Understanding Meaning and World

Understanding Meaning and World:

A Relook on Semantic Externalism

By

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To my Gurudev

Hilary Putnam,

Who taught me how to love philosophy a little more...

Without whom not!

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INTRODUCTION

For the last few years, the concept of natural kind terms has haunted me, especially the location of these terms. Are the meanings of natural kind terms in the head or in the world? This question has been the most pressing one in the philosophy of mind and language. I realised that we cannot separate the mind from the world. I had in the beginning only a layman's conception regarding mind, meaning and the world. When I entered the field of philosophy, inspired by my mentor Hilary Putnam, I found that semantic externalism is a vexing issue involving a vast area. The nature of meaning regarding propositional contents and natural kind terms gives rise to a fundamental disagreement between the two groups of philosophers called internalists and externalists, as I argue in Chapter 1. The theory of description is a reliable theory which deals with the descriptive sense of a proper name, whereas the causal theory of reference obviously offers much more significance to objective reference. The descriptivist thinks that the meaning of a general term consists in its descriptive contents, so here, the references of proper names can be determined by description. Descriptivism follows the idea that, in the case of referring to an object, a name that refers to the referred object has the property (relational property).

It seems to me that Frege's theory of reference can be found to be about the relation between language and the world, while his theory of sense is regarding the relation between language and mind. Hence we find that Fregeans amongst externalists (like Gareth Evans, Putnam), emphasise Frege's theory of reference, while Fregeans amongst internalists (like Gabriel Segal, Searle) emphasise Frege's theory of sense. So these recent orthodoxies, i.e. internalism and externalism, both have a Fregean root.

There are a lot of cases where a speaker cannot know the reference-deterring properties that descriptivists argue for. Putnam (if I am not wrong) is the first thinker who extends the causal theory of reference to proper names and to natural kind terms (though in this thought experiment, he does not take Kripke's "Baptism" seriously). He claims that the causal theory of reference accepts the "social transmission" of the terms and a "causal chain" which is linked with linguistic community. The

elementary question for Putnam is how the user of the word would explain its meaning. Semantic externalism claims that the concepts important for our knowledge become meaningless if and only if they have no causal connection with the referent or the external world.

In Chapter 2, I attempt to see how mental content makes a certain difference to our beliefs. Chalmer's six puzzles indicate the necessity of admitting narrow content. Internalists like Segal, Searle, Fodor, and Block argue in favour of the concepts of non-referentiality, supervenience and micro-structure to establish internalism by holding the dictum that "meanings are in the head". For Searle, intentionality does not depend on any representational background. The mental states that possess objects have some internalistic background. Here we can draw a parallelism between mental states and language in terms of mind, but not through language. To satisfy psychological conditions, mind inflicts intentionality upon language. Besides, Block's "splitting objection" in favour of internalism assumes that if X (person) splits into A and B, two different people, then the principle of identity suggests that X is not equal to A and X is also not equal to B. Even A and B are not equal, as they occupy a distinct location at the same time. Block's "conceptual role semantic" claims that without any change in narrow content, it is quite impossible to formulate a substantial change in the beliefs of A and B. Even Fodor argues that to identify supervenience, it is required to accept narrow contents. His intention is to show that meaning is individualistic. But Putnam refutes this view to suggest that every speaker who counts as fully competent in the use of language might be called upon to face the constraints of publicity. The naturalistic outlook that a human being is inclined towards is the seminal magnetism of externalist appeal. The meaning of a term is generally fixed by two things that traditional theories of meaning ignore. These things are the world and other people, and were first pointed out by Putnam. Putnamian semantic externalism makes explicit the meaning of a natural kind term determined by two different levels: "stereotype" and "division of linguistic labor", where the nature of the paradigm of the terms gets its meaning in conjunction with our transactions with the external objects and socio-linguistic practices.

Chapter 3 covers a crucial part of my analysis, where I look again at the debate, from philosophy of language to metaphysics, by scrutinising the scopes of different externalisms and their interrelations. My purpose here is to preserve the externalist thesis from the strong criticisms of internalists. In natural language, there is an important problem related to the existence of empty terms. If the externalist admits that without any

reference they cannot have any content, then "what will be the reference of 'water is wet' in Dry Earth?" From this perspective, the internalist charges that "externalism is catastrophic". So here we will find that the concept of the "causal chain" in externalism fails to satisfy the semantic requirement. The second great charge against externalism raised by internalists is the problem of self-knowledge and the first person authority, which are by nature much more authoritative and incorrigible. The primary concern is whether externalism leads to a claim that a person may not have first person authority over his or her own mental states. I have tried to respond to these arguments from the externalist background, mainly from Davidson, Burge and Bilgrami's points of view. Davidson tries to show that externalism is compatible with privileged self-knowledge which tells us about the infallibility and incorrigibility of our mental contents. His sunburn example proved this. We cannot claim that mental states are out of mind, as causal relations make a critical difference to mental states, like water is causally related to H_2O and "twater" is causally related to XYZ. Davidson holds a historical causal theory of representational content, according to which we cannot separate the idea of past causal interaction with external affairs in our constitutive meaningful use of language. He modifies the Wittgensteinan representational thesis to add that the content is individuated by causal and historical environment. Social externalist Tyler Burge claims that the question is not whether beliefs are in the head or constituted by external objects; his claim is more commonsensical, and talks about the location of beliefs' contents. For him, belief states are located where the believers are located. It seems to me that there is a crucial relationship between belief content and the believer, in the sense that these belief contents are embedded by socio-linguistic practices.

Besides, Bilgrami, as an externalist, offers a unified content theory, in which he finds unity in the narrow and wide contents in our beliefs. He also believes that the first person authority of an agent is not immediately available. It inevitably varies from agent to agent. So these are not concepts that have an *a priori* background, because our concepts are embodied in our social behaviours. Orthodox externalists disbelieve in self-knowledge for the reason that it will lead to inconsistency.

Bilgrami's thesis of "constraint on externalism" rules out the bifurcation content theory to intimate that social externalism items can well suit the contents that are routed through the agent's beliefs. Even in different situations, where external items look for social contents, Bilgrami's constraint thesis clarifies its linguistic requirement through turning these issues into ordinary beliefs like "water is the substance that comes out of

the tap". Thus Bilgrami protects his constraint theory from the threat of self-knowledge; social and non-social external elements are unified with agents' beliefs.

Actually, my intention in this book, especially in Chapter 4, is to show how we can reformulate the relationship between internalism and externalism from the perspectives of semantic holism and phenomenology. It seems to me that every sentence has its own semantic imports, and we should understand these semantic imports in terms of separate semantic concepts that are dependent on the entire language. Semantic holism can make a bridge between internalism and externalism only if we accept that analyticity and apriority are possible in our natural language. It is a well-known fact that semantic holism is much closer to semantic externalism, whereas semantic atomism is closer to semantic internalism. It seems to me that we can accept the concepts of apriority and analyticity to some extent in natural language, because there are some "one criterion words", like the terms "vixens" and "bachelors" etc., and "law-cluster" concepts, like "atoms are indivisible", which can be regarded as analytic propositions and are regarded as true because they are accepted as true.

Bilgrami's new theory of externalism emphasises that it is possible for two agents to share a particular concept in their locality of contents, even if they do not share the same concept on the "meaning theoretical" level. He strongly believes that no two agents can have the same concepts at the "meaning theoretical" level, as concepts are very fine grained, so they are hardly ever shared. Bilgrami mainly refutes the bifurcation theory of content for two different reasons. The first commonsensical reason is that it is very unintuitive to say "I always have a thought". The second is that a thought with wide content is very often the kind of thought that one cannot know that one is having, and Bilgrami does not think that we should ever say that there is failure of self-knowledge unless there is some psychological evidence for it, such as self-deception or some similar Freudian type - one should not deny self-knowledge on the basis of theories of reference of linguistic terms. In other words, we may get to know more astronomy if we discover that the morning star is the evening star, or that water is H_2O, but we do not get to know *our own minds* better).

Most philosophers (externalists) try to consider how intentionality is submerged into the world, though there are some philosophers, whom we call internalists, who think that the world is submerged into intentionality. Here my concern is to show the mind-world relationship from Heidegger's

point of view. Heidegger's conception of Dasein makes a linkage between the world and Being. We cannot separate Being (mineness) from this mundane world. The conception of Dasein omits the division between the subject-object dichotomies. The mineness or ownness of Dasein discloses that Dasein does not refer to an isolated world, as it is always surrounded with the public world. To refute the *ontic sense* of Dasein, Heidegger argues that Dasein has some *ontological existential sense* that refers to the inseparability of man and world. Similarly, we cannot separate the mind from the world. Meaning and mind are externally embedded and this hooks a referential directness into the objective world.

My reformed externalism, which I call *internalistic-externalism*, considers language a "social phenomenon" of inter-subjective communication, which also tries to make a connection between internalism and externalism. My *internalistic-externalism* believes that intrinsic contents do not rest on a third person's beliefs, as here, the agent is the main authority on his/her beliefs or the contents of these beliefs. The agent has some immediate access to the content that a third person can only infer, like in the case of "toothache". This conception of authoritative self-knowledge may incline toward solipsism or be close to acceptance of a kind of private language, but, like Wittgenstein, I reject any kind of private language or solipsism. It seems interesting to me to believe that intrinsic experiences get their meanings when they are used in public language, and we can also think about these through natural language. An incorrigible private experience finds its external expression when we attempt to see its meaning from our publicly sharable language viz., natural language.

But my theory is distinct from Bilgrami's "unified theory of content" in the sense that, for me, the contents are by nature unified, but division is created because of natural language. It seems to me that there are individualistic minds, but these do not work privately, since they participate in our natural language. I will argue that analytic philosophy and continental philosophy (phenomenology) can meet to make a link between the mind and the world in regards to the theory of meaning, language and phenomenal Dasein or "being-in-the-world". My argument is that there is no private mind, as minds are related with the linguistic world, and natural language is the ground on which minds meet. There is no mind in our linguistic community that can be apart from the environment. So meaning is not something which is only external; the meaning of a term can be determined partly because of the contribution of the mind and obviously partly because of the contribution of the world. There is a symmetrical way of showing the co-relation of mind and world.

CHAPTER ONE

THE INTERNALISM-EXTERNALISM DEBATE IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND MIND

"Humans are distinguished from other animals by their power of meaning-end-reasoning."
—David Papineau

Introduction

In this chapter, my aim is to build up the groundwork of the theory of meaning and mind. Here I will emphasise how the theory of description and the causal theory of reference can separately develop their points of view, viz. mentalese individualism and socio-linguistic phenomenon. Descriptivism focuses on the general terms that consist of descriptive content and lead to the mode of presentation of reference through sense. Meanwhile, the causal theory of reference refutes descriptivism to ensure that there is a causal chain of reference between words and objects that helps us to identify an agent's thought and its relation with the external environment. The debate between internalism and externalism is based on two traditional controversial theses: internalism holds that mental contents are semantic contents and they are in our minds or heads, whereas externalism says that contents are actually linguistic references and they exist in the external world. The externalist slogan is that "the meanings ain't in the head", whereas internalists like Segal, Searle, Block and Fodor have argued in favour of internalism by claiming that "meanings are in the head or brain". Internalists' arguments feature in the explanation of the mentalese standpoint, e.g. the intentionality, self-referentiality and supervenience hypotheses. On the other hand, externalists (especially Hilary Putnam) try to provide a response to critics with a background of natural kind externalism (physical externalism) which is committed to the theory of casual constraint of reference. My focus in this chapter is to revisit the debate between externalism and internalism and find out its importance in the philosophy of mind and language.

(1.1) Contemporary Debate: Internalism versus Externalism

In tracing back to the internalism versus externalism debate, we find that the onset of the distinction between internalism and externalism dates back to the Cartesian legacy. As intended by Descartes, the idea of the "self-containedness thesis" is that the mind is self-contained with respect to the world, i.e. what is truly mental or internal to the subject can exist without the existence of anybody else. Even the essence of the mentalistic character of an individual mind is capable of distinguishing itself from any material objects. The idea of external or internal and the dualistic idea about body and mind emerge from the Cartesian view. We can see this debate from two alternative perspectives: metaphysical and linguistic. Metaphysically, we can explain this debate about the existence and identity conditions of mental content. When it comes to finding the location of mental content, philosophers are divided into two groups. The fundamental concern between these two groups that escorts their disagreement is the relationship between the mind and the world. Internalists try to defend the thesis that the content of the mind is essentially independent of the external world, while externalists claim that there is a causal relationship between mental content and the non-mental world. So the location of the content is the core of the metaphysical debate regarding internalism and externalism, in the sense that internalism believes that mental properties are intrinsic only if they are preserved across internal replicas, whereas externalism is opposed to this thinking. For externalists, mental properties are dependent on the physical or social environment. In a word, for internalists, mental contents are located in one's head, whereas externalists' claim is that they are located in the world.

In his writings, Descartes tries to give some elementary replies, which conceptually stand on epistemology and ontology. The modern philosophy of mind, beginning with Descartes, and its historical journey pave a dominant way of thinking by looking again at the mind-body problem and also challenging the two predominant radical opinions, viz. monism and materialism. Mark Rowlands claims:

> The Cartesian conception is not just a single view of the mind; it is an array of interwoven views, like the strands of a rope, each lending support to the others, and each being supported by the others. The strength of the Cartesian picture lies not merely in the strength of the individual theses that make it up but also, and perhaps even more importantly, in the way

these strands bind together to yield a sweeping and comprehensive vision of the nature of human beings.[1]

We know that Descartes' substance dualism provides for a causal interaction between mind and body, which are by nature two different substances, and his motivation by science and reason privilege him to think that there is a distinctive place of mind within a metaphysical framework. Descartes' doctrine (Cartesian Dualism) mingles with epistemology and ontology. From the perspective of ontology, he claims that the existence of the mind does not depend on the existence of the body and vice versa. Their interrelated relationship can be regarded as external and contingent. Besides this, from the realm of epistemology, he also claims that we can know and be aware of our own minds, but knowing others' minds is not dependent on first person authority or intuition. In brief, we can be securely aware of our own minds. For Descartes, physical things such as the body have spatio-temporal locations. Actually, extension is the essential part of the body, whereas minds are essentially thinking things, so we can call them immaterial.

Here one can ask: "Is man an amalgam of two things – mind and body?" Descartes' answer would be "yes"! There is a keen interaction between mind and body, but in principle, they could be separated. For Descartes, a body is not only considered heavy, coloured and hard, but can be extended in length, have depth, etc., whereas mind, as a non-physical substance, is an amalgam of thought and extended substance through reason. Dualism not only teaches us that these two different sets of properties encompass the dichotomy between the mental and the physical, but focuses on the notions of autonomy, exclusion, privilege etc. The first set of properties, which we call "mental properties", also includes the features of thought, rationality, consciousness, subjectivity, self-knowledge etc. The second set of properties deals with some of the mundane physical properties like shape, size, weight, extension etc. This autonomy is what externalism questions, which I will focus on later. An agent can bear both these sets of properties, emphasising the mind-body problem by raising some puzzling situations. We can claim that mind and matter are heterogeneous substances, in this sense, but for me it sounds problematic.

However, the problem of Descartes' dualism inflates the question about "interactionism" between the physical and the mental properties. Rowlands says:

> The problem of Descartes's dualism is explaining how this interaction between mental and physical takes place. The general problem is that Descartes makes the mental and the physical so different that they don't seem to share the necessary properties to make this sort of interaction intelligible.[2]

This effect infringes on the first law of thermodynamics, as it accepts that an interaction between physical and non-physical is possible. This is a significant charge against Descartes' dualism. "Interactionism" is not only a metaphysical issue. It has a broad epistemological perspective. In *Discourse on Method*, Descartes considers that to get rid of the imperfection of knowledge, it is required that we must doubt from the very beginning. But permanent scepticism cannot be a reliable method of sincere inquiry. From this fact we can prove that, in spite of denying everything, the denier remains. So the indubitable, fundamental truth of Descartes' philosophy is "Cogito ergo sum" or "I think, therefore I am".

There is a well-proven opinion that consciousness or self (I) is independent in its existence. Self has continuous and identical existence, as it has certain successive modes of thought. One can ask: can we know for certain that material objects are affecting our senses, that it is not that we are producing the material objects, or the existence of these material objects depends on our perception? McCulloch says:

> We have perceptual experiences and form beliefs which we take to be generally reliable guides to a material environment which we inhabit. That is, we take ourselves to know things about the material world, where *knowing things about* is a specific relation between minded things and their world.[3]

We find two types of claims to understanding the mental phenomena: the location claim and the position claim. The location claim emphasises that there is a keen token identity between mental entities and the subject's skin. It actually says that mental events are located inside the skin of the subject that possesses them. The location claim cannot be regarded as a claim about properties; rather, it is exclusively a claim about particulars. Meanwhile, the position claim insists on the idea that the mental properties of the subject do not depend on the external properties of the subject, as mental properties are intuitive and non-relational in nature. So the independence of mental properties can be explained by the notion of individuation, which expresses an externalist approach to the subject of the properties.

There is epistemic containment within a subject that calls for the argument for certainty in Cartesian Dualism. It goes like this:

Premise 1. I can doubt that my body exists.
Premise 2. I can't doubt that I am a thinking being.
Premise 3. So, I am distinct from my body or I, as a thinking being, am not my body.

The idea of certainty cannot work with Descartes' argument for dualism, because the argument for certainty can mislead the basis of the physical world, but the strong approach of the mind has an authority nevertheless deluded by the question of certainty. The question of certainty is not constructed from dualism. It stems from the "self-containedness thesis" and also the fact that our mental states are self-presenting. We are not certain about our knowledge of the external world, as it can be falsified, but knowing one's own mind has a special content, viz. first person authority, takes a better approach to knowing one's own mind rather than knowing the external world. The content of infallibility is associated with the concept of knowing your own mind. If you do not carry out any self-deception, then your mental state will provide you with incorrigible knowledge about the inner world. Descartes' opinion was a little less extreme than the present view about first person authority or self-knowledge, but we can surely claim that the idea of incorrigible knowledge of our own mental state leads to self-intimating content, or it would be better to say that your own mind is transparently available to yourself, and you are the only person who can infallibly think that you know things about "x or y".

(1.2) The Descriptivism of Frege and Russell

Frege has distinguished between the study of word-world relations (theory of reference) and the study of word-meaning relations (theory of sense). However, he wants to see them as working together in a fully integrated theory of language. Frege takes sense as the *mode of presentation of the reference*. In the case of proper names, and also definite descriptions, Frege considers these singular terms to designate their references not directly, but indirectly, i.e. via sense. For him, linguistic expressions have both sense and reference. He attempts to dissolve the concept of proper names into singular terms. Thus, the class of singular terms seems to be ever swelling. Actually, proper names, singular pronouns, demonstratives, definite descriptions, and indefinite

descriptions are all regarded as "singular terms". Frege believes that the semantic value of a word depends on the particular object that it stands for. In his famous paper "On Sense and Reference", Frege claims:

> Every declarative sentence concerned with the reference of its words is therefore to be regarded as a proper name, and its reference, if it has one, is either the True or the False.[4]

Frege also believes that for traditional philosophers, the conception of identity relation is based on the logical law of identity. We may clarify this by arguing that everything is principally identical with itself. But Frege assumes that it is not the case that all identity relations are of the form "A is A" or "Red is red". We may even find some identity statements of the form "A is B" or "All mothers are women" etc. Now what is curious is that Frege draws a puzzling picture from a different point of view. Here we will find a difference in cognitive values, because if we consider it a relationship between objects, then we will not find any kind of cognitive difference between two identical sentences. But one cannot deny this kind of difference in our language. To get some ideas of these difficulties, let us look closely at these problems. Here, two different cases have been noted:

a)   The morning star is the morning star.
b)   The morning star is the evening star.

Both "morning star" and "evening star" designate the same planet (Venus) as their reference. So we may find that it is impossible to make a distinction between these two sentences through the referential theory of meaning. We need to see its sense, as here the sense is something different. There is no doubt that the notion of sense is defined as a "mode of presentation" of reference. Let us now consider the sense of "morning star" in this way: a star which obviously rises in the "morning sky"; similarly, the sense of the term "evening star" would be "a star which rises in the evening sky". Frege cautions us, saying that every term that carries sense has also a reference that can go wrong. Even bearer-less names, numbers and abstract entities have no references at all. We find a new dimension in his well-known work "Logic",[5] where Frege introduces the concept of "mock proper names" which have no designation. For instance, proper names like "Scylla has six heads" or fictitious characters like "Falu Da" in Satyajit Roy's detective stories are to be regarded "mock proper names". Here it is relevant to mention that Frege actually believes in the context principle, which says that the sense of a term can be understood in terms of the context of the sentence in which the term is used. Frege believes that the term always contributes to the determination of the sense

of a sentence in which it is used. He also thinks that a proper thought can only be expressed by an assertoric sentence. Here it must be noted that an assertoric sentence can be a proper assertion if and only if it expresses a proper thought.

Frege believes that there is a third kind of sentence that is neither true nor false, but logic does not deal with it. Let us see how a sentence might fail to be either true or false. Suppose I say "All of Lalan's sons are asleep". Now, if all the sons of Lalan were really asleep, then this sentence would be true. If not all of them are asleep the sentence would be false. But in this case, Lalan has no sons at all; can we say that the sentence is true? The answer would be definitely not. Can we claim that the sentence is false? The answer would be definitely not. So, we see that in such a situation there is no reference to the expression "the sons of Lalan", so the sentence fails to have a truth value. We may call such a sentence an expression without thought. Frege says:

> Names that fail to fulfil the usual role of a proper name, which is to name something, may be called mock proper names.[6]

One may argue that Frege believes in proper names that have sense, though though they have no reference. He thinks that some proper names have fictitious sense. R.M. Harnish[7] tries to clarify this thought from three different perspectives. Let me discuss these one by one:

a)   *Fictitious Sense from an Idealistic Interpretation***:**

Here, fictitious proper names belong to the realm of ideas. They have no direct relationship with a sentence about physical objects rather than about the world of ideas. We can even try to interpret our sentences in such a way that they would be mere ideas. Frege tends to use such idealistic ideas in his logic, though he had a firm belief that sense is objective and by its nature cannot belong to the realm of mere ideas.

b)   *Not True or False***:**

Frege believes that "instead of 'fiction' we could speak of 'mock thought' (*Scheingedanken*). Thus, if the sentence of an assertoric type is not true, it is either false or fictitious, and it will generally be the latter if it contains a mock proper name".[8] But we need to confirm that the "mock proper name" is not devoid of sense. Like a genuine proper name, it does not express any thought which is either true or false.

c)   *Lack of Seriousness***:**

Frege had a firm belief that logic does not deal with any kind of mock thought. We may have these thoughts in language and fictions, but we cannot take fiction seriously the way we take logic seriously. In the movie "*2012*", a writer shows that the world is going to be destroyed in 2012, but we do not take it seriously, whereas we would give the same issue much more value or take it more seriously if it were to be raised by scientists. I have clarified this idea elsewhere[9] that "… in fictions, though names are used there, they are not used in order to genuinely refer to something. It is as though we are playing a game as if referring".

It would be very relevant to ask: what would happen to fiction about historical characters, like dramas about Julius Caesar or Chandragupta Mourya? Frege replies:

> Even the proper names in the drama, though they correspond to names of historical persons, are mock proper names; they are not meant to be taken seriously in the work.[10]

The word "mock" is suggestive. It means "as if" a proper name, or a term which seems to function like a proper name but actually does not. It seems to me that Frege is no longer taking mock proper names as proper names without reference, because "Caesar", in a drama, is definitely a mock proper name, and yet it refers to the great Roman Emperor. We may finally consider that Frege is actually replacing "not to be taken seriously" by "not being used to refer to". What I want to say here is that in fiction, though names are used, they are not used in order to genuinely refer to something. It is as though we are playing a game of "as if" referring or referring to something that sounds like pretending.

Besides, Bertrand Russell tries to criticise the Fregean notion of sense and bearer-less names, including the concept of "semantic value", in his well-known "Theory of Description". F.P. Ramsey considers Russell's theory of description a paradigm case of philosophy. Russell has two different views about the conception of description. In his *Principia Mathematica*, he first states that "by a 'description' we mean a phrase of the form 'the so and so' or some equivalent form". But two years later, in his famous article "On Denoting" (1913), Russell has modified his thinking to mention that a description may be of two sorts, definite or indefinite. An indefinite description is a phrase of the form "a so and so" and a definite description is a phrase of the form "the so and so". Russell's main purpose is to make a distinction between names and definite

descriptions. He uses an example to establish his thought: "Scott is the author of 'Waverley'." Obviously, here "Scott" is a name and "the author of 'Waverley'" is a definite description. But in the case of abstract entities or bearer-less names, like "unicorn" or "round square", Russell believes that these are merely proper names with no designation. He also tries to make a distinction between a definite description and an indefinite description of "uniqueness". An example of definite description may be as follows: "The present president of India is a man." Now, an example of indefinite description is as follows: "I met a girl on the way to temple." He also suggests that we can say "I met a ghost on my way to temple". Though this sentence is meaningful, the problem is that it has no constituent, therefore we can regard it as false.

Russell thinks that definite descriptions are incomplete symbols which can be used in the context of a sentence. Here, Russell attempts to avoid the problem of identifying definite descriptions in terms of any proper names; therefore, their semantic value does not depend on the objects which they stand for. He also offers a way of paraphrasing the standard type of whole sentence by breaking it up into three different parts which are derived from the main. He also cautions us that only a genuine proper name can turn out to be a demonstrative expression, such as "this" and "that". We can express the main sentence "Scott is the author of 'Waverley'" as follows:

a) At least one person authored Waverley.
b) At most one person authored Waverley.
c) The person who authored Waverley was Scott.

Actually, the original proposition refers to the name, but analysis shows that this operation is descriptive. Even in the case of the sentence "The present king of France is bald", we will find that the object that is referred to by the descriptive phrase does not exist. It would be better to suggest that the sentence should be treated as false rather than lacking in truth value. Ayer writes:

> Russell calls these purely demonstrative signs logically proper names and he takes it to be characteristic of a logically proper name that its significant use guarantees the existence of the object which it is intended to denote. Since the only signs which satisfy this condition are, in his view, those which refer to present feelings or sense-data, his philosophy of logic is tied at this point to his theory of knowledge.[11]

Here, I would like to point out the reason why I have discussed Frege and Russell's descriptivism as preliminary platforms from which the debate between internalism and externalism was initiated. It is difficult to decide whether Frege was an internalist or an externalist. It seems to me that Frege's theory of reference is about the relationship between language and the world, while his theory of sense is closer to the relationship between language and mind. As an internalist, Searle claims:

> Both the Fregean and the present account of meaning are internalist in the sense that it is in virtue of some mental state in the head of a speaker and hearer – the mental state of grasping an abstract entity or simply having a certain intentional content – that speaker and hearer can understand linguistic references.[12]

But Putnam considers Frege an externalist. In his paper "Meaning and Reference", he states:

> Frege, however, rebelled against this "psychologism." Feeling that meanings are *public* property - that the *same* meaning can be "grasped" by more than one person and by persons at different times – he identified concepts (and hence "intensions" or meanings) with abstract entities rather than mental entities.[13]

At present, Putnam still believes that Frege is an externalist, as he says:

> I do not believe I have ever called him (Frege) an "internalist", What I said in "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" is *not* that he thought that *meanings* (*Sinne*, in his terminology) are internalistically identified, but that he thought that *grasping a meaning* was a mental state in the traditional internalists sense, and that too is a mistaken form of internalism. However, I am not a professional Frege scholar and I could be wrong. Today, some philosophers are reading all sorts of "up to date" doctrines into Frege. Perhaps they are right, but I am not yet convinced. My evidence for my reading of Frege as holding that grasping concepts is a mental state in the traditional sense is that he said that "concepts are transparent to reason and reason's nearest kin" [I quote from memory]. Obviously, if externalism is right, the identity conditions for the concept *water* are not "transparent to reason."[14]

I agree with Putnam that Frege's theory of meaning has an externalist perspective. But it sounds interesting to me that Frege can also be regarded as an internalist when it comes to his descriptivism. Frege's descriptivism tells us that one can think about an object without having any constitutive relationship to the object. This thesis opens up space for empty terms.

(1.3) Putnam and Kripke's Theses on Reference

We find refutations of descriptivism in Putnam and Kripke's thoughts regarding the meaning of proper names. They refute Lockean descriptivism. Lockean descriptivism states that:

(a) An ordinary natural kind term (like water) denotes not only a natural kind, but also a nominal kind.
(b) It does so in a specificatory way, i.e. by a description.
(c) The term requires association with the right list of superficial properties.

Now one may ask: "What are natural kind terms?" and also "What are nominal kind terms?" Actually, a natural kind term is determined by the properties, the possession of which is necessary and sufficient for membership of the kind. A natural kind term is of course a term that denotes such a natural kind. The fundamental properties of water are H_2O, or one oxygen atom bonded to two hydrogen atoms. Terms like "water" or "gold" are not merely singular terms, but also general terms. Meanwhile, a nominal kind is regarded as a property which is determined by superficial properties that are not necessary or sufficient for natural kind terms, for instance, "bachelor".

Saul Kripke, when he was a fellow of Harvard's society (1963-67), first claimed that the reference of a proper name or a natural kind term is determined by causal chains. There is an initial "baptism" of water (or H_2O) by the term "water". Our successful use of the term "water" depends on causal relations between our use of the term and the event of baptism. Kripke argues that Russellian descriptivism is wrong in considering proper names to be definite descriptions. Kripke also believes that Mill is right to conclude that proper names are non-connotative. Kripke thinks that natural kind terms are like rigid designators, devoid of any connotation. Kripke's theories of direct reference and rigid designators say that a singular term "x" is directly referential if and only if it is non-descriptive, and as a rigid designator, this singular term refers to the same object in all possible worlds.

Though Hilary Putnam extends the causal theory of reference of proper names to natural kind terms, still he does not give significance to baptism, as Kripke proposed. Putnam actually gives more importance to the question of how the user of the word would explain its meaning. He thinks that we cannot define a natural kind term (like "tiger") by merely

conjoining some "defining characteristics", like striped, four-legged, carnivorous etc. This is so because a natural kind term may have some abnormal members. For instance, a three legged tiger is still a tiger. In *My Intellectual Autobiography*, Putnam says:

> On the view I proposed, the meaning of a "natural kind term" such as the word "gold" is partly fixed by the division of linguistic labor and partly by what I was later to call the shared "stereotype".[15]

Here we find a crucial difference between Putnam and Kripke, as we do not find the idea of "division of linguistic labour" in Kripke's works. But the main issue of the Kripke-Putnam thesis is that the descriptive specification of a natural kind term does not ensure any reference relationship between the term and its referent. Later, the views of Putnam and Kripke are extended to the philosophy of mind. It is supposed that just as the language-world relationship is crucial in deciding what our terms mean, similarly, the thought-world relationship is important in identifying our thoughts and their objects. This thesis gives birth to externalism.

There is a tendency to explain the meaning of sentences in terms of truth conditions, and truth conditions are explained in terms of the references of the constituent terms of a sentence and its synthetic structure. Logicians consider the structure of a sentence from the point of view of symbolic logic, and also seek a reliable logical theory which would explain how its truth conditions are determined. Meanwhile, the Grammarian emphasises the structure of natural language, seeking a mapping of each sentence from the prospective of "semantic representation" or "meaning". We find radical progress in the structure of semantic theory from the period of Frege to the present. But one important question remains untouched. Putnam takes this point and asks: "Why is the theory of meaning so hard?"

We may find a plausible answer in Putnam's own point of view. He thinks that the problem lies mainly in the use of general terms, or names, if you like. Actually, general terms can be given meaning in different ways:

First, the transformation of verbal forms, like "hunter", i.e. one who hunts.
Secondly, natural kind terms, like gold, tiger, lemon etc.

A natural kind term is determined by the properties which are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for membership of the kind. Actually, a natural kind term has some fundamental properties. For

instance, water (H_2O) is a natural kind term whose fundamental property is being composed of molecules of one oxygen atom bonded to two hydrogen atoms. A non-natural kind term has some superficial properties whose possession is not necessary or sufficient for its membership. For instance, "mother" is a non-natural kind term whose essential property is not always "giving birth to a child". There are some "barren women" who become mothers by adopting a child. I will focus on this issue in more detail later.

There are two different theories that help us to understand natural kind terms. One is called the "description theory" of natural kind terms, and the other the "causal theory" of natural kind terms, as I already mentioned. Description theory claims that to understand a natural kind term, it is important to grasp its sense or intention. The common way of understanding sense or intention is to know the descriptive conditions of the referred term. The sense of a name is given by a definite description, which is mainly associated with the name. For instance, "Wittgenstein was a pupil of Russell and also a teacher of Anscombe". Here, "Wittgenstein" is the name and "a pupil of Russell and also a teacher of Anscombe" are the descriptions. Gareth Evans mentions that:

> The Description Theory of what a name denotes holds that, associated with each name as used by a group of speakers who believe and intend that they are using the name with the same denotation, is a description or set of descriptions cullable from their beliefs which an item has to satisfy to be the bearer of the name.[16]

On the other hand, the causal theory of reference describes two different parts through which they are associated with each other:

First, the theory of reference fixing; this tells us how a term is associated with its referent.

Secondly, the theory of reference borrowing; mainly a social transmission of a term which has a causal chain linking it with the linguistic community. I shall discuss this later.

According to the traditional view (description theory), the meaning of a natural kind term is given by specifying a conjunction of its fundamental properties. How can you define a tiger? The answer is so simple: "just conjoin all its properties." A tiger has different properties, like striped, four-legged, carnivorous etc. Therefore the conjunction of all these properties is the actual meaning of the term "tiger". Now "the tiger has the properties x, y, z" can be considered an analytic truth. Here, the predicate

term is contained in the subject. But Putnam challenges this point of view. He argues that this is a mistaken idea. The term "tiger" is not definable by merely conjoining some "defining characteristics", like striped, four-legged, carnivorous etc. One may ask why it cannot be defined in such a way; Putnam clarifies that a natural kind term has some abnormal members. A three legged tiger is still a tiger. Here we can find two different notions: natural kind terms and normal members. We know that a natural kind term has certain characteristics which indicate the "essential nature" of this term, which is generally shared by its normal members. So a normal member is an individual which is essentially associated with that natural kind term. We may call this "essential nature" a characteristic of these natural kind terms. Putnam claims:

> *Language is not only used to verify and falsify and classify*; it is also used to *discuss*. The existence of standardized stereotypes, and hence of meaning, is a necessity for *discussion*, not for classification.[17]

Putnam also believes that sometimes, traditional theory plays an important role in describing "one-criterion" concepts like bachelor, vixen etc. Putnam suggests that we are never able to define a natural kind term by its "defining characteristics", because normal members of the term (like lemon, yellow, peel, tart taste etc.) may not be the ones we really take to be normal. What we call normal may also change with time and vary under different circumstances. Normally, a stripeless white tiger is also a tiger, or a blue lemon is also considered a lemon. Actually, description theorists try to understand natural kind terms, for instance, a tiger, in terms of such properties as striped, carnivorous etc. We find that these criteria do not necessarily follow from the natural kind term. So the analyticity of a natural kind term is not possible in description theory, though we will find some exceptions here. So Putnam thinks that here it is important to admit a causal theory of natural kind terms. I will briefly clarify his view. According to Putnam, the modified definition of the natural kind term "lemon" will be as follows:

> X is a lemon = df X belongs to a natural kind whose… (as before) OR X belongs to a natural kind whose natural numbers used to….(as before) OR X belongs to a natural kind whose normal members were formally believed to, or are now incorrectly believed to…(as before).[18]

We find that two ideas are significant in a causal theory: the idea of *reference fixing* and the idea of *reference borrowing*. In the causal theory of reference, we may identify the sense of a term through the type of its causal chains. It has a connection with causal networks, i.e. the social

transmission of a name in our linguistic community. Putnam especially picks up on this issue for rejecting the description theory. He argues that not only *reference fixing, but* also *reference borrowing* has an important role to play in the context of the definition of a natural kind term. Putnam extends the causal theory of reference of proper names to natural kind terms, which no one has done before.

(1.4) Putnam on Externalism

I would like to discuss how an important insight that we find in Putnam's "Twin Earth Thought Experiment" can help us in tackling the main question: "Do natural kind terms have wide content?" The most celebrated argument for its truth derives from the thought experiment devised by Putnam. In his famous article "The Meaning of 'Meaning'",[19] Putnam speaks about two presuppositions which traditional theories of meaning accept. In fact, Putnam challenges the presuppositions, which are:

A. Knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain psychological state.
B. The meaning of a term determines its extension.

Putnam wants to clarify that we cannot accept these presuppositions together, and we should drop one of them. It is quite true that we cannot relinquish the second presupposition, as it would be a denial of our theory of meaning. We cannot discard the thesis that the meaning of a term determines its extension. Here, a relevant point still remains unsound. We need to take a closer look at this point. Quine wonderfully suggests that there is "no entity without identity".[20] If we are to admit mental states, we need to state their identity conditions. For this, we need to mention their identity conditions through their content. For instance:

Arka believes that Ram is an avatar.

Aban believes that Krishna is an avatar.

We find a difference between their beliefs because the contents of their beliefs are different. Kim thinks:

Content has a lot to do with what is going on in the world, outside the physical boundaries of the subject.[21]

There are two types of mental content which we find in the philosophy of mind:

a)   *Narrow content*: Narrow content is the content of a particular belief which is determined by the individual's internal mental properties. An internal property is a property that does not depend at all on the individual's environment. We find this idea first in Descartes' "self-containedness thesis". Later, descriptivists like Frege, Russell etc. also believed that names are actually descriptions in disguise. "Wittgenstein" is not a proper name, but a definite description like "the eccentric pupil of Moore and Russell and the author of *Philosophical Investigations*". Russell does not believe that "Pegasus", "ghost" or other such abstract entities have any real existence. The terms "Pegasus" and "ghost" are descriptive terms that are not applicable to anything in the world, rather than in our conceptual scheme. Actually, the meaning of a mental state is determined by its internal properties. This internal property is understood in terms of the descriptive conditions. Fodor, Segal, Searle, and Ned Block are supporters of this view.

b)   *Broad or wide content*: Wide content is the content of a particular belief which is not determined by individual intrinsic properties. Actually, it (the content) is determined by an individual's relation to his/her environment. We may also call it relational wide content. Putnam, Burge, Davidson, and even later, Fodor, have become supporters of this view. I would like to discuss how an important insight that we find in Putnam's "*Twin Earth Thought Experiment*" can help us in tackling the question "Do natural kind terms have wide contents?"

Putnam wants to clarify that we cannot accept the mentioned presuppositions together, and we should drop one of them. It is quite true that we cannot relinquish the second proposition, as that would be a refutation of our theory of meaning. Now Putnam claims that if meanings have to determine the extension of a term, then we must admit that meanings are not in the head. Putnam tells us to imagine a science fiction scenario where we find a planet like our earth in the galaxy. Let us call it "twin earth". Let us also imagine that "twin earth" and our earth are identical and are inhabited by persons who are, molecule for molecule, *Doppelgangers*. In a word, they are truly identical. But there is one difference which we may find; in Putnam's words:

> One of the peculiarities of Twin Earth is that the liquid called "water" is not H_2O, but a different liquid whose chemical formula is very long and complicated. I shall abbreviate this chemical formula simply as XYZ.[22]

However, all the observable properties of H_2O and XYZ remain the same. Twin water or "twater" tastes like water and it quenches thirst like water. Now Putnam urges us to imagine the period of 1750, when neither the inhabitants of earth or of twin earth had any knowledge of chemistry and they were therefore unable to realise that "water" and "twater" had different chemical constitutions. Let us also imagine that Sree is a girl on our earth; she says that "water quenches thirst". Similarly, twin-Sree, who is actually, molecule for molecule, identical with the Earthian Sree, also says that "water quenches thirst". Putnam suggests that, although they are in the same psychological state, their words refer to different things. Here, by the term "water", Sree means H_2O, while twin-Sree means XYZ, because they have learnt the use of the term "water" in completely different ways: one by an act of ostension to H_2O and the other by an act of ostension of XYZ. So it follows from this experiment that despite being in the same psychological state[23] (narrow content) Sree and twin-Sree have used the innocent term "water", which actually means two different objects. And changes in the meaning of the term (water/twater) lead to a consequent change in the term's extension and also create a change in the speaker's mental state. So Putnam says: "Cut the pie any way you like, 'meanings' just ain't in the head!"[24]

Putnam's thought experiment, which rests on his causal theory of reference, establishes an anti-descriptive standpoint. For him, the meaning of a natural kind term like "water" is determined by its relational broad or wide content. So, for reference fixation, any association of the description or the internal state of the speaker is inadequate. In this situation, a speaker would have to grasp the socio-linguistic phenomenon that is behind the success of such a reference. Putnam's idea of "division of linguistic labour" suggests to us that:

> ... It is simply that "meanings" should be implicitly known (or "associated" with the relevant words and sentences) by *every* speaker who counts as *fully competent in the use of language*. This might be called the constraint of *publicity*: it requires that meanings should be public.[25]

Here Putnam wants to clarify that a fully competent speaker has the ability to use his/her own words aptly and also understand others' words properly in his/her own linguistic community. This may rely on his/her interactions with others of varying interests, capacities and also expertise

within the same community circle. According to Putnam, an individualistic conception of knowledge cannot be possible at all. He does not believe that every speaker will be an expert on everything which he/she uses his/her language to speak about. Here, one important issue is that it is required for the speaker to be aware of a standard minimum account of information about the used words through which he/she is able to participate in any kind of shared discussion in his/her linguistic community. I would like to insert here some of my observations that may be able to express the whole debate in a nutshell. There is a longstanding misunderstanding about the facts of Putnam's semantic externalism. We consider that the "twin earth" thought experiment puts importance on the fact that on "twin earth", the term "water" does not consist of H_2O, so we earthians should say that it is not "water" at all. The term "water" has different meanings on our earth and "twin earth", as it varies depending on the environment. Putnam says that earthian Sree's word "water" and twin-earthian Sree's word "water" are not synonymous, but can be homonymous. They are not synonymous because earthian Sree and twin-earthian Sree are not microphysical duplicates. In the case of the "twin earth thought experiment", the references of natural kind terms like "water", "tiger", "gold" etc. are dependent on the causal connections between instances of these terms. This process is possible in three different ways:

Firstly, there may be a direct way that depends on the speaker's perception.

Secondly, one can communicate with other speakers who have the right causal connections with instances of the natural kind term and get information from him/her.

Thirdly, it is also possible that one person can interact with a thing that may not exist, or that no other people may be familiar with, like "extraterrestrial intelligence" etc. We may call it, as Putnam does, "reference by description". But this "reference by description" also ultimately rests on the direct reference procedure. Putnam actually generalises the "twin earth" argument to propose that references to objects in the external world depend on information carrying causal connections with those objects. The main point I would like to focus on is what makes externalism attractive or what the significance of semantic externalism is today.

It seems to me that the most attractive part of semantic externalism is that there exists a naturalistic stance towards human beings in the world. Another part of it is confronting the view of incorrigibility or intrinsic

ability that attempts to see the whole debate from the skin inwards. Semantic externalism vindicates the fact that the concepts that are important for our knowledge become meaningless if and only if they have no causal connection with their referents or the external world. Like Putnam, I also believe that to have a concept, it is necessary to have an appropriate causal connection with our environment. Semantic externalism implies externalism about the mind; if to have a mind is to have thoughts, then to have a mind, it is not sufficient to have the right goings-on in the brain and the rest of the body; to have a mind you have to be hooked up to an environment in the proper way, or see the casual interactions that extend into the environment. Elsewhere, I mentioned that:

> The externalist claims that my present belief is caused by my past beliefs. Even my future beliefs must be causally connected with my present and past beliefs. So there is a causal change which guides our belief system. If we trace back to the origin of this belief, then we will find that there is an "initial baptism" or reference fixing of a name or natural kind term by some speakers.[26]

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I have reviewed the case for descriptivism and referentialism as the preliminary steps in the debate between internalism and externalsim. It might be thought that the debate is not confined to the theories of definite and indefinite description and the causal theory of reference. Frege's theory of meaning, which integrates with his theory of language, focuses on the claim that the theory of reference and the theory of sense (the study of word-meaning relations) can go together. Frege's theory of meaning has taken an important role in the ongoing debate between internalism and externalism. His theory of reference is closer to externalism, indicating that meanings are public properties that can be grasped by different people at different times, or one person at different times. So in a word, it is shareable, and this concept of shareability refutes the thesis of "psychologism". Besides, internalists have placed importance on the theory of sense, which inclines towards the mental state of the speaker and hearer who grasp certain intentional contents.

The main argument against descriptivism, as portrayed by the causal theory of reference (Putnam, Kripke and so on), is that in determining the meaning of a natural kind term, it is not possible to get the required meaning through the mere conjoining of the "defining characteristics". There are some cases where defining characteristics cannot help to obtain

the exact meaning of the term because of some abnormal characteristics of the term referred to. For externalists, the procedure of changing the definition of a term is possible by changing its reference. The traditional theories of meaning try to ignore two very crucial aspects like, other people and the world, that become prominent in the causal theory of reference, viz. externalism. Putnamian semantic externalism makes explicit the meaning of a natural kind term, determined on two different levels – "stereotype" and "division of linguistic labour", where the nature of the paradigm of the terms gets its meaning in conjunction with our transactions with external objects and socio-linguistic practices. I think that the most attractive part of semantic externalism, as argued by Putnam, is its naturalistic outlook towards human beings in the world. Besides this, the externalism thesis also challenges the view of intrinsic abilities, which tries to see the whole debate from the skin inwards.

CHAPTER TWO

MIND AND WORLD:
A LINGUISTIC SKETCH

"Philosophy is not only concerned with changing our views, but also with changing our sensibility, our ability to perceive and react to nuances."
—Hilary Putnam

Introduction

The first chapter brings out a clear understanding of the enduring debate between internalism and externalism, which originated from a non-descriptivist account of descriptivist tradition, a tradition which curtails the role of the causal theory of reference in semantics to concentrate much more on internal mental content. The reason why this debate has received so much attention in the philosophical community is that it tries to draw attention to the relationship between the mind and the world. The debate centres round the question of whether the world has a constructive relationship with the mind or not. In this chapter, I would first like to delineate the defence of internalism that accepts the narrow content thesis from the different perspectives of internalists like Chalmers, John Searle, Bogossian, Frank Jackson, Ned Block and Jerry Fodor. For them, "meaning is a mental or some sense intrinsic content" that does not rest on the external world. The non-relationality, self-referentiality, indexical expression, and supervenience theories try to establish the claims that mental contents are narrow in nature and that the meaning of a term can be derived through the mental state of the subject. I would like to conclude the chapter by defending the externalist view (once proposed by Putnam), challenging the internalist approach through a holistic framework of externalism that paves the way to a socio-linguistic background for meaning; a thesis asymmetry with the conceptual role of semantics.

(2.1) The Six Puzzles Regarding Content

David Chalmers [1] wonderfully portrays the fact that there are six puzzles in philosophy which indicate the necessity of admitting narrow content.

1.   The first puzzle is one that results from Putnam's "*twin earth thought experiment*", which we discussed earlier.

2.   The second one is *Frege's puzzle,* which speaks of the cognitive difference between our thoughts that "*Hesperus is Hesperus*" and "*Hesperus is Phosphorus*". This cognitive difference also indicates a conceptual difference in our mental content.

3.   The third puzzle about belief was made famous by Kripke in his thesis "*A Puzzle about Belief*". Kripke attempts to show that we cannot draw any definite conclusion about the substitutivity of belief context. He wants to refute Mill's "theory of names", which tells us that the meaning of a name is exhausted by its referent. Actually, Mill's theory believes in the transparency of proper names, which was later rejected by Frege and Quine. Both of them believed that proper names are not windows into belief content, because in such a scenario there would be a fallacy of *reductio ad absurdum*. Kripke mainly argues for two different principles:

> *First*, the *disquotational principle*, which tells us that if a speaker of a language L assents to P and "P" is a sentence in L, then the speaker believes that P.
> *Second*, the *translational principle*, which tells us that the truth of a sentence in a language expresses the same truth value in the case of the translation of the sentence into another language. If a sentence expresses a truth in one language, then a correct translation of it into any other language expresses the same truth.

I will mention here Kripke's famous puzzle in Bilgrami's words. Bilgrami writes:

> Here are the barest bones of Kripke's puzzle. A Frenchmen, Pierre, learns from his nanny, while growing up monolingually in Paris, something which he expresses by saying "*Londres est jolie*." When, later, Pierre goes and settles in an ugly section of London and after picking up the native language, he is disposed to say "London is not pretty." However, he doesn't realize that the city he learnt about in Paris is the city of which he is now a resident. The example gives rise to a puzzle because, given

certain assumptions (included among which is the assumption of a denotational conception of meaning and concepts), one would, by a short step, end up attributing blatantly inconsistent beliefs to Pierre.[2]

We can summarise this puzzle in this way. Let us imagine Soma (an agent) meets Mimi (another agent) on two different occasions, once in a music hall and the other in a university seminar. It is difficult for Soma to recognise that she has met the same person, Mimi, twice. Therefore, she utters two different sentences: "Mimi has musical talent", and "Mimi has no musical talent". Here we will find that a rational person holds contradictory beliefs.

4. A similar kind of problem arises in propositional attitudes ascribing context. Chalmers describes it as "*the mode of presentations problem*". Let us look at an example: Arka says that "Aban believes that Harry Potter can fly with his broomstick". This is a true sentence. Let's imagine that Aban does not know that "Daniel Radcliffe" played the role of Harry Potter. In this scenario, Arka's claims will be false. But both accounts are same. "Harry can fly" and "Radcliffe can fly", as propositions, can be regarded as the same. For Chalmers, to believe that Radcliffe can fly, we need to go through it in terms of appropriate modes of presentation. Now one might ask: "How can the mode of presentation be treated as an account of belief ascriptions?" This is a difficult puzzle related to content.

5. *The problem of the essential indexical*. Chalmers writes: "When I believe that I am in danger, I will take evasive action. This belief seems to be essentially indexical, or self-directed; if I merely believe that x is in danger, where (unbeknownst to me) I am x, I might do something else entirely. How can we square this indexical aspect with an account of the contents of thought?"[3]

6. *The puzzle of contingent a priori*. Saul Kripke attempts to show that we have found a mistake in the traditional account of the intimate relationship between *a priori* and necessary proposition. In *Naming and Necessity*, he says that it is not true that an *a priori* proposition must be necessary. First, Kripke considers Wittgenstein's comment about the standard metre bar of Paris. He mentions that Wittgenstein says something very puzzling about this. He says:

> There is *one* thing of which one can say neither that it is one meter long, nor that it is not one meter long, and that is the standard meter in Paris.[4]

Kripke believes that we can find a mistake in Wittgenstein's view. He asks the question: "If the stick is a stick, for example, 39.37 inches long (I assume we have some different standard for inches), why is not it one meter long?"[5]

The length of everything totally depends on the time at which we measure it. Now it is important for us to ask: "Is it necessarily true that the stick S is one meter long at time t_0?" Some philosophers are trying to establish that a purely meaning-constituting sentence like "Stick S is one meter long at t_0" is a justified *a priori* statement which must be necessarily true. But Kripke believes that this definition is not able to define the meaning of what we call a "metre"; rather it indicates a fixing of the reference. Let us see what we are doing here. We are marking out a stick of a particular length at a particular time and deciding to call the length "one metre". This really marks out an accidental property and we have to make a note of this. Here it is important to say that if we had applied heat to this stick S at time t_0, stick S would not have been one meter long. In Kripke's own words:

> In some counterfactual situations the stick might have been longer and in some shorter if various stresses and strains had been applied to it.[6]

Kripke points out that there is an intuitive difference between the phrase "one metre" and the phrase "the length of S at t_0". In the real world, the phrase "one metre" designates a certain length; we universally regard it as 39.37 inches. Here, the first phrase "one metre" would be the "length of the stick S at time t_0". But the second phrase, "the length of stick S at time t_0", is not able to designate anything. The reason for this is that if we had applied heat to stick S at time t_1, then it would have expanded in its length.

Once, Putnam suggested to me:

> Kripke does not use the term "*a priori* proposition" because *a priori*ty has to do with *Knowledge*; even if my knowledge that the standard meter stick in Paris is one meter long is *a priori* (because I know that stick is the "standard"), the phrase "one meter" long is not *synonymous* with "the same length as the standard meter stick in Paris", because the standard meter stick in Paris *could have been* less than a meter long, in which case the property we rigidly designate as "being one meter in length" would not have been (i.e. isn't the same in that possible world) as the property of being (in that possible world) the length of the standard meter stick in Paris... I know *a priori* that the standard meter stick in Paris is one meter long is "*an a priori* proposition", you make it sound as if "being a priori" is an *intrinsic* property of the relation between the properties of being the

standard meter stick in Paris and being the length; but it isn't. But contingent identities between the designations of predicates can, surprisingly, sometimes be known *a priori*. That's Kripke's discovery.[7]

Now we can remind ourselves of Quine's famous dictum: "No entity without identity." If we are to accept mental states in our ontology, then we need to state their identity conditions. A mental state is identified through its contents. We find a difference between two beliefs because the content of the beliefs is different. We may understand the content of a mental state by inner specifications or by relational specifications.

(2.2) Internalism versus Externalism: Searle's Defence of Internalism

The origin of internalism can be found in the thinking of Descartes. From his first principle "Cogito ergo sum", a new way of thinking was derived which is called the "self-containedness" thesis. According to this view, the mind is internal to the subject and does not depend on any kind of external object or body.

Gabriel Segal, in his book *A Slim Book About Narrow Content,*[8] speaks of internalism, mentioning two ideas fundamental to it:

a) *Non-relationality***:**

Content is not relational so it does not depend on the environment. Here, the term "relational" is used in the sense that our beliefs, desires etc. are not dependent on the external world. They are regarded as an intrinsic framework of an agent.

b) *Supervenience on microstructure***:**

The advantage of focusing on microstructure is that on the level of elementary particles, whatever it is that determines content probably supervenes on it.

John Searle, in his book *Intentionality: An Essay in Philosophy of Mind,*[9] argues the "meanings are in the head" thesis. He believes that the fundamental question of philosophy is "how does language relate to reality?" In his previous work *Speech Acts,*[10] he claims that speakers are always related with the performance of a linguistic act. But his main intention is to show from Fregean accounts how expressions and objects are related to an individual mind. Searle resists the Fregean idea of a "third

realm". For Searle, the Fregean theory of meaning is actually an internalist thesis. He aptly points out that the classical debate between internalism and externalism is based on the main question "What is the proper way to analyse meaning and reference in our language?" Searle writes:

> Both the Fregean and the present account of meaning are internalist in the sense that it is in the virtue of some mental state in the head of a speaker and hearer – the mental state of grasping an abstract entity or simply having a certain intentional content - that speaker and hearer can understand linguistic references.[11]

Searle talks about five types of objection which are raised by externalists to suggest that in the scenario of reference and meaning, narrow content does not play any substantial role. We can précis these objections as follows:

1) There is a difference between *de re* and *de dicto* and other kinds of propositional attitudes. *De re* beliefs make a standard relationship between agent and object.
2) There is also a difference between the referential and the attributive use of definite descriptions. Attributive use is related to objectivity, while referential use is not.
3) All indexical expressions, like "I", "you", "this", "that" etc., require an objective account; in other words, these are world-involving.
4) The causal theory of reference tells us that reference is achieved by virtue of some external causal relationship.
5) The causal theory of reference opposes the psychological theory of meaning and any kind of psychologism.

But Searle does not consider these objections suitable. He believes that "meanings are in the head". Searle at first tried to refute Putnam's arguments. Putnam tried to hold on to the revised version of "meaning determines extension" and avoid alternative arguments like "psychological states determine extension". To refute Putnam's thinking, Searle uses an example. He says that "The murderer of Brown" fixes the extension, even though it is a fact about the world, i.e. who committed the murder of Brown. Searle suggests:

> The theory that intension determines extension is the theory that intensions set certain conditions which anything has to meet in order to be part of the extension of the relevant intension.[12]

It is worth mentioning that there is a crucial difference between *de re* and *de dicto* beliefs. *De re* refers to actual objects, while *de dicto* refers to psychological contents. Even Tyler Burge, in his famous paper "Belief de re",[13] claims that "A *de re* belief is a belief whose correct ascription places a believer in an appropriate non-conceptual contextual relation to objects the belief is about…" But Searle firmly states that *de dicto* beliefs are conceptual in nature and *de re* beliefs are considered, in a sense, a contextual aspect. Intentionality is a new factor that Searle attributes to the background of conceptual and contextual analysis.

Here, it is relevant to discuss the concept of indexical expressions. In his paper "The Problem of Essential Indexical",[14] John Perry believes that some thought contents are indexical. He also believes that it is too hard for a Fregean to know the indexical intentional content, as the Fregean sense cannot grasp the conditions of satisfaction. Suppose X believes "I am X" and Y also believes "I am X". We will clarify here that X is true, but Y is false. In the case of "I am X", the Fregean sense of the sentence is not sufficient to determine which proposition is actually expressed by it. Perry and Kaplan accept the theory of "direct reference". Searle suggests:

> According to them, in such cases the proposition is not the Intentional content in the mind of the speaker but rather the proposition must contain the actual objects referred to.[15]

Searle also believes that there is a long-standing misunderstanding about the concept of intentionality, and even in the nature of the indexical, as in the thought of Perry and Kaplan. Actually, indexicality does not consist in representational backgrounds. Searle thinks that a person can consider Mr. X to be the inventor of Y. Suppose it was proved that one million years ago, the same object Y was invented by some humanoid in a distant galaxy. Now the question is: can we still say "Mr. X was the inventor of Y"?

Searle replies sharply that:

> When I say Benjamin Franklin invented bifocals there is a concealed indexical in the background: the functioning of the Background in such cases assigns an indexical interpretation to the sentence. Relative to *our* earth and *our* history, Benjamin Franklin invented bifocals …[16]

He also mentions three different components of indexical expressions, through which he is trying to give a response in favour of internalists' account of indexical expressions. Let me discuss this briefly.

a)   Self-referentiality: Searle claims that if a person sees his/her hand in front of his/her face, then the condition of his/her indexical proposition would be self-referential; it may be better to say *intentionally* self-referential. This is because here, the truth condition requires reference to the utterance itself. It does not depend on any third person's claim.

b)   Non-indexical descriptive content: Searle believes that self-referentiality is also related to the idea of lexical meaning or non-indexical descriptive content. Actually, there are four types of non-indexical expression that we find in our language: *time* (now, later, yesterday, etc.), *place* (here, there etc.), *utterance directionality* ("I" refers to the person speaking), and *discoursal relations* (the former, the latter). Even non-indexical contents have two important parts - a sense can be determined by a particular determinable form. Besides this, a sense expresses the sort of entity that an expression refers to. For instance, "yesterday" expresses the determinate time "one day before", and here, the type of entity which is referred to is without doubt a day.

c)   Awareness of the context of the utterance: The intentional content of an utterance will be fulfilled only by the intentional context of awareness on the part of the speaker and also the hearer. Sometimes we might say "That man is drunk". Here, an indexical expression needs some indexical relation to clarify its sense, for example: "The man who stands in relation R (perceptual or temporal) to this utterance is drunk."

Now we can summarise Searle's thinking in the following way:

a) Meanings are actually in the head of the speaker, which is also a part of the mental makeup of the language user.
b) Linguistic utterances are intentional in nature.
c) Meanings do not depend upon external, causal or contextual determinations.

Actually, for Searle, intentionality has an "aboutness" feature. When a person believes, then he/she believes *in something*. When one desires, then he/she must desire *something*. This shows that mental states like belief, desire, fear, etc. are linked with intentional objects. Now, one can ask: "Is there any intentional state that has no causal link to the world or an object?"

In this case, we see that there is no pain "for something", like the way in which there can be love or hate "for something". Frank Jackson once

told me: "The object of a pain is the (putative) disturbance located where the pain is felt to be. I of course agree that there is nothing a pain is of in the sense in which there is something one is fearful of." But the problem is that we cannot claim that every mental state has an intentional object. What is the intentional object of the mental state "truth"? Or "universality"? The concepts of truth and universality lack intentional objects. Searle gives the example of undirected euphoria or anxiety. A change in an intended object can lead to a consequent change in beliefs. So the changeability of an agent's belief rest on its intended object. Believing in "ghosts" and believing in "cancer" are not the same belief anyway. Searle thinks that even mental states that possess objects have internalistic factors. No beliefs are independently attached to an object. Searle articulates three different features of intentionality to refute the causal theory of reference. These are as follows:

a)   Psychological mode and representative content are two important features of intentional states. The former deals with the psychology of beliefs and desires, whereas the latter pertains to what is believed, what is desired, etc. It is not that the states have their own content, but intentional states, with their contents, refer to objects.

b)   Mental states do not only depend upon psychological modes. Let me take two ordinary examples: if X (a person) claims that "it is too hot today", here the direction of the belief is mind to world, but in the case of a belief where X (a person) believes that "Y (his friend) will come to visit my home today", here, the direction is obverse or from world to mind. So we find that intentionality and mental states have contents as well as objects; they are directed to fit together.

c)   The "condition of satisfaction" is also a fundamental feature of intentionality. It helps to understand intentionality as an intention that can be satisfied when what is intended is satisfied. When we want to know a person's intentional state, then we must understand in what conditions his/her intention would be satisfied. Now Searle claims that the intentionality of mental states is intrinsic. It is not derived from others, as intentionality is considered a bedrock here. But language's intentionality is derived, as it has some representational capacity. Searle writes:

> A sentence is a syntactical object on which representational capacities are imposed: beliefs and desires and other Intentional states are not, as such, syntactical objects (though they may be and usually are expressed in

sentences), and their representational capacities are not imposed but are intrinsic.[17]

A parallel between language and mental states can be drawn in terms of the contribution of the mind, rather than language. The mind imposes intentionality on language purposely, and here, the purpose is obviously to meet a condition that expresses a psychological state upon it. It is not that language does not have a considerable position here: it helps the mind to think. Language has the ability to refer and attribute, which can be regarded as a mirror of the mind. We know that only words that are parts of a language have meaning, but mental states do not have meaning, because they are by nature intentional. Logical positivists and ordinary language philosophers bestow significance on language rather than the mind. They consider that the notion of incapability of understanding language rejects the sense of knowing or believing our mental states. Through language we can structure or categorise the concepts of the mind. Thinking is a process that depends upon language. Even Searle also admits that without the help of language we cannot explain a mind's intentionality. Searle argues that any primitive, paralinguistic form of intentionality depends on language and for him, intentionality that is illuminates in a linguistic form is no doubt internal.

Searle also raises a wonderful answer to propose that animals and children have pre-linguistic forms of intentionality. Children develop a richer concept of intentionality, or a complex series of developing mental states that interact with intentionality, which it would be possible if we anticipate it and expand a more categorised linguistic form. But for Searle, the structure of the process depends on the primitive biological forms that are associated with pre-linguistic intentionality.

There is a tendency to know a person's mental states in terms of the conditions that satisfy the person's intentions. It would be very odd if Searle claimed that the mind imposed intentionality on language purposely. We may think that the concept of meaning is related to the entities that deal with language and not with mental states. So language is the parameter that helps us to talk about intentionality, which has an aboutness feature. Putnam thinks that the problem is contained in the confusing use of terms like *intension* and *intention*. When we want to know a person's mental state, then actually we want to know the content of their thought (a notion closely related to propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires). So here, the notion is actually intension rather than intention. If my mental state is thinking "today will be a rainy day", in this

case, one's talking about "my intention being satisfied" makes no sense. However, to ask whether the veridicality condition (accuracy condition) of that state is satisfied does make some sense. It would even be misleading if we claim that for Searle, mental states are intentional, as they express a person's intentions, rather than intensions. Putnam would agree with Searle's opinion that language does not require there to be intentionality. Putnam also argues that even the mental states of animals are capable of representing simple features of the world, like shape, colour, distance etc., and in the case of non-human primates, it is possible that there is already full-fledged intentionality - "full-fledged" in the sense that here, the concept of mistaken belief is available to the theory of mind. Here, one could ask: What is the use of language? Putnam replies:

> Language vastly enlarges the range of contents our mental states are able to have, but I don't think it is necessary for there to be intentionality (sense and reference) at all.[18]

For Searle, we cannot claim that mind in any way imposes intentionality on mental states, as he thinks that they are intrinsically intensional and that mental states are caused by and even realised in the brain. But it would be very difficult to find the difference that says these are brain states rather than mental states. One idea is that Searle believes that the "brain secretes intentionality", like the way the adrenal gland secretes cortisol. This is a very controversial issue that I would like to avoid here.

In their paper "Some Content is Narrow",[19] Frank Jackson and Pettit claim that it is too hard to prove narrow content. But basically, their aim is to preserve the notion of narrow content in terms of the truth condition in folk psychology. They consider that the problems of predicting human behaviour have compelled them to believe in the folk truth of evaluable narrow content. In the case of prediction of bodily movement, it is required to know the person's internal neurophysiology. But it is quite impossible for a layman to do so. Therefore, folk psychology tries to explain narrow content from the observable behaviour of mankind. One may ask: "What constitutes the externally available evidence that helps us to solve the folk problem of predicting behaviour?" A quick answer would be our raw behaviour or physical behaviour, which we can immediately perceive through our sense organs. But we find one hard problem here. The behaviour of human beings is incredibly different. If we want to know an action, it is better to know the internal etiology of certain behaviours. Frank and Pettit claim that:

But we cannot go internal to find the patterns and generalizations we folk need to get started. Rather, we have to find the patterns at the behavioural, external level first, and then maybe we can proceed to go internal to explain the patterns we have discovered, and so describe our data in the language of intentional action.[20]

Here, one thing we must clarify is that a partition between the compatibility of possibilities and the incompatibility of possibilities has taken a key role in our belief. Even the truth evaluability of the contents depend on the set of possibilities. Now one may ask whether predictive content is a folk notion or not. In the case of predictive notions, sometimes we depend on an implicit common sense theory on people's behaviour. But the externalist claims that predictive contents are actually broad contents that stay outside of the skin. There are two alternative opinions we find in this situation. One opinion tells us that predictive content is something non-individualistic in nature. It is something like water solubility. Meanwhile, another opinion says that water solubility is a kind of narrow property that actually makes supervenience on internal content. Let us imagine, for an example, that if Aritra (a person) was near a lion, then he would start to run away from the lion. Is this individualistic? If we consider this action individualistic, then what is required here? In the first sense, to be individualistic it is required that the property will be inter-world narrow in every possible world. Another opinion tells us that to be individualistic is to require that the property will be intra-world narrow in every possible world, where the subject and his/her doppelganger (molecule-for-molecule identical person) have the same property. Frank and Pettit claim that predictive content will be intra-world narrow, not inter-world narrow. The decisive point is that doppelgangers exhibit the "same behaviour in the same situation". One can assume that the autonomous belief–desire patterns of predictive content must be narrow. Jackson once wrote to me:

I agree that the causal history of content involves a shared language and our place in a society of fellow thinkers and language users but all the same I think that the content of what we share supervenes on how we are from the skin in.[21]

(2.3) Block's Way Out

Ned Block raises a wonderful question in this regard. He says: "If I accept a sentence and later reject it, then the meaning of what I accept is not the same as the meaning of what I later reject, so how can I ever change my mind?"[22] Here, it is important to mention that Block considers

"meaning" and "content" more or less interchangeable and believes that contents are narrowly holistic. Narrow content is actually inside the head. Psychological explanation is the main purpose of narrow content. Block wants to clarify his thinking, which is based on a version of Putnam's *Ruritania* [23] example. The argument is that *Bruce* and *Walter,* two doppelgangers (molecule-to-molecule identical people) live in different places: let us call the places *B* and *W.* The dialects of the two places are the same, except in *B,* people use "grug" instead of "beer", whereas in *W,* they use "grug" instead of "whiskey". Now imagine that the *B* dialect lacks "beer", and the *W* dialect lacks "whiskey". In *B,* "whiskey" means "whiskey" and in *W,* "beer" means "beer". Here, Ruritanian is considered the same as English except for the use of "grug" in the two dialects. At the age of 10, both Bruce and Walter have the same beliefs about the concept of "grug", like:

a. "Grug" is a brownish liquid.
b. "Grug" is bought in liquor stores.
c. "Grug" is often served before dinner.
d. Drinking "grug" makes grownups act funny.

But at the age of 12, when they learn more about society, then Bruce could claim the following:

a. "Grug" translates in English to "beer".
b. "Grug" comes in small cans.
c. More than six cans of "grug" make people very drunk.
d. "Grug" is relatively cheap.
While Walter could claim the following:
a. "Grug" translates in English to "whiskey".
b. "Grug" comes in litre bottles.
c. One glass of "grug" knocks you out.
d. "Grug" is expensive.

Here, both doppelgangers have the same belief, except for the indexical "grug" beliefs. Both of them have even used it as it is terminologically appropriate in their own societies. The argument focuses on the basic idea of sameness and difference. At the age of 10, Bruce's "grug" has the same narrow content as Walter's "grug". But at the age of 12, we can see some difference in their narrow contents because of the differentiation in their native tongues. Block suggests that:

The idea is to justify this inter-personal claim by appeal to an *intra-personal* claim, the claim that each twin's two "grug's" differ in narrow content from each other, a consequence of the DIFFERENCE principle. But isn't this just a matter of a difference in beliefs too?[24]

Block's *first objection* is that neither "Bruce" nor "Walter" learns anything (any main essential property) about "grug", like its chemical formula (roughly20% alcohol is used in "beer", and 40%-50% is used in "whiskey". Block's *second objection* is an indexical objection which says that, by the rule of logic of identity, it follows that Bruce "grugB" is not equal to Walter's "grugW". The same holds for narrow synonymy. But Block does not hold that this indexical difference makes a difference in their psychological explanations. In Block's words:

> But the difference comes from the indexical not from the narrow content of "grug" itself. Bruce says "Grug is their word for whiskey". Whereas Walter says "Grug" is our word for "whiskey". It is the indexical difference that makes the difference.[25]

Block's *third objection* is regarded as a "splitting objection", which argues that if X (person) split into two persons A and B, then the principle of identity suggests that X is not equal to A, and X is not equal to B. Even A is not equal to B, as both inhabit distinct locations at one time. Now Block argues that without a change of narrow content, it is quite impossible to make extensive changes in the belief of a split of "grug" into "grugB" and "grugW". Block claims:

> The upshot is that I could have motivated the difference in narrow content between the two "grugs" within each twin at age 12 by appealing just to the fact that each twin thought the two words picked out different things. There was no real need to appeal to a difference in beliefs.[26]

What is important here is that we need two kinds of identity relation: one is the intra-personal relation and the other is the inter-personal relation. Then the main problem of holism (you cannot change your mind) will be solved.

(2.4) Fodor on Narrow Content

Jerry Fodor also supports narrow content as a function from concept to referent. In his early writing, in *The Language of Thought,*[27] he believes in narrow content and supports that "meanings are in the head" hypothesis. For him, the conception of narrow content is related to certain function-

based observable properties. In his book *Modularity of Mind*, Fodor points out that psychology is not a primary level philosophy, but a kind of speculative work. Even he considers the theory of observation a major problem. Our mind is not a single homogeneous system. It is actually composed of numerous sub-systems, and every sub-system carries out certain tasks. Each system depends on certain modules. There are five sense modules, and one specific language module. The language module closely interacts with the conceptual system, which is considered a computational module. Fodor thinks that a particular object can be recognised through the conception of its perceptual prototype. But we cannot consider a perceptual prototype an image. Here, one thing needs to be clarified: the concept of the prototype is distinct from the concept of the stereotype. The stereotype mainly deals with words and phrases, while Fodor's prototype is something deeper than words. Fodor believes that if a person perceives an object in his/her visual system, then he/she will have built up a module, which is like a little computer through which the mind can recognise the shape of an object with no colour or image. Putnam clarifies Fodor's ideas by saying that it is just like a thermostat, which can recognise a change of temperature without processing the concept of temperature. Fodor, who was inspired by Noam Chomsky, thinks that the Putnamian concept of the "division of linguistic labour" has just played the role of giving information about the observable properties (referent) of a narrow content, without giving enough referents through which we can recognise it properly. He believes that only internal language can be regarded as a proper object of scientific study. A universal grammar is a theory of an initial state of the language system. Here Fodor attempts to give us a psychological narrow content theory by establishing a relationship between linguistic mental entities and non-linguistic entities.

Even Fodor's computational theory about content is a variant of Searle's intentionality theory. In his early writing, e.g. *Psychosematics,*[28] Fodor depends upon the supervenience hypothesis in order to sustain the claim of individualistic narrow content. Fodor writes:

> States of type X supervene on states of type Y iff there is no difference among X states without a corresponding difference among Y states. So, in particular, the psychological states of organisms supervene on their brain states iff their brains differ whenever their minds differ.[29]

For Fodor, we have to identify mental content in terms of narrow content to establish supervenience theory, and in this aspect, the externalist theory about broad content is wrong.[30] Supervenience theory

claims that there can be no change in supervenient property without a change in subvenient property; it may be better to say that no psychological change will occur without a physical change. Here we notice that a dependence relationship is associated with being coloured, and being red is said to be conceptually necessary, but it is not possible for a psychological-cum-moral property, for example, being an honest human, to become conceptually necessary. In this case, being honest and being a man are not conceptually necessary. MacDonald writes:

> In short, supervenience itself is a name for a class of thesis that may concern different objects, different kinds of relations between them, and different strengths of relations, each thesis itself requiring independent explanation and defence.[31]

Now, Fodor believes that folk psychology is externalist in nature, but he had a long-held belief in the argument that folk psychology and scientific psychology are both individualistic in nature. Internalism focuses on the idea that two agents who are physical duplicates will be psychologically alike, no matter how much their respective environments diverge. Fodor's famous *Computational Theory of Mind* is regarded as an individualistic agenda. Having established this thesis, Fodor turns to the theory of "methodological solipsism", which deals with an approach in cognitive science which talks about an agent isolated from the environment. "Methodological solipsism" also tries to describe the internal mental life of an individual in a way that makes no hypothesis about the nature of the external world. Fodor claims that the concern of cognitive psychology is to "study mental processes qua formal operations in symbols". We can clarify this idea to add that cognitive psychology is mainly interested in the internal process of a representation which only has manipulating syntactic or formal properties, like a computer. In Cain's words:

> In short, cognitive psychology, in studying and attempting to characterize the computational processes executed by the mind-brain, will consider the individual in isolation from the environment and will individuate mental representations and states formally or syntactically and, therefore, individualistically.[32]

In his well-known book *The Elm and the Expert*,[33] Fodor modifies the conception of scientific psychology in terms of the "computational theory of mind". This argument runs as follows:

The higher level laws are implemented by lower level mechanisms. Scientific psychology commits to a "computational theory of mind" by holding those intentional laws which are implemented by computational mechanisms themselves.

Now two different conditions are required:

a) Computational mechanism can implement intentional laws only if those laws are narrow.
b) Even those laws appeal to the intentional properties that are locally supervenient.

I would like to clarify here that Fodor's whole philosophical argument is based on two issues:

Firstly, he believes that mental states are characteristically intentional.
Secondly, he also argues that mental processes are characteristically computational.

One can claim that the Fodorian thesis cannot solve the "twin earth" problem. Oscar's desire for "water" causes him to form an intention to get a glass of "water", and also to engage in "water"-seeking behaviour. Meanwhile, Oscar2's desire to "twater" similarly causes him to form an intention to get a glass of "twater" and to engage in "twater"-seeking behavior. Here, Oscar's thoughts diverge in their causal power from Oscar2's twater thoughts, and vice versa. Externalists criticise internalists by saying that, if internalists considered the twins different in their causal power, we should admit that these states are dependent upon the external world. Fodor tries to give a response to this comment. He argues that the difference between the twins and their thoughts fails to meet a necessary condition for being a difference in causal powers. There is also a conceptual connection to be found between the twins and also in their thought. Fodor thinks:

> It is *conceptually necessary* that if you are connected to water in the right way then you have water thoughts (rather than twater thought) and it is again *conceptually necessary* that if you are connected to twater in the right way then you have twater thoughts (rather than water thoughts). To have water thought *just is* to have a thought that is connected to water in the right way, and to have a twater thought just is to have a thought that is connected to twater in the right way.[34]

The term "right way" obviously indicates the exact way in which your thought is a proper water thought.

(2.5) Putnam's Response to the Critics: A Holistic Framework of Externalism

Putnam sketches a theory of holism in two parts:

a. Holism with respect to meaning
b. Holism with respect to belief fixation

But the conception of belief fixation creates so many problems in meaning holism. It is true that there is a mass of differences between the beliefs of our ancestors and those of present generations in the context of nouns, like plant, water, etc. The present generation believes that plants contain chlorophylls, that plants carry out the photosynthesis process, etc. But 200 years ago, our ancestors did not have all this knowledge. In such a situation, we do not consider them to have lived in a different world, or think that their notions were "*incommensurable*" with our notions, because Putnam suggests that the concept of our beliefs has been identified differently over time, but not the essence. Putnam now claims that "all interpretation depends on clarity, because we always have to discount at least some differences in belief when we interpret".[35]

But another option still remains, and that is holism with respect to meaning. Putnam admits its philosophical importance in his writings. "*Sophisticated mentalism*" informs us that entities are actually (a) psychologically real, (b) associated with individual sentences, and (c) also involved in the processing of these sentences. But this creates many problems in our ordinary language, because sometimes the same sentences can have different meanings, or different sentences may have the same meaning. It is not an analytical sentence that "tigers have stripes", because stripeless tigers are still considered tigers. In Putnam's paper "Meaning Holism", we find a satisfactory solution to the problem of "sophisticated mentalism". Here Putnam establishes his "holism" as depending upon three fundamental requirements:

a) *"Meaning must have the right powers of disambiguation"*: This shows that our theory of meaning is actually a true picture of the speaker's knowledge.

b) *"Invariance of meaning under the normal process of belief*

fixation": Let us consider that if the word "tiger" means a tiger that has stripes, then our process of belief fixation will change when we find that some tigers are stripeless. But we do not think the word "tiger" has changed its meaning; this teaches us to interpret a speaker's utterances within a consistent holistic framework.

c) Putnam also believes that meaning must be known by "every speaker who counts as fully competent in the use of language. This might be called the constraint of publicity: it requires that meaning should be public".[36] It indicates the practical ability of a "speaker" to engage in linguistic behaviour. Here, it is also pertinent to mention that Akeel Bilgrami also tries to avoid the causal theory of relation, because there is no exact way of establishing the causal relation between the concept of the agent and the object in the environment. In his book, *Belief and Meaning: The Unity and Locality of Mental Content,*[37] Bilgrami says that contents are necessarily public, as they are externally determined, not in a causal way. This is also a counter attack on Putnam's present thinking. But Putnam says:

> My position has always been that there are causal constraints on reference, but that does not mean that reference can be reduced to causality.[38]

Amongst the earliest and also the most influential arguments for relational wide content, we find this argument in Putnam's paper "The Meaning of 'Meaning'",[39] where there is a tendency to map the whole system from linguistic content and also to extend it to mental content. We can present the thesis of "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" through three statements:

First, the meaning of a word takes a relevant part, in Putnam's view, but he avoids the content of psychological states.
Second, Putnam extends the causal theory of reference of proper names to natural kind terms.
Third, he also believes that meaning can be separated into two factors:
    i) Extension conditions
    ii) Stereotypes

In his paper "The Meaning of 'Meaning'", Putnam speaks about two presuppositions which traditional theories of meaning accept. Basically, he challenges these two presuppositions, which I mentioned earlier:

a) Knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain psychological state.

b) The meaning of a term determines its extension.

Putnam wants to clarify that we cannot accept these presuppositions together and we should drop one of them. It is quite true that we cannot relinquish the second proposition, as it would be a refutation of our theory of meaning. His "twin earth" thought experiment claims that I and my *doppelganger* share the same psychological state about "water" and "twater" as tasteless, colourless, liquid, etc. But the fact is that on my "earth", water is identified as H_2O, but on "doppelganger earth", water is identified as XYZ. In such a situation, neither of us has knowledge of the fact we are referring to two different things using the term "water". So it follows from this experiment that, in spite of being in the same psychological state (narrow content), I and my doppelganger can use the innocent term "water" to actually mean two different substances. And a change in this meaning leads to a consequent change in extension and even a change in our mental states. So Putnam concludes that "cut the pie any way you like, 'meanings' just ain't in the head!" Even in the case of "elm" and "beech", it is too difficult for a speaker to make a distinction between them. Therefore, we need a "division of linguistic labour", in which experts will guide us about the exact meaning of a reference term. Putnam suggests:

> The conceptual content associated with the words "elm" and "beech" is practically the same; but the extensions are determined by criteria known to experts with whom the average speaker is in a cooperative relation.[40]

In his book *Representation and Reality,*[41] Putnam also tries to refute Block's point of view regarding the defence of the narrow content thesis. Ned Block endorses the view that all plausible psychological theories on things like belief, desire, even perception, are related to the computational theory of mind. Block primarily refutes Fodor's view on the conception of the "function of observable properties", and tries to establish his own thesis called "conceptual role semantics". Putnam thinks that Block has taken the idea of the "conceptual role" from Wilfrid Sellars's famous work *Science, Perception and Reality.*[42] Sellars also thinks that language has maintained three different rules:

a)   *Language entry rules*:

There is a belief box; when a speaker has a certain experience, then he puts it into a sentence and keeps it in a belief box.

b)   Language rules:

When a speaker accepts certain sentences, then he accepts other sentences.

c)   Language exit rules:

When a speaker has certain beliefs in his belief box, then he performs certain bodily movements or says certain words etc.

Block believes that we can describe "conceptual roles" synthetically and he tries to give much more attention to the concept of similarity of meaning, rather than sameness of meaning. Putnam criticises Block's opinion, saying that a "conceptual role" can be changed without there being a change in meaning. Here, Putnam concludes this idea in two different ways:

First, Putnam believes that the meaning of a word will lose its own context if and only if there is a change in the meaning of the word, but the conception of reconstruction of meaning is only dependent on the consequent change of the subject.

Secondly, in the case of a natural kind word, the extension is regarded as a dominant "component" of meaning. Even Putnam endorses that water and H_2O are not synonymous terms. Actually, H_2O is synonymous with a description like "a chemical compound which consists in two parts of hydrogen and one part of oxygen". Block believes that to be a natural kind term is to be a conceptual role. Here, Putnam rightly points out the mistaken part of Block's conceptual role semantics. He suggests that a person can have a conceptual role for "ether", which is regarded as an empty expression. Putnam also states:

> A central problem that a conceptual role theory faces is this: only a *small number* of the beliefs we have at a given time partake in fixing the meaning of a term.[43]

He gives a wonderful example: a king as a male hereditary ruler of a country is regarded as a fundamental feature of the stereotype of the term "king". But we find that the King of England does not rule. Therefore, there are some family resemblances which are actually denoted by the term extension. Block might say that this difficulty is not only applicable to his "conceptual role semantics", but we can regard it as a genuine problem of any kind of theory of meaning.

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, the argument of the six puzzles was introduced to bring into the discussion the role of narrow content. Applying these analyses, internalists make a distinction between individual and environment. Internalism gives much more attention to the narrow content of the mind, whereas externalism is concerned with the language of causal events, which is fixed by external affairs. Actually, internalism focuses on the claim that the beliefs and experiences of an agent are fully constituted by what goes on inside the mind of the subject, where the physical or social environment cannot have any influence on their content. So, in internalism, the content of the mental state of an agent does not depend on the external affairs of the subject. Meanwhile, externalism holds that the world is individuatively basic with respect to mental states, and mental distinctions are defined by the worldly state of affairs. I have also examined three prominent thinkers' defence of internalism; they try to refute externalism and the belief in the wide content thesis. Searle, Block and Fodor aim to give satisfactory accounts of internalism by analysing their own strategies: "intentionality", "conceptual role semantics" and the "computational theory of mind". Searle's intentionality hypothesis talks about indexical expressions of self-referentiality and an awareness of the context of utterances, which precede the fact that linguistic utterances are intentional in nature and meanings are in the head of the agent, therefore not dependent on the causal or contextual determination of the external world. Block and Fodor both try to show that computational models of our conceptual system are intrinsic in nature. Fodor is much more interested in the psychological narrow content theory, using it to establish a relationship between linguistic mental entities and non-linguistic entities in terms of perceptual prototypes. Contrary to the internalists' argument for narrow content, Putnam and other externalists have introduced the idea of broad content, according to which our perceptual experience makes a causal link with the environment. Even in the case of some exceptional terms like "elm" and "beech", though the terms are conceptually the same, an expert in our linguistic community will know the distinctions that can help the layman to distinguish between the two similar trees or the words. Here, perception is a causal content that represents what is perceived in the environment. So Putnam suggests that meanings are not in our head or mind. This claim leads to one of the most significant debates in contemporary philosophy of mind and language. We find conflict between externalism and the introspective knowledge of content. The externalist approach shows that the content of our thoughts rests on the external

environment, and is obviously not in the head of the speaker. Now the point is that any kind of knowledge about this content would be knowledge of the external environment. It would not be possible for agents to know that "water is wet" or "twater is wet" without knowing the external world or environment in which the terms "water" and "twater" are located. This sort of knowledge is based on empirical knowledge about content, rather than introspective knowledge that points toward internalism.

CHAPTER THREE

EXTERNALISM AND ITS CRITICS

"Living in a material world I am a material girl."
—Madonna

Introduction

In the first two chapters of my book, I have discussed the debate between internalism and externalism from the perspectives of metaphysics and philosophy of language. In this chapter, my intention is to track down the transition of the debate from philosophy of language to philosophy of mind. First, I will point out varieties of externalism and their scopes in the debate. Later, my purpose will be to scrutinise the two strong charges raised by internalists against externalism. I will discuss the views of Segal, Boghossian, Dretske and Shoemaker, whose strongest criticisms against externalism are particularly pertinent to the debate. The crucial task of this chapter is to give a response to the arguments made by internalists against externalism (empty terms and self-knowledge) based on the approaches of three prominent externalists: Davidson, Tyler Burge and Bilgrami.

(3.1) Varieties of Externalism

As discussed earlier, externalism says that our intentional mental states have contents that are world-involving. The content of an agent's thought does not supervene on his/her mental states. Here, "external" means "external to the body or skin of the subject". Externalism does not exist only in one form; it can vary as follows:

1. *Natural kind externalism,* supported by Hilary Putnam. We may also call this physical externalism. Putnam's "twin earth" thought experiment deals with natural kind terms like "water". According to Putnam, though the earthian and twin-earthian have the same psychological states, they still use the natural kind term "water" to refer to two different substances (H_2O, and XYZ respectively). A change in the meaning of the term "water" leads to a consequent change in its extension and also a change in

mental states. Here, Putnam's intention is to prove that mental content cannot supervene on bodily states.

2. Natural kind and non-natural kind externalism can have a social character. We may call this view *social externalism*, and it is supported by Tyler Burge and followed by many others. Burge pays attention to intentional states involving not only natural kind terms, but also non-natural kind terms like "sofa", "arthritis", etc. Burge describes a set of "arthritis" beliefs of an agent, and these beliefs were attributed to content clauses containing "arthritis in oblique occurrence". In this case, many of these beliefs were true; for instance, the agent had the sort of pains and aches that characterise "arthritis". But the person wrongly believed that he/she had "arthritis" in her/his thigh. The person was ignorant about the fact that, by definition, "arthritis" cannot develop in a patient's thigh; it is actually an inflammation of joints. Burge argues:

> The differences seem to stem from differences "outside" the patient considered as an isolated physical organism, causal mechanism or seat of consciousness. The difference in his mental contents is attributable to differences in his social environment… such differences are ordinarily taken to spell differences in mental states and events.[1]

3. There is another kind of externalism which is called *singular term externalism*, propounded by Gareth Evans and later by John McDowell. It is also called *radical externalism*.

4. There is another type of externalism, found in Bilgrami's writings, that he called *externalism with constraint* (C). In *Belief and Meaning*: *The Unity and Locality of Mental Content,*[2] Bilgrami says that "the contents of an agent's mind are necessarily public". But one thing is important here: Bilgrami attempts to avoid the causal determination thesis, an initial claim of externalism, because for him there is no exact way to determine the causal relations between speakers and objects in the world.

5. *Phenomenological externalism*, a recently developed externalism, is well supported by McCulloch in his paper "Phenomenological Externalism". The slogan of the phenomenological externalism is "contents are not in the head but in the mind". McCulloch emphasises:

> Phenomenological externalism is an attempt to cash out intentionality, *construed as a genuine mental feature*, in terms of real (e.g., ontic, causal, nomic) relations between thinkers and bits of the world.[3]

Here I want to add that, while defending the critical theory of phenomenological externalism, McCulloch has elaborated upon the concept of world-involvedness in terms of configuration of subjectivity. Later, I will try to defend various types of externalism in my writings.

(3.2) Two Strong Charges against Externalism

Internalists have renewed the attack on externalism from two strong perspectives, through which they attempt to argue that externalism is incompatible with a) *empty natural kind terms* and b) *privileged self-knowledge and first person authority*. First, I will mention here the first charge, which is known as that of "empty natural kind terms", deliberately argued by internalists against externalism.

3.2.1 Empty Natural Kind Terms and Externalism

According to externalists, natural kind terms are fundamentally relational to their environment. Internalists, mainly Segal, claim that "this most courageous of externalist views is catastrophic. There are numerous empty kind terms that we must take to express concepts".[4] Segal's view on moderate internalism is referred to as the "Thesis of World Dependence" of kind concepts or "TWD". Segal argues that non-physical entities or empty terms are not meaningless. The non-existence of ghosts does not mean that "ghost" is meaningless, because we have an idea about ghosts in our mind. He claims that "ghost" is also considered an empty natural kind term as there are specific names for specific kinds of spirit or ghost, and many common features of ghost stories are shared by different cultures. For Segal, internalism refers to theses where two interconnected requirements are met:

> *First*, content does not depend on anything *outside of the skin*.
> *Secondly*, content also depends on *microstructures*.

Though Segal believes that Putnam's twin earth thought experiment can be regarded as a paradigm case in the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, still he criticises Putnam's argument, saying that if we believe that on twin earth there is no water (H_2O), we cannot rightly claim that twin Oscar is actually Oscar's twin. Here we find some kind of ramification. Even Thomas Kuhn once suggested to Segal that an object which is in nature totally different to H_2O could not be microscopically very similar to water. So one might argue that although the twin earth

thought argument is conceptually possible, it is nomologically impossible. Segal's refutation of the fundamental characteristics of physical externalism as defended by Putnam is as follows:

First, physical externalism states that the extension of a non-empty term depends on the real relationship between the agent and the external world. But Segal refutes the thesis by showing that non-physical terms or empty concepts are not meaningless. We can have significant ideas regarding certain empty terms such as "polio", "quark", "ghost" etc.

Secondly, in physical externalism, it is also required that an extension condition is essential to the cognitive content of the concept. Segal says that this thinking is catastrophic in the sense that there are so many empty concepts expressed in our language. Someone might argue that "water is wet" without any thought containing the idea of H_2O. One can refer to H_2O only if the earth actually contains water, not if the earth is empty.

Now I will mention another key charge that is raised by Paul Boghossian with the main purpose of attacking externalism from the background of "empty concepts". Boghossian renews his attack on externalism in his well-known paper "What Can the Externalists Know *A Priori*?"[5] He suggests that in the case of empty terms, the externalists fail to denote natural kind terms like "phlogiston" or "ghost". Boghossian's objection against externalism is that externalism is incompatible with privileged self-knowledge because:

a) Externalists cannot individuate any property as the reference of an empty natural concept such as "ether" or "ghost".
b) Without any reference they cannot admit any content.
c) Sometimes, on the basis of introspection, we consider whether an apparent natural kind thought has any content or not. In this case, self-knowledge and *a priori* thinking help us to infer knowledge about the concepts of natural kind terms such as "water", "gold" etc.
d) Empirical investigation also helps us to decide whether a particular natural kind thought has any content or not.

Externalism gives relevant answers to the above criticisms. For externalists, if "water" exists on the earth, then Souvik (an agent) uses the term "water" because he has interacted causally with instances of "water". This would not be possible if water did not exist. It follows from this experiment that empty terms have no meaning, as they have no reference

success, and there is no causal relation between empty terms and the environment. By this argument, externalists try to give a satisfactory answer to the question raised by Boghossian regarding empty terms. But it is not a satisfactory answer, because externalists cannot give the truth conditions of "water is wet" on earth and cannot specify the tokens of water. I will discuss these issues later.

3.2.2 Self-Knowledge and First Person Authority

Here, I will first confer Boghossian's point of view on privileged self-knowledge and externalism. Boghossian asks the question "Is externalism compatible with the doctrine of privileged self-knowledge?" For him:

> By an externalism about mental content, I mean the view that what concepts our thoughts involve may depend not only on facts that are internal to us, but on facts about our environment.[6]

He also clarifies the concept of self-knowledge by saying that:

> By a traditional doctrine of privileged self-knowledge, I mean the view that we are able to know, without the benefit of empirical investigation, what our thoughts are in our own case.[7]

In the case of self-knowledge, we find that the process of knowing oneself is removed from any kind of empirical knowledge. The process of self-knowledge relates to the following requirements:

a) The agent entertained a thought.
b) The thought has a particular conceptual content.
c) The content is that "water is wet".

Boghossian also admits that the concepts of referent and extension take a central role in the knowledge of a natural kind term like "water". Here, the referent of "water" will be the stuff called "water", and the extension of "water" consists of the set of all aggregates of "H_2O" molecules that exist anywhere. Boghossian tries to prove that we can find a term which may articulate a property, but nothing actually has that property. Boghossian reminds us that externalism is interested in talking about the linguistic community, rather than the individualistic theory itself.

It is relevant to discuss again the concept of empty natural kind terms. Boghossian mentions two kinds of scenario in which natural kind terms, for example quark, caloric etc., fail to designate their referents. The

referent of a word is not available here. It would be a hasty claim that the existence of a concept is only dependent on its referent, because we can imagine the concept of "dry earth", like we can imagine "twin earth". Externalists, however, hold that "water" expresses an atomic concept under some conditions where it has a non-empty extension, and this extension may be H_2O or XYZ or something else. We can say that this argument is much more metaphysical than epistemic or semantical. Some externalists reply that the concepts are satisfied by different context-independent conditions. Now what would the satisfactory conditions of "water" on "dry earth" be? The extension of "water" on "dry earth" cannot be found. In Boghossian's words:

> ... Since there is no natural kind at the end of the relevant causal chain leading up to uses of "water" on dry earth, there is no fact of the matter what the referent of "water" is and so no fact of the matter what proposition is expressed by sentences involving it.[8]

An externalist might reply that a determinate concept cannot be expressed by an empty token; therefore, empty terms have no extensions. Related to this, it will be affirmative to talk about Fred Dretske's defence of externalism. Wonderfully, he claims that our beliefs have mental contents which are determined by the external state of affairs. He writes that:

> Beliefs are in the head, but what make them beliefs, what gives them their intentional content, what makes them *about* something, are the relations in which these internal states stand (or stood) to external affairs.[9]

We can compare beliefs to the concept of money. Money is in our pockets. But the pocket does not give the money its value. The worth or value of money is constituted by external matters, such as social and economic conditions. Similarly, beliefs have content because what happens in our conceptual world is related to the external world. Dretske also believes that he is not only an externalist when it comes to mental content; he also considers himself an externalist with relation to all kinds of representation. The instruments on the dashboard in a car are also relational facts which express information about the car's speed (like 80 km/hr). It is comparable with an object or an event in our brains' processes. An event or object becomes representational through acquiring an appropriate informational function. Dretske calls this kind of externalism, which denies that thought supervenes on the neurobiology of the thinker, *metaphysical externalism*. But he refutes the argument to say:

The special authority we enjoy about our own minds is an authority about what we think – that, for instance, there is water – not about the fact that we think it.[10]

For Dretske, sense perception gives us reliable information about external affairs. But sense perception cannot be about what is happening in the mind. For example, if a person claims that he walked all the way from England to India, then it would not be easy to believe. It would be physically impossible for a person to go from England to India and cross the sea by walking. Now, internalists may argue that we can know this impossibility through our internal mental states or intuition. But that does not help. Though Dretske believes in externalism, he is compelled to accept authoritative and privileged access in experience. Dretske writes:

My first person authority extends only to the facts that, *given that these external relations obtain*, are internally accessible to me – to content, to what I think and experience.[11]

Here, the concept "I think" is quite difficult to understand. One cannot learn the meaning of "I think" through the teaching of others, but only by thinking oneself, in a linguistic community, as grown up people do. So externalists need to accept the concept of first person experience. With this argument, Dretske tries to imply the importance of internal states and first person authority in the field of externalism.

In the light of the foregoing account of self-knowledge and first person authority, I would like to discuss Sydney Shoemaker's views on first person authority. We know that self-knowledge is knowledge of our own beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. Without the conception of self-knowledge, it is impossible to discuss deliberation. Shoemaker suggests:

Deliberation is a self-critical enterprise. One's beliefs, desires, and intentions are up for review, and for this to occur one must not only have them but be aware of having them.[12]

He firmly believes that rationality has a significant position in self-knowledge. If an agent is aware of his/her beliefs and desires, then it obviously follows that he/she has knowledge of them. To be blind about one's own beliefs and desires is paradoxical. It is like saying "it is shiny but I do not believe that it is so". Though there is a logical inconsistency, from the psychological perspective, it can sound true, because one can psychologically believe that it is not raining though in the real world it is actually raining heavily. Here, it would be suitable to mention that asserting is considered a criterion through which we can make a

justification of the truth in our judgments. Therefore, we cannot get a first person psychological statement on the basis of bodily or behavioural facts. What is surprising about first person statements is that they do not always talk about the speaker's body. First person authority relates to internal experiences and not external bodily affairs. Access to a first person experience has been always internal and not external.

For Shoemaker, we can divide first person psychology into two groups:

a) *Corrigible statements:* Statements about perceptual and publicly observable objects are regarded as corrigible statements. In fact, a person can believe a sentence is true even though it is false, or is late proved by others to be false.

b) *Incorrigible statements*: Shoemaker says that incorrigible statements talk about private experiences or mental events, and include statements about pain, mental images etc. Shoemaker thinks:

> In such cases I shall say that the first-person statement is based on the criteria for the truth of a "nonpersonal component" of it. What I wish to attack is the view that a first-person statement, if known to be true or asserted with justification, must be based on the criteria for the truth of the *whole* statement, and not simply on the criteria for the truth of its nonpersonal components.[13]

In the case of sceptical doubt about our own existence, Descartes has shown that "I think, therefore I am", which means that thinking is the criterion through which we can be aware of our own existence. This Cartesian line of reasoning summarises the idea of indubitability or the infallible knowledge of an individual's thoughts that are not based on empirical knowledge. Though contemporary rationalists like Burge disagree with this opinion, from the Cartesian accounts we can call it self-knowledge. Jasper Kallestrup, in his recent work *Semantic Externalism,* writes:

> *Self-knowledge* is the knowledge we each enjoy of our own mental states as opposed to the knowledge we purport to have of the external world. This thesis also goes under the name "privileged access," and we shall use both interchangeably.[14]

Self-knowledge is ultimately based on the observation of our inner selves; we also know that self-knowledge is not empirically corrigible by

others. Even our knowledge of mental states is not incorrigible by nature. In defending the transparency of belief states, Gareth Evans mentions:

> [I]n making a self ascription of belief, one's eyes are, so to speak, or occasionally literally, directed outward – upon the world. If someone asks me "Do you think there is going to be a third world war?" I must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the question "Will there be a third world war?"[15]

However, there is a crucial difference to be found between the way we know our own minds and the way we know others'. The distinction between first and third person utterances rests on the concept of *avowals*, i.e. expressions of our intentional or sensational states. The statement "I have a toothache" is regarded as a "*phenomenal avowal*", while the statement "I hope the weather stays cool" is regarded as an "*attitudinal avowal*". Three alternative characters are interconnected with the concept of *avowals* or self-knowledge:

a) *Authoritative*:

If one claims that he/she is in a certain mental state, then the sentence will be a *prima facie* case only if he/she fails to guarantee the truth of his/her *self-ascription.* So here, sincerity and competence are the primary conditions for becoming a self-knowledge or *avowal* statement. But in the case of *attitudinal avowals*, one can carry out self-deception, or make the mistake of engaging our own intentional states with our second order beliefs.

b) *Non-inferentiality*:

Avowals and first person authority are not related to the concept of non-inferentiality. If I claim that "I have throat pain", there is no conception of inferentiality on my side. But in the case of a second or third person, if I tell them that "I have a throat pain", then they have no other way to know without inferring about my mental attitude. The point is that second and third person ascription might be fallible because of this mere non-immediate access to the first person's mental attitudes in terms of inferentiality.

    c)   *Salience*:

It is possible for a third person to be familiar with all the relevant facts of a first person's behaviour, but a third person will not be able to grasp the basic psychology of the first person. According to Kallestrup:

> A basic mental state *M* is salient to the speaker who has it. If in normal circumstances *M* occurs in Anna, then Anna knows that it occurs. In similar circumstances, if *M* does not occur, then it cannot seem to Anna in every way as if it does occur.[16]

Here I would like to mention that first person beliefs and desires are in nature salient to one's own self, but not to others. These are the common features that are easily endorsed with regard to self-knowledge or the avowal theory of first person authority. Evans takes a hybrid view to propose that one aspect of a content determines reference to the actual world, while another determines reference to possible worlds. We can find alternative opinions to Evans's in Fumerton's paper "Introspection and Internalism". He emphasises:

> My internal states are states that we can identify with my exemplifying nonrelational properties – they are states that could exist in a world containing no other entity but me.[17]

For instance, my thought of green is just my being acquainted with the universal green. Here we can take an example sentence: "I can know through introspection that my son is tall." Furmeton replies:

> The internalist claims that the existence of my son and his causal connections to my internal state is no part of what *constitutes* my thinking of my son. That internal state may, of course, be included in the subject matter of propositions that describe features of the world that go beyond the internal state.[18]

As I mentioned earlier, first person authority is not based on any kind of evidence and it is regarded as an essentially direct method.

(3.3) A Response from Davidson

At first, Donald Davidson, as an externalist, tries to clarify the debate between externalism and first person authority to say that first person authority is better privileged than second or third person authority. He admits:

Special authority attaches directly to claims about the desire and belief, less directly to claims about the necessary causal connection.[19]

He is well aware of the fact that first person authority can turn out to be false, because sometimes our own attitudes turn out to be incorrigible thoughts. Now the question is: "Why are self-ascriptions privileged?" Davidson replies that in *The Concept of Mind*, Ryle suggests that what we take as "privileged access" is due to nothing more than the fact that we are generally better placed to observe ourselves than others are. He also adds:

> I agree with Ryle that any attempt to explain the asymmetry between first person present tense claims about attitudes, and other person or other tense claims, by reference to a special way of knowing or a special kind of knowledge must lead to a sceptical result.[20]

Now we can take two different statements in connection with this: John's statement "I believe Wagner died happy" and the statement Smith expresses: "John believes that Wagner died happy." These statements are not the same, according to Davidson, because there is a first person/third person asymmetry between the two. This asymmetry tells us that there is a primary level difference between the self and other descriptions. It is logically true that my claim "I am feeling hungry" and your claim about me, "Sanjit is feeling hungry", are not the same.

Another asymmetry tells us that in the case of self-ascription, when I claim "I am happy" and X, a second person, says "Sanjit believes that he is happy", here the self-ascriptive statement is always more authoritative than the ascription of the other. In the first case, the self-ascription of happiness speaks authoritatively and about my true mental content. But in the second case, there is a difference, as others cannot with authority speak about my mental states. In my case, I can report my thinking truly and authoritatively. Davidson writes:

> To put the matter in its simplest form: there can be no general guarantee that a hearer is correctly interpreting a speaker; however easily, automatically, unreflectively, and successfully a hearer understands a speaker, he is liable to serious error.[21]

First person utterances are logically different from third person utterances. The latter is more prone to error than the former, whereas the former are taken as true under normal circumstances. Even then, first person authority is not actually error free. Davidson defends externalism, as he is aware that our thoughts are either true or false because of their relation to the external world. Davidson suggests:

Mental states (such as believing) can be, and usually are, identified in part by their causal relations to events and objects outside the subject whose states they are.[22]

Like Putnam, Davidson also believes that the meaning of a word rests on the speaker's linguistic background and what he/she has learned in the linguistic community. Following Hacker,[23] I will describe Davidson's externalist account in the following way:

a. *Naturalist debate*: In the theory of meaning, Davidson believes in the empiricist way. Words and their relations with the appropriate objects and situations take a relevant place in Davidson's theory.

b. *Causal component of meaning:* In his paper "The Myth of Subjectivity", Davidson clarifies his notion of the causal component of meaning by saying that "in the simplest and most basic cases words and sentences derive their meaning from the objects and circumstances in which they were learned".[24] He also tells us that the meaning of a word is dependent on the causal relation between an agent and the external world.

c. *Connection between language and reality*: Language, for Davidson, is anchored in reality. The presence of water will be true when there is water in the actual world. However, he admits that there are many words in natural language which have no causal relationship to the world; we cannot learn these words by way of the correspondence theory of meaning.

d) *Genetic constraints on speaker's meaning*: The reference and meaning of a word used by a speaker rest on the nexus between words and objects. Davidson says:

… The correct interpretation of what a speaker means is not determined solely by what is in his head: it depends also on the natural history of what is in the head.[25]

In his "Knowing One's Own Mind", Davidson tries to show that externalism may well be consistent with the claim of first person authority. He wants to point out that something which is external to the subject (or part of his physical or social environment) may well be intrinsic to it, in the sense that mental states can be individuated in terms of first person authority. He comes up with his famous sunburn example. Suppose a person has a skin condition which is identified by a doctor as sunburn. Here, though the sun is external to the patient, it is in terms of the sun that something which is internal to him, i.e. his skin condition, is identified.

Similarly, the broad relational content of thought is external to the subject, yet it is individualised. Davidson believes the following in this regard:

Firstly, mental states, like beliefs and desires, etc., are similar to other states, like diseases, which are identified in terms of their causes, because they are partially identified in terms of the social and historical contexts in which they occur.

Secondly, one should not think that this implies that physicalism is wrong, as "how we describe or identify events has nothing directly to do with where those states and events are".

Thirdly, it is possible for us to communicate with others, and also have access to their minds, only because other people's mental states and the meanings that their words have are partially identified in terms of the causal relations between them and the external world. This does not, however, jeopardise first person authority. In his famous Swampman argument, Davidson [26] assumes that Davidson and Swampman are not only intrinsically physical duplicates, but also behavioural duplicates. In his words: "Suppose lightning strikes a dead tree in a swamp; I am standing nearby. My body is reduced to its elements, while entirely by coincidence (and out of different molecules) the tree is turned into my physical replica. My replica, The Swampman, moves exactly as I did; according to its nature, it departs the swamp, encounters and seems to recognize my friends, and appears to return their greetings in English. It moves into my house and seems to write articles on radical interpretation. No one can tell the difference."

So we can say that Davidson and Swampman are synchronic, physical and behavioural duplicates. Before we go further, let me remind readers that Davidson believes in a historical causal theory of representational content according to which we cannot separate the idea of past causal interaction with external affairs in our constitutive meaningful use of language. He modifies Wittgenstein's representational thesis to add that content is individuated by causal and historical environment. Through this thesis, Davidson claims that Swampman has no capacity for intentional thought. He also claims that Swampman has not learned the meaning of any terms in our learning situation. The reason is that Swampman has no teleological function in his brain, so the utterance of his words has no reference; there is no question about their meaningfulness. As Kallestrup points out:

According to these theories, part of what makes Davidson have any thoughts at all is that they are rooted in his external environment via causal-historical chains of communication, but since Swampman has no causal pedigree he is utterly incapable of expressing or entertaining thoughts during t_1-t_2.[27]

We know that one can recognise someone only if one has encountered him/her before, but in the case of Swampman, there is no question of meeting with all Davidson's friends from before. Even Swampman is not able to speak a public language, as he had never gone through our learning processes. Another crucial argument is raised by Ruth Millikan from a biological perspective. She claims:

> As argued above, you and Davidson are also members of the same real kind, the kind Homo sapiens. Does it follow that you and Swampman are members of the same real kind? Is being members of the same real kind a transitive relation?[28]

But here, in the case of Swampman, we will find discontinuity between ancestors and descendents. No such discontinuity is possible in the case of *Homo sapiens*. You and I are both human offspring, but Swampman is not a human. So it does not follow that belonging to the same real kind is regarded as transitive. Humans and other species have certain evolutionary similarities which the Swampman does not possess. These natural kind features are individuated precisely by their microphysical constructions, for example water as H_2O. But *Homo sapiens* is not a natural kind term like Putnamian "water" or "twater". It is obviously a real kind, and it also has a historical causal background.

Putnam's natural kind externalism teaches us that the twins are ensconced in physically different environments, and this environmental difference warrants a difference in their conceptual ascription. On the other hand, Burge's social externalism indicates that their different content ascriptions make a difference in the balance of their linguistic practices, rather than their different physical environments. Both Putnam and Burge believe in the hypothesis that twins have different psychological characteristics. Davidson agrees with Putnam and Burge about the role of environment in the case of content ascription. Joseph Owens rightly points out:

> Davidson is a linguistic externalist: he agrees that twins ensconced in different physical environments admit of different psychological descriptions, but he denies that their mental states are somehow external – he denies that they differ in their mental states.[29]

Davidson assumes that, though Burge's argument is inadequate for self-knowledge, Putnam's thought experiment is compatible with self-knowledge. The problem is that if we accept content in terms of external factors, then self-knowledge appears to be threatened. This is because, if everything in our minds is determined by the external world, then knowledge of our own minds seems to be impossible. Davidson prefers to search for reconciliation between self-knowledge and externalism. One of the assumptions supported by Putnam is that meanings are not in the head and thoughts cannot be grasped by first person authority. This full-fledged idea is supported by natural kind externalism, which we looked at earlier. The other problem with externalism is that the externalist, in general, identifies self-knowledge with access to inner mental states. Davidson discards this assumption and shows that natural kind externalism is compatible with privileged self-knowledge, which tells us about the infallibility and incorrigibility of our mental contents. In his paper "Knowing One's Own Mind", Davidson talks about two assumptions that are of immense significance to externalism:

First, if a thought is identified by something outside of the head, then it is not wholly in the head.
Second, if a thought is outside the head, it cannot be grasped by the mind and so has so no first person authority.

Davidson does not accept the first assumption. For him, if mental contents are actually linked with external objects, for that reason we cannot assert that they are outside of our heads. He offers an example: let a skin specialist check my skin and tell me that my skin is affected by sunburn. To identify the cause of the rash on my skin, the doctor refers to something (sunlight) outside of my skin. So from an externalist perspective, we can presume that the sun, which is regarded as an external object, is causally related to my skin. Davidson thinks that here, causal interaction has taken an important role in our linguistic reference. In his words:

> The claim is that all thought and language must have a foundation in such direct historical connections, and these connections constrain the interpretation of thoughts and speech.[30]

Even in the case of "water", when an agent thinks about water, the concept of water is not outside of his/her head. He/she thinks that thoughts about water and "twater" are different, in the sense that water is causally related to H_2O while "twater" is causally related with XYZ. Here, two different causal relations make a critical difference to mental states. For

this reason, we cannot say that mental states are outside the mind or outside the head. So the claim about first person authority in mental states is defensible. Davidson also tells us that philosophers who deny compatibility between self-knowledge and externalism are misguided. They consider *self* as a "theatre" where the mental contents are displayed, and the world as a mirror, so they find it tricky to blend the mind with the world. Davidson refutes this Cartesian model of the mind. For him, the "mind" is necessarily related to the external world. Davidson states:

> On the one hand, there are the true inner states, with respect to which the mind retains its authority; on the other hand there are the ordinary states of belief, desire, intention and meaning, which are polluted by their necessary connections with the social and public world.[31]

(3.4) A Response from Tyler Burge and Social Externalism

Woodfield considers social externalism an individuation condition of thoughts, and these thoughts issue from trained thinking. He suggests:

> Social externalism, as I understand it, says that people who are competent in a public language are equipped to have certain thoughts whose contents are fixed (in part) by the lexical semantic norms of their language.[32]

He even claims that Burge does not consider his own position social externalism. However, I think Burge believes in contents which are determined by the physical (not mental) and also linguistic environment. Anti-individualism is the view that the natures of many mental/physical states constitutively rely on relations between those mental states and specific aspects of elements in the environment. It would be irrelevant to claim that mental/psychological states themselves are related to the environment, or that they occur in the environment, or that they enclose entities in the environment within them. Burge sets out two types of thought experiment in his 1979 and 1986 papers. I will talk about those experiments briefly and try to explain how he establishes his argument against internalism. In his paper "Individualism and the Mental",[33] Burge argues that a protagonist speaker, let us call him Ramprasad (an agent), said "I have arthritis in the thigh". But we know this is wrong, because "arthritis" occurs only in the joints and bones, and not in the thigh. Here, the agent Ramprasad's comment is counterfactually different from the content of his belief in the actual situation. Let us imagine that in both situations (actual and possible), Ramprasad's intrinsic physical and

historical states remained unchanged. One can argue here that there may be some physical changes which occur in the environment. Woodfield responds:

> The answer is: Alf (agent) *has been* causally affected by the linguistic environment in which he has been brought up – but only to the extent that the inner traces have come to be a *partial* reflection of the ambient language.[34]

Social externalism looks at concepts as norms. Concepts are by nature abstract; they are not located in people's minds. Basically, they are dependent on social practice or the "socio-linguistic environment". At first, Burge focuses on the limited scope of the "twin earth" thought experiment. The argument looks like this:

a) It just talks about natural kind terms, like water.
b) It only considers dependency on the external environment.

Burge focuses not only on natural kind terms, but also on non-natural kind terms like government, sofa, arthritis, etc. His main intention is to illustrate that non-natural kind terms have wide contents. In one of his recent writings, *Origins of Objectivity,*[35] Burge argues that the question is not whether beliefs are in the head or constituted by external objects, but more commonsensical; it talks about the location of beliefs' contents. He adds a new idea: that belief states are located where the believers are located. Now he believes in a crucial relationship between belief content and believers, in the sense that social, linguistic practices alone embed these belief contents. In the case of the arthritis argument, Burge says that only through socio-linguistic practice one can determine whether one has arthritis in the thigh or in the joints. Burge emphasises that an agent would surely lack in arthritis thoughts, even if his internal history remained the same, even in the counterfactual situation. This difference lies in what the social environment determines regarding arthritis. I concur with Burge that the key point of *Origin of Objectivity* is that the constitutive determinants of a state are not necessarily part of the state. The circulatory system is a constitutive determinant of the heart. It is necessarily referred to in an explanation of what a heart is; a heart would not be a heart if it did not pump blood around a wider system - but the wider circulatory system is not part of the heart. Similarly, although elements in the physical and social environment are constitutive determinants of what it is to be in specific psychological states, they are not part of the psychological states at all. The psychological states are not located where they are.

In "Intellectual Norms and the Foundations of Mind",[36] Burge assumes that X (an agent) inhabits a society where, in spite of the same physical structure, "sofa" does not mean something to be used only for sitting. Once X comes to accept claim *1*, then he no longer accepts claim *2* or its negation. Now the consequences look like this:

1. Sofas are religious artifacts.
2. Sofas are large, overstuffed pieces of furniture made for sitting.
3. Sofas are not large, overstuffed pieces of furniture made for sitting.

It seems to me that the concept expressed by "sofa" comes under the heading of what Burge refers to with the term "reduced" with regards to the notion of a sofa, like an anthropologist might employ on coming into a society that uses a term for objects that he or she can recognise, but by whom it is used he or she has not yet determined.[37] Burge briefly considers some remarkable ways to synchronise the notion of "reduced". One elaboration considers that the reduced notion is "*tied to perceptual aspects of sofas*". The other proposal is that the reduced notion is a "*thing of a kind relevant to understanding what these things are* (where some sofas are indicated)". Burge suggests that the first proposal might not capture X's notion of "reduction" properly, and that the second at best confuses reference-fixing with a meaning-giving description. Burge also states:

> The idea that we can attempt to determine what our thoughts are from a vantage point that is neutral as to which of various alternative thoughts we are thinking seems to me to be not only deeply implausible but incoherent… One's first person standpoint is inseparable from the thoughts that one actually thinks.[38]

Now it is impossible to notice that social externalism can go together with first person authority. Social externalism generally entails the existence of other people and their linguistic practices, bringing about the content of thoughts. So, it seems to follow that if we know *a priori* the content of our own thoughts, we must know *a priori* that there are socio-linguistic practices and other people. Burge refutes this argument by arguing that one may know something without knowing the "background enabling conditions" that make knowledge possible. For example, your knowledge of your thought that "water is a liquid" does not entail knowledge of the conditions that make the thought possible, for instance, the existence of "water" or H_2O. Timothy Williamson argued in his 2004 *Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society* that the use of thought experiments need not involve any *a priori* intuition, but only "our general cognitive capacity to handle counterfactual conditionals, which is not

exclusively *a priori*...”[39] That is, Williamson assimilates the crucial parts of thought experiments in philosophy into ordinary, contingent counterfactuals that are not asserted on *a priori* grounds. For example, “If Dr. Johnson had kicked George Berkeley, he would have kicked a bishop” is both *a posteriori* and contingent.

(3.5) Bilgrami on Self-knowledge and Externalism

Recently, Bilgrami has taken up the idea of transcendental self-knowledge. He rejects the traditional concept of Cartesian self-knowledge by arguing that our own mental states are not infallible to us. For example, beliefs about our past mental states have a propensity to go wrong. One can even discard the idea of *transparency,* which tells us that our mental states are simply accessible to correct beliefs. He refutes the thesis to cite that there are some racists who believe that all men are not able to develop equally. This is definitely a mistaken belief. Let us take an example; Aritra mistakenly believes that he wanted whiskey on the eve of New Year of 2016. But he does not believe or come to believe that he wanted wine. Bilgrami emphasises that beliefs about our mental contents are not evidentially based or warranted by virtue of their relationship to other evidential beliefs. As I go further, I would like to take up the issue of Bilgrami's *constitutive thesis*, which says that “there is a clear sense in which... there can be no exceptions to the claim that if someone believes that P, then he believes that P and vice versa”.[40]

The intuitive starting point of Bilgrami's transcendental argument shows the distinction between first order intentional beliefs and second order intentional beliefs. Let us take an example: Bappa believes that “he believes that his father is worthy of respect”, while his behaviour reveals a contemptuous attitude towards his father. Now we can correctly identify Bappa's first order beliefs towards his father; that he is not worthy of respect, as revealed through his behavioural evidence. Here, one thing worth mentioning is that for Bilgrami, Bappa's second order beliefs cannot be regarded as a mistake. Here, the first order belief renders its truth from the second order beliefs, though it follows an inconsistency in the realm of first order belief regarding his misbehaviour towards his father, caused by the agent's resentment. Bilgrami holds that:

> Self-knowledge is a necessary condition of responsible agency... not merely know that he has acted..., but [he must] also know the intentional states which cause and explain (rationalize) the action.[41]

An intentional belief regarding his father is that he is worthy of respect, which causes him to assert that his father is worthy of respect. Now Anthony Brueckner[42] formalises Bilgrami's constitutive thesis as follows:

> For all intentional states *i* and all subjects *S*, if *i* meets the condition *of responsible agency* (CRA), then *S* has *i* iff *S* believes that he has *i*.

Brueckner also formalises Bilgrami's thinking to add that with no intentional state, it would be a problem to rationalise or describe an action if the agent does not know the belief-desire pair that rationalises his/her action. It is not only that self-knowledge requires first order beliefs. Even second order beliefs can be true under conditions of responsible agency. But it is surprising to see that Brueckner concludes by criticising:

> I conclude that Bilgrami's complex transcendental argument for the constitutive thesis CT is unsuccessful. He has not shown that knowledge of one's own mind is a condition for the possibility of responsible agency.[43]

Social externalism and natural kind externalism both reject the concept of unified content to show that there is one notion of content, which is called externalism. This externalism is separated from any kind of self-knowledge and internalists' views. Bilgrami thinks that the self-knowledge argument only threatens orthodox externalism. He raises a *prima facie* problem of externalism. He writes:

> If things outside the agent's ken determine the contents of an agent's intentional states then, *prima facie*, that raises a question about how the agent can always have knowledge, or at any rate full knowledge, of those contents. That is, to the extent that there might be features of the external things that the agent does not know, then to that extent he would not fully know the concepts and contents that those external things determine.[44]

Bilgrami does not accept the social externalist view that our mental contents are fully determined by the social world. So he comments:

> Burge says that one does not have to know the necessary conditions that go into the thought that p being the thought it is in order to have that thought. And so if one is unaware of the various external factors that go into its being that thought, it neither follows that one does not have that thought nor, given their common necessary conditions, that one does not have the iterated thought that expresses self-knowledge of the thought.[45]

For Bilgrami, self-knowledge of mental contents is an essential part of those contents. Bilgrami holds that two alternative choices are waiting for the orthodox externalist: either they will choose the possibility of attributing inconsistency to agents, or they will accept the concept of bifurcated content. The first choice is totally unacceptable to any orthodox externalist, like Burge or Putnam. The second choice is also unacceptable for them, because they rebut any kind of unity between externalism and self-knowledge. The meaning of an agent's utterance can be one thing and the content of his belief another. It would be contradictory, rather than inconsistent, if one uttered that "Water is not H_2O" or "I have arthritis in my thigh". For them, meaning is external while content is internal.

Orthodox externalism does not admit self-knowledge for the reason that it would lead to self-inconsistency. That is why it bifurcates content into narrow and wide content. However, Bilgrami rules out this bifurcation of content. He states:

> But my externalism, unlike these others, has no problems with inconsistent attributions in the first place. Neither dilemma nor therefore trilemma ever exists for my view. My constraint on externalism sees to it that external items which determine concepts do not determine concepts that are at such odds with his other beliefs that he will fall into the situation of uttering or thinking inconsistent thoughts just on the basis of the concepts attributed to him. Agents, on my view, may think thoughts that we specify as "Water is not H_2O" or "I have arthritis in my thigh" but the concept of water or arthritis in these cases will not be determined by the experts' beliefs or by scientific essence etc.[46]

Bilgrami offers a unified content theory which makes room neither for narrow content nor for wide content; according to this theory, there is unity between both these contents in our beliefs. So it is easy for his *constraint theory* to show that social external items are able to enter into content routed through the agent's belief. Even taking the alternative position, where external items lack social contents, Bilgrami's *constraint thesis* clarifies its meta-linguistical specification through reducing these issues to ordinary beliefs like "water is the substance that comes out of the tap", and thus he tries to remove his constraint theory from the threat of self-knowledge, where social and non-social external elements are unified with an agent's beliefs.

Concluding Remarks

Boghossian and Segal discuss the transmission of the non-referring token of water on "dry earth". Their aim is to refute the concept of the causal referential theory of externalism. Meanwhile, Shoemaker's effort is to confirm privileged self-knowledge by dropping reference altogether from semantic theory so as to understand one's mental content in terms of infallible knowledge of thoughts. Davidson, Burge, and especially Bilgrami, the three foremost externalists, are in favour of constructing a theory in which "self-knowledge is compatible with externalism". Davidson holds that mental states can be understood in part by their causal relations to events and objects outside of the subject. Burge suggests that if we know *a priori* about the content of our own thought, then we must know *a priori* that there are also social and linguistic practices. If we want to find a compatible strategy for self-knowledge which avoids all threats of externalism, then we must modify Putnam's causal theory of reference and meaning, because all these kinds of externalism (Putnam, Burge, Davidson, etc.) have failed to unify the external environment as constituting the content of thought. So one can follow Bilgrami's constraint theory to avoid the bifurcation of content and accept a unification of contents. The central assumption of Bilgrami's externalism is that contents are obviously public, as they are externally determined. Contents are not determined in a causal way, but every determination of content must be normative and public.

CHAPTER FOUR

AN ARGUMENT FOR A REFORMED EXTERNALISM

"After learning from the works of great philosophers, we should try to make some more progress. By standing on the shoulders of giants, we may be able to see further than they could."
—Derek Parfit

Introduction

In the last chapter of the book, my intention is to reconcile the main debate between internalism and externalism, and also reformulate the relationship between mind and meaning from the perspectives of holism and phenomenology. First, I will show how we can make a bridge between internalism and externalism through semantic holism. I will concentrate much more on Quine's "confirmation holism" and Fodor's arguments against holism. More specifically, following on from the sustained attacks on strong holism and radical internalism, I want to put forward a reformed externalism which I call *internalistic externalism*. Later, I will focus on the Heideggerian conception of *Dasein* or "being-in-the-world", in which I have found the clue through which I can reach my destination. Here, my effort will be to show how Heidegger mingled the two different things, being and world, together. On my way to formulating a new kind of externalism, phenomenology will be my guide and Bilgrami's specific version of externalism or *constraint (C)* will be my inspiration.

(4.1) Is Semantic Holism a Bridge between Internalism and Externalism?

I mentioned earlier that Putnam, or any other externalist, cannot believe in the possibility of an individualistic conception of knowledge. Knowledge is something that is always shared among many in the collectively used language. Here it is required that a speaker must have a minimum amount of information about the used words by which he/she

will participate in any collective discussions. This theory is familiar, in the form of Putnam's "division of linguistic labour". Putnam believes that the model of use of the language of the speaker and the hearer will be holistic, i.e. a particular word or sentence does not occur in isolation; it is actually dependent upon the whole program. Putnam thinks:

> Meaning, in my view, is a coarse grid laid over use.[1]

Putnam also accepts Wittgenstein's "use theory of meaning", emphasising that the conception of meaning of a word or sentences lies in its use in a linguistic community. Wittgenstein considers meaning to be correlated with understanding, and understanding is also associated with explanation. Wittgenstein considers:

> Let's only bother about what's called the explanation of meaning, and let's not bother about meaning in any other sense.[2]

Actually, Wittgenstein thinks that philosophy is nothing but analysis and discussion of language. Language is "*a form of life*" and the activity of man is a game. Hence, the language game is a form of language and a child, as Wittgenstein suggests, learns here to play the language game from his/her elders in the linguistic community. Any language game has two aspects: an agent and the environment. Therefore, the agent's appropriate use is guided by the environment, which gives information about the external world. We are familiar with Wittgenstein's famous dictum: "*Don't ask for the meaning, ask for the use*."

Putnam says: "Frege taught us that words have meaning only in the sense of making a systematic contribution to the truth-condition of the whole sentences."[3] As we know, for Frege, the meaning of a word is dependent on the context of the sentence. Wittgenstein also says that to understand a sentence is to understand a language. Davidson puts it together to say:

> ... Only in the context of the language does a sentence (and therefore a word) have meaning.[4]

The general view of "semantic holism" or "meaning holism" suggests that the meaning of a linguistic expression depends on its relations with others' expressions in the same totality. This relation may be inferential or conceptual. Semantic holism is different from "meaning atomism" because "meaning atomism" deals with expressions which have independent

meaning restricted to smaller parts and often unidirectional in molecular theories. In Ned Block's own words:

> Atomism characterizes meaning and content in terms of none of the web; it says that sentences and beliefs have meaning or content independently of their relations to any other sentences or beliefs and therefore independently of any theories in which they appear.[5]

Semantic holism was introduced more elaborately and impressively by C.G. Hempel (1950) and W.V. Quine (1951). Hempel states that theoretical sentences cannot stand alone. Only together with other theoretical sentences do they imply observational sentences. We can regard this as confirmation holism. Quine also thinks that "The unit of empirical significance is the whole science".[6] Confirmation holism insists that the contribution of theoretical sentences depends on the contribution of other sentences. Quine also believes that "procedures" about the assertibility of anything are associated with the entire language, not with a single sentence.

Here, I will give more attention to W.V. Quine's "semantic holism" to analyse the concept of holism and also differentiate it from "atomism". Quine holds that our learning of language starts with sentences that are directly associated with external stimuli, so any semantic change which occurs in any part of the system consequently affects a large part of the network. Fodor and Lepore claim:

> Quine is a verificationist; that is, he accepts the identification of the meaning of a statement with its means of confirmation...[7]

Quine's "semantic holism" is derived from his two well-known theories: "confirmation holism" and "verificationism". Quine's conception of "confirmation holism" assumes that there are no specific hypotheses through which we can assume any evidence or counter evidence in experiments; only the whole theory can do it. Besides this, in his paper "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", he clarifies his idea on "verificationism" to write that "the meaning of a statement is the method of empirically confirming or infirming it".[8] Whether we can call Quine a verificationist or not is a highly controversial issue that I will discuss later.

We can summarise Quine's arguments for semantic holism following Fodor and Lepore's thoughts:

a) Meaning consists in its empirical contents.

b) It is impossible for us to know any scientific theory individually. Actually, they are corporate bodies which lack any kind of empirical content in isolation from other sentences about the same theory.

c) The meaning of a sentence is dependent on the corporate body of sentences.

Quine, who believes that language is a social phenomenon, says:

> Language is a social art which we all acquire on the evidence solely of other people's overt behaviour under publicly recognizable circumstances.[9]

Here it is worth mentioning that Quine makes a distinction between "observational sentences" and "theoretical sentences". Observational sentences belong to the periphery, as these are directly related with experience, whereas theoretical sentences lie above them in a linguistic network. Here, "linguistic network" refers to a group of sentences whose constituent parts recur and the identity roles of these related sentences.

I will mainly discuss Quine's arguments for "semantic holism" as follows:

First: The scientific practices argument:

When a scientist carries out an experiment with a hypothesis, he/she makes certain background assumptions that relate to accepted theories or the truth values of auxiliary assumptions. The scientist's aim is to incorporate the hypothesis in the theory. The general form of that hypothesis is actually based on observable evidence in certain conditions, in which case it will be true. If for any reason it turns out to be false, then the scientist does not refute the whole hypothesis, rather he/she refutes the antecedent of the observation categories.

A. Grunbaum [10] refutes the restricted version of the Duhem-Quine thesis to indicate that it is not logically possible in the case of any experiment for there to be an alternative set of assumptions. Even in physics, we cannot find such an alternative set of assumptions in any relevant cases, like atoms or electrons. If we revise a theory in an unrestricted sense (changing its meaning of some items), then the thesis may still be true, but in a trivial sense.

Secondly: *The language learning argument:*

Quine believes in certain observational sentences which can be known by external stimuli. I mentioned earlier that these observational sentences are mingled with theoretical sentences, and also that they constitute a whole scenario where the meaning of any particular sentence is related to a unit of other sentences. If, in any case, one of our linguistic predictions turns out to be false, then we should revise the sentence to avoid the false prediction.

Thirdly: *The Reductio argument:*

Actually, in rejecting the mentalistic theory of meaning, Quine denies the conception of analytic and synthetic distinction. Here his intention is to prove that semantic holism is possible. The first dogma, as Quine puts it, is the cleavage between analytic propositions, which are grounded independently of matters of fact, and synthetic propositions, which are grounded only on facts or empirical contents. This rejection of the mentalistic theory vindicates externalism, which paves the way for semantic holism. One thing worth mentioning is that the heart of semantic holism is that the meaning of a sentence is defined in regards to the totality of nodes and paths in its semantic networks. Now one might ask, how can Quine's theory of "radical translation" illuminate his theory of meaning holism?

For Quine, translation is an indeterminate fact. As we know, "rabbit" and "gavagai" have same stimulus meaning, but linguists who desire to analyse the translation of the native term "gavagai" will face problems. Here, stimulus synonymy mainly corresponds to translation. For Quine, the terms "rabbit" and "gavagai" are co-extensive. He says that "terms and references are local to our conceptual scheme".[11]

"Is Quine's holism strong or moderate?" One may easily ask this question. In order to modify his strong holism, Quine takes two alternative arguments:

a) Our propositions about the external world are not internalistic, but are regarded as part of a corporate body.
b) The distinction between the analytic and the synthetic is unintelligible, so it can be abandoned.

Now I will clarify the concept of "strong holism" to say that strong holism believes in the unity of meaning of the whole language. It also

believes that if a sentence is isolated from other sentences, then it lacks its own meaning. We find the idea of "strong holism" in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", where Quine claims:

> No statements are immune to revision.[12]

This indicates that the meaning of a sentence cannot be isolated from other sentences in the same language. However, "moderate holism" tells us that the meaning of a sentence is determined by its relation to many other sentences. But the fact is that the units of meaning would be fragments of the language. It seems to me that in his later works, like "Epistemology Naturalized" and *Word and Object,* Quine became much closer to a "moderate holist" than a "strong holist".

In *The Language and Thought*, Jerry Fodor assumes that no simple concept can be determined by any other concept in our conceptual scheme. Semantic holism thinks that one can grasp the concept X if and only if he/she can grasp the other concepts Y and Z which are related to X. Fodor calls it a kind of "epistemic liaison" that an agent engages in with the other concepts in a conceptual scheme. Fodor tries to refute "semantic holism" and "conceptual role semantics" by putting forward two arguments, which are as follows:

First: The "Reductio ad Absurdum" argument:

To avoid holism we need to accept the traditional analytic-synthetic distinction. An analytic sentence can be true by virtue of its own meaning, whereas a synthetic sentence is made true by extra-linguistic facts. For example, "all bachelors are unmarried"; this is regarded as a true analytic sentence, where the predicate term "unmarried" is contained in the subject term "bachelor". Another example: "a dog is an animal" and "dogs bite postmen"; here, the first sentence is obviously analytic, while the second one is considered a synthetic proposition, because it gives us new information and we need to justify this information through external experience. We know that it may be false, as not all dogs bite postmen. I will now discuss why Fodor is reluctant to accept conceptual role semantics. Cain points out:

> Fodor's answer runs as follows: Holism implies that, barring cosmic accident, no two individuals or time slices of the same individual ever share a concept and, thus, ever share an intentional state.[13]

It is plausible that *A* (an agent) has a belief about an *O* (object) which *B* (another agent) does not have. Two individuals can have different beliefs on the same object. But semantic holism suggests that an initial difference in the beliefs of two different individuals constitutes a certain change in their conceptual schemes. Here, they cannot share a single intentional state. It is relevant to note here that the acquisition or abandonment of a new belief on the part of one of the speakers causes a certain change in their concepts. Fodor and Lepore refute this idea. They argue:

> The colloquial senses of "similar belief" *presuppose* some way of *counting* beliefs, so they presuppose some notion of belief *identity*. If you have most of the beliefs that I have, then, a fortiori, there are (one or more) beliefs that we both have.[14]

They also think that the similarities in beliefs between two agents are dependent on the concept of same inferences. We might say that two agents have similar beliefs only if one believes in A, B, C and D or the other believes in A, B and D. In a word, there are some similarities between the elements of their beliefs.

*Secondly***:** *Inconsistency with thought argument:*

If we deny that content is compositional, then the ability of thought to be productive and systematic will turn out to be false. Cain clarifies Fodor's arguments, stating:

> According to Fodor, content is compositional in the respect that the content of a complex concept is exhaustively determined by content of its constituent concepts and the manner in which they are combined.[15]

Fodor also suggests that the compositionality of content creates a problem in conceptual role semantics. If we admit that concepts are by nature compositional, we must admit that the causal role is also compositional. Now this raises a huge problem. Let me take an example: in the term "black dog", there is a causal link between "black dog" and "animal", and "black dog" with not being "white dog". There is an intimate causal relationship between "dog" and "animal" and also between "black" and "white". One might believe that "black dogs are ferocious". Here we will find a causal link between "dog" and "ferocious". Is it possible to find a causal link between "black" and "ferocious"? Fodor thinks that the content of a concept can be a matter of its causal role, but we cannot say that this causal role may be compositional.

Fodor and Lepore, who quote from "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" to prove that Quine is a meaning holist, mislead us on the argument cited regarding meaning. The Duhem-Quine hypothesis expresses that our bodies of scientific theory confront recalcitrant experiences as wholes. This is a sort of evidential holism. Even Quine was very cautious about the boundary of "verificationism", which hints at the failure of radical empiricism. From the background of natural science, Quine's inculcations of the meaning of a word rest on sensory evidence. Therefore, the concept of evidential checkpoints, according to Quine, would be "inter subjective", i.e. it would be available to the third person perspective. However, it would be evidence for interpreters of Quine to argue that meaning should be public. But I believe that actually, Quine is hinting that evidence must be public. Observational sentences are holophrastic ones where conjunction takes no role. The concept of prediction makes a bridge between an observation and a theory. In Quine's words:

> The observation sentence is the means of verbalizing the prediction that checks a theory. The requirement that it command a verdict outright is what makes it a final checkpoint. The requirement of inter-subjectivity is what makes science objective.[16]

This sort of naturalistic perspective leads Quine towards language as a social art. Quine's empiricist account stresses the perspective of naturalism, explaining and interpreting the world in terms of sentences and words. So language, here, blends with natural science. For Quine, reference and observational sentence together create a bond between language and word through the capacity of a certain linguistic apparatus. We see a sort of holistic standpoint that is clarified by Quine in his *Pursuit of Truth.* He writes:

> We learn short sentences as wholes, we learn their component words from their use in those sentences, and we build further sentences from words thus learned.[17]

Beside Quine's "radical translation" manual is a continuous process of revisiting this translation manual through sentences rather than words in the light of the translator's success or failure of communication in a native language that is quite different from the translator's own language, usually English. Quine is well aware that translation equation may well be possible between two similar languages and culturally similar communities, but he worries about the translation procedures between two different kindred languages. Quine's "indeterminacy of translation" thesis is best discussed in his book *Word and Object.* In the case of two different languages, like a

jungle language and English, the concept of intercommunication becomes hostile because of the two different vocabularies of the communicating persons. Quine says:

> Only by taking the initiative and querying combinations of native sentences and stimulus situations so as to narrow down his guesses to which eventual satisfaction… What he must do is guess from observation and then see how well his guesses work.[18]

Quine's "radical translation" procedure is mandatorily related with his behaviourism, because in a field situation, a translator (English speaking person) who does not follow a native's speech mainly tries to extract the meaning of the native's speech, like "gavagai", from the native's behaviour. Even the amenability of natives' behaviour in different situations may mislead translators regarding the exact meaning of the term "gavagai". Let us imagine that an English speaking translator visits a jungle and hears an unknown native word, "gavagai", uttered by a native when a rabbit is passing by in the field. On hearing this native word "gavagai" and seeing that a rabbit is passing in the field, it may well be possible that the translator would tentatively note down the translation of "gavagai" as "rabbit". But in this case, intercommunication is not possible because of their different languages and vocabularies. The only things that a translator can follow are the expressions for assent and dissent of a native speaker in different situations; for example, if an animal is caught in a net and the native speaker utters the same term, "gavagai", then it will be clear to a translator that "gavagai" means the same as rabbit. It is very important to see that, in this case, Quine accepts "stimulus meaning" (which depends on the individual speaker), i.e. rabbit: this observational sentence is a sort of "stimulus meaning" for the translator, whereas "gavagai" is the "stimulus meaning" for the natives. Quine also believes that "empathy" takes a very prominent role in the procedure of language learning. This sort of "indeterminacy of translation" encourages Quine to accept the indeterminacy of meaning. Interpreters of Quine have misunderstood Quine's concept of "stimulus meaning", as they place it in the category of "meaning", which actually, it is not. Quine takes "stimulus meaning" as a science-worthy notion that has some empirical content.

Quine's denial of the traditional analytic-synthetic distinction is a challenge to the mentalist theory of meaning. Some critics think that Quine's rejection of the mentalist theory paves the way towards an externalism that is also interlinked with meaning holism, because for them, meaning holism depends on the semantic externalism hypothesis. In

the case of determining the meaning of a sentence like "Agni is a missile", we should know the socio-linguistic practices of the community in which the term "Agni" refers to a missile. This is a holistic externalist approach to meaning. Putnam does not believe that Quine is bothered about "meaning" or "verificationism". Actually, Quine's conception of "meaning" in his naturalised epistemology is a second grade notion that does not depend on a "science-worthy" notion. For him, verbal behaviour is more important than indeterminate meaning. It would be very impressive for a holistic position to claim that the meaning of every sentence depends on the meaning of all other sentences. Once Putnam wrote to me:

> I have been writing to you that Quine is not a meaning holist, but a semantic nihilist. He does not believe that there is any such thing as "meaning" in the semantic sense. The term "empirical meaning" is widely used in philosophy of science, but does not refer to anything semantic. In Quine's version, the empirical meaning of a theory is the "observation categorical" it implies, "Empirical meaning" is holistic by definition, trivially, but it is not what anyone calls the meaning of sentences and words. Fodor sometime paints Quine as a meaning holist by pretending that what Quine says about the holism of empirical meaning has to do with the holism of "meaning" in the semantic sense, but that is a mistake. There are no meaning and no semantic nodes – no semantic *anything* - for Quine. Semantic talk is heuristic and not to be taken seriously in metaphysics, according to Quine.[19]

Now I would like to focus on the term "knowing", and we will see how is it challenged by holism from Dennett's point of view, which I highly appreciate. Dennett wonderfully claims that, when a person knows, we indicate that a person knows something or precisely specify a few things that he knows. But this specification depends on an indefinite number of assumptions. In the ordinary sense, "knows" refers to knowing as true. In this case, it may well be possible that one agent can claim to know a proposition P, but this P (proposition) somehow turns out to be false. Here, the answer would be that the agent had a belief in P, but he did not know P properly. Knowing rests on psychological states like belief, disbelief etc. Dennett cautions us that there are some cases where we find incompatibility between the two different notions of knowledge -truth conditions and the knowledge of belief. Dennett claims:

> When called upon to produce one's knowledge one can do no better than to produce what one believes to be true, and whether or not what one believes to be true is true does not affect its being one of those things one will produce as knowledge when asked, or will otherwise act on *as if one knew them*… A thing (a fact or proposition or whatever) could not occupy

a special psychological position (e.g., have a special functional potential in the direction of behavior) in virtue of its truth, so knowing something cannot be purely a matter of being in a particular psychological state.[20]

The "process of knowing", according to Dennett, depends on two different concerns. First, we need to determine what a person knows or exhibits as knowledge; our task is to see which of these can be true. Secondly, we bear in mind that a person can be regarded as a store of information and misinformation. Now the question is: can we specify the content of an agent's store with any precision? Dennett thinks that the storage of information is not only the constitutive part of the knowing of an agent, because libraries, dictionaries etc. have a lot of stored information, but they are unaware of this fact. The most notable of Dennett's claims is that "knowing requires understanding", and the understanding of the word does not rest on the understanding of the sentence. It may even be possible that one can understand a sentence without understanding the speaker's utterances or speech. Dennett does not believe that the ability to produce paraphrases is part of understanding a sentence, because he argues that a computer program can construct paraphrases of English to translate into Russian sentences, but that does not show that the computer understood the sentences. In the case of a computer, though it has some verbal connections (input-output system), it lacks acquaintance with the objects that words refer to. The processes of the conceptual scheme and the perceptual apparatus do not work with computers. Dennett gives importance to the concept of the behavioural capacities of agents in the process of understanding. If an agent X claims that "Y (another person) is here", it shows that the person must be able to assert and know other consequences, like "Y is a friend of X", and the term "here" means in town, not in another place, etc. If X claims at a party that "Y is here", then X must be able to point out person Y at the party. All these corroborating behaviours depend on verbal tests. But Dennett challenges this argument by giving an example: when a child claims "my daddy is an astrologer", we find that the child has the ability to produce paraphrases, but can we claim that the child has all the other knowledge about his statement, like what an astrologer is and how the positions of the stars and movements of the planets have a tremendous influence on the behaviour, lives and fates of an individual? Obviously it is not possible for a child to grasp all these things in his/her childhood. He/she can utter the sentence like a parrot, but understanding of the sentence will grow slowly over the years. So if we say that understanding involves certain degrees, then we should claim that the conditions of understanding of knowledge are also related to degrees. So, the knowledge of a child about a term is a

sort of small knowledge, whereas the knowledge of an adult person about a term is quite mature knowledge. Following Ryle, Dennett shows that the knowledge system relies on the processes of *knowing how* and *knowing that*. The *knowing how* process is a matter of ability or skill. It has no relation to any of the sorts of proposition that are kept in one agent's head. On the other hand, *knowing that* is a process of description that one can grasp without any ability or skill. Though it is true that a child's knowing system is very close to the *knowing how* process, we cannot deny the concept of the *knowing that* process, e.g. "today is Sunday" or "today is a holiday", in our learning systems. In the case of the understanding of a word, Dennett believes in degrees of understanding, levels that vary from speaker to speaker. The knowledge of a scientist of the term "atom" and the knowledge of a layman are not the same. So it is not possible to show the limits of understanding in the processes of the knowledge system.

(4.2) Bilgrami on Belief and Meaning: A New Theory of Externalism

Bilgrami's thesis on the unity of contents suggests that contents are externally determined, but the same contents can also explain the actions and the commonsense psychological behaviour of an agent. Bilgrami does not deny the concept of externalism, as externalism implies the publicness of thought and meaning in our linguistic framework. But he cautions us that it will not be wide content. His external elements are determined by his new thesis, which is called *constraint (C).* In *Belief and Meaning*, Bilgrami introduces the idea of *constraint (C)* in order to avoid the problem of bifurcation. In his own words:

> (C): When fixing an externally determined concept of an agent, one must do so by looking into indexically formulated utterances of the agent which express indexical contents containing that concept and then *picking that external determinant for the concept which is in consonance with other contents that have been fixed for the agent.*[21]

Bilgrami thinks that to understand belief content, it is required to be familiar with our everyday ascriptions of others' beliefs. We can imagine a counterfactual community where the term "arthritis" refers to counterfactual arthritis, not real arthritis. It would not be inconsistent if X (an agent) believed "I have an arthritis in my thigh" in a counterfactual linguistic community. Even Bilgrami thinks that the process of the same beliefs occurring in two agents might be possible. Bilgrami says:

... our intuitions about explanation require that they (their beliefs) be the same. If, for instance, both Bert and counterfactual Bert put a balm on their respective thighs because they want to relieve what they take to be their painful arthritis, our intuitions tell us that no matter what their community and its experts think, they have the same psychological conceptions, and therefore… these amount to being the same explanations.[22]

Permit me to confine my attention to Bilgrami's treatment of the following sentences:

(a) X believes that he has arthritis in his thigh.
(b) X believes that he has a rheumatoid ailment that afflicts only the joints in his thigh.
(c) X believes that he has a rheumatoid ailment that does not afflict the thigh (if and only if X believes that a thigh is not a joint).

We found that to accept sentence a, we need to accept sentence c, which is basically an inconsistent sentence. We also need to break the elementary rule of the "principle of charity". Therefore, we should reject the everyday common practices of belief attribution. Here, one thing we need to clarify is that Bilgrami's theory of meaning actually deals with the theory of the literal meaning of an agent's sentence or terms. We know - Davidson's "radical interpretation" tells us - that if an interpreter wants to test a theory of meaning, then he/she cannot take for granted any knowledge of the content of an agent's beliefs. Here, the interpreter's effort will be to grasp the circumstances under which the agent's ascriptions construct certain true sentences. Davidson also thinks that an interpreter can have the ability to express the literal meaning of an agent's sentence and terms. But Bilgrami refutes this theory to say that "at the meaning-theoretical level... concepts are very fine-grained and they are hardly ever shared by people".[23] So it is difficult work for an interpreter to express the literal meaning of another person's words. Davidson asks Bilgrami:

... how could an interpreter grasp, much less formulate, the truth conditions of an utterance which she lacked the resources to conceive?[24]

Bilgrami answers:

The concept of truth is relevant to truth-theories of content only in the sense of truth as an agent (whose contents are in question) conceives of it.[25]

One can ask: how can we fix or externally determine the concept of an individual? Bilgrami gives us two alternative points through which we can solve this problem. According to the *first formulation,* we need to correlate each gross external item with an individual concept. In this case, the idea of shared similarity takes on an important role. The second formulation also tells us that it is necessary to find correct descriptions for external items. Bilgrami wants to establish a causal relationship between a concept and its content. He claims:

> The causal relations between external states of affairs and whole utterances of sentences are necessarily the evidence we look to for the attribution of *concepts*… content can itself be analyzed in terms of composition, by some routine method, out of concepts.[26]

The central point of Bilgrami's holism is that two agents can share their concepts in a particular locality, but it may be possible that they do not share any concepts at the meaning theoretical level. In the same way, we need to believe that there will also be a difference between belief contents attributed at the level of locality and certain belief contents attributed at the meaning theoretical level. It seems to me that Bilgrami makes an equivocation in the second step or the belief state. Here, his main purpose is to show that it is not the case that two agents who speak the same natural language express beliefs with the same content when they utter a given sentence in that language. Bilgrami believes that, even if Subrata and Sumit both utter the same sentence, "water will quench thirst", it does not prove that they have the same contents. The sentence "water will quench thirst" may have a different literal meaning or express a different belief in each speaker's idiolect. So we need to make a division between speakers' linguistic expressions and the contents of these expressions. Bilgrami writes:

> All one needs to do … is to see what beliefs the two agents will agree on. Imagine them communicating in this local context of drinking water and see what they agree on and what beliefs puzzle and throw them off. If one of them says that the substance that they wish to drink will not poison them and the other agrees, then that belief may be counted as relevant to this local concept "water" which goes into the explanation of their actions. If one of them says that the substance has the chemical composition H_2O and the other is puzzled by that, count that belief as irrelevant in this locality.[27]

Now I will say a few words on Bilgrami's new theory on externalism, which can be regarded as "*individualistic externalism*". Through the concept of unified content, he tries to bring the debate between internalism

and externalism into one framework. Bilgrami does not believe in non-social orthodox externalism within his theory of externalism. He also makes a distinction between the public nature of content and the social nature of content, and he denies the second. His thesis became *individualistic externalism*[28] because it denies social contents as individualist, and it is also regarded as externalism, as it accepts the public nature of content. In the case of studying languages, an individual learns his/her idiolects, which are more connected with the intentionality of our beliefs than closely related to their meaning and contents. The objects of study, which we can call sociolects, are deeply related to the language of the community or a more local language, for examples French and Parisian, Hindi and Bhojpuri etc. Once I asked Bilgrami: "Why do you consider the bifurcation of contents (wide and narrow) an artificial division?" Bilgrami wrote to me:

> For several reasons, the most commonsensical reason being that it is very unintuitive to say that every time I have a thought, I really have two thoughts. The second is that a thought with wide content is very often the kind of thought that one cannot know that one is thinking, and I do not think that we should ever say that there is failure of self-knowledge unless there is some psychological evidence for it, such as self deception or some similar Freudian style reasons -- one should not deny self-knowledge on the basis of theories of reference of linguistic terms (in other words, I may get to know more astronomy if I discover that the morning star is the evening star or that water is H_2O, but I don't get to know *my own mind* better).[29]

(4.3) Heideggerian Model: Dasein-World Nexus

According to Mary Warnock, existentialists like Spinoza, having shown what man's place in the universe is, have shown a new way to look at human emotions and human understanding. In Kierkegaard's writings, we find that he, as an existentialist, wants above all to free readers from the illusion of objectivity. To him, the aim of philosophy is to discover subjectivity, which is concrete and not an abstraction. From Kierkegaard to modern existentialists; all of them have taken the idea of "subjectivity" as the starting point of their philosophies. Kierkegaard says:

> ... The way of objective reflection makes the subject accidental, and thereby transforms existence into something indifferent, something vanishing... The way of objective reflection leads to abstract thought, to mathematics, to historical knowledge of different kinds; and always it

leads away from the subject, whose existence or non-existence, and from the objective point of view quite rightly, becomes infinitely indifferent.[30]

Human understanding is no doubt a part of what it means to be a human being. When one asks the question "What is being?", Heidegger urges one to look at his own being. Heidegger understands the idea of "being" as it discloses itself in the idea of Dasein. Heidegger makes a distinction between ontical existence and the ontological existence of being. Ontical existence is something which enables humans to engage in everyday existence and ontological existence is something which encourages human beings to raise queries about his own Being. According to Heidegger, the fundamental condition of Dasein is "being-in-the-world". In this context, Reinhardt Grossmann comments:

> It is fundamental condition of being a person to have a world around you.
> The traditional idea of course is that the mind is intentional. A mind is
> always related to something. A mind always comes with object.[31]

Heidegger explicates the idea of "world hood of the world" in terms of "being-in-the-world". In the expression "being-in-the-world", "in" has extra significance. It refers to the spatial dimension of the world. We cannot separate "I" from this contemporary world. It seems to me that "the word 'I' is to be understood only in the sense of a non-committal formal indicator. We cannot think of an existence just as an 'it', here the existent also refers to 'I'. This personal pronoun lays claim not only to a unique place, but also to a unique Being".[32] "Mineness" is a term that has sometimes been used to express the awareness that "my" existence is unique and distinct from the existence of everyone else. I am not just a specimen of a class. "I am I." Here, Heidegger's purpose is not to make a juxtaposition between "Dasein" and "being-in-the-world". He goes on to say that Dasein is being-in-the world, i.e. the "essence" of Dasein lies in its existence. He mainly stresses subjectivity. There is a necessary connection that can be found between Dasein and the world, but there is no such necessary connection between Dasein and the entities in the world. Here, by entities of the world, we mean all the surrounding objects in this world. Actually, Heidegger brings out the conception of the world in terms of the categorical and existential frameworks which are distinguished from ontical sense, which is generally related to entities. Heidegger does not believe that the world is the totality of all entities, but he thinks that it is also a system of reference. The world is characterised by the way in which Dasein exists. We cannot think of the idea of being without an idea of the physical body. Similarly, the concept of a world without human beings is valueless, and a human being without the world is

merely an abstraction. Heidegger's unique contribution in this field consists in the use of a method which he calls "hermeneutic phenomenology". Hermeneutic phenomenology is the way in which a being perceives the world from an intellectual point of view. Here, the term "phenomenology" expresses a maxim which takes us back "to the things themselves". Mary Warnock explains this method in *Existentialism* as follows:

> The phenomenological method is said to be "hermeneutical" just because it does reveal significance. The world is thought of as a code or set of symbols, and the purpose of the phenomenological method is to interpret it.[33]

We can make a distinction between perceiving the Taj Mahal and looking at a photo of the Taj Mahal. In the first case, we are directly confronted with the external object (the Taj Mahal), whereas in the photo, we are indirectly and also intentionally seeing the object (the Taj Mahal). Any intentional act by a subject is always correlated with external objects. Dan Zahavi and Gallagher state:

> Husserl's *Logical Investigations* contains the first proper phenomenological investigation of intentionality. Like Brentano, Husserl argues that one does not merely love, fear, see, or judge; one loves a beloved, fears something fearful, sees an object, and judges a state of affairs... all of these diverse forms of consciousness are characterized by intending objects…[34]

But one thing we can add here is that the presentations of these objects have various modes, like perception, imagination, recollection, etc. We can also say that all phenomenological qualities are also representational. There are no non-intentional objects. We can even consider pain a sensory representation which occurs because of bodily damage. But Dan Zahavi and Gallagher believe that we need to take mind and meaning as environmentally embedded, so that they are directly referentially hooked to the world. They write:

> When I see a red ball, the ball is my intentional object, not because it satisfies the general meaning "the red ball," but because it satisfies the demonstrative content "*this* red ball."[35]

We have seen that for Heidegger, the conception of Dasein is not described in terms of "properties" that are possessed by objectivity. Dasein never deals with "what", like house, car, etc., but with "that", a concept that helps to signify the object in itself. Dasein can be well portrayed by its ownness (je meines). And Dasein's ownness is the very possibility of it, which cannot be avoidable. The concept of mineness or ownness has

certain public stances that are inseparably related to the understanding of human nature. There is an *a priori* determination of existence regarding the existential. For Heidegger, if we want to know the existential spatiality of Dasein then we should understand "being-in-the-world", the essential structure of Dasein, in detail. Here, an ontological understanding means a type of care that expresses a pre-phenomenological acquaintance with "being-in-the-world", which remains an inadequate ontological explanation.

If we look at the concept of the world, then we should preliminarily analyse the term "being-in". The world is not ontologically the mere essence of the name, of human types, but a characteristic of Dasein that becomes a constitutive element in the case of "being-in-the world". Being-in-the-world mainly consists of everyday, corporeal things, but the form it has taken is nonetheless a careful method. This is not a purely theoretical base, but a practical concern that proceeds to discuss knowledge. Therefore, the phenomenological explanation of the description of properties cannot determine what Dasein actually is. The referential context indicates that Dasein is not only embedded in the world, but in the user (being). This approach by Heidegger aims to refute the traditional opinion that talks about a separation between the knower and knowing objects. Even Descartes tried to demonstrate a distinction between the mind and the world. Heidegger claims that one should reject the thought that we can see the world objectively, as the world is not a mere object. Dasein is inextricably associated with the objective world. So the construction of a demarcation line between Dasein and the world would be flawed. Heidegger tries to analyse the meaning of being in terms of its existence. Dasein, for Heidegger, means *Da* (there) and *sein* (being), or in a word, "being there". Heidegger thinks that the ontological stature of being make a separation between human beings or Dasein and the rest of the world's objects. There are two concerns that need to be clarified here. The first concern is that Heidegger rejects the *ontical sense* of Dasein to establish that Dasein cannot be factual and a set of all physical entities. It may well be possible that Dasein does not exist, in *the ontical sense,* in the world. Actually, for him, "world" is not a term that refers to the totality of things; it refers to the sense in which the things or objects of the world are related to human beings or Dasein. Here, Heidegger looks into the *ontological existential sense*, which focuses on the equipment or practices that lead towards a public "we-world". Dasein is inseparable with "being-in-the-world", as I earlier mentioned. Here, "in" does not designate the "aspatial" relation between Dasein and world, but actually means to sojourn or "to stay". We cannot claim in a similar way that man stays in the world as books stay in bookshelves. Dreyfus says:

In laying out world, Heidegger seems to shift without explanation from speaking of the workshop, to the referential whole (*Verweisungsganzheit*), to the equipment whole (*Zeugganzes*), to the involvement whole (*Bewandtnisganzheit*), to the phenomenon of world, to worldliness. The *equipment whole*, I take it, describes the interrelated equipment; the *referential whole* its interrelations; and the *involvement whole* adds human purposiveness. The workshop is a specific example of all these wholes; the *phenomenon of world* is the special way the world manifests itself; and *worldliness* is the way of being of the world and of all its subworlds.[36]

(4.4) A Reformed Externalism

In the traditional period, science had some sub-divisions, creating formal sciences like logic and mathematics. Natural science, including psychology and social science, can be regarded as empirical science, and the differentiation, in spite of expediency, relies on various subject matters, sources of knowledge and techniques. Carnap tries to show that there is a "unity in science" beneath the approach of unity in empirical statements, which is possible because of a single language where all "states of affairs" can be understood using the same methods. The analysis of language proves that philosophy cannot be a distinct knowledge system, separated from science. Scientific research, whih involves experiment, observation, empirical materials and classification, also pursues importance in the form of scientific statements that have contents. The analysis of contents takes a prominent place in logic and philosophy of language. Natural science is based on observation and empirical status stands for nature as a spatio-temporal event. Even in the cases of history and social science, observation, as a subordinate method, takes an important position, but the preceding roles are taken by *empathy* and *understanding*, a more *normative* discipline that governs in philosophy, social science, history etc. Psychology, a divergent field (though it takes experience as its prime method), also has an intense demarcation with natural science, as psychology deals with the "psychical", whereas natural science involves physical methods. Psychology not only attains knowledge through experience, but "understanding empathy" has also taken a relevant role. Here, my main purpose is to show, following Carnap's thought, that the "unity of science" is possible because of the terms and "states of affairs" that are applied very ordinarily in scientific inquiry. If we look upon the "objects" that mean words, and the "state of affairs" that is exposed to statements in a philosophical sense (through analysing language), then we will see that the diversified methods of science can be merged into one.

Another important query is: How can we get the meaning of a term in our language? Scientific enquiry would suggest that either by "translation" or by "definition", one can get the meaning of a term, which could be true for a nominal description like "tiger", which is equal to such-and-such a distinguished character. Or, by some ostensive definition, we find various languages in our scientific language, like the language of arithmetic, the language of economics, the language of physical science and the language of psychology, which are distinct from one another. Arithmetical theorem uses a language where numbers, properties, relations between numbers and numerical symbols take a foremost role. Economists use the language of supply, demand, price etc. So we do not find a universal language; for example, some scientists believe that we cannot translate or describe an electro-magnetic field in the language of economics.

The verification and direct experience that govern in natural science also face *protocol statements*. Here, verification that depends on *protocol statements* requires clarifying the meaning of the terms that are used by experience; they need to be more lucid in the course of further discussion. The *protocol* is that verification cannot state a single statement without entering into further discussion in the realm of entire systems. This is a holistic process of language that subsequently organises the root of scientific thought. Here, the language of direct experience has a previous backlog, where justification and clarification of the use of terms and words or of the extent of statements involve further discussions from a holistic approach to language.

A controversial question that I would like to re-examine in my paper is that if we consider physical language (the language of empirical science) inter-subjective, can it also serve as a universal language (where the state of affairs as a statement would be expressed in terms of the language use) or not? How could physical language be "inter-subjective"? There is a sense in which "qualitative determination" can be distorted or translated into "quantitative determination"; e.g. "Kashmir is quite cool now" can be translated into a quantitative statement like "The temperature of Kashmir is between five and seven degrees centigrade". Here, in the first case, physics places importance on quantitative concepts and the numerical could not only correspond with the determinate auditory field, but as an inter-subjective matter that physical statements contain to resolve other inter-sensory fields. For me, the process would be complicated if one wished to determine a colour, like "blue" of a specific kind. In this case, every physical state of the colour "blue" consists of an explicit combination of the frequencies of "electro-magnetic oscillation" that also

absorb a wave in the frequency of high intensity of the blue part of the spectrum. Here, the spectrum can be regarded as superfluous.

Now, the argument is that we can expand the visual sense into the other senses. A completely blind person can identify the frequency of an electro-magnetic oscillation through a microphone which can pick up the exploration of the spectrum by constructing a set of emissions of adequate intensity of motion. By applying this thesis, we can claim that a personal determination based on inter-sensory information makes physical determination more inter-subjective; that is to say, a person can physicalise essential determinations (qualitatively) by physicalising himself and other persons.

There is a trend which demonstrates how all other languages draw on biology, psychology and social science, which can be put into the realm of physical language. Carnap claims that "apart from the *physical language* (and its sub-languages) *no inter-subjective language is known*". Science that deals with inter-subjective statements denies the claim of subjective interpretation, aiming to make physical language the language of science. To be a language of science, physical language does not have the only necessary criterion of inter-subjectivity; another relevant criterion that tries to fulfil its dream is the concept of a "universal language". If we take biology, then we can see how we reduce biological laws to physical laws and biological concepts to physical concepts. Biology deals with species, organs etc., whereas physical science tries to see all these from a perceptible qualitative determination like fertilisation, eggs, the processes of spermatozoon etc., which leads to the definition of the redistribution of parts within the meaning of cell division, metabolism etc., which have empirical and perceptible criteria to show that biological statements can be transformed into physical language. Even physical science claims that every psychological concept refers to definite physical properties that point towards a sort of behaviourism. By this process, natural science, through its two fundamental criteria, (inter-subjectivity and the universalisability of language) tries to prove that observation and the evidential base of experience in physical science rule the scientific universe by creating a unity of science. I aim to challenge this by arguing that extensionality and the acquisition of natural language as a regimented notion of linguistic practices privilege an account of common sense and context sensitivity based on a philosophical perspective, accepting that observational and theoretical terms get their meanings through a functionally based approach, as argued by Putnam. Another important issue is that the process of understanding terms vindicates language

preceding thought to find justified and unjustified thoughts. Of late, philosophy of science has adopted this approach, and it ought to be followed by physical sciences in the near future. Like my mentor Putnam, I strongly believe that one should not think of "language as something that a community has created, like an automobile, something that the individual user has no part in creating. A language is like an art from which each user modifies and adds to. There is a constant interaction between the subjective and the inter-subjective".

It seems to me that if we want to reform externalism, then we need to formulate a reconciliation between internalism and externalism. I propose to do this from two different perspectives. First I will try to show this reconciliation from the background of semantic holism, and then I will try to develop a bridge between internalism and externalism from the realm of the Heideggerian point of view. In the case of semantic holism, I will accept both externalism and a socio-linguistic background together. But one thing I want to clarify here is that I do not agree with Quine about the second dogma, through which he was trying to refute the traditional distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. I agree with Putnam that, as holism is undeniable, similarly, we cannot reject the traditional analytic-synthetic distinction at all. I hope we can reconcile internalism and externalism together if we accept that meanings are holistic, and also there is a certain distinction between analytic propositions and synthetic propositions in our natural language. Here my main purpose will be to show that "the analytic-synthetic distinction is necessary and harmless in semantic holism", because if I am able to prove that this traditional distinction is necessary and harmless, then it will be easy to reconcile the ideas of internalism and externalism within one holistic framework. Externalists like Quine do not accept the conception of analyticity because of the correlated conception of a priority, which indicates that the meaning of an object is independent of the external world and that meaning is something which is located in our heads.

Let me illustrate the idea of analyticity and share how it is connected with my reformed externalism. We can take the notion of meaning for the sake of the foundation of philosophical systems. More precisely, we can talk about the "atomistic notion" of cognitive meaning. For me, it is "atomistic" in the sense that here, the meanings of a sentence can be derived one by one. Besides this, it is also cognitive, as here, the meaning of an atomistic sentence is relevant to knowledge that is actually connected to reality. Depending on this supposition, one can define analytic sentences as unrelated to reality, therefore they cannot fail to be

true. This notion of definition makes it well fitted with the *a priori* claim, as it calls for detachment from reality, and the notion of the epistemological significance of truth value (unsupported by evidential justification or confirmation/disconfirmation) brings the notion of the analytic sentence closer to a priority. Quine, who is a believer in observational sentences and the process of verificationism, to an extent, strongly believes in holism. He deeply believes that empirical sentences, with the collaboration of a large number of other sentences, get their meaning through experiences. This is an inclusive theory that gives importance to implication, but rejects the individual sentence and the process of the one-by-one method (the atomistic approach to meaning). Quine shows that if we believe in the claim about reality and experiential processes, then it would be very shaky to accept the method of atomism, which is generally applied to the thesis that each individual part of a sentence can offer an understanding of the meaning of the whole sentence. Peter Hylton wonderfully claims:

> Bodies of sentences taken together make claims that cannot be parceled out among the individual sentences, hence the idea of a "claim upon reality" does not fit with our taking individual sentences, rather than wider theories, as the relevant units.[37]

Actually, holism tries to attack the notion of atomistic meaning. Quine's attack on the notion of cognitive meaning makes analyticity untenable. Now, one can question whether we can find any kind of tenable notion that rescues the claim of "truth in virtue of meaning". If so, then how may it be possible? Quine agrees to accept that it may be possible only in the case of mathematics, where an understanding of analyticity is encompassed, but it has no epistemic significance. Quine rejects the hypothesis that meaning can be grasped through introspectable mental items. He aims to eliminate analyticity and admits theoretical language in the sense that here knowledge is embodied in the use of language. For him, asertoric uses of sentences ramify the concept of holism in the case of thinking about meaning. In his very early writings, e.g. "Truth by Convention" (1936), Quine says that one can determine the meaning of a word in the context of determining the truth and falsity of the sentence. He clarifies the thought in this way:

> Any acceptable evidence of usage or meaning of words must reside surely either in the observable circumstances under which the words are uttered… or in the affirmation and denial of sentences in which the words occur.[38]

This quotation talks of meaning that is coextensive with evidence. If we take the traditional definition of an analytic sentence, one that speaks about the truths of analytic sentences under every circumstance, then the thesis does not fit with Quine's claim. Carnap discusses the understanding of analyticity to add that some circumstances are able to discard any sentences. But in the case of analytic sentences, he claims that this type of abandonment does a favour for language. The main reason is that Carnap tries to see analyticity as language-oriented; however, this is a different issue. Quine's approach to meaning, which he later rejected, is basically based on holism. Hylton claims:

> Many sentences are more deeply theoretically embedded than this one, so that the observable circumstances that affect our acceptance or rejection of them may be extremely remote from anything that would ordinarily be thought of as their meaning. Holism implies that, even giving our impossible assumption, meaning is not a straightforward matter. Nevertheless, the imagined situation represents all that there could be to cognitive meaning on a Quinean view.[39]

Here, one can again ask about cognitive meaning and its derivation in sentences. Quine answers that one needs to see the context of the sentences where the cognitive meaning takes place. We also need to see the ways in which the truth value could vary in terms of the observable circumstances. But critics could well argue that to get a reasonable variation, one has to discriminate between contexts, as there are some cases where truth can be regarded as the constitutive meaning of a given word. Besides, there are some sentences where we see that truth is, in virtue, related to the meaning of that word. It would be very difficult for Quine to deny that the sentence "All bachelors are unmarried" is analytic. Let us imagine a child who is well aware of linguistic erudition, but unacquainted with the meaning of the word "bachelor", and can understand the meaning of the term "bachelor" only if others from his community suggest to him that it means "unmarried man". In this case, the sentence becomes analytic if everyone accepts that it is true just by learning the word is true. In a videotape entitled "*In Conversation: W.V Quine*" (1994), we notice that Quine becomes quite sympathetic with such a claim of analyticity. We can accept a sentence as analytic only if "failure to accept it indicates that the speaker is not a competent user of one or more of the words in that sentence". One of the most insightful defences of the analytic-synthetic distinction can be found in the writing of Hilary Putnam, in "The Analytic and the Synthetic", where he claims that the distinction cannot be regarded as an epistemological work. As we have already noted, for him, only one-criterion words like "bachelor", "vixen"

etc. are regarded as instances of analyticity. In contrast, we find "law-cluster" concepts in theoretical physics that need multifarious criteria (laws and inferences) for their application. All these criteria, including "law-cluster" and "one-criterion" concepts based on "definitions", are linked with language that Quine cannot suspect. Carnap, who also tries to make a demarcation between analytic and synthetic statements, firmly believes that analytic sentences are not immune to revision. For him, in short, analytic sentences can be reversed, and this revision may be possible because of changes of language in the sentence. Besides this, in the case of synthetic sentences, revision is possible just because of a change in the beliefs that are associated with the proposed sentence. The concept of *immune revision* has an epistemological background that also illustrates that synthetic statements are not related to the changeability of language, as these are involved with internal revisions, while external revisions are associated with changes of language and play a relevant part in analytic statements. Carnap firmly believes that evidence, justification and concepts are all language-centric. But this approach goes wrong as it cares about determining the justification for internal and external revision, where language takes an important role. Here, the main problem arises when there is no language in the presupposition; it will then be very difficult to attain a justification of the language. But for Quine, the decisive part of the demarcation between internal revision and external revision does not depend on any sort of clear cut contrast. No rule can be set out to create a boundary between evidence and theory. For Quine, synthetic sentences can generally be fixed, as the evidence for the sentence can be confirmed easily. Our degree of confirmation or confidence in making a decision has some background enabled conditions; this background theory leads the system as a whole to our beliefs. Hylton is right when he says:

> Holism, in Quine's view, gives us principled reasons to think that no such theory of confirmation is available. According to that doctrine, the relation of justification does not, in general, hold between experience and individual sentences, but rather between experience and theories, more or less sizeable groups of sentences.[40]

Quine accepts holism to refute the atomistic notion of cognitive meaning based on analyticity by arguing that in regard to sentences that depend on the notion of justification, their cognitive meaning and correlations with evidential checkpoints must be applied to other sentences or theories that are related with them. So in a liberal sense, a sentence,

according to Quine, has cognitive meaning if and only if it implies experience and takes theory as a whole, and not piece-by-piece.

Let me elaborate on Putnam's thoughts, which wonderfully make a bridge between analytic and synthetic sentences. Putnam claims:

> I am convinced that there is an analytic-synthetic distinction that we can correctly (if not very importantly) draw, and I am inclined to sympathize with those who cite the examples and who stress the implausibility, the tremendous implausibility, of Quine's thesis — the thesis that the distinction which certainly seems to exist does not in fact exist at all.[41]

Putnam thinks that there is another kind of distinction present, which is the main discussion topic in his article "The Analytic and The Synthetic". Here he cautions us about the thought that we have no purpose in making a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements by merely using the words in terms of disposition, i.e. the tendency to use these related terms in trivial expressions like "having the same meaning". What he thinks is that there is a "limited" notion of analyticity, which applies to such trivial cases as "all bachelors are unmarried" and which is philosophically unimportant, and an important but "revisable" notion of "necessity" or "conceptual truth". For Putnam, there are some words which are "one-criterion words", like bachelor, vixen etc. As well as there, there are words which are not "one-criterion words"; they fall under semantic categories. In fact, all nouns fall under semantic categories; for instance, cats, home etc. Putnam says:

> It is important to distinguish "analytic" truths of the sort "all cats are animals" from analytic truths of the sort "all bachelors are unmarried", in part because the former tend to be *less* necessary than the latter. It might not be the case that all cats are animals; they might be automata![42]

Putnam clarifies his idea by using a scientific concept or the notion of a *law-cluster* concept. As he writes:

> Law-cluster concept are constituted not by a bundle of properties as are the typical general names like "man" and "crow", but by a cluster of laws which, as it were, determine the identity of the concept.[43]

Wittgenstein believes that "game" is such a *law-cluster* concept. There are some philosophers who claim that the concept of "species" is a *law-cluster* concept. But Putnam takes "energy" as a cluster concept. He also thinks that in highly developed science, we may find that most terms are

actually *law-cluster* concepts, though there are some suspicions about their analyticity.

Kinetic energy is the energy of motion. An object which has motion, whether it is vertical or horizontal, has kinetic energy. The mathematical equation of kinetic energy is $K.E=\frac{1}{2}mv^2$, where "m" is the mass of the object and "*v*" is the velocity. Here it seems to me that if anyone wanted to change the definition of energy, then it would be necessary for him/her to change the meaning of "kinetic energy" or clarify the cluster concept with "redefinition". Similarly, in the case of "All bachelors are unmarried", we cannot get rid of the term "unmarried" unless we can make a radical change of the meaning of the term "bachelor". It is also important to alter the extension of the term "bachelor". Here, one may feel enticed to agree with Quine. In the case of "All bachelors are unmarried", we define "bachelors" as "unmarried men", but there are lots of plausible scientific explanations of the concept of "energy". One might argue that "truth by definition" has no notable value in analytic judgment. Actually, Quine is not interested in psychological synonymy or poetic synonymy. He is concerned with cognitive synonymy, and this synonymy can be defined in terms of the interchangeability thesis of *salva veritate*. But Putnam opposes Quine by claiming that "truth by stipulation" does not play a key role in the concept of analyticity in our natural language. But he admits that "truth by stipulation" is the nature of analytic judgment in the model, i.e. the formal language model. Now Putnam wants to clarify the question "Why should we have analytic statements (or the strict synonymies pointed out by Quine) in our language?"

In a hypothetical formalised language, the statement "All bachelors are unmarried" is considered an analytic statement which is immune from revision. Two important points emerge from this picture. *Firstly*, in a formalised language, an inventor can express his commands as per his own choices. *Secondly*, Putnam believes that "bachelor" is not a *law-cluster* term. "Bachelors are unmarried men" acquires truth by mere stipulation, which can also be substituted by a complex expression like "male adult human being who has never in his life married". Putnam tells us that we can think about an enduring institution, like "marriage", but it is not necessary that our institution must be enduring, because both the bride and the groom are aware of the concept of "divorce", which is legally supported by our society. Similarly, in our formalised language we say "Let every statement be subject to revision", but it is not a permanent issue; we can find exceptions. Let us imagine that all bachelors are suffering from "sexual frustration". Now "sexual frustration" becomes a

criterion for distinguishing bachelors from non-bachelors. One day we may find that by some "neurosis", those who are already married are also victims of such a "sexual frustration". Then our previous stipulation that "bachelors" is synonymous with "unmarried men" becomes inconvenient. So we should admit that there is a radical difference between formalised language and natural language when we want to talk about linguistic rules. We can clarify the main issues from the perspective of natural language. In traditional philosophy, there is an incorrect tendency to make a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements in the context of "intuitive" and also "demonstrative" truths. So we tend to lump together analytic statements, traditionally considered "intuitive truths", with all their consequences. From this thinking one might obtain a rough definition: an analytic statement is a statement which satisfies the criteria presented or a consequence of such a statement. But it is quite true that the last clause of these criteria indicates "borderline" cases of analyticity. For example, "girls are women" etc. Even though it is quite true, we can find statements in natural language which are truly analytic and others that may be construed as analytic. The same thinking is also applicable to synthetic statements. But then what are their criteria? Putnam [44] mentions four criteria. Let me explain them below:

a) The statement has the form: "something (someone) is an A if and only if it (he, she) is a B", where A is a single word.
b) The statement holds without exception, and provides us with a *criterion* for something being the sort of thing which the term A applies to.
c) The criterion is the only one that is generally accepted and employed in connection with the term.
d) The term A is not a "law-cluster" word.

Let me discuss the first criterion:

"Something is *A* if and only it is a *B*", e.g. "Someone is a bachelor if and only if he is an unmarried man". But one might argue that this is a *vicious circle*. To put it another way: "Someone is a bachelor if and only if he is a unwed man." If we try to define synonymy in terms of analyticity by saying that synonymous expressions are analytically true, one objection may arise. Let us take an example: "Someone is a bachelor if and only if he is either an unmarried man or a unicorn." We know that from the perspective of Noam Chomsky's "*transformational grammar*", the quoted sentence is considered ungrammatical. Putnam thinks that we can summarise this issue as the conjunction of the following claims:

a) This statement is linguistically odd and not clearly true.
b) There is no question about its general acceptance.
c) People do not ascertain the term "bachelor" by the corresponding connection with the terms "unmarried", "unicorn" etc.

These problems arise because certain misunderstandings lie beneath our theory. Firstly, the English terms "or" and "if and only if" are not synonymous with logical function "V" or "≡". Secondly, people might query its intelligibility, or decline to accept it. Thirdly, people might reject it because "quoted criterion" is not a generally accepted criterion for someone being a "bachelor". Notice that here, the concept of "criterion" has great importance. We should examine it based on its uses. Putnam confirms that we can define "criterion" in two different aspects.

Firstly, the "criteria" I am speaking of are necessary and sufficient conditions for something being an "A".
Secondly, by means of these criteria people can and do determine that something is an "A". We may find many indicators of "bachelorhood", like being young, living alone, being high spirited etc. But the criteria will be determined by a combination of the first and second criteria which we have mentioned above. Then it will follow that the sentence "bachelors are unmarried men" will be an analytic truth. But our main concern remains unsound.

Putnam himself has raised the issue of the relevance of the four criteria of analyticity. Putnam argues that it would be pretty insignificant to admit that "Someone is a bachelor if and only if he is an unmarried or unwed" is an exceptionless law. It is quite true that there are no exceptionless laws; rather there is the "*law-cluster*" concept which is discussed in science. But one may ask: Is there any such concept in philosophy? Putnam replies that such a concept in philosophy is called a "one-criterion" word, like vixen, bachelor etc. But we should also admit that some sentences with law-cluster concepts or one-criterion words which were once used as analytic truths would today become false propositions. For instance, "Atoms are indivisible" or "Whales are fishes". So we can see that if we admit these are law-cluster concepts or one-criterion words, then the linguistic characteristic of the word also changes. Putnam also believes that an analytic statement may be true from the perspective of the "rules of language" or "true by stipulation", even "true by implicit convention", but all these expressions are true only metaphorically. Here Putnam says:

What is the reality behind the metaphor? The reality is that they are true because they are accepted as true...[45]

In Hilary Putnam's *My Intellectual Autobiography,* [46] he tells us that one evening during a party at Reichenbach's house at Harvard, a graduate student asked C.G. Hempel: "I grant that one cannot show a clear analytic, synthetic distinction in a natural language, but why cannot one do it in a formalised language?" Putnam recollects: "I have never forgotten Hempel's answer: 'Every formalised language is ultimately interpreted in some natural language. The disease is hereditary!'"

I do not think it would be plausible to deny the concept of "analyticity" in our natural language. We cannot even think of it as trivial. As we know that the concept of analyticity is traditionally associated with the conception of a priority, an externalist could not substitute it with anything independent of our expression. Analyticity is here to stay. So there will be no problem with me accepting analyticity or a priority with externalism. Quassim Cassam also says:

> The project of identifying a priori enabling conditions for the acquisition of various different kinds of knowledge by various different means would be doomed if the pessimist is right since a priori enabling conditions are just ones which can be known a priori. That is why, for better or worse, I am committed to optimism.[47]

Cassam asks us to imagine a flag, the left half of which is red and the right half of which is green. Now can we imagine a circumstance in which something can be red all over and green all over at the same time? The answer will be that we cannot imagine such a thing. But this knowledge is not dependent on experience; it arises from our understanding, which is allied with our intuitive insight. Reasoning is another case with which we can associate the idea of *a priori* knowledge. Let us imagine that Mr. Pranab Mukerjee is the present President of India and the president lives in Delhi. Now by reasoning, I come to know that Mr. Pranab Mukerjee lives in Delhi. So we find that, in the case of this knowledge, it is not true that meaning is always external or that it is only in the mind. I believe that we need to see holism as a thesis where meaning is referentially attached to reality but intrinsically dependent on the agent's mind. I agree with externalists, especially with Putnam, on the thesis that molecular duplicates do not necessarily have the same thoughts; that is the whole point of externalism. But molecular duplicates in environments which are physically identical in the relevant respects - e.g. "water" is H_2O in both environments, "gold" is Au, etc. - do have the same thoughts. However, I

do not think that if there is a certain change in the environment, then our thoughts will necessarily change. I think not only molecule-for-molecule duplicates, but also two different agents, can share the same thoughts though their environments may be different. Let us imagine that a fighter pilot and a submarine pilot are talking about their war strategies during the war. They do not know each other personally. It is also important here that, through radar they are aware of the fact that both their respective aircraft and submarine are fighting for the same country. Now it so happen that the commanders have a disagreement about certain war strategies. An externalist could admit the point and say "yes, that's true because their external positions are not the same; one is in the sky and the other is under the water". But it seems to me that, though it is accepted that there is a vast difference to be found in their locations, it is still true that, in some respects, their internal states remain the same; e.g. both of them are soldiers and they are both fighting for their own country. So we can easily claim that meaning is related to the mind and the mind is not separated from the world. I consider language a social phenomenon of inter-subjective communication, as I noted earlier. The way to explain meaning is from conceptual schemes, which are always related to external references. One might ask: What, then, are the references of non-existent terms like "ghosts", "number", etc.? I consider a reference to have two parts: *direct reference* to objects and *indirect reference* to objects. In the case of concrete, observable entities, obviously the reference to our conceptual scheme is direct. But an indirect reference will be applied in cases of non-existent terms like "number", "ghost" or "unicorn". For instance, we can take the example of "unicorn". Here, if we summarise the conception of "unicorn" then we will find that we can divide it by its description, e.g. "a winged horse that can fly". If we divide this term by description, then we will obviously find some external objects which are related with the term referentially, like horses, wings, the concept of flying etc.; all these are available in the external world. In this case, we can observe the reference indirectly through description. I admit that this is not a causal reference like "water" being referred to H_2O or "table" to a concrete "table"; we can say it is a reference which we attain through mere description. So it also seems to me that the main debate between internalism and externalism, which follows from the debate between the theory of description and the causal theory of reference, is not coherent. In our theory of knowledge, "description theory" is as important as "causal theory". So it is implausible to radically say that meaning is always related to the external world or that meaning is in the mind. We see that meaning is interconnected with our external world and also with our minds.

Here, it is relevant to say that my *internalistic externalism* paves the way for the "semantic" to enter into "ontology".

It seems to me that the debate between internalism and externalism is not only a semantic issue; we can see this problem from the perspective of "ontology". Let me now turn to Heidegger's thesis on Dasein. Heidegger emphasises the public world in his concept of Dasein. He believes that all kinds of special world (the physical world, the phenomenal world) have some public sphere: there is no privacy of experience about the personal world. Heidegger says:

> Self and world belong together in one entity, Dasein. Self and world are not two entities, like subject and object, or like I and thou; rather, self and world are the basic determination of Dasein itself, in the unity of the structure of being-in-the-world.[48]

Dasein constantly enters into all kinds of association with others. Therefore Heidegger emphasises the question of *being with.* Dasein cannot be an isolated being, because we cannot imagine Dasein as a worldless subject. Dasein exists essentially for the sake of other men. Dreyfus clarifies Heidegger's concept of Dasein to say:

> Remember, however, that strictly speaking we should not speak of *Dasein's* being socialized. Human organisms do not have Dasein in them until they *are* socialized.[49]

Let us now see the problem from the perspective of consciousness and intentionality. Sartre thinks that if you were conscious of nothing, then you would be an unconscious thing. Actually, consciousness is always related to consciousness *of* something. Dan Zahavi and Gallagher also aptly claim that the phenomenological account of intentionality is given in terms of its representation. They write:

> A *re*-presentation is something that *re*-presents; it is something that provides us with a derivative and mediated contact with the object represented.[50]

Now we can derive certain consequences. The way I have put my point may mislead the reader about the role of semantic externalism. I will explain this by considering two relevant points. My thesis is more externalist than internalist; this is why I propose to call my reformed theory *internalistic externalism* rather than *externalistic internalism*. My purpose here is to explain the theory from the realm of externalism or to give more prominence to externalism. I will be happy to declaire myself

an externalist, rather than an internalist, in the field of philosophy of language and mind. I firmly believe that it is trivial to make a division between externalism and internalism. Meaning, mind and world are not different entities. If I am not wrong, they are interconnected with each other like "self and world", as Heidegger mentioned in his philosophy. I think meaning is related to the mind and the mind is always in the world. When we talk about the mind, we are not talking about something distinct from the phenomenal world. The mind is surrounded by the objective world. As we cannot separate being from the contemporary world, similarly, we cannot separate our mental content from this world. I agree with externalists that the reference of content to our objective world has a great importance. I also agree with internalists, that the same content has a great value in our minds. I do not believe in the inner-outer distinction, because in this case, we need to make a distinction between the mind and the world. Therefore, it would be unfeasible to make a bridge between internalism and externalism. My *internalistic externalism* says that the meaning of our belief content plays two different roles at the same time. One is its "*meaning theoretical*" role, and the other is its role in the context determined by society or environment, which I call "*socio-environmental meaning*". The "*meaning theoretical*" role has much more to do with our mind, as internalists point out, whereas "*socio-environmental meaning*" depends on the linguistic community, as mentioned by Putnam and Burge. In the meaning theoretical stage, an individual can think about any term or concept based on his/her own choice. He/she can break the norms of the linguistic society to which he/she belongs. He/she can think his/her pet dog is his/her son, or his/her parrot is his/her daughter. It is possible in our own minds, where our minds are king. However, we cannot see the case so easily from the background of "*socio-environmental meaning*", because here the norms of society tell us that biologically, a dog cannot be the son, and a parrot cannot be the daughter, of a human being. Here we need to follow the rules of the society in order to continue our communication, which is the ultimate goal of language. Otherwise, there will be a communication gap.

One might argue that in our society, we sometimes find that radical changes take place in the meaning of a term, e.g. "whale". Once, we believed that "a whale is a fish", but later, scientists proved that "whales are mammals". In this case, a radical change has taken place in our meaning system. The change is not from the intrinsic part of mental content; it is much more related to the behaviour which we find in the life of a whale or its externalist reference (biological features). I agree, at this point, with externalists on the conception of linguistic experts or the

referential theory of causality. But I would disagree with them if they claimed that there is no conception of an "individualistic mind" or that meanings are not in "the individual's head". Of course, there are individual minds, but these do not work privately; they participate in our natural language, because natural language is the ground on which minds meet. There is no mind in our linguistic community which can be separated from the environment. Therefore, I believe that meaning is not something which is only external; meaning becomes meaning due to the presence of a mind. So the mind and meaning are embedded in the world in a symmetrical way. Even beliefs, desires, pain and other mental items are dependent on the mind, in the same way they are dependent on the world. So in short, my *internalistic externalism* brings about harmony between the world and the mind through the concept of meaning. Meaning is the place where two different aspects meet. My *internalistic externalism* can be regarded as the product of a relationship (which may be causal or descriptive) which prompts us to extract the external objects whenever we talk about the meaning of a concept. I do not think, like Bilgrami, that there is a unity of contents. For me, contents are in general unified in our thought, but a division is made by natural language, like wide, narrow, external and internal, in favour of our communication. My concept of *internalistic externalism* can be best understood in the realm of thought; it is not in the natural language, because in natural language, there are so many vague concepts, like "this" and "that", used as indexical terms, and also certain inferential concepts which raise problems regarding the conception of unified contents. Even the subject-object dichotomy can play an important role. For instance "this stomach pain will kill me" or "that building is gorgeous". In this case, the content of my belief is not so easy to point out from the perspective of internalism or externalism. But for *internalistic externalism,* it is not difficult to understand the problem, as I believe that, from the internalists' point of view, we can fix the meaning of concepts, and from the externalist point of view, we can fix their references. We cannot separate them. When we think or are conscious about X, then X will automatically be something in the world or related to the world.

Concluding remarks

In a reply to Putnam, elsewhere, Dummett says:

I learned my language from other people; without it I could form only inchoate thoughts about the immediately present. I might be quite cunning in dealing with the immediately present, but I should barely be rational. I

am what I am only because I belong to the human race, and am surrounded by its members, with whom I interact in various ways.[51]

Following Dummett, we can consider that just as "myself" cannot be divorced from the rest of the human race, similarly, our minds cannot be detached from the world. The mind, the world and other people constitute a common circle where the mind is related to the world, so we cannot take apart the mental content and the physical world.

Quine emphasises the learning process of language, which is directly associated with external stimuli. In this case, a sort of semantic change in a part of the system can consequently affect a large part of the network, as the meaning of a sentence, for Quine, depends on the corporate body of sentences. It is quite true that we need to take meaning and mind as embedded, so that they hook to the causal referential directness of reality through the conceptual insight of the agent. I think that in the indigenous field of language learning, at the primary level, it is not possible for a learner to know the whole meaning of a sentence through a tribunal of sense experience. A learner can grasp the sentence which seems to him/her the most pertinent to expressing his/her thoughts in communication. I think it is a reliable process for a learner or a speaker to have partial knowledge of the meaning of an expression, and the process of learning this knowledge, or to an extent, the specific expression of the words can be gradually increased along with the maturity of the speaker or learner and his/her linguistic practices. I have also shown that there are some cases that trivially show a keen distinction between analytic and synthetic statements by introducing the notion of one-criterion words, cluster concepts and *a priori* knowledge. My *internalistic externalism* focuses on the interrelationship of being and the world from the perspective of phenomenology. The intricate relationship between being and world, as proposed by Heidegger, seems to me very relevant for reconciling mind and world. There is another side, where I look again at the theory of meaning by proposing *socio-environmental meaning* and *theoretical meaning* to show that in natural language, meaning and mind are interconnected to each other, in regards to the world, which expedites our linguistic communication. In conclusion, I attempt to reconcile the mind and the world through the concept of meaning and mental entities that are also dependent on the world.

SOME WORDS

Though I have given short concluding remarks for each chapter, here I would like to summarise my main conclusion or what I have achieved in my book. My main intention has been to reconcile internalism and externalism, the debate between which is considered one of the most vital problems in the philosophy of mind and language. I have tried to show that we can regard the "theory of description" and the "causal theory of reference" as a primary step in the debate between internalism and externalism, through which we can enter into the realm of meaning and the world. Basically, internalists believe in the conceptual role semantics, intentionality, and supervenience hypotheses, and consider meanings intrinsic ("meaning in the head" hypothesis). However, externalism argues that we need to accept wide or broad contents to determine the meaning of terms, so meanings cannot be located in the head of a speaker. For externalists, meanings have causal and referential ties with the socio-linguistic community and the environment. Externalists believe that talking about properties or determining states cannot be fulfilled through "individuation". Here, one needs to claim the "causation" or external reference, which is no doubt outside of the skin.

In this scenario, empty concepts, self-knowledge and first person authority have raised some important charges against externalism. I have also tried to propose replies from the perspective of an externalist, to establish that self-knowledge is compatible with externalism. Here, I have not attempted to sketch an exhaustive diagram of the unity of internalism and externalism; however, it is relevant to mention some features which may help to grasp the fundamental intention of this thesis. It is worth emphasising that externalism considers "natural kind terms" partly fixed by the "division of linguistic labour", and partly fixed by what are called "stereotypes". So we find that externalism gives importance to the "thought world causal relationship", whereas internalists, who are the strongest supporters of "descriptive theory", believe in the conception of a conjunction of all the descriptive properties of a natural kind term.

My thoughts are somewhat nearer to externalism. Here I have tried to argue that the environment can be changed, but agents can retain the same thoughts. So it is not always the case that the environment makes changes

in the content of the thought of agents. It is well known that logical inconsistency is related to the world and language, whereas psychologically, we can find no such inconsistency. It seems to me that in psychology, the deliberations of the mind are a self-critical enterprise. For instance: "It is raining and it is not raining"; here we find a logical inconsistency, because in our world we will never find such a case. But psychologically, there is no inconsistency in thinking "it is raining and it is sunny at the same time". It also seems to me that we can reconcile first person authority and self-knowledge with externalism only if we accept *corrigible* and *incorrigible* beliefs together. *Corrigible* beliefs are in nature perceptual, and these deal with public observable entities, like "I feel it is too cool". But *incorrigible* beliefs are regarded as mental events or private (individual) experiences, like mental images and pain. If we accept reformed externalism, which I call *internalistic externalism*, then it will be easy to solve these inner-outer problems. *Internalsitic externalism* accepts that there are some concepts which are intrinsic in the sense that they are not dependent on second or third person experience. Here the first person or agent is much more authoritative and there is immediate acceptance of these contents. But like Wittgenstein, I also do not support any kind of private language or solipsism, so I believe that intrinsic experiences get their meaning when they are used in public language, and we can also think about them through natural language. So incorrigible experiences become external when one tries to see their meaning from our publicly sharable language viz. natural language. So it can be easily derived that mental contents are not in the mind (they are external), but we can call them intrinsic in some cases, as their agents are the best authority on and have immediate access to their concepts, like "I am feeling hungry".

My third point is that we can identify a difference between Bilgrami's new theory of externalism and my *internalistic externalism*. Bilgrami believes that contents are not determined in a casual way, but every determination of contents is public and normative. I would agree with Bilgrami only if he used the term *necessarily* in his thesis. It seems to me that it is "not necessary" that all the determinations of our content are causally fixed. For instance: "I am personally influenced by Bilgrami's thinking"; in this sentence there is no causal relationship. I am not causally influenced by Bilgrami's thoughts, but rather *normatively* influenced by him. Besides this, I also do not agree with Bilgrami when he tells us that there is no exact way in which the causal relations between the concepts of an agent and the objects in the world can be established. For Bilgrami, "there is no direct way of fastening on the external determinants of

concepts". It seems to me that, though there are causal constraints on references, that does not mean that a reference can be reduced to causality. Bilgrami commits this mistake. We cannot reduce the concept of reference into causality, a relationship that externalists claim exists between words and the world.

Now I will clarify more elaborately and technically the main achievements in my reformed externalism.

First, semantic holism, which naturally fits with semantic externalism, mainly concerns how belief states are dependent on each other for having their contents fixed. In Quine's dictum: the meaning of a sentence is dependent on the corporate body of sentences. Quine also denies any kind of analyticity, as he considers the division between analytic and synthetic unintelligible. We can also derive analyticity from "cognitive synonymy"; this synonymy can be defined in terms of interchangeability. This is the point where I do not agree with semantic holism, especially with Quine. For me, semantic holism can mingle with analyticity. In my reformed externalism, I have tried to explain that, in a hypothetical formalised language, we can say that analytic propositions are immune from revision, as the speaker can express his/her logical thought in a formalised language. But I am closer to agreeing with Putnam regarding the conception that there is a limited notion of analyticity which applies to such a trivial case as "all bachelors are unmarried", and though it is philosophically unimportant, an important notion of analyticity depends on the "necessity of revisability" and "conceptual truth". This is the point at which my reformed externalism comes into its own, as it claims to explain a priority and analyticity along with externalism. As we know, necessity and a priority are the main criteria of analytic propositions. It also seems to me that reflection, understanding and calculation provide us with non-empirical knowledge or a priori knowledge. So we find that semantic holism can be compatible with analyticity; similarly, internalism and externalism can be reconciled.

Secondly, my *internalistic externalism* paves the way for the "semantic" to enter into phenomenology or "ontology". In the last chapter, I discussed Heidegger's concept of Dasein or being-in-the-world. I think the debate between internalism and externalism is not only a semantic problem; we can put it forward in the ontological field. The conceptions of self and the world and their interrelationship are common matters in "ontology". Heidegger tried to bring Dasein to the world which was bracketed by Husserl. He explicitly stressed that it can be seen

phenomenologically that being and the world are related in the structure of "being-itself". Similarly, mind and language are both world-directed, and we cannot separate mental content from the physical world, as mental content gets its meaning through shareable language in our community. It also seems to me that in the cases of non-existent terms like "unicorn", there will be no problem for my reformed externalism, as I believe that reference has two parts: *direct reference* to objects and indirect *reference* to objects. In the case of "unicorn", if we analyse the concept of unicorn then we will find that we can divide it by its description, e.g. "a winged horse that can fly". If we divide this term by description, then we find certain external objects are related to the term referentially, like "wing", "horse" etc. So it is credible to argue that it is always possible to interconnect mind and world through language. Externalism, in Putnamian form, determines the meanings of terms in favour of the physical environment, whereas Burge's externalism is closer to the linguistic environment. For physical externalism, the notion of truth conditions plays an important role in determining the meanings of referred terms, but for Burge, it would be suitable to turn to linguistic use rather than truth conditions. The conception of Putnamian meaning cannot be located in the head, as the truth conditions of the sentence are sensitive to change in regards to the changeability of the agent's natural environment. My attempt here is to look again at the externalist background by supporting the causal theory of content and truth conditions. But I fervently believe that the processes (which may be truth conditions or linguistic uses) of externalism cannot restrict the contribution of the mind. I strongly believe that the mind, the world and other people constitute a common circle where the mind is related to the world, and we cannot separate mental content from the physical world. Mental contents are sometimes directly causally related with the world, and sometimes indirectly related with the world through descriptions, especially in cases of non-existent conceptual terms. I also believe that there are some cases where thoughts are supervenient on the physical state of the world, like the cases of gold, water etc., but these are not the last words of semantics.

I would like to support internalism to an extent, but my purpose is to bring about a reconciliation in the debate between externalism and internalism, in the sense that we need to take mind and meaning as embedded, so that they can be linked with causal referential directness to the world (an externalist point that I fully accept). But here, we cannot reject the role of our conceptual insight, which externalists try to ignore. I also believe that the causal history of content is also associated with shared language, and what we as language users have achieved by our

linguistic skills (the contents) and can share with others. Here, I think that what we share (the conception of shareability is an externalist approach) actually supervenes on how we are from the skin in (an internalist approach)! I have already mentioned that there is no mind in our linguistic community which can be detached from the environment; therefore, for me, the meaning of a term is not something which is only external; the referred term gets its meaning partially from the contribution of the mind and obviously partially from the contribution of the world.

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[14] Hilary Putnam personally wrote to me. I am indebted to him for this note.

[15] Hilary Putnam, "My Intellectual Autobiography," in *Philosophy of Hilary Putnam* (Library of Living Philosopher Series, Illinois: Open Court, 2015), 77. I am personally thankful to Hilary Putnam for sending me an earlier draft of the manuscript.

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[22] Putnam, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'", 223.

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[24] Block, "An Argument for Holism," 157.

[25] Ibid., 163.

[26] Ibid., 166.

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[29] Fodor, *Psychosemantics*, 31.

[30] Here it is important to mention that in a private conversation, Putnam told me: "As I pointed out in my email of April 17th, his (Fodor's) more recent position (in *The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology*, MIT Press, 2000) agrees with me in rejecting "narrow content" and accepting externalism (i.e., rejecting that semantics is locally supervient) although, unlike me, Fodor now wants to reject talk of intentional meaning entirely" (12.5. 2010).

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