

## **The Wonders of the Wonderful City: Social Impacts and Legacies of the 2016 Olympic**

### **Games in Rio de Janeiro**

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### **Abstract**

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the social impacts and legacies expected for Rio de Janeiro as the Brazilian city prepares to host the 2016 Olympic Games. The analysis is focused on four aspects: urban regeneration, people displacement, sport participation and nationalism. These are some of the claims used by sporting mega-events proponents (government and elite groups) to justify the public spending on the spectacle.

### **Introduction**

*Rio de Janeiro. October 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2009.* Millions of people were anxiously waiting a result – some at home watching on TV, some at Copacabana beach where a stage was set. The result came: Rio de Janeiro was announced as the winning candidate on the bid to host the 2016 Summer Olympics. The city and the country began celebrating the long awaited choice (Rio had previously bid for the 2004 and the 2012 Olympic Games). Now, it was finally Rio's turn!

*Brazil, June 17<sup>th</sup>, 2013.* It all began with an increase in bus fares across the country. Tired of paying high taxes and seeing no return in the form of better public services, Brazilians decided to 'wake up' from a state of social numbness, go to the streets, and show to politicians, fellow citizens, tourists, and

the world that they would not ‘take it’ anymore. During the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup, soccer celebration was replaced by violent protests resulting in a generalized riot against sporting mega-events in Brazil (2014 FIFA World Cup Finals and 2016 Summer Olympics), which became the ‘scapegoat’ of all social problems in the country (Kfourri, 2013; Reuters, 2013).

Episodes like the ones above-described make clear that sporting mega-events have already had social impacts on Brazil. Politicians and public administrators expect that the 2016 Olympic Games will help to better the country’s position as an important global economy. At the same time, the local population expects social improvements as a consequence of the investment of public money in the Games. In this chapter, we focus on social impacts that have already been experienced and on the legacies that are expected as a result from hosting the 2016 Olympics. The real impact of the Games and legacies cannot be examined in here, as this chapter was written well before the Olympics in Rio. However, it is possible to demonstrate that the development projects follow a similar pattern undertaken by other host cities, complying with the demands of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). For the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio, we focused on four social impacts: urban regeneration, people displacement, sport participation and nationalism.

### **Sporting Mega-Events: Legacies and Social Impacts**

Tomlinson and Young (2006) argue that the FIFA World Cup and the Summer Olympics are the biggest platforms to showcase nations worldwide. What they represent to host cities and countries goes beyond the scoreboard and the podium. For some countries, to host a mega-event is seen as a way for rehabilitation and regeneration. In the last two decades, sporting mega-events grew so much in size and importance because of the promotional appeal for host cities (Horne &Manzenreiter, 2006), that are

transformed into ‘urban entertainment destinations’ – UEDs (Hannigan, 1998). Opportunities to become an UED also caught the attention of developing nations which have seen the mega-events as their chance to better position themselves in the global economy. For many urban centers, economic growth is now led by “consumption, recreation, tourism, and the provision of services” (Rosentraub, 2000, p. 219). The culture of consumption has commodified leisure activities, including recreational travel, and created a need for “the generation of constant change and novelty” (Britton, 1991, p. 454), as well as the production of tangible goods and intangible labor-services, which represent the purchase of a life-style (Britton, 1991).

The desired goals of sporting mega-events include “the expansion of trade, creation of an international image in the mind of the corporate community of a location with suitable status and infrastructure from which to base corporate operations, land development, tourism development, and downtown renewal” (Britton, 1991, p. 471). These goals, in turn, according to the claims made by proponents of mega-events in justifying public spending, should help strengthen national identity and generate social and economic development. Although of short-term duration, these spectacles have long-term consequences, and, therefore, are seen by urban leaders as channels for solving problems (Roche, 1994). For Sugden and Tomlinson (1998), sporting mega-events are an irresistible opportunity to revitalize urban infrastructures and to articulate and celebrate national pride.

In hosting sporting mega-events, cities’ proponents expect positive impacts and legacies. Some authors consider impacts and legacies as synonymous (e.g., Dickson, Benson, & Blackman, 2011; Preuss & Solberg, 2006; Solberg & Preuss, 2007), while others analyze impacts and legacies as different concepts (e.g., Hiller & Wanner, 2011; Jones, 2001). Impacts are usually assumed to happen before, during, and after events. Legacies, on the other hand, are defined as

future benefits that can last *after* the event (Solberg & Preuss, 2007). Although impacts are very important and should be discussed, tangible and intangible legacies have become the field on which boosters and critics battle to support their ideas (Horne, 2010). The term *legacy* is now part of the charter of the IOC (Dickson, Benson & Blackman, 2011), becoming, thus, the key word used by mega-events proponents in order to guarantee support from different segments of the local society. As noted by Dickson et al. (2011), in a recent symposium on legacies conducted by the IOC, it was acknowledged that defining legacy is difficult because the concept has been used in different contexts. The literature has considered either three broader aspects – economic, social and environmental (Hritz & Ross, 2010; Kim & Petrick, 2005; Yoon, Gursoy, & Chen, 2001) – or seven specific dimensions of legacy – economic, tourist, environmental, cultural, psychological and political (Preuss & Solberg, 2006).

For many previous investigations (e.g., Deccio & Baloglu, 2002; Ritchie, Shipway, & Cleeve, 2009; Zhou & Ap, 2009), the social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) has offered a suitable theoretical framework to explain the importance of legacy of sporting mega-events. Basically, authors believe that local residents will support a mega-event in their community if they perceive that such mega-event will generate positive legacies for them. In addition, other studies (Girginov & Hills, 2008; Ohmann, Jones, & Wilkes, 2006; Waitt, 2003) have indicated that social impacts deserve a special attention in the exchange process.

A consensual definition of social impact does not exist (Ohmann et al., 2006). However, some authors have agreed that social impact should take into account consequences and changes in the quality of life of the residents of the host communities (Brunt & Courtney, 1999; Girginov & Hills, 2008; Ohmann et al., 2006). Therefore, social impacts of mega-events include all changes

made in preparation for staging such event and affect somehow the quality of life of the residents. Social impacts can be positive or negative. Ritchie et al. (2009), for example, reported both positive (e.g., inspiring young people to play sports) and negative (e.g., disruption of daily lives) social impacts as consequences of hosting the 2012 London Games. An example of positive social impact happened in Barcelona. The host of the 1992 Olympic Games is often cited as an example of success, because the Games established Barcelona as a competitive global city (Kennett & Moragas, 2006). One of Barcelona's main achievements with the Games was the global re-positioning of the city, placing it on Europe's cultural map (Berne, 1998; Hornblower, 1990); ) Furthermore, the Games granted the city gentrification, illustrated by redevelopment of the city's waterfront (Hornblower, 1990) and the rehabilitation of more than 200 parks, plazas, streets of neglected older neighborhoods (Glueck, 1987).

Part of the positive perception from residents can be attributed to the 'feel good' effect (Maennig& Porsche, 2008), that is, the pleasure derived from a sporting event on participants, attendees, volunteers, or simply citizens that are surrounded by the event (Kavetsos & Szymanski, 2008). When hosting the 2006 FIFA World Cup Finals, Germany relied on the 'feel good' effect to make the event one of the most important events ever hosted in the country (Maennig& Porsche, 2008), which strengthened the country's image (Grix, 2012) and created a newfound pride in being German (Sark, 2012). Despite criticisms, mainly related to people displacement (Pillay & Bass, 2008), the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa offers another good example. At the end of the competition, residents' perception was that the event "increased their sense of pride, social cohesion, and self confidence" (Knott, Allen & Swart, 2012, p. 118).

## **Urban Regeneration**

Urban regeneration is part of every mega-event host city's agenda since Barcelona hosted the 1992 Olympic Games and became an example of how to achieve global positioning by focusing on local development. Now, every host city wants to follow the 'Barcelona Model' or be even better – a guarantee given by Rio's mayor, Eduardo Paes (Mendes, 2013). The reason behind improving infrastructure, transportation, communication system and social areas lies on the economy, for these are “features that attract capital and talent as to a place to live, work and do business” (Howell, 2005, p. 64).

But after the 1992 Olympics, there has been no report of urban regeneration success credited to the Games from any other host city (Atlanta '96, Sydney 2000, Athens '04, Beijing '08, and London '12). The Chinese city of Beijing focused almost exclusively on its 'look' as a global city, in which impoverished residential areas were turned into gentrified spaces and “the construction of buildings whose function was to increase the circulation of both symbolic and investment capital” (Ren, 2011, as cited in Barker, 2013, p. 2). The British capital used the Olympics to regenerate London East Side, a less developed region. However, what marked the process was the eviction of residents and small businesses around the Olympic Park, contradicting the promise of economic growth for the area (Coaffee, 2012). Even Barcelona has failed in transforming the waterfront Olympic Village into affordable housing for low-income families (Garcia-Ramon & Albet, 2000).

Rio de Janeiro, as many other Brazilian cities, has long waited for urban regeneration projects – some dated from 1965 (Marques, 2013) that stumbled in local, state and federal government bureaucracy. The 2016 Games is regarded as a mean to prioritize these projects. But besides only investing in top of the line sporting facilities and attraction for tourists, the city's projects should target many areas,

including all *favelas* (slums). In this sense, Rio's development policies follows what Howell (2005) suggests as right strategies: "reaching into all neighbourhoods to ensure creative opportunities and investment strategies ... developing citywide spaces and places that stimulate creative capacity and innovation for all citizens" (p. 65), as a way of encouraging economic growth.

Rio's mayor has stressed that the infrastructure work, particularly for the Olympic Park, is being done through public-private partnership for the first time in Olympic history (Mendes, 2013). And he notes that the transformations will become legacies: "I do not want to build an aquatic park worth trillions of dollars to then become a 'white elephant'. The transformations are for the population and not for the foreign visitors to see" (Paes, as cited in Mendes, 2013, freely translated).

The city is promising that the projects will reflect on an improvement of quality of life for low income communities, including the construction of new residential areas, such as *Bairro Carioca* that will house 10 thousand people victims of floods caused by the rains, or residents from risky areas from the North Zone (CidadeOímpica, Social, n.d.). Another program considered one of the most important legacies of the Games is *Morar Carioca*, which consists of social integration of all of Rio's *favelas*, benefiting 55 communities and more than 200 thousand people. A re-urbanization process at a cost of R\$ 8 billion (about US\$ 3.5 billion), that should be done by 2020, consists of works "in infrastructure, landscaping, implementation of leisure and educational equipment... transforming the area that was considered of risk into safe places for the population" (CidadeOímpica, Social, n.d.). *Porto Maravilha* (Marvelous Port) is considered the largest urban regeneration project in Brazil (CidadeOímpica, Infrastructure, n.d.) and it has been in the city's plans since the 1970s. The idea is to revitalize five million square meters of the harbor in a center for cultural and gastronomic activities, attracting new companies and residents to a previously abandoned historic region. The project consists of complete

demolition of *Perimetral* Overpass, which will be replaced by expressways, underground road and tunnels, two museums, and a new boulevard.

Rio Operation's Center should integrate the city's everyday life management through 560 cameras installed all around the city (CidadeOlímpica, Infrastructure, n.d.). It is regarded as a legacy in public safety, making possible to "to check data, cross maps and, in extreme situations, plan evacuation possibilities, calling the responsible teams to solve the problem in the shortest amount of time" (CidadeOlímpica, Infrastructure, n.d.).

In the public transportation department, Rio's projects of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system, Light Rail Transit (LRT) system, subway, trains and ferry boats encompass R\$ 20 billion (about US\$ 8.5 billion) and are expected to be ready by 2016, being considered the most important legacy of the Games (Magalhães& Schmidt, 2013), increasing the transportation capacity from 18% to 63%. From the North Zone to the West Zone, the Olympic City will be interconnected through the BRT. In downtown Rio, LRT will connect to *TransBrasil* and other means, such as ferries and subways, optimizing the traffic in the region. "In the *Providencia*, the city's first *favela*, a chair lift will make going up the hill something easier, apart from providing a beautiful view of the *Guanabara* bay and downtown to residents and visitors" (CidadeOlímpica, Transportation,n.d.). LRT trains should start operating in Downtown Rio mid-2015 with six lines, 42 stations, one of each being Santos Dumont Airport, encompassing a total of 30 kilometers of track (CidadeOlímpica, Transportation,n.d.). The city of Rio will pay almost R\$ 6 million (about US\$ 2.6 million) a month to the operating company for 25 years of contract, and, to ensure its viability, the city offered as guarantee a municipal public land, valued at R\$ 144,4 million (US\$ 62 million), as part of the real state fund for the project (Bastos, 2013). There will be also three expressways serviced by BRT system: *TransOeste*, which will have



56km of extension in the West Zone of Rio; *TransCarioca*, which will have 39km of extension, connecting *Barra da Tijuca* (the richest neighborhood of the city) to *Ilha do Governador* (where the international airport *Tom Jobim* is located); and *TransOlympic*, which will have 23km of extension and will connect two main Olympic competition zones: *Deodoro* and *Barra da Tijuca* favoring 400 thousand people daily by reducing commuting time from 1 hour and 50 minutes to 40 minutes, in average (CidadeOlímpica, Transportation, n.d.).

Environmental projects, such as a new center for residual treatment, are part of the plans for Rio 2016, to be another legacy for the population after the end of the Games, *Favelas* such as *Chapéu Mangueira* and *Babilônia* will receive housing units made with materials that use sustainable techniques (CidadeOlímpica, Environment, n.d.). *Madureira* neighborhood has already got some benefits by the construction of the third largest park in the city (CidadeOlímpica, Environment, n.d.), offering recreational, sporting and cultural activities. The West Zone of Rio, where most of the Olympics' competitions will take place, is going through processes of cleaning and sanitation of its lagoon system, composed of 14 rivers of the *Bacia de Jacarepagua* (CidadeOlímpica, Environment, n.d.). Lastly, the West Zone of Rio and the region surrounding the city of Rio should be benefit by reforestation of seven million trees (the largest reforestation in Latin American to date) around the Petrochemical Complex of Rio de Janeiro by Petrobras (the Brazilian state-run oil company) until 2016 (Leite, 2013). The project is part of Rio's plans of planting 24 million trees to neutralize carbon emissions during the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics.

While most of the above-mentioned urban regeneration legacy projects are still on paper, reports and concerns about delays have been the main subject on the media. The Federal Court of Audit informed that between 2010 and 2012, only R\$ 92 million (about US\$ 40 million) were invested for the Games,

contrary to the R\$ 1,6 billion (about US\$ 700 million) promised to be invested in that same period by the Ministry of Sports (Magalhães, 2013). That Court also mentioned that lack of solid plans concerning legacy could cause “errors such as those that led to the bursting of the budget of the 2007 Pan-American Games and other events held throughout the country” (Magalhães, 2013).

In September 2013, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) demanded from Rio more agility regarding transportation, infrastructure and hospitality (Figueiredo, 2013). The IOC was assured by the Rio Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (ROCOG) that everything was on schedule and that the city would be ready for the Games (Figueiredo, 2013). The IOC’s vice-president, John Coates, did not demonstrate any confidence, and, three years before the Games, he had already expressed being sure that Rio would not be ready on time to offer proper facilities for some modalities, and some delegations would not be able to stay at the Village (because the competition sites are too far away). (Coates, as cited in Linden, 2013).

### **People Displacement**

People displacement has been an issue of concern since Seoul hosted the 1988 Olympic Games, when 720,000 people were displaced as part of the preparation process (Bulman, 2007). The most impressive report about people displacement was published as a consequence of preparations for the 2008 Beijing Olympics. The Switzerland-based Center on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) reported that, in March of 2008, 1.25 million Chinese people had been displaced in preparation for the Games (Battan, 2008). Since then, COHRE has proposed a guideline for Olympic host cities as an attempt to protect housing rights of local residents (COHRE, 2007). Although the problem was not as severe as in Beijing, evictions were reported in London 2012, too. Five years before the London Games, COHRE reported that 1,000 family

houses were already under threat of demolition (COHRE, 2007). After the Games, it was noted, for example, that over 400 residences were demolished in Stratford, East London in preparation for the 2012 Olympics (Watt, 2013).

Figures concerning people displacement in Rio de Janeiro as preparation for the 2016 Olympics are still blurry. More pessimistic estimates have mentioned that around 70,000 residents have been or will be removed from their houses in Rio (Crumpler & Steiker-Ginzberg, 2013; Romero, 2012). So far, these are only estimates. However, reports published by the Associated Press show that, in 2010, municipal housing authority made 6,927 evictions and paid resettlement costs in 88 different neighborhoods across Rio de Janeiro city (Barbassa, 2012). Activists and politicians have criticized not only the evictions, but also the money offered for resettlement (US\$ 16,000 per house), which they asserted was far from enough to find another home to live in Rio (Barbassa, 2012). This is partially a reflection of real estate speculation, which has made prices of properties soared in Rio, after this city was chosen to host the 2016 Games (Brasileiro & Millard, 2012).

In the *Vila Autódromo* slum, at *Barra da Tijuca* neighborhood, there have been frequent attempts to displace 4,000 low income inhabitants. This would be only another case of eviction among many others in Rio, if this slum was not located in the exact place chosen to be the Olympic Park, the setting for major sport venues in Rio 2016. In 2009, when Rio was elected as the host of the 2016 Games, the city's authorities announced that thousands of families in six slums, including *Vila Autódromo*, would be removed as part of the preparation for the Games (Sorensen, 2013). Nevertheless, *Vila Autodromo* has been an interesting case because its dwellers have resisted eviction since then. Other slums have been 'successfully' moved by the

city's government, but *Vila Autodromo* has become a focus of resistance against people displacement in Rio. As time goes by, the political power of its residents seems to increase. For example, when the official plan<sup>1</sup> for the Olympic Park was designed, it proposed the preservation of the *Vila Autódromo* community (Sorensen, 2013). However, the 'battle' is not over: Rio city's authorities insist that this community needs to be removed because now it is located in a "risk area", as a consequence of the expansion of two roads that will be built close to the slum (Sorensen, 2013).

Beyond *Vila Autódromo*, many other cases of evictions are reported in Rio de Janeiro. Besides evictions, poor communities have gone through a complete restructuration, which some have called a mere 'lipstick and mascara', in order to accommodate the Olympics (Sorensen, 2013). Currently, the city watches a process of 'pacification' of the slums, involving military personnel supposed to take control of some areas dominated by drug dealers (Kumar, 2012).

## **Sport Participation**

Stimulating sport participation has been recognized as one of the most desirable legacies of hosting the Games (Minnaert, 2012). Sport participation is desirable not only to guarantee future generations of Olympic champions, but also, and mainly, to produce social and health benefits that are consequences of an active lifestyle. This is a strong argument to justify huge amounts of public money invested in hosting processes of sporting mega-events (including investments in elite sport). The idea is: public money is not being invested only to stage an event, rather it is

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<sup>1</sup> The winning plan was developed by the British firm AECOM, and it proposes the construction of four main arenas in the Olympic Park – the Olympic aquatics stadium, the velodrome, the tennis center, and the field hockey center, among other minor facilities.

allocated in order to promote health and better quality of life for local residents. Based on that, organizers and boosters of recent editions of the Games have struggled to connect the hosting to higher levels of sport participation in host communities. For example, Sebastian Coe, the chairman of the 2012 London Olympics, had asserted: “I will fight the nostrum that this is just about elite sport. The challenge is not whether we finish fourth or 20th in the medals table but what we do to convert big British moments into 10,000 more kids picking up sport” (Beard, 2008).

Research has been conducted to verify the so-called ‘trickle-down effect’, i.e., benefits to the host city/nation in form of increased popular participation in sports as a clear consequence of hosting sporting mega-events (Hogan & Norton, 2000). Australian elite sports received an investment of A\$ 1.16 billion (approximately US\$ 1 billion), as part of the preparation to host the 2000 Sydney Olympics (Hogan & Norton, 2000). Despite the investment, no evidence was found to suggest that a trickle-down effect was verified across the Australian population (Hogan & Norton, 2000). Other studies ratified Hogan and Norton’s results, demonstrating no evidences of effects on mass sport participation across the country as a consequence of hosting the Games (Toohey & Veal, 2007; Veal, Toohey, & Frawley, 2012). In a similar way, after hosting the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, China has not experienced a boost in grassroots and participation sports (Feng & Hong, 2013). In spite of previous examples of non-existent trickle-down effect, one of the pillars of the London 2012 bid was the promise of using the Games to boost sport participation for all in the UK (Girginov & Hills, 2008). After winning the bid, mass participation in sports became “the key Olympic legacy” promise for London 2012 (Grix & Carmichael, 2012). Considering that legacies are achieved over the years, it could be argued that it is still too early to make assertions about impacts of the 2012 Games on sport participation in

the UK. However, some scholars have already affirmed that such impacts are very unlikely to happen (Girginov & Hills, 2008; Grix & Carmichael, 2012; Hamer, Weiler, & Stamatakis, 2014).

Rio de Janeiro has also proposed that hosting the Games would be important to stimulate sport participation and healthy lifestyle in the country (Candidature file for Rio de Janeiro to host the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games, 2009). However, so far, Rio's organizing committee has developed only a few projects to promote a more active lifestyle among Brazilians in association with the Olympics. The proposals outlined in Rio's Olympic bid look, nowadays, as mere formalities to win the bidding process. After Sydney 2000, support for sport participation has been part of bid campaigns, responding to one of the IOC's 'missions'. The Olympic Charter says that the IOC is expected "to encourage and support the development of sport for all" (Olympic Charter, 2007, p. 15). Therefore, to be competitive in the bidding process, cities began adding topics related to improvement of sports for all, sport participation, and quality of life in their candidacies (even when they have no concrete plan to use the Olympics to increase sport participation).

Few projects that tried to use the 2016 Games to promote sport participation are isolated actions, which have not been integrated into a larger plan. For example, in March of 2013, ROCOG launched the sustainability management plan for the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games (Rio2016, n.d.), which describes environmental, economic and social objectives of hosting the Games. However, the plan does not mention sport participation, physical activity, or improvements toward an active lifestyle. It is noteworthy that in the sustainability management plan website, ROCOG highlights sport participation: "We plan the Games with people in mind, in order to create benefits such as work

experience, new knowledge, adoption of Olympic and Paralympic values and inspiration to practice sports” (Rio2016, n.d.).

Among the above mentioned isolated actions, some interesting examples can be outlined. In September of 2013, the 2016 Olympic Public Authority (OPA) joined a private program – *Move Brazil*, which started in 2012 with a goal to stimulate sport participation among Brazilians. This program was originally created by the Social Service of the Commerce (SESC), a private non-profit organization, which operates in the areas of education, health, leisure, and culture. The main purpose of the 2016 OPA is to coordinate federal, state, and municipal governments to oversee the preparation process for the 2016 Games, mainly to guarantee the fulfillment of the promises made to the IOC. As mentioned previously, one of these promises was to promote sports for all. Considering that the government’s perception of sport legacy is clearly biased toward elite sport (see <http://www.apo.gov.br/site/legado/>), apparently, OPA has decided to join an already existing private program to fill the gaps in the Brazilian government planning related to sport for all and sport participation as a consequence of hosting the Games.

The city of Rio de Janeiro has two projects to promote sport participation as part of the 2016 Games plans: Olympic villages and the Olympic experimental gymnasiums. The municipal department of sport and leisure of Rio de Janeiro has built sport facilities – ‘Olympic villages’ – in ten different poor neighborhoods of the city. Managers of this project say that these spaces have been designed in these areas because they target underprivileged kids, who do not have sport-related leisure opportunities (CidadeOlímpica, n.d.). Some of these villages have an interesting variety of facilities, including swimming pools. However, others are quite simple, offering basically a multi-purpose outdoor sport court and a skateboard track.

In another venture linking the 2016 Games to sport participation, the municipal department of education of Rio de Janeiro has built three Olympic experimental gymnasiums. Basically, these gymnasiums are facilities, where elementary/middle school children can practice six Olympic sports (track and field, swimming, volleyball, handball, wrestling, and table tennis), as a complement their regular school schedule. Although the program stimulates sport participation, it cannot be defined as a sports-for-all initiative, for two different interrelated reasons. First, its main purpose is to prepare sport-talented youth to be elite athletes (Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro, 2011). Second, it targets students who already have experience with sport competition and are interested in sports (O Globo, 2012).

## **Nationalism**

Sport is “perhaps one of the most powerful and visible symbols of national identity and nationalism” (Jackson, 2008, p. 351), and “[i]f hosting a major sporting event is already interpreted as a victory, actually winning a major international sporting competition provides even greater opportunities for the celebration of a nation” (Rowe, 1995, p. 137). Hargreaves (2002) discusses the relation between sport, nations and nationalism provoked by globalization, pointing to the media as the vehicle that positioned sport on a world scale. Politicians work to promote sport as a tool for strengthening the sense of national pride, “as a way of enhancing their state-nation’s prestige and influence internationally” (Hargreaves 2002, p. 32).

In Germany during the 2006 FIFA World Cup, national pride became headlines of local newspapers highlighting that for the first time in over 60 years, Germans were not ashamed to be proud of their



nation. In Germany, the country once divided into two nations (West and East Germany), and then unified in 1990, “the notion of ‘nationalism’ is often treated as extremely suspect ... Claiming pride in Germany or, worse, pride in ‘being German’ can easily pigeon-hole a person as reactionary” (Schrag, 2009, p. 1085). In this scenario, one of the most important legacies of the 2006 FIFA World Cup was to improve Germans’ nationalism. Nationalism has been defined as a political, economic, and sociological phenomenon, which leads individuals to develop positive attitudes toward their own country (Druckman, 1994).

The 2002 World Cup also boosted the sense of national identity for the two host countries, Japan and South Korea. In Japan, “young people, who usually pay little attention to national symbols, sang the national anthem and wrapped national flags around themselves” (Takahashi, 2011, p. 495). In South Korea, similar demonstrations of national pride were observed on match days. However, some authors have asserted that they were more a result of mainstream media coverage and the government actions to facilitate public celebration, rather than a genuine reaction to the competition (e.g., Hong, 2013).

In Greece, when Athens hosted the 2004 Olympics, the goal was a redesign of national identity, taking the Games as “an opportunity to brand the look of a *new* Greece” (Traganou, 2009, p. 76). During the Games, nationalism was everywhere. However, after the Games, also due to the country’s economic crisis, nationalistic feelings decreased in Greece (Gatopoulos, 2010).

When the topic is mega-events’ legacies in Brazil, very little concerning nationalism is discussed in the media, which, so far, focuses more on the issues described on the previous segments of this chapter – the tangible legacies. This is no different for the 2016 Rio Olympics. Demonstration of national pride is expected to be perceived during the Games in two ways: Fans cheering for Brazilian athletes at the

events and celebrating wins in the streets; and/or, groups opposing the mega-event and protesting against the public money used to fund the Olympics. In both cases, the authors' opinion is that the 2016 Olympics should be useful to improve nationalist feelings not only during the Games, but also and mainly after them, as an important social legacy for the country.

## **Conclusion**

Examining social impacts of the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro can properly be done years after the event is finished. This chapter provided an outline of the social projects planned for the city in preparation for the Games and it can serve to guide future studies that hope to determine what were (if there were) the positives legacies of the mega-event in Rio. So far, evaluation of legacies impacts is a neglected area of research (Bob & Kassens-Noor, 2012). What can be said is that if all the projects planned by the organizing committee and the government of Rio for the 2016 Olympics are concluded as designed, there should be indeed some social legacies.

Regarding people displacement, the literature demonstrates similar elements: poor communities, uneducated people, and an imminent need of cities' gentrification as part of the hosting demands (Watt, 2013). Showing a 'perfect' image of host cities and their people has been one of the most important objectives of hosting sporting mega-events. This pressure has brought negative legacies such as removing any sign of poverty or underdevelopment from the public view (Kennelly & Watt, 2011), which is the main motive to displace poor people from their homes— 'out of sight, out of mind'.

In terms of sport participation, the project of the Olympic Villages in poor neighborhoods seems to work as a stimulus to sport participation in the communities. Besides that, the reality is that there is

not an integrated plan for sport participation and only isolated programs have been implemented. Moreover, the program of gymnasiums for students of public school only targets children who already have interest and experience in sport. Considering the potential for far-reaching impacts of the Games, and the amount of public money invested in the event, governments (federal, regional and municipal) should use the opportunity of the Games in Rio to promote sport participation all around the country. Unfortunately, it has not been done yet.

Finally, in terms of strengthening of nationalism due to the 2016 Olympics in Rio, there has not been much debate. The Brazilian government has counted heavily on national pride to promote the 2014 World Cup (Nery & Coutinho, 2014). Since the protests against the mega-event began in 2013, Brazilians have demonstrated less enthusiasm for the event (Muzell, 2014). Protests have led the federal government to change the discourse about the World Cup: From emphasizing the legacies for the population to focusing on the pride of the 'football nation' hosting the mega-event, with the elaboration of the slogan *Copa das Copas* (The World Cup of the World Cups) (Nery & Coutinho, 2014). However, it is important to stress that protests are a form of demonstrating nationalism, considering that the groups against the mega-events in Brazil claim for a better country, focusing on improving social issues, from poor education and public health system, to public safety, and poverty.

Social impacts represent important intangible legacies. However, the scenario so far has shown that Brazil still does not have strategies to leverage all the possible social legacies sporting mega-events can leave to their hosts. After hosting two mega-events back-to-back (the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics), will Brazil become another example in the sports literature of a host country left with economic debt and no long lasting legacies?

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