

# The pragmatics of attraction: explaining unquotation in direct and free indirect discourse\*

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## Abstract

The quotational theory of free indirect discourse postulates that pronouns and tenses are systematically unquoted. But where does this unquotation come from? Based on cases of apparent unquotation in direct discourse constructions (including data from Kwaza speakers, Catalan signers, and Dutch children), I suggest a general pragmatic answer: unquotation is essentially a way to resolve a conflict that arises between two opposing constraints. On the one hand, the reporter wants to use indexicals that refer directly to the most salient speech act participants and their surroundings (ATTRACTION). On the other hand, the semantics of direct discourse (formalized here in terms of event modification) entails the reproduction of referring expressions from the original utterance being reported (VERBATIM). Unquotation (formalized here also in terms of event modification), allows the reporter to avoid potential conflicts between these constraints. Unquotation in free indirect discourse then comes out as a special case, where the salient source of attraction is the story protagonist and her actions, rather than the reporting narrator and his here and now.

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## 1 Introduction: reporting speech and thought

### 1.1 The direct–indirect distinction

Many languages offer two basic options for reporting what someone said or thought. If we want to report just the content of what someone said or thought, we choose an indirect discourse construction.

- (1) a. Mary said that she would never forgive me.
- b. He thought that his heart was broken.

On the other hand, if we want to report the actual words uttered (either out loud, or *sub voce*, in the case of a thought), we go for a direct discourse construction.

- (2) a. Mary said, “Oh no, I’ll never forgive you”
- b. “My heart’s broken,” he thought. “If I feel this way my heart must be broken.”

The two basic reporting modes can be distinguished semantically, and, in many languages, also syntactically. In the grammar of English, for instance, indirect discourse involves a complement clause embedded under a verb of saying or thinking, while direct discourse offers the report as an independent main clause with a non-subordinating, often parenthetical, reporting frame (*she said/thought*). Semantically, pronouns, tenses, and other indexicals in an English indirect discourse complement are interpreted with respect to the actual, reporting utterance context. The first person pronoun *me* in (1a) refers to me, the reporter. Indexicals in direct discourse, by contrast, are ‘shifted’, i.e., interpreted with respect to the context of the reported utterance. The *I* in (2a) does not refer to me but to Mary, the reported speaker.

Interestingly, these are not the only two modes of reporting. Various constructions in different languages do not fall neatly into either category. In this paper I will discuss various apparent exceptions to the general rule that indexicals in direct discourse are shifted. My main focus is on free indirect discourse, which I introduce in the next subsection.

## 1.2 The puzzle of unquotation in free indirect discourse

Free indirect discourse is a form of reporting speech or thought, characteristic of narrative contexts (Banfield, 1973; Fludernik, 1995). Consider the following report of Mary’s thoughts as she is packing her bags.

- (3) Mary was packing her bags. Tomorrow was her last day. Oh how happy she would be to finally walk out of here. To leave this godforsaken place once and for all.

Free indirect discourse shares characteristics with both direct and indirect discourse. Syntactically, free indirect discourse patterns with direct discourse: the report clauses are independent (=“free”) main clauses, while the say/think frame is realized parenthetically, or, typically, left implicit. Semantically, free indirect discourse displays one of the most salient characteristics of indirect discourse: all pronouns and tenses are interpreted from the reporting perspective. However, other context dependent expressions (e.g., *tomorrow*, *here*, and *this* in (3)) are interpreted as in direct discourse, i.e. evaluated relative to the protagonist’s perspective.

Free indirect discourse is thus truly a hybrid of direct and indirect speech. Given that we have a pretty good understanding of the semantics of both direct

and indirect discourse, this raises the question if we can reduce free indirect discourse to one of these basic modes. Since Schlenker's (2003) introduction of monsters (i.e. context shifting operators) in indirect discourse, the go-to approach in semantics has been to try and reduce free indirect discourse to indirect discourse (Schlenker, 2004; Sharvit, 2008; Eckardt, 2014).

I argue for the opposite reduction: free indirect discourse is a species of direct discourse, involving genuine quotation. In earlier work I have shown that free indirect discourse exhibits some key characteristics of quotation that cannot be accounted for by existing context shift analyses (Maier, 2015, 2014a). In particular, free indirect discourse, like direct discourse, allows the reporter (the narrator) to slip into the language, dialect, or idiolect of the reported speaker/thinker (the protagonist):

- (4) Ah well, her fathaire would shoorly help her out, she told John in her thick French accent.

To account for such data I offered an alternative semantic analysis in which free indirect discourse is like direct discourse but with holes for the pronouns and tenses. More precisely, the truth conditions of (3) can be schematically represented as in (5), in which the quotation marks indicate regular direct discourse and square brackets indicate "unquotation".

- (5) Mary was packing her bags. "Tomorrow [was] [her] last day. Oh how happy [she] [would] be to finally walk out of here. To leave this godforsaken place once and for all."

Given any reasonable semantics of quotation and unquotation (such as the one developed in section 2 below), logical forms like these get the truth conditions right. But this approach does raise a few concerns. Let's start by addressing the least worrying ones, viz. that it appeals to invisible quotation and unquotation operators. First, an appeal to covert quotation is not particularly problematic, as regular direct discourse is also often left unmarked, for instance in colloquial spoken English, but even in writing, particularly with direct thought reports. In addition, some early occurrences of free indirect discourse are in fact overtly marked by quotation marks:<sup>1</sup>

- (6) How Anne's more rigid requisitions might have been taken, is of little

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<sup>1</sup>Helen de Hoop p.c. has collected similar examples from the early Dutch epistolary novel *Sara Burgerhart* by Aagje Deken and Betje Wolff, 1782.

consequence. Lady Russell's had no success at all – could not be put up with – were not to be borne. “What! Every comfort of life knocked off! Journeys, London, servants, horses, table, – contractions and restrictions every where. To live no longer with the decencies even of a private gentleman! No, he would sooner quit Kellynch-hall at once, than remain in it on such disgraceful terms.” [Jane Austen *Persuasion* (1817)]

Likewise, covert unquotation needn't worry us either. Shan (2011) and Maier (2014b) describe various cases of overt mixed quotation where, arguably, some expressions must be interpreted as covertly unquoted. In section 3 we'll see many concrete examples of covert unquotation in direct discourse.

The remaining, most serious problem for the quotation approach is that it overgenerates. Since, as far as syntax and semantics are concerned, any constituent in an overt quotation can be unquoted, it remains a mystery why in free indirect discourse all and only the pronouns and tenses get unquoted. I call this the puzzle of unquotation in free indirect discourse.

In the current paper I try to solve this puzzle. I will show that the apparent unquotation restriction to pronouns and tenses in free indirect discourse is not an isolated phenomenon to be stipulated to get the truth conditions right, but an instance of a much more general pattern. Following the terminology of Evans (2012) I propose to explain the observed unquotation patterns in direct and free indirect discourse in terms of attraction, a pragmatic mechanism that can be used to describe a wide variety of seemingly unrelated data, from direct speech in Kwaza, to signers use of pointing in role shift, and children's interpretation of pronouns in direct speech.

Before discussing the pragmatics of unquotation in free indirect discourse and beyond, I will first present a concrete semantic account of quotation and unquotation in which to frame the pragmatic discussion more effectively.

## 2 The semantics of quotation and unquotation

### 2.1 Direct and indirect discourse as event modification

The standard account of indirect discourse in formal semantics is that developed by Kaplan (1989). Kaplan sketches a way of analyzing indirect discourse as an intensional operator within his two-dimensional Logic of Demonstratives. The idea is that my utterance of (1a) (*Mary said that she'd never forgive me*) is true iff there was an earlier speech act in which Mary said something that expressed that

she'd never forgive me. In other words, the proposition expressed by the report's complement clause, as uttered by me in the current context, gives us the content (but not the form) of the original utterance event.

One way to make this precise is by assuming that a speech act is an event, which can have an agent and a duration (as usual in neo-Davidsonian event semantics), but also a linguistic form and a propositional content. We can then treat indirect discourse reports as asserting that there was an utterance event  $e$  whose agent ( $agent(e)$ ) is given by the subject term and whose content ( $content(e)$ ) is given by the intension of the complement clause.

$$(7) \quad \|\text{Mary said that she'd never forgive me}\| = \exists e[\text{say}(e) \wedge \text{agent}(e) = \|\text{Mary}\| \wedge \text{time}(e) < n \wedge \text{content}(e) = \wedge \|\text{she'd never forgive me}\|]$$

First, some general notes on the semantic framework and notation I'll be using. I'm assuming a traditional Montagovian framework, with a recursive translation mechanism,  $\|\cdot\|$ , mapping syntactically wellformed expressions to expressions in an interpreted formal language (a higher-order, intensional, typed lambda calculus with indexicals). For instance,  $\|\text{Mary}\| = m$  (a constant of type  $e$ ), and  $\|\text{say}\| = \lambda p_{st} \lambda x \lambda e[\text{say}(e) \wedge \text{agent}(e) = x \wedge \text{content}(e) = p]$ .<sup>2</sup> Well-formed expressions of this formal language can be interpreted in a model (relative to an assignment  $f$ , a Kaplanian context  $c$ , and a world  $w$ ), notation:  $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket_w^{f,c}$ . For instance,  $\llbracket \wedge \alpha \rrbracket_w^{f,c} = \lambda w. \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket_w^{f,c}$  and  $\llbracket i \rrbracket_w^{f,c} =$  the agent/speaker of  $c$ . In this paper I'm interested primarily in the semantics–pragmatics interface, so I will content myself with just presenting the logical forms of entire sentences, without spelling out the underlying assumptions concerning syntax, translation, and model-theoretic interpretation.<sup>3</sup>

On a conceptual level, the idea behind  $content(e)$  is that certain eventualities, like say-events and belief-states, have a propositional content (Hacquard, 2010). Formally,  $content$  denotes a function from such contentful eventualities to propositions – in this case mapping an utterance event  $e$  to what was said in  $e$ .<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup>I also assume existential closure of leading lambda's left over at sentence level (as usual in event semantics), and (the translational analogues of) rules like predicate modification and intensional function application (Heim & Kratzer, 1998).

<sup>3</sup>In most cases, filling in the gaps is a straightforward exercise, but in others, some additional research is needed. I leave this for another occasion.

<sup>4</sup>For those skeptical of  $content$  as a theoretical primitive, note that an utterance event  $e$  occurring in a world  $w$  at time  $t$  quite naturally determines a unique Kaplanian context of utterance ( $context(e) := \langle agent(e), t, w \rangle$ ), and also a Kaplanian character ( $char(e) :=$  the character of the sentence uttered in  $e$ ). Hence, the skeptic may understand  $content(e)$  as  $char(e)(context(e))$  (for

This event modification approach to indirect discourse has a number of advantages over the traditional intensional operator approach. First and foremost is that it extends straightforwardly to direct discourse. Where indirect discourse complements specify the content of the original speech act, direct discourse specifies its linguistic surface form.

$$(8) \quad \|\text{Mary said "No, I'll never forgive you"}\| = \exists e[\text{say}(e) \wedge \text{agent}(e) = m \\ \wedge \text{time}(e) < n \wedge \text{form}(e) = \ulcorner \text{No, I'll never forgive you} \urcorner]$$

Here, *form* is a function mapping an utterance event to the “linguistic form” of the utterance. There are different entities that we might call the linguistic form of an utterance. For written language, I use the simple typographical form, as represented by a sequence of letters in the Roman alphabet; for spoken language, I use these same letter sequences as crude approximations of phoneme sequences; and for signed examples I use the standard notation where signs are represented as English words in capital letters.<sup>5</sup> I use the little square ‘Quine hooks’ around such letter/phoneme/sign sequences to refer to them in the formal language:  $\llbracket \ulcorner abcde \urcorner \rrbracket_w^{f,c} = abcde$ .<sup>6</sup>

## 2.2 Thinking vs. saying

So far we have looked only at reported speech, but in section 1.1 we also saw examples of both direct and indirect thought reports. Indirect thought reports, under the header of propositional attitude reports, have traditionally received a lot of attention in the philosophical and linguistic literature. Direct thought reports, like (2b), repeated in (9), by contrast, are seriously understudied.

$$(9) \quad \text{“My heart’s broken,” he thought. “If I feel this way my heart must be broken.”}$$

[Ernest Hemingway, ‘Ten Indians’, in *Men Without Women*, 1927.]

Direct thought reports are particularly relevant for the current investigation, as my goal is to defend the analysis of free indirect discourse as direct discourse, and

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any utterance event *e* at a given time and world).

<sup>5</sup>In principle, IPA would be a more appropriate alphabet for spoken utterances, and it might even be possible to come up with an alphabet of ‘signemes’ for signed utterances.

<sup>6</sup>More specifically:  $\ulcorner abcde \urcorner$  is a well-formed expression of type *u* (cf. Potts 2007), and the five letter string itself is an entity in the corresponding domain  $D_u$ .

free indirect reports are typically used to convey a character’s inner thoughts.<sup>7</sup>

I propose to treat direct thought reports exactly like direct speech, i.e., as asserting the existence of a thinking event with a linguistic form.

- (10)  $\exists e[think(e) \wedge agent(e) = x \wedge time(e) < n$   
 $\wedge form(e) = \lceil \text{My heart is broken. If I feel this way my heart must be broken} \rceil]$

A thought event is like an utterance event – think of it as the *sub voce* utterance of a sentence in the subject’s language of thought. In other words, in direct thought reports, thinking is conceptualized as silently speaking to yourself.

This conception of thoughts as concrete spatio-temporal entities with linguistic form is rather different from the conception of beliefs as propositional attitudes that we find in the traditional semantic analysis of attitude reports. I consider this a virtue of the present account, as in fact direct thought reports have very different semantic properties from typical attitude reports. For instance, indirect belief and other attitude reports are closed under logical consequence, or at least they typically allow inferences as in (11a), while direct thought and speech reports do not allow analogous inferences, as shown in (11b).

- (11) a. I thought/believed/knew/realized/feared/imagined that John and Mary were both idiots  
 $\Rightarrow$  I thought/believed/knew/realized/feared/imagined that John was an idiot  
 b. “John and Mary are both idiots”, I thought  
 $\not\Rightarrow$  “John is an idiot”, I thought

The pattern in (11b) is predicted by the event modification approach sketched in (10). The existence of an event with a given linguistic form does not entail the existence of another event with a different form.

We might analyze indirect attitude reports as reports of more abstract, contentful states instead of events. Like speech events, these attitudinal states have a propositional content, i.e. *content* maps attitudinal states to sets of possible worlds. To capture the inference in (11a) we further assume that a state *s* is a state of believing that John and Mary are idiots if its content entails that they are, i.e., if the propositional content of *s* is a subset of the proposition that John

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<sup>7</sup>In fact, as Banfield (1973) suggests, free indirect speech reports purporting to represent X’s words, are often better thought of as reporting what the addressee Y is hearing than as what X is saying. If so, perhaps all so-called free indirect speech reports are really free indirect thought reports.



and Mary are idiots.

$$(12) \quad \exists s[\text{believe}(s) \wedge \text{agent}(s) = i \wedge \text{time}(s) < n \wedge \text{content}(s) \subseteq \wedge[\text{idiot}(j) \wedge \text{idiot}(m)]]$$

The semantics in (12) is arguably appropriate for *believes that*, but the inference patterns are less clear for *said that* or *thought that*. Hence it is not clear whether we should switch from the strict event specification analysis in (1a) to the more flexible state analysis in (12) for these types of reports as well. I will leave this for another occasion. What's important for this paper is that direct discourse involves an event of saying or thinking, which is a spatio-temporally realized concrete particular, with a certain linguistically specifiable form.

### 2.3 Speaking and signing vs. writing

Apart from the unification of direct and indirect speech and thought reports, another major selling point of the event modification approach is that we can incorporate central insights from the demonstration theory of quotation (Clark & Gerrig, 1990; Davidson, 2015) to account for action and speech reports in spoken or signed language. In these modalities reporters may specify not (just) the form or content of the original event, but demonstrate some relevant features of it.

Let me illustrate with the English *be like* construction. The  $\langle\langle\rangle\rangle$  notation in (13) is meant to indicate my saying *She was like* followed by a shrugging gesture.

$$(13) \quad \text{She was like } \langle\langle \text{shrugs} \rangle\rangle$$

The shrugging gesture is an event that is 'recruited' (in Recanati's 2001 terms) into the syntax of the spoken sentence. Note that this kind of recruitment is possible only in a live medium, like speaking or signing, not in printed writing, since you can't print an event. Davidson (2015) proposes an analysis of demonstrations like (13) in terms of event modification. In our notation, the logical form of (13) would look like (14), where  $s$  denotes Sue and  $d$  the reporter's shrugging event:

$$(14) \quad \exists e[\text{agent}(e) = s \wedge \text{time}(e) < n \wedge \text{demonstration}(d, e)]$$

The logical form in (14) features Davidson's *demonstration*, which relates two events if they are sufficiently similar in certain contextually salient respects. In this way, (14) captures the idea that the reporter's shrugging serves as a demonstration of what Sue did.

Focusing on signed language, Davidson takes this demonstration analysis of spoken *be like* as her starting point to capture canonical direct discourse con-

structions in spoken and signed languages. Spoken speech reports with demonstrational (aka iconic or simulative) elements, like (15), would be analyzed as asserting the existence of a past saying event sufficiently similar to the reporter’s verbal demonstration, i.e. the event of her uttering *Ehh well I don’t know* in a creaky voice.

(15) The old man said,  $\langle\langle$ *in a creaky voice:* $\rangle\rangle$  “Ehh... Well, I don’t know”

I propose – contra Davidson – that examples like (15) are really mixtures, consisting of a simultaneous direct speech and action report, as shown in (16) (where *o* refers to the old man and *d* to the event of uttering the quoted fragment in a creaky voice).

(16)  $\exists e[say(e) \wedge agent(e) = o \wedge time(e) < n \wedge form(e) = \lceil Ehh... Well, I don’t know \rceil \wedge demonstration(d, e)]$

In this way we maintain a straightforward, uniform analysis of direct discourse across modalities, while leaving room for demonstrative strengthening in ‘live’ modalities. Printed writing does not allow demonstrative action reporting at all, so cases like (13) and (15) do not occur there.

## 2.4 The semantics of unquotation

In certain genres of factual writing, square brackets are used to indicate editorial adjustments to a quotation. In previous work I’ve introduced unquotation as the dual of mixed quotation (Maier, 2014b). But we’re interested now in unquotation in full, clausal, direct discourse. The new event semantics of direct discourse allows a simpler semantics, bypassing mixed quotation entirely.

The goal of this subsection then is to capture the truth conditions of direct discourse constructions containing unquotation brackets, as in (17).

(17) “Find a way to get rid of [me] as soon as possible,” they said.

The idea is that the brackets indicate that the material inside is to be interpreted from the reporter’s perspective, i.e. outside the scope of the quotation. In the current theoretical framework then, unquoted expressions are to be modeled as specifications of content, while the surrounding quotation is a specification of form. I’ll use metalinguistic quantification over expressions: variables  $\epsilon$ ,  $\epsilon'$ , etc. range over linguistic forms, i.e. sequences of letters/phonemes/signs. Formally:

$\llbracket \lceil abc\epsilon de \rceil \rrbracket_w^{f,c} = abc \cap f(\epsilon) \cap de$  (the string consisting of the first three letters of the alphabet, followed by the string  $f(\epsilon)$ , followed by the letters ‘d’ and ‘e’).

$$(18) \quad \exists e[\text{say}(e) \wedge \text{agent}(e) = x \wedge \text{time}(e) < n \\ \exists e' \sqsubset e \exists \epsilon[\text{form}(e) = \lceil \text{Find a way to get rid of } \epsilon \text{ as soon as possible} \rceil \\ \wedge \text{form}(e') = \epsilon \wedge \vee \text{content}(e') = i]$$

In words, (17) asserts the existence of a speech event  $e$  with linguistic form *find a way to get rid of  $\epsilon$  as soon as possible*, where  $\epsilon$  indicates some unspecified word (or complex expression), the reference of which is fixed by the unquoted material. Translating this into our formal notions of events with contents and forms, (18) says that in addition to the speech event  $e$  there should be a sub-event  $e'$  of uttering  $\epsilon$  ( $\text{form}(e') = \epsilon$ ), which refers to me ( $\vee \text{content}(e') = i$ ).<sup>8</sup>

## 2.5 The semantics of free indirect discourse

Over the previous subsections I’ve developed a concrete semantic framework for representing direct and indirect speech and thought reports, as well as unquotation. With this we can now return to the free indirect discourse examples from 1.2 to make the informal paraphrases in terms of quotation and unquotation precise. Consider, (3) repeated in (19a) below. In (19b) I repeat (part of) the informal paraphrase from section 1.2, and in (19c) I now add the actual logical form, according to the semantic theory laid out above.

- (19) a. Mary was packing her bags. Tomorrow was her last day. Oh how happy she would be to finally walk out of here. To leave this god-forsaken place once and for all.  
 b. ... “Tomorrow [was] [her] last day” ...  
 c.  $\exists e[\text{think}(e) \wedge \text{agent}(e) = x \wedge \text{time}(e) < n \wedge \\ \exists e', e'' \sqsubset e \exists \epsilon', \epsilon''[\text{form}(e) = \lceil \text{Tomorrow } \epsilon' \epsilon'' \text{ last day} \rceil \wedge \\ \text{form}(e') = \epsilon' \wedge \vee \text{content}(e') = \llbracket \text{was} \rrbracket \wedge \\ \text{form}(e'') = \epsilon'' \wedge \vee \text{content}(e'') = \llbracket \text{her} \rrbracket]]$

The logical form in (19b-c) is still somewhat simplified. For instance, we’re unquoting the entire words *was* and *her*, but, as I’ve argued elsewhere, what is re-

<sup>8</sup>This is a case where spelling out the exact recursive translation rules is non-trivial. For instance, we’ll likely need to assume some kind of syntactic movement to get the unquoted expressions outside the quote. Cf. Maier (2014b) and Koev (2016) for more detailed proposals incorporating such a movement, or Shan (2011) for an account without movement.

ally unquoted is just the past tense (which, moreover, is not typically interpreted in situ, but first moved higher up) and the third person feature (Maier, 2015). Nonetheless, (19) suffices to illustrate how our formalization of direct discourse and unquotation can be used to explicate the informal free indirect discourse semantics suggested in section 1.2.

### 3 The pragmatics of unquotation in direct discourse

In the previous section we developed a semantics to back up the intuitive quotational paraphrases of free indirect discourse reports. This leaves us with some pragmatic issues, like where do the covert unquotations come from? In this section I survey cases of apparent unquotation in other varieties of direct discourse. In section 4 I then apply the insights gained here to tackle the central puzzle of unquotation in free indirect discourse.

#### 3.1 Second person magnetism

Typologists occasionally observe puzzling direct discourse reports in which a second person pronoun behaves as if it were in indirect discourse, i.e., as referring to the reporter's current addressee. Thus, van der Voort (2004) writes about direct discourse in Kwaza, an isolated language of Brazil:<sup>9</sup>

As most examples in this section indicate, the quotative construction contains direct speech embedded in an extra layer of inflexions. As is seen here [in (20)], this is not the case when the subject of the quoted utterance is a second person. In that case the interpretation is one of indirect speech and the identity of the second person equals the hearer in the actual speech context instead of the (logically expected) speaker. So the quoted second person represents an exception to the direct speech analysis of the quotation construction presented in the previous sections. [van der Voort 2004:411]

He uses the following example to illustrate the point:

(20) maga'riDa kukui'hỹ-xa-'ki-tse  
*Margarida ill-2sg-DECL-DECL*

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<sup>9</sup>This passage is also cited and discussed by Evans (2012).

literal translation: ‘Margarida (says) “you are ill”’  
intended interpretation: ‘Margarida says that you are ill’

With (20), the reporter uses a second person inflection to refer to her current addressee, without thereby suggesting that Magarida’s original utterance was also second person. In other words, (20) would be true if, for instance, Margarida had said something like “That annoying linguist is ill”. Given that the Kwaza quotative construction (glossed as DECL-DECL) otherwise consistently behaves as direct speech, I suggest that the logical form of (20) involves unquotation:

- (21) a. Margarida says “[you] are ill”  
b.  $\exists e[say(e) \wedge agent(e) = m' \wedge \exists e' \sqsubset e \exists \epsilon[form(e) = \ulcorner \epsilon \text{ be ill} \urcorner$   
 $\wedge form(e') = \epsilon \wedge \vee content(e') = you]]$

Evans (2012) cites similar observations about quotation constructions in Slave (Canada) and Nez Perce (U.S.).<sup>10</sup> He even adds an example from colloquial spoken English:

X had become confused about which house his daughter-in-law Y lives in, knocked on the neighbour’s door, and had been directed to the daughter-in-law Y’s house. Later he tells his daughter-in-law what had happened. ‘They told me, “Oh, you<sub>X</sub>’ve got the wrong house, you<sub>Y</sub> live next door.”’  
[Evans 2012:87]

The first *you* behaves as usual. It refers to the original addressee of the reported speech act (i.e., the neighbor giving directions to X). The second *you*, by contrast, refers to the addressee of the reporting speech act (i.e., X telling his daughter-in-law about getting lost earlier). Formally, I propose to capture the apparent truth conditions of (21) in terms of direct speech and unquotation, as in the Kwaza example.

- (22) The told me, “Oh, you’ve got the wrong house, [you] live next door.”

Evans coins the term “second person magnetism”, or, more generally, “speech act participant attraction”, to describe a pragmatic mechanism that gives rise to

<sup>10</sup>The data Evans mentions for Slave and Nez Perce are ultimately inconclusive, as there is some additional evidence that the reports in question are indirect rather than direct discourse (Anand & Nevins, 2004; Deal, 2014). For these languages, more research is required to compare the relative merits of a monstrous indirect discourse analysis (à la Schlenker 2003) and a direct discourse with unquotation analysis (as proposed here).

quotation constructions as in Kwaza, Slave, and Nez Perce, as well as occasional readings<sup>11</sup> like (22) in English.

what is basically direct speech can undergo ‘speech act participant attraction’ which leads any arguments in the quoted passage referring to the addressee (Kwaza, Slave, Nez Perce) or the speaker (Nez Perce) to trump the person value that they would have as calculated from the perspective of the reported speech event. This leads the construction to depart from canonical direct-speech status those values of its person features that are susceptible to second person attraction, even though in all other respects the construction is direct speech.

[Evans 2012]

Evans offers no more detailed theory of the semantics or pragmatics of attraction. Below I will integrate the underlying intuition into our formal semantics of direct discourse and unquotation. I suggest that the pragmatic attraction by the salient speech act participants, i.e., the actual speaker and/or hearer in the reporting context, as described by Evans in the quote above, is a general pragmatic principle. We can reformulate it as a constraint as follows:

- (23) **ATTRACTION:** when talking about the most salient speech act participants, use indexicals to refer to them directly.

Concretely, this rule entails that a speaker should always use *I* to refer to herself (rather than, say, *the speaker* or *Ema*), and *you* to refer to her current addressee. By ‘referring directly’ I mean using an indexical that picks out its referent by being evaluated relative to the current utterance context. Crucially, I’m using ‘referring’ here in its pragmatic sense, i.e., a speaker using an expression to refer to something.<sup>12</sup> In that sense, indexicals in direct discourse reports may be used to refer *indirectly*. For instance, in *John said “I am here”*, the indexicals *I* and *here* are used to refer indirectly to John and the place where he made his utterance.

The possibility of indirect reference in direct speech points to a potential conflict between the semantics of direct discourse and the pragmatics of attraction. I will make this concrete by formulating a second constraint:

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<sup>11</sup>Evans suggests that this example may be just a “performance error”. Nonetheless, if examples like this occur regularly, that could be taken as evidence for attraction as a pragmatic principle.

<sup>12</sup>In Kaplan’s (1989) *Logic of Demonstratives*, it is a logical truth that all indexicals refer directly. This theorem however depends on a *semantic* notion of direct reference. On Kaplan’s semantic construal, indexicals in direct discourse have no reference at all, while on the current pragmatic construal they may still be used to refer to individuals (Maier, 2016).

- (24) VERBATIM: in direct discourse, faithfully reproduce the linguistic form of the reported utterance.

This is simply an informal paraphrase of our semantics of direct discourse in terms of form specification, and hence a semantic rather than a pragmatic constraint.

The two constraints conflict in cases where we want to quote a speech act about someone who participates in the reporting speech act, but who played a different role in the original speech act. The cases considered by Evans and cited above are of this type. Take the Kwaza example in (20). Magarida was talking about X, let's say by describing him in a third person way as *that annoying linguist*. Later, the reporter is talking to this linguist X about what Magarida said. According to ATTRACTION the reporter must use a second person pronoun if he wants to refer to X, his current addressee. But, since he's using the direct discourse mode of reporting, VERBATIM entails he must faithfully reproduce Magarida's way of referring to X, i.e., by using *that annoying linguist*.

Our semantic inventory offers a way to resolve this conflict: use unquotation to locally suspend VERBATIM. The logical form with unquoted *you* in (21) (*Magarida says "[you] are ill"*) allows the reporter to satisfy ATTRACTION, referring to the current addressee with a second person pronoun, without violating VERBATIM, because unquoted material need not be faithful to the original form.

The unquoted *you* in the logical form of the colloquial English report in (22) can also be explained as the resolution of a conflict between ATTRACTION and VERBATIM. The neighbor literally said something like *Oh, you've got the wrong house, she lives next door*, so VERBATIM would force the direct discourse reporter to refer to the daughter-in-law indirectly, as *she*. But since the reporter is telling this story to his daughter-in-law, ATTRACTION forces him to refer to her as *you* instead. We can satisfy both by invoking unquotation, which explains the logical form we postulated for the example in (22).

But what about the other indexical in this English example? In the first clause, the reporter refers to himself indirectly with a shifted *you*, thus violating ATTRACTION.<sup>13</sup> The quote from Evans above suggests that there may be some cross-

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<sup>13</sup>A report that avoids this violation by unquotation would look like (ia), with logical form (ib).

- (i) a. ?They told me, "Oh I've got the wrong house, you live next door"  
b. They told me, "Oh [I]'ve got the wrong house, [you] live next door"

More empirical research, for instance a corpus study on colloquial, oral storytelling, would have to be done to determine if such reports indeed occur, or if ATTRACTION in English is restricted to

linguistic variation in what participant role can give rise to unquotation by ATTRACTION. Thus, in Kwaza and Slave (and colloquial English?), only the current speech act’s addressee exerts a force of attraction that is great enough to trump VERBATIM and thus give rise to unquotation. In other languages, or perhaps just other genres, it may be both the speaker and the addressee. And on the other end of the spectrum, in English academic prose for instance, VERBATIM may be so strong that the role of ATTRACTION is negligible.<sup>14</sup>

In the remainder of this section I’ll use the pragmatic unquotation-by-attraction story to explain some findings from sign language and child language research.

### 3.2 Attraction in sign language role shift

The sign language analogue of direct discourse is role shift (Padden, 1986). In role shift, the reporter shifts her body and/or breaks eye contact with her current addressee to indicate that she’s quoting someone else’s words. Consider the following basic example.

- (25) JOHN IX-1 HAPPY<sup>RS</sup>  
 ‘John said/signed/thought, “I’m happy”’

First, some notes about notation. As usual in sign language linguistics, lexical signs and names are represented in capital letters. The sign language equivalents of pronouns are pointing signs, represented as IX (for “index”). IX-1, the sign language equivalent of a first person pronoun, is typically realized as a pointing toward the signer’s own chest; IX-2, the second person pronoun, is realized as a point toward the addressee. Third person pronouns are realized as pointings toward any other concrete entities in real space, or to more abstract “discourse referents” associated with specific locations in signing space. The scope of the non-manual role shift marking is indicated by an overline.

So, (25) represents the signer signing the name sign for some John, and then, in role shift, signing *I’m happy*, which includes a point to the signer’s chest to mimic John’s utterance of *I*, i.e. we have a shifted first person referring to the reported speaker/signer rather than the reporting signer. The verb of saying is

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the addressee.

<sup>14</sup>On the other hand, Maier 2015 cites style guides for formal writing that suggest that a reporter should adjust pronouns and tenses to fit the reporting environment. This may be viewed as an instance of unquotation by attraction, quite similar in fact to what we’ll see in section 4. The only difference then is that the unquotation must be marked overtly in such genres.



often left implicit. I will use the term *utterance* as a modality unspecific mode of referring to the event of intentionally producing something with linguistic form and content.<sup>15</sup>

(26)  $\exists e[utt(e) \wedge agent(e) = j \wedge form(e) = \ulcorner IX-1 \text{ HAPPY} \urcorner]$

As observed by Engberg-Pedersen (1995), Quer (2005) and others, not all pronouns are necessarily shifted in a role shift. In (27), the indexical IX-1 is shifted, referring to the agent of the reported thought, while HERE is not shifted, referring to the location where the report is taking place:

(27)  $\overline{IX-a \text{ MADRID MOMENT}^i} \text{ JOAN THINK } \overline{IX-1 \text{ STUDY FINISH HERE}}^{RS}$   
 intended interpretation: ‘When he was in Madrid, Joan thought he would finish his study in Barcelona.’ [LSC (Catalan Sign Language), Quer 2005]

For authors like Quer (2005) and Schlenker (2016), this is evidence that role shift is not like direct discourse after all, but rather like indirect discourse, with a so-called monstrous operator to account for the indexicals that do shift, like the IX-1’s in both (25) and (27). Davidson (2015) argues against the monstrous approach<sup>16</sup> and offers a monster-free alternative, based on a purely demonstrational account of quotation. Though much closer to my own proposal, Davidson’s approach still makes the wrong predictions for mixed indexicality cases like (27). Concerning this very example, she points out that her account “makes the prediction that more iconic indexicals will shift before less iconic indexicals under role shift”. But in (27), both IX-1 and HERE are pointing signs, and as such they are simply not iconic at all – after all, I do not resemble a pointing at my own chest (the sign IX-1 in LSC), nor does Barcelona resemble someone pointing to the ground (the sign HERE in LSC). In sum, I fully agree with Davidson that role shift is essentially a form of direct discourse, as opposed to a monstrous operator. However, to deal with unshifted pronouns, I suggest we use the mechanism of unquotation (for the semantics) and attraction (for the pragmatics).

<sup>15</sup>It is often noticed in the sign language literature that a reporter may include gestures and other iconic elements (especially in so-called classifier constructions, cf. Davidson 2015) into their report, as demonstrations of certain paralinguistic or extralinguistic events surrounding the reported utterance. As outlined in section 2.3 for spoken reports, I propose to model this as a demonstrational action report modifying the reported utterance event with the additional constraint *demonstration(d, e)* (with *d* referring to the reporter’s partly verbal demonstration).

<sup>16</sup>I’ve added some arguments against the monstrous approach to role shift myself (Maier, 2016).

Let's start with the semantics. We can describe the correct truth conditions of (27) as follows:

- (28) a. ...JOAN THINK "IX-1 STUDY FINISH [HERE]"  
 b.  $\exists e[\dots think(e) \wedge agent(e) = j \wedge \exists e' \sqsubset e \exists \epsilon [form(e) = \ulcorner IX-1 STUDY FINISH \epsilon \urcorner \wedge form(e') = \epsilon \wedge \vee content(e') = here]]$

Here is another example, taken from a pilot study about role shift in NGT (Sign Language of The Netherlands).<sup>17</sup> Some signers were presented with a video of Martine signing (29a) and then Macha reporting that utterance as in (29b). Crucially, in (29a) Martine refers to Johan Crujff by finger spelling his last name, letter by letter, while in (29b) Macha in her report refers to Crujff by pointing at a nearby picture of Crujff.

- (29) IX-1 THINK C-R-U-I-J-F-F BEST SOCCER PLAYER  
 'I think Crujff is the best soccer player.'  
 (29) MARTINE IX-1 THINK IX-a<sub>pointing-at-Crujff</sub> BEST SOCCER PLAYER<sup>RS</sup>  
 intended: 'Martine said, "I think Crujff is the best soccer player"'

When asked to judge the felicity of (30b) as a report of (30a), most subjects judged (30b) equally felicitous as a fully verbatim variant (both report variants averaging 3.9 on a 5-point Likert scale). I propose to capture the apparent truth conditions of (29b), like those of (27), in terms of quotation and unquotation:

- (30) MARTINE "IX-1 THINK [IX-a<sub>pointing-at-Crujff</sub>] BEST SOCCER PLAYER"

Now the pragmatics. Why is HERE unquoted in (27), or the pointing at Crujff in (29)? My answer follows the attraction explanation for unquotation in Kwaza and colloquial English. The cases of unquoted *you* in 3.1 involved attraction by a salient speech act participant, viz. the addressee. In the sign language cases above, we have a signer talking about other salient entities present in their immediate surroundings: the place where signer and addressee are currently located: Barcelona in (27), and Crujff in (29). Hence, we should modify ATTRACTION to apply to any salient entity physically present in the current utterance context, not just the immediate speech act participants (speaker and hearer, as Evans suggested). In this way, ATTRACTION will pull the reporter toward using indexicals,

<sup>17</sup>This study was performed by myself and Martine Zwets in Nijmegen, 2012. Unfortunately, the study never moved beyond the exploratory, informal data collection stage. The evidence presented here should be understood as purely anecdotal.



Pragmatically, the reason why children should choose to interpret the second person in (32) as unquoted is by now familiar. The most salient entities physically present in the context of the reporting utterance include Monkey (the current speaker), Elephant (the current addressee), and Dog (who is standing just a few feet away). These salient individuals thus attract the use of indexicals that refer to them directly, i.e. *I* for Monkey, *you* for Elephant, and *he* for Dog. Since the speech act roles were divided differently in the original utterance (*I* referred to Dog, etc.), this conflicts with the verbatim reproduction requirement imposed by the semantics of direct discourse. Unquoting the pronoun as shown in (32) resolves the conflict.

One last remaining question is, why are adults not affected? Looking closely at the adult data, Köder et al. (2015) conclude that adults *are* affected. They make significantly more “mistakes” in direct than in indirect discourse, and the mistakes that they make are compatible with the attraction effect, i.e. direct speech pronouns are interpreted as unquoted. Nonetheless, compared to the children, it looks like the adult grammar gives more weight to VERBATIM, in many cases ranking it higher than ATTRACTION. The very late acquisition of this adult constraint ranking suggests a possible influence of writing instruction in school. Perhaps the strict verbatim requirement and the necessity of consistent, overt marking of both quotation and unquotation in formal writing, interferes with adults’ performance in this experiment.

## 4 Attraction in free indirect discourse

We set out to explain why pronouns and tenses are unquoted in free indirect discourse. I will argue that unquotation in free indirect discourse derives from the pragmatics of attraction, exactly as in the above examples of unquotation in spoken and signed languages. Note however that in the cases discussed in 3, unquotation was always the result of attraction to salient entities physically present in the reporter’s immediate surroundings. Thus, we’ve seen unquoted ‘local indexicals’ like *I*, *you*, and *here*. In free indirect discourse the unquotation extends to remote third person pronouns and past tenses.

To bring out the continuity between pragmatic attraction in direct discourse and unquotation in free indirect discourse, let’s start with a case of free indirect discourse in a spoken, first person, present tense narrative.

(33) This woman left me a voice mail, asking all kinds of questions about

you. How well do I know you? Where have we met? Have I ever noticed anything strange about you?

Here, a speaker/narrator<sup>18</sup> is telling his addressee about the content of a voice mail message from some third person. The questions in (33) are intended as reports of what this person asked the speaker. They exhibit the key characteristics of free indirect discourse: the form of the reporting faithfully reproduces the form of the original questions, except for the pronouns, which are adjusted to fit the reporter's perspective. On our quotational analysis, the logical form must be as in (34).

(34) ... "How well do [I] know [you]?" "Where have [we] met?" "Have [I] ever noticed anything strange about [you]?"

This is precisely the pattern of quotation and unquotation that we encountered in Kwaza, sign language, and child language (e.g., *Dog said, "[you] get the ball"*). The attraction explanation extends to this case without further modification. On the one hand, direct quotation of questions entails the use of verbatim, i.e. shifted, indexicals, as in *How well do you know him?* On the other hand, the story is about two very salient, physically present speech act participants, viz. the speaker and his addressee, which leads to attraction, i.e., a preference for choosing indexicals to pick out these salient participants directly: *How well do I know you?* Unquotation of the pronouns referring to the salient participants resolves the conflict.

The exact same explanation holds for literary cases of free indirect discourse in so-called second person narratives, a somewhat experimental form of storytelling in which the main protagonist is the narrator's addressee.

(35) Sunlight. A morning. Where the hell are your sunglasses? You hate mornings – anger rises in you, bubbling like something sour in your throat – but you grin into the morning because somebody is approaching you, shouting a magic word. Your name.

[from Joyce Carol Oates, 'You' (1970), cited by Fludernik 1995:82]

It is not entirely clear where the free indirect reporting in this passage begins or ends, but the direct question with the expletive is definitely intended as a report of the second person protagonist's thoughts – it's not the narrator asking where

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<sup>18</sup>Narratologists stress the fundamental differences between the narrator and the author, and between the narratee and the reader. In this paper I do not make these fine distinctions. I use the terms narrator and author (or speaker, or writer, for that matter) interchangeably.

your sunglasses are. So, again, the form is that of a (typographically unmarked) direct discourse, but the indexical *your* is adjusted to the narrator's frame of reference – the original thought would be in the first person (*Where the hell are my sunglasses?*). The logical form then is:

(36) ...“Where the hell are [your] sunglasses?” ...

In this case too the unquotation may be explained pragmatically, in terms of attraction: the most salient agent is the protagonist (i.e., you) so ATTRACTION requires that the narrator use the appropriate indexical expression to refer to that agent directly: *your*. But this is only possible if the VERBATIM constraint imposed by the semantics of direct discourse is locally suspended, through unquotation.

Now it is but a small step from free indirect speech in first and second person present tense narratives, to the standard, literary examples, illustrated by (37), repeated from section 1:

- (37) a. Mary was packing her bags. Tomorrow was her last day. Oh how happy she would be to finally walk out of here. To leave this god-forsaken place once and for all!
- b. ...“Tomorrow [was] [her] last day.” ...

The difference between examples like (37) and the examples discussed before (in this section and the previous), is that the most salient entities under discussion – the story's protagonists – are both physically and temporally removed from the actual, reporting speaker (i.e., the narrator). The kind of stories where we find free indirect discourse reports like (37) are told by a so-called omniscient, third person narrator. Such a story does not concern the immediate here and now of the narrator, but is presented as taking place in the past, dealing primarily with protagonists observed from a distance by the narrator and her addressee.

So let's take a closer look at (37). The story is about Mary – a third person, referred to by her name or by third person pronouns, and whose actions are described in the past tense. Mary is more salient than the narrator or his addressee. Likewise, the story time is more salient than the time of the narration.<sup>19</sup> Hence, while in earlier cases the source of attraction was always someone or something in the reporter's here and now, in these types of literary third person narratives,

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<sup>19</sup>The time of narration is a rather abstract concept, distinct from both the time of writing and the time of reading, but, as pointed out above, such subtleties don't concern us here. What's important is that, in the case of a story, the time of narration is less salient (or backgrounded, not-at-issue, if you will) than the time of the story, whenever these two notions come apart.

the source of attraction is the protagonist and her here and now. As a result, the narrator should use the appropriate referential terms to refer directly to those distant but salient story agents. In such a case, the appropriate directly referential terms for the narrator to refer to his protagonist and her actions directly are third person pronouns and past tenses. The pull of *ATTRACTION* thus explains the unquotation of pronouns and tenses in cases like (37).

## 5 Conclusion

The goal of this paper was to solve the puzzle of unquotation in free indirect discourse: if free indirect discourse is really best described in terms of quotation and unquotation (as argued elsewhere), why is it that it's precisely the pronouns and tenses that get unquoted?

In order to solve the puzzle, I first presented a novel semantic analysis of reported speech, designed to describe also some less well-studied cases, such as signed and spoken reports, direct thought reports, and unquotation.

Next, armed with the formal apparatus of quotation and unquotation, I surveyed cases of apparent unquotation in various languages, drawing on descriptions in the typological literature, examples from sign languages, and data from child language experiments. It turned out that in all these diverse cases, unquotation can be described as the pragmatic resolution of a conflict between two opposing constraints: (i) *ATTRACTION*, use referring expressions to directly pick out the most salient entities relative to your own, i.e. reporting, context; and (ii) *VERBATIM*, when reporting directly, be faithful to the form of original utterance. Given our semantic framework, unquoting the expressions used to pick out the salient speech act participants (and salient entities surrounding them) allows the reporter to satisfy both constraints.

Seen in this light, the case of free indirect discourse is not fundamentally different from the way Kwaza speakers or Catalan signers use and interpret direct speech. The only difference is that in a typical, literary narrative (with a third person omniscient narrator), the greatest source of attraction is not the narrator and his here and now, but the story's protagonist, and her here and now, which are arguably much more salient.

Reducing the unquotation pattern found in free indirect discourse in this way to the much more general pragmatic phenomenon of attraction partially solves the puzzle of unquotation, viz. the question of why pronouns and tenses get unquoted. I thereby defended the quotational approach to free indirect discourse

from a serious charge of overgeneration. I have shown that unquotation is not an *ad hoc* stipulation to get the truth conditions for free indirect discourse right, but the result of a general pragmatic constraint resolution strategy found in a wide variety of direct discourse reporting constructions.

In closing, let me point out that the attraction explanation falls short of a complete answer to the puzzle of unquotation in free indirect discourse. Attraction explains why (most) pronouns and tenses are unquoted in free indirect discourse, but it fails to explain why certain non-pronominal indexicals are *not* unquoted. Why does the narrator in (37) reproduce his protagonist's *tomorrow*, *here* or *this* verbatim, while unquoting pronouns and tenses to satisfy ATTRACTION? In the end, it looks like we still have to assume some additional, grammatical constraints on what can in principle be unquoted in a given direct discourse construction. Thus, from the very limited data we have encountered in this paper we might hypothesize that English and Kwaza direct speech in principle allows unquotation of at least second person pronouns, while the grammar of role shift in some sign languages may be more flexible, allowing unquotation of any pointing sign. Free indirect discourse then comes out similar to role shift in allowing unquotation of all pronominal elements.

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