he said. Captain Ged had been with his team, made up of three Zanzibaris and two mainlanders, for eight years. Also, of course, were Zanzibari tour guides sharing the street with *machinga* from the mainland, and vendors who worked with islanders and mainlanders each day.

While my informants noted working well with mainlanders and Zanzibaris alike and were in support of the Union, they expressed some more negative feelings towards

the government. Among my Zanzibari informants, they all expressed their support for the opposition party, CUF, and wanted to see change in the government. As Juda told me, “so many Zanzibaris feel they need to support the opposition government. There is peace but the ruling party formed the government and does not listen to the people and their needs. The opposition party listens to us.” As I understood through my research, CUF was known to be more representative as a party of the Muslim population of Tanzania and CCM was more mainland- and Christian-representative. So, many in Zanzibar felt their government was not ever considering their needs. Salum expressed the same: “The problem is with the government. The ruling party claims to listen to its people but they forget about them once the campaigning is over. I support the opposition because I want change.” Salum remembered them handing out t-shirts and various items branding the party name, while making promises that they have yet to deliver on. Some examples being, a promise to never cut electricity on the island again (after a three-month stint without it) only to have it cut not long after the last election; as well as a promise to improve the education system after most students failed their exams (and improvements are yet to be seen). These kinds of frustrations were shared among all my informants of the street economy.

Others felt their government put priority on foreigners coming in over addressing the struggles of their own people. Rames saw this with how tourism took precedence over local matters: “There is so much power in CCM so it will never change. They are a better government on the mainland than they are in Zanzibar... Here there is so much concern for the tourists but the government doesn’t care about the locals who are struggling.” To note also, Rames was from the mainland and had experienced both sides. He was witnessing how Zanzibaris were more disadvantaged than those on the mainland under the CCM party. He told me that the government was putting so much funding into tourism, but not helping the community – even pushing them out as Stone Town continues to develop hotels and restaurants. Hassan made a similar comment regarding tourism: “They hide the reality of life here from tourists. People [tourists] will wonder how they [locals] live and will realize the government is not good.” Hassan spoke specifically about the beach towns in Zanzibar, where the villages sit just behind a line of resorts and lodges where the tourists stay. He said when the tourists see this juxtaposition, they might question how the government treats its own people.

In summary, Zanzibaris and mainlanders of the informal street economy were supportive of the Union in how it allowed for the movement of work between the island

and mainland – they felt they worked well together. However, my informants all expressed the belief that CCM as a party, was less representative of the needs of Zanzibaris. They were happy to work and live alongside one another, and Zanzibaris were welcoming to others coming in. While my informants respected the Union, each expressed a hope for change to come by supporting the opposition party and were not happy with the way things were with the current government.

(2.3) Perceptions of Mainlanders Held Outside the Street Economy

During my research, I came across multiple individuals whom I took up more casual conversations with, that happened to work across different formal economy enterprises. I soon came to find that their opinions on Zanzibari and mainland relations differed from those of the street economy. Most of these formally employed informants spoke quite passionately about their dislike for mainlanders working on the island and the loss of Zanzibari culture. They mostly expressed a negative perception of mainlanders and spoke with enthusiasm about the subject, unlike my informants in the street economy who were more relaxed about Zanzibari-mainlander relations and were quite positive in their responses.

Commonly, they alluded to a kind of threat that mainlanders posed to their businesses, culture and daily life. Mainlanders were coming in to Zanzibar to ‘take over’, localize themselves, and bring about ‘change’. Of the more openminded informants I met, they told me that many Zanzibaris ‘fear change’ and are uninterested in sharing what they have with anybody from outside. One man told me about Zanzibaris who dislike mainlanders, that “they forget that they are also Tanzanian, just like themselves... This is one country, and we are free to go anywhere inside of it just like mainlanders are free to come here.”

Desmond, who was in his mid-30s, had a guesthouse which he owned on the north of Unguja. He was born and raised in Stone Town and often talked about being very proud to be Zanzibari. During my first encounter with him, he had this to say:

Yes, you will see a very clear divide between Zanzibaris and mainlanders. Christians in Zanzibar are very different – different from most of us. There are so many who want to see Zanzibar divide and be independent from the mainland... Mainlanders, they are coming here and doing drugs – you’ll see these guys on the beach trying to get money from the restaurants and from tourists just so they can get more drugs. And the women you’ll see, they are prostitutes. They come to live here and they call themselves ‘locals’, but they are not.

One evening while having dinner at a restaurant on the beach with Desmond and his friends, he was laughing while we watched two men trying to get commission from the restaurant owner. They had followed a group of female tourists down the beach and were claiming to have brought them to the restaurant, and were deserving of a cut. Desmond raised his eyebrows at me to point out that these were the mainlanders he was talking about. He saw mainlanders as the root of most problems regarding drugs in Zanzibar; that they had introduced these kind of activities, tainting Zanzibar's culture. Any Zanzibari beach boys were, in his mind, influenced by mainlanders who had 'brought' this way of life with them, causing problems around the island because of it. Their 'differences', Desmond noted, were enough to wish for an end to the Union. He did not express the same understanding that my street entrepreneur informants had regarding mainlanders who were just trying to get by in the way of the informal economy; making opportunities for themselves wherever they could. Desmond associated these 'tricks' to make money, with drugs and risky behaviour which was not the 'Zanzibari way', and faulted mainlanders for it.

Ilhaam owned a low budget hotel in Stone Town and had grown up there. He was in his late 30s and also noted, as Desmond had, there was a divide between Zanzibaris and mainlanders. He explained:

The divide between Zanzibaris and mainlanders is really less along religious lines and is more political. It comes down to where you are from. To give you an idea, I would say the tension is like, three times what it is like between Quebec and other Canadians. You know? They want to divide, they want their language preserved – it's like that. And there isn't conflict, but there is definitely tension.

In another conversation I had with Ilhaam, he added that, "there is a kind of 'othering' of one another. Like, 'we know best' kind of thing." So, Ilhaam recognized the tensions being about 'where you are from', as opposed to my informants who saw some differences based on religion. He did share with them, though, the perspective that there was not conflict but tension in some cases. Ilhaam saw the divide going both ways, where Zanzibaris and mainlanders both saw one another as 'others' who differed and wanted to be separate. His view was that the tension between these groups was quite high, compared to my informants who did not see it that way and were not concerned with where others were from.

Another man who I spoke with was quite bitter about a couple experiences he had had with mainlanders working in Zanzibar. Benji was in his 50s and had grown up in

Zanzibar, but had lived and worked in the United States for quite a few years. In our conversation, he disagreed that Zanzibaris were lazy and went on to explain it was the culture of the people that limited them from working in tourism as the mainlanders do:

It is the culture that prohibits Zanzibaris from working in tourism. It's not about being lazy, but it is the cultural boundaries. And it took us too long to realize we needed to get into tourism, before the mainlanders took over. The younger generation is now realizing... But I worry that Zanzibar's culture will soon be lost. In Pemba you can see the 'real' Zanzibar. There are no mainlanders going there.

Benji considered mainlanders to have 'taken over' tourism in Zanzibar and felt that it was their own cultural practices and values that held Zanzibaris back from participating. And now, he feared the culture could be lost because of it. On speaking about Pemba, the second largest island of Zanzibar which was known to be populated mostly by Zanzibaris, Benji noted it being more 'authentically' Zanzibar than Unguja. So, mainlanders made Zanzibar less like Zanzibar in his eyes.

This perspective, which was shared between multiple individuals who I spoke to, demonstrated how those of the formal economy were especially 'threatened' by mainlanders who were bringing about change to their beloved island. As businessmen, any sort of outsider competition to their own success was a source of concern, and perhaps, the supposed takeover of tourism was seen as an opportunity taken from under them. And with outsider business would come outsider culture as well – another source of anxiety that Zanzibar was losing something. Benji went on to share a couple of stories of some encounters he had with mainlanders working on the island:

The street vendors are from Arusha. They piss me off when they think I am not a local. And these guys are telling me about taking me to the islands. I had to tell them, 'stop fucking bothering me! I am from here, I was born over there and you are from Arusha. I know more about the islands than you!' This other guy was working at a bar at this hotel. He was from Zimbabwe and was telling me what I should do in Zanzibar while I was here. I told him, 'I am the local.'

Benji felt very strongly about mainlanders who attempt to 'localize' themselves, and was very offended when he was not viewed as a local himself. He remained closed off to the notion that mainlanders could be welcomed in as part of Zanzibar's culture (or as Tanzanians), and instead would always view himself as being more knowledgeable and familiar with the island. In this way he was almost fearful that mainlanders were 'taking over' and taking his place.

Ahmed, who seemed to be an engineer involved in some projects on the island like building a new hospital, stated to me: "Zanzibar is losing its culture." He saw the

economic advantages of mainlanders bringing in new business and projects, but said it meant the culture could not be preserved with it. And in a sudden moment of passion, he exclaimed that I needed to add in how he felt about Kenyans:

It is mostly Kenyans who own and work in the hotels here. They are really taking over the business and are so difficult. Put that in your research, really, that there are mainlanders and there are Kenyans – I really can't stand Kenyans who are working here.

Overall, in my various encounters with members of the formal economy in Zanzibar I found that among them, there was a greater emphasis on the divide and differences between Zanzibaris and mainlanders, a more negative impression of mainlanders working in Zanzibar and a feeling that Zanzibar was losing its culture. These perceptions differed to those found from informants in the street economy, who did not feel negative towards mainlanders and emphasized their tolerance of differences. Upon asking the question of why these more economically secure members of Zanzibar's society expressed more hostility towards mainlanders, it was explained to me that those in the formal economy usually 'do not understand small business' – referring to the kinds of business of *machinga* and vendors pushing food carts. As my street economy informants told me, and what I found for myself, you will not often find a Zanzibari doing this kind of work. Those outside the street economy view such work to be too difficult with too little reward, and have minimal respect for the hardships that come along with those activities. Their views seemed slightly complicated, as they did not respect the work mainlanders were doing but complained that mainlanders were taking the jobs from Zanzibaris. To further confuse this positionality, an informant of mine said:

I think it's nice to have that service, where if I need a cigarette or sweets, these guys will bring them to me. And right at my feet! I bet you – no, I know – anyone who dismisses mainlanders coming here, they buy from *machinga*. Because they know it's good to have them. But they aren't willing to admit.

While it was not specifically brought up in my findings, based on my general comparison between informal street entrepreneurs and members of the formal economy, I would argue that the difference comes down to social relations. Where networks of understanding and sharing of space and socioeconomic circumstances bonds street workers, formal work enterprises are much more driven by competition and individualized success. Further, by knowing and experiencing the daily hardships alongside one another, informal actors can form an understanding about the

circumstances of others on the street. These men who are more isolated in their businesses are very much disconnected from the street and thus view mainlanders as problematic to their culture and economy.

Chapter Summary

The findings presented in this chapter have illuminated how the individual experiences of my informants of the mobile street economy speaks to a wider understanding of what it means to work – and relate to others through such work – in the informal economy.

Based on my findings, I noted key analytical themes which helped to clarify the various social networks at work within the informal economy which connect entrepreneurs.

Shared spaces, routinized mobility, shared understandings and experiences related to struggle (i.e. the hustle required in their work and the socioeconomic marginalization they face) and repeated cooperation in work (as a means of trust-formation), make up the social networks existing between entrepreneurs of the Zanzibar street economy.

Further, it was demonstrated that Zanzibari-mainlander relations are positive rather than conflictual between those of the informal economy, who respect one another's identities and work ethics, tolerate any differences related to religion and who are willing to work well with one another. Members of the formal economy, however, expressed more hostile feelings towards mainlanders working in Zanzibar, seeing them as threatening to the culture and economy of Zanzibar.

The following chapter will delve into these findings and revisit important theoretical perspectives introduced in the literature review, as well as explore new perspectives in order to fully answer the research question of this study.

Chapter 4.

Discussion and Conclusion

In this chapter, I will review, analyze and discuss – in light of relevant literature – the findings of this study. The empirical findings that were presented in the previous chapter were intended to inform what is going on between entrepreneurs of the street economy in Zanzibar, and this chapter will discuss those findings against broader theoretical questions about how we should understand the street economy as a unique space of engagement and relationship formation. Overall, what I detail in this chapter is my particular focus on the processes of relationship building in the setting of the informal economy through social processes – beginning with shared physical spaces, mobility, then social networks which are founded in exchanges, interactions, routine and repetition – and how these processes hold the potential to facilitate conflict mitigation between identity groups. As well, I discuss how entrepreneurs of the street economy relate to their everyday experiences to identify themselves and each other within the context of the ‘hustle economy’, relating on a level that does not occur outside the street economy; thus, consequently challenging the geographical identity divide that breeds tensions amongst other members of Zanzibar’s society.

Literature which was not fully introduced or explained up to this point will be highlighted, especially where my findings revealed new theoretical perspectives to be considered. Further, the themes which I pulled out of my findings will be clarified fully and their significance to the overall study will be laid out. A discussion and summary will note the significance of this study’s findings; what they mean for further research and what they tell us about social relations in the informal economy.

I begin with a comparison between my own study and others which also look at social networks in informal economies. I point out that where my research focuses on the social *processes* that take place between street entrepreneurs, other research regards the actions that can *result* from informal social organization. Upon developing my research question for this thesis, my initial interest was on the consequences and outcomes of social relationships in the informal economy (regarding their capacities to bridge antagonistic group identities). However, I found that in order to uncover why such relationships between informal actors were significant, I had to focus on how these

relationships actually developed through participation in the informal economy. In other words, I shifted my perspective to first understand *how* street entrepreneurs make connections with one another, before looking for what can (more tangibly) *happen* due to those connections.

Also, to clarify, while I *have* argued thus far that cooperative social relations amongst street entrepreneurs can lead to conflict mitigation, for the purpose of this research I do not consider this an ‘action-outcome’ (Kinyanjui 2010). Instead, I seek to stress that social connections and relations can produce a shift in *perspective* within individuals – who, through their position in the informal economy, can connect with others in ways that defy ethnic differences or tensions. So, I consider conflict mitigation through social connections in the street economy to be an example of an ‘unintended outcome’, not an intended one (Kinyanjui 2010). As a result, my attention in my research was towards the relationships which are formed in the street economy and what qualities or characteristics solidify those relations.

Next, referring back to a theme I picked up in my findings regarding shared space and mobility of street actors, I address broader theories on physical spaces and routinized spatial practices. I align my research findings with the notion held by certain space theorists that physical space is socially constructed and maintained through relationships – whether between individuals or how individuals relate to certain spaces. I argue, as informed through these theoretical perspectives, that those who share the street (that physical space) also share cooperative and meaningful social relationships. As demonstrated in my findings, entrepreneurs sharing and moving through distinct spaces are able to form connections and identify one another, forming social relationships through repeated and routine spatial practices.

A third section involves a continued discussion of social networks in informal economies and how relationships are built between entrepreneurs. I look at what specific traits are accounted for in previous research in the informal economy in facilitating social networks to form, and compare these to my own findings. Following what was already noted in the first chapter of this thesis, a closer comparison is drawn between my research and Meagher’s (2010) case study in Nigeria. Here, I discuss what social relations are based upon – where it tends to relate less to ethnic ties than it does to business or socioeconomic ones – and how those connections can facilitate positive relations between individuals.

Finally, I revisit theories around trust among informal actors and hustling economies to compare them with my own findings. What I argue – through also comparing my study to others – is that being a member of the street or hustle economy is what defines one’s identity there. In other words, a communal identity is taken on when an individual participates in these economies of the street. However, trust and partnerships must be earned as trust-formation occurs through reciprocated actions and favours.

I then will conclude the chapter with a summary of everything that has been explored and discussed thus far, and make suggestions for further studies on this particular topic. I point to the key findings that my research revealed, and revisit my research question to finally come to a point of conclusion.

Process of Relations Versus Action Outcome of Relations

Importantly, my study differs from many others regarding social networks and relations in informal economies in its focus on the *process* of relationship formation that occurs between entrepreneurs. What I sought to understand were the processes which informal actors engage in (consciously or not) while participating in the informal economy every day – which connect them with one another – and to learn about what new kinds of relationships were formed through that participation. Further, I intended to view these relations through the context of identity politics – as in, how these processes occurred between groups who had the potential to find themselves in conflict. The key interest of my study thus revolved around how social relations and their development are unique to the street economy and how they might have the potential to reveal processes of conflict mitigation.

It has been more common among scholarship on informal social networks to hone in on more broad, tangible or action-related outcomes that entrepreneurs have the potential to carry out (Lindell 2010; Meagher 2010). Being faced with vulnerable realities as a marginalized population encourages informal entrepreneurs to reach out to one another in various ways, and what might come from that – in the form of action or advocacy – is what other research has mostly focused on. Meagher points to how those who struggle as informal producers rely upon networking strategies to get by (2014:131); and Lindell says that the informal economy sees a bridging of ethnic and even class divides as diverse people collaborate together in their activities in order to fulfil the

necessity of survival (2010:2). I will further address these points in the discussion later on about the 'hustle economy'.

Existing studies have aimed to identify the possibility for collective social action that might include starting a movement, protesting or initiating some kind of political change. Lindell's edited work (2010) presents a range of examples of 'collective organizing initiatives' in African informal economies 'in the context of contemporary economic and political transformations' (2010:2). For example, her view of informal economy organizations is that their 'central importance' regards their ability "to achieve rights of informal actors" (2010:9). Thus, her curiosity lies in how these social networks might lead to a collective pursuit of rights. Some of the papers in the collection view the informal economy in its relation to globalization, seeing it as a 'site of significant political organizing' on global dimensions (Scheld 2010:155) Or, as informal actors lack basic working rights, other papers sought to understand how networks are mobilized to form social movements to 'address the challenges facing them' (Lindell 2010:187) and to ultimately produce 'access to loans, access to utilities ... or political acceptance of the informal economy' (Jimu 2010:109). Meagher measures such movements and organized associations against their effectiveness as a 'mechanism for political voice' (Meagher 2010:46).

So, these perspectives have overlooked the, might I say, micro and everyday processes that I was most interested in; those quiet interactions that connect Captain Ged, the tired fisherman who is sitting on the beach, and Juma, the tour guide who has spent the day hustling customers; or how when Rames needs a cigarette, he always calls over to the same *machinga*. These minute efforts to form relationships with one another, I argue, are necessary before more impactful organizations can be established.

Here, Asef Bayat's (2010) theory of 'social nonmovements' is valuable to consider. Bayat, similarly, identifies the importance of the "quiet and unassuming daily struggles" of the "urban disenfranchised" in cities (2010:5); but where my research focuses on the social implications of these experiences, Bayat notes their key political context. The social movements addressed above relate to deliberate organization among networks of people in the informal economy, but Bayat identifies how the everyday and fragmented activities of "informal people," actually transform cities and bring about change – what he refers to as "the quiet encroachment of the ordinary" (2010:14). To explain further, Bayat argues that the actions poor populations take out of necessity to "better their lives" – where every day they are "quietly impinging on the

propertied and powerful” (2010:15) through, say, selling their merchandise in a public space or illegally piping their water from the municipality (2010:20) – are not mundane, but meaningful as “politics of practice” (2010:20). Especially regarding street vendors, Bayat says that by actively and persistently using public space (illegally) for their businesses – as atomized individuals, not collectives – they, through sheer numbers, pose a “challenge [to] the state prerogatives” (2010:12). Thus, the very act of being a street vendor or entrepreneur is deemed part of this greater ‘nonmovement’, where noncollective actors share grievances and daily practices, “assert collective will in spite of all odds” (2010:26) and ultimately contribute to “unintended consequences of agents’ daily activities” (2010:53).

I intend to clarify that while I recognize similarities in my own research with Bayat’s argument, the ‘unintended outcomes’ I chose to focus on were the perceptions held among the street entrepreneurs towards one another – not of what their actions contributed to the nonmovement of legitimizing illegal economic activity. I did encounter this element of defiance and agency when every day the police were making life difficult for the street vendors by demanding bribes or even making arrests. In response, the vendors helped one another avoid being caught or they simply paid up and continued with their business. However, I did not read this as a political response that was quietly challenging Zanzibar’s society, because the police were most often out to make a personal gain and were not aiming to outright stop street vending. So, while I share with Bayat a perspective that the practices of everyday life can demonstrate important meaning in the informal economy, I do not, in this research, align my findings with the notion that they are linked to social (non)movements. Bayat’s view of the street, though, as a key space where “passive networks” are formed is something I will return to later.

Another perspective which comes from scholarship regarding informal economy networks is on the economic effectiveness of actors who organize together (Meagher 2010; Lindell 2010). That is to say, how these networks affect the overall success of the entrepreneurs, their activities and their resulting position in the economy. A question Meagher also asks in her study is, “Does the use of a wider range of social ties lead to the development of more dynamic and globally competitive enterprise networks, or does it weaken and fragment network organization?” (2010:83). Her inquiry regards how social ties might weaken or strengthen the economic performance of informal entrepreneurs. In my study, I did not look into the daily profits of my informants or how their performance in their activities was potentially improved by engaging with their

social ties; but observed myself how difficult it was for street entrepreneurs to maintain steady business and that most of them relied on one another for resources (such as transportation, guide services or even customers). As many of my informants told me, “we work together” or “we cooperate because we do the same work,” and that they all were after the same *mzungus*. In any case, I would say that doing business in the street requires a degree of interdependence (established through social ties and relationships) and in doing so, one has a better chance at being competitive in the network.

Furthermore, studies have looked for what kinds of organizing and network strategies practiced in the informal economy could be utilized in the formal economy, or in development policy and practice. Ilahiane and Sherry (2008) suggest that the street markets of Rabat and “similar arrangements throughout the world provide both opportunities and lessons for firms from the world’s wealthy industrialized nations” (2008:253). The lessons, they say, come from the ‘economic and social forces’ of informal economic business and could offer insight for formal business models: “The informal economy can thus serve as a laboratory for disruptive innovations, marketing insights, and discovery” (2008:253). And regarding policy, Kinyanjui notes her paper’s purpose as such:

informal sector institutions and relations have intended and unintended outcomes, are a basis for solidarity, have a degree of adaptability, are spaces of activism and are transformative. The challenge this paper poses to policy and practice is how to build on these important elements of informal sector institutions and relations, instead of imposing formalization and service development models that have been developed in ivory towers and centres of influence. (2010:33)

I am in agreement that the informal economy and the relations between its actors vary in their intentions – where some groups may recognize the value in organizing themselves to seek out a common goal (intended outcomes), and others may simply see it as alike individuals functioning together in this environment of economic activity (unintended outcomes). My informants were not members of any associations or distinctly organized groups, but simply related to one another due to their circumstances and demonstrated a kind of unquestioned solidarity. Where Kinyanjui (2010) aims to give more credit to the informal economy and its actors as a source of organizing through relations, I sought to give attention to initial relationship-formation processes (and not simply the ability to organize). Through this learnt and observed perspective, I argue that actors who engage in the street economy come into opportunities to coordinate their activities and, possibly, their interpersonal relationships with others through sharing physical space. With what I

found, this was an important starting point to then link entrepreneurs to one another through more varied networks.

Besides shared spaces influencing relations between actors, the street as a space also implicitly enforces certain social codes of conduct. A set of particular unspoken rules tend to exist in other informal economies that have been written about (see Robert Neuwirth 2011; Alena Ledeneva 2006; Tatiana Thieme 2013), which were also apparent in Zanzibar – and these rules help to generate a certain behaviour and attitude among entrepreneurs (i.e. favour-based trust formation, an assumed interdependence across activities or a recognition of a shared hustle-to-survive approach). For example, when Captain Ged came to Juma's car window, there was no specific conversation about him being owed money. Juma simply knew, without needing reminding, that Captain Ged was entitled to a cut from the business they had done together earlier. Or also, how Haji explained the existence of a kind of unquestioned responsibility that comes along with working in the street – you look out for one another, especially when someone could get in trouble with the police.

What I intend to point out here is that a certain level of organization among individuals who participate in the informal economy exists in their relations with one another. So, while existing research has focused on how a collective of informal actors have the potential to *produce* something (i.e. a resulting change or action), I wanted to explore the deeper interpersonal context occurring between these individuals. In this way, my study differs in its attention to the *process of relations* which takes place instead of searching for a kind of *action outcome* of those relations that exist in the informal economy. Where this process of relations begins, I argue, is in the shared space among mobile street entrepreneurs.

Significance of Mobility and Routinized Spatial Practice

As noted in my findings chapter, the way in which my informants identified with and acknowledged their physical environment where they worked was a significant aspect of the relationships they had with other entrepreneurs (i.e. bonds or partnerships occurring in their space where they work and not outside of it; or the ability to trust others because you know where to find them, physically). I have been referring to this space as the street economy; where actors are not fixed in a specific place via a structure, and rather roam freely between multiple areas selling their products and services from their hands or by word of mouth. The street itself was fundamental in facilitating connections among

entrepreneurs, who knew one another through the act of repeatedly seeing each other and sharing their physical space of work. Di Nunzio (2012) similarly found among street hustlers in Addis Ababa, that they knew one another through their sharing of the street as a space of survival: the geographical space where their hustle activity took place (2012:437). Bayat (2010) refers to these connections between informal actors as “passive networks,” and found on the streets in Iran that solidarity is not deliberate but occurs “passively and spontaneously ... by sensing their commonalities” through daily interactions or simply seeing one another (2010:19). Space, Bayat says, “provides the possibility of mutual recognition” (2010:22) and that when it is shared, “the needs associated with common property” encourage ‘spatial solidarity’ (2010:50).

Alison Brown (2004) defines the ‘street economy’ as being ‘complex’ and ‘inter-connected’, “where people carry out the ‘functional and ritual activities that bind a community’ ... that encompasses not only buildings, objects and spaces, but also ‘the people, events and relationships that occupy them’” (2004:1).

I found just this; that the street economy as a physical space functions as a medium for facilitating social interactions. The actors who utilize the street as their space, consequently build relationships with one another due to their routines performed in it. As well, relationships significantly relied upon physical spaces: my informants knew if they wished to work with someone they needed to go to a specific location. A fisherman could be found on the beach beside Forodhani, a tour guide would be waiting along the path nearby, and a private car for hire was always parked along Kenyatta Road. So, social relations were built through the physicality of street entrepreneurs and spaces were defined by individuals and their activities.

My analysis here is informed by theoretical understandings of space as being socially constructed and practiced (Lefebvre 1991; Bourdieu 1989; Harvey 1973, 2004; Giddens 1984; Certeau 1984). Just as Henri Lefebvre (1991) suggested space not be taken for granted or as a naturally occurring truth (where space just *is*), I found that the world of Zanzibar’s street economy was taking place in a space that had been – and was continually being – formed around the actions of entrepreneurs. Lefebvre’s concept of ‘spatial practice’ is most useful to my own research, which regards that space is a ‘product of society’, where values and meanings produce and affect spatial practices, and that “space embodies social relationships” (2014:298). Here, I consider the entrepreneurs of the street economy to be relating to one another through their practices inside their shared spaces, and because of those relations, the physicality of the street

has meaning as a distinct space – recognized by both those participating in it and those seeing and observing it. So, social relations are creating or giving existence to spaces.

Where I link this theoretical perspective to my own findings, and why physical space came to be significant to me in this case, was related to how the days of research tended to repeat themselves. Activities and observations became predictable as I moved between the three key areas where street economy activity takes place in Stone Town; and as well, with how the activities *remained* in those distinct physical spaces. Further, my informants consistently referred back to shared spaces or associated certain individuals with the same physical locations. When I asked where I might find some of the *machinga* boys, I was told, “they always hang out in Darajani.”

One might observe that the street economy is defined by the physical *street* – simply that these actors use the street as a space to conduct their business – but as I wanted to conduct an exploration of social relations, I viewed geographical space in comparison to *social space* (Bourdieu 1989:16). So, I began to ask the question instead: how do the relations of the street economy between its actors define these spaces, and how do actions in physical spaces (spaces of the informal economy) affect social relations?

To expand on the theoretical concepts discussed above – where space is socially constructed through human practice and social relationships – Anthony Giddens (1984) says that both “time and space are organized through social action” (1984:13) and ‘social structure’ is “produced and reproduced in what people do” (1984:77). He says that ‘interaction’ and the ‘continuity’ of that interaction make up social structure between actors (1979:62). Tatiana Thieme (2013) – who studied the hustling youth of the informal waste economy in Nairobi – demonstrates what these interactions look like in spaces of the informal economy:

This [the shift between ‘survialism’ to ‘livelihood strategies’] generated alternative spaces of ‘learning,’ where certain individuals commanded respect, where deals and schemes were made in seemingly public nonchalance, and where economic transactions were contingent on specific relational ties ... These spaces adhered to particular economic logics that had more to do with solidarity than self-interest, with finding ‘use and exchange value’ in under-utilized recourses such as waste, and with affirming ‘street credibility’ in a both highly callous and ‘human’ economy. (Thieme 2013: 391)

My own findings very much reflected the same spatial interactions Thieme found among the youth hustlers. In the pursuit of survival where my informants carried out activities to

'make do', the streets as a space became a place for creativity and resourcefulness: the 'wheelings and dealings' made between entrepreneurs who saw one another as hustlers, enduring the same daily struggles. Just as Thieme notes, that in an economy of tough competition, 'relational ties' and 'solidarity' came before self-interest, Zanzibar's street vendors demonstrated the same kind of collectiveness (both in their language and actions). The networks of inclusivity – where my informants acknowledged one another as a 'we' – and interdependence between their activities, implied a valuing of each other's resources and a support system in their everyday practices.

In seeking to connect this concept of space to social networks, this brings me to one of my key arguments regarding the street economy: that it uniquely facilitates cooperative behaviour among those sharing the physicality of it. In a discussion on the street as an abstract space, Lefebvre said the following:

It [the street] has something of a dialogue about it, in that it implies a tactic agreement, a non-aggression pact ... It imposes reciprocity, and a communality of use. In the street, each individual is supposed not to attack those he meets; anyone who transgresses this law is deemed guilty of a criminal act. A space of this kind presupposes the existence of a 'spatial economy'... This economy valorizes certain relationships between people in particular places (shops, cafes, cinemas, etc.), and thus gives rise to connotative discourses concerning these places; these in turn generate 'consensus' or convention ... there is to be no fighting over who should occupy a particular spot; spaces are to be left free... (Lefebvre 2014:292)

What I propose to link here is the idea that the street is a space – or 'spatial economy' for social relationships – that functions on 'reciprocity', 'communality', and 'consensus'. There exists a kind of code for those who occupy the street to uphold and the levels of cooperation vary between individuals depending on their 'spatial segregation' (Bourdieu 1989:16). Pierre Bourdieu's (1989) concept here says that "space is constructed in such a way that the closer the agents, groups or institutions which are situated within the space, the more common properties they have; and the more distant, the fewer" (1989:16). Further, "people who are close together in social space tend to find themselves by choice or by necessity, close to one another in a geographic space" (Bourdieu 1989:16). Thus, we can look at the street entrepreneurs as having found themselves in a physically close space alongside one another by 'necessity' of survival, and sharing many 'common properties' inside their networks of association – i.e. as mobile economic actors, in the sharing of experiences and understandings of struggle,

and interdependence in their work activities – consequently opening up social space for trust-formation and cooperation.

Again, Thieme's findings are reflective of my own in this case, when she discusses 'the base':

the informally marked territory within which youth defined the boundaries of their neighbourhood and de-facto customer base. It delimited their place of work and social life within the *mtaa* [neighbourhood], marking economic zoning and certain 'codes' of conduct. (Thieme 2013: 391)

And also:

although the base of any given group comprised an informally marked territory in the neighbourhood, there was always a kind of 'headquarters' or sitting corner where the groups assembled, greeted, schemed, hung out, bantered, began or ended their working ventures. The base was a meeting point where you could be found, where you belonged and where you were known. It informed street credibility and relationships to the base had everything to do with one's visibility. (Thieme 2013: 401)

In Zanzibar, my informants too pointed out that their 'place of work' and 'social life' remained inside the spaces in which they spent the majority of their time; such as the hub of Forodhani, which certainly functioned as a 'base' or 'assembling' point for almost all of the street economy. While the entrepreneurs were mobile in their daily activities, everyone had a distinct geographical area where they and others in the same activity could be found at any given moment – as mentioned, the young guides who sat along the path into Forodhani, or *machinga* who I found huddled in Darajani, the fishermen lounging in their 'office' on the sand, and the collection of vendors who did not veer far from Kenyatta Road's main strip. And further, the relationships being formed between these actors most definitely 'had everything to do with one's visibility', as I was told that you get to know those who you see repeatedly in these spaces.

Finally, regarding spaces and spatial theory related to my research, I want to note the importance of routine, repetition and daily reproduction of movement in space. As has been touched upon, repeated action or everyday practice informs 'societal structures' and 'spatial order' (Giddens 1984; Lefebvre 1991; Löw 2008). Giddens argued, "Routine is integral both to the continuity of the personality of the agent, as he or she moves along the paths of daily activities, and to the institutions of society, which are such only through their continued reproduction" (Giddens 1984:60). The physical path in which the street entrepreneurs moved between was constant and resembled daily ritual. While my informants each kept their own pace, their paths were predictable each day; I

knew what time Salum would stroll into view from the road; or that I would see Captain Ged rushing along the street waving and yelling greetings at people he knew; I never failed to meet Sahir and Haji seated together on the curb; and Rames' colourful beanie always bobbed through the narrow streets of tourist shops.

Related to this order of spatial practice is trust. Trust, as was communicated to me, often times could be initiated between actors because "routines convey security and a 'certainty of being'" (Löw 2008:33); i.e. the reassurance in knowing one's routine meant you also knew they would be there tomorrow. In spaces, actors are monitoring the social and physical flow of one another (Giddens: 1984:5) including their 'positioning and movement' from one place to the next (Löw 2008:35).

Michel de Certeau (1984) views space (and specifically cities) through the movements that occur within it, where he says: "A space exists when one takes into consideration vectors of direction, velocities, and time variables. Thus space is composed of intersections of mobile elements. It is in a sense actuated by the ensemble of movements deployed within it" (1984:117). What is of particular use to my analysis is Certeau's perspective on 'walkers' in space, as my informants were uniquely mobile in their daily work, walking through their environment to sell products and services. Walkers as 'mobile elements' transform space into *something* – as "space is a practiced place" (Certeau 1984:117) – and they are responsible for "linking sites one to the other" (1985:129) through their movement which 'actualizes' them (1985:130). The street entrepreneurs of Zanzibar dispersed themselves between three key locations and connected those places via their movements. Their mobility was an important aspect in defining and identifying other actors of the street economy. Predictably was what instilled reassurances among the street entrepreneurs: as Captain Ged told me, "you can trust others who you know how to find." So, routines in spaces not only identified my informants to one another, but also signified one's trustworthiness.

What I have sought to argue is that the informal street economy – especially where actors are mobile in their businesses and engaging in their social settings – as a distinct physical space should be appreciated as a unique environment which facilitates social relations between its actors. Zanzibar, as a case in this research, revealed a network of *positive* social relations due to specific attributes which must also be taken into consideration. Importantly, an attitude expressed among the informal entrepreneurs was that part of their culture was to be tolerant of difference and to value peaceful relations. Zanzibaris, too, were recognized as tranquil people who do not seek out

conflict. Further, being an informal economy that is heavily dependent on tourist activities, the street entrepreneurs very much recognized a need to cooperate with one another and it was extremely common for activities to cross over with one another. So, these attributes specific to Zanzibar's informal economy, paired with the sharing of physical space, was what helped facilitate positive and cooperative social relations between street entrepreneurs.

Social Networks and Relationship Building

One of my key arguments is that social networks exist among informal economy actors and my findings have led me to argue that the networks were existing because of shared space, mobility and routinized practices of street entrepreneurs. I have demonstrated thus far, that social networks of Zanzibar's informal economy were formed through spatial practices, as defined through space theory. While introduced in the first chapter of this paper, the theoretical perspectives of social network analysis and social networks of the informal economy will be further discussed here.

Karl Marx has said that “society is not merely an aggregate of individuals; it is the sum of the relations in which these individuals stand to one another” (1953:175). Social networks serve as such a medium to observe these ‘relations’ among individuals. These collectives or formations of individuals perform “action [that] is facilitated or constrained by direct and indirect exchanges or transactions among social actors possessing different resources” (Knoke 2009). The interdependence which existed between my informants’ activities was demonstrative of such exchanges – where each knew who could provide particular resources when they needed and their sharing of resources founded stronger relationships between certain individuals. John Barnes (1954) is noted as a key theorist for his analysis of ‘social networks’ as a concept, and said that society (or social life) exists as “a set of points, some of which are joined by lines... [in a] total network” and that interpersonal relations between people form a “partial network” inside (Barnes 1954:237). Further, he explains that, “The points of the image are people, or sometimes groups, and the lines indicate which people interact with each other” (1954:237). So, the key idea to the network is connectivity – not the aggregate of existence but what the connections between them add up to.

Similarly, my research interests included observing those specific and direct connections that occurred between individuals – even the simple gestures, like giving one another nicknames, watching football highlights in the local bar together, or shaking

hands as the working hours came to an end before heading home. By observing these smaller and interpersonal means of connection and adding them up, I then sought to view them all together as a larger system of social interactions. Viewing social networks through such a perspective like Barnes allowed for an in-depth exploration of the processes of relationship-formation to reveal the daily and new connections street entrepreneurs make.

Some scholars (Meagher 2010; Lindell 2010; Roitman 1990) have started to view the importance of social networks in the informal economy. As has been discussed previously, existing research has tended to view social networks in regards to how they may or may not have the potential to lead to real action or provide insight to business and development policy. Meagher (2010) looks at social networks and ties in her study on Nigerian informal enterprise – specifically in garment and shoe manufacturing. As a population facing marginalization and economic hardship, Meagher’s case seeks to understand how participants in the ‘garment cluster’ use “networking strategies [to] shape economic action” (2010:7) and utilize “relations of community, class, gender and [religion]” (2010:131). A key focus of hers is on a shift being noticed among informal economy actors away from forming social relationships through ‘strong ties’ – which are identity-based (such as one’s ethnicity or religion) – to ‘weak ties’ – which are instead “based on affective relations across communal boundaries, and business ties, built up through repeated market interaction with no prior social bond” (Brautigam 2003:4; Meagher 2010:84). This perspective was important to my case as I anticipated that in my research I would find my informants to not place as much concern on where one another was from or what religion they practiced, and instead relate on levels more related to business relations (and I came to find exactly that).

Yet, whereas I noted it to be something positive – seeing as my study wanted to determine if identity perceptions could be challenged – Meagher found it to be less so, due to her focus on how weak ties impacted organization and economic practices. She does note that strong ties are faulted for causing narrowmindedness, and that weak ties have the potential to “facilitate the mobilization of new resources and information in response to changing circumstances” (2010:83). Still, it has been difficult to find much research on informal economies which emphasized different identity groups operating together, and this is something Meagher points out: there are those with strong cultural and historical ties to indigenous artisan groups; groups related to one another through their Igbo dialect or are from similar indigenous groups; and there are also a range of

new groups with no historical or communal connections to these activities, and non-Igbos (2010:90). In looking at what she found, dependence on weaker ties tended to increase the importance of non-economic loyalties, and led to less cohesion among members in gaining access to resources (2010:103). Also, personal networks which were formed resulted in increased 'differentiation within clusters' (2010:121), as new and diverse producers introduced 'conflicting social identities' (2010:138).

One key difference I will point to is Meagher's informants' lack of mobility; in the shoe and garment cluster, most are inside of small shops and dependent on what they have around them in close proximity (as well as the people they must work directly beside). I suggest that perhaps more identities clashed because this economy does not offer the same fluid aspect of the street economy, where you get to know one another through movement. As well, while garment producers rely on someone for tools to do their work (due to a broken sewing machine or missing thumb tack), they do not share in business the way street hustlers do. If it were not for shared resources and trades networks, many who work in Stone Town would be unable to have business. Therefore, there is a greater reliance on one another in the street economy than there is in the garment clusters Meagher explored.

Where other studies on social networks in informal economies differ in their findings regarding what methods of social organization can *lead to*, many share in what these social networks actually *look like*. For example, Meagher notes how her informants depended on one another through the borrowing and renting of equipment (for clothing and shoe manufacturing), the 'sharing of work spaces', delegating 'excess work' to one another, and "helping fellow producers get started or back on their feet" (2010:131). As well, she saw that they were motivated to cooperate together "because of moral compulsion and economic insecurity," and the dependence they placed on "the good will of their fellow producers" during extremely difficult times (2010:132). These were the same reasons my informants gave me – and which I observed – for choosing to cooperate with other members of the street economy: they empathized with one another's hardships, knew in order to do well they needed to do business together, and that favours were reciprocated.

Where these 'moral' means of cooperation come from within the informal economy (and especially in the street economy) I argue, have to do with how entrepreneurs identify themselves and one another. Just as I have discussed, where strong ties have been replaced by weak ties among informal actors, social networks are

being built upon repeated business interactions, exchanges and reciprocating of favours. Another level to these relationships has to do with what it means to be part of the 'hustle economy', which will be discussed in the following section as the final aspect of my discussion chapter.

Who You Can Trust in the Hustle Economy

Upon revisiting this concept of 'trust', I want to first clarify how 'cooperation' and 'solidarity' have come up throughout the entirety of this thesis as well. It is important to note that I do not conceptualize these three concepts as interchangeable or as sharing the same meaning related to my findings. Instead of aligning scholarly or dictionary definitions to these terms, I aimed to utilize their ethnographic definitions – as in, how they arose through the different themes in my data and how they were defined or communicated by my informants. For example, trust does not always come along with solidarity; trust had to be earned and practiced over time. Street entrepreneurs may recognize one another's shared struggles and grievances, but, as discussed previously, trust can also relate to features of conflict instead of positive solidarity among individuals. My informants spoke to these concepts in separate circumstances and I have aimed to reflect that in my analysis, and wish to stress here that they do not mean the same. With that in mind, I will demonstrate how I interpret trust specifically in the hustle economy based on my findings and analytical perspectives.

Similarly to how I have discussed that the informal economy and the street as an abstract space have embedded in them a set of unspoken rules, the hustle economy functions the same. While in many ways the survivalist nature of hustlers of informal economies requires them to rely on and trust only themselves (Wacquant 1998), they also are in a position where they must put in any effort possible to simply get through the day. Thieme (2013) explains the effort involved in hustling:

the cyclical nature of the 'hustle' encompassed all efforts from 'doing whatever you can to feed your stomach that day' to 'being free to grow one business and invest in another.' The hustle was both the freedom to thrive and the risk to fall. Self-proclaimed hustlers often asserted '*tunajaribu*' ('we are trying'), as if to say that regardless of the outcome, it was crucial to 'try.' (2013:400)

The street entrepreneurs of Zanzibar repeatedly used the term 'hustle' when noting the work they did, day in and day out. Even when there were no customers around, they tried; when they repeatedly got turned down for business, they got back up and tried

again. My informants all communicated that they didn't want to be doing such challenging work but at least they were proud for making the effort when others sat idle and refused hustle like them.

What I mean to point out here regarding the effort involved in hustling is that there also exists a recognition among hustling societies that supporting one another is necessary and it comes along with the environment. In the hustle economy, it is "assumed that everyone [is] struggling" despite any differences that might exist between individuals (Thieme 2013:406). In knowing that everyone is facing the same adversities, there is also a feeling of collectivity. Thieme found in the groups of youth she studied, they "worked in collectives and valued both 'working hard' with moments – even hours – of '*kuzurura*' ('just roaming around')" (2013:397). So, like my informants did, the youth hustlers in Nairobi spent time working together and socializing during down time (i.e. when there was no business or they decided to take a break). They connected with one another through their necessity to survive as hustlers, and also as individuals looking for that human connection amidst the daily precarity and uncertainty they face each day.

In the informal economy, 'collective identities' come to fruition in ways that "transgress existing boundaries and [in their constructions] create new categories of sameness and novel forms of identification" (Lindell 2010:14). The kinds of social connections that are formed in such an environment really, I argue, do not occur in the same way outside of the informal economy. As I found among members of the formal tourist economy in Zanzibar, there was a stronger tension towards the Zanzibari and mainlander divide as they spoke negatively about mainlanders who were coming to the island. While it was difficult to pinpoint the particular reasons for expressing those attitudes, besides possibly feeling threatened in relation to their businesses or Zanzibar's culture and economy, I strongly suggest that for those who work outside the street economy, they have not been exposed to the same experiences street entrepreneurs have: the hardship, the collective identities and the shared spaces to negotiate in social networks. Difference does not have much weight among street vendors and hustlers because everyone is apart of the same struggle, and there is a sense of solidarity in that shared experience – and consequently, a shared identity. In Thieme's study, an informant of hers explained the unique identity of those who hustle together in the *mtaa* (what they refer to their neighbourhood as):

In Kenya, we never acquired a national character or identity as a people. We were either tribes, or part of a social and economic class. There is no 'we' in Kenya, it is only 'I' ... But in the *mtaa*, people look at our group as a model. Youth come here,

instead of going to look for construction work, because they know that they will find a common identity. (2013:398)

So, as Thieme also found, I saw that being part of the informal economy also meant taking on an identity which was not connected to one's ethnicity or necessarily class status, and rather related to a being part of a collective on the margins who find commonality in one another's struggles (or hustle). My Zanzibari informants even respected the difficult work mainlanders come to the island to do – they recognized that they often had not been educated, were away from their families, and were doing the tough jobs that nobody else wanted to do. All my informants empathized with anyone who hustled for a living, and never mentioned any divide between islanders and mainlanders unless I asked – to which they answered, “we are all equal and living and working together in the street.”

Lindell (2010) too notes that, “the collective identities of organized informal workers are not pre-given or stable, but are rather continuously constructed and re-constructed through multiple struggles and relations and in response to wider societal change” (Lindell 2010:14). The hustle economy is dynamic and reactive to the convergence of diverse people. In the street markets of Morocco, the social atmosphere is also one that crosses religious and cultural divides, as “one is likely to buy a used foreign mobile phone from a footloose Arab on the side of the street, and one is also likely to take it to the anchored Berber hacker to decode it” (Ilahiane and Sherry 2008:250). Or among the plastic bag sellers in mainland Tanzania, one's tribal identity does not determine their trustworthiness: “If one gets into a fight, friends are the ones who protect you, not coethnics ... From the purely professional perspective of bag selling, coethnicity does not guarantee someone will not steal one's sale” (Burbidge 2013:98).

And who, really, can you trust in the hustle economy? Trust must be earned within these collectives of people who identify on levels of mutual hardship, as it is not simply given (Meagher 2010:84). Earning trust comes with demonstrating one's character, and character, in the informal economy, is demonstrated through the work that everyone does each day. The unique functioning of the street economy makes it an environment of tested alliances where you are either in or out – you abide by the unwritten codes, or you will never make it in the hustle life.

While all of this movement and informal organization may appear chaotic or disorganized to the outsider, this is the way of the street economy and what makes it a space for strong social relations to form.

Conclusion

Individualism of traders refers to the fact that they operate independently of any social pressures, make decisions entirely in terms of their own interests as they conceive them, and relate to each other through separate person-to-person deals, but this does not mean that alliances or partnerships among traders are not important. The individual trader is the centre of a series of linkages of composite trading coalitions and social networks. (Ilahiane and Sherry 2008:252)

In my research, I sought out to explore the question of whether informal economic activities could foster cooperative relations between Zanzibaris and mainland Tanzanians. I was most interested in learning about the processes of relationship-formation among members of the informal economy to determine if their activities could serve as a means for conflicting identity groups to connect socially, and adopt trusting relations instead of unfriendly ones. Where I had anticipated focusing on the outcomes of participating in the informal economy, I came away with a deeper exploration of what relations are built upon via that participation. Upon delving into the world of the street economy in Zanzibar, I found an encouraging sense of collective identities, solidarity and mutual empathy. The street itself was an environment to learn from – where unwritten rules guided the movements and partnerships between actors, mutual hardships bounded unlikely individuals together in arms, and business traded hands across diverse activities. After immersing myself among the street entrepreneurs of Zanzibar, I found that individuals were connected through their sharing of physical space, their mobility in their activities, shared understandings of struggle as members of the hustle economy, and interdependence in their work activities.

I also discovered that members of the street economy disregarded difference among themselves, and instead expressed empathy for one another no matter where they were from. Both Zanzibari and mainlander entrepreneurs noted their respect for each other, recognizing that hustling in the street was what identified them as a collective, and that they shared the same daily hardships.

Where my thesis concludes here, I come to wonder about what more could come from these discoveries. I suggest that another perspective one might explore based on the findings of this research could regard gender roles in the street economy. During my

time in Zanzibar I heard inklings that there were female tour guides and vendors, but this was never something I saw for myself. I would be curious to know whether Muslim women in Zanzibar are finding ways to defy certain social and cultural norms placed upon them that prevent them from participating in the public sphere of the street economy. Of course, one must consider a host of other aspects to this problem, where perhaps the street economy would welcome them as equal players in the 'hustle game', but the expectations of their family members or of other Zanzibaris would continue to permit their participation.

Another direction this research could take is to conduct a comparative study in another geographical region. Where perhaps Zanzibar's particular history and identity politics related to the Union government attribute its street economy in a particular way, it would be beneficial to compare this case to another. Even to explore the street economy playing out in Dar es Salaam, where Zanzibaris represent the minority and come to find their place there. Or, to test the argument made here that the sharing of physical space can promote positive relations between antagonised identity groups, taking this study to another African country that has known opposing groups operating in a mobile street economy.

Overall, this research has suggested the informal street economy be recognized as a unique and complex social space, where social relations and networks play out. Shared physical spaces must not be taken for granted or as natural, but instead questioned and explored as mediums of social connections. As well, it has proposed that identity in the hustle economy is earned and enforced through the mutual struggle of its participants.

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