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The Arabs in Israel: A National Minority and Cheap Labor Force, a Split Labor Market Analysis

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THE ARABS IN ISRAEL:
A National Minority and Cheap Labor Force
A Split Labor Market Analysis

by

SAMIR M. MIARI

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate
School of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor Of Philosophy

NOVEMBER

1986

DEDICATION

To my wife Yosra and our two beloved daughters, Tanya and Lena, whose sacrifices are beyond repay.

To my parents, Samiyah and Mostafa Miari, whose sincere efforts to give me the best were hampered by the Arab-Jewish conflict.

And, to all those Arabs and Jews who wish to understand, in earnest, the Arab-Jewish relations so that the future could be made better.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to extend my gratitude to the many people who helped in making this study possible. First and foremost I wish to thank members of my committee for their valuable comments and support: Drs. Kathleen McCourt, Peter Whalley, co-chairs, Christine Fry, and Vincent Mahler, members. I am particularly indebted to Peter Whalley, co-chair of my committee, for his continuous advice and support throughout, particularly during the early stages of this project. His intellectual contribution has been invaluable in defining the problem at hand.

Thanks are also due to Dr. David Fasenfest of the Sociology Department at Loyola University who read the manuscript and provided much valued comments and advice.

Special thanks are due to my family whose encouragement, continued support and comfort always came when they were most needed. Without such support and understanding the task at hand would have been impossible. Special thanks are also due to my brother, Suhail Miari, who spared no efforts to make me and my family feel welcomed in his newly adopted country. His help in many ways contributed to the successful completion of this project. I also wish to extend my thanks to my father and mother in-law, Abdul-Rahim and Mariam Haj-Yahia, for their continued support throughout this period. Their frequent visits to

this far away land served as a reminder of the realities and flavour of the Middle-East.

VITA

Samir Miari is the second of fifteen brothers and sisters born to Mostafa and Samiyah Miari. He was born on June 13, 1946 in Birwa, a small village on the western tip of the hills of Galilee, Palestine. As a result of the Arab-Jewish war of 1948 Birwa was destroyed and Mr. Miari and his family began what turned out to be a series of relocations until 1950 when they finally settled in Maker, another Arab village in western Galilee, where he and his family still live. He completed his elementary education in Maker in 1960. In 1964 he graduated from Yanni High School in Kofer-Yasif, a near-by village.

In 1969, Samir graduated from the School of Social Work at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Upon graduation Samir worked as a deputy director of the International Cultural Center for Youth, in East Jerusalem. In June of 1970, he moved to the National Insurance Institute as a rehabilitation social worker in East Jerusalem. There he helped establish the first rehabilitation services for Arab workers.

In 1971 Samir travelled to the United States for further education. Between September 1971 and May 1973 he attended the George Warren Brown School of Social Work at Washington University in St. Louis Missouri. During the Academic year 1972-73 Samir was awarded a research assistantship from Washington University and on May 1973 he received his MSW.

Between the years 1974 and 1977 he attended School of Engineering at the Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C. In 1977 Samir returned to his country. During the following five years he worked in a variety of settings. He was the senior social worker for the drug addiction clinic in Akko, in Northern Israel, from 1977 to May 1980; students advisor then lecturer in the School of Social Work at Haifa University, from July 1977 to August 1982; part-time lecturer at Beir-Zeit University in the West Bank, from February 1980 to June 1982; and senior supervisor at the ministry of Social Betterment, working mostly with Arab social workers in the Little Triangle, from September 1979 to August 1981.

In August 1982 he was awarded a research assistantship for three consecutive years from the department of Sociology, Loyola University of Chicago, where he pursued his doctoral studies. From 1984 to December 1986 Samir worked as statistical consultant at the Loyola Computer Center.

Samir plans to return home and resume his teaching career at one of the local universities where he will conduct further studies on the Arab-Jewish relations.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

RACE/ETHNICITY IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL LITERATURE

The era following World War II which signaled the beginning of decolonialization has witnessed a renewed interest by sociologists in the question of race and ethnic relations. This renewed interest in research and theory building reflects, more than anything else, the persistence of ethnicity and the emergence of many ethnic conflicts within and between societies around the world. Aside from class, race and ethnicity are probably the most widely recognized lines along which cleavages within most of the world's societies occur. According to Glazer and Moynihan, until quite recently in the west "the preoccupation with property relations obscured ethnic ones", at least in Western societies, but now "it is property that begins to seem derivative, and ethnicity that seems to become a more fundamental source of stratification".¹

The emergence of racial/ethnic conflicts, however, stands in direct contradiction to the assertions by early sociologists of the inevitable mitigation and even disappearance of race/ethnicity as a factor in intra and inter-societal relations. Weber, for example, argued that ethnicity

¹ Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975, p. 17.

or 'ethnic honour' is one more example of irrationality. According to him, communal consciousness and ethnic identity flourished only in the absence of 'rationally regulated action'. Hence, ethnic consciousness and identity could not be expected to survive within the confines of bureaucratic rationality which Weber saw as sweeping over the western world. Karl Marx, similarly, described what he called the "remains of nationalities" as "fanatic partisans of the counter-revolution" and foresaw their disappearance as an inevitable outcome of the 'great historical revolution'.² Tonnies' famous dichotomy of *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft* also reflected a process whereby irrational, kin-like or tribal bonds between people give way to affiliation based on mutual interest and need. Durkheim, similarly, talked about the process where organic solidarity would replace mechanical solidarity. The fact that ethnic relations were long ignored by sociologists is partly due to such assertions by the sociological giants. According to Rex, for a long time race was considered the domain of biology but, he adds, "evenwhen the falseness of racist biology was systematically exposed, some sociologists were inclined to argue that the problem simply did not exist."³

The historical development of race and ethnic relations, however, proves that neither industrialization, modernization and urbanization, nor class solidarity have been powerful enough to do away with ethnicity

² Parkin, F., Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979, p. 31.

³ Rex, J., Race Relations and Sociological Theory, Schocken Books Inc. New York: N.Y. 1970, p. 1.

as a focal point of societal cleavages. The inadequacy of the earlier formulations is magnified not only by the persistence of racial and ethnic conflicts but also by the intensification of these conflicts. we need alternative explanations.

Contemporary Racial and Ethnic Theorizing:

The last two decades have witnessed a renewed interest by sociologists in the study of racial and ethnic problems. As research efforts intensified several theorizing patterns began to emerge. Among the areas of ethnic relations that have received the most attention have been: ethnic prejudice, consciousness and identity, and ethnic solidarity. The underlying assumption of most research in these areas seem to be the argument that, given the level of modernization and industrialization, and given the fact that ascriptive criteria are being replaced by achievement criteria, (for assigning roles, positions, rewards and privileges), then integration and assimilation will be forthcoming. The structural and political arrangements of western liberal democracies in particular were considered conducive to the promotion of a value consensus and therefore to integration and assimilation. It is also generally assumed in such arguments that the system is interested in promoting social harmony. Because one of the characteristics of the capitalist system is that it operates through economic rationality and, since social harmony and the absence of conflict are in line with such economic rationality, it seemed not unreasonable to attribute the lack of ethnic integration or its slow

process to factors other than structural or political. This is especially so when the public ideology speaks loudly of such goals.

Thus, when studying ethnic groups, researchers have stressed cultural variables, miscegenation, or as Harris (1959) prefers it 'endogamy' vs. 'exogamy', attitudes, prejudices, patterns of residential segregation and the like. All of these variables are said to result either in the emergence of 'collective identity' which hinders integration, or enhance integration and assimilation. While the study of these variables is important and at times can yield some explanations it does not in and of itself adequately explain either the persistence of ethnic conflicts or their inter and intra-societal variations.

Because such approaches failed to account for the continued persistence of ethnic conflicts, another 'extreme' view, to use Bonacich's term,⁴ which argues for the primordialness of ethnicity emerged. This view argues that ethnicity, race, and nationality (in short, communalistic frames) are 'natural bonds' which link people together. Such a bond is strongest when shared ancestry is the common denominator. However, according to Bonacich there are at least three reasons for questioning the primordial nature of such communalistic ties. First, as a result of interbreeding, a mixed ancestry is continuously being generated which makes it problematic to define ethnic boundaries.⁵ Second, intra-ethnic conflicts and class struggles have

⁴ Bonacich, E., 'Class Approaches to Ethnicity and Class', The Insurgent Sociologist, vol. X, no. 2, Fall, 1980, p. 10.

⁵ In his comparative analysis of four societies (Mexico, Brazile, the U.S. and South Africa), Van den Berghe (1967) argued that where these

persisted in spite of shared ancestry. Third, the fierceness of conflicts based on ethnicity, race, and nationality is not dependent upon shared ancestry. In other words, the fact that ethnic groups share common ancestry does not necessarily make the inter-ethnic conflicts milder and vice versa.

Because of these reasons Bonacich concludes that "ethnic, national, and racial solidarity and antagonism are all socially created phenomena" which use "primordial sentiments". But these sentiments which are based on ancestry are "not just there", they must be "constructed" and "activated".⁶

The model of primordial ethnicity theory accepts ethnic division as given and proceeds to comment on its consequences. These are seen as either negative in the form of discrimination against out-groups or positive in the form of support for the in-group members. Such analysis is typical of the psychologically rooted tradition which can best be characterized as ahistorical and politically naive. Criticism has been levelled against such approaches for their inadequacy to explain much.

As Wolpe noted:

In sum, a member from a racial group is treated unequally, it is asserted, because he is defined as a member of that group..... This would seem to give rise to questions concerning the conditions in which definitions or attitudes of hostility arise but, in fact, sociologists who adopt this approach take this simply as given and, as a consequence, race relations are removed from both an economic and structural context and treated as an area sui generis.⁷

interbreeding or, miscegenation were accepted racism was lowest.

⁶ Bonacich, E., 1980, p. 11.

⁷ Wolpe, H., 'Industrialization and Race in South Africa'. In:

Van den Burghe accuses such research of trivializing race/ethnicity and characterizes sociologists who undertake such approaches as conservative and politically naive. He said:

The stance of the liberal academic establishment on the issue of race was not only conservative and politically naive, it was also bad sociology, because it attacked mostly epiphenomena like attitudes, stereotypes, and discrimination rather than the underlying historical, economic, and political causes of racism. Ask trivial questions and you get trivial answers. And, at the policy level, trivial answers cannot solve fundamental problems...⁸

Schermerhorn complained that in recent years the trend has been to depend more on updating the results of scientific studies in the field than on "rethinking them".⁹

A decade later a similar criticism was levelled against the inadequacy of research on racial/ethnic relations. In the fall of 1980, for example, a special edition was published by The Insurgent Sociologist designed to further the development of sociology of race and ethnicity which placed them, according to the Binghamton Collective, "...within the larger context of class, capitalist development, anti-imperialist struggles and the transition to socialism."¹⁰ The editorial board argues that "Sociologists have followed the lead of journalists and politicians in focusing upon racial/ethnic tensions, while ignoring the class and colonial bases for conflicts which have arisen at various

Zubaida, S. (ed.), Race and Racialism, London: Tanistock Publication, 1970, p. 156.

⁸ Van den Burghe, Intergroup Relations, Basic Books, New York, 1972, pp. 10-11.

⁹ Schermerhorn, Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research, New York: Random House, 1970, p. 9.

¹⁰ The Insurgent Sociologist, vol. X, no. 2, Fall 1980, p. 3.

periods in time..... These simplistic analyses contribute to the mystification process and tend to reinforce a conservative, status-quo line of political action."¹¹

Despite such criticisms, or perhaps because of it, sociological inquiry into the field of race/ethnic relations has continued to yield several theoretical formulations. The most recent of such theoretical formulation is the 'Split Labor Market Theory', which relates ethnic antagonism to conflicting economic interests between, basically, two classes: capitalists and high paid workers.¹² Its claim to validity lies in the fact that it avoids the pitfalls inherent in attributing ethnic discrimination to primordial human nature and the notion that ethnic solidarity, and hence ethnic discrimination, is a remnant of pre-capitalist societies and expected to vanish with modernization. Consequently, in explaining group variations of ethnic antagonism, majority-minority relations are not treated as a simple dichotomy. Rather, majority groups are identified and their relations with and attitudes towards the minority are analyzed on the basis of their material interests.

Such a treatment of the majority is befitting the Israeli case in which the status of the Arab minority has been sensitive to intra-Jewish cleavages. While on the surface it appears that differential attitudes

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Bonacich, E., 'A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market'. American Sociological Review, vol. 37, (October), pp. 547-59.

toward the Arabs are split along ethnic lines (Oriental- Ashkenazi),¹³ in reality this split is rooted in the conflicting material interests of the two Jewish ethnic groups which are derived from their different locations within the occupational hierarchy.

From this perspective there is a remarkable similarity between Israel and South Africa where the status of the nonwhites was shown to be influenced by conflicting material interests between business and white labor.¹⁴ In her analysis Bonacich shows that there exists a definite relationship between the occupational location of members of the 'majority' (white minority) and their attitude toward the nonwhites. She has shown that the status of the colored in South Africa has been contingent upon the results of a continuous struggle between two 'white' groups with conflicting material interests: capitalists and labor. Accordingly, Bonacich was able to map-out the attitudes of each group with regard to policies related to the coloreds and document the methods by which these attitudes have been institutionalized and are expressed.

¹³ Among all the terms used to indicate the Jewish ethnic cleavages in Israel, Oriental-Ashkenazi seems the most adequate. 'Orientals' is used instead of 'Sephardim' because Sephardim includes European Jews from England, France, Italy, and Greece, who were dispersed from Spain following the Crusades in Europe and the Spanish Inquisition (see Schnall, D., Radical Dissent in Contemporary Israeli Politics, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979, f.n. p. 156). Similarly, while some writers prefer the use of the term 'Western' others prefer Ashkenazi. Although 'Ashkenaz' means Germany, the term has gained a wide usage in Israeli society and has come to describe the privileged non-Oriental Jewish population which includes Jews from Europe, America, and even Russia. Hence, throughout this thesis the terms Orientals and Ashkenazim will be used to identify two culturally distinct Jewish ethnic communities.

¹⁴ See Bonacich, E., 'Capitalism and Race Relations in South Africa: A Split Labor Market Analysis'. In: Zeitlin, M. (ed.), Political Power and Social Theory, vol. 2, Greenwich: Connecticut, 1980, pp. 239-271.

In her analysis, labor is shown to be more hostile toward the colored and has continuously supported exclusionary policies whereas capitalists were shown to be more supportive of inclusionary policies.

Since the split labor market theory will be used throughout this analysis an expanded presentation of its concepts and theoretical underpinnings is necessary.

THE SPLIT LABOR MARKET - THEORETICAL FORMULATION

The theory of the split labor market has been undergoing modification and refinement ever since it was first formulated by Edna Bonacich in 1972. The most recent modification was introduced in 1986 by Bosewell who elaborated and clarified some of its concepts, and introduced new ones of his own.¹⁵

The general premise of the theory is that economic processes are more 'fundamental' to the development of ethnic antagonism in a given society than racial and cultural differences. The key concept, 'ethnic antagonism', was chosen by Bonacich for analytical accuracy. The use of the term 'ethnic' was preferred over the term 'racial' for two reasons; a) while races come from continents, Bonacich argues, ethnic groups come from 'subsections of continents'; b) discrimination (exclusion and/or caste-like treatment) could be found 'among national groupings within a racial category.'¹⁶ Similarly, the term antagonism was preferred over other terms such as prejudice and discrimination because the former carries 'fewer moralistic and theoretical assumptions' in that it allows for the possibility of reciprocity.

The central hypothesis is that ethnic antagonism is one of the consequences of a labor market split along ethnic lines. In order for a labor market to be split two conditions have to be met: a) two or more

¹⁵ Bosewell, T., 'A Split Labor Market Analysis of Discrimination Against Chinese Immigrants, 1850-1882,' American Sociological Review, 1986, Vol. 51 June PP. 353-71.

¹⁶ Bonacich, 1972, p. 75.

labor groups must exist in a society, and b) there must exist a discrepancy in the price of labor for doing the same work, or that a discrepancy in their price would exist if they were to do the same work. This split in the labor force is usually superimposed on the market by the business community. As a result of the expansion of the economy and/or high benefits and wages gained by local labor, business tends to turn to other sources of labor power. These sources are found either locally in distant and isolated communities, or through the importation of foreign labor, or through frontier expansion and occupation. The newly acquired labor force is paid, usually, less than the local labor.

As a result of discrepancies in the price of labor, a conflict develops between "three key classes: business, high paid labor, and cheap labor"¹⁷ The business class is mainly interested in keeping production costs as low as possible in order to compete in the market and/or increase the margin of profitability. Thus, when local labor costs are high business tends to either import cheap labor or use "indigenous conquered populations". Consequently, the higher paid labor feels threatened since the new class of cheap labor will replace the higher paid labor in some industries and/or geographical areas which has the effect of undermining the bargaining power of the high paid labor. In reaction high paid labor develops hostility and antagonism toward cheap labor, even though "cheap labor does not intentionally undermine more expensive labor".¹⁸ In fact it is the cheap labor's weakness,

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 81.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 83.

Bonacich argues, "that makes it so threatening, for business can more thoroughly control it."¹⁹ If such a split in the labor market occurs along ethnic lines, Bonacich argues, then "the class antagonism takes the form of ethnic antagonism"²⁰

Although the concept antagonism was chosen to allow for reciprocity, cheap labor initially plays only a passive role. The major conflict develops between the high paid labor and business. A victory for the former is manifested in either exculsion of or caste-like treatment for minority labor. While the exclusion movement aims at preventing the physical presence of cheap labor in and around employment areas, the caste system attempts to apply exclusivity to the higher paying jobs and restrict cheap labor from entering these categories. Both systems result in the preservation of high pay for already advantaged labor and discriminate against low paid workers. Exclusion, however, represents a more complete victory for the high paid labor and, therefore, Bonacich argues, it is the preferred system even if it means the high paid labor has "to do the dirty work"²¹ themselves.

The split labor market theory is essentially a materialistic theory in that it takes economics as its most basic variable. Bonacich argues that the status of ethnic minorities in the occupational structure is determined by the outcome of a continuous conflict between employers and 'white' labor. The formation of attitudes toward minority labor is both

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 81.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 82.

²¹ Ibid., p. 88.

a part and a product of this conflict. As will be seen this point is made clearer by Bosewell who introduces the notion of 'racist discourse'. The 'cheapness' of cheap labor is attributed by Bonacich to lack of 'resources' which are available to it at the point of origination, and the inability of such labor to organize politically and economically thereafter.

In this sense Bonacich diverges from Marxist analysis which argues that the capitalist class aided by the powers of the state is basically responsible for the creation and maintenance of ethnic divisions. The racist attitudes of expensive labor are explained by Marxists as the result of being bought off by capital which is responsible for the diffusion of false ideology, for the purpose of segmenting the working class, and the eventual adoption of such ideology by expensive labor. According to Burawoy, a Marxist scholar, racism is used to divide because it "is such a powerful ideology, binding together classes within racial groups, shaping class interests, promoting particular configurations of alliances, and generally shaping the terrain and expressions of class struggle."²² Bonacich, on the other hand, accords expensive labor a major role in the power struggle and considers their racist attitudes to be a consequence of their attempt to protect themselves from being displaced by the cheap labor, at the initiative of capital. She argues that "Business..... rather than desiring to protect a segment of the working class supports a liberal or laissez-

²² Burawoy, 'The Capitalist State of South Africa: Marxist and Sociological Perspectives on Race and Class'. In: Zeitlin, M. (ed.), Political Power and Social Theory, vol. 2, Greenwich: Connecticut, 1980, p. 292.

faire ideology that would permit all workers to compete freely in an open market. Open competition would displace higher paid labor."²³

While the theory has been successfully used to explain antagonism between blacks and whites²⁴ certain areas and concepts of the theory remain either ambiguous or undeveloped. Bosewell mentions three such areas. He, rightly, points out that: 1) there is an ambiguity concerning the dynamics which reproduce split labor market conditions; 2) the theory completely neglects the function of a racist ideology, or what Bosewell calls 'racist discourse', and the role of the state; and 3) the theory does not elaborate on the consequences of the reproduction of split labor market conditions and racist discourse for labor market segregation.²⁵

Related to the first point is the question of the continued cheapness of cheap labor. Burawoy, for example, rejects the notion of cheap labor altogether. He argues that the responsibility of the state for the reproduction not only of labor power but the labor process, i.e., the reproduction of the system of exploitation as a whole, makes the 'price' of cheap labor rather expensive. This is because in order to guarantee the 'cheapness' of labor to the individual employer, the state oppresses struggles, regulates the flow of labor and so on.²⁶

²³ Bonacich, 1972, p. 87.

²⁴ see Bonacich, 1975, 1976, 1980; Wilson, 1978; Bosewell, 1986.

²⁵ Bosewell, 1986, pp. 353-55.

²⁶ See Burawoy, 1980, p. 285.

While this argument by Burawoy is basically correct it is only half the truth. If the state is as powerful as Burawoy believes it to be (which is not altogether erroneous), then the state can create and justify the existence of mechanisms through which the costs are passed on to minority labor. Such was the case, for example, with the Chinese immigrant workers who were required in 1852 by a California law to pay \$3 per month for the privillage of mining. It did not matter that the law was declared unconstitutional in 1870 because by then mining had become unprofitable anyway.²⁷ Beyond that, maintaining 'law and order' and regulating the flow of minority labor in underdevelopd societies may not be as expensive as Burawoy supposes. One should remember that in such societies where unequal development is characteristic, minority labor is dependent on the developed segment for many services, the most important of which is transportation. Without such a service minority labor is usually immobile and unthreatening.

In Israel, for instance, Ian Lustick (1980) shows that the Israeli authorities achieved almost total control over the Arab minority through three mechanisms all of which were handled at a fraction of the cost. These were: segmentation through isolation and fragmentation; economic dependence; and co-optation of leadership. The last is shown to be particularly effective and cheap in light of the traditional Arab mode of family organization exemplified by the extended family.

²⁷ For more details see Bosewell, 1986, p. 359.

Hence, although the intervention of the state is necessary to generate and maintain the cheapness of low-cost minority labor other factors influence the discrepancy in the price of labor and should be considered, at least during the initial stages. For example, the differential cost of labor can be a result of differential resources (economic and political) which are available to the two groups of labor respectively, as Bonacich argues. Or, such differentials in wages can simply be the product of "regional or national differences in income and the cost of living which result from uneven development of capitalism."²⁸ While such conditions can produce differential wages during the initial stages they cannot account for the continuation of the low cost of minority labor. Bonacich explains the continuation in wage differential, or more precisely the low cost of minority labor on the basis of what she calls "weak market position".²⁹ She does not define the source of this weakness, however.

In fact, beyond the initial stages one should expect wages to eventually equalize due to an increase in demand for cheap labor and a corresponding decrease in demand for expensive labor (the logic of supply and demand). Unless, of course, other factors are introduced which cause overcrowdedness of cheap labor in certain industries and/or geographic locations. Under such circumstances the split labor market is reproduced, and hence the continued 'cheapness' of minority labor is guaranteed. According to Bosewell, "market crowding increases the

²⁸ Bosewell, 1986, p. 353.

²⁹ Bonacich, 1976, pp. 39-40.

relative supply of minority labor for a position, thus reproducing the ethnic split in labor cost. Crowding in one industry will push minorities to other industries, spreading split labor market conditions and ethnic antagonism throughout the labor market."³⁰

To create such conditions the function of ideology and the role of the state must be considered. While Bonacich (1980) completely ignores the role of the state, Burawoy (1980), as noted, accords it a major role in creating and maintaining cheap minority labor. This is particularly true in the case of settler colonial situations such as South Africa and Israel. As will be shown later, through confiscation of Arab property the Israeli government increased the availability of Arab labor. However, restrictions imposed on the movement of this labor to certain geographic locations forced Arab labor to accept even cheaper wages than they would have otherwise. The eventual replacement of geographical restrictions by sectoral and positional restrictions resulted, furthermore, in overcrowdedness which has had the effect of maintaining Arab labor at low cost. Bosewell (1986) elaborates on the role of the state from a split labor market perspective. The intervention of the state is required in conjunction with a specific ideology because, according to Bosewell, "the initial ethnic differences in the cost of labor will not be continually reproduced under competitive market conditions unless workers continue to be ideologically identified."³¹ However, the state actions cannot be seen as totally dependent on the

³⁰ Bosewell, 1986, p. 353.

³¹ Ibid., p. 354.

political power of the 'victorious', i.e., expensive labor or capital. It is also contingent upon "the potential effects on the economy in general and tax revenues in particular, the national and international political environment, and the sequence of elections."³²

Bosewell makes a significant contribution by distinguishing between the long term interests of the working class and the interests of the individual worker. While the long term interest of the working class is to prevent discrimination, he argues, it is in the individual worker's interest to support state actions aimed at limiting the competitive potential of minority labor.

³² Ibid., p. 354.

ARAB-JEWISH RELATIONS

The Pre-State Period:

Intra-Jewish conflict of interest with respect to the Arabs seems to have surfaced long before the state was established. This intra-Jewish conflict revolved around the employment status of the Arabs in Jewish businesses and was manifested despite the continuing Arab-Jewish bloody conflict over the land of Palestine throughout that period.

Relations between Arabs and Jews began deteriorating in the last quarter of the nineteenth century when Jews, represented by the Zionist Organization, announced their intentions to return to Palestine to "rebuild" a homeland for the Jewish people and were exacerbated by the subsequent Jewish immigration which followed. Prior to that period, the Jewish community living in Palestine had developed good relations with the Arabs. Numbering around 24,000 and living mostly in the four towns of Hebron, Safed, Jerusalem and Tiberias, half of this Jewish community was Sephardic (Oriental), and the other half Ashkenazi or European.

Even then, however, relations between the Arabs and the two Jewish ethnic communities were differentiated. According to Kalvarisky, a Jewish administrator of the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association,

The Sephardim,.... in the course of their work or commerce had business connections with the Arabs and sometimes went into partnership with them. The relations between the Sephardic Jews and the Arabs were good, and many Jews and Arabs became firm friends.³³

³³ Cited in A. Cohen, 1970, p. 46.

The Ashkenazim, on the other hand, are described as having had no contact with the Arab inhabitants of Palestine.

The nature of relations between the Arabs and the Ashkenazim, however, began to change with the arrival of the first Jewish immigrant group to Palestine. This group of immigrants, known as the first aliyah (literally "ascendance", but implies immigration to Palestine/Israel), comprising 25,000 Jews from Russia and Rumania arrived in Palestine during the period between 1882 and 1903. The new settlers, according to Lucas, "had a capitalistic and colonialistic approach to the land and the Arab population was seen as a reservoir of extraordinary cheap labour."³⁴ Indeed, it is reported that these early immigrants employed ten times as many Arabs as Jews.³⁵

The exploitation of the native Arabs was not dissimilar to colonial patterns on the African Continent and elsewhere.³⁶ It was characterized by the settlers' cultural distaste and racist antagonism toward the natives.³⁷ Accordingly, out of sense of a superiority the Jewish settlers referred to the Arabs of Palestine as barbarians.³⁸

³⁴ Lucas, N. The Modern History of Israel, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974, pp. 24-5.

³⁵ Hirst, D. The Gun and the Olive Branch, London: Faber and Faber, 1977, p. 25.

³⁶ Weinstock, N. "The Impact of Zionist Colonization on Palestine Arab Society Before 1948". Journal of Palestine Studies, 2 (Winter), pp. 50-51.

³⁷ Childers, E. "The Worldless Wish: From Citizens to Refugees". In I. Abu-Lughod (ed.), The Transformation of Palestine, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971, p. 166.

³⁸ Hirst, 1977, p. 22.

While organized Jewish groups continued to immigrate to Palestine the newcomers were not united in their approach to the Arabs. Between 1882 and May 1948 (just before the establishment of the state was proclaimed), 517,200 Jewish immigrants had arrived in Palestine, mostly from East European countries (see Table 1.1). Whereas the First aliyah sought after and exploited cheap Arab labor settlers of the Second and Third aliyahs (1904-1923) objected vehemently to the employment of Arabs in Jewish businesses and enterprises. It was during the Second aliyah that the concept of "conquest of labour", which meant the replacement of Arab workers by Jewish workers, was first introduced. The Histadrut, which was founded in 1920 as the General Federation of Hebrew Workers, was the strongest and most militant of all organizations which opposed Arab employment. In 1933 the Histadrut began using even force to remove Arab workers from Jewish enterprises.³⁹

³⁹ See the statement by Flappan in Chapter 6.

Table 1.1
Immigration of Jews to Palestine and Israel
by Continent of Origin and Period of Immigration
1882-1975

Period	All Countries (thnds)	Asia & Africa % (1)	Eastern Europe % (2)	Central Europe % (3)	Balkans % (4)	Western Europe % (5)	Others %
1882-1903	25,000	4.0	96.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
1904-14	40,000	5.0	95.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
1919-23	35,100	4.7	84.2	4.6	2.1	4.4	0.0
1924-31	81,600	12.3	78.3	2.7	2.7	4.0	0.0
1932-38	197,200	9.0	60.3	22.9	3.9	3.9	0.0
1939-45	81,800	18.3	34.4	37.0	6.8	3.5	0.0
1946-My48	56,500	4.0	67.7	21.0	4.5	2.8	0.0
1948	101,819	14.0	53.0	8.2	21.4	0.7	2.6
1949	239,576	47.5	27.5	12.6	9.5	0.5	2.4
1950	170,215	49.6	44.9	2.8	0.9	0.6	1.2
1951	175,129	70.8	25.7	1.3	1.1	0.3	0.8
1952-54	54,065	75.8	11.7	2.7	2.1	3.8	3.9
1955-57	164,936	68.2	23.0	5.7	0.2	1.7	1.1
1958-60	75,487	36.0	55.5	1.9	0.4	3.5	2.5
1961-64	288,046	60.5	31.9	1.2	0.2	4.7	1.5
1965-67	60,793	37.8	13.6	2.3	0.1	8.8	4.2
1968-73	247,802	26.8	37.5	2.2	0.1	18.7	7.9
1974-75	52,007	9.2	62.4	1.7	0.0	19.5	7.2

(1) Excluding South Africa.

(2) USSR, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania.

(3) Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary.

(4) Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Turkey.

(5) Other European Countries, North America, South America, South Africa and Oceania.

Source: Figures are calculated on the basis of Tables 2.7, p. 37 and 2.11, p. 41, in Dov Friedlander, The Population of Israel, New York: Columbia University Press, 1979; figures for the years 1882 to 1914 are from Sammy Smooha, Israel: Pluralism and Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, Table 9, p. 281.

It is important to note that while Jewish immigration to Palestine was continuing, more and more Arab peasants became hired labor. This was precipitated mostly by land purchases by the Jewish National Fund (J.N.F) and the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association from Palestinian and non-Palestinian feudal landlords (See Chapter 4 for more details). Since the beginning of the twentieth century the two agencies had embarked upon an ambitious program of land purchases through which large tracts of land were bought during a relatively short period of time. These purchases, however, resulted in either dispossession or eviction of the Arab peasants who were working the land. Having led a peasant life and lacking other alternatives the Arabs were willing to work for low wages. This fact was never absent from the minds of Jewish employers as well as Jewish workers. As Granott testifies:

The extent of Jewish labor in the old villages, which served as the center for private agricultural investment, was as a rule only limited, and even in those plantations which engaged Jewish workers, there was always a group of Arab employees receiving low wages in comparison with the Jews (emphasis added). The existence of such bodies of Arabs in Jewish villages was somewhat of a danger to security in times of emergency, and even more to the maintenance of a higher economic standard.⁴⁰

As this quotation indicates Jewish employers were not completely at liberty to reap the fruits of cheap Arab labor. Various Jewish groups fought against it and attempted to prevent it. Tensions among the Jewish population concerning the status of Arab labor surfaced as early as the early 1900's. The different resolutions passed by the Zionist

⁴⁰ Abraham Granott, Agrarian Reform and the Record of Israel, London: Ayre and Spottiswood, 1956, p. 51.

organization and the Histadrut condemning and prohibiting employment of Arab labor in Jewish businesses and enterprises, and prescribing sanctions against Jewish violators testifies to the seriousness of the "problem". This is to say, in addition to the national conflict which characterized Arab-Jewish relations, there was a conflicting material interest among the different Jewish groups which played a significant role in determining relations of the different Jewish communities with and attitudes toward the Arabs.

The Arab-Jewish war of 1948 ended, (at least temporarily), the bloody clashes between Arabs and Jews which had lasted almost fifty years. The immediate result of that was the establishment of the state of Israel and the dispersion of most of the Palestinian people who became refugees in adjacent Arab countries and elsewhere. A small Arab community, which numbered about 160,000 remained in Palestine and became a minority in the Jewish state.

The Post-State Period:

The state of war which has characterized relations between Israel and its Arab neighbours since 1948 has often been cited as the major impediment to the integration of the Arabs into the political, social and economic life of the state, mainly on security grounds. Government policy in the Arab sector, it is claimed, has been determined on the basis of security considerations. The claim has been made that Israeli Arabs, in view of their cultural affinity with the Arabs across the border and their physical and legal presence within the boundaries of Israel, pose a security risk to the state.

True, it would be an historical inaccuracy to ignore the national and security factors on shaping the predicament of the Arabs in Israel. After all, the Arabs are part of the Palestinian people who have been at war with the state since the beginning. Furthermore, it is doubtful that they have resigned themselves to accepting the state and its policies unconditionally. If anything the Arabs have been undergoing a process of re-Palestinianization and show an increased awareness of their Palestinian nationality and affiliation.

Furthermore, between Arabs and Jews there are primary linguistic, cultural and religious differences which have been institutionalized and cannot be expected to weaken as a result of Arab modernization, social mobility, the end of the state of war, or any other development. The Arabs are Arabic-speakers whereas Hebrew is the official language of the state and the Jewish population. Arabs are either Arab or Palestinian in nationality and Moslem, Christian or Druze in religion. They are therefore alienated from the basic ideology of a Jewish and a Zionist state.

In addition to their national and political losses, the Arabs have suffered great economic losses as a result of the establishment of the state. Many villages were destroyed during the 1948 war and the period after that, and much property and Arab land were confiscated. While some of the inhabitants of these villages remain in Israel they were never allowed to go back and reclaim their property and therefore became internal refugees. Add to that the fact that even though the Arabs are a minority in the Jewish state they are part of a greater majority in

the region. This is never forgotten by either the Arabs or the Jews. Hence, the national question constitutes a major division between Arabs and Jews in Israel.

Several institutional arrangements have been built into the very structure of the state which are designed to emphasize its Jewish sectarian character and consequently increased the rigidity of the Arab-Jewish division. Among these arrangements are: the Law of Return which grants automatic citizenship to Jews who immigrate to the state but not to Arabs; the adoption of Jewish symbols in the Israeli public domain; and, the induction of Jews but not Arabs into the armed forces. The last has come to constitute an admission criterion to many positions and job-categories and for entitlement to housing subsidies, grants, admission to institutions of higher education and even child allowances and other benefits. Using service in the armed forces as a basis for either entitlement or increased benefits was done with the prior knowledge that the Arabs are the only group which would not qualify. In consequence, these arrangements have institutionalized the Arab-Jewish division favouring Jews and discouraging the development of Arab (Palestinian) nationalism.

The security question is derived from this division. Consequently, certain policies and practices have been specifically designed to address the security issues which cover areas unrelated to security as the concept is applied in the West. To mention only one example, a return of those internal refugees to their former property would have been considered a threat to security, a possibility against which the Israeli authorities evidently felt compelled to guard.

Nonetheless, it would be equally misleading to attribute the state of Arab-Jewish relations in Israel to the national and security factors alone. For one thing the use of national security as a justification for differential treatment against the Arabs has been inconsistent.⁴¹ In addition, the differential attitudes toward the Arabs among the Jewish population along the Ashkenazi-Oriental axis, for example, weakens the security argument. While antagonism and prejudice by both ethnic groups towards the Arabs are high, they are higher among the Orientals than among Ashkenazim (see Chapter 3). Hence, unless one is willing to make the unreasonable assumptions that either the Orientals are more conscious than the Ashkenazim of the security requirements of the state, or that Orientals are more chauvinistic than other Jews, it is very difficult to explain this variation in antagonism on the basis of security grounds. As Schermerhorn points out "prejudice is a product of situations, historical situations, economic situations, political situations; it is not a demon that emerges in people simply because they are depressed."⁴²

The limitations of the security argument can further be demonstrated when one considers the status of the Druze community. This community constitutes about 10 percent of the non-Jewish population. Despite the fact that members of this community are the only non-Jews who have been inducted into the armed forces, their status does not fare much better than that of the other members of the Arab minority when it comes to

⁴¹ See Waschitz, 1975.

⁴² Schermerhorn, 1970, p. 6.

land confiscation, economic development, or the attitudes of the Jewish majority. Beyond that, however, the validity of the security argument can be questioned on the grounds that many of the official and unofficial policies and practices toward the Arabs pertain to areas which have no bearing whatever on national security. The expropriation of Arab lands (Chapter 4) and the refusal of the Histadrut to admit Arab labor to its ranks until 1959 (Chapter 6), are only two examples.

Liberalization of policies and practices toward the Arabs, as limited as they may be, which have ensued over the years despite the continuation of the state of war, suggests that other factors, in addition to the national aspect and the ensuing security considerations, are involved in the determination of the status of the Arabs. That these policies have not gone far enough toward integrating the Arabs in the social, political, and economic life of the state on an equal basis, despite the demonstrated military superiority of Israel vis-a-vis all the Arab countries combined, further reduces the explanatory power of the security argument.

Between 1948 and 1959 Arabs were almost completely excluded from Israeli economic, political and social life. Through a combination of military government orders which restricted the movement of Arabs and controlled a wide range of their daily activities and the successful efforts by the Israeli labor union (Histadrut) to keep Arab labor away from the Jewish labor market, a rigid Arab-Jewish division was maintained. The residential segregation between Arabs and Jews further enhanced this division (Chapter 2).

While the Arab-Jewish division continues to be maintained, a certain elasticity in the dividing line began to appear in the late 1950's. This was represented by: 1) the beginning of a process of relaxation of travel restrictions, 2) the eventual abolition of the system of military government in 1966, 3) the extension of union protection by the Histadrut to Arab workers in 1959, and 4) the opening of certain social mobility routes, although limited, to Arabs.

In this thesis, I will attempt to demonstrate that the status of the Arabs in Israel has been influenced by conflicting material interests of two Jewish ethnic groups: Ashkenazim and Orientals. It will be shown that, while the maintenance of a rigid Arab-Jewish division which excluded Arabs from the economic, political and social life of the state worked to the benefit of both Jewish groups, the Orientals benefited the most from such a situation. By contrast, Ashkenazim gain greater benefits from a certain elasticity in, but not the complete elimination of, the dividing line.

A rigid division which excludes Arabs provides employment opportunities to educated Orientals who man those agencies which either control or serve the Arabs because of their knowledge of and familiarity with the Arabic language and Arabic culture. In addition, the exclusion of Arabs provides protection for lower class Orientals who mostly man unskilled and semi-skilled positions. A rigid Arab-Jewish division, however, limits the access of Ashkenazim (who are mostly either managers or employers) to cheap Arab labor. The maintenance of an elastic division, on the other hand, while it continues to benefit the Oriental

middle-class, does not provide as effective a measure for protecting the lower-class. As to Ashkenazim, elastically maintained division results in the expansion of the system (because of the need to create extra organizational apparatus to maintain the division) which enables the accommodation of some of the demands of Orientals for equality without any loss to Ashkenazim. At the same time Ashkenazim can enjoy greater access to Arab labor. Consequently, it will be shown that while Orientals express greater hostility and support exclusionary policies toward the Arabs, Ashkenazim support more 'liberalized' policies.

Rather than being ethnically anchored, the intention of this thesis is to demonstrate that the heightened antagonism by Orientals toward the Arabs is partially derived from their material interests which are best served by the exclusion of Arabs. To be sure, the study does not intend to show the extent of discrimination and oppression against the Arabs in Israel. Much has already been said and written about the subject. Nor does the study intend to analyze Arab-Jewish relations in their totality. I only wish to demonstrate that the status of the Arabs in the Jewish state has been influenced by conflicting material interests of two Jewish ethnic groups; namely, Orientals and Ashkenazim. In consequence the analysis does not intend to detract from the significance of the national conflict between Arabs and Jews. The fundamental contradictions imbedded in the Arab-Jewish historical conflict over the land of Palestine continue to be the most significant element which governs the Arab-Jewish relations in Israel. My attempt here, therefore, is to add an additional dimension by examining the

effects which the dynamics of the intra-Jewish conflicts have on maintaining the Arabs in a segregated, subordinate position, and to explain some of the changes which have accrued over time.

The significance of this analysis stems from the fact that if indeed the heightened Oriental antagonism toward the Arabs is anchored ethnically rather than being materially motivated, the ascendance of Orientals to positions of power in Israel should be particularly worrisome to the Arabs. Worth noting in this regard is the fact that the Orientals' ability to influence policies has been gaining momentum. This is partly due to their increasing proportion in the Jewish population due to a relatively high birthrate and a decline in immigration from Western countries. The Orientals constitute over 60 percent of the Jewish population. While they are still grossly underrepresented in the country's military, political, and economic elites a noticeable rise in Oriental ascendance to positions of power (economic and political) can be expected.

If, on the other hand, this analysis is correct, and the attitudes of the Orientals toward the Arabs are indeed a derivative of their material interests, then the prospects of Orientals gaining a substantial representation in the country's institutions will not be accompanied by any dramatic changes in policies toward the Arabs because a change in their occupational positions will lead to a subsequent shift in their material interests.

As to the attitudes of the Jewish population in general, while one expects antagonism against Arabs to remain high, a convergence of attitudes between Ashkenazim and Orientals is very likely. When such time comes and occupational positions and power are more equitably allocated between the two Jewish groups, it is likely that the Jewish ethnic cleavages will be transformed into class cleavages. But even then their attitudes toward the Arab population will continue to be antagonistic because the primary dynamic which governs their relations with this population; namely, control over enemy-affiliated minority, will remain essentially the same.

CHAPTER II

THE ARAB MINORITY

The unequal development of the Arab and Jewish sectors in Palestine continued in the post-state period. Having come mostly from developed countries, Jewish immigrants (see Table 1.1) were more technologically and educationally advanced than the indigenous Palestinian Arabs. Furthermore, the economic activities of the Zionist organization and other Jewish institutions during the pre-state period undermined economic development in the Arab sector.¹ The persistence of these conditions meant that from the beginning of the state of Israel conditions existed which produced wage differentials between Arabs and Jews.

In addition, the perpetual forced co-existence which typified Arab-Jewish relations since the inception of the Zionist settlement did not change with the establishment of the state. To the contrary, the Arab-Jewish division was now institutionalized. The maintenance of the Arab-Jewish division legitimized discrimination against the Arabs and provided the ideological basis for the continuous reproduction of split labor market conditions, condemning the Arabs to dead-end low paying

¹ For further details on the effect of the Jewish economic activities on the Arab economy see Zureik, The Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1979, especially chapter 3.

jobs. Thus, while certain conditions initially existed which were responsible for the initial Arab-Jewish differentiation, others were 'constructed' and became instrumental in perpetuating this differentiation.

This chapter will describe these constructed conditions: the demographic distribution and continued segregation of Arabs; the methods, mechanisms and institutions responsible for boundary maintenance between Arabs and Jews; and the availability of and access to economic, educational and political resources. In addition, I will discuss the effect of ideology on how Arabs are viewed in Jewish academic circles which in turn has the effect of perpetuating the dominant ideology.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARABS

The most immediate consequence of the establishment of the state was the reduction of the demographic status of the Arabs from a majority to a minority. Close to 900,000 Palestinians inhabited Palestine at the time of the issuance of the Declaration of Independence proclaiming the establishment of the state of Israel on May 14, 1948. Following the 1948 Arab-Jewish war, only 160,000 Arabs remained within what came to be known as the Armistic lines -- later the Green lines--.² The rest of the Palestinians were dispersed and became refugees scattered throughout the Middle-East and beyond.

² J. Abu-Lughod, 'The Demographic Transformation of Palestine', in I. Abu-Lughod (ed.) The Transformation of Palestine, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971, p. 161.

Hence, contact between Arabs and Jews involves what Stanley Lieberman³ calls subordination of an indigenous population by a migrant group. Whereas the Arabs represent only a fraction of the original indigenous Palestinian people, the Jewish population grew mostly as a result of immigration. From 1882 to May 1948 (just before the proclamation of the establishment of the state), 517,200 Jews had immigrated to Palestine. From 1948 to 1975 another 1,629,875 Jews entered the country as immigrants (Table 1.1).

While the number of Arabs in Israel increased over the years their relative proportion in the general population remained somewhat constant, ranging between 11 and 14 percent. High birthrates, especially within the Moslem community, a decrease in infant mortality, and low levels of out migration on the part of the Arabs seem to have offset the high level of immigration among the Jewish population (Table 2.1)

³ Lieberman, S., 'A Societal Theory of Race and Ethnic Relations.' American Sociological Review, 1961, vol. 26, pp. 902-10.

TABLE 2.1
 Jewish and Arab Population in Israel:
 1949-1981 (in thousands)

Year	Total Population	Jews	Arabs	Arabs as % of Total
1949	1,173.9	1,013.9	160.0	13.6
1955	1,789.1	1,590.5	198.6	11.1
1960	2,150.4	1,911.3	239.1	11.1
1965	2,598.4	2,299.1	299.3	11.5
1970	2,944.0(a)	2,582.0	362.0	12.3
1975	3,405.2	2,959.4	445.8	13.1
1980	3,811.7	3,282.7	529.0	13.8
1981	3,877.3	3,320.3	545.0	14.0

Source: Statistical Abstracts of Israel, Jerusalem, no. 33, 1982, p.31

(a) Includes Arabs of East-Jerusalem.

It is estimated that almost 70 percent of the Arabs are Moslems,⁴ about 20 percent Christians and 10 percent Druze.⁵

The great majority of the Palestinians who had inhabited the area in which Israel was established either fled or were forced out during the war or were expelled by the Israeli authorities thereafter. Only 107

⁴ The addition of the Arabs of East Jerusalem raises the proportion of Moslems to about 78 percent.

⁵ A sect which is an offshoot separated from Islam around the 11th century. The Druze are concentrated basically in Northern Israel, Syria and Lebanon. For a detailed yearly estimates in the relative proportions of the three religious groups, see Dove Friedlander, 1979, Table 2.4, p.34; Sabri Jiryis, 1976, Table 4, p. 291.

villages out of 585 in this area remained.⁶ The large urban centers were almost totally emptied of their Arab inhabitants. Only 10 percent, or close to 29,000 Palestinians, out of the over 300,000 who inhabited the big urban centers of Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, Lydd-Ramleh, Nazareth, Akka, Tiberias and Safed remained in these cities.⁷

Most of the remaining Arabs live in Galilee in the North, with two other major concentrations in the Little Triangle, in the Center, and in the South where the Bedouins reside. The annexation of East Jerusalem since 1967, however, added another major concentration in the Jerusalem district (Table 2.2). As noted earlier, those Arabs, who numbered around 66,000 in 1967, do not share the experience of the Arabs in Israel. They are still considered by most of the world community, which does not recognize the annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel, and in turn consider themselves to be, under occupation. While they are not included in this analysis, their inclusion in the demographic statistics is due to the difficulty of separating them from the general figures given by the Israeli Abstracts.⁸ The increase in the Central district, however, came as a result of an agreement between Israel and Jordan in 1949 which gave the former control over the villages of the Little Triangle.

⁶ Zayyad, T., 1976, p. 94.

⁷ See Lustick, I., 1980, Table 2, p. 49.

⁸ The number of Arabs in East Jerusalem is estimated by Smoocha (1978, p. 280), to have reached 92,000 in 1975.

TABLE 2.2
 Distribution of Arab Population by District:
 1948-1973 (percentages)

District	1948	1961	1968	1973
Jerusalem	1.4	1.7	18.2	17.7
North	73.4	57.8	48.0	47.6
Haifa	8.4	19.4	16.3	16.4
Central	2.2	10.4	9.2	9.6
Tel-Aviv	3.2	2.7	1.9	1.8
South	11.4	7.5	6.4	6.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Zureik, E., The Palestinians In Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism, London: Routledge & Kegan, 1979, Table 5.2b, p. 110.

The evacuation of the urban centers meant that most of the Arabs who remained in Israel were rural residents. Over 80 percent live in all-Arab rural areas and two all-Arab towns (Nazareth and Shafa-Amr); the rest live in mixed towns the most notable of which are Akka, Haifa, Tel-Aviv-Jaffa, Ramleh and Lydd (Table 2.3).

TABLE 2.3
Distribution of Arab Population by Area of Residence:
1955-1973 (percent)

Year	All Arab Villages	All Arab Settlements	Mixed Settlements	Total
1955	74*	10	16	100.0
1961	74*	13	13	100.0
1971	69*	13	18	100.0
1973	44	31	25**	100.0

* Includes Bedouins, who by 1971 amounted to 10 percent of the Arab population. A settlement has a population of 5,000 or more. Altogether there are fifteen all-Arab settlements and six mixed settlements.

** Includes East Jerusalem.

Source: Zureik, E., The Palestinians In Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism, London: Routledge & Kegan, 1979, Table 5.3, p. 111.

What is remarkable in Table 2.3 is the fact that since 1948 the Arabs have remained residentially segregated in their villages and no significant movement from village to urban centers can be detected. Even in the so-called mixed towns, Arab and Jewish neighborhoods are segregated. The Arabs usually inhabit those run-down and decaying neighborhoods under slum-like conditions: Wadi-Nusnas in Haifa, Hai-el-Ajami in Jaffa, and the Old city in Akka are some examples.

The refusal of the authorities, as well as the Jewish public to integrate the Arabs in mixed neighborhoods is the most important single factor which is responsible for this segregation. Requests by Arabs to live in developmental towns such as Carmeil, Upper Nazareth and others have consistently been turned down by local Jewish authorities as well as officials of the housing ministry. Most telling is the experience of the Arabs in Akka. Despite their desperate need for housing and despite the existing vacancies in newly built apartment houses in the new city the Arabs are not admitted to those housing projects. Instead, they are being encouraged to transfer to Maker, a near-by village on the Western tip of lower Galilee, to housing units erected by the government for this purpose.

As will be shown later, keeping the Arabs segregated in their villages and towns proved to be expedient for the purpose of control, and for discrimination in terms of government allocation of services, development funds and employment opportunities. In addition to being discriminatory, differential allocation has been particularly instrumental in perpetuating unequal development between the Arab and Jewish sectors and proved to be significant in reproducing split labor market conditions as a result of crowdedness of Arab labor in the only available jobs in the Jewish sector.

It should not be understood from the above that the Arabs live in secluded areas far away from Jewish settlements and urban centers. The size of the country prevents such a conclusion. But beyond that, under a policy of Jewish population distribution the authorities have built

Jewish settlements and towns in the heart of every Arab concentration, which has had the effect of reducing the proportion of Arabs relative to Jews in all districts (see Table 2.4).

TABLE 2.4
Population Distribution of Arabs and Jews:
1948-1971 (Percent)

District	1948		1961		1971	
	Jews	Arabs	Jews	Arabs	Jews	Arabs
Jerusalem	96	4	98	2	76	24
North	37	63	58	42	54	46
Haifa	84	16	82	13	84	16
Centarl	87	13	93	7	92	8
Tel-Aviv	99	1	99	1	99	1
South	28	72	89	11	91	9

Source: Zureik, E., The Palestinians In Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism, London: Routledge & Kegan, 1979, Table 5.3, p. 111.

The most dramatic decreases in the proportion of Arabs occurred in the Southern and Northern districts (Table 2.4). In the South the proportion of Arabs has decreased between 1948 and 1971 from 72 percent to only 9 percent. Similarly, the proportion of Arabs in the Northern district has decreased over the same period from 63 percent to 46 percent. While these decreases in the proportion of Arabs have been a result of systematic policy by the government this policy was not applied successfully in all districts. Although in the South the policy has been most successful, in the Northern District the success of the Israeli authorities has been rather limited, although the Arabs ceased to constitute a majority in the region. The 'Judaization of Galilee' is one such project designed to further reduce the proportion of Arabs in the Northern District.⁹

While Arabs, as noted, are barred from residing in these settlements and towns, they are 'welcomed' as commuting laborers but not as entrepreneurs.¹⁰ The immediate consequence of this policy of population distribution has been the tapping of all sources of cheap Arab labor by the Jewish settlements and employers.

In addition to geographical segregation other societal and structural arrangements have also been constructed to emphasize the Arab-Jewish demarcating line. These will be discussed in the next section.

⁹ See an expanded discussion of the programs and policies which are designed to address this issue in Zuriek, E., 1979, especially pages 106-112.

¹⁰ See the experience of the Arabs from Der-el-Asad, Bina, Nahef and Majd-el-Kurum with Carmiel, in Chapter 4.

SOCIETAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARY MAINTENANCE

The Arab minority was promised full equality by the 'Declaration of Independence' which emphasized that Israel will maintain 'complete equality of social and political rights for all its citizens, without distinction of creed, race or sex'. The Declaration went on to call upon the 'sons of the Arab people dwelling in Israel to keep the peace and to play their part in building the state on the basis of full and equal citizenship'. Although they were enfranchised the Arabs became a nonassimilating minority in a state in which religion defines nationality, and ethnicity and class overlap. Membership in the group is ascriptive in that Arabs are born to their minority status.

Several structural arrangements have made crossing over between the majority and minority groups very difficult. Among these, and the most important perhaps, is the legal separation between the religious communities and the unavailability of civil marriage which makes intermarriage impossible unless one of the parties converts so that marriage can take place within the confines of one religion. Civil marriage does not exist in Israel nor is it recognized. Hence, notwithstanding a few exceptions, endogamy is the practice of members of both majority and minority. In addition, the definition of a Jew as one who was either born to a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism limits the mobility of individual Arabs to a majority status to its minimum. Moreover, the Arabs are easily identifiable by a special combination of appearance, accent, name and address. The fact that the identity cards, which must be carried at all times and presented upon request, state

clearly a person's identity as either Arab or Jew, eliminates ambiguity concerning one's identity altogether. Hence, Arabs can rarely pass as Jews.

Discrimination against the Arabs was legitimized through other institutional arrangements which were built into the very structure of the state since the beginning and came to emphasize its Jewish sectarian character. The Law of Return was among the first laws to be enacted and it is one of the most exclusionary of the Israeli laws which represents to a great extent the state's sectarian character. By extending the right of citizenship to all Jews of the world who wish to immigrate to the state while refusing such rights to native Palestinian refugees the law clearly established a favourable status for Jews in Israel. The extensive incorporation of Jewish symbols in Israel's public domain, such as the flag with the star of David and the national anthem (which speaks of the Jewish 2000 years of yearning to return to the holy land), further testify to this Jewish sectarian character and act as an alienating force toward the Arabs.

On the other hand, the policies and mechanisms which were, and continue to be, devised by the Israeli authorities to deal with the Arab minority seem to be aimed at continued segregation and subordination of this minority making them economically and politically dependent on the Jewish sector. The most diffuse pattern of this institutional behavior is reflected in the setting-up of special departments, within the ministries and other institutions, to handle the affairs of the minorities which include the Arabs. Needless to say these departments do

not apply the same standards and guidelines, in assessing needs and eligibility, which are applied to the Jewish population by the general departments. For example, programs and projects which are designed to aid certain underprivileged groups, such as subsidized public housing, income tax deductions, low interest loans and grants to investors are limited to the Jewish population. The local council of Ma'alot-Tarshiha in the northern district exemplifies this point in its extremity. The council was established in 1963 by a municipal union of Jewish Ma'alot and the Arab village of Tarshiha, to be a model of cooperation on an equal basis between Arabs and Jews. Despite the fact that the council has a common budget, the government continues to give preferential treatment to the Jewish population by classifying Ma'alot, but not Tarshiha, as a development town, a border settlement and a locality with a needy population.¹¹

Differential treatment of Arabs by the authorities was further manifested in three other areas: free movement, land confiscation and service allocation. The movement of Arabs was restricted by the military government which was imposed on the Arabs between 1948 and 1966.¹² Land was confiscated from Arabs and given to Jews,¹³ and there has been a differential allocation of services such as connecting Arab villages to water and electric networks, pavement of roads, building of schools and development funds. These policies have resulted inevitably

¹¹ See Smooha, 1978, fn. 25, p. 399.

¹² See Chapter 5 for more details on the Emergency Regulations, the activities of the military government and the rationale given.

¹³ See Chapter 4 for details.

in the generation of a surplus of Arab labor with employment alternatives being limited to Jewish businesses and enterprises which were not completely free to use this labor. The next section will present an overview of the experience of Arab labor.

ARAB LABOR

Despite the granting of full citizenship to Arabs the Histadrut and other labor organizations continued their pre-state struggle against the employment of Arabs. Only this time their success was almost complete in that Arabs were, until 1959, excluded from the labor market through two legally sanctioned methods: first, the Histadrut was put in charge of all labor exchanges through which it chose to serve only its members who were, by definition, Jews (Arabs were not admitted to the Histadrut until 1959); and second, the Arabs were placed under a military government and their movement out of their villages was restricted. To move out of the villages, even for the purpose of employment, Arabs required special permits which were issued by a regional military governor on a very selective and limited basis.¹⁴ Hence, during the first few years of statehood, the Arabs had a very limited access to the Jewish labor market.

On the other hand, the few employment alternatives which existed in the Arab villages were limited to agricultural work. An extensive program of Arab land confiscation by the Israeli authorities, however, eliminated many of these employment opportunities. This resulted in a

¹⁴ See Chapter 5 for further details.

high unemployment rate among the Arabs.

High unemployment rates were not limited to Arabs during this initial period of statehood, however. During the first few years the country experienced great economic difficulties which necessitated even the rationing of food and other commodities. Not until the mid fifties did the economy begin to show some signs of recovery. Until then the Jewish population experienced the highest unemployment rates the country was ever to experience (Table 2.5). The flow of hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants to the newly created state was the most important single factor which contributed to this state of affairs. Between 1948 and 1951 over 686,000 new immigrants entered the country, half of them coming from Asia and North-Africa (Table 1.1). Clearly, under these conditions, namely, economic depression and heightened Jewish immigration, there was hardly any demand for Arab labor. Hence, labor organizations were successful in their bid to limit access of Arabs to the Jewish labor market.

TABLE 2.5
Unemployment as a Percent of the Labor Force
1949 -1965

Year	Percent Unemployed	Civilian Labor Force (thousands)
1949	13.9	343
1950	11.2	450
1951	8.1	545
1952	8.8	584
1953	11.5	599
1954	9.2	608
1955	7.4	619
1956	7.8	646
1957	6.9	690
1958	5.7	698
1959	5.5	714
1960	4.6	736
1961	3.6	774
1962	3.7	818
1963	3.6	840
1964	3.3	384
1965	3.6	912

Source: Nadav Halevi and Ruth Klinov-Malul, The economic Development of Israel, New York: Praeger, 1968, Table 14.

Changes in both conditions beginning in the mid 1950's, i.e., expansion of the economy and a significant decline in the number of immigrants entering the country, precipitated an increased demand for Arab labor. Only 294,484 immigrants entered the country between 1952 and 1960, which was less than half of what had entered the country

during the first three years of statehood (or a yearly average of 29,448 compared with a yearly average of 228,913 immigrants during the first period). But in order to have more open access to Arab labor it was necessary to lift, or at least partially relax, the restrictions on the movement of Arabs. A step the authorities proved willing to undertake, under pressure from different Jewish groups who began intensifying their campaign of opposition to the restrictions around 1958. This step proved to be the first on the road toward a gradual and eventually total elimination of the whole system of military government in 1966.

The Arab labor force, which had been partially generated through land confiscation since 1948, was disoriented as a result of dispossession and control by the military government. Lacking other employment alternatives this labor force was eager to work for wages and benefits below what was offered to Jewish labor. Most of the Arabs became wage-earners working for Jewish employers. This increased the Arabs' dependence on the Jewish sector and the Jewish economy which gradually incorporated them heavily in the lower ranks of the occupational ladder concentrating mainly in specific employment sectors and job-categories. As will be shown, under these conditions the Histadrut elected to admit Arab laborers to its ranks¹⁵

¹⁵ See Chapter 6 for more details.

ARAB EDUCATION

The Arab educational system and education for Arabs in Israeli universities is still problematic. Although more and more graduates of the Arab educational system are being accepted for higher education in Israeli universities, the situation is still far from satisfactory. In 1983/84, for example, only 4.4 percent of the total Israeli students enrolled in Israeli universities were Arabs, (of whom only 25 percent were enrolled in the natural sciences). In addition, 1,900 out of 4,700 or 41 per cent of total number of Arab students were enrolled in universities outside Israel. Statistics show that the proportion of Arab students to the Arab population in Israel is 4 students per thousand citizen. This proportion falls far below the Palestinian average of 40 students per thousand.¹⁶

Comparing Arab and Jewish students Mar'i shows that until 1973 Arab university students comprised 2 percent of the total student population in Israel. Since 1974, however, this proportion has increased to 3.5 percent which is still very low relative to the 15 percent which represents the proportion of Arabs in the general population.¹⁷ In addition, vocational schools for Arabs are scarce and where they exist they are usually poorly staffed and equipped. Despite a rising demand by the Arab population for such education the government is still very slow to respond.¹⁸

¹⁶ Falestine Althowrah, 22.6.85, No.563:33 (Arabic).

¹⁷ Sami Mar'i, Arab Education in Israel, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1978, p. 106.

Arab university graduates have great difficulty finding appropriate employment, commensurate in status and income with their training. In a government-sponsored survey of Arab university graduates who received their degrees between 1961 and 1971 it was found that 47.3 percent of those employed in white collar occupations worked as teachers.¹⁹ Since nothing has been done to remedy this situation, it is likely that these findings continue to be reflected in current employment patterns.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Although the Arabs are enfranchised, during the 38 years of Israel's existence, the Arabs have never been allowed to form their own political parties. On the contrary, any attempts at such political organization were very quickly suppressed. The late fifties and early sixties witnessed a particularly increased interest by the Arabs in organizing politically. The Al-Ard (the land) movement was the most serious of these attempts. All these attempts, however, were crushed. Not until the election of 1984 did the Arabs attempt to organize politically again. This time some elements of the Al-Ard movement formed a coalition with leftist Zionists to form a slate called 'The Progressive Slate for Peace'. Although the Elections Committee initially denied the group their request to run in the elections, through a subsequent appeal to and ruling by the High Court of Justice (Supreme Court) the group was granted the right to enter the elections. They were not allowed to campaign fully and were not sure they would be allowed to enter the

¹⁸ Ibid., especially Chapter 8, pp. 145-172.

¹⁹ Lustick, 1980, p.21.

elections, however, until a confrontational meeting with the minister of defense, who has the authority to outlaw the group despite the ruling by the Supreme Court, took place. During their meeting with the defense minister the Arab delegates were cross examined by the minister who, under intense pressure from the Jewish delegates, finally gave the go-ahead. The slate won two seats in the Knesset which were allotted to an Arab (head of the slate) and a Jew. The Arab member eventually lost his immunity on the ground that he holds extreme political views.²⁰

EXPLAINING THE STATUS OF THE ARABS

The Arab-Jewish division has continuously been used as a basis for explaining the predicament of the Arabs. Everything is derived from security requirements and every decision is claimed to be merely political as though politics are completely divorced of societal undercurrents. Such claims have been so widespread that even academic circles have come to accept the situation as fait accompli. Despite the public and institutional recognition of the status of the Arabs as a separate ethnic entity they have rarely been considered by Israeli sociologists as an integral part of the Israeli society, differing ethnically yet deserving of analytic consideration and investigation within this framework. Indeed very little has been done in the form of any serious academic work concerning the Arabs in Israel.²¹ This curious

²⁰ A personal communication with the Arab member of Knesset in November 1985.

²¹ See Zureik, 1979, particularly Chapter 1.

lack of interest in the sociology of the Arabs in Israel is what prompted Lipset to conclude that:

Almost none of the academic research and policy decisions about the problems of education, or social mobility, ever deal with Arab citizens of the country..... Articles about the Israeli situation which break down attainments and statuses by ethnic background are generally headed 'The Israeli----- System', but have no column for over 400,000 Israeli Arabs who comprise 14 percent of the population of the state.²²

As noted, such omissions are usually reasoned away by the claim that the problem of the Arabs is purely a political one. The following footnote by an established Israeli sociologist, Chaim Adler, in a paper entitled 'Social Stratification and Education in Israel' is typical. He said:

It ought to be stated quite clearly that this analysis does not deal with another aspect of stratification within Israel, namely the Arab-Jewish division. This has, unfortunately, so far been first and foremost a political problem and only secondarily a social or educational one.²³

When such an 'apologetic' note is omitted, however, and the Arabs are included in the works, they are either underrepresented²⁴ or, dealt with in terms of side issues.²⁵ Other investigations related to the Arabs have been limited mainly to socio-psychological and/or socio-anthropological perspectives.²⁶ Henry Rosenfeld's research stands as an

²² Seymour Lipset, "Education and Equality: Israel and the United States compared", Society March/April, 1974, p. 65.

²³ Chaim Adler, "Social Stratification in Israel", Comparative Education Review, vol. 18, no. 1, p. 12.

²⁴ Out of 450 page book entitled "Israeli Society" Eisenstadt (1970) devotes no more than 16 pages to the Arabs.

²⁵ In a 700 page book entitled "Integration and Development in Israel" prepared by Eisenstadt, Bar Yosef and Adler (1970), the Arabs are represented through two articles entitled 'Sedentarization of the Beduins in Israel' and 'The Status of Arab Village Women'.

²⁶ See, for example, Raphael Patai's (1947) work on Middle Eastern

exception to the above rules. The most notable of his works is a research paper entitled 'The Origins of the Process of Proletarianization and Urbanization of Arab peasants in Palestine' (1974).

The lack of interest in, and under-representation of minorities in established sociological circles is not peculiar to Israel. In fact, as Zureik (1979) noted, interest in the sociology of minorities can be seen as a direct correlate of acts of protests and violence. Such research, when it is forthcoming, does not address the problems from the vantage point of the minorities. Rather, sociologists have tended to adopt the 'official' labeling of what is problematic and borrow a world view which is in agreement with the dominant ideology. In this sense Zureik argues "it is the sociological locus of the problem which has become the problem itself"²⁷ such that "the formulation of the solution to a particular social problem is rooted within the problem itself, which in turn has been defined in terms of the minority at hand".²⁸ The Israeli sociologists do not seem to have deviated from such tendencies.

The following quote from Sami Smooha, himself an Iraqi Jew is only one example. Smooha writes:

The mass of Jewish people regard the Arabs as outsiders, and their feelings toward them range from hostility, through contempt and pity, to indifference. They opt out of any responsibility for the Arabs, entrusting a free hand to the authorities to deal with them.

societies, including Israel; Emanuel Marx's (1967) research on the Beduins; Erik Cohen's (1971) work on Arab youth; Yochanan Peres' (1969,1971) investigations of Jewish-Arab ethnic relations; and Yalan et al. (1972) work on the modernization of Arab villages.

²⁷ Zureik, 1979, p. 4.

²⁸ Ibid.

The authorities being on the average more liberal than the general public, are interested in pacification and the continued compliance of the Israeli Arabs...²⁹

Irrespective of the accuracy of Smooha's description, the statement does not make clear why the authorities are more liberal than the general public, nor does it explain why this has continuously been the case despite the continued change in leadership. As will be shown in the next chapter the 'authorities' have not been independent of the influence of the general public in their policies toward the Arabs. Nor have policies been promulgated with complete disregard to their effect on the Jewish economy and population. More to the point, however, given the description of the harsh treatment of the Arabs it cannot be concluded that such has been a result of liberal policies. If anything the description by Smooha fits the dominant ideology which regards the Arabs as an inferior people and dispensable to the system.

SUMMARY

In this chapter the major structures and mechanisms which define the boundaries between Arabs and Jews are identified. Boundaries have been maintained through residential segregation, institutional segmentation, laws and regulations, and the adoption of Jewish symbols in the public domain, which set Arabs apart from Jews.

Whereas residential segregation and institutional segmentation made differentiation against the Arabs easy the laws and regulations provided not only the legal basis for this differentiation but also the

²⁹ Smooha, 1978, p. 46.

justifying ideology. Through segregation and institutional segmentation it was made easy, for example, to direct development funds to Jewish towns and settlements, encourage economic development through favorable tax laws, expand educational and recreational facilities in Jewish but not in Arab settlements. Even when Arab and Jewish settlements were grouped under one municipal jurisdiction, such as the case of Jewish Ma'alot and Arab Tarshiha, governmental and quasi-governmental agencies found the way to channel extra funds to the Jewish settlement only, by defining the Jewish but not the Arab as a development town, despite the geographic proximity of the two towns.

As a consequence of these policies the Arab and Jewish sectors continued to develop in an unequal pace. However, these policies and the accompanying unequal developments would not have been possible without clearly marked demarcating lines which were, and continue to be, maintained through residential segregation and institutional segmentation.

While segregation and segmentation represent a manifestation of the physical separation between Arabs and Jews, this division would have been very difficult to maintain without the support of an ideology. Through the enactment of laws and the adoption of certain symbols, which emphasized the Jewish sectarian character of the state, the extension of superior status to Jews compared to the Arabs was justified. Hence, it was possible for governmental and quasi-governmental agencies such as the Histadrut to promulgate policies against the Arabs designed to further the Jewish interests. However, as it will be shown in the next

chapter some policies benefited certain Jewish groups more than others which resulted in the emergence of conflict of interests among the Jewish population. This conflict set the dynamics which underly changes in the attitudes of the Jewish population and in policies toward the Arab population. These dynamics will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III

THE JEWISH POPULATION AND THE ARABS

A split labor market can be maintained only if the majority is clearly differentiated, and particularly if such a differentiation is along certain demarcating lines such as ethnicity. This chapter will highlight the Jewish inter-ethnic differentiation along the Ashkenazi-Oriental lines emphasizing the respective benefits of each of the two ethnic groups from, and their attitudes toward, the different policies dealing with the Arabs. As part of the documentation of attitudes, voting trends in national elections will be examined in lieu of the advocated policies and platforms of two of the biggest political parties: Labor Alignment and the Likud.

THE JEWISH INTER-ETHNIC CLEAVAGES AND THE ARAB MINORITY

Differentiation of the Jewish population along the Ashkenazi-Oriental lines seems to correspond to different attitudes along these lines toward the Arabs. Whereas Ashkenazim occupy managerial and elite positions in the economy, the polity and the military, Orientals man the lower rungs in all of these spheres. This Ashkenazi-Oriental division is well established in Israeli society and much has been written to describe and analyse its causes and consequences for Israeli society. While writers differ in their theoretical orientation and philosophical

leanings they all agree that a disparity exists between Ashkenazim and Orientals in the economic, social and political spheres.

There are many causes for this Jewish inter-ethnic differentiation. While they will not be dealt with here extensively a few seem relevant to our discussion and therefore deserve attention. First, the immigration patterns: whereas the major Ashkenazi immigration pre-dates the establishment of the state, most Oriental immigrants arrived after the state and its institutions were already established (see Table 1.1). The implication of this is that not only did Orientals enter the new society from the bottom, they did not participate in the bloody fighting between Arabs and Jews which had lasted for almost fifty years prior to the establishment of the state. The fighting was carried out mostly by Ashkenazim who bore the consequences and paid the price. Thus, Ashkenazim have felt that they are the ones who are responsible for, and therefore they should enjoy the fruits of, the establishment of the state.

Second, most Oriental immigrants came from Arab countries, speak the Arabic language, subscribe to the Arabic value system, and even resemble Arabs in their physical features. While they clearly had occupied a subordinate positions in these countries there is no evidence to suggest that they had been harshly mistreated.¹ The Ashkenazim, on the other hand, resemble European Gentiles and their cultural heritage is based on Yiddish, which is a German-Jewish dialect.

¹ See Smooha, pp. 49-50.

And third, Orientals were perceived and treated by Ashkenazim as inferiors who have nothing to offer the new society even before the establishment of the state: no efforts were expended by the Zionist Organization to either encourage or attract Oriental immigration to Palestine, nor were they received enthusiastically once they arrived in the country.² It was not an accident, therefore, that the social institutions which were built by the early comers, i.e. Ashkenazim, were geared to the needs of, and were controlled by Ashkenazim. According to Smooha,

The neglect of the Oriental Jewry abroad by the Zionist movement was only duplicated by the East European establishment regarding Orientals in Palestine. Behind the lofty ideals of 'one people' and the neutralization of ethnicity there were the stark realities of superiority and paternalism of Ashkenazim toward Orientals which rendered impossible any meaningful relations between them. Orientals were looked upon as backward and incapable of contributing to the new society. They were considered marginal members of the Yishuv (Jewish Settlement) whose lack of adaptiveness was deplored, yet nothing was done to incorporate them as equal members.³

Even after they arrived in Israel the Orientals' reception was "far from cordial or enthusiastic".⁴

² The experience of the Yemenite Jews who immigrated at the turn of the Twentieth Century provides a clear example of how Oriental Jews were treated and the role they occupied within the Yishuv. It is asserted that they not only occupied a subordinate position relative to the Ashkenazim but they were expected to play the role of Jewish working class and were treated accordingly, getting smaller plots of lands than did immigrants from Eastern Europe and smaller apartments etc. For a detailed history of the Yemenites' experience and treatment see Smooha, 1978, pp. 54-55; Patai, 1970, pp. 187-8; Gluska, 1974, p. 110.

³ Ibid., p. 59.

⁴ Ibid., p. 86.

Clearly, as the above demonstrates, the similarities between Arabs and Orientals are striking. Arabs and Orientals share language, customs to a great extent, values, and a negative image bestowed upon both of them by Ashkenazim. Furthermore, since most Orientals immigrated after the state was established and the Arab-Jewish active hostility had subsided, they were saved the burden of exchanging reciprocal hostile acts with the Arabs. Hence, one would expect more cordial relations to have developed between Orientals and the Arabs. However, the evidence shows that the opposite happened. That is, Orientals are more hostile toward the Arabs than are Ashkenazim and support exclusionary policies more often than do Ashkenazim.

JEWISH DIFFERENTIAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE ARABS

Data from a variety of sources such as public polls, voting patterns and survey research point out that Orientals and Ashkenazim differ in their attitudes toward the Arabs. While systematic data are unfortunately not available, the few studies which attempted to address the subject seem to agree in their findings. On the basis of these studies three conclusions can be reached: 1) the proportion of those who express hostility toward the Arabs is very high among all Jewish groups; 2) this level is higher among the religious than it is among the nonreligious; and 3) Oriental Jews, on the average, express negative and hostile attitudes in higher proportions than do Ashkenazim.

For the following reasons the religious-nonreligious dichotomy will not be dealt with in this analysis. First, it is inherently difficult to

define the religious population. While the concept is vaguely defined, in Israel it connotes the orthodox Jews. This connotation, however, leaves out many reformists, observants and self-professed religious people. Certainly the three religious parties (the National Religious Party, Agudat Israel, and Poali Agudat Israel) do not represent the entire religious population. According to Elyakim Rubinstein, only 13-15 percent of the religious population vote for the religious parties.⁵

Second, the religious population cuts across ethnic as well as class lines. It is noted, for example, that the Oriental Jews vote disproportionately more for the National Religious Party. According to Smooha, the socioeconomic gaps between religious and nonreligious can be accounted for by ethnicity.⁶ It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the discrepancies in the expressed attitudes toward the Arabs between the religious and the nonreligious may also be understood as ethnically based.

The finding that Orientals are more hostile to Arabs than are Ashkenazim was surprising even to veteran students of Israeli society. Commenting on the results of his survey on Jewish differential attitudes toward the Arabs in 1971 Peres wrote, "this discovery seems to be astonishing."⁷ In 1971 when was asked about marrying an Arab in a state-

⁵ Elyakim Rubinstein, "The Lesser Parties in the Israeli Elections of 1977". In Howard Penniman (ed.) Israel at the Polls: The Knesset Elections of 1977, American Enterprise Institute for Public Research, Washington, D.C., 1979, p. 177.

⁶ See Smooha, 1978, p. 149 & p. 178.

⁷ Peres, 1971, p. 1038.

wide sample of the adult urban population only 8 percent of Orientals said they 'agreed' or 'agreed but preferred a Jew' compared with 24 percent Europeans. Twenty seven percent of the Orientals compared to 40 percent of the Europeans expressed readiness for friendship with Arabs; and, 40 percent of Orientals compared to 48 percent of the Europeans expressed readiness to share a neighborhood with Arabs.⁸ Furthermore, 85 percent of the Orientals compared to only 64 percent of the Europeans agreed with the proposition that 'Arabs will not reach the level of progress of Jews'. And, 78 percent of the Orientals compared to 53 percent of the Europeans did not want to have an Arab as a neighbor.⁹

Attitudes among the Jewish population toward the Arabs were also found to show significant differences when they were examined along the religious-nonreligious axis. In 1970 Zuckerman-Bareli, reported that as many as 94 percent of the religious and 89 percent of the partly observant, compared to 76 of the nonreligious, thought that the Israeli government did much or too much for the Israeli Arabs.¹⁰ While the data, unfortunately, do not identify the ethnic origin of the respondents ethnicity can, nonetheless, be assumed to be a factor in the reported results.

⁸ See Ibid., Table 11, p. 1039.

⁹ See Ibid., Table 12, p. 1039.

¹⁰ Zuckerman-Bareli, C., 'The Structure of Religious Conception of Youth in Israeli Society', doctoral dissertation, Jerusalem: Hebrew University. Cited in Smooha, 1978, p. 199.

A substantial and ethnically differentiated antagonism continues to characterize attitudes of the Jewish population toward the Arabs. An unpublished study by the Van Lear Institute (a prestigious public opinion polling institute) reports that 40 percent of young Israelis are sympathetic to Meir Kahane or his ideas.¹¹ These ideas, which advocate a total expulsion of the Arabs from the state, are the most extreme ever expressed in public against the Arabs in Israel.

Generally speaking, most interpretations of this phenomenon rely on socio-psychological models which are at best ahistorical and do not account for variation and change. Smoocha, for example, is not sure whether the heightened hostility of Orientals toward the Arabs, is "largely a result of their lower socioeconomic status."¹² According to him, "it is possible that anti-Arab emotions and scapegoating are particularly intense among the Oriental lower classes as a result of the interaction of poor education, deprived status and blocked mobility."¹³ He further asserts that "the tensions generated by the conflicts among Jews are partially dispelled by scapegoating the Arabs. Lower-class Orientals are seemingly disposed to enhance their status within the Jewish quasi-cast by taking a harder line than the Ashkenazim against the Arabs."¹⁴

¹¹ New Outlook, July, 1985, pp. 11-14.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 103.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

Such interpretation is in line with the thought that Orientals aspire to be like Ashkenazim. This line of thinking negates reality which, if anything, shows an increase in Orientals' awareness of and rediscovered pride in their cultural heritage. This kind of thinking was dominant in the sixties and provided perhaps a framework upon which Peres (1971) based his analysis. Peres, a pioneer in the area of Arab-Jewish relations, asserts that "the Orientals feel that they must reject the remaining traces of their Middle Eastern origin to attain the status of the dominant European group. By expressing hostility to Arabs, an Oriental attempts to rid himself of the 'inferior' Arabic element in his own identity and adopt a position congenial to the European group which he desires to emulate"¹⁵

It is true that the cultural heritage carried by the Oriental Jews was detested by Ashkenazim during the fifties and sixties. It was feared that the impact of immigration from Middle-Eastern countries would have the effect of downgrading the Israeli society and many leaders articulated those fears in public, emphasizing the superiority of Ashkenazi culture and criticizing the culture, customs and values of the Orientals. Orientals were called primitive, ignorant and a people 'with a 16th century level.'¹⁶

¹⁵ Peres, Y., 1971, p. 1040.

¹⁶ See quotes by Ben-Gorion, Israel's Prime Minister during the first decade and half; Eban, for a long time Israel's Foreign Minister; and, Golda Meir, and an expanded discussion of this point in Smoocha, 1978, pp. 87-89.

Such an atmosphere may have generated certain feelings of inferiority among Oriental Jews. Furthermore, these feelings may have been even exacerbated by the fact that compared to Ashkenazim the contribution of Orientals to the establishment of the state was very limited. It should be recalled that most Orientals immigrated after the state had already been established. Hence, the burden of Israel's wars fell upon the shoulders of Ashkenazim who also reaped the glories of victory. Until 1967 the Arab-Jewish wars (1948,1956) had produced Ashkenazi 'heroes' only.

From this perspective the war of 1967 offered the Orientals an unprecedented opportunity because it offered them the chance to participate fully in the actual fighting and pay their dues to the system, so to speak. Furthermore, the occupation of vast and densely populated Arab areas (West-Bank, Gaza, Sinai and the Golan Heights) had two additional consequences. First, to communicate with and control the newly occupied Arab masses knowledge of the Arabic language and Arabic culture proved to be expedient. The fact that Orientals mastered these skills and were readily available to fill the newly opened positions highlighted their usefulness and contribution to the system, for the first time in the history of the state. Second, the continued occupation of these Arab areas also resulted in the expansion of the system which offered an opportunity to accommodate part of the Oriental elite without any loss to Ashkenazim. These developments capitalized on the early experiences of the system with the Arab minority prior to 1967.

The early experiences show that the continuation of the state of war between Israel and the Arabs since 1948 coupled with the continued emphasis on the Jewish sectarian character of the state played a major role in solidifying the Arab-Jewish division. In and of itself the division gave Orientals the opportunity to stress their membership in the superior Jewish group, a status with which the Orientals were not familiar and had never experienced before and therefore were eager to emphasize.

Nonetheless, while the status of superiority over the Arabs which is ensured by membership in the Jewish majority is not insignificant, the economic benefits which accrue to the Orientals as a result of maintaining a rigid Arab-Jewish division are no less important. These advantages for the Orientals are ubiquitous and serve all classes well. First, the agencies which either serve or control the Arabs provide many jobs for educated Orientals. This function cannot be overemphasized if one considers the fact that these agencies include several departments in the government ministries, in the Histadrut, political parties, Arabic-speaking schools and mass media, the internal security services and the police and most importantly the military government apparatus. While the last was abolished in 1966, in 1967 it was reinitiated in a much expanded version over the occupied territories of the West-Bank and the Gaza Strip. This provided, and continues to provide, considerable employment opportunities to Oriental Jews who speak the language and know the culture and whose loyalty to the state is never questioned. The support of Orientals for the continuation of the status quo in the occupied territories should be understood against this background.

Second, the continuation of exclusionary policies which translate into discrimination against the Arabs gives the Orientals an edge over the Arabs both during periods of recession and in times of full employment. During a recession the Arabs are the ones who are fired first, while during full employment the Arabs take up manual and low paid jobs, which has the effect of upward displacement of Orientals in the occupational hierarchy.¹⁷ Recent comparative data show that Jewish in-mobility to the occupational category of office administrators between the years 1969 and 1982 was almost twice as high as Arabs, while out-mobility from unskilled labor of Jews and Arabs was about 3:1 ratio.¹⁸ Furthermore, the authors also show that whereas Ashkenazim have experienced the highest in-mobility into the occupational category of professional, scientific and technical work, Orientals' mobility into the middle rungs positions as office administrators was the highest.¹⁹

The process of upward displacement of Orientals was further enhanced by the entry of the Arabs from the occupied territories, but it is significant to note that, irrespective of the findings of the study, the public in Israel perceives this to be the case. This perception was captured magificently in a monologue of a North African Jew recorded by the famous Israeli novelist Amos Oz:

¹⁷ Stock, 1968, pp. 22-3.

¹⁸ Lewen-Epstein, N. & Semyonov, M., 'Ethnic Group Mobility in the Israeli Labor Market'. American Sociological Review, 1986, vol. 51 June, Table 1, p. 345, and p. 348.

¹⁹ Ibid.

If they give back the territories the Arabs will stop coming to work, and then and there you'll put us back into the dead-end jobs like before.... Look at my daughter; she works in a bank now, and every evening an Arab comes to clean the building. All you want is to dump her from the bank into some textile factory, or have her wash the floor instead of the Arab.²⁰

Third, as a result of exclusionary policies, ethnic gap (pa'ar adati) has come to mean Oriental-Ashkenazi differentiation in the public minds as well as in government circles. Hence, programs designed to promote ethnic equality whether initiated and financed by the government or other Jewish institutions such as the Jewish Agency, the Histadrut and others are devoted completely to the Orientals. Under less rigid exclusionary policies some of these funds would have to be redirected to the Arab areas which are no less needy.

However, while there are clear advantages to the Orientals, the policy of exclusion has had its drawbacks. For Orientals the continuation of the state of war has made full equality between them and Ashkenazim less imperative. The study by Epstein-Semyonov shows that while both Orientals and Ashkenazim experienced occupational upward mobility, "the two Jewish groups retained their relative (emphasis in original) hierarchical position in the occupational structure."²¹ Furthermore, as a consequence of rigidity in the Arab-Jewish division, Arabs have been concentrated in the lower ranks of the occupational hierarchy where they present direct competition to the basically Oriental lower classes. Orientals and Arabs have a much higher

²⁰ Ibid., p. 344.

²¹ Ibid., p. 350.

concentration in unskilled occupations than do Ashkenazim who exit these occupation at a greater rate than either group.²²

The Ashkenazim have also benefited from the system of exclusion. First, whereas the implementation of equality between them and Orientals would have resulted in a real loss to Ashkenazim, the maintenance of a rigid division between Arabs and Jews has resulted in the expansion of the system through which certain of the Oriental demands are met without any significant loss to Ashkenazim. Yet a complete exclusion of the Arabs would have limited employers' (basically Ashkenazim) access to cheap Arab labor and would have resulted in making expensive Jewish labor even more expensive. Hence, only when employers' demands for such cheap labor were minimal were they inclined to tolerate a complete or a near complete exclusion of the Arabs during the period 1948-1958. When their demands for such labor increased, however, the disadvantages of exclusion outweighed the benefits and therefore had to be relaxed.

The system of exclusion was not cancelled altogether, however. Under the influence of labor it was only transformed to a caste-like system limiting the Arabs to certain positions and job-categories. These dynamics were set forth in the Employment Service Law which was passed in 1959. Through two of its provisions the law legitimized discrimination on security grounds and provided protection to local workers. These two provisions were clearly directed against the Arabs since they are the ones considered security risks and also against whose 'intrusion' local employment, i.e. Jewish employment, needed to be

²² Ibid., Table 1, p. 345 and p. 348.

protected, since no significant employment opportunities exist in the Arab sector (see further details on the law and its provisions in Chapter 6)

It is clear, therefore, that both Orientals and Ashkenazim benefit from the Arab-Jewish division. While the gains of Orientals are greatest under a policy of exclusion, the Ashkenazim can benefit most from treating the Arabs as caste-like segregation. Both systems, however, result in oppression of the Arabs. By way of interpolation, furthermore, it must be added that while the occupied West-Bank and the Gaza strip are not the subject of this analysis one dares say that the political attitudes of Israel vis-a-vis these occupied territories are not completely divorced from the influences of such dynamics.

On the basis of the foregoing it should be expected that Orientals more than Ashkenazim support those parties which advocate hard line policies toward the Arabs. In the following section ethnic voting trends will be documented showing the relationships between shifts in party politics and corresponding shifts in ethnic voting.

JEWISH ETHNIC VOTING PATTERNS AND THE ARABS

It cannot be claimed that the status of the Arab minority occupies a central role in election campaigns. That is not to say, however, that the issue of the Arabs is one which has no effect whatever on voting decision. It constitutes one of those undercurrents which also characterize the Jewish inter-ethnic rift. The Oriental-Ashkenazi division, which by all accounts constitutes a central domestic issue, is hardly raised as a campaign issue by any political party as one deserving public debate.²³ To the contrary, the issue has hardly ever gone beyond general declarations of all parties emphasizing the need for greater integration without specifying a program or programs to achieve such an end. Even in internal discussions at party conferences the issue of ethnicity is suppressed because of its explosive nature.²⁴

In general it must be emphasized that many factors influence voting decisions in Israel. While these factors are interrelated, not all are articulated as issues to be raised during an election campaign. On the other hand, issues which are raised in election campaigns are not necessarily determined on the basis of their saliency. An issue may be raised because it appeals to the greatest margin of voters. Most central to all election campaigns, for example, have been defense and

²³ Efraim Torgovnik, "Party Factions and Election Issues". In Arian (ed.), The Elections in Israel-1969, Jerusalem: Academic Press, 1972, p. 16.

²⁴ See a discussion of the Labor Party's conference in 1971 by Aroneff, 1979. pp. 126-29. Also see an excellent review of the determinants of an issue which is to be raised in election campaign, how it is formulated and the issues which were raised in the 1969 Israeli elections, in Torgovnik, 1972, pp. 21-40.

foreign affairs, two issues over which criticism of the position of the Labor Party is least tolerated by its leadership.²⁵ To a lesser degree the economy has also been raised as an issue during some election campaigns.

Despite the lack of public debate among political parties during election campaigns the influence on voters of issues pertaining to ethnic division can hardly be overemphasized. The mass switch of the Oriental vote from Labor to the Likud in 1977, which played a major role in the defeat of Labor and gave the Likud the opportunity to form a government for the first time in the history of the state, is mostly attributed to the disenchantment of Orientals with the slow pace with which Labor was implementing their integration. In fact, the Oriental support for the Labor party had been waning since the early sixties and in the mid-seventies it reached its highest proportions.²⁶

On the basis of this discussion it should hardly be expected that the status of the Arab minority would be publicly debated during election campaigns. Nor can the extent to which a party's 'Arab' policy influences voting decisions of its constituency be determined. Hence, rather than seeking causal relationships between Jewish support for a specific political party and that party's declared policies toward the

²⁵ Aroneff, M., 'The Decline of Israeli Labor Party: Causes and Significance'. In: Penniman, H., (ed.) Israel at the Polls: The Knesset Elections of 1977, American Enterprise Institute for Public Research, Washington, D. C., 1979, pp. 115-45.

²⁶ See Arian, A., 'The Electorate: Israel 1977'. In: Penniman, H., (ed.) Israel at the Polls: The Knesset Elections of 1977, American Enterprise Institute for Public Research, Washington, D. C., 1979, pp. 59-89.

Arab minority, non-causal ethnic voting trends will be discussed and documented in this section.

Mapai, which following several alignments became the Labor Alignment, has won every single election from 1949 to 1973. Its first defeat occurred in 1977. Between 1948 and 1977 the party was in control of the government and other Jewish institutions. It still holds the majority vote in the Histadrut. Hence, the party can be considered responsible, or take credit, for the policies toward the Arabs.

On the other hand, between 1948 and 1977 Likud was in the opposition. In fact, during the first two elections the Likud, or Herut (freedom) as it was known, was not the biggest of the opposition parties (see Table 3.1 below). And, until 1964 it was not part of the Histadrut. The party was formed in 1948 by the leaders of the Irgun Tsevai Leumi (National Military Organization known as Etzel) which was one of three Jewish underground groups that operated in Palestine during the years of British rule and was known for the brutality of the atrocities committed by its members against Arabs and British. Menachem Begin, who had been the leader of Irgun since 1942, became Herut's leader. In 1977 he became prime minister, a position he held until his resignation in 1984.

TABLE 3.1
Distribution of Seats, First Through the Ninth Knesset
1949-1977

Party	1st 1949	2nd 1951	3rd 1955	4th 1959	5th 1961	6th 1965	7th 1969	8th 1973	9th 1977
Mapai	46	45	40	47	42	} 45 }	Labor Alignment		
Achdut Ha'avodah			10	7	8		} 56	51	32
Mapam	19	15	9	9	9	8			
Rafi						10			
							Gahal	Likud	
Herut	14	8	15	17	17	} 26	26	39	45
Liberal	7	20	13	8	17		} 5	4	4
Indep liberal	5	4	5	6					

Source: Abridged from Penniman, H., (ed.) Israel at the Polls. American Institute, Washington, D. C. 1979, p. 310.

During the early years of statehood Herut adopted extreme nationalistic stands and according to Akzin, "came to be recognized as the foremost nationalist party in Israel".²⁷ Hence, it could not have

²⁷ Akzin, B., 'The Likud'. In: Penniman, H., (ed.), Israel at the Polls: The Knesset Elections of 1977, American Enterprise Institute for Public Research, Washington, D. C., 1979, p. 93.

been expected to object to Mapai's (representing the government) policies of Arab land confiscation, and indeed no such objection was ever raised.²⁸

On the other hand, on economic matters Herut stood for the broadening of private enterprise; compulsory arbitration of labor conflicts; and, curtailment of preferential treatment of collective and Histadrut-owned enterprises.²⁹ These stands have, rightly, been perceived as anti labor, i.e., Jewish labor. Their consistency is further evidenced by the fact that Herut opposed the policy of movement restriction on the Arabs.³⁰ These stands were neither popular among nor supported by organized labor. According to Akzin, Herut's supporters and voters during those early years "came from both middle-class and working-class elements within the population".³¹

Following a series of alliances during the sixties between Herut and other parties (see Table 3.1) Likud was formed and entered the elections of 1973 under that name. Since then, the greatest difficulty which faces the party prior to an election campaign has been the formulation of the socio-economic plank in its platform. The difficulty is embedded in the need to reconcile differences separating the different factions of the party, those who support the encouragement of private initiative

²⁸ See Chapter 4 for details.

²⁹ See Akzin, 1979, p. 94.

³⁰ See Chapter 5 for more details on Begin's speech in the Knesset and his subsequent comments on the outcome of a vote against the military government which failed to abolish it in 1964.

³¹ Akzin, 1979, p.105.

and freedom from government controls and those labor-minded groups who are anxious to preserve the cooperative and collectivist features of the Israeli economy. An additional problem is the desire to raise the living standards of the economically and educationally disadvantaged while preserving the interests of the wealthier and educationally advanced strata.³² Paradoxically, while the Likud sought in 1977 to limit the role of the Histadrut³³ this move, unlike its similar position during the fifties, was not perceived by the lower classes as being anti labor, let alone anti-Oriental.

Hence, whereas during the early years of statehood the party (Herut) advocated certain liberal (inclusionary) policies toward the Arabs, in the later years it has shifted its attention somewhat to the disadvantaged, mostly Orientals and the exclusion of the Arabs. The party's stands vis-a-vis the status of the occupied territories following the 1967 war provide further testimony to this trend. Its advocacy of harsh measures against the Arabs, the control of all the occupied territories with minimum political and civil liberties for the inhabitants (which is what the 'Autonomy' advocated by the Likud means) contrasts sharply with Labor's advocated position of territorial compromises. The latter policy, of course, would result in an increase in the number of enfranchised Arabs in the state and the closing off of many agencies which deal with the Arabs and the loss of many jobs by middle-class Jews (mostly Orientals) who man these positions.

³² See Ibid., pp. 105-6 for a detailed account of these conflicting views and their solutions by the party prior to the elections of 1977.

³³ Ibid., p. 106.

These shifts in policies of the Likud contributed to the increased support the party received among the Orientals. On the other hand, Labor, which had administered the most exclusionary policies toward the Arabs, was also supported by Orientals. The waning of support for its policies and leadership among Jews correspond to the beginning of liberalization in its policies toward the Arabs. In an article entitled 'The Electorate: Israel 1977', Asher Arian presents a tabulation of actual election results and data collected through surveys following the elections of 1969, 1973 and 1977. Tables 3-2, 3-8 and 3-10 show a clear shift in ethnic voting and support for both parties. Whereas on the average in 1969 Labor received over half of the Oriental vote, this proportion dropped to about 40 percent in 1973 and to about 30 percent in 1977. By contrast, support for the Likud by Orientals has increased from about 27 percent in 1969 to about 44 percent in 1973 and about 60 percent in 1977 with more profound increases among the young Orientals than among the old.³⁴

In sum, while these shifts in voting trends have been significant, they cannot be directly attributed to shifts in Party's stand toward the Arabs. As noted at the beginning of this section many factors have precipitated this shift. We can conclude, however, that such changes represent what we might expect if our ongoing analysis of the relationship of attitudes of Orientals toward the Arab population has some validity. These attitudes, as I have maintained so far, are motivated by the Orientals' economic interests as they are conceived to

³⁴ See Arian, A., 1979, pp. 62-66.

be best served by the maintenance of a more rigid division between Arabs and Jews. The upshot of such division is on the one hand the maintenance and even the expansion of control agencies, which offer employment opportunities to middle-class Orientals and, on the other hand the limiting of the competitive potential of Arab labor against the Jewish lower class which is composed mostly of Orientals.

SUMMARY

In this chapter I have shown that the interests of Orientals and Ashkenazim did not, and do not, always coincide. This lack of coincidence is derived from the inter-ethnic Jewish rift and differentiation. Whereas Ashkenazim occupy mostly managerial and elite positions in the occupational hierarchy Orientals occupy mostly the middle and lower positions. Despite continued demand by Orientals for equality the inter-ethnic Jewish differentiation has persisted.

Differentiation between the two Jewish ethnic communities was also reflected in ethnic variations in attitudes toward the Arabs. While both Jewish groups were shown to benefit from an Arab-Jewish division, their respective benefits vary with the extent of rigidity in this division. Whereas Orientals gain most from a rigid division, one which views Arabs as outsiders and therefore must be kept under control and prevented from participation in the social, political and economic life of the state, Ashkenazim gain more from allowing certain elasticity in the dividing line, one which allows Arabs at least a minimal participation in the economic sphere so that they are more accessible to Jewish business under least favorable conditions.

As expected, these conflicting interests were expressed through different attitudes adopted by each Jewish ethnic group and through voting trends to political parties in accordance with these attitudes. Hence, many changes in policies toward the Arabs were the result of the interplay of these dynamics. The next three chapters will describe these dynamics in more details. In these chapters it will be shown that opposition to policies and practices against the Arabs was mostly related to the interests of the opposing group. For example, whereas hardly any Jewish opposition was raised against confiscation of Arab lands, opposition against the military government particularly the policy of movement restriction was progressively intensified in accordance with economic expansion and demand for Arab labor.

CHAPTER IV

LAND POLICIES AND IMPLICATIONS

According to the split labor market theory an initial discrepancy in the price of labor can be a result of differences in resources which are available to two ethnically distinguishable groups of labor. This is also true of the Arab-Jewish contrast in Israel. Arabs began losing control over a major economic source through land purchases by the Zionist Organization during the pre-state period as well as through land confiscation following the establishment of the state. No other single factor has contributed as much as the confiscation of Arab land to the generation of cheap Arab labor and eventual total economic dependence of Arabs on the Jewish sector.

The exodus of the Palestinians in 1948, as a result of the Arab-Jewish war and its atrocities, left Israel in control of large areas of cultivable land. Despite this, Israel enacted laws and set up mechanisms which allowed it to continue to confiscate Arab land. Thus, since 1948, hundreds of thousands of dunums (a dunum is equal to a quarter of an acre) of Arab owned cultivable land have been confiscated by the Israeli authorities. Since the Palestinians depended on the land for their subsistence, this loss brought about a total transformation of the Arab occupational structure.

Since the establishment of Israel, the decline in the proportion of the Arab labor force who are employed in agriculture has been dramatic. Available data show that in 1955 almost half (48.8 percent) of the Arab labor force was employed in agriculture. This proportion dropped to 44 percent in 1962, 30.9 percent in 1968,¹ 19.9 percent in 1972 and by 1981 had dropped to a mere 11.5 percent (Tables 4.2,4.3,4.4).

No doubt, general modernization of agricultural methods and the introduction of technology to agriculture are partly responsible for this decline. But the central factor responsible for this decline has been the confiscation of Arab land.

In this chapter I examine Israel's land policies and their consequences on the Arab occupational structure from three vantage points: first, I examine the extent to which land expropriation is responsible for the decline in the proportion of Arabs employed in agriculture; second, the extent to which this labor was channelled into the Jewish labor market and under what conditions; and third, I examine the respective benefits of Jewish labor and Jewish capital as a result of these developments and, conversely, the extent to which these benefits were instrumental in determining the status of Arab workers.

¹ See Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1976, Table 13, pp. 304-5.

The Acquisition of Arab Land by the Israeli Government

Following the 1948 war Israel was in control of almost four-fifths (4/5) of Palestine's area (21 million out of 26 million dunums). Eighty percent of the area which fell under Israeli control represented land abandoned by the Arab refugees.² Within this area many villages were emptied and destroyed. Out of 585 Arab villages only 107 remained: the rest were destroyed and their population scattered within, as well as outside of, the territory that became Israel.³

This abandoned property (referred to later on as absentee property), represented, according to Peretz, "one of the greatest contributions toward making Israel a viable state."⁴ Both movable and immovable properties were immediately put to use by the Israeli authorities. The immovable property consisted of millions of dunums of Arab land, citrus orchards, olive and orange groves, apartment buildings, shops, offices, storehouses and the like. In 1954, more than one-third of Israel's Jewish population lived on absentee property and nearly a third of the new immigrants, (250,000 people), settled in urban areas abandoned by Arabs. The Arabs left whole cities like Jaffa, Akka, Lydd, Ramleh, Baysan, Majdal. In all, 388 towns and villages, and large parts of 94 other cities and towns containing nearly a quarter of all the buildings

² Don Peretz, Israel and the Palestine Arabs, The Middle East Institute, Washington, D. C., 1958, p.143.

³ T. Zayyad, "The Fate of the Arabs in Israel". Journal of Palestine Studies, 6 (Autumn), pp. 92-103.

⁴ Don Peretz, 1958, p. 141.

in Israel⁵ were abandoned.

In order to manage this property, Israel created mechanisms and enacted special laws to provide the 'legal' basis for formal control over the property. The first regulations concerning absentee property were published on December 12, 1948 by the Provisional Government.⁶ The regulations, known as the Absentee Property Regulations, were promulgated by the Finance Minister in accordance with the powers bestowed upon him by the Law and Administration Ordinance of 1948.⁷ In addition, the Minister of Finance appointed a Custodian of Absentee Property to replace the Custodian of Abandoned Property. On March 14, 1950, the Knesset replaced these regulations with the Absentee Property Law.

The interest of this study in these regulations stems from the fact that, as promulgated, the regulations had a far reaching effect on the Arabs in Israel. Over 81,000 out of 160,000 Palestinians who remained in Israel and became citizens were defined by the regulations, and subsequently by the law, as absentee and consequently their property was confiscated.⁸

⁵ Haaretz, June 15, 1951. Cited in Peretz, 1958, p. 143.

⁶ Kovetz Ha-Takanot (Official Gazette) 37 Dec. 12, 1948, p. 91.

⁷ Jerusalem Post, Dec. 19, 1948. Cited in Peretz, 1958, p. 150.

⁸ Ian Lustick, 1980, p. 174.

The Regulations defined all persons who held property in Israel as absentees if, on or after November 29, 1947 (the date of the United Nations Resolution on the Partition of Palestine), they were: "a) citizens or subjects of Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq or the Yemen, or b) were in any of these countries or in any part of Palestine outside the area of the regulations, or c) were Palestine citizens and left their places of habitual residence."⁹ Thus, every Arab in Palestine was liable to be classified as an absentee under the regulations. As Peretz notes:

All Arabs who held property in the New City of Acre, regardless of the fact that they may never have traveled farther than the few meters to the Old City, were classified as absentees. The 30,000 Arabs who fled from one place to another within Israel, but who never left the country, were also liable to have their property declared absentee. Any individual who may have gone to Beirut or Bethlehem for a one day visit, during the latter days of the Mandate, was automatically an absentee.¹⁰

Indeed, over 40 percent of the land owned by legal Arab residents of Israel was confiscated by the authorities as part of the absentee property policy.¹¹

The Arabs, Israeli citizens who lost property as a result of the regulations' stipulations, were of three categories: about 15,000 Arabs from Galilee who for whatever reason were "not at their place of residence" when the area was occupied by Jewish forces; about 31,000 Arabs from the Little Triangle in the center, who became Israeli residents as a result of the Armistic agreements in 1949 between Israel

⁹ Peretz, 1958, p. 151.

¹⁰ Ibid., P. 152.

¹¹ Peretz, p. 142.

and Jordan; and about 35,000 Arabs who, during the first years of Israel's existence, either infiltrated back across the borders or were legally admitted as part of a limited family reunion program.¹²

Expulsions of Arabs from their villages and homes - long after hostilities had subsided - and the confiscation of their property was another method by which Arabs were deprived of their lands. In some cases whole populations were evicted and scattered in neighboring villages and their property confiscated. In others, part of the population was scattered in different villages while others were forced to cross the armistic lines to the neighboring countries. In still others, only some of the inhabitants were rounded up and sent across the borders.

Representing the first category are the villages of Ikrit whose inhabitants were expelled on November 5, 1948,¹³ Khasas, Qatiya and Yanuh which were emptied of their Arab population on June 5, 1949, and the village of Ghabsiya whose inhabitants were expelled in January 1950. All of these villages are located in Western Galilee in the north.

¹² See Lustick, 1980, pp. 173-74. For a detailed account of the court battles between the Custodian and an Arab, resident of Jaffa, who was legally admitted back through London only to find his property confiscated, see Don Peretz, 1958, p. 177.

¹³ For a detailed account of the eviction of the people of Ikrit, and the legal and popular struggle for the return of its inhabitants, see Elias Shakour, Blood Brothers, Chosen Books, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1984.

The second category is represented by Kufr Anan in the Triangle which was emptied of its inhabitants on February 28, 1949, and the inhabitants of Majdal in the south who were expelled over a three-week period across the Egyptian borders, to the Gaza strip, on August 17th. And on November 17, 1951, the inhabitants of Khirbet Buweishat in the Triangle were expelled and forced to cross the Jordanian border to the West Bank.

Representing the third type, i.e., selective expulsion, are the villages of Rihaniya in Galilee from which seven families were expelled in October 1953, and on October 30, 1956 the Baqqara tribe was forced to cross the northern border to Syria.¹⁴ As late as 1959, Bedouin tribes were expelled to Jordan and Egypt and their return to Israel was later secured only after United Nations intervention.¹⁵

Between the years 1953 and 1954, the Bedouins in the south were particularly harassed by the army. Haaretz reports that:¹⁶

The Army's desert patrols would turn up in the midst of a Bedouin encampment day after day dispersing it with a sudden burst of machine-gun fire until the sons of the desert were broken and, gathering what little was left of their belongings, led their camels in long silent strings into the heart of the Sinai desert.

Many other villages were either partly or completely demolished with many of their inhabitants now living in various parts of Israel but with no access to their 'former' property. Among these villages are Batat, Amqa, Saffuriya, Mijdal, Mansura, Ma'ar, Kuweikat, Berwa, Damun, and

¹⁴ See a more detailed description of these expulsions in Sabri Jiryis, 1976, pp. 81-92.

¹⁵ Sabri Jiryis, 1976, p.82.

¹⁶ Haaretz, Nov. 19, 1959.

Ruweis, to mention only a few.

Few Arab land owners were saved from some kind of confiscation procedure. Those Arabs who escaped the Absentee Property Regulations and expulsion orders were hardly missed by other laws and regulations. From the early 1950's until the late 1970's, numerous laws and regulations provided the legal basis for land confiscation. Among these were:

1. The Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945, upon which the military government was based. Article 125 of the regulations was particularly designed to address the issue of land.¹⁷ It empowered the military governors to order any area closed. Upon the issuance of such an order access to such areas became restricted, for "security reasons", to holders of special permits, the issuance of which were to be approved by the army chief of staff or the minister of defense. A few years later the land in a closed area or parts of it were confiscated and given to Jewish farmers and later declared open.¹⁸

Even the High Court for Justice (Supreme Court) could not challenge the authority of the military government. And when such a challenge was presented and the Court ordered the government to allow the villagers to return to their homes and property, the military made sure there were no homes to which the inhabitants could return. It either dynamited the homes

¹⁷ See the remarks of Shimon Peres and Shmoel Segev concerning the function and use of Article 125 in chapter 5.

¹⁸ See Lustick, 1980, pp. 178-179.

in the villages, such as the case of Ghabsiya, or attacked and destroyed the village through air strike as was the case of Birem and then the village and the land surrounding it were ordered closed areas.¹⁹

2. Regulations which were promulgated by the minister of defense in 1949; the Emergency Regulations (security zones). These regulations were renewed periodically by the Knesset until December 1972 but no renewal requests have been submitted since. The regulations empowered the minister of defense, with the approval of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, to designate certain areas along the borders as "security zone". Exploiting his power the minister declared almost half of Galilee, all of the Triangle, an area near the Gaza Strip in the south, and another along the Jerusalem Jaffa railway as security zones.²⁰ All of these areas cover large tracts owned by the Arabs.

Once an area was declared closed the defense minister was empowered to order, if he saw fit, any permanent resident of such an area to leave the security zone within fourteen days of the order. Large areas of land were confiscated by this method. Some of the expropriated lands were later sold to the Jewish National Fund (JNF) (also known as Ha-Keren Ha-Kayemet

¹⁹ For a detailed account of the legal battles between the villagers of Ghabsiya and the military government, see Sabri Jiryis, 1976, pp. 89-90.

²⁰ Kovetz Ha-Takanot (Official Gazette), 18, June 8, 1949, p. 230; 215, November, 2, 1955, p. 144.

Le-Yisrael), in accordance with an agreement made earlier with the government's legal advisor in a meeting near the end of 1948.²¹

3. The Emergency Regulations for the Expropriation of Uncultivated Lands (also known as the Cultivation of Waste Land Ordinance), is another law which enabled the government to confiscate Arab land. Passed in October 1948,²² the law empowers the minister of agriculture to take possession of uncultivated land or of any lands in cases where the minister "is not satisfied that the owner of the land has began or is about to begin or will continue to cultivate the land." (Article 4) This law was used extensively in conjunction with Article 125 of the Emergency Regulations.
4. The Emergency Land Requisition Law, passed in 1949, gave the government the right to expropriate land whenever a "competent authority" (appointed by the government) determines that the land "is required for the defense of the state, the security of the people, to safeguard essential provisions or services, or to absorb immigrants or settle retired soldiers or men disabled while on active service".²³

²¹ Joseph Weitz, Diaries and Letters to the Children, Tel-Aviv, 1965, 3, pp. 373-4. Cited in Jiryis, 1976, p. 91.

²² Laws of the State of Israel, 2 (1948/1949), p. 72.

²³ *Ibid.*, 4, p. 3.

5. In 1953 the Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts and Compensation) Law was passed. The law empowered the finance minister to make a list of lands that had been confiscated, in whatever manner, from the establishment of the state on May 14, 1948, to April 1, 1952. If the minister certified that these lands were "used or assigned for purposes of essential development, settlement or security" and were "still required for any of these purposes," then, as a result of this certification, these lands would automatically become the property of the Development Authority.²⁴

The purpose of this law, according to the finance minister who proposed the bill was "to legalize certain actions taken during the war and after it... when the government began to take over absentee property..."²⁵ That is to say, the aim of the government in proposing this bill was to legitimize the massive land transfer that had taken place from 1948 to 1952 and to preclude legal attempts by Arab residents to take advantage of loopholes in the laws or the absence of due process in order to press their claims in the courts. According to Lustick,²⁶ "Under the terms of this law fully 1,250,000 dunums were expropriated".

²⁴ LSI 4, p. 43, Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts and Compensation) Law, Section 2, article (a).

²⁵ Knesset Debates, June 3, 1952, p. 2202. Cited in Jiryis, 1976, p. 96.

²⁶ Lustick, 1980, p. 175.

6. In 1958 yet another law dealing with land expropriation was passed. This law, known as the Prescription Law, amended the older Ottoman law so that occupiers of unregistered land were required to demonstrate unchallenged possession, not for ten years as had been the rule, but for fifteen to twenty-five years.²⁷ Under the terms of this law Arabs were forced to produce records from the British Mandate period. According to Oded, the government lawyers who drafted this law knew that the British Mandatory authorities had undertaken

the systematic survey and settlement of title to land, aimed inter alia at establishing the occupier's rights on more exact and secure foundations; but in view of the need to adjudicate first of all the area where Arab and Jewish claims conflicted, the all Arab parts of Palestine were left till last, and the process of settlement of title only began in most of Arab Galilee after Israel's establishment.²⁸

In the context of its overall survey of land registration in Israel, according to Oded, the government has made a point of challenging every Arab claim to land ownership, no matter how small the plot of land involved. As a result the government has become a "major land holder in every village.... endowed with thousands of separate plots, some of them tiny, with which it can do very little."²⁹ However, the aim of the government by such action was soon cleared by the following bill which was introduced to the Knesset but was not passed.

²⁷ LSI, 12, p. 129, Law of Prescription.

²⁸ Yitzhak Oded, "Land Losses Among Israel's Arab Villages," New Outlook, 7, no. 7 (September 1964), p. 13.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 15.

7. The Land Concentration bill which was proposed to the Knesset on November 7, 1960. Although the bill was rejected by the Knesset its mere proposal sheds further light on the government's Arab land policies. When proposing the bill the minister of agriculture argued that:

The state, the development authority and Ha-Keren Ha-Keyemet Le-Yisrael are the legal owners of hundreds of thousands of dunums in Galilee, the Triangle, and Wadi Ara (all are Arab areas, ed. note). There are more than 250,000 dunums divided into small plots which are swallowed up among the plots owned by the Arabs. In this form it is impossible to make use of the land for settlement or development. We need government intervention to concentrate this land and the proposed bill would enable the state and the development authority to merge the plots they own into larger areas which could then be settled or developed or improved according to the needs of the nation.³⁰

In order to accomplish this concentration, the bill proposed empowering the minister of agriculture to declare a given area 'a land concentration area' and the authority to exchange plots or pay compensation depending on the availability of state land as is decided by the minister.

It is clear from the foregoing that under the guise of an elaborate legal code the Israeli government has utilized every means to gain control of Arab lands. The ease with which the government got the Knesset to pass the laws and regulations needed for this purpose has more to do with the Israeli political system than with fairness and any apparent consensus.³¹ The fact that the laws which deal with land enable

³⁰ Knesset Debates, November 7, 1960, p. 132. Cited in Jiryis, 1976, p. 100.

³¹ According to the Israeli political system for any party or coalition of parties to be able to form a government it is essential to

the government to gain control of privately owned Arab land under every possible circumstance shows that this policy was systematic, consistent and with clear goals and objectives.

Land Losses and Arab Labor

Since the data with respect to the extent of land losses by Arabs to the Israeli authorities and hence to Jewish individuals and institutions, are scarce, it is very difficult to provide exact figures. However, a few examples can illustrate the pattern. According to the table below (Table 4.1) over 68 percent of the total land privately owned by Arabs was expropriated. That is to say only one third of the land owned by Arabs before 1948 remained under their control.

have control in Knesset (the legislature). The fact that the Knesset members do not represent a specific constituency and are members of specific parties, makes voting follow party line more often than not. Such a system guarantees the support of the parliament for any laws and/or policies the government wishes to introduce and pursue.

Table 4.1

Expropriation of Arab Land Since 1948 (Selected Villages)
(Dunums)

Name of Village	Area Possessed in 1947	Area Possessed after Expropriation	Total Area # Expropriated
Aksal @	13,666	4,396	9,270
Abu Snan @	12,871	5,434	7,437
Ara-Arara *	26,000	7,000	19,000
Arrabe *	95,000	11,350	83,650
Baka el-Ghrbiyeh *	22,000	7,000	15,000
Beisan-Ein al Assad @	25,594	10,204	15,390
Beit Jann *	26,000	13,000	13,000
Buqaia'h @	10,276	3,500	6,776
Deir-el-Assad, Binah and Nahaf *	16,000	7,000	9,000
Deir Hana *	16,000	9,500	6,500
Jaljuliah *	14,000	0,800	13,200
Jatt *	12,000	9,000	3,000
Kfar Bara *	4,000	2,000	2,000
Kfar Kara' @	14,543	2,618	11,925
Kfar Kassem *	12,000	9,000	3,000
Maghar @	45,590	12,227	33,363
Maker @	8,661	3,884	4,777
Mi'lya @	19,136	2,997	16,139
Majd el-Krum *	20,000	7,000	13,000
Qalansawe *	18,850	6,780	12,070
Sakhnin *	55,000	30,000	25,000
Taibeh *	45,000	13,000	32,000
Tamra (Acre) @	30,549	14,489	16,060
Tira *	40,000	8,000	32,000
Um el-Fahm *	125,000	25,000	100,000
Yirka *	55,000	18,000	37,000
Total:	793,012	246,679	546,333

Source: * Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State, 1980, p. 179. @ Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel, 1976, (Table 5), pp. 292-95 (data presented by Jiryis do not include expropriations after 1963).

Numbers are calculated on the basis of the information in the first two columns.

In addition to material loss to the Arabs, confiscation of land has had other consequences on the Arab population living in Israel, the most important of which has been the transformation of the Arab labor force from self-employed farmers to unskilled hired labor. As can be seen from the three tables below (Tables 4.2,4.3,4.4) most of the Arab labor force (57%) in 1931, was employed in agriculture. This proportion declined to 38 percent in 1963 and to about 20 percent in 1972. By 1981 the percentage of the Arab labor force employed in agriculture had declined to mere 11.5 percent. This decline corresponds to an increase in the category of unskilled labor. Furthermore, if we examine the 1972 figures we find that over a quarter of the Arab labor force (26.4%) are employed in construction. Combining this category with the category of miners and craftsmen (for comparative purposes), we find that while in 1963 39.3 percent of the Arab labor force was employed in this category, by 1972 this proportion increased to 42.8 percent. This represents an increase of 3.5 percent or about 10 percent of the 1963 figure.

Table 4.2
Employed Arabs and Jews by Category of
Employment (Percentages) *

Economic Sector	1931	
	Arabs	Jews
Agriculture	57.1	18.1
Industry, crafts, construction	12.0	33.5
Transportation	6.0	6.4
Commerce	8.2	19.1
Liberal professions	2.7	11.6
Public service	3.9	2.2
Domestic service	3.2	3.5
Rent, others	6.9	5.6
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Y. Ben-Porath, The Arab Labor Force in Israel, Jerusalem, Israel Universities Press, 1966, p. 19. Cited in Zureik, The Palestinians..., 1979, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, p. 123.

* Sample size is not provided in original.

Table 4.3
Employed Arabs and Jews by Category of
Occupation (Percentages)

Occupation	1963		1972	
	Arabs	Jews	Arabs	Jews
Professional, scientific, technical	5.5	12.9	6.6	17.6
Administrative, executive, managerial, clerical	2.0	16.8	3.9	19.0
Traders, agents, salesmen	4.7	8.4	8.2	8.4
Farmers, fishermen and related work	38.0	11.8	19.9	6.9
Workers in transportation and communication	4.3	5.5	6.6	5.0
Construction, quarrymen miners, craftsmen, etc.	--	--	26.4 *	6.7
Service, sport and recreation	39.3	32.1	18.4	24.0
	6.2	12.5	10.0	12.4
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Abs. (thds)	66.2	747.0	94.6	902.5

* The 1972 Israeli census separates construction workers, quarrymen and miners, etc. Thus among the Arabs 26.4% are in construction and mining (unskilled jobs), compared to 6.7% among Jews. (Zureik, p. 123)

Table 4.4
Employed Arabs and Jews in Israel
By Occupation (Percentages)

1981

Occupation	Arabs	Jews			
		Total	Born in Israel	Born in Asia-Africa	Born in Europe-Amerca
Total (thds)	133.0	1,144.5	451.5	313.7	379.3
Percentage	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Scientific & academic wrkers	2.8	8.8	9.5	2.7	13.0
Other Prof., technical & related workers	9.4	15.5	19.5	9.0	16.1
Administrators & managers	1.2	4.0	4.1	2.5	5.2
Clerical & rel. workers	5.5	20.4	24.1	15.8	19.8
Sales workers	7.0	7.7	6.2	8.5	8.8
Service workers	10.7	11.2	8.0	19.0	8.6
Agricultural workers	11.2	4.9	6.2	5.4	2.9
Skilled workers in industry, building, trans & other skiled workers	38.2	24.4	20.7	31.9	22.8
Other workers in indust, buil & trans. & unskilled wks.	13.7	3.2	1.8	5.3	2.9

Source: Statistical Abstracts of Israel, Jerusalem, No. 33, 1982, pp. 333-349.

One cannot conclude on the basis of these data alone that such a shift in the occupational undertakings of the Arabs was a function of land loss. After all, many contemporary urban societies were still at a rural stage forty or fifty years ago and such a shift was not only natural but was considered desirable and economically rational. In the case of the Israeli Arabs, however, the relatively high rate of such transformation coupled with the rate and extent of land losses to the Israeli authorities make the argument concerning a possible link between land losses and occupational transformation tenable.

Over a period of less than 20 years (from 1963 to 1981),³² the Arab labor force employed in agriculture declined from 38.0 percent to 11.5 percent. In comparison with the figures from 1931 -i.e. over a fifty years period- the figure in 1981 constitutes only 14 percent of the 57.0 percent in 1931, a decline of 86 percent.

The same pattern of decline holds even if we limit the analysis of data to the period which covers the years since Israel came into existence in 1948. Despite the initial loss of property by thousands of Arabs during the 1948-49 period, as a result of the Absentee Property Law, 50 percent of the Arab labor force was still employed in agriculture in 1950. Thus, 80 percent of the Arab labor force which was employed in agriculture in 1950 was eventually diverted to other sectors, mainly as unskilled and semi-skilled workers. A survey of the construction industry in 1975 in Haifa showed that only 36.5 percent of

³² The 1963 is taken as base because it is the year when restrictions on the movement of Arabs were relaxed considerably. This gave Arab labor the opportunity to seek employment as hired labor.

those who worked in construction were Jews, working primarily in supervisory positions, while 42.9 percent were Israeli Arabs, and 20.5 percent were Arabs from the West Bank.³³

While this decline in the proportion of the Arab labor force employed in agriculture is very significant, one can further argue that the rate of decline would have been even greater had it not been for some Jewish land 'owners' who were either leasing the land to Arabs or employing Arabs on farms as hired labor, a practice which was denounced by many Jewish officials as well as some journalists³⁴ (see below pp. 108-111).

This suggests that while the relationship between the rate of decline in the Arab labor force employed in agriculture and the rate of land expropriation may not be highly correlated it is, nevertheless, clear that a certain relationship does appear to exist between the two variables. The fact that access of dispossessed Palestinians to labor sites was controlled through travel restrictions by the military government (see chapter 5), from 1948 to 1966 (the years during which

³³ Y. Waschitz, 'Commuters and Entrepreneurs', New Outlook, vol. 18, 1975, p. 46

³⁴ Habib Kanan was among the first journalists to call attention to such practices by the Jewish settlers. Writing in Haaretz on December 7, 1964, Kanan complained that

When a Jewish farmer hands over the work on his land to Arab peasants, he is supporting one of the important claims of Israel's enemies, namely, that the Jews in Israel do not have deep roots in the land they claim as their father land. They have the support of facts when they point to the Jews as city dwellers whose only interest is the exploitation of Arab labor. Nor would it be difficult to describe the Jews as a negative element turning back the social clock several decades to the time when the landowning effendis (landlords, ed. note) lived in the cities while the peasants did the farming on their land.

most land confiscation occurred), makes it almost impossible to evaluate the extent to which land confiscation resulted in Arab labor for hire because under these circumstances unemployed Arab labor seeking work was invisible.

Furthermore, the continued restriction by the so-called national institutions (JNF, Jewish Agency, Histadrut etc.) against hiring Arab labor, coupled with the lack of data on Arabs who were willing and able to work, further distorts the real impact land confiscation has had on the transformation of Arab labor. Whether this lack of reliable data on the number of Arabs who became hired labor as a result of dispossession was part of an attempt by the Israeli authorities to prevent bad publicity inside as well as outside the country, remains to be determined.

Since it has been established that confiscation of Arab land resulted in the generation of Arab labor for hire in the Jewish markets, the question then becomes: to what extent was Arab labor needed by the Jewish markets? Stated differently, to what extent did the need of the labor market for unskilled labor influence confiscation policies? Who were the beneficiaries and who were the losers, among the Jewish population, as a result of this policy?

The importance of these questions stems from the fact that by establishing a connection between government policies and meeting the labor needs one can demonstrate government responsiveness to the needs of employers, i.e., owners of the means of production. Hence, the

relations between the government, employers and labor will be better understood.

A satisfactory answer to these questions, however, would entail the availability of: a) detailed data on the supply of Jewish labor and the demand of the labor market at specific historical periods; b) detailed data on the extent and period of expropriation and the amount of labor generated as a result of each expropriatory act. Unfortunately, these data are not available. But even if these data were available, one would still have to consider a third factor before reaching any definite conclusions, namely the proportion of Arabs who were channeled to the labor market. As will be pointed out in chapter 5, throughout the 1950's until the mid 1960's the flow of Arab labor to employment sites was controlled by the military government.

Nevertheless, on the basis of existing data one can safely say that expropriation of Arab land resulted in no loss to any segment of the Jewish population. Although, theoretically one could argue that the generation of a large army of reserve labor must have hurt Jewish workers, in reality that did not happen. While this army of Arab labor was ready and willing to work, its movement was restricted and therefore its potential as a possible competitor in the labor market was curtailed. Thus, in reality the Arab labor force lacked the minimal 'offensive weapon' necessary to present any threat to Jewish workers, namely, free movement to and from employment sites, and free negotiation for work conditions and salaries. One has to remember that most expropriation of Arab land occurred during the years 1948 and 1966 which

correspond to the period during which the Arabs were under the control of the military government.

The fact that Arab labor did not materialize as a threat to Jewish labor does not mean that other segments of the Jewish population did not benefit from the availability of 'cheap' labor. Thus, as far as the Jewish population was concerned, this was not a zero-sum game. The continuously expanding Israeli economy and its need for labor found in the Arabs an easy reservoir from which to fill its needs cheaply. The efficient mechanism of control over the flow of such labor and the fact that Arabs were not members of the Histadrut (labor union) whereas most Jews were, (which meant Arabs, almost by definition, were the last to be hired and the first to be fired), undermined the Arab labor bargaining position for higher salaries and better work conditions which contributed in turn to an ideal situation for both the Israeli economy as a whole and the individual employer, without any real cost to Jewish labor.

That is to say, all three factors combined -- the generation of Arab labor through confiscation of land, the regulation of the flow of Arab labor through the restriction on their freedom of movement, and the lack of union-protection to the Arab worker -- forced Arab labor into accepting a position inferior to Jewish workers in terms of work status and pay. On the other hand, union-protected Jewish labor was not threatened by the availability of Arab labor because the flow of the latter to employment sites was restricted and therefore its 'threatening' potential was limited. Thus, the development of what

could be envisioned as a class conflict between Jewish labor and Jewish capital over the status of cheap Arab labor was avoided.

That these policies were calculated, systematic and with clear objectives can further be supported by the following episode. Toward the end of 1961 the authorities announced the confiscation of 5,100 dunums from the Arab villages of Deir el-Assad, Bi'nah, and Nahaf, in Western Galilee. In the early years of Israeli statehood, these villages lost 3,500 dunums of cultivated land. This time the regime, as part of its continuing efforts to "Judaize the Galilee," decided that more village lands were needed in order to build a new Jewish development town, Carmiel. The lands expropriated included quarries and orchards from which the bulk of the villages' workers made their living. Although the inhabitants suggested that other of their lands in the area be used for the construction of the new town so that they would not be forced to travel to Jewish cities for employment, their requests were refused. Rather, the government indicated that the industries to be built in Carmiel would create jobs for those Arabs left unemployed as a result of the expropriation.³⁵

The villagers' complaints were brought before the Knesset Finance Committee by two Knesset members: Moshe Sneh (member of the Communist party) and Yusef Khamis (an Arab Knesset member of Mapam party). In its draft report the minority on the committee stated that "the Committee is not convinced that there is no alternative to the expropriation of the agricultural land belonging to the three villages. There is no

³⁵ Lustick, 1980, p. 177; Jiryis, 1976, pp. 109-111.

justification for this land seizure, not only because the government has no means of compensating the owners with comparable land (there is no land of this quality in the area), but because there is no need for the land for the establishment of the town, since the planning authority has no intention of constructing any buildings on the site."³⁶

After the establishment of Carmiel, Arabs were denied either residence or investment in the town.³⁷ On the other hand, Arab labor, to work on construction sites for new housing and road pavement, was welcomed.

I have noted elsewhere the military governor's concern with the 'overflow' of Arab labor to Jewish colonies and the extra restrictive orders issued by the governor to limit such an overflow. While the Carmiel episode is not unique,³⁸ it nevertheless illustrates a pattern which was used over and over again, a pattern in which everybody gained except the Arabs. The Arabs were forced out of their lands and out of their occupations as independent farmers, to become landless laborers for hire without the advantage of fair competition in the open labor market.

³⁶ Knesset Dates, October 31, 1962, p. 24. Cited in Jiryis, 1976, pp. 109-10.

³⁷ The minister of housing is quoted as saying, in response to an Arab applicant to live in Carmeil, that "Carmeil was not built in order to solve the problems of the people in the surrounding area." Knesset Debates, Dec. 2, 1964, p. 485. In Jiryis, p. 110. For the objection to an Arab contractor to invest in industries in Carmeil in which both Arabs and Jews will be employed, see Maarive, Jan 30, 1972.

³⁸ Jewish Upper Nazareth by the old city of Arab Nazareth and Ma'alot by the Arab village of Tarshiha in the north provide other examples.

Even the Islamic waqf (an Islamic endowment) was confiscated as absentee property and put under the control of the Custodian despite the fact that God can hardly be considered an absentee (especially in the holy land), and the Moslem community -for whose sake the waqf was endowed- did not disappear. This action by the Israeli government enraged the Arabs and was the basis of a poem by Rashid Hussain, an Arab poet, in which he declares, sarcastically:

God has become a refugee sir!

Expropriate then, even the rugs of our mosques.

The significance of the property of the Islamic waqf lies in its size. It is estimated that one eighth (1/8) of Palestinian wealth belonged to the waqf. In terms of fertile land it was estimated to be somewhere between 750,000 and 1.1 million dunums, half of it inside Israel.³⁹ This was in addition to many businesses and shops which had they been left to the Islamic community to manage would have provided employment and income for thousands of needy Arabs. Such a possibility, however, would have meant the forestallment of the Israeli policies (or part of them) toward the Arabs. Thus, the fact that the Israeli government chose to take the extra step and expropriate this property, despite the outrage of the Arabs and certain segments of the Jewish population,⁴⁰ and despite reservations expressed by the Supreme Court as to the legality of the government's action,⁴¹ provides further evidence that the Israeli

³⁹ Yaacov Shimshoni, Palestine Arabs, Tel-Aviv, 1947, p. 90. (Hebrew), and Atallah Mansour (an Arab journalist), in Haaretz, Dec. 13, 1965.

⁴⁰ See Habib Kanan, Haaretz, April 21, 1951.

⁴¹ See Sabri Jiryis, 1976, p. 118.

government was following its policy with consistency and clear objectives.

Arab and Jewish Opposition to Land Expropriation

Although most segments of the Jewish population benefited from the government's policy of confiscation, this policy was not always welcomed by all these segments. Both Arabs and Jews, for different reasons, fought against the expropriation of Arab lands. As can be seen from the following discussion, no clear pattern can be discerned from the Jewish opposition to certain of these policies. Even members of the ruling party (Mapai), and members of the Herut party, which is known for its extreme views against the Arabs, objected at one point or another to certain of these policies.

Opposition to government's policies concerning the expropriation of Arab lands was apparent from the early stages and was expressed by both Arabs and certain segments of the Jewish population. The first signs of opposition to the government's handling of Arab property were manifested against the proposed Absentee Property Law in 1950. While the law closely resembled the emergency regulations which had dealt with absentee property since December 1948, the proposal of the law to the Knesset offered an opportunity for Knesset members and others to voice their opposition. During the Knesset debates over the provisions of the law several Knesset members, Arabs as well as Jews, spoke against the law. Most opposition was raised against provisions which dealt with the Arab citizens of the state.

There was a general feeling among those opposing the law that depriving the Arabs of their property: a) would poison relations between the Arabs and Jews of the country; b) would hamper any future prospects of integrating Arabs into the life of the state; and c) could undermine security. Some Knesset members expressed the belief that the law was not free from racial discrimination. The following quote from the daily Haaretz⁴² summarizes the arguments. Haaretz called for the return of property or payment of just compensation to Arab residents.

We have nothing to be proud of in rejection of Dr. Sneh's and Mr. Elyashar's amendment.... We are not at war with the Arabs who are established citizens of the state..... A law which automatically makes them absentee is insufferable..... This is a matter of conscience and political understanding.

The newspaper warned that there would be little possibility of integrating Arab farmers into the state "if Israel condemns them to a life of perpetual poverty."

David Elston, a columnist for the Jerusalem Post, also expressed his opposition to the law. Writing in Haaretz on July 8, 1951, Elston described the law as "perhaps the most serious factor creating embitterment among all Arabs." He pointed out that in Galilee twenty villages had been deprived of their property by Jewish collectives, which "arrogated to themselves, through long-term leases granted by the Minister of Agriculture, lands of Arabs who were free from any guilt or wrong doing."

⁴² Haaretz, March 20, 1950, and July 2, 1951. Cited in Peretz, 1958, p. 172.

The excessive powers and freedom the law accorded the Custodian of absentee property were particularly singled out for criticism by other members of the Knesset. Ben-Ami of the Sephardim party (a party which later disappeared), argued that the law's definition of absentee harmed the whole community. The two sections most objected to by Ben-Ami were the section which classified as an absentee any individual who had moved from one section of the country to another, and the section which gave the Custodian the full power to determine who was and who was not an absentee. Eliahu Elyashar, another Sephardim member, believed that the law violated the rights of non-absentees, both Jews and Arabs, because it was "arbitrary" and "un-Jewish".

The powers of the Custodian were also criticized on different grounds. Members of Herut and the General Zionist parties, for example, saw party favoritism in the appointment of the Custodian by the Mapai Minister of Finance. The concentration of a quarter of Israel's wealth and most of its lands in the hands of the Custodian and his authority to reallocate such wealth without any parliamentary control was feared for furtherance of party influence.

Many amendments to the different provisions of the law were introduced by different Knesset members, all of which were defeated by the Mapai-Religious Bloc Government coalition. The amendment by Moshe Sneh (of the Mapam Party and later of the Communist Party), and Eliahu Elyashar (of the Sephardim Party), to protect the Arabs legally residing in the state, was defeated by the smallest margin of 8 votes (26 against and 18 for the proposed amendment). It received a cross-section of party

support. Members of the General Zionist, United Religious, Mapai, Arab members from Nazareth associated with Mapai and the Communist party voted for it. Two-thirds of the members present abstained.⁴³

Absentee property handling was also criticized by the Hebrew author and columnist Moshe Smilanski who was known for his prestate activities in behalf of the Zionist Organization. Writing in the independent newspaper Haaretz, he said " The authorities had taken too long to remember their obligations to protect occupied property.....Sometime we will have to account for its theft and despoliation not only to our conscience but also to the law". "Where", he asked, "were the authorities when the theft began?"⁴⁴

Moshe Keren, then Arab-Affairs editor for Haaretz, also criticized the land acquisition of the late 1940's and early 1950's and called them "wholesale robbery in legal guise". In 1955, Keren wrote "Hundreds of thousands of dunums were taken away from the Arab minority.... The future student of history will never cease to be astonished at how it happened..."⁴⁵

⁴³ See discussion on the amendments and vote in Peretz, 1956, pp. 168-70.

⁴⁴ Haaretz, July 26, 1949. Cited in Peretz, P. 154.

⁴⁵ Moshe Keren, "Have We an Arab Policy?" Haaretz, January 1, 1955.

The Leasing of Land to Arabs

As a result of economic expansion beginning in the late 1950's and early 1960's many employment opportunities in industrial and other works were opened up (see Chapter 5). Jews who had been working in agriculture began seizing upon these opportunities, leasing their lands to Arabs, and moving to a different line of work. As noted earlier, however, the practice of leasing lands to Arabs or hiring Arabs to work on the land was strongly denounced and steps to eradicate the practice were undertaken by the government. These practices by Jewish individuals and collectives were referred to as "irregularities".

In 1966 Haaretz published an article in October entitled "Ishmael's National Fund" (a pun on the Hebrew name of the JNF), in which the author quoted the director general of the JNF as labeling the "irregularities" in the use of public land a "national sin". The author went on to say, "If Arab labor is not completely eradicated then the development plan for the Northern region will prove to be an empty dream". In the article the author quotes the deputy director of the Israel Land Administration to the effect that "only a clearly formulated law will solve the problem."⁴⁶ In a second article on the same day Haaretz reports that in many cases individual Arabs have been sublet, or have been hired to work, the very same lands which were expropriated from them.

⁴⁶ "Ishmael's National Fund," Haaretz, October 14, 1966.

Two weeks later the Agricultural Settlement Law (Restriction on use of Agricultural Land and Water) was introduced in the Knesset and was passed on August 1, 1967. According to the Law those who break it, i. e., continue to lease lands to Arabs and/or employ Arabs on their farms, would be deprived of their rights to use the land.⁴⁷

Commenting on the law, Uri Avenery, an independent opposition member of the Knesset said:

There are two conflicting trends to this law; it is a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde law. To all appearances what we have is a law with an extremely positive social aim; the landlords, who, through various kinds of favoritism, have succeeded in obtaining from the Israel Land Authority state land on cheap and easy terms, are to be compelled to return that land to the Israel Land Authority if they transfer their right to cultivate it to others....

What they really aim at are the Jewish Effendis (emphasis in original), and the Arab cultivators. What is meant is the land that was confiscated from the Arabs and handed over through favoritism to Jews who then leased it back to the Arabs who have thus become its cultivators.⁴⁸

Ten years later the practice was still going on, and along with it the anger of the Israeli officials and the search by those officials for ways to 'eradicate' the practice. According to Chomsky,⁴⁹ "Ten settlements were recently fined 700,000 Israeli pounds" because they were leasing land to Arabs, and the Minister of Agriculture warned that 'anyone caught leasing land to Arabs will be punished'. The Minister, according to Chomsky, gave an estimate of 10,000 dunums that have been

⁴⁷ Laws of the State of Israel, 21, (1966/67), p.105.

⁴⁸ Cited in Zureik, 1979, p. 117.

⁴⁹ N. Chomsky, 'The Interim Agreement', pp. 24-5. Cited in Amal Samed, Palestinian Women: Entering the Proletariat', Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. VI, no 1, 1976, pp. 159-68.

leased to Arabs and commented that it is 'a very serious phenomenon which must be fought in every way possible'. In addition to the minister's warning, the Director of the Galilee region of the Jewish Agency also announced 'that his office has sent a circular to all (Jewish) settlements in which they are warned that leasing of national lands for cultivation by Arab lessees or rental of orchards for fruit picking and marketing by Arabs is in violation of law, regulations of the settlement authorities, and the settlement movement'.

Two questions which must be asked are: why do the government and other 'national institutions' interfere with the practice of Jewish individuals and settlements who control the land?; why are Arabs who are 'full-time' citizens of the state not allowed to lease or rent land in the open market, from Jewish individuals and collectivities?

Clearly, this practice by the authorities has two definite consequences: a) it prevents the Arabs from developing into independent workers making more of them available to Jewish employers; and, b) the policy had the effect of sharpening the Arab-Jewish division separating the insiders (Jews) from the outsiders (Arabs). This emphasis on the Arab-Jewish division is further supported through the use of concepts such as 'nation', 'national lands' and the 'division of labor' between the Israeli government and the national institutions. The concept "nation" does not mean people who live in Israel, which includes Arabs and Jews. Rather it means the Jewish people including those Jews who reside anywhere in the world as well as those who live in Israel. Consequently, "national land" is the land which belongs to the Jewish

nation⁵⁰ which, properly speaking, includes only that land registered as owned by the JNF, the most prominent of the national institutions with regard to the land question. However, the JNF controls, either directly or indirectly, over 92 percent of Israeli land area.⁵¹

The recognition of the value of control over the land since the early days of Zionism is not untypical of colonial settlers elsewhere. Hence endowing the land to the Jewish rather than to the Israeli people and giving control over its management to non-Israeli organization (JFN) is designed to guarantee a continued control over the land without which no colonial settler project can ever hope to succeed.

Since the JNF had been the major land purchasing Zionist Organization during the pre-statehood era, it is necessary to investigate its purchasing activities, its regulations of both Jewish and Arab labor, and the necessity for its continued existence as an independent institution even after the Jewish state was established.

The JNF and its Land-Purchase Activities

On the eve of the 1948 war and the establishment of the state of Israel the total Jewish land holdings did not exceed 7 percent.⁵² Most lands were purchased from Arab landlords, some of whom did not even

⁵⁰ For more elaboration on these definitions, see Uri Davis, 'Land Ownership, Citizenship and Racial Policy in Israel'. In: Sociology of Developing Societies-The Middle East, Talal Asad and Roger Owen (eds.), pp. 145-58; Lustick, 1980, pp. 106-7.

⁵¹ Lustick, 1980, p. 107.

⁵² A. Grannot, Agrarian Reform and the Record of Israel, London: Eyre & Spottiswood, 1956, p. 28.

reside in Palestine.⁵³ The Jewish National Fund (JNF) was one of two Jewish organizations most active in land purchase in Palestine, besides individuals, the other was the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association (PICA). Founded with the financial support of Baron Edmond de Rothschild, PICA allotted its lands to tenants who were primarily private farmers obliged to defray their capital debt overtime.⁵⁴ Most of these lands were eventually sold to Jewish farmers and registered as their private property.⁵⁵ The JNF, by contrast, was founded by the Zionist Organization in 1901 and therefore was buying land on behalf of the 'Jewish people' as their 'inalienable property'. Thus, its allocation method differed from that of PICA. Here the allocation was on the basis of leaseholds to individual Jewish farmers, to companies, or to collective settlements. The agreements of such leases were usually drawn for 49 years.⁵⁶ During the 1930's and 1940's the JNF intensified its land purchase activity and in 1947 it became the largest Jewish landowner, owning more than a half of the Jewish-owned land in Palestine (see Table below).

⁵³ According to the Statistical Department of the Jewish Agency, as of March 1936, 52.6% of Jewish owned land was purchased from "large absentee landowners", 24.6% from "large resident landowners", 13.4% from "various sources" such as the government, churches and foreign companies, and only 9.4% from small Palestinian farmers. Cited in Lehn, "The Jewish National Fund". Journal of Palestine Studies, 3 (Summer), 1974, pp. 74-91.

⁵⁴ Lucas, 1974, p. 112.

⁵⁵ Granott, 1956, p. 28.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 143.

Table 4.5
 Jewish Landownership (in Dunums)
 By Year and Purchaser (1882-1947)

Year	P.I.C.A.	J.N.F.	Private Purchaser	Total
1882	—	—	22,500	22,500
1900	145,000	—	73,000	218,000
1914	235,000	16,000	167,000	418,000
1927	323,000	197,000	345,000	865,000
1936	435,000	379,000	426,000	1,231,000
1947	435,000	933,000	366,000	1,734,000

Source: A. Granott, Agrarian Reform and the Record of Israel, London: Eyre and Spottiswood, 1965, p. 28.

Following the establishment of the state the JNF continued to operate its own fund raising apparatus under the direction of the World Zionist Organization. In 1950 the Knesset passed the Development Authority Law which according to Granott, the chairman of the board of directors of the JNF from 1945 to 1960:

expressly states that the Authority shall not be able to sell or alienate land... in any manner except to the following four bodies: the State of Israel; the JNF; Local Authorities; and the institutions for settling landless Arabs.

In Practice only two of these bodies are of concern - the state and the JNF, since the body for settling landless Arabs has never been established. Thus a great rule was laid down, which has a decisive and basic significance - that the property of absentees cannot be transferred to ownership to anyone but (the) national public institutions above, either the state itself, or the original Land Institution of the Zionist Movement.⁵⁷

The law gave priority to the requirements of the JNF. In Granott's words: "Every area must first be offered to the JNF and only if it gives notice in writing that it is not interested, may it be transferred to others, whether by sale or lease."⁵⁸

The JNF shares responsibility for another body, the Israel Land Administration, with the Ministry of Agriculture. In this context it exercises administrative control over all state lands, which combined with JNF holdings equal 92 percent of Israel's land area.⁵⁹

According to Lustick there are two reasons why the official status of the JNF is kept nongovernmental: first, as nongovernmental 'philanthropic' agency the JNF enjoys a tax-exempt status from the American Internal Revenue Service which allows it to collect contributions in the United States and other countries. The second reason, which has a greater significance to this analysis, is the fact that by not being formally part of the Israeli government, the JNF does not have to serve a constituency of Israeli citizens. In Lustick's words: "although the government of Israel is bound according to its own

⁵⁷ Granott, 1956, pp. 103-4.

⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 106

⁵⁹ Joseph Weitz (former Director of the Development Authority of the JNF), "Land Ownership", Cited in Lustick, 1980, p. 99.

democratic norms to address itself, in the laws it promulgates, in the programs it sponsors, and in the services it provides, to Jewish and Arab citizens alike, the Jewish Agency (another of the so called national institutions), and the JNF are mandated to operate only in regard to Israel's Jewish population."⁶⁰

As indicated earlier, this is not to say that the government and the JNF act in total independence from each other. Nor does it mean that the government does not subscribe to the JNF principles. It only means that the JNF can apply those principles with greater freedom and under less pressure from inside as well as outside the country. Few laws were passed by the Knesset which are completely in accord with the principles of the JNF. The Agricultural Settlement law referred to earlier is only one example. In 1960 the Knesset enacted Basic Law: Israel Lands according to which state land was defined as the 'inalienable' right of the Jewish people, a definition which conforms to the principles held by the JNF. The two most important principles of the original constitution of the JNF, which were resented by the Arabs are:⁶¹

(i) the principle that Jewish property is inalienable; no Zionist settler may dispose of his lease to anyone but a Jew, (ii) the principle carefully safeguarded by the powerful Jewish Federation of Labor, that only Jewish labour may be employed in Zionist colonies. The net result is that, when the Jewish National Fund makes a purchase the Arabs lose not only the land itself but also any chance of being employed on this land.

⁶⁰ Lustick, 1980, p. 106.

⁶¹ Great Britain and Palestine: 1915-1945, Information paper No. 20, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946, p. 36. Cited in Zureik, 1979, pp. 118-19.

True to these principals an official of the JNF declared in an interview with Lustick in 1979⁶² that "The economic impact of our land purchases and our activities on Arabs is not considered....The government would have to look after all citizens if they owned the land; the JNF owns the land, let's be frank, we can serve just the Jewish people."

It is very difficult in light of statements such as these to argue that the JNF (the biggest land owner in Israel) and the Israeli government, are not aware of the consequences of land policies on the Arabs. As early as 1930 the Hope-Simpson Inquiry of 1930, a British committee set up to investigate the causes of the Jaffa riots of 1929, addressed the threat posed by Jewish land acquisition to the indigenous Arab population. The Committee stated that

The result of the purchase of land in Palestine by the Jewish National Fund has been that land has been extraterritorialized. It ceases to be land from which the Arab can gain any advantage now or in the future. Not only can he never hope to lease or to cultivate it, but by the stringent provisions of the lease of the Jewish National Fund he is deprived forever from employment on that land.⁶³

The fact that Zionist sources tend to underestimate the impact of land purchase by Jews on the Arabs by presenting low figures of previously cultivated areas and of displaced families provides further evidence that the Zionist institution then as now, and with it the Israeli government were aware of the real consequences of their actions on the Arabs and were attempting to distort these facts systematically.

⁶² Lustick, 1980, p. 106.

⁶³ J. Ruedy, "Dynamics of Land Alienation". In: I. Abu-Lughud (ed.), The Transformation of Palestine, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971, p. 130.

Thus, Miller,⁶⁴ relying on Zionist sources, gives a breakdown of lands sold to Jews in the plains of Isdraelon (Marj-Ibn-Amer) and Acre alone by previously tenanted area and number of tenants. From those two areas alone Miller's figures show that 688 Arab tenants were affected by the sale.

These figures, however, tell only part of the story. While they may account for tenants, they ignore completely the laborers who also worked on, and lived off, the sold land. In contrast to the 688 families which were displaced from the two areas, according to Miller, a figure of 8,000 is quoted by Hirst⁶⁵ as the number of peasants, living in twenty-two villages, who were displaced as a result of the sale of the (Marj-Ibn-Amer) plain alone. Hirst emphasizes that "the fate of the 8,000 peasants was never determined".

The number of laborers who worked on the land becomes significant when one considers the fact that most large tracts in Palestine which were sold to Jews, were owned by landlords many of whom did not even live in Palestine proper. The figures in Table 6 show the distribution of land ownership according to a 1936 British Government investigation of 322 villages.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Y. E. Miller, "Administrative Policy in Rural Palestine: The Impact of British Norms on Arab Community Life 1920-1948. in J. S. Migdal, (ed.), Palestinian Society and Structure, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 260.

⁶⁵ Hirst, The Gun and Olive Branch, London: Faber and Faber, 1977, p. 29.

⁶⁶ R. Sayigh, Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries, London: Zed Press, 1979, P. 31.

Table 4.6
Land Ownership in Palestine in 1936

Size of holding (in dunums)	Owners as % of the population	Area owned as % of total cultivated land
Above 5,000	0.01	19
1,000-5,000	0.20	8
100-1,000	8.00	36
0-100	91.80	37

Source: R. Sayigh, Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries, London: Zed Press, 1979, p. 31.

According to the figures in the Table, 91.8 percent of the population either did not own land at all or their land holding did not exceed 100 dunums. The total holdings of this category amounted to only 37 percent while 19 percent of the total owned land were held by 0.01 percent of the population. The picture becomes even more clear by a further breakdown of the last (0-100 dunums) category. According to Sayigh⁶⁷ 27.6 percent of the population owned plots of less than 40 dunums, while 21.9 percent owned plots of less than 5 dunums. These plots of less than 40 dunums were far smaller than the minimum needed for family subsistence.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 32.

⁶⁸ The Hope-Simpson Report of 1930 defined the minimum amount of land needed by a family of five to sustain itself without other sources of income: 130 dunums of unirrigated land; 100 dunums of rich land with

SUMMARY

In this chapter I have attempted to untangle one of the most complicated and least documented subjects which touches upon Arab-Jewish relations in Israel. I have shown that the multiplicity of laws, regulations, and institutions which deal with the subject of land were designed to dispossess the Arabs of their land in a systematic way. Entrusting control over the land to a Zionist, non-Israeli, and nongovernmental agency (the JNF), which subscribes to discriminatory principles was done by the government (and the Knesset) for the purpose of avoiding legal and political (national and international) ramifications.

Clearly, control over the land is of major importance to any colonial settler society, and without it no settlement project can ever hope to succeed. Israel, being no different, started the process of control over the land through purchase, before the turn of the century. The availability of cheap Arab labor seems to have been secondary during the initial stages of statehood to the objective of controlling the land. The loss of property by the Arabs, on the other hand, had two major consequences: first, since Arabs could no longer continue working as self-employed farmers they turned to hired work as the only means to earn their livelihood; and second, the very absence of this major economic resource to the disposal of Arabs forced them into accepting menial jobs and lower wages than their Jewish counterparts.

livestock; 40 dunums of partially irrigated land with dairy farming; 15 dunums of tree plantation. Ibid., p. 32.

However, as will be pointed out in the next two chapters, during the initial stages the Jewish economic sector in general and Jewish employers in particular were not allowed to make full use of this cheap labor power. Furthermore, through a combination of denying Arab labor access to Jewish labor sites by the military government (Chapter 5) and a denial of union membership to Arabs by the Jewish labor union (the Histadrut, Chapter 6) the development of a competitive labor market was prevented. Hence, the initial conditions which set the stage for a discrepancy in the price of labor were reproduced and no 'equalization effect' on wages was allowed to take place.

CHAPTER V

THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT

Whereas limiting the availability of economic resources to Arabs set the initial conditions for a split labor market the "Military Government" or "Military Administration" (Memshal Tzvai), was instrumental in reproducing these conditions. It provided an 'identifying ideology' through the claim that its very existence was necessitated by the security risk to the state posed by Arabs. It continuously curtailed the availability of political resources to the Arabs. It controlled the flow of Arab labor to Jewish employment sites through restriction orders on the movement of Arabs which had the effect of limiting the development of a competitive labor market. And it controlled a host of political, educational and even social activities, which would have resulted in a more independent Arab labor force. According to Lustick, the military government was the most important instrument used by the Israeli government to control its Arab citizens.¹

The military government was also used for land confiscation. While it was not the sole mechanism through which confiscation of Arab lands was, and continues to be, made possible (see Chapter 4) the military government's methods, the legal basis under which it operated, and the

¹ See Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1980, pp. 123-25, 178

system of justifications used, made land confiscation a smoother operation than it would have been otherwise.

In this chapter I describe the military government's methods of operation, the legal basis upon which its activities were predicated, and the spheres of Arab's daily lives over which the military government had a jurisdiction. I also examine the validity and function of the national security argument which was used to justify the existence of the military government, describe the struggle for its abolition, paying a special attention to the role played by the different Jewish groups in this struggle and outline the respective benefits (economic and political) of those Jewish groups who supported as well as those who opposed the continuation of the military government.

Chronology of Events

Military government over the Arab areas in Israel was formally established on October 21, 1948. The measure, which was signed by Brigadier General Elimelech Avner, gave official recognition to the de facto role which the Jewish units had been playing in those areas since their capture - that of an occupation army. According to the order, five military governors were named in the predominantly Arab districts conquered by Jewish forces in the course of the fighting. These districts consisted of Nazareth, western Galilee, Ramle-Lod, Jaffa, and the Negev - all of which fell in the area projected as the Arab state according to the 1947 United Nations Partition Plan of Palestine. The treatment of the Arabs in those areas seems to have varied widely,

according to the inclination of the local military governor.²

Following the end of fighting, and the subsequent signing of cease-fire agreements between the Israeli government and the Arab governments of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, which determined the Armistic lines, Israel retained large areas beyond those allotted to the Jewish state by the Partition Plan of 1947. About 160,000 Arabs remained in those areas and subsequently became citizens of the state of Israel (see Chapter 2).

The military government over these areas was eventually reorganized and reformed. In January 1950, the military government was formally and legally established on the basis of the Defense (Emergency) regulations of 1945, which gave the military governors the power to appoint military commanders, while judicial powers were entrusted to military courts appointed by the army chief of staff.³

After formal adoption of the emergency regulations, the minister of defense used the powers granted him to appoint military governors for the three principal regions corresponding to the geographical concentration of Israel's Arab inhabitants - the Northern Command, encompassing the Galilee and the Haifa area; the Central Command, with responsibility for the 'Little' Triangle; and the Southern Command,

² G. Shamir, "The Establishment of the 'Military Administration' over the Arab Population in Israel during the War of Independence" (seminar paper: Tel-Aviv University, 1973), pp. 12-13 (Hebrew).

³ For a detailed description of the composition and authority of those courts, see Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs In Israel, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1976, pp. 15-17

responsible for the Bedouins of the Negev (see Chapter 2). In 1949 these areas contained over 90 percent of Israel's Arab population, and even in 1958 fully 85 percent of all Israeli Arabs still lived in areas assigned to the Military Administration.⁴

From the beginning, however, the military government, and the Defense regulations in particular, came under attack from many different groups for very different reasons. Some of these attacks took the form of demonstrations, articles in the newspapers, and even motions for the complete abolition of the military government, which were introduced occasionally in the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament). Under continuous pressure and criticism from the left, represented by the Communist Party, and from the right, represented by the Herut Party of Begin, the military government was forced to make continuous changes and reform. On November 8, 1966, Eshkol (the Prime Minister at the time), announced in the Knesset that the government had decided "to consider the military government apparatus abolished as of December first of this year, and to transfer the responsibilities it has shouldered until now to civil authorities."⁵

With this announcement, the struggle for the abolition of the military government came to an end although many of its activities and actions in the Arab sector have had a long lasting effect on the Arab-Jewish relations the consequences of which are still felt until this day.

⁴ Ian Lustick, 1980, p. 123.

⁵ In Jiryis, 1976, p. 63.

Policies and Practices

It is very difficult, based on an analysis of the various articles of the Defense regulations, to comprehend the full scope of the military government activities and their real consequences. These statutes, consisting of 170 articles divided into fifteen sections, were inherited from the British mandate. The British had originally enacted these regulations to deal with the Palestinian Arab revolt of 1936-39. The regulations which gave the Mandate government the legal and administrative freedom of action it might choose were to be invoked only when a state of emergency had been declared. Thus, in a period of relative calm the regulations were rarely activated.⁶

Until 1945, however, the regulations were continuously being modified and changed. Although originally promulgated to deal with the Arab uprising, the regulations were soon to be used against the Jews of Palestine, particularly against the Lehi organization (Lochamei Herut Yisrael - Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, otherwise known as the Stern Gang). Consequently, Jewish opposition to the regulations was voiced on many occasions and in different forms. The following declaration by the Hebrew Lawyers' Union in 1946, is a typical one.⁷

The powers given to the ruling authority in the emergency regulations deny the inhabitants of Palestine their basic human rights. These regulations undermine the foundation of law and justice, they constitute a serious danger to individual freedom and they constitute a regime of arbitrariness without any judicial

⁶ See Sabri Jiryis, 1976, pp. 9-11.

⁷ See an excellent review of Jewish criticism of the regulations by Sabri Jiryis, 1976, pp. 11-13.

supervision.⁸

Since the regulations, as they were originally promulgated by the Mandate authorities, could be invoked only after an "emergency situation" had been declared, in Israel, according to Lustick,⁹ "an 'emergency situation' was declared immediately following the establishment of the state and that declaration is still in force." This declaration gave the rationale for invoking the regulations and consequently setting security as the most frequently cited reason for the maintenance of the military government. Arabs have consistently been portrayed as enemies of the state and therefore the military government was needed to control and suppress any attempt by the Arabs for sabotage before it takes place. In March of 1956, for example, a report issued by a special committee, which was appointed by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to examine the military government and make recommendations, stated that "the areas under military government and the scope of the activities of the military commander should not be abolished or reduced, because

these areas are one of supreme importance from the security point of view, and need to be kept under control, since they might be made use of by the enemy in an emergency.¹⁰

As late as 1963, in a speech on February 20th during a Knesset debate on the abolition of the military government, Ben-Gurion expressed his determination to maintain the military government. The indispensibility

⁸ Cited in Emanuel Dror, 'The emergency regulations', in Arie Bober (ed.), The Other Israel, New York, Doubleday, 1972, p. 134.

⁹ Ian Lustick, 1980, p. 124.

¹⁰ Quoted by Jiryis, 1976, p. 35.

of the military government, in Ben-Gurion's views, stems from the fact that

three regions, Galilee, the Triangle, and the Negev, are hotbeds of hate and conspiracy, and therefore always a potential danger. Acting openly under cover of communism, there are elements in these areas who could instigate disturbances among the Arabs themselves, or between Arabs and Jews, in any moment of tension.¹¹

Since security-related reasons were always given as justification for the activities of the military government, one would assume that invoking any of the 170 articles of the regulations is somehow related to security measures. Far from it. Article 125, for example, was among the most frequently invoked. This article "grants the military governor the power to proclaim any area or place a forbidden (closed) area.... which no one can enter or leave without... a written permit from the military commander or his deputy.....failing which he is considered to have committed a crime."¹² Thus the article empowered the military commander to close areas which could include whole villages or districts and prevent anyone from either entering or leaving. By doing so, the military commander was able to control the flow of people on a daily basis to and from any area in the country. On the surface such actions could be explained on security grounds claiming that the security of the people entering or leaving such areas was at stake. Or, conversely, it could be claimed that by entering such areas the Arabs jeopardized the security of the state. As the following quotes will show however, it is doubtful that the security and the safety of the people (Arabs in

¹¹ Knesset Debates, Feb. 20, 1963, p. 1215 as quoted by Sabri Jiryis, 1976, p. 44.

¹² Quoted in Jiryis, 1976, p. 17.

particular) who live in or near such closed areas were of concern to the military governor when he ordered those areas closed. Instead, one of his primary interests (although there were others which will be discussed later) was the confiscation of Arab land.

Before a vote in the Knesset on the military government's abolition in 1962, Shmoel Segev, who was familiar with the work of the security services, wrote:

The repeal of Article 125 which deals with the "closed areas" - the most important article as far as the military government is concerned - would mean in practice the abolition of the legal power to declare areas closed.... The closing of an area by virtue of this article means that it is being prepared for Jewish settlement, (emphasis added), which is becoming more and more urgent with the increasing waves of immigration.¹³

Addressing the same subject Shimon Peres, then deputy minister of defense, wrote:

It is by making use of Article 125, on which the military government depends to a large extent, that we can directly continue the struggle for Jewish settlement and Jewish immigration.... In Galilee... today, there are hundreds of thousands of dunams of unsettled land which are earmarked for programmed settlement.¹⁴

In his speech on Feb. 20, 1963, Ben-Gurion declared that "the military government came into existence to protect the right of Jewish settlements in all parts of the state."¹⁵ These remarks were perhaps the first public indication of some of the intended consequences and functions of the military government, i.e. the confiscation of Arab land which amounted to hundreds of thousands of dunams (see Chapter 4). As

¹³ Maariv, Dec. 29, 1961.

¹⁴ Davar, Jan. 26, 1962.

¹⁵ Knesset Debates, Feb. 20, 1963, p. 1217. Quoted by Sabri Jiryis, 1976, p. 53.

described by Lustick,¹⁶ the scenario worked in the following manner:

A closed area encompassing Arab-owned agricultural lands is declared a "closed area". The owners of the land are then denied permission by the security authorities to enter the area for any purpose whatsoever, including cultivation. After three years pass, the Ministry of Agriculture issues certificates which classify the lands as uncultivated. The owners are notified that unless cultivation is renewed immediately the lands will be subject to expropriation. The owners, still barred by the security authorities from entering the "closed area" within which their lands are located, cannot resume cultivation. The lands are then expropriated and become part of the general land reserve for Jewish settlement. Eventually permission to enter the "closed area" is granted to Jewish farmers; alternatively the classification of the area as "closed" is lifted altogether.

Arab as well as Jewish controlled areas were subject to the practice of closure by the military government. Although a "closed area" in theory applied to both Arabs and Jews, in practice only Arabs were required to carry permits for entering or leaving such an area. This practice was described by the state controller in a report in 1959 in which he wrote:

An order from the military governor declaring an area closed is, in theory, applicable to all citizens without exception whether living in the area or outside it. Thus anyone who enters or leaves a closed area without a written permit from the military governor is in fact committing a criminal offense. In practice, however, Jews are not expected to carry such permits and in general are not prosecuted for breaking the regulations in Article 125.... There is something wrong in this law, which was drafted to apply to all citizens in the country but is in fact enforced only against some of them.¹⁷

The state controller may or may not have been aware of all the consequences of such discriminatory practices by the military government.

¹⁶ Ian Lustick, 1980, p. 178.

¹⁷ State Controller's Report on Security for Financial Year 1957/58, Feb. 15 1959, pp. 57-58. Quoted in Jiryis, 1976, p. 26

Although these policies may have been designed to enhance confiscation of Arab lands as an important goal, other goals were served equally well by these policies. One of these goals was the regulation of the flow of Arab labor to Jewish labor markets. This was made clear through an order by the military governor of the northern region issued to all the Arabs in his area to stay out of the Jewish settlements. The reason for such an order according to the governor was that "he could not control the increasing infiltration of the agricultural colonies by minority laborers who were becoming permanently employed in various fields".¹⁸ In fact travel permits were very hard to come by in times of high unemployment. This prevented Arab laborers from reaching their place of work in the cities, thus securing work for the Jews.¹⁹ Furthermore, "until 1953 the military government determined the wages of Arab laborers in the areas under its control" because, according to Levi Eshkol, minister of finance, "there are no labor offices in the area."²⁰

It would be misleading to conclude that this was the extent of the military government's intervention in Arab lives. Indeed the regulations gave the military governor dictatorial powers over the Arabs. His activities, according to the regulations did not fall under the jurisdiction of any civil court including the High Court for Justice. The military governor answered directly to the chief of staff and the minister of defense. Thus, many of the appointed governors' activities

¹⁸ Haaretz, Oct. 11, 1955.

¹⁹ Yorma Ben-Prath, The Arab Labor Force in Israel, (Jerusalem, The Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel, 1966), pp. 51-52, 55.

²⁰ In Jiryis, 1976, p. 274

went unchecked.²¹ Of particular interest to this study is their power to restrict travel, since such restrictions seem to have been directed mainly against travel for employment purposes. In fact Lustick reports Israeli government statistics for the year 1953-1954 which show that 80 percent of all travel permits to have been "issued in connection with employment, the rest being for medical treatment, contact with courts and legal advisors, and contact with Government departments."²²

It does not follow, however, that permits were handed out freely and on demand. Although statistics showing the ratio of those granted permits to the number of applicants are impossible to find,²³ some observations are indicative of the limited number of permits issued at any particular time. As late as 1958, and at a time when this practice was supposed to have been liberalized, only one out of every three Arabs living in a military zone held a travel permit, with half of those permits granted for a short period.²⁴ In 1956, according to the Jerusalem Post, only 800 of the inhabitants of Um-el-Fahm, the largest

²¹ Sabri Jiryis, p. 40, quotes an ex-military governor as saying:

(The military government) interferes in the life of the Arab citizen from the day of his birth to the day of his death. It has the final say in all matters concerning workers, peasants, professional men, merchants, and educated men, with schooling and social services. It interferes in the registration of births, deaths, and even marriages, in questions of land and in the appointment and dismissal of teachers and civil servants. Often, too, it arbitrarily interferes in the affairs of political parties, in political and social activities, and in local and municipal councils.

²² Ian Lustic, 1980: 124.

²³ I do not believe that such statistics in fact exist.

²⁴ See Lustick, 1980, p. 125.

of the Arab villages, held such permits.²⁵ Considering the village's demographic composition -- over 60 percent of its 6,000 inhabitants at the time were internal refugees from neighboring villages which were destroyed during the 1948 war -- one can only wonder as to the real number who were in need of and applied for such a permit for employment purposes.

The few permits which were issued specified the initiation and expiration dates and the destination and route to be travelled. The implications of such a policy of specification on the Arab worker were many. First, since these permits were only periodic and their renewal was never to be taken for granted, the stability and reliability of the Arab worker was, naturally, questioned by the Jewish employer. Thus, irrespective of qualifications, Arab workers were typically assigned to the secondary job sector performing unskilled work in dead-end jobs which paid minimum wages and carried no benefits. Secondly, the limitations on destination and travel route by the issued "permit" affected the Arab worker's ability for a wider job hunt and compromised his bargaining power for better wages, job conditions and/or job quality. Such a practice, on the other hand, impeded the development of a competitive labor market because Arab labor, due to their dependence on travel permits whose continuation of issuance was never guaranteed, were seen as unreliable. Hence, the stereotypes of "cheap" and "unskilled" were typical yet unjustified descriptions of the Arab laborer which contributed to a further erosion in his status and image.

²⁵ The Jerusalem Post, April 4, 1956.

Third, by also applying the restrictions to travel between Arab villages, the military government prevented any organization of Arab workers which may have struggled for better conditions. Such a policy, coupled with the fact that the Arabs were not permitted to join the Israeli labor union (the Histadrut) until 1959 (see chapter 6) left the Arab labor force fragmented, with each worker facing his situation by himself. These practices provided fertile grounds, politically as well as ideologically, for Jewish employers to use arbitrary measures in order to benefit from a fragmented, disoriented and cheap Arab labor force, assigning them to low status and menial work.

Low status occupations for the Arabs seems to have been a matter of official policy, also justified on the basis of security. The following quote by Lubrani (then advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab affairs) articulates this policy rather well. In April 1961, Lubrani declared, in a lecture to a Jewish audience in Tel-Aviv, that the Arabs were the "sworn and everlasting enemies" of the state. Such declarations had, by that time, become routine by state officials. What was not routine, however, was his acknowledgement that:

With one hand we take what we give them with the other. We give them tractors, electricity, and progress, but we take land and restrict their free movement. We give them high schools, but we prevent their graduates from entering honorable occupations.....were there no Arab students perhaps it would be better. If they would remain hewers of woods perhaps it would be easier to control them.²⁶

Needless to say, the statement does not refer to a fair and negotiated trade-off between the state and its Arab citizens. Clearly, the 'taking' of the land, the 'restriction' of movement, and the 'prevention' of Arab

²⁶ Zeev Schiff, "If I Were an Arab," Haaretz, April 4, 1961.

graduates from entering 'honorable' occupations were forced actions. Such actions, one would assume, were designed to fulfil certain policy objectives which, despite the official statements to the contrary, make the 'security' explanation untenable.

It is in the light of such declarations that the military government's behavior towards the Arabs are to be interpreted. The harsh and indiscriminate methods of the military government were continuously being justified through statements such as the one mentioned above. While such practices and declarations provided ideological justification for differentiating Arabs, the continued existence of the military government and the system of travel restrictions were handicapping the efforts of Jewish employers to make full use of Arab labor because of the limited access to this demoralized and cheap labor. One would assume, therefore, that those who benefited the least from such policies and practices were among those who opposed the military government. Stated differently, certain segments of the Jewish population who opposed the military government did so because they would have benefited from its abolition. In general, those who could have used "cheap" Arab labor, for example, would have benefited from the abolition of the military government and the easy access to such labor which would have come as a result. And in the late fifties when the need for unskilled labor intensified (see Chapter 6) so did the campaign for the abolition of travel restriction against the Arabs.

The Struggle for the Abolition of the Military Government

The significance of the struggle for the abolition of the military government lies in the fact that it lasted too long. It was no earlier than 1966 (18 years after the military government was established) that pressure against the government could produce total abolition. This suggests that the forces which benefited from its continuation and, therefore supported it, were far greater and more powerful than the forces against it. Clearly, that segment of the Jewish population which benefited the most as a result of continued operation of the military government opposed its abolition. These are: labor in general and unskilled labor in particular, employees of the military government's bureaucracy and its derivative agencies (see Chapter 3), and the ruling party because it can claim that its policies are designed to protect labor and therefore it deserves the support of labor, i. e., Jewish labor. The next three sections will describe this struggle, how it was waged and by whom. I will also describe critical periods during which the struggle intensified, the facilitating events for this intensification and the validity of the rationale used in the defense of the continuation of the military government.

Both Arabs and certain segments of the Jewish population struggled against the military government either for modification of the emergency regulations, the "legal" basis for its operation, or for total abolition of the system. The struggle against the military government was a hard and continuous one. However, since this study is not concerned with the detailed history of this struggle, only a synopsis of these struggles will be discussed here.

The Arabs' opposition to and struggle against the military government can be understood in light of its activities in the Arab sector. The struggle for its abolition symbolized a struggle against the government's policies with regard to the Arabs. Arabs felt that with the abolition of the military government and all that it symbolized, their lives as citizens and as Arabs within the Jewish state could only be improved.

Among the Jewish population, however, different groups voiced opposition to the military government for different reasons. These can be grouped into five categories: a) opposition to the military government for humanistic reasons; b) opposition as a result of concern for Israel's image in the international arena; c) opposition to the military government as a result of its political activities in terms of rallying Arab votes for Mapai, the ruling party; d) opposition to the military government and struggle for Arab equality as part of a general struggle for the character and future of the Israeli society; e) opposition by the business community which was seeking an easier access to the "cheap" Arab labor force.

Opposition to the military government were expressed in a variety of forms, the most visible (and perhaps least sanctioned), of which are the motions introduced in the Knesset for the military government's abolition. As early as July 1949, the minister of Justice introduced a bill to repeal the emergency regulations.²⁷ The bill was not approved,

²⁷ Knesset Debates, July 12 1949, pp. 975-78. Cited in Jiryis, 1976, p. 32.

however, because "of objection to it in the Knesset and among the people", according to the minister.²⁸ In May 1950, Zisling, a member of the United Workers' Party (Mapam), which served in the opposition, proposed a bill to repeal the defense regulations within three months. When his suggestion was turned down by the Knesset Committee on Constitution, Law, and Justice, Zisling proposed that the military government be abolished altogether within one year, on the ground that "its existence is not in the best interests of the nation nor conducive to better administration of the areas under its control, being a restriction on the freedom of the people."²⁹

This time the proposal was turned over to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. After declaring that "the Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945,....are incompatible with the principles of a democratic state", the committee asked the Committee on Constitution, Law, and Justice, to "present a new bill on the defense of the state, within two weeks."³⁰ The new bill was never prepared and on Feb. 12, 1952, the Knesset approved the conclusion of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, which had been presented to it on Dec. 3, 1951. The Committee had concluded that "as long as the present security situation between the state of Israel and its neighbors continues, the military government has to be maintained for the protection of the nation".³¹

²⁸ Ibid., Nov. 21 1950, p. 283. Cited in *ibid.*, p. 32.

²⁹ Ibid., May 16 1951, p. 1787. In *ibid.*, p. 32.

³⁰ Ibid., May 22 1951, pp. 1828-33. In *ibid.*, p. 32.

³¹ Ibid., Dec. 3 1951, p. 1322. In *ibid.*, p. 33.

Subsequently, proposals dealing with the military government were crossed off the Knesset agenda. For example, on Dec. 1, 1954, Meir Vilner of the Communist Party proposed the abolition of Article 125 and the system of closed areas on the ground that "the military governors have lately made a habit of declaring whole villages and stretches of land 'closed areas' within the larger closed area under military government, in order to prevent Arab peasants from working the land". As noted, his proposal was crossed off the Knesset agenda.³² Six months later two bills for the abolition of the military government, were introduced by the Communist Party and Mapam (United Workers' Party).³³ The fate of these two proposals was not dissimilar to the earlier proposal by Vilner, i.e., both proposals were crossed off the Knesset agenda.

Clearly, the government in general and Mapai in particular had the vote in the Knesset and the support of the public (manifested by election results, see Chapter 3) which enabled it to continue in its refusal to alter either its policies toward the Arabs or the activities of the military government. Hence, only when public support declined did the party agree to review this policy. This came toward the end of 1955, following the results of the third Knesset elections. Mapai (the party which had been in power since the establishment of the state), won only 40 of the 120 seats Knesset. This was lower than the 46 and 45 seats they had won in the first and second elections respectively.³⁴ In

³² Ibid., Dec. 1 1954, p. 241. In *ibid.*, p. 33.

³³ Ibid., May 18 1955, p. 1664. In *ibid.*, p. 34.

order to form a government, Mapai had to form a coalition with two smaller parties: Achdut Haavoda and Mapam. Both parties were based in the Kibutzim movement which employed Arabs, and, generally speaking, had an Ashkenazi constituency. Upon forming the coalition, both parties insisted on a review of the government policy toward the Arabs. Only then did Prime Minister Ben-Gurion appoint a committee (headed by Professor Ranter of the Technion, the Institute of Applied Technology in Haifa), to study the question of the military government and make recommendations. But, as noted earlier, the Committee came out in total support of the military government, attributing the need for such a system to the security requirements of the country. Nevertheless, some relaxation of travel restrictions was announced in 1957.

Other major reforms in the military government were announced on August 5, 1959, on the eve of the fourth Knesset elections. These reforms constituted a relaxation of travel restrictions on the Arabs to certain Jewish urban centers. Further reforms and relaxation of travel restrictions took place in 1964. As noted earlier, toward the end of 1966 the system of the military government was abolished completely. As will be shown in the next chapter these periods (1959, 1964) witnessed great economic expansion and a decline in the rate of immigration which increased the demand for Arab labor.

³⁴ Richard Scammon, 'Knesset Election Results, 1949-77', in: Howard Penniman (ed.), Israel At The Polls, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D. C., 1979, p. 310.

It should be emphasized that the parliamentary activities discussed here so far constitute only one manifestation of the public (Arab and Jewish) opposition to the military government. One should note however, that inasmuch as it conveys the seriousness with which the military government was perceived, the presentation does not provide the most dramatic picture. Nor does this presentation provide a complete account of all the motions which were presented in the Knesset for the reform and/or abolition of the military government. I only tried to highlight some of the basic attitudes and policy guidelines which guided the military government and its actions, and to provide some of the inter-party dynamics which characterized the struggle over the military government.

Other forms of protest included such tactics as public demonstrations, letter writing, petitions, editorials and others which were expressed by people ranging from political parties to intellectuals, to university professors and kibbutzim members as evidenced by the following statement signed by "representatives of twenty kibbutzim and about two hundred intellectuals including seventy professors and lecturers at the Hebrew University."³⁵ The signed statement reads as follows:

About 200,000 of the inhabitants of Israel, belonging to another religion and with a different nationality, do not enjoy equal rights and are the victims of discrimination and repression. The overwhelming majority of Arabs in Israel... have neither freedom of movement nor of residence. They are not accepted as members with equal rights and obligations in the Histadrut or as employees in most concerns....The continuation of this situation could seriously

³⁵ Jiryis, 1976, p.38.

endanger the security of the nation.³⁶

However, despite such wide opposition the military government continued to operate using national security as a rationale for the continuation of its existence. The next section will examine the validity of such a rationale.

The National Security Argument

Since national security seems to have been the most cited reason for the imposition and continuation of the military government, it is important to investigate the validity of this argument. That is to say, to what extent did the Arabs in Israel constitute a security problem for the Jewish state? And secondly, to what extent were mechanisms such as the military government and the accompanying defense regulations needed to combat such a threat?

For several reasons it is clear that no entirely satisfactory answer can be offered to either of the two questions. The subjectivity attached to the meaning of the concept of security, for example, makes it all the more difficult to operationalize and thus measure. Furthermore, even if it were possible to define the concept objectively and to operationalize it, the data needed for its investigation is usually classified and unavailable to researchers.

One cannot, for example, examine the validity of the security argument by showing the rate of violation over a period of time. Assuming that such statistics are available their interpretation can be

³⁶ Ner, July-August, 1958. In *ibid.*, p. 38.

totally misleading. Consider, for example, an Arab who was caught working in what had been declared a closed area. Such an Arab would have been tried and convicted on the ground of violating security regulations irrespective of the fact that he may have done nothing to harm the security of the state and/or the people. The fact that, regardless of whether the person was tried in a military or a civilian court, the military government did not have to supply any details to the court except stating that the individual in question was engaged in activities harmful to the security,³⁷ makes such statistics all the more meaningless.

Beyond this, however, such statistics cannot be argued to show the extent to which the Arabs constituted a security risk. Such statistics can perhaps be used more adequately to show either the efficiency of the military government in apprehending violators, the extent to which Arabs obeyed the law, or both things combined.

This is no justification to avoid tackling the two questions posed at the beginning of this section. The importance of these questions stems from the fact that if the answers to both questions were in the affirmative, one would be led to conclude that it was indeed national security which dictated to the military government its actions and methods. The maltreatment of the Arabs could then be analyzed as merely

³⁷ Sabri Jiryis, 1976, quotes a ruling by the High Court of Justice (Supreme Court) in Appeal 50/46 in which the court declared that "The responsibility of protecting the higher interests of the state rests on the military commander (emphasis in original), and it is up to him to decide whether these interests prevent him from revealing any additional details explaining the basis for his orders." p. 21

unintended consequence. Conversely, if the answer to either question is negative, one can reasonably conclude that the system of military government was created to serve something other than the declared security requirements.

The difficulties inherent in the answer to both questions, therefore, make the discussion on the basis of statements made by Israelis who were as familiar with the security problems and the military system as those who advanced the security argument, an adequate strategy.

As early as 1957, the influential newspaper Haaretz, for example, wrote:

It is impossible to accept the claim that it is thanks to the watchfulness of the military governors that there has been no political sabotage and no serious attempt by the Arab population to organize an underground movement. If there are extremist groups among the Arabs willing to risk hostile acts against Israel, no military government will be able to stop them. The military government is not a solid organization and its manpower is limited. The physical presence of military rule in the Arab areas is not on a scale to prevent hostile acts on the part of the local population; it is rather the fear of the state's power to punish that has prevented deeds harmful to the nation, and this fear will remain even if the military government is abolished or its powers curtailed.³⁸

A ministerial committee headed by Pinhas Rosen, the minister of Justice, which was appointed to reevaluate the military government, had come to the same conclusion. Although its official report was not submitted to the Knesset until 1962, the news about the committee's intentions to recommend "extensive improvements for the Arab minority", had been leaked to the press earlier.³⁹ In its report to the Knesset,

³⁸ Haaretz, Feb. 11, 1957.

the committee declared:

....Yet even if we assume that sections of the Arab population have not yet resigned themselves to the existence of the state of Israel, it does not necessarily follow that the Arabs in Israel will be prepared to engage in organized mass action against the state. Only such a threat on a mass scale could justify the existence of the military government and the normal resources of the security services are sufficient to control individuals..... If this nationalism, insofar as it exists at all, has not yet exploded, it is not due to the deterrent factor of the military government but to the lack of sufficient motive.⁴⁰

Four things are made clear by the statement of the ministers: a) the statement defines "organized mass action against the state" on the part of the Arabs as a security concern; b) it sets this condition as the only justification for the existence of the military government; c) the statement determines that the Arabs do not have "sufficient motive" for such organized action; and d) the committee determines that outside the military government there are 'normal' resources which are "sufficient to control individuals". Pinhas Rosen who chaired the committee and was minister of justice at the time, declared later that "on the basis of what he had learned as chairman of the Ministerial Committee..... the military government was not necessary for security purposes."⁴¹ Despite such an unequivocal determination, however, the military government continued for another five years.

³⁹ Davar, March 26, 1959.

⁴⁰ Knesset Debates, Feb. 20, 1962, p. 1319. Cited in Jiryis, 1976, p.38.

⁴¹ The Jerusalem Post, Nov. 15, 1962.

In his book Curtain of Sand, Yigal Allon (1960), a previous commander of the Palmach (a pre-state military group), a leader of Achdut Haavoda party (which formed a coalition with the government), a minister and deputy prime minister in many governments, and a member of Kibbutz Dgania in Galilee, wrote:

There is absolutely no connection between effective control of the borders and the existence of the military government.... It is an error to believe that the existence of the military government can prevent espionage or that it can prevent the Arab population from harboring infiltration. This task can only be undertaken by a competent security department and an intelligence network worthy of the name.... Because it has no direct security task, the military government concentrates on internal political activities, such as the establishment of a counterforce to prevent the formation of undesirable political organization.⁴²

Two other members of the Achdut Haavoda Party spoke in opposition to the military government during a Knesset debate on Feb. 20, 1962. Bar-Yehuda, an ex-minister of the interior, argued that the military government must be abolished because "for a long time, it has performed no real security function and has indeed become a factor greatly increasing the insecurity of the state."⁴³ Moshe Carmel, another member of Achdut Haavoda and ex-cabinet member, also expressed his views on the military government. He said:

This institution is no longer essential to the security of Israel, and its continued existence may well harm the establishment of healthy relations between Israel's Jewish and Arab inhabitants....It blocks any genuine feeling of citizenship among the Arab population, and it damages Israel's reputation abroad. The military government.... no longer performs any positive functions in protecting the country from within, and its existence does more harm than good.⁴⁴

⁴² Yigal Allon, Curtain of Sand, Tel-Aviv, 1960, pp. 327-8.

⁴³ Knesset Debates, Feb. 20, 1962, pp. 1322-3. In Jiryis, 1976, p. 46.

Similar views were expressed by the Mapam Party through the statement of Yaakov Hazan, the second man in the party. He announced that:

We are convinced that the military government does no service to the security of the state of Israel and it is incompatible with the principles of justice and law..... The military government is making the Arab minority feel more and more strongly that it is despised, rejected, and discriminated against as race apart, and this can only breed hatred.⁴⁵

Right wing parties such as Herut and the Liberal Party (which was formed in 1961 by a union between the General Zionists and the Progressive Party) expressed similar views in opposition of the military government. As was resolved by a conference of the Herut movement in January 1962, and expressed by Menachem Begin in the Knesset in February of that year, "the administrative system called the military government no longer fullfilled any real security functions."⁴⁶ This position by Herut and the Liberals should not be surprising since the two parties who later combined to form the Likud, advocated free enterprise and the curtailment of collective bargaining (see Chapter 3). These positions represent a clear support of capital and against labor. Advocating abolition of the military government is, therefore, in line with these stands since such abolition provided an easier access of Jewish employers to Arab labor.

In 1965, less than a year after becoming prime minister (replacing the retiring Ben-Gurion), Eshkol ordered a review of the military government. The man Eshkol appointed for the job was Isar Harel, for

⁴⁴ Ibid., Feb. 20, 1963, p. 1211. In Ibid., p. 46-7.

⁴⁵ Ibid., Feb. 20, 1962, p. 1317. In ibid., p.47.

⁴⁶ Ibid., Feb. 20, 1963, p. 1209.

years the head of Israeli military intelligence. It could be argued that this appointment by Eshkol was designed to emphasize that the military government was being kept for national security reasons only, for to admit otherwise would have been bad politics nationally and internationally.

In the middle of December 1965 Harel presented his recommendations. Although there were no official announcements, the speculation was that Harel recommended the abolition of the military government.⁴⁷ However, these speculations were confirmed two months later when spokesman for the prime minister stated that "1966 will be recorded in the history of the Arabs in Israel as the year of the abolition of the military government for all practical purposes, and the elimination of all other sources of discontent among the Arab population of the country."⁴⁸

Six months later, on July 10, 1966, in a rare press conference in Tel-Aviv Harel stated that

The military government is not a necessity on security grounds and could be dispensed with. The army should not be concerned with our Arab citizens; it is a blot on our democracy... that this is so. Even if there were a need for restrictions, they should be applied individually. This collective restraint is a violation of the feelings of the Arabs. It should be far better to put individuals under stricter observation than to cast doubts on the whole Arab population in the state, and thus humiliate them.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Haaretz, Dec. 3, 1965.

⁴⁸ Haaretz, Feb. 10, 1966.

⁴⁹ The Jerusalem Post, July 10, 1966.

Clearly, if these statements do not dispel the security argument as the major reason for the continuation of the military government they, nevertheless, weaken such an argument considerably. Based on such evidence the national security cannot be accepted as a satisfactory explanation for the continuation of the system of military government for as long as it did. In fact the swift victory of Israel, in June 1967, over three major Arab countries (Egypt, Syria and Jordan), only six months after the abolition of the military government, reduced the alleged threat of the Arabs in Israel to the state's security to a mere joke.

Alternative Interpretation

There are other explanations for the continuation of the military government, which must be examined. Clearly, the military government was instrumental in confiscating Arab lands. But lands continued to be confiscated by the Israeli government after the military government was long abolished. Furthermore, the Israeli legal code contains enough clauses which provide a 'legal' justification for the confiscation of Arab land. This suggests that the confiscation of Arab land could not have been a major reason for the continuation of the military government although gaining control of Arab land was a primary objective of the Zionist organization and the state of Israel (see Chapter 4).

Another reason given for the continuation of the military government was its ability to stack Arab votes for Mapai, the ruling party at the time. Indeed, there is some evidence which points in this direction.

First, despite the harsh measures taken by the government (represented by Mapai Party), against the Arab population, Mapai received the lion's share of the Arab vote during Knesset and local elections from 1949 to 1965. For example, in the first knesset elections, Mapai and its affiliated Arab lists received 61.3 percent of the Arab vote in the all-Arab localities. The results of the second through the sixth Knesset elections -i.e., 1951, 1955, 1961, and 1965 - show the percentage of the Arab vote for Mapai and its affiliated Arab lists to be 66.5, 62.4, 52.0, 50.8, and 50.1 respectively.⁵⁰

Naturally, accusations were leveled by other parties against Mapai for its utilization of the military government to swing Arab votes. Aharon Cohen of Mapam argued that

The refusal of Mapai, the main party in power, to give up this position of strength (the military government), was because the party secured for itself in this way both the majority of Arab votes for the Knesset elections and the possibility of exerting pressure on Arab electors supporting contending parties.⁵¹

Similarly, when in 1963 a close 57 to 56 vote in favor of continuation of the military government was received with two Arab members linked to Mapai voting in favor, Menachem Begin of Herut commented that "the military government safeguards a special corner in this house (a place for the Arab members linked to Mapai), and today.... this corner will safeguard the survival of the military government."⁵²

⁵⁰ Jacob Landau, The Arabs In Israel: A Political Study, Oxford University Press, London, 1969: 152.

⁵¹ Cohen, A., Israel and the Arab World, Funk & Wagnalls, New York, 1970: 494.

⁵² Haaretz, Feb. 21, 1963.

This activity of the military government on behalf of Mapai seems to have intensified the opposition of other parties. According to Moshe Unna,⁵³ a former Knesset member and a member of the National Religious Party, Achdut Haavoda and Mapam played an influential role in the government's periodical reforms of the military government. In 1961 when both parties entered a coalition agreement with Mapai to form the government, both parties insisted on reserving the right to vote against the government, if necessary, over the military government.

Such service by the military government to Mapai should not be taken lightly, considering the fact that the Arabs constituted between 11 and 14 percent of the population, with no less than 70 percent turnout on election days of those eligible to vote. This means an average addition of between 5 to 8 Knesset members to Mapai, which is a large enough bloc to relieve Mapai of the need to seek unnecessary coalition partners. Needless to say, the selected Arab members who ran on Arab lists affiliated with Mapai were chosen, financed and campaigned for by the Mapai Party machine in cooperation with the military government. Thus, Arab Knesset members who were linked to Mapai owed their political positions to the party and were dedicated to its service. Such Arabs had never developed a constituency of their own and therefore could not have made it to the Knesset without the help of the party. Nor could it be claimed that they represented the interests of the Arabs. Arab MK's who decided to run on their own after being purged and replaced by Mapai stood no chance.⁵⁴

⁵³ Cited in Jiryis, 1976, fn. 40, p. 251.

No other party, since the abolition of the military government has ever managed to command such a political 'support' among the Arabs and a total control over 'their' Knesset members. However, it would be misleading to conclude that this benefit was limited to Arab vote-stacking. This would have been too obvious to the other Zionist parties who would have been more successful in fighting against it. The greater benefits of Mapai and one against which it was very difficult to fight is the role played by the military government in protecting the interests of Jewish labor through the military government's ability to limit the access of Arab labor to Jewish employment sites. These policies for which Mapai could claim credit were in line with the wishes of Jewish labor and earned Mapai the support of the labor vote, which was proportionally far more significant than the Arab vote.

The segment of Jewish labor which was more threatened by a free entry of Arab labor to employment sites was unskilled and semi-skilled labor, because it is this sector which has continuously absorbed most Arab labor.

⁵⁴ The best example of this is the case of Salih Khneyfes, a Druz from Shfa Amr (one of the only two all-Arab cities), and Mas'ad Qassis, a Christian from Miilya, a small village in northern Galilee. Both were MK's on the eve of the fourth Knesset elections when Mapai decided to replace them, despite their objections and protests. They both then ran as independents, enlisting every possible support from their hamulas (extended families), and neighbors. Both MK's failed to gain their seats back and received less than .5 percent of the Arab vote. (See Mansour, 'Israel's Arabs go to the polls', New Outlook, Jan. 1960:23. Schiff, 'Israel's Fourth Elections', *ibid.* Jan. 1960: 15-23)

According to Table 5.1 below in 1963, 77.3 percent of the Arab labor force was concentrated in three main job categories. These were: a) farmers, fishers and related workers; b) construction workers, quarrymen and miners; c) craftsmen, production process and related workers. Among the Jewish population, the table makes it clear that those who immigrated from Africa-Asia (Orientals) were concentrated more heavily in those three job categories than those Jews who immigrated from Europe-America (Ashkinazim). The figures from the table add up to 61.1 percent for those who immigrated from Africa-Asia during the years 1948-1954 and 64.9 percent for those who immigrated during the 1955-1963 period. The corresponding figures for the immigrants from Europe-America for the two immigration periods are 39.4 percent and 45.4 percent respectively. It is also interesting to note that the lowest concentration of the labor force in these jobs is found among the Israel-born (Jews) with 35.8 percent.

TABLE 5.1
 Jewish And Arab Employment By Occupation, Continent
 Of Birth And Period Of Immigration (1963)
 (Percentages)⁵⁵

OCCUPATION	Immigrated from Europe-America			Immigrated From Asia-Africa			Israel Born	Total Jewish	Arabs
	Since 1955	1948- 1954	Up to 1947	Since 1955	1948- 1954	Up to 1947			
Professional, Technical & Related Wrk.	21.1	11.9	16.6	3.2	5.3	4.1	21.2	12.9	5.5
Administrative Executive, Managerial & Clerical Wrks.	11.7	18.1	26.2	6.6	7.2	15.1	21.7	16.8	2.0
Traders, Agents And Salesmen	5.8	12.8	10.9	4.9	6.4	13.8	4.2	8.4	4.7
Farmers, Fishers And Related Workers	12.0	7.1	8.3	24.3	17.6	6.8	10.7	11.8	38.0
Workers In Transport And Communication	1.4	5.3	5.6	3.3	4.3	7.5	9.1	5.5	4.3
Construction Workers Quarry Men And Miners	4.6	7.6	5.0	12.9	12.4	10.9	4.7	7.8	} 39.3
Craftsmen, Production Process And Related Wrks.	28.8	24.7	18.1	27.7	31.1	22.4	20.4	24.3	
Services, Sport And Recreation Wrkers	14.6	12.5	9.3	17.1	15.7	18.8	8.1	12.5	
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Abs. (Thds)	55.0	147.4	168.9	51.3	163.6	30.0	130.8	747.0	*66.2

The Orientals would have been hurt the most by any policy of liberalization of movement for the Arab labor force. In addition, as noted in Chapter 3, middle-class Orientals were also likely to suffer as a result of dismantling the military government apparatus and its supporting ideology, because these agencies were mostly manned by Orientals. One would expect the Orientals, therefore, to have been more antagonistic toward the notion of abolishing the military government.

This cannot be ascertained, however, from the available data. No recognizable all-Oriental group which supported the military government or opposed its abolition can be identified. However, the overwhelming support of Orientals for Mapai (later the Labor Alignment) which controlled both the government and the Histadrut (see Chapter 3) could be seen as an expression of support for, among other things, the exclusionary policies toward the Arabs. And, as noted, the two institutions, the government and the Histadrut, were already doing more than adequate job in minimizing the 'threat' of Arab labor toward the Orientals. In fact, following the abolition of the military government in 1966, Mapai and its partners lost 7 mandates in the 1969 elections and its power decreased from 63 MK's in 1965 to 56.⁵⁶ This loss is significant in light of the fact that two years earlier (1967) the leadership of Mapai gave the state its biggest victory ever over the

⁵⁵ Source: Data for the Jewish population were obtained from the CBS Statistical Abstract of Israel, Jerusalem, 1965, p. 319. For the Arab population data were obtained from Y. Porath, The Arab Labor Force in Israel, Jerusalem, Israel Universities Press, 1966, p. 22.

* The total for the Arab population was calculated as the difference between total employees and Jewish workers. CBS, 1965, pp. 317-19.

⁵⁶ See Penniman, H., 1979, p. 310.

Arab states, a record which was used extensively during the election campaign. However, the loss in 1969 (as well as a further decline in Mapai's power in 1973, and 1977) is partially attributed to a decline in the support among Orientals (see Chapter 3) who constituted the bulk of unskilled labor against whom the Arabs were competing (Chapter 6).

A Final Note

Evidence indicates that the national interest, i.e., the Jewish interest, was seen by the state authorities and its agencies as best served by a total control over the Arab population. This control was to be achieved partially through confiscation of Arab lands to be deposited in Jewish hands, and increased economic and political dependence of the Arabs on the Jewish sector.⁵⁷ The military government was used as the mechanism to enhance such goals.

These policies, including the restrictions imposed on the Arabs in general and Arab labor in particular, were an extension for the Arab-Jewish conflict waged for several decades prior to the establishment of the state. Attempts to restrict employment of Arabs in Jewish enterprises as a substitute for Jewish labor date as far back as the second wave of immigration (1904-1914) (see Chapters 1&6). The practice which came to be known as "conquest of labor" and meant rather the replacement of Arab workers, employed in the Jewish farms and factories, by Jewish workers was eventually spearheaded by the Histadrut (after its

⁵⁷ According to Ian Lustick, the mechanisms of control involved segmentation and fragmentation, along geographical, religious and communal lines, economic dependence, and cooptation of leadership. See Lustick, 1980, ch. 4, 5.

founding in 1920) and adopted by all Jewish institutions (see Chapter 6). Together these institutions represented the organizational apparatus of the Zionist movement which was committed to the creation of homeland in Palestine, for the Jewish people.

With the establishment of the state these institutions continued to function and their commitment to the basic tenets of Zionist ideology remained intact. When considering the position of the Arab minority in Israel, therefore, one must remember that the organizational ideologies of these institutions and the personal commitments of the individuals who controlled them are rooted in hostile attitudes toward the Palestinian Arabs for, among other things, land control and ownership, and Jewish labor. It should not be surprising, therefore, to find that the men and women who filled the bureaus and agencies of the Israeli government, as well as those who remained at the helm of the 'national institutions', continued, after 1948, the fight against the Arab minority that they had waged in the decades before against the Arab majority of Palestine. Only now these struggles were sanctioned and encouraged by the Israeli government.

The Histadrut, for example, continued in its refusal to accept Arabs (Israeli citizens) as members and/or employ Arabs in its economic institutions (see chapter 6). And the J.N.F. continued to consolidate its hold on Arab land and lease it to Jews only. The fact that the Israeli leadership which was responsible for the formulation of policies towards the Arabs, are alumni of these institutions is reflected in the biographies of the following individuals.

David Ben-Gurion, a cofounder of the Histadrut and its first secretary - general in 1921, also presided over the formation in 1930 of Mapai. From 1935 to 1948 he served as chairman of the Jewish Agency and for most of Israel's first fifteen years as a state, he was both prime minister and defense minister.

Moshe Sharet, was head of the Jewish Agency's Political Department from 1933 to 1948. From 1948 to 1956 he served as foreign minister and as prime minister during Ben-Gurion's brief retirement in 1954. In 1960 he became the chairman of the Jewish Agency and served in that capacity until his death in 1965.

Levi Eshkol, was Israel's prime minister from 1964 to 1969 and its defense minister from 1964 to 1967. He had been very active in the 1920's and 1930's in the financial affairs of both the Histadrut and the Labor Party (Mapai). Selected as the director of the Land Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency in 1948, he continued to serve in that capacity while holding, until 1963, the post of minister of finance.

Golda Meir, worked as the head of the Political Department of the Histadrut in the late 1930's and 1940's. In 1946 she took over as director of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency while Moshe Sharet was under British arrest. In 1949 she was appointed minister of labor and later foreign minister, a post which she held from 1956 to 1965. In 1965 she became secretary-general of the Labor Party. After Eshkol's death in 1969 she became prime minister and held that post until 1974.

Clearly, these individuals represent the highest levels of Israeli officials under whose auspices policies regarding the Arabs, including but not limited to the military government, were devised and implemented. Before the establishment of the state, these individuals and others were the leaders of organizations which had fought for Jewish labor and against Arab labor. It is inconceivable, therefore, that such individuals would have changed their attitudes and ideological commitments upon the establishment of the state. Thus, one cannot escape the conclusion that the question of Arab labor in Jewish enterprises must have been under consideration especially when the new state and its leaders were facing grave economic problems compounded with the task of absorbing massive Jewish immigrants (see Table 5.2) to the new state.

TABLE 5.2
Yearly Immigration By Continent of Birth
(1948-1966)

Period	Absolute Numbers			
	Total	Asia-Africa	Europe-America	Not Known
1948	101,819	12,931	77,032	11,856
1949	239,076	110,780	123,097	5,199
1950	169,405	83,296	84,638	1,471
1951	173,901	123,449	50,204	248
1952	23,375	16,725	6,647	3
1953	10,347	7,760	2,574	13
1954	17,471	15,493	1,966	12
1955	36,303	33,736	2,562	5
1956	54,925	47,617	7,305	3
1957	69,733	29,361	39,763	609
1958	25,919	11,490	14,428	1
1959	22,987	7,635	15,348	4
1960	23,487	6,801	16,684	2
1961	46,571	22,004	24,564	3
1962	59,473	46,677	12,793	3
1963	62,086	43,054	19,028	4
1964	52,193	21,831	30,362	0
1965	28,501	n.d	n.d	n.d
1966	13,451	n.d	n.d	n.d
Grand Total	1,231,023	640,640		

Source: CBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel, Jerusalem, 1967, 18. p. 89.

Thus, while the commitment of the leadership to give preference to Jewish over Arab labor must have been a real one, this preference could not have been expressed in any conventional way. The fragile position of Israel in the international arena did not allow Israel to institutionalize 'apartheid-like' conditions preventing Arabs from entering Jewish employment sites and/or limiting private Jewish

enterprises from hiring Arab labor, unless Arabs were stigmatized as disloyal and a national security risk. Otherwise, such actions against the Arabs would have been too obvious to the international community, where Arab delegations at the United Nations were already complaining about the "complete absence of security for the Arabs in areas under Israel control in violation of guarantees provided for minorities under the partition plan...."⁵⁸ As a result of these complaints, the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP), undertook the examination of some of the Arab demands such as the abrogation of the Absentee Property Act, the requisition and proscription of Arab houses and lands, the reunion of families, and the freezing of Waqf property.⁵⁹

That the Israeli government was concerned about its international image and reputation with regard to its treatment of the Arab minority is further reflected in the fact that in May 1949 Abba Eban (later Israel's ambassador to the United Nations) found it necessary to elaborate on the Israeli government's objectives with regard to the Arabs, with more than a passing note during his address before the United Nations Ad Hoc Political Committee which was evaluating Israel's second application for membership in the United Nations. Eban stated that

The government of Israel reaffirms its obligation to protect the persons and property of all communities living within its borders. It will discontinue any discrimination or interference with the rights and liberties of individuals or groups forming such

⁵⁸ United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, General Progress Report and Supplementary Report, December 11, 1949-October 23, 1950, P. 12. Cited in Ian Lustick, 1980, p.61.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 16. In *ibid.*, p. 61.

minorities. The government of Israel looks forward to the restoration of peaceful conditions which might enable relaxation of any restrictions on the liberty of persons or property.⁶⁰

With Israel still struggling for international legitimacy having had its first application for membership to the United Nations rejected, it would not have been conceivable or clever for it to incorporate apartheid conditions within its legal system without finding the 'right' rationale for it. The military government system, therefore, and the subsequent security argument as the justification for its existence, seemed the best solution. Although the military government fulfilled many functions, Arab labor was one of its main concerns.

Summary

In this chapter I highlight some of the activities of the military government. I have shown that its activities with regard to land confiscation fits well with the general policy discussed in Chapter 4. While dispossession resulted in the emergence of Arab labor for hire which furthered the dependence of Arabs on the Jewish Sector the military government was used to make the operation of land confiscation a smoother one.

One of the most important of the military government's activities was the restriction of the movement of Arabs. Through these restrictions the access of Arab labor to Jewish business and enterprises was

⁶⁰ Aubrey S. Eban, Israel: The Case for Admission to the United Nations (address delivered before the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the United Nations, May 5, 1949, published by Israel Office of Information), p. 41.

controlled and monitored by the military government in accordance with the demands of the Jewish labor market, i., e., only when the demand for labor was greatest did relaxation of travel restrictions begin to appear. From 1948 to 1959, when unemployment among the Jewish population was high, restriction orders were most rigid. A significant drop in Jewish unemployment rates and immigration patterns, on the other hand, resulted in a gradual relaxation of travel restrictions. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that one of the major roles played by the military government was the protection of Jewish labor against Arab competition. Taken together these distinctions created what Bosewell calls 'the identifying ideology' which has been responsible for the reproduction of split labor market conditions.

Furthermore, the military government was shown to have played a direct role as Arab vote-stacker for Mapai (the ruling party at the time and later the Labor Alignment) which claims to be the representative and protector of labor's interests. That its policies with regard to the Arabs were supported by labor in general and Orientals in particular is evidenced by the heavy support the party enjoyed among both groups and the subsequent decline of such support following changes in these policies.

These dynamics, in addition to other evidence presented throughout the chapter refute the argument that national security was the underlying reason for the existence of the military government. However, the use of such an argument in defense of the military government and its operation seems to have fulfilled other functions.

It weakened the struggle of Arabs against the military government and limited the support of Jewish elements to their struggle, and it disarmed critics of the military government both nationally, particularly Jewish employers, and internationally.

It is these functions which enabled the military government to continue operating for as long as it did. A major consequence of the military government's operation and the subsequent national security argument was that it highlighted the Arab-Jewish division. Accordingly, society appeared divided into two distinct groups: those who are loyal (Jews) and those who are disloyal (Arabs); those whose liberties and freedom are to be protected (Jews) and those whose freedoms are to be curtailed; those whose economic and political interests are to be safeguarded and furthered (Jews) and those whose economic and political interests are to be forsaken and controlled.

As noted, the major beneficiaries from such policies and rational have been labor and Mapai, labor's representative. The struggle of Jewish labor against Arab labor will be discussed and detailed in the next chapter. As will be shown, the identifying ideology proved to be instrumental in limiting the Arabs to certain positions and job-categories, despite the abolition of the military government.

CHAPTER VI

THE HISTADRUT AND THE ARAB LABOR FORCE

Since the Arabs in Israel have been stripped of their property and as a result they became totally dependent on hiring out their labor (see Chapter 4), the status and well being of Arab labor becomes a reflection of the status and well being of the whole Arab community.

The greatest 'enemy' of minority labor according to the split labor market theory is 'white' labor. As soon as the business sector begins employing minority labor (which by definition is cheaper than "white" labor) tension which develops into conflict erupts between expensive labor and business over the status of minority labor. While the preferred outcome of this conflict for expensive labor is a total exclusion of minority labor, which represents a complete victory for labor, a caste-like treatment of minority labor benefits both expensive labor as well as the business sector. Either resolution, however, will result in the continued cheapness of minority labor, limiting its access to certain job-categories and/or specific geographic locations and positions all of which contribute to the continuous reproduction of split labor market conditions.

Whereas Chapter 5 examined the role of the military government in terms of maintaining and enforcing exclusion of Arab labor, limiting its

access to Jewish labor sites to the minimum possible, this chapter will examine the role played by the Histadrut, representing Jewish labor, in determining the status of Arab labor. Specifically, I will examine the attitudes and practices of the Histadrut toward Arab labor; the relationship between those attitudes and the structure and extent of demand for labor in general and Arab labor in particular; the Histadrut's reaction to the relaxation of travel restrictions; and, the effect of all of these on wages, occupational and hierarchical location of Arabs. I will begin with pre-state period.

The Pre-State Period

Throughout the pre-state period the question of Arab labor in Jewish colonies was continuously debated and addressed by the Histadrut and other Zionist institutions. Typically, the employment of Arabs was portrayed as a threat not only to Jewish labor but to the whole Zionist design in Palestine. The conflict between the Jewish and Palestinian peoples made perpetrating such typifications easier. The Histadrut seems to have played a major role both in the conflict itself and in the formulation of the Jewish perception towards Arabs in general and Arab labor in particular. Since its founding in 1920 as the General Federation of Hebrew Workers, the Histadrut set out to organize Jewish workers and waged a tireless campaign on their behalf. The principle of 'conquest of labor' or '100 percent Jewish labor' seems to have been the pillar of the Histadrut's activity throughout its pre-state history. To implement this principle the Histadrut conducted extensive and sometimes violent picketing of Jewish firms and farms that employed Arabs.

The implementation of the "conquest of labour" was practiced by all Zionist institutions. The J.N.F., which was responsible for the purchase of land and the leasing of such land to Jews, for example, prescribed fines and even the eventual eviction of farmers breaking the rule against employing non-Jewish labor.¹ Similarly, the Jewish Agency, founded in 1929 as the representative of the world Jewry, stated in its constitution that "The agency shall promote agricultural colonization based on Jewish labour, and in all works by the Agency, it shall be deemed to be a matter of principle that Jewish labour shall be employed."²

These policies by the other Zionist institutions were completely in line with the demands of the Histadrut which played a major role in their implementation. Once founded the Histadrut declared that it would aim to improve the conditions of the Jewish workers, whether cooperators or hired workers. The key element in this doctrine was "the assumption that Jewish capital had no national value without Jewish labour".³ The importance of the "conquest of labour" was explained by Abraham Granott, who was then chairman of the board of directors of the Jewish National Fund (J.N.F.), this way:

Without Jewish labour even the ownership of the land could not serve as a guarantee of the national character of the enterprise, and the Jewish future would not be assured.... The extent of Jewish labour in the old villages,... was as a rule only limited, and even those

¹ Ruedy, J. 'Dynamics of Land Alienation', in I. Abu-Loghud (ed.), The Transformation of Palestine, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1971, p. 130.

² Cited in *ibid.*, p. 130.

³ Lucas, 1974, p. 54.

plantations which engaged workers, there was always a group of Arab employees receiving low wages in comparison with the Jews. The existence of such bodies of Arabs in Jewish villages was somewhat of a danger to security in times of emergency, and even more to the maintenance of a higher economic standards.⁴

By the early 1930's the Histadrut succeeded in gaining control of a large segment of the Jewish labour market through the enforcement of hiring rules, stating that only Jewish labor be hired.⁵ The Histadrut's campaign against Arab workers went beyond mere declarations. According to Flapan,⁶ force was also used to evict Arab workers from Jewish enterprises. He describes such campaigns which took place in 1933 this way:

Specifically formed mobile units moved from place to place to identify and evict by force, if necessary, Arab workers from construction sites and other Jewish enterprises. Every single case of removal of Arab workers - and in many cases the operation took the form of an ugly scene of violence - was reported in the Jewish press and reverberated in the Arab media creating an atmosphere of unprecedented tension.

Clearly, such actions by the Histadrut were against the interests and wishes of Jewish employers who preferred to continue benefiting from cheap Arab labor. Hence, to be more forceful the Histadrut described its actions as being on behalf of the national, i.,e., Jewish interest, rather than merely reflecting the interests of labor. This was not very difficult to do because since the early days of its founding the Histadrut had involved itself in the conflict between the Zionist

⁴ Granott, A., Agrarian Reform and the Record of Israel, London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1956, p. 51.

⁵ Lucas, 1974, p. 153.

⁶ Flapan, S., 1979, p. 266.

Organization and the Palestinian Arabs. One of the Histadrut's most notable activities in this regard was the creation and maintenance of the Haganah, the underground army which fought against the Arabs and British and became, in 1948, the foundation of the Israel Defense Forces. Hence, as a trade union the Histadrut's historical development, political aims and economic practices set it apart from most labor unions in the West. Having emerged as an integral part of a nationalist movement (the Zionist movement), and not as a result of mass workers' aspirations, the Histadrut was bound to adopt nationalistic, i. e., Zionist ideology.

The most important aspect of the ideology adopted at the time by the Zionist movement and subsequently by the Histadrut was the exclusive national rights of Jews over Palestine. This aspect of the ideology resulted not only in the exclusion of Arab workers from membership in the Histadrut but helped enlist its members for the 'struggle' against the Arabs in general and the Arab workers in particular. As it was articulated by Yago, the task of the Histadrut

was not solely to divert working class struggles, but to eliminate part of the working class (the Palestinian Arabs) from labour market competition in order to accomplish the two-pronged state building program of the Zionist movement- 'conquest of labour/conquest of land.'⁷

Thus, the emphasis by the Histadrut on hiring only Jewish workers was a logical extension of its ideological commitments. In 1935 the Histadrut representatives on the Zionist Executive Council "promoted a motion

⁷ Yago, G., "Whatever Happened to the Promised Land? Capital Flows and the Israeli State." Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 21, 1976-7, p. 126.

(which was unanimously adopted) emphasizing the duty of all members of the Zionist Organization to employ only Jewish labor. Defiance of this resolution would entail expulsion from the Zionist Organization."⁸

While hostility against Arab labor continued throughout the pre-state history the establishment of the state in 1948 did not bring about an immediate change in the Histadrut's orientation toward the Arabs.

The Post-State Period - (1948-1958)

The importance of examining the attitudes of the Histadrut toward Arab labor lies in the power and influence of the Histadrut on the Israeli economic, political and social life.

Since its founding in 1920 the Histadrut has grown into conglomerate holding corporations, companies, banks, industrial concerns, and agro-industries. Although the Histadrut represents over 80 percent of Jewish employees,⁹ its union activities, according to Davis, "constitute a fraction of its interests, concentrated in one of its numerous specialized departments, the Department of Labour Union."¹⁰

⁸ Zvi Sussman, "The Policy of the Histadrut with Regard to Wage Differentials: A Study of the Impact of Egalitarian Ideology and Arab Labour on Jewish Wages in Palestine", Jerusalem, Hebrew University Press, 1969, p. 162.

⁹ S. Smooha, Israel: Pluralism and Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, p. 106.

¹⁰ Uri Davis, Israel: Utopia Incorporated, London: Zed Press, 1977, p. 50.

Industries controlled by the Histadrut employ 23.3 percent of Israel's total labor force and produce 20.8 percent of Israel's GNP (figures for 1968/69). The Histadrut has a virtual monopoly over health insurance services (there is no national health insurance in Israel) with an extended network of Histadrut-owned and operated hospitals, dispensaries, and rest homes. It also operates mutual aid funds and pension funds for its members. Members of the Histadrut enjoy a variety of services offered by the organization such as Histadrut-sponsored vocational training programs, evening educational courses, social and cultural clubs, and sports leagues. The Histadrut also publishes books and periodicals, sponsors group tours abroad, and conducts a host of educational, technical, and propaganda activities. The fact that wages and work conditions are negotiated between the Histadrut and the Industrialists' Union and the government on a nation-wide basis further extends the power, influence and prestige of the Histadrut.

following the establishment of the state, the Histadrut did all in its power to preserve available jobs for Jewish workers and new immigrants. With a double-digit unemployment rate among the Jewish population, (see Table 2.5) the Histadrut was not in the mood to 'talk' Arabic. During this period (1948-1959), the preferred method of dealing with Arab workers by the Histadrut continued to be exclusion. Arabs were only allowed to take those jobs which were undesired by Jewish labor. As Aharon Cohen, writing in 1964, testifies:

In the period 1948-58, the Arab worker was driven into the unskilled, manual jobs that were the most exhausting and least well paid, jobs shunned by the Jewish workers such as mixing plaster, cleaning jobs, unskilled jobs in quarries and construction and the like...

Most office and other work in the state was closed to the Arabs;.... when an Arab managed to "snatch" a few days on construction job or in other city work, in some primitive workshop, or on the margins of Jewish agriculture in some settlement, he was inevitably fired for not being "organized". "Attacks" on the Arab workers intensified during unemployment crises affecting the Jewish population, when even the meanest jobs were in demand.¹¹

Two related conditions aided the Histadrut in making exclusion against the Arabs possible: a) control over all labor exchanges making them available to Histadrut members only (which excluded the Arabs as non-members); and b) the restriction on the movement of Arabs imposed by the military government making Arabs unemployable in metropolitan areas. In fact, according to Ben-Porath, the Histadrut exercised a veto during this period over the granting of work permits by the military government to Arab villagers wishing to work in metropolitan areas.¹²

Even without the requirement of membership the Arabs would have been given the lowest priority in job allocation by the Histadrut labor exchanges. All the characteristics which weighed heavily in giving applicants priority worked against the Arabs. Among these criteria: service in the Israeli and British armies, a year of imprisonment or banishment in the Diaspora, or carrying out tasks for the Zionist movement which led to a delay in immigrating to the country.¹³

¹¹ Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World, Tel-Aviv, Merhavva, 1964, pp. 530-32.

¹² Ben-Porath, Y., The Arab Labor Force in Israel, Israel Universities Press, Jerusalem, 1966, pp. 52-55.

¹³ Center of General Labor Exchanges, The Labor Exchange Constitution: The Work Priority Constitution, Tel-Aviv, 1954, pp. 12-13, (Hebrew). In Ben-Porath, p. 55.

In addition to the Histadrut and the military government, the Ministry of Labor was also involved in monitoring Arab access to the general market. Until 1958 the Ministry of Labor had opened a sum of nine labor exchanges in the Arab sector. Of these, three were opened in rural areas in three of the villages of the Little Triangle; Um-el-Fahm, Taibeh and Baqua-el-Gharbieh. The other six were opened in Nazareth and the mixed towns of Haifa, Akka, Jafa, Ramleh and Lydd.

One should not get the false impression, however, that these exchanges were engaged in finding jobs for the Arabs. As Ben-Porath argues, the exchanges "played no role in actually finding work for Arabs in the Jewish sector". Because, he argues, "they (the exchanges), were cut off from the general network of labor exchanges", (which, as noted above, was controlled by the Histadrut), and "which objected to Arabs entering the Jewish labor market."¹⁴ The function of the exchanges seems to have been twofold: a) the monitoring and regulation of Arab worker's entry to the Jewish sector; b) the distribution of relief workdays allotted to Arab workers by the government.¹⁵

The number and geographic locations of these exchanges further testify to their inadequacy in serving Arab workers. Despite the fact that the bulk of the Arab population resided in rural areas, only one-

¹⁴ Ben-Porath, The Arab.... pp. 52-53.

¹⁵ The allotment of relief work days was used by the government to relieve unemployment and construct public projects. This method was discontinued in 1963. From 1953 to 1963 the average yearly allotment to the Arabs was about 93,000 work days. The figures for 1961 show that in that year, for example, 35 work days were allotted per unemployed Arab compared to over 100 work days allotted to unemployed Jew. See Ben-Porath, fn. 10, p. 53.

third of these exchanges were opened in such areas. This may have been due to the fact that the military government's use of restriction orders on the movement of Arabs proved to be effective in regulating the Arabs' entry to Jewish markets. As for the Arabs residing in mixed towns the military regulations did not apply nor was the rule of localism¹⁶ applicable in their case. Since, according to Ben-Porath, "the Histadrut exchanges refused to deal with Arab manpower", without the labor exchanges of the ministry this manpower would have been left unregulated.

The significance of those exchanges became clear when it was realized that Arabs who found work on their own needed the consent of the exchange for work permits. This consent depended on the employment situation in the intended place of work and on the applicant's right to employment. This right for employment was determined on the basis of, among other things, ownership of land. Since no minimum amount of land for such determination was ever specified, a person could be disqualified, in theory at least, for owning a very small plot of land.

As for the Labor Ministry's exchanges in the rural areas it is important to emphasize that the three branches were all located in the area closest to the economic center of Israel where workers would be most in demand. Thus, the demand that workers obtain the consent of the labor exchange before accepting employment and the fact that those

¹⁶ The rule of localism stipulates that workers residing in one geographic area have priority to jobs in their area over outsiders. This, as will be explained, was used as a form of protectionism against Arab workers who usually resided in all-Arab towns and villages with very little employment opportunities.

exchanges had the authority to withhold this consent seem to have been designed to restrict rather than enhance the entry of Arab labor to the Jewish sector. Neither the villages of Galilee, where most of the Arabs reside, nor the Negev in the South, where the Bedouins reside, had any labor exchanges in their villages. Applications for travel permits to search for and accept employment by Arabs residing in those areas were handled directly by the military government. As noted earlier (see chapter 5) the issuance of such permits not only was limited but took into account employment conditions in the Jewish sector.

To summarize, during the first few years of statehood the entry of the Arab labor force into the Jewish sector was not only monitored but was controlled in order to give preference to Jewish labor. The three agencies most responsible for this monitoring and control were the military government and the Labor Ministry, both of which represent the government, and the Histadrut, representing the interests of labor. During this period both the government and the Histadrut were controlled by Mapai. The fact that Mapai enjoyed public support for its policies whereas Herut and the Liberals who represented mostly employers and the well educated, well to do middle-class, were politically weak (see Chapter 3) made the Histadrut 'triumphant' with regard to its exclusionary policies toward the Arabs. Depressed economic conditions coupled with high rate of unemployment among the Jewish population during this initial period, seem to have played a decisive role in the struggle over the status of Arab labor between the Histadrut and Jewish employers tipping the balance in favor of the Histadrut. The next section will examine the labor market conditions during this period.

Labor Market Conditions and Arab Labor
(1948-1959)

The economic conditions immediately following the establishment of the state, coupled with a massive influx of immigration, made employment opportunities extremely limited. Between 1948 and 1964 the Jewish population of Israel tripled (Table 1.1) and the increase in the Jewish labor force was similar (Table 2.5). The Jewish population grew from about 649,000 in 1948 to about 2,239,000 at the end of 1964. Most of this increase (67 percent) was due to immigration. In fact by the end of 1951 (only three years after the establishment of the state), the Jewish population more than doubled, reaching 1,404,000 with 88 percent of the increase due to immigration.¹⁷

Between 1948 and 1951, the period during which the highest immigration influx occurred (see Table 1.1), the economy was dominated by the need to furnish basic provisions for the large and continuing influx of immigrants. According to Pack, consumer demands for all manufactured goods were rapidly increasing but no commensurate increase in domestic supply was forthcoming.¹⁸ Pack also argues that this lack of domestic supply was a result of "lack of capital with which to employ potential workers and the immigrants unfamiliarity with industrial occupations."¹⁹ Thus, a very high proportion of manufactured consumer goods was supplied

¹⁷ Friedlander, D. and Goldscheider, C., The Population of Israel, Columbia University Press, N. Y. 1979, pp. 30-31, tables 2.1, 2.2.

¹⁸ Pack, H., Structured Change and Economic Policy in Israel, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971, p. 73.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 74.

through imports. Such economic conditions and activities were reflected in a high rate of unemployment as shown in table 1.

As measured by several indices the economy began showing signs of expansion after 1954.²⁰ A good proportion of imported goods started to be manufactured locally under a policy of import substitution. By 1958 imports constituted only 25.8 percent of the total supply of manufactured goods (domestic plus foreign) compared to 46 percent in 1951.²¹

Not only did the ratio of import relative to domestic production decline, but the proportion of exported domestic products rose considerably. In terms of manufactured goods the proportion rose from 5.2 percent in 1951 to 14.5 percent in 1958 and to 23.6 percent in 1964. Export of agricultural output rose from 9.2 percent in 1951 to 18.3 percent in 1964.²²

The gross domestic product also showed a dramatic increase during the period 1950-1965. In 1950 the gross domestic product was 1,160,000 IL (Israeli Lira) compared to 1,884,000 IL in 1954, 2,719,000 IL in 1958, and 5,245,000 IL in 1965, all calculated on the basis of 1955 prices. The compounded rates of growth for these years was about 10 percent annually.²³

²⁰ Ibid., p. 75.

²¹ Ibid., p. 74.

²² Ibid., p. 65, table 3.6.

²³ Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1968, pp. 140-41. In Pack, 1971, p. 29, table 2.8.

The data also show inter and intra-sectoral variations in expansion.²⁴ This unevenness in development among the sectors was affected to a great extent by government decisions. In formulating its policies the government took into consideration the sector's capacity to absorb the unemployed and anticipated growth in the labor force irrespective of productive efficiency.²⁵ Such policies should not be surprising coming from a government headed by Mapai claiming to be protector of labor's interests. The results of this policy of economic expansion were reflected in the decline of unemployment from almost 14 percent in 1949 to 5.7 percent in 1958 and to 3.3 percent in 1964 (see Table 2.5).

The actual decline in the unemployment rate would have been even greater had it not been for some distortion in the figures of the early years. Those figures do not include, for example, underemployment estimated to have been around 5 percent,²⁶ nor do they include those immigrants who were housed in temporary camps and were not required to register in labor exchanges.²⁷ These facts help magnify the extent to which the economy was able to absorb the numbers of job-seekers who, as a result of immigration, were continuously increasing both proportionally and in absolute. The exclusion of the Arabs enabled the Histadrut to secure many jobs for Jewish immigrants, a task which also

²⁴ for more details see Pack, tables 4.1, 4.2, pp. 74-77.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 14.

²⁶ Ibid., fn. 23, p. 13.

²⁷ Friedlander, D., The Population....., p. 14; Ben-Porath, The Arab Labor Force in Israel, Jerusalem, Universities Press, 1966, p. 48.

proved politically beneficial to Mapai. And, to be successful in its efforts the Histadrut continued to play the nationalistic tune in conjunction with the national security tune played by the military government.

Other reasons can be pointed out to explain employers' acquiescence with these policies manifested in the absence of any vigorous campaigns for more access to Arab labor, although there was always a demand to abolish travel restrictions. For one thing the private sector was not well developed nor was the need for labor particularly great. 2) The travel restrictions were neither absolute nor unbendable legally and illegally, which meant employers were, at least partially, enjoying the benefits of cheap Arab labor. 3) Not all Jews, especially the newcomers, were automatically organized through the Histadrut. That meant there was, for a while at least, a pool of Jewish 'cheap' labor from which employers could fill their needs, and those Jews were indeed earning low incomes. As Pack notes:

... during at least part of the 1950's, differences in pretax income were widening; as might be expected the immigration lowered the level of unskilled wages relative to skilled.²⁸ The intervention of the Histadrut, which reflected their strongly egalitarian philosophy, prevented actual differences in income from reaching levels that would have occurred solely through market forces. Nevertheless, there were growing differences between incomes of veteran (pre 1948) residents and new immigrants.²⁹

²⁸ Uri Baharal, The Effect of Mass Immigration on Wages in Israel, Jerusalem: Falk Project, 1965. In *Ibid.*, p. 188.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

As the economy expanded around the mid-fifties, and demand for labor increased with Arabs still excluded from the labor market, wages for Jewish labor began rising. Table 6.1 below shows a rate of increase in wages of about 10 percent compounded annually. Furthermore, the Table shows that these increases in wages correspond to decreases in the unemployment rate.

TABLE 6.1
Nominal Wage Changes and Unemployment Rates
(1956-1965)

	Wages (Percentage from Previous Year)	Unemployment Percentage of Labor Force
1956	11.0	7.8
1957	8.5	6.9
1958	11.4	5.7
1959	7.2	5.5
1960	6.3	4.6
1961	11.0	3.6
1962	13.0	3.7
1963	12.0	3.6
1964	12.0	3.3
1965	20.0	3.6

Source: Abridged from Howard Pack, Structural Change and Economic Policy in Israel, New Haven: Yale University Press, Table 7.10, p. 205.

Other consequences of the expansion of the economy were the opening of new job opportunities in the industrial and construction sectors. Having gained experience with the passage of time and gained command of the language, the new immigrants set out to take advantage of the newly created opportunities. Since agricultural work was less rewarding (in terms of wages and benefits) than industrial employment, a shift from the former to the latter began to take place triggering a process of decline in the percent of Jewish men employed in agriculture. During the period 1958-1962, the greatest rate of decline in agricultural

employment occurred among immigrants from Asia-Africa. (see Table 6.2). As a result there was a change in both the supply and the structure of demand for agricultural labor.

TABLE 6.2
Employed Jewish Men in Agriculture:
1958-1963 (percent of total Jewish employed men)

Year	All Jews	Asia-Africa (new immigrants)
1958	16.5	29.0
1959	15.3	25.8
1960	15.3	24.2
1961	14.7	22.2
1962	13.0	n.d.
1963	12.4	n.d.

Source: Ben-Porath, The Arab Labor Force in Israel, Jerusalem, Universities Press, 1966, Table 2.12, p. 32.

The mechanization of agriculture and the shift to specialization and industrial crops resulted in a decline in the demand for farm workers as a whole, while at the same time the demand for seasonal workers increased. Since Jewish workers were able to find more stable employment in industry the need for Arab workers to fill those seasonal positions intensified. Similar processes of mechanization and

specialization were experienced by other branches of the economy. For example, the construction industry which experienced rapid expansion due to the increased need to house new immigrants, also chose the route of mechanization and specialization. Consequently, the demand for unskilled labor intensified. This demand was ultimately filled, at least partially, through the hiring of Arab labor. The figures in Table 6.3 show that the percent of Arab labor employed in construction between 1958 and 1963 increased from 19.4 to 25.6.

TABLE 6.3
Non-Jewish Employed men, by Industry:
1958-1963 (percent)

Year	Agriculture	Manufacturing	Construction	Other	Total
1958	42.4	16.1	19.4	22.1	100.0
1959	44.0	17.2	14.8	24.0	100.0
1960	46.8	15.7	15.4	22.1	100.0
1961	44.0	16.7	18.0	21.3	100.0
1962	45.1	14.3	20.1	20.5	100.0
1963	38.0	17.7	25.6	21.7	100.0

Source: Ben-Porath, The Arab Labor Force in Israel, Jerusalem, Universities Press, 1966, Table 2.11, p. 31.

The expansion of the labor market coupled with the anticipation of a limited expansion in the Jewish labor force (due to decline in immigration) together with a shift in the structure of demand for workers in certain sectors and the rising cost of Jewish labor resulted in an increase in demand for Arab labor. It is at this time when the demand for the abolition of travel restrictions began intensifying (see Chapter 5). However, the fact that Arab labor, prior to its admission to the Histadrut, operated more clandestinely meant that employers did not have to abide by the labor union's rules concerning wages and benefits paid to Arab labor who were unorganized and vulnerable to such exploitation due to their limited resources and employment alternatives. Paradoxically, this weakness of the Arab labor increased their competitive potential and 'threat' for Jewish labor who were members of the Histadrut.³⁰ This competitive potential of the Arab labor and the corresponding fears by the Histadrut were further intensified by a government decision in 1958 to begin a process of relaxation on travel restrictions (see Chapter 5). The next section describes the Histadrut's response to these and other developments.

The Opening of the Histadrut to Arab Membership

In 1959 the Histadrut announced its decision to open its ranks to Arab membership. Such an event symbolized the end of an era for the Arab labor force. The argument that the decision by the Histadrut was a result of an attempt to bridge the gap between its 'working-class'

³⁰ See Chapter 1 and Bonacich argument concerning the relationship between the weakness of minority labor and its threatening potential against majority labor.

'socialist-internationalist' ideology and discrimination against the Arabs is untenable. In the first place those who advance such an argument present no data in support of their claim. Secondly, if indeed this shift in the policy of the Histadrut towards the Arabs can be attributed to its egalitarian philosophy, then one would assume that some precipitating event(s) must have occurred to elicit such a shift. Otherwise, how else can one explain the fact that for over 39 years the Histadrut was able to reconcile the differences between this presumed philosophy and its discrimination against Arab labor?

The fact that one can search in vain for such event(s) which, suddenly, made the gap between a 39 year old ideology (1920-1959) and practice unbearable and in need of abridgement weakens this argument considerably. What brought about this decision by the Histadrut, I propose, was: a) the expansion of the Israeli economy and its need for unskilled labor which could not be met by Jewish labor; and b) the Histadrut's desire to regulate the entry of the Arab labor force limiting its competitive potential through, among other things and in an awkward way, raising Arab wages so that Arab labor becomes less attractive to Jewish employers.

The increasing demand for Arab labor, the result of increased demand for labor which could no longer be fulfilled by Jewish labor, was perhaps the most important factor precipitating a change in attitude of the Histadrut. As noted, the Histadrut was controlled by Mapai, which also controlled the government. Since Mapai was competing with other political parties for Jewish constituency, a continued control over

business's access to Arab labor was neither in the best interest of the country or Mapai. Especially, that the near full employment among Jewish labor weakened in part the argument of the Histadrut against employing Arab labor.

Furthermore, the mounting pressure on the government to abolish travel restrictions, indeed the whole military government system (see chapter 5), made the relaxation on travel restrictions, which were first introduced in 1958, a non-reversible process. This action increased the availability of Arab workers to Jewish employers. As non-union members the Arabs were not in a good bargaining position, accepting whatever wages and benefits they were offered. These developments placed the Arabs in a position of undercutting the Histadrut's efforts to secure more jobs and better work conditions for its Jewish members. Thus, with the relaxation of restriction orders the policy of exclusion by the Histadrut was no longer practical or enforceable. It was replaced by a policy of caste-like, restricting the Arab workers' mobility vertically into subordinate positions as well as horizontally limiting their access to certain job-categories. This new policy was also a policy of containment.

The passage of the Employment Service Law in 1959, furthermore, made exclusion not only impractical but even illegal. It set up the Employment Service to which Histadrut labor exchanges were transferred. The law also required both workers and employers to resort to labor exchanges and prohibited discrimination on grounds of, inter alia,

religion, nationality or race.³¹ The law's anti-discrimination measures against the Arabs, however, were limited. The loopholes provided by section 42(b) of the law left the Arab workers vulnerable to arbitrary measures by the labor exchange officers. This section states that "It shall not be considered discrimination if the character or nature of the task or considerations of state security prevents or prevent a person's being sent to or engage in some particular work."³²

This clause seems to have provided the legal basis for disguised discrimination against the Arabs who alone, as a group, were considered high security risks. Furthermore, the law stipulates that labor exchanges had to be established everywhere, and the Employment Service regulations recognized the link between the worker and the exchange in his place of residence and gave priority and protection to local workers. Since the bulk of the Arab population lived in segregated all-Arab towns and villages (see Table 2.3) it was possible through this clause to restrict the Arab workers' entry to Jewish settlements whenever such an action was desired.

Hence, while the provisions of the law to control and expand labor exchanges somewhat legitimized the entry of much needed Arab workers to Jewish settlements and enterprises, the clauses of security and localism provided the legal framework for the closure of certain job categories and positions in the face of Arabs. Since both clauses amount to a measure of protectionism for the Jewish workers it is likely (although I

³¹ Laws of the State of Israel, 1959, vol. 13, p. 34.

³² *Ibid.* p. 34.

have no data to support this), that the two clauses of security and localism were the result of a compromise negotiated by representatives of business and the Histadrut representing the workers.

Nevertheless, the enactment of the Employment Service law and the relaxation of travel restrictions, two not unrelated events, resulted in an increase in the participation of Arabs in the labor force. As can be seen from Table 6.4, between 1958 and 1963 the most dramatic increases occurred in the lower (14-17) and upper (55+) age-categories. While the participation of the former increased from 41.5 to 60.6 percent the latter increased from 32.4 to 45.5 percent with the other age-categories showing only modest increases.

The significance of these increases, particularly in the two extreme age-categories, lies in the fact that in times of high unemployment these age-categories are expendable and usually show a higher than average rate of unemployment (the former on the basis of lack of experience while the latter on the basis of weakened physical ability). It is when a labor shortage is experienced that those two age groups are recruited to the labor force. Furthermore, such recruitment could very well indicate a rising demand for certain, unskilled labor especially in the areas of agriculture and services, as the case is shown to have been.

TABLE 6.4
 Labor Force Participation of Non-Jewish Men
 by Age: 1958-1963

Year	14-17	18-34	35-54	55+
1958	41.5	90.1	88.6	32.4
1959	49.2	92.0	86.8	36.9
1960	49.7	92.9	86.9	39.9
1961	58.4	93.9	90.0	40.3
1962	60.7	94.4	91.4	41.1
1963	60.6	94.8	93.6	45.5

Source: Ben-Porath, Y., The Arab Labor Force in Israel, Jerusalem, Universities Press, 1966, Table 1.10, p. 17.

The change in policy toward the Arab workers by the Histadrut, therefore, seems to have been an expression of accommodation to these emerging economic as well as structural realities which in the long run proved to be in the interest of its Jewish constituency. As is evident from occupational data the overall effect of the entry of Arabs on Jewish labor has been the upward displacement of Jews particularly Orientals. These dynamics seem to have been maintained beyond the initial period of the Arabs' entry to the labor market. The recent study by Epstein and Semyonov analyzing data on Arab and Jewish labor between the years 1969 and 1982 concludes that the higher the status of an occupation the more likely was the in-mobility of Jews relative to Arabs (both citizens and noncitizens). This led the authors to conclude that "although Israeli Arabs enjoyed some upward mobility, the gap

between them and Jews grew wider".³³ That the change in policy was undertaken by the Histadrut as a strategy designed to combat Arab labor's competitiveness, and not as a result of a genuine change in its outlook toward Arab labor or indeed a desire to integrate Arabs, is further evidenced by the fact that although Arabs were accepted as members in 1959 it was only in 1965 that they were permitted to participate in the election to the Histadrut convention. In fact, until then (1965) the Histadrut continued to have as its official name as the General Federation of Jewish (emphasis added) Workers of the Land of Israel.

Furthermore, one can also argue that a genuine change in outlook on the basis of egalitarian philosophy would have produced equality or at least equality of opportunities. While in theory Arab and Jewish members of the Histadrut are equal³⁴ in practice it has not been the case. The Arabs are still being dealt with through a special department (the Arab Department). This suggests that the Histadrut is still in favor of, and accordingly continues to maintain, separation between Arabs and Jews. A quick look at the Histadrut institutions and economic activities reveals that Arabs are still locked out of these institutions. According to Lustick, "Of the thousands of Histadrut-owned firms and factories, not one was located in an Arab village in 1977....,³⁵ there were, in 1975, only 5 Arabs on the 168-member Histadrut Executive (Vaad Hapoal) and no

³³ Lewin-Epstein, N., and Semyonov, M., 1986, p. 350.

³⁴ Even this statement can be contested in light of the fact that the Histadrut still maintains a separate Arab Department.

³⁵ To my knowledge this statement remains accurate even today.

Arab members of the 18-member Central Committee of the Histadrut. Nor were there any Arabs among the over 600 managers and directors-general of Hivrat Ovdim industries."³⁶ This means not only that Arab input or influence on the decision making process in the Histadrut is almost nonexistent but more importantly, this suggests a continuation of limited upward mobility for Arabs.

Jewish Labor Protected

I have shown, so far, that while expropriation of Arab land resulted in an increase in the proportion of Arab labor, the system of military government in conjunction with Histadrut pressures limited the access of this labor to the general labor market. Furthermore, I have argued that the expansion of the economy accompanied by an increase in labor demand which could not be fulfilled by Jewish labor forced structural changes (the eventual abolition of the system of the military government) as well as changes in the dynamics employed by representative of labor, the Histadrut (from exclusion to caste-like).

The discussion so far seems to indicate that leaders of both the government and the Histadrut attempted, with great eagerness, to protect Jewish labor and its interests. This eagerness may have been motivated by nationalistic, i.e., Zionist and anti-Arab, feelings as well as determination on the part of those leaders to create and maintain a Jewish working class in accordance with the original Zionist ideology and aspirations.³⁷

³⁶ Lustick, 1980, pp. 96-7.

I propose, however, that part of the reason that Jewish labor needed such protective measures lies in the competitive potential of Arab labor. And one of the most important factors which made Arab labor attractive and increased their competitive potential against Jewish workers is wage differentials. It must be emphasized at this juncture, however, that while the initial differences in wages are partly rooted in the unequal development of the two sectors prior to the establishment of the state, mostly reflected in differences in living conditions, style of life and other matters (see Chapter 1), the continuation of wage differentials between Arabs and Jews are partially an artifact of restrictions, land confiscation, the Histadrut's practices and other policies which continue to reproduce these conditions.

The next two sections will document Arab-Jewish differentiation in terms of hierarchical location and wages. Although systematic data with regard to differences in wages do not seem to be available it is possible, nevertheless, with the help of sporadic data and background variables to shed some light on this aspect of Jewish-Arab relations. In general, differences in wages can be manifested in two ways: a) differential in sectoral and hierarchical positioning, or b) differences in wages for similar work within the same or similar sectors.

³⁷ The coincidence between the government views and those of the Histadrut may have been in part due to the fact that most leaders of the government fulfilled important posts in the Histadrut prior to the establishment of the state. And, until 1977, when the Labor Alignment lost the elections to the Likod, both the government and the Histadrut were controlled by Mapai. (see further details on biographies of some of the leaders in chapter....)

Sectoral and Hierarchical Positioning of the Arabs

While differences in wages and benefits on the basis of job differentiation and positioning are accepted norms in any stratification system, it is the concentration of a certain category of people (whether this category is based on race, religion or ethnicity) which raises questions. In the case of the Arabs in Israel, since the establishment of the state they have been primarily concentrated in those sectors of the economy which demand few skills and in which remuneration and work conditions are among the lowest. Table 6.5 below shows a rough distribution of the Arab labor force between 1954 and 1963 by sector.

TABLE 6.5
Non-Jewish Employed Men by Occupation: 1954-1963 (percent)

Year	Profess. & Administ. workers	Traders	Farmers	Transport workers	Manufac- turing & Construct.	Service Workers	Total
1954	6.0	6.5	53.7	2.3	27.2	4.3	100.0
1955	7.2	7.7	48.0	4.3	28.8	4.3	100.0
1956	7.1	7.3	50.7	3.7	26.5	4.7	100.0
1957	5.4	5.4	46.0	2.8	35.5	4.9	100.0
1958	5.4	7.0	40.7	4.1	37.5	5.3	100.0
1959	5.6	6.8	43.2	3.8	34.0	6.6	100.0
1960	6.0	6.6	45.5	4.4	31.3	6.2	100.0
1961	5.1	5.3	42.9	3.9	36.0	6.8	100.0
1962	5.2	5.8	44.0	5.1	34.6	5.3	100.0
1963	5.7	5.0	38.0	5.0	43.8	6.3	100.0

Source: Ben-Porath, Y., The Arab Labor Force in Israel, Jerusalem, Universities Press, 1966, Table 2.8, p. 29.

The most striking piece of information presented in Table 6.5 is the high concentration of Arabs in agriculture and construction. A more careful examination of the Table would reveal that the annual decline in the proportion of agricultural workers was absorbed almost entirely by the construction branch. The decline in agricultural workers was shown in chapter 4 to have been, partially, a result of Arab land confiscation policies. The difficulty in separating self-employed Arabs in agriculture from Arab wage laborers (on Arab and Jewish farms) makes it also difficult to assess the exact implications of land confiscation on the transformation of Arab labor. As noted earlier, however, during the late 1950's some of the Arab labor was channeled to agricultural labor in order to fill the vacancy created by occupational shifts of Jewish labor from agriculture to industry.

Part of this Arab labor which was channelled to agriculture may have also been employed in agriculture in the Arab sector, either as self-employed land owners or as wage laborers. Had it not been for this fact the rate of decline in Arab agricultural workers may have been even greater.

It is of sociological significance, therefore, to point out that while occupationally some of the Arabs engaged in agricultural work did not experience a shift, their status was, nevertheless, transformed from independent to dependent workers; from self-employed land-owners into hired agricultural workers. The figures in the Table do not reflect this reality. Those Arabs did not only experience a decline in their occupational status but by going to agriculture they also over-crowded

this sector which is partially responsible for the depressed wages it offers in comparison with other employment sectors.³⁸

TABLE 6.6
Non-Jewish Employed Persons as Percent of All Employed
persons, by Industry: 1961-1963

	Both Sexes		Men	
	1961	1963	1961	1963
Agriculture	22.1	22.0	23.3	23.2
Manufacturing	4.9	5.4	5.8	6.3
Construction	13.5	18.0	13.8	18.3
Other Industries	3.4	3.6	4.5	4.7
All Industries	7.9	8.1	9.2	9.7

Source: Ben-Porath, Y., The Arab Labor Force in Israel, Jerusalem, Universities Press, 1966, Table 2.3, p. 25.

Table 6.6 shows that in comparison with the Jewish population the Arab labor force have been over represented in agriculture and construction and under-represented in those job-categories which have high pay and good job conditions. While the Arabs accounted for about 11 percent of the total population during the specified period³⁹ they accounted for 22 percent of all agricultural labor. Similarly, in

³⁸ See Chapter 1 for an expanded discussion on the effect of crowdedness on the reproduction of split labor market.

³⁹ Friedlander, The Population..., TABLE 2.1, p. 30.

construction the Arabs accounted for about 18 percent in 1963.

Between 1950 and 1973 the proportion of Arab workers in the construction sector rose from 6 to 25.5 percent.⁴⁰ This proportion would have been even greater had it not been for Palestinian workers from the occupied West-Bank and Gaza who were also channeled, in part, into the construction industry. A survey of this industry, which was conducted in 1975 in Haifa, shows the proportion of the Israeli Arabs in construction to be 42.9 percent compared to 36.5 percent of the Jews and 20.5 percent of the Arabs from the West Bank.⁴¹

Although census data provide an indication of the occupational positioning of the Arabs it is very difficult to infer the sociological significance of the employer/employee status. In his 1969 study of Um el-Fahm, an Arab village of about 11,000 people at the time (in 1986 the village's population was reported to have reached 22,000 and its municipal status was upgraded to city), Garaisy reported that 92 percent of his sample of 116 villagers working in Jewish settlements occupied subordinate positions. Only 8 percent were in supervisory roles, and 95.8 percent of the respondents had Jewish supervisors while for 4.5 percent the supervisors were Arabs.⁴²

⁴⁰ Yachiel Harari, The Arabs in Israel: Facts and Figures, no. 4, Givat Haviva, Center for Arab and Afro-Asian Studies, 1974, p. 20. Cited in Zureik, The Palestinians in Israel, 1979, p. 124.

⁴¹ Y. Waschitz, "Commuters and Entrepreneurs", New Outlook, vol. 18, 1975, pp. 45-46.

⁴² S. Garaisy, "Arab Village Youth in Jewish Urban Centers: A Study of Youth from Um El-Fahm Working in Tel-Aviv Metropolitan Area", unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Brandeis University, 1971. Cited in Zureik, 1979, p. 125.

Hence, the concentration of Arabs in those sectors (see Table 6.6), despite the fact that they offer low wages and no mobility chances can only be a result of the closure of other possibilities. Lack of interest by the Histadrut in integrating Arab workers in other branches of the economy makes it particularly responsible for this state of affairs. It is possible that by not integrating the Arabs the Histadrut attempted to prevent over-crowdedness in those other branches of the economy thereby protecting the highly desirable occupations and positions for its Jewish constituency. As the following quote demonstrates, Arabs were not only pushed to menial jobs but even when they became organized within the Histadrut they continued to work for lower wages and were considered to work harder than their Jewish counterparts (more on this later). Writing in 1962, Zeev Schiff of Haaretz notes:

Even when he is an organized worker registered with the Histadrut, the Arab does not entertain great illusions, he comes primarily to work... Another reason for the Jewish employer's preference for Arab worker is that his wages are generally lower.⁴³

Arab-Jewish Wage Differentials

Throughout the post-state period Arab labor was said to have been willing to accept lower wages than Jewish labor, becoming, therefore, cheaper than Jewish labor to employ. One of the main reasons for the 'cheapness' of labor, according to Bonacich, is the lack of resources available to this labor. I have shown elsewhere (see chapter 4) that as a result of the 1948 war over half of the Arabs who remained in Israel

⁴³ Haaretz, October 19, 1962.

lost their land or a major portion of it. Furthermore, I have shown that through systematic expropriation of land many Arabs lost part or all of their property. Thus, whether intended or not, the establishment of the state coupled with certain governmental policies resulted in a loss of much of the resources over which Arabs had control.

The same argument could be made with respect to political resources. Although Arabs were never disenfranchised, their political activities were confined within the existing Zionist parties. They were never allowed to form their own political party or develop into a pressure group. The few attempts to organize politically and enter elections to the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) in the late 1950's and early 1960's were immediately suppressed and the leaders for the most part were banished, detained or put under house arrest.⁴⁴

With little economic and political resources, and a lack of union protection, the Arabs proved to be an easy target for exploitation. One of the hardest to prove and most disguised form of exploitation, however, is the existence of wage differentials between Jews and Arabs doing the same or comparable work. However, the best available data suggest that between 1949 and 1952 Arab wages were roughly 35 to 70 percent of the Jewish wages for similar work. The smallest gap was between Jewish and Arab skilled workers.⁴⁵ However, one should bear in

⁴⁴ For a detailed account of these attempts, most notably the Al-Ard (the Land) movement and the treatment its leaders received by the Israeli authorities as well as the press such as continuous harrassment, banishment, and house confinement, see Lustick, 1980; Jiryis, 1976; Landau, 1968.

⁴⁵ Ben-Porath, 1966, p. 70.

mind that the latter category (skilled labor) encompasses a very small proportion of the Arab labor force. As late as 1960 it was estimated that Arabs working in agriculture earned half as much as Jews working in similar jobs.⁴⁶ It is important to note that during that period almost half of the Arab labor force was employed in agriculture (see Table 6.5). And the ratio of Arab to Jewish workers working in "Jewish agriculture" was estimated in 1975 by a study for the Ministry of Agriculture to be 6:10.⁴⁷ That is to say, almost 38 percent of the total labor engaged in agricultural work were Arabs. This is far greater than the 13 percent which represent the proportion of the Arabs in the population.

Few studies have attempted to compare the average incomes of working Arabs and Jews. While family income cannot be taken as a direct measure of wages it, nevertheless, sheds light on some of its aspects. Ian Lustick shows that in 1975/1976 the average per capita income among Arabs living in urban areas was 572 IL (Israeli Lira), while per capita Jewish income in these same areas was 1,687 IL,⁴⁸ almost three-times that of the Arabs. Keep in mind that the great majority of the Arabs live in what are classified as rural areas (see Table 2.3) and have incomes that are, in general, much lower than urban employees. With regard to this fact, Lustick comments that "Judging from a comparison of

⁴⁶ S. Zarhi and A. Achiezra, The Economic Conditions of the Arab Minority in Israel, no. 1, Givat Haviva, Center for Arab and Afro-Asian Studies, 1966, p. 12.

⁴⁷ Waschitz, 1975, p. 48.

⁴⁸ Ian Lustick, 1980, p. 7.

living conditions in these villages with those prevailing in the towns, there is every reason to think that had the large villages been included in the survey, the gap between Jewish and Arab incomes would be shown to be considerably wider."⁴⁹

A survey sponsored by the Histadrut in thirty Arab villages revealed the average income per Arab family in 1969 to have been 3,910 IL,⁵⁰ This is compared to an average income of Jewish families of 10,500 IL for the same year.⁵¹ In 1971 yet another study of income inequality showed the average income of Jewish families to have been 12,900 IL compared to 8,600 IL average income of Arab families.⁵² While one can only speculate on the discrepancies between the different estimates, the fact remains that they all report large gaps in the average incomes between Jewish and Arab families.⁵³

⁴⁹ Ibid., fn. 27, p. 276.

⁵⁰ Gutman E., Klaf H., and Levi S., The Histadrut and its Activities in the Arab Sector: Research on the Status, Opinions and Behavior of Arab Villagers in Israel. Jerusalem, Israel Institute for Applied Social Research, 1971, (Hebrew), p. 20. Cited in Lustick, 1980, p. 7.

⁵¹ Lustick, 1980, Table 1, p. 7; Zureik, 1979, Table 5.9, p. 126.

⁵² Remba Oded, "Income Inequality in Israel: Ethnic Aspects," in Michael Curtis and Mordechai Chertoff (eds.), Israel: Social Structure and Change, New Brunswick, N. J. Transaction Books, 1973, p. 207.

⁵³ Since the different estimates do not relate to the same years the discrepancies between them may be partly due to inflation which, in Israel affects the level of wages in absolute as well as in relative terms. An agreement which was signed and has been in effect since 1952 with periodic revisions between the government, the Industrialists Union and the Histadrut stipulates that part of their wages employees should receive cost-of-living allowance which is sensitive to inflation. For more details on the way these calculations are made and their effect on the level of inflation, see Pack, 1971, pp. 201-205.

Two conclusions can be drawn from what has been said. First, the relative occupational distribution of Jews and Arabs since the establishment of the state has been unfavorable to the Arabs. Data on employment show that as late as 1975, 19.2 percent of the Arabs compared with 51.1 percent of the Jews held white-collar (scientific, professional, managerial, clerical and business) jobs.⁵⁴ The grouping together of these occupational categories, however, gives a false impression concerning the extent of Arab involvement in these top jobs since most Arab white-collar workers are employed by the Ministry of Education as school teachers in the Arab sector.

In a survey taken in 1963 of high school graduates, for example, it was reported that of the 457 respondents 98 were unemployed. Of those who were employed, 39.6 percent worked as school teachers, 21.2 percent as clerks, 8.0 percent as laborers and 31.2 percent were continuing their education in Israel and abroad.⁵⁵ That is to say, of those employed in white collar occupations 65 percent were school teachers. Furthermore, in another study which was sponsored by the government, it was reported that 47.3 percent of those Arab university graduates who received their degrees between 1961 and 1971 and were employed in white collar occupations worked as teachers.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ For these comparisons and others, see also S. Smooha, Israel: Pluralism and Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, pp. 138-41.

⁵⁵ Attalah Mansour, "Arab Intellectuals Not Integrated," New Outlook, 7, no. 3, June 1964, p. 28.

⁵⁶ Eli Rechess, A Survey of Israeli-Arab Graduates from Institutions of Higher Learning in Isreal, (1961-1971), Cited in Lustick, 1980, p. 21.

Other categories of employment show that for the same year (1975), the nonskilled workers among the Arabs amounted to 13.0 percent compared with 5.2 percent among the Jews; 40.3 percent of the Arab employees were concentrated in the low-status blue-collar branches of agriculture and construction compared with only 11.8 percent of Jews.

The second conclusion to be drawn is that while admission of Arabs to the labor union has contributed somewhat to a rise in their wages, no equalization effect either occupationally or in terms of hierarchical positioning, which reflect wages and incomes, were allowed to take place. Arabs are still paid less than Jews for doing the same work. Similarly, while differences in per capita incomes between Arab and Jewish families have narrowed they are still wide. It is reported that in 1973 the per capita income of an average Arab family reached 56 percent of an average income of a Jewish family. This is compared to 35 percent reported in 1956-7.⁵⁷ These figures are consistent with the figures reported by Zarhi and Acheizra which show that in 1963 the average income of an Arab earner is 45 percent of that of a Jewish earner.⁵⁸

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it is expected that Arab family incomes will continue to increase but only up to a point. Since incomes reflect both wages and occupational and hierarchical locations, and since Arabs are not expected to reach or even come close to reaching parity with respect to either their occupational distribution or

⁵⁷ Smooha, 1978, p. 140.

⁵⁸ S. Zarhi and A. Acheizra, 1966, p.12.

hierarchical positioning, it follows that parity in incomes with the Jewish families should not be expected.

Summary

On the basis of the foregoing it is possible to highlight several observations. First, the Histadrut has been antagonistic toward Arab labor and its policies have affected their wages and occupational and hierarchical locations. During the first eleven years of statehood (1948-59) Arab labor was kept out of the Histadrut which practiced a policy of total exclusion of Arab labor. This lack of union protection increased the vulnerability of Arab labor to exploitation.

Second, even the opening up of the Histadrut to Arab membership seems to have been in line with its original ideology of serving Jewish labor. This step was taken by the Histadrut following a relaxation on travel restriction (itself a function of the pressure of expanding economy and increased demand for labor) which resulted in an increase in Arab labor's participation in the labor market. The latter placed Arabs in a more threatening position to Jewish labor because of their wage differentials.

Clearly, then, equalization of wages and benefits for similar work was in the long-term interest of expensive, i.,e., Jewish labor, because it minimizes competition and undercutting allowing expensive labor to preserve whatever gains they had achieved. The extension of union protection to Arab labor has produced such equalization between Arab and Jewish labor to a great extent. The immediate results for the Arabs

have been a considerable improvement in their wages, incomes and status. Had Arab labor not been extended union protection, equalization of wages would still have happened as a result of freer entry of Arabs to the labor market and the resulting effect of crowdedness. However, such equalization would have occurred under most unfavorable conditions to Jewish labor, who would have been dragged down trying to compete with cheaper labor.

The Histadrut opened itself to Arab membership only after the passage of the Employment Service Law (1959) which set forth the mechanisms of protectionism and preservation for Jewish labor. The law not only provided a basis of justification for limiting the accessibility to certain occupations and positions to Jews (by virtue of their security standings) but the freer entry of Arabs under these conditions has had the effect of upward displacement of Jewish labor. The lack of objections by the Histadrut to this differential treatment of its members coupled with the fact that the Histadrut itself still maintains a separate department for Arab labor leads me to conclude that the admission of Arabs to the Histadrut was merely a strategy designed to protect Jewish labor and not to integrate the Arabs. To use a different terminology, the status of the Arabs was transformed from exclusion to caste-like. This is to say that by extending union protection to Arab labor the Histadrut was not compromising the interests of its Jewish constituency. Far from it. The data presented show that the Arabs take jobs which, for the most part, are least desired by Jews. The more prestigious jobs are reserved, through protectionist policies, to Jewish

labor. Furthermore, while both Arabs and Jews were shown to have improved their occupational status and incomes, the rate of improvement among Jews has been far greater. Hence, while the gap in incomes between the two groups was very wide prior to the admission of Arabs to the Histadrut, the data presented in this chapter show that toward the 1980's this gap grew even wider. From this perspective, it could be argued that the Histadrut is still continuing in its long-standing tradition of protecting Jewish labor, and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future.

As to the business sector, while its access to Arab labor was limited during the initial period, employers benefited from the lack of union protection for the Arabs. Hence, whereas the business sector was active against the travel restrictions there was no such activity on behalf of status equalization of Arabs with Jewish labor. Needless to say that following the 1967 war and the occupation of the West-Bank and Gaza, business gained access to the biggest pool of non-unionized, disoriented and cheap labor yet. And, it is there where business has been successful in resisting Histadrut's attempts to get employers to pay higher wages and better benefits for the noncitizen Arab labor which would, inevitably, limit their competitive potential against the Histadrut's Jewish and citizen Arab constituency.

Finally, it is of interest to note that as an employer the Histadrut should have been equally interested in cheap labor. After all, the Histadrut owns and manages many economic firms and projects. By the mid 1960's the Histadrut had become one of the largest employers in the

country, second only to the government. It is reported that by 1968 the Histadrut owned, either fully or in part, 54 of the 205 top companies in Israel.⁵⁹ However, for the Histadrut to have preferred short economic gains, by allowing free entry of Arabs to a tight labor market, over long term interests would have been irrational politically and ideologically. First, the Histadrut was a 'national institution' and was competing for constituency among the Jewish population. Second, it was ideologically committed to the Zionist ideas and for a long time advocated the idea of 'Jewish labor'. Deviation from such ideas overnight would not have been either feasible or politically clever. The third and most important factor perhaps, was the fact that the Histadrut was controlled by Mapai (the ruling party at the time) and so was the government. Leaders of the government and the Histadrut were related (either ideologically or personally)⁶⁰ which made the Histadrut more susceptible to influence by the leaders of Mapai and, perhaps, vice versa. Advocating policies which negatively effect Jewish labor, therefore, would have been contrary to party interests.

⁵⁹ See details in Uri Davis, Israel ... 1977, pp. 100-103.

⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 103.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this study an attempt was made to describe and analyse factors which hindered the full integration of the Arab minority in Israel into the economic, political and social life of the state. Since the establishment of the state the Arabs have been 'welcomed' to a subordinate minority status where they still remain after almost four decades of statehood.

There is no doubt that the Palestinian-Jewish conflict which began long before Israel was established has played a major role in the treatment of the Arabs. The continued emphasis on the sectarian character of the state as a Jewish state through the adoption of Jewish symbols, history and laws which serve the interests of the Jewish people, provided the basis for the Arab-Jewish division within the state. By virtue of definition, such emphasis regards the Arabs as outsiders and justifies their treatment as nonequals.

However, despite the continuation and even the intensification of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, certain liberalization of policies toward the Arabs have ensued. These can hardly be attributed to any effective struggle by the Arabs or to the goodwill of the Israeli authorities. The Arabs were never allowed to organize in an independent political

party nor could they have developed into an effective pressure group within the Israeli political system. The Arab minority which remained in Israel was basically rural and leaderless, a fact which was further exacerbated by intra-Arab cleavages along religious, parochial and geographic lines. These divisions, which had been maintained during the Ottoman rule and the British mandate, and reinforced by the Israelis, delayed the development of national spokesmen for the Arabs.

On the other hand, it would be naive to argue that changes in policies come as a result of the goodwill of governments. Governments, and particularly elected governments, tend to be sensitive to the interests and pressures of their constituency. The Israeli government is no exception. By virtue of numerical superiority of Jews over the Arabs (87:13) and a sense of shared goals and interests, the Jews rather than the Arabs, are the ones considered the real constituency. Hence, policies toward the Arabs seem to be attuned to the service of the Jewish, rather than the Arab, population.

Needless to say, the interests of the Jewish community do not always converge and even come in conflict at times. For example, the interests of the religious versus the non-religious, labor versus capital, Orientals versus Ashkenazim, and so on. Throughout this study I have maintained that the status of the Arab minority in Israel has been sensitive to intra-Jewish conflicts, itself a function of Jewish inter-ethnic differentiation between, mainly, Ashkenazim and Orientals. I have shown that as a consequence of this Jewish inter-ethnic differentiation differential attitudes toward the Arabs have been

institutionalized in the Jewish population. The correspondence between the attitudes of the two Jewish ethnic groups toward the Arabs and their respective conflicting benefits lend substantial support to this argument.

I have argued that Orientals, by virtue of their differentiated position relative to Ashkenazim benefit the most from a rigid Arab-Jewish division. Subsequently, I have shown that not only do Orientals express more hostile attitudes toward the Arabs than do Ashkenazim, but they also support policies which have the effect of keeping the Arabs in a subordinate position. On the other hand, it was argued that while Ashkenazim, in general, benefit from an Arab-Jewish division their benefits are greatest when such a division is less rigid and therefore may support or object to those policies in accordance with their perceived interests. As an example, it was shown that while hardly any objection was raised over the expropriation of Arab land, the policies of restriction on the movement of Arabs drew harsh criticisms, and objections to such policies seem to have intensified in conjunction with economic expansion and decline in immigration rates. Similarly, Jewish voices were kept silent over the objection of the Histadrut to extend union protection to Arab labor which made them more vulnerable to exploitation.

This selective advocacy of liberal approaches to the Arabs by certain segments of the Jewish population is a reflection of the interests of those segments. It was shown that whereas land expropriation resulted in the generation of Arab labor which had the potential of serving the

interests of the business community, the policy of travel restriction limited the access of this community to the cheap labor. Hence, self-interest seems to be the motive which dictated the response of the business community toward those issues.

On the other hand, labor was shown to be antagonistic to Arabs. Exclusion was advocated and practiced whenever it was politically and economically feasible. However, when exclusion could not be practiced it was replaced with a caste-like treatment. During the first eleven years of statehood (1948-59) the Histadrut, representing labor, refused membership to Arab labor and fought against their employment. But even when it admitted Arabs to its ranks the Histadrut sought to enhance the interests of its Jewish constituency rather than integrate the Arabs on an equal basis. Consequently, while the Arabs gained considerably in terms of wages, incomes and occupational status, the limitations on their upward mobility and occupational undertakings still persist and are the basis for continuously widening gap between Arabs and Jews. The fact that these limitations have been institutionalized and legitimized by the Employment Service Law (1959) suggests that any improvement in the occupational status of the Arabs will always lag behind that of Jews.

If the attitudes of Orientals toward the Arabs are not a derivative of these dynamics, they nevertheless have been institutionalized through the labor market. It must be recalled that while Ashkenazim occupy the managerial and upper positions, the Orientals in general man the middle and lower rungs of the occupational hierarchy. Since these

are the only positions open to Arabs a competitive and confrontational relationships develop between them and Orientals. It was also shown that as a result of more integrational policies toward the Arabs, the middle-class Orientals stand to lose certain employment opportunities and that the Oriental community may have to share development funds with the Arabs. Hence, both lower and middle-class Orientals are more likely to adopt antagonistic attitudes toward any notion of liberalization toward the Arabs.

Implications and Future Developments

The split labor market perspective predicts that in the absence of conditions which reproduce a split in the labor market certain equalization will occur. Among the most effective of the factors which continuously help reproduce a split in the labor market is the presence of a strong ideology. However, it has not been made clear by this perspective under what conditions, short of a complete disappearance of ideology, equalization can be achieved.

As noted, throughout the statehood period ideology has been used to rationalize the maintenance of the Arab-Jewish division and the limited progress toward full integration of the Arabs into the life of the state. Without the use of ideology it would have been very difficult nationally and internationally, for example, to forcefully transfer over two-thirds of the land from Arab to Jewish hands, restrict the movement and limit the civil and political freedom and organization of the Arabs, and maintain the Arabs outside the labor market or in its lower rungs.

The ideology used by Jews to justify domination over the Arabs stresses the their 'inherent' right over the land of Palestine, emphasizing the fact that Israel was established for the purpose of 'redeeming' the land and the Jewish people. Accordingly, the rights of Jews are superior to others. This ideology has not only not weakened but in fact has been recently gaining strength. It is in this fact that the grimmness of the findings of this study for the future of the Arab minority lies. Ideology in Israel has been institutionalized through such things as the national anthem, the Star of David, the Law of Return, and the continued operation of Jewish, but not Israeli agencies, such as the JNF and the Jewish Agency. Such institutionalization has made ineffective the efforts of some Jewish groups --such as Shelli, the Civil Rights Movement and Mapam-- who oppose the treatment of Arabs as second class citizens. The continuation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict which provided the basis for ideological rationalization and whose outcome is very difficult to predict makes any conclusions regarding the future of the Arab minority in Israel at best tentative.

On the other hand, since its establishment Israel has experienced a very high economic growth rate due, in no small measure, to contributions from the World Jewish community, reparation from West Germany and much financial and military support from other Western countries. This expansion, irrespective of its sources and causes, has also benefited the Arab minority in an indirect way through a continuous rise in demand for labor which precipitated a liberalization of policies toward the Arabs. Under more stringent conditions the Arabs would not have experienced such liberalization.

Hence, it should not be surprising to find that in times of slow economic growth and high unemployment, such as the one experienced since 1983, hostility against the Arabs in general and Arab labor in particular reappear. Here, again, ideology is invoked and latent feelings of hostility are aroused. Arabs are blamed for high unemployment among Jews. As Meier Kahane (a member of Knesset since 1984 and the head of a right wing party, Kach), addressing a gathering of Oriental Jews explains: "the greedy Jewish employer can hire two Arabs for the wages of one Jew."¹ The way to deal with this Jewish greed is to throw the Arabs out. As Kahane explains to his audience, "there is one solution. It is not partial solution. ARABS OUT (emphasis in original)....That's the solution.... Don't ask me how...Let me be a minister of defense for two months and not a single cockroach will be left here. I promise you a clean Eretz Israel".²

The significance of Kahane's ideas and statements is not that they demonstrate Kahane's racism, which has been established since the days when he headed the JDL (Jewish Defense League) in the United States. The significance of such statements lies, rather, in the growing support for such ideas among the Israeli public. While during the 1970's Kahane was considered marginal in Israeli society, in 1984 he won a seat in the Parliament, and as noted (see Chapter 2) in 1985 over 40 percent of young Israelis are reported to be sympathetic to Kahane and his ideas. A few public opinion polls report that in coming elections Kahane is

¹ New Outlook, July, 1985, p. 13.

² Ibid., p. 13.

expected to increase his parliamentary power substantially, and that his support among Orientals is gaining in strength.³

If the increase in support for Kahane and/or his ideas are indeed related to the economic conditions, then a further deterioration in the economic situation will have grave consequences for the Arabs. It is conceivable that as a result of high unemployment due either to a continued stagnation of the economy or a resumption of Jewish mass immigration (for example from Russia) or both, the process of incorporating the Arabs will not only be halted but even reversed, especially, if the ideology to support such a development continues to be operative. The fact that both conditions, i.e., continued economic weakness and mass immigration, are likely to happen (considering the world economic problems and the recent developments in the Israeli-Russian relations) leads me to conclude that the final chapter on the Arab minority in Israel has yet to be written.

³ Ibid., pp. 11-14.

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The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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