

Apologia in Xenophon's *Anabasis*

Submitted by Shane Geoffrey Brennan, to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Research in Classics, January 2011.

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Signed:

Shane Brennan

Abstract

Xenophon of Athens probably did not write his *Anabasis* until thirty years or more after the events which it describes. This remarkable gap, taken together with the absence of a prologue, the presence of a number of prominent themes and authorial concerns, and the complex literary construction of the work, has made the task of explaining it problematic. Situating the text in the context of Xenophon's later life and wide-ranging literary output, in this dissertation I argue that *apologia* is the defining element in the work. Through his elaborate narrative structure and representation of his own character, Xenophon is defending himself, his social class, and his teacher, Socrates. In Books 5 and 7 (of 7) he is occupied with a rigorous defence of his conduct on the retreat, answering charges of deceiving the soldiers, hubris, corruption, and mercenary service, while in Books 3 through to 7, he is defending the memory of Socrates. For from the point of his introduction into the text at the opening of Book 3, following the decapitation of the Greek High Command at the Greater Zab River, Xenophon the character is acting as a pupil of Socrates would have done had he found himself in similarly dire circumstances. His actions, counsel, and moral bearing during the course of the retreat are a testimony to the value of his teacher's training, and powerfully undermine the charges of impiety and corrupting the youth levelled against Socrates in 399. At the same time, the outstanding leadership performance on the retreat of Xenophon's character reflects on himself as the historical figure behind the exemplar. By highlighting its different forms and bringing out its pervasiveness, the dissertation demonstrates that *apologia* is the major factor in the formation of the text.

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Notes

Referencing

The author-date system has been used for referencing. Works cited have been arranged largely in accordance with the *Chicago Manual of Style* (14th edn.).

Texts and translations

Thesaurus Linguae Graecae texts have been used throughout: for Xenophon, these are all based on Marchant's *Oxford Classical Texts* 1900-1921. In cases where a textual dispute or uncertainty impinges on an argument alternative readings are taken into account.

Passages cited are in translation, with the original supplied alongside the English in the main body or in the footnotes in all instances where a key argument is being made; any apparent arbitrariness in the application of this method is down to oversight on my part. Key words and terms are in the original, usually with an accompanying translation.

Translated passages from Xenophon's *Anabasis* are from W. Ambler's *Agora* 2008 edition. Where I have chosen to supply a modified translation this is indicated. The translations used for other ancient authors are cited in the *Translations of Ancient Works* section of the bibliography. Any modifications to these are noted in the text.

Spelling

Greek words have been transliterated, except where their Latinised or anglicised forms have a marked currency. All peculiarities and inconsistencies are my responsibility.

Possessives with Greek names of more than one syllable are marked by an apostrophe alone when they end with 's': e.g. Socrates' teaching, Pericles' speech. Cyrus takes possessive 's'.

Dates

All dates are 'B.C.' unless otherwise stated.

Abbreviations

Xenophon's works are abbreviated as below (Latin abbreviations in square brackets). References to *Anabasis* in the dissertation are given by book, chapter, and paragraph, and are preceded by *An.* only in cases where ambiguity may arise. Ancient authors and their works, where abbreviated, are done so according to standard conventions; for a listing of these see the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (revised 3rd edition, 2003). For journal title abbreviations see *L'Annee Philologique*. Note further:

CAH *Cambridge Ancient History*. 2nd edn. 1961-. (1st edn. 1923-1939).

DK H. Diels and W. Kranz. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. 6th edn. 1952.

FGrH F. Jacoby. *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*. 1923-.

IG *Inscriptiones Graecae*. 1873-.

LGPN *A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names*. 1987-.

LSJ H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. Stuart Jones. *A Greek-English Lexicon*. 9th edn. with revised supplement 1996.

XENOPHON'S WORKS:

Ages. Agesilaos [Ag.]

An. Anabasis Kyrrou [An.]

Apol. Apologia Sokratous [Ap.]

**Ath.* Athenaion Politeia [Ath. Pol.]

Hell. Hellenika [Hell.]

Hipp. Hipparkhikos [Eq. mag.]

Hie. Hiero [Hier.]

Kyn. Kynegetikos [Cyn.]

Kyro. Kyroupaideia [Cyr.]

Lak. Lakedaimonion Politeia [Lac.]

Mem. Apomenmonegmaton (Memorabilia) [Mem.]

Oik. Oikonomikos [Oec.]

P.H. Peri Hippikes [Eq.]

Por. Poroi [Vect.]

Symp. Symposion [Symp.]

* Pseudo-Xenophon. This work was included in Xenophon's output in antiquity but is not thought to be his.

A classic is a book that never finishes saying what it has to say.
Italo Calvino

Introduction

Xenophon's *Anabasis* is the major surviving account of a journey by a classical Greek. Beginning at Sardis, where Cyrus the Younger began assembling his forces for an attempt on the Persian throne, it chronicles the march of the expedition to Babylonia, and thence the retreat of the Greek mercenary force down country to the Black Sea, along the coast to Byzantium, around Thrace, and finally back to the coast of Asia Minor. The story recalls the dangers and obstacles the Greeks had to overcome on their long circumambulation, and provides a firsthand report of places and peoples in the western Persian Empire. In this latter regard it is a unique repository of ethnographic detail, an important source of information on the Achaemenid administration, and one of the earliest surviving records of the physical landscapes, climates, and natural environments of the regions reported on. For example, the author names and provides the width of rivers; he describes in detail the date harvest in Mesopotamia, and names animals, such as ostriches and antelopes, which are no longer present in the area. On the Black Sea he describes phenomena such as 'mad honey', and whistled speech, a practice still alive today in the appropriately named settlement of Kuşköy, 'bird village'.

Yet for all the valuable information which he provides, it is evident from attentive reading of the text that the author had additional concerns to travel description and war reportage. There is manifest interest in military leadership, Socrates and the ethical life, Sparta and its suitability to govern empire, and a strong concern with *apologia*: self-defence and defence of Socrates, especially. Significantly, we glean from internal evidence — a flash-forward in Book 5 — that *Anabasis* was probably not completed until 30 years or more after the event; that is, no earlier than the 370s. This raises the question why Xenophon decided to write his account then,

after such a gap. Clearly, he had specific motivations, even what we might term a writing agenda. The fact that major themes and concerns in *Anabasis* recur prominently in other of his writings indicates that the corpus is likely to be the product of a single, if evolving, literary project. The principal goal of this dissertation is to come to a more informed understanding of Xenophon's writing aims, and in particular his reasons for sitting down to write a book based on the expedition of Cyrus the Younger and his own experiences in the years 401-399.¹

The enduring problem of characterising *Anabasis*, and of trying to fit it into a generic category, stems in part from its author's artful integration of thematic strands into the travelogue, in part from the absence of a prologue to the work or any indication of purpose, and in part from the complex literary construction of the narrative. In this latter regard, Xenophon has two distinct presences in *Anabasis*: as the author and historical participant in the march, and as a character in the story; however, he furthermore disguises his own voice by engaging a pseudonymous author, who is not mentioned in the text but is referred to elsewhere as one Themistogenes of Syracuse (Xenophon, *Hellenika* 3.1.2).²

The difficulty in describing the work is apparent from the number of different descriptions which have been applied to it by scholars in modern times. These include: a response to other accounts of the expedition; a work of personal apologetics; a polemic against other generals on the retreat; a didactic work on leadership and military practice; an eyewitness campaign narrative; guidebook; travelogue; traveller's memoir; literary travel; reflective autobiographical travelogue; panhellenism, and a historical work built around the characters of individuals; non-

¹ Erbse (2010: 477, 501 - translation of 1966 paper), in his important analysis of the text, emphasised the paramount need to address Xenophon's writing motivation. More recently John Dillery (2009: 406), criticising the scope of a new monograph on *Anabasis*, has written: 'Should not one of our duties as readers and interpreters of an ancient text be to determine what the author of the text in question hoped to achieve by writing it? To be sure, we may want to stress other avenues of approach, other outcomes of our research, but not to situate the work in the world, and specifically the thought, of the author, seems to me to be a mistake'.

² Bradley (2001: 60) extends this arrangement to have three Xenophons, so speaking of 'the author Xenophon, the extradiegetic historical actor Xenophon, the character called Xenophon in the text, and the anonymous narrator created to mediate this relationship'.

standard work of history; military handbook; military memoir; military theory; autobiography; novelesque autobiography; political philosophy; philosophical self-discovery; study of social organisation and action; and story of trust and deceit.³ Notably the ancient reception of the text was less complex, with writers generally taking it as a narrative of the events on the march (see Arrian, *Periplus* passim; Aelian, *De Natura Animalium* 6.25; Diodoros 14.19-31, 37; Diogenes Laertios 2.50; and Strabo 8.7.5). On the other hand, those coming to the book from a more literary perspective showed awareness of still waters: Lucian berates Xenophon for omitting a preface (*De historia conscribenda* 39), while Plutarch, owing to the fact that Xenophon attributes the work to another, saw a personal agenda behind the text (*De gloria Atheniensium* 345e).⁴

The argument of this dissertation is that the pre-eminent concern in *Anabasis* is *apologia*. In a variety of different ways, through the course of the text, Xenophon is defending himself and his teacher, Socrates, and to a less comprehensive degree,

³ A response to other accounts of the expedition, Tarn 1927, Breitenbach 1967, Cawkwell 1972 (restated 2004); work of personal apologetics, Erbse 2010, Anderson 1974, Azoulay 2004, Gray 2008; polemic against other generals, Calvino 1999; didactic work on leadership and military practice, Tuplin 1991; eyewitness campaign narrative, Gwynn 1929, Waterfield 2006; guidebook, Bell 1924; travelogue, Adams 2007; traveller's memoir, Roy 2007; literary travel, Higgins 1977; reflective autobiographical travelogue, Cartledge 2002: 59; a historical work built around the characters of individuals, and with a panhellenic orientation, Dillery 1995; irregular work of history, Lendle 1995; military handbook, Boucher 1913; military memoir (at least in formal terms this designation is problematic as Xenophon attributes authorship to another), Westlake 1987, Gera 1993, Pomeroy 1994, Luce 1997, LaForse 2005, Lee 2007, Macleod 2008; military theory, Spaulding 1937; strongly autobiographical, Momigliano 1990, Humble 1997, Thomas 2009; novelesque autobiography, Bradley 2001 (or more specifically, a shift from history to this form, which he defines as 'a prose narrative that exhibits narrative structures and characteristics typical of the novel in presenting the author as a fictively wrought character at the centre of recent historical events'); political philosophy, Ambler 2008, Buzzetti 2008; a story of philosophical self-discovery interwoven with a military adventure, Howland 2000; study of social organisation and action, Nussbaum 1967; story of trust and deceit, Hirsch 1985. Rood (2006: 48) writes that 'historiography is the genre with which the experimental *Anabasis* has the greatest affinity'; see Marincola 1997 on the development of historiographical genres and the difficulty of fitting *Anabasis* into a category. Cartledge (1987: 67) holds that Xenophon was not 'a historian in the proper sense'. With the exception of *Kyroupaideia*, the genre assignment of Xenophon's other works present fewer challenges to modern scholars (see Gera 1993: 1-13 for a discussion of the problems of describing *Kyroupaideia*). The number of explanations for *Anabasis* makes an evaluation of each here impractical, though many of them are engaged with in the course of the dissertation.

⁴ For analyses of Xenophon's writings in the Second Sophistic see Rutherford 1998.

the *hippeis*, the elite cavalry institution at Athens to which he had been affiliated. While the presence of *apologia* in the work has long been widely recognised by modern scholars, the extent to which it informs the structure of the narrative and determines its content has not been fully appreciated. In the first edition of the *CAH*, W. Tarn articulated the prevailing, and still current, view thus: 'Sophainetos wrote the first story of the expedition, and Xenophon probably wrote his own account, the *Anabasis*, largely because he thought Sophainetos had overlooked his merits'.⁵ This hypothesis, however, covers only one apologetic element, and, moreover, the dissertation demonstrates that it is based on a tenuous premise: the evidence for an *Anabasis* by Sophainetos is slight, and later published versions of the expedition are traceable to Xenophon's. The departure point of this study is that Xenophon's motivations for writing are better sought for in the evidence of the text itself. A close reading of *Anabasis* exposes a number of lengthy speeches by the author answering specific charges — of deceiving the soldiers, hubris, and corruption — and reveals evidence of a concerted attempt to address matters related to his involvement in the expedition: service as a mercenary, service with Cyrus the Younger, and intimate association with Sparta. These issues, as we learn from Xenophon himself late in the text, are set against the background of his exile from Athens, and it is argued that it is this very public stain on his character which is the prime driver of his personal *apologia*.

Analysis of the text reveals furthermore that as a part of his own defence Xenophon defends an aristocratic institution, the *hippeis*, whose reputation had declined severely following its role in the brief reign of the Thirty at Athens in 404/403. Xenophon himself was a *hippeus* and, judging from the apologetic character of his account of the Thirty in *Hellenika*, is likely to have had some active involvement in their rule. Poignantly, as he led the Cyreans into the Spartan campaign in Asia in 399, Xenophon would have met up with the force of 300 horsemen sent out to Thibron by the democracy that year. In *Hellenika* he writes: 'The Athenians sent those who had served in the cavalry under the Thirty, for they

⁵ Tarn 1927: 5. In recent time the flag for the Sophainetos hypothesis has been held most staunchly by George Cawkwell (1972, 2004).

thought that it would be advantageous to the people (τῷ δήμῳ) if these men went abroad and died there' (3.1.4).

One of the key research outcomes of this study is the presentation of evidence for *Anabasis* as a defence of Socrates. By representing his own character in the story as a model pupil of Socrates, Xenophon defends the Athenian philosopher against the charges brought against him in 399 and at the same time highlights the worth of his education to the city. The case for *Anabasis* being a Socratic work receives support from the fact that several of Xenophon's other books are devoted to defending the memory of his teacher, and others still, such as *Kyroupaideia*, have been shown to bear distinctive imprints of the philosopher's influence.

The *apologia* thesis does not negate the importance of other themes and concerns in the work, although it is argued that a number of these, in one way or another, serve the underlying apologetic agenda. For example the problem of leading in a military context is unquestionably a major preoccupation in the work: in the dissertation it is maintained that three leadership styles are presented in succession, with the most effective being that which Xenophon himself practises. Although his outward intentions in this arrangement are to offer guidance on the comparative efficacy of different leadership approaches on the one hand, and to defend Socrates by highlighting the value of his training on the other, the outstanding performance of the model student of the philosopher also reflects on the historical figure behind the exemplar.

The dissertation is structured around four chapters. The first, with the aim of establishing a context for his later literary career, focuses on Xenophon's personal background and the circumstances of his early adult life. His tendency towards *apologia* is flagged by an analysis of his account of the reign of the Thirty at Athens in *Hellenika*. Xenophon is likely to have been active on the non-democratic side and it is argued that he uses his history to exonerate his youthful self from serious wrongdoing. An incidence of intertextuality between the historical work and *Anabasis* is remarked upon, with the latter, set after the restoration of the

democracy, at pains to emphasise both Xenophon's immaturity (3.1.6) and his youthfulness (3.1.25). In similar apologetic vein, in his treatment of the Thirty in *Hellenika*, Xenophon takes the opportunity to call attention to the courage of Socrates in the face of pressures from the tyrants. The chapter concludes with an examination of evidence for the dating of *Anabasis*. The aim of this section is to mark a window of time for authorship, so enabling the text to be situated in a personal and historical context.

Addressing the question of Xenophon's writing motivations, the second chapter builds up a picture of his agenda in *Anabasis*. Part 1 highlights the agenda's didactic leaning by looking at the extensive use of exemplars, a key feature in the literary construction of *Anabasis* and of other of his works. Part 2 focuses on one of the author's major interests — the problem of how to lead a military force. It is demonstrated that in addition to a range of instructional episodes, Xenophon presents three different leadership styles, and leads his reader to conclude that the one which he represents is the optimal. It is shown that Xenophon is particularly interested, and insightful, in the matter of managing mercenaries, a subject topical through much of the fourth century. The examination of his treatment of leadership brings out the strong didactic flavour in the work and at the same time demonstrates that it serves the author's encompassing apologetic aims.

The third chapter turns to look in detail at Xenophon's defence of himself. Having in Part 1 re-evaluated the traditional apologetic hypothesis — that Xenophon wrote his account in response to another, Part 2 traces accusations made against him in the text and his responses to these. In Part 3 it is shown how Xenophon distances himself from both Cyrus the Younger and the Spartan state, and the argument is made that his purpose in so doing is to demonstrate that there is no basis for questioning his *polis* loyalty on these grounds. In the same part his defence of the *hippeis*, a prominent institution of his social class, is highlighted. The analysis of this chapter brings out the extent to which personal *apologia* — to include his *hippeis* defence — pervades and shapes the text.

In the final chapter it is argued that in *Anabasis*, as he is in what are widely regarded as his Socratic works — *Memorabilia*, *Apologia*, *Symposion*, and *Oikonomikos* — Xenophon is defending the memory of Socrates. The introduction of Socrates into the narrative in a flashback which forms part of the introduction of Xenophon's character signals to the reader the start of a special relationship; in the course of the journey this is revealed as being between a teacher whose presence is not tangible but felt, and an outstanding pupil putting his learning into practice. The significant degree to which the pupil's fate, and indeed that of the army as a whole, depends on this relationship is reflected by the dire circumstances in which the scene is set. Now adrift in Asia, and without possibility of further firsthand guidance, the pupil faces the ultimate test of his learning. Xenophon the character duly exemplifies key (Xenophonic) Socratic virtues in his execution of leadership responsibility; and in doing so, by underlining his own piety, he rebuts the charge of impiety against Socrates, while the fact of his young age answers the second charge of corrupting the youth. Xenophon's success in bringing the army out of Asia testifies above all, in an eloquent and original way, to the quality of the training he has received from Socrates.

Each chapter contains a detailed final conclusions section and the dissertation is completed by a summary set of conclusions. The principal ones are that Xenophon's *Anabasis* realises an extensive apologetic agenda which is centred on himself, but with substantial attempts as well to defend the memory of Socrates and the reputation of the *hippeis*. This writing motivation is the prime shaper of the narrative and ultimately accounts for the major part of its contents; for instance a strong didactic element in the work — on the familiar Xenophonic theme of leadership — is regarded as serving the apologetic theme.

*

This study is part of a wider revival of interest in Xenophon and his writing which has been ongoing for the past three to four decades. The seminal work of William Higgins, *Xenophon the Athenian*, published in 1977, can be identified as a catalyst

for initiating reappraisal, as can the important contribution of Hartmut Erbse, 'Xenophon's *Anabasis*', in 1966. Reflecting on the dramatic decline in Xenophon's reputation in the modern era, Erbse identified the eminent 19th century historian, Barthold Niebuhr, as instrumental in setting aside the high reputation which Xenophon had enjoyed for most of the preceding two millennia. According to Erbse, Niebuhr sought to establish a more scientific, less amateur, image of the author, and his influence was notable. Erbse excerpts Niebuhr's somewhat emotional assessment of his subject: 'Truly no state has ever expelled a more degenerate son than this Xenophon. Plato too was not a good citizen; he was not worthy of Athens, he has taken incomprehensible steps and stands like a sinner against the saints, Thucydides and Demosthenes, but yet how altogether differently from this old fool!'⁶

The nineteenth-century decline continued well into the twentieth. Eminent, and less well-known, authorities continued to highlight faults in Xenophon's writings and person. In his *History of Western Philosophy* (1946), Bertrand Russell described him as a man 'not very liberally endowed with brains, and on the whole conventional in his outlook'. As recently as 1987, in his monumental *Agessilaos*, Paul Cartledge summed up his judgement of the man: 'All that can and should, I think, be salvaged from the case for Xenophon the thinker is a handful of banal platitudes which sort only too well with the kind of plain man's guide to Socratic thinking that he provides in the *Memorabilia*'. But generally, across a broad range of scholarship, negativity has been replaced with a more sympathetic and balanced assessment of his intellectual achievements and abilities. In the introduction to his paper on 'Xenophon and Socrates' at the first Liverpool Xenophon conference in 1999 (proceedings 2004), Robin Waterfield, I think, touched on the core of the writer and his unflattering modern reception: 'He [Xenophon] is a quieter writer than Plato, if I may put it that way, and so it is easier to miss the fact that a great deal of thought has gone into what he says, that he has and pursues his own agenda, and

⁶ Niebuhr 1828: 467, cited in Erbse 2010: 500. On Niebuhr's article and its reception see further Tuplin 1993: 13 and Kelly 1996: 157-158.

that much of that thinking has arguably been coloured by his conception of Socrates'.

The level of general and scholarly interest in *Anabasis* allow it a fair claim to be in the vanguard of Xenophon's rehabilitation. Its current popularity in the Western world is testified to by the fact that there are five English-language translations in print (with a further two forthcoming), a Hollywood screenplay in progress, and numerous recent books on the subject. Internet interest is also vibrant, with networking sites featuring pages, and bloggers offering opinions and reviews. One recent satisfied reader records on his weblog: 'I've got very little to add to what's [here](#) [Wikipedia]. Xenophon sounds like a bad ass. One thing I'm always struck by when reading old books is how much less masculine modern men are. The book is great on leadership as well.' I feel Xenophon would have been quietly pleased with this 21st-century endorsement, and with the apparent banishment of Niebuhr's ghost.⁷

In coming to a more informed understanding of Xenophon's thought and literary output, a clearer picture of the times in which he lived emerges. Areas in which our

⁷ Translations. *The March Up Country*, W.H.D. Rouse, 1947, in Ann Arbor paperbacks since 1964; *The Persian Expedition*, Rex Warner, 1949, Penguin; *Xenophon: Anabasis*, John Dillery, 1998, Loeb (revised edition); *The Expedition of Cyrus*, Robin Waterfield, 2005, Oxford World's Classics; *The Anabasis of Cyrus*, Wayne Ambler, 2008, Cornell. Forthcoming: a new Penguin edition from Christopher Tuplin, and a Landmark (Pantheon Books) translation from David Thomas (due 2014). See Appendix II for a full list of editions and translations.

Hollywood. Robert Schenkkan has been commissioned by Sony Pictures to write a screenplay of Xenophon's *Anabasis*.

Recent books. *The Ten Thousand* (Historical novel), Michael Curtis Ford, 2001, London; *Xenophon's March* (History and travel), John Prevas, 2002, Cambridge, Mass.; *The Long March* (Academic), Robin Lane Fox (ed.), 2004, New Haven; *The Sea! The Sea!* (Academic), Tim Rood, 2004b, London; *In the Tracks of the Ten Thousand* (Travel), Shane Brennan, 2005, London; *Xenophon's Retreat* (History and travel), Robin Waterfield, 2006, London; *A Greek Army on the March* (Academic), John Lee, 2007, Cambridge; *The Lost Army* (Historical novel), Valerio Manfredi, 2008, London; *American Anabasis* (Academic), Tim Rood, 2010b, London.

Online review: <http://foseti.wordpress.com/2010/04/23/review-of-anabasis-by-xenophon/>
Last accessed 02/12/10.

For the burgeoning scholarly literature on Xenophon since Breitenbach 1967, see Tuplin's introduction to the 1999 Xenophon Conference volume, *Xenophon and his World* (2004a). Over fifty papers were presented at the 2009 Xenophon conference held in Liverpool, proceedings forthcoming from E.J. Brill.

knowledge is increased include: the development of prose writing, and the context for literary production in the first half of the fourth century; the role and influence of Persia in Greek affairs; rivalry between Athens and Sparta; and the impact of Socrates' legacy in the decades immediately following his death. Detailed analysis of *Anabasis* in particular yields important evidence for the emerging significance of mercenary soldiers in the Greek world and shines a revealing spotlight on the early stages of Spartan hegemony in the same sphere. Finally, in bringing out the extraordinary inventiveness and subtlety of this work, it is implied that not only does its author deserve continued and still more careful attention, but other writers too of the same epoch need to be read with marked alertness and openness of mind.

Xenophon and a History of His Times

What enchanted me most about Xenophon's personality and makes me feel him as a contemporary of ours are his contradictions, his solitariness.

Takis Theodoropoulos, *The Novel of Xenophon*

Xenophon was the son of Gryllos, an Athenian who owned land in Spata in the east of Attica, the present-day location of the city's international airport. The year of his birth is not known, nor is there reliable information on when, or where, he died. For the more than seventy years that he may have lived, there are few solid biographical details, and most of these derive from his own works. But if his own life is sparsely documented, knowledge of Classical Athenian life is comparatively rich, and by examining aspects of the social, economic, and political history of the city, this chapter conveys a sense of the world in which he lived, and which defined who he was and became. Supplementing this by sifting the autobiographical content of his writings, and what survives from the ancient biographical tradition, the chapter builds up a picture of Xenophon's life with the overall aim of establishing a context for the dominant themes and concerns that arise in his writings. As with other portraits of this author, the picture of him that emerges is to a large degree subjective, and the conjectures arising from it here are accordingly qualified.

The main focus in this treatment is on Xenophon's early years in Attica, and in particular on widening the perspective on the circumstances of his departure from the *polis* in 401. His relationship with Socrates and with the Thirty Tyrants is explored, as is the important question of his exile. In varying degrees each of these subjects is returned to in later chapters.

A remarkable feature of Xenophon's *Anabasis* is that it was almost certainly written at a considerable remove in time from the events it describes. The question as to why he chose to write his account after such a lapse imposes itself.¹ To approach an answer to this important Xenophonic question, in the final section of the chapter an attempt is made to mark a window of time for authorship, so enabling the text to be situated in a circumscribed personal and historical context. A tentative dating to the years following the King's Peace (387/6) connects elements in the work, such as Spartan hegemony and panhellenism, with pressing issues of the period, although a conclusion is that these are not paramount concerns in the author's agenda.

1. BACKGROUND

1.1. Sources for Xenophon's life

Xenophon was the author of fourteen complete works, a number of which furnish evidence for his life.² In some cases the detail seems transparently autobiographical, while in others, although not signposted as such, reasonable arguments can be made that he is referring to personal experience. However, it

¹ The question is formulated in the following terms by two of Xenophon's keenest analysts. Delebecque (1947: 43): 'Il est vrai que les intentions de notre auteur ne sont pas toujours apparentes. Pourquoi et pour qui écrit-il l'*Anabase*? Est-ce pour le plaisir de rédiger des souvenirs personnels ou avec le souci de tirer de son expérience un enseignement pour autrui, pour ses compatriotes, pour ses fils? Cherche-t-il à se faire lire d'un public lacédémonien, ou athénien, ou simplement grec? Se met-il à la tâche pour charmer le lecteur par un récit d'aventures ou pour célébrer les soldats hellènes habiles à se tirer des griffes barbares? Songe-t-il à répandre des idées socratiques ou à faire oeuvre de propagande en faveur de Lacédémone? Ou bien Xénophon veut-il glorifier Xénophon?'

Erbse (2010: 477): 'One might well think that the solution to this straightforward problem ("What was Xenophon attempting to achieve through his composition of the *Anabasis*?") must have been found long ago, at least before it was thought to hand out a grade to the author. But as so often happens...judgement was quickly passed before a justified reason for the judgement had been found. In fact research has dodged the question of the point of the work; where it has felt itself compelled to give an answer, opinion has been divided'.

² A *Constitution of the Athenians* was also attributed to Xenophon in antiquity, but the work, though it is alleged to express his sentiments, is by dint of its early dating almost certainly not his. Most commentators believe it was written before 411, and probably during the Archidamian War (431-421). For a thorough recent treatment of issues surrounding the text see Marr and Rhodes 2008. It is possible that Xenophon wrote other works of which there is no surviving record.

may not always be the case that the detail so provided can be taken at face value. As is shown in the course of the dissertation, Xenophon's self-representation is invariably affected by his purpose(s) in writing and is not primarily intended to be autobiographical. This is particularly apparent in *Anabasis*, his account of Cyrus the Younger's march up-country in 401 and the subsequent retreat homeward of his Greek mercenaries; while many regard this as the most important source for his life, it is argued here that the Xenophon we see in the text is an exemplary figure, a young Athenian and a pupil of Socrates who applies the lessons of his teacher to the extreme situation in which he has found himself.³ The question of the historical veracity of his self-representation is sharpened by his notable absence in other putative accounts of the expedition,⁴ and by the fact that he attributes authorship of the work to another.⁵

The only surviving biography of Xenophon from antiquity is that written by Diogenes Laertios in the third century AD (*Lives of the Philosophers* 2.48-59). Diogenes seems to have derived his material from a variety of sources (he names ten in the biography and alludes to several others), though not all of these are regarded as reliable, and neither is Diogenes himself.⁶ Badian, in a thorough critique of this *Life*, uses the date he gives for Xenophon's death to illustrate the problem.⁷ Citing a Ktesikleides, Diogenes (2.56) states that Xenophon died in 360/59, 'the year in which Phillip, the son of Amyntas, came to the throne of Macedon'. While Ktesikleides is accurate on the year that Phillip

³ *Anabasis* as an important source for Xenophon's life: Due 1989: 203; Momigliano 1990: 45; Gera 1993: 6; Humble 1997: 3, 46 and 2002: 69, 76; Dillery 1998: 3; Nails 2002: 301; Rood 2005: xiii-xiv and 2006: 48; Roy 2007: 66; Macleod 2008: 7; Gray 2010a: 6.

⁴ In the Diodoros/Ephoros version of the march Xenophon is only referred to once, this in Thrace at the end of the journey (14.37.1-4). For discussion see Chapter 3.1.

⁵ At *Hell.* 3.1.2 Xenophon writes that the story of Cyrus's campaign was told by Themistogenes of Syracuse, a figure otherwise unknown except for a short entry in the *Souda*. See further Chapter 3.1.2.

⁶ See Pomeroy 1994: 1; Humble 2002: 69. The latter argues that Diogenes makes use of 'recognisable biographical *topoi* which often contain patently false information'. Of the writers Diogenes uses, one in particular, Dinarkhos, deserves notice for being a source that may not ultimately derive from Xenophon himself. Dinarkhos wrote a speech for a freedman against (probably) the grandson of Xenophon, and in this it is believed, as was the custom in Attic oratory, a potted history of the family was provided. Diogenes (2.52) cites Dinarkhos as his source for the names of Xenophon's sons – Gryllos and Diodoros – and his statement that the Spartans provided him with a house and land. Lipka (2002: 3) speculates that Dinarkhos was personally acquainted with Xenophon.

⁷ Badian 2004: 33-34.

If he became ruler, he had evidently not surveyed important literature of the period: Diodoros/Ephoros associated Phillip's rise with the death of Alexander of Pherai, and Xenophon writes in *Hellenika* (6.4.37) that he was working on his excursus on Thessaly when Tisiphonos, Alexander's successor, was in power. Diogenes is not aware of any discrepancy and apparently does not have any system in place to check the information from his sources.

While Diogenes, whose interest was philosophers, will doubtless have read Xenophon's Socratic works, as indicated above, he does not seem to have studied his subject's historically-orientated writings. Furthermore, there is some evidence that he may have adapted passages in the oeuvre for his biography. Anderson marks two such instances, the first relating to Xenophon's famous first encounter with Socrates (*Lives* 2.48), which he speculates may have come from *Memorabilia* 4.4.5;⁸ the second is where Diogenes (2.48-9) talks of Xenophon's fondness for a Klinias: he cites a profession of love by Xenophon that he attributes to a work of Aristippos, but in fact the quote is from Xenophon's *Symposion* (4.12) and the speaker is Kritoboulus.⁹ A degree of caution is therefore required when using Diogenes.

1.2. Family

Xenophon's father's name is given as Gryllos the Athenian by Diogenes (2.48). He writes that he belonged to the deme of Erkhia, which was an agricultural district some 20 kilometres from the city.¹⁰ Xenophon provides virtually no

⁸ Anderson 1974: 9. Another possible framing source for this meeting is *Oik.* 2.16-18, where Socrates declares his interest in 'learning who in the city are most knowledgeable about each occupation'. Waterfield thinks that the incident was part of an anecdotal tradition, 'consonant with conversion stories throughout the ages' (2006: 45).

⁹ Anderson 1974: 30. Humble (2004a: 233) uses this example to show how 'invented facts could make their way into the biographical tradition'. The case is a clear example of the biographer failing to read his subject, the *Symposion* being a work one would have expected Diogenes to be familiar with. See Brunt 1980 for a treatment of the transmission by ancient authors of earlier writers.

¹⁰ See Vanderpool (1965: 21-6) for details of Erkhia's location. According to Stronk (1995: 3) neither Gryllos nor his son figure on the lists of officials functioning in this deme. Interestingly, Isokrates was also from Erkhia, and his father, a landowner, is named by Plutarch as a *khoregos* (*Moralia* 836e). But see further note 13 below. Depending on one's view about whether Iskhomakhos in *Oikonomikos* is a version of

information about his parents, though the fact that he named one of his sons Gryllos seems to provide support for Diogenes' statement.¹¹ Anderson considers that there is no evidence that Xenophon had brothers or sisters.¹² One of the pieces of information that Xenophon does provide about his family comes in *Anabasis*, and concerns a religious practice of his father. 'On the next day, going to Ophrynion, Xenophon sacrificed and burnt whole piglets, according to his father's custom' (τῆ δὲ ὑστεραία Ξενοφῶν προσελθὼν εἰς Ὀφρύνιον ἐθύετο καὶ ὠλοκαύτει χοίρους τῷ πατρίῳ νόμῳ, 7.8.5). While it is not possible to infer the extent, and bearing in mind that *patrioi nomoi* could also mean 'Athenian custom', the information could indicate that Xenophon grew up in a religiously observant *oikos*.

Xenophon's writings, in particular *Peri Hippikes*, *Hipparkhikos*, and *Anabasis*, suggest that he was an experienced cavalryman and something of an authority on equine matters. From his own evidence it seems reasonable to infer that his family owned an estate, and that he served in the Athenian cavalry, a rite of passage for many young aristocrats.¹³ That membership of the *hippeis* was necessarily confined to the class of well-off landowners becomes clear from a consideration of the costs involved. According to Spence's study of cavalry, a mount in the fourth century would have cost a minimum of 100 drachmas, with most paying in the order of 500.¹⁴ 'The minimum was equivalent to ten months' wages for a skilled craftsman (or over two years' fairly generous wheat ration for an adult male) while the average would have bought nearly twenty months'

Xenophon, the former's statement at 20.22-24 could suggest that Xenophon's father was an agricultural property developer.

¹¹ The norm in Classical Athens was for a son to be named after the grandfather, though it was not unknown for a son to be given the father's name (cf. Golden 1990: 25, and Pomeroy 1994: 267). In Dinarkhos' speech *Against Xenophon* (note 6 above) the defendant is thought to be the author's grandson.

¹² Anderson 1974: 14.

¹³ While there is no mention of the family in Davies' propertied class, the Register, as the author is at pains to point out, is 'not to be taken as adequately representing this class, let alone as anything even remotely approaching a complete roster of upper-class Athenians' (1971: xxx). Xenophon (no. 192) and his sons, Diodoros (no. 55) and Gryllos (no. 72), are included in Spence's prosopography of Athenian *Hippeis* (1993). On horse ownership as a sign of wealth see Xenophon *P.H.* 2.1, Thucydides 6.15.3, Isokrates 16.33, Lysias 24.11-12, Aristotle, *Politics* 1289^b34-36.

¹⁴ Spence 1993: 183. Evidence from the late fifth century indicates that, at the high end, sums in excess of 1000 drachmas were paid. Cf. *An.* 7.8.6; Aristophanes, *Clouds* 21-3, 1224-5.

wheat supply for a family of six'.¹⁵ Running costs were similarly high. In addition to the need to have slaves to groom and exercise them, if they were to be in good condition the horses needed to be fed on grain, a produce never in ready supply in Attica. Other costs included riding tackle, veterinary expenses, and, where necessary, the leasing of grazing pasture. In the case of the cavalry — which the landowning citizens were required to form — the state, at least from the middle of the fifth century, did provide subsidies: a *sitos* payment for part of the year, and a *katastasis*, a loan towards the purchase cost of the horse repayable on the cavalryman's retirement.¹⁶ But this support seems to have defrayed only a small part of the costs. As Spence writes: 'membership of the equestrian milieu was an expensive pastime which few citizens could afford'.¹⁷

There is other evidence pointing to Xenophon's aristocratic status. In *Anabasis* (3.1.4) he informs us that he was a long-standing ξένος of Proxenos of Boiotia; guest-friendship was, by and large, an aristocratic institution, and at the least the relationship suggests his family was well-connected.¹⁸ Then there are Xenophon's writings, a number of which are didactic in style and tone. In his works he sometimes portrays oligarchic Sparta in a favourable light, and he shows, for example, the characteristic aristocratic disdain for sedentary labour (see *Oik.* 4.2-3, 6.5).¹⁹

1.3. Age

Diogenes (2.55) writes that Xenophon 'flourished in the fourth year of the ninety-fourth Olympiad [401/0], and he took part in the expedition of Cyrus in the archonship of Xenainetos in the year before the death of Socrates' (ἤκμαζε δὲ κατὰ τὸ τέταρτον ἔτος τῆς τετάρτης καὶ ἐνενηκοστῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος, καὶ ἀναβέβηκε σὺν Κύρῳ ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Ξεναινέτου ἐνὶ πρότερον ἔτει τῆς

¹⁵ Spence 1993: 183.

¹⁶ See *ibid.* 279-80.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 272. See also Anderson's monograph (1961) on ancient Greek horsemanship.

¹⁸ Badian (2004: 39) speculates that the relationship was an inherited one, a view which Xenophon's usage of ἀρχαῖος in the context — he would probably still have been in his 20s — supports. On Xenophon and guest-friendship see further Chapter 3.2.3.

¹⁹ Gray (2010a: 10), envisaging Xenophon maintained in 'Socratic idleness' by his family, comments that 'it would be exceptional to find any writer of humble origins in the ancient world'.

Σωκράτους τελευτή). While references to the high-point of a subject's life often imply the fortieth year (the second century chronographer Apollodoros, for instance, uses such a scheme), in this case, on account of the next clause stating that Xenophon marched with Cyrus, it is considered that it is his most famous exploit which is being referred to as his *acme*.²⁰ On the basis of a reference to the age of Proxenos at 2.6.20 (see below), several writers have placed Xenophon's birth in the early 420s, which would make him just under thirty when he joined Cyrus in 401.²¹

While Xenophon makes no direct reference to his age in his writings, at several places in *Anabasis* he does touch on the matter. At 3.1.14, after the Greeks have been shorn of several senior commanders by Tissaphernes on the banks of the Greater Zab River, he awakens from a fitful dream and poses himself a series of questions about his fate and that of the army:

As for defending ourselves, no one is making preparations or showing any care; rather, we are lying here as if it were possible to stay at peace. From what city do I expect a general who will carry out these measures? And as for myself, what age am I waiting for? (3.1.14).

When he subsequently addresses the captains of Proxenos, he tells them that 'if you assign me to lead, I will not cite my young age as an excuse' (εἰ δ' ὑμεῖς τάπτετ' ἐμὲ ἡγεῖσθαι, οὐδὲν προφασίζομαι τὴν ἡλικίαν, 3.1.25). Greek states frequently laid down minimum ages for various offices; at Athens, for a *strategos* or other high-ranking military official it was thirty, so it does seem reasonable to put Xenophon under that age at this time.²² Supporting this is the fact that Proxenos, who was a guest-friend of Xenophon's, was around thirty at

²⁰ Cf. Anderson 1974: 9, Pomeroy 1994: 2.

²¹ Breitenbach 1967: 1571; Cawkwell 1972: 143, n.2; Anderson 1974: 9-10.

²² Minimum ages. See Dover 1965: 50 (on Thucydides 6.36.5), Rhodes 1981: 510. In his writings Xenophon does touch on his concept of age. At *Mem.* 1.2.35 he has Socrates ask Charikles about the age limit 'below which a man is to be accounted young', to which he is told, 'under thirty'. While this is in line with what seems to be a generally held view of age, in *Agésilaios* Xenophon writes that the Spartan king, who was 40 when he came to power in 398, was 'still a young man when he gained the throne' (1.6).

the time of his seizure by Tissaphernes (2.6.20). However, as Badian remarks, offering the example of Alkibiades and Pharnabazos, 'there is no reason why *xenoi* must be of the same age'.²³

At the conclusion of his *Xenophon*, Diogenes (2.59) writes that he has 'found it stated in some places that [Xenophon] flourished in the eighty-ninth Olympiad [424-20], at the same time as the rest of the disciples of Socrates'. The origin of this is probably the story passed down through Strabo (9.2.7), repeated by Diogenes in his *Socrates* (2.22), of how Socrates saved Xenophon's life at the Battle of Delion in 424. However, placing Xenophon's birth in the 460s would put him into his 100s when he wrote his final work. Badian dismisses the idea, and thinks Diogenes did too by virtue of his placing of the information at the end of the biography, almost as a 'footnote'.²⁴ Nonetheless there are reasons why this possibility cannot be completely discounted. Isokrates, who was born in the same deme in the 430s, lived to be almost a hundred, and was writing into his eighties.²⁵ Then there is the fact that putting Xenophon's birth back to the 460s would permit him to be the author of the Ps.-Xenophon tract, dated most recently to 423/4.²⁶ As to the objection of 3.1.25 above, an argument of the dissertation is that Xenophon in *Anabasis* is an exemplary figure, and a part of his literary persona is the youth he emphasises in the work. So a centenarian Xenophon born in the middle of the fifth century is not out of the question, though the evidence for this is not compelling.²⁷

1.4. Youth

If Xenophon's birth is placed in the early 420s, as the weight of evidence indicates, it was into interesting and dangerous times that he was born. With the

²³ Badian 2004: 39.

²⁴ *Ibid.* 36. But the same writer systematically undermines the credibility of Diogenes.

²⁵ 'With these thoughts in mind I set myself to write this discourse — I who am no longer in the prime of youth but in my eighty-second year' (Ταῦτα δὲ διανοηθεὶς ἔγραφον τὸν λόγον τοῦτον, οὐκ ἀκμάζων, ἀλλ' ἔτη γεγονῶς δύο καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα), Isokrates, *Antidosis* 9.

²⁶ See Marr and Rhodes 2008.

²⁷ Dillery (1998: 4) argues that 7.2.38 furnishes evidence for an older Xenophon: 'For Seuthes to imagine that Xenophon had a daughter of roughly marriageable age (which, of course, could be as early as twelve or thirteen), he could not have been quite as young as 3.1.25 implies.' But Seuthes is surely imagining a future scenario - καὶ εἴ τις σοὶ ἔστι θυγάτηρ - rather than a present one. Cf. 7.6.34.

outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431, Attica was subjected to annual raids by Sparta, the aim of which was to disrupt the supply of food into Athens. As landowners, Xenophon's family would have suffered directly, and what wealth they had stored (in whatever form) must have gradually been depleted as one prospective harvest after another was destroyed.²⁸ Attendant on this disruption would have been seasonal dislocation, the *oikos* moving into the city at least for the duration of the raiding season. On account of the war Anderson contends that Xenophon was in fact raised in Athens,²⁹ though the intimate knowledge of the countryside which he shows in several of his works (notably *Oikonomikos*, *Kynegetikos*, and the opening chapters of *Poroi*) would seem to point to a substantial experience of rural life. In any case, from 425, following the capture of several hundred Spartans at Sphakteria, the countryside was safe from attack.

The sons of wealthy fifth-century Athenians were educated in private schools, where they were taught literacy, arithmetic, music, and physical education.³⁰ Plato (*Protagoras* 325e-326a) paints a picture of the literary classroom:

The children, when they have learnt their letters and are getting to understand the written word as before they did only the spoken, are furnished with works of good poets to read as they sit in class, and are made to learn them off by heart: here they meet with many admonitions, many descriptions and praises and eulogies of good men in times past, that the boy in envy may imitate them and yearn to become even as they.

²⁸ Gryllos may have had a stake in the silver mines at Laureion (see Anderson 1974: 10), but as Xenophon himself implies in *Poroi* (4.25), income from this resource dwindled following the Spartan seizure of Dekeleia (in 413. Dekeleia was situated in the north of Attica and was visible from the city: see Thucydides 7.19.2, and *Hell.* 1.1.35). Waterfield (2006: 38-9) speculates that Gryllos had interests in colonies abroad, though again, as he acknowledges, revenues from these would have dried up as the Athenian empire disintegrated. Yet as Xenophon's departure from Athens in 401 with at least one horse shows, the family did not become impoverished. See further note 83 below.

²⁹ Anderson 1974: 10, 18.

³⁰ Cartledge (1987: 57) considers that the education would have been 'decidedly athletic'. On the subject see further B. Strauss 1993.

In their music classes the boys learned how to sing and often how to play one or more instruments, the aulos, and the lyre, for instance. Music was an integral part of Athenian life, featuring in the major festivals and in performances of plays, so ability in the art was a cultural asset for the state and the individual alike.³¹ As a child Xenophon may have participated in processions or choirs; in later life he certainly shows an appreciation for dance (see *An.* 6.1.5-13), and a flair for choreography is evident in his advice to cavalry commanders on public displays (see *Hipp.* 3.10-12).

Physical education, likewise, brought benefits to both the individual and his *polis*. In a world where war was more common than peace, an army needed soldiers who were in the habit of training and knowledgeable about combat techniques. Pursuits taught to the boys in the *gymnasion* included running, the long-jump, discus and javelin, boxing, and wrestling. There is reason to believe that Xenophon acquitted himself well in this sphere for in his prime he represents himself as hardy (for example, in freezing winter conditions, rising at dawn without his cloak to chop wood, *An.* 4.8.12), and fit (racing up a hillside fully accoutred, *An.* 3.4.47-49). In his writings Xenophon stresses the importance of physical fitness and preparedness for an army (cf. *Kyn.* 13.11, *Kyro.* 8.1.34-35).

In addition to this formal education, Xenophon would have learned how to hunt and to ride. 'The first pursuit, therefore, that a young man just out of his boyhood should take up is hunting, and afterwards he should go on to the other branches of education, provided he has means' (*Kyn.* 2.1). Xenophon is effusive in his praise for hunting: 'For it makes the body healthy, improves the sight and hearing, and keeps men from growing old; and it affords the best training for war' (*Kyn.* 12.1). The cavalry, which the landowning class was obliged to provide, tended to have a young age profile, so it would have been as a youth that Xenophon was introduced to the art of horsemanship. He gives a full account of the training of men and horses in his works, and it is apparent

³¹ Davies 1967 has estimated that in the fourth century around 97 festival liturgies were performed in Athens, this rising to 117 in a Panathenaic year. In the fifth century the number may have been higher: see Jones 1984: 118.

from these that he himself was an accomplished cavalryman.³² It is clear too that he had a great passion for riding. Early in *Hipparkhikos* (1.11) he writes that 'by dwelling on the brilliancy of horsemanship, you might fire some of the young men with ambition to serve in the cavalry'. It is hard not to see in this an autobiographical reference, a remembrance by the author of the circumstances of his own initiation. One can imagine him as an adolescent being taught the basics of equestrianism, perhaps by his father, and the thrill of his first ride across the Mesogeian Plain.

2. COMING OF AGE

2.1. Philosophy

Beyond his schooling there is evidence that Xenophon pursued an interest in higher thought. Much of his corpus bears a philosophical stamp, and the fact that Socrates figures prominently in four of his works — *Apologia*, *Memorabilia*, *Oikonomikos*, and *Symposion* — suggests that, even if he was not a part of his circle, he was an ardent admirer of the teacher. He may also have attended sophist lectures by Prodikos in Boiotia (see below). It is to be noted too that Xenophon was known first and foremost as a philosopher by the ancients.³³

The degree to which Xenophon was a participant in Socrates' circle, and by extension his ability as a thinker, has been much debated. Although he only appears once in a conversation, *Mem.* 1.3.9-12, elsewhere in this work he gives the impression that he was often in attendance at talks ('For I myself never heard Socrates indulge in the practice...' [of making the worse appear the better

³² The role and importance of the cavalry in ancient Greek warfare has been the subject of much debate. Traditional views that it played a minimal role in the age of the hoplite especially (see for instance Snodgrass 1999: 85 and Brereton 1976: 16) have been questioned in monographs by Bugh, Spence, and Worley. On its use by Athens in the Peloponnesian War the latter writes (1994: 3): 'cavalry was employed in a variety of tactical roles: to serve as the first and principal line of defence against invasions or incursions; to gain victory by surprise; to prevent the envelopment of a phalanx; and to defeat a withdrawing foe'.

³³ See Tuplin 1993: 28 for a full list of the antique references to Xenophon as philosopher. Pomeroy (1994: 22) notes that Diogenes places Xenophon immediately after Socrates in his catalogue of philosophers.

argument], 1.2.31; cf. also 1.4.2, 2.4.1, 2.5.1, 4.3.2). In the opening of *Oikonomikos* (1.1) he claims to have been present at the events about to be related, though it is improbable, for example, that he was on hand when Socrates referred to the death of Cyrus the Younger (4.18). If the view that he was born in the early 420s is right, it is similarly unlikely that he was in attendance at the *Symposion* (1.1), dramatic date 422.³⁴

The most interesting piece of evidence pertaining to the relationship comes from *Anabasis*. Recalling how he came to leave Athens, Xenophon recounts that he consulted Socrates about whether he should accept an invitation to join Cyrus the Younger in Asia. Socrates, 'suspecting that [his] becoming a friend of Cyrus might bring an accusation from the city, because Cyrus had seemed eager in joining the Lakedaimonians in making war against the Athenians, advised Xenophon to go to Delphi and take common counsel with the god about the journey' (3.1.5). In the *Memorabilia* (1.1.6) Xenophon writes that this was how Socrates dealt with 'intimate friends' (πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιτηδεῖους), so there is an implication that he himself was one of these. Famously, Xenophon disregarded the advice he was given and instead asked to which god he should sacrifice in order to ensure the success of the journey he had in mind (3.1.6). Socrates' response — annoyance, and acceptance (3.1.7) — indicates a type of paternal relationship between the men, an impression which is reinforced in the account given by Diogenes of their first meeting (*Lives* 2.48).³⁵ In Chapter 4 it is argued that this episode is one of the keys to reading *Anabasis*, even though the encounter may not in fact be historical.

The views of modern scholars on Xenophon's relation to Socrates are frequently, as Noreen Humble has asserted, dictated by their own pre-determined attitudes towards him and his work.³⁶ The dearth of solid evidence facilitates the making of inferences that fit with preconceptions. In the past century portraits of Xenophon as a philosopher especially were often negative,

³⁴ Kahn (1996: 32) argues that Xenophon is using the first person narrative in a consciously fictitious way and was not present when he says he was.

³⁵ Whidden (2008: 52) remarks that on the only two occasions which Socrates and Xenophon meet, 'the philosopher scolds him for his behaviour'. Gray (2010a: 9) comments that he 'depicts himself in the starring role of Socrates' ignorant pupil'.

³⁶ Humble 2002: 66-67, and 1997: 19.

often with the aim of venerating Plato. Bertrand Russell's view of a man 'not very liberally endowed with brains, and on the whole conventional in his outlook' is not untypical.³⁷ Vlastos finds it almost inconceivable that Xenophon could have been part of the Socratic circle, though he sees fit to respond to Russell's claim of a stupid Xenophon.³⁸ Cawkwell for his part does not imagine Xenophon in any regular attendance at Socratic gatherings: 'His philosophy is second-hand and second-rate...He was at his happiest when far removed from what he regarded as the debasing trivialities of sophists' talk'.³⁹ In more recent times, M. Grant and D. Nails are even more damning,⁴⁰ and although more fair-minded, Paul Cartledge does not manage to conceal distaste, opining that while he did receive 'a kind of higher education' from Socrates, there is a question about 'whether this affected his intellectual development and moral outlook as deeply as Xenophon clearly wanted others to believe'.⁴¹

The defenders of Xenophon's status as a philosopher can be similarly prone to reactionary impulses. Leo Strauss, for instance, argues fervently that Xenophon

³⁷ Russell 1946: 89. He goes on: 'There has been a tendency to think that everything Xenophon says must be true, because he had not the wits to think of anything untrue. This is a very invalid line of argument. A stupid man's report of what a clever man says is never accurate, because he unconsciously translates what he has heard into something that he can understand. I would rather be reported by my bitterest enemies among philosophers than by a friend innocent of philosophy. We cannot therefore accept what Xenophon says if it either involves any difficult point of philosophy or is part of an argument to prove that Socrates was unjustly condemned' (90). Moving on to Plato, Russell informs us that, 'in addition to being a philosopher, [he] is an imaginative writer of great genius and charm' (90).

³⁸ Vlastos 1991: 99 and 103 for Xenophon not part of Socrates' circle, 101-102 for his response to Russell: 'But Xenophon is anything but a stupid man. His *Cyropaedia* is as intelligent a venture in belletrist didactic fiction as has come down to us from classical antiquity. Both in that work and copiously elsewhere Xenophon displays shrewd judgment of the world and of men. If I had been one of those ten thousand Greeks, left leaderless in the wilds of Anatolia, casting about for a commander we could trust to lead us safely back to civilization, I doubt if I could have hit on anyone better than Xenophon for the purpose; my vote would certainly have gone to him over Russell'.

³⁹ Cawkwell 1972: 26.

⁴⁰ Grant (1989: 203) writes: 'Xenophon was very proud to have known Socrates, although, since his philosophical capabilities fell short of his pretensions, he must have been one of the great man's more or less uncomprehending, intermittent hangers-on, rather than a serious student. What he later had to say about his hero, therefore, is just a rag-bag of second-hand hearsay and reading and invention'. Nails (1995: 20): 'The way I employ Xenophon's texts is as a sort of layman's appendix to Plato. Xenophon shows not the slightest inclination or talent for philosophy in anything that he writes'.

⁴¹ Cartledge 1987: 59. In a similar vein Kahn (1996: 30) sees Xenophon as being 'rather like a sponge, soaking up ideas, themes, and even phrases from Antisthenes, Aiskhines, and Plato'.

is the primary source for our knowledge of Socrates.⁴² That he should not be considered so, he writes, is the result of 'a powerful prejudice which emerged in the course of the nineteenth century and is today firmly established. According to that prejudice Xenophon is so simple-minded and narrow-minded or philistine that he cannot have grasped the core or depth of Socrates' thought.'⁴³ He does not say what or who the source of the prejudice is, but it is reasonable to assume that he is referring to the shadow of Plato, the Socratic *par excellence* for modern philosophers.⁴⁴

From Xenophon's concern with virtuous action and the moral value of labour, it is apparent that underlying his own philosophy are the basic principles taught by his Socrates: self-discipline (*enkrateia*), self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*), and endurance (*karteria*). To his way of thought, practical endeavour is the true path to virtue. 'For the beautiful and good man,' he has Socrates say in *Oikonomikos*, 'the best line of work and the best branch of knowledge is farming' (6.8, trans. Pomeroy, modified). It is arguably in this grounded direction which Xenophon sought to lead his readers in his ambitious literary programme.⁴⁵

2.2. War

While he makes no mention of it in his works, it is quite likely that Xenophon fought for his city in the Peloponnesian War, probably, given his family

⁴² Strauss 1970: 83-6. Strauss's conception of an ironic Xenophon, influential in W. Higgins' seminal 1977 work, has again begun to draw the interest of readers. See forthcoming Liverpool 2009 Xenophon conference proceedings edited by C. Tuplin.

⁴³ Strauss 1970: 83.

⁴⁴ For this audience Xenophon's interest in practical morality is much less appealing than Plato's investigations into the nature of the soul. There is a longstanding debate as to which of the two writers, if either (see Higgins 1977: 22), paints the more realistic picture of Socrates. For an overview see Pomeroy 1994: 22-26. I find appealing her view that the length of Socrates' life and his range of interests make it permissible for the portraits of both men – Plato's thinker and Xenophon's practical man – to have a claim of historicity. See further Kahn 1996, Waterfield 2004, Dorion 2006. What both writers do have in common is that they each strove to rescue the memory of Socrates from the injustices directed at him during his trial and in the years that followed; Waterfield (2009: xiii) considers that for both men Socrates was a 'moral hero'. On the Socratic Question see further Chapter 4.2.

⁴⁵ Although the sort of world view espoused by Xenophon became unfashionable in Western intellectual circles in modern times, a strong echo of it, notably in emphasis on the moral value of toil and land, is found in the work of one of the greatest writers of the last century, Alexander Solzhenitsyn. See especially *Russkii vopros k kontsu XX veka* (1995), and *Arkhipelag GULAG* (1973–1978).

background, as a cavalryman. Even had he been born as late as the mid-420s, he would have been eligible for military service in the later stages of the war. Some evidence to support this may be found in passages from his *Hellenika* which seem to convey a sense of autopsy. An example is the detailed account he gives at 1.2.1-13 of a campaign by the Athenian general Thrasyllus in Ionia in 409;⁴⁶ notably, he writes of a Persian commander who 'managed to capture one Athenian alive and kill seven others' (ἓνα μὲν ζῶν ἔλαβεν, ἑπτὰ δὲ ἀπέκτεινε, 1.2.5). There is furthermore a strong possibility that he was part of the fleet sent to Mytilene in 406 to rescue the blockaded Athenian force: 'When the Athenians learned of the events at Mytilene and the siege, they voted to bring help with 110 ships, manning them with everyone — both slave and free — who was of age. The ships were manned and departed in thirty days. Even many of the Knights [*hippeis*] went on board' (1.6.24).

Xenophon is still more likely to have been involved in the *stasis* at Athens that followed the war. The group who took power after the defeat to Sparta were predominantly of the aristocratic class, and they found natural support from those who formed the cavalry (cf. *Hell.* 2.4.2).⁴⁷ Xenophon may indeed have been obliged to take his orders, although given his background it seems not unreasonable to suppose that he participated willingly; if this was the case, his hostility to the actions of the Thirty recorded in *Hellenika* would suggest that not long into their tyranny he withdrew, or became an unwilling participant. Or at least, as argued in Section 3.1 below, this is the impression which he wishes to give in his history of the period.

Turning to his evidence in *Hellenika*, and again pushing the autopsy argument, some of his descriptions do seem to show that he played a part in the rule of the Thirty. Green, commenting on the role of the horsemen in the rule of the Thirty, thinks that it is clear from the way Xenophon describes an ambush at Phyle

⁴⁶ Cawkwell 1979: 9, Stronk 1995: 4, and Thomas 2009: xx, among others, share this view. But as Humble (1997: 7) points out, 'detail is not necessarily a sign of autopsy'.

⁴⁷ As Bugh points out (1988: 126), it is significant that Thrasyboulos on the democratic side could only acquire about seventy *hippeis* (see *Hell.* 2.4.25). The Thirty oligarchs are named at *Hell.* 2.3.2; Krentz (1989: 191) thinks this list is an interpolation but nonetheless that it is accurate. At least one of the Thirty, Khairelaos, was apparently closely associated with the cavalry (see Spence 1993: 189); their leader, Kritias, was an intimate of Socrates.

(*Hell.* 2.4.6) 'that he was an eyewitness — his description of the noise the grooms made as they curried their horses is particularly revealing — and probably an active participant'.⁴⁸ There is, too, a palpable sense of anger in his account of the murder of a group of citizens who were on their way to their farms to get provisions (*Hell.* 2.4.26); awful as they were, such incidents cannot have been uncommon during a civil war, yet it is clear that Xenophon had been affected by the fate of these 'people from Aixone'.

Diogenes has nothing to say of Xenophon's military record prior to his joining of Cyrus's expedition, but another third century AD writer, Philostratos, says that he was captured before the Battle of Arginousai in 406 and held prisoner in Boiotia (*Vitae Sophistarum* 1.12). In a somewhat unexpected twist to this tale he writes that Xenophon secured release on bail in order to attend lectures by Prodikos, the eminent Khian sophist.⁴⁹ If this was the case, as Anderson points out, Proxenos, a Boiotian and guest-friend of Xenophon's, could have arranged the release.⁵⁰ It was Proxenos who, in 402/01, invited Xenophon to join Cyrus the Younger in Asia.

2.3. Politics

Under the democracy, through the course of the fifth century, the aristocracy saw its power steadily eroded: as she grew as a sea power, Athens came to rely more on her rowers — drawn predominantly from the urban poor (θηῆτες) — than on her infantry (ζευγῖται) and cavalrymen (ἵππεῖς).⁵¹ If not originating with him, the strategy gained significant momentum under Pericles, who sought to degrade the power of his political opponents (see Plutarch, *Pericles* 7.3, 7.6, 9.2-4). Naval power was ideally suited to democracy: a large navy required

⁴⁸ Green 1994: 222. See also Erbse 2010: 488.

⁴⁹ Perhaps not unrelated is that the fact that the only surviving version of Prodikos' famous lecture, the Choice of Herakles, is in the *Memorabilia* (2.1.21-34).

⁵⁰ Anderson 1974: 18.

⁵¹ See Ps.-Xenophon, *Ath.* 1.2; cf. *Hell.* 6.1.11. The θηῆτες, lowest of the four Solonian property classes at Athens, comprised all those who were unable to afford to arm themselves as hoplites, the third class. The horse was the defining symbol of the aristocracy, being at once a mark of wealth, mobility, and power. The ἵππεῖς (second class) therefore was a term that, to all Athenians, would have denoted more than simply the cavalry corps or a narrow economic class. Xenophon, from the evidence of his outstanding performance on the retreat of the Ten Thousand, was an exemplary figure of this group.

large numbers of rowers — 170 per ship —, whose equipment was comparatively basic and could be supplied by the state as part of its fleet construction. When Athens put a hundred ships to sea, it had 20,000 citizens at sea.⁵²

Two impacts in particular of this change are notable. Firstly, the democratic system was more liable than others to empower men less capable of exercising authority and so it endangered the effectiveness of the *polis*; secondly, the pursuit of empire, whose wealth was needed to help maintain the huge cost of running the fleet, inevitably brought Athens into conflict with others, and ultimately it was those in the countryside who would have to bear the brunt of attacks on the country.⁵³ That the war that came was against Sparta made it all the more unpalatable, for the Spartans, with their ideals of rule by the best and self-sacrifice for the public good, represented a model of what many Athenian aristocrats would have wished their state to be.⁵⁴ In many ways Xenophon was one of these; that his writings frequently display a positive attitude towards democracy needs to be taken in the light of his interest in political philosophy on the one hand, and on the other as part of his attempt in his extensive apologetic agenda to make himself appear not hostile toward the democratic power at Athens.

⁵² Potts (2010: 55) questions the view that 'virtually all the rowers (except in times of acute national emergency) were Athenian citizens', suggesting that alongside the poorest citizens there were in the fleet 'significant numbers of foreign mercenaries, slaves and immigrants newly settled in the city'. However the essential point, that the economically less well off were harnessed as a powerful political tool, still holds. As Finley writes of the naval system (2004: 172): 'The citizens who served in the navy were drawn from the poor and they were known to be the staunchest supporters of the democratic system in its late fifth-century form'.

⁵³ See Ps-Xenophon, *Ath.* 2.14; Bugh 1988: 114-15. Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 24.3) estimated that over twenty thousand people were supported by 'the money the empire brought in'. At *Oik.* 2.6 Xenophon outlines the obligations that the state imposed on large landowners, noting that in time of war these became more onerous; for costs see Davies 1971: xxi-xxii.

⁵⁴ It is not intended to give the impression that the aristocracy at large was indifferent to the economic benefits that empire brought. Armed with the capital needed to exploit the resources of new territories, many of the wealthier citizens of this class doubtless benefited to a comparatively greater degree than the less well off. It was only when the enterprise began to falter, through what was seen as poor management, that the aristocratic body became disgruntled. See Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 29.1.

Dissatisfaction fuelled by failures in the war led, in 411, to a short-lived oligarchic revolution, in which the cavalry was certainly involved.⁵⁵ After the capitulation to Sparta in 404 the cavalry again played a role in revolutionary events, this time as enforcers of the rule of the Spartan-backed Thirty (Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 38.2). As Bugh puts it, the fact that the democratic leader, Thrasybulos, was only able to field seventy horsemen 'says much to confirm that the Athenian cavalry overwhelmingly supported oligarchic rule'.⁵⁶ Though he was probably too young to be involved in the events of 411, as argued above, Xenophon was probably a participant in the later upheaval. If so, judging from his own account of the period, this was a reluctant involvement, for in his reports of events he often expresses sympathy for the victims of the Thirty's tyranny (see, for instance, *Hell.* 2.4.13 ff). The question of Xenophon's positive attitude to democracy is looked at in more detail in the next chapter (2.2.4). There is no reason, however, to suppose that his core political convictions were different to his peers, nor is there compelling evidence to show that these convictions underwent transformation in the course of the *stasis*; it is furthermore the case, as argued in the next section, that *Hellenika* strikes a discernible note of personal *apologia* and Xenophon's narrative needs to be considered in this context.

With the restoration of the democracy in 403, and the city coming to terms with its defeat to Sparta and the loss of its empire, Xenophon cannot have been greatly optimistic about his future in Athens. When a letter arrived from Proxenos inviting him to travel to Asia to meet a Persian prince, he must have felt that a unique opportunity was at hand. In the circumstances, it is perhaps understandable that he disregarded the advice of Socrates and put a leading question to the god at Delphi.

3. DEPARTURE FROM ATHENS

The circumstances of Xenophon's departure from Athens are traditionally framed in the terms above. Given his presumed involvement with the harsh rule

⁵⁵ On this episode see Bugh 1988: 114-119.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 126. Cf. *Hell.* 2.4.25.

of the Thirty, and the ambition to which his subsequent adventures and writings testify, this explanation seems very reasonable. As Cawkwell memorably wrote, 'it was time for a young man with a taste for war and a distaste for democracy to be off'.⁵⁷ In this section and the following, I attempt to deepen and broaden the perspective on Xenophon's departure. First, I look critically at his evidence for the period 404-401 in *Hellenika*, and then, widening the focus to take in a range of contemporary materials, try to assess the political climate in Athens in this period and how this impacted on citizens of Xenophon's class. It is suggested that in his case, from his evidence in *Hellenika* and *Anabasis*, there are grounds for arguing that he left the city out of fear for his life. In Section 1.5 some of the factors in his personal background are reconsidered with a view to coming to a better understanding of how these might have influenced his decision to go or stay.

3.1. *Xenophon and the Thirty*

In the spring of 404 Athens surrendered to Sparta and, probably in September, under Lysander's gaze, a body of 30 was elected to 'codify the ancient laws as a basis for a new constitution' (*Hell.* 2.3.2).⁵⁸ Xenophon's initial judgement on the work of this group is negative (*Hell.* 2.3.11-12), and it continues in this vein as he recounts events in the short but bloody reign of the oligarchs. Nonetheless, it seems apparent from the circumstances of his age and background, and his evidence in *Hellenika*, that he was one of their enforcers. The cavalry was part of the armed wing of the Thirty and, as argued above, several of Xenophon's descriptions suggest that he himself was involved in actions. The extent to which he was involved in the most 'unjust' episodes would, as is shown, have been an important factor in determining his future

⁵⁷ Cawkwell 1972: 13.

⁵⁸ See note 64 below on the chronology of events in the period 404-03. There are four major historical sources for this period: Xenophon, *Hell.* 2.3-2.4.43; Diodoros 14 *passim*; Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 34.2-41.1; and Justin's epitome of Trogus 5.8.5-10.11. Rhodes (1981: 419), on the basis of differences in content and arrangement, considers that the accounts are independent of one another. Krentz (1982: 9) argues that Aristotle drew on the Oxyrhynchos Historian and that his account, 'especially in its order of events', is more accurate than Xenophon's. Other sources include Plutarch's *Life of Lysander*, Nepos's *Life of Thrasybulos*, and the Lysianic corpus, especially *Against Eratosthenes*, a speech delivered by the orator himself in 403 against a member of the Thirty.

following the restoration, although membership of the cavalry was in itself a determining factor. Before getting to his point of departure, however, the nature of his evidence for the period is considered.

The *Hellenika*, Xenophon's history of Greece from 411-362, was probably written in two parts, the first a continuation of Thucydides down to 404, the second from 404 to 362 (1-2.3.10 and 2.3.11-7.5.27 respectively).⁵⁹ His account of the Thirty comes in the second part and is the focus of its opening. This was probably written in the early 350s and was very likely one of his last works. A major question concerning Xenophon's *Anabasis* is why, 30 years or more after the event, he wrote his account of the march of the Ten Thousand. The same (type of) question is equally pressing with this part of *Hellenika*, composed at an even greater distance from the events described. In the case of *Anabasis* it is argued in the dissertation that the work is shaped to a significant degree by an apologetic agenda, and it seems to be that the same essential characterisation can be applied to this part of *Hellenika*. As Tuplin remarks of 2.3.11-7.5.27: 'it would be singular if it were written entirely without thoughts about Athens and what Athenians might learn from it. Indeed it is a virtually inescapable assumption that Xenophon expected the work to have, at least *inter alia*, an Athenian audience.'⁶⁰ As *apologia*, it is to Athenians and their posterity he is writing, his intention being to present his own participation in the regime of the Thirty Tyrants as comparatively benign. An examination of selected passages from *Hell.* 2.3.11-2.4.43 provides support for this case.

⁵⁹ See Cawkwell 1979: 18, Tuplin 1993: 11. Delebecque (1957: 39 ff.) believes that Xenophon was employed by Thucydides as a secretary in the last years of the fifth century and that the first two books of *Hellenika*, except 2.4.43, were written in this period, a suggestion which Higgins (1977: 169) dismisses as 'pure fantasy'. Neither does Cawkwell (1979: 28) regard favourably the idea that Xenophon began *Hellenika* while he was still in Athens. For arguments for a unitarian view, see Higgins 1977: 99-101, and especially Gray 1991. The chronology of Xenophon's works is considered in Section 1.6.

⁶⁰ Tuplin 1993: 33. See also Cuniberti 2009: 7. Dillery (1995: 139), who notes that Xenophon wanted to re-examine the events surrounding the Thirty at Athens, and that he did not have to, quantifies the extent of his treatment: 'Not counting the brief mention of their installation at 2.3.2-3, the Thirty's story extends (from 2.3.11 to 2.4.43) over twenty Oxford pages or more than a tenth of the entire history which covers almost fifty years; assuming that their rule extended from the summer of 404/3 to the summer of 403/2, no other year is covered in such detail in the *Hellenika*.'

2.3.15. This, at the outset of his defence, establishes two parties within the Thirty: one fronted by the extreme ideologue, Kritias, the other by the more moderate Theramenes.⁶¹ 'It is not reasonable,' he has the latter say to the former, 'to execute a man simply because he has been honoured by the democracy and when he has done no harm whatsoever to the aristocracy' (2.3.15, trans. Marincola, modified). (The division is reinforced through Theramenes at 2.3.38.) As becomes clear from his narrative — specifically his persistent criticism of the actions of Kritias — it is the moderate camp to which Xenophon is allied. The fact that he is not warm to Theramenes either (cf. 1.7.8, 2.2.16 ff.) underscores his self-representation as a man driven by justice and not self-interest.

2.4.20-22. In this speech, which he attributes to an esteemed herald, 'a man with an especially beautiful voice', Xenophon gives expression to the injustice that has befallen the city. Immediately following the appeal he writes that, 'the remaining leaders of the Thirty, affected by his words, led those who had marched out with them back to the city' (οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ ἄρχοντες καὶ διὰ τὸ τοιαῦτα προσακούειν τοὺς μεθ' αὐτῶν ἀπήγαγον εἰς τὸ ἄστυ, 2.4.22). At this stage at any rate, after eight months of the tyranny, the majority of the anti-democratic party was coming to the view that they were in the wrong, and there is little doubt that Xenophon is one of them.

2.4.26. A cavalry contingent led by Lysimakhos came upon a group on their way to collect provisions from their farms, and, in spite of their pleas for mercy, and strong opposition from many of his men, the commander had them put to death. This can be read as Xenophon alerting us to an oppositional structure within the

⁶¹ The presentation of characters and events in oppositional terms is characteristic of Xenophon's writing style, although the reality behind his stories is usually less straightforward. The apparently bloodthirsty Kritias, for instance, was a friend of Socrates, a student of oratory, and the author of two works on Sparta (DK 88 B 6-9, 32-7). Munn (2000: 218 ff.) argues that he had a vision to create a 'Spartan Athens'; Pownall 2009 re-examines Xenophon's portrait of Kritias in *Hellenika*, taking as her departure point recent positive reassessment of the fragments of his writing. Aristotle, while favourable towards Theramenes, points at the complexity of assessing his legacy (*Ath. Pol.* 28.5). For a consideration of the speeches of Kritias and Theramenes in *Hellenika* see Usher 1968.

corps: the few, at the top, are cruel and distant, while at the base the members are compassionate and have not lost touch with morality.⁶²

Episodes involving Socrates in *Hellenika*, *Memorabilia*, and the works of Plato which relate to this period are also deserving of attention, as is an example of intertextuality. At the opening of *Mem.* 4.4, writing of Socrates' unwavering commitment to the law, Xenophon tells of how he refused to obey any unlawful command of the Thirty, notably their ordering of him to arrest a citizen on a capital charge: 'when they commanded him and certain other citizens...he alone refused' (4.4.3). On the same incident Plato (*Seventh Letter* 324e-325a) writes: 'they [the Thirty] tried to send him, along with others, after one of the citizens, to fetch him by force that he might be put to death — their object being that Socrates, whether he wished or no, might be made to share in their political actions; he, however, refused to obey and risked the uttermost penalties rather than be a partaker in their unholy deeds. So when I beheld all these actions and others of a similar grave kind, I was indignant, and I withdrew myself from the evil practices then going on.' Xenophon is more reserved, but through his recounting of the episode he, too, as a disciple of Socrates, is dissociating himself from the rule of the Thirty. He is, furthermore, defending Socrates in this episode (as is Plato) by highlighting his concern for legality.

The episode in *Hellenika* (1.7.1-16) is still more concerned to defend Socrates. In it, Xenophon provides a dramatic account of the Arginousai trial, his purpose being, as Henry argues, to accentuate the extraordinary courage of Socrates' action in refusing to admit an illegal motion.⁶³ Again, in marking the probity of his teacher, Xenophon creates an implication about his own. Xenophon's elaborate defence of Socrates in *Anabasis* is argued for at length in Chapter 4.

⁶² Support for this indication of a division within the cavalry body may be found in an epitaph at the Kerameikos which records the years of birth (414/3) and death (394/3) of a cavalryman, Dexileos, killed at the Battle of Corinth (*IG II²* 6217). The detail of his life's span is unique in Attic epigraphy, and one explanation offered is that his family sought to emphasise that he would have been too young to have served in the cavalry under the Thirty. For details of the Dexileos dedication see Bugh 1988: 136-9.

⁶³ Henry 1966: 197. 'Now the development of this entire scene was obviously contrived with no other object in view than to set off the adamant refusal of the great philosopher in the face of overwhelming constraint. All objections that Xenophon in according Socrates only this one line is slighting him or that he does not recognise the meaning of his life are intolerable and can only arise from a profound misconception of the artistry of the description'.

The presence of Xenophon's apologetic agenda can be detected in a notable case of intertextuality between *Hellenika* and *Anabasis*. At two junctures in the latter, set in time (roughly) two years after the restoration of the democracy, he is at pains to emphasise both his immaturity (3.1.6) and his youthfulness (3.1.25). In so doing he furnishes a sympathetic contextualisation for his actions under the Thirty, whatever these may have been in fact, as a *hippeus*.

As in the case of *Anabasis*, what we have in *Hellenika* is scarcely an historical account at all, but rather an interlayered work of *apologia*, moral philosophy, and didacticism. The version of the events of 404-401 that Xenophon gives us needs, therefore, to be taken in this light. With the aim of gauging the political atmosphere in the city following the restoration in 403 I now turn to consider what Xenophon's account, and other contemporary documents, tell us about the status of the *hippeis* in this period.

3.2. Return of the Democracy

By September 403 the Thirty were marginalised and democracy restored.⁶⁴ Pausanias, the Spartan king, and a delegation sent from Sparta by the ephors, brokered a settlement on the following terms: 'that there was to be peace between both sides; that the men of the city and the men of Piraeus were each to depart to his own home, except for the Thirty and the Eleven and the Ten who had ruled in the Peiraieus' (*Hell.* 2.4.38). It was permitted as well that any of those who had been involved with the city party (τῶν ἐξ ὄστρωος) and were concerned about their security should be free to settle in Eleusis, to where the Thirty had gone in late 404 (*Hell.* 2.4.38, Diodoros 14.33.6).

Agreement to these terms by the democrats, the victors, seems to have been a magnanimous gesture. Large numbers of them had suffered injustice and

⁶⁴ Xenophon's chronology of events is vague at best, as it is in the rest of *Hellenika* (see Cawkwell 1979: 21, 154 note; Munn 2000: 340 ff.). Anderson (1974) holds the following broad datings for the events of 404-03: 404 spring – surrender of Athens; 404 autumn – Thirty assume power; 404-03 midwinter – Thrasyboulos seizes Phyle; 403 spring – defeat of Thirty (Kritias killed), the Thirty replaced by the Ten; 403 late summer – Restoration. The September terminus is given by Hornblower 1991: 183. Krentz (1982: 147-52), in a detailed consideration of the chronology, argues that the restoration occurred in October. See also Munn (2000, appendix D), and Rhodes 1981: 462 ff.

violence at the hands of the oligarchs; by the reckoning of the herald in the speech mentioned above, in the eight months of their reign, the Thirty had come close to killing more Athenians than the Peloponnesians did in ten years of war (*Hell.* 2.4.21).⁶⁵ Episodes reported by Xenophon include the arrest and execution of those 'least likely to submit to being pushed out of politics' (*Hell.* 2.3.14, 17), the execution of the male citizens of Eleusis (*Hell.* 2.4.9),⁶⁶ and the murder of people from Aixone (*Hell.* 2.4.26). Yet much of the evidence relating to the period, including Xenophon's, gives the distinct impression that the Pausanias amnesty was effective.⁶⁷ On the basis of these testimonies, some modern scholars appear to hold up the reconciliation as a proof of democracy's inherently more civilised nature. Finley writes:

In those two centuries [the fifth and fourth] Athens was, by all pragmatic tests, the greatest Greek state, with a powerful feeling of community, with a toughness and resilience tempered, even granted its imperial ambitions, by a humanity and sense of equity and responsibility quite extraordinary for its day (and for many another day as well). Lord Acton was one of the few historians to have grasped the historic significance of the amnesty of 403. 'The hostile parties,' he wrote, 'were reconciled, and proclaimed an amnesty, the first in history.' *The first in history*, despite all the familiar weaknesses, despite the crowd psychology, the slaves, the personal ambition of many leaders, the impatience of the majority with opposition.⁶⁸

There is cause to believe, however, that the reality may have been different, and certainly not as straightforward. Green writes:

⁶⁵ Aristotle says that the Thirty killed no less than fifteen hundred men (*Ath. Pol.* 35.4). See further Isokrates *Pan.* 113, *Areop.* 67, *In Lochitem* 11; Diodoros 14.5.6-7; Nepos 8.1.5.

⁶⁶ Lysias, *Against Eratosthenes* 52, gives three hundred as the number arrested and executed. He says as well that citizens of Salamis were among these victims.

⁶⁷ See, for example, *Hell.* 2.4.43; Lysias, *Mantitheos* 8; Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 40; Nepos 8.3.3. Rahn (1981: 111) concludes from a study of speeches delivered to Athenian juries in the period that there is evidence of 'a continual committal on the part of the audience (i.e., the jury), to the amnesty and the agreements made with the Spartans in 403 BC'.

⁶⁸ Finley 2004: 183. Sato 2008 makes a quieter and more convincing case for the effectiveness of the amnesty.

Scholars tend to overestimate the impact of the official amnesty between factions orchestrated by Pausanias in 403. Wars, and civil wars above all, are not so easily written off. Greeks and Irishmen have always had a special talent for *μνησικακία*, the nursing of ancient wrongs.⁶⁹

McKechnie expresses a similar view, seeing recriminations against those involved with the Thirty in the speeches of Lysias: 'The reason must be that, amnesty or no amnesty, the upheavals of 404/403 were not easily forgotten by the Athenians'.⁷⁰ The democracy, moreover, had shown itself during the war with the Peloponnesians to be capable of brutality and mercilessness in equal measure:⁷¹ a backlash was certainly expected by some if not all of those involved with the Thirty (see *Hell.* 2.4.23). And the first act of the victors, as Xenophon describes it, has a menace that is inconsistent with the view of humanity and tolerance suggested by some. Led by Thrasyboulos, carrying their arms, the democrats ascended the Akropolis and sacrificed to Athena; thereafter convening an assembly, the leader addressed the *ἐκ τοῦ ὄστρωος ἄνδρες* in what can only be characterised as uncompromising terms: 'Men of the city [he said] I advise you to know yourselves. And you would especially know yourselves if you attempted to define those qualities on which you pride yourselves so much that you would attempt to rule over us. Do you believe you are more righteous than we are?...Do you base your pride on the friendship of the Spartans? How can that be now, when they have handed you over, just as people collar and hand over vicious dogs, to the common people here, whom you have wronged — and having done that, they then turned and went home?' (*Hell.* 2.4.40-41).⁷² It seems likely, then, that vengeance was almost certainly

⁶⁹ Green 1994: 223.

⁷⁰ McKechnie 1989: 23. For an analysis of the post civil war trials see Wolpert 2002.

⁷¹ E.g. execution in 421 of adult males in Skione, enslavement of women and children, land given to Plataians (Thucydides 5.32.1); execution of Melian males in 416/5, women and children sold (Thucydides 5.84-116); execution of the six generals after Battle of Arginousai in 406 (*Hell.* 1.7); Assembly decree to cut off the right hand of every man taken alive after naval showdown with Sparta in 405 (*Hell.* 2.1.31). See also *Hell.* 2.2.3, 2.2.10.

⁷² The historicity of the speech has been questioned. B. Strauss (1986: 92), cited by Munn (2000: 418), dismisses it, along with the democrat's earlier speech at Mounykhia, as 'rather conventional...what Xenophon would have said had *he* been Thrasyboulos'. But Anderson (1974: 59) considers that the speech represents 'the substance of what Thrasyboulos actually said'. Gray (1989a: 103-106) too considers it authentic. Firm

taken. As Plato wrote of the restoration: 'it was not surprising that in some instances...men were avenging themselves on their foes fiercely' (*Seventh Letter* 325b).

We might make sense of the evidence if we speculate that the takeover was attended by a short burst of retribution, but that then the spirit of the reconciliation took hold. Yet there is striking evidence of enmity several years after the restoration. In 399, for instance, the Spartan commander Thibron, beginning campaigning in Asia Minor, asked Athens for 300 horsemen, whom he said would maintain himself.⁷³ The Athenians, Xenophon writes, 'sent those who had served in the cavalry under the Thirty, for they thought that it would be advantageous to the people if these men went abroad and died there' (οἱ δ' ἔπεμψαν τῶν ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα ἵππευσάντων, νομίζοντες κέρδος τῷ δήμῳ, εἰ ἀποδημοῖεν καὶ ἐναπόλοιντο, *Hell.* 3.1.4). In isolation this might be dismissed as Xenophon's gloss — it could be argued that the Athenians were honouring their treaty obligations to Sparta and that Xenophon's comment is personal bias rather than objective report⁷⁴ — but as is apparent from a speech of Lysias (26), even down to the late 380s cavalry service under the Thirty was regarded as a mark of untrustworthiness by the democracy.⁷⁵

evidence for a belligerent atmosphere comes from a speech delivered shortly thereafter by Lysias. He opens *Against Eratosthenes*: 'The difficulty that faces me, gentlemen of the jury, is not in beginning my accusation, but in bringing my speech to an end: so enormous, so numerous are the acts they [the Thirty] have committed'. On the subject see further Usher 1968.

⁷³ Diodoros in his summary does not mention this, although even in a more comprehensive account it need not have been included. Diodoros and his method are discussed in Chapter 3.1.1.

⁷⁴ Gray (2007: 17-18) characterises these men as criminals, though there seems to be no basis for such a judgement, certainly not in Xenophon's account.

⁷⁵ In his speech, *On the Scrutiny of Evandros*, dated to 382, Lysias writes: 'Suppose that he were now under scrutiny for admission to the Council, and he had his name registered on the tablets as having served in the cavalry under the Thirty: even without an accuser you would reject him' (26.10). See further the *Panegyrikos* (esp. 110-114) of Isokrates, dated to 380 or later. On animosity towards the cavalry following the amnesty see Green 1994: 223, Bugh 1988: 151, McKechnie 1989: 23, Spence 1993: 217, 219. Krentz's (1982: 145-6) suggestion that hardcore supporters of the Thirty could have escaped blame and condemnation 'by claiming that they had been forced to submit to a cruel and oppressive government' seems to me to be somewhat naïve. For a terminus to the hostility we might look to Xenophon's *Hipparkhikos*, which was probably written in the 360s (see Section 1.6).

What might be the truth of all this? Undoubtedly in the democratic faction agreeing to and, according to several contemporary reporters, upholding (broadly) the reconciliation of Pausanias, there was a strong element of *realpolitik*. The democrats could not afford to irritate Sparta, who showed her intentions in subjecting democratic Elis in the Elean War (403/01), and they needed stability if their system was to flourish again. Relevant to this last point is the fact that the oligarchs maintained a base at Eleusis and with or without Spartan support they remained a threat to stability in Attica.⁷⁶ That the democrats were alive to this danger is clear in the action of Archinos, who, in clear contravention of the Pausanias peace, moved to limit the numbers from the city party who were apparently readying to go there pursuant to the amnesty (Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 40.1). Nonetheless, Eleusis was a credible centre of opposition and as such acted as a check on the excesses of the democracy, whose supporters lived now in the knowledge that pogroms could provoke a renewed civil war or even a full-scale Spartan invasion.⁷⁷ More from circumstance than by choice, then, did they confine their collective retribution to recalling the *katastaseis* from the cavalry, now the symbol for democrats of oligarchic repression.⁷⁸ The *hippeis*, together with those from the city party who 'chose' to remain under the democracy, and who had not been involved in atrocities during the war, can have felt a degree of security, though not much.

The political landscape was to change somewhat in 401 when the remnants of the Thirty — supposedly recruiting mercenaries for a campaign (see further below) — were lured out of their bolthole in Eleusis to attend a meeting with the

⁷⁶ Eleusis was the Attic stronghold nearest to the Peloponnese. The link between the oligarchic faction and Sparta (or at least Lysander) was strong throughout. It was Lysander who effectively installed the Thirty (Diodoros 14.3.4-7), and Xenophon has their leader, Kritias, express loyalty to Sparta (*Hell.* 2.3.25). When the oligarchs began to run into trouble late in their reign they sent for, and received, assistance from Sparta. Rahn (1981: 113) argues that the democrats looked to Pausanias as a counterweight to Lysander, though he may overplay the significance of the schism between the two men in terms of its effect on Spartan foreign policy. Sparta was not traditionally known for a fondness towards democracies.

⁷⁷ Bugh (1988: 130-31) offers a different view on the oligarchs continued presence in Eleusis, namely that it 'served as a constant reminder of the troubled times but a few years past'. It surely did, but its significance was more than just symbolic.

⁷⁸ For a consideration of social attitudes to the cavalry before and after the Thirty see Spence 1993: 211 ff., especially 216-218. On the recalling of the *katastaseis* see Lysias, *In Defence of Mantitheos* 6-7; a fragment from another of his speeches, *Against Theozotides*, dated to 403/2, suggests that the *sitos* allowance given to the cavalrymen was reduced at this time. On this see Bugh 1988: 131-133.

democratic side. In an episode strikingly similar to events involving the leadership of the Ten Thousand in Mesopotamia in the same year (cf. *An.* 2.5), they were seized and put to death. A reconciliation with those inside the town was initiated by the democrats and the civil war formally came to an end. 'Both parties then swore not to remember past doings, and to this day they live as fellow citizens and the people abide by their oaths' (καὶ ὁμόσαντες ὄρκους ἧ μὴν μὴ μνησικακήσειν, ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὁμοῦ τε πολιτεύονται καὶ τοῖς ὄρκοις ἐμμένει ὁ δῆμος, *Hell.* 2.4.43). With this pocket of radical oligarchs removed, the immediate check on the democracy was lifted. Its show of making an amnesty was doubtless intended to succour Sparta — a public gesture of reassurance now that its foothold in Attica had been removed. As Xenophon's subsequent revelation about Thibron and the Athenian cavalry shows, it was not wholly genuine.⁷⁹

It was in the year of the Eleusis amnesty that Xenophon left Athens.⁸⁰ His departure — probably in April — may be unconnected, but it may not have been coincidental that he left the city in the period that this last pocket of the faction he was associated with was eliminated.⁸¹ His statement in *Hellenika* that 'both parties then swore not to remember past doings, and to this day they live as fellow citizens and the people abide by their oaths' (2.4.43) *could* have been written to avoid any suspicion by posterity that he had fled the city out of fear for his own life. In *Anabasis*, when he recalls the reason for his leaving Athens to join Cyrus, he pointedly makes no reference to the political situation in the city

⁷⁹ To be added to this are the trials of influential anti-democrats which took place in the same year (399). Green (1994: 225) writes: 'the suppression of the Eleusis faction seems to have encouraged the democrats to take further covert action against their opponents: it is in this atmosphere that the different yet related trials of Andokides and Socrates — both early in 399, each in its own way politics masquerading as religion — should be evaluated'. A speech of Aiskhines (1.173) shows clearly that the official charges against Socrates — impiety, and corrupting the youth — were not the reasons why everyone thought he had been put to death. The 'sophist', he says, was put to death 'because he was shown to have been the teacher of Kritias, one of the Thirty who put down the Democracy'.

⁸⁰ The 401 dating of the Eleusis amnesty is given by Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 40.4, by way of Xenainetos' archonship. See also Hornblower 1991: 183, Spence 1993: 217, and Waterfield 2006: 50. Munn (2000: 284) suggests the beginning of Xenainetos' year (June 401) for the fall of Eleusis. Green (1994: 224-5) stretches the date to 401/0, so allowing him to suggest that the mercenaries the Thirty were recruiting could be those being commanded by Xenophon in Thrace in the winter of 400. See further Section 1.5.2 below.

⁸¹ For starting dates for Cyrus's expedition see Brennan 2008.

at this time, other than giving us the reason why Socrates was concerned with his plan — that involvement with Cyrus could cause him trouble with the authorities (ὁ Σωκράτης ὑποπτεύσας μή τι πρὸς τῆς πόλεως ὑπαίτιον εἶη Κύρω φίλον γενέσθαι, 3.1.5). There is no reason to suspect that this advice was not given, and it would be unfair to imply that Socrates was invoked by Xenophon to better obscure some other reason(s), but *Anabasis* may not tell the whole story.⁸² (On the matter of the democracy's attitude to Xenophon joining Cyrus, I am inclined to think that it rather would have been glad to see another *hippeus* live and die in a foreign land, though of course Socrates is correct in seeing that joining the prince could also provide grounds for action against him in the future. One of the ironies here is that had Xenophon stayed in Athens, there is every chance he would have ended up where he did, fighting with Thibron in Asia in 399.)

The strongest argument against this hypothesis is the presence of at least 300 horsemen in Athens in 399. Clearly, if the decapitation of the Eleusis opposition had caused serious unease among the *hippeis*, most would have left in 401.⁸³

⁸² What does seem to be true, or at least admissible to say, is that Xenophon is content to have readers associate the cause of his exile with his involvement with Cyrus the Younger. This is a sense strengthened only a few paragraphs on (3.1.10) when, in what might be a defence to a charge of association with the prince, he asserts that he was not aware of his true purpose when he joined the expedition. Whatever his intention was, later writers – Diogenes Laertios 2.58 (but cf. 2.51), Dio Chrysostom 8.1, Pausanias 5.6.5 – cited his association with Cyrus the Younger as the reason for his exile from Athens.

⁸³ *Anabasis* provides some evidence for a departure of Athenian officers, though not for an exodus, and of course some or all of these men may already have been exiles. Amphikrates, Kephisodoros, Phrasias, and Polykrates are named as captains, and Lykios is the commander of the cavalry; an Ariston is one of three ambassadors chosen by the army at Kotyora to sail to Sinope; Gnesippos and Theopompos appear in situations that suggest them to be senior figures. There may well have been other Athenians in the force not mentioned by Xenophon. The presence of these men in a mercenary enterprise may be unusual; it is tempting to imagine that they thought service with a prince, even a barbarian one, was preferable to life in a democracy (see further below on Cyrus recruiting at Eleusis, and also Bugh 1988: 151, and Roy 1967: 307-308), though it is equally likely that they could have joined for financial reasons; Delebecque (1957: 90-92) thinks that Xenophon did. Rahn (1981: 104), and Green (1994: 222), argue that Xenophon had had his property confiscated. The latter argues that his sale of his horse in 399, 'a truly desperate measure for a *hippeus*', is evidence that he 'clearly had no home funds on which to draw'. But aside from the practical reason that drawing on home funds from abroad would have been difficult (an anachronism?), the key point must be that Xenophon was able to *leave* Athens with one or more horses of his own, together with his groom and his mount, and that he was capable of supporting this entourage for several months at least (cf. 4.2.20, where Xenophon refers to his shield-bearer deserting him in Kurdistan). Owning just one

Clearly too, if Xenophon had been guilty of a serious crime during the terror of the Thirty, he would have left the city considerably earlier, or else risked coming to a bad end. So we can probably conclude that his links with the Thirty were not the main reason for his departure in 401. But there is another possibility: that he was one of those who went to Eleusis in accordance with the reconciliation brokered by Pausanias. Large numbers of the city party apparently intended to do so, and only extreme actions by the democrats prevented an exodus (Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 40.1-2). Some support for this might be found at *Hell.* 2.4.43, where there is an apparent temporal lacuna: with the words ὑστέρῳ δὲ χρόνῳ he moves from the victory speech of Thrasybulos in 403, to the showdown with the oligarchs at Eleusis in 401. Although omissions are not at all uncharacteristic of Xenophon, there are at the same time grounds here to argue that his knowledge of life in Athens in the interval was limited.

In this scenario Xenophon's actual role in the tyranny could have been more compromising, in which case he would have been primed to leave Attica when there were signs that the democracy was setting its sights on Eleusis. His statement in *Hellenika* that 'the men at Eleusis were trying to hire foreign soldiers' (2.4.43) is indicative of an escalation in tension which, notwithstanding his own consecutive linking of the hiring and the marching out of the democracy, will probably have built over a period of time. It can now be remarked that by early 401, Cyrus the Younger was drawing together his forces for his attempt on the Persian throne. Recruitment of Greek soldiers was his priority, and Eleusis, populated with disenfranchised anti-democrats, must have been regarded as fertile ground. Notably, as Munn points out, it was the place where 'less than two years earlier Lysander had assembled a mercenary force to protect his allies in Attica'.⁸⁴ What this could reveal, then, is Xenophon disguising the real reason why, and how, he came to join the expedition. As a compromised junior figure in the tyranny, he felt obliged to leave Attica when the end for the anti-democratic pocket seemed in sight; and rather than it being

horse, Spence (1993: 193) comments, 'marked an Athenian as possessing considerably larger financial resources than those of the average citizen'. See 3.3.19 (Xenophon has a number of horses – ὄρῳ δὲ ἵππους ὄντας ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι, τοὺς μὲν τινας παρ' ἐμοί), and 1.2.12 (Cyrus's first payment to the men came 4 months after they had set out, and wages thereafter were irregular).

⁸⁴ Munn 2000: 283. The friendship between Cyrus the Younger and Lysander may be significant here. See *Hell.* 1.5.1-7; *Oik.* 4.20-5.

an invitation and a visit to Delphi which saw him on his way to Cyrus, it was the latter's agents circulating about Eleusis who provided the incentive. This reading of events does not necessarily imply that his account of how he consulted with Socrates about the expedition (*An.* 3.1.5) is a fiction, though the historicity of the episode does become more suspect.⁸⁵

4. SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I GO?

With the democracy resurgent, Xenophon may, then, have felt it prudent to leave Attica in 401. On the other hand, *Hell.* 2.4.43 could be taken at face value, and whether he had been living at Athens, Eleusis, or elsewhere in Attica, there was — as he wanted us to believe — no threat to his life at this point. In this case, and with the aim of broadening the perspective on his departure, this section considers other reasons or causes which could have lain behind his decision.

4.1. *The Influence of Socrates*

Xenophon's writings on Socrates point to a meaningful connection between the men; his revelation that he consulted with him on the subject of Proxenos' invitation to join Cyrus the Younger in Asia is indicative of a confidential relationship by 401.⁸⁶ Xenophon's writings, through their more or less didactic character, furthermore leave the impression that he saw himself as an active pupil of the teacher, himself imparting through his corpus the wisdom he considers he has benefited from.

Though Socrates himself had no need for it, the idea of travelling to learn — the journey to knowledge conceived of as an outward movement — was a long-

⁸⁵ According to the terms of the original amnesty, 'those living at Eleusis were not allowed to visit the city of Athens, nor were those living at Athens allowed to visit Eleusis' (Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 39.2). Socrates is supposed to have rarely set foot outside of the city, and he was an opponent of the Thirty, so the meeting is not likely to have happened at Eleusis.

⁸⁶ For such a momentous decision, it would have been normal for a young man to take advice from his father, a fact that prompts Anderson (1974: 79) to believe that Gryllos had died. Xenophon, at various junctures in the oeuvre, stresses the importance of the paternal relationship: see *Kyro.* 8.1.1, and note *An.* 7.6.38.

established way of broadening the mind.⁸⁷ Exemplary wise men were often interminable travellers, as for instance Solon, Thales, Hekataios, and Pythagoras. For young men, moreover, it was something akin to a rite of passage, a returning home in a state of maturity.⁸⁸ Set alongside this is the impression from his treatises and travelogues that Xenophon preferred to be putting his learning into practice rather than sharing in the types of activities that earned Socrates the reputation of 'being an idle chatterer who measures the air' (*Oik.* 11.3).⁸⁹ Xenophon, then, may have decided that travel — seeing places, meeting people, and informing himself about different *nomoi* — offered the most suitable path towards self-improvement (see the epigram of Diogenes Laertios, 2.58). There is evidence for this, I suggest, in his account in *Anabasis* of how he came to join Cyrus in Asia. In this he is at pains to stress that he did not join in a military capacity, balancing this statement with a strong conjunction, ἀλλά, in order to emphasise what his reason was — to become friends with Cyrus, who was highly regarded by Proxenos, a guest-friend of Xenophon's and also a pupil of Gorgias (2.6.16; Diogenes Laertios 2.49).

Among the Greeks there was one Xenophon, an Athenian, who followed the army neither as a general nor a captain nor a common soldier. But rather Proxenos, an old guest-friend of his, had sent for him from his home, promising if he would come to make him friends with Cyrus, whom he said he considered to be better for himself than his fatherland was (3.1.4, trans. Ambler, modified).⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Socrates apparently never set foot outside of Athens except on military service. See Plato, *Krito* 52b; Diogenes Laertios, 2.22.

⁸⁸ Cf. Whitmarsh 2001: 280-81. Howland (2000: 878) remarks that the ascent - the journey from death to life, darkness to light, confusion to clarity - is by this time a well established paradigm of education.

⁸⁹ See further Aristophanes, *Clouds* 1485. In what some take as an important revelation of his writing aims, at *Kyn.* 13.7 Xenophon writes that he wishes his work 'not to seem useful, but to be so' (οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν αὐτὰ βούλομαι μᾶλλον ἢ εἶναι χρήσιμα). The authenticity of this book has been a subject of discussion, though Gray's 1985 study has dampened most of the speculation.

⁹⁰ Ἦν δέ τις ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ Ξενοφῶν Ἀθηναῖος, ὃς οὔτε στρατηγὸς οὔτε λοχαγὸς οὔτε στρατιώτης ὦν συνηκολούθει, ἀλλὰ Πρόξενος αὐτὸν μετεπέμψατο οἴκοθεν ξένος ὦν ἀρχαῖος· ὑπίσχεντο δὲ αὐτῷ, εἰ ἔλθοι, φίλον αὐτὸν Κύρω ποιήσειν, ὃν αὐτὸς ἔφη κρείττω ἑαυτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος. 3.1.4.

We may presume that Proxenos' high estimation of Cyrus is related to his character, the high quality of which is attested to by Xenophon in his later obituary of the prince (1.9).⁹¹ From the obituary we are led to understand that Cyrus was a desirable model for young aristocrats aspiring to excellence in rulership, and as such we can imagine that Socrates — whom Xenophon famously consulted about whether or not to join Cyrus (3.1.5) — would have supported the initiative of the young philosophers.⁹² This argument is developed in Chapter 4.1 when this key introductory passage is considered more fully.

4.2. Other factors

We do not know what Xenophon did in the years 403-01, though it is probable that he kept a low profile. The family estate in Erkhia would have been a logical place for him to be based. Following years of disruption, no doubt there was much work to be done, and there is ample testimony of Xenophon's concern for estate management in his writings. It is possible that in this period he began writing. The first part of *Hellenika*, a continuation of Thucydides, is, by general consensus, believed to have been written earlier than the rest of the work and some think it may have been authored in Athens.⁹³ Doubtless, he also kept his horses and his horsemanship skills sharp. He may also have married, twenty-five to thirty being the normal age to do so for upper-class Athenians.⁹⁴ Yet for all that he may have come to feel a sense of under-achievement: a *hippeus* groomed for government (see *P.H.* 2.1), he was too young to have played any significant role in the Peloponnesian War and may now have been permanently tainted by his association with a badly failed regime. The requirement for candidate office-holders to undergo *dokimasia* meant that he faced the prospect

⁹¹ Although the obituary is written in glowing terms, in the preceding narrative Xenophon paints a more complex picture of Cyrus, which in the end does not add up to a model of an ideal leader. See further Chapter 3.3.2.

⁹² See *Oik.* 4.18, where Socrates declares: 'Yes, by Zeus, to be sure, if Cyrus had lived, he would, I think, have proved himself an excellent ruler'. Socrates is sceptical in this case because Cyrus had been a key factor in the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War and Xenophon's association with him could provoke a reaction from the government. The fact that neither Xenophon nor Socrates seem concerned about the Persian's role in their city's defeat may reveal something about their attitude towards the democracy.

⁹³ Delebecque (1957: 39 ff.) believes that Xenophon was employed by Thucydides as a secretary in the last years of the fifth century and that the first two books of *Hellenika*, except 2.4.43, were written in this period.

⁹⁴ Cf. Hesiod, *Erga* 695-697. See Pomeroy 1994: 3, Roy 2004: 272.

of having his conduct during the reign of the Thirty scrutinised by unsympathetic officials. More generally, for Xenophon's generation there must have been a sense of living, literally, in the shadow of the city's golden age. The grand architecture of the Akropolis was now as much a reminder of lost power and status as once it had been the symbol of those things. In the circumstances, it would be understandable if he was alert for opportunities beyond Attica to forge a fulfilling life for himself.

At the same time, there were attractions outside of Athens, more accessible now that war was suspended. As a youth on visits to the city, Xenophon would have glimpsed a world of strange sounding tongues and wares, and from multiple vantage points about Attica he would have seen boats trailing in and out of the Peiraieus.⁹⁵ The Athenians, doubtless because of their links to the sea and the consequent open nature of their economy and society, were more inclined towards travel than other Hellenes.⁹⁶ Though this was driven by commerce, *theoria* as an added-value part of the experience came to be increasingly emphasised. Describing the momentous decision of his countrymen to sail on Sicily, Thucydides writes that, 'the young men of military age longed for foreign travel and the sights abroad, quite confident of a safe return' (τοῖς δ' ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ τῆς τε ἀπούσης πόθῳ ὄψεως καὶ θεωρίας, καὶ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες σωθήσεσθαι, 6.24.3).⁹⁷

⁹⁵ In his autobiography, W.B. Yeats (1955: 15) reminisces of childhood summers spent in the port city of Sligo. 'All my dreams were of ships; and one day a sea-captain who had come to dine with my grandfather put a hand on each side of my head and lifted me up to show me Africa.'

⁹⁶ See Montiglio 2005, chapter 6, especially 119-120. Montiglio sees in Aiskhylos' *Suppliants* and *Prometheus Bound* a reflection of the 'growing fascination with "spectacles" of foreign lands' among Athenians (120). (Casson (1994: 85) maintains that Athens itself, with its architecture and glorious history, developed into a major tourist attraction from the second half of the fifth century, though one imagines that not many visitors came during the war.)

⁹⁷ The principal reasons for travel were trade, pilgrimage, war, health, tourism, and philosophy. An important factor in the growth of tourism from the fifth century was the development of infrastructure, roads and inns in particular (modern economists note a positive relationship between new roads and the number of cars on the road).

There was no shortage of possible destinations for Xenophon to consider. Egypt, with its ageless monuments, was apparently a favourite of the Greeks.⁹⁸ Anatolia will also have held strong appeal. Realm of the Great King and of great kingdoms past, the landmass was a source of intrigue and fascination for the Greeks. In an examination of their social life, Mahaffy wrote: 'There seems no doubt that even about Solon's time educated Athenians considered a visit to Asia Minor, and to the splendid court of Lydia, just as necessary as our young noblemen once considered a visit to the French court, then the perfection of refinement and elegance.'⁹⁹ If not quite how it may have been, certainly no small number of Greeks made their way to the eastern Mediterranean and beyond to travel and seek fame and fortune. Ktesias, a wanderer from the port of Knidos who became the physician of the Persian King, may be an exception, but the fact that, on his own account, he became a member of the Royal Court and a confidant of the Queen underlines what possibility existed for the adventurous and the ambitious.¹⁰⁰

4.3. Stay

Granted there were a number of reasons why Xenophon might have chosen to leave Athens, it is the case, too, that there would have been forces pulling in the opposite direction. In this final part of the section I touch briefly on some of these factors.

As the later biographies of other *hippeis* demonstrate (see especially Lysias, *In Defence of Mantitheos* 8), a political future in the city cannot have been completely ruled out. Xenophon himself is at pains to advertise the efficacy of the amnesty (*Hell.* 2.4.43), though his subsequent revelation about the 300 sent

⁹⁸ Herodotus 3.139. Aristotle, writing of Solon (*Ath. Pol.* 11.1), says that he 'went abroad to Egypt for trading purposes and also to see the country'. See also Herodotus 1.30.

⁹⁹ Mahaffy 1875: 147.

¹⁰⁰ Successful Greeks abroad. Xenophon reports that Tissaphernes, the Persian satrap, employed a Greek as a military adviser (*An.* 2.1.7); Greek sculptors are said to have worked on the mausoleum at Halikarnassos (Hornblower 1982: 240 names six); Greek learned men found audiences in high places (see Herodotus 1.30), though they often had to engage in trade to pay their way (cf. Plutarch, *Solon* 2.4. The career of Ktesias tends to polarise commentators, some believing his account of his life and times accurate, others that he never in fact left the environs of Knidos. See further Chapter 3.1.3.

out to Thibron (*Hell.* 3.1.4) somewhat undercuts the 'oaths' statement. What comes across in some of his later works, especially *Hipparkhikos* and *Poroi*, is his concern for the welfare of Athens; it could be speculated that if he was moved to act so after he had been exiled, it would follow that he had a desire as a younger man to help get his city back on its feet. A strong hint of this, or at least of a non-hostile attitude toward the democracy on his part, is his repeated stated desire to return home in *Anabasis*.¹⁰¹

The family estate in Erkhia might have been another reason for staying put.¹⁰² As remarked above, by this time his father may have passed away and no siblings are mentioned in the sources. In any event, with his avid interest in land, we might expect that he would have welcomed the opportunity now to apply and develop his knowledge. At this stage, too, he may already have been married and wished to begin a family, although in contemplating a venture abroad he presumably did not imagine he would be away for as long as turned out.¹⁰³ Last but not least there was Socrates, whose wisdom and humanity seems to have instilled in all of his followers a singular devotion. In short, there were ties of family, land, and friendship which Xenophon will not have contemplated severing lightly.

5. XENOPHON THE TRAVELLER

5.1. *On the Road*

However he came to his decision, in spring 401 Xenophon sailed for Ionia from the Peiraieus with his horse and attendant. For the next two years they would

¹⁰¹ Gray 2007: 17 makes this point with reference to his view of democracy. Against this, it could be argued that his wish to return home was to support, or be a part of, the surviving opposition to the restored regime. See note 183 below for instances of Xenophon's airing of his desire to go home in *Anabasis*.

¹⁰² Green (1994: 222) believes that the estate was confiscated after the death of Theramenes, citing in support of his view the fact that Xenophon had to sell his horse in 399 to pay for his planned return home. However, the very fact that he was able to leave Athens with at least one horse is good evidence that he had resources to draw on in 401 (cf. note 83 above).

¹⁰³ *An.* 7.6.34 indicates that Xenophon had no children when he left Athens, but that he did wish to have a family.

travel through Anatolia, Syria, Mesopotamia and European Thrace (see map, Appendix I).¹⁰⁴ These are said to be the most illuminated years of Xenophon's life, for he records major events concerning himself in this period in his *Anabasis*. However, as has already been noted, there are problems with taking the work as an autobiographical source. Although his movements are closely tracked in this intense period, and he is the focus of attention from the third book onwards, it is not certain that we get a true insight into Xenophon's personal life and his experiences on the march. As argued in the course of this dissertation, the Xenophon of *Anabasis* is an exemplary figure, a young Athenian and pupil of Socrates behaving as a pupil of Socrates would have done had he found himself in similar circumstances.

Xenophon remained in mercenary service when his journey with the Cyreans concluded in Ionia in 399. Hired by the Spartans to lead the same mercenaries in a war of liberation against Persia, he served first under Thibron, then Derkylidas, and Agesilaos. Xenophon deals with the events of this period in *Hellenika* but does not make any explicit mention of himself. In *Anabasis* (5.3.6) he informs us that he returned to Greece with Agesilaos.¹⁰⁵ Judging from the detail of his account (*Hell.* 4.3.15-23), he seems to have been at the Battle of Koroneia that summer (394) though there is disagreement about whether or not he fought.¹⁰⁶ Xenophon, as is apparent from his encomium of the Spartan king,

¹⁰⁴ Xenophon sold his horse in Lampsakos for lack of funds to return home, though it was returned to him again in Ophrynon (*An.* 7.8.6). He refers to a shield-bearer (ὑπασπιστής) who deserted him in Kardouchia (4.2.20), and he may have had other attendants who accompanied him through his travels. The shield-bearer may have been on horseback or, perhaps like Xanthias in Aristophanes' *Frogs*, he rode a donkey.

¹⁰⁵ Agesilaos was recalled to assist Sparta in 394 (*Ages.* 1.36). It seems likely that this was the first occasion on which Xenophon returned to Greece since his departure in 401. Humble (2002: 78) unearths the view of Grote (1865: 565) that he returned to Athens after the death of Socrates, and then went back to Asia Minor to continue his service with Sparta, but this scenario has no modern support. Xenophon gives an account of the march home at *Hell.* 4.3 and *Ages.* 2.1 ff.

¹⁰⁶ From *Hell.* 4.3.15, 17, it seems likely that the Cyrean force ('the foreign contingent that Herippidas commanded') fought. Plutarch, *Agesilaos* 18.2, believes Xenophon did as well, an assertion accepted by Cawkwell 1976: 63, and Tuplin 1998b: 781. Krentz, on the other hand, writes (1989: 2): 'this is only Plutarch's interpretation of *An.* 5.3.6. Xenophon implies that he was present out of friendship for Agesilaos rather than hostility for Athens, and twice states that Herippidas (not he himself) commanded the Cyrean unit (*Hell.* 4.2.4, 3.15-18; [*Xen.*] *Ages.* 2.10-11)'. But Xenophon never mentions himself at all in *Hellenika*, and if he was not involved in some way in the combat, what was he doing on the battlefield? It is striking that in *Anabasis* he states that he was not following Cyrus in a military capacity (3.1.4), yet he rides out to meet him from the

was a great admirer of Agesilaos. His close association with him over many years can be understood in the same way as his relationship with Socrates and with Cyrus the Younger. Here again, Xenophon was following an exceptional character in order to learn and to develop himself.

5.2. Exile

At some time in 399 or later, a decree was passed in Athens banishing Xenophon.¹⁰⁷ The reason(s) for the order is not known, though if the date of the decree of Euboulos (Diogenes Laertios 2.59) could be established, the matter would be clearer. Broadly, an earlier banishment would point to Xenophon's associations with Cyrus, and Socrates, while a later one would suggest that his continued involvement with the Spartans was the cause. In any case, some form of *prodosia* is likely to have been the basis of the charge laid against him.¹⁰⁸ The question of Xenophon's exile, impinging as it does on the interrelationships between Athens, Sparta, and Persia on the one hand, and on his personal writing motivation on the other, is an important one. Notwithstanding the paucity of ancient evidence for his exile, there has been much written in modern times on the subject.¹⁰⁹ In this section I provide an overview of the main scholarly positions and argue that the matter was bound up with the efforts of the restored democracy to re-establish itself at home and abroad. The important matter of Xenophon's response to his exile is dealt with in Chapter 3.3.

Greek line so as to learn 'if he had any announcement to make' immediately prior to the battle at Kounaxa (1.8.15).

¹⁰⁷ The *terminus post quem* for the decree is provided by a passage in *Anabasis* (7.7.57): Xenophon is in Thrace getting ready to return home and remarks, οὐ γάρ πω ψῆφος αὐτῷ ἐπῆκτο Ἀθήνησι περὶ φυγῆς. Several scholars have interpreted the 'not yet' as meaning that the decree was then imminent (Erbse 2010: 483, Anderson 1974: 148, Higgins 1977: 23), though Tuplin (1987: 60) does not think the term carries this meaning: 'Xenophon is merely giving an incidental explanation (for the benefit of readers who know him as "the Athenian exile") of how he could even think of going home'. See also Rahn 1981: 118. For the process of how decrees were voted on and passed see Woodhead 1981: 39; for the terminology of exile see Dillery 2007: 52.

¹⁰⁸ Undesirable political associations were a common basis for exile; professional failure, as seems to be the case with Thucydides, was another.

¹⁰⁹ Ancient writers referring to Xenophon's exile: Diogenes Laertios 2.51, 58, 59; Dio Chrysostom *Or.* 8.1; Plutarch, *On Exile* 10; Pausanias 5.6.5.

Tuplin lists seven postulated combinations of date and cause for Xenophon's exile. According to him, the most common are (1) Date — 399, Cause — association with Cyrus's rebellion against Artaxerxes, and (2) Date — 394/3, Cause — association with the Spartans, especially participation in the Battle of Koroneia in August 394.¹¹⁰ His own study leads to: Date — late 395/4 or beginning 394/3, Cause — supporting Cyrus and Iaconism.¹¹¹ While the cause, or one of them, is likely to be true, this dating, as is argued below, is less persuasive.

Subsequent studies of the problem by Badian and Green are worth noting.¹¹² Badian dismisses Xenophon's joining Cyrus as the cause of exile on the implied grounds that the decree would have been passed when, or soon after, he had left for Asia in 401.¹¹³ In his view, 'it was only when it became clear that [Xenophon] intended to stay at Sparta, after his going there with Agesilaos, that the Athenians were seriously upset'.¹¹⁴ His establishment of the Battle of Koroneia as a *terminus post quem* for the exile decree rests on the belief that Xenophon could not have made an offering at the Athenian treasury at Delphi, where he (probably) went with Agesilaos following the battle in August 394 (*Hell.* 4.3.21), had he been an exile.¹¹⁵ I disagree with this view on the practical grounds that no one was likely to stop Xenophon enriching the sanctuary, all the more so as he was in the company of a victorious Spartan king;¹¹⁶ as argued

¹¹⁰ Tuplin 1987: 59-60.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.* 68. This view is shared by Dillery 1998: 4-5.

¹¹² Green 1994 and Badian 2004. Other treatments include: Erbse 2010 - argues that the cause of exile was taking part in the march against the Persian King; Rahn 1981 - political circumstances at Athens the cause, date 394/3; and more briefly Lipka 2002 - participation at Koroneia, and devotion to Sparta in general, the causes, and date 394. David Thomas believes that the decree dates to the outbreak of the Corinthian War in 395: not wishing to antagonise the King, Athens recalled her horsemen, and Xenophon failed to comply, so earning his exile (conversation with author). Bradley (2001: 77) identifies what may be an authorial hint on the cause of exile at 7.6.35, but the reference - that he had incurred the hatred of people more powerful than him - is too vague to make anything of it.

¹¹³ Badian 2004: 41, as Breitenbach 1967: 1575.

¹¹⁴ Badian 2004: 42. This view is echoed by Lesky 1963: 664, and Lipka 2002: 3-4.

¹¹⁵ Badian 2004: 41. See Plutarch, *Agesilaos* 19.

¹¹⁶ For comparison see *Hell.* 3.2.22, 26: Agis prevented from sacrificing at Olympia by the Eleans and his return to the sanctuary as victor. M. Scott (2010: chap. 2 *passim*) discusses the control and management of Olympia and Delphi and suggests that dedicators had greater flexibility as to the placement of their votives in the latter place. On Xenophon's offering at Delphi, it is notable that Diogenes implies that he had already made it by the time of his visit with Agesilaos: of the money which he had in

later in the dissertation, Xenophon was contemptuous of the decree against him, and his dedication may be seen as a symbolic expression of this.

Green opts for the earlier date, 399. He takes a broader view on the problem, rightly asserting that 'if any progress is to be made, it must be through careful scrutiny of context and background'.¹¹⁷ However, his resulting hypothesis is, as regards cause if not date, flawed on the basis of his argument that the democracy believed Xenophon might lead the Cyreans to Attica to support the remnants of the oligarchic faction.¹¹⁸ To the best of our knowledge the radical pocket at Eleusis was eliminated in 401 — Munn thinks at the beginning of the archonship of Xenainetos, June 401¹¹⁹ — upon which, as Green notes, 'the separatist movement collapsed'.¹²⁰ Unless he intends the elimination to have taken place a full year later than this (he places the attempt of the Eleusis diehards to raise mercenaries to '401/0'), it is not clear whom he is referring to when he subsequently writes: 'it would be extraordinary if an approach was *not* [sic.] made to Xenophon at this point'.¹²¹ In any case, the earliest point at which deployment of the Cyrean force could have been considered as a possibility was June 400, after they had arrived in Byzantium. To come at the matter from the other end, as it were, it might not have been unrealistic for the oligarchs to approach Xenophon in late spring 401, possibly before he left Attica for Asia, with their plans. However it is very much open to question whether Xenophon would, and could have, led the army back out from under Cyrus's nose in his own satrapy.

But Green is nonetheless correct to emphasise the link between the political climate at Athens in the tumultuous period following the rule and removal of the Thirty and the decree issued against Xenophon. He concludes:

Ephesus in 399 (see below), Diogenes (2.51) writes that he gave half to the temple priest for safekeeping, and with the remainder 'he sent in votive offerings to Delphi' (ἔπεμψεν εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀναθήματα). 'Next,' he continues, 'he came to Greece with Agesilaos.' (On the use of temples for the safe depositing of objects and funds see Casson 1994: 73.)

¹¹⁷ Green 1994: 219.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.* 224-5. Humble (2002: 80) thinks that this was 'certainly possible'.

¹¹⁹ Munn 2000: 284. Cf. Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 40.4.

¹²⁰ Green 1994: 224.

¹²¹ *Ibid.* 225.

Xenophon's exile thus falls into the same general category as the exactly contemporaneous trials of Andokides and Socrates, as part of a vengeful anti-oligarchical backlash that sought to circumvent the terms of the amnesty, and was fuelled by a very real fear (whether justified or not) of a military-backed counter revolution.¹²²

I do not think that the exile was part of a backlash, but rather that it was part of a systematic exercise in uprooting the long-standing anti-democratic tradition at Athens. To the famous trials Green mentions is to be added the infamous dispatch of cavalry to Asia. Three hundred who, at least as Xenophon saw it, were sent away to die fighting in a foreign land (*Hell.* 3.1.4). Since the restoration Athens had been following a course of compliance with Sparta,¹²³ but while doing so, she patently had an eye to taking opportunities to lessen the hold which the Spartans exerted. My view, then, is that the decree was passed in 399 as part of an ongoing drive by the democracy to re-establish itself and remove threats permanently from within. Its elimination of the Eleusis faction in 401 was a major step towards this end, and it in turn paved the way for action against prominent anti-democratic figures and movements, such as the Socratics. By early 399, as news of the Cyreans' remarkable retreat and their exploits in Thrace filtered back to Greece, Xenophon's profile ceased to be obscure. The decree against him in that 'cathartic' year was a message from the democracy, not only to him, but to *all* his aristocratic fellows in arms, that they were not welcome home.

As to the official cause of the decree, clearly, the amnesty ruled out pro-oligarchic sympathies, and laconism was politically awkward;¹²⁴ association with Cyrus, whose cause was lost, would have been the most convenient charge. Xenophon, not untypically, sheds little light on the matter in his writings, though as has been argued earlier, the impression from *Anabasis* is that he is content to have his involvement with Cyrus to be thought of as the reason. There may

¹²² *Ibid.* 226. See also Higgins 1977: 23-24.

¹²³ *Hell.* 3.1.4, 3.2.25: supplying troops to Sparta.

¹²⁴ Rahn (1981: 115) writes: 'the evidence from the law courts, the politics of Athens' leading men and the accounts of the ancient historians all imply that between 403 and 395 BC no one could be or was condemned for pro-Spartanism'.

be a good case to be made that what (he has) Socrates say at 3.1.5 (ὁ Σωκράτης ὑποπτεύσας μή τι πρὸς τῆς πόλεως ὑπαίτιον εἶη Κύρω φίλον γενέσθαι) is close to the truth of this matter: Socrates is the embodiment of virtue in Xenophon's writings and his wisdom is proverbial (cf. *Mem.* 4.8.11).¹²⁵

5.3. *The Settled Life*

Following the Battle of Koroneia, Xenophon went with Agesilaos to Sparta (Plutarch, *Agesilaos* 19-20). For his services to the *polis*, and presumably in light of his exile from Athens, he was awarded an estate in Elis, near Olympia.¹²⁶ This area had only in recent years come under Spartan control (following the Spartan-Elean War of 403-01), and as Tuplin stresses, Xenophon's establishment in the frontier region should be taken in this context.¹²⁷ On account of a lack of evidence, there is some debate about whether Xenophon went immediately to live on the estate at Skillous or continued to campaign with Agesilaos;¹²⁸ the two possibilities need not be mutually exclusive and the matter of when he took up residence must remain inconclusive.¹²⁹

¹²⁵ On the date of exile see further Chapter 3 (3.3.3). For the largely unchanged reception in antiquity of Socrates as moral exemplum, see for instance Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 1.42.

¹²⁶ Cf. *An.* 5.3.7, and Diogenes Laertios 2.52, citing Dinarkhos. For the lot of the exile in Classical Greece see McKechnie 1989. Montiglio (2005: 31) writes: 'Many historical exiles do find a haven soon after their expulsion. In the social reality of classical Greece, exile does not generate permanent movement. Normally, it was not very difficult for an exile to relocate, since many cities, from the end of the archaic period, became increasingly open to foreigners, including exiles, in the hope of binding the newcomers to themselves'.

¹²⁷ Tuplin 2004b: 266 ff. See *Hell.* 3.2.21 ff. for Xenophon on the Elean War. Tuplin (2004b: 255-57) provides details of the estate and a description of its probable location; Cartledge (1987: 60) and Lendle (1995: 316) respectively show the site on sketches of the north-west Peloponnese. See also the Barrington Atlas map 58 (Talbert 2000), and the bibliography provided by Bowen (1998: 3, n. 11).

¹²⁸ Wood (1964: 36-37) thinks that after Koroneia, Xenophon was 'without doubt engaged in military missions for his foster city over the next six or seven years'. Lee (2005: 44) believes that he was granted the estate in 387, but does not explain where the date comes from. Arguments for Xenophon continuing in active service, like those deployed to support his participation in earlier wars, tend to be based on the detail of his descriptions, here of campaigns in the Corinthian War: see *Hell.* 4.5, 6.

¹²⁹ Anderson (1974: 165) thinks that by about 393 Xenophon was settled in Skillous with his wife, but continued in Spartan service. On a reading of *An.* 5.3.7, Green (1994: 217) assumes that Xenophon was living at Skillous in 392. 'All we know for sure from this passage is that Megabyzus visited Xenophon at Skillous in 392...The date is certified by the fact that Megabyzus was in Olympia...to attend the Games: the first

There is somewhat less uncertainty about when Xenophon left Skillous, although he does not make reference to leaving his estate in his writings. The Battle of Leuktra in 371 ended Spartan hegemony in Greece and the Eleans duly moved to reclaim their former territory, a situation that probably obliged Xenophon to leave.¹³⁰

On his own account, given as a flash-forward in his narrative of the *parabasis* (5.3.5-13), Xenophon's time at Skillous seems to have been idyllic. Out of his share of money from a sale of slaves on the Black Sea, he built a temple to Artemis (a smaller scale copy of the one at Ephesus), and he organised an annual festival in her honour; together with his sons, he hunted wild animals and cultivated fruit trees. This view, reproduced affectionately by Diogenes Laertios (2.53), may be overly romantic, for there would have been hard work done too. Making a success of the land will have required an efficient *oikos* and constant attention from the landowner (we might suppose that the material for *Oikonomikos*, Xenophon's essay on estate management, is based at least in part on his experience here);¹³¹ moreover, it seems probable that it was at Skillous that Xenophon sat down to write in earnest.¹³² Then again, there may be a more serious problem with the description. It is, as remarked, idyllic, and with *Anabasis* replete with exemplars this raises the question whether this, too, is not a form of ideal representation. In Part 1 of the next chapter I suggest that it is, and that the fruits described are to be understood as the result of a well-lived life. Xenophon's fortune in receiving this bounty at once confirms him as a just and good person, and holds out the same prospect for others who would follow a virtuous path (cf. *An.* 3.1.43).

Olympiad after the year 394 was the 97th, which fell in 392.' However if we give any credence to the arguments that Xenophon did not move to Skillous following Koroneia and campaigned with Agesilaos into the 380s (see Underhill 1900: lxxxix), then the visit could have taken place in 388, or even later.

¹³⁰ See Diogenes Laertios 2.53. Pausanias (5.6.6) says that the Eleans tried Xenophon for receiving land from the Spartans, but that they pardoned him, and he remained on the estate for the rest of his life. Badian (2004: 38) suggests that Xenophon might later have been given the chance to return to his estate, and that he would 'certainly have accepted such an offer if it was made'.

¹³¹ See Pomeroy 1994: 5-8; Macleod 2008: 14. Wood (1964: 65) thinks that Iskhomakhos in the philosophical text is Xenophon himself.

¹³² As a notable comparison, it was in mature years that another contemporary traveller, Ktesias of Knidos, commenced his literary career. On Ktesias see further Chapter 3.1.3.

In *Anabasis* Xenophon speaks of returning to Athens on a number of occasions yet there is no evidence that he ever did so.¹³³ Diogenes says that after being forced to leave Skillous he travelled to Corinth and that he died there at an advanced age (2.53, 56).¹³⁴ However he also writes that the decree of exile against Xenophon was repealed (2.59),¹³⁵ and on this basis, and in light of the Atheno-centric character of *Poroi* and *Hipparkhikos*, both written not earlier than the 360s, it has been argued that Xenophon did return to his home city.¹³⁶ Additional support for this view is said to be furnished by the outpouring of eulogies to Xenophon's son after his death at Mantinea in 362, this marking 'a strong link with Athens at this time'.¹³⁷ But it does not seem to be safe to infer that: (i.) the aforementioned works had to be written in Athens; (ii.) praises for Xenophon's sons would not have been written had he been absent from the city and no longer an exile; and (iii) Xenophon returned home when the decree of banishment was lifted (if indeed there was ever a formal repeal). If in his departure from Athens there was a hint of haste, there was every reason for his return to be on his own terms. It is also the case, as Anderson remarks, that had Xenophon moved back to Athens we would expect to have anecdotes about his personal contact with prominent individuals in the city.¹³⁸

¹³³ Returning home: 3.2.26, 6.2.13, 7.1.4, 7.6.11, 7.6.33, 7.7.57; and see note 183 below.

¹³⁴ Passages in *Hellenika*, notably 7.1.18-19, are taken by some to furnish evidence that Xenophon was present in Corinth in the 360s (see e.g. Cartledge 1987: 61), although others counter that the same work shows it was unlikely he was there (see Higgins 1977: 128).

¹³⁵ This is thought to have happened either after the King's Peace c. 387 or at some time in the early 360s; in any event not later than 362, when his sons were fighting for Athens in the Mantineian War. There is some question about whether or not a decree would have been needed to rescind the exile: see Tuplin 1987: 67-68. For discussions on the issue and possible dates see further Cawkwell 1972: 15, Cartledge 1987: 61, Higgins 1977: 128, 175, Waterfield 1990: 7, Green 1994: 218-9, Bowen 1998: 3.

¹³⁶ See Delebecque 1957: 334, Wood 1964: 37, Higgins 1977: 128, Waterfield 1990: 7, Badian 2004: 42, Macleod 2008: 11, and Thomas 2009: xx. *Contra* Breitenbach (1967: 2501) who considers it inconceivable that Xenophon ever returned to Athens.

¹³⁷ Humble 2002: 84.

¹³⁸ Anderson 1986. Note as well Worthington (1999: 20) on the case of Dinarkhos, which is similar except in inverse: 'we do not know when, how or where Dinarkhos died. A move back to Corinth would, one might expect, have prompted a reference in Dionysius' careful account, as indeed would a violent end to his life or disgrace in a trial, so Dinarkhos may well have died of old age while still living in Athens.' I am personally inclined to the view of Breitenbach above.

In the end what we have is the account of Diogenes and the doubtful story by Pausanias about the Eleians inviting Xenophon back to Skillous.¹³⁹ In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, there is no compelling reason why Diogenes should be lightly disregarded.

The last dateable event in Xenophon's works is the Third Sacred War (*Por.* 5.9), which broke out in late 356. It is widely believed that he died shortly after this. Assuming that he was born around the start of the Peloponnesian War, he would have been in his seventies.

6. DATE OF COMPOSITION OF *ANABASIS*

It seems probable that, notwithstanding its vividness, *Anabasis* was composed long after the events of 401-399 which it describes. Notably the author's description at 5.3.7-13 of life at Skillous, nostalgic in tone, and using the imperfect tense, suggests that it was written after he had left his estate (c. 371), though it might as well have been a work in progress when he left. This gap in time between authorship and event is one which needs to be central to considerations of the work's character. In broad terms, it marks the text as a product of mature years and provides support for a view argued for in the dissertation that it is part of a single literary project — rather than, as an 'early' date would suggest, a work of reportage centring on a personal adventure. More specifically, as Lee has pointed out, the probability of late authorship draws attention to the presence of a strong, indeed a pressing, writing motivation.¹⁴⁰ In this final section of the chapter I examine evidence for the dating of *Anabasis* and seek to establish a window of time for its composition.¹⁴¹ Before this, the chronology of Xenophon's other writings is briefly looked at.

¹³⁹ Pausanias 5.6.6. On this see Humble 2002: 85.

¹⁴⁰ Lee (2005: 45) points out that there were many things going on in Greece in the 360s (as there were in the preceding decades), and Xenophon, too, had other writing projects: 'Why bother with the *Anabasis*?'

¹⁴¹ Sekunda (2009: 1) suggests that Xenophon may have been continuously writing down and revising his thoughts, publishing particular works as profitable opportunities arose. While this hypothesis does reasonably in explaining incongruities in individual works, it does not take sufficient account of dominant themes and interests which underpin the corpus, and which probably render it the product of a more closely defined

Xenophon is known to have written fourteen books, all of which are extant (although it is unlikely it cannot be excluded that he wrote additional pieces of which no traces survive). The task of establishing a chronology for these has proved to be difficult, and not uncontroversial. The internal evidence, and the limited biographical information, rarely allow for any solid assertions on the date of authorship of individual works; several of these, moreover, are thought to have been written spasmodically.¹⁴² Specific historical references and circumstances do, nonetheless, enable some works to be loosely dated — or at least the passages in question to be so. Thus, mention of the Theban 'Sacred Band', formed around 378, and unfavourable comparison of the same to elite Spartan warriors, assigns the *Symposion* (8.34-35) to a window closing at Leuctra, 378-371. *Hipparkhikos*, with its particular Athenian interest, has been linked to the post-Leuctra period and improved Atheno-Spartan relations, perhaps to the period 366-362. *Kyroupaideia* 8.8.3-4 was certainly written after 399, and probably after the Satraps' Revolt of 361. *Hellenika* 6.4.37 was written after Tisiphonos took power in 357/6; *Agesilaos* postdates the Spartan king's death in 362/1, and the *Poroi* 5.9 reference to the Third Sacred War indicates an authorship date (shortly) after 356. The picture which emerges is of a mature body of work inspired and shaped by the author's extensive life experiences, and in particular his early association with Socrates the Athenian.¹⁴³

timeframe. With most writers, I consider that *Anabasis* was written as a whole; see Humble 1997: 26-27.

¹⁴² Delebecque 1957 made one of the earliest attempts to set down a chronology, though his effort has not met with wide approval. Higgins (1977: 131-3) asserts that most of Xenophon's works were written between 368-354, which I think is not unlikely, except it is somehow counter-intuitive not to see him taking advantage of conditions in Skillous to write. Most scholars are of the view that Xenophon composed his works late in life, even if they disagree on the relative chronology. See for instance Humble 1997, Krentz 1989, Cawkwell 2004. As remarked in Chapter 1 *Hellenika* is widely believed to have been composed in two separate parts — 1-2.3.10, and 2.3.11-7.5.27: see MacLaren 1934b, Cawkwell 1979: 18, Cartledge 1987: 65 ff., Tuplin 1993: 11. For unitarian arguments see Higgins 1977: 99-101, and Gray 1991.

¹⁴³ Tuplin (1998: 781) remarks on the intimate relationship between Xenophon's works and his personal experiences. Studies which consider the dating of particular works include Aalders 1953 on *Hiero*, and Humble 2004b on *Lak*. Lipka (2002: 4) thinks the question of chronology is 'not so essential for the understanding of Xenophon's writings as is sometimes claimed'.

6.1. Internal Evidence

An. 5.3.6. Agesilaos: After 394

Accounting for the share of the money he received from the sale of slaves on the journey, Xenophon explains that he left the portion due to Artemis with the sacred officer at Ephesus, 'when he went away from Asia with Agesilaos on the march against the Boiotians' (ὅτ' ἀπήει σὺν Ἀγησιλάῳ ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας τὴν εἰς Βοιωτοὺς ὁδόν, 5.3.6). Agesilaos, if not Xenophon himself, fought at Koroneia in 394, so the text (or at least this part of it) cannot be dated before this point.

An. 1.8.26. Ktesias: After 393/2

There is particular, and arguably some circumstantial evidence, to show that Xenophon drew on the *Persika* of Ktesias of Knidos. At 1.8.26 he cites a battle report by Ktesias, who was the king's physician at Kounaxa; at 1.8.27 he refers to him again, now as a source for casualty numbers on the King's side. Some consider as well that Xenophon's account of the events surrounding the accession of Artaxerxes to the throne (1.1.3) is based on Ktesias,¹⁴⁴ and Cawkwell has argued that Xenophon used a rudimentary route-guide contained in Book 23 of the *Persika* in the construction of his march record.¹⁴⁵ There is to be added to this the fact that Plutarch was in no doubt that Xenophon had read the work of Ktesias: 'for he makes mention of him, and had clearly read his books' (μέμνηται γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῖς βιβλίοις τούτοις ἐντετυχηκῶς δῆλός ἐστιν, *Artaxerxes* 13.6, trans. Perrin, modified). His assertion may have been on the basis of the textual evidence cited above, although he may also have been privy to another ancient source now lost.

Ktesias' *Persika* covers events down to 397; given its substantial size (twenty-three books, to compare with the two of Hellanikos and nine of Herodotus), it is unlikely to have been published until some years after.¹⁴⁶ A *terminus post quem*

¹⁴⁴ Bigwood 1983: 347; Almagor 2009: 3-4.

¹⁴⁵ Cawkwell 1972: 21-22. Tuplin is critical of this view (1991: 47).

¹⁴⁶ Ktesias seems to have left the court around 397 to act for the King in affairs on the sea-coast (see Plutarch, *Artaxerxes* 21.1-30; cf. Diodoros 2.32.4). Judging from Photios (see following) he remained connected to events at court for some years after.

of 393/2 is supplied by Photios, who in his epitome of the work writes: 'And the grave of Klearchos, eight years after the time he was killed, was discovered in the midst of palm trees, which Parysatis in secret had had planted by her eunuchs' (καὶ τὸ χῶμα δὲ τοῦ Κλεάρχου, δι' ἐτῶν ὀκτώ, μεστὸν ἐφάνη φοινίκων οὓς ἦν κρύφα Παρύσατις, καθ' ὃν καιρὸν ἐκεῖνος ἐτελεύτησε, δι' εὐνούχων καταχώσασα, *Bibl.* 72.44b.16-19, trans. author). In the opening of his epitome he writes that Ktesias disagreed with Xenophon on some points, but this was probably written by Photios with both works at hand and is his own judgement.¹⁴⁷

An. 5.3.7-13. Halcyon Days at Skillous: After 372

In this passage Xenophon provides us with a glimpse of how his later life unfolded. In addition to the manner of his description of Skillous (see further below), the estate where he was settled by the Spartans, his statement that he hunted with his sons (5.3.10) provides dateable material. At 7.6.34, in a speech to the army defending his involvement with the Thracian chief, Seuthes, he indicates that at that time — winter 400/399 — he had no sons; presumably — though by no means certainly — he had no time for domestic affairs in the years that immediately followed, campaigning hard as he was in Asia Minor with the Spartans. His settlement at Skillous in the Peloponnese, probably in the late 390s, presented a practical opportunity for him to begin a family.¹⁴⁸ On the question of what age his sons would have had to be in order to hunt, it can be remarked that they would not likely have been initiated into this adult world

¹⁴⁷ Dating of *Persika*: see Bigwood 1978, Lenfant 2007, Stronk 2010, Llewellyn-Jones and Robson 2010.

¹⁴⁸ On the basis of the widely held view that Xenophon was born in the early 420s, he would then have been in his mid-30s. Hesiod, an early fount of solid practical advice, recommended that a man should marry at about thirty, *Erga* 695-697.

before they were in their teens,¹⁴⁹ so the early 370s could be a *terminus post quem* for the date of authorship.¹⁵⁰

Xenophon's nostalgic description of Skillous, and the fact that he uses the imperfect tense throughout, could be taken as evidence for a still later date.¹⁵¹ The territory where his estate was situated had belonged to the Eleans and was retaken by them following the Battle of Leuktra in 371, an event which is believed to have forced Xenophon and his family to leave. On the basis of this evidence some have argued that the work must have been written after 371, and written somewhere else.¹⁵² However, it seems at least as plausible to regard *Anabasis* as being a work in progress at this juncture: its thoughtful construction and abundance of accurate travel and geographic detail point to a work that would not have been finished quickly.¹⁵³

Yet as a piece of evidence for date, and indeed place, there may be a problem with this passage. As is shown in the next chapter (2.1), exemplars are a key literary device in Xenophon's construction of the text; his representation of people, events, and even places, is often driven by his wish to illustrate a leadership lesson, or reinforce a point about moral behaviour, rather than serving the aim of realistic portrayal. It follows from this view that the historicity of the above passage cannot be taken for granted.¹⁵⁴ As argued in Chapter 2.1, what I consider we have in this flash-forward in the narrative is Xenophon

¹⁴⁹ Xenophon makes references to this matter in other writings, though nothing really conclusive can be drawn from these. Cf. *Kyn.* 2.1: 'The first pursuit, therefore, that a young man just out of his boyhood should take up is hunting' (Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν χρὴ ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα τὸ τῶν κυνηγεσίων τὸν ἤδη ἐκ παιδὸς ἀλλάττοντα τὴν ἡλικίαν); in the *Kyroupaideia* (1.2.8) he writes that in the Persian system, boys are enrolled into the class of young men at 16 or 17. Cf. Plato who has Persian boys commencing riding lessons at seven (*Alkibiades* 121e).

¹⁵⁰ Breitenbach (1967: 1640) noted that the boys could have been as young as ten; coupling this with the possibility that they could have been born in 399, the evidence relating to the sons does not, strictly, allow the composition date to be pushed further down than the early 380s.

¹⁵¹ See Cawkwell 2004: 48; Waterfield 2006: 189. MacLaren, however, has made the point that the use of the imperfect does not rule out the text having been written at Skillous (1934a: 244).

¹⁵² See Cawkwell 2004: 47-8, S.R. Bassett 1999: 475, Anderson 1974: 173.

¹⁵³ An ancient wit is said to have remarked of Isokrates, a contemporary of Xenophon's, that it took him longer to write his treatise on panhellenism than it did Alexander to conquer the whole of Asia. Cf. Isokrates *Panegyrikos* 14.

¹⁵⁴ *Contra* Humble (2006: 43), who considers this 'one of the few solid autobiographical details we have about Xenophon outside the time frame of the *Anabasis*'.

indicating the result of his good actions on campaign (and in the following years of his life). A number of the alternative readings of the passage referred to in Chapter 2.1 support the argument that Skillous plays an essential literary role in the text.

The above suggestion need not mean that Xenophon did not live at Skillous, whether for a short period of time or for the entirety of his life post-Koroneia. There is no conclusive evidence either way. That he did live there is probable, given that his banishment from Athens and period of service to Sparta made it likely that he would have settled in an area within the Spartan sphere of influence, and these facts in turn make it reasonable to accept his own statement that Sparta settled him there (5.3.7); that they placed him in a disputed border area, a fact that Xenophon does not allude to, makes the arrangement the more plausible as it achieves several ends simultaneously. In sum, while it is likely that Xenophon resided at Skillous, the paradigmatic quality of the passage in *Anabasis* undermines its value as chronological (and historical) evidence.¹⁵⁵

Hell. 3.1.2. Themistogenes of Syracuse: relative dating

In the opening of Book 3 of his *Hellenika* Xenophon offers up what appears to be a remarkable revelation: 'The story of how Cyrus gathered an army and with it marched up-country against his brother, how the battle between them turned out, how Cyrus was killed, and how after this the Greeks made their way safely back to the sea — all this has been written by Themistogenes of Syracuse' (3.1.2). This statement provides evidence for the relative chronology of *Anabasis*, for it indicates that the work — regardless of whether or not Themistogenes is a pseudonym — predates (the second part of) *Hellenika*. Unfortunately this does not provide a great help, as the task of dating the latter is equally problematic and no solid inferences about the date of authorship of

¹⁵⁵ Later authors did not doubt that Xenophon had lived at Skillous: see Diogenes Laertios 2.52; Plutarch, *On Exile* 10, 14. Pausanias (5.6.6) relates that Xenophon was allowed to return to Skillous by the Eleans after being tried and acquitted by the Olympic Council on a charge of receiving the land from the Spartans; he himself was shown what was said to be Xenophon's tomb, though this whole story may be Elean propaganda. See Humble 1997: 16 citing Breitenbach (1967).

our work can be drawn from it; even if we make an assumption (by the reference to Tisiphonos at 6.4.37) that the entire work dates to 356, this is almost coterminous with the author's death.¹⁵⁶

I would like to offer an alternative explanation for *Hell.* 3.1.2. The passage could mark a point in Xenophon's conceptual development of *Anabasis*, this being a work in progress at the time he was composing (this section of) *Hellenika*. As the literary aspect of the former grew, he decided to publish a companion piece that would provide the broad context for his writing agenda; as indicated in his description of it, this would be a threadbare narrative of events, and would be written under a pseudonym with the aim of avoiding confusion between the two works. In the event, this lesser project never came to fruition, for it almost certainly would have left some trace in the ancient literary record, the later *Souda* excepted. In his final version Xenophon included the detail which at this juncture of *Hellenika* he had thought to commit to a companion work.¹⁵⁷ In this reading *Anabasis* postdates *Hell.* 3.1.2. (The question of the pseudonym is looked at further in Chapter 3.)

An. 6.4.8. Response to Isokrates: After 380

Isokrates, a contemporary of Xenophon's,¹⁵⁸ published his treatise on panhellenism around 380 or later.¹⁵⁹ Passages in *Anabasis* have been linked to ones in the *Panegyrikos*, suggesting that Xenophon may have had some form of engagement with this work.¹⁶⁰ At *Pan.* 146, for instance, Isokrates says that

¹⁵⁶ For the dating of *Hellenika* see note 142 above.

¹⁵⁷ Anderson (1974: 83) suggests that there were two editions of *Anabasis*, the one attributed to Themistogenes covering the same ground as 'our *Anabasis* I-IV'; Tsagalis (2009: 454) posits something very similar, with the later work expanding and improving on the earlier.

¹⁵⁸ Xenophon and Isokrates were probably born within a few years of each other in the same district of Attica; the evidence from their work suggests they shared similar views on political philosophy, both being advocates of enlightened monarchy as an effective form of government. See further Gray 2000 and 2007.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. *Pan.* 126: καὶ νῦν Ὀλυνθίους καὶ Φλειασίους πολιορκοῦσιν ('and now they are laying siege to Olynthos and Phleious'). *Hellenika* dates these sieges to 382 (5.2.11) and 380 (5.2.8) respectively.

¹⁶⁰ See further Dillery 1995: 80. Millender (2009: 22) considers that the authors, owing to the 'strong resemblances between their accounts of the Cyreans and their mutual interest in the issue of friendship, especially of the Spartan variety...were "in conversation"'. Cawkwell (1972: 16-17) sees no literary relationship.

Cyrus's Greek mercenaries 'were not picked troops, but men who, owing to the stress of circumstances, were unable to live in their own towns'. This suggestion of a ragbag, rootless army, could well have irked Xenophon, and he may be responding at *An.* 6.4.8 (it could as well be Isokrates responding to this comment, which would make his work postdate Xenophon's):

For most of the soldiers had sailed out to undertake this service for pay, not because they lacked a livelihood, but having heard of Cyrus's virtue; some brought other men with them, and some even spent money of their own on the enterprise. Still others had left their fathers and mothers, and some even their children, intending to return again after having earned money for them, all having heard that others with Cyrus were doing very well. Being of this sort, then, they yearned to be safe in Hellas (6.4.8).¹⁶¹

It is worth noting that in the same *Panegyrikos* passage above Isokrates goes on to comment favourably that, when the Persians seized the Greek High Command, 'hoping by this lawless act to throw their army into confusion...the soldiers not only stood together but bore their misfortune nobly (καλῶς)' (148); and then at 149: 'Let me sum up the whole matter: these men did not set out to get plunder or to capture a town, but took the field against the king himself'.

Yet the stain of his earlier disparaging remark is not fully removed, and with Xenophon's propensity for *apologia*, there must be a strong possibility that he took *Pan.* 146 hard and is responding to it at *An.* 6.4.8. As I show in Part 2 of the next chapter, Xenophon furnishes lessons in the handling of mercenaries through his narrative, and shows that the paramount driving force behind their behaviour is self-interest; furthermore, he takes trouble to distance himself from the mercenaries on the march, emphasising at several points, in different ways,

¹⁶¹ τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἦσαν οὐ σπάνει βίου ἐκπεπλευκότες ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν μισθοφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τὴν Κύρου ἀρετὴν ἀκούοντες, οἱ μὲν καὶ ἄνδρας ἄγοντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ προσανηλωκότες χρήματα, καὶ τούτων ἕτεροι ἀποδεδρακότες πατέρας καὶ μητέρας, οἱ δὲ καὶ τέκνα καταλιπόντες ὡς χρήματ' αὐτοῖς κτησάμενοι ἤξοντες πάλιν, ἀκούοντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς παρὰ Κύρῳ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ πράττειν. τοιοῦτοι ὄντες ἐπόθουν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα σφῆξασθαι. 6.4.8.

that he is not driven by the desire for profit, this being the guiding light of the mercenary body (see Chapter 3.2.4). It is the fact that he does not generally portray them in glowing light that makes 6.4.8 stand out:¹⁶² according to this description Xenophon is amongst a community of virtual *kaloι kagathoi*, a hard-working body of men who, if not seeking personal development, are pursuing the (important Xenophonic) virtue of self-sufficiency.¹⁶³ This incongruous quality of the passage, coupled with the apologetic character of the work, indicate that it could very plausibly be a response to the *Panegyrikos*, so providing a *terminus post quem* for *Anabasis*.¹⁶⁴ The possibility that Xenophon was separately responding to the sentiment of the *Panegyrikos* is looked at in Section 6.2 below.

¹⁶² Mercenaries behaving badly: 1.2.11, demanding money from Cyrus; 1.4.12, the men refuse to proceed unless given more money; 4.4.14, burning of houses in Armenian villages; 5.4.16-18, unsanctioned raid; 5.7.12-25, murders at Kerasos; 6.2.4-7, threatening a Greek city (Herakleia); 7.1.15-19, storming of Byzantium.

¹⁶³ McKechnie (1989: 80) prefers what Xenophon says in 6.4.8 to the characterisation of Isokrates; Azoulay (2004) too thinks there is something in the honourable depiction, arguing that Xenophon is distinguishing between two categories of Greeks, one which followed from noble motives, the other only out of desire for profit. While this argument has some appeal, Azoulay's conclusion that, in this regard, 'the Ten Thousand cannot be considered as a homogenous group' (2004: 297), is misleading in that it may suggest that the proportion of men belonging to each category was comparable if not equal. There can be little doubt that those joining Cyrus for the promise of fortune formed the largest group by far; Roy's (2004: 287-288) argument that the ultimate aim of the mercenaries was to secure long term employment in Cyrus's garrisons is consistent with this view. Neither is it affected by the status of the men prior to their joining Cyrus: that they *might* have come from modestly prosperous backgrounds is not a proof that they did not seek to increase their material means. Cf. van Soesbergen 1982/3: 134-135; McKechnie 1989: 79-80; Roy 2004: 271, 275-6.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. *An.* 3.1.10: this earlier statement also represents the men in positive light and could also be taken as a response. 'When they came to Kilikia, however, it then seemed clear to all (πᾶσιν) that that the expedition was against the King. Although they feared the journey and were unwilling, the majority (οἱ πολλοί) nevertheless followed along out of shame both before each other and before Cyrus'. However, the actual events at Kilikia as narrated by Xenophon in Book 1 - the men refuse to go on and agree to do so only after Cyrus has increased their pay - contradict this idea of a noble motive on the part of the majority. A further confusing signal regarding Xenophon's attitude to the mercenaries is found in a reference he makes in *Hellenika*. On the Maeander Plain, Derkyllidas prepares to face the armies of Pharnabazos and Tissaphernes; the former wishes to attack the Greeks, who are apparently in some disorder, but the latter opposes, recalling 'how the Greek army of Cyrus's supporters had fought with and defeated the Persians' (3.2.18). In what may be an echo of Thucydides' moving tribute to Brasidas (4.81), Xenophon adds that Tissaphernes 'believed that all Greek forces were similar to those'.

An. passim. Negative assessment of Sparta

As is demonstrated in later sections of the dissertation, Xenophon's portrayals of Spartan figures of authority in *Anabasis* are frequently negatively slanted. While emphasising the state's paramount status among Greek *poleis* in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War, he at the same time questions the moral basis of this authority by revealing a set of negative character traits — selfishness, deceitfulness, and cruelty included — exhibited by its representatives abroad.¹⁶⁵ Given his longstanding and close links to several senior Spartans, and the likelihood that following his return from Asia Minor in 394 he resided in an area under Spartan control, this expression would seem to need to be located at terminal points of these relationships.¹⁶⁶ Arguments similar to those used for the dating of the censorious Chapter 14 of *Lak.* might also be used here, except that Xenophon's treatment of Spartan failings in *Anabasis* is measurably more subtle.¹⁶⁷ although a close reading of the work must leave at least a sense of uneasiness about the integrity of the Spartan leaders depicted, in his narrative of the retreat Xenophon is implicitly admiring of the state's military prowess, and his formal assessment of the man who has succeeded in extricating them from the clutches of the King in Babylonia is creditable, if not glowing (cf. 2.6.1-15 for the obituary of Klearchos). It might be said, then, that Xenophon's skill as a writer enabled him to sidestep potential

¹⁶⁵ Sparta as leader of Greece: cf. 3.2.37, 6.6.9, 6.6.12, 7.1.27, 7.1.30; best leaders 7.6.37. *Examples of negative traits.* Self-centredness: Klearchos persuades Greek generals to go to tent of Tissaphernes believing he will be able to remove those who are threatening his personal authority (2.5.27-30). Deceitful: Anaxibios makes false promises of pay to the Cyreans at Byzantium (6.1.16, 7.1.3-7). Cruel: Aristarchos sells more than 400 Cyrean sick and wounded at Byzantium into slavery (7.2.6).

¹⁶⁶ Of the Spartan leaders whom he was associated with, Xenophon was closest to, and seemingly the most enamoured of, Agesilaos (cf. his encomium, written 360/359). His admiration for the king might have acted as a restraint on the airing of his views, as too could the nature of the relationship. One view of what this was is transmitted by Plutarch. In his *Agesilaos* (20) he says that the king ordered, ἐκέλευε, Xenophon to send for his sons to have them reared at Sparta. If Xenophon's freedom to act was limited, then it is reasonable to assume that his latitude to write freely was too — whether he wrote in Sparta, at Skillous, or elsewhere within the Spartan-controlled world. The death of Agesilaos in 360 could, thus, provide a *terminus post quem* for authorship. It is possible that at that stage Xenophon was resident at Corinth (Diogenes Laertios 2.53, 56), or further afield (Athenaios, *Deipnosophistai* 10.427 ff., has Xenophon Socratizing with a Dionysius at a lavish dinner table in Sicily).

¹⁶⁷ For the particularly problematic dating of *Lak.* see Cartledge 1987: 56-57, and especially Humble's excellent treatments 1997: 39-44 and 2004b: 219-220.

restrictions on his ability to express his views freely.¹⁶⁸ The question to be addressed here is whether his views are rooted in the experience of the march, in which case they can conceivably be dated to any time after the event, or whether they are a retrospective representation of Sparta inspired by some later event(s) or circumstance(s). In the former case the evidence of *Anabasis* shows that Xenophon had reason to be circumspect about Sparta as early as 401;¹⁶⁹ however, his subsequent serving with Sparta, and personal association with Agesilaos, would suggest that disillusionment came late. One possible source of this, the Peace of Antalkidas, is considered below.

6.2. External Evidence

External evidence for the date of the work is thin. Some consider that the figure of 6,000 given by Isokrates in the *Panegyrikos* (146) as the number of retreating Cyreans derives from *An.* 7.7.23, which would thus furnish a *terminus ante quem* of c. 380.¹⁷⁰ Xenophon, though, has already stated (5.3.3) that the number who survived the march down to the sea was 8600; moreover, even if *Anabasis* was in circulation Isokrates could have obtained his figure from another source, or it may simply be a suitably low (to amplify the weakness of Persia) estimate.¹⁷¹ His treatise, nonetheless, may be helpful in shedding light on the chronology question. An alternative approach to this problem would be to try to link prominent concerns in *Anabasis* to particular historical circumstances. Notwithstanding his exile,¹⁷² and (putative) long residence in an idyllic country retreat, by the evidence of his writings Xenophon remained connected to events and currents of thought in the Greek world.¹⁷³ Several of the major concerns

¹⁶⁸ Millender (2009: 25) similarly argues that Xenophon's portrayal was subtle enough for him to get away with the criticisms he makes.

¹⁶⁹ Noreen Humble has made this point, and notes as well that what Xenophon says in *Hellenika* 'is often far from laudatory' (2004b: 220).

¹⁷⁰ See Breitenbach 1967: 1641-2. As noted Isokrates' statement at 146 that the Greeks were not picked troops (discussed above) could conceivably be a response to *An.* 6.4.8.

¹⁷¹ This last explanation is preferred by both Parke 1933: 29 and van Soesbergen 1982/3: 134.

¹⁷² The cause of Xenophon's exile is doubtless a major factor in shaping the content and character of some of his writings; his apologetic agenda in *Anabasis* is examined in detail in Chapter 3. See Dillery (2007) for an exploration of the impact of exile on the Greek historian.

¹⁷³ S.R. Bassett concludes in her study of his use of Ktesias in *Anabasis* that Xenophon 'was influenced by earlier authors, contemporary authors, and by stories that were

recurring across his writings have strong contemporary resonances. For instance, in his portrayal in *Anabasis* of an empire 'strong in its extent of territory and number of people, but weak in the length of its roads and the separation of its forces, if someone should make war quickly' (1.5.9), there is an apparent engagement with the contemporary 'Panhellenist' agitation for a crusade against Persia championed by Isokrates. Elsewhere Xenophon thinks of founding a colony, the aim being 'to acquire both land and power for Greece' (5.6.15). While such a sentiment might not have been remarkable if expressed at the turn of the fourth century, it is notable that it chimes with popular feeling in the 380s.¹⁷⁴

As has been mentioned, a marked feature of the work is its negative portrayal of Spartan leaders. While Xenophon could have had different motivations for this, one could be linked to the pronounced anti-Sparta and anti-Persia feelings that prevailed in Greece, and particularly Athens, following the King's Peace of 387/6 (effectively a deal between Sparta and Artaxerxes to limit Athenian ambitions). Taking the *Panegyrikos* and the *Olympic* oration of Lysias to be literary manifestations of this popular sentiment, it is possible that Xenophon is reacting to these in his *Anabasis* in his careful distancing of himself from both Sparta and Persia.¹⁷⁵ In the two sections which follow, I highlight passages in the *Panegyrikos* which, if they are not an entirely accurate reflection of public

circulating through Persian and Greek society' (1999: 483). Pomeroy (1994: 15-16) thinks that Xenophon had a library at Skillous. Had he indeed lived there, not far from Olympia, he could have attended up to half a dozen Olympic Games. Cf. Tuplin 2004b: 263; Casson 1994: 77-79. L'Allier (2009: 10) remarks that there was a philosophical school (of Phedon) at Elis, and a Pythagorean sect at Phlious in the Argolid. Kahn (1996: 30) in contrast, seeking to establish Xenophon as a marginal Socratic figure, characterises Skillous 'as a remote village'.

¹⁷⁴ For detailed consideration of panhellenism in *Anabasis* see Rood 2004a; see also Dillery 1995: 59-63, and Cawkwell 2004: 64-67. Tuplin (2007a: 27) comments that there are 'complex issues surrounding *Anabasis* and fourth century panhellenism', and suggests that Xenophon is responding in a rational way to Isokrates's take on the role of mercenaries (27-28). In the failed colony project Howland (2000: 881, 883) sees engagement with Plato's *Republic*. As part of this discussion it is perhaps worth taking note of the maxim that the use of the past is intimately connected with the present.

¹⁷⁵ Lysias' oration (33) was delivered in 384. While these pieces, to a certain degree at least, must reflect sentiment, like all effective oratory they will also have been influential in forming and directing the popular response. Isokrates, who on his own reckoning had more students in his school than all other sophists of the day put together (*Antid.* 39-40), included among his pupils Ephoros, Theopompos, Hypereides and Timotheos. The *Panegyrikos* extended his popularity abroad; it may have inspired the Second Athenian Confederacy of 378.

sentiment at Athens in this period, will have been in wide circulation and widely influential. In such a climate it should not be surprising if Xenophon, by then an exile from his city, was stirred to explain his associations with both Sparta and Persia.

Sparta's betrayal of (Pan)Hellenism

Early in his history of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides has Brasidas say to the Akanthians that the Spartans had sent him and his army out 'to validate the cause which we proclaimed at the beginning of the war: to fight the Athenians for the liberation of Greece' (4.85.1).¹⁷⁶ In *Hellenika* (3.4.5, and 3.1.3-4) Xenophon ascribes a similar motive to Agesilaos' campaign in Asia. Yet in spite of their good intentions, in the *Panegyrikos*, reflecting on the poor present state of Athens' affairs, Isokrates sees fit to rear on Sparta:

We may well blame the Lakedaimonians because, although in the beginning they entered upon the war with the avowed intention of freeing the Hellenes, in the end they delivered so many of them into bondage; and because they induced the Ionians to revolt from Athens, the mother city from which the Ionians emigrated and by whose influence they were often preserved from destruction, and then betrayed them to the barbarians (122).

The betrayal referred to here is the King's Peace (or Peace of Antalkidas), signed in 387/6.¹⁷⁷ According to its terms, the cities of Asia were to belong to the King, and those on the Greek mainland, μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας, were to be autonomous, with the King as enforcer of the terms. Thus the alliances which

¹⁷⁶ Cf. Thucydides 8.46.3 for the same goal iterated by Alkibiades: 'The Athenians would cooperate in a policy of enslavement, with the Aegean area subjugated to them and all the Greeks living in the King's territory subjugated to the King: whereas the Spartans were coming on the contrary as liberators, and it was not likely that when they were liberating Greeks from Greeks they would stop short of liberating Greeks from barbarians, unless the Persians managed somehow to get them out of the way soon'.

¹⁷⁷ Xenophon reproduces what is probably just a summary of the text at *Hell.* 5.1.31. Cf. Isokrates *Pan.* 120, 176. Antalkidas, a leading Spartan, and probably a political opponent of Agesilaos, negotiated the peace with Persia. Tuplin describes it as 'a remarkable achievement' for Persia (2009: 341).

had Athens and Thebes respectively at their cores, and the union of Argos and Corinth, had to be dismantled. Sparta, however, as leader of the voluntary Peloponnese League, did not fall under the clause, leaving her with effective hegemony over the mainland states. Her willingness to press home this supremacy deepened her unpopularity amongst the Hellenes, a situation in which Xenophon, settled by Sparta in the Peloponnese, may have felt decidedly uncomfortable, perhaps sufficiently so for him to sit down and write.¹⁷⁸

Athenian 'misobarbarism'

The ultimate target of Isokrates' ire is Persia, the historical enemy of Hellas and of Athens in particular. The Mede/barbarian is by the early fourth century a defining feature of Athenian identity, the polar 'other' whose range of character flaws furnish the template for the ideal democratic citizen. Isokrates is at pains to establish a primacy for Athens on the basis of its supposed historical hostility towards the Asiatics:

Of my own countrymen also I have a similar tale to tell. For towards all other peoples with whom they have been at war, they forget their past enmities the moment they have concluded peace, but toward the Asiatics they feel no gratitude even when they receive favours from them, so eternal is the wrath which they cherish against the barbarians. Again, our fathers condemned many to death for defection to the Medes; in our public assemblies even to this day, before any other business is transacted, the Athenians call down curses upon any citizen who proposes friendly overtures to the Persians (*Pan.* 157).

Isokrates continues in the same vein for several paragraphs. While his treatise needs to be appreciated as a work of emotive public oratory, of propaganda for

¹⁷⁸ Cf. *Hell.* 5.3.16 and 5.4.1. Xenophon's judgement on the treaty is that it benefitted Sparta (*Hell.* 5.1.36). Ephoros (Diodoros 15.19) writes that as a result of it her reputation declined; Plutarch at his remove is more damning, claiming it had been made by Antalkidas in the interest of the King, and was a 'mockery and betrayal of Greece' (*Artaxerxes* 21.5). For other attacks on Sparta hegemony of the day see Isokrates *Pan.* 18, 80-81, 110-114, 123-132. Xenophon suggests that Sparta's zenith was reached in about 379, following the surrender of Olynthos (*Hell.* 5.3.27).

panhellenism, it is its public inscribing of sentiment, actual or exaggerated, that lends it its power. This could have been a further spur to Xenophon to defend himself, and as is shown in Chapter 3, there is considerable evidence in *Anabasis* to support a claim that in the work he is distancing himself from Persia.

6.3. Conclusions

The search for a date of composition for *Anabasis* is hampered by the dearth of autobiographical information in the work, and by the fact that its paradigmatic character renders it an inherently unreliable historical source. From internal evidence all that can really be asserted is that it was written after the publication of Ktesias' *Persika* in the late 390s, although a short passage in Book 6 (4.8) indicates, arguably, that it was written after the *Panegyrikos* of Isokrates, dated to 380.

Following his return from Asia with Agesilaos in 394, Xenophon (probably) resided in the Peloponnese and embarked on his literary career. Reasonable confidence that it was in the Peloponnese and in (semi-)retirement that he began to write does, nonetheless, provide a broad context for the oeuvre. It was suggested that an approach to the chronology problem would be to match one or more of the themes and concerns in *Anabasis* with particular historical circumstances; through strong echoes of panhellenism, and discernible defences against his associations with Sparta and Persia respectively, this revealed the late 380s/early 370s as a plausible window of authorship. Given Xenophon's links with Sparta and Persia, and the fact that he was already exiled from Athens for one — or both — of these reasons, there can be little doubt but that his standing at home fell further in the period following the King's Peace. It is certainly plausible, then, that he chose this time, through this work, to distance himself from both Sparta and Persia.

There are, however, a number of caveats to be taken into account with this approach. Firstly, there is the risk of circularity, a particular writing motivation being invoked to justify a time-frame, but this in turn being dependent on the writing motivation. Panhellenism, and *apologia* vis-à-vis Sparta and Persia,

were not the only motivations Xenophon had for writing *Anabasis*, and they may not have been the most important.¹⁷⁹ Xenophon's negative treatment of Spartan leaders, furthermore, may have explanations additional, or different, to *apologia*. As argued in Chapter 2, a main preoccupation in *Anabasis* is styles of leadership, and Xenophon clearly criticises the Spartan; he could, as well, be critically commenting on the state's hegemony of Greece in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War, an exercise that need not be tied to any particular time period (in support of this motivation, Books 6 and 7 especially provide an intimate insight into the exercise of Spartan power as she comes to terms with her newly acquired status in the Hellenic world).

The second caveat is that a part of the problem of pinning Xenophon down, whether in time or to place, is his apparent aloofness, or indifference to life-changing events. His exile from Athens, referred to only twice and apparently incidentally (5.3.7, 7.7.57), is one example; another is the death of his son in a cavalry action on the Athenian side at Mantinea in 362. 'Good men among them were killed', is his sole comment (*Hell.* 7.5.17). Doubtless Xenophon felt this loss keenly, as he must have the loss of his motherland, but it is a feature of his character and writings that he will not show us. This same outwardly impermeable persona would (possibly pointedly) not be responding to the sort of public pressure exerted by Isokrates' rhetoric.

7. CONCLUSIONS

The evidence for Xenophon's life ultimately derives from two main sources: his own writings, and the biography of Diogenes Laertios, who had independent sources but drew on Xenophon's oeuvre as well. Diogenes did not interrogate his material well and errors and inconsistencies in his writing are common. While *Anabasis* is regarded by many as the most important document for the

¹⁷⁹ Cawkwell (2004: 64-67) concludes that 'panhellenism has at least tinged the *Anabasis*...but it would be wrong to think of the book as essentially panhellenist propaganda'. As argued in the following chapters, Xenophon's apologetic agenda is extensive, and is not confined to defence of himself, however important this aspect of it may be. In the next chapter it is demonstrated that a key concern in the work is instruction on military leadership.

author's life, as has been demonstrated in this chapter, the work may not be reliable in this regard.

From the hard evidence, such as it is, a rough outline of Xenophon's life may be figured:

- Born in Attica in the early years of the Peloponnesian War
- Of landowning class, member of the Athenian cavalry
- A follower of Socrates (although the nature and extent of his relationship with the philosopher is disputed)
- 401-399. Left Attica in April/May 401 and travelled through Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia, Eastern Anatolia, and along the Black Sea coast with the mercenary army of Cyrus the Younger. Became leader of the 'Cyreans' in Thrace at the end of the journey and returned with them to Asia to fight with Sparta in its campaign against Persia
- Exiled from Athens at some point in the period 399-394
- Returned to Greece in 394 with the Spartan king Agesilaos
- Allotted land (by Sparta) in north-west Peloponnese; based there with his family (wife and two sons), probably until late 370s
- Authored 14 (+) books, the last of which dates his death to the late 350s.

This chapter has sought to generate a picture of the times in which Xenophon lived, with special focus on the post-war *stasis* and its aftermath at Athens. Through highlighting the circumstances in which he was brought up and lived, a context is established for the themes and concerns that recur in his writing. By any standard, the closing years of the fifth century were interesting ones, defined by cultural, political, and social upheaval: that Xenophon should, when he sat down to write in his later years, be influenced by this experience should not be surprising. His preoccupation with ordering — personal lives, households, armies, societies — may be seen as a reaction to the unstable environment in which he was raised. In the next chapter, his deep interest in the subject of leadership is examined.

Xenophon was born into a landowning family and was raised in the aristocratic tradition of the time. His class was defined not only by its comparative wealth,

but by educational background, connections at home and abroad, common political outlook, and by a conviction of superiority, of a right to lead and to take part in governing the state.¹⁸⁰ There is no evidence to suggest that Xenophon ever adopted views, or pursued ends, that were seriously at odds with his own heritage. As argued in the course of the dissertation, his positive interest in democracy can be attributed to his interest in political philosophy and a concern to defend his reputation at Athens, rather than reflecting concern for enlightened government or civic empowerment.

From his writings it is clear that Socrates was a major influence in his life. Four of his works feature the philosopher prominently, and it is an argument of this dissertation that on one level *Anabasis* functions as a Socratic defence. In the key passage of this work (3.1.4-10) there is the sense of a paternal relationship between Socrates and Xenophon, one which survives in the later story of the first meeting between the two told by Diogenes in the opening of his biography. Though the association of country aristocrat and city-bound thinker might seem somewhat incongruous, underlying the relationship were common anti-democratic and pro-Spartan sentiments (Xenophon certainly seems to have changed his attitude regarding the latter, possibly, as suggested in later chapters, as a result of his experiences on the long march). This background was ultimately to place Xenophon and Socrates on the wrong side of the authorities. The outcome for both was, in a sense, the same, in that they were to be deprived of the homeland that they each professed, and demonstrated, deep concern for.

An objective of this chapter has been to widen the perspective on Xenophon's departure from Athens in 401. From his own evidence and that of other ancient sources it is apparent that a hostile political climate in the city towards members of his class, and those directly associated with the Thirty Tyrants in particular, was an important factor. However to argue, as some have done, that Xenophon's involvement with the *hippeis* was 'the cause' of his leaving his homeland is too narrow a view to take.¹⁸¹ While in itself the fact compromised his standing, and probably undermined his safety, given the constraints within

¹⁸⁰ The right to power: Thucydides 6.16; Xenophon, *Kyros*. 8.1.37, *P.H.* 2.1.

¹⁸¹ See Bugh 1988: 123, 129.

which the restored democracy was obliged to operate it would not on its own have been a sufficient reason to drive him into self-exile. The cases of other *hippeis* who subsequently gained office contradict the contention that remaining at home was not a realistic option, as indeed does the presence of at least 300 horsemen in the city in 399. On the other hand, these cases certainly relate to participants who were not involved at a high, or serious, level in the criminality of the Thirty. Xenophon's age, and (the admittedly apologetic) character of his writings, strongly suggest that he would not have been in this last category, but there is no certainty on this. If Xenophon was not at Athens but in Eleusis, as I have argued he *could* have been, his perceived culpability, even by this migratory act alone, would have been higher. While this hypothesis is indeed speculative, it has the merit of highlighting the fact, notwithstanding the meeting with Socrates at *An.* 3.1, that there is no concrete evidence for his being in the city in the period following the restoration of the democracy.

There were, as has been shown, other factors in play too, and it may well have been that even in a more favourable atmosphere Xenophon would have gone on the road. He was young and ambitious, keen for adventure, and probably seeking to find his place in the world. Though it may have facilitated his intellectual development, his involvement with the Socratics, in the main a fairly sedentary group, would not have met his need to be a part of the military and political life.¹⁸² Joining the war against the Peloponnesians late, with his country's power in decline, he did not have the opportunity to participate in the type of military event that had helped to define such prominent figures as Thucydides, Alkibiades, and even Socrates himself. A chance to join the circle of an important figure in Mediterranean geopolitics must have seemed like a unique chance to develop and establish himself. It was, then, most likely an interplay of political and personal factors that led to his departure from Athens in the late spring of 401.

¹⁸² See Buzzetti 2008. In his deconstruction of *Kyroupaideia*, Higgins (1977: 56) writes: 'Xenophon's Socrates and Cyrus [the Great] have too much in common to warrant a radical segregation. Both possess a similar self-control, both honour the gods, both are rulers of themselves. Both have an analogous task: to dispose men to care about the right things in the right way...Yet [they] are not exactly the same, either, for Cyrus is certainly not devoted to the life of the mind and Socrates never cares to pursue the life of honour and glory to be found in government'.

Some of these same reasons will have been significant in the question of his return. His intention to go home following his extraordinary adventure in Asia was prevented first and foremost by an intensification of the hostility towards his class, the decree passed against him being a result and expression of this state of affairs.¹⁸³ It was probably not until the King's Peace (c. 387) that this circumstance changed, and while he was then at liberty to go home, there is no evidence that he did so — no trace in the records of a homecoming, or of any subsequent involvement in civic life.

In the last part of the chapter evidence for the dating of *Anabasis* was examined. While no date for authorship was determined, it was argued that it was written during Xenophon's retirement, probably begun, if not finished, on the estate at Skillous furnished him by the Spartans. This indicates a significant gap between the event and publication, possibly one of up to forty years. It was suggested that the political climate in Greece following the King's Peace of 387/6 provides a persuasive background for the work, linking a number of its concerns — Sparta's stewardship of Hellas, panhellenism, the struggle for the memory of Socrates — with pressing matters of the day. It was further considered from the internal evidence, and the notable degree of thematic unity across Xenophon's works, that the work and corpus are the product of a mature, reflective phase.

A clear and reliable portrait of Xenophon is elusive. He emerges from the complex literary fabric of his own writings as a man difficult to pin down. The pattern that emerges from the traces we have of his early life is one of extensive movement; his early exposure to the exhilaration of horse riding may well have left him with a passion for movement and travel, and from his reports this evidently found expression in the march of the Cyreans. In this travelling community he found a place in the world, a home on the move where he tested his practical training and the solidity of his Socratic morality against the random challenges thrown up by fortune. From such flux, tellingly relived for at least

¹⁸³ Xenophon wants to go home: 6.2.15, 7.1.4, 7.1.8, 7.1.38, 7.7.57. Bradley (2001: 80) points out that Xenophon's phrasing of his desire as being 'to sail away' is contextualised in his later speeches to the army in Thrace (7.6.11-38) where he speaks of having turned back to help them after he had already 'set out for home'. On the subject of Xenophon's *nostos* see further Chapter 3.3.

another five years, it would always be hard to return to settled life. In this light, perhaps displacement from Skillous was not as traumatic as it might be thought to have been; perhaps he left of his own accord before 371, if indeed he had ever settled there. Notably Xenophon was not alone in embracing life outside of the *polis*. McKechnie writes of the Cyreans: 'Once those who wished to had sailed away, or settled in the cities near Byzantium, it could be said that the remainder had chosen the wandering life, that the army itself had become (now by choice, though previously by chance), in Isokrates' phrase, a "wandering army"¹⁸⁴.

In the next chapter an outstanding feature of the author's literary method is explored, and the question of what motivated him to write his *Anabasis* is addressed.

¹⁸⁴ McKechnie 1989: 80.

Xenophon's Agenda in *Anabasis*: Lessons in Leadership

*How vain it is to sit down and write before you have stood
up to live.*

Thoreau, *Walden*

While Xenophon's works span an extraordinary range of genres — biography, and arguably autobiography, history, historical fiction, philosophical dialogue, technical treatise, travelogue — almost all are closely connected by the recurrence of certain themes and concerns.¹ These include Sparta and panhellenism, Socrates and moral philosophy, leadership, and *apologia*. One inference to be drawn from this is that his works are the product of a single, if evolving literary project; a second is that these common elements may offer insight into what his motivations for writing were. To investigate this further, in this chapter the subject of leadership — which recurs prominently across the oeuvre — is explored in *Anabasis*. The analysis shows a clear concern in the work with issues of military leadership and, importantly, it shows that the manner of the presentation is decidedly didactic: in addition to showcasing the strengths and weaknesses of individual leaders, the author critiques different styles of leadership, and implicitly concludes that the optimal form is that which is informed by both democratic principles and moral philosophy. Combined with the openly didactic character of several of his other works, a strong case emerges for instruction being a key element of the author's agenda in *Anabasis*.

A further factor supporting the claim for the work's didactic character is the author's extensive use of exemplars, a prominent feature as well in the literary construction of other of Xenophon's works. Part 1 of the chapter illustrates the

¹ Gish and Ambler (2009: 182) comment that the range of Xenophon's writings have no rival in the ancient world.

paradigmatic nature of the narrative and provides the relevant background for arguments in this and the following chapters.

The subtle, if unambiguous, conclusion of Xenophon's elaborate exposition on leadership styles alerts to another key element of his agenda: *apologia*. In representing his character as a successful leader in the Athenian philosopher mould, he is defending his own reputation, and also that of his teacher, Socrates. These apologies are explored in depth in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively, with a main conclusion of the dissertation being that Xenophon's treatment of leadership in *Anabasis* is also intended to serve an extensive apologetic agenda.

PART 1. XENOPHON'S USE OF EXEMPLARS IN ANABASIS

The richness of Xenophon's life experiences furnished him with substantial writing material. His output of fourteen complete works reflects the range of these experiences and at the same time reveals an extraordinary literary talent.² Hallmarks of Xenophon the writer include experimentation with form, genre innovation, subtlety of style, and use of a variety of literary devices. In this part attention is drawn to one of the more remarkable features of his literary method: his extensive use of exemplars. The treatment, while not being exhaustive, highlights the prevalence of exempla and how they enable the author to realise his writing agenda. Xenophon's agenda is explored more fully in the Part 2, but the preponderance of exempla already indicates that instruction is one of its defining features.³

² As Gray remarks (2010a: 1), 'he was so highly regarded that all of his writings were preserved, and one (*Respublica Atheniensium*) credited to him as extra'. On the Ps-Xenophon tract, MacDowell's (2009: 9) explanations for works that may have been wrongly attributed to Demosthenes are attractive: 'A papyrus would not necessarily bear the writer's name. Demosthenes may have been given a copy of someone else's speech which, when found among his possessions after his death, was assumed to be his own. Or a bookseller may have thought he could get a higher price for a copy of a speech if he attached Demosthenes' name to it.'

³ The power of example to influence human behaviour was readily understood by Xenophon and became for him a prime instructional method. Cf. *Kyroupaideia* 8.8.5, where, having witnessed it in their rulers, Xenophon says the inhabitants of Asia turned to wickedness: 'for of whatever sort those who are foremost may be, such also, for the

1.1. Context: Overview of the Development of Xenophon's Literary Method

The paradigmatic nature of Xenophon's *Anabasis* is evident from a close reading of the text. Many of the episodes and events described have a distinctly exemplary quality, as do the leading characters in the story; Xenophon himself, as argued in the final chapter, is represented as a model student of Socrates, his aim being to defend his own character and to defend his teacher against the charges brought at his trial in 399. This section brings out Xenophon's preference for this form of literary expression. The argument made is that he uses exemplars in *Anabasis* as a means of realising aspects of his apologetic agenda and for instruction on leadership (in this case in the military context). As in other of his works, moral exempla are also a feature, and the main inspiration for this attempt at providing guidance on character to his readers is his association with Socrates. The link between the men was touched upon in the previous chapter and is looked at again in Chapter 4.2.

Xenophon's extensive use of exemplars can be appreciated better by considering contemporary developments in historiographical writing in the early fourth century. Frances Pownall examines this subject and shows how writers such as Xenophon, Ephoros, Theopompos, and even Plato (in the funeral oration in his *Menexenus*) came to manipulate the past for the purpose of moral instruction.⁴ The notion of historical accuracy, if ever it had wide adherence, now became a more marginal concern.⁵ The context for this paradigm shift, as Pownall argues, was the social, economic, and political upheaval of the later

most part, do those beneath them become' (ὁποῖοί τινες γὰρ ἂν οἱ προστάται ᾧσι, τοιοῦτοι καὶ οἱ ὑπ' αὐτοῦς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίνονται).

⁴ Pownall 2004. On Xenophon and paradigmatic history see also Dillery 1995. The suitability of the former's employing of the *Menexenus* as part of her argument has been questioned. In a review of her monograph, among more serious criticisms, Noreen Humble (2008) writes: 'It is first and foremost a Socratic dialogue and within that it purports to present an epideictic oration. That it treats historical material does not make the *Menexenus* generically equivalent to the other three works under discussion'.

⁵ Dillery (1995: 130) writes that Xenophon's use of positive and negative exemplars permitted him 'not only to provide moral lessons but also to construct historical explanations, as those places and persons are made to represent larger truths about the past'. On the problems of *Anabasis* as a historical text see especially Bradley 2001: 60-65.

fifth century.⁶ In coming to his text in the 370s or later, Xenophon was thus in an intellectual milieu that sought to reinvigorate moral fibre and which embraced morally driven paradigmatic writing as a way of promoting *aretê*. This is not, however, to say that earlier historical writing was disregarded: as shown in Part 2, in *Anabasis* Xenophon draws on the content of Thucydides, even if he is not strongly influenced by this author's method. Nor is it to say that paradigm was not a force in forming the narratives of earlier writers: see, for example, Herodotus' presentation of three model forms of government in his constitutional debate (3.80-82), and Thucydides' use of set piece accounts to illustrate military phenomena (e.g. Mantinea for the hoplite battle, 5.64-75; Plataea for sieges, 2.71-78).⁷

Although he was an important part of the fourth-century trend in historiography, typically Xenophon was also apart from it, developing his own approaches to enhancing the effectiveness of his agenda. The unique, genre-defying nature of *Anabasis* may be attributed to the requirements of this agenda, in particular his personal *apologia*. In order to attract and keep the interest of his audience he needed to find innovative ways of expressing his own defence; a colourful framework and diverse subjects thus serve to keep the audience engaged, while making overt, and often lengthy, apologetic passages more digestible. In the work, one of his innovations is his rooting of exemplars in a *real* context: his detailed, and impressively accurate, march record provides the foundation for the leadership lessons he wishes to provide.⁸ In this way one form of truth complements another, and consequently the impact of the individual episodes is greater. In this innovation Xenophon may have sought to forge a unique imprint for his own teaching style, though it is at least as likely that his main intention was to keep his audience engaged by playing on their knowledge of the

⁶ Pownall 2004: 9. According to the author, it would not be until the modern era that a 'scientific' history would develop (*ibid.* 1).

⁷ An immediate difference between Xenophon and his two predecessors is evident in the openings of his historically-orientated works, *Anabasis* and *Hellenika*, which, as Gray remarks in the case of *Hellenika* (1989a: 1), begin in *media res*. In contrast both Herodotus and Thucydides open with succinct programmatic statements.

⁸ In more general historical contexts versions of the past in the fourth (and indeed fifth) century tend to be highly subjective and/or to draw on mythological tradition, with the end of serving the agenda of the writer/orator, e.g. the Athenian version of the Persian Wars and of Athenian relations with the Medes: see Isokrates, *Pan.* 157 ff., and note Xenophon's selective use of a Persian history in *Kyroupaideia*. On the integrity of Xenophon's march record in *Anabasis* see Brennan 2009.

expedition's historicity.⁹ The enduring popularity of the work is a testament to the effectiveness of its style as well as content.

1.2. Exemplary Episodes in *Anabasis*

To illustrate Xenophon's method and the nature of his exemplars, in this section a selection are analysed. The first relates to the army's initial leader and his (effective) successor, the second to the overarching expression of the leadership theme in *Anabasis*, and the third to Xenophon himself and his later life in the Peloponnese.

1.a. *Wagons stuck in Mud. 1.5.7-8.*

While travelling through the desert region north of the Middle Euphrates, the author reports that wagons in the train become stuck in mud. He says that Cyrus ordered them to be dragged out, and eventually they were freed by a group of Persian nobles. Although this episode takes place in the closing stages of the march to Babylonia and there are challenging circumstances, such as the terrain, and a lack of food, the event could not be said to have any substantial significance in the story. In a straightforward account of the march we might expect it to warrant no more than a mention, yet it receives a half page of OCT. Putting this in context, the description of the long stage (90 parasangs) during which it occurs receives only the same amount of space.

Analysis of the event reveals the substance of its exemplary character, if not quite yet its main purpose, which Xenophon artfully holds up in order to underline the point he wishes to make. Upon arriving at the place where wagons had become stuck, he tells us that Cyrus, who is accompanied by the most privileged of his men, ordered two of them to take some of the native army and help to free the wagons.

⁹ *Contra* Higgins (1977: 95) who writes that Xenophon's purpose in providing the march record is not to establish authenticity but 'to suggest quietly the ever deepening ensnarement of the Greeks within Persian territory'. S.E. Bassett (1917: 567) puts the record down to a compulsive tendency in the author, he being 'an industrious gatherer of facts of this kind'. I have not yet read Rood on Xenophon and parasangs (2010a).

But when it seemed to him that they did so at their leisure, as if in anger (ὀργῆ) he ordered the best of the Persians around him to go down. And then one might have beheld a sample of good order: they each threw off their purple cloaks where they chanced to be standing, and rushed, as a man would run to win a victory, down a most exceedingly steep hill, wearing these costly tunics and coloured trousers, some of them, indeed, with necklaces around their necks and bracelets on their arms; and leaping at once, with all this finery, into the mud, they lifted the wagons high and dry and brought them out more quickly than one would have thought possible (1.5.8).

Xenophon is highlighting features of Cyrus's leadership which he wishes to draw attention to; although the scene could reflect accurately a real event witnessed by, or reported to, Xenophon, on balance it seems more plausible to believe that it has been built up, if not wholly designed by the author, in order to enable his points to be learned. (I think of Xenophon as recalling some likely incident on the march which he then adapts to suit his didactic ends.) While in this instance he is evidently bringing thought to bear on the value of commanding discipline and loyalty, the main lesson of the episode only becomes clear in the second book when Xenophon chooses to highlight another incident — again, not a particularly obvious one to dwell on — involving Cyrus's successor as leader of the army, Klearchos the Spartan.

1.b. Klearchos in the Mud. 2.3.11.

As the Greeks begin their long march homewards from Mesopotamia, Xenophon reports that the route which they were led along by the Persians was criss-crossed by ditches and canals full of water. To cross these they had to make bridges from palm trees; Xenophon describes how Klearchos, leading the army, handles this situation:

And here it was possible to learn how Klearchos commanded, holding his spear in his left hand, his staff in his right. And if any of those who had been assigned to one of these tasks seemed

to him to be shirking, he would pick out someone appropriate, and strike him, and at the same time he himself would get into the mud and take up the task, with the result that it shamed all who did not join him in earnest (2.3.11).¹⁰

While the disciplinarian in Klearchos is to the fore, he complements his use of physical punishment with exemplary action: in doing as he himself orders, the leader inspires — or in this case shames — those around him. His descent into the mud pointedly recalls Cyrus's failure to do so when his wagons had become stuck. In his explicit flagging of this episode as a lesson in leadership, Xenophon is emphasising the importance of this quality in a leader. The implicit linking of this episode with the earlier one gives both a sense of the subtlety of Xenophon's narrative and the degree to which it is subject to paradigm.

2. Leaders.

The paradigmatic character of the narrative registers again on the macro level. For instance in dealing with the subject of leadership style Xenophon chooses to present different paradigms; his choosing of three (arguably there are more embedded in the narrative) perhaps betrays the influence of Herodotus' three-sided constitutional debate (as mentioned above, *Histories* 3.80-82). Moreover, and more interestingly from the viewpoint of intertextuality, both writers here are concerned with the problem of how to lead and dwell on similar models. What Herodotus presents — first democracy, then oligarchy, and then monarchy, with this last being decided on as best by the Persians — is inverted by Xenophon who introduces his styles in order of their effectiveness, the first being represented by the Persian prince, Cyrus the Younger (Book 1), the second by Klearchos of Sparta (Book 2), and the final and optimal by Xenophon the Athenian (Books 3-7). A further difference between the two writers is that whereas Herodotus' treatment of the rulership problem takes the form of an open discussion of the merits and deficiencies of each of the three types he

¹⁰ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἦν Κλέαρχον καταμαθεῖν ὡς ἐπεστάται, ἐν μὲν τῇ ἀριστερᾷ χειρὶ τὸ δόρυ ἔχων, ἐν δὲ τῇ δεξιᾷ βακτηρίαν· καὶ εἴ τις αὐτῶ δοκοίη τῶν πρὸς τοῦτο τεταγμένων βλακεύειν, ἐκλεγόμενος τὸν ἐπιτήδειον ἔπαισεν ἄν, καὶ ἅμα αὐτὸς προσελάμβανεν εἰς τὸν πηλὸν ἐμβαίνων· ὥστε πᾶσιν αἰσχύνῃν εἶναι μὴ οὐ συσπουδάξειν. 2.3.11.

names, Xenophon fashions his material into the storyline without indication of his purpose. His treatment of leadership styles is examined in detail in Part 2.

3. Skillous. Xenophon in Paradeisos. 5.3.7-13.

At some time following his return to Greece with Agesilaos in 394, Xenophon was settled in the Peloponnese by the Spartans. He describes his later life on his estate in *Anabasis*, and there is a clear sense of this being idyllic:

8. The river Selinos chanced to flow through the place. And also in Ephesus a river Selinos flows beside the temple of Artemis, and fish and mussels are present in both. And on the land at Skillous it is also possible to hunt all the wild animals of the chase...10. For both Xenophon's sons and those of the other citizens used to hold a hunt for the festival, and the men who wished to would join the hunt with them. Boars, gazelles, and deer were captured from the sacred precinct itself, as well as from Mount Pholoe. 11...In the sacred precinct are both a meadow and hills full of trees, sufficient to nourish pigs, goats, cattle, and horses, so that even the baggage animals of those who come to the festival have their feast. 5.3.8, 10, 11.

The Skillous vignette has been read in a variety of ways by scholars, many of whom comment on the contentment portrayed in it.¹¹ Most recently, Rood has

¹¹ Horn (1935: 158) writes that 'we can imagine Xenophon's joy and satisfaction as he spent his later years in this delightful place, indulging his love of hunting and writing'; Higgins (1977: 97) remarks on the simplicity and quiet of the author's life at Skillous: 'Family, farming, the hunt, it all seems somehow far removed from the adventures of an earlier day. He seems to have come to a new understanding about the nature of *philotimia*, the love of glory and fame, to have reduced the scope of his past ambitions to a contentment with place and the stability of the definite which he could not find while addicted to travel'. Dillery (2007: 67) likewise sees an ideal quality in Xenophon's construction of his life at Skillous: 'Xenophon finds a new identity in exile, as the patron and sole official of a new community he has founded, just as he had imagined doing on the march of the Ten Thousand, but without result'. Azoulay (2004: 300-301) regards the Skillous digression as part of an attempt by Xenophon to impress that he did not profit personally from the expedition (in the passage he accounts for the monies he has received from booty), but does not deny its idyllic quality. Referring to the annual offering of a tithe to the goddess from the fruits of the estate (5.3.9), Tuplin (2004b: 263) remarks that this evokes a 'paradigmatic, traditional festival' (incidentally, he does

written that Xenophon's reason for describing the estate was 'to show that it was modelled on the goddess' [Artemis'] own sanctuary at Ephesus and to stress its plentiful produce'.¹² I take this divine parallel further and suggest that Xenophon's aim is to indicate an earthly paradise, a heaven on earth. The episode is thus principally intended to be a moral exemplar showing the benefit that flows from a noble and pious life. The idyllic estate is divine reward for just action and piety; the abundance of meat — fish, mussels, boar, deer, gazelles — Xenophon hunting with his sons, celebrating with his neighbours, is a clear portrait of an earthly paradise. As Xenophon himself puts it in his speech to the generals and captains of the army on the banks of the Greater Zab River, this is the life which accrues in the end to brave men:¹³

For my part, men, I have pondered also this, that regarding all those who crave staying alive through wars in whatever way they can, these for the most part die both badly and shamefully; but all those who know that death is common to and necessary for all human beings, and compete over dying nobly, these I see somehow arriving more often into old age and, for as long as they live, passing their time more happily (3.1.43).¹⁴

not consider that Xenophon intends to portray the estate at Skillous as a *paradeisos*, *ibid.* 268). Bradley (2001: 77) makes the point that the digression 'previews and emphasises Xenophon's exile', and sets 'the physical context of the exile before reader's eyes' (80). This reading supports the argument that Skillous plays an essential literary role in the text.

¹² Rood 2009: 2 (and 18-19). See this paper for a study of the Skillous scene's reception.

¹³ Cf. also *Lak.* 10, where Xenophon points out that worthy Spartans at the end of their lives earn a place in the *gerousia*. The ends of Tissaphernes (*Hell.* 3.4.25) and Klearchos (*An.* 2.6.1), and the undistinguished death of Kheirisophos (*An.* 6.2.14, 6.2.18, 6.4.11) also fit into this paradigmatic scheme. Notably, in the case of the Persian, Xenophon has an envoy of his assassin say to Agesilaos: 'The man responsible for your and our troubles has now received his due'. The model of benefit/punishment for deeds done is applied not only to individuals in Xenophon: note for instance in *Hellenika* the case of the Thirty at Athens, and the connecting of Sparta's eventual downfall at Leuctra to its illegal seizure of the Theban citadel (5.4.1).

¹⁴ ἐντεθύμημαι δ' ἔγωγε, ὧ ἄνδρες, καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι ὀπόσοι μὲν μαστεύουσι ζῆν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὗτοι μὲν κακῶς τε καὶ αἰσχροῶς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἀποθνήσκουσιν, ὀπόσοι δὲ τὸν μὲν θάνατον ἐγνώκασιν πᾶσι κοινὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ἀνθρώποις, περὶ δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἀποθνήσκειν ἀγωνίζονται, τούτους ὀρῶ μᾶλλον πῶς εἰς τὸ γῆρας ἀφικνουμένους καὶ ἕως ἂν ζῶσιν εὐδαιμονέστερον διάγοντας. 3.1.43.

PART 2. XENOPHON *DIDASKALOS*: LEADERS AND LEADERSHIP IN *ANABASIS*

As remarked several of Xenophon's works have a clear didactic character, indicating that instruction was a major part of his writing agenda. The *Cavalry Commander*, and the treatises on *Hunting* and *Horsemanship* are explicitly concerned with practical instruction;¹⁵ the *Kyroupaideia*, through direct teaching and paradigm, has a pronounced didactic flavour, as do the major Socratic works.¹⁶ One of Xenophon's main subjects is leadership, and in *Anabasis*, the story of an army on the march, there is an evident interest in military leaders and the leadership of armies.¹⁷ In the account Xenophon himself commands the army for a considerable part of its arduous journey back to Greece. The aims of this part are to bring out the extent to which the subject pervades the text and to demonstrate that the author's aim in his treatment is instruction. The argument made is that, in addition to a range of practical situational lessons, he presents different styles of leadership, and implies that the optimal is that which he himself is representative of on the retreat. One important lesson that emerges is that it is essential for a leader to be aware of the nature of his constituency, and to understand the interplay between ruled and ruler, soldier and commander.

¹⁵ The first is addressed directly to *hipparcheis* and outlines the tasks that a successful commander must undertake; the treatise on hunting concludes with the author advising young men to follow what he has written (ὥστε ὑπάρχειν ἐνθυμουμένους τοῦτων θεοφιλεῖς τ' εἶναι καὶ εὐσεβεῖς τοὺς νέους τοὺς ποιοῦντας ἃ ἐγὼ παραινῶ, 13.17), while that on the art of horsemanship opens with the statement that 'we wish to explain to our younger friends what we believe to be the correct method of dealing with horses' (βουλόμεθα καὶ τοῖς νεωτέροις τῶν φίλων δηλῶσαι ἧ ἂν νομίζομεν αὐτοὺς ὀρθότατα ἵπποις προσφέρεσθαι, 1.1).

¹⁶ In *Kyroupaideia* Xenophon outlines the education of Cyrus the Great and proceeds to demonstrate its worth in a range of situations. Of the major Socratic works, *Memorabilia* provides guidance on a range of moral and practical questions, while *Oikonomikos* focuses on household and agricultural management (Gray 2010a: 21 remarks that it 'offers a complex of teaching and learning strategies about success in farming').

¹⁷ Leadership is a central concern in the *Cavalry Commander*, *Oikonomikos*, *Kyroupaideia*, *Agésilaios*, and *Hiero*, and is notably evident in *Hellenika* commander descriptions and anecdotes, e.g. Teleutias in Book 5, and in *Memorabilia* 3.1-5. This range of contexts is indicative of a broader interest on Xenophon's part in political philosophy, particularly in the problem of how to rule. Xenophon's expertise on the subject is, it is worth noting, highly valued by modern practitioners; Peter Drucker (1993: 158) writes: 'The first systematic book on leadership: the *Kyroupaideia* of Xenophon – himself no mean leader of men – is still the best book on the subject'.

This argument is made in the first section through a consideration of the army's character.¹⁸

2.1. The Political Character of the Army

Studies of the Ten Thousand's organisation have shown the extent to which the political character of the army resembled, and differed from, that of a *polis*.¹⁹ At various junctures the rank and file, whether by contingent or in general assembly, listen to speeches by their leaders and deliberate on matters at hand; leaders are, moreover, brought to account for their actions and subjected to the justice of the army.²⁰ Yet in other cases, often, tellingly, in more trying circumstances, the democratic dynamic is absent: decisions are taken by the leader(s) without consultation and are carried through without protest from the soldiers. This applies most notably during the march from the Greater Zab River to Trapezus, a pressurised period when tight control and discipline were self-evidently in the collective interest and served the common objective of reaching safety (cf. 3.5.17, 4.1.12, 4.6.7, 4.8.9). In this section I argue that in *Anabasis* Xenophon seeks to elucidate a behavioural model for mercenaries.²¹ In his construction, ethnic and contingent loyalties are overridden by individual self-interests, which can readily form into a collective will that is difficult, if not impossible, to resist (cf. *Mem.* 3.9.4, then *An.* 1.2.11, 1.3.7, 1.4.13-16, 2.4.2-4, 5.1.2-3, 5.7.34, 6.1.17-25, 6.4.10-11). As the author demonstrates, this will manifests itself in various forms and at times which are not always predictable;

¹⁸ Leadership in *Anabasis* has been a focus of attention for scholars since Breitenbach's 1950 study, which brought out the concern in Xenophon's historiographical works for portraying models of good military leadership. Notable subsequent studies which cover *Anabasis* include Wood 1964, Nussbaum 1967, and Humble 1997. Humble establishes Xenophon's as an ideal form of command, and proceeds to compare the leadership of the Spartans in the story to this ideal, with the aim of revealing any pro-Spartan bias in the writer.

¹⁹ See Nussbaum 1967, Anderson 1974, Dalby 1992, Hornblower 2004, Lee 2007. For parallel arguments as to the extent to which Alexander's army resembled the Macedonian state on the road, see Hammond 1989.

²⁰ Voting: 3.2.9, 33, 38; 5.1.4, 7, 8, 11, 12; 5.6.11, 33; 6.1.32; 6.2.4-7; 6.4.11; 7.3.5-6, 14. Justice: 5.8.1.

²¹ The origin of this line of enquiry is a paper by Christopher Tuplin on Xenophon in Anatolia in which he comments that an aim of *Anabasis* is 'to highlight the problems involved in controlling mercenary armies' (2007a: 27). The importance of *Anabasis* as a source of information on mercenaries has long been recognised by modern scholars. See especially Roy 1967, Parke 1933, Griffith 1935.

if he is to be successful, it is essential for the leader of such a group to be able to manage its dynamics.²²

The Exercise of Mercenary Power: Disobedience, Democracy, Disorder

A basic model for the behaviour of mercenaries is that their aim, on the one hand, is to follow instructions, and on the other to take home what profit they can.²³ Once he has set out the terms of their employment, the employer should, therefore, be reasonably confident of leading them towards his stated end. In his detailed depiction of the Cyreans' relationship with two separate employers, Cyrus the Younger and Seuthes of Thrace, Xenophon shows how any alteration to this contract can result in great dangers. The focus in the present treatment is limited to Cyrus the Younger.²⁴

The most obvious and the most sensitive contractual changes relate to money: mercenaries will demand it from anyone, whenever it is due (cf. Thucydides 8.84). As Xenophon demonstrates, delay has the side-effect of undermining authority in the longer term, a process that can end badly for the employer. He begins by showing Cyrus setting about his task of managing mercenaries with some expertise; he carefully assembles his armies (1.1.6-11), reviews the force (1.2.7), and prudently presides over games for the Arkadians — who form a

²² The success of Pericles' leadership is, arguably, attributable in large measure to his understanding of the mindset of the Athenian *demos*. Cf. Plutarch, *Political precepts* 3-4: 'it is necessary to turn oneself to learning the character of the citizens, the dominant character, that is, that appears from the combined characters of them all...The Athenian people, for example, is swift to anger...The statesman must not ape the popular character but he must understand and use the features which make each society amenable. Ignorance of the character of the people produces mistakes and failures in political dealings, just as much as in royal friendships'.

²³ With reference to the Ten Thousand Dalby (1992: 16) formulates it as follows: 'the men's aim when they were Cyrus's mercenaries (like the aims of other mercenaries) had been to follow what instructions had come to them from above and to take home, individually, what pay and profit they could.' Lee (2007: 77-78), more abstractly, defines their interest in terms of opportunity: amongst a range of possibilities, 'economic opportunity was probably the greatest motivator'. See also Roy 2004.

²⁴ In the period of Xenophon's narrative (401-399) the Cyreans have three different employers, each with their own objectives: Cyrus the Younger forms the army, with the intention of pacifying the Pisidians (1.2.1); the Thracian dynast Seuthes engages the force planning to use it to regain his father's lands (7.2.32-34); and the Spartans under Thibron enlist the remnants of the army for a campaign against Tissaphernes (7.6.7). Roy (1967: 316) remarks that terms of service were negotiated on a contractual basis, and in some detail.

major block within his mercenary force (1.2.10; cf. *Hiero* 9.1-3). Yet shortly after, he is unable to pay the mercenaries monies owed. A disturbing disregard for his status is recorded: 'He owed his soldiers more than three months' wages, and they often went to his headquarters and demanded it' (καὶ πολλάκις ἰόντες ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας ἀπήτουν, 1.2.11). Although the money is soon paid thanks to the timely arrival of a benefactor, Cyrus's standing as a leader has been damaged. The first evidence of a degrading of his power occurs only a matter of days after. The prince, at the behest of his benefactor, the Queen of Kilikia, holds a review of the entire army on the plain at Tyriaion. Having inspected his native troops, when he had ordered them to arrange themselves in their battle formations, he reviewed the Greeks (1.2.15). Halting his own chariot at the middle of the phalanx, he sent his interpreter to their generals and ordered them to advance with their weapons facing forward (1.2.17). The generals passed this order to the soldiers:

When the trumpet sounded, they advanced with weapons forward. After this, advancing faster and faster of their own accord (ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου) and with a shout, the soldiers began to run toward the camp; and there was great fear among the barbarians as both the queen in her carriage, and those in the market — leaving their wares behind — fled (1.2.17-18).

While the men obey the order from Cyrus passed on through their generals, consciously empowering themselves, they put on display not only their arms, but the extent to which the power of their leaders is dependent upon them. Cyrus is reported to have been pleased for the fear the display struck in the barbarians (1.2.18), but such independent behaviour must also have unsettled him to some degree. The incident may have served to remind him that freedom was the source of Greek strength (cf. 1.7.3).

A more serious incident of disobedience occurs once the army has crossed the Taurus Mountains, a landmark which exposes the pretence that the expedition's object is the Pisidians (cf. 1.2.1). Realising now, if not before, that they had been misled, and suspecting that Cyrus was marching against his brother, the men refused to continue. They said that 'this was not what they had been hired

for' (μισθωθῆναι δὲ οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἔφασαν, 1.3.1). Xenophon describes at length (4 OCT pages) the tense series of events at Tarsus in order to highlight how easily control of a mercenary body can be lost, and how dangerous the potential consequences of this can be. Notable is the collective decision of more than 2,000 soldiers to shift their allegiance from their respective leaders to another, one whom they adjudged would be a more effective champion of their welfare (1.3.7; cf. 6.1.17-18, where the soldiers decide to choose a single leader believing this would increase their chances to win booty). A further lesson seems to be that mercenaries will readily, if not enthusiastically, accept new terms if it suits their self-interest. In this case, it was deemed that the new object — the satrap Abrokomas, who was said to be on the Euphrates — was acceptable, contingent on an increase in pay; when this aim in turn proved to be false, an additional increase in pay was sufficient to persuade the men to march against the King (1.4.11-13).

An evident distinction drawn here is with a citizen army, whose loyalty to their *polis* normally outweighs considerations of individual and collective self-interest. The Spartans at Thermopylae are a clear case in point, with the same principles of self-sacrifice being expressed in the Athenian ephebic oath (cf. too, Plutarch, *Kimon* 17.6).²⁵ Nor do ethnic affiliations carry much weight with mercenaries, as Xenophon indicates when informing us of the fact that a large contingent of Arcadians, who had been under the command of Xenias of Parrhasia (Arcadia), chose to decamp to the command of Klearchos the Spartan (1.3.7).²⁶ Absent as well is any sense of a unifying ideological agenda, such as panhellenism, or indeed fear of great monarchic power, such as the native contingent are implied to exhibit through the author's silence on their behaviour at Tarsus and elsewhere.²⁷

²⁵ Making a comparison with the Athenian force that sailed to Sicily in 415, Parke (1933: 24) writes that the Ten Thousand 'had gone to serve as far from its home...but moved by no stimulus of national ambition'. Mixed or coalition armies seem to be a separate case. Citing the refusal of the Corinthians to participate in an attack on Athens when they realise the real purpose of the expedition (Herodotus 5.92), Hornblower (2004: 257-258) writes that such forces 'sometimes behave very like mercenary ones'.

²⁶ Lee (2007: 66-74) argues persuasively for this position, explaining the later Arcadian-Achaean secession as 'the product not of long-simmering tensions, but of a short-term chain of events' (69-70).

²⁷ The mercenaries in the later part of their journey frequently confront Spartan power: cf. their storming of Byzantium 7.1.14 ff. However Hornblower, in the same passage

Democracy is a further means by which the collective will of the mercenary body is expressed. Following Cyrus's death and the assumption of responsibility for their own fate by the Greeks, this particular form of political expression becomes prominent. For instance at Herakleia on the Black Sea, dissatisfied with gifts sent to them by the people of the city, the men assemble themselves and resolve to send one of Kheirisophos and Xenophon to secure more provisions from the citizens. In the event, these two prove strongly reluctant to do so (οἱ δὲ ἰσχυρῶς ἀπεμάχοντο) on account of it being a friendly Greek city, and the men sent instead their own ambassadors (6.2.4-7).

In an earlier notable instance on the *parabasis*, the men use democratic power to assert symbolically their control over the leadership (5.8.1). Having been called to account for their actions since the beginning of their rule, several of the generals are fined, with Xenophon himself forced to answer charges of *hubris* (on this episode see further Chapter 3.2.2). His *apologia* and later elaborate addresses to the men show, however, that the mercenaries are amenable to the charm and power of speech. Through this episode Xenophon is also highlighting the propensity of democracies to hastiness and hasty judgements, and doubtless expects his readers to recall both the trial of the generals at Athens after Arginousai and the earlier Mytilenean episode. (See note 75 below for insights provided by Xenophon on the control and management of democracies.) Democratic power is also used by the soldiers to ensure equitable distribution of booty among the whole army:

Now whenever the army stayed back resting, it was permitted to go out after plunder, and those who went out kept what they got. But whenever the entire army went out, if anyone went out

cited above (2004: 258), seems to regard them as being in a special relationship with Sparta: 'it is not quite safe to treat them [the Ten Thousand] as a mercenary force in the sense of a body with no state ties whatsoever. When the question of the supreme command comes up at a late stage of the expedition, Xenophon hints plainly that the Spartans will have an interest in the outcome and will be less than pleased if a non-Spartan is appointed'. While it *could* be argued that the Spartans felt some sense of proprietorship over the army, the army in Xenophon's account felt no loyalty to Sparta. Cf. 6.1.30, and the treatment of the men by the Spartans once they have crossed out of Asia (e.g. 7.2.6, 7.2.13).

separately and got something, it was decided that this be public property (δημόσιον ἔδοξεν εἶναι). (6.6.2).

Where civil means of expression fail, or are inadequate to the circumstances, the preferred form of mercenary expression is violent action. An early hint of this is seen at Tarsus when Klearchos' own men initially prevent him from moving forward by attacking his entourage. 'Klearchos at this point narrowly escaped being stoned to death' (1.3.2).²⁸ Instances of violence recur on the march inland (cf. 1.5.11-12), but are more or less absent from Kounaxa to the Black Sea, when the restraining imperative of survival recedes. At Kotyora, when the men learn of a supposed plan by the generals to sail them back in the direction whence they came (to Phasis, 5.7.1), they react negatively: 'On hearing this, the soldiers took it hard, and gatherings began to take place and circles to be formed, and it was greatly to be feared that they would do the sort of things that they had done also to the heralds of the Kolchians and the market managers, for as many of these as did not flee into the sea were stoned to death' (5.7.2). The highly volatile situation is defused by Xenophon, who hastily convenes an assembly in which, through unadorned and systematic argument, he quells the bubbling discontent of the mercenaries (5.7.5-11).

The most notorious incident of disorder occurs at Byzantium. Instructed to leave the city by the admiral Anaxibios, the men do so reluctantly, not having been paid the money they were promised by the Spartan. As their generals confer outside the walls, the mercenaries 'snatched up their weapons and ran in a rush toward the gates, intending to go back inside the wall...Other soldiers ran toward the sea, and at the breakwater they got over the wall and into the city; and when other soldiers, who chanced to be within, saw the action at the gates, they cut through the bar with their axes, and threw the gates wide open, and the rest raced in' (7.1.15-17). Once again, Xenophon is on hand to reign in the mercenaries, and again he achieves this through reasoned argument (7.1.18-32).

²⁸ Hornblower (2004: 249) writes that 'stoning is the paradigm of the undisciplined collective act'.

Leaders and Leadership

As noted the subject of leadership is prominent in Xenophon's writings. In different works he engages with it in contexts ranging from empires (*Kyroupaideia*) to the household (*Oikonomikos*); as is demonstrated here, a principal concern in *Anabasis* is military leadership. A critical factor distinguishing treatment of the subject in this book from that in others is the explicit non-fictional setting, the effect of which is to impart greater force to episodes within the narrative, even if these episodes are frequently paradigmatic. This extensive use of paradigm is a further notable feature of the work. Although on occasion he is prescriptive, either as narrator or character (cf. 2.2.5, 2.2.13, 3.3.36-44, 7.7.41), in the main Xenophon's didacticism is realised indirectly through example.²⁹ As discussed in Part 1, his preference for this style is doubtless due to the development of historiography along these lines, but may be based too on a wish to develop a different approach to that used by Socrates, and to avoid putting his audience off through overt didacticism.

The importance of the leadership theme may be gauged from the fact that a considerable amount of the narrative is taken up describing the characters and actions of leaders in the story. The more than 30,000 strong Asian contingent is almost completely ignored except for Cyrus and a handful from his inner circle, while of the 14,000 odd Greek mercenaries, only a very small number are mentioned (c. 70), with the majority of these being officers (c. 50).³⁰ Xenophon himself, up until the events on the banks of the Greater Zab River, appears only three times (1.8.15-16, 2.4.15, 2.5.37-41), whereafter he has cause to mention himself over 270 times. The prominence of the leadership theme can further be brought out by examination of the travelogue, which is frequently abbreviated to

²⁹ In his obituaries, of Cyrus (1.9), and then the captured generals (2.6), Xenophon is more explicit in his guidance. Gray (2010a: 12) remarks: 'The obituary is a device he appears to have invented for the purpose of revealing the secrets of leadership'. In his treatment of leadership in other works Xenophon tends to be more openly didactic: for example in the *Kyroupaideia*, he sets out Cyrus's training in the opening book, and in the remaining ones demonstrates the efficacy of his education.

³⁰ Roy (1967: 303-306) provides a list of individuals whose name and nationality are given in *Anabasis*: 16 of these are *strategoï*, 29 *lochagoï*, 7 are other officers (*taxiarchs*, *hipparch*), and 14 are non-officers.

allow for treatment of a leadership event. Two examples taken from the cases dealt with in the following sections illustrate this.

1. Mutiny at Tarsus. *An.* 1.3. (See Section 2.3 below for detail of the episode.) Klearchos, the Spartan commander who is closest of all the Greeks to Cyrus, deals with a mass insubordination at Tarsus and succeeds in getting the mercenaries to continue. The detail which Xenophon provides on Klearchos' engagement with the problem makes it apparent that he is going beyond what is needed to be told about the episode for the purposes of the story; the space occupied, over 4 OCT pages, is just under half of the whole narrative length up until this point. Certainly the event is an important one, but evidently so too for the author is its handling by the Spartan, and, as argued above, this links into a supplementary concern about the management of mercenary soldiers.

2. Wagons stuck in mud. *An.* 1.5.7-8. (On this incident see further Part 1 above and Section 2.2 below.) Travelling through the remote desert region north of the Middle Euphrates, a number of wagons become stuck in mud and Cyrus orders them to be freed; eventually they are lifted out by a group of Persian nobles. Although this episode takes place in the closing stages of the march to Babylonia, and there are difficult circumstances, the event could not be said to have special significance in the story. However it receives a half page of OCT, the same amount of space as the description of the long stage (90 parasangs) during which it takes place.³¹

While, as remarked, a number of leaders feature in *Anabasis*, on a quantitative measure the most prominent are those who effectively head the Greek force during the course of its long march. These are Cyrus the Younger, Klearchos the Spartan, and Xenophon the Athenian and Kheirisophos the Spartan.³² The

³¹ Of Xenophon's method in *Hellenika* Pownall (2004: 110) writes: 'he often gives relatively minor people and events, for their intrinsic moral value, as much space or more than important ones'.

³² Strictly, following the seizure of several of the generals by the Greater Zab, the leadership is a collective of seven (Xenophon, Kheirisophos, Sophainetos, Timasion, Xanthicles, Philesios, and Kleanor); in practice, Xenophon and Kheirisophos jointly command, with Kheirisophos *primus inter pares*. Kheirisophos leaves at Trapezus but returns again at Sinope and is elected sole leader; Diodoros 14.27.1 writes that he was elected supreme commander at the Greater Zab. *Contra* Roy (1967: 289, 296), who

arrangement of the narrative reflects this primacy, with Cyrus the focus in Book 1, Klearchos in Book 2, and Xenophon and Kheirisophos in Books 3-6; following the death of Kheirisophos (6.4.11), Xenophon dominates the stage in Book 7.³³ In his exposition of the actions of these individual leaders, one of Xenophon's concerns is to highlight their respective strengths and weaknesses and thereby for his record to serve as thoughtful and instructive material for aspiring commanders. His standard teaching method can be formulated in the following terms:

- Leader is confronted with a problem/opportunity
- Leader implements a course of action, or does not act at all
- Lesson. The impact of the decision is occasionally commented on, but more often the reader, who is a witness to the unfolding events, is left to reflect himself on its implications for the leader, his command, and for the army as a whole.³⁴

An important additional aim, it is argued, is to critique different styles of leadership: Cyrus is royalty and rules on an oriental model; Klearchos and Kheirisophos are products of the Spartan militaristic tradition; and Xenophon himself is an Athenian citizen and a student of moral philosophy.³⁵ This important aspect of the work, then, is as much about the effectiveness of leadership styles as it is a practical exercise in learning from the successes and

considers that the seven *strategoí* managed the army's affairs by majority decision 'until Kheirisophos was elected sole leader' (289).

³³ Xenophon receives most attention, being mentioned in the text approximately 275 times, all but three of these (1.8.15-16, 2.4.15, 2.5.37-41) in Books 3-7. Cyrus is mentioned 236 times, 177 in Book 1; Klearchos, 95 times, the majority of these in Book 2; Kheirisophos, 87 times. The most frequently mentioned of the other leaders are the Persians, Tissaphernes and Ariaios, 70 and 32 respectively; Menon the Thessalian, 29; and Proxenos of Boiotia, 25. (All figures are approximate.) The leaders in this second group frequently function to bring out qualities or failings of those in the first. See, for example, Cyrus and his relationship to Tissaphernes below; Kroeker (2009: 8) argues for Klearchos and Proxenos as opposites.

³⁴ Cf. Mitchell's (2008: 30) conclusion that Thucydides' political theorising 'is implicit and allusive rather than explicit, and worked out through action and event. He presents the case, but he leaves his readers to draw their own conclusions.'

³⁵ Coming from a different perspective Kingsbury (1956: 163) identifies the roles of Cyrus, Klearchos, and Xenophon as significant within the architecture of the work; in her view the characters are framed by the genre of tragic drama, with the rank and file being a massed chorus. 'The spectacle of drama or epic is that of a single large action carried on by a few major characters with a chorus of individuals more or less affected by the actions of the main characters'.

failures of outstanding men. In the remaining sections features of the leadership of these men accentuated by the author are examined.

2.2. Cyrus the Younger

Cyrus, the son of Darius and Parysatis, is the principal actor in Book 1. He assembles the expeditionary force, leads it up-country to Babylonia, and directs the attack against his brother. As with the other main characters in the story, the picture which Xenophon draws of him is not intended to be an accurate historical portrait, but rather is a composite of (probably real) individual traits and, in this case, the stereotype of an oriental ruler. In the author's representation, Cyrus's potential to be a great king (1.9.1) resides in his appreciation of Greek values and customs, epitomised in his lauding of 'freedom' in his address to the officers in the run-up to battle (1.7.3); his route to virtue, however, is problematised by the deeper roots of his upbringing (cf. 'disorder', 1.7.20). A selection of incidents from the march up-country both illustrate his hybrid character and prompt reflection on the prince's leadership.³⁶

An. 1.2.11-12. A Crisis over Pay.

On the Kaÿstros Plain in western Anatolia, Cyrus is approached by the soldiers, to whom he owes more than three months wages. Xenophon reports that 'he was clearly distressed; for it was not in keeping with the character of Cyrus not to give them their pay, if he had it' (1.2.11). While they are still encamped on the plain the Queen of Kilikia arrives and soon after the men are paid. Xenophon reports that 'it was said that Cyrus had intercourse with the Kilikian' (1.2.12).

In this vignette Xenophon highlights several features of his Cyrus's leadership, in particular his concern for his soldiers, and his resourcefulness. The first feature distinguishes Cyrus from the stereotype of oriental enslaver and is an

³⁶ Some, placing weight on the obituary of Cyrus (1.9), regard Xenophon's portrayal of his leadership as ideal: see for example Delebecque (1947: 97), and more recently, Azoulay (2004: 299), Almagor (2009: 9), and Millender (2009: 7). There is, however, a clear, and not to be unexpected contradiction between the encomium, and the account given of Cyrus and his leadership on the march up-country. In the end this portrait is not that far away from the picture painted by Plutarch in his *Artaxerxes* (2-3).

early example of Xenophon's individualist representation of the prince.³⁷ The quality nonetheless has a potentially negative aspect to it: in his obituary of Proxenos, Xenophon remarks on the danger of softness in a leader, saying that 'he [Proxenos] was manifestly more afraid of being hated by his soldiers than his soldiers were of disobeying him...Thus the noble and good among his associates were well disposed to him, while the unjust plotted against him, as against someone easily manipulated' (2.6.19-20).³⁸ Cyrus's own obituary (1.9), which, at odds with his depiction in the preceding narrative, is clearly a portrait of an exemplary leader, does not disqualify the latter part of this description being applied to him. Notably, the ways in which Cyrus seems to have been deceived, or manipulated, by Tissaphernes (1.1.2-3), Megaphernes (1.2.20), Menon (1.4.13-17), Orontes (1.6), and Klearchos (1.8.12-13), suggest that concern for, and a trusting attitude towards, others was a weakness of his rule.

A second facet of Cyrus's leadership featured in this passage is his resourcefulness, apparent in the manner of his securing of substantial funds from the Kilikian queen. The importance of this quality is underlined by the evident potential of the cash crisis to derail the whole enterprise; Xenophon may also be saying that good leaders are always prepared to put their bodies on the line for their men. On the other hand, we are clearly invited to wonder how, hardly having begun his march up-country, Cyrus has already run out of money. In spite of the care he shows for his men, he has now failed in his duty to provide for them (cf. *Hipp.* 6.2: 'feelings of loyalty will naturally be fostered when the commander is kind to his men, and obviously takes care that they have food'). Given his straitened financial circumstances his earlier decision to offer more to Aristippos than he requested seems, in this new light, to be more bravado than professional generalship (1.1.10). It could have been that the meeting with the Kilikian queen was pre-arranged, but Xenophon would hardly then have described Cyrus as being distressed (ἀνιώμενος) when the men came to him demanding pay. The sudden, unexpected shadow of disorder

³⁷ There may be an implied contrast here to Spartan contemptuousness towards men owed money: see 7.1.7, and cf. Thucydides 8.84.

³⁸ Late in the journey, in Thrace, Xenophon is described by Seuthes to the Spartans as a φιλοστρατιώτης (7.6.39). However, Xenophon has shown that he is not afraid to be disliked by the soldiers (cf. 5.8.13-16), and what Seuthes has construed as over-familiarity may just as easily be interpreted as proper concern for the welfare of the men and the army as a whole.

which comes over the expedition is reinforced by the suggested image of the barbarian royals copulating on the dusty Asian plain.

An. 1.5.7-8. Wagons stuck in Mud.

In the course of marching through the desert a number of wagons in the train become stuck in mud.³⁹ Cyrus, who is accompanied by the best and most privileged of his men, orders two of them to take some of the native army and help to free the wagons. But the prince is dissatisfied with their efforts and orders others from his entourage to go down:

Here, then, it was possible to observe some portion of their good order. For throwing down their purple robes wherever each chanced to be standing, they hurled themselves, just as one might run for victory, down a very steep hill, with their very expensive tunics and multicoloured trousers, and some even with necklaces around their necks and bracelets around their wrists. Leaping at once into the mud with these on, they lifted the wagons out into the air more swiftly than one might have thought possible (1.5.8).

In terms of the teaching formula outlined above, Cyrus has encountered a (minor) logistical problem, and when his solution to this has not had the desired result, he responds by committing additional, higher quality resources to expedite the matter; his successful resolution, furthermore, reveals the loyalty which he commands among those close to him, this in contrast to the mercenaries he has hired (cf. 1.3). However, at the same time the episode raises questions about Cyrus's style of leadership. For instance, why did he not himself take part in the action, lead by example, as later Klearchos (2.3.11) and Xenophon (3.4.47, 7.3.45) see fit to do? Then there is the fact that his motivation for sending the others seems to have been anger (ὀργή). Perhaps,

³⁹ The paradigmatic character of this episode was brought out in Part 1, where it was remarked that, on the balance of probability, incidents such as this are based on actual events which the author adapts to his own end. The mud incident probably occurred north of the Middle Euphrates, in the west of the modern Anbar province of Iraq. For the potential chronological value of the episode see Brennan 2008.

rather than being an expression of loyalty, the nobles were afraid of the consequences of not showing immediate and unquestioning obedience. The impression is that the stereotypical image of the oriental ruler driving his horde forward with the lash lurks not far beneath the surface.⁴⁰

An. 1.5.11-17. Diffusing a Dispute.

At a desert halting-place on the way to Babylonia⁴¹ a quarrel arises involving Klearchos and the soldiers of Menon the Thessalian.⁴² A stand-off between their two camps ensues, and Proxenos attempts unsuccessfully to placate the Spartan commander, being told by him to get himself and his men out of the way. 'At this point, Cyrus came up and inquired into the matter. He immediately took his javelins into his hands, and riding with those of his trusted troops who were present, he arrived in the middle and spoke as follows:

"Klearchos and Proxenos and other Greeks who are present, you do not know what you are doing; for if you begin a battle with each other, believe on this day that I will have been cut to pieces, and you not much later than I. For if our affairs go badly, all these barbarians whom you see here will become even more hostile to us than are those who are with the King." Hearing this, Klearchos came to himself. And both sides having ceased, they put their arms in their places' (1.5.16-17).

⁴⁰ We might make a comparison with Iphikrates' handling of trierarchs at Corcyra, and the result, but he is acting in measured fashion, not out of anger. 'He warned them that anyone who failed to follow him must not find fault with the punishment that would be inflicted upon him. When the scouts announced that the ships were arriving and the herald made the proclamation, the eagerness displayed by all was a sight worth seeing. Everyone who was about to sail went at a run to his ship' (*Hell.* 6.2.34).

⁴¹ Opposite the city of Charmande, which lies on the south bank of the Middle Euphrates, probably in the vicinity of Heit.

⁴² Following a dispute between men from the two camps, Klearchos adjudged that one of Menon's men was at fault and beat him; the victim reported his mistreatment to his comrades, who were angered, and when later that day they saw Klearchos passing through their camp, they hurled stones. Hornblower, in an illuminating study of Spartan violence (2000), does not refer to this episode, though it may offer additional circumstantial evidence for his thesis that free Greeks were enraged by Spartan use of the βακτηρία for beatings on account of its demeaning quality - 'both a weapon in a crude sense and not quite a weapon' (70) - and its regular use against helots. I hasten to add that Xenophon does not refer to Klearchos' staff here, but when we see him striking soldiers later on (2.3.11), it is with his βακτηρία. See further Section 2.3 below.

Cyrus's intervention is both decisive and critical. Seeing the great danger he reacts at once and places himself, armed, between the two sides. Proxenos had done this too, but his words, instead of defusing the crisis inflamed the situation (Klearchos judged that he 'spoke of his experience in mild terms', 1.5.14). Cyrus has thus achieved this result through a combination of action and judicious words, neither on their own sufficient to bring about the resolution. (Cf. also his earlier effective handling of officer desertions at Myriandros, 1.4.6-9, and note 50 below.)

It is notable that Xenophon here, as he does elsewhere (see Chapter 3.3.2), casts Cyrus as a Greek. 'For if our affairs go badly, all these barbarians whom you see here will become even more hostile to us (ἡμῖν) than are those who are with the King.' Having attributed valour and wisdom to Cyrus, it seems as if Xenophon is denying that these qualities can be present in a typical barbarian ruler. Cyrus's potential Greekness is brought out in other ways through the book, arguably most strongly by contrast with Tissaphernes, who is the embodiment of barbarian perfidy. This opposition is signalled at the very outset when, summoned to the court by his father, Cyrus takes Tissaphernes, ὡς φίλον, but is then slandered by him and nearly loses his life (1.1.2-3). His open, trusting nature, and sense of τιμή, is repeatedly emphasised, as is the treachery of Tissaphernes.⁴³

An. 1.7. The Approach of Battle.

As the army marches through Babylonia, they pass by a trench dug by the King; contrary to Cyrus's expectation, he fails then to appear for battle. Cyrus summons the soothsayer who had predicted eleven days previous that the King would not give battle within ten days and pays him the money he had promised, for he had said then, 'he will not fight at all, if he will not fight within these ten

⁴³ Cyrus's noble nature: sends extra funds to guest-friend (1.1.10); holds a trial for a traitor (1.6); charges directly against the king while Tissaphernes makes to plunder the Greek camp (1.8.24, 10.8). A feature of Xenophon's didactic method is his use of other leaders - Tissaphernes, Proxenos, Menon, Ariaioi - to highlight the presence or absence of qualities/vices in his main protagonists. There is a view that Xenophon depicts Cyrus the Great in his *Kyroupaideia* as a Greek rather than a Persian. See Gera 1993: 27 n.6 and reference.

days' (1.7.18). As a result of this belief, and no one challenging their passage by the trench, Cyrus advanced more carelessly (ἡμελημένως, 1.7.19).

On the third day he was making his advance both sitting in his chariot and with only a few troops in order in front of him, while the greater part of his army was advancing in disorder, and many of their weapons were being carried for the soldiers on wagons and pack animals (1.7.20).

Having prepared his army for battle (1.7.1-9), Cyrus has effectively stood the men down, the basis of his confidence being his own opinion that his brother would not now fight as too much time had elapsed. This fraternal hunch, however, sits in opposition to the real presence of a newly dug trench, and evidence over many days of enemy scouts in the vicinity (cf. 1.6.1).

The commander's poor judgement in this case is subsequently exposed when, late morning, an aide comes into sight riding at top speed, shouting that the King is approaching. 'Then indeed much confusion ensued, for it seemed to the Greeks, and indeed to all, that he would fall on them at once in their disorder' (ἔνθα δὴ πολὺς ταραχὸς ἐγένετο· αὐτίκα γὰρ ἐδόκουν οἱ Ἕλληνες καὶ πάντες δὲ ἀτάκτοις σφίσιν ἐπιπεσεῖσθαι, 1.8.2). The army, though, manages to get into order, Cyrus saved from his error by the gaping flatness of the Mesopotamian plain. But the consequences of his poor leadership judgment as a leader are only deferred, for the commander in whom he now entrusts the success of the expedition, Klearchos of Sparta, disobeys his order to attack the enemy centre (1.8.12-13). Keeping the river on his right, Klearchos instead leads the Greeks against the force arrayed directly opposite them.⁴⁴ In his obituary of Klearchos, Xenophon writes that he had before disobeyed the ephors, an act which earned him the death sentence at Sparta (2.6.3-4): it was at this point he went to Cyrus,

⁴⁴ Cf. Plutarch, *Artaxerxes* 8.3-7: 'if he [Klearchos] sought safety above everything else, and made it his chief object to avoid losses, it had been best for him to stay at home... The caution of Klearchos rather than the temerity of Cyrus must be held responsible for the ruin of Cyrus and the expedition.'

who therefore, Xenophon implies, knew before hiring him of his propensity for disobedience (cf. also 1.3.8).⁴⁵

In a poignant irony, it is in an attempt to prevent the King getting in behind the Greek force that, with just his own six hundred cavalry, Cyrus launches his fatal attack on the Persian centre. The heroic action fought by Cyrus's own men, epitomised by the destruction alongside him of 'the eight best of his staff' (Κῦρος δὲ αὐτός τε ἀπέθανε καὶ ὀκτὼ οἱ ἄριστοι τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἔκειντο ἐπὶ αὐτῷ, 1.8.27), contrasts pointedly to the simultaneous movement away from the battle epicentre of the mercenaries (1.8.19). With the barbarians mirroring the Spartan ethos of glorious death (cf. *Lak.* 9.1-2), and the Greeks skirting along the fringes of the battle, Xenophon confounds the stereotypes and seems to admit the possibility of an ideal oriental leadership.

2.3. The Spartans: Klearchos and Kheirisophos

Following the death of Cyrus, Klearchos the Spartan became *de facto* leader of the Greek mercenaries, remaining so until his capture some 7 weeks later by Tissaphernes.⁴⁶ His unofficial elevation was due to a combination of his Spartan background (cf. 3.2.37), long experience of warfare (2.6.2, 15), and his privileged position under Cyrus (1.6.5, 3.1.10).⁴⁷ From his obituary we learn that he became an exile from Sparta and thereafter turned to Cyrus, who was sufficiently impressed by his character to part with money for a force to be maintained in the Chersonese (1.1.9). Xenophon goes on to tell us of his fondness for war. 'When it is possible for him to be at peace without shame or harm, he chooses to make war; when it is possible for him to turn to an easygoing life, he wishes to do hard labour, so long as it be in making war; when it is possible for him to possess money without risk, he chooses to diminish his funds by making war. He was willing to spend on war just as on a favourite or some other pleasure, so fond of war was he' (2.6.6-7).

⁴⁵ Humble (1997: 64) points out that this characteristic was all the more remarkable for a Spartan, 'whose whole upbringing demanded the strictest obedience'.

⁴⁶ From the report of Cyrus's death to the Greeks (2.1.4), Klearchos takes over effective command (cf. 2.2.5).

⁴⁷ Age may also have been a factor, longevity conferring authority. Cf. 2.1.10, and Thucydides 5.65.2. Klearchos was around fifty at the time of the expedition (2.6.15).

There is a sense in this description, and through the obituary, that Xenophon could as well be describing the state, the militarised Spartan mode of life which he describes in *Lak*. Just, then, as with Cyrus, with Klearchos we are viewing a stereotype inflected by real individual traits. This is no less true of Kheirisophos, who in effect takes over his compatriot's role following the events by the Greater Zab River. Kheirisophos, moreover, is an official Spartan representative, having been sent out by the city with 700 hoplites (1.4.3; cf. Diodoros 14.19.5); Xenophon underlines his status at the outset, himself recommending to the Greeks that he should lead the vanguard, 'since he is also a Lakedaimonian' (3.2.37). In the selections which follow key characteristics of the Spartan leader emerge, so linking the two Cyrean commanders and enabling the effectiveness of this leadership style to be assessed. As in the case of Cyrus, the reader is implicitly invited to contemplate the reasons behind positive and negative outcomes.

*An. 1.3. Managing Crises (1): Dealing with a Mutiny.*⁴⁸

At Tarsus, realising they have been deceived and suspecting the true scale of Cyrus's ambition, the men refuse to continue (1.3.1). Klearchos attempts to deal with the crisis by using force to get his own troops to move, but they react violently, throwing stones at him and the pack animals as they try to go forward.⁴⁹ Later he changes tack and calls an assembly of his men: standing before them, he begins to cry, and continues doing so for a long time (πολὸν χρόνον, 1.3.2). The men fall silent and look on in amazement. By virtue of the emotive speech which he subsequently makes on the subject of his personal loyalty, Klearchos secures the trust of his men, and a large number of others (some 2,000 soldiers) leave their own commanders to join him (1.3.7).

⁴⁸ Although this event occurs in Book 1, when Cyrus is leader, on this occasion the prince has suffered what can only be described as temporary leadership paralysis, thus leaving the Spartan in effective charge.

⁴⁹ Taking up again Hornblower's study of Spartan violence (see note 42 above), the angry reaction may have been triggered by the use of the βακτηρία, which was probably carried by all Spartan officers (2000: 58). But presumably there is a link with the circumstances of its usage: in the canal case below, there is no adverse reaction from the men when Klearchos uses his staff to strike.

Klearchos' instinct when confronted with this mutinous situation is to act as a disciplinarian, using force to bring about order (cf. *Lak.* 2.2, 6.1-2). On first sight, his response to the failure of this approach seems almost un-Spartan — this impression reflected in the reaction of the men to his tears. But in fact another key trait of his training is apparent in this action, the art of deception being taught to Spartan youths from an early age (cf. *Lak.* 2.6-9, 1.5; and see *An.* 4.6.14-15). In playing false with his true loyalties (cf. 1.3.8) he is drawing on this training. One outcome is that Cyrus is pressed into offering an increase in pay, and the crisis is averted, for the time being at least; a second is that Klearchos has succeeded in strengthening his own position in the army.

The ability of leaders to adapt to circumstances as they present themselves is undoubtedly one of the instructive features of this episode. So too is the ineffectiveness, and even the danger, of using violence to control mercenaries (the important question of how to control mercenaries at critical moments is developed through the narrative by Xenophon, who himself is faced with this task on several occasions). In addition, a concern arises about the impact which the decision of 2,000 soldiers to transfer their allegiance to Klearchos from the commands of Pasion and Xenias might have on the unity of the army as a whole. Not long after the departure from Tarsus, one consequence of the decision — or rather the failure of either Klearchos or Cyrus to address the transfer — manifests itself in the desertion at Myriandros of the two disaffected commanders (1.4.6-9).⁵⁰

An. 2.3.11. *Crossing Canals: Leadership in the Field.*⁵¹

Following the battle at Kounaxa, the Greeks conclude a truce with the King, whose heralds lead them off to a location where they can secure provisions (2.3.1-9). Even though a truce is in effect, Klearchos keeps the army in order and he himself commands the rearguard (2.3.10); his control invites contrast with Cyrus's laxity on the approach into Babylonia. Xenophon reports that the

⁵⁰ The episode at Myriandros is a further instance of paradigm in the narrative: it clearly serves the purpose of revealing the consequence of Klearchos' self-interested leadership on the one hand, and on the other of Cyrus's leadership skill in restoring the morale of the men and his own standing among them.

⁵¹ Another paradigmatic episode; see above Part 1.

route which they were led along by the Persians was criss-crossed by ditches and canals full of water and that to cross they had to make bridges from palm trees:

And here it was possible to learn how Klearchos commanded, holding his spear in his left hand, his staff (βακτηρία) in his right. And if any of those who had been assigned to one of these tasks seemed to him to be shirking, he would pick out someone appropriate, and strike him, and at the same time he himself would get into the mud and take up the task, with the result that it shamed all who did not join him in earnest (2.3.11).

The disciplinarian in Klearchos is again to the fore, though in this episode he complements his use of physical punishment with exemplary action: in doing as he himself orders, the leader motivates those around him. This is another key quality of Spartan leadership (cf. *Lak.* 8.2). Notably, Klearchos' descent into the mud recalls Cyrus's failure to do so when his wagons had become stuck. In his explicit flagging of this episode as a lesson in leadership (καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἦν Κλέαρχον καταμαθεῖν ὡς ἐπείσται), Xenophon is emphasising the importance of this quality in a leader. (Xenophon himself displays it on several occasions through the retreat: see 3.4.47-48, 4.4.12, 7.3.45, and note also *Kyro.* 1.6.8, *Oik.* 12.18, and *Hipp.* 6.4: 'In short, a commander is least likely to incur the contempt of his men if he shows himself more capable than they of doing whatever he requires of them'.)

An. 2.5. Greater Zab River: Leadership around the Table.

Some days after terms for a return to Ionia had been agreed and sworn upon with the Persians (2.3.26-28), the Greek army, together with a Persian one led by Tissaphernes, set off north along the Tigris River. However, mutual suspicion between the two sides grows steadily and threatens to develop into serious conflict (2.4.9-11). At the Greater Zab River, on the initiative of Klearchos, the two leaders meet to discuss the volatile situation (2.5.3-27); as a result, the Spartan agrees to return to the tent of Tissaphernes on the next day with the other generals in order that those suspected of being responsible for fomenting

hostility can be identified. Not all in the Greek camp are convinced of the wisdom of this, but five of the generals, and twenty captains, are prevailed upon by Klearchos to go (2.5.29-30). He and the generals are seized, and the captains cut down, by the Persians (2.5.31-32).⁵²

From Xenophon's construction of the dialogue between the men at their meeting, it is clear that the Persian outwits his adversary: at the start Klearchos assumes that Tissaphernes shares his implacable faith in the sanctity of their oaths (πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ καὶ μέγιστον οἱ θεῶν ἡμᾶς ὄρκοι κωλύουσι πολεμίους εἶναι ἀλλήλοις, 2.5.7), thereby leaving himself open to be exploited on trust. He goes on to reveal personal ambition by suggesting that he would be willing to lead the mercenaries in any number of campaigns that would benefit Tissaphernes (2.5.13-14); in his reply, Tissaphernes says: 'and as for those things in which you are useful to me, you too have said most of them, but it is I who know the greatest of them: for it is possible only for the King to have his tiara upright on his head, but perhaps another, if you are on hand, could easily have upright the one that is upon his heart' (2.5.23). Klearchos thus departs with heady prospects in mind. Xenophon then reveals that he was already anxious to purge the army of elements in it hostile to himself (2.5.29); given his arrangement with Tissaphernes that each of them would identify the troublemakers (2.5.24-26), it is apparent that he saw the occasion as well as an opportunity to strengthen his own grip over the army.⁵³

While the initiative of Klearchos was commendable, it is clear that he had not the requisite level of political skill to carry it through successfully. Far superior in this field, Tissaphernes turned the situation to his own advantage by exploiting the naivety, rashness, and ambition of the Spartan. Reviewing events from his perspective, the decision of the Greeks to remain in Babylonia for over twenty days while he gathered his own force (2.4.1) must have been taken as a sign of

⁵² Danzig (2007: 35) remarks: 'the fact that some Greeks guessed Tissaphernes' intentions shows that his actions were not as shocking as Klearchos' were foolish'. Rood (2006: 51) sees one of the roles of the advisers ('some Greeks') here as pointing up the rashness of the person (Klearchos) who neglects it.

⁵³ Klearchos' suspicion of his fellow officers, and his need to cajole them to go to Tissaphernes, summons a contrast with Cyrus and the apparent loyalty which he inspired in those under his command (cf. 1.5.8, 1.8.24-28). Even when dealing with a noble who had been treacherous towards him previously, Cyrus acts justly (1.6).

uncertainty, and he may well have attributed this leadership failure to credulity (cf. 2.4.7).

Once again, as at Tarsus, and on the battlefield at Kounaxa, Klearchos failed to act in the interest of the whole army body. His actions now proved not only fatal to himself, but, by depriving it of its high command, put in serious peril the very survival of the Greek army. This theme of Spartans pursuing individual self-interest is continued through the narrative and is especially marked in Xenophon's depiction of their behaviour in European Thrace (Book 7 *passim*).

An. 3.1-3. Managing Crises (2): Difficult Straits.

On the initiative of Xenophon Kheirisophos the Spartan becomes commander of the army vanguard, with himself and Timasion taking charge of the rear and the army's two eldest generals the flanks (3.2.37; on the command see further note 60 below). Kheirisophos' primacy arises from his status as a Spartan ('let Kheirisophos lead, since he is also a Lakedaimonian', 3.2.37), and, we may assume, from his experience in the field.⁵⁴

In contrast to the elaborate speeches made by Xenophon (Book 3 *passim*), Kheirisophos' words to the men are sparse, and may seem to be inadequate in light of the desperate circumstances in which the army finds itself. Yet with their reputation for military prowess, and tradition of military success, the men look to the Spartans for decisive action rather than inspirational words and gestures (recall, for instance, their amazement when Klearchos wept at Tarsus before

⁵⁴ Kheirisophos does not feature in the surviving histories of the Peloponnesian War, but it may be inferred from the fact that he has been sent out by Sparta with 700 hoplites that he was a respected commander at home (incidentally, and unintentionally downgrading his prominence, Roy (1967: 300) speculates that these men were Peloponnesian mercenaries hired by Sparta for the purpose). Xenophon, deliberately one suspects, is vague on the subject of Spartan support for Cyrus (1.4.2-3), but Diodoros on the other hand (14.19.2-5, 21.1-2) is clear that Kheirisophos and his contingent are an official, if clandestine, Spartan contribution to the expedition. He writes as well that the army chose the Spartan as supreme commander at the Greater Zab (14.27.1). That Kheirisophos was not among the generals who were taken to Tissaphernes by Klearchos shows not that he was of secondary standing, but that Klearchos trusted him more than the other commanders: it is he whom Klearchos sent to Ariaaios following the battle at Kounaxa to offer him the throne (2.1.4-5. Menon the Thessalian goes as well because he 'wished it, since he was a friend and a guest-friend of Ariaaios').

going on to speak at length). Kheirisophos, in his pragmatic response to the crisis, meets this expectation. When Xenophon has concluded his speech (1.5 OCT pages long) to an assembly of surviving generals and captains, Kheirisophos instructs the men to go and choose new rulers where this is necessary, in order that a full assembly of the army can be held: 'and as he said this, he got up, so that what was needed might be carried out, not delayed' (3.1.46-47); following Xenophon's subsequent and lengthy speech to the full assembly (5 OCT pages), for which he dresses himself in his finest armour, Kheirisophos urges the measures spoken of to be voted on 'as soon as possible' (3.2.33).⁵⁵

Kheirisophos impresses his stamp in the crucial period which sees the army cross the Greater Zab River and establish its viability. It is he who answers Mithradates — an old ally of Cyrus who comes claiming to be well-disposed towards them — on the morning they set out (3.3.3); the subsequent decision not to admit heralds so long as they are in enemy territory (Mithradates was suspected by the Greeks of spying for Tissaphernes) bears the trademark of his militaristic training, as does the preceding decision to burn the wagons and dispose of anything superfluous (3.3.1). Once on their way, he leads from the front and is quick to point out and admonish even high-level errors (cf. 3.3.11, Xenophon at fault).

The quiet pragmatism of Kheirisophos is, understandably, easily overlooked amidst the drama of Xenophon's introduction to the story, and particularly when set against the memorable series of speeches which he delivers on the banks of the Greater Zab River. However, in the wider picture, these same inspirational speeches are an equally, and arguably, an even more important ingredient for survival. In the terrible solitude and danger of the predicament, there is the unmistakable impression that the laconic contribution would not be sufficient of itself to bring about the rebuilding of morale that, Xenophon at least,

⁵⁵ It may be that in his response to Xenophon's speech to the officers (3.1.45) — 'previously, Xenophon, I knew you only so far as to have heard you were an Athenian, but now I praise you for what you are saying and doing, and I would wish that as many as possible be of this same sort' — Kheirisophos is acknowledging what Xenophon's narrative will go on to demonstrate, namely that, at least for a non-homogenous army, an Athenian style of leadership is more effective.

sees as a prerequisite for escape from Tissaphernes' grasp (cf. 3.1.39-42, and *Kyros*. 1.6.13). In this regard, Xenophon's leadership brings into relief the limits of that of Kheirisophos when dealing with a non-Spartan army.

An. 1-4 passim. Military expertise.

Both of the Spartans show a high level of competence in military matters. Numerous instances highlight tactical proficiency (1.8.13, 4.3.17), proficiency in the art of deception (2.3.9, 2.4.26), strategic foresight (2.3.13, 3.5.6), maintaining order and obedience (2.2.20, 2.3.11), and logistical nous (2.3.5, 4.7.3). The quality of the Spartans' training and its more or less successful application invites comparison with Cyrus and Xenophon respectively. While demonstrably capable, both of these men are shown lacking in one or more important facets of military leadership: Cyrus, for example, in leaving his forces vulnerable on the approach to battle by not maintaining their order (1.7.19-20), Xenophon through failing to grasp the limitation of pursuing enemy cavalry on foot (3.3.8-10). However, in the latter case, the deficit is evidently attributable to inexperience and Xenophon duly shows that he has the critical capacity to learn from his mistakes (see further Section 2.4 below). What comes through from the author's narrative is that military expertise, while an essential ingredient in good military leadership, is not sufficient by itself to make a good leader.

*An. 4.6.2-3. Incident with the Guide: the Angry Spartan.*⁵⁶

After a week sheltering from ferocious winter weather in the Armenian Highlands, the Greeks continue on their journey, taking with them as a guide the chief of the village where they had stayed (4.6.1).⁵⁷ On the third day's march, still not in sight of any settlements, Kheirisophos confronted the guide, who insisted that there were none in the area. Becoming angry with him (αὐτῷ ἔχαλεπάνθη) the Spartan struck him (αὐτὸν ἔπαισεν), and that night, not having

⁵⁶ For this section I am indebted to feedback received from Chris Farrell, Phil Davies, and Rosie Harman at an ICS Graduate Work in Progress Seminar, March 19, London, 2010.

⁵⁷ The Armenian villages Xenophon writes of are probably situated to the north of the Euphrates in the region of Bulanik. See Brennan 2009 for comment on stretches of the journey through eastern Anatolia.

been bound, he fled.⁵⁸ Xenophon states that this incident — the harsh treatment of the guide and the neglect that led to his escape — 'was the sole disagreement between Kheirisophos and Xenophon on the march' (4.6.3). By this explicit disapproval he is first and foremost underlining the importance of the need for commanders to manage properly key assets; later in the march he himself exemplifies the correct approach, placing informants under strict guard (ἐφύλαττεν ἰσχυρῶς) 'in order that they might be his guides wherever needed' (6.3.11).

While Xenophon may be being ironic when he says that this was the only thing the two men disagreed on (see 4.1.19, and further Chapter 3.3.3), in relating this incident he is pointing up two serious failings in Kheirisophos' leadership, both of which may be attributable to his Spartan background. The first is his arrogant attitude towards the guide: his failure to ensure that he was bound resulted in the man fleeing during the night, this leaving the Greeks lost in a harsh environment. They may subsequently have gone on to follow a river, the Phasis, in the mistaken belief that it emptied into the Euxine, an error that at the least lengthened their journey and occasioned additional hardship. Given the prudence of Kheirisophos' leadership up to this point, it is hard not to read his inaction here as a form of arrogance, deeming the guide to be so insignificant as not to warrant detention.

The second, and arguably more severe, fault in Xenophon's eyes is the event that led to the guide fleeing — Kheirisophos, by his quickness to anger, striking the man. This lack of self-discipline in a critical situation left the entire army open to potentially devastating consequences, a fact signalled by Xenophon when he singles out the incident as one where he has crossed words with the Spartan. Nor is this the first time that Spartan rage has endangered the expedition: as described above, Klearchos, having been stoned by Menon's men, orders his own to arms to exact retribution for the humiliation (1.5.11), with only the prompt intervention of Cyrus preventing disaster (and cf. 2.6.9). It is notable that in *Hellenika*, too, Spartan propensity to anger is highlighted; for

⁵⁸ As it would with Klearchos at 1.3.1 and 1.5.11, it would be nice to know if Kheirisophos used his stick; if so, it would seem that free Greeks were not the only ones to be outraged by abusive deployment of the βακτηρία.

example at 1.6.6-7, 2.4.32-34, 5.3.3-7, and 6.2.19. At *Hell.* 5.3.7, Xenophon interjects an explicitly didactic paragraph warning of the danger of acting out of anger: 'Now I claim that men can learn from such experiences [the fate of Teleutias], and they can learn especially that it is not right to punish anyone in anger — even a slave, since masters who are angry often themselves suffer greater evils than they inflict on their servants. And it is a complete and utter mistake to attack an enemy with anger rather than judgement. For anger acts without foresight, whereas judgement has in view a way to harm one's enemy without suffering any hurt from him in return.'

Xenophon, from extensive firsthand experience, is evidently of the view that Spartan commanders are prone to angry outbursts and can exhibit arrogance in their attitude towards non-Spartiates. This temperament is shown as undermining the effectiveness of their leadership on the retreat, and by extension, a view is implied about their suitability for governing Greece. Xenophon does not put forward an explanation for these character faults, but he may be hinting in the episode with the guide that they are a consequence of their social system and its dependence on an underclass of helots: the guide, chief of a village which supplies the stables of the Great King (4.5.34), is in a similar type of relationship to the Persians as the helots are to the Spartans. Referring to the Teleutias episode mentioned above, Thomas writes, 'the reason Spartans are addicted to outbursts of temper may be the high proportion of unfree people within Spartan society, whom upper-class Spartans can attack without restraint'.⁵⁹

2.4. Xenophon the Athenian

Although it is he who has proposed Kheirisophos to lead (Χειρίσοφος μὲν ἡγοῖτο, ἐπειδὴ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιός ἐστι, 3.2.37), Xenophon's own dominant role on the retreat implies that he is at least as influential in the directing of the

⁵⁹ Thomas 2009: xl; cf. Hornblower 2000: 60-61, 69-71, and on 71 citing Redfield's (1995: 173) interesting explanation for the phenomenon of Spartan violence: 'Spartiates, he [Redfield] notes, "were raised predominantly by women, then evicted into the male world of asceticism and competition, and we may attribute to the abruptness of this change the rigid and yet uncertain self-control of the Spartans; for all their discipline, they were certainly (as we meet them in the histories) more than other Greeks subject to fits of rage and violence"'.
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march.⁶⁰ By his own account it is he who stirs the army from its torpor (ἀθύμως) on the banks of the Greater Zab River following the devastating decapitation strike by Tissaphernes. His speeches, first to the captains of the contingent to which he is attached, then to the surviving generals and captains of the army, and finally to a full assembly of staff and soldiers, succeed in rallying morale and producing a plan for an ordered retreat out from under the shadow of Tissaphernes.⁶¹ The achievement brings to mind Themistocles' persuading of the Athenians to leave their city and their subsequent improbable triumph over Persia (cf. Plutarch, *Themistocles* 10.1-2; Herodotus 7.143). Arguments in his speeches furthermore invite comparison with ones made by other leaders of the early fifth-century Persian resistance. For example, his argument that the king would gladly build roads to assist the Greeks in leaving his territory (3.2.24) mirrors Aristides' plea to Themistocles that, rather than destroying the bridges over the Hellespont and cutting off Xerxes's army, they should seek ways to speed his departure from Hellas 'lest, being shut in and unable to make his escape, from sheer necessity he throw this vast force of his upon the defensive' (Plutarch, *Aristides* 9.3-4). With more contemporary resonance, the eloquence of Xenophon's speech to the full assembly recalls key addresses given to the Athenians by important statesmen during the Peloponnesian War, in particular the funeral oration which Thucydides ascribes to Pericles at the outset of the

⁶⁰ New generals are elected by the surviving officers to replace those seized by Tissaphernes (3.1.46-47), leaving seven in overall command for the retreat: Xenophon, Kheirisophos, Sophainetos, Timasion, Xanthicles, Philesios, and Kleanor. This structure appears to have operated until Sinope on the Black Sea, when Kheirisophos is elected sole commander (6.1.18). Nonetheless, on the crucial march down to the sea Sophainetos only appears once (4.4.19), and Kleanor twice (4.6.9, 8.18), with none of the others bar Xenophon and Kheirisophos being mentioned at all; moreover, the latter, like Klearchos before him, seems to be regarded as *de facto* leader (cf. 3.4.38, where he orders Xenophon to the front). This need not necessarily indicate that the others had only a nominal involvement in leading the march, but Xenophon would hardly have underplayed their roles to such a significant degree knowing that one or more might challenge a seriously biased account. Diodoros reports that Kheirisophos was made supreme commander following the seizure of Klearchos (14.27.1). On the matter see further Roy 1967: 293-294, and Erbse 2010: 495-499, who seeks to show that Diodoros' report is not reliable.

⁶¹ We might see Xenophon's purpose in his speeches as being to mould a force like that of Cyrus the Great: 'Cyrus's army was full of zeal, ambition, strength, confidence, mutual exhortation, moderation, obedience; this, I think, is most terrible for the opposition' (*Kyro*. 3.3.59). His speeches contain motifs of exhortation from a range of categories, including custom, justice, and expediency. On the arguments, forms, and functions of exhortative speech, see further Keitel 1987.

conflict (2.35-46).⁶² Notably, for his address, Xenophon accoutres himself in his finest armour: in the absence of a recognisable physical forum this act symbolises the formality and importance of the occasion.⁶³ The democratic setting — full assembly, speech, the inclusion of the whole group in the decision making process, and the earlier Council of captains and commanders — in turn symbolises the new style of leadership which Xenophon the Athenian will come to impose on the army, and which will deliver it from the clutches of the King, eventually, to the shores of Asia Minor.

As with his depiction of the other principal leaders, Xenophon's representation of himself is not to be regarded as wholly historically accurate;⁶⁴ rather than Xenophon *qua* Xenophon, the character we have in *Anabasis* is at one and the same time an exemplar of a young Athenian citizen and, as is argued in detail in Chapter 4, a model student of Socrates. It is this democratic and philosophical background — whether or not either was actually embraced by the author — which informs his leadership throughout. In this section distinctive features of Xenophon's character's style are highlighted, and where relevant, contrasted to their absence in the barbarian and Spartan approaches to leadership.

Xenophon the Democrat

The number, length, and rhetorical accomplishment of the speeches which Xenophon makes are the hallmark of his leadership. From his formal introduction to the story in Book 3, he makes over twenty substantial speeches, invariably at times of difficulty either for the army or for himself. While the power of action is by no means overlooked by Xenophon's character, his narrative emphasises the primacy of the spoken word and its power to influence and even to change the course of unfolding events.⁶⁵

⁶² See Mitchell 2008 for an illuminating study of 'political champions' in the Athenian democracy.

⁶³ Xenophon is doubtless also keen to impress, if not to cast a spell on his audience: see *Kyros*. 8.1.40, and Erbse 2010: 491. Cf. Waterfield (2006: 183) who suggests that the dressing up reveals a pretentious side to Xenophon's character.

⁶⁴ *Contra* Due (1989: 203) who considers Xenophon's depiction of himself as a 'self-portrait'.

⁶⁵ The power and charm of speech: 3.2.8-32, Xenophon rallies men to pull together and save themselves; 5.7.5-33, defuses tense situation arising from rumours that the army is to be led back towards the Phasis; 5.8.2-26, successfully defends himself against

From his first address to the assembled army it is apparent that Xenophon is embracing the tradition of Athenian public oratory, where political success depends on the ability to persuade and carry the majority. More particularly, as Ferrario has observed, this pivotal address, replete with references to sacrifice and freedom, is indebted to the funerary oration, the delivery of which was reserved for eminent political and military leaders of the democracy (cf. Thucydides 2.34.6).⁶⁶ Xenophon is thus positioning himself in a line of successful Athenian leaders and signalling that his leadership on the march ahead will be according to the same principles as his democratic forebears. Towards this end, I suggest that he intends his leadership performance to be viewed by his readership against the background of Pericles' famous funeral speech. Throughout the retreat, Xenophon is the embodiment of the ideals expressed by Pericles in his address, and his success builds the case for democratic leadership being more effective than the two styles he has already showcased.⁶⁷ The examples below demonstrate how echoes of Pericles' speech reverberate through the retreat, and how Xenophon links himself to it via his character.⁶⁸ Following this exposition another key dimension of Xenophon's leadership, his interest in ethical philosophy, is considered.

charge of hubris; 7.1.22-32, prevents sack of Byzantium; 7.6.11-38, defends himself against charge of corruption. Cf. *Mem.* 3.3.11, *Hipp.* 8.22. Dio Chrysostom (*On Training for Public Speaking*, 15-16) writes of Xenophon's speeches: 'If it is needful for the statesman to encourage those who are in the depths of despondency, time and again our writer shows how to do this; or if the need is to incite and exhort, no one who understands the Greek language could fail to be aroused by Xenophon's hortatory speeches'. On his speech to the general assembly Erbse (2010: 491) writes: 'These familiar tropes of Athenian rhetoric provide scarcely any grasp on how to deal with the present situation. But they do give the exhausted troops the will to live again: Xenophon manages to *get something* to happen, and demonstrates that only he, the educated and rhetorically trained Athenian in the midst of the rough mercenaries, has access to the means for this success'.

⁶⁶ On Xenophon's speech Ferrario (2009: 23) writes: 'The recollections of the victories over the Persians, of the *eleutheria* that the Greek states enjoy, and of the achievements of the soldiers' *progonoi* are all also traditional themes of the Athenian *epitaphios logos*.' Similar patriotic tropes appear in many of Xenophon's later speeches: cf. 3.4.46, 4.8.14, 6.5.23-24.

⁶⁷ Beyond the retreat Xenophon continues to represent himself as an important Athenian figure; cf. his dedication at the Athenian treasury at Delphi (5.3.5), probably made while Agesilaos was there in August 394. As Ferrario (2009: 25) remarks, 'such commemorative effort was certainly a known behaviour on the part of high-achieving military commanders'.

⁶⁸ Examining the role of advice and advisers in *Anabasis*, Rood (2006) asserts that Thucydides' portrayal of Pericles is 'relevant to interpreting Xenophon's self-presentation' (50); he goes on to point up similarities in how each leader deals with 'the heightened feelings of the crowd' (55), and how Xenophon's complaint about being

Thucydides 2.40.2. 'We are unique in the way we regard anyone who takes no part in public affairs: we do not call that a quiet life, we call it a useless life. We are all involved in either the proper formulation or at least the proper review of policy, thinking that what cripples action is not talk, but rather the failure to talk through the policy before proceeding to the required action.'

Xenophon's initiative by the Greater Zab exemplifies this principle. To call attention to the Periclean speech at the very outset, he uses symbolic and literal references: as suggested above, his dressing-up is meant to mark the formality of his address — the sartorial equivalent of Pericles' mounting a specially constructed platform (cf. Thucydides 2.34.8); and then his statement immediately prior to the speech that, if he is to die now, he wishes himself to be adorned nobly, prompts the reader to call funerary speeches to mind.⁶⁹ Arguably, to his readership none would have been as familiar as that of Pericles. A further notable parallel to add to these are the political circumstances: both actual audiences, Xenophon's more pressingly, are facing daunting futures with a formidable enemy at the gate.

Thucydides 2.37.1. 'Our constitution is called a democracy because we govern in the interests of the majority, not just the few.'

On each occasion on which a participatory assembly is held, the Athenian form of government is emulated. The majority is empowered through voting and given voice through the freedom afforded to ordinary soldiers to air their views.⁷⁰ Although assemblies have been held prior to the establishment of the new leadership, they have either been limited in their participation (1.3.2; 1.4.13), or intended only to report information (1.4.12).⁷¹ From the crossing of

blamed for offending someone but not being remembered for doing a favour (5.8.25-26) mirrors Pericles' that 'the Athenians take credit for success themselves, but blame failure on their advisers' (55).

⁶⁹ I owe the point about the link between Xenophon's reference to his death and funerary oration to Ferrario 2009: 22-23.

⁷⁰ Voting: 3.2.9, 33, 38; 5.1.4, 7, 8, 11, 12; 5.6.11, 33; 5.8.1; 6.1.32; 6.2.4-7; 6.4.11; 7.3.5-6, 14. Voices: 5.1.2; 5.8.2; 6.2.4, 5; 6.4.18; 7.3.13; 7.6.8. See Nussbaum (1967: 48) for a definition of the general assembly of the army.

⁷¹ It is notable that Klearchos calls an assembly of his own men only after his use of physical force to achieve his end has failed (1.3.1-2). He does not call any assemblies

the Euphrates up until the Greater Zab there are no assemblies at all recorded, whereafter through to Thrace more than twenty are. Indeed Xenophon, from a tense episode at Kotyora (5.6.37), leads us to believe that there would have been more had his view always prevailed.

The question of Xenophon's attitude to democracy is one which, arguably, does not receive as much attention as it might. The commonplace view that he is not enamoured of the system tends to be based on his aristocratic profile rather than a close reading of his writings.⁷² From these it is evident that political philosophy is a preoccupation, with different forms of government appraised in several works: the evidence from *Anabasis* is that Xenophon readily grasped how potentially effective a means of exercising and maintaining power democracy was, and from this perspective he can properly be characterised as an enthusiast. By contrast, we can counterpoint the sceptical attitude to democracy of Thucydides' Kleon, who, on account of the influence of demagogues, sees the system as undermining the power of the *polis*.

Some examples highlight Xenophon's exposition of democracy in action. Notably, as Nussbaum points out, no proposal put to the army is ever rejected:⁷³ the clear implication is that, in situations where a leader judges that a proposal may not pass, he simply does not put it forward and may instead seek another way to achieve the desired end (conversely, if he fears a proposal brought forward by the men may pass, and he does not want it to do so, he can intervene to have it bypassed: cf. 6.1.25-31). For example when the army is at Trapezus and faced with the possibility of there being insufficient ships to ferry them onwards, Xenophon's suggestion that they order the cities along the coast to have the roads rebuilt is received negatively. 'Here they cried out that there

during the critical period in which he has command post-Kounaxa up until his capture at the Greater Zab River.

⁷² Anderson, for example, writes that 'his political ideas reflect the inherited traditions and prejudices of his class' (1974: 40). For Xenophon as an anti-democrat see Luccioni 1947, Vlastos 1983, Goldhill 1998, Brock 2004, Pownall 2004. Writing on *Anabasis*, Dalby (1992: 17) comments: 'He [Xenophon] was not an enthusiast for democracy, so one might look for unsympathetic reporting of mass meetings'. When carried out, however, the search scarcely shows positive on this count. Indeed Gray (2010a: 13) remarks that 'it is hard to find any image of democracy in his works other than a positive one'.

⁷³ Nussbaum 1967: 58.

was no need to go by land. And Xenophon, because he knew their foolishness, did not put anything to a vote, but persuaded the cities to rebuild the roads voluntarily, saying that they would be rid of them more quickly if the roads were easily passable' (Ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἀνέκραγον ὡς οὐ δέοι ὁδοιπορεῖν. ὁ δὲ ὡς ἔγνω τὴν ἀφροσύνην αὐτῶν, ἐπεψήφισε μὲν οὐδέν, τὰς δὲ πόλεις ἐκούσας ἔπεισεν ὁδοποιεῖν, λέγων ὅτι θᾶπτον ἀπαλλάσσονται, ἦν εὐποροὶ γένωνται αἱ ὁδοί, 5.1.14).

Howland points out the need for suppression of dissenting voices, citing the example of Apollonides, a captain in the contingent of Proxenos who airs concern about the wisdom of trying to escape from the King following the seizure of the generals by the Greater Zab (3.1.26). Xenophon cuts Apollonides off in mid-speech and after a detailed response proposes that he be demoted from captaincy to slave (3.1.27-30).⁷⁴ In his own account Xenophon brings out several other central operating principles in the control and management of democracies.⁷⁵

Thucydides 2.37.2. 'We are open and free in the conduct of our public affairs.'

Xenophon makes accessibility a virtue of his leadership. Early on in the retreat, he makes it explicit that he is approachable at any time:

⁷⁴ Howland 2000: 886. 'The political understanding displayed here is profound: the freedom of speech that characterises the community of soldiers after Xenophon's ascent is made possible only by the prudent use of force to suppress dangerous speech at the moment of founding'.

⁷⁵ For instance, in an episode at Herakleia (6.2.4-7) Xenophon shows that democratic will is comparatively easier to subvert: in this case both he and Kheirisophos get out of a task they have been charged with by the soldiers, an implication being that, had they been instructed on this by another form of authority, they may not have been able to avoid compliance. A further insight is provided in Thrace where, directly expounding on political philosophy, he says to Seuthes: 'You surely know that those who have now become your subjects have been persuaded to be ruled by you not out of friendship for you but by necessity, and that they would undertake to become free again unless some fear should hold them down' (7.7.29; cf. Thucydides 3.37.2). There is a clear notion here of a human propensity for freedom, of a state of not being held in subjection by (an)other(s); in seeming to address this need, democracy, Xenophon is hinting, provides an efficient means of controlling a population. In his words to Seuthes Xenophon may have in mind Athens' dependence on intimidation rather than loyalty to control the Delian League.

While Xenophon was having his breakfast, two youths ran up to him; for they all knew it was possible to go up to him as he was having breakfast or dinner or, even if he were sleeping, to wake him and tell him anything one had to say that related to the war (4.3.10).

The merit of this reputation is manifested in this instance by the army, through the agency of the youths, finding a way out of a difficult predicament.

A similar situation arises later on in the march down country when, faced on the opposite bank of a river by an array of determined local warriors, Xenophon is approached by one of the peltasts, a man who had been a slave at Athens and believed he knew the language of this tribe. 'I think,' [he said], 'this is my fatherland. And unless something prevents it, I am willing to converse with them' (4.8.4). As a result, a misunderstanding about the motive of the Greeks on the part of the tribe was cleared up and the Greeks were able to continue on their way.

Xenophon's accessibility is implicitly attributable to the greater accountability to which Athenian leaders were bound; he gives a strong indication of this at Kotyora, where it is decided to 'subject the generals to a trial covering all the time that had passed' (5.8.1). This mirrors the Athenian practice of *euthuna* — the public audit of archons at the end of their service — and while he does not say that the suggestion was his, he has made the one immediately preceding this to purify the army (cf. 5.7.35). Xenophon's conscious effort to make himself accessible to the soldiers contrasts with what he says about Klearchos in his obituary: 'he [Klearchos] even used to say that the soldier had to fear his ruler more than the enemy if he were to stand guard well, keep his hands off his friends, or go against the enemy without making excuses' (2.6.10).⁷⁶

⁷⁶ As Xenophon shows elsewhere, accessibility as a leadership quality is not exclusive to democracies: cf. the Spartan Teleutias at *Hell.* 5.1.14; *Ag.* 9.1-2.

Xenophon the Philosopher

Xenophon's leadership as represented in *Anabasis* has a further dimension to it, one which, it is argued in this section, owes itself to his training with the philosopher Socrates. His marked capacities for self-discipline, selflessness, rational thinking, and foresight on the one hand, and his piety on the other, can be more persuasively attributed to Socrates, the ethical philosopher *par excellence*, than to his education in the 'School of Hellas'. Xenophon's representation of himself as a model pupil of Socrates is examined in Chapter 4; in the current section examples from the narrative are provided to illustrate the aforementioned qualities.

1. Self-discipline

A virtue on display from the point of his introduction is Xenophon's ability to be master of himself. Overcoming the fear and despair that has gripped the army — visited upon his character through a dream in which he sees his father house burning (3.1.11) — he rises, and though extremely afraid (περίφοβος), takes command of the crisis. Throughout his performance on the retreat this quality is in evidence, sometimes implied by way of contrast to others (for example Kheirisophos striking the guide, 4.6.2-3). We also witness it, from a different angle, in an episode which sees him recognise his own error and initiate corrective action.

3.3.8-11: A Flawed Manoeuvre: Learning to Learn.

Almost immediately after they had crossed the Greater Zab River, the army is harried by the pursuing Persians; the Greek rear came under severe pressure and Xenophon in response decided to lead out a contingent. However, they were unable to catch up with the enemy, and were rendered more vulnerable for having detached from the main body. The action furthermore retarded the progress of the army as a whole, and did this at a critical phase of the retreat. Upon halting the march for camp, Kheirisophos and the oldest of the generals blamed Xenophon 'because he went off in pursuit, away from the phalanx, and because he ran risks himself and yet was no more able to do harm to the

enemy' (3.3.11). Xenophon openly acknowledges his error (ἀκούσας δὲ Ξενοφῶν ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὀρθῶς αἰτιῶντο, 3.3.12), but goes on to point out that the episode has exposed their critical need for cavalry and slingers. The measures he proposes to remedy this are adopted and, as a result, the army is able to fend off a sustained attack the following day.

On first reading, Xenophon's act in going off to pursue the enemy on foot could be taken as an ill-disciplined one; in fact, it is tactical naivety, evidence of his inexperience in military matters.⁷⁷ His capacity to acknowledge the error, and to learn from the episode, evidences a mind operating on a principle of self-control (ἐγκράτεια): this capacity to learn from mistakes is, he is saying, more valuable than a fixed set of techniques, and is a key hallmark of successful leadership. That Xenophon has learned well on the arduous march down country — and has been learning from Cyrus and Klearchos through the march up-country — is demonstrated by his masterful conduct of the expedition to procure supplies from the Drilai when the army is no longer able to source them on forays from Trapezus (5.2; cf. also 7.3.37-38).

This episode touches on both of the major apologetic elements in the work, each examined in turn in the following chapters. By his highlighting of his capacity to learn from his mistakes, and to do so quickly, Xenophon is pointing to the benefit of his Socratic training (Chapter 4), while in showing himself in a flawed light, as he does on a number of other occasions, he serves his personal *apologia* by increasing sympathy for his character (Chapter 3).⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Xenophon has not joined the army in a military capacity, and though he has likely seen active service during the Peloponnesian War, his young age precludes significant campaign experience (cf. 3.1.25). Against this both Anderson (1974: 117) and Lee (2007: 54) consider that Xenophon, by virtue of the fact that Proxenos' men had elected him in their leader's place, had executed commander duties during the course of the seven months of the march up until this point; Anderson, indeed, considers that 'from the first Xenophon showed superior professional skill in tactics and handling men in formation' (129).

⁷⁸ Xenophon's forgettable moments: idea to establish a colony (5.6.15 ff.); gets drunk with Seuthes and gives grounds for suspicions against himself on the part of the men (7.3.29-32, see further Chapter 3.2.3); over friendly with those under his command (φιλοστρατιώτης, 7.6.4).

2. *Selflessness*

Xenophon shows constant concern for the welfare of the soldiers, even to the extent of putting their interests ahead of his own. Thus we see him in the harsh weather conditions of Armenia returning to give aid to stragglers (4.5.8, 18; cf. 4.5.11, Kheirisophos camping at a village for the night while men are still out on the trail), and in Thrace, foregoing his own share of pay and booty (7.6.19, 7.7.39-40, 56). Xenophon's selfless actions could be read in the light of the Periclean framework, where doing good for others is regarded as a means to gaining advantage for oneself (Thucydides 2.40.4-5); however, his selflessness seems to draw on a less calculating basis than this, as is implied on the several occasions in which those whom he has benefitted, far from even acknowledging their debt, charge him with doing them harm.⁷⁹ Selflessness on the part of Athenian generals seems, furthermore, to be uncommon. In his account of Nicias' surrender on Sicily, Thucydides makes a point of underlining his exceptional character: '[he] asked him [Gylippos] to do whatever he and the Spartans wanted with his own person, but to stop the slaughter of his men...Of all the Greeks in my time, he was the least deserving of this depth of misfortune, since he conducted his whole life as a man of principle' (7.85-86). It seems proper therefore to situate Xenophon's enlightened behaviour in the overlapping space between the political and moral spheres, and to see it as well as a measure of his progress on the path to becoming *kalos kagathos*.

3. *Analytical thinking*

Time and again when the retreating army is confronted with a challenge, it is Xenophon who devises an effective solution. But rather than simply supplying this in the narrative, Xenophon builds it up so that the stages of resolution are transparent: this process draws attention to the disciplined cognitive action as much as to the solution, showing the importance and value of this quality to the

⁷⁹ At 5.8 Xenophon has to defend himself against a charge of hubris brought by several of the soldiers in connection with his actions to save them in the snow; at 7.6.9-10 he is charged with enriching himself at the expense of the soldiers. A function of these episodes may well be to elucidate the related views that mercenaries tend to be grateful only at the moment of gratification, and that their loyalty cannot be relied upon.

leader. Two examples from the pressurised march across eastern Anatolia are given below.

4.6.5-13. The army finds that its way across heights down to a plain is blocked by an array of tribes lined up on the ridge.⁸⁰ Kheirisophos, leading the army, is indecisive, and waits until the rear has come up so that a discussion can take place. One of the generals, Kleanor, recommends they attack as soon as they have eaten, for delay, he argues, will embolden the enemy. Xenophon then interjects, beginning by defining what their objective is: 'If it is necessary to fight, we must prepare to fight with as much strength as possible. But if we wish to cross over as easily as possible, it seems to me we must consider how we might receive fewest wounds and lose as few bodies of our men as possible' (4.6.10). He then proceeds to outline his proposed solution (4.6.11-13).

4.7.1-7. Subsequently the army crosses through the territory of one of the same tribes which had been blocking the ridge. The Taochi had taken refuge in a high stronghold, where they had gathered in all of their provisions. Attempts by Kheirisophos to take it have failed and he invites Xenophon on his arrival to help address the problem of taking the fort. Again, Xenophon defines the nature of the problem and proceeds to outline a solution (4.7.7).

4. *Foresight*

An additional outcome of Xenophon's philosophical training might be said to be foresight, defined here as action based on a considered and informed reading of a situation or set of circumstances. Themistocles displayed it in preparing his city for a further, greater struggle against the Persians, when others thought that Marathon meant an end to the war (Plutarch, *Themis*. 3.5), and Socrates shows it when he advises Xenophon to consult the oracle about his plan to join Cyrus the Younger (3.1.5). Xenophon at several points on the retreat himself displays this uncommon quality, sometimes drawing attention to it by an implied contrast to lack of foresight in others. Thus when in a difficult phase late in the march he has local informants placed under strict guard 'in order that they might be his

⁸⁰ The pass may be over the Çakırbaba Dağları, a watershed between the Aras and Çoruh rivers. See map (Appendix I), west of Kars.

guides wherever needed' (6.3.11), the reader recalls how Kheirisophos had earlier endangered the army in the Armenian mountains by failing to guard their guide (4.6.2-3). For further instances of Xenophon's foresight see 5.1.13-14, 5.7.3, and 7.3.12.

5. Piety

After his speech-making, arguably no feature marks Xenophon's character on the retreat more than the respect which he shows for divine laws and his reverence towards the gods. Hardly any course of action is undertaken without there first being an attempt to discern divine will, and due gratitude is always offered for successful outcomes (cf. 3.2.9, 4.3.13, 5.2.9, 6.1.22, 7.8.10). I argue in Chapter 4 that this aspect of Xenophon's leadership is a pillar of his defence of Socrates, but undoubtedly too, in the same way as democracy, he regarded it as an effective way of influencing and maintaining control over a constituency. By this I do not mean to say that Xenophon was ambivalent about religion, rather that he saw that its practice could be beneficial in the exercise of leadership. The examples below illustrate this argument.⁸¹ It is notable how neither of the other principal leaders pays anything like the same amount of attention to the conduct of religious matters as Xenophon does.⁸²

3.2.9. An omen from the gods. A sneeze from the ranks at the outset of Xenophon's key speech to the army by the Greater Zab River occasions a mass prostration. Xenophon seizes on this moment, declaring that the sneeze is an omen from Zeus the Saviour, delivered at the point when the talk was of salvation. Before launching into his speech proper he has thus been able to frame his rhetoric against the backdrop of divine approval.⁸³

⁸¹ On the relation of Xenophon's piety to his leadership in *Anabasis* see further Buzzetti 2008: 18-20.

⁸² There are numerous occasions from Tarsus to the Greater Zab on which Klearchos might have sought divine guidance, but in the narrative he only does so on a single occasion (2.1.9). In contrast to Xenophon at Sinope (see below), Kheirisophos does not sacrifice to find out if it is in the soldiers' and his own interests to accept the sole command (6.1.32; cf. 6.1.31). Cyrus does sacrifice before the crucial battle (1.8.15), but is not conspicuously pious through the march up-country.

⁸³ A sneeze, as an involuntary action, was considered to be a divine signal. Dreams - such as Xenophon experienced at critical moments on the retreat - were also regarded

6.1.17-31. Evasion of a dangerous role. At Sinope the men decide to choose a single ruler to lead them, and their choice is Xenophon. Xenophon, however, although he is flattered by the offer, realises that accepting it could be a serious source of trouble for him with the Spartans. 'And for me, in turn, I do not believe this to be very safe at all' (6.1.26). He may further see that, given the motivation of the men — maximising their booty — the role of sole commander would be based on an unstable platform. When the soldiers apparently still insist that he take the position, he has recourse to sacrifices which he says he undertook. 'I swear to you by all the gods and all the goddesses that when I became aware of your judgement, I offered sacrifice as to whether it was better both for you to turn this command over to me and for me to undertake it. And the gods signalled to me in the sacrifices, so that even a novice would know it, that I must abstain from this monarchy'. Thus they elected Kheirisophos' (6.1.31-32).

6.4.12-22. Following the entrails. At Kalpe Harbour on the Black Sea coast, fearing that there is a plan to found a colony at this site, the soldiers wish to press on; Xenophon is happy to go along with this desire (though he is suspected of wanting to colonise the place), subject to favourable sacrifices. Over days, however, these persistently fail to be propitious, with the result that even with their provisions dangerously low, the men will not venture out for supplies. Xenophon performs the sacrifices himself, and by so doing indicates that control over the ritual can in turn be used to resist even basic impulses such as hunger and fear. (For a fuller account of this episode see Chapter 4.3.)

Conclusions

Leadership is a major interest throughout the Xenophontic corpus. In *Anabasis* Xenophon brings to bear his substantial experience of war to present a detailed picture of different military leaders and leadership styles in a non-fictional setting. It is apparent from the nature of his paradigms, and from the structure of the narrative, that he intends his presentation to be instructive. I have argued that his didacticism here works on two levels. Firstly, there are 'situational lessons', wherein the behaviour of a commander in a challenging situation is

as a way in which gods communicated with men. On divine intervention see Dover 1994: 133-144.

observed. These are signalled by a standard method which has one of the leaders facing a challenge, and are given force by their being situated in a *real* context. The flowing narrative produces vivid images of recognisable historical figures in action and by this colouring the author ensures that the experiences of good and bad practice which he wishes to share are the more effectively digested and retained. His second lesson is an exposition of major styles of leadership. Three different ones are treated — Oriental, Spartan, and Athenian. Through successive focus on exponents of each, their distinctive features are brought out, as are their respective strengths and weaknesses. In each case the individuals under spotlight are composites of the stereotype and unique character traits which the author chooses to highlight.

Oriental

Cyrus displays several of what, from the Greek perspective, are typical weaknesses of barbarian rule. There is lack of forethought in his planning of the expedition (he runs out of money early) and disorder in his advance towards his brother's army in Babylonia.⁸⁴ He cannot exert full control over his mercenary contingent — in the end a failure which cost him his life. His own troops are faceless and nameless, except for a handful in his inner circle, whose obedience may be owed as much to fear as loyalty. Often in situations where he displays leadership qualities, as when he intervenes between Klearchos and Menon and their armies by the Euphrates, Xenophon shows him representing himself as a Greek, thereby pointing to the impossibility of truly successful barbarian rule. While Xenophon's encomium of the prince is, appropriately for the genre, flattering, the reality of his rule as depicted in Book 1 shows that this style of leadership is inefficient and, ultimately, ineffective. The success of the retreat provides a proof of the comparative superiority of Greek leadership. By the same token, Xenophon also shows that the capacity for ideal leadership is not restricted by ethnicity: the barbarian, by acquiring virtue, has every potential to become a successful ruler.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ See Herodotus on Cambyses (3.25) for a similar instance of barbarian impetuosity.

⁸⁵ Xenophon almost seems to make a point of this in his choice of Cyrus the Great as model for the ideal king; see *Kyro.* 8.1.21-32 for a summary of the essential virtues which Cyrus the Great bears. In *Anabasis* the inverse situation is also demonstrated: Menon, through his lack of virtue (2.6.21-28), is a *de facto* barbarian.

Spartan

Klearchos, Book 2, and Kheirisophos, Books 3-6, are the principal representatives of the Spartan style of leadership. Not surprisingly, they are both marked as highly capable in military matters, and they display competence in diplomacy and speech; Klearchos especially shows impressive flexibility in turning to oratory to achieve a notable success for his leadership. When they need to, then, Spartans can deploy the power of speech too (cf. Brasidas in Thucydides 4.84-87). Yet in the performance of Kheirisophos, we see that they do not do so nearly enough to be effective in an army of non-Spartans. Xenophon demonstrates convincingly that there are other factors, too, which make them unsuitable for all but parochial leadership: notably, they are quick to anger, corruptible, and selfish. Although Xenophon does not seek to explain these character failings, when set alongside the context of his own self-representation, the intended inference is that they are attributable to their own society and system of government.

Athenian

Xenophon himself is the embodiment of the third style of leadership presented. This is Athenian in character, with a distinctively Socratic flavour. By making repeated, if subtle, allusions to the working of government at Athens, and wearing his own identity openly, he makes his self-representation as a leader conform to that of a leader of the democracy.⁸⁶ His exemplifying of Socratic precepts is intended to enhance this model and at the same time to differentiate it from the conventional Athenian one. From the evidence of the narrative this is the most effective style of leadership, its outstanding features being its rooting in an ethical philosophy and the use of speech to motivate, influence, and direct action; pointedly, inexperience, if not ineptitude, in military affairs, is not a bar to successful leadership. The failure of both Cyrus and the Spartans to exert

⁸⁶ Several models from the Athenian past for Xenophon's character on the retreat were suggested; a further one may be Kimon, of whom Plutarch says: 'he received with mildness those who brought their wrongs to him, treated them humanely, and so, before men were aware of it, secured the leadership of Hellas, not by force of arms, but by virtue of his address and character' (*Kimon* 6.2). As suggested Xenophon could, additionally, be drawing a contrast between himself and these approaches to leadership, and other political figures, such as Kleon.

decisive control over the mercenary body on the one hand, and Xenophon's success in leading the expedition back to Asia Minor on the other, is the ultimate measure of the respective management approaches. Xenophon's achievement is made all the more impressive by the fact that the task of leadership became measurably more difficult after the army had reached the sea and the attendant pressures of survival that had bound the Greeks together receded. In narrating the performance of his character Xenophon offers a number of valuable insights into the operation of democracy, indicating how this system can be managed to the advantage of its leaders. He may well be being ironic when he reports Seuthes's claim to the Spartans that he is a φιλοστρατιώτης (7.6.4); however, the contradiction between his apparent concern for the welfare of the men and his pursuit of leadership aims that are sometimes against their wishes (as for example at Trapezus, where he has roads built) is resolved by his acting in (what he considers to be) the best interests of the army as a whole. There is no doubt that Xenophon's view is that, as with any other form of government, the success of democracy is dependent on politically and morally responsible leadership.

Mercenaries

I argued in the opening section that an important additional concern in the work is the subject of how to manage mercenary soldiers. The increasing use of hired men by states in the fourth century made this subject a pertinent one, and Xenophon, with his extensive experience, was ideally placed to provide guidance (see further Chapter 3.2.4). A series of lessons emerges from his work: for example, mercenaries cannot be controlled by violence; they react badly to being deceived and tend to be untrusting; they are susceptible to demagoguery and will subject themselves to a leader who convinces them he can realise their immediate aims; their gratitude is short-lived, if forthcoming at all, and needs to be constantly curried with actual or prospective material wealth. Xenophon furthermore shows how a large mercenary body can constitute a formidable political force, being capable of directing its own activity and not being fettered by loyalties to states or individuals — even those which have shown themselves ready to look out for the interests of the members. In this light Sparta's awkward attempts to dismember the Ten Thousand as they

marched towards, and into, her sphere of control looks less cynical and treacherous. It is following a failed attempt by the Spartans to disperse the men into Thrace that Xenophon again demonstrates that mercenaries can be (just about) managed through the power and charm of speech. His comparatively greater leverage on the journey may in the end be due to his Athenian background and recognition by the men themselves that democracy could be a more efficient means of expressing collective will than gross acts of disobedience and disorder.

PART 3. CONCLUSIONS

Noreen Humble has remarked that, as with every writer before and after, Xenophon had an agenda.⁸⁷ In his case, the range of his subject matter, his innovative use of literary forms, and his personal evasiveness make the attempt to infer this conclusively less than straightforward; the likelihood of a wide chronological writing span introduces additionally the possibility of evolving concerns and motivations. Nonetheless, close reading of his corpus reveals a number of prominently recurring elements, among them preoccupations with Socrates and Sparta, political philosophy, a penchant for moral and practical instruction, and *apologia*. This suggests, if not a single literary project, a real degree of unity, with different works expressing views and thoughts pressing at the time of authorship.

The focus of this chapter has been on *Anabasis*, considered by many to be Xenophon's most autobiographical piece of writing. In Part I I turned to look behind the text at the processes of its construction, and specifically at the author's use of exemplars. As shown, these are a dominant, even a defining feature of the narrative, the author to a large extent realising his apologetic and didactic agendas through this means. In a sense, too, the medium is the message: in the Xenophontic world learning takes place in-field, through the practice and experience of power, politics, and warfare. A result of the wide use of exempla is that Xenophon's accounts of the past tend to be less than

⁸⁷ Humble 2007.

systematic and can appear to be historically biased, factors that have caused him to be labelled as shoddy, or worse, by a number of modern scholars. However, by appreciating his method and reading his work on its own terms, apparent omissions and anomalies are seen in a more sympathetic light.

Given that an argument made here was that Xenophon rooted his exemplars in a real context, it is appropriate to address briefly the question of omissions in the march record in *Anabasis*. To take a pair of well-known examples, during the course of the retreat the author does not describe the crossing of the Greater Zab River, and he makes no mention at all of the Lesser Zab River before that. While both of these are notable river crossings — and are events that would almost certainly have surfaced in a more methodical account — their omission does not undermine either the accuracy or the completeness of the overall record: points before and after are duly registered and there is no question left open about their relative locations. As far as research to date has shown, most of the events and incidents on the march which Xenophon describes can be assigned to actual locations.

Part 2 looked at the theme of leadership, and it was demonstrated that the author's purpose in his extensive treatment of the subject was primarily didactic. A concern with leaders and leadership is evident in much of Xenophon's oeuvre and *Anabasis*, the story of an army on the march, presents an ideal canvas for the presentation of lessons on military leadership; a study of Xenophon's treatment indicates that while set in a real context, these are paradigmatic and are not necessarily intended to portray real events or character traits. However, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the raw material for the lessons derives, in the main, from actual observations made (or episodes learned about) by the author on the road.

Xenophon's lessons on military leadership are of two types. Firstly, he provides case studies, or what might be termed situational instruction: that is, he describes how a leader encounters and then deals with a challenge on the march. Typically these episodes are artfully integrated into the narrative and it is left to the reader to discern the lesson, though these tend to be unambiguous. It is pertinent to emphasise that readers of Xenophon, known for the range of his

military experiences and his connections with high-level figures around the eastern Mediterranean, will probably have expected to learn something on the subject and will therefore have been alert to the subtlety and nuances of his narrative. The instruction so provided, while not to be characterised as systematic, nonetheless covers many of the key areas — discipline, motivation, self-control, strategy, diplomacy, financial management, provisioning — that a military commander must aspire to be master of on campaign.

The second type of lesson, more deeply embedded still into the narrative, concerns different styles of leadership. Xenophon presents three in succession, each one a progression toward an ideal of command. The narrative is structured around these consecutive treatments, beginning in Book 1 with the Persian prince, Cyrus the Younger, then moving on to focus on the Spartan approach through Klearchos and, later, Kheirisophos (Books 2 and 3-6 respectively), and finally, in tandem with the latter, on Xenophon himself, who is introduced as a young Athenian in a close relationship with the philosopher Socrates (Books 3-7). His style, indebted to Periclean democracy and to Socrates, clearly comes across as the optimal one, an impression underwritten by the fact that it is Xenophon more than any other who is instrumental in bringing the army to safety.⁸⁸ The death of all the previous leaders suggests finite life for their respective approaches; notably, through his exposure of the weakness of Spartan rule beyond their own *polis*, Xenophon is at the same time commenting on Spartan hegemony of Greece, and foreshadowing its end.

As with the other leaders under focus, Xenophon himself is to be understood as an exemplar, in his case a model young Athenian citizen and pupil of Socrates. A further remarkable feature of the author's didactic method is his skilful interrelating of events and leaders. For example when Klearchos descends into muddy canals early on the retreat, we recall Cyrus's failure to do so when his wagons had become stuck along the Euphrates; prior to that Klearchos' tight marshalling of the first stage of the retreat, even with a truce in force, draws a sharp contrast with Cyrus's laxity on the approach into Babylonia. Similarly,

⁸⁸ Xenophon's character in *Anabasis*, hardly surprisingly, bears resemblance to *Agésilaios*, and to Cyrus the Great in *Kyroupaideia*, but there is too in his conception of himself a notable similarity to Plato's 'Philosopher King' (see *Republic* 473c-e). On the interrelationship between *Anabasis* and the *Republic* see Howland 2000.

other leaders in the story, notably Tissaphernes, Proxenos, and Menon, function to bring out qualities, and the lack thereof, in the main subjects.⁸⁹ While both of the types of lesson presented — situational and stylistic — are intended to be valuable (cf. *Hunting* 13.7), in the end, Xenophon is more concerned with discovering the factors that make good leaders than he is with simply providing a record of their actions. His conclusion, moreover, is not exclusive: a barbarian leader who is willing to set aside his own training and have his actions guided by ethical philosophy and democratic ideology can be as successful as any Greek.

A particular concern which emerges in *Anabasis* is the problem of how to manage a large body of mercenaries. Through Xenophon's adult lifetime the subject was topical, and there were few in a better position than he to contribute ideas to the issue. A reading of the text as a guide to mercenary management reveals a thought-provoking treatment; it furthermore brings to the fore Xenophon's interest in political philosophy and thereby links the work to others in the corpus in which the problem of how to rule is considered. Gray has claimed that all of Xenophon's works show 'an interest in paradigms of government', an assertion which finds support here in the argument that a major focus in *Anabasis* is on the management of mercenaries, a unique constituency of growing importance on the political landscape.⁹⁰ Xenophon lays special emphasis on the power of speech, and the democratic system more broadly, in controlling a large, independent-minded population. Through his record of the march down country he also highlights the fact that the existence of pressing external circumstances lessens resistance to command. Xenophon's various and prescient observations on the operation of democracy show how highly he regarded the utility of the Athenian system; while his ultimate interest in the problem of government was in finding ways to secure the success, or well being, of the whole community, and not just of its rulers, it could be argued that

⁸⁹ The role of Tissaphernes in *Anabasis* deserves special attention. Although Xenophon in this and other of his works (*Agés.*, *Hell.*) portrays him as a treacherous and untrustworthy figure, he nonetheless emerges as a formidable military commander and statesman. An alternative presentation of leadership styles to the one argued for here could have Tissaphernes's as the template for the superior model. See further Chapter 3 (3.2.4).

⁹⁰ Gray 2007: 2.

this concern does not come across pointedly in his consideration of the problem of how to manage mercenaries.

Stepping back from the subject detail, Xenophon's elaborate treatment of military leadership in *Anabasis* can be seen to link with a broader, and, I argue, a still more pronounced concern in this work — *apologia*. In representing his character as an ideal leader, he is addressing questions about his role on the retreat raised by other participants and writers,⁹¹ and also defending the memory of Socrates, whose teachings inform to a large degree his actions on the retreat. These respective *apologias* are the subject of the remaining chapters.

⁹¹ Rood (2006: 56), plausibly, appears to take the opposite view on this, regarding Xenophon's major self-defence speeches as being designed to highlight qualities of his leadership. 'Xenophon's defence of his earlier conduct [his striking of the soldier in the snow] ensures that the positive qualities of his leadership (his maintenance of discipline and morale, for instance) are not left to be inferred from the narrative, but presented as such in a speech, and acknowledged by his internal audience. (The same is true when Xenophon defends his later conduct before the Spartans and the Thracian ruler Seuthes.)'

Apologia Xenophontos

Consequently death, which because of the changes and chances of life is daily close at hand, and because of the shortness of life can never be far away, does not frighten the wise man from considering the interests of the state and of his family for all time; and it follows that he regards posterity, of which he is bound to have no consciousness, as being really his concern.

Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 1.38

The impression given by *Anabasis* is that Xenophon was at pains to represent his role on the retreat of the Ten Thousand as highly significant. From obscurity in the march up-country, he emerges as a formidable leader of men on the banks of the Greater Zab River; until the army leaves Thrace some 15 months later, he is involved in almost every major action, and is constantly on hand with sound advice. The fact that he appears to have used a pseudonym has been taken as a reinforcement of this view, there being an argument at least from the time of Plutarch that the attribution was intended 'to win greater credence for his narrative' (*de gloria Atheniensium*).¹ Yet from the evidence of his other writings, from which he is mostly absent, Xenophon was not a man we might expect to be given to self-aggrandisement; indeed, the promoter of ethical philosophy, and author of practical works intended for public benefit, might be expected not to embrace such a self-interested motive.² A resolution to this contradiction — a

¹ 'Xenophon, to be sure, became his own history by writing of his generalship and his successes and recording that it was Themistogenes the Syracusan who had compiled an account of them, his purpose being to win greater credence for his narrative by referring to himself in the third person, thus favouring another with the glory of the authorship' (Ξενοφῶν μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ γέγονεν ἱστορία, γράψας, ἃ ἔστρατήγησε καὶ κατώρθωσε, [καὶ] Θεμιστογένει περὶ τούτων συντετάχθαι τῷ Συρακοσίῳ, ἵνα πιστότερος ἢ διηγούμενος ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἄλλον, ἐτέρῳ τὴν τῶν λόγων δόξαν χαριζόμενος'), *Moralia* 345e.

² Xenophon is a retiring presence in most of his books, and in these, where he does touch on events that involve him, he does not seek recognition or sympathy. For example in his *Hellenika*, rather than name himself as the leader of the Cyreans in

reconciliation between Xenophon the author and his character in the account — can be brought about if his aim is understood as being more subtle and politically-directed than vain personal glory. In the previous chapter it was said that Xenophon in *Anabasis* is an exemplar, a hybrid model of a young Athenian and a pupil of Socrates, and that this form of representation effects an original and powerful defence of Socrates. Yet to the greater number of his readers, whatever the degree of their awareness of his Socratic defence, Xenophon's actions will have been read at least in some sense as his own, a fact that he himself must have been fully conscious of. In this chapter, Xenophon's defence of himself through his character in the narrative is examined. The analysis of this and the following chapter — where the argument for a Socratic defence is developed — is intended to bring out the nature and pervasiveness of the apologetic element in *Anabasis* and the extent to which it shapes the text.

In Part 1 a persistent view about the reason why Xenophon wrote his account of the expedition — as a response to another published version — is examined and it is concluded that the evidence for another account is not compelling. In subsequent Parts, examining closely the content of his speeches and his self-representation, alternative motivations for personal *apologia* are argued for. Part 2 focuses on direct attacks made on Xenophon's integrity in the course of the retreat, and, additionally, on the matter of his involvement in a mercenary enterprise, a circumstance which he will have been keen to explain. Part 3 is concerned with Xenophon's exile from Athens: the argument is that his

service to Sparta, he refers to 'the leader of the men who had fought with Cyrus' (ὁ τῶν Κυρείων προεστηκώς, 3.2.7); later in the same account, coming to the battle (of Mantinea) in which one of his son's died, by all accounts bravely, Xenophon confines himself to the comment that 'many brave men were killed' (7.5.17). Diogenes opens his biography by describing his subject as 'a man of rare modesty' (2.48), a distinction not afforded by him to any other of the Socratics. It is more common now for modern writers to share this view: see especially Gray 1998, chapter 6, and 1989b: 137: 'Xenophon saw *megalegoria* (lit. 'big talk') as a fault of character associated with self praise, the antithesis of the good grace he so admired in Agesilaos of Sparta'. *Contra* Waterfield (2006: 190), who discerns a decided hint of self-promotion in *Anabasis* and thinks that Xenophon exaggerated his role for his own benefit; *ibid*: 183, 'there was a somewhat pretentious side to Xenophon's character; he was, after all, the one who chose to make his first major speech to the ruffian mercenary army, after the capture of the generals, in his finest armour, the metalwork chased in gold, the helmet mightily plumed, the shield beautifully engraved'. Likewise LaForse (2005: 12) thinks that *Anabasis* is predominantly about Xenophon's own success, and he adds in a note that 'it is a rare modern critic who does not think Xenophon exaggerates his own importance in the *Anabasis*'.

elaborate distancing of himself from both Cyrus and Sparta in the text are explained in large part by his banishment and constitute a comprehensive defence against the decree of exile. Xenophon's defence of the *hippeis* is also examined in this part.

By reading the text as *apologia* a view opens up on the important question of the author's intended audience(s). While he was evidently writing for Greeks — the account is written in Attic, and from a Hellenic viewpoint, with a marked tendency to report what was not familiar to the Greek experience³ — taking cognisance of the substance of his *apologia*, it becomes possible to circumscribe this broad grouping and identify within it a defined body of citizens, or social class, at which particular types of defence were aimed. For instance in the case of his careful distancing of himself from Sparta and Persia it is argued that his audience is primarily the citizens of his native city, Athens, while in defending himself against the taint of mercenary service he has his own social class in mind. A conclusion of the chapter is that the aristocratic class at Athens was the core audience for the work.

PART 1. ANABASIS AS A RESPONSE TO OTHER ACCOUNTS OF THE EXPEDITION WHICH DID NOT DO JUSTICE TO XENOPHON'S ROLE

A setting straight of the record has, in modern times, been one of the most widespread explanations offered for *Anabasis*. Xenophon's dramatic introduction into the narrative at the Greater Zab River (3.1), and his near flawless achievement in helping lead the Greeks homeward, is believed by many to be a response to (what he at least saw as) unfair portrayal of his role in other accounts of the march.⁴ This *apologia* argument is dependent on there

³ On the reporting of the unfamiliar see Brule 1995, Tuplin 1999, Roy 2007, Brennan 2009.

⁴ The theory appears to have emerged in the late nineteenth century in German and French scholarship (Schwartz 1889: 161-193, Dürrbach 1893: 346 ff.). W. Tarn, in the first edition of the CAH (1927: 5), states it thus: 'Sophainetos wrote the first story of the expedition, and Xenophon probably wrote his own account, the *Anabasis*, largely because he thought Sophainetos had overlooked his merits'. Later adherents to this view include Breitenbach 1967: 1646-7, Cawkwell 1972: 17-19 (restated 2004), Anderson 1974: 81-84 (though a qualified endorsement), Stronk 1995: 9, Dillery 1998: 7-9. See Lee (2005: 46) for a recent overview.

having been another account published prior to Xenophon's, and on that not portraying him in a favourable light. There are differing views on this matter. Though Xenophon's is the only one that survives, his may not have been the only account of the expedition to have been published. Four fragments of a *Kyrou Anabasis* by Sophainetos — who is likely to be the Stymphalian general in Xenophon's account — are mentioned in Stephanos, the sixth-century AD Byzantine lexicographer (FGrH 109 FF 1-4); Xenophon himself refers to the record of Themistogenes (*Hell.* 3.1.2), and the history of Ktesias contains an account of the Battle of Kounaxa and other information related to the march.⁵ There could have been other, probably rudimentary, accounts, no traces of which now survive.⁶

1.1. Sophainetos of Stymphalos

In Book 14 of his *Universal History* Diodoros relates the story of Cyrus's march up-country and the retreat home of his Greek mercenaries (14.19-31, 37). His account is almost certainly based on that of the fourth-century historian Ephoros, whose history covered the period immediately following the Trojan War down to the siege of Perinthus in 341.⁷ The question of Ephoros' source(s) for the march has divided opinion. His apparently poor opinion of Xenophon, suggested by his neglect of the latter's *Hellenika* as a source for his own history, has been thought to rule out Xenophon's *Anabasis*;⁸ he may have used a text or texts of which we now have no knowledge, though there is a modern tradition which thinks he drew on Sophainetos.⁹ In Xenophon's account he is the oldest

⁵ Ktesias' *Persika*, a history in 23 books, survives partially in an epitome by Photios, and through Plutarch's *Artaxerxes*.

⁶ For unknown authors of the period see Breitenbach 1970: 406-407. Cartledge (1987: 59) writes that 'it is generally agreed that [Xenophon's] was not the first participant account to be published'.

⁷ Diodoros has been shown to have a tendency to follow one source wherever he can; since Jacoby (FGrH), it has been widely accepted that his source for material on Greece and the East in books 11-14 is Ephoros. See also Brunt 1980: 478, Gray 1980: 308, and Markle 1994: 44.

⁸ For discussion see Barber 1935: 64-65 and 111, Westlake 1987: 248, Stylianos 2004: 68. Erbse (2010: 498) detects a pronounced 'anti-Xenophon' bias in Ephoros, but thinks he did draw on the work, changing or reordering passages as he saw fit. Higgins (1977: 94) suggests that, as a pupil of Isokrates, Ephoros may have avoided using the work of a known Socratic.

⁹ Barber 1935: 127, Cawkwell 1972: 17-19, Lendle 1995: 12, 249, Stronk 1995: 7. Erbse (2010: 498) thinks that Sophainetos was probably one of his sources. Westlake

of the Greek generals (6.5.13) and one of those who survived the expedition. It is plausible that he may have published his story.

Two preliminary issues concerning a Sophainetos *Anabasis* present themselves, namely, the slightness of the reference to his work in Stephanos (four fragments) and its lateness (sixth century AD). The scanty surviving material, appearing in the context of geographical names — Sophainetos is quoted as an authority for two tribal names, a city, and a river (see note 17 below) — is hardly sufficient to assert that it is the basis of any substantial account of the expedition; while to do so may not be 'a desperate hypothesis',¹⁰ it is in my opinion not a strong one.¹¹ More problematic still is the fact that what would have been a significant work — not least because it would have survived through a generation before being used by Ephoros (writing in the later 330s and 320s) — was unknown to later writers: notably, neither Polybius, Dionysius of Halikarnassos, Arrian, nor Plutarch, who dealt directly with the event in his *Artaxerxes*, have heard of it. It may be relevant too that Arcadia, for all the size of its reputation for producing soldiers, was not famed for literary exponents (although the military writer, Aeneas Tacticus, is said to have come from the same Stymphalos). Explanations for the work by doubters range from outright scepticism about its existence, to a belief that it is a forgery, to a theory that Sophainetos' story was incorporated into a military handbook and Stephanos at his long remove inferred that he had written an actual account.¹²

The lynchpin of the 'response' apologia theory under consideration is that Diodoros makes only one mention of Xenophon, and this comes when the

(1987) has argued that the Oxyrhynchos Historian was Ephoros' main source, though this is speculative (for this criticism see especially Stylianos 2004: 70); no less so is Anderson's suggestion that a Greek confidant of the Persian king, Phalinos (*An.* 2.1.7), could have authored some form of account, and that Ephoros in turn could have drawn on this (1974: 83).

¹⁰ Bigwood (1983: 349), on the basis that virtually nothing is known of Sophainetos' work, characterises it as such.

¹¹ Cf. Higgins (1977: 93): 'In the absence of significant portions of Sophainetos' work this [assertion of a substantial account] must remain a gratuitous assumption'. However Roy (1967: 290), Cawkwell (1972: 17-18), and Dillery (2009: 406), among others, assume that there was a meaningful work.

¹² Scepticism: Bigwood 1983: 343; Forgery: Westlake 1987: 252; Mistaken transmission: Stylianos 2004: 73-74. To be added to these is a recent suggestion by Almagor (2009: 2) that the name Sophainetos is 'the result of some later corruption and a hyper-correction of "Xenophon"'.

remnants of the army are in Thrace (14.37). His ultimate source, then, can hardly have been Xenophon, and the most obvious candidate is the putative work of Sophainetos. Tentative evidence of animosity shown towards Sophainetos by Xenophon comes from two passages in *Anabasis*: at 5.8.1 he notes that the Stymphalian had been fined for neglect (κατημέλει) by the men (although charges against three of the other generals, including himself, are noted too); more interestingly, at 6.5.13, in the closest he comes to castigating a fellow commander, he interrupts him as he dismisses the option of crossing a ravine to declare that, in the interests of safety, they must cross. They do, and are successful, and Sophainetos is not heard of again.

The first reservation with the Sophainetos hypothesis arises from the quality of Diodoros' compilations. While it is very likely that Ephoros is his source for the march, it is less certain that he reproduced a faithful summary of his version. From modern studies it is clear that Diodoros was slipshod in many ways. As evidence of his carelessness, Brunt points to his having the Athenians starve the Spartans trapped on Sphacteria (Diodoros 12.61-63), whereas it must be unlikely that Ephoros would have rejected Thucydides' detailed testimony on this matter (4.31-39);¹³ a more concerning incidence is apparent in his seventeenth book, which he based on Klitarchos: while the latter's work is believed to have run to 12 books, Diodoros compressed it into just one. Brunt writes: 'If he paraphrased Klitarchos in a few places, he had to abbreviate inordinately elsewhere, and simply leave out masses of material'.¹⁴ Xenophon's dropping out of the Ephoran narrative could, then, be as well due to the method of Diodoros as the indifference of Sophainetos. A second, related concern is the disposition of Ephoros himself: if, as some consider, he bore an 'anti-Xenophon' bias (note 8 above), he could have chosen selectively from his source(s). He has, moreover, a marked tendency to rewrite his sources, a factor which can lead to significant distortion; Gray writes: 'No matter what the quality of the original, by the time it had passed through the hands of Ephoros, it was likely to

¹³ Brunt 1980: 493.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* 493.

have altogether lost that quality'.¹⁵ In both of these outlined situations the original(s) need not have been hostile or indifferent to Xenophon.¹⁶

A third reservation with the hypothesis is that nothing in the fragments of Sophainetos' *Anabasis* corresponds with Diodoros/Ephoros, whereas the names are all found in Xenophon; that being said, the references are so slight, nothing conclusive from this can really be drawn.¹⁷ More revealing is a study by Stylianos which has sought to demonstrate that most of Diodoros' account can be shown to derive from Xenophon.¹⁸ While endorsing the belief that Ephoros was dismissive of Xenophon's *Hellenika*, Stylianos makes the point that *Anabasis* was an altogether different work, and one a capable historian such as Ephoros would not have disregarded so quickly;¹⁹ in any event, as he shows, the chronological detail and the narrative style in Diodoros are very similar to Xenophon's, so whatever the ultimate source, it is at least not materially at odds with the Athenian's record.²⁰

A further point in support of Diodoros being ultimately based on Xenophon, and notwithstanding earlier comments on the quality of his compilations, is that the

¹⁵ Gray 1987: 73.

¹⁶ Another relevant, if speculative point, is that Diodoros could be focussing on leaders as a framework for his compilation: thus he says that Kheirisophos was elected supreme leader by the men after the seizure of the generals by Tissaphernes (14.27.1), and he says Xenophon was chosen as their leader in Thrace (14.37.1). The understanding in the accounts which follow respectively is that leadership resided in the named leader and no additional command information was necessary; however stellar, or anonymous, Xenophon's role might have been, by this approach it would not anyway have been noted by Diodoros.

¹⁷ F. 109.1 Καρδοῦχοι = *An.* 4 passim; F. 109.2 Τάοι (Τάοχοι in Xenophon) = *An.* 4 passim; F. 109.3 Φύσκος = *An.* 2.4.25; F. 109.4 Χαρμάνδη = *An.* 1.5.10.

¹⁸ Stylianos 2004; *contra* Westlake 1987 who allows for only limited use of *Anabasis* by Ephoros, arguing instead that his main source was the *Hell. Oxy.*

¹⁹ Stylianos 2004: 68, noting, however, that 'Ephoros was no mere compiler. He could recast his sources, and even interfere with their historical causation and interpretation' (74). Erbse (2010) makes more of this habit, arguing that Ephoros, 'who is more concerned with an effective than a reliable presentation of the material' (499), 'typically changed or reordered Xenophontic passages as he saw fit' (498).

²⁰ The assertion of course supposes that Diodoros accurately reproduced his source, and see caveat on Ephoros in note above. Dalby (1992: 17), following Roy (1967: 294-295), regards Diodoros' account as an over-simplification of Xenophon's: 'It has nothing independent to offer.' On the other hand, Marincola (2010) argues that the first author of an account shapes the story, and subsequent writers, if they contradict facts, rarely go against the traditional narrative: so on the basis of this argument we should not perhaps expect notable divergence between any of the accounts, whichever appeared first.

passage in which Xenophon is mentioned (14.37.1) in fact betrays a concise and accurate reading of *Anabasis*.

About the same time, of those men who had campaigned with Cyrus and managed to get back safely to Greece, some now returned to their own countries, but the majority of them, having grown accustomed to a soldier's life, chose Xenophon as their general (Diodoros 14.37.1).

The statement that some of the soldiers who had got back safely to Greece returned to their own countries (καὶ διασωθέντων εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα τινὲς μὲν εἰς τὰς ἰδίας πατρίδας) reflects Xenophon's statements that Byzantium was the first Greek city which the army came to (*An.* 7.1.29; cf. 6.1.17, 6.5.23), and that some of the soldiers sold their weapons 'and sailed away' (7.2.3). That the army was indeed then in Thrace is confirmed in Diodoros' next line: 'And Xenophon with this army set out to make war on the Thracians who dwell around Salmydessos' (ὅς ἀναλαβὼν τὴν δύναμιν ὤρμησε πολεμήσων Θρᾶκας τοὺς περὶ τὸν Σαλμυδησσὸν οἰκοῦντας, 14.37.2). For Xenophon being chosen as their general, Diodoros/Ephoros is evidently drawing on his return to Thrace (*An.* 7.2.8); Xenophon does not say he was then chosen as leader, but he implies as much: οἱ δὲ στρατιῶται ἐδέξαντο ἠδέως καὶ εὐθύς εἶποντο (7.2.9). He subsequently presses this more: Μετὰ ταῦτα Ξενοφῶν μὲν ἠγείτο, οἱ δ' εἶποντο (7.3.7). What is revealing is that while on two occasions before this Xenophon has been offered the leadership (6.1.19, 7.1.21), he has declined these opportunities, so it is only in Thrace that he is in sole command. Diodoros in this passage, then, is consistent with *Anabasis*, a fact which mitigates against the charge that he is guilty of undue oversight of Xenophon in his report of the expedition — this is further strengthened if the point about his having a leadership framework is credible (note 16 above).

In light of the foregoing arguments, and the obstacles outlined to accepting a work by Sophainetos, the most reasonable conclusion is that Xenophon was not writing in response to a work by Sophainetos.

1.2. Themistogenes of Syracuse

Xenophon's account contains no detail about the narrator: Xenophon is a character in the story, and is formally introduced into it in the third person (3.1.4). In his *Hellenika* (3.1.2) Xenophon does, however, write that one Themistogenes of Syracuse authored an account of Cyrus's march up-country and the retreat of his Greeks to the sea; as MacLaren in his study of the problem noted, this statement has caused considerable trouble for students of *Hellenika* and *Anabasis*.²¹ The solution to the problem might be framed in the following terms:²²

- 1.) Themistogenes wrote an *Anabasis*, Xenophon did not
- 2.) Themistogenes and Xenophon wrote accounts, but the former's is lost
- 3.) Themistogenes is a pseudonym used by Xenophon.

The principal advocate for the first scenario (1) is the author of the *Souda*, who considered that *Anabasis*, though attributed to Xenophon, was actually the work of Themistogenes.²³ It may be presumed that he based his view on *Hell.* 3.1.2, though it cannot be discounted that he derived it from a source now lost. On the weight of the antique literary evidence for Xenophon's *Anabasis* alone it is safe to say that his belief that Xenophon did not write an *Anabasis* is incorrect;²⁴ the fact that several themes and concerns in the work recur across Xenophon's corpus may furthermore be pointed to as a proof that he was indeed the author. The second scenario (2) above is more plausible, but is undermined by the fact that the only ancient reference to Themistogenes external to *Hellenika* is the

²¹ MacLaren 1934a: 240. Rood (2005: xix) calls this 'the oddest passage in the whole of Xenophon'.

²² There are other explanations for the passage, notably that it is an interpolation (Richter, cited in Prentice 1947: 74), and that the name is the result of a copyist's error and that the sentence should read: 'Has been written, rightfully and dutifully, by one of Cyrus's men' (Prentice 1947).

²³ The *Souda* entry: Θεμιστογένης, Συρακούσιος, ιστορικός. Κύρου ανάβασιν, ἥτις ἐν τοῖς Ξενοφώντος φέρεται· καὶ ἄλλα τινὰ περὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδος (123.1).

²⁴ References to Xenophon's *Anabasis*: Dionysius of Halikarnassos, *Art of Rhetoric* 8.11, 9.12; Strabo, *Geography* 8.7.5; Arrian, *Periplus* 2.3, *Anabasis* 1.12.2; Lucian, *Dream* 17; Aelian, *On Animals* 6.25; Athenaeus 6.252a; Diogenes, *Lives* 2.50, 57; Pollux 10.80.

entry in the *Souda*; in this regard the same reservations about Sophainetos in Stephanos raised above are applicable.²⁵

The notion that Themistogenes was a pseudonym used by Xenophon (3), current at least from Plutarch's day, is the most widely accepted explanation for *Hell.* 3.1.2. Plutarch considered that his aim was 'to win greater credence for his narrative' (*de gloria Atheniensium*, 345e), but other equally (mostly) credible views have been aired since: recent ones include that the pseudonym was intended to signal the objectivity of the account ('Themis' for natural order; 'Syracuse' for its remove from the Aegean hub);²⁶ that the attribution was 'in part Xenophon's unconscious recognition that he had been uprooted by the expedition, that he no longer was who he had been';²⁷ and that he was simply being modest.²⁸ While in Chapter 1 (Section 1.6) I put forward a further possible explanation, in the next chapter I argue that Xenophon's purpose in using a pseudonym was to emphasise that the work is not autobiographical.

Whatever the thinking behind it, the pseudonym does seem to be the most convincing explanation for *Hell.* 3.1.2; the fact that *Anabasis* pointedly lacks a prologue or proem might be adduced as (qualified) evidence that the work was published in this way. If Xenophon is using a pseudonym he is not responding to an account by Themistogenes.

²⁵ Strauss (1972: 178) appears to try to make some connection between Themistogenes and the Syracusan who features in the *Symposion*, though he provides no indication of what this might be: 'As for Xenophon's choice of a Syracusan as the antagonist of Socrates, I fear that its explanation may depend on the explanation of "Themistogenes of Syracuse," the author of a book which is indistinguishable from Xenophon's *Anabasis*.'

²⁶ Krentz 1995: 157, and see further Tsagalis 2009. Erbse (2010: 494) dwells on Themistogenes, 'descendant of justice', opining, with additional reference to his use of Theopompos at 2.1.12-13, that Xenophon has a strong liking for wordplay.

²⁷ Waterfield 2006: 194.

²⁸ Bowen 1998: 1. In his novel of the march, Manfredi (2008: 397) has his heroine suggest that Xenophon, in a diary he was keeping, was embarrassed to speak of himself in the first person. 'He spoke of himself as if he were speaking of another person. He didn't say "I"; he said "Xenophon". Perhaps he found it embarrassing to speak well or badly of himself'.

1.3. Ktesias of Knidos

Ktesias, having been captured in a campaign, is said to have spent seventeen years at the Persian court as the personal physician of the Great King.²⁹ In addition to an *Indika* (1 book), *Geography* (3 books), and some medical treatises, he wrote a multi-volume history of the Persian Empire down to 397.³⁰ In his *Persika*, according to Photios' epitome, 'he differs almost entirely from Herodotus' (*Bibl.* 72.35); Photios adds that in some respects he also disagrees (ἐπ' ἐνίων διαφωνεῖ) with Xenophon, but it is to be presumed that Photios is writing from his own perspective, comparing Xenophon's account with that of Ktesias, rather than implying — as he does explicitly with Herodotus — that the work of the Knidian postdates some or all of Xenophon's corpus. A case for the latter is, at least in the case of *Anabasis*, ruled out by Xenophon's mention of Ktesias and his account.³¹

Without the complete work, only a limited catalogue of comparable subject material between the two authors can be drawn up. From Xenophon we know that Ktesias gives an eyewitness account of events on the battlefield at Kounaxa in 401, Xenophon referring to this in his own battle report (1.8.26-27).³² Ktesias further provides detail of the fate of the generals captured by Tissaphernes on the Greater Zab (*An.* 2.5), claiming to have had contact with Klearchos at Babylon, even being given his ring as a sign of friendship.³³ It is probable that Ktesias learned from him a variety of detail about the march, and he could have included this in his *Persika*, though there is no evidence in what

²⁹ Diodoros 2.32.4. A tradition of Greek healers at the Persian court seems to have begun with Democedes of Kroton, who tended to King Darius (Herodotus 3.129-130).

³⁰ Epitomes of the *Persika* and *Indika* survive in Photios (*Bibliotheca* 72); fragments of Ktesias are collected in Jacoby (FGrH 688). Besides Photios, the major transmitters are Nicolaus of Damascus, Diodoros, and Plutarch. For an up to date treatment of the writer and his works see Stronk 2010, and Llewellyn-Jones and Robson 2010. Kuhrt 2010 asserts that we do not really have Ktesias at all, and she draws attention to the view of some scholars that his work may be a fiction, or at least was written without him ever having left the surroundings of Knidos. But historians write today about places they have never visited, and the bustling port of Knidos would have provided a wealth of research possibilities.

³¹ Xenophon refers to him twice in *Anabasis* (1.8.26, 27 = FGrH 688 F21). See Chapter 1.6.

³² For a treatment of the relationship between the battle reports of Xenophon and Ktesias see S.R. Bassett 1999. Note the caveat of Thucydides on eyewitness battle reports, 7.44

³³ Plutarch, *Life of Artaxerxes* 18 = FGrH 688 F27; cf. Photios 72.44a.30.

survives to support such a hypothesis; furthermore, Xenophon did not emerge as a figure in the march until after the seizure of the generals, so Klearchos will not have had anything to say about his role on the retreat.

It could be argued that Ktesias took details of the retreat from another source — there being ample time for him to do so (the *Persika* was published no earlier than the late 390s: see Chapter 1.6 above) — and on the basis of this provided a report of the retreat, one which was not to Xenophon's liking. Whether such a report would fit in a history of Persia must be questioned, and it might be added that it is unlikely that Xenophon would have referred to Ktesias' account at all if he had felt dissatisfied with his own portrayal in it.³⁴ Ktesias' work, furthermore, does not seem to have been well received critically in antiquity, so even if Xenophon had been disparaged in it he might not have felt a pressing need to respond.³⁵

Conclusions

The case has been made here that Xenophon's account of the expedition was the only written one in circulation. Evidence for an *Anabasis* by Sophainetos is slight, and because so little of it is extant, there is no conclusive way to judge that it was unfavourable to Xenophon.

It is probable that Themistogenes was a pseudonym used by Xenophon, though there is no agreement on what his purpose in using this was. Plutarch, reasonably, considered he intended it as a way to enhance his reputation at home — that he wished to create an image of himself as an outstanding Athenian; perhaps, as suggested in Chapter 2, in the mould of Themistocles or

³⁴ While not going as far as to suggest that Xenophon was writing in response to Ktesias, Almagor, in a recent attempt to show a substantial relationship between the works of the two authors, argues that 'the Athenian's report is linked in a special way to the *Persika* and that Xenophon had to take into consideration the stories he found there' (2009: 2). Kelly (1996: 159) believes that Xenophon was set on correcting the detail given by Ktesias in his history.

³⁵ Almagor (2009: 2 n.14) provides an extensive list of references for the predominantly negative ancient reception of the *Persika*. Nor has Ktesias' writing been highly valued in the modern era (cf. Momigliano 1990: 10), although this may now be changing: see for instance S.R. Bassett 1999, Stronk 2007 and 2010, Llewellyn-Jones and Robson 2010.

Pericles. I have argued that his undeniably glowing account of himself is principally intended to be a defence of Socrates (on this see further Chapter 4), but that inevitably, too, the performance of his character reflects on the historical figure behind it. My addition to the pseudonym debate is that Xenophon's purpose in attributing the work to another was to signal that it is not autobiographical.

The work of Ktesias, although it intersects with the expedition, and might have contained interviews with its leading Greek, would not have had anything to report on the retreat. To argue for, as has recently been done, a dependence by Xenophon on the work of Ktesias is not the same as arguing that he wrote in response to him, or that he composed *Anabasis* as a corrective to the Knidian's account. The view that Xenophon took up his pen in response to other accounts is, accordingly, not accepted here.

PART 2. CHARGES AND CHARACTER ATTACKS

As remarked in Chapter 2, the later books of *Anabasis* are dominated by speeches given by Xenophon. Examination of these shows that a number bear a decided apologetic character, engaging in an elaborate way with charges made against the author. These may have been contained in whole or part in another published account, though it is more likely that they featured in the prevalent oral accounts told at home; as a natural process, common strands amongst the myriad of stories told by the participants would have formed the basis of durable oral versions.³⁶ In the Peloponnese especially, where literary culture was slower to take hold than in other parts of Greece, Athens notably, the oral record retained its primacy through the fourth century.³⁷ In this environment it would have been harder for Xenophon, resident in this region in

³⁶ The following reference is owed to Stylianos (2004: 73): cf. 2.1.17 where Klearchos envisages advice given by a Greek in the King's service being *spoken* of back in Greece: 'And you know that whatever advice you give us will of necessity be spoken of in Greece (λέγεσθαι ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι)'. Waterfield (2006: 190) compares the Ten Thousand to the survivors of the Chinese Long March, noting that many stories would have circulated afterwards about the expedition.

³⁷ See Harris 1989: 89-90, 112-114. It is perhaps not overstating his influence to say that Xenophon's account of the expedition, together with his other written works, would have been a catalyst for inroads of literacy in Sparta and the wider Peloponnese.

his later life, to avoid what was being said. There may well have been positive sentiment echoed, given his role in the success of the retreat, but by his own account, too, many in the army had axes to grind with him. The argument of this second part of the chapter is that in *Anabasis* Xenophon is responding to particular charges made against him and to slights on his character. An important point of difference with the *apologia* theory that has been examined is that, according to the latter, Xenophon was prompted to write from a sense of injured pride, whereas in what is considered here, he is defending himself against personal attacks. His warning to the soldiers at 5.7.12 (and plea at 5.7.32-33; cf. also 6.1.21) to take care of their reputation in the eyes of others reveals at the same time his own deep concern on this score.³⁸

2.1. Deceiving the soldiers. An. 5.6.17, 27; 5.7.5-12

While the army is encamped outside the Black Sea city of Kotyora (see map, Appendix I) awaiting the arrival of ships from Sinope, Xenophon is accused of planning to found a colony with the aim of furthering his own name and power. Initially, when word of the venture circulated, the prospect of settling in the Pontus divided the men, but when they learned that Xenophon had been sacrificing in secret the mood turned against him: 'Then Philesius and Lycon got up, both Achaeans, and said that it was terrible for Xenophon in private, not in common with the army, both to be persuading people to stay behind and to be sacrificing on behalf of remaining, while not speaking publicly to the common about these things' (5.6.27).

Xenophon has already explained to the reader his reason for considering establishing a colony (having ample, and skilled, manpower on hand), and has stated that the aim was 'to acquire both land and power for Greece' (καλὸν αὐτῷ ἐδόκει εἶναι χώραν καὶ δύναμιν τῇ Ἑλλάδι προσκτήσασθαι, 5.6.15). He now defends himself to the army, claiming that the sacrifices were made to

³⁸ Erbse, in his important deliberation on the purpose of the work (1966, re-published 2010), writes that the text is a defence of Xenophon's actions in the years 401-399; however, he focuses on only one motivation for this, namely Xenophon's association with Cyrus the Younger, which Erbse considers to be the cause of his exile (2010: 486). This and the next part of the chapter seek to reveal a more complex picture and to unpack the various elements of Xenophon's personal apologetic agenda.

learn 'whether it was better to begin to speak to you and to act about these things or not to touch the matter in any way at all' (5.6.28). He blames the soothsayer, source of the rumour — allegedly because he himself is anxious to return to Greece, for slandering him. As there are ships on route to take them homewards, and two of the other generals, Timasion the Dardanian and Thorax the Boiotian, have secured pay for the men from Black Sea Greek cities, he recommends without reservation that they pursue this course. 'It seems to me a beautiful thing to arrive safe where we wish to go and also to get a salary for our very difficulties' (5.6.31).

However, the matter is not laid to rest. Those who had promised the men money discovered that, because the army had decided to sail away anyway following Xenophon's recommendation, the colonists (the Herakleians) went back on their promise to send money as well as ships. Now they only sent the ships and Timasion and Thorax, 'terrified of the army' (5.6.36), went to Xenophon and proposed that they should arrange for all to sail east to Phasis. Xenophon answered that he would say nothing of the sort to the army. But another general, Neon the Asinaean, spread a rumour that it was he who was planning to lead them back to Phasis, and a menacing atmosphere developed in the camp. Sensing the danger Xenophon summoned an assembly, and in an emotive but methodical speech (1.5 OCT), defended himself against this subsequent charge of deception (5.7.5-12).

The byzantine machinations surrounding their plans in going onwards at Kotyora suggest an even more complex picture than Xenophon paints of events here. Existing tensions between commanders have been intensified by several factors — arguably chief among them the creation of a vacuum by the earlier departure of Kheirisophos at Trapezus — and there may well have been a determined attempt by one, or a group of them in concert, to gain control of the army. Xenophon's comprehensive defence against the charge of deceiving the army is best set in this context of a power struggle in which he, Timasion, Thorax ('who was always doing battle with Xenophon over the generalship', 5.6.25), and Neon, acting in the place of Kheirisophos, were the principal protagonists. It is only at Sinope that the army decides on a sole commander (cf. 6.1.18).

2.2. Hubris. An. 5.8.1

Many of the Ten Thousand were Peloponnesians, and those who eventually did return to Greece will all have had their own stories to tell about the adventure.³⁹ As remarked above, Xenophon, who was probably living in the region in the later part of his life, may have been moved by what was circulating to defend himself. (It could also have been the case that there was something negative in an account by any other author of an 'anabasis', although the case for other versions has not been found persuasive here.) Further evidence for this form of *apologia* is found at Kotyora where, as Xenophon relates, the generals were brought to account for their conduct on the retreat (5.8).⁴⁰ He himself is accused by several of the men of *hubris*, violent assault intended to humiliate the victim: *Ξενοφώντος δὲ κατηγορήσαν τινες φάσκοντες παίσθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ὡς ὑβρίζοντος τὴν κατηγορίαν ἐποιοῦντο* (5.8.1).⁴¹ We must believe that such a charge would have been unsettling for Xenophon, positioning himself as he was through his writing as an important follower of Socrates; it would also have been damaging for his image as a military leader, another area where he was constructing authority by his writings.

Xenophon deals comprehensively with the charge made against him at Kotyora. In an address to the men (5.8.3-12), he methodically questions one of his accusers and demonstrates that his actions against him were entirely justified;⁴² he then proceeds to justify other cases where he beat men on the grounds that discipline was necessary for the good of the army as a whole (5.8.13-22).

³⁹ On the question of the mercenaries' origins see Roy 1967 and 2004, Lee 2007, Brennan 2008. Roy (2004: 280-288) argues that most never returned home, their main objective being to 'stay in employment in Asia Minor' (288). The experience of economic emigrants in more recent times, for example in the case of citizens from Ireland for much of the 20th century, supports this view.

⁴⁰ Xenophon names three other commanders, among them Sophainetos, whom he says was fined for neglect.

⁴¹ Dover defines *hubris* as 'behaviour in which a citizen treats a fellow-citizen as if he were dealing with a slave or a foreigner'. A charge of *hubris* was indictable under Attic law: see Dover (1994: 54) with references to Demosthenes (21.71 ff.), Isokrates (20.2-11), and Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1378^b10-35).

⁴² His accuser, who turned out to be a mule-driver, had tried to bury a man alive in the snow rather than carry him as ordered by Xenophon: 4.5.7-22.

Greatly adding to the sense of authentic self-defence is the undisguised frustration with which he concludes the episode.⁴³

'But I am amazed,' he said, 'that if I am hateful to anyone among you, you recall it and do not stay silent, but if for anyone I lightened the burden of winter, or kept an enemy away, or joined in providing something for one who was weak or at a loss, no one recalls it; nor if I praised someone who acted nobly or if I honoured as well as I was able anyone who was good, you recall nothing of it' (5.8.25).⁴⁴

As a part of the same extraordinary developments at Kotyora related by Xenophon, he tells us, in the passage immediately following the colony episode above (5.7.13-25), of a series of disgraceful events at Kerasos, a Greek city through which the army had passed after leaving Trapezus (for these locations see Appendix I). He describes at length (2 OCT pages) how some of their men had attempted to plunder a friendly village with the intention of making off with their booty on a ship; the survivors of the failed raid subsequently stoned to death representatives of the village who came to see the Greek commanders. We would have expected the recounting of this villainous affair to have come at Kerasos (5.3), but Xenophon delays it in his narrative in order to establish a context in which his own actions on the retreat seem not only appropriate, but of the sort that are absolutely necessary if the army is 'to avoid appearing to be the worst and most contemptible men in the eyes of both gods and men' (5.7.12).⁴⁵ The recounting of the Kerasos passage concludes with the purification of the whole army ('with Xenophon advising it and with the soothsayers joining in this counsel', 5.7.35).⁴⁶

⁴³ For Xenophon expressing exasperation at his treatment by the soldiers see also 7.6.11, 23.

⁴⁴ ἀλλὰ γάρ, ἔφη, θαυμάζω ὅτι εἰ μὲν τιμὴν ὑμῶν ἀπηχθόμεν, μέμνησθε καὶ οὐ σιωπᾶτε, εἰ δὲ τῷ ἢ χειμῶνα ἐπεκούρησα ἢ πολέμιον ἀπήρυξα ἢ ἀσθενοῦντι ἢ ἀποροῦντι συνεξεπόρισά τι, τούτων δὲ οὐδεὶς μέμνηται, οὐδ' εἴ τινα καλῶς τι ποιοῦντα ἐπήνεσα οὐδ' εἴ τινα ἀνδρα ὄντα ἀγαθὸν ἐτίμησα ὡς ἐδυνάμην, οὐδὲν τούτων μέμνησθε. 5.8.25.

⁴⁵ The specific usage of the passage for Xenophon's own purpose is underlined by the fact that his internal audience must already have been aware of the recent events involving their comrades.

⁴⁶ Gwynn 1929, describing this passage as a 'long and ill-proportioned digression', believes that the author originally had it in the natural sequence of events i.e. at 5.4.1,

The effectiveness of Xenophon's defence against the charge at Kotyora is already apparent in the course of his speech: the men shout out that he had struck the man who is accusing him 'too few blows', and when he invites others to say why they were struck, no one comes forward (5.8.12-13). His competence and justice are subsequently affirmed at Sinope (6.1.18-19) when the men approach him to be their sole leader, and again at Byzantium (7.1.21-22) when he is offered the same distinction.

2.3. Corruption. An. 7.6.9-10

Equally as damaging a charge as *hubris* for Xenophon would have been that of *dōrodoxia*: Xenophon the commander enriching himself at his soldiers' expense, Xenophon the moral philosopher acting as an unprincipled brigand. Such an accusation was levelled at him in Thrace in spring 399 after the army, which had spent the winter in the service of a local chief, Seuthes, agreed to enlist with the Spartans in their campaign against Tissaphernes.⁴⁷ Perhaps significantly, the first accuser was a Peloponnesian.⁴⁸

But we, Spartans, would have come to you long ago if Xenophon had not prevailed on us and brought us here, where we have been soldiering day and night through the terrible winter without stopping; and he has the benefits of our toil. For Seuthes has enriched him, while depriving us of our pay. So, as the one speaking first, if I could see this man stoned to death as justice for having dragged us about, I would consider myself to have my pay and would not be aggrieved at all the hard work I have done (7.6.9-10, trans. Ambler, modified).⁴⁹

when the army was leaving Kerasos, but that he later altered the arrangement as part of a response to Sophainetos, who is another of the generals brought to account by the men at Kotyora.

⁴⁷ Seuthes II, a *paradynast* of the Odrysian king, Medocus. See further Stronk 1995: 140 ff. See *Hell.* 3.1.3-6 for the beginnings of the Spartan campaign against Persia.

⁴⁸ An Arkadian. Following his attack, others stood up and made similar charges.

⁴⁹ Ἄλλ' ἡμεῖς μὲν, ὧ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ πάλαι ἂν ἦμεν παρ' ὑμῖν, εἰ μὴ Ξενοφῶν ἡμᾶς δεῦρο πείσας ἀπήγαγεν, ἔνθα δὴ ἡμεῖς μὲν τὸν δεινὸν χειμῶνα στρατευόμενοι καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν οὐδὲν πεπαύμεθα· ὁ δὲ τοὺς ἡμετέρους πόνους ἔχει· καὶ Σεύθης ἐκεῖνον μὲν ἰδίᾳ πεπλοῦτικεν, ἡμᾶς δὲ ἀποστερεῖ τὸν μισθόν· ὥστε [ὃ γε πρῶτος λέγων]

Xenophon's defence against the charge is, again, methodical and thorough. His speech, covering 4.5 pages of OCT, is divided into two parts (7.6.11-32, 33-38). In the first he addresses the army's historic situation, arguing persuasively that, even without pay, they benefitted from their association with Seuthes: without his cavalry they would have been ineffective and vulnerable, but with him they have been able to secure sufficient supplies to survive the winter. Swearing by all the gods and goddesses (θεοὺς ἅπαντας καὶ πάσας), he repudiates the charge of profiteering at the soldiers' expense (7.6.18-19, cf. 7.3.10, 5.2-4).

In the second part of his defence (7.6.33-38) he turns the focus on himself. Having already stated that he had turned back to help the army when he heard they were in difficulty (7.6.11),⁵⁰ he recalls how he had left the men to go home at Byzantium, with their gratitude 'ringing in [his] ears' (7.6.33). The present result of his decision to return and help them is that he has earned the enmity of the Spartans, whom he has disobeyed, and of Seuthes, who has been angered by his persistent advocacy of the soldiers' interests. By acting as a φιλοστρατιώτης he has jeopardised his future in Greece and alienated a potential benefactor. And now he faces the death penalty at the hands of the soldiers.⁵¹

This is Xenophon's immediate defence of himself, its elaborateness both a reflection of the gravity of the charge and a measure of his concern for his reputation. Its apparent success is signalled by the response to it given by a Spartan: here the medium is as important as the (laconic) message: an outsider — not one of the army — and not well disposed to Xenophon, is moved to stand up for him.⁵² 'By the Twin Gods, men, I have to say that personally I do not think

ἐγὼ μὲν εἰ τοῦτον ἴδοιμι καταλευσθέντα καὶ δόντα δίκην ὧν ἡμᾶς περιεῖλκε, καὶ τὸν μισθὸν ἄν μοι δοκῶ ἔχειν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς πεπονημένοις ἄχθεσθαι.

⁵⁰ In contradiction to 7.2.8-9, where Xenophon says that he returned to the army having been pressed to do so by Anaxibios. See Stronk's comment 1995: 260.

⁵¹ Millender (2009: 16) notes that in his lengthy speech Xenophon 'equally calls attention to the harm inflicted on the Cyreans by their fellow Greeks'. She locates his *apologia* in a context of Spartan pursuit of alliances with barbarians to the detriment of other Hellenes (12).

⁵² Xenophon's relations with Spartan officials, rarely represented as cordial on the journey, became notably strained following the arrival of the Ten Thousand at Byzantium. For detail see Part 3 of this chapter.

it is right for you to be angry with this man' (Οὐ τὸ σιώ, ἀλλ' ἔμοι μέντοι οὐ δικάίως δοκεῖτε τῷ ἀνδρὶ τούτῳ χαλεπαίνειν· 7.6.39).

Yet in a certain sense, for the audience this second defence is almost redundant, for it is set within a framework of personal transparency that the author has assiduously built up in the preceding narrative: by the time the charge of corruption is made against him, Xenophon's innocence is already virtually beyond doubt. A selection of examples highlights these foundational blocks of his defence.

7.1.5-6. At the outset of the book Xenophon recounts the detail of his brief encounter at Khrysopolis with Medosades, Seuthes's ambassador, who asks him to help persuade the army to cross to Thrace. 'But the army will cross over,' Xenophon responds, 'so let Seuthes pay neither me nor anyone else on this account' (7.1.6). Later, in the presence of Seuthes and two Greek officers, Xenophon asks the ambassador to confirm the details of the encounter. 'On saying this, he asked Medosades if what he said was true. He said it was' (7.2.25).

7.2.10. Second approach by Seuthes. 'Now Seuthes heard that he [Xenophon] had come back again, and sending Medosades to him by sea, he asked him to bring the army to him, promising him in speech whatever he thought would persuade him. But he [Xenophon] answered that it was not possible for any of this to come to be. So on hearing this, Medosades departed.' Again, at the same meeting with Seuthes, and with Phryniscos the Achaean and Polykrates the Athenian present, Xenophon seeks corroboration. 'At this he again asked Medosades whether he had said this. He assented also to these points' (7.2.26-28).

7.2.17. Considered preparation for going to see Seuthes after the army is prevented by Aristarchos the Spartan from crossing to Asia. 'So when the sacrifices seemed to be propitious both for him and for the army to go safely to Seuthes, Xenophon took Polykrates the Athenian captain, and from each of the generals (except Neon) he took a man whom each trusted.'

7.2.19-30. First meeting with Seuthes. On the Thracian's order Xenophon is only allowed to bring two men into his tower. But before they come to business, Xenophon requests that the others with him are called in: 'Outside is the person most trusted by each of the generals, except Neon the Lakonian. So if, then, you want this transaction to be still more marked by trust, call in also those who are outside' (ἔξω εἰσὶν ἀπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν ὁ πιστότατος ἐκάστῳ πλὴν Νέωνος τοῦ Λακωνικοῦ. εἰ οὖν βούλει πιστοτέραν εἶναι τὴν πράξιν, καὶ ἐκείνους κάλεσαι, 7.2.30).

7.3.7. Xenophon brings the army to Seuthes. 'On seeing [Seuthes], Xenophon bade him ride up, so he could say to him what seemed advantageous with as many as possible listening.'

The narrative prior to the corruption charge is, furthermore, marked by its careful, detached recording of the army's relationship with Seuthes. The impression is that the convergence between the Greeks and Seuthes has come about more by fate than design, an end achieved by the author's setting out of a chain of events which lead to the army joining Seuthes: he makes clear that it is only when the Spartans refused to let the men cross into Asia (7.2.12-13), and only after sacrifices had proven favourable (7.2.17), that he went to see Seuthes, this with a view to securing the army's survival through the winter. When Seuthes has made his offer, Xenophon reports that anyone who wished to do so was allowed to speak. 'And many spoke in the same vein, that what Seuthes had said was of the greatest value. His proposals were exactly what they needed: now that it was winter, those who wanted to sail back home could not do so; there was no way they could survive in friendly territory if they had to buy the necessities of life; and it would be safer for them to spend time and get their food in hostile territory with Seuthes than on their own. The fact that they were going to get paid, on top of all these advantages, was generally held to be a lucky bonus' (7.3.13).

The same systematic approach is evident in the author's construction of his friendship with Seuthes. At their first meeting Seuthes refers to the kinship between Athenians and Thracians (7.2.31), so establishing a filial basis for the friendship between the two men (cf. Thucydides 2.29). This link is subsequently

emphasised when he suggests they adopt 'Athena' as the watchword for the two forces (7.3.39). Xenophon highlights the appropriateness of the bond from his own perspective by representing Seuthes as a noble figure: a man who is in search of justice, and who has taken measures to be self-sufficient (7.2.32-4). Other civilised qualities attributed to him by Xenophon include the ability to hold drink (7.3.35) and a sound knowledge of Greek (7.6.8).⁵³ Xenophon and Seuthes formally establish their guest-friendship by 'giving and receiving the hand-clasp of friendship' (7.3.1).⁵⁴

Nonetheless, and for all its considered construction, the matter of Xenophon's dealings with Seuthes during his time in Thrace transpires not to have been as straightforward as portrayed. After the Cyreans have enlisted with Sparta, Xenophon is sent to Seuthes by the new employers to try to recover the pay due to the mercenaries (7.7.20). In a lengthy speech (4.5 pages OCT) he dwells on the fact of their friendship, and details how he has acted in Seuthes's interests throughout. In so doing, Xenophon underlines the honourable nature of his relationship with the Thracian, making the possibility of corruption seem implausible. Seuthes's response — anger at the person who was responsible for the payment not being made — re-establishes his credentials as a just man, one whom it would be suitable for Xenophon to be on terms of friendship with.⁵⁵ However, during the speech, Xenophon does seem to own up to receiving gifts from Seuthes: 'You, however, even before I served you in any way, received me with pleasure evident in your eyes, your voice, and your gifts of hospitality' (σὺ δὲ πρὶν μὲν ὑπηρετῆσαι τί σοι ἐμὲ ἐδέξω ἠδέως καὶ ὄμμασι καὶ φωνῇ καὶ ξενίοις, 7.7.46). As Azoulay points out, *xeniois* here must be translated as 'hospitality

⁵³ Xenophon's tendency to blur constructed boundaries between Greek and barbarian has been remarked upon in the last chapter; see further Part 3.

⁵⁴ Cf. Herman 1987: 18, Stronk 1995: 198, Azoulay 2004: 291.

⁵⁵ The reason for the absence of due monies is laid at the door of Herakleides, a Greek from Maroneia who has the confidence, and holds the purse strings, of Seuthes. Xenophon clashed angrily with him over the amount of money he claims to have received from the sale of booty earned by the army (7.5.4-5): it as a result of the underpayment that Xenophon falls out both with the army and with Seuthes. *Money trail*: 7.4.2, Herakleides sent by Seuthes to Perinthos to sell booty taken from ravaged territories; 7.5.4-6, the money is sufficient only to make a part payment to the men; Xenophon, with an oath, derides the paymaster, so earning his enmity; 7.6.41, Herakleides is accused of stealing the money in front of an assembly of the Greeks and promptly slips away with Seuthes.

gifts' and not 'hospitality'.⁵⁶ Xenophon in the end is thus owning up to receiving material benefit from Seuthes, but within the sphere of guest-friendship, in which it has a traditional legitimacy. He is adamant throughout that he did not receive *dōra*, gifts that would count as attempts at corruption.⁵⁷

The fineness of this distinction may have been lost on the men — who were convinced that he had received *dōra* from Seuthes (ἔφασαν δέ με καὶ δῶρα ἔχειν παρὰ σοῦ, 7.7.44) — and formed the earlier grounds for their accusation against him. Xenophon himself, in what is perhaps a vindictive swipe, has earlier named other commanders who did receive gifts, so there is real reason for the men to be suspicious about the goings-on with Seuthes.⁵⁸ Xenophon's plea to Seuthes to pay the men's wages through him (7.7.49) (an act that would improve his standing among the soldiers), and indeed this long speech in general, seems to show that his earlier elaborate efforts at defusing the bribes issue have not ultimately had the desired effect. The affair invites reconsideration of a prior episode in which Xenophon is suspected of 'persuading' a soothsayer to pronounce an unfavourable reading of victims (καί τινες ἐτόλμων λέγειν ὡς ὁ Ξενοφῶν βουλόμενος τὸ χωρίον οἰκίσαι πέπεικε τὸν μάντιν λέγειν ὡς τὰ ἱερὰ οὐ γίγνεται ἐπὶ ἀφόδῳ, 6.4.14). Does this reveal a prior suspicion of bribery on his part? In the end one is left with the feeling that Xenophon is not disclosing everything about his dealings with Seuthes, and that this defence, notwithstanding its length and detail, is not his most effective.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Azoulay 2004: 294.

⁵⁷ The gradual replacement of the clan by the polis as the paramount social unit is the context against which these tensions should be seen. We might see the beginnings of this transformation in Pericles' efforts to undermine and counter the aristocratic power base of Kimon (see Plutarch, *Pericles* 7.3, 9.2-4); judging from a speech Xenophon has Agesilaos make to Pharnabazos in 395 (*Hell.* 4.1.34), the marginalising of *xenia* culture must have been almost completed by the early fourth century. Cf. Herman (1987: 7) who remarks: 'when seen from the perspective of the community, gift-exchange with an outsider - the essential characteristic of guest-friendship - could appear as bribery. The antithetical notion of abstinence from accepting gifts became the mark of the ideal citizen.'

⁵⁸ 'The generals were in disagreement: Kleanor and Phryniskos wished to lead the army to Seuthes, for he persuaded them, and gave a horse to one and a woman to the other' (οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἐστασίαζον, Κλεάνωρ μὲν καὶ Φρυνίσκος πρὸς Σεύθην βουλόμενοι ἄγειν· ἔπειθε γὰρ αὐτούς, καὶ ἔδωκε τῷ μὲν ἵππον, τῷ δὲ γυναῖκα, 7.2.2, trans. Ambler, modified).

⁵⁹ Another basis for suspicion (and anger) on the part of the soldiers against Xenophon, and one which could have been the touch paper for the corruption charge, was his behaviour at the dinner hosted by Seuthes (7.3.15-33). Here Herakleides tells

2.4. The Spectre of the Mercenary

As is the case today, mercenaries in the ancient world were not highly thought of.⁶⁰ Traditionally, cities defended themselves with their citizenry and did not rely on paid troops, outsiders or otherwise. However in the course of the fourth century, with economies monetised and ever greater numbers of hoplites taking up military service abroad, the practice came to be widely accepted as a feature of Greek society;⁶¹ this did not extend to the elite classes, for whom any wage-earning (which implied dependence and susceptibility to corruption) was considered dishonourable. For an aristocrat, hiring himself and his arms out for pay was a dire measure, and Xenophon the *hippeus* will have wanted to distance himself from *misthos* relationships with both Cyrus and Seuthes. This, it is argued here, is a further strand of his personal *apologia*, one that was probably directed at readers from his own social class.⁶²

Xenophon deals directly with the nature of his relationship with Cyrus. At the point of his character's introduction to the story he makes it explicit that he did not join the prince for military service: 'Among the Greeks there was one Xenophon, an Athenian, who followed the army neither as a general nor a captain nor a common soldier' (Ἦν δέ τις ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ Ξενοφῶν Ἀθηναῖος, ὃς

Xenophon and the other guests that they should give what gifts they can in order to gain the dynast's favour (7.3.16-18; for this Thracian custom see also Thucydides 2.97.4); Xenophon is dismayed, 'for he had come across from Parium with nothing, save a boy and enough for the road' (7.3.20). When his turn comes at the banquet, he stands up, slightly drunk (ὑποπεπωκώς), and declares at length that he is enthusiastically placing (δίδωμι) himself and his companions at Seuthes's service (7.3.29-31). This declaration might not have been well received by the other Greeks at the dinner. The men were not subjects and their leaders were such by their gift: Xenophon may be acknowledging such a mistake by recording the embarrassing episode, excusing it on the grounds of inebriation. (For interest, Xenophon and Seuthes probably crossed paths one more time after the Cyreans had left for Asia: in the spring of 398 the Greeks travelled back to Thrace with Derkylidas who was hosted there by Seuthes. See *Hell.* 3.2.9.)

⁶⁰ Cf. Plato, *Laws* 630b, 697e; Isocrates, *On the Peace* 46, *Ep.* 9.8-9; Demosthenes, *First Phillipic* 46; Aeneas Tacticus, *On Siegecraft* 11.14, 12.3; Aristotle *Nic. Eth.* 3.89.

⁶¹ See Trundle 2005 on the increase in mercenary numbers in the fourth century.

⁶² The literature on mercenaries in the ancient world is extensive; as a chronicle of mercenary service, *Anabasis* is a uniquely important source for ancient historians working on the subject. In this section my focus is on Xenophon and his self-representation: I do not seek to evaluate the information he provides about service for pay, or the related network of reciprocal friendships. For studies on the political and social history of mercenaries see notably Trundle 2004, Roy 1967, Griffith 1935, Parke 1933.

οὔτε στρατηγὸς οὔτε λοχαγὸς οὔτε στρατιώτης ὧν συνηκολούθει, 3.1.4, trans. Ambler, modified).⁶³ In the same passage he implies that his reason for joining was out of admiration for the personal qualities of the prince, a motive which later finds an echo at 6.4.8 (on this passage see above Chapter 1.6).⁶⁴ Regarding money, there is no indication through the course of the marches that he is seeking any, or that he is in need of maintenance;⁶⁵ in fact we learn he has come from Athens well-resourced, this being implied in his report of how he formed a cavalry for the retreating army: 'I see too there are horses in the army, some mine...' (ὁρῶ δὲ ἵππους ὄντας ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι, τοὺς μὲν τινας παρ' ἐμοί...3.3.19, trans. Ambler, modified).⁶⁶

In the same passage Xenophon explains why, although deceived about the purpose of the expedition, he nonetheless continued: 'when they came to Kilikia, however, it then seemed clear to all that the expedition was against the King. Although they feared the journey and were unwilling, the majority nevertheless followed along out of shame both before each other and before Cyrus. Xenophon too was one of these' (3.1.10). After Cyrus has been killed in Babylonia, the Greeks are forced to embark on a journey of survival, and Xenophon plays a key part in its success. Notably, when eventually they reach

⁶³ 1.8.15 may contradict this statement: Xenophon approaches Cyrus on the *battlefield* to learn if he has any announcements to make prior to the engagement (on the intention of this vignette see 3.3.1.2 below). Also, the election of new officers following the seizure of the generals by the Greater Zab River warrants some consideration. Upon awakening from his dream, Xenophon summons together the captains of Proxenos (3.1.15) in order to decide on a plan of action; he makes himself available to lead, and is readily accepted as leader (3.1.25-26, 3.1.47). Xenophon was clearly a part of Proxenos' contingent, and clearly the captains regarded him as an integral part of their unit and someone in whom they were prepared to entrust command (cf. Anderson 1974: 117, and Lee 2007: 54). The implication is that he may have been more than, as Stronk has put it, 'a gentlemanly kind of hanger-on of Proxenos' (2009: 5). As against this, however, Kheirisophos, commending Xenophon for his rallying speech to the officers, says that all he had previously known about him was that he was an Athenian (3.1.45): I owe this last point to LaForse 2005: 22.

⁶⁴ Azoulay (2004: 299) contends that it was his ties of friendship with Proxenos that led Xenophon to join Cyrus.

⁶⁵ Except for 1.8.15, Xenophon is completely absent from the march up-country with Cyrus. This representation of himself as a mere implied presence ensures that he cannot be explicitly associated with the several episodes involving demands for pay: cf. 1.2.11, soldiers demanding money from Cyrus; 1.3, strike at Tarsus; 1.4.12, the men refuse to proceed unless given more money. His absence also serves to reinforce his claim that he did not follow the army in a military capacity.

⁶⁶ At 4.2.20 Xenophon refers to his shield bearer (ὑπασπιστής), a further indicator that he had not come without resources. Cf. Chapter 1.3 above.

the straits of the Bosphoros, in sight of what Xenophon terms the first Greek city (Byzantium), he announces that he wishes to leave (7.1.4).⁶⁷ The objective of safety which he had set down on the banks of the Greater Zab River has now been achieved and he has no further responsibility to the men: 'And then it was over the kingship of Cyrus that you were brave men, but now [after the seizure of the generals], when the contest is over your salvation (τῆς ὑμετέρας σωτηρίας), it is surely very fitting that you be both better and more eager' (3.2.15). This declaration is a delineation of the nature of his association with the Ten Thousand, and is the background against which his later service with Seuthes is to be read. Having gone and left the army at Byzantium, he returns to assist the force when he hears it is in trouble, finally leading it to Seuthes, whom he judges to afford the best chance of survival through the winter. On the matter of payment from the army's new employer he is pointedly indifferent; typically, after Seuthes has made his offer to the men and they are digesting the terms, Xenophon is thinking of their future safety. 'How far from the sea will you expect the army to follow you?' (7.3.12).

Throughout the text Xenophon distinguishes between himself and the mercenary body by showing that *he* is not motivated by personal enrichment. At Tarsus the men continue with Cyrus when they are granted an increase in pay (1.3.21), whereas Xenophon continues because he believes it is the honourable thing to do (3.1.10);⁶⁸ when he thinks of founding a city on the Black Sea coast, it is not with a view to increasing his own wealth and power, but that of Hellas (καλὸν αὐτῷ ἐδόκει εἶναι χώραν καὶ δύναμιν τῇ Ἑλλάδι προσκτήσασθαι πόλιν κατοικίσαντας, 5.6.15); he turns down the opportunity to become sole leader of the army (6.1.25-31), and to become tyrant of Byzantium (7.1.21-31), in both cases there being a clear indication that he would have personally benefited

⁶⁷ First Greek city: 7.1.29. Xenophon has referred to cities along the Black sea coast as being Greek, but he regards these as being outside the Hellenic world (Trapezus 4.8.22, Kerasos 5.3.2, Kotyora 5.5.3, Herakleia 6.2.1): cf. 6.1.17 at Harmene, the port of Sinope, where they are 'near to Greece', and 6.5.23 in Bithynia, where they are at the very 'gates of Greece'.

⁶⁸ At 3.1.10 Xenophon writes that 'the majority (οἱ πολλοὶ)...followed along out of shame both before each other and before Cyrus', but this contradicts the account he has earlier given at Tarsus, where it is implied that the men assented to go on only when an increase in their wage was granted (1.3.18-21).

from the position;⁶⁹ when Seuthes invites him to take something from the proceeds of the sale of plunder in Thrace, he declines and tells him to give the pick to the officers who are with him, who duly take up this offer (7.5.3-4); again, when the Thracian finally furnished the army with pay, Xenophon, who is central to the transaction, pointedly did not take anything for himself or become involved in the distribution of the booty (7.7.48-57).

A further degree of separation from the mercenaries is achieved through the way in which Xenophon controls them as one of their leaders: by deflecting the body from its course at critical junctures, he disrupts its natural tendency, thereby showing himself to be an alien — if benign — force attached to it, rather than being a part of it.⁷⁰ For example, at Kotyora when the men become severely agitated by rumours that they are going to be led east on ships to the Phasis, foreseeing dire consequences, Xenophon 'decided to convene an assembly of them as quickly as possible and not to allow them to gather spontaneously' (5.7.2-3). Again at Byzantium, after the soldiers, deceived by the Spartans, force their way angrily back in to the city, Xenophon, 'fearing that the army might turn to plundering and that there might arise incurable evils for the city, for himself, and for the soldiers, [he] ran over and raced inside the gates with the crowd' (7.1.18)...

When the soldiers saw Xenophon, many raced up to him and said, 'Now it is possible for you to become a man, Xenophon. You have a city, you have triremes, you have money, and you have men in such numbers. Now then, if you should wish, you would benefit us, and we would make you great.' And he answered, 'You speak well, and I will do so too. But if you desire this, fall into order and ground your weapons as quickly as possible,' he said, wishing to calm them. And he himself

⁶⁹ Ironically, the reason that the men tried to persuade Xenophon to be their supreme commander is that they considered it would be easier to score booty with him in charge (6.1.17-18); on the Byzantium episode see below.

⁷⁰ Xenophon's concern with the matter of how to manage mercenary soldiers was explored in the previous chapter. Cf. Tuplin (2007a: 28): 'The message is that, unless they are exceptionally well led and controlled, mercenaries are dangerous in general and therefore, in particular, a dangerous tool for the liberation of Greek subjects of Persia'. Xenophon's concern with the management of mercenaries, and the apologetic purpose suggested here, are not mutually exclusive.

passed the word and bade the others pass it and ground their weapons (7.1.21-22).

The tone of the speech which follows (7.1.25-31) underscores the essentially paternalist nature of his relationship with the men,⁷¹ while its content — a spelling out of the consequences of rebellion, and an attempt to kindle the patriotism of the soldiers — affirms that Xenophon's concerns extend beyond his personal sphere of interest.⁷²

At the conclusion of the book Xenophon closes his defence on the question of mercenary status by referring to his then impoverished circumstances:

From there they sailed to Lampsakos...and Eukleides asked him how much gold he had. Swearing an oath, he told him it would not even be sufficient for his trip home, if he should not sell his horse and what he had with him, but Eukleides did not believe him (7.8.1-2).

The promise of neat closure is, however, seemingly denied by the odd pronouncement that he was not believed by the soothsayer, Eukleides (ὁ δ' αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐπίστευε). A number of explanations are possible. It could be a clever way by Xenophon of showing that he did have gold — and probably quite a lot of it (cf. 5.3.4-7) — but that this was sacred money, of no significance for his own welfare. He has earlier emphasised that he had earned nothing from his time with the Cyreans in Asia: 'for he had come across from Parium [to Thrace, having been on his way from Byzantium to Greece with Anaxibios] with nothing but a boy and money enough for his travelling expenses' (7.3.20). The reaction

⁷¹ In his *apologia* speech for the corruption charge made against him in Thrace, Xenophon recalls that the men even called him 'father', and promised to remember him always as benefactor: ἀλλὰ καὶ πατέρα ἐμὲ ἐκαλεῖτε καὶ αἰεὶ ὡς εὐεργέτου μεμνήσεσθαι ὑπισχνείσθε (7.6.38).

⁷² It may be remarked that Xenophon's controlling of the mercenary body in some ways mirrors Pericles' effective handling of the Athenians in the 430s: both men, riding accusations of corruption, succeed in steering their respective constituencies, not being led by their wishes and demands. Xenophon's actions also call to mind literary models, notably Odysseus and the compassion he shows for his hapless crew on their ill-fated attempts to return home; Xenophon alludes to this Homeric text twice in the course of the retreat (3.2.25, 5.1.2).

of the soothsayer could also be taken as representative (or prophetic) of a view in the Hellenic world that the Ten Thousand had taken a substantial amount of booty on their long march home. Xenophon may be indicating wearily that, even as he sets out for home, he is facing a prejudice that he may never overcome; if this is the case, then it is ironic that he immediately furnishes grounds for this by reporting on how he led a raiding party against a Persian aristocrat and secured a large amount of booty for himself and his friends (7.8.8-23). Moreover, he has now transgressed his own carefully cultivated aversion to personal profit built up through the course of the book.⁷³

However, this final Xenophonic twist may be accommodated within the wider context of his own moral outlook, in this instance via the virtue of self-sufficiency, one of the qualities on which he places a premium in his writings (cf. *Kyn.* 2.1, *Mem.* 1.1.9), and through the implementation of justice, this last suggested by the circumstances of the raid, the target being a barbarian of great (excess) wealth — some or all of which is doubtless owed to exploitation of the indigenous Greek population — and the booty taken then shared amongst loyal mercenaries. As is argued in Part 3, the episode could also be a part of the continuity between Xenophon's separate services in Asia, functioning to rule out poverty as the reason he joined the Spartan campaign against Tissaphernes.⁷⁴

Conclusions

It is evident from his account that Xenophon was defending himself against serious attacks on his character. The space, thought, and craftsmanship which he deployed in his defence is sufficient to show that *Anabasis* was not a whimsical exercise in self-promotion.

⁷³ Greeks considered it admirable for a person who was in great need to remain poor rather than seek to alleviate his situation through dishonourable or dishonest means (Dover 1994: 171 with references).

⁷⁴ Bradley (2001: 81-83) suggests that the ending is intended to be anti-climactic so that the reader is prompted to construct his own closure to the story, namely that Xenophon's *nostos* has been thwarted by the exile decree against him. See Section 3.3.3 below.

The charges against him considered in this part — deceiving the soldiers, hubris, corruption, and service for profit — were particularly damaging to a man whose writings promote virtuous conduct; that he should go to lengths to refute the charges and justify his actions is a reflection of the depth of his concern about what was being said, in whatever form. (It can be remarked that if the charges had never received wide circulation, he would hardly have brought them up at all.) The elaborate structure of his defence in Book 7 is especially remarkable and raises the question whether this section would have been written at all were it not for the corruption charge. It is, nonetheless, connected to the preceding body of the work through its continuation of several prominent themes and concerns; notably, Xenophon uses the emergence of the Cyreans into the Greek world to expand his commentary on the reality of Spartan hegemony.

Two points should be highlighted with regard to Xenophon's defence in Book 7. Firstly, his speeches in the form given were probably never delivered on the march (this applies to the other books as well). While he very likely did give answers to the men on the subject of the charges, these were surely not on the scale or detail of the speeches which he includes in his narrative. There are a number of factors which support this, the most obvious being that, had they been delivered in the form presented, stories of misconduct by him would hardly have subsequently gained the currency they seem to have done. Nor would it have been feasible for his speeches to have been delivered to the greater body of the army; typically, speeches in theatre must have been brief, and communicated down the line by word of mouth (cf. *Lak.* 13.9).⁷⁵ Secondly, for all

⁷⁵ However, Thucydides does make a point of telling us how Pericles at the Kerameikos mounted a specially constructed high platform (ἐπὶ βῆμα ὑψηλὸν) 'so that he could be heard as far among the crowd as possible' (2.34.8). For discussion of the physical and environmental factors in warfare see Keegan 1976; Aldrete (2008) outlines impediments in the hypothetical case of a force not greatly dissimilar in size to that of the Cyreans plus camp-followers: 'Consider an ancient army of 20,000 or more soldiers gathered together to hear their general's speech. Assuming that the men were not muttering among themselves, could even the most quietly attentive hoplite or legionary situated somewhere in the middle of these massed ranks have really heard anything but intermittent snatches of his general's words over the incessant background noise of the clinking and jangling of the men's armor and weapons as they shifted uncomfortably in their full battle equipment...? Finally, how many of his men could the general reach with his unamplified voice? The usual limit on projecting coherent complex speech with the human voice is around 100 yards in the direction in

its considered construction and polish, the defence is not without blemish; for example, at several points Xenophon furnishes contradictory information: at 7.2.8 he says that Anaxibios ordered him back to the army, but in his defence speech he states that he returned because he had heard the men were in difficulties (7.6.11). In the same speech (7.6.12) he says that Seuthes sent for him many times (πολλοὺς ἀγγέλους πρὸς ἐμὲ πέμποντος), but in the narrative he records only two such occasions (7.1.5 and 7.2.10).

PART 3. DEFENDING HIMSELF AGAINST PHILOBARBARISM AND LACONISM

Like much else in his life, Xenophon's relationship with his native city was not straightforward. He grew up in a time of turmoil, and was aligned with the pro-Spartan side which was defeated in the brief but bitter civil war that followed the Peloponnesian War.⁷⁶ His political orientation may have been a factor in his departure from the city in 401; and as was argued in Chapter 1 (5.2), it may well have been the underlying reason for the decree of exile passed against him at some time in the 390s. He himself refers incidentally to the exile decree in *Anabasis* (5.3.7, 7.7.57), and some consider that in this work he is answering the charge(s) against him, whatever this may have been.⁷⁷ This is without doubt the case, though I believe that his pathway is a systematic defence of his character and actions rather than emphasis on any specific charge. Xenophon would have regarded the banishment as a stain on his character, but it would be

which a speaker is facing.' See also MacDowell 2009: 5, and most recently Anson 2010, with focus on the delivery of pre-battle speeches.

⁷⁶ Xenophon can probably be placed in the Kimonian philo-laconian tradition at Athens, whose adherents will not have welcomed Pericles' prosecution of the war with Sparta.

⁷⁷ See Erbse 2010: 486, Breitenbach 1967: 1646, Humble 2002: 80. Xenophon's statement at 7.7.57 that the decree at that point had not yet been passed (οὐ γάρ πω ψήφος αὐτῷ ἐπῆκτο Ἀθήνησι περὶ φυγῆς) rules out the late 400s as a possible date. The decree could have been rescinded by the time he was writing the work; Dillery thinks it was still in effect in 371 (1995: 94; see also 2007: 61), with a number of writers believing it was revoked not long afterwards (cf. *New Pauly*, 'Xenophon'). This view finds support in the facts of Xenophon's sons fighting for Athens in the 360s, and the (probable) publication of *Hipparkhikos* (a work which seeks to aid Athenian military efficiency) in that decade. See further Chapter 1.5.

typical of him to engage with the decree indirectly, undermining its content with substantial contrary evidence.⁷⁸

It is apt to remark that disdain is a feature of Xenophon's mindset, being one of his favoured ways of putting down an individual, or diminishing the importance of an event. His disdain can be expressed directly, through a personal attitude or the action of a character, or more frequently, indirectly through simple omission. For the former case, see for instance *Hell.* 4.5.6, where Agesilaos deliberately ignores the Boiotian embassy;⁷⁹ an example of omission is the author's apparent failure to comment on claims that Derkylidas was of a savage temperament (cf. Ephoros, *FGrH* 70.71). Xenophon's silence here is not only a historical judgement but an expression of his own attitude to such charges against the Spartan general's character. Notable also is his omission in *Anabasis* of any detail regarding the composition of the barbarian contingent of Cyrus's force. This is in contrast with the care he has taken to describe the Greeks and their respective contingents. The information which he does provide — that they numbered 'one hundred thousand', together with 'about twenty scythe-bearing chariots' (1.7.10) — clearly communicates the idea of a numberless horde.

While on first consideration the apologetic content of *Anabasis* promises to reveal its audience, the oblique nature of much of the *apologia* and the rich thematic variety of the text complicate this linkage. Moreover, Xenophon can target a particular group whilst seeming to address a broader one (see, for instance, my reading of *An.* 1.8.15 in Section 3.1.2 below). This being said, while nowhere in the text is it made explicit, there are a number of specific instances and representations which collectively enable the assertion to be

⁷⁸ Thomas (2009: xviii) offers an alternative take on Xenophon's attitude to his exile: 'it is interesting to note that Xenophon never expresses bitterness about his exile, so presumably he accepted that he had done something to deserve it'. Lipka (2002: 4) says: 'The banishment left no trace in Xenophon's writings; he remained the Athenian who admired Sparta but did not reject Athens.' In general, as noted at Chapter 1.6 (conclusions), Xenophon is not forthcoming on matters concerned with his personal life.

⁷⁹ Cf. Thucydides 7.3, where the Athenians ignore the proposal brought by an enemy herald on Syracuse and send him back without an answer.

made that he is writing to the Athenians, or at least that it is his fellow countrymen whom he sees as being, as it were, in the front row.⁸⁰

3.1. XENOPHON'S AUDIENCE: TO THE ATHENIANS

In substantiating the argument that the core audience for Xenophon's personal defence is Athens, my departure point has been to consider, with regard to his actions after his departure from the city in May 401, what might have been considered *prodosia* by the citizen body?⁸¹ There seems to be two outstanding bases for such a charge:

- 1.) His (brief) association with Cyrus the Younger, and
- 2.) His links with Sparta

In Sections 3.2 and 3.3 I show that the text contains substantial evidence for *apologia* on both of these counts respectively. Through his studied representation of characters, and of his own relations with them, Xenophon convincingly removes grounds for suspicion against himself on these sensitive political matters. In the present section evidence which points to his countrymen as being his intended audience is highlighted. This section also reveals a further element of Xenophon's apologetic agenda — his defence of an institution, the

⁸⁰ From an analysis of *Lak. and Agesilaos*, Cuniberti (2009: 2) has argued that Xenophon's works were written on two levels for two audiences that are simultaneously meant but distinctly managed: Spartans and Greeks. Seeing the condition of exile as a major determiner in his writings, he writes: 'In a word, it seems to me that Xenophon provides an early symbolic example of the decline of the *polis* as a close and self-referential literary background. Obviously I do not mean to say that, until Xenophon's time, literary works did not move beyond the *polis* in which they had been written, but it is surely true that the author, especially the Athenian one, when thinking about his own reader (listener), had in front of him above all his fellow citizens and that these represented the primary reference audience. This is certainly not how it was for Xenophon.' *Contra* Erbse (2010: 486) who writes that the work is 'directed by Xenophon to the Athenian reading public'. See further Kelly 1996 who makes a distinction between public and private literature, and argues that Xenophon's historical writing was intended for the latter, 'small circles that listened to readings and joined in discussions' (157). These would be what might be termed upper class gatherings.

⁸¹ Xenophon himself in *Hellenika* (1.7.20-22) furnishes an indication of the legal environment for such charges; the law that may be applicable - 'for sacrilegious people and traitors' - states that 'if someone betrays the city and or steals sacred property, he is to be judged in court, and if he is found guilty, his property is to be confiscated and he is not to be buried in Attica'. It may be that those found guilty *in absentia* were exiled. On Xenophon's exile see Chapter 1.5.2.

hippeis, belonging to his social class. Given the probable lateness of publication it seems that his aim in this was most likely of a promotional nature, though he may have retained a bitterness about the treatment of the horsemen following the restoration of the democracy at Athens (cf. for instance, *Hell.* 3.1.4). In defending the horsemen, Xenophon is, of course, also defending himself.

3.1.1. Emphasis on *Polis* Identity

An. 3.1.4. Formal Introduction. Xenophon begins his formal introduction of his character to the story, Ἦν δέ τις ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ Ξενοφῶν Ἀθηναῖος (3.1.4). At the outset he is emphasising who he is, thereby inviting the interest of his fellow countrymen. The call to an Athenian audience is repeated by the author's situating of the genesis of his story in Athens, and by his involving in it of one of the city's most outstanding figures: ὁ μέντοι Ξενοφῶν ἀναγνοῦς τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἀνακοινοῦται Σωκράτει τῷ Ἀθηναίῳ περὶ τῆς πορείας (3.1.5).⁸² A related possibility is that Xenophon is calling to mind the trial of Socrates, in that the episode deftly defends against the charges that were made against him: Xenophon, a young man, shows prudence and forethought in seeking out advice, and the advice he receives is conventionally pious (Socrates recommends he go to Delphi and take counsel with the god about the journey).⁸³ See Chapter 4 for the development of this argument.

5.3.5. Athenian treasury at Delphi. Out of his share of booty won on the march, Xenophon informs his readers that he set up a votive offering to Apollo in the Athenian sanctuary at Delphi (5.3.5); if he was already an exile at this time (he probably visited in 394, in the company of Agesilaos, cf. *Hell.* 4.3.21), the act would have an enhanced significance.

⁸² Dillery (1995: 72) comments on the passage: 'The story-teller introduction functions, as it does elsewhere in Xenophon, to suggest the fortuitous nature of a moment of great historical importance, since the modest, inconspicuous manner of introducing the subject has the effect of drawing notice to it' (1995: 72).

⁸³ Cf. *Kyro.* 3.1.38-40: it has been suggested that in this story of an Armenian sophist who is killed by the king for corrupting his son, Xenophon is making an allusion to the death of Socrates and hence addressing the work to an Athenian audience (Gera 1993: 24).

3.1.45, 4.6.16, 6.2.10, 7.2.19, 7.2.31. 'Xenophon of Athens'. In each of the cited instances Xenophon is addressed, or referred to, as an Athenian: 3.1.45, by Kheirisophos the Spartan; 4.6.16, by Kheirisophos; 6.2.10, by Kallimachos the Parrhasian and Lykon the Akhaian; 7.2.19, by Thracian guards; 7.2.31, by Seuthes. The inference from this fairly regular pattern is that Xenophon does not seek to hide or play down his background, while at the same time, showing confidence in his status, he is not over-anxious to press his identity.

6.1.20. Xenophon sees his name esteemed at home. When offered sole leadership of the army at Sinope Xenophon writes that he was stirred to take the role when he thought how it would 'obtain greater honour for himself in the eyes of his friends' and how 'his own name would be greater when it should arrive in the city' (καὶ εἰς τὴν πόλιν τοῦνομα μεῖζον ἀφίξεσθαι αὐτοῦ, 6.1.20). In not actually naming Athens Xenophon indicates how fixed he is in his *polis* identity.

7.7.57. Desire to go home. Once he feels he has no further responsibility to the army, Xenophon says that he wants to sail away, ἀποπλεῖν (6.2.15; cf. also 7.1.4, 7.1.8, 7.1.38). His destination, as he makes explicit towards the end, is his city: Ξενοφῶν δὲ οὐ προσήει, ἀλλὰ φανερός ἦν οἴκαδε παρασκευαζόμενος· οὐ γάρ πω ψῆφος αὐτῷ ἐπῆκτο Ἀθήνησι περὶ φυγῆς (7.7.57). Notable also is his speech by the Greater Zab River (3.2.8-32), in which he expresses concern about the danger to the Greeks of remaining in Asia: 'But I fear that once we learned to live lazily and to pass our lives amid abundance, and to consort with the tall, beautiful women and maidens of the Medes and Persians, like the lotus eaters, we would forget our way home' (3.2.25). Bradley argues that in fact the story of Xenophon's *nostos* is the core plot-line of the story, discernible already in Socrates' concern about the implications at Athens of his becoming involved with Cyrus.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ Bradley 2001: 78 and 77.

3.1.2. Emphasis on Social Identity: A Class Defence

1.8.15. Xenophon rides out to see Cyrus. Prior to his formal introduction to the story, Xenophon has made several brief appearances in the narrative. The first is in Babylonia, and he is on horseback, riding out from the ranks to consult Cyrus before the battle at Kounaxa. At the very first he impresses his identity as a *hippeus*, a member of the Athenian aristocratic class of 'knights'.

In the light of 3.1.4 (Xenophon's formal introduction), it is tempting to read this first appearance as a quiet assertion of loyalty to class above city. The form of the interjection is subtle enough to avoid alienating the wider citizen body, and in any case his implied association is with an Athenian institution. In the episode Xenophon is, literally, positioning himself in a commanding role, thus reflecting kudos on his native city as well as his social class. He may, further, intend his readership to make a connection with Alkibiades. In Thucydides 6.16.1, justifying his assertion that he has a better claim to command than others (προσῆκει μοι μᾶλλον ἐτέρων, ὧ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄρχειν), Alkibiades cites his recent success in the chariot race at Olympia: in his speech to the Athenians he explicitly associates horsemanship with power and with his own credentials for leadership. In making this allusion Xenophon is foreshadowing his own claim to lead the army at the Greater Zab River.

3.3.16-20. Formation of cavalry. Following his appointment as one of the army's leaders, one of Xenophon's first tactical initiatives is to form a cavalry. An Athenian, Lykios, is appointed commander (3.3.20). Through the course of the arduous retreat, the cavalry plays a conspicuous part in securing the survival of the army. Its capacity to scout and skirmish proves especially beneficial to the force.⁸⁵ The presence and effectiveness of the cavalry grant Athens and her *hippeis* an important role on the retreat, though she has not nearly as many men as other *poleis* represented on the march.

⁸⁵ Cf. Xenophon at 7.6.29: 'And after the cavalry unit was attached to us, we never even saw an enemy. Until then, our enemies followed confidently after us, and with their horsemen and peltasts they prevented us from scattering anywhere in small groups to provide provisions in greater abundance'.

4.7.22-24. 'The Sea, the Sea!' Just as he has entered the story on horseback at a critical juncture, at a later pivotal moment in the march Xenophon features on his mount. Responding to the noise from the front of the army, he and Lykios and the cavalry gallop forward to assist in what they assume to be a major confrontation, only to realise that the shouts herald the end of the arduous march down to the sea (ἐδόκει δὴ μείζον τι εἶναι τῷ Ξενοφῶντι, καὶ ἀναβὰς ἐφ' ἵππον καὶ Λύκιον καὶ τοὺς ἰππέας ἀναλαβὼν παρεβοήθει· καὶ τάχα δὴ ἀκούουσι βοῶντων τῶν στρατιωτῶν Θάλαττα θάλαττα καὶ παρεγγυῶντων, 4.7.24). The momentous character of the episode serves to amplify the prominence of the *hippeis* in the narrative, so adding weight to the argument that Xenophon is defending the institution in this work. The many militaristic qualities which he, rarely off his horse, displays on the retreat — riding skill, valour, initiative, daring, cunning — are those that he wishes also to associate with the *hippeis*.⁸⁶ Xenophon's effectiveness and utility on horseback also readily complement his treatise on cavalry command (*Hipparchikos*), providing practical examples of the value of cavalry in military operations.

3.1.3. Promoting Athenian Values: Xenophon the Democrat

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, in *Anabasis* Xenophon's leadership is to a significant degree informed by democratic precepts. It was argued that his interest in this form of government — a part of a wider interest in the problem of how to rule — is in its efficacy as a means of achieving leadership goals; he is not evidently concerned with democracy in its literal sense. Nonetheless, pursuing his apologetic agenda, he is alive to the importance of not making himself appear hostile to the *demos*. For instance on several occasions he calls for proposals to be put to a show of hands, even though these are invariably

⁸⁶ Providing a comparative context, in the earlier narrative Xenophon emphasises the prestige of the Persian cavalry, even if their numbers are comparatively small. 1.7.11: 'The enemy was said to be 1.2 million, with 200 scythe-bearing chariots. There were also 6000 horsemen under the command of Artagereses and these were deployed in defence of the king himself'; 2.4.6 Klearchos: 'You see, in the event of being driven to an engagement, we have no cavalry to help us, but with the enemy it is the reverse — not only the most, but the best of his troops are cavalry'.

situations where the course he is proposing will certainly be approved.⁸⁷ On other occasions he makes a point of highlighting democratic leanings in himself and their simultaneous absence in others; for example, he recommends at Kotyora that an assembly be called to discuss a plan to sail back towards Trapezus, but Timasion the Dardanian 'expressed the judgment that they should not hold an assembly but that each should first try to persuade his captains' (5.6.37). In a notable episode in Thrace, Xenophon draws a sharp contrast between himself and a pair of Spartan officials (sent to bring the Ten Thousand back to Asia).⁸⁸ The Spartans are seeking to recover the monies owed to the mercenaries by the Thracians and, at Xenophon's behest, confront a warlord who is aggrieved at the ravaging of villages in his newly acquired territory:

'Well,' the Spartans continued, 'we will leave when the men who have brought about this state of affairs [won the land] for you have been paid. Otherwise, we are going to lend them our immediate support and will take vengeance on the oath-breakers who have wronged them. If you and Seuthes are in that group, our quest for justice will start with you.' Xenophon said, 'Would you be willing, Medosades, to allow the people in whose country we now are to vote, since you say that they are your friends, on this question: whether it is fitting that you go away from their country or that we do?' He said he would not...(7.7.17-18).

3.1.4. Flattery: Wars against the Persians

At the momentous troop assembly the morning after the Greek generals had been seized on the banks of the Greater Zab River, accoutred in his finest armour, Xenophon delivers a morale-lifting speech in which he singles out Athens for its role in previously standing up to the Persians. 'For when the Persians and others with them came in a vast expedition in order to annihilate

⁸⁷ 3.2.9; 3.2.32; 5.1.7, 8; 5.2.38; 5.7.33, 35; 7.3.3-6. Cf. 5.1.14 'Here they cried out that there was no need to go by land. And Xenophon, because he knew their foolishness, did not put anything to a vote'.

⁸⁸ For Spartan antipathy to democracy see *Hell.* 2.3.45.

Athens, the Athenians dared to stand up to them and were victorious' (ἐλθόντων μὲν γὰρ Περσῶν καὶ τῶν σὺν αὐτοῖς παμπληθεῖ στόλῳ ὡς ἀφανιούντων τὰς Ἀθήνας, ὑποστῆναι αὐτοὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τολμήσαντες ἐνίκησαν αὐτούς, 3.2.11, trans. Ambler, modified). Significantly, he implies that Athens was seen by the Persians as the most important of the Greek cities, and he makes no reference to Sparta, referring only to the collective Greek effort against Xerxes (see 3.2.12-14).⁸⁹ Here again Xenophon plainly has in mind as readers his own countrymen.

3.2. ASSOCIATION WITH CYRUS THE YOUNGER

During his time away from Greece, Xenophon established at least two relationships with important non-Greeks: the Persian prince, Cyrus the Younger, and, as was discussed in Part 2, the Thracian dynast, Seuthes. His involvement with the younger Cyrus must always have been a peculiar affair in the eyes of his fellow countrymen; he must have sought for an opportunity to justify his actions, and there is considerable evidence that he did so in *Anabasis*. In this section I show that Xenophon's defence strategy with regards to Cyrus has several interlinking parts. On the most direct level he represents the prince as a noble, if not exemplary, figure, one whom it would be fitting for an aspiring *kalos kagathos* to be associated with; at the same time, he limits to an extreme degree the contact which he actually has with him. A second defence, executed quietly in the course of his introduction to the story, is a declaration that he was deceived about the true purpose of Cyrus's expedition: on the one hand this reinforces the implied assertion that Xenophon followed Cyrus out of admiration for his character, and on the other it seeks to absolve him from charges of adventurism and of being involved in an action against the King. A third defence is his careful setting up of Tissaphernes as a Greek nemesis — the arch-barbarian whom the Ten Thousand engage and ultimately outwit. These distinctive but complementary points are dealt with in turn below, being preceded by brief background descriptions of the relationship between Athens and Persia, and the construction of identity at Classical Athens.

⁸⁹ That Xenophon here was in morale building mode is apparent from a later assessment which he makes of Athenian power at its height: cf. 7.1.27.

3.2.1. The Context of Xenophon's Persian Defence

Athens and Persia

In her public persona Athens nurtured a reputation for hostility towards Persia. She had supported the Ionians in a revolt against the King in 498 and was involved in resistance to Persian expeditions into Greece in the early fifth century. The Athenians prided themselves on Marathon (491) and Salamis (480), though during the second invasion they had abandoned their city to the enemy. This fact, and the stain of violation on the Athenian psyche that resulted from the seizure of the Akropolis, doubtless underlies the vehement anti-Persian rhetoric of subsequent generations. Isokrates' fourth-century speeches provide a good illustration of this; in the *Panegyrikos*, for example, he writes:

Of my own countrymen also I have a similar tale to tell. For towards all other peoples with whom they have been at war, they forget their past enmities the moment they have concluded peace, but toward the Asiatics they feel no gratitude even when they receive favours from them; so eternal is the wrath which they cherish against the barbarians. Again, our fathers condemned many to death for defection to the Medes; in our public assemblies even to this day, before any other business is transacted, the Athenians call down curses upon any citizen who proposes friendly overtures to the Persians; and at the celebration of the Mysteries, the Eumolpidae and the Kerykes, because of our hatred of the Persians, give solemn warning to the other barbarians also, even as to men guilty of murder, that they are forever banned from the sacred rites. So ingrained in our nature is our hostility to them that even in the matter of our stories we linger most fondly over those which tell of the Trojan and the Persian Wars, because through them we learn of our enemies' misfortunes; and you will find that our warfare against

the barbarians has inspired our hymns, while that against the Hellenes has brought forth our dirges (157-158).⁹⁰

Isokrates, a close contemporary of Xenophon's, was influential as both a teacher and an orator at Athens. His articulation in this speech — dated to the late 380s — of his countrymen's attitude towards Persia doubtless chimed with popular sentiment, albeit, courtesy of the King's Peace a few years earlier, it probably marks a peak in the enduring climate of hostility. However at the same time, existing alongside this popular feeling, amongst the wealthier classes there would not have been anything unusual about an association with a (aristocratic) foreign figure; as Herman has put it, the ancient world was 'united at its highest social level by a web of complex alliances'.⁹¹ Proxenos' relationship with Cyrus, and Xenophon's with Proxenos, are cases in point.⁹² Cyrus, nonetheless, may have been considered an inappropriate 'friend' for an Athenian. It was his role in the defeat of Athens by Sparta in the Peloponnesian War that concerned Socrates when Xenophon came to consult with him on whether or not he should join the prince's expedition.

Identity

The profound impact of the Persian penetration of Athens is manifest in the way Athenian culture represents Persians after the event. Before, foreigners tend not to be very prominent in the literary and visual records, and the images and characterisations depicting them are based on types which, if they are not accurate, are not at the same time inherently pejorative. The focus of the Athenians' attention at this time is on their own polity and their own past. Athenian identity at this time may be characterised as 'aggregative': 'built up on the basis of similarities with peers'.⁹³ After the invasions it moves decisively towards a 'contrastive', or 'oppositional', paradigm. The Athenian is now imagined as the opposite of the barbarian: he is democratic, athletic, war-like, frugal, and free. That is, he is not subject to a tyrant, physically flabby,

⁹⁰ Cf. *Panegyrikos* 150-152 for extremely negative characterisation of Persians.

⁹¹ Herman 1987: 162.

⁹² Cf. also Alkibiades' personal connections with both Tissaphernes (Thucydides, 8.47) and Pharnabazos (*Hell.* 1.3.12); see also *Hell.* 2.1.14, Cyrus and Lysander.

⁹³ J. Hall 1997: 47.

effeminate, decadent, and slavish.⁹⁴ This polarised conception of ethnicity is encapsulated in a scene Xenophon himself paints at Ephesus in *Hellenika* (3.4.16-19). To prepare his army for war with the Persians, Agesilaos has forged a 'workshop of war', with the gymnasia full of Greeks exercising and competing against one another; in order to instil contempt for the enemy, he has some captured barbarians stripped and brought in to be sold at the market. 'When the soldiers saw the skin of these captives, which was white because they never took their clothes off, and when they saw, too, that these men were soft and unused to toil because they were accustomed to ride in carriages, they concluded that fighting such men would be no more difficult than fighting women' (3.4.19).

While Xenophon's portrayal of the 'barbarian' is generally consistent with the contrastive model, he is on occasion at pains to nuance his representations, so enabling varying degrees of 'barbarism' to be expressed. Thus, for instance, barbarians not subject to the king (e.g. the Kardouchoi and the Makrones), and therefore free, are less cowardly and can exhibit a certain measure of virtue.⁹⁵ Then, on the Greek side of the polarity, there are Persians who behave more like Greeks. The satrap Pharnabazos, for instance, adapts himself to Greek custom by forsaking his luxurious trappings and sitting on the grass with Agesilaos (*Hell.* 4.1.30); in *Anabasis* (7.7.48) Seuthes shows himself to be honourable by making good on his promise to pay the Cyreans, this in notable contrast to Spartan duplicity in this last phase of the retreat: cf. 7.1.7-13; 7.6.13, 24. And just as a Greek could in truth be falsely assigned a barbarian identity,

⁹⁴ Other reasons have been put forward to explain why the 'barbarian' was recast in this starkly negative light: demonising the Persians provided Athens with a justification for the creation and continuation of her own empire (J. Hall 2002: 187); Athens had a large population of foreign slaves, and their presence both reinforced and was a stimulus for arguments supporting the belief that barbarians were inferior (E. Hall 1989: 2); Persia, whose preferred form of government was tyranny, would not likely be tolerant of a democracy - if Athens was to be spared another invasion, it needed to convince other poleis that the barbarians were a menace to all (E. Hall 1989: 58). For how the Greeks saw themselves and constructed their identity see further E. Hall 1989, J. Hall 1997 and 2002, Cartledge 2002, Harrison 2002; for a wider lens on the question of identity see Barth 1969.

⁹⁵ For this point see Kroeker 2009: 15. We might envisage a linear scale with the perfect barbarian at the tip of one end, and the perfect Greek at the other. For elements of the 'pure barbarian' type, see for example, Aiskhylos, *Persians*; Isokrates, *Pan.* 150, 181; and *Airs, Waters, Places* 16. Cf. also the Eurymedon Vase, which depicts an Athenian with an erect phallus striding towards a stooped Persian archer.

as in the case of Cyrus, so barbarians could bear the outward form of Greeks. In *Anabasis* the figure of Menon the Thessalian is a barbarian in all but name (cf. 2.6.21-28), and Apollonides, though he spoke in the Boiotian dialect, is discovered through his cowardly nature to be in fact a Lydian (beholding him in disgust for his unwillingness to confront the King, Agasias of Stymphalos sees that both of his ears are pierced, 'like a Lydian', 3.1.26-31). Possibly Xenophon's generally more discerning analysis derives from his social background and a resulting heightened affinity with those sharing similar values, but it may be too a case of travel broadening the mind.⁹⁶

3.2.2. Xenophon's relationship with Cyrus the Younger

In his account Xenophon represents Cyrus as a generally virtuous man and a charismatic, if limited, leader.⁹⁷ The obituary which immediately follows Cyrus's

⁹⁶ Instances in *Anabasis* in which typical barbarian traits are assigned to the Persians and their army:

Slavishness. Cyrus's native troops rarely feature in Xenophon's reports; their anonymity communicates their servility, this to be contrasted with the Greek propensity for challenging authority where it is perceived to be unjust. Cf. 1.3.1-2, 1.4.12, 5.8.1, 7.1.12-17.

Cowardice. Flight of native troops during review at Tyriaion, 1.2.18; the portion of Artaxerxes' army facing the Greeks at Kounaxa does not stand their attack, 1.8.19; the armies regroup and face off but the barbarians flee again and from yet further away, 1.10.10-11; Persians harry Greeks but turn and flee when attacked, 3.3.7-10.

Effeminacy. Cyrus's companions dressed in robes and jewellery, 1.5.8; camp-followers, including women, prevent the Persians from sacking all of the Greek camp following Kounaxa, 1.10.3, cf. 6.1.13; a barbarian captive bears an axe 'just like those the Amazons have', 4.4.16.

Treachery. Breaking oaths. Ariaaios 2.2.8, 2.5.39; Tissaphernes 2.3.26, 2.5.32; Tiribazos 4.4.6, 4.4.18.

⁹⁷ Cyrus is one of several leaders whom Xenophon focuses on as part of his didaxis on military leadership, a major element of the work. In this sphere, as was demonstrated in the previous chapter, he is not flawless; as was remarked, Xenophon's Cyrus may not be all that different from the picture painted by Plutarch in his *Artaxerxes* (2-3). *Contra* Almagor 2009: 9, Millender 2009: 7, who both consider that Xenophon portrays Cyrus as the ideal leader; Tamiolaki 2009: 4 is closer to the mark when she categorizes him as 'an ideal leader [who is] closer to perfect virtue'.

Cyrus's character. 1.1.6, 1.1.8, 1.2.1, deploys deception; 1.3.20, less than honest (see also 3.1.9-10); 1.4.7-8, fairness: two officers desert, but rather than pursuing and punishing them, Cyrus lets them go, announcing he will not keep anyone against their wishes; 1.4.10, violent: destroys, without apparent reason, the extensive gardens (and palace) of the Syrian satrap; 1.5.15-16, diplomatic: diffuses a tense standoff between Klearchos and Menon by placing himself between their troops and impressing on them the danger of the situation for the army as a whole; 1.6 justice: tries a traitor. Cyrus also features in other of Xenophon's works, and in these appearances the variable quality of both his leadership and moral worth are emphasised. For instance at *Hell.* 1.5.3, he promises Lysander that if he has to, he will break up and sell his own throne

death at the end of Book 1, appropriately to its genre, focuses on his personal qualities: notable of these are his bravery (1.9.6), loyalty (1.9.9-12), and generosity (1.9.22-23), all highly valued attributes for a Greek. With the aim of defusing the prejudice of his audience — and without challenging the Athenian binary model of identity — Xenophon lays emphasis on Cyrus's likeness to an aristocratic Greek. His recasting in this form has already been made almost complete by characterisation in the earlier narrative, in particular by several of his speeches. For example, prior to the battle in Babylonia, Xenophon has him address the Greek generals and captains and extol the superiority of Greeks over barbarians: although '*their* numbers are great, and *they* will come on with a great shout' [my italics], their threat will be no greater than this (1.7.3-4).⁹⁸ This transformation is evident again in the words Cyrus has used shortly before when attempting to impose calm over a potentially disastrous dispute between Greeks:

Klearchos and Proxenos and other Greeks who are present, you do not know what you are doing; for if you begin a battle with each other, believe on this day that I will have been cut to pieces, and you not much later than I. For if our affairs go badly, all these barbarians whom you see here will become even more hostile to us [ἡμῶν] than are those who are with the King (1.5.16).

It is only after he has gone to lengths to establish the prince as a worthy subject that Xenophon outlines the circumstances in which he came to join him (3.1.4-10).⁹⁹ He tells us that he was invited to do so by Proxenos the Boiotian, a guest-

to finance the Spartan war effort; *Oik.* 4.20-24, he meets Lysander in his garden, and, to the stupefaction of his guest, explains that he has planted all of the trees himself, and that when in good health never sits down to dinner 'before working up a sweat either by practising some military skill or doing some agricultural work'. Then *Hell.* 2.1.8-9 in a chilling contrast has Cyrus execute two cousins for not honouring him in the same fashion as they would the king - but the passage may be an interpolation.

⁹⁸ Note also in this speech Cyrus's dwelling on the value of freedom. Leaving the question of chronology aside, Xenophon may be alluding here to the dictum of Isokrates: τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὄνομα πεπτοῖηκεν μηκέτι τοῦ γένους, ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας δοκεῖν εἶναι, καὶ μᾶλλον Ἕλληνας καλεῖσθαι τοὺς τῆς παιδείας τῆς ἡμετέρας ἢ τοὺς τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως μετέχοντας (*Pan.* 50).

⁹⁹ This apologetic interpretation was suggested by Delebecque (1957: 200); Hirsch categorically rejects the notion that Xenophon 'was forced to praise Cyrus in the

friend, and a pupil of Gorgias, who believed Cyrus 'to be better for himself than his fatherland was' (ὄν αὐτὸς ἔφη κρείττω ἑαυτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος, 3.1.4).¹⁰⁰ Even though Proxenos' credentials must make this an appealing proposition (and the preceding narrative has borne out to some degree his high assessment of the prince), Xenophon prudently consults Socrates and takes his advice by consulting the oracle on the matter (his failure to ask the question he has been told to marks him as not yet wise at that point — see further Chapter 4). With some subtlety and literary skill, Xenophon has thus not only justified his decision to join Cyrus, but he has made it seem a commendable course for an ambitious young man keen for learning and new experience to take.¹⁰¹

Finally, a related aspect of Xenophon's defence of the relationship is, paradoxically, his lack of contact with Cyrus. In the story he has hardly any dealings with him, so quite simply there is little basis for intimating a personal relationship between the men.¹⁰² Xenophon's act of keeping himself off the stage almost completely during the period when Cyrus is the chief actor (Book 1) may be at least in part explained in this apologetic light.¹⁰³

3.2.3. Defending against the attack on Artaxerxes

In the passage in which he enters the narrative, almost obscured by the dramatic circumstances of his introduction, Xenophon writes that he was

Anabasis in order to defend his own choice to follow Cyrus on his march to Cunaxa' (1985: 172), being convinced that the praise is genuine: 'it is clear that he was impressed by this brave and rebellious prince' (72).

¹⁰⁰ Danzig (2004: 19) gives off that Proxenos advised Xenophon that Cyrus was 'better for him than his fatherland', and concludes that the phrase 'points forward to his banishment'. But there is no such ambiguity in the Greek and Xenophon does not set up the decision to go as a choice between one future and another.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Azoulay 2004, who argues that Xenophon's participation in the expedition is down to his honouring of his guest-friendship with Proxenos, though even in this case his motive has moral content.

¹⁰² Xenophon is introduced to Cyrus by Proxenos upon his arrival in Sardis (3.1.8-9) and thereafter their paths cross only once, this as the armies line up on the battlefield in Babylonia (1.8.15). But Diogenes Laertios 2.50, whatever his source - it may be conjecture, considered that the men were close: καὶ ὃς γίνεται παρὰ Κύρῳ, καὶ τοῦ Προξένου φίλος οὐχ ἥττον ἢν αὐτῷ.

¹⁰³ Erbse (2010: 489) adds that he continues to be a 'scarcely involved spectator' under the command of Klearchos (Book 2), this underlining the claim that he had been ignorant of the expedition's purpose. So too Tsagalis 2009: 451-452.

deceived (ἐξαπατηθείς) about the object of the expedition (3.1.9-10).¹⁰⁴ This explicitly apologetic claim seems to be curious in that, as Socrates has indicated, the potential problem for Xenophon at Athens lies in the fact of his merely associating with Cyrus. The most plausible explanation would be that it is a response to a charge that he joined in an expedition against the Great King. This presupposes a favourable relationship between Athens and Artaxerxes, and there is nothing implausible in this from at least the outbreak of the Corinthian War in 394.¹⁰⁵ I suggest here that Xenophon has two further aims in making this seemingly innocuous but in fact highly significant statement.

He is in the first place drawing attention to his own — and his similarly youthful guest-friend's — naivety, both in their believing in the unassailable virtue of Cyrus and in their lack of geopolitical nous. The scale of the force, and Cyrus's ambition as was manifested in his support for Sparta in the Peloponnesian War, were not unknown to them, but unlike the experienced satrap Tissaphernes they did not see that the expedition's declared purpose was suspect.¹⁰⁶ The same general point is made by Xenophon's overlooking Socrates' advice and his posing a leading question to the oracle at Delphi (3.1.5-6). As I argue in the next chapter, the rapid maturing of his character through the expedition is part of the text's Socratic defence.

Xenophon's second and more pressing aim with this statement is to exonerate himself from involvement in an unjust conspiracy, one, moreover, whose target his city at subsequent junctures was on working terms with. For the fact is that Cyrus seems to have had no just cause to make an attempt on the Persian

¹⁰⁴ ἐλέγετο δὲ ὁ στόλος εἶναι εἰς Πισίδας. ἐστρατεύετο μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐξαπατηθείς – οὐχ ὑπὸ Προξένου· οὐ γὰρ ἦδει τὴν ἐπὶ βασιλέα ὀρμὴν οὐδὲ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τῶν Ἑλλήνων πλὴν Κλεάρχου (3.1.9-10). Plutarch writes that Klearchos was ordered by Sparta 'to give Cyrus every assistance' (*Artaxerxes* 6.3). Spartan involvement in the expedition is later confirmed by Xenophon: cf. 1.2.21, 1.4.3.

¹⁰⁵ In 395 the King's man, Tithraustes, channelled money to influential groups in the mainland cities for the purpose of warring on Sparta; Xenophon writes that, 'the Athenians would not accept the money, but they were nevertheless eager to wage war against Sparta, thinking that they would again acquire an empire' (*Hell.* 3.5.2). Pausanias later (5.6.5) writes that one of the reasons the Athenians were upset with Xenophon for joining Cyrus was that their relations with Artaxerxes were positive (εὖνους). On this passage see Rahn 1981: 117 and Tuplin 1987: 66.

¹⁰⁶ Τισσαφέρνης δὲ κατανοήσας ταῦτα, καὶ μείζονα ἠγησάμενος εἶναι ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ Πισίδας τὴν παρασκευὴν, πορεύεται ὡς βασιλέα ἢ ἐδύνατο τάχιστα ἵππεας ἔχων ὡς πεντακοσίους, 1.2.4.

throne, being driven only by his own ambition. This is the judgement of Plutarch (cf. *Artaxerxes* 3.5, 6.3), and notably Xenophon does not seek to provide a political or moral justification for the rebellion. Having offered a brief summary of the court turmoil that attended the death of the father — Cyrus is implicated in a plot, but at the behest of his mother is allowed back to his satrapy — he writes that the young prince, 'having been in danger and dishonoured, [Cyrus] began planning how he would avoid being subject to his brother ever again but rather, if he were able, would rule as King instead of him' (ὁ δ' ὡς ἀπῆλθε κινδυνεύσας καὶ ἀτιμασθεὶς, βουλευέται ὅπως μήποτε ἔτι ἔσται ἐπὶ τῷ ἀδελφῷ, ἀλλὰ, ἢν δύνηται, βασιλεύσει ἀντ' ἐκείνου, 1.1.4). Xenophon adds that in this aim he was supported by his mother, whose grounds were that, 'she loved him more than the ruling king, Artaxerxes' (Παρύσατις μὲν δὴ ἢ μήτηρ ὑπῆρχε τῷ Κύρῳ, φιλοῦσα αὐτὸν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν βασιλεύοντα Ἀρταξέρξην, 1.1.4). From these opening paragraphs we are given to know that Artaxerxes, an older son of the King, was appointed as the successor (cf. Plutarch, *Artaxerxes* 2.3). In light of these circumstances, laid out at the very start of the book, it is vital for Xenophon as a follower of Socrates to make it explicit that he never intended to be part of an adventure whose motive was typically 'barbarian'.

3.2.4. Tissaphernes: 'Xenophon's Wicked Persian'

Another element of Xenophon's defence of his association with Cyrus revolves around the satrap, Tissaphernes. Well-known in the Greek world for his having played both sides against one another in the Peloponnesian War, with his subsequent role in Ionia his reputation as an enemy of Greece became cemented. As demonstrated in this section, in *Anabasis* Xenophon plays on this reception and sets him up as a common enemy of both Cyrus and the Greeks.¹⁰⁷

Tissaphernes is introduced at the very beginning of the story accompanying Cyrus to the Persian court (c. 405); but although he has gone up-country with

¹⁰⁷ Xenophon's antipathy towards Tissaphernes is carried across his oeuvre, suggesting a general usage for him as a Greek nemesis. Cf. *Ages.* 1.11 = *Hell.* 3.4.6 ('Tissaphernes broke all his promises immediately'); *Ages.* 1.15, 29, Tissaphernes as a poor tactician.

the prince, ὡς φίλον (1.1.2), he proceeds to slander him to the new king: Τισσαφέρνης διαβάλλει τὸν Κῦρον πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν ὡς ἐπιβουλεύει αὐτῷ (1.1.3). On the subsequent return of the two men to Asia Minor, in the face of a revolt of his cities to Cyrus, Tissaphernes secured himself at Miletos and from this base began to plot to take back the Ionian cities (1.1.6-7). He is thereafter named by Xenophon as the informer of Cyrus's plot to the King (1.2.4), so consolidating the audience's empathy for Cyrus as another victim of his treachery. After the prince has been killed, Tissaphernes successfully pretends to be a friend of the Greeks, but reveals his intentions when he lures several of their generals into a deadly trap and then harries the army into the hostile Kardouchian hills. Upon his return to Asia Minor, he again proceeds to menace the Greek cities on the coast (*Hell.* 3.1.3).¹⁰⁸

In the devious picture he paints of Tissaphernes, Xenophon invokes the stereotype of the barbarian and by the same token accentuates the anomalous nature of his Cyrus's character.¹⁰⁹ By assigning this *bête noire* a central role in his account, he furthermore imparts a nobility to the struggle of the Ten Thousand, an aspect which is reinforced in the very last line of the work when we are told that they are co-opted into a Spartan-led campaign against the barbarian. Ἐν τούτῳ Θίβρων παραγενόμενος παρέλαβε τὸ στράτευμα καὶ συμμείξας τῷ ἄλλῳ Ἑλληνικῷ ἐπολέμει πρὸς Τισσαφέρνην καὶ Φαρνάβαζον (7.8.24).¹¹⁰

In his narrative Xenophon links Tissaphernes closely to the King: Tissaphernes is the one who warns him of Cyrus's plot (1.2.4); he is selected to face the Greek contingent at Kounaxa (1.8.9; cf. 1.10.7, 2.3.19); in the aftermath of the battle, reporting the arrival of heralds to demand the Greek surrender, Xenophon says that they 'arrived from the King and Tissaphernes' (2.1.7); when

¹⁰⁸ Commenting on *Hell.* 3.1.3-4, Dillery (1995: 102) writes: 'This passage makes Tissaphernes, not Artaxerxes, the instigator of the attempt to subject the Ionian cities. This makes Tissaphernes, the villain of the *Anabasis*, the chief antagonist in the Ionian War.'

¹⁰⁹ On Xenophon's portrayal of Tissaphernes see Cawkwell 1972, Hirsch 1985, and Danzig 2007 ('Xenophon's wicked Persian'). Hirsch (1985: 26) writes that Xenophon has created 'a portrait of the Persian satrap that verges on the diabolic'.

¹¹⁰ The epilogue, which follows this, 7.8.25-26, is considered by many editors to be an interpolation.

he comes to negotiate with the Greeks, Tissaphernes is acting for the King (2.3.20); Tissaphernes receives the King's daughter as his wife (2.4.8); Xenophon opens his midnight address by the Greater Zab River to the Greek generals and captains saying, 'Now we all know, of course, that the King and Tissaphernes have seized those of us they had the power to seize; and as for the rest of us, it is clear that they are plotting how they may destroy us, if their power permits' (3.1.35); addressing an assembly of the soldiers the next morning, Kleonor the Orchomenian says, 'But you see men, the King's perjury and his impiety. And you see Tissaphernes' infidelity' (3.2.4). By his meticulous binding together of these two figures, Xenophon manages to represent Artaxerxes himself as a paragon of perfidy. Cyrus's attempt may not, therefore, be as unjust and self-serving as it first appeared to be.¹¹¹

Xenophon's depiction of Tissaphernes offers, incidentally, a good instance of paradigmatic history exposed by historical reality. While the satrap may go up-country with Cyrus 'as a friend', his first responsibility is to the King, to whom he shows loyalty in revealing the information he has on Cyrus's plot against him. He furthermore, and notwithstanding the contradictory statement in *Agesilaos*, shows strategic competence at Kounaxa, and bravery (1.10.7), and he displays exemplary leadership skill in his disposal of the Greek high command and subsequent shunting of the army into the hills of the Kardouchoi (cf. *Hipp.* 5.9: 'there is nothing more profitable in war than deception'). This is to be set in the wider picture of his considerable influence in the eastern Mediterranean over many years. Indeed perhaps no other figure in the late fifth century exerted as much influence on the politics of the region as Tissaphernes. Notably, his policy of setting Greeks against one another prolonged the war between Athens and Sparta and consequently enabled Persia more easily to retain its control over Ionia.¹¹²

¹¹¹ Hirsch (1985: 23) thinks that Xenophon is hostile towards Tissaphernes and the King 'probably because they were the paramount enemies of Cyrus, for whom he has so much esteem'; in describing Tissaphernes as a 'personal enemy' of Xenophon's, neither does Stronk (2009: 9) seem to see through to his apologetic purpose.

¹¹² Thucydides attributes Tissaphernes' policy of allowing the Hellenes to wear each other out to Alkibiades (8.45-46). But this depriving of Tissaphernes of strategic nous may be Hellenocentrism.

3.3. SPARTA

Xenophon served with Spartan officers in the retreat of the Ten Thousand, and he subsequently led the remnants of the Cyreans in the Spartan campaign against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos.¹¹³ He remained in their service until his return to Greece with Agesilaos in 394, after which he settled on an estate in the Peloponnese (see above Chapter 1.5.3). A tradition has it that his sons were educated in Sparta (Plutarch, *Agesilaos* 20; Diogenes Laertios 2.54).

Xenophon's close association with Sparta may have been the cause of his exile from Athens. Rivalry between the states was unremitting, with their contrasting political systems being a constant point of tension. For the re-established Athenian democracy, Xenophon's Socratic links, and links to the *hippeis*, already rendered him something of an enemy within; his high-level ties with the Spartans in Asia would seem to have made a return to the city problematic. So as an Athenian the matter of his relationship with the Peloponnesian *polis* is one which he must have sought to address, whether or not it was in fact the cause of the exile decree.¹¹⁴ Being the beginning of his relationship with the Spartans, the retreat of the Ten Thousand was an apt place to focus his defence.

In the previous chapter it was shown how, in his account, Xenophon is subtly critical of Spartan commanders on the retreat; his depiction could well, indeed, be read as commentary on Sparta's hegemony in the Greek world. This critique must have been intended for a broad Hellenic audience, including the Spartans themselves, and certainly his fellow Athenians. However, because of its deliberately understated presentation it may not of itself have been sufficient to convince the latter that Xenophon was not an adopted Spartan, just as a patriotic Spartan reader would not necessarily be readily put out by the portrayal of his fellow countrymen.¹¹⁵ In this section I argue that Xenophon additionally deploys two particular techniques in order to distance himself firmly from Sparta

¹¹³ When, at *Hell.* 3.2.7, Xenophon writes of 'the leader of the men who had fought with Cyrus', it is considered that he is referring to himself.

¹¹⁴ Among those who consider that it was are Lesky (1963: 664), Breitenbach (1967: 1575), and Badian (2004: 42). Tuplin (1987: 68) and Dillery (1998: 4-5) think it was one of the reasons.

¹¹⁵ Thomas (2009: li) writes of his stance in *Hellenika*: 'His criticisms of Spartans are those of an insider, the kind that the Spartans themselves would make of their fellows'.

on the retreat. Both of these devices — the establishment of *agon* and *apistia* respectively between the sides — depend for their effectiveness on his own identity as an Athenian.

3.3.1. Nature of relationship (1): *Agon*

Throughout his narrative Xenophon represents his relations with Spartan officials as rarely more than functional. The exception which underlines this is his establishment of guest-friendship with Kleander, the harmost of Byzantium, who is portrayed as showing wise judgment in the case of charges made against two of the Cyreans, and in seeing through accusations that had been made against Xenophon (6.6.25-35). Nonetheless, there are times at which Xenophon does seem to be bolstering Spartan power, and it is evident that he seeks to counter this impression. For example, after the army has crossed to Byzantium, and, having been deceived by Anaxibios, storms the city, he succeeds in calming the men and returning control to the Spartans (7.1.11-32): Xenophon confronts the risk of being accused of pro-Spartanism in this case by arguing in his speech that he is acting in the interests of the men. But he has furthermore, since his own rise to the high command, created a division between himself and Sparta by sustaining a real measure of tension in the relationship. One of the ways in which he achieves this is through his bringing out a competitive spirit between himself and Kheirisophos, the leading Spartan.

Xenophon's first encounter with Kheirisophos and Spartan power comes late, after he has delivered his speech to the remaining Greek commanders by the Greater Zab River. The response of Kheirisophos, who joined Cyrus at Issos with seven hundred hoplites (1.4.3), pointedly reveals no prior interaction, and in this way addresses any suspicion that Xenophon may have left Athens to join up with Sparta:

After [Xenophon's speech] Kheirisophos said, 'Previously, Xenophon, I knew you only so far as to have heard you were an Athenian, but now I praise you for what you are saying and doing, and I would wish that as many as possible be of this same sort, for the good would be shared in common' (3.1.45).

An equally important function of this response is to bring into relief a view that Spartans regard their northern neighbours as neither distinguished in words nor action; Xenophon goes on to develop a palpable undertone of tension in his dealings with the Spartans, playing on the traditional rivalry between the two states. On a formal level this is symbolised by the respective roles of the two men on the retreat: Xenophon is a commander at the rear, while Kheirisophos leads, as Sparta does in the Greek world.¹¹⁶ Right from the beginning this leadership is subjected to scrutiny by Xenophon, who invariably sees through to a more effective way of achieving an objective: see for instance 3.4.41, 3.5.3-6, 4.1.15-25, 4.3.27-28, 4.7.2-7.¹¹⁷ According to Xenophon, only on one occasion do the men fall out — over the mistreatment of a guide by Kheirisophos (4.6.2-3) — but given the number of times they have locked horns up until that point, this declaration must be regarded either as ironic, or as an outward show of contrived magnanimity. (The former reading is possibly supported by an evidently ironic set-piece involving the two men which takes place shortly after the incident with the guide: see 4.6.14-16, and cf. *Lak.* 2.7.)

3.3.2. Nature of relationship (2): *Apistia*

A second important element in Xenophon's representation of his relationship with Sparta is the presence of *apistia*, mistrust. In bringing this out he undermines any charges of *prodosia* or laconism, and simultaneously enhances the dramatic tension of his narrative. The tension between himself and the Spartans, moreover, is aggregative, so that we come to expect an eventual breakdown in the relationship. A selection of passages, beginning from the positive appraisal of Kheirisophos at 3.1.45 above, charts the progress of the decline.

3.4.37-39. As they march north following the events by the Greater Zab River, Kheirisophos summons Xenophon and orders him to bring the peltasts to the front. Xenophon rides forward from the rear but does not bring the peltasts, for he has seen Tissaphernes come into view with his army.

¹¹⁶ Sparta as first among the Greek states: 6.6.9, 12; *Hell.* 3.1.3, 5.

¹¹⁷ Calvino (1999: 20) writes: 'there are often two protagonists in each episode: the two rival officers, Xenophon and Kheirisophos, the Athenian and the Spartan, and Xenophon's solution is always the more astute, generous and decisive one.'

The Spartan does not inform Xenophon why he wants the light-armed troops at the front, though the reader knows that his order does have a tactical rationale as a ridge by which the army must cross has been taken by the Persians (3.4.37-38). Xenophon, too, has cause to justify his decision given that he has seen Tissaphernes and his whole army approaching (ἐπιφαινόμενον γὰρ ἑώρα Τισσαφέρην καὶ τὸ στράτευμα πᾶν, 3.4.39). In the ensuing exchange between the two men, each questions the action of the other, revealing an underlying mistrust between them. The use of direct speech dramatises the *hypopsia*. 'Why do you call?' (Τί καλεῖς;) Xenophon asks. Kheirisophos gives his reason in brief, and then asks in his turn: 'But why did you not bring the peltasts?' (ἀλλὰ τί οὐκ ἦγες τοὺς πελταστάς; 3.4.39).

4.1.15-21. The army comes under severe attack in the Kardouchian hills. On one occasion, instead of slowing the march to keep touch with the rear, Kheirisophos presses ahead and as a result Xenophon's men were forced into flight; we are additionally informed that two brave men were killed (δύο καλῶ τε καὶ ἀγαθῶ ἄνδρε τέθνατον, 4.1.19).

When confronted by Xenophon, Kheirisophos provides an explanation for his decision to keep marching: their road led up to a narrow pass and he sought to seize this before the enemy. 'It is for this I was hurrying, and I did not wait for you on account of this, that I might somehow be able to take the pass before they did. The guides we have deny there is any other road' (4.1.21). The explanation is reasonable (even though it turns out that there is another pass), but Xenophon had, evidently, assumed that they were abandoned without just cause and his description of his own reaction reveals a marked distrust of the Spartan: 'When they arrived at a stopping place, Xenophon went directly to Kheirisophos just as he was and began to blame him for not waiting, and for compelling them to fight at the same time they were trying to flee' (ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀφίκοντο ἐπὶ σταθμόν, εὐθύς ὥσπερ εἶχεν ὁ Ξενοφῶν ἐλθὼν πρὸς τὸν Χειρίσοφον ἠτιᾶτο αὐτὸν ὅτι οὐχ ὑπέμενεν, ἀλλ' ἠναγκάζοντο φεύγοντες ἅμα μάχεσθαι, 4.1.19).¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ We might take Xenophon's subsequent comment that the front and rear 'took vigorous care of one another' to be ironic (καὶ ἰσχυρῶς ἀλλήλων ἐπεμέλοντο, 4.2.27).

4.2.13-17. In the course of heavy combat with the Kardouchoi, fearing that a height just taken would be lost as they progressed up to another, Xenophon orders men to hold it while he and the rest press forward. He assigns its defence to three captains, and the first two of whom he names are Athenian. In light of the critical importance of the task, these appointments can be read as significant. The trust he has placed in his fellow countrymen is subsequently implied to have been fully warranted when the third captain, an Argive exile, fled (πεφευγὼς) back to the main party reporting the hill retaken and the two Athenians killed (4.2.17).

4.6.17-19. Xenophon offers to lead the rearguard in a night operation to take an occupied height. He is confident that the enemy will give way once his men have climbed onto any part of the ridge.

Kheirisophos, who had encouraged Xenophon to take on the task (4.6.16), now changes his mind. 'And why do you need to go and leave your defence of the rear? But send others, unless some volunteers show themselves now' (4.6.19). Xenophon offers no indication as to what was behind Kheirisophos' change of mind, but it is readily understandable in the context of the prevailing atmosphere of mistrust, Kheirisophos being concerned that success by Xenophon would strengthen his standing among the men.

6.1.16-32. Kheirisophos left the army at Trapezus in order to secure ships to take the men home (5.1.3-4). His failure to return prompted them to continue their journey by land. They are about half-way to Byzantium when he rejoins them, having with him a single vessel, and nothing for the soldiers except a promise that Anaxibios, the Spartan admiral, would have pay for them once they had left the Euxine.

It becomes apparent from the events which follow that Kheirisophos' return has less to do with assisting the army than ensuring that they evacuate the Black Sea area; it is apparent also that he has been tasked with keeping a check on Xenophon, who is evidently now viewed by Sparta as a threat to her interests in the region. In a brief speech which he gives to the army following his election as its leader, complementing the men on withdrawing their offer of the same to

Xenophon (below), Kheirisophos informs them that 'Dexippos [a Spartan officer] said he believed Xenophon would be more willing to share rule over the army of Klearchos with Timasion, a Dardanian, than with himself, a Lakonian' (6.1.32; cf. 6.6.34). Spartan suspicions seem to be not without grounds, for shortly after Kheirisophos had arrived from Byzantium, the men, 'now that they seemed to be near to Greece' (6.1.17), decided to choose a single ruler (so as to make their plans for the securing of booty more effective), but in spite of the presence of Kheirisophos, they chose Xenophon: 'The captains approached him and said the army was of this judgement, and each showed his goodwill and tried to persuade him to undertake the rule' (6.1.19).

Pre-empting his election by the assembly, Xenophon told the men that it would not be in their interests to choose him over a Spartan, and that the role, if he should seem 'to be undermining the authority of their [the Spartan] position', could lead to a bad end for himself (εἰ οὖν ταῦτα ὀρώων ἐγὼ δοκοίην ὅπου δυναίμην ἔνταῦθ' ἄκυρον ποιεῖν τὸ ἐκείνων ἀξίωμα, ἐκεῖνο ἐννοῶ μὴ λίαν ἂν ταχὺ σωφρονισθείην, 6.1.28). To undercut any presumption that personal factors lie behind the animosity (his earlier statement that he only fell out once with Kheirisophos may also have had this aim), he specifically links Spartan distrust of him to the fact of his being an Athenian. 'For I see that the Spartans did not cease making war on my fatherland until they made the entire city agree that they were their leaders' (ὀρῶ γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τῇ πατρίδι μου οὐ πρόσθεν ἐπαύσαντο πολεμοῦντες πρὶν ἐποίησαν πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν ὁμολογεῖν Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ αὐτῶν ἡγεμόνας εἶναι, 6.1.27).

7.1. Byzantium. Once the Cyreans have left Asia the Spartans become hostile towards them, regarding the mercenary body as a threat to stability in its sphere of control. Xenophon is now under open suspicion for the influence he wields, though by his own account his only desire is to sail away (7.1.8). Ironically, it is he who saves Byzantium from being sacked, convincing the Cyreans — who have burst back into the city having been locked out by Anaxibios — that it is in their own best interests to leave (7.1.24-31). In spite of this, when he subsequently requests permission to re-enter the city so that he can sail away, he is informed that Anaxibios has serious reservations about letting him in, for 'it

was not suitable for the soldiers to be near the wall, with Xenophon on the inside' (λέγειν γὰρ Ἀναξίβιον ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιτήδειον εἶη τοὺς μὲν στρατιώτας πλησίον εἶναι τοῦ τείχους, Ξενοφῶντα δὲ ἔνδον, 7.1.39).

7.2. Treachery in Thrace. A change of officials at Byzantium, and the influence of Pharnabazos, leads to individual Spartans competing against one another. Xenophon, sailing away with Anaxibios, is ordered by the latter to return to Thrace and bring the Cyreans over to Asia; but Aristarchos, the new harmost, 'having been persuaded by Pharnabazos' (7.2.12), sails to Perinthos to prevent the crossing. In a terse exchange with Xenophon, he tells him: 'Anaxibios is no longer admiral; I am the harmost here. If I catch any of you on the sea, I will sink you' (7.2.13). The next day he sends for the generals and captains of the army, but Xenophon is advised that if he goes with them, 'he would be seized, and he would either suffer something on the spot or be turned over to Pharnabazos' (ἤδη δὲ ὄντων πρὸς τῷ τείχει ἐξαγγέλλει τις τῷ Ξενοφῶντι ὅτι εἰ εἴσεισι, συλληφθήσεται καὶ ἢ αὐτοῦ τι πείσεται ἢ καὶ Φαρναβάζῳ παραδοθήσεται, 7.2.14). So Xenophon seeks out Seuthes, the Thracian dynast, secures an agreement for employing the men, and takes them into his service.

Spartan manoeuvrings around the Propontis as Xenophon portrays them, notably of individuals pursuing their own interest above that of the state, justify his decision to lead the Cyreans into barbarian service and provide a final, garlanded proof that he has been justified in his ongoing mistrust of Spartan rule. His decision to go to Seuthes marks the inevitable break in the relationship, although (owing to uncertainty of direction and disunity amongst the Spartans) it does not prove fatal for either him or the men.

3.3.3. Xenophon in Spartan Service: the Exile Question, Again

Given the level of mutual distrust between Xenophon and Sparta, Spartan mistreatment of the Cyreans, and Xenophon's leading of the mercenaries into service with Seuthes, a reconciliation between the sides in the winter of 399 must have seemed implausible. However, at the behest of the cities on the coast, Sparta had decided to launch a campaign against Tissaphernes in Asia Minor (*Hell.* 3.1.3-4, Diodoros 14.35) and Xenophon and the mercenaries had a

new use. Thibron sent for them, promising the soldiers a daric per month and more for the captains and generals (7.6.1).

Xenophon, consistent with his declared aim at Khrysopolis (7.1.4), does not take up this offer but rather prepares to leave for home. 'Xenophon did not go near [a sale of booty] but was openly preparing to head homeward, for the vote for his exile had not yet been passed against him at Athens' (7.7.57). Some of those influential around him (οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι) plead with him at least to lead the army to Thibron; pointedly, he does not say whether or not he agrees to this, but he does cross into Asia with the army (7.8.1).¹¹⁹ Depending on the time of year, it is probable that he could have sailed from the Hellespont to Athens via the north Aegean islands, although this option seems to be ruled out by his desperate financial situation at that point (cf. 7.3.20, 7.8.2).¹²⁰ Perhaps it is not unreasonable to conjecture that, in order to perform a last service to the men and at the same time take any opportunity that might arise for plunder, he decided his best way home was to take the army down the coast and to depart from Ephesus, where he had arrived two years previously.

Yet in spite of his statement that he was preparing to go home, and his problematic relationship with Sparta, we know that Xenophon does not then return home but serves under a succession of Spartan commanders in Asia Minor (Thibron, Derkylidas, Herripidas) until his return to Greece in 394 with Agesilaos.¹²¹ Adding to the *aporia* surrounding his presence we know further that he held Thibron in low regard, and also that by enriching himself at Pergamum on the journey through Aeolia (7.8.23), he had no pressing pecuniary motive for service.¹²²

Two possible explanations for this outcome suggest themselves. The first is that Xenophon believed that the war had the potential to liberate the Greek cities of

¹¹⁹ Xenophon has assumed leadership of the army in Thrace, see 7.2.9, 7.3.7; cf. Diodoros 14.37.1.

¹²⁰ For sailing conditions in the Mediterranean see Tammuz 2005, Brennan 2008.

¹²¹ Grote (1865: 565) thinks that Xenophon travelled to Athens after the death of Socrates, and then back to Asia Minor to continue service with Sparta, but this scenario has no modern support.

¹²² Thibron was condemned for 'allowing his troops to plunder their friends' and exiled, *Hell.* 3.1.8; cf. *Hell.* 3.1.10, 3.2.1, 3.2.7.

the coast, and at the same time deal a fatal blow to Tissaphernes, whom he has cast in his writings as an archenemy of Greece; persuaded as to the campaign's importance for Greece, he abandons his own plan in order to serve the greater community.¹²³ This act of selflessness would round off nicely the image he has projected of himself as a model pupil of Socrates.

The second explanation, which, on balance, I find more concrete and persuasive, is that during the period between his departure from European Thrace and arrival in Ionia, the decree of exile against him at Athens was passed.¹²⁴ The matter of his exile has been discussed earlier in the dissertation (Chapter 1.5.2), and I now suggest that, taken in the apologetic context described in this chapter, the case for the 399 date argued for is strengthened.¹²⁵ By definition the decree was public knowledge, so Xenophon had no need to inform his (Athenian) audience that it was at this time it was passed (though the οὐ πω serves this purpose), and as argued, he will not at all have been inclined to provide publicity for the event. Outcast from his own country, he now has little alternative other than to put himself to use in the campaign against Persia.¹²⁶

¹²³ Cuniberti (2009: 10) points to the Asian campaign as having the potential to realise 'a positive hegemonic function for Sparta'; perhaps as well Xenophon saw this potential and sought to encourage it.

¹²⁴ Erbse (2010: 492-493) considers that 'such an interpretation is certainly suggested by the words used and presumably the author counted on it that the Athenian reader would understand him'.

¹²⁵ Xenophon's statement, as he is readying to leave Thrace, that the decree against him had 'not yet' been passed (οὐ γάρ πω ψήφος αὐτῷ ἐπῆκτο Ἀθήνησι περὶ φυγῆς, 7.7.57) does seem to carry a temporal quality, and a number of scholars have interpreted it as an indication that the decree was then imminent (Erbse 2010: 483, Bradley 2001: 80, Higgins 1977: 23, Anderson 1974: 148; see Woodhead 1981: 39 for the process of how decrees were voted on and passed). Tuplin (1987: 60), however, does not think the term carries this meaning: 'Xenophon is merely giving an incidental explanation (for the benefit of readers who know him as "the Athenian exile") of how he could even think of going home'. So Rood 2006: 58, and see also Rahn 1981: 118.

¹²⁶ Bradley (2001: 82-83) argues that the narrative is so designed as to bring the reader to the point that he is led to construct for himself the existence of the exile decree as an obstacle to Xenophon's *nostos*. I do not think, however, that Xenophon wished to afford the decree such prominence in the minds of his readers, but rather his overriding aim was to emphasise his qualities as a citizen and in this way undermine all and any charges against him. Moreover, there is the awkward fact for this thesis that surely some, if not all given the time lapse between event and publication, of Xenophon's readers would have known that he had been exiled at this time and so was prevented from returning home.

Conclusions

This section has shown that a paramount aim of Xenophon's apologetic agenda was to address the questions of his relationships with Cyrus the Younger and Sparta respectively. His association with Cyrus — who was instrumental in bringing about Athens' defeat in the long and costly struggle against Sparta — further compromised him in the eyes of the *demos* (already suspicious of his connection with Socrates and the Thirty), as did his subsequent and longstanding links with the Lakedaimonians. Either one or a combination of these two factors was very likely the cause of his banishment from the city in the 390s, and in any case they are conspicuously hanging threads which, unless we disregard the evidence in his corpus for his concern for Athens (for instance in *Poroï*, and *Hipparkhikos*), he will have wanted to tie up.

In terms of the decree itself, I consider that the *formal* charge against him was the outcome Socrates had feared at 3.1.5: association with Cyrus (ὁ Σωκράτης ὑποπτεύσας μή τι πρὸς τῆς πόλεως ὑπαίτιον εἶη Κύρῳ φίλον γενέσθαι). Socrates is a paragon of virtue and wisdom in Xenophon's writings and he, if anyone, could be credited with near-prophetic powers. This, therefore, is as close as Xenophon can go to a statement of the truth without actually spelling it out.¹²⁷ With regard to the date of the decree, I have argued that it was passed 'early', in 399, probably during the time Xenophon was leading the Cyreans down the Asia Minor coast to join Thibron — possibly at the same time as the 300 *hippeis* were sent out from Athens. This dating supports the case made in Chapter 1.5.2, where it was also shown that the date of exile would be revealing of its (formal) cause, an earlier date suggesting links with Cyrus, a later one, with Sparta. Needless to say, the Athenians may well have found good cause in his actions with Agesilaos in 394 to exile him, but they could not do so again. Among the ironies here is the fact that many of the mercenaries who joined

¹²⁷ He may give another hint in this direction later in the narrative, at 7.6.35, where he writes of having incurred the wrath of 'those much stronger than myself' (ταῦτα πολὺ κρείττοσιν ἐμαυτοῦ) because of his concern for the army. The remark is too vague to be used as evidence for the cause of his exile, but it must refer either to the Athenian *demos*, the Spartan government, or the governors of the Great King, all of whom had reason to see him as having acted against their interests.

Cyrus were likely to have been exiles from their own cities (cf. 4.8.26), Xenophon, in the end, becoming one of them.

A challenge in arguing the case that Xenophon was defending himself against his exile is that he only incidentally refers to the decree and does not name Athens as his intended audience for the work. However, it has been demonstrated that the author, by explicitly signalling his Athenian background and identity, makes it apparent that his countrymen are envisaged as being in the front row; more substantially, the content and texture of the text itself — Xenophon's systematic distancing of himself from both Cyrus and Sparta through careful representation of his relations with them, and the integration of thematic strands such as *apate*, *agon*, *hupopsia*, and *apistia* — demonstrate that he was at pains to address questions on the subject of his loyalty to his *polis*. The deliberate ambiguity surrounding the identity of his main audience for his main defence is, I suggest, a mark of his contempt for the exile decree.

PART 4. CONCLUSIONS

Readers of Xenophon's *Anabasis* have long remarked on an apologetic *Tendenz* in the work. An explanation offered by Dürrbach in the nineteenth century was that Xenophon wrote his account in response to another which did not depict him in flattering light. While this view retains some currency today, it has not been found persuasive in this chapter. Evidence for another published account of the march is slight, and moreover there is a well-founded view now that Diodoros' summary of the expedition — considered by some to have derived (via Ephoros) from an *Anabasis* written by Sophainetos — is ultimately based on Xenophon's account.

Xenophon's work is, however, unquestionably dominated by his own presence, and in this chapter a case has been made for reading *Anabasis* as an *apologia pro vita*. In Parts 2 and 3 it was shown that Xenophon devotes a substantial amount of energy and space to confronting matters that had an impact on his respective standing as a Socratic, military leader, and as an Athenian citizen; it was suggested that the whole of Book 7 is a defence against the charge of

corruption laid against him in Thrace. It is apparent that Xenophon wishes to leave an indelible impression of himself as a responsible citizen who represented his *polis* with distinction. In the course of his narrative, explicitly in the case of character attacks, implicitly on the matter of his *polis* loyalty, he thoroughly debunks charges/suspensions of corruption and improper behaviour, association with barbarian enemies, and pro-Spartanism. The extent to which self-defence pervades *Anabasis* permits inferences to be made about why he wrote the work, and for whom it was intended. While the defence of his character was doubtless directed at the widest possible readership, the careful construction of his relationship with Sparta and 'others' in the text seems to be directed at an Athenian audience, perhaps in particular his own social class; Xenophon may well be signalling this by being on horseback at the point of his very first appearance in the story. It is a mark of his skill and subtlety as a writer that he can seem to reach out simultaneously in his work to distinct audiences.

Although in a real sense the march of the Ten Thousand was a source of troubles for Xenophon the Athenian, yet the telling of the story provided him with a means to address effectively issues not all of which stemmed solely from his participation in the march. Most notably, there is his longstanding connection with Sparta, a relationship whose form he undoubtedly sought to influence if not reconfigure in *Anabasis*. Through his subtly negative portraiture of Spartan rule in the work, Xenophon is moreover marking the state's unsuitability for hegemony of Greece. As Humble writes of officials in the Propontis, 'their collective failure to deal effectively with the mercenaries is indicative both of the failure of Sparta to train its citizens for leadership roles outside the insular world of Sparta and of the lack of direction provided by the Spartan authorities to leaders abroad'.¹²⁸ For all its preoccupation with *apologia* — and notwithstanding claims that several other of his writings show pro-Spartan bias — *Anabasis* is not a defence of Sparta.

While the story of the expedition and its aftermath presented itself as an ideal vehicle for the expression of other concerns and interests, through a close reading of the author's speeches, and a highlighting of the sizeable space which

¹²⁸ Humble 1997: 93.

they and connected episodes consume, this chapter has brought out the very significant extent to which personal *apologia* has shaped the work. Objections to *Anabasis* as personal *apologia* tend to be based on a view that a sole and self-evident explanation for the work is available. In his seminal book on Xenophon, still a stimulating portrait of the author, William Higgins engages with the apologetic explanation and finds it unconvincing. If he is defending himself, Higgins asks, why does he spend so much time on so many things unrelated to *apologia*? 'What has *apologia* got to do with men chasing ostriches and wild donkeys or getting sick on honey? A work of defence, moreover, implies a certain method of operation by which evidence is sifted and selected for biased ends. Yet Xenophon seems free of such prejudice'.¹²⁹ The argument presented here suggests that Higgins did not notice sufficiently the elaborate defence of himself which Xenophon conducts through the later books, and he is generous in seeing him as an impartial reporter of events. His conclusion, that the work is 'one man's obviously idiosyncratic vision of [the historical] event', does not do justice to the complex yet coherent agenda which Xenophon has succeeded in weaving into his story of the journey. Wencis, in an article published in the same year, comes closer to describing its character in speaking of 'the hybrid form of the *Anabasis*'.¹³⁰

That personal *apologia* is a prominent item on Xenophon's writing agenda is supported by its recurrence in other of his works, notably the opening of the second part of *Hellenika* (see Chapter 1.3.1). Concern with other forms of *apologia* furthermore is evident across his oeuvre: most obviously in his Socratic works, less so in those which highlight the merits of his friends (*Agesilaos*, *Hellenika*) and class (*Kynegetikos*, *Hipparkhikos*, *Anabasis*). In defending his teacher, friends and social group, Xenophon is also defending himself. In the final chapter I turn to look at how in *Anabasis* he builds a comprehensive defence of Socrates, and how this serves as well to defend him against criticism of his own character.

¹²⁹ Higgins 1977: 94.

¹³⁰ Wencis 1977: 49. Cf. Dillery (1995: 64) who remarks that 'there is nothing to prevent us from seeing the *Anabasis* as both *apologia* and panhellenic call to action'.

Apologia Socratous

I have often wondered by what arguments those who drew up the indictment against Socrates could persuade the Athenians that his life was forfeit to the state. The indictment against him was to this effect: Socrates is guilty of rejecting the gods acknowledged by the state and of bringing in strange deities; he is also guilty of corrupting the youth.

Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.1.1

In his *Apologia* and the first third of *Memorabilia 1* (1.1-2), Xenophon defends the memory of Socrates against the charges of impiety and corrupting the youth brought against him in 399; in the remainder of the latter (1.3-4.8), and in two of his other works, *Symposion* and *Oikonomikos*, Socrates is a central character, and there is the clear sense that Xenophon is defending, and indeed promoting the value of, the philosopher's character.¹ In this final chapter I argue that in *Anabasis*, by representing himself as a model pupil of Socrates, Xenophon attempts to refute the charges levelled at the philosopher, and, through his outstanding performance on the retreat, to highlight the value of the Socratic training. In contrast to the aforementioned works, Socrates only makes a single appearance, yet it occurs at the pivotal point in the narrative and his presence thereafter is felt throughout Xenophon's arduous trials on the retreat.

The chapter begins with an analysis of Xenophon's introduction of his character into the story, and shows that its purpose is to establish him as an aspiring *kalos kagathos* who finds himself unwittingly caught in a desperate situation. In the second part a context for the relationship between Socrates and Xenophon

¹ Scholars traditionally group these four works into a Xenophontic Socratic cycle. See for instance Kahn 1996: 29, Macleod 2008: 5; Morrison (1988: vii) expands the category to take in *Hiero* and *Agesilaos*. Socrates appears twice in Xenophon's 'historiographical' works: at *An.* 3.1.5, and *Hell.* 1.7.15. Besides the *Anabasis* passage, only on one other occasion do Socrates and Xenophon appear together, this at *Mem.* 1.3.9-12.

is established, and in the third it is demonstrated how, through his actions and words on the retreat, Xenophon builds a comprehensive defence of his teacher against the charges made. While I argue that his formal aim in representing his character as an ideal leader is to defend Socrates, this representation also serves the didactic aims of the work, and further, it strengthens his personal *apologia*. The distinction between exemplar and author is finely blurred, and both are roundly enveloped in an aura of kudos; Xenophon's readers, regardless of the degree to which they are aware of his intended purposes, will have certainly linked the two figures in some way.

PART 1. THE FRAMING OF XENOPHON: THE PHILOSOPHER ARMED

Xenophon in *Anabasis* comes across as being more than an average leader. His energy and daring at times verge on the superhuman, and it is tempting to conclude that in his narrative he has bigger aims than defending himself against personal attacks and redeeming his reputation at home.² The explanation offered here for his extraordinary self-portrayal is that Xenophon's character is an exemplar, that he projects himself as a model pupil of Socrates behaving as such a pupil would do in this type of situation.³ That *Anabasis* is not intended to be autobiographical is signalled, I suggest, by the author's attribution of the work to another (cf. *Hell.* 3.1.2). At the point of his character's introduction into the story at the start of Book 3, we thus have a pseudonymous narrator and two Xenophons: the author and historical figure who was a participant in the march and the character in the text called Xenophon. Rather, then, than claiming a glorious role for himself, Xenophon is defending an individual whom he holds in

² Calvino (1999: 20) in an essay on *Anabasis* writes: 'on occasions Xenophon appears to be one of those heroes from children's comics, who in every episode appear to survive against impossible odds.' Cawkwell (2004: 60): 'Indeed he never seems to make a mistake. Both in counsel and in action, Xenophon was always right.'

³ In describing Xenophon as a model pupil the intention is not to imply that he is a faultless one (his failure to follow Socrates' advice about the journey is proof that he is not); rather this quality refers to his capacity to apply his learning to any given situation, and to continue to learn from his experiences. Cf. *Mem.* 4.1.2. 'Thus [Socrates] would often say he was "in love", but clearly his heart was set not on those who were fair to outward view, but on those whose souls excelled in goodness. These he recognised by their quickness to learn whatever subject they studied, ability to remember what they learned, and desire for every kind of knowledge on which depend good management of a household and estate and tactful dealing with men and the affairs of men.'

the highest regard. Regardless of whether or not he was, in fact, an outstanding pupil of Socrates, in *Anabasis* his character behaves as such, and as such the work stands as an *apologia* for his teacher. This part demonstrates how, by way of his introduction into the story, Xenophon constructs the framework for his elaborate and innovative defence of Socrates.

Prelude. An. 2.1.12-13.

On the day after the battle in which Cyrus has been killed, the King sent heralds to the Greeks to demand they surrender their weapons. Among them was one Phalinos, a Greek in the service of Tissaphernes. In reply to the demand, a young Athenian tells him: 'We have no other good except our weapons and our virtue. In having our weapons, we think that we could make use of our virtue as well; but if we surrender these, we think we would also be deprived of our lives. Do not think, then, that we will surrender to you the only goods we have, but with these we will do battle over your goods as well.' Phalinos laughed out loud at this and replied: 'But you are like a philosopher, young man, and what you say is not without charm. Know that you are a mindless fool, however, if you think that your virtue could prevail over the King's power' (2.1.12-13).⁴

One family of manuscripts names the young Athenian of this episode as Theopompos, and another names him as Xenophon;⁵ in the former case there are grounds for thinking that Xenophon may be deliberately disguising himself, the name Theopompos, 'sent by god', indicative of the sort of wordplay he shows elsewhere in his writing.⁶ Thus Phalinos' words seem intended by the

⁴ μετὰ τοῦτον [Θεόπομπος] Ἀθηναῖος εἶπεν· ὦ Φαλίνε, νῦν, ὡς σὺ ὀρᾷς, ἡμῖν οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ἄλλο εἰ μὴ ὄπλα καὶ ἀρετὴ. ὄπλα μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες οἴομεθα ἂν καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι, παραδόντες δ' ἂν ταῦτα καὶ τῶν σωματῶν στερηθῆναι. μὴ οὖν οἴου τὰ μόνα ἀγαθὰ ἡμῖν ὄντα ὑμῖν παραδώσειν, ἀλλὰ σὺν τούτοις καὶ περὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων ἀγαθῶν μαχοῦμεθα. ἀκούσας δὲ ταῦτα ὁ Φαλίνοσ ἐγέλασε καὶ εἶπεν· Ἀλλὰ φιλοσόφω μὲν ἔοικας, ὦ νεανίσκε, καὶ λέγεις οὐκ ἀχάριστα· ἴσθι μέντοι ἀνόητος ὢν, εἰ οἶει τὴν ὑμετέραν ἀρετὴν περιγενέσθαι ἂν τῆς βασιλέως δυνάμεως. 2.1.12-13.

⁵ *Anabasis* is preserved in two main families of manuscripts, 'c' and 'f'. The 'c' family here has Theopompos (OCT), while the 'f' has Xenophon. See Ambler's note (2008: 264 n.4) on the two readings. Theopompos appears nowhere else in Xenophon's writings. In addition to this passage, prior to 3.1.4 Xenophon appears three times: at 1.8.15-16, 2.4.15, and 2.5.37-41.

⁶ E.g. Themistogenes, 'descendant of justice' (*Hell.* 3.1.2). See further Erbse 2010: 494, and Strauss 1975: 118.

author to foreshadow the struggle which he, the young philosopher, is destined to engage in. On one level his triumph, and arguably that of Socrates in his own life, is the victory of ἀρετή over δυνάμις.

Xenophon the Athenian. An. 3.1.4-5.

Xenophon formally introduces his character into the story at the start of Book 3, following the treacherous seizure of the Greek commanders by Tissaphernes on the banks of the Greater Zab River. Night has come on, and the men are lying about in despair, convinced they will never see their homeland, family, or friends, again:

4. Among the Greeks there was one Xenophon, an Athenian, who followed the army neither as a general nor a captain nor a common soldier. But rather Proxenos, an old guest-friend of his, had sent for him from his home, promising if he would come to make him friends with Cyrus, whom he said he considered to be better for himself than his fatherland was. 5. After reading the letter Xenophon conferred with Socrates the Athenian about the proposed journey (3.1.4-5, trans. Ambler, modified).⁷

The passage contains three critical assertions about Xenophon and the expedition of Cyrus: he did not go in a military role, let alone as a mercenary; he was invited by a longstanding friend who regarded Cyrus extremely highly; Socrates was consulted about whether or not he should go. As I demonstrate below, the passage is intended to establish that Xenophon embarked on his journey with the aim of exposing himself to new experiences and developing his character.

⁷ Ἦν δέ τις ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ Ξενοφῶν Ἀθηναῖος, ὃς οὔτε στρατηγὸς οὔτε λοχαγὸς οὔτε στρατιώτης ὣν συνηκολούθει, ἀλλὰ Πρόξενος αὐτὸν μετεπέμψατο οἴκοθεν ξένος ὦν ἀρχαῖος· ὑπισχνεῖτο δὲ αὐτῷ, εἰ ἔλθοι, φίλον αὐτὸν Κύρῳ ποιήσειν, ὃν αὐτὸς ἔφη κρείττω ἑαυτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος. ὁ μὲντοι Ξενοφῶν ἀναγνοῦς τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἀνακοινοῦται Σωκράτει τῷ Ἀθηναίῳ περὶ τῆς πορείας. 3.1.4-5.

1. It was argued in Chapter 3.2.4 that Xenophon's statement that he followed the army 'neither as a general nor a captain nor a common soldier' was intended to dissociate himself from mercenary service, and from a military association with Cyrus, whose bankrolling had enabled Sparta to triumph in the Peloponnesian War. I suggest now that the statement also serves to create a space in which another, non-military purpose can emerge clearly. Although Xenophon has already appeared in what seems to be a military capacity (riding out to Cyrus prior to the battle engagement at Kounaxa to learn if he has any announcements to make, 1.8.15), this may be justified in the same manner as his taking up of arms now: namely, as an act required in the particular circumstance of those with whom he is allied facing a severe challenge. It is notable that shortly after he is introduced, the narrator explains that he was deceived as to the purpose of the expedition, and writes: 'the majority nevertheless followed along out of shame both before each other and before Cyrus. Xenophon too was one of these' (3.1.10).

2. Proxenos is 'an old guest-friend' of Xenophon's. We know from his preceding obituary (2.6.16-20) that he was also a student of Gorgias the Sophist, and that he 'desired from his very adolescence to become a man competent to do great things' (εὐθύς μὲν μειράκιον ὧν ἐπεθύμει γενέσθαι ἀνὴρ τὰ μεγάλα πράττειν ἰκανός, 2.6.16). While Xenophon is critical, even contemptuous, of his ambition, he remarks that Proxenos would not be willing to obtain any of his ends unjustly (2.6.18). He goes on to write:

19. He was competent to rule over those who were noble and good; he was not, however, competent to impress upon his soldiers either respect for himself or fear, but he was more ashamed before them than the ruled were before him. And he was manifestly more afraid of being hated by his soldiers than his soldiers were of disobeying him. 20. He thought it was sufficient for being fit to rule, and for seeming to be, to praise

the one who did well and not to praise the one who did something unjust (2.6.19-20).⁸

While Xenophon is doubtless using the obituary of his friend to comment on Gorgias and his brand of philosophy, his main intention is to lead into the core character-development theme of the journey. Proxenos, who is probably about the same age as Xenophon (cf. 2.6.20, and Chapter 1.1.3), is drawn away from his homeland by admiration for Cyrus, whom he considers 'to be better for himself than his fatherland' (3.1.4).⁹ His ambition — to acquire a great name, great power, and much money — is explicitly moderated by a moral compass: 'Although he desired these things exceedingly, it was also clear that he would not be willing to acquire any of them with injustice (μετὰ ἀδικίας) but thought he ought to obtain them with what is just and noble and, if not with these, then not at all' (2.6.18). An outward journey facilitating inner development is thus framed for the young aristocrats.¹⁰ The untimely demise of Proxenos and the success of Xenophon on the retreat serve to emphasise the greater desirability of the Socratic education over that of Gorgias and the other sophists.¹¹ (See *Kynegetikos* for Xenophon's negative attitude towards sophists.)

⁸ ἄρχειν δὲ καλῶν μὲν καὶ ἀγαθῶν δυνατὸς ἦν· οὐ μέντοι οὐτ' αἰδῶ τοῖς στρατιώταις ἑαυτοῦ οὐτε φόβον ἰκανὸς ἐμποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἠσχύνετο μᾶλλον τοὺς στρατιώτας ἢ οἱ ἀρχόμενοι ἐκεῖνον [...] ᾤετο δὲ ἀρκεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἀρχικὸν εἶναι αἱ δοκεῖν τὸν μὲν καλῶς ποιοῦντα ἐπαινεῖν, τὸν δὲ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ ἐπαινεῖν. τοιγαροῦν αὐτῷ οἱ μὲν καλοὶ τε καὶ ἀγαθοὶ τῶν συνόντων εὖνοι ἦσαν, οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι ἐπεβούλευον ὡς εὐμεταχειρίστῳ ὄντι. 2.6.19-20.

⁹ The broad context for this pursuit of individual development is the Classical, particularly Athenian, view that rationality continued to develop up until late middle age. The capacity to reason was considered to grow in tandem with increasing experience. See further Dover 1994: 102-106. Xenophon describes Cyrus the Younger's education and his virtues as a prince in his obituary, 1.9.

¹⁰ There is some other evidence, though not very compelling, for the youthful pair being involved in philosophical activity prior to this adventure. Philostratos, writing in the third century A.D., says that Xenophon, having been captured before the Battle of Arginousai (in 406) and held prisoner in Boiotia, secured his release on bail in order to attend lectures by Prodikos, the eminent Khian sophist (*Vitae Sophistarum* 1.12). Anderson (1974: 18) makes a connection with Proxenos, and suggests that he could have arranged the release. An essay of Prodikos, 'On Herakles', is referred to in the *Memorabilia* (2.1.21-34).

¹¹ Widening the field for comparative philosophical commentary by Xenophon, Howland (2000) argues that *Anabasis* is a 'companion piece' to Plato's *Republic*, and that Xenophon sought to engage Plato in a dialogue about the nature of Socratic philosophising: 'both works can be viewed as variations on a common set of themes and issues, as meditations that are best appreciated in tandem, just insofar as one of them takes the measure of the other' (877). Howland contends that both works, in highlighting the unattainability of ideal communities, show us the limits of politics (883).

3. Xenophon's consultation with Socrates on whether or not to join Cyrus has long attracted the attention of readers.¹² It has been used to support the view that he was a prominent pupil of Socrates, and has been summoned as evidence for supporting the claim that association with Cyrus or with Socrates constituted the cause of his banishment from Athens. The meeting furthermore furnishes evidence for reading *Anabasis* as a personal *apologia* (see Chapter 3.3.2.2), and perhaps for an attempt to bolster the image of the expedition through a Socratic connection. My view is that the meeting may not actually have taken place, and that it fits rather into the paradigmatic scheme of *Anabasis*.¹³ However even if it did not take place, its literary value is not reduced — the prime function of the episode in the narrative is, I argue, to situate Socrates at the heart of Xenophon's decision to join Cyrus. At once, the philosophical aspect of the enterprise is underscored, and Socrates, by his concern, becomes a presence that will be linked to the trials his pupil is fated to undergo in the months ahead.¹⁴ Xenophon's subsequent failure to follow the advice given by Socrates emphasises his youthful character and is symbolic of the need he stands in of the sort of training he cannot obtain within the Socratic circle.¹⁵ There is little doubt that (Xenophon's) Socrates would have approved of

He envisages Xenophon's journey in similar terms as described here but with a different emphasis on the Socratic relationship: 'The *Anabasis* is also...the story of Xenophon's intellectual and moral growth. It traces the path of his personal appropriation of the wisdom of Socrates, whom Xenophon leaves behind in Athens' (876).

¹² See for example: Wood 1964: 35; Strauss 1975: 123-124; Wencis 1977: 47; Higgins 1977: 83, 98; Dillery 1995: 72; Humble 1997: 11-12; Gray 1998: 98-99, and 2007: 17; Bradley 2001: 77; Rood 2006: 56-59; Ferrario 2009: 20-21; Tsagalis 2009: 451-452; Erbse 2010: 487-488. Humble's observation (2002: 66-67) that the views of modern scholars on Xenophon's relation to Socrates are frequently dictated by their own pre-determined attitudes towards him and his work is notably applicable to interpretations of this famous scene.

¹³ See Chapter 1.3.2 and Chapter 2.1. Danzig (2004: 18) remarks on the suspect historicity of other Xenophontic encounters with Socrates. Cf. Kahn (1996: 33) who thinks the episode did occur.

¹⁴ On occasion the presence is made distinct through parallels, as for instance when at Kotyora Xenophon (along with the other leaders) stands trial before the army (5.8.1): see Part 3, 'Socrates in *Anabasis*'. Howland (2000: 880) argues that Socrates' presence has already been signalled in the opening lines of Book 3 (1.2) through the use of *aporia*, this word 'the hallmark of a philosophical encounter with Socrates'. The word is also used at 3.1.11, preceding the description of Xenophon's fateful dream. I am not myself convinced of this point, not least as the word seems singularly appropriate given the army's predicament.

¹⁵ This action itself allows for multiple readings. Wencis (1977: 47) thinks that it provides a glimpse of 'Xenophon's ability to make his own decisions, a foreshadowing of his potential for leadership'; other readers see a show of impetuous disobedience,

the initiative, his reservation in the reported case being the potential dangers to his pupil that could arise from association with Cyrus the Younger.¹⁶

These three elements, then, of what is the key passage to the work together construct the framework within which the account of the retreat is to be read.¹⁷ The young Athenian, a student of Socrates ambitious to learn from a prince of the Persian court, sets off across the Aegean on his personal *anabasis*. 'So after sacrificing to the ones the god had indicated, Xenophon sailed off. He overtook Proxenos and Cyrus at Sardis, when they were already about to set out on their upward journey, and he was introduced to Cyrus' (ὁ μὲν δὴ Ξενοφῶν οὕτω θυσάμενος οἷς ἀνεῖλεν ὁ θεὸς ἐξέπλει, καὶ καταλαμβάνει ἐν Σάρδεσι Πρόξενον καὶ Κῦρον μέλλοντας ἤδη ὁρμᾶν τὴν ἄνω ὁδόν, καὶ συνεστάθη Κύρῳ. 3.1.8).

Later evidence that this was indeed how Xenophon intended his participation to be portrayed comes from his biographer, Diogenes Laertios, who saw fit to write this epigram on his subject (2.58, trans. Hicks, modified):¹⁸

Not only did Xenophon march up to Persia on account of Cyrus,
But to search for some way that would lead up to Zeus.
Having shown Greek achievements to be owed to his education,
He called to mind how beautiful was the wisdom of Socrates.

and the pupil's assertion of independence from his teacher: cf. Wood 1964: 35, Rood 2006: 61. Rood assumes that had Xenophon taken his teacher's advice he would *not* have gone on the expedition; he may be referring to Socrates' sceptical stance, but otherwise it surely cannot be excluded that the oracle would have responded positively to the question Socrates wished him to ask.

¹⁶ Cf. *Mem.* 4.1.2 (cited in note 3 above). At *Oik.* 4.18 Socrates declares that, 'if Cyrus had lived, he would, I think, have proved himself an excellent ruler'. Thus the prince's potential as a model of good leadership is affirmed. (There may be a contradiction lurking here in that, by the dramatic date of this work, the over ambitious and indeed morally suspect nature of Cyrus's expedition must have been known to Socrates. This seems to be another case of paradigm clashing with reality.)

¹⁷ Bradley's analysis of Xenophon's literary construction of the text leads him to argue for two narrative strands, history in Books 1-2, and 'novelesque autobiography' in Books 3-7; he attributes the narrative transformation to the new situation of the army (2001: 74).

¹⁸ οὐ μόνον ἐς Πέρσας ἀνέβη Ξενοφῶν διὰ Κῦρον,
ἀλλ' ἄνοδον ζητῶν ἐς Διὸς ἦτις ἄγοι,
παιδείης παρ' ἑῆς Ἑλληνικὰ πράγματα δείξας,
ὡς καλὸν ἢ σοφίῃ μνήσατο Σωκράτεος. 2.58.

The Philosopher Armed. An. 3.1.13-14.

Back in real narrative time Xenophon's world has changed dramatically. With the Greek high command decapitated, he finds himself in mortal peril in a land far from Greece. Awakening from a dream, he articulates his new reality, his linear analysis and persistent questioning of himself emphasising already his Socratic training:

Why I am lying here? The night is passing and at dawn the enemy will probably arrive. If we fall into the king's hands, we will surely die inglorious deaths, after witnessing all the most terrible scenes one could possibly imagine and suffering the full range of the most gruesome tortures. Yet no one is showing the slightest interest in defence or doing anything practical about it; we are just lying here as if we were in a position to be at ease. From what other city do I expect a general to come and organise things? Why am I waiting? How old do I have to be? I will not get any older at all if I just surrender to the enemy today (3.1.13-14).¹⁹

So the student is impelled into action. Rising, he calls together the captains of his slain companion and urges them to take their fate in hand. 'Let us not wait for others to come and call us to these most noble deeds: let us be the ones who begin to incite the others to virtue' (3.1.24). Xenophon is appointed as the leader of Proxenos' contingent, and following a conclave of generals, an assembly of the entire army is called. The young Athenian accoutres himself in his finest armour and prepares to address the soldiers. His character and learning are now to be tested in the crucible of war. Socrates is on trial again: success will be a testimony to the worth of his teaching, failure, another proof of his pernicious influence on the youth of Athens.

¹⁹ τί κατάκειμαι; ἢ δὲ νύξ προβαίνει· ἅμα δὲ τῆ ἡμέρα εἰκὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἦξειν. εἰ δὲ γενησόμεθα ἐπὶ βασιλεῖ, τί ἐμποδὼν μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα μὲν τὰ χαλεπώτατα ἐπιδόντας, πάντα δὲ τὰ δεινότατα παθόντας ὑβρίζομένους ἀποθανεῖν; ὅπως δ' ἀμυνούμεθα οὐδεὶς παρασκευάζεται οὐδὲ ἐπιμελεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατακείμεθα ὥσπερ ἔξον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν. ἐγὼ οὖν τὸν ἐκ ποίας πόλεως στρατηγὸν προσδοκῶ ταῦτα πράξειν; ποίαν δ' ἡλικίαν ἐμαυτῷ ἐλθεῖν ἀναμείνω; οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγ' ἔτι πρεσβύτερος ἔσομαι, ἐὰν τήμερον προδῶ ἐμαυτὸν τοῖς πολεμίσις. 3.1.13-14.

PART 2. SOCRATES AND HIS CIRCLE. ACCUSERS AND DEFENDERS

In Chapter 1.2.1 Xenophon's interest in philosophy and his relationship with Socrates was touched upon. This is complemented and expanded upon in the first section of this part by means of a more detailed look at Socrates' life and teaching. In the second section the charges made against him are outlined, and in the third the impact of his trial and the enduring literary legacy produced by his followers is looked at.

Life of Socrates

Socrates is not believed to have written anything in his lifetime, and most of what we know of him derives from the surviving accounts of his life and teachings provided by his pupils, contemporaries, and the later biographical tradition.²⁰ The principal surviving first-hand sources are Aristophanes, Plato, and Xenophon.²¹ Each presents a portrait of the philosopher that is in important ways different from the other: from the 'pretentious parasite' of Aristophanes, to Plato's inquisitive intellectual, to Xenophon's practically orientated ethical philosopher. Extracting the historical figure from these records has proven to be as contentious an exercise as it is problematic; doubtless, each account contains elements of truth, but how much can probably never be known.²² An

²⁰ Plato (*Phaedo* 59c-61c) says that he wrote poetry in prison, though nothing of this survives. The later biographical tradition is extensive, diverse, and frequently contradictory. To take an example, Diogenes Laertios (2.20) refers to an Aristoxenos who has Socrates as a banker: 'he would at all events invest sums, collect the interest accruing, and then, when this was expended, put out the principal again'. It has been well put that Socrates is both the best known and the least known of ancient philosophers.

²¹ Aristotle, who was born after the death of Socrates, makes frequent reference to him in his works, but his remarks are considered to be based mostly if not completely on Plato's picture. See Waterfield (2004: 86), and generally *New Pauly* entry on Socrates, and Nails' entry in the *Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*.

²² Dorion (2006: 95-96) presents 17 differences between the Socrateses of Plato and Xenophon and asserts that 'there is no hope of harmonising their doctrines'; *contra* Pomeroy (1994: 23): 'Socrates' method of enquiry, his personality, and some of his ideas, as reported by Xenophon on the one hand and by Plato on the other are, in my view, essentially reconcilable'. In recognition of an acceptance of meaningful alternative pictures some scholars now speak of Socrates^p and Socrates^x. Aristophanes' is the earliest portrait of the philosopher, and he is the only one of the surviving sources who could claim to have known him as a younger man; however, the fact that his picture was produced in a comedic context may make it less historically valuable than the other two. But some think that his Socrates is a Pythagorean, and

historical picture of Socrates can, nonetheless, be tentatively sketched from what appears to be common in the reports from antiquity, and from what is known of the times through which he lived and died. In this latter regard, the context for Xenophon at Athens in the closing years of the fifth century provided in Chapter 1 is relevant here too, notably the circumstance that both men found themselves part of a minority towards whom the restored democracy was not well disposed.

Diogenes Laertios (2.44), citing the authority of Apollodoros (*Chronology* 34), says that Socrates was born in the archonship of Apsephion, in the fourth year of the 77th Olympiad. This places his birth in 469-68, some forty years before Xenophon and Plato. A sculptor by trade, he is said to have had works displayed before the entrance to the Akropolis during the time of Pericles.²³ While he does not seem to have been prosperous, he was sufficiently well off to serve as a hoplite at Potidaea in 432 and in early campaigns of the war with Sparta. From the reports of Plato and the later biographer Diogenes he was not lacking in valour or stamina, and was regarded highly by those who served with him and against him.²⁴

A common theme of the biographical tradition is the philosopher's physical oddness. A thick-set frame marked by a pot-belly, bulging eyes, and flaring nostrils, is said to have made him more akin to a satyr than a man.²⁵ He went about barefoot and was impervious to cold and alcohol; on his drinking prowess, no less a figure than Alkibiades enthused that he could drink anyone under the table, and that nobody had ever seen him drunk.²⁶ It is likely, though, that there is a degree of exaggeration in the depiction of his person and

that this characterisation could well be a true reflection of the philosopher as a young man: see *Birds* 1553-64 and the interpretation of this passage by Ogden 2009: 27. On the 'Socratic Question' see notably Dorion 2006, Waterfield 2004 (with references on p.86), Danzig 2003, Vlastos 1991 (chaps. 2-3) and 1983.

²³ Statutes of the *Charities* and an image of *Hermes Propylaios*. Pausanias 1.22.8, 9.35.7; Diogenes Laertios 2.18-19; Suidas s.v. *Sokrates*.

²⁴ Socrates in battle: Plato, *Symposium* 220d-e, 221a, *Laches* 181b; Diogenes Laertios 2.22-3.

²⁵ On Socrates' appearance see: Plato, *Theaetetus* 143e, *Symposium* 215a-216e; Xenophon, *Symposium* 2.19, 4.19, 5.5-7; Aristophanes, *Clouds* 362.

²⁶ Barefoot: Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.6.2; Plato, *Symposium* 220b; Aristophanes, *Clouds* 103, 363. Drinking: Plato, *Symposium* 220a. Gill (1973: 27) points out that Plato's description of Socrates' controlled reaction to his poisoning in the *Phaedo* could be intended to underline his physical toughness.

constitution, a natural tendency where a larger-than-life character is concerned. For their part, the intentions of both Plato and Xenophon in highlighting Socrates' outward rawness are doubtless to draw attention to the inner beauty of his soul, emphasising that it is this state which the philosopher desires.²⁷

From Plato and Xenophon we learn that his main approach to teaching was based on the elimination of what is not true as a path to what is. His engine for this process was a series of questions which probed the axioms underlying his interlocutors' assumptions about the world and their own place in it.²⁸ This method drew many into his circle, though it irked some and intimidated others.²⁹ His fame, or infamy, soon earned him a place in the popular culture of the day: in the City Dionysia of 423 he was a main character in Aristophanes' comic play, *Clouds*. In it he is cast as a deranged head of a school which teaches young men, among other things, how to avoid repaying their debts (1214-1302), and that it is just to beat their parents into submission (1408-46). Commenting on a passage (358-363) in which Prodikos is referred to admiringly, and Socrates dismissively — σὺ τε, λεπτοτάτων λήρων ἱερεῦ ('and you, priest of the most subtle trifles', 358, trans. Dover) — Dover writes that the lines are 'intelligible as comedy only if we believe that Aristophanes shared the popular esteem of Prodikos as an artist, and regarded Socrates, by contrast, as a pretentious parasite who inexplicably fascinated some wealthy young men but had nothing coherent to say and produced nothing of any artistic merit'.³⁰ Whatever the truth of Aristophanes' characterisation, as Plato has Socrates himself argue at the

²⁷ Cf. Socrates' prayer to Pan. 'O beloved Pan and all ye other gods of this place, grant to me that I be made beautiful in my soul within, and that all external possessions be in harmony with my inner man. May I consider the wise man rich; and may I have such wealth as only the self restrained man can bear or endure' (Plato, *Phaedrus* 279b-c).

²⁸ Although Xenophon seems to downplay the prominence of the elenchus (cf. *Mem.* 1.4.1), he uses the technique himself: e.g. Socrates with Euthydemus, *Mem.* 4.2.8-39. Socrates denied that he was a *didaskalos* (cf. Plato, *Apologia* 19e), but probably to distance himself from sophists who took money for their teaching services; Socrates did not (cf. *Mem.* 1.2.5-7; Plato, *Apologia* 19e), although Aristophanes has his Socrates appear to accept a payment in *Clouds* 1146 ff.

²⁹ Diogenes Laertios (2.21) writes: 'frequently, owing to his vehemence in argument, men set upon him with their fists or tore his hair out'. Even in the *logoi*, there are hints that having Socrates and his companions pay a visit could be a daunting experience: cf. *Mem.* 4.2.1-2.

³⁰ Dover 1968: lv-lvi.

opening of his trial (*Apologia* 18a-b, 19c), the poisonous image of him painted in the play endured in the minds of many.³¹

Plato and Xenophon emphasise that to the very end of his life Socrates was an ardent believer in the sanctity of the law. In his *Memorabilia* Xenophon writes: 'All his private conduct was lawful and helpful: to public authority he rendered such scrupulous obedience in all that the laws required, both in civil life and in military service, that he was a pattern of good discipline to all' (4.4.1).³² Specific examples of this behaviour that are recorded include his refusal, while serving on the Council's presiding committee in 406, to support the decision of the Assembly to put forward an illegal motion concerning the fate of the generals from the Arginousai campaign (this being to judge them collectively, not severally: *Hell.* 1.7.9-15, and see also *Mem.* 1.1.18, Plato, *Apology* 32b, *Gorgias* 473e); then during the reign of the Thirty, when the regime sought to implicate other Athenians in their crimes, he refused to take part in the arrest of a man who had not committed any offence (Plato, *Apology* 32c-d).

Socrates' concern for upholding the law was a part of his mission to produce virtuous citizens for the state. The process of acquiring virtue (*areté*) was the path to becoming *kalos kagathos*, a condition which enabled men to benefit themselves and others, or in Xenophon's words, 'to do their duty by house and household, and relatives and friends, and city and citizens' (*Mem.* 1.2.48).³³ A specific group of interest to Socrates were young men of outstanding potential; these individuals he would attempt to pick out and then prepare for leadership

³¹ That version 1 of *Clouds* was placed last in the 423 competition may (or may not) say something about the representation of Socrates in it. Socrates appeared in other of Aristophanes' plays, as well as ones by Kallias, Eupolis, and Telekleides, in nearly all cases his portrayal being along the same negative lines as in *Clouds*. (Fragment 372 from Eupolis reads: 'I hate Socrates who has thought everything out but ignored the problem how to provide himself with food'.)

³² ἰδίᾳ τε πᾶσι νομίμως τε καὶ ὠφελίμως χρώμενος καὶ κοινῇ ἄρχουσι τε ἃ οἱ νόμοι προστάττειεν πειθόμενος καὶ κατὰ πόλιν καὶ ἐν ταῖς στρατείαις οὕτως ὥστε διάδηλος εἶναι παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους εὐτακτῶν. *Mem.* 4.4.1.

³³ It is worth emphasising that the term *areté* - excellence, good quality, good disposition - covers a range of meanings. In common usage it tended to indicate either valour or brave deeds, or a moral quality. The term is discussed at length by Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics* Books 2-6. Tamiolaki (2009: 2) suggests that Xenophon uses the word in two ways: in a political/military sense, this mostly in his historical writings, and, mainly in his Socratic works, with a moral sense.

roles in the state (cf. *Mem.* 1.6.15, 3.1-7).³⁴ Among those with links to his circle were several of the leading political figures at Athens at the close of the fifth century. However in spite of his influence, not all turned out as he would have liked: Kritias became a leader of the Thirty Tyrants, and Alkibiades, whom Socrates is said to have saved at Potidaia in 432 (Plutarch, *Alkibiades* 7), and struggled to save from a life of hedonism, did not in the end realise his full potential.³⁵

Although he opposed neither side in the civil war at Athens in 404-03, Socrates antagonised both, and was held in deep suspicion by many in the *demos*. Natural scepticism concerning the practice of philosophical inquiry on the part of the conservative majority was intensified by the turbulence that had brought Athenian society to its knees in the preceding quarter century; that the aforementioned Kritias and Alkibiades had central roles in the more catastrophic episodes provided a basis for their disapproval (cf. *Mem.* 1.2.12). Socrates' presence following the restoration was especially unwelcome to the leaders of the *demos*. As a potent symbol of non-conformity, he rose inevitably to the top of the list of personalities whom the new democracy, loosing itself from the shackles of Sparta, regarded as a threat to its viability. As concluded in Chapter 1, his trial was ultimately a part of a determined effort to uproot opposition and clear the way for a fresh period of democratic rule.

*The Charges against Socrates and his trial*³⁶

In 399 an indictment was brought against Socrates by three of his fellow citizens, Meletos, Anytos, and Lykon. Diogenes Laertios preserves the wording in his biography of the philosopher:

³⁴ His initial encounter with Xenophon as reported by Diogenes Laertios (2.48) may be seen in this context.

³⁵ Alkibiades, a byword for flamboyance in Classical literature, was famously implicated in a scandal involving the mutilation of the city's Hermes statues. Thucydides remarked that the people, 'feared him for the extent of the lawlessness of his lifestyle, and his attitude towards everything in which he was involved' (6.15.4, trans. Hammond, modified).

³⁶ The literature on Socrates' trial is extensive. My objective in this section is only to summarise the historical event. For the trial and its political and social context, see for example Sato 2008, Nails 2006, Brickhouse and Smith 2002, Munn 2000, B. Strauss 1986.

This indictment and affidavit are sworn by Meletos, the son of Meletos of the deme Pitthos, against Socrates, the son of Sophroniscos of the deme Alopecce: Socrates is guilty of refusing to recognise the gods recognized by the state, and of introducing new divinities. He is also guilty of corrupting the youth. The penalty demanded is death (2.40).³⁷

Meletos and Lykon were not well-known characters, a minor poet and orator respectively, but Anytos was a distinguished statesman and an important figure in the restored democracy; this suggests that the prosecution, if not orchestrated by leading democrats, had the support of some of them.³⁸ That the case did have its origins in politics rather than justice is apparent from the later robust refutation of the charges by several of the Socratics; one of these, Xenophon, comments sarcastically to emphasise the point: 'I wonder (θαυμάζω), then, how the Athenians can have been persuaded that Socrates was a freethinker, when he never did or said anything contrary to sound religion...no less wonderful is it to me that some believed the charge brought against Socrates of corrupting the youth' (*Mem.* 1.1.20-1.2.1).

Socrates made his own defence speech at the trial, though Lysias is said to have prepared one for him.³⁹ Having heard defendant and prosecutors, the jury found Socrates guilty by a clear but not sizeable majority (approximately 280 to 220, on the assumption of 500 jury members: cf. Plato, *Apology* 36a). Exercising his right to propose an alternative punishment to the death penalty,

³⁷ τάδε ἐγράψατο καὶ ἀντωμόσατο Μέλητος Μελήτου Πιτθεύς Σωκράτει Σωφρονίσκου Ἄλωπτεκίῃθεν· ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης, οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. τίμημα θάνατος. Diogenes Laertios 2.40. See also Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.1.1, *Apologia* 10; Plato, *Apologia* 24b.

³⁸ In Plato's *Meno* (90b-95a) Anytos is offended by Socrates, an outcome which points to a personal animosity between the two men. However the historicity of the encounter is not assured, and in any event does not rule out a politically motivated trial. For an excellent recent study of Anytos and his role in the prosecution of Socrates see Sato 2008.

³⁹ In his biography of Socrates, Diogenes Laertios (2.40-41) says that he read the speech of Lysias and, though impressed, thought it not suitable for him. 'If it is a fine speech, how can it fail to suit you? Well, [Socrates replied to him] 'would not fine raiment and fine shoes be just as unsuitable to me?' Cf. Gray (1989b: 140) for an interpretation of this to the effect that Socrates rejected the speech because it failed to portray his own high-mindedness (*megalegoria*) well enough.

Socrates suggested that he be maintained at the public expense, and though he subsequently offered to pay a fine, his uncompromising attitude through the trial probably led to his death (cf. Plato, *Apologia* 36d and 38b).

The Socratic Writings

There is some evidence that the Athenians were remorseful after convicting Socrates. Diogenes Laertios (2.43) says that they shut up the training grounds and gymnasia, banished Anytos and Lykon, and put Meletos to death.⁴⁰ On the other hand there is evidence of lingering unpopularity. A work dated to the late 390s by the Athenian rhetorician Polykrates, *Accusation of Socrates*, speaks of Socrates' malignant effect on Kritias and Alkibiades. (The banishment of Xenophon from Athens, dated between 399 and 394, is not a particularly useful indicator of public feeling here as the later date would more likely be due to his links with Sparta than Socrates.)

For those in Socrates' circle, his trial and death were an understandable cause of pain and dismay. In the years following, many set about defending his memory, giving rise to a genre of *Sokratikoi logoi*. In these Socrates is typically the central character and his virtues, and his value to friends and city, are emphasised through dialogue and deed.⁴¹ Known authors of such works include Antisthenes, Aeschines, Euclides, Phaedo, Simmias, Plato, and Xenophon. The latter two were prominent in this movement, developing inventive literary forms in order to defend the memory of Socrates and promote the value of his philosophy.⁴² There is a longstanding debate about the extent to which Socrates

⁴⁰ The veracity of this report has been questioned, though attempts to undermine it are not helped by the obscurity of the protagonists, in particular the later life of Anytos.

⁴¹ For the term *Sokratikoi logoi* see Aristotle, *Poetics* 1447b11. In speaking of a 'Socratic work', I draw a distinction between a *logos* and an *apologia*, the former being a prose work which has Socrates as its main protagonist, e.g. *Oikonomikos*, the latter a piece whose primary aim is to address the charges made against Socrates, e.g. Plato, Xenophon *Apologia*. A Socratic work can, then, be defined as one which aims particularly to defend Socrates against the charges made against him at his trial, and/or generally portrays his character and teaching in favourable light. This definition allows *Anabasis*, where the presence of Socrates through the retreat is implied, and in which the charges against him are challenged, to be categorised as a Socratic work.

⁴² The men's relationship is unclear, though they were undoubtedly acquainted with one another's work. Plato does not mention Xenophon in his writings, but is probably criticising his *Kyroupaideia* in *Laws* 694c6-7, where the Athenian Stranger says that Cyrus 'was entirely without a right education, and had paid no attention to household

in these writings serves as a vehicle for the thoughts and individual outlooks of the authors.

Xenophon, who was not in the city for Socrates' trial, and so may have felt a greater sense of frustration than others connected to the philosopher, is regarded as having authored four 'Socratic works': *Apologia*, *Memorabilia*, *Symposion*, and *Oikonomikos*. Socrates is the central figure in each, and in different ways they each present his personal qualities and teachings, with the aim of underlining that he was ὠφέλιμος to friends and city alike. Although they aim at the same end, the works set about their task in subtly different ways, evidence of the author's artistic impulse in seeking originality of expression. Alert to his subtlety, some have argued that other of Xenophon's works are Socratic too, notably the *Kyroupaideia*, the chief character in which may be an embodiment of the philosopher's teachings.⁴³

The historical and philosophical worth of these books has, however, long been a matter of contention, with precedence on both counts being afforded to Plato in the modern era. The latter's early dialogues in particular have been thought by many scholars to contain the most accurate picture of Socrates and his teaching. The suspicion that Xenophon used Socrates as a mouthpiece for his own ideas is founded principally on the view that opinions, and even situations, assigned to Socrates by Xenophon are often somehow incongruous: Socrates discoursing on farming practice, generalship, and dancing at a *Symposion*.⁴⁴ Yet given the fact that so little concrete is known about Socrates' life, claims of

management'; Xenophon names Plato only once, at *Mem.* 3.6.1. In his biography of Plato, Diogenes Laertios (3.34) writes that 'Xenophon was not on good terms with him', and goes on to say that they wrote in competition with one another. Athenaeus (11.112) similarly remarks on rivalry. Modern scholars are divided on the matter of their relationship. Pomeroy (1994: 26) argues strongly against the assumption that, where the two cross literary and philosophical paths, Xenophon was copying from Plato; Waterfield (2004: 107-109) lists 18 instances in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and *Symposion* where he argues the author is drawing on Plato.

⁴³ Whidden (2008: 31 n.3) argues persuasively that the plural pronouns ('we', 'us', 'our') used by Xenophon in the *Kyroupaideia* prologue are meant to refer to Socratics, and concludes that it was Xenophon's conversations with Socrates that motivated him to write the work. See also Gera 1993: chapter 2.

⁴⁴ *Oik.* 19, *Mem.* 3.1-5, and *Sym.* 2.15-21 respectively. Socrates^x famously dismisses speculations on the nature of the universe as useless (*Mem.* 1.1.11-16), but Socrates^p is also principally concerned with ethics (cf. *Phaedo* 96a-100a). This picture of the philosopher is starkly different to that of Aristophanes in *Clouds*.

this sort are not watertight; the oddness, even faint absurdity of Xenophon's image of Socrates (and indeed that of Aristophanes') to a modern reader, arises from the iconic status which Plato's Socrates has assumed in our time.⁴⁵ What Xenophon may actually be doing is providing a supplement, if not a corrective, to what he viewed as the subjective portrait of his counterpart. This would explain why his picture is starkly different at points, and why he, for example, seems to downplay the importance of Platonic features such as the elenchus (cf. *Mem.* 1.4.1). But it is perhaps more likely to be the case that he is presenting a moral exemplar, the *kalos kagathos*, inspired by the life and teaching of Socrates as he himself interpreted them.

For the purpose of the present argument the question of Xenophon's faithfulness to the 'real' Socrates and to his philosophy, whatever these may have been, is not critical: the overriding point is that his intention is to *defend* the memory of Socrates, and this project is not unduly affected by nuances in his historical representation. For argument's sake, even if Xenophon were using Socrates as a mouthpiece to promote his own philosophy, the roundly positive representation of Socrates in any case constitutes a *de facto* defence of the historical figure. Indeed it would be surprising if Xenophon's Socrates, like other historical figures depicted in his writings, did not have a marked paradigmatic character (cf. Cyrus the Great, Agesilaos).⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Nails (2006: 5) remarks that through his dialogues Plato's account of the indictment, trial, and execution of Socrates, has become 'philosophy's founding myth', and has immortalised Socrates in the popular imagination. Socrates' most widely known statement, 'The unexamined life is not worth living', comes from Plato's *Apologia* (38a). This primacy, however, is a modern phenomenon, the pair having been by and large ranked at the same level and held in equal esteem up until the 20th century. Waterfield (2004: 79) suggests that it is 'really only with the rise of analytic philosophy, to which Plato's concerns are more akin, that Plato's stature in this respect has overtaken that of Xenophon'.

⁴⁶ Gray, arguing that Xenophon constructed Socrates' character in the *Apologia* in light of a rhetorical theory, cautions against the historicity of the figure: 'The Socrates of literature might need to be different from the Socrates of real life if he were to convince the audience' (1989b: 139). Cf. in a similar vein Gill (1973: 28), who detects in Plato's description of Socrates' death in the *Phaedo* an instance of an historical event being transformed into a representation of a philosophical idea: '[this] should alert us to the possibility that many of what seem to be authentic glimpses into the life, and death, of the historical Socrates may in fact be illustrative pictures, attached or inset, like the myths of the dialogues, into Plato's arguments'.

PART 3. DEFENCE OF SOCRATES

In Part 1 it was shown how in *Anabasis* Xenophon carefully introduced himself as a model pupil of Socrates seeking to further his learning. Part 2 highlighted key aims of Xenophon's Socrates' teaching, namely the production of virtuous citizens and the preparation of promising young men for leadership of the state. In this final part of the chapter the argument is developed that Xenophon, himself one of the promising talents nurtured by the philosopher, from his introduction in Book 3 to the conclusion of his *Anabasis*, is defending Socrates against the charges brought against him in 399. The linkage between his exemplary conduct and the charges is established firstly through the character of his leadership style and secondly by the philosopher being a prominent presence in the book. The Socratic character of Xenophon's leadership was argued for in Chapter 2, and in the first section of this part, the case for Socrates' pronounced presence on the retreat is made. In the second and third sections it is demonstrated how Xenophon combats each of the charges against his teacher.⁴⁷

Socrates in Anabasis

Socrates appears only once in the story, this at the opening of the third book, when the author recounts how he was invited to join Cyrus the Younger by Proxenos, and how he thereafter sought the advice of Socrates: (3.1.4 is quoted in Part 1 above)

5. After reading the letter [from Proxenos] Xenophon conferred with Socrates the Athenian about the proposed journey. And Socrates, suspecting that becoming a friend of Cyrus might bring an accusation from the city, because Cyrus had seemed

⁴⁷ The charge of refusing to recognise the gods recognized by the state, and of introducing new divinities, has been analysed in detail by scholars, with various interpretations arising on its meanings and the culpability of the defendant (cf. Munn 2000, and more recently Sato 2008 and Waterfield 2009). In the present treatment the compound charge is conflated into impiety, and Xenophon's actions set against this measure. The gods whom he sacrifices to on the retreat are traditional ones, and, in so far as I am aware, no new deities are introduced (Zeus Meilichios, whom Xenophon sacrifices to at the end, had been honoured by his family in Athens for at least a generation: cf. 7.8.4).

eager in joining the Lakedaimonians in making war against the Athenians, advised Xenophon to go to Delphi and take common counsel with the god about the journey. 6. But having gone Xenophon asked Apollo to which one of the gods he should sacrifice and pray in order to make the journey he had in mind in the noblest and best way and, having done well, to return safely. And Apollo indicated to him the gods to whom he needed to sacrifice. 7. When he came back again, he told the oracle to Socrates; upon hearing it, Socrates blamed him because he did not first ask whether it was more advisable for him to make the journey or to remain, but he himself had judged that he was to go and then inquired how he might go most nobly. 'However, since you did ask it in this way,' he said, 'you must do all that the god ordered' (3.1.5-7, trans. Ambler, modified).⁴⁸

There are several elements of this episode which render the appearance of Socrates in it of paramount significance to the story. Firstly, as shown in Part 1, the passage is a part of Xenophon's extraordinary introduction of himself into the story: Socrates' involvement in this is accordingly marked as significant *per se*. Secondly, Socrates is central to the decision to join Cyrus the Younger, a decision which it is evident to the informed reader is one of the most important of Xenophon's life; embedded as it is in the desperate situation which the army finds itself in, Socrates' role assumes significance as well for the fate of the Ten Thousand. The fact that Xenophon ignores the advice he is given is intended to underline his lack of wisdom at this point and at the same time this action serves to exonerate Socrates from any suspicion that it was under his influence

⁴⁸ ὁ μέντοι Ξενοφῶν ἀναγνοῦς τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἀνακοινοῦται Σωκράτει τῷ Ἀθηναίῳ περὶ τῆς πορείας. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ὑποπτεύσας μὴ τι πρὸς τῆς πόλεως ὑπαίτιον εἶη Κύρω φίλον γενέσθαι, ὅτι ἐδόκει ὁ Κύρος προθύμως τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας συμπολεμῆσαι, συμβουλεύει τῷ Ξενοφῶντι ἐλθόντα εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀνακοινῶσαι τῷ θεῷ περὶ τῆς πορείας. ἐλθὼν δ' ὁ Ξενοφῶν ἐπήρητο τὸν Ἀπόλλω τίνι ἂν θεῶν θύων καὶ εὐχόμενος κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα ἔλθοι τὴν ὁδὸν ἣν ἐπινοεῖ καὶ καλῶς πράξας σωθεῖν. καὶ ἀνεῖλεν αὐτῷ ὁ Ἀπόλλων θεοῖς οἷς ἔδει θύειν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πάλιν ἦλθε, λέγει τὴν μαντείαν τῷ Σωκράτει. ὁ δ' ἀκούσας ἠτιᾶτο αὐτὸν ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο πρῶτον ἠρώτα πότερον λῶν εἶη αὐτῷ πορεύεσθαι ἢ μένειν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς κρίνας ἰτέον εἶναι τοῦτ' ἐπυνθάνετο ὅπως ἂν κάλλιστα πορευθεῖν. ἐπεὶ μέντοι οὕτως ἦρου, ταῦτ', ἔφη, χρὴ ποιεῖν ὅσα ὁ θεὸς ἐκέλευσεν. 3.1.5-7.

that Xenophon left to join Cyrus. The establishment of Xenophon's state of immaturity further adds to the dramatic tension in the story by casting in doubt his ability to undertake the daunting challenge of leadership; an early tactical mistake which draws the ire of Kheirisophos confirms the scale of the challenge facing the young Athenian (3.3.8-11). Xenophon's ultimate success, which builds steadily through his trials on the retreat, is thus made the more impressive and duly reflects on the training of Socrates, whose presence, established in this key episode, is now felt through the course of the retreat. A final point is that the appearance of Socrates, if not actually unsurprising (in *Mem.* 1.1.6, from the circumstances of the episode in question, we can infer that Xenophon was an intimate associate of the philosopher), is not essential: if he wished to show himself semi-wise by seeking advice, Xenophon need not have named Socrates as his advisor.

Although he does not mention him by name again, in several episodes through the narrative, Xenophon conjures the presence of Socrates. This is so for instance at Kotyora, when Xenophon (along with the other generals) stands trial before the army (5.8.1): that these are the very people he has struggled to benefit in the preceding months recalls the fate of Socrates and the Athenian democratic habit of eliminating its best citizens. In this sense the episode also foreshadows the author's exile. Another notable instance in which Socrates is recalled is in the fact of Xenophon's loyalty to the army: his repeated and selfless commitment to its safety (7.1.4, 7.6.11, 7.7.57) brings to mind Socrates' refusal to leave Athens when afforded the opportunity to avoid death (cf. Plato, *Krito*).

Additional support for a pronounced Socratic presence comes from other of Xenophon's (conventionally) non-philosophical works. In *Hellenika* Socrates similarly makes just a single appearance, and here too it is especially significant and can be related to an apologetic purpose on Xenophon's part. Henry's reading of the section reveals its essence, the purpose of the author's dramatic account of the Arginousai trial being to accentuate the extraordinary courage of Socrates in refusing to admit an illegal motion (*Hell.* 1.7.1-16).⁴⁹ The

⁴⁹ Henry 1966: 197. 'Now the development of this entire scene was obviously contrived with no other object in view than to set off the adamant refusal of the great philosopher

Kyroupaideia represents a still more pointed case, for Socrates is not mentioned in it by name at all, yet his presence is felt through the narrative. Gera discerns three types of Socratic influence in the work: personal traits shared by Socrates and Cyrus the Great; reference to events related to Socrates' trial and death; and the Socratic tenor of much of the dialogue.⁵⁰ Almost the same interpretative model could be applied to *Anabasis* with Xenophon's character in the place of Cyrus the Great, but here the author has gone further by naming Socrates at the critical juncture of the story. As now argued below, his presence is made more vital by the implicit linkage of his pupil's actions to the charges made against him.

CHARGE 1. THE DEFENCE AGAINST IMPIETY: refusing to recognise the gods recognized by the state, and introducing new divinities.

When Xenophon asks him for advice on whether or not he should join Cyrus the Younger, Socrates, aware of the political sensitivity of the matter and the potential dangers for his pupil, refers him to the god at Delphi. Socrates' later reaction to Xenophon's failure to ask the right question underlines his piety: 'However, since you did ask it in this way,' [he said] 'you must do all that the god ordered' (3.1.7; cf. *Mem.* 1.1.2).⁵¹ Reflecting this piety Xenophon proceeds through the retreat to display the utmost reverence towards the gods. Hardly any course of action is undertaken without first there being an attempt to discern divine will, and due gratitude is always offered for successful outcomes. Through the march he sacrifices to traditional deities and does not introduce new ones (note 47 above).

Xenophon could, of course, by nature have been of a pious disposition, although it is implicit that this tendency, if it was already there, was cultivated and brought to a higher state by his contact with Socrates: what substantiates the argument for a Socratic defence is the pains to which he goes to emphasise

in the face of overwhelming constraint. All objections that Xenophon in according Socrates only this one line is slighting him or that he does not recognise the meaning of his life are intolerable and can only arise from a profound misconception of the artistry of the description'.

⁵⁰ Gera 1993: 26-27.

⁵¹ Gray (1998: 99) puts it: '[Xenophon] characterises Socrates as supremely wise and supremely pious, obeying the oracle in spite of his forebodings'.

this piety. The examples given below, taken from regular points along the retreat, illustrate both his extraordinary piety and the degree to which it is a part of his everyday life. To bring these two factors into more relief, the emphasis here is on the performance of ritual rather than the (numerous) occasions in which he either simply invokes or swears by a deity, or speaks of the consequences of impiety for others (for example of oath breaking, 3.2.10, and arrogance, 6.3.18); also towards this end, where relevant, contrast is drawn with other leaders of the army.

3.2.9. Pledges by the Greater Zab River.

As Xenophon begins his momentous address to the army on the dawn following the seizure of their generals, somebody in the assembly sneezes, and at once all the soldiers prostrate themselves to the god. Xenophon acts to complement this devoutness by recommending that they 'vow to sacrifice thank offerings for our salvation to this same god [Zeus the Saviour] wherever we first arrive in a friendly land, and that we should vow as well to sacrifice also to the other gods to the extent of our power' (3.2.9). This was pledged by a show of hands and the solemn vows were made and the paean sung. Only 'when all was fine with what pertained to the gods' did Xenophon continue his address. (For fulfilment of these vows see 4.8.25; for usage of piety in leadership see Chapter 2.2.4.)

4.3.8-13. Crossing of the Centrites.

Just as he has done at the Greater Zab River, on the banks of the Centrites, in the midst of a second dire crisis for the army — enemies stand in front and behind, and there is a seemingly impassable river to cross — Xenophon has a disturbing dream, which he takes as a divine sign that the situation will be favourably resolved (4.3.8). Having related this to Kheirisophos at dawn, the generals offer sacrifice. Shortly after this, while he is having breakfast, Xenophon is approached by two youths who have discovered a ford. On completion of their report Xenophon's attention at once (εὐθύς) turns to the gods. 'Immediately, then, Xenophon himself poured a libation and bade the youths pour one and pray to the gods who had shown both the dreams and the crossing, to accomplish as well the good things that were still left' (4.3.13).

5.7.35. Purification of the army at Kotyora.

At a tense assembly called by Xenophon himself at Kotyora (see Appendix I for location of this and the other cities referred to), he announces that he sees a serious problem of disorder developing in the army (5.7.12). He proceeds to elaborate on his concern, describing a murderous incident that had taken place not long before in Kerasos. 'What city will be our friend and receive us,' he concludes, 'if it sees such lawlessness in us?' (5.7.33). As a result a series of measures are proposed, following which, Xenophon advises that the army should be purified (καθῆραι τὸ στράτευμα), and this takes place on the spot (5.7.35).

6.1.17-31. The leadership at Sinope.

At Sinope the men decide to choose a single ruler to lead them, and their choice is Xenophon. Although he is flattered by the offer, considering that the role would enhance his reputation and that it might enable him to be the cause of some good (ἀγαθοῦ τινοῦς) to the army, he nonetheless has pause for thought. 'Now such considerations stirred him to desire to become a ruler with sole command. But when, on the other hand, he reflected that it was unclear to every human being how the future would go, and because of this there was the danger of throwing away even the reputation he had already earned, he was at a loss. Since he was at a loss how to decide, it seemed best to take common counsel with the gods' (6.1.21-22). As he had done following his visit to Delphi, having been sent there by Socrates, Xenophon sacrificed to Zeus the King. The result being unfavourable, he duly declined the leadership. Notable here is that the alternative candidate, Kheirisophos the Spartan, chosen in the face of Xenophon's refusal, does not consult any deity about his own decision.

This case is notable again in that it may, on another level, furnish evidence for a less than pious Xenophon, or at least one who is using his reputation for piety to realise a desired outcome. In this regard the episode serves rather the leadership *didaxis* theme on his agenda as shown in Chapter 2.4. Thus, believing that the role will be a poisoned chalice owing to the high expectations of the soldiers, Xenophon attempts to avoid it by having recourse to divine

counsel. When the men insist that he take up the position, he responds: "I swear to you by all the gods and all the goddesses that when I became aware of your judgement, I offered sacrifice as to whether it was better both for you to turn this command over to me and for me to undertake it. And the gods signalled to me in the sacrifices, so that even a novice would know it, that I must abstain from this monarchy". Thus they elected Kheirisophos' (6.1.31-32).

6.4.12-22, 25. Waiting for a positive sign at Kalpe Harbour.

At Kalpe Harbour on the Black Sea, the army having reunited after an unsuccessful division into three units, Xenophon recommends that they complete their onward journey on foot. The matter of proceeding has assumed an urgency for they have exhausted the supplies in their current location. Xenophon and the other generals offer sacrifice, but these are not propitious for the journey (6.4.13); the next day Xenophon offers sacrifice again, three times, but the signs are not favourable. The soldiers are now agitated as their provisions have at this point run out (6.4.16). Xenophon therefore decides to sacrifice on the question of going out for provisions instead of the journey, and he does so three times, but again without a positive outcome (6.4.17-19). Following this the men, going hungry, keep coming to his tent, 'but he said he would not lead them out unless the sacrifices should become [propitious]' (ὁ δ' οὐκ ἂν ἔφη ἔξαγαγεῖν μὴ γιγνομένων τῶν ἱερῶν, 6.4.19). The next day, once again, he offers sacrifice — and nearly the entire army circles around, but again they are disappointed. The victims having been exhausted, an ox is bought and sacrificed, but not to the desired end (6.4.22). At this stage, seeking to enhance his standing, one of the generals, Neon the Asinaean, arranges for a foray away from the harbour; but the men who go out are decimated by the enemy, with as many as five hundred killed (6.4.23-24). Receiving news of the desperate situation, Xenophon takes an ox and after sacrificing leads out to give aid (6.4.25). In this case he does not report the outcome of the sacrifice, which must almost certainly mean that it was not favourable. But he has already shown remarkable piety, insisting on waiting for the sign on *five* separate occasions, in spite of the increasingly difficult circumstances.

The same argument as made about the episode above, showing how piety can be used to realise leadership objectives, applies here as well. In this case Xenophon painstakingly illustrates the power which religion can exercise over a community, and more particularly how, by assuming control over the ritual process, the leader can resist even basic impulses such as hunger and fear.

7.8. Through the Troad and Aeolis.

In the final phase of the Cyreans' journey, after they have crossed back over from Thrace to Asia Minor, Xenophon's concern shifts from the army's welfare to his own. After two years campaigning he is penniless and is forced to sell his horse to fund his passage home (7.8.2, 6). This unhappy outcome would seem to indicate some divine disapproval, for all the attention he has been at pains to pay to the gods, but the situation does fulfil the prediction made by a soothsayer at the outset of his journey at Ephesus. As he left the city, Xenophon saw an eagle perched on his right, screeching. The soothsayer who was escorting him interpreted this to mean that the journey he was setting out on would bring him into great danger, for the eagle when sitting is vulnerable: small birds can swarm it, or a snake can strike. Neither would there be much reward, as the eagle gets its food on the wing, not hunting by foot. But the journey would bring him glory and fame, the eagle being the bird of Zeus the King (6.1.23). Xenophon's forced sale of his horse in Lampsakos — moreover his means of transport — can thus be read as a symbolic act ending his part in the expedition and at the same time marking a new, prosperous phase of his life's path.

It happens then that in Lampsakos, another soothsayer, Eukleides the Phliasian, reveals that Xenophon has been an obstacle to himself by failing to sacrifice to one of his family's customary deities, Zeus Meilichios. Taking the counsel of this soothsayer, he 'sacrificed and burnt whole piglets, according to his father's custom' (7.8.5), and hence a series of beneficial events follow which provide him and his closest companions with ample resources. In the broader scheme we see that the gods have been true and that Xenophon's piety has brought him due benefit (cf. 'Skillous' in Chapter 2.1.2). The reference to Athens at this juncture may be significant, at the same time looking back to his training with Socrates one last time and ahead to his exile from the city.

5.3.4-9. In the Peloponnese.

Xenophon pointedly emphasises that his piety is not the kind that only flourishes in times of difficulty by relating in a flash-forward how he later used his share of booty from the sale of captives to honour pledges made by the army to both Apollo and Artemis. It is implied that the offering he makes to Apollo at Delphi does not take place until his return to Greece (5.3.5), which is probably not until several years after the conclusion of the expedition; while the pledge to Artemis, fulfilled by his purchase of land and building thereon of a temple and altar, happens only after he has been settled in an estate in the Peloponnese (5.3.6-9). These substantial gaps in time, the latter obligation discharged in time of personal peace, highlight the enduring quality of his piety.

CHARGE 2. THE DEFENCE AGAINST CORRUPTION OF THE YOUTH

As remarked in Part 2 the paths followed by several of Socrates' followers, Kritias and Alkibiades notably among them, would seem to have provided grounds for claims that he had misled them through his teaching.⁵² Caricatures in works such as those of Aristophanes will have served to fuel, if not indeed to create, popular suspicion about the influence of Socrates on those around him, especially the younger members of his circle (cf. *Clouds*), while after his death, accusations such as those made by Polykrates perpetuated these enduring suspicions. Giving substance to the charge, Socrates^x himself admitted to one claim, namely, that he persuaded young men to obey him instead of their parents; however, he justified this action by arguing that he had some expertise in the field and so it was sensible for him to be the one to offer guidance (*Apologia* 20-21). Xenophon confronts the prejudice against him in the *Memorabilia* (1.2.12-16), arguing that in the case of both Kritias and Alkibiades,

⁵² Morrison (2010: 196) asserts that the Athenians did not suspect Socrates of promoting evil or of instilling a taste for greed and ambition in those following him; however his point, finished below, is surely only safely applicable to the educated strata of society, and perhaps not everybody in this group subscribed to this sentiment: 'the thought was either that Socrates' probing, critical spirit had a kind of nihilistic influence on the young, relaxing the hold that traditional values might have on them and thus allowing the baser human impulses to take over, or that quite apart from the question of moral influence, Socrates gave his young associates a mental training that amounted to a powerful tool or weapon that they could then use for the good or ill of the society around them'.

it was fierce personal ambition that drove each to join Socrates, for they believed that from him they would acquire skills in speech and action that would advance them in politics. 'For my part I believe that, had heaven granted them the choice between the life they saw Socrates leading and death, they would have chosen rather to die' (*Mem.* 1.2.16; cf. 1.2.47).

Xenophon himself was another young man who had chosen to follow Socrates, and he too earned the disapproval of the city, some action(s) of his leading to the passing of a decree of exile against him in the 390s.⁵³ As has been demonstrated, in his *Anabasis* he goes to lengths to show himself to be a responsible and upstanding citizen, and, as is argued in this chapter, in this work he also seeks to defend the memory of Socrates. At 3.1.5 Socrates' concern for his welfare, manifested in his advice to him to go to Delphi for counsel, shows his individual responsibility and directly confronts the charge of corrupting youth. In informing us that he *disregarded* Socrates' advice, Xenophon removes any grounds of suspicion that the teacher was behind his decision to leave Athens and join the rebellious Cyrus the Younger. The episode also carries larger implications about the attitude of Socrates toward those whom he is in a relationship of trust with (cf. *Mem.* 1.1.6). In actual fact, as Xenophon demonstrates through his own conduct on the retreat, Socrates' education is an invaluable ingredient in the making of truly effective leaders. Thus the same polity which deprived Socrates of his life and exiled Xenophon is revealed to have acted not only unjustly, but contrary to its own interests. By extension Xenophon is indicating that he too is a victim of injustice.

In his idealised self-representation in *Anabasis*, Xenophon embodies the qualities which he regarded as key tenets of the Socratic life, chief among these being self-control (ἐγκράτεια) and self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια).⁵⁴ As these form

⁵³ On Xenophon's age see Chapter 1.1.3. At *An.* 3.1.25, addressing the captains of Proxenos, he writes: 'if you assign me to lead, I will not cite my young age as an excuse' (εἰ δ' ὑμεῖς τάπτετ' ἐμὲ ἡγεῖσθαι, οὐδὲν προφασίζομαι τὴν ἡλικίαν). On the exile decree see Chapter 1.5.2.

⁵⁴ Dorion (2006: 97) speaks of a triad of Socratic virtues, adding as the third *karteria*, 'endurance'. I have chosen to include this as a part of *enkrateia*, considering the concept to share as much in common as not with this virtue. Surprisingly, Dorion does not include *Anabasis* in his list of other Xenophontic works - *Kyroupaideia*, *Hiero*, *Agésilao*s, *Lak.* - in which the author attributes to the lead protagonists (Cyrus,

the foundation of his successful leadership, the usefulness of his education is brought into sharp relief. Several examples of these virtues are provided below so as to illustrate as well the persistence and rigour of his defence. Other Socratic qualities which Xenophon displays prominently on the retreat include piety, as shown above, courage, justice, and the ability to effectively deploy analytical speech (cf. *Mem.* 3.6.15, and generally 3.1-5). The power and charm of Xenophon's speeches was put forward as a key distinguishing feature of his leadership earlier in the dissertation.

1. Self-control. *Enkrateia*.

In the *Memorabilia* (1.5.1) Xenophon posits self-control as a virtue and invites his readers to judge for themselves whether or not Socrates led men up to that virtue through his discourse.⁵⁵ He concludes his presentation with Socrates declaring:

'Should not every man hold self-control to be the foundation of all virtue, and first lay this foundation firmly in his soul? For who without this can learn any good or practise it worthily? Or what man that is the slave of his pleasures is not in an evil plight body and soul alike?'...Such were his words; but his own self-control was shown yet more clearly by his deeds than by his words (1.5.4-6).⁵⁶

Xenophon, too, by his actions, displays this virtue on numerous occasions through the retreat, so time and again demonstrating the value of his Socratic training.

Simonides, Agesilaos, and Lykourgos respectively) 'the same characteristics, virtues, and doctrines which Socrates incarnates in the four *logoi Sokratikoi*' (105).

⁵⁵ Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια καλὸν τε κάγαθὸν ἀνδρὶ κτῆμά ἐστιν, ἐπισκεψώμεθα εἴ τι προυβίβαζε λέγων εἰς ταύτην τοιάδε. *Mem.* 1.5.1.

⁵⁶ ἄρα γε οὐ χρὴ πάντα ἄνδρα, ἠγησάμενον τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀρετῆς εἶναι κρηπίδα, ταύτην πρῶτον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κατασκευάσασθαι; τίς γὰρ ἄνευ ταύτης ἢ μάθοι τι ἂν ἀγαθὸν ἢ ελετήσειεν ἀξιολόγως; ἢ τίς οὐκ ἂν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς δουλεύων αἰσχροῶς διατεθεῖη καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν;...τοιαῦτα δὲ λέγων ἔτι ἐγκρατέστερον τοῖς ἔργοις ἢ τοῖς λόγοις ἑαυτὸν ἐπεδείκνυεν. *Mem.* 1.5.4-6.

An. 3.1.11, 5.7.3. Mastery of Self: Fear.

During the night following the seizure of the Greek generals, Xenophon shows that he possesses the ability to be master of himself. Having been visited by a dream in which he sees his father's house burning (3.1.11), he gets up, and though extremely afraid (περίφοβος), proceeds to take command of the severe crisis at hand. In these darkest hours by the Greater Zab River, by virtue of his self-control, Xenophon overcomes the fear and despair that has gripped the army.

A second notable case where he conquers his fear is at Kotyora (5.7.3), when the army becomes volatile and threatens to vent its anger on him as the one supposedly attempting to lead them away from, rather than towards, home. In spite of the atmosphere and real danger to his life (he indicates this by reference to an earlier deadly episode at Kerasos: 'it was greatly to be feared that they would do the sort of things that they had done also to the heralds of the Kolchians and the market managers, for as many of these as did not flee into the sea were stoned to death', 5.7.2), he keeps his composure and, through a methodical speech (5.7.6-11), defuses the tension.

An. 3.1.26-30, 4.1.17-22. Mastery of Self: Anger.

In spite of the adverse circumstances, and the immense pressures which he bears as a leader of the retreating army, Xenophon does not display loss of self-control in frustrating or upsetting situations. At several points we see that he is angry, but that he checks this emotion so that he is not led into taking an action or decision that may subsequently prove to be detrimental to his own or the army's interests. So for example, at the Greater Zab River, as he attempts to lift morale, he patently becomes angry with a captain who accuses him of talking nonsense in maintaining that the Greeks could obtain safety 'in any other way than by persuading the King' (3.1.26). Nonetheless he manages to contain himself, and has the individual, whose opposition threatens the fragile belief he is resurrecting, relieved of his captancy and sent to be a baggage carrier (3.1.30).

Later, in the Kardouchian hills, when the army comes under severe attack and the rear is left exposed, with the result that two of his best men are killed, Xenophon confronts Kheirisophos, the commander of the van. 'When they arrived at a stopping place, Xenophon went directly to Kheirisophos just as he was and began to blame him for not waiting, and for compelling them to fight at the same time they were trying to flee. "And now two noble and good men are lying dead, and we were not able either to take them up or to bury them".⁵⁷ Yet in spite of his clear upset, he does not allow this to cloud his judgment, and immediately turns his attention to the challenge of moving forward through the enemy's territory (4.1.22). Nor, it is later revealed, does he allow the incident to spoil his relationship with his fellow leader (cf. 4.6.3).

An. 4.4.11-12. Braving the elements.

The harsh conditions of the Armenian winter made progress for the army slow and difficult. A heavy fall of snow one night covered the men where they slept; where it did not fall off it kept them warm, and there was a great reluctance to rise in the morning. Xenophon, however, got up undressed (γυμνός) and began to chop wood for fire. This action encouraged others, who got to their feet and began to build fires.⁵⁸

An. 7.3.23-25. The Thracian banquet.

The Greek generals and captains are invited to a dinner (ἐπὶ δεῖπνον) hosted by the Thracian dynast, Seuthes. Large quantities of food and wine are laid on, and Xenophon describes how one of the Greeks, an Arcadian by the name of Arystas, heaped bread and meat on his knees and continued to eat even when wine was brought round. Xenophon represents himself in almost a binary relation to Arystas, whom he has tell the wine bearer: 'Give it to him [Xenophon]. For he is already at leisure, but I am not yet' (7.3.24). By

⁵⁷ ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀφίκοντο ἐπὶ σταθμόν, εὐθύς ὥσπερ εἶχεν ὁ Ξενοφῶν ἐλθὼν πρὸς τὸν Χειρίσοφον ἤτιᾶτο αὐτὸν ὅτι οὐχ ὑπέμενεν, ἀλλ' ἠναγκάζοντο φεύγοντες ἅμα μάχεσθαι. καὶ νῦν δύο καλῶ τε καὶ ἀγαθῶ ἄνδρε τέθνατον καὶ οὔτε ἀνελέσθαι οὔτε θάψαι ἐδυνάμεθα. 4.1.19.

⁵⁸ On Socrates' endurance: *Mem.* 1.2.1, 1.6.2; Plato, *Symp.* 220b-c.

highlighting the gluttony of Arystas, he draws attention to his own modest eating habits.

However, he subsequently reveals that he has allowed the taste for wine to trump his control of his appetites. Climbing to his feet when the drinking horn came to him again (7.3.29), he pledged himself and his companions to the service of Seuthes, boasting that they would bring great benefit to him. 'With their help, if the gods are willing, you will take back a great deal of land, that which was your father's, and you will also acquire land, and you will acquire many horses, many men, and beautiful women' (7.3.31). The moment seems benign enough, but in the later context of the tense relations between Xenophon and the army over suspicions about his dealings with Seuthes, it assumes distinct significance. As I have argued in the previous chapter (3.2.3), the declaration may have angered some in the army and been one of the causes of the serious accusation of corruption that was subsequently made against him (7.6.9-10). In choosing to use an instance of his own weakness as an example at this penultimate juncture, Xenophon makes a closing warning about the dangers of *akrasia*.

An. passim. Absence of Enkrateia.

The consequence of lack of *enkrateia* (*akrasia*) is a theme which has run through the work. Xenophon repeatedly underlines the indispensability of this quality by including incidents where its absence carries serious implications, if not for the individuals involved, then for the army as a whole. The case of Kheirisophos losing control and striking the guide, who then fled (4.6.2-3), has been examined in Chapter 2.2.3. Another marked episode occurs in the territory of the Mossynoikoi, between Trapezus and Kotyora on the Black Sea coast (5.4.14-21; see map, Appendix I). A number of the Greeks, 'not having been so ordered by the generals but for the sake of plunder' (καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τινές, οὐ ταχθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν, ἀλλὰ ἀρπαγῆς ἕνεκεν, 5.4.16), followed one Mossynoikoian tribe in its attack against another; the defenders routed them and mutilated many of the bodies. 'After cutting off the heads of the dead,' Xenophon writes, 'they displayed them both to the Greeks and to their own enemies, and at the same time they sang a certain tune and danced to it'

(5.4.17). Xenophon's lesson is that the ill-discipline of these soldiers has cost them their lives and the hope of a dignified burial were they to fall in action. It has also, as he is at pains to stress, endangered the army because the enemy tribe has been emboldened by its brutal triumph (5.4.18).

2. Self-sufficiency. *Autarkeia*.

This virtue might be described as beginning in the ability to meet one's own needs by oneself. As Socrates teaches, the resources each individual consumes vary, but it is incumbent on the aspiring *kalos kagathos* to reduce his dependence on material goods until such point as his needs are minimal. In his *Memorabilia* Xenophon has Socrates put it in a more eloquent way:

You seem, Antiphon, to imagine that happiness consists in luxury and extravagance. But my belief is that to have no wants is divine; to have as few as possible comes next to the divine; and as that which is divine is supreme, so that which approaches nearest to its nature is nearest to the supreme (*Mem.* 1.6.10).⁵⁹

The subject of self-sufficiency arises at other junctures in this work, for example, through Socrates' conviction that a man should do all he can for himself before turning to the gods for help (*Mem.* 1.1.9); it is also a feature in other works, for example in *Oikonomikos*, where Cyrus the Younger is praised for his gardening habit (4.20-24), and in *Poroi*, a composition which encourages Athens to seek economic recovery in moderation and self-sufficiency rather than imperial adventure. In *Anabasis*, Xenophon shows how he himself steadily progresses towards this Socratic ideal.⁶⁰ Once more it is the benefit produced for the

⁵⁹ ἔοικας, ὦ Ἄντιφῶν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰομένῳ τρυφὴν καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι· ἐγὼ δ' ἐνομίζον τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ὡς ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον κράτιστον, τὸ δ' ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ κρατίστου. *Mem.* 1.6.10.

⁶⁰ From Xenophon's perspective, arguably, the main result of attaining self-sufficiency is εὐδαιμονία. In the *Oikonomikos*, following their dialogue in the *paradeisos* at Sardis, he has Lysander say to Cyrus the Younger: 'I think you deserve your happiness, Cyrus, for you earn it by your virtues' (Δικαίως μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Κύρῃ, εὐδαίμων εἶναι· ἀγαθὸς γὰρ ὢν ἀνὴρ εὐδαιμονεῖς, 4.25). Dorion (2006: 105) claims that Plato's Socrates has no concern with *autarkeia*: 'This is doubtless because the only self-sufficiency that would

community as much as for the individual which stands as testimony to Socrates' usefulness.

An. 3.2.7, 3.3.19, 4.2.20. Prepared for war.

We know that Xenophon comes on the expedition well equipped for military adventure. He has several horses (3.3.19), a shield-bearer (4.2.20), and at least two panoplies (3.2.7). He has also brought enough money to last for a prolonged period, this evidenced by the fact that while Cyrus's first payment to the men only comes four months after they had set out (1.2.12), and is thereafter irregular, he does not suffer any want. Perhaps, indeed, he is too well prepared, or over-provisioned, for his journey. Soterides' attack on him as they ascend a height ('we are not contending on equal ground, Xenophon; for you are carried on a horse, but I am labouring hard, carrying this shield', 3.4.47) may hint at a sense of luxury on Xenophon's part. The depletion of his resources over the journey so that in the end he has only his horse (7.8.2), marks his arrival at a state close to the divine and corresponds with the maturing of his character which has taken place on the retreat.

An. 1.5.1-3. Hunting.

As the army marched through the Arabian Desert, Xenophon describes how the horsemen hunted native wildlife — wild asses, ostrich, bustards, antelopes — adopting as they did tactics suitable to the nature of beast and terrain. Given the environment and the remote location their success was self-evidently of benefit to the army; it is probably safe to suppose as well, with his interest and expertise in hunting and horsemanship, that Xenophon was to the fore among the riders. Perhaps it was on such forays that he earned the respect and admiration of Proxenos' officers, evident in their willingness to have him lead their contingent following the events by the Greater Zab River.

count in Plato's eyes is self-sufficiency with regard to knowledge and the good, not the self-sufficiency with regard to the material conditions of existence which Xenophon attributes to Socrates. And since Socrates^p is ignorant and constantly in search of the knowledge and virtue which would finally satisfy his aspiration to the good, he cannot be self-sufficient'.

An. 4.1.12-14, 7.5.3, 7.7.56. Nothing in excess.

At several points Xenophon indicates his own self-sufficiency by reference to the surplus needs of others. In the Kardouchian hills, when a decision is taken to shed excess baggage and people, Xenophon is not among the soldiers who conceals any goods out of desire to keep them (4.1.12-14). In Thrace he passes on his share of plunder to the other officers with him: 'For me it will suffice to take something on a later occasion, but give these things to these generals and captains who have followed with me' (7.5.3); again, when their employer is persuaded to pay up, Xenophon declines his share of the booty (7.7.56).

An. 7.8.8-22. Raid in Mysia.

Xenophon's decision to forgo what is due to him is shortly after revealed to have been less than prudent, for as remarked above he is forced to sell his horse at Lampsakos in order to fund his trip home (7.8.6). This could be seen as providential in placing him in yet closer proximity to the Socratic ideal of perfect *autarkeia*; however, instead of asceticism he turns to banditry, leading a plundering raid which is intended to enrich himself and his most trusted officers: 'After having dinner, he marched [with the intent of capturing a wealthy Persian, Asidates, and his wife and children] while also taking the captains who were special friends and those who had become most trusted through it all, in order to benefit them' (7.8.11). On the other hand, his action, which notably has followed on from a specific sacrifice outside Lampsakos (see above), demonstrates his ability to supply his own needs and those of his friends when it is necessary and not opposed by the gods. At the end of his account, Xenophon may be quietly asserting the primacy of this virtue over other ones, while privileging the active over the contemplative life.

An. 6. Absence of *Autarkeia*.

As he does with *enkrateia*, Xenophon demonstrates the importance of *autarkeia* by showing the consequences of its absence. In Book 6 he carefully charts the self-destructive impact of the army's moving away from the ideal of self-

sufficiency. At Harmene, a port beyond Sinope, he writes: 'Now since they seemed to be near Greece, it occurred to them to consider even more than before how they could return home with something in their possession' (ὡς δὲ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐδόκουν ἐγγὺς γίνεσθαι, ἤδη μᾶλλον ἢ πρόσθεν εἰσῆει αὐτοὺς ὅπως ἂν καὶ ἔχοντές τι οἴκαδε ἀφίκωνται, 6.1.17). Although they elected a sole commander at Sinope, at Herakleia, dissatisfied with the gifts of hospitality (ξένια) provided by that city, they gather together and decide themselves to demand more. This ploy being unsuccessful, the Arcadians and Achaeans split away, believing they will fare better on their own (6.2.4-12). But in pursuing booty they lose coherence as a force and eventually are encircled by the Thracians (6.3.2-6). It is only Xenophon's willingness and ability to relieve them that averts a disastrous fate. The army's movement away on the *parabasis* from the high state of *autarkeia* it had attained on the geographical *katabasis* is thus shown simultaneously to mark its disintegration as a successful community.

PART 4. CONCLUSIONS

I have argued that Xenophon subtly but surely represents himself in *Anabasis* as a pupil of Socrates who is seeking to develop his character and learning. The high intensity of the events which form the backdrop to his dramatic introduction to the narrative oblige the reader to pay special attention to the circumstances: by involving Proxenos, the pupil of Gorgias, and then Socrates, he indicates a philosophical motive for his joining of Cyrus the Younger. The consultation with Socrates marks their close relationship and characterises it as one between teacher and pupil. The educational motive is reinforced shortly after by Xenophon's statement that he was 'fully deceived' (δὴ οὕτως ἐξαπατηθεὶς) as to the purpose of Cyrus's campaign (3.1.10): in other words, he did not join Cyrus to participate in an adventurous expedition against the King.⁶¹ Immediately following this we are witnesses to his night of darkness, emerging from which

⁶¹ This statement primarily serves Xenophon's personal defence. As argued in the last chapter (3.3.2.3), Cyrus's expedition was legally, morally, and politically suspect, and as such it would not be an ideal learning environment. Xenophon does not blame Proxenos for the deceit, for he was also ignorant of Cyrus's real purpose; when the true aim of the expedition became apparent, both men, and indeed the other Greeks, 'followed along out of shame both before each other and before Cyrus' (3.1.10).

he steps up to take the responsibility of leadership (3.1.11-15). This moment is the critical juncture whereby his journey of self-development becomes a test of his character — and where he begins his defence of Socrates.

The evidence for *Anabasis* as a Socratic defence is substantial, though Xenophon presents his material in a characteristically subtle fashion. His defence is set in train through the introduction of Socrates almost simultaneously with his own character at the key dramatic moment of the narrative, and by his rebuttal in the recollected episode of the charges of impiety and corrupting the youth made against the philosopher: by advising the young man to take counsel with the god, Socrates' innocence is indicated and the case against him implied to be motivated more by politics than justice. The question of Socrates' guilt, and indeed of the accuracy of Xenophon's portrait of him and his teachings, is not critical to this thesis. Regardless of how true Xenophon's representation of the philosopher is, he *is* defending the historical Socrates against the charges brought against him in 399.

From the Greater Zab River, Xenophon and Socrates dominate the stage, the teacher's presence shadowing that of the pupil as he endures the trials of his anabasis. On occasion Socrates is made visible by way of an overt or implicit reference to his trial, but the principal means of keeping the philosopher to the fore is the substance and style of Xenophon's leadership: almost every action, even his failures, few in number as they are, recall his ethical training and touch directly upon the charges made against Socrates. Through time and space Xenophon shows the vigour and extent of his piety, and his exceptional capacities for self-control and self-sufficiency — key elements of his leadership style — recall those of Socrates. The periodic absence of these qualities in other leaders serves as well to emphasise the value of his teacher. In the literary account the successful retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks is owed to Xenophon in his exemplary form of model student of Socrates, and so by extension to the Socratic training, which is thus demonstrated to have had real benefit to a community.

There is a danger with the sort of interpretation offered here that it reads too much between the lines, or overstates the subtlety and complexity of the

narrative. How do we know this is what Xenophon intended? One answer to this is that *Anabasis* must be read as a part of the author's oeuvre and not simply as an isolated work. In this way the themes and concerns that recur throughout the oeuvre and root it in a common writing agenda become apparent, as too does the particular way they inform each of his writings. A second answer lies in the evidence of the text itself; for instance, in the ratio between what might be termed the march narrative and what is not obviously relevant to it. Xenophon's speeches alone constitute a notable portion of the entire work, while the attempt of Cyrus, the ostensible cause of the book, covers just one of its seven parts. The question could be answered in another way by pointing to the need for greater attention to be paid to the author and his writings; the effort, as is hoped has been demonstrated here, enhances understanding of the writer and his many subjects in equal measure.

Conclusions

An enduring challenge for scholars of Xenophon's *Anabasis* has been to provide an explanation of the nature of the work. The challenge stems from uncertainty about Xenophon's purpose in writing, and from the unique nature of the text itself; the combined effect, as one writer has put it, is that the work has resisted a commonly agreed modern classification.¹ The main conclusion of this dissertation is that *Anabasis* is first and foremost a work of apologetics: in a variety of ways, through the course of the text, Xenophon is defending himself, and his teacher, Socrates. The rich thematic and subject variety of the narrative, and its unique structure, defined by two distinct Xenophons and a pseudonymous author, can be explained by the special requirements of *apologia* — the author's need to attract and keep the interest of his audience in the face of a highly personalised agenda.

Xenophon's oeuvre is marked by a strong apologetic tendency. His four Socratic works are concerned to defend the memory of the philosopher; *Agesilaos* and *Kynegetikos* are at an important level defences of their respective subjects, while in his other historiographical work, *Hellenika*, the author devotes substantial space (over 10% of the history) to the rule of the Thirty at Athens, subtly distancing himself in this from the harsher element of the regime. A further distinguishing feature of the oeuvre is a taste for didacticism. In some works, such as the technical treatises, this is explicit, in others it is less apparent but no less a force in the text. In *Anabasis*, for example, the subject of military leadership is pervasive, yet integrated into the storyline to such a degree that its presence might go unnoticed to those not

¹ LaForse (2005: 2), who cites as well Tuplin's comment that the work is 'generically-speaking eccentric'. Tuplin elsewhere writes: 'it [*Anabasis*] is generally supposed to have had purposes less naïve than its external appearance might suggest, even if descriptions of that purpose certainly differ' (1993: 13).

interested in the subject; those who are interested can benefit from a range of situational lessons, and a thoughtful critique of variant leadership styles. Furthermore, important insight is provided into the problem of how to manage mercenary soldiers, a subject topical in the early and middle decades of the fourth century.

Among the other concerns and themes incorporated into the narrative are Spartan hegemony of Greece, panhellenism, and military tactics. While *Anabasis* serves as a vehicle for the expression of these, they also constitute a means through which the author transforms his account from a record of parangs and speeches into an engaging story. Far from weighing it down as some have maintained, his interweaving of these strands with events on the ground enriches the text, and make it ultimately, as Wencis has put it, 'pleasing and profitable to the reader'.²

Perhaps the most remarkable achievement of *Anabasis* is the author's harnessing of the substantial didactic aspect of the work for his apologetic ends. By having his own character embody an ideal, philosophical form of leadership, he promotes the value of his Socratic training and defends his teacher; at the same time, the words and deeds of his character in turn reflect on the author and historical figure behind the book. The ambitious scheme is effected by way of the author's use of a pseudonym, which permits the creation of the character Xenophon and indicates that the story is not autobiographical.


The literary accomplishment evident in *Anabasis* betrays the hand of a skilled and intelligent writer. The fact that many of the elements prominent in *Anabasis* recur throughout Xenophon's oeuvre suggests a common writing agenda. This probably evolved over the wide chronological span — perhaps the three decades before his death — of his publications, and it was almost certainly inspired by his association with the philosopher Socrates, whose teachings and spirit pervade the corpus. Following Socrates, Xenophon's ultimate aim was to bring benefit to his friends and countrymen; but although he followed, he did so in his own way, choosing to instruct through literature, a field in which he proved

² Wencis 1997: 44.

to be highly original and inventive. One mark of this is his defence of Socrates in *Anabasis*. Breaking from the traditional Socratic *apologia*, in which the subject is a main protagonist, in the work he powerfully undermines the charges brought against the philosopher by presenting the outstanding success and piety of one of his pupils. In this sense *Anabasis* may properly be added to the author's cycle of Socratic works, and a good case can be made for it being one of the most effective and original of these. A final remark, flowing from the apologetic character of the work, is that the decree of exile against Xenophon, strongly dated to 399 by arguments presented in the dissertation, had a profound impact on his subsequent thought and sense of identity.

That *Anabasis* continues to attract diverse responses from its readers is a measure of its richness, a case in point for Calvino's maxim that a classic is a book that never finishes saying what it has to say. However, the range of engagements is, too, a measure of the distance still to be covered before an adequate understanding of the work and its author is reached. It is hoped that the present study has made some contribution to this process. Areas for profitable future research include: a systematic exploration of the author's usage of exemplars in his writing; further investigation of the march record's reliability in *Anabasis*, with particular reference to the use of parasangs and the question of a diary; the author's intended audience(s), approached perhaps by way of a comparative study of contemporary authors; a consideration of *Anabasis* in light of recent research into the 'ironic Xenophon'; and the problematic question of the author's relationship with Socrates and the extent of the influence of the philosopher's life and teaching on his work.

Appendix I: Route map



Appendix II

Editions of Xenophon's *Anabasis* and English language translations

MAJOR MODERN EDITIONS

1825. L. Dindorf. *Teubner*. 1st edn. Leipzig.

1904. E. Marchant. *Oxford Classical Texts*. Oxford.

1909. W. Gemoll. *Teubner*. 2nd edn. Leipzig.

1922. C.L. Brownson. *Loeb*. Cambridge, Mass.

1931. C. Hude. *Teubner*. Leipzig.

1930-31. P. Masqueray. *Budé*. Paris.

1972. J. Peters. *Teubner*. Revision of Hude.

1998. J. Dillery. *Loeb*. Revision of Brownson.

ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS (19th century dates approximate only as some editions may be later printings)

19th Century

1817. Hutchinson. Glasgow.

1821. Schneider. Oxford.

1823. Townsend. London.

1834. Balfour. London.

1837. Long. London.

1839. Hickie. London.

1839. Spellman. New York.

1843. Owen. London.

1848. Charles. New York.

1850. Macmichael. London.

1854. Watson. New York.

1856. Boise. New York.

1873. Kendrick. New York.

1887. Clark. New York.

1897. Daykns. London.

20th Century

1900. A.S. Walpole. Macmillan. London. (By book, not complete).

1922. C.L. Brownson. Loeb: Cambridge, Mass.

1947. W.H.D. Rouse. Thomas Nelson and Sons. Edinburgh.

1948. R. Warner. Penguin. Harmondsworth.

1998. J. Dillery. Loeb: Cambridge, Mass.

21st Century

2005. R. Waterfield. Oxford World's Classics. Oxford.

2008. W. Ambler. Agora. Ithaca.

Forthcoming: C. Tuplin. Penguin. Harmondsworth.

Forthcoming: D. Thomas. Pantheon Books. New York.

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