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### The Pricing of Conservative Accounting and the Measurement of Conservatism at the Firm-Year Level

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#### Abstract

This paper analyzes the pricing of conservative accounting and introduces a new measure of conservatism. We contribute to the conservatism literature in two main ways. First, we analyze the nonlinear pricing of conservatism using the return decomposition model of Vuolteenaho (2002) and investigate the pricing implications of special items which are one of the main accrual items through which conservatism is facilitated. Our conceptual analysis implies - and our empirical results show - that the asymmetric properties of conservative accounting and the existence of alternative non-accounting sources of information generate a nonlinear relation between the unexpected revision in equity returns and earnings news, which is defined as the shock to current and future cash flows. Underlying this nonlinearity pricing result is the assumption that equity markets learn about shocks to firm cash flows from non-accounting as well as accounting sources. In addition, the analysis implies that the GAAP treatment of special items generates a nonlinear and discontinuous relation between unexpected revisions in equity returns and special items. Second, based on this model, we construct a conservatism ratio (CR) at the firm-year level that is a function of contemporaneous good/bad news. CR is defined as the ratio of the current earnings shock to total earnings news and measures how much of the total shock to expected future earnings is recognized in current year earnings. We show empirically that CR incorporates bad news faster than good news at the firm and year level, consistent with conservative accounting.

We have benefited from comments by Gus De Franco, Peter Easton, Hai Lu, Stephen Ryan, and workshop participants at the EAA meetings in Dublin, the Hebrew University, the Interdisciplinary Center-Israel, University of Cyprus, University of Notre Dame, SUNY-Buffalo, Tel-Aviv University, and the University of Toronto. Hope gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Deloitte & Touche Professorship.

#### 1. Introduction

This paper analyzes the pricing of conservative accounting and introduces a new measure of conservatism at the *firm-year* level. We contribute to the conservatism literature in two main ways. First, we analyze the nonlinear pricing of conservatism using the return decomposition model of Vuolteenaho (2002), focusing primarily but not exclusively on the pricing of special items, one of the major accrual items through which conservatism is facilitated. Our conceptual analysis implies – and our empirical results show – that the asymmetric properties of conservative accounting generate a nonlinear (convex) relation between the unexpected revision in equity returns and earnings news. Earnings news is the conceptually correct measure of an earnings surprise and is defined as the shock to the discounted sum of expected current and future earnings over the lifetime of the firm. In other words, earnings news is the conventional current earnings surprise plus the surprise to future earnings (appropriately discounted). Underlying this nonlinearity pricing result, as we shall see, is the very reasonable assumption that equity markets learn about shocks to firm earnings (cash flows) from non-accounting as well as accounting sources. In addition, the analysis implies that the GAAP treatment of special items generates a nonlinear and discontinuous (quasi-convex) relation between unexpected revisions in equity returns and special items irrespective of the news source. Second, based on the Vuolteenaho (2002) model, we construct a conservatism ratio (CR) at the firm-year level that can be used to measure the asymmetry between gain and loss recognition timeliness. Specifically, CR is computed as the ratio of the current earnings surprise to earnings news. Hence, CR shows how much of the total shock to current and expected future earnings (cash flows) is recognized in current year earnings. By this criterion, firm A is more conservative than firm B at time t if A's conservatism ratio is greater (less) than B's conservatism ratio for a given negative (positive) earnings shock measured at time t.<sup>1</sup>

Although our approach is in the spirit of <u>Basu (1997</u>), the structure of the <u>Vuolteenaho (2002)</u> model necessitates a different analysis along a number of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Hence, CR is a meaningful measure of conservatism only if conditioned on the sign of the earnings shock.

dimensions. First, good and bad news in the model are defined in terms of *shocks* (revisions) to returns and not return levels. This shock definition accords with intuition. Suppose that returns are expected to be 15% and, because of a new information shock, returns expectations are revised downwards to 5%. This is surely bad news despite the fact that returns are positive.<sup>2</sup> Second, the model shows that shocks to returns are not merely a function of the conventionally measured earnings surprise but rather are a function inter alia of earnings news.<sup>3</sup> Specifically, unless shocks to current earnings are completely transitory, they affect expectations of future earnings as well. Therefore, the impact of good and bad news on current earnings, or even on the conventional earnings surprise, is an insufficient metric of conservative accounting *absent controls for the impact of the good/bad news on future earnings*.<sup>4</sup> Third, the model explicitly controls for shocks to time-varying expected discount rates (expected return news). This issue is potentially important because, as shown by Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997, p. 265), among others, small changes in expected returns are persistent.

The empirical results are consistent with the implications of the conceptual analysis. In particular, we find that the hypothesized nonlinear relation between the revision in equity returns and earnings news is highly significant and increasing convex as predicted. We further find that the (positive) association between negative earnings news and special items is significant and larger than the (positive) association between positive earnings news and special items. We also find that the nonlinear relation between the revision in equity returns and special items is increasing convex. Although we focus primarily on special items, a separate analysis indicates that the revision in equity returns is also a highly significant and increasing convex function of both the conventional

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Positive (negative) raw returns are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for good (bad) news. Basu (1997), in a sensitivity analysis, subtracts total market returns from firm returns. However, this measure of unexpected returns is potentially misspecified because it fails to account for systematic risk.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The conventional view of the earnings-return paradigm is that the current level of earnings provides information about expected future cash flows and, this in turn determines the current level of security returns. We do not contest this. However, the standard Basu-type analysis of conservative accounting focuses correctly on the asymmetry between "good" news and "bad" news events on equity valuation. Good news and bad news refer to revisions or equivalently to shocks, not levels. Thus, it is more useful to analyze conservative accounting with a revisions approach rather than a levels approach. Specifically, the perspective of this study is that revisions to current earnings provide information about revisions to expected future cash flows which, in turn, determines revisions to equity returns.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> In the absence of controls, there is a potential correlated omitted variables problem.

earnings surprise and the earnings level. However, the Vuolteenaho model yields differential timeliness values for the earnings level that are far smaller than those of Basu.

Finally, we establish the properties of the new conservatism ratio (CR) for which the Vuolteenaho model provides the requisite inputs. We show empirically that CR incorporates bad news faster than good news at the firm-year level. More specifically, we demonstrate that when there is a negative shock to future cash flows, a greater proportion of the shock is incorporated into current period earnings than when there is a positive shock. This finding is consistent with the asymmetric timeliness of conservative accounting. We find that, on average, almost 60% of bad news is recognized in current earnings as opposed to only 47% of good news.

In what follows, Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on conservatism and special items, and Section 3 presents the conceptual analysis. Section 4 describes the return decomposition model and the measure of earnings news. Section 5 describes the data and Section 6 provides the empirical results. Section 7 concludes.

#### 2. Literature Review

#### 2.1 Conservatism<sup>5</sup>

Basu (1997) interprets conservatism as capturing accountants' tendency to require a higher degree of verification for recognizing good news than bad news in financial statements (Basu 1997, p.4). Under this interpretation, earnings reflect bad news (e.g., unrealized losses) more quickly than good news (e.g., unrealized gains). Based on this interpretation, <u>Basu (1997)</u> predicts and finds strong evidence that reported earnings are timely in reflecting publicly available bad news compared to good news.<sup>6</sup> The subsequent literature refers to the Basu measure of conservatism as "differential timeliness."<sup>7</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Our review is limited to those papers that have direct bearing on our empirical modeling. In particular, we do not review papers on conservatism that are clearly of interest but not directly related to our approach such as <u>Beaver and Ryan (2005)</u> and <u>Bagnoli and Watts (2005)</u>. <u>Bagnoli and Watts (2005)</u> develop a model in which conservative accounting choices potentially have pricing implications

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Specifically, Basu (1997) uses a reverse regression of price-deflated earnings on an indicator variable for negative stock returns (D), stock returns (R), and stock returns interacted with the indicator variable (subscripts omitted): EARN =  $a_0 + a_1D + \beta_0R + \beta_1R^*D$ . He then tests for and finds the coefficient  $\beta_1$  to be significantly positive.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Some studies refer to differential timeliness as "earnings conservatism" or "conditional conservatism" as compared to "balance sheet conservatism" or "unconditional conservatism" (as reflected in the market-to-book ratio) (e.g., Beaver and Ryan 2005; Pae et al. 2005).

A number of papers examine why conservatism is so ubiquitous. Watts (2003a) reviews several possible explanations. According to Watts (2003a), the main explanation for conservatism is contracting.<sup>8</sup> Watts (2003a) argues that accounting conservatism efficiently constrains managers' tendency for opportunistic behavior; managers with limited tenure have incentives to inflate reported income to increase their bonuses and the value of their stock options. However, accounting conservatism facilitates the use of earnings as a performance measure by deferring the recognition of gains until they are verifiable (Barclay, Gode, and Kothari 2003).<sup>9</sup> Conservatism is also valuable in debt contracts. Lenders want to protect themselves against excessive dividend payments and additional borrowing. Conservative accounting directly constrains dividend payouts based on earnings (and retained earnings). Conservatism further triggers write-offs of impaired assets and recognition of unrecorded liabilities, pushing the debt/equity ratio closer to its maximum limit and tightening the constraints on additional borrowing, offsetting managers' incentives to overstate earnings, overstate assets, and understate liabilities (Pae, Thornton, and Welker 2005; Vasvari 2006). To sum up, timely incorporation of economic losses in financial statements increases the effectiveness of corporate governance, compensation systems, and debt agreements in motivating and monitoring managers (Ball 2001, p. 141).<sup>10</sup>

A number of studies have examined whether Basu's measure of differential timeliness varies across countries with legal and other institutional factors (e.g., <u>Pope and Walker 1999</u>; <u>Giner and Rees 2001</u>). For example, Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) compare timeliness in common law and code law countries. They argue that because shareholders, lenders and others are assumed, under common law, to be at arm's length

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> In addition, shareholder litigation, the link between taxation and financial reporting, and the incentives of standard setters and regulators may all contribute to conservatism (Watts 2003a).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Managers also prefer an accounting system that incorporates losses in a timely fashion because it allows them to bond themselves ex ante to act in the interests of shareholders and, thus, make their employment contracts more valuable (Ball 2001).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Notwithstanding the desirable aspects of conservatism discussed, not all accountants have a favorable view of conservatism. Most of this criticism relates to the fact that conservatism in the current period may lead to aggressive reporting in future periods. Penman (2003, p.87) points out that consistent application of conservative accounting results in higher book rates of return and earnings growth without any economic justification. In discussing the evidence of increasing conservatism over time, Watts (2003b, p.292) concludes that U.S. firms' earnings (and the earnings of firms in other common law countries) are timely in reflecting bad news, but are not timely at all in reflecting good news (which might be related to overly conservative accounting).

from the firm (as contrasted with the stakeholder model in code law countries), information asymmetry generally is ameliorated by timely public disclosure (Ball et al. 2000). Consistent with their arguments, they find that earnings are significantly more timely in incorporating bad news (i.e., earnings are more conservative) in common law countries than in code law countries.<sup>11</sup>

It is also documented that U.S. accounting practice appears to have become more conservative over recent decades (Basu 1997; Givoly and Hayn 2000; Pae et al. 2005; Ball and Shivakumar 2006). Basu (1997) observes that increases in conservatism coincide with increases in auditors' exposure to legal liability. Pae et al. (2005) posit that the explanation lies in increased SEC enforcement of accounting standards over time. Givoly and Hayn (2000) ascribe the increase in conservatism to numerous FASB standards that yield earlier accruals of expenses and losses and deferrals of revenue recognition, and also to the increasingly litigious environment faced by corporate managers.

Notwithstanding the large number of studies employing differential timeliness as their measure of conservatism, recently researchers have argued that the use of this measure should be more selective and qualified. Givoly et al. (2004) demonstrate that the use of differential timeliness leads to anomalous results. The authors show that the measure fails to detect conservatism in instances where it is most likely to exist. In addition, although one might expect the degree of conservatism to be a relatively long-term characteristic of the firm's reporting system, Givoly et al. (2004) document that differential timeliness is highly volatile over time. They attribute the results to the use of aggregated measures of earnings and returns as well as the nature of events occurring during the period and firms' disclosure policies (see also Gigler and Hemmer 2001). They conclude that differential timeliness suffers from serious measurement errors and that care should be taken when employing the measure in empirical studies.<sup>12,13</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Ball and Shivakumar (2005) examine differential timeliness for U.K. private versus public firms. In fact, they describe firms with high differential timeliness as having "higher quality" earnings. They find that privately held firms exhibit significantly less differential timeliness.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Price (2005) documents that not only are earnings more sensitive to current bad news, they are also more sensitive to lagged bad news and that as much as 65% of bad news is incorporated in stock price before it is incorporated in earnings. This finding is not consistent with the implicit assumption of the Basu model in which bad news is always concurrently reflected in earnings and returns. Price (2005) also provides support

Ball and Shivakumar (2005; 2006) discuss the role of accruals and accounting conservatism in the context of earnings management measurement. In addition to the role accruals play in mitigating noise in cash flows (e.g., Dechow 1994), they argue that a major role of accruals is to recognize gains and losses in a timely fashion, particularly losses. They argue that timely gain and loss recognition through accruals improve the timeliness of earnings and thus improve the usefulness of financial statements generally. Ball and Shivakumar (2006) demonstrate the role of accruals in the asymmetry between gain and loss recognition timeliness. That is, economic losses are more likely to be recognized on a timely basis, as accrued charges against income, whereas the recognition of economic gains is more likely to be deferred until realized in cash. Ball and Shivakumar (2006) improve on the Basu (1997) specification by using abnormal returns rather than raw returns and by relating conservatism to accruals. Nevertheless, the various accrual models employed in Ball and Shivakumar (2006) are ad hoc although they have been used extensively in prior research. In a related study, Pae et al. (2005) find that the accrual component of earnings, but not the cash flow component of earnings, is more conservative for firms with low balance sheet conservatism (defined as a low market-tobook ratio) than for firms with high balance sheet conservatism. This finding is consistent with accruals being used to effect earnings conservatism.

In this paper, we focus on a direct measure of conservatism, namely, earnings news, and relate this measure to special items, another metric of conservatism. Thus, our paper is related to <u>Ball and Shivakumar (2005;</u> 2006) in that we study how special item accruals are used for effective timely recognition of economic losses. The focus on special items is also consistent with Givoly et al.'s (2004) suggestion of using disaggregated earnings measures when measuring accounting conservatism.

#### **2.2 Special Items**

According to GAAP, special (or unusual) items are material items that are considered unusual in nature or occur infrequently. Such items can have a very large

for some of the findings in <u>Givoly et al. (2004)</u> that other factors besides conservatism can induce asymmetric timeliness of earnings.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Dietrich, Muller, and Riedl (2006) argue that many of the empirical results in the conservatism literature are attributable to the estimation procedure rather than to conservatism.

impact on earnings and book value of assets and equity. For example, in their review of empirical studies of asset write-downs, <u>Alciatore et al. (1998)</u> identify a mean write-down ranging from 4% to over 19% of total assets, with maximum write-downs reaching 90%. In addition, Riedl and Srinivasan (2006) document a large increase in both the frequency and magnitude of reported special items throughout the period 1993 – 2002. Although gains also occur, such as gains from sales of assets, the majority of special items are losses. The preponderance of special or unusual losses reflect the conservative bias of accrual accounting that requires early recognition of declines in asset values but tends to delay recognition of most gains until realized. In addition, the magnitude of special items suggests that they represent an economically significant proxy for how conservatism is achieved by firms.

The literature on special items focuses primarily on earnings and the earnings response coefficient (ERCs). Fairfield, Sweeney, and Yohn (1996) analyze accuracy improvements in out-of-sample one-year-ahead forecasts of the return on equity to examine the predictive content of earnings disaggregations. They document that disaggregating earnings into operating earnings, non-operating earnings, and special items improves forecasts. Their results suggest that, although special items can result either from proper application of GAAP (e.g., a write-down of impaired assets) or from earnings management (e.g., big bath accounting that artificially improves future reported profitability), separate disclosure of these items may improve the usefulness of financial reports.<sup>14,15</sup>

Elliott and Hanna (1996) investigate the information content of earnings in the presence of large nonrecurring or unusual charges. Consistent with anecdotal evidence

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> In a valuation context, special items are theorized to be of minimal relevance since they are transitory in nature. However, Black, Carnes, and Richardson (2000) find that special items are value relevant. This finding holds both for firms that report single and for firms that report multiple occurrences of such items over a rolling six year period. Value relevance is consistent with special items reflecting a persistent negative shock to future earnings and cash flows.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Dechow and Ge (2006) find that low accrual firms with large negative special items consistently earn higher positive returns than other low accrual firms. This finding is robust to including proxies for investor sentiment, bankruptcy risk, and investor recognition. According to the authors, special items reflect underlying economics and are indicative of firms that have over-invested in (ex post) poor strategies. Dechow and Ge (2006) argue that special items are indicative of management taking action to turn the firm around, but that investors overweight the probability that the firm will be unsuccessful. They show empirically that special item–low accrual firms end up "turning themselves around" at higher rates than expected by investors and, as a consequence, show improved stock price performance.

that the frequent reporting of write-offs can impair investors' ability to assess firm performance, Elliott and Hanna (1996) find that the valuation weight on earnings before special items declines significantly in quarters following the recognition of large special items. ERCs decline even further if subsequent special items are reported. They also document that the ERC on special items is lower than the ERC on earnings before special items (consistent with the notion that special items are more transitory than other components of earnings) and that the ERC on special items declines with the frequency of reported special items.

Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and Shevlin (2002) examine the association of the postannouncement earnings drift with earnings components, including special items. They document that, consistent with previous research, special items are more transient than other earnings components. However, they also find significant differences between positive and negative special items. Positive special items are less than completely transitory in that they are followed by a smaller but still positive amount of earnings in subsequent quarters. Negative special items, on the other hand, are followed by positive earnings in subsequent quarters.

Francis, Hanna, and Vincent (1996) examine whether managerial manipulation or economic impairment drives write-off decisions and whether the market reacts differently in the two cases. They find that proxies for both manipulation and impairment are significantly related to the write-off decision,<sup>16</sup> and on average, investors react negatively to write-offs. However, they document significant positive reactions to restructuring charges.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Incentives are not significantly related to inventory and fixed assets write-offs, but are strongly significantly associated with restructuring charges and goodwill write-offs.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Two recent papers by Riedl (2004) and Segal (2003) are directly related to Francis et al. (1996). Riedl (2004) examines long-lived asset impairments. In particular, he investigates whether SFAS 121 leads to improvements in the reporting of impairment charges. Contrary to the intentions of FASB, he finds that economic factors have a lower explanatory power for write-offs after SFAS 121. He also finds that big bath behavior explains more of the variation in write-offs after the new standard takes effect (and that these big baths likely reflect opportunistic behavior rather than the provision of managers' private information). In a similar study, Segal (2003) contrasts goodwill write-downs before and after SFAS 142. SFAS 142 was intended to reduce managerial discretion and enhance the reporting for goodwill impairments. However, Segal (2003) does not find any significant differences in the reporting incentives before and after SFAS 142. Similarly, he does not find any difference in the market reaction to write-downs following the implementation of the new standard. Segal (2003) concludes that goodwill write-downs continue to be significantly associated with managers' reporting incentives.

Frankel and Roychowdhury (2005) find that the timeliness of IBES earnings is less asymmetric than that of GAAP earnings. Since IBES earnings are purged of many "special items," this finding can be interpreted as special items being an important means of implementing accounting conservatism. Consistent with this notion, Shroff, Venkataraman, and Zhang (2004) find that negative special items have a higher relation with concurrent stock returns than positive special items.<sup>18</sup>

In conclusion, researchers have shown considerable interest both in conservative accounting in general and in special items. However, there is limited empirical evidence on how market participants price conservative accounting in general and special items in particular. Our study aims to provide more evidence regarding these issues using the theoretical framework of Vuolteenaho (2002).

#### **3.** The Conceptual Analysis

This section provides a conceptual analysis of the relations among earnings news, special items, and revisions in returns. In particular, we show that earnings news and special items are nonlinearly related to revisions in equity returns provided that (i) the accounting system is conservative *and* (ii) equity markets learn about shocks to firm earnings (cash flows) from non-accounting as well as accounting sources. We illustrate these relations using a relatively simple but nevertheless rich example. For simplicity, absent specific information such as special items to indicate otherwise, shocks to earnings are assumed to be completely transitory and expected returns (discount rates) are assumed to be intertemporally constant.<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, we do not incorporate the conservatism ratio in this section. Instead, Appendix A develops and examines the conservatism ratio under more general conditions.

Suppose that management (and/or the auditors) suddenly anticipate a negative shock to the firm's expected future cash flows, for example, in the form of a reduction in the market value of a long-lived asset. In an "ideal" conservative accounting system, the negative shock will be accrued in earnings in a timely fashion (relative to actual cash

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> In contrast, Riedl and Srinivasan (2005) do not find a significant difference in response coefficients across positive and negative special items.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> In the empirical analysis below, we specifically control for expected return news.

flow realizations), in the form of a special item (asset write-down). Provided that the asset is carried on the books at its market value prior to the shock, meaning that accumulated book depreciation equals accumulated economic depreciation, and provided the firm has a 100 percent dividend payout ratio policy, the asset write-down will exactly equal to the shock to current and future cash flows (i.e. earnings news) and the change in market value of equity. Investors should correctly interpret the special item as conveying new information of an impending negative shock to future cash flows, driving down equity returns by the amount of the asset write-down in a timely fashion. Thus, earnings news, special items, and the revision in equity returns are all negative and equal to each other.

Now consider the symmetrically opposite case in which management anticipates a positive shock to expected future cash flows, that is, positive earnings news. In an ideal conservative accounting system there are no special items to reflect the positive shock; and positive earnings news will not be recorded in the accounts until the future cash flows are realized. Furthermore, if accounting is the only source of news about shocks to future cash flows, then the revision to returns is zero as well.

Thus, when the accounting reports are the only source of information, the relations among the three variables are linear with only difference being that with negative shocks these variables are negative and with positive shocks these variables are zero. In addition, linearity obtains whether the accounting system is conservative or not, although the shock to returns depends upon the extent of conservatism.

Suppose instead that equity markets are able to learn about positive shocks to future cash flows from non-accounting sources. When the shock to cash flows is negative, earnings news, special items, and revisions to returns are negative and equal to each other as before. However, when the shocks to future cash flows are positive, earnings new and special items are equal and zero because of conservatism but equity returns will adjust to reflect the positive shock because of non-accounting sources of information. Therefore, when the equity markets can learn about positive shocks to future firm cash flows from non-accounting sources, the ideal conservative accounting system will generate a nonlinear relation between earnings news and revisions in returns and between special items and revisions in returns. Hence, the existence of information sources other than the accounting system is a necessary condition for the nonlinear relation between revisions in returns and earnings news.<sup>20</sup>

This analysis indicates that in an ideal conservative accounting system, the nonlinear relation between earnings news and revisions in returns is identical to the nonlinear relation between special items and revisions in returns. However, the conservative accounting system defined by GAAP is far from ideal. In particular, GAAP and firm financing/investment policies create a wedge between earnings news and special items. There are three main reasons why special items are a less than perfect measure of negative earnings news and, hence, a less than perfect measure of the revision in equity returns. First, book depreciation rarely equals economic depreciation. If accumulated book depreciation is greater than accumulated economic depreciation then the asset write-down to bring the asset's book value to market value will be less than earnings news. Conversely, if accumulated book depreciation is less than accumulated economic depreciation then the asset write-down to bring book value to market value will necessarily be greater than earnings news. Second, under GAAP, if the sum of the future undiscounted cash flows from the asset is greater than the carrying value of the asset, no special item is recognized even though there is a negative shock to the asset's future cash flows. Third, if the firm's policy is to reinvest free cash flows from the asset, the reduction in free cash flows arising from the negative shock to the asset's future cash flows will also drive a wedge between special items (that do not recognize this opportunity cost) and negative earnings news. Thus, under GAAP, when earnings news is negative, special items and earnings news (revision in returns) will be positively correlated but they will not be equal to each other.

Similarly, under GAAP, special items that provide timely information about positive earnings shocks are sometimes recognized, albeit fairly infrequently (e.g., if the firm recognizes a gain on sale of an asset, or the firm reverses a portion of a restructuring charge anticipated to be larger). Thus, under GAAP, special items can be positive and positively correlated with (although unlikely to be equal to) positive earnings news. Therefore, under GAAP, the relation between special items and revision in returns will be

 $<sup>^{20}</sup>$  This condition is also necessary for the nonlinear relation between returns and earnings as in Basu (1997).

nonlinear but generally weaker than the nonlinear relation between earnings news and revision in returns.

In short, the asymmetry inherent in conservative accounting under GAAP, coupled with alternative sources of value relevant information, lead to an asymmetric response by equity markets to positive earnings news (special items) relative to negative earnings news (special items). As a result, revisions to equity returns are more highly correlated with negative earnings news (special items) than with positive earnings news (special items). Furthermore, under GAAP, special items, positive or negative, provide an imperfect measure of the impact of new information on equity returns relative to earnings news yielding a weaker nonlinear relation between special items and revision in returns. An example will help explicate these ideas.

BENCHMARK SCENARIO						
	T=0	t=1	t=2	T=3		
CF	-30,000	13,139	13,139	13,139		
NI		3,139	5,110	7,377		
MS		13,139	28,250	45,626		
PPE-BV	30,000	20,000	10,000	0		
PPE-MV	30,000	21,361	11,425	0		
BV	30,000	33,139	38,250	45,626		
MV	30,000	34,500	39,675	45,626		
COC		15%	15%	15%		
RET		15%	15%	15%		

Consider a new all equity firm that invests \$30,000 in a depreciable plant at t=0. The firm's cost of capital (COC) is an intertemporally constant 15%. The plant earns expected cash returns of \$13,139 (end of year) for each of three periods and then the firm costlessly liquidates. Cash returns from plant activity are invested in marketable securities that earn the firm's cost of capital.<sup>21</sup> The firm depreciates the asset using the straight line method. There are no taxes. Given these data, the present value of the plant and its market value at t=0 is \$30,000. An investor would earn an IRR of 15% on the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> The assumption that free cash flows remain invested in the firm and are not paid out as dividends adds additional illustrative complexity to the analysis.

investment. Each period the financial report shows a depreciation expense accrual of \$10,000. The stock price goes up by 15% a year. See the BENCHMARK SCENARIO in the table above for end of period book value of equity (BV), market value of equity (MV), cash flows from operations (CF), earnings (NI), book value of property, plant, and equipment (PPE-BV), market value of property, plant, and equipment (PPE-BV), market value of property, plant, and equipment (PPE-BV), and marketable securities (MS),.<sup>22</sup>

Scenario 1 is similar to the benchmark scenario with one major difference. Just prior to publication of the financial report at t=2, management discovers that cash flows for the period are 10% lower than expected, \$11,825 instead of \$13,139, and consequently also revises downwards its estimates of expected future plant cash flows from \$13,139 to \$9,854 at t=3, a reduction of 25% from the benchmark scenario. The carrying value of PPE at t=2 prior to the change in estimate is \$10,000 whereas the (revised) undiscounted future cash flows from the asset are \$9,854. Since the carrying value of PPE is less than the undiscounted future cash flows, an impairment is recognized under current GAAP and a special accrual of -\$1,431 = (9,854/(1.15)-10,000) is recorded in order to bring PPE down to its market value of \$8,569. In contrast, earnings news (N<sub>E</sub>), the reduction in the value of the firm over its remaining lifetime due to the revision of expected future cash flows, is -\$4,266, closely corresponding to the (unexpected) change in market value (DEL(MV)) of -\$4,170 (=35,505-39,675).<sup>23</sup> The reduction in market value translates into a revision in expected returns  $(r_t-E_{t-1}(r_t))$  of -12% relative to the benchmark scenario. Note that the change in the market value of the firm is comprised of a reduction in the (market) value of PPE of -\$2,856 (=8,569-11,425) and of a reduction in the end of year balance of marketable securities of -\$1,314 (=26,396-28,250). Of course,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Net income (NI) equals cash flow (CF) minus depreciation expense plus investment income, computed as beginning-of-period balance of marketable securities (MS) multiplied by the cost of capital (COC). PPE-MV is computed as the present value of future cash flows. Finally, market value (MV) is computed as the sum of PPE-MV and MS.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> The small difference in the two numbers is due to the fact that earnings news is computed here somewhat inexactly but more simply as the sum of the changes in ROE multiplied by the beginning of period book value of equity over the life of the firm. Earnings news is defined more exactly in Section 4 below. Note that earnings news in Scenario 1 is computed based upon the period 2 report. This computation does not presuppose knowledge of the period 3 shock beyond the period 2 special items. In particular, given the asset write-down (special items) in period 2, plant cash flows in the next period equal the product of the asset value and COC. Moreover, the period 3 return on marketable securities (the beginning of the period balance of MS times COC) and depreciation expense are also known. Ultimately, special items are what link the period 3 shock to the period 2 report.

whether this negative earnings shock is fully reflected in equity returns in the current period depends upon whether shareholders learn of the downward revision of expected cash flows. Absent for now non-accounting sources of information, the primary source of information to the equity market regarding the downward revision in future cash flows is the recorded special item.

Scenario 1 raises a measurement issue.. The recorded special item is only -\$1,431 whereas the reduction in equity value is the earnings news of -\$4,170, a difference of -\$2,739. This difference has two sources: (1) the difference between the carrying value of the asset and its market value of -\$1,425 = (10,000-11,425), caused by a (straight line) depreciation policy that differs from economic depreciation; and (2) the reduction in the investment in marketable securities due to the reduced operational cash flows of -\$1,314, caused by the less than one hundred percent dividend payout ratio and the fact that the GAAP definition of special items does not include this opportunity cost. These results are summarized in the table below denoted SCENARIO 1.

SCENARIO 1						
	t=0	t=1	t=2	T=3		
CF	-30,000	13,139	11,825	9,854		
NI		3,139	2,365	5,326		
MS		13,139	26,936	40,830		
PPE-BV	30,000	20,000	8,569	0		
PPE-MV	30,000	21,361	8,569	0		
BV	30,000	33,139	35,505	40,830		
MV	30,000	34,500	35,505	40,830		
$N_E = \Delta E(ROE) * BV_{t-1}$		0	-4,266	0		
DEL(MV)		0	-4,170	0		
SI		0	-1,431	0		
COC		15%	15%	15%		
RET		15%	3%	15%		
$r_t-E_{t-1}(r_t)$		0%	-12%	0%		

The comparison of Scenario 1 with the benchmark scenario is illustrative. First, the conventional earnings surprise is an incomplete measure of the news event, because

the change in market value is determined both by revisions to current cash flows (the conventional earnings surprise) in period 2 *and* to expected future cash flows in period 3. Indeed, the conventional earnings surprise of -\$2,745 (=2,365-5,110) understates the overall shock to future cash flows, whereas earnings news captures the total shock to future cash flows. Second, bad news is defined by the revision to period 2 returns of -12% (=3%-15%) and not by the period 2 return of 3%. Therefore, an analysis using raw returns is potentially misspecified. Third, the special items accrual significantly understates earnings news and the revision to equity returns.<sup>24</sup> This scenario indicates that while earnings news and the revision in equity returns are perfectly positively correlated, special items are less than perfectly positively correlated with either earnings news or the revision in equity returns, despite the fact that special items signal and provide information about the shock to future cash flows to shareholders.

Scenario 2 is also a negative earnings event. Specifically, Scenario 2 is similar to Scenario 1 except that expected future plant cash flows at t=3 are identical to the cash flows at t=2 of \$11,825. Unlike Scenario 1, the reduction in plant value is not recognized as an impairment under GAAP because the carrying value of the asset (\$10,000) is less than the undiscounted value of the expected future cash flows (\$11,825). In the absence of a special item or external sources of information to signal the reduction in future cash flows beyond t=2, equity values fall only by 4% at t=2 and with the remaining reduction of 3% at t=3. Earnings news is -\$1,314 in period 2 and -\$1,258 in period 3 as compared to the unexpected changes in market value of -\$1,314 in both periods.<sup>25</sup> By comparison to Scenario 1, zero special items are a rather poor measure of negative earnings news and the consequent reduction in the equity value of the firm. Note that there is negative market reaction in both periods 2 and 3 (-4% and -3%, respectively) because there is no special item (or other sources of information) to signal the further reduction in asset value in period 3. This example shows that the gap between earnings news and special items is affected by the GAAP definition of an impairment event, in addition to the two other

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Of course, if the firm adopts a depreciation policy such that book depreciation is less than economic depreciation, the special item could potentially overstate earnings news and the revision in equity values, although this is unlikely. It is even more unlikely if free cash flows are not paid out as dividends. More often than not, the historical cost basis of asset value understates market value, so that special items are likely to understate earnings news and the revision to equity values.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Note that in this scenario the shocks to cash flows are assumed to be completely transitory and, hence, the earnings news in period 2 only captures the shock to ROE in period 2.

reasons illustrated in Scenario 1. In particular, scenario 2 is characterized by no association between earnings news and special items and a (perfectly) positive association between earnings news and the unexpected revision to equity returns. These results are summarized in the table below denoted SCENARIO 2.<sup>26</sup>

SCENARIO 2					
	t=0	t=1	t=2	T=3	
CF	-30,000	13,139	11,825	11,825	
NI		3,139	3,796	5,866	
MS		13,139	26,936	42,801	
PPE-BV	30,000	20,000	10,000	0	
PPE-MV	30,000	21,361	11,425	0	
BV	30,000	33,139	36,936	42,801	
MV	30,000	34,500	38,361	42,801	
$N_E = \Delta E(ROE) * BV_{t-1}$		0	-1,314	-1,314	
DEL_MV			-1,314	-1,314	
SI		0	0	0	
COC		15%	15%	15%	
RET		15%	11%	12%	
$\mathbf{r_{t}} - \mathbf{E_{t-1}}(\mathbf{r_t})$		0%	-4%	-3%	

Scenario 3 illustrates a positive earnings news event. Again, it is assumed that accounting reports are the only source of information about shocks to future cash flows. Instead of expecting cash flows to decrease, management expects cash flows to increase 10% relative to the benchmark at t=2, from \$13,139 to \$14,453, and 25% relative to the benchmark at t=3, from \$13,139 to \$16,424. Thus, Scenario 3 is completely symmetric to Scenario 1 but with positive shocks to future cash flows. Absent accrual information on the gains because of conservatism and absent external sources of information about the shock, shareholders do not learn about the new situation until the cash flows are realized (i.e., no positive special items are recognized). In this scenario, earnings news (unexpected change in market value) is \$1,314 (\$1,314) in period 2 and \$3,229 (\$3,285)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> If the market learns about the negative shock to cash flows in period 3 then the correlation between earnings news and unexpected returns would not be perfect, yet still be positive. The associations of unexpected revisions in returns and earnings news with special items would still be zero.

in period 3, resulting in unexpected returns of 4% and 8%, respectively. Thus, under this scenario, there is no association between special items and earnings news and between special items and the revision in equity returns. The revision in equity returns is (perfectly) positively associated with earnings news. The results of this scenario are summarized in the table below denoted SCENARIO 3.<sup>27</sup>

SCENARIO 3					
	t=0	t=1	T=2	T=3	
CF	-30,000	13,139	14,453	16,424	
NI		3,139	6,424	10,859	
MS		13,139	29,563	50,422	
PPE-BV	30,000	20,000	10,000	0	
PPE-MV	30,000	21,361	14,282	0	
BV	30,000	33,139	39,563	50,422	
MV	30,000	34,500	43,845	50,422	
$N_E = \Delta E(ROE) * BV_{t-1}$		0	1,314	3,285	
DEL_MV			1,314	3,285	
SI		0	0	0	
COC		15%	15%	15%	
RET		15%	19%	23%	
$r_t - E_{t-1}(r_t)$		0%	4%	8%	

Figure 1 illustrates the relation between the revision to returns and earnings news for Scenarios 1 and 3 assuming unrealistically that accounting reports are the only source of information for equity markets. Since accounting reports are the only source of news, the revision in returns are necessarily *linearly* related to earnings news, although because of conservatism negative news has a greater impact on returns than positive news (-12% versus 4%).<sup>28</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Scenario 3 assumes that no positive special items are recorded. However, as noted above, under GAAP, positive special items are sometimes recognized when earnings news is positive so that empirically one should expect a weak correlation between special items and positive earnings news and special items and the revision in returns.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> We convert dollar earnings news to percentage by dividing the dollar earnings news by beginning of the period book value of equity. For example, in Scenario 3 the percentage earnings news equals to 4%

Once we allow for non-accounting alternative sources of information for positive shocks, the relation between the revision to returns and earnings news become nonlinear.<sup>29</sup> The case of negative earnings shocks (Scenario 1) remains unchanged since in that case all the relevant information is available to the equity markets from the accounts anyway. What does change is the case of positive earnings shocks (Scenario 3). Scenario 4 below shows what happens when accounting reports are not the only source of information for the capital markets in the case of positive earnings shocks. Because of the information from non-accounting sources, shareholders learn at t=2 of management's expectations of future cash flow increases. Consequently, returns adjust fully at t=2 to the positive news. Period 2 returns increase from 15% to 28% to reflect expected cash flow changes in both periods 2 and 3 (\$4,170). In contrast, under conservative accounting, the accounts are unaffected by the change in expectations about future cash flow increases so that earnings news and special items are unchanged from Scenario 3. A comparison of Scenarios 1 and 4 shows that alternative non-accounting sources of information about positive firm shocks and conservative accounting in tandem create a nonlinear convex relation between revisions in returns and earnings news (see Figure 2).

Further justification for the claim that conservatism generates a nonlinear convex relation between revisions in returns and earnings news is provided by Callen (2006). He models conditional conservatism as a right-truncated shock to earnings in a Vuolteenaho framework. He derives analytically the relations between revisions in returns and earnings news both for a firm with a symmetric unbiased accounting system and for a conservative firm. Callen shows that while the relation between revisions in returns and earnings news is linear for the unbiased firm, the relation is convex nonlinear for the conservative firm just as described in the scenario analysis above.

<sup>(=1,314/33,139).</sup> The percentage earnings news equals (by construction) to unexpected ROE. The expected ROE is 15.4% (=5,110/33,139, see Benchmark Scenario) and the actual ROE is 19.4% (=6,424/33,139).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> The non-linearity result is robust to allowing non-accounting information to also inform about negative shocks. But, in that case, accounting might be irrelevant (dominated) to the extant that external sources provide similar information about negative shocks and better information about positive shocks. More realistically, the more conservative the accounting system, the more likely is management to provide better (more timely) information about negative shocks and the non-accounting system to provide better information about positive shocks. In that case, nonlinearity obtains *and* accounting matters.

The relation between revisions in returns and special items (see Figure 3) is discontinuous and quasi-convex irrespective of external sources of information.<sup>30</sup> This is because special items in our scenarios are uniformly zero for positive shocks. Even under GAAP, special items typically understate the revision in returns for positive news shocks yielding a nonlinear relation whether or not security adjust fully to positive news.

SCENARIO 4					
	t=0	T=1	T=2	T=3	
CF	-30,000	13,139	14,453	16,424	
NI		3,139	6,424	10,859	
MS		13,139	29,563	50,422	
PPE-BV	30,000	20,000	10,000	0	
PPE-MV	30,000	21,361	14,282	0	
BV	30,000	33,139	39,563	50,422	
MV	30,000	34,500	43,845	50,422	
$N_E = \Delta E(ROE) * BV_{t-1}$		0	1,314	3,285	
DEL_MV			4,170	0	
SI		0	0	0	
COC		15%	15%	15%	
RET		15%	27%	15%	
$\mathbf{r}_{t}$ - $\mathbf{E}_{t-1}(\mathbf{r}_{t})$		0%	12%	0%	

Together with the Vuolteenaho (2002) model, the above conceptual analysis provides the framework for our empirical investigation. First, we examine the association between earnings news and special items, and, in particular, we contrast the association between negative earnings news and special items and positive earnings news and special items. Second, we analyze the relations between revisions in equity returns and earnings news and between revisions in equity returns and earnings news and between revisions in equity returns and special items. Third, in a further analysis, we investigate the relations between revisions in equity returns and the conventional earnings surprise and between revisions in equity returns and earnings levels. Finally, we empirically analyze the conservatism ratio.

 $<sup>^{30}</sup>$  The numbers in Figure 3 are based on Scenarios 1 and 4. Scenarios 1 and 3 yield the same qualitative result except that unexpected returns will a bit more than 4% instead of 12% in the positive quadrant.

#### 4. The Vuolteenaho (2002) Return Decomposition Model

Extending prior work by <u>Campbell (1991</u>) and Campbell and Ammer (1993), Vuolteenaho (2002) employs the Clean Surplus Relation to show that revisions in stock returns can be expressed as a function of earnings news and expected return (discount rate) news. Formally,

$$r_{t} - E_{t-1}(r_{t}) = \Delta E_{t} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^{j} (roe_{t+j} - i_{t+j}) - \Delta E_{t} \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^{j} r_{t+j}$$
(1)

where

 $\Delta$  denotes the first differencing operator

 $E_t$  is the expectations operator and  $\Delta E_t = E_t(\cdot) - E_{t-1}(\cdot)$ 

 $r_t = \log \text{ equity return (cum dividend) in excess of the risk free rate in period t}$ 

 $\rho$  is a constant error approximation term

 $i_t = \log$  of one plus the risk free rate in period t

roe = log of one plus return on equity (i.e., earnings divided by beginning of period book value of equity)

Defining the unexpected stock return components as expected-return news (Nr) and earnings news (Ne), equation (1) can be expressed as:<sup>31</sup>

$$\mathbf{r}_t - \mathbf{E}_{t-1}(\mathbf{r}_t) = \mathbf{N}\mathbf{e} - \mathbf{N}\mathbf{r} \tag{2}$$

where

$$Ne = \Delta E_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j (roe_{t+j} - i_{t+j}) = \text{Earnings News}$$
(3)

$$Nr = \Delta E_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^j r_{t+j} = \text{Expected Return News}$$
(4)

Equation (2) shows that the unexpected revision in current equity returns increases with earnings news and decreases with expected return news. An unanticipated increase in the firm's earnings conveys positive information about the firm's prospects

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> As a sensitivity analysis we estimate earnings news as the sum of accruals news and cash flow news (see Callen and Segal 2004). The idea behind this alternative estimation is that the breakdown of earnings into cash flows and accruals may provide a better prediction of future cash flows than earnings alone. No inferences are affected if we use this alternative approach. However, breaking down earnings to accruals and cash flows precludes us from computing our conservatism ratio.

and hence translates into higher returns. Conversely, an unexpected increase in future expected returns (discount rates) due to higher risk, for example, translates into negative unexpected current returns, similar to the effect of an increase in the yield rate on bond prices.

In order to empirically examine the associations between earnings news, special items, and unexpected returns, and to construct the conservatism ratio, we need estimates of earnings news and expected return news. The return decomposition [Equation (2)] provides the basis. However, in order to implement the return decomposition, estimates of expected future returns and expected future earnings are required. Following Campbell (1991), Campbell and Ammer (1993), Vuolteenaho (2002), Callen and Segal (2004), and Callen, Hope, and Segal (2005), we implement the return decomposition using a parsimonious log-linear vector autoregressive (VAR) model with state variables consisting of log stock returns, log of one plus ROE (earnings scaled by initial book value of equity), and the log book to market ratio. Appendix B describes the estimation procedure in detail.

To facilitate the analysis, we generate firm-year estimates of earnings news and expected return news by estimating the firm-year variance-covariance matrix and assuming that within-industry observations have the same VAR coefficient matrix. For example, earnings news [Equation (B6) in Appendix B] is a function of the VAR coefficient matrix [A] and the residuals from the VAR regressions [Equations (B2a) through (B2c)]. Thus, earnings news can be estimated at the firm-year level using the VAR coefficient matrix and the vector of residuals  $E_{it}=[e_{1it}, e_{2it}, e_{3it}]$ , where  $e_j$  is the estimated residual from equation j and i (t) is the firm (time) index. The variance-covariance matrix  $\Omega_{it}$  is computed as  $[E_{it}\rho E_{it}]$  where  $\rho$  denotes the transpose. We then estimate the conservatism ratio as the residual from the earnings equation [Equation (B2b)] divided by earnings news.

#### 5. Sample and Descriptive Statistics

The data are obtained from annual COMPUSTAT and monthly CRSP files for the years 1962 to 2004. Return on equity is computed as income before extraordinary items (DATA18) scaled by the beginning of the period stockholders' equity (DATA60). The

risk-free rate is the annualized three month T-Bill rate. Annual stock returns are computed from monthly CRSP data adjusted for dividends. Returns are computed over a period starting nine months before and ending three months after the fiscal year end.

We impose the following restrictions on the data. First, we remove firms in the financial industry (SIC 6000-6999). Second, we require non-missing values of contemporaneous and one lag each of ROE, annual returns, and the book to market ratio. In addition, we require non-missing values of special items (DATA17). These restrictions yield a sample size of 114,061 firm-years. Eliminating firms with market value of equity less than \$10M reduces the sample size to 94,540. Finally, in order to mitigate data errors and scaling problems, we delete the top and bottom one percent of all the variables included in the VAR system. These restrictions reduce the sample to 86,600 (10,292) firm-years (firms).

Table 1 shows the distribution of the major variables of interest. The sample firms exhibit large variation in market capitalization; the mean and median market values of equity are \$1,220 million and \$119 million, respectively. Median cum dividend equity market returns and accounting returns on book value of equity are ten and twelve percent, respectively. The median book-to-market ratio is 0.65. To be consistent with the computation of earnings news, we compute special items (SI) as DATA17 scaled by beginning of the period book value of equity.<sup>32</sup> Since SI is non-zero for only 28,789 firm-years, the 25<sup>th</sup> percentile, median and 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of SI are zero.<sup>33</sup> Finally, the mean (median) CR is 0.525 (0.407), indicating that on average the current period shock to earnings equals approximately 50% of the total economic shock to current and future cash flows.

#### 6. Empirical Results

In this section we present the empirical results. We first provide descriptive statistics of the VAR estimation results and the news items. We then show the analysis of the relation between earnings news and special items, and present the results of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> As sensitivity tests, we repeat the analysis scaling special items by beginning of the period total assets or market value of equity. The results are similar to those reported.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Untabulated results show that if we restrict the sample to observations with non-zero SI, then the mean and median SI are -0.039 and -0.015, respectively.

analysis of the association of earnings news and special items with revisions in unexpected returns. Finally, we introduce the conservatism ratio, its empirical properties, and association with economic shocks. We also briefly discuss how the conservatism ratio can be used in future research.

#### 6.1 VAR Estimation

We estimate the VAR equations by industry using the Fama and French (1997) industry classification. Table 2, Panel A shows the mean estimated parameters across industries and their standard errors.<sup>34</sup> The standard errors are computed using the Fama-Macbeth (1973) method. The significant parameter estimates imply that returns are negatively associated with past returns and positively associated with past earnings and the past book-to-market ratio. Earnings are positively associated with past returns and past earnings and negatively associated with the past book-to-market ratio. The book-to-market ratio is positively related to past returns, past earnings, and the past book-to-market.

Table 2, Panel B provides descriptive statistics of expected-return news (Nr), earnings news (Ne), and revisions in unexpected returns  $(r_t-E_{t-1}(r_t))$ .<sup>35</sup> To eliminate potential outliers we delete the top and bottom one percent of the news items and the revisions in unexpected returns, resulting in a sample of 82,398 observations. The mean and median of Ne (0.011 and 0.033, respectively) are significantly positive, indicating that on average the earnings news is "good." The mean and median Nr are also significantly positive (0.003 and 0.005, respectively) and, similar to the findings of Vuolteenaho (2002), Callen and Segal (2004), and Callen, Hope, and Segal (2005), significantly smaller than Ne, indicating that earnings news is the main driver of revisions in unexpected returns at the firm level. The mean and median revisions in unexpected returns (0.002 and 0.009, respectively) are also positive, consistent with the positive mean and median earnings news.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Reported results are based on a parsimonious VAR using one lag. Untabulated results show that our inferences are robust to including two lags in the VAR estimation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> The revision in unexpected returns is computed as the residual from the VAR return equation. See equation (B2a) in Appendix B.

Table 2, Panel C shows the Pearson and Spearman correlations among the variables of Equation (2). Ne (Nr) is positively (negatively) and significantly correlated with the revision in unexpected returns  $(r_t-E_{t-1}(r_t))$ , and Ne and Nr are negatively and significantly correlated with each other. These correlations are consistent with the predictions of the model (Equation (2)). Specifically, the model predicts that the association of the revision in unexpected returns with Ne (Nr) is positive (negative).

Table 2, Panel D presents the means for earnings news (Ne), expected-return news (Nr), and revisions in unexpected returns ranked by earnings news quintile portfolios. Quintile 1 is the most negative and quintile 5 is the most positive Ne quintile. This panel shows that revisions in unexpected returns increase monotonically with the Ne quintiles. Specifically, revisions in unexpected returns increase from -36%, in the lowest quintile, to 37% in the highest quintile. The Nr column shows that, excluding the first quintile, the mean of Nr decreases monotonically with Ne. This result indicates that earnings news is inversely related to expected-return news, suggesting that positive earnings news is associated with risk reduction and a concomitant decrease in the discount rate.<sup>36</sup>

#### 6.2 Earnings News and Special Items

Table 3 analyzes the relation between earnings news (Ne) and special items (SI). Panel A lists mean Ne and mean SI ranked by Ne quintile portfolios. Quintile 1 is the most negative and quintile 5 is the most positive Ne quintile. The results in this panel are generally consistent with our expectations. Specifically, when earnings news is negative (quintiles 1 and 2), so are special items. With the exception of quintile 3, when earnings news is positive (quintiles 4 and 5) special items are non-negative. This panel also shows that the means of SI increase monotonically from quintile 1 to quintile 5. For example, the mean of SI in quintile 1 is -0.049 and increases monotonically to 0.005 in quintile 5.<sup>37</sup> Overall, these results indicate that there is a positive relation between earnings news and special items.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> We are not making a causality statement here but rather document an association.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> As a sensitivity analysis we examine the frequencies of positive and negative special items by earnings news portfolio quintiles. Going from the most negative earnings news (quintile 1) to the most positive earnings news (quintile 5), the proportion of firms with negative (positive) special items decreases (increases) monotonically with earnings news.

Panel B of Table 3 shows the results of regressing special items on earnings news, a dummy variable (D) equal to one if earnings news is negative and zero otherwise, and an interaction variable between earnings news and the dummy variable (D\_Ne). We estimate the regression using panel data with firm and year fixed effects. The regression results show that the coefficient of earnings news is positive and significant. In addition, the interaction variable is positive and significant, indicating that the association between special items and negative earnings news is stronger than the association between special items and positive earnings news. These results are consistent with special items being an account through which conservatism is manifested. Specifically, when special items are negative (e.g., a write-off of a capital asset), it is an indication of a negative shock to future cash flows (earnings news). When special items are non-negative, the association with future cash flows is positive but weaker, consistent with the notion that good news generally is not recognized until the cash flows are realized.

#### 6.3 Earnings News, Special Items, and Revisions in Unexpected Returns

We estimate Vuolteenaho's (2002) equation in reverse regression form in the spirit of Basu (1997).<sup>38</sup> More formally, based on equation (2), we regress earnings news on revisions in unexpected returns and expected-return news:

$$Ne_{t} = \alpha_{0} + \alpha_{1}(r_{t}-E_{t-1}(r_{t})) + \alpha_{2}Nr_{t} + \varepsilon_{t}$$
(5)

where the  $\alpha_j$  are parameters and  $\varepsilon_t$  is a white noise innovation term. Consistent with the valuation model, we expect  $\alpha_1 > 0$  and  $\alpha_2 > 0$ .<sup>39</sup>

Given that earnings news equals the sum of the current period earnings shock and future earnings shocks, one can decompose Ne into its components and regress current period earnings shock (CES) on the independent variables in Equation (5) as well as the shock to future earnings (FNe). We also estimate a variant of the model using the level of earnings. Specifically, the current period earnings shock equals current period ROE (i.e.,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> In equation (2), the revisions in returns are tautologically determined by Ne and Nr so that there are no parameters to estimate. However, we test equation (2) using *ex post* revisions in returns so that the relation has an error structure.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Note that  $\alpha_2 > 0$  because Nr is on the other side of the equation in a reverse regression.

earnings scaled by beginning of period book value of equity) minus the expected ROE (see Equation B2b). Thus, we include the predicted ROE (PROE) as an explanatory variable in the levels regression.

In addition, we argue above that special items are an imperfect substitute for earnings news so that special items should be non-negatively associated with revisions in equity returns. To examine this conjecture, we re-estimate the regression with special items as the dependent variable.

We estimate the regressions using panel data with firm and year fixed effects.<sup>40</sup> The regression results are presented in Table 4, Panel A. The results of the earnings news regression are presented in the Ne column in Panel A.<sup>41</sup> The signs of the estimated coefficients are as conjectured – positive and highly significant at the 1% level. Similar to the earnings news regression, the signs of the estimated coefficients in the special item regression (SI column) are positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating a positive relation between special items and unexpected returns.<sup>42</sup>

In a further analysis, we regress the current period earnings shock (CES) and the earnings level (ROE) on the revision in unexpected returns, expected return news and other control variables as dictated by the Vuolteenaho model. The shock to future earnings (FNe) and the predicted (expected) next period ROE (PROE) are the relevant controls.<sup>43</sup> Consistent with the findings above, the coefficients on revisions in unexpected returns and expected-returns news in the current period earnings shock and the earnings level regressions (CES and ROE columns, respectively) are positive and significant. The coefficients on the shock to future earnings (FNe) in both regressions are positive and significant, and the coefficient on the predicted ROE in the ROE regression is also positive and significant.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> We obtain similar results when estimating the regressions using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) methodology.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Although Nr<sub>t</sub> and  $(r_t-E_{t-1}(r_t))$  are highly correlated - see Table 2, Panel C - the maximum Variance Inflation Factor of 2.18 and Condition Index of 2.56 are not indicative of multicollinearity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> We also test whether the coefficients across the Ne and SI regressions are equal by estimating both equations as a system. The coefficient on the unexpected revisions in returns in the SI regression is significantly smaller (at less than the 1% level) than the coefficient on the unexpected revisions in returns in the Ne regression ( $\alpha_1$ ), consistent with special items being a noisy measure of earnings news.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> These variables obtain by decomposing Equation (1) further so that CES and ROE are the variables on the left-hand of the equation, respectively

These regressions, however, abstract from the potential nonlinearity induced by conservative accounting as discussed in the conceptual analysis. To test for nonlinearity, we estimate the equation:

$$Ne_{t} = \beta_{0} + \beta_{1}D + \beta_{1}(r_{t} - E_{t-1}(r_{t})) + \beta_{2} D^{*}(r_{t} - E_{t-1}(r_{t})) + \beta_{3} Nr_{t} + \varepsilon_{t}$$
(6)

where the dummy variable (D) that takes a value of one if unexpected revisions in returns are negative:<sup>44</sup>

Panel B shows the regression results.<sup>45</sup> In all regressions, the coefficient estimate on the revisions in unexpected returns, the interaction coefficient, and the expected-returns news coefficient are all positive and significant at the 1% significance level. The positive coefficient on the interaction variable suggests differential timeliness in the incorporation of negative news relative to positive news.

Following Basu (1997), we compute the ratio of the coefficient on the interaction variable to the sum of the coefficients on the interaction variable and revisions in unexpected returns to gauge the extent to which earnings news, special items, current period earnings shock, and earnings levels capture differential timeliness. These ratios are 1.04, 1.15, 1.18 and 1.15, respectively.<sup>46</sup>

#### **6.4 Conservatism Ratio**

We compute a ratio (CR) that can be used to determine the degree of conservatism at the firm-year level, defined as the current period earnings shock (CES) divided by earnings news (Ne). The current period earnings shock is measured by the residual from the earnings equation (see Equation B2b of Appendix B) and earnings news is calculated according to Equation B6. CR therefore shows how much of the total shock to current and expected future earnings (cash flows) is recognized in current year earnings. By this criterion, firm X is more conservative than firm Y at time t if X's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Callen (2006) derives equation (6) analytically by modeling the shocks to earnings of a conservative firm (in a VAR system) as a right-truncated error term.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> The Variance Inflation Factors for all four regressions are less than 10 indicating that multicollinearity is not a concern.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> For comparison, Basu (1997) reports a ratio of 4.66. The difference between the ratios is likely attributed to the inclusion of discount rate news, the shock to future earnings, and the predicted ROE in the regression.

conservatism ratio is greater (less) than Y's conservatism ratio for a given negative (positive) economic shock (i.e., good/bad news) measured at time t. Thus, one has to control for economic news when gauging the degree of conservatism. Appendix A develops the analytical properties of the conservatism ratio under fairly general conditions.

We investigate the empirical properties of CR by examining its association with good and bad news using both univariate and multivariate analyses. Consistent with the conservative nature of accounting, we expect CR to be negatively associated with unexpected returns (a proxy for news) and to be more highly negatively associated with bad news events than with good news events. This follows because in a conservative environment more of the earnings shock should be recognized in current period earnings for bad news than for good news (for a given level of economic shock).

Since a negative CR raises interpretation issues (see below), we delete the negative CR observations (11,009) from the analysis. In addition, we eliminate the top and bottom one percentile of CR (1,427 observations), resulting in a sample of 69,962 observations.

Table 5, Panel A presents a univariate analysis of the mean and median CR conditioned on the sign of unexpected returns. The mean (median) of CR for positive unexpected returns is 0.466 (0.388) as compared to 0.593 (0.439) for negative unexpected returns. The differences in the means and medians are significant at less than the 1% level. Hence, the univariate analysis indicates that CR is higher for bad news, consistent with differential timeliness.

Panel B presents the multivariate analysis. In column (1), CR is regressed on revisions in unexpected returns, a dummy variable (D) equal to one if the revisions in unexpected returns is negative and zero otherwise, and the interaction of D and the revisions in unexpected returns. As expected the coefficient on the revisions in unexpected returns is negative and significant, and the coefficient on the interaction variable is positive and significant. Specifically, the coefficient on the revisions in unexpected returns is -0.41 and the coefficient on the interaction variable is 0.95. Hence, the coefficient on negative news equals 0.54. This indicates that CR is positively (negatively) associated with bad (good) news, consistent with the conservative nature of

financial accounting. In addition, similar to the findings in the univariate analysis, the coefficient for bad news is significantly greater (at the 1% level) than the absolute value of the coefficient on good news, consistent with differential timeliness.

In column (2) we repeat the regression in column (1) after adding the following control variables: ROE, SIZE (log market value of equity), LOSS (a dummy variable equal to one if earnings are negative and zero otherwise), and SI. We do not have prediction for the signs of the coefficients on ROE and SIZE. We expect positive coefficient on LOSS and negative coefficient on SI.47 The coefficients on revisions in unexpected returns and the interaction variable are identical to those reported above. As expected the coefficient on LOSS is positive and significant indicating that CR is generally higher when firms report losses. The coefficient on SI is negative and significant consistent with higher CR when firms report negative special items (e.g. write offs).

A negative CR raises interpretation issues. Specifically, the cases where earnings news is negative and the current period earnings shock (CES) is positive may represent overly aggressive financial reporting because the firm has a positive CES even though it will experience an overall negative shock to future cash flows. Similarly, cases where earnings news is positive and CES is negative may represent overly conservative financial reporting. The data are consistent with this conjecture. The correlation between CES and revisions in unexpected returns for negative CR observations is -0.68 in contrast to a correlation of 0.35 for observations where CES and earnings news are of the same sign (untabulated).<sup>48</sup> We leave it for future research to investigate the negative CR cases more thoroughly.

The conservatism ratio has potential for future research. For example, CR can be used to determine the extent of conservatism at the *firm-year* level. Since CR is a function of both the magnitude of the economic shock and the sign of the shock, it is important to control for both of these when determining the degree of conservatism. One possible way of doing so is to classify the sample observations into portfolios formed

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Note that SI is negative for write-offs.
 <sup>48</sup> Appendix A shows that earnings news is a weighted average of the CES and revisions in unexpected returns. Hence, CES and earnings news may be of opposite sign if CES and revisions in unexpected returns are also of opposite sign.

based on the annual revisions in unexpected returns, and rank the observations within each portfolio according to the CR. This ranking is a proxy for the degree of conservatism. One can then use this measure of conservatism for both cross-sectional and time-series analyses. For instance, researchers can examine how the cross-sectional differences in conservatism relate to factors that affect the reporting choices of the firm such as governance, auditor independence, or compensation. Another avenue for research is to investigate how the time-series properties of the degree of conservatism change with external factors such as new regulation (e.g. new accounting standards, Sarbanes-Oxley, etc.).

#### 7. Conclusion

This paper first analyzes the nonlinear pricing of conservatism using the return decomposition model of Vuolteenaho (2002) and investigates the pricing implications of special items, one of the major accrual items through which conservatism is facilitated. Consistent with implications of accounting conservatism for revisions in security returns, we show empirically that there is a significant increasing nonlinear relation between revisions in equity returns and revisions in expected current and future cash flows (earnings news). In particular, revisions in equity returns are more highly associated with negative earnings news than with positive earnings news. Our analysis of conservative accounting also implies that revisions in equity returns are a nonlinear function of special items such that revisions in equity returns are either more highly positively correlated with negative special items than with positive special items or revisions in equity returns are uncorrelated with special items. The empirical results confirm this conjecture as well. Our results imply that special items are an imperfect and noisy measure of unexpected revisions in expected future cash flows by comparison to earnings news, consistent with our conceptual analysis.

Future research should try to control for a number of potential measurement issues that may be affecting these results. First, reporting special items as a separate line item, especially prior to the mid 1990's, may have involved extensive self-selection by managers. Riedl (2004) reports on a survey by the FEI from 1991 which shows that 52% of write-offs were not included as special items (see also Riedl and Srinivasan 2006).

This suggests that firms "self select" into reporting special items (within GAAP enforcement constraints). Hence, we expect and observe that most special items will be negative to encourage investors to view them as one-time or "non-recurring" items. This self-selection process suggests that it may prove interesting and fruitful to examine (extreme) discretionary accruals in place of special items as an alternative measure of special items. Of course, discretionary accruals, like special items, can also be used as an earnings management tool. Second, the literature review reveals that not all special items are homogeneous and that, subject to data limitations, it may be useful to split special items into their component parts.

This paper also develops a new direct metric of conservatism at the firm-year level based on the Vuolteenaho (2002) model. This conservatism ratio (CR) is computed as the ratio of the current earnings shock to earnings news. Hence, CR shows how much of the total shock to expected current and future earnings (cash flows) over the lifetime of the firm is recognized in current year earnings. Focusing on positive CR's, we find that a greater proportion of the shock to cash flows is recognized in the current period when the shock is negative than when the shock is positive, consistent with conservative accounting. Negative CR's are likely to reflect either overly aggressive accounting or overly conservative accounting depending upon whether earnings news is negative (positive) and the earnings surprise is positive (negative). The correlations between the earnings surprise and unexpected returns for negative versus positive CR observations are consistent with our interpretation of negative CR's. We leave it for future research to investigate the negative CR cases more thoroughly.

#### **Appendix A: The Conservatism Ratio (CR)**

The conservatism ratio can best be understood by reference to the time series properties of the earnings news measure [Equation (3)]. Perhaps the simplest example is to assume that the firm's earnings, as measured by roe<sub>t</sub>, follow a stationary AR(1) process with drift and that the firm's expected rate of return (cost of capital) is intertemporally constant:

$$roe_t = \mathbf{\alpha} + \mathbf{\beta} roe_{t-1} + \mathbf{\varepsilon}_t \tag{A1}$$

where the persistence parameter  $\beta$  is assumed to lie between 0 and 1 and  $\varepsilon_t \sim (0, \sigma^2)$  is a zero mean error term. It is fairly straightforward to show that in this case<sup>49</sup>

 $CRt \approx 1 - \beta$ 

In other words, the conservatism ratio (approximately) equals one minus the persistence of  $roe_t$  so that the more persistent are earnings the smaller the conservatism ratio, that is, the less that the earnings shock is recognized in current earnings relative to future earnings. This accords with intuition since a shock to an AR(1) firm will have the same impact on earnings each and every period over the lifetime of the firm. Moreover, the impact of the shock on earnings over the lifetime of the firm increases directly with the firm's earnings persistence. As a result, the more persistent are earnings the less of the shock that will be recognized in any period's earnings.

In the simple AR(1) example, CR varies by firm but is intertemporally constant. The analysis in the text allows for far more complex (and realistic) time series patterns in earnings and discount rates by assuming a VAR system. In the case of a VAR, the CR varies generally both by firm and over time. To see this consider the simple stationary VAR example with only two variables  $r_t$  and  $roe_t$ :

$$\mathbf{r}_{t} = \alpha_{1}\mathbf{r}_{t-1} + \alpha_{2}\mathbf{roe}_{t-1} + \eta_{1t} \tag{A2a}$$

$$\operatorname{roe}_{t} = \beta_{1} r_{t-1} + \beta_{2} \operatorname{roe}_{t-1} + \eta_{2t} \tag{A2b}$$

It can be shown that the conservatism ratio in this case is:<sup>50</sup>

<sup>49</sup> The proof is based on the definition of earnings news (Ne<sub>t</sub> =  $\Delta E_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j roe_{t+j}$ ). Substituting the

AR(1) dynamic of *roe<sub>t</sub>* into the latter relation and noting that  $\Delta E_t roe_{t+j} = (\rho\beta)^i \epsilon_t$  for  $j \ge 0$  yields Ne<sub>t</sub> =  $\epsilon_t$  /(1- $\rho\beta$ ). By definition CR<sub>t</sub> =  $\epsilon_t$ /Ne<sub>t</sub> = (1- $\rho\beta$ ). Since  $\rho$  is very close to 1 (0.967), the result follows immediately.

$$CR_{t} = \frac{(1 - \alpha_{1})(1 - \beta_{2}) - \alpha_{2} * \beta_{1}}{\beta_{1}(\frac{\eta_{1t}}{\eta_{2t}}) + (1 - \alpha_{1})}$$
(A3)

Clearly, in the case of a VAR system, the conservatism ratio is generally dependent upon all of the parameters of the dynamics. Also, unless (i) the shocks to earnings and returns are always equal or (ii) the shocks to returns are always zero, or (iii)  $\beta_1 = 0$ , the conservatism ratio is dependent upon the relative shocks ( $\eta_{1t}/\eta_{2t}$ ). In particular, the greater the shock of earnings relative to the shock to expected returns, the greater the conservatism ratio. Moreover, since the shocks are time dependent so is CR. Straightforward observation shows that the conservatism ratio is a decreasing function of the earnings persistence parameter  $\beta_2$  and the earnings parameter  $\alpha_2$ . The relation between the other parameters and the conservatism ratio is ambiguous.

#### **Appendix B: Estimation of the Vuolteenaho Model**

In general, the VAR estimation is facilitated by assuming that the dynamics of the data are well described by a (stationary) time-series model. Specifically, define  $z_{it}$  to be a vector of firm-specific state variables that follows the vector autoregressive process:

$$\mathbf{z}_{i,t} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{z}_{i,t-1} + \eta_{i,t} \tag{B1}$$

Consistent with Vuolteenaho (2002), Callen and Segal (2004), and Callen, Hope, and Segal (2005), the VAR coefficient matrix **A** is assumed to be constant over time and over firms. The error term vectors  $\eta_{i,t}$  are vectors of shocks and are assumed to have a variance-covariance matrix  $\Omega$  and to be independent of all variables known at t-1.

We estimate a parsimonious VAR where the state variables consist of log stock returns ( $r_t$ ), log of one plus ROE (earnings scaled by book value of equity), and the log

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Note that if past returns have no impact on roe so that  $\beta_1 = 0$  then roe<sub>t</sub> is AR(1) as before and the conservatism ratio equals one minus the persistence of earnings (1- $\beta_2$ ) as before.

book to market ratio (bm<sub>t</sub>).<sup>51</sup> The VAR model can then be described as a system of (mean-adjusted) equations:

 $r_{t} = \alpha_{1}r_{t-1} + \alpha_{2}roe_{t-1} + \alpha_{3}bm_{t-1} + \eta_{1t}$ (B2a)

 $roe_{t} = \beta_{1}r_{t-1} + \beta_{2}roe_{t-1} + \beta_{3}bm_{t-1} + \eta_{2t}$ (B2b)

 $bm_{t} = \delta_{1}r_{t-1} + \delta_{2}roe_{t-1} + \delta_{3}bm_{t-1} + \eta_{4t}$ (B2c)

We estimate the regressions separately by industry<sup>52</sup> (using the Fama and French (1997) classifications) using weighted least squares with one pooled regression per state variable. Each annual cross-section is weighted equally by deflating the data for each firm-year by the number of firms in that year.<sup>53</sup> Consistent robust standard errors are obtained using the Shao-Rao (1993) jackknife method.

As shown by Campbell (1991), the variance decomposition of these valuation models can be implemented empirically by combining the residuals from the VAR estimation with the unexpected current return valuation equation [equation (1)]. Formally, let  $ei\rho = (0, ..., 1, ..., 0)$ , where the 1 is in the i'th position. The unexpected change in returns is computed as:

$$\mathbf{r}_{t} - \mathbf{E}_{t-1}(\mathbf{r}_{t}) = \mathbf{e}\mathbf{1}\rho\boldsymbol{\eta}_{1t} \tag{B3}$$

Equation (A1) implies that forecasts of the state vector  $z_{i,t}$  can be computed as:

$$E_{t}[z_{i,t+1+j}] = A^{j+1} z_{i,t}$$
(B4)

Using equation (A4), the revision in expected future returns (expected return news) is computed as:

$$\Delta E_{t} \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^{j} r_{t+j} = E_{t} \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^{j} r_{t+j} - E_{t-1} \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^{j} r_{t+j}$$

$$= e \Gamma \rho (I - \rho A)^{-1} \eta_{i,t} = \lambda_{1} \eta_{i,t}$$
(B5)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> The book to market ratio is included in the parsimonious VAR because our model is generated from this ratio. Vuolteenaho (2002) similarly includes the book to market ratio in his VAR specifications. It also controls for the firm's growth prospects.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Industry subscripts are suppressed in above equations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> Using OLS gives similar results.

Similarly, the revision in expected current and future earnings (earnings news) is computed as:<sup>54</sup>

$$\Delta E_{t} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^{j} (roe_{t+j} - i_{t}) \equiv E_{t} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^{j} (roe_{t+j} - i_{t}) - E_{t-1} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^{j} (roe_{t+j} - i_{t})$$

$$= e2^{(I - \rho A)^{-1}} \eta_{i,t} = \lambda_{2} \eta_{i,t}$$
(B6)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> Following Vuolteenaho (2002), Callen and Segal (2004), and Callen, Hope and Segal (2005), we assume that  $\rho$ =0.967. The results are not sensitive to this assumption.


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


Figure 1 shows the linear relation between revisions in equity returns and earnings news when accounting reports are the sole source of news for equity market participants. The numbers in the figure are obtained from Scenarios 1 and 3. Note that dollar earnings news numbers in the SCENARIO tables are converted to percentages in this and subsequent figures by dividing the dollar earnings news by beginning of period book value of equity. Hence, the earnings news in the figure equals the sum of the unexpected changes in ROE as per footnote 28.

Figure 2- The Relation between Revisions in Equity Returns and Earnings News Information from Accounting and Non-Accounting Sources




Figure 2 shows the nonlinear convex relation between revisions in equity returns and earnings news when equity market participants are privy to firm news from non-accounting sources as well as accounting reports. The numbers in the figure are obtained from Scenarios 1 and 4.




Figure 3- The Relation between Revisions in Equity Returns and Special Items

Figure 3 shows the nonlinear quasi-convex relation between revisions in equity returns and special items. The numbers in the figure are obtained from Scenarios 1 and 4. Note that we convert the dollar special item numbers in the SCENARIO tables to percentages by scaling special items by beginning of period book value of equity. By assumption, the book value of the asset is less than undiscounted future cash flows from -Y to the origin on the vertical axis, so that special items are zero (the asset is recoverable) as illustrated by Scenario 2. The 45 degree (dashed) line going through the origin facilitates comparison with Figure 1.

## **Table 1: Descriptive Statistics**

	Mean	Std. dev.	Q1	Median	Q3
MV	1,220	7,603	36	119	520
ROE	0.102	0.171	0.045	0.122	0.188
BM	0.846	0.920	0.391	0.645	1.017
RET	0.191	0.527	-0.144	0.104	0.405
SI	-0.013	0.082	0.000	0.000	0.000
CR	0.525	0.553	0.269	0.407	0.573

# Notes to Table 1:

Table 1 shows the sample distribution for selected variables where Std. Dev. is the standard deviation and Qi denotes the i'th quartile. **MV** is market value of equity in millions of dollars. **ROE** is the book return on equity computed as earnings before extraordinary items (DATA 18) divided by beginning of period book value of equity (DATA 60). **BM** is the book-to-market ratio. **RET** is the annual cum dividend return computed from monthly returns. **SI** is special items (DATA17) scaled by lagged book value of equity. **CR** is the conservatism measure computed as the earnings surprise divided by earnings news. The number of firm-year observations is 86,600 (CR is based on 69,962 observations).

# Table 2: VAR Estimation and News Summary Statistics

I and A.	I and A. VAN Coefficient Matrix					
	RET <sub>t-1</sub>	ROE <sub>t-1</sub>	BM <sub>t-1</sub>			
RET <sub>t</sub>	-0.020*	0.098***	0.097***			
	(0.01)	(0.017)	(0.007)			
ROEt	0.064***	0.486***	-0.021***			
	(0.004)	(0.021)	(0.003)			
BM <sub>t</sub>	0.112***	0.196***	0.837***			
	(0.01)	(0.024)	(0.008)			

Panel A: VAR Coefficient Matrix

Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of News Items

	Mean	Std. dev.	Q1	Median	Q3
Nr	0.003	0.162	-0.090	0.005	0.101
Ne	0.011	0.251	-0.087	0.033	0.146
$r_t - E_{t-1}(r_t)$	0.002	0.376	-0.229	0.009	0.239

**Panel C: Sample Correlations** 

	Ne	Nr	$r_t - E_{t-1}(r_t)$
Ne	1	-0.304***	0.690***
Nr	-0.114***	1	-0.765***
$r_t - E_{t-1}(r_t)$	0.611***	-0.765***	1

Quintile	N <sub>e</sub>	Nr	$r_{t} - E_{t-1}(r_{t})$		
1	-0.35	0.05	-0.36		
2	-0.06	0.06	-0.16		
3	0.03	0.01	0.01		
4	0.12	-0.03	0.16		
5	0.31	-0.07	0.37		

Panel D: Means of Expected Return News and Revision in Returns Ranked by Earnings News Quintile Portfolios

## Notes to Table 2

Panel A of Table 2 lists the parameter estimates of the parsimonious VAR. We estimate the VAR equations by industry (Fama-French (1997) industry classification). Panel A shows the mean estimated parameters across industries and their standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are computed using the Fama-Macbeth (1973) method. The model variables include the mean-adjusted cum dividend annual excess log return,  $r_t$  (the first element of the state vector z); the mean-adjusted log of earnings normalized by prior period book values, roe<sub>t</sub> (the second element); and the mean-adjusted log book-to-market value ratio,  $bm_t$  (the third element). The sample size for the VAR estimation is 86,600 firm-year observations.

The parameters in the table correspond to the following system:  $z_{i,t} = \Gamma z_{i,t-1} + \eta_{i,t}, \qquad \Omega = E(\eta_{i,t}, \eta'_{i,t})$ 

Panel B of Table 2 lists summary statistics of the news items as defined in Appendix B:

Nr = Expected Return News =  $e1^{\rho}\Gamma(I - \rho\Gamma)^{-1}\eta_{i,t} = \lambda_1^{\eta_{i,t}}$ 

Ne = Earnings News = e2`  $(I - \rho\Gamma)^{-1}\eta_{i,t} = \lambda_2 \eta_{i,t}$ 

ei' = (0, ..., 1, ..., 0), where the 1 is in the i'th position. We eliminate the top and bottom one percentile of the news items and the revisions in unexpected returns,  $r_t-E_{t-1}(r_t)$ . Thus, the panel and all subsequent tables are based on 82,398 observations.

Panel C of Table 2 shows the correlations between Ne, Nr, and  $r_t-E_{t-1}(r_t)$ . The revision in unexpected returns is defined in Appendix B as  $r_t-E_{t-1}(r_t)=e1^{+1}\eta_{1t}$ . Pearson (Spearman) correlations are reported below (above) the diagonal.

Panel D of Table 2 lists the means of Ne, Nr, and  $r_t-E_{t-1}(r_t)$ , all ranked by Ne portfolio quintiles.

\*, \*\*\* indicate significance level of 10% and 1%, respectively.

**Table 3: The Relation between Earnings News and Special Items** 

Quintiles			
Quintile	Ν	Ne	SI
1	16,480	-0.350	-0.049
2	16,480	-0.060	-0.008
3	16,479	0.033	-0.003
4	16,480	0.121	0.000
5	16,479	0.311	0.005

Panel A: Means of Special Items and Earnings News (Ne) by Earnings News Quintiles

**Panel B: Regression Results of Special Items on Positive and Negative Earnings** News

Intercept	-0.020*** (0.004)
D	0.059*** (0.001)
Ne	0.048*** (0.002)
D_Ne	0.121*** (0.003)
F-Value	356***
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.15

#### Notes to Table 3

Panel A of Table 4 lists mean earnings news (Ne) and special items (SI) ranked by earnings news quintiles. Quintile 1 is the most negative Ne quintile and quintile 5 is the most positive Ne quintile. Panel B presents the coefficient estimates (standard errors) of the regression of SI on Ne, D and D\_Ne. D is equal to 1 when Ne is negative and zero otherwise. D\_Ne is the interaction of D with Ne. Ne is defined in the notes to Tables 2. The regression is estimated using firm and year fixed effects (not shown). \*\*\* indicates significance level of 1% level (two-sided).

 Table 4: The Relation between Revisions in Unexpected Returns and Earnings

 News, Special Items, Current Period Earnings Shock, and Earnings.

	Ne	SI	CES	ROE
_				
Intercept	0.005	-0.024***	-0.001	0.005
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
$r_{t} - E_{t-1}(r_{t})$	0.748***	0.078***	0.068***	0.070***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Nr	1.067***	0.193***	0.378***	0.377***
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
FNe		, <i>,</i> ,	0.541***	0.530***
			(0.003)	(0.003)
PROE			· · · ·	0.920***
				(0.003)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.63	0.11	0.71	0.78

**Panel A: Linear Specification** 

# **Panel B: Nonlinear Specification**

	Ne	SI	CES	ROE
Intercept	0.010	-0.022***	0.001	0.006
Ĩ	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
D	-0.005***	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$r_{t} - E_{t-1}(r_{t})$	0.728***	0.072***	0.062***	0.065***
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
$D^{*}(r_{t} - E_{t-1}(r_{t}))$	0.029***	0.011***	0.011***	0.010***
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Nr	1.066***	0.192***	0.377***	0.376***
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
FNe	, , ,	· · · · ·	0.541***	0.530***
			(0.003)	(0.003)
PROE			, ,	0.920***
				(0.003)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.63	0.11	0.71	0.78

#### Notes to Table 4

Panel A of Table 4 shows the coefficient estimates (standard errors) of the earnings news (Ne), special items (SI), current period earning shock (CES), and earnings scaled by beginning of period book value of equity (ROE) regressions. FNe is the shock to future earnings (i.e., FNe = Ne - CES). PROE is the predicted ROE from Equation B2b. Ne,  $r_t - E_{t-1}(r_t)$ , and Nr are defined in the notes to Table 2; SI is defined in the noted to Table 1. Panel B repeats the analysis allowing for a nonlinear relation between the dependent variables and revisions in unexpected returns. D equals 1 when revision to unexpected returns  $[r_t - E_{t-1}(r_t)]$  are negative (0 otherwise). The regressions are estimated using firm and year fixed effects (not shown). \*\*\* indicates significance level of 1% level (two-sided).

Table 5: The Relation between the Conservatism Ratio and Unexpected Revisions inEquity Returns

Netul IIS			
	N	CR	$r_{t} - E_{t-1}(r_{t})$
$r_t - E_{t-1}(r_t) > 0$	37,722	0.466 (0.388)	0.288 (0.23)
$r_t - E_{t-1}(r_t) < 0$	32,240	0.593 (0.439)	-0.289 (-0.22)
Difference		0.127*** (0.051)***	

Panel A: Mean (Median) Conservatism Ratio for Positive and Negative Unexpected Returns

Panel B: Regressions of Conservatism Ratio (CR) on Proxies for Positive and Negative News

	Predicted Sign	(1)	(2)
Intercept	?	0.510***	0.657***
		(0.041)	(0.048)
D	?	0.160***	0.160***
		(0.007)	(0.007)
$r_{t} - E_{t-1}(r_{t})$	-	-0.405***	-0.405***
		(0.013)	(0.014)
$D^{*}(r_{t} - E_{t-1}(r_{t}))$	+	0.945***	0.954***
	_	(0.020)	(0.020)
ROE	?		0.157***
			(0.025)
SIZE	?		-0.025***
			(0.004)
LOSS	+		0.036***
			(0.010)
SI	-		-0.096***
			(0.034)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>		0.06	0.06

## Notes to Table 5

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Panel B of Table 5 shows the coefficient estimates (standard errors) of the regressions of CR on good and bad news (and control variables). CR is defined as the ratio of the current period earnings shock to total earnings news. SIZE is the log of market value of equity. LOSS is an indicator variable equal to one if earnings are negative (zero otherwise). All other variables are defined in previous tables. The regressions are estimated using firm and year fixed effects (not shown). \*\*\* indicates significance level of 1% level (two-sided).