

Martinez-Alvarez, M; Acharya, A; Arregoces, L; Brearley, L; Pitt, C; Grollman, C; Borghi, J (2017) Trends In The Alignment And Harmonization Of Reproductive, Maternal, Newborn, And Child Health Funding, 2008-13. Health affairs (Project Hope), 36 (11). pp. 1876-1886. ISSN 0278-2715 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2017.0364

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Trends In Alignment and Harmonization Of Reproductive, Maternal, Newborn, And Child Health Funding, 2008–13

Journal:	Health Affairs						
Manuscript ID	017-0364.R3						
Manuscript Type: Original Article							
Keywords: aid effectiveness, ODA, RMNCH, ALIGNMENT, HARMONISATION							
Note: The following files were submitted by the author for peer review, but cannot be converted to PDF. You must view these files (e.g. movies) online.							
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Trends In Harmonization Of

Financing For Reproductive,

Maternal, Newborn, And

Child Health, 2008–13

Abstract

Donor financing to low- and middle-income countries for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health increased substantially from 2008 to 2013. However, increased spending by donors might not improve outcomes, if funds are delivered in ways that undermine countries' public financial management systems and incur high transaction costs for project implementation. We combined quantitative and gualitative methods to examine the guality of funding for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health globally and in Tanzania, based on two principles of aid effectiveness: the alignment of donor financing with the recipient country's public health financial management systems, and donor harmonization for coordinated, transparent, and collectively effective actions. We found that alignment of donor financing deteriorated throughout the period, with the proportion of funds channeled through governments decreasing from 47 percent to 39 percent. Tanzania-based donors attributed the change to pressure donors were under to achieve and show results. Donor harmonization was low overall and remained relatively constant, although it increased in sub-Saharan Africa and decreased in South Asia. Bilateral funding agencies were the most harmonized donors. We recommend that future assessments of Sustainable Development Goals financing include measures of harmonization and alignment of funding.

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Official development assistance for health from wealthy countries to low- and middle-income countries guadrupled from \$5 billion in 1990 to over \$21 billion in 2013.¹ The increase was accompanied by an expansion of actors and initiatives in the health sector, including global health initiatives. Simultaneously, interest in the effectiveness of official development assistance has grown, a topic addressed in a series of high-level forums and international conferences-in Monterrey. Mexico (2002); Rome, Italy (2003); Paris, France (2005); Accra, Ghana (2008); Busan, South Korea (2011); Mexico City (2014); and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (2015)—each of which issued declarations. The Paris declaration articulated five principles of aid effectiveness: country ownership of national strategies; alignment of aid with country strategies; harmonization, or coordination, of donor aid; results for funding; and accountability between donors and aid recipients.² These principles encourage providers of official development assistance to align their funding with a recipient country's development strategies and systems, so that donors' activities are harmonized, and recipients and donors focus on achieving results for which they are mutually accountable.² These principles form the core of declarations and conferences above, and have been collectively defined as the "global aid effectiveness agenda."3

Most of the literature to date on official development assistance for health has focused on tracking its distribution from donors to countries and its targeting to countries' needs.^{4–8} Less attention has been paid to its effectiveness in relation to the Paris principles, although there is evidence that funding fragmentation,⁹ volatility,¹⁰ and high transaction costs for recipient governments¹¹ limit both the impact of official development assistance on health and the sustainability of progress already achieved. A 2014 report found progress in the use of country-results

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frameworks and joint assessments of national strategies, but it reported reduced use of national financial management procedures and less predictable funding for 2015– 17.¹² There have been further concerns that the focus on achieving global goals (including the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations) and targets based on national averages have incentivized programs to focus on easily attained targets, thereby widening inequities¹³ and favoring specific health conditions and population groups.^{14,15} In addition, little attention has been paid to the adherence to aid effectiveness principles of health donors that target specific populations or diseases—despite recognition of the fact that providing assistance in the form of vertical projects (that is funds that are designated for specific diseases or population groups contribute to the proliferation of programs, fragmentation of programming, and transaction costs for national health ministries and hinders donor harmonization.^{16,17}

We used a mixed-methods approach to assess whether there were improvements in the alignment and harmonization of donor funding for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health between 2008 and 2013, both at the global level for donors and recipients and at the country level, using Tanzania as a case study. We focused on this funding because of the large increase in donor funding in recent years to low- and middle-income countries related to Millennium Development Goals 4 and 5 (to improve child survival and maternal health, respectively).¹⁸ We used a case study to highlight how global trends affect national ministries and country-based donors. We selected Tanzania as our case study because it is a low-income recipient country that has a high degree of dependency on official development assistance and that experienced a substantial increase in external reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health funding between 2008 and 2013.¹⁸ It is also a

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country in which we have extensive experience working and living, and we are therefore familiar with its health systems and relevant stakeholders.

Study Data And Methods

Data Sources

Quantitative data for both global and country-level analyses were extracted for the years 2008-13 from the Countdown ODA+ data set, which tracks flows of official development assistance (ODA) and private funds from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (collectively referred to hereafter as ODA+ to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health.^{18,19} The data set includes information about sixty-four donors and 147 recipient countries and is based on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD's) Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database, to which it applies the Countdown project classification for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health (RMNCH).¹⁸ All records in the CRS are individually classified as RMNCH following the Countdown ODA+ framework¹⁸—in which both the full value of vertical projects (such as family planning, providing emergency obstetric care, and vaccinating children) and a proportion of the value of funding for primary health care, HIV prevention and treatment, health-sector budget support, general budget support, and so on are considered to promote reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health.¹⁸

For the qualitative component of the study, Melisa Martinez-Alvarez conducted semistructured interviews with members of the headquarters staff of four of the top ten donors to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health (n = 4), representatives of donors in Tanzania (n = 7), and representatives of governmental and nongovernmental organizations working in the Tanzanian health sector (n = 15). The interviews explored whether and how principles of aid effectiveness are

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considered in resource allocation and the perceptions of trends in resource allocation patterns over time and their consequences. A semistructured interview tool was used to guide the interviews (see the interview guide in the online Appendix).²⁰

Analytical Framework

We developed an analytical framework to assess progress toward alignment and harmonization of official and Gates assistance to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health, based on the definitions in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness² that could be feasibly measured with our data (Appendix Table 1).²⁰

According to the Paris Declaration, *alignment* refers to the degree to which donors base their support on recipient countries' national development strategies, institutions, and procedures.² The Paris indicators to assess the alignment of donor funding focus on the proportion of official development assistance that uses national financial systems, is reported on national budgets, and is predictable and untied (can be used to purchase goods and services from any country), as well as the quality of country systems.^{2,21} The Countdown ODA+ data did not allow us to assess the proportion of funds reported on national budgets or the degree of tying official and Gates assistance to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health. Instead, we assessed the proportion of funds disbursed through government systems; the proportion of funds from the top ten donors of ODA+ for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health at the country level in Tanzania as a proxy for predictability.

Tanzania received ODA+ for this area of health from twenty-eight to thirty-two donors during the study period. The top ten donors accounted for 88.2 percent of the funds (and therefore would have had the most impact on the volatility of funding); we

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discuss only these funders in our analysis of volatility. We therefore measured alignment by the share of ODA+ delivered through government channels by donor and by recipient country; the share of ODA+ delivered through the government that used pooled modalities rather than project funding; and volatility in total ODA+ to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health disbursed by donors to Tanzania.²²

Harmonization is defined in the Paris Declaration as the degree to which donors' actions are coordinated, transparent, and collectively effective.² The indicators used to evaluate harmonization according to that definition are the use of common arrangements and procedures and shared analysis.^{2,21} Our data did not allow us to systematically compare donors and recipient countries using these indicators. Furthermore, we did not consider them to be suitable ways to assess the impact of donor activities on recipient countries. Instead, we assessed the fragmentation and proliferation of funding for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health, which donors committed to reduce in the Paris² and Accra Declarations. We did this at the global level through indices of dispersion by assessing donor proliferation and recipient-country fragmentation of funding. A donor is a high proliferator if it distributes its budget among many recipients and a low proliferator if it concentrates its budget among a small number of countries.¹¹ Fragmentation refers to the number of donors in a given recipient country relative to the total official and Gates assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health. A country is highly fragmented if there are many donors, each of which provides a small share of the total official and Gates assistance.¹¹

Data Analysis

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We classified ODA+ to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health as disbursed through the government if the OECD's Creditor Reporting System database classified it as such (CRS channel codes 10000–19999) or if the channel code was empty but the CRS aid type was general budget support (A01) or health-sector budget support (A02). We manually classified projects as disbursed *through the government* if the "channel name" field indicated a government agency, and as *outside the government* if the same field indicated a nongovernmental organization. We considered ODA+ to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health to have been delivered as pooled funds if the type of assistance was general budget support (CRS type A01), health-sector budget support (CRS type A02), or basket funds or pooled funding (CRS type B04) that were explicitly channeled through the government. We analyzed trends in aid type for the period 2009–13, because data for 2008 were incomplete.

Global Analysis

We examined donor proliferation and recipient-country fragmentation of funding using the Theil and Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices, respectively¹¹ (see the supplementary methods in Appendix),²⁰ based on three-year averages of ODA+ to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health in the period 200611 and the average in the period 2012–13 to remove yearly variation.²³ The Theil Index (which ranges from 0 to the natural log of the number of recipients) compares the amount disbursed by a donor to a country to the average amount disbursed by the donor per country. A smaller Theil Index indicates greater proliferation, or that there are many recipients that receive less than the average amount from a particular donor. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) compares the number of donors in a recipient country to the total amount of ODA+ to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child

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health that the country receives. It is estimated as a number between 1/*n* and 1, where *n* is the number of donors disbursing official development assistance to a recipient country. Larger values suggest concentration of ODA+ (in other words, that a single donor or small group of donors contribute a significant share of the assistance); smaller values indicate greater fragmentation in assistance (in other words, the assistance is distributed in small amounts by many donors). Therefore, the larger the HHI, the greater the degree of harmonization of ODA+.

We generated measures of alignment and harmonization of funding for every donor and recipient country. We estimated averages across donor types (bilateral, multilateral, global health initiatives, and the Gates Foundation) and recipient country income groups (using the World Bank classification through 2016 per-capita gross national income of low- (<\$1,005), lower-middle(\$1, 006-\$3,955), upper-middle (\$3,956-\$12,235), and high-income countries(>\$12,236))²⁴. We categorized the European Union (EU) as a bilateral donor since EU institutions, rather than member states, ensure coherence and control spending for official development assistance.²⁵ We distinguished between multilaterals (made up of multiple members, including UN agencies and Bretton Woods institutions) and global health initiatives (single-issue agencies, including the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance). For 2013 we estimated ranges of values for channel, modality and fragmentation index [please provide] for each of the income groups (see Appendix Figure 1).²⁰ We analyzed fragmentation across geographic regions. *Tanzania Case Study*

To explore the alignment of donor funding with government strategies in Tanzania, we also examined volatility year by year in ODA+ to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health disbursements for each of the top ten donors in

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the period 2008–13. To measure fragmentation in Tanzania, we calculated the number of donors; the proportion of total ODA+ to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health that each donor represented; and the number of transactions for the period 2008–13. We assumed that each record in the CRS database represented a transaction. Although a single project can be delivered as multiple transactions, each transaction incurs costs in terms of reports and meetings.

For the qualitative analysis, interviews were recorded and transcribed. Data from the interviews were analyzed using thematic coding²⁶ that was based on the analytical framework (for details, see Appendix Table 1).²⁰ The coding framework was developed by Melisa Martinez-Alvarez and Josephine Borghi, and all coding was undertaken by Melisa Martinez-Alvarez. NVivo was used to manage the data. Qualitative analysis was undertaken after the analysis of quantitative data. The results of the analyses were integrated during the writing of this article.

Limitations

This study was subject to several methodological limitations. First, we assessed aid effectiveness in relation to the two principles that could be measured with our data. Other important principles of aid effectiveness (country ownership of national strategies, management for results, and mutual accountability of donors and recipients) were not addressed. These principles are difficult to assess across countries, since they require the use of qualitative methods to understand whether the mechanisms in place achieved their intended outcomes.³ In addition, we did not determine what the funds were spent on, despite the implications this may have for their effectiveness. Alignment and harmonization of funding could be measured in ways other than those used in this study. For instance, a measure of alignment should consider whether donor funding is filling gaps in national plans, but there is

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no consistent methodology that can be used to assess this. Similarly, harmonization should be assessed according to the degree to which donors adopt common approaches in recipient countries. This is difficult to achieve across countries. An indepth case study in Tanzania found that despite coordination mechanisms' being in place, internal donor structures and incentives were hindering harmonization efforts.³ Furthermore, our definition of *aid effectiveness* was restricted to the code of good practice outlined by the global aid effectiveness agenda, instead of being based on an evaluation of the impact of different modalities for official and Gates assistance on reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health outcomes.

Second, there were some limitations to our data. Information in the Countdown ODA+ database was manually coded by different people in different years, and although the team performed consistency checks, some bias may have still been introduced.¹⁹ In addition, we made assumptions about the proportions of funds for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health that were delivered as general or health-sector budget support, since donors indicated only the funding modality, not its subsequent allocation to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health.¹⁸ In Tanzania, general budget support is disbursed through the Ministry of Finance, so including this type of financing might have resulted in an overestimation of the number of transactions that the Ministry of Health managed. However, we do not anticipate this to be substantial. Our estimates of official and Gates assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health differ from those previously reported in Countdown ODA+ analyses¹⁸ because we excluded funds reported as regional disbursements—since we were interested in aid flows to specific recipient countries. By considering only funds disbursed through the government if that was the channel recorded in the CRS database, we might have underestimated the

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amount of funds delivered through a third partner but ultimately disbursed to governments (for instance, GAVI disburses 74.3 percent of its official and Gates assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health through UNICEF). In addition, we were not able to unpack the drivers of funding allocation. However, this is the subject of future work currently being undertaken by the authors.

Finally, only Martinez-Alvarez conducted the interviews and analyzed the qualitative data. This may have biased both the participants' responses and how they were interpreted.

Study Results

Alignment Of Donor Funding

In the period 2009–13, 40.9 percent of official and Gates assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health was delivered through governments (Exhibit 1). On average, in the period 2008–13, global health initiatives delivered 44.3 percent of their funds through governments; the shares for bilaterals and multilaterals were 38.5 percent and 58.7 percent, respectively (Appendix Table 2).²⁰ Of the top ten donors, those channeling the highest proportions of funds through governments were Germany (81.3 percent) and the Global Fund (61.7 percent), and those channeling the lowest proportions were the Gates Foundation (1.4 percent) and GAVI (9.7 percent) (Appendix Table 3).²⁰ In the same period, the share of funds for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health disbursed through government channels declined from 46.6 percent to 38.7 percent (Exhibit 2). Bilateral agencies and global health initiatives reduced their funding through governments, while the funding of multilaterals increased in 2009 and then stayed constant.

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In the period 2009–13, for those donors delivering official and Gates assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health through government channels, only 12.9 percent of the assistance, on average, was delivered as pooled funds with other donors, with 82.0 per cent being disbursed as project funding (there was insufficient information to estimate the modality of the remainder 5.1 percent) (Appendix Table 4).²⁰ Of the top ten donors, Canada (86.0 percent), EU institutions (61.7 percent), and the United Kingdom (32.8 percent) disbursed the highest proportion of their funds through governments as pooled funds (Appendix Table 4).²⁰ Eighteen donors disbursed none of their funds to governments as pooled funding, including the Global Fund, GAVI, and the Gates Foundation. The share of government funds pooled across all donors increased from 7.5 percent in 2009 to 18.2 percent in 2011 and then decreased to 13.1 percent in 2013 (Exhibit 3).

Between 2008 and 2013, disbursements of total official and Gates assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health through government channels increased for lower-middle- and low-income countries (from \$1,403.5 million to \$2,035.3 million and from \$1,292.7 million to \$1,785.8 million, respectively) (Exhibit 4); however, as a proportion of total ODA+ to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health, funds through the government decreased in both income groups (from 45.9 percent to 39.3 percent and from 47.0 percent to 36.2 percent, respectively) (Appendix Table 5)²⁰.). Of the funds channeled through the government, 9.6 percent were delivered as pooled funds with other donors in lower-middle-income countries, and 15.8 percent were delivered as pooled funds in low-income countries. Trends in alignment showed a high degree of heterogeneity (Appendix Figure 1);²⁰ although the top three recipients received about half of their funds for reproductive, maternal,

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newborn, and child health through their governments (Nigeria 46.6 percent, Ethiopia 45.9 percent, and Kenya 41.4 percent) (data not shown).

Qualitative findings showed that donors' headquarters staff members had concerns about the use of pooled funds, given the need for control and accountability to their own governments that resources are spent in appropriate ways.

One staff member said: "For us as an agency..., the solution is not, essentially, to have all the funds in one basket and then make grants to countries; we have some specific things that we need to try to accomplish.... The degree of control and accountability that we need, therefore—it's usually not going to be satisfied by, essentially, having all of our funds in global mechanisms."

Harmonization Of Donor Funding

On average, donors provided official and Gates assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health to about forty five recipient countries between 2006 and 2013. Seven donors donated to more than a hundred recipient countries, including three of the top ten donors (the United States donated to 110.6 countries, the Global Fund to 109.2, and the European Union to 110.7) (Appendix Table 7).²⁰ For most donors, the Theil Index was less than or near 1.0, which indicates high proliferation of funding—that is, disbursement of small levels of official and Gates assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health to many countries. The Theil Index overall was relatively unchanged between 2006–08 (0.95) and 2012–13 (0.99) (Appendix Figure 2).²⁰ Multilaterals had higher levels of proliferation of funding, with a Theil Index of 0.57 in 2006–08 and 0.72 in 2012–13, than bilaterals (Theil Index: 1.12 and 1.11, respectively). The Gates Foundation had the lowest

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levels of proliferation of funding (Theil Index: 1.49 in 2009–11 and 1.91 in 2012–13) (Appendix Figure 2).²⁰

In a given year in the period 2008–13, recipient countries received official and Gates assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health from an average of 15.4 donors, although five countries had more than 30.0 donors (Mozambique had 32.6; Tanzania and Kenya each had 31.4; and Afghanistan and Ethiopia each had 30.2) (data not shown). There was little change in the fragmentation of funding over time (the HHI was around 0.32for the time interval averages across the time period) (Appendix Table 9).²⁰ However, fragmentation was reduced for countries in sub-Saharan Africa (HHIs 0.23 in 2006–08 and 0.26 in 2012–13) and in Latin America and the Caribbean (HHIs: 0.39 and 0.44, respectively), whereas it increased in South Asia (HHIs: 0.19 and 0.15, respectively) (Appendix Table 8).²⁰ Official and Gates assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health was more fragmented across low-income countries, although there was substantial variation within country income groups (Appendix Figure 1c).²⁰

Our qualitative research findings showed that bilateral donor representatives were especially concerned about the risk of proliferation of donors in recipient countries. Other donor types acknowledged that the risk of proliferation of donors was not explicitly considered when allocating funds to countries, with allocations based on priority areas and country proposals. Most staff members in donor headquarters who participated in our interviews agreed that fragmentation increases transaction costs for recipient governments, hinders the coordination of donors with different priorities and funding models, and risks duplication of efforts. However, one

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headquarters staff member did not think that "having multiple partners engaged on common issues is inherently a problem."

Tanzania Case Study

Tanzania received US\$2.6 billion of official and Gates assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health in the period 2008–13. The top ten donors accounted for 86.0 percent of all funds, with just the top two (the United States and the Global Fund) making up 55.8 percent of all of the assistance. Assistance delivered through government channels decreased from 69.9 percent of the total assistance in 2008 to 52.8 percent in 2013, and the share of funds channeled through the government but pooled with funds from other donors decreased from 2011 to 2013 (Appendix Figure 3a).²⁰ There was increased reliance on project funding, from 49.0 percent of the assistance in 2008 to 90.9 percent in 2013 (Appendix Figure 3a).²⁰ In the same period, the United States delivered 40.7 percent of its funds through the Tanzanian government, compared to 80.1 percent for the Global Fund (data not shown). Neither donor disbursed money as pooled funds with other donors.

Official and Gates assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health in Tanzania was highly volatile over the period 2008–13. With the exception of the United States, disbursements from the top ten donors fluctuated considerably (Appendix Figure 3c).²⁰ Fluctuations were greatest for Global Fund disbursements, which oscillated between \$61.0 million and \$124.9 during the period (Appendix Figure 3c).²⁰

In our qualitative research, Tanzania-based respondents reported that donors had disbursed funds through the government without giving sufficient consideration to strengthening health financial management capacity. As a result, donors had been

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disappointed by the results obtained, which—coupled with increased pressures to "attribute [money] to results"—meant that donors had reverted to funding projects instead of using pooled approaches with other donors.

One representative of a donor said: "Everybody thought we had found the Holy Grail, but I think now the people are a little bit more critical and realize that it's not that easy. And now we see another move—moving away from [general budget support and health-]sector budget support and back to projects, and putting the flag (meaning attributing results to their funding)."

The average number of donors disbursing official and Gates assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health in Tanzania increased from twenty-eight in 2006–08 to thirty-five in 2012–13 (Appendix Table 9).²⁰ Fragmentation of donor funding increased slightly between 2009–11 (HHI: 0.21) and 2012–13 (HHI: 0.18). The assistance was delivered as 2,563 transactions in 2008, increasing to 4,258 transactions in 2011 (Appendix Figure 3b).²⁰ The United States and Global Fund accounted for 161 and 11 of these transactions in 2008 and 225 and 9 transactions in 2013, respectively (data not shown).

Like donor headquarters staff members, most donor representatives interviewed in our qualitative research in Tanzania reported concerns about the levels of fragmentation of funding and its impact on the quality of the dialogue between the government and donors. One representative based in Tanzania said, "There are so many activities and initiatives and implementing agencies that the dialogue often remains very general, and at a higher level we are not able, because of the multitude of actors, to coordinate all activities very well."

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However, another interviewee perceived that fragmentation of donor funding resulted in "a more active dialogue in health," with "more substance in the discussions between donors and government in the health sector."

Discussion

Our study analyzed trends in the period 2008–13 in two key principles of aid effectiveness: the alignment of donor funding with country strategies and financial management systems and the harmonization of the funding with that of other donors in relation to official and Gates assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health. We found little evidence of improvement in donors' adherence to either principle overall, although we identified both improvements and deteriorations in some metrics for certain donors and recipients. Alignment of the assistance deteriorated in the study period, with most donors moving away from pooled funding supplied by multiple donors. Harmonization of donor funding remained constant, despite increased funding for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health. High levels of fragmentation of funding at the country level remain a concern, as demonstrated by the case of Tanzania.

Achieving alignment of donor funding with country strategies requires that donors use a country's institutional and management arrangements, which we assessed as the proportion of funds that were pooled by multiple donors and delivered through government channels. In the study period, fewer than half of all reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health funds from donors to recipient countries were delivered through governments, and the share of donor funding to governments decreased over time across lower-middle- and low-income countries. This is surprising, given donors' commitments to the Paris Declaration and its five

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principles, which call for greater alignment of donor funding with recipient countries' priorities and systems than was typical in the past.

We found substantial variation across donor types: Multilaterals disbursed the highest proportion of funds through governments, while some of the largest bilateral donors disbursed the majority of their funds through nongovernment channels (for instance, the United States disbursed 65.4 percent of its funds this way). By pooling funds with other donors, donors could create an effective means of aid coordination, but we found that donors' enthusiasm for pooling funds has decreased in recent years, as shown by the decrease in the share of pooled funds (from 18.2 percent in 2011 to 13.1 percent in 2013).

These trends are concerning because they represent a reversal of gains perceived by our country-level participants in increased donor coordination and greater government control of funds. While still aligned to government systems, project funding channeled by donors through governments increases transaction costs, since each project requires separate negotiation, management, and reporting.¹¹ Projects delivered outside the government are the least coordinated with or aligned to country strategies. Results from our qualitative research showed that donor disillusionment with progress and the desires to control funds and for greater accountability to domestic populations of donor countries—to make it possible to demonstrate the effective use of funds—are making these modalities more attractive. Our results are similar to those of a study in Uganda.¹⁴

Funding volatility at the country level was also substantial, as seen in Tanzania. Year-by-year fluctuation of funds makes it hard for governments to plan activities and honor their commitments to their citizens.²⁷ This is particularly

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worrisome, as the poorest countries have been shown to be more likely to receive unpredictable amounts of official development assistance.¹⁰

Through international agreements, donors have repeatedly committed to becoming more harmonized with other donors by increasing the concentration of funding.^{2,28} We found that the proliferation of official and Gates assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health remained relatively constant over time. Proliferation was lowest for bilateral donors and the Gates Foundation. Multilateral donors and global health initiatives have resource-funding formulas that require them to fund all eligible countries. Therefore, we would have expected them to spread their funds more evenly, but we would have expected bilaterals to make further strides toward concentration of funding. Two studies that explored trends in overall concentration of official development assistance also reported little progress.^{23,29}

We found little change between 2008 and 2013 in fragmentation trends for official and Gates assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health at the country level. However, low-income countries received the most fragmented funds, with fragmentation levels falling in sub-Saharan Africa and increasing in Asia . The fact that funds became less fragmented in sub-Saharan Africa despite increases in funding and the number of donors suggests that funds were concentrated among few donors—which is encouraging. Nevertheless, some of the poorest countries still had high levels of fragmentation in funding, as seen in Tanzania. This is consistent with findings from a study of official development assistance for health.⁹ High degrees of proliferation and fragmentation in funding decrease the effectiveness of the assistance by increasing transaction costs for the recipient government and hindering coordination with other donors,¹¹ especially

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when donors are disbursing funds through their own projects outside of government channels. Arne Bigsten and Sven Tengstam attribute a lack of harmonization to donors' having differing goals, and a tendency to micromanage developmental projects and to the possibility of some donors becoming free riders when there is harmonization of funding.³⁰

Policy Implications

The findings from this study suggest the need for reflection on the future of official development assistance to low- and middle-income countries. There have been concerns about the stagnation of donor health-sector funding.³¹ and indeed only one of the United Nations' seventeen Sustainable Development Goals to be achieved by 2030 directly addresses health (compared to three of the Millennium Development Goals). However, it is not enough to advocate for increased funding, particularly if funds are delivered for separate projects by myriad donors with diverse requirements. With a higher number of goals and indicators for the Sustainable Development Goals than for the Millennium Development Goals, there is potential for increasing the fragmentation and recipient countries' transaction costs of official development assistance. It may be unrealistic to expect UN agencies to concentrate this assistance, but they could reduce transaction costs by coordinating funds in a given country-for instance, through delegated cooperation mechanisms. In addition, there is no agreed-on ideal level of fragmentation of funding, and too much concentration of funding may also be harmful.¹¹ The key may be to find a balance between meeting recipients' needs and not undermining the effectiveness of official development assistance.

Better methods are also needed to assess that effectiveness. A previous study showed that the Paris Declaration principles are broad and multidimensional,

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while the indicators proposed to assess progress are narrow and imprecise and rely too heavily on quantitative data.³ The indicators used in our study capitalize on publicly available data to compare countries globally. However, they do not capture some principles of aid effectiveness (notably country ownership of national strategies, management for results, or accountability), nor do they capture all aspects of alignment and harmonization (such as donors' ability to fill gaps in national strategies or coordinate in-country activities). Country ownership of national strategies, management for results and accountability are best assessed qualitatively. Therefore, there is a need for more single- or multicountry case studies, as well as better methods to assess qualitative indicators globally (for instance, surveys that assess global aid effectiveness declarations could include open-ended auestions).³

Conclusion

When donors are assessed for their support in implementing the Sustainable Development Goals, they should be held accountable not only for how much they disburse to achieve different goals or subgoal targets, but also for how aligned their funds are with national health plans, how the funds are disbursed, and the number of donors already operating in the health sector. Our study has shown that it is possible to monitor the alignment and harmonization of donor funds by using existing data sources and country case studies. The Global Financing Facility is a financing instrument launched at the Financing for Development Conference in Addis Ababa in 2015 in an effort to strengthen the Paris principles by improving domestic and donor resources for reproductive, maternal, newborn, child, and adolescent health in sixtythree high-burden countries. It will be important to link this initiative with processes to monitor progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals.

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Pooled modalities: These include general or health-sector budget support and health basket funds. Funds disbursed in this way allow recipient governments more control of how resources are used and accounted for.

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Exhibit list

Exhibit 1 (figure)

CAPTION: Total official development assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health, by donor, channel, and modality, 2009–13 **Source/Notes:** SOURCE Authors' analysis of data from the Countdown ODA+ database. NOTES Channels include governments and private and nonprofit organizations. "Other bilaterals" include all bilateral funders other than the United States and the United Kingdom (such as the European Union). IDA is the International Development Agency of the World Bank. "Other multilaterals" include all multilateral funding agencies other than the World Bank (such as the United Nations and development banks). The Global Fund is the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. BMGF is the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

Exhibit 2 (figure)

CAPTION: Percentages of official development assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health delivered through government channels, by donor type, 2008–13

Source/Notes: SOURCE Authors' analysis of data from the Countdown ODA+ database. NOTES BMGF is the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. GHI is global health initiatives (defined in the text).

Exhibit 3 (figure)

CAPTION: Percentages of official development assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health delivered through government channels and disbursed as pooled funds (with those of other donors), by donor type, 2008–13 **Source/Notes:** SOURCE Authors' analysis of data from the Countdown ODA+ database. NOTES The percentages for global health initiatives (defined in the text) and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation were zero.

Exhibit 4 (figure)

CAPTION: Total disbursements of official development assistance for reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health, by channel and modality and recipient-country income group, 2009–13

Source/Notes: SOURCE Authors' analysis of data from the Countdown ODA+ database. NOTES Amounts are in constant 2013 US dollars. "Government pooled" includes donor funds disbursed through government channels and pooled with funds of other donors. "Government other" includes funds delivered through governments for which the modality could not be specified. "Nongovernment" includes all funds delivered outside of the government, whether or not the modality could be specified.

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Acknowledgment

A previous version of this paper was presented at the Conference of the International

Association for Health Economics, Milan, 12th-15th July, 2015. This work was funded

through a subgrant from the US Fund for UNICEF under its Countdown to 2015 for

Maternal, Newborn, and Child Survival Grant (No. OPP1058954) from the Bill and

Melinda Gates Foundation. The authors thank the interviewees for sharing their time

and expertise.

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
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
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
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Bio 7: Josephine Borghi is an associate professor in health economics and policy in the Department of Global Health and Development, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.

Donor (proportion of total)	Channel/modality (proportion of total)
	Government pooled (5%)
United States (31%)	
	Government projects (34%)
United Kingdom (7%)	
	Government modality unspecified (2%)
Other bilateral (23%)	Projects without channel specified
IDA (6%)	(3%)
Other mutlilateral (4%)	
Global Fund (16%)	Non-government projects (52%)
GAVI (8%)	
BMGF (5%)	Non-government modality unspecified (3%)







Supplementary methods

1. Introduction

2. Introduce interviewees

A. Interview guide

1

c. Ask for permission to record, explain what the results will be used for and

5. How does your agency decide which countries to invest in? the size of investment?

ii. What are the advantages and disadvantages of this?b. Does your agency work with (recipient country) governments?

ii. What are the advantages and disadvantages of this?8. In you view, is fragmentation a problem for the effectiveness of ODA to RMNCH and your

a. Introduce aim and objectives of projects

procedures for anonymising data d. Ask for permission to quote and

b. How long they have worked at X agency3. How are decisions of funding allocation made in your agency?

a. What is the decision-making process?
 i. Who is involved?

ii. What procedures are involved?4. How does your agency decide on how much to invest in RMNCH?

a. Country-level factors – disease, need, history

6. How does your agency decide on the size of each project?

a. Does your agency work with other donors?i. If so how and why?

i. If so how and why?

b. How does your agency deal with this?9. In your view, is your agency's ODA to RMNCH effective?

b. Introduce aim of the interview

a. What their job involves

a. Versus total health ODA

b. Versus total ODA

b. Aid effectiveness

agency's projects in particular?

b. How could it be improved?10. Challenges and important issues for the future

a. If so how?

a. Why?

7. Once in-country

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
B. Theil and Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices


We calculated the Theil index through the weighted value of a ratio of actual amount donated to a recipient and the mean value a given donor donates: $\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}\frac{x_i}{\mu}\ln\left(\frac{x_i}{\mu}\right)$, where N is number of recipients, ln expresses the natural log, x_i is the amount a recipient i receives, and μ is the mean amount received across recipients. If a donor gave an equal amount to all recipients, then the Theil value would be 0; and if a donor heavily favours one recipient whilst also giving to more than a few recipients (say, N>5) then the Theil value converges to the natural log of N. There are different versions of the Theil Index, in the present context the important aspect is that the amount donated by a donor to a country is compared to the average amount donated to all countries by the donor, through the corresponding ratio: $\ln\left(\frac{x_i}{\mu}\right)$; thus, many small donations in comparison to the mean will produce a small Theil number. The log term above would be negative in this case for a lot of recipients. This would be characteristic of a proliferator.¹ The global number of recipients is above 100, the overall donations made to the countries by a multi-lateral should result in a small Theil index due to many small recipients. However, a bilateral donor can restrict the number of recipients; there is no specific reason why it cannot concentrate in giving aid to only a few countries. Thus, a small Theil index value for bilateral should be worrisome.


The HH index is expressed as the following, $\sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i^2 = HH \, Index$, where s_i represents the share of total aid donor *i* gives to the recipient. The smallest value would occur if all donors gave the same amount to country i, and the largest value would occur if there were only a single donor.


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Figure 1: Variations around the income country group average in 2013 for proportion of ODA+ to RMNCH disbursed through the government, proportion of ODA+ to RMNCH pooled and the fragmentation index









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


Figure 3. ODA+ to RMNCH to Tanzania by a) modality, b) number of transactions and c) year-on-year variation of the top 10 donors

Table 1. Definitions, indicators, and measurement strategy for assessing the alignment and harmonisation of ODA+ to RMNCH

Paris Declaration definition	Indicator	Measurement strategy
Donors base their overall support on partner	ODA+ to RMNCH delivered through government channels / Total ODA+ to RMNCH	Global trends by donor and recipient country (2008-2013)
countries' national development strategies, institutions and	ODA+ to RMNCH to government channels that is pooled / ODA+ to RMNCH to government	Global trends by donor and recipient country (2009-2013)
procedures.	Individual donor volatility	Trends in total ODA+ to RMNCH disbursed by top 10 donors to Tanzania (2008-2013)
	Donor proliferation	Trends in Theil index at the global level for all donors (2008-2013)
Donors' actions are more harmonised, transparent	Recipient fragmentation	Trends in Herfindahl-Hirschman index at the global level for all recipient countries (2008-2013)
and collectively effective.	Number of transactions	Trends in Tanzania (2008-2013)
	definition Donors base their overall support on partner countries' national development strategies, institutions and procedures. Donors' actions are more	definitionIndicatordefinitionODA+ to RMNCH delivered through government channels / Total ODA+ to RMNCH ODA+ to RMNCH to government channels that is pooled / ODA+ to RMNCH to government channels that is pooled / ODA+ to RMNCH to governmentprocedures.IndicatorDonors' actions are more harmonised, transparent and collectively effectiveRecipient fragmentation

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Table 2. ODA+ to RMNCH by channel and modality for each donor type between 2008 and 2013 (all values presented in constant 2013 USD millions)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
Bilateral							
Total ODA+ to RMNCH	4,128.7	4,935.8	5,552.2	5,634.1	6,094.5	6,486.4	32,831.6
ODA+ to RMNCH through	1,784.6	2,054.7	2,203.1	2,188.4	2,156.7	2,249.0	12,636.5
government (% of total)	(43.2%)	(41.6%)	(39·7%)	(38·8%)	(35·4%)	(34.7%)	(38·5%)
ODA+ to RMNCH pooled (%			350.3	585.4	460.6	517.3	2,167.2
ODA+ to RMNCH delivered		153.5 (7·5%)	(15.8%)	(26.7%)	(21.4%)	(23.0%)	(17.2%)
through government)			(13.8%)	(2017/8)	(21.470)	(23.076)	(17-276)
Multilateral							
Total ODA+ to RMNCH	916.9	1,207.7	1,051.9	1,167.8	1,007.7	1,145.6	6,497.6
ODA+ to RMNCH through	433.9	748.9	625.6	696.1	624.7	681.9	3,811.1
government (% of total)	(47.3%)	(62.0%)	(59.5%)	(59.6%)	(62.0%)	(59·5%)	(58.7%)
ODA+ to RMNCH pooled (%		121.6					
ODA+ to RMNCH delivered			75.2 (12.0%)	72.5 (10.4%)	61.6 (9·9%)	39.4 (5·8%)	443.0 (11.6%
through government)		(16.2%)		N			
BMGF							
Total ODA+ to RMNCH		165.0	141.8	281.4	266.2	214.5	1068.9
ODA+ to RMNCH through		3.5 (2.1%)	2.1 (1.4%)	2.9 (1.0%)	2.9 (1.1%)	3.6 (1.7%)	15.0 (1.4%)
government (% of total)		010 (11270)	(,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	(,)			2010 (21170)
ODA+ to RMNCH pooled (%							
ODA+ to RMNCH delivered		0	0	0	0	0	0
through government)							
GHI							
	1,557.7	1,548.4	2,052.8	1,797.7	2,495.9	3,105.1	12,557.7
Total ODA+ to RMNCH							
ODA+ to RMNCH through	860.0	864.9	1,036.4	718.6	782.3	1,305.7	5,567.8
government (% of total)	(52.2%)	(55.9%)	(50.5%)	(40.0%)	(31.3%)	(42.0%)	(44.3%)
ODA+ to RMNCH pooled (%							· ·
ODA+ to RMNCH bolled (%		0	0	0	0	0	0
ODAT to RIVINCH delivered							

through government)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
Total	6,603.3	7,856.8	8,798.7	8,881.0	9,864.3	10,951.5	52,955.

Table 3¹: ODA+ to RMNCH through the government by donor as a proportion of total ODA+ to RMNCH for that donor (2008-2013, constant 2013 US dollars)

Donor	Total ODA+ to RMNCH	ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH through gov as % of total ODA+ to RMNCH
Bilateral			
Australia	1069.3	204.5	19.1%
Austria	34.1	10.5	30.7%
Belgium	330.3	181.5	55.0%
Canada	1624.8	253.9	15.6%
Czech Republic	5.3	0.9	16.1%
Denmark	344.8	163.3	47.4%
Estonia	0.4	0.0	3.8%
EU Institutions	2500.0	1031.3	41.3%
Finland	118.2	24.9	21.1%
France	373.7	318.6	85.3%
Germany	1402.8	1140.2	81.3%
Greece	8.9	7.3	81.2%
Iceland	4.0	2.5	60.7%
Ireland	322.7	132.2	41.0%
Italy	245.8	140.6	57.2%
Japan	1203.7	580.4	48.2%
Korea	268.6	228.6	85.1%
Luxembourg	129.0	56.4	43.7%
Netherlands	561.8	266.5	47.4%
New Zealand	59.2	21.4	36.2%
Norway	556.5	136.4	24.5%
Poland	0.6	0.4	56.1%
Portugal	27.5	18.9	68.9%
Slovak Republic	0.3	1015	0.0%
Slovenia	1.3	0.2	15.4%
Spain	549.1	105.4	19.2%
Sweden	567.0	136.4	24.1%
Switzerland	210.3	55.1	26.2%
United Arab	210.5	55.1	20.270
Emirates	162.4	94.0	57.9%
United Kingdom	3850.5	1682.5	43.7%
United States	16298.3	5641.7	34.6%
BMGF	1068.9	15.0	1.4%
GHI	12557.7	5567.8	44.3%
GAVI	4201.9	408.7	9.7%
Global Fund	8355.8	5159.2	61.7%
Multilateral	6497.6	3811.1	58.7%
AfDB	0.6	0.6	100.0%
AfDF	254.7	202.1	79.4%
Arab Fund (AFESD)	5.9	202.1	0.0%

¹ Donors with more than 50% of NULL Channel and empty values excluded, as well as UNAIDS that had 100% coded as other

200.3 4.3 0.7 3032.0 111.8 316.4 18.3	200.3 0.1 0.3 2785.0 66.3 316.4	100.0% 1.2% 38.6% 91.9% 59.3%
0.7 3032.0 111.8 316.4 18.3	0.3 2785.0 66.3	38.6% 91.9%
3032.0 111.8 316.4 18.3	2785.0 66.3	91.9%
111.8 316.4 18.3	66.3	
316.4 18.3		59.3%
18.3	316.4	
18.3	316.4	
		100.0%
	12.1	66.5%
41.7		0.0%
157.3		0.0%
50.3	14.3	28.5%
743.3	213.5	28.7%
1020.9		0.0%
0.8		0.0%
280.3		0.0%
120.2		0.0%
137.8		0.0%
52955.7	22030.4	41.6%
	743.3 1020.9 0.8 280.3 120.2 137.8 52955.7	743.3 213.5 1020.9 0.8 280.3 120.2 137.8 52955.7 22030.4

Table 4. Total ODA+ to RMNCH, ODA+ to RMNCH through the government and ODA+ to RMNCH pooled by donor between 2009 and 2013 (constant 2013 US dollars)

Donor	Total ODA+ to RMNCH	ODA+ to RMNCH delivered through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH to the government delivered as pooled funds	ODA+ to RMNCH to the government delivered as projects	ODA+ to RMNCH to the government modality unknown	% ODA+ to RMNCH through the gov't delivered as pooled funds	% ODA+ to RMNCH through the gov't delivered as projects	
Bilateral								
Australia	958.4	181.8	94.6	48.6	38.7	52.0%	26.7%	
Austria	27.3	8.5	2.5	5.9	0.0	30.0%	69.9%	
Belgium	280.3	148.7	31.7	86.0	31.0	21.3%	57.8%	
Canada	1441.2	239.1	205.6	17.2	16.4	86.0%	7.2%	
Czech Republic	5.3	0.9		0.2	0.7	0.0%	18.8%	
Denmark	293.6	136.9	47.6	79.4	9.8	34.8%	58.0%	
Estonia	0.4	0.0		0.0		0.0%	100.0%	
EU Institutions	2183.6	814.0	502.6	216.3	95.1	61.7%	26.6%	
Finland	96.9	19.5	13.4	1.7	4.4	68.6%	8.6%	
France	334.0	282.2	20.8	198.4	63.0	7.4%	70.3%	
Germany	1189.8	966.8	91.9	804.1	70.9	9.5%	83.2%	
Greece	5.8	4.5	2.1	0.2	2.2	46.2%	4.4%	
Iceland	4.0	2.5		2.5		0.0%	100.0%	
Ireland	259.5	106.4	79.4	4.7	22.3	74.6%	4.4%	
Italy	188.5	101.3	0.6	69.0	31.8	0.6%	68.1%	
Japan	1055.2	503.0	29.1	440.8	33.1	5.8%	87.6%	
Korea	242.6	204.1		174.5	29.7	0.0%	85.5%	
Luxembourg	95.8	45.5		34.6	10.8	0.0%	76.2%	
Netherlands	460.9	207.8	125.6	30.2	52.1	60.4%	14.5%	
New Zealand	48.7	18.0	12.8	3.4	1.8	71.0%	18.7%	
Norway	455.6	106.4	71.9	7.9	26.7	67.5%	7.4%	
Poland	0.6	0.4		0.3	0.0	0.0%	89.1%	
Portugal	24.4	17.1	0.9	15.5	0.7	5.2%	90.5%	

Donor				ODA+ to RMNCH to the government delivered as projects	ODA+ to RMNCH to the government modality unknown	% ODA+ to RMNCH through the gov't delivered as pooled funds	% ODA+ to RMNCH through the gov't delivered as projects
Slovak Republic	0.3						
Slovenia	1.3	0.2		0.1	0.1	0.0%	35.2%
Spain	383.4	79.3	26.6	30.5	22.2	33.5%	38.5%
Sweden	476.6	95.5	55.9	16.8	22.7	58.6%	17.6%
Switzerland United Arab	179.1	41.1	20.6	12.0	8.4	50.2%	29.2%
Emirates United	162.4	94.0	30.5	47.3	16.2	32.5%	50.3%
Kingdom	3363.9	1329.0	436.1	705.4	187.5	32.8%	53.1%
United States	14483.2	5097.5	164.6	4858.5	74.4	3.2%	95.3%
BMGF	1068.9	15.0		14.5	0.5	0.0%	96.8%
GHI							
GAVI	3706.5	309.7		309.7		0.0%	100.0%
Global Fund	7293.5	4398.2		4398.2		0.0%	100.0%
Multilateral							
AfDB	0.6	0.6		0.3	0.3	0.0%	46.4%
AfDF	202.1	202.1	36.2	110.4	55.6	17.9%	54.6%
Arab Fund (AFESD) AsDB Special	4.8						
Funds	200.3	200.3		199.9	0.4	0.0%	99.8%
BADEA	4.3	0.1		0.1		0.0%	100.0%
GEF	0.4	0.3		0.3		0.0%	100.0%
IDA	2625.3	2440.1	63.3	2376.8		2.6%	97.4%
IDB Sp.Fund IMF (Concessional	111.8	66.3		66.3		0.0%	100.0%
Trust Funds)	270.8	270.8	270.8			100.0%	0.0%

Page	45	of	68
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Donor 8 9	Total ODA+ to RMNCH	ODA+ to RMNCH delivered through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH to the government delivered as pooled funds	ODA+ to RMNCH to the government delivered as projects	ODA+ to RMNCH to the government modality unknown	% ODA+ to RMNCH through the gov't delivered as pooled funds	% ODA+ to RMNCH through the gov't delivered as projects
10 Kuwait (KFAED)	18.3	12.1		12.1		0.0%	100.0%
11 OFID	41.7						
12 UNAIDS	137.0						
13 UNDP	42.2	14.3		13.5	0.8	0.0%	94.2%
14 UNFPA 15 UNICEE	601.5	170.2		134.7	35.4	0.0%	79.2%
16 UNICEF	821.8						
17 UNPBF	0.8						
18 UNRWA	238.7						
19 WFP	120.2						
20 WHO 21 Grand Total	137.8						
21 Grand Total 22 23 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 47	46352.4	18951.9	2437.4	15548.7	965.8	12.9%	82.0%

Table 5². ODA+ to RMNCH by channel and modality for each recipient country income group between 2008 and 2013 (all values presented in constant 2013 USD millions)

	2000	2000	2010	2011	2012	2012	Tatal
llich in come	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
High-income							
Total ODA+ to RMNCH							
(constant 2013 USD)	6.3	4.4	9.0	1.8	3.1	2.4	27.0
ODA+ to RMNCH through							
government (% of total)	5.4 (86.6%)	4.4 (65.1%)	6.7 (74.8%)	0.5 (27.7%)	1.4 (44.8%)	0.9 (36.6%)	17.8 (66.0%)
ODA+ to RMNCH through							
gov't pooled (% of ODA+ to							
RMNCH through gov't)		1.7 (57.4%)	1.6 (24.4%)	0·1 (18·8%)	0·5 (33.2%)	0·0 (0·0%)	4.5 (25.5%)
ODA+ to RMNCH through							
gov't project (% of ODA+ to							
RMNCH through gov't)		0.7 (24.3%)	4.7 (69.1%)	0·3(67·0%)	0.9 (62.7%)	0.8 (85.3%)	8.8 (49·4%)
Upper-middle-income							
Total ODA+ to RMNCH							
(constant 2013 USD)	784.7	940.2	879.6	792.4	842.3	824.7	5063.8
ODA+ to RMNCH through							
government (% of total)	368.9 (47.0%)	502.1 (53.4%)	420.3 (47.8%)	360.9 (45.6%)	409.9 (48.7%)	410.6 (49.8%)	2,472.7 (48.8%
ODA+ to RMNCH through							
gov't pooled (% of ODA+ to							
RMNCH through gov't)		14.9 (3·0%)	9.0 (2.1%)	25.8 (7.1%)	57.0 (13.9%)	59.4 (14.5%)	169.3 (6.8%)
ODA+ to RMNCH through		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		· · /	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	· · ·
gov't project (% of ODA+ to							
RMNCH through gov't)		402.4 (80.1%)	393.9 (93.7)	323.7 (89.7%)	342.7 (83.6%)	340.5 (82.9%)	1,967.8 (79.6%
Lower-middle-income				()	()	()	/
Total ODA+ to RMNCH							
(constant 2013 USD)	3055.9	3730.9	4077.3	4173.0	4541.2	5183.8	24762.1
ODA+ to RMNCH through	0000.0	0,00.0		11/0.0	10 11.2	0100.0	10,488.4
government (% of total)	1,403 (45.9%)	1,783.9 (47.8%)	1,823.9 (44.7%)	1,770.9 (42.4%)	1,670.8 (36.8%)	2,035.3 (39.3%)	(42.4%)
government (/º or total)	1,403 (43.370)	1,705.9 (47.070)	1,023.3 (44.7 %)	1,770.3 (42.470)	1,070.0 (00.070)	2,000.0 (09.070)	(72.4/0)

² Income unclassifiable includes countries not included on the World Bank classification. ODA+ to RMNCH disbursed through the government where modality was not identified not shown (hence percentage ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't pooled plus ODA+ to RMNCH gov't project does not add up to 100)

Health Affairs

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't pooled (% of ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't) ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't project (% of ODA+ to		107.6 (6.0%)	166.1 (9.1%)	328.0 (18.5%)	178.2 (10.7%)	185.4 (9.1%)	1,007.2 (9.6%)
RMNCH through gov't)		1,331.1 (75.0%)	1,625.7 (89.1%)	1,424.5 (80.4%)	1,474.6 (88.3%)	1,830.0 (89.9%)	8,475.7 (80.9%
Low-income Total ODA+ to RMNCH (constant 2013 USD) ODA+ to RMNCH through government (constant 2013	2748.4	3162.0	3824.0	3911.4	4469.1	4932.8	23047.7
USD)	1,292.7 (47.0%)	1,364.2 (43.1%)	1,607.7 (42.0%)	1,471.8 (37·6%)	1,476.3 (33.0%)	1,785.8 (36·2%)	8,998.5 (39.09
ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't pooled (% of ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't) ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't project (% of ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't)		149.8 (11·0%) 918.0 (67.3%)	247·7 (15·4%) 1,327.1 (82.5%)	303·5 (20.6%) 1,146.6 (77.9%)	285.9 (19·4%) 1,172.8 (79·4%)	311.2 (17·4%) 1,460.9 (81.8%)	1,423.1 (15·8 6,712.4 (74.6
Income not classified Total ODA+ to RMNCH (constant 2013 USD) ODA+ to RMNCH through government (constant 2013	8.0	19.3	8.9	2.6	8.5	7.9	55.2
USD) ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't pooled (% of ODA+ to	8.0 (100.0%)	18.9 (97.9%)	8·5 (96.3%)	1.7 (68.2%)	8.1 (95.6%)	7.8 (96.8%)	53.0 (96.1%)
RMNCH through gov't) ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't project (% of ODA+ to		1·1 (5·8%)	1·1 (12·9%)	0.6 (32.5%)	0.6 (7.6%)	0.7 (8.8%)	6.0 (11.3%)
RMNCH through gov't)		0·2 (1·3%)	4·9 (57·8%)	1·2 (66·6%)	7·5 (92·4%)	7·0 (91.1%)	21.1 (39.8%)

Table 6: Annual total ODA+ to RMNCH, ODA+ to RMNCH through the government and ODA+ to RMNCH pooled by recipient country (constant 2013 US dollars; pooled funds not shown for 2008 because of data inaccuracy)

9																		
10		2008			2009			2010			2011			2012			2013	
11 Recipient 12 country 13 14 15	Total ODA+ to RMNC H	ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNCH	ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNC H	ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled									
16 16Afghanistan	212	64	0	313	76	0	293	81	0	315	93	0	295	76	1	309	76	1
17 _{Albania}	10	3	0	7	3	0	6	2	0	5	2	0	7	2	0	2	0	0
18 Algeria	3	2	0	3	1	0	2	1	0	4	2	0	2	1	0	4	1	0
19 ^{Angola}	82	13	0	55	14	0	65	13	0	49	5	0	70	12	0	78	32	0
20 21 ^{Anguilla}	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22Antigua and 23 Barbuda	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
24 ^{Argentina}	14	3	0	8	7	0	6	0	0	2	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	0
25 Armenia	9	2	0	11	4	1	11	5	3	11	5	4	8	4	1	6	3	1
26 _{Azerbaijan}	6	3	0	7	4	0	10	4	0	11	8	0	8	5	0	10	5	0
27 _{Bangladesh} 28	151	21	0	233	120	0	212	77	4	202	26	21	210	76	18	337	122	18
28 29 ^{Barbados}	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0			0			0			0
30 Belarus	4	1	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	0
31 Belize	0	0	0	2	0	0	3	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	5	2	0
32 _{Benin}	46	17	5	62	28	3	71	26	2	72	27	3	56	16	1	63	7	1
33 34 ^{Bhutan}	3	3	0	2	2	1	3	2	0	2	1	0	3	2	0	3	1	0
35 ^{Bolivia}	39	7	2	40	7	4	38	10	6	36	12	7	38	12	0	34	4	0
36Bosnia and	11	4	0	11	8	0	14	9	0	10	5	0	11	8	0	10	3	0
37 ^{lerzegovina} 38 ^{Botswana}	94	27	0	103	38	0	46	36	0	45	35	0	30	28	0	40	28	0
39 Brazil	8	3	0	11	1	0	13	4	0	10	2	0	5	2	0	4	1	0
40 Gurkina Faso 41	78	48	6	92	53	16	114	72	14	64	32	14	103	38	9	107	54	9

1 2 3 4 5 6 Recipient 7 country 8 9 10	Total ODA+ to RMNC H	2008 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNCH	2009 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNCH	2010 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNCH	2011 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNCH	2012 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNC H	2013 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled
11 Burundi	46	29	2	50	25	3	65	31	2	61	18	1	53	14	1	74	33	1
12 _{Cambodia} 13	72	38	0	90	46	3	121	55	6	113	64	0	100	25	0	102	41	0
13 14 ^{Cameroon}	34	16	4	50	30	1	38	17	0	86	53	0	58	22	1	77	41	1
15 ^{Cape Verde}	3	3	0	3	2	1	5	5	0	6	3	0	3	3	0	5	4	0
16 Central 17 African 18 ^{Republic}	22	5	2	15	3	0	20	6	0	21	1	1	21	3	0	30	5	0
19 ^{Chad}	32	13	0	33	7	0	59	5	0	41	7	0	47	7	0	83	33	0
20 Chile	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	3	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
21 China 22 (People's 23Republic of)	106	55	0	103	79	1	84	61	0	49	29	0	52	37	0	31	20	0
24 ^{Colombia}	8	1	0	6	0	0	12	2	0	11	5	0	8	2	0	42	31	0
25 Comoros	1	0	0	2	1	0	6	2	0	4	2	0	6	4	0	7	3	0
26 congo, Rep.	14	8	0	7	4	0	27	8	0	20	6	0	13	6	0	15	6	0
27 Cook Islands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
28 29 ^{Costa Rica}	3	0	0	3	1	0	3	1	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0
29 36 ote d'Ivoire	62	25	9	75	41	1	111	54	7	82	46	5	80	46	4	105	70	4
31 Croatia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0			0			0
32 _{Cuba}	5	1	0	2	0	0	5	1	0	3	0	0	3	0	0	4	0	0
33 Democratic 34 People's 35 Republic of 36 Korea	7	0	0	15	0	0	17		0	8	0	0	15	0	0	19	0	0
37Democratic 38Republic of	226	61	18	268	70	4	310	71	6	330	80	0	376	78	1	434	77	1
39 ^{the Congo 40^{Djibouti} 41 42 43 44}	10	6	1	10	6	0	6	3	0	7	3	2	12	6	0	8	2	0

1																		
2																		
3 4																		Į
5		2008			2009			2010			2011			2012			2013	l
6 Recipient	Total	ODA+ to	ODA+															
7 country 8	ODA+ to	RMNCH through	to RMNCH	ODA+ to	RMNCH through	to RMNCH	ODA+ to	RMNCH through	to RMNCH	ODA+ to	RMNCH	to RMNCH	ODA+ to	RMNCH through	to RMNCH	ODA+ to	RMNCH through	to RMNCH
9 10	RMNC H	gov't	pooled	RMNCH	gov't	pooled	RMNCH	gov't	pooled	RMNCH	through gov't	pooled	RMNCH	gov't	pooled	RMNC H	gov't	pooled
11 Dominica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12 _{Dominican}	18	10	0	19	9	1	23	11	0	22	4	2	23	9	0	23	13	0
14 Ecuador	14	8	0	10	3	0	8	2	0	5	1	0	4	1	0	5	2	0
15 _{Egypt}	65	32	0	31	10	14	35	19	9	18	12	0	17	4	0	11	7	0
16 17 ^{El Salvador}	14	3	0	16	4	0	19	5	0	15	4	0	14	4	0	15	6	0
▲ o Equatorial	9	1	0	6	0	0	7	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
19 ^{Guinea} 20 Eritrea	24	16	0	20	10	0	37	27	0	15	8	0	20	17	0	26	18	0
20 Entrea 21 Ethiopia	349	174	8	378	196	27	479	265	59	561	193	71	515	174	87	687	363	87
22 Fiji	4	1	0	3	1	0	4	1	0	3	1	0	12	1	0	5	1	0
23 Former	2	2	0	1	1	0	2	1	0	2	2	0	1	1	0	2	2	0
24 Yugoslav 25 Republic of																		ľ
26Macedonia																		ļ
27 ^{Gabon}	4	1	0	6	5	0	3	2	0	3	2	0	3	2	0	4	3	0
28 Gambia	9	7	1	12	10	0	15	9	0	13	7	1	13	6	0	22	11	0
29 Georgia 30 _{Ghana}	16	6	5	15	8	4	16	9	2	14	4	2	15	3	0	10	1	0
31	104	67	19	163	83	37	156	87	34	150	61	40	197	93	6	203	83	6
32 Grenada	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	C	0
33 ^{Guatemala}	44	8 14	0	32	9	0	26 25	4 15	3	36	15	0	34 40	10 12	0	31	6	0
34 Guinea 35 Guinea-	25 9	14 3	0 1	23 10	6 6	0 1	35 15	15 11	0 0	27 10	12 4	1 0	40 5	12 1	1 0	33 21	10 11	1 0
36 Bissau	5	Э	T	10	U	T	15	11	U	10	4	U	J	T	U	21	ΤT	U
37 Guyana	18	10	0	18	11	0	15	10	0	11	7	0	9	5	0	7	5	0
38 _{Haiti}	90	27	3	110	38	7	183	61	1	190	53	0	139	44	0	142	45	0
39 _{Honduras} 40	37	16	0	35	7	3	42	13	0	40	13	0	47	20	0	50	7	0
41																		
42																		
43 44																		
44																		

1 2																		
3 4 5 6 Recipient 7 country 8 9	Total ODA+ to RMNC	2008 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNCH	2009 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNCH	2010 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNCH	2011 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNCH	2012 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNC	2013 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled
10 11 India	H	224		467	264		450	224	45	504	274		100	202		H	224	
10	414	324	4	467	361	11	458	321	45	594	371	1	486	293	99	400	234	99
13	111 5	64 0	0 0	102 1	51 0	0	126 5	71 0	0 0	96 7	54 0	1 0	125 11	59 0	1 0	135 6	83 0	1 0
14 ^{Iran} 15 ^{Iraq}	5 34	0 20	0	1 44	6	0	5 37	0 7	0	13	2	0	21	0	0	20	0	0
15 ^{Iraq} 16 Jamaica	34 6	20 4	0	44 5	6 4	0	6	5	0	6	2 4	0	3	1 2	0	20 6	1 4	0
17 Jordan	32	4 2	0	53	4 11	0	52	5	0 11	66	4 13	0 14	5 83	2	0	57	4 6	0
18 Kazakhstan 19	9	6	0	11	3	0	10	5	0	5	3	0	83 11	9	0	7	4	0
10	228	112	5	329	139	0	427	179	6	473	179	4	533	206	4	, 592	253	4
20	3	2	0	2	135	0	2	0	0	2	0	4	2	0	4	2	0	4
21 ^{Kiribati} 22 Kosovo	5	2	0	5	1	0	4	0	0	4	1	0	5	1	0	2	1	0
23 _{Kyrgyz}	19	12	1	16	11	2	4 17	12	5	18	11	2	14	7	2	14	6	2
24 Republic	15	12	T	10	11	2	17	12		10	11	2	14	,	2	14	0	2
25ao People's	22	15	1	21	15	0	30	19	1	29	20	0	33	20	0	35	24	0
26 ⁰ 00000000000000000000000000000000000																		
28 ^{Lebanon}	15	3	0	14	1	0	16	3	0	11	1	0	20	1	0	25	1	0
29 Lesotho	20	15	1	23	17	11	40	31	4	54	38	5	57	38	1	66	50	1
30 Liberia	63	28	1	58	14	3	62	14	5	71	18	19	77	35	18	74	34	18
31 _{Libya}	13	12	0	8	8	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	3	1	0	2	0	0
32 Madagascar 33	71	30	0	57	14	0	103	26	0	61	13	0	73	7	0	113	17	0
34 ^{Malawi}	152	100	7	153	81	22	141	65	11	187	90	20	256	115	17	262	97	17
35 Malaysia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
36 Maldives	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	0
37 _{Mali}	77	31	14	89	41	8	104	24	34	134	51	4	137	18	15	157	25	15
38 Marshall 39 Islands 40	4	4	4	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7	7	0	0	0	0

- 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

1 2 3 4 5 6 Recipient 7 country 8 9 10	Total ODA+ to RMNC H	2008 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNCH	2009 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNCH	2010 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNCH	2011 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNCH	2012 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNC H	2013 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled
11 _{Mauritania}	14	7	0	12	3	1	13	3	1	12	4	1	14	2	0	14	4	0
12 _{Mauritius}	1	1	2	3	3	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	0	1	0	0
14 Mayotte	4	4	0	2	2	1	5	5	0			0			0			0
15 Mexico	3	1	0	3	1	0	3	0	0	4	0	0	5	0	0	4	0	0
1 6 Micronesia, 1 7 Fed. States	7	7	9	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	12	12	0	0	0	0
18 ^{Moldova}	13	6	0	16	10	8	31	21	14	24	17	7	21	14	0	12	3	0
19 Mongolia	6	2	0	5	2	1	8	5	0	9	7	0	11	7	0	10	8	0
20 _{Montenegro}	2	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
21 _{Montserrat}	1	1	0	0	0	0			0	1		0	0		0	0	0	0
22 23 ^{Morocco}	17	14	0	30	25	1	29	22	3	20	17	5	23	14	8	37	15	8
2 ⁴ ^{lozambique}	219	125	17	228	117	50	287	178	57	289	161	57	311	163	63	340	169	63
25 Myanmar	44	3	0	36	4	0	47	1	0	40	1	0	107	2	10	125	14	10
26 _{Namibia}	40	22	0	71	57	0	74	50	0	55	29	0	71	47	0	63	35	0
27 Nauru	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
28 29 ^{Nepal}	61	33	0	57	26	6	82	26	7	63	27	6	63	22	7	70	30	7
30 Nicaragua	47	19	3	56	15	7	48	13	4	50	23	2	41	14	0	33	6	0
31 Niger	70	23	0	71	19	3	89	19	7	80	19	4	70	20	1	85	20	1
32 _{Nigeria}	373	192	0	649	342	14	445	216	9	556	238	4	675	235	6	954	480	6
33 _{Niue}	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
35 ^{Oman}	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
36 Pakistan	176	66	1	269	80	1	360	117	94	362	167	0	401	86	0	455	90	0
37 Palau	1	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
38 _{Panama}	1	1	0	3	1	0	3	0	0	2	0	0	3	1	0	3	1	0
39 ^{Papua} New 40 ^{Guinea} 41 42 43 44	59	17	0	66	21	10	52	16	1	78	8	1	78	5	1	95	3	1

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1 2																		
3 4 5 6 Recipient 7 country 8	Total ODA+ to RMNC	2008 ODA+ to RMNCH through	ODA+ to RMNCH		2009 ODA+ to RMNCH through	to RMNCH		2010 ODA+ to RMNCH through	ODA+ to RMNCH	Total ODA+ to	2011 ODA+ to RMNCH through	ODA+ to RMNCH		2012 ODA+ to RMNCH through	ODA+ to RMNCH	Total ODA+ to	2013 ODA+ to RMNCH through	ODA+ to RMNCH
9 10	H	gov't	pooled	RMNCH	gov't	pooled	RMNCH	gov't	pooled	RMNCH	gov't	pooled	RMNCH	gov't	pooled	RMNC H	gov't	pooled
11 Paraguay	9	4	0	12	3	0	14	4	0	6	1	0	7	2	0	5	1	0
12 Peru	28	5	0	70	39	0	34	4	0	22	1	24	43	28	23	36	26	23
13 14 ^{Philippines}	45	8	0	52	17	2	64	10	8	55	17	4	55	13	0	63	6	0
14 15 ^{Rwanda}	131	78	12	156	99	16	180	121	17	191	119	4	191	117	8	170	99	8
16 aint Helena	1	1	1	1	1	0	3	2	0	1	1	0	7	7	0	7	7	0
17 _{Saint Kitts}	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0		0
18 and Nevis 19Saint Lucia	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	4	4	0	3	3	0	2	2	0
29aint Vincent		0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21 and the																		
22 Grenadines 23 Samoa	1	1	0	2	1	2	4	3	0	1	1	3	5	4	4	5	5	4
23 Santoa 24 Sao Tome	4	1	0	2	1	0	3	1	0	5	1	0	3	4	4	7	1	4
25 nd Principe	*	Ŧ	U	2	÷	U			Ŭ		1	U		±		,	Ŧ	U
26 Senegal	65	19	7	76	33	2	69	23	8	83	25	8	100	39	0	95	29	0
27 Serbia	8	4	3	13	11	3	7	5	0	10	5	0	5	3	0	8	2	0
28 _{Seychelles} 29	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
29 Sierra Leone 30	36	16	2	52	15	3	57	19	1	55	23	1	51	15	1	75	14	1
31 Solomon	9	5	0	10	5	6	10	8	6	12	10	4	8	5	6	13	10	6
32 Somalia	34	3	0	52	0	0	50	0	0	48	0	0	93	0	0	75	1	0
33 34 ^{South Africa}	220	113	0	307	160	0	356	158	23	383	163	18	390	180	31	373	187	31
34 35 South Su			0			0			0	65	5	12	155	23	28	162	34	28
36 Sri Lanka	16	11	0	26	12	0	27	15	0	18	8	0	16	7	0	15	8	0
37 _{States Ex-} 38 _{Yugoslavia}	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
39 Sudan	133	17	0	115	8	0	180	18	0	87	8	0	115	8	0	127	7	0
40 _{Suriname}	3	2	2	9	8	0	4	4	0	4	4	0	1	1	0	2	2	0
41 42																		
43 44																		
44 45																		

1 2																		
3																		
4 5		2008			2009			2010			2011			2012			2013	
6 Recipient 7 country 8 9	Total ODA+ to RMNC	ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNCH	ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNC	ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled									
10 11	н	_	_			_			_			_			_	н		
11 _{Swaziland} 12 _{Syrian Arab} 13 _{Bopublic}	12	9	0	21	14	0	39	28	0	42	19	0	35	15	0	41	24	0
· · Republic	12	2	0	16	7	0	12	5	0	6	1	0	18	0	0	62	3	0
14 Tajikistan	16	4	2	16	5	3	27	8	1	14	3	1	22	6	0	22	6	0
15 _{Tanzania} 16 _	321	225	39	342	217	55	434	266	68	413	244	39	468	166	49	589	311	49
17 I hailand	31	20	0	21	12	0	26	17	0	38	27	0	33	10	0	43	20	0
18 ^{Timor-Leste}	14	1	0	11	4	0	19	10	0	14	4	0	25	5	0	16	3	0
19 Togo 20 –	21	7	2	27	10	3	26	12	1	32	16	0	10	6	0	36	12	0
20 _{Tokelau} 21 _{Tonga}	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21 Tonga 22 23 Tohaga	1	1	0	1	1	0	2	1	0	4	4	1	3	2	1	1	1	1
	2	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
24 Tunisia	10	10	1	4	3	0	3	2	0	2	1	0	6	5	0	5	3	0
26 ^{Turkey}	4	3	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0
27 ^{7 urkmenista}	2	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
28 ⁿ Tuvalu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
29 ^{Tuvalu} 30 ^{Uganda}	182	78	4	234	126	14	278	122	4	286	112	7	404	212	3	356	131	3
31 Ukraine	28	6	0	27	4	0	26	2	0	28	2	0	18	3	0	11	5	0
32 Uruguav	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0
33 _{Uzbekistan}	16	5	0	19	3	0	21	5	0	16	3	0	24	10	0	19	11	0
34 35 ^{Vanuatu}	3	2	0	4	3	0	3	2	0	2	0	1	4	2	1	7	4	1
36 ^{Venezuela}	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
37 Vietnam	80	50	16	78	66	3	100	62	3	109	69	6	99	68	6	115	82	6
38 _{Wallis and}	0	0	0	15	15	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
39 Futuna 40West Bank	67	11	3	63	6	3	195	120	26	98	30	5	98	10	0	57	4	0
40west bank 41	07	11	5	00	0	5	100	120	20	50	50	5	50	10	0	57	-7	v
42																		
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44 45																		
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47																		

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Page	55	of	68
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Health Affairs

1 2 3 4 5 6 Recipient 7 country 8 9 10	Total ODA+ to RMNC H	2008 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNCH	2009 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNCH	2010 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNCH	2011 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNCH	2012 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled	Total ODA+ to RMNC H	2013 ODA+ to RMNCH through gov't	ODA+ to RMNCH pooled
11 and Gaza																		
12 Strip	40	10	0	20			50	47	0	42	0	4	01	20	0	4 47	Γ 4	0
13 Yemen 14 _{Zambia}	43 187	18 87	0 19	38 194	14 95	1	52 176	17	0 12	43 250	8 84	1 15	91 264	28 103	0	147 331	54 88	0
15 _{Zimbabwe}	68	87 19	19 0	194 106	23	11	1/0	74 10	12	250 121	٥4 م	15 14	204 309	28	8 0	215	88 19	8 0
16 17 ^G rand Total	6603	3078	275	7857	23 3672	426	8700	3867	658	8891	3606	 	9864	3567	557	10952	4240	557
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48											9 3606							

Time period	2006-2	008	2009-	2011	2012-2	2013	2006-2013	average
Donor	Avg. No. countries Supported	Theil Index						
AfDB					2.0	0.67	0.7	0.22
AfDF	28.3	0.31	18.0	0.50	16.5	0.75	20.9	0.52
Arab Fund (AFESD)	1.7	0.76	3.7	0.82	4.5	0.66	3.3	0.75
AsDB Special Funds			27.0	1.64	10.5	0.87	12.5	0.84
Australia	36.0	1.46	59.3	1.81	54.0	1.24	49.8	1.50
Austria	52.7	1.50	40.3	1.21	62.0	1.23	51.7	1.32
BADEA			1.7	0.07	7.0	0.32	2.9	0.13
Belgium	55.0	1.20	64.3	1.49	51.0	1.19	56.8	1.29
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation			53.0	1.49	66.5	1.91	39.8	1.13
Canada	73.0	1.20	95.0	1.59	84.0	1.48	84.0	1.42
Czech Republic			7.7	0.83	22.5	0.70	10.1	0.5
Denmark	36.0	0.93	44.0	1.20	30.0	1.34	36.7	1.1
Estonia					4.5	0.38	1.5	0.1
EU Institutions	106.3	0.89	115.7	0.96	110.0	0.92	110.7	0.9
Finland	48.0	1.18	59.3	1.00	57.5	0.86	54.9	1.0
France	48.7	1.19	68.0	1.06	62.0	1.22	59.6	1.1
GAVI	67.7	0.84	69.7	0.81	71.5	0.86	69.6	0.8
GEF	0.3	0.00	0.3		4.0	0.22	1.6	0.0

Time period	2006-200	8	2009-20	11	2012-201	.3	2006-2013 av	erage
Germany	90.0	1.28	92.7	1.22	93.0	1.25	91.9	1.25
Global Fund	105.3	0.83	106.7	0.82	115.5	0.92	109.2	0.86
Greece	37.7	0.83	22.0	2.10	10.0	2.32	23.2	1.75
Iceland			1.3	0.39	5.0	1.04	2.1	0.48
IDA	69.3	0.80	64.7	1.31	53.0	1.06	62.3	1.00
IDB Sp.Fund			11.0	1.16	13.5	1.71	8.2	0.9
IMF								
(Concessional	29.7	0.65	34.3	0.73	26.0	0.58		
Trust Funds)							30.0	0.6
Ireland	62.0	1.46	50.7	1.50	40.0	1.15	50.9	1.3
Italy	81.7	1.12	82.7	0.91	74.5	0.90	79.6	0.9
Japan	126.3	1.05	126.3	1.02	126.0	1.10	126.2	1.0
Korea	60.7	0.97	64.7	1.22	60.5	0.99	61.9	1.0
Kuwait			4.0	0.89	3.5	0.19		
(KFAED)			4.0	0.89	5.5	0.15	2.5	0.3
Luxembourg	46.3	1.10	48.7	1.04	42.5	1.26	45.8	1.1
Netherlands	43.3	1.07	33.3	1.06	25.0	0.93	33.9	1.0
New Zealand	21.7	1.34	21.7	1.25	17.0	1.06	20.1	1.2
Norway	70.3	1.13	65.3	1.28	64.0	1.35	66.6	1.2
OFID			14.0	0.85	18.5	0.68	10.8	0.5
Poland					12.0	0.91	4.0	0.3
Portugal	7.7	0.47	7.7	0.87	6.5	0.55	7.3	0.6
Slovak					4.0	0.88		
Republic					4.0	0.88	1.3	0.2
Slovenia			11.0	0.51	14.0	2.20	8.3	0.9
Spain	78.3	0.76	79.3	0.86	64.0	0.97	73.9	0.8
Sweden	94.3	1.39	87.7	1.34	81.5	1.26	87.8	1.3
Switzerland	59.7	1.09	56.7	1.21	53.0	0.92	56.4	1.0

Time period	2006-200	8	2009-20	11	2012-201	3	2006-2013 av	erage
UNAIDS	114.3	0.59	105.0	0.45	97.0	0.43	105.4	0.49
UNDP	66.3	1.00	69.3	1.06	62.0	1.17	65.9	1.08
UNFPA	115.0	0.52	116.3	0.46	116.5	0.43	115.9	0.4
UNICEF	116.0	0.93	116.3	1.07	114.5	1.11	115.6	1.04
United Arab Emirates			24.0	1.65	23.0	1.32	15.7	0.99
United Kingdom	55.3	1.14	52.3	1.37	52.5	1.10	53.4	1.20
United States	108.0	1.10	111.3	1.28	112.5	1.27	110.6	1.22
UNPBF			1.3	0.11	0.5		0.6	0.04
UNRWA	4.0	0.17	4.0	0.20	4.0	0.25	4.0	0.2
WFP			44.7	0.76	39.0	0.97	27.9	0.5
WHO			36.7	0.31	111.0	0.34	49.2	0.2

⊿0 Table 8: Total ODA+ to RMNCH (2013 USD millions), average number of donors and average HHI by region

Time period	2006-2008	2009-2011	2012-2013	Change
East Asia & Pacific				
Total ODA+ to RMNCH	587.43	680.05	808.20	220.89
Average No Donors	10.34	11.67	12.46	2.12
нні	0.51	0.37	0.44	-0.07
Europe & Central Asia				
Total ODA+ to RMNCH	176.27	187.57	158.82	-17.45
Average No Donors	14.42	14.22	13.86	-0.56
нні	0.26	0.27	0.29	0.03
Latin America & Caribbean				
Total ODA+ to RMNCH	378.54	494.62	448.85	70.3
Average No Donors	10.02	11.73	11.17	1.1
нні	0.39	0.36	0.44	0.0
Middle East & North America				
Total ODA+ to RMNCH	347.38	352.83	422.08	74.7
Average No Donors	13.27	16.76	20.00	6.7
нні	0.38	0.30	0.25	-0.1
South Asia				
Total ODA+ to RMNCH	949.52	1454.09	1532.84	583.3
Average No Donors	20.58	24.00	23.50	2.9
нні	0.19	0.15	0.15	-0.04
Sub-Saharan Africa				
Total ODA+ to RMNCH	3,343.53	5,344.22	7,030.45	3,686.9
Average No Donors	19.94	22.52	22.04	2.1
нні	0.23	0.26	0.26	0.0

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Table 9: Number of donors and Herfindahl-Hirschman index by recipient country between 2003 and 2013 (presented in two or three year averages)

	2006-200)8	2009-201	1	2012-201	.3	2006-2013 av	verage
Recipient country	Average no.	HH-	Average no.	HH-	Average no.	HH-	Average no.	HH-
Recipient country	of donors	index	of donors	index	of donors	index	of donors	index
Afghanistan	26.67	0.2	32	0.2	32	0.14	30.2	0.18
Albania	19.67	0.13	17.33	0.13	14.5	0.33	17.2	0.20
Algeria	12.33	0.17	14.33	0.17	13.5	0.43	13.4	0.26
Angola	24.67	0.13	23	0.25	21	0.27	22.9	0.22
Anguilla	0.33	1	0.33	1	0.5	1	0.4	1.00
Antigua and Barbuda	1.67	0.36	1.33	0.84	0.5	1	1.2	0.73
Argentina	14	0.22	14.33	0.36	12	0.19	13.4	0.26
Armenia	18.67	0.32	17.33	0.25	16	0.17	17.3	0.25
Azerbaijan	13.33	0.26	14	0.22	14	0.22	13.8	0.23
Bangladesh	24.67	0.11	28.33	0.12	28.5	0.12	27.2	0.12
Barbados	3	0.73	3	0.6	13	0.56	6.3	0.63
Belarus	14.33	0.27	14.67	0.11			9.7	0.13
Belize	4.67	0.33	7.67	0.54	8	0.24	6.8	0.37
Benin	25	0.11	25.67	0.15	25.5	0.17	25.4	0.14
Bhutan	10	0.19	11.33	0.14	12	0.19	11.1	0.17
Bolivia	20.67	0.14	24	0.16	25.5	0.14	23.4	0.15
Bosnia and Herzegovina	23	0.11	19.67	0.23	18	0.2	20.2	0.18
Botswana	12.33	0.87	16	0.85	12	0.85	13.4	0.86
Brazil	18	0.14	19	0.18	18.5	0.16	18.5	0.16
Burkina Faso	26	0.09	27.33	0.11	28.5	0.13	27.3	0.12
Burundi	24.33	0.13	28	0.12	26	0.14	26.1	0.13
Cambodia	25	0.17	30.33	0.17	30	0.13	28.4	0.16

	2006-200	08	2009-201	1	2012-201	L 3	2006-2013 av	verage
Recipient country	Average no. of donors	HH- index	Average no. of donors	HH- index	Average no. of donors	HH- index	Average no. of donors	HH- inde
Cameroon	24.33	0.19	25.33	0.26	26.5	0.2	25.4	0.2
Cape Verde	10.33	0.22	13.67	0.21	7	0.37	10.3	0.2
Central African Republic	15	0.18	19.33	0.11	22.5	0.15	18.9	0.1
Chad	21.33	0.09	25.33	0.11	22	0.16	22.9	0.1
Chile	10.33	0.33	13.33	0.29	10	0.31	11.2	0.3
China (People's Republic of)	24.67	0.14	26	0.2	25	0.16	25.2	0.1
Colombia	16	0.17	20.33	0.22	19	0.42	18.4	0.2
Comoros	7.67	0.22	10	0.26	12.5	0.17	10.1	0.2
Congo, Rep.	15.67	0.16	19	0.21	16	0.21	16.9	0.1
Cook Islands	2.33	0.57	2	0.29	3.5	0.46	2.6	0.4
Costa Rica	9.33	0.28	10.33	0.43	7.5	0.57	9.1	0.4
Cote d'Ivoire	20.33	0.26	23.67	0.25	22.5	0.22	22.2	0.2
Croatia	7.33	0.26	5.67	0.25			4.3	0.1
Cuba Democratic	12.33	0.33	12	0.27	12.5	0.5	12.3	0.3
People's Republic of Korea Democratic	13	0.17	10	0.19	13.5	0.2	12.2	0.1
Republic of the Congo	27.33	0.1	31.67	0.1	30.5	0.13	29.8	0.1
Djibouti	12	0.18	17.33	0.09	15.5	0.09	14.9	0.1
Dominica	2.67	0.27	3.33	0.26	2.5	0.57	2.8	0.3
Dominican Republic	13.67	0.28	14	0.35	11.5	0.4	13.1	0.3
Ecuador	15.07	0.19	20	0.35	17.5	0.15	18.2	0.:

	2006-200	08	2009-201	1	2012-201	.3	2006-2013 av	erage
Recipient country	Average no.	HH-	Average no.	HH-	Average no.	HH-	Average no.	HH-
Recipient country	of donors	index	of donors	index	of donors	index	of donors	index
Egypt	22	0.34	23.67	0.3	21	0.28	22.2	0.31
El Salvador	15	0.22	18.33	0.2	19	0.26	17.4	0.23
Equatorial Guinea	6.33	0.42	6.67	0.46	6.5	0.27	6.5	0.38
Eritrea	17.67	0.18	18.33	0.35	14	0.52	16.7	0.35
Ethiopia	26.67	0.15	32.33	0.2	31.5	0.18	30.2	0.18
Fiji	7	0.29	5.67	0.26	9.5	0.55	7.4	0.37
Former Yugoslav								
Republic of	13.67	0.2	10	0.42	9	0.45		
Macedonia							10.9	0.36
Gabon	10.33	0.52	9.67	0.34	11.5	0.21	10.5	0.36
Gambia	15.67	0.33	17.67	0.48	15	0.34	16.1	0.38
Georgia	17.33	0.2	16.67	0.24	17	0.31	17.0	0.25
Ghana	25	0.11	30.33	0.13	30	0.16	28.4	0.13
Grenada	2.33	0.64	2.67	0.35	1	0.59	2.0	0.53
Guatemala	19	0.23	21	0.2	20	0.29	20.0	0.24
Guinea	19.67	0.13	18.67	0.18	21	0.15	19.8	0.15
Guinea-Bissau	16.33	0.12	19.33	0.24	16.5	0.39	17.4	0.25
Guyana	9	0.42	10.67	0.34	10.5	0.49	10.1	0.42
Haiti	17.33	0.39	26.67	0.27	25	0.45	23.0	0.37
Honduras	15.67	0.18	20.67	0.12	21	0.22	19.1	0.17
India	25	0.15	29	0.17	31	0.14	28.3	0.15
Indonesia	23.33	0.12	24.33	0.17	23.5	0.16	23.7	0.15
Iran	7.67	0.41	9	0.44	10.5	0.5	9.1	0.45
Iraq	18.33	0.52	21.33	0.46	22	0.37	20.6	0.45
Jamaica	9.33	0.35	9	0.46	6.5	0.36	8.3	0.39

	2006-200	08	2009-201	1	2012-201	L 3	2006-2013 av	verage
Recipient country	Average no. of donors	HH- index	Average no. of donors	HH- index	Average no. of donors	HH- index	Average no. of donors	HH- inde
Jordan	18.67	0.33	22.67	0.31	24.5	0.36	21.9	0.3
Kazakhstan	11.67	0.35	13.33	0.24	12	0.46	12.3	0.3
Kenya	28	0.24	31.67	0.32	34.5	0.36	31.4	0.3
Kiribati	4.67	0.48	5	0.32	5.5	0.41	5.1	0.4
Kosovo			13.67	0.14	13.5	0.22	9.1	0.1
Kyrgyz Republic Lao People's	17	0.12	19.67	0.11	21	0.11	19.2	0.1
Democratic Republic	21	0.17	27.33	0.1	27.5	0.1	25.3	0.1
Lebanon	23.33	0.2	22.33	0.35	24.5	0.24	23.4	0.2
Lesotho	16	0.22	20.33	0.33	17	0.48	17.8	0.3
Liberia	20.33	0.1	25.33	0.19	21	0.22	22.2	0.1
Libya	3.33	0.73	7.67	0.41	12.5	0.18	7.8	0.4
Madagascar	22.67	0.15	25.33	0.25	25	0.24	24.3	0.2
Malawi	26.67	0.14	29.67	0.15	31.5	0.17	29.3	0.3
Malaysia	8.67	0.42	10	0.27	9.5	0.24	9.4	0.3
Maldives	6	0.38	8.33	0.18	7.5	0.21	7.3	0.2
Mali	24.67	0.09	28.67	0.13	29.5	0.14	27.6	0.2
Marshall Islands	3	0.95	2.33	0.87	3.5	0.9	2.9	0.9
Mauritania	16.67	0.31	18	0.14	19.5	0.14	18.1	0.2
Mauritius	4	0.63	5.67	0.63	5.5	0.38	5.1	0.5
Mayotte	0.67	1	0.67	1			0.4	0.6
Mexico	11	0.28	15.67	0.19	15	0.31	13.9	0.2
Micronesia, Fed. States	2	0.98	3	0.91	3.5	0.93	2.8	0.9

	2006-200	08	2009-201	1	2012-201	.3	2006-2013 av	verage
Recipient country	Average no.	HH-	Average no.	HH-	Average no.	HH-	Average no.	HH-
Recipient country	of donors	index	of donors	index	of donors	index	of donors	index
Moldova	17.33	0.18	19	0.25	20	0.15	18.8	0.19
Mongolia	17.33	0.13	20	0.11	23	0.16	20.1	0.13
Montenegro	7.67	0.27	8.33	0.36	7	0.49	7.7	0.37
Montserrat	0.67	1	1	0.91	1	1	0.9	0.97
Morocco	16.67	0.18	17.33	0.22	19.5	0.26	17.8	0.22
Mozambique	29.33	0.11	33	0.23	35.5	0.23	32.6	0.19
Myanmar	18.67	0.09	20.67	0.1	24.5	0.14	21.3	0.11
Namibia	18.33	0.4	16.67	0.52	16	0.51	17.0	0.48
Nauru	2.33	0.97	1.67	0.52	2	0.95	2.0	0.81
Nepal	25.33	0.16	29	0.13	29.5	0.14	27.9	0.14
Nicaragua	26	0.09	27	0.08	24	0.1	25.7	0.09
Niger	24	0.1	26.33	0.13	25.5	0.1	25.3	0.11
Nigeria	23	0.21	26.33	0.2	22	0.16	23.8	0.19
Niue	2.33	0.95	1.67	0.82	2.5	0.9	2.2	0.89
Oman	1.33	0.52	1.33	0.5			0.9	0.34
Pakistan	21.33	0.18	27	0.14	23.5	0.19	23.9	0.17
Palau	2.67	0.81	4.67	0.61	5	0.44	4.1	0.62
Panama	7.33	0.23	9	0.46	7.5	0.27	7.9	0.32
Papua New Guinea	15.67	0.55	16	0.29	16.5	0.42	16.1	0.42
Paraguay	11.33	0.23	14.67	0.2	12	0.21	12.7	0.21
Peru	21.33	0.22	22	0.25	20	0.4	21.1	0.29
Philippines	21	0.28	20.67	0.18	22.5	0.22	21.4	0.23
Rwanda	27	0.22	29.33	0.3	27.5	0.31	27.9	0.28
Saint Helena	1	1	1.33	0.99	2	0.99	1.4	0.99
Saint Kitts and	1	0.94	1	0.65	1.5	0.87	1.2	0.82

	2006-200	08	2009-201	1	2012-201	.3	2006-2013 av	/erage
Recipient country	Average no. of donors	HH- index	Average no. of donors	HH- index	Average no. of donors	HH- index	Average no. of donors	HH- inde
Nevis								
Saint Lucia	3	0.66	5	0.55	2.5	0.75	3.5	0.6
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	2.67	0.89	3.67	0.31	2.5	0.86	2.9	0.6
Samoa	5.67	0.27	5.67	0.25	5.5	0.31	5.6	0.2
Sao Tome and Principe	10.67	0.24	11.67	0.21	12	0.22	11.4	0.2
Saudi Arabia	1	0.98					0.3	0.3
Senegal	24	0.14	27.67	0.16	29.5	0.2	27.1	0.1
Serbia	18.67	0.14	16	0.49	15	0.57	16.6	0.4
Seychelles	3	0.42	5.33	0.24	5.5	0.33	4.6	0.3
Sierra Leone	20	0.11	23.33	0.17	25.5	0.17	22.9	0.1
Solomon Islands	4.33	0.83	7	0.31	8.5	0.7	6.6	0.6
Somalia	19	0.11	24.67	0.13	26.5	0.16	23.4	0.2
South Africa	23.67	0.45	24	0.68	24	0.51	23.9	0.5
South Sudan					26.5	0.12	8.8	0.0
Sri Lanka	25.67	0.18	27	0.11	24	0.11	25.6	0.3
States Ex-Yugoslavia	4.33	0.34	1.33	0.74	2	0.53	2.6	0.5
Sudan	23	0.11	28.67	0.16	26.5	0.24	26.1	0.3
Suriname	5.33	0.51	5	0.42	5	0.42	5.1	0.4
Swaziland	13.33	0.42	16	0.34	16.5	0.4	15.3	0.3
Syrian Arab Republic	11.67	0.22	13.33	0.23	26.5	0.11	17.2	0.3
Tajikistan	19	0.12	23	0.11	21.5	0.13	21.2	0.2
Tanzania	28.33	0.15	31.33	0.21	34.5	0.18	31.4	0.2
Thailand	16.33	0.42	19	0.41	18.5	0.36	17.9	0.4

	2006-200	08	2009-201	1	2012-201	.3	2006-2013 av	verage
Recipient country	Average no.	HH-	Average no.	HH-	Average no.	HH-	Average no.	HH-
Recipient country	of donors	index	of donors	index	of donors	index	of donors	index
Timor-Leste	15.67	0.16	17.33	0.19	19	0.2	17.3	0.18
Тодо	18	0.25	22.67	0.25	21	0.31	20.6	0.27
Tokelau	1	1	1.67	0.85	2.5	0.95	1.7	0.93
Tonga	6	0.42	4.33	0.38	4	0.41	4.8	0.40
Trinidad and Tobago	4	0.49	3.33	0.32			2.4	0.27
Tunisia	9	0.59	12.33	0.22	16.5	0.17	12.6	0.27
Turkey	10.67	0.85	9.33	0.22	10.5	0.17	9.7	0.55
Turkmenistan	5.67	0.85	8.67	0.21	6	0.23	9.7 6.8	0.44
Turks and Caicos Islands	0.33	0.4	8.07	0.24	U	0.28	0.8	0.31
Tuvalu	2.33	0.7	2.67	0.22	4	0.35	3.0	0.42
Uganda	27.67	0.25	29.67	0.36	32	0.3	29.8	0.30
Ukraine	19	0.32	20.67	0.38	18	0.27	19.2	0.32
Uruguay	7.67	0.24	9.67	0.16	9.5	0.24	8.9	0.21
Uzbekistan	15.67	0.13	16	0.19	16	0.15	15.9	0.16
Vanuatu	4.67	0.62	5.67	0.27	5	0.42	5.1	0.44
Venezuela	8	0.24	9.67	0.16	6.5	0.34	8.1	0.25
Vietnam	28	0.08	31	0.1	30.5	0.12	29.8	0.10
Wallis and Futuna	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.0	1.00
West Bank and Gaza Strip	23.67	0.16	30.67	0.3	29.5	0.16	27.9	0.21
Yemen	18	0.15	21.33	0.16	24	0.15	21.1	0.15
Zambia	27.67	0.19	28.33	0.3	25.5	0.29	27.2	0.26
Zimbabwe	26	0.16	27.67	0.15	24	0.22	25.9	0.18
All recipients							15.4	0.32

Health Affairs

Recipient country Average no. of donors HH- index Average no. Average no. of donors HH- index Average no. of donors HH- index Average no. of donors HH- index		2006-200)8	2009-201	1	2012-20	13	2006-2013 a	verage
	Recipient country	Average no. of donors	HH- index	Average no. of donors	HH- index	Average no. of donors	HH- index	Average no. of donors	HH- inde

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