



Religious Nationalism in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

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Abstract

This thesis explores a new political phenomenon in the Middle East - the reconciliation of nationalism and Islamism by Islamic political parties in the context of nation states. Although the concept of religious nationalism has been discussed substantially before, as for example in Juergensmeyer (1993: 40) where the author defines religious nationalism as "*the attempt to link religion and the nation-state*", this work highlights that a new brand of religious nationalism has emerged in the Middle East as the result of the intertwining of nationalism and Islamism. The focus of this study is, therefore, on the development of religious nationalism in the continuously tumultuous region of the Middle East. The aim of this research is to investigate whether Islamism in Kurdistan is limited by the politics of nationalism, which is an accentuated example for the whole Middle East region.

Furthermore, it should be noted that many of the religious nationalists themselves have not yet fully acknowledged the existence of the trend of merging between Islamism and nationalism. For instance, although the position of the Muslim Brotherhood of Kuwait, during the liberation of their state from the Iraqi regime, is a clear example of religious nationalism, all other affiliations of this organisation around the world at that time viewed the military operation as a foreign occupation. Highlighting this historical juncture in the political life of the Middle East by studying the Islamism in the Kurdistan region helped to elaborate on this new type of politics exceptionally well. This is essentially due to the absence of a politically recognised nation state which renders Kurds to be particularly susceptible to various manifestations of nationalism. The key finding of this project was, therefore, the notion that Islamism in Kurdistan has become significantly framed by the politics of nationalism.

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Acronyms

GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
IGC	Iraqi Governing Council
IIGC	Iraqi Interim Governing Council
IIP	Iraqi Islamic Party
IMIK	Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Sham, also known as: ISIL = Islamic State in Iraq and Levant
ISUK	Islamic Students Union of Kurdistan
KCP	Kurdistan Communist Party
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party
KIG	Kurdistan Islamic Group, also Known as: KIK = Kurdistan Islamic Komal (Group)
KIL	Kurdish Islamic League
KISL	Kurdistan Islamic Sisters League
KIU	Kurdistan Islamic Union
KPP	Kurdistan People's Party
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
KSA	Kurdistan Students Association
KSDP	Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party
KSP	Kurdistan Socialist Party
KSU	Kurdistan Students Union
KTP	Kurdistan Toilers' Party
LC	Leadership Committee
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
ME	Middle East
MP	Member of Parliament
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
RN	Religious Nationalism
SG	Secretary General
USA	United States of America
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Introduction

A significant political transformation has occurred, and continues still, among the political parties in the Middle East. Among these parties, the Islamic political parties are particularly affected by this phenomenon. As this thesis demonstrates, the Kurdistan Islamic Union in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is a particularly clear example of this political transformation.

The Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) was established in 1994, with its tenets based fundamentally on the ideology and strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, over the last few years, a significant transformation has occurred with respect to the political aims and objectives of this party. In this context, the present study focuses on Middle Eastern Islamic political parties in general, but on the Kurdistan Islamic Union in particular, as an example of a Middle Eastern Islamic Political Party shaped to a formidable degree by the ongoing transformation of the regional political landscape.

Background of the study:

In the late era of the Ottoman Empire, two kinds of nationalism emerged in the Middle East. First, a secular nationalism, such as the Kemalist nationalism in Turkey that originated in secular movements and has preserved its character until the present time. Second, a nationalism propagated by non-secular religious figures with neither its movements nor the leaders of these movements being secular. It is worth noting in this regard that Kurdish nationalistic

movements were led by men such as Shaikh Ubaidullah Nahri, Shaikh Saaid Peeran, Shaikh Mahmood Hafeed, and Mullah Mustafa Barzani who were all highly influential religious figures. However the second type of nationalism, which the Kurdish nationalistic movements were part of, either disappeared, or eventually were transformed into fully-fledged secularism. Thus, the situation emerged in which *“few Islamists have followed the logic of Islamic community as against the nation, and few nationalists have not accorded religion a place of honour in the attributes of the nation”* Zubaida (2004: 404).

After the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) by Al-Banna in 1928 in Egypt, another type of political movement came into existence in the Middle East. This movement, with its emphasis on Islamic teachings and their proliferation, was fundamentally different from both abovementioned types of nationalism. However, despite having branches all over the Middle East, by the 1990s, it became clear that the Muslim Brotherhood had failed to achieve its goals. Therefore, significant changes were observed in the tendencies and strategies of the movement. Together, these changes gave rise to a phenomenon representing yet another type of nationalism: neo-religious nationalism. The existing body of evidence supporting the notion of the existence of a new type of nationalism in the region makes a proper examination particularly important. Furthermore, the majority of the previously conducted works, especially MA dissertations and PhD theses, dealing with Kurdish Nationalism focused on its history, without paying much attention to emerging religious strands within the Kurdish nationalistic movements.

Significance of the Study:

It has been indicated that there is a clear absence of research regarding religious nationalism within the context of Kurdish nationalistic movements. This, together with the necessity to examine the phenomenon of religious nationalism as an emerging political force in the region, then constitutes the rationale behind the decision to research this pertinent topic through a PhD thesis. Finally, this study can be perceived as being a part of a much larger effort to understand how nationalism and religion have been influencing each other during the last few decades.

The Aim of the Study:

This study aims to explore the principles and factors governing the spread and political impact of religious nationalism in the Middle East. This will be accomplished by conducting a form of case study where the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) is evaluated and examined as a political manifestation of religious nationalism. It is apparent that the KIU was, originally, ideologically influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood. The manner in which the Muslim Brotherhood was established, and the way in which it operated, was very different from that of nation state nationalism. However, the Brotherhood soon became a representative umbrella organisation of pan-ideological political parties, spanning not only the Arab world but establishing branches in many other countries in the Islamic world. The strategy of the MB included focussing on the inner development and transformation of Muslim individuals, Muslim families, Muslim societies and Muslim governments in the line with specific Islamic

teachings, with the ultimate goal of uniting the lands inhabited by Muslim majorities into an Islamic caliphate.

The argument that this thesis presents, and then intends to substantiate with evidence, is based on the assertion that at this point there are two kinds of nationalisms active in the Middle East: the secular nationalism and the religious nationalism. This thesis examines the latter that is represented here by the KIU. The essence of the argument is that although many of the political parties within the Muslim Brotherhood, including KIU, have adopted similar political tools and strategies, in reality, many of the political parties that have subscribed to religious nationalism do not, necessarily, strive to create the Islamic caliphate - the ultimate goal of the MB. Indeed, despite the fact that all of them are religious, and accordingly share some form of loyalty, these parties, nevertheless, represent religious nationalism and thus have aims on a national level specific within their states. In other words, each of these parties makes every effort within the framework of its nation state. With respect to the KIU, I am examining the party's nationalistic aims and objectives. Furthermore, I will also analyse the perspective of the KIU's representatives regarding an array of Kurdish standpoints which make the KIU different from other political parties in Iraq. This is particularly relevant when comparing the KIU with the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) which operates in a very similar ideological framework.

However, regardless of the degree to which their values are shared, the KIU has had many disagreements with the IIP over a plethora of significant issues – such as the case of Kirkuk. Many differences between other MB nationalist-religious parties can be highlighted in this regard – for example, the differences between the stance of the two abovementioned parties concerning the invasion

of Iraq in 2003 and the rest of parties under the MB. Similarly, the position of the MB in Kuwait differed substantially from the viewpoint of all the other MBs over the Iraqi invasion of 1990. The foregoing thus constitutes evidence of the dominance of the 'national' aspect of religious nationalism in many parties subscribing to political Islam. Another example of this pragmatic religious nationalism, prior to the on-going Syrian civil war, was the relationship of the Syrian government with Hamas and the Egyptian MB on one side, and the Syrian MB on the other.

The focus of this research is to highlight the gradual shift from Islamism to religious nationalism in the Middle East through a case study. It seems from the outset that the political motivations of KIU are, like those of all similar movements in the region, framed in terms of their own nation states. However, the KIU is different from similar religious nationalist movements, given the factor of the non-statehood of Kurdistan. On the other hand, for all other comparable religious nationalist movements, this is a common model of the nation state in the region. Hence, the '*levels of identity*' that Huntington (1993: 24) talks about can be easily observed with regard to the KIU and the case of Kurds in Iraq. The research question and the related hypothesis are covered in more detail in Chapter Three in section 2. 2. 4.

This thesis is structurally divided into two parts. Part one includes Chapters One, Two and Three. Part two comprises Chapters Four, Five, Six, Seven and Eight. Each chapter starts with its own introduction, detailing the subjects covered. Essentially, Chapter One presents the theoretical framework, Chapter Two covers the literature review and methodology, Chapter Three deals with historical backgrounds (from embracing Islam to the dawn of religious

nationalism), Chapter Four discusses the De-Facto Kurdistan Region and the Rise of Religious Nationalism, including some data analysis. Chapters Five, Six and Seven thoroughly cover the method of data analysis and discuss its results, as follows: Chapter Five deals with Islam and the KIU, Chapter Six focuses on democracy and the KIU, Chapter Seven covers nationalism and the KIU, and finally, Chapter Eight concludes the whole thesis.

Structure:

The thesis comprises eight chapters. Part one consists of the first three chapters. Chapter One is introductory, covering the background and scope of the study, its purpose and rationale, and religion and nationalism, including: nation, nationalism, Islam and nationalism and Kurds and nationalism. Other relevant subjects such as national identity, religious nationalism and its common types are also covered in this chapter. Chapter Two encompasses the literature review and the methodology, comprising the participants, methods, rationale of the research methods, research question and hypothesis, pilot study, materials and challenges. Chapter Three covers the periods beginning with embracing Islam until the dawn of religious nationalism. It includes Islam in Kurdistan, the role of Kurds during the Islamic eras, the Kurds in the post-Ottoman Empire (from its collapse) – from Kurdish religious nationalism to its dichotomy into religious groups and nationalists, the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic awakening in Kurdistan, and Kurdish nationalism. Political issues such as the rise of Marxism and socialism, political parties and social rebellion, other Islamic movements and groups, radical jihadism and terror in Kurdistan, de-radicalisation, and Salafis are also covered.

Part two deals with data analysis and discussion. The analysis of the data is based on twenty-six themes that highlight the area examined by my hypothesis. Chapter Four contains subjects such as: from revolution to governance, the Kurdistan front and the 1992 election, self-ruling and challenges, the struggle for power and civil war, the emergence of the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the *raison d'être* and role of the KIU, the KIU and the political outcome, elections, ethno-politics and the KIU, and the KIU's second political phase. Chapter Five is dedicated to discussion of the themes of universalised Islam (Umma), Islamic caliphate, Muslim Brotherhood, sacredness, Shari'ah, preaching and politics, and Muslim-Muslim conflicts and rights. Chapter Six deals with democracy, theocracy or civil sovereignty?, Islamism versus secularism, and role of women. Finally, chapter Seven explores Kurdish or Muslim?, nationalism, nation state, reform, *realpolitik*; which includes KIU's politics in the Kurdistan region, Baghdad, and towards other parts of Kurdistan.

Part One

Chapter One

Theoretical Framework

Religious Nationalism and Islam

1.1 Introduction:

This introductory chapter will focus on the background, scope, purpose and rationale of the study, with the main part concentrating on the theoretical framework. The principal argument here will conclude that religion and nationalism have gone through various turbulent relationships. However, in a region such as the Middle East, and in the shadow of a religion such as Islam and the different ethnic groups that believe in Islam, nationalism and religion have eventually reconciled and both are currently aiming at serving different nation states. This phenomenon is a new kind of religious nationalism. In this part of the chapter the following subjects are covered: nation, nationalism, religion and nationalism, national identity, religious nationalism, neo-religious nationalism, Islam and nationalism, and Kurds and nationalism.

Despite the fact that religions can inspire great service and sacrifice for the sake of humanity, conflicts that arise from religious ideology often result in a good deal of bloodshed and can be considered as some of the most dangerous clashes to occur on earth¹. This is attributed to their adherents' vehement belief

¹Religion has been a major feature in some historical conflicts and the most recent wave of modern terrorism. Woodlock, R. (2013).

in the conflict being a true cause, as well as their willingness to sacrifice everything for the sake of God, including their lives, as stated by Aslan (2010: 82):

"When Pat Robertson, American premier evangelical preacher, heard about the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, he was convinced it was part of God's master plan for the region.' *This is God's land*' Robinson declared, '*and God has strong words about someone who parts and divides His land. The rabbis put a curse on Yitzhak Rabin when he began cutting up the land*'.

This deeply rooted idea of self-sacrifice for the religious cause manifests itself in the bomber's belief that his actions are done for the sake of God. His measure for this becomes quantitative whereby, in order to maximize reward from God and to attain the highest honour in paradise, it is necessary for him to kill as many people as possible. This is not necessarily limited to the killing of non-Muslims in an occupied Muslim land, but can also include fellow Muslims in a mosque. This follows a similar rationale to that expressed by the rabbi (see above quote) in the assassination of Rabin.

The purpose of this study is neither to provide any form of religious authentication or judgment, nor to validate any political behaviour or ideology. It will, however, sometimes highlight the religious motives underlying particular political behaviours from the perspective of religious nationalists. Thus, the subject of this thesis is religious nationalism. More specifically, it will focus on the role of both religion and nationalism in political thought through investigating the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) as a core example. This thesis is about the new wave of religious nationalism amongst the Kurds, which is represented by

the KIU in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. It will explore the different roles of both nationalism and religion in the KIU as exemplified through an investigation of its political development and political behaviour. For the above mentioned reasons, the KIU is the most relevant case in order to achieve the aims of this study.

1.2 Background:

When the KIU began as a political party in 1994, it was the only non-militant, peaceful, civil political party working alongside all other political parties whilst simultaneously disregarding matters related to ideology. This situation was all the more poignant in that the KIU's peacefulness existed as a stark contrast to the backdrop of civil war that was occurring between other main political parties, who were fighting between themselves. On one hand there existed brutal fighting between the Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). On the other, the on-going battle between the PUK and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) that continued from 1994 till 1998 resulted in a division of the region into two sub-regional territories. Meanwhile, all the main political parties were splintered between both sub-regions, and the KIU remained as the only wide spread party in the whole region. Continuation of the KIU on its peaceful means of conducting its politics made it the second party in each sub-region of the PUK and KDP. Consequently, KIU not only became a model for IMIK and the bigger dissident of it, the Kurdistan Islamic *Komal* (Group) (KIK), but also a model for the dissidents of the PUK too. Thus, in 2009, they formed Change (*Gorran*) movement.

In contrast to other Islamists in Kurdistan, the KIU was and still remains the only religious nationalist party that started by balancing its politics between religion and nationalism and then shifted from pan-Islamism into religious nationalism. As a party its work centres on both the people in the nation state and the Iraqi-Kurdistan region. Not only was its first statement issued on the day of its proclamation on 06/02/1994 illustrative of this, but the party's practices throughout both the Islamist versus non-Islamist tension, and secular-secular party tensions are also indicative of these priorities. As Aslan (2010: 24) highlights "*the real threat to global security comes from the rise of religious trans-nationalist movements, such as Jihadism, which cannot be contained within any territorial boundaries*". In the Kurdistan region within this time period all other organised Islamists were jihadists who were largely inspired by the jihadist movement of either Afghanistan or the Islamic republic of Iran, thus placing little to no attention on the nationalist demands of the Kurds. However, the KIU became a model for other Islamists and non-Islamists entities insofar, as abovementioned; it was able to maintain a balance between religion and nationalism. Currently both KIK and IMIK are emulating the KIU through practicing a political civil life following their de-radicalisation post-2003. Nevertheless KIU remains as the pioneer amongst the various parties in terms of its nationalism objectives. In its general congress in May 2012 it aimed to adopt self-determination² and striving for an independent nation state as its strategy, thus making it the first and the only Kurdish political party up until that moment to have publicly called for such a nationalist demand. It is therefore

² Also, in the last congress in May 2016, the KIU reiterated the self-determination right for the people of Kurdistan in an independent national state of Kurdistan.

pivotal in a discussion related to religion and nationalism in Kurdistan and the influences this has on the political landscape.

Kurdistan's lack of statehood renders the KIU's transformation and nationalist focus as more obvious, especially when contrasted with other non-Kurdish MB cases in the Middle East (ME). For the MBs in Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, or Syria, as they have no problem of statehood, it is more possible for them to deny their religious nationalism and their motivations as being largely centered around working for their own nation states, whereas Kurdish parties are unable to do so consequent of their primary focus in acquiring statehood. The KIU is also often criticised for not only its transformation from Islamism to a religious nationalism, but its call for the right of a nation state. Subsequently in some cases such as that of Syria, the Syrian MB denies nation rights for Syrian Kurds, whereby the ongoing call for federalism within the state of Syria from Syrian Kurds continues up until this day. Meanwhile, on the other hand, the KIU are enjoying federalism in Iraqi-Kurdistan. For example, only recently their latest party's general congress enhanced its political demand through calling for an independent nation state.

However the KIU as a group, and subsequently the Kurdish call for statehood, are oftentimes not considered by other MBs as Islamic causes. This is especially evident when the situation is compared with that of Hamas in Palestine and the support engendered for Hamas by all other MBs regarding its call for an independent state. Arguably this is a result of the occupied party (the Palestinians) as being occupied by non-Arabs and non-Muslims (Israel); whereas the opposing parties for Kurdish independence, on the other hand, include Arab, Muslim countries. This can be in part attributed to the Kurds'

demands for their nation rights as being perceived as an attempt to further weaken other Islamic states. In short, although the MBs call for the rights of Palestinians using Islamic support as their basis, the Kurdish case is not viewed through the same lens and so garners no status as an Islamic case. This double standard can be furthermore seen in the support of Islamist parties as Islamic cases in other Arab countries, bar the Kurdish case. Apart from their support to Hamas in Palestine, many other examples of the support of the Arab Islamists to other non-Kurdish freedom fighters have been seen during the so-called Arab spring, such as the support of the MB and the Salafis given to the Syrian fighters against *Asad*.

Other examples of Islamists who supported Islamic cases include *Abdullah Azam*, the mentor of Bin Laden, who was a MB that dedicated himself for the Jihad in Afghanistan. Even though these events took place at the same time as the ethnic cleansing, chemical bombardment and genocide operations of the Kurds in the *Anfal campaign* under Saddam Hussain, the Kurds received no support from a single *mujahid* and the Iraqi regime was in no way condemned for its massacre of the Kurds.

1.3 Scope of the Study:

Throughout the Middle East there has been a huge political transformation, especially amongst the various political parties. Islamic political parties have, in particular, been heavily influenced by the shifting political landscape. This study will focus on this transformation with an emphasis on the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, which is believed to be reflective of

this on-going shift. Through a focus on this case study, the thesis will explore to what extent an examination of the Kurdish phenomenon with its specific features elucidates this region-wide process.

The KIU was established in 1994. Initially its ideology and strategies were based on that of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). However, over the last few years the party has undergone a significant transformation in regards to its political aims and objectives.

There has been little research on religious nationalism in Kurdish Politics. Most of the previous work (especially MA and PhD dissertations) on Kurdish Nationalism focuses on historical political movements with little analysis of the religious nature of these movements. In this context, I feel that an investigation of Kurdish religious nationalism (RN) is relevant. This research will also be useful insofar as it will offer both a point of comparison and contrast between similar phenomena throughout the region.

A limitation of this study is the relationship between Islamism and Nationalism in Kurdistan. In Kurdistan, the KIU is a special paradigm for many reasons, unique in character, and is a phenomenon throughout the whole ME region. It is a representative case of transforming from Islamism into nationalism.

1.4 Purpose of the Study:

This study aims to examine the newly emerged political phenomenon that is the intersection and subsequent interaction of both religion and nationalism in Kurdistan. This will be explored in light of similar Islamists in the Middle East.

This study will argue that the Kurdish example is illustrative of a new kind of religious nationalism, one that differs from the conventional religious nationalism that was observed in the last century. The case study for this project is the KIU in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, and aims at exploring the case of the KIU in light of it being a new form of religious nationalism. To understand this new phenomenon, it is necessary to explore the traditional definition of Religious Nationalism, which necessitates a general overview of the basic concepts.

1.5 Rationale of the Study:

The significance of this project can be highlighted in the following manner:

1) Religion has had a deep influence on the Middle East, evidenced by the many Islamic empires, which existed in the region over the last 13 centuries, until the end of the Ottoman Empire. Kurds, in oneway or another, were part of this history. Now, increasingly the phenomenon of Islamism generally and religious nationalism specifically as a combination of religion and nationalism in the political arena is worth such a project. Especially, since there is no clear cut academic research highlighting the combination of religion and nationalism in Kurdistan.

2) Despite the foundation of Israel in 1948 as a religious, nationalist state, a sense of nationalism was growing among the Islamic movements. The establishment of Israel as a religious nation kind of provoked the Islamists. Hence, their Islamic dimension was increasing as a reaction to that. However, since the 1990s, the nationalist dimension of many Islamists has begun to grow.

Understanding this phenomenon among the Kurdish Islamists is extremely important.

3) Looking back at the era of nationalism in the Middle East, particularly from the 1950s onwards, there were two paths of movement, nationalism on one side, and Islamism on the other. However, today there is a juncture between the two. For instance, in the new Iraq³, you cannot distinguish between the two, as almost all the Arab political parties, especially the majority (Shiias), are religious and nationalists at the same time. This phenomenon is particularly important in the case of Kurdish nationalism. Kurdish nationalism is not yet distinctive in the region because it has not yet come to fruition as a nation state. In Kurdistan, religious nationalism has grown side-by-side with the nationalist movement. Understanding this in the Kurdish political arena is the task of this thesis.

4) Finally, the significance of this study for its target audience, such as researchers of the Middle East, diplomats, political science students, Islamism and political Islam, Kurdish studies, religious nationalism, and similar situations is valuable, because it highlights a new phenomenon which is expanding over the region, especially in the margin of the growing democracy.

The emergence of a new wave of religious nationalism in the region of the Middle East is completely different than the nationalist and religious movements of the last century. Zubaida (2004: 413) states: "*Pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism have been dreams and aspirations, while the territorial nation-state is the only concrete political reality, as nation and as state. But there are many forms of articulations between territorial nationalisms and Islam*". Investigation of this

³The term 'new Iraq' refers to post Saddam's regime which is supposed to be a democratic Iraq.

issue will enhance our understanding of the social politics of the region. This phenomenon has especially grown in the shadow of the Arab spring. Furthermore, it will aid in understanding how nationalism and religion influence each other. More importantly, in the Kurdish case, all three elements of nationalism, religion, and working towards statehood are still new, and the Kurdish followers of religious nationalism show more eagerness than any other example, except the Palestinian case.

1.6 Religion and Nationalism:

Before stepping into the subject of religious nationalism, first, and briefly, nation and nationalism need to be examined.

1.6.1 Nation:

Smith (2003: 24) defines a nation as “*a named human population occupying a historic territory and sharing common myths and memories, a public culture, and common laws and customs for all members*”. According to this definition, the Ottoman⁴, for example, would have been considered as a nation in light of this definition. Nonetheless, ideas surrounding the exact definition of the term

⁴ Marsh (2008: 101) “throughout almost its entire history from the 13th to the early 20th centuries, for example, the Ottoman Empire was ordered along religious lines, not national ones. In fact, there was no national identity per se, with all Muslims enjoying the same rights and privileges no matter what their ethnic background. Turkic, Arabic, Slavic, or so on. All non-Muslims (*dhimmi*) in the empire, meanwhile, were placed by the Sublime Porte into a confessional community, or millet. This system provided a high degree of tolerance for ethnic differences and even religious diversity and worked well for hundreds of years”.

'nation' have shifted throughout history according to the way in which various nations have been formed⁵. Nebez (2002: 8) states:

“The Arabic word of *Ummah*, which the Arabs currently use as equivalent to the European word of nation, similar to the word of *Al-Qawm* which existed before the appearance of Islam, and it has been mentioned 67 times in Quran, of which 13 times in a plural form. However, it seems that this word basically had no political meaning. Rather it was referring to a community with reference to a particular religion. This will be clarified by the following Quranic verse: ‘*and we certainly sent into every nation a messenger*’ meaning we have sent to every religious community a prophet”.

Furthermore, the concept of *Ummah* is explicitly clear from the constitution of *Madina*, that was written by the prophet Muhammad, and the word *Ummah* is referred to as citizens or the community of the diverse state of *Madinah*. This is evident in article 30 of the constitution “the Jews of *BanuAwf* shall be considered a community along with the believers”⁶. In the actual Arabic text the word community is referred to as *Ummah*.

For example, when the *Kemalists* rebuilt Turkey on the basis of Turkish racialism and named it Turkey, the land adopted a sense of exclusiveness whereby it became the land and nationhood of the Turks. Through doing so there was an explicit denial of all other ethnic groups, languages and cultures, including their scripts and pronunciations. All citizens were forced to accept this

⁵Bonikowski, B., 2016, “meanings attached to the nation vary within and across populations as well as over time”.

⁶The Constitution of Medina: First constitution of Human history. Online: (www.constitutionofmadina.com/?page_sid=8).

new nation, which considered all the citizens of Turkey as Turks, thus neglecting other ethnic identities⁷. This ideology of the Kemalists dated back to the late Ottoman era in second half of the 19th century, which was when the idea of Turkification first came to exist amongst the Turkish elites, an idea that would later pave the way for a Turkish nationalism. Eventually this idea was successfully attained and subsequently manifested through an attempt to assimilate all other groups. This policy of a nation based on ethnicity also existed in other regions in the Middle East and was promoted by similar minded nationalists. Hence the concept of nation after the Ottoman Empire referred to ethnic groups and this currently remains the case throughout the region. Although the Sykes Picot agreement hugely helped in creating nation states throughout the Middle East, this new system was unable to unite many Arab nation states on the basis of their heavily entrenched existing notions of nationalism and ethnic exclusivity.

1.6.2 Nationalism:

Nationalism as Smith (2003: 24) states is:

“...commonly used in several senses, most notably to refer to sentiments, on the one hands, and ideologies and movements, on the other hand. Here, I shall restrict its meaning to the latter, and define nationalism as an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity, and identity on behalf of a population

⁷“Article 66 of Turkey’s constitution: 1- everyone bounds to the Turkish state through the bound of citizenship is a Turk”.

some of whose members deem it to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'".

During the later stage of the Ottoman Empire nationalism was perceived as the engine that would generate modernity. Unlike the case of Europe, however, nationalism in the Middle East resulted in weak, fragmented nation states. Nations such as the Kurds were left behind with no equal rights as a result of nationalist movements, and so nationalism in this sense was neither the vehicle for modernity nor a mean for stability in the region. On the contrary, it led to sentiments and extremism between various ethnic groups that later caused disastrous ethnic wars and tensions. In short, nationalism emerged in the region as a movement aimed at establishing a greater sense of modernity, but instead shaped itself in the form of political entities with ideological backgrounds. Smith (1987: 18) explains:

"Nationalism, both as ideology and movement, is a wholly modern phenomenon, even if, as we shall see, the 'modern nation' in practice incorporates several features of pre-modern *ethnie* and owes much to the general model of ethnicity which has survived in many areas until the dawn of the 'modern era'".

In a region such as the Middle East, a region that consists of a set of countries rife with underlying ethnic and religious tension, nationalism no doubt would lead to an intense degree of ethnic conflict. Not only this, but the additional tension amongst Arab countries regarding natural resources and borders has in the past led to events such as the invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi regime in 1990. Furthermore, the fanatic fervor and strong ethno-centric sentiment that is often caused by nationalism would only serve to produce further internal

problems. In essence an ethnic-based nationalism, therefore, results in a preference by those in power for those of a given ethnicity, which thus creates exclusivity. This can be seen in the case of various Arab states that necessarily prefer their own people over those of neighbouring countries, a position which is further extended when related to a specific city, a sect, or clan. Ethno-centric sentiments of this nature are well known amongst extreme nationalists, who oftentimes produce many jokes about each other. This mentality sometimes leads to a sense of tribalism, nepotism, kinship, and ultimately oligarchy. The nationalism of the Arab Baath Socialist Party is an example of this, whereby their vision led both Iraq and Syria into funneling down the power into a sense of Iraqism and Syrianism, which then extended into the hands of two sects, clans, family, a man, and then ultimately their sons.

Generally the Middle East has always faced problems en masse regarding secular nationalism. Contrary to the Western nationalism that Smith (2003: 15-16) describes as:

“Nationalism as it appeared in the West was secularizing, if not an outright secular and anthropocentric, doctrine. That was certainly the case with Revolutionary France, for the Hellenic nationalism of Greek intellectuals in Kemalist Turkey, and among several subsequent Marxist nationalisms. These were the official nationalisms of the secular elites and they have loomed large in the discussion of nationalism”.

Unlike nationalism in the West, which was based on secularism and exclusion of religion, this perspective was never accepted by the masses in the Middle East. Even more extreme secular parties such as the Kemalists, who came to power in 1908 through a coup, were unable to abolish the caliphate until 1924.

Overall, therefore, nationalism emerged in the Middle East as a hope for modernisation, but then transformed into anti-colonialism. Nonetheless, there were and still are secular nationalist elites in the Middle East as well as many other Islamic countries. As a result, political elites are in a position where not only can they not implement a more secular approach in their societies, but also for the purpose of remaining in the political arena it is necessary for them to sometimes praise Islam and religious figures as this will deter anger from the mass public. Hence in the Middle East secularism and nationalism are perceived by the people through different lenses. Contrary to Smith (2003: 17)'s remark, people in the Middle East did not realise that "*Nationalism may also appear as rivals and surrogates for traditional religions*". In addition, in many cases even the leaders themselves were religious figures, and the slogans and motivations of nationalist mobilisations incorporated Islamic content.

There do exist, however, some extreme cases in Middle Eastern secular nationalism where the case of nationalism vis-à-vis religion came to the light. In these circumstances oftentimes political elites dealt literally with the cases and so misread Islam, their societies and nationalism⁸. Smith (2003: 17) describes the way in which "*In this model, the nation state replaces the deity, history assumes the role of divine providence, the leader becomes the prophet, his writings and speeches from the sacred texts, the national movement becomes the new church, and its celebratory and commemorative rites take the place of religious ceremonies*".

⁸Werleman (2015) quoted "You can take religion out of the state, but not out of the nation," from Karen Armstrong's *Fields of Blood: the History of Religion and Violence*, when the French colonised Muslim-majority countries, and "the army officers wanted to secularise, but found themselves ruling devout nations for whom a secularised Islam was a contradiction in terms. Undeterred these rulers declared war on the religious establishment".

Although most nationalists would not dare to admit the aforementioned, the rival Islamists have often employed these ideas and behaviours of nationalists. The mainstream Islamists often utilise secular fundamentalism. The hyper-secularism of the Kemalists, in Turkey, for instance, led to the strong Islamism of the AK party and its support by the people. Furthermore, many of the so called '*Takfiris*' expiatory groups have built their ideologies on the ideas and behaviours of secular nationalists, who perceive secularism as a replacement for religion⁹. Yet, overall, in the Islamic World, all nationalist movements, almost always referred to, at least publicly, to Islamic sentiment. For instance, the notion of martyrdom was used in all revolutions, wars and even demonstrations¹⁰. Quite often during such events, one could hear the slogan of '*Allahu Akbar*' (Allah is the greatest) being shouted out emphatically. This has been done regardless of whether a given event was related to a cause dear to secular nationalists or Islamists. In other words, in the Middle East, since the early days of embracing nationalism to the present day, nationalism has never been accepted as a rival or surrogate to Islam.

1.6.3 Religion and Nationalism:

Generally, nationalism in the Middle East - as well as in other places – has, in itself, elements of fanaticism¹¹. In this case, religious elements come into play,

⁹ Ibid "An overwhelming majority of Europeans fighting for IS are being recruited from the most hyper-secular state on the continent: France".

¹⁰ It is obvious to any political observer in Arab countries that all nationalists, Islamists, socialists and even the communists call their killed individuals in their struggle for their cause as martyrs.

¹¹ According to Hayes, nationalism mobilises a 'deep and compelling emotion' that is 'essentially religious'. Like other religions, nationalism involves faith in some external power, feelings of awe

in the sense that similarly to religious exclusiveness, nationalists put often their nations on pedestal. There are many arguments with regard to the relation between religion and nationalism¹². In relation to the purpose of this project, I will shed light on four main relevant arguments; the first two remain the most relevant to this study. The second two arguments will be dealt with under Islam and nationalism.

Firstly, the idea of sacredness that many followers of nationalism subscribe to, such as the idea of sacred land, comes from what Smith (2003: 255-256) mentions:

“Four kinds of cultural resources and sacred foundation, drawn from earlier religious belief-systems, have been of particular importance in this regard:

A myth of ethnic election, the conviction of being chosen for a covenant or mission, or both, by the deity;

A long-standing attachment to particular terrains regarded as sacred and as belonging to the community, and it to them;

and reverence, and ceremonial rites, focused on the flag. Straining a bit to sustain the metaphor, Hayes argued that nationalism has its gods – ‘the patron or the personification of [the] fatherland’; its ‘speculative theology or mythology’, describing the ‘eternal past and . . . everlasting future’ of the nation; its notions of salvation and immortality; its canon of holy scripture; its feasts, fasts, processions, pilgrimages and holy days; and its supreme sacrifice. But while most world religions serve to unify, nationalism ‘re-enshrines the earlier tribal mission of a chosen people’, with its ‘tribal selfishness and vainglory’. Brubaker (2011: 3).

¹² For instance, Brubaker (2011: 1) classifies this relation onto four categories, as he highlighted them in his abstract as follows:

“Building on recent literature, this paper discusses four ways of studying the relation between religion and nationalism. The first is to treat religion and nationalism, along with ethnicity and race, as analogous phenomena. The second is to specify ways in which religion helps explain things about nationalism - its origin, its power, or its distinctive character in particular cases. The third is to treat religion as part of nationalism, and to specify modes of interpenetration and intertwining. The fourth is to posit a distinctively religious form of nationalism”.

A yearning to recover and realize the spirit of one or more golden ages, epochs of communal heroism and creativity;

A belief in the regenerative power of mass and individual sacrifice to ensure a glorious destiny, and the importance of commemorating and celebrating the community and its heroes”.

Normally, the notion of “the chosen people” is heard in reference to the so-called “people of the book,” especially Jewish people. This has even been described in the Qur’an (2: 47) “*O Children of Israel! Remember My Favour which I bestowed upon you and that I preferred you to the ‘Alamin[mankind and jinn (of your time period, in the past)]*”. Similarly, another rank has been mentioned regarding the Muslims in the Qur’an (3: 110) “*Ye are the best community that hath been raised up for mankind. Ye enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency; and believe in Allah*”. With no mention of the rationale behind being good and proud as followers of a certain religion are, might lead to arrogance and racism, and has no humane message that many religions call for. Further, whenever the followers of any religion or nation had this feeling and dealt with others in such a manner, it sparked hatred and isolation.

The idea of sacred land is also one of the used parts of the Abrahamic religions by nationalists. For instance, in Islam, human life is the most sacred and more important than anything else. In a well-known, *Hadith*, the prophet stated that, “*Destroying Kaaba¹³ stone by stone, is less evil than killing a single Muslim*”. This means that whatever is sacred, even as much as Kaaba, to Allah, a

¹³Muslims believe the Kaaba was originally built by Abraham and Ishmael, but the site was re-dedicated by Muhammad and has been reconstructed since. When Muslims pray, wherever they are, they turn toward the Kaaba, and during the hajj, pilgrims walk counterclockwise around it seven times.
(Tate, A., 2014) <<http://www.ibtimes.com/what-kaaba-black-cube-marking-islams-most-sacred-site-sparks-curiosity-1699203>>.

human's life is greater than it. Otherwise, the credibility of the religion should be called into question. The idea of sacred land seems to be the most problematic, because if a nation cannot argue the idea of descending from a chosen people, having a golden era or glorious historical heroes, then they surely must have a land to stick to, a sacred land to be proud of among the other nations. This is actually one of the most controversial and dangerous ideas that might create conflicts between the nations anywhere and anytime. As far as the other three elements¹⁴: (a chosen people, a golden era or glorious historical heroes) are concerned, they are only related to oneself, and are not of much provocation to others. However, the idea of a one nation being entitled to sacred land could lead to intrusion of other lands. The worst case scenario is this intrusion, which leads to on-going apprehension, and the inhabitants of that particular land would continuously feel insecure. Again, even with the ability to regain or occupy the land, the new inhabitants will have the same insecurity, simply because anytime whenever the other nation has the ability to regain the 'sacred land', it would almost definitely do so. This cycle could possibly go on forever. The example of the sacred land of Palestine and the historical claims to it shared by Jews, Christians and Muslims can well represent this argument.

However, the idea of a sacred homeland is not necessarily inherited from the divine religions. Smith (2003:256) stated:

“Alongside the even more widespread attachments to loyalty and region, the idea of a sacred ethnic homeland became prominent among certain ancient peoples, and was transferred, particularly in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, to other lands in much later periods of history. In both cases,

¹⁴Smith (2003: 255-256).

modern nationalists were able to draw on popular traditions and sentiments of chosen peoples and sacred homelands, and integrate them into the nationalist salvation drama, redirecting their primary focus into the political realm”.

In the early stages of Islam, such sacred ethnic homelands were regarded as ‘*Jahilia*’ (ignorance), and Islam abolished all kinds of ideas. Despite what was established in Islamic history, this issue remained unresolved until the introduction of nationalism¹⁵ at the end of Ottoman Empire. Banko (2011) remarked:

“In 1869, the Ottoman government issued the Ottoman Law of Nationality, which defined Ottoman citizenship (*tabi'iyet*) without reference to religion. Without distinction, all Ottoman subjects were defined as Ottoman nationals. Around this same time, Egyptian intellectuals began to spread ideas of territorial nationalisms distinct from an Ottoman identity (*osmanlilik*). According to the work of historian Ussama Makdisi, Syrian Butros al-Bustani in the 1860s distributed pamphlets throughout Syria addressed to his countrymen; these advocated that a secular citizenship be developed, taught and actively practiced. These Ottoman Arabs were influenced by the French concepts of *patrie*, or fatherland, and used *watanto* mean the same - the homeland as the focus of identity, belonging, and duty”.

¹⁵ “The relationship between Islam and nationalism is a very modern one. Historically, all members of the Muslim faith were conceived of as being united into one community of believers, the *Ummah Wahida*. In this *ummah*, one’s particular ethnicity and place of residence were irrelevant, for the common faith in the teachings of Muhammad was what united Muslims together”. Marsh (2008: 103).

Thus, for the Islamic world too, this idea has been derived from a non-religious standpoint¹⁶. As Smith mentioned earlier, it has been transferred from ancient peoples to Judaeo-Christian tradition, then into Islam. Later, in both cases, religion has been used to philosophize and moralise the idea of chosen people and sacred land. This is despite the Islamic texts clarify the message of Islam in this regard, which is liberation from all kinds of similar sentiments that are called the *Jahiliyah*. Also, the Qur'an (49: 13) has stated:

“O mankind! We have created you from a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know one another. Verily, the most honourable of you with Allah are those (believers) who have At-Taqwa [i.e. they are one of the Muttaqun (the pious. See V. 2:2)]. Verily, Allah is All-Knowing and Well-Acquainted (with all things)”.

So, the only scale for being the best is piety, not one's nation or tribe. Hence, there is no one sacred nation, tribe, object, or land, but instead there is only one thing most sacred on earth: human life. When nationalism introduces a chosen people or a sacred land for certain people, then other nations could raise similar ideologies. Then, the next nation would follow in this ideology, and so on.

Thus, none of the [Abrahamic] religions have initially preferred their followers over the others. For example, if the early generations of Muslims considered themselves superior to others, how could they possibly approach them and

¹⁶“With the development of separate states in which Muslims predominated, separate national identities began to emerge alongside the existing Muslim identity, leading to a hybrid religio-national identity, for example, Egyptian Muslims, Libyan Muslims, and Saudi Muslim”. Ibid: (105).

convince them to accept Islam, with having such a barrier in between? Over time, the cultures and attitudes of religious people have changed. Thus, of self-sacredness have been created and used for political purposes. For instance, the aforementioned four sacred foundations have been used by no religious nationalists. Smith (2003: 255- 256) once more highlights:

“Each of these four kinds of cultural resources and sacred foundations has a long history; none of them have been ‘invented’ by nationalists. Of course, the terms in which they have been put clearly differ from those to be found in a pre-nationalist world”.

Sometimes, people subconsciously practice religion in non-religious contexts, as with nationalism. In some cases, nationalism becomes a religion¹⁷, especially to people such as fundamentalists, who look at themselves as the best people, or the chosen ones, or their land as the holy one; this implies it is better than other lands.

A logical question therefore arises whether any religion could claim that it is the best and its followers are the chosen people. Within any religion, the issue of a chosen group, sect, or school of thought has occurred. For example, in Islam, misinterpretation of Quranic verses and other religious texts by nationalists resulted in mass confusion. For instance, when we look from a nationalist perspective at the history of Islam, each Muslim ethnic group by referring to their own glorious martyrs or heroic Muslim leaders could claim that they are the best Muslims according to their role in the Islamic history. Even, sometimes nowadays, some of the secular nationalists blame those Muslim leaders from their own nationalistic point of view, insofar as the historical leaders did not work

¹⁷Brubaker (2011: 3) on Hayes. See footnote 11 above.

for their ethnic group, rather they only dedicated themselves to Islam. However, in that Islamic era, that sort of ideology would hold no meaning or value. The reason is simply because nationalism is relatively a new ideology, and the historical Muslim leaders and scholars did not look at today's issues from a nationalist standpoint. Nationalists might accuse Muslim leaders of having no special attention to their own people, ignoring the different context in which they lived. This is an anachronism, and unbalanced judgment, as nationalists try to weigh these religious values with the nationalist ideology. Smith (2003: 258-259) adds:

“Maintaining a sacred communion of the people requires that its members strive to ensure that their nation continues to be ‘authentic’ or ‘true to itself,’ and this can be achieved only by assiduously cultivating the four kinds of cultural resources that act as ‘foundations’ or ‘pillars’ of national identity, and by continuing to regard them as canonical and holy. Hence, the repeated calls by secular as well as religious nationalists leaders to the members of their nations to be true to their unique national vocation, to love their homelands, to remember their ancestors and their glorious past(s), and to imitate the heroic dead and be prepared to make sacrifices for the happy and glorious destiny of their nation”.

There wouldn't be a problem to do so, as long as other nations or ethnic groups are not affected in the process. However, in the process of trying to prove these grand notions of nationalism, there is almost always direct influence on surrounding nations, which is why nationalists and their ideals of chosen lands never can be ended. The main problem with these “sacred” ideas is that they feed selfish arrogance, which fuels hatred.

Secondly, Kedourie (1971: 76) talks about the relationship between nationalism and religion:

“In Zionism, Judaism ceases to be the *raison d’être* of the Jew, and becomes, instead, a product of Jewish national consciousness. In the doctrine of Pakistan, Islam is transformed into a political ideology and used in order to mobilize Muslims against Hindus; however, this it cannot do, since an Islamic state on classical lines today would be an impossible anachronism”.

Despite all this, it is important to bear in mind that not all Jews are Zionists. When we look at Zionism, Kedourie’s assertion can be valid in regards to the relationship of religion to nationalism¹⁸. To some extent, the Pakistani example cannot fit into the same category of nationalism. He said it must be “in order to mobilize Muslims against Hindus.” Otherwise, assuming that there were no Hindus in India at all, would Pakistan still emerge? Also, for a religion like Christianity or Islam with followers of all races and ethnicity, how and to what nationalism would the religious followers turn to? Of course, last century witnessed the emergence of many religious nationalist states, but nationalism wasn’t the replacement of the religions. Both examples of Pakistan and Israel support this argument, insofar as in these two countries, the religion helped the creation of the nation state. It was therefore not the people turning to nationalism whilst leaving the religion behind. So, in some cases, in order to protect a certain people, religion was used, and religious nationalism was the

¹⁸The Israeli government’s own statistics show that 15% of Israelis are religious. This doesn’t stop 90% of them claiming that this land has been given to them by God... in whom they don’t believe. (<http://www.biblebelievers.org.au/zionmyth6.htm>).

product. However, this wasn't the case with all the types of nationalism that emerged, especially when more than one nation have the same official religion.

Hence, even in the examples given by Kedourie, such as Israel or Pakistan, nationalism was not the replacement of religion. Conversely, in both cases religion was the key that legitimised the distinction and stepped towards a nation state. However, such religious nationalist states did not necessarily lead to theocracy. Democracy, to a large extent, is practised especially in Israel, and in Pakistan, too. It is practised much more than in Arab secular states such as Syria, for example, or Iraq under Saddam. In all instances of nationalism in the Middle East, whether in secular states or religious nationalist states, religion is still one of the strong mobilisers. Iran under the secular regime of the Shah did not prevent the strong growth of religious mobilisation that brought Khomeini to power. Similarly, the strong nationalism of the Kemalists and their hyper-secularism did not stop Islamism in Turkey.

1.6.4 National Identity:

National identity differs from one nation to another, even if they all officially celebrate one religion. Smith (2003: 24-25) writes, "*As the maintenance and continual reinterpretation of the pattern of values, systems, memories, myths, and traditions that form the distinctive heritage of the nation, and the identification of individuals with that heritage and its pattern*". National identity can be shaped by elements that vary from nation, religion, sect, ethnicity, or geographical area. So, the diversity within one community, nation, or a religion could highlight the national identity. Within this identity is an example of how

diversity is respected and protected. For instance, in Islam, as it has been cited from Ibn Al-Qayyim¹⁹ on Fatwa: Islamic rulings and judgments may change by time, place, and condition. This variation has always existed; otherwise, the gates of dictatorship would have opened. As a part of national identity, culture holds great importance. It is culture that highlights the differences between one nation and another. The differences in culture may be due to religion, ethnicity, territoriality, tribes, sects, and other factors. Smith (2003: 25) comments, “*Two of the nation’s most important cultural resources and traditions are constituted by ‘ethnicity’ and ‘religion’*”. In many cases, within one religion, an ethnic group differs from the others; not all the followers are uniform. Religions clearly have their differences as well. So within one religion, some other aspects may hold greater importance than in the others. Zubaida (2011: 185-186) elaborates “*Ben Badis (d. 1940), a prominent reformist, like other Algerian ulama²⁰ in the first half of the twentieth century, resisted the colonial thrust to make Algeria French with the slogan, ‘Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my fatherland’*”.

Here, a multi-dimensional view of national identity can be observed. For instance, there might be an American, Muslim Arab from an Egyptian ethnic minority. For each of these identities, there is a distinct culture that ultimately creates an identity different from a non-American, Muslim Egyptian. Understanding cultural differences is quite important to realize and to create a distinction between the practices of people of one religion from different cultural perspectives. Akyol (2011) talks about the way that some local cultural practices have been linked to the articles of faith of Islam. He gives an example on his

¹⁹ Elias, Abu Amina, 2014, Ibn Al-Qayyim on Fatwa.

²⁰ *Ulama* is the plural of *Aalim*, which is a scholar.

visit to *Mecca*. He says that he went to visit the holy *Kabaa*, and while he was doing his *Tawaf*, the spiritual circle walk around *Kabaa*, he noticed that men and women were walking shoulder to shoulder, with no separation between them. However, when he left *Kabaa* to have his lunch downtown, he went into a Burger King and noticed that there were two designated areas that physically separated men from women. Then, he remarks, "That is culture." Otherwise, if the issue of separation of men and women was a religious issue in Islam, then from the time of the prophet, they would practice separation in the holiest place, the *Kabaa*. Akyol concludes that there are various Muslim cultures that have different practices, but if one person was to look at any one of them, they might conclude that one society is representative of Islamic society as a whole. Hence, in Muslim nations, each culture comes from different traditions that constitute their unique national identities, which are more often different from one another. There is no contradiction between holding more than an identity. So, religious nationalism can be the crossroads of religion and nationalism within different ethnicities of a religion.

1.6.5 Religious Nationalism:

When it comes to ideologies and religious rhetoric, neo-religious nationalism has a different stance than that of a secular one. This is clearly different than a pure, religious vision with no political integration. Rather, this stance has given nationalists anew political vision, which can be considered as political toleration and pluralism. On the other hand, even with the same ideology of Religious Nationalism (RN) and sharing of Islamic principles, once it comes to political differences, there would be a pure political vision which disregards the religious

or ideological principles. In a sense that the religious nationalists are disregarding the notion of Islamic nation (*Ummah*), and dealing with the situation on the bases of the current de-facto nation states. Thus, the whole idea of sanctity, either from a nationalist or religious point of view, can be argued. Even in religion, the idea of sanctity of many things, like the holy land or a holy person has been created by the people. Otherwise, humanity must be the focus of the religions²¹ or, the idea of sanctity, in both cases, will undoubtedly lead to hatred and ultimately end in war over which people believe in the “true” sacred entity.

We looked at nationalism and its sacred elements that were derived from divine religions into Judaeo-Christian tradition, and recently, into Islam, too. In some cases, Smith remarks, “Ethnos would appear to be more suited to cultural rather than biological or kinship differences; it is the similarity of cultural attributes in a group that attracts the term ‘ethnos’ (1987:21).” For long periods of time, the Ottoman Empire was able to rule many different ethnic groups on the basis of the general Islamic culture that brought Muslims and non-Muslims together. Zubaida (2011: 24) states:

“The thinkers Abdulkarim Soroush and Mohsen Kadivar in Iran, and Ali Bulac and his associates in Turkey, as well as Hizb al-Wasat in Egypt, have argued that Islam is not essentially about the state, but about the community (*Umma*). They proceed to identify the community with a “civil society” of actively participating citizens. Some Islamists in exile, such as Tunisian writer Rashid Ghanoushi, echo this theme”.

²¹When we say the religions, we refer to the Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam).

This was seen in different places over various periods of time in many religions and cultures. For instance, as Smith (1987: 23) mentions:

"In Yugoslavia, where the Muslims of Bosnia have decided to adopt the name 'Muslim' as an ethnic designation in the Yugoslavian census, which requires everyone to name their nationality. This, in spite of the fact that many such Bosnian Muslims no longer adhere to the beliefs and practices of Islam. Yet they identified themselves, and were identified by others, by reference to their religious origins (the fact that they had been Muslims) in a society where nationality and religious affiliation were closely intertwined, preferring this identity as their emblem than the name of the province they had so long inhabited".

This is a well-defined example of religious nationalism. When a religion is subject to oppression, then the sense of affiliation to the religion grows, by both religious and non-religious individuals. However, when the oppression is towards nationality or ethnicity, then almost all people will agree on the basis of nationalism. A good example is that of Kurdish nationalism, where we can see that the oppressors are other Muslim ethnicities; it is quite obvious that the nationalist movement will appeal to both secular and religious people alike.

Juergensmeyer's (1993: 40) definition for religious nationalism is a "means to attempt to link religion and the nation-state". However, neo-religious nationalism in the Middle East does not look to establish or run a state on the basis of this definition. It is not like the last century's examples of religious nationalist states, such as Pakistan, Israel, Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia Herzegovina, which were founded on the basis of a particular religion to have a state for that given people and/or religion.

From the last century's perspective on religious nationalism, we come across the following kinds that Juergensmeyer (1996: 1-2) classifies as:

A. **Ethnic Religious Nationalism:** "This kind of nationalism is linked to people and land. I use the term "ethnic" in this context to refer to communities bound by race, history or culture, who feel opposed or limited within an old social order and who wish to establish a political identity of their own, usually in a geographical region of their own (1996: 1-2)." The previously mentioned examples of religious nationalisms (Pakistan, Israel, Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina) fall in this category - national identity connected to religion, and state formation based on it".

B. **Ideological Religious Nationalism:** "This second kind of nationalism is attached to ideas and beliefs." In a multi-ethnic state like Iran, after the Revolution of 1979, [First name here] Khomeini established the Islamic government on the basis of the notion in Shiasm of "*Wilayat al-faqih*." This disregarded the different ethnicities that were living in Iran. Thus, the strength of Khomeini's success came not from a particular ethnicity, but from the majority of Shia Muslims that comprised the Iranian nation and believed in his ideology. This kind of religious nationalism, whether it is in the framework of a state, like the Iranian one, or is spread over many states, like the Muslim Brotherhood, has the same kind of ideology vis-a-vis western secular nationalism. Juergensmeyer declared, "Religious nationalists are now rejecting the

ideological underpinnings of western secular nationalism, the faith in reason and the social contract expressed by the ideologues and by theorists such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Locke, and replacing it with a new ideological framework of their own, one that combines traditional religious beliefs in divine law and religious authority with the modern notion of the nation-state”.

C. Ethno-ideological Religious Nationalism: “A third form of religious nationalism, which one might call "ethno-ideological" combines the other two and is both ethnic and ideological in character.” Hamas in Palestine and the KIU in Kurdistan could be considered examples of this kind of religious nationalism”.

The examples of religious nationalism vary from a place to place or from one time to another. The aforementioned example of the former Yugoslavia, where people wanted to be called Muslim rather than any ethnic name comes from people feeling that their religious identity is in danger. . However, when a nationality is in danger, people will emphasize their nationality, but this doesn't necessarily mean forgetting their religion (and vice versa). This is well-understood as protection of oneself and the identity that one belongs to. Sometimes, people prioritize and protect both their religion and nationalism. This is not a contradiction. (Smith, 2003: 9) notes:

“It is usual to see in nationalism a modern, secular ideology that replaces the religious systems found in pre-modern, traditional societies. In this view ‘religion’ and ‘nationalism’ figure as two terms in the conventional

distinction between tradition and modernity, and in an evolutionary framework that sees an inevitable movement whether liberating or destructive-from the one to the other”.


In truth, one can argue that in many cases, such as in Israel, Pakistan, the former Soviet Muslim-populated client states, and Bosnia, nationalism protected religion. However, for other examples, such as the Arab countries, as well as Kurdistan, Islamism has appeared as a reaction to secular nationalism.

1.6.6 Neo-Religious Nationalism:

There is a new, growing wave of religious nationalism (RN) in the Middle East. This is a result of having political parties within the framework of the territorial nation states of the ME that were initially rejected by the Muslim Brotherhood, which, according to their political strategy, they were ultimately aiming to have an Islamic caliphate. Therefore, they looked at those many emerged territorial nation states from the legacy of the Ottoman Empire as non-Islamic states. However, since the 1990s, they have changed their behavior in this regard; they have actively gone into these other nation states with complete recognition for their statehood. Since then, the motivation for work within this framework, according to them, is religious, despite the point that the context is a nation state. In other words, for them, their political participations are in the sake of religion and to serve the nation. Thus, to keep their nation state prosperous and safe, it's their religious duty to defend it from any external danger. They would do so even if that danger was coming from a nation with the same official religion and they got help for that protection from a state of a different religion.

An example of this is that of Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion in 1990 and the stance of Kuwaiti MBs on the invasion, as well as the liberation by the US and the western alliance. This phenomenon is one of the more highlighted events in the shadow of the Arab spring. The participation is through a democratic election, where the political demand and fulfilling the political promises is the means of this participation. Thus, the strife and the political participation are within the nation states and for the sake of the people of that particular state and the demands of its people.

Generally, there are political and religious thought transformations among these Islamic political parties. From their perspective on our study of the KIU, there are two circles. The first one contains creeds and worshipping, and the second one contains everything else. The first circle is not negotiable; everything regarding the creed and worship has to be according to Islamic resources. However, for the second circle, which contains everything else, including politics, it is the open circle, unless there it contains something that reflects badly on the first circle. For instance, according to Islamic political parties, how the country should be run is by justice, which is the ultimate Islamic goal of governing. With this, it doesn't matter where the idea of this second circle comes from, in which means it is implemented, or what is it called.



These new and growing ideas of the Islamist movements, especially the MB-inspired political parties, are supported by Islamic proofs. This can open a new political era towards the ME, as well as to the Islamic world. In this new interpretation, what is important for them is how justice and a better way of life are implemented. That is the shared circle between all the citizens of a state, which is the open circle. For the first circle, again, it is special only to the believers of that circle (Muslims). Surprisingly, this closed circle of creed and worship is understood and interpreted differently by Muslim scholars. In other words, Islam demands its followers to stick to the first circle for themselves, and to be as conservative as possible in this circle. In regards to giving freedom to anyone who is outside that circle, the Quran states, "To you be your religion, and to me my religion (109: 6)." Hence, for those who are inside or outside this circle, there is a private sphere; no one can force others to come into this private sphere. Quranic verse also states: "There is no compulsion in religion (2: 256)." Thus, the second circle is a circle shared between everyone, and it is open and left to be as progressive as possible. This circle includes all other aspects of life, including politics, instead of the personal sphere.

Understanding religion and nationalism, or any other political affairs in secular and Islamist perspectives, comes from this point, which is looking at politics and religion differently. On one hand, for many Islamists, all of life has to be in one circle, and the circle is dealt with as creed and worship. They interpret everything according to their religious perspectives. On the other hand, there is a new kind of transformation among the Islamists, which is classifying the personal and public sphere as closed and open circles. This new understanding

of religion and politics, and placing politics outside the circle of religion, for the sake of religion, is what I call a new wave of religious nationalism. Testing this in Kurdistan by looking at the case of the KIU makes us look at two narratives. Are these two narratives compatible, or are they different? The narrative of ethnic nationalism, which paints a particular picture of Kurdistan, and the counter-narrative of political Islam, which places the Kurds within the *Umma* and longing for the Caliphate who is no longer there. What does that mean? How does it work? How do these two narratives of identity interact in modern Kurdish political life? Studying this new wave of religious nationalism in Kurdistan, by looking at the role of nationalism and Islamism in the case of KIU, is the purpose of this research.

1.7 Islam and Nationalism:

Continuing on the relationship between religion and nationalism and focusing on Islam as a religion, there is a whole range of views on this kind of relationship which varies according to time, location and understanding of both Islam and nationalism. Within Islam, there are two main views, represented by Sunnis and Shias. Iran is used as the majority Shia dominant area, and its point of view on this issue is highlighted in point three below. Further, point four below covers two main beliefs within the Sunnis.

Thirdly, religious distrust leads to the evolution of nationalism. The Iranian case clearly explains this kind of relation between religion and nationalism. Ferdows (1967: 90) concluded, in her thesis, that "Iranian nationalism contained a thread of distrust". Despite the fact that Iran is a multi-ethnic country, it is Shiism that

engenders the unity of the majority of the Iranians. Therefore, being Iranian has become the nationalism for the wider Iranians, rather than a particular ethnic group, including Persians. Yarshater (1989) highlighted that "In 1935 the Persian government requested countries with which it had diplomatic relations to call Persia Iran". Thus, on the basis of Shiism a nation from amalgamated ethnic groups was created. Since then, the idea of Iranianism has been introduced in order to embrace other non-Shi'a and non-Persian alliances. According to Quora "The Ancient texts of Iran claim that they are Aryans, the word 'Iran' itself means, 'Land of the Aryans'". Consequently, assimilating the many non-Persian Aryans in Iran was due to the Iranian dimension. Yet, the prime identity of the country is Shiism.

Prior to the Safavid era, today's Iran was a Sunni majority, then forcefully, over time, it was turned into Shiism. Countrystudies.us (n. d.) records that:

"Although Shias have lived in Iran since the earliest days of Islam, and there was one Shia dynasty in part of Iran during the tenth and eleventh centuries, it is believed that most Iranians were Sunnis until the seventeenth century. The Safavid dynasty made Shia Islam the official state religion in the sixteenth century and aggressively proselytized on its behalf. It is also believed that by the mid-seventeenth century most people in what is now Iran had become Shias, an affiliation that has continued".

Similarly, [Global Security](http://GlobalSecurity.com) (N. D.b) records that "the Safavids declared Shia Islam the state religion and used proselytizing and force to convert the large majority of Muslims in Iran to the Shia sect. Under the early Safavids, Iran was a theocracy in which state and religion were closely intertwined".

Thereafter, and on the basis of Shiism the masses were mobilised. In Iran, where the nation is based on the Shi'a sect, it does not mean that the vast majority of the people are religious in terms of practising the daily religious rites. Nevertheless, the total allegiance is for the sect. Thus, political reactions are against any external threat coming from non-Shi'a and/or non-Muslims, and it is equally religious nationalistic whether the reaction is coming from a practising or non-practising individuals. This has been the case since the foundation of the Islamic republic. Ferdows (1967: 15) noticed "Afghani as well as Malkam Khan²² had observed rightly that the only means of mobilizing mass support for any national movement in Iran would be through religious feeling against foreigners and infidels".

This mistrust developed within the Shiite Persians in both nationalist and religious senses alike. Ferdows (1967: 90) highlighted that:

"This distrust was perhaps due to the deep, almost fierce, pride which characterizes the attitude of most Iranians towards their country. They look back upon the past when Iran was the Persian Empire and see their culture as the fountainhead of civilization. Their invaders, whether Turks, Mongols, or Arabs, have all been referred to as barbarians in Iranian history books".

From a religious perspective, ever since Shiism was adopted by the Safavids as the state's religion, the religious mistrust deepened Iranian nationalism. Accordingly, starting with the prolonged conflicts with the Ottomans until the

²² Malkam Khan was an Armenian [Christian] who rose to the high office of becoming Naser ed-Din Shah's trusted adviser and later was sent to London as the Shah's envoy. Ferdows (1967: 15).

Islamic republic, Iran has been mobilising people against the foreign Sunni Ottomans, the grand Satan (America), Israel and the Wahhabis.

In this context, whenever religious institutions in Iran wanted to mobilise the masses against the rulers, they simply accused and labelled them as being anti-religion, betrayers or even hypocrites. Ferdows (1967:90) explains that:

“Although Iran had never been directly subjected to the indignity of colonial rule, modern nationalism in Iran emerged as a reaction to foreign intervention and its immediate target was the autocratic regime of the Shah and the officials of the government who were supposedly foreign tools and traitors to the national interests of the Iranian people”.

Actually, this is the case, even when the reformists are all religious Shias within the Islamic republic system. Yazdani (2016) comments on the reaction of the Iranian government towards the reformists as such:

"This reform movement took a blow in 2009. The crackdown saw dozens killed and disappeared, hundreds arrested, many of whom continue to be held indefinitely in the notorious Evin Prison. Authorities placed the de-facto leaders of the Green Movement, Mousavi and the other reformist presidential candidate Mehdi Karroubi under house arrest, where they continue to be held".

Not only political reform, but also educational reform, in the name of safeguarding education from westernizing influences, is subject to such a policy. The *Washington Post* (2011) observed “Iran’s education reform takes anti-Western tack”. A detail of this safeguard, represented by the Iranian education ministry, was reported by Erdbrink (2011) “The Education Ministry's

plan, titled 'The Program for Fundamental Evolution in Education and Training,' envisages schools becoming 'neighborhood cultural bases' where teachers will provide 'life' guidance, assisted by selected clerics and members of the paramilitary Basij²³ force".

Thus, even before the Islamic revolution, the phobia of the foreign influence on the interests of Iran gave the religious institution and religious trends the chance to interfere in politics. Ferdows (1967: 95) claimed that "The oil question was perhaps the most important reason for the Fadayan's²⁴ thrusting itself into politics. Had it not been for this crisis, the movement would probably have remained a purely religious one". Basically, the impact of the religious

²³The Basij Resistance Force is a volunteer paramilitary organization operating under the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). It is an auxiliary force with many duties, especially internal security, law enforcement, special religious or political events and morals policing. The Basij have branches in virtually every city and town in Iran.

- The Basij have become more important since the disputed 2009 election. Facing domestic demands for reform and anticipating economic hardships from international sanctions, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has mobilized the Basij to counter perceived threats to the regime.
- For more information about Basij, see: Alfoneh, (n. d.), Online Available at: <<http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force>>.

²⁴ Fada'iyan-e Islam was an Iranian Islamic fundamentalist terrorist secret society founded in 1946 by a 21 year-old theology student Navvab Safavi, who sought to purify Islam in Iran by ridding it of 'corrupting individuals' by means of carefully planned assassinations of certain leading intellectual and political figures. The group survived as supporters of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution of Iran. During the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Fadayan members served as foot soldiers for Khomeini and formed part of the fundamentalist wing of the revolutionary base, pressuring Khomeini to implement rule of Islam immediately. They called for a "wholesale introduction of Islamic legal and social codes including a ban on music, alcohol, the cinema, usury, women working outside the home and compulsory veiling." Many of its members went on to serve in the Islamic Republic regime. See: Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium.

institution in mobilising the grassroots has come from its influence over the bazaaris²⁵, which constitutes the majority of the people in Iran.

Therefore, the Iranian nationalism is a unique case of its kind within religious nationalism, which demonstrates a special relation between religion and nationalism on the basis of mistrust, starting within Islam and relying on the Shi'a sect. Ferdows (1967: 92) stated that "over ninety percent of the Iranians are Shiites, and once Shiism has been the state religion in Iran for over centuries, it has been, and remains, a bulwark of Iranian nationalism". Furthermore, within the Shia sect, the current Islamic republic has adopted the Shi'a *Imaamiyyah*²⁶, and within the *Imaamiyyah* has adopted *Ithna Ashariyyah* (Twelvers). Even within these elements it has adopted and relied on the concept of *Wilayat al-Faqih*²⁷, and functions upon it. Thus, Iranian nationalism is encircled by so much religious mistrust that the nation works by, and only trusts, the Imam's teachings; no more.

Fourthly, there is another vision within the Sunnis, which claims that there is no relation whatsoever between religion and nationalism. Accordingly, in late Ottoman era, nationalism as a political means came into being. With regard to this point, Muslim scholars have dealt with a wide range of explanations. Mohammad Ammarah, for instance, looks at this from different angles. He states that "when the talk is about Islam and its position from 'Arabism' and 'the

²⁵"This group [the bazaar group] is composed of small businessmen, wealthy merchants, shopkeepers, members of the guilds, and masses of poor hangers-on in the bazaar area who have always been most responsive, emotionally, to great issues, and who are always ready to turn out for mass demonstrations". Ferdows (1967: 91).

²⁶For more details of various Shia sect, see Abu Iyaad, Online Available at: <<http://www.shia.bs/articles/stryy-understanding-and-classifying-the-various-shia-sects.cfm>>.

²⁷For further information on the concept, see Al-Islam.org (N. D.a), Online Available at: <<https://www.al-islam.org/shia-political-thought-ahmed-vaezi/what-wilayat-al-faqih>>.

Arab nationalism'...and its position from 'the Arab Unity' ... we have to draw attentions to the fact that we are dealing with more than 'an Islam'!..". Ammarah (1988: 5). Furthermore, Ammarah (1988: 5-8) classifies Islam into four categories: "Islam: the religion, Islam: the Civilisation, Islam: the history and finally Islam: the contemporary. According to him, Islam: the religion, has nothing to do with nationalism; any nationalism. However, this does not mean it denies nationalism; because, Islam is a global religion, and being a global religion does not deny the conditions in which the people live. Nationalism is one of the situations where human groups live, whether they are Muslims or non-Muslims (1988: 10). Thus, according to this explanation, although the religion ultimately accepts the reality, and the situation that the people are living in, initially it has nothing to do with any political context, including nationalism.

Ammarah's moderate vision on this issue would lead one to look at the more extreme vision that is represented by the Salafis in regard to the relation of religion and nationalism. Shaykh Abdul-Azeez Bin Baz²⁸ (n. d.b) issued a fatwa concerning this relationship as follows:

"This call is ignorance and it is not to ascribe oneself to it, nor to encourage those who call to it. Indeed, it is obligatory to destroy it, because Islamic law orders us to combat it and drive it out, to refute their analogies and claims with answers which make the truth clear to those who seek it. For it is Islam alone that keeps alive the Arab character, language, culture and morality. To snub this religion is, in reality, to destroy the Arab character in its language, culture and morality. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the (Muslim) preachers to strive hard to

²⁸"ABDUL AZIZ bin Baz was the Grand Mufti and head of the Council of Ulema (Islamic scholars) in Saudi Arabia from 1962". Darwish (1999).

spread the call of Islam, in order to defeat those who attempt to suppress it. It is well known that Islam necessitates the view that calling to Arab nationalism or any other kind of nationalism is a false message and a great error, and it is a clear abomination, loathsome ignorance, and a plot against Islam and its people”.

For Bin Baz, nationalism is not only unacceptable to Islam, being a call for ignorance, but it is also a plot against Islam and its people. Nevertheless, nationalism is understood in the Arab world, and it is still widely practised within the Arab Sunni states. Despite any denial of nationalism, even in Saudi Arabia, Arab nationalism is practised –the name of the state itself includes the word Arab (Saudi Arabia). However, when talking about the relationship between Islam and nationalism, the denial comes in, and especially when the issue of non-Arab nationalism is raised, such denial is given more emphasis.

Concluding my argument, the relationship of religion and nationalism makes us highlight the main two arguments by Smith and Kedourie as the most relevant to this study. On the one hand, for Smith, there are four sacred foundations for nationalism that came from earlier belief-systems. However, he states that the idea of sacredness came first from ancient peoples into Judaeo-Christainity. Then, it became a political ideology in the form of secular nationalism. For Smith (2003: 26) “In this new political ideology, a worship of the secular nation replaces that of the deity, while the nationalist movement takes the place of the church, and posterity becomes the new version of immortality in place of the afterlife”. On the other hand, Kedourie argues that religion itself turns into nationalism, as he highlights the example of Zionism and Pakistan rooted in religion and grew into a nationalistic movement, and later, a nation state. For

Kedourie (1971: 76) "This transformation of religion into nationalist ideology is all the more convenient in those nationalists can thereby utilize the powerful and tenacious loyalties which a faith held in common for centuries create". I disagree with Kedourie's evidence with regard to his assertion of transforming religion into nationalism. Since there are multi-ethnic religions, such as Islam and Christianity, no one can assume that all followers from different places around would turn to a single nationalist state. The reality nationalism in those multi-ethnic religions does not prove his assertion. Yet inside one of the nationalist states - take any Arab country for the sake of argument - throughout the twentieth century, there was always space for both Islamists and seculars. Furthermore, now in the shadow of the Arab spring, in some cases, the Islamists have the upper hand, not the nationalists. As for Smith, I agree with his argument; by looking at the nationalist movements in the Middle East (ME), we see at least one sacred element is focused on. For example; as mentioned above the sacred land of Israel or Palestine and its on-going conflicts represent an empirical supporting point of the pertinent argument. This is the case for seculars and for the newly-emerged religious nationalists, too. However, for the seculars, they wouldn't cite religion as their influence, but still they rely on the idea of the sacredness for their purposes. In some other extreme secular cases, the assertion of Smith has been implemented exactly in regards to worshiping the secular nation, the "sacred" leader, and his "holy" speeches.

Furthermore, looking at the relationship between religion and nationalism from a different perspective conveys a sense of understanding of the eagerness that comes from the sacred dimensions that nationalism has taken from religions. In particular, for this study, the works of Smith and Kedourie are the most relevant. For Smith, the sacred dimension of nationalism provides a base and

explanation for the growing sense of nationalism among the Islamists. More importantly, this sense of growing feelings for nationalism is not only legitimised by religion, but also for the Islamist, and as will be seen in the coming chapters, it is the demand of the religion. Thus, the argument of Smith is the core that constitutes the basis of this study. As for Kedourie, the idea of replacement of religion by nationalism is what this study disproves. Kedourie's thought is profoundly important to my study, not least as a counter argument that challenges any nationalist motivations by religion. For him nationalism grows with the demise of religions. Hence, in order to fully examine this kind of relationship, both works are extremely important, and are more relevant to this research than any others.

1.8 Kurds and Nationalism:

Like other nations in the Middle East, nationalism is relatively new to the Kurds. However, there are other indications that show the Kurdish awakening to nationalism goes back further, and emerged long before the western introduction of nationalism to the region. Nebez (2002: 28-29) records that:

“The idea of establishing a nationalistic Kurdish state, which unites the whole Kurdish nation in an independent Kurdistan, with the leadership of a Kurdish King has emerged in Kurdistan itself, and was not received from the foreigners. This idea, at least goes back to the beginning of the sixteenth century. This is in contrary to the Persian, Arab and Turkish nations which were similar to the European nations in the Middle Ages as they were trying to establish territorial states, not nation states. Then all those empires or

states that they established were called after their leaders' families, such as the Abbasid state, Qaramani state, Ottoman state, Safavid state and Qajari state, not Arabic, Turkish or Persian states”.

This is in relation to the awakening of nationalism. However, in reality, attempts to establish a Kurdish nation state started in the eighteenth century, and in the first half of the nineteenth century they had reached a state of organised military struggle. When the princes of Kurdistan, such as the princes of Botan, Baban, Soran, Badinan and Ardalán were starting their revolutions and clashed with the Ottoman and the Qajar states, they were all thinking about establishing a nation, not a territorial, state (Nebez, 2002: 29).

It is commonly believed by the Kurds that the word *Kurdayeti*, i.e. *Kurdism*, is mainly used for nationalism. However, Ghani (2011: x) refers to the beginning of Kurdish nationalism as a reaction to the centralisation policy of the Ottomans, stating:

“They resisted the Ottoman policy of centralisation and the notion of *Kurdism* flourished. This can be regarded as a key turning point for the development of Kurdish nationalism, reinvigorating a Kurdish consciousness in respect of politics, language and literature. Kurdish Meals (Islamic scholars), popular poets and Kurdish folkloric poets played a major role in the creation of *Kurdism* in the first half of the nineteenth century in Soran, Botan and Baban emirates”.

Apart from resisting the growing nationalism among the Ottoman and Qajar elites, there was another crucial element that helped the growth and emergence

of Kurdayeti from a religious point of view. Abdulaziz (2016b: 75-76) concludes the demands of the Kurds from Ubaidulla's conference in 1880 as follows:

“1- Liberating Kurdistan from the tyranny and oppression of Qajar and Ottomans.

2- Forming a united, free Kurdistani state from both controlled Kurdish territories by the Qajar and Ottomans.

3- Trying to execute the Islamic Shari'ah, especially in terms of justice, which had been long forgotten under both Persian and Ottoman rulings”.

The above three points indicate the early religious nationalism among the Kurds. The Kurdish realisation of being different from the non-Kurdish entities, especially the Ottomans and Qajars, had been going on for a while²⁹.

Unlike the other nations in the region, the Kurds, during the growth of nationalism, always had an extra burden and more challenges. Prior to the existence of nationalism and following the treaty of Zuhab [Zahaw] in 1639 between the Ottoman and Persian Empires, they formally established their border that had been unofficially marked after the Ottoman victory at the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514. The importance for the Kurds is that this border separated them from these two great Middle Eastern empires and, in effect, it still largely exists today as the border between Turkey and Iran. (Gunter, 2011: 313). At the beginning, the Kurds supported the Ottomans because they shared the same Sunni sect and preferred them to the Safavids. However, as Nebez (2002: 27-28) highlights, it appears that after uniting with the Ottomans, the Kurds soon realised that they no longer had the same independence which they had

²⁹ For more details, see Snnw (1998: 123) in Chapter three.

enjoyed in their own emirates. Then, they started thinking about independence and strengthening themselves through uniting their emirates. Furthermore, after World War 1, and according to the Sykes-Picot treaty, the rest of the Kurdistan territories which had been under the Ottomans were further divided between the newly emerged Turkey, Iraq and Syria. This made the Kurdish aspiration for independence more difficult. On different occasions over the twentieth century, whenever the four countries that have a Kurdish population (Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria) felt the danger of the growth of Kurdish politics in any of their four countries, they collaborated against them. However, these barriers never stopped the aspiration of the Kurds in acquiring their nationalistic rights in any parts of Kurdistan under those four states. In conclusion, with the rise of nationalism in the region, the Kurds, as one of the biggest nations in the Middle East, became the victims, while other nations such as Arabs, Turks and Persians have been in possession of their own nation states.

Chapter Two

Literature Review and Methodology

2.1 Introduction:

In order to choose the right methodology, I had to dedicate a significant amount of time and effort to reading and consulting my supervisor. Eventually, I determined that the qualitative, single-case study, semi-structured interview was the best option for my case. I list the details of my methodology in this chapter, which is organized as follows: describing the participants, the samples, and discussing each technique I used. In the section titled "Methods," I have given further details on how I followed the method in the fieldwork. The rationale of the research method is discussed here. I also have included an additional section for the research question and hypothesis. Additionally, I highlighted the pilot study, materials, and challenges that I faced. The first part of this chapter deals with the literature review, which includes the main authored books related to the subject matter, but not inclusively addressing my thesis.

2.2 Literature Review:

Presently, there is no direct literature on the subject of religious nationalism in Kurdistan, or on the KIU. However, there are a few marginal subjects that touch on this issue within other subjects, such as Kurdish nationalism, with no direct commentary on new religious nationalism in Kurdistan. Therefore, I studied a few works with similar, but indirect subjects. It is crucial to highlight here, that despite the huge literature in regard to nationalism, Kurdish nationalism,

religious nationalism, Islamism and the relation of nationalism and religion that I came across during this study, none focused on what would be the core of my research, with the exception of the works of Smith and Kedourie. This is because they all centre on a subject such as the theory or history of nationalism, the rights of nations, the national liberation movements, the Islamist movements, and so on. However, since my study covers the growing sentiments of nationalism within a religious group, it is therefore my claim that Smith's and Kedourie's works are the most relevant: simply, because one of them explains the developed sentiments of nationalism and relates them back to religions, and the other represents a counter-argument by claiming religion transforms into nationalism. Hence, their works best fit within the theoretical framework of the relationship between religion and nationalism, and are more relevant to my work other than any of the other works.

One work I came across was (*Nasiwnalizm w Nasiwnalizmi Kurdi: Deedeki Islami Hawcharx*) Nationalism and the Kurdish Nationalism: a Contemporary Islamic Perspective by Karwani³⁰ (2008), which consists of two volumes. The first volume contains four chapters, and the second volume contains eight chapters. While this book does not precisely fit into the framework of my project, it is a good contribution to the field of the contemporary Islamic vision towards nationalism - Kurdish nationalism, in particular.

Chapter four of the first volume has been devoted to Kurdish nationalism and the KIU's vision. In this chapter, Karwani presents his reading in regards to the KIU's rhetoric towards Kurdish nationalism. His commentary on the KIU's rhetoric uses the framework of Kurdish nationalism and the KIU's contribution to

³⁰The actual name of the author is Abubakir Ali, however he is known as Karwani as his *nom de plume*.

this newfound nationalism. Thus, the author tries to direct Kurdish nationalists, whether they are secular or religious, towards the goals of the Kurdish nation. In other words, he advises both Kurdish nationalist movements to set aside differences and internal controversy in the name of Islam or nationalism. In Karwan's opinion, no one has the right to be the spokesperson for either movement since Islam and the Kurdish nation are two sides of Kurdish identity.

While it does not relate to the entire theme, this particular chapter of Karwani's book is beneficial for my work. However, it does also include statements and political stances of the KIU in regards to Kurdish nationalism. Ali (2008: 11) states, "Publishing these volumes in regards to Kurdish nationalism is containing all my writings about the subject until this moment." Thus, it is somewhat of a combination of many articles written by Karwani over the last few years. The book is written in Kurdish.

(Mustaqbal Al-Haraka Al-Islamia fee Kurdistan Al-Iraq) The Future of the Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan. By Muhammad Saeed Noori Al-Baziani (2006) is a master degree dissertation. Although its title refers to the Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK), it generally talks about the Iraqi Islamic movements as a whole. Hence, on the surface, the book does not fall into the subject of my project. It does not even marginally cover the topic of my project (religious nationalism); on the contrary, it deals with the Islamic movements in Iraq as a whole in a traditional way. Although the book is entitled "Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan," the book classifies the Islamic movements into two parts. The first part covers the Shia trend, which is split into two periods: before and after the revolution of 1958 in Iraq. The second part deals with the Sunni trend.

Again, it divides this trend into two periods: before and after the revolution of 1958.

Chapter one of *The Future of the Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan*, as it is stated in its English abstract (Al-Baziani, 2006: 309-314), covers the historical development of the Islamic movement in Iraq. This chapter has been divided into a preface and two sections. The first section is a historical briefing of the establishment and development of British influence in Iraq, along with the stance of both Iraqi Shia and Sunni Islamic trends. The second section focuses on the geopolitics of the different Islamic trends since their establishment starting from the first half of the twentieth century until 2003. Chapter two has been devoted to the visions of the IMIK towards various aspects of life. Chapter three deals with the IMIK and international policies. This includes various issues, such as the IMIK and the new world order, the IMIK and terrorism, and the IMIK and the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998³¹ (Enrolled Bill [Final as Passed Both House and Senate] of the USA. Chapter four, which discusses the future of the IMIK, is divided into two sections. The first covers the major obstacles that the IMIK faces. The second section of this chapter proposes solutions to evade the aforementioned obstacles. In the final chapter, the conclusion is drawn. This book is written in Arabic. I found *The Future of the Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan* to be beneficial for my study in the historical background of major Islamists in Kurdistan, especially since the writer used to be a leading member of the IMIK.

³¹Bill Text 105th Congress (1997-1998) H.R.4655.ENR
The Library of Congress <<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c105:H.R.4655.ENR:>>.

An outline of Kurdish Islamist groups in Iraq by David Romano 2007 is based on fieldwork and personal interviews conducted in Iraq in 2003 and 2004; this study presents a significant amount of never-before published data concerning Islamist movements. While it does not relate entirely to the main theme of my study, this work is vital for understanding the historical background of these movements in Kurdistan. Another importance of this work in regards to my project is what Romano highlighted himself: "Particular attention is paid to the links between various groups, their transformation or splintering into new organizations, and the role of the non-Kurdish Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood in spawning these movements". Finally, this work, as is obvious from its title, is only an outline of Kurdish Islamists as a whole in less than 15 pages. Otherwise, it is not an in-depth analysis that should be read alone when studying such a broad area of Islamism in Kurdistan.

Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity by Anthony D. Smith (2003) introduces a great work on interactions between religion and nationalism. The title draws attention to the idea of being chosen by God; this refers to the high self-ranking that some nations have chosen for themselves with reference to their religion, such as the Judeo-Christian example of claiming to be the chosen people. Furthermore, the book presents a wide range of examples from historic landscapes in Ireland, Switzerland and Egypt, myths of Arthurian Britain, Holy Russia, and Byzantium. The book consists of nine chapters, which all highlight the idea of sacredness. The chapters examine nationalism and religion, the nation as a sacred communion, election and covenant, peoples of the covenant, missionary peoples, sacred homelands, ethno-history and the golden age, nationalism and golden ages, and the glorious dead. Smith (2003: 255) concludes by stating, "*Four kinds of cultural*

*resources and sacred foundation*³² drawn from earlier religious belief-systems have been of particular importance in this regard” Most nationalists refer to at least one of the four sacred foundations to sustain their nationalism, despite whether they are secular or religious. Although this book does not completely relate to my project, it is useful in considering the relationship between religion and nationalism, which I use extensively throughout my theoretical framework.

How to Win a Cosmic War: Confronting Radical Religions by Reza Aslan 2010 emphasizes the ongoing war between good and evil. Aslan (2010) states that, “Cosmic wars are fought not over land or politics, but over identity.” He believes that placing value on religious identity is becoming an increasingly popular practice throughout global society. Aslan (2010) in presenting this book argues that “Indeed, in many parts of the world, including the United States, religion is quickly becoming the supreme identity, encompassing and even superseding ethnicity, culture, and nationality”. In his opinion, provocation by one side of the war initiator would lead to a reaction of the other side, then to the danger of fire of a cosmic war. That danger comes from the same base that *Smith (2003: 255-256)* articulated - in the name of chosen people and/or a sacred land. In his novel, Aslan (2010: 81) states, “The religious Zionists argued that the war of 1967 had been God’s design; God had compelled the Arabs to attack Israel in order to force the Jews to fight back and thus liberate all of the Promised Land.” With this logic, at one point the whole world would be pit against itself in the name of what Aslan argues is "good versus evil" and "us versus them.” He clearly articulates that US president George W. Bush and Osama Bin Ladin played this game of cosmic war, simply by implementing the politics of ‘us

³² See chapter one for (Smith, 2003: 255-256) the four kinds of cultural resources and sacred foundation.

versus them', in a sense of one religion against the other. Thus for Aslan, religious nationalism is not a threat to global security. However, Aslan (2010: 24) believes that, "The real threat to global security comes from the rise of religious trans-nationalist movements, such as Jihadism, which cannot be contained within any territorial boundaries".

Although *How to Win a Cosmic War* is not directly related to my case study, it helps supporting the theoretical framework of my argument, as well as helps support many practical experiments throughout the chapters. For instance, Aslan's argument proves that religious nationalism is not only not posing a threat to global security, but also in many cases is a necessity, as it contains a nation with its characteristics, in a sense that every nation has to its special characteristics, whereby religion included has a unique entity. Hence, religious nationalism could be a solution for people of a certain nation, rather than imposing any kind of values through transnationalism, which is more likely to be subject to rejection, and negative public reaction, and ultimately wars.

Mark Juergensmeyer is the author of a work unlikely to be directly related to my project, *The New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (1993). While it is slightly unrelated, it is one of the most profound works on religious nationalism. The book consists of three parts, which include seven chapters. He ends his work with a conclusion entitled as follows: "Can We Live with Religious Nationalism?" Juergensmeyer (1993: 193) immediately begins the chapter with an answer, "Than depends, in part, on how religious nationalism behaves, and in part, on how it is perceived. What once appeared to many Westerners as an anomaly and an annoyance is now often seen as a global foe". Furthermore, Juergensmeyer (1993: 248) elaborates that,

“Religious nationalism raised new hopes, and it also came along in time to rescue the idea of the nation-state.” An importance of this work for my project is that it includes various examples throughout the world. Therefore, it makes me aware of other experiences and practices of religious nationalism, which I must be aware of for my well-versed analysis.

Aram Ali Saeed, (*Dozi Kurd: La NewanBeeree Natawayee W Ayeeneeda*), which can be translated into English as, “The Kurdish Case Between Nationalism and Religious Thoughts” (2009). This work is an edited book which contains interviews of five Kurdish academics and writers. It is an attempt to clarify the role of Islam in helping the Kurds to advocate their nationalistic rights. It is also an attempt to criticize the Kurdish secular nationalists in their accusations of Islam, which often for them Islam had a negative role in the process of achieving the goals of nationalism of the Kurds. It also subtly defends the Kurdish Islamists as religious nationalists striving for the rights of the Kurdish nation.

In order to focus on these issues, the editor highlighted a statement from each of the interviewees as an indication for his stance on the subject of the book. For instance, for Masoud Abdulkhaliq (2009: 10), he highlighted the following: “In Kurdistan, in the way that the seculars want socialism, communism, and liberalism means to establish a state for the Kurds, in the same way the Islamists also want by the religion means to establish a Kurdish state.” For Hakeem Ahmad (2009: 54) he highlighted the following: “Throughout historical eras, it has been proved that the spirit of the religion of Islam has always been an encouraging factor for motivating thought, not dormancy, and to be at the service of humanity”.

Generally, this work does not directly fall into the category of my work. The first reason for this is because it is about the Kurdish Case between nationalism and religious thoughts. Then, it is only about the literature of both nationalism and religious thoughts. It is only a one-sided argument that mainly defends religion in favour of Kurdish national rights.

Abubakir Ali (Karwani) (2011) (La Kiltoori Jama'atawa Baraw Hizbeki Pashxan Islami Hawcharx) "From the Culture of Jama'a (Group) Towards a Modern Party with Reference to Islam", as it is Karwani (2011: 3) by the author in the introduction what this book consists of "is basically some interviews, which later on were edited in the form of a book. It expresses some of the perspectives of the author on the history of evolving contemporary issues and functions of the Islamic current".

Overall, it is a good work on the theory of Islamism, and touches on the steps that the Islamic parties generally should take in order to become solid political parties. For instance, Karwani (2001: 132) recommends that, "The Islamists of today must - through holding the slogans of reform and justice - look for a strong political justification". It is mainly about the inner reforms of the Islamic parties from being mostly religious groups that prioritized justifying their politics from historical texts, to becoming contemporary demands of the people. For the author, these kinds of policies are among the ultimate Islamic objectives that lead to justice. Therefore, in Karwani's belief, this must be the policy that the Islamists must adopt instead of merely holding the title of "Islamic" and evolving around historical Islamic legitimacy.

Although this book does not directly correlate with the field of my work, it represents a great contribution to the theory of political Islam, and directly benefits the Kurdish Islamists in working on their popularity, which according to the author, is achieved by not following the Arabic examples, but instead, through following the Turkish AK party or by Malaysian examples. Karwani himself is a leading member of the KIU. He used to be a politburo of the party when this work was published.

Edris Siwaili, (2009b) (Rawtee Islami La Bashoori Kurdistan 1946-1991: TwejeenawaiakyMejwee La Kar w Chalaki Part w Komala Islamiakan) "The Islamic Current in Southern Kurdistan 1946-1991: a Historical Research for the Activities of the Islamic Parties and Groups" is a pretty self-explanatory title. Siwaili's work is a thorough historical background for the Kurdish Islamists in southern Kurdistan. Although it is the most direct book so far on the history of Islamism in southern Kurdistan, it does not fall under the theme of my project. However, this work is quite helpful and important for my thesis, especially in writing chapter six, where I use it thoroughly and mainly rely on it for the historical background. This is the second edition, which the author has spent a great time revising, further documented the events, and included his interview with Salahaddin Muhammad Bahaddin, the former Secretary General of the KIU. More importantly, as the author mentions in the introduction, three years after the first addition, the book was reviewed many times, and he used many other sources, theses, and feedback that, according to him filled many gaps and created corrections for mistakes in the first edition.

Another importance of this book is the fact that it was written in 2009, where apart from the KIU, the IMIK and KIK were also practicing civil political strife.

For instance, if it was written a decade earlier (probably under the influence of jihadism of the two latter parties, which at that time both were IMIK), could have had a different outcome due to majority interviewees who mainly were formerly IMIK leaders, and whose vision at that time were different to the events and the circumstances. However, by 2009, they all were calling for similar civil and political reforms in the region. Even as mentioned earlier, the KIU, KIK, and two other secular parties formed the Reform and Services List for the general elections of 25/07/2009.

Omar Ali Ghafour's novel (2013), (16 Sal La New Yakgrtwi Islami) "16 Years within the Islamic Union" chronicles the author's experience in the Islamic Union of Kurdistan. The book also includes detailed critiques of the KIU based on Ghafour's experience in the party over the mentioned years. Although this book can be helpful in some of aspects for my project, it is, however, not directly tied to my thesis. Mostly, this work details the operation of the party, and the experience and feelings of the author as a former member of the party from a dissident point of view. The author, in this regard, on the back cover of the book Ghafour (2013) stated that, "Those years, bating of being the history of development of my thoughts experience, are also a perspective for studying the Islamic Union's past operations too. Therefore, it was important for me to document the summary of my own experience." Hence, it reflects an angle of self-criticism from a former member of the KIU, which highlights some of the cons without discussing the main point of my thesis.

Omar Abdulaziz (2011) wrote (Yakgrtui Islami Kurdistan w PrsiChaksazi La Harem: Bochoon w Gutar, Halwest, Yadasht w Proja) "Kurdistan Islamic Union and the Question of Reform in Kurdistan Region: Opinions and Rhetoric,

Position, Memoirs and Projects” This book consists of three main parts. Part one contains a general analysis to rhetoric and stance memoirs of the KIU from 1994-2011 in regards to reform in the region. Part two contains the texts of the memoirs of the KIU from 1994-2011, whether that was with the cooperation of other Kurdish political parties, or by the KIU alone. Part three is an appendix for the images and photocopies of those documents which were covered in the book.

This book was authored in the summer of 2011, after two the months of continued demonstrations that took place in Sulaimani in the spring of that year. The demonstrators were calling for reform, which coincided with the so-called package reform, which was presented on behalf of the demonstrators by the three opposing parties (Change movement, the KIU, and KIK) to the region’s president, parliament, and the cabinet on March 3, 2011. The importance of this book stems from the fact that the author was a politburo member of the KIU and the head of the party’s parliament block in the region’s parliament. Thus, he personally was involved in most of the reform attempts that were referred to in the book. Although this book is partially an important one for my research, however, it is not the main subject of my thesis.

In her *Religion in Iranian Nationalism: The Study of the Fadayan-I Islam*, Ferdows (1967) stated:

“a study of the Fadayan Islam (Devotees of Islam), the politico religious group which played a significant role during the nationalist movement 1951-53 in Iran. It is hoped that it will shed some light on the subject of the role of religion in nationalism as a political phenomenon in that country”. (1967: 1).

Since the focus of the study is on Shi'a Iran, it is obvious that it does not directly cover the subject of my project. Nonetheless, it will shed light on the importance of religion in portraying Iranian nationalism as a religious nationalism: therefore, it falls into the category of the relationship between religion and nationalism. This helped me when I conceived my idea of looking at this sort of relationship when I covered religion and nationalism in Chapter One.

Overall, Ferdows' work has provided and covered a few key issues in studying nationalism in the Muslim World. Ferdows (1967: 4) argues that "the problem of the present day nationalism in the Muslim countries of the Near East in general, and Iran in particular, is that it differs from the western nationalism in several important ways". Her justifications alert me, and any other researchers in the field of nationalism in the Muslim World, to important issues to be aware of in studying nationalism.

Generally, her study highlights the example of Iran among all the Muslim cases, on the basis of what she describes on page 90, as "a thread of distrust". Referring to the general trend of Iranian politics, in pre- and post-Islamic revolution, where politics always reflects the mistrust of the Iranian governments to any potential threats to the identity of Iranian state, represented by Shi'ism, whether those threats have come from Muslim or non-Muslim entities. The thesis is divided on four chapters, as follows: Chapter one is covering the background, which is a historical review. Chapter two is covering Fadayan Islam. Chapter three is about Kashani³³. Chapter four is the conclusion. Then, she has the appendix at the end of the thesis.

³³ Ayatollah Kashani: was believed by almost all Western observers to be the actual leader of the Fadayan Islam.
Ferdows(1967: 82).

Abubakir Ali (Karwani) (2016) (Islami Boon La QonaghiPashIslamida) "Being Islamist in the Post Islamic Age." His work consists of two parts: part one, contains his previous work, which was published in 2012, entitled (BinamawChwarchewaGishtiakaniHizbekiPashxan Islami Hawcharx: Xwendnawaiak La Adabiati Parti Dad w GashapedaniTurkia w Azadi w DadparwariMisr) "The General Principles and the Frame of A Contemporary Islamic Party: A Study of the political literature of Turkey's Justice and Development Party, and Egypt's Freedom and Justice". Part two contains the reprint of his book (covered above) (La KiltooriJama'atawaBarawHizbekiPashxan Islami Hawcharx) "From the Culture of Jama'a (Group) Towards a Modern Party with Reference to Islam", which was initially printed in 2011.

This work does not cover the subject of my project; it is, simply, theorising for the Islamists of Kurdistan to change their political framework, in the sense that they follow the offices of Justice and Development of Turkey and Freedom and Justice of Egypt so that they can be publically accepted by the masses, instead of relying only on the Islamist voters. Karwani (2016: 288) sums up by stating that:

"Now the Islamists are in a self-redefining stage. Accordingly, they are required to redefine their rhetoric, slogans, and their role in the society. If, they are aiming at a further influential political role, and want stronger masses support, they must understand the mechanisms, requirements and the contemporary political logic. They must also, logically restudy their patriotic situation, and the society's needs, especially those of the growing generation".

Thus, Karwani's work, and all his previous works in similar vein, is theorising for a kind of liberal and secular Islamist. Karwani's rendering of Islamists is different from my work, which focuses on the growing sense of nationalism among the Islamists.

Jamal Nebez (2002) *Beerî Neteweyî Kurd: Ne Beerî Qawmyîti Rojhalatî w Ne Beerî Nasyonalîzmî Rîjawaîe* (The Kurdish Neteweyî Philosophy Is Neither Oriental Nor Occidental Nationalism). This work highlights the nature of Kurdish nationalism, in which it tries to present it as a distinct kind of nationalism. As is obvious from the title, for Nebez, Kurdish nationalism is neither similar to those in the Middle East, in particular the Arab nationalism, nor to those in the West. For that reason Nebez even did not want to call it nationalism, rather he preferred the Kurdish word Neteweyî. This is a fine contribution to the nature of Kurdish nationalism; however, it does not shed light on the religious side of the issue. Therefore, it does not cover the subject matter of this project.

Omar Abdulaziz (2016b) *Xabati Kurd w Rahandi Islami: Karigari Islam Lasar Shorsh w Rapareen w Rehxrawa Siasia Kurdiakan 1850-1950* (The Kurdish Strife and the Islamic Dimension: the Influence of Islam on the Kurdish Revolutions, Uprisings and Political Organisations 1850 - 1950). This work is particularly important, since it covers two significant elements: the influence of Islam on the Kurdish nationalist movement and the peak of nationalism '1850 – 1950', where it touches the subject of my thesis. Indeed, it is a contemporary work that highlights some of the resources that I have already covered, such as the role of Ubaidullah in his early attempts at Kurdish religious nationalism in late nineteenth century. Nonetheless, it does not precisely fall into the subject of my thesis. It is highlighting the influence of Islam as a religion on Kurdish

nationalism, not religious nationalism, as a new phenomenon that shifts Islamism into nationalism: which is what this project covers.

2.2 Methodology:

2.3.1 Participants:

I conducted my interviews by using the selective snowball³⁴ technique through a leading member of the party, who then arranged the meetings for me; the majority of my interviewees were in Sulaimani and Erbil. Initially, she arranged for the Sulaimani leaders to be interviewed first; then, she contacted me with the assistant Secretary General in Erbil to facilitate the rest of the interviews with my chosen samples in Erbil³⁵. I completed twelve interviews with the leaders and policy makers of the KIU during my first visit to the Kurdistan Region. Then, as a necessity and for further data collection for the project, I approached some other potential interviewees, one of whom had no time to meet or write to me, while others agreed as shown in the definition below (interviewees 13 to 20). Thus, the total number of interviewees was 23, and another two (22 and 23) promised to write to me, however due to their own

³⁴“A snowball sample is one in which the researcher collects data on the few members of the target population he or she can locate, then asks those individuals to provide information needed to locate other members of that population whom they know”.(Crossman, A., n., d., Snowball Sample, Online Available at: <<http://sociology.about.com/od/Types-of-Samples/a/Snowball-Sample.htm>>).

³⁵Selective Snowball, also known as: “**Exponential discriminative snowball sampling**. Subjects give multiple referrals, however, only one new subject is recruited among them. The choice of a new subject is guided by the aim and objectives of the study”. (Dudovskiy, J., n. d., Snowball Sampling, *Research Methodology*, Online Available at: <<http://research-methodology.net/sampling-in-primary-data-collection/snowball-sampling/>>).

workloads, they apologised that were unable to participate in the data collection. The reason behind selecting these people (except interviewees 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17) was to get the information directly from the policy makers and implementers, since they are responsible for the policies of the party, and the highest-ranking members of the party. Interviewees 10, 13, 18 and 20 agreed to answer my questions in writing, by emailing me. Interviewee 19 agreed to have a Skype session, during which I had a chance to ask my questions. Interviewees 14 and 15 answered my questions over the phone. The purpose of interviews 14, 15, 16 and 17 was to verify information, where except for interview 14, they were asked specifically for certain information. I had an opportunity to meet interviewee 20 in Sulaimani in June 2016, where he agreed to answer my questions by emailing the answers to me. Samples 16 and 17 are representatives of other Kurdish political parties in London, whereas interviewee 15 is based in Newcastle. Thus, samples 15, 16 and 17 are British Kurds living in the UK. As a result of my second visit to the Kurdistan region in late May and early June 2016, apart from my participation in the seventh congress of the party, I had a chance to make appointments to interview participants 18, 19, 20 and 21. Interviewees 24 and 25 provided me with extra data including union, local and general election results. Finally, interviewee 26 gave me access to the archives of the official website of the party. For the subjects involved see the list of the interviewees in the appendix.

2.3.2 Methods:

I adopted qualitative, single-case study, semi-structured interviews with the political leaders of the KIU. I conducted these interviews by using the selective

snowball technique through a member, who arranged the meetings for me with the majority of my interviewees in Sulaimani and Erbil. I asked her to get in touch with the participants and ask for their permission to interview them. First, she contacted two of the leaders in Sulaimani and got their permission to be interviewed. Then, when I visited their office, I introduced myself to two more of the leaders. Since it was Ramadhan, one of the interviewees invited me to his office in Kalar for a Ramadhan breakfast gathering in Garmian, where I had an opportunity to obtain permission of the head of *Garmian's* centre of the party. Thus, I already had four participants in Sulaimani, one in Kalar, and my contact person, who is among the party's leaders herself.

As for the Erbil interviewees, my contact person had already reached out to the assistant Secretary General of the KIU. However, he preferred the interview to take place after *Eid*. Accordingly, after the holiday of *Eid*, I went to Erbil, to the headquarters of the party. Since, most of the leaders are not originally from Erbil, and they had gone back to their relatives during the *Eid* celebration, when I visited the Secretary General, the leaders were coming to the office of the Secretary General to congratulate him on the occasion of *Eid*. This was a great opportunity for me to reel in as many participants as I wanted. On the same morning, I had a chance to interview one of them. Later that afternoon, I interviewed another one. The next day, from half past eight until noon, was spent interviewing another three participants. Finally, on the evening of the same day I visited the former Secretary General with a member of KIU's parliament at his home, where I could interview him too. I found myself with another six interviews in Erbil. The total number of interviews became 12. However, two of them were written interviews, while the other ten participants agreed to verbal interviews.


Furthermore, in May 2016 the KIU held its seventh congress, which I attended for the whole two days (28th and 29th May) in Erbil. This was a chance for me to secure three more interview promises, and after the congress (in July and August) all three answered my questions. I also had the opportunity to witness the congress in person, the content of which was documented by Speda TV channel. Later, I obtained a copy of the congress videos by contacting Mr. Abdul-Kareem Ahmad, the director of the channel. During the conference, I met most of the interviewees, as well as some of those who provided me with data and information from their offices, archives or publications. I was also able to visit the archive of the KIU's official website (Kurdiu.org) in Sulaimani after the congress, where I spent a whole day scanning previously published documents about the KIU.

For further clarification, I also examined KIU statements, manifestoes, media broadcasts and bylaws. For the interviews, I initially had fourteen questions prepared. Then, during the fieldwork, I realised that I needed more questions to elaborate, and some other questions were crucial for the success of the project. Questions one to 14 are the pre-fieldwork questions. Questions that come after the initial question were followed by a dot, such as (3. 1, 3. 2) are the set of questions needed to further clarify the research question. Also, during the fieldwork, I realized that I needed many other questions that either were crucial for my project, or were potential questions I may have needed while writing the thesis.

2.3.3 Rationale of the Research Method:

The rationale behind the selective snowball methodology comes from the nature of the study, i.e. dealing with a political party. In such situations, accessing senior officials was not possible through other methodologies as they are not easily approachable for interview. Hence, through snowball methodology, I was able to contact other available officials at the time, when I attended the headquarters in Sulaimani and Erbil, where I could select from those who had time, were ready to be interviewed by me, and were important for me to interview. When I was given more than one option to choose from, I used my prior knowledge about each member, and went for the best available participant in order to ask him/her the right question from my pre-planned list of questions. The rationale of numbering my samples from the first group during my fieldwork in summer 2012 (from 1 to 12) is to indicate their political hierarchy in the KIU. Sample number one was the Secretary General at the time. Sample number two, was the head of the leader's council of the party. Sample number three was the assistant Secretary General of the party, and so on. Thus, the numbering did not come from the subject who was interviewed first and gave me access to other samples, but it came from the importance of their position and their importance in the sequence of my interviews – who was important to come next, and why.

Therefore, I am going to highlight the key importance in selecting my samples, which simultaneously explains the selective technique that I adopted within the snowball methodology. First, for further clarification and positioning of my samples within the sequence of the interviews is shown in the following diagram:



To the right hand side of the diagram the arrow shows the Sulaimani region, where I chose six of my interviewees from a total of twelve initial interviews. To the left hand side of the diagram, the arrow shows the Erbil region, where I selected my other six samples. Starting from Sulaimani, the rationale for selecting interviewee number 8 was that he is the most influential leader, thinker and theorist among the party that calls for reform, and even known by many as the secular leader of the KIU. Almost all his recent books concentrate on changing the party into a conservative nationalist democratic party such as the AK party of Turkey. In the last (seventh) congress, in May 2016, he nominated himself as the Secretary General of the party, and according to ekurd.net got 25% of the votes. This came after publically publishing his manifesto, which informed the members of the congress as well as the whole party. Even during the congress, the NRT channel asked him in a live broadcast about his nomination, during which he reiterated as follows:

“I want the KIU to step into a transitional phase that it separates the preaching and religious affairs, and establishes a party on new bases of citizenship... a nationalist Islamic democrat party that can embrace all the people, with patriotic and political projects. It is necessary that all these Islamic political parties to be dismantled, they are all expired and regressive political forms. Then, it is necessary to form a new democratic party with Islamic reference from the substance of all of them”.

Thus, the rationale behind choosing sample number 8 was to examine the party's intra-discussions with regard to the separation of preaching and politics, reform and other issues concerning the nationalistic dimensions by the KIU.

Choosing samples 9 and 10 was due to their differences from sample number 8. Interviewee number 9 is an academic with a Shari'ah study background, and was the head of the KIU's cleric scholar office at the time. Interviewee number 10 is a cleric and was the head of the pursuance high council of the KIU. At the outset of his interview, interviewee 9 asked me whether I deliberately chose him after interviewee 8, since it was the afternoon of the same day that I had conducted my interview with interviewee 8 in the morning. I asked him why? He replied: "you might know I have different thoughts than him in certain issues, especially in regard to the issue of preaching and politics". Similarly, I intentionally wanted to interview sample number 10. This was on account of my desire to question a cleric within the KIU's officials for the purpose of diversity in their educational and political views towards the importance of nationalism.

Likewise, in Erbil it was extremely important for me to ask the selected subjects from among the other possible samples. My key contact was interviewee 3, the assistant of the secretary general, who had access to all the political bureau members and the members of the leadership council, as well as other heads of offices of the party. From the available options, I preferred to go for interviewee 2, who was the head of the leadership council and was a former minister in the KRG. The role of the KIU in preparing members for the government, and what statesmanship meant to them, was an important question to ask a former minister of the party. Through interviewee 2, I had the opportunity to interview the number one man of the party at the time. This was the best option to ask questions related to holiness, being above the law, and any kind of immunity; if there was any.

Overall, each of the selected samples held an important position, and was selected intentionally from among the other options. Although, the snowball technique might give an impression that each sample leads to another, whether it is a good sample or not, in my case, I was able to make it a selective snowball, with many options to choose from. The advantage of the snowball technique for me was that, when a suggestion came from an existing sample, I had a chance to choose those whom I thought would be a good option. Of course my prior knowledge about characteristics and suitability of the samples helped me hugely in the selective process.

2.3.4 Research Question and Hypothesis:

2.3.4.1 Research Question:

For more than two years, I thought about the research question. I wrote many questions; sometimes I had four research questions at the same time. However, after many readings, reviews, supervision, consultations, and more importantly, gathering my data, I reached the conclusion that the most concise research question for my project was the following: Is Islamism Defined by Nationalism in Kurdistan? This question answers any questions I may have about the title (Religious Nationalism in the Middle East: Islamism and Kurdistan Region of Iraq) completely. Thus, investigating this question will directly examine my hypothesis.

2.3.4.2 Hypothesis:

After much thought, I hypothesized that Islamism in Kurdistan is limited by the politics of Nationalism. This is due to the point that there were many semis organised underground by Muslim Brothers among the Kurds since the 1970s. Their priority was to preach Islamic values, and hoping for a margin of freedom to widen the circle of the '*dawa*,' calling for Islam. The opportunity presented itself after the uprising of 1991, and consequently the safe haven and provided comfort by the USA, Britain and France that was provided in Iraqi Kurdistan, which opened their eyes to the opportunity in front them, which was greater than what they expected. Thus, the goal changed from wanting a free, organized missionary was taken to the level of political parties, which from that time onward became an additional missionary advantage.

Having a political party demanded a political vision. From the political situation of that time, where Kurdistan was suffering from ideological tensions, economic sanctions, and civil war, KIU's *raison d'etre* was proven because of its moderate Islamic vision, its charitable organizations, and its efforts for mediating between the fighter parties. Then, it became one of the main political parties, accepted internally, regionally and internationally. Furthermore, they recently announced their part in mediating between the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and the Turkish government for their current peace negotiation. More importantly, it is the first political party among the main political parties of the Kurdistan Region to call for a nation state of Kurdistan. All these factors highlight the rapid growth of nationalism in the KIU within the first decade of its existence.

2.3.5 Pilot Study:

After almost seven months of starting my study, I realized that the only feasible case for my project was the KIU. This was due to many factors, such as the focus of the thesis, the accessibility to data, and its relevance. Conducting interviews as the most appropriate method of research for this study made me ponder what questions would help me create my hypothesis. I wrote the questions in English, and then asked a researcher in London to read them and give me her understanding of each question. This was to assure whether each question was clear enough to include and help assert my thesis. Then, I had to translate them into Kurdish. Shortly after arriving in Kurdistan, I showed them to a few volunteers and asked them if they understood each of them. This was crucial to validate; my Kurdish had to make sense to native speakers of the language who lived in the society of the study. None of the volunteers were participants. However, I made sure to read the questions to one low-ranking member of the KIU to see how the questions might be understood by their leaders. Overall, there were no major issues, aside from a few areas that needed minor improvements. I believe the reason behind this was my native Kurdish, and my own translations into Kurdish. After collecting my data and using quotations, I once again looked at the English version of the questions to make sure they served their purpose in the study, and matched them with the answers.

2.3.6 Materials:

Before beginning the fieldwork, I prepared a digital camcorder with an internal hard disc; this made sure that I was keeping the data by easily saving them on my external hard drive for security purposes. I also carried my digital Dictaphone with me, along with paper and pens as well. I was simultaneously recording the interviews, writing down keynotes in between, and preparing the right question to ask, especially when the interviewee's answer was going in a different direction. At other times, I had to politely redirect him or her to my question. In total, the initial interviews conducted in 2012 yielded 571 minutes of recording from ten interviewees; that equated to an average of 57.1 minutes for each of them. The other two participants, as mentioned earlier (10 and 22), preferred to answer their questions in writing. Prof. Aladdin (13) also emailed me his answers. Here, a comment regarding ethics should be mentioned considering the length of the interviews. For each interview, I allotted 40 minutes maximum, which I asked of my interviewees beforehand. However, the majority of them continued talking and gave lengthy answers. After beginning and outlining the interview to one of the participants, he replied with, "Let me give you a general introduction first, and then ask your questions." His introduction was more than one hour and a half. Consequently, he left me with a huge load of data to deal with. Overall, the length of the interviews was between 25 minutes and 145 minutes varying from one interviewee to another. Out of that collected data, I have transcriptions totalling 40,420 words. I have every video, audio recording, and electronic transcripts saved. Also, some of the participants gave me some of their books which they thought were related and beneficial to the study. Additionally, one participant ordered two CDs from the archive of the official newsletter of the KIU, which contained the majority of their

newspapers from 1994 until the summer of 2012. Interview 19, which was conducted by Skype, lasted 29 minutes. As for interviews 18 and 20, I received the answers by emails.

2.3.7 Challenges:

One of the major challenges was the fact that I began the fieldwork on the 19th of July 2012, and *Ramadhan* (the fasting month) began on the 21st of July and continued until 18th August. Hence, it was very difficult to interview my participants during the day, considering they were all fasting. Also, during daytime in July and August in Kurdistan, the heat was no less than 45 degrees C, making comfort and convenience scarce. Furthermore, at night, the participants all went to *tarawih* prayer, which makes them busy until late. Since they had to wake up before dawn to have breakfast in order to prepare for the next day's fast, they would not stay too late after *tarawih*. Therefore, during the whole month of *Ramadhan*, I could only conduct four out of twelve of my interviews. That was one third of the interviews which took three quarters of my time doing fieldwork. My return ticket was for the 31st of August, which meant I could only work until the 30th. One of my participants agreed to answer my questions in writing, so he took my questions during *Ramadhan* and sent the answers back after *Ramadhan*. Five participants were from Sulaimani. However, two out of the four interviews were conducted in *Garmian*, in the city of *Kalar*. The remaining seven interviews had to be conducted after *Ramadhan*, six of which had to be conducted in Erbil, and the seventh preferred to answer me in writing. However, after nearly three months he emailed me apologising for not being able to write anything.

Another challenge was that even in the final quarter of my time in fieldwork, there was *Eid* (feast) break, which is a four day, formal public holiday that starts directly after the last day of fasting. Therefore, I had to do the remaining seven interviews in only six days. Also, since all those seven participants were not originally from the capital Erbil, they all returned to their hometowns to visit their families and friends for *Eid* celebrations. When they came back to the capital, there were more *Eid* celebrations for them, since their fellow cadres from different apparatus of the party were visiting them to congratulate them for *Eid*. Luckily, I managed to conduct six of the interviews during that time, which as mentioned earlier, took place over only a couple of days. The seventh participant requested the questions and preferred to answer me in writing in addition to the other two; he was a member of parliament. However, I was waiting for his answers until January 2013, but he sadly emailed me to apologise for not being able to answer my questions due to his very busy schedule. For this, I had to backtrack, but with only few questions to the first person that I contacted in Sulaimani and whom helped me with facilitating my interviews. Thus she as a member of the leadership committee answered my questions and emailed them back.

Another challenge was dealing with the lengthy answers given by most of the participants. This forced me to ask many other questions to redirect them back to the point that I wanted them to touch on. However, sometimes their diverted answers raised some other issues that made me feel were important for my project, which I used later on.

Chapter Three

From Embracing Islam to the Dawn of Religious Nationalism

3.1 Introduction:

This chapter is dedicated to the general affairs of the Kurds, from first embracing Islam to the dawn of religious nationalism. It will cover the introduction of Islam into Kurdistan and the reaction of the Kurds to the new religion (taking into account the general occupation), and the threats to their existence during that time, under the occupation of the Sassanid Empire. Another subject of this chapter is the role of the Kurds during the Islamic eras, with a focus on the rise of nationalism; theories with regard to religious nationalism will also be touched on. Another section of this chapter is devoted to the period following the reign of the Ottomans, in which the Kurds faced the second major division in their history. Covered will be religious nationalism and the dichotomous relationship between religion and nationalism, or secularism and Islamism. It will also shed light on the period which spans the embrace of the Muslim Brotherhood until the establishment of Kurdish owned Islamic groups and movements. This part of the chapter will attempt to examine the way that Kurdish nationalism has evolved from religious nationalism into both secular and Islamist nationalisms, and to understand the reasons behind the chasm between the two. Furthermore, it will attempt to understand the politics of nationalism in both of its aforementioned forms, secular and Islamic, in the Middle East, by making use of the Kurdish case as an example. Finally, the

dangers of radicalisation among the Kurds, and the threat it poses to the progress of uniqueness of the Kurds within the Middle East, will be outlined.

3.2 Islam in Kurdistan:

The majority of Kurds were from the First Nations, outside Arabia, which accepted Islam with ease right at the beginning of the Islamic conquests. This, according to Hama Kareem (2006: 15), was due to the fact that:

"When the Islamic troops knocked the door of the borders of the Mount region [Kurdistan], who came to the door were not the Kurds. Although Kurds were at home, those who opened the door were the Persian troops that forcefully without the permission of the Kurds were occupying their home".

Shourush (n.d: 114), citing Muhammad Amin Zaki, has spoken about the Muslim conquerors arriving Kurdistan in the year 18 AH³⁶; it is obvious that until this date, the Kurds were under Persian rule since the latter overcame the Medes Empire. The Kurds, then, were hoping that, under the long occupation of Persia, some kind of rescue would arrive; there are, however, counter-arguments that claim that the Kurds, similarly to the Persians, were against the Islamic conquests. The stronger argument, arguably, is that which is in favor of the true acceptance of the majority of the Kurds to Islam; despite claims that some of the Kurds fought the Muslim conquerors alongside the Persians, this does not

³⁶ The Hijri calendar is the Islamic dating system deriving its name from the Hijra, the Arabic word for migration, referring to the migration of the prophet Muhammad (SWT) from Mecca to Yathrib (Medina) in the Arabian Peninsula in 622 A.D. thus marking the first year in the Islamic calendar. The first day of the Islamic calendar, 1 Muharram, 1 A.H. (Anno Hijrae) is Friday July 16, 622 A.D Julian (<http://snahle.tripod.com/higri.htm>).

change that fact that those Kurds were under the command of the Persian troop's leaders. This is similar to any other era in which they were under the control of the invaders with little alternative, such as those who served forcefully under Saddam's regime in Iraq during its war against Iran, or invading Kuwait in 1980s and 1990, or even, in some cases, against their own people; it is clear that these regimes were commanding the recruited followers to fight. This does not necessarily means that those followers were committed to such kinds of combat, especially when they were not representing their people or, on the contrary, working for foreigners. The main support for this argument comes from the long standing allegiance of the Kurds to Islam, the up-to-date religiosity of the Kurdish people, and the upholding to the mainstream of Islam.

Furthermore, Mar'i (2006a: 27) added that:

“The embracing of the Kurds to Islam, made them feel their existing as a distinct entity with their language and heritage within the Islamic entity. On the other hand, the loss of the Medes state and shrinking their civilisation role under the series of foreign states, such as the Achaemenids, the Greeks, the Parthians and Sassanids made the Kurds unsurprisingly welcoming Islam, and considering it as a transition into a better situation. Rather, it would get the Kurds out of the injustice of the Persia and complication of the Zoroastrian clerics (Magians) who had been imposing unbearable rituals and traditions on them”.

Also, Ahmad (2006: 107) in answering Aljazeera Net's question: “however, some of the Kurdish nationalists consider the Arabic Islamic conquests to be invasions and the starting epoch of dividing the Kurdish nation” stated as follows:

“With complete objectivity, without any emotions and with due respect to my Kurdish people, I say that the Kurds embraced Islam with absolute satisfaction. Similar to the Arabs, the Kurds were consisting of a group of people, and their origin goes back to the Gutians, one of the branches of the people of Zagros, who ruled Babylon for a whole century, and had a strong state. However, their state disappeared since the Persians came to the region after the Kurds by three centuries.

“Thus, the Kurds shifted from rulers to the ruled and from oppressors to the oppressed, and then they were like that until the Islamic conquest. It was natural for them to welcome the new religion which rescued them from oppression which lasted for many centuries. Therefore, there was no resistance to the Islamic conquest, but marginally. Then the Kurds were unlimitedly sincere to Islam”.

Understanding the vision of the Kurds with regard to Islam as a religion, and their stance towards it as a political entity right from the beginning, is crucial. Since that juncture, the Kurdish people have had many opportunities to demonstrate their true feelings towards Islam in the shadow of the many weaknesses that the Islamic empires have had over this time. Hama Kareem (2006: 39-40) has recorded that the following steps had been taken by the Kurds towards Islam and its troops, including the Arabs of early Islam:

"1- yet, the Islamic preaching were in *Mecca*, when the Kurds sent *Jaban* as a representative to *Mecca* and *Meddinah*, passing the news of Kurds to Islam, and bringing back the news of the prophet and Islam to the

Kurds. This is barring the representatives of *Jazira* region and the merchants of *Bajin* tribe.

2- When the Islamic troops reached *Jalawla*³⁷, before the start of war; a Kurdish delegation from *Sharazoor* arrived to the Islamic troops. Before stepping into Kurdistan territory, they secretly came to an agreement on few things away from the Persians.

3- The mentioned agreement resulted in a revolt in *Sharazoor*, which was turned a blind eye to by many of the historians. By approaching the troops of Islam to Kurdistan, according to the agreement, the Kurds in *Sharazoor, Hawraman and Sharbajer* started a popular uprising against the Persian troops and state apparatus. Hence, the region was cleared up [from the Persians]".

This is how Islam came to be introduced into Kurdistan. Contrary to the Persians, the Islamic army for the Kurds was a Salvation force; since pre-Islam, the Sassanid and the Byzantine empires were mainly occupying the whole land of Kurdistan. Thus, the Kurds were neither politically nor religiously independent and were looking for an opportunity that fulfilled time-to-time political independence and continued religious freedom. *Nawxosh* (2012: 26) states, in regard to this point, "*if Islam had not been arrived to Kurdistan, in between the Sassanid and Byzantine, a nation in the name of Kurds would not exist anymore. As a result, they would disappear like the Assyrians and Babylonians*". At the time, the Kurds had nothing to fear by trying this new growing force; Islam was not a mere belief separate from the injustice that the Kurds were suffering

³⁷ It is alleged by the contemporary Kurdish intellectuals in Kurdistan Region that *Jalawla* has being mistakenly pronounced by the non-Kurdish Muslims; otherwise its true Kurdish name is *Gulala*. Therefore, and accordingly, it is currently called *Gulala*.

under. The Kurds simply wanted to escape their oppression; by welcoming the newly growing force of the time, the Kurds hoped to get rid of the occupiers.

However, the denial of this favouring of Islam by some of the Kurdish intellectual has emerged from the zeal of nationalism that grew among the Kurds after the remapping of the Islamic world based on ethnic nationalism, and depriving the Kurds as the result of a similar right. Though during the early Islamic eras there was no nationalism in today's sense, the Kurds were one of the nations that benefited from Islam in order to regrow their entity. According to Nawxosh (2012: 7), at that time:

"Since the history of the Kurds and Persia were so close, and the absolute power was in the hand of Persian, with no power for the Kurds. This kind of shared life continued till the era of the Sassanid. This in all political, cultural and religious aspects, were in the service of the Persia. This made the Kurd, to look for an opportunity to get their freedom".

Consequently, since the collapse of Mede Empire, the Kurds once again had a chance to work on three important elements of independence. Nawxosh (2012: 8) elaborates that "Nation, language and faith were strong causes for secession of Kurds from Persian! And the Kurdish language grew in the mosques. Then they restored their independent nationhood identity from the Persian. The language, gained its own morphology, syntax and semantics, and separated from Persia".

In fact, the denial of the positive influence of Islam doesn't change the reality. The Kurds could reject Islam once it had no political power over them, at least since the abolishment of the caliphate in 1924. However, this doesn't mean that

the Kurds, as with other Muslim ethnicities over the years, had not suffered political oppression at the hands of Kurdish and non-Kurdish Muslim leaders. Overall, the majority of the Kurdish people have convincingly chosen Islam as their religion, and today they practice its rituals more than any time in the past. Simply by looking at the mosques in Kurdistan region during the *Jum'* prayers, it becomes apparent that the number of praying people has hugely increased. Also, according to the PUKonline.net quoting regional officials from the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs, even in the atmosphere of austerity in the current year of 2015, the amount of money spent by Kurds going to Saudi Arabia for visiting the holy places reached 7.5 billion³⁸ US dollars. This amount does not including other expenses with respect to 3656 pilgrimages that according to the same source have gone for the pilgrimage to Mecca this year. Moreover, had it not been for the restrictions and quotas that limit the number of people allowed to visit Mecca each year from every country, it is assumed that the number of Kurds going to Saudi Arabia would have been significantly higher.

3.3 Role of the Kurds during the Islamic Eras:

Throughout the reigns of Islam, there has always existed a semi-Kurdish self-government in different parts of Kurdistan. On many occasions, there has been more than one Kurdish rule at a time due to the fact that there were no nation states in today's sense; in addition, the tribal non-agreements between the entities led to rivalries between them, subsequently weakening them. According to the mentioned sources, most of the former Kurdish dynasties are as follows:

³⁸ Even, if this amount is not accurate, and only assuming it is 7.5 million, still it is a substantial amount of money during the current economical austerity that the region suffers from.

"*Saffarid* dynasty from the mid third century [864] to 288 AH [901] (Al-Alawi, 2010: 206), [However, Bosworth (2010) records the period as (861-1003)]. *Salarids* (300-420 AH) [912-1029] (Al-Alawi, 2010: 206). *Ardalan* Emirate (1169-1867). *Bashnawi* emirate (888-889) (Tawfiq 2010: 65). Hassanpour (1992: 50) mentions the followings dynasties in the mentioned regions:

"*Shaddadids* (951-1174, Transcaucasia). *Hasanwayhids* (959-1095, *Dinawar*). *Marwanids* (990-1096, Diyarbakir). *Annazids* (991-1117, Hulwan) had established their power in various parts of Kurdistan. These dynasties were, however, wiped out between the 11th and 15th centuries by the invasion of the Seljuq Turks (11-12th c.), the Mangols (13th century) and their successors".

Furthermore, there are other emirates³⁹ that are mentioned by the following sources: *Hakkari* emirate was a prominent Kurdish emirate for more than 500 years until its last *mir* [prince, leader] was deposed in the mid-19th century. Al-Alawi, (2010: 209-262) also mentions other Fayli Kurdish dynasties, such as "the *Fayli Atabegs*, the minor *Luriatabeg* state during the Safavids, and other *Fayli* governments, like *Nakhawis*, *Deeris*, the Fayli Kurds of Iraq". Overall, there were many, many states, emirates and sultanates throughout the

³⁹(Tawfiq 2010: 44) *Bokhti* emirate (380-420 AH/990-1029). (Shar'ati: 2013) *Shwankara* (1168-1200). (Metropolitan Museum of Art, n.d.) *Ayyubid* Dynasty (1171-1260) in Egypt, Syria, and parts of *Hijaz* (Saudi Arabia) and Yemen. (Chaliand 1993: 17-18) Emirate of *Baban* (1649-1851). (Sykes 1930: 277) the reign of *Karim* khan [Zand] (1750-1779) in Iran. (Gunter 2004b: 199) "*the ruler of the semi-independent Kurdish emirate of Botan, surrendered to the Ottomans in 1847*". (Tawfiq 2010: 83) *Jawani* emirate (1006-1012). (Tawfiq 2010: 107) *Jolamerg* emirate. (Tawfiq 2010: 117) *Chopy* emirate. (Tawfiq 2010: 125) *Hamidian* emirate. (Tawfiq 2010: 177) *Qaimari* emirate. (Tawfiq 2010: 227) *Mahrani* emirate. (Tawfiq 2010: 243) *Hazabani* emirate. (Gunter 2011b: 111).

Islamicera. Batlisi⁴⁰, (2006) classified them into four parts, more detail of which can be found in the footnotes.

Over the twentieth century, since the collapse of the Ottomans, there were attempts in different parts of Kurdistan to establish themselves as a nation state, a move which faced brutal opposition by the occupiers of Kurdistan.

⁴⁰ "Part one, is covering the rulers of Kurdistan who regarded them as kings and sultans, in five chapters. Chapter one, mentioning the rulers of *Diyarbakir, jazira [Bokhtis] (Marwanids)*. Chapter two, mentioning the rulers of *Dinawarand Sharazwr*, whom were known as *Hasanwayhids*. Chapter three, mentioning the rulers of *Fadhilwayhid*, whom were known as great *Lur*. Chapter four, mentioning the rulers of the minor *Lur*. Chapter five, mentioning the *Sultans* of Egypt and Syria, whom were famous as *Ayyobiddynasty*.

Part two, is dedicated in mentioning the great rulers of Kurdistan, whom, albeit did not reach independence level and proclaiming their sultanates, yet, they achieved currency making and being mentioned in Friday prayers. This part too, consists of five chapters: chapter one, mentioning the rulers of *Ardalan*. Chapter two, mentioning the rulers of *Hakkari*, whom were known as *Shnbo*. Chapter three, mentioning the rulers of *Amadiya*, whom were known as *Badinan*. Chapter four, mentioning the rulers of *Jazeeera*, whom were known as *Bokhti*. This chapter is subdivided into three sections. First mentioning the rulers of *Jazira*. Second mentioning the rulers of *Gurgil*. Third mentioning princes of *Fanak*. Chapter five, mentioning the rulers of *HasanKifa*, whom were known as *Malkan*.

Part three, is covering the other rulers and mirs of Kurdistan, this consists of three main branches: first, contains nine chapters: chapter one, mentioning the rulers of *Jmshkzk*, which talks about the rulers of *Mjnkurd, Prtk* and *Sqman*. Chapter two, mentioning the rulers of *Murdasi*, this contains the rulers of *Akeel, Palw* and *Charmok*. Chapter three, mentioning the rulers of *Sason (Qapljuz)* whom eventually were known as the rulers of (*Hazo*). Chapter four, mentioning the rulers of *Khezan*, which covers the rulers of *Khezan, Mks* and *Asbaeerd*. Chapter five, mentioning the rulers of *Kls*. Chapter six, mentioning the rulers of *Sherwan*, this covers three branches, the rulers of *Kifri, Irun* or *Iruhand (Kirni=Kirti=Kurti)*. Chapter seven, mentioning the rulers of (*Zrqi=Zrki*) which contains four branches: the rulers of *Drzeni, (Krdkan=Kardkan), (Itaq=Htakh)* and *Tarjeel*. Chapter eight, mentioning the rulers of *Suidi*. Chapter nine, mentioning the rulers of (*Sulaimani=Sulivani*) this consists of two branches: first, mentioning the rulers of *Qalb* and *Batman*. The second, is mentioning the rulers of *Miafarqeen*. The second branch is covered in twelve chapters: the first covers the rulers of *Soran*. The second covers the rulers of *Baban*. The third covers the rulers of *Mukri*. The fourth covers the rulers of *Bradost*, which consists of two branches: one, mentioning the rulers of (*Washni=Ashnw=Ashna*), and two, mentioning the rulers of *Somai*. Chapter five covers the rulers of *Mahmoodi*. Chapter six covers the rulers of *Danbli*. Chapter seven covers the rulers of *Zrza*. Chapter eight covers the rulers of *Astooni*. Chapter nine covers the rulers of (*Tasni=Dasniah*). Chapter ten, covers the rulers of *Kalhur*, this consists of three branches. The first, mentioning the rulers of *Plnkan*, the second, *Drtank*, and the third is on *Mahidasht*. Chapter eleven covers the rulers of *Bana*. Chapter twelve covers the rulers of *Trza*. Finally, the third branch is covered in four sub-branches: First, mentioning the rulers of *Siamansoor*. Second, mentioning the rulers of *Chnki*. Third, mentioning the rulers of *Zangana*. Fourth, mentioning the rulers of *Pazooki*.

Part four, is covering the rulers and mirs of *Badlis*.

Some examples of this opposition are as follows: Hawar (1990: 544) writes that "*the first kingdom of Kurdistan under Shaikh Mahmoud Hafeed, in Southern Kurdistan was from 1918 to 1919*", Kurdsat (2011) highlights that "*the [second] kingdom of Kurdistan [under Shaikh Mahmoud, again] lasted from 1922 to 1924*" and White (2000: 77) states that the Republic of Ararat lasted from 1927-1930. In addition, Ervand (1982: 217-18) states that the Republic of Kurdistan in *Mahabad* remained only eleven months (1946-47), while De Waal, (2003: 183) writes of *Lachin* Kurdish Republic in 1992.

Despite the fact that there were a number of self-governances at different levels by the Kurdish rulers throughout the reigns of Islamic, notably the Ardalan dynasty, lasted for 700 years. However, this has been rare due to certain factors, such as disagreements between the rulers of different regions (and, in some case, those within the same region), as well as their links and allegiance to different greater powers, like the Ottomans and Safavids, and religious differences, being divided between Sunni and Shiias. Plus, due to the non-existence of the notion of race-based nationalism, the Kurds did not benefit from uniting all the Kurds under a single self-ruling state; there were no nationalistic feelings under the banner of Islam. For the same reason, for hundreds of years different nations had accepted the ruling of a single dynasty, such as the *Umayyads*, the *Abbasids* or the *Ottomans*. On the same basis, other nations also came to accept the ruling of *Ayyubid* in Egypt, Syria, *Hijaz* and Yemen.

Snnw (1998: 113-14) has commented on the situation of the Kurdish principalities in terms of their internal relations, as follows:

"Since the eighteenth century, the *Baban* principality became the most powerful Kurdish principality. However, due to the internal family conflicts

between the princes, the principality weakened in the following century. This gave the opportunity to the *Soran* principality to appear as the most powerful among the Kurdish principalities. As for the *Badinan* Principality, it was in conflict with both *Baban* and *Soran* principalities".

The situation with the other none Kurdish regions was similar to this during this period of the Ottoman Empire. Snnw (1998: 114-15) adds that:

"Up-till the early nineteenth century, the Kurdish principalities in the Ottoman state had kept their internal independence. However, this situation had not last long, especially during the reign of Sultan *Mahmoud* the second (1808-1839) when the Ottomans were strengthening and widening their central power. He defeated Ali Pasha (*Tabln*) in Albania in 1822, and controlled Tripoli (Libya), Baghdad and Mosul between 1831 and 1835. During this new policy, the Ottomans tried to defeat all the [semi-independent] Kurdish tribes and Principalities, which led to many revolutions by the Kurds to defend their rights. This continued over the nineteenth century".

In terms of the nationalist critics to these entities, there is an arguably, unfair critical judgment towards Salahaddin and his Ayyubid dynasty among the Kurds, with regard to failing to achieve nation statehood for the Kurds by exercising their power widely over time. This, one could argue, is not a realistic criticism; the Ayyubids were ruling outside the land of Kurds. If there was a racial sentiment among those people, they would never have accepted the Ayyubids to rule over their people and land; if such a criticism is legitimate, it would also have to be leveled at the other Kurdish dynasties that were ruling over the land of Kurdistan and the Kurdish people. Nonetheless, this is still an

unrealistic judgment, as it concerns a different situation and different sense of allegiances, which cannot be aligned with nationalism in today's sense. The nationalist sentiment came to the Islamic world as late as the second part of the nineteenth century.

It can be argued, therefore, there was no clear-cut nationalism among the Kurds during that time, which was also the case with the other Muslim nations. By looking at the Kurdish nationalist movements and their revolutions since the second part of the nineteenth century, one clearly notices a call by the Kurds for nation statehood over Kurdistan, on the part of Shaikh Ubaidullah Nahri. Snnw (1998: 123) remarks:

"In the 1880 revolution, we notice that a fundamental modification had occurred to the thought of Shaikh Ubaidullah and to his plan. Before that revolution, the Kurds used to revolt for [some tactical demands], or to obtain further self-ruling and strengthening themselves in their lands, not to establish an independent entity to contain [all] the Kurds of the Sultanate [Ottomans] and Persia together. With the second revolution of Shaikh Ubaidullah in 1880, the situation changed. For the first time in the history of the Kurdish movements in the nineteenth century, a Kurdish leader lonely comes to arise within the Kurdish tribal and feudal society, the Kurdish issue in a unique nationalistic rhetoric to call for uniting all the Kurds in a single independent entity, using terms such as 'nation' and 'homeland', and concentrating on the racial and cultural antagonism of his people".

Noticeably, Shaikh Ubaidullah was theorising a complete religious nationalism, and nation building, on the land of Kurdistan. Furthermore, Snnw (1998: 123) highlights that "*when Shaikh Ubaidullah started his revolution in September and October of 1880, he sent two letters to Joseph Cochran, the American physician and Presbyterian missionary in Kurdistan, and to Iqbal al-dawla, the Persian ruler of Urmia*". Snnw (1998: 123) quoted the first letter, which states "*the Kurdish nation, consisting of more than 500,000 families, is a people apart. Their religion is different (to that of others), and their laws and customs are distinct...*". This is what makes Shaikh Ubaidullah distinct among all the Kurdish leaders; his idea was that of complete nation building on the basis of race, religion and law. As for race, the Kurds are an independent people. The differences in religion and law originate from the fact that the Kurds are *Shafi'isMazhab*(jurisprudence), which differs from the *Shia Jafaris* of Iran (that which that the Safavids created their nation state of Iran on) and the *Hanafi* of Turkey. Yet, despite the divided nature of Kurdistan, this is the strongest dimension of the Kurdish nation; Kurds being primarily Sunni Shafi'is makes them different than all other surrounding Muslim nations of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.

3.4 Post Ottomans Empire:

3.4.1 Collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the Kurd:

After the Ottomans, and especially after the Great War, the Middle East witnessed enormous changes in its political environment; a new map shadowed over the region, many new nation states emerged, and new political tensions

came to exist. All of this came into effect in a world that was described by Lazarif (2007: 15) as follow "*In early twentieth [of the 20th century] the world was relatively stable. That came after many years of bloody wars and devastations, which was followed by political and economic turmoil. Then, generally, the situation became more stable in the Middle East too, except one region: Kurdistan*".

This new era for the Kurds brought with it much grief; regionally, and internationally, the situation had turned against them. As Lazarif (2007: 15) witnessed "*indeed, the land of Kurds was boiling, since the people neither wanted appeasement with their situation under the repression, nor with the many promises regarding their self-determination⁴¹, which all the promises remained just a piece of paper*".

Not only did the Kurds not get the right to self-determination, but the new epoch also further fragmented them in between the newly emerged states, such as Turkey, Iraq and Syria, who all gained sovereign statehood in lieu of Kurdistan. In this regard, Lazarif (2007: 15) underlines the following:

"Nothing changed in regards of Kurdistan's boundaries, but its inner boundaries, that separate the Northern Kurdistan and North Western (Turkey's Kurdistan) from Southern Kurdistan and South Western (Iraq and Syria), that formed the international borders between Turkey, Iraq and Syria. The borders between Turkey's Kurdistan [northern Kurdistan]

⁴¹ Self-determination: National self-determination was the principle applied to the break-up of Austria, German, and Ottoman Empires by President Woodrow Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' after the First World War. It is also embodied in the charter of the United Nations, in the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence of Colonial Countries and Peoples, and in the 1970 Declaration of the Principles of International Law. (McLean. I., & McMillan, A., 2003: 483).

and Iraqi Kurdistan [Southern Kurdistan], and between Iranian Kurdistan [Eastern Kurdistan]⁴² with Iraqi Kurdistan remained stable".

If the Kurds of the Ottoman Empire remained under one of the newly formed states, this would have, in the long run, been much easier in terms of their struggle towards self-determination and the establishment of a united Kurdistan.

The international community after the Great War also dealt with the issue of the Kurds from the point of view of the British; the British mandate that was ruling over Southern Kurdistan was viewing the issue of the Kurds' right to nationhood in terms of its own political interests. However, some Kurdish intellectuals claim that this decision was ideological. This is unlikely, as the promises laid out in Sevres⁴³ treaty for the Kurds were under the supervision of the allies, Great Britain among them; if there were any hidden agendas against the Kurds, they would not mention the Kurds and their rights at all. However, when, a conflict of interest between the British and the Kurds wish for nation statehood occurred, the treaty of Lausanne⁴⁴ was proposed. In this treaty, the British wanted to

⁴² The Treaty of Zuhab [Zahaw] in 1639 between the **Ottoman** and **Persian** Empires formally established their border that had been unofficially marked after the Ottoman victory at the **Battle of Chaldiran** in 1514. The importance for the Kurds is that this border separated them between these two great Middle Eastern empires and in effect still largely exists today in the border between **Turkey** and **Iran**. (Gunter, 2011: 313).

⁴³ The stillborn Treaty of Sevres signed in August 1920 provided for "local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish area"(Article 62) and in Article 64 even looked forward to the possibility that "the Kurdish peoples" might be granted "independence from Turkey." (Gunter, 2011: 6).

⁴⁴ Although the Treaty of Sevres (1920) held out the possibility of Kurdish independence, as mentioned above, the definitive Treaty of Lausanne (1923) made no mention of the Kurds. What is more, the British already had decided to attach the largely Kurdish *vilayet* of Mosul to Iraq because of its vast oil resources. The British felt that this was the only way Iraq could be made viable. (Ibid: 14).

compromise Turkey, but were not ready to give up their oil reserves for Turkey or France.

This policy was an ongoing cause of unrest for the Kurdish issue, as well as for the people of Kurdistan and the surrounding states on which Kurdistan was divided, despite the fact that the British were aware of the consequences of such a decision. Lazarif (2007: 51) gives a brief outline of the history of Kurdish national demands and the main players in this process before the division of Kurdistan:

“It is well known that the turmoil that started in Kurdistan, initiated in the early decades of the nineteenth century, and spread to a wide area throughout the century, and in the early of the following century. At that time, it used to be an internal affair of the Ottoman Empire and Iran. This was a concern for two major colonial states: Czarist Russia and the Great Britain. Then the circle of the concern by the major countries to the Kurdish issue widened in the period that followed after the peace reconciliation in the Middle East (1918-1923). This concern grew after the war, and at the price of France and the United States of America. However, as far as the Kurds concerned, the problem had not been resolved, neither for the Middle Easterners nor for the major western countries that had connection to it”.

Although the Kurds became the victims of imperialist interests, according to Lazarif (2007: 52) *“the very wide trend by the writers, journalists, politicians and historians in the West as well as in the East, those who study the situation in*

Kurdistan, are to look at it from the non-Kurdish perspective". This is primarily due to their orientalist point of view, which tried to label the Kurdish nationalist movements, and their leadership, 'reactionaries'. This was an attempt to prove that the Turks, Arabs and Persians were far more civilized than the Kurds, and that they should be punished accordingly. Lazarif (2007: 52-53) highlights some writers of this kind of propaganda, who described the Kurds as 'backwarders' in all aspects, both as social and cultural. They also labeled Kurdish society as being dominated by the tribal and feudal system, with no intellectual class.

3.4.2 From Kurdish Religious Nationalism to Dichotomy into Religious or Nationalists:

Basically in the Kurdish case, religious Shaikhs led the nationalist movements which appeared in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, most notably Shaikh Ubaidullah Nahri, who was struggling to establish a nation state within Kurdistan on the basis of Islam. Dashti (2014) argues "*Shaikh Ubaidullah Nahri is considered to be the first Kurdish leader, who was calling for the establishment of the independent state of Kurdistan*". Since there was no clear-cut distinction between the religion and nationalism in that period, religious nationalism continued until the revolts of Shaikh Mahmud Hafeed in southern Kurdistan and Shaikh Sa'id Piran in northern Kurdistan in 1925. Karwani (2008: 15) notes that "*from the great Shaikh Ubaidullah, till Shaikh (Abdulsalam) Barzani, Shaikh Mamhood, Shaikh Sa'id Piran, Qazi Muhammad, and their revolutions and uprisings were all started with a combination of popular Islamic motives*".

However, this kind of combination, with both Kurds and non-Kurds, did not last; according to Karwani (2008: 15):

“with the appearance and spreading around the modern ideologies, such as secularism, Islamism, especially Marxism and the new Islamic ideology, also the new era of the military *Coup d'états*, and the backwardness authoritarian nationalist regimes in the region, the issue of Islam and nationalism, widely were presented as problematic, and as two contradictory polar. Then, both were presented as alternative to each other”.

A raw model for nationalists in the Middle East was the *Kemalists*; from the Reza Shah of Iran to the later nationalists in the Arab world, all followed the extremism of the *Kemalists*, in the sense that they all undermined the religious extent of their nationalism. Despite the prominence of religion in all Kurdish nationalist movements, the later Kurdish nationalists also followed suit with regard to *Kemalism*. Over the entire region, as Karwani (2008: 14) observed:

“the Collide of nationalism and the region’s value system, had led to different kinds of reactions. At the outset, nationalism more was appearing in a sense of nation and land loving, with sympathy to the fellow citizens. Though, at this level too, nationalism and the traditional Islamic culture had a shared resistance movement against the occupiers and the colonialists”.

As a result, religious and secular figures began to diverge and the whole issue of secular nationalism was questioned by later Islamists. Karwani (2008: 14) explains that:

“..., nationalism in the east, similar to many other notions and trends, couldn't maintain its natural progress and reach its natural results. In the west, nationalism, due to its good extent that filled the spiritual vacuum, that the radical critique, and the enlightenment had against Christianity in the form of the church. While, here [Islamic World], religion has occupied a wide area of the human's spiritual and material life. Contrary to the west, nationalism here didn't become a framework for cultivation of political liberalism and democracy”.

In fact, the hyper secularism that varies from a region to another, starting with Turkey, day after another widened the gap between nationalists and non-secular nationalists. Those non-secular nationalists later were called Islamists. With reference to Kurdistan, although the notion of Islamism and Islamists did not clearly appear till 1980s, this was due to the fact that Kurdistan was not an independent state like Turkey, Iran or the Arab states. However, the same factors that led to the appearance of Islamism in the region were also present here; Siwayli (2009b: 20); Erwani (2004: 62); Ali (1999: 26); explain that:

"if we need to talk about the beginning and historical roots of the Islamic trend in Southern Kurdistan, it is difficult to determine its beginning. In order to know its beginning, we need to note two main important reasons that affected all the Islamic trends over the Islamic world. The first effect, that affected the start of the contemporary Islamic trend, was the religious reform movement that was led by Jamaladin Al-Afghani (1839-1896), Muhammad Abda (1849-1905) and Muhammad Rashid Ridha (1865-1935)".

A religious reform, demanded by a small stratum of the religious elites, took place over the Ottoman Empire; for them, all of the political, economic and military declines were down to the influence of the old regime and non-religious reforms. This attitude was also present among the Kurdish scholars too. According to Siwaili (2009b: 20):

"The influence of the above scholars had reached Kurdistan in the early twentieth century. The grand Mulla of Koya was influenced by those new ideas. Accordingly, he was propagating for religious reforms. He was even hopping to meet them and to write the Islamic teachings for the Muslim people".

Arguably the greatest factor that led to this dichotomy, and concentrated the religious dimension, is highlighted by Siwaili (2009b: 21) here: "*the second effect was the abolishment of the Islamic caliphate in 1924. Although, the legitimacy of the Ottoman caliphate was debated, however, its abolishment was considered as a deadly hit. Since, the caliphate was a spiritual symbol for the Muslims*". This was the catalyst for the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt by Hassan Al-Bana in 1928. As for southern Kurdistan, a clear Islamic political movement appeared quite early on, even before the Muslim Brotherhood. Siwaili (2009b: 22) records that:

"after the battle of *Darbandi Bazian* [in 1919], and capturing Shaikh Mahmoud by the British, two political parties were established in Sulaimani, which later they united in a front. Those two parties were (*Parti Nishtmani Kurd, Parti Islami Kurdi*) (the Kurdish Patriotic Party, and the Kurdish Islamic Party). The Kurdish Islamic party was against the

British, they willed to agree with the Turks, if they would acknowledge the independence of Kurdistan".

Similarly, another attempt was recorded by Siwaili (2009b: 23) as "*in 1934 Abdullah Beg, the son of Ahmad Beg, Shaho; the poet, along with other figures in Halabja established an Islamic party, in the name of (Hizbi Islami Kurd⁴⁵) (the Kurdish Islamic Party)*". During this time there was not a dichotomous relationship between secularism and Islam in Kurdistan, like that of other neighboring countries; this indicates the depth of such political thought among the Kurds. Abdulaziz (2016b: 100) claims that:

"This Kurdish Islamic Party had influence on a huge number of later intellectuals, whether in southern Kurdistan, such as the prime cadres of Brotherhood party and *Darkaw* party, then Hiwa party. Or in *Mukrian* and eastern Kurdistan generally, which started few organisations, such as (*Ithadi* Mohammadi) the party of Mohammadian Union, (*Hizbi Azadixwazi* Kurdistan) the Liberal Party of Kurdistan, and the later (JK)".

For Siwaili (2009b: 24-25):

"The establishment of (*Parti Islami Kurdi*, the Kurdish Islamic Party) and (*Hizbi Islami Kurd*, the Kurdish Islamic Party) at that period of time raises few questions. It is my belief that the establishment of those two parties away from any external influences; they were the outcome of the political and social situation of the time in Southern Kurdistan. The founders of those political parties wanted to benefit from Islam to serve their nation, and lift up its sufferings. For us, we can say that the establishment of

⁴⁵ Abdulaziz, O., 2016 traces the date of the establishment of this party to 1933.

those two Islamic parties becomes a beginning for the Islamic trend of Kurdistan".

As previously mentioned, the mosques had an important role in Kurdistan after the Kurdish people embraced Islam; under the prolonged occupation by Persia of the Kurdish identity, their language was under the threat of disappearance, as with other nations under similar circumstances. Similarly, after the appearance of nationalism and the division of Kurdistan, the mosques assumed the same role, that of protecting the national identity of the Kurds. This kind of role was noticed even in the Christian world by Juergensmeyer (1993: 135-6), who noted the churches resistance to forceful change:

"The polish church was one of the primary purveyors of the spirit of polish nationalism. Its central role was especially evident during the czars' attempts to Russify the areas of Poland they controlled by forcing the churches to embrace the Orthodox faith. These unsuccessful attempts reinforced the image of the polish Church as a bulwark of Polish nationalist culture".

We can compare the Kurdish case to the Polish one, in terms of the role of the church in sustaining and preserving Polish nationalism against attempts of Russification, and changing their nationality by converting their church to an Orthodox denomination. There are two useful examples here; the first is the process of the Safavid, which succeeded in converting some of the Kurds to Shi'ias and ultimately led to the controversy of identifying as Kurds, and the second is the majority who resisted the change and maintained their pure

nationality, primarily due to them maintaining Sunnism against the new imposed Shi'ism. This comparison brings to light the failure of the Kurdish religious figures to create a religious nationalism that would distinguish them as their own nation, alongside the Safavid and the Ottomans. For the late Ottomans and the era of nationalism, as was discussed above, disagreement among the religious orders and the tribes were the primary obstacles facing the dissident Shaikhs and their nationalist attempts. Above all, the Shafi'i jurisprudence was fundamental in the uniqueness of the Kurds, if used for that purpose. However, it was the mosque, far before the appearance of secularism in Kurdistan, which defended the concept of Kurdish identity and presented all the leaders of the Kurdish nationalist movements until the establishment of the Republic of Kurdistan in Mahabad, Eastern Kurdistan, in 1946. Abdulaziz (2016b: 17) argues that "the mosques and its graduates in Kurdistan had significant roles in the revolutions, revolts and organisations of Kurdistan. Even, in many occasions the pioneers and the leaders were from the educated elites of the mosques, the Shaikh order Khanaqas⁴⁶, and the scholars, Mulas, their students, and the judges".

3.4.3 Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic awakening in Kurdistan:

Although the political situation in Kurdistan was different than that of the Arab states, due to the unique situation of the Kurds lack of nation statehood, among the Kurdish Muslim scholars there was a yearning similar to that of Islamic

⁴⁶ A khanaqa or tekiye is a religious meeting place for a sufi or dervish ritual gathering (majlis). The inside looks like a simple mosque with a mihrab (prayer niche) but no minbar (pulpit where Friday prayers are said). Portraits of sheikhs, flags, and the silsila, the spiritual pedigree or chain of transmission that links a sufi master with the founder of his particular tariqa (mystical path), as well as sharp objects used during ceremonies distinguish a khanaqa from a regular mosque. Gunter (2011b :160).

revivalism in Arab countries; this situation was no different to that of the rest of Iraq in this respect. Siwaili (2009b: 25) records that "after the establishment of the Iraqi state, few Islamic associations had been established in Iraq. Most of those associations had opened their branches in the cities of Kurdistan, and had activities. Mostly, they had activities in Islamic preaching, charity, education and cultivation of Islamic culture".

Examples of those associations were, as Siwaili (2009b: 25-28) mentions, "*the Islamic Youth Association and the Islamic Guidance Association*"; for all of the Islamic associations in Iraq, there were branches in the main Kurdish cities based upon the network of scholars between the cities of Baghdad, Mosul and the Kurdish cities. This was the dawn of a new kind of apolitical activity among the religious Kurdish elites, as well as the Arabs of Iraq. According to Siwaili (2009b: 28) "*the various activities of those associations had become a beginning for many other associations, especially after the Second World War. The Muslim Brotherhood had benefited from the experience of those associations and followed them*".

All the above Islamic activities paved the way for the Muslim Brotherhood to cross its way into Iraq. Abdulhamid (2009: 17) highlights that:

"the first contact between the Muslim Brotherhood and Iraq was when Dr. Hussain Kamaladin came to Baghdad, and was appointed as a professor at the Engineering College. His students found him to be an Islamic *Da'iah* [caller or missionary]. He attracted them with his deep Islamic modern knowledge, his humbleness, decentness and his ability in teaching his subject".

Siwaili (2009b: 31) adds that:

"the beginning of arrival of the Muslim Brotherhood to Iraq was through Egyptian scholars, who, with the intention of spreading the Brotherhood, came to Iraq. In the beginning of 1940 a group of Egyptian scholars came to Iraq, among them were Shaikh Al-Ahmar, who in Basra and Zubair started calling for the Muslim Brotherhood thought. Also in 1942, on the demand of the leadership of the Brotherhood, (Hussain Kamaladin and Muhammad Abdulhamid Ahmad) came to Iraq to spread the Muslim Brotherhood thought".

Indeed, when we look at the spread of the Muslim Brotherhood outside Egypt, we can see three patterns of expansion. First were those importing it through scholars who used to be studying in Egypt and had since returned to their own countries, most notably Syria and neighboring countries. Second were those exporting the idea by sending missionaries via the Muslim Brotherhood, as in the case of Sudan. The third consisted of migration on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders after their crises with the Egyptian regime, for example that of Libya and the Arab Gulf States; in case of Iraq, first and second patterns were the most prominent.

Gradually, a number of students at the University of Baghdad embraced the thought of the Muslim Brotherhood. Siwaili (2009b: 32) observed that "*the first organisational cell in Baghdad was in the engineering college*"; he mentions some of the names, a few of which were Kurds. Abdulhamid (2009: 22) adds that "[Abdulhamid's] brother Nidhamadin was from the first individuals whom were cultivated on the hand of Dr. Hussain Kamaladin in Baghdad. Then between 1955 and 1960 was the head of the branch of the Brotherhood in

Erbil". This was the beginning of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq, which began gaining followers among university students which then, with the return of Muhammad Mahmood Al-Sawaf from Egypt, spread among the scholars. Abdulhamid (2009: 20) states that "*When Muhammad Mahmood Al-Sawaf returned to Iraq in 1946, he found a solid ground to work on. This was due to the existence of many youth who were cultivated by Dr. Hussain Kamaladin*".

When Al-Sawaf returned to Iraq, he began with the Islamic associations; according to Abdulhamid (2009: 21) "*he became a member of both the Islamic Guidance Association that was led by Shaikh Qasim Al-Qaisi, the national Mufti of Iraq, and the Islamic Moral association, which was led by Shaikh Amjad Al-Zahawi*". Shaikh Amjad Al-Zahawi was a Kurd and thus with those Islamic associations and the well-known Shaikh's among them, this became a springboard for Al-Sawaf and the Muslim Brotherhood. Abdulhamid (2009: 21) elaborates:

"then Al-Sawaf with cooperation of Shaikh Al-Zahawi, and some other prominent Shaikhs established the Islamic Brotherhood Association. Indeed, this association was (the Muslim Brotherhood). They wouldn't name it so, because the law would not allow any association with the same name of another association in other countries".

Over time, the Islamic Brotherhood disseminated into in various cities of Iraq, such as Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk, Basra, Sulaimani and Rumadi (Abdulhamid, 2009: 27-31).

Abdulaziz (2016b: 245) highlights another Islamic local movement stating that:

“it has been mentioned in some other resources that a political organisation called (*YaketiQutabianiAyni*” the Religious Student Union, allegedly in 1954 secretly was established in Sulaimani. Its objective was social reforms. They had a publication was called (*DangiFaqe*⁴⁷) the voice of *Faqe*, this was distributed secretly in Sulaimani, Kirkuk, Hawler and Diala”.

The evidence suggests that the acceptance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq was in a missionary capacity; despite the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood was, at that time, working at a political level, in Iraq the motive was on more of an individual level. In other words, in a multi-ethnic society like that of Iraq, Arabic and Kurdish nationalism did not yet exist among the Islamists. This was the case even in 1960, when the Iraqi Islamic Party was established on the same Islamic principles that combined Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens. Abdulhamid (2009: 53) records that, at the first conference of the party in 1960, Shaikh Osman Abdulaziz gave a speech on behalf of the scholars of Kurdistan. However, the establishment of the party demanded a political vision on certain issues. Abdulhamid (2009: 55) quotes Ch. 6, Article 37 of the party’s charter (1960), as follows:

"The party believes in the necessity of the unity of Iraq between all the citizens on the basis of their Iraqi nationalities. It considers Iraq as a part of the Arab nation, which must unite in a strong state on the basis of Islam, not any other principle. So, this single state becomes the core for the universal Islamic unity between all the Islamic nations. Thus, there

⁴⁷*Faqe*: is a term called to a student who studies Islamic Fiqh (Jurisprudent). Normally, they are studying in mosques and taught by religious scholars.

must be one Islamic state that combines all the Muslims in the whole world”.

This particular article articulates two important issues. Firstly, it emphasises the strategic road-map of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology, whose official aim was, initially, to unite the Islamic lands and create an Islamic caliphate. Secondly, when the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood became a political party, the political situation of the time demanded a stance on the Kurdish issue in particular. This was a way to deny the national rights of the Kurds, in a sense of a failure to recognize an independent nation state for the Kurds; however, the article was also recognizing the equal rights of the Kurds side by side with the Arabs, on the basis of Iraqi nationality. This was exactly the terms the Kurdish national movement was demanding, as this was later adopted by the Kurdish revolution in 1961 to gain their rights within the Iraqi state.

Throughout 1960s, until the ban on the Iraqi Islamic party (IIP) in 1971, Kurdish Islamists remained working within the party rather than joining the Kurdish revolution. This was due to two reasons outlined above, as well as the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), as the leading party of the revolution, being similar to all the nationalist parties in Iraqi Kurdistan, which was, ideologically, not an ideal model for Islamic figures to follow. Proclaimed in its bylaw since its third congress in 1953, this was highlighted by Ahmad (2012) as follow “[the members of the third congress of the KDP] *wrote a new bylaw for the party, with the most dangerous article that recognised Marxism-Leninism to be utilised as a programme for the party*”. Furthermore, during the revolution of 1976, led by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the leftist ideology deepened further; Stansfield (2003: 85) traces the origins of the PUK to “*several interrelated*

factors, the origin division within the KDP between the Barzani-wing and the Ahmad-Talabani faction". According to him, this division led to the basis of a new organisation. Stansfield (2003: 85) elaborates "The growth of left-wing political idea, culminating in the establishment of *Komala* is a further important factor. It is from the structure of the PUK was dependent upon the organisation of *Komala* as it was the only political grouping operating on a reasonably large scale within Iraqi Kurdistan".

After banning the IIP, alongside other political parties such as the Al-Ba'ath Party, the Kurdish Muslim Brotherhood stayed deactivated until the late 1970s/early 1980s. At this time, particularly during the Iraq-Iran war, many of them fled the military to the Iraqi refugee camps in Iran, where they began their activities. Also, due to the loose control of the Iraqi regime over some Kurdish cities and towns, such as Halabja, another group of them became active on a local level. At this time, apart from the later *Salafism* trend, almost all Islamic activity among the Sunni Iraqis in both Arabic and Kurdish societies had, in one way or another, a historical link to the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq. Nonetheless, among the Kurds, this activity remained at an individual level due to the stronghold of Sufi and Darwish orders, and the political aftermath of the Kurdish revolution. After the Iranian revolution of 1979, and proclamation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Islamic activities increased worldwide, including in Iraq and Kurdistan. During the same period, Afghani Jihad and Salafism preaching had a significant role in attracting the youth to the mosques. Overall, the so called 'Islamic awakening' started to be noticed in Kurdistan throughout 1980s.

3.4.4 Kurdish Nationalism and rise of Marxism and Socialism:

Initially, all the Kurdish nationalist movements were led by religious figures in all parts of Kurdistan. However, by the middle of the twentieth century, under the influence of secular nationalists throughout the Middle East, Kurdish nationalists, too, started holding a secular banner. Although the issue of secularism remained an issue for the political elites, as the masses had no idea of such ideologies, for religious figures the situation was very different; the clearer secularism became, the more those religious figures distanced themselves from seculars and their movement. The masses, and even the overwhelming majority of supporters of Kurdish nationalist movements, had neither the interest nor understanding regarding secularism. They all nonetheless agreed about advocating the Kurdish issue, with no knowledge of the ideology that the political elites were calling for. I remember in 1984, during a demonstration led by the affiliate members of the PUK in my home town Kalar in Southern Kurdistan, one of the slogans was "*we are the sons of Marx, with no fear of the death*", which was loudly repeated by the demonstrators, with little attention being paid to the actual meaning of the slogan. Personally, till few years later I had no idea who or what was Marx. Later on, when I started thinking and remembered that particular slogan I asked few friends who also participated in the demonstration about their realisation of that slogan and its meaning. I couldn't find a single person of that range of age knowing what was going on. The only thing that made all of us to take part in the demonstration was our enthusiasm and courage, not Marx or Marxism.

By 1946, the majority of Kurdish politicians who were inspired by the idea of a republic of Kurdistan came to an agreement in order to establish a political party which combined them all. Ahmad (2012) remarks:

"When the Democratic Party for the Iranian Kurdistan was established on 16th February 1945 it was led by Qazi Muhammad, and its struggle was specified for the Iranian Kurdistan. This made Barzani think about a similar step, especially, after the arrival of Hamza Abdullah to Mahabad to tell Barzani about the desire of the Kurdish political parties for establishing a Kurdish political party from all the Kurdish parties in Iraq. On this basis, Barzan with Hamza Abdullah and the Iraqi Kurdish military officers formed a party and named it the Kurd Democratic Party-Iraq; they also wrote its bylaws. Thus, territorial and regional Kurdish political parties came to exist, whereas before, the political parties and organisations were established for the whole of Kurdistan".

It can be discerned from this that, during that time, there were already a number of Kurdish political parties, with different ideologies and objectives. However, the proclamation of a Kurdistan Republic in Mahabad enhanced their political motive and unified them around a nationalist objective; they wanted a nationalist figure that had cross-party appeal, such as Barzani. However, Stansfield (2003: 64) argues that "*it is likely that Hiwa [Party] saw Barzani as a vehicle for the nationalist cause, and intended to discard him once the objective of the autonomy was obtained*". To a large extent, this was similar to the Iranian revolution of 1979, as well as the revolutionist and opposition political parties of Iran at the time of Khomeini. Desired was a figure who represented multicultural Iran, but who the majority Shi'as could support; for the secular political elite,

Khumaini was merely a bridge for the period of the revolution. Nevertheless, in both cases, Barzani and Khumaini both later controlled the situation though, unlike Khumaini, the secular elite among the Kurdish politicians had, once Barzani came back from the Soviet Union after the coup d'état of 1958 by Abdul Kareem Qasim, adopted socialism as the pathway of the party. Indeed, this was the real dichotomy present in traditional Kurdish nationalism, from being religiously led to being governed by secularism.

Barzani had his own ideas, and didn't become the vehicle that Hiwa or the leftists might have hoped; right from the formation of the party, this became obvious. Stansfield (2003: 66) refers to the first congress of the party, and Barzani's agenda, as follow:

"The new KDP held its first congress in Baghdad on 16 August 1946. The thirty-two delegates elected a central committee with Hamza Abdullah as secretary-general, Barzani as president-in-exile, and Sheikh Latif and Ziyad Agha as vice-president. The balance in the leadership Barzani supported saw the position of secretary-general going to a leftist, and two tribal elders in the positions of vice-President".

Also, Ahmad (2012) comments on this moment in the party's history as follows"*...furthermore, the leadership of the new party became under the control of the communists of Shorh, and the Marxists of Rzgari. The central committee was comprised of four members from the right nationalist Hiwa party, three members of the Kurdish communists, and three members from the Rzgari party*".

Hence, from the moment the party was formed, there was a new kind of nationalism that differentiated itself from previous nationalistic movements; the party, from the perspective of the religious figures, was not in line with its nationalist movement predecessors, especially with Barzani leading the party, who was known as a Mulla who was not in the country. The party at this time was not adhering to any particular ideology, though the majority of its leaders were known as anti-religion. This led to the conclusion of the third congress of the party, highlighted here by Ahmad (2012):

"the third congress of the party that was held in Kirkuk in January 1953 was a dangerous indication in the history of the party, where Ibrahim Ahmad changed the name of the party to 'Kurdistan Democratic Party'. That was an important progress in political thought of the party, because it achieved a shift from the idea of a people to the idea of the homeland. Also, they wrote a new bylaw for the party, with the most dangerous article that recognised Marxism-Leninism to be utilised as a programme for the party. By doing so, they made away with the communists accusations and swept across its masses in Kurdistan".

Yet, Abdulaziz (2016b: 117) considers the formation of the Hiwa party in 1939 as the ideological dichotomy of the Kurdish organisation. Also, he records that when the KDP was formed in 1946, the Kurdish communist members of the Iraqi communist party joined it. Abdulaziz (2016b: 118).

For reasons outlined previously, the party was not ideal from the point of view of Kurdish religious figures; throughout the Middle East during this period, due to western colonialism and to avoid being labeled reactionists or pro-imperialism, almost all of the nationalist parties aligned themselves with Marxism and

socialism. However, there was a crucial element missing with regard to the ideology of these nationalist movements and this was the issue of the myth, memories and symbols of those nationalist movements (including the Kurdish one). For the religious elites, this was a fundamental element of any kind of movement, particularly as, during the same period of time, there was an alternative, the Muslim Brotherhood, who provided pure Islamic myth, memories and objectives. For the Kurdish religious figures, this was especially important as, contrary to other nation groups, the Kurds were on the road towards nation building.

For the religious figures, Kurdish myths, memories and symbols were drawn from their history, in which they are purely Islamic, something which all previous movements had already proved. Furthermore, linking Kurdish nationalism to communism and socialism was an alien concept to Muslim societies, including the Kurds. As with the other nationalisms in the region, the Kurdish one faced a kind of dichotomy due to the deprivation of the Kurds from their nation state right, which made the strengthened the Kurdish seculars at the cost of the Islamists. As Githens-Mazer (2006: 8) elaborates:

"Myths, in the context of ethnic groups and nations, serve to 'establish and determine' a nation's foundation and system of values, creating a set of beliefs put forward as a narrative about the group itself. The value of national myths, memories and symbols comes from their being 'founded on living traditions of the people (or segments thereof) which serve both to unite and to differentiate them from their neighbours'".

As for the religious figures during this period, the Kurdish people never objected to their values, despite suffering a political inequality. Over time, especially after

the 1990s by which time the Islamists had increased within the Kurdish society, the non-Islamist nationalists argued that the Kurds did not have a religious problem, but were suffering from political inequality. The extreme seculars began to blame Islam for the poor political situation of the Kurds, which led to the creation of unique myths, memories and symbols separate from historical concept; for the Islamists, all memories, symbols and myths of the Kurds come from its Islamic history, and so too, they argue, should Kurdish values.

Another concept normally referred to by the nationalists in the stage of nation building is that of a mythical leader; of the nationalists in the region, apart from the Islamic leaders and figures, none can be counted as a mythical leader. In order to fill this vacuum, the nationalists tried to appoint contemporary secular leaders, such as Kemal Ataturk of Turkey, Jamal Abdunnassir of Egypt and Abdullah Ojalan of PKK in Northern Kurdistan. However, in Southern and Eastern Kurdistan, the consideration of mythical leaders circles religious figures, such as Qazi Muhammad and Mulla Mustafa Barzani; some have looked historically in order to exemplify nationalist mythical leaders of pre-Islamic eras. This effect is far from being followed by new generations. In some cases, there were attempts to nationalise even the Islamic symbols and figures, starting with the prophet Muhammad himself; although Michel Aflaq (the founder of Alba'th party) was himself a Christian, he was theorising his Arab nationalism from the life of the prophet of Islam. Aflaq (1943) *"In the past, one person's life summarized the life of a nation. Today the life of the whole nation in its new revival should become a detailed exposition of the life of its great man. Muhammad was all the Arabs, let all the Arabs be Muhammad today"*.

3.4.5 Kurds: Political Parties and Social Rebellion:

During this period political parties were new in Kurdistan, and transforming Kurdish nationalism in terms of political entities with political ideologies was not accepted by many, among them the religious figures. A stereotype had emerged regarding political parties and politicians as a group of opportunistic liars whose personal ambitions came at the cost of the people. Furthermore, it became common among not only the religious figures and their followers, but also by the chieftains and their tribesmen, to keep away from political parties. This phenomenon remained among the Shaikhs and their order followers. However, many of the clergies preferring to support the Islamic movement, which was not considered a political party with similar objectives to other non-Islamic parties. The Islamic movement, for those clergies, even after the formation of the Islamic party, was '*Da'wa*' (a religious mission). Yet, later, for other Islamists such as the Salafis and other non-Islamists, affiliation of clergies and religious figures in any kind of political parties became unacceptable. On the other hand, many other clergies and religious figures have already joined and are supporting secular political parties, thus opposing the Islamists.

3.4.6 Other Islamic movements and groups:

According to Siwaili (2009a: 9), the Muslim Brotherhood, by way of Subhi Dawdi, arrived Halabja in 1960. This came from Kirkuk, where the MB existed even before the formation of the Iraqi Islamic party. Before the official arrival of the Muslim Brotherhood to the Kurdish cities, Siwaili (2009a: 22), quoting Dawdi, states that Sawaf used to have tours to Sulaimani, Halabja and Hawler.

However, his tours were aimed at the scholars, not the youths. This does not necessarily mean that those scholars had embarrassed the Muslim Brotherhood, however, his tours had an impact on enhancing the Islamist culture; this becomes obvious as, in the words of Dawdi:

"For the first time, when the communism gained popularity in 1958-1959, I noticed in a newspaper that the scholars of the South and North issued a *Fatwa*, equating communism with blasphemy. From the south; Muhsin Al-Hakim [the grand *Shi'a Marja'*], and from Kurdistan Shaikh Osman and some other scholars were among those who issued the *Fatwa*" (Siwaili, 2009a: 22)

For reasons previously mentioned, the Kurdish Islamists couldn't integrate into the Kurdish revolution. This is actually one of the criticisms faced by the nationalists. After the closure of the Iraqi Islamic party, only few months after its formation, they didn't appear formally anywhere in Iraq again. Though the party was officially terminated by its leaders in 1971, and the Kurdish MB, too, was obliged by this decision, nevertheless, since the late 1970s, both individually and at the level of propagating Islamic teachings in different parts of Kurdistan, the MB way of Islamism had started again.

In fact, the Islamic revolution of Iran enhanced the morale of the Kurdish Islamists; Leezenberg (2001: 218) states "*Be this as it may, in Iraq, as elsewhere, Islamist ideas and movements received a great boost with the successful Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979*". During this period in Kurdistan, namely the 1970s and early 1980s, the term 'Islamism' did not exist publicly among the Kurds, though the Iran-Iraq war also was another reason for those individuals to flee the Iraqi military and settle down in Iranian camps, where they

made plans to organise themselves. Salahaddin Muhammad Bahaddin, who later became the Secretary General of Kurdistan Islamic Union (1994-2012), and was reelected in the seventh congress of the party on 28th May 2016, was among those individuals. With regard to the Afghani jihad and the media focus on their victories against the Russian troops, this was yet another contribution to the rise of those individuals, and groups. Above all, the so-called 'Islamic awakening', and practicing youths, started peaking within Kurdish society; Halabja, for its many scholars, their history with the MB, and its many *Madrasas* and Islamic schools, had a pioneering role in cultivating those youths.

The Iraqi regime, due to the war with Iran and its intention to deepen the sectarianism politics among the Kurds, turned a blind eye to some of their activities. At the same time, this policy of marginal freedom provided the chance for the regime to monitor Islamic activities closely; this led to the arrest of some of its activists in 1987. Shourush (n. d.:179) highlights that:

“in the first half of the 1980s and during the years of the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi government had in various ways encouraged the emergence of a Sunni religious movement in order to act, as that government had hoped, as a barrier against the penetration into Kurdistan of the religious and political influence of Iran and its *Shi'i* forces. The government had viewed the Islamic movement as a useful counterweight to its adversary, the armed Kurdish movement, which it accused of cooperating with Iran. However, things did not work out as planned for [by] the Iraqi government. The Islamists soon turned to violence in their struggle against the 'infidel regime'“.

Allegedly, the Iraqi regime had tried to involve the Kurdish Islamists into their politics through Saddam's father-in-law, *Khairullah Tifah*, and his contacts with some of the Kurdish Scholars in Halabja. However, the regime's policy didn't work as the nature of the view of the MB towards the Shi'ias, who used to be seen as an Islamic sect, is not as other Islamists view them, not unlike none Muslims such as the Salafis; this was the view of Kurdish scholars too. The Kurds believe that whoever collaborated with the regime would be seen as a betrayer, and branded a *Jash* (babe donkey). Therefore, even if the regime had succeeded in convincing the scholars, the number actually following them was minute. On the contrary, the policy of the regime against the Kurdish people led the Islamists to consider action that would support their nation.

3.4.6.1 The Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan:

By the time the Iraqi policy towards the Kurds intensified and the result of this was described by Leezenberg (2001: 219) as:

"The turning point, at least as far as the emerging Islamic Movement was concerned, seems to have in 1987. In May of that year, it appears, mullah Othman called for a *jihad* or holy war against the Iraqi regime, in reaction to the destructions and chemical attacks on Kurdish villages in the region".

Shourush (n. d.:178-179), while quoting Al-Nafeer newspaper, no. 3, 1989, which used to be the official press of the Islamic movement in Iraqi Kurdistan, stated the following:

"The Kurdish Muslim cadres were strengthened in their determination to form their own organisation to and declare armed struggle against the regime of Saddam Hussayn after the intensification of Iraqi policies against the Kurds, such as the chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians, especially against the town of Halabja, which had itself been an important centre of those Islamic cadres. These conditions led to the creation of the Islamic movement in Iraqi Kurdistan and the decision to focus on armed struggle. It began that struggle (jihad) in the Kurdistan Mountains, through an armed organisation composed mainly of Islamic Kurdish fighters. The basic objective of that organisation is to rid Iraq and Kurdistan of 'Saddam's infidel regime'".

Until the uprising of 1991, the Islamic movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK) had no significant tensions with other Kurdish political parties. However, there was a, mainly political, rivalry between the nationalist political parties, most notably the PUK (the ruling party in Sulaimani Province), particularly when the IMIK was rapidly gaining followers at the expense of other parties. The first general parliamentary election in 1992 saw the rise of the IMIK and other Islamists, especially the Kurdish MB, who in 1994 formed a Kurdistan Islamic Union, but couldn't pass the 7% margin required to enter parliament. Shourush (n. d.:179) explains that:

"The Islamic movement has been a newcomer to political organisation in Iraqi Kurdistan, and it has to contend with a deep-rooted nationalist movement which deprived it of possibilities of rapid growth and expansion in the area. Nevertheless, the organised Islamic movement was able to achieve perceptible advances, as in the recent elections

[1992] in Iraqi Kurdistan where it polled 47,000 votes, and ranked in third position, albeit a long way behind the large Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan".

Until the formation of the KIU in 1994, the IMIK was the biggest Islamic party in Kurdistan; however, because of their involvement in the civil war with the PUK, their member numbers were rapidly decreasing. Leezenberg (2001: 223) highlights that:

"Since the early 1990s, IMIK appears to have lost some of its urban constituency, in part because of its violent methods. In March 2000 municipal elections in the PUK area, it was the Islamic Union Party [Kurdistan Islamic Union] (*Yekgirtuyislami*) rather than IMIK that gained a significant percentage of the votes; in all, Islamic groups received some 30 per cent of the votes in the Sulaimaniya area; the Halabja area remained strictly IMIK territory".

Currently, the IMIK is suffering from a decrease in popularity, due to many internal disagreements and the split that led to the creation of the Islamic Group in 2001. Proof of this unpopularity are the results from the latest general parliamentary election of the Kurdistan, which took place in September 2013; the IMIK barely gained a seat whereas the KIU, for instance, gained ten seats, and the Islamic Group also gained six seats out of the 100 seats of the Kurdistan regions parliament. There are also another 11 quota seats for the other ethnic and religious minorities in Kurdistan region, distributed as follows: five seats for the Turkmen, five seats for the Chaldean and Assyrian Christians, and a seat for the Armenians.

3.4.6.2 Hizbullah:

Throughout the 1980s, a few Islamic groups and political parties came to the surface. One of those parties was Hizbullah. On the topic of Kurdistan Hizbullah (Party of God), Shourush (n. d.: 180/181) remarks as follow:

"This organisation is composed primarily of the Barzanis, who took refuge in Iran after the collapse of the armed Kurdish movement in 1975. It is led by Shaykh Muhammad Khalid al-Barzani, the spiritual guide of the Naqshabandi order among the Barzanis. The party was formed after the beginning of Iran-Iraq war, and it is supported by Iran. It appears to have taken this name for itself in order to be identified with similarly-named Iranian-backed *Shi'i* parties. However, the movement has distinguished itself from other Pro-Iranian Hizbullah by avoiding the practice associated with those parties, except for its armed struggle against the Iraqi government".

The name and their closeness to the Iranians made the Kurdish people reluctant to associate with the party; for some others, it was considered a branch of the KDP. This became clear later, when the second leader of the party, Adham Barzani, became one of the leaders of the KDP. According to Shourush (n., d.: 181):

"The parties influence among the Kurds appears to be very limited. Moreover, it seems unable to expand its membership outside the circle of Barzani supporters of Shaykh Muhammad Khalid. A notable development in this party is the sudden split which took place a few

years ago when Shaykh Adham al-Barzani broke away from the party of his uncle Shaykh Muhammad Khalid, and established a separate Islamic party known as the Islamic revolutionary party".

Shaikh Adham eventually jointed the KDP, and recently, after the general election of the regions parliament on 21st September 2013, resigned from the KDP. Again, in 2016 he rejoined the KDP and currently is leading the party's leadership council in Sulaimani.

3.4.6.3 Iraqi Kurdistan Islamic Liaison Movement:

With regards to the Iraqi Kurdistan Islamic Liaison Movement, Siwaili (2009b: 141) argues that there are different opinions regarding its formation; according to some sources, the movement originates in the period 1975-1976. However, all other resources consider 1978 the official establishment of this party. According to Siwaili (2009b: 142):

"other opinions in this regard refer to the early activities of this party to the late 1970s. The motivator of this movement was Abdulrahman Nawracy, who used to be the secretary of the directory of Sulaimani *Awqaf*. He had a good and a wide connection to many Islamic scholars and figures, in which he could influence a number of them to have a very basic organisation".

During this period, the Ba'th party was at the peak of its strength, and controlled all the cities in Iraq, including Kurdistan; however, the motivation for enhancing Islamic teaching was growing within a small circle of religious scholars. On the other hand, the expansion of extreme secularism and atheism among wide

range of intellectuals, created much discussion regarding the defense of Islam as a creed first. Consequently, during the late 1970s and throughout 1980s, a wave of Islamic writing was becoming popular; the scholars, as well as the individuals within Islamism, created a network of communication. Also significant was the appearance of religious cassettes throughout the cities, towns and the villages of Kurdistan; most of these cassettes were produced using the Friday prayer speeches, made by prominent preachers such as Mulla Ahmad Khanaqa in Sulaimani. Many of these youths were going from different districts, travelling as far as two hours in order to attend prayers and speeches. The more that anti-Islamism was growing, the more determined those who were Islamist-minded became. Consequently, there was a surge during this period of Islamic groups in Kurdistan, in which they became pillars of the later Islamic parties in Kurdistan.

Siwaili (2009b: 143) remarked:

"The majority of the cadres of this party were religious scholars. This, to a large extent, had an impact on the movement, and came to be known as an Islamic religious scholar's movement. On the other hand, this organisation was a basic one, with no central organisational body that would unite all the members in a single view, with a central vision and organisational method. However, what combined all views an Islamic culture and the Baa'th oppression".

In this organisation, as with others, the younger followers were influenced and attracted by personal contacts, no one imagining that what their gatherings might lead to. This party, along with similar armed Islamic parties and groups during that period, were aided by Iran. Their armed struggle against the Iraqi

regime and demand for continuation not only created the perception that these groups were under the control of Iran, but also that all the secular Kurdish parties were under the same influence.

For Siwaili (2009b: 143):

"this party after its formation in 1978 remained secretly till 14th September 1984 when a number of its members left to the mountains [out of the control of the Iraqi regime] and formally proclaimed the Iraqi Kurdistan Islamic Liaison Movement. Shaikh Muhammad Barznji [the late and last guide of Islamic Group, who passed away in July 2014] was nominated as the guide of the movement. This was considered the beginning of the overt work of this party, and continued until the formation of the Islamic Movement in 1987".

Once again, Siwaili (2009b: 150) highlights that:

"...this party had a good relationship with Iran, and Iran was supporting them. This relationship some other times had become complicated. Since 1982, Iran had started a project to gather the Iraqi Islamic opposition. For that, it formed the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq [SCIRI]. This council brought together all the Iraqi Shia Islamic oppositions. When the Iraqi Kurdistan Islamic Liaison Movement was proclaimed, it became the only Sunni member in the council".

Since the entry of this party into the Iranian made coalition, Shaikh Muhammad Barznji had come to be known the number one pro-Iranian amongst the Kurdish Islamists.

3.4.6.4 Kurdish Islamic Military:

In regards of this group, (Siwaili, 2009b: 151) remarks as follows:

"Kurdish Islamic Military is the first Kurdish Islamic militant party in Southern Kurdistan. There are two opinions in regards of the year of the formation of this party; some of the researches consider 1980 as the year of the formation of it. However, the other opinion refers to the early February 1981 as the date of its formation".

Furthermore, (Siwaili, 2009b: 151) refers to Nawsheerwan Mustafa Amin (the current Change Movement leader, while stating that "*this organisation with the help and plan of Iran was proclaimed in Tehran*". As for Mas'ud Abdulkhaliq "*the Islamic Military firstly was influenced by Libya*" (Siwaili, 2009b: 151). As with most Kurdish armed movements during the era, this organisation, as well as other later Islamist armed movements, was seeking help from Iran and other anti-Iraqi regime countries.

Siwaili (2009b: 152) remarks that "*Libya was providing them arms, and Iran despite its cash support, was also politically supporting them*". Siwaili (2009b: 152) goes on to say that "this party was comprised of disproportionate members. At the beginning, on the basis of interests came to exist with the encouragement of Iran. It had no ideological or organisational base. Therefore, it had become an example of an undisciplined party [and did not last long]".

3.4.6.5 Association of Muslim Students in Kurdistan:

With regards to the Association of Muslim Students in Kurdistan, Shourush (n. d.: 181) states that:

"This association had been founded in a conference in Canada in early 1988. It declared itself a professional non-party association of Muslims in Kurdistan, simultaneously, its aims were defined as the Islamisation of the Kurdish issue through the establishment of an Islamic alternative for the Kurdish people's struggle to win its just rights; training of Islamic cadres to operate in Kurdistan; cooperation with other Islamic organisations in order to combine their efforts for the establishment of an Islamic state".

This association later mainly focused on getting scholarship for the cadres and members of the Islamic groups, most notably from the International Islamic University of Malaysia, at which one of the founders of the association was a lecturer; they were also publishing an Islamic magazine.

3.4.6.6 The Islamic Jihad Clique in Iraqi Kurdistan:

Overall, the Jihadist movements in Kurdistan, to some extent, neglected to consider the nature of the Kurdish society, such as the tribal dimension, socio religious issues, the Shafi'i school of thought, and political issues. However, since being Salafi jihadist, this group had disregarded all of these issues, instead behaving radically. Any other group which had displayed a similar mentality would have had troubles with the society and faced political opposition. According to Siwaili (2009b: 158) "*the beginning of the Islamic Jihad*

Clique in Iraqi Kurdistan goes back to a secret organisation in the early 1980s, when the founder of this clique Mulla Amin Pirdawud Khoshnaw first started it". As for their geographical origin, Siwaili (2009b: 158) states that "*this group had started their activities in Hawler, and then they became the strongest Islamic trend in Hawler in 1980s. Also, to some extent they had activities in Mosul and Sulaimani too*".

For the aforementioned reasons with regard to their extremism nature, Siwaili (2009b: 159) goes on to say:

"right from the beginning of the formation of the Islamic Liaison Movement, and IMIK, Mulla Amin few times [secretly] visited Iran to contact those two movements, in order to proclaim Jihad. He met the leaders of those both movements, and after a series of conversations, he disappointedly returned".

Unlike the other jihadist subgroups which came together and created IMIK, Mulla Amin and his collective remained separate. The final attempt was what Siwaili (2009b: 159) describes thusly: "*during the uprising of March 1991, the Jihad Clique joined the IMIK. However, shortly in June 1991 the disagreements started, consequently they left the IMIK*".

However, it could be argued that their extremism always directly or indirectly influenced other Islamists; on the one hand, individuals within the IMIK with a similar mentality were leading the movement towards tension and ongoing battles with other Kurdish political parties (the PUK especially), whilst on the other hand, when the Kurdistan Islamic Union first announced the establishment of the party, they assassinated one of its leaders in Hawler, and started

attacking their charitable medical clinics in Akre and elsewhere. The main reason for this hatred on the part of the KIU was from their standpoint of refusing extremist behaviour and publicly denouncing all kinds of extremism and violence.

3.4.6.7 Al-Nahdha Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan:

The history of this movement goes back to the late 1970s and early 1980s in Halabja, where it started its activities. Al-Baziani (2006: 81-82) remarks that, according to Islamic resources and the literature of Al-Nahdha Islamic Movement (NIM or the Islamic Renaissance Movement), it started organising in 1979 under the leadership of Shaikh Siddiq Abdulaziz; Siddiq was the youngest brother of Shaikh Osman Abdulaziz, who were secretly in different cities and districts of Kurdistan. This secret work continued until November 1994, at which point the organisation, under its new name, was publicly announced. This movement was known, before this announcement, as the second line of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kurdistan, the first line led by Salahaddin Mohammad Bahaddin, supported by the international MB. The NIM and IMIK united in August 1999 and comprised a new movement named the Islamic Unity Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan, and Shaikh Ali Abdulaziz became the general *Murshid* [guide], with [his brother] Shaikh Siddiq Abdulaziz as his deputy. However, after the election of 2000, the majority of the NIM cadres joined with the conglomeration of Shaikh Ali Bapeer, forming a new collective: Islamic Group in the Iraqi Kurdistan (Komali Islami). Other cadres of NIM, in addition to Shaikh Siddiq, remained with Shaikh Ali Abdulaziz during the announcement a new group named the Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan, which was also the

name of the previous IMIK. A combination of NIM cadres and former IMIK cadres helped them with the later de-radicalisation accepting civil struggle rather than sticking to jihadism as the only political method. When the USA and the allies liberated Iraq in 2003, Komali Islami had come under the attack of the allies. Further, in an operation they captured the Amir, Ali Bapeer, who stayed in prison for 22 months, and under, the new policy, gave up their militant struggle and adopted a political struggle instead. The role model to follow, in this respect, was the Kurdistan Islamic Union which, since its establishment in February 1994, has adopted a civil political struggle as its political method, denouncing all forms of political violence and terrorism; this has been practically proved as the best method of political struggle.

3.4.6.8 Kurdistan Islamic Group:

As previously discussed, the Islamic group, Komali Islami, split from the IMIK, though during this period, they were not the only faction who had defected away from the IMIK; as Nazmi (n. d.: 328) observes "*during the year 2001, the IMIK split up into four factions in contention with each other, Islamic Group, Unification movement, Soran Force and Jund Al-Islam*". There has been ongoing disagreement between the leaders of the IMIK, especially Shaikh Ali Abdulaziz, and Shaikh Ali Bapeer, the long-standing current Amir of the Islamic Group. However, their union with NIM provided an opportunity for the latter to adopt the majority of the movement's members to his side. Due to its militia, the Islamic Group suffered a lot after the liberation of Iraq by the U.S. and its allies in 2003; however, after adopting a civil political method and abandoning their armed struggle, they became first among all the factions that gone out of the

former IMIK in terms of popularity. In the recent Parliamentary General election in Kurdistan, they gained 6 seats out of the 100, whereas the current IMIK hardly gained a single seat. Furthermore, if these two factions, namely the Islamic Group and the current IMIK, had not agreed and adopted a non-militant struggle, they would have been remembered as terrorists, much like their sister factions.

3.4.6.9 The Iraqi Kurdistan Islamic Clique:

Shortly after the formation of the IMIK, many disagreements took place within the movement. Siwaili (2009b: 160/161) highlights that Fatih Krekar later left the IMIK and on the 5th November 1990 formed a party called the 'Iraqi Kurdistan Islamic Clique'. After the uprising of 1991, the party terminated its activities, its members then joining the IMIK. Krekar himself joined the IMIK and became the head of the military office of the movement. As the IMIK was, in general, a group of hodgepodge individual and subgroups comprised of the Salafi Jihadists, other Salafis, and mainly

led by Shafi'i former Muslim Brotherhood like Shaikhs, disagreements were common. For the same reasons, as well as a lack of political experience by the newly joined cadres, tensions were high within the secular Kurdish political parties, the PUK particularly, which up until that time was labeled a socialist party with background in Marxist ideology.

This lack of a unified ideology and a political methodology within the IMIK at this time was widening the rift between its cadres. The defeat of the movement by the PUK in December 1993, and the later agreements between the two parties

mentored by Iran, was not accepted by a wide range of the movement's cadres. Many of the extreme cadres considered the movement and its leadership as being in a weak position, not at the required level of jihadism that they had come to expect. For those cadres Iran, as a Shi'a government, and the PUK as a secular party, were not regarded highly; these cadres and members had little in the way of political or national objectives. All that united them was jihadism, mainly inspired by the jihad of Afghanistan; in other words, they were mere global jihadists, rather than Islamist Kurdish freedom fighters. The basic problem in this stretches back to the establishment of the IMIK, when the group it was more a reactionary effort, rather than a preplanned organisation with clear defined political objectives. For these reasons, many jihadist groups had separated from the IMIK, such as Hamas, Jundul Islam and Ansarul Islam.

3.4.6.10 Radical Jihadism and Terror in Kurdistan:

Formally, the first group that had left the IMIK and announced their aims of jihad were Hamas, whose policy allowed no compromises towards the Kurdish political parties, as well as the regional states, notably Iran, who had always support them. The name 'Hamas' originates from the Hamas of Palestine, which is an acronym of *Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiah*, an Islamic Resistance Movement; and the word *Hamas* in Arabic means enthusiasm. The catalyst for this, as recorded by Romano (2007: 9), was that:

"In 1997 and 1998, when the IMK decided to cooperate with the secular PUK and join the Kurdistan Regional Government, that important splinter movements opposed such cooperation with secularists and broke off

from the group. These dissidents were also upset that the IMK had refrained from imposing Sharia law in the areas it controlled. Some of the Afghan veterans (Hassan Sofi, Omar Barziani, and Mullah Krekar) broke off to form Hamas in 1997. Hamas based itself in the town of Khormal and promoted a literalist, Salafi interpretation of the Quran".

After almost a year, the more cracks appeared when the Second Soran Force, also led by Aso Hawleri in 1998, left the IMIK and started its own jihadi organisation. Romano (2007: 10) remarks that:

"The IMK's largest military unit (350-400 fighters), the Second Soran Force, broke off from the organization in 1998 as well and took control of Biyara (the village where they were based) as an independent force. The Second Soran Force was led by Aso Hawleri and included many Arab veterans of Afghanistan (including Hawleri himself). It too espoused a puritanical Wahabi interpretation of Islam".

In discussing the IMIK, it can be observed from its leadership, cadres and members that it was a distinctly Kurdish movement, in the sense that they were all Kurds and had a shared struggle against the regime of Saddam, which aligned with the Kurdish nationalist movements. From the appearance of these newly emerged jihadists, one could no longer identify any Kurdish or Iraqi political aims and objectives; however, it did demonstrate the global jihadism that Bin Ladin and Al-Dhawahiri had adopted during the same period. In addition, the methods employed in their struggle were indistinguishable from those of Al-Qaeda, which involved attacking and killing the non-Muslim politicians, usually westerners and their allies. In a YouTube video clip, Mulla (Krekar, n. d.) states the following:

"No Fatwa necessarily for those who openly oppose Islam is needed, and if a Muslim comes across him in a street, let use an axe to behead him or fire a bullet through his brain. No need for Fatwa, don't worry about the security forces. If it is possible for me to kill him, I will do it myself. Then let the authorities come and kill me too".

In 1999, as mentioned earlier, both the IMIK and NIM united and created the Islamic Unity Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan; Hamas was also invited to join the new union, an invitation they eventually accepted. Romano (2007: 10) highlights:

"In 1999, the two Aziz brothers (Ali and Siddiq) united al-Nahdha and the IMK, and formed the Islamic Federation of Kurdistan (also known as the Islamic Unity Movement of Kurdistan). The Islamic Federation of Kurdistan also reconciled with Omar Barziani's Hamas and brought it into the federation".

During this time, there was a hope that all of the Islamists would be gathered under this aim, including Kurdistan Islamic Union. There were accusations by the Islamic Unity towards the KIU for not joining their united front and creating one Islamic movement of Kurdistan. The reasoning given by the KIU for not joining was based on its rejection of their armed movement. Nevertheless, instructions were given to wait further and judge the success of this new unity; as the KIU predicted, this unity soon to come to an end. The majority of the cadres and members of the former NIM supported Ali Bapeer and broke away, establishing the Islamic Group in June 2001. Following this, the former Hamas members broke away in July 2001; the remaining cadres and members reformed the IMIK in September of the same year. During this time, Mulla

Krekar announced what he called "the Reformist Group", in the sense that he was endeavoring to mediate between all the splinters and unite them; despite prolonged efforts, this attempt failed.

Also in July 2001, the former members of Hamas broke away from the Islamic Unity Movement and United with Tawheed, created in May 2000 and led by Abdul Ghani Bazazi; together they formed the so called "Islamic Unity Front", led by Abu Baker Hawleri. Just a few months later, this front and the Second Soran Force joined to form Jund Al-Islam, led by Abdullah Shafi'i. Finally, in December 2001, Jund al-Islam and the Reformist Group of Mulla Krekar came together and formed Ansar Al-Islam under the leadership of Mulla Krekar. Ansar Al-Islam continued its activities until 2003, where upon the USA and the allies invaded Iraq, dismantling them from their powerful position in Kurdistan. During the same year, their members joined both Ansar Al-Sunnah and Jaysh Muhammad, and finally, in 2004, joined Al-Qaeda in Iraq, led by Al-Zrqawi.

The remaining terrorist groups among the Kurdish Jihadists later joined the Islamic State in Iraq and *Sham* (Levant), ISIS or ISIL. A new group of jihadists have more recently joined them, among them a Salafi Shaikh known as MulaShwan, who had been focused on in Kurdish media as a notorious figure of Kurdish terrorism. According to Rudaw (2015b), the number of Kurdish terrorists among ISIS numbers around 500; despite the geographical closeness between the ISIS territories and the Kurdistan region, when compared to the number of terrorists from Tunisia, for instance, 500 is a relatively small number. According to Altaqreer (2014), the number of the terrorists joint ISIS from the following countries, is as follows:

Country	No. of Terrorists joint ISIS
Tunisia	3200
Saudi Arabia	3000
Morocco	1500
France	700

This relatively low number can be attributed to a few factors, most notably:

1. The nature of the Kurdish political context, which is still struggle for the national rights and self-determination.
2. The KIU's pioneer as a civil non-violent actor, which became a role model for the young Islamists.
3. Following the steps of the KIU by the KIK and IMIK.

However, the alleged violation of human rights by anti-terror squads and the security forces in Kurdistan region against Islamist detainees and their family members has increased the number of those terrorists willing to commit terrorist acts, especially with ISIS. Otherwise, the number may have been smaller.

3.4.6.11 De-radicalisation:

There are two groups among the Islamists in Kurdistan region who de-radicalised their methods of political struggle; the Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG) and the current Islamic Movement in Kurdistan (IMIK). Considering this de-radicalisation from the point of view of Ashour (2009: 7), it has been defined as such: *"De-radicalisation is primarily concerned with changing the attitudes of armed Islamist movements towards violence, rather than towards democracy."*

Many de-radicalised groups still uphold misogynist, homophobic, Xenophobic, and anti-democratic views". Over the period of the de-radicalisation of KIG and IMIK since 2003, they have been under the influence of the USA troops in Iraq, who have imprisoned both leaders of the two groups, altering the public perception of these two de-radicalisation. The core question in this regard is whether both of these organisations would give up their armed struggle without the existence of the USA and their allied troops in Iraq. It also draws attention to questions regarding what both organisations were doing with their arms, especially at a time then both of their organisations and leaderships were coming under the pressure of the allies influence, going as far as attacking the KIG's armed men using rockets. Finally, even under the pressure of the U.S. troops, the extent to which the de-radicalisation over the time became of the behaviour of the cadres and members of both organisations? All the questions in this regard are valid, unless otherwise proven by practice of both organisations.

Since 2003, both of these organisations have gone through different experiences; from the beginning, this was not at all an easy task for their leaders, who were, for many years, mobilising their followers on the basis of struggle (jihad) against the invaders and non-believers, only to completely de-radicalise. For their followers, the invaders and non-Muslims were all over the land of Iraq, including Kurdistan region and, therefore, despite the behavioural de-radicalisation, many doubted the ideological de-radicalisation aspect. In reality, some of their leaders had stated that the question of armed struggle depended on the need for it, in the sense that there may be a return to it if it is necessary and feasible. Overall, de-radicalisation is a practice of different phenomena, Ashour (2009: 7) observing that: "*Separate from the ideological*

level, de-radicalisation can occur only on the behavioural level. On that level, de-radicalisation means practically abandoning the use of violence to achieve political goals without a concurrent process of ideological de-legitimisation of violence. De-radicalisation can occur in only one of the two levels".

However, for both KIG and IMIK, whichever levels of de-radicalisation came first, over time they both adapted to cope with the new political atmosphere, following the example of the KIU; to a large extent, they have both integrated into the political situations of the region. One could argue that they have already passed the danger of what Ashour (2009: 7) refers to, stating:

"...there is also a third level of de-radicalisation. Following the declaration of ideological and/or behavioural de-radicalisation by the leadership of an armed group(s), there is usually the challenge of organisational de-radicalisation: the dismantlement of the armed units of the organisation, which includes discharging / demobilising their members without splits, muting or internal violence".

Nonetheless, as for the historical background, they both need continuous deeper de-radicalisation, especially with the lack of American troops on the ground, and particularly with the mess in the region that led to the upsurge of the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and its challenges. Otherwise, the de-radicalisation has worked effectively, and the religious disproving by both parties as to ISIS's claims proving the deep rooted de-radicalisation, followed by a wider political and social struggle; this is the wider sense of jihad that the modern and moderate political Islamists are following.

3.4.6.12 Salafis:

Salafism, in the form put forward by Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahab in Najd (in today's Saudi Arabia), was a violent extremism that examined all aspects of Islam, from creed to worshipping. Theoretically, they radicalised Islamic creeds starting with the Muslim individuals and societies by declaring them disbelievers or apostates and then practicing the verdict of apostasy, by which the apostates must to be killed; the group would later be called the Wahabees, and the ideology Wahabism, named after its founder Muhammad Ibn Abul Al-Wahab. For the first time in the history of the Islamic World, *Khawrijtes* were the first to carry out such radical ideology and behaviour. Their first conflict was with the fourth Caliph of Islam Ali bin Abitalib, the son in law and a cousin of the prophet Muhammad. According to Aal Mansi (2014) "*Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahab was accused by the scholars of its time, including his brother Sulaiman, who used to be a judge by being and practicing the thought of Khawarijtes*".

The Wahabees took this way of life very seriously and put excessive worth on practicing Islam; this led to their marginalisation throughout Muslim societies, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, as there it is the official version of Islam supported by the government. Nevertheless, the nature of the non-Saudi societies made the Muslims reluctant to accept such an ideology and extremism in the name of Islam. Therefore, Wahabism suffered from isolation within those Muslim societies as the more liberal the society was, the more Wahabism was isolated. Wahabees become violent easily, terrorising the society, normally, after accusing the society of being non-Muslim in an attempt to legitimise the use of violence against them. Aal Mansi (2014) has said that "*the Wahabism thought is the origin source of the modern Takfiris* [calling the Muslim individuals

and societies as non-believers or apostates]”. He elaborates that “*Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahab himself practiced this ideology, that which is now adopted by terrorist groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda, sometimes distributing his books among their followers*”.

The most dangerous ideology among the Kurdish Islamist is Salafism, which is another name for Wahabism. At the most fundamental level, they are breaking down the uniqueness of the Kurdish religious nationalism, the Shafi’ism that makes the Kurds unique among the surrounding Muslim communities. For instance, the Shi’as of Iraq (and the majority in Iran) follows Ja’fary (Shi’asm), while the Sunni Arabs of Iraq, the majority of Syrians and Turks are following Hanafi school of thought. This means that between the main four countries that the Kurds are divided between; the Kurds remain unique by following their own school of jurisprudence. The breaking down of this uniqueness by the Salafis is, however, endangering a dimension of Kurdish nationalism. Furthermore, the ongoing radicalisation among the Kurdish armed movements, such as the IMIK, has its roots in the thought and behaviour of the Salafis. The more that Salafism was expanding among them, the more they radicalised and lost control of their leadership. All the aforementioned terrorist groups which splintered from the IMIK in the 1990’s and early 2000’s were influenced by Salafism. Similarly, the current Salafis in Kurdistan are a potential danger and Larva of the future terrorism. Nonetheless, the rivalry policy between the main two Kurdish parties, the KDP and PUK, and the Islamic parties in the region granted the Salafis and Salafism overwhelming freedom within the mosques, in which they preach hate and radicalise the youth. This comes about by not recognising any kind of school of thought or jurisprudence among the Muslims, particularly as they only consider those who are following their way as true Muslims. In the long run, this

ideology is a potential source of terrorism, which might at any time trigger a societal catastrophe; their thinking and their vision towards Muslim societies is an ongoing threat.

3.4.5 Concluding Remarks:

At the time of the introduction of Islam to the land of Kurdistan, the Kurds were under the occupation of the Persians; their land, language, culture and religion were under threat of disappearing. The Kurds were expected to seek salvation and, accordingly, they adopted Islam. Their new occupier gave them the opportunity to free their land, culture and language by cultivating their literature and promoting their political power. As a result, they built numerous emirates, states and Sultanates. However, as the general political model was not a nation state in today's sense, the Kurds were similar to the other Muslim ethnicities in that neither thought of nation building; nor was possible for them to have such an entity under the pan-Islamic caliphates.

Nonetheless, the absence of any internal collaboration between the Kurdish entities led to their fragmentation and, consequently, weakened their non-united bodies. Though the majority of the Kurds identify as SuniShafiis, for the above reasons they did not apply this in achieving a united strong entity like that of the Safavid Iran. Furthermore, the many disagreements between the Kurdish tribes were yet more obstacles in the path of Kurdish unity.

Upon the arrival of nationalism to the region, a nationalist revolution occurred in Kurdistan against the centralised Ottoman ruling. Among the revolution leaders, Shaikh Ubaidullah Nahri was a distinct religious nationalist figure which, for the

first time, put forward an idea of Kurdish religious nationalism, focusing on a single united nation-state for the whole of Kurdistan; this was to be based on being Kurdish and SuniShafii, two characteristics that distinguish the Kurds from those who surround them.

After the First World War, the mere political interest of the imperial powers and the new emerged nation states of the region caused Kurdistan to be divided into newly emerged non-Kurdish states. Since the new map of the region was drawn on the basis of nationalism, the Kurds were faced with a new era of politics, wanted or otherwise. Therefore, it was possible for the Kurds to work on their political reality, most notably nationalism. Although the Kurds became victims of this new political environment, a solution had to be addressed from the situation, namely stepping out from the reality. Right from the beginning, and under the influence of a long Islamic history, two clear attempts of proclaiming two Islamic parties in southern Kurdistan, in 1919 and 1934, indicate that Kurdistan witnessed some of the very earliest attempts, even earlier than that of Egypt with Islamism. However, the term Islamism was not in today's sense neither in Kurdistan nor elsewhere. Establishing an Islamic party in Kurdistan at that moment was very different to the one that was started in Egypt by the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, but as Siwaili (2009b: 24-25) highlighted, this was an attempt to "*benefit from Islam to serve their nation*". Obviously, these came after the attempts of Shaikh Mahmood, which were aimed towards establishing a self-determined Kurdish entity in southern Kurdistan.

Mosques, from the first appearance of Islam in Kurdistan until recent years, have played a crucial role in the revival and preservation of the Kurdish language and culture. Politically, all of the early nationalist movements were led

by grand Muslim figures among the Shaikhs and the clerics. However, as was the case of Safavid and Shi'ism, the Kurdish religious figures had no chance to have a distinct Kurdish religious nation. This was due to two major factors, the first, during the Ottoman reign; with the attempt of Shaikh Ubaidullah Nahri, the Ottomans consisted a Sunni ruling and the fragmentation of the religious leadership of the Kurdish society was between many disagreeing Shaikhs and Sufi orders. Secondly, under the influence of a secular nationalist, Kurdish nationalism shifted to secularism by the mid-20th century, which led to horrific genocides by the Ba'th party, branding the Kurds and their nationalist movement as apostates and implementing a false ruling of ethnic cleansing in the name of Islam. It was obvious that the Ba'th was not an Islamic ruling, and that the Kurds were not apostates or non-believers in Islam, however the justification was present, and the secular nationalism of the Kurdish movement could not rely on Islam to preserve the Kurdish nationalist rights⁴⁸. This also paved the way for the genocide of the Kurds, which was met with silence in the rest of the Islamic world, strengthening the Ba'th regime in their chauvinistic policies against the Kurds. Although this is not a justification for entire Muslim societies, especially those of the Arab land, two major factors had worked on the side of the Ba'th in their policy towards the Kurds. Firstly, the image of the Ba'th as defenders against the Shi'a regime of Iran to the majority Sunnis of the Islamic world was maintained. Secondly, the Arab chauvinistic sentiment among the Arabs preserved their silence. Even now, when the balance of Islamism and nationalism comes to the surface in the Arab world with regard to the Kurds, the vast majority of Arabs keep silent. The recent offenses of the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS) against the Kurds in Iraq and Syria are proving fuel to this

⁴⁸ For blaming Islam for the political situation of the Kurds, see Baxawan's (2016) article (*Is Islam Responsible for Backwardness of the Kurd?*) published in Kurdish in Rudaw.

argument, as there exists no single Arab stance condemning ISIS regarding their actions towards the Kurds.

Shortly after WW1, the politics of nationalism gradually deepened at the cost of the politics of the Islamist vision of having a united Islamic land. In other words, although the newly emerged nation states were created on the coattails of imperialism, they have become a reality; Islamists have become one of its first line defenders. This phenomenon was crystalised by time, particularly in the case of the Kurds, and the main reason for this is due to non-independent nation state that non-Kurdish Islamist could realise. We can see right from the birth of the Kurdish Islamic parties that the political demands were for the Kurds and for the sake of Kurdistan; both Kurdish Islamic parties of 1919 and 1934 clearly illustrate this argument. Also, in the last quarter of the century, Islamic parties such as the IMIK, KIU and KIG proved this argument. Similarly to elsewhere in the Middle East in the mid-twentieth century, a dichotomy between the seculars and the Islamist nationalists occurred. Nonetheless, the political framework for both sides remains nationalistic and is focused on the nation state, explicitly or otherwise. For the Kurdish political parties too, the political platform is nationalism, and the more they advance in their politics, the more realistic and achievable their goals become.

Part Two

Chapter Four

Kurdistan Region De-Facto and the Rise of Religious Nationalism

4.1 Introduction:

This chapter will focus on the conclusion of political strife and revolution in southern Kurdistan, and its de-facto self-ruling, which came to exist after the 1991 uprising. The rise of religious nationalism will also be discussed, from preaching to politics, as will religious nationalism and the phases that this phenomenon witnessed. The chapter is divided into seven titles, and finishing with some concluding remarks; highlighted will be the development of the Kurdish movement, from revolution to self-governing, as well as the Kurdistan Front, in its role as a cooperation framework for the political parties of Kurdistan; the role of the front in preparing for the 1992 elections will also be covered. Self-ruling and the challenges involved, most notably the struggle for power and civil war, will be covered, as will the emergence of the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU); important factors include the *raison d'être* and role of KIU, the KIU and political outcome, participating in elections, ethno-politics and KIU's second political phase. Finally, the issue of self-determination and independence in Kurdistan will be covered, specifically the stance of the main political parties that comprise the parliament and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), with

regard to the issue of self-determination and proclaiming the nation state of Kurdistan.

4.2 From Revolution to Governing:

From the inception of the British mandate, as explained by The History Guy (n.d.), *“Rebellion by Iraqi Kurds against the British Mandate, Kurdish tribesmen, led by Sheikh Mahmud, a powerful Kurdish leader, attempted to establish an independent Kurdish nation”*. In fact, Sheikh Mahmud announced his kingdom the superior one and himself the King of Kurdistan. He was, however, shortly hereafter defeated by the British. This was followed by subsequent revolts throughout the twentieth century, chronicled by Hawar (1990), Tripp (2007), Ihsan (2000), Barzani (2002) and the History Guy (n.d., BBC, 2011) as follows:

Revolt of Ibrahim Khan Dalo 1920

Uprising of Barzan 1932

Kurdish Revolt 1943

Kurdish Revolt 1945

Kurdish Revolt 1961-1970

Kurdish Revolt March 1974

Kurdish Revolt 1976

1991 Uprising

These revolts demonstrate that the Kurds continuously refused to be ruled by the Iraqi governments, as was the case across all regions of Kurdistan; however, in part due to the circumstances of the Kurds, the outcome across these states varied.

Each of these revolts faced brutal opposition by the British Mandate and the Iraqi governments. Arguably the most ruthless military operations were the last ones carried out by Saddam's regime, termed the Anfal campaigns⁴⁹; these took place in the final year of the Iraq-Iran war in 1988, using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), primarily chemical weapons, which swept across almost all liberated areas of Kurdistan which were under the control of the *Peshmarga* (Kurdish Liberating Fighters). The word Anfal was chosen in order to justify the genocide operations, as the Kurds were not Muslims and were to be accordingly punished; this is, of course, false, both contextually and in terms of the Kurds being non-Muslims. The Ba'th party was not the implementers of this

⁴⁹ Anfal--"the Spoils"--is the name of the eighth Sura of the Koran. It is also the name given by the Iraqis to a series of military actions which lasted from February 23 until September 6, 1988. While it is impossible to understand the Anfal campaign without reference to the final phase of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Anfal was not merely a function of that war. Rather, the winding-up of the conflict on Iraq's terms was the immediate historical circumstance that gave Baghdad the opportunity to end its longstanding efforts to bring the Kurds to heel. The Iraqi regime's anti-Kurdish drive dated back some fifteen years or more, well before the outbreak of hostilities between Iran and Iraq.

Anfal was also the most vivid expression of the "special powers" granted to Ali Hassan al-Majid, a cousin of President Saddam Hussein and secretary general of the Northern Bureau of Iraq's Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party. From March 29, 1987 until April 23, 1989, al-Majid was granted power that was equivalent, in Northern Iraq, to that of the President himself, with authority over all agencies of the state. Al-Majid, who is known to this day to Kurds as "Ali Anfal" or "Ali Chemical," was the overlord of the Kurdish genocide. Under his command, the central actors in Anfal were the First and Fifth Corps of the regular Iraqi Army, the General Security Directorate (Mudiriyyat al-Amn al-Ameh) and Military Intelligence (Istikhbarat). The pro-government Kurdish militia known as the National Defense Battalions, or jahsh, assisted in important auxiliary tasks. The first was the integrated resources of the entire defense Battalions; the word jahsh means "donkey foals. The second was "Saboteurs", the term commonly applied by the Iraqi regime to the Kurdish peshmerga guerrillas and their civilian sympathizers. Military, security and civilian apparatus of the Iraqi state were deployed, in al-Majid's words, "to solve the Kurdish problem and slaughter the saboteurs".

policy, which had nothing to do with Islam; the only rationale behind it was using the name as a means to legitimise the brutal massacres and to abuse the reputation of Islam. The Iraqi regime, in order to finalise any further revolts, committed genocide against the village dwellers of liberated areas, bringing the Kurdish revolution to an end.

However, when the Iraqi regime invaded Kuwait⁵⁰ on the 2nd August 1990, and then consequently to liberate Kuwait, the International alliance, under the leadership of the United States of America, attacked Iraq; the Shi'as in southern Iraq and the Kurds in Kurdistan (northern Iraq) began an uprising in March 1991. The uprising went on to control the entirety of Kurdistan and other Kurdish cities, including Kirkuk and Khanaqeen. However, this control did not last long, and soon the regime had a counter-attack. As the people had already experienced chemical attacks and mass murder during the Anfal campaigns, they feared a similar reaction from the regime; they chose to evacuate the cities and migrated in great numbers towards Iran and Turkey. This led to a humanitarian crisis, and consequently the UN Security Council issued Resolution 688 on 5th April 1991. This was followed by the No Fly Zone⁵¹,

⁵⁰**Background - The Gulf War:**

A. On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, prompting the UN Security Council to pass Resolution 660 the same day demanding 'that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces'.

B. Iraq's failure to comply led to Resolution 661, adopted on 6 August 1990, which called for the restoration of the 'sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait' and imposed wide-ranging economic sanctions against Iraq.

C. The US and the UK began deployments of troops to the region soon afterwards (Op DESERT SHIELD), with the initial aim of deterring further Iraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia which was threatened by large numbers of Iraqi forces on its border.

D. On 29 November 1990, the Security Council passed Resolution 678 which authorised Member States "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990)..." unless Iraq withdrew from Kuwait on or before 15 January 1991.

E. Iraq's failure to meet the UN deadline led to the coalition war against Iraq, Operation DESERT STORM, which began on 16 January 1991 and continued until Iraqi forces were driven from Kuwait on 28 February, when hostilities were suspended.

(<http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/38010/mod-no-fly-zone-r1.pdf>).

⁵¹ The Iraqi no-fly-zones were established in April 1991 (north) and August 1992 (south) as a coalition (US, UK and France) initiative in support of UNSCR 688 demanding an immediate end

proposed by the USA, the UK and France (also was known as Safe Havens in Iraq): these proposals providing some promise of safety. Although the Iraqi regime regained control in the major cities during this time, the Kurdish people had their second uprising in late 1991; this caused the withdrawal of the Iraqi regime from the main three governorates of Erbil, Sulaimani and Duhok, all of which lay under the no fly zone.

4.3 Kurdistan Front and 1992 Election:

Political disagreement amongst Kurdish politicians began from 1961, during the beginning of the revolution, and intensified by 1964. This prolonged internal disagreements after the setback of 1975, leading to the existence of many other political parties alongside the KDP. Although this brought with it a new era of pluralism, it was the trigger for internal civil war between Kurdish political parties; it was many years before most of them agreed to work together under the promise of cooperation. According to Osman (2001a) *“in May 1988 the Kurdistan Front was formed. The front comprised the PUK, KDP, KSP, Kurdistan People’s Party, Kurdistan Socialist Party and the Iraqi Communist Party-Kurdistan Branch”*. This front, however, came too late, as the Iraqi genocide operations had already started and the Iraq-Iran war was in its final stages, the war ending in the summer of 1988. Nevertheless, it did provide some help to the Kurdish parties during their struggles. Osman (2001a) adds:

“Its existence also played an important role in avoiding a bigger political setback when the Iraq-Iran war had ended because the Kurdish Political

to Saddam's brutal repression of Kurds in north and Shias in south. 10. Iraqi aircraft were forbidden from flying inside the zones. This was enforced by US, UK and French aircraft patrols. Ibid.

will was, to a certain extent, united when the Kurdistan Front decided that the struggle should continue by all possible means. It was also important for rallying resistance against the Iraqi government in Kurdistan and gaining understanding and support for the Kurdish issue abroad”.

The end of the Iraq-Iran war cost the Kurds and their political parties dearly. On the ground, the Iraqi troops controlled almost all the liberated territories that were previously under the control of Kurdish political parties. The villages and towns of those territories were destroyed by the Iraqi government, and most of their inhabitants were captured and/or killed in the so called ‘Anfal campaigns’. Nonetheless, the existence of the Kurdish political parties and their front, with their affiliates inside the cities of Kurdistan, helped them prepare to take the opportunity of the weaknesses in the Iraqi regime, its troops defeated during the liberation of Kuwait in 1991. Within days, they had successfully controlled all cities and towns in Kurdistan, including Kirkuk and Khanaqeen. After the second uprising of the people in Kurdistan, which took place in October of 1991, the complete withdrawal of Iraqi administrations left a vacuum for Kurdish political parties to fill; this led to the general election of 1992.

There were many criticisms among the smaller parties, Osman (2001a) remarking upon the election as follows:

“The election was held on 19th May 1992, with many irregularities and rigging by the two main contenders [PUK and KDP]. As a result, none of the participating parties, including us [Kurdish Socialist Party], accepted the results and an agreement between the two parties was reached on to the way the assembly was to be divided. The results were very close with

a slight majority for the KDP, though the PUK insisted on splitting the assembly by 50-50 and the KDP accepted”.

This election was very important for the Kurds in southern Kurdistan, as well as in all the other parts of Kurdistan and diasporic Kurds. This was considered the right step towards self-ruling, the desired result of the many years of struggle by the Kurds. There were, however, many challenges, particularly the internal disagreements in an era of new self-ruling when these disagreements became more serious. Stansfield (2003: 121) highlights:

“The subsequent 50:50 system was a workable but extremely fragile shared type of governmental organization, dependent upon the preservation of a balance of power between the KDP and PUK. When this balance was altered, the system became unworkable and provided yet another catalyst for the decline into confrontation and conflict”.

Disagreements were present even during the initial stages of the uprising in 1991 with regard to control over the cities and towns of Kurdistan; the historical disagreements between both the KDP and PUK disappeared for a while under the threat of genocide by the strong Iraqi regime, only to reappear when the threat was starting to fade out. When they came back into the cities, all of them had a desire to organise the maximum number of followers into their organisations; this worsened when the race for power began. The more the region had hoped to survive, the tougher the struggle for power against each other became. Furthermore, there were other issues, such as those highlighted by Osman (2001a):

“the differences over the failed negotiations [of 1991] with the government and the government’s withdrawal from the aforementioned areas heralded a new era of dispute between the two parties. They had different approaches to the future of relations with the Iraqi Government and with the outside. Talabani and PUK favoured seeking a solution with the international community and Barzani and KDP were more for trying seriously to reach a settlement with Baghdad. Furthermore, the remarkable increase of the areas under their control and the resources available to them increased competition that escalated the dispute”.

4.4 Self-ruling and challenges:

The intention of the Iraqi government in withdrawing its administrations from Kurdistan cities and towns was to cause the failure of the Kurdish political parties, hoping that the people of Kurdistan would organise an uprising in response to this failure. Another significant pressure was that of the central government of Iraq; despite the economic sanction placed on Iraq, they then imposed internal sanctions on the region by not allowing any kind of fuel, electricity and other basic needs to pass the Iraqi check points into the region. The justification for this was, claimed Saddam Hussain⁵², to stop an area uncontrolled by the authorities turning into a sabotage point in the destruction of the rest of Iraq. He clarified the nature of the sabotage to be smuggling government aids across the border into Iran to the people in Kurdistan, acted out by the controlling political parties. The people of Kurdistan, therefore,

⁵² (Alubaidi, A., nd) to watch Saddam’s statement, follow the following YouTube link: (<https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=ICu9rS9N19o>).

suffered two sanctions: one by the international community and another by the Iraqi regime.

Another challenge was the lack of experience in administration and ruling by the political parties; especially when they adopted the policy of reward and privileges to their cadres by appointing them in civil posts, where they only had previous experience in partisan organisations. This lack of experience and favouritism led to maladministration and corruption. The 50:50 policies between the PUK and KDP deepened this corruption, as in cases where the minister was from one side; his deputy had to be from the other; the director from one party, his deputy from the opposite party. Consequently, with a competition over power raging, all administrative life became a political race and hindered the daily routine of administration for the people. It became standard practice that posts were only gained by getting a recommendation (*Tazkia*) from one of the two parties (the KDP or PUK) and proving his or her loyalty to them; this was the case even for the smallest governmental posts. Consequently, this excluded any none PUK-KDP expertise, reflecting further on the maladministration.

4.5 Struggle for Power and Civil War:

Disregarding the quality of those who were appointed in governmental posts reflected poorly on the quality of governance and led to a deeper level of nepotism, favouritism and recommendation systems. In other words, the best possibility for gaining a post became political loyalties rather than expertise. When this situation reached the point that which each of the two rival parties wanted more than 50% of the posts, they had to go to extreme lengths to win

the struggle for power and gain the majority share of the people; to achieve this, each of them had to out-recruit the other party in such a tense political situation on the verge of civil war. For both parties, as the government of the region, they had to generate revenue to fuel the government; this primarily came from customs, imposing customs not only on the goods that were imported or exported out of the region, but also between the cities of the region too. This worsened the economic situation as the poor had a heavier burden due to the two other sanctions from the international community on Iraq and the Iraqi regime in the region.

By escalating the tensions between the KDP and PUK, the main revenue from customs from Turkey on one side and Iran on the other side came under the control of the two parties. The Iranian border customs came under control of the PUK, the custom of Ibrahim Khalil between the region and Turkey came under the control of the KDP. The lack of transparency among them affected the economic revenues, especially when, under the sanction, the central government in Baghdad had to rely on the region to smuggle oil out of the country and establish a business for its elites, in particular for the sons of Saddam. The differences deepened between the PUK and KDP mainly over the revenues of Ibrahim Khalil's custom. The civil war, or as it is known in Kurdish, the 'War of Brothers' broke out in 1994, and continued until 1998; fuelling the war and its aftermath deepened the rentier economy⁵³ in the region. Despite the

⁵³ The rentier economy has, basically, been used to explain the politics of Iran, under the Shah, and the Arab oil states in terms of the fact that they have not undertaken democratic transformation or political reforms. "*In the wealthy Arab oil-exporting countries, which have been referred to as rentier states because they live off 'rents'-income from oil-there are other problems (on rentier states, see Beblawi and Luciani, **The Rentier State, 1987**). These states have sought to buy the loyalties of rentier populations by distributing a vast array of goods and services. They too have been unwillingly to permit widespread political participation*" (Bill, and Springborg, 2000, p. 59). Nevertheless, the rentier economy did not stop the Iranian revolution, at the first stance. In the cases of both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, there are many types of growing politics that the rentier state could not stop; for instance, the politics of

fact that in the new Iraq, the share of the region from the wealth of Iraq (17%) deepened the rentier policy of the two ruling parties in the region, due to many factors, this did not cease the growth of a strong political opposition to the ruling system of the region.

4.6 The Emergence of Kurdistan Islamic Union:

As the result shared power in 1992 between the KDP and PUK, and for the aforementioned reasons, a kind of resentment started to grow among the people in the region. Leezenberg (2001: 163) argues “*With the collapse of the strong Ba’ath state in 1991 and the ensuing economic crisis, the lower strata of the urban population became ever more dependent on patronage as a mean for survival*”. Apart from the two leading parties, there were many other smaller parties in the region; either because those political parties were following one of the two parties, or because they were followed by those people who were discontent with the political situation, since then there has always been a vacuum to be filled. However, due to lack of democracy, the militia’s presence in the region and the soon-to-be civil war between the KDP and PUK, it was not an easy job for any kind of political party to attempt this. The masses hoped for an escape from this chaos; whichever political party displayed even the most minimal disagreement towards the situation had a chance to present itself as the middle-ground.

resentment, even amongst the families of Aal-Saud, in Saudi Arabia, and, Aal-Sabah, in Kuwait, as well as the politics of the Islamist in both states. Therefore, the theory of the rentier economy, itself, is rather thin, analytically. Furthermore, the history of Kurdistan points away from this theory: in spite of the fact that, for many years, the Iraqi regime provided welfare, money, and authority to the Kurdish collaborators (*Jash*) (*josh (jash)*), or little donkeys, Kurds who fight on the side of the Iraqi government.

Gunter, 2004 (PP 165-166), suddenly, in 1991, almost all of them, with their tribal chiefs, turned against the regime, and participated in the uprising of 1991 (**Mustafa, 2009: 3**).

On 6th February 1994, after a series of battles between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK), the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) came to exist. As mentioned in chapter three, the KIU grew out of such chaos; during that time, however, the main motive was not merely a political one. Kurdistan, as a part of the Middle East, had already witnessed the Islamic awakening, and had already identified the IMIK as a jihadist movement, which had already had a series of battles with the PUK. Two important events paved the way for the KIU's acceptance by the people of Kurdistan and by other political parties. The first was its reputation which, through its benevolent association with the Islamic Kurdish League⁵⁴ (IKL) since 1992, had already provided many services. The second was its announcement as the first non-militia party after the resentment of the people towards the armed clashes and battles of the PUK and IMIK, and the imminent inevitable civil war between the PUK and KDP.

4.6.1 the Raison d'etre and role of the KIU:

The main two factors mentioned above paved the way for the KIU, though in terms of strategy and longevity, the KIU had to prove itself politically. During that time, there was little difficulty for political or social actors to exist due to the

⁵⁴ Islamic Kurdish League (Kurdish: Yakgrtwi Islami Kurd) is an Islamic charitable development foundation, it was established in 1988 on the hand of a number of Kurdish intelligentsia among them Shaikh Dr. Ali Muheideen Qaradaghi, and it adopted a number of objectives to serve the region by its various domains. The IKL entered Iraq in 1992 and opened branches in Duhok, Erbil, Sulaimani and Darbandikhan, and after 2003 it widened its services and opened branches in Kirkuk, Mosul and Baghdad.
Islamic Kurdish League, <http://www.iklkurd.com/>

circumstances that the region was witnessing. Leezenberg (2001: 223) remarks:

"Following the 1991 uprising, several factors created room for Islamist Organizations like IMIK, Rabita [IKL] and Yakgirtu [KIU] to gain social and political influence: the collapse of the hitherto strong state apparatus; the ensuing social, political and economic chaos; and the gradual erosion of Kurdish nationalism as a mobilizing force".

The KIU in its first manifesto, published on 6th February 1994, highlighted its strategy as follows:

"...therefore, in today's circumstances our strategy for serving our Kurdish people is: 1- Striving to rebuild Kurdistan, and deletion of the trace of all kinds of expulsion, Arabisation, genocide, and all the coercions that our people suffered from. 2- Insisting on obtaining all our just rights on our territories, thus we can defend our existence and rights. 3- We consider the parliament and government of the region as two privileges, therefore respecting, preserving, and developing them are of our duties. 4- Preserving the internal securities and avoiding all kinds of social, tribal or political fighting. Hence, this leads to the rule of law, and our people will be accordingly respected. 5- In order for our people to get out of the economic crisis that suffers from, we must try to increase and establish the charitable relief organisations, and by helping and preserving them we attract the vision of the charitable people so they can help our people." (KIU Media office, 1998: 11-12)

From the announcement⁵⁵ of the party, the KIU thought of its *raison d'être*, and conveyed the message that they were a necessity for the people of Kurdistan and to the situation, to participate in rebuilding Kurdistan and try to delete any trace of expulsion, Arabisation and genocide by helping the people that suffered from the regime; the people of Kurdistan had already experienced at least one of these three during the regime and had already, through their benevolent association, proved that they could help in this regard. As for the second point, striving for obtaining the just rights of the people of Kurdistan meant federalism, which was adopted by the region's parliament in 1992. This idea was, for an Islamic political party, a new one and was in line with all of the other political parties, passing the message that the KIU strategically had no disagreements over this crucial issue for the people and the political parties in the region. The clarification of a strategic political aim by an Islamic party was so important, as the people wanted to know what kind of policy a newly established Islamic party would adopt for the future of the region.

Furthermore, during that time, many of the other Islamists (among them some of the leaders of the IMIK) were not respecting the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). In some cases, their militias were challenging the apparatus of the KRG, such as the fighting triggered in the district of Darbandikhan in 1993, during which some of the security forces were killed by some of the peshmargas of the IMIK; this led to fighting between the PUK and the IMIK. As for not admitting the KRG, they were mocking the KIU for seeking

⁵⁵Due to the fact that before declaring a political party on 6th February 1994, the cadres and preachers who were from the founders of the KIU were considering themselves to be of the Muslim Brotherhoods in Iraq, they did not consider that day as the beginning of the establishment of the party, but they claim to have a kind of organisational way of life before that which they trace back to 1950s, referring to the first entrance of the MB into the cities of Kurdistan. Therefore, they consider the 6th February 1994 the announcement day of the party, not the establishment day.

permission from the KRG for establishing the party. Some of the leaders of the IMIK considered the parliament counter-Islamic, to the extent that one of their prominent leaders published a book titled 'Parliament between the Belief and Infidelity'. During this time, the KIU came to exist and announced in its first manifesto that it considers the parliament and the KRG as two privileges of the people of Kurdistan that it respects, preserves and helps to develop; this declaration was well respected by all the parties and by the people of Kurdistan. Through this, the KIU presented a moderate kind of Islamism that strived for the political demands of the people in Kurdistan, and left no room for non-Islamic parties to claim that all Islamists are against the political will of the people of Kurdistan.

By respecting both the parliament and the KRG, this automatically led to the implementation of the fourth strategic point of the manifesto of the KIU: 'preserving the internal securities and avoiding all kinds of social, tribal or political fighting' (the KIU, contrary to all other political parties, guaranteed this by not having militias). From this action, the KIU demonstrated that it was not only distinct from the other Islamists, such as the IMIK, but also from all other political parties, by not having its own militias; they were considered defenders of Kurdistan, and so their policing must be by the government, not the political parties. Under such circumstances, with all the political parties holding arms with no respect with regard to the law, chaos ensued, people reporting internal fighting between families, tribes and political parties, especially in the newly re-inhabited villages across of Kurdistan. People were generally in fear that internal fighting between the groups would trigger at any moment. Calling for, and practicing, a zero-militia policy in such a chaotic situation was widely welcomed by the people in the region.

With regards to the fifth strategic point of the first manifesto of the KIU, the new party once again emphasised its strength and presented itself as a solution regarding the economic crisis of the region. Highlighting the importance of helping and preserving those organisations, via the authorities of the KRG, would attract the largest number of them, in order to help the people of the region through the crisis; this would guarantee the activities of the KIU and its charitable organisations. Calling for the establishment of local charitable relief organisations was of the utmost importance for the KIU to stay in the region under all circumstances. Despite the existence of a number of international appeal organisations in the region, after the 31st August 1996 and the interference of the Iraqi army into the region by the invitation of the KDP to defeat the PUK, the majority left the region and did not return to resume their activities. However, the KIU and similar organisations remained, especially the IKL, which actively continues its charitable activities to the present day. In recent years, other local similar organisations were established by the media and the leading political parties, such as the Ibrahim Ahmad Foundation (funded by the PUK), and Barzani Foundation (funded by the KDP). All followed the KIU in this, as they were the pioneers in such charitable work.

Though the KIU was mainly concerned with uniting and centralising its organisations in different cities, and setting up legal cover for its centralised preaching, its leadership from 1991 to 1993 had progressed sufficiently, politically, to justify announcing a political party. The main two political additions, a moderate Islamism which recognised the national institutions of Kurdistan (such as parliament and the KRG), and its non-militia means, distinguished it

from the other Islamists; in addition to its well respected charitable organisations, this proved its necessity for the society during that era. Its raison d'être in terms of containing the growing youth of the Islamic awakening of Kurdistan into a moderate political entity, which would otherwise be potentially subjected to radicalisation, was also extremely important. The KIU approach of Islamism and politics became a model to be followed during the de-radicalisation process of other Islamists, as well as a model of political party for other non-Islamists too.

One of the most important raison d'être of the KIU as a political party in the region was its peaceful approach, internally and in terms of its role as a mediator between the warring parties during the civil war in the region. Abdulaziz (2011: 70-81) summarises⁵⁶ the KIU's attempts in mediating between the fighting parties; the KIU's peaceful approach was not only important in proving itself as a new party to the people of Kurdistan, but also with regards to educating its members and followers on such behaviour. This became the hallmark of the KIU, and it was soon known as a peaceful political party. As previously mentioned, the assassination of its founding member by the jihadists

⁵⁶ 1- The KIU's mediation between the KDP and PUK as follows:

KIU politburo delegation's visit on 2/3/1994 to the PUK's politburo attempting to cease fire.

Visit of the same delegation on 4/3/1994 to the KDP's second branch for the same purpose.

- On 2/5/1994 the KIU's leadership committee sent an official letter to PUK and KDP asking calling for cease fire.

- On the same day [2/5/1994] the KIU leadership committee's delegation visited the PUK's politburo attempting to pacify the tensions between the two parties.

- In the same first week of May upon the KIU's suggestion the idea of (peace and brotherhood committee) was presented, which later on had many activities in regards of mediating and peace.

- On 14/9/1996 the KIU politburo issued a statement to its organisations, emphasised its condemnation of the civil war.

- Furthermore, we must refer to the important statement of the General Secretary of the KIU on 26/9/1996 in the presence of Mas'ud Barzani and the political leadership of the Kurdish parties.

2- The war between KDP and Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

3- The second war between the PUK and IMIK.

4- The mediation of the KIU and KIG".

(Abdulaziz, 2011: 70-81)

did not spur feelings for retaliation unlike other parties; rather, KIU referred its grievances to the courts and believed in the rule of law. Its political life began with no equipment for retaliation that other parties owned in the form of their militias. This made the KIU subject to attacks mockery from some of its competitors. However, the more stable the region became, the more the other parties followed the KIU in this regard.

4.6.2 The KIU and Political Outcome:

Due to the above factors, the KIU grew rapidly in the first few years of its announcement. Unlike the other political parties, one of its characteristics was its presence in all the cities of the region. The PUK, for example, was mainly controlling Sulaimani, the KDP the Duhok, and the IMIK were controlling Halabja. However, as Leezenberg (2001: 222) highlights:

"Bahdinan [Duhok governorate] is a traditional KDP stronghold, and tribal structures and Sufi orders have remained relatively strong. Subsequently, it was the Rabita [IKL]⁵⁷ rather than the Islamic Movement that made inroads in this area, but once again, and significantly, primarily in urban areas like Duhok".

Due to the nationalistic party's dominance in the villages during the revolutions, their ideologies were spreading and prevented those areas from receiving any new ideas. However, in 1988, the Iraqi regime committed a mass genocide and destroyed these villages, either killed the habitants or gathering them into

⁵⁷*Rabita*: is the Arabic word for Islamic Kurdish League (IKL). However, here is referring to KIU since it was for many known by it, due to its charitable activities and its prior existence. Hence for many people for many years the KIU was referred to by its charitable organisation *Rabita*.

camps near the cities, away from the control and ideology of those parties; slowly, the new ideology of Islamism was growing in those camps. Nonetheless, due to the uprising of 1991 and the return of many of those people to their villages, they once again became strongholds of those parties' ideologies. Although the IKL had many of its projects in the villages, the KIU could not expand in the rural areas as much as they could in urban areas. Consequently, although the KIU saw huge expansion in the cities, especially among the educated (such as students, teachers, doctors, etc.), its influence remained limited in the rural areas.

4.6.3 Elections:

In its first few years, the KIU was mainly working on the following factors:

It's preaching (Quran 2:107) (*We have not sent you except as a mercy for all mankind*) this included its benevolent works. Its soft reform (Quran 11: 88) (*I want nothing but to set things right as far as I can*). This politically presented in its mediation attempts. Both above points required the KIU to avoid political rivalry. However, both above points enhanced and widened the circle of its organisations and increased the number of members. This caused the main political parties to be wary, stating that this widening of the circle of the KIU is at our cost, due to the benefits gained through the civil war.

One of the strategies that the student organisations and syndicates of the KIU employed in 1998 and 2000 was participations in the elections during these academic years. This participation was important as under the control of both the KDP and PUK, which divided the region into two controlled areas, such a

democratic step was crucial for the region, especially as no election had taken place since the 1992 general election. Conversely, it was important for the KIU itself to weigh up its existence over the four years. Generally, the results indicated that its organisations had significantly expanded to a degree that it became the number two party in each canton of the KDP and PUK. This later led to harsh political contestation by both parties towards the KIU in the territories that they ruled.

Taking the student organisation elections as an example, starting from 1998 the results of the elections in the secondary schools between the main two rivals (Kurdistan Students Union-KSU led by the KDP and Islamic Students Union of Kurdistan-ISUK led by the KIU) in the governorate of Erbil for the academic year of 1998/1999 were as follow:

Organisations	Percentage ⁵⁸
KSU	68.6%
ISUK	22.7%

Source: the personal archive of Amjad Mohamad, the former ISUK's secretary.

For the all universities, institutions and the secondary schools in both governorates of Erbil and Duhok, which were under the rule of the KDP, the results were as follows:

⁵⁸ All the student organisation elections' results were provided by the former Secretary of ISUK.

Organisations	Percentage
KSU	68.6%
ISUK	22.7%
UIS ⁵⁹	0.3%
AMSK ⁶⁰	1.6%

Source: the personal archive of Amjad Mohamad, the former ISUK's secretary.

Of the above results, the results of Salahaddin University-Erbil and University of Duhok were as follows:

University	KSU	ISUK
Salahaddin	71.5%	27.5%
Duhok	58.15%	36.34%

Source: the personal archive of Amjad Mohamad, the former ISUK's secretary.

Allegedly, a high percentage of ratio of votes for the KIU in the areas under the control of the KDP in Erbil and Duhok were coming from the supports of the PUK, as they had no candidates of their own to vote for, preferring to vote for the KIU in order to embarrass the KDP by supporting the newly emerged KIU. This allegation is doubtful, for various reasons:

In the same way that the KIU was growing in those areas, they were growing similarly in the areas under the PUK too. Thus, it was not in the interest of the PUK to support the KIU whatsoever.

⁵⁹ Union of the Islamic Students (UIS) was the students of Al-Nahdha Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan.

⁶⁰ Association of Muslim Students in Kurdistan (AMSK). See chapter three.

The above table shows that the ratio of the ISUK in University of Duhok was 36.34%, while its result in Salahaddin University in Erbil was only 27.5%. The PUK had never had much popularity in Duhok compared to its popularity in Erbil. For instance, the following table shows the PUK's results in the 1992's general election in comparison to the KDP in both governorates:

	KDP	PUK & Toilers'
Duhok	168683	15184
Erbil	152143	148352

Source: the personal archive of Amjad Mohamad, the former ISUK's secretary.

Thus, according to the 1992's elections, the PUK's presence in Duhok was only 9% of the KDP's popularity in the same governorate. According to the same election, its presence was 97.5% of the KDP's popularity in Erbil governorate. This disproves the allegation, as, if this was the case, the ISUK would get more votes in Erbil rather than Duhok through the support of the PUK students; the results indicate the opposite effect, receiving 36.34% in the University of Duhok and only 27.5% in Salahaddin University in Erbil.

If the PUK wanted to support any other organisations against the KDP, it would rather support the other smaller organisations. This due to the following:

Not to highlight the growth of the KIU, as it was the number one growing party in its own controlled areas too. They would support organisations with a similar ideological mindset, not an Islamic party such as the KIU.

If this allegation was correct for Erbil and Duhok under the KDP, it is still unclear how the ISUK could possibly achieve similar results in Sulaimani, which was controlled by the PUK, unless with the possibility of the same allegation for

supporting the KDP followers to them against the PUK; the above reasons disprove this possibility also.

In the University of Sulaimani and the institutions of Sulaimani governorate (under the control of the PUK), the main rivals were Kurdistan Students Association (KSA) led by the PUK and ISUK; and the results of the elections in the academic year of 1998/1999 were as follows:

KAS	ISUK	UIS
63.6%	27%	2.6%

Source: the personal archive of Amjad Mohamad, the former ISUK's secretary.

Generally, by looking at the results of Erbil and Duhok, it can be noticed that the KIU grew equally in the universities in Erbil at this stage, with the Sulaimani results coming in similarly, by 27.5% and 27% respectively. However, this grew by 36.34% in the University of Duhok. If we look back again at the results of the general elections of 1992, in the governorates of Sulaimani and Kirkuk⁶¹, the results were as follows:

	PUK	KDP
Sulaimani	207168	92449
Kirkuk	53129	24606

Source: the personal archive of Amjad Mohamad, the former ISUK's secretary.

This indicates that the KDP's presence in the governorate of Sulaimani was 44.64% of the size of the PUK, and its presence in Kirkuk governorate was 46.30% of the PUK's size. Hence, the presence of the KDP in these two governorates was quite close to that of the PUK, while, according to the same

⁶¹Note: till 2003 Kirkuk city was under the control of the Iraqi regime. However, in the KRG there was Kirkuk governorate containing the districts of Darbandikhan, Kalar and Chamchamal, and the governorate was run from Darbandikhan.

general elections of 1992, the PUK's presence in Duhok governorate was only 9% of the presence of the KDP. In this first general election, both the KDP and the PUK had almost the same size in the capital Erbil, whereas the PUK received what is equal to 97.50% of the votes that the KDP received. Although this shows that, generally and overall, the KDP were more popular in the region than the PUK in 1992's general elections, and with the later overall expansion of the KIU in all the governorates, according to the latest general election for the Iraqi parliament in 2014, out of the four received seats of the KIU, two of them were received in Duhok governorate. As for the Provincial Councils Elections in the region, which took place simultaneously with the Iraqi general elections in 2014, the KIU, out of the six seats received in the three governorates of the region, three of them were from Duhok:

Duhok	Sulaimani	Erbil
3	2	1

Source: the personal archive of Amjad Mohamad, the former ISUK's secretary.

Despite their strategic agreement and coalition with the KDP over the last ten years, the PUK are still limited in their governorate. Similarly, the KDP, in comparison to its presence in the 1992 general elections in the Sulaimani and Kirkuk, did not, according to the election results, perform well.

Due to the many acts that the region witnessed during the circumstances by which the KIU came to exist, and the strong Islamic awakening, the KIU experienced unexpected growth, especially among young people. This growth can be attributed to its Islamic background, not necessarily its politics. However, the more the situation settled, the more became a realistic size. In the elections of the student organisations of the academic year 2000/2001, the average size

in all the universities, institutions and secondary schools under the control of the KDP, in both governorates of Erbil and Duhok, was as follow:

KSU	ISUK	IUMIK ⁶²
81%	10.41%	0.01%

Source: the personal archive of Amjad Mohamad, the former ISUK's secretary.

Due to the single party ruling and the monopoly of the ruling party, there were always complains about the results of the elections and their credibility. However, over time and with the power of the rentier economy operation, the KDP also grew; as the winner in the last general election of the region in 2013, they received 38 seats out of the 100 seats available to Kurdish entities in the region's parliament. In the same election the KIU received only 10 seats. As for the period after the civil war, between 1994 and 1998, both fighting parties (the KDP and PUK) were primarily concerned with the conflict; they cared little about the growth of an unarmed political party such as the KIU. With their peace agreement, they both concentrated on expanding their organisations, and relied heavily on the rentier economy for this; despite their peace agreement, they pursued each other's followers in their controlled areas. This is the main reason for the substantial differences in the votes from 2000 onward as, from this date, both the KIU and the PUK in Erbil and Duhok, and the KDP in Sulaimani and Kirkuk, did not receive the amount of seats near that of the 1992's general election. The power shift that took place under the reform demands also cost the PUK more than any of the other parties.

Now to compare the Islamists, who were new in the political arena of Kurdistan, to the Communists, who had existed in Iraq as a political party since 1934, in

⁶² For (Islamic Unity Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan -IUMIK) see Al-Nahdha Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan, where IMIK and Al-Nahdha united for around a year and called it IUMIK.

terms of the general elections in the region. The following statistics clearly demonstrate the extent of the influence of religion among the Kurdish society:

1992	Islamists	Communists
	5.05%	2.5%

In 2005, the KIU, IMIK and the Kurdistan Communist Party (KCP) were in the Kurdistan coalition. However, KIK alone received 4.86%.

2009	Reform & Services ⁶³	IMIK	KCP
	12.83%	1,45%	0.8%

2013	KIU	KIK	IMIK	KCP
	10 seats	6 seats	1 seat	1 seat

The above data strongly suggests that Kurdish society is in line with Islam and does not accept anti-Islamic ideologies. On the other hand, the society does not approve of radicalisation and extremism. For instance, all of the Islamist parties in the 1992 general elections had only 5.05%, which did not pass the 7% margin, and therefore did not gain any seats. Whereas, in the 2013 general elections, they received 17 seats in total, out of the 100 seats allowed for Kurdish entities in the Parliament, while the PUK only received 18 seats. In addition, the reasons for the size of the votes of the Islamists in 1992 general elections can be summarised as the following:

⁶³As mentioned above, the Reform and Services consisted from the KIU, KIK, KSDP and Toilers’.

The Kurdish society was new to Islamists, and the opponent parties could easily mobilise the masses against them. Although, the civil Islamists were also in coalition with the IMIK, the IMIK was the banner for the coalition. Thus, the main reaction towards them was one against an armed Islamist movement. Overall, at that time, the nationalist politics of the Islamists was not very clear, neither for themselves nor for the voters. In other words, according to the above comparison between the communists and the Islamists, over the course of four general elections, religion served a significant role in mobilising the people of Kurdistan. The Islamic awakening, in particular, had its own role in this mobilisation, and would have been even more significant, if not for clashes between the armed Islamists and other Kurdish nationalists in the past. Although the main three Islamist parties are currently at different levels of participation in the Kurdish nationalism, for the above reasons, they have not yet realized their own ambitions. Allegedly, the prominent candidates among the Islamists are still the clerics, not their politicians. Taking the 2010 Iraqi general elections, for instance, there is strong support for this allegation. In this election, in the Sulaimani governorate, from the 103188 votes that the KIU received, Aziz Hafiz (or MallaAuzair), a prominent cleric in Kurdistan, alone received 46314 votes. From the same list of the KIU's candidates, the top individual, Bakr Hama Siddiq, a well-known lawyer, author and politician, received 12332 votes. For the KIK, this effect can be seen most clearly, as in the same elections in Erbil, of the 62706 votes that the KIK received in that governorate, Ali Bapeer, the leader of the party, who is a well-known cleric, received 50116 votes. This means that two clerics from the KIU and KIK alone received nearly 45% of votes in the case of KIU, and 80% in the case of KIK in those two governorates during the 2010 Iraqi general elections.

In the region's general election in 2013, of the 186721 total votes that the KIU received, the head of its candidates list, the politburo and its prominent politician figure Mawlood Bawamurad according to Rudaw (2013) only received 6600 votes. The preacher Haji Karwan, who had never been known as a politician, but was well known as an Islamic preacher, received 76943 votes; Omar Kochar, another preacher, received 40000 votes. Hence, out of the 186721 votes that the KIU received, two of the party's preachers alone received 116943 votes. This made their proportion 62.50% of the total votes in the 2013 general elections. However, Mawlood Bawamurad "*referred the reasoning and explanation for such a result back to the failure of the political rhetoric of all the political parties in Kurdistan, which made the voters to trust neither the political parties nor their political figures*" (Rudaw, 2013). For Bawamurad, this kind of results is not necessarily due to the Islamic background of the KIU and its voters, but instead to the mistrust by Kurdistan's voters towards the politicians and the political parties. To a large extent, this argument is valid, as most of the candidates who received a large number of votes, from all the non-Islamic parties too, were not prominent politicians in their parties. For instance, of the 476736 votes that the Change movement received, Ali Hama Salih, a TV presenter, received 139767 votes.

4.6.4 Ethno-Politics and the KIU:

Ethno-politics gradually developed among the KIU alongside the political enhancement going on in the region generally, which Iraq in particular experienced from 2003 onward. For this reason, the Turkmen members of the party left, and established their own party on the basis of their own ethno-

politics; the gradual shift from religious politics to further ethno-politics took place within the party. During every election, in order to attract the maximum number of the voters, the parties had to prepare ever more nationalistic manifestos. During this period, the voter numbers varied and the statistics did not behave in the same way as was seen during the student organisation elections, for instance. The new politics of the party lost thousands of the Islamist voters, voting instead for Islamists who had not yet reached this stage of politics, the KIK particularly; the KIU did not gain much from more nationalist voters, who would logically prefer exclusively nationalist parties such as the PUK and KDP. Yet, among its candidates for both the Iraqi and Kurdistan general elections, the clerics had a better chance, and it was they who gathered most of the votes for the KIU; to a large extent, and as mentioned above, this was the same for KIK.

After the civil war, when the new era of political rivalry demanded that the KIU concentrate its nationalistic politics to attract the maximum amount of voters, instead of targeting only students and professional syndicates. Focusing on nationalism cost the KIU something else which none of the non-Islamist Kurdish parties had: a large number of Turkmen members and supporters, especially in the city of Erbil. Ghafur (2013: 51) remarks:

“...in the first years of the announcement of the KIU, which until that moment the party had not indulged into political emulation, and had not faced with the nationalistic demands of the Kurds, it had a religious trans-nationalism rhetoric, and they all [Kurds and non-Kurd members such as Turkmen] confidently were under its flag continued their Islamic struggle. However, day after day and year after another under the pressure of the

Kurdish nationalism of Kurdistan, that non-nationalist Islamism of the KIU withdrew in favour of the Kurdish nationalist rhetoric to the lowest level. That, for the Turkmen members, was a trigger of concern and stance”.

Thus, slowly the volume of nationalism increased within the politics of the KIU, this behaviour considered a normal attitude for any political party in the position of the KIU. Otherwise, the question is raised as to its political demands would be within such a nationalistic atmosphere, such as that of Kurdistan, especially when the Kurds had suffered a lot, even ethnic cleansing, in the process of defending their right to existence as a nation. However, due to three factors, this kind of nationalistic behaviour by other non-Kurdish Islamists is not well documented: Those non-Kurdish Islamists are not representing a revolutionist nation within their states, like that of the Kurds which, over a century, suffered from their regimes. They have no such circumstances, and even in a multi-ethnic society, like those of Egypt and Syria, they are from the nation that rules the state, and similarly to all their Arab nationalist parties, they never wanted to recognise the nationalist rights of the other ethnicities.

They are not in a position, like that of the KIU, which demands them to struggle for equal national rights among the nations of the region. Rather, they blame the KIU for this political decision and expect them to keep quiet for the sake of the so-called Islamic unity.

They all practice nationalist politics within their own states, however, due to the above two factors, they either don't realise their nationalism, and still desire an Islamic caliphate, or are simply denying the rights of the Kurds, instead blaming their nationalist movement: this is especially true in the cases of Iraq, Syria and

Turkey, as the Kurds are struggling against two Arab nations and the Sunni state of Turkey.

As for the KIU as a political party in Kurdistan, its advancement in politics brought the party closer to its nationalistic demands, otherwise it had no *raison d'être* as a political party in the first place; it had to remain a benevolent preaching group and not interfere into politics. This was not in line with Islamic principles and the understanding of the KIU, as they consider politics a dimension of the good deeds that Islam requires from Muslims. In the case of the KIU, the more they practiced politics the more nationalistic they became, until the aftermath of the Iraq and the increase in political demands by the Kurds, leading to the establishment of the KIU as one of the first Kurdish players within Iraq to accept the reality that Turkmen members have their right to have another political party, with their own political ambitions.

4.7 KIU's Second Political Phase:

The KIU rapidly grew in the region, from its establishment until the invasion of 2003, however, as with other Kurdish political powers, the policy that was followed took into account the ongoing threat of the Iraqi regime on the region, the danger of another phase of civil war between the main ruling parties, the carrying out of serious kind political manoeuvres, due to its Islamic background, especially when the Islamic militias were involved in the civil war. Therefore, its politics mainly focused on mediating and self-maintaining, with few attempts at political manoeuvres. However, after 2003, when all the three mentioned circumstances disappeared; the regime changed and the danger of civil war

disappeared, as coalition forces existed in Iraq. Furthermore, no more Kurdish Islamic militias remained, and, more importantly, the KIU became well known by America and had been classified as a legitimate Kurdish nationalistic entity by them. Under the authority of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the Iraqi governing council was established, and the SG of the KIU was a member of the council.

The new political era witnessed by Iraq, Kurdistan and the rest of the region demanded many political steps from the Kurds, in order to gain the utmost benefit from the situation. The aftermath of the civil war brought changes in the way that the region was run, the social political life under the rentier economy and the two controlled cantons run by the KDP and PUK. Above all, the newly liberated disputed areas between Iraq and the region required a total political reform and transparency in the region. All of these factors provided the KIU with an opportunity to call for reform. Its political position as the third Kurdish entity at that time gave it a louder voice.

During this phase, the KIU was part of the coalition government, while also acting as an opposing party. In a sense, it was trying to use its position within the government to call for reform, which made it impossible for the party to adopt its policy as an opposition party outside the government. Abdulaziz (2011: 82) remarks:

“...the KIU was utilising its existence in the government for reform. Even, this point was raising a question about it: how could [the KIU] be in the government and at the same time consider yourselves as opposition and criticise the authorities? Obviously the answer of the KIU’s leadership was the following: due to the special political circumstances of the region,

and instability of the [region's] political experience, we have chosen this form of politics, for this phase. With changes in the political atmosphere, we could review our political stance”.

Although this policy was not an effective one as an opposition, it was a starting point for opposition experience in an atmosphere in which, under the effect of the civil war, any political objection could be viewed as a counter to the political experience of Kurdistan. Nonetheless, this led to bigger voices calling for political reform, and eventually political opposition too. This was not the only experience of its kind, but many other political parties were trying the same kind of policy. Even, at the level of the ministers, there were such attempts, such as the reforms that Professor Dlawar Alladdin (the minister of Higher education and Scientific Research) called for; Alladin was a minister of the PUK, when they were in coalition with the KDP. He was trying to adopt reforms within his ministry, which facilitated reforms and overall development of the ministry, where his policies were opposed by their partner KDP, and he could not complete his four year term; his service lasted only two years. Furthermore, when the former opposition parties of the Change movement, the KIU and the KIK decided to participate in the coalition government after the 2013 elections, they all stated that they wanted to reform and implement their reform package within the government. Reforms were difficult to implement by an opposition party, so attempts had to be made within the government to implement reform policy together with their allies.


The second term of the general elections for the Kurdistan Parliament took place on January 30th, 2005, after the first election that took place in 1992. The KIU ran for the general election within the Kurdistan Democratic Patriotic list in

the second term, which contained all the main parties of the region, including the Christians and the Turkmen entities. The list out of the 111 seats received 104 seats, the KIK received 6 seats and Kurdistan Toilers' Party and the independents one seat. The KIU, from the 104 seats, received 9 seats.

Political Parties	Total of Votes	Percentage	No. Seats
Kurdistan Democratic Patriotic	1570663	89.00%	104
Islamic Komal of Iraqi Kurdistan	85237	4.86%	6
Kurdistan Toilers' Party and the independents	20585	1.17%	1
Kurdistan Democratic Labour Party	11748	0.67%	0
Kurdistan's People Democratic Movement	10952	0.62%	0
Independents List	10262	0.59%	0
Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party	9081	0.52%	0
Iraqi Republican Gathering	9499	0.54%	0
Iraqi Unity Patriotic Front	8255	0.47%	0
Kurdistan Democrats Movement	6690	0.38%	0
Kurdistan Conservative Party	5506	0.31%	0
Iraqi Patriotic Brotherhood Party	3422	0.20%	0
Kurdistan Patriotic Trend	2018	0.12%	0
Total of the Votes	1753919	10%	111
Rejected Votes	23760		

The results of the second term of the general elections of the Kurdistan region, January 30th 2005.

Source: the personal archive of the Elections office of the KIU.



Prior to 2003, and working with the Iraqi opposition, the KIU always classified itself as a Kurdish party rather than an Islamist opposition. On more than one occasion, it was suggested that the Iraqi Islamists should be classified together, as they have the same ideological bases. However, the KIU never wanted to be classified under the banner of the Islamists, but preferred to be classified as a Kurdish party instead. Therefore, when the Iraqi Interim Governing Council (IIGC) was appointed in 2003 over a year, from the 25 members, 5 members were assigned to the Kurds, and one of those five Kurdish members was the Secretary General of the KIU. Therefore, when Kurdistan's general election took place in January 2005, the KIU entered the coalition with almost all the Kurdish entities, but not KIK, which until that moment were experiencing the aftereffects of the prior civil war with the PUK. Also, their leader at that time, Ali Bapir, was jailed by the Americans from July 2003 until April 2005⁶⁴, and did not become a part of the coalition.

⁶⁴See Chris Kutschera's page for more information <http://www.chris-kutschera.com/A/Ali_Bapir.htm>.

The main reason for having such a big coalition was to keep all the region's entities united, so that they all have the same policy towards the central government in Baghdad (in negotiation over the disputed areas) and the constitutional rights of the people of Kurdistan. However, in the same year on 15 December 2005, the Iraqi Parliamentary election was taking place. The KIU alone decided to run for that election outside the Kurdish coalition; for the first time, the KIU called publicly for reform, its manifesto based on reform and anti-corruption. This was a shock for the main two ruling parties of the region, mobilising their masses against the KIU, stating that they had gone out of consensus with the people of Kurdistan. Furthermore, they accused them of being anti-Kurds, pro-Arabs and the agent of the foreigners (referring to the Muslim Brotherhood). This led to a general attack on all the offices of the KIU over the Badinan area under the KDP on 6th December, perpetrated by the youth organisations of the KDP, an act which included setting all of their offices on fire. According to EKurd Daily (2005) "*four KIU members were killed, including a high ranking official of the party*". Despite the accusations and the attack, the KIU's five members in the Iraqi parliament, with the 53 members of the Kurdish Alliance in Baghdad, worked for Kurdish politics. The KIU's explanation and rationale for running alone for the Iraqi parliament was based in its resentment and the non-reform policies of the two parties, an act which was later criticised by many political analysts. Indeed, the KIU should have gone independent for the earlier elections of January 2005 rather than the central government, as the reform of the region should emerge within itself, rather than the other way around.

The concepts transparency, corruption, nepotism and reform became the daily subjects of the Kurdish media. Some had gone further, referencing the call for


reform within the PUK; this was one of the ruling parties of the region, started on the hand of Nawsheerwan Mustafa (the deputy SG of the party) which eventually led to the formation of the Change Movement in 2009.

Within the wider call for political reform, the third term of Kurdistan's parliamentary general election took place on 25th July 2009. For this term the KIU, Kurdistan Islamic Komal (Group) (KIK), Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party (KSDP) and Kurdistan Toilers' Party (KTP) had a coalition parliamentary list and called it 'Services and Reform'. The list gained 13 seats out of the 100 seats allocated to the Kurds. There are other 11 seats allocated to religious and ethnic minorities, as follow: 5 seats to Turkmen, 5 seats to Chaldean and Assyrian Christians, and 1 seat to the Armenian Christians; the total number of the Kurdistan Parliament's seats becomes 111 seats. According to the prior agreement of the four parties of the parliamentary list of Services and Reform, the KIU received 6 seats, the KIK 4 seats, the KSDP 2 seats and the KTP 1 seat out of the 13 seats that the coalition received.

A list of the voting results for the political parties and coalitions in the election are as follows:

Political Parties	KDP&PUK +	Change Movement	Services & Reform	Islamic Movement	Communist	Turkmen	Christians	Others	Total
Governorate									
Sulaimani	288980	303103	127020	19564	6026				
Hawler	420627	122205	68029	6916	7839				
Duhok	333574	14443	42124	666	1160				
Others	33189	5273	3669	1	3				
Total	1076370	445024	240842	27147	15028	29845	27644	14296	1876196
Percentage	57.37%	23.72%	12.83%	1.45%	0.8%	1.59%	1.47%	0.76%	

Source: the personal archive of the Elections office of the KIU.



The KIU's political participation, disregarding the specificities of its existence and objectives, was positive in creating a political culture. This political culture was democratically orientated in many respects; civil life; with no militia, positive women participation, non-tribalism, political reform and political opposition were among the major issues that the KIU worked on. Currently, these are among the top political topics affecting the region, all worked on by the major political parties. Although the KIU had suffered a lot when it started and called for this kind of policy, even when it was mocked for expecting such a policy in a region full of militia, civil war and violation of the human rights. However, the success of this kind of policy in the region, and having this political culture, is the success of the political philosophy of the KIU, whether it had itself directly gained from it or not. In contrast, some of the political parties were mobilising and maintaining their organisations by creating civil war and trying to defeat the other political parties. On the contrary, recently, in a peaceful contestation, they cannot mobilise or even maintain their existence, but the more the democratic successes, the more they are losing.


Officially, after the general elections of 2009, there were political oppositions in the region, which consisted of the Change movement with 25 parliamentary seats, with the KIU on 6 seats and KIK 4 seats. Throughout that parliamentary term, those three opposition parties had more than one third of the seats of the parliament, and were in collaboration in their call for anti-corruption and political

reforms. Abdulaziz (2011: 117-151) classifies the KIU's efforts, by itself or with the other political parties, into two phases. The first one occurred prior to the 2009 elections, which summarises them in nine points, and the second phase, which started after that general election, continued until the 2013's general elections, and summarises it in ten points. Until the fourth term of the general elections in Kurdistan, the opposition parties, despite the promises of the government for reforms, did not witness any kind of reform. All parties decided to take part in the government that would emerge from the fourth general elections, which took place on 21 September 2013, hoping to start reforms within the government.

The results of the elections for the Kurdish parties in the fourth term that took place on 21st September 2013 were as follows:

KDP	Change	PUK	KIU	KIK	IMIK	KSDP	KCP	Third Direction
38	24	18	10	6	1	1	1	1

Source: the personal archive of the Elections office of the KIU.



4.7 Independence of Kurdistan:

Throughout the twentieth century, the Kurdish political parties in southern Kurdistan never happened to see any political party to call for an independent nation state for the Kurds after the revolts of Shaikh Mahmood, who clearly called for a kingdom of Kurdistan. According to those political parties, this was due to the regional and international circumstances, which would not allow the Kurds such a step. The attempts of Shaikh Mahmood, in the first half of the century in Iraq, and of Qazi Muhammad in Iran, both failed to achieve this. First striving for autonomous rights for the Kurds in Iraq, and ending with the federalism of Parliament of Kurdistan on 4th October 1992, enhanced the political ambitions of the Kurds in this part of Kurdistan. After 2003, in light of the changes in Iraq and the wider region, many of the political interests of the major political players in the region changed. In particular, when the political parties and the people of the region were disappointed by the Iraqi central government with respect to its reluctance to implement the Iraqi constitution, thus guaranteeing the right of the Kurds in Iraq.

Since 1991, the Kurds in Iraq have had two opportunities towards the independency in this part of Kurdistan; however, for the same reasons stated above, the political parties did not even mention the issue of independence seriously during those two occasions. The first occasion was after the uprising of 1991 and the no-fly-zone that was provided by the USA, UK and France. The second occasion was after the 2003 regime change in Iraq. Although the referendum movement, alongside the Iraqi general elections on 30th January 2005, ran a referendum pole, according to the Kurdistan Referendum Movement International Committee (2005), in all the Kurdish areas, including

the so-called disputed areas; “*the total number of Kurdistan voters participating in the referendum was 1,998,061 people*”. According to the same source, 98.88% of them voted ‘yes’ in favour of independence of Kurdistan, and the results were as follow:

Governorate	Voted for Independence	Voted for Staying in Iraq	Total Votes	Percentage For Independence	Percentage for Staying in Iraq
Kirkuk	131,274	181	131,582	99.88%	0.12%
<u>Nineveh</u>	165,780	111	165,891	99.93%	0.07%
Diyala	35,786	627	36,413	98.28%	1.72%
Sulaimani	650,000	5,796	656,496	99.12%	0.88%
Hawler (Erbil)	622,409	11,289	636,898	98.23%	1.77%
Duhok	368,163	2,247	370,781	99.39%	0.61%
Total	1,973,412	20,251	1,998,061	98.88%	1.12%

Source: Kurdistan Referendum Movement – International Committee, 2005.

For the same reasons, the political parties hoped to guarantee the Kurdish rights within the Iraqi constitution by rebuilding Iraq and staying within it, rather than acting on the wishes of the 98.88% of the voters. As they disappointed the Kurds via the Iraqi governments, and did not implement the constitution, gradually the position of the Kurdish political parties changed. The position of the major political parties in the parliament and government of Kurdistan can be classified into two groups, with regards to the independence and establishment of a nation state for the people of Kurdistan. The first group which publicly advocated this idea and thought about this step timely with respect to the future of Kurdistan Region, comprise of the KIU, KDP and KIK. The KIU officially adopted self-determination and the establishment of a nation state as its

strategy in its congress in May, 2012⁶⁵. According to Rudaw (2014) prior to the last Iraqi general election in April 2014, the KIK announced the same idea for Kurdistan's nation statehood, arguing that was the right time for this step. As for the KDP, especially when tensions between the region and the central government in Baghdad arise over budget and power sharing, the head of the party, Mr. Masoud Barzani (also the current president of the region), stated that they would fight for independence. Directly after the control of Mosul by the terrorist Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (Levant) (ISIS), as Khalaf (2014) highlights, Barzani declared that *"he was no longer bound by the Iraqi constitution and called on the Kurdish parliament to prepare for an independence referendum"*.

The second group consists of the PUK and the Change movement. As Abdulla (2014) comments *"PUK leaders are reluctant to speak out publicly in favour of Independence"*. The change movement, in this regard, followed the same policy of the PUK, stating that it is not the right time for an independent nation state. Rather, they state that change and reform should be prioritised over an independent Kurdistan. Chomani (2014) quoted *"KNN, a TV network close to Gorran, reported on July 6 that [Nawsheerwan]⁶⁶ "Mustafa believes Kurdish claims of independence should not only be based in rhetoric, but also on democratic, accountable and transparent rule"*. It is true that democracy, reform and anti-corruption are all necessary for an independent nation; however, once the chance is gone, it might never come back. Thus, striving for democracy, human rights and positive governing demands should not stop the Kurds from utilising the available chance of having their own nation state. All parties

⁶⁵Also, in the last congress in May 2016, the KIU reiterated the self-determination right for the people of Kurdistan in an independent national state of Kurdistan.

⁶⁶Nawsheerwan Mustafa: the late leader of Change Movement (Gorran) died on 19th May 2017.

nonetheless laude the ambition of the people of Kurdistan towards this goal. They all also believe in achieving this goal in peace, The Economist (2015) remarking:

“If the landlocked Iraqi Kurds are to win statehood by peaceful means, plainly they must reach an accommodation with their neighbours. Their biggest new hope on this score is the transformation of their once scratchy relations with Turkey. Nechirvan Barzani, the prime minister, emphasises friendship with Turkey and Masoud Barzani, the president, gets on well with RecepTayyipErdogan, Turkey’s president. Annual bilateral trade now exceeds \$8 billion and 100,000 Turks are reckoned to be working in Iraqi Kurdistan. They built the snazzy new airport in Erbil, where Americans and Europeans, among others, can enter without a visa. Turkey is easily the region’s leading investor”.

Convincing Iraq and Iran is the challenge faced by the Iraqi Kurds in terms of achieving their nation state peacefully. As for Syria, it is already suffering from its own troubles, and may not be able to control its own territories, even less having a say in the future of the Kurds and that of Kurdistan. It is understood by those who are supporting the idea of independency that Turkey will not oppose a nation state of the Kurds in northern Iraq; this is the only gateway for exporting Kurdistan’s petrol, and furthering their bilateral business. As AkhbarAlaalam, 2014 reports “*the oil of North Iraq [Kurdistan Region] suffices Turkey for 200 years*” Furthermore, as Rudaw Net (2015a) quoted (Turkish I TV), Rajab TaibErdugan, the president of Turkey, stated “*they will not oppose a nation state for the Kurds in Iraq, and scission of the Kurds from Iraq is an internal Iraqi affair*”. Unlike Iraq and Iran, it is expected that the current Turkish

government will accept the situation of the Kurdistan region, as it has already accepted itself as a self-ruling region; whereas in the past, none of the Turkish governments were ready to accept any kind of development in Kurdistan. Nowadays, they want their own peace process to success and getting into any negative interference would further its own problem similar to that of the Kurdish issue. Stopping its peace process, and entering into new warfare with the Kurds, would ruin its economic growth and halt their strategic plans. Above all, they would lose potential business with the Kurds, which they are the number one beneficiary from.

When it comes to the sectarian politics of the region, Turkey, again, wants the Kurds as majority Sunnis to its side. This political decision is also important in the rebalance of power between, Turkey and Iran on the one hand, and between Turkey and the Arab states on the other. Under the development of these politics in Syria, Iraq and recently Yemen, as well as the role of Iran in this politics, caused the Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and Saudi Arabia to reconsider their position on the Kurds and Kurdistan. On June 4th 2015, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in Washington saw talks between Maj. Gen. Anwar Eshqi from Saudi Arabia and Ambassador Dore Gold from Israel, the Saudi Maj. Gen. Eshqi, (2015) suggested “*working toward the creation of a greater Kurdistan in peaceful ways as this will weaken Iranian, Turkish, and Iraqi ambitions and would split up a third of each of these countries in favour of Kurdistan*”. It is left to the Kurdish politicians whether they act in a way by which they benefit from the situation, or hesitate again and miss the opportunity.

However, recent political tensions between the political parties in the region led to differences over the issue of referendum. When Barzani called the political parties for a meeting to assign a date for the referendum, two of the major political parties, Change Movement and Islamic Group, boycotted the meeting. Their reason for this was to reactivate the Parliament that has been suspended by the KDP since 2015, before any talks about a referendum. Nonetheless, all other political parties, including the PUK, had consensus on the issue and agreed to go for the referendum on 25 September 2017. (Chmaytelli, 2017).

4.8 concluding Remarks:

The political parties and Kurdish revolutions throughout the twentieth century, with the help of the international community and direct help from the USA, UK and France via the implementation of the no-fly-zone, became extremely fruitful. A free region in major parts of southern Kurdistan in 1991 was taken over by the Kurdish political parties. A year later, the Kurdish political entities ran a general election, and in the result, Kurdistan parliament and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) were born. However, due to lack of administration experience and the struggle for power between the main two parties, which on the basis of a 50:50 shared power in the first decade of their governing experience, did not provide a good example of self-ruling.

As mentioned in Chapter three, Islamism among the Kurds in southern Kurdistan goes back to the late 1940s and early 1950s of the last century. Due to many factors, among them the orientation of the Kurdish political parties, the Kurdish movement and lack of abilities the Kurdish Islamists were not able to

integrate into the revolution, in the words of Karwani (2014) "*until early 1980s, could not expand*". Therefore, during these years, they remained politically unproductive. Once again, Karwani (2014) remarks:

"...the [Islamic] trend during this era, due to a lack of clarity in its identity and characteristic as an independent entity, rarely had a written political framework. This was because of the nature of the Muslim Brotherhood thought and the era, which had given more preaching context to the trend. In other words, the Islamist Kurds, had more of identity rhetoric, and their thoughts generally revolved around slogans and the general concepts of trans-nationalism issues".

This was not only the case with the Kurdish Islamists, but also generally, as Esposito (2011:17) highlights "*Although nationalists since the 1960s have called for a separation of national and religious identities, Islamists continue to support the notion of membership in the Ummah as the primary identity for all Muslims, rather than ethnic, linguistic, or geographic identities*". It can be argued that since the 1990s, within the Islamic political parties, not yet the preaching groups, this notion has slowly become less believable. Noori (2015) states that "*we want our Kurdish version of Islam*". However, at an individual level and that of non-political actors, Islamic trans-nationalism is still a strong mobiliser. Therefore, when it is needed, it is used to mobilise the grassroots.

The Kurdish Islamists too, in particular the KIU, had gone through the same political cycle; they stayed preaching, with no clear political vision, for decades. Eventually they found themselves in a political context, which made it difficult to stay at the same level of preaching and distancing themselves from politics. In order to protect the preaching, groups of the preachers had to establish a

political party, which required a political vision. This political vision, over the first few years, evolved into a complete religious nationalism. Religious nationalism is a complete nationalism, with a political concentration on the nation state, and concern about the religious dimension. This is the case with all the Islamic political parties in the Islamic world so that their political mission has evolved accordingly; in many cases, however, they deny this case. This denial either goes back to lack of political opportunity, i.e. not being in power, or, perhaps they are enjoying their nation statehood and do not identify with the feeling that the Kurdish religious nationalists have towards their nation.

Chapter Five

Islam and the Kurdistan Islamic Union

5.1 Introduction:

In this chapter, I will argue that the KIU has evolved from a traditional Islamic pattern, caring about Islamic feelings more than anything else, to the level of a political party that is concentrating on regional needs, with reference to Islam. This argument will be based on the themes presented in the chapter. Conventionally, Islamic groups are sympathetic with the notions of Umma, Islamic caliphate, Shari'ah, and so on, mainly looking at these concepts from a historical perspective. However, when the group turned into a political party, its political demands made it perceive them differently, in the best interests of its political demands. Accordingly, the experience of the KIU shows it is offering this kind of evolution within the context of the Kurdistan region and its unique political needs and status quo.

5.2 Universalised Islam (Umma):

In order to examine the KIU's understanding of the concept of Islamic Umma, and its enthusiasm towards Kurdish nationalism, I asked the following question: "As a Kurdish Islamist or an Islamist Kurd if you prefer what do you think of the universalised Islam?". The purpose of this question is to examine again whether

there is any preference between nationalism and Islamism by the leaders of the party, as well as to see how they look at the universalised Islam by examining whether they have a complete loyalty to Islam as an Umma with disregards to ethnicity (as is the case with some Islamists in transnational groups such as Al-Qa'eda). The importance of this question is firstly to reiterate the answers from question one and to double-check the balance and loyalty towards the Kurdish nationality and Islamic religion by the party. Its importance secondly is to examine the policy of the KIU in regards to the theoretical background of the MB strategy, the revivalism of Islamic glory through restructuring the Muslim individual, the Muslim family, the Muslim society, the Muslim government, and the Islamic caliphate. Through obtaining the answer to this question, we will have the basis to testing the research question. This allows us to have a window into looking at the political thought and behaviour of the KIU and understanding their visions towards all other affairs, both religion and nationalism alike. It also helps to test other similar contemporary MB-inspired political parties' behaviours throughout the ME. Finally, it is important in order to see the differences between the KIU and other MB groups and political parties, since the Kurds are a nation without a state, whereas other MB groups and political parties have their own states and govern citizens with a state.

Mohammad Ahmad (2012) answers the question as follows:

“As far as I understood, Islam has few dimensions, such as the Universal dimension. Islam hasn't come to melt down the nations into a universal body. It has come to make partnership between the nations on the basis of being human beings.

Also, it forms partnership between Muslims as followers of a religion, as they have shared worship in which they are partners.

Similarly, there is another circle which is the circle of the nations, another creation of God. Hence, it is God's decision to have all these different nations, as it has referred to by the following Quranic verse (49:13) "O mankind! We have created you from a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know one another. Verily, the most honourable of you with Allah is that (believer) who has At-Taqwa [i.e. he is one of the Muttaqun (the pious. See V. 2: 2)]. Verily, Allah is All-Knowing, Well-Acquainted (with all things)".

Thus, to know each other, then Quran asks us to cooperate with each other, where it says (5: 2) "...Help you one another in Al-Birr and Al-Taqwa (virtue, righteousness and piety); but do not help one another in sin and transgression".

Concentrating on various circles such as nationalism, universality of Islam and humankind as a whole is a new interpretation among Islamists. This links their world view to places beyond the traditional boundaries of the Islamic world which they used to define including the western world as former colonial powers. The importation of nationalism at the end of the Ottoman Empire by the

nationalists alone came from beyond traditional Islamic boundaries. As a result, the nationalism that came during the era of colonialism to the ME states was seen by the Islamists as a non-Islamic nationalism.

However, this new vision of nationalism as explored by certain Islamists leads them to look differently at non-Islamist nationalists and the west. Therefore, looking at nationalism as a political product, which is for them is a realistic solution for living in peace with neighbouring Muslim nations as well as living in the international community with harmony and not as rivals, is a significant progress in Islamic political thought and behaviour. Furthermore, this is also a kind of liberalism which brings some progress for secularists and Islamists, as not being anymore under the influence of the conspiracy theory that the whole region, seculars and Islamists alike, was suffering from. It also highlights the rights of the nations among the Islamic Umma, bringing to it a new interpretation on the basis of partnership and cooperation and widening this cooperation beyond the Islamic Umma. This is a form of normalisation that has emerged over a century of experience.

As the KIU is representing a nation that has been divided across other Muslim nation states, the example of the KIU is a chance to elaborate the details of connection between nationalism and Islam. Without the example of the KIU leading the way, other similar groups appear unlikely at this moment to state so clearly the connection between nationalism and Islam in the case of Kurdistan. This partnership comes with the equal rights for the affected nations, with the nationless state of Kurdistan surrounded by fully developed nation states - in the case of the Arabs, even more than a nation state. This leads to a lack of connection and equality between Kurds and their fellow Muslim nations, both in

the region and with other Muslim and non-Muslim countries through the world. This feeling, in certain extreme secular nationalist cases, has led to polar reactions, with some rejecting Islam as a suitable identity for Kurds, and others rejecting western policies, particularly after the downfall of the revolution in 1975, when the United States of America left Kurdistan at the mercy of the agreement between Iraq and Iran.

Abubakir Ali (2013) has made comments which have some relevance to this phenomenon:

"Islam as a religion is above nationalism. This means that any attempts to subjugate Islam as a universal monotheistic religion to any particular nationalist will is a betraying to Islam. To some extent, some nationalists among the Arabs and the Persians have practiced this. Does this mean that we cannot produce an Islamic understanding of nationalism? No, because nationalism is a fact in the contemporary societies, holding influence on these societies. This fact has created crisis, aggrieve, and demands. Therefore, in the light of Islamic values, we can talk about nationalism, but not from the point of view of Islam itself. Islam itself holds the beginning of justice, the beginning of the rejection of injustice, and the beginning of equality between nations. It doesn't prefer a language to another one, or a race to another. All human beings are equal before God, with all their nationalist, linguistic and racial differences. As a result, we can talk about dealing with nationalism, and we can have Islamic movements with nationalist inclination. In the light of these Islamic values, Islamic values can to some extent be mingled with the nationalist values. Consequentially, Islamic movements with

nationalist backgrounds, or nationalist movements with Islamic backgrounds, come into existence, the KIU being one of those movements”.

Recently, nationalists among the Arabs and Persians have been accused of using Islam for their nationalist purposes, such as the Iranian politics of Shia Islam in serving pan-Iranism. This is similar to the situation facing Kurdish Islamists in regards to Islamists and nationalism. This way of thinking has enhanced the sense of nationalism in the KIU, helping the KIU to think differently about nationalism from an Islamic perspective. As a result, the KIU can be seen to be practicing the first working combination of Islam and nationalism, which attempts to fully understand the general principles of Islam, such as justice and combating injustice, as a core matter in addressing nationalism. The KIU elaborates on political issues using this methodology, and focuses on stability, justice and equal rights for every single nation, claiming that this understanding is based on Islamic principles which do not ask for a particular political form. This kind of understanding avoids mixing every single political issue into the circle of creed and worship, to the extent that some extremist political parties do, and therefore provides a better approach to consolidating religion with political modernity and the civil life.

Salahaddin Babakir's thoughts are particularly interesting in relation to this (2012):

“We believe that none of these concepts are contradicting each other. When God has created you in a particular geographical area, that called Kurdistan, and we are speaking Kurdish, then we are Kurds. This is the nationalism circle. There is another circle which is the circle of faith that,

with all other Muslim nations, comprises the Islamic world. Furthermore, in the circle of mankind, we are all partners in humanity. These circles are not contradicting each other. In Islam, everyone has his duties and rights in each of these circles. Therefore, in the circle of nationalism, Islam has given all rights to the nations. For the circle of the Islamic brotherhood, Islam has designated other duties and rights. Similarly, in the circle of the humanity, there are another set of duties for Muslims towards their fellow humankind”.

Normally, Islamists adopt political points of view from their Islamic interpretations. Their political behaviours are therefore different according to their exact interpretations and religious practice. Therefore, the recognition of multiple dimensions of identity is a modern movement from transnational Islamic thought which denied national rights, and which classified the whole world on the basis of 'us' and 'them' in the manner that Aslan (2010) talks about in his book *“How to win a Cosmic War”*. This transformation of thought, as a moderate interpretation of Islam, shifts from the classification of the whole world as binary opposites of good and evil towards a multifaceted recognition of the nations within Islam, and all other entities worldwide. This is observed particularly in how the KIU had a neutral stand in the Islamic secular civil war in the 1990s, also with its condemnation of the 9/11 attacks, as well as all the terrorist attacks within Kurdistan and Iraq, without hesitation.

5.3 Islamic Caliphate:

As, previously mentioned, the Islamic caliphate in one form or another existed from the death of the prophet Muhammad up until 1924. As a result, for Muslims it became part of the fabric of Islam. As a result, after the abolishment of the caliphate in 1924 by the *Kemalists* in Turkey, there was a widespread and diverse reaction from the religious figures and clerics. Consequently, in 1928 Hassan Al-Banna started the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt. The ultimate goal of the MB was to unite the Islamic land and revive the caliphate. However, nation states began to emerge over the twentieth century, and the change in the political map following the legacy of the Ottoman Empire was accepted by the people of the region. Within the Islamist movements, especially those formed political parties; they moved to become religious nationalists and accepted the new reality. These days, a caliphate for many Muslims is not a religious demand or a necessity, but in the past it served as the only form of governance. However, even during those eras and through different parts of the Islamic Empires, the caliphs had no real political power; they were only prayed for in the Friday prayers by the Imam as a symbol of the unity of the Muslim World.

In order to discuss this issue with the KIU, I first asked the following question: “the MB's rhetoric theoretically refers to the strategy of restructuring the Muslim individual, family, society, government and the revival of the Islamic caliphate. What is your position according to this? Will there be a caliphate?” Amin (2012) answered as follows:

"We believe that Islam has not determined a specific form of governance, and that caliphate was just one form out of many forms. An Islamic caliphate attempts to unify the Muslim nations. It can be a unity between the Muslim States, with each of them having their own political identity. In this sense, they have a strategic union. This can be compared to the European Union, or NATO, where no one can call it a dictatorship, or a union against humanity and justice. In other words, the European Union doesn't mean the terrorisation of non-Europeans. Likewise, any kind of unity between Muslim nations does not necessarily mean the terrorisation of non-Muslim nations".

Amin (2012) continues his argument further:

"Caliphate does not mean the control of all the Muslim States by a state; this never happens. If it were the demand of the people and for the sake of the common goods of all nations, such as in the example of the European Union, this would be a legitimate demand and would be possible. In this case, it should not necessarily be called a caliphate, as a caliphate was a historical and political system of ruling, rather than a religious form of governance. However, in Islam there is a value placed on the unity of the Muslim nation, which could be in any form or mechanism. The Islamic caliphate does not necessarily mean a unified state, but is rather the unity of the nations of Muslims. In reality, the Islamic caliphate never had a centralised state. There were Islamic federations, and the caliph was the symbol of the unity of the Muslims. Nowadays, we are not obliged to stand by a historical form; many nations are trying to collaborate to form different unities. These unities then help

to prevent war, as long as they are formed on the basis of justice and equality, rather than control and coercion”.

Mohammad Ahmad (2012) answered the above question as follows:

"We prefer the education of individual, family and society [of the theory of the MB]. However, political issues and exercises of power are on-going variable issues in Islam. Whereas creed, worship and manners are non-variables in Islam, statute and politics are all variables which vary depending on time and place. As a result, the Islamic caliphate was a human experiment, in a political form, which today we are not obliged to follow. The Islamic culture is a human experiment; we can take some of it, and abandon some of it, because it is not sacred in itself. Therefore, we adapt according to the human evolution cycle. We do not strive to return to the caliphate, and the states are built on the basis of nations. Hence, we have our own nation state on the basis of our nationality. As a result, the nation can be formed on the basis of shared interests, who can then create an organisation for the states of the region. Other than such an arrangement, we do not believe in the concept of a caliphate. And no one can install himself as a caliph and imposes his will on other nations. Right now in the United Nations, there are Muslim and non-Muslim states, and there is no problem”.

It seems from the existing evidence and from the opinions of KIU members that no one, save for utopians like the Islamic State in Iraq and *Sham* (Levant) (ISIS), is calling for a caliphate. Instead, nationalism has been deepening, with each nation state developing itself. Within these nation states, despite the Islamic links, the behaviour of the Islamists is no different than that of the non-

Islamists, insofar as all the religious and secular nationalists alike in each Muslim state are working for the good of their own nation state. Bawamurad (2012) answered the same question as follows:

"Generally, the MB's way of thinking was a reflection of the circumstances that came to exist at that time. Following the attacks made by the colonialist states and the influence these exerted, new values came to exist within the Muslim societies. For many of the Muslim groups, among them the MB, many of these things which came to exist under the influence of those circumstances were alien to Muslim societies at the time. Therefore, as a reaction to the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate, the MB made the completion of the caliphate their objective. Following the division of the Ottoman legacy after the Cykes-Pikot agreement, the MB knew it would be difficult to unite those territories into one entity; however, they proclaimed the formation of the caliphate as their objective, as at the time it was not possible for an Islamic group to work with no stance on this issue".

In regards to the KIU and the issue of caliphate, some of the shorter answers included Bawamurad (2012): "*The caliphate for us is a form of ruling as formed by Muslims through history, and it is in no way whatsoever a legitimate Islamic form of ruling to be obliged*". Abubakir Ali (2012) answered: "*There is no issue of the caliphate in our dictionary*". From many of these answers, the conclusion seems to be a total denial of even thinking about the caliphate among the leadership of the KIU. However, to test the understanding of their lower level members on this concept, I asked the following question: "*What about your*

grassroots' vision regarding the caliphate? Do they look at this issue in the same way as you?". Amin (2012) answered as follows:

"No one in the KIU believes in enacting a caliphate in the modern day in the same manner as its historical form. There is not a single Muslim Brotherhood in the whole world today that believes in the concept of the caliphate in its historical form. In other words, there is no MB that believes in following the command of a single caliph, because neither in the past this was possible nor in today's reality this can be possible. Apart from the *Tahreer* party, which have a traditional vision in regards to the Islamic caliphate, no single MB looks at the caliphate in such a way".

Abubakir Ali (2012) answered the same question as follows:

"In the education of our members, we have always generalised our thoughts. In doing so, we know that this issue is not in the literature or thoughts of the party at all. There is no existence in our rhetoric of the caliphate. We consider this to be a historical form of ruling; instead, we now talk about the right of self-determination for the people of Kurdistan. We, as the KIU, talk about the self-determination of the people of Kurdistan to establish an independent state of Kurdistan. In the future, after the creation of the independent state of Kurdistan, if the people of the whole region - the Kurds, Arabs, Persians and other nations - in a shared understanding came to the conclusion to create a modern form of cooperation, then it would be their rights to participate in this or not. This matter is left to the free will of future generations".

Therefore, the KIU realises that although the idea of the caliphate is not possible, the Kurdish national right has not yet even been granted. The KIU therefore supports being realistic in order to gain similar rights to the nations in the region as a nation state. For them, the caliphate is a historical and unachievable goal for which no nation can currently strive, as no nation has even reached the much lower standards of equality required to accept equal rights for Kurds as a state and a people alongside the many other nation states of the region.

It is worth noting a limitation of my study in that when I conducted my interviews in the summer of 2012, there was no ISIL or ISIS at that time, and it would have been useful to gain the KIU's opinion on this. The emergence of ISIL and their call for the caliphate demonstrates the political failure of the region. ISIL came to exist and proclaim an Islamic caliphate in the shadow of the failure of the Arab spring. When the MB in Egypt came to power following an election, a coup erupted which ousted their elected president and led to the mass murder of the party's members in the streets of Cairo. This offered an opportunity to the extremists to claim that this disproved the concepts of democracy, and that it is a delusion that Muslims could possibly come to power through peaceful means. As a result, Jihadism and terrorism became a forefront tactic; strengthened by how many Sunnis in Iraq under the sectarianism gave a blind eye to the ISIL controlling their territories in Sunni Iraq. As a result, ISIL formed a radical call for the caliphate over the Muslims territories, and called for all Muslims to focus their loyalty on their caliph, hoping not to control just Iraq and Levant but to rule over the entire land of the Muslims, perhaps even the entire world.

5.4 Muslim Brotherhood:

The advantages and disadvantages of having a relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is widely argued. Hearing from the KIU in regards to this kind of relationship was crucial for my interview. When questioned about the KIU's ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, Burhan Ahmad (2012) answered as follows:

"We have benefited from the MB as a school of moderatism. We also benefit from the experiments of other people, too. We observe experiments from all around the world. We even study the European political parties, and wherever we find a good example - after taking our nation and people's characteristics into account - we can apply those techniques to our mission. As an Islamic party, we profess moderatism, and the MB is one of those parties that support us in creating this circle of moderatism. Also, the MB, as well as others, favour us considerably on our stances regarding freedom, political participation, practicing democracy, the role of women, respecting coexistence, providing justice, and more. However, we mainly prioritise the needs of our society. Since we have emerged out of our community, and our community is suffering from many problems, we strive to resolve its issues and stop its suffering. This is one aspect of our party that makes us stand out from the rest. However, as social democrats all over the world share similarities in some of their beliefs, we generally share similarities with moderate Islamists, and particularly with the MB, especially where moderatism is concerned. Otherwise, the highest authority in the KIU is the congress, the leadership committee follows after, and ranking last is the politburo,

which makes crucial decisions. Beneath these positions, we have a flexible decentralised system in which the local committees have their own roles. Therefore, wherever anything is compatible with our strategies, we accept it, just as we are free to reject anything that is incompatible with our experiment”.

Salahaddin Bahaddin, (2012) who is a veteran MB, the first leader and founder of the KIU who witnessed all the transformations, remarked on the issue as follows:

"Now, we cannot say that those who were taught the Muslim Brotherhood's education are still Brotherhood in the same sense that past MB was. Before anything, in the past, the political question did not exist. There was only the issue of preaching, and preaching is the same anywhere; geography doesn't affect it. However, when a political issue comes to the forefront, the political parties, with reference to the MB, cannot all have one objective, because the political agenda of any state is different than another. There will always be differences. For that, the MB political parties, in terms of thought processes and preaching methods are similar, but in terms of political projects are different. For instance, most MB political parties can agree on moderatism in thoughts and practice. Hence, there is only a kind of solidarity in the work style. Otherwise, for instance, in regards to an issue like Kirkuk, the Iraqi Islamic Party's position is like that of (*Allawi*)⁶⁷, whereas our position is like the KDP and PUK. Perhaps sometimes these similarities and this

⁶⁷ (Iyad Allawi: a secular Iraqi politician and head of the Iraqiya bloc, previously served as Iraq's interim prime minister following the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime. His electoral bloc won the largest number of seats in Iraq's parliament in 2010). Asharq Al-Awsat, Online <<http://www.aawsat.net/2015/01/article55340883/iyad-allawi-iraq-has-no-clear-strategy-to-fight-isis>>.

kind of relationship have an influence on party ranking and how different parties interact with one another. However, there are unwavering nationalists. Hence, each of these Islamic parties is a nationalistic political party that stands for the benefit of their people and states, but with an Islamic standpoint. They bear similarities with secular parties which do the same thing".

Merging a religious group into politics is triggering a rippling wave of nationalism in the Middle East. Simply, because the general trend of the politics in the entire region is nationalism. However, this nationalism is not necessarily going to call for leaving Islamism. It is more the question of political behaviour and evolvement. We saw in chapter one how this evolvement started from the 1990s onward. Sometimes, those political leaders had to use their powers in critical situations and could not ignore major issues. The MB Kuwaitis during the Iraqi invasion and the Kurdish case in Kurdistan region left no room for doubt in this regard. Whenever an Islamic group denies their problems, it has either not taken politics seriously, especially if the group has stayed away from regional conflicts, or they may have no national threats. These parties do not wish to live in denial of any issues they face, but it may be because they lack experience in such situations of dire problems.

Abubakir Ali (2012) answered as follows:

"Our relationship with the MB is that historically, we were under the influence of their thought. Afterward, we reached a point where we benefited from all Islamic thought experiences. Now, we benefit from all the Islamic and non-Islamic successful political ideologies of the world. We can say that, in the same way that social democrats around the

globe are a patriotic entity in their own countries, and because they share similar ideologies, they are all in an international framework of social democrats joined together as one entity. We have such a relationship. We are a Kurdistan entity, we defend the interests of Kurdistan, and in our recent congress [sixth congress took place in May 2012], we adopted self-determination as our party's strategy".

Indeed, there is a crucial difference between the social democrats and the MBs. Amongst social democrats, there is no issue of nationalism, since the majority of them seem to be against the idea of one single, representative nation; this may be in hopes of remaining united. However, for the MB, and particularly their vision towards the Kurdish case, they haven't yet recognised the rights of the Kurdish people as an issue of people who must have their own nation state equally to all the nation states in the region. This may be a similar thinking to that of the Arab nationalists when they consider the possibility of a proclamation for a nation state by the Kurds as further fragmentation to the Arab world. In some other extreme examples, they even regard that possibility as the emergence of another Israel in the region. This is why many of the MBs do not speak out often when it comes to the self-determination of Kurdistan and the stance of the KIU in that regards; they accuse it of being a nationalist goal, and KIU members, as Islamists, shouldn't have nationalistic feelings. While they; the non-Kurd MB all share the same feelings towards their own nations, the only difference is that, they don't need to express it, because their nation states already securely exist, and so nationalism is not on their political agenda. However, the only similar case to the Kurdish is the case of Palestine and Hamas, where they are too deprived from an independent nation state, which all the MBs support.

The more the Islamists step into politics, whether they are Muslim Brotherhood affiliated or not, the more politically realistic they become to the modern nation states. Therefore, for some, it is confusing to be Islamists and nationalistic at the same time, as it has been noted by some observers. Nafi (2016: 10) remarks that “in the 1980s and 1990s, combined with the Islamists’ inability to grasp the nature of the modern state, created confusion about the Islamists phenomenon and its trajectory”. Hence, this kind of route by all the Muslim Brotherhood political parties now becomes clearer, more than at any other time in the past. The MBs of Kuwait are good Kuwaitis, and this nationalism path came to the forefront when Kuwait, as an entity, was under invasion. Similarly, in the Kurdish case, the KIU stands for Kurdish nationalism more than any other MB elsewhere, with no problem in Kurdistan. This stand, for some, is a new trajectory among the Islamists.

5.5 Sacredness:

Despite that in Islamic literature it is believed that no human is sacred, many of the religious leaders and figures are hailed as holy persons. This is not necessarily because those leaders themselves declared themselves to be holy; their followers played in role in praising their leaders. Not only the religious leaders, but also almost all the Shaikh orders, and many other preachers have been labelled as holy persons. This was a major issue in Islamic reform. One of the reasons for the leaders to keep quiet and enjoy their new statuses was to give no room for any political opponents. This is why whenever we hear about

reforms, taking the opposition into consideration is necessary, and checks and balances are essential. To shed light onto this issue in the KIU, I questioned both the former and the current Secretary General (SG) of the KIU about it. More specifically, I asked the current SG the following question: "*As the Secretary General, how do you deal with criticism? Do you, as the most important person of this party, have any kind of religious immunity to protect you from criticism?*". Muhammad Faraj, (2012) answered as follows:

"Since we in the KIU have decided that an election is one of our most important mechanisms, it is up to our members to elect people. Elections are used both in our party and for the Kurdish people. For instance, when the people elect members of parliament, then that is legitimacy, and it is so in the party. This does not mean that those who were elected have religiously been elected, because we believe that the positions in government aren't divine; they have been given by the people. Those people who trust in you, they will elect you for a limited period, and when the period is finished, then you have no mandate. In the KIU, there is no sacredness for the highest ranking person or any other persons".

To the former SG, I also asked, "*Is there any religion immunity for the Islamist leaders, in a sense that they have a sanctity that prevents them from criticism?*" Bahaddin (2012) answered as follows:

"Certainly, there is no such a thing, because, before anything, the leader is not infallible. Even the prophets were infallible in their prophecy and their message. However, in practicing their leadership, they were not infallible. In the biography of the prophet, it is clear that he did not know

how to fecundate palm⁶⁸. Hence his command, in that aspect, was not an infallible. If this is the case with the prophet, which in few places was criticised in *Qur'an*, how could other people not make mistakes without criticism? However, this sacredness that was invented by people for their rulers was falsely linked to religion. At the same time, we have to differentiate between sanctification and appreciation, or respect".

Apart from the political and religious leaders, especially when the sentiment of nationalism came to exist, the idea of sacred people and sacred land started to grow. To assess the KIU in this regard, I asked, "*Some of the theorists, among them Anthony D. Smith, talk about the sacred dimensions of nationalism. What is sacred for you, and what is not?*" Faraj (2012) answered:

"We, as a political party with Islamic reference, feel that these issues are clearly identified in the *Qur'an*. When people had questions about the prophet, the *Qur'an* immediately reminded them, and tells the prophet to tell them, that Quran (18:110) "*Say I am only a mortal like you, (except that) it is (divinely) revealed to me that...*". If sometimes, there were disputes between two persons, they would say that this is the prophet [Muhammad], and he knows who is wrong. He [the prophet] would in return say, "*No, I am a man like you, don't try to deceive me and make me judge for your favour*". Thus, even the prophet himself did not desire to be recognised as sacred or to be called '*knowing the unseen*'.

⁶⁸ After arriving in Medina, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) passed by some people who were fecundating some date palms, so he asked them what they were doing. When they told him, he said, "I don't think that will provide any benefit," or in another narration, "It would be better if you didn't do that." So they refrained from doing it, and that year the crop was not as good. They mentioned it to him (peace and blessings be upon him), and he replied: "I am only a human: if I command you to do something in your religion, then take it; but if I tell you to do something based on personal opinion, then [realize] that I am only human," and in another narration, "Yet if I inform you of something from Allah, then do it, for indeed I will never convey an untruth on behalf of Allah Mighty and Majestic," and in yet another narration, "You know better of your worldly affairs."

However, this does not mean that he was not deserving of the utmost respect. Some scholars say that if the prophet as a judge had established a certain decree, but later on [in a time after the death of prophet] different judge preferred another decree of the prophet was not the best one for that day, he could refute the prophet's decree. However, for issues detailed in the prophecy, we cannot do so, especially in regards to the issues of creed and worshipping. This also goes for all other concerns. Sacredness is only for God, and for those commands that were revealed to the prophet. At the cost of the humanity, no place, time, or anything else is sacred. However, this does not mean not to respect these things. I have to respect and love my nation, and strive for its independence. This does not mean I have to prefer any person from my nation to good individuals of the other nations".

This is an important issue, which Islamists are in progress to resolve. Otherwise, no reform and no progress are possible. The importance of this issue comes from the point that it is religiously theorised for, and it is a step towards clarification of the grey area between Islamism and secularism in the Muslim World.

5.6 Shari'ah:

Implementing Shari'ah is one of the ongoing controversial issues among Islamist parties. For many Islamists, whoever calls for implementing Shari'ah law is considered a real Islamist, whereas seculars consider these to be fundamentalists. However, what the concept of Shari'ah means to them is the

real issue that must be unveiled in order to understand exactly what those Islamists want. For example, for many people, when the word Shari'ah is mentioned, the penal codes come to mind. To understand how the KIU perceives Shari'ah, I asked the following question: "*how do you understand Shari'ah and how do you practice it?*" Babakir (2012) answered as follows:

"We generally understand that in Islam, when we talk about legislation, state running and politics, Shari'ah is meant to symbolise the objectives [of Islam], rather than the implementation of a kind of law or jurisprudence. The Qur'an and Sunnah demand from Muslims to implement justice when they are ruling. Therefore, implementing justice is the objective of Islam. As for how to implement it, these are the details left for human minds to solve. What Islam wants is to implement justice in ruling. How this justice is done, this is left for the humans themselves. This has nothing to do with the system's name, because even in the name of Islam, when justice was not implemented, Islam does not accept it. However, as long as justice is implemented under any other name, that is then an Islamic ruling".

Bawamurad (2012) commented on this issue as so:

"We think that every good deed in this life is Shari'ah, and all the good deeds of this Universe are from God and are legitimate too. Otherwise, we do not think that implementing a kind of jurisprudence is Shari'ah. This is a law-making process formed by the representatives of the people in the legislative authority".

In a lecture presented by Bawamurad (2012) in the University of Human Development in Sulaimani, he stated that *“the KIU in no document or a formal statement has mentioned that it would implement Shari’ah”*. This was a trigger for a wave of media propoganda against Bawamurad and his party by other Islamists. This difficulty in understanding the concept of Shari’ah and Islam itself is leading to problematic systems of governance, such as what can be seen in Turkey with the AK party, with Syria and ISIL, or with the Taliban form of ruling.

Ramadan (2013) comments on this point:

“I do not define Shari’ah as a legal corpus of Islamic law. For me, in the Quran, Shari’ah is defined as “the way”. The most important thing for me is the objectives of the law such as justice and equality. To be faithful to these objectives is to truly be within Shariah”.

Hence, looking at Shari’ah from the objective of justice in Islam is different than concentrating on implementing an Islamic jurisprudent out of context. From this perspective, Islam does not need to forcefully implement any kind of jurisprudence if it does not lead to justice. For instance, if non-Muslims are not convinced to follow Islam itself, it is contradictory to the Quranic principle (2: 256) *“there is no compulsion in religion”* to make him or her forcefully follow Islam. Furthermore, the personal choices made by individuals must also allow some degree of freedom, such as a Muslim’s choice on whether she should or should not wear Hijab. Here, it must be considered whether it is part of Shari’ah to make her wear it by force. The question of personal choice within religion is something I wanted to ask the KIU. In regards to the Hijab, and whether it is to be imposed by the KIU if they were a ruling party, similar to that imposed by

Iran and Afghani Taliban, Bayan Ahmad (2012) a female politburo member and member of Kurdistan parliament, answered as follows:

"This kind of thinking is unauthentic, because clothing is a part of individual's freedom, and no one has the right to interfere in it. Everyone is free to wear whatever she wants. This is related to the individuals and their belief and freedom, and must not be imposed on anyone. This issue is like the religion of Islam itself, which cannot be imposed on anyone. The Qur'an says "*there is no compulsion in religion*", meaning no belief can be imposed on anyone; likewise, no one can impose an item of clothing on him/her. Right now, we have many friends with whom we have a good relationship, and who respect each other. Even in the elections they vote for us. However, they are free to choose their clothing and free in the way they dress".

In the following answer by Pa (n. d) *Fiqh* is mentioned, which is what many of the more extreme Islamists refer to rather than Shari'ah:

"Jurists define it as 'the science of the derived legal rules as acquired from their particular sources'. Let us take this definition in detail. *Fiqh* is a 'science'. It is true that jurists used the word science to mean comprehension or knowledge; they [with] no doubt studied *fiqh* as [a] specific subject with specific principles, so we can conclude that they considered it a science in modern sense. However, some legal writers are reluctant to denominate it so because it is often coloured with social opinions and affected by the circumstances of the environment and human life".

The danger is that a specific fiqh which can be well fitted for a given society may not necessarily work with another. Take, for instance, the Wahabi fiqh, which is no problem for a tribal society like that of Saudi Arabia. However, it would never work in a society like that of Turkey. This is what is referred to as the Shari'ah, in a sense that its objective is justice. The Wahabi fiqh that is accepted by the tribal society in Saudi (including the majority of women), but which bans women from driving, does not fulfil the justice inherent in Shari'ah; furthermore, it would not work in the liberal society of Turkey. Therefore, when we talk about the general practice of Shari'ah, we actually talk about Islam itself in a societal context. This understanding of the nature of the society and the implementation of the justice of Islam is the process of fiqh as understood by the jurists. In other words, in Islam or Shari'ah, there is always fiqh in accordance with the need and the nature of the society, and the justice comes from how that fiqh is fulfilling the need of that particular society.

5.7 Preaching and Politics:

Any political party evolves over time, and its vision towards various political aspects will therefore vary from time to time. In the case of Islamic political parties, when they move from being a preaching group into the political arena, this change is clearly noticed. A preaching group has only one task; the religious mission. In comparison, an Islamic political party's task is to improve all the aspects of the nation, including religion, as well as maintaining the regional and international political responsibilities.

As a result, it was expected that the KIU over the past few years would go through tumultuous debate over the performance and functionality of its preaching and politics. Traditionally, it is hypothesised by Islamists that in Islam politics is a component of the Islamic system. However, in a democratic context where there are many political parties coexisting, with each of them claiming to be the true or best stream of Islam, then it is necessary to see that politics is focused more on variable daily issues than religion. Therefore, the question should be who has the better politics, not who has the better version of Islam. In such a context, the issue surrounding separating politics and preaching comes to the surface. To discuss this issue with the KIU, I asked the following question: "*How are the debates on separating preaching from politics within the KIU?*" Abubakir Ali (2012) answered as follows:

"This question is warmly discussed within the KIU. This question is not unique to the KIU, but it is a question related to all the Islamic political parties of the Islamic world. This is especially true in the Middle East, particularly those countries historically under the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. In many states where political parties are established, preaching has remained in the framework of the movement. These discussions are currently ongoing within the KIU. This is because a preaching group considers being Muslim as the base for affiliation, and a political party must consider citizenship as the base for the affiliation. A political approach must be presented to all the citizens, and those citizens who believe in this political approach should have access to be affiliated to the political party. In the KIU, there is a group, myself included, calling for transforming the party into a democratic Conservative party with an Islamic background, rather than a preaching

Islamic group. In other words, the mission of this group is that all those in Kurdistan who believe in our party, regardless of religion, should be able to work towards the shared objective that we all believe in".

In regards to the political development of the KIU, Bawamurad (2012) commented as follows: *"If we go back to the beginning of the establishment of the KIU, its first manifesto clarified that it had been established as a political party:*

To avoid being banned.

To be an official body for preaching.

To distinguish this group from other groups".

In regards to this question, the Secretary General Bahaddin (2012) added: "Firstly, it was for reorganising the preaching body, which at that time was fragmented. Secondly, it was to have a political addition to the [political arena of Kurdistan] through utilising historical thought".

Therefore, preserving the act of preaching had a pivotal role right from the moment of forming the KIU. The ongoing political demands in the region helped to advance the KIU from being a preaching group alone into a both political and religious group. The political group was formed in order to preserve its preaching whilst avoiding the influence of the Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK), which at that time relied on arm struggle and since 1992, had occasionally been involved in armed conflict with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The preaching elites within the Kurdish MBs took advantage

of the political party law⁶⁹ that was issued by the parliament of the region to announce a political party. This was a timely and important decision for the KIU to make at this time in order to further its preaching and gain independence.

Since the KIU grew over the course of the years, with participation and influence throughout the region, Iraqi and local elections, its politics gradually developed. The political demand of the region hugely expanded, particularly from 2003 onwards. As all of the veteran members of the KIU were originally preachers, and they all found themselves becoming busy with the day to day organisational and political affairs, the party couldn't maintain the same level of preaching under these new circumstances. Alongside this, the entirety of Iraq was opened up, particularly in the newly liberated territories and cities where there were similar circumstances to 1991-1992 in the Kurdistan region, meaning that demands for preaching highly increased. This meant the KIU had to assess its abilities in regards to this, and realise that it was not possible for the party to contain the situation in the same way as it did previously in 1991-1992. Henceforth, the issue was raised of how best to keep or separate preaching and politics. At the same time as this, a number of nationalities and ethnicities came to the forefront in Kurdistan's newly liberated cities, which challenged the expansion of the KIU. For example, in Kirkuk, Khanaqeen and Baghdad, different Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen ethnicities began to form grassroots action. During this period, many of the leading members of the KIU according to Amin (2012) formed the Turkmen Justice Party. Therefore, the maintenance and expansion of the KIU as a Kurdish political party and a preaching group became increasingly problematic.

⁶⁹ Law of Political Parties of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, issued by the National Assembly (Parliament) of the Kurdistan region of Iraq in October 1993.

This kind of debate and action of separating preaching from politics will be faced by all similar political parties in time. For instance, the Tunisian *Ennahda* movement, since its establishment in the 1980s until the Tunisian revolution, had no problem in thinking about this partition. However, the revolution and the demand for political contest made it think seriously about the separation, and in 2016 made a decision in this regard. Affan (2016: 1) states that “at its tenth national congress, the Ennahda movement declared that they would separate ‘politics’ from ‘preaching’ and to transform itself into a national democratic party”. The ratio of votes in favour of the decision was reported by Souli (2016) “in an electronic vote, 93.5 percent of delegates voted in favour of separating the party's religious and political activities”.

Another issue that the KIU had to face in the new Iraq after 2003, it had to exist alongside two non-militia Kurdish Islamic parties. Under the new circumstances, these parties withdrew from armed struggle and adopted a similar form of political struggle as adopted by the KIU. These parties are the Kurdistan Islamic Group (Komali Islami) (KIK), and the new IMIK. Aladdin (2014) highlights that "As a competitive political party, KIU had to keep an eye on its Islamist competitors Komall [KIK], and Bizutnawa [IMIK]". Amin (2012) remarks on this debate as follows:

"I can say that the KIU is at a transitional stage in determining its identity. At this transitional stage, if the KIU could polarise both poles [preachers and politicians], and successfully keep the balance between them and satisfy both sides, then it can survive as a party. On the one hand, it needs to have a strong educational and preaching performance that

could assure the cadres of the Islamic movement [the preachers]. On the other hand, it has to assure the Islamist cadres' activists and its voters that the KIU could truly represent their political demands. Therefore, both sides will accept it, and whatever identity it might have, as long as it performs the political demands in a positive way”.

Alongside these two Islamist political parties, which are the current preaching competitors holding the KIU back from concluding the issue of separating preaching and politics, the sudden appearance of the Change (*Gorran*) movement in 2009 posed a threat to its political advancement.

Overall, from 2003 to 2009, due to few attempts for political reform that may have positioned the KIU as politically advanced, the internal demand within the party for the separation of preaching and politics seems to have never reached the required level. If it had, the party's position on this would be much clearer, with a far better separation between these two at times disparate and conflicting poles.

5.8 Muslim-Muslim Conflicts and Rights:

In order to test how deep the issue of national rights is within the KIU, particularly in the case of conflicts with other Muslim nations on Kurdish land such as Kirkuk, I asked the following question: “*How do you deal with the question of Kirkuk? How would you feel if you, as Muslim Kurds, gave up Kirkuk to the Brother Arab Muslims, in order to avoid further bloodshed and tensions?*”.

The purpose of this question was to evaluate the level of nationalism within the KIU, especially in terms of the issue of Kirkuk, and the tension between the

Kurds on one side and the non-Kurds in Iraq such as Islamists on the other side. This question has importance in two different ways. Firstly, it tests the extent of nationalism in the KIU and its support of the Kurdish movement. Secondly, it tests the loyalty of this nationalism when faced with arising tension between non-Islamist Kurds and non-Kurd Islamists. By answering this question, we will understand the type of policy that the KIU adopts in regards to both nationalism and religion. Consequently this will help to test their political project as well as the extent of the support given or hindrance suffered by the KIU in regards to Kurdish nationalism. Through this, it is possible to see how the KIU approaches the issue of rights, and whether it is for themselves as a nation or for others.

Muthana Amin (2012) answered this question as follows:

"In our understanding, rights have nothing to do with brotherhood, or non-brotherhood. For instance, I refer to the question of nationalism as the question of inheritance. I say, when God has divided the inheritance between brothers and sisters, God himself has divided the rights of everyone, from the brothers, sisters and the mother. Why? This is to avoid them from being angered by one another. To avoid mixing their rights, that would lead to political and nationalist conflicts, and consequently to bloodshed. When a nation occupies another nation, and disregards its rights, this is like a big brother who controls the inheritance. Then he tells his brothers and sisters, let's keep our brotherhood, let's keep this house united, I am your brother, and I will be serving you instead of our father. This is deceiving. Then, the brothers and sisters must not say that our brother is right, unless they are foolish.

We, the Islamists, neither are the oppressor brother, who keeps the keys in his pocket and oppresses the brothers and sisters, nor the foolish brother. Therefore, when between brothers and sisters from the same parents, the rights are divided on them by God. On this earth too, the rights must be given back to their owners. Afterwards, they can for the sake of brotherhood give their rights to us, which never happens! For that, we, the Islamists, are not the foolish brother, to give up our rights, in the name of brotherhood".

From this example and explanation, it is difficult to see any difference between a nationalist and the understanding of national rights among the Muslim nations by an Islamist. On a number of occasions, the KIU have been accused of being loyal to the Muslim Brothers and to the Arabs. In the general election of 2005, when the KIU decided to run alone for Iraqi parliament, the nationalist parties accused them of being anti-Kurds, Arab loyalists and even of not being Kurds, due to them not taking part in the Kurdistan coalition. Consequently, in many areas, including the whole governorate of Duhok and the districts of Duhok, Zakho, Sumail, Akre, Amedi, and *Shaqlaw* in the Erbil governorate, all of the KIU offices and media stations were burnt down, and five of their members were killed, including a politburo member. However, this did not lead to a large reaction by the KIU. According to many political statements and stances, the KIU continued working side by side of other Kurdish nationalists, defending the rights of Kurdistan in the Iraqi parliament. The rhetoric and practice of the KIU therefore shows their belief and work for the national rights of Kurdistan.

The issue of defending Kirkuk, as well as other disputed conflict areas between the Kurds and the Iraqi government, has become the symbol of nationalism

among the Kurds. For example, the disagreement between the Kurdish revolution and the Iraqi government in 1974 was over this issue. Although the KIU did not exist at this time, in today's Kurdish politics, being an Islamic party, its stance in this regard is very important. This is particularly important because, in the rest of Iraq, Islamists predominantly control the political arena. The tie of Islam which connects Kurds to Arabs has not influenced Islamists to have a different vision to that of the Baathists. The Baathists originally claimed that the affected areas were Iraqi lands, which did not belong in any way to the fabricated autonomy area. In this new Iraq, the Iraqi Islamists and non-Islamists behave in a similar way. This is despite the fact that in the new Iraqi constitution, there is a new article, Article 140, which deals with this issue. Nonetheless, there is continued pressure to deactivate this article. The question of Kirkuk has therefore become a beacon for the Kurds of national rights. Examining other political parties against this beacon demonstrates the nature and the extent of nationalism within the KIU.

Despite this on-going situation, the same participant Amin (2012) elaborates on the issue of rights as follows:

"Philosophically, sometimes, values contradict interests. When you have an interest for yourself or your nation, sometimes you are in line with values, and other times you are not. For instance, when there is a piece of land which belongs to another country and your country wants to occupy it. At this moment, you are between two options, between the value of justice, and the insistence on the interest of your nation to occupy the land. Here, if you are only a nationalist, and not taking values into account, you would support your nation, even when it is wrong.

Therefore, our understanding of the nationalist question has to be in line with the concepts of rights and justice. Then, these concepts of rights and justice are Islamic values. At the same time, they are international, democratic, human rights and modern life values. These values have not only been mentioned in religion, but also have been mentioned in international laws, democracy and human philosophies too. When a right contradicts these values, then you must not be with your nation. Otherwise, you are then a chauvinist person."

When examining many nationalists in the region, as well as across the world, we find this assessment an accurate match of them. Furthermore, opportunistic approaches by politicians lead to a public impression that politics generally operates in this manner; concepts such as rights and justice are not commonly discussed, unless they are used by oppressed groups like the Kurds. As Kurds continue to suffer from injustice and the denial of their rights, a positive form of nationalism is emerging in regards to their rights in Kirkuk. One question regarding this is whether the KIU only talks as an Islamic party on these issues while their rights as Kurds have been forgotten by Iraqis, or whether they would still talk about these issues if they were in the more fortunate position of their fellow Islamists in central Iraq. However, for now, this position would question the stance of other Islamists in Iraq. It would also heighten eagerness surrounding national issues, particularly if they consider themselves right and the other side being wrong. As a result, this makes the Kurdish Islamists like the KIU to feel how other Islamists are nationalists, even without any kind of admitting, even with the oppression policies of their governments towards other peoples like Kurds. They consider that they should be proud with their people's right, and that it is their religious duty to defend such a right.

Abubakir Ali (Karwani) (2012) answers this question as follows:

"We could look at this question from a few perspectives:

Firstly, from a justice perspective, we could look at justice from the framework of the current circumstances, which have been created by the new nation states.

Secondly, from the historical oppression perspective from which the Kurds have suffered.

Thirdly, from the perspective of the solution of the Kurdish issue in Iraq.

From the legal, justice perspective, according to much accumulated historical and geographical evidence, Kirkuk is a natural part of the Kurdistan region's territory. Then as well as now, the criterion of nation state building around us is the land, language, nation, national identity, and states are formed on these bases, therefore it is the right of the people of Kurdistan to claim back those territories. During the Ottoman era, Kirkuk was the capital city of the province of Sharazoor. The surrounding area, during the establishment of the Iraqi state, used to be called southern Kurdistan. Southern Kurdistan became linked to Iraq due to colonial interests in the area and to keep the balance of sectarianism in Iraq, which was again in the interest of British to maintain Iraq in the way they wanted".

The city of Kirkuk symbolises great oppression; thousands of families from Kirkuk have been displaced because of their Kurdish nationality, with their assets controlled and confiscated. Now, these families must go back to their homes and their assets must be returned to them. This then is the removal of

the historical oppression, and returning justice. Kurdish revolutions have many times collapsed on the question of Kirkuk. People of Kurdistan consider Kirkuk as a non-detached part of their land; Kirkuk has become a symbol of removed identity and human dignity, as well as Kurdish nationalism. Without resolving the question of Kirkuk, the issue of Kurds in Iraq cannot be resolved, and therefore the fear of the continuation of historical oppression will continue, leading to instability in Kurdistan, Iraq and throughout the ME.

Through these three perspectives, we concentrate on returning Kirkuk and all other detached areas to the Kurdistan region. This is aimed to take place through peaceful methods by implementing article 140 of the Iraqi constitution. Through a referendum by the people of these areas, it will be determined whether they want to return to the Kurdistan region, or if they want to remain as a part of Iraq. This answer explains in some detail the three perspectives of justice, historical oppression and the importance of a solution for the sake of stability in Kurdistan, Iraq and the ME. It demonstrates a clear political vision not only for the solution of the Kirkuk issue, but also for the issue of Kurds within Iraq as well as in Turkey, Syria and Iran. In the recent negotiations and ceasefire between the AK party and the PKK, both sides demonstrated their desire for a peaceful solution that helps to end decades of conflicts, and that leads to economic, social and political prosperity for their country. As a result, the general trend of policy in the region is towards a peaceful manner of politics. In my interview with the deputy secretary general of the party, with an interest in ensuring the prolongation of the peaceful struggle and the belief in this by the party, I asked several times "*what if they wouldn't accept these peaceful solutions, and started war against you?*". In his responses, it was never once mentioned that we should then revert to war. Although looking forward to a time

where these geographical areas belonged to the people of Kurdistan, the deputy secretary general considered the Kurds to not want war, and therefore it would be necessary to patiently rely on discussion and dialogue, despite this taking longer.

With the last century's Muslim-Muslim conflicts over territories, and the continuing denied rights of existence for the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria, the potential of conflict still exists. In light of this, the KIU leaders continue to insist that national right is a matter of justice and that any nation should be equal to their fellow Muslim nations. To address this, the KIU believe in returning their rights in a peaceful manner, no matter how long that might take, as well as believing that policy makers will finally return to a manner and reality which welcomes peace and stability as the only way to prosperity of their people and country. For example, the KIU publicly announced that they were mediating between the AK party and PKK for a peaceful negotiation. As Abubakir Ali (2012) expressed, "*if we were in power, we would use our Islamic dimension to convince them [the Iraqi government] to settle our conflicts*", demonstrating the desire to pursue peaceful negotiations in order to further prosperity and stability in the region.

5.9 Concluding Remarks:

This chapter covered Islam and the KIU. Its aim was to test the curve of progress of the party from a traditional preaching group to the level of a nationalist political party. To reach my conclusion, I looked at seven themes, as follows: Universalised Islam (Umma), Islamic caliphate, Muslim Brotherhood,

Sacredness, Shari'ah, Preaching and Politics, and Muslim-Muslim conflicts and rights. With no hesitation, the participants from the leadership of the party answered my questions. All the answers supported my hypothesis, and confirmed the progress of the party in relation to the Islamic dimension. They all articulated that the KIU, deeply and convincingly, believes and works for the good of the Kurdish nation and its land. Further, from the analogy drawn by Dr. Amin, it becomes clear that this nationalistic approach, for them, is a religious duty, and divinely the Kurds must have an equal right to anyone else, with no compromise on an independent nation state for the Kurds. Also, for them, at whatever cost, they must defend this right, which they again consider as another religious duty towards their nation. Hence, Islam is not hindering the KIU from being nationalist. Conversely, it is boosting its nationalistic strife.

Chapter Six

Democracy and the Kurdistan Islamic Union

6.1 Introduction:

This chapter is dedicated to looking at the influence of democracy and modernity on the KIU. In the modern world, politics and political participation are judged by democracy and its values. The Islamists, traditionally, are accused of being non-democratic. However, in recent years, a few of the Islamist political parties are engaging with democracy. In order to judge the KIU by some of the measures of democracy, this chapter is highlighting a number of themes which are core concerns for any Islamic party that claims to be democratic. These themes include: democracy, theocracy or civil sovereignty, Islamism versus secularism, coexistence and role of women.

6.2 Democracy:

The Islamist sense of democracy as a philosophical and historical concept can be traced back to Abraham Lincoln (1863), where democracy was defined as a "government of people, by the people, for the people". Democracy has been interpreted differently by each of the Islamic political parties. In order to understand the various interpretations of democracy, it is necessary to first understand what we refer to when we say 'Islamic political party'; since not every Islamist group is a political party, we refer explicitly to those that already have a political organisation and that are practising democracy through those organisations as well as in the political sphere of their countries. In reality,

democracy as a whole has not been practised much in the Middle East (ME) region, save from in Turkey. Furthermore, when we talk about democracy in such a region, we need to be realistic in both cases when we are talking about Islamists or non-Islamists, in understanding their practice of democracy and how it is still evolving. The term 'democracy' itself has moved through a cycle of evolution and been understood differently at different times. There are various reactions to the concept from separate parties, from the simplistic interpretation as 'a ruling of people by the people' that was completely rejected by the vast majority of Islamists, especially those of non-political parties such as Salafis who consider it to be a non-Devine ruling or 'ignorance ruling', up to the sophisticated practice of democracy as practiced by Islamists such as the AK Party of Turkey.

When we examine the historical way of ruling in Medina by the prophet Muhammad himself, this seemed to arise as a kind of consensus formed by the majority of the dwellers, both Muslims as well as non-Muslims such as the Jews of Medina who disregarded Islam. This was presented in the so-called 'constitution of Medina'. Therefore, regarding the current political parties, for the sake of argument as different religions, it is the consensus that they organise themselves accordingly and agree on certain ways of ruling. Such consensus then represents a concept of democracy. However, it is important to note that the modern contemporary states of the Middle East differ from the historical state of governance in Medina at this time. At the time that Medina was ruled by the prophet Muhammad, there was no better ruling either in the Arab peninsula or by the super powers of the time, such as the Persian and Byzantine Empires. More importantly, when political differences among the Muslim society emerged even from the first generation of Islam, such as the disagreement of the fourth

caliph Ali bin AbiTalib and the governor of Sham (Levant) Mu'awia Bin AbiSufian, it was a disagreement and political difference between two of the companions of the Prophet and their followers, and not a disagreement between Muslims and non-Muslims, or between the ruling of Islam against non-Islamic ruling. Hence, accepting or rejecting democracy as it is practiced today and has been defined in literature, such as of the (online Oxford Dictionary, n.d.) as "a system of government by the whole population or all the eligible members of a state, typically through elected representatives", is not the issue on which Muslims or Islamists should disagree. But, as demonstrated by the history of Islam, the issue should instead be about the fact of whether the consequences of democracy and democratic ruling lead to justice or not. As long as democratic governance leads to justice across the country, and preserves the rights of all of society, including their religious rights, Islam has no rejection to it.

The early ruling of Medina by Muhammad demonstrates an early form of democracy which sought justice for all, and can be used to demonstrate a solid example to be used as a basis for democracy in Muslim countries in the modern day. If we look at the prophet Muhammad and his companions, who suffered from the persecution and the siege of the tribe of Quraish, we can see how he sought a safe haven for his religion and its followers. To do this, he first headed towards Ta'if in order to find a place away from Quraish to preserve his religion and its followers. This was the same reason that led them to migrate to Yathrib, which they later called MadinatArrasul (the city or the town of the messenger). This was following the embrace of the two main tribes of Aws and Kazraj,

meaning they could migrate there and established a ruling in the city. In doing this, they had taken into account the current dwellers of Medina and the diversity between Muslims and non-Muslims when they wrote the constitution and the way of ruling. This means that neither the prophet nor the immediate rulers that followed him wanted or tried to establish a ruling system meant only for Muslims, which disregarded other religions or non-believers. This was the system of justice which the Muslim community wanted for themselves and for their fellow non-Muslims. As a result of this, if there was a tyrant Muslim ruler who did not protect the justice of Muslims and non-Muslims alike, then Muslims had the duty to oppose him, rather than obeying him simply for his religion. Therefore, the essence of ruling in Islam is to be left to the community, as long as it leads to justice for all, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. In terms of what Sharia refers to in regards to this, this theme was explored in more detail in Chapter Five.

In order to find out about the KIU leadership and their understanding and perspectives towards democracy, I asked some of them a number of questions, including what they would define as democracy. Burhan Ahmad (2012) defines democracy as: "... *a mechanism of organising the authorities, and an alternative to dictatorship*". He further commented as follows:

"We in the Middle East have suffered from dictatorship more than elsewhere; look at the examples of Saddam Hussain, Bashar Al-Assad, Mubarak, Zain Al- Abdeen Bin Ali, Ali Abdullah Salih and the rest of them. Therefore, in this region, we long for democracy. Since the people

are the source of power and authority, democracy is a good mechanism for organising and classifying them”.

In answering my question: *"if the KIU had a chance to win the majority in the general election, then after four years' time couldn't get the majority again, will you peacefully hand the power over to the winner?"*, Burhan Ahmad (2012) answered as such:

"Certainly, we believe in a peaceful hand-over of power, and this is another principle of democracy. Plurality, human rights and law abiding are all principles of democracy, and we believe in all of them. These are from the bylaw of the KIU, and we call for them to be enacted. How could we possibly not act these out ourselves!"

Practising democracy internally and within their own political party is one of the issues of which many of the KIU members are proud. For example, in their latest congress, the KIU limited the term in office for the Secretary General to a maximum of two terms, with four years for each term. In regards to this, I directly wanted to hear from the former Secretary General, and asked him: *"As the first Secretary General, since the establishment of the KIU in 1994 till the sixth congress which took place in May 2012, you continued in the post. However, in the latest congress, you did not candidate yourself for the post. What was behind this?"*. (Bahaddin, 2012) answered as follows:

"This is one of the practices of democracy that we believe in. We believe that nowadays democracy is an active part of today's world. Moreover, democracy is not in contradiction to Islam, nor to our Islamic

understanding. Before anything else, the people are the source of the power in democracy. Since the second congress, we have recognised this, and it has become one of our by-laws, helping us to avoid all kinds of violence and adopt dialogue and discussion into our mechanisms. In regards to handing power over to others, we came to the conclusion that we should limit the time of persons in power, and the Secretary General should not stay in his post forever. This is an innovation among the Kurdish political parties, and initiated by the KIU. It is not only an innovation among the Islamists, but also among all the secular political parties too in the Middle East. Furthermore, another innovation was that for the first time we live broadcast the entirety of the sixth congress⁷⁰.

I was interested in testing whether this is a political manoeuvre by the KIU, especially as it contradicts much with the historical Islamic leadership as far back as the caliphs, or whether they are genuinely convinced of it being a good idea and on what basis. Therefore I asked him the following question too: "If we look at the Islamic history, including the Rashideen caliphs, we notice that whenever anyone had been elected, he had stayed in power till his death. When you limit the term of the Secretary General of the KIU to a maximum of two terms only, do you think your approach is more Islamic than those historical examples?". Bahaddin's answer was as follows (2012):

"This [approach] is more authentic and more Islamic, because the authentic way is *Shura* (consultation) which is clearly prescribed in Quran (42: 38) "*and who conduct their affairs by mutual consultation*". When

⁷⁰ Indeed, this was the case with the seventh congress too, which took place on 28th and 29th May 2016.

Abubakir [the first caliph after the prophet] was elected, he said that "*I was appointed to be your leader, and I am not the best among you; if I did well, then help me, and if I did wrong, straighten me*". He did not pretend to be nominated or delegated by God. These days, democracy exists as a very good product of human beings' intelligence; we therefore choose to practice it".

I asked the newly elected deputy of the Secretary General (SG) the same question Babakir (2012), and he answered as follows:

"This is a better approach than the historical approach, because I believe that a ruler, if he wants to rule seriously, should do so for only a term or maximum two terms. More than that, they are conventionally ruling, and the ruler would not have any connection to the people, meaning that everything lags behind. Thus, limiting the time they have to rule is a very important issue, and it is in the benefit of the people".

Mohammad Ahmad (2012), a politburo member and the board of council chief of the Slaimani region answered the initial question of "*How do you understand democracy, and how do you practice it?*", as follows:

"Democracy is based on principles; it is a collection of mechanisms. Its principles vary from one region to another according to what democracy means to them in each region. However, generally, it is a collection of principles, mechanisms and concepts, which promote freedom, elections, freedom of expression, transition of power, and separation between

authorities. This means it is a collection of concepts that guarantee justice and freedom among human beings. We consider it as wisdom, and whenever we find wisdom, it is ours. Therefore, we believe in the concept of democracy, as long as it guarantees “freedom, brotherhood and justice”; the framework contained by our slogan is democracy's mechanism. Through the mechanism of democracy, we can advance the mechanism of politics. Democracy is a successful man-made experience; there is no obstacle preventing us from accepting it. With all of the concepts that Islam demands from us, and our desire as a nation to achieve them, democracy's mechanisms can help us achieve these.”

In response to the following question: *“If you democratically came to power, and then in the next election a secular political party won the election, would you peacefully hand the power over to them?”*, Mohammad Ahmad (2012) answered as follows:

"We strongly believe that no authority has the legitimacy to retain ultimate power and remain ruling indefinitely when people have not voted for them, even if it was an Islamic party. In Islam, forceful leadership has no legitimacy, and in order to rule, you need to have the trust of the people through the means of the voting system. Hence, when people give their trust to someone or something else, even a secular party, you must hand the power to him. If you do not hand it, then it is coercion, and coercion is forbidden in Islam”.

Using democracy as a one way ticket to power is one of the accusations that Islamist parties often face. However, there are many examples of how Islamists have been suppressed by secular parties. The Islamists in Turkey were one of the victims of misuse of power against them and against democracy as a system. In other words, in many examples the Islamists were the victims of a lack of democracy and not the other way round. Durmus (2015), in regards to Erbakan, comments on this: *“His political goals quashed by three military coups, Erbakan fought against all odds to raise the voice of the conservatives who were long neglected by governments and repressed by secular policies, through policies such as blacklisting and banning head scarves”*. The latest coup was in 1997. Similarly to this, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt came to power through means of a free and fair election, then after one year the military toppled them with a coup and ousted the president Mursi by force in 2013. What happened in Algeria in the 1990s shows that this allegation of the use of democracy as a ticket to power seems to be in fact backwards; the seculars in these examples have misused democracy and banned the Islamists from using it. In Turkey the failed coup d'état attempt of 15th July 2016 was the last in a series of the military coups, some of which were against the Islamists. For more details in regard to those coups, see the table below:

Coups d'état	Casualties (during the Coup)		Method	Chain of Command Maintained?	Popular Support	American Reaction	Target	Army Divided?	Success/Failure
	Police/Soldiers	Civilians							
27 May 1960	1 junta member died.	2	Classical coup	No	Divided	Support	Democrat Party and pious strata of society	Yes; deeply	Success
22 February 1962	None	none	Classical coup	No	NA	No Support	Military government	YES	Failure
21 May 1963	8 dead; 26 wounded		Classical coup	No	NA	No Support	Military government	YES	Failure
1971 ⁵	-	-	Preemptive coup	Yes	NA	full CIA knowledge	The left	YES	Success
1980	None	None	Classical coup	Yes	Yes	Support	Both left and right	NO	Success
1997 ⁶	-	-	Network coup	Yes	Divided	Support	Welfare party and pious strata of society	No at the top brass; Yes at the lower ranks	Success
15 July 2016 coup	62/5 initial no of coupists dead 24.	170 dead 2185 wounded (total)	Classical coup by the Gülen Network	No	No	Ambivalent	Government and allied conservative social groups.	YES	Failure

Source: Omer Aslan, (2016: 8).

Furthermore, the political and democratic thoughts of many Islamist parties have advanced in such a sense that even when they receive the majority of the votes, they look to share the power with other political parties. Muhammad Ra'uf (2012) comments on this: "if we now get 51% of the votes, we would not form the government alone. Generally, democracy is new in the region; any kind of political party advocating democracy cannot currently form government alone and successfully run the country". Therefore, right from the beginning the KIU proclaimed the slogan that '*we are a participant, not an alternative*'. For further clarification, I asked a few of the leaders of the KIU, among them Muhammad Ra'uf (2012) for the rationale behind this slogan. He, in addition to the above statement, added: "... if the society developed similarly to the British or the America political system, for instance, then if we alone form the government, then lose the election after the four years term, we are again democratically participating, and not just as an alternative".

So, according to him, in either case they want to participate as a party, and not just use democracy in order to come to power then monopolise the power. For example, in 2011 when the Tunisian Al-Nahdha party came to power, and lost the election in 2014, they peacefully handed the power over to the new winner. What precisely the term alternative refers to is to participate in governing either in a coalition government or governing as a winner, and smooth and fair execution of post-election transformation. Thus, they are participating in governing but not as an alternative, in the sense that they control the power for them, like what happens after a coup.

A further question I asked to Muhammad Ra'uf (2012) about practising democracy within the KIU, especially as he was one of the nominees for the post of the SG in the last congress⁷¹, was as follows:

“When we look at the Islamic history and legacy, right from the beginning we see a *Shura* (advisory) council that consisted of a number of people. During the reign of the first caliphs, there were ten. This meant people had the choice to only elect one of them”.

His answer made me ask a question in clarification as follows:

‘Do you have such a nomination process within the KIU, or do all the members have the right to candidate themselves for that post?’. Muhammad Ra'uf (2012) answered:

"We have gone through many phases, our organisation, and have many various stages; all members, from the bottom to the leadership committee and politburo, have the right to elect all leaderships on each

⁷¹ He, also, nominated himself once again for the post of Secretary General in the seventh congress in May 2016.

level, according to the rights that are given by our bylaw. This is the case in all the political parties around the world. This time, in the [sixth] congress, through the initiative of the former SG, this post too was opened for election, and the former SG did not nominate himself for the post. From now on, all upcoming congresses will follow the same pattern. Those who have the right to nominate themselves are obliged to act by the bylaw of the KIU. For instance, for this post, every nominee must have been a politburo member for at least two terms. For this last congress, sixteen members were qualified to nominate themselves. However, only four of them did."

Another issue particular to democracy is the participation of women in the public life and in politics. To clarify the vision of the KIU in this regard, I asked Bayan Ahmad the following question:

"Generally, among the Islamic parties and groups, the exclusion of women from the general leadership (in a sense of only allowing men into the top posts such as president, prime minister and judge) still exist. In the KIU, you have had similar posts held by women, such as head at some of your offices and at some occasions; organisation branches such as the Swedish branch. How do you view this issue? Can a woman be a president, even if some Islamists deny this and claim that it is restricted by a Hadith by the prophet? Do you have your own vision in this regard?"

Bayan Ahmad (2012) answered:

"Of course, there are many new theories in this regard. If we look at the Holy Quran, we have a stringent Quranic argument which mentions '*Balqees*', the queen of Sheba. The story of her in the Quran as a successful women leader and a queen is to confirm that this woman is an example to be followed by all women throughout history. Therefore, we in the KIU have no issue with women becoming even the leader of our party. In the recent congress, there were talks about sister [female members of the KIU] nominees for the SG post. In the KIU, we believe that when a sister can obtain the trust of her brothers and sisters, we have no objection of her holding any post. Therefore, we have no objection against a woman becoming the president of the Republic and the president of our region, and there are no legitimate obstacles existing within the structure of the party".

Another phenomenon relevant to an Islamic democracy is the modernity of democracy and in what way it can continue to respect the universal values. To highlight this issue, I asked the following question: "*In the KIU's bylaw, article four, the general principles says that the source of our politics is, firstly, the unchangeable Islamic values and principles, and secondly, the unchangeable human values. What exactly are the unchangeable are human values?*". Amin (2012) answered as follows:

"This means that the KIU not only utilises the rich Islamic heritage, but also utilises humanity's heritage too. There are many values of humanity outside of the Islamic context that are all important and widely practiced.

Often these are standardised, with nations built upon them. These human values include general freedoms, democracy, human and political rights, and anti-corruption. All of these are concepts and values that are not exclusive to Islam but belong to the wider set of core values within humanity, and around which all nations form a consensus. Therefore, our thoughts are not closed in onto just the Islamic heritage, but are open to any reasonable and good principle from any nation. This is not in counter with Islam; in contrary, it is the re-practicing of the open mind that Islam wants Muslims to have".

Another issue in democracy on which KIU and other political parties have recently focused is the concept of good governance. To further my knowledge on this subject, I asked the following question: "*Clause twelve of article four of the KIU's bylaw says that good governance and justice are Islamic objectives as well as necessities of life. What is good governance to you?*". Amin (2012) answered as follows:

"Good governance is a concept much used within international documents. It is governance which focuses around effective democratic, justice and human rights measures. Good governance in our literature refers to the governance demanded by Islam, because Islam demands good governance. Therefore, Islamic history is full of examples of good governance. Of course, certain parts of Islamic history are examples of not so good governance too. This was a deviation from the kind of governance that Islam demands, which respects people's dignity and rights whilst remaining as an earthly and humble power".

To understand this better alongside Islam's original essence of democracy, particularly in terms of ruling and sovereignty, I asked the following question: “*The sovereignty of the Umma (nation) before implementing Sharia is a concept that has been discussed a lot nowadays, especially by the Islamists. How do you understand this concept?*”. Babakir (2012) answered as follows:

"It is better to say 'the sovereignty of the people'⁷², because in today's world and in accordance with the United Nations, apart from us as the Kurds, each person and group of people has its own sovereignty. This is formed on the basis of separate borders, and no one can breach those borders. Thus, the sovereignty of the people in the constitutions has to be at least the second article after the first article of the definition of the state. This is an important issue that considers the people as the source of authorities. This is so in Islam, and the people - according to a contract - give the authority to a subset of people to lead and rule them on behalf of the millions of them, who cannot all rule. Therefore, in today's sense this is democracy. The sovereignty is the people's sovereignty; no one can rule in the name of God. This is exactly what the homage is. People, exactly like any other business in the market, can give power to whoever they want, and in accordance with whatever conditions they agree on. This is an agreement between the people and the rulers”.

The concept of democracy and the practice of it are similar across many societies. However, when it is new and hasn't become normalised within a

⁷² This is an early indication of the depth of nationalism by the KIU, which is going to be covered in chapter seven. It is reiterating the party's treatment to the concept of the *Umma*; which was covered in chapter five, with no attention to or even including in the party's literature or their political agenda.

society, it may be rejected for no apparent or discernible reason. This is the case with some of the newly emerged social and political entities, including the Islamists who are new to politics and react differently to the emergence of democracy. However, when they become a part of the political system, then their vision towards it will change. For instance, Ali Bapeer the Amir (leader) of the Islamic Group in 1990s wrote a book entitled *Parliament between Belief and Infidelity*. However, in 2010 he nominated himself to the Iraqi Parliament and became an MP, and his party is now one of the main parties running for parliament in the Kurdistan Region, and in this term they are in the coalition government that rules the region. In describing the de-radicalising of the Egyptians, Jihadists Ashour (2011) refers to one of their leaders who recently described their desire to make change in society without the use of combat:

"We were not in love with combat...if there was a way to hold a government accountable, Sadat would probably be alive today... we didn't know another way to change things.' This is how the Jihadist icon *Abbud Al-Zumur*, former leader of Dr. *Ayman al-Zawahiri's* Al-Jihad organization, recently explained the most famous assassination in modern Egyptian history. *Zumur* is now currently an elected member of the Consultative Council of the Egyptian Islamic Group (IG). Until last March, he was also the most famous political prisoner in Egypt".

All of the above discussions indicate something important in regards of the Islamists, which is the evolution of societies and their political thoughts in the Middle East. Democracy within the nation states of the Middle East is a relatively new phenomenon, especially the practice of it, as well as the concept

of the nation state as the framework for practising it. This is particularly new for Kurdish society and for the Islamists such as the KIU, where both the nation state and the practice of democracy within it are very new. The situation within Kurdistan is still very complex; on the one hand they have not yet reached the stage of a nation state, and on the other hand the experience of democracy within such a region of the Middle East hasn't yet become a good political model. Therefore, the political strife of the KIU towards both a nation state and democracy is a model which all similar religious nationalists strive for in the whole region. They are the political framework for it, whether they realise and admit it or not.

6.3 Theocracy or Civil Sovereignty?

It has been a long period under the shadow of partial Islamic participation in ruling, which only served to clarify that Islam does not need a theocracy. Theoretically, it is clear that for the Sunni branch of Islam, the ruler after the prophet is up to the people to choose according to a social pack. The problem in many regions of the Islamic World is of the unbalanced, monopolistic competition between seculars and Islamists, which in some cases, leads to hyper-extremism on both sides. Utilising democracy helps both sides to set aside differences and realise that Islam itself can bring them together, and allow them to work together for the good of the nation. Thus, the possibility of any kind of theocracy will disappear, and all the theories of civil sovereignty that exist in literature will fruitfully work in ruling and social cohesion.

Abubakir Ali, (2014) commented on this subject:

"I believe that we are in an era that has passed the ideological States. Forty or fifty years ago, the region was witnessing a stage of contemporary, ideological Islamism and secularism that was forced to turn into ideological movements; both of those two ideologies failed, and they couldn't live with democracy. Now, we are in a stage in which democracy means a civil constitution. In the past, a political party would make a coup d'état, and would write a constitution. Now, people write constitutions, despite their different political affiliations. Ergo, there is a desire for a constitution that the seculars, Islamists, Muslims, and non-Muslims are taking part in. This constitution is Islamic and it is not. It is secular, and it is not. It preserves Islamic identity, and democracy becomes the shared point amongst all the entities. In the framework of this constitution that we have agreed on, a social pack for running the state and practicing our differences comes to exist. Then, the possibility of staying in power by a political entity would not exist, because we would not have an Ideological army or security forces, and we would not have a predominant ideology. All these apparatus will become patriotic and professional. Thus, democracy is a pathway to power, and at the same time, it is a mechanism to take them [the political entities] down from power when they lose the trust of the people in the election. Yes, we in the framework of this constitution agree with the seculars to administrate our society, and whenever we lose the trust of the people, then it is our moral, religious, and patriotic duty to hand the power [back to the people]. Then, we once again try to gain that trust through civil striving".

Theocracy⁷³ as a sacred ruling was already practiced during the aforementioned period (the coup d'état's era of 20th century). Calling and practicing the rule of the leading party and the necessity leader was a kind of sacred ruling, whether it was in the name of secularism, socialism, or nationalism. However, allowing anyone to rule is the gateway that opens politics to the public and nixes any kind of theocracy, which ultimately leads to civil sovereignty. After the Arab spring, on the one hand, people throughout the Arab world was demanding and calling for political participation, and would no longer keep quiet –unless they were oppressed as has happened in Syria and Egypt. On the other hand, the major Islamic political parties, such as the Tunisian Nahda movement, are already calling for the sovereignty of the people. Nafi (2016: 5) refers to the main themes of Nahda's recent conference as the three pillars of the party's new version, which are as follows: "1- *the nationalist values of the Tunisian republic, as stated in the (new, post-revolution) constitution*; 2- *An Islamic framework*; and 3- *The value of human achievement*". Prior to this, under the democracy theme, I went through the KIU's position towards democracy values and constitutional right for all the people, disregarding religious affiliation. Here again, the civil sovereignty was reiterated.

⁷³Theocracy means literally 'the rule of God' and the term was invented by Josephus (AD 38-c.100) to describe the ancient Hebrew constitution and the role of Mosaic Law. However, if you do not literally believe that the law has been handed down by God on tables of stone, it may be difficult to accept theocracies on their own terms. A more secular version of the meaning of theocracy is that it is priestly rule. Arguably, however, the more important distinction is between regimes that have religiously revealed laws or policies unchallengeable even by a popular majority or by an inherited monarch, and regimes that do not. (It should be noted that even such regimes which claim that their laws are divinely ordained and thus immutable do not make this claim in respect of all laws. For example, the Islamic Shari'a recognizes a category of positive law, the *mubah*, covering such matters as driving on the right, which are religiously neutral.

McLean and Mcmillan (2003: 536).

6.4 Islamism versus Secularism:

Right from the beginning, what made the KIU distinct from the other Islamists was its vision on this issue, not wanting to label the society or divide it onto seculars and Islamists. When the civil war occurred between the Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the IMIK wanted to give the war an Islamic and Secular dimension. However, despite the severe critiques by the IMIK to the KIU, yet the KIU was outspoken when it described it as a conflict of interest and a struggle for power, not one of religion. This caused some of the hyper Islamists to direct extreme criticism towards the KIU; some of them even doubted the Islamic identity of the KIU for the aforementioned stance; in some cases, these hyper-Islamists described it as a secular party. Over time, as an internal issue to the KIU (and similar to the issue of preaching and politics), the Islamic banner of the KIU was oftentimes discussed at different levels of the party. To assess this issue with the leadership of the KIU, it was necessary to understand their vision on the issue. Bawamurad (2012) in regard to the concept of Islamism and Secularism commented as follows:

"Our Islamism identity has been occurred in counter to secularism. Basically, Islamic political parties have been established on the basis of opposing colonialism and the alien values to our societies. For that, this has continued up-till the current time. Then, from 1920s onward, the Marxist and Secular orientations came to exist. Because these orientations fundamentally were anti religion movements, the Islamist movements had to continue to defend the religious values. So, the Islamic movements are generally reactions to protect the Islamic values

and preaching. Otherwise, I have already my own opinion in this regard. Which is the Islamic Suffix is not necessary for the Islamic parties to have in their titles. However, because there are communist, socialist and liberal parties in the society, these Islamic parties have existed in counter to them. Furthermore, because nowadays the jurists have issued a number of *fatwas*, which prohibit entering such parties, consequently, this has become a necessity. Otherwise, in the political context, now in the Kurdistan region similar to the other political parties, we have the political requirements, as well as our political strife is for this land and people. Similarly, we have all organisational, media, grassroots organs and we candidate our members for the political posts too. More importantly, we actively participate in all the political issues".

Thus, if we take the concepts of both secularism and Islamism, they are both new and have come to exist in the region as reactions to each other. Basically, the term 'secularism', similarly to the term 'nationalism', was looked at as a hope towards prosperity and development. However, the secular elites had no secular stance towards religious values, in the sense that they had an anti-religion stance, thus leading to the growth of the concept of Islamism, in terms of defending religious values against the attacks of secularism. Otherwise, the term 'Islamism' never existed throughout the history of Islam; even when we refer to the 'Islamic eras', this term has come to exist during this controversial discourse of Islamism and Secularism. To elaborate further, the researcher asked the following question: "*is the Islamic suffix⁷⁴ of the KIU, you as the party*

⁷⁴ As in the Kurdish version it is (*Yakgtui Islami Kurdistan*) and well known as (*Yakgtui Islami*), it can be said suffix. However, for the English translation, as it is (Kurdistan Islamic Union), and known as Islamic Union, it can be said prefix.

want it, or the reality has given it to you?". Bawamurad (2012) answered as follows:

"In reality, it is a part of the identity that we have. As long as in our country there are political parties called socialists, communists and nationalists, it is then normal to have an Islamic political party too. This suffix is an indication to distinguishing this group of people who work in this party as being caring about the religious rites and manners, and their political work has emerged from the *Shari'ah* thoughts and principles. However, this has not created a political identity for us. This only distinguished us from the others by compliance to the Islam as our religion. Whether this suffix is exist or not, it does not change anything from the reality, because what is important is the message not the title. Now in the Arab spring, we see all the Islamic parties choose their names to be justice, freedom and development without an Islamic suffix. However, we couldn't yet, mobilise our grassroots on the basis of political project".

If we take both terms, especially when they counter one another, we see that both have no philosophical base. In all the secular parties in the Kurdistan Region, we see many practicing religious members. Actually, in many cases, apart from the few atheists among the leaders of some of those secular parties, who wish to use the secular title for their anti-religion stances, there are no philosophical ideologies at all. Even some other times, they use the religious means for political ends. The picture below shows a veiled woman was

nominated by the communist party for the region's parliament during the campaign of 2013.



As for the Islamic parties, such as the KIU, when for them the Islamic ruling is not a particular Islamic jurisprudence; and, as long as justice is achieved, that is then the objective of Islam. When the Iraqi constitution⁷⁵ and the draft constitution of the Kurdistan Region⁷⁶ (approved by Kurdistan Parliament on

⁷⁵Iraqi Constitution in section one, fundamental principles, article 2, states that:

“First: Islam is the official religion of the State and is a foundation source of legislation:

- A. No law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam.
- B. No law may be enacted that contradicts the principles of democracy.
- C. No law may be enacted that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in this Constitution.

Second: This Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people and guarantees the full religious rights to freedom of religious belief and practice of all individuals such as Christians, Yazidis, and Mandeans.

(<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html>).

⁷⁶ Draft Constitution of Kurdistan Region, “**Article 6:**

This Constitution confirms and respects the Islamic identity of the majority of the people of Iraqi Kurdistan. It considers the principles of Islamic Sharia as one of the main sources of legislation. Likewise, this Constitution upholds and respects all the religious rights of Christians, Yazidis, and others, and it guarantees to every individual in the Region freedom of belief and the freedom to practice their religious rites and rituals. It is not allowed:

First: Enact a law inconsistent with the provisions of the fundamentals of Islam.

Second: Enact a law inconsistent with democracy principals.

24th June 2009) both guarantee respect to the Islamic identity, and no law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam, the question arises as to what Secularists and Islamists, respectively, might want to achieve. Essentially, the best guarantee for such societies is the society itself; any political party that wants to be accepted by the society must adopt and respect the principles and values of the society in order to avoid rejection and marginalisation. In looking at both extreme Marxists, such as the Worker-communist Party of Kurdistan, and the extreme Islamists, such as the disappeared groups of Jundul Islam and Ansarul Islam, they will never be accepted by the Kurdish society, and will not become popular; this is due to the fact that the Kurds have political demands regarding national rights in lieu of ideological issues. Also, it is, by nature, a moderate religious society and will neither accept religious nor anti-religious extremism.

Hence, in light of the historical background and context, many of those political parties have revised their aims and objective; to highlight, this kind of change in the KIU, the researcher asked the following question: "*if you were now establishing the party, would you choose the Islamic suffix?*", to which Bawamurad (2012) remarked:

"No, indeed, right from the beginning we wanted to name the party KIU, because it was similar to Kurdish Islamic League (KIL), which was our charitable social service organisation. Otherwise, even that time, we might have named it (Justice and Benefaction). If, we had established it

Third: Enact a law inconsistent with the rights and fundamental freedoms contained in this constitution".

now, certainly, we would name it something like (Justice and Development)”).

Since the KIL was the springboard for the KIU and their subsequent reputation, they wanted to use a similar name, the Kurdistan Islamic Union, which is not dissimilar to the Kurdish Islamic League; in Kurdish KIL is (*Yakgrtui Islami Kurd*) and KIU is (*Yakgrtui Islami Kurdistan*). They are, in essence, the same name, but the word ‘Kurd’, which refers to the Kurdish people in the case of the KIL, has been changed to the word ‘Kurdistan’, which refers to the land of the Kurds in the case of the KIU. This has actually led to a prolonged confusion by many people, among them some politicians; according to the above statement by Bawamurad, this was a deliberate mixture and usage of the name of the charity organisation and they soon realised that the Islamic suffix was not of much help in the long run. The issue of having it or not having it is due to the same discussion and factors discussed in the section ‘Preaching and Politics’.

Otherwise, having the adjective “Islamic” or not, would not change the reality of the political platform of the party. Actually, in the second draft⁷⁷ of the constitution and bylaws of the KIU for the seventh congress, drafted by the KIU leadership council (2016a: 4), in article one, under name and definition, there were two options with regard to the name of the party: “1- *Kurdistan Islamic Union*; and 2- *Kurdistan Patriotic Union*”. Thereafter, in the subsequent drafts, only the KIU option remained. Personally, I believe that at this historical juncture, with fighting ISIS and the nation building ambition of the region, it is

⁷⁷ The second of the four drafts that I am aware of.

important to have the adjective “Islamic” by a Kurdish political party such as KIU. Put simply, with any further steps towards independence, the anti-Kurdistan Arabs would mobilise their extremists against the Kurds, and similar to the Ba’th regime, would commit genocide against them in the name of Islam. Therefore, the Kurds too, at this stage, must benefit from the Islamic identity, in order to avoid any misuse of terrorism against them by those who do not want a Kurdish entity, and deny the rights of the existence of Kurdistan.

6.5 Coexistence:

Looking back to 1992-1994, we can observe many tensions between the Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK) as the major Islamic militia, and several other secular political parties, particularly the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). As a result, after the fatal battles between the IMIK and PUK at the end of 1993, it was not an easy task for the KIU to announce the introduction of an Islamic civil political party on 6th February 1994. Not only was this a non-militia Islamic party, but at that time this was also the only non-militia political party in the whole region of Kurdistan. Therefore, the purpose of the question “*How do you survive as an Islamic political party among many other secular Kurdish political parties?*” is to explore the confidence, tolerance, and coexistence of the KIU within the other surrounding political parties, many of them secular. The importance of this question is not only because of their ability to coexist in such an atmosphere, but also due to them being the only civil political party and only single unique example promoting a civil political culture, therefore becoming an example to be followed by other Islamic and secular groups, such as the Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG) and the Change movement.

Through answering this question, this is possible to identify the political thought that led the KIU to such an unlikely coexistence that has been exemplified by many other political parties as a moderate Islamic party. In order to best examine the KIU's belief in coexistence, I also attempted to ask my interviewees about their opinion of other Islamists, particularly the Salafis, as they are not supportive of Islamic political parties as well as other religious minorities.

Muhammad Raauf (2012) answered the question as follows:

"Very briefly, firstly, we from very early on had no support for the battles between secular and Islamic. Secondly, we, in the same way that we don't believe in an extreme radical salifism, we neither believe in an extreme radical secularism. In the same way that you see the *takfiris*⁷⁸ among the Islamists, there are takfiris among the seculars too. The takfiris of the seculars are those who do not accept any Islamists, or even any religion. These kinds of seculars do not only believe in the separation of religion from the state, but also in the separation of religion from life. They don't believe in any kind of Islamic thinking. Apart from these seculars, we can coexist with any kind of seculars. We can even rule together. My personal belief is that, this century in the ME, the power is going to be in the hands of the moderate Islamists and the moderate seculars. The moderate Islamists are those who do not establish religious states in a sense of theocracy. In other words, in any aspect of the life, they do not interpret it in a religious way, in the same way they would interpret a creed matter. The moderate seculars are those who

⁷⁸*Takfir* is an Arabic word refers to a blasphemer, who labels the others as non-believers or who committed blaspheme.

believe in the basic principle of Islam, and believe in the moderate Islamic movements. The moderates from both sides are those who believe in leading their countries towards stability, prosperity, social justice and the rule of law. Therefore, it is not important if the presidents of those states are Islamists or seculars, as long as they are moderates".

The whole concept of being a 'moderate', as stated by Raauf, is centred around the notion of accepting others with tolerance and coexistence. As a result, the introduction of moderate Islamists and seculars has been seen as a challenge to traditional Islamism and secularism, who have always been much opposed to each other. In this conflicting environment, at the beginning, being a moderate political force, with no militia to protect the party has been treated as laughable. This is particularly in comparison to the surrounding parties, with the seculars, communists and Islamists all having their own militias. There are two main reasons why the KIU had a chance to survive:

Firstly, it began with its own charitable organisation called Islamic Kurdish League (IKL) which has been active since 1992 in the region. At the time, Kurdistan was under two sanctions: the international sanction on Iraq, and an internal sanction by Saddam's regime on the Kurdistan region. Therefore, the KIU's movements to sponsor thousands of orphans, provide food to the needy, and build mosques, schools, hospitals, and mobile clinics, made them different from any other political party. At this time, many parties were busy fighting each other on controlling territories, customs revenue, and ideological issues.

A second reason why the KIU had a chance to survive was that, when the KIU was originally announced, the major Islamic group IMIK had just been defeated

by the PUK. As a result, there was a prevailing hope that a peaceful non-militia Islamic party would come and replace the tensions between the Islamists and non-Islamists. Consequently, the KIU greatly benefited from this, coupled with their charitable activities, and in a short time became a prominent political party. This can be particularly seen in the liberation of 2003; when the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) was founded on July 13, 2003, there were five members representing the Kurds out of the twenty five members of the council, with one of those five being the Secretary General of the KIU. The KIU managed to not only survive but to in fact prosper, due partially to their moderate approach and tolerance towards seculars, Islamists, communists, Muslims and non-Muslims right from the start.

Amin (2012) has expressed himself on this issue as follows:

"Because we believe in freedom, everyone - whether he is a liberal, a communist or anything else - is free. As we believe in freedom, we believe in rights too. First of all, everyone is free how he wants to be. Secondly, he has the right of justice. That must be guaranteed for him. The justice gives him his rights and his freedom. Therefore, the KIU has chosen "Freedom, Justice and Brotherhood" as their slogan".

The claim to be a tolerant moderate, if it is not supported by a strong belief and commitment, cannot last for long on its own. Holding the slogan of "Freedom, Justice and Brotherhood" right from the start has helped the KIU to train its members and followers to practice coexistence. Through this slogan, they found their strength and *raison d'etre* in this concentrated belief and practice.

Hassan Shamerani (2012) added further to this topic:

"We have understood from Islam that it gives freedom to every individual, group and entity, in their beliefs, ideology, religion and sects. Islam never agrees for its beliefs to be imposed by force. Quran (2: 256) says "*There is no compulsion in religion*". Therefore, coexistence across all the secular parties is easy. We believe that we all can freely practice our religion, beliefs, ideas and sects without any problem".

The KIU's originality in terms of its ideas of tolerance and coexistence, as originating from Islamic thought, made them unique pioneers among the Islamists in this regard. Although this is the same for non-Islamists, such as the Change movement, this was unique within Islamic parties. The most important point in this regard is the fact that the radical Islamists support their ideas by Islamic texts; the KIU, too, supports its ideas with Islamic texts. This made the KIU's policies viable and dominant in the region, and even made them an example to be followed in the era of de-radicalisation.

In regards to the KIU's coexistence with other Islamists in Kurdistan, Abubakir Ali (2012) answered as follows:

"In the past, because there was a militant movement, our visions were too different. However, since they too have no arms now, and they have adopted a civil struggle, I can say every day we come closer to each other. However, the different historical developments still has its intellectual and political influence on each of us. For instance, the idea of

the Caliphate may be more thought about by them, but we have left it behind".

Condemning any kind of terror in thought and practice from anyone, including from the Islamists, was the first thing that the KIU announced in its first manifesto at its proclamation in 1994. However, working alongside non-violent Islamists, the KIU is able to share the same policy of coexistence. In many ways, this is a bonus, due to the unique form of Islamic cooperation involved in this. This has helped both of the other main Islamic parties, the KIG and IMIK, to accept each other after their dissidence in 2001, and to follow suite of the KIU in its approach to politics.

In regards to the Salafis, Amin (2012) commented on the participation of the Salafis of Egypt in political life and their establishment of the Noor party:

"For Salafis, or any other Islamic movements, when they come into political life their thinking will be more moderate. Therefore, they understand the issues better, as well as the necessity for cooperation and growing together".

The KIU's expectations of the Salafis of Kurdistan to participate in political life in the future have grown in the light of the Egyptians' example. The importance of the Salafis' participation derives from the fact that they are likely to be politically more realistic in their vision towards society, politics, minorities and political parties, whether they are seculars or Islamist. The first and closest example to

them as Islamists is the KIU. Therefore, with there being a chance of political participation by all types of Islamists, there are two advantages that can be gained: one for the Islamists themselves, and one for wider society. Firstly, no one would remain to claim and talk alone in the name of Islam, as all Islamic parties would be representing only their political parties. Secondly, having a political party means the party is liable before law, and is responsible for their behaviours in front of and towards wider society.

In reference to the KIU's position on religious minorities, Babakir (2012) answered as follows:

"In the KIU, from our understanding of Islam and how it respects every language, nation and religion, we believe that it doesn't matter whether those religions and nations are majority or minority: they have the same rights. The rights of these religions have been clearly mentioned in the Quran and through the traditions of the Prophet. Even an atheist person, on the basis of Quran (2: 256) "There is no compulsion in religion", has his own freedom. In terms of justice, and implementing the rule of law, the judicial system is for protecting the rights of every citizen, disregarding their religion and beliefs. The Islamic history, too, is full of examples of how to respect beliefs, worship, and the way of life of people".

There are two significant points that can be made from this answer. Firstly, having insight from an Islamic perspective in regards to the rights of other non-

Muslims - whether they are from other religions or non-believers - helps to close the gate of hatred and ideological war. Secondly, the mention of the judicial system and equality before law demonstrates the growing importance of the concept of citizenship, whilst diminishing rights based purely on affiliation to religion. Therefore, this answer shows the gradual rejection of theocracy and the movement towards civil governance, both which the KIU supports.

Muhammad Faraj (2012) adds further:

"When we believe in freedom, then we should accept its results. From this perspective, we must respect the existence of all of society. Respecting and protecting citizens' rights has to be recognised by the constitution. The constitution must be implemented. The rights of citizenship will protect equality between all existences of society, with protection and respect for all of them. Rights, freedom and many other concepts are important, and they must be protected for the citizens. Respecting the existence of society shouldn't contradict these concepts and freedom, because these concepts and freedoms are unchangeable. These existences are the entities of this society, and this society is ruled by law. No one must be above the law. So, everything must be in the framework of constitution, and all the citizens must be highly valued".

Talking about the rule of law and the practical steps of coexistence highlights the history of the KIU across a number of different occasions in regards to both their belief in rule of law as well as their belief in coexistence. For example, in the two attacks in 2005 and 2011 on their offices in Duhok and further afield, they had no reaction but to return to the rule of law. In regards to coexistence and working with others, in 1996 they cooperated to some extent with the

Conservative Party of Kurdistan, which is a non-Islamic party. Furthermore, in the general election of 2009, they ran for parliament in partnership with the Social Democrat Party of Kurdistan, Kurdistan Toilers' Party, and KIG. Working together with seculars and Islamists, without any ideological clashes, validates and demonstrates the KIU's beliefs in rule of law and coexistence.

6.6 Role of Women:

One of the most unsavoury characteristics of Middle Eastern societies is the poor treatment of women; the more tribal the society is, the worse the treatment towards women is viewed. The danger in this comes from the fact that despite that it arises from tribalism; sometimes there are attempts to give it a religious dimension. Take, for instance, the issue of women driving cars in Saudi Arabia; one could argue that it has nothing to do with religion, while many think it is a religious ban. In a conservative society, like that of the Kurdish one, it is not easy for women to participate in politics, especially during the 1990s. Still, for many Islamists, the only role fit for women is to be in the home as a housewife. It is important to understand the KIU's vision in this regard, and the extent of roles for women in their political and organisational day to day. In answering the following question, (*what is the role of women in the KIU?*), Bayan Ahmad (2012) a female politburo member, answered as follows:

"Right from discussing the idea of forming the political party, the KIU has consulted the sister's [the female members of the KIU] opinion. Which at that time, the other political parties might not count for women that much. This from the point that a preaching group, right from the idea of establishing a political party, the sisters thought and vision was important


for them, and they counted for. Then, when the list of the founder members were presented to the region's government to form the party, the list included sister members. This is another indication for this important participation".

In answering: "*what is the role of the sisters in decision making in the KIU?*", Bayan Ahmad (2012) answered as follows:

“As I mentioned, the role of the sisters started right from the formation of the KIU. Then in the second congress of the party in 1996, only after two years of its formation, the sisters without any kind of quota had a member in the leadership committee of the KIU. In the congress of 1999, among the 30 members of the leadership committee, three sisters were elected. As for the congress of 2005, the number of the sisters reached five in the total number of the committee that was 35, and a sister of them was elected to be a politburo member. This is how the sisters participated in decision making till the recent congress, which took place in May 2012. In this congress, in the total number of 35 of the committee members, nine sisters were elected for the committee, and three of them were elected for the politburo. This time was according to the quota system that was adopted by the party. This is due to the rise of the female sisters within the party, which is amounted to be half of the total members of the whole KIU. Although, personally I disagree with the quota system, as it might give a chance to some people who are not quite prepared for a certain post. However, in this society, as well as the entire societies of the region, which they do not believe in women's abilities, it might for the time being, be a good idea”.

If we look at the ratio of women in the leadership committee of the KIU in comparison to the other main four political parties; Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Change movement, and Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG) (according to Welate Me (2010) for the KDP, (PUKPD.org) for the PUK, Salam (2015) for the Change movement and Rabati (2015) for KIG, we see the following figures:

Political Party	No. of Leadership Committee (LC)	No. of Women members in the LC
KDP	53	5
PUK	50	9
Change Movement	54	6
KIK	30	1
KIU	35	9



The percentages, according to the above statistics, are as follows: KIU: 25.71%, PUK: 18%, Change movement: 11.11%, KDP: 9.43% and KIG: 3.33%. It is obvious that the ratio of the women in leadership roles among the KIU is bigger than that of any other party. This is despite the grievances that were expressed by Xaraman Jaf (2013), the secretary of Kurdistan Islamic Sisters League (KISL), the women's organisation of the KIU, about the misusing of power by those parties in favour of their own similar organisations, and their attempts to marginalise the role of KISL in public life.

Bringing women back to public life is extremely important in any Muslim society. The importance of this for a party like the KIU comes from two angles; the first, is the correction of the idea that the Muslim women cannot integrate into the public life, and that any woman that wants to be publicly free needs to compromise her Islamic values. This kind of perception is traditionally used by the secular political parties due to that idea that the more women that were liberalised, the more those secular parties' popularities were expanding. Secondly, the KIU benefited practically from women's reintegration into the public life, and gained huge popularity among women. More importantly, the more popularity it had among the women, the more potential members it was gaining, simply due to the important role of women within the family sphere as mothers, wives, sisters and daughters.

6.7 Concluding Remarks:

Judging any political party with reference to its religious background, and by measures of democracy, has to be according to democratic principles. For instance, when looking at a political party such as the ruling party of Germany, the Christian Democrat Union, it is necessary to judge it by its political behaviour according to democratic measures, not labelling it as a non-democrat, due to its Christian identity. The same is true with the KIU, from the perspective of the themes covered in this chapter. It is notable that within the democratic margin of the region, the KIU has made relatively good democratic progress. Remarkably, women's participation in the leadership and organisation of the party stands out in comparison with other major political parties of the region. Continuous internal democratic changes through elections are another

aspect of the advancement of the KIU. Working on civil sovereignty and the abolition of all types of theocracy has left no room for non-democratic dogma that could be used in politics by a religious group. Overall, within the context of the region, a noticeable democratic progress has been observed in regard to the KIU.

Chapter Seven

Nationalism and the Kurdistan Islamic Union

7.1 Introduction:

This chapter looks at the role of the KIU in Kurdish nationalism. Nationalism, for many Islamists, especially those in non-political parties, is a non-Islamic ideology, and it is labelled as the product of western imperialists attempting to cause fragmentation and differences in the Islamic Umma. However, by looking at the realpolitik of the Islamist political parties, the politics of nationalism can be seen clearly, in the sense that they are practising nationalism in their day-to-day politics. The data show to what extent the KIU has contributed to Kurdish nationalism. First, by looking at the theoretical aspects through several themes, then by looking at some aspects of realpolitik in the KIU over the last few years, this chapter examines the KIU's nationalistic politics through the highlighted themes of Kurdish or Muslim, Nationalism, Nation State, Reform, Realpolitik. With reference to Kurdistan, the following subjects are highlighted: mediating and peace-making, maintaining the unity of the region, combatting all kinds of terror in the name of Islam and pioneering a non-militia political model, and introducing good character cadres and statesmen in Baghdad, then finally in other parts of Kurdistan.

7.2 Kurdish or Muslim?

One direct semi-structured question which was asked to interviewees identified a core theme for this project, questioning their feelings of being Muslim and Kurdish. The question “What is your feeling as a Kurd and an Islamist? What does either of these mean to you?” was directly asked to 6 out of 12 interviewees. In one way or another, it has been implicitly asked to the other interviewees too. Of these, almost every interviewee expressed clearly and directly his feeling towards each of the above identities, demonstrating that this is an important prevailing theme in this study.

The purpose of this question was to find out the feelings of the leaders of the KIU towards both nationalism and Islamism, and to see whether there is any preference of one over the other. This question is important to this study as it demonstrates the extent of the development of the sense of nationalism within the KIU leaders from moving from an Islamist group into a religious nationalist political party. It is also important in order to see the balance between maintaining one's religion and utilising it for the purpose of promoting the causes and purposes of Kurdish nationalism. This is particularly important to question within the context of Kurdistan, where Kurds as a nation without a state are divided between the three Muslim nationalities of Arabs, Turks and Persians. The importance of this question is seen through the extent that the other neighbouring nations, especially those on which the Kurdish land is divided on such as Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey, have contradictory feelings to the Kurds, accusing the Kurdish Nationalists as separatists or even in some extreme cases as non-Islamic nationalist rebels. What I was aiming for in asking this question was to see how, despite the accusations by Arabs, Turks and

Muslims against the Kurdish Nationalist movements, the KIU has participated within the Kurdish National movement, and has used its Islamic background to further the rights of the Kurdish nation.

Mohammad Ahmad (2012) answered the question as follows:

“The Kurdish identity and the religion identity are not contradictory to each other. I am in nationality a Kurd, and as religion a Muslim. They are both complementary to each other, and they are not alternative to each other, neither contradicting each other. Therefore, they are both important, and each nation has its own religion and its national identity”.

This indicates the balancing act involved in supporting both nationalism and religion on the same level. This also shows that there is no question of comparison between them in terms of preference of one over the other; they can in fact complement each other. The expression of this by an Islamic party validates and demonstrates nationalism in a political context. This not only demonstrates the KIU's stance as an Islamic political party, but also in some ways questions and tests other similar political parties in the Middle East (ME). However, the feelings of the KIU, as representing Kurds as a nation without a state, is naturally separate from the case of other Arab or Turkish Islamists. Although many parties and states are practicing somewhat similar approaches to religion and nationalism on the ground, their situations do not stand out in the same way that the case of Kurdistan does. The example of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) of Kuwait during the Iraqi regime's invasion in 1990 works well to demonstrate this, since Kuwait has exerted every effort to liberate their land from the neighbouring Arab nation of Iraq, with the help of the non-Muslim western coalition forces led by the United States of America (USA).

Burhan Ahmad (2012) has also expresses his feelings in regards to this question:

“We as Kurds, from the beginning of the appearance of Islam, willingly entered Islam. Today, as hundreds of other nations on this earth, we are proud of being Muslim. We do not see any obstacles to being a Kurd and a Muslim. It is obvious that being a Kurd, Arab, Turk, or any other nationality is out of the hands of the humans. God has created us in that particular nation. There must be wisdom in this God's will. Therefore, we are proud with God's wisdom. God wants me to have a role as a Kurd, and he wants me to cooperate and coordinate with the other nations in the matters that are shared between us”.

Through recognising the hundreds of nations believing in and practicing Islam it is easier to understand the KIU's belief in its nationalist duties to its nation. By having no nation state, Kurdish people are made to feel they are deprived of the same rights granted to all other Islamic nations. Therefore, if the KIU do not appropriately strive to meet its nationalist demands, as a political party it may find its role invalidated. Since all those countries on which the Kurdish people are divided (Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey) do not deny the Islamic identity of the Kurds, but are practicing the denial of the national rights of Kurds, the entire political demand in the Kurdish arena must circle around their national rights. The realisation of the KIU's role in this national political demand, and working towards this, makes its role pivotal amongst other nationalist political parties. In knowing this, it is necessary to understand how the KIU's Islamic dimension further clarifies its identity as a Kurdish Islamic political party. In other words,

what does an Islamic dimension mean in the context of a Kurdish political party?

Abubakir Ali (Karwani) (2012) has expressed himself regarding this question as follows:

“For me, being a Muslim and a Kurd are two sides of my personal patriotic identity. We have multi-dimensional identity. I am at the same time a Muslim and a Kurd, Oriental and cosmopolitan...etc.”.

This statement explicitly highlights the importance of nationalism and religion for the KIU, looking at these concepts as two sides of the same coin. It also outlines the multi-dimensional identity which combines different dimensions of Kurdish society into one entity. This is the core of the revived version of society in the ME, particularly in Kurdistan, in comparison to societies and political parties over the last century which were divided between secularism and Islamism. In this limited sense, one could either be a secular nationalist, with no credit to the Islamic dimension of society, or a devote Islamist, with no attention paid to nationalism.

In relation to this, Shamerani (2012) reflects his feelings towards being an Islamist as well as Kurdish, as follows:

“Being a Muslim or an Islamist comes after my birth. However, in regards to my nation, it starts with my birth from Kurdish parents. Then when I was older, willingly I chose my religion. Hence, before being a Muslim, I was a Kurd, then I have chosen Islam, or I could possibly have chosen another religion. Even then, my Kurdish identity would remain as

it is. Choosing any religion, according to Islam is people's choice. However, one has no option in choosing his nation".

This is an advanced version of nationalism as seen in the KIU. Regarding the nation as the base of identity is a new idea for Islamists, especially given that this particular statement has been announced by a cleric leader of the party. Promoting this kind of understanding from an Islamic perspective is seen to be more influential than ever before, where both nationalism and Islamism had two different paths. Combining these two together, as seen by the KIU, we can see the Kurdish version of religious nationalism.

7.3 Nationalism:

When we look back to the time that Islam came to the Arabian Peninsula, their society was linked to tribalism, with no nationalism in today's sense. Contrary to this, these days there are strong feelings of nationalist in many Muslim societies which has taken the place of tribalism. In order to understand Islam's modern day stance to nationalism, we need to look back at Islam's historic treatment of tribalism. In the same way that the first generation of Islam didn't prefer one tribe over another, today there is no preference of a nation over another. Therefore, Islam recognises all nations as it recognised all the tribes at the beginning, meaning every nation is as proud of and loyal to their nation as tribes were proud of their own tribe. When I asked Abubakir Ali (2012) whether their stance on nationalism is different than that of the other Kurdish nationalists, such as the KDP and PUK, in regards to the issue of Kirkuk, he replied that "*We have no differences to the KDP or PUK in answering this question. If we were in*

power instead of them, we would benefit from our Islamic background in approaching Kirkuk and its other components, such as the Arabs and Turkmen, with a different rhetoric". When the former and first Secretary General of the KIU was elaborating this in regards to their relationship with the MB, (Bahaddin, 2012) highlighted this issue as follows: "In regards to an issue like Kirkuk, the Iraqi Islamic Party's position is the same as that of Allawi, and our position is like that of the KDP and PUK".

The arrival of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula led to cohesion between all of the tribes. This was because it did not allow what the Qur'an describes as '*Jahiliah*' (ignorance), one of its dimensions being a blind loyalty to the tribe and to be on its side even when it was aggressive towards other tribes' rights. Islam made those tribes as cohesive as being brothers. This brotherhood was not at the cost of the small tribes. As Abubakir Ali expressed, Islam can play this role between nations too, in encouraging them to have a softer tone towards each other. In other words, it can bridge the gap between them.

The problem in this is that, despite the existence of this Islamic tie, when it comes to the right of a nation like Kurdistan, the Muslim nations' stance remains a pre-Islamic tribalism one. Similar to the efforts of the pre-Islamic tribes in obliterating the weaker tribes, nowadays the stronger Muslim nations have the same stance towards the Kurds and their national rights. They all enjoy the privileges of being nation states, but do not recognise the same right of a nation like Kurdistan. This is the real challenge for the KIU, as well as other Kurdish Islamists, in their struggle to convince the other Islamists in other nations to recognise the rights of Kurds. But many of those non-Kurdish Islamists regard nationalism as a *Jahiliah*, in a sense that the Kurdish Islamists shouldn't

struggle for their national rights. However, as they have already guaranteed rights for themselves with no problem as the Kurds have, it is common for them to deny having such a feeling, or not having realised it. As a result, the struggle of the Kurdish religious nationalists is extremely difficult.

In regards to what the KIU have contributed into Kurdish nationalism, Professor DlawerAlladeen (2014), the former minister of higher education and scientific research of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and political commentator, commented as follows:

"From my point of view, I can see the following:

a. KIU was founded on the brotherhood's principles by people who were either affiliated to, or closely associated with, MB. From the outset, they adopted a very moderate or diluted nationalistic approach. They adopted a non-violent and non-confrontational approach to advance their cause, thereby avoiding overt nationalistic policies, which contrasted with other Islamist parties. KIU had a long term vision that defined their pathway to power. They initially focused primarily on preaching and aiding the poor, the young and the educated. This strategy served their objectives well. They grew exponentially, particularly during the difficult times for the 1990s, gathering palpable support and sympathy across Kurdistan Region. Up to this point, they did not need to engage in public debates on nationalism. Their transformation came when they needed to translate their ground support into votes for power.

b. In keeping with MB movements elsewhere and with the Turkish AKP, the KIU entered the parliamentary political process in Kurdistan

and began competing for votes in subsequent elections. They needed to appeal to a wider (more secular) audience than their traditional Islamic sympathisers. They had to compete with the secular nationalistic parties, including the KDP and PUK, as well as the other Islamist parties (Komall [KIK] and Bizutnawa [IMIK]). They therefore introduced numerous Kurdish nationalistic narratives into their literature and began to debate these openly. They had to be seen to be promoting the Kurdish cause, Kurdish identity and Kurdish nationalism in addition to moderate Islam. As a result, by design or by default, they have ended up contributing significantly to Kurdish nationalism. The evidence becomes clearer when you look at their policies and the performance of their MPs and Ministers in Baghdad against the anti-Kurdish lobby.

c. On the international stage, KIU founders and supporters presented themselves as Kurds while integrating with international Muslim world. They promoted the Kurdish cause, Kurdish culture, and Kurdish distinctive identity. They achieved milestones for the Kurds among Islamic movements in the Arab and Islamic world. They won financial and political support too”.

To reflect on this last point, when the KIU was participating in the former Iraqi opposition conferences, such as those which were held in Washington, London and Salahaddin, they were not classified alongside the Islamists due to their nationalist politics. Right from their early years of being a political party, the KIU behaved politically as a nationalist party. This was the political realisation as what was required from them as a political party. These days, with the Kurds fighting against ISIL, despite there being disagreement between many of those

non-Kurdish Islamists in the region of the ME and worldwide, we haven't yet heard an honourable condemnation by them on the ISIL's aggression towards Kurdistan. This shows the extent of the nationalist politics of the Islamists against Kurdish nationalism. Therefore, despite their criticism of the nationalist views of the KIU, their own nationalist politics is slowly becoming more clarified.

7.4 Nation State:

After the First World War, under the mandate of the British and French and according to the Sykes-Picot agreement, many nation states in the Middle East first came into existence. Kurds were the biggest nation that was deprived from the equal rights that all the other nations gained. This was not the only deprivation which the Kurds suffered under the new circumstances; they also lost their unity due to the geopolitical map drawn by the Sykes-Picot agreement. Where the Ottoman Empire had controlled the territory of Kurdistan, this land was divided between the newly created Turkey, Iraq and Syria. This follows the historic first division in 1639 which drew a border between the warring Ottoman and the Safavid Empires at great cost to the Kurds.

Therefore, every ethnicity in the region was granted a nation state apart from the Kurds. Since that moment, the Kurds have been in an ongoing struggle to regain their national rights. To this end, they have undergone and experienced many revolutions, rebellions, prolonged guerrilla warfare, massacres, chemical bombing and genocide from the invading regimes of Kurdistan.

These days, with the existence of the Kurdish Islamic political parties, it has become a priority for the public to know the stance of those Islamists in regards

to the national rights of the Kurds, particularly the right of self-determination. The main two Islamic parties, the KIU and Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG) (also known as KIK), have already called for the right to self-determination. To elaborate on this issue, I asked some of the leaders of the KIU the following question: *"In your recent congress in early May this year, you adopted self-determination and called for a nation state as a strategic aim in your manifesto. What does this mean, and how are you going to achieve it?"*. Abubakir Ali (2012) answered as follows:

"Obviously, we alone cannot achieve this. What is important is to recognise this right, and the level of thought in our party at this level. Creating a Kurdish nation state is a natural right for the people of Kurdistan. Like all the nations in this world, Kurds must have their right to self-determination. Nowadays, we are raising the idea of intellectual education, and try to normalise this idea with the other Islamists in the region in order to encourage its use. Another strategic point of ours is to gain the support of the other Islamists on the Kurdish issue. Wherever there is any attempt to gain the self-determination of the people of Kurdistan, we will participate in these".

Burhan Ahmad (2012) answered the question as follows:

"I think the best mechanism to achieve this important issue is the unity of the Kurdish people. I am afraid, many times, that the KDP and PUK don't come to a unified statement or come to a disagreement with the central government [of Iraq] unless they are under pressure. We haven't yet reached this step of having a nation state; this is the fault of the KDP and PUK, as they couldn't step towards this. In all these nations which have

achieved self-determination, the first step for them was their own internal unity. Hence, the best mechanism is that we as Kurds have a big aim such as this and gather around it. To make that big aim our strategy, then we all as seculars, Islamists and communists must work for it".

From this quote, we can see that what is important for the KIU is their belief in and calling for self-determination and having a nation state for the Kurds. An important step in this, in the viewpoint of the KIU, is to gather around a goal which unifies all the Kurds despite their ideological differences. In regards to the position of the surrounding nations in Iraq, Iran and Turkey towards the Kurds taking this step, they believe that those nations must ultimately come to a conclusion to admit the rights of the Kurds, then work together for the benefits of all the nations of the region. This approach by the KIU in believing their ability to convince them may be naive, but for them the Islamic tie is an important one in order to build trust between them and in order to convince those brother nations. This conclusion is necessary in the long run, to avoid further wars in the region and to benefit from the revenues of the region. However, it relies upon the politics of the entire region, as well as the politics and assistance of international players, which until this moment have not helped to contribute towards solving the issue. It also depends on the independent evolutions of the societies of the region, especially in their understanding and reaction to the concept of nationalism. Shamerani (2012) further elaborates on this strategy of working towards achieving this goal:

"We believe, in terms of our religion and nationalism, in the rights of self-determination for the Kurdish people. For this reason, we have made it one of our future strategies. To achieve this, we strive on two levels:

Theoretically, we will have dialogues, especially with our neighbours who are Arabs, Turks and Persians, in cooperating through the mechanism of religion. We will work hard on supporting this dialogue.

We will work together with all of the political parties in Kurdistan to strive to achieve and safeguard this right and to demonstrate that it is our religious and nationalist duty to strive for it”.

Bawamurad (2012) answered as follows:

"We came to the conclusion that the Turks are practicing good 'Turkism', the Persians are practicing good 'Persianism' and the Arabs are practicing good 'Arabism', both in terms of nationalism and religious commitment. In the face of this, we believe that our nation is facing a three-sided attack. We have the prerequisite requirements and viability to be a state. One of the prerequisites for having a state is a good economy, and we have this economy in Kurdistan. We are surrounded by few religious powers [states], which have a negative effect on Kurdistan; we as Islamists in the region have our influence. We try to introduce this idea to them, because we share an identity, which is the religious identity. However, we are different in our national identity. It comes down to our ability whether or not we will be successful in this".

Similarly, Mohammad Ahmad (2012) answered as follows:

"We consider that we have two pathways. The first one is to try to keep our unity as Kurds against the external influences. The second one is to work hard internally to encourage a fundamental reform in the administration and in the political system of the region. Through this, our political system will grow. In terms of the other parts of Kurdistan, each part will have to endure democratic, political and civil strife in order to gain their national rights. The other states in the Middle East have been built on the basis of nationalism; our nation, too, has to have its own nation state. Therefore, similar to the European Union, we can form a nation which will benefit all the nations in the region, on the basis of shared interests. Through democracy, human rights and self-determination, we can build a nation state for the Kurdish people. We are in no way whatsoever, and never will be, against the national interests of any state".

Since the rapid changes in much of the world's politics, including Middle Eastern politics, it is likely that changes may come to the Kurdish issue in the region. Already, the situation in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq has advanced so that it is in some ways a semi-independent region. Keeping within Iraq whilst continuing to support and develop constitutional rights and economic progress demonstrates an advanced example to the rest of the Kurds in the region. For the Kurds in Syria, although there are still many challenges, but through changes of regime or not, they are likely to in time guarantee a kind of self-ruling which can already be somewhat observed.

In Turkey, the Kurdish case has reached a level which is impossible for the Turks to deny anymore. The peace process has already theoretically proved the existence of the Kurds as a political case with its own national rights. In order for Turkey to advance its economic growth and political model, there is no other option for them but to settle down to developing the recognition of the Kurdish people to a level that would be acceptable to the Kurds in Turkey. As for Iran, in comparison to the results of the Kurdish situation in the mentioned three countries, and with Iran's attempts to enter the international arena with an acceptable policy, there is certainly room for improvement in developing a fairer policy towards the Kurdish issue. Nonetheless, it can be seen that the Kurdish issue is advancing, and is in no danger at the time of writing to returning to the dark stages of the twentieth century.

The Middle East at some point must resolve its conflicts and reach a level of peace; therefore, a necessary and serious issue which would help to stabilise the region is to fairly reconcile the Kurdish issue. The Kurds themselves are realising this fact, and to some extent they are already ready for the upcoming stage of this journey. One indication of this is their avoidance of Sunni Shia sectarianism, and their attempts to develop a balanced policy with the major players in the region. The fighting of ISIL on a land area of over 1000 kilometres has already advanced the Kurdish case more than ever. To further understand the issue of nation state and self-determination as recognised by the KIU, Amin's answer (2012) is relevant:

"We, from our Islamic perspective, recognise and admit the right of every nation to have its own state. In previous years, the KIU has had many

Turkmen members; the KIU encouraged them to go and establish an Islamic, nationalistic Turkic party, which has turned into the Turkmen Justice Party. Most of these members were our members, whom we encouraged them to go and establish their own party for their nation. Because whatever we consider as a right for ourselves, we have to consider it for the Arabs, Turkmen, Persians, and all other nations too. Alongside this, we believe that the Kurdish nation must be satisfied and have its own self-determination. This is a natural right for the Kurdish nation”.

In answering the similar question, "Is this an attempt for Iraqi Kurdistan, or for all parts of Kurdistan?". Amin (2012) answered "Now, at this stage, it is for the Iraqi Kurdistan, with a demand for federalism for the other parts of Kurdistan. However, principally for us, the existences of an independent state on the whole land of Kurdistan, for the Kurds as a nation, is a legitimate right".

Although all the answers recorded from the leadership of the KIU are focused on peaceful means and dialogue, it is clear that they ultimately are calling for the national rights of the Kurds in all parts of Kurdistan. Solving the issue of the Kurds as a package gives a real and realistic solution for the issue in the entire region. Otherwise, solving the issue only partially will cast a shadow over the whole region and lead to further turbulence in the area. There is a crucial point that must be reached by all the four countries under which the land and the people of Kurdistan are divided. For instance, when they adopt and practice a

nationalist politics, they must realise that the real solution for the Kurds under their power must be a nationalist solution too. If nationalism were to be diagnosed as a disease, the treatment must be the same medication for the same disease everywhere; unless the disease were to be eradicated meaning no medication is required.

In answering the question, "*What does Kurdish and Kurdistan mean to you? Is it worth continuing the tension over being Iraqi or Kurdistani?*". Mohammad Ahmad (2012) answered as follows:

"As states are built on the nationalist basis, we too say that we are a nation. It is our right to have our own nation state. Otherwise, let's have other nations abandon their own nation states, and then we can agree. Then we have no problem, and would not need to talk about being Iraqi or Kurdistani".

Similar to the issue of secularism and Islamism in the Middle East, nationalism too seems to be a reaction by both secular and Islamist nationalists. In a sense that a nationalist from one nation might argue with another in other nation when it comes to nationalism. For instance, if any individuals or groups from the Middle East live in Europe or America, they would not raise the issue of nationalism and they would all live happily in homogeneous and multicultural societies despite their national diversities. However, when these same people go back to the Middle East, or even discuss nationalism whilst in the west, they can easily disagree and become agitated over the joined issues of nationalism

and ethnicities. This clearly demonstrates the limitations of nationalism over all other human social forms, including Islamism. However, if an actor such as the KIU could possibly convince other Islamic players to give national rights to the Kurds, then that would disprove this allegation.

7.5 Reform:

Nowadays, the concept of reform in Kurdistan is constantly discussed. In the Kurdistan region over the last years, this has been heavily discussed in the media, especially by the opposition political parties. Among the political parties calling for reform was the KIU. In other occasions, the KIU has claimed to be the pioneer in calling for reform. It is claimed that this call for reform has cost the party hugely, and led to it being under attack by the ruling party in the Badeenan region on a couple of occasions in 2005 and 2011. In regards to this, I asked them "What would you reform?". Mohammad Ra'uf (2012) commented on this:

"When we say we are a reformist party, we are not radicals. We gradually reform individuals, society and the political system. Reform in our perspective is an ongoing process, and we are not a radical movement which believes in rapid changes that make no long-term difference. The reformist movements work on the human's mind and on society, and then continually work on the political system. Hence they have an internal dynamic. At the same time, we have focussed on two things; the first one is society, which we always need to advance. The second one is ruling in a just manner; if there is no just ruling, it would be

a dictator ruling. A society is never going to be prosperous, unless the ruling is just. This is what we consider to be the essence of the philosophy and thought of Islam. One of the characteristics of the KIU is that we haven't drawn this idea from any Islamic resources of jurisprudence".

Drawing justice and reform from Islamic principles is one of the ideas which the KIU claims to be working on. For them the broader political philosophy in Islam is to implement justice, and to maintain this justice continual reform is necessary. For the Secretary General of the KIU, reform is a form of social remedy. Mohammad Faraj (2012) commented in regards to reform as follows:

"Reform has two meanings, an Islamic and a political one. In Marxism it is the opposite to radicalism, in a sense of revolution and fundamental changes. However, for us, reform is remedy. In society, we have to rely on reform. We have to fix the mistakes. We in the KIU believe that the individuals by default are all respected, because God in the Qura'n (17: 70) says that "*Indeed we have honoured the children of Adam*". This means every human has to be looked at as a human and has to be respected. What we reform is the human's action. The radicals, on the other hand, dismantle the human and the action together. This is wrong; we do not do so. We try to remedy the action, because he is a human, and he has his own rights just like me. It is true his action is wrong, but we need to fix his mistakes for him, not eradicate him. Therefore, the concept of reform for us is to remedy the actions, not to eradicate the action and the actor together. Sometimes if a person has made a

mistake, he has at the same time done many good deeds too; I cannot because of the mistake deny the many good deeds".

When we talk about remedy in a society, this gives the impression that by nature that society is healthy, but that, due to some unfortunate circumstances, it needs treatment. This kind of vision made the KIU right from the start a different and distinct Islamic and political party.

In terms of its Islamic nature, as a reformist movement, it separated it from the other Islamist parties, who regard society and the ruling elites as deviations from Islam. This is the boundary between the extreme radical Islamists and the moderates' reformists, who consider the society, including the rulers as Muslims, as needing to reform through an ongoing process. In any society, reform in this sense is crucial and always necessary.

In terms of its political nature, the KIU wanted and strived for a reasonably moderate reform in comparison to the other opposition political parties, save for some of their members who were under the influence of the Change movement in Sulaimani. The general trend of the opposition was moderate and realistic, which led to reasonable negotiation by the leadership of the party and therefore a strong participation in the coalition government that came to exist after the general election of 2013 in the region.

This led to them also having a stronger position in governance when examining the level of their criticism during the opposition, and the performance of the governing within the coalition government. Right after the election, Mohammad Ra'uf (2013) in a television interview on *Rudaw* mentioned that they proudly wish to participate in the coalition government, as they had no extreme opposition which would lead to any embarrassment in working with others. Without a reform policy, this was not an easy message for the leadership of the KIU to deliver. Adopting a language for reform is one of the characteristics which helped the KIU shift from a mere Islamic movement to a credible political party with a strong political weight in the region.

7.6 Realpolitik:

This segment will consider the realpolitik of the KIU, and its political practices as a Kurdish nationalist party, on behalf of the Kurds in the Kurdistan region, Baghdad and the wider Kurdistan. However, it is crucial to note that I am looking here at the nationalistic progress of this political party, not necessarily aiming to praise it. Therefore, it is not my interest to consider the many criticisms that have been highlighted in critiques of the party.

7.6.1 In Kurdistan region:

7.6.1.1 Mediating and Peace Making:

Right from the beginning of the party in 1994, due to the fact that the KIU had no militia, as a civil political party, it always relied on peaceful means to

demonstrate its politics. This civil politics and non-militia platform provided an opportunity for it to mediate between the fighting factions in the region. As mentioned in Chapter Four, Abdulaziz (2011: 70-81) summarised the KIU's attempts in mediating between the fighting parties in the aforementioned period.

Even after the growth of the opposition, and during the peaceful political struggle between the different political parties, the KIU maintained this role. According to the Anadolu Agency (2015) Mohammad Faraj, the Secretary General of the KIU, was nominated as the Figure of the Year 2015 by the *Garmian* Centre for a referendum. In the celebration of the nomination, Bawanoori (2015), the director of the centre, declared the main two reasons of the nomination as: "for his prominent role as the Secretary General of the KIU in serving the political process and his peace making and mediating between the Kurdish political parties". As tensions arose between the main political parties in 2015, as the result of the dispute over the election of the president⁷⁹ of the region, again the KIU endeavoured to mediate and sought a peaceful resolution of the crisis. According to Kurdiu.org (2015a) Mr. Angus McKee, the Consul General of the United Kingdom in Erbil, in a meeting with the Secretary General of the KIU highly praised the KIU's efforts in the process of bringing the political parties of the Kurdistan region together, and its emphasis on generating a consensus between the parties over the question of the presidency of the region. With regard to the same issue, Kurdiu.org (2015b) reports that in a similar meeting the Consul General of the USA, Matthias Mitman, further to his appreciation of the KIU, called for the KIU to continue in its efforts, which in his opinion were appropriate for Kurdistan.

⁷⁹ For the dispute over the presidency election of the KRG, see Dalay, 2015.

Apart from the statements mentioned, there are many others by politicians⁸⁰, journalists⁸¹, organisations and other political institutions that gave credit to the KIU for its peaceful approaches and mediations. Kurdiu.org (2014) records the award of a prize to Salahuddin Mohammad Bahaddin on the anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The prize was conferred by the Human Rights Development Organisation, which stated that Salahaddin Mohammad Bahaddin is one of the figures of Kurdistan Region who has served prominently in the scope of humanitarian, peace, and human rights inside and outside the region.

7.6.1.2 Maintaining the Unity of the Region:

The renowned Kurdish journalist Qurbani (2016), who is associated with the PUK, in an article published in Rudaw prior to the seventh congress of the KIU, said that his main objective in writing about the KIU was "the necessity of preservation of the KIU and its advantage to the unity of the Kurds is linked to its overall political existence [in the entire of the region]⁸²". The principle reason for Qurbani's article is to bring to light the fact that the region is already divided between two different areas – one called *Badinan* controlled by the KDP, and

⁸⁰ For the praises of politicians from different political backgrounds to the KIU in its first three years as a political party See Ali, A., (Karwani), 1997, *Yakgrtooi Islami Kurdistan La Waqi9 w NaxiCamawarda*(KIU in the Actual Life and Heart of the Masses), Ministry of Education Press, Sulaimani, Kurdistan Region.

⁸¹ See the media mogul RebinHardi (2014) describing the role of Salahaddin Bahaddin the Secretary General of KIU in pacifying the tensions between the PUK and Change movement (Gorran).

⁸²As stated earlier, virtually all the Kurdistan region is divided between the two controlled areas dominated by the KDP and PUK, accordingly their existence in the area under the other party remained relatively weak. This is the case with all the other parties. Thus, the only major political party that exists equally in the two areas is the KIU.

the other called *Soran* controlled by the PUK. This kind of division has a historical background, which is highlighted by *Qurbani* (2016) as follows:

"From the beginning of the linkage of this part of Kurdistan to the Arabic Iraq, one of those tactics that all the Arab regimes were working on, was to create political and social chasms between (Badinan and Soran). Which during the Kurdish revolution became the dominant areas of *Malayi and Jalali*⁸³, and later on the yellow and green administrative zones. This chasm has been working till this moment, in which its aftermath is still ongoing, and will deepen. The risk of the chasm is not only maintaining two different cracked fronts, but also it will grow on the bases of hatred, refusal of the other and opposing each other".

Hence, for *Qurbani* the KIU can be a shared entity between the Badinan and Soran regions, with the major Kurdish political parties cooperating with the KDP and PUK, who had worked on deepening the chasm between the two regions that originally had two different dialects, *Badini* and *Sorani*, to distinguish them from each other. *Qurbani* (2016) refers to the necessity for the existence of the KIU as such "probably themselves [the KIU members] do not realise the necessity of preservation and growth of the KIU how much it serves the national unity for the time being and for the future of the Kurds". The whole discussion comes from the viewpoint that the KIU exists equally in both regions, which is a unique case among the political parties, which generally exist in one or other of the regions. This by itself is an ongoing potential danger for the unity of the Kurds in the region.

⁸³the terms *Jalali* and *Malayi* refer to the traditional rivalry between the faction that followed *Jalal Talabani*, which is called *alali* after him, and *Malayis* refers to the followers of *Mula Mustafa of Barzan*.

It is not merely an accidental position that the KIU was blessed and distinct among the Kurdish political parties in southern Kurdistan. More importantly, it is the practical position of the KIU, that intervened to safeguard the unity of the region. In addition to what has been recorded by Abdulaziz (2011: 70-81) by highlighting the KIU's efforts in mediating between the fighting parties of the region to maintain its unity, there are other examples of action by the KIU. When on 14 January 2015 there were attempts to separate the *Shangal* district into an independent canton (Mohammad, 2015), according to Islam Paik (2015) the Secretary General of KIU made a statement against it, in which stated "we are against proclamation of the canton of Shangal, because it will fragment us. The Kurdish nationalist movement should have thought of uniting all parts of Kurdistan, not attempting to fragment the southern Kurdistan under any name or excuse". This was a case of the KIU calling and working for a unified position between all the political parties, before and after the regime change in Iraq. Ikhwanweb (2006) refers to the statement of the KIU Politburo on the tenth anniversary of its declaration, where it emphasised the call for internal unity of the region, stating "Unify the internal home and relation of Kurdistan by ending the period of double administration of the Kurdistan Region Government; unify the political discourse on federal system basis".

Immediately after the proclamation of the party in 1994, when the civil war between the KDP and PUK broke out, the KIU began its efforts to reunify the region by initiating a peace process between the fighting parties. In its first political project to rectify the situation in Kurdistan, which was issued on 27 June 1994, the KIU suggested seven points. In point five, where Abdulaziz

(2011: 201) recorded the KIU's initiation, it states the following: "reopening the headquarters and offices⁸⁴ of the both major parties [KDP and PUK] all over Kurdistan, in the same way before the clashes. This is in order to abandon all thoughts of dividing Kurdistan, and regain the trust by the two parties". By taking an overview of the points of the KIU's political manifesto⁸⁵, it becomes clear that the nationalistic feelings and keenness for the unity of the Kurdistan region come from their belief in what they are doing. Furthermore, to prove these behaviours truly emerge from their political belief, the KIU membership office (2008e: 61-220) has adopted topics such as: nationalism, nation loving, human rights, lessons from the history of the Kurds and Kurdistan, and the geography of Kurdistan in the Cultural Curriculum: Cultural Appendix of the Educational Curriculum for Nominees. In the first stage of party membership, the members of the KIU are going to be educated on these elements, in order to promote the values of nationalism in them.

7.6.1.3 Combating all Kinds of Terror in the Name of Islam and Pioneering Non-Militia Political Model:

The KIU from its beginning tried to make its hallmark a moderate, non-militia Islamic party, and in this way differentiate itself from other Islamists and non-Islamists. Its first manifesto, published on 6th February 1994, clearly underlined:

"We believe that in our struggle principles, in order to reach our objectives, we have to believe in freedom of thought and thought

⁸⁴ When in May 1994 clashes between the supporters of the PUK with supporters of KDP occurred (Global Security, 2014) in all controlled areas by the PUK, all the headquarters and offices of the KDP were controlled by the PUK supporters and vice versa. Thus the situation became as if the Badinan region became a region for the KDP and Soran for the PUK.

⁸⁵ See the manifesto in Abdulaziz (2011: 155-194).

differences. Compulsory and imposing is not acceptable in Islam. (Quran 2: 256) '*There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion*'. We believe in moderateness in intelligibility, media and preaching. We do not prefer any kind of extremism in religiosity". (KIU Media office, 1998: 11)

Essentially, being a civil political party without any kind of militia was pioneering a political model that, after the liberation of Iraq in 2003, became a role model in the process of de-radicalisation. Although it was questionable for a political party to survive in such a chaotic environment without a militia to protect itself, the KIU tried to make it a feature of its strength. Ali (2008) commented that:

"the messiah was KIU and its new model of the political challenge. The first right decision made by KIU was to avoid any military activities and remained without any militia. This political farsightedness helped KIU get along with all of the different parties, groups and interests in the region. At that time, it was fairly unbelievable to have a party without militia and survive, but was able to read the facts and the figures correctly and not to do the same mistake of the others. KIU general secretor, Salahuddin Muhammad Bahaddin in the answer of a Turkish journalist who had asked about the ability to survive without militia said that their civilian nature is the secret of their success".

The KIU paid the price of calling for moderation starting from the first year of its proclamation as a party. On 6 October 1994, just eight months from its foundation, a terrorist group called the Islamic Jihad Clique in Iraqi Kurdistan

assassinated *FuadChalabi*, one of its leaders in Hawler, and started attacking their charitable medical clinics in Akre and elsewhere. As mentioned in chapter three, the main reason for this hatred of the party of the KIU was from their standpoint of refusing extremist behaviour and publicly denouncing all kinds of extremism and violence. However, the response of the KIU was to insist on continuation of the same policy of denouncing all kinds of extremism and calling upon the role of law in reaction to violations. The KIU, in a statement issued on 7 October 1994, in reaction to the assassination reiterated its policy, stating that terrorists would never be able to stop the moderate peacemakers, in particular the KIU (KIU Media office, 1998: 39).

In its literature, the KIU persisted with this stance. For instance, in the KIU Media office (1998), which contains the manifestos and statements of the Kurdistan Islamic Union from 6th February 1994 until 27th December 1998, there are statements showing the position of the KIU against terror, terrorists, militia and violation of the human rights. In a statement after its second congress on 24 August 1996, it emphasized that the congress renewed its non-militia strategy. It also considered dialogue to be the best solution for communication between the political entities. (KIU Media office, 1998). Furthermore, on the occasions on the first, second, third and fourth anniversaries of the proclamation the party, the politburo of the KIU focussed on dialogue, freedom of thought and expression, pluralism, moderatism, fighting against terror and militias. (KIU Media office, 48-52, 59-62, 79-82, 96-101).

More importantly, the KIU was consistently working on the education of its members and followers through its membership curriculum, publications and media. Internally, for instance, the members' educational curriculum, in the third stage, course two, lessons two, three and four have three subjects entitled '*Qadhiat al-takfeer wal-9unf al-fikri fee al-tareekh wal-waqi9 al-mua'sir: 1, 2 and 3*' (the issue of blasphemisation and the thought violence in history and contemporary situation 1, 2 and 3) (KIU Membership Office, 2008c: 22-56). Externally, the KIU became a role model and a school for moderatism for Islamists and non-Islamists alike. The Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG) and Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK), after the 2003 events, followed suit in adopting a non-militia political party stance. Also, newly emerged non-Islamist political parties such as the Change Movement (Gorran) benefited from the experience of the KIU in this regard.

Nowadays, several members of the KIU are leading moderatism think tanks and forums, such as International Moderatism Forum, which opened its branch in Kurdistan⁸⁶ on 3 October 2015, led by Salahuddin Bahaddin, the Secretary General of the KIU. This was another timely reaction to ISIS and combatting extremist thoughts among the Kurds. The former politburo member and head of the KIU's parliamentary bloc, Dr. Omar Abdulaziz, is a leading thinker of this forum, who has written extensively about extremism and terror, especially in his series articles entitled '*ZnciraiTwnrawi*'⁸⁷ (the Series of Extremism) published in the local media. He is also a prominent speaker on the subject in the media,

⁸⁶<http://www.wasatyea.net/?q=content/%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86>

⁸⁷Abdulaziz, 2016.

lectures and forums throughout the region. Abubakir Ali (Karwani), a former politburo member and candidate for the Secretary General post in the seventh congress, is another leading member who has his own stamp in this regard. Karwani in 2015 wrote a book entitled '*Daesh La Newan Twndrawi Aeeni w Shksti Dawlatda*' (ISIS between religious extremism and state failure).

Further, in combatting all kinds of extremism, Tahsin Hama Ghareeb of the KIU cadre, and scholar, founder and director of Hazhan⁸⁸ magazine and website, has been working on presenting a Kurdish version of Islam. He cautions against moderate Islam among the Kurds being hijacked by non-Kurdish extremists. Similarly the former member of the KIU politburo, Abdulrahman Siddiq⁸⁹, works in the same direction criticising the extreme interpretation of Islamic texts that have been utilised by terrorists, and calls for a Kurdish version of Islam. Finally, there is a list of new young generation scholars who work in the same direction⁹⁰, an example being Qani9 Xursheed, the founder and director of '*Projai Biri Mianarawee*' moderatism thought project, which so far has published more than 40 books⁹¹, presented a series of radio programmes, published CDs, run courses, organised talks, lectures and educational camping.

Overall, when we talk about moderatism, we need to bear in mind that it is growing in a democratic context. The less room that is afforded to religious nationalism, the more terror grows. In other words, either we deal with the

⁸⁸<http://www.hazhan.org/>

⁸⁹<https://www.facebook.com/birwrakan.official/>

⁹⁰<http://hawsani.org/>

⁹¹Xursheed, 2014.

Islamists democratically in the context of religious nationalism, or the chance for the rise of terror is increased. Using the example of depriving the MB in Egypt from democracy and the active participation of AK party of Turkey can help in this regard. However, the responsibility of a political party such as the KIU will increase in a democratic framework due to its religious background. Also, the shared responsibility is extended to other local and international entities who care for democracy and are serious in combatting terror. Because, firstly, when we talk about religion, we talk about submission, servitude, sincerity, faithfulness, peace, harmony, and kindness towards one's self and others. However, when we see a deviation within a particular religion by a group of people or individuals, this is no more a religious act. Secondly, it is the duty of the followers of that particular religion, before anyone else, to repel, face the deviation and treat it. It is then the duty of other people to work with the people of that religion to remedy the deviation, instead of taking advantage of the situation to accuse the religion itself for what that group or individual(s) have done. Thirdly and finally, by ignoring the second point, the circle of deviation will widen, and will eventually reach globally.

7.6.1.4 Introducing Good Character Cadres and Statesmen:

In order to examine the KIU's claim of providing good character statesmen to the nation, I first will look at what my interviewees said in this regard. Then I will look at elements in the member's curriculum. Finally, I will be looking at some examples who have gone through the process of the KIU's preparation.

Muhammad Ra'uf (2012)⁹² in reply to '*how do they prepare statesmen?*' answered as follows:

"We through three mechanisms create statesmen. We have already practiced two of them, and will step towards the third one from now on. The steps are:

The first mechanism is preparing individuals on the basis of our moderate thinking, and in the light of our programme. We produce an individual, whenever he/she undertakes a post will be dealing with it professionally. He/she would not betray the post, and would not mix between politics and the post. We will grow in the mind-set of our individuals to treat on the basis of citizenship concept, and not to practice a narrow-minded partisan in the framework of the state.

The second mechanism is through those members who already gone through the first mechanism and have undertook state posts; they have practiced the required professionalism. This makes them pioneers for the later statesmen.

Third mechanism is our plan for the future candidates for the parliament and the governorates councils to participate in special courses. Those courses will benefit from the expertise of those who already have experience in those fields, as well as other professionals, such as university professors and other technocrats".

There are a few elements in the membership curriculum of the KIU that indicate a positive inclination in preparing their members and cadres for the future as

⁹² See appendix three.

principled statesmen. Here, we shall refer to some of those elements. In the educational curriculum, KIU Membership Office (2007: 261-271), in the series of the educational curriculum, stage one, part two, there is a subject entitled '*Karigari Haram LasarJianiMrov*' (the influence of ill-gotten on the human being's life). When looking at the many complaints about the corruption of the state officials, starting from the citizens, opposition parties, and ending up with the president of the region⁹³, reconsidering education and values are fundamental and crucial from stage one of the political party's membership to combat stealing and dishonesty. Also, in the KIU Membership Office (2008e: 83-98), in the series of the educational curriculum, stage two, part one, a subject under the title of trueness is thoroughly covered. Again, this is another important subject for future professionalism and political reform.

Despite the above ethical examples in the membership curriculum of the KIU, there are other good political elements for educating the KIU's members. The following are subjects according to the referred sources:

- KIU Membership Office (2008d, 7-31), in the series of the cultural curriculum, cultural appendix of the educational curriculum for Enoch's stage: Politics.
- KIU Membership Office (2008d, 33-62): Political parties.
- KIU Membership Office (2008d, 63-72): Conducting a successful dialogue.
- KIU Membership Office (2008d, 73-90): '*Shurra*' (consultation), in which it interprets the concept differently as being as a system that obliges the rulers to listen to the citizens.

⁹³ See Zaman 2016.

- KIU Membership Office (2008d, 91-110): Democracy.
- KIU Membership Office (2008d, 111-124): Socialism.
- KIU Membership Office (2008d, 125-140): Westernisation.
- KIU Membership Office (2008d, 141-150): Globalisation.
- KIU Membership Office (2008d, 194-207): The contemporary struggle of the people of Kurdistan.
- KIU Membership Office (2008e, 185-234): The contemporary Islamic awakening and trends.
- KIU Membership Office (2008e, 287-314): The history of the Kurds.

Mustafa Abdullah (2016), the head of the KIU membership office, verified the following list of former members and supporters of the KIU who play political roles or as journalists in other political parties or media:

Name	Position
Dr. Yousif Mohammad	Speaker of the Kurdistan Region Parliament
Dr. Haval Abubakir	Governor of Sulaimani Province
Dr. Farhad Atrushi	Governor of Duhok Province
Hoshiar Abdullah	Head of the Change Movement (Gorran) bloc in Iraqi Parliament, and the former director of KNN ⁹⁴ .

⁹⁴KNN (Kurdish News Network) was founded in 2008 as a subsidiary of the Wusha Corporation, an independent Kurdish media group, and first started broadcasting on the 31st of December 2008. KNN has been found as an independent channel linked with Wusha Cooperation for Kurdish Independent media, but Following the Gorran Conference in 2014, the media channels of Gorran Movement has been collected in a single organ of Gorran Movement which includes (KNN tv Channel, Gorran Radio, Gorran website and Sbeyi website and KNNC. (<http://www.knnc.net/en/About>).

Ali Hama Salih	Kurdistan Region Parliament Member
Dr Mohammad Ali Hawrami	Coordinator (Head) of Political Research Room of Gorran
Abdulrahman Siddiq	Moderatism thinker
Dr. Zana Ra'uf	Former Kurdistan Region Parliament Member
Ahmad Mira	Editor in Chief of Liven Magazine and Press ⁹⁵
Omed Qaradaghi	Journalist and TV presenter
Hiwa Jamal	Presenter at Rudaw TV ⁹⁶
Mohammad Ra'uf	Presenter at KNN TV
Hawar Jalaladin	Presenter at Rudaw
Shoxan Abubakir	Presenter at KNN TV

⁹⁵Lvin is a leading free media magazine and online press that reveals the truth about the corruption in the region. On different occasions its journalists were subjected to attacks by the corrupt officials, Soran Mama Hama its Kirkuk office's director was assassinated on 21 July 2008 (Reporters without Border, 2011). According to mission and the vision of the press, its objectives are the following:

- 1) Creation and growth of the free media in Kurdistan.
- 2) Publication of meticulous and correct information about the events and the changes related to the daily life of the citizens.
- 3) Preserving the nationalistic strategy of the people of Kurdistan globally, without any chauvinistic involvement.
- 4) Creation the utmost transparency in administration and politics in the Kurdistan Region.
- 5) Scrutinize the state and government institutions upon their responsibilities towards the citizens.
- 6) Practice of the values of democracy and humanism, and broadening the freedom of expression and human rights.
- 7) Educating the masses in regards to anything that endangers the system of democracy, human rights and wastes the national wealth.
- 8) Abiding the journalism ethics and principles, especially the code of journalism conduct items, which Lvin magazine has adopted as its own especial bylaw.

(<http://www.lvinpress.com/n/about.aspx>).

⁹⁶ See Rudaw Media Network: About Us (<http://rudaw.net/english/about>).

Critics blame the KIU for not being able to retain all those good members, yet the KIU officials take the more positive view of presenting such good examples to society wherever they are serving.

7.6.2 In Baghdad:

The officials of the KIU proudly and always claim that they are the first line defenders of the interests of the people and the land of Kurdistan. This kind of defending has taken place in Kurdistan, Baghdad, abroad, and has been expressed in Kurdish, Arabic and English. On some occasions, because of these nationalistic sentiments, they have been accused by some non-Kurd Islamists as non-Islamist or even nationalists. Atroshi (2016) claims that:

“The KIU had a pioneering role in Baghdad in regards to the Kurdish issue, and the unity of the Kurds and its outstanding stances in the Iraqi Parliament since the collapse of Saddam’s regime in 2003. Since the participation of the Secretary General in the Iraqi Interim Governing Council (IIGC), he proved to all the unity of the Kurds. While in Baghdad the standpoint of the Islamist political parties were different than that of the secular ones. The KIU was presenting the Kurdish issue as an issue of a people, which is the people of Kurdistan, before anything else such as a religious or an ethnic issue”.

It was an important historical juncture for the KIU to play nationalistically rather religiously after the fall of the regime in Baghdad. Many of the Islamists in Iraq, especially the Sunnis, were against the change and a foreign existence on the

land of Iraq. In Bahaddin's memoirs (2009: 13), relating his membership of IIGC, he recorded that during the meeting of a delegation of the IIGC with Michael Ancram, the British Shadow Foreign Secretary, on 23rd July 2003, the KIU Secretary General and IIGC member stated that "we need a just parliamentary federal civil ruling, not a religious ruling that some people imagine". Undeniably, this was the call of the Kurdistan Parliament and KRG since 1992. Likewise, Haladny (2016) reiterates that "in Baghdad shoulder to shoulder with the other parliamentary blocs, we have been defending the national rights of our people".

These political positions of the KIU emanated from its political thought that since its establishment had worked on and educated its members. The second man of the party at the time, Hadi Ali, who at the tenth anniversary of the proclamation of the KIU published a book entitled 'the KIU at its tenths anniversary: history, stances and achievements' elaborates on this as follows:

"this characteristic of the KIU, i.e. being Kurdistanian has no contradict at all with being Islamic. Because from our point of view, Islam as religion and source of values is a global and universal. However, as a social and political project, it has to be patriotic and nationalistic with reference to the society and homeland that works on". (2004: 26).

It has never been recorded that on any single occasion, in Baghdad, whether by members of parliament, ministers or other officials of the KIU, has a stand against the interests of the Kurds been taken due to their being Islamists or for

any other reason, even after being subject to attacks by the Kurdish ruling parties, such as those of the 2005 and 2011.

7.6.3 In Other Parts of Kurdistan:

According to the bylaws of the KIU (2008:10) in article five, specifically, under Kurdistan issues: point five, the Kurdish nationalist issue in other parts of Kurdistan has been adopted. It clearly “supports the nationalistic Kurdish issue in the other parts of Kurdistan for the sake of achieving their rightful demands in a peaceful and democratic manner”. Similarly, the draft of the bylaw adopted by the leadership council on 07 May 2016, which was presented to the seventh congress, has reiterated the same principle under article five, point six. (The KIU Leadership Council, 2016b: 5).

Some other Kurdish political parties in southern Kurdistan had to work with Iran⁹⁷ or Turkey against the Kurdish movements of those parts of Kurdistan, in order to guarantee the support of those countries on their side. However, the situation was extremely different with the KIU, as it has kept its hands clean towards fellow Kurds in other parts of Kurdistan due to its non-militia platform. Furthermore, the KIU has rendered possible services to them instead. According to Bahaddin (2009: 76) when the IIGC discussed the non-Iraqi organisations that the former Iraqi regime allowed to work in Iraq, he raised with

⁹⁷ For further details in this regard, please see author’s article: ‘*Iran’s Role in the Kurdistan Region*’.

the council the issue of the Kurdish opposition to Iran and demanded to dissimilate between them and the People's Mojahedin Organisation of Iran⁹⁸.

Haladny (2016) claims that "the KIU bloc [in Kurdistan region parliament] has supported and expressed its backing to the other three parts of Kurdistan by conveying parliamentary delegations and issuing formal statements or directly in bilateral meetings with the political parties and entities of other parts of Kurdistan". Furthermore, in answering my question: (what has the parliamentary bloc of the KIU in Kurdistan region's parliament done for the sake of the Kurdish nationalism question?), Haladny (2016) summarised the main points, only in regard to western Kurdistan, as follows:

"After the invasion of Kobani⁹⁹ by ISIS, the Kurdistan Parliament delegated a parliamentary team, led by the KIU bloc, to visit the displaced people of the city on the border of Turkey and Syria. The delegation played the following roles:

1. Visiting the displaced people and delivering the aids of parliament, this subsequent visit led to set up a camp for them.
2. Meeting with all the political parties of the Western Kurdistan, particularly with the Democratic Union Party (PYD)¹⁰⁰.
3. Consecutively the delegation returned to Kurdistan, and issued two important resolutions in the Kurdistan parliament as follows:

⁹⁸<https://www.mojahedin.org/home/en>

⁹⁹For further information about the battle for the city of Kobani, please see: Cockburn, 2015.

¹⁰⁰<http://en.pydrojava.com/>

- A. Resolution number 24 of 2014: supporting the people of the Western Kurdistan in any kind of autonomy. This was the formal recognition of the Kurdistan Parliament to the will of the people of Western Kurdistan.
- B. Resolution number 28 of 2014: with regard to sending the Peshmarga forces to liberate Kobani”.

As for northern Kurdistan, occasionally the KIU’s officials claim that they have been trying to help the people of that part of Kurdistan. Khalil Ibrahim (2016), the former head of the relationship dossier of the KIU on Kurdish affairs in northern and western Kurdistan, and member of the executive body of KIU political bureau, stated that since the time of *Najmaddin Arbakan*¹⁰¹, we have been talking about the solution of the Kurdish issue in Turkey with the Turkish government. We have told them that it is so crucial to solve this issue by the Islamists of Turkey. He added that this was our position with the AK party, too. Ibrahim (2016) summarised their efforts in the peace process between the PKK and AK party as follows:

“We directly went to the PKK and delivered their demands to Ankara, and spoke to AK party as the ruling party directly conveying our message. Thus, we encouraged both sides, and we presented our opinions to them. Although, the peace process unfortunately has stopped now, we continued with both parties during the two and a half to three years of the process. Our role between the PKK and the Turkish government was initially secret. However, in 2013, the Secretary General Mr. Mohammad

¹⁰¹ *Najmaddin Arbakan*: Turkey’s first Islamist Prime Minister.

Faraj and I overtly visited *Qandil*¹⁰². This came after my other few visits to *Qandil*, then we visited Ankara and went back again to *Qandil*. Both sides thanked the KIU for our efforts, and *Salahuddin Dameertash* and his delegation in Sulaimani mentioned the role of the KIU¹⁰³.

7.7 Concluding Remarks:

This chapter highlighted the nationalist sentiments of the KIU. The elements of examining the feelings of nationalism were two types: theoretical and realpolitik. On the theoretical side, I looked at few thematic aspects, such as: Kurdish or Muslim, nationalism, nation state and reform. This part of the chapter dealt with the growth of the feelings of nationalism within the KIU, where the participants clearly expressed this feeling. For instance, when we looked at the theme (Kurdish or Muslim) clearly we noticed the growth of nationalism, by the participants expressing themselves as equally being Kurds and Muslims. Nationalism and nation state were two other aspects which touched upon the growth of nationalism and the nationalist demands of the KIU. Finally, the issue of reform that the party has been calling for, over the last decade, clarified the nature of the reform that the party hopes for, and framing the envisaged nationalism was another aspect to explore, to make it feasible within the field of the religious nationalism.

¹⁰² *Qandil* Mountain: is a mountain along the KRG and Iranian border, where the central command centre of the PKK is based.

¹⁰³ *Salahuddin Dameertash*: the co-leader of the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) in Turkey.

In order to examine another side of the claimed nationalist slogans of the KIU, it was important to look at the practical day-to-day policies of the party. To test the realpolitik, I investigated the policies of the KIU in the Kurdistan region, covering: mediating and peace-making, maintaining the unity of the region, combatting all kinds of terror in the name of Islam, and its pioneering in becoming a non-militia political party model, with introducing good character cadres and statesmen. Then, I looked at the role of the party in Baghdad in the interest of Kurdish nationalism. Finally, I scrutinised the role of the KIU towards other parts of Kurdistan.

Throughout the chapter, it became clear that the KIU is not a fundamental, dogmatic Islamic party that disregards the feelings for nationalism, nation state, with the one and only objective being towards a religious-framed ruling party that many of other Islamists strive for. Rather, it became quite clear that the political strife of the KIU towards Kurdish nationalism lacks nothing other than those who call themselves Kurdish nationalists.

Chapter Eight

Conclusion

This study aimed to explore the concept of religious nationalism as a new trend among the Islamic political parties of the Middle East, with a focus on the establishment of a nation state. The importance of this issue comes from the fact that, over the last century, the establishment of territorial nation states in the Middle East faced many challenges, above all that of the Islamists considering the newly emerged nation states as anti-religious entities. Furthermore, highlighting and studying the juncture of the change through the stance of those Islamists at the level of political parties, and the challenge of becoming genuine nationalists with recognition of the nation states, is at the core of this project. The choice of using Islamism in Kurdistan as an anchor for this study is of particular importance due to the Kurds' deprivation of their desired nation state. Conversely other Middle Eastern nations, the Arabs for example, have no such problem; Kurdish Islamism is a unique case when discussing the experience of religious nationalism.

Religious nationalism, defined by Juergensmeyer (1993: 40) as "*the attempt to link religion and the nation-state*", is not a usage adopted by this study. Rather, the term 'religious nationalism' here means specifically the reconciliation of those religious movements that, at the outset, opposed the new nation states,

which were, at the time, considered a cause of fragmentation in the united body of the Islamic caliphate. However, over time, as more Islamists integrated into politics, the more the reality of the new politics of the region was accepted, in the context of nation statehood. For instance, the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) began as an Islamic movement with few nationalist objectives, though now it fervently supports Kurdish Nationalism. Thus, it is argued that the term 'religious nationalism' in this context consists of the combination of previous religious movements, or Islamist movements, and the nationalism that they initially opposed.

This new phenomenon of religious nationalism, according to the findings of this study, comes down to many factors. Above all, according to the Islamist's new political vision, the nature of Islam is as a religion that has left politics and the way of ruling entirely in the hands of the Muslim population; the political form is not determined by Islam as a particular type of caliphate, for instance. In other words, the existence of nation states is not contradictory to the teachings of Islam. For the Kurdish Islamists, and according to the leading figures of the KIU, the ultimate objective of Islam in ruling a state is to fulfil a judicial role, and as long as this role is fulfilled, the political form is not important. According to the findings of this study, another factor in the rise of religious nationalism is the treatment of Islam within a political context. Previously, Islam accepted the existence of Arab tribes, and similarly, it does not reject the existence of the national and ethnic diversity at the current time; this phenomenon has emerged from the introduction of Islamic political parties into nationalism, and the acceptance of this as the new political climate.

This study is not about religious authentication or judgement of any kind; neither is it a religious validation of any other political behaviour or ideology. Rather, it is about the interrelation between religion and nationalism in a political context, with regard to Islam and the new nation states that emerged in the Middle East after the Ottomans. This relationship has gone through tumultuous phases, until eventually they came together and created a unified entity in the shape of religious nationalism. The initial opposition came after the rejection of secular nationalism to Islam, which led, consequently, to the Islamists reacting to this kind of nationalism.

The typical nationalism that was adopted by the Kemalists in Turkey was exemplified as a secular nationalism, after which many of the nationalists in the Middle East followed suit. This type of nationalism, continuing with the example of Turkey, tried to assimilate all the ethnicities, languages and cultures into the amalgamated nation of Turkey. This policy eventually failed as it was in contradiction to the current successful examples of nationalism globally; in terms of the concept of citizenship, no single race governs its citizens. This policy was also in contradiction to the historical background of the region, where, for hundreds of years, the Islamic Empires, including the Ottomans, could not effectively run all the diverse groups under their control, without even attempting to assimilate them, in a sense of trying to making them a single race.

When the Turkification policy of the Kemalists began, it provoked all ethnicities to call for racial nationalism. In practice, this kind of policy, in the name of

nationalism, was neither in line with the current nation states, nor with the historical background of Islamic coexistence. Despite the harsh opposition of the extreme secular nationalists towards religion in the Middle East, secularism has never been accepted by the masses. Overall, in the Middle East, since the early days of nationalism up to the present day, nationalism has never been accepted as a rival or surrogate to Islam by the public. Rather, recently, both secular and religious nationalists are attempting to theorise for the legitimacy of nationalism using Islamic texts and related literature.

The historical relationship between religion and nationalism goes back to what Smith, (2003: 255-256) refers to as:

“Four kinds of cultural resources and sacred foundation, drawn from earlier religious belief-systems, have been of particular importance in this regard:

A myth of ethnic election, the conviction of being chosen for a covenant or mission, or both, by the deity;

A long-standing attachment to particular terrains regarded as sacred and as belonging to the community, and it to them;

A yearning to recover and realize the spirit of one or more golden ages, epochs of communal heroism and creativity;

A belief in the regenerative power of mass and individual sacrifice to ensure a glorious destiny, and the importance of commemorating and celebrating the community and its heroes”.

In the early stages of Islam, such sacred ethnic homelands were regarded as '*Jahiliah*' (ignorance), and Islam abolished all kinds of ideas. The concept as stated by Smith (2003: 256) "was transferred, particularly in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, to other lands in much later periods of history", and eventually into Islam too. In all cases, religion has been used to philosophise and moralise the idea of 'chosen people' and 'sacred land', despite the fact that Islamic texts clearly regard such sentiments as ignorant. By developing such an ideology, when a nation portrays itself as a chosen one and its land as sacred, this encourages other nations to raise similar ideologies.

The rise of nationalism in the Middle East over the last century, and the acceptance of nationalism and nation states by the Islamists, has created a multi-dimensional national identity. Karwani (2012) remarks "I am at the same time a Muslim and a Kurd, Oriental and cosmopolitan...etc.". Taking into account the extreme religious and nationalist ideas that have led to global terror, finding shared values within the religion and humanity is a springboard towards peace and coexistence; religious nationalism can cross the path of religion and nationalism within different ethnicities of a given religion. The interest of each of those nations, as long as it is not on the basis of the religious dogma, will lead to further healthy relations across the world. In other words, if in the past the strong sense of belonging to religion led to war between the religious groups, then, in the era of nation building in the Middle East, the existence of this kind of religious nationalism could be the remedy, a step towards the coexistence of multiple nations within one religion; Islam, then,

would provide a pragmatic relationship with the rest of the world on the basis of shared interests.

When a religion is subject to oppression, the sense of affiliation to the religion grows within both religious and non-religious individuals; the example of the Bosnian Muslims was highlighted by Smith (1987: 23) "In Yugoslavia, where the Muslims of Bosnia have decided to adopt the name 'Muslim' as an ethnic designation in the Yugoslavian census, which requires everyone to name their nationality". This is also the case with Muslim populated client states in Israel, Pakistan and the former Soviet Union, where religion led to nation states. At the same time, in these cases, it can be said that nationalism protected religion; within one nation in the Middle East, Islamism has grown as a reaction to secularism, as with Arab Islamists, and the early Kurdish Islamists too. However, when oppression is focused on ethnicity, the growth will be on the basis of nationalism. Furthermore, in cases like that of Kurdish nationalism, where the oppressors are other Muslim ethnicities, this inspires both secular and religious nationalists alike. Based on the arguments made, we will call the phenomenon under investigation a "Neo-religious nationalism" since it is not completely in line with Juergensmeyer's (1993: 40) view as the "attempt to link religion and the nation-state". One of the characteristics of neo-religious nationalists is their claim that their political participation is for the sake of the religion and to serve the nation. In other words, serving their nation is one of their religious duties. Another characteristic is their understanding of Islam itself. They classify Islam into two different circles, a circle of creed and worship, which they call a closed circle, and an open circle for all other businesses

including politics. In the closed circle, innovation is prohibited, and it has to be as it was at the time of the prophet. As for the open circle, according to them, it is up to the interests and demand of the time, and they can be as creative as possible within it.

The Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) came into existence on 6th February 1994, after a series of battles between the Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) throughout 1992 and 1993. Although it was not an easy task for the KIU to present itself as a non-militia Islamic party, it was a source of pride for it as the first civil and non-militia Kurdish party in the Kurdistan region. Thus, this became a political model for the de-radicalisation process of both the IMIK and the Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG), which followed after 2003, as well that of the Change Movement in 2009. More importantly, the KIU's vision of coexistence was religiously theorised. This was beneficial on two levels; firstly, it knocked down the barrier of ideological and religious hatred, and secondly, it worked towards the concept of citizenship and being equal in the eyes of the law, in terms of equal citizenship, not on other religious, sectarian, racial or tribal affiliations.

In order to highlight the shift by the KIU from being a preaching group to being a political party with many nationalism characteristics and demands, I adopted semi-structured interviews for my fieldwork, in which I interviewed many of the leading figures of the KIU. As a result, seventeenthemes, and another six themes under *realpolitik*, totalling 23 themes were identified in the fieldwork;

each of those themes demonstrated a side of this shift. Overall, the data is highly contributory towards the project, and aids the hypothesis. From the concluded themes, it is difficult to distinguish the differences between the KIU and any other nationalist parties. The evidence shows that the Islamic dimension cannot be a hindrance in efforts by the KIU to be an active religious nationalist political party, and conversely, has tried to use it to help the national demands of the Kurds.

However, there are other obstacles faced by the KIU in their desire to be as popular as the AK of Turkey; for instance, the major issue is the combination of preaching and politics. The main challenges preventing the KIU from separating of the two are: internal disagreement, the nature of the voters, other Islamist rivals, and the risk of losing the trust of the grassroots. Other contributory factors include a long history of other parties calling for nationalism, the rentier economy that has already classified a large ratio of the voters on the side of the ruling parties and the sudden emergence of the Change (*Gorran*) movement in 2009.

Above all, the long history of the Kurds' call for nationalism, and the struggle of the whole nation in this regard, with no rights of self-determination and nation statehood as of yet, made the benchmark for any kind of political party a nationalist one. There is no *raison d'être* for political parties without nationalist demands in the Kurdish political arena. In other words, for the Kurdish people, a political party with no or little nationalist demands will not survive. Therefore, it is

my hypothesis that Islamism in Kurdistan is limited by the politics of nationalism, though this is the case with all other Islamic political parties including those in Turkey and in the Arab countries. However, the nature of the politics portrays different images; when the issue is a bread-and-butter issue or justice and development, then the political parties will align themselves accordingly. Nonetheless, they are all nationalists, and each of them reflects its own condition, the Kurdish nationalism being ever more highlighted.

There are many examples that highlight the phenomenon of religious nationalism among the Islamic political parties of the Middle East. Each of them proves the reality of the nationalistic dimension of those political parties, just as with their sister non-Islamic parties in their struggle for their nations and nation states. To take the example of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) of Kuwait during the Iraqi regime's invasion in 1990, Kuwait had exerted every effort to liberate its land from the neighbouring Arab nation of Iraq, with the help of the non-Muslim western coalition forces led by the USA. This was despite the stance of almost all other MBs worldwide which was against western 'interference'; yet the nationalistic logic of the Kuwaiti MBs, like their fellow Kuwaitis, welcomed that kind of 'interference' to liberate their state. The position of all the Iraqi parties against the rights of the Kurds in Iraq since 2003, and the regime change, is still same as the Baath nationalists. This is despite the fact that all those political parties, apart from the Communist party, are Islamists. In Turkey, when the cease-fire ended and the war broke out, the AK party did not hesitate to fight the brother Kurds. This evidence demonstrates that all of these Islamic

parties are, in fact, nationalist. In the interest of their nations, they have no hesitation in fighting for their nations, just like any non-Islamic nationalist.

Hence, in answering the research question, 'Is Islamism defined by nationalism in Kurdistan?', the conclusion reached, through observed evidence and the findings of this research, as well as from the behaviour of all similar religious nationalists across the Middle East, is to the affirmative. Therefore, my hypothesis 'that Islamism in Kurdistan is limited by the politics of nationalism' was, to some extent, correct. However, when we refer to Islamism, we mean the Islamic political parties, or what is sometimes called 'political Islam'. Otherwise, we do not refer to those Islamists who are not yet involved in politics as political parties. The main reason for this is, firstly, the political focus in Kurdistan is nationalism due to the deprivation of self-determination rights and the nation state of Kurdistan. Secondly, as mentioned above, and according to the findings, Islam itself demands nationalistic politics from Islamists. This is not only the case with the Kurdish Islamic parties, but also with all Islamic political parties across the Middle East; they are all religious nationalists. The only difference is the fact that the Kurdish situation is more prominent than other cases.

Therefore, those Islamic political parties in the Middle East which are well integrated into politics and exhibit an advanced level of political performance are no longer Islamists in the traditional understanding of this term; rather, they represent a form of religious nationalism. Initially, Islamism as a political ideology in opposition to all other ideologies came into existence as a result of the harsh treatment of the secular nationalists towards Islam and its teachings.

However, the decrease in the perceived sense of threat, as well as the integration of political parties with Islamic teachings into mainstream political life, led to the birth of a new trend called religious nationalism. The more these 'new' Islamists have integrated into the politics of nationalism, the more they have steered away from Islamism as an ideological dogma. Eventually, these Islamic political parties assumed the characteristic of religious nationalists.

Finally, my recommendation for further study is to highlight the phenomenon of terrorism in the Middle East, including ISIS, under the shadow of the phenomena of religious nationalism. My personal initial hypotheses for such a relationship are as follow:

The less room that is offered to religious nationalism, the more terror grows. In other words, either we deal with the Islamists democratically in the context of religious nationalism, or the opportunity for a rise of terror is increased. Using the example of depriving the MB in Egypt from democracy and the active participation of the AK party of Turkey can help in this regard.

Appendixes:

Appendix 1: Interview with Abubakir Ali (Karwani), a politburo member

چاوپیکهوتوو له گهډل نه بو بکر علی، نه ندامی مه کته بی سیاسی یه کگرتووی نیسلا میی کوردستان

پ1/ چۆن ههست دهکەیت وەکو کوردیکێ ئیسلامی، هەریەک له کورد بوون و موسلمان بوون چی دهگهیهنیت بۆت؟

و/ ئهگەر تۆزیک بگهڕێنمهوه بۆ میژوو، له قوناغی پێش سههره‌لدانی حیزبی کوردیدا، له کاتی کدا له رفزه ئاینیه میلیهکانی کۆمه‌لگا، رابهرا بهتی بزوتنهوهی ناسیونالیستکانیان کردووه له کۆمه‌لگای کوردیدا، ههچ دژایهتیهک له نیوان ناسنامهی ناسیونالیزمی و ئاینی خه‌لکدا نه‌بووه. واته جۆریک له هارمۆمۆنیتهت و (انسجام) له ناو خه‌لکدا بووه. به‌لام له دواي دهرکهوتنی پارتیه سیاسییه‌کانهوه، وورده ورده په‌رینهوهی ئایدۆلوجیا سیکۆلاریسته‌کانهوه بۆ ناو کوردستان و هه‌ک به‌شیک له رۆژه‌لاتی ناوهراسهت جۆریک له (تناقض) له نیوان شوناسی ئیسلامی و شوناسی نه‌ته‌وايهتی خه‌لکه‌که‌دا به پاشخان و پالنانی ئایدۆلوجی؛ به تایبهت چه‌پ و مارکسیزم دێته‌کایه‌وه. ئهگەر کورتی کهینه‌وه بۆ ئیستا، به بروام من موسلمان بوون و کورد بوونی من یان هه‌ر تاکیکێ تر له کوردستاندا دوو پرووی ناسنامهی کهسیتی نیشتمانی منن. ئیمه ناسنامهی فره ره‌هه‌ندمان هه‌یه، من له یه‌ک کاتدا موسلمانیشم و کوردیشم، ئیسانیشم و رۆژه‌لاتیشم... هه‌ند. له‌سایه‌ی بروابوون به فره ره‌هه‌ندی ناسنامه‌یه‌دا ئیمه کێشه‌یه‌که‌مان بۆ دروست نایه‌ت. ئه‌م ره‌هه‌ندانه په‌کتری ته‌واو کرده، وه به‌سه‌ریه‌که‌وه شوناسیک ئه‌به‌خه‌شن به من، بۆیه له یه‌ک کاتدا من هه‌ست ده‌که‌م به موسلمان بوونی خۆم، وه به کورد بوونی خۆم، هه‌ر وه‌ها به ئینسانی بوونی خۆم، ئینتیا بوونیشم له هه‌موو ئه‌م شیوازه په‌کتری ته‌واو ده‌که‌ن، وه شوناسیک فره‌هه‌ند بۆ من دروست ده‌که‌ن.

پ2/ وەکو کوردیکێ ئیسلامی یان ئیسلامییه‌کی کورد گه‌ر ده‌ته‌ویت، چۆن سه‌یری ئیسلام ده‌که‌یت و هه‌کو ئاینیکێ جیهانی؟ جیهانیبوونی ئیسلام چی ده‌گه‌یه‌نیت؟

و/ من خۆم نووسینم هه‌یه له‌م باره‌یه‌وه. ئیسلام ئاینیکێ بان نه‌ته‌وه‌یه، ئیسلام ئاینیکێ سه‌روو نه‌ته‌وه‌یه. واتا هه‌ر هه‌ولیک بۆ ملکه‌چکردنی ئیسلام و هه‌کو ئاینیکێ په‌کته‌په‌ستی جیهانی بۆ خواستیکێ ناسیونالیستی دیاری کراو، ئه‌وه خیانه‌ته به ئیسلام، وه ئیسلام پێچه‌وانه‌ی ئه‌وه‌یه. دیاره هه‌ندێ له ناشیونالیسته‌کان، له‌وانه ناشیونالیسته‌ سه‌ره‌به‌ی و فارسی و تاراده‌یه‌که‌یه‌ش له هه‌ندێ کاتدا ئه‌م پرۆسه‌یان کردووه. به‌لام ئایا ئه‌مه ئه‌وه ده‌گه‌یه‌نیت که تێگه‌یه‌شتنی ئیسلامیانه بۆ ناشیونالیزم نه‌توانین به‌ر هه‌م به‌یه‌نین؟ نه‌خێر، ناشیونالیزم له‌به‌ر ئه‌وه‌ی واقه‌یکه، فاکتیکه له کۆمه‌لگاکاندا، له کۆمه‌لگاکا هاوچه‌رخه‌کاندا ئه‌م فاکتانه پۆلێن کردنی، وه (مترتبات) ی هه‌بووه له سه‌ری. وه واقه‌یکێ خولقاندووه، ئه‌م واقه‌هه‌ش قه‌یرانی خولقاندووه، وه زو‌لمی لێ بووته‌وه، وه چاوه‌ڕوانی دروستکردووه، وه پێوه‌ری دروستکردووه. له‌به‌ر ئه‌وه له روانگه‌ی به‌ها ئیسلامیه‌کانه‌وه ئیمه ئه‌توانین قسه له‌سه‌ر ناشیونالیزم بکه‌ین، نه‌ک له روانگه‌ی خودی ئیسلام خۆیه‌وه. بۆ نمونه ئیسلام سه‌رته‌ای دادپه‌روه‌ری هه‌یه، سه‌رته‌ای رته‌کردنه‌وه‌ی زو‌لمی هه‌یه، سه‌رته‌ای په‌کسانی گه‌لانی هه‌یه، ریزی زمانیک نادات به‌سه‌ر زمانیکێ تر، ریزی (عرق) نیک نادات به سه‌ر (عرق) نیکێ تر، ئینسان هه‌موو له‌به‌رده‌م خوا په‌کسانن به ئینتیا جیاوازی نه‌ته‌وايهتی، زمانه‌وانی و نه‌ژادی. لێره‌وه ئیمه ئه‌توانین باس له مامه‌له‌کردن له‌گه‌ڵ ناشیونالیزم بکه‌ین، وه ده‌توانین بزوتنه‌وه‌ی ئیسلامیمان هه‌یه‌ت به هه‌ناسه‌ی ناشیونالیسته‌نه‌وه. له روانگه‌ی ئه‌م به‌ها ئیسلامیانه ئه‌م به‌ها ئیسلامیانه تیکه‌ڵ ده‌کات به به‌ها

ناشیونالیستەکان، لەبەر ئەوە بزوتنەوی ئیسلامیی پاشخان ناشیونالیستی، یان بزوتنەوی ناشیونالیستی پاشخان ناپیی دێتە کایەو. ئیستا یەكگرتووی ئیسلامیی کوردستان خۆی یەکیکە لەو بزوتنەوانە.

پ3/ چۆن مامەڵە دەکەن لەگەڵ کێشەیی کەرکوک؟ وەك کوردییکی ئیسلامیی چی دەبێت گەر دەست بەرداری ئەو پرسە بن بۆ برا عەرەبە موسلمانەکانتان؟

و/ ئیمە لە چەند روانگەییەکی سەیری ئەو پرسە دەکەین:

یەكەم: لە روانگەییەکی (حقوقی)یەو، دیارە (حقوقی)یش لە چوارچۆیی ئەو دۆخەیدا سەیری دەکەین کە دەوڵەتی (قطری) و دەوڵەتی نوێ و ناشیونالیستی نوێ خولقاندویەتی.

دووەم: لە رووی ستەمە میژووییەکیو.

سێیەم: لە رووی چارەسەرکردنی کێشەیی کورد لە عێراقدا سەیری ئەم پرسە دەکەین.

لە رووی (حقوقی)یەو بە پێی کۆمەڵێک پێدراوی جوگرافی و میژوویی، کەرکوک بەشێکی سروشتیە لە خاکی هەریمی کوردستان. مادام پێوەریش ئیستا جیاوازی خاکی و زمان و نەتەوێ شوناسی ناشیونالیستی و دەوڵەتەکان لەسەر ئەو بنەمایە دروست دەین، کەواتە مافی گەلی کوردستانە کە داوا بکاتەو. کاتی خۆشی پایتەختی و لایەتی شارەزور بوو لە کاتی دەوڵەتی عوسمانی. و ئەم ناوچەیە لە سەرۆبەندی پێکەینانی دەوڵەتی عێراقیشدا پێی و تراوێ کوردستانی باشور. لە چوارچۆیی سیاسەتیکی دیاریکراویدا ئەم کوردستانی باشور بە بێ پرسە خەڵکەکی لکێراوێ بە بە عێراقی عەرەبیەو. ئەمەش لەبەر پێداویستی کۆلۆنیالیستەکانی ئەو سەردەمەو، راگرتنی هاوسەنگی (مذهب)ی لە عێراقدا ئەمەیی خولقاندوو، نەك بەپێی (عقد)ییکی کۆمەڵایەتی حکومەتی عێراق دروستکراوێ و کوردهکا بەشێکی لەو گری بەستە.

کەرکوک هێمای ستەمیکی گەورەیی، هەزارەها خێزان لەو شارە لەسەر کورد بوون دەرکراون. مۆک و مآلیان دەستی بەسەردا گیراوە. ئیستا ئەم خێزانانە دەبێت بگەڕێنەو بۆ شوێنەکانی خۆیان، مۆک و مآلیان بۆ بگەڕێنێتەو. ئەمەش لا بردنی ستەمە میژووییەکیو، گێرانەوێ بەشێکی لەو (حقوق)یەو. وە چەندین جار شۆرشێ کورد لەسەر پرسە کەرکوک تێک شکاوە، وە خەڵکی کوردستان کەرکوک بە بەشێکی جیاکراوێ لە وولاتەکی خۆیان دەزانن، وە کەرکوک بوته سومبولیک لە بریندارکردنی شوناس و کەرامەتی ئینسان و نەتەوێ کوردی. وە بێ چارەسەری پرسە کەرکوک، کێشەیی کورد لە عێراقدا جارەسەر نابێت. وە ئەگەر کێشەیی کورد لە عێراقدا چارەسەر نەبێت، ترسی ئەو هەمە کە زۆلمە میژووییەکان دژی کورد درێژەیی هەبێت، وە (استقرار) لە کوردستان و عێراق و پرۆژەلاتی ناوهراستیشدا دروست نابێت.

لە هەموو ئەم روانگەوێ ئیمە جەخت لەسەر ئەو دەکەین کە کەرکوک و ناوچە داڕێژراوێکانی تری کوردستان بگەڕێنەو سەر هەریمی کوردستان. بەلام جەختکردنەو کەشمان رێگایەکی ئاشتیخوازانەییو، خەباتیی دەستوریە. لە رێگای جێبەجێکردنی مادە ١٤٠ لە دەستوری عێراق، کە پرس بە خۆی خەڵکی هەریمە کە دەکات بۆ ئەوێ جارەنووسی خۆیان دیاری کەن، ئایا دەیانەوێت بگەڕێنەو سەر هەریمی کوردستان یاخود دەیانەوێت وەکو بەشێکی لە عێراق بمانێنەو؟ پێشێل کردنی ئەم پرنسپییە کە دیاریکردنی کە دیاریکردنی مافی چارەیی خۆنووسی ناوچەییکی دیاری کراو لەرێی راپرسیەکی گشتیەو بۆ خەڵک و دەنگدەرەکانی زۆلمیی گەورەیی کە ئیمە نابێت قبوڵی بکەین.

پ4/ ئایا ئەم هەلوێستەیی ئیو هێچ جیاوازیەکی هەمە لەگەڵ هەلوێستی ناشیونالیستەکانی تر، بۆ نمونە پارتی دیموکراتی کوردستان و یەکیتی نیشتمانی کوردستان؟

و/ هیچ جياواز يهكمان نيه له م پرسه لهگهك پدك وينك، تنها نموه نعبيت نهگه نيمه دهسه لاتدار بووينايه له جياتي نموان له كهركوك سودمان دهيني لهو همناسه وباكراونده ئيسلاميهي خومان. رهنكه (خطاب) يكي نهرم ترمان بوايه بهرانبهر به پيگهاتهكاني تری كهركوك و هكو عهرهب وتوركمان. نم هاوبهشه ئيسلاميهمان بهكار دهينا بو قناعت پيكردي نموان، بو نموهی رازی بن به چار سهريكي ناستيخوازانه بو كيشهكه به قازانجي چار سهري كيشهه كورد له عيراق.

پ5/ نهگه رازی نهين؟

و/ هیچ هيزيك له كوردستان ناتوانيت به ئاساني دهستبهر داری نهو مافهبيت. نموكاته نهگه هر جي بهجي نهبوو، دهبيت ريفراندم لهناو خهلكي كوردستاندا بكریت بو چو نيتي رووبهروو بوونهوهی رمتكر دنهوهی مادهيهكي دهستووری و مافيهكي نهتوايهتي خوراو.

پ6/ كاميك له شوناسانه گرنگترن بوت: كوردبوون، موسلمان بوون، كوردستاني بوون؟ نهی نمونده دههينيت له سهر كوردستاني بوون و عيراقی بوون كيشهكان نمونده دريژه پي بدين و هكو لايهنه ئيسلاميهكاني عيراق له كورد و عهرهب؟

و/ و هكو وونم نم رههردانه رههندي يهك ناسنامه، وه تهواو كهري يهك (شخصية) ي نيشتمانين. نمهم له بابيهتيكي خومدا به چه سپاوه نيشتمانيهكاني هيزه كوردستانيهكان باس كردوه له كتيبي (عيلمانيهت له نيوان روژ ههلات و روژ ناوا: سهرنجيك له واقع). وه نووسيو مه كه ههريمي كوردستان دهبيت چهند چه سپاويكي ههبيت: كوردبوون، كوردستاني بوون، موسلمان بوون، ديموكراسي بوون. دهبيت نممانه چه سپاوه نيشتمانيهكان بن. نممانهش به بهشهكاني رههندي شوناسي خوم دزمانم. كوردبوون نامازيه به رههندي نهتوايهتي من. كوردبوون من كو دهكاتهوه لهگهله هممو نهوانهه كه له ربي نهژادي وزمانهوه كوردن. موسلمان بوون من كو دهكاتهوه لهگهله هممو پيگهاتهكاني كوردستان و عيراق و جيهاني ئيسلامي، كه شوناسي ئيسلامميان ههيه. نممانهش ئينتماي منه بو (امة) يكي عقيدى. كوردستاني بوون ئينتماي من بو نيشتمانيك دروست دهكات. وه شوناسيكي ترم پيك دهبهخشيت بو هممو نهوانهه كه له سهر نهو نيشتمانه دهژين بهدر له ئاين ومهز ههه و نهتهوه. ليروهه من كو دهكاتهوه لهگهله (مسيحيهك ويزيديهك وتوركمانيك). دياره فراوانترين شوناس بو پيگهاتهكاني كوردستان كوردستاني بوونه. چونكه تاكه شوناسه كه سهر جهم پيگهاتهكاني كوردستان به نهتوايهتي وئايني ومهز هههه كو دهكاتهوه. نيمه له كوردستان ههمانه له رههندي كوردستاني بوون وموسلمان بووندا يهك دهگرنهوه و هكو توركمان. ههمانه له كوردستاني بوون وكورد بووندا يهك دهگرينهوه و هكو يهزيدي، ههمانه تنها له كوردستاني بوونى دا يهك دهگرينهوه و هكو مسيحيهك كه كوردستانيه، به لام نه كورده نه موسلمانيش.

پ7/ نممانهه لاي خواروهه چي دهگهينن بوت: ئيسلام، دهولت، وه نهتهوه؟ ئايا هيجيك لهمانه (تناقض) يان نهگونجان ههيه له نيوانياندا؟

و/ ئيسلام ئاينيكى جيهانيه، له ربي باوهر بوون پي مرؤف دهبيتته موسلمان، وه جوريك له ئهرك وئيلتزام وچاوهر واني رووي تي دهكات. ئيسلام به پيچهوانهه كهنيسهه كاسوليكى سهدهكاني ناوهر است پيگهاتيكي هيراتيكي نيه. ئيسلام له چوار چيوهيهكي سياسييدا پيناسه ناكريت. دهتوانيت له زياد له چوار چيوهيهكي سياسي پيناسهه ئيسلام بكهيت. چونكه ئيسلام له خويدا چوار چيوهيهكي هيراتيكي ئيدارى پله بهندكراوى نيه كه بلانيت نممه پيچهوانهه نم دهولتهيه. نموهه كه جىگاي بايهخي ئيسلامه له چوار چيوهه دهولتهه نهتوايهتي نموهه كه سيستمى سياسي له سهر بناغهه جياكارى و دژايهتي وزولم و ناعدهالتهه نهبيت. پيچهوانهه پرائيسپهكاني ئيسلام نهبيت، پيچهوانهه مافى هاوالاتى و جياكارى نهتهوههه وئايني ومهز هههه نهبيت. و اتا نموهه جىگاي بايهخه له دهولتهه نهتهوههه عهدهالتهه، وه ئينسجامى شوناسه له نيوان موسلمان بوون و ناشوناليسهت بوون و فره كلتورى له وولاتدا. دهولتهه به و اتا هاوچهرخهكهه چوار چيوهيهكه دهبيت له سهر

بىنەمى گرىن بەستى كۆمەلەيتى درووست بووبى، وە ناسنامە جىياوازەكانى ناوخۇى لەخۇبگرىت، وە ھەموو پىنكەتەكانى بەچاوى يەكسان سەيرىكات. وە ئەگەر پارىزگارى لە شوناسى زۆرىنەش بىكات دەبىت بە جۆرىك لە جۆرەكان ناومندىكى بى لايەن بىت بەرانبەر پىنكەتەكانى. وە نابىت ئامرازىك بىت بەدەست زۆرىنەيەكى دىنى يان مەزھەبى يان ئايدۇلۇجى سىياسى بۇ جىياكارى وسەر كوت كىردى پىنكەتەكانى تر لە كۆمەلەگادا. بەدەر لەمە نابىت بە نەتەمە بەرانا سىياسىيە ھاوچەرخە (اخلاق) يەكەى.

نەتەمە خۇبىناسەكردىتىكى ھاوچەرخە لە چوارچىوۋى كەسىتتەكى (معنوي) گریمان كر اودا، كە ئىنسان لەرئى ئىنتما بۇى ھەستىكى دىارى كر اوى بۇ درووست دەبىت. وە كۆمەلەك ئەركى دەكەوتتە ئەستو، لە ھەمان كاتدا كۆمەلەك ماف وچاومروانىشى بۇ درووست دەبىت. نەتەمە دەتوانىت لە چوارچىوۋى دەولەتتەكدا يان چەند دەولەتتەك خۇى رىك خات. ياخود لە دەرموۋى نەژاد خۇى رىكخات. ديارە بە پىي ئەو تىۋرە جىياوازە كە باس لە درووست بوونى نەتەمە دەكەن. دىدى ئىسلامىيەش زىاتر لەگەل فورمىك لە نەتەمە يەتتى داگونجاوۋە كە نامەروومەكىكى نىشتىمانى ھەبىت نەك نەژاد پەرىستانە.

پ/۸ چۆن زىاتر دروشمەكانى يەكگرتوۋى ئىسلامىيە كوردستان (نازادى، براىەتتى، دادپەرورەى) راقە دەكەيت لە پروانگەى پەيوەندىتان لەگەل برايانى موسلمان، بە تايەت كە ئىو نەتەمە يەكەى بى دەولەتن؟

و/ پەيوەندى ئىمە لەگەل برايانى موسلمان ھەر ئەو يە كە ئىمە لە روۋى مېژوو يىوۋە لەژىر كار تىكردى فىكرى ئەواندا بوۋىن. دوواتر گەشتىنە قۇناغىك سوودمان لە ھەموو ئەزمونە فىكرىيە ئىسلامىيەكان وەرگرتوۋە. ئىستا سوود لە ھەموو ئەزمونە فىرى و سىياسىيە سەر كەتوۋەكانى جىهان وەر دەگرىن بە ئىسلامى و نائىسلامىيە. ئىمە دەتوانىن بلىين چۆن سۇشىال دىموكراتەكان لە دنىادا ھەر يەكە لە وولاتى خۇياندا ھىزىكى نىشتىمانىن، بەلام لەبەر ئەوۋى لە رىي فىكرىيەوۋە لە يەكتر نىزىكن، لە چوارچىوۋىيەكى جىهانىدا بەناۋى ئەنتەرناشىونال سۇشىال دىموكرات كۆبوونەو، ئىمەش بەو جۆرىن. ئىمە ھىزىكى كۆنگرەى ۶ى [كوردستانىن پارىزگارى لە لە بەرژومەندىيەكانى كوردستان دەكەين، وە لەم كۆنگرەشدا ستراتىژى گەشتىن بە مافى چارەى خۇنوسىن و قەوارەى [يەكگرتوۋە كە لە ئايارى ۲۰۱۲ بەرپوۋە چوۋ نازادىمان كىردوۋە بە يەكەك لە لە ستراتىژەكانى حىزبەكەمان. ئىمە زىاتر ئىخوانى بوون وەك ميانەرموبوون سەيرمان كىردوۋە لە بەرانبەر گرۋپە جىھادىيەكاندا. وە ئىمە خۇمان (اضافە) مان بۇ سەر ئەو فىكرە ھەيە. ئىمە لە سنورى فىكرى (تقلیدى) ئىخواندا نەوستاۋىن، خۇمان گەشەيەكى تايەت بە خۇمان كىردوۋە لە ھەرىمى كوردستاندا. بەلام كۆمەلەك خالى ھاۋبەش ھەيە وەك ميانەرموبوون و بىرواۋوون بە دىموكراسى و پەنابەردنە بەر توندوتىژى و رىزگرتن لە ئاراستەكانى خەلك، كە رەنگە ئەمانە لەگەل ھەندى حىزبى ترى ئىخوانى و غەيرە ئىخوانى كۆمانكەتەوۋە لە ناۋچەكەدا.

(نازادى و براىەتتى و دادپەرورەى) ديارە ئەم سى دروشمە بەشىكى رەنگدانەوۋە كۆمەلەگى كوردستانە كە كاتىك يەكگرتوۋە درووست بوۋە لە كوردستان شەرى بىراكوژى ھەبوۋ. بەشىكى رەنگدانەوۋە باكگراۋندە ئىسلامىيەكەى يەكگرتوۋە. ديارە يەكگرتوۋە لە ۱۹۹۴ دروست بوۋ، كە ئەو كات كوردستان بە قۇناغى شەرى ناوخۇدا تى دەپەرى. براىەتتى و دادپەرورەى دوو چەمكى رەسەنى ئىسلامىن، لە ھەمان كاتدا براىەتتى و دادپەرورەى دووچەمكى سىياسى و فەلسەفەن (كونى) شە. ديارە ئەم دروشمانە لە دوو ئاستدا خۇبىندەمىان بۇ دەكرىت: يەكەم بۇ كۇتابى ھىنانى شەرى ناوخۇ، ناۋچەگەرى، عەشیرەت گەرى. ئاۋاش، بە ئاشتى و پىنكەوۋە ژيان و، لە ساىەى ياساى پارتەكاندا (نازادى و براىەتتى و دادپەرورەى) دروشمىكى گىرنگن. بەلام لە ئاستى رۆژ ھەلاتى ناۋەر استدا ئىمە براىەتتىمان بەو (تفسىر) كىردوۋە كە ھەول دەدىن بۇ گىرانەوۋە ھاۋسەنگى مېژووۋى لە ئىۋان نەتەمە گەورەكانى رۆژ ھەلاتى ناۋەر است، كە كورد و فارس و عەرەب و توركە. ئەو ناھاۋسەنگىيە بە ھۇى بى بەشكردى كورد لە قەوارەى خۇى تىك چوۋە. لە رىي ئەوۋە كورد مافى چارەى خۇنوسىنى ھەبىت، وە قەوارەى خۇى دروست بىتتەمە دەبىت كوردىش قەوارەى سەربەخۇى خۇى ھەبىت وەكو ئەوانى تر. ئەگىنا بە نەبوونى نازادى بۇ گەلى كورد وەكو گەلانى ترى ناۋچەكە، كە ھەم مافىكى خاۋىيەو، ھەم مافىكى سىياسى ھاۋچەرخە، نە براىەتتى و، نە دادپەرورەىش دىتە دى. كەۋاتە ئىمە لە دوو ئاستى ناخۇى ھەرىم و ئاستى ناۋچەكە سەيرى دروشمەكانمان دەكەين.

پ ۹ / ئیوه چۆن دعتوانن وهكو پارتیكى سیاسى ئیسلامی لهگه‌ل ئه‌و هه‌موو عیلمانیه هه‌ل بکه‌ن؟

و / ئیمه له‌بهر ئه‌وه‌ی برومان به‌ فره‌ که‌لچهری وفره‌ بوونی هه‌یه (تینی) دیموکراسیمان کردوه. ئیمه‌ ته‌نها پارتیكى باکگراوند ئیسلامی نین، به‌لکو پارتیكى باکگراوند ئیسلامی، نیشتمانی دیموکراسی هاوچهرخین. له‌بهر ئه‌وه‌ ئیمه‌ برومان به‌ دیموکراسی هه‌یه وه‌كو شیوازیکی (عقلانی) یانه‌ بۆ به‌ریوه‌بردنی جیاوازیه‌کان وده‌سه‌لات ووه‌ده‌رنانی توندو تیژی له‌ کایه‌ سیاسیه‌کان. ئه‌و خۆی بۆ خۆی وامان لی ده‌کات که‌ ئیمه‌ برومان به‌ ئالوگۆری ئاشتیانه‌ی ده‌سه‌لات، به‌ فره‌یی سیاسی له‌ کۆمه‌لگه‌که‌مان، به‌ ریکه‌وتن له‌سه‌ر ده‌ستوریکی هاوچهرخ هه‌بیت. له‌ هه‌موو شتیکیشدا جیاوازی نین، ئیمه‌ نه‌گه‌ر له‌ هه‌ندئ شتدا بۆ نمونه‌ له‌ ئایدۆلۆجیادا له‌ عیلمانیه‌ک جیاوازی بین، وه‌ له‌ هه‌ندئ جووری بیرکردنه‌ماندا جیاوازی بین، به‌ هه‌مان شتیه‌ کۆمه‌لێک شتی تری هاوبه‌شمان هه‌یه. بۆ نمونه‌ له‌ کورد بووندا، له‌ کوردستانی بووندا، له‌ باوه‌ربوون به‌ مافی هاوالاتی بوون و دیموکراسی، له‌ نیشکر دهمان بۆ قه‌واریه‌کی سه‌ربه‌خۆ بۆ میللته‌که‌مان، بۆ چه‌سپاندنی دادگه‌ری له‌ وولاته‌که‌مان؛ هه‌ریه‌ک له‌ دیدی خۆیه‌وه‌. له‌ به‌ر ئه‌وه‌ نه‌گه‌ر له‌ هه‌ندئ شتدا جیاوازی بین کۆمه‌لێک شتی تری هاوبه‌شمان هه‌یه. چه‌سپاوی نیشتمانیمان هه‌یه، که‌ هه‌موومان کۆده‌کاته‌وه‌. وه‌ ده‌بیت ئیمه‌ له‌ چوار چیه‌وه‌ی ده‌ستوریکی هاوچهرخ هه‌موومان پیکه‌وه‌ بژین.

پ ۱۰ / چۆن له‌ دیموکراسیه‌ت تی ده‌گه‌ن وچۆنیش په‌یره‌وی ده‌که‌ن؟ نه‌گه‌ر به‌ دیموکراسی بگه‌نه‌ ده‌سه‌لات، هه‌روه‌ها به‌ دیموکراسی ده‌سه‌لات (تسلیم) ده‌که‌نه‌وه‌ گه‌ر له‌ هه‌لبژاردن ده‌رنه‌چوون؟

و / به‌ بروای من ئیستا ئیمه‌ له‌ قوناغیکداین که‌ قوناغی ده‌وله‌تی ئایدۆلۆجیمان تی په‌راندوه. ۴۰-۵۰ سأل له‌مه‌و پێش که‌ ناوچه‌که‌ به‌ قوناغی ئیسلامی ئایدۆلۆجی هاوچهرخ و عیلمانی به‌ ئایدۆلۆجی کراودا تی ده‌په‌ری، وه‌ هه‌ردوو ئه‌و ئایدۆلۆجیایه‌ شکستیان خوارد. وه‌ نه‌یانتوانی له‌گه‌ل دیموکراسی هه‌ل بکه‌ن. ئیمه‌ ئیستا له‌ قوناغیکداین ده‌سته‌به‌ری دیموکراسی له‌م قوناغه‌ بریتی یه‌ له‌ بوونی ده‌ستوریکی مه‌ده‌نی. پێشتر حزبیکی کودتای ده‌کرد و، ده‌ستوریکی داده‌نیا. ئیستا پیکه‌ته‌کانی گه‌لێک ئه‌و ده‌ستوره‌ داده‌نێن به‌ جیاوازی هه‌زه‌ سیاسیه‌کان وئینتفا فیکری و سیاسیه‌کانیانه‌وه‌. که‌واته‌ خواستی ده‌ستوریک هه‌یه‌ که‌ عیلمانیه‌کان وئیسلامیه‌کان و، موسلمانه‌کان وناموسلمانه‌کان به‌شداری تیدا ده‌که‌ن. ئه‌م ده‌ستوره‌ ئیسلامیه‌و ئیسلامیش نیه‌، عه‌لمانیه‌ و عه‌لمانیش نیه‌. پارێزگاری له‌ شوناسی ئیسلامی ده‌کات، وه‌ دیموکراسی ده‌بیتته‌ خالی هاوبه‌شی نیوان سه‌رجه‌م هه‌زه‌کان. له‌ چوارچیه‌وه‌ی ئه‌م ده‌ستوردا که‌ ئیمه‌ له‌ سه‌ری ریکه‌وتووین گری به‌سه‌تیکی کۆمه‌لایه‌تی بۆ چۆنیتی به‌ریوه‌چوونی ده‌سه‌لات و، (ممارسه‌) کردنی جیاوازیه‌کانمان پیک دیت. ئه‌و کاته‌ نه‌گه‌ری ئه‌وه‌ی که‌ هه‌زیک له‌ ده‌سه‌لاتدا به‌مینیته‌وه‌ له‌ ئارادا نابیت. چونکه‌ سوپای ئایدۆلۆجیکراومان نابیت، ئایدۆلۆجیه‌کی (مه‌یمن) مان نابیت. ده‌زگایه‌کی (أمني) به‌ ئایدۆلۆجیکراومان نابیت. به‌لکو ئه‌م ده‌زگایانه‌ ده‌بینه‌ ده‌زگای (مه‌نی) و نیشتمانی. له‌م چوارچیه‌وه‌ دیموکراسی ریکه‌یه‌که‌ بۆ گه‌شتن به‌ ده‌سه‌لات، له‌ هه‌مان کاتدا میکانیزمیکیشه‌ بۆ هه‌ینانه‌ خواره‌وه‌ی کاتیک که‌ متمانه‌ی خه‌لک ئه‌دۆرینیت له‌ هه‌لبژاردن. به‌لێ ئیمه‌ له‌ چوارچیه‌وه‌ی ئه‌م ده‌ستوره‌ که‌ که‌ له‌گه‌ل عیلمانیه‌کاندا ریک ده‌که‌وین بۆ به‌ریوه‌بردنی کۆمه‌لگای خۆمان، وه‌ وه‌ هه‌ر کاتیک متمانه‌ی خه‌لکمان دۆراند ئه‌و کاته‌ ئه‌رکی ئه‌خلاقی وئاینی و نیشتمانی ئیمه‌یه‌ بینه‌ خواره‌وه‌. وه‌ جاریکی تر هه‌ول به‌دین ئه‌و متمانه‌ به‌ ده‌ست بینه‌یه‌وه‌ له‌ ریکای خه‌باتی مه‌ده‌نیه‌وه‌.

پ ۱۱ / ووتاری برایی موسلمان له‌ ئاستی تیوریدا ئامازه‌ به‌ ستراتیژی بنیاتنه‌وه‌ی تاکی موسلمان و خیزانی موسلمان و کۆمه‌لگای موسلمان و حکومه‌تی ئیسلامی و گه‌یرانه‌وه‌ی خیلافه‌تی ئیسلامی ده‌کات، ئیوه‌ وه‌کو برایی موسلمان کورد له‌ کوی ئه‌م ستراتیژیهدان؟ ئایا خیلافه‌ت دروست ده‌بیتته‌وه‌؟

و/ باسیك له فسر ههنگی ئیمه‌دا نیه به‌ناوی خیلافهت. پیمان وایه ئه‌وه فۆرمیکى رابووردووی میژووی موسلمانانه. ئه‌مه مانای ئه‌وه ناگه‌یه‌نیت که نه‌توانین (تصور)ی فۆرمیک له فۆرمه‌کانی یه‌کیتی موسلمانان و ناوچه‌که بکرنیت. به‌لام ئه‌وه فۆرمه (تصور)کراوه ده‌بیت: یه‌که‌م: له سهر بناغه‌ی ئیراده‌ی ئازادی گه‌لانی موسلمانانی ناوچه‌که دروست ببیت، هه‌یچ هه‌یزیک بۆی نیه به‌ناوی ئیسلام و دروستکردنی خیلافه‌ته‌وه به زۆر یه‌کیتی به سهر موسلماناندا بسه‌پینیت. ده‌بیت گه‌لانی ناوچه‌که موسلمانانی ناوچه‌که خۆیان به پێداویسته‌یه‌کی پێشکه‌وتنی ژیا‌ری و شارستانی خۆیانى بزانه‌ن، وه له سهر ئیراده‌ی ئازادی خۆیان بیت. دووهم: پێویسته هه‌موو گه‌لان له‌و چوارچه‌وه‌یه‌دا سه‌ربه‌خۆیی و ناسنامه‌ی خۆیان پاراستنیت. سه‌ی یه‌م: ده‌بیت سوود له‌میکانیزمه‌ هاوچه‌رخه‌کانی هاوشیوه‌ی یه‌کیتی ئه‌وروپا و مرگه‌ریت بۆ دروستکردنی یه‌کیتیه‌که له ناوچه‌که. وه ده‌بیت هه‌م پارێزگاری له ناسنامه‌ی گه‌لان و قه‌واره سه‌ربه‌خۆکان بکات، هه‌م جوړیک له یه‌کیتی دروست بکات. وه مه‌رجیش نیه هه‌موو ئه‌وه قه‌واره موسلمانیش بن. ده‌شکریت و وڵاته موسلمانه‌کان یه‌کیتیه‌کی تابه‌ت به خۆیان به‌و شتیوه‌یه‌ی باسکرا هه‌بیت. به‌لام له ناو ئه‌وه ده‌وله‌ته موسلمانانه خه‌لکی غه‌یر موسلمانیش هه‌یه، ده‌بیت ته‌واوی مافه‌کانی پێکهاته نا موسلمانه‌کانی ناو ئه‌وه ده‌وله‌ته موسلمانانه، وه له ناو هه‌ر فۆرمیکى یه‌کیتی چاوه‌ڕوانکراودا پارێزراوبیت. وه مافی هاوڵاتی بوونیان وه‌کو هه‌ر موسلمانیکى تر هه‌بیت. ئه‌مه‌ش باس له فۆرمی رێکخراوی ناوچه‌یه‌ی ده‌که‌ین، ئه‌گه‌نا له [وه‌کو نه‌ته‌وه یه‌که‌گرتووه‌کان] چوارچه‌وه جیهانیه‌که‌دا هه‌ر هه‌موومان ئه‌ندام ده‌بین له‌و رێکخراوه جیهانیانه چونکه ئه‌رکی جیهانیشمان له ئه‌ستودایا.

پ ۱۲ / تێروانیی ئه‌ندامانتان بۆ چه‌مکی خیلافهت چۆنه؟ ئایا هه‌یچ جیاوازیه‌که هه‌یه له‌ رای سه‌رکردایه‌تیتان له‌م قوناغه؟

و/ ئیمه له‌بهر ئه‌وه‌ی (منه‌ج)ی په‌روه‌ده‌یه‌ی ئه‌ندامانمان هه‌یه، بیرو رایه‌کانمان به‌رده‌وام (تعمیم) ده‌که‌ین. ئه‌م شته‌ش (مطرح) نیه، له‌بهر ئه‌وه له ئه‌ده‌بیات و فیکری حه‌یزه‌که (مطرح) نیه. وه ئیستا شتیك له ئه‌ده‌بیات و فسر هه‌نگی ئیمه‌دا نه‌ماوه به‌ناوی خیلافهت. پیمان وایه فۆرمیکى رابووردو بووه له جوړیکه‌سه‌نه‌وه، ئیستا ئیمه باس له مافی چاره‌ی خۆنووسینی خه‌لکی کوردستان ده‌که‌ین. ئیمه وه‌کو یه‌که‌گرتووی ئیسلامی کوردستان باس له مافی خه‌لکی کوردستان و گه‌لی کوردستان ده‌که‌ین بۆ دروستکردنی ده‌وله‌تی سه‌ربه‌خۆی خۆی. دواى دروستکردنی ده‌وله‌تی سه‌ربه‌خۆی خۆی، ئه‌وه کاته ئه‌گه‌ر ناوچه‌که به کورد و عه‌ره‌ب و فارس و نه‌ته‌وه‌کانی تره‌وه به تێگه‌یه‌شتنیکى هاوبه‌ش گه‌شته‌وه ئه‌وه قه‌ناعه‌ته بۆ دروستکردنی فۆرمیکى هاوچه‌رخ بۆ هاوکاریکردنی یه‌کتری، ئه‌وه کاته مافی خۆیانه که به‌شدارى بکه‌ن یا نا. ئه‌مه‌ش ده‌مێننیه‌وه بۆ ئیراده‌ی ئازادی نه‌وه‌کانی داها‌توو.

پ ۱۳ / ئایا هه‌ست ده‌که‌ن به هه‌یچ جوړه رکه‌به‌یه‌که له‌لایه‌ن ئیسلامیه‌کانی تره‌وه؟

و/ جاران چونکه بزوتنه‌وه‌یه‌کی چه‌کداری هه‌بوو، دیدمان زۆر له یه‌که جیاواز بوو. به‌لام له‌بهر ئه‌وه‌ی ئیستا ئه‌وانیش چه‌کیان دانیاوه، وه خه‌باتی مه‌دنه‌ی ده‌که‌ن ده‌توانم بلێم رۆژ له دواى رۆژ له یه‌کتری نزیک ده‌بینه‌وه. ئه‌گه‌ر چی ئه‌وه‌یه‌سه‌ندنه میژوویه جیاوازه هه‌یشه‌تا تابه‌ته‌مه‌ندی فیکری و سیاسى بۆ هه‌ریه‌که‌مان هه‌یشه‌توته‌وه. ره‌نگه‌ بۆ نمونه بیروکه‌ی خیلافهت لای ئیسلامیه‌کانی تر زیاتر (مطرح)بیت، که لای ئیمه ئه‌وه شته‌مان (تجاوز)کردوه.

پ ۱۴ / پرسى جیاکردنه‌وه‌ی (دعوة) و سیاسه‌ت له ناو یه‌که‌گرتوودا چۆنه؟

و/ ئیستاش ئه‌م بابته (مناقشه‌)ی گه‌رمه له ناو یه‌که‌گرتوو، ئه‌وه پرسیکه تابه‌ت نیه به یه‌که‌گرتوو، به‌لکه پرسیکه تابه‌ت به سه‌رجه‌م حه‌یزه ئیسلامیه‌کانی جیهانی ئیسلامی، به تابه‌ت رۆژه‌لاتی ناوه‌راست. به

تایه‌تتریش ئەوانەیی که له رووی میژوووییەوه کاریگەر بوون بە فیکری ئیخوانی. له بەر ئەوه له زۆریک له وولاتاندا حیزبی سیاسی درووست کراوه و، دەعوە له چوارچێوەی بزوتنەوهیەکدا ماوتەوه. ئەو (مناقشە)انە درێژەیی هەیه یەگرتوو. له بەر ئەوه دەعوە موسلمان بوون دەکات بە (اساس)ی ئینتەما، بەلام حیزبی سیاسی دەبیت هاوالاتی بوون بکات بە (اساس)ی ئینتەما و نیش کردنی سیاسی. وه پرۆژەیهکی سیاسی (طرح) بکات بۆ سەرجهم هاوالاتیان، وه ئەو هاوالاتیانەیی که باوەریان بەم پرۆژە سیاسیه هەیه له ناو ئەم حیزبه جێیان دەبیتەوه. له ناو یەگرتوودا کۆمەڵێک هەن که من یەکیانم داوا دەکەین ببینە حیزبیکی دیموکراتی (محافظ) باکگراوند ئیسلامیی، ئەک کۆمەڵێکی ئیسلامی دەعووی بین. به واتایهکی تر هەموو ئەوانەیی له کوردستاندا که باوەریان بەم پرۆژەیی ئیمه هەیه له ناو ئیمەدا بتوانن خەباتی سیاسی بکەن بۆ بەدیهێنانی ئەو ئامانجه هاوبەشانەیی بروامان پێیەتی.

پ/ ۱۵ / پیت وایه سەله‌فیه‌کانی میسر که له پریکدا پاش شۆرشه‌که دەرکه‌وتن و پارتیکی سیاسیان پێک هینا، رێگر بوون یان یارمەتیدەر بۆ برایانی میسر؟ وه چ وانیه‌ک له‌م باره‌یه‌وه یەگرتوو فێر دەبیت؟

و/ له‌ روویه‌که‌وه رێگر بوون، وه له‌ روویه‌که‌وه یارمەتیدەر. یارمەتیدەر بوون چونکه پاش سالانێکی دور له‌ رەتکردنەوه‌ی حیزبی ئیسلامیی گەشتنه ئەو قەناعەته که حیزب پێک بهێنن. ئەمەش وورده وورده (ممارسة) کردنی کاری سیاسی دەیانکاتەوه، وه ازیان له‌ کۆمەڵێک قەناعەت پێ دەهینیت. وه بەرو دورکەوتنەوه له‌ فیکره‌ کۆنەکانی خۆیان دەیانبات. وه له‌ هەندێ کاتی هەستیاردا وەکو هەلیژاردنی سەرۆکایەتی، پشٹیوانی (محمد مرسى)یان کرد. چونکه ریکخراو بوون ئەم پشٹیوانیه‌ رۆلی بینی. بەلام چونکه تازەن و داواکاریه‌کانیان (اصولي) تره‌ له‌وه‌ی ئیخوان، رەنگه‌ له‌ کاتی به‌ریوه‌بردنی ده‌ولەتدا جۆریک له‌ کیشو (اشکالیة) بۆ ئیخوان درووست بکەن، وه جۆریک له‌ (مزایدە)ی ئیسلامیی به‌ سەر ئیخواندا بکەن. ئەوه‌ش جۆریک له‌ ئیشکالیه‌ت بۆ ئیخوان درووست بکات.

پ/ ۱۶ / له‌ کۆنگره‌ی شەشدا مافی چاره‌ی خۆنووسینتان کرده‌ ستراتیژ و خستانه‌ ناو به‌رنامه‌ی کاره‌وه، ئەمه‌ چۆن به‌رجه‌سته‌ ده‌کەن؟ وه‌ میکانیزمان چیه‌ بۆی؟

و/ دیاره‌ ئیمه‌ خۆمان به‌ تەنیا ناتوانین ئەو کاره‌ بکەین. ئیمه‌ گەرنگ ئەوه‌یه‌ ئەمه‌ وەکو حەقیقەت بناسین. وه‌ ئاستی فیکری حیزبه‌که‌ یەکلا بووتەوه‌ له‌و باره‌یه‌وه‌ درووستکردنی ده‌ولەتی کوردی به‌ مافیکی سەرۆشتی خەلکی کوردستان دەزانین. وەکو هەموو میلیتاریکی تر له‌م جیهانه‌ پێویسته‌ کوردیش مافی چاره‌ی خۆی دیاری بکات. ئیمه‌ ئیستا (توعیه‌)ی فیکری ده‌کەین، وه‌ هەول دەهین که ئیسلامیه‌کانی تر له‌ ناوچه‌که‌دا ئەم بیرۆکه‌یه‌یان لا ناسایی بکەینه‌وه‌، وه‌ قەناعەتیان پێ بکەین. وه‌ خالێکی تری ستراتیژیه‌کانمان بەده‌ست هینانی پشٹیوانی ئیسلامیه‌کانی تره‌ بۆ (قضیه‌)ی کوردی. وه‌ هەر هەولێکی تری جیدی هەبیت بۆ ئەوه‌ی خەلکی کوردستان بگاتە مافی چاره‌ی خۆنوسین، ئیمه‌ به‌شداري ئەو هەولانه‌ ده‌کەین.

پ/ ۱۷ / ئەمه‌ بۆ کوردستانی عێراق، یان بۆ هەموو پارچه‌کانی تری کوردستان هەول دەهەن؟

و/ ئیستا بۆ ئەم قوناغه‌ بۆ کوردستانی عێراق، وه‌ داوای فیدرالی بۆ پارچه‌کانی تری کوردستان ده‌کەین. بەلام له‌ رووی (مبدأ)یه‌وه‌ بوونی ده‌ولەتیکی سەر به‌خۆ له‌ سەر ته‌واوی خاکی کوردستان بۆ گەلی کورد وەکو نەتەوه‌ له‌سەر ئاستی هەموو پارچه‌کاندا به‌ مافیکی ره‌واي دەزانین.

پ۱۸ / له مادهی ۴دا له پروگرام وپیرموی ناوځودا؛

یهکم: بنهماو بهها ئیسلامیه نهگورمهکان وبهها مرویه چهسپاوهکان به سرچاوهی کاری سیاسی " بهها مرویه چهسپاوهکان" مهستان له؟" دوزانن

و/ ئهتوانم بلنیم بههاکانی مافی مروّف و دیموکراسی و، همموو ئهو بهها (کونی) بانهن که بهشئوهمیهک له شئوهکان ئیستا فهر ههنگه زیندوو مهکانی دنیا و (بشریه) تیایدا هاوبهشه، ئهوانه که گهشه به بههاکانی مافی مروّف و چهسپاندنیان دهن. لهوانه چهمکی دادپهروهری و لیبوردهیی وفرهیی و... هند.

پ۱۹ / " حوکمرانیی راشد و دادگهر ئامانجیکه ئیسلامیهی و پنیویستهیهکی ژیانه

، حوکمرانیی راشد چی دهگهینیت؟ "

و/ حوکمی راشد ئیستا چهمکیکی جیهانیه که نهتهوه یهگرتوو مهکان بهکاری دههینیت. بهو حوکمهتانه دهلین که کومهلنیک مارجیان تیدایا، لهوانه حوکمهتیکه دیموکراسی و، رهفاهییت بو گهلهکانیان. ئهو جوړه حوکمهتیه که بهلای نهتهوه یهگرتوو مهکانهوه ستانداردی تاییهت بوی ههیه. وه ئهو جوړه حوکمه له ههر کومهلگایهکدا بچهسپیت ههست به دادگهری، وه به جوړیک له یهکسانی و، جوړیک له خوشگوزهرانی مادیش دهکن. وه جوړیک له دادپهروهری سیاسیش لهئارادا دهینت.

کوتایی

Appendix 2: Interview with Burhan Ahmad, the head of the Garmian Centre of the KIU in the Kalar district

چاوپیکهوتنی بورهان ئەحمەد / ئەندامی سەرکردایەتی یەگرتووێ ئیسلامی کوردستان و،
ئێپرسراوی مەلێبەندی چواری گەرمیان

پ1/ چۆن هەست دەکەیت وەک کوردێک، وە چۆن هەست دەکەیت وەک موسڵمانێک؟

و/ دیارە ئێمە وەک کورد لە سەرەتای سەرھەڵدانی ئیسلامەو کورد وەک نەتەوێکانی تر ئارەزوومەندانە بریاری داو موسڵمان بێت. ئێمەڕۆش وەک سەدان گەلی تری سەر ئەم ئەرزه شانازی دەکەین بە موسڵمان بێن. دیارە کوردبوون یان عەرەب بوون¹⁰⁴ بوونمانەو. وە هیچ رێگریەک نابینن لەوەی کوردبین و موسڵمان یان تۆرک بوون، یان هەر نەتەوێهێکی تر لەدەرەوێ دەسەلاتی مەرۆقەکانەو، خوا بەو نەتەوێ درووستی کردوون، وە (حکمة)تیکی خۆی تێدایە. هەر بۆیە ئێمەش شانازی بەو (جعل)ە خۆاییەو دەکەین. دیارە خواش دەیوێت من وەک کوردێک رۆلی خۆم ببینم، وە لەگەڵ نەتەوێکانی تر هاوکاری و هەماهەنگی و هاریکاری لەو کارانەو کەوا خالی هاوبەشن لە نێوان نەتەوێکاندا بکریت.

پ2/ وەک کوردێکی ئیسلامی یان ئیسلامیەکی کورد گەر دەتەوێت، چۆن سەیری ئیسلام دەکەیت وەک ئاینێکی جیهانی؟ جیهانیبوونی ئیسلام چی دەگەینێت؟

و/ ئەگەر سەیری ئاینەکانی قورئانی پیرۆزبکەین بۆمان دەر دەکەوێت کە سەرەرای ئەوەی کە بە زمانی عەرەبی هاتوو، ئەم ئاینە ئاینێکی جیهانیە. وە ئەم پیغمبەرە (خاتم)ی هەموو پیغمبەرە، وە ئەواوکاری هەموو ئەو پیامانەو کە پیغمبەرانێ پێش خۆی هیناویانە. وە قورئان ئەواوکاری ئەو پیامانەو کە تورات و ئینجیل هیناویانە لە لایەن خواوە. ئەلبەتە هەر لە سورەتی (الفرقان)دا کە سوورەتیکی مەکییە، خۆی گەرە ئامازە بە جیهانگیری ئیسلام دەکات (تبارک الذي نزل الفرقان علی عبده لیكون للعالمین نذیرا). یان لە شۆینیکی تردا دەفەر مویت (وما ارسلناک الا کافة للناس بشیرا و نذیرا). وە هەر لە سەرەتای هاتنی ئیسلام هەموو نەتەوێکان جگە لە عەرەب لەدەوری کۆبوونەتەو، سەلمانی فارسی و صەیبی رۆمی و بیلالی حەبەشی، وە تەنەت کاونی کوردی لێرەو لە کوردستان رۆشتوو بە مەدینە کاتیک هەوایی هاتنی ئاینێکی تازە هاتوو بیستوو، وە سەرەجام باوەری پێهیناوە. وە هەر لەبەر یەکسانی تێروانیی ئیسلام بۆ سەر جەم بەشەرەکان و بە یەکچاوسەیر کردنیان، ئەوتە پیغمبەر (د. خ.) پشتهڵدەکاتە خزمەکانی کاتیک کە دەستەڵداناگرن لە ستەمکاری و، دەرەنجامیش کۆچ دەکات بۆ مەدینەو خەڵکەکەو کە خزمیشی نەبوون ئەوای پشنگیرییان لێ کردوو. ئەمە وەک هەلوێستی کردەیی ئیسلام، لەرووی تیوری شۆه پیغمبەر (د. خ) زۆر بە توندی بەرەو رۆی ئەو کەسانە و ستاوتەو کە لەسەر بنەمای رەگەز، یان رەنگ تانەیان لە کەسانی تر دا بێت. هەر بۆیە ئیسلام جیاوازیەک ناکات لە نێوان نەتەوێکان. وە ئێمەش وەک کورد شانازی دەکەین بەم جیهانبینی ئیسلام کە هیچ جیاوازیەک ناکات لە نێوان نەتەوێکان.

پ3/ چۆن مامەڵە دەکەن لەگەڵ کێشەو کە کوک؟ وەک کوردێکی ئیسلامی چی دەبێت گەر دەست بەرداری ئەو پرسە بن بۆ برا عەرەبە موسڵمانەکانتان؟ بۆ ئەوەی لانی کەم خۆین نەریژریت، یان قەیرانەکە کۆتایی پێبێت.

¹⁰⁴ Actually, this question is similar to a question if someone would have been questioned about his tribe and possibility of contradiction of being a Muslim at the same time!

و/ ئیمه وەکو کورد و عەرەب کیشەمان نیە بە یەکەوه، ئەو رژیمە دکتاتۆریە فاشستانە که حوکمی عێراقیان کردووه هەولیان داوه لە رووی دیموگرافی و جیوگرافی و کارگێرییەوه کەرکوک بگۆرن و بیکەن بە شاریکی عەرەبی. بەم شێوەیە ئەو رژیمە دژایەتی کوردی ئەوشارەیان کردووه، هەر وەها دژایەتی تورکمەنیشیان کردووه. وە بە دەرکردنی دەیان هەزار خیزانی کورد و تورکمەنی کەرکوک لەو شارە، خستە سەری ناحیە و قەزاقانی بە سەر پارێزگاکانی تر، هەولێ بە عەرەب کردنیان داوه. بەم شێوەیە هەر لە کۆنەوه ئەو رژیمانە هەولێ گۆڕینی ناسنامە ی نەم شارەیان لە کوردیەوه بۆ بە عێراقی کردن داوه. وە سەر جەم ئەو شوێر شانهی کورد لە عێراق و نەگەیشتن بە رێکەوتن ھۆکارەکی دەگەریتەوه بۆ کەرکوک. ئەو رژیمانە دانیا بە کوردستانی کەرکوک دا نە نیاوه. دیارە میژووش هەر و هاتوو، بەکێک زالمە و یەکیکیش مەزلۆم، وە لایەک داگیرکەرە و لایەکیکیش داگیرکراو. بۆ نمونە کاتیکی کە رژیمیکی داگیرکەری وەکو عێراقی سەددام داگیری کویەیت دەکات، وە پاش نەمانی ئەو رژیمە ئیتر مانای ئەوه نیە کە عێراقیەکان قەرەبووی ئەو زەرەرانی کویەیتیەکان بکەنەوه. هەر وەکو چۆن ئەو هەولێ سەددام بۆ کردنی کویەیت بە پارێزگایەکی عێراق و، سەرەنجام هەولەکە سەری نەگرت وە لایەن دنیاه دژایەتی کرا، ئاواش پاش نەمانی هەمان رژیم دەبیت ئەو ستمە لە سەر کەرکوک لایبرییت. وە سەر جەم بەلگە میژووویەکانی کاتی عوسمانیەکان و، رووسەکان و ئینگلیز نەک هەر کوردستانی بوونی کەرکوک دەسەلمینن، بەلکو ئەوش دەسەلمینن کە بەدەرەو جەسانیش کوردستانین. لە بەر ئەوه ئیمە نابیت ملکەچ بین بۆ سیاساتیکی چەوتی داگیرکارانە ی رژیمە دکتاتۆرەکان کە ویستوویانە بە زۆر بیسەپینن. وە چونکە ئەمرۆ عێراق، عێراقیکی نوێیەو عێراقیکی فیدرالە، دەبیت هەموو پیکهاتەکان بگەن بە مافەکانیان وە چی تر بە بەهانە ی زۆرینەو کەمینەوه مافەکانیان پیشیل نەکریت. وە عێراق ئیشتا دەستوریکی هەیه، ئەو دەستورەش هەموومان لە سەری رێکەوتوین و، دەنگمان پێ داوه. وە لەم دەستورە چارەسەری کیشە ی کەرکوک کراوه. بەلام ئیستا دەبیت پرسیین کە کێ نایەوت چارەسەری کیشە ی کەرکوک بکات؟ وە نابیت بە ناوی دیموکراسیەوه چی تر درێژە بە سیاسەتی رژیمە دیکتاتۆریەکان بدریت.

پ/ ٤ / مەبەستمان لەم پرسیارە ئەویە کە کاتیکی رژیمە پیشووەکانی عێراق لە سەر بنەمای ناشیونالیستی عەرەبی ئەم جۆرە سیاسەتەیان پەیرەو کردووه، کوردیش چونکە عەرەب نەبووه ملی نەداوه بەو سیاسەتە. بەلام ئیستا ئیوه وەکو ئیسلامی کوردستان، بۆچی (تنازل) بۆ بەرانبەرەکانتان کە ئەوانیش ئیسلامی عەرەب ناکەن؟

و/ پێش هەموو شتیکی موسلمانێکی عەرەب یان تورک گەر بیهیوت برایەتی لە گەل مندا بکات، دەبیت مالم داگیر نەکات. وە تەنانت لە فەرموودە ی پێغەمبەردا هاتوو (من قتل دون ماله فهو شهيد) با ئەو کەسە کە دەیهیوت مالهکەت داگیر بکات موسلمانیش بێت. کەواتە هەر کەسێک لە پیناوا مالم و نەفس و کەرمانتیدا بکوژریت شەهیدە. ئیتر کاتیکی ئەو کە ئیدعای موسلمان بوون دەکات، وە کاتیکی کە بەلگە ی کوردستانی بوونی کەرکوک دەخریتە روو دەبیت ملکەچی راستی بێت. نەک بە پێچوانەوه داوا لە ئیمە بکرت کە کەرکوک لە کاتیکی کوردستانی دەستبەرداری بین بۆ خەلکیکی کە خوشیان دەزانن ئەوه بە زولم دەستکاری دیموگرافی و جیوگرافی و کارگێری کراوه. تا سالی ١٩٦١ لە ٦٣% کەرکوک کورده، وە پێش ئەو کاتەش ئەم ریزە ی زیاتر بووه، وە ریزە یەکی تریش تورکمەن. وە زۆر جاریش ئیعترافیان کردووه کە کوردستانی، بەلام لەبەر ئەویە شاریکی نەوتیە دەلێن ئیمە رازی نابین بێتە شاریکی کوردستانی. لە بەر ئەوه ئەم بیانکە ی نەوتە ناهێلێت دان بە حەقدا بنین. ئەگەر ئیمە بگەرینەوه بۆ دەستوری عێراق ئەو کیشە یە چارەسەر کردووه، نەوت کە سامانیکی نیشتمانیە داهاکە ی دەگەریتەوه بۆ خەزینە ی گشتی! فیدرال. دە ی کەواتە کە داهاکی نەوت دەگەریتەوه بۆ حکومەتی مەزکەری ئتر بۆچی دان بە حەقدا نابین تەنانت ئەو نەوتانەش کە لێرە لە هەریکی کوردستان بەرەم دەهێنریت دەبیت داهاکە ی بگەریتەوه بۆ خەزینە ی گشتی فیدرال، کەواتە هیچ جیاوازیکی نیە گەر کەرکوک بگەریتەوه بۆ سەر هەریکی کوردستان یان بەم شێوە ی بمانیتەوه. لە بەر ئەوه ئەو دەستورە کە مادە یکی تایبەت کردووه بەم پرسە کە مادە ی ١٤٠ و، هەموومان دەنگمان پێداوه دەبیت ریزی لیبگرین و پابەندی بین. ئەم مادە یە باس لەوه دەکات کە ئەم کیشە یە دەبیت بە سێ قوناغ چارەسەر بکرت، یەکەم: ناسایی کردنەوه، دووم: نامار، سێیەم: ریفراندۆم.

كهواته له كۆتاييدا خەلكى شارمەكه خۇيان بېرىرى چارنووسى خۇيان دەدن. وه تا ئىستاش قۇناعى يەكەمىيان جى به جى نەكردووه. وه ئاماده نىن ئەم مادىهه جى به جى بىكەن. وه ئىمه به پلهى يەك دەسەلاتى جىبهجىكار كه حكومەته به تاوانبار دەزانين لەم بارمەه. كهواته ئىسلام نەك داوامان لى ناكات دەستبەردارى كەركوك بىن؛ بەلكو داوامان لى دەكات كه پارىزگارى لى بىكەين.

پ/5 به لآم ئەوه چەند مانگىكه حكومەتى ناوهندى عىراق ھەرىمى كوردستان تاوانبار دەكات بەمەهى كه داھاتى نەوت ناخەنە روو، وه ئەوان نازانن كه ھەرىم چۆن گرى بەستە نەوتىەكانى كردووه وچۆنىش به رىووهى دەبات. له بەرانبەردا حكومەتى ھەرىم دەللىت كه داھاتى نەوتى ھەرىم له دەسەلاتەكانى ھەرىم دايا وپەيوەندى به حكومەتى ناوھەندىەوه نىه.

و/ سەبارەت به ياساى نەوت وگازمەه، پەرلەمانى عىراق (مقصر)ه، وه ھىشتا ياساىەكى لەم بارمەه پەسەند نەكردووه. وه له دەستورى عىراقدا ھاتووه كه ھەرىم حەقى ئەمەهى ھەمەه كه گرى بەستى نەوتى بىكات، بە لآم داھاتەكەى دەبىت بەگەرىتەوه بۆ ناوهند. وه ھەرىمىش ۱۷% ى داھاتى عىراق وەردەگەرىت. بۆ ئەمەهى ئەم (نزاع)ەى ھەرىم و حكومەتى ناوهندى يەكلاىى بەگەرىتەوه دەبىت دادگای فیدرالى بېرىار بەدات كه ئەم گەرىبەستانەى ھەرىم ياساىەه يان نا ياساىى. بە لآم له بەر ئەمەهى كه له ناوهند ياساى نەوت گاز ھىشتا نىه، ئەم قىسانەى كه دەيكەن ياساىى نىه، بەلكو قسەى كار بەدەستانى وەكو شەھەرىستانى و مالكى و كەسانى ترە. بە لآم له ھەرىم ياساى تايبەت به نەوت گاز ھەمەه. وه به شىوہەبەكى گشتى چونكه ئىستا ھەندى كىشەى تر ھەن له نىوان ھەرىم و ناوهنددا، ئەم پەرسەش ئىستا چە دەكەنەوه. وه ناوهند دەمەوىت ھەندى ھەژمەونى خۆى بسەپىنىت به سەر ھەرىم دا، له بەرانبەردا حكومەتى ھەرىمىش ھەندى پەچەكردار دەنوینىت.

پ/6 كامىك لەم شوناسانە گەرنگەرن بۆت: كورد بوون، مۇسلمان بوون يان كوردستانى بوون؟

و/ كورد بوون ھىچ دەسەلاتىكى خۆمى تىدا نىه، خوا به كورد درووستى كردووم، ديارە حكەمەتىكى تىدايا. له بەر ئەمە دەبىت منىش وەكو مەروڤىكى كورد خەزمەت بەكەم. سەبارەت به كوردستانى بوونىش به ھەمان شىوہ دەسەلاتى خۆمى تىدا نىه، مەن له كوردستان لەدايك بووم نەك له جىگەبەكى تر. ھەر بۆيە چۆن باوك ودايك كۆمەلەك مافىان ھەمە لەسەر مەندال بە ھەمان شىوہ نىشتامنىش مافى ھەمە به سەر ھاو لاتیەكانىەوه. وه پىوېستە بەگەرى لى بىكەن و، شانازى پىوہ بەكەن ھەر وەكو چۆن شانازى دەكەن به باوك ودايك كه ھىچ دەسەلاتىكىان له ھەلبىزار دىياندا نىه. ھەر بۆيە پىوېستە ھەمەو ھاو لاتیەك به وەفا بىتەبەرانبەر به خاك و بە نىشتامەنەكەى. له ھەمان كاتدا پىوېست دەكات كه شانازى به خۆشى بىكات كه لەم نەتەمە نىشتامەندا خولقارە كه حىكەمەتىكى خواى تىدايا. سەبارەت به ئاينىش پىكەتەبەكى گەرنكى شوناس و بوونى مەروڤە. كاتىك كه مەمەوىت وەكو مەروڤى كورد رۆل بىبىم دەبىت مۇسلمان بەم چونكه گەلى كورد مۇسلمانە، بەم شىوہەش مەن رۆلى كورد بوونم دەبىم. ھەر بۆيە دەبىت مەن شانازى بەم بەكەم كه كوردم وه له كوردستاندا له دايك بوو، كه نىشتامەنە ھەر وەھا به ئىسلامىشەوه بەكەم كه ئاينەم، بەم شىوہە مەن رۆلى تەواوى خۆم دەبىم. وه ئەمانەش تەواوكەرى يەكەن، وه چەند رەھەندى شوناسى مەنى كوردى كوردستانى مۇسلمانە.

پ/7 له بارەى عىراقى بوونى ئىوہ، ئايە ئىوہ به رەزەمەندى خۆتان و بە گەرىبەستىكى كۆمەلەمەنى بوون به عىراقى؟ رەنگە ئىستا لەسەر شەقامەكانى كوردستان پەرسىت له گەنجەكان ھەر عەرمبىش نەزانن و، ھىچ شانازىەك به عىراقەوه نەكەن. ئايا ئىوہ به ئەمەرى واقع بوون به عىراقى يان ھەر له پىناو بەرژمەندى؟

و/ له راستىدا عىراق و تەواوى وولتانى ناوچەكە له رۆشناىى رىكەوتنى ساىكس پىكۆدا درووست كراون. وه كوردستانىش به زۆر واقعىكىان به سەردا سەپاندووه. وه ئەم رىكەوتن و واقعەش ھىچ له قەناعەت و بلاوہرى ئىمە ناگۆرىت كه ئەم كوردەش مىللەتىكە وەكو مىللەتانى تر، وه كوردستانىش ئەگەر چى

قەوارمىھەكى سىياسى نىيە ئىستىبا بەلام قەوارمىھەكى جۇگرافى نكولى لى نەكراوھ، وە نىشتىمانى سەر جەم كوردانە. وە ئەمە ئومىدى ئىمەيە، وە بە ئومىدەوھش دەژىن، وە مافى خۆشمانە كە لە سەر ئەم خاكەى كوردستان قەوارەى سىياسى كوردستانىش ھەيىت، كە دەولەتى كوردستان دەيىت. وە مافى چارەى خۇنوسىن كە بەلئىنامە نىونەتەمىيەكان و مافەكانى مروؤف دانى پىدا دەنن دەيىت بۇ كوردىش فەراھەم بىت. بەلام ئىمە ئىستىبا كە لە عىراقدا دەژىن كە كورد و عەرەب و توركمانىشى تىدايا، وە بە دەستورنىك پىكەوھ دەژىن. ئىمە رازىن بە دەستورە وە ھەموومان دەنگمان پى داوھ، بەلام پىويستە لايەنەكانى تىرىش كە دەنگىان پى داوھ ئەوانىش رىز لەم دەستورە بگرن. ئىمە لەم قۇناغەدا رازىن بە پى ئەم دەستورە لە گەل نەتەمەكانى تردا لە عىراق دا بژىن. بەلام لە ھەمانكاتدا، وەكو ئامانجىكى بالاتر قەناعەتەمان واپە كە كورد نەتەمەيەكە وەكو نەتەمەكانى تر. وە لە دەستورى عىراقىشدا نە نوسراوھ كە كورد مافى چارەى خۇنوسىنى نىيە.

ب/۸ دەولەت چى دەگەيىنەيت بۆتان؟

و/ دەولەت (مۇسسە) يەكى سىياسىيە، وە دەيىت بە شىو مەھەكى مەدەنى بىت. وە لە سەر بىنەماى ھاوالاتى بوون ژيانى ھاوالاتىيانى رىك خات بە دەر لە ئىنتەماى رەگەزى و ئىننىيان، وە ھەول بەدات بۇ خۆشگوزرانيان.

رافە دەكەن لە روانگەى پەيوەندىتان لەگەل "نازادى برايمەتى دادپەروەرى "پ/۹/ چۆن دروشمەكانى برايانى مۇسلمان، بە تايىبەت كە ئىوھ نەتەمەيەكى بى دەولەتن؟

و/ سەبارەت بە نازادى ئىمە قەناعەتەمان واپە ئەگەر مروؤف نازاد نەيىت ناتوانىت تەنەت پەپەروەى لە ئاينەكەشى بكات. ھەر بۆيە يەكەم پىرنسىپ ئەمەيە كە مروؤف نازاد بىت، وە نازادانە بىر بكاتەوھ، وە نازادانە بىرىارى خۇى بەدات چ لە سەر ئاستى تاك چ لە سەر ئاستى خىزان چ لە سەر ئاستى كۆمەلگا چ لە سەر ئاستى دەولەتىش. وە لە ئىسلامىشدا (لا اكرهه فى الدين) كە دەيىت مروؤف نازاد بىت لە ھەلپژاردنى ئاينى يان بىرو بۆچونى يان جۆرى ژيانى. وە بە ئەزمونىش بۆمان دەر كەوتوھ گەر كاتىك حىزبىكى ئىسلامىي وويستىتى بە زۆر بىرو باو مەكانى بسەپىنىت، سەر نەجام سەر كەوتوھ نەبووھ. وە ئىستىبا ئەوانەش لە كوردستان قەناعەتەيان ھاوتە سەر ئەوھى كە حىزبىكى سىياسى بن، وە وەكو ئىمە ئەوانىش خەبەتى سىياسى مەدەنى بگەن. وە ھەر وەكو نازادى پىرنسىپى يەكەمە لە تاكەكانەوھ، ناواش دەيىت فەراھەم بىت لە نىوان گەلاندا، وە دەيىت گەلان رىز لە نازادى يەكتر بگرن. وە بە زۆر سەپاندن و توندوتىزى بىرو بۆچون، توندوتىزى تىرى لى پەيدا دەيىت. ئەم توندوتىزىش گەر لە نىوان و لاتىكدا بىت ئەوا كولى دەكات، وە گەر لە نىوان وولاتاندا بىت ناواش ئەو وولاتانە دىسان كولى دەكات. وە ئەگەر نازادىش نەبوو برايمەتىش پاشان دادپەروەرىش نابن. وە (العدل اساس الملك) وە ھەر شتىك لە سەر بىنەماى دادپەروەرى نەبوو ئەوا بەردەوام نابىت. ئەمەش كە لە بەھارى عەرەبى دا دەيىنن لە بەر ئەمەيە كە ئەو وولاتانە لە سەر بىنەماى دادپەروەرى بەرئوھ نەچوون؛ ھەر بۆيە گەلان لىيان راپەريون.

ب/۱۰ چۆن دەتوانن وەكو پارتىكى سىياسى ئىسلامىي لەگەل ھەموو ئەو پارتە عىلمانىانەدا ھەل بگەن؟

و/ ديارە ئىمە خالى ھاوبەشمان ھەيە لە گەل پىكەھاتە سىياسىيەكان چ كۆمۇنىست بن، چ عىلمانى وەكو پىك وىنك، يان ھەر پارتىكى تر. وە چەندىن پىرنسىپى ھاوبەش ھەيە كە ئىمە لەگەلئاندا كار بگەن. وە لەوانەيە لە پرووى فىكرىەوھ لەگەلئان جىواوز بىن، بەلام ئىمە (ممارسە) سىياسەت دەكەن. ئىمە نەھاتووين (صراع) ئايدۆلوجىيان لەگەلئان بگەن. وە لە ھەندى قۇناغدا ھەندى (حساسىة) ھەبووھ، بەلام بۇ خىزمەتى گەل وولاتان خالى ھاوبەشى زۆر ھەن كە بىتوانن پىكەوھ كارىان بۇ بگەن. وە ئىمە ئىستىبا كارى ھاوبەشى ئۆپوزىسىون دەكەن لە گەل كۆمەلى ئىسلامى وگوران كە پارتىكى عىلمانىيە. لە ھەلپژاردنى ۲۰۰۹ شدا لە لىستىكى ھاوبەشدا دابەزىن لە گەل كۆمەلى ئىسلامىي و حىزبى سۆشىيال دىموكرات و زەمەت كىشان كە دوو پارتى عىلمانى بوون.

ب ۱۱ / چۆن له ديموكراسى تى دهگن وه چۆنئيش بهرجهستهى دهگن؟

و/ ديموكراسى ميكانيزمى ريكخستنى دهسهلاتهكانه، وه ئەلتهر ناتيفى ديكتاتوريمته، يان به بيجهوانهوه. وه ئيمه له رۆژهلاتى ناوهراس تالاولى ديكتاتوريمتمان له ههموو شوئنيك زياتر جهشتوه، ئهويه نمونهكانى سهدام حوسين وبهشار ئەسهد وموبارك وزهين ئەلعابدين وعهلى عهبدو لا سالح وئهنوى تر. له بهر ئهوه لهم ناوچهيه ئيمه زياتر تامهزوى ديموكراسين. وه گهليش سهراوهى دهسهلاتهكانه، ههس بويه ديموكراسى ميكانيزمىكى باشه بۆ ريكخستن ودابهشكردى ئەم دهسهلاتانه. بۆ نمونه ئيمه وهكو يهگرتوو له كوردستان كه پارتيكى ئيسلامين وخهلكهكەش له ۹۰% موسلمانن، بهلام ئيمه له ۱۰% دهنگهكانيش ناهينين له ههلبزاردن، بهلام به سهراوهى دهنگهكانيش رازين. خهلك تاتيک دهنگ به عيلمانيهكان دهن وبه ئيمه نادهن ريزيان لى دهگرين وبه لاشمانهوه ناساييه. له ههمانكاتدا له شوئنيكى تر وهكو ميسر كاتيک ئيسلاميهكان زۆرينه دههينن به ههمان ميكانيزمى ديموكراسى بهرانبهسرهكانيش پي رازين.

ب ۱۲ / ئەگه يهگرتوو له ههلبزارنهكاندا وهكو برايانى ميسر زۆرينه به دهست هينا، وه دواى چوارسال له ههلبزاردن ئه زۆرينه نههينايهوه، ئايا به ناشتيانه دهسهلات دهنه دهستى براوهكان؟

و/ به دلنبايهوه، ئيمه باوهرمان به دهستاو دهستى ناشتيانهى دهسهلات ههيه، ئەمهش يهكيكى تره له بنههكانى ديموكراسى. فرهى يهكيكى تره له بنههكانى ديموكراسى، مافى مرؤف، ريزگرتنى ياسا، ئەمانه ههس ههموو پرنسيپهكانى ديموكراسين، وه ئيمه باوهرمان به ههمويان ههيه. وه له پهيرهو وپروگرامى يهگرتوو ههيه، وه خومان داواى دهكهن، ئيتىر چۆن دهكرت قهناعهتمان پي نهبيت.

ب ۱۳ / له وتارى برايانى موسلماندا، له ئاستى تيورى ئمازه به ستراتيژى بنياتانهوهى كهسيى موسلمان، خيزانى موسلمان، كۆمهنگاي موسلمان، حكومهتى ئيسلامى وه خيلافهتى ئيسلامى دهكات وهكو شيواى كوششى برايانى موسلمان. ئيوه وهكو برايانى موسلمانى كورد له كويى ئەم ستراتيژدان، ئايا خيلافهت دروست دهبيت؟

و/ ئيمه باوهرمان وايه كه بناغهى ههموو كۆمهنگايهكى تهنروست، ههموو دهولهتتيكى (رشيد) دهبيت تاكى چاكه وهاولاتى سالح بيت، له بهر ئهوه ئيمه قهناعهتمان وايه كه دهبيت له تاكهوه دهست پى بكهين ئەگه بمانهويت دهولهتتيكى بههيزمان ههبيت. وه ئەگه بهرتهتتيكى بههيزت نهبيت دواتر بيناكت لاواز دهبيت وله ههموو ساتيكد ئەگهري رووخانى ههيه. وه ئەگه ئيمه توانيمان تاكى باشى نيز ومى پهروهده بكهين لهو ريگايهشهوه خيزانى پهروهدهكراوى باش پهيدا دهبيت. وه ديسان بهيهك گهيشتنى دوو كهسى رۆشنبرى وچاك ههلبهته مندالى چاكيش دهخهنهوه. وه به پهيداوونى كۆمهنگاي خيزنى باش، دياره كۆمهنگايهكى باشيش ديته كايهوه. جۆره كۆمهنگايهكه كه گيانى ليبوردهيه وئاگاليك بوون وهولانانى توندو تيژى وخوپهستهى وبوغز وقين، كۆمهنگايهكى بهختههر ديته بوون. وه لهو كۆمهنگا چاكهدا بريارى ههلبزاردى كهسى چاكيش دهن بۆ ئهوهى بهريوهيان بيات. وه بهم شيويه كاتيک كه كۆمهنگايهكى (رشيد) دروست دهبيت، حكومهتى (رشيد)يش پهيدا دهبيت. سهبارهت به خيلافهتى ئيسلامى ئيمه له يهگرتوو قهناعهتمان وايه كه خيلافهت دهقيك له قورئان يان له سونه لهسهر نيه. تهنه ئهوهنده ههيه ئەمه له سهردمه پيشووهماندا فورميك بوو له دهولهتدارى. بهلام ئيستنا واقيعهكه گۆراوه. بۆ نمونه دهولهتى نهتهويهى دروست بووه، وه چهندهها ميكانيزمى تر پهيدا بووه. وه خيلافه بۆخوى ناويكى پيروژ نيه. بهلكو دهبيت ئەمهرو بگهريين به دواى ميكانيزمى سهردمهيهوه پيشكهوتودا. بۆ نمونه ئيستنا له ئهروپا له رووى سهربازيهوه پهيمانى نهيتوى ههيه، له رووى ئابوريهوه بازارى ئهروپى هاوبهشى ههيه، له رووى دراويشهوه يوروى ههيه. ههس وهها له چهندين رووى ترموه توانيوهتتى يهكيتيهكى بههيز بهيئنه كايهوه. ئيمه برومان وايه كه دهكرت وولاته موسلمانهكان له سهس بهنماى بهرژمونهدى هاوبهش جورىك لهم يهكيتيه

بەھننە ناراۋە. ۋە مەرجىش نىيە ئەمۇ يەككىتتە بەواتاى يەك دەۋلەت بوون بىت. بۇ نمونە ئىستا دەۋلەتى كۆنقىدرالى ھەبە، ئەم دەۋلەتەنە ھەر يەكەم سەرۋەرى خۇى ھەبە، ۋە لە نەتەۋە يەكگرتتوۋەكان وولاتى سەربەخۇن، بەلام لىسەر بىنەماى بەرژومەندى ھاۋبەش يەك دەگرن. ۋە لەۋانەشە لەم يەكگرتتە دەسبەردارى ھەندى بەرژومەندى خۇيان بىن لە پىناۋ بەرژومەندىكى بالاتردا. دەكرىت ئەم جۇرە ھاۋبەشەش لە نمونەى ئەم يەككىتتەنە بۇ پارمەتى دانى يەكتر بىت. ۋە بوونى يەككىتتەكىش جىاۋازە لە بە يەك بوون، ۋەكو ئەم نمونەى يەككىتى ئەۋروپا كە ئاماژەمان پىكرد. كەۋاتە ئىمە ناكۆشەن بۇ خىلافت ۋەكو فۇرمە كۆنەكەمى كە واتاى يەك دەۋلەت بوون دەگىيەنەت. بەلام ئەگەر بەرژومەندى بخۋازىت دەكرىت چەند وولاتىكى موسلمان ۋە ناموسلمانىش لەم جۇرە يەككىتتە بەھننە كاپەۋە.

پ/ باشە تىگەشىستى ئىندامانتان ھىچ جىاۋازىكى ھەبە لەم تىگەشىستەى بەرىزتان ۋەكو سەركردايتى يەكگرتو؟

و/ لەۋانەى ئىندامىك لە خۋارمە ئەم تىگەشىستەى منى نەبىت. بۇ نمونە ھەموو تاكىكى كورد خەون دەبىنەت بە دەۋلەتى كوردىمە، بەلام كاتىك گۇئ دەگرن لە سەركردىكى سىياسى لەۋانەى ھەندىكىان ۋا بزانن ئەم سەركردىمە زۇر رەش بىنە. يان لەۋانەشە تۆمەنبارى بىكەن بە خىانەتىش. ئىمەش كاتىك كە بىر لە واقى ئەمروى جىهان دەكەنەۋە خىلافتى ئىسلامى بە راستى ئاستەنگى زۇرە، تەنەت ھەندى جار لە ناۋ يەك دەۋلەتدا دوۋ حىزبى ئىسلامى ناتوانن بەيەكەۋە ھەل بىكەن. ئەم ئىتر چۇن ئەم ھەموو دەۋلەتە كە ئابورى جىاۋازو كلتورى جىاۋاز و زۇر شتى ترى جىاۋاز، مەگەر ھەر بە قسە ئاسان بىت يەكىيان پى بگرىت لە يەك دەۋلەتدا. بەلام لە واقى كردهى دا زۇر قورسە. ۋە لە مېژووشدا زۇر جار خىلافت تەنە شتىكى سىيولنىك بوۋە، ئەگىنا لە زۇر كات ۋەلە زۇر شوپىندا خەلىفە ھىچ جۇرە دەسەلاتىكى كردهى نەبوۋە. ۋە ئەمەش بە شىۋەمەكى كردهى گەشتۋىنەتە ئەم قەنەتە. كاتىك كۆمەلىكى ئىسلامى كارى سىياسى ناكەن لەۋانەى زۇر شتى تىۋرى ھەبىت باۋەرىان پىي ھەبىت يان تىگەشىستى تايبەتىان لەم بارمە ھەبىت. بەلام واقى جىاۋازە لە تىۋرى.

پ/ ئايا ئىۋە ھەست بە ركابەرى دەكەن لە لايمە ئىسلامىەكانى ترەۋە؟

و/ ۋەكو شىۋازى كار ئىستا ئەم ئىسلامىانەش كە كاتى خۇى چەكداربوون ۋەكو ئىمە كارى سىياسى مەدەنى دەكەن، ۋە لە پەرلەماندا ھەن ۋ، ھەست بە تەنگرە ناكەن لە گەلىان. بەلام لە ۋانەى ۋەكو ھەر حىزبىكى تر لە ئاستى قەنەت پىكردنى تاكەكانى كۆمەلگا ھەر حىزبەۋە ھەزبكات خەلك بەلاى خۇيدا رابكىشەت. بەلام ۋەكو كىشە نەخىر، بەلكو بەردەۋام (تفاهم) مان ھەبە.

پ/ پىت ۋابە بزوتتەۋە سەلەفى لە مىسر كە دۋاى شۇرشەكە پارتىكى سىياسىيان راگەياندا، ھاۋكار بوون يان رىگر لە بەردەم برايانى مىسر؟

و/ مەن بروام ۋابە بوون بە حىزبى سەلەفى زىاتر لە بەرژومەندى ئىخواندايا. چۈنكە گەر نەبەن بە حىزب خەلكى تر بە جۇرنىك لە جۇرەكان بەكارىان دىنەت. بۇ نمونە ئىستا لە كوردستان چۈنكە سەلەفى حىزب نىن، حىزبە دەسەلاتدارەكان بەكارىان دىنن بۇ بەرژومەندى خۇيان. بەلام كاتىك كە بوونە كىيانىكى سىياسى ئىتر دەۋانەت راستەۋ خۇ لەگەلىا مامەلە بىكەت. ۋە لەگەلىان بگەيتە مىكانىزىمىك كە بەرژومەندى ھەردوۋلامان پىارىزىن. ئەلەتە سىياسەت (يعنى) بەرژومەندى. كەۋاتە مەن ئەۋم پى باش بوۋ كە لە مىسر سەلەفىەكان حىزبىكى سىياسىيان پىك ھىنا. بە ھەمان شىۋە پىشم خۇشە كە لە كوردستان سەلەفىەكان ھەمان رىگە بگرنە بەر ۋە حىزبىك پىك نەئىن. ئەم كاتەش واقى بىنانە سەبرى دنيا دەكەن.

پ/ له كۆنگره‌ی شه‌شدا مافی چاره‌ی خۆنوسینتان بریاردا وه‌كو ستراتژی كارنان، چۆن نهم ستراتژی‌ه به‌رجه‌سته ده‌كهن؟ به تايهت كه هه‌ر ئیستا ووتت هیشتا ئه‌ندامتان هه‌یه كه به‌روای به خيلافهت هه‌یه، ئه‌وه‌شت ووت كه له‌وانه‌یه به‌لای سیاسیه‌كانه‌وه به‌رژمونه‌ندی نه‌یهت له درووستكرده‌ی ده‌ولت له‌م كاته‌دا.

و/ دياره كۆنگره‌ی به‌كگرتوو له كاتێكدا گری دراوه كه به‌هاری عه‌مه‌ی و واقه‌یه‌ی تازه له ئارادایا. ته‌نانهت ئیستا توركیا شیوازی مامه‌له‌ی له‌گه‌ل هه‌رمی كوردستان گۆراوه. له سوریا واقه‌كه به‌رمو گۆرانكاری ده‌چیت. وه له توركیاش واقه‌یه‌ی تر له ئارادایا بۆ كورد له هه‌ردوو بواری خه‌باتی چه‌كداری په‌كه‌كه یان یان پارتی ئاشتی و دیموكراسی، له به‌ر ئه‌وه ئیستا باسی كورد له ناوچه‌كه باسیكی جیدییه. وه قوناغه‌كه ئه‌وه ده‌خوازیت كه باسی مافی چاره‌ی خۆنوسین بکهین. وه ئیمه له قوناغه‌كانی پێشووتردا ئاماژمان به‌م مافه كردوو، به‌لام له ستراتژی‌دا دامان نه‌یابوو. بۆیه به‌لای ئیمه‌وه بارودۆخی كورد و ناوچه‌كه و دنیاش گۆرانكاری به‌ سه‌ردا هاتوو، هه‌ر بۆیه ئیستا ئه‌م مافه‌مان كردوو به ستراتژی‌مان. ئه‌مه‌ش گه‌ر خه‌مونه‌کانن ده‌بم به واقه. گۆرینی ئه‌م رژیمة سته‌مكاره عه‌مه‌یه‌ی دوینی به خه‌یالی كه‌سه‌دا نه‌ده‌هات كه ئاوا ئه‌مرو له ناوچه‌ی ئه‌مه‌ش ئه‌مه‌مان پێ ده‌لێت كه ئه‌گه‌ر گه‌لانی عه‌ره‌ب به خه‌نیش نه‌یان‌بێنیت كه ئاوا رژیمة‌کانیان له ناوچه‌ی ئه‌مه‌رو ئاواته‌کانیان هاته دی، ئیمه‌ش ده‌یهت گه‌شبین بین، وه رۆژێك له رۆژان ئه‌م ئاواته‌مان دێته دی. به مه‌رجێك خۆمان باوه‌رمان پێی هه‌یهت وه کاری بۆ بکهین. من پێم وایه به‌كریزی گه‌لی كورد باشترین میكانیزمه بۆ ئه‌م كاره گه‌رنه‌گه. به داخه‌وه زۆر جار پێك وینك تا زۆریان پێ نه‌یهت وه له گه‌ل حكومه‌تی ناوه‌ندا تێك نه‌چن نا‌یهن داوای په‌ك هه‌كوئستی بکه‌ن له پارتیه‌ سیاسیه‌كانی تر. وه تا ئیستا بۆ ئه‌م هه‌نگاوه كه كورد دوا كه‌وتوو ناوانی (پێك و پێك)ه، كه نه‌یان‌توانیوه به‌رمو ده‌ولته‌ی كوردی هه‌نگاو بنه‌ین. وه هه‌موو ئه‌م میله‌تانه كه گه‌شتوو به مافی چاره‌ی خۆنوسیان هۆكاری په‌كه‌میان په‌ك ریزی ناو خۆیان بووه. بۆیه باشترین میكانیزم ئه‌مه‌یه كه ئیمه‌ی كورد ئامانجیكی گه‌رمه‌مان هه‌یهت وه ده‌وری كۆبینه‌وه، وه ئه‌م ئامانجه گه‌رمه‌یه بکه‌ینه ستراتژی‌مان، ئه‌نجا به عیلمانی و ئیسلامی و كۆمونیست، هه‌ر هه‌موومان کاری بۆ بکهین. ئیتر شته بچوکه‌كانیش با (خیلاف)مان هه‌یهت له سه‌ری به‌خه‌ینه كه‌نارو كار له سه‌ر ئه‌م ستراتژی‌هه‌ به‌لایه بکهین. وه ئه‌مه‌ش به ئه‌ركی سه‌رشانی خۆمانی ده‌زانین، ئیتر كه خه‌لكی تر به خه‌نیه‌ی نه‌ گونجای بزانیت یان ناماده‌ی نه‌ ییت له‌م پێناوه، ئه‌وه ئیتر هه‌لوئستی ئه‌وانه. وه ئیمه سوورین له سه‌ر پاراستنی ئه‌م ئه‌زمونه، وه به قوناغه‌یه‌ی ده‌زانین به‌رمو مافی چاره‌ی خۆنوسین، كه مافیكی ره‌وای گه‌له‌كه‌مانه.

پ/ ئایه ئه‌مه ته‌نها تاكتیکێك نیه به‌كگرتوو به‌كاری به‌یه‌نیت بۆ سه‌رنج راكیشانی جه‌ماهر به‌لای خۆیدا؟

و/ زۆر جار هه‌بووه ئیمه خه‌ریك بوونه به رێك خه‌ستی كوردستان و نه‌هیشتنی شه‌ری ناوخو و نه‌هیشتنی كیشه‌كانی نیوان هه‌رم و عیراق. وه كاتێكیش كه زه‌مینه‌ سازی بوو بۆ ئامانجی باله‌ ده‌یهت کاری له سه‌ر بکهین. وه بۆ جیه‌یه‌ی كوردی ئه‌م ستراتژی‌مان هه‌ول ده‌دین زه‌مینه‌ سازی بکهین، وه ناومالی كورد رێكبه‌یه‌ن. وه مه‌رجیش نیه كاتێك كه ستراتژی‌یکمان هه‌بوو به ئاسانی وه كاتێكی كه‌مه‌دا بێته دی. بۆ نمونه كاتێك له ۱۸۹۷ درووستكرده‌ی ئیسرائیل ده‌كریته ئامانج، پاش ۵۰ سال دێته دی. گه‌رنه‌گ ئه‌مه‌یه كه ئیمه له سه‌ری كار بکهین وه هه‌ول ده‌دین بیکه‌ین به ئامانجی زۆره‌ی لایه‌نه‌ سیاسیه‌كانی كوردستان و، گه‌له‌كه‌مانی بۆ ئاماده‌كه‌ین.

كۆتایی

Appendix 3: Interview with Mohammad Ra'uf, the head of the leader's council of the KIU

چاوپیکهوتنی محمد رؤوف، سهروکی نهجومهانی سهرگردایهتی یهکگرتووی ئیسلامی کوردستان

پ ۱/ خزمتهی گهل وولات چی دهگهینیت له ئیسلامدا؟ چون یهکگرتوو دتوانیت پرژهی سیاسی خوی لهو رونگهیهوه بهرهم بینیت؟

و/ یهکگرتوو وهکو حیزبیکه ئیسلامی هاوچهرخ، وهکو عیزبیکه خاوهن نهزموونیکه ۱۹ ساله به چند قوناغیکدا تپهیرهیه که دتوانین بلین گهسهی سیاسی هاتهریبه لهگهل گهسهی مهعریفی وتیگهیشنتی بو ئیسلام ومیژوو ئیسلامی وکلتووری ئیسلامی. وه خویندنهوه نوئی بو بق دهقهکان که توانیوتی کاری ئیسلامی سیاسی خوی لهگهل کاره ئینسانیهکانی و، داخوازیهکانی مروف له ژياندا گهسه پیدات به جوریک که (تقلیدی) کس نهکات، وه چاولیگهری وکۆپی کس نهینت، بهواتای (حرکات) ی ئیسلامی و فیکری ئیسلامی تر. وه هیچ (تقلید) یکی نهکردوه تا له چوارچیهی فیکری میانهموی ئیسلامیدا نهیت. نهوش له پیناو گهسه پیکردنی ههلو مهرجی کۆمه لایهتی و سیاسی وئابووری کوردستان. وه یهکگرتوو ههولی داوه شتی نوئ بهینیته کایهوه، وه به پنی پیناسهی حیزب که له کۆنگرهی شهشدا هاتوه که له برگهی (۲ و ۳ و ۴ و ۵) ی پرنسیپه گشتیهکانی یهکگرتوو که له کۆنگره بریاری له سهر دراوه، وه ئیشتی لهسهر دهکهن بو چوار سالی ناینده.

کاتیک ئیمه نهلین یهکگرتوو حیزبیکه ئیصلاحیه، له ههمان کاتدا جگه له ئیصلاحی، کۆمه لیک تری حیزبیکه ئیصلاحیه، ریفورم "دهستهواژهمان له پالدا دانیاهو بو تهواوکاری واتای ئیصلاحی، لهوانه خوازه، نیشتمانیه، تیدهکۆشیت له پیناو بنیاتنانی کۆمه لگهیهکی گهسه سهندوو، وههینانه کایهی ئهم پیناسهیهش (اجماع) کۆنگرهی له سهر بووه که ۷۲۵ کس که ئهنادمی "دهسه لاتیکی دادگهر کۆنگره بوون به نوینه رایهتی سهرجهم ئهنادمانی یهکگرتوو. لیرهوه دهه دهکهنیت که یهکگرتوو حیزبیکه ئیصلاحیه؛ رادیکال نه.

پ ۲/ ئیصلاح له چیدا دهکهن؟

و/ کاتیک که دهلین حیزبیکه ئیصلاحیه کهواته رادیکال نین. ئیصلاح له تاک وکۆمه لگاوه بو سیستهم به (تدرج). وه ئیصلاح له روانگهی ئیمهوه پرۆسیستیکه بهردهوامه و، کۆتایی نایهت. وه ئیمه بزوتنهوهیهکی رادیکال نین که گۆرانکاریهکی خیرا بکات وکۆتایی پی بینیت. بزوتنهوه ئیصلاحیهکان لهسهر (عقل) ی مروف وکۆمه لگا و، پاشان لهسهر ریفورمی سیستهمی سیاسی به بهردهوام کار دهکهن. کهواته دینامیکهتی لهناو خویایهتی. لهههمان کاتدا ئیمه دوو شتمان له بهرچاو گرتوو، یهکهم کۆمه لگا، که به بهردهوام دهمانهویت کۆمه لگا بهرمو پیشهوه بهرین. دووهمیش دهسه لاتی دادگهرمان ههیت. دهسه لاتی یان دادگهر یان دیکتاتور. ههرگیزیش کۆمه لگا گهسه سهندوو ناییت تا دهسه لاتهکه دادگهر نهیت. ئهمهش به ئامانجیکه ئیسلامی دهزانین، ئهمه به (جوهر) ی فیکر و فلهسهفهی ئیسلامی دهزانین. یهکیک له تایهت مندیهکانی یهکگرتوو ئهمه که ئهم تیگهیشتنانه له هیچ سهراومهیهکهوه و فیههیکه ئیسلامیهوه وه نهگرتوو. راستهوخو چی له ناو قورئاندا ههیه ئیمه مامه لهمان له گهلدا کردوه. تهناهت لهم پرسانه مامه لهی زهق وراستهوخومان لهگهل (حدیث) یشدا نهکردوه. بهلکو ئهمه راستهوخو به جهوههر وداخوازی قورئان وداوکاری قورئان دهزانین که پیشخستنی کۆمه لگا و حوکمیکه دادگهره. ههر بویه ئهو بنه ما گشتیانه له خزمتهی ئهم دوو خاله دایا. رهههندهکانی ئیصلاح، وه چون بهرمو دهسه لاتیکی دادگهرانه دهرویت له ستراتیژمکاندا ناماژهمان پیکردوه. له نامانجه گشتیهکانیشدا شروقهمان کردوه. بو نمونه له خالی چوارمدا باس له گهلی کورد دهکات، باسی ئهوهمان کردوه که نهتهوهیهکی سهربهخویه. لیرهوه ئهمانهویت ناماژه به ئهوه بکهین که ئیمه نه بهشیکین له نهتهوهی عهرهب یان فارس یان تورک، وه رازی نین

به بن دهستی وپله دوویی. گهلی کوردستان که پینگ هاتوو له کورد وتورکمان وناشوری و... هند به یهک خیزان دهزانین له ژیر رۆشنایی چهکی هاوآلاتی بووندا که خواستیکی دیموکراسیه. له ناو خیزانیکیدا دهییت مافهکان بهی (تمییز) دابهش بکریت. له شوینیکی تردا باس لهوه دهکهن که کورد بهشیکه له (أمة) ی ئیسلامی، ئەمەش ئاماژەیه بۆ ئاین وەکو نایدۆلوجیا و بۆ ئینتیمای میژووویهکه. وه کورد ههمان مافی سیاسی و نهتهوهیی و ئینسانی وەکو بهشەکانی تری (أمة) ی ئیسلامی ههیه به دروستکردنی دهولەتیشوه. هەر بۆیه باسی مافی چاره‌ی خۆ نووسنمان له ههمان برگه‌دا کردوه.

پ/۳/ ئیمه بهشدارین نهک ئەلتەرناتیف، دروشمیکه هەر له سه‌رته‌ای دروستبوونی یه‌ک‌گرتوووه به دی کراوه، ئایا ئەمه تاکتیکی سیاسی بۆ قوناغیک؟ یان چۆن له ئیستادا راقه‌ی دهکهن؟

و/ ئەوه بۆ دوو شت کاتی خۆی ووتوو مانه: یه‌که‌م، بۆ ئەوه‌ی (سقف) ی طموحی ئەندامانمان ئەوه‌نده نهرز نه‌کهن. چونکه ئیمه تازه بووین له کاری سیاسیدا. دووم، له ههمان کاتدا وه‌لام بوو بۆ ساحه‌ی سیاسی که به‌رده‌وام ترساندوو یان له ئیسلامی. ئیستا له باوچه‌که دیموکراسیه‌ت دروشمی ههموو حیزبه‌کانه، ئیتر ئەم دروشمه واتای نیه، چونکه مۆدیلی ئیلتەرناتیف و حیزبی سه‌رکرده‌و تاکه حیزب نه‌ما. هەر بۆه پێویست ناکات باسی ئەلتەرناتیف بکریت. ته‌نانه‌ت ئەو حیزبانەش که له هه‌لیژاردن زۆرینه دینن دهرۆن داوه‌تی حیزبی تر ده‌کهن بۆ ئەوه‌ی به‌شدارێ له حکومه‌تا بکهن، به‌ ناوی گه‌شه‌ی دیموکراسی و گه‌شه‌ی کۆمه‌لگه‌وه حکومه‌تی ئیلتلافی دروست ده‌کهن بۆ ئەوه‌ی پیکه‌وه چاره‌ی کیشه‌کانی کۆمه‌لگا بکهن. ئیمه ئەگەر ئیستا ۵۱% ی ده‌نگه‌کان بێنن، به‌ ته‌نها حکومه‌ت پێک ناهێنن. به‌ شێوه‌یه‌کی گشتی چونکه له ناوچه‌که دیموکراسیه‌ت له سه‌رته‌ایه، هه‌چ جۆره حیزبێک ناتوانیت حکومه‌ت پێک به‌هێنیت ئەگەر کۆمه‌لگه‌ش پێشکه‌وتوو بێت وەکو به‌ریتانیا یان ئەمریکا، به‌ ته‌نه‌اش حکومه‌ت [و سه‌رکه‌وتوو بێت پێک به‌هێنیت، چونکه به‌ هه‌لیژاردن ده‌چیته سه‌ر حوکم و پاش چوارسالی تر دهرناچیت، که‌واته به‌شدارێ دیموکراسی ده‌کهن، نه‌ک ئەلتەرناتیف.

پ/۴/ له ناو یه‌ک‌گرتوودا چۆن پراکتیکی دیموکراسی ده‌کهن، به‌ تایبه‌ت که تۆ کاندید بوویت بۆ بوستی ئەمینه‌داریتی یه‌ک‌گرتوو؟ ئەگەر بێتوو سه‌یری میژووی که‌له‌پوری ئیسلامی بکهن هەر له نمونه‌ی یه‌که‌مه‌وه، ئەنجومه‌نی شورا یه‌ک هه‌بووه که ژماره‌یه‌ک کەس بوونه، که بۆ یه‌که‌م جار ۱۰ کەس بوون. وه خه‌لک ته‌نها بۆی هه‌بووه له نێو ئەو ۱۰ کەسه هه‌لیژیرن. ئایا له ناو یه‌ک‌گرتوودا ده‌سه‌لاتیکی شاره‌وه‌ی وا هه‌یه که چهند کەسێک کاندید بکات، یان ههموو ئەندامان ئازادن خۆیان بپالێون؟

و/ ئیمه به‌ چهند قوناغیکدا تیپه‌ریوین. ریکه‌ستنه‌کانمان له خواره‌وه تا سه‌رکرده‌یه‌تی و مه‌که‌ته‌ب سیاسی به‌ هه‌لیژاردنه به‌ پێی ئەو مافانه‌ی که په‌یره‌و و په‌رۆگرام پێیان ده‌به‌خشیت. ئەمەش له ههموو حیزبێکی دنیا‌دا هەر وایه. ئەمجاره له کۆنگره‌دا به‌ ده‌سته‌پێشخه‌ری ئەمینه‌دارێ پێشوو پۆستی ئەمینه‌داریتیش خرايه به‌ر په‌رۆسه‌ی هه‌لیژاردن، چونکه ئەمینه‌دارێ پێشوو خۆی کاندید نه‌کردوه. ئیتر له‌مه‌ودوا بۆ کۆنگره‌کانی تریش هه‌روا ده‌ییت. ئەوانه‌ش که بۆیان هه‌یه خۆیان کاندید بکهن به‌ پێی په‌یره‌وی یه‌ک‌گرتوو. بۆ نمونه بۆ پۆستی ئەمینه‌داریتی، ئەوانه‌ی که لانی که‌م دوو خه‌ولی مه‌که‌ته‌ب سیاسیان ته‌واو کردییت بۆیان هه‌یه خۆیان کاندید بکهن. ئەمجاره‌ش ۱۶ کەس بۆیان هه‌بوو خۆیان کاندید بکهن بۆ ئەو پۆسته، به‌لام ته‌نها ۴ کەس خۆی کاندید کرد.

پ/۵/ چۆن مامه‌له ده‌کهن له‌گه‌ڵ چه‌مه‌که‌کانی عیلمانی ئیسلامی له کاری سیاسیدا؟

و/ زور به كورتى، يهكهم: نيمه هر له سهر متاوه باومرمان به شهرى عيلمانى ونيسلامىي نهووه. دووم: نيمه هر ومكو چون باومرمان به نيسلامىييهكى سهلفى رادىكالى توند رهو نيه، باومرمان به عيلمانى رادىكالى توند رهونيش نيه. وه هيچ كهسيك لهگهل هم توند رهوانه ههناكات. هر ومكو چون له ناو نيسلامىييهكاندا (تكفير) يهيه، له ناو عيلمانىييهكانيشدا (تكفير) يهيه. (تكفير) عيلمانيش نهوانن كه هيچ نيسلامىييهكيان قبول نيه. تمنانته نايينيشيان قبول نيه. نهانته نيك هر باومرمان بهوه ههيه كه ناين له دهولت له يهك جيابن، بهلكو باومرمان وايه كه ناين وژينيش له يهك جيا بن. نيمه له گهل هم عيلمانىيهدا مهگر بتوانين دايلهلوگى مهعريفى وفىكرى بگيرين، نهگينا ههلكردن وپيكمههژيانى سياسى زمحمته له گهلان. چونكه نهوانه دهستپيشخهري له رهتكردهوه دهكهن. نهوانه باومرمان بهوه نيه كه هيچ جوړه بيركردهويهكى نيسلامىي ههبيت. وه باومرمان وايه كه ناين نايين له هيچ كايهيهكى ژياندا ههبيت. جگه لهو جوړه عيلمانىي، نيمه لهگهل ههموو جوړه عيلمانىيهدا دهوانين ههلبكهين، تمنانته پيكمهه دهسهلات بهريوه بهرين. من قهناعته شخسى خوم وايه كه هم سدهيه له روژههلاتى ناوهراست دهسهلات به دهست نيسلامىي ميانهرهوه و عيلمانىي ميانهرهوه دهبيت. نيسلامىي ميانهرهوه نهوانن كهوا دهولته دىنى بهواناي ثيوراطى دروست ناكهن. به واتايهك له ههموو شتيكى ژياندا تفسيرى دىنى وعهقيدى بو بكهيت. عيلمانىي ميانهرهويش نهوانن كه باومرمان به پرنسيپه بنهرهتيهكانى نيسلام ههيه. وه قهناعهتيان به بزوتتهوه نيسلامىي ميانهرهوهكان ههيه. قهناعهتيان بهوه ههيه كه ههموو هم وولاته پيكمهه بهرهوه كهناى نارامى وگهسهههندويى وداگهري كومهلاتى وحوكمى ياسا بهرين. جا ئيتر گرننگ نيه كه سهروكى هم دهولتهانه نيسلامىي يان عيلمانىي دهبن، بهم واتا ميانهرهويه نيسلامىي وعيلمانىي.

پ6/ نيوه چون (رجل دولة) بهرهم دهينن؟ به واتايهك كه نهنداميك بيت نيش بو نهو وولاته بكات، وه بو هاوالاتيانى هم وولاته كار بكات و، باومرى ههبيت به چهكمى هاوالاتى بوون. وه بتوانيت ههنگاو بنيت بهسهر هم واقعهه سياسيه كه له عيراق وكوردستانيشدا بهدى دهكرنت، كه لهوانهيه كهسيك سهروك وهيران بيت وتائيفى بيت، كهسيك كار بو حيزبيك يان بو هوژيك بكات. نايا نيوه دهوانن كهسيك بهرهم بهينن كه بهشتويهيهكى موديرن كار بو دهولت بكات؟

و/ نيمه به سئ ميكانيزم (رجل دولة) دروست دهكهن. وه تا ئيستا دوومان (ممارسه) كردهوه، بهلام يهكيكيان ماوه. وه برياره له دواى هم كونگرهوه نهماش يهكيك بيت له ستراتيجى مكاني كارمان. يهكهم پيگهيندنى تاك له سهر بنههاى نهو بيركردهوه ميانهرهوانه كه ههمانه. له سهر بنههاى نهو پروگرامهيه كه دامانرشتهوه. بهم شيوهيه نيمه تاكيك بهرهم دهينن كه كاتيک هر كاريكى گرتته دهست پروفيشنالا نه مامهله بكات، خيانهت له كارهكهيه نهكات، كاري حيزب وياسهت نهباته ناو كارهكهيه. نهو كيشهيهيه كه ئيستا لهگهل دهسهلات ههمانه كه حيزب ودهسهلات تيكل كراون، نيمه له نيمه له (ذهنية) تى تاكى خومان دهرههينين. بو نهوهي ممارسههيهكى ئيجابى وئينسانى ولهسهر بنههاى چهكمى هاوالاتى بوون كارهكانى بكات، نهك ممارسههيهكى حيزبى تهسك له چوارچيوهيه دهولتهدا بكات. دووم: نهو كهسانهيه كه تا ئيستا پوستى دهولتهتيان وهرگرتوه له نيمه، له پيشدا به ميكانيزمى يهكهدا دهروا، نهجا به ممارسههه پراكتيزى پروفيشنالا نهيه دهخاته روو. شنيهم ئيستا ش له بيرى نهوهداين كه ميكانيزمىي تىر كه بريتيه له بهشدارى پيكردن له خوولى تاييهت بگرينه بهر. بو نمونه نهوانهيه كه كانديد دهكرين بو پوستهكانى ومكو پهلهمان، نهجومهني پاريزگكان.... هتد خوولى تاييهت بو شار مزابوونيان لهو بو ارانه بو بكهينهوه. نهماش به سوود وهرگرتن له نهزمونى نهو كهسانهيه كه لهو بو ارانهدا ممارسههتيان ههيووه. به ههمان شيوهه سوود وهرگرين له تواناكانى كهسانى تىر پسيور ومكو ماموستايانى زانكو وكهسانى تىر تهكنوقراط.

كوتايى

Appendix 4: Mawlood Bawamurad, a politburo member of the KIU

چاوپىكەوتنى مەۋلۇد باۋەمۇراد، ئەندامى مەكتەبى سىياسى يەكگرتوۋى ئىسلامىي كوردستان

۲۰۱۲/۸/۲۵، ۱۱:۳۰

پ1/ چۆن ھەست دەكەيت وەكو كوردىكى ئىسلامىي، مەبەست ھەر يەك لە كورد بوون وموسلمان بوون چى دەگەينن بۆت؟

و/ لە راستى دا مروف لە ھەر كۆمەلگايەكدا تەنھا يەك ئىنتىماي نىھ. مروف كۆمەلگايەك شوناس وكۆمەلگايەك ئىنتىمائاتى ھەيھ. من لە رووى ئاينىھە موسلمانم، ئەم شوناسەش دەمبەستىھە بە ھەزاران ومليۇنەھا ومليارەھا خەلكى ترموھ لە رووى زموى لە چوارچىوھى دىنىكدا، كە ئەويش دىنى ئىسلامە. شوناسىكى ترم كورد بوونە، وە خەلكى ئەم كوردستانەم. وە (خاصية) نەتھەمبەستىھە بىرىتھە لە زمانەكەم، كەلتورەكەم، جل وبەرگەكەم، (عادات وتقاليد)، وە ئەو چوارچىوھى جوگرافىھە كە باو باپىرمان لە سەرى ژياوين. واتە كۆمەلگايەك شت من لە خەلك جيا دەكاتھە كە پىنى دەبم بە كورد. كەواتە شوناسى كوردبوونم كاتىك ديارە كە بەرانبەرم ەبەب وفارس وتورك ھەيھ. لىرموھ من ھەلگىرى تايھەتمەندىھەكى ئىنسانىم كە پىنى دەوترىت كورد بوون. ئەمەش كۆمەلگايەك جياكارىھە لە نىوان ئىمەھ ئەوان. لىرموھ من كوردم وەكو كائىنكى مروفى، ھەروھە موسلمانىشم وەكو ئىنتىما بۆ ئاينىكى (توحيدى) ناسمانى.

پ2/ ئەگەر بىتو سەيرى تىۋرى برايانى موسلمان بەكەين دەبىنن ھەر لە سالى ۱۹۲۸ موھ ستراتىژىھەكيان ھەبووھ بۆ كار، كە ئەويش دروستكردنەھە تاكى موسلمان وخىزانى موسلمان وكۆمەلگايەك موسلمان وھكومەتى ئىسلامىي وپەكپىگرتنەھە خاكەكانى ئىسلام وپاشان دروستكردنەھە خىلافتى ئىسلامىي. ئىستا ئىوھ وەكو مىللەتتىكى بى دەولەت لە كويى ئەم ستراتىژىھەدان؟ ئايا خىلافتى ئىسلامىي دروست دەبىت؟

و/ بە شىۋىھەكى گشتى بىر كوردنەھە برايانى موسلمان كاردانەھە ئەو بارودۇخە بووھ كە تىپىدا دروست بوون. لە ژىر كارىگەرى ھىرشە گشت گىرەكانى دەولەتە كۆلۇنيالىستەكاندا، كۆمەلگايەك بەھا ھاتە كايەھ لە نىو كۆمەلگايەك موسلمانەكاندا. وە بە لاي كۆمەلگايەك موسلمانەكانەھە، پىش ھەموويان برايانى موسلمان زورىك لەو شتەنە كە لە ژىر سايەھى ئەو سەردەمەدا ھاتنە كايەھ نامۇ بوون بە كۆمەلگايەك موسلمانەكان. ھەر بۆيە لە كاردانەھە رووخانى خىلافتى عوسمانى برايانى موسلمان وشەھى خىلافت دەكەنە نامانجيان، ئەگىنا ھەموو كەس دەبىزانى پاش دابەش كوردنى مىراتى دەولەتى عوسمانى لە پاش گرىبەستى سايكس پىكۆ وە، ئىتر زۆر ئەستەمبوو كە جارىكى تر ئەو خاكەنە يەكيان پى بگىرىتەھە. بەلام برايانى موسلمان لەبەردەم ئەم كوردارە گەورە ئەم كاردانەھە ھەل كوردنى نامانجى خىلافتىھە ھەلگرت. لە بەر ئەو لەو كاتەدا نە دەكرا كۆمەلگايەك ئىسلامىي ھەستىت بەھو جۆرە كارە، بە بى ئەھە قسەھى ھەبىت لە سەر خىلافت. ئەگىنا كاردانەھە برايانى موسلمان بەرانبەر بە كۆلۇنيالىستەكان كاردانەھە بووھ بەرانبەر بەھو دوركەوتتەھە لە ئاين وبەھا ئاينەكان. لە بەر ئەھە دەتوانىن بلنن برايانى موسلمان بزوتتەھەھەكى دەستگرتتە بە شوناسى ئاينى و، زىندوكردنەھە گيانى ئاينىھە. وە بۆ دەستگرتتەھە بە بەھاكەنى ئىسلام شتىكى سروسىتھە كە دەبىت بانگەواز لە ئاستى تاكدا بىكرىت، پاشان خىزانىش لە دەرنىجامدا دروست دەبىت و، پاشانىش كۆمەلگايەك موسلمان. ئەنجا نامانجەكانى تر لە رۇشنايى (وما أرسلناك الا رحمة للعالمين) موھ ھاتوھ. بەلام لىرەدا دوو شت تىكەلاو بوون، ئاين وەكو پەيامى خودا بۆ ھەموو مروفەكان، وە ئاين وەكو (طرح) تىكى سىياسى. بەلام بوونى كيانىكى سىياسى يەكگرتوۋى جىھانى قەت ناتوانىت ھوكمى جىھان بىكات، چونكە

دەبىت سەرۆكى ھەبىت، دەبىت دەسەلات ھەبىت. بە درىژايى مېژووش رووى نەداو ھە دەسەلاتىك ھەبىت ھوكمى دنيا بكات. ھەر بۆيە ئەمانە زياتر دروشمن جوانن، نەك تىزى سىياسى عەقلانى.

بىننەو ھەر يەكگرتوو، يەكگرتوو ھەكو كۆمەلئىكى بانگخووزى پاشخان ئىخوانى، ۋە ئىخوان كاتىك لە عىراقدا لە ھەفتاكان تووشى شەكست ۋە لەبەر يەك ھەلوھشاندن بوو، ۋە مەراقب عامى ئىخوان لە عىراقدا بەواتاى [بىريارى داو ھە ھەو حىزبە رابگىرئىت. ۋە لە بەر ئەو ھە كوردستاندا ھەردەم جۆرە ئازادىيەك ھەبوو، ۋە بە تايبەتى كە عىراق زۆر دژايەتى بزوتتەو ھەي [تۆزىك ھەكو مەتى عىراق دەسەلاتى لاواز بوو نەشىونالېستى كوردى دەكرد، بە تايبەت كە ھەندىك لەو نەشىونالېستانە چەپ بوون، جۆرىك لە پەراويزى جۆلانەو بۆ تەوژمى ئىسلاميانە ھەبوو. لە بەر ئەو تەوژمى ئىسلامىي لە سەر شىووزى بانگەوازى ئىخوانى كۆتايى پىنەھات. راستە رىكخستى نەبوو، بەلام ھەكو بانگەواز بەردەوام بوو. لە بەر ئەو كەسايەتە كوردى ئىخوانىيەكانى (جىل)ى دووم لە ھەشتاكاندا كەوتتە بىرى رىكخستن. ھەر بانگەوازى ئىخوانى بۆخۆى ئاكارىكى گىرنگى ھەيە كە نەوئىش بانگەوازەكە رىكخستە (نەن نەعو بالنتىم، ۋە لا نەعو للنتىم). ئەمەش ۋاى كوردو ھە ئىخوان ھەرچەندە تووشى قەيرانىش بىن، ھەر كە دەرفەتى بانگەوازىيان ھەبوو، لەبەر ئەم سترەكچەرى بانگەوازەكەيان بە ئاسانى ھەلدەسنەو. ۋە لە بانگەوازەكەدا پلە بەندى ھەيە، كە ئەوئىش بۆ خۆى پلە بەندى ۋە سترەكچەرى رىكخستە. ۋە يەكگرتووش لە سەر بىنەمى كىشەى كورد دروست نەبوو. ۋە ئا حىزبىك نەبوو ۋە لادمانەو ھەي چارەسەركى كىشە نەتەوھەيەكانى بە ئىعتبارى ئەو ھەي كە كورد بەشەيكە لە عىراق لە رووى دابەشكردنى جوگرافىيەو، بەلام نەتەوھەيكى سەر بەخۆيە پىنويستە مافى چارەى سەر بەخۆيى ھەبىت. گەر بگەرئىنەو بۆ سەرئەوئى دروست بوونى يەكگرتوو، ۋە لە بەيانى يەكەمى دا ھاتوو كە بۆ ئەو دروست بوو كەوا ھەكو چوارچىوھەيكى سىياسى خۆى كۆبكاتەو، ۋە:

(۱) خۆى لە (ممنوع) بوون ۋە ئا خۆى لە قەدە غەكردن بىپارئىزئىت.

(۲) ئەنجا ئەم حىزبەش ئۆرگانىك بوو بۆ بانگەواز كوردن.

(۳) ئەم كۆمەلە لە كۆمەلەكانى تر خۆى جىيا بكاتەو.

ئەوكاتەش ديارە ئەحزابى تىرى ئىسلامىي ھەبوو، ھەكو بزوتتەوئى ئىسلامىي، كە بزوتتەوھەيكى چەكدارى بوو. ئەنجا سەلەفەيەكان ھەبوو ۋە ھەيە كە ئەوانىش جۆرى بىر كوردنەوئى خۆيان ھەيە. ئەنجا ئىخوان موسلمىن ھەبوو كە ناسراو بە بزوتتەوھەيكى (ۋەسلى اعتدال)ى. ۋە سەر كوردايەتى ئەوكاتەى ئىخوان لە كوردستان قەناعەتى ۋەبوو كە پىنويستە ئىمە ئەم ئارامىي ھەرئىم بىپارئىزىن. ئەنجا لەو سەرئەوئى يەكگرتوو ھەولى داو كە لە رىنگاى رىكخراو ھەي خىزخووزىيەكانەو زۆرترىن خەلكى كوردستان بەرەو دىندارى بەرئىت. بەلام لە ھەمانكاتدا ھەر لە بەياننامەى يەكەمى حىزبدا ھاتوو كە ئىمە ھەول دەدەين كە سەرئەوئى رىكخراو ئىسلامىيەكان بەرەو كىشەى كورد رەكئىشەين. ۋە لە كۆنگرەى دووم ھەندى شت كرانە سترەتئىزىيەت لەوانە ھەولدان بۆ ھىنانى رىكخراو ئىسلامىيەكان ۋە پىشتىگىرىيان بۆ كىشەى كورد، ھەولدان بۆ پاراستنى فرمىي لە كوردستان، ھەولدان بۆ پاراستنى ئاسايشى ھەرئىم. ۋە ئەمانە كۆمەلە سترەتئىزىيەتئىكى ئەوكاتەى حىزب بوون.

ۋە خىلافەت بەلاى ئىمەو فۆرمىكە لە دەسەلاتى موسلمانانى ئەو سەردەمە، ۋە بە ھىچ شىوھەيك بەلگەيەكى شەرى لەسەر پابەندبوون بە خىلافەت نەي. ۋە سىياسەت پىرۆسەيەكى عەقلانىيە، ۋە ھەكو مە بەو واقە سىياسىيەى كە تىپادا دەزئىت. ئىمە ئىستا لە ھەرئىمى كوردستان محكومىن بە كىشەى نەتەوھەكەمان كە برىتئە لە مافە سىياسىيەكانى گەلى كورد لە نىوان گەلەكانى رۆژ ھەلاتى ناومرەست. لە بەر ئەو ۋە وورده ۋە وورده بە تىپەر بوونى كات يەكگرتوو بەم ئاقاردا ھاتوو. ۋە يەكگرتوو بە ھىچ شىوھەيك بىر كوردنەوئى خىلافەى نەي. ئىمە لە كوردستاندا دەزئىن، ۋە محكومىن بەو واقىعەى كە تىپادا دەزئىن. ۋە زەمىنە كۆمەلەيەتئىكەى ئىمە، ۋە زەمانەكە تحكوم دەكات بە ئەو ھەي كە ئەم حىزبە چۆن جموجل بكات. ۋە ھەموو حىزبئىك كۆمەلئىك فاكتەرى سىياسى ۋە كۆمەلەيەتى ۋەزىنگە سىياسىيەكە ئاراستەى دەكەن كە بەرەو كوئى بروات. حىزب

سروشتى ياسكىلى ھەيە، ئەگەر بە بەردەوام بايدان لى نەدەيت دەبىت يان بوستئىت يان دەكەويت. لە بەر ئەو ئىمە ناتوانىن كۆمەلە خەلكئىك كۆبەيەنەو لە دەور كۆمەلە دروشمئىك كە نە ئاسوئەيكى روونى ھەيە، نە

له ئىستاشدا بوونى ھەيە. يەككەك لە شكستى زور ئىك لە حيزبە ئىسلامىي و عىلمانىيەكانى ئەم ناوچەيە ئەومىيە كە ناتوانن داھىنان بىكەن لە كارە سىياسىيەكانيان. چونكە سىياسەت داھىنانىيەكى عەقلىيە بۆ ئەو واقىعەي كە تىيداي. وە سىياسەت (تدبىر الامور)ە، بەلام لە پەنجا سالى پىشوو دا ئىسلامىيەكان لە ناو بىرى مېژوودا ژباون، ئىتر ئەو مېژووە ناوى خىلافەي لى دەنىيت، ناوى حوكمى خاويى لى دەنىيت، يان پىرۆزى دەكەيت چونكە ھىچ داھىنانىيەكان تىدا نەكردووە سەر ناگرنىت. لە بەر ابەرىشدا ئەوانەي كە بە ناوى عىلمانىيەتووە لە پۆژئاوا شتىيەكان ھىناووە، بە ھەمان شىوہ داھىنانيان تىدا نەكردووە. وە لە بەر ئەو كە نەيانتوانيوە نە لە گەل واقىعەكەي خۆياندا بژيىن، وە نەيشيان توانيوە موتوربەي ئەو شتە ھىنراوہ بىكەن سەر كەوتوو نەبوون. وە من ھوى سەرەكى شكستى ئەم و لاتانە بۆ ئەو دەگەر ئىمەوہ چونكە سىياسەتمەدارەكانى ئەم وولاتانە داھىنەر نىن. خۆيان داھىنانى بىرى سىياسى و تدبىرى ئومورى خۆيان ناتوانن لە سەر كۆمەلنىك تىزىزى بىرو بۆچون بىكەن كە لە كەلتورى خۆيان و واقىعەي خۆيان و واقىعەي ئىنسانى و كەونى دروست بووبىت. ئەمرو لە دنبادا كۆمەلنىك تىزى فىكرى و سىياسى ھەيە لە بىرى دىموكراتى و لىبىرالنىدا بۆ ئىمە شتى (حىايە)ين، ئەوئەندە بە كەلك و گەورەن، چونكە سىياسەت مادام پروسەيەكى عەقلىيە بوو وە ھەموو بەر ھەمە چاكەكانى مېژوو سىياسەتيان گەياندووە ئەمرو، كەواتە تويش مادام سىياسەت دەكەيت بە شتىيەك لىھوان و بە شتىيەك لىھەم بەر ھەمە سىياسىيە. ئىمە دەتوانىن لە كەلتورى مروفايەتى ئەم بەر ھەمە سىياسىيە بىننىن. ئەو ھەلەيەي عىلمانىيەكان و ئىسلامىيەكانى و لاتانى ئىمە تىكەوتون ئەومىيە لە برى ئەوہي بەھا سىياسىيە سەر كەوتوو ھەمەكان بەيىن، دەرۆن فورم و سكىچ و چوارچىوہەكان دەھىنن. لە كاتىكدا حسابى ئەم زەمىنە سىياسىيەي ئىريەمان نەكردووە. وە ھەموو پروسەيەكى سىياسى ئاوا بە مىكانىيەكى ھىنانى و مكو فورم، نەگۇنجاو دەبىت لە گەل ژىنگە سىياسىيەكە لە ھەموو بوارە كۆمەلەيەتى و كەلتورى و روشنىبىرى. لە بەر ابەرىشدا ھىنانى ئەو فورمە مېژويانەش و مكو فورم و چوارچىوہەي سىياسى بە ھەمان شىوہ شكست دەخۆن، چونكە ئىرمو ئىستا واقىعەي تىرى سىياسىيە. وە باشترىن شت بۆ ئىمە ئەومىيە كە نايە لە مېژوو يان لە دەرەو دەھىننىن بەھا سىياسىيە سەر كەوتوو ھەمەكان بەيىننىن. بۆ نمونە ھەتا رۆزى دوايى بەھاي دادگەرى نەمرە، ئىتر لە ھەر كوتەك بەھىننىت گرنىگ ئەومىيە كە دادگەرى بەرپا بىكات.

بە ھەر حال يەكگرتوى ئىسلامىي كوردستان پاش تىپەرىبوونى چەندىن كۆنگرە، وە بە ھوى ئەومىيە كە تىكەلەوى سىياسەت بوو واقىعەتتىكى سىياسى جىوازى ھەيە لەو ساتە و مەختەي كە تىا ھاتە راگەياندن. ئەمەش ئەومىيە كە يەكگرتوو ئىستا بەشنىكە لە چارەسەرى كىشەكانى نەتەوہەكى خۆي بە شتىوہەكى (حقىي). وە ئىمە چەندىن سالە ئەو ھەمە راگەياندووە كە ئىمە ھاوكارى ھىزە سىياسىيە كوردستانىيەكانىن. وە بىرۆكەي ئەلتەرناتىف لە كوردستان دا بىرۆكەيەكى نا سەر كەوتوو، وە ئەزمونى شەرى چەند سالەي ناوخۆي لى كەوتووە كە لە سەر كىشەي ھاوبەش و ئەلتەرناتىف بوو. چونكە ئەوكاتە پىك و پىك يەكترىان قەبوڵ نەدەكرد وە مكو ھاوبەش، وە نەشيان دەتوانى بىنە ئەلتەرناتىف. بەلام لە داھاتوودا دەبىت ھەلپژاردن ئەم كىشانە يەك لاى بىكاتووە. وە بوونى حىزبىش بە سروسى و اتاى ئەلتەرناتىفى دەسەلات دەگەيەننىت.

و بە شتىوہەكى كەردەيى ئىمە دواي ۲۰۰۳ رۆشتوئەتە نىو پروسەي سىياسى، پاش ئەومىيە كە ھەلپژاردنى ئەنجومەنى پارىزگاكان ئەنجام درا، كە كۆمەلنىك خەلكمان ھەلپژاردن، ئەنجا پاشان ھەلپژاردنى ئەنجومەنى نوئىنەران لە عىراق كرا، وە بە پىكەتەن لە گەل ھاوپەيمانى كوردستانى كۆمەلنىك پەرلەمانتارمان ھەبوو. كەواتە ئىمە بە شتىوہەكى راستەو خۆ وە بە شتىوہەكى كەردەيى لە داوى ۲۰۰۳ لە ھەلپژاردنەكانى ۲۰۰۵ و ۲۰۰۶ و ۲۰۰۹ و ۲۰۱۰ بەشدارى پروسەي سىياسى ھەرىمى كوردستان و عىراقمان كەردە. وە راستەو خۆ پاش روخانى رژىمى عىراق ماموستا صلاح الدىن ئەمىندارى ئەوكاتەي يەكگرتوو ئەندامى ئەنجومەنى حوكمى عىراق بوو، وە من لەو كاتە جىگرى بووم.

وە كارى سىياسى كارىكى زور زور زور ئالۆزە، وە لە لاىەكى ترموش كارىكى بەردەوام گۆراو، لە لاىەكى ترموش كارىكى گشت گىرو ھەمەلايەنەيە. وە كار و كاردانەوہەكانى رووداو سىياسىيەكان ھەموو كاتى توى سىياسى دەگرنىت، وە تۆ ناتوانىت لال بىت لە ناست ئەو رووداوانە. وە ھەموو حىزبىك لە دنبا يەككەك لە ھۆكارەكانى دروست بوونى بوونى كىشەيە. كاتىك لە كۆمەلگايەكدا كىشەيەك ھەيە كۆمەلنىك نوخە كە تواناي ئەمىيان ھەيە بىكەونە پىش كۆمەلنىك خەلك پىك دىن لە سەر ئەومىيە كە چۆن چارەسەرى ئەو قەيرانە بەلام بە داخەو زور جار لەم و لاتانەي ئىمە حىزب دەبىتە چوارچىوہەك بۆ مەز ھەب يان بۆ ئاين يان بۆ بىكەن

تایفه یان بۆ نەتەوہ یان بۆ خەیل یان بۆ عەشیرەت. بەم شێوەیەش حیزب لە چوار چۆنە یان مەبەستەیی کە دەبێت لە پێناویدا دروست بێت لادەدات. بەمەش حیزب کە دەبێت پڕۆسەییکی سیاسی ئیختەبایی بێت، وە هەوڵی ئەوەیەتی کە کۆمەڵێک خەڵک بە کۆمەڵێک بێروبۆچوونەو بەگەیهننیتە دەسەلات دەچیتە دەروە. ئیستا وای لێھاتوو کاتێک رەخە لە حیزبێک دەگریت، وای رەخە یان قەسەت بە ئاینێک یان نەتەوہییەکی یان تیفەییەکی ووتوو. بۆ نمونە ئیستا رەخەییەکی لە حیزبی دەعوە یان ئەنجومەنی ئیسلامی لە عێراق بگرە، وای لێ دێت کە تۆ رەخەت لە شیعە گرتبیت.

پ/۳ کەواتە یەگەرتووی ئیسلامی چۆن حیزبایەتی دەکات؟ وە سیاسەت چی لە یەگەرتوو دەخوایێت، چیشی سەپاندووە بە سەریا؟

و/ ئیمەش وەکو حیزبەکانی تر هەیکەلێلی رێکخستمان هەیە، وە سەرکردایەتیمان هەیە، ئیمە جەماوەریکمان هەیە، وە ئیمە کۆمەڵێک ئەفکار و پرنسیپی سیاسیمان هەیە کە لە بەرنامەی سیاسی خۆماندا نوسیمانە. وە لە رووی سیاسییەو شوناسی ئیسلامیمان هەیە، ئەگەر چی جاری واش هەیە شوناسی ئیسلامی بوون بۆ حیزبی سیاسی دەبێتە هەڵە چونکە شوناسی ئیسلامی بوون شوناسی زۆربەیی تاکەکانی کۆمەڵگاکەمانە. بەلام لێرەدا شوناسی ئیسلامی بوونی ئیمە لە بەرانبەر بە عێلمانی دا دروست بوو. وە لە بنەرەدا حیزبی ئیسلامی لەسەر بنەمای دژایەتی کۆلۆنیالیزم و بەها نامۆکانی بە کۆمەڵگای ئیمە دروست بوو. لە بەر ئەوە ئەم شتە بەر دەوامە تا ئەمڕۆش، پاشان لە ۱۹۲۰ بە دوای رەوتە مارکسی و عێلمانیەکانیش هاتە ئارا، وە چونکە ئەمانەش لە بنەرەدا بزوتنەوێکی دژە ئاینی بوون، بزوتنەوێکی ئیسلامیەکان بۆ هیچیش دروست نە بوونایە بۆ بەرگری لە بەها ئاینیەکانیان بەرانبەر بەمانە دروست دەبوون. کەواتە رەوتی ئیسلامی کاردانەوێکی بە شێوەیەکی گشتی بۆ پاراستنی بانگەوازی ئیسلامی. ئەگەر نا من هەر لە زووەو رای خۆی لەم بارەو هەیە، کە ئەحزابی ئیسلامی پێویست ناکات پاشگری ئیسلامی هەبێت. بەلام چونکە لە کۆمەڵگادا ئەحزابی سۆشیالیست و کۆمەنیست و لیبرال هەیە ئەم ناوێش کە ئەحزابی ئیسلامیە لە بەرانبەریدا پەیدا بوو. وە چونکە ئەمڕۆ (فوقهائ)ی ئەمڕۆش کۆمەڵێک فەتوایان داوە کە نابێت بڕۆیتە ناو ئەو جۆرە ئەحزابانەو، دەرناج ئەمە بوو پێویستیەکی. ئەنجا بوونی پاشگری ئیسلامی ئاماژەیی بۆ شوناسی ئاینی نەکی شوناسی سیاسی، بۆ نمونە کاتێک کە دەلێت یەگەرتووی ئیسلامی کوردستان، پاشگری ئیسلامی ئاماژەیی بۆ ئەوەی کە ئەم حیزبە پابەندە بە (حلال و حرام) و دروشمە ئاینیەکان وەک تاک، هەر وەها پابەندە بە رێنمایە ئیسلامیەکان. ئەگینا لە واقعی سیاسیدا ئیمەش ئیستا لە هەریە کوردستان وەکو حیزبەکانی تر پێداویستیە حیزبەکانمان هەیە وە وەکو ئێوانیش کۆششی سیاسیمان بۆ ئەم خاک و خەڵکیە. وە هەموو ئۆرگانە حیزبەکان و راگەیانندنەکان و جەماوەریەکانمان هەیە، وە خەڵک کاندید دەکەین بۆ پۆستە سیاسییەکان وەکو حیزبەکانی تر. وە لە هەموو کێشە سیاسییەکاندا بە جیدی بەشداری دەکەین. وە ئیستا لە بەرەو ئۆپۆزیسیۆندا کارێکی سیاسی گەرنە ئەنجام دەدەین. وە دەمانەوێت گەندەلی سیاسی و ئیداری و ئابوری لە هەریەدا بنەبەر بکەین، وە خودی ئۆپۆزیسیۆنیش بۆخۆی خواستیکی سیاسی گەرنە دیموکراسیە.

وە ئیمە بەشێکی لە نەتەوہەکی خۆمان، وە نوێنەرایەتی بەشێک لە کۆمەڵگایەیی خۆمان دەکەین. وە هەرکاتێک کە زۆربەر دەنگەکانمان بە دەست هینا دەبینە نوێنەری گەلەکەمان. کەواتە ئیمە باوەرمان وایە دەسەلاتی سیاسی هەلقۆلای دەنگ و متمانەیی ئەو خەڵکیە، وە گەل سەرچاوەی دەسەلاتەکانە. وە لە کەلتوری ئیسلامیشدا هەر وەهاو هاتوو کە (امە) سەرچاوەی دەسەلاتەکانە. وە دەسەلاتی من لە خواوە نیە، دەسەلاتی من لە ئیرادەیی ئەو خەڵکیە کە من دەسەلاتداریان بۆم. ئەوان منیان دانیاو کە دەسەلاتداریان بۆم، خوا منی دانەنیو. خوا تەنها پێغەمبەرانێ نارووە، ئیتر پاش پێغەمبەران سەرچاوەی دەسەلات لای گەلانە. وە 'گەل سەرچاوەی لای زۆربەیی ئیسلامیەکان (حرام)ە، چونکە ئەوان پێیان وایە کە ئەمە تیزیکی دیموکراتیە. وە لە 'دەسەلاتە راستیدا ئەگەر گەل سەرچاوەی دەسەلات نەبێت، ئەم کێشە؟ ئایا جێگەییەکی یان شوێنیەکی هەیە سەرچاوەی دەسەلات بێت بۆ من؟ ئەگەر دەلێت لە شەریعەتەو سەرچاوە دەگریت، شەریعەت کۆمەڵە دەقیکە بۆ پراکتیزەکردن، نەکی بۆ متمانە دان بە من. گەل سەرچاوەی دەسەلاتە بەواتای ئەو دەسەلاتە دەدات بەو

کسانه‌ی که حوکمی بکن، نه‌گینا نهو حوکمه شعرعی نیه. وه هرکاتیکیش بیانهویت نهو دسه‌لاتهم لی وهرگر نهوه، ئیتر نهوکاتمش هر نهوان سرچاوه‌ی دسه‌لاته‌کهن که نایانهویت من ئیتر دسه‌لاتداریم

پ ۴/ نایا شریعة چی ده‌گه‌ینیت به‌لاتانهوه؟

و/ ئیمه به هیچ شیوه‌یهک وهکو به‌کگرتوو قسه‌مان له سهر شریعت به واتای فقه نیه، واتا شریعت به فقه تی ناگهین. به‌لای ئیمهوه شریعت یعنی کۆی هممو نهو شته زهروره‌تانه‌ی ژبان که له (کتاب وسنة) دا ههیه یان له عالهمی (مشهود وسنن) دا ههیه وهکو سید قطب باسی ده‌کات. کهواته شریعت بریتیه له هممو نهو یاسا وپیوره گهوره‌ی گشتیانه که له‌م ژباندا ههیه بۆ نهوه‌ی ئهم که‌ونه‌ی له‌سهر بره‌ی به‌ریوه، وه هه‌ندیکیش (سنن) ی نه‌خلاق‌ی و(سنن) ی کۆمه‌لگایه هیچ به‌لگه‌یه‌کی قورنانی پیوست نیه، بازیکیش نهوه‌یه که له قورن و(السنة الصحيحة) دا هاتوه. ئیمه پیمان وایه هممو شتیکی باش له‌ی ژبان شریعتیه. وه هممو شته چاکه‌کانی مروّف وئهم که‌ونه له خواوه‌یهو شعرعیه. وه زۆر جار نهوانه‌ی که داوای جی به جیکردنی شریعت ده‌کهن، داوای جیبه‌جی کردنی جۆریک فقه ده‌کهن. وه زۆر جاریش بیر له (قصاص) و نه‌حکامی تری شریعت ده‌کهنهوه. ئیمه وا بیر ده‌کهنهوه که کاتیک بگه‌ینه دسه‌لات ئیتر دسه‌لاتی ته‌شرعی کاری یاسا دانان ده‌کات. وه ئه‌گه‌ر زۆر به‌ی خه‌لک پیمان و ابوو که به‌ندیکیش شعرعی بکریت به یاسا، نهوکاته نهوه یاسایه‌کی شعرعیه. وه‌کی تر ئیمه جیبه‌جیکردنی فقه به شعرعی تی ناگهین، به‌لکو نهوه کاروباری یاسادانانه که نوینه‌رانی گه‌ل له دسه‌لاتی ته‌شرعی هه‌لده‌ستن به کاروباری یاسا دانان. ئیمه وهکو به‌گه‌توو ئیسلامی کوردستان خواز یارین خه‌لک به شیوه‌یه‌کی گشتی پابه‌ند بیت به دروشمه‌کانی ئیسلام، خه‌لک پابه‌ند بیت به فرمانه‌کانی ناین، خه‌لک دیندار بیت به‌واتا ته‌واوه‌کی نه‌ک به‌واتای ته‌نها نوێژکردن وپروژوگرتن، واتا به واتای لیبورده‌یی به واتای خۆشه‌یستی، به واتای هاوکاری وپیکه‌وه ژبان وچاکه‌خواری. وه له قورنندا زیاتر له ۲۲۲ جار باسی کردار یان کار هاتوهوه، به‌لام سه‌یر ده‌کهنیت کار لای مارکسیه‌کان ده‌بیته دروشم، وه جیدیته له کار له نه‌روپا هه‌یه نه‌ک لای ئیمه. سه‌یر ده‌کهنیت قورن زۆر زیاتر له فیکری مارکسی باس له (عمل) ده‌کات، ته‌نانه‌ت نهو که‌سانه‌ی که بالترین پایمان لای خوا هه‌یه نه‌وانه‌ن که کرداری بالیان هه‌یه، (وان لیس للانسان الا ما سعی، وان سیعیه سوف یری) (سوف) ئیتر له له قیامه‌تدایت یان له دنیا کهواته (عمل) مهرجی گرنگه بۆ به ئینسانی باش بوون وگه‌شتن به پاداشتی نهو کرداره.

ئیمه له به‌کگرتوو هر له کۆنگره‌ی دووهوه خۆمان به‌کلایی کردۆتهوه، که ووتومه‌نه کیشه‌ی کورد کیشه‌ی خه‌لک و خاکه. کهواته ئیمه کیشه‌ی نه‌ته‌وه‌که‌مان هه‌یه له سهر خاکه‌که‌مان که کوردستانه. کهواته ئیمه هه‌ردوو ره‌گه‌زی گرنگی به ده‌ولت بوونمان هه‌یه که ره‌گه‌زی خه‌لک و ره‌گه‌زی خاکه. وه نهو رۆژگار که کۆنگره دوومان به‌ست له ۱۹۹۶ له ۶۰ تا ۷۰ ریکخراوی خیرخوازی له‌م هه‌ریمه‌دا کاریان ده‌کرد، هه‌مووشیان باسیان له‌وه ده‌کرد که کیشه‌ی کورد له‌م هه‌ریمه کیشه‌یه‌کی مروّیه. به‌لام ئیمه نه‌ومان چه‌سپاند که کیشه‌ی کورد کیشه‌یه‌کی سیاسییه که کیشه‌ی میله‌تیکه له سهر خاکه‌که‌ی. ئه‌مه‌ش به‌ واتایه‌ی که وهکو هه‌موو نه‌ته‌وه‌کانی تر کوردیش مافی سیاسی خۆی هه‌یه. ئه‌مه‌ش ده‌توانین به خه‌لکی وهرچه‌رخانی نه‌وتوی دابنیت له بیر یه‌کگرتوو ئیسلامی کوردستان. به‌لام هه‌شتا نهو کات نه‌مه‌ نه‌بووبوو به‌وه‌ی که ته‌وژی نه‌ته‌وه‌یی ئیسلامی له ناو یه‌کگرتوودا به هه‌یز بکات. به داخه‌وه هه‌ردوو بالی ئیسلامی نهو کات، هه‌م باله ئیخوانیه‌که هه‌م باله سه‌له‌فیه جیهاده‌که کاریگه‌ر بوون به ده‌روه‌ی خۆیان. هه‌یه تا ئیستاش باوه‌ری وایه که هر له کیشه‌ی نه‌ته‌وایه‌تی گه‌ریین، وه به شتیکی خرابی ده‌زانن. وه زۆر جار لای جیهاده‌یه‌کان ناوی معسکه‌ر مه‌کان ده‌نران جه‌وه‌هر دودایه‌ف بۆ نمونه، ئه‌مه‌ش نهوه ده‌گه‌ینیت که ئهم خه‌لکه باس له دامه‌زراندنی حکومه‌تیک ئیسلامی ده‌کهنهوه، نه‌ک خه‌ریک بن کیشه نه‌ته‌وایه‌تیکانیان چاره‌سه‌ر بکهن. وه له به‌نه‌رندا حکومه‌ت بریتی یه له ئیداره‌ی به‌ریوه‌بردنی کۆمه‌لگا. وه حکومه‌ت هر شوناسی نیه، به‌لام ئه‌مه کاردانه‌یه‌که له ژیر کاریگه‌ری بیر مارکسی چه‌پدا که نه‌وان حکومه‌تیک کۆمۆنیستی و حکومه‌تیک کریکاری و چه‌پ، دسه‌لاتیک که‌وا له بیر تاییته‌ی خۆیاندا هاتوهوه. وه له به‌رانبه‌ردا کاردانه‌وه‌ی له سهر ئیسلامیه‌کان هه‌بوو که نه‌وانیش داوای حکومه‌تی ئیسلامی بکهن.

له ناو هەر حیزبێکدا پێنج رەگەز هەیە، یەکەم بریت یە لەو کۆمەڵە خەڵکەکانی که له دەوری کۆ دەبنهوه، ئەم خەڵکەش له دەور کۆمەڵێک ئەفکار و مبادئ کۆ دەبنهوه که دهکاته رەگەزی دووم، له بەر ئەوهی ئیستا ئەومەهه باوی ئەفکار ئەماوه دەتوانین بڵاین پرۆژەیهکی سیاسی. وه رەگەزی سێهەم بۆ حیزب بریتیه له ریکخستن، وه هەموو حیزبەکانی رۆژەلاتی ناوەراست به ئیسلامی و عیلمانیهوه له سەر فورم و ستایلی حیزبی مارکسی بەریوه دەچن. رەگەزی چوارەم جەماوەره، ئەگینا ئەم حیزبه دەبێتە حیزبی نەخبه، یان حیزبی بنه‌م‌الە. وه رەگەزی پێنجەم هەولێ گەشتتە به دەسه‌لات. وه ئیمەش هەر له سەر هەمان شیوازی حیزبایەتی کار دەکەین. جەوهەری ئەساسی حیزب بریتی یە له ریکخستنی حیزب. وه بۆ ئەم ریکخستنه‌ش چۆنیتی پەروردهو پێگەیانندن زۆر گرنگه. وه بۆ ئەوهی بته‌و‌یت ئەفکاری حیزب بگۆریت پێویسته بەرنامە ی پەرورده و پێگەیانندی ئەندامان بگۆریت، ئەگینا هەر چەندە درووشمەکان و ئامانجەکانیش بگۆریت ئەومەهه کرنگ نین. وه ئەفلاتون یەکەم کەسه که باس لەوه دهکات که سیاسی باش ئەو سیاسیهیه که پەرورده‌کراوه. له‌بەر ئەوه پەرورده تەنها چەمکی ئیخوانی ئیسلامی نیه. هەر بۆیه ئیفلاتون ئەوه‌شی ووتوه که دهسه‌لاتدارەکان یان دەبیت فەیلەسوفەکان بن یان ئەوانه بن که راویژ به فەیلەسوفەکان دەکن، وانا عەق‌لی ئەوهیان ههیه که له فەیلەسوفەکان تێبگن. ئیمه ئەگەر چی له کۆنگره‌ی دوو ووتمان کێشه‌ی کورد کێشه‌ی خەڵک و خاکه، به‌قەد ئەوه خەڵک و هۆشیاریمان بلانوه‌کردوه. چونکه له راستیدا پارته نەتەوییه‌کان و میژووی تەوژمی نەتەوه‌یی په‌نجا سال لەوه پێش دهستی پێ کردبوو. ئەمەش بەشیکێ نەتەوییه‌کان و میژووی وه بەشیکێ تریشی نەتەوییه‌کان چەپ بووه، وه به هەردووکیان بەرانبەر به عەرب و ئاین. ئیمەش به‌لای هەندیکیان‌هوه به نوێنەری ئاین و عەربیه‌شی دانراوین.

بەم شێوه‌یه وورده وورده فیکری سیاسی یه‌ک‌گرتوو له کۆنگره‌ی دوومه له ۱۹۹۶ پێشکەوتوه، وه پرۆژه‌ی سیاسیه‌که‌ی بۆ خزمەتی نەتەوه‌و نیشتمان‌ه‌که‌یه‌تی. وه ئیستا یه‌ک‌گرتوو ئیسلامی کوردستان هه‌چی کهم نیه له پارته نەتەوییه‌کانی تر، وه ئیستا هۆشیاری نەتەوه‌یی لای ئەندامانی ئیمه به‌شیکه له ناخ و نه‌ستیان. ئیستا له هه‌ستی هه‌موو ئەنداماندا ئەوه دروست بوو مین و بێرانی‌م. ئاوا هه‌ست ده‌کەین که ئیمه ئەگەر براین له گەل عەربێکدا، به‌لام مافی سیاسی خۆمان هه‌یه. به هەمان شێوه له‌گەل تۆرک و فارس و نەتەوه‌کانی تریشدا ئەوه لای ئەندامانمان دروست بووه. ئەگەر چی ئیمه شو‌قین‌یست نین و به‌که‌م سه‌یری نەتەوه‌کانی تر ناکه‌ین. هەر بۆیه به‌لای ئەمریکیه‌کان‌هوه کاتێک که له عێراق بوون ئەم شیوازه‌ی یه‌ک‌گرتوویان به پردیک ده‌زانی بۆ نیوان خۆشی نەتەوه‌کانی عێراق. بۆ ئەوه‌ی شه‌ری نەتەوه‌یی نه‌بیت، وه پێک‌دادان روو نه‌دات له نیوان نەتەوه‌کان که له رووانگه‌یه‌کی (ع‌نصری) یه‌وه له‌وانه‌یه هەر کاتێک هه‌ل‌گه‌رسیت. به‌لام ئەمریکیه‌کان له‌وانه‌یه ئیستا ده‌رکی ئەوه‌یان نه‌کردبیت که ئیمه وه‌کو کورد کێشه‌ی سیاسیمان هه‌یه نه‌ک رەگەز پەرس‌تی. وه به‌پێی هه‌موو مافه نیو نەتەوییه‌کان و مافه ئیسلامیه‌کان و ئاینه‌کانی تریش کوردیش وه‌کو میلیتانی تر ته‌واوی مافی نەتەوه‌یی خۆی هه‌یه. ئەم گه‌شه‌کردنه له بیری نەتەوییه‌کانی لای یه‌ک‌گرتوو گه‌شه‌کردنیک س‌روش‌تیه. ئیستا بزوتنه‌وه ئیخوانیه‌کان به هه‌چ شێوه‌یه‌ک پ‌الپشتی نەتەوییه‌کانی کوردی ناکه‌ن، به‌ل‌کو تاوانباریشی ده‌کەن. به‌لام ئەگەر له ئێران بزوتنه‌وه‌یه‌کی ئیسلامی کوردی بوايه چونکه ئێران له نەتەوه‌ی عەرب نیه، ئەوا ئیخوان زۆر به جیدی پ‌شتیوانی لێ ده‌کردن.

وه سیاسه‌ت هه‌رده‌م له واقع دا ده‌کریت، وه واقه‌یش هه‌رده‌م زۆر شت ده‌سه‌پ‌ن‌یت به سەر کاری سیاسیدا. کاتێک که پ‌ی‌غ‌مه‌بەر (د. خ.) وه‌حی‌شی بۆ ده‌هات، وه‌حی داواي ئەوه‌ی لێ ده‌کرد که به‌شیک لهو کۆمە‌ل‌گا باشه بیکه. له بەر ئەوه من قه‌ناعه‌تم وایه گەر ئیستا پ‌ی‌غ‌مه‌بەر (د. خ.) له‌م واقعه بوايه ۹۵% که‌لتوری دیموکراتی و مرده‌گرت، چونکه دا‌هینانیکێ مرو‌ویی چاکه، مرو‌وف ده‌توانیت بیکاته به‌شیک له بەرنامه بۆ خۆی. ئەوه‌ته خه‌لیفه‌کان دا‌هینانی فارسه‌کانیان هیناوه، چونکه دا‌هینانیکێ مرو‌وبه. له‌بەر ئەوه کێشه له سیاسه‌ت نیه، به‌ل‌کو کێشه له تێگه‌شتن له سیاسه‌ته. ئەم تێگه‌شتنه‌ش به‌پێی واقع و کات ده‌گۆریت. بۆ نمونه کاتی خۆی زۆربه‌ی سه‌رکرده ئیخوانیه‌کانی عێراق له‌وانه مح‌د احمد الراشد و عدنان الد‌لیمی و طارق الهاشمی و زۆریکی تریان فیدرالیه‌تیان به گه‌وره‌ترین فیتنه بۆ عێراق ده‌زانی، به‌لام ئیستا گه‌وره‌ترین داواي ئەوان ج‌نیه‌ج‌یکردنی فیدرالیه‌ته. بۆ نمونه ئیستا که ئیخوان دا‌کوکی له عێراق یان میسر یان سوریا یان قه‌ته‌ر ده‌کات واته دا‌کوکی له سایکس پ‌یکو ده‌کات.

ب۵/ تو له قسهكانندا ووتت همموو شتتيكي باش لهم دنبايه شرعيه، وه بهشيكه له شريعت ئايا گهر وابتت بوجي رمخنهتان له عيلمانيهت هميه، وه زور جار عيلمانيهت شتي زور باشي هميه؟

و/ عيلمانيهت راسته كه پرؤسهيهكي رؤژئاوايه له هملؤوشاندنوهي پيومندي نئوان ئاين وسياست، بهلام ئاين به واتاي ئاين نا، بهلكو به واتاي دسهلاتتيكي ئايني فمزركارو به سهر كؤمهلگا. وه ئيمه ههر له كؤنگره يهكههموه باسي ئهوهمان كردوه كه پشتگيري له دهولتتيكي ديموكراتي مهدهني فرمبي دهكهن. كهواته عيلمانيهت پرؤسهيهكي گؤريني دسهلاتتيكي ئاينيه بؤ دسهلاتتيكي مهدهني به شئويهك كه همموو خهلك له سهر بنههاي هاوالاتي بوون پيكهوه بزوين، وه خهلك به ناوي خواوه دسهلات نعبات بهريوه. ئيمهش له باسي جيبهجيكردي شريعت باس له جيبهجيكردي ئهحكامي (فقه)ه. كهواته لاي ئيمه شري ئاين ودهولتتمان نيه. له رؤژئاوا شري دسهلاتتيكي ديني همبووه لهگهل كؤمهلگايهكي مهدهني، وه همموو كس دمبنت مامله بكرت له سهر بنههاي هاوالاتي بوون، نهك هاو ئايني بوون. ئيمه دهكرت هاو ئاين بين لهگهل كهسيك له فرمسا يان نايجيريا، بهلام هاوالاتي بوون له سهر بنهمار ئه گرئ بهسته كؤملايهتيه يه كه خهلكي دمبستتتهوه به خاكيكهوه، وه سيستم و حكومتهتيك بهريوهي دهبات. هاوئايني بوون ههستتيكي روجي ويژداني پيروزه. كهواته ئيمه له ئيسلامدا كيشه دسهلاتي ئاينمان نيه، نهگهر چي خهلكي كيش به ناوي خليفهشوه حوكمي كرديت. بهلام ئيمه له ناو دهقه شرعيهكان شتي وامان نيه كه به ناوي خواوه حوكم بكرت، دسهلات هي ئومهته وه دسهلاتدار دادمنيت وچاوديزيشي دهكات ولاشي دهبات.

بهلام ئهوانهي كه له سهر بنههاي هاوالاتي بوون ماملههي يهكسان ناكهن لهگهل هاوالاتياندا چونكه موسلمان نين، له راستيدا ئهوانه تيگهشتتتيكي چموت وههزرهكارانهيان هميه، وه بؤ چونهكانيان هيچ پهمنديهكيان به ئيسلاموه نيه. بهلام عيلمانيهت له ولاتي ئيمهدا عيلمانيهتيكي دزه ئاينه. وه ئهم بهناو عيلمانيهتمش له راستيدا بههاكاني لهگهل بههاي كؤمهلگاكانماندا ناخوات. وه زور جار له خوا چييه، پيغهمبهر چييه، مزگوتت بؤ چييه چ سوديكي لي دمبنت وه دست پي دهكهن. ليژه دهيانهوتت كؤمهلگا بي باور بكن، نهك دسهلات علماني كهن. بهلام له رؤژئاوا عيلمانيهت بهواتاي دسهلاتتيكي مهدهني بهواتاي دسهلاتي همموو هاوالاتيانه له سهر بنههاي هاوالاتي بوون. عيلمانيهت لاي ئيمه له دزايهتي كردني نايندا بيست ههنگاو چون، بهلام له ديموكراتيزهكردني دسهلاتي سياسي دا نيو ههنگاو نهچوون. چونكه ئهم بيرانه (استيراد) دهكرين ليژه بهرهم ناهينرين، له كاتيكا ئيمه پئويستمان به داهينانه له واقعي كؤمهلگاكهمان. نهگهر چي له دواي نهومدهكانهوه و، له دواي دهركهوتني روتتي بههيزي ئيسلامي له توركيوا ههرسههيناني بلوكي رؤژههلات ئهم بؤچوانه تا راديهك گؤراون. بهلام هيشتا روتتي ئيسلامي (مراجعاتي) زوري پئويسته.

ب۶/ پاشگري ئيسلامي خوتان حمز دهكهن ههبيت يان واقع پني بهخشون؟

و/ له راستيدا بهشيكه جياكردنوهي ئه شوناسه كه ئيمه ههمانه. مادام له ولاتي ئيمهدا شتتيك هميه ناوي حيزبي سوشياليست وكؤمونيست وناشيوناليسته، شتتيكي سروشتيه كه حيزب ههبيت ناوي ئيسلامي بيت. ئهم پاشگرمش ئاماژهيه بؤ جياكردنوهي ئه كؤمهلگه خلكهي كه له چوار چيوهي ئهم حيزبهدا كاردهكهن كه پابهندن به ئاداب ودروشمهكاني ئاين. وه خهلكيكن سهرچاوهي كاري سياسيان له بير وپرنسيپهكاني شريعتتهوه ومرگيراوه. بهلام ئهمه شوناسي سياسي بؤ ئيمه دروست نهكردوه. ئهمه ئيمه له ئهاني تر ومكو ئيلتزام به ئايني ئيسلاموه جياكردتتهوه. وه ئهم پاشگرمش ومكو ناو ههبيت يان نهبيت هيچ له كيشهكه ناگؤريت، چونكه ناوهروك گرنگه نهك ناو. وه ئهم پاشگره ئيسلاميهش نهومته بار به سرمانهوه. وه ئيساش له بههاري عهربي دا ههرچي حيزبي ئيسلامي هميه همموو به ناوي عدالت ونازادي وگهشهسندنهوه هميه، نهك به پاشگري ئيسلاميهوه. بهلام ئيمه له راستيدا ئيمه هيشتا نهمانتوانيوه جهامورتيك له سهر بنههاي پرؤژهي سياسي له خو كؤكهينهوه.

پ/۷/ ئەگەر ئىستانا يەكگرتوو دامەزرىنن، ئايا پاشگىرى ئىسلامىي ھەلدەبژىرن؟

و/ نەخىر. ھەر لە بنەرەندا ناوى يەكگرتووى ئىسلامىي كوردستان، لە راستىدا خۇمان ھەزمان كورد كە ھاوشىوھى راببىطھى ئىسلامىي كورد بىت كە رىكخراوىكى خىرخوازى خۇمان بوو. ئەگىنا ھەر ئەو كات لەوانەيە ناومان بىنايە (عدالة واحسان). وەگەر ئىستانا دروستمان كوردبايە بە دۇنيايىھوھ ناومان دەنيا شتىكى وەكو (عدالة والتتمية).

پ/۸/ چۆن مافى چارەى خۇنووسىنتان كوردە ستراتىژى سىياسىتان؟

و/ ئىمە دۇنيا بووين كە توركەكان باش توركايەتى دەكەن و، فارسەكان باش فارسايەتى دەكەن و، عەرەبەكان باش عەرەبايەتى دەكەن، لە پال ئەوھشدا باش دىندارى دەكەن. ئىمەش گەشتىنە ئەو قەناعتەى كە ئەم مىللەتەى ئىمە لە بەردەم شالائوىكى گەورەدايەو، (مقومات)ى دەولەت بوونىشى تىدايە. ئىمە بە دەر لەوھى كە پارەى نەوت دەرواتە گىرفانى كىوھ، بەلام يەككىك لە (مقومات)ى بە دەولەت بوون برىتى يە لە نابورىەكى باش، ئەم نابورىەش لە كوردستاندا ھەيە. ئەنجا لە چوار دەورى ئىمە كۆمەللىك دەسەللىتى مەزھەبى ھەيە، كە ئەمە كارىگەرى سەلبى لە سەر ھەرىمى كوردستان ھەيە. لە ھەمان كاتدا ئىمە وەكو ئىسلامىي لە ناوچەكە لە ھەموو زياتر ھىزىرتىن. وە ئىمە ھەول دەمىن ئەم پروژەيە (تسويق) بكمىن بۇلايان، چونكە ئىمەو ئەوان لە يەك شوناسدا ھاوبەشىن كە برىتى يە لە شوناسى ئايىنى، بەلام لە شوناسى نەتەوھىيش لە يەكتر جىاوازىن. بەلام ئەوھ دەمىنئىتەوھ كە ئايا ئىمە لەم كارە سەرگەوتوو دەبىن؟ وە دەتوانىن ئەمە بكمىنە بەشنىك لە مادەى خەباتى سىياسى ئەندامانمان؟

كۆتايى

Appendix 5: Dlawar Aladdin, the former minister of the Higher Education and Scientific Research of the region, who answered my question by email

Dear Kak Mohammad,

Apologies for the delay in responding.

Your question on the contribution of KIU into Kurdistan Nationalism is a complex one, and requires historic, cultural, political and social considerations. You might be well advised to debate this with some of the KIU leaders such as Mr Salahaddin Bahaddin and Abubakir Karwani, who are well versed with this topic.

From my point of view, I can see the following:

- a. 1. KIU was founded on the brotherhood's principles by people who were either affiliated to, or closely associated with, MB. From the outset, they adopted a very moderate or diluted nationalistic approach. They adopted a non-violent and non-confrontational approach to advance their cause, thereby avoiding overt nationalistic policies, which contrasted with other Islamist parties. KIU had a long term vision that defined their pathway to power. They initially focused primarily on preaching and aiding the poor, the young and the educated. This strategy served their objectives well. They grew exponentially, particularly during the difficult times for the 1990s, gathering palpable support and sympathy across Kurdistan Region. Up to this point, they did not need to engage in public debates on nationalisms. Their transformation came when they needed to translate their ground support into votes for power.
- b. 2. In keeping with MB movements elsewhere and with Turkish AKP, KIU entered the parliamentary political process in Kurdistan and began competing for votes during subsequent elections. They needed to appeal to a wider (more secular) audience than their traditional Islamic sympathisers. They had to compete with the secular nationalistic parties, including the KDP and PUK, as well as the other Islamist parties (Komall and Bizutnawa). They therefore introduced numerous Kurdish nationalistic narratives into their literature and began to debate these openly. They had to be seen to be promoting the Kurdish cause, Kurdish identity and Kurdish nationalism in addition to moderate Islam. As a result, by design or by default, they end up contributing significantly

to the Kurdish nationalism. The evidence becomes clearer when you look at their policies and performance (of their MPs and Ministers) in Baghdad against anti-Kurdish lobby.

c. On the international stage, KIU founders and supporters presented themselves as Kurds while integrating with international Muslim world. They promoted the Kurdish cause, Kurdish culture, Kurdish distinctive identity. They achieved milestones for the Kurds among Islamic movements in the Arab and Islamic world. They won financial and political support too.

d. 3. As a competitive political party, KIU had to keep an eye on its Islamist competitors Komall, Bizutnawa. In considering religious nationalism in Kurdistan, the other parties cannot be ignored. Therefore, I suggest you introduce some comparative alignment between all three Islamist parties. Bizutnawa was established well before KIU in Kurdistan and has a much longer history of engaging in internal and external debate on religious nationalism.

I hope you find these useful.

Dlawer

Appendix 6: Bayan Ahmad, a politburo of KIU and a member of the Kurdistan Parliament

به‌یان نه‌حمهد نه‌ندامی مه‌کته‌بی سیاسی یه‌گرتوو ی ئیسلامی کوردستان و، نه‌ندامی په‌رله‌مانی کوردستان

پ/ رۆلی خوشک چیه له‌ناو ریزه‌کانی یه‌گرتوو ی ئیسلامی کوردستان؟

و/ سه‌ر هتا و هه‌ر له دامه‌زراندنی یه‌گرتوو تیروانیی سه‌ر کردایه‌تی یه‌گرتوو بۆ کاری خوشکان هه‌لقو لاه له تیگه‌یشتنی ئیسلامی بۆ کاری ژن. له ئیسلامدا ژن هاوبه‌شی پیاوه بۆ ئاوه‌دانکردنه‌وه‌ی سه‌ر زه‌وی. هه‌ر بۆیه ئیسلام ژن به ته‌واو کاری پیاو ده‌زانیت، وه هاوکارو شه‌ریکیکی راسته‌قینه‌یه له خیلافت. بۆیه سه‌ر کردایه‌تی یه‌گرتوو هه‌ر له سه‌ر هتای دامه‌زراندنیوه تا ئیستا ئه‌م تیگه‌یشتنه وای لیکردوون که (توظیف) یکی باشی ژن له ناو ریزه‌کانی یه‌گرتوو بکهن. وه هه‌ر له بیروکه‌ی دامه‌زراندنی پارته‌کی سیاسی، یه‌گرتوو رای خوشکیان وه‌رگرتوه، که ره‌نگه هه‌زه سیاسییه‌کانی تر به‌و شێوه‌یه‌و له‌و کاتانه‌دا حساب بۆ ژن نه‌کهن. که کۆمه‌ڵه‌کی ده‌عه‌وی هه‌ر له بیروکه‌ی دامه‌زراندنی حیزبکی سیاسیوه پرس و‌رای خوشکی پێ گ‌رنگ بووه و، حسابیان بۆ بۆ‌چونه‌کانیان کردوه. وه‌کاتیکیش لیستی دامه‌زرانه‌رانی یه‌گرتوو پێشک‌ه‌ش به حکومه‌تی هه‌ر پیم‌ کرا بۆ دامه‌زراندنی حیزب ناوی خوشکی تێدا‌بوو، ئه‌مه‌ش ئاماژه‌کی تری ئه‌م به‌شداریه گ‌رنگیه.

پ/ به‌شدارای خوشک له دروستکردنی بریاری سیاسی له ناو یه‌گرتوو چۆنه؟

که‌واته به‌شدارای خوشک له بریارد و‌ه‌کو ئاماژه‌مان پێ کرد هه‌ر له دامه‌زراندنی یه‌گرتوووه ده‌ست پێ ده‌کات. وه له دووه‌م کۆنگره‌ی حیزب له ۱۹۹۶ پاش دوو سه‌ال له دامه‌زراندن خوشک به‌ بێ بوونی هه‌یچ کۆتایه‌ک بوو به نه‌ندامی سه‌ر کردایه‌تی یه‌گرتوو ی ئیسلامی کوردستان. وه له کۆنگره‌ی ۱۹۹۹ له کۆی ۳۰ نه‌ندامی سه‌ر کردایه‌تی ۳ خوشک هه‌لبژێردان بۆ نه‌ندامی سه‌ر کردایه‌تی. وه له کۆنگره‌ی ۲۰۰۵ ژماره‌ی خوشکان له سه‌ر کردایه‌تی بووه ۵ خوشک ئه‌مه‌ش دیاره له کۆی ۳۵ نه‌ندامی سه‌ر کردایه‌تی، وه خوشکێک له‌وانه هه‌لبژێردرا بۆ نه‌ندامی مه‌کته‌بی سیاسی. وه به‌م شێوه‌یه کاری خوشکان هاتوه له ناو ، وه نه‌گه‌ر سه‌یری ئاماره‌کانی یه‌گرتوو بکه‌یت نزیکه‌ی ¹⁰⁵ ریزه‌کانی یه‌گرتوو تا ئه‌م کۆنگره‌ی دوایی نیوه‌ی نه‌ندامانی یه‌گرتوو خوشکن. هه‌ر بۆیه ئه‌مجاره سیسته‌می کۆتاما‌ن به‌کار هه‌ینا بۆ هه‌موو ئۆرگانه‌کان، وه له کۆی ۳۵ نه‌ندامی سه‌ر کردایه‌تی ۹ خوشک هه‌لبژێردان بۆ سه‌ر کردایه‌تی. وه له‌وانه‌ش ۳ خوشک هه‌لبژێردان بۆ مه‌کته‌بی سیاسی. نه‌گه‌ر چی سیسته‌می کۆتا من خۆم زۆر باوه‌رم پێ نیه، چونکه له‌وانه‌یه به‌م سیسته‌مه که‌سێک بێته پێش ئه‌و توانایه‌ی نه‌بیت. به‌لام بۆ ئه‌م کۆمه‌ڵگایه و ته‌واوی کۆمه‌ڵگاکانی ناوچه‌که که باوه‌ریان به تواناکانی ژن نیه له‌وانه‌یه شته‌کی باش بێت بۆ ئیستا.

پ/ نایا سیسته‌می کۆتا له خۆیدا جۆره موجه‌له‌یه‌کی نا به‌جی نیه بۆ ژن که و‌ه‌کو خۆت ووتت له‌وانه‌یه که‌سانیک بێنینه پێشه‌وه شایانی ئه‌و پۆسته نه‌بن و، سه‌ره‌نجام به‌رانه‌ر ژن زیاتر بکهن؟

و/ راسته ئه‌مه‌رۆ به کۆتا هه‌ندێ پۆست ته‌نانه‌ت له په‌ر له‌مانیش به‌ر ژن که‌وتوووه، ئه‌و رۆله‌ش نابینن. به‌لام هه‌ر بێت باشه، چونکه ئه‌مه شته‌کی کاتیه تا کۆمه‌ڵگا هۆشیار ده‌بیت و، هه‌ست ده‌کات به تواناکانی ژن

¹⁰⁵ کۆنگره‌ی شهم له ئایاری ۲۰۰۶ به‌سترا.

ودانى پيا دەنيت. ھەر نەمىرۆ سەدان ژن ھەن رۆلى زۆر گىرنگ دەبىنن لە زانكۆكان و رىكخراوھەكانى كۆمەلگاي مەدەنى و، بوارەكانى تردا. وە ئىمە لەگەل ئەوش كۆتەمان بەكار ھىناو، بەلام كاندىدە خوشكەكانمان بە ھەلژاردن ئەو پۆستانەيان دەست خستوو. وە يەكئىك لە شانازيەكانى يەكگرتوو ئەو ھىە كە بە سەدان خوشكى سەركرەدى لە ناستە جياكاندا ھەلخستوو، ئىستاش لە پۆستەكانى وەكو پەرلەمان زۆر خەلك ھەيە پىمان دەلئيت بەراستى ئىو جىگاي رىزن بۆ ئەو رۆلە چالاكانەي كە دەبىنن.

پ/ بەشئو ھەيەكى گشتى لە ناو پارت و كۆمەلە ئىسلاميەكان تا ئىستاش باسى ئەو ھەيە كە نايت ژن سەركرەدەي گشتى بگريتە دەست. ئىو ئەگەر چى خوشكتان ھەيە لىپرسراوى يەكەمە بۆ نمونە لىپرسراوى مەكتەبە، يان چەند خولئىك لەمەو پىش لە سويد خوشكە خلود حىدەرى لىپرسراوى لقى يەكگرتوو بوو كە لىپرسراوى يەكەمى يەكگرتوو بوو لەو وولاتە. ئايا چۆن دەروانە ئەم پرسە، دەكرت ژن بىتتە سەرۆك كۆمار يان دادوم بۆ نمونە، كە ھەندىك لە ئىسلاميەكان دەلئىن نايت چونكە دەقى (حەدىث) رىگري دەكات. ئايا ئىو تىئورىكى تايبەتتان ھەيە لەم بارەيەو؟

و/ سەروشتى، لەو بارەو شتى تازە ھەيە، ئەگەر ئىمە سەپرى قورئانى پىرۆز بەمىن ئىمە (حەجە) ئىكى قورئانىمان ھەيە، كە ئەو پىش باسى (بلىقس) ھە كە خوى گەورە لەبەر حىكمەتئىك لە قورئان ناوى ھىناو، وە بە ژنىكى لىھاتوو وە بە پاشا باسى كردوو. ئەمەش نامازيەكى باشە بۆ ژنان بە درىزايى مىزوو، كە ژنىكى سەركرەدى لىھاتوو بوو، و وولاتەكەي لە خەتەرناكى وە بە راوئىژ و، بە (مواصفا) تىكى سەركرەدەي باش رزگار كردوو، و بردوو بۆ ئىسلام. ئەمەش بەلگەيەكى زۆر گەورەيە، ھەر بۆيە ئىمە لە يەكگرتوى ئىسلامى كوردستان ھىچ لارىەكمان نىە كە ژن بىتتە سەرۆكى حىزبىش. وە لەم كۆنگرەيەش باسى ئەو ھەبوو كە كاندىدى خوشك ھەيت بۆ پۆستى سەرۆكى حىزب، لە بەر ئەو لە ناو يەكگرتوو ئەو قەناعەتە كە خوشكىك مەمانەي برايان و خوشكان بە دەست بىتتە ھىچ لارىەك نىە. وە ئىمە ژن بۆ سەرۆكايەتى كۆمارو سەرۆكايەتى ھەرىمىش ھىچ لارىەكمان نىە، وە ھىچ رىگريكى شەرىش نىە. وە سەرۆكايەتى ئىستا وەكو خەلىفە يان ئەمىرى مۇسلمانانى جارەن ھەموو دەسەلاتىكى نىە. ئىستا دەسەلاتەكان دابەش دەكرىن، وە بۆ ھەر پۆستىكى گىرنگى لەو جۆرە راوئىژكار ھەيە. وە بە ھىچ جۆرىك ئەمىرۆ برىار لەو ناستانە برىارى تاكە كەس نىە. ھەر بۆيە سەرۆك ژن بىت يان پىاو ھىچ جىاوازيەك نىە، وە بە قەناعەتى يەكگرتوو ھىچ جىاوازيەك نىە لە نىوان ژن و پىاو بۆ ھەر پۆستىك.

پ/ رۆلى خوشكى يەكگرتوو لە پەرلەمان، بە تايبەت پەرلەمانى كوردستان كە تۆ ئەندامىت تىايدا چۆنە؟

و/ پىش ئەم خولە لە كۆى ۹ ئەندامى يەكگرتوو لە پەرلەمانى كوردستان ۳ خوشك ئەندام پەرلەمان بوون. وە ئىستاش ئىمە لەگەل برايان ۵۰ بە ۵۰، لە ۶ ئەندامى پەرلەمانى يەكگرتوو ۳ى خوشكىن. ئەمەش پىشكەوتنىكە و، بەلگەيە لە سەر چۆنىتى باومرى يەكگرتوو بە ئەندامى خوشك. وە ئىمە كە ۶ ئەندامىن لە پەرلەمانى كوردستان بەرانبەر ۶۰ كەس كاردەكەين. وە ھەر يەكەمان لە زياتر لە لىژنەيەك كاردەكەين. وە بە بەردەوام (حضور) ئىكى تەواومان ھەيە لە ناو جەماورە.

پ/ پەيوەندى خوشكانى يەكگرتوو لەگەل رىكخراو ژنانەكانى تر بە تايبەت عىلمانىەكان چۆنە؟ وە چۆن سەپرى (عدالە) و يەكسانى دەكەن كە زۆرىك لەو رىكخراوانە داواى يەكسانى دەكەن لەگەل پىاو، بەلام زۆر جار دەبىستىن كە رىكخراو ئەفرەتئە ئىسلامىيەكان باسى (عدالە) دەكەن، وە ئەوش دەلئىن كە مەرج نىە ھەموو يەكسانىەك عدالە بىت و ھەموو عدالەتئىكىش يەكسانى

و/ ئىمە پەيوەندى بەردەوامان لە گەل سەرجم رىكخراوكاندا ھەيە. وەكو يەكگرتوو بە چاوپىكى واقعىانە سەپرى ھەموو شتىك دەكەين. وە ئىمە زۆر كراومىن بەرانبەر بە بىرو بۆچونى خەلكانى تر، وە (تفہم) يان

دهكەين. وه ههولئى ئيمه بۆ ئهويه كه دادگهري ههبيت له نيوان پياو وژندا، وه بههيج شيوه يهك ئيسلام قهبولئى دهرجه دوويى ناكات بۆ ژن. له قورئاندا ده فرمويت (ان اكرمكم عند الله اتقاكم) كهواته ژن وپياو هيج فرقيكيان نيه. وه رۆلهكانيان له كۆمهنگا تهواوكاريه نهك (تفاضل)ى. ئيمه له گهئ ئه ريكخراوانه پهيوهندى باش وهاوكاريان ههيه كه بۆ ژن تيدكهوشن. وه ئيمه چى وهكو خوشكاني يهكگرتوو، چ وهكو پهلهمانتاريش زۆر دژايهتى ههندئ عورفى دواكهوتوو دهكەين كه دوورن له دادگهري ئيسلام، بهلكو بهشيكن له بيري دواكهوتوى كۆمهنگا. بهلام كاتيك كه پرۆژه ياساى (جيندهر)ى وهزارهتى رۆشنبيري هاته پهلهمان، كه به تهواوتهى باسى له يهكسانى ژن وپياو دهكردو، هيج حسابيكي بۆ واقعى كۆمهنگا نهدهكرد، ئيمه تتيگهيشتمان بۆ كۆمهنگاي خۆمان خسته روو. بۆ نمونه كاتيك كه سهيري رۆلى پياو وژن وهكو تهواوكارى يهكترى له كۆمهنگا دهكەيت دهبينت عدالتهتيكى تهواوه ههيه نهگه چى له رۆالهندا وازانيت يهكسان نين. ئهمهش بهراستى خزمهت به كۆمهنگا دهكات. ههس كاتيك به كهس سهيري ئافرهت كراوه، ئهوه نا عدالتهيه، دووره له تتيگهيشتنى ئيسلامي. ههس بۆيه لهو كاتهوه يهكگرتوو هاتوته دامهزراندن ئيمه شهريكى گهورهمان لهگهئ ئه (عورف و عادات)ه چهوتانهى كۆمهنگا ههجوو بهرانبهس به ژن. كه ئهوانهش عورف وزادهى كۆمهنگان و دوورن له دادگهري ئيسلام. وه ههس كاتيكيش كه ئيسلام گهشه سهخندوو بووه ئافرهت رۆلى بهرچاوى ههجووه. بۆ نمونه كاتى پيغههمبەر (د.خ.) وخهليفه راشيدهكان، دهبينن ئافرهت رۆلى بهر چاوى ههجووه له درووستكردنى بهريار وله جيهادو له سهرجهم بوارهكاني تردا. ههس كاتيكيش كه ئيسلام لاواز بووه (عدالة) نهماوه جاريكى تر ستهمى كۆمهنگان باالى كيشاوتهوه بهسهس ژانداو ستميان لئى كردوون. ههس بۆيه ئيمه وهكو يهكگرتوو شورشيكي گهوره دهكەين لهم بوارهدا، وه ههس له ۱۹۹۴ موه تا ئيستا به بهردهوامى لهم پيناوهدا خهريكين. ئيمه كاتيك كه بهشدارى دهكەين له كوئنگرهى كاروبارى ئافرهتان له ناوخو ودهرموهى عيراق، ههسوو ريكخراومان (اعجاب)يان ههيه به يهكگرتوو لهم بواره. بۆ نمونه له يهكيك له كوئفرانسانه ژنيك كه نوينهرى حيزبيكى عيراقى بوو، ووتى خۆزگه ههسوو حيزبهكان وهكو يهكگرتوو دهبوون له مامهلهكردنيان له گهئ ئافرهت. دياره هيشتاش ههس ماومانه، تهنانهت له يهكگرتووشدا ههنگاوى ترمان ماوه لهم بواره، بۆ ئهوهى ژن به تهواوتهى رۆلى خۆى بيبينت. وه ئيمه سهدان خوشكمان ههيه كه به خۆبهخشى دهواميكي تر له ريكخراوماندا دهكەين.

ب/ ههولتان وهكو ريكخراوى خوشكان بۆ پاراستى مافهكاني ئافرهت له پرۆژه ياساكانى كوردستاندا چۆنه؟

و/ ئيمه سكرتاريهتى خوشكانمان ههيه كه بهبهردهوام ياداشت لهسهس بابيهتى جوراوجۆر له بارهى مافهكاني ئافرهت دهنووسن، بۆ نمونه ياداشتتيك له بارهى كهسى بهشدارى ئافرهت له كابينهى شهشم وحهوتهمى حكومهتى ههريم به بهراورد له گهئ بوونى ژن له پهلهماندا. ههس ئيستا به هاوكارى سكرتاريهتى خوشكان من پرۆژه ياسايهك له بارهى پاراستنى مافهكاني مندالم له بهردهستدايا. ئيمه ههس له ريكخراوى خوشكان، ههس له پهلهمانيش داكوكيكارين له مافهكاني ژن. وه ههول دهنهس سهرجهم مافهكاني ژن به ياسايى بكرت. وه ئيمه رۆلى بهرچاومان ههجوو له دهركردنى ياساى بهرهنگار بوونهوهى توندو تيژى خيزانى كه پارسال له پهلهمانى كوردستان دههجوو. وه ههولئى زۆرمان ههيه له سهنتهركانى ژنان وسهنتهركانى دالدهى ژنان بۆ پاراستنى مافهكانيان. وه ههستمان كردوه كه به راستى توندو تيژيهكى زۆر ههيه بهرانبهس به ژن، بهرانبهس به مندالم، ههس بۆيه ئهوه ياسايهكى كه ئاماژهمان پئى كرد بهراستى ياسايهكى باش بوو لهم بواره. وه ئيمه رۆلمان ههجوو له ههسواركردنى چهندين ياسا لهوانه ياساى بارى كهسيتى. وه له سهرجهم ئهس ياسايانهدا ههولمان داوه كه رۆحى عدالتهت بچهسپينين، وه بارى ژن و مندالم باشتر بهكەين. ئيستايش خهريكين به پرۆژه ياساى بيبينى مندالم له كاتى جياوونوهى دايك و باومك. دياره ههولمكاني ئيمه بۆ سهرجهم تويزمكاني ئهس گهلهيه بئى جياوازي ژن وپياو.

پ/ وەكو خوشكەنى يەكگرتوو ئەم جل و بەرگە كە بە واجبى شەرى دەزانن، نایا لە كاتى بە دەست
هینانى زۆرىنەى پەرلەمان و پىك هینانى حكومت، ھەر وەكو ھەندى خەلك ترسى ھەبە ئیوہ ئەم جل
و بەرگە ناكەنە ياسا و بەزۆر وەكو ئىران و ئەفغانستانى تالیبان ناسەپنن بەسەر خەلكدا؟

و/ ئەو جۆرە بىر كەردنەو ھەبە بىر كەردنەو ھەبە سەقەتە، چونكە جل و بەرگ بەشەكە لە ئازادى تاكە كەس، وە
نابىت كەس دەستتو ھەندى تىدا بكات. ھەموو كەس ئازادە كە چى لە بەر دەكات. وە لە لاىن ئىسلام ھەبە
تەنھا ھەندى مەرج ھەبە ئەگىنا زياتر جىھىلراوہ بۆ كەلتوورى گەلان. ديارە لە كۆتايىشدا ئەسە وەكو وەتمان
پەيوەندى ھەبە بە ئازادى تاكەكانى ناو كۆمەلگا و بىروباو مەريان، وە نابىت بەسەپنرەيت بە سەر كەسدا، ھەر
وەكو خوودى ئىسلام نابىت بەسەپنرەيت، لەم بارەوہ قونان دەفەرمووت (لا اكره في الدين) كە پرنسەپنەكە
و نابىت بە ھىچ شەيوە ھەبە ھىچ بىروباو مەريەك بەسەپنرەيت بەسەر خەلكدا. تەنات بە ئەو كەسە موسلمانىش
بىت كەس بۆى نەبە بەزۆر جل و بەرگى بە سەردا بەسەپنرەيت. وە ھەر ئىستاش ئىمە زۆر ھاورىمان ھەبە كە
تەكەلەبى و ھاموشومان ھەبە، و زۆر رەزى يەكترى دەگرين، وە تەنات لە ھەلبەزاردىشدا دەنكەمان دەندى،
بەلام بۆ جۆرى جل و بەرگ خۆيان ئازادەن ھەر چۆنىك پىيان باشە.

پ/ فرەژنى لە نىوان پەرلەمانى عىراق و پەرلەمانى كوردستاندا، لە عىراق (مشروع) ھە لە كوردستان
(ممنوع)، ئیوہ لەم بارەوہ بۆچوونتەن چۆنە؟

و/ يەكەك لەو ياساينەى كە لە بارەى بارى كەسەتتو ھەموو كەرا، فرەژنى بوو. فرە ژنى لە كوردستاندا
بە رەھايى وەكو عىراق ئازاد نەبە، بەلكو مەرج دار كراوہ. وە نابىت بە زەوقى پىاو بىت، و بۆ ئەزىت دانى
ئافەت بەكار بەھنرەيت. لىرەبەدواوہ دەبىت ژنى يەكەم رازى بىت وە لە دادگا مەرەبەنەكە بىرەيت. ھەر
وەكو لە زۆر شتى تردا خراب حالى بوون ھەبە، لە بارەى فرەژنىش خراب حالى بوون ھەبە. وە
بەكار ھىنانىك غەلەت ھەبە بۆى. لە ئىسلامدا حوكمى فرەژنى جائزە ئەگەر پىويستى ھەبوو، بەلام ئەسەل
لە ئىسلامدا بەك ژنەبە. وە زانايان باسى مەرجەكانى فرەژنىان كەردوہ لەوانە كاتىك كە ژنەكە تواناى مندال
بوونى نەبىت، يان ژن زۆر نەخوش بىت، يان بۆ ھەندى پىاو كە حالى تايەتەيان ھەبە، ئەمانەش جەند
حالىتەكى (استثناء) ناوازە و كەمن. كەواتە فرە ژنى بۆ (معالجە) بە نەك رەھا. وە ئىسلام لە فرەژنى
رەھاوہ سنوردارى كەردوہ، لە سنوردارىشەوہ مەرجى بۆ دانباوہ. وە لە واقعىشدا ئىمە رۆژانە رووبەرووى
چەندىن كىشە دەبىنەوہ كە بە ھۆى فرەژنىوہ روو دەندەن. زۆرىكىش لە دووژنى (فشل) دەھىنرەيت. زۆر
جارىش بە ھۆى ئەو ھەبە كە پىاو نەيتوانىوہ دادگەر بىت لە نىوان ژنەكانىدا، كە مەرجى سەرەكى ئەم بابەتەبە.
دەرنجەم سەتەم و كارەساتى لى دەكەوتتەوہ. بەم شەيوەبەش ياساكەى پەرلەمانى كوردستان شەرى ترە بە
پىئى ئەو باسەى كە لەم بارەوہ كەردمان.

كۆتايى

Appendix 7: Hassan Shamerani, the head of the pursuance high council of the KIU

چاوپنیکهوتنی حهسهن شه میرانی

له بهرواری ۲۰۱۲/۸/۱۵ پرسیارهکان پیشکەش کران

وهلامی پرسیارهکان بهشیوازی نووسراو له بهرواهێ ۲۰۱۲/۸/۲۶ گهشتوتهوه دهستم

پ/۱/ چۆن ههست دهکهیت وهکو کوردیکی ئیسلامیی؟ کورد بوون وئیسلامیی بوون ههس بهکهیان چی دهگهیهنیت بۆت؟

و/ کورد بوونم وئیسلامی بوونم لهیهک کاتدا زۆر سروشتیه وهیچ (تناقض) ودرایهتیهک له نیوانیانانا نابینم. چونکه دوو چهمکی جیاوازی وتهاوکاری یهکن، کورد بوونم هیچ پهیهندی به هیچ ئاینیکهوه نیه، چونکه من پیش ئهوهی ئاینی ئیسلام یان ههس ئاینیکی تر وهرگرم من ئههیت سهر به نهتهوهیهک بم، وه ئهوهش به دهس خۆم نهبووه. کورد بوونم واته من له دایک و باوکیک بووم که سهر به نهتهوهیهک بوون که پینی ئهلیه (کورد) ئیتر منیش بوومهته (کورد)، حمز بکهم وحمز نهکم له بهر ئهوه نه کهس بۆی ههیه دهرم کات لهم نهتهوه ولهم پیناسهیه، نه منیش بۆم ههیه شانازی بپوه بکهم که بوومهته کورد چونکه به دهست خۆم نهبووه. له بهر ئهوه ههس مروقی که له دایک ئههیت له دایک و باوکیک، ئهوان سهر به ههس نهتهوهیهک بن ئههیش ئههیته کهسێک لهم نهتهوه، ئیتر حمز بکات یان حمز نهکات. جا لهبهس ئهوه من که له دایک و باوکیکی کورد بووم ئهوا منیش کوردم. کوردیش وهکو ههس نهتهوهیهکی تری ئهم جیهانه کۆمهلهی مروقی له سهر خاکی ژیاون وپیناسهیه نهتهوهیان وهرگرتووه. هیچ گرهتیکم نیه لهوبارهوه.

به نیسهت ئیسلامی بوونم یان موسلمان بوونم، چونکه جیاوازی ههیه له نیوان (موسلمان وئیسلامیا)، موسلمان بهو مروقه ئههین به ئارهزی خۆی موسلمان بووبیت وهرجی موسلمانیهتی تیا بیت له بهروابوون به خوی گهوره ههتا قهناعت به راستی ودروستی ئهوهی له قورئان وسونهتی (صحیح) دا هاتووه. بهلام ئیسلامی بهو مروقه موسلمانانه ئهوتری لهگهله موسلمان بوونیا بریاری دابیت خهبات بکات له پیناو بلاوکردنهوهی ئاینی ئیسلامدا وههول ببات بی زۆر لی کردن وگرتهبهری ریگای توندو تیژی مروقهکان ئاینی ئیسلام قبول بکهن وپیکهنه بهنامهی ژیانی دونهیاان به هیواهی بهختهوهری دونهیاو سهرفرازی دواروژ ئهم مروقه پینی ئههین ئیسلامی. ئهههش وهک کورد بوون وکوردایهتی وایه. واته میلهتی کورد ههموو کوردم، بهلام مهرج نیه ههموو کوردایهتی بکهن و، خهبات بکهن له پیناو پاریزگاری له نهتهوهی کورد ودامهزراندنی دوهلهتی کوریدا. ئیهمه ههموو موسلمانین بهلام مهرج نیه ههموو خهبات بکات له پیناو ئیسلامدا.

جا موسلمان بوون یان بوون به ئیسلامی دواي ئهوهدیت که من له دایک دهیم، بهلام سهبارته نهتهوه وهکو ووتمان ههس به لهدایک بوون لهو باوک ودایکه نهتهوهکهم دیاره. پاشان که گهوره دهیم وبه ئارهزووی خۆم ئاینهکهم ههله دهبرێرم. کهواته من پیش ئهوهی موسلمان بووبم کورد بووم، دواتر ئاینی ئیسلام وهرگرتووه. وه ئهکرا من ئاینی ئیسلام وهرنهگرم، وه یان ئاینیکی تر وهرگرم، ئهوکاتهش کورد بوونهکهم ههس له شوینی خۆیهتی، بهلام وهرگرتنی ههس ئاینی به پینی ئاینی ئیسلامیش نازادی خهکه وهری دهگری یان نا.

پ/۲/ وهکو کوردیکی ئیسلامیی، یان ئیسلامیهکی کورد گهر دهتهویت چۆن سهیری ئیسلام وهکو ئاینیکی جیهانی دهکهیت؟

و/ به گویرهی ئهوه وهلامهی له پرسیاوی یهکهمدا روونم کردوه، ئهم دهستهوازهیه راسته که بلاین (کوردی موسلمان) یان (کوردی ئیسلامی). جا من وهک موسلمان وکوردیکی ئیسلامیی سهیری ئاینی ئیسلام نهکهم

که ناینکه خوی گهوره نار دوویتهی بۆ ههموو مروّفهکان ودوای ئهو ههموو ناینه راست و دروستانهی لهپیشهوه نار دوویتهی بۆ مروّفهکانی پیشوو، بآلام بههوی ئهوهی عادهتی خوی گهوره وابوو ههموو نهتهوه وکۆمهله مروّفی خوی گهوره پیغمبهری بۆ نار دووه و بهیانی خوایی بیاناردوه بۆیان. ئهوانیش گهیانوو یانه و خهلهکیش به نار مزوی خویان و هریان گرتوه یان نا. به داخهوه ههندی به نهزانی شهری ناینی کردوه به مانایهک ههولئ داوه به زۆر ناینی خوی بسهپینئ، ئهوش به پیی دهقی ناینهکان ئهو شهراوه راست و دروست نهوون، وه (لا اکراه في الدين) ئهبنیت دروشمی ههموو مروّفیکی خاوهن ناین بیت. جا ئو ناینانه بهردوام هاتوون ودوای وهفاتی پیغمبهرهکه خهلهکی دهستکاری خودی ناینهکیان کردوه و دوواتر خوی گهوره پیغمبهریکی نار دووه راستی کردوهتهوه. بهم شیوهیه ئهه حالته بهردوام بوو ههتا خوی گهوره (به قناعهتی ئیمهی موسلمان) دوا بریاری خوی داو ناخر پیغمبهری نارد که (محمد) بوو (دروسی خوی لهسه)، وه ناخر پهیمی خوی نارد که (قورئانی پیروژه) و فهرمووی له مروّفهکانی سه زهوی به ههموو جیاوازیهکانهوه که ئهه (محمد) پیغمبهری ههمووتان بیت و ئهه (قرآن) پهیمی منه ناخر پهراومه بۆ ههمووتان وه روژی دوا پیدا له دوای هاتنی محمد و قورئانهکهی هیچ ناینیکی تر قبول نیه لای خوی گهوره. جا ئیتتر خاوهن ناینهکانی تر قناعهت بکهن بهم بریاره ئهوه موسلمان دهن، ئهگهر قناعهت نهکن ئهوه له دنیا دا لهسه ناینی خویان ئهمننهوه و ئازادن و پیکهوه لهگهله موسلمانان ئهژین و قیامهتیش ئیتتر پهیوهندی به خوا خویوه ههیه که لپرسینهوه لهو بریارهی خوی دهکات لهگهلیان، نهک موسلمانان له دنیا په لپرسینهوه لهگهله کهس لهو بارهوه بکهن، چونکه خوا خوی ئازادی داوه به مروّفهکان له ههلهزار دنی ناین دا. جا من ئههه قناعهتهکه که ئیسلام دوا ناینی خوا په بۆ ههموو مروّفهکان و بهو پی یه ئیسلام ناینیکی جیهانیه وه پنیوستی ئهزانم له ریگای پسپورانی ناینی شارهزایان له (کتاب) که قورئانهو دوا این فهرمووهی خوا په بۆ مروّفهکان و ئیتتر به گویرهی قناعهتی ئیمهی موسلمان پیغمبهرایتهی به هاتنی (محمد) درودی خوی لهسه کوتایی هات و خوی گهوره خوی پاریزگاری له قورئان دهکات له دهستکاری و فهوتان، وه تا کوتایی ژبانی مروّفهکان لهسه زهوی ئهمنئ. جا زۆر پنیوسته زانایانی شارهزاو به تیگهیشتنیکی واقعیه لهو قورئانه تی بگهن و وهک و وتم به بی و هسائیلی توندو تیژی بیگهیهنن به ههموو مروّفهکانی سه زهوی. خوشبهختانه ئیتتر پنیوستمان به (قتال) نیه بۆ گهیانندی ناین به مروّفهکان، ئیستا له ریگای راگهیاننده جوړاو جوړهکانهوه ئهتوانئ ناینی ئیسلام بگهیهنئ به جهماوهرو، کهس ناتوانئ ری لئ بگرئ و بهو شیوهیه سنور نهماوه له بهردم گهیانندی مهفاهیمی قورئان و فهرمووه راستهکانی (محمد پیغمبهر) درودی خوی له سه، بهلام ئهوهی گرنگر مروّفهکان بزائن ئهوهی زانایان ئهگهیهنن مهرج نیه ههمووی مهبهستی قورئانهکه بیت، به مانای قسهی زانایان و تیگهیشتنیان له ناین جیاوازه له زودی قورئانهکه. واتا ئهکرئ ئیمه قسه یان فهتوای زانایهکمان قبول نهبنیت، ئهوه مانای و نیه ئهوه پیچهوانهی خودی ناینهکهیه، مهگهر یهکئ یان کۆمهلهی (ملحد) بن هه خودی ناین (رهه) کهنهوه، ئهوش ئازادن وه قورئان دا ئازادیان پی دراوه به پیی نایتهی (لا اکراه في الدين).

پ ۱۳ / چۆن مامهله دهکهن لهگهله پرسی کهرکوک؟ چۆنه ئهگهر و مکو کوردی موسلمان دهستبهر داری بن بۆ برا عهرمه موسلمانهکانتان، بۆ ئهوهی چی تر خوین ریژی یان لانی کهم ئهه کیشیه کوتایی پی بیت؟

و / بهداخهوه مهسهلهی کهرکوک ئالۆز کراوه و قوربانی زۆر دراوه بۆ گهیشتن به چار سهری ئهه کیشیه. ههتا ئیستا چار سهه نهکراوه و دوا چار سهه مادهی (۱۴۰) تا رادهیهک، ئهگهر ئههجام بدریت شتیکی باشه. بهلام ئهویش له رووی سیاسیهوه لهپهری زۆری بۆ درووستکراوه. ئهوهی گرنگه ئیمه وهک کوردیکی موسلمان و ئیسلامی هیچ کیشیهکمان نیه له رووی دنیویهوه. ناینهکمان داوای لیکردوین له کاروباری روژانهمان (عادل) بین ههتا له گهله دووژمنیشا (ولایجر منکم شنان قوم علی أن لا تعدلوا، اعدلوا هو أقرب للفقوی)، واته: رقتان له کۆمهلهی واتان لئ نهکات نا عادل و نادادپهروهر بن له (تعامل) لهگهلیان، پنیوسته عادل بن ئهوه نزیکه لهوهی ئهه پلهی تهقواتان دهس کهوئ که زۆر مهبهستی موسلمانانهو پیی ئهچنه بهههشتهوه.

جا پرسی کهرکوک ئهبنیت بچینه ناو میژوووه و ئهگهر خاکی کوردستانه (که ئیمه قناعهتمان وایه) ئهوه ئهبنیت خهباتی بی و وچانی بۆ بکرئ وه رووی ناینهوه تاوانه برا عهرمهکان داوای بکهن و تاوانیشه هه

كوردنيك رازى بىت بياندا، چونكه مافى خەلكى كەركوكە بۇ كەس نىيە (تتازل)ى لى بكات بۇ كەسى بىگانە. وە ئەگەر لە بەرانبەرىشدا بە پىي ميژوو توانرا بسەلمىنرەيت كە كەركوك كوردستانى نىيە نايىت ب زور داگىرى بگەين. وە ئەگەر سەلماندنيش ئەستەم بىت نىيە نامادەين وەك كوردى موسلمان لەگەل ميللەتى خومان نامادەين چارسەرى سياسى بۇ بدوزينەو وە (توافق) رىكبخرەيت. وە نىيە نامادەين وەكو لايەنىكى سياسى ئىسلامىي بچينە مواجەهى برا عەرەبەكان و بەپىي ئاراستەى ئاين و دەقەكانى قورئان كە ھەموو گەلئى خواى گەورە جىاى كردۆتەو و ئەبىت زمان و سنورى خاكى پاريزراو بىت و مافەكانى داين بگري و لەگەل باقى گەلانى ترا (تعارف) و (تفاهم) و (تعايش) لە نىوانيانا ھەبىت (وجعلناكم شعوبا و قبائل لتعارفوا).

پ/۴ / كاميك لەم شوناسانە گرنگترن بۆت: كورد بوون، موسلمان بوون، يان كوردستانى بوون؟ ئايا ئەو ئەھنيت كيشە لەسەر كوردستانى بوون و عىراقى بوون بەردەوام بىت؟

و/ و ابزانم لە وەلامى پرسىارەكانى پيشوودا ئەم وەلامەت دەست دەكەوت. بە كورتى ئەكرەيت لە يەك كاتدا من كوردم، موسلمانم، ئىستا (عىراق)يشم. بەلام ئەكرەيت ئەگەر رۆژئ كوردستان سەربەخوىي وەرگرت عىراقىكەم نامىنيت و ئەوكاتە دوو دەولەتى دراوسى ي ھاوکارو ھاو دين ئەبين.

پ/۵ / ھەريەك لەمانەى لاي خوارمە چى دەگەينيت بۆت: ئىسلام، دەولەت، نەتەو؟ ئايا ھىچ نە گونجان (تتاقض)يك لە نىوانياندا ھەيە؟ ئايا چۆنە ئەگەر سەر بە ھەموويان بىت؟

و/ ماناي ئەمانە لاي من زور ئاسان چارسەر بوون:

ئىسلام: ئەو ئاينە پىرۆزمە كە پەروەردگارم بە يەكەكا كە ناوى (محمد)ە و لە نەتەوئى خوم نىيە نارەوئەتى بۇ ھەموو مروق و نەتەوئەكان بى جىاوازي لەخودى ئاينەكەدا ئەوئى باس كردوو و ئىستا (واقعا) وايە. منيش بە ئارەزوى خوم ئەم ئاينەم قەبوئ كردوو. ھەر ئەو ئاينەش تىيگەياندوم ريز لە ھەموو ئاين و مەزھەب و بۆچونەكان بگرم و ھەرگيز شەر نەكەين لە سەر ئەو جىاوازيانە.

دەولەت: بە چوارچۆمەيە دەزانم كە ئەبىت ھەلبۇزىردراوانى جەماوئەرى ئەو نەتەوئە ناوچانە ئىدارەى دەكەن وە لە سنورىكى ديارى كراودا دەژين. وە دەبىت دەولەت (محايد) بىت و لەسەر بنەماى (مواطنة) و اتا ھاوئەتى بوون مەمەلەى دانىشتوانى بكات و ھەول بەدات ئازادى و مافەكانى ھاوئەتياى بپاريزەيت. وە ھەول بەدات دادپەروەرەنە فەرمان رەوايى بكات و، ھەول بەدات كە ھەموو تاكەكانى ھەست بگەن كە بوون و ژين و خزمەت گوزارياى بۇ داين كراو و، ئەو دەولەتەش بەرپرسە بەرانبەر بەو مافانە.

نەتەوئە: ئەو خەلكەيە كە يەك زمان و يەك خاك و يەك ميژوو و يەك چارەنووس كۆى دەكاتەو. ئەمەش خواى گەورە خوى خەلكى و درووست كردوو و ئەبىت پاريزگارى لەو تايەتمەنديانە بگري و ھىچ نەتەوئەيەك نە ستەم لە نەتەوئەيەكى تر بكات، وە نە ستەميشى لى بگريت.

ھىچ (تعارض و تتاقض)يك نايينم لە نىوان ئەو دەستەواژانە. وە منى ئىسلامى و موسلمان لە يەك كاتدا سەربە نەتەوئەى كوردم و موسلمانم و لە ناو دەولەتى خومدا كە كوردستانە انشاء الله كە درووست بوو ئەژيم.

پ/۶ / چۆن زياتر دروشمەكانى (نازادى؛ برايتى؛ دادپەروەرى) راقە دەكەيت لە رەوانگەى پەيوەنديتان لەگەل برايانى موسلمان، بە تايەت كە ئيوە نەتەوئەيەكى بى دەولەتن؟

و/ لهبار هی پهیومندی نئمه وهک یهکگرتووی ئیسلامی کوردستان له گهل (برایانی موسلمان) بهم شیوهیهیه: برایانی موسلمان له کاتیکدا دروست بوو، وه پیشهوا (حسن البنا) رحمتی خوی لی بیت له گهل هاوکارانی له سالی ۱۹۲۸ بناغیان دانا وولاتانی موسلمان نشین شکستیان هینا بوو له بهرهه هاوپهیمانی رورژناوا که میراتی دهولتهی عوسمانیان دابهشکرد پاش شکانی نهو دهولته له جهنگی جیهانی یهکهه. وه به کهوتته ژیر رکیزی نهو وولاتانه بهرنامه وابوو که له بهرنامه ئیسلام دوریان خهنامه بهتایبته له رووی ژبانی دونیاییهوه. نهوه بوو له تورکیا دهستیان پی کردو خیلافتهی عوسمانیان هلهوشاندهوه ودهولتهتیکي عهلمانیان له شویدا دانییا. وه نهو دهولته عیلمانیهکی بی لایهن نهبوو وهک نهوهی له سیستهمی رورژناوا، بهلکو دژایتهی وجهنگی چهکه ئیسلامی ورهههنده ئیسلامیهکانی نهکرد و سهرپوش وبانگ وپیتی عهرهیی وچهندن شتهی تری قهدهغه کرد. پیشهوا بهنا ههستی بهم معترسیه کردو ههولی دا دووباره هیمتهی میللتهانی موسلمان بهرزکاتهوه وتیبیان گهیمتیت که نهو شکسته کاتیو نهیتت متمانهمان بهخومان وناینهکهمان ههیتت ونهکهوبینه ژیر کاریگری نهو حالته نهخوازراوو بهو پئییه هات نهو قوتابخانهیهی داناو ناویان نا (کۆماری برایانی موسلمان) وهات بهشیوهیهکی میانهره و تیگهیشتهی جوان له قورنان وسونهت ۲۰ بناغهی بو تیگهیشتهن له ئیسلام داناو ناویان نا (الاصول العشرین) ولهویوه چهندهها پهراوو نامیلکه دهرکرا. نهوه بو خهلکی میسر ودواتر چونکه ههموو میللتهانی موسلمان یهک ناینین، به هوی ههندئ قوتایی وماموستا که چوبونه میسر ولهوی بهخزمتهت ماموستا حسن بهنا گهشتن وبهوه شیوهیه گونجاوه میانهرهویه شهرهی ئیسلامی بو کردن. نهوانیش دهرمنجام وهریان گرت وهینایانهوه بو وولاتانی خویان. وه ههندئ له ماموستایان وزانایانی وروشنبیران وموسلمانانی وولاتهکانیش زور بهلایانهوه راست ودروست وباش بوو، چونکه ئیسلام یهک ناینهوه ههموو یهکی که بییهوی موسلمان بیت نهیتت له رووی عهقیدهو عیبادتهت ونهخلاقی ئیسلامیهوه وهک یهک وایین، مهگر ههندئ حیوازی بچوک له بیرو تیگهیشتهندا له نایتهکانی قورنان، یان ههندئ بواری فقهیدا. ههر بویه له عیراق وله کوردستانیش پیشوازیمان لهو قوتابخانهیه کرد. دهرمنجام به شیوهیهکی گهشتی له عیراق نهندام ولایهنگیری زوری بو دروست بوو. وه من له سالی ۱۹۶۸مه ناشنا بووم بهو قوتابخانهیهی بووم به نهندام تیایدا. جا نهو کاته حیزبی شیوعی وپارتی دیموکراتی کوردستان ههبوو، بهلام بهرانهر به ناینی ئیسلام یاب دژ بوون، یان گرنگیان پی نه نهوا. منیش وهاوریکانم نهمانویست ههم ناینمان پاریزراو بیت ههم دونیاشمان له رووی نازادی ودابین کردنی مافی میللتهکهمان وههر مافی که مروف نهیتت بو دابین بکری، نئمه نهومان لهناو نهو قوتابخانهی برایانی موسلمان دهست کهوت. له رووی ناینیهوه شهرحیکی جوانی ئیسلامیان کرد وهک عهقیده وعیبادتهت ونهخلاق وبههاکان. وهک پرورژهی سیاسی وشینواری خهبات وجیهاد وههولدان بو دابین کردنی مافی میللتهت وشینواری حوکمرانی نهوه نه ناین چوارچیهیهکی دیاری کراوی داناوه که موسلمانان له ههر شوتینیک وهک یهک نهنجامی بدن، نه نهو قوتابخانهیهش دیاری کردوه. بهلکو نئمه وا حالیبووین که نهو قوتابخانهیه ئیمانی ودهعهوهی وپهروردهیهیه. بهلام بو پرورژهی سیاسی نهوه ههر وولات ونهتهویهک به گویرهی زمان وشوین وتایهتهمندی خویان نهکری بهرنامه بو خویان دانین ولهسهری برورن. وه نهوان بو میسر بهرنامه وخهباتی سیاسی خویان ههبووه، بهلام ههرگیز داوا نهکراوه وناکری کۆپی بهرنامهی سیاسی میسر یان وولاتیکي تر بینین بو ئیره، نه ناینی ئیسلام داواي نهوه کردوه، نه برایانی موسلمان. بهلکو وتویانه ههموو وولاتی بو خهباتی سیاسی نازاده، بهلام پابهندبوون به بهها ونهخلاقه ئیسلامیهکانهوه گرنگه. بو نئمهش که چوبینه ناو نهو قوتابخانهیه وبه شانازیوه کارمان تیادا کردوه ودینمان پاریزراو بووهو به گویرهی تواناشمان له وولاتی خوماتدا دژی زالم وداگیرکاران بووین وقوربانیمان داوه وبهندینخانهمان دیوه ودهربهدهربووین لهگهل باقی حیزب ولایهنه سیاسیهکانی تر. بهلام لهوانیه ناستی خهباتی سیاسیمان لاواز بووبیت وکومتهرخهمیمان ههبووبیت. بهلام له رووی نایمی ورؤحی عیبادتهت ونهخلاقوه سودمان زور گهیاندهوه به میللتهکهمان کهوا نهزانین نهوش خزمتهتیکي گهرمهیه بو دنیا ودوا رورژمان.

نهو شیوه دینداری وخهباتهتمان بهردهوام بوو تا راپهرینه گهرمهکی کوردستان له سالی ۱۹۹۱. وه هاتنهومان له ئیران دواي کزچه میلیۆنیهکه وهملبژاردنی ۱۹۹۲ ودامهزراندنی حکومتهی ههریم ودهرچوونی یاسای حیزبهکان، له سالی ۱۹۹۴ بریاری خو راگهیاندنمان دا له ژیر ناوی یهکگرتووی ئیسلامی کوردستان و، بووبینه ههنگری دوو پرورژه، پرورژهیهکی دهعهوی بو نهوهی گرنگی بدین به رههندی عهقیدهو عیبادتهت ونهخلاقی میللتهی خومان به پئی ناینی ئیسلام وبهرنامهیهکی پهروردهیی بو تاک وکومهلگا بو نهو کهسانه که بهگویمان دهکهن بی بهکارهینانی توند وتیزای به فیکریکی میانهرهوانه. وه پرورژهیهکی سیاسی که نهویش ناینهکهمان داوا له میللتهان دهکات که ههول بدن وولاتهکانیان له کۆلیهی وژیر دهستیهی وستهم وگهندهلی

ودیکتاتوریت پرزگاری کهن. لهم پیناوهشدا بهرنامهو پروژمان نامادهکرد ولهگهل باقی حزبه نیشتمانیهکانی ترده خهباتمان کردوه. وه ماوهیهکیش بهشداری حکومهتمان کردوه. نیستاش وهکو ئۆپوزیسیون بهردوامین له خهباتی سیاسی. جا له پروژه دهعهویکه سودمان له میانهموی فیکری براییانی موسلمان وهرگرتوه ونهدامانمان له سهر پهروره کردوه. بهلام له پروژه سیاسیهکمان که باس له کیشه وگرفتیی میللهتهکمان نهکات وچارهسهری بۆ دانهنی خۆمالیهو فۆتوکۆپی هیچ شوینیک نیه. نهگهر چی دهکریت سوود له ههر نهزمونیکي باش له ههر کوییهک بیت وهربگرین. بۆ نههم پروژه سیاسیهش دروشمی (نازادی، براییهتی، دادپهروهري)مان دیاری کرد، که وامان نهزانی دابین کردنی نهو دروشمانه کوردستان پرزگار دهبیئت. وه ههر له ۱۹۹۴مه تا نیستاش خهبات نهکمین لهو پیناوهدا دهکمین. سوپاس بۆ خوا نیستا بووینته ژمارهیهک که ههموو لایهک حسابی بۆ دهکات

پ/۷ چۆن دهتوانن وهکو پارتيکی ئیسلامی سیاسی لهگهل نهو ههموو پارتیه عیلمانیه ههل بکهن؟

و/ نيمه وا له ئیسلام تیگهشتوین که نازادی نهکات به ههموو تاگ وگروپ ولایهتیک له بواری بیر وباوهر ومهزهه و ناییدا، وه ههرگیز رازی ناییت بیر وباوهري خوی به زۆر بهسپیننی وله قورئاندا دهفهرمویت (لا اکراه في الدين). له بهر نهوه ژبان لهگهل ههموو حیزبه عیلمانیهکان ئاسانه وبروامان وایه نهکری ههموو نازادانه مومارسهی ناین ومهزهه و بیری وبۆچوونی خوی بکات وکیشیهک نهبیئت. وه له پروژه سیاسیهکهدا وا نهزانم پیکهوه ژبان زۆر ئاسانتره ودازوازی ههموو حیزبه ئیسلامی وعیلمانیهکان زۆر نزیکن له یهکهوه له دابین کردنی نازادی ومافهکانی میللهت وچارهسهرکردن گهندهلی ودامهزراندنی سیستهمیکی راشد وکونجاو که مافی ههموو لایهک بیاریزی بئ جیاوازی. نههم بریوایهمان وای کردوین لهگهل ههموو حیزبهکان به راست وچهپانهوه بژین وبهکو زۆر جار نیمه میانجیگهري وئاشتهواییمان دروست کردوه لهناکوکی شهري ناو خویاندا.

پ/۸ چۆن له دیموکراسی تی دهگهن وچۆنیش بهرجهستهی دهکهن؟

و/ نيمه زۆر به سنگ فراوانی رازی بووین به دیموکراسی له رووی عمهلی ومومارسهی سیاسیهوه که باشترین ریگهیه بۆ گهیشتن به دهسهلات بئ توندو تیژی و، زۆر نحهزیکه له شورای قورئانیهوه. بهلام مهرج نیه له ههموو خالهکانیدا نیمه پیی رازی بین وههموو نهوانهی که بۆ وولاتانی رۆژئاوا مومارسه دهکریت بۆ وولاتانی موسلمان نشین بشی. لئیردها نیمه پرنسیپی (الحکمة ضالة المؤمن أنى وجدها فهو أحق بها)مان ههیه، واته: شتی راست ودروست گومبوی مروقی ئیمانداره، بهو پییه ههر چیهک پیچهوانهی ئاینهکمان نهبوو، وه به سود بوو بۆ میللهتهکمان پیی رازین. ههر بۆیه به عمهلی به دیموکراسی رازی بووین.

پ/۹ ووتاری براییانی موسلمان له ئاستی تیوریدا نامازه به ستراتیژی بونیاتنانهوهی کهسیتی موسلمان، خیزانی موسلمان، کومهنگای موسلمان، حکومهتی ئیسلامی، خیلافهتی ئیسلامی دهکات. نیوه وهکو براییانی موسلمانی کورد له کوی نههم ستراتیژهدان؟ نایا خیلافهت دروست دهبیئت؟

و/ نیمه براییانی موسلمان وهکو قوتابخانهیهک سهیر دهکهن. نههم قوتابخانهیه خاوهنی دوو پروژهیه، پروژهیهکی دهعهوی که ناینی ئیسلام خوی وایه، وه پروژهیهکی سیاسیش. جا ووتاری براییانی موسلمان له پهروهردهو بونیاتنانهوی کهسیتی موسلمان تا دروست کردنی خیلافهت باسی ههر دوو پروژهیهک. له پیشهوه باسم کرد که نیمه له بواری پروژه دهعهویهکهدا زۆر سوودمان لهو قوتابخانهیه وهرگرتوه. بهلام له بواری پروژه سیاسیهکه نیمه نهکری جیاوازیین وراى ترمان ههبیئت. بۆیه نیمه نیستا باسی گیرانهوهی خیلافهت به پرنسیپ نازانین و، دروست بوونهوهی به دور دهنانین، بهلام به موستهحیلش نازانین چونکه ههر شتی که جاریک دروست بوو نهکری دووباره بیتهوه.

پ ۱۰ / تیرانینی ئەندامانتان بۆ چەمكى خىلافت چۆنە؟ ئايا ھېچ جياوازيەكى ھەيە لەگەل تيروانینی سەرکردايەتیتان؟

و / لە نىوان ئەندامان و سەرکردايەتى يەكگرتوو لە باسى خىلافت جياوازي نيه و، بە پىويستى نازانين خۆمانى پىوه خەرىك بەكەين. وه ئيمه باسى خىلافت بە ناين نازانين، بەلكو سيستەمىكى سياسى بووه وله زمەنەيەكدا موسلمانان مومارەسەيان كرددوه، ئەكەرى بگۆردریت وشىوازي تر مومارەسە بەكریت. لای ئيمه گرنگ ناومرۆكه و، گرنگ ئەوميه كه مروفەكان و ھاوڵاتیانی ناوچەكە ژيان و ئاینیان پاريزراو بىت.

پ ۱۱ / ئايا تىگەيشنتان بۆ چەمكى خىلافت بە پىي كات گۆرانكارى بە سەردا دىت؟ گەر وایە چى ھۆكارى ئەم گۆرانكارى بە؟

و / لە پيشەوه وەلامى ئەم خالە ھەيە.

پ ۱۲ / ئايا ھەست بە ھېچ چۆرە ركبەريەك دەكەن لە لاين ئىسلاميەكانى ترموه؟

و / سروشتيه ركبەري لە نىوان تاك و كۆمەل و لاين و ھەر گروپىك كه لە گۆرەپانەكدا ھەيو كارى سياسى و ئاینى دەكات ھەيبت. چونكە ئيمه ئاینەكەمان فەرموويەتى (كل حزب بما لديهم فرحون) واتە ھەموو لايبەك و گروپىك ئەوى لەسەرى كۆبووتەوه و بىرواى پىيەتى خوشالە. لەسەر ئەو بنەمايە كار دەكریت، بەلام زۆر پىويستە كه چارچۆمەك ھەيبت كۆمان كاتەوه بۆ ئەوى سنورى ئازادى بەكتر نەبەزىنين. ئيمه بىروامان بەم حالەتە ھەيە و ھەولمان داوه لەو سنورەدا كار بەكەين، و ھەستيش دەكەين ركبەري ھەيە لە نىوان لاينە ئىسلاميەكان، بەلام سوپاس بۆ خوا نەگەشتوتە كارى نەخوارا و پىكدادان وەك ئەوى لە نىوان عىلمانىەكاندا رووى دا.

پ ۱۳ / پىت واتە بزوتتەوى سەلەفى ميسر رىگر بوون يان يارمەتى دەر بۆ برايانى ميسر؟ چ وانەيەك لەم بارەيەوه وەكو ئىسلامى كورد فیردەبن؟

و / بە ووردى ھىشتا دراسەى حالەتى سياسى ئەم دوواييەى ميسر نەكردوه و، يەنھا لە دوورمۆه لە راگەياندن ھەندى شت ئەيىنم. بەلام زۆرم پى باش بووه كه ئىسلاميەكان ھاوکارى يەكن بەتايبەت لەسەرخستى پروژە سياسىەكەدا. وە ئيمه لە كوردستان پيش ئەوان ھەولى پىكەوه ژيانمان داوه و لە ميسريشەوه ئەوه فیر بووين كه ئەوى بە (نظري) ووتومانە لە ھاوکارى نىوان ئىسلاميەكان سەلما كه ئەركە و دەبىت زۆر پىكەوه بوون و ھاوکارى يەك بن، ئەگینا سەركەوتنى سياسى بە دەست ناھینن.

پ ۱۴ / لە كۆنگرەى شەشدا مافى چارەى خۆنوسنتان بىر ياردا وەكو ستراتىژى كارتان، چۆن ئەم ستراتىژە بەرجەستە دەكەن؟

و / بىر يارى مافى چارەى خۆنوسين بۆ گەلى كورد بىروامان پىيەتى لە رووى ئاینى و نەتەومىيمانەوه، بۆيش كىرمانە يەكێك لە ستراتىژى كارى ئاینەمان. بۆ بەرجەستەكر دىشى بەم شىوہە ھەولى بۆ دەدەين:

۱- لە رووى تىۆريەوه ئيمه باسى دەكەين بە تايبەت لە گەل دراوستىكانمان كه عەرب و تورك و فارسن، وە ئاینیش كۆمان دەكاتەوه لە گەلیان. ئيمەش لە روانگەى ئاینەوه ئەتوانين كارى باشى لەسەر بەكەين لەگەلیان.

۲- لهگهڵ هه‌موو لایه‌نه سیاسیه‌کانی سه‌ر گۆره‌پانی کوردستان هاو‌ده‌نگین و هاو‌خه‌بات ده‌بین له پارێزگاری کردن له‌م مافه‌ و به‌ ئه‌رکی ئایینی و نیشتمانی خۆمانی ده‌زانین و به‌پێی توانامان هه‌مۆلی جیدی یۆ ده‌ده‌ین.

کۆتایی

Appendix 8: Interview with Xaraman Jaf, the secretary of the Kurdistan Islamic Sisters League (KISL)

ئێوه و‌ه‌کو ئه‌ندامی خوشک له‌ نێو ریزه‌کانی یه‌ک‌گرتوو یان و‌ه‌کو خوشکان چ رۆلێکتان هه‌یه‌ بۆ خزمه‌ت‌کردنی کێشه‌ی گه‌له‌که‌تان و‌ه‌کو نه‌ته‌وه‌یه‌کی بێده‌ه‌له‌ت؟

یه‌ک‌گرتوو خوشکان له‌ سه‌ره‌تای خۆ راگه‌یانده‌یه‌وه تانیستا پلان و به‌رنامه‌ی تایبعت به‌خۆی هه‌یه‌ بۆ خزمه‌تی گه‌ل و نه‌ته‌وه‌که‌تی ئه‌ویش له‌ چوار چیه‌وه‌ی ئه‌و ده‌سه‌لاته‌ی که‌ ریک‌خراوه‌کان هه‌یانه‌، و‌ه‌ک بلاو کردنه‌وه‌ و ئاراسته‌ کردنی به‌یان و یاداشت له‌کاتی ئیویست و به‌شداری رێبێوان و به‌ده‌مه‌و بون و هاو‌کاری کردنی لێقه‌وماوانی نه‌ته‌وه‌که‌مان و و ناساندنی نه‌ته‌وه‌که‌مان له‌ کۆنگره‌و کۆنفرانسه‌ ناو‌خۆیی و جیهانیه‌کان ... هه‌ند

رۆلتان له‌ به‌رزکردنه‌وه‌ی هۆشیاری نه‌ته‌وه‌یی؟

کاری هه‌نوکه‌ییمان هۆشیاری کردنه‌وه‌ی تاکه‌کانی کۆمه‌لگه‌یه‌ له‌سه‌ر جهمی بواریه‌کان و ئه‌مه‌ش به‌ روونی له‌ په‌یره‌وه‌ی ناو‌خۆی ریک‌خراوه‌که‌ماندا داریژراوه‌ و له‌ ناو کۆنگره‌دا کۆده‌نگی ئه‌ندامانی کۆنگره‌ی هه‌ناوه‌ و، له‌وه‌ روه‌شه‌وه‌ له‌سه‌ر جهمی له‌که‌انمان و به‌ پێی ئه‌و ئالانه‌ی له‌سه‌ر تارێته‌وه‌ ئاراسته‌یان ده‌کریت، هه‌ستاون به‌ سازدان و کردنه‌وه‌ی ضه‌دین خول و و‌رک شو‌ت و سیمینار و ضالاکی جۆراو جۆر و بلاو کردنه‌وه‌ی هۆشیاری له‌ رێپه‌ی به‌رنامه‌کانی خوشکانه‌وه‌ له‌ رادیو و کتێاله‌کانه‌وه‌ به‌مه‌به‌ستی

هۆشیاری کردنه‌وه‌ی کۆمه‌لگه‌که‌مان و به‌رزکردنه‌وه‌ی رۆحی نه‌ته‌وه‌ی و نیشتمانی له‌نیوان ئه‌ندامانی خۆمان و تاکه‌کانی تری کۆمه‌لگه‌که‌مان.

- رۆلی ریک‌خراوی یه‌ک‌گرتوو خوشکان له‌سه‌ر کۆمه‌لگای کوردی له‌ رووی هۆشیاری و رۆشنیاری و فکریه‌وه‌ چي بووه‌؟ تواناوه‌ ژنان هۆشیاری بکه‌نه‌وه‌؟

خوشکان رۆلی به‌چاوه‌ی کاریگه‌ریان له‌ناو کۆمه‌لگادا بینه‌وه‌ له‌ زۆر رووه‌وه‌ هه‌رله‌ کردنه‌وه‌ی بنکه‌کانی نه‌ هه‌ستنتی نه‌ خۆی ده‌توانی و ئه‌یه‌ نه‌دی کۆمه‌لایه‌تی و راست کردنه‌وه‌ی ئه‌و چه‌مکه‌ هه‌لانه‌ی که‌ به‌ناوی ئیسلامه‌وه‌ ذنی ئیده‌چه‌توسینرايه‌وه‌، و هۆشیاری کردنه‌وه‌ی کۆمه‌لگه‌که‌مان له‌ روتکردنه‌وه‌ی داب و نه‌ریته‌ هه‌له‌ و سه‌پینراوه‌کان له‌ناو کۆمه‌لگه‌دا، و بلاوکردنه‌وه‌ی رۆشنیاری گه‌شتی له‌ناو ژنان دا، و له‌مه‌سه‌له‌ چاره‌نووس سازه‌کانی کۆمه‌لگه‌که‌مان به‌تایبته‌ مه‌سه‌له‌ی ژنان و زۆر بواری تری فیکری و رۆشنیاری دا خوشکان خۆیان سه‌لماندوه‌.

- گرنگترین به‌ریه‌ست و ریک‌گه‌کانی به‌رده‌م ئه‌م ریک‌خراوه‌ چین؟

نەمرو لە جبهاندابەگشتی تەحەدییەکی زور روو بەترووی ژنان و کاری ریکخراوەیی ژنان دەبیتۆتە ، یەگرتووی خوشکانیش بێبەش نێ لۆ تەحەدییات و کیشمەکیشانی و لەهەندیک روووە تەشکی گەرتووی بەرکەوتووە ،بەسیفەتی ئیسلامی بونی هەمیشە محارەبە کراوە بەچاویکی نامۆ تەماشای دەرکراو زۆریک مافی رەوای خوراوە ، و هەمیشە هەولێ تەهەمیشکردنی دراوە ، و رەکابەرەکانی نەیانەهێشتووە لەشۆبە گەرنەکاندا دەرکەوت ، بەلام کادەرەکانی ئەم ریکخراوە رۆژ بەرۆژ خۆیان فەرز دەرکەن و بەواقعی بۆ ساحەکەتی دەسەلمین کەتەوان خەمخۆرو دلسۆزی راستەقینەتی توێژەکیانن .

ئەمە جگە لە نۆ هەموو جیارکاریە دەسەلات بەرامبەر ریکخراوەکان دەیکات و پێوەریکی دیارو گونجایی نێ بۆ هەلسەنگاندنی کاری ریکخراوەکان و تەنها (حیزبانی) دەسەلات گەرنگی بە ریکخراوەکانی خۆیان دەدەن لێ گشت روویەکتۆ دەعمی مادی زۆریان دەرکەن ، هەروەها نۆ جیاکاریە رەگەزیەتی کەتەب و نەرتی نادروستی سەپاندووەتی ، و لەکۆمەڵگاکەماندا ریشەتی داکوئە و هەمیشە ذنی بە پلە دوو تەماشای کردووە یەکی تە لێ ئاستەنگەکان ، چونکە هەر ئەم بۆچونە وادەکات نادادیەک هەبێت بە بی بونی پێوەریکی واقیعیانە بۆ هەلسەنگاندنی لێهاتووەکان لەتیوان رەگەزەکانداو هەمیشە ژنان مەغدورن

تێروانی هەلەتی کۆمەڵگا بۆ کاری ریکخراوەیی و نەهاتنە پێشۆتە کەسانی بەتوانا و شارەزا ، یەگرتووی خوشکان فەراغی کەسی پێشەیی هەتیە جاری واهتیە بۆ کاریک پەتووەندی بەجەندین کەسۆتە دەرکەت نایەنە پێشۆتە

سەرقالی زۆریک لێ خوشکان بە دەوامی حکومیەت وای کردووە داھینانکاری نەبیت بۆ بەرۆ پێشبردنی ریکخراوەکە و کاروبارەکان زیاتر روئینیات بن

کۆتایی

Appendix 9: Interview with Salahadin Babakir, the assistant Secretary General of the KIU

د. صلاح الدين بابكر، یاریدەدەری نەمینیاری گشتی یەگرتووی ئیسلامی کوردستان

ب/ تێهەڵکێش کردنی ناین و نەتەوێ تا چ رادەهێک لێ نێو یەگرتوودا بە دەی دەکریت؟

و/ یەگرتووی ئیسلامی هەر لێ راکەیاننەهێو لێ ۱۹۹۴ یەکیک لێ داھینانکاریانە کردی ئەو بوو کە توانی هاسەنگیەک داھیننیت لێ نێوان ئەوێ کە کاری نەتەوێ بکات یان کاری ئیسلامی . چونکە لێ شۆرشێ رزگاریخواری گەلی کورد تا رادەهێک ئەو جۆرە هاسەنگیە وون کرابوو ، کە حیزبێک لێ هەمان کاتدا بتواننیت شۆرش و خەبات بکات بۆ ئازاد کردنی گەل و ولاتەکە ، وە باکگراوندی ئیسلامی هەبیت . ئەو کاتە وائەبیرا کە تەنها لایەکیان هەلبێژێردریت . یەگرتوو کە هات توانی هاسەنگیەک لێ نێوان هەردوو چەمکە دا بنیت . لێ رووی نەتەوێ بەریاری دا ناسنامە نەتەوێ کورد بێت ، وە لێ رووی ناسنامە (عقیدە)یشی ئیسلامی بێت . هەر بۆیە ناوەکەشی و (صیاغە) کرد کە هەردوو چەمکە تێیدا رەنگ بداتەو کە بریتی بوو لێ (یەگرتووی ئیسلامی کوردستان) ، کە هەم ئیسلامیە هەم کوردستانیە . بۆیە پێم وایە کە توانی هاسەنگیەکی باش رابگریت لێ نێوان هەردوو حالەتەکەدا ، ئەویش لێ روانگە تێگەشتنی بۆ ئیسلام کە لێ قورئان و فەرموودە و تێگەشتووێ هێچ جۆرە دژایەتیەک نێ لێ نێوان ئەوێ کە تۆ کار بۆ نەتەوێ خۆت بکەیت ، هەول بەهیت لێ پێناو ئازادی دا ، وە خۆشگوزەرانێ بۆ فەرەهەم بێنیت ، وە لێ هەمان کاتدا موسڵمانێکی باش و مولتەزم بێت خزمەتی ئاینەکەشت بکەیت . چونکە ئێمە پێمان وایە کە کورد بوونی

نیمه (جعل) یکی خوابیه. خوای گهوره نیمه‌ی به کور درووست کردوه، وه نهو مافه‌شی پنداوین که خزمهت نه‌توه وولاته‌که‌ی خویمان بکه‌ین، وه موسلمانیکی مولته‌زیم و دینداریش بین و پابه‌نس بین به هممو رینماییه‌کانی ئیسلامه‌وه. بویه لهو روانگه‌وه ههل درا که یه‌گرتوو له ستراتیژی‌ته‌که‌ی خویه‌وه له ماوه‌ی ته‌مه‌نیدا نهو هاوسه‌نگیه رابگرتیت، وه تا ئیستاش له مومارسه‌ی عمه‌لی پیم وایه توانیویته‌ی هاوسه‌نگی له نیوان کورد بوون ونه‌توه‌بوونی رابگرتیت. به‌لکو نیمه زور جار ده‌لئین به تئروانینی ئیسلامیانه‌وه خزمهت به نه‌توه‌که‌مان ده‌که‌ین. چونکه نیمه وه‌کو موسلمان له روانگه‌ی ئیسلامه‌وه سه‌یری ژیان و بونه‌ور وه‌ممو نهو شتانه ده‌که‌ین که له نیوانیدا هه‌یه. هه‌ر بویه نیمه هه‌ولمان داوه نهو هاوسه‌نگیه بیاری‌زین، وه کار له‌سه‌ر هه‌ر دوو ره‌ه‌نده‌که بکه‌ین به شتویه‌که‌ی ته‌ریبی به بی نه‌وه‌ی که تووشی یه‌کتر برین و (تقاطع) بن. وه به شاهیدی خه‌لک توانیویشمانه تا نه‌م ساته وه‌خته که سه‌رکه‌وتنیکی باش له راکرتتی نهو هاوسه‌نگیه له نیوان هه‌م کورد بوون وه‌م ئیسلامی بووندا رابگرین.

پ/٢ کاتیکی که ده‌لئیت راکرتتی هاوسه‌نگی، نایه نه‌مه تاکتیکی سیاسی، یان بۆ ره‌زامه‌ندی خوایه و نایه‌که پالت پتوه ده‌نیت؟

و/ نایه‌که پالنه‌ر بۆمان بۆ نه‌وه‌ی خزمهتی نه‌توه‌که‌مان بکه‌ین. کاتیکی که خوای گه‌وره له قورناندا ده‌فه‌رمویت (وکلک جعلناکم شعوبا و قبائل لتعارفوا) لیرموه نه‌م نایه‌ته نه‌ومان تیده‌گه‌یه‌نیت که کورد بوونی نیمه (جعل) یکی خوابیه. خوا گیان نیمه‌ی به کورد درووست کردوه، عه‌ریبی به عه‌ره‌ب درووست کردوه، فارسی به فارس درووست کردوه، وه تورکیشی به تورک درووست کردوه. نه‌م جیاوازی زمانه‌ش نایه‌تی‌که له نایه‌ته‌کانی خوای گه‌وره، نامانجه‌که‌شی دیاری کردوه که بۆ یه‌کتر ناسین و پیکه‌وه ژیانه. هه‌ر چون خوا که باس له گه‌وره‌یی ئاسمانه‌کان ده‌کات، ئاواش باس له جیاوازی زمانه‌کان ده‌کات و مکو نایه‌تیکی خۆی. خوا خۆی مه‌به‌ستی بووه که زمانی جیاواز هه‌بیت، وه نه‌توه‌ی جیاواز هه‌بیت، به‌لام نه‌م زمانه جیاوازه بۆ نه‌وه‌یه که یه‌کتر ته‌واکه‌ن (تکاملی) بن نه‌ک (تقاطع) ی. و مکو ووتیشمان نامانجه‌که‌ش بۆ یه‌کتر ناسین و پیکه‌وه ژیان و یه‌کتر ته‌واکردنه. له‌به‌ر نه‌وه و چه‌ندین نایه‌ت و فه‌رموده‌ی تر نه‌م نایه‌ هانمان ده‌دات که خزمهتی زمان ونه‌توه‌که‌ی خویمان بکه‌ین.

پ/٣ له ناوچه‌ی رۆژه‌ه‌لاتی ناوه‌راست و وولاتان له‌سه‌ر بنه‌مای ناشیونالیزم درووست بووه، کوردیش دابه‌ش کراوه به سه‌ر چوار وولاتا، نه‌مه‌رۆ به‌رژه‌مندی نه‌و وولاتانه رینگه به کورد نادات له‌سه‌ر هه‌مان بنه‌ما ده‌ولته‌ی خۆی بنات بنیت. کاتیکی کورد تیکۆشان ده‌کات بۆ وولاتی سه‌ربه‌خۆی خۆی نه‌وان رینگه‌ نادن و سه‌ره‌نجام شه‌ر رووده‌دات و خوین ریژی روو ده‌دات. نایه‌ی ئیسلام له‌مه‌باره‌وه چی ده‌لئیت؟ وه نیوه هه‌لوێستنان چیه، به تاییه‌ت که یه‌گرتوو له کۆنگره‌ی شه‌شدا مافی چاره‌ی خۆنوسینی کرده ستراتیژی کاری؟

و/ به‌لئی راسته نیمه له کۆنگره‌ی شه‌شده‌مه‌دا له ستراتیژی یه‌که‌مه‌دا باسمان له هه‌ول دان کردوه بۆ درووستکردنی ده‌ولته‌تیکی کوردی. نه‌وه‌ش پیمان وایه که هه‌ر نه‌و خوایه‌ی وه نه‌و نایه‌ی که ری‌ی داوه به عه‌ره‌ب زیاتر له ٢٠ ده‌ولته‌ی هه‌بیت، وه ری‌ی داوه به فارس چه‌ند ده‌ولته‌تیکی هه‌بیت سه‌ربه‌خۆی هه‌بیت، ری‌ی داوه به تورک چه‌ند ده‌ولته‌تیکی هه‌بیت، هه‌ر هه‌مان خوا و ناین و قورئان ری‌ی ده‌دات به کورد که ده‌ولته‌تی سه‌ربه‌خۆی خۆی هه‌بیت. مادام خوا زمانی جیاوازی داوه به عه‌ره‌ب و فارس و تورک ونه‌توه‌که‌نی تر، وه مافی ده‌ولته‌تی سه‌ربه‌خۆی پنداوون، هه‌مان خوا هه‌مان ماف ده‌دات به کورد که ده‌ولته‌تی سه‌ربه‌خۆی هه‌بیت. له به‌ر نه‌وه نیتر جیگای خۆیه‌تی که کورد هه‌ول بدات که ده‌ولته‌ت سه‌ربه‌خۆی خۆی هه‌بیت و مکو سه‌ره‌م گه‌رترین نه‌توه‌یه له‌سه‌ر رووی زه‌وی که نه‌بووته خاوه‌ن ده‌ولته‌تیکی سه‌ربه‌خۆی خۆی، به‌مه‌ش کیشه‌که چاره‌سه‌ر ده‌بیت. نه‌م دابه‌ش کردنه‌ی کوردیش دیاره دابه‌ش کردنی کۆلونیالیسته‌که‌نه که هه‌له‌یه‌کی خراپی مرۆفه و ده‌بیت راست بکرتیه‌وه. له به‌ر نه‌وه ئیسلام ده‌بیته ئاسانکار بۆ درووست بوونی ده‌ولته‌تی کوردی.

کاتیک که موسلمانیکى عەرب، موسلمانیکى تورك، موسلمانیکى فارس خاوەنى دەولەتى سەر بەخۆى خۆیان و، کوردیش بئى بەشه لەو مافە نایەكسانى هەیه. وه باز نەى يەكتر ناسینهكان سى باز نەن، باز نەى نەتەوه كه ئیمه كوردین كه له كوردستاندا دەژین، بەمەش ئیمه كورد لەم باز نەدا براین. باز نەى دووم باز نەى برائەتى ئیمانیه كه ئیمه كۆدەكاتەوه له گەل هەموو مرقۆفەكان ئیمه خۆمان به برا دەر زانین، له روانگەى ئەوهى كه ئیمه هەموو مرقۆفین. ئەم باز نەه دەبیت بۆ ئەوه بێت كه كارەكانمان بۆ ئاسان بێت نەك (تعقید). بۆ نموونه ئیمه له باز نەى برائەتى نەتەوهی كوردین، وه له گەل وولاتانى وەكو عەرب و فارس وتوركدا دەژین، ئەمانەش برامانن له باز نەى ئاینەكەدا. ئەم باز نەى دەبیت ئاسانكارى بكات لاى ئەو سى نەتەوه بۆ ئەوهى ئیمەش وەكو ئەوان دەولەتیکى سەر بەخۆمان هەبیت. ئەنجا پەيوەندیەكى باش و هاوبەش له نیوانماندا دروست دەبیت. هەر بۆیه ئیمه پیمان وایه كه چارەسەرى ریشەیی و ستراتیزی و دور بۆ كیشەى كورد له رۆژ هەلاتى ناوەراست ئەوهیه كه رى بدریت كه كوردیش بێتە خاوەنى دەولەتى سەر بەخۆى خۆى.

ئەوجاش له گەل نەتەوه دراوسێكاندا لەسەر بنەمای بەرژ موندی هاوبەش بەتایبەت له رووى ئابوری و سیاسییەوه پیکهوه بژین، ئیتر هەریهكەو خاوەنى كیانى سەر بەخۆى خۆى دەبیت و، كیشەشمان بۆ يەكتر نابیت. وه جگه لەم چارەسەرەش، بەراى ئیمه (مسكنات) و چارەسەر نیه. تەنەت ئیستانش له عێراق نەتوانراوه كه پەيوەندیەكانى حكومەتى هەریم و حكومەتى ناوەندى عێراق لەسەر بنەمای فیدرالى ریکبخریت، وه كیشەكان هەر بەردوامن. له هەموو دنیا كیشەى سەرەكى له نیوان حكومەتى ناوەندى و هەریهكەكاندا لەسەر دەسەلات (صلاحیات)، وه ئیمه ئیستا هەم كیشەى دەسەلاتمان هەیه هەم كیشەى (صلاحیات)، جگه له كیشەى سەر وەت و سامانییش. دیاره ئیمه ئەوشمان ووتوو كه دروست كەردنى دەولەتى كوردى هەم ئامادەسازى نیوخۆیی، هەم ئەقلیمی، هەم نیودەولەتى هەیه. ئەنجا بۆ ئەمانەش كاتى دەویت، ئەلبەتە كار بۆ كەردنیش.

پ ٤/ / ئەگەر دەر نجام ئەوان هەر رازى نەبوون و، هیرشیان كرده سەر كوردستان، وەكو ئەزمونەكەى قازى محمد، ئایا هەلۆبىستى ئیوه وەكو يەكگرتوى ئیسلامى كوردستان كه ئەم ستراتیژەتان هەلگرتوو هە كاتە چى دەبیت؟ وه ئایا هەر راگەیاندى ناوا ستراتیژىك له ئیستاوه نابیتە مایەى دوور من پەیدا كەردن بۆ كوردستان؟ وه ئەگەر هیرش كرایه سەر كوردستان كه دەر نجام خوین ئەرێژریت، ئیوه چۆن حسابتان بۆ ئەمە كەردوو ه؟

و/ له خەباتى رزگارێخوای گەلى كورد له هەر چوار پارچهى كوردستان ئەم ئەزمونى رێگرتن بەزور، وه ستهم لێكردن، وه كێكردنى دەنگى ئازادىخوازانەى كورد، وه بئى بەش كەردنى له مافەكانى تاقى كراوتەوه له سەد سالى رابووردوودا. وه هەزارهەا قوربانى له پیناودا دراوه و، خۆین و فرمیسكێكى زۆریش رژاوه. وه هەموو لاش گەشتونەتە ئەو قەناعەتە كه ئەم رێگا چارەیه رێگه چارەیهكى خراپه، وه نامانگەیهبیت به نەتیجه، چ ئیمه وەكو كورد چ ئەو گولانەش كه له گەلێان دەژین. له بەر ئەوه پیم وانیه جارێكى تر ئەم سى نەتەوه كه عەرب و تورك و فارسن پەنا ببەنەوه بۆ ئەو رێگه چاره. وه ئیمەش كه ئەلێین دەبیت زەمینەسازى ناوخۆیی و ئەقلیمی نیودەولەتى بۆ بكهین مەبەستمان لەوهیه كه دەبیت ئەم شته له رێگای گفنو گۆ و تەفاهم و قەناعەت پێكەردنیانەوه بكریت، بۆ ئەوهى جارێكى تر توشى قوربانیدان و فرمیسك و خوین رشتن نەبێن لەو پیناوهدا. پاش زەمینەسازى ناوخۆ دەبیت قەناعەت بەو دەولەتانه بكهین كه ئەمە بەرژ موندى ئەوانیسه، چونكه بتهوت یان نا ئەمە كیشەیهكى (تراكم) یه له رۆژ هەلاتى ناوەراست دەبیت چارەسەر بكریت. وه لەوانەیه كه له رێگای گفنو گۆ و تەفاهمەوه زۆر بخایەنیت، بەلام ئەمە سەلامەتترین رێگایه و، هەر بەم رێگایهش كۆتایى دیت. پاشان زەمینەسازى نیودەولەتیش زۆر گرنهه چونكه كاتیک كه دەولەت رادەگەینین پێویستمان به دانپانان و پشتیوانی نیودەولەتى هەیه. ئەمەش دیاره پاش زەمینەسازى ئەقلیمی ئاسانتر دەبیت. وه ئیمه كوردى عێراق دەبیت قەناعەت به عێراقیهكان بكات و، كوردى ئێران به ئێرانیهكان و، كوردى توركیا به توركیا و، كوردى سوریا به سوریا، راسته ئەمە لەوانەیه زۆر بخایەنیت، بەلام هەر ئەم رێگایه راست و دروسته بۆ گەیشتن بەو ئاواته.

پ/۵ پاش ههموو نهم همولانه وگرنگیان، پاش بهدهست هینانی تمنانت دانپینانی نیودمولتیش نهگر نهو دمولتانه هر رازی نهوون، دهرنجام تووشی شهر دهنهوه، وه دهبیت گهلی کورد بهرگری بکات، نایا نیسلام ریگادهدات بهو بهرگری کردنه؟

و/ من پیم وایه کوردیش حمز ناکات تووشی شهر بیتوه، به تابیهت له هریمی کوردستان بو گهیشتن بهو مافهی. له بهر نهوه لهوه دهچیت که ریگهچارهی نارامگرتن وبهکارهینانی زمانی گفتوگو ودایهلوگ بهکار بینیت با دریزتریش بیتوه. وه نیستاش کاتی داگیرکردن بهسهر چووه، سیستهمی نیو دمولتی نیستا ریگه نادات که نهمهویهکه نهمهویهکی تر داگیر بکات. وه نیمه بو نمونه لهگهل عیراقتا نیستا بریاری فیدرالیمان داوه، نهمش (جیل)ی داهاتوو پیی رازی نابن، کهواته کیشهکه هر کۆتایی نههاتوو. کهواته عهقل ولوژیک داوامان لی دهکات که بهر مو پیشهوه برۆین، نهک بگهریینهوه بو دواوه بو خوین رشتن.

پ/۶ چه مکی نوممت له کوپی نهم بازنامه: نهمهوه، نیمان، مروقیایهتی بهک دهگریتهوه؟

و/ نیمه نیمان وایه که نهمهوه هیچیان (تعارض)یان نیه لهگهل بهک، کاتیک که تو خوا له شوینیکی جوگرافی دیاریکراودا دروستی کردوبیت که ناوی کوردستانه وبه کوردی قسه نهکین نیمه کوردینم نهمه بازنه نهمهویه. باز نهیهکی تر باز نهی نیمانیه که لهگهل گهلانی تری موسلماندا باز نهی دنیا ی نیسلام پیک دینیت. نهمجا له باز نه مروییهکه، نیمه ههموو هاوبهشین له مروقیایهتی. وه نهم بازنامهش ریگر نین له بهکتر. له نیسلامیشدا هر کس له باز نهی خو مافهکان ونه کهکانیشی دیاری کردوو بو. له بهر نهوه ناینی نیسلام له باز نهی نهمهومی مافی تهوای داوه به نهمهوهکان، وه له باز نهی بریایهتی دینداریش ماف ونه کی دیاری کردوو، به ههمان شیوش له باز نهی مروقیایهتی کومه لیک نهکی تری دیاری کردوو بو موسلمان که ههمیتی بهرانبهر به مروقیهکان. کهواته له پروانگهی نیسلامو نهک ومافهکان دیاری کراون بو هر بهک لهو بازنامه.

پ/۷ هندی کس پیی وایه که نیسلامیهکان لهسهر بنهمای (ولاء ویراء) مامله دهکمن لهگهل مروقیهکان، به واتایهک موسلمانیکی خرابیان له هاوالاتیهکی غیره موسلمانی باش پیی باشتره. رای نیوه لهم بارهوه چونه؟

و/ نهو کسه موسلمان که پابند نیه به بهها مرویهکان بو نمونه راست گوپی، له بهرانبهردا کسینی ناموسلمان که راست گوپی با موسلمانیش نهبیت نهگر بریار بیت که لهگهل کامیان کاربکیت یان هاوهلی یان شهراکعت، من پیم وایه دهبیت لهگهل نا موسلمانه راستگو که بیکهیت نهک موسلمانه ناراستگو که. کهواته هر له بهر نهوهی که نهو کسه موسلمانه پیم باشتر بیت له ناموسلمانی که له کاتیکدا که نا موسلمانه که لهو بههویه له موسلمانه که باشتره رهوا نیه من هر موسلمانه که پیی باشتر بیت. نهمجا دیاره بابتهیکی تریش ههمیه که نهو میش نهویه نهو موسلمانهش که له باز نهی نیسلامهتیدا برامه دهبیت ریز بگرم وناموآگاری بکهم بو دهستهه لگرتن لهو شته خرابیهی. وه نیسلامیش ههموو مافیکی دۆستایهتی وهاورپیهتی وبهیهکهوه ژیانی دیاری کردوو له نیوان موسلمانیک وغیره موسلمان لهسهر بنهمای بهها مرویهکان. وه بهها مرویهکانی وهکو راستگوپی ووهفاداری وهاوکاری کردنی بهکتر ههموو نهو بههانه، بههای مرویین، وه لو ههمان کاتدا بهها نیسلامیشن. وه هر مروقیک نهو بههیا نهی تیدا بیت تو دهنانیت هاورپیهتی بکیت، وه لهگهلایشی بزبیت، تمنانت (تفضیل)یشی بدهیت به سهر کسینی موسلمانی دوور لهو بههانه.

پ/۸ تیگهیشنتان بو شهریهت وپراکتیزهکردنی چونه؟ نایا نیوه وهکو یاسا له شهریهت تیگهشتون یان وهکو چی؟

و/ نېمە بەگشتى وا تېدەگەين كه له نىسلامدا كاتىك كه باس له تەشرىع وبەرئومبەردنى وولات و سىياسەت دەكەين، شەرىعەت مەبەست له (مقصد)مكانه نەك جىبەجىكردىنى چۆرە فېقھىك يان ياسايەك. بۇ نموونە كاتىك كه نىسلام داوا دەكات له حوكمدا دادگەرى جىبەجى بىكرىت، قورئان وسونەت داوا دەكەن له مۇسلمان كه كاتىك حوكم دەكات دادگەرى جىبەجى بكات. كەواتە (تحقيق)كردنى دادگەرى (مقصد)ى نىسلامە بەلام چۆنى (تحقيق) دەكات ئەمە ووردكارىه جىبى هېشتووہ بۇ عەقلى مروقەكان خۇيان. ئەوہى كه نىسلام مەبەستىتى (تحقيق)ى دادگەرىه له حوكمدا. نىتر چۆن ئەم دادگەرىه ئەنجام دەدات ماوتەوہ بۇ عەقلى نىنسانەكان ومىكانىزمەكانىان لەم پىناوہ. لەوانەيە له كاتى پىغەمبەر وخەلىفە راشدىنەكان بە جۆرىك وبەمىكانىزمىك بووبىت، بەلام نىستا بە جۆرىكى تر ومىكانىزمىكى ترە. ئەو كاتە وا پىويستى كردوہ، وە نىستاش وا پىويست دەكات. كەواتە گرنىگ دادگەرىه، ئەگىنا بە دۇنيابىوہ كات وشوین ومىكانىزم بەردەوام دەگۆرىت. وە ئەم شتە پەيوەندى بە ناویشوہ نىه، چونكە بە ناوېكى نىسلامىشوہ دادگەرى داىبن نەبوو ئەوا نىسلام پىي رازى نىه، بەلام مادام دادگەرى (تحقيق) ببىت با ناوى حكومتەكەش ھەر شتېكى ترىش بىت ئەوا حوكمىكى نىسلامىه. ئەم مىكانىزمەش بە جىنھىلداوہ بۇ مىكانىزم كات وشوین وعەقلى مروقەكان گرنىگ ئەوہىه كه دادگەرى جىبەجى بىكرىت. بۇ نموونە نىستا له رۆژئاوا رىزگرتتى كات، چەمكى ھاوالاتى بوون، نە بوونى رەشوہ، يەكسانى ئەمانە ھەموو له (مقصد الشرىعة)ن ورۆحى نىسلامەتىن، ئەمە با ناویشى سىستەمىكى نىسلامىش نەبىت بەلام (مقصد)ى نىسلامىن.

پ/ ۹ چۆن له دىموكراسى تېدەگەن، وە چۆنىش بەر جەستەى دەكەن؟

و/ من پىم وايە كه دىموكراسى گونجاوترىن مىكانىزمى بەشدارىه له دەسەلات وئالوگۆرى دەسەلاتە كه عەقلى بەشەرى پىي گەشتىت تا نىستا. چونكە ئەگەر سەيرى حوكم و حوكمرانى بكەيت له مېژووى مروقايەتى دا كۆمەلنىك شىواز ھەبووہ بۇ ئەوہى مروقەكان حوكم و حوكمدارى پىي بەرئومبەرن. وە ئەوہى كه مروقايەتى لەم دوو سەد سالىەى دووايى پىي گەشتووہ بۇ بەشدارى له دەسەلات وئالوگۆرى دەسەلاتە كه دىموكراسىه له ھەموويان باشترە. وە ھەتا مروق و پرىكخستى ژيانى سىياسى و حوكمرانى ھەبىت، دەبىت حوكمرانى نىدارە ھەبىت. چون ئەمەش رىكەخرىت ئەوہ ئەو مىكانىزمەيە كه مروقەكان بە عەقلى پىي گەشتوون، لەبەر ئەوہ كه دىموكراسى باشترىن بەر ھەمى عەقلى مروقە لەم بوارە كه بۇ بەشدارى سىياسى وئالوگۆرى دەسەلاتە باشترە لەو ھەموو سىستەمانە كه رىگەيان نەداوہ بە بەشدارى سىياسى وئامادەش نەبوون بە ھىچ شىوہمىك دەستبەردارى دەسەلات بن با ناويان سولتانى مۇسلمانانىش بووبىت. لەبەر ئەوہ من (پىقن)م ھەيە كه كاتىك يەكگرتوى نىسلامى كوردستان له رىگەى سندوقەكانى دەسەلاتەوہ بگاتە دەسەلات، وە له ھەلبۇزاردنى داھاتوو كاتىك كه نەيتوانى بەلنىھەكانى كه داوئتى بە جەماوەر يان ئاواتەكانى جەماوەر ناھىنىتە دى وجەماوەرىش متمانەى پىي نەداوہ و، داگرت له كورسى دەسەلات، وە بەھەمان شىوہى چۆنە سەر دەسەلات بە دەنگى ھاوالاتيان دەسەلاتىش جى دىلتىت و دەپداتە دەست لاپەنى براوہ.

پ/ ۱۰ مامەلەتان لەگەل كەمايەتە نايىنەكان چۆن دەبىت؟

و/ نېمە له يەكگرتوو، وە له تىگەيشتمان بۇ نىسلام كه رىزى دانىاوہ بۇ ھەموو زمانىك، وە بۇ ھەموو نەتەوہمىك وە ئاينىك نىتر با ئەو نەتەوہ يان ئاينە ھەرچەندىك بن زۆر كەم يان زۆر زۆر ھەمان مافيان ھەيە. وە بۇ خاوەن ئاينەكان بە ئاشكرا باس له رىزگرتنىان ومافەكانىان كراوہ له قورئان وسونەت دا. تەننەت بۇ كەسىكى مولحدىش لەسەر بنەماى (لا اكراه فى الدين) نازادى خۆى ھەيە وسەربەستە. ئەمروش باس له جىبەجى كردنى دادگەرىه له جىبەجى كردنى ياسا، وە دەزگەى دادگەرى بۇ پاراستى مافى سەر جەم ھاوالاتيانە بە سەر جەم ئاين وبىروباوەر مەكانىانەوہ. وە مېژووى نىسلامىش پەرە له نموونەى چۆنىتى رىزگرتتى بىرو باوەر و پەرسەتەش و جۆرى ژيانى خاوەن ئاينەكان.

كۆتايى

Appendix 10: Interview with the head of the KIU's scholar ,Muthana Amin office

د. مثنى أمين نهدامى سهرگردايهتى يهگرتووى ئىسلامىي كوردستان

پاش باسکردنى بابتهى تويزينهوهكه، جهانبیان به باشیان زانى پيشهكيهك پيشكش بفر موون، نهجا وه لامي پرسيار مكان بدهنهوه.

ئهم تويزينهوهى تو نهچيتهوه سهر يهكيك له ههره سهر مكيترين (ازواجية) يك دهر بارهى دوو چهك كه له وولاتانى ئىسلامىي كارى لهسهر نهكرت. كه يهكيكيان برپتبه له چهكى دهعه، كه نهوه نامانجى ئىسلامه و هكو ناين. چهكى دوو هميش برپتبه له كارى سياسى، كه نهوه نامانجى بزوتنهوه ئىسلاميهكانه و هكو نهركيان بهر انبه به كومه لگا و دهولته ئىسلاميهكان. نهوه دوو نهر كه له كومه لگا ئاستدا بهر جهسته دهپتتهوه. سهر تا كه نهوه بزوتنهوه ئىسلاميهكانه دروست بوون ره ههئدى بانگهواز له سهر يان زال بوو. وه پهروهردهكردنهوهى جار يكي ترى كومه لگاي موسلمان بهرو به هاكانى ئىسلام له سهرى زال بوو. به لام له ههمان كاتدا تايهتتهنديتى نهوه بزوتنهوه ئىسلاميهكانه و هكو ئيخوان موسلمين و هكو نمونهيهكى ناشكرا و هگوره تايهتتهنديتى نهوه له كارى بانگهواز دا نهوه بوو بانگهواز و كارى سياسى بهيهكهوه گري دابوو. نهوه بزوتنهوهى ئىسلامى ترمان هيه وهكو نوور ههر له سهر متاوه لهسهر نهوه بينا كرابوو به حوكمى نهوه زينگيهيهى كه تيدا پهبادبوو و خوى يباريزيت له ههر كار و چالاكيهكى سياسى. بزوتنهوهى تر يشمان هيه نهوه بزوتنهوهانى كه شيوازى سهلهفيان و هرگرتوه، وه بزوتنهوهيهكى تر كه شيوازى سو فيان و هرگرتوه. نهوه له پيش ئيخوانيشهوه بوون و ئيستاش ههر ههن. وه تا ئيستاش ناراستهى زور بهيان بهرو دوور كهوتنهويه له چالاكى سياسى، وه كاردكرنه له سهر زانسته ئىسلاميهكان و بانگهواز بو ئىسلام، راستكردنهوهى نهخلاق.

تايهتتهنديتى بزوتنهوه ئيخوانيهكان و نهوانهش كه هاوشيوه نهوانه نهويه ههر له سهر متاوه چالاكى سياسى و بپركردنهوه له فهزاي سياسى و ليكولينهوه له فهزاي سياسى، وه كار كردن بو ئيصلاحى نهوه فهزا سياسيه بهشيكى سهرمكى بوو له نامانجى نهوه بزوتنهوه ئىسلاميهكانه. من ليروه ده ليم جياوازي نيوان بزوتنهوه ئيخوانيهكان نهوه بوو نهوه ههر له سهر متاوه پلانيان ههبوو بو نهوهى كه ئىسلام له بوارى سياسى دا بهر جهسته بكن، وه ئيصلاحىي سياسى دروست بكن. چونكه سهر متا رووخانى خيلافت بوو به شوك و سهدهميهك و اى كرد كه حسن بهنا نهوه بزوتنهويه دروست بكن. نهوه له رووى تيوريدا له فيكرى ئيخوان موسلمين دا لهوه سهر چاوه دهگريت كه ئىسلام ئاينيكى گشت گيره و شامله. وه مادام ئاينيكى گشتگير و شامله، وه نهگهر دههويت ئىسلام و هكو خوى خزمهت بكهت، دهبيت بهو گشتگيرى و شموليهته خزمتهى بكهت. نهگهر ئىسلام سيستميك بيت بو عيبادت و پهستن، نهوه تشرعيكيشه و اتا ياسايهكه بو دهولت. ئىسلام له ديدگاي ئيخوان موسلمينهوه و هكو نيمام بهنا له (اصول العشرين) دا باسى دهكات ئىسلام سيستميكى شامله بو ههموو بواركاني زيانى مروف. ههر و هكو چون فيكره، ههر وه دهعهويه، شار ستانيهته، نهوهته، دهولته، (جيش) ه، هيزه، ههموو شتيكه. ئىسلام ههر و هكو چون سيستميكه بو بپرو باوه، ههر وه سيستميكه بو پهستن، وه بو حوكمرانى و دهسه لات و بهر يوه بردنى كومه لگا. نهوه تيگهيشتنى تايهتتهى ئيخوان موسلمينه، وه نهوه ئيخوان موسلمين جيا دهكاتوه له بزوتنهوه سو فى و سهلهفى و نوورى و ره وتهكانى تر. ههر بويه ئيخوان موسلمين ههر له سهر متاوه به نهركى خويان زانى بزوتنهويهكى ئىسلامىي گشتگير دروست بكن، ههر و هكو چون تيگهيشتنيان بو ئىسلام گشتگيره. به لام دواى ماويهك كه ريگا نه ددرا بزوتنهوه ئىسلاميهكان خهباتى سياسى بكن، له بهر نهوه ستهم و پهراويز خستنه، سهيرت دهكرد كه بزوتنهوه ئىسلاميهكه ههر خويهتى حيز بيكى سياسى دروست نهكردوه. نهگهر بزوتنهويهكى ئىسلامىي له كومه لگاي خوى بيهويت كار يگهر بيت و، پروژهى ههبيت بو ئيصلاحى كومه لگاي خوى پيوستى به دروستكردنى حيز بيكى سياسيه. نهجه نهوه حيز به سياسيه روليك نهبيت غيبرى رولى بزوتنهوه ئىسلاميهكه.

ھەندىك حىزبى سىياسىيىش لە كۆتايى سەدەى بىيىست لە دەولەتەنى ئىسلامىيى دروست بوون، ئەم حىزبە سىياسىيەنەش تەنھا ئامانجى سىياسىيان لە خۆ گىترىبوو، لە بەر ئەو پىكھاتەو بىرو بۆچوون و تاكتىك و ستراتىژىيەتەيان وەك بزوتتەو ئىسلامىيەكان نەبوو. چونكە ئەمان باسيان لە كارى پەروەردەو بانگەواز نەدەكرد، وە كارىيان لەسەر زىندوكردەنەو خىلافەى ئىسلامىي نەدەكرد. باسيان لەو دەكرد كە بە مەرجەيەتەيكى ئىسلامىي دەبانەوئەت ئىصلاحىيەكى سىياسى لە ناو كۆمەلگەى خۆيان دروست بىكەن. ئەمەش وای كەرد كە ئىتر باس لە دوو چەمك و دوو ستراكچەر بىكرىت كە ئەوئەش بەرنامەى حىزبىيەكى سىياسى و بزوتتەوئەمەكى ئىسلامىيەن. ھەر وەھا باس لە پەيوەندى ئىوان، يان چۆنىتەى رىكخستى پەيوەندى ئىوان ئەو شتانەى كە دەعوەين وە ئەو شتانەى كە سىياسىيان ھاتە ئاراو. ئەمەش بوو بە يەكەيك لەو بابەتەت و تۆيژىنەوانەى كە بزوتتەو ئىسلامىيەكان و حىزبە سىياسىيەكان كەوتتە باسكردنى. ئايا كارى بانگەواز و زىندوكردەنەو بەھا و وروشتە ئىسلامىيەكان و ژيانەوئەى ئىسلام دەكرىت لەگەل كارى سىياسىيدا؟ ئايا دەكرىت شتە جىھانەى و نىوخۆيەكان تىكەل بىكرىن بە يەكترى؟ ئايا دەكرىت ئەو بەرنامەى كە بۆ پەروەردەى تاك دادەنرىت تىكەك بىكرىت بەو بەرنامە سىياسىيەى كە بۆ گرتتەدەستى دەسەلاتە؟ ئايا كىيەركىي سىياسى رقىك دروست ناكات لەو حىزبە سىياسىيە لە لايمەن ئەندامانى حىزبەكانى ترمو؟ كاتىكەش رقىك دروست بوو لە حىزبىيەكى سىياسى ئىسلامىي، ئايا ئىتر ئەو حىزبە (أهلية) ئىمىنىت بۆ ئەوئەى بانگەوازى خەلك بىكات بۆ بارى پەروەردەى؟ چونكە ئەو خەلكە كە دەبنە نەيارى ئەو حىزبە سىياسىيە ئىتر ئامادە نىن گۆئ بىكرن لە ئامۆژگارەكانى. لىرمو و واقەئەك دروست بوو كە دوای ئامانجەكانى بزوتتەوئەمەكى ئىسلامىي ئامانجەيكى گىشتكىرن، وە لە سەروو نەتەوئەمىن، وە ئامانجى حىزبىيەكى سىياسىيە دەبىت پراو پىر باسى ژىنگەى لوكالى خۆى بىكات، وە تەنەت دەبىت باسى ئەو بەرژمەندىيانە بىكات كە ھەندىك جار دژ بە بەرژمەندى ھەندى وولاتى ترى ئىسلامىيەن. وە لىرەدا دەبىت بەرژمەندى ناوخۆى بىخاتە سەروى بەرژمەندى ئومەت و بەرژمەندى گەورەتر. لىرەدا ئەم پىرسىيانە كە دروست بوو، وە جۆرى ھەلوئەست گرتن لەم كىشەيە كە كىشەيەكى راستەقىنەى و، كىشەيەكى شەكلى نىە. ئەمەش وای كەرد كە ئەم كە چەند مۆدىلەك لە كارى ئىسلامىي بىتە ئاراو:

- يەكەيك لەو مۆدىلانە ئەوئەى كە بزوتتەو و حىزب بەيەكەو. لە يەك ستراكچەر، وە بە يەك ناو و يەك بەرنامە بەلام ئەم بزوتتەو ئىسلامىيە خۆى كارى سىياسى دەكات، خۆى لە ھەمان كاتدا كارى دەعوە و پەروەردەش دەكات. وەكو يەكگرتووى ئىسلامىي كوردستان، (حركة العدل والاحسان) لە مەغرب، (حركة المجتمع المسلم) لە جەزائىر، (الجماعة الاسلامية) لە پاكستان، و بزوتتەوئەى ھەماس لە فەلەستىن. ئەمانە ھەموو كارى دەعوەى و كارى سىياسىيە دەخەنە ژىر رقىكى يەك سەركردايەتى و يەك پىروگرام، بەلام كارەكان لەناو خۆياندا دابەش دەكەن. مەكتەبەيك بۆ پەروەردە و بانگەواز، وە دامەزراوئەى دەعوەى دروست دەكەن بۆ كارى دەعوە. وە دامەزراوئەى سىياسىيە دروست دەكەن بۆ كارى سىياسى، بەلام نايگەيەنە ئەوئەى كە حىزبىيەكى سىياسى دروست بىكەن، ھەر خۆيان رۆلى سىياسىيە ئىبىن و، لە ھەمان كاتىشدا رۆلى بزوتتەوئەمەكى ئىسلامىيە ئىبىن.

- مۆدىلەكى تر ئەوئەى كە لە خۆيدا دوو جۆرە، جۆرىكەيان ئەوئەى كە بزوتتەو ئىسلامىيەكە حىزبە سىياسىيەكە ئازاد دەكات بۆ كارى سىياسى. جۆرەكەى تىريان حىزبە سىياسىيەكە كۆنترۆل كراو لەلايمەن بزوتتەو ئىسلامىيەكەو. جۆرى يەكەمى ئەم مۆدىلە وەكو ئىخوان مۇسلىمىن لە عىراق كە حىزبى ئىسلامىي عىراقىيان دروست كەرد، وەكو ئىخوان مۇسلىمىن لە ئوردن كە (حزب جبهة العمل الاسلامي) يان دروست كەرد، وە لە ميسر ئىخوان مۇسلىمىن (حزب الحرية والعدالة) يان دروست كەرد. ھەر وەھا (حركة التوحيد والاصلاح) لە مەغرب كە (حزب العدالة والتنمية) يى دروست كەردو، كە ئىستا حكومەتە لە مەغرب. بەلام ئىستا (حركة التوحيد والاصلاح) كۆنترۆلى (حزب العدالة والتنمية) ناكات. لىرەدا ئىشى بانگەواز كەردن ئىشى بزوتتەوئەمەكى و، ئىشى سىياسىيە ئىشى حىزبەكەيە، مۇنافەسە داكات لەسەر دەسەلات و ھەول دەدات كورسى پەرلەمان بە دەست بەننىت و حكومەت پىك بەننىت، وە دانانى پىروژەى سىياسىيە بۆ گەشە پىدان بەو وولاتە. ئەمەش سەركردايەتى حىزبە سىياسىيەكە خۆى ئەم كارە دەكات، ناگەرئەتەو بۆ بزوتتەوئەكە بلىت چى بىكەن. كەواتە بە تەواوتەى سەربەخۆيە. بەلام بەلئىنامەيك ھەيە لە نىوانىياندا كە ئەوئەش يەكگرتتەوئەى كە يەك ستراتىژىيەتى گىشتى دا. بۆ نمونە دەبانەوئەت وولات و بەرئەمەردن و گەشەكردنى بە شىوئەيك بىت، ئىتر ئەو كارى ئەنجا ھەندىك لە سەركردايەتەكانى بزوتتەوئەكە ئەم حىزبە دەبەن. حىزبەكەيە كە چۆن ووردكارى بۆ دەكات

بهریوه. به لأم سهرکردایهتی حیزبهکه نیستا (متفرغ)ه بۆ ئەم حیزبه. جۆرەکهی تر لەم مۆدیلە که حیزبه سیاسییهکه سهر بهخۆ نیه به تایبەت له پرسه گرنهگهکاندا ناتوانیت به تنها بریار بدات

- جۆریکی تر له حیزبی ئیسلامی ههیه بۆ بوونی ههچ باکگراوندیکی بزوتنهوهیهکی ئیسلامی، به واتایهک که بزوتنهوهیهکه ههجووبیت و دروستی کردبیت یان لێی جیاوو بیتهوه، ئەمەش وەکو حیزبی رهفاه له تورکیا، وه ئیستاش حیزبی داد وگهشهپندان.

وه له بنهڕهتدا بۆ جۆری یهکه له نموونهی یهکگرتوو و جهماعهی ئیسلامی (حرکه العدل والاحسان) یش شوناسیان بزوتنهوهیهکی ئیسلامیه دهیانویت به گشت گیری خزمەت به کۆمهلهگهکان بکهن. وه له نیوان خزمەت کردنی کۆمهلهگادا ویستویانه پرسی سیاسیش ببوژیننهوه، چونکه به لایانهوه بهشتیکی گرنگی خزمەت کردنی کۆمهلهگا بریتیه له پرسی سیاسی. جا ئەمانهش تا رادهیهک جیاوازی ههیه له نیوانیاندا، بۆ نموونه که سهیری یهکگرتوو دهکهیت دهبنیت و ویستویهتی (توازن) بپاریزیت له نیوان ئەوهی سیاسییه وه ئەوهی دهعهوی و ئیسلامیه. به لأم له بهر دۆخی سیاسی تایبەتی کوردستان وای لێ کردوه زۆر نزیک بووتهوه له حیزبیکی سیاسی. به لأم له رووی میژوویی و کاری بانگهوازی ههجووکههیش ههس بزوتنهوهیهکی ئیسلامیه. ئەمەش وای لێ کردوه که زیاتر له حماس بچیت له بواره که وهکو حیزبیکی سیاسی فلهستینی زیاتر دهردهکهوت له وهی که بزوتنهوهیهکی ئیسلامی بیت. ئەمەش له بهر زۆری گرنگی ههمه سیاسییهکه که له ههردوو کهسهکهدا میللەتی بۆ دهولەتن. ههس بۆیه ناوکانشیان ههس حیزبی سیاسییه، به لأم ئەوهی که دهیانسانیت و لێیان تیدهگات دهزانیت ئەمانه پێش له وهی حیزبی سیاسی بن بزوتنهوهیهکی ئیسلامین. چونکه ئەوانهی که له یهکگرتوو کۆبوونهتهوه به پهروهرده و دهعه هاتوون بۆ لای یهکگرتوو. رێژهیهکی کهم که دهنگههوانی یهکگرتوو له دهرهجمای هۆگر بوون به ئەدای سیاسی یهکگرتوو دهنگهکانیان دهنه یهکگرتوو. وه به قهناعهت من تا ئیستاش ئەوانه زیاتر جهماوره ئیسلامین. ئیستاش دهتوانم بڵێم که یهکگرتوو له قوناغیکی راگواستندا بۆ دیاری کردنی شوناسی خۆی. لهم قوناغی راگواستنه ئەگهس یهکگرتوو توانی ئەم دوو جهماسهره بهیهکهوه هههگریت، وه به ئەنس له نیوانیان بپاریزیت، وه ههواداران ههردوو کارهکه رازی بکات به وهی که ئەومنده ئەدای پهروهردهی و دهعهوی بههیز بیت که کادیران و ههواداران بزوتنهوه ئیسلامیهکه دانیان بن که ئەم رهوته جیگای خواست و ئاواتهکانیان تیدا جیگا دهبنهوه، ئەوا دهمیننهوه لهو ههیکهله. له لایهکی تریش ئەوانهی که کادری چالاک سیاسی ئیسلامی، وه ئەو جهماوره هشی که دهنگههوانه ئەگهس قهناعهتی بهوه کرد که ئەم بزوتنهوه ئیسلامیه که ناوی یهکگرتوو دهتوانیت نوینهرایهتیکی راستهقینهی بههیزی خواسته سیاسییهکانی ئەوان بکات، ئەوا ئەوانیش لێی رازی دهبن و قهبولیان ههس شوناسیکی ههبنیت مادام ئەوهی که ئەرکی سیاسییه به باشی پێی ههلهستن.

لێرهدا دوو جۆر رکابه و دوو رسکیش له بهردهم یهکگرتوو دایا، مۆدیلێکی ئیسلامی بوون که بهردهوام بهر مو ئیسلامی بوون و بهر مو بزوتنهوه بوون رای دهکشیت. مۆدیلی گۆرانیش ههیه که بهردهوام بهر مو سیاسی بوون رای دهکشیت. کهواته ئەم دوو تهحهديه له بهردهم یهکگرتوو دایا. لێرهدا چار سهس ئەگهس یهکگرتوو بریاری دا که حیزبیکی سیاسی دروست بکات و، خۆی و هکو بزوتنهوهیهکی ئیسلامی بمینیتهوه بۆ کاری پهروهردهی دهعهوی رهنگه ئەو ئەزمونه سهرکهوتوو بیت. چونکه ئەو کاته ههموو ئەو کادره دهعهوی سهرکهوتووانه پشتیوانیهکانیان بۆ ئەو حیزبه دهبنیت که دروست دهبنیت. به لأم ئەمەش گرفتێ تر دواتر دروست دهکات و هکو بۆ مۆدیلە هاوشیوهکان دروست بووه. ههس یهکهش لهم مۆدیلانه ۱۰۰% راست و دروست نیه. پێشینهی میژوویی و جوغرافیا و کیشه نهتهومی ههموو ئەمانه گاریگهریان ههیه له سهس ههلهزاردنی جۆری مۆدیلەکه. ئەنجا ههجوونی توانا بۆ بهرپهردنی دوو کاری سیاسی و دهعهوی لهیهک کاتدا به (کفانه)یکی تهواو تهحهديهکی تره. نایا ئەومنده کادیری شارهزاو چالاک بۆ ههردوو بوارهکه ههیه به سهرکهوتویی کارهکان به ریه بهرن؟ نایا گهر سهر کهوتوش بیت، نایا دواتر کتیهرکێ و موناغهسه له نیوانیاندا دروست نابیت؟ نایا ئەم حیزبه سیاسی هههیشه دهتوانیت ئەو پێوهرانه بپاریزیت که وه لائی ئەم کوتله دهعهویه مسوگهر بکات بۆخۆی؟ وه ئەم کوتله دهعهویه که له کاری سیاسی دوورکهوتنهوه نابنهوه به هاوشیوه بزوتنهوهیهکی سۆفی، وه دوورکهوتوو له دنیا و کاری سیاسی؟ نایا دهتوانیت و هکو گروپێکی فشار سیاسهت بکات؟ وه قهناعهتی تایبەتی من لهگهه ئەوهدا نیه که لهم ههمل و مهرجهدا جیا بکرتنهوه؟ به لأم قهناعهتی من وایه که سیاسهت کردن بهو تاکتیک و ووردکاریه که پێویستی پێیهتی، بهو (صراع) و کتیهرکێیهی که

پيويستى پييهتى، بهو پسيوربوون له پيشكش كړدى پروژو و خزمهت كړدى راسته خو كوهملگا نهمه كايهيكه غميرى دنياى خزمهت كړدن به بواري پورمورده وزانستى شهرى وزيندو كړندهوى ئيسلام لهناو كوهملگا وهيدايه تدانى خهلك و ئيصلاحي ئهخلاقى خهلك و كوهملگا كهواته نهمه دوو فزاي جياوازن، هر كه سينك بلئت نهم دوو فزايه يهك فزان به ره هايى، نهوه وا دوزانم تينه گيشتووه. وه نهوه كه شمس بلئت به ره هايى نهم دوو شته دوو شتى جياوازن و تيكه ل نانهوه به يه كترى، بهواتا سياست شتيكه وكارى ئيسلامي پورمورده يى شتيكى تر نهو يش من وا دوزانم هر تينه گيشتووه. له بهر نهوه من ده ليم بزوتنهويهكى ئيسلامي نهگر حيز بيكى سياسيش دروست بكات خوشى هر ده بيت سياست بكات. نهى چون (تناقض) دروست نه بيت؟ ده بيت نهم بزوتنهويه ئيسلاميه سياست بكات و هكو گروهى فشار، و هكو لوبى. به لام حيز به سياسيه كه سياست دهكات و هكو حيز بي سياسى.

ئيمه له زانسته سياسيه كان چوار كه نالمان هه به يو مومار سه كړدى سياست:

كه نالى يه كه م كه نالى تاكه كه سيه، له ريگاي به شدارى كړدن له راى گشتى، و هكو وونار بيژيك له سر مينبر، و هكو پيشكش كاري بهر نامه يه كه له تله فزيون، و هكو نووسه ريكي به ناوبانگ كه راکانى زور كاريگرن له سر دروست كړدى فزاي گشتى. كه نالى دووم بريته له كه نالى گروهه كانى فشار، و هكو سنده كان، ريخراوه جهاموره يكان، پيشه يه يكان، ريخراوه كانى كوهملگاي مه دنى، وه كاتيك نه مانه تورنيك له نيوانياندا دروست ده بيت ده بيه گروهى فشار. نه مانه مش مرچ نيه نه پيشه يى بن، نه جهامورى، به لام كوهملگن يو نهوه حكومت بخه نه ژير فشار له ديار يكردى برياريكى ديارى كراو. من پيم وايه بزوتنهويه ئيسلاميه كان له سر نهم ناسته مومار سه ي سياسه بكن. وه نهگر نهمه نه كمن به ته واوتى كه نالى سيه هم حيزى وازيان هينا له سياست، واته نه ليم نين شتيكه سياست شتيكى تر. سياسيه، وه نامانجى حيزى سياسيش ۱۰۰% سياسيه يو گرته ده ستى ده سه لاته. حيز به شيوه ي تيم كار دهكات وه ريخستنيكى سياسى دروست دهكات وه هو ل ده دات يو نهوه ي بگات به ده سه لات. كه نالى چوارم كه نالى حكومه ته، هر كه سينك كه وه زير يان په له مانتر، پاريزگار بوو نيمر نهوه كه سيكى سياسيه.

له بهر نهوه تو ده توانيت سياست بكه يت و هكو حكومت كه له ده سه لاتا بيت، و هكو حيزى سياسى، و هكو گروهى فشار، وه و هكو تاكه كه س يو دروست كړدى راى گشتى. له دروست كړدى راى گشتيدا، وه له دروست كړدى گروهى فشار بزوتنهويه ئيسلامي ده توانيت سياست بكات به چالاكى. كه هاته سر نهوه ي و هكو حيز بيكى سياسى بيكات، ده توانيت نهم كاره بسپيرت به ده زگايه كى سر به خو. وه كاتيكش كه ده زگايه كى سر به خو ش دروست ده كمن نيمر گوئ به هندن پيوهرى ئيسلامى نادن بهو و اتايه ي كه له كارى بانگواز دا پيوسته، نهو يش نهوه ي نهم نه دانه له رووى ناينيه وه چه نديك كه سيكى وابه ستو به نه ركه ناينيه كان، و هكو نايا نافره تيكى دا پو شراوه يان نا، نو يژ دهكات يان نا، موملانه يان نا؟ چونكه حيز به پيوهندي به پروژو ه سياسيه وه هه به. وه نهم پيوهرانه كه باسگران پيوهرى بزوتنهويه كى ئيسلامين نهك حيز بيكى سياسى. به لام تيمه نيستا چونكه له ناو يه كگرتو وه دوو شوناسه كه تيكه له نيمر ناتوانيت به چونكه يه كگرتو تاكو نيستاش و با كگراونده ميژويه كشى. پيوهرى حيز بيكى سياسى نه دانه و هر گريت بزوتنهويه كى ئيسلاميه، وه هر جى نه دانه يى هر جى نه دانه بوونه له بزوتنهويه كى ئيسلاميدا. من قه نانه تم وايه نيستا نهگر يه كگرتو حيز بيكى سياسى دروست بكات و، به هر جى نه دانه يى حيز بيكى سياسى نه دانه مافه كانى پاريزراو بيت، وه كانديد بكر يت بى هيج گرفتيك خهلكى زور هه به نامادهن بيه نه دانه يى نهوه حيز به.

ليزه دا مه به ست نهويه كاتيك كه باس له ته واو بوون يان ته واو نهوونى رولى بزوتنهويه ئيسلاميه كان ده كريت راست نيه نيمر رولى يان ته واو بوونيت. چونكه له رووى واقعيه وه هيشتا رولى يان ته واو نهوونى كاتيك كه سه يرى نه روى واقع ده كه يت. نه نانه تم نهو انهش كه ناوى حيزى سياسى يان له خو يان ناوه، هيشتا هر كارى ده عوى و سياسيش پيكه وه ده كمن و هر جى نه دانه يى شيان هر هر جى بزوتنهويه كى ئيسلاميه. كه زياتر بزوتنهويه كى ئيسلامين وكارى سياسى ده كمن، نهك حيز بيكى سياسى وكارى ده عوى بكن.

كاتيك كه سىرى ژياننامى پىغمبەر (د. خ) دهكيت نى كاته هيج گرتيك نى بوو چونكه لهپل كاتدا ناين و سياست و سربازى و هممو شتهكان به يهكوه كراون بى گرفت. كاتيكش كه دولت دروست بوو، نيتر دولتهكه هممو بوارهكانى ريكخستوو، چونكه هيج ركبهرىكى نهووه، وه دولتهكه دولتهكى نىسلامى بووه. بهلام نىستا دولت شوناسى بووته شوناسى سىكولر. وه گروپيك له خلك نىم جوړه چالاكيانه نىجام دهن، نىم گروپش شهر عيتى نوينرايتى هممو كۆمەلگای موسلمانان نيه، وه ناتوانيت به ناوى هممو كۆمەلگای موسلمانوه قسه بكات. تنها شهر عيتى خوځان ونى نىندانمانان هيه كه دمچن به ناويانوه نىم چالاكيانه دهكن. لهبر نىم ليره پيوست به نىم دهكات كه گروپى جياواز هينيت، پيوست بهوه دهكات همدى جار چالاكى سياسى جياكرتوه له چالاكى پىرومدهيى ودهعوى. بهلام هيج مؤديلك بى گرفت نيه.

وه نىم مؤديلانوش كه بزوتنهكه حيزبهكه كۆنترؤل دهكات به راي من سر كهوتوو نين، نىم نمونهى حيزبى عيراقى. نىستا حيزبى عيراقى دهيويت هميكلىكى سياسى جيا له نىخوان دروست بكرت بو نىم خلكىكى ناشيونالىست لىيان كۆ بيتوه، وه خلكيك كه نزيكن له نىسلاميهكان و نىسلاميهكان خوځيان به مارجعيتى نىسلامى جياوازوه كۆببنوه لهو هيزه سياسيهى كه دروست دهيت. وه كاتيك كه نىم هميكله دروست بوو نيتر نىخوان وازى لى دهينيت. وه نىم كاته ومكو نمونهى مهغربى لىديت. برواشم وايه نمونهى نىردينش سر كهوتوو نهو نىخوان حيزبىكان دروست كرد به ناوى (جبهه العمل الاسلامى)، بهلام نىانتوانى نامانجهكانى حيزبىكى سياسى له كۆكردنوهى چالاكوانى سياسى كۆمەلگا له خوځيان كۆبكنوه. زياتر نىندانميتى وسر كړدايهكهى لهدهست نىخوانهكاندا مايهوه. وه برواشم وايه نىم كه نىستا له ميسر هيه، نىم نىخوان موسلمين سر بهخوى نىم نىم حيزبه سياسيهكه لهوى كه چۆن پى باشه وا كارى سياسى بكات قناعتم وايه نىم زور سر كهوتوو نىم. نىم نىخوان مهجور دهيت كه خوى راستهوخو بىت كارى سياسى بكات، نىم كاتش تووشى نىم كالىت نىم دهيت كه نىخوان ومكو بزوتنهوهيكى نىسلامى دهيويت له (صراع)ى دهسه لاتدا بيلان بىت، ومكو نوينرايتى بههيك، دهيت لايىم نوينرايتى كهسك كه له دهسه لاتدا بىت. كهواته له مونا فسهى دهسه لاتدا عبيدار دهيت، چونكه ركبهرهكان رق هلمدگرن، نيتر نىم نىم ناتوانن نامؤزگاربان بكن ومكو بى لايىم، كه بىگومان لايىمگرى كهسك دهكن دژ به كهسكى تر. نىم كاديره دهعو بهكانيان سر قال دهبن به كارى سياسيهوه.

پ/ كاتيك كه يهكگرتوو هات و حيزبى راگهياند هر نىم كاديره دهعو يانه بوون كه نىستا كارى سياسى دهكن، نىم نيتر چۆن دهوانيت له هيمان كاتدا كۆمەلگ كادرى تايهتى هينيت بو دهعه و، كۆمەلگى تريس بو كارى سياست؟ نايه نىم ماويه نىم نىم كادرى دهعو پىگهياندوه كه نىمى لهبر پروات؟

و/ داعيهكانى نىم كه سياسهتبان كړدوه، له جيهانى دهعهش نهبراون. هر چنده ومكو كهسانى (مترغ) بو دهعه كاربان نهكردوه. هر دوو كارهكان له يك كاتدا نىم داوه، چونته ناو ريكخستنهكان وموعظهى پىرومدهيى ونىم خلاقىيان كمر دوه و، كه چونته ناو كۆمەلگا له زور شويندا كارى پىرومدهيان نىم داوه، كه چونته ناومنده سياسيهكانش كارى سياسيان نىم داوه. نايه نىم دوو كاره هر دوو كىيان ناوا بهيهكوه دهكرت؟ نىم پرسياريكه، وه نايه ناوا باشه يان باشتر وايه كه جياكرتوه؟ نىم نىم جيامانكردوه چى روو دهوات؟ نايه نىم كات سياسيهكانمان تهواو دور ناكهونهوه له دنياى دهعه؟ نىم دور كهوتنهشيان نايه كارى لىم كوالعتى خوځان نىم؟ نىم ش كه كلكردنوهى شوناسى كهسه سياسيهكان دهگهينيت بى گومان ناسهوارى پىرومدهيى خوى هيه، وه توخكردنوهى شوناسى نىسلامىيان ناسهوارى سياسى ناباشى هيه. چونكه كه شوناسه نىسلاميهكان توخ دهكيتوه چينيك له جهامور دور دهكونهوه. وه كه شوناسه نىسلاميهكان لاوز دهكيت چينيكى نىسلاميت لى دور دهكوتوه. من قناععتى خوم وايه كه نىم پيوستمان بهم بهش بهش كړدنه نيه. نىم نىم كه گرتمانه كاراييه له هر دوو بوارهكه. نىم نىم هر دوو بوارى دهعو و سياسيش بههيز بكن دنوانين هر دوو كارهكه بهيهكوه بكن. كهواته دهيت باس له جياكردنوهى پىرومدهكان له چوار چيوه يهكگرتوودا بكن. به قناععتى من سياست پيوستى به نىم زور نيه. كارى سياسى پيوستى به كهسايتى كاريزمى، كهسايتى نىم و بههيز، كهسايتى خاوهن فيكر، وه خاوهن جور نىم هيه بو دروستكردنى هلمو نىم لىم شقام، لىم ميديا،

وہ پیشکشہشکردنی پرورژہ. واتہ عہقلیک بۆ درووستکردنی پرورژ و، جورئەت بۆ درووستکردنی ھەلۆیست. کہ ئەم دوو شتە ھەبوو عہقلیکی بەھیز، لەگەڵ دلیکی بەھیز بۆ جورئەت وکارایی، وە بە جیدی خەمەکانی خەلک لە خۆگرتن وداکوکی لیکردنیان ئاوا دەنگی خەلک و جەماوەر کۆدەبنەوہ لەو حیزبە. وە دەشتوانن نوینەرایەتی خەلک بکەن نیت ئیسلامیی بن، ریشیان ھەبیت، نەیانیت یان ھەر شتیکی بن خەلک شوینیان دەکویت. من نموونەیکە خۆمت پێ دەلیم، کاتیکی کہ بۆ ھەلیژاردنەکانی پەرلەمانی عێراق خۆم کاندید کرد نزیکی ۹۲۵۰ دەنگ ھینا، بەلام کہ لە خۆپیشاندانەکانی ۱۷ شوباتی ۲۰۱۱ دا بەشداری کرد، وە بە جورئەتەوہ کەوتە بەر چاوی خەلک، خەلک لە نزیکیوہ زیاتر منیان ناسی وئیب ساینیک لە کۆتایی سالی ۲۰۱۱ دا راپرسیەکی کردبوو لەسەر ئەوہی کہ کێ لە کوردستان کاریگەرترین کەسایەتی ۲۰۱۱ بوو؟ دیارە ناوی من لەگەڵ ناوی مام جەلال و نەوشیروان موستەفا و کاگ مەسعود و م. صلاح الدین و ژمارەیک کەسایەتی تریش، دەرئەنجام من یەکەم دەنگ ھینابوو کہ ۳۵% دەنگەکان بوو. کاگ نەوشیروان ۲۲% دەنگەکانی بە دەست ھینابوو کہ کاریزمایەکی زۆر ھەبە لەناو کاری ئۆپوزیسیۆن. مام جەلال نزیکی ۵% ھینابوو، کاگ مەسعود ۱۰% ھینابوو. مەبەست ئەوہی کہ چۆن ناوی من چۆتە ئەوئ؟ دیارە لەو چالاکیانە بەردەم خەلکە خۆپیشاندەرە، کاتیکی کہ تۆ ئازایانە مافەکانی خەلک لە ئەستۆ بگریت وداکوکی لێ بکەیت ئەوانیش پشتگیری لێ دەکەن با ھەر کەسیکیش بێت.

یەگرتوو بە دنیایەوہ بەرای من حیزبیک ئیسلامیە کیشە نەتەوایەتی بەکارناھینیت بۆ مەبەستی سیاسی خۆی، بەلکو کیشە نەتەوایەتی لە ئەستۆ گرتووہ وکو بەشیک لە ئەرکی ئیسلامی.

پ/ نايا ئیوہ حیزبیک مەدەنین یان ئیسلامی؟

و/ ئیمە ئەو بەھایانە ناشیونالیزم کہ بەھای رەوان و، بەشیکن لە ئەرکی کوردیک بەرانبەر بە نیشتمانەیکە، وە بەرانبەر بە نەتەوەیکە، ئەم ئەرکانە بەھایەکن دەبیت لە ناو ئیمەدا جیان بێتەوہ. نیشتمانی بوون لە چوارچۆی ئەو نیشتمانەدا کہ تیدا دەژیت بەھایەکە، ناشیونالیزم بەھایەکی ترە، دیموکراسیەت بەھایەکی ترە. من دەلیم ئەمانە ھەموو بەھایەکن ئیسلام جەختیان لەسەر دەکاتەوہ. ھەر بۆیە منیش قەبوڵم، ئەمەش وا دەگەیتت کہ ئەولەویەت لای من ئیسلامە. کاتیکی من وکو کەسیکی کورد کہ دەچمە بەردەم ھەلۆیستیک بۆ نموونە کاتیکی کہ عەرەبیک ستەمی لێ دەکریت، وە من پشتگیری لیناکەم لەبەر ئەوہ کہ عەرەبەو کورد نیە، مانای ئەوہی کہ من ئیسلامی نیم لەو کاتە، من ناشیونالیزم. وە ئیسلامەکەم بەکار دەھێنم بۆ بیانوی ناشیونالیزم. کہ بەداخەرە ھەندیک لە ئیسلامیە عەرەبەکان ئاوان. جا ھەر ئیسلامیەک کاتیکی کہ ھەر ستەمیک قەبوڵ دەکەن لەبەر بەرژووندی نیشتمانەیکە خۆیان، ئەو کاتە ئیتر ئەو کەسە لە چوارچۆی شوناسی ئیسلامی دەچیتە دەرەوہ. ئیمە قەناعەتەمان وایە کہ ھیچ کاتیکی بەرژووندی نەتەویمیمان دژ نیە لەگەڵ شوناسی ئیسلامیمان. بەلام ئەگەر دژ بوون شوناسی ئیسلامیەکە ئەسە. وە دەبیت شوناسی نەتەویمی بگۆنجیترت لەگەڵ شوناسی ئیسلامی. وە ئەم شوناسە نەتەویمی سەردەمیکی تر لەوانەیکە یەک نەگرنەوہ لەگەڵ جیھانگیری وچەمکە تازەکاندا. وە بەشیک لەو ناشیونالیزمە توندەرەوہ کہ لەم وولاتانە ھەبە ھی ئەوہی کہ نەتەوەیکە ژیر دەستەبە، وە نەتەوەیکە ستەمی لێ دەکریت. وە ھەر ئەو کەسە ناشیونالیزمە خۆشی ستەمی لێ دەکریت لەبەر ئەو شوناسە نەتەویمی. بەلام لە نایندە کە ستەمەیکە لەسەر نەما تیروانینی دەگۆریت. بۆ نموونە ئیستا لە ھەریمی کوردستان زۆر جیاوازە لە کوردستانی ئێران و تورکیا، ئیمە ئیستا لە ھەریمی کوردستان تێگەشتنمان بۆ شوناسی نەتەویمی راستەر بوو، وە زۆر جیاوازە لە تێگەشتنی ئیستای ئەوان بۆ شوناسی نەتەویمی. ئیمە کاتیکی کہ وکو ئۆپوزیسیۆن رەخنە لە دەسەلاتی کوردی ھەریم دەگرین، ئەوان پێیان ناخۆشە وا دەزانن لە دژی بەرژووندی کورد کار دەکەیت. چونکہ ئەو لەوئ (محروم) لە ھەر جۆرە ئازادیەکی نەتەوایەتی، بەلام ئەو نازانیت کاتیکی کہ ئەویش گەشتە ئەم ئاستە ئیتر تێدەگات کہ شوناسی نەتەویمی خۆبت نیە من بپەرستم، وە بەھاکانی تر ئیتر گرنگ دەبن وکو دیموکراسی و نازادی تاکە کەس و مافی مرۆف و شەفافیەت و... ھتد.

لە رووی فەلسەفیەوہ ھەندیک جار بەھا لەگەڵ بەرژووندی دژ ئەو مستن لەگەڵ یەکتەری. کاتیکی کہ تۆ بەرژووندیکە خۆت یان نەتەوەیکە بۆ ئەو دەستی خەیت، ھەندیک جار یەک دەگریتەوہ وە ھەندیک جار یە

بەك ناگر ئىتەمۇ لەگەل بەھاكاندا. بۇ نموونە نەگەر پارچە زەمبەك كاتىك كە ھى نەتەمۇبەككى ترە، بەلام نەتەمۇبەككى تۆ ئەمەتتە ئەر زەمبەك ھى ئەمەتتە، لەمەكەتەدا تۆ لە ئىوان دوو شت دايت، لە ئىوان جىبەچىكرەدى بەھەي دادگەردايت، وە لە ئىوان سوور بوون لەسەر بەرژمەندى نەتەمۇبەككى. لىرەدا ئەگەر تەنھا كەسنىكى ناشىونالىست بىت و، گوئ نەدەيتە بەھاكان داكۆكى دەكەيت لە نەتەمۇبەككى با لەسەر ناحەقىش بىت. لەبەر ئەمە ئىمە تىگەشىشمان بۇ پەرسە نەتەمۇبەككى و نىشتەمانبەكان دەبىت پەمەست بىت بە چەمكى ماف و دادگەردى. وە ئەم چەمكى ماف و دادگەردايت بەھەي ئىسلامن، لە ھەمان كاتدا بەھەي نىودەولەتى و دىمۇكراسى و مافى مەژ و ژىيانى سەردەمن. ئەم بەھەيانش تەنھا لە ئايندا باس نەكرا، بەلكو لە ياسا نىودەولەتى و دىمۇكراسى و فەلسەفە ئىنسانىيەكانىشدا باس كراو. كاتىك كە مافىك دژە لەگەل ئەم بەھەنەدا، ئىتر تۆ دەبىت لەگەل نەتەمۇبەككى خۆت نەبىت. ئەگىنا ئىتر تۆ كەسنىكى شوقىنىستى، تۆ كەسنىكى سەروشتى نىت.

پ/ چۆن ھەست دەكەيت وەكو كوردىك، وە چۆن ھەست دەكەيت وەكو موسلمانىك؟

و/ مەن پىم وایە مەژ بوون شوناسى يەكەمە، موسلمان بوون شوناسى دوومە، كورد بوون شوناسى سىھەمە. بۇ نموونە ھەر بەرژمەندىك كە كورد بە بەرژمەندى دەزانىت، لای مەن بەرژمەندى نىە ئەگەر ئىسلام قىوالى نەبىت. چۆنكە لای مەن ئىسلام وەكو ئەم بەھەي و مەبەھە ستانداردانەيە كە بەرژمەندىكەنى كورد دەخاتە ئاستى رەوايەتى و نارەوايەتى. چۆن كە ھەر كىشەيەك ھەبەو لە ياسا نىودەولەتى، وە لە دىمۇكراسىيەت و بەھاكانى ترەدا، كە چۆن كەسنىك ئەم پىوەر و بەھەيانش پىشلىكەت ئىتر و اتاى نىشتەمانى بوون نەتەمۇبەككى بوون و ناشىونالىست بوونت و اتاى نامىنىت. لای مەن ئىسلامى بوون ئەم ستانداردەيە كە بۇ كورد بوونم دىارى دەكەت، وە چارچىوہ و ئامانجى بۇ دىارى دەكەت. لەبەر ئەمە لای مەن ئىسلامى بوون بەھەي يەكەمە، چۆنكە ئىسلامى بوون باسە لە بەھەي و پەرسىيەكان و ستراتىژەكان. كورد بوون باسە لە واقع، باسە لە تاكتىك و بەرژمەندى. بەرژمەندى و تاكتىك بائىت لەگەل بەھاكان.

بەلام لە كاتىكدا كە ئاين دەجىتە ناو رىشك و رەگەز و مەژووى نەتەمۇبەككى ئىتر دەبىتە بەشنىك لە شوناسى ئەم نەتەمۇبەككى. وە لە ھەمان كاتدا ھەر سوکايەتى كوردنىك بەھەي نەبىتە سوکايەتى كوردن بە نەتەمۇبەككى. واتە ھەر سوکايەتى كوردنىك بە ئىسلام دەبىتە سوکايەتى كوردن بە كورد. وە ھەر سوکايەتى كوردنىك بە كورد دەبىتە سوکايەتى كوردن بە بەشنىك لە ئىسلام. وە ئەم شوناسانە ئەمەندە بە ناو يەكدا تىكەل بوون ئاسان نىە كە لە يەكپان جىا بەكەيتەمۇ. بەلام لە ئاستى تىورى جىا دەكرىنەمۇ. وە ئىسلامى بوون دەبىتە ستاندارد و (مەبەھە) بۇ ئەمەي بزانرىت بەرژمەندىيەكان رەوان يان نارەوا.

پ/ وەكو كوردىكى ئىسلامى يان ئىسلامىيەكى كورد گەر دەتەمۇبەككى، چۆن سەبەرى ئىسلام دەكەيت وەكو ئاينىكى جىھانى؟

و/ كورد بوون بىرىتە لە باسكردن لە سنورىكى جوگرافى دىارى كراو. باسكردن لە ئىسلام باسكردنە لە ئاين و ھىدايەتتىك بۇ ھەمەو مەژمەنە. بە دالنىيەمۇ ئىسلام تەنھا بۇ كورد يان بۇ ھەمەب تەنھا نىە، ئىسلام بۇ رەزگار كوردنى ھەمەو بەشەرىتە. مەن و ئەبىم كە ئىسلام ئاينىكى رەزگار كەرى بەشەرىتە لە تارىكى و بەدبەختى و چارمەشى كە كۆمەلگەي مەژمەنە تىدەكەوت. لەبەر ئەمە كورد بوون باسە لە شوناسىكى دىارى كراو، وە لە جوگرافىيەكى دىارى كراو. وە كاتىكىش كە دىتە ناو باسەمۇ كە ستەمىك يان ماف خواردنىك لە ئارادا بىت. بەلام ئىسلام ھەمەيشە باسنىكى زىندە بۇ رەزگار كوردنى ھەمەو كۆمەلگەكانى مەژمەنە. قورئان خۆى دىارى كوردە كە مانجى ئاين بىرىتە لە لە دروستكردنى دادگەردى لە كۆمەلگە. لە بەر ئەمە ئىسلام داواى دادگەردى دەكەت بۇ ھەمەو كۆمەلگەكانى مەژمەنە. وە پىكەمۇ ژىيانى نەتەمۇبەككى لەسەر بىنەمەي دادگەردى و خۆشەبەستى و پىكەمۇ ژىيان و ھاوکارى. كەواتە ئىسلام تەنھا ھى كورد نىە، ھى ھەمەب نىە، ئىسلام ئاينىكە ھاتوہ بۇ رەزگارى ھەمەو كۆمەلگەي مەژمەنە بۇ ئەمەي رەزگارى بىت لە ستەم. وە ھەمەو كۆمەلگەي مەژمەنە بۇ ئەمەي بە دادگەردى و سەلامەتى و برايتە بىزىن. لەبەر ئەمە ئىسلام ئاينە وە كورد بوون نەتەمۇبەككى، ئاينىش زۆر لە نەتەمۇبەككى گەورەترە و فراوانترە.

و مگو كوردیكى موسلمان ههست به دوو شت دهكهیت، یهكهم: ههست به نهوه دهكهیت كه تو سهر به نومهتیكى ئیسلامی كه بهشیكه له تو، وه زور گهورهتره له نهتهوهكهی تو. وه ههموو پهكیکیش له ئهئدامانی نهو ئومهته برای تویه. دووم: ههست بهوه دهكهیت كه پهپامییکی گهوره هاتوه بو سهر زهو، تو پیویسته بهشار بیت له نهوهی كه ئهم پهپامه وئهم زرگار په بگهیهنیته ههموو مروقایتهی. لهبهر نهوه تو ههست به بوونی ئهركیک دهكهیت له بهرانبه به ئیسلام. تو و مگو موسلمانییکی كورد ئهم ئیسلامه و مگو پهپامییکی ناشتی وبرایهتی وبهها جوانهكان پیویسته بگهیهنیته ههموو كومهلگای مروقایتهی. تو و مگو موسلمان بهرپرسیار هتیت ههیه بهرانبه به ئیسلام. بهرپرسیار بهتیهکی تر بهرانبه به ئیسلام نهوهیه كه هاو ئاینهكانی ترت به برای خۆت بزانیته. وه نازارهكانیان به نازاری خۆت بزانیته. وه هاوکاری كردنیان به ئهركی خۆت بزانیته. ئهمه پێداویستییهكه ئیسلام و مگو ئاینییکی جیهانی بهرانبه به كهسیکی موسلمانێ كورد دروستی دهكات. وه جیههجهكردنی ئهم پێداویستیانه بهشیکی گرنهگه له موسلمان بوونی كهسیکی موسلمان. لهبهر نهوه كوردییکی موسلمان جیاوازه له كوردییکی لیبرالی، كوردیكى ناشیونالیست، چونكه ئهم نهوه رهههنده ئیسانیه گهورهشی ههیه، وه ئهركی ههیه بهرانبه به مروقایتهی.

پ/ رهخنهیهك ههیه بهرانبه به ئیسلامیهكان گوايه ئیسلامیهکی مه غریبه ئهفغانیهکی موسلمانێ گرنهگه به لایوه له هاو لاتییهکی خۆی مادام ئیسلامی نیه، لهم جیهانهگیریهی ئیسلامه دا چون سهری ئهم بابته دهكهیت؟
و/ خۆی ههموو ئهم شتانه پیویست به به لانس ههیه، پیویستی به جیاگردنهوهی مافهكانه له پهكتری. كهسیکی هاو نیشتمانی خۆم ئهركییکی لهسهر ههیه جیاوازه لهو ئهركهی كه كهسیکی موسلمانێ وولاتییکی تر. ئهمانه ئاستی جیاوازی. سهرهتا ئیسلام موسلمان فیری نهوه دهكات كه نهوهی خزمته ئهركیکی تایهتی ههیه لهسهرت، نهوهی دراوسینه ئهركیکی تایهتی لهسهرت ههیه، هاو نیشتمانه كهت ئهركیکی تایهتی لهسهرت ههیه، موسلمانانی تر ئهركی تایهتییان لهسهرت ههیه، مروقهكانی تری دنیا با موسلمانیش نهبن ئهركیکی تری تایهتییان ههیه لهسهرت. مروقه ئهركی لهسهرت تو ههیه، تو دهبیته بهرانبه به ههریهك لهمانه ئهركی تایهتی خۆت بهجی بهیتهیت. وه ئهو گریمانهی كه ئهركی خۆت بهرانبه به نهتهوه كهت دژه لهگهڵ ئهركهكانت بهرانبه به مروقهكانی تر، یان به پێچهوانهوه ههلهیه. وه عهقل بچوكیه كه ههندیک له ناشیونالیسته شو قینییهكان ئهو بیرکردنهویان ههیه. ئهگینا من ئهركم بهرانبه به نهتهوهكهی خۆم خهباتکردنه بو زرگار کردنی و دا ببنکردنی ژانیکی كهرامتهمندانه بۆی. وه كاتیک كه ئهركه مروقایهتیهكانی ترم دینه ئاراه، بو نمونه كاتیک كه مروقیك له شوینیک كه ستهمی له دهكریت من دهبیته داکۆکی له بكهم، ئهمه پێچهوانهی ئهركه نهتهوهیهكانی خۆم نیه بهرانبه به نهتهوهكهم. وه هیچ دژیتهیهك له نیوانیاندا نیه. ئهمه و مگو نهوه وایه كه كهسیك ئیت بپرسیت تو دهبیته لهگهڵ دایكت باش بیت یان لهگهڵ خیزانهكهت، یان لهگهڵ باوكت؟ ئهمانه ههیهكه ئهركیكیان ههیه لهسهرت، وه نابیت لهسهر حسابی پهكتر بن. ئهم گریمانانه ههردهم گریمانی خهلكی عهقل بچوكی شو قینیین. ئهكریت ئهفغانیهكیشم خوشبویت، بریتانیهكیشم خوشبویت، ئهمریكیهكیشم خوشبویت، وه عهرهییكیشم خوشبویت، به لām پێش له ههموویان كوردهكهی خوشم خوشدهویت. ئهركی پهكهمی من كوردهكانه، چونكه من خۆم كوردم، له جیگایه دا دهژیم. ئهگهر من ئهمریکی بوومايه، ئهوكات ئهركی پهكهمی من نابیته كورد چونكه ئهو كومهلگایه پێداویستییهکی تری ههیه بهو شئوهیه خهباتی بو دهكهم. به لām كهسیکی و مگو تو با له بهریتانیا یان ئهمریكاش بژییته دهبیته ههس خهبات بو كورد بكهیت، چونكه میلهتهكهت پیویستی پیت ههیه. به لām له ههمان كاتدا ئهو كومهلگایهش كه تیایدا دهژیته ئهركی ههیه لهسهرت.

پ/ چۆن مامهله لهگهڵ پرسهی كهركوك دهكهن؟ و مگ كوردیكى ئیسلامی چی دهبیته گهر دهست بهرداری نهو پرسه بن بو برا عهربه موسلمانهكانتان؟ بو نهوهی لانی كهم خوین نه ریژریت، یان نهو كیششیه كوتایی پێبیته.

و/ له تیگهیشتنی ئیمه ماف پهپوهندی به برایهتی و غهیری برایهتیوه نیه. بو نمونه من پرسه نهتهوایهتی دهشوبهتیم به پرسه میرات، ئهئیم كاتیک كه خوا له ئاسمانهوه میراتی دابهشكردوه له نیوان برا

وخوشکهکاندا که یهك باوك ویهك دایکیان ههیه، خوا خۆی مافهکانی ژن وکۆر وکچی دابهش کردوه، بۆچی، بۆ ئهوهی لهیهکتری عاجز نهین، بۆ ئهوهی تیکهله کردنی مافهکانیان نهیهته هۆی دروست بوونی کیشهی سیاسی و نهتهوهیی و خوین نهژینریت. وه کاتیک که میللهتیک میللهتیک تر داگیر دهکات، وه مافهکانی پیشیل دهکات، ئهوه وکو برا گهوریهکه که دهست دهگریت بهسهر میراتهکهدا، بهلام دواییش دهلیت با ئیمه برائیهتیمان تیک نهچیت، وه با ئهم مالهمان تیک نهچیت من ههر برای ئیوهم له جیاتی باوکم خزمهتان دهکم. ئهوه خهلهتاندنه. ئیتر برا وخوشکهکانی تر نابیت بلین برا گهورهکهمان راست دهکات چیمان بویت دهمانداتی، مهگر کهسیکی گهزده بیت. ئیمه ئیسلامی نه برا ستمهکار کهین که کلپهکان بخهینه کیرفان وستهمکار بین، وه نه برا گهزدهکهشین. چونکه ئیمه دهزانین له نیوان برای دایک ویاوکیشدا خوا خۆی له ئاسمانهوه مافهکانی دابهش کردون، لهم سهر زهویهشدا ئهوهی بوو به ماف دهییت دابهش بکریت. دوا ئهوهی که مافهکهمان بهش کرد، تو وهرهوه مافهکهی خۆت به پیاوتمی بدهروه به من. له بهر ئهوه ئیمه ئیسلامی برا گهزدهکه نین به ناوی برائیهتهوه مافهکانمان بخۆن.

پ/ کامیک لهم شوناسانه گرنگرتن بۆت: کورد بوون، موسلمان بوون یان کوردستانی بوون؟ ئایا ئهوه ئههینیت له ناو عیراقد لهسهر کوردستانی بوون و عیراقدی بوون کیشهکان بهردوام بن؟

و/ کاتیک که مرؤف ئازادانه دهچیت ناو ههر چوارچۆیهکه، یان کاتیک که خۆی دهبینتهوه له ناو ههر چوارچۆیهکهدا که قبولت کرد، دهییت پیداو یستیهکانی ئهوه قبول کردنه جیبهجی بکهیت. ئهگینا تو مرؤقیکی بی پهمانیت. ئهگر بریاره پهمانیک عیراقدی نیشتمانی ههیت وه ئازادانه ئهمهمان قبول کردیت، ئیتر ئهخلاق و یاسا رینگهمان پێ نادات نکولی لهو ئهرکانهی خۆمان بکهین. چونکه خۆمان قبولمان کردوه. وه ئهگر سهپینز اویشه بهسهرمان دهییت ئهوهندهی لی قبول کهین که دهمانین ئهنجای بدهین. وه نابیت بلین ههمووی قبول دهکهین ودوایی تهنها نیوهی ئهنجام بدهین. وه لهم چوارچۆیهکهدا ئیمه ئهوکات ئهرکمان ههیه بهرانبهر به عیراق وه بهرانبهر به ههریمهکهمان، ئهنجا بهرانبهر به مرؤقیهتی. ههمو ئهم ئهرکانهش کۆمهلیک پهماننامه وه دهستور ریکی خستون. تا ئهوه کاتهش ئیمه دهستور مکهمان قبوله دهییت ئهرکهکان جیبهجی بکهین. وه ئهگر دهستور مکهش ههر کهسیک قبولی نیه، دهییت ئاشکرا بلیت من قبولم نیهوه ههلهناستم به ئهرکهکان، چونکه ئهمه سهپینز اوه به سهرمدا، وه ئهمه نا عدالتهیه. به رای ئیمه هیچ نهتهوهیهک نابیت زۆری لی بکریت بۆ ئهوهی له ژیردهستی نهتهوهکانی تردا، یان به ناچار لی لهگهله نهتهوهکانی تردا بژیت. ئهمه قهناعتی ئیسلامی ئیمهیه، وه دهلیین فارس مافی ئهوهی نیه که تورک بخاته ژیر دهستی خۆی، تورکیش مافی نیه عمره ب بخاته ژیر دهستی خۆی، وه ههمو نهتهوهیهک دهییت مافی چارهی خۆنوسینی ههیت. وه ئهگر لهگهله ههر نهتهوهیهکهشدا دهژیت، دهییت ئازادانه بژیت، وه ئازادانه ریکهوتی لهگهله ئهنجام بدات. وه لهم بوارهدا فیکری ئیسلامی قولتر له فیکری لیبرالیته دهر وانیته بابتهکان. فیکری لیبرالی رۆژناوا مافهکان لهسهر بنهمای بالانسی هیز ریک دهخات. وه ههر واقعیکی بهسهرتدا فهرزکرا دهییت قبولی کهیت. بهلام ئیسلام لهسهر ئهوه بنهمایه ریکی ناخات، بهلکو دادگهری چۆنه ناوا ریکی دهخات، نهک ئهوهی بسهپینریت. (المؤمنون علی شروطم) وه دهییت مرؤف کاتیک که مهرجیک قبول کرد پابهند بیت پییهوه. ئهمهش بهشیکه له ئهخلاقی سیاسی وئخلاقی ئینسانیش. لهبهر ئهوه ئیمه باوهرمان به یاسای دادگهری ههیه نهک (صراع) سهپاندنی هیز.

پ/ ههریهک لهمانهی خوارمهوه چی دهگهینن بۆت: ئیسلام، دهولت، نهتهوه؟ ئایا هیچ (تناقض)یک ههیه له نیوانیاندا؟ ئایا دهکریت سهر به ههموویان بیت؟

و/ به دلناییهوه هیچ (تناقض)یک نیه له نیوانیان. ئیسلام باسی کۆمهله شتیکی کردوه بۆ ئیمه، بهکیک لهوانه دهفهرموت (وجعلناکم شعوبا وقبائل لتعارفوا ان اکرمکم عند الله اتقاکم)، واته ئیوهمان کردوه به گهله وهۆز. له شوینیکی تریش باس له نوموت دهکات (وان هذه امتکم امة واحدة وانا ربکم فعبدون)، واته قورئان باسی

ه) نوموتیش ئهو يهكگرتنهيه كه لهسهر بنه‌ماي نايين درووست¹⁰⁶ له سئ شت كردووه كه (شعوب، قبائل و أمة دهبيت. هه بويه دوترتيت ئومتهي ئيسلام يان ئومتهي مهسيحي يان ئومتهي جولهكه. كهواته ئومته ئهو پهيو منديهيه كه لهسهر بنه‌ماي نايين درووست دهبيت. ئهي (شعوب) چيه؟ ئهو پهيو منديهيهيه كه لهسهر بنه‌ماي زمان درووست دهبيت، و مكو (شعب) ي ئه‌رمبي و (شعب) ي كورد ي و (شعب) ي فارسي. (قبائل) چيه؟ (قبائل) ئهو گروهه كومه لايه‌متيانهيهيه كه لهسهر بنه‌ماي پهيو منديه خيزاني و خوين و خزمایهتي درووست دهبيت. ئهم سيانه هه‌رسكي له قورئاندا ريزي ليگيراوه. ههچكاميشيان دژ بهوي تريان دانه‌راوه، چونكه خوا ده‌فرمويت ئيمه ئيوهمان جياكردوتهوه لهسهر بنه‌ماي ناييني جياوازم لهسهر بنه‌ماي زماني جياواز ونه‌تهوي جياواز بو ئهويه كه ئيوه يهكتر بناسن، وه سود له يهكترى وهرگرن، وه ئه‌زمونه‌كاني يهكترى بخوينه‌وه.

پ/ ئهي ئهو نامازهي كه له دهستوري مهدينه‌دا هاتووه (أن المسلمین ويهود بني عوف أمة) كه باس له ئومتهي ئاييني ناكات، چيه؟

و/ ئهمه باس له ئومتهي سياسي دهكات. به‌لام ئه‌وهي كه زياتر قورئان جهختي لئ دهكات و زور به‌كاري هيناوه بهواتهي ئومتهي ئايينه (وأن هذه أمتكم أمة واحدة وانا ربكم فاعبدون). وه (ملة) يش به هه‌مان شيوه بهواتاي پهيو مندي ئاييني له قورئاندا هاتووه. ئيسلام و مكو فيكري ماركسي نيه كه پهيو منديه‌كاني گهل ونه‌ته‌وه هو هوز هه‌لبوه‌شينيته‌وه و، پهيو منديه‌كان بهينيته‌وه سه‌ر ناستي تاكه كهس. ئيسلام داوا دهكات كه ريز له مروّف و مكو تاك بگيريت، به‌لام خيزان له‌سه‌روي تاكه‌ويه، وانا گرنكي خيزان له‌سه‌روي تاكه‌ويه. ئه‌نجا گهل و هوزيش له‌سه‌روي تاكه‌ومن. هه‌موو ئه‌مانه‌ش ناييت بكرينه دژي يهكترى. وانا ناييت بو ئه‌وهي ئومته‌كه‌م بياريزم تاكه‌كاني گه‌له‌كه‌م سته‌م لئيكريت. ئهم ناستانهي تاك و هوز و گه‌لانه ريز ليگيراون به بئ ئه‌وهي (تناقض) له نيو انياندا درووست بيت.

ده‌ولتيش برپتبه لهو گريه‌سته كومه لايه‌تبه سياسي ياساييه كه كومه له خه‌لكيك ده‌به‌ستتته‌وه به‌يه‌كه‌وه له‌چوار چيوه‌ي جوگرافيايه‌كي ديارى كراودا، وه ده‌سه‌لاتيك ده‌به‌خشيت به هه‌نديكيان بو ئه‌وهي ده‌سه‌لاتدار بن، وه (التراميك) يش ده‌به‌خشيت به گهل. ئهم ده‌ولته‌ ده‌كرتيت بچوك بيت، ده‌كرتيت گه‌وره‌بيت، ده‌كرتيت چهند نه‌ته‌ويه‌ك له‌خو بگريت، ده‌كرتيت يه‌ك نه‌ته‌وه له خو بگريت. هاوالاتي بوونيش برپتبه له چونه ناو ئيلتزاميكي ئه‌خلاقى ياسايي، وه هه‌ستان بهي ئه‌ركانهي كه هاوالاتي بوون داواي دهكات. نه‌ته‌ويه‌يش به‌راي من (شعب) ه. هه‌موو ئه‌مانه‌ش ريز ليگراون نه‌ك پيرو، ريز ليگرتنه‌كه‌ش له‌به‌ر ئيرادهي مروّفه‌كانه نه‌ك خودي ئهم شتانه خويان بو نمونه ئه‌گه‌ر مروّفه‌كاني وولاتيك به‌رژه‌هه‌نديان و ابو كه وولاته‌كيان دابه‌ش بكن ده‌بيت ريزي ئه‌و دابه‌ش كردنه بگيريت له‌به‌ر ريزي ئيرادهي گه‌له‌كه. يان ئه‌گه‌ر ئه‌مرؤ كومه‌ليك هاتن وزمانيكيان داتاشي وقسه‌يان پئ كرد ده‌بيت ريز لهو زمانه بگيريت و مكو هه‌ر زمانيكى تر چونكه پئويستى بوون ئه‌و كومه له خه‌لكيه و خواست و ئيراده‌بانه

پ/ چون دروشمه‌كاني 'ئازادى و برابتهي و دادپه‌رومى له روانگه‌ي پهيو منديتان له گهل براياني موسلماندا رافه‌ده‌كن، به تايبه‌ت كه ئيوه نه‌ته‌ويه‌كي بئ ده‌ولته‌ن؟

و/ پيش هه‌موو شتتت ئهم دروشمانه‌ي يه‌كگرتوو بو ناوخوي كوردستانه، بو ئه‌و خه‌لكانهيه كه سودمندن له يه‌كگرتوو، بو ئه‌و كومه‌لگايه يه كه يه‌كگرتوو ئه‌يه‌ويت گرفته‌كاني چاره‌سه‌ر بكات. ئيمه برابته‌يمان له ئه‌لتەر ناتيفي شه‌رى ناوخو دانياره، راسه ئيمه برومان به برابتهي ئاييني و برابتهي مروّفابته‌يش هه‌يه، به‌لام ئهم دروشمانه بو ناوخو دانراون. وه مه‌به‌ستمان له برابتهي نيوان خه‌لكي هه‌ريمى كوردستانه، كه ده‌بيت له باريكى ناسايش و برابته‌يدا بزين. ئه‌مه‌ش به هه‌موو پي‌كهاته موسلمان و مه‌سيحي و يز يديه‌كانه‌وه ده‌بيت به برابتهي پي‌كه‌وه بزين. ئيمه ده‌مانه‌ويت روشنبيري برابتهي له نيو ميلله‌ته‌كه‌ي خو‌ماندا بچنين بو ئه‌وهي ريگا

¹⁰⁶ Personally, I feel *Umma* as it has been referred to in the verse referring to the unity of the religion in terms of validity and the rewards in thereafter.

بگرين له هر جوړه شيوه زېږونې ماف پېشنيل كړدن وتوند وتيزي ودابلؤوساندن. نازاديش مېهېستمان له مويه كه كوردستان هم له ناوځوې خويدا نازاد بېت له ستمكارۍ هم له ناست ميله تاندا نازادى خوې بدهست بهي نيت بو ئوهى بوځوې نه مويه كې سر به خوې خوې هېيت. دادپېرومريش مېهېستمان له دووباره جيبه جېكر دنيتي له سر ناستي ناوځوې بو خومان، وه له سر ناستي نه مويه كاندا نيمه وبراياني عمر ب و فارس و تورك ده بېت به دادگرانه سنور مكاني نيوانمان رېك بخت كه چي مافي ئهوانه وچي مافي نيمه. واته ئه مانه تهواو كاري يه كترن و مكو باز نه يه، هر وولاتيك نازادى تيدا نه بوو هر گيز دادپېرومريش تيدا نابيت، دادپېرومريش نه بوو برايېتى ناكريت. من دلېم نازادى له سر وو هموو به هاكانه مويه، ته ناهت له سر و بهاي نيمانيش مويه. چونكه نيمان به بي نازادى نابيت (فمن شاء فليؤمن ومن شاء فليكفر). وه ئه گر كسيك نيماني به هر شتيك هينا به لام به بي بوونى نازادى، نيتر ئه مويه نيمان نيه به كو نيفاقه. له بر ئه مويه به هاي هر ه گوره له بوونى مرؤقا بر يته له به هاي نازادى. وه نه ماني نازادى خوې بوځوې نه ماني دادپېرومريه. وه ئه گر نازاد نه يم وه برايېتېش سه پتېز ابېت به سر ما چ به هايه كې هيه

پ/ چون دهوانن و مكو پارتيكي سياسي ئيسلامي له گهل هموو ئه پارت ه عيلمانياندا هل بكمن؟

و/ له بر ئه مويه باومرمان به نازادى هيه. هموو كسيك نازاده كه ليبراليسته يان كومونيسته يان هر شتيك. له بر ئه مويه باومرمان به نازادى هيه باومرمان به مافيش هيه. يه كم نازاده كه خوې چونه، نهجا مافي دادگرى هيه له سر من كه ده بېت دادپېرومري بو دابن بكمن. دادپېرومريش ئه مويه كه مافه كاني خوې بدمي. هر بويه يه كرتو نازادى و دادپېرومري و برايېتېشى و مكو دروشم دانياوه. چونكه كسيك دهوانيت له گهل يه كيكى تر دا بزيت، به لام نازادى نه داتى، كه واته دادگرى نيمو برايېتېش واتى نيه. ئه گر كسيك بلېت هر نازاديت دده مويه و برايېتېش له گهل ده كم به لام دادپېرومريت له گهل ناكات، نيتر كه نازادى دراوه بويه نيمه برومان به پنه مويه زيان هيه چونكه برومان به سى چه مكي (نازادى و دادپېرومري و برايېتې) ه هيه كه كردمان به دروشم. نيمه برومان وايه كه به در له بير كردنوه و باومر و ناي و فيكر ده بېت براين. برواشمان وايه كه نابيت كسمان (وصي) بېت به سر كسمانه مويه، ده بېت همومان نازادى بدين به يكترى. وه له كاتيكا هم نازادى و برايېتېه واتى هيه كه دادپېرومري هېيت.

پ/ چون له ديموكراسي تى دهگن وه چونيش بهر جهسته دهگن؟

و/ نيمه قناعه تمان وايه كه ديموكراسي فله سفه يه كه وه ميكانيزميكه، بو ريكخستى سيستميكى سياسي ته ندرست. ئه مويه هابانه كه ئيسلام له ميژروى خويدا بهر جهسته كروه، ئيسا له م سر دمه ناومان لى ناوه ديموكراسي. خه لكېك هم ديموكراسيه به عقل دوزيه مويه، مهرج نيه له ئيسلاميشى و هر گرتيت وه ناوى ناوه ديموكراسي. نيمه كاتيكا كه سه يري ديموكراسيهت دهگن، ديموكراسيهت يه كسان ناكمن له گهل ليبراليزم. ديموكراسيهت شتيكه ليبراليزم شتيكى تره. ليبراليزم كه فله سفه يه كه ده كريت جياوازي هېيت له گهل ئيسلام، وه به دلنبايش هيه تى له گهل ئيسلام. به لام ديموكراسي و مكو ميكانيزمى بهر يوه بردنى ده سلا تى سياسي، وه ريكخستى زيانى سياسي كه بر يته له چه مكه سره مكيه كاني به شدارى، يه كسانى، هلئزاردن، جيا كردنوهى ده سلا ته كان له يه كترى، هموو ئه مانه نيمه پيمان وايه كه داهينانيكى عقلى به شمرى هم سر دمه مويه وه گونجاوه له گهل ئيسلام، وه ميكانيزميكى زور جوانه. وه ده كريت ميكانيزميكى زور باش بېت بو رزگار بوون له كوملېكى زور لهو كيشو نالوز يانه كه ده سلا تى سياسي دروستى دهگن.

مهرجيش نيه ديموكراسيهت به م شيوه زېږونې كه ئيسا بهر جهسته ده كريت له هېچ ده وله تيكدا ۱۰۰% يه كسان بېت به دادگرى. ئيسا ده بېت كه خه لك له ريگاي سر مابه دار كان، وه له ريگاي كونترؤلكردنى ميديا چهواشه يه كى زور بو دنگدهران دروست دهگن، دهر نجام ئه نازاديهى كه دلين داومانه به دنگدهران تهواو نيه چونكه ئه مويه كه راي گشتى دروست كروه بو دنگدهران ئه كاديميكى بي لايمن نيه كه هموو ئيجابيه كان و سه ليه كان ۱۰۰% بخاته بهر ده ستيان. ريگا دراوه به ده زگانى راگهياندى كه زور جار يارى به

عەقلى خەلك ئەكەن وە راستىيەكان دەشتيونىن، خەلكى چاك دەكەنە خراب و خەلكى خرابىش دەكەنە چاك. رېگات داوہ ئەم (دجل) وشەيتانىيەتە لە لاين رايگاندىنەو بەسەر راي گشتيەوہ ئەنجام بدریت. وە كيش ئەم رايگاندىنە دەبات بە رتوہ خاوەن سەرمايدارەكان، كۆمپانيا گەورەكانە. ئەمەش دەرنجام ۱۰۰% كاريگەرى ھەيە لەسەر دەرنجامەكان. لەبەر ئەوہ ناتوانيت باس لە ديموكراسيەتيەكى راستەقينيەى ۱۰۰% بەكەيت لە ھيچ شونىيەكى دنيا. بە پيچەوانەوہ ئەگەر بئو بە ھا ئيسلاميهكان بەئيريت و موتورە بەكریت بە بيري ديموكراسيەت خزمەتيەكى گەورە بە جوانتر و باشتر كردنى ديمەكراسيەت دەكات لەوہى كە ئىستا ئەنجام دەدریت.

پ/ لە ووتارى برايانى موسلماندا، لە ئاستى تيورى نامازە بە ستراتيژى بنياتنەوہى كەسيەتى موسلمان، خيزانى موسلمان، كۆمەلگاي موسلمان، حكومەتى ئيسلامىيە وە خيلافەتى ئيسلامىيە دەكات وەكو شيوازي كوششى برايانى موسلمان. ئيوہ وەكو برايانى موسلمانى كورد لە كويى ئەم ستراتيژەدان، نيا خيلافەت دروست دەبیت؟

و/ ئيمە برومان وايە كە ئيسلام باسى فورمىكى ديارى كراو لە حوكمرانى ناكات، وە خيلافەتەيش فورمىكى بوو لە فورمەكان. خيلافەتى ئيسلامى يەعنى يەكيتى ئومەتاني ئيسلام. وە دەكریت يەكگرتنيك بيت لە نيوان دەولەتە ئيسلاميهكاندا ھەر يەكەيان شوناسى سياسى خویشان بياريزن، وە لە ستراتيژيەتيەكى يەكگرتووشدا يەك بگرنەوہ و سەرۆكيشى ھەبیت. ئەو سەرۆكەش بە ريكەوتنى نيوانيان لەسەرى ريكەون. وەكو ئىستا نەتەوہ يەكگرتووەكان كە سەستەمىكە لەو جۆرە، بە ھەمان شيوہ فيدراليەت سەستەمىكە، وە كۆنفيدرايش سەستەمىكە. ئىستا يەكيتى ئەوروپاش سەستەمىكە، ناتو سەستەمىكە كەسەيش ناليت سەستەمى ناتو يان يەكيتى ئەوروپا سەستەمىكى ديكتاتورىە. يان يەكيتىەكە دژ بە مرفايەتيە، دژ بە دادگەر يە. وە واتاي ئەوہش نيە كە ئيتر خەلك بتوقيت و بلين ئەوروپا يەكبان گرتوہ. ئەى بۆچى دەبیت لەسەر ھەمان بنەما باس لە يەكگرتنى دەولەتە ئەگەر! وە خيلافەت دەخاتە ژير كۆمەلەيك پرسيارى گەورەوہ! ئيسلاميهكان بەكریت خەلك خۆى بتوقينيت خيلافەت بریتی بيت لەوہى كە دەولەتيەك خۆى سەپينيت بەسەر دەولەتە ئيسلاميهكان، وە بەزور داواى بەيعەتيان لى بكن، ئەوہ بوونى نيەو ھەر نابيت. ئەوہش كە باس لە خيلافەتى ئيسلامىيە دەكات باس لە يەكگرتنى تواناي دەولەتە ئيسلاميهكان دەكات لە بوارە جياكانەوہ. ئەمەش بە شيوازيك كە تەعبير لە خواستى گەلە موسلمانەكان بكات بە شيوازيكى سروشتى، نەك بە شيوازيكى سەپينراو. ھەر وەكو چۆن گەلانى ئەوروپا خويان برياريان دا يەكيتى ئەوروپا دروست بكن، داوا ئەوہ دراو دروست بكن، داوا ئەوہ پەرلەمان دروست بكن.

يەكگرتنى دەولەتە موسلمانەكانيش ئەگەر روو بدات نابيت بەو واتايە بيت كە يەكەك خۆى بكات بە قوينا، وە خۆى سەپينيت بەسەر خەلكدا. بەلكو تەنھا گەر زەرور بوو وەكو نمونەى گەلانى ئەوروپا ويەكيتى ئەوروپا لەبەر بەرژوونەدى خواستە بالاكاني گەلان موسلمان بيت. وە مەرجيش نيە بە ناوى خيلافەتەوہ بيت، چونكە ناوى خيلافەت ئاين نيە. وە خيلافەتەيش تەنھا فورمىكى سياسى ميژووييە، وە ھيچ مەشروعيەتيەكى ديارى كراوى نيە. بەلام لە ئيسلامدا بەھايەك ھەيە كە ئەويش يەكيتى ئومەتى ئيسلامە، ئەويش دەكریت بە ھەر ميكانيزميك بيت. وە خيلافەتى ئيسلامى بەواتاي يەك دەولەت نا، بەلكو يەعنى يەكيتى ئومەتى ئيسلام. ئەم يەكيتىە لە فيدراسيۆنيكدا لەوانەيە كەلكى ھەبیت. لە واقع دا خيلافەتى ئيسلامىيە ھيچ كاتيك دەولەتيەكى سەنتراليزمى مەركەزى نەبووہ. فيدراليەتى يەكگرتنى ئيسلامىيە ھەبووہ. بەلام خەليفە رەمزی يەكيتى موسلمانان بووہ. وە ئىستا ئيمە ھيچ فورمىكى ميژووييە واجب نيە لەسەرمان. بەلام ھاوكارى ويەكيتى ئومەتى ئيسلام، وە خەمخواردنى يەكترى ئەمانە نەركى شەرى و ئەخلاقە لەسەر ئومەتى ئيسلام. ئەمەش چۆن دەخريتە بواری پراكتيزوہ، بە يەكيتى لە بواری سياسى، لە بواری ئابورى، لە بواری سەربازى، ئەم يەكيتىانە ئامانجىكى ئاينى و سياسىيە لە ھەمان كاتدا. ئەمەش نەك تەنھا بۆ ئومەتى ئيسلام، بەلكو گەلانى دنيا ئىستا ھەموو بەرەو يەكيتى دەروات. ئەمەش بەرژوونەدى ميللەتەكان لەو دايا. بەرژوونەدى ھيچ ميللەتيەك لەو دا ئەمەرۆ بەرژوونەدى ھەموو گەلان لەو دايا كە بەرەو يەكيتى¹⁰⁷ نيە كە لە شەردا بيت لەگەل دراوسىكەى.

سەيرى تيورى رايلىستەكان بەكە¹⁰⁷

ويەكگرتن وتىكەلەۋى بىرۇن. ھەموو ئەمانەش ديارە لەسەر بىنەماي دادگەرى وريز لەيەكتر گرتن دروست بوويىت، نەك لەسەر بىنەماي سەپاندن.

پ/ باشە تىگەيشتنى ئەندامانتان ھىچ جياوازيەكى ھەيە لەم تىگەيشتنەي بەريزتان وەكو سەرکردايەتى يەكگرتوو؟

و/ ھىچ كەسنىك لەناو يەكگرتوى ئىسلامىي دا بەو فۇرمە مېژوويىيە لە خىلافت تىنەگەيشتنوو ھە باوەريشى پىي نىيە. ھە ھىچ ئىخواننىك لە دنيا ئەمەرو باوەرى بەو نىيە كە چەمكى خىلافت برىتيە لەو فۇرمە كۆنەي كە يەك خەلىفە فەرمان دەكات ھەمووي بەگوئي دەكات. چونكە نە لە مېژوودا واپووە، نە لە واقعيشدا ئەمەرو دەكرىت واپىت. جگە لە حيزبى تەحرير كە بۇچوونىكى (تقليدي)يان ھەيە بۇ خىلافتى ئىسلامىي ھىچ ئىخواننىك ئەمەرو وا سەبرى خىلافت ناكات. بۇ نمونە كە ئەمەرو ئىخوان پىكەو كاردەكەن، بە ھىچ شىوئەيەك ھىچ برىارىكى مەركەزى نىيە كە بلنىت بۇنمونه لە ميسر دەرىجىت وئىتر وولاتانى تر بەگوئي بەكەن. ھە كاتىكىش كە خەلك بە تەزىمى جىھانى ئىخوان ناوى دەبات لە راستى دا ھىچ واتايەكى لەو بارمە نادات، بەلكو جۆرە ھەماھەنگىيەكە بۇ تەنسىق وراوئىزكردن ورا گۆرىنەو ھەكتر ناسىن. ئەمەش ۱۰۰% وەكو ئەتەر ناسىونال لىبرال دىموكراتە.

پ/ نايا ئىو ھەست بە ركابەرى دەكەن لە لاين ئىسلامىيەكانى ترمەو؟

و/ بە دلنىيايەو ھەموو گروپنىك لەگەل گروپنىكى تر ركابەرى ھەيە. بەلام دەبىت ئەو ركابەريانە بخرىنە چوارچىوئەيەكى ئەخلاقى جوانمەو كە لەگەل ئەو بەھاو (قىم)انە دژ نەبىت كە ئىمە باسيان دەكەين بۇ خەلك.

پ/ پىت واپە بزوتنەوئى سەلفى لە ميسر كە داوى شۆرشەكە پارتىكى سىياسىيان راگەياند، ھاوكار بوون يان رىگر لە بەردەم برايانى ميسر؟ ھە چ وانەيەك لەم بارمە ھەيە بۇ ئىسلامىيەكانى كوردستان؟

و/ سەلفىيەكان ھە بەر بزوتنەوئىيەكى ئىسلامىي تر كاتىك كە دەچىتە بوارى سىياسىيەو بىر كوردنەوئى ميانەرموتر دەبىت. ھە باشتر لە پرسەكان تىدەگات، ھەستكردنى بە پىويستى ھاوكارى زياتر دەبىت. ھەر بۇيە ھەولدانى بۇ نزيكبوونەوش زياتر دەبىت. لە بواريكى ترىشدا ئەگەر جاران تەنھا مونافەسەيەكى پەرومردىي وئاينى بوو، ئىستا مونافەسەكە دەچىتە بواريكى سىياسىيەو. بەلام ئەگەر ئەو بزوتنەو ئىسلامىيەنە بتوانن لە ئامانجىكى سىياسى گشتى دا يەكبەرنەو، ئەو دەتوانن سود لە دوو شت وەربىگرن: يەكەم سود لەو ھەربىگرن كە ئەم بزوتنەو سەلفىيەنە بەرە ميانەرموى دىن، دووم دەكرىت سود لەو ھەربىگرن كە مادام ئەم سەلفىيەنە ھىزىكى ئىسلامىن دەكرىت لە ئامانجە گشتىيەكاندا دۇست وبرا ھاوكار بن. ئىمەش بۇ ئەوان ئەوانىش بۇ ئىمە. لەبەر ئەو مەن واى دەبىنم كە كارا بوونى سەلفىيەكان لە بوارى سىياسى رۇشتىيەنە بەرە ميانەرموى، رۇشتىيەنە بەرەم واقى بوون، كە تا ئىستا ئەم دوو رەكەزە لاى برايانى سەلفى گرتى ھەيە. لەبەر ئەو مەن ئەمە بە نامازەيەكى ئىجابى ئەبىنم.

پ/ لە كۆنگرەي شەشدا مافى چارەي خۇنوسىنناتان برىاردا وەكو ستراتىژى كارتان، چۆن ئەم ستراتىژە بەر جەستە دەكەن؟

و/ ئىمە لە روانگەي ئىسلامىيەنە مافى دەولەت بوون بە مافى ھەموو نەتەوئىيەكى دەزانىن. لە سالانى پىشوو يەكگرتوى ئىسلامىي كوردستان كۆمەلە خەلكىكى توركانى لەگەل بوو، يەكگرتوو ھانىدان كە بچن حىزبىكى ئىسلامىي نەتەوئىيە توركانى دروست بەكەن. كە ئەمەرو حىزبى عەدالەي توركانە. زۆرىيەي زۆريان ئەندامى ئىمە بوون، ھە ئىمە ھانماندان كە بىرۇن حىزبىكى تايبەت بە خۇيان بە نەتەوئىيە خۇيان دروست بەكەن. چونكە ئەوئى كە ئىمە بە رەواي دەزانىن بۇ خۇمان دەبىت بە رەواشى بزانىن بە توركان

و عه رب و فارس و هممو نهتهوكان. هر بويه نيمه قضاعهتمان و ايه كه دهبيت نهتهوهي كورد له حالي خوي رازي بيت و ه سمر بهخوي خوي و هر گريت. و ه هميش مافيكی سروشتي نهتهوهي كورده.

پ/ له پروگرام و پيرهوي ناوخوي يهكگرتوو، مادهي چوارم بنهما گشتيهكان: يهكهم بنهما و بهها ئيسلاميه نهگورهكان و بهها مروبييه چهسپاوكان سمر چاوهي كاري سياسيمانن، مهبست چيه له بهها مروبييه چهسپاوكان؟

و/ نهمه نهوه دهگيهبيت كه يهكگرتوو تنها له (تراث) ئيسلاميي سود و مرناگريت. بهلكو له (تراث) ئيسلاميش سود و مردهگريت. ههندي بهها همن ئيسنانين، له غميري ئيسلاميشدا جهختيان لهسمر كراوتهوه و ه گرنكي پي دراوهو بهر جهسته كراوه. و ه ئيسنا سيستمى بو دروستكراوه، و ه دهولتخان لهسمرى كاردكهمن، و هكو بهها مروبيهكاني تاييهت به مافي مروف، نازديه گشتيهكان، ديموكراسيهت، مافه سياسي و مهدهنيهكان، دژايهتي گندهلي، هممو نهمانه نهو چهملك و بههايانهن كه بههاي مروفايهتين به واتايهك كه مروفايهتي هممو لهسمرى كوكن. و ه فيكري نيمه داخراو نيه تنها لهسمر كلتوري ئيسلاميي، بهلكو كراويه بو و مرگرتتي هممو شتيكي جوان له هممو نومت و ميلهتتيك. و ه نهميش دژ نيه لهگهل ئيسلام، بهلكو به عهكسوه نهم بهر جهستهكردنهوي نهو كرانهوي عهقلهيه كه ئيسلام دهيويت كهسي موسلمان ههبيت.

پ/ نايا نيوه چون له شريعت تيگهيشتون، نايا شريعت بهواتا ياسا و دادگا، يان به واتاي هممو ئيسلام ديت؟

و/ بهشيوهيكی گشتي به دوو بهكار هينان شريعهي ئيسلاميي بهكار ديت، كاتيک كه دهئين شريعهتي ئيسلاميي بهواتاي مرادف و هاو واتاي خودي ئيسلام بهكار ديت، و ه جاري واش ههيه به واتاي ياساي ئيسلامي ديت، نهو بهشهي ئيسلام كه ياسا و نهحكامه. ليرهدا نيمه نهئين ئيسلام دهبيته سي بهش: ئيسلام بريته له عهقيده، عيادتهت، شريعت. نا ليرهدا شريعت دهبيته بهشي جياواز له عيادتهت و عهقيده. نا ليرهدا دهبيته ياسا و نهحكام. و ه كاتيک كه دهلييت دهبيت شريعت (تطبيق) بكهيت، له بواري عهقيده و عيادتهت چونكه بواري تاكه كهسين گرفت دروست ناكات لهگهل هيچ كومهلگايهك، بهلام كاتيک هاته سمر نهوهي نهحكام و ياساكانى شريعت بكهيهت ياسا بو كومهلگا، نا ليرا سلهمينهوه، ترس، كيشه لهگهل كومهله كهسيك دروست دهبيت، به تاييهت نهو كومهله كهسه كه لهگهل ئيسلام گرفتيان ههيه، و ه ئيسلاميان و هكو شريعت قبول نيه. و ه كومهليك غيره موسلمانيش دهرسن كه نهو نهحكامه ئيسلاميهان جيهگه مافهكاني نهواني تيدا نهبيتهوه. لهبهر نهوه تيگهيشنتيكي ههله ههيه لهسمر ئاستي نيودهولتهي لهسمر جيهجيكردني شريعت. له لايهكي ترهوش كومهليكي ئيسلاميي توند رهو همن كه زور وينايهكي ناشيرينيان له (تطبيق) كردنيان شريعت داوه به خهلك، و ه خويان زور تيگهيشنتيكي كهم و كورت و خراپيان لهبارهي شريعهتهوه ههيه. و ه به فيقهيكی كون وتوند و دواكهوتوو و ه بهو تيگهيشنته توندروهوي خويان ناو بنين شريعت، و ه دهشيانهويت بلين نهمه ئيسلامه و جيهجيشي كهمن لهسمر خهلك. نهميش واپكردوه خهلكي توقاندوه له شريعت. قضاعهتي نيمه و ايه نهوهي كه ويناى بهر جهستهكردني شريعهتي له زيهني خهلكدا ناشيرين كردوه نهو جوړه تيگهيشنته ناتهندروستانهيه له ئيسلام خوي، و ه له شريعت خوي. نهگينا شريعت خوي كومهليك ياسا و نهحكامه كه ژيانى كهسهكاني نيو كومهلگا ريك دمخات به شيوازيك كه مافي هممو كهس تيايدا پاريزراوه. نهم مافه پاريزراوش پاريزراو دهبيت و هكو بهشيك له ناين، بهواتايهك كه پاراستني مافي هممو كهس نهركي ئاينمانه. نهجا خودي ئيسلام هر خوي داواي حوكمي مهدهني دمكات كه به هيچ شيوهيكه كهس ناتوانيت بهناوي خواوه و ه كو نهوهي له سهدهكاني ناوهراست دا كهنيسه بهناوي خواوه حوكمي كردوه و ابيت. بهلام چونكه كومهليك نمونهي دواكهوتوو له نمونهي حوكمي تاليبان له نهفغانستان لهبهر چاوي خهلكه و ا دهران نهميه شريعت. نهگهر سميري (تراث) ئيسلاني بكهيت، هيچ شارستانيهتيك به قهد (تراث) ئيسلاميي ياساي نهووسيهتهوه له هممو بواركاني ژياندا. بهلام ناوي شريعه بووه، كه به واتاي ياسا ديت. كهواته شريعت يهعني نهو ياسا و سيستمهيه كه دادگهري دهپاريزيت بو موسلمان و ه غيره موسلمان. ياساش له

هممو شونينك به پي ياساي گشتي وولات دهچيت به رپوه، بو نمونه نيستا له بهر يتانيا كه كه سيكي موسلمان دادگايي دهكرت و اتاي نهوه نيه كه نيتر نهو موسلماننه نهچوسينر نيتوه چونكه به ياساي نيسلام دادگايي نهكراوه، گرنك نهويه كه دادگهري رهچاو و پيروه بكرت، وه به چاوي بهكساني دادگايي هممو هاولاتيان بكرت. نهمش كاتيك كه سهيري ميژوو دهكيت كاتيك كه نيمام عهلي خهليفه دهبيت لهگهل هاولاتيهكي ناسايي جولهكه به بهكساني دهچنه بهردهم قازي شور ميج. كهواته نه پيوست دهكات بتوقين له وشه ي شهريعت، نه سووريش بين لهسر بهكار هيناني، چونكه گرنك دادگهري پيوسته له بو ياسا يان شهريعت، وه بهكساني هاولاتيانش بهر انبهر ياسا يان شهريعت گرنك نهك ناو. نهجا هر بهشيك له شهريعت كه نهبوو به ياسا نيتر نيمه مافي نهومان نيه كه له دهولندا جتبهجي بكين. نهمش دياره له ريگاي پير لهمانهوه ياسا برياري لهسر دهريت. سهراوهي نه ياسا يانتهش كه له پير لهمانهوه دهردچن دهكرت شهريعت نيست، وه دهكرت غهيري شهريعت نيست. نيستا كه پيوستمان به ياسايهك ههبوو من وهكو زانايهكي نيسلامي بيت دهلم نهگه له قورئان و حديث) وشهريعت ههبوو باش، نهگه نهبوو برو له نيسرائيل يان لاي بوذي يان چيني يان نهمريكي بيهينه به يهك مهرج دژ نه بيت لهگهل نيسلام، نيتر نهوه نيسلاميه. با حومنيكيش شهريعت نيست، به لام به بي وهگرتي له پير لهمان وهكو ياسا نيتر جتبهجيكردني شهريعت نيه

نهمش جياوازيهكي تره له نيوان بزوتنهويهكي نيسلامي وحيزينيكي سياسي نيسلامي، چونكه بزوتنهوه نيسلاميهكه باس له شهريعت و پيروده دهكات به لام حيزي سياسي باس دهستور و ياسا دهكات. به واتايهك دهكرت نيمه وهكو بزوتنهويهكي نيسلامي بانگهواز بو نهوه دهكيت كه خهلك له زياني خوياندا شهريعت جتبهجي بكين، به لام له ناستي وولاتدا ياسا جتبهجي دهكرت. بو نمونه من وتو هاورين، من كاتي خوي خانويهك كردوه به ناوتهوه، به لام نيستا كه داوات لي دهكيت كه خانويهك بهديهوه تو نيكاري دهكيت، وه دهليت برو بو ياسا، ياسايش چونكه خانويهك هابهناوتهوه دهليت هي تويه. نيمه ههول دهدين كه تو وهكو موسلماننيك پيش نهوهي كه نهو مافه كه ياساش بداتي خوت شتهكه به ناشهريعت بزانيت وستم له من نهكيت. كهواته بو نهوهي مافيك كه هي خوت نيه با ياساش بداتي تو دهزانيت كه ناشهريعت خوت قبولي ناكيت. بهم شيوهيهش پهيوهندي من وتو شهريعت، به لام پهيوهندي من وكومهلگا ياسايه. نمونهيهكر تر نهگه نيستا منيان ههليژارد بو پاريزگاري سلطاني، ياسا ريدهدات كه ناروق بفروشريت، من ناتوانم نهو عارهقه (منوع) بكه چونكه تنها ناشهريعت. چونكه نهو خهلكه منيان ههليژاردوه بو نهوهي نهو ياسايهيان بهسردا جتبهجي بكه كه ريگا به فروشتنه ناروقيش دهكات. با مهنع كردني ناروق شهريعت نيست، به لام سهپاندي وهكو ياسايهك ناشهريعت. مافي نهو خهلكيه كه خويان يان شهريعت بهرجهستهكمن وهكو تاك به نه كرين ونهخواردني ناروق، يان ههول بدن نهفروشتنه ناروق بكهنه ياسا له ريگاي پير لهمان ودهزگاي ياسا دانانهوه. يهكگرتوو وهكو بزوتنهويهكي نيسلامي كار لهسر زيانهوهي شهريعت ونهحكامي شهريعت دهكات لهناو نيمانداراندا، به لام يهكگرتوو وهكو حيزينيكي سياسي كار لهسر سهروهي ياسا وچهسپاندي دهكات لهناو كومهلگا.

ب/ بدهدي ۱۲ له مادهي چوارم: حوكم راني راشد و دادگهرا نه نامانجيك نيسلامي و پيوستيهكي زيانه، حوكم راني راشد چيه؟

چهمكنكه له دوكيومينته نيودهولتهيكاندا زور بهكار ديت، نهو (good governance) و/ حوكمي رهشيد حوكميه كه پيوه مكاني ديموكراسي و دادگهري و كهرامهت و مافي مروف و نهو شتانه پير هوي لي دهكات. خهباتي نيمه بو حوكمي رهشيد خهباتمانه بو نهو حوكميه كه نيسلام داواي دهكات، چونكه نيسلام داواي حوكمي رهشيد دهكات. وه ميژووي نيسلام پريتي له نمونهي جواني حوكمي رهشيد. دياره بهشيكيش له ميژووي نيسلامي نمونهي زوري حوكمي غهيره رهشيد و خراپي تيايه، دياره نهمش لادان بووه لهو حوكميه كه نيسلام داواي دهكات. نهمش بهواتاي خو له خهلك نهكردنه به خوا، وه ريزگرتي خهلك و كهرامهت و مافهكانيان ديت.

كوتايي

Appendix 11: Mohammad Ahmad, the chairman of the Leadership Council in the Sulaimani region

د. محمد أحمد، ئەندامی مەکتەبی سیاسی و سەرۆکی دەستە ی سەرکردایەتی دەقەری سلێمانی

پ1/ چۆن هەست دەکەیت وەکو کوردێک، وە چۆن هەست دەکەیت وەکو موسڵمانێک؟

و/ ناسنامەی کوردی و ناسنامەی ئاینی دوو چەمکی دژ بە یەک نین. من وەکو نەتەو کوردم وەکو ئاینیش موسڵمانم. هەردووکی بە یەکەو تەواوکاری یەکتەرن، وە ئەتەرن ناتێقی یەک نین، و دژی یەکتەریش نین. لەبەر ئەوە هەردووکیان گەرنەن، چونکە هەموو نەتەو یەک ناسنامەی ئاینی خۆی هەیە، وە ناسنامەی نەتەویی خۆی هەیە. ئێمەش وەکو گەلێک زۆربەمان موسڵمانین. بەلام بەو پەری ریزیشەو دەر وائینە هاوڵاتیەکانی تێمان کە لەسەر هەر ئاین و بیرو باوەریکەن. هەموومان هاوڵاتی ئەم وولاتەین، هەموومان وەکو یەک مافمان هەیە، وە هەموومان ئەرکمان لەسەرە. من ئاینەکەم وام پێ دەلێت کە ریز لە ئاینی پێکەتەکانی تری کوردستان بگرم. وە تەواوی مافەکانیان رەچاو بکەم. وە لە هەمان کاتیشدا شانازی دەکەم بەوەی کە موسڵمانم و ئاینەکەم ئیسلامە. وە هەموومان پێکەو کوردستانین و هاوڵاتی ئەم وولاتەین، وە پێکەو تێدەکو شین لە پێناو مافەکانماندا.

پ2/ وەکو کوردێکی ئیسلامی یان ئیسلامییەکی کورد گەر دتەوئیت، چۆن سەیری ئیسلام دەکەیت وەکو ئاینێکی جیهانی؟ جیهانیبوونی ئیسلام چی دەگەیت؟

و/ ئەوەندی من لە ئیسلام تێگەشتووم، ئیسلام چەند رەهەندیکی هەیە، لەوانە رەهەندیکی گەردوونی. وە ئیسلام نەهاتوو نەتەوکان بئۆتێتەو لە بۆتێهکی جیهانیدا. بەلکو هاتوو هاتوو هاتوو دروست کردوو. هاوبەشی لە نیوان نەتەوکاندا دروست کردوو وەکو مەروەف. وە لە نیوان موسڵمانەکانیشدا وەکو ئاین و پەرسەشەکان کە هەموو موسڵمانەکان تیایدا هاوبەشن. بە هەمان شێو بەزەیهکی تریش کە بەزەیه نەتەوکانە کە ئەویش (جەل) یکی خواییە، واتە بریارێکی خواییە کە هەموو ئەم نەتەو جیاوازانە هەبن، هەر وەکو لەم ئایەتەدا هاتوو (انا خلقناکم من ذکر وانثی وجعلناکم شعوبا وقبائل لتعارفو ان اکرمکم عند الله اتقاکم). دیارە بۆ ئەوەی یەکتەر بناسین، ئەنجا داوامان لێ دەکات کە هاوکاری یەکتەر بکەین، وەکو دەفەر مۆیت (وتعاونوا علی البر والتقوی ولا تعاونوا علی الاثم والعدوان). دیسان خوا داوامان لێ دەکات (لاینهاکم الله عن الذین لم یقاتلوکم فی الدین ولم یخرجوکم من دیارکم ان تبروهم وتقسطوا الیهم) واتە خۆی گەرە رێگەتان لێ ناگریت کە لەگەڵ هەموو خەلکدا چاک بن و دادگەر بن لەگەڵیان مادام شەرتان لەگەڵدا ناکەن و دەرمان ناکەن لە وولاتەکانمان. چونکە هەمووتان بران و لە یەک دایک و باوک بوون. کەواتە لەگەڵ هەر مەروەفیک با هەر بیرو باوەریکیشی هەبیت بریار وایە کە وەکو برا هاوکار و چاکە کاریین لەگەڵ یەکتەر. هەر وەها خوا دەفەر مۆیت (ولقد کرمتا بنی آدم) واتە بە راستی ئێمە ریزمان نیا لە نەوکانی ئادەم. هەر بۆیە دەبیت مەروەف هەر لەبەر مەروەف بوونی ریز بگیری.

لەگەڵ ئەوەشدا کە بەو شێو یە لەسەر بنەمای ریز لەیەکتەر گرتن و دادگەرە مامەلەکردن لە سەر بنەمای مەروەف بوون، خوا چەند ئەرکیکی تری بۆ دیاری کردووم وەکو موسڵمان لەگەڵ موسڵمانەکاندا کە ئەویش جۆریکی ترە لە براریتی کە براریتی ئیمانیه لە نیوانماندا. ئەویش لەبەر ئەوە کە قورئانمان یەکە، باوەرمان یەکە، وە بەیەکەو نوێژی هەینی دەکەین، حەج هی هەموومانە، پەرسەشەکانی تر هی هەموو موسڵمانانە. ئەمەش وادەکات کە کۆمەڵێک خالی هاوبەش لە نیوانماندا داوامان لێ بکات کە هاوکاری یەک بین لەسەر بنەمای (وتعاونوا علی البر والتقوی) چاکە وە خوا ترسان. بەلام ئەم جۆرە هاوکاریە لەسەر بنەمای دژایەتی کەسانی تر نیە. وە بەزەیهی (تکلیف) ی من لە پێناو ئاوەدان کردنەوی رۆوی زەوی بەزەیهی نەتەو کەمە کە کوردە. لەبەر ئەوە بەزەیهی (تکلیف) ی من گەلەکەیی خۆمە. لەبەر ئەوە من گەرنگی بە وولات و مێللەتی خۆم ئەدەم. ئەمەش وەکو تەواوکاری یەک بۆ موسڵمانان و، وەک تەواوکاری یەک بۆ مەروەفەکان هەموویان. وە ئیسلام

تایبتمندیهکانی نەتەویەکی ناسرێتەوه له پێناو جیهانی بوونی ئیسلامدا. وه ئیسلام پەچاوی هەموو پەهەندەکانی تریش دەکات بەلام لەسەر حسابی مافی پەهەندەکانی تر نا. بۆ نموونه ئیسلام باوەری به مولداری تاکە کەس هەیه بەلام لەسەر حسابی گشتی نا. وه له هەمان کاتدا پەچاوی بەرژموندی گشتیش دەکات. بەلام ئەگەر دژ و مستان، (أولوية) دەدات بە بەرژموندی گشتییەکە. بەلام له بنەرەتدا هەر دوو بەرژموندیەکی دەبێت پارێزراو بێت. بەیهکەوه هەر دووکیان پۆلی تەواوکاری دەبینن، نەك پۆلی دژایەتی. بەواتەیهکی تر جیهانگیری ئیسلام بەواتای داخراوان نیه بەسەر موسلمانەکاندا و بەس، بەلکو بەواتای کرانەویە بەسەر جیهاندا بەشیوەیهکی گشتی له شیوەی هەر سێ بازەنی نەتەوه و ئیسلام و جیهان.

پ/3 چۆن مامەڵە دەکەن لەگەڵ کێشەیی کەرکوک؟ وهك كوردیکی ئیسلامی چی دەبێت گەر دەست بەرداری ئەو پرسە بن بۆ برا عەرەبە موسلمانەکانتان؟ بۆ ئەوەی لانی کەم خوێن نەرێژریت، یان قەیرانەکە کۆتایی پێبێت.

و/ ئەم پرسە پرسیکی ئاینی نیه، بەلکو پرسیکی سیاسییه. لەبەر ئەوە دەکرێت له پەوانگەیی جێبەجێکردنی دادگەری، درووست بوونی هاوسەنگیەکان، بۆ چارەسەری کێشەکان تێی بپروانین. پێش هەر چتیگ کورد کاتیگ له عێراقدا هاوڵاتیە حەز دەکات وەکو هاوڵاتی پله یەك مامەڵەیی لەگەڵدا بکریت، نەك پله دوو یان پله سێ. ئەم مامەڵەییە تا ئیستا نەکراره. کورد دەبووێت له عێراقدا سەنگیکی راستەقینەیی هەبێت، وه هاوبەش بێت. وه ئەم هاوبەشیەش هاوبەشیەکی راستەقینە بێت. وه یەكێك لەم فاکتەرانه كه ئەم یەكسانی هاوبەشیە بەشیوەیهکی راستەقینە یەكلائی دەکاتەوه پرسی کەرکوک. له پرووی میژوویی و له پرووی جوگرافیەوه کەرکوک کوردستانییه. وه ئیمه و ئهزانین ئەگەر کەرکوک بکەوێتە سەر هەریمی کوردستان، کورد (وزن)ی دەبێت له هاوکێشەیی عێراقدا. (وزن)مەکەشی قورستر دەبێت. ئەوکاتە ئەو هاوبەشیەیی که دەبووێت درووست دەبێت. ئەوکاتەش وەك هاوڵاتی پله یەك له عێراقدا پۆلی دەبێت. پێش هەر مافیگ، ئەوکاتە هەستی تاکێ کورد و دەبێت که هاوبەشە له عێراق و، بەو شیوەش هاوسەنگی درووست دەبێت له عێراق. لەوێشەوه عێراق بەرمو ئیستقراری سیاسی دەروات. بەلام ئەگەر کەرکوک نەبێتەوه سەر هەریمی کوردستان هاوسەنگی درووست نابێت و، کوردیش هەر به پله دوو و پله سێ دەمینێتەوه. لەو پەوانگەوه، وه بۆ چارەسەری ئەم کێشە ئیمه بپروانمان وایه که به ریگەیی سیاسی، به ریگەیی مەدەنی، به ریگەیی روشنبیری هەول بەدین ئەم قەناعەتە درووست کەین که ئەمە تەنها چارەسەرە بۆ ئەوی کێشەیی کورد له عێراقدا کۆتایی بێت دەبێت کەرکوک بگەرێتەوه سەر هەریمی کوردستان. وه بەم شیوەیه ئیستقراری سیاسی له عێراقدا درووست دەبێت. لەو پەوانگەوه ئیمه سەیری ئەم کێشەیه دەکەین، وه بۆ ئەوی کورد وەکو پێکەتایەکی سەرەکی سەیر بکریت، وه دادگەری جێبەجێ بێت، وه هاوبەشی راستەقینە درووست بێت، وه ئیستقراری سیاسی درووست بێت، وه (توازن)ی نیشتمانی درووست بێت، کەرکوک بگەرێتەوه سەر هەریم. وه ئەمەش به ریگای دەستووری که له مادە ٤٠١ دا هاتوه.

دیاره پزیمی پێشوو (تەریب) و (تەبیث)ی کەرکوک کردوه، به زۆر ماله کورد و تورکمانەکانی دەرکرد، وه مال و سەرۆتەکانی داگیرکرد، وه خەلکی عەرەبی له پارێزگاکانی ترهوه ئەهینا و لەهوی جینشینیی کردن. هەر ئیستاش به شیوەیهکی ئاسایی عەرەب لەو پارێزگایانە دین و له سلیمانی و هەولیر و دەهوک نیشتهجێ دەبن و، هیچ کێشەیهکی نیه. بەلام ئەوی پێشوو که به زۆر بووه، ئیتر ستمێگ درووست بووه. ئەم ستمەش نابێت بەردەوام بێت، وه دەبێت باری کەرکوک بگەرێتەوه سەر (اصل)مەکی خۆی. ئەنجا دادگەری درووست دەبێت. ئەو خەلکی که به زۆر هینراون بگەرێتەوه شوینی خۆیان، وه ئەوانەش که به زۆر دەرکراون بگەرێتەوه شوینی خۆیان، ئەوکاتە حالەتەکه ئاسایی دەبێتەوه. که حالەتەکش سروشتی بوویەوه ئیتر ئاساییه که عەرەبیکی هەر پارێزگایەکی تر بێت له کەرکوک نیشته جێ بێت وەکو ئیستا له شارەکانی تری هەریمی کوردستان نیشتهجێ دەبن. هەر وەکو ئاساییش دەبێت که کوردیکی کەرکوک بچێت له بەسرە دانیشیت. ئەمەش ناچیتە چوارچۆیهی گۆڕینی دیمۆگرافی بۆ ئامانجی سیاسی وەکو له سەرەمی پزیمی پێشوو له کەرکوک کرا.

پ/٤ / كامنيك لهم شوناسانه گرنگترن بۆت: كورد بوون، موسلمان بوون يان كوردستاني بوون؟ نايان نهوه
ئههينيت كيشهكان لهسر كوردستاني بوون و عيراقى بوون بهردوام بن؟

و/ كورد بوون ناسنامهيهكى نتهوهيه، موسلمان بوون ناسنامهيهكى ئاينيه، وه همدوو ئهم دوو ناسنامهيه
تهواوكارى يهكن. نه دژ به يهكن، وه نه ئهلتەرناتيقي يهكن. من ههر وهكو چۆن نتهوهى خۆم ئهويت ههر
واش ئاينى خۆم دهويت. وه ناكريت جيايان كهينهوه. لهويه پاش وپيشيان بخهيت، هيج گرتنيك لهوهدا نيه.

وه بۆ كوردستاني بوون و عيراقى بوون، ههموى باس لهم نا دادگهريهيه كه له عيراق دا كراوه. به
دریژى ميژووى عيراق كورد ههستى به ستهم كردوه. كيمياباران كراوه، ئهفسال كراوه، گوند
وديهاتهكانى رووخينراوه. حسابى بۆ نهكراوه، ههميشه كهنار خراوه. ئيستا له عيراقى نويدا دهمانهويت
لهسر ئه بنهمايانهى كه لهسهرى ريك كهوتووین لهوانه ديموكراسى، سيستمى فيدرالى، تهواقى
نيشتمانى، هاوبهشى راستهقينه، هاوسهنگى نيشتمانى، دادگهرى له دابهشكردنى سهرووت ودهسهلاتدا. بۆ
نمونه ئيستا له ههرىمى كوردستان به پيى دهستور كۆمهليك ماف ديارى كراوه، بهلام ههندى جار
(خلاف) دروست دهبيت له ئيوان حكومهتى ناوهندى و حكومهتى ههرىم، ئهمهش ئاساييه كه دروست بيت،
بهلام كيشهكه لهوه دايا كه دادگهريهيه كه جينى متمانهى ههمو لايهك بيت. لهبهر ئهوه تا نهگهينه
قهناعت و دلنبايى، وه به تهوافق و ريكهوتن نهبيت ناگهينه دهر نهجاميكي كردهيى. وه كاتيكيش كه شتيك
بۆ ماوهيهك لهبهر ئهمرى واقع قبول دهكرت، بهلام ههر كاتيكي كه بارودوخى بهرانهر باشتر بوو كيشهكان
سهر ههل دهنهوه. وه شتيكى ئاساييه بۆ جيبهجي كردنى دادگهرى ئهوانهى كه ستهميان لى كراوه دهبيت
قهههيوو بكرينهوه، ئهوانهش كه ستهم كار بوون دهبيت تولهيان لى بكرينهوه. بهمهش مافهكان دهچنهوه بارى
سروشنى خوى. ئهوكات كه واى ليهات وه هاوسهنگى نيشتمانى دروست بوويهوه، ئهوجا پرۆژهى
نيشتمانى لهسر بنهماى هاوالاتى بوون دروست دهبيت. ئهوكاتهش ههمو عيراقيهك ههست به بوونى خوى
دهكات. ئهوكاتهش كه ئيمه له عيراقدا لهبهر ئهوهى كه كورددين ستهممان لى نهكرايه، و خاكمان داگير
نهكرايه و، تهواوى مافى هاوالاتى بوونمان پاريزراو بووايه ئيتتر ئهم باره ناساييه دروست نه دهيوو.

ئيستاش كه دهولت لهسر بنهماى نتهوايهتى دروست بووه، ئيمهش دهليين خو ئيمهش نتهوهيهكين. مافى
خۆمانه كه ئيمهش دهولت نتهوهيميمان ههبيت. ئهگينا وهرن با نتهوهكانى تريش واز له دهولت نتهوهيى
بين، وه پيكهوه لهسر شيوازيكي تر ريك بكهوين، ئهوكاته ئيمه گرتمان نيه، وه باسى كوردستاني
بوون و عيراقى بوون ناكهين.

پ/٥ / چۆن دروشمهكانى نازادى برايهتى دادپهروهرى رافه دهكهن له روانگهى پهيوهنديتان لهگهله برايانى
موسلمان، به تايهت كه ئيوه نتهوهيهكى بن دهولتن؟

و/ ئيمه لهسر بنهماى برايهتى مروپى، برايهتى ئيسلامى، وه برايهتى نتهوهيى هاوكارى يهكين. دهبينيت
برايهتى چهند باز نهيهكه. له باز نهى برايهتى مروپيدا دهبيت ههمومان نازاد بين و وهك يهك مافمان ههبيت.
وه له باز نهى برايهتى ئيسلاميدا، كه توى موسلمان كۆمهليك مافت ههيه، منيش دهبيت ههمان ماف ههبيت. به
ههمان شيوه ئه مافانهش كه من بوخۆم به رهواى دهبينم، دهبيت بۆ برا موسلمانكهشم، وه بۆ برا
مروپهكهشم به رهواى ببينم. له ههمان كاتدا له باز نهى نتهوهشدا كه براى يهكين نابيت يهكيكمان ستهمكار
ويهكيكمان ستهم ليكراو. وه دهبيت له چوار چيوه نتهوهكهماندا دادگهرى جيبهجي بكهين، وه ههمومان له
بهرانهر ياسا يهكسان بين. وه ياسا سهروهر بيت لهسر ههمومان. لهم ريكخراوشدا كه له پيناو كۆمهليك
ئامانجى هاوبهشدا تيدهكوشين، ئهمهش جورىكى تره له برايهتى. ئهكرت له چوار چيوه ئهم برايهتى
ئيسلاميدا همول بدهين نتهوهكانى تر قهناعت پى بكهين. وه همول بدهين لهگهليان بۆ ئهوهى كه بۆ خويان
پينان خۆشه ئيمهش ههمان مافمان ههيه. لهم روانگهوه ئيمه دهر وائينه چهكمى برايهتى.

به ههمان شيوه چهكمى نازادى ههر له له دايك بوونى مروقهوه دهست پى دهكات كه به نازادى له دايك
دهبن، وه دهبيت به نازاديش بژين. لهبهر ئهوه ئيمه دهليين مروقهكان دهبيت نازاد بن، وه به نازادى بژين.
وه ههمو ئه مافانهى كه خوا به مروقى داوه يهكسان بن تيايدا. ههر بويه ئيمه ئهمانهويت كه نازاديهكانى

تاك، وه نازاديهكانى خيزان، وه نازادى نەتەومەكان، وه نازادى مرۆفەكان هيجيان رەتكر دنەوى ئەوانى تريان نەبەت. وه هيجيان رېگەر نەبن بۆ ئەوانى تريان، بەلكو هەموومان لە دەستەبەر كردنى نازاديهكاندا جا چ نازادى سياسى بېت، يان نازادى مەدەنى بېت، يان نازادى ئابورى بېت، نازاديهكان بەگشتى بۆ هەموومان وەك يەك دەستەبەر بكرىت. ئەگەر لەسەر بنەماى ھاوالاتى بوونە، يان لەسەر بنەماى ئيسانى بوونە. خەلكانىك ھەن بەناوى ھاوالاتى بوون ھەموو شتەك بۆ خويان فەراھەم دینن، بەلام بەرانىر بە ھاوالاتيهكانى تر وانين. نەتەومەك، گەلەك، وولاتىك بە ناسايى دەبىنەت نەتەومەكانى تر بچەوسىننەتەوه لە پىناو بەرژمەندى خويدا. ئىمە قەناعەتەمان وايە كە نازاديهكان لە نيوان ھەموو مرۆفەكاندا رەچاوبكرىت. ھەموو ئيسانىك مافى خوى ھەبە، وه دەبەت نازادى ھەبەت. ئەمانەش ھەموو لە چوارچىوہى دابىن كردنى دادگەر پيدا دەكرىت. دادپەروەرى ھەر لە ناو مالىكدا پىويستە، تاوەكو لە ناو حيزبەكەدا، وه لە ناو كۆمەلەگادا. ئىمە پىويستە دادپەروەرى جىبەجى بکەين لە ھەموو ناستەكاندا، چونكە ھەم نايەنەكەمان داوامان لى دەكات، ھەم وەكو نەتەومەكەش لە نەبوونى دادپەروەرىدا ستەممان لى كراو.

ب/٦ چۆن دەتوانن وەكو پارتىكى سياسى ئىسلامى لەگەل ھەموو ئەو پارتە عىلمانىەدا ھەل بکەن؟

و/ ئىمە نا بېت مامەلەكانمان لە سەر بنەماى ئابدۆلۆجى بېت. ھەر وەكو ووتمان بازەنى برايتى كۆمان دەكاتەوه لە برايتى مرۆبى، ئەنجا برايتى ھاوئىشتەمانى بوون كۆمان دەكاتەوه. دەكرىت لە چەمكە ھاوبەشەكانەوه دەست پى بکەين، مەجالىش بەدەن بۆ جياوازيەكانمان. جياوازيەكانىشمان دەكرىت رۆلى تەواكارى ببينن نەك دژايتى. ئىمە ھەموو لەم وولاتە ھاوالاتىن، تۆ كە عىلمانىت من كە ئىسلامىم ئەركى ھاوبەشمان ھەبە. لە ھەمان كاتدا مافى ھاوبەشمان ھەبە. كە جياوازيشمان ھەبە، جياوازيەكان بۆ تەواكارى بېت باشە. وه دەتوانين رۆلى تەواكارى بەدەن جياوازيەكانمان. واتە من بوونى خۆم لە نەبوونى تۆدا نەبىنەتەوه. من كاتىك كە بۆچوونىك ھەبە، وه نازادىم لە بۆچوونەكەم، تۆيش نازادىت لە وەرگرتنى يان وەرەگرتنى بۆچوونەكەم. لەم چوارچىوہەدا ئىمە مامەلە لەگەل ئەم شتانەدا دەكەين.

ب/٧ چۆن لە ديموكراسى تى دەگەن وه چۆنىش بەرجەستەى دەكەن؟

و/ ديموكراسى پرنسىپە، وه كۆمەلەك مىكانىزمە. پرنسىپەكانى لە شوپىنەكەوه بۆ شوپىنەكى تر واتاى جۆراو جۆرى وەرگرتووه. بەلام بە شىوہەكى گشتى كۆمەلەك مىكانىزمە كە برىتتە لە نازادى، برىتتە لە ھەلبژاردن، برىتتە لە نازادى بىرور، برىتتە لە ئالوگۆرى دەسەلات، برىتتە لە دابەش كردنى دەسەلاتەكان. واتە برىتتە لە كۆمەلە چەمكىك بۆ دابىنكردنى دادپەروەرى و نازادى لە نيوان مرۆفەكاندا. ئىمە بە دانايى دەزانين، دانايىش لاى ئىمە وون بووى باوەردارە، لە ھەر شوپىنەكەوه دەستى كەوت خوى بە خاوەنى دەزانين. لەبەر ئەوه ئىمە زۆر قەناعەتەمان بەم چەمكەنى ديموكراسى ھەبە، مادام واتاكانى نازادى وواتاكانى برايتى، واتاكانى دادپەروەرى دابىن دەكات. ئەم چوارچىوہى كە دروشمەكانى ئىمە تىدا جى بووتەوه مىكانىزمەكانى ديموكراسىيەتە. بە مىكانىزمەكانى ديموكراسىيەت دەتوانين برايتى دەستەبەر بکەين، وه ئەتوانين نازادى دەستەبەر بکەين، وه دەتوانين دادپەروەرى دەستەبەر بکەين. وه دەتوانين گەشە بەدەين بە پرۆسەى سياسى. ديموكراسى ئەزمونىكى مرۆبى سەرکەوتووه، هيج رېگريك نىه لە وەرگرتنىدا. چونكە ھەموو ئەو چەمكەنى كە ئىسلام داوامان لى دەكات، ئىمە وەكو نەتەومەكەش دەمانەوت پىنابىنگەين، مىكانىزمەكانى ديموكراسىيەت خزمەت دەكەن لەم بوارە.

ئىمە وا تىگەشتووين كە گەل سەرچاوهى دەسەلاتەكان، ديموكراسىيەتەش وا ئەلەت. مادام گەل سەرچاوهى دەسەلاتەكانە ئالوگۆر كردنى دەسەلات، وه شىوازەكانى ھەلبژاردن بەو شىوہەى كە گەل پەسەندى دەكات، وه متمانەى بە كى دا ئىمە پى رازين. وه قەناعەتەمان وايە كە ئەمە راستە. وه بەردەوام دوو شت گرنگن كە رەچاوبكرين، يەكەم دەستوورە، دوومەيش متمانەى گەلە بۆ ئەو كەسەى كە ئەم دەستوورە جىبەجى دەكات. ھەرچەندە تۆ دەستورىش جىبەجى بکەيت، بەلام گەر گەل متمانەى پى نەدايت كەواتە شەرعیەتت نىه. لە مێژوو ئىسلامیدا بۆبە بە خىلافەتى راشدى ووتراوه رەشىد چونكە يەكەم بەو دەستوورە كە گەل پى رازى

بووه حوكم كراوه، نهجا گهل نهو متمانههه داوه بهو خهليفانه. به لام كاتيك به متمانهه گهل دهسه لات وورنه گيراوه، ئيتير حوكمه رهشيد نهماوه. هس بويه حوكمه رهشيد به ميكانيزمهكانه ديموكراسيه ديه ده. ئيسلاميه داواي حوكمه رهشيد دهكات بو خهك.

پ ۸/ نايانگه به ديموكراسيه گهشته دهسه لات، به لام له ههلبزاردنه دوواتردا حيزبتيه عيلمانه له ههلبزاردندا برديهوه، دهسه لاته به شيومهكه ئاشتيانه وبهپيه ديموكراسيه دهدهنه دهست؟

و/ ئيمه زور قهناعهتمان وايه كه ههچ دهسه لاتيك شه عيهته مومارسهه دهسه لاته نامينهت با ئيسلاميه بيت كاتيك كه خهك متمانهه پيه نهدهت. به زور سهپاندنه دهسه لات شه عيهته نيه له ئيسلامدا. له ئيسلامدا دهبيت خهك متمانهت بداته. كاتيكهش كه گهل نهو دهسه لاته دهدهت به هس كهسنيك با عيلمانيه بيت، دهبيت تو دهسه لاتهكهه بهپيه. كاتيك كه نهديهت نهوه (غضب)ه، (غصب) به له ئيسلامدا حهرامه.

پ ۹/ له ووتاره برابانه موسلماندا، له ئاسته تيوري ئامازه به ستراتيژه بنياتنهوهه كهسپيه موسلمان، خيزانه موسلمان، كومهلگاي موسلمان، حومهته ئيسلاميه وه خيلافته ئيسلاميه دهكات وهكو شيوازي كوشتنه برابانه موسلمان. ئيه وهكو برابانه موسلمان كورد له كويه نهه ستراتيژهدهان، نايه خيلافته دروست دهبيت؟

و/ ئيمه ههمان شيوازي پهرومده كرده تاكل، دوايه خيزان و، پاشان به كومهلگامان پيه باشه. به لام بابتهه سياستهت ومومارسه كرده دهسه لات شتيه گوراوه له ئيسلامدا. بو نمونه عهقيهه وعبادهت وههلاق له شته نهگورمهكان له ئيسلامدا، وه ههتا روزه دوايه درو هس درويه بهلايه ههموو كهسپيهوه، به ههمان شيوه بو دزه وخبانهت. كه باوره دايه بيت بهردوام عبادتههكان نهجام دهدهت. نهمانه له نهگوراوهكان. به لام (معاملات) وسياستهت له گوراوهكان، كه به پيه كات وشوين دهگورين. له بهر نهوه خيلافته ئيسلاميه نه مونيكي ميژوويه بووه له فورميكي سياسي، نه مرو (ملزم) نين پيهوه. كلتوري ئيسلاميه نه مونيكي مرويه، نه نيهت ههنديه ليه وه بهگريه، نه نيهت ههنديه ليه وه نهگريه، چونكه (مقدس) نيه. له زمانه شتيه گونجاو بووه، به لام ئيسنا ناگونجهت. له بهر نهوه ئيمه دهبيت له گهل رهروهه پيشكهوتنه زيانه مروفايهتيدا بين. وه مروفايهت بهبيت له گهشه كرده بيت. ئيسنا ئيمه بو نهوه تيناكوشين خيلافته بهگه نهوه. ئيمه نهتهويهكين، وه دهولهتهكان له سه بهنه مه دروست بوون، ئيمهش پيوسته له سه بهنه مه دهولهتهكان ههبيت بو نهتهومهكه خومان. پاشان دهكريه نهتهوهكان له سه بهنه مه هاوبهش پيكهوه له شيوهه ريخراوه نيو نهتهومهكانه تر له سه بهنه مه بهرزه مهنده هاوبهش جوهره ريخراويك ههبيت بو وولاتانه ناوچهكه. جگه لهوه ئيمه قهناعهتمان پيه نيه. وه نايته كهسنيك خوي بكات به خليفه نيرادهه خوي بسهپينهت به سه بهنه مهكانه ترده. بو نمونه ئيسنا له نهتهوه بهگرتوهكان وولاتانه ئيسلاميه وغيره ئيسلاميه تيدايه ههچ گرهتبهكيش نيه.

پ ۱۰/ باشه تيهگهيشتنه نهانمانته ههچ جياوازيهكه ههيه لهه تيهگهيشتنهه بهريزان وهكو سه كردهيه تيهگرتوه؟

و/ ئيمه ئيخوان وهكو قوتابخانهه (وسط) سودمان ليه وهگرتوه. وه له نه موني خهكي تيره سود ومردهگرين. به لام ههموو خومالي دهكهن. ئيمه نهانهت درسهه حيزبه نهو رويهكان دهكهن، وه هس نه مونيكمان پيه گونجاو بووه له گهل له بهر چاگرته تايبهتمهنده وولات وميللهته خوماندا نهوانين وهري بهگرين. وهكو لايهنيه ئيسلاميه پهروهه له ميانهروهه دهكهن، ئيخوان بهكبه لهو لايهنايه كه (فضل)ه زوره له سه دروست كرده نهه ميانهروهه. له زور شته وهكو نازاده وبهشداري سياسي وبهپهروهه له ديموكراسيه ورولي نافرته ورزگرته له پيكهاتهكانه تري كومهلگامان دابين

کردنی دادگەری، لەوانە ھەموو ھاوشیوەین. بەلام واقعی ئیمە چی دەخواریت، وە ئیمە کە ھەلقولای ئەر واقعەین کە میللەتەکان کیشیەکی ھەبە، سەنەمی لای کرارە، دەبیت ئەر سەنەمە لایەری. لەبەر ئەر ئیمە تاییەتمەندی خۆمان ھەبە، وە ئازادین لە تاییەتمەندیانە. بەلام ھەر وەکو چۆن سۆشیال دیموکراتەکانی دنیا لە ھەندئ شتدا ھاوشیوەن، ئیمەش لەگەڵ ئیسلامیە مێنەرە موکان بەگشتی و ئیخوان بە تاییەتی کۆمەڵێک چەمکی میانەرووی دەمانبەستتیت بەیەکەرە. ئەگینا بالاترین دەسەلات لای ئیمە کۆنگرەبە، ئەنجا سەرکردایەتی پاشان مەکتەبی سیاسی، وە دەسەلات و بریارەکانمان لەمانەو وەردەگرین. ئەنجا ئیمە سیستەمی لامەرکەزی نەرم (لامرکزی مرن) پەیرەو دەکەین، کە دەزگا (محلی) یەکان رۆلی خۆیان ھەبە. لەبەر ئەر لە ھەر کۆیی ئەر دنیایە زانیمان ھەر شتێک لەگەڵ ستراتیژیەتی گشتیمان دەگونجیت وەری دەگرین و کاری پێ دەکەین. وە ئازادیشین لە رەت کردنەوێ ھەر شتێک کە ناگونجیت لەگەڵ ئەزموونەکانمان.

دەسەلات لە ئیسلامدا دەسەلاتێکی مەدەنیە، نەك ئاینی. چونکە دەسەلات ھی خەلکە، وە دەسەلاتداریش وە خەلک ئازادە کە دەسەلات دەدات بە ھەر کەسێک، ئەنجا چاودیری بکات. نوێنەری خەلکە نك خوا و لایەری سەنەمی لەگەڵدا بکات و، بیگۆریت. ئیمە ئەمەمان لە رێگە تیگەشتنمان لە ئاینەو دەسە کردووە. وە سیاسەت لە ئیسلامدا لە گۆراومکانە و چی بەرژومندی دابین بکات ئەر باشە.

پ ۱۱ / ئایا ئیو ھەست بە رکابەری دەکەن لە لایەن ئیسلامیەکانی ترەو؟

و / (منافسە) ی ئیجابی لە نیوان ئیسلامیەکان خۆیاندا، عیلمانیەکان لە ناو خۆیاندا، ئیسلامی و عیلمانی ئاساییە. وە لە ناو ھەر وولاتێکدا موناڤسە ی ئیجابی پێویستە. بەلام دزایەتی خراپە. ئەگەر من وابزانم ئیسلام تەنھا ئەرەبە کە من دەببینم، ئیتر جگە ئەرەب گومراییەم کوفرە نابیت. ئەمەش ئیسلام نایەوێت. ئیجتھادی سیاسی ریزلی گیراوە لای ھەموومان. گەرنگ ئەرەبە لەسەر ھاوبەشەکان کۆببینەو وە موناڤسە ی ئیجابی بکەین.

پ ۱۲ / پیت وایە بزوتنەوێ سەلەفی لە میسر کە دواي شۆرشەکە پارتنیکی سیاسییان راگەیاندا، ھاوکار بوون یان رێگر لە بەردەم برایانی میسر؟ وە چ وانەیک ھەبە لەبارەو بۆ ئیسلامیەکانی کوردستان؟

و / ئاساییە ئیسلامیەکان کاتیک کە لە دەرەوێ دەسەلاتن جیاوازیان زۆرتر بیت، بەلام کاتیک کە دەسەلات دەگرە دەست و اقەیک بێتە پێش بتوانن بەیەکەرە (تفاهم) بکەن و ھاوکاری بکەن و رۆلی تەواوکاری بۆ یەکتر بگێرن. من ئومید دەکەم سەلەفی لە ھەموو شوینیک خۆیان بە بەشێک، وە بەشێکی گەرنگیش بزانت، بەلام خۆیان بە ھەموو شت نەزانت، وە غەیری خۆیان سفر کە. ئەگەر لەسەر بنەمای یەکتر قبول کردن و کارکردن لەسەر بوارە ھاوبەشەکان و عوزر ھینانەو بۆ جیاوازیەکانمان، وە جیاوازیەکانمان بۆ تەواوکاری بیت کیشە نابیت. بەلام ئەگەر ئەر رۆشنبیریە لاواز بیت ھەر زوو تیکدەچن لە ناو خۆیاندا. وە نا تەبا دەبن. وە سەلفیەکانیش کۆمەڵێک مروفن و قابیلی گۆران و پێشکەوتن، لە سەرئاو قەناعەتیان بە ھیچ جۆرە حیزبیک نەبوو. بەلام ئیستا ئەرەبە لە کویت لە میسر لە یەمەن حیزب دروست دەکەن، وە مومارەسە ی کاری سیاسی دەکەن. ئەمەش پێشکەوتنیکە لە (نەج) سەلفیەتدا دروست بوو، وە بە تێپەری کات پێشکەوتنیک ئیجابی دەبیت بۆ کارکردنی سیاسی لەگەڵ ئیسلامیەکانی تردا.

پ ۱۳ / لە کۆنگرە ی شەشدا مافی چارە ی خۆنووسینتان بریاردا وەکو ستراتیژی کارتان، چۆن ئەر ستراتیژە بەرچەستە دەکەن؟

و / ئیمە قەناعەتمان وایە کە دوو رێگامان گرتووتە بەر، یەکەم ھەرل دەدەین کە کورد ناگۆک نەبن بەرانبەر بە کیشە دەرەکیەکان، دوومیش لەناو خۆشماندا جیدی کار بکەین بۆ ئەرەب چاکسازەکی ریشەیی لەناو سیستەمی ئیداری و سیاسی ھەریم دروست ببیت. بەم شێوێ پروسە ی سیاسیمان گەشە دەکات. وە لەسەر

ئاستى بەشەكانى تىرى كوردستان، ھەر بەشەو لە ناو وولاتەكەى خۇيدا لە رىنگاى خەباتى سىياسى و مەدەنى و، بە شىواى ديموكراسىيە تىبىكۆشەن لە پىناو دەستەبەر كوردنى مافەكانى ئەم نەتەو مەھە. مادام دەولەتەكانى تر لە رۆژ ھەلاتى ناومراست لەسەر بنەماى نەتەو مەھە درووست بوون، دەبىت ئەم نەتەو مەھە ئىمەش دەولەتى نەتەو مەھە خۇى ھەبىت. ئەوكات نەتەو مەكان پىكەو لەسەر بنەماى بەرژ مەندى ھاوبەش لە شىو مەھە بازارى ھاوبەشى ئەمروپا ئىمەش دەتوانىن شتىكى ئاوا درووستكەين كە بەرژ مەندى قازانجى ھەموولايەكى تىدا بىت. كەواتە ئىمە ھەول دەمەين لە رىنگاى ديموكراسى و مافى مەروۇف و مافى چارەى خۇنووسىنەو دەولەتەك بۇ نەتەو مەھە كورد درووست بكەين. وە ئىمە بە ھىچ شىو مەھەك دزى بەرژ مەندى نەتەو مەھەكانى ھىچ وولاتىك نىن و نابىن.

كۆتايى

Appendix 12: Salahaddin Muhammad Bahaddin, the former Secretary General of the KIU

صلاح الدين محمد بهاء الدين، نەمىندارى پىشوو يەكگرتوو ئىسلامى كوردستان

۰۰:۱۹، ۲۰۱۲/۰۸/۲۶

ب/ ۱ ھەر لە سەرەتاو يەكگرتوو ئىسلامى كوردستان بۆچى دروستكرا؟

و/ بى گومان يەكگرتوو لە كەش و ھەوايەكدا پىك ھات كە وامان دەزانى گۆرەپانى كوردستان پىويستى ھەيە بە ھىزىكى سىياسى كۆمەلەيەتى پەروەردەيى بىتە مەيدان. وە ئەو توانايانە كۆ بكتەو كە لە رووى پەروەردەيەو لە رووى فيكرىيەو لە رووى چالاكى بانگەواز مەھە بوونيان ھەبوو لە كوردستاندا وە پەروەردەى دەستى ئىخوان بوون وەكو قوتابخانەيەكى فيكرى. بەلام ئىخوان لە ۱۹۷۱ مەھە لە عىراقدا رىكخستى وەستابوو. بەلام لە كوردستاندا بوونى ئەم چالاكيانە ھەبوو ئەگەر چى پەيوەندى نەمايوو بە عىراقەو، چونكە وەكو ووتمان لە عىراق رىكخستن نەمايوو. ئەگەر چى لە كوردستانىش پەيوەندى تەواو بە يەكەو ھەبوو، بەلكو محورى شارىك جياواز بوو لە شارىكى تر. وە كۆمەلەيكىش لە ۱۹۸۰ كانەو لە ئىران بوون. وە چالاكيەكى زۆر لە ناو ئوردگانى كورد ئاوارەكان لە ئىران ھەبوو. ئەم محورەنە كۆكردنەو مەھەكى دەويست. ئەنجا ياساى حىزبەكان لە پەرلەمانى كوردستان لە ۱۹۹۳ دەرچوو، ئىمە بىرپارماندا ئەو توانايانە كۆ بكەينەو، وە حىزبىكى سىياسى راگەيەين بە ناوى يەكگرتوو ئىسلامى كوردستان. وە لەو كاتەدا گروپىكى تىرى ئىسلامى چەكدار ھەبوو لە كوردستان بە ئەجىنداى تەرەو. ديارە ئىمە ھەر لە ھەشتاكانەو جياواز بوون لەمان كە نەھجىكى پەروەردەيمان ھەبوو، وە مەدەنى بوون. ئەو جياوازيەش داواى ئەو مەھە دەكرد كە بوونىكى مەدەنى جيا لەو بوونە چەكدارى ھەبىت. وە لەو كاتەدا گۆرەپانى كوردستان پىويستى بە ھىوركردنەو ھەبوو، چونكە پىر بوو لە چەكى ئىسلامى و غەيرە ئىسلامى. ئىمە دەمانويست شتىكى تازە داھەينىن، ھىزىكى سىياسى و فيكرى و پەروەردەيى بىت. ھەرەھا گىرنگىمان دەدا بە كارى خىرخواى. وە گىرنگىمان دەدا بە بوارى فەرھەنگى و رۆشنىرىش. ئەنجا مەدەنى و بى چەكىش بوون، كە ئەوكات ئىمە يەكەم حىزب بوون لە كوردستان كە مەكتەب عەسكەرى نەبوو. وە ئىمە حىزبىك بوون ھەر لە دامەزراندنەو تا ھەموو پىرنسىپەكان بە ديموكراسى ھەلسوكەوتمان دەكرد. ئىمە بە خويندەنەو مەھەكى نوئى بۇ ئىسلام و كوردايەتى و كوردبوون ھاتىنە بوون، كە شتىكى زۆر گىرنگ بوو

بۇ گۆرەپانى كوردستان. ئەوكاتەش كە لە پاش ۱۹۹۱ ھە كوردستان نازاد ببوو، ھەر حیزبەو بە باكگراوندى خۆى داواى حوكمرانى كوردستانى دەكرد. ئەوكاتە پارتى و يەكئىتى و سوشىالست و بزوتنەوى ئىسلامى و حیزبى شىوعى و حیزبى تریش ھەبوون. ئىمە تەنھا حیزبىك بووین كە پاشخانى عەسكەریمان نەبوو. بەو بوونە مەدەنى و مىللى و خیزخوازیەو دەماننازى، نەك ھىچى تر. لەو كاتەش بەلای خەلكەو سەیر بوو، وە دەیانووت كە چۆن حیزبىك لە ناو ئەم جەخانەو چەكداربەدا دەتوانیت حیزبایەتى بكات. سەرەتا وابوو، بەلام سوپاس بۇ خوا بوینە پارسەنگىك بۇ سەرخستنى دیموكراسى. ھەر لە ھەلبۇزاردنەكانى ۱۹۹۲ كە ئەوكات وەكو ئىسلامى سەربەخۆ بەشداریمان كرد، ئەنجا لە ھەموو ھەلبۇزاردنەكانى تردا ئىمە تەنھا لایەنىك بووین كە تەزویرمان نەدەكرد. وە ئىمە ھىچ (سلطە)یەكمان نەبوو، (اعتماد)مان لە سەر خەلك بوو. بىگومان و امان دەزانەى كە پئویستى گۆرەپانى كوردستان بە ناو حیزبىكى مەدەنى ھەمە كە بە پاشخانىكى ئىسلامى كاری نىشتمانى و خزمەتگوزارى بۇ مىللەتەكەى بكات. وە ئەو شىوانسن و تشویە و تشویشە كە دروست ببوو لە سەر تىگەشتنى ئىسلامى، لە سەر تىگەشتنى نەتەواپەتى، لە سەر (ممارسە)ى حوكمرانى ھەموو ئەوانە ئىمە بە كار لەسەر كردن زیاتر لە بواری راگەیاندن، كە قورسایى مادى خۆمان خستە سەرى ھەولماندا ئەو بۆشایانە پىر بكەینەو.

پ/۲ ئەگەر ئەو شتانەى كە باستكردن پۆلین بكەین بە سەر دوو بەشدا: یەكەم خواستىكى دەعوى، دووم: خواستىكى گۆرەپانى سیاسى كوردستان. كامیان پالئەرى گەورەتر بوون؟

و/ یەكەم رىكخستەنەوى كارە دەعوىكە، كە پەرتەوازە بوو، ئەنجا (اضافە)یەكى سیاسىش. كە ئەویش حیزبىكى سیاسى كوردستانى بوو. ئەم حیزبە سیاسىش بە سود وەرگرتن لە (مرجعیە)ە فیکریەكە بۇ خزمەتکردن بە ئەو گەل و نىشتمانە. لە بەر ئەو پڕۆژەى سیاسى ئىمە (اهتمامات) مىللى و نىشتمانى ھەبوو. لە ھەمانكاتدا پرسە دەعوىكەش رىكخرا و بەگەر خرا و بە ياسايش كرا.

پ/۳ ئیو ھەكو یەكەم ئەمىندارى یەكگرتوو ھەر لە دامەزراندنى یەكگرتوو لە ۱۹۹۴ تا كۆنگرەى شەشەم كە لە مانگی مايسى ئەمسال (۲۰۱۲) بەردەوام بوون، بەلام لە كۆنگرەدا خۆتان نە پالوت ئیتىر بۇ ئەو پۆستە، وە لە نیوان چوار كاندید یەكیكیان ھەلبۇزیردرا! مە بەست لەم خۆ كاندید نەكردنە چى بوو؟

و/ ئەو یەكەكە لە مومارسە دیموكراسیەى كە ئىمە پەیرەوى دەكەین، وە باوەرمان پێپەتى. باوەرمان وایە كە دیموكراسى بەشێكى زیندوو لە ژيانى ئەم سەردەمە. دیموكراسىش ھىچ پىچەوانەى ئىسلام و تىگەشتنى ئىسلامیمان. پىش ھەموو شت سەرچاوەى دەسەلات گەلە، ئەمەش ھەر لە كۆنگرەى دوو ھەموو لە پڕۆگرامدا دامانیواو. ئەنجا واز ھینان لە توند و تیزى بە ھەموو شىوازەكانى، وە داپەلۆگ و گەفتوگۆ ئالیەتەمانە. لە باسى دەساودەسى دەسەلات باوەرمان ھاتە سەر ئەو كە ماوەى ھەبیت، وە ئەمىندار نابیت ھەتا ھەتايە ھەر بىننیتەو. من لە كۆنگرەى چوار لە ۲۰۰۵ باسى ئەم بابەتەم كردوو، وە رام وابوو كە یەكگرتوو زۆر شتى باشى كردوو، پىم باشە ئەمەش (اضافە) بكەین. وە من لە كاتىكدا خۆم ھەلبۇزیرم دەبەمەو، بەلام پىم باشە ئەمە دابھننن. ئەو بوو ئەوكات پىشنيارمەكەم وەرنەگىرا، رەنگە من لە پىشدا ئامادەسازیم نەكردبیت بۇ ئەو باسە، وە وەكو (مفاجئە)یەك و ابوو بۇ كۆنگرە. ئەنجا لە كۆنگرەى پىنجدا لە ۲۰۰۸ پىشنيارى سى سەرۆكایەتیم كرد بۇ ئەو دەسەلاتەكانى ئەمىندار بىریت بەوان. ئەو سەرۆكایەتەمانەش بىریتى بوون لە سەرۆكى ئەنجومەنى سەرکردایەتى و سەرۆكى شورای گشتى و سەرۆكى مەكتەبى سیاسى. ئەنجا ئەمىندارىش بىننیتەو وەكو ھىما. ئەو بوو ئەم بىرۆكەمە سەرى گرت و ئەو سى سەرۆكە ھەلبۇزیردرا. ئەنجا ئەو سى سەرۆكە لە گەل ئەمىندارا (ھىئە)ى سەرۆكایەتییان پىك دەھینا. ئەمەش ئامادەسازى بوو بۇ ئەو كە لە كۆنگرەى شەش بە تەواوتى ئەم داھینانە ئەنجام بەدەین. وە دە مانگ پىش كۆنگرەى شەش من باسى خۆ نەپالوتنم لە سەرکردایەتى كرد، بۇ ئەو ئامادەى ھەبیت و لە كۆنگرە نەبیتەو بە (مفاجئە). ئەنجا كە دەنگ و باس لە ناو رىكخستەكان پەیدا بوو، من سەردانى ھەموو رىكخستەكانم كرد و، ھەولم دا زمەینەسازى و ئامادەى

درووست بکەم لە ناو ئەنداماندا بۆ ئەم هەنگاوه. ئەو بوو ئەم داھینانە بێ وینەیه لە ناو حیزبی کوردیدا یەگرتوو دەستپێشخەر بوو، ئەمەش نەک لە ناو ئیسلامیەکان، بەڵکو عیلمانیەکانی رۆژەلاتی ناوەراست. هەر وەها داھینانیکێ تر ئەو بوو کە بۆ یەکەم جار دیسان کۆنگرەکه راستەوخۆ پەخش کرا.

پ/ ئەگەر سەیری میژووی ئیسلامیی بکەین، بە خەلیفە راشدینەکانەوش، دەبینین هەر کەسێک کە هەلبژێردراوه تا مردن ماوتەمۆه لە دەسەلاتەکە. ئایا ئەم داھینانە ئیوێه کە ماوتەن بۆ ئەمیندار دیاری کردووه کە ئەو پەری دوو خوولە، ئیسلامیی ترە یان ئەو نمونە میژووییانە؟

و/ ئەمە ئەسل تر ئیسلامیی ترە، چونکە شورا ئەسلە (وامرهم شورا بینهم). ئەمۆتە ئەبو بەکر کاتیک هەلبژێردارد ووتی (ولیت علیکم ولست بخیرکم، فان احسنت فاعینونی، وان اسنت فقومونی). ئەو وای نەزانیو کە هەلبژاردنی (تفویض) یکێ خوابیە. ئەنجا ئەمۆر مادام دیموکراسی هەیه کە بەرھەمیکی زۆر باشی عەقڵی ئینسانە، ئیمە بە باشمان زانی کە پەیرەویی بکەین.

پ/ ئایا هیچ حەسانەیکێ ناینی هەیه بۆ سەرکردهی ئیسلامیی، بە واتایەک کە هیچ قودسیەتیکیان هەبیت و، نەتواندیت رەخنەیان لێ بگیردیت؟

و/ بە دلنایایی نەخێر. چونکە پێش هەموو شتێک سەرکرده (معصوم) نیە. ئەنجا تەنانت بۆ پیغەمبەرانیش (معصوم) بوون لە پەیمانەکیان و گەیانندی ئەو پەیمانە. بەلام لە مومار سەکردنی سەرکردهیی، (معصوم) نەبوون. سەپردەکەیت لە ژبانیامە پیغەمبەر ئەو دەر دەکەوت و مکو نەیزانیو دەر خورما چۆن (تلقیح) دەکریت، وە بە سو عەتەو پیی و تون خەریکی چین خوا رازقە، کە چی ئەو سألە دارەکانیان بەری نەگرت. کەواتە فەرمانکردنی لەو بوارە (معصوم) نەبوو، سەرەنجام کاتیک کە هەواییان پێ دا پیی فەرمان (انتم اعلم بأمر دنیاکم). لە جەنگی بەردا کاتیک کە لە پلانی جەنگدا شارەزا نەبوو، پێیان ووت کە چۆن بکەن باشە. لە قورئاندا لەمبارەو لە چەندین شوێندا رەخنە لێ گیراوه. کەواتە ئەگەر ئەمە وایە لەگەڵ پیغەمبەر، ئێتر چۆن خەلکی تر هەلە ناکات و نایبیت رەخنە لێ بگیردیت؟ بەلام ئەو پیرۆزییە کە داھینرا لە ناو خەلکدا بۆ دەسەلاتدار بەرگی ناینی دەکریت بە بەردا. بەلام شتێک هەیه کە ریزگرتن و تەقدیر دەبیت لە پیرۆزکردن و تەقدیس جیا بکرتیتەوه.

پ/ چ جۆرە پەيوەندیەک هەیه لە نێوان حیزبە ئیخوانیەکاندا؟

و/ بێگومان ئیستا ناتوانیت بڵیبت ئەو کەسانە کە پەروەردە بوون لە سەر پەروەردە ئیخوانی، ئیستاش ئیخوانین بەو مەفھومە جارێ. پێش هەموو شتێک جارێ پرسێ سیاسی لە ئارادا نەبوو، تەنها بابەتی بانگەواز هەبوو. بانگەوازی لە هەموو شوێنێک و مکو یەکە، جوگرافیا کاری لە سەر ناکات. بەلام کاتیک کاری سیاسی دێتە پێش حیزبە مەرجیەت ئیخوانیەکان سەرچەم ناتوانن یەک پڕۆژە سیاسیان هەبیت. چونکە ئەجیندای سیاسی هەر وڵاتیک جیاوازه لە وڵاتیکێ تر. کێشەو خواستی رۆژانەیی هاوڵاتی لە وڵاتیک بۆ وڵاتیکێ تر جیاوازه. دەرەنجام چی درووست دەبیت؟ جیاوازی درووست دەبیت. لەبەر ئەو حیزبە ئیخوانیەکان لە رووی رەھەندە فیکری و شیوازی بانگەواز لە یەک دەچن، بەلام لە رووی پڕۆژەیی سیاسیەو جیاوازی. بۆ نمونە لە (وسطیة) و میانەرووی لە فیکر و مومار سەدا تا رادەیک کۆ دەنگیان هەیه. لە تیگەیشتنی (وسطیة) یانە لە قوربان و (سنة)، لە بە کارنەھینانی توندوتیژی، لە تیگەیشتنی (فقہ) واقع، لە پرسێ تیگەیشتنی (مقاصدي) بۆ ئاین، لە پرسێ بە کارھینانی میکانیزمەکانی سەردەم لەوانە دیموکراسی، ئەمانە هاوبەشیەکن کات و جیگای کاریان تێ ناکات. بەلام پڕۆژەیی سیاسی یەگرتوو جیاوازه لەگەڵ پڕۆژەیی سیاسی (عدالة والحرية) ی میسر. کەواتە تەنها جۆرە (تضامن) یک هەیه لە شیوازی کاردا، ئەگینا بۆ نمونە لە بارە کەرکۆکەو حیزبی عێراقی هەلوێستی و مکو (علاوي) یە، ئیمەش هەلوێستمان و مکو پارتی

ويەكىتى يە. لەوانەيە ھەندى جار ئەم لىكچونەى كار وجزره پەيوەندىانە كارىگەرييان ھەبىت لە سەر ئاستى و جۆرى مامەلەى يەكتەر، بەلام (ثوابت)ى نەتەمەى ھەيە. كەواتە ھەر يەكە لە ئەم پارتە ئىخوانيانە پارتى سياسى نىشتەمانىن ھەر يەكە بۆ خزمەتى گەل و ولاتى خويان، بەلام بە مەرجەيتى ئىسلامىي، ھەر وەكو لە بەرانبەر دا حيزبە عىلمانىەكانىش بە مەرجەيتى عىلمانى خويان.

كۆتايى

Appendix 13: Mohammad Faraj, the former Secretary General of KIU

محمد فەرەج، ئەمىندارى گشتى يەكگرتووى ئىسلامىي كوردستان

پ/ ١/ ئىو ەكو ئەمىندارى يەكگرتووى چۆن مامەلە دەكەن لەگەل رەخنە گرتن دا؟ ئايا ئىو ەكو كەسى يەكەمى ئەم حيزبە ھىچ ھەسەنەيەكى ئابى ھەيە ئىو ەكو لە رەخنە لى گرتن بياريزىت؟

و/ ئىمە ەكو يەكگرتووى ئىسلامىي كوردستان لە بەر ئەو بەريارمان داو ەكە ھەلبەردن مىكانىزمى ديارى كردن بى، ئىتر ئەكەوتە دەست ئەو خەلكانە كە كەسەكان ديارى دەكەن. ئەمەش چ لە حيزبەكەمان دا بىت، يان بۆ گەلەكەمان. بۆ نمونە كاتىك كە گەل پەرلەمان ھەلبەزىرەيت، ئىتر ئەو شەرعەيتە. ھەر وەھاش لە حيزبدا ئەمەيە كە ئەندامان دەنگيان دابىت بە كەسەك بۆ پۆستەك. ئەمە ئەو ناگەيەنەيت كە لە رووى ئابىئە ئەو پۆستەى وەرگرتەيت. چونكە ئىمە پىمان وا نى ەكە پۆست ئابى بىت. پۆست خەلك ئەى بەخشەيت، ئەو خەلكەى كە مەمانەى پىت ھەيە ئەو پۆستەت پى دەبەخشەيت بۆ ماومەيەكى ديارى كراو، كە ماومەكە تەواو بوو ئىتر ئەو شەرعەيتە نامىنەيت. لە يەكگرتووى ئىسلامىي كوردستان ھىچ پىرۆزىەك نە بۆ كەسى يەكەم، نە بۆ كەسى تر ھەيە.

ئىمە كاتىك كە باسى باومەبوون بە ئازادى دەكەين، ئازادى واتاى باومەبوونە بە جىاوازيەكان. ئەوانەش كە رازىن بە دىكتاتورەيت، ئىتر جىاوازي نامىنەيت، چونكە ھەموو يەك جۆر بىر دەكەنەو. كە ئازادىمان ھەلبەزارد، ئىتر جىاوازيەكان دەردەكەون. چونكە ھەر كەسى لەو سنورەى كە ئازادە قەسەى خۆى دەكات، و ە بىرو راى خۆى ئەخاتە روو. ئەمەش جۆرىك لە (اختلاف) و جۆرىك لە بە يەكدا چوون دروست دەبىت. بە چى ئەمە چارەسەر دەكەين؟ ديارە بە (قبول) كردن. ھەر بۆيە دەبىت رىز لە يەكتەر و بىرو بۆچوونى يەكتەر بگرين. و ە لە رىي مىكانىزمەكەو كە لەسەرى رىك دەكەوين و پىي دەلەين دەستور يان سىستەم رىك دەكەوين لە سەر يەكلاکردنەو ئەم كىشانە. ئىتر زۆر ئاسايە كە خەلك شەكەنى منى بە دل نەبىت، و ە رەخنەى لى ھەبىت. منىش دەبىت سود لەو رەخنەنە وەرگرم. چونكە ئەو خەلكەى كە رەخنەم لى دەگرن دوو جۆرن: يان منى بە دل نى، ھەر ھەز دەكات من بچووك بەكاتەو، يان لە راستى دا من ھەلم ھەيە. ئەگەر بەشى دوومە، دەبىت من زۆر رىزى لى بگرم، چونكە ئەو دەبىتە ئاوينەى من و، ھەلمەكەم پىشان دەدات. و ە من ئەبىت خىرا سوپاسى بەكەم و، ھەلمەكەم راست بەكەمەو. ئەگەر ئەو كەسى كە ھەر ھەزى لە من نىو دەيەوت گرتەم بۆ دروست بەكات. دەبىت بزانم پالەرى ئەمە چىە؟ نەك بىم دزايەتى بەكەم و ھەول بەدم لاى بەرم. بى گومان شتەك لە مندا دەبىنەيت بە دل نى. دەبىت من چارەسەرى ئەو كىشەيەى بۆ بەكەم. و ە دەبىت دل نى كەسە بەو ئالوزىەدا نەھىلمەو، چونكە بىرکردنەو لە دل نىكى ئالوزدا كىشە بۆ خوشى و بۆ خەلكىش دروست دەكات. لىپرسراوى يەكەم دەبىت نىشى ئەو بىت كە كەش و ھەواى ئازادى و ئارامى ئاسايش

بخولقینیت. بۇ ئەۋەي خەلك بە نارامى بېر بكنەۋە. ۋە كاتىكش كە بە نارامى بېرىان كرددەۋە پېش كەۋتەن درووست دەبىت. بە واتايەكى تر پلان درووست دەبىت، كە پلانىش درووست بوو بى گومان پېشكەۋتەن درووست دەبىت. ئېمە ۋەكو يەكگرتوۋ كارى جىدى لەم بوۋارە دەكەين، لىزەشەۋە دەمانەۋىت ۋولتەكەمان ۋحكومەتېش ۋا بىت.

ب۲/ لە بەندى يەكەمى پەيرە ۋپروگرامى يەكگرتوۋدا ھاتوۋە كە ئىۋە حىزبىكى ئىصلاحىن. ئىصلاح چىبە بەلاتانەۋە؟

ۋ/ ئىصلاح دوۋ واتاي ھەيە، واتايەكى ئىسلامىي ۋ، واتايەكى سىياسى كە لە لىكدانەۋەي ماركسىانە بەرانىر بە رادىكالە، بە واتاي شورش ۋگورېنىكى رېشەيى. بەلام ئىصلاح چاك كرددە. لە كۆمەلگادا دەبىت پېشت بە ئىصلاح بېستىن. دەبىت ئېمە بېين ھەلەكان راست بكنەۋە. ۋە ئېمە لە يەكگرتوۋ باۋەرمان ۋايە تاكەكان ھەموو بەرېزن، چونكە خوا دەفەرموۋىت (ولقد كرمانا بني آدم)، لە بەر ئەۋە ھەموو مروۋىك ۋەكو مروۋف بە گەورەۋ دابنرېت، بە رېزەۋە سەير بكرېت. ئەۋەي كە ئېمە قسەمان لە سەرتى كرددەكانى مروۋفە. ئېمە نابىت ھەرگىز مروۋفەكان لەكەدار بكنەين. نابىت لە بەر كرددەيك كەسەكە لەناوبەرىن. رادىكال كەسەكە كرددەكەش لەناۋ دەبات. ئەمەش ھەلەيە، ئېمە ۋا ناكەين. ئېمە ھەول دەدەين كرددەكەي چاك بكنەين، چونكە ئەۋ كەسە مروۋفە ئەۋىش ۋەكو من مافى بېر كرددەۋەي ھەيە. ئەۋىش ۋەكو من مافى ژيانى ھەيە، ۋە پىۋىستى بە ئەۋە ھەيە سەركەۋتەن بۇ خۇي بە دەست بەئىنېت. راستە ھەلە دەكات، بەلام پىۋىستە ھەلەكانى بۇ چاك بكنەۋە، نەك لە ناۋى بەرىن. كەۋاتە چەمكى ئىصلاح لاي ئېمە بە واتاي راسكردنەۋەي ھەلەي كەسەكان دېت، نەك لە ناۋبەردى كرددەۋە كەسەكەش بە يەكەۋە. جارى ۋا ھەيە كە ئەۋ كەسە ئەگەر يەك ھەلەي ھەبىت، بەلام دەيان شتى جوانى ھەيە. من ناكرىت لە بەر ئەم ھەلەيە دەيان شتە جوانەكەي نكولى لى بكم. ۋە ئەم كەسە كە ئىستا خراپە دەكرېت بكرېت بە مروۋىكى زور باش. لە قورئانىشدا باس لە گورېنى كرددەكان ھاتوۋە، ۋەكو (ان الله لا يغير ما بقوم حتى يغيروا ما بأنفسهم). كەۋاتە باس لە خۇكورېن ۋبەرەۋ باش چوونە، ۋە شتتىكى (ممکن)ېشە. ۋە ھەمېشە بۇ ئەۋەي لە دەروەي مروۋفەكان چاكسازى بكرېت، پىۋىستە لە ناۋەۋەي مروۋفەكان زەمىنە خۇش بكرېت. ۋە ئەۋە مروۋفانە كە دەتەۋىت بەرەۋ چاكسازى بچن دەبىت لە ناۋەۋەي خۇيان نامادەيى ۋاز ھىنان لە كرددە خراپەكان ۋبەرەۋ كرددە چاكەكان رۇشتەن ھەبىت.

ب۳/ فىقەي ۋاقە كە زور جار باسى لئوۋ دەكەن، بە لاي ئىۋەۋە چى دەگەيەنېت؟

ۋ/ بەرېۋەبەردى ژيانى سىياسى پىۋىستى بە دوۋ شت ھەيە، ئەمەش ۋايە تەنانت بۇ ژيانى كۆمەلەپەتى ۋژيانى ئابورېش، يەكەم پىۋىستى بە تىۋر ۋپلان ھەيە، دوۋم پىۋىستى بە جى بە جى كرددە ھەيە. ئەم تىۋرەش پىۋىست دەكەت كە لە لايەن خەلكىكەۋە دابنرېت. دانانى ئەم تىۋر ۋنەخشەيە لە كويدا جىبەجى دەكرېت؟ پېش ئەۋەي دەست بكنەيت بە جىبەجىكردى لە ھەر جىگاپەك دەبىت سروسى جىگاكە بزانىت. ئايا ئەم خەلكە دەتوانن؟ ئايا پىيان دەكرېت؟ ئايا تەھمولى دەكەن؟ ئايا سەركەۋتوۋ دەبىت؟ ئەمە فىقەي ۋاقە. دەبىت ۋاقە بزانىت. چونكە ھىچ تىۋرىك بە بى لىكدانەۋەيەكى راست ۋدروستى ۋاقە ھەرگىز سەركەۋتوۋ نابىت. تەنانت ئاينى خوا ئەگەر لىكۆلېنەۋەيەكى جوان ۋ ووردى ۋاقەت نەبىت ناتوانىت جىبەجى بكنەيت. لە قورئاندا باسى پىغەمبەرەكان دەكات، لە ھەندى شوپندا ۋەكو پىۋىست سەركەۋتەن نەھىناۋە، بۇ؟ چونكە ۋاقەكە يارمەتەدەر نەبوۋە. لە بەر ئەۋە زور گرنگە ئەمە رەچاۋ بكنەين ئەۋ ھەلۇبىست ۋبىرارانە، ئەۋ ياسايانە كە دەتەۋىت جىبەجىيان بكنەيت دەبىت لە گەل ۋاقەكەدا گونجاۋ بىت. ئەگەر نا سەركەۋتوۋ نابىت. لە بەر ئەۋە چەندە گرنگە كە پلان دابنېت، ئەۋەندەش گرنگە ۋاقەكە بخونىتەۋە. ئەم دوۋانە پىكەۋە دەر ھاۋىشتەيەكى جوانيان دەبىت. ئەگەر نا سەركەۋتوۋ نابىت. ۋە ئەگەر ۋاقەت نە خويندەۋە مەجبور دەبىت شتەكانت بسەپىنېت، ئىتر ئەۋە لە چاكسازى ۋەلە دېموكراسى دەردەچىت، ۋە دەبىتە ئىستېداد. بەلام گەر دەتەۋىت ۋەدالەتخوازى ۋنازادى بە كار بەئىنېت، ۋە دەتەۋىت دېموكراسىيەت بە كار بەئىنېت، دەبىت ئەم بەرنامەۋە پلانە كە دايدەنېت لە گەل ئەم ۋاقە گونجاۋ بىت. سەرەتا ۋاقەكەت

خوښدېښتموه نهنجا ههنگاو بنيت. نيمه ههول دهمين بو ناوخواي حيزب و بو دهموش نهم فيقهی واقع له بهرچاو بگرين.

پ/۴ / نهخلاقى سياسى لای نيوه چونه؟ به تايهت كه نيوه حيزبىكى توپوزسيونن وه چاوتان له سر دسه لاته دهتانهويت رمخنهى جيدي بگریت، لهوانه به لای ههدين خهلكهوه نهم شته گرنه نه بيت به لايهوه گرنه نيوه كه چون بتوانيت نهم دسه لاته ناشيرين بکات، وه چون لای بياتوه وراي گشتى به لای خویدا بگوریت، نيوه له گهل نهمه دا چون مامله دهکن؟

و/ يهکم نيمه لهگهل تيوري ميکافيلی (الغاية تبرر الوسيلة) نين، دوهم ناوهرؤك چنده گرنه به لام نيمهوه نهم ميکانيزمهش كه ناوهرؤكهكهى پى جيبه جى دهكيت نهمه گرنه. ومكو قاعدهيهكى شهرعى دهليت (مايبنى على الفاسدي فهو فاسد). نهنجا نهخلاقى نيسلامى نيمه كار يگرى ههيه له سر سياسه تمان، نيمه ناتوانين ههمو شتهكانى بهرانبهرمان (حذف) بکين. له بهر نهم ياساى نيمه وايه كه به شته باشهكانى خهلك بلين باش، وه رمخنهش له شته خراپهكانى بگرين. ريخنهكشمان بو چاك كردنه، نهك بو ليدان و(تشهير) پيكردن. جياوازي نيمه نهمه (لانبخس الناس اشياهم)، كاتيك كه خهلكيك با نياري نيمه بن و نيمه شيان خوش نويت كاتيك كه شتيكى باش نهنجا دهمدين دست خوشيان لى دهكين. وه نهگه پيوست بکات يارمه تيان دهمدين، بو؟ چونكه مبهست لای نيمه نهنجا داني كار هوانهكهيه. نهم مبهست نيه كه نيمه خومان نهنجامى بهدين. نيمه دهلين ههركهسيك كاريكى باش نهنجا بدات نيمه پيوسته پشتگيرى لى بکين. وه له ههركوئيش كاريكى خراپمان بينى، بيگومان رمخنهى لى دهگرين و كار دهكين بو چاك كردنى وراستكردهوهى.

پ/۵ / كاتيك كه نهخلاقى سياسى بهكار دههينن له كاري سياسيتان، به لام ركابهركانتان رهچاوى نهم نهخلاقه سياسيه ناکهن، نيوه چ خهساريك دهکن؟

و/ نيمه هيج خهساريك ناکهن، با بهشيوهيهكى كاتيش جهماوهر مکهمان كه بکهنهوه، نيمه پيمان وايه نهخلاقى سياسى زور گرنه دهبيت بيگيرينهوه. نيمه له كومه لگادا دهزين، دهبيت تاكهكانى كومه لگاکهمان تهندروست بن. بهرانبهر به يهك ههلهپرست نهن، بهرانبهر به يهك دروزن نهن، بهرانبهر به يهك خائن نهن. دهبيت نيمه ههول بدين نهم رهوشته جوانانه بگيرينهوه. نهخلاق دهبيت له ههمو شتيكدا ههبيت، تهناهت له نابوردا. دهتوانيت بلين جياوازي نيسلامى و غيره نيسلامى ليره دايان، بو نمونه كاتيك له قورئاندا باس له پيدانى قهرز دهكات، وه كاتيك كه پيوستى كرد نهم قهرزه له كاتى خویدا بدرينهوه به لام بارى قهرز كه رهك زور خراپ دهبيت قورئان دهفرمويت (فنزرة الى ميسرة) داواى پيدانى ههليكى تر دهكات، نهك به پيچوانهوه ومكو نهم له نهوروپا بانكهكان رهچاوى بارو دوخى قهرز كه رهك ناکهن و كه سهكه توشى شكستىكى گهوه دهبيت له دهر نهنجامى نهم قهرزه. كهواته نهم لايوردهيه لای نيمه. نهنجا ههميشه لايوردهيه گرنه تهنهت له بهرانبهر به تاوانباريش، قورئانيش دوپاتى لايوردين دهكاتوه (والعفو خير). نهم نهخلاقى نيسلاميه دهبيت دروست ببنهوه بو نهمه كيشهكانمان قول نهن. بو نهمه بهرانبهر رق وكينه ههلهنگریت. چونكه ناتوانين به رق وكينهوه نيمه بهرانبهر به يهكتر بزيين. دلتيك نهگه رق وكينه تيا بوو ناتوانيت بهر ههمى ههبيت، نيت نهمه له بواري سياسى بيت يان كومه لايهتى يان نابورى. نيمه باوهرمان وايه مروفايهتى يهك پارچهيه، وه نيمه ليرهوه دهست پى دهكين وه دهمانهويت نهمهش رهوشتى ههمو مروقهكان بيت. بهم شيوهش دهمانهويت نهم كار لهگهل كار هوانهكانى ترى مروفايهتى يهك بگرنهوه. نيمه دهمانهويت دوو شت دروست بکين له دنيا نهنجاش ناستى و ناسايشن. ناستى و ناسايشيش يهکم به رهوشتى جوان دروست دهين، نهنجا به متمان به يهك بوون كه نهمهش له دهر نهنجامى رهوشتهوه دپته دى. كه رهوشتمان جوان بوو شهرمان بهرانبهر به يهكتر نامينيت. كه متمانمان به يهكتر ههمو خيانت بهرانبهر به يهكتر ناکهن. كهويه ناوا ناستى دروست دهبيت، نهمه ناسايش دروست دهكات. چونكه له يهكتر دنيا دهين، كه دنياش بووين ناترسين. وه رق وكينهمان بو يهكتر نابيت چونكه بهرانبهر به يهكتر

ناشتين. كاتيك كه بهر انبهر به يهك ناشت بين نهفكارمان بو درووست دهبيت له كمش وههواي تهندر ووستدا دهتوانين بدير بكهينهوه. هر كهسيكيش له كمش وههواي ئازاددا بيري كردموه بهر همهي جوان وئهفكاري بهر هم دههينيت.

پ6/ ئيوه كه دهتانهويت نهخلاقي سياسيان ئاوا بيت، بهلام ئايا له بهر ئهوهي كه يهكگرتوو ناشتي خوازه وه نهرم ونيانه خهلكي تر ئيستغلالي ئهه دهكات به شتيازكي سلهبي وه شهر انگيزه بهر انبهر، ئهوتته زياتر له جاريك مهقهر تان دهسوتين، وه مافتان دهخون، ئيوه چون مامله دهكهن لهم بارهوه؟

و/ ئيمه كوئل نادهين. بهرهمو لهو وهستانهي لوقماني كهكيم دهكهن كه وانهي زور گهره يتيابه كه به تو له كوملگا دهبيت پيشهنگيكي به هيز بيت، وه خهلك فيري شتي جوان بكهيت. خهلك: 'كورهمهي دهبيت لهوانهيه له دهرنجامي نهزائين وستهموه فيري زور شتيكي خراب بووبن ومكو نهزائين ونهفامي وزولم وزور وستهم ودزي وكوشتن وخيانت ودرؤكردن وزور شتي تري خراب. كاتيكيش دهتويت كه خهلك لهم رهوشته خراپانه دوور خهيتوه پيوستت به نارامگري ههيه، چونكه رووبه رووي زور شت دهبيتوه كاتيك دهتويت لهو خراپانه خهلك دوورخهيتوه، وه دهبيت خو راگر بيت (وصبر على ما أصابك). ئيمهش له پيناو چهسپاندي ئهه بهها بالايهه كوئل نادهين. سهه جار ئازارمان بدن هر دووبارهي داكوكي كردن لهم رهوشته جوانانه دهكهنهوه. چونكه پيمان وايه كه ريگاي سهه كهوتن ئهههيه. ئهه سهه كهوتنهش كه بريتيه له رهوشتي جوان كه ناشتي وئارامي بهرهم دههينيت هم بو كوملگاكهمان هم بو جيهانيش هم بو خومان لاي خوا له دوا روژدا باشه. كهواته بهم شيوهيه هر بهردوام دهبين و، مهنهجهيتيش ناگورين.

پ7/ لهوانهيه ههنديك كه يهكگرتوو نهناسن وا تيبگهن كه يهكگرتوو هر ئهوتته ديموكراسي دهويت ومومارسهي دهكات بو مهيهستي خوي، به واتايهك هر ئهوتته ديموكراسيان دهويت تا دهگنه دهسهلات ئيتر نه ديموكراسيان دهويت، نه دهسهلاتيش دهههوه به خهلك. ئايا ئيوه نهگهر به ديموكراسي گهشتنه دهسهلات، ومگهر له ههلبزاردي داوتردا متمانهي خهلكتان به دست نههيناوه، ئايا دهسهلات دهههوه به عيلمانيهك كه لهو ههلبزاردهدا براوه دهبيت؟

و/ ئهوه به دست ئيمه نيه به دست خهلكه. به دست ئهوه خهلكهيه كه شهر عيهتي به دسته كه بريتيه له جهماوهري دهنگ دهر، كه ئهمرو مني به دلّه بهياني مني به دل نيه. ئيتر من شهر عيهتم نامينيت. بهو شيوهيهش هيچ دهسهلاتيكم نامينيت. ئهه گهلهش كه دهسهلاتي به ئيمه داوه ئهمرو به حيزبيكي تري دهكات، ئيتر ئيمه دهسهلاتمان نامينيت و، هيچ شهر عيهتيكمان نيه. ئهه شهر عيهتمش له لاي خواوه نهراوه تاوهكو كوملگيك به ناوي دينداريهوه داگيري بكات. ئهوه شهر عيهته گهل داويتي وگهليش وهري دهگريتهوه. دياره گهليش ئهوه شهر عيهته دهكات ئهوه كهسهي كه پابهنده به جيبهجيكردي خواستهكان و بهرژموهنديهكاني. وه هر ئهههش چاكه ونابيت بيگورين به شتي تر. تهنانت كاتيك له نويزدا خهلك رازي نهبوون كه ئيماميك نويزيان بو بكات نابيت ئهوه نويزه بكات و، گوناوه بار دهبيت بهردوام بيت، بهلكو فهبيت ئيماميهكه بهجي بيانيت. جا ئههه كه بو عيادته وايه، بو دنيا هيچ گومانيكي تيدا نيه كه وايه. ئيتر ئهوه حيزبه يان دهسهلاته كه دهنكي به دست نههيناوهتهوه شهر عيهتي نامينيت و، هرچي قسه وفرمانئ بكات دهبيتته ستهم. وه له لايهك دهكهوتته بهر نهفريني خوا، وه له دنياش دهكهوتته بهر نهفريني خهلك. ئهوه خهلكهش لئي هلهدهستن ودهري دهكهن ومكو ئهوهي كه دهبينين له بههاري ناوچهكهدا روو دهكات. وه حكومت ومكيلي خهلكه، خهلك هر كاتيك ئهوه موكلهيه به دل نهبوو لاي دهبات. لاي ئيمه دهسهلات گريهستتبه لهسهه بنههاي ومكالت له گهلهوه بو ئهوه كهسانه كه رازين حوكمرائي بكهن بو ئهوه ماوهيهو كاتهي كه لهسهري ريگ كهوتوون. وه برياري ئهه خهلكهش له بهر لهماندايه كه نوينهي خهلكه.

پ8/ (سيادة الامة قبل تطبيق الشريعة) چهكميکه نهمرو بهر گوي دهکوييت به ناييهت له لايهن ئيسلاميهکانهوه، نيوه چون لهمه تيگهشتون؟

و/ و اباشه که بليين (سيادة الشعب)، چونکه دنيا نهمرو بهيني نهموه يهکگر تووهکان بهش بهش بوو، وه ههر گهليک (سيادة) ي خوي ههيه، نيمه ي کورد نهمييت که بهداخهوه تا ئيستاش بي بهشين. کهواته گهلهکان لهسهر بنهمای سنورمهکان جياکراونهتهوه، وه ناتوانن سنورمهکان بهزينن. کهواته سهرومري گهل له دستوردا بهلای کهمهوه دهبييت دووم ماده بييت پاش ماده ي يهکهم که پيناسه ي وولاتهکيه. نهمهش شتيکي زور گرنگه که دياري بکرييت گهل سهراوه ي دياري کردني دهسهلاتهکانه. نهم سهرومريه گرنگه له پيش ههمو شتيکهويه. له ئيسلامدا نهمه وايه، وه گهل نهم دهسهلاتانه به پي پي گري بهستيک دهدايه کهسانیک بو نهمه ي لهبري خهک که مومکن نيه مليونهها خهک ههستن به هوکمراني. کهواته به شيوازي نهمرو ديموکراسيه. وه دهسهلات دهسهلاتي خهک کهس ناتوانييت به ناوي خواوه هوکمراني بکات. وه بهيعهت بهتواوتي نهم واتايه دهگيهييت، که خهک دست دهخه نه ناو دست نهم کهسه ي که دهيانوييت دهسهلاتي بدنه ي وکو چوم له بازاردا مامهله دهکن نهم دهسهلاتهشي دهدهني بهو مهرجانه ي که لهسهر ي ريک کهوتون. وه نهمهش گري بهستنهکيه که خهک ودهسهلات دهيهستن.

پ9/ کاتيک که سهيري ميژوو ئيسلامي دهکوييت دهبييت کاتيک که دهسهلاتدار دهسهلاتي وهرگرتووه بهردوام بووه تا مردن. بهلام نهمرو له ديموکراسيدا ماويهکي دياري کراو ههيه، نايه نهمه باشه يان نهم شيوازه که له ميژوودا هاتووه؟

و/ نهمه باشه، چونکه من باومرم وايه که دهسهلاتدار گهر بهيوييت به جيدي کار بکات ههر چوار سال دهتوانييت کار بکات، نهمپهري نهموانييت ههشت سال که دوو خوله. چونکه لهوه زياتر نيتر دهبيته شيوازيکي تهقليدي وله خهک دادهبرييت و، شتهکان توشي دواکهوتن دهبن. کهواته دياري کردني کات شتيکي زور باشه و، له سودي گه لانه.

پ10/ که سهيري روژهلاتي ناومر است دهکوييت دهبييت خيل و هوژ وتايه له سياستهدا روليان ههيه، نهمته که چون له عيراقدا به ناوي ديموکراسيهشموه نهم شتانه زور روليان ههيه. يهکگرتووي ئيسلامي کوردستان چون مامهله لهگهل نهم شتانه دهکات؟

و/ نيمه که باومرمان هينا به نازادي، نيتر دهبييت دههاويشتهکاني نازاديان قهبول بييت. لهم روانگهوه دياره دهبييت ريز له ههمو پيکهاتهکاني کومهلگا بگريين. ريزگرتن وپاراستني مافي هاوالاتيانيش دهبييت له دستوردا دياري کرابييت و، نهم دستورهش دهبييت جييهجي بکرييت. مافي هاوالاتييونيش يهکسانبي نيوان ههمو پيکهاتهکاني کومهلگا دهپاريزييت له گهل پاراستني ريزي سهرحهم پيکهاتهکاني کومهلگا. ماف ونازاديهکان وچندين چهکي تريش شتي گرنگن که دهبييت پاريزراو بييت بو سهرحهم هاوالاتيان. ريزگرتني پيکهاتهکاني کومهلگاش نابييت لهسهر حسابي نهم چهک ونازاديهکان بييت. چونکه نهم چهک ونازاديهکان نهگورمهکانن، نهم پيکهاتانهش قهوارهکاني نهم کومهلگايهن، نهم کومهلگايهش به ياسا دهروات بهريوه، کهسنيش نابييت له سهرو ياساوه بييت. کهواته ههمو جموجولنيک دهبييت له چوار چيوه ي نهم دستوره بييت که هاوالاتي کردووه به بهرترين بهها.

پ11/ بهلای تيورستکانهوه، لهوانه نهمتوني دي سمث باس له رههندهکاني پيروزي ناشيوناليزم دهکات. بهلای نيمهوه چي پيروزو چي پيروزي نيه؟

و/ نيمه وکو حيزبيک که به مهرجيهتي ئيسلامييهوه کار دهکين، ههست بهو دهکين که نهم شتانه به رووني له قورناندا دياره. کاتيک که خهک پرسياريان لهباري کهسي پيغهمبهروه بو دروست دهبييت قورنان يهکسره بيريان دهخاتهوه، وه دهفهر موييت نه ي پيغهمبهر پنيان بلئ (ما انا الا بشر مثکم). ههندوي جار که

كيشه هبوايه له نيوان دوو كهدا وايران دهوت نيتر نهو پيغهمبهره خوي دهرانتي خهتاي كاممانه، نهى فمرمو
 نهخير منيش مروقيكم وهكو نيوه هول مهدهن بمخلمهتتين، وه هول بدن مافهكه بدهم به نيوه وه ستهم له
 يهكيكي تر بكم. كهواته تهانتهت پيغهمبهريش خوي دوورگرتووه لهوهي كه به پيروزي بزائن، يان وابزان
 كه غيب دهرانتي. بهلام نهه نهو ناگيهنيت كه له ريزو (مكانه) ي پيغهمبهر كه بكرتيموه. بهلام نهوهي كه
 پيغهمبهر وهكو خوا وابيت، نهخير، نهه له ئيسلامدا وانيه وهكو له ئاينهكانى تردا سهيري پيغهمبهرهكانيان
 دهكن. ههندي له زانايان دهلين نهگهر هات وپيغهمبهر وهكو دادومر دادومري كرد، بهلام دواتر دادومريكي تر
 دادگهريهكي تري به باش زاني وه نهو دادگهريه ي پيغهمبهرى بو ئيسنا به باش نهزاني دهتوانيت نهو
 دادگهريه ي پيغهمبهر لابات. تهنها له گهيراندى پهيامى ئيسلامدا ناتوانيت پيچهوانه ي پيغهمبهر بكهيت. (ما
 آتاكم الرسول فخذوه) (من التبليغ) ه، كهواته نهوهي كه له ئايندا پيغهمبهر بو هيناوين دهبيت ومري گرين، به
 واتاي عهقيدهم پهرستش. بو شتهكانى تريش وايه، بهلام نهه پيچهوانه ي نهوه نيه كه ريزي كهسهكان
 وشتهكان بگيردرت. بهلام (تقديس) تهنها بو خوايه، وه بو نهو فمرمانانهيه كه پيغهمبهر لاي خواوه هيناويتى.
 وه لهسر حسابى مروقهكان شوين وكات شتهكانيش پيروزنين، ههرومكو لهو فمرمودهدا هاتووه (لهدم الكعبة
 أهون من دم امرئ مسلم). بهلام نهه نهو ناگيهنيت كه ريزي كهعه يان شوينهكان نهگيردرت. وه من
 دهبيت ريز لهم نيشتمانه ي خوم بگرم، من دهبيت نهو وولاتهم خوشبويت وخباتي بو بكم. بهلام نههش نهوه
 ناگيهنيت كه كهسيكي لاري نههوهكه ي خوم له باشي كهسهكانى نههوهكانى تر بزائم.

كوتايى

Appendix 14: Sami Atroshi, former Iraqi MP (2010-2014).

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته اخي الحبيب

لقد كان للاتحاد الإسلامي الكوردستاني دور رائد في بغداد فيما يتعلق بالشأن الكوردي ووحدة الصف
 وتقديم النماذج المميزة من النواب في البرلمان العراقي منذ بداية سقوط نظام صدام حسين عام 2003.

فمنذ مشاركة أمين عام الحزب الأستاذ صلاح الدين محمد بهاء الدين في عضوية مجلس الحكم في العراق
 اثبت للجميع وحدة كلمة الكورد في الوقت الذي اختلفت فيه وجهات نظر الأحزاب الإسلامية عن العلمانية في
 بغداد قام بأداء دوره في التعريف بالقضية الكوردية لكل الأطراف العراقية والأجنبية وان القضية هي قضية شعب
 كوردستان قبل ان تكون القضية متعلقة بجانب ديني أو اثنوي، وكذلك عمل لتهيئة الأرضية المناسبة وخاصة مع
 الأحزاب التي تنتمي الى السنة في العراق من خلال تعريفه بالقضية من وجهة نظر إسلامية معتدلة.

وبعد ذلك كان للاتحاد دور بارز في التشكيلات البرلمانية المتعددة من خلال مشاركة افراده بشكل متميز
 مع قلة عددهم، بدأ من المجلس الوطني ثم الجمعية الوطنية والمشاركة بشكل جلي في لجنة وضع الدستور، ثم
 مشاركة أعضاء الحزب في دورات مجلس النواب العراقي الثلاث لحد اليوم ويمكن إعطاء وصف مختصر لأهم
 ما قام به أفراد الحزب خلال هذه الفترة مما يخدم القضية الكوردية وكما يلي:-

1. وحدة الصف الكوردي ووحدة الكلمة، بالرغم من أن الاتحاد نزل بقائمة منفردة لانتخابات مجلس النواب العراقي في ك1 2005، إلا انه عمل على وحدة الصف مع حرمانه لكثير من الحقوق الانتخابية وبعد أن قدم تضحيات وشهداء بسبب اختياره النزول بقائمة منفردة، إلا انه فضل العمل على وحدة الصف وخاصة فيما يتعلق بالسياسات العامة للإقليم وحقوق الشعب الكوردستاني.
2. المشاركة الجادة في اللجان المختصة وتقديم مشاريع القوانين لصالح العراق ككل ولكن تخصيص جوانب مهمة للشعب الكوردي وخاصة لضحايا حلبجة والانفال سيئة الصيت.
3. العمل على ضمان حقوق الشعب الكوردي والتخصيصات المالية وخاصة للموظفين والبيشمركة والمادة 140 وغيرها من القضايا في قانون الموازنة العامة للدولة.
4. ضمان نسبة الكورد في قانون الانتخابات وخاصة للمحافظات في الإقليم من خلال تقديم مشروع مميز لتعديل قانون الانتخابات لعام 2010.
5. دور واضح لوزراء الاتحاد الإسلامي في مجلس الوزراء العراقي مع ان الاتحاد كلن يملك وزيراً واحداً في كل دورة ولكن من خلال مشاركتهم الواضحة وضمن وحدة المطالب والقضايا الكوردستانية.
6. المشاركات الجادة في المؤتمرات المحلية والدولية والحرص على تقديم أفضل المشاركات وبيان حقوق الإقليم وشعبه الدستورية.
7. الدور المميز للبرلمانيين من اعضاء الحزب في الاعلام العراقي عامة والاعلام الكوردي خاصة.

أرجو أن يكون هذا الجواب المختصر يفي بالغرض أخي الحبيب وأعتذر عن التأخير في ارساله لكم.

Appendix 15: Khalil Ibrahim, (2012-2016) Head of the relationship Dossier of the KIU to the Kurdish affairs in northern and western Kurdistan, and member of the Executive Body of KIU (Political Bureau). (July 2016 – to date), Skype interview, 12th July 2016.

چاوپيکهوتن له ریڭای سکایپهوه لهگه‌ل خلیل ابراهیم

له 2012 تا 2016: بهرپرسی دۆسیه‌ی په‌یوه‌ندییه‌کان لهگه‌ل کوردانی باکور وپۆژناوا. ئه‌ندامی ده‌سته‌ی کارگێری مه‌کتبه‌ی سیاسی و بهرپرسی دۆسیه‌ی په‌یوه‌ندییه‌کان.

له کۆنگره‌ی چه‌وته‌وه (2016): ئه‌ندامی ده‌سته‌ی کارگێری ئه‌نجومه‌نی جێبه‌جێکردن (مه‌کتبه‌ی سیاسی).

به‌رواری چاوپيکهوتن: 2016/07/12

پ1/ رۆلی په‌گرتوو چی بوو له پڕۆسه‌ی ناشتی نیوان پارت کرێکارانی کوردستان و تورکیا؟

په‌گرتوو ئیسلامی کوردستان، و هه‌و هه‌زیکی ئیسلامی میانهره‌و، ئیمانی هه‌یه به پرسی میله‌ته‌ی خۆی و هه‌و پرسی نه‌ته‌وه‌یی و نیشتمانی. وه پرسی خۆی به پرسیکی (عادل) و راست و ره‌وا ده‌زانیت. هه‌ر بۆیه په‌یوه‌ندی‌کانمان سیاسه‌تیکی کراوه‌ی هه‌یه لهگه‌ل هه‌ر که‌سێک و، هه‌ر لایه‌نێک، چ ده‌ولت بێت یان هه‌زیکی سیاسی بێت. روانگه‌ و ئاراسته‌ی په‌یوه‌ندی‌کانمان به‌ره‌و ئه‌وه‌یه که خزمه‌ت به کێشه‌که‌مان بکات و هه‌و پرسیکی له

عیراق و تورکیا و ئیران و سوریا. وه پرسى ئیمه‌ی کورد، پرسىكى ئیسلامی و رۆژ هه‌لاتی ناوه‌راستی و ناوچه‌ییشه به‌گشتی. له‌بهر ئه‌وه ئیمه له‌گه‌ڵ تورکیا هه‌ر له‌ نه‌وه‌ده‌کانه‌وه په‌یوه‌ندیمان هه‌بووه، به‌ تایه‌ت له‌گه‌ڵ هه‌یز و لایه‌نی ئیسلامیه‌کان، که وورده وورده په‌ش ده‌کوتن تا گه‌شتنه‌ ده‌سه‌لات. هه‌ر له‌ کاتی خواله‌خۆشبوو (نجم الدین اربکان) هه‌وه په‌یوه‌ندیمان هه‌بووه. چه‌ندین جار ئیمه به‌شداربووین له‌ فیستیقایلی فه‌تخی قوسته‌نتینه‌یه، ته‌نانه‌ت لیژنه‌یه‌کی سیاسی دروستکرا جه‌نابی م. صلاح الدین ئه‌مینه‌داری گه‌شتی ئه‌ندام بوو له‌ لیژنه‌یه. هه‌ر له‌وه‌ کاته‌وه باسی پرسى چاره‌سه‌ری کیشه‌ی کورده‌مان کردووه. واته‌ چۆن چاره‌سه‌ر بکریته، وه‌ چۆن گه‌رنه‌که که له‌سه‌ر ده‌ستی ئیسلامیه‌کان چاره‌سه‌ر بکریته. ئیمه هه‌ر له‌وه‌ کاته‌وه تا پارتی داد و گه‌شه‌ پێدان هاته‌ سه‌ر ده‌سه‌لات، به‌رده‌وام باسی پرسى کورده‌مان کردووه. پرسى کورده‌مان له‌ چه‌ند (منطلق) ئیکه‌وه باس ده‌کرد: وه‌کو کیشه‌یه‌کی سیاسی چه‌ند زه‌رووره که چاره‌سه‌ر بکریته. چه‌ند گه‌رنه‌که (اهتمام) به‌ ناوچه‌ کورده‌یه‌کان بدریته و، پرۆژه‌ی به‌ر مه‌هه‌پنه‌ان و هه‌ندیک پرۆژه‌ی گه‌وره له‌وه‌ ناوچه‌ نه‌نجام بدریته به‌ مه‌هه‌ستی گه‌رنه‌کی دان به‌وه‌ ناوچه‌ به‌ مه‌هه‌ستی خۆشگوزرانی خه‌لکی ناوچه‌ کورده‌یه‌کان. وه‌ له‌ هه‌موو بواره‌ کۆمه‌لایه‌تی و ئابوری و سیاسیه‌یه‌کان گه‌رنه‌که لا له‌ ناوچه‌ کورده‌یه‌کان بکریته‌وه. باسی میژوو مان ده‌کرد له‌گه‌ڵیان، که چۆن هه‌رکاتیک کورد و تورک پیکه‌وه بوون؛ هه‌ر له‌کاتی زه‌نجیه‌کانه‌وه بگه‌ره تا سه‌له‌جوقیه‌یه‌کان و تا ئه‌یه‌یه‌یه‌کان و تا عوسمانیه‌یه‌کان، وه‌کو دوو نه‌ته‌وه‌ی سه‌ره‌کی له‌م ناوچه‌یه هه‌ر کاتیک پیکه‌وه کاریان کردووه و له‌ئاشتی دا بوون و به‌ک ووتار بوون و له‌ یه‌ک قه‌واره‌دا کاریان کردووه، وه‌ پیکه‌وه خۆیان به‌ خاوه‌نی زانیینت، هه‌ر دوو له‌ بوونه‌ته هه‌یزیکه‌ گه‌وره و کاریگه‌ر له‌ ناوچه‌که. پاشان دواى روخانی ده‌ولته‌ی عوسمانی و، هاته‌ سه‌رکاری که‌ماليه‌یه‌کان ئه‌وه جۆره رۆشنبیره‌یه‌یان، شته‌کان گۆردران.

ئیمه به‌رده‌وام باسی شوپنه‌واره‌ی نه‌رینی ئه‌وه سیاسه‌ته‌مان ده‌کرد. له‌وه‌لوه‌ش زۆر هانی پارتی کرێکارانمان ده‌دا که هه‌ر چه‌نده خۆین بریژریته، وه هه‌ر چه‌ند چه‌ک به‌کار به‌یئریته، چاره‌سه‌ر هه‌ر گه‌فتوگۆیه، چونکه کیشه‌که کیشه‌یه‌کی سیاسیه نه‌ک (امنی) تا به‌وه شیه‌یه چاره‌سه‌ر بکریته. ئیمه هانی هه‌ر دوو لایمان ده‌دا بۆ چاره‌سه‌ر کردنی پرسى کورد. دياره به‌رده‌وام هانماندان و قسه‌مان بۆ کردوون و شتمان نووسیه و چاوپیکه‌وتمان له‌گه‌ڵ هه‌ر دوو لادا نه‌نجام داوه تا کار گه‌شته ئه‌وه‌ی پرۆسه‌ی ئاشتی ده‌ستی پیکرد. دياره که‌سانی تریش رۆلیان هه‌بووه له‌م پیناوه‌دا، به‌لام ئیمه وه‌کو یه‌که‌گرتوو راسته‌وخۆ چۆنه‌ مالى په‌که‌که و قسه‌ی ئه‌وانمان برد بۆ نه‌تقهره و، پاشان چۆنه‌ مالى نه‌که‌په وه‌کو پارتی ده‌سه‌لاتدار و، وه‌کو حه‌یز بیه‌ له‌گه‌ڵ سه‌رکرده‌کانیاندا راسته‌وخۆ قسه‌مان کرد. وه قسه‌ی هه‌ر دوو لایمان بۆ یه‌کتر ده‌برد. به‌م شیه‌یه‌یه‌ش هه‌ر دوو لایمان هانده‌دا و، ئیمه‌ش پینشیاى خۆمان پینشکه‌ش ده‌کردن. ئه‌گه‌ر چی ئیستا پرۆسه‌که به‌داخه‌وه وه‌ستاه و نه‌ما. ئیمه له‌ماوه‌ی ئه‌وه دوو سال و نیو تا سه‌ی سه‌له‌ی پرۆسه‌که به‌رده‌وام بووین له‌گه‌ڵیان. وه به‌رده‌وام قسه‌ی خه‌یرمان ده‌کرد و پینشگیری ئه‌وه پرۆسه‌یه‌مان ده‌کرد. وه هه‌ولمان ده‌دا که کورد له‌ باکور له‌ ئاستیکه‌ میلی له‌گه‌ڵ پرۆسه‌که‌دا بن به‌سه‌ر جه‌م هه‌یز و لایه‌ن و ریکه‌راوه‌کانیان هه‌وه، حه‌زمان ده‌کرد که ئاماده‌ی کۆمه‌لانی خه‌لک هه‌بیت بۆ ئه‌وه پرۆسه‌یه بۆ ئه‌وه‌ی فشار به‌خه‌رتنه سه‌ر لایه‌نه‌کان و ده‌ولته‌یه‌ش بۆ ئه‌وه‌ی بینه‌ده‌م داخوایه‌که‌وه، که داخوایه‌کی هه‌موو گه‌له. وه ته‌نها کیشه‌یه‌که نیه له‌ نیوان په‌که‌که و ده‌ولته‌ت. چونکه له‌ راستیدا ئه‌مه کیشه‌ی میلیه‌تیکه و ناییت قه‌تیس بکریته له‌ چوارچه‌وه‌ی هه‌یزیکه‌ی سیاسی دا، چونکه ئه‌مه پرسىکی ره‌وايه. ئیمه هه‌ولمان دا هه‌تا نوینه‌ری قه‌ندبیلیش به‌شدار بیت راسته‌وخۆ، لایه‌نی تورکیاش قه‌بولی کرد. به‌لام دياره هه‌ندێ مه‌رج هه‌بوو، ئه‌وه بوو دوايه هه‌ده‌په هاته سه‌ر خه‌ت و له‌گه‌ڵ به‌ریز عبده‌الله ئۆجه‌لان گه‌فتوگۆ ده‌ستی پیکرد. وه ئیمه ته‌نانه‌ت له‌ سه‌لی ۲۰۰۷ کاتیک که کیشه‌ که‌وته نیوان هه‌ریم و تورکیا، تا کار گه‌شته ئه‌وه‌ی که تورکیا هه‌ره‌شه‌ی له‌ هه‌ریم ده‌کرد و هه‌یزیشی هه‌نایه سه‌ر سنور، ئه‌وه‌کاته له‌سه‌ر ده‌ستی جه‌نابی مامۆستا صلاح الدین ئه‌مینه‌داری گه‌شتی ئه‌وه گه‌ریه کرایه‌وه. دواى ئه‌وه نیتر په‌یوه‌ندیه‌کانی هه‌ریم له‌گه‌ڵ تورکیا به‌ره‌و باشی چوو، وه ئه‌وه پینشکه‌وته‌ی به‌ خۆیه‌وه بینه‌ تا ئیستا. وه ئیمه له‌ پرۆسه‌ی ئاشتی چه‌ندین جار به‌ نه‌ینی هاتوچۆمان کردوه له‌ نیوان په‌که‌په و تورکیا. به‌لام به‌ شیه‌یه‌یه‌کی ئاشکرا له‌ ۲۰۱۳ جه‌نابی مامۆستا مه‌جد فرج ئه‌مینه‌داری گه‌شتی و به‌نده پیکه‌وه چۆنه‌ قه‌ندیل. من پینشتر چه‌ند جار چوومه‌ته قه‌ندیل، وه پاشان چۆنه‌ته نه‌تقهره، ئه‌نجا جاریکی تر چۆنه‌ته قه‌ندیل، وه له‌ لایه‌ن هه‌ر دوو لاره سوپاسی یه‌که‌گرتوو کراوه، وه له‌ کۆنگره‌ی رۆژنامه نووسیدا صلاح الدین ده‌میرتاش و وه‌فدی هاوملی له‌ سه‌لیمانی باسی رۆلی یه‌که‌گرتوو ئیسلامی کورده‌ستانیان کرد. له‌وه‌ پیناوه‌دا ئیستاش ئه‌گه‌ر چی دۆخه‌که خراپه، به‌لام ئه‌گه‌ر هه‌ر کاتیک ده‌رفه‌ت هه‌بیت قسه‌ی خه‌یر ده‌که‌ین. ئیمه ئه‌گه‌ر چی هه‌ر له‌ سه‌ره‌تاوه تورکه‌کان دانیان نه‌ده‌نا به‌ پرسىک له‌ تورکیا که پنی بوتریته پرسى کورد، که ئه‌وه‌یش درێژه‌ی بیه‌ر و بۆچوون و (ثقافة) کمالیزم بوو، که سه‌ر جه‌م تورکه‌کان کاریگه‌ر بوون پنی به‌ ئیسلامی و غه‌یری ئیسلامی. ئیمه هه‌ولیکه‌ی زۆرمان دا تا بگه‌نه ئه‌وه قه‌ناعه‌ته

که ئەم پرسە پرسینی ئیسلامیە، وە پرسینی ئینسانییە، وە پرسینی ولاتی تورکیایە، وە پرسینی میللەتییە که پینی دەوتریت کورد و میلۆنان کەسەن، وە پرسینی رۆژەلانی ناوەراستە. وە هیچ جۆرە سەقامگیری و گەشە پیدان و دیموکراسیەتیک لە تورکیا دروست نابیت بە بێ چارەسە کردنی پرسە کورد. ئێمە زۆر کارمان لەسەر عەقڵی ئیسلامی تورکی کردوو، تا گەشتوتە ئەو دەرەنجامە. ئیستاش که پرۆسە ناستی وەستاو، هەندیک هەولمان دا لەگەڵ هەردوو لایەن، بە داخووە نامادەنین.

پ/ ۲ / رۆلی یەکگرتوو چیه له رۆژناوای کوردستا؟

پاش بەرپا بوونی شۆرشێ سوریا دژی رژیمی دکتاتۆری ئەسەد، ئێمە لەگەڵ هیز و لایەنە کوردییەکانی رۆژناو بە هەردوو لایەن که ئەمرۆ لایەنێک پینی دەوتریت ئەنەکەسە که ژمارەیک هیز و لایەنی بێ چەک دەگریته خو، که بریتییە لەو پارتە سیاسیە کوردیانە که لە کۆنەو خەبات دەکەن، وە ژمارەیان ۱۲ پارتی سیاسیە. وە ئەم ئەنجومەنە زیاتر پەيوەندییان گەرم و گۆرە لەگەڵ هەریکی کوردستان. ئێمە پەيوەندی بەهیزمان هەیه لەگەڵ ئەو پارتانە، چ وەک پارتی سیاسی، چ وەک ئەنجومەنەکەش. ئەنجومەنێکی تریش هەیه بە ناوی تەقەدەم که زیاتر روانگە پارتی کرێکاری کوردستانی بەسەر وە زالە. ئەم ئەنجومەنە بریتییە لە پارتی یەکییتی دیموکرات (پەیهەد) و یەکیەکانی پاراستنی گەل (پەیهەگە) و یەکیەکانی پاراستنی ژن (پەیهەژە)، ئێمە لەگەڵ ئەمانیش پەيوەندییمان هەیه. دیارە ئێمە بە هەردوو لایەن راگەیاندا که ئێمە لەگەڵ شۆرشین. کورد دەبیت (مصدقیە) نیشتمانی هەبیت.

ئێمە سێ پەيوەرمان هەیه بۆ روانگەیکە دروستی کورد لە سوریا: یەکەم، ئایا خۆیان چەند سەر بەخۆن؟ ئێمە لەگەڵ ئەو نین که کێشە پارچەکانی تر بهینرینە ئەو. بە واتایەک لایەنێک سەر بە پارتی دیموکراتی کوردستان و لایەنێک سەر بە یەکییتی نیشتمانی کوردستان و لایەنێک سەر بە پارتی کرێکاری کوردستان بێت. چونکه ئەمانە مەملاتی سیاسی خۆیان دەبەنە رۆژناو. ئیستا دەر فەتییکی میژوووی لە رۆژناو دروست بوو، ئێمە لەگەڵ ئەوین که خۆیان سەر بەخۆ بن. وە کوردانی بەشەکانی تری کوردستان و هیز و لایەنەکانیان پشتگیری ئەوان بکەن. بۆ ئەوەی خۆیان خاوەنی بریاری سیاسی خۆیان بن. پەيوەری دووم: ئایا هەلوێستیان بەرانبەر ئەم شۆرشە سوریا و بەرەو ئۆپۆزیسیونی دژی ئەسەد چیبە؟ ئێمە لەگەڵ ئەو بووین که ئەمانە تاییەتمەندی خۆیان لەبەر چاوی بگرن، مەرجی خۆیان هەبیت، بەلام هەلوێستیان پشتگیری ئەم شۆرشە بێت. سێیەم: هەلوێستیان لە رژیمی ئەسەد. بۆ ئەوەی وینەیان بەو شێوێهە نەگێردریت که ئەمانە لەگەڵ ئەم رژیمەن، چونکه ئەم رژیمە (مصدقیە) نەماو، (وطنیە) نەماو، (شرعیە) نەماو، وە حیزبێکی دکتاتۆرە. ئێمە لەسەر ئەو سێ پەيوەرە ئیشتان لەگەڵیان کردو.

ئێمە هەولمان دا پەيوەندییان لەگەڵ ئۆپۆزیسیونی عەرەبی دروست بکەن. وە بووینە هۆی دروستبوونی پەيوەندی نیوان ئەنەکەسە و هیز و لایەنی عەرەبی ئۆپۆزیسیون. وە رۆلمان هەبوو بۆ ئەوەی ئەوان بچنە ناو ئینتلافی ئۆپۆزیسیونی سوریا، که سەرەنجام گەشتتە نیمزاکردن. ئێمە پەيوەندییمان هەبوو بە چەند لایەنێکی نیو ئۆپۆزیسیونی سوریا، تەنانت چاودیری گشتی بریانی موسلمان هاتە کوردستان. ئێمە رۆلمان هەبوو وە هەولمان دا که بانگهێشتی فەرمی بکەن لە لایەن سەرۆکی هەریەمە. سەرەنجام پەيوەندییان لە کوردستان و تورکیا دروست بوو. وە لە نیوان تەقەدەم و ئۆپۆزیسیونیش لە قاهیرە پەيوەندییەکە دروست بوو. لە هەموو ئەمانە رۆلمان هەبوو. ئێمە هەم لە ریگای لایەنە بێ چەکەکانی نیو ئۆپۆزیسیونی سوریا و هەم لە ریگای بریانیەو هەولماندا که پەيوەندی هەبیت لە نیوان ئۆپۆزیسیون و لایەنە کوردییەکانی رۆژناو. وە ئێمە لەگەڵ لایەنی توندو تیز پەيوەندییمان نیه و، پەيوەندییان لەگەڵ دروست ناکەین. بەلام لەگەڵ لایەنە میانەرمەکانی نیو ئۆپۆزیسیونی سوریا پەيوەندییمان هەبوو و، رۆلیمان هەبوو بۆ ئەوەی پەيوەندییان لەگەڵ هەردوو ئەنجومەنی کوردی رۆژناو باش بێت. وە هەولیماندا که ئەو لایەنە بچنە ناو ئینتلافی ئۆپۆزیسیونی سوریا.

وە بۆ پەيوەندی نیوان هەردوو ئەنجومەنەکە رۆژناو ریگەوتنی هەولێر یەک و هەولێر دوو و دەهۆک هەیه. لەوبارەشەو، ئێمە بەردەوام هەولمان لەگەڵ داوون بۆ ئەوەی پابەند بن بەو ریگەوتنەو، وە هانمانداون، وە

دوابه‌وای هه‌ریه‌کیک له‌و ریکه‌وتننه‌سه‌ردانمان کردوون به‌مه‌به‌ستی هاندانیان بۆ دروست بوونی متمانه له‌ نیوانیان. ئی‌مه‌ په‌یوه‌ندیان له‌گه‌ل هه‌موویان باشه‌. ئه‌وانیش متمانه‌یان به‌هه‌له‌کانی یه‌ک‌گرتوو هه‌یه‌، ده‌ش‌زان د‌لس‌وزانه‌ و‌خه‌مخ‌ورانه‌هه‌له‌کان له‌گه‌ل ده‌دین. ئی‌مه‌ ر‌امان و‌ایه‌ که‌ هه‌یچ کام له‌ ل‌ایه‌نانه‌ نه‌ چنه‌ ناو جه‌مه‌سه‌ری ناوچه‌گه‌ریه‌یه‌، به‌له‌کو به‌په‌یوستی ده‌زانین که‌ یه‌ک هه‌له‌ویست بن و، خاوه‌ن یه‌ک گوتار و‌یه‌ک ستراتیژ بن بۆ خزمه‌تی په‌رسی کورد له‌ ر‌ۆژ‌ئاوا، و‌ه‌ نه‌چنه‌ ناو هه‌یچ جه‌مه‌سه‌ریک چ ناوچه‌یی بی‌ت، چ نه‌یوه‌له‌تی. ئی‌مه‌ و‌ه‌کو کورد ده‌بی‌ت خ‌ۆمان بۆ خ‌ۆمان له‌ خه‌می کیشه‌که‌ماند‌ابین، و‌ه‌ مامه‌له‌ له‌گه‌ل هه‌موو ل‌ایه‌نه‌کاندا بکه‌ین به‌ جه‌مه‌سه‌ریه‌کانیشه‌وه‌ به‌و ش‌یوه‌یه‌ی که‌ خزمه‌ت به‌ نه‌ته‌وه‌که‌مان ده‌کات و، ها له‌ خزمه‌ت ناینده‌ی گه‌له‌که‌مان دا. ئی‌مه‌ و‌ه‌کو یه‌ک‌گرتوو له‌ گه‌ل ئه‌و جه‌مه‌سه‌ریه‌کانی نین و، له‌ گه‌ل سه‌نگه‌ری له‌ یه‌ک‌تر گرتندا نین. ئی‌مه‌ ده‌بی‌ت ده‌رس له‌ می‌ژوو و‌ه‌ر‌گه‌رین، و‌ه‌ نه‌ چینه‌ نه‌یو م‌لم‌لانیه‌کی و‌ه‌کو سه‌فه‌وی و‌ع‌وسمانی و، ئی‌مه‌ ببینه‌ سوته‌مه‌نی شه‌ر‌م‌کان. ئی‌مه‌ ناب‌یت ببینه‌ دار ده‌ست بۆ ئه‌و ل‌ایه‌نانه‌و سوته‌مه‌نی شه‌ر‌م‌کانیان. کورد مافی نه‌ته‌وه‌یی خ‌ۆی هه‌یه‌، و‌ه‌ ئه‌مه‌ر‌ۆ هه‌یژیکه‌ دینامیکه‌یه‌ له‌ ناوچه‌که‌، و‌ه‌ هه‌یژیکه‌ حه‌س‌ابی بۆ ده‌کر‌یت. کوردستانیش گه‌ریه‌کیه‌کی جیۆسیاسی ز‌ۆری هه‌یه‌ له‌ چاوی ده‌وله‌تان، له‌به‌ر ئه‌وه‌ کورد ده‌بی‌ت ناو م‌الی خ‌ۆی په‌پاریز‌یت، و‌ه‌ ده‌بی‌ت ل‌ایه‌نیکی به‌ هه‌یژ بی‌ت، و‌ه‌ هه‌یژیکه‌ د‌پ‌ل‌ۆم‌اسی و‌سه‌ریازی و‌ئاب‌وری گه‌ریه‌کی بی‌ت و، هه‌موومان له‌ بو‌ارانه‌دا کار بکه‌ین. و‌ه‌ خاوه‌نی یه‌ک هه‌له‌ویست و‌یه‌ک سیاسه‌ت بین به‌ له‌ به‌ر‌چاوه‌گرتنی تابه‌ته‌مه‌ندی هه‌ر پارچه‌یه‌ک. و‌ه‌ ئی‌مه‌ به‌ یه‌کسانی په‌یوه‌ندیان له‌گه‌ل هه‌موو ل‌ایه‌نه‌کانی ر‌ۆژ‌ئاوا هه‌یه‌.

ئی‌مه‌ هه‌ر له‌ سه‌ره‌تاه‌وه‌ له‌ سه‌ر چه‌ند ته‌مه‌ریک ئی‌شمان کردوه‌ له‌ ر‌ۆژ‌ئاوای کوردستان. ته‌مه‌ری سیاسی که‌ باس‌مان کرد. ئه‌نجا ته‌مه‌ری یارمه‌تیدان و‌کو‌مه‌کی. ل‌یره‌ هه‌موو ر‌یک‌خه‌سته‌که‌مان و‌مید‌ی‌مان و‌ر‌یک‌خراوه‌که‌مان و، هه‌موو د‌ۆست‌انیشمان هانداه‌وه‌ بۆ ئه‌وه‌ی یارمه‌تی ئاواره‌کانی ر‌ۆژ‌ئاوا و‌سوریا بده‌ن که‌ گه‌له‌ک ز‌ۆرن له‌ هه‌ریم. و‌ه‌ له‌ ده‌ر‌وه‌ی هه‌ریمیش یارمه‌تیمان داو‌ن. و‌ه‌ ر‌اب‌ی‌طه‌ی ئی‌سلامی که‌ ر‌یک‌خراوه‌کی خه‌ی‌خ‌وازی نزی‌ک له‌ یه‌ک‌گرتوو یارمه‌تی ر‌ۆژ‌ئاوای داوه‌، به‌ تابه‌ت یارمه‌تی قوتابخانه‌کانیان. ته‌نانه‌ت له‌ گونده‌کانی چ‌ی‌ای کوردان له‌ نزی‌ک ده‌ریا و‌نزی‌کی ل‌ا‌ذ‌قیه‌ یارمه‌تی ئی‌مه‌ گه‌ش‌ت‌وته‌ خه‌له‌که‌کی، به‌ تابه‌ت قوتابخانه‌کانیان. و‌ه‌ به‌ تابه‌ت بۆ که‌مه‌په‌کان، چ و‌ه‌کو یارمه‌تی دارایی و، چ و‌ه‌کو یارمه‌تی تر ز‌ۆر یارمه‌تیمان داو‌ن. هه‌روه‌ها له‌ بواری خو‌ب‌ب‌ندن، یارمه‌تی قوتابخانه‌که‌مان داو‌ن، چ له‌ هه‌ریمی کوردستان، یان له‌ تورکیا. که‌واته‌ له‌ س‌ی‌ بواری سیاسی خو‌ب‌ب‌ندن و‌یارمه‌تی دانی ئاواره‌کان ئی‌مه‌ یارمه‌تی برا‌کانی ر‌ۆژ‌ئاوامان داوه‌.

پ/٣/ له‌ پاش رووخانی رژی‌می به‌عه‌سه‌وه‌ له‌ به‌غدا تا هه‌نووه‌که‌ رۆلی یه‌ک‌گرتوو چی بووه‌؟

په‌ش رووخانی رژی‌م، یه‌ک‌گرتوو به‌ش‌دار بووه‌ له‌ هه‌موو دانیشه‌ته‌کانی ئۆپ‌ۆزسیۆن، چ له‌ نیویۆرک، چ له‌ له‌ندن، و‌ه‌ دواتریش له‌ ٢٠٠٢ له‌ هاوینه‌هه‌ماری سه‌لا‌حه‌دین له‌کوردستان. ئه‌وه‌ بوو ئه‌نجومه‌نیکی ئۆپ‌ۆزسیۆن دروست‌کرا. ئی‌مه‌ ئه‌ندامی ئه‌و ئه‌نجومه‌نه‌ش بووین. ئی‌مه‌ هه‌ر له‌ سه‌ره‌تاه‌وه‌ هه‌له‌ب‌ژارده‌ی فیدرالیان کردبوو، و‌ه‌ ووتاری کوردی یه‌ک ووتار بوو په‌ش رووخانی رژی‌م. و‌ه‌ له‌ به‌ر‌انه‌به‌ر سه‌رجه‌م ل‌ایه‌نه‌ عی‌راقیه‌کاندا یه‌ک هه‌له‌ویست بووین له‌ به‌ری داخ‌وازیه‌کانی گه‌له‌که‌مانه‌وه‌. دوا‌یی داخ‌وازیه‌که‌مان بووه‌ جو‌ره‌ ده‌ستوریک بۆ کوردستان و‌بۆ عی‌راقیش. و‌ه‌ له‌ ٢٠٠٢ له‌ کو‌یه‌ له‌ کو‌ی زیاتر له‌ ٣٠ پار‌تی سیاسی که‌ کو‌بوونه‌وه‌ به‌ ئی‌مه‌شه‌وه‌ سه‌رجه‌م داخ‌وازیه‌کانی کورد خرا‌نه‌ ناو ئه‌و ده‌ستوره‌. پاش رووخانی رژی‌میش ئی‌مه‌ ل‌ایه‌نیکی سه‌رکه‌ی بووین، و‌ه‌ جه‌نابی مام‌ۆستا صلاح ئه‌م‌ین‌داری گه‌شتی بووه‌ یه‌ک‌ک له‌ ئه‌ندامانی ئه‌نجومه‌نی حوکم له‌ کاتی بر‌ی‌مه‌ر (سی پی ئه‌ی) که‌ ئه‌وکات ئه‌نجومه‌نه‌که‌ له‌ بواری کارگه‌ری و‌سیاسی عی‌راق دا رۆلی ده‌بینی. که‌واته‌ یه‌ک‌ک له‌ په‌نج ئه‌ندامه‌ کورده‌ی ئه‌نجومه‌نی حوکم یه‌ک‌گرتوو بوو.

له‌وکاته‌وه‌ ئی‌مه‌ به‌رده‌وام بووینه‌ له‌ هه‌موو بو‌ار‌م‌کاندا. له‌ ئه‌نجومه‌نی نه‌ی‌ش‌مانی کاتی که‌ دوا‌ی ئه‌نجومه‌نی حوکم ده‌سته‌ب‌کار بوو؛ له‌و‌پ‌ش س‌ی ئه‌ندامان هه‌بوو. دواتریش له‌ ئه‌نجومه‌نی نو‌ینه‌ران به‌رده‌وام له‌ هه‌موو خ‌وله‌که‌کاندا نو‌ینه‌رمان هه‌بووه‌. ئی‌مه‌ له‌ حوکومه‌تی بر‌ی‌مه‌ر و‌ه‌زیرمان هه‌بوو، و‌ه‌ له‌ هه‌موو حوکومه‌ته‌که‌کانی تریشدا و‌ه‌زیرمان هه‌بووه‌. که‌واته‌ ئی‌مه‌ له‌ عی‌راق به‌رده‌وام به‌ش‌دار بووینه‌، و‌ه‌ هه‌له‌ویستمان یه‌ک هه‌له‌ویست بووه‌ له‌ گه‌ل سه‌رجه‌م ل‌ایه‌نه‌ کوردیه‌کان له‌ به‌غدا. و‌ه‌ به‌رده‌وامیش هه‌له‌مان داوه‌ که‌ ل‌ایه‌نه‌ کوردیه‌که‌مان یه‌ک هه‌له‌ویست بن له‌ به‌غدا، بۆ ئه‌وه‌ی له‌مه‌ر داخ‌وازیه‌که‌مان به‌هه‌یژتر بین. ئی‌مه‌ و‌ه‌کو په‌رسی کورد مافی چاره‌ی خو‌ن‌وسینمان کردوته‌ ب‌ژارده‌. و‌ه‌ هه‌له‌ی په‌ش‌خه‌ستی ده‌سته‌که‌ته‌که‌مان ده‌دین تا دروست‌کردنی ده‌وله‌تی سه‌ر‌به‌خ‌ۆی کوردستان. ئی‌مه‌ ستراتیژمان به‌ ده‌وله‌ت بوونی کورده‌. به‌لام ئه‌م به‌ ده‌وله‌ت بوونه‌ش په‌ش‌ه‌کی ده‌وی‌ت، زه‌مینه‌ خو‌ش‌کردنی ده‌وی‌ت.

ئیمه تا ئیستا له میانهای ئه ستراتیژه کار دهکهن. ئه ستراتیژه له کۆنگره ی شهس له ۲۰۱۲ پهسهند کراوه، وه له کۆنگره ی ههوتیش له ۲۰۱۶ جاریکی تر پهسهند کرایهوه.

ئهگهر چی ووتمان له پنیس رووخانی رژیم له ۲۰۰۲ دوو دهستور دانرا، یهکیکیان بو عیراق وئهویتیش بو ههیم، وه یهگرتوو بهشدار بوو له دارشنتی ئه دهستورانه که له روانگهی داخواییهکانی کوردهوه له ههیم هاتنه ئارا. وه ههردوو دهستورمهکش له پهلهمانی کوردستاندا پهسهند کران. بهلام دوا ی رووخانی رژیم، ئهوه بوو هاوکیشهکان گۆران، ئیتر لیژنهیهکی تر دروست کرا بو دارشنتی دهستوری عیراق. له لیژنهیهشدا ئیمه ههبووین. بو کوردستانیش ئیمه ئهندامی لیژنه ی نووسینی دهستوری کوردستان بووین. ئهوه بوو دهستوری عیراق له ۲۰۰۵ تهواو بوو، وه مافیکی زۆری کوردی تیا چهسپاوه ئهگهر چی تانیستاش جیهجی نهکراون. بهلام بهداخهوه ئهوه ی کوردستان تانیستاش تهواو نهبووه.

Appendix 16: The [First] Draft of Constitution and Bylaws of the KIU for the Seventh Congress:

رهشنووسی

پروگرام و پیڕهوی ناوخوی

بهگرتوی ئیسلامی کوردستان

بو کۆنگره ی ههوتهم

۲۰۱۶

(بە ناوی خواوەندی بەخشندەى مېھرەبان)

(دەسپىك)

يەكگرتوو لە ھەناوی كۆمەلگەى كوردستانىيەو ھەلقوڵاوە كە خواوەنى گەورەترين قوربانيدانى خەباتى رزگارى خوازىيە لە مېژوووى مرۇقايەتيدا، لەگەل ئەوھشدا ھىشتا گەورەترين نەتەووە گەلى ناوچەكەيە، كە قەيرانى ناسنامو بېدەولەتى ھەيە، ھەرچەندە تەواوى بىنەماكانى بوون بە دەولەتیشى نامادەيە، لەبەرتەووە ھەك تەواوكارىكى نەو گۆرەپانى رزگاربخوازىيە بوونى خووى بە زەرورەتەيكى حەتمى زانیووە تا ببیتە كارمەكتەريكى كارىگەر و بەرچاوى كۆرى خەباتى، بەلام بە شىوازىكى مەدەنيانە.

يەكگرتوو پارتىكى سياسى نىشتەمانى كوردستانىيە، تىدەكۆشيت لە پیناو چەسپاندلى بەھاكانى ئازادى و دادپەرودەرى كۆمەلایەتى لە سەر بىنەماى ھاوولاتی بوون و فراوان كردنى بازنەكانى براپەتى (وھەك: براپەتى مرۇقايەتى و ئاینى و نەتەواپەتى و نىشتەمانى و ھاوكارى و ھاوكاروانى) تازەمىنەى پىكەووە كارکردنەمان بۆ بېرەخسىتى لە پیناو كوردستانىكى سەربەخۆ و نازادو گەشەسەندوودا.

يەكگرتوو لە سەر بنچینەى پىكەووە گرێدانى چەمكەكانى: (ئىسلام، مرۇقايەتى، نەتەووە، نىشتەمان) پىكەتەو بىنەماى فەكرى و روانىنى سياسى و ستراتىژو ئامانج و رېبازو رېرەوى كارکردن و پىوھەرى ھەلسەنگادن و پىرۆگرامى پىگەياندن و نامرازو شىووە شىوازى چاكسازى و دىسپلینە رىكخراوھىيەكانى ديارى دەكات .

يەكگرتوو لەم پىرەوو پىرۆگرامەدا پىرسى گەشەدان بە پىرۆسەى سياسى لە مافى چارەى خۆنوسىنەووە بىگرە تا دەكاتە دەولەتى سەربەخۆ بۆ گەلى كوردستانى كردۆتە ئەركىكى ستراتىژى لەخەباتى خۆيدا، نەمەش ھەلگرتنى ھەنگاوىكى گەورەيە لە چوارچىوھەيكى دەستەبىزىيەووە بۆ فەزايەكى نىشتەمانى بەرفراون، ھاوكات پىرسى دىموكراسىش ھەك ئامانجىكى سياسى بالا دەبىنیت بۆ بەدەست ھىنانى ھىزىكى سەربازى نىشتەمانى دامەزرادەيى گەشەكردوو دوورلە دەست تىوھردانى حزبى، تاكاربكات بۆ پاراستنى ئاسايشى ھاوولاتی، دواجار ئەم ھىزەو ئەركەكانى بىنە سىما ديارەكانى ئامادەكارى لەپیناو بەدەھىنانى ئەوخوليا مېژووويەى گەلەكەمان، واتە دەتوانىن بلاین يەكگرتوو بەشىكى گەورە لەخەمەكانى نىشتەمان و خواستەكانى نەتەووەكەمانى لە ئەستۆ گرتوووە.

يەكگرتوو ھاوولاتی بوون، بە بناغەو تەوھەرى سەرمكى دارشتنى سىستەمى حوكەمرانى و بە سىستەماتىك كردنى كۆمەلگە دادەنیت، تاكو ھەموان ھەك يەك رۆلى سروشتى خۆيان بگيرن لە خزمەتکردنى خەلك و خاكى كوردستان، ئىتر ھاوولاتیان ھەر ئاينى و پىكەتەو ئاينزاو رەگەزو رەنگىكى سياسىان ھەبیت بە بى ھەلاویرکردن، بەمەش چوارچىووە زەمىنەى بەدەھىنانى دادپەرودەرى لە ولاتدا فەرھەم دیت، بۆيە يەكگرتوو چاكسازى سياسى لەسەر بىنەماى چاكسازى كۆمەلایەتى ھەلچنىووە، چونكە لە دىلى يەكگرتوووە (ئايندەسازى بەندە بە مرۇقسازىووە) لەم رىگەيەووە بەم شىوھە پىرۆسەى دروست بوونى سىستەمى حوكەمرانى رەشىد زامەن دەكریت،

سىستېمە ھۆكۈمرانلىقكە سۈرۈشتە ۋە ماھىيەت ۋە ئاراستىمىگە دېھوگراسى لەخۇ دەگرېت ۋە دەسلەت شېۋالزىكى لامېركىزى ۋە ياسا سەۋەبى ۋە جىكارىنەھە دەسلەتلىكە (ياسادانان ، جېئەجىكىردن ، دادومى) ۋە دەگرېت، ئىترە جىزىبە ھۆكۈمرانلىق ۋە دەستەبىزى كارىبەدەستى تۈنەي خىراپ كەلك ۋە دەگرېتلىن لە دەسلەت ئابىت.

يەككەرتوۋ پىتى ۋە يە بۇ ئەھەبى سىستېمى سىياسى پارىزراۋ بىت لە ھەم دەستىۋەردانىكى جىزى ۋە لايەندارىتى ئابدۇلۇجى ۋە رىككەۋەتنى ژىرەبەزىرى سىياسى، دەبىت ژىانى سىياسى بە دەستورى بىرېت، سەۋەبى ياسا بىجەسىپت ۋە دەسلەت بىرېتە دەسلەتلىكى دامەزراۋەبى، بۇ ئەھەبى پىرۇسەبى دىارىكىردى رۇل ۋە ئەرك ۋە مەبى كارەكتەرى سىياسى ۋە پىكەتەبى كۆمەلەبەتە ۋە ھەۋەلەتلىن ۋە پىرسى بە ئۆرگانىزەكىردى كۆمەلگەۋ سىستېمى ھۆكۈمرانلى لە ژىرەبە جەشەنە فەشار ۋە پەستانىكە نەبىت، ئىترە ئەۋ فەشار ۋە پەستانە جىزى بىت يان ئابدۇلۇجى يا سىياسى.

يەككەرتوۋ قەنەمەتى ۋە يە پىۋ ۋە ژن، ھەۋەشەن ۋە تەۋەۋەبى بەككەرتن ۋە پىۋىستە پىكەۋە شەن بىدەنە ژىر تەۋەۋەبى ئەركە نىشەمانى ۋە نەتەۋەبى ۋە ئابىنى ۋە سىياسى ۋە كۆمەلەبەتەبەكەن، ئەرك ۋە رۇل دابەشەكىردىن تەنەبە لە رەۋى تەمادەبى ۋە مەرجە ياسا ۋە لىھەتەنەكەنەبە ۋە، نەبى جىۋەۋەبى رەگەز رىگىرېن لەبەردەم ھىج مەمەسەبەك لە بۋەرە جىجەبەكەنەبە ژىاندا.

ئەم پىرەۋ ۋە پىرۇگىرامە دەستورى كار ۋە پەبەمانى نىۋەنەبە بۇ لىككەبەشەن ۋە ھارىكارى كىردن، ھەۋەك دەمەنەۋە ئاۋىنەبەك بىت بۇ بىر ۋە بۇچۈۋە ۋە ۋەقى كارمان بۇ جەمەۋە.

ئەم پىشەكى يە بەشەكى بىنەرتەبە لە پىرەۋ ۋە پىرۇگىرامى جىزىب ۋە دەبى ئەنەمان پەبەنە بىن پىبەۋە.

بهشی یه که م: (پرۆگرام)

مادهی یه که م: ناو و پیناسه :-

۱/ ناو: دوو رای جیاوازه یه: ۱/ ناو که وهك خوی، ۲/ پاشگره ئیسلامیه که لایبهین.

۱. یه کگرتووی ئیسلامیی کوردستان (الاتحاد الاسلامي الكوردستاني)

۲. یه کگرتووی نیشتمانی کوردستان (الرابطة الوطنية الكوردستانية)

۲/ پیناسه :

یه کگرتوو حزییکی ئیصلاحی نیشتمانیه، ئیده کۆشی له پینا و بونیات نانی کۆمه لگه یه کی گه شه سه ندوو ده سه لاتییکی دادپه روه ردا.

مادهی دووهم: شوین :- باشوری کوردستان - هیراق

مادهی سێیه م: نارم و ئالاو دروشم :-

نارم/ دوو دهستی لیکه له پیکراو له ناو بازنه یه کی نیمچه داخراو داییت.

ئالا/ رهنگی قاوهیی کال

دروشم / ۱. نازادی، برایهتی، دادپه روه ری

۲. نازادی، چاکسازی، دادپه روه ری

مادهی چواره م: بنه ما گشتیه کان :-

۱. بنه ماو به ما بالا ئیسلامیه نه گۆره کان ئیلهام به خشن بۆ ره هه نده کانی کاری یه کگرتوو.

۲. به ما مروییه چه سپاوه کان و نه زمون و ده سکوته مروییه کان سه رچاوه ن بۆ یواره جوړاو جوړه کانی کار له یه کگرتوو دا.

۳. گه ل سه رچاوه ی ده سه لاته کانه، فرهیی سیاسی و، ده ستاو ده ست کردنی ناشتیانه ی ده سه لاتو، جیگر کردنی سیستمی په رله مانی و چه سپاندنی بنه ما دیموکراسیه کان و نیشتمانی بوونی حکومت و مامه له کردن له گه ل جه ماوه ره له سه ره بنه ما ی مافه کانی ها ولاتی بوون، بی هیج هه ل و پرکردنی، بناغه ی ناشتی کۆمه لایه تی و سه قامگیری سیاسین.

۴. حوکمرانی راشدو دادگه رانه، خواستیکی گشتی و پیویستییه کی ژیا نه، بۆ ده سته بهر کردنی مافه سیاسی و ئابوری و کۆمه لایه تییه کانی ها ولاتیان.

۵. خزمەتکردنى مروقت و، پاراستنى ريزو كهرامەت و ئازادى و مافەكانى بى ھەلاويژكردن (دون تميمين) شەركىكى سەرەكىمانە و چارنامە جىھانىيەكانى مافەكانى مروقتيش بە دەستكەوتىكى مروقتايەتى دەزانين.
۶. گفتوگو و ديالوگى بابەتيانە زامنى چارەسەرى بنەپەتین بۆ پرسە فكري و سياسى و نايدولوژيەكان.
۷. رەتكردنەوى ھەموو چەشئەكانى تيرورو توندوتىژى و پەرگىرى لە فكري لە مەمارسەدا.
۸. كورد نەتەويەكى سەرەخويەو، ناسنامەى تايبەت بەخوي ھەيە، مافى خويەتى كە چارەنوسى خوي ديارى بكات و، ئەندامىكى سەرەخوي كۆمەلگەى نيونەتەويەى و دامەزراوەكانى بىت.
۹. گەلى كوردستان يەك خيزانە - بى جياوازي و ھەلاويژكردن - كوردستانيش نيشتمانى ھەمووانە، زىدى پىكەوہ ژيانى دانيشتوانەكەيەتى بەھەموو نەتەوہ و ئاين و ئاينزاكانەوہ، داھات و سامانە سروشتى يەكان مولكى گشتى يەو، مافى ھاوبەشى ھەموانە.
۱۰. چاكسازى بنەپەتى لە بوارى سياسى و كارگىرى و ئابورى و كاراكردى رۆلى دەسەلاتى دادەرى و پاراستنى سەرەخوي دەگاكان و، سەرەرى ياسا و شەفافيەت، گەرەنتى پيشكەوتن و خوشگوزەرانى و چارەسەرى گەندەلین.
۱۱. بەشدارى كاراي ئافرەت لە كارى سياسى و چاكسازى كۆمەلايەتى و چەسپاندنى رۆلى تەواوكارى لە ھەموو بواریەكانى ژياندا، زامنى گەشەكردن و سەرکەوتنى ھەر كۆمەلگەيەكن.
۱۲. سازكردى زەمىنەى گونجاو بۆ گەشەدان بە لىھاتنەكانى لاوان و كاراكردى بەھەر و تواناكانيان، بنەماى بەدەست ھيئەتى نايندەيەكى پيشنگ دارن بۆ ھەر نەتەوہ و گەليەك.
۱۳. ميژوى ئيسلامى و كەلەپورى نەتەوہكەمان، ئەزەمنى مروقى سنوردان بەكات و شوينى خويان، سود ليوەرگرتيان بەندە بەرەدى گونجاوى و ولەمدانەويان بۆ پيوستى و پيشھاتەكانى سەردەم، بەگويرەى تيگەيشتنى (مقاصد)يانە بۆ ئيسلام.

۱۴. بەھيژكردى رۆلى چاكسازى مزگەوت و پىگەى زانايانى ئيسلام و پاراستنى ماف و رۆلى پيشەنگيان لە ناو كۆمەلگادا، لە پيداويستى پاراستنى رەسەنايەتى كۆمەلگەكەمانن.
۱۵. ھاوسەنگى كارى پەروەردەيى و بونيات نانى تاكو خيزان و كۆمەلگە و خەبات لە پيئاو دەستەبەركردى دادپەروەرىدا زامنى سەلامەتى رەوتى چاكسازيانەى يەكگرتووە، لە ھەردوو گۆرەپانى سياسى و كۆمەلايەتى دا.
۱۶. رەتكردنەوى بالادەستى و دەمارگىرى مەزھەبى و نەتەويەى و سەپىنەوى ئاسەوارو كلتورى ديكتاتورىيەت و، بلاوكردنەوى رۆشنىيرى ديموكراسى و مافەكانى مروقت و بەيەكەوہ ژيانى ناشتيخوزانەو نەزەومەندانەى نيوان پىكەھاتەكان لە عىراقى نويدا.

تىدەكۆشۈن لە پىنچاۋ ھېنخاندەى:

۱. بوژاندنەۋە پايەندىۋونى زياترى بەھا ئىسلامىيەكان لە ژيانى تاكە كەسى و خىزان و كۆمەلگاداۋ، پەرەدان بە گيانى چاكەخۋازى و يىرى ميانپەرەۋى لە ناۋ كۆمەلگەدا.
 ۲. بەدەستورى كردنى ژيانى سىياسى لە ھەر يىمى كوردستانداۋ دەستەبەر كردنى سىستىمى لامەركەزى ئىدارى.
 ۳. پاراستنى دەستكەوت و مافەدەستورىيەكان، بەدەيھىنخانى سەرچەم مافەكانى گەلى كوردستان، ھەولدان بۇ بەدەستەيھىنخانى پشتىۋونى كۆمەلگاي نىۋو دەۋلەتى و گەلانى مۇسلمان و ناۋچەكەۋ ناۋەندە جوۋاۋ جوۋەكان بۇ سەر بەخۋىي وەك مافىكى سىروشتى ھەرنەتەۋەيەك.
 ۴. گىپرانەۋەى ناۋچە كوردستانىيەكانى دەرەۋەى ھەر يىم بۇ سەر ھەر يىمى كوردستان و چەسپاندنى سنورى ھەر يىمى كوردستان.
 ۵. دامەزاندنى پەيوەندىيەكى ھاۋسەنگ لە نىۋان گەلى كوردستان و گەلانى دراۋسى و ناۋچەكە، بۇ بەدەيھىنخانى دادپەرۋەرى و ناشتى و سەقامگىرى سىياسى نىۋانمان و دۆزىنەۋەى فۇرمى نوۋى بەيەكەۋە ژيان لەسەر بىنەماى رىزو بەرژەۋەندى ھاۋبەش.
 ۶. پشتىگىرى كردنى مافە نەتەۋەيىيەكانى گەلى كورد لە پارچەكانى تىرى كوردستان، لە پىنچاۋ بەدەستەيھىنخانى مافەكانىيان و چارەسەرى كىشەكانىيان بەرپىكارى ناشتى و دىموكراسى.
 ۷. ھاۋشان لەگەل گرنگىدان بە دۆزى رەۋاى گەلى كورد، پشتىگىرى كردنى مافە سىياسى و مەدەنى و نەتەۋەيىيەتى و ئاينىيەكانى نەتەۋەى توركمان و كىلدو سىريان و ناشوورى و يەزىدى و سەرچەم پىكھاتە ناينى و مەزھەبى و نەتەۋەيىيەكانى تىرى گەلى كوردستان.
 ۸. بەنېشتمانى كردنى دام و دەزگا ھوكمرانىيەكان و كۆتايى ھىنخان بە ھەژمۋونى حىزى لەسەريان، رىكخستنى پەيوەندىيەكانى نىۋان ئۇپۇزسىۋن و دەسەلات و، بوۋار رەخساندن بۇ بەشدارى كاراى ھەموو پىكھاتەكانى ھەر يىم، دوور لە ھەموو چەشئە ھەلاۋىر كردنىك لە تەۋاۋى كايە سىياسى و ئابورى و كۆمەلەيەتتەكاندا.
- پىكھاتە ناينى و مەزھەبى و نەتەۋەيىيەكانى تىرى گەلى كوردستان.
۸. بەنېشتمانى كردنى دام و دەزگا ھوكمرانىيەكان و كۆتايى ھىنخان بە ھەژمۋونى حىزى لەسەريان، رىكخستنى پەيوەندىيەكانى نىۋان ئۇپۇزسىۋن و دەسەلات و، بوۋار رەخساندن بۇ بەشدارى كاراى ھەموو پىكھاتەكانى ھەر يىم، دوور لە ھەموو چەشئە ھەلاۋىر كردنىك لە تەۋاۋى كايە سىياسى و ئابورى و كۆمەلەيەتتەكاندا.
 ۹. رەت كردنەۋەى ناۋەندگەرايى و دەمارگىرى مەزھەبى و نەتەۋەيىيە سىرىنەۋەى ئاسەۋارو كىلتورى دىكتاتورىيەت و بەدىموكراتىيەزە كردنى كايە سىياسىيەكان و پاراستنى مافەكانى مەۋقە و قول كردنەۋەى گيانى پىكھەۋەژيانى نارەزوۋ مەندانەى نىۋان پىكھاتەكان و دەستەبەر كردنى مەارەسەى مافى چارەنوس بۇيان لە عىراقى نوۋدا.
 ۱۰. چاكسازى بىنەپەتى ھەمەلەيەنەۋە قەلاچۆ كردنى ديار دەۋى گەندەلى، لىپىچىنەۋەى ياسايى لە گەندەلكاران، كارا كردنى رۆلى چاۋدىرى پەرلەمان و داۋاكارى گشتى و دىۋانى چاۋدىرى دارايى و دەستەى دەستپاكى.

۱۱. بەدپهينانى دادپەرورەرى سىياسى و كۆمەلەيتەتى لە داپەشكردنەوہى دەسەلات و سامانداو شەفافىيەت لە پىرسى نەوت و گازو گىشت داھاتەكانى تر لە ھەرىمى كوردستان.
۱۲. چەسپاندى سەرھەتاي كەسىيەتى سزاکان (شخصية العقوبة) و سەرھەخۆيى و بى لايەنى دادگاكان و يەكسانى ھاو لاتيان لەبەردەم ياسادا.
۱۳. پىشتىگىرى كردنى مەيدايى نازادو رۆژنامەگەرى ئەھلى و پىشتىوانى كردن لە دامەزرادەكانى كۆمەلگەى مەدەنى و كاراكردى رۆليان بۆ بەشدارى كردن لە گەلەلەكردنى پىرۆژەى ياساكان و چاودىرى دام و دەزگاكان و قولكردنەوہى گىيانى ديموكراسى و فرەحزبى و لىبوردەيى لە كۆمەلگەدا.
۱۴. بەرگىركردن لە مافى تويژە ھەژارو كەمدەستەكانى كۆمەلگەى خاوەن پىداويستىيە تايەتپەكان لە داينكردنى ژيانىكى شايستە بۆيان و سازكردنەويان و ھەولدان بۆ دەستبەركردنى بيمەى كۆمەلەيتەتى بۆ ھاو لاتيانى كوردستان و نۆزىنەوہى ھەل كار بۆ بىكاران لە لايەن حكومەتەوہ.
۱۵. كاركردن لە سەر چاكسازى كۆمەلەيتەتى، كاركردن بۆ كەمكردنەوہى نەريتە نامۆكان و ديارەى بەھەلە تىگەيشتن لە ھەندى دەقى ئايىنى.
۱۶. پىشتىوانى كردن لە بەشدارى سىياسى و كۆمەلەيتەتى و ئابورى و پەرورەدەيى زياترى ئافرەتان و كۆتايى ھيئان بە ستەمى كۆمەلەيتەتى دژيان و ھەولدان بۆ گۆزىنى ھەرياساو دۆخىك كە پىچەوانەى مافە رەواكانيانە.
۱۷. چەسپاندى بەھاكانى خيژان و رەتكردنەوہى توندوتىژى خيژانى و پارىژگارى ياسايى و مادى و مەعنىيەى حكومەت لىيان و پارىژگارى كردن لە مافەكانى منداڵ.
۱۸. داپشتنى سىياسەتتىكى ئابورى نىشتمانى و ئەتەوہيى روون، پتەوكردنى ژيخانى ئابورى و بەرھەمەينان، جوړاو جوړكردنى سەرچاوەى داھات، گرنگى دان بە گوندەكان و بەھيژكردنى كەرتى كشتوكالى و پيشەسازى و گەشت و گوزارو ... تاد.
۱۹. چاكسازى پەرورەدەيى لە دام و دەزگا پەرورەدەيەكانى ھەرىم و گرنگى بايەخ پىدانى لە بودجەى ھەرىمداو بەرزكردنەوہى ئاستى زانستى و پەرورەدەيى قوتايى و بەرز راگرتنى پيشەى مامۇستايەتى و ھيئانەكايەى كەشيكى پەرورەدەيى گونجاو لە ناوھەندەكانى خویندندا.
۲۰. بەھيژكردنى نىتەمى نىشتمانى لاوان و بەشدارى پىكردينان لەكايە سىياسىيەكانداو پاراستن لادان و مادە بپهوشكەركان و داپشتنى سىياسەتتىكى نىشتمانى بۆ وەلامدانەوہى خواست و چاوەوانەكانيان و گەشەدان بە تواناكانيان.
۲۱. داپشتنى سىياسەتتىكى ئابورى نىشتمانى و ئەتەوہيى گونجاو و گەشەكردو و فرەيى سەرچاوەكانى داھات، وەك برودان بە كەرتەكانى كشتوكال، پيشەسازى، گەشتيارى و بواردەكانى ترو، پارىژگارى كردن لە بەرھەمە خۆماليەكان و كۆتايى ھيئان بە پاوانخووزى و لابردنى كۆت و بەندەكانى سەرگەرتى تايەت و پاراستنى مافەكانى كرێكاران و بەكاربەران و تويژە كەمدەستەكان و سەرمايەى ناوخۆيى و گرنگى دان بە گوندەكان.
۲۲. پىشتىگىرى كردنى بزافى نوپكردنەوہى تيويزەكردنى فەكرى ئىسلامى و دىيالوگى نيوان ناراستە فەكرى و سىياسىيەكانى كوردستان و نووسەرو رۇشنىبىرانى حزب.
۲۳. ھەولدان بۆ چاكسازى كردن لە سىستەمى تەندروستى ھەرىم و پارىژگارى كردن لە ژينگەى كوردستان.
۲۴. گەشەدان بە ئەدەب و ھونەرى رەسەن.

بهشی دووهم: (پیرهوی ناوخو)

مادهی شه شه م: ریساكانی کاری حزبی له یه کگرتوو دا: -

۱. شه م پیرهوه دستوری کارو چالاکي و په یوه ندى نیوان سهرجه م دامه زراوه و ده زگا و ریكخستنه كانی حزبه، شه ندانمان له هه موو پلهو ئاستیكدا پیوهی پایه ند دین.
۲. گهره نتي به شداری و بوونی خوشكان له سهرجه م ئورگان و مه كتبه ب و ده زگا كانی حزب دا، بهو مه رجه ی له (۲۵٪) كه متر نه بییت لهو ناوه ندانه دا كه خوشك به پیی مه رجه كان هه ن.
۳. ده سته بهر كردنی شایسته ی پوستی حزبی، له سه ر بنه مای لیوه شاره یی به پیی ژماره ی شه ندانمانی ریكخستن و، پوستی حكومیش به پیی ژماره ی ده نگ.
۴. پاراستنی هاوسهنگی له نیوان پریرادانی ناوه ند (مرکز) له ئاراسته كردنی گشتی حزب و خو جیبیه تی (لامرکز) له راپه راندن و بهر پیوه بردنی کارو چالاکیه كاندا.

مادهی جهوتهم: كۆنگره: -

بهكهم / بهرترین دهسلاته له مزیدا، خوئی ناسایی (۴) سال جاریكه.

gggg / پیکه بییت له:

۱. شه ندانه دامه زراوه ره كان.
۲. شه مینداری گشتی و شه ندانمانی شه نجومه نی سهر کردایه تی و ده سته ی بالای بهواداچوون و شه نجومه نی راویژکاری له خوله دا.
۳. بهر پیرس و کارگیرانی دامه زراوه ناوه ندیه كانی حزب و مه لبه نده كان به پیی پیرهوی ناوخو.
۴. په رله ماننارو وه زیرو سه فبرو وه کیل وه زیرو بهر پیوه به ره گشتی یه كان و بهر پیرس و شه ندانمانی شه نجومه نی پاریزگا له خوئی خویمان و راویژکاره كان و نوینه رانی یه کگرتوو له ولاتانی دهره وه.
۵. سهر کردایه تی بوی هه یه ژماره یه كه كه به پیویسته ی بزانی بو شه ندانمانی كۆنگره دیاری بکات به مه رجی زیاتر نه بی له (۱۰٪) شه ندانمانی كۆنگره.
۶. شه ندانه هه لبیژراوه كان له یازنه كانی هه لبیژاردنه كاندا.

سسسس / نه ركه دهسلاته كانی كۆنگره:

۱. په سه ند كردنی پروگرام و پیرهوی ناوخو و ستراتیجی چوار سالی حزب.
۲. هه لبیژاردنی شه ندانمانی سهر کردایه تی به زۆرینه ی ناسایی دهنگی دهنگه ران.
۳. هه لبیژاردنی شه مینداری گشتی به (۳/۲) ی دهنگی شه ندانمان، شه گه ر دهنگی پیویسته ی به ده ست نه هیئا به زۆرینه ی دهنگ له نیوان یهكهم و دووهم دا.
۴. هه لبیژاردنی شه ندانمانی ده سته ی بالای بهواداچوون به زۆرینه ی ناسایی دهنگ ده ران.

۵. ھەلۋەشان دىنەھەي حزب يان يەكگرتن لەگەل حزبىكى تر بەزۆرىنەي (۳/۲) ى دەنگى ئەندامانى كۆنگرە.

۶. بېرىارەكانى بەزۆرىنەي رەھا (۱+۵۰) ى دەنگى دەنگدەران دەردىت، جگە لە خالەكانى (۵،۳،۴).

مادەي ھەشتەم: ئەمبىندارى گشتى:-

بەكەم / پېئاسە: بەرپىسى يەكەمە لە حزب دا و بەرپىسى ئەنجومەنى گشتى و ئەنجومەنى بالاي سەرۆكايەتى و مەكتەبى سىياسى يە.

مەرجەكان:

۱. بەلای كەمەھە دوو خولى ئەندامىتى مەكتەبى سىياسى تەواكردىت.
۲. مافى گرتنە دەستى پۆستى ئەمبىندارى گشتى تەنھا دوو خولى يەك لەدواي يەكە.
۳. تەمەنى لە (۴۰) سال كەمتر نەبىت.
۴. لە حالەتى خالى بوونى پۆستى ئەمبىندارى گشتى، لە كۆپوونەيەكى ھاوبەشى ئەنجومەنى سەرۆكايەتى و دەستەي بالاي بەدواداچووندا بە (۳/۲) ى دەنگەكانيان كەسبىك بۇ ئەي پۆستە ھەلدەبىزىن بە ەكالەت، بەي مەرجەي ماوەكەي لە سالىك زياتر نەبىت و، لەي ماوەيەدا كۆنگرەي ناسايى ئەنجام يدرى بۇ ھەلپىژاردنى ئەمبىندار.

سەنەم / نەركە و مەسەل تەكانى ئەمبىندارى گشتى:-

۱. يانگكردن و لىپىرسىنەھە لە ئەندامان و دامەزراھە دەزگاكان و بەرپىسەكانيان لەكاتى پىويستدا.
۲. نوپنەرايەتى كردنى حزب و لىدوان بەناويەھە لە چوارچىۋەي سىياسەتى گشتى حزىدا.
۳. داواي كۆپوونەھە ناسايىيەكانى ھەرسى ئەنجومەنى گشتى و، ئەنجومەنى سەرۆكايەتى و، سەرۆكايەتى دەكات.
۴. سەرپەرىشتىكردنى گشتى بەرپوۋچوونى كارەكانى ھەرسى دامەزراھەي ئەنجومەنى گشتى و ئەنجومەنى بالاي سەرۆكايەتى و مەكتەبى سىياسى دەكات.

۵. واژوكردن لەسەر داواي بوون بە ئەندام.

۶. واژوكردن لەسەر دوا بېرىارى سزاي دەركردن لە حزب.

۷. سالانە سەرپەرىشتى ئەنجومەنى گشتى و، مانگانە لەگەل ئەنجومەنى سەرۆكايەتى كۆدەبىتەھە.

۸. بۆي ھەيە لە كۆپوونەھەي ھەر دەزگايەك بەشدارىت لە گشت ناستەكاندا.

۹. بېرىاردان لەسەر خەرجىيەكانى حزب.

يەكەم / پېنالىتە:

- بەرزىن دەسلەپتە لە دىۋى كۆنگرە بۇ داپشتى پىلان و چاۋدىرى و بەدواداچوون و دىارى كىردى سىياسەتە گىشتىكەنى حزب و، دەستەى كارگىرى ھەيە بۇ رىكخستى كارەكانى.

سەئەم / پېنالىتە: پېنالىتە:

- (۳۵) ئەندام (۲) ئەندامى يەدەك كە كۆنگرە ھەلىان دەبىزىرى، بۇ پىلاننان و داپشتى سىياسەتە گىشتىكەنى حزب، بەرەچاۋكىردى رىزەى پارىزگانان بەپىئى رمارەى ئەندام رىزەى كۆتاي خوشكان.

سەئەم / مەرجەكانى ئەندامىتى:

تەمەنى لە (۲۵) سال كەمتر نەبىت.

(۱) ماۋەى ھاتنى بۇ نىۋ حزب لە (۹) سال كەمتر نەبىت.

(۲) خاۋەن دىدىكى سىياسى و رۇشنىرىيەكى ئىسلامى و ئەزموونىكى كىردارى و توانايەكى سەركردانە بىت.

(۳) پىۋىستە بەپىئى لىھاتتەكانى بەرپرسىارىتەى بۇ ئورگانىكى حزب لەئەستۇ بگرى و، بە پىچەوانەۋە ئەندامىتەى لە دەست دەدات و، كەسى دىۋى ئەى لە دەنگدا دىتە شوپىنى.

چۈرەم / نەركە و مەسەلەتەكانى ئەنجومەنى سەركردايەتى:

۱. سەروكى ئەنجومەن لەناو خۇياندا ھەلدەبىزىرىن بە زۆرىنەى رەھا (۰%+۱) ى ئەندامان.
۲. دەستەى كارگىرى لە ناو خۇيدا ھەلدەبىزىرىن بە زۆرىنەى رەھاى دەنگەكان لە يەكەم كۆپۈنەۋەى ئەنجومەنى سەركردايەتى لە ماۋەى يەك ھەفتەدا.
۳. ھەلبىزاردى ئەندامانى مەكتەبى سىياسى لەنىۋ ئەندامەكانىدا كە رمارەىان (۱۲) ئەندامە لە دەنگى يەكەمەۋە ھەتا دوانزەيەم لە رىزىنەدى دەنگەكانى ھىنراۋدا، لەيەكەم كۆپۈنەۋەى سەركردايەتى دا بە مەرجىك ئەۋ كەسى كە ھەلدەبىزىردىت بۇ مەكتەبى سىياسى خولىك سەركردايەتى كىردىت.
- ھەلبىزاردى بەرپرسى ئەنجومەنى ئورگانە ناۋەندىكەنى حزب.
۴. كۆپۈنەۋەكانى بە زۆرىنەى رەھاى ئەندامانى گرى دەدىت.

۵. بىرپارەكانى بە زۆرىنەى رەھا (۰%+۱) ى دەنگدەران دەدىت، جگە لەى بىرگانەى رىزەى تايىتەى بۇ دىارى كراۋە.

۶. لىزىنەى كاتى بەپىئى پىۋىست پىك دەھىتى.

۷. پىكەيتانى لىزىنەى پىلاننان و بەدواداچوون كە زىاتر نەبى لە (۵) ئەندام بۇ لىزىنەى پىلانى گىشتى و بۇ راپەراندنى ئەۋ ستراتىژو پروگرامەى كۆنگرە دىارى دەكات.

۸. بىرپاردان لەسەر بەشدارى كىردن يان بەشدارى نەكردن لە كايىنەى حكومەتدا يان ئۆپۈزسىۋون بوون بەراۋىز لەگەل ئەنجومەنى راپەراندنى پارىزگاناندا بە (۳/۲) ى دەنگ.

۹. دیاری کردنی پالییوراوان بۇ شەندامیەتی پەرلەمان شەگەر لیست داخراو بوو، ھەرۋەھا بۇ پۈستە وەزارىەكان و پلە تايىبەتەكانى سەرو ئەنجومەنى پارىژگا لەسەر بئەماى ژمارەى دەنگ.
۱۰. بېرىاردان لەسەر ھەلوپەستە سىياسىيە نىشتەمانىيە گۈنگەكان و پىرسە گۈنگەكان بە (۳/۲) ى دەنگى شەندامان.
۱۱. پەسەندکردنى ھاوپەيما نىيەتى سىياسى لەگەل حزب و ھىيزە سىياسىيەكاندا بە (۳/۲) ى دەنگى شەندامان.
۱۲. پەسەندکردنى بوجەى سالانەى حزب.
۱۳. بانگھېشت کردن بۇ كۆپۈنەوھەى نائاسايى كۆنگرە بە (۳/۲) ى دەنگى شەندامانى ئەنجومەنى سەرکردايەتى .
۱۴. ھەلپەساردنى شەندامىيىتى شەندامانى سەرکردايەتى بە (۳/۲) ى دەنگى شەندامان.
۱۵. رەزامەندى لەسەر كۆرۈنەوھەى يان پەيوەستکردن يان راگرتنى مەكتەب يان مەلپەند يان ھەر ئۆرگانىكى گىشتى بە (۳/۲) ى دەنگى شەندامان.
۱۶. پىرسىنەوھە لە ئەمىندارى گىشتى و، بەرپىرسە بالاكانى حزب بە (۳/۲) ى دەنگى شەندامان بەپىي لائىھەكى رۇشن كە دواتر سەرکردايەتى پەسەندى دەكات.
۱۷. پىرسىنەوھە لە مەكتەبى سىياسى و شەندامانى مەكتەبى سىياسى بە (۰.۵%+) ى دەنگى شەندامان و، بەپىي لائىھەكى كە دواتر سەرکردايەتى پەسەندى دەكات.
۱۸. بۇ ھەيە گۈنگرە پىش و پاش بخت بە رەزامەندى (۳/۲) ى دەنگى شەندامان بە مەرجىك سالىك زياتر نەيى.
۱۹. رەزامەندى دەدات لەسەر لائىھەى ئۆرگانە گىشتىيەكانى حزب بە رىژەى (۰.۵%+) ى دەنگى دەنگدەران.
۲۰. پەسەند کردنى شەندامانى ئەنجومەنى راويزكارى بەپىي لائىھەكى كەبە (۰.۵%+) ى دەنگى دەنگدەران دیارى دەكرىت، كە مەكتەبى سىياسى پىشنيارى دەكات بە زۆرىنەى ناسايى دەنگى شەندامان.
۲۱. كۆپۈنەوھە ناسايىيەكانى وەرزىن، يان لەسەر داواى ئەمىندارى گىشتى يان ئەنجومەنى بالاي سەرۆكايەتى كۆدەيىتەوھە، بۇ كۆپۈنەوھەى نائاسايى بەزۆرىنەى رەھاي دەنگدەران، يان پىشنيارى سەرۆكى ئەنجومەنى سەرکردايەتى و پىشتىوانى کردنى لانى كەم (۵) شەندام، يان لەسەر پىشنيارى دە شەندام، كۆپۈنەوھەكانىشى بەزۆرىنەى رەھا (۰.۵+) ى شەندامانە.
۲۲. پەسەندکردنى وازنامەى ئەمىندارى گىشتى و شەندامانى سەرکردايەتى و شەندامانى ئەنجومەنى گىشتى و دەستەى بالاي بەدواداچون بە (۳/۲) ى دەنگى شەندامان.
۲۳. پىرسىنەوھە لە دەستەى بالاي بەدواداچون بە (۳/۲) ى دەنگى شەندامان.

مادەى دەيەم: ئەرك و دەسەلاتەكانى سەرۆكى ئەنجومەنى سەرکردايەتى:-

۱. ئامادەكردنى كارنامەى كۆيۈنەۋەى ئەنجومەن بەراۋىژ لەگەل مەكتەبى سىياسى.
۲. ئاگاداركدنەۋەى ئەندامان بۇ بەشدارى لە كۆيۈنەۋەكاندا راستەوخۇ يان لە رىگاي رازگرەۋە.
۳. سەرۆكايەتى كۆيۈنەۋەكانى ئەنجومەن دەكات و واژۇ لەسەر كۆنۈوس و بېرپارەكان دەكات.
۴. سەرپەرشتى لېژنە كاتىبەكانى ئەنجومەن دەكات تاپەرپرسىيان بۇ دىارى دەكرىت.
۵. پرسىنەۋە لە جى بەجى كردنى بېرپارو راسپاردەكانى ئەنجومەن لە ئۆرگانەكانى حزب دا.

مادەى يانزەيەم: ئەنجومەنى گشتى (المجلس العام):-

بەكەم / پېكھاتە:

ئەنجومەنىكى گشتى يە كاروبارى سىياسى و دارايى و بانگەوازو ناوخوى حزب ھەلدەسەنگىيى لە ماۋەى سالىكدا.

مەمۇر / پېكھاتە: ئەم ئەنجومەنە پىكدىت لە:-

- ا/ ئەمىندارى گشتى + ئەندامانى سەرکردايەتى + بەرپرسى ئۆرگان و دامەزراۋە ناۋەندىەكان بەپىي پېرەۋى ناوخۇ + ئەندامانى دەستەى بالاي بەدواداچوون + بەرپرسى مەلپەندەكان + ئەندامانى فراكسىيۇنەكانى پەرلەمان لە ھە خولەداۋ وەزىرەكان + سەرۆكى فراكسىيۇنى پارىزگاكان + دامەزرىنەران + سەفەرەكان + لىپرسراۋى ئەنجومەنى بالاي دەستە پىشەيەكان + بەرپرسى سكرتارىەتى خوشكان و قوتابيان و ئۆفيسى گشتى لاۋان + نوپتەرانى حزب لە ولاتان.
- ب/ ئەۋانەى ئەنجومەنى سەرکردايەتى بە پىۋىستى بزانى بۇ بەشدارى كردن بە زۆرىنەى دەنگى رەھاي دەنگى دەنگدەران، بەمەرجى لە رىژەى (۱۰٪) ى ئەندامان زياد نەكات.

سەيەم / ئەرك و دەستەلاتەكانى:

۱. پىداچوونەۋە ھەلسەنگاندنى كارو چالاكى گشتى حزب و ھەلۋىستە سىياسىيەكانى بەمەيەستى پاراستنى ھاۋسەنگىيەكان لە ماۋەى سالى رابدودا.
۲. ئاراستەكردنى راسپاردەى پىۋىست لە ھەردوۋ يۋارى سىياسى و كارو چالاكى ناوخويى گشت ئۆرگانەكانى حزب بۇ ئەنجومەنى سەرکردايەتى بۇ ماۋەى داھاتوو.
۳. ئەمىندارى گشتى سەرپەرشتى ئەم ئەنجومەنە دەكات .

یه‌که‌م / پیناسه:

دسته‌یه‌کی بالای به‌دواداچوون له‌ده‌ب‌ژێردریت له‌گه‌ل ئەندامانی سه‌رکردایه‌تی به‌دوو لیستی جیاواژ، ژماره‌یان له (۷) ئەندام زیاتر نابێ، دوو ئەندامی یه‌ده‌کی ده‌بێ بۆ به‌دواداچوون و دادوه‌ریی و چاودێریکردنی کارو چالاکی و پرسه‌ ناو‌خۆییه‌کانی حزب، ته‌هاوی مافو ئیمتیازاتی ئەم دسته‌یه له‌گه‌ل سه‌رکردایه‌تی‌دا هاوتایه.

دووه‌م / نه‌رک و ماف و سه‌ه‌ڵته‌کانی:

چاودێری و به‌دواداچوون ده‌کات بۆ ئۆرگانه‌ بالاکانی حزب له ئەم‌م‌ین‌داریه‌تی و، ئەنجومه‌نی بالای سه‌ه‌ه‌ڵته‌کانی، ئەنجومه‌نی سه‌رکردایه‌تی، له‌ لادن له‌ په‌په‌رو پروگرامو، کێشه‌ ناو‌خۆییه‌کانیان چاره‌سه‌ر ده‌کات، به‌پێی هاوسه‌نگی راگرتن له‌ نێوان شه‌رک و مافه‌کانیاندا، به‌پێی پروگرامو پێپه‌وی ناو‌خۆی حزب.

سه‌یهم / سه‌رجه‌کانی ئەندامیه‌تی بریتین له:

- ا- ئەمه‌نی له (۶۰) سال‌ که‌مه‌تر نه‌بێت.
- ب- ماوه‌ی ئەندامیه‌تی له‌ حزیدا (۹) سال‌ که‌مه‌تر نه‌بێ.
- ج- لانی که‌م خولیک ئەندامی سه‌رکردایه‌تی بووبێ.

چواره‌م / دسته‌ی بالای به‌دواداچوون پیک ه‌یت له:

- ا- سه‌ه‌ه‌ه‌کی ده‌سته له‌نیو ئەندامانیدا به (۳/۲) ی ده‌نگی ئەندامان هه‌ل‌ده‌ب‌ژێردریت، ئەگه‌ر له‌ حاله‌ته‌تیکدا به‌پێی ئەم سه‌رجه‌ یه‌کلا نه‌کرایه‌وه، شه‌وا له‌ نێوان یه‌که‌م پالیئوراو و دووه‌م پالیئوراو کامیان زۆرتیرین ده‌نگی ناسایی به‌ ده‌ست هینا یه‌کلا ده‌کرێته‌وه.
- ب- (۳) ئەندام وه‌ک ده‌سته‌ی کارگیڕی بۆ راپه‌راندنی کاروباری رۆژانه‌ی ده‌سته له‌ناو خۆیاندا به‌ زۆرینه له‌ یه‌که‌م بۆ سه‌یهم ده‌نگ دیاری ده‌کریت.
- ج- کۆیونه‌وه ناساییه‌کانی مانگانه‌ ده‌بێ، هه‌روه‌ها کۆیونه‌وه‌یان بۆ به‌دواداچوونی کێشه‌کان و چاره‌سه‌رکردنی گرفته‌کان به‌پێی پێویست ده‌بێ.
- د- داکوکی کردن له‌ مافی ئەندامان له‌هه‌موو ناسته‌کاندا به‌پێی پێپه‌رو پروگرامی ناو‌خۆ، له‌دادوه‌ریدا بریاره‌کانی (ملزم) و بریاره‌کانی به (۳/۲) ی ده‌نگی ئەندامان په‌سه‌ند ده‌کرێ.
- ه- سه‌ه‌ه‌ه‌شتی هه‌ل‌ب‌ژاردنه‌ ناو‌خۆییه‌کان ده‌که‌ن له‌رووی لائحه‌ی بوون و یاسایی بوونه‌وه.

مادەى سىيانزەھىيەم: ئەنجومەنى بالاي سەرۆكايەتى:-

يەكەم / پىئاسە:

ئەنجومەنىيەكە بۇ كۆكردىنەۋەدى بەرپىرسانى دامەزراۋە بالاكانى حزب بە مەبەستى ھەماھەنگى و گىفتوگۆكردن دەبارەى سىياسەت و بېرىارو ھەلۋىستە گىشتىيەكانى حزب و يەكخستىيان، لەلەيەن ئەمىندارى گىشتىيەۋە بەرپۆۋە دەبىرېت، راسپاردەو پىشنىيارەكانى ئاراستەى سەركردايەتى و مەكتەبى سىياسى دەكرېت تا بېرىريان لەسەر وەرېگرېت.

ھوۋەم / پىكھاتە: پىك دېت لە:-

- بەرپىرسى ئەنجومەنى سەركردايەتى.
- بەرپىرسى دەستەى بالاي بەدواداچوون.
- بەرپىرسى ئەنجومەنى بانگەواز.
- بەرپىرسى ئەنجومەنى كاروبارى پەرۋەردەو رىكخستى.
- بەرپىرسى ئەنجومەنى كاروبارى ھەلېژارن و پەرلەمان.
- بەرپىرسى ئەنجومەنى راپەراندنى پارېزگاكان.

سىيەم / كۆبۈۋنە ۋەكان:

- كۆبۈۋنەۋەكانى ۋەرزى يان بە پىي پىۋىست دەبن.

مادەى چواردەھىيەم: مەكتەبى سىياسى:-

يەكەم / پىئاسە:

بالاىرېن دەزگاي راپەراندنە بۇ جىيەجىيە كىردى:

۱. پلانى گىشتى حزب و بېرىارەكانى سەركردايەتى.
۲. پىشنىيارو ئاراستەكانى ئەنجومەنى بالاي سەرۆكايەتى.
۳. راسپاردەكانى ئەنجومەنى گىشتى.
۴. لەبەرەم ئەنجومەنى سەركردايەتېدا بەرپىرسىيارە، بۇ ئەم بىۋارەش لائىھەيەكى پەسەند كىراۋى سەركردايەتى بە (۳/۲) ى دەنگى دەنگدەران بۇ رىكخستى ئەم ئەركە نامادە دەكرېت.
۵. ژمارەى ئەندامانى (۱۰-۱۲) ئەندامە لەلەيەن ئەنجومەنى سەركردايەتىيەۋە ھەلەدەبىژىردى بۇ:-
 - أ- بەرپىرسى ئەنجومەنەكان.
 - ب- بەرپىرسى ئەنجومەنى راپەراندنى پارېزگاكان.
 - ج- (۳) ئەندام بۇ بەرپىرس و كارگىرانى مەكتەب سىياسى.

دوھم/ پیکھاتە: پیک دیت له:

۱. ئەمپنداری گشتی
۲. (۴) کارگپڤ
۳. بەرپرسی ئەنجومەنی بانگەواز
۴. بەرپرسی ئەنجومەنی پەرودەر دەو ریکخستن
۵. بەرپرسی ئەنجومەنی ھەلبێژاردن و پەرلەمان
۶. دامەزراوەی راگەیاندن
۷. دامەزراوەی کارگپڤی و دارایی
۸. بەرپرسی ئەنجومەنی راپەراندنی پارێزگاکان

سێیەم/ ئەرك و دەسەلاتەکانی مەکتەبی سیاسی:

۱. راپەراندنی پریارەکانی ئەنجومەنی سەرکردایەتی و ئەنجومەنی بالای سەرۆکایەتی.
۲. داواکردنی کۆیونەوێ ناسایی ئەنجومەنی سەرکردایەتی.
۳. دەرکردنی بەیاننامەو ھەلوێستەکانی حزب.
۴. بەزۆرینەى رەھا پریارو ھەلوێستەکانی حزب دیاری دەکات لە کۆیونەوێ فەرمیەکانیدا، رای ئەمپندار لەکاتی بەرامبەر وەستانی دەنگەکاندا یەکلاکەرەو دەبێ.
۵. پالۆتنی بەرپرس بۆ ھەر ئۆرگان و دامەزراوەیەك کەلە دەرەوێ سەرکردایەتی کەسیکی بۆ دیاری بکری، بە راپۆرت لەگەڵ دەنگای پەيوەندیار.
۶. رەزامەندی بە زۆرینەى رەھا بۆ دیاری کردنی خەرجیەکان و وەبەرھێنان.
۷. دانان و گۆرینی کارگپڤان و ئەندامانی دامەزراوە ئۆرگان و دەزگاکانی حزب، بەراویژ لەگەڵ ئۆرگانە پەيوەندیارەکاندا.
۸. پریارەکان بە زۆرینەى رەھا (۱+۵۰) ی دەنگی دەنگدەران، لە حالەتی بەرامبەر وەستاندا دەنگی ئەمپندار یەکلاکەرەو دەبێت.
۹. کۆیونەوێ دەوری ئەنجام دەدات لەگەڵ تەواوی ئۆرگانەکاندا .
۱۰. دەستەبەکی کارگپڤی بۆ خۆی لەناو ئەندامەکانیدا ھەلەبێژێ و لائحەى کارکردنیان بۆ دیاری دەکری لەلایەن مەکتەبی سیاسی بە زۆرینەى رەھا (۱+۵۰) ی دەنگی ئەندامانی مەکتەبی سیاسی.
۱۱. کۆیونەوێ ناساییەکانی مانگانەبەو، دانیشتنی ناسایی لەسەر داواى ئەمپندارو بەپێى پێویست دەبێ و، بە نامادەبوونی (۳/۲) ی ئەندامانی کۆیونەوێکانی گری دەدرین، پێویستە (۴۵) سەھات پێش کۆیونەوێ کارنامە بگاتە دەستی ئەندامان جگەلە کۆیونەوێ ناساییەکان، کەبۆ کاریکی دیاری کراوی گرنگ سازدەکری.
۱۲. نامادەکردنی بودجەى سالانەى حزب بۆ بەردەم ئەنجومەنی سەرکردایەتی.

ماده‌ی پانزده‌م: نه‌نجومه‌نی کاروباری بانگه‌واز :-

یه‌که‌م / پیناسه:

شهم نه‌نجومه‌نه گرنگیسه کاروباری بانگه‌واز و باگخوزان و زانایان و زانسته شه‌ره‌یه‌کان و روشنییری نیسلامی و ناو‌خوی و کاروباری کومه‌لایه‌تی ده‌دات .

دووم / پیکه‌اته: پیک دیت له :

۱. به‌رپرسی نه‌نجومه‌ن که نه‌ندامیکی مه‌کتیه‌بی سیاسی ده‌ییت.

۲. به‌رپرسی به‌شی به‌نگه‌واز و بانگخوزان و روشنییری نیسلامی.

۳. به‌رپرسی به‌شی کاروباری کومه‌لایه‌تی.

۴. به‌رپرسی به‌شی زانایان و زانسته شه‌ره‌یه‌کان.

۵. به‌رپرسی به‌شی ری‌کخراوه ناحکومی و بانگه‌وازیه‌کانی.

۶. ده‌زگای راگه‌یاندنه بانگه‌وازیه‌کان.

سئ‌یه‌م / ته‌واوی کارو چالاکیه‌کانیان به‌ پی‌ی لانیحه‌یه‌کی په‌سه‌ندکراوی سه‌رکردایه‌تی ری‌ک ده‌خرین.

ماده‌ی شانزده‌م: نه‌نجومه‌نی په‌رورده‌و ری‌کخستن :-

یه‌که‌م / شهم ده‌زگایه‌ ته‌واوی کاروبارو چالاکیه‌کانی ری‌کخستن و په‌رورده‌و پی‌گه‌یاندن و نامارو روشنییری و هوشیاری له ناو‌خوی حی‌زبدا به‌رپوه ده‌یات .

دووم / پیکه‌اته:

پیک دیت له :-

۱. به‌رپرسی نه‌نجومه‌ن که نه‌ندامی نه‌نجومه‌نی سه‌روکایه‌تیه.

۲. به‌رپرسی به‌شی نامار.

۳. به‌رپرسی به‌شی خول و پی‌گه‌یاندن

۴. به‌رپرسی به‌شی روشنییری و هوشیاری

۵. به‌رپرسی به‌شی په‌رورده‌و ری‌کخستنن یرایان

۶. به‌رپرسی به‌شی په‌رورده‌و ری‌کخستنن خوشکان

۷. به‌رپرسی به‌شی په‌رورده‌و ری‌کخستنن قوتاییان و لاوان و وهرزش

۸. به‌رپرسی به‌شی ری‌کخستنن دهرده.

سئ‌یه‌م / شهم دام‌زراویه به‌لانیحه‌یه‌کی په‌سه‌ندکراو له لایه‌ن سه‌رکردایه‌تیه‌وه ته‌واوی کاروباره‌کانی ری‌ک ده‌خات .

مادى ھەققىدە ۱۱-م / نەنجومەنى ھەلبىزاردن و پەرلەمان :-

يەكەم / بەرپىرسە لە رىكخستىن و بەرپىرە بىردىنى سەرچەم كاروبارو چالاكىيەكانى ھەلبىزاردن، پەرلەمان و حكومت و پەيوەندى يە سىياسى يەكانى حزب.

- ئەندامىكى مەكتەبى سىياسى بەرپىرسى دەپ.

دووم / پىكىدەت لە :

۱. سەرۆكى ئەنجومەن كە ئەندامى مەكتەبى سىياسىيە.

۲. بەرپىرسى بەشى كاروبارى پەرلەمان و حكومت.

۳. بەرپىرسى بەشى ھەلبىزاردن.

۴. بەرپىرسى بەشى كاروبارى پەيوەندى يە سىياسىيەكانى حزب

۵. بەرپىرسى بەشى كاروبارى رىكخراو پىشەيى و جەماوەرەكان.

سەئىيەم / تەواوى كارو چالاكىيەكانى بەلائىحەيەكى پەسەندكراو لەلەين سەرکردايەتەيەو رىك دەخات.

مادى ھەژدەيەم : نەنجومەنى راپەراندنى پارىزگاگان :-

يەكەم / ئەنجومەنىكى حزبىيە لەسەر ئاستى پارىزگاگە يان زياتر پىك دەھيئىرى، بۇ سەرپەرشتى كاروبارەكانى حزب لە سنورى دەسەلاتەكانى شەو ئەنجومەنەداو ئورگانىكى تەنسىقى و ھاوكارى و چاوپوشنى گشتى ئاستى پارىزگاگانە.

دووم / پىكھاتە : پىك دىت لە :-

۱. بەرپىرسى ئەنجومەن كە ئەندامىكى مەكتەبى سىياسى سنورى پارىزگاگە دەپتەو، مەكتەبى سىياسى لە كۆبوونەوھى ئاسايىدا بە زۆرىنەى رەھا ديارى دەكات.

۲. ئەندامانى ئەنجومەنى سەرکردايەتى و دەستەى بالاي بەدواداچوون كە دانىشتووى شەو پارىزگاگەن بەپىئى پىرەو پروگرام.

۳. بەرپىرسى مەلبەندو ئورگانە ناوەندىەكانى ترى يەكگرتوو كە دانىشتووى سنورى پارىزگاگەن بەپىئى پىرەو پروگرام.

۴. ئەندامانى پەرلەمان و ھەزىرو ھەكىل و ھەزىر و سەفەرەكان و بەرپىرەبەرە گشتى يەكان ئەگەر شەو كەسانە خۇيان لە ئاستى ئەندام مەلبەند بەرەوژورتەر بوون و بەپىئى لائىھەى ناوخۇى يەكگرتوو، كە دانىشتووى سنورەكەن لەي خولەى خۇياندا.

۵. بەرپىرسى فراكسىيۈنى ئەنجومەنى پارىزگاگانى سنورى پارىزگاگە.

۶. بە لائىھەيەكى پەسەندكراو لەلەين سەرکردايەتەيەو ئەرك و چالاكىيەكانى رىك دەخريئ.

سىنەم / ئەرک و دەسەلاتەكان :-

۱. دانانى بەرنامەو مىکانىزم بۇ جىبەجى كىردىن راپەراندنى بىرپارەكانى حزب له ئەنجومەنى سەرکردایەتى و مەكتەبى سىياسى و ئورگان و دامەزراوه ناوهندىەكانى حزب له سنورى دەسەلاتەكانىندا.
۲. پەسەندکردنى پالیئوراوانى ئەنجومەنى پارىزگاكانیان و، سەرپەرشتى و هاوکارىکردنیان.
۳. بەرپۆبەردن و راپەراندنى ھەلمەتەكانى ھەلبىژاردن له دەقەرەكەياندا.
۴. بەرئىزدنەوهى راپورت و كۆنوسى كۆیوونەوهكانیان بۇ مەكتەبى سىياسى.
۵. كۆیوونەوه ناساىیەكانیان مانگانەیەو، كۆیوونەوهى ناساىیش لەسەر داواى سەرۆكى ئەنجومەن و، بەپىی پىویست ئەنجام دەدرى.
۶. لەسەر ناستى پارىزگاكان ئەنجومەنى راپۆزكارى پىك دەهینرى بە لائىحەیەكى پەسەندكراوى سەرکردایەتى.
۷. سەرپەرشتى چالاکیە خوجىیەتیەكانى سنورى دەقەرەكەیان دەكات.
۸. مانگانە لەگەل بەرپرسى مەلبەندەكان كۆدەبىتەوه یان بەپىی پىویست.
۹. سەرپەرشتى رىكخستنى پەيوەندیەكانى حزب دەكات لەسەر ناستى دەقەرەكان، لەئىز رۆشنایى ئاراستەكانى مەكتەبى سىياسى و بەرنامەى گشتى و سىياسەتى گشتى حزب له بواری پەيوەندیەكاندا.
۱۰. پالوتنى پله تاییبەتەكانى سەرو پارىزگا بۇ ئەنجومەنى سەرکردایەتى تاییەكلايان بكاتەوه.

مادەى نۆزدەهەم: دامەزراوهى میدیایى و ھونەر:-

- یەكەم: ئەو دامەزراوهیە كه تەواوى كاروبارى میدیایى و راگەیانندنەكانى یەكگرتوو بەرپۆه دەبات.
- دووهم: پىك دىت له: بەرپرس كه ئەندامىكى مەكتەبى سىياسى یان سەرکردایەتى دەبیت و چەند كارگىپرێك، كارگىپر بۇ بواریەكانى: كەنالى ناسمانى، رادیوكان، سایتە ئەلكترۆنى و سۆشیال میدیاكان.
- سىنەم: تەواوى كاروچالاکیەكانیان بەپىی لائىحەیەكى پەسەندكراو دەبیت لەلایەن سەرکردایەتیەوه.

مادەى بیست: دامەزراوهى كارگىپرې و دارایی:-

- یەكەم / ئەو دەزگایەیه كه تەواوى كاروبارى كارگىپرې و دارایی و ەبەرھىنانى حیزب بەرپۆه دەبات دووهم / پىك دىت له:-

۱. بەرپرسى دەزگا كه ئەندامىكى (مەكتەبى سىياسى) یان سەرکردایەتى دەبیت.
 ۲. (۴) كارگىپرې دەبیت بۇ بەرپرسى بەشەكانى كارگىپرې و دارایی و ەبەرھىنان
- سىنەم / تەواوى كارو چالاکیەكانیان بە پىی لائىحەیەكى پەسەندكراو لەلایەن سەرکردایەتیەوه دەبیت.

مادەى بېستە و يەك: ناوئەند :-

يەكەم / ئۆرگانىكى حەزىبە لەسەر ئاستى ئەنجومەنى راپەراندنى پارىزگا لەسەر داواى ئەنجومەن و ئۆرگانە ناوئەندىەكان بەپىئى پىپرەو و پروگرام، بەراوئىژ لەگەل ئەنجومەنى راپەراندنى پارىزگاكان و بە رەزامەندى ئەنجومەنى راپەراندن دەكرىتەو، شەركى جىبەجىكردى پىلان و بەرنامەى ئۆرگانە ناوئەندىەكانە لەستورى دەسەلاتىداو، بەپىئى لائىحەيەك كە پەسەند كراو لەلایەن سەركردايەتتەو كارگىپرى بۇ ديارى دەكرىت.

دووم / پىكديت لە:

۱. بەرپرسى ناوئەند

۲. ژمارەيەك كارگىپرى كە ژمارەيان پاشتر لائىحە ديارى دەكات داواى رەزامەندى مەكتەبى سىياسى.

سئىيەم / كۆبوونەوئەكانى مانگانەيە، يان دوو مانگ جارىك لەگەل بەشەكانى مەلئەنددا.

تېيىنى: سەبارەت بە مەلئەندو ئۆرگانەكانى خوار مەلئەند لە لق و ناوچەو ئوسرەكان، وەك چۆن لە لائىحەى پىشووئا هاتوئە هەروا بەمىنى ئاداواى كۆنفرانسەكان زياتر چاوپوشن دەين و داواى بە لائىحەيەكى پەسەندكراوى سەركردايەتى رىك بخرىن:

مادەى بېستە و دوو / مەلئەند :-

يەكەم / شەو دەزگايەيە كەسەرپەرشتى و بەرپوئەبىردنى كاروبارى حزب و رىكخستەكانى لە ئەستۆ دەگرىت لە ستورى چالاكەكانىدا.

دووم / لائىحەيەك بۇ مەلئەندەكان ديارى دەكرىت لەلایەن دامەزراوى ناوخواو، ئەنجومەنى سەركردايەتى پەسەندى بكات، هەتا وئەى واقع بەجوانى رونبىتەو تائەوكتە دەكرىت بە لائىحەى كۆن مامەلە بكرىت، يان لەسەر شەو رىك بكوين بەرپرسى مەلئەندەكان هەلئەبىرئىردىن بۇ بەرپرسى مەلئەندو، دواتر لەلایەن ئەنجومەنى گشتتەو پەسەند بكرىت، چونكە بەپىئى پۆستەكەيان دەين بە ئەندامى سەركردايەتى و بەلەدەست دانى ئەو پۆستە بەئەندامانى سەركردايەتى نامىن.

سئىيەم / شەو لائىحەيەى بۇ مەلئەندەكان ديارى دەكرىت تەواى شىوازى لق و ناوچەكانىش بەپىئى واقعى نوئى رىك بخرىتەو، لە لائىحەى نوئىدا، كە دامەزراوى كاروبارى ناوخواو يان پەروئەو رىكخستە داى دەرىژن.

مادەى بېست و سى: ئق: -

يەكەم: ئەو دەزگايەيە، كە بەرپۆەبىردنى كاروبارى حزب لە ئەستۆ دەگرېت لە سنورى كاروچالاككېيەكانىدا.

دووم: پېكدېت لە: -

۱. لېپىرسراوى لق.

۲. يارىدەدەرى بەرپىسى لق (بەپىيى پېويست).

۳. (۶-۸) كارگېرى بەشەكان.

۴. لېپىرسراو ناوچەكان.

۵. ئەنجومەنى لق.

سىيەم: بەشەكانى لق كارەكانيان لە رېگەى پېكھېئانى لېژنەكانەو رادەپەرېتن.

جوارەم: كۆبوونەوە ئاساييەكانى ھەفتانەو، كۆبوونەوەى فراوان مانگانەيە.

مادەى بېست و چوار: ناوچە: -

يەكەم: ئەو دەزگايەيە كە بەرپۆەبىردنى كاروبارى پەرودەو رېكخستنى (ئوسرەكان) لە سنورى ناوچەكەدا لە ئەستۆ دەگرېت.

دووم: پېكدېت لە: -

۱. لېپىرسراوى ناوچە.

۲. (۲) كارگېر بۆ ئەو ناوچانەى بارەگايان ھەيە.

۳. لېپىرسراو ئوسرەكان و ئەلقەكان.

سىيەم: كۆبوونەوە ئاساييەكانى (۱۵) رۆژ جارىكە.

مادەى بېست و پېنج: ئوسرە: -

يەكەم: ئەلقەى يەكەمى رېكخستنە لە حزب دا.

دووم: كۆبوونەوەكانى (۱۰) رۆژ جارىكە.

مادەى بېست و شەش: پلەكانى ئەندامىتى: -

پلەى يەكەم/ ئەندامى پالئوراو:

ئەو كەسەيە، كە ھاتوۋتە نېو رېزەكانى حزب و فۆرمى ئەندامىتى پىكرىدۆتەو.

پلەى دووم/ ئەندامى رېكخراو:

ئەو كەسەيە، كە قۇناغى پالئوراو بەرسەركەوتوويى دەپرىتو، لە چالاكېە گشتىيەكاندا بەشدار دەپىت.

پلهی سئیه/ئەندامی کارا:

ئەو کەسە، کە قونانی ریکخراو بەسەرکەوتووێ دەبێ و شیاوییت بۆ لە ئەستۆگرتنی لێپرسراویتی لە ناو حزب دا.

مادهی بیست و هەوت: ئەندامی و مەرجهکانی :-

هەموو هاوڵاتیەکی هەریمی کوردستان و عێراق لە ناوە دەروەدی ولات مافی بوونە ئەندامی حزبیان هەیه بێ جیاوازی، بەو مەرجهی :-

1. تەمەنی لە (١٦) سال کەمتر نەبێت.
2. بێهەماو نامانجەکانی حزبی لاپەسەند بێت و پێوهی پابەندییت.
3. ئەندام نەبێت لە هیج حزبیکیان ریکخراویکی تری سیاسیدا.
4. لەلایەن دوو ئەندامی حزبهوه پشتگیری بکریت.
5. داوانامەیک پیشکەش بکات و، واژوی لەسەر بکات.

مادهی بیست و هەشت: ئەرك و مافەکانی ئەندام :-

یهکەم/ ئەرکەکانی ئەندام :-

1. هەولدان بۆ خزمەتکردنی گەل و نیشتمان و پاراستنی ناسنامە ی ئیسلامی و نەتەویدی.
2. کارکردن لەسەر خۆ راهیخان و پەرەدەکردن بەپێی پروگرامی حزب.
3. کارکردن بۆ بەدیھێنانی نامانج و بەرنامە ی سیاسی حزب.
4. پاراستنی نەهێنیەکانی حزب.
5. هەولدان بۆ زیادکردنی ئەندام و لایەنگر بۆ حزب.
6. جیبەجێ کردنی ئەرکەکانی و پابەندیبوون بە بریارو رێنماییەکانی حزب.
7. نابوونە مانیگانه بداتە حزب و چەندە لە توانایدا هەبێ هاوکاری مادی حزب بکات.

دووەم/ مافەکانی ئەندام :-

1. مافی هەلبژاردن و خۆپالوتنی هەیه بەپێی پێرەوی ناوخوای حزب.
2. مافی رادەرپرین و پیشنیارکردن و رەخنە ی بونیاتنەری هەیه بۆ گشت ئەندامان و دەزگاکانی حزبی.
3. مافی سکالاکردن و داکۆکی لەخۆکردنی هەیه.
4. مافی دابینکردنی ناستیکی بژیویی گونجاو هەیه، ئەگەر خۆی یەکلا کردبێتەوه بۆ کاری حزب.

٥. مافی دابینکردنی سێ لهسههرچواری ئیمتیازاتی مادی بۆ ئەندامانی ئەنجومەنی سەرکردایەتی و مەکتەبی سیاسی و ئەمینداری گشتی و، دەستەئە بەدواداچوون لەکاتی ئەبوونی سەرچاوێی داھاتی گونجاو.

سێیەم / سزاگان:-

١. ئاگاھدار کردنەوه (التنبیة).
٢. وریاکردنەوه (الانذار).
٣. سەرکوونەکردن (التوبيخ).
٤. هەڵپەساردنی ئەندامی (تعليق العضوية).
٥. دەرکردن (الفصل).

چوارەم / لەدەستدانی ئەندامی:-

١. کشانەوه له ئەندامیەتی حزب.
٢. دەرکردن.

مادە ١١ بیست و نۆ: هەڵوێشاندنەوهی حزب:-

لەکاتی هەڵوێشاندنەوهی حزبدا، سامانی گواستراوە و نەگواستراوەی دەدریژتە حزبیکی هاویشیوەی، یان لایەنیکی خێرخواز کە ئەندامانی دامەزرێنەر و ئەندامانی ئەنجومەنی سەرکردایەتی لێو خۆلەدا دیاری دەکەن.

ستراتیجیەتی کاری یەگرتووی ئیسلامی کوردستان بۆ چوار سانی داھاتوو

١. گەشەدان بە دەستکەوتە دەستوریەکانی گەلی کوردستان لە فیدرالیەتەوه بۆ مافی چارە خۆنووسین و هەوڵدان بۆ بە دەولەت بوون.
٢. بەرەوپێش بردنی کاری ئیسلامی میناڤەر و پرۆژەئە هاوکاری ئیسلامی و کاراکردنی بواری کاری بانگخواری لەپێش دامەزرێوە مەدەنی و جەماوەریەکان.
٣. بەدەستپێدانی پشتیوانی هیژە ئیسلامیەکان، بە قازانجی چارەسەری دۆزی گەلی کوردستان.
٤. بەدامەزرێوەی کردنی پرۆسەئە چاکسازی ریشەیی هەمەلایەن لە هەرێمی کوردستان و عێراق.
٥. داکوکیکردن بۆ دابەشکردنی دادپەرورانی داھاتی هەرێمی کوردستان بەسەر هەموو ناوچەکاندا.
٦. بەرچەستەکردنی کۆمەڵگەییەکی گەشەسەندوو، بە چەسپاندنی بەها بالاکان و قولکردنەوهی گیانی لیبۆردەیی و پیکەرەژیان.
٧. پەرورده و پێگەیانندی تاکی کارا، بەپێی بنه‌ما گشتیەکان و ئامانجە دیاریکرداوه‌کانی پێڤرە و پرۆگرامی یەگرتووی ئیسلامی کوردستان.

Appendix 17: The [Second] Draft of Constitution and Bylaws of the KIU:
Adopted by the KIU Leadership Council on 07 May 2016:

پەشێووسی
پروگرام و پیرهوی ناوخی
یه کگرتووی ئیسلامیی کوردستان
په سه نذکراوی نه نجومه نی سه رکردایه تی
له (٢٠١٦/٥/٧)

بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ الرَّحْمٰنِ الرَّحِیْمِ

(دەسپیک)

یەكگرتوو پارتیكى نیشتمانى كوردستانیه له پیناو چه سپاندنی به هاکانى نازادى و دادپەرورەرى كۆمه‌لایه‌تى تێده‌كۆشى، به مهرجه‌یه‌تیكى ئیسلامیه‌وه له‌سەر بنه‌مای هاولاتی بوون و بازنه فراوانه‌كانى برایه‌تى تازه‌مینه‌ی پیکه‌وه کارکردن پرەخسى له پیناو كوردستانىكى سەرپه‌خۆ نازادو گه‌شه‌سەندودا.

یەكگرتوو له‌سەر بنچینه‌ی پیکه‌وه گریزانی چه‌مکه‌كانى (ئىسلام، مرۆفایه‌تى، نیشتمان، نه‌تبه‌وه) پیکهاته‌وه بنه‌مای فکرى و ستراتیژو نامانچ و پروگرامى پیکه‌یاندن و دسپیلنه ریکخراوه‌یه‌یه‌كانى دیارى ده‌کات.

یەكگرتوو پرسى گه‌شه‌دان به‌ بوارى بانگه‌وازو په‌روه‌ردو پیکه‌یاندن و گه‌شه‌دان به‌ پرۆسه‌ی سیاسى له مافى چاره‌ى خۆنوسینه‌وه تا ده‌گاته ده‌ولته‌تى سەرپه‌خۆ بۆ گه‌لى كوردستان، کردووه‌ته ئه‌ركىكى ستراتیژى له‌ خهباتى خۆیدا، هاولات پرسى دیموکراسییش وهك میکانیزم و نه‌زمونىكى مرۆفایه‌تى ده‌بیته بۆ به‌دهست هیئەتى هیژىكى نیشتمانى دامه‌زراوه‌یى گه‌شه‌کردو نوور له‌ ده‌ست تێوه‌ردانى حزبی، تاكار یكات بۆ پاراستنى ناسایشى هاولاتی، دواجار نه‌م هیژو ئه‌ركه‌كانى بینه‌ سیما دیاره‌كانى ناماده‌كارى له‌ پیناو پاراستنى ده‌ستكه‌وته‌كانى و به‌ ده‌یه‌ئەنى مافه‌كانى و خهبات له‌ پیناو گه‌یشتن به‌ خولیاى میژویى گه‌له‌كه‌مان.

یەكگرتوو (هاولاتى بوون) و (به‌دامه‌زراوه‌یى كردن) و (یاسا سه‌روه‌رى) به‌ سى بناغه‌ى سه‌ره‌كى سه‌قامگیرى سستى حكومرانى داده‌ئیت، تاكو هه‌مووان وهك یه‌ك رۆلى سروسشتى خۆیان بگێرن له‌ خزمه‌تکردنى خه‌لك و خاكى كوردستان، ئیتر هاولاتیان هه‌ر ئاین و ئاینز او پیکهاته‌وه ره‌گه‌زو ره‌نگىكى سیاسیان هه‌بیته به‌بێ هه‌لاویزکردن، به‌مه‌ش چوارچێوه‌وه زه‌مینه‌ى به‌ده‌یه‌ئەنى دادپه‌روه‌رى له‌ وڵاتدا فه‌راهه‌م ده‌بیته، هه‌ر بۆیه‌ چاكسازى سیاسى له‌سەر بنه‌مای په‌روه‌ردى تاكو چاكسازى كۆمه‌لایه‌تى هه‌لچنیه‌وه.

یەكگرتوو قه‌ناعه‌تى وایه‌ پیاو و ژن هاولشان و ته‌واوكارى یه‌كترن و ئه‌رك و رۆلیان ته‌نها له‌ روى ناماده‌یى و مهرجى یاسایى و لیها ته‌نه‌كانیا نه‌وه ده‌بیته بێ هیچ جیاكاریه‌ك له‌سەر بنه‌مای ره‌گه‌ز. نه‌م پێره‌و پروگرامه‌ ده‌ستورى كارو په‌یمانى ئیوانمانه‌ بۆ لێك تێگه‌یشتن و هاریكاری كردن، هه‌روه‌ك ده‌مانه‌وى ئاوینه‌یه‌ك بیته بۆ یه‌رو بۆچوون و واقعى كارمان بۆ چه‌ماوه‌ر. نه‌م ده‌سپیکه‌ش به‌شیکى به‌ته‌رتیه‌ له‌ پێره‌و پروگرامى حزب و ده‌بى ئه‌ندامان پا به‌ندبن پێیه‌وه.

بەشى يەكەم: (پروگرام)

مادەى يەكەم: ناو و پىناسە:-

۱/ ناو:

يەكگرتووى ئىسلامىي كوردستان (الاتحاد الاسلامي الكوردستاني).

۲/ پىناسە:

يەكگرتووى حزبىيىكى (ئىصلاحي) نىشتىمانىيە، لە پىناو يونىياتنانى كۆمەلگەيەكى گەشەسەندوو دەسەلاتىيىكى دادپەرورە بە مەرجەيەتتىكى ئىسلامى تىدەكۆشىت.

مادەى دووهم: شوئىن:- كوردستان - عىراق

مادەى سەئىيەم: نارم و نالو دروشم:-

۱. نارم/ دوو دەستى لىكەھەئىيىكرائو لە ناو هىلالىك .

۲. نالو/ رەنگى قاوئىيى .

۳. دروشم/ ئازادى، بىرايەتى، دادپەرورەرى

مادەى چوارەم: بىنەما گىشتىيەكان:-

- ۱- بىنەماكانى ئىسلام سەرچاوەن بۇ رەھەندەكانى كارى يەكگرتوو .
- ۲- بەھا مەروئىيە چەسپاوەكان و ئەزمون و دەسكەوتە مەروئىيەكان، ئىلھام بەخشىن بۇ بوارە جۇراو جۆرەكانى كار لە يەكگرتوودا .
- ۳- گەل سەرچاوەى دەسەلاتەكانەو، فرەيى سىياسى و، دەستاو دەست كردنى ئاشتىيانەى دەسەلات بەھەئىزاردنو، چەسپاندنى بىنەما دىموكراسىيەكان و نىشتىمانى بوونى حكومەت و مامەئە كردن لەگەل جەماوەر لەسەر بىنەماى مافەكانى هاوئەتى بوون، بىئ هىيچ ھەلاوئىر كەرنىك، بناغەى ئاشتى كۆمەلايەتى و سىقامگىرى سىياسىن.
- ۴- حوكمرانى راشدو دادگەرانه، ئامانجىكى ئىسلامىي و خواستىكى گىشتى و پىويستىيەكى ژيانە، بۇ دەستەبەر كردنى مافە ياسايى و سىياسى و ئابورىيى و كۆمەلايەتتىيەكانى هاوئەتىيان .

- ۵- يەھيىزىكرىنى رۇلى چاكسازى مۇگەوت و پىگەي زانايانى ئىسلام و پاراستنى ماف و رۇلى پىشەنگىيان لە ناو كۆمەلگادا، لەپىداويستى پاراستنى رەسەنايەتى كۆمەلگەكەمانن .
- ۶- پاراستنى رۇزو كەرامەت و نازادى و مافەكانى مروڧ بى ھەلاوئىركردن و جىياوازى و چەسپاندى لە دەستوردا، ئەركىكى سەرەكىمانە و چارنامە جىھانىسەكانى مافەكانى مروڧقىش بە دەستكەوتىكى مروڧايەتى دەزانن بە مەرجى پىچەوانە نەبىت لەگەل بىنەماكانى ئىسلام .
- ۷- رەتكردنەبەي ھەموو چەشەنەكانى پاكتاوكرىدن و تىرۇرو توندوتىرۇ و پەپرگىرى لە فەكر و لە ھەلسوكەوتدا .
- ۸- كورد نەتەبەيەكى سەرەبەخۇيە، بەشپىكە لە ئومەتى ئىسلامى و ناسنامەى تايبەت بەخۇي ھەيە، مافى خۇيەتى كە چارەنوسى خۇي دىارى بىكات و، ئەندامىكى سەرەبەخۇي كۆمەلگەى ئىونەتەبەيەى و دامەزراوەكانى بىت .
- ۹- گەل كوردستان يەك خىزانە - بى جىياوازى و ھەلاوئىردن - كوردستانىش نىشتمانى ھەمووانە، زىدى پىكەبە ئىانى دانىشتوانەكەيەتى، بەھەموو نەتەبەى و ئاين و ئايزاكانەبە، داھات و سامانە سروسىتتەبەكان مولى گشتىن و، مافى ھاوبەشى ھەمووانن .
- ۱۰- چاكسازى بىنەبەتتەي لە بوارى سىياسى و كارگىرەى و ئابورى و كاراكرىنى رۇلى دەسەلاتى دادوهرى و پاراستنى سەرەبەخۇي دادگاكان و، سەرەهرى ياسا و شەفاقيەت، گەرەنتى پىشكەوتن و خۇشگوزەرانى و چارەسەرى گەندەلن .
- ۱۱- بەشدارى كاراى ئافرەت لە كارى سىياسى و چاكسازى كۆمەلەيتى و چەسپاندى رۇلى تەواوكارى لە ھەموو يوارەكانى ژياندا، زامنى گەشەكرىدن و سەرەبەتتەى ھەر كۆمەلگەيەكن .
- ۱۲- سازكرىنى زەمىنەى گونجاو بۇگەشەدان بە لىھاتنەكانى قوتايان و لاوان و كاراكرىنى بەھەرە تواناكانيان، بىنەماى بەدەست ھىنانى ئايندەيەكى پىشنگ دارن بۇ ھەر نەتەبەى گەلەك .
- ۱۳- مېژوى ئىسلامىي و كلتور و كەلەپورى نەتەبەكەمان، ئەزمنى مروڧى سىنوردان بەكات و شوڧنى خۇيان، سود لىوەرگرتىيان بەندە بەرەدى گونجاوى و ھەلامدانەبەيان بۇ پىويستى و پىشەتەكانى سەرەم، بەگوزەرى تىگەيشتنى مەبەستدارنەى(مقاصد)پانە بۇ ئىسلام .
- ۱۴- گفوتگوى باپەتپانە زامنى چارەسەرى بىنەبەتتەى بۇ پىسە فەكرىي و سىياسى و ئايدۇلۇزىيەكان .
- ۱۵- ھاوسەنگى كارى پەروەردەيى و بونىياتنەى تاك و خىزان و كۆمەلگە و خەبات لە پىناو دەستەبەركردنى دادپەروەرىدا، زامنى سەلامەتى رەوتى چاكسازىيانەى يەكگرتوۋە، لە ھەردو گۆرەپانى سىياسى و كۆمەلەيتى دا .
- ۱۶- يەكگرتوۋ بالادەستتەي و دەمارگىرەى حزىي و مەزەبەى و دەمارگىرەى نەتەبەيەى رەت دەكاتەبەى بۇ سىرپەنەى ئاسەوارو كلتورى دىكتاتورىيەت تىدەكۆشنى و بەشدارى پىرۆسەو، بلاوكرىنەبەى رۇشنىرەى دىموكراسى و مافەكانى مروڧ و بەيەكەبە ئىانى ئاشتىخوزانەى نارەزومەندانەى ئىوان پىكەتەكان دەكات .

مادەى پىنچەم: نامانجەگان:

تېدەكۆشىن لەپىناي ھاتنەدى ئەم نامانجانە:

- ۱- بوژاندنەھەي پابەندبوونى زياتر بە بەھا ئىسلامىيەكانەھە لە ژيانى تاكە كەسى و خىزان و كۆمەلگادا، پەرەدان بە گيانى چاكەخوۋىيى و بىرى ميانەپرەويى لە ناو كۆمەلگەدا.
- ۲- ھەلداڭ بۇ بەدەستورى كردنى ژيانى سىياسى لە ھەرىمى كوردستاندا دەستەبەر كردنى سىستىمى كارگىرپى لامەركەزىي.
- ۳- پاراستنى دەستكەوت و مافەدەستورىيەكان و بەدەپھىئانى سەرچەم مافەكانى گەلى كوردستان و بە دەستھىئانى پىشتىوانى كۆمەلگاي نىو دەولەتى و گەلانى موسلمان و ناوچەكەي ناوھەندە جوړا و جوړەكان بۇ سەرەخوۋىيى، ھەك مافىكى سروشتى ھەرنەتەھەيەك .
- ۴- بەشدارىي لە پرۆسەي گىرپانەھەي چەسپاندىنى ناوچە كوردستانىيەكانى دەرەھەي ھەرىم بۇ سەر ھەرىمى كوردستان و ديارىكردنى سنورى ھەرىمى كوردستان .
- ۵- دامەزراندنى پەيوەندىەكى ھاوسەنگ لەنېوان گەلى كوردستان و گەلانى دراوسى و ناوچەكە، بۇ بەدەپھىئانى ناشتى و سەقامگىرى سىياسى نېوانمان و دۆزىنەھەي فۆرمى نوۋى بەيەكەھە ژيان لەسەر بنەماي رىزو بەرژەھەندى ھاوبەش .
- ۶- پىشتگىرى كردنى دۆزى رەواي كوردو مافە نەتەھەيەكانى گەلى كورد لە بەشەكانى تىرى كوردستان، لەپىناي بەدەستھىئانى مافەكانىيان بەرپىكارى ناشتى و دىموكراسى .
- ۷- پىشتگىرى كردنى مافە سىياسى و مەدەنى و نەتەھەيى و ئاينىەكانى نەتەھەي توركمان و كلدو سىريان و ناشوورى و ەھەب و يەزىدى و كاكەيى و سەرچەم پىكھاتە ئاينى و مەزھەبى و نەتەھەيەكانى تىرى گەلى كوردستان .
- ۸- بەنىشتمانى كردنى دام و دەزگا حوكمپرانىەكان و كۆتايى ھىنان بە ھەژمونيى حزبى لەسەريان و رىكخستنى پەيوەندىەكانى نېوان ئۆپۆزسىيۆن دەسەلات و، بوار رەخساندن بۇ بەشدارى كاراي ھەموو پىكھاتەكانى ھەرىم، دوور لە ھەموو چەشەنە ھەلاۋىر كردنىك لە تەھواي كايە سىياسى و ئابورى و كۆمەلايەتھەكاندا .
- ۹- كاراكردى رۆلى چاودىرى پەرلەمان و داواكارى گىشتى و ديوانى چاودىرى دارايى و دەستەي دەستپاكي، بەمەبەستى چاكسانى بنەپەتى ھەمەلايەنەھە قەلاچۆكردى دياردەي گەندەلى.

- ۱۰- بەدەپھىئانى دادپەرەھەي سىياسى و كۆمەلايەتى لە دابەشكردنەھەي دەسەلات و سامانداو شەفافیەت لە پىرسى نەوت و گاز و گىشت داھاتەكانى تر لە ھەرىمى كوردستان .
- ۱۱- بەرز راگرتنى رۆلى پىشەمەرگە لە پاراستنى كوردستان و بە نىشتمانى كردنى دام و دەزگاكانىيان و پىشكەشكردنى خزمەتى شىاو بە كەسوكارى شەھىدان و ئەنفالكران و قوربانىانى كىمىاباران .
- ۱۲- پەرورەدەكردن و پىگەياندىنى تاكى پەيامدارو خىزانى بەختەھەرو بونىاتنانى كۆمەلگەيەكى گەشەسەندو .
- ۱۳- پىشتگىرى كردنى میدىاي ئازاد و رۆژنامەگەرى ئەھلى و پىشتىوانى كردن لە دامەزراوەكانى كۆمەلگەي مەدەنى و كاراكردى رۆلىيان بۇ بەشدارى كردن لە گەلاھەكردنى پرۆژە ياساكان و چاودىرى دام و دەزگاكان و قوئۇرندەھەي گيانى دىموكراسى و فرەحزبى و لىبوردەيى لە كۆمەلگەداو نەبەزاندىنى بەھا بالاكان .

۱۴- بەرگىرىكىردن لە مافى تويۇرۇم ھەزارو كەمدەستەكانى كۆمەلگەو خاوەن پىداويستىيە تايىبەتەكان لە داينىكىردنى ژيانىكى شايستە بۇيان .

۱۵- بەدپەيئانى چاكسازى كۆمەلەيەتى، بۇ نەھىشتىنى نەرىتە نامۇكان و دياردە ناپەسەندى دژە نەتەپەيىيەكان.

۱۶- پشتيوانى كردن لە بەشدارى سياسى و كۆمەلەيەتى و ئابورى و پەروەردەيى زياترى ئافرەتان و كۆتايى ھيئان بە ستەمى كۆمەلەيەتى دژيان و ھەولدان بۇ گۆپىنى ھەر دۇخىك كە پىچەوانەى مافە رەواكانيانە.

۱۷- چەسپاندى بەھاكانى خىزان و رەتكردنەپەى توندوتىژى خىزانى و، پارىزگارى كردن لە مافەكانى مندال.

۱۸- دارشتنى سياسەتتىكى ئابورىيى نىشتىمانى و نەتەپەيى پوون و، پتەوكردنى ژىرخانى ئابورىيى و بەرھەمھيئان و فرەيى سەرچاۋەكانى داھات و، بەرەدان بە كەرتەكانى كشتوكال و ئاژەندارىيى و پىشەسازىيى، گەشتيارىيى و بوارەكانى ترو، پارىزگارى كردن لە بەرھەمە خۇمالىيەكان و كۆتايى ھيئان بە پاوانخوزى و لابردنى كۆت و بەندەكانى سەركەرتى تايىبەت و، پاراستنى مافەكانى كرىكاران و بەكاربەران و تويۇرۇم كەمدەستەكان و سەرمايەى ناو خۇيى و گىرگىدان بە گوندىگان .

۱۹- چاكسازى پەروەردەيى لە دام و دەزگا پەروەردەيىيەكانى ھەرىم و بەرەزكردنەپەى ئاستى زانستى سەرچەم ئاستەكانى خويۇندىن و خويۇندىن بالا و تويۇرۇمەپەى زانستى و ئاستى پەروەردەيى قوتايى و بەرەز راگرتنى پىشەى مامۇستايەتى .

۲۰- بەھىزكردنى ئىنتىماي نىشتىمانى لاوان و بەشدارى پىكردنىان لەكايە سياسىيەكاندا و پاراستنىان لەلادان و مادە بېھۇشكەرەكان و، دارشتنى سياسەتتىكى نىشتىمانى بۇ بەدەمەپە ھاتنى خواست و چاۋەروانەكانيان و گەشەدان بە تواناكانيان و بەنەبەكردنى ھەموو ئەو ھۆكارانەى دەبنە ھۆى كۆچكردنى لاوان و ھاۋلاتيان .

۲۱- گەشەدان بە ۋەرزى و ۋەرزىكاران و ۋەلامدانەپەى خواست و پىداويستەكانيان .

۲۲- پشتىگىرى كردنى بزاقى نوپكردنەپەى تويۇرۇمەپەى فەكرى ئىسلامى و دىالوگى ئىۋان ئاراستە فەكرى و سياسىيەكانى كوردستان و نووسەرو رۇشنىيران و گەشەدان بە ئەدەب و ھونەرى رەسەن و گىرگىدان بە تويۇرۇمەپەى زانستى .

۲۳- چاكسازى كردن لە سىستىمى تەندروستى ھەرىم و پارىزگارى كردن لە ژىنگەى كوردستان و پاراستنى سەرچاۋەكانى ناو .

۲۴- پشتيوانى كردن لە پۇلى زانايان و بانگخوزان و بەرەز راگرتنى پۇلى مەگەوت لە پاراستنى كۆمەلگاۋ ئاشتەوايى كۆمەلەيەتى و بايەخدان بە بەھا ئىسلامىيەكان .

۲۵- گىرگىدان بە پەۋەندى كوردى لە ھەندەران و پاراستنى كلتورى رەسەنيان و بەھىزكردنى ئىنتىماي نىشتىمانيان و كاركردن بۇ بەرھەمەندىپوون لە تواناكانيان لە پىنا و دۇزى رەۋاى گەلەكەماندا .

۲۶- پشتىگىرىكردنى رىكخراۋە مەدەنى و پىشەيى و جەماۋەرىيەكان و بەرەدان بە توانا پىشەيىيەكان و بەرھەمەندىپوون لىان لە خزمەتى كۆمەلگاۋا .

بەشى دووھم: (پېرەوى ناوخۇ)

مادەى شەشم: رېسائىنى كارى حزبى لى يەكگرتوودا:-

- ۱- ئەم پېرەوى دەستورى كارو چالاكى و پەيوەندى نىوان سەرجهم دامەزراوى دەزگاوى رېكخستىنەكانى يەكگرتووى، پابەندىبون پېووى ئەركى سەرشانى ھەموو ئەندامانە، لى ھەر پلىو ئاستىكىدا بىن.
- ۲- گەرەنتى بەشدار بوونى خوشكان لى سەرجهم ئۆرگان و دەزگاكانى حزب دا، بىو مەرجهى لى (۲۵٪) كەمتر نەبىت.
- ۳- دەستەبەركردنى شايستەبى لى سەر بىنەماى لىبوشاوبى و پىسپۆرى بۇ پۇستى حزبى، بى پىئى ژمارەى ئەندامانى رېكخستىن و، بۇ پۇستى حكومىش بى پىئى ژمارەى دەنگ.
- ۴- پاراستىنى ھاوسەنگى لى نىوان بېراردانى ناوئەند (مركزى لى ناراستەكردنى گشتى حزب و خوجىبەتى (لامركزى لى راپەراندىن و بېرپوەبىردنى كارو چالاكىەكاندا.
- ۵- دامەزراوى بالاكى كارەكانىان لى رېگەى بۇردى راپوئىكارى بېرپوەدەبەن لى كەسانى ئەكادىمى و ئەزمووندار.

مادەى ھەوتەم: كۆنگرە:-

بەكەم / بەرتىن دەسەلاتە لەمخىدا: خولى ئاساى (۴) سال جارىكە.

دووھم / بېكەت لى:

- ۱- ئەندامە دامەزىنەرەكان .
- ۲- ئەمىندارى گشتى و ئەندامانى ئەنجومەنى سەركردايتى و ئەندامانى دەستەى بالى بەنواداچوون و ئەندامانى ئەنجومەنى راپوئىكارى بالى لەھەر خولكىدا .
- ۳- بەرپرس و كارگىرانى (ئەنجومەنى بانگەواز و ئەنجومەنى پەروەردە رېكخستىن و ئەنجومەنى كاروبارى سىياسى و جەماوەرى) (دامەزراوى راپەراندىن و ھونەر و دامەزراوى كارگىرى و داراى) بەپىئى پەپىرەوى ناوخۇ .
۴. لىپرسراوى ئەنجومەنى بالى دەستە پىشەبىبەكان.
- ۵- بەرپرسى مەلبەندەكان و بەرپرسى لىقەكان بە پىئى پەپىرەوى ناوخۇ .
- ۶- بەرپرس و كارگىرانى ناوئەندەكان بە پىئى پەپىرەوى ناوخۇ .
- ۷- خاوەن پىلە تايبەتەكان لى پەرلەمان و حكومەتدا لى خولى خۇياندا نوئەرانى يەكگرتووى لى ولاتانى دەرەوى.
- ۸- ئەندامە ھەلبىزىراوەكان لى بازىنەكانى ھەلبىزاردندا، كە لەلايەن ئەنجومەنى سەركردايتى يەوى بازىنەكان دىارى دەكرىن .
- ۹- سەركردايتى بوى ھەبە ژمارەبەك كە بەپىوئىستى بزائى بۇ ئەندامانى كۆنگرە دىارى بىكات، بەمەرچى زىاتر نەبى لى (۰.۵٪) كۆى گشتى ئەندامانى كۆنگرە.

سەنئەت / نەرك و دەسەل تەكانس كۆنگرە:

- ۱- پەسەندىكى پىروگرامم و پىرەپەوى ناوخۇ و ستراتىجى چوار سالى داھاتووى حزب .
- ۲- ھەلبۇزاردىكى ئەمىندارى گىشتى بە زۆرىنەي رەھا (۵۰% + ۱) ى دەنگى دەنگەران .
- ۳- ھەلبۇزاردىكى ئەندامانى سەركردايەتى بە زۆرىنەي سادەي دەنگى دەنگەران .
- ۴- ھەلبۇزاردىكى ئەندامانى دەستەي بالاي بەدواداچوون بە زۆرىنەي سادەي دەنگى دەنگەران .
- ۵- ھەلبۇزاردىكى ئەندامانى دەستەي بالاي بەدواداچوون بە زۆرىنەي سادەي دەنگى دەنگەران .
- ۶- بىرئارەكانى بەزۆرىنەي رەھا (۵۰% + ۱) ى دەنگى دەنگەران دەرىت، جگە لە خالەكانى (۳، ۴، ۵) .
- ۷- خۇندنەھەي راپۇرتى گىشتى حىزب و ھەلسەنگاندنى ئەدای حىزب و ئورگانەكانى .

مادەي ھەشتەم: ئەمىندارى گىشتى :-

يەكەم / بېناسە: بەرپىرسى يەكەمە لە حزب دا و بەرپىرسى ئەنجومەنى راپەراندن و ئەنجومەنى گىشتى يە .
دووم / مەرجەكان:

- ۱- بەلاي كەمەو يەك خۇلى ئەندامىتى مەكتەبى سىياسى يان ئەنجومەنى راپەراندنى تەواكرديت .
- ۲- مافى گرتنەدەستى پۇستى ئەمىندارى گىشتى تەنھا دوو خۇلى يەك لەدواي يەكە .
- ۳- تەمەنى لە (۴۰) سال كەمتر نەبىت .
- ۴- لە حالەتى خالى بوونى پۇستى ئەمىندارى گىشتى، سەرۇكى ئەنجومەنى سەركردايەتى كارەكانى بەرپۇو دەبات كە لە (۶۰) رۇز زياتر نەبىت وە لەس ماوئەدە ئەندامانى كۆنگرە لەس خولەدا كۆدەبنەو بۇ ھەلبۇزاردىكى ئەمىندارى گىشتى بە پى ي مەرجەكان و رېكارەكان .

سەنئەت / نەرك و دەسەل تەكانس ئەمىندارى گىشتى :-

- ۱- نۆينەريەتى كردنى حزب و لىدوان بەناوئەھە لە چوارچىووى سىياسەتى گىشتى حزبدا .
- ۲- داواي كۆبوونەھە نااسايەكانى ھەرسى ئەنجومەنى راپەراندن و، ئەنجومەنى سەركردايەتى و ئەنجومەنى گىشتى دەكات .
- ۳- سەريەشتىكردنى گىشتى بەرپۇوچوونى كارەكانى ئەنجومەنى راپەراندن و ئەنجومەنى گىشتى .
- ۴- واژوكردن لەسەر داواي بوون بە ئەندام .
- ۵- واژوكردن لەسەر داوا بىرئارى سزاي دەركردن لە حزب .

- ۶- مانگانە لەگەل ئەنجومەنى راپەراندن كۆدەبىتەھە سالانە سەريەشتى كۆبوونەھەكانى ئەنجومەنى گىشتى دەكات .
- ۷- بۇي ھەيە لە كۆبوونەھەھە ھەر دەزگايەك بەشداربىت لە گىشت ئاستەكاندا، جگە لە دەستەي بالاي بەدواداچوون .
- ۸- بىرئاردان لەسەر خەرجىەكانى حىزب بە پى ي بوجەي پەسندكراو لەلەين ئەنجومەنى سەركردايەتى .
- ۹- لە كاتى ئامادەنبوونى ئەمىندارى گىشتى، سەرۇكى ئەنجومەنى سەركردايەتى رادەسپىرېت بۇ ئەندامانى كارەكانى .
- ۱۰- بۇردىكى راپۇرتى بىرئارسازى بۇ ئەمىندارى گىشتى پىكدەھىترىت .
- ۱۱- بەدواداچوون و لىپرسىنەھە لە ھەر بەرپىرس و دەزگايەك دەكات لە ئورگانەكانى حىزبدا جگە لە دەستەي بالاي بەدواداچوون .

يەكەم / پېئاسە :

• بەرئزترىن دەسەلاتە لە حزىدا لە نىوان دوو كۆنگرەدا بۇ داپشتنى پلان و ديارى كردنى سياسەتى گشتى حزب .

دووم / پېكھاتە : پېك دېت لە :

(۳۵) ئەندام و (۲) ئەندامى يەدەك كە ئەندامى كۆنگرە ھەلىان دەبىژىرن، بە پىي رىژەي پارىژگاگان، لەسەر بىنەماي ژمارەي ئەندامان و رەچاوكردنى كۆتاي خوشكان.

سەنەم / سەرجەكانى ئەندامىتى :

(۱) تەمەنى لە (۲۵) سال كەمتر ئەبىت.

(۲) ماوەي ھاتنى بۇ نىو حزب لە (۹) سال كەمتر ئەبىت.

(۳) خاوەن دىدىكى سياسى و رۆشتىرىيەكى ئىسلامى و ئەزموونىكى كردارى و توانايەكى سەركردانە بىت.

(۴) پىويستە بەپىي لىھاتتەكانى بەرپىسيارىمەتى بۇ ئۆرگانىكى حزب لەئەستۇ بگرئو، بە پىچەوانوۋە ئەندامىمەتى ئەم ئەنجومەنە لە دەست دەدات، ئەندامى يەدەگ لە شوئى دادەنرىت .

(۵) بۇردىكى راوئىژكارى برىار سازى بۇ ئەنجومەنى سەركردايەتى پىك دەمىنرىت .

چوارەم / ئەرك و دەسەلاتەكانى ئەنجومەنى سەركردايەتى :

۱- سەركى ئەنجومەن لەناو خۇياندا ھەلدەبىژىرن بە زۇرىنەي رەھا (۱+۵۰) ي ئەندامان لە ماوەي يەك ھەفتەدا.

۲- رازگىرك لە ناو خۇيدا ھەلدەبىژىرت بە زۇرىنەي رەھاي دەنگى دەنگدەران لە يەكەم كۆبوونەوۋەي ئەنجومەنى سەركردايەتى لە ماوەي يەك ھەفتەدا.

۳- ھەلبىژاردنى ئەندامانى ئەنجومەنى راپەراندنكە ژمارەيان (۱۲) كەسەو بە شىوۋەيەكى جىاجىا ھەر جارەي بۇ پۇستىك ھەلبىژاردن ئەنجام دەدرىت .

۴- ھەلبىژاردنى بەرپىسى دامەنزاوۋە ئۆرگانە ناوۋەندىيەكانى حىزب و بەرپىسى مەلبەندەكان .

۵- كۆبوونەوۋەكانى بە ئامادەبوونى (۱) ئەندامانى گرى دەدرىت.

۶- برىارەكانى بە زۇرىنەي رەھا (۱+۵۰) ي ئامادەبووان دەدرىت، جگە لەي بېگانەي رىژەي تايبەتى بۇ ديارى كراوۋە.

۷- لىژنەي كاتى بەپىي پىويست پىك دەمىنى.

۸- پىكھىنانى لىژنەي ھەمىشەيى پلاننان و ھەلسەنگاندن كە زىاتر نەبئ لە (۵) ئەندام بۇ دانانى پلانى گشتى و بەدپھىنانى ئەو ستراتىژو پروگرام و ئامانجانەي كە كۆنگرە پەسەندى كردوۋە.

۹- برىاردان لەسەر بەشدارى كردن، يان بەشدارى ئەكردن لە كايىنەي حكومەتدا يان ئۆپۇزسىيۇن بوون دواي راوئىژ لەگەل ئەنجومەنى دەقەرەكان و ناوۋەندو مەلبەندەكان بە (۱) ي دەنگى دەنگدەران.

۱۰- پەسەندىكردنى پالىئوراوان بۇ ئەندامىمەتى پەرلەمان و پۇستە وەزارىيەكان و پلە تايبەتەكانى سەرو ئەنجومەنى پارىژگا لەسەر بىنەماي ژمارەي دەنگ .

۱۱- برىاردان لەسەر ھەلوئىستە سياسىيە نىشتمانىيە گرىنگەكان و پرسە گرىنگەكان بە (۲/۲) ي دەنگى ئەندامان.

۱۲- پەسەندىكردنى ھاوپەيمانىمەتى سياسى لەگەل حزب و ھىزە سياسىيەكاندا بە (۳/۲) ي دەنگى ئەندامان.

۱۳- پەسەندىكردنى بوجەي سالانەي حزب.

- ۱۴- بانگه‌یشت کردن بۆ كۆبۆونەوه‌ی ئاناسایی ئەندامانی كۆنگره له خولێ خۆیدا به (۳/۲)ی دەنگی ئەندامانی ئەنجومەنی سەرکردایەتی .
- ۱۵- هەلپەساردنی ئەندامی ئەندامانی سەرکردایەتی به (۳/۲)ی دەنگی ئەندامان.
- ۱۶- رەزامەندی لەسەر كۆنەوه یان پەيوەستکردن یان راگرتنی مەلەبەند یان هەر ئۆرگانیکى گشتی به (۳/۲)ی دەنگی ئەندامان.
- ۱۷- پرسینەوه له ئەمىندارى گشتی و، بەرپرسە بالاکانی حزب به (۳/۲)ی دەنگی ئەندامان بەپێی لائىحه‌یكى رۆشن که دواتر سەرکردایەتی پەسەندی دەکات.
- ۱۸- بۆی هەیه گۆنگره پێش و پاش بخات به رەزامەندی (۳/۲)ی دەنگی ئەندامان به مەرجیک له سالیك زیاتر نەبێ.
- ۱۹- رەزامەندی دەدات لەسەر لائىحه‌ی ئۆرگانە گشتیەکانی حزب به رێژە (۱+۰/۵)ی دەنگی دەنگدەران.
- ۲۰- پەسەند کردنی لیستی ناوی ئەندامانی ئەنجومەنی راویژکاری بالآ بەپێی لائىحه‌یك كەبە (۱+۰/۵)ی دەنگی دەنگدەرانى دیارى دەکریت؛ که ئەنجومەنی راپەراندن پێشنياری دەکات به زۆرینه‌ی سادەى دەنگی ئەندامانی.
- ۲۱- كۆبۆونەوه ئاساییەکانی وەرژین، یان لەسەر داواى ئەمىندارى گشتی یان ئەنجومەنی راپەراندن كۆ دەبیته‌وه، بۆ كۆبۆونەوه‌ی ئاناسایی، یان پێشنياری سەرۆکی ئەنجومەنی سەرکردایەتی و پشتیوانی کردنی لانی كەم (۵) ئەندام، یان لەسەر پێشنياری (۱۰) ئەندام.
- ۲۲- پەسەندکردنی وازنامەى ئەمىندارى گشتی و ئەندامانی سەرکردایەتی و ئەندامانی ئەنجومەنی گشتی و دەستەى بالآی بەدواداچوون به (۳/۲)ی دەنگی ئەندامان.
- ۲۳- دووباره هەلپەساردنەوه‌ی سەرۆکی ئەنجومەنی سەرکردایەتی و ئەنجومەنی راپەراندن و ئۆرگانە ناوەندیەکانی حیزب و بەرپرسی ئەنجومەنی دەقەرەکان و بەرپرسی مەلەبەندەکان داواى تێپەربوونی دوو سال بەسەر كۆنگره‌دا داواى كۆبۆونەوه‌ی ئەنجومەنی گشتی .
- ۲۴- پەرله‌مانتار و وەزیرەکان به پێی پێویست که سەرکردایەتی دیاری دەکات بەشداری پێ دەکات له كۆبۆونەوه‌کانی ئەنجومەنی سەرکردایەتی دا .
- ۲۵- پیکهینانی لیژنەیه‌کی هاوبەش له نیوان ئەندامانی سەرکردایەتی و دەستەى بالآی بەدواداچوون بۆ راقه‌ی لیكدانەوه‌ی هەر خالیکی پەیره‌وپرۆگرام که راقه‌ی جیاوازی ئی بکەیتەوه .
- ۲۶- پەسەند کردنی لائىحه‌ی خەرجیەکانی حزب.
- ۲۷- به پێی پێویست بریاری پیکهینانی سەنتەری جۆراوجۆر دەدات وەك (سەنتەری توێژینه‌وه‌ی ستراتیژی سیاسی، سەنتەری توێژینه‌وه‌ی راپرسی، سەنتەری پەره‌پێدانی فکری ئیسلامی، پەیمانگای پیگه‌یانندی کادیران و بۆرە جۆراوجۆرەکان).
- ۲۸- لیپرسراوی مەلەبەندەکان بەشداری پێ دەکات له كۆبۆونەوه‌کانی ئەنجومەنی سەرکردایەتی .

مادەى دەيىم: ئەرك و دەسەلاتەكانى سەرۆكى ئەنجومەنى سەرگردايەتى:-

- ۱- نامادەكردنى كارنامەى كۆيۈنەۋەى ئەنجومەن بەراۋىژ لەگەل ئەنجومەنى پاپەراندن .
- ۲- ئاگاداركردنەۋەى ئەندامان بۇ بەشدارى لە كۆيۈنەۋەكاندا راستەخۇ يان لە ريگاي رازگرەۋە .
- ۳- سەرۆكايەتى كۆيۈنەۋەكانى ئەنجومەن دەكات و واژۇ لەسەر كۆنۈوس و پريارهكان دەكات .
- ۴- سەرپەرشتى لپژئە كاتتەكانى ئەنجومەن دەكات تا بەرپرسیان بۇ ديارى دەكرت .
- ۵- پرسینەۋە لە جئ بەجئ كردنى پريارو راسپاردەكانى ئەنجومەن لە ئورگانەكانى حزب دا .
- ۶- لە كۆيۈنەۋەكانى ئەنجومەنى پاپەراندن بەشدارى دەكات .
- ۷- لە حالەتى خالى بوونى پۆستى ئەمىندارى گشتى، سەرۆكى ئەنجومەنى سەرگردايەتى كارەكانى بەرپۆۋە دەبات كە لە (۶۰) رۆژ زياتر نەبیت وە لەۋ ماۋەيەدا ئەندامانى كۆنگرە لەۋ خولەدا كۆدەبنەۋە بۇ ھەلئاردنى ئەمىندارى گشتى بە پى ى مەرجهكان و ريكارەكان .

مادەى يانزەيىم: ئەنجومەنى گشتى (المجلس العام):-

پەكەم / پیناسە :

ئەنجومەنىكى گشتى يە بۇ ھەلسەنگاندنى ئەدای سالانەى سەرجهم يوارەكانى حيزب و ئەمىندارى گشتى سەرپەرشتى دەكات و لەكاتى پيويستدا كۆيۈنەۋەى نائاسايى ئەنجام دەدات لەسەر داۋاي ئەمىندارى گشتى يان سەرگردايەتى .

مەمور / پىكھاتە: ئەم ئەنجومەنە پىكديت لە:-

- ۱- ئەمىندارى گشتى + ئەندامانى ئەنجومەنى سەرگردايەتى + ئەندامانى ئەنجومەنى پاپرژكارى بالآ + بەرپرسى ئۆرگان و دامەزراۋە ناۋەندىەكان بەپى ى پپەرەۋى ناوخۇ + ئەندامانى دەستەى بالآى بەدواداچوون + بەرپرسى مەلئەندەكان + ئەندامانى فراكسيۇنەكانى پەرلەمان و ەزيرەكان لەۋ خولەدا + سەرۆكى فراكسيۇنى پاريزگاكان + دامەزرىنەران + سەفیرەكان + لپپرسراۋى ئەنجومەنى بالآى دەستە پيشەيەكان + نوينەرانى حزب لە ولاتان + سەرۆكى بۆردەكان .

- ۲- ئەوانەى ئەنجومەنى سەرگردايەتى بە پيويستى بزائى بۇ بەشدارى كردن بە زۆرىنەى دەنگى رەھاي دەنگى دەنگدەران، بەمەرچئ لە ريژەى (۱۰٪) ئەندامانى ئەنجومەنى گشتى زياد نەكات .

سەيىم / ئەرك و ەستەلاتەكانى:

- ۱- پياداچوونەۋە ھەلسەنگاندنى كارو چالاكى گشتى حزب و ھەلويستە سياسىيەكانى بەمەبەستى پاراستنى ھاۋسەنگىەكان لەماۋەى سالى راپردودا .
- ۲- ناراستەكردنى راسپاردەى پيويست لە يوارەكانى كاروبارى سياسى و بانگەۋازو كارو چالاكى ناوخويى گشت ئورگانەكانى حزب بۇ ئەنجومەنى سەرگردايەتى بۇ ماۋەى داھاتوو .

بەكەم / پىناسە :

ئۆزگەنچىكى بالاي بەدواداچوون و دادوهرىسى و چاودىرىسى كىردىنى كارو چالاكى و پرسە ناوخويىبەكانى
حىزىبە تەواوى مافى ئەندامانى ئەم دەستەبە ئەندامانى ئەنجومەنى سەركىردايەتى ھاوتان .

ھوومە / پىكھاتە :

- ۱- پىك دىت لە (۹) ئەندام و (۲) يەدەگ كە لە كۆنگرە ھەلدەبىزىرىن .
- ۲- سەرۆكى دەستە كە بە زۆرىنەى دەنگى ئەندامانى ھەلدەبىزىردىت .
- ۳- دەستەى كارگىرى لەئىو ئەندامانىدا دىارى دەكرىت كە ژمارەيان (۳) كەسە، بۆ راپەراندنى
كاروبارى پۆژانە.
- ۴- بۆردىكى رايۆنكارى برىارسازى بۆ دەستە پىك دەمىنرىت .

سەبەم / مەرجەكانى ئەندامىتەى «دەستە برىتەن لە :

- ۱. تەمەنى لە (۴۰) سال كەمتر ئەبىت.
- ۲. ماوہى ئەندامىتەى لە حزىدا (۹) سال كەمتر ئەبى.
- ۳. لانى كەم خولپك ئەندامى سەركىردايەتى بووى، يان خاوەنى ئەزمون و شارەزايى بى لە يەكى لە
بوارەكانى كارى ئەم دەستەبە .

چوومە / نەرك و مەسەلتەكانى «دەستەى بالاي بەدواداچوون :-

- ۱- چاودىرىسى و بەدواداچوون دەكات بۆ ئۆزگەنە بالاكانى حىزب، لە ئەمىندارىتەى و ئەنجومەنى
راپەراندن و ئەنجومەنى سەركىردايەتى لەرووى پابەندى بە پەپرەپروگرام، وە كىشە ناوخويىبەكانىيان
چارەسەردەكات بە پىى ھاوسەنگى راگرتن لە نىوان نەرك و مافەكانىياندا بە پىى پروگرام و پەپرەوى
ناوخوى حىزب .
- ۲- كۆبونەوہ ناسايىبەكانى مانگانەبە.

- ۳- داكۆكى كىردن لە مافى ئەندامان لەھەموو ناستەكاندا بەپىى پىپرە پروگرامى ناوخو، لەدادوهرىدا
برىارەكانى (ملزم) نو برىارەكانى بە (۳/۲)ى دەنگى ئەندامان پەسەند دەكرىن.
- ۴- چاودىرى ھەلبىژاردنە ناوخويىبەكان دەكات لەرووى لائى بون و ياسايى بوونەوہ.
- ۵- پۆلى داواكارى گىشتى دەبىنرىت بۆ پرسە ناوخويىبەكانى حىزب.
- ۶- رۆلى يەكلاكەرەوہ دەبىت لە ئەگەرى رودانى جىياوازى راو بۆ چوون لە نىوان ئۆزگەنە بالاكاندا لە
پىرەوى ناوخوۋدا.

بەكەم / پېئاسە:

بالاترىن دەزگاي راپەراندنە بۆ جۆبەجۆ كىردنى بېرىپكەننى ئەنجومەنى سەركرادىيەتى و راسپاردەكانى ئەنجومەنى گىشتى و بە ئەنجام گەياندنى پىلانى گىشتى حىزب، لەسەر جەم ئەنجومەنەكانى بانگەوازى پەرورەدە و كاروبارى سىياسى و بوارەكانى تردا، كە لەلایەن ئەنجومەنى سەركرادىيەتەيەو لە ئاى ئەندامانى دا بە زۆرىنەى دەنگى دەنگدەران دىياری دەكرىن، بەپىئى تايپەتمەندى ھەر ئەنجومەنىك، وە لەبەردەم ئەنجومەنى سەركرادىيەتى حىزبدا بەرپىسىارە.

بەكەم / پېئاسە: پىك دىت لە:-

- ئەمىندارى گىشتى بەرپىس .
- (۴) كارگىر كە ئەنجومەنى سەركرادىيەتى بە ھەلبۇزاردن بە زۆرىنەى دەنگى دەنگدەران لە ئاى ئەندامانىدا دىيارىان دەكات بۆ بەرپىوئەبىردنى بواری كارگىرپى و دۆسىكەكانى بواری كارەكانى ئەم ئەنجومەنە.
- بەرپىسى ئەنجومەنى كاروبارى بانگەواز كەبە ھەلبۇزاردن لە ئىو ئەندامانى سەركرادىيەتدا بە زۆرىنەى دەنگى دەنگدەرانى دىياری دەكرىت.
- بەرپىسى ئەنجومەنى كاروبارى پەرورەدە رىكخستەن كەبە ھەلبۇزاردن لە ئىو ئەندامانى سەركرادىيەتدا بە زۆرىنەى دەنگى دەنگدەرانى دىياری دەكرىت.
- بەرپىسى ئەنجومەنى كاروبارى سىياسى و جەماوهرى كەبە ھەلبۇزاردن لە ئىو ئەندامانى سەركرادىيەتدا بە زۆرىنەى دەنگى دەنگدەرانى دىياری دەكرىت.
- بەرپىسى ئەنجومەنى دەقەرەكان كەبە ھەلبۇزاردن لە ئىو ئەندامانى سەركرادىيەتدا بە زۆرىنەى دەنگى دەنگدەرانى دىياری دەكرىت.

سەنەم / نەرك و دەسەلتەكانى ئەنجومەنى راپەراندن:

- ۱- جىبەجىكردى بېرىپكەننى ئەنجومەنى سەركرادىيەتى .
- ۲- داواكردى كۆپوئەيە نائاسايى ئەنجومەنى سەركرادىيەتى.
- ۳- دەركردى بەيئاننامە ھەلوئىستەكانى حزب.
- ۴- بەزۆرىنەى رەھاي ئەندامان ھەلوئىستەكانى حزب دىياری دەكات لە كۆپوئەيە فەرمىيەكانىدا، راي ئەمىندار لەكاتى بەرامبەر وەستانى دەنگەكاندا يەكلاكرەو دەپن.
- ۵- پالائىنى بەرپىس بۆ ھەر ئۆرگان و دامەزراوہەك كەلە دەرەوہى سەركرادىيەتى كەسىكى بۆ دىياری بكرى، بە رايۆن لەگەل دەزگاي پەيوەندىدار.
- ۶- رەزامەندى بە زۆرىنەى رەھاي بۆ دىياری كىردنى خەرجىيەكان و وەبەرھىتان.
- ۷- دانان و گۆرپىنى كارگىرپانى ئەنجومەنەكان و ئەندامانى دامەزراوہ و ئۆرگان و دەزگاكانى حزب، بەراويۆن لەگەل ئۆرگانە پەيوەندىدارەكەدا.
- ۸- بېرىپكەن بە زۆرىنەى رەھاي (۵۰% + ۱) دەنگى دەنگدەران دەپىت .
- ۹- كۆپوئەيە دەورى ئەنجام دەدات لەگەل تەوايى ئۆرگانەكاندا .

- ۱۰- كۆپوئەيە ئاساييەكانى مانگانەيەي، دانىشتنى نائاسايى لەسەر داواي ئەمىندارو بەپىئى پىئويست دەپن .
- ۱۱- ئامادەكردى بودجەي سالانەى حزب بۆ بەردەم ئەنجومەنى سەركرادىيەتى.
- ۱۲- سەپەرشتى كاروبارى راگەياندن و ھونەر لە حىزبدا دەكات .
- ۱۳- سەپەرشتى كاروبارى كارگىرپى و دارايى لە حىزبدا دەكات .
- ۱۴- بەرپىسى (دامەزراوہى راگەياندن و ھونەر) و بەرپىسى دامەزراوہى (كارگىرپى و دارايى) بەشدارى پى دەكات لە كۆپوئەيەكانى بە گۆرپەي پىويست .

ماده‌ی چواردهیم م : نه نجومه‌نی کاروباری بانگه‌واز :-

یه‌کهم / پیناسه :

نه‌نجومه‌نی‌که ته‌واوی کاروباری بانگه‌واز و بانگخوازان و زانایان و زانسته شه‌ریه‌کان و روشنیبری نیسلامی و کاروباری کومه‌لایه‌تی به‌ریوه‌ده‌بات .

دووم / بیتک‌هاته : بیتک دیت له :

- ۱- به‌پرسی نه‌نجومه‌ن که نه‌ندامی نه‌نجومه‌نی راپه‌راندنه .
 - ۲- (۱ تا ۳) کارگی‌ری نه‌نجومه‌ن .
 - ۳- به‌پرسی به‌شی بانگه‌واز و بانگخوازان و روشنیبری نیسلامی .
 - ۴- به‌پرسی به‌شی کاروباری کومه‌لایه‌تی .
 - ۵- به‌پرسی به‌شی زانایان و زانسته شه‌ریه‌کان .
 - ۶- به‌پرسی به‌شی ری‌کخواه ناکومی و بانگه‌وازیه‌کان و خیرخوازیه‌کان .
 - ۷- به‌پرسی ده‌نگای راگه‌یاندنه بانگه‌وازیه‌کان .
 - ۸- لی‌پرسراوی ناوه‌نده‌کانی په‌یوه‌ست به نه‌نجومه‌ن له نه‌نجومه‌نی ده‌قهره‌کان .
- سه‌ییم / بوردیکی راپی‌زکاری بریار سازی له که‌سانی پسپور بو‌نم نه‌نجومه‌نه پی‌کده‌هینری‌ت .**
- چوارهم / ته‌واوی کارو چالاکیه‌کانیان به پی‌ی لانیحه‌یه‌کی په‌سه‌ندکراوی سه‌رک‌رایه‌تی ری‌ک ده‌خرین .**

ماده‌ی پازده‌هم م : نه نجومه‌نی کاروباری په‌روه‌ده‌و ری‌کخستن :-

یه‌کهم / پیناسه :

نه‌نجومه‌نی‌که ته‌واوی کاروباری چالاکیه‌کانی ری‌کخستن و په‌روه‌ده‌و پی‌گه‌یاندن و نامارو روشنیبری و هوشیاری له ناوخوی حیزیدا به‌ریوه‌ده‌بات .

دووم / بیتک‌هاته : بیتک دیت له :-

- ۱- به‌پرسی نه‌نجومه‌ن که نه‌ندامی نه‌نجومه‌نی راپه‌راندنه .
- ۲- (۱ تا ۳) کارگی‌ری نه‌نجومه‌ن .
- ۳- به‌پرسی به‌شی په‌روه‌ده‌و پی‌گه‌یاندن و منه‌هج .
- ۴- به‌پرسی به‌شی ری‌کخستن و هوشیاری .
- ۵- به‌پرسی به‌شی روشنیبری و تو‌ی‌زینه‌وه‌ی فکری .
- ۶- به‌پرسی به‌شی نامارو دیکومینتاری .
- ۷- به‌پرسی ناوه‌ندی ری‌کخستن‌نی ده‌روه‌ه .

- ۸- بهرپررسی بهشی کاروباری خوشکان .
 - ۹- بهرپررسی بهشی قوتابیان و لاوان .
 - ۱۰- لیپرسراوی ناوهندهکانی په یوه ست به نهجمه ن له نهجمه نې دهقهره کان .
- سښیم / بۆردیکي راویژکاری بریارسازی له کهسانی پسیپۆر بۆ نهجمه نې پیک دهینتریت .
چوارم / نهجمه نې به لایحه یه کی په سندرکراو له لایه ن سهرکردایه تیه وه تهواوی کاروبارهکانی ریک دهخریت .

ماده ی شازدهه م / نهجمه نې کاروباری سیاسی و جه ماوه ری :-

یهکم / پیناسه :

نهجمه نې که تهواوی کاروبارو چالاکیهکانی هه لئیزاردن و په رله مان و حکومت و په یوه ندى په سیاسی یهکانی حزب و ریکخواه پیشه یی و جه ماوه ریبهکان و کاروباری زانکو و خویندنې بالا بهرپوه دهبات .

دوهم / پیکدیت له :

- ۱- سهروکی نهجمه ن که نهدامی نهجمه نې راپه راندنه .
 - ۲- (۱ تا ۳) کارگیږی نهجمه ن .
 - ۳- بهرپررسی بهشی کاروباری په رله مان و حکومت .
 - ۴- بهرپررسی بهشی هه لئیزاردن .
 - ۵- بهرپررسی بهشی کاروباری په یوه ندى په سیاسیبهکانی حزب .
 - ۶- بهرپررسی بهشی کاروباری ریکخواه پیشه یی و جه ماوه ریبهکان و وهرزش .
 - ۷- بهرپررسی بهشی کاروباری زانکو و خویندنې بالا .
 - ۸- بهرپررسی بهشی لیکولینه وه و پیوه رو راپرسی .
 - ۹- لیپرسراوی ناوهندهکانی په یوه ست به نهجمه ن له نهجمه نې دهقهره کان .
- سښیم / بۆردیکي راویژکاری و یاسایی بریارسازی له کهسانی پسیپۆر بۆ نهجمه نې پیکده هیتریت .
چوارم / تهواوی کارو چالاکیهکانی به لایحه یه کی په سندرکراو له لایه ن سهرکردایه تیه وه ریک دهخریت .

ماده ی هه قدهه م : دامه زراوه ی راگه یانندن و هوته ر :-

یهکم : پیناسه :

هه دامه زراوه یه که تهواوی کاروباری میدیایی و هوته ری له حییزیدا بهرپوه دهبات .

دوهم : پیکهاته : پیک دیت له :

- ۱ . بهرپررسی دامه زراوه که نهدامیکی سهرکردایه تی یه .
- ۲ . بهرپوه بهری که نالی سپیډه .
- ۳ . بهرپوه بهری سایتی کوردیو .
- ۴ . کارگیږی که ناله ته له فزیونی و رادیوییه لۆکالیبهکان .

۵. کارگیری کاروباری هونهری.

۶. کارگیر بۆ هەر دهنگایهکی مهركهزی كه نوآتر دروست دهكریت.

۷. ئەم دامەزراوهیه له لایەن ئەنجومەنی راپەراندنەوه له رینگای یهكئ له كارگیرهكانیهوه سه‌ره‌رشتهی دهكریت.

• ته‌واوی كارو چالاكیه‌كانی ئەم دامەزراوه‌یه به پێی لایحه‌یه‌کی په‌سندكراو له سه‌ركرده‌یه‌تی رێكده‌خریت.

ماده‌ی هه‌ژده‌هه‌م: دامەزراوه‌ی کارگیری و دارایی:

یه‌که‌م / پێناسه:

ئەم دامەزراوه‌یه كه ته‌واوی کاروباری کارگیری و دارایی حزب به‌پێوه‌ده‌بات .

دووه‌م / پێکهاته: پێک دیت له:

۱- به‌رپرسی دامەزراوه .

۲- (۴) کارگیر بۆ به‌شه‌کانی (دارایی گشتی + کارگیری گشتی + ووردبینی و چاودێری + وه‌به‌ره‌یه‌تان) .

۳- یه‌که کارگیری و داراییه‌کان (الوحدات الحسابية).

سه‌یهم / سه‌رچاوه‌کان: دارایی حیزب:

۱- بوجه‌ی حکومت به‌ پێی یاسای حیزبه‌کان .

۲- ئەم یره ئابوونه‌ی كه له پله تاییه‌ته‌كان و سه‌رجه‌م رێكخستنه‌كان وهرده‌گیریت .

۳- به‌خشین له‌لایه‌ن خێرخوازانوه .

۴- قازانجی پرۆژه‌کانی وه‌به‌ره‌یه‌تان .

۵- هەر یارمه‌تیه‌کی تری بۆ مه‌رج .

• ته‌واوی كارو چالاكیه‌كانیان به پێی لایحه‌یه‌کی په‌سندكراو له سه‌ركرده‌یه‌تی رێكده‌خریت .

ماده‌ی نۆزده‌هه‌م: ئەنجومەنی راپێژگاری:

یه‌که‌م / ئەنجومەنی راپێژگاری بۆ كە ژماره‌ی پێکهاته‌ی ئەرك و ده‌سه‌لاتی به‌ لایحه‌یه‌کی په‌سندكراو له سه‌ركرده‌یه‌تی دیاری ده‌كریت.

دووه‌م / ئەنجومەنی راپێژگاری ده‌قه‌ر كه ژماره‌ی پێکهاته‌ی ئەرك و ده‌سه‌لاتی به‌ لایحه‌یه‌کی په‌سندكراو له سه‌ركرده‌یه‌تی دیاری ده‌كریت.

يەكەم / پېئاسە :

ئەنجومەنىكى ھىزىيە لەسەر ئاستى پارىزگاىەك يان زىاتر پىك دەھىئىرى، بە مەرجى لە دوو مەلئەند كەمتر ئەبى، بۇ سەرپەرشىتى كاروبارەكانى ھىزب لە سنورى دەسەلاتەكانى ئەو ئەنجومەنەداو پولى تەنسىقى و ھاوكارى و چاوپوشنى گشتى ئاستى دەقەرەكە دەبىئىت .

دووم / پىكھاتە: پىك دىت لە :-

- ۱- بەرپىسى ئەنجومەن كە ئەندامىكى ئەنجومەنى سەركردايەتى يە .
- ۲- (۱ تا ۲) كارگىرى ئەنجومەن .
- ۳- ئەندامانى ئەنجومەنى راپەراندن و ئەنجومەنى سەركردايەتى و دەستەى بالاي بەدواداچوون كە دانىشتووى سنورى ئەو دەقەرەن بەپىى پىرەو پروگرام .
- ۴- بەرپىسى مەلئەندو ئۆرگانە ناوئەندىەكانى تىرى يەكگرتووى كە دانىشتووى سنورى دەقەرەكەن بەپىى پىرەو پروگرام .
- ۵- بەرپىسى ناوئەندەكان .
- ۶- ئەندامانى پەرلەمان و ھەزىرو ھەكىل ھەزىر و سەفەرەكان و بەرپوئەبەرە گشتى يەكان ئەگەر ئەو كەسانە خۇيان لە ئاستى ئەندام مەلئەند بەرەوزورتر بوون و بەپىى لائىھەى ناوخوى يەكگرتووى، كە دانىشتووى سنورەكەن لەو خولەى خۇياندا.
- ۷- بەرپىسى فراكسىيۇنى ئەنجومەنى پارىزگاكانى سنورى دەقەرەكە.

سەئەم / نەرك و دەسەلاتەكان :-

- ۱- دانانى بەرنامەو مىكانىزم بۇ جىئەجىئە كىردن و راپەراندنى برىارەكانى ھىزب لە ئەنجومەنى سەركردايەتى و ئەنجومەنى راپەراندن و ئۆرگان و دامەزراو ناوئەندىەكانى ھىزب لە سنورى دەسەلاتەكانىاندا .
- ۲- پەسەندكىردنى پالىوراوانى ئەنجومەنى پرېزگاكانىيان لە سنورى خۇيدا .
- ۳- بەرپوئەبىردن و راپەراندنى ھەلمەتەكانى ھەلبىئاردن لە سنورەكەيدا بە پىسى بەرنامەو پلانى پەسندكراوى ئەنجومەنى سەركردايەتى و بەھاوكارى ئەنجومەنى كاروبارى سىياسى و جەماوەرى .
- ۴- بەرزكردنەوئەى راپۇرت و كۆنوسى كۆپوونەوئەكانىيان بۇ ئەنجومەنى راپەراندن.
- ۵- كۆپوونەوئە ئاسايىيەكانىيان مانگانەپەس، كۆپوونەوئەى ناسايش لەسەر داواى سەرۆكى ئەنجومەن و، بەپىى پىويسىت ئەنجام دەدرئ و ھەرەھا كۆپوونەوئەكانى دوو جۇر دەبىئت كۆپوونەوئەى گشتى و كۆپوونەوئەى بەرپىسى ئۆرگانەكانى ھىزب .
- ۶- لەسەر ئاستى دەقەرەكان ئەنجومەنى راوئىزكارى پىك دەھىئىرى بە پىسى لائىھەپەكى پەسەندكراوى ئەنجومەنى سەركردايەتى.
- ۷- سەرپەرشىتى چالاكىە خۇجىيەكانى سنورى دەقەرەكەى دەكات .

۸- مانگانە لەگەڵ بەرپررسی مەلەبەندەکان و ناوەندەکان و ئۆرگانەکان کۆدەبیتەوه یان بەپێی پێویست.

۹- سەرپەرشتی ریکخستنی پەيوەندیەکانی حزب دەکات لەسەر ناستی دەقەر، لە ژێر رۆشنایی ئاراستەکانی ئەنجومەنی راپەراندن و سیاسەتی گشتی حزب .

۱۰- پالوتنی پلە تایبەتەکانی سەرو پارێزگا بۆ ئەنجومەنی سەرکردایەتی .

چوارەم / بە لائەحیکە پەسەندکراو لەلایەن ئەنجومەنی سەرکردایەتیەوه ئەرك و چالاکیەکانی رێک دەخرێت.

مادە ۱ بیست و یەك : ئاوەند :-

یەكەم / پێناسە :

ئۆرگانێکی حزبیە لەسەر ناستی ئەنجومەنی دەقەر پێکدێت، ئەركی جێبەجێکردنی پلان و بەرنامەیی ئەنجومەنە ناوەندیەکانە لەسنوری دەسەلاتیدا .

دووەم / پێکدێت لە :

۱- بەرپررسی ئاوەند

۲- ژمارەیهك کارگێڕ که لائەحە دیاری دەکات دواي رەزامەندی ئەنجومەنی راپەراندن.

• تەواوی کار و چالاکیەکانی بە لائەحیکە پەسەندکراو لەلایەن سەرکردایەتیەوه رێک دەخرێت.

مادە ۱ بیست و دوو / مەلەبەند :-

یەكەم / پێناسە :

ئەو دەزگایە کە سەرپەرشتی و بەرپۆوەبردنی کاروباری حزب و ریکخستنهکانی لە ئەستۆ دەگرێت لە سنوری قەزایەك یان زیاتردا .

دووەم / پێکھاتە : پێک دێت لە :

۱- بەرپررسی مەلەبەند کە بەشداری کۆیوونەوهکانی ئەنجومەنی سەرکردایەتی دەکات .

۲- () کارگێڕ بۆ بەرپۆوەبردنی بەشەکانی مەلەبەند.

۳- بەرپررسی لقیەکان.

۴- ئەنجومەنی مەلەبەند.

سێیەم / بەشەکانی مەلەبەند کارەکانیان لە رێگای پێکھێنانی لیژنەوه رادەپەرێنن.

چوارەم / کۆیوونەوه ناساییەکانی (۱۵) رۆژ جاریکە.

• تەواوی کار و چالاکیەکانی بە لائەحیکە پەسەندکراو لەلایەن ئەنجومەنی پەروەردەو ریکخستنهوه ریکدەخرێت.

مادەى بېست و سى : ئق :-

يەكەم : پىناسە :

ئەس دەنگاھىيە، كەبەرىيە بىردىنى كاروبارى حزب لە ئەستۆ دەگرىت لە سنورى كارو چالاككەدا نىدا.

دوومە : پىكدېت لە :-

۱- لىپىرسراوى لىق.

۲- () كارگىپى بەشەكان.

۳- لىپىرسراو ئاۋچەكان.

۴- ئەنجومەنى لىق.

سەئەم : بەشەكانى لىق كارەكانىيان لە رىگەى پىكەئىنانى لىژنەكانەسە رادەپەرىن.

چوارەم : كۆپوونەسە ئاسايىيەكانى (۱۵) پوژ جارىكە، كۆپوونەسەى فراوانى مانگانەيە.

- رىكخستنى كاروچالاككەكانىيان بەلانئەيەكى پەسەندكراو لەلايەن ئەنجومەنى پەروەردەو رىكخستەسە رىكەخرىت.

مادەى بېست چوار : ئاۋچە :-

يەكەم : پىناسە :

ئەس ئۆرگانەيە كە بەرىيە بىردىنى كاروبارى پەروەردەو رىكخستنى (ئوسرەكان) لە سنورى ئاۋچەكەدا لە ئەستۆ دەگرىت.

دوومە : پىكدېت لە :-

۱- لىپىرسراوى ئاۋچە.

۲- (۱) كارگىپى بۆ ئاۋچە بى بارەكان .

۳- (۲) كارگىپى بۆ ئەس ئاۋچانەى بارەكانىيان ھەيە.

۴- لىپىرسراو ئوسرەكان و ئەلقەكان و گروپەكان.

سەئەم : كۆپوونەسە ئاسايىيەكانى (۱۵) پوژ جارىكە.

- ئەس ئاۋچە كاروچالاككەكانىيان لەلانئەى پەسەندكراو لە ئەنجومەنى پەروەردەو رىكخستەسە دىارى دەكرى.

مادەى بېست پىنج : (ئوسرە+ئەلقە+گروپەكان) :-

يەكەم : پىناسە :

- ئوسرە : ئۆرگانى يەكەمى رىكخستەسە لە حزب دا.

- ئەلقە : ژمارەكان لە روى رىكخستەسە لە ئوسرە گەورەترە، زياتر بۆ ئەندامانەيە كەلە روى جوگرافىيەسە لە يەكتر نرىك نىن و لەلايەن كادرىكى حىزبەسە سەپەرشتى دەكرىن.

- گروپه‌كان: ئەو ئەندامانەن كە هێشتا نەخراونەتە ناو رێكخستنه‌كان، زیاتر له دوستانو لایهنگران یۆ چالاکی جۆراوجۆری پشتیوانی و هاوکاری حیزب پیکده‌هێنرێن له‌لایه‌ن كادریکی حیزبه‌وه سه‌رپه‌رشتی ده‌كرێن له‌بواره‌كانی بانگه‌وازی و كۆمه‌لایه‌تییدا چالاك ده‌كرێن. دووهم: كۆبوونه‌وه‌كانیان (۱۰) رۆژ جارێكه.

ماده‌ی بیست و شەش: پله‌كانی ئەندامی:

پله‌ی یه‌كەم/ ئەندامی پالیئوراو:

ئەو كەسه‌یه، كه هاتووته ئیو ریزه‌كانی حزب و فۆرمی ئەندامی پركردوته‌وه.

پله‌ی دووهم/ ئەندامی رێكخراو:

ئەو كەسه‌یه، كه قۇناغی پالیئوراو به‌سه‌ركه‌وتووی ده‌بێت، له چالاکیه گشتیه‌كاندا به‌شدار ده‌بێت.

پله‌ی سێهەم/ ئەندامی كارا:

ئەو كەسه‌یه، كه قۇناغی رێكخراو به‌سه‌ركه‌وتووی ده‌بێت و شیاو‌بێت یۆ له ئەستوگرتمی لێپرسراویتی له ناو حزب دا.

ماده‌ی بیست و هەوت: ئەندامی و مه‌رجه‌كانی:

هه‌موو هاو‌لاتیه‌کی هه‌ری‌می كوردستان و هێراق له ناوه‌و ده‌ره‌وه‌ی وڵات مافی بوونه ئەندامی حزبیان هه‌یه بێ جیاوازی، به‌و مه‌رجه‌ی:

- ۱- ته‌مه‌نی له (۱۸) سال كه‌مه‌تر نه‌بێت.
- ۲- پنه‌ماو ئاما‌نجه‌كانی حزبی لاپه‌سه‌ند بێت و پێوه‌ی پایه‌ندی‌ت.
- ۳- ئەندام نه‌بێت له هه‌یج حزبیك یان رێكخراویکی تری سیاسیدا.
- ۴- له‌لایه‌ن دوو ئەندامی حزبه‌وه پشتگه‌یری بكرێت.
- ۵- داوانامه‌یه‌ك پێشكه‌ش بكات، و‌اژو‌ی له‌سه‌ر بكات.

ماده‌ی بیست و هه‌شت: ئەرك و مافه‌كانی ئەندام:

یه‌كەم/ ئەركه‌كانی ئەندام:

- ۱- هه‌وڵدان یۆ خزمه‌ت‌كردنی گه‌ل و نیشتمان و پاراستنی ناسنامه‌ی ئیسلامی و نه‌ته‌وه‌یی.
- ۲- كاركردن له‌سه‌ر خۆ راهی‌نان و په‌روه‌رده‌كردن به‌پێ‌ی پرۆگرامی حزب.
- ۳- كاركردن یۆ به‌دییه‌نانی ئاما‌نج و به‌رنامه‌ی سیاسی حزب.
- ۴- پاراستنی نه‌یینه‌كانی حزب.

۵- هەلەدان بۆ زیادکردنی ئەندام و لایەنگەر بۆ حزب.

۶- جێبەجێ کردنی ئەرکەکانی و پابەندبوون بە بریارو رێنماییەکانی حزب.

۷- نابووێتی ئەندامی بەداتە حزب و چەندە لە توانایدا هەبێ ھاوکاری مادە حزب بکات.

دووەم/ مافەکانی ئەندام:-

۱- مافی هەلبژاردن و خۆپالائوتنی هەبێ بەپێی پێرەوی ناوخۆی حزب.

۲- مافی رادەربرین و پیشنیارکردن و رەخنە بونیاتنەری هەبێ بۆ گشت ئەندامان و دەزگاکانی حزب لەناو ئۆرگانەکانی حیزیدا .

۳- مافی سکاڵاکردن و داکوکی لەخۆکردنی هەبێ.

۴- مافی دابینکردنی ناستیکی بژێوی گونجاوی هەبێ، ئەگەر بە فەرمی یەکلا کرابێتەوه بۆ کاری حزب.

۵- مافی دابینکردنی سێ لەسەرچواری ئیمتیازاتی مادە بۆ ئەندامانی ئەنجومەنی سەرکراوەتی و ئەنجومەنی راپەراندن و ئەمینداری گشتی و، دەستە بەلای بەدواداچوون لەکاتی نەبوونی سەرچاوەی داھاتی گونجاویان لە حالەتی نەخۆشییان لە حالەتی وفات کردن .

سێیەم/ سزاکان:-

۱- ئاگادار کردنەوه (التنبيه).

۲- وریاکردنەوه (الانذار).

۳- سەرکوێنەکردن (التوبيخ).

۴- هەلبەساردنی ئەندامی (تعليق العضوية).

۵- دەرکردن (الفصل).

چوارەم/ لەدەستدانی ئەندامی:-

۱- کشانەوه لە ئەندامیەتی حزب بە پێشکەش کردنی وازنامە لە حزب بە نوسین.

۲- دەرکردن.

۳- مردن .

۴- یون بە ئەندام لە حزبیکی تر .

مادە ییست و نۆ : هەلەشاندەوهی حزب:-


۱. هەلەشاندەوهی حزب مافی کۆنگرەییە بە (۲/۲) دەنگی ئەندامان.

۲. لەکاتی هەلەشاندەوهی حزبدا، سامانی گواستراوه و نەگواستراوهی دەدریته حزبیکی ھاوشێوهی، یان لایەنیکی خیرخواز کە ئەندامانی دامەزرێنەر و ئەندامانی ئەنجومەنی سەرکراوەتی لەی خولەدا دیاری دەکەن.

ستراتیجیەتی کاری یەگرتووی ئیسلامی کوردستان بۆ چوار سائی داھاتوو

- ۱- گەشەدان بە دەستکەوتە دەستوریەکانی گەلی کوردستان لە فیدرالیەتەتەرە بۆ مافی چارەی خۆنووسین و ھەڵدان بۆ بە دەولەت بوون.
- ۲- بەرەوپێش بردنی کاری ئیسلامی میانەپرە و پرۆژەیی ھاوکاری ئیسلامی و کاراکردنی بواری کاری بانگخوازی لەپێی دامەزراوە مەدەنی و جەماوەریەکان.
- ۳- بەدەستھێنانی پشتیوانی ھێزە ئیسلامیەکان، بە قازانجی چارەسەری دۆزی گەلی کوردستان.
- ۴- بەدامەزراوەیی کردنی پرۆسەیی چاکسازی ریشەیی ھەمەلایەن لە ھەریمی کوردستان و ھێراق.
- ۵- داکوکیکردن بۆ داھەشکردنی دادپەرورەرانەیی داھاتی ھەریمی کوردستان بەسەر ھەموو ناوچەکاندا.
- ۶- بەرجەستەکردنی کۆمەلگەییەکی گەشەسەندوو، بە چەسپاندنی بەھا بالاکان و قولکردنەری گیانی لیبوردەیی و پیکەرەژیان.
- ۷- پەرورەو پیگەیانندی تاکێ کارا، بەپێی بئەما گشتیەکان و نامانجە دیاریکرداوەکانی پێرەو و پرۆگرامی یەگرتووی ئیسلامی کوردستان.

Appendix 18: the KIU's New Organisational Hierarchy Adopted by the Seventh Congress in May 2016:



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Interviews:

In my first fieldwork in summer 2012, I had a chance to do the following interviews: From **Erbil**, where the headquarters of the KIU are located:

1- Mr. Mohammad Faraj, the Secretary General of the KIU (2012-2016). Erbil, 26 August, 2012.

2- Dr. Mohammad Ra'auf, the head of the leader's council of the KIU (2012-2016). Former Trade Minister in the KRG (2006-2010). Erbil, 26 August 2012.

3- Dr. Salahaddin Babakir, the assistant Secretary General of the KIU (2012-2014). Erbil, 25 August, 2012.

4- Mr. Mawlood Bawamurad, a politburo member of the KIU (2012-2016). Erbil, 26 August, 2012.

5- Mrs. Bayan Ahmad, a politburo of KIU and a member of the Kurdistan Parliament (2009-2013). Erbil, 26 August 2012.

6- Mr. Salahaddin Mohammad Bahaddin, the Secretary General of the KIU (1994-2012) and was re-elected in the seventh congress in May 2016. Erbil 26 August 2012.

From Sulaimani:

7- Dr. Mohammad Ahmad, the chairman of the Leadership Council in the Sulaimani region (2012-2016).Kalar, 12 August 2012.

8- Mr. Abubakir Ali (Karwani), a politburo member (2012-2014). Sulaimani, 5 August 2012.

9- Dr. Muthana Amin, the head of the KIU's cleric scholar office (2012-2016). Currently he is an Iraqi MP and head of the KIU's parliamentary bloc in Iraqi parliament. Sulaimani, 5 August 2012.

10- Mr. Hassan Shamerani, the head of the pursuance high council of the KIU (2012-to date). Sulaimani, 25 August 2012.

11- Mrs. Xaraman Jaf, the secretary of the Kurdistan Islamic Sisters League (KISL) (2012-2016). Email, 18 December 2013.

12- Mr. Burhan Ahmad, the head of the *Garmian* Centre of the KIU in the Kalar district (2012-2014). Kalar, 8 August 2012.

After the first fieldwork, I contacted many other academics and journalists, but nobody has replied, except interviewee 13:

13- Prof. Dlawar Aladdin, the former minister of the Higher Education and Scientific Research of the region (2010-2012), who answered my question by email. Email, 22 January 2014.

Interviews 14, 15, 16 and 17 done after I returned from the first fieldwork.

14- Mr. Hama Salih Ahmad (lives in Kurdistan Region), a Sunni Muslim who has *Qalkhani* relatives and in contact with some of the *Qalkhanis*, phone called, 2014.

15- Mr. Maleek Mahmood (lives in Newcastle, England), a Shaikh, phone called, 2014.

16- Mr. Saman Rabati (lives in London), Representative of Kurdistan Islamic Group in the UK, phone called, 14 March, 2015.

17- Mr. Fuad Salam (lives in London), Representative of the Change movement in the UK. London. 11 January 2015.

During the second fieldwork in May and June 2016, I was able to get agreements of the interviewees 18, 19, 20: samples 18 and 20 answered my questions and emailed me; however, interviewee 19 preferred to get the interview done by Skype.

18- Mr. Sami Atroshi, former Iraqi MP (2010-2014). Email, 11 July 2016.

19- Mr. Khalil Ibrahim, (2012-2016) Head of the relationship Dossier of the KIU to the Kurdish affairs in northern and western Kurdistan, and member of the Executive Body of KIU (Political Bureau). (July 2016 – to date), Skype interview, 12th July 2016.

20- Mr. Abubakir Haladni, Currently Kurdistan Region MP, head of the KIU bloc in Kurdistan Parliament. Email, 30 August 2016.

Interviewee 22, during my first fieldwork promised to answer me in writing, due to his own over workloads, after more than three months apologised for not been able to answer my questions.

After returning from my second fieldwork, in August 2016, I called the sample 21, to verify a list of former KIU cadres and members, who are currently working in different political parties and media rather than the KIU.

21- Mr. Mustafa Abdullah, Head of the membership office of the KIU. Phone call, 2016.

22- Dr. Omar Abdulaziz, Head of the KIU Parliamentary bloc in Kurdistan Region Parliament.

I had a chance to meet the sample 23, in London in July 2016, he promised to answer my questions in writing. Similar to sample 21, he apologised to me after two months.

23- Mr. Omar Kochar, Currently Kurdistan Region MP.

24- Mr. Barzan Ahmad, Head of the elections office of the KIU (2012-2016), replied by email. Email, 26 May 2015.

25- Mr. Amjad Mohamad, the former head of the Islamic Students Union of Kurdistan-(ISUK), Email, 15 May 2016.

26- Jamal Ghareeb, writer at Kurdiu.org, gave me access to the archive of official website of the KIU.