Ten-month-old infants infer the value of goals from the costs of actions

Authors: Shari Liu*^{1,3}, Tomer D. Ullman^{1,2,3}, Joshua B. Tenenbaum^{2,3}, & Elizabeth S. Spelke^{1,3}

5 Affiliations:

- ¹Department of Psychology, Harvard University
- ²Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- 8 ³Center for Brains, Minds, and Machines (CBMM)
- 9

1 2

3 4

10 *Correspondence to: shariliu01@g.harvard.edu

11

12 **Abstract:** Infants understand that people pursue goals, but how do they learn which goals

- 13 people prefer? Here, we test whether infants solve this problem by inverting a mental model of
- 14 action planning, trading off the costs of acting against the rewards actions bring. After seeing an
- agent attain two goals equally often at varying costs, infants expected the agent to prefer the goal
- 16 it attained through costlier actions. These expectations held across three experiments conveying
- 17 cost through different physical path features (jump height and width; incline angle), suggesting
- 18 that an abstract variable, such as 'force', 'work' or 'effort', supported infants' inferences. We
- 19 model infants' expectations as Bayesian inferences over utility-theoretic calculations, providing a
- 20 bridge to recent quantitative accounts of action understanding in older children and adults.
- 21

One Sentence Summary: Infants use the amount of work or effort an agent is willing to expend,
 to determine the value of the agent's goal.

24

25 Main Text:

26 When we observe people's actions, we see more than bodies moving in space. A hand reaching 27 for an apple is not just one object decreasing its distance from another; it can indicate hunger (in 28 the person who is reaching), helpfulness (if the person is reaching on behalf of someone else) or 29 compromise (if the person reaching would prefer a banana, but not enough to go buy one). This 30 fast and automatic ability to interpret the behavior of others as intentional, goal-directed, and 31 constrained by the physical environment is often termed 'intuitive psychology' (1-4). Here, we 32 use behavioral experiments and computational models to probe the developmental origins and

32 use benavioral experim33 nature of this ability.

Over the past two decades, research has revealed that the building blocks of our intuitive psychology are present as early as the first year of life. Despite infants' limited experience, their interpretations of other people's actions are guided by assumptions about agents' physical properties (5), intentions and goals (6), mental states (7-10), causal powers (11), and dispositions to act efficiently (7, 12, 13). This wealth of findings does not reveal, however, whether infants' capacities depend on a host of distinct local abilities (14-16), or on a single coherent system supporting inference, prediction, and learning (3, 17-19).

- Here, we tackle this question in a case study, based on a computationally precise proposal
 for a coherent, abstract, and productive system for action understanding (Fig. 1). Previous studies
- 43 suggest that infants are sensitive to the costs of agents' actions (3, 7, 12, 13), and can infer
- 44 agents' preferences (6, 9). Decision theorists for hundreds of years have recognized these as the
- 45 two central factors guiding the decisions of rational agents (20–22). Here we ask whether infants

1 can integrate these dimensions to infer agents' goals: Do infants use the cost that an agent

2 expends to attain a goal state in order to infer the value of that goal state for the agent?

3 [Fig 1 here]

Such an inference has been proposed to rest on three nested assumptions that together constitute a "naïve utility calculus" (23), analogous to classical economic thinking. First, agents act to maximize their utility U, under constraints (2, 4, 24, 25). Second, this utility separates into rewards and costs, two distinct components that can be individual targets of inference (26). That is, if R(S) is the reward of a goal state S, and C(A) is the cost of an action, then an agent acts to maximize the following:

10

$$U(A,S) = R(S) - C(A).$$
 (1)

11 Third, the cost of an action is not arbitrary but depends in general on properties of both the agent 12 and the situation they are in, which determine how much effort the agent might need to exert to 13 carry out that action.

These assumptions can be formalized as generative models that successfully predict the quantitative and qualitative behavior of adults and older children (*4*, *23*, *26*). In these models, observers who reason that other agents are maximizing their expected utility according to Eq. 1 can use what they know about rewards and costs to predict the agents' future actions. Inverting this process, observers can use the agents' overt actions to infer their hidden rewards and costs, according to:

20 $P(R, C | A) \propto P(A | C, R) \cdot P(R, C)$, (2) 21 where P(R, C | A) is the posterior distribution over the rewards and costs of an agent. By Bayes' 22 theorem, this distribution is proportional to the product of P(A | C, R) — the likelihood of the agent 23 choosing action A given rewards R and costs C, given by a rational planning procedure (4, 23) 24 —and P(R, C), a prior distribution over costs and rewards.

25 Do infants apply the logic of cost-reward reasoning? Past research suggests that infants 26 are sensitive to the relative value of different goal objects for an agent who chooses to approach 27 one object over another (6, 27) as well as the relative efficiency of the actions taken by an agent 28 who approaches a goal object (12, 13, 28). Past studies do not reveal, however, whether infants 29 have a unified intuitive psychology in the form of a generative model, or separate representations 30 for variables like cost and reward that become unified only later in development, as children gain 31 experience exerting themselves to achieve goals or communicating with others about their 32 desires and actions. It is also an open question whether infants consider cost and reward in terms 33 of abstract variables, such as work, effort, desire or value, or whether their understanding is 34 restricted to perceptual features of actions, such as the distance or duration an agent travels, or 35 the number of times it selects a particular goal. In physical action contexts, effort often covaries 36 with perceptible properties such as the length or duration of a path traveled, but it depends 37 ultimately on the amount of force that the agent must exert over time and distance (i.e., the 38 amount of work the agent must do). Likewise, value often covaries with the number of times 39 agent selects a goal, but ultimately depends on how strongly the agent desires a goal relative to 40 the cost of achieving it or its value relative to other options.

We designed and conducted three experiments to test whether infants learn about the reward agents place on goals from cost, working backwards from the assumption that agents maximize utility and inferring relative rewards from observed actions under varying costs. We then use the data from these experiments, together with the findings from past experiments (*6*, *7*, *13*), to test a variety of computational models of infants' performance, including models with integrated versus isolated, and abstract versus cue-based, representations of costs and rewards 1 (see model description in Supplementary Materials). Our empirical and computational findings

- 2 support the view that a productive system grounded in costs-reward tradeoffs guides action3 understanding toward the end of the first year of life.
- 4 [Fig 2 here]

5 We tested N = 80 ten-month-old infants in three experiments with pre-specified designs, 6 procedures, sample sizes, and analysis plans (29). In all experiments, infants first saw an agent 7 move to and refuse to move to each of two target goals under conditions of varying cost. Then 8 infants watched test events in which the agent chose either the higher or the lower value target 9 when both were present at equal cost. If infants infer the reward of the targets to the agent from 10 the effort undertaken to reach them, and then they should be more surprised when the agent 11 chooses the lower value target, looking longer at the test trials displaying that action (30).

12 In Experiment 1 (N=24), we leveraged events widely used in studies of early action understanding, wherein animated characters jump efficiently over barriers of variable heights to 13 arrive at goal objects (3, 7, 13, 31), and indicate their preferences by selecting one goal over 14 15 another (6, 9). During familiarization, infants watched six trials consisting of four different 16 events involving a central agent and one of two target individuals on a level surface (Fig. 2A; 17 Movie S1). In each event, the target jumped and made a noise, and the agent responded by 18 turning to face and beginning to approach the target, whereupon a barrier fell onto the stage 19 between directly in the agent's path. On two of these events (one for each target), the agent 20 looked to the top of the barrier, made a positive "Mmmm!" sound, backed up and then jumped 21 over the barrier, landing next to the target. On the other two events, the agent looked to the top 22 of the barrier, made a neutral "Hmmm..." sound, backed away, and returned to its initial position. The critical distinction between these events concerned the height of the barrier, and 23 24 therefore the length, height, and speed of the jump that the agent undertook so as to clear it (all jumps were equated for duration). For one target, the agent jumped over a low barrier and 25 26 declined to jump a medium barrier; for the other target, the agent jumped the medium barrier and 27 declined a tall barrier. After this familiarization, the agent appeared between the two equidistant 28 targets on a level surface. Infants viewed two pairs of looped test events (Fig. 2D-2E, Movies 29 S4-5), order counterbalanced, in which the agent looked at each of the targets and then 30 repeatedly approached either the higher or the lower value target. Our pre-specified dependent 31 measure was average log-transformed looking time (32) across test trials; we predicted 32 differential looking at the test events but did not pre-specify the direction of this difference.

33 Infants looked longer at test trials in which the agent chose the target for whom it had 34 jumped a lower barrier (M=28.41s, SD=14.85), relative to the target for whom it had jumped a higher barrier (M=21.79s, SD=12.29) (Fig. 3), 95% CI [0.062, 0.591], B=0.327, SE=0.130, 35 36 $\beta = 0.502$, t(24) = 2.523, p = .019, two-tailed, mixed effects model with random intercept for 37 participant (30). These findings suggest that infants inferred the rewards that the central agent placed over the targets from the cost the agent was willing to expend to reach these targets, and 38 39 they therefore expected the agent to choose that target at test. Nevertheless, Experiment 1 does 40 not show whether infants used the physical effort undertaken by the agent, or variables that 41 merely correlate with effort (e.g. distance, speed), in their predictions.

42 [Fig 3 here]

To control for distance and speed of travel, Experiment 2 (*N*=24) used ramps of three different inclines to convey cost (Fig. 2B; Movie S2). On each familiarization trial, a target appeared on the top of one ramp, and the agent looked up the ramp and either climbed to the target or returned to its starting position. The agent climbed the shallow ramp and declined to

1 climb the medium ramp for one target, and climbed the medium ramp and declined the steep 2 ramp for the other target. The methods were otherwise the same as in Experiment 1. Consistent 3 with our pre-specified directional prediction, infants again looked longer at the test events in 4 which the agent approached the lower value target (M=30.94s, SD=13.31) than the higher value 5 target (M=27.05s, SD=17.55) (Fig. 3), 95% CI [0.028, 0.472], B=0.250, SE=0.109, $\beta=0.408$, 6 t(24)=2.294, p=.015, one-tailed (30). This finding further suggests that infants understand 7 agents' actions in accord with abstract, general and interconnected concepts of cost and reward, 8 but narrower explanations remain. In Experiments 1 and 2, the agent was confronted with an 9 obstacle to its forward motion (a barrier or ramp), and the size of the obstacle covaried with the cost of the agent's action, requiring the agent to move further upward to attain the higher value 10 11 target. Because infants become sensitive to the effects of gravity on objects' on inclined planes 12 well before 10 months of age (33), they may learn that agents will move to greater heights or 13 overcome higher obstacles for more rewarding targets, without invoking a more abstract representation of physical effort. Experiment 3 was undertaken to explore these interpretations. 14

15 In Experiment 3 (N=32), the agent was separated from each of the two targets during familiarization not by an obstacle but by a horizontal gap in the supporting surface (Fig. 2C, 16 17 Movie S3). Infants first saw a ball roll off the edge of a narrow, medium, and wide gap, and shatter (Movie S6). During familiarization, these three trenches, requiring jumps of variable 18 19 lengths and speeds but of equal durations and heights, were interposed between the agent and 20 target; the agent moved to the edge of a trench, looked at the far side, and then jumped over a 21 narrow trench for one target (and refused the medium trench), and a medium trench for the other 22 target (and refused the widest trench). The methods were otherwise unchanged (Fig. 2E, Movie S5). The methods and analyses for Experiment 3 were preregistered at https://osf.io/k7yjt/ (29) 23 24 and tested the same directional prediction as Experiment 2. Infants again looked longer at the 25 lower value choice (M=23.05s, SD=13.58) relative to the higher value choice (M=17.47s, 26 SD=10.69 (Fig. 3), 95% CI [0.020, 0.501], B=0.260, SE=0.119, $\beta=0.403$, t(32)=2.185, p=.018, 27 one-tailed (30).

28 Regardless of whether an agent cleared higher barriers (Exp. 1), climbed steeper ramps 29 (Exp. 2) or jumped wider gaps (Exp. 3) for one target over the other, infants expected the agent 30 to choose that target at test. Across all experiments, infants looked longer at the lower value action (M=26.99s, SD=14.13) than the higher value action (M=21.64s, SD=13.94), 95% CI 31 32 $[0.139, 0.415], B=0.277, SE=0.070, \beta=0.424, t(80)=3.975, p<.001$, one-tailed, mixed effects 33 model with random intercepts for participant and experiment, supporting our general hypothesis 34 that infants infer the values of agents' goals from the costs of their actions. Although past 35 research had shown that infants represent the goal of an agent's action from observations of an 36 agent's choices between two objects (6) and expect agents to give different emotional responses 37 when agents complete versus fail to complete their goals (31), the present experiments provide 38 evidence that infants develop ordinal representations of reward even when the number of choices 39 and expressed emotions are equated across the actions and only the costs of the actions vary. 40 Moreover, they show that infants do not simply attribute higher reward to goals that agents pursue for a longer duration or attain with greater frequency, because these variables were 41 42 equated as well. The findings provide evidence for longstanding suggestions that infants 43 represent physical cost as a continuous variable that agents seek to minimize (3, 13): Infants 44 make appropriate cost assessments even when the specific physical features that distinguished 45 lower- from higher-cost actions, including the relative length, curvature, duration or speed of a motion trajectories, systematically varied. Together, Experiments 1-3 suggest that infants 46

represent cost and reward as interconnected, abstract variables that they apply to a wide range ofevents.

3 The discovery that infants infer the rewards of goals from the costs of achieving them 4 provides empirical support for the thesis that an abstract and productive system guides infants' analysis of agents and their actions (3, 17, 19). Specifically, we suggest that the cognitive 5 6 machinery supporting infants' intuitive psychology includes a mental model both of how agents 7 plan actions in the forward direction, in accord with maximizing their utilities (Eq. 1) (23), and a 8 procedure for inverting this model, in accord with the computational framework of inverse 9 planning (Eq. 2) (4). Applying this general framework to our specific experiments, we posit that infants have developed a model of action planning prior to the experiment: they assume that 10 11 agents value some goal objects more than others, and to engage in costlier actions to achieve 12 goals with higher reward. When the infants see the agent take costlier actions to arrive at one target than at another, they invert this model to infer the relative reward of the two targets to that 13 agent. Then when they see the agent flanked by the two targets in a situation where costs are 14 15 equal, they apply their knowledge of the targets' relative value to the agent to run their planning model for that agent forward, predicting the target that it will approach. We have implemented 16 17 this hypothesis in a computational model that accounts not only for the findings of the present experiments but also for a range of past studies of early action understanding (6, 7, 13). 18 Furthermore, we compared this model to an array of simpler models that focus only on relative 19 20 costs or rewards in isolation, or on particular cues to effort or value. We find that the only the 21 full model with abstract variables for costs and rewards can account for all of the findings (Fig. 22 S3: see Supplementary Material for details).

23 The present studies raise key questions for future research. First, the cognitive 24 architecture underlying infants' assessment of cost remains to be explored. Our experiments 25 suggest that infants are responding to an abstract notion of cost, rather than specific physical path 26 features such as vertical motion (controlled for in Exp. 3), horizontal motion (controlled for in 27 Exp. 1), or raw path length (controlled for in Exp. 2). We do not know, however, whether infants 28 represent the abstract costs of actions by drawing on a concept of experienced effort or exertion 29 within the domain of naïve psychology, or by leveraging an intuitive concept of force or work 30 done (i.e. the integral of force applied over a path) from the domain of naïve physics (34, 35), or perhaps both. Next, our experiments investigated only one class of goal states and target-directed 31 32 actions, leaving open the breadth and generality of infants' intuitive psychology. In particular, 33 cost can be defined in terms of work or effort to produce physical forces, but there are other 34 kinds of costs: Agents could consider variables like the mental effort of planning (36, 37) and the 35 risks of choosing certain actions, neither of which involves applications of force. It is an open 36 question whether these other variables trade off against reward in infants' intuitive psychology 37 the way that physical work or effort does. Lastly, our studies do not speak to the origins of these 38 abilities. Although 10-month-old infants cannot perform the actions from our experiments or 39 communicate with others about them, their productive system for reasoning about costs and 40 rewards may arise through their experiences observing the actions of other agents or performing actions within their repertoire, such as lifting their arms or balancing their bodies against the 41 42 force of gravity. Alternatively, this system of intuitive psychology may guide infants' action 43 understanding from the beginning. Testing these possibilities would address fundamental 44 questions concerning the nature, origins, and interrelations between our intuitive psychology and

45 intuitive physics.

However these questions are answered, the present study suggests that our propensity to understand the minds and actions of others in terms of abstract, general and interrelated concepts begins early. Before human infants learn to walk, leap and climb, they leverage mental models of agents and actions—forward models of how agents plan, and inverse models for working backwards from agents' actions to the causes inside their minds.


7 References and Notes:

6

- F. Heider, M. Simmel, An experimental study of social behavior. *Am. J. Psychol.* 57, 243–259 (1944).
- 10 2. D. C. Dennett, *The Intentional Stance* (The MIT Press, London, 1987).
- G. Gergely, G. Csibra, Teleological reasoning in infancy: The naïve theory of rational action. *Trends Cogn. Sci.* 7, 287–292 (2003).
- C. L. Baker, R. Saxe, J. B. Tenenbaum, Action understanding as inverse planning.
 Cognition. 113, 329–349 (2009).
- 15 5. R. Saxe, T. Tzelnic, S. Carey, Five-month-old infants know humans are solid, like
 inanimate objects. *Cognition*. 101, B1–B8 (2006).
- A. L. Woodward, Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor's reach. *Cognition*.
 69, 1–34 (1998).
- G. Gergely, Z. Nádasdy, G. Csibra, S. Bíró, Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. *Cognition.* 56, 165–193 (1995).
- K. H. Onishi, R. Baillargeon, Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs? *Science*.
 308, 255–8 (2005).
- 9. Y. Luo, R. Baillargeon, Do 12.5-month-old infants consider what objects others can see
 when interpreting their actions? *Cognition*. 105, 489–512 (2007).
- Y. Luo, S. C. Johnson, Recognizing the role of perception in action at 6 months. *Dev. Sci.*12, 142–149 (2009).
- P. Muentener, S. Carey, Infants' causal representations of state change events. *Cogn. Psychol.* 61 (2010), pp. 63–86.
- A. E. Skerry, S. E. Carey, E. S. Spelke, First-person action experience reveals sensitivity
 to action efficiency in prereaching infants. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A.* 110, 18728–33
 (2013).
- 32 13. S. Liu, E. S. Spelke, Six-month-old infants expect agents to minimize the cost of their
 33 actions. *Cognition*. 160, 35–42 (2017).
- A. L. Woodward, Infants' grasp of others' intentions. *Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci.* 18, 53–57 (2009).
- M. Paulus, Action mirroring and action understanding: an ideomotor and attentional
 account. *Psychol. Res.* 76, 760–7 (2012).
- 38 16. C. M. Heyes, C. D. Frith, The cultural evolution of mind reading. *Science*. 344, 1243091 (2014).
- 40 17. E. S. Spelke, K. D. Kinzler, Core knowledge. Dev. Sci. 10, 89–96 (2007).
- 41 18. J. B. Tenenbaum, C. Kemp, T. L. Griffiths, N. D. Goodman, How to grow a mind:
 42 statistics, structure, and abstraction. *Science*. 331, 1279–1285 (2011).
- 43 19. R. Baillargeon, R. M. Scott, L. Bian, Psychological Reasoning in Infancy. *Annu. Rev.*44 *Psychol.* 67, 159–186 (2016).
- 45 20. D. Bernoulli, Exposition of a new theory on the measurement of risk. *Econometrica*. 22, 23–36 (1954).

- 1 21. J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism* (Oxford University, 1863).
- 2 22. J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Clarendon Press, 1879).
- J. Jara-Ettinger, H. Gweon, L. E. Schulz, J. B. Tenenbaum, The Naïve Utility Calculus:
 Computational Principles Underlying Commonsense Psychology. *Trends Cogn. Sci.* 20, 589–604 (2016).
- C. G. Lucas *et al.*, The child as econometrician: A rational model of preference
 understanding in children. *PLoS One*. 9 (2014), doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092160.
- 9 25. A. Jern, C. Kemp, A decision network account of reasoning about other people's choices.
 10 *Cognition.* 142, 12–38 (2015).
- J. Jara-Ettinger, H. Gweon, J. B. Tenenbaum, L. E. Schulz, Children's understanding of
 the costs and rewards underlying rational action. *Cognition*. 140, 14–23 (2015).
- Y. Luo, R. Baillargeon, Can a self-propelled box have a goal? Psychological reasoning
 in 5-month-old infants. *Psychol. Sci.* 16, 601–608 (2005).
- 15 28. G. Csibra, G. Gergely, S. Bíró, O. Koós, M. Brockbank, Goal attribution without agency
 16 cues: The perception of "pure reason" in infancy. *Cognition*. 72, 237–267 (1999).
- Detailed methods and analyses from the experiments reported in this paper are available in
 the Supplemental Materials.
- 1930.Prior to conducting Exp. 1, we were unsure whether infants would express their20expectations by longer or shorter looking at the unexpected event, and so we pre-specified21a two-tailed alpha. After Exp. 1, however, we had strong reason to believe that infants22would look longer at the test actions that they found less probable, and so we pre-specified23(for Exp. 2) and pre-registered (for Exp. 3) one-tailed tests and report these numbers in the24text. However, results of all three experiments were also statistically significant by two-25tailed tests, with p=.031 and p=.036 for Exp. 2 and 3, respectively.
- A. E. Skerry, E. S. Spelke, Preverbal infants identify emotional reactions that are
 incongruent with goal outcomes. *Cognition*. 130, 204–216 (2014).
- 32. G. Csibra, M. Hernik, O. Mascaro, D. Tatone, M. Lengyel, Statistical treatment of
 looking-time data. *Dev. Psychol.* 52, 521–536 (2016).
- 30 33. I. K. Kim, E. S. Spelke, Infants' sensitivity to effects of gravity on visible object motion.
 31 *J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform.* 18, 385–393 (1992).
- 32 34. E. Téglás *et al.*, Pure reasoning in 12-month-old infants as probabilistic inference. *Science* 33 (80-.). 332, 1054–9 (2011).
- 34 35. T. D. Ullman, E. Spelke, P. Battaglia, J. B. Tenenbaum, Mind games: Game engines as an architecture for intuitive physics. *Trends Cogn. Sci.* xx, 1–17 (2017).
- 36 36. A. Shenhav *et al.*, Toward a Rational and Mechanistic Account of Mental Effort. *Annu.* 37 *Rev. Neurosci.* 40, 99–124 (2017).
- 38 37. W. Kool, S. J. Gershman, F. A. Cushman, Cost-Benefit Arbitration Between Multiple
 39 Reinforcement-Learning Systems. *Psychol. Sci.* 28, 1321–1333 (2017).
- 40 38. B. Foundation, Blender (2016), (available at blender.org/download).
- 41 39. J. Pinto, XHAB64 (1995).
- 42 40. R. M. Casstevens, jHab: Java Habituation Software (2007).
- 43 41. R. D. C. Team, R: A language and environment for statistical computing (2015),
 44 (available at https://www.r-project.org/).
- 45 42. D. Bates, M. Mächler, B. Bolker, S. Walker, Fitting linear mixed-effects models using
 46 lme4. J. Stat. Softw. 67 (2015), doi:10.18637/jss.v067.i01.

1 2	43.	R. Nieuwenhuis, M. te Grotenhuis, B. Pelzer, Influence.ME: Tools for detecting influential data in mixed effects models. <i>R J.</i> 4 , 38–47 (2012).
2	44.	H. Wickham, ggplot2: Elegant graphics for data analysis (Springer-Verlag, 2009).
3 4	44. 45.	G. Gergely, H. Bekkering, I. Király, Rational imitation in preverbal infants. <i>Nature</i> . 415 ,
5	45.	755 (2002).
6	46.	A. N. Meltzoff, Understanding the intentions of others : Re- enactment of intended acts by
7	40.	18-month-old children. <i>Dev. Psychol.</i> 31 , 838–850 (1995).
8	47.	Y. Mou, J. M. Province, Y. Luo, Can infants make transitive inferences? <i>Cogn. Psychol.</i>
0 9	4/.	68 , 98–112 (2014).
9 10	48.	T. Kushnir, F. Xu, H. M. Wellman, Young children use statistical sampling to infer the
10	48.	preferences of other people. <i>Psychol. Sci. a J. Am. Psychol. Soc. / APS.</i> 21 , 1134–1140
11		
	40	(2010). C. Caibra, S. Dírá, O. Kaáz, C. Carachy, One year old infants was talaslasiasl
13 14	49.	G. Csibra, S. Bíró, O. Koós, G. Gergely, One-year-old infants use teleological
14 15	50.	representations of actions productively. Cogn. Sci. 27, 111–133 (2003).
	30.	A. Jern, C. Kemp, in <i>Proceedings of the 36th {A}nnual {C}onference of the {C}ognitive</i>
16 17	51	<i>{S}cience {S}ciety</i> , P. Bello, M. Guarini, M. McShane, B. Scassellati, Eds. (2014).
17	51.	J. Hamlin, T. Ullman, J. Tenenbaum, N. Goodman, C. Baker, The mentalistic basis of
18 19		core social cognition: experiments in preverbal infants and a computational model. <i>Dev.</i>
	50	Sci. 16, 209–226 (2013). S. Bussell, B. Namig, Artificial Intelligences, A. Madarm, Approach. Third edition (2014).
20	52.	S. Russell, P. Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, Third edition (2014).
21	53.	R. Sutton, A. Barto, Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction. <i>MIT Press. Cambridge</i> ,
22	E 1	Massachusetts (1998).
23	54.	N. D. Goodman, V. K. Mansinghka, D. M. Roy, K. Bonawitz, J. B. Tenenbaum, Church: a
24		language for generative models. Uncertain. Artif. Intell. (2008).
25		
26		
27	A	
28	Acknowledgements: All authors wrote the paper, S.L. designed the experiments and collected	
29	and analyzed the data under the direction of E.S., and T.U. built the computational models under the direction of LT. This material is based upon work supported by the Center for Proing. Minds	
30	the direction of J.T. This material is based upon work supported by the Center for Brains, Minds	
31	and Machines (CBMM), funded by National Science Foundation STC award CCF-1231216, and	
32	by a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship under grant DGE-1144152. We	
33	thank the families who volunteered to participate, and A. Aguirre, R. Guzman, C. Kerwin, N.	
34 25	Kalra, and H. Tarr for research assistance. All data, analyses, and materials from the experiments	
35		nodels reported in this paper are archived on the Open Science Framework at
36	nttps:	://osf.io/mykph/.



1 2 Fig. 1. A schematic of our computational model. The forward direction (A) defines the agent as a 3 rational planner that calculates the utilities of different actions from their respective costs and 4 rewards, and then selects an action stochastically in proportion to its utility. In this case, the 5 overall utility for approaching Triangle is higher than for approaching Square, so the central 6 agent (Circle) will likely choose Triangle over Square. An observer (B1) assuming this model 7 and some priors over the costs of different actions, can (B2) observe a series of actions and then 8 (B3) infer a posterior distribution over the hidden values of an agent's costs and rewards given 9 its actions. These posteriors can then be used to (B4) predict the actions of the agent in a new situation, in which the same goal states can be reached by different actions. 10 11

12






Fig. 2. Structure of Experiments 1-3. During familiarization (A-C), the central agent (Circle) 3 accepted a low and refused a medium cost for the lower value target (in this case, Square), and 4 accepted a medium and refused a high cost for the higher value target (Triangle). Other than the

5 sizes of the barriers, ramps, and trenches, and the consequent trajectories of motion, the pairs of

- 6 events displaying approach or refusal of approach to the two targets were identical. At test (D-
- 7 E), the agent looked at each of the two targets and chose either the lower or higher value target. 8 White circles indicate start- and end-points of action, and white lines indicate trajectories.
- 9
- 10






Fig. 3. Boxplots of average looking time towards the higher and lower value choice during test in 3 Experiments 1-3. White diamonds indicate means, with error bars indicating within-subjects 4 standard errors. Horizontal lines indicate medians, boxes indicate middle quartiles, and whiskers 5 indicate points within 1.5 times the interquartile range from the upper and lower edges of the 6 middle quartiles. Light grey points connected across boxes indicate looking times from 7 individual participants. Beta coefficients indicate effect sizes in standard deviations, and 8 asterisks indicate significance relative to pre-specified (Experiments 1-2) and pre-registered 9 (Experiment 3) alphas (*<.05). See text and SM for statistical analyses.

- 10
- 11
- 12