

EUROPEAN INTERVENTION IN MOROCCO.

"The devil ships of the Nazarene nations came again and again to the bay of Tanjah to see if the Prince of the Faithful were indeed dead, as rumor often stated."

A Moorish tradition relates that Allah, when He created the World, called all the nations of the earth together and gave unto each the choice of one good thing for its kingdom. Some selected fertile lands; some delightful climate; others beautiful scenery; but the English alone asked for good government. The failure of Oriental states to solve the problem of self-rule has become a proverb and the history of Morocco has demonstrated that it is no exception to the rule. Indeed, the misgovernment, the corruption, and the lack of security and public order, in this African state extending through a long period of years, have not only involved her Sultans in frequent disputes with their European neighbors, but also have made the "Morocco question" one of the prominent fields of European diplomatic activity during the past decade.

Morocco or Al Mogreb—the Key of the West—is by reason of its fertility, its natural resources and its geographical position, the most desirable of the northern African countries. It is slightly larger than France, being equal in area to the State of Pennsylvania plus Cuba, and has a population of about 5,000,000. The country is protected by the Atlas ranges from the winds, storms and heat of the desert. The climate is delightful and the soil of the valleys and plains exceedingly rich. Agriculture is now one of the chief occupations of the inhabitants; but there is no reason why Morocco cannot become a great grain producing region. Every known variety and kind of vegetable and grain can be raised there; and it could easily supply all the markets of Europe with early spring vegetables.

The mountain pastures are among the finest grazing districts of the world and already an extensive sheep and grazing industry is being carried on. In 1906, over \$1,360,000 of wool and \$3,156,000 worth of hides and skins were exported under unfavorable conditions. With proper methods for the developments of these industries, with adequate protection for life and property, and with suitable transportation facilities, the trade of Morocco could easily be trebled or quadrupled within a few years. Regular

steamer service has been established by English, French and German companies during the past ten years; and the total trade of Morocco, which remained practically stationary in the decade prior to 1896, rose from \$13,000,000 in that year to over \$23,600,000 in 1906-07.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century Great Britain controlled the largest share of this commerce—about 40%—while France came next with 20, and Germany third with 9%. In recent years Germany has made determined efforts to increase her trade, and has underbid the English and Spanish, whose percentages have fallen while her own rose to 12% in 1906. Great quantities of cheap goods and utensils have been imported by Germany, sometimes even stamped with the names of English mercantile or manufacturing centers.

On the other hand, France with skillful generalship and persistent, enlightened effort, has outdistanced all competitors. Her share of the entire trade in 1906 was over 41%, while England retained 32, and Spain only 4.8%. Through her superior position in Algeria, the Sahara and Senegal, France possesses unrivaled advantages for trade with Morocco; and she is destined to secure more and more of it as time passes. Her citizens have already invested above 30,000,000 francs there and these claims must be cared for and protected.

The topography of the country has exerted a great influence upon the history and government of Morocco. The state is crossed by a number of mountain chains which have effectively divided it into several distinct provinces and prevented thus far all efforts to promote a real unity. Tribal independence, local jealousies and personal rivalries have been successfully encouraged and perpetuated. These natural divisions gave rise to the two capitals of Marrakesh and Fez, and the minor principalities of Sus, Tafilet and the Reef. This separateness has been further accentuated by the lack of good roads and of modern means of transportation and communication.

Over various parts of the empire, the control of the Sultan has been uncertain and often merely nominal. The more powerful rulers have succeeded in maintaining a real supremacy over the strong tribal chieftains, frequently calling them to account with a ruthless hand. The weaker Sultans have, however, sometimes gone for years without having been able to collect the customary tribute. In recent years foreigners and natives have been af-

forded protection, when in districts under the immediate supervision of the imperial authority. But, elsewhere, life and property have had no security; and the natives have been compelled to buy protection, as in mediaeval times, from powerful chieftains or from influential government officials, or to put themselves in some way under the mantle of foreign Powers. In many cases it has been practically impossible for the sovereigns to enforce their decrees or introduce reforms; and Mulai-el-Hasan, father of the present Sultan, lost his life marching to Taflet to put down a rebellion in 1893-94.

Besides the strength of the local authorities, favored by the natural features of the country and the tribal conditions, there are two other things that contribute materially to the weakness of the empire. One is the peculiar position of the Shereefian or ruling family. The other is the method of government.

There are three royal or Shereefian families, but the right of succession is restricted to *one* family only—the Fileli Shereefs of Taflet. No regular law or custom of succession exists, but the new sultan must be a relative of the old. Usually the old sovereign designates some member of his family, whom he considers the most qualified; but the office is elective and no succession is legal without the consent and vote of the family council. The other branches of the royalty—the Idris Shereefs of Zarahun (near Fez) and the Wazan Shereefs have a vote. While they cannot rule, no one can ascend the throne without their approval. Their social and political position is one of great importance; and they are really more respected by the masses than the Sultans themselves. At present they are under the protection of France—the Idressi Shereefs of Wazan being particularly friendly with the French; and they cannot be interfered with by the reigning family. They must, on the contrary, be constantly conciliated by the Fileli Shereefs and are, therefore, often a hindrance rather than an aid to good government.

The government of Morocco is absolute in theory, there being no fundamental laws or constitution to hold the sovereign in check; but in fact the Sultan is far from being a real despot. The free exercise of his powers is hampered by custom and restrictions on every hand. Not only is he unable to enforce his will against the great Shereefian families and the powerful tribal chieftains; but he is also continually at the mercy of his vizier or prime minister who in wealth and influence has often been superior to the

ruler himself. The government is administered through a group of six ministers of whom the Grand Vizier is the chief and entirely responsible. If he, and they, are corrupt—which has happened often in the past—it is only possible to remove them by a cabinet crisis which involves a display of intrigue and force, resulting in the imprisonment and death of the ministers and the sequestration of their property.

The Sultan is the religious head—the Defender of the Faithful—as well as the political sovereign of the empire. This places him in a unique position; but at the same time, it increases his responsibilities and hampers his freedom of action. The Mohammedan peoples of northern Africa are held together not only by a common religion, but also by a number of powerful secret fraternities. The Snoussya of Algeria and the Derkaoua are intensely anti-European, while the Tedjinia and the Moulay Taieb of Morocco and the northern Sahara are friendly to the English and French. The influence of these societies is so great and far-reaching that no sultan would dare to ignore them for long; and when one or more of them is once aroused to demand a religious war or an anti-foreign crusade, the rulers are practically helpless before them. The French rule the largest portion of Mohammedan Africa and so they cannot permit any one section, like Morocco, to remain free from their control and a hot-bed of Mohammedan conspiracies. England, threatened by similar outbreaks, such as the Mahdi uprising in the Sudan in the 80's, has gladly joined hands with France to hold in check these restless religious peoples who chafe naturally under foreign control and a restricted freedom.

The possession of Morocco is, for other reasons, a vital necessity for the success of French colonial enterprise in Africa. It is the key-stone of her arch. Without it she cannot hope to solidify her extensive domains, or to control the trade routes and commerce of northern Africa and the Sahara. Without it, there is little chance of her coping with those endless border difficulties and desert robberies which have so hampered the trade of the entire region ever since the French-Moroccan treaty of 1845. Patiently and thoroughly France has studied the problem for years, and woven a net-work of influences within and without the country so powerful that neither the Sultan, nor any outside Power, can hope now to shake off her hold. This prolonged effort to secure the suzerainty of Morocco was not accomplished with-

out encountering many and serious difficulties, not the least of which were the intrigues of competing European states. But it has contributed materially to the development of an equitable balance of power in Europe and to the establishment of an enlightened cooperation of the Powers in the partition and administration of the Dark Continent.

It began over a century ago when France undertook systematically the work of erecting a great colonial state in North and West Africa. As early as 1830, she had made an entrance into Algiers; but it took seventeen years before the French were able to subdue the patriotic and able Abd-el-Kader, Bey of Algiers and Oran. In 1847 the city of Constantine was taken and the lands of its Bey were annexed to Algiers in the following year. But twenty years more of warfare, 1850-1870, were necessary before the Berbers and Kybeles of the mountain regions submitted; and ten years of military administration followed ere the French could place the country under a progressive and peaceful civil government. In 1881 boundary troubles gave an opportunity for interference in Tunis, then nominally under Turkey. By a display of force and energetic diplomacy the Bey was prevailed upon to sign the treaty of Kasr-es-Said in 1883 and to place his country under the protection of France. The present ruler—Sidi Mohammed en Nasr—enjoys a sovereignty held by his family since 1705; but since 1898 he has permitted the French to direct the entire administration of the state.

About 1880 France adopted a definite policy of colonial expansion and consolidation in North and West Africa. Starting from the small French settlements on the Senegal and Gaboon rivers, the Ivory coast and in Dahomey, a magnificent colonial empire has been evolved through the splendid efforts of such able pioneers as Captain Galliene, Colonel Frey, Colonel Auchinard, Captain Binger and M. De Brazza. It extends over a vast district reaching from the Congo on the south to the Mediterranean on the north, and from the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan on the east to the Atlantic ocean on the west, and comprises an area equal to the United States, including Alaska. Definite boundaries to these possessions, as well as the recognition of her various claims, were secured through skillful and conciliatory diplomacy in the Franco-British treaties of 1882, 1889-91, and 1898-99, and the Franco-German treaties of 1894, and 1896-97.

But this was not sufficient to insure the complete success of the French Colonial Empire and the permanent establishment of good order and security in northern Africa. Three things remained to be accomplished; the completion of a definite understanding with Great Britain as to the administration of affairs in North Africa, the development of a system of alliances that would give France a position of security in European circles, and the placing of Morocco under French protection. Accordingly, M. Delcassé, who had been so successfully conducting French colonial politics, turned his attention enthusiastically to the field of continental diplomacy.

In 1892 the first and most basal of all the treaties—that between France and Russia—was arranged; but it did not become the present complete and harmonious alliance until 1898. This was followed by the Italian-French "Approachment" which began with treaties of commerce and navigation in 1896-98 and was consummated through definite understandings concerning Tunis and Tripolis in 1899. So that since 1900 the relations of France and Italy have been most friendly and cordial. Then came the *Entente Cordiale* with Great Britain, which commenced with the visit of King Edward to Paris in 1903 and the return trip of President Loubet to London, and was concluded in the remarkable treaties of 1904¹ which concerned not only all the French and British possessions in northern Africa, but also embraced their interests in Siam, Gambia, Nigeria, Madagascar, the New Hebrides and Newfoundland. Here the agreement was reached that England, on the one hand, should be unhampered in her administration of the finances and government of Egypt as long as the French bondholders were protected, and that France, on the other hand, should be free to assist the Sultan of Morocco in "improving the administrative, economic, financial and military condition of his country," provided that the integrity of the Sultan's domains was preserved, the commercial interests of Great Britain safe-guarded, and the special rights of Spain in northern Morocco recognized.

The friendship of Spain was cultivated by a favorable Franco-Spanish interstate railway agreement in 1885 and cooperative treaties between the two neighbors for the economic development of northern Spain in August, 1904, and February, 1905. The King

¹*Archives Diplomatiques*, 1904. Vol. I, pg. 413; and letters of Lansdowne and Delcassé, pgs. 557 and 771.

of Spain visited Paris and London and in 1906 consummated his marriage with the niece of King Edward. Spain gave her adhesion to the Franco-British treaty of April, 1904, in an agreement with France concerning Morocco in October of the same year;² and the whole series of alliances and treaties was successfully capped in 1907 by a three-cornered arrangement between France, Spain and England, guaranteeing the perpetuation of the *status quo* in North Africa.³

Meanwhile the French were taking definite steps to put an end to the disorders on the Algerian-Morocco frontier, and to bring about the much needed reforms within Morocco itself. They occupied the Tuat Oasis—south of Algeria and southeast of Morocco—and, through the efforts of M. Reveil, Governor-General of Algiers, a definite arrangement was reached with the Sultan on July 20, 1901, concerning the regulation of trade and the police on the Algerian-Morocco frontier, France agreeing to assist with troops in restoring order and establishing the imperial authority in East and Southeast Morocco. In June, 1903, the French occupied Zanagra and aided the Moroccan forces in suppressing brigandage in the region of Figuig. In August the French and Sheriffian troops occupied the district of Oudjda in Eastern Morocco; and the French were permitted to establish military posts there to preserve order.⁴

When the Franco-British treaty of April, 1904, had been arranged, France made every effort to procure the consent of the Sultan to the general terms of this agreement and to the acceptance of her aid, to a still greater degree, in the maintenance of order, the establishment of the royal authority and the reorganization of the finances and government of the realm. Abd-el-Aziz and his advisors, although friendly to the French Republic in a general way, hesitated to admit any foreign Power into any large or intimate share in the direction of the local affairs of the kingdom. They understood full well the advantages, but they realized, on the other hand, the unpopularity of such a move with the majority of the inhabitants of Morocco; and they foresaw the probable effect on their own position, if the scheme were attempted at that time. But, at this critical moment, Germany suddenly

² *Archives Diplomatiques*, 1905, pg. 677-78.

³ *Archives Diplomatiques*, 1907, Vol. II, pg. 49-53.

⁴ French "*Yellow Book*," or "*Documents Diplomatiques*"—*Affaires du Maroc*, 1901-1905; Nos. 83-84.

broke into the field of Moroccan diplomacy with a stroke so powerful and so skillful that the perplexed mind of the Sultan took hope afresh, and that, for a time, the beautiful fabric which the French had been so carefully weaving for years threatened to fall to pieces at the moment of its completion.

Germany had not been consulted in the arrangement of the Franco-British-Spanish treaties concerning northern Africa and she felt that these agreements did not contain sufficient guarantees that the commercial rights of her citizens in Morocco would be respected. On March 31, 1905, while engaged in a Mediterranean cruise, Kaiser William suddenly appeared off Tangier and sent a message of friendship through Moulai Abd-el-Malek, the uncle of the Emperor, to the Sultan at Fez, in which he assured Abd-el-Aziz of his support and announced that he would do all in his power to safeguard the interests of Germany in Morocco.⁵

Through the influence of the German minister to Morocco, the Sultan was led to demand, in May, that the question of reforms in his domains should be submitted to a conference of those Powers who had participated in the treaty of Madrid in 1880 by which the policy of the "Open Door" had been introduced into Moroccan commercial affairs. This was in direct opposition to the plan of France and a blow at the Franco-British *Entente* of 1904. M. Delcassé refused to admit that any other Power, except Spain and herself, had a right to participate in the proposed interference in Morocco; and a spirited correspondence ensued between the foreign offices of Berlin and Paris. At length Germany, putting the matter in the form of an ultimatum, demanded either the resignation of M. Delcassé and the appeal to a general conference, or war. France, who had maintained a dignified and consistent attitude throughout the controversy, agreed on July 8 to the dismissal of Delcassé and the calling of a European congress, on condition that the French and German representatives at Fez should be withdrawn simultaneously and that the two Powers should unite in urging later the conclusions of the conference upon the Sultan. In addition, the sovereignty of the Emperor, the integrity of the empire, the freedom of trade, the paramount interests of France in Morocco, and the introduction of reforms through a court established by the Powers, were fundamental principles agreed to by both parties.⁶

⁵ French "*Yellow Book*"—*Affaires du Maroc*, 1905-6, Pt. II, No. 234; German "*White Book*"—*Morocco Correspondence*, 1905-6.

⁶ *Archives Diplomatiques*, 1905, Vols. III-IV, pg. 559-746 ("*Affaires du Maroc*").

Thus came about the famous Algeciras Conference of 1906, the Sultan agreeing to its being held at Algeciras, in southern Spain, and issuing the formal invitations to the European states. In the negotiations which followed, the United States played the part of a neutral umpire desiring to see fair treatment for the claims of both litigants. England, Spain, Italy and the smaller Powers approved the French policy, and Germany was unable to secure the recognition of her claim for the establishment of a general international committee of reform, the work of introducing financial and military reforms into Morocco being intrusted to France and Spain.⁷ The Emperor's real motive in forcing this meeting of the Powers upon France appears to have been, not the humiliating of the French Republic to the verge of war, but the testing of the British-French *Entente* and the diplomatic isolation of France,⁸ Russia being then occupied with the Russian-Japanese war. The results of the Algeciras Conference were exactly opposite to these expectations. The bonds between France and her new friends—England, Spain and Italy—were materially strengthened. Germany was shown to be no longer a dictator in European politics; and the diplomatic isolation of the German Empire itself was hastened.

But before France and Spain could set to work seriously to carry out the Algeciras program, troubles arose within Morocco itself, which threatened to nullify all the good intentions of the European states. In May, 1906, M. Charbonnier, an employe of the French-Algerian steamboat company, was murdered in Tangier and serious anti-foreign demonstrations occurred in Sud-Oranais, Tafilit and Mogador. In February, 1907, Ben Mansour, an Arabian Sheik of pro-French sympathies, was assassinated in Tangier, and the killing of Dr. Mauchamp, a French surgeon, by a mob in Marrakish on March 23, was followed by a terrific outbreak in Casa Blanca on March 31, in which nine Europeans were slain. Similar uprisings took place in various parts of the country; and all the foreigners in the interior fled to the coast cities and embarked as rapidly and as secretly as possible, most of them suffering great hardships. Raissuli, the most powerful and intrepid of the sheiks now rising in rebellion throughout the land,

⁷ Whole act published in *Archives Diplomatiques*, 1907, Vol. II, pg. 5-49, and in the "Yellow Book"—*Affaires du Maroc*, 1906, Pt. II.

⁸ Compare article on "Morocco and the Powers," by Edwin Maxey, in "*Archives Diplomatiques*," 1908, Vol. II, pg. 280-86.

carried off Kaid McLean, the Scotch commander of the Sultan's bodyguard, on July 3, and by the middle of the summer Morocco was in the throes of civil war.⁹

Abd-el-Aziz, who, since the death of the Grand Vizier, Sidi Akhmed, in 1900, had been ruling in person, was now thirty years of age and a man of European training, considerable culture and good intentions. But he was lacking in energy, in will power and in political experience; and he was rapidly losing popularity on all sides because of his extravagance and his predilection for Europeans, a large number of whom—particularly Englishmen—he had drawn into his service. His country was practically bankrupt through a lax financial system and his gratification of a costly taste in jewels and modern toys, such as Krupp guns. He not only made treaties with the hated Nazarenes and borrowed money from them, but he took delight in their latest inventions, such as automobiles, cameras, phonographs, billiard-tables, and even clothes! Surely he could no longer be a true Musselman! It was even rumored that Abd-el-Aziz had sold himself and his country to the foreigner—or to the devil—and the anti-foreign party was not long in securing a formidable following.

In May, 1907, his brother, Mulai-el-Hafid, who had been governor of western Morocco for several years, was persuaded to head the rebellious forces, and in August was hailed as Sultan. Mulai-el-Hafid was officially proclaimed ruler by the Ulemas in Marrakish on January 11, 1908, and warmly welcomed by the people in Fez in February. He was soon able to take the field energetically against Abd-el-Aziz, who had retreated to Rabat and whose forces were rapidly diminishing. In a brief campaign lasting from March to July, 1908, he triumphed completely over his brother and compelled his abdication.

Meanwhile France and Spain had not been idle. From November, 1906, to July, 1907, they were busy introducing the new police regime in the port towns of Morocco. When the anti-foreign riots occurred, they hurried warships to Tangier, Mogador, and Casa Blanca, to protect Europeans and restore order. In March, 1907, the French troops occupied Oudjda, near the Algerian frontier; and in August the French and Spaniards landed at Casa Blanca, the former under General Drude, and took possession of the surrounding district. The troubles continuing, the French deemed it expedient to advance into the interior for the

⁹ French "*Yellow Book*"—*Affaires du Maroc*, 1906-07, Pt. III.

purpose of preserving order and protecting the trade of western Morocco. Accordingly, General D'Amade occupied the whole of the Chaouiya, a large region lying immediately south and east of Casa Blanca, between January and March, 1908,¹⁰ and held it in trust for the Sultan until the affairs of the kingdom could be satisfactorily adjusted. France refused to take sides in any way during the civil struggle between the royal brothers, and maintained a strictly impartial attitude throughout the entire conflict.

In August, 1908, Mulai-el-Hafid was greeted in Tangier as the lawful sovereign of all Morocco; and he immediately entered upon the task of securing the recognition of the European Powers. He selected, and applied first to that State that had the least at stake within Morocco itself and seemed the most likely to be conciliatory, *i.e.*, Germany. Kaiser William hastened to welcome the new ruler, and sent a note to the Powers in September announcing his intention of recognizing officially Mulai-el-Hafid and urging the others to do the same. But this was contrary to the spirit of the agreement of 1906; and on September 14, 1908, France and Spain sent a joint note to all of the States requesting that no one recognize Mulai-el-Hafid until he had given satisfactory assurances that he would accept and observe the treaty of Algeciras. The European governments favored the French policy. Germany backed down, and France and Spain were permitted to assume charge of the negotiations with the Sultan.

It was this move of Emperor William, it will be remembered, that drew upon his foreign policy the bitter attack of Herr Basserman in the Reichstag and the criticism of the German press in November, 1908. This pressure made the German government conciliatory and the diplomats at Paris were able to pursue their pacific and enlightened program without serious hindrance. The German foreign office, however, professed to believe that France would annex all or part of Morocco, because of her continued military occupation. But by January, 1909, the French were able to convince the Emperor of their pacific intentions; and on February 9 the two countries reached a complete understanding. Germany agreed to give France and Spain a free hand in the settlement of the Moroccan question; and France promised to respect the integrity of the kingdom, to preserve freedom of trade

¹⁰ French "*Yellow Book*"—*Affaires du Maroc*, 1908; R. Rankin, "*In Morocco with General D'Amade*," Longmans, 1908.

and to protect the special commercial rights of the German Empire.

Although the proofs are not yet at hand, there is a well-grounded suspicion that the Emperor made this sudden concession in order to secure the neutrality of the French in the Balkan crisis of 1909, then at its height because of the seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria and the vehement protests of Servia.

France now had a clear field for the cutting of the "Gordian knot" in the little "Kingdom of the West." Mulai-el-Hafid must deal with her alone and without hope of assistance from without. Till 1904 the sultans were able to escape from their obligations and to hold off the French by appeals to England. Since then they have leaned on Germany for support, as we have seen; but now Europe presents a united front and France can no longer be betrayed in the rear. M. Regnault, French minister at Tangier, was sent immediately to Fez on a special mission to the new sovereign; but, for a year past, a constant diplomatic conflict has been in progress between Mulai-el-Hafid and the French foreign office, the latter consistently refusing to withdraw their troops from the country until the Sultan should recognize the treaty of Algieras and agree to pay an indemnity for the French and Spanish military expenditure during the recent disturbances in Morocco. The negotiations were considerably impeded by the outbreak of hostilities last July between the chieftains of the Riff country (in northern Morocco, opposite Spain) and the Spaniards who have certain military posts and mining concessions there. A severe conflict ensued, lasting several months and proving most costly to Spain in both money and men. Fortunately, the questions at stake were satisfactorily adjusted in December and the last obstacle to the complete pacification of Morocco was removed.

The French, meanwhile, exasperated at the slowness of the Sultan, sent an ultimatum to him through M. Regnault on February 19, 1910, giving his Highness forty-eight hours in which to accept the "Franco-Moroccan Accord" arranged some days previous with his representatives in Paris, on penalty of having all the customs and ports of the country seized. Mulai-el-Hafid is reported to have flown into a terrible rage; but he cooled down sufficiently to accept the French proposition on February 21. And the end of the French occupation seems near.

The "Accord" calls for the payment of \$12,000,000 indemnity to cover the costs of the Franco-Spanish military occupation; and, if carried out, will place Morocco completely under the supervision of the French Republic. For it will be practically impossible for the Sultan to pay off such a heavy debt without a thorough reorganization of the finances and internal administration of the realm. To accomplish these reforms Mulai-el-Hafid must first employ French, Spanish and Swiss financiers, in accordance with the regulations of Algeciras. Then we may confidently expect soon to see French experts in the judicial, administrative and military departments of state, for financial readjustment is futile unless it is accompanied by such enlightened reforms in justice, in taxation, in administration and in the police, as will afford protection for life and property, make a good government possible, and promote foreign trade and domestic enterprise.

The situation of the Sultan is indeed difficult. He has no special love for Europeans or European methods. He secured his present position and powers chiefly through the support of the anti-foreign party, and therefore is bound not to concede too much to the French or other outsiders. On the other hand, there are powerful interests in his state favoring the French, and Mulai-el-Hafid, himself, is considerably indebted to them for their policy of non-intervention during the recent revolution. Then many needed and vital reforms, commercial, economic, governmental, educational and hygienic, cannot be introduced without foreign capital; and the Sultan cannot hope to maintain order on the frontiers and provide the necessary protection for the life and property of his subjects throughout the kingdom without French assistance. His first and most imperative move—the removal from his country of the foreign armies of occupation—he is accomplishing in a skillful manner by acceding to the French conditions, only after a prolonged delay and under the most severe pressure. It remains to be seen if he can work out a successful government that will ensure the future welfare and prosperity of his people, with the minimum of foreign aid, and without arousing the enmity and passions of his Mohammedan subjects.

The task of France is an equally serious problem. Her colonial enterprises in northern and western Africa, as well as the interests of trade and civilization generally, demand that her control over Morocco should be strong and thorough. The consent of the ruler will mean little without the acquiescence of the peo-

ple in a country whose inhabitants have long been accustomed to a large degree of independence, and the control of whose sovereign is still merely nominal in many regions. To win over a stubborn, superstitious and ignorant population to the acceptance of a form of government they dislike, the presence of foreigners they detest, and of customs and methods which they do not understand, is an exceedingly delicate and arduous work. As one of the Moorish statesmen has said: "This country is not as the land of the Nazarenes and cannot be made like it in haste."

The "blind prejudice of ignorance and superstition" are still holding the land in their clutches and impeding its development at every step. One native objected to railways, because they would, like other European novelties, get out of order and then no one could make them go again. Another, referring to the introduction of the postal system, remarked: "Before people had couriers, those Moors who had a little money could go and make a little more; but now that there are couriers who bring letters for everybody, everyone knows the prices and the Moors cannot make money." While many are afraid of railroads, because they are considered aids to foreign monopolies, the people would welcome irrigation projects and other assistance in developing the land and preventing famine. But it must be Morocco for the Moroccans, as far as possible; and the bitter and unreasoning hatred of foreigners and foreign ideas can be surmounted by fair treatment, an honest and straightforward diplomacy, and a friendly, unselfish spirit.

The French must go slowly and seek earnestly to win the confidence of Mulai-el-Hafid and his people. They must prove to the inhabitants that they are not coming to take their land and wealth away, but that they are honestly desirous of assisting in the development of the country and in procuring for the citizens the protection for life and property so sorely needed. French engineers, merchants, laborers and farmers can materially assist in this movement; but they must not be introduced into the land in large numbers or too rapidly, for some time to come. In the spring of 1907, there were only twenty or thirty foreigners in Casa Blanca. Now there are in the neighborhood of seven hundred. These Europeans should only be allowed to penetrate gradually into the interior, and even then they must be kept under careful governmental supervision. The colonization of the

country on an extensive scale by the French or Spanish should be absolutely prohibited.

No interference with the religious beliefs or private life of the people should be permitted; and the rights of all classes must be respected, as far as is consistent with good government. Native institutions, customs and methods ought to be utilized and developed whenever possible. When necessary, force may be employed with discretion, but it must always be used with a firm and just hand through the recognized government. The people should be made to feel that it is the Prince of the Faithful who compels his subjects to accept the inevitable, and not the foreigner. In twenty or thirty years' time, with patience, tact and forbearance, the French may hope to be ruling a new and reorganized Morocco; but it will be under a veiled suzerainty, as she is now managing Tunis, or, as Great Britain controls Egypt, never under a rod of iron such as that with which Japan is holding down a humiliated and prostrate Korea. And the Moorish proverb: "He who stands long enough at the door is sure to enter at last," will once more have been fulfilled.

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