

1 **Tobacco companies' use of retailer incentives after a ban on point-of-sale**
2 **tobacco displays in Scotland**

3 Martine Stead¹, Douglas Eadie¹, Richard I Purves¹, Crawford Moodie¹, Sally Haw²

4

5 1. Institute for Social Marketing, Faculty of Health Sciences & Sport, University of Stirling,
6 United Kingdom, FK9 4LA

7 2. Faculty of Health Sciences & Sport, University of Stirling, United Kingdom, FK9 4LA

8

9 Corresponding author: Martine Stead, Institute for Social Marketing, Faculty of Health
10 Sciences & Sport, University of Stirling, United Kingdom, FK9 4LA, Email:

11 martine.stead@stir.ac.uk, Tel: +44 (0)1786 467387

12

13 Word Count: 4,095

14

15 Suggested MeSH terms:

16 Tobacco Industry

17 Marketing

18 Qualitative Research

19

20 Accepted for publication in *Tobacco Control* by BMJ Publishing Group. The version of
21 record is available at: <https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2017-053724>

22

1 **Tobacco companies' use of retailer incentives after a ban on point-of-sale tobacco**
2 **displays in Scotland**

3

4 *4,095 words*

5

6

7 **ABSTRACT**

8 **Introduction**

9 Incentives have been used by tobacco companies for many years to encourage retailers to sell
10 and promote their products. However, few studies have examined the use of retailer
11 incentives in countries with a ban on the open display of tobacco products in stores.

12

13 **Methods**

14 As part of the DISPLAY study, annual qualitative interviews were conducted with 24 small
15 retailers in four Scottish communities. This paper focuses on data collected in June-July
16 2015 and June-July 2016, after a ban on the open display of tobacco was fully implemented
17 in Scotland.

18

19 **Results**

20 Retailers described being offered and benefiting from a range of financial and other
21 incentives, typically offered via tobacco company representatives ('reps'). Most of the
22 retailers received tobacco manufacturer support for converting their storage unit to be
23 compliant with the new regulations, and several participated in manufacturer 'loyalty' or
24 'reward' schemes. Incentives were additionally offered for maintaining stock levels and
25 availability, positioning brands in specified spaces in the public-facing storage units (even

1 though products were covered up), increasing sales, trialling new products, and participating
2 in specific promotions, such as verbally recommending specific brands to customers.

3

4 **Conclusions**

5 Even in a market where the open display of tobacco is prohibited, tobacco companies
6 continue to incentivise retailers to sell and promote their brands and have developed new
7 promotional strategies. For countries that have implemented tobacco display bans, or are
8 considering doing so, one option to combat these practices would be to ban promotional
9 communications between manufacturers and retailers.

10

11

1 **INTRODUCTION**

2 With most tobacco marketing now banned, retail outlets are increasingly central to tobacco
3 company marketing activities.[1] A key objective for tobacco companies is to achieve brand
4 visibility and maximise potential marketing opportunities at the point-of-sale.[2] Tobacco
5 companies offer tobacco display unit contracts to retailers, whereby retailers receive a free
6 regularly maintained storage unit in return for stocking and displaying the company's brands
7 in optimal positions.[3] Retailers are encouraged to participate in 'loyalty' or 'reward'
8 programmes which incentivise them for having products in stock, positioning and sales. [4, 5]
9 Manufacturers' representatives (or 'reps') visit retailers regularly to check availability and
10 sales and encourage participation in new promotions.[6] Incentives and rewards offered to
11 retailers include volume rebates, in-kind payments such as free stock,[7] cash payments and
12 'points' which are redeemable for cash or goods.[4, 6]

13

14 In countries where visible displays of tobacco are prohibited, incentive schemes might be
15 expected to decline. However, news reports from Canada and Australia, where open displays
16 of tobacco products are banned, suggest that tobacco companies are continuing to engage
17 retailers in financial incentive schemes.[8, 9] To date, there has been limited academic
18 research concerning retailer incentive practices following a display ban. In Scotland, all
19 point-of-sale displays of tobacco products were prohibited in 2013 in supermarkets over 280
20 m² of retail space and in 2015 in small stores. We examine small retailers' experiences of
21 incentives to promote tobacco in the two-year period after displays were prohibited in small
22 stores.

23

24

25 **METHODS**

1

2 **Design and sample**

3 The data reported here form part of the DISPLAY study, which is designed to evaluate the
4 impacts of the legislation prohibiting the open display of tobacco products at point-of-sale in
5 Scotland.[10, 11, 12, 13] This study includes annual interviews with a cohort (n=24) of small
6 independent high street tobacco retailers to explore their experiences of implementing the
7 display ban and their relationships with tobacco companies over the period. The retailers
8 interviewed were from four Scottish communities selected to match the main DISPLAY
9 study communities in terms of levels of urbanisation and social deprivation, assessed using
10 the Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation (SIMD) scores (see [10] for fuller description).
11 This paper presents data from two waves following implementation of the legislation in small
12 stores, with wave 1 (W1) conducted 2-3 months post-ban and wave 2 (W2) one year later.

13

14 The twenty-four retailers were recruited using a structured protocol to represent five retail
15 categories: grocery/convenience stores (n=12), CTNs (confectioners, tobacconists and
16 newsagents) (n=5), off-licences (liquor stores) (n=3), petrol station/garage forecourt shops
17 (n=3), and fast food/take-away outlets (n=1). These categories represented all retail outlets in
18 the study communities selling tobacco, excluding large supermarkets, mobile vans and illicit
19 channels.

20

21 **Procedure**

22 Retailers matching the sample criteria were provided with an information sheet and
23 subsequently re-contacted to answer any questions, provide written consent and schedule an
24 interview. Participants were offered a financial incentive (30 GBP; 39 USD; 35 Euro) for
25 participation. Data were collected by three of the authors (MS, DE, RP) using a 20-30

1 minute semi-structured interview guide administered face-to-face in-store during business
2 hours. During customer transactions, the interview and recording were paused. The
3 interviews examined retailers' attitudes towards the ban, measures taken to remove products
4 from public view, the level and nature of support provided by tobacco companies and new
5 promotional strategies. Field visits also provided an opportunity to examine marketing
6 materials and incentive offers designed for the retail trade. Ethical approval was provided by
7 the Stirling University School of Management Research Ethics Committee.

8

9 **Analysis**

10 With participants' consent, interviews were audio-recorded and then transcribed and coded
11 using QSR Nvivo11 software. Analysis of transcripts was led by one researcher (MS), and
12 themes based on the core questions and topic areas were agreed among those undertaking the
13 interviews. The reliability of these themes was then reassessed by a process of familiarisation
14 with the transcripts by one researcher (MS) and cross-examination by the other two (DE, RP).
15 Discussions between researchers enabled identification of emerging themes and resolution of
16 interpretive difference. Few differences emerged, and those that did largely concerned how
17 to best categorise new incentivised retail practices. These analyses allowed the team to
18 identify patterns across the data.

19

20

21 **RESULTS**

22 Retailers described being offered incentives in return for a range of practices: retaining a
23 tobacco unit, maintaining availability, positioning products, sales, trialling new stock and
24 promoting brands. Incentives were sometimes offered through retailer 'partnership' or
25 'loyalty' schemes such as Ignite (Imperial Tobacco) and Drive Plus (Philip Morris); copies of

1 promotional materials for the schemes were shown to researchers during the fieldwork.

2 Typically, participating retailers were awarded with points redeemable for cash or gifts,

3 including hospitality, iPads and business equipment.

4

5 **Retaining a tobacco unit**

6 Before the display ban, all but one retailer had a contract with a major tobacco company for

7 the provision of a display and storage unit (termed a ‘gantry’ in the UK). Such contracts

8 offered to supply, maintain and periodically update the unit in return for the retailer stocking

9 and displaying the manufacturers’ products, usually in accordance with a detailed layout

10 diagram. In addition, some of these retailers received payments or loyalty points as part of

11 the unit contract (also referred to as ‘slotting fees’): *“they [Imperial] pay us for having a*

12 *gantry, they pay us £250 a year” (Retailer T, Grocery/Convenience Store, W1).*

13

14 In the months before the display ban, 17 of the 24 retailers received offers as part of their

15 existing contract to fit covers free of charge to their units to make them compliant. This

16 ensured minimum disruption and cost for retailers and enabled tobacco manufactures to retain

17 and signpost tobacco in a prominent position within the store (see Figure 1). In the remaining

18 cases, the tobacco manufacturer chose to terminate the existing contract and offered the unit

19 in-situ free of charge. Retailers in this position assumed this to be a commercial decision

20 based on their level of tobacco sales. In these cases retailers had to fund a unit adaptation

21 solution themselves or move stock to another part of the store out of public view. One retailer

22 opted to move tobacco products out of public view, while the remaining six retailers

23 continued to store tobacco within the existing unit. Four were subsequently supplied with

24 free unit covers by Philip Morris subsidiary e-cigarette brand ‘Vivid’.

1

2 Those retailers whose contracts continued after the display ban tended to be visited more
3 regularly by reps and to have more opportunities to negotiate other incentives than did
4 retailers whose contracts were terminated; the pattern was not clear-cut, however, with
5 retailers with and without contracts having varying levels of enthusiasm for engaging in
6 incentivised practices. Overall, most of our sample appeared to engage in at least one
7 incentivised practice.

8

9 **Maintaining availability**

10 Retailers described being offered a range of incentives in return for maintaining availability
11 of their brands. Several noted that they were awarded points which could be redeemed for
12 cash or gifts in return for having specific brands in stock; one commented that failing to meet
13 a particular points threshold could mean losing out on a regular bonus:

14

15 *Marlboro seem to be coming in and pushing their brands and making sure*
16 *you've got the [Philip] Morris stock. If I don't have [it] I'll lose points and*
17 *I won't get my full – it gets paid every two months (Retailer B, Grocery/Convenience*
18 *Store, WI).*

19

20 There was a perception among some retailers that whereas before the display ban they had
21 had to work “extremely hard” to qualify for points or bonuses, after the ban simply having
22 specified brands in stock was sufficient: “*now it's a case of just having them in store and you*
23 *will get your reward.... there are more incentives now, they pay out more now than*
24 *previously*” (Retailer S, Grocery/Convenience Store, W2). One described making “*like, 200-*

1 *300 quid out of one Rep.... just for stocking their brand” (Retailer D, Grocery/Convenience*
2 *Store, W1).*

3

4 Retailers perceived that they were being incentivised to maintain availability because tobacco
5 companies were concerned that stock levels would drop after the ban. Some commented that
6 as they no longer needed to maintain full shelves (because the unit was covered up),
7 sometimes stock levels ran low. Where this happened, there was a risk of losing a sale or a
8 customer switching to a different brand: *“They [tobacco reps] want to make sure that the*
9 *products are in stock, because (a) if somebody asks for them and you don’t have them, they*
10 *don’t make a sale, and (b), if their product is in stock and somebody else’s isn’t, then a*
11 *customer might be able to say ‘oh well give me something else at the same price’ ” (Retailer*
12 *S, Grocery/Convenience Store, W2).*

13

14 **Positioning**

15 Even after their tobacco units were covered up, retailers were rewarded for adhering to
16 specified layouts (known as ‘planograms’). One described being awarded *“extra points”* for
17 maintaining Imperial Tobacco’s two-thirds share of the unit space (Retailer T,
18 Grocery/Convenience Store, W1), while another noted that JTI *“still want those three shelves*
19 *even though it’s dark”* (Retailer S, Grocery/Convenience Store, W2). Retailers commented
20 that even though products were no longer in view, companies still sought to secure prime
21 positions, such as eye level or top shelves.

22

23 *For some reason they [JTI] want their products stocked at the top shelves. And then*
24 *everything else can go at the bottom, different brands... I don’t know is it for*

1 *convenience sake or is it for the customer, it's easier for us to locate their products?*

2 *(Retailer M, Grocery/Convenience Store, W1).*

3

4 One retailer described how a rep had rearranged his unit so that JTI brands, rather than
5 clustering in the prime 'diamond' at the centre of the display, were now arranged across "*ten*
6 *shelves*" (Retailer G, Off-Licence, W2), with some of the unit lying empty because he was
7 not allowed to fill the space with competitor brands. Another noted that manufacturers were
8 less concerned with overall quantity of stock than with securing exclusive unit facings:

9

10 *Q Do they stipulate how much stock you've got to hold?*

11 *R No....Even if you've got just one, one, two, two on front, that's*
12 *absolutely fine.*

13 *Q As long as you're filling the front row?*

14 *R Yeah (Retailer N, Grocery/Convenience Store, W1).*

15

16 A few retailers speculated that the tobacco companies' aim was to ensure that when the unit
17 was opened, customers were exposed to a solid block of only that particular company's
18 brands: "*I think when your flaps go up, they want to hit the person, you know, like*" (Retailer
19 E, Grocery/Convenience Store, W1). In contrast, some retailers noted how reps advised them
20 to place new products "*next to something that is similar to it*" (Retailer G, Off-Licence, W1),
21 i.e. a competitor brand in a similar price bracket, to create incidental customer exposure when
22 the flaps were opened.

23

24 **Sales**

1 Several retailers described how incentives were linked to sales, with “points” being awarded
2 which could be converted to cash or gifts: *“If you make your targets, if you sell every product*
3 *that they want you to sell, you get so many points an’ then the points give you vouchers*
4 *(Retailer K, Garage, W2).* Some described retaining the bar codes from ‘outers’ (cartons of
5 cigarette packs purchased at wholesalers) to provide the rep with proof of sales which could
6 be converted to financial rewards in the region of £100-£120:

7

8 *The last 3 months, they gave me £120 actually for collecting bar codes ... £60 on my*
9 *card and £60 shopping vouchers (Retailer P, CTN, W2).*

10

11 *For every bar code you get 100 points and 100 is equal to £1. .. So basically, to get*
12 *100 bar codes, I have to sell 100 outers. (Retailer D, Grocery/Convenience Store.*
13 *W2).*

14

15 One retailer noted that he had been initially required to provide proof of sales, in the region of
16 *“57 to 59 outers per week”* (Retailer S, Grocery/Convenience Store, W1), in order to qualify
17 for a new storage unit contract, but that the threshold had subsequently been relaxed.

18 Incentives for meeting sales targets were also offered as part of specific promotions, as
19 subsequently discussed.

20

21 **Trialling new stock**

22 Several retailers described being offered incentives for trialling new brands, such as loyalty
23 card points, free stock of the new product, or exchange of old stock which was not selling:

24

1 *They let you know, 'That's a new brand. If you keep it, we'll give you something free'*
2 *(Retailer N, Grocery/Convenience Store, WI).*

3
4 *That's Ignite, that's something Imperial Tobacco's doing at the moment and this is*
5 *what I get points on, is the trialling stock, if I've, anything new that comes out, I've*
6 *got it so I get points for that, availability, share of space and point-of-sale (Retailer*
7 *D, Grocery/Convenience Store, WI).*

8
9 Other retailers noted that they were reluctant to trial new brands in case they were left with
10 stock they could not sell, particularly as customers could not see these products, although this
11 put them in a potentially strong bargaining position in terms of negotiating favourable
12 incentives:

13
14 *They say this is a new brand we are launching, and then they say 'well, we will give*
15 *you free packets to do this with and this is the margin', you know... it's quite good*
16 *that way. I normally don't stock Rothmans so I asked the rep 'how are you going to*
17 *help me sell these cigarettes', and that's a way of saying 'what are you going to give*
18 *me to promote your cigarettes?'* (Retailer M, Grocery/Convenience Store, WI).

19
20 This same retailer noted how these kinds of incentive agreements fostered complicity
21 between reps and retailers, subtly pushing the retailer not only to stock new brands but also to
22 encourage their sale:

23
24 *They throw in a couple of packets of free stock to move it, so then you are incentivised*
25 *to say 'well why don't you try this' quietly between two friends, do you know what I*

1 *mean? ... unconsciously you are becoming the rep for the company” (Retailer M,*
2 *Grocery/Convenience Store, W1).*

3
4 **Participating in specific promotions**

5 Several retailers described incentives for participating in specific promotions of new
6 products. One example was a 2016 promotion entitled ‘Sell More, Earn More’, aimed at
7 retailers participating in Philip Morris’s Drive Plus programme, for the value brand
8 Chesterfield. The promotion rewarded retailers and their staff, in the form of payments to
9 their Drive Mastercard or vouchers, for each Chesterfield pack sold above an agreed base
10 rate.

11
12 *It’s a new scheme just now. Chesterfield are saying if you keep a bar code of every*
13 *box of an outer ... if you keep that and send them ... then they will give you free*
14 *money or free stock (Retailer L, Grocery/Convenience Store, W2).*

15
16 At W1, some retailers thought that they were not allowed to inform customers about products
17 which they had not asked for, as that could be construed as advertising:

18
19 *I think what the manufacturers want you to do is maybe talk to the customers and say*
20 *we’ve now got this one or that one, but we wouldn’t do that (Retailer Q, CTN, W1).*

21
22 However, it was apparent from other interviews at W2 that reps were financially incentivising
23 retailers to draw customers’ attention verbally to new products. Some retailers described how
24 they had been informed by the rep that they would be visited over the next few weeks by a
25 ‘mystery shopper’ who would ask for a rival brand; retailers who instead recommended

1 Chesterfield at £5.99 to the mystery shopper would be awarded £100. Although some
2 retailers who had engaged in the promotion were sceptical that customers would take up the
3 offer, some noted that they did sell more Chesterfield during the promotion period.

4

5 *If we sell the Chesterfield, they send mystery shoppers to a shop and if we just ask the*
6 *customer 'would you like this cigarette rather than trying other cigarette', they give*
7 *you a hundred pounds.*

8 ***Interviewer: If you do it correctly you get a bonus?***

9 *Yeah we had a hundred pounds for it (Retailer N, Grocery/Convenience Store, W2).*

10

11 *So this way now they've got us pushing the brand verbally. ... They come in and they'll*
12 *ask for the opposite, the leading brand for the other company and we're supposed to*
13 *offer them the brand that they're trying to push and that's when they'll say 'we're the*
14 *mystery shopper, you've passed or you've failed' ... They give us a timescale of when*
15 *they're doing it, so for the next four weeks we're pushing that product off our shelves*
16 *because we don't know who the person is going to be (Retailer G, Off-Licence, W2).*

17

18

19 Retailer-facing promotional material produced for the Chesterfield promotion confirmed the
20 nature of the financial incentives (Figure 2, [14]). Although it did not mention the mystery
21 shopping test, it did state that retailers should “recommend” Chesterfield to customers
22 interested in other low-price brands.

23

24 Another new product which retailers were encouraged to promote was the £5.99 price-
25 marked Player's Crushball, introduced by Imperial Tobacco shortly before W1. One retailer

1 was advised by his rep to place Crushball next to the £6.99 price-marked Sterling in the
2 storage unit, so that customers asking for the latter would glimpse the new lower-priced
3 product “*and say, alright, we will take that one*” (Retailer E, Grocery/Convenience Store,
4 W2). Another retailer described how the rep advised him to pick up the new product “by
5 mistake” when a customer asked for its competitor, in order to bring the product to
6 customers’ attention.

7

8 *I kept one packet [of Player’s Crushball] next to the Sterling one ...so I’ll just*
9 *deliberately pick up this packet an’ go, ‘Oh sorry, I got the wrong packet but do you*
10 *want this?’ That’s the way the tobacco rep told me to start selling them so, just to play*
11 *with the customer a bit, so they move from Sterling (Retailer D, Grocery/Convenience*
12 *Store, W1).*

13

14 **DISCUSSION**

15 We found that even in a country with a ban on the open display of tobacco products, retailers
16 continued to be incentivised for stocking, selling and promoting tobacco. Our findings
17 substantiate news reports describing similar practices after display bans in Canada and
18 Australia.[8, 9] The sample is not necessarily representative of all tobacco retailers in
19 Scotland, and the small sample size meant that there was limited scope to explore sub-group
20 variations (e.g. by shop type), although heterogeneity across shop types was achieved in the
21 overall sample. While there was variation in the extent to which retailers reported engaging
22 in incentivised practices, most engaged in at least one practice, suggesting that the strategies
23 identified in our study are likely to be adopted in other countries with, or planning to
24 implement, a display ban.

25

1 Tobacco industry documents from the 1970s describe the purpose of retail point-of-sale
2 marketing as fourfold: to (1) inform the consumer of the presence of the brand; (2) promote
3 recognition; (3) generate interest and excitement; and (4) stimulate trial purchase and re-
4 purchase.[2] The rationale for bans on tobacco promotions and displays at point-of-sale is to
5 reduce the ability of tobacco companies to exploit the retail environment in this way.[1]
6 However, this study demonstrates that display bans do not prevent tobacco companies from
7 attempting to exert influence on retailers via their sales reps.

8

9 There are several possible explanations for tobacco companies offering incentives to retailers
10 in a market where tobacco products cannot be openly displayed. Some retailers have
11 questioned the value of having prime retail space devoted to a product hidden from view.[15]
12 The UK retail trade press contains accounts of retailers reducing the amount of tobacco stock
13 they carry, shifting tobacco products into smaller and less prominent storage units, and re-
14 using the tobacco unit space for other product categories.[16] Our findings suggest that
15 tobacco companies are investing considerable resources in persuading retailers that tobacco
16 remains a viable and profitable category deserving of a premium position in store. Nearly all
17 retailers in our sample had new covers fitted to their storage units free of charge by tobacco
18 companies or their subsidiaries, thereby ensuring that the tobacco unit remained in place.

19

20 There is evidence that tobacco companies encourage retailers to maintain full storage units,
21 and avoid their brands being out of stock, to prevent a possible loss of sales.[17, 18, 19, 20]
22 There is a risk for the companies that retailers may reduce the number of brands carried, or
23 fail to keep storage units topped up, as customers can no longer see them. This study
24 indicates that tobacco companies who supply retailers with purpose-designed public facing
25 storage units continue, after a display ban, to use contracts and financial incentives to

1 maintain availability of their own brands and to restrict stocking and promotion of competitor
2 brands.

3

4 Retailers were also incentivised to continue to display products according to specified layouts
5 (planograms), even though customers could no longer see the full array of products. The
6 rationale for this seems to be to maintain prime eye-level position and reduce customer
7 exposure to competitor brands when the unit is opened. Within the retail press, one retailer
8 stated that “If a customer requests a JTI brand they only see JTI brands when that section of
9 the gantry is opened”, [19] and another was quoted: "There is a school of thought that the
10 traditional-style back-wall gantries with doors do still offer a small marketing opportunity as
11 adult smokers can get a glimpse of your range when you slide the doors open to retrieve a
12 product”. [16] While a display ban reduces the ability of the packaging to act as a sales
13 reminder, incidental exposure occurs when tobacco purchases are made. In view of this and
14 the ability of prominently positioned tobacco storage units to signal the availability of
15 tobacco, consideration could be given to measures to further reduce temporary exposure to
16 tobacco products at point-of-sale, e.g. by stipulating that tobacco units are completely out of
17 customers’ sight, in overhead or under-counter units (e.g.

18 [https://www.conveniencestore.co.uk/advice/your-business/the-future-of-tobacco-](https://www.conveniencestore.co.uk/advice/your-business/the-future-of-tobacco-merchandising/534195.article)
19 [merchandising/534195.article](https://www.conveniencestore.co.uk/advice/your-business/the-future-of-tobacco-merchandising/534195.article)). For retailers, this would free up space for displays of other
20 products.

21

22 Our findings indicate that retailers were also being rewarded for trialling new stock and
23 participating in new product promotions. With customers’ ability to find out about new
24 products severely restricted in dark markets, the retailer has become the key channel of
25 information and influence: “when the doors go up, retailers will become true tobacco

1 category managers as adult smokers are anticipated to ask them more questions” (BAT acting
2 head of business development, quoted in Convenience Store, 13th March 2015). In our study,
3 we found evidence of retailers being offered financial incentives to promote and sell new
4 products through verbal recommendations. Similar tactics were reported in Australia, with
5 retailers rewarded for verbally recommending John Player Special in a mystery shopper
6 test.[19] The display ban legislation in Scotland and the rest of the UK contains detailed
7 regulations on the removal of permanent displays of tobacco products and printed material,
8 but does not address product promotions through verbal communication by retailers.
9 Comments made by our sample suggested that there was confusion on this point, and that
10 while some perceived verbal recommendations as contravening the legislation, others were
11 happy to comply with reps’ encouragement to make such comments to customers. Verbal
12 communication is likely to become particularly pertinent in markets where standardised
13 packs are introduced (retailers were not required to sell tobacco in standardised packaging
14 when this study was conducted).

15
16 The practice of offering retailers contracts and rewards for the stock, placement and sale of
17 tobacco products is not new,[5, 21] but this study demonstrates how the strategies used by
18 tobacco companies have been adapted to work within the context of a display ban. Placement
19 of products within the tobacco unit continues to be incentivised, now with the aim of
20 maximising incidental exposure when flaps are lifted, and new incentives are being offered
21 for sales and promotions, in particular ‘mystery shopper’ schemes which reward making
22 verbal recommendations to customers. One potential measure to further reduce tobacco
23 manufacturers’ ability to exploit the retail environment would be a ban on payments to
24 retailers.[21] In Quebec an amendment to section 26 of the Tobacco Control Act bans
25 promotional communication between manufacturers/distributors and retailers.[22]

1 Manufacturers/distributors will not be allowed to offer rebates, gratuities or other benefits
2 related to tobacco sales from November 2017.[23] Not allowing any type of payment to
3 retailers is considered an important first step towards the retail reform of tobacco
4 products.[24] Other options for reducing tobacco companies' exploitation of the retail
5 environment include reducing retail density, banning tobacco sales near schools and
6 incentives for retailers to stop selling tobacco. [25,26]

7

8 Evidence suggests that display bans can restrict exposure to tobacco products at point-of-
9 sale.[11, 27, 28, 29] However, our study reveals a range of new marketing strategies and tools
10 designed to promote and maintain the visibility of tobacco in the retail environment.
11 Continued monitoring is needed to identify emerging approaches by tobacco companies to
12 counter display legislation.

13

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

What this paper adds

▶ We explored how tobacco companies incentivised retailers to sell and promote their brands after a display ban in Scotland.

▶ Retailers described receiving incentives for maintaining a tobacco gantry, availability, product positioning, sales, trialling new products, and participating in promotions, such as verbally recommending specific brands.

▶ A ban on the open display of tobacco products does not prevent tobacco companies from promoting their products within the retail environment. A ban on promotional communication between manufacturers and retailers is one possible option to address this.

1 **References**

- 2
- 3 1. Lim KY, Kin F, Lian TY et al. Surveillance of Tobacco Industry Marketing Strategies
4 at Retail Outlets. 2008. Available at:
5 [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08b9fed915d3cfd000e2a/Malaysia_r](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08b9fed915d3cfd000e2a/Malaysia_retailmarketing-Final_technical_report.pdf)
6 [etailmarketing-Final_technical_report.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08b9fed915d3cfd000e2a/Malaysia_retailmarketing-Final_technical_report.pdf) (date accessed 8 January 2017).
- 7 2. Pollay R. More than meets the eye: on the importance of retail cigarette
8 merchandising. *Tobacco Control* 2007;16:270-4.
- 9 3. Feighery EC, Ribisl KM, Achabal DD, et al. Retail Trade Incentives: How Tobacco
10 Industry Practices Compare With Those of Other Industries. *American Journal of*
11 *Public Health* 1999;89(10):1564-1566.
- 12 4. Rooke C, Cheeseman H, Dockrell M et al. Tobacco point-of-sale displays in England:
13 a snapshot survey of current practices. *Tobacco Control* 2010;19:279-284.
- 14 5. Feighery EC, Ribisl KM, Clark PI, et al. How tobacco companies ensure prime
15 placement of their advertising and products in stores: interviews with retailers about
16 tobacco company incentive programmes. *Tobacco Control* 2003;12:184–188.
- 17 6. Feighery EC, Ribisl KM, Schleicher NC, et al. Retailer participation in cigarette
18 company incentive programs is related to increased levels of cigarette advertising and
19 cheaper cigarette prices in stores. *Preventive Medicine* 2004;38:876–884.
- 20 7. Federal Trade Commission. Federal Trade Commission Cigarette Report for 2013.
21 Available at: [www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-](http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-cigaretterreport-2013/2013cigaretterpt.pdf)
22 [cigaretterreport-2013/2013cigaretterpt.pdf](http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-cigaretterreport-2013/2013cigaretterpt.pdf) (date accessed 8 January 2017).
- 23 8. Porter I. Tobacco: Convenience stores under pressure. *Le Devoir*. 26 October 2015.
24 Translated by the Quebec Coalition for Tobacco Control. Available at:
25 [www.cqct.qc.ca/Documents_docs/DOCU_2015/ART_15_10_26_Depanneurs_sous_pr](http://www.cqct.qc.ca/Documents_docs/DOCU_2015/ART_15_10_26_Depanneurs_sous_pression_LEDevoir_ENG.pdf)
26 [ession_LEDevoir_ENG.pdf](http://www.cqct.qc.ca/Documents_docs/DOCU_2015/ART_15_10_26_Depanneurs_sous_pression_LEDevoir_ENG.pdf). (date accessed 8 January 2017).

- 1 9. The New Zealand Herald. Big tobacco's sneaky new trick. *The New Zealand Herald*,
2 16 December 2016. Available at:
3 http://m.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=11768375 (date
4 [accessed 22 December 2016](#))
- 5 10. Haw S, Amos A, Eadie D et al. Determining the impact of smoking point of sale
6 legislation among youth (Display) study: a protocol for an evaluation of public health
7 policy. *BMC Public Health* 2014;14:251.
- 8 11. Eadie D, Stead M, MacKintosh AM et al. Are Retail Outlets Complying with National
9 Legislation to Protect Children from Exposure to Tobacco Displays at Point of Sale?
10 Results from the First Compliance Study in the UK. *PLoS ONE* 2016;11(3): e0152178.
11 doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0152178.
- 12 12. Stead M, Eadie D, MacKintosh, AM et al. Young people's exposure to point-of-sale
13 tobacco products and promotions. *Public Health* 2016;136: 48–56. Published online
14 first: 10 May 2016. doi: 10.1016/j.puhe.2016.03.032
- 15 13. van der Sluijs W, Haseen F, Miller M et al. “It looks like an adult sweetie shop”:
16 point-of-sale tobacco display exposure and brand awareness in Scottish secondary
17 school students. *Nicotine Tob Res*;18(10):1981-1988.
- 18 14. Philip Morris Limited Drive Plus. “Sell More, Earn More with Chesterfield” Trade
19 Programme booklet. 2016; London: Philip Morris Limited.
- 20 15. McClean, P. Cigarette sales no longer key profit source for UK corner shops.
21 *Financial Times*, Oct 18, 2016. Available at: [https://www.ft.com/content/e38184a2-](https://www.ft.com/content/e38184a2-947e-11e6-a1dc-bdf38d484582)
22 [947e-11e6-a1dc-bdf38d484582](#) (date accessed 15 February 2017).
- 23 16. Convenience Store. The future of tobacco merchandising. 8 April 2016. Available at:
24 [http://www.conveniencestore.co.uk/advice/your-business/the-future-of-tobacco-](http://www.conveniencestore.co.uk/advice/your-business/the-future-of-tobacco-merchandising/534195.article)
25 [merchandising/534195.article](#) (date accessed 15 February 2017).

- 1 17. Feletto E, Burton S, Williams K, et al. Who stops selling? A systematic analysis of ex-
2 tobacco retailers. *Tobacco Control* Published Online first: 9 March 2016.
- 3 18. Harper T. Why the tobacco industry fears point of sale display bans. *Tobacco Control*,
4 2006;15(3);270-271.
- 5 19. Convenience Store. Dealing in a Dark Market. 13 March 2015. Available at:
6 [http://www.conveniencestore.co.uk/advice/products-in-depth/dealing-in-a-dark-](http://www.conveniencestore.co.uk/advice/products-in-depth/dealing-in-a-dark-market/515145.article)
7 [market/515145.article](http://www.conveniencestore.co.uk/advice/products-in-depth/dealing-in-a-dark-market/515145.article) (date accessed 15 February 2017).
- 8 20. Lavack AM, Toth G. Tobacco point-of-purchase promotion: examining tobacco
9 industry documents. *Tobacco Control* 2006;15:377-84.
- 10 21. Bloom PN. Role of slotting fees and trade promotions in shaping how tobacco is
11 marketed in retail stores. *Tobacco Control* 2001;10:340-4.
- 12 22. Martial L. While you were sleeping. *Tobacco Reporter* 2016;11:28-9.
- 13 23. Retail Council of Canada. Sale of tobacco products and smoking bans in Quebec.
14 2016. Available at: [http://www.retailcouncil.org/advocacy/sale-of-tobacco-products-](http://www.retailcouncil.org/advocacy/sale-of-tobacco-products-and-smoking-bans-in-quebec)
15 [and-smoking-bans-in-quebec](http://www.retailcouncil.org/advocacy/sale-of-tobacco-products-and-smoking-bans-in-quebec). (date accessed 15 February 2017).
- 16 24. Smoking and Health Action Foundation/ Non-Smokers' Rights Association. Eye on
17 the industry. Spring 2016 edition. Available at:[https://www.nsra-](https://www.nsra-adnf.ca/cms/file/files/Eye_on_the_Industry_2016-FINAL2.pdf)
18 [adnf.ca/cms/file/files/Eye_on_the_Industry_2016-FINAL2.pdf](https://www.nsra-adnf.ca/cms/file/files/Eye_on_the_Industry_2016-FINAL2.pdf) (date accessed 15
19 [February 2017](https://www.nsra-adnf.ca/cms/file/files/Eye_on_the_Industry_2016-FINAL2.pdf)).
- 20 25. Henriksen LS. Comprehensive tobacco marketing restrictions: promotion, packaging,
21 price and place. *Tobacco Control* 2012;21:147-53.
- 22 26. Henriksen LS. The retail environment for tobacco: a barometer of progress towards the
23 endgame. *Tobacco Control* 2012;24:e1.
- 24 27. McNeill A, Lewis S, Quinn C et al. Evaluation of the removal of point-of-sale tobacco
25 displays in Ireland. *Tobacco Control* 2011;20:137-143.

- 1 28. Dunlop S, Kite J, Grunseit AC, et al. Out of Sight and Out of Mind? Evaluating the
2 Impact of Point-of-Sale Tobacco Display Bans on Smoking-Related Beliefs and
3 Behaviors in a Sample of Australian Adolescents and Young Adults. *Nicotine &*
4 *Tobacco Research* 2015;17(7): 761-768.
- 5 29. Bogdanovica I, McNeill A, Britton J. Cohort study investigating the effects of first
6 stage of the English tobacco point-of-sale display ban on awareness, susceptibility and
7 smoking uptake among adolescents. *BMJ Open* 2017;7:e012451. doi:
8 10.1136/bmjopen-2016-012451.

9

1 **Acknowledgements**

2 The authors would like to acknowledge the contribution of the DISPLAY study team (Amanda
3 Amos, Catherine Best, Dorothy Currie, John Frank, Farhana Haseen, Andy MacGregor,
4 Anne Marie MacKintosh, Gozde Ozakinci, Jamie Pearce, Winfried van der Sluijs), the
5 administrative support provided by Aileen Ireland, Aileen Paton and Susan Fair, and the
6 retailers who participated in the study.

7

8 **Contributors**

9 MS drafted the manuscript. MS, DE and RP collected, coded and analysed the data. CM and
10 SH advised on the structure of the paper and contributed to the Introduction and Discussion.
11 SH conceived of and is principal investigator of the overall study. All authors commented on
12 drafts of the manuscript and approved the final version.

13

14 **Funding**

15 The study was funded by the UK National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) PHR project
16 10/3000/07. The study sponsor had no influence on study design and the collection, analysis,
17 and interpretation of data, the writing of the article and the decision to submit it for
18 publication.

19

20 **Competing interests**

21 None declared.

22

23 **Ethical approval**

24 Ethical approval for this part of the DISPLAY study was provided by the School of

1 Management Research Ethics Committee, University of Stirling.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11