# *The Culture of Prison Management*

# *Measurement of Risk Control Culture in the English and Japanese Prison Services using the Grid and Group Cultural Theory*

Submitted by **Ayako Nakamura**, to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics, September 2011.

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# *Abstract*

Comparative analysis is crucial to academic studies of public administration because it provides understanding of the nature of different types of public service institution: in particular, it helps to show what they do and don't have in common, what kinds of institution they are, and what kinds of problems they face. However, in order to effectively conduct comparative research of public service institutions it is important that some thought is given to how they can best be compared. Accordingly, it is argued in this study that the differences between public service institutions can be appropriately analysed by examining their respective risk control cultures.

This study makes use of the grid and group cultural theory, as developed by Mary Douglas, Aaron Wildavsky and Christopher Hood, to analyse the risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services in regard to two specific types of risk, namely suicide and violence. The results show that particular patterns of organizational behaviour within the English and Japanese prison services can be identified with their respective risk control cultures. More specifically, the English prison service tends to try to control risk by using formal rules and granting strong leadership roles to governors. By contrast, the Japanese prison service tends to use informal rules and group pressures to control risk. Furthermore, the peculiar organizational patterns of risk control within both organizations are often not recognised by their members. As a result, the strengths and weaknesses of organizations can be identified by analysing the patterns of risk control behaviour within them.

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# *List of Abbreviations*

| | |
|---|---|
| ACCT | Assessment Care in Custody Team in HMPS (England) |
| AIJ | Amnesty International Japan |
| C.B. | Correctional Bureau (Japan) |
| CARC | Correctional Administration Reform Committee in 2003 (Japan) |
| CSRA | Cell-Sharing Risk Assessment in HMPS (England) |
| CPR | Centre of Prisoners' Right (Japan) |
| G/G | Grid and Group |
| HMCIP | Her Majesty's Chief Inspectorate of Prisons (The official author of the HM Prison Inspectorate Reports) |
| HMIP | Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons |
| HMP | HM Prison (s) |
| HMPS | Her Majesty's Prison Service |
| IEP | Incentives and Earned Privileges |
| IMB | Independent Monitoring Board |
| IRS | Incident Record Systems in HMPS |
| JMOJ | Ministry of Justice (Japan) |
| MOJ | Ministry of Justice (England) |
| NOMS | National Offenders Management Service (England) |
| NPA | National Police Agency (Japan) |
| PIAG | Performance, Information& Analysis Group (England). |
| PIVC | Prison Institutions Visiting Committees (Japan) |
| POA | Prison Officers Association (England) |
| PPO | Prison and Probation Ombudsman (England) |
| PSI | Prison Service Instructions (England) |
| PSO | Prison Service Orders (England) |
| SCT | Safer Custody Team (England) |
| SIRs | Security Information Reports in HMPS (England) |
| SPC | Suicide Prevention Co-ordinators (England) |
| VRC | Violence Reduction Co-ordinators (England) |

# List of Japanese Glossaries

*Jinj-iin* [人事院]:

National Personnel Authority

*Kunrei* [訓令]:

Regulatory codes in the Japanese Prison Service, which are equivalent to Ministerial Ordinance

*Joshiki* [常識]:

Common sense in Japanese. It was used to explain the risk control procedures by Japanese prison service staff whom I conducted interviews.

*Seiza* [正座] position:

Sitting upright on the floor with their legs folded back under themselves

*Tanto* [担当] system:

The traditional system for controlling prisoners by small groups in Japanese prisons.

*The Penal Institutions Act:*

The ellipsis of *The Act of the Penal Institutions and the Treatment of Sentenced Inmates* issued in the Japanese prison service. The act was issued in 2005, as a result of the CARC 2003.

*Tsutatsu* [通達] or *Imei-Tsutatsu* [依命通達]:

Regulatory codes in the Japanese Prison Service, which are equivalent to Ministerial Instructions

# *Introduction*

## *The rationale of this thesis*

Comparative analysis of public services is a central part of studies of public administration. Comparison provides understanding of the nature of public service institutions: in particular, of what they have and don't have in common, what kinds of institution they are, and what kinds of problems they face. In this way, comparative analysis helps to identify the strengths and weaknesses of public institutions and to provide external information which can be used to improve them.

An effective method is needed to carry out comparative studies of different institutions. In this regard, it is particularly important to consider which facets of public institutions we compare and how. Although the method for comparative studies of public administration has been developed over several theories and case studies, a recurring problem is that each study tends to become preoccupied with the peculiar details of specific institutions rather than identifying common characteristics shared by all institutions. Finding comparable factors across institutions is a long term goal for comparative public analysis.

In response to this trend, Christopher Hood has made a comparative analysis of the internal cultures of public service institutions in his book, *the Art of the State* (1998). In this work he introduces the grid and group theory (henceforth g/g theory) as a means of comparing the ways in which control is created in public service institutions. Following the publication of this work, a number of researchers have considered the practical use of the g/g theory as a means of studying several public service domains: food regulation, groups of high-class civil servants, higher education institutions, and prison services. Nevertheless, the g/g theory is still not widely recognised as a comparative framework for studying culture and there is very little understanding of how it can be applied to real cases in public administration. Given the context outlined above, the purpose of this study is to develop existing discussions of the g/g theory by employing it to make a comparative study of an area of public administration, namely prison services.

## *Theories and case studies*

This study is intended to contribute towards existing discussions of the g/g theory which was established by Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky in the field of anthropology. Although it has many advantages over other cultural theories, the method for applying it to real cases is not yet fully established. This problem is well known in the social sciences. Therefore, this study focuses on developing an effective method for applying the g/g theory to real cases in public service domains.

Measurement theory in the social sciences is referred to here in order to achieve the aims of this study. Additionally, some studies which make use of organizational, institutional, and classic leadership theories are taken into account. In this way, this study analyses the risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services, specifically by using the g/g framework to compare patterns of suicide and violence risk control. These case studies demonstrate the validity of the g/g theory as a means of making comparative studies of culture in public service domains. Finally, the results of this study are used to assess the effectiveness and appropriateness of this method.

## *Overview of data sources*

The data gathered for the case studies came from both qualitative and quantitative sources. This study attempts to measure culture by transforming the qualitative data into quantitative ones.

A variety of primary sources were used here including official government statistics and reports. First, primary sources on the English Prison Service include parliamentary acts and statutory instruments, annual and thematic reports conducted by HMPS and the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), HM Chief Inspectorate of Prisons (HMCIP) reports, and Independent Monitoring Boards (IMB) reports and Prison and Probation Ombudsman (PPO) reports. Meanwhile, primary sources on the Japanese prison service include parliamentary acts and statutory instruments, annual or thematic reports by the Correctional Bureau (C.B.) and the Japanese Ministry of Justice (JMOJ), and reports by Prison Service Visiting Committees (PSVC).

Second, reference is also made in this study to supplementary data gathered from secondary sources. These sources range from academic studies in criminology and

public administration to literature written by retired prison staff and former prisoners. I used news sources such as Nexis UK and, for Japan, @Nifty News Search. With regard to news sources, @Nifty News Search is a substitute of Nexis which is not available in Japan. Additionally, I also referred to reports by major voluntary groups that work for penal reform or prisoners' right: Howard League and the Prisons Organization UK (Prison. Org. UK) which work for prisoners in HMPS and the Centre for Prison Rights (CPR) and Amnesty International Japan (AIJ) for Japanese prisons.

Third, original interview data was collected from Japanese and English prison staff. Semi-structural interviews were conducted with 15 staff members from the Japanese and English prison services between 2008 and 2010. Two of these interviews took place over the phone. Table i.1 shows a breakdown of the prison staff whom I interviewed.

Table i.1: Breakdown of interviewees.

| Break down list of Interviewees | England | Japan |
|---|---|---|
| Directors of the National HQs | 0 | 1 |
| Governing Governors | 3 | 0 |
| Governor Grades (Middle or high class Managers) | 2 | 1 |
| Prison Officers | 0 | 0 |
| Trainers (Workshop staff or teachers) | 5 | 0 |
| National HQ staff (including audit unit) | 0 | 2 |
| Members of independent monitoring groups (IMB, HMIP | 1 | 0 |
| Total (N=) | 11 | 4 |

Although the number of interviews is relatively small, gaining access to prison staff was extremely difficult in both Japan and England. Formal research requests were rejected in both countries because my research was considered to be for personal purposes. As a result, it was only possible to informally interview personal contacts. Due to this limited access, interviews were conducted with three UK prison governors who had retired within the past 10 years.

It proved particularly difficult to gain access to prison officers. Although I tried to make contact with prison officers informally, my efforts were unsuccessful. However, a few of the prison staff members who I interviewed had previously worked as prison officers before getting their current positions (see Table i.2). Therefore, the data about prison officers are based on these interviewees.

Table i.2: Interviewees with experiences of working as prison officers

|         | England | Japan |
|---------|---------|-------|
| Yes     | 2       | 3     |
| No      | 7       | 1     |
| Unknown | 2       | 0     |
| Total N= | 11     | 4     |

Interviews were semi-structural but focused on the theme of risk control in prisons. This theme ensured that useful information was gathered during all interviews. The interviews lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. It was agreed beforehand with interviewees that interview data would be kept confidential and that any quotes used in this study would be anonymous. Due to the sensitivity of the interview theme, most interviewees did not agree to be taped. Accordingly, quotes are based on my interview notes. Furthermore, the interviews with Japanese prison staff members were conducted in Japanese and quotes are based on my own translations of the original data.

## *Research Questions*

This study is intended to answer four key research questions concerning the culture of public service organizations: 1. what is culture?; 2. why is the g/g theory better than other cultural theories?; 3. how can organizational culture in the English and Japanese prison services be observed in reality and how can the g/g theory be used to identify this kind of culture?; and 4. why should culture be analysed in the study of public administration?

1. **What is culture?**

   Previous studies show that culture can be defined in two ways. In order to effectively analyse culture, it is necessary to discuss how culture can be defined in this study with reference to previous cultural studies.

2. **Why is the g/g theory better than other cultural theories?**

   The second question relates to the selection of a cultural theory for the purposes of this study. More specifically, why is the g/g cultural theory better suited to the aims of this study than other cultural theories? Therefore, some consideration is given in this study to the methodological advantages of the g/g

theory and why it should be adopted to identify cultures of risk control in public service analysis.

3. **How can organizational culture in the English and Japanese prison services be observed in reality and how can the g/g theory be used to identify this kind of culture?**

This question relates to the previous one in the respect that it is also concerned with methodology. Referring to previous studies which have tried to measure culture, it is argued here that culture can be best observed through aspects of more specific kinds of culture such as the risk control cultures of prison services. Thus, this study asks how can the risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services be identified using the g/g theory ?   In this way, it is argued that measuring culture is an effective technique for comparatively identifying culture in two similar institutions.

4. **Why should culture be analysed in the study of public administration?**

The final question is concerned with the contribution that analysing culture makes to the study of public administration. By addressing the research questions outlined above both in the theoretical and empirical chapters, this study aims to identify what cultural analysis, as based on the g/g theory, can or cannot do for the study of public administration.

## *Structure and Chapter plan*

This study consists of 8 chapters excluding this introduction and the conclusion. Chapter 1 reviews how culture has been discussed and analysed in previous studies. The ways in which culture has been defined in previous studies, as highlighted by the first research question cited above, are discussed in this chapter. Issues and theories relevant to the analysis of culture are also discussed in this chapter such as the relationship between risk and culture, measurement theory, and studies of organizational and institutional theories.

Chapter 2 introduces the g/g theory. The first section of this chapter gives an overview of the theory and discusses the methodological advantages and issues raised by using it to measure culture. Next, based on the issues raised in the first section, the

second section reviews previous works in which the g/g theory has been used to analyse real cases. Taking account of the problems encountered by these previous studies, the third section discusses the most essential issue concerning the third research question: what variables and scales should be adopted for making measurements.   In the case of this study, the grid and group dimensions are selected as variables for measuring culture. Following these discussions, four aspects representing g/g dimensions in organizational risk control structures are defined: formalization, compliance, specialization (roles), and autonomy. Chapter 3 focuses on the method of measuring the risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services. The measurement process proceeds in five steps: 1. setting the purpose of the measurements, the institutional level at which the prison service culture will be observed, and specific risk to be analysed in this study; 2. coding the four aspects suggested in chapter 2 to fit in with the cultures of risk control in the relevant prison services; 3. scoring these codes using the g/g scales; and 4. demonstrating the outcomes of the measurement process.

Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter. Based on the four aspects of risk control discussed in chapters 2 and 3, this chapter analyses the formalization of the rules which define the risk control system in the relevant prison services as the first grid aspect of prison risk control structures. Chapter 5 discusses the compliance level of local establishments in response to the rules discussed in chapter 4 as the first group aspect of prison risk control structures. Chapter 6 discusses the leadership roles of governors in local establishments in terms of the specialization of governors which corresponds to the second grid aspect of prison risk control structures. In response to the roles of governors, Chapter 7 discusses the autonomy of local establishments where governors exercise their roles in relation to specific risk control strategies

Taking stock of these theoretical and empirical discussions, chapter 8 summarises the overall risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services. The demonstration techniques discussed in chapter 3 are used in this chapter and consideration is given to the effectiveness of the g/g method as a means of measuring the cultures of risk control in the relevant prison services. Finally, the concluding section gives answers to the four research questions stated above and evaluates the outcomes of this study. Based on these findings, I would like to conclude this study by suggesting possible directions for future research.

# *Chapter 1*

# *Cultural Theories: Theoretical and Methodological Development of Cultural Analysis*

This chapter discusses the theoretical and methodological development of cultural analysis in previous studies. While this study is intended to compare the organizational cultures of the Japanese and English prison services, there are several approaches and analytical points of views which may be adopted to discuss culture. The history of cultural analysis is explored here in terms of the following issues: definitions of culture, the aims of cultural analysis, methodological development and difficulties in analysing culture, and the relationship between culture and risk. The first section discusses definitions of culture in the social sciences by referring to classic studies in the field. Then, based on these definitions, further consideration is given to studies of cultures since the 1960s. Taking account of the methodological issues raised by these works, the second section summarizes an agenda for effectively analysing culture. The following issues are mentioned in the discussion: the aims of cultural analysis; the units and size of analysis; theories of culture and organization; measuring culture and measurement theory in the social sciences; and culture in relation to risk.

## *1.1: Cultural theories and methods*

In order to discuss the organizational culture of prison services, it is necessary to define "culture" in public service analysis. This section reviews the definition of culture in classic anthropology and the ways in which political and national cultures have been analysed in the social sciences.

### *1.1.1: Definition of culture*

The definition of culture has been discussed in the relationship between the social group and individuals in the group. This conception began to be discussed by anthropologists in the 1950s. The classic definition of culture by Klockhohn is that "*culture consists in patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reacting, acquired and transmitted mainly by*

*symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in art crafts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional ideas and especially their attached values"* (Klockhohn, 1951).

Kluckhohn argued that culture is maintained by social groups in relation to individual values. He defined that the value is a conception a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual, regarding the preference which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of actions" (Kluckhohn, 1951 and 1967). Hence Klockhohn defined that culture is patterns of overall behaviour shared among the social group, and it concerns with values of individuals. Later researchers also referred to his definition of culture in their works such as Geertz (1973) and Hofstede (2001).

Furthermore, in response to this definition of culture, Kroeber and Parsons (1958) insisted on narrowing down the definition of culture to aid analysis of social groups which are more established and organized than those covered by traditional anthropological studies. They insisted that although the concept of culture in the anthropological tradition is useful, for the purposes of analysing social organizations and their systems it should be used to describe a specifically relational system of interaction among individuals and collectives (Kroeber and Parsons 1958). To illustrate this point, although anthropologists define an individual as a *"member of a culture",* in the social sciences this relationship should be expressed as *"member of the society of culture X."* These suggestions are useful in as far as they help us to think about how we may define culture in the field of public administration research. The crucial point of agreement is that cultures develop around formalised and established social organizations. Hence culture is defined as patterns of behaviour including thinking, feeling, and reacting to stimuli shared among members of social groups.

### 1.1.2: Analysis of national culture

Based on the definition of culture outlined above, this section considers how cultural analysis has been conducted on a large scale in the field of politics, particularly at the national level. The first major attempt at cultural analysis in political science was made by Almond and Verba in their classic study of national political culture, *The Civic Culture* (1963).

Almond and Verba's research was intended to analyse culture at the national level as an independent variable for political stability and change (Almond and Verba 1963; and Welch, 1993). They explained that political culture consists of attitudes,

beliefs, values, and skills which are current in an entire population as well as the special tendencies and patterns which may be found within separate parts of that population, and its influences levels of political stabilities (Almond and Verba, 1963). In order to analyse culture, they used the typology of national civic culture (*ibid.*).

In spite of Almond and Verba's ambitious analysis of national culture, their research and methodology were heavily criticised for two major reasons: 1. the typology they used is biased towards democratic values; and 2. their evidence is weak and the size of the survey is too small to prove the relationship between national culture and political change. Firstly, with regard to the typology of political culture, if political culture reflects the conditions which result indifferent forms of democracy in different nations, the typology should be value-free. Nevertheless, the typology of civic culture used by Almond and Verba was categorised according to developmental stages which lead to western styles of "stable democracy" (Welch 1993). As a result, the United States, Great Britain and other western democratic states were identified as the most ideal civic cultures while Mexico became identified as the least culturally civic nation out of the group of case studies (Almond and Verba, 1963).

Secondly, the amount of data collected was too small to support Almond and Verba's hypothesis that insists political stabilities are caused by political culture. In response to this criticism, Almond himself admitted that the sample size of countries was too small to make generalizations about the influence of political power on democracy (Almond and Verba, 1963). In response to this problem, Welch (1993) has concluded that it is not possible to make purely statistical correlations between national culture and political stabilities, in which respect civic culture in the form proposed by Almond and Verba. The crucial point to take away from the second debate is that there is a strong relationship between the unit of analysis and evidence. Cultural analysis on a large scale requires a sufficiently large body of evidence to support it. Thus, Almond and Verba's attempt to explain political change in terms of national culture failed for these reasons.

### 1.1.3: *National value and culture survey*

Almond and Verba's work on civic culture receives severe critics discussed above. However, two main researches responded to the issue for measuring national culture between 1970 and 1990. Inglehart and Hofstede have attempted to make up for the insufficient amount of collected by Almond and Verba by conducting surveys across a

much broader range of countries. They both developed their methodologies to identify national cultures based on individual values.

The first cultural study based on the large N (number) survey was conducted by Inglehart between 1970 and 1990 in his study of national value shifts. According to Inglehart (1990 and 1997), the study of political culture is based on the assumption that autonomous and reasonably enduring cross-cultural differences exist and that they have political consequences (*ibid.*). He hypothesized that mass value systems are changing in ways that have important economic, political, and social consequences (Inglehart, 1990 and 1997). Inglehart explored this hypothesis through cross-level analysis based on data gained from a large number of societies that vary across the full economic and political spectra (Inglehart 1997). Between 1970 and 1990 he conducted two large surveys which covered twenty-six nations (Inglehart 1990 and 1997): namely, *the Euro-Barometer surveys* from 1970 through to 1986, and *the World Values Survey* from 1981 to 1990. The aim of these surveys was to measure a cultural shift from *modernism* to *post-modernism* then occurring between the younger and older generations. The size of these surveys was significant for Inglehart's research. *The World Value Survey* covered 70 percent of the world's population at that time across 43 countries and societies(Inglehart 1997). The sizes of the samples of each survey were approximately 90,000 cases in 1981 and 1990-1 for the *Euro-Barometer* and *World Value* Surveys respectively (*ibid.*).

Inglehart and his team designed the surveys based on ranking scales in order to measure changing values. For example, respondents were asked to choose the answer between one and four scales concerning values of work: "1. Very important, 2. Quite important, 3. Not very important, 4. Not at all important, and 0. Not ascertained (Inglehart 1997: p. 394). In this way, the surveys asked a broad range of questions about different facets of everyday life: religion, family, sexuality, economic and social status, work ethics, and satisfaction or well-being (Inglehart 1990). Respondents' answers were assigned ranking scores based on the materialist and post-materialist value scales by categories of social values. Results were added up as national materialist and post-materialist scores for each country, and demonstrated through several statistical processes; such as calculating mean values or assigning weighing values for standardization (Inglehart 1990).

Inglehart highlighted three main findings of his survey. First, each nation has specific values, attitudes, and thus a so-called political culture. Second, these values are changeable but normally the pace of change is very slow and political culture, expressed

as values, is more stable than economic factors. The value survey conducted between 1973 and 1988 shows that the values of each nation state did not dramatically change over the targeted period (Inglehart, 1990: p.423). Third, throughout advanced industrial societies, mainly in Western Europe, the shift from materialist to post-materialist values depends significantly on younger generations. That is, young people in industrial societies are more likely to have post-materialist values than their elders (*ibid.*). Inglehart concluded that the responses to the surveys were influenced by durable cultural components in each society brought about by their distinctive historical experiences (*ibid.*).

In spite of the high level of planning, complexity, and scale of Inglehar's research, several criticisms have been levelled at it. Firstly, with regard to culture as an independent variable, his hypothesis was not supported well enough by the survey. He admitted the influence of culture on social economic and political changes but he also warned that cultures are not necessarily enough in themselves to account for all of those changes (Inglehart, 1990). This problem showed that even though Inglehart's survey covered a large number of variables in order to identify national cultures, it still struggled to explain specific outcomes as independent variables. He explained that it is due to the contingency of culture.

Secondly, although culture is considered as contingent factors to explain specific changes as Inglehart evaluated, the design of his surveys also showed that the methodological issue. In both World Value Survey and Euro-Barometer Survey the survey questions asked respondents about abstract and general values: for example, "how far do you approve or ecological movements or protecting nature, women's movements, anti-apartheid movements?" (Inglehart, 1997: p.419). The independent variables formed by these questionnaires were considered too general to give an adequate explanation for specific social and political changes.

Thirdly, the appropriateness of the samples taken for both surveys is questioned in studies of Inglihart. The samples selected for some countries do not seem to properly represent their populations. For example, although 1,000 samples were collected from China for the 1990 survey, 90% of these came from highly educated urban people (Inglehart 1997). Inglehart mentioned that these samples were assigned weights to compensate for this bias (*ibid*.). However, if the economic and geographical diversity of China are taken into account, it seems doubtful that the sample effectively represents the values of Chinese citizens.

Finally, in terms of the definition of culture, Inglehart's understanding of the relationship between culture and values is questionable. In his research, national culture is defined as the aggregation of individual values. In this respect he assumed that culture can be measured by gathering large enough amounts of data about individual values. This assumption requires careful consideration. In particular, we should ask whether culture as collective patterns of behaviour (*i.e.* including ways of thinking) is equal to the sum of the values held by individuals in social groups.

The final question relates to the issue of the scales covered by survey questions. Randall (1998) has argued that in order to make cross-national comparisons, these scales must be consistent across national groups. Based on this understanding, he has examined the assumption that the scale used in the World Value Survey is a consistent cross-national measuring device. He did this by transforming answers to the survey into logarithm values using a log-linear model (the *latent model*) (*ibid.*). As a result, he found that the scale is biased by the common stratification variables of gender, education, age, and country. Figure 1.1 demonstrates how the logarithm model adjusts the scale for different countries.

Given observed raw scale scores of 1 through to 4 for the United States, Japan, and Finland, it can be seen that the scale of 1 for some respondents in Finland is below those of the United States and Japan. Similarly, the score of four observed for some U.S. participants would be categorized as score three for Japanese and Finnish participants. These results suggest that post-materialist scales are not necessarily consistent measuring devices, at least in terms of the assumptions made by the log-linear model.

Figure 1.1: Scales continuum adjusted by the log-model. (Randall 1998)



**Latent Postmaterialism Attitude Continuum**

**e 3. Raw Scale Scores (1 to 4) Plotted against the Latent Trait**

Randall's critics have pointed out that the scales for measuring values are not necessarily equivalent with each other. Specifically, if a subjective or individual value is measured, the distance between these scales tends to differ according to the context of the sample. If the scale ranges differ between countries, they may also differ among individuals who share the same nationality. Hence, although Inglehart measured culture by the aggregation of individual values, these values were not necessarily measured on equal scales. This raises further questions about Inglehart's research: in particular, whether his results are comparable or not, whether they can be measured on unequal scales, and whether they are addible.

The second cultural study based on a value survey was led by Hofstede. Much like Ingrehart, Hofstede (1991; and 2001) also used a large number (N) survey to analyse national and organizational culture. He conducted the international employee attitude survey programme between 1967 and 1973 in the IBM Corporation. The survey was carried out in two stages during this period, and more than 116,000 questionnaires were returned in 20 languages from IBM employees in 72 countries (Hofstede , 1991 and 2001). His survey was intended to help deal with differences in the ways in which people think, feel, and behave in cross-national organizations. Furthermore, he argued that so many solutions in economic, technological, medical, or biological cooperation do not work or cannot be implemented because they ignore the cultural differences which affect the ways in which partners from different social groups think and behave (Hofstede, 1991).

Hofstede defined that culture is the mental human programming represented by widespread patterns of acting, feeling, and thinking shared within social groups. (Hofstede, 2001). He also asserted that culture is always a collective phenomenon and individual values are learnt from consists of shared patterns within the same social environment which are given to individuals to learn (*ibid.*). As he himself stated: "[culture] is the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another" (Hofstede, 1991 and 2001).

In terms of this culture as collective patterns of behaviour, Hofstede insisted that culture builds up in layers over society because everyone belongs to a number of different social groups and categories of people at the same time (Hofstede 2001). In his research, he focussed on two major levels of culture, national culture and organizational culture, which he tried to measure with uniform scales (Hofstede, 1991 and 2001). Hofstede's concept of national culture was related to the idea of national character which had developed in the early twentieth century. However, he stressed that the concept of national culture carefully manages the deterministic stereotypes and biases about nation states of its predecessor (Hofstede, 2001). He defined the layers of culture as follows:

1. A national level according to one's country (or countries for people who migrated during their lifetime)
2. A regional and ethnic and religious and linguistic affiliation level, as most nations are composed of culturally different regions and ethnic and religious and language groups
3. A gender level which separates, for example, grandparents from grandparents from parents and parents from their children
4. A social class level associated with educational opportunities and with a person's occupation or professions
5. A level for those who are employed at organizational or corporate levels
( Hofstede, 1991: p. 10)

Unlike Inglehart, Hofstede's IBM Survey was not necessarily intended to explain national or organizational changes in terms of culture. Hofstede insisted that the cultures of different social groups often conflict with each other thus making it difficult to predict new situations or changes (Hofstede, 2001). The purpose of his research was

to explore how national cultural patterns develop among major groups within human populations groups and how they gain stability over long periods of time (*ibid.*).

In order to measure national culture as he defined it, Hofstede made use of the five dimensions of society identified by Inkeles and Levinson (1969) in their work on common problems in society: 1. relation to authority; 2. conception of self; 3. the relationship between the individual and society; 4. the individual's concept of masculinity and femininity; and 5. ways of dealing with conflicts, including the control of aggression and the expression of feelings. Based on those five dimensions of society by Inkeles and Levinson, Hofstede suggested that national culture and cultural differences can be measured in terms of the attitudes of group members in response to five social aspects: 1. power distance; 2. individualism versus collectivism; 3. masculinity versus femininity; 4. long-term versus short-term orientation; and 5. uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 2001).

Hofstede's survey asked questions about those five social aspects. As well as Inglehart, his survey was based on multiple choice questions which involved preference scales representing the intensity of each social aspect. For example, the questionnaire asked: *"how often would you say your immediate manager is concerned about helping you get ahead?"* Respondents were invited to answer this question with one of the five following responses: 1. always; 2. usually; 3. sometimes; 4. seldom; and 5. never (Hofstede, 2001 p. 469). In order to analyse the survey results, Hofstede (2001) calculated additions of responses he received from IBM employees in different countries and analysed them based on the mean, correlation and coefficient values (Hofstede 2001). In addition to comparing national cultures based on his IBM survey, Hofstede also discussed the differences between the organizational cultures of IBM in different countries.

Although the study of Hofstede developed the method for measuring culture discussed as above, it also involved several questions and issues. The first issue is the mixture of definitions of culture in his study. Hofstede designed his IBM survey with the intention of developing a typology of cultural analysis. He clarified the distinction between individual values and cultures shared by social groups. Moreover, his large N survey and its questions were based on his five social aspects. Accordingly, his surveys were also intended to identify a more coherent typology of culture based on these dimensions.

Nevertheless, his analysis and the techniques used for it begged several questions in relation to definitions of culture. Although he emphasized differences

between individual values and collective patterns of behaviour in his definition of culture, the survey was designed to find values held by IBM employees rather than collective patterns of behaviour within the organization. The results of the survey were demonstrated by the aggregation of questionnaires which asked individual IBM employees about their values and then labelled the results as "culture". As with Ingelhart's study, this led to questions over whether individual values can extensively turn into culture; whether it is appropriate to add up all responses by countries ignoring the possible differences in ways of understanding scale units depending on respondents or countries (see Figure 1.1); and analyse results by relevant statistical techniques, such as mean values.

Furthermore, even though Hofstede took the view that the results he received from the IBM Corporation were representative of national culture (Hofstede 2001), it is questioned how far they reflect the overlaps between different cultures and societies. He asserted that cultures are layered across social groups. Based on these social layers of culture, national cultures are considered not necessarily equal to organizational cultures in a straight way. In order to argue that the culture of IBM effectively represents national culture, he needed to carry out further research to prove that organizational culture can be extended to national culture

Moreover, with regard to survey questions, although Hofstede's IBM survey asked more specific questions than Ingelhart's World Value Survey, it still tried to identify general values in relation to general situations. For example, the survey asked respondents how important they consider to "1. work with people who cooperate well with one another, 2. have training opportunities, and 3. have considerable freedom to adopt their own approach to the job in general" (Hofstede 2001: p. 468). Without specifying situations in which a question like this becomes relevant for respondents, it is hard to understand how they can give a realistic response to them. This sort of abstract questioning may be easily influenced by the contextual conditions in which respondents find themselves at the time of the survey. In order to gain more accurate responses concerning patterns of behaviour shared in the social group, survey questions need to be supported by contextual information which provides specific situations when the topic of the question becomes matter for responses.

Therefore, three major criticisms can be made of Hofstede's attempts to measure national culture. First, it is questioned to express culture as collective patterns of behaviour shared in the social group by adding up individual values by the social group. Second, he received a mismatch between what he wanted to know about

(national culture) and what he found out from the results of his survey. He designed the survey questions specifically for IBM employees with the aim of identifying national culture. Yet if the survey was intended to measure organizational culture, the questions should have been focused on organizational structure or, alternatively, if it was intended to measure national culture, the survey should not have focused solely on the IBM Corporation. Third, his survey questions were too abstract for respondents to give realistic answers to them.

### 1.1.4: The findings and issues raised by cultural analysis in previous research

The last section explored some previous attempts at cultural analysis in the social sciences. This section summarises the findings and issues raised by those studies and how they can help here with the development of a method for measuring culture.

The first issue is the definition of culture. Almond and Verba, Inglehart, and Hofstede all defined culture as collective patterns of behaviour shared by social groups. However, their methods for identifying these patterns of behaviour are not necessarily linked with their recognition of culture. Inglehart (1990 and 1997) and Hofstede (1991 and 2001), in particular, tried to identify culture through the addition of individual values. As I discussed above, there is no clear evidence to show that culture, defined as collective patterns of behaviour, is produced solely by the addition of individual values. Therefore, the distinction between individual values and culture collective patterns of behaviour needs to be made clearer.

The second issue is the function of cultural analysis. The research discussed above also raised questions about the purpose of cultural analysis: in particular, whether culture can be an independent variable to explain some outcomes. Almond and Verba and Inglehart tried to identify culture as an independent variable in order to explain the political stability in terms of national culture. Inglehart also suggests that culture is a highly contingent factor and thus does not work well as an independent variable capable of explaining the causality of some specific political, economic or social changes. In response to this issue, Hofstede intended to comparatively identify and demonstrate national culture rather than to explain the causality of specific changes. With regard to the purpose of cultural analysis, his research showed that it is possible to analyse culture apart from the causation of specific changes in institutions. Thus, based on those findings and approaches in previous cultural studies above, it should conclude that culture should not be analysed as an independent variable for the purpose of explaining specific outcomes in society due to its contingency.

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The third issue is the appropriate institutional size and units for analysing culture. Previous cultural studies I discussed as above have focused on identifying national culture. Nevertheless, the outcomes of their works revealed several limits of identifying national culture as a unit of analysis. National culture is too contingent or too large to be identified as the unit of cultural analysis. Previous studies have highlighted two major reasons why national culture is difficult to measure: 1. there are a large number of variables involved in the identification of national culture; and 2. it is difficult to collect a sufficient number of samples to represent national culture.

Firstly, with regard to the number of variables, Inglehart tried to identify national values in terms of broad social dimensions. Consequently, a large number of variables were involved in identifying these values. In spite of the large scale of the survey, its outcomes showed that values demonstrated by those variables are not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of national cultures. Secondly, the studies examined above suggest that it is technically difficult to gather a sample of respondents who are representative of their country of nationality. Almond and Verba (1963) were criticized because they did not collect enough data to prove the existence of about national culture. Likewise, Inglehart faced difficulties in collecting a sufficiently large sample for his World Value and Euro Barometer survey. Access to respondents may differ conditions in the countries where they live. As the case of China has shown (see p.28), it is extremely difficult to collect samples which fully represent a national population. Meanwhile, Hofstede only conducted his survey in the IBM Corporation across 22 nation states which is also not a sufficiently large sample to insist upon the existence of national culture.

In light of these problems, it may thus be argued that in order to effectively analyse culture, it is very important to consider the appropriate unit of analysis. The studies discussed above show that national culture is technically and conceptually difficult to analyse. The most commonly recognised reason for this problem is that national cultures are too large for it to be possible to define all variables within them. Meanwhile, Hofstede (2001) has noted that culture is represented by several social group units: organizational, regional, family, individual, etc. (*ibid.*). In terms of the social group unit, which was introduced in the first section of this chapter, Kroeber and Parsons (1958) emphasized the distinction between the cultures of socially established units and non-established units (see Sec. 1.1.1). Within the layer of culture, an organizational culture such as IBM is considered a socially established unit. In terms of

this organizational culture, Hofstede's study showed significant differences between the branches of IBM across 22 countries.

Thus, in light of the work of Kroeber and Parsons (1968) and Hofstede (2001), it can be concluded that the level of socially established organizations is an appropriate unit of analysis. For the purposes of this study, the socially established organizations are prison services. However, this status could also be extended to public service institutions in general. Unlike non-established social group units, established organizations generally have visible organizational control structures. As far as culture is analysed in the socially established units which have clear organizational structures, culture can be better analysed with those structures of the organization. Hence, in order to analyse organizational culture, it is useful to involve approaches for structural organizational analysis from previous studies of organizational and institutional analysis (see Sec. 1.2.1)

The fourth issue is the method and techniques for analysing culture. Previous studies have shown that typologies of culture are the main method for identifying culture. As outlined above, Almond and Verba defined three types of civic culture, Inglehart identified pre- and post-materialistic value alongside more complex combinations of social dimensions, and Hofstede defined culture structurally in terms of five social dimensions. Each of these authors generally defined and named the specific characteristics of the cultural group. However, one essential question has never been asked by previous studies: what is the typology of culture and what does it mean in comparative cultural analysis?

An answer to this question is provided by measurement theory which helps us to understand the definition and function of those typologies. This theory discusses the typology as a measurement technique which is identified as one of four levels of measurement scales (Hoover and Donovan 2004). This theory also develops appropriate techniques to be used in response to the level of measurement (Becker 1999). Whereas the next section will explain details of this theory (see Sec. 1.2.2), it is useful to consider the meaning of typologies as a type of measurement in social science.

In the process of applying types of culture to real cases, previous studies assigned analytical codes which indicated specific types of culture. This is another part of the method to analyse culture by typologies. For example, Almond and Verba's basic typology involved codes in response to the cultural types. Meanwhile, Inglehart and Hofstede identified culture by coding variables and assigning rating scales to each code. Concerning the rating scales, I raised two issues in the previous section: 1. rating scales

are perceived differently from different subjective viewpoints; and 2. there is no evidence that group culture is equal to the aggregation of individual values (see Sec. 1.1.3). In addition to the matter of typologies, it is important to consider how these issues can be managed in the coding process. This consideration forms part of the broader discussion of the method which needs to be developed for analysing organizational culture.

The fifth issue also relates to the method for analysing culture. It specifically relates to the appropriateness of value surveys in terms of abstract values of individuals. Inglehart and Hofstede both conducted large questionnaire-based surveys. Nevertheless, the design of their surveys raised the following question: can abstract survey questions effectively identify culture?  As I pointed out earlier when discussing the criticisms levelled at Inglehart's and Hofstede's studies, abstract questions are not necessarily effective for the purposes of identifying culture. In order to measure organizational culture, it is important to specify the situations in which patterns of organizational behaviour can be most effectively observed.

In regard to situations in which culture can be effectively observed, Douglas and Wildavsky have discussed the relationship between culture and risk in social group units (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983; see Sec. 1.2.3). Their work in this regard relates to how uncertainty is perceived and managed by social groups. They argued that the perception and acceptability of risk and the ways in which risk is controlled may differ depending on the group culture. Hofstede also identified the cultural contingency of risk management in his dimension of "uncertainty avoidance" (Hofstede 2001). However, he did not focus on the relationship between culture and risk in depth. Accordingly, it will be useful to consider the value of analysing culture in relation to the perception and management of risk in organizations.

## 1.2: Measuring organizational culture

The last section discussed previous cultural studies and the issues they raised. Based on these issues and conditions, this section will explore theories and methods which can help to analyse culture more effectively. Firstly, in order to shed light on the structural approach to organizational culture, I will discuss some studies in organizational theory. Secondly, I will introduce the measurement theory with reference to the typology and

coding scales. Thirdly, I will introduce the work of Wildavsky and Douglas on risk and culture.

### *1.2.1: Organizational theories: Structures of the organization and cultural analysis*

The formal structural approach to understanding organizations, known as the structural contingency theory, was popular between the 1960s and 70s (Donaldson 1999). The theory proposes that organizations should adjust their structures to fit environmental contingencies.

Pugh (1973) analysed the formal structures of organizations based on the functional approach. He defined 6 primary facets of organizational structure which control organizational behaviour while also referring to previous works on organizational structure:

1. *Specialization*: the degree to which and organization's activities are divided into specialized roles.
2. *Standardization*: the degree to which an organization lays down standard rules and procedures.
3. *Standardization of employment practices*: the degree to which an organization has standardized employment practices (e.g. a distinctive feature of personal career systems)
4. *Formalization*: the degree to which instructions and procedures, etc., are written down.
5. *Centralization*: the degree to which the authority to make certain decisions is located at the top of the management hierarchy.
6. *Configuration*: the shape of the organization's role structure: *e.g.* whether the management chain of command is long or short; whether superiors have limited spans of control; whether there are relatively few subordinates, or a relatively large number of subordinates, and whether they represent a large or small percentage of specialized or support personnel. (Pugh, 1973:p.18.)

In addition to these facets of organizational structures, Pugh (1973) also pointed out the contextual factors which determine these structures in the organization: 1. *Origin and history*: experiences which are gained by the organization; 2. *Ownership and control*: the kind of ownership and whether it is concentrated in a few hands or divided among many; 3. *Size*: the number of employees, net assets, market position, etc.; 4. *Charter*: the number and range of goods and services. 5. *Technology*: the degree of integration

achieved in an organization's work process; 6. *Location*: the number of geographically dispersed operating sites; 7. *Interdependence*: the extent to which an organization depends on customers, suppliers, trade unions, and any owning groups. (Pugh 1973: p.26)

Although these factors help to provide understanding of the structure of organizations, those traditional understanding of organizational structures by Pugh was criticised for not including a notion of operations and performance in organizations. Later researchers insisted that organizational structures are determined not only those contextual factors, but also to fit performance and strategic choices by members in the organization (Donaldson 1999). In response to this understanding of organizational structures consisted of fixed and non-fixed factors, Tolbert and Zucker (1996) also analysed the informal process whereby new structures develop in organizations through the behaviour of their members.

Therefore, organizations consist not only of formal structures, but also of informal processes enacted by members inside the organizations In order to understand the structure of organizations, the behaviour of their members and other informal processes should be taken into account in addition to their formal structures. Hence organizational culture, defined as shared collective patterns of behaviour, should be analysed in terms of the formal and informal aspects of the organization.

### 1.2.2: Measurement theory in the social sciences

Previous cultural studies have shown that making typologies with analytical coding is the common way of analysing culture. This section discusses the attributes of the typology in the measurement theory of the social sciences. The measurement theory is intended to evaluate the meaning of measurement techniques used in the social sciences and to develop appropriate analytical techniques. It provides a clear standard for quantitative analysis in the social sciences.

In their book, *The Element of Social Scientific Thinking* (2004), Hoover and Donovan explain that the definition of measurement depends on the variable which determines what level of measurement can be attempted and also relates to what sort of hypothetical relationships can be formulated using the variable (Hoover and Donovan, 2004: 94). Three things need to be considered when we select selecting variables for measuring specific cases in the social sciences: 1. their *properties* or *characteristics*; 2. the measurement *technique* appropriate to these properties or characteristics?; and 3. the

*levels* of measurement that are possible in view of the variable's properties and the chosen measurement technique ( *ibid*.) .

In order to analyse specific cases, it is necessary to consider the characteristics and properties of variables which effectively measure those cases. The measurement techniques may differ according to the characteristics of variables. Thus, the concept of levels of measurement is needed to provide a framework for discussions of variables along these lines. The level of measurement defines four measurement techniques: *classify order, set standard units of distance, and locate absolute zero (ibid.).* By combining these components it is possible to make four levels of measurement:

1. *Nominal* measurement only uses the *classifying* technique.   It can be applied to statistics concerned with the frequency of cases in each classification.
2. *Ordinal* measurement uses *classify* and *order*. It allows statistics to describe the ways in which cases are ordered with respect to a variable.
3. *Interval* measurement uses *classify*, *order*, and the *set standard units of distance* techniques. It permits comparisons to be made of quantitative differences among cases on a scale.
4. *Ratio* measurement uses all four of the techniques listed above. It allows comparisons to be made of absolute distances between cases.
   (Hoover and Donovan, 2004: p. 99).

The ordinal level of measurement gains the continuum order from the nominal level of measurement: that is, the highest height, the $2^{nd}$ highest height, and the lowest ($3^{rd}$) height. The comparability is higher in the ordinal level than in the nominal level. Meanwhile, if these heights are measured by the metric scales, the ordinal level becomes the interval level. Among the heights of 180, 160, and 140 cm, 180cm of height is 20cm higher than that of 160cm. 160cm is 20cm higher than that of 140cm, and 140cm is 40cm lower than 180cm. Hence the interval level of measurement provides equal units of distance between scales. As a result, it is enable to measure cases, providing standardized distances between cases, and the comparability of the interval measurement scales is higher than in the ordinal level of measurement.

The distinction between the interval and ratio levels of measurement is determined by how zero is understood. In the interval level of measurement, zero is just an arbitrary concept. Hoover and Donovan (2004) emphasize that in the interval level of measurement, zero does not mean "nothing happened before zero". Zero is established

as a point from which it is possible to count backwards and forwards in order to define comparative degrees of two variables such as temperature or Biblical time (Hoover and Donovan, 2004). On the other hand, in the ratio level of measurement, zero means "true zero".   Accordingly, before zero in the ratio scale means no distance at all hence "there cannot be less than zero" (*ibid*) for variables such as distance, weight, or age.

It is essential to choose the appropriate level of measurement for each variable and to consider its characteristics before proceeding with any research. The available statistical and analytical techniques may differ in terms of their level of measurement. (Hoover and Donovan 2004; and Becker 1999; see Table 1.1). For example, if variables measure cases at the interval level of measurement, the statistical techniques based on mean values are available for analysis; such as *mean, standard deviation, and correlation* are based on this assumption (see Table 1.1). Those techniques are appropriate to be used because cases measured by the interval scales maintain equal units of distances between those cases. By contrast, it is not appropriate to use these techniques to analyse data in the ordinal level of measurement because it is based on a ranking order among cases without considering equal units of distance between those scales.

Based on the measurement theory, basic typologies of cultural analysis used in previous cultural studies primarily considered to be the nominal level of measurement because those is based on classification without any continuum scales between variables. For example, the typology of civic culture proposed by Almond and Verba (1963) should be viewed as being on this level of measurement. Although Almond and Verba's cultural types were biased towards their understanding of western democracy, there are no continuum scales, such as order or rankings, between the three types of political culture posed in the civic culture typology.

Meanwhile, the rating scale surveys conducted by Inglehart (1997) and Hofstede (2001) are usually considered as being on the interval level because scales are assigned numbers which seem to have equal units of distance between them: *i.e.* 1, 2, 3, and 4. Nevertheless, Randall (1998) criticised the work of Inglehart by pointing out that units of distance differ among nation states. As I discussed above, the units of distance among these rating scales may differ depending on the perception of respondents hence equal units of distance are not necessarily ensured between scales. Therefore, Inglehart's and Hofstede's studies and their surveys should be considered as being on the ordinal level of measurement.

Based on this understanding of level of measurement in surveys conducted by Ingelhart and Hofstede, it should be argued that their statistical techniques used for analysing results. Although Inglehart and Hofstede added up responses from surveys by countries, and analysed results based on mean values of those (see Sec. 1.1.2), those are considered as inappropriate techniques for their case studies measured by the ordinal scales in measurement theory (see table 1.1). Based on measurement theory, adding up variables measured by the ordinal level of measurement or producing mean values of those by countries does not show substantial statistical meanings in order to analyse results.

Thus, although the previous section questioned studies of Inglehart and Hofstede in terms of the relationship between individual values and culture as collective patterns of behaviour, measurement theory also suggests that their research designs not necessarily appropriate based on the concept of levels of measurement and appropriate statistical techniques correspond to those levels. In conclusion, conducting the large N survey, which is intended to measure individual values in the organization, is not considered the best way of measuring culture as organizational patterns of behaviour. In order to avoid the methodological confusion as Hofstede and Ingelhart showed, the definition of culture should strictly distinguish culture as collective patterns of behaviour and individual values.

Table 1.1: Examples of appropriate statistics by levels of measurement

| Level of Measurement | Nominal | Ordinal | Interval | Ratio |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Permissible Arithmetic Operations | Counting | Greater than or less then operations | Addition and Substraction of scale values | Multiplication and division of scale values |
| Appripriate statistics | **Cross Tabs** | | | |
| | Chi square Phi Cramer's V Contingengy Coefficient (CC) Lambda<br><br>Uncertainty Coefficient (UC) Kappa ( k) | Spearman's Rank Order Correlation Kendal's Tau-b Somer's D<br><br>Gamma Mantel-Haenszel | | |
| | **Non Parametric statistics** | | | |
| | Goodman& Kruskal tau (t) Chi-square runs<br><br>Binomial<br><br>Macnemar Cochran (Q) | Kolmgorov-Smirnov. Sign Wilcoxen<br><br>Kendall Coefficient of Concordance (W) Friedman two way ANOVA Mann-Whiteney (U) Wald-Wolfowitz Kruskal-Wallis | | |
| | | **Frequencies** | | |
| | | Median (Mdn) Interquartile range (IRQ) | Mean (M)<br><br>Stadnard deviation Parson's product moment correlation (r) t-test (t) analysis of variance (ANOVA) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) Factor analysis Regression Multiple correlation:R | Coefficient of variation , (CFVAR)<br><br>SFVAR=SD/M |

This tables was referred to Becker, L. (1999)

http://www.uccs.edu/~faculty/lbecker/SPSS/scalemeas.htm

### 1.2.3: Culture and risk

Previous cultural studies have shown that measuring culture in de-contextualised general abstract situations is difficult. Additionally, those studies suggest that culture as collective patterns of behaviour should be distinguished from individual values. In light of this finding, this thesis argues that culture can be more effectively observed by specifying the situation for the organization.

Douglas and Wildavsky (1983) analysed culture in terms of risk and how it is perceived and controlled in social groups. Even though they used the classic definition of culture, they strictly distinguished culture from individual values by assuming that culture is a particular guiding principle in a particular form of society which does not indicate individual private beliefs in the depths of people's minds.

They insisted that culture can be observed in the process by which social groups define how they accept and control whatever they perceive to be risk (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983). In this regard, risk is defined as the fear of possible changes which irreversibly and involuntary affect us (*ibid*.). They analysed how risk is selected and controlled by social groups through case studies of organizational fear. Specifically, their case studies were concerned with environmental issues linked to technological developments in North American communities. They insisted that every culture has biases towards highlighting certain risks as being serious threats while downplaying others.

In order to identify culture through their studies of risk, Douglas and Wildavsky claimed that risk control behaviour involves two different tasks for social groups: 1. the estimation of risk based on objective scientific analysis; and 2. the acceptability of risk judged according to the level of risk which is acceptable for the social group organization determined by the institutional process of controlling risk in the social group. The process is consisted of two factors which relate to the specific risk: 1. *knowledge* about risk, which indicates the future, shared within the social group, and 2. *consent* between members of the social group which determines the approach against risk perspective to risk in the group (*ibid.*; see Figure 1.2).

If the knowledge of risk is certain and consent for the approach against risk is completed in the social group, the problem is solved by calculating a programme which avoids the risk (see Figure 1.2). The issue mainly concerns whether the technology for the programme is available to the social group. If knowledge is certain, but the consent is incomplete, the solution is to get agreement between members. The issue is how a cohesive discussion may be built. If knowledge is uncertain, but consent is complete,

the problem becomes a matter of how information can be gained. In this case, the solution involves conducting research to fill gaps in the knowledge. If knowledge is uncertain and consent is incomplete, the problem becomes a matter of gaining both knowledge and consent. The solution to the dilemma requires fulfilment of both factors (*ibid.*). Douglas and Wildavsky explain these forms of risk control using a table consisting of four quadrants (see Figure 1.2).

Figure1.2:    Risk and control in relation to knowledge and consensus

Knowledge

| | Certain | Uncertain |
|---|---|---|
| **Complete** | Problem: Technical<br><br>Solution: Calculation | Problem: Information<br><br>Solution: Research |
| **Contested** | Problem: (dis) Agreement<br>Solution:<br>Coercion or discussion | Problem:<br>Knowledge and Consent<br>Solution: ? |

(Consent)

(Chart A, p.5; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983)

They argued that cultural analysis shows how consensuses are made in social groups. Beyond the case of North American communities, all social groups develop specific views about what kinds of risk they should avoid. They insist that those views tend to differ among social groups. Thus, Douglas and Wildavsky analysed culture by focussing on how attitudes towards risk developed in social groups. Furthermore, Douglas and Wildavsky developed a theory, based on their work on risk and culture, which typologically measures ways of behaviour commonly shared in the social group: namely, the grid and group cultural theory (*i.e.* the "g/g" theory). It is argued in this study that the grid and group theory provides a methodological solution to problems of cultural analysis discussed above (see Sec.1.1.4).

## 1.3: Conclusion

This chapter reviewed issues of cultural analysis from previous cultural studies. Section 1.1 showed that there are several issues in order to appropriately analyse culture: definitions of culture, units of analysis, contingency of culture and the contribution of cultural analysis, organizational structures and culture, the effectiveness of large N surveys, available statistical techniques based on measurement theory, and culture in relation to specific situations. In response to those issues, Section 1.2 discussed that organizational and institutional theories can provide structural facets for analysing organizational culture, and measurement theory provides the methodological criteria to understand how to measure organizational culture. Furthermore, studies of Douglas and Wildavsky suggested that culture is more effectively observed in relation to specific risk, and they developed the g/g theory for analysing risk control culture. This study asserts that the g/g theory meets the criteria for those issues stated above. The theory is enable to analyse culture as collective patterns of behaviour shared in the prison service organizational unit based on clear distinction of this culture from individual values; involving structures of organization and institutional theories; and providing a comparative framework with continuum scales. Accordingly, chapter 2 explains the advantages of using the g/g theory to measure culture, referring to points made in this chapter.

# *Chapter 2*

# *The Grid and Group Cultural Theory*
# *as a Solution to Measure Culture*

Chapter 1 discussed the methodological and conceptual difficulties inherent in analysing culture, referring to previous efforts to define and measure it. Earlier studies have shown that the size of the social group unit influences measurement variables and also that national culture is too large to measure culture. Instead, two important conclusions can be made from the outcomes of these studies. First, culture can be more effectively measured by focusing on small well-established social group units. Second, socially established organizations are more appropriate subjects for measuring culture than national cultures.

In order to analyse culture in organizations, it was necessary in chapter 1 to examine measurement theory and studies which have used organizational and institutional theories. Organizational theories suggest that organizational culture should be discussed in terms of formal structures and the informal behaviour of members which helps to establish the aforesaid structures. The measurement theory discussed previously suggests that it is necessary to consider what kinds of measurement should be used for the purposes of comparing and analysing culture. With regard to the specific situations in which culture becomes a reality, Wildavsky and Douglas have insisted that culture is effectively observed in relation to risk control. Following these discussions, chapter 2 explains the g/g cultural theory which is the methodological framework around which the risk control culture in formally established organizations, including the Japanese and English prison services.

The first section of this chapter gives an overview of the g/g theory. It continues to explain why the g/g theory is a suitable means of measuring culture, in places referring back to the methodological issues and criteria raised in chapter 1. Criticisms and issues raised about the g/g theory are also discussed in this section. In response to the issues raised in the first section, the second section reviews previous works in which the g/g theory has been used to analyse real cases. The third section discusses the properties of the variables in the g/g framework which are crucial to the application of the theory to real cases. Finally, this chapter offers a methodological

framework for using the g/g theory to measure the risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services.

## *2.1: Grid and group cultural theory for measuring organizational risk control culture*

The g/g theory provides a comparative framework for analysing culture in different social group units. This section gives an overview of the theory and discusses its methodological advantages based on the issues raised in chapter 1.

### *2.1.1: Overview of grid-group theory*

The g/g theory is a framework for cultural analysis developed by Douglas and Wildavsky. It defines culture qua social relations as patterns of interpersonal relations or, in different words, *ways of life* (Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 1990*)*. Douglas insisted that the behavioural choices available to individuals are constrained by their respective social contexts. This context can be structurally represented in terms of two dimensions of social reality: grid and group (Douglas, 1982).

Group refers to the extent to which individuals are incorporated into social units. The more individuals are incorporated into social units, the more their choices are subject to group control (Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 1990). The higher end of the group dimension indicates tighter control over admission into the group and higher boundaries of membership (*ibid.*). Grid denotes the degree to which an individual's life is circumscribed by externally imposed rules. The more binding and extensive the rules are, the less life is open to individual negotiation (*ibid*.). The concept of grid is derived from Durkheim's account of social regulation. Douglas has noted that the concept of grid refers to the image of *"the cores-hatch of rules to which individuals are subject in the course of their interaction"* (Douglas 1982).

The theory proposes that these two dimensions of social reality come into orthogonal contact with each other. As a result, the g/g framework is divided into four quadrants, each of which represents a particular cultural type: namely, *hierarchism, egalitarian, fatalist and individualist*. Wildavsky and Douglas claim that every culture in the world can be placed on the continua made by combining the "grid" and "group" axes. Accordingly, the social reality represented by g/g variables is graphically described by the g/g theory. Figure 2.1 is a visual representation of the g/g theory.

Although the four cultural types are essential to this theory, there are a few other possible types which can be used in the g/g framework: hermit and hybrid. "Hermit" is a social unit (usually lone individuals) which does not have any level of grid and group pressures (Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 1990). Meanwhile, Hood (1998) has insisted that there can be hybrid types of control which involve combinations of the four basic cultural types.

Figure 2.1: Visual map of the g/g theory

high grid

| | |
|---|---|
| Fatalist | Hierarchical |
| Individualism | Egalitarian |

low group                                                                 high group

low grid

This g/g theory was introduced to public administration by Christopher Hood (Hood, 1998). He has claimed that the theory is increasingly being applied to institutional analyses in the social sciences beyond anthropology *(ibid.)*. Hood takes the view that the g/g theory provides understanding of the diversity of human preferences as "ways of life" and of how those preferences relate to different styles of organization. For these reasons, he has argued that the g/g theory can contribute to our understanding of certain issues in public administration. In addition to the four traditional cultural types, Hood has also identified four types of control which each correspond to one of the cultural types oversight for hierarchism, mutual control for egalitarian, competition for individualism, and contrived randomness for fatalist (see Figure 2.2) .

Figure 2.2: Visual map of the g/g theory including types of control (p. 7: Hood , 2004)

high grid

| | |
|---|---|
| Fatalist<br>Control:<br>Contrived Randomness<br>Ex. Selection by lot | Hierarchist<br>Control: Oversight<br>Ex. Audit and Inspection |
| Individualism<br>Control: Competition<br>Ex. League tables of better and worse performers | Egalitarian<br>Control: Mutuality<br>Ex. Paring police officers on patrol |

low group                                                                 high group

low grid

The *"oversight"* way of control responds to hierarchist. According to Hood's definition, it means *"s*crutiny and steering from some point above or outside the individuals in question*"* (Hood, 1998)*.* In the field of public administration it is seen as reviewers, monitors inspectors or regulators that are to some degree detached from line management of the chain of command structure of organizations (Hood, 1998 and 2004). *"Mutuality"* responds to the egalitarian cultural type. It denotes *"c*ontrol of individuals by formal or informal group processes, whether by deliberate design or otherwise*"* (Hood, 1998). The institutional mechanism of mutual control requires individuals in the organization to accommodate the preferences of others *(ibid.).* *"Competition"* denotes control for individualism. It refers to *the processes of rivalry* in public institutions*.* As Hood points out, heads of government organizations *"typically have to compete for good-quality recruits, budgetary allocations, valued office locations, major policy responsibilities, corporate awards, or league table rankings, reputations, prestige or position in the pecking order"* in this type of control culture (*ibid*.). Finally, *"contrived randomness"* responds to the fatalist cultural type. It means controlling members of government organizations *"by more or less deliberately making their lives unpredictable in some way"*. For example, lotteries can be used to elect or select public officeholders (Hood, 1998 and 2004).

Thus, Hood has made the g/g theory more applicable to cases in public service analysis by providing a more concrete understanding of how control works in the four types of culture defined by the g/g theory. As well as the original g/g theory, this method helps us to avoid analysing culture in terms of abstract situations by defining specific types control within social groups.

### *2.1.2: Methodological advantages of the grid-group theory*

This section explores the potential of the g/g theory as means of solving issues using the criteria set out in chapter 1 (See Sec. 1.1.4) .

1) Defining culture and large N surveys of individual values

The g/g theory is based on the definition of culture as collective shared patterns of behaviour in social groups. It proposes that the "ways of life" of all groups and people can be divided into four cultural types (Douglas 1999). In this respect, the g/g theory focuses on culture patterns of collective behaviour which can be observed in society.

In terms of the relationship between individual values and collective behaviour, Douglas has stated that the theory focuses on analysing the extent to which individual

choices are constrained by shared ways of thinking. According to the g/g theory, this relationship can be reflected by the grid and group dimensions (Douglas 1982). Therefore, the g/g theory does not construe culture as merely an extension of the values and thoughts of individuals. Regardless of what individuals think or prefer in their minds, their behaviour (*i.e.* choice) is to greater or lesser degrees constrained by g/g dimensions, and this constraint modifies culture in the theory. Hence the g/g theory can clearly focus on culture as a collective phenomenon distinct from individual values.

This distinction in the theory also suggests that large N surveys are not needed to operate it. If culture is not necessarily constructed from the individual values and mental processes of those individuals, large N surveys, which are supposed to analyse and aggregate individual values, are not required to apply the g/g theory to real cases.

2) The unit of analysis

The g/g theory analyses culture at the any level of the social group unit. Previous studies, which used the g/g theory, have not indicated that restrictions should apply to the level at which the g/g theory can be used. Accordingly, the theory is available to analyse any layer of culture where rules and group pressures exist. It could apply at a national or organizational level down to small groups of friends and families.

However, the theory is considered to be more applicable to certain types of institution than others. Publically recognized or established institutions have more visible structures consisting of rules (grid) and membership conditions (group). These institutions include authorised business corporations, schools, and hospitals. By contrast, it is difficult to observe the grid and group dimensions in more private institutions such as families, play groups, and some voluntary associations. In this case, public service institutions, including prison services, seem the most appropriate case studies for the g/g theory. This is because rules and membership conditions within such institutions tend to be highly formal and visible and can thus be observed easily.

3) Organizational and Institutional approaches

Chapter 1 explained some organizational and institutional theories which suggest that organizational culture should be analysed in terms of formal and informal structures in the organization. Donaldson, and Tolbert and Zucker (1999 and 1996 respectively) have explained that organizational theories are based on a tension between formal organizational structures and actions taken by individuals within organizations (*ibid.*: also see Sec. 1.2.1).

The g/g theory identifies culture by combining the "grid" variable which represents rules and the "group" variable which represents group pressures, both of which reflect institutional constraint that bind and restrict individual behaviour. Both dimensions can involve formal and informal aspects of organization. Rules exist formally or informally in the social group unit, and group pressures may be mostly observed in the informal aspects. The theory is potentially designed to manage the formal and informal aspects of organizational structure.

4) Level of measurement: the continuity of the dimensions identifying culture in reality

Much like other forms of cultural analysis, the g/g theory is based on the typology of ways of life. However, according to the measurement theory, the theoretical framework is at the ordinal rather than the nominal level of measurement because the degrees of grid and group dimensions in the organization determine those four cultural types.

The grid and group dimensions identify culture in the social group unit on continuous scales: from high to low orders. Thus, the four types of culture are also comparative continuous scales which are measured by the grid and group dimensions: hierarchism responds to high grid and high group measurements, egalitarian responds to low grid and high group measurements, individualist responds to low grid and low group measurements, and fatalist responds to high grid and low group measurements (see Figure 2.1). The visual map of the g/g theory shows that the four cultural types are labels for the four quadrants made by the intersection of the grid and group axes. Hence the relationships between the four cultural types are defined by the degrees of grid and group dimensions. According to the measurement theory, the g/g theory fits the ordinal level of measurement because there is a higher level of comparability between its scales and variables than those of normal cultural typologies.

### 2.1.3: Criticisms and issues against the grid-group theory

Although the g/g theory has the potential to measure culture, it also has its criticisms which have raised issues about how it can be applied to real cases. Accordingly, this section introduces some of the criticisms levelled at the g/g theory and some of the methodological issues that have hung over its application to a particular case study, namely the prison services.

According to Douglas (1999), there are three major criticisms of the g/g theory: 1. the model is static; 2. it is deterministic; and 3. there is not enough evidence to support it. Firstly, the theory binds all of the organizational features of social groups into

a static map. Questions have also been raised about why it is based on only four cultural types and two social dimensions (Douglas 1999). In response, Douglas has explained that there are four cultural types, not because there are only four possible types and two possible dimensions of culture, but rather because the g/g theory focuses on two dimensions of social reality which create patterns of behaviour that can be simplified into four organizational models *(ibid.)*. The grid and group dimensions do not refer to all of the factors which contribute towards the development of culture in society. Instead, the g/g theory focuses on two key factors which effectively identify social culture. The validity of this assumption can be proven if the g/g theory is used to explore more case studies.

In terms of the critics against the four cultural types, insisting those types are static, the question itself is questioned in considering the characteristics of the theory. Firstly, previous works have already pointed out that other types of culture are possible: for example, hermit and hybrid (Hood 1998). Moreover, the idea of hybrid cultures allows for the combination of cultural types thus increasing the number of cultures possible in the g/g theory. The key issue in this regard is how hybrid cultures may be coherently included alongside the original four cultural types. However, this is mostly a matter of how the g/g theory is used through research design. Additionally, if the g/g theory is explained in terms of measurement theory, it is not limited to only the four cultural types. As discussed in the last section, the g/g theory identifies culture based on the ordinal level of scales assigned by the degree of g/g dimensions. The ordinal level of scales include several ordering techniques; such as high/low, ranks 1, 2, 3…and 10. Although the g/g framework originally involves shows high or low scales, more complex ranking orders are possible in the ordinal level of measurement. If the g/g theory can develop these scales, the number of types of culture can increase beyond the standard four.

The second criticism of the g/g theory highlighted by Douglas is that the g/g theory is deterministic, and cannot flexibly respond to institutional changes. This view relates to more general criticisms of cultural analysis. As well as other cultural theories, it is hard to explain how changes (outcomes) come about with the g/g theory. This invites an important question regarding the functioning of the g/g theory: can culture be an independent variable? In response to this criticism, Douglas has stressed that one of the major strengths of the g/g theory is that it allows us to trace economic and social problems which may develop in organizations due to their members' patterns of behaviour (Douglas 1999). It is not appropriate to explain either of these problems as

independent variables. However, the theory can provide comparative plots of culture, showing how culture as collective patterns of behaviour may differ depending on organizations, and suggest potential strengths and weakness embedded in those patterns. I agree with Douglas' view that previous cultural studies show that it is difficult for culture to be an independent variable which can explain the causality of changes as the dependent variable. Although the studies in question are mainly concerned with national culture, it can be seen from them that it is difficult to discuss culture as an independent variable because it is highly contingent. As Douglas has mentioned, the purpose of analysing culture with the g/g theory should be to comparatively identify the characteristics of social groups: in particular, their strengths and weaknesses in comparison with others.

The third criticism of the g/g theory is that there is a lack of evidence to support it (Douglas 1999). The other two criticisms of the g/g theory discussed above also ultimately draw upon this lack of evidence. It is the case that previous studies which have used the g/g theory to identify culture in real social organizations are not enough to fully demonstrate its appropriateness in the field of cultural analysis. Thus, it can be concluded at present that the method for applying the g/g theory to real cases is not yet properly established and that more case studies are needed to achieve this end.

Therefore, in order to effectively measure the risk control cultures of the Japanese and English prison services, it is necessary to summarise the methodological issues raised by previous works. In particular, it is important to discuss how a method for measuring culture with the g/g framework can be developed without losing the advantages of the theory which were mentioned in the last section (see Sec.2.1.2). Hence Section 2.2 discusses methodological issues for applying the g/g theory to analyse culture in reality, reviewing previous studies used the theory.

## 2.2: Previous studies using the grid-group theory to measure culture

This section introduces three major studies which have used the g/g framework to measure organizational culture: 1. the work of Gross and Rayner in *Measuring Culture* (1985); 2. *listorg* by Mars (2005); and 3. Major study used the g/g theory in the field of public administration by Hood and his colleagues. In order to effectively review previous works, it is necessary to clarify the main methodological issues raised about

the g/g theory in relation to the general problems for analysing culture set out in chapter 1 (see Sec. 1.1.4).

The first issue is the purpose of analysing culture in the g/g theory. As discussed above, I have argued that the g/g theory is not meant for clarifying causation of specific outcomes, but rather for identifying the characteristics of organizations in comparison with others. Therefore, I shall now clarify how analytical functions of the g/g theory have been understood in previous works used the theory.

The second issue is units of analysis. Although the previous section discussed the g/g theory can be used to analyse any social institution in principle, it is still necessary to review the kinds of social units that have been examined by previous studies. The third issue is the way of discussing risk and culture. The g/g theory was originally intended to analyse culture in terms of risk control. Thus, it is important to know how the theory can be used to analyse the relationship between culture and risk.

The forth issue is the way of involving institutional and organizational theories in order to gain in order to gain a structural understanding of culture? As discussed in chapter 1 (see Sec.1.1.4), those theories should be involved to structurally analyse organizational culture. Accordingly, it is important here to clarify how previous works have considered these factors and how they can be managed in the process of analysing culture by the g/g theory

The fifth issue is choices of variables for analysing culture by the g/g theory. Although the g/g framework is explained in terms of the grid and group dimensions and the four cultural types, it is still worth reviewing what kinds of variables previous studies have used to measure culture. This issue also relates to the level of measurement. Thus, in light of the outcomes of previous studies, I would like here to select the best scales of variables for measuring the risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services.

The final issue is analytical techniques used by previous studies. Although previous national culture studies have shown that coding is the common way of analysing culture, this finding still needs to be clarified in light of case studies which have used the g/g theory. I will also discuss here the appropriateness of using statistical techniques in response to the level of measurement adopted in the g/g analysis based on measurement theory.

***2.2.1: Gross and Rayner: Coding grid and group variables and the EXACT model***

Rayner and Gross have attempted to measure culture quantitatively using the g/g theory in their book, *Measuring Culture* (1985). For the purposes of their study, Gross and Rayner tried to illustrate the different kinds of argumentations that might be applied to the four quadrants of the g/g map. They tested the theory by applying it to a simulation of a hypothetical New England community called Lakemouth. This town was subject to a crisis in the form of an energy company planning to build a nuclear power plant nearby (Gross and Rayner 1985)

The community consisted of five social units: 1. a Chamber of Commerce; 2. a fishermen's trade union (*Local 387*); 3. a residents' association for a seasonal condominium situated on the coast (*Dune Dwellers*); 4. an anti-nuclear power plant association formed by local residents (*LANE*); and 5. an alternative activist group formed by local residents (Scallop shell Caucus) (Gross and Rayner 1985). Each group had different purposes and approaches towards the planned nuclear power plant *(ibid.)*. Gross and Rayner selected two variables to measure the cultures of each of these groups along the group and grid axes. They defined the properties of the g/g dimensions by considering all of their attributes. Firstly, for the group dimension they claimed that group pressure can be observed through the following five factors of members in the social group unit: *proximity, transitivity, frequency, scope, and impermeability (ibid.).*

Gross and Rayner's predicates for the group dimension (Gross and Rayner, 1985):

1) *Proximity*: the closeness of members to each other measured by the average distance between them in the social unit. Smaller distances between members indicate a higher group level.

2) *Transitivity*: The extent to which social interaction between members of a social unit is transitive: *e.g.* equality between members. If members are more transitive, the group level of the social unit becomes higher.

3) *Frequency*: the proportion of members' time which can be allocated to participating in certain activities with other members of the social unit. More frequent events with other members indicate a higher group level in the social unit.

4) *Scope:* The diversity of the interactive involvement of members in the activities of a given unit relative to their interactive involvement in activities outside the unit. If the diversity of interactive involvement in the unit is high or, alternatively, if members have more interactive

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involvement outside the unit, the group level of the social unit becomes lower.

5) *Impermeability*: the likelihood that a non-member who satisfies the membership requirements of the social unit and wants to join it will actually attain membership. If it is difficult for non-members to gain membership, the group level of the social unit becomes higher.

These aspects of the group variable show that Gross and Rayner considered group pressure to be exerted via two conditions of group membership   members group: 1. the physical and metaphysical distances separating members defined in Gross and Rayner's terms as *proximity, transitivity, frequency*, and *scope*; and 2. the openness of the group to new members defined as *impermeability*.

Meanwhile, Gross and Rayner stated that the grid level is observed through rules which assign "roles" to individuals in social units. Following this basic principle for grid variables, they set four analytical codes for the grid dimension:

1) *Specialization:* the degree to which members are assigned specific roles in the social unit. High specialization indicates a high grid level in the social unit.

2) *Asymmetry*: the degree of symmetrical interaction concerning the assigned roles of group members. For example, if the roles of the service taker and giver are constantly changing between members in the social unit, this indicates a low asymmetry level and a low grid level for the unit. Meanwhile, if these roles are fixed and cannot be exchanged between members, this indicates a high asymmetry level and a high grid level for the unit.

3) *Entitlement:* whether titles are given by *ascription* or *achievement*. These two concepts are derived from Parsons (1970). If members are allocated more roles by ascription, this indicates a higher grid level for the social unit.

4) *Accountability*: the immediate accountability of members. According to Gross and Raner (1985), accountability comes in two forms: coercive and non-coercive. To illustrate, the former type of accountability includes fines and sanctions while the latter includes disapproval and the application of

moral pressure. The more members are allowed to hold other members to account, the higher the grid level becomes.

<div align="right">(Gross and Rayner, 1985; pp. 71-85)</div>

In order to measure their predicates for the grid and group dimensions, Gross and Rayner hypothesized that culture can be measured as the degree of social interaction between group members. They named their method of calculation the EXACT model. This model analyses the nine predicates with the following scales: persons (*xi)* in the social unit (X), activities (*ai*) of group members (*xi)*, publicly recognized roles in activities assumed by group members (*ci*), eligible non-members who are excluded from membership (*ei*), and a time span in which typical distribution of activities occurs (T) (Gross and Rayner 1985).

Following this model, Gross and Rayner (1985) defined nine formulae for calculating numerical scores for the nine predicates based on network analysis: *prox, trans, freq., scope,* and *imper.* for the group dimension and *spec.*, *asym.*, *entitle.*, and *accountability* for the grid dimension. Furthermore, they calculated the mean scores for the grid and group dimensions. In order to justify the adoption of mean scores, they explained that if the predicates are equally important and structurally independent in the construction of the g/g levels, taking the average score of all predicate scores by each dimension is the best way of demonstrating results (*ibid.*). All g/g predicate scores were valued between a minimum of 0 and a maximum of1 (0<X<1, 0<Y<Y). As a result, all social units in the Lakemouth nuclear plant case were scored as follows (see Table. 2.1):

Table.2.1: Grid and group scores for each predicate of the social group units in the Lakemouth nuclear plant case

| | Chamber of Commerce | Local387 | Dunes Dwellers | LANE | Scallopshell Caucus |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prox | 0.97 | 0.48 | 0.56 | 0.52 | 1 |
| Trans | 0.9 | 0.88 | 0.16 | 0.48 | 1 |
| Freq | 0.52 | 0.37 | 0.07 | 0.27 | 0.89 |
| Scope | 0.72 | 0.94 | 0.2 | 0.41 | 0.91 |
| Imper | 0.85 | 0.11 | n/a | 0 | 0.75 |
| **GROUP (Mean Values)** | **0.79** | **0.56** | **0.25** | **0.34** | **0.91** |
| *Group/Grid are calculated as the <u>average</u> of all predicate scores | | | | | |
| Spec | 0.9 | 0.92 | 0 | 0.79 | 0.12 |
| Asym | 0.88 | 0.89 | 0.14 | 0.88 | 0 |
| Entitle | 0.97 | 0.26 | 0 | 0.82 | 0 |
| Acc | 0.23 | 0.95 | 0 | 0.23 | 0 |
| **GRID** | **0.75** | **0.76** | **0.035** | **0.68** | **0.03** |

Finally, Gross and Rayner mapped the g/g scores for each social unit on the g/g map. They used a form of the g/g map in which the X ("group") and Y ("grid") axes cross orthogonally in the left bottom corner of the "individualism" quadrant. Consequently, the X and Y variables both move away from zero (see, Figure 2.3, and 2.4).

Figure 2.3: G/g map ( X=Group, Y=Grid) (Rayner and Gross, 1985)



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
Figure 2.4: Results for the social units in the Lakemouth nuclear plant case



Then, I will evaluate the study by Gross and Rayner in respond to the methodological issues raised in the beginning of this section (see Sec.2.2). Firstly, the purpose of Gross and Rayner's study was to demonstrate how different social groups with different ways of life respond to the same risks. Causality was not considered in their analysis. Secondly, their research focused on small social group units within the fictional town of Lakemouth. Each of these groups had different purposes and members and represented different interests. Some were more formal institutions than others and some were profitable while others were non-profit making organizations. Moreover, the wide range of social groups covered by Gross and Rayner's study shows that the g/g theory is potentially applicable to social groups in general. Thirdly, Gross and Rayner's research focused on a specific situation affecting a hypothetical town: namely, plans to build a nuclear energy plant. Their study demonstrated the different responses that various social groups might have to a particular crisis affecting their town and thereby also showed how different responses to the same risk can come about through the cultural differences between small social groups.

Fourthly, in regard to structural analysis and organizational and institutional theories, in order to measure culture Gross and Rayner focused on the individual behaviour of members of social groups. Therefore, an analysis which focuses on organizational structure was not clearly observed in their work. Nevertheless, the g/g predicates raised in Gross and Rayner's study partially reflect their own view of organizational structure. For example, the grid predicates are concerned with the roles played by members of social groups: specialization, accountability, and *etc.* (Gross and Rayner, 1985; see Sec. 2.2.1). Pugh (1973) also defined specialization as the degree to which the activities of organizations are divided into specialized roles in his study of organizations (see Sec. 1.2.1). The organizational and institutional factors discussed in

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chapter 1 share some things in common with the g/g predicates used by Gross and Rayner.

Fifthly, in terms of the variables to measure culture, Gross and Rayner adopted the grid and group dimensions as essential variables. The four cultural types are considered the consequences of those two variables. Gross and Rayner's took the view that the group dimension is represented by the closeness of members and the openness of membership in the group while the grid dimension is represented by the roles assigned to members. This understanding of the grid and group dimensions provides useful information for considering what they represent in reality. Accordingly, based on their understanding of the reality of the g/g dimensions, Gross and Rayner assigned nine codes to them which allowed them to be analysed in detail. In different words, they used coding as a way of measuring culture based on g/g variables.

In terms of level of measurement in their study, Gross and Rayner's (1985) evaluated their outcomes based on the ordinal scales, which indicated whether a social unit has a greater or lesser degree of g/g predicates than other social units regardless of the number of units being ranked (Gross and Rayner, 1985). The understanding Gross and Rayner had of their predicates and the scale units they used to measure them invites questions about how appropriately they used statistical techniques in their research. They took the mean scores of nine predicate codes for the grid and group dimensions. However, if they measured g/g levels at the ordinal level of measurement; those mean scores do not indicate any effective meaning in measurement theory (see Sec. 1.2.2). The appropriateness of the statistical techniques they used can be questioned in the demonstration of the results in their method used the g/g theory.

### 2.2.2: Listorg by Mars

Gross and Rayner (1985) tried to qualitatively and quantitatively measure culture with the g/g framework. Although the appropriateness of their statistical technique has been questioned, they have provided a useful understanding of the properties of the g/g variables. The work of Mars (2005) on risk management in the building industry is also of value for understanding the properties of the g/g variables. Mars (2005) defines seven basic factors which should be coded as grid and group variables: namely, *labour, information, space, time, objects, resources and group incorporation* (he has coined the pneumonic, "*Listorg*", to stand for them). He has assigned these factors to the grid and group dimensions as follows:

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*Listorg by* Mars (2005)

> *1. Labour (Grid): Are* labour divided according to whether tasks are considered appropriate for people with different roles or ranks (high grid)? or are tasks undertaken flexibly in response to factors such as adaptability, availability, and urgency and are they multi-sourced (low grid)?
>
> *2. Information (Grid):* is information restricted on a need to know basis and validated only if derived from approved sources (high grid) or is it free-flowing and multi-sourced (low grid)?
>
> *3. Space (Grid)*: is space primarily used to buttress rank and restricted or allocated to people in high office (high grid) or is it used adaptively to fit functional needs (low grid)?
>
> *4. Time (Grid):* is time used as a social organiser and source of control (high grid) or as a fluid resource that allows for personal autonomy (low grid)?
>
> *5. Objects (Grid):* are objects primarily allocated to rank irrespective of function (high grid) or according to functional needs (low grid)?
>
> *6. Resources (Grid):* are resources controlled from the centre (high grid) or allocated to specific functions as required (low grid)?
>
> *7. Degree of group incorporation concerning following factors (Group):*
>
> (High group)
>
> -Overlaps between work and leisure
>
> - Shared tasks and decision-making
>
> - Kinship
>
> - Shared histories
>
> - Residential propinquity
>
> (Low group)
>
> - General lack of these factors

In response to the methodological issues raised in the beginning of this section (see sec. 2.2), firstly, in terms of the aim of his study, much like Gross and Rayner (1985), Mars intended to use the g/g theory to demonstrate culture among groups of building workers. Causality was not taken account in his research. Secondly, the unit of analysis in Mars' research is limited to groups of building workers active on specific building sites.

Thirdly, he applied *listorg* to case studies by focusing on the risk of incidents on building sites (Mars 2005). Fourthly, he did not directly involve the analytical perspective provided by organizational and institutional theories in his research. However, some factors on the grid axis (*e.g. division of labour, information, and space*) are seemed to show structural characteristics of culture in his analysis. Fifthly, in terms of variables to measure culture, Much like Gross and Rayner who used coding to measure g/g levels, Mars assigned analytical codes in response to g/g dimensions which represent the grid or group dimensions. The codes he assigned to the grid dimension provide a clearer image of what it represents in real cases. Meanwhile, in comparison with Gross and Rayner's (1985) study, codes for the group dimension assigned by Mars is still abstract and provides little understanding of how group pressure is observed in the social group unit.

Additionally, as regards the analytical codes for the g/g variables, there is some dissonance between Mars and Gross and Rayner. Whereas Gross and Rayner (1985) understood that the "time" and "space" codes reflect group properties, Mars (2005) defined them as grid variables. Considering these similarities and differences, it is necessary to discuss the properties of the grid and group variables as they are defined in my method for measuring organizational risk control culture. Furthermore, Mars only used high / low scales to measure these codes for the grid and group dimensions. He does not discuss the summary and demonstration techniques in his work.

### 2.2.3: Application of grid-group theory in public service analysis: Structural analysis of risk control using the four cultural types

Following the introduction of the g/g theory into public administration research by Hood, some scholars applied the theory to cases in public service domains. After publishing *The Art of the State* (Hood 1998), Hood and his colleagues applied the g/g theory to analyse the NPM reforms and different types of control in public service institutions. First, Hood, Scott, James, Jones and Travers (henceforth Hood *et al*, 1999) analysed types of control in five public service domains in England and Wales: Central Government, local government, the prison service, state schools, and Eurocratic regulation (Hood and *et al.* 1999).

The method and outcomes taken in their works of 1999 (Hood *et al* 1999) is further developed in the aforementioned study. Hood, James, Peters and Scott (henceforth Hood *et al*, 2004) went on to conduct a structural analysis of culture and control in three public service domains across the world: prison services, higher

education and universities, and high-ranking civil servants. Contributions were made to this study by several researchers from OECD countries, and their case studies are based on comparisons between 8 OECD countries: Australia, England, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, and the U.S. These cross national inter-departmental empirical studies helped to apply the g/g theory to a much wider field of case studies.

A number of methodological issues are raised by this study. First, the purpose of their study was to use the typology of the g/g theory to identify types and patterns of management influenced by New Public Management (NPM) (Hood 2004). Hood stated that the study was intended to go beyond "folklore" and the peculiarity of comparative public service analysis (*ibid.*). Second, with regard to the unit of analysis, Hood *et al* (2004) focused on three public service domains at the national level in each country: for example, control in the national prison service (*ibid.*). They were mainly concerned with formal control structures rather than the informal behaviour of members in the institution. Furthermore, it should be noted that Hood *et al* were not clear about what kinds of risk they were concerned with. Instead, they focused on providing an overview of control in the relevant institutions.

Unlike previous works in sociology and anthropology, Hood *et al* (2004) rather concentrated on the structure of patterns of control in public service institutions (*ibid.*). Although they did not directly refer to the organizational theories or factors mentioned in chapter 1, the overall control structures and particular control techniques used in each institution were discussed (Hood *et al*, 2004). In terms of the control structures, Hood *et al* (2004) refereed to the framework of control systems defined in their previous works (Hood *et al*, 1999; and Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin 2001: *henceforth* Hood *et al*, 2001). In those previous works, Hood defined three analytic components of risk regulation systems in public service institutions: *standard-setting, information gathering,* and *behaviour modification.*

> *Components of risk control systems*
> *(Hood et al,1999, pp.47-49; and ,2001,pp.21-27)*
> - *Information-gathering*: gathering information when issues of probability and consequence are in question.
> - *Standard setting:* setting targets and guidelines
> - *Behaviour-modification*: control intended to modify organizational behaviour by coding compliance and deterrence standards.

In regard to the choice of variables, Hood (1998) and his later works with his colleagues (Hood *et al*, 1999, 2001, and 2004) took a different methodological path from previous studies. They analysed cases based on not g/g dimensions but four cultural types: hierarchy, egalitarian, individualist and fatalist. Later works also constantly analysed types control based on the four cultural types by highlighting examples which represent each of them (*ibid.*). Hood has consistently applied the theory to public institutions using the four cultural types.

### *2.2.4: Summary of previous methods and the direction of the method for this study*

There are several methods for using the g/g theory to measure organizational culture. In response to the methodological criteria outlined in the beginning of section 2.2, I will now discuss these methods for measuring organizational culture based on the g/g theory.

1) The purpose of analysing culture: units of analysis and specific risks

Previous studies have shown that the g/g theory helps to identify patterns of behaviour within different social groups. It achieves this end by effectively demonstrating culture with a comparative framework rather than explaining the causality of specific outcomes. In terms of the unit of analysis, Gross and Rayner (1985) and Mars (2005) focused on small social group units, some of which were not established institutions. Moreover, they measured culture in relation to specific risks for the targeted social groups: building a nuclear power plant near a town, and incidents on building sites.

Meanwhile, studies in public administration have mainly focused on more formal or established public institutions. Although the unit size in public service domains is generally larger than those covered by Mars and Gross and Rayner, studies of public administration have shown that the g/g theory can provide a comparative framework for analysing culture. Moreover, the four cultural types were more clearly represented in the formalised structures of public institutions. It was noted in chapter 1 that more significant results can be gained from analysing culture in established organizations rather than non-established ones (see Sec. 1.1.4).

2) Structural analysis: how to combine organizational and institutional structure

Mars (2005) involved a few structural perspectives in his g/g analysis of building workers (*i.e.* structure of providing or allocating information, objects, and resources in the building industry). Hood *et al* (1999 and 2001) also suggests three main components

of control structure in public service institutions (*i.e.* information gathering, behavioural modification and standard settings. In order to gain a structural understanding of culture in the method for measuring risk control culture in prison services by the g/g theory, it is necessary to summarise those factors raised by Mars (2005) and Hood *et al* (1999), taking account of structural and institutional factors discussed in chapter 1 (see Section 1.2.1 ). How to coherently involve those factors raised by Mars (2005) and Hood *et al* (1999 and 2001) in the g/g theoretical framework, collating those with factors raised in organizational and institutional theories, should be considered in the process of establishing the method to measure culture.

3) Choosing, coding variables and issues with scales

All of the previous studies discussed so far have used analytical codes to evaluate their case studies. For the g/g theory, the problem is how codes are assigned in the g/g framework. Previous researchers have shown that there are two possible ways of coding variables based on either the g/g dimensions or the four cultural types. The former method was adopted by Rayner and Gross (1985) and Mars (2005), while the latter was adopted by Hood *et al* (2001). Although both approaches have advantages and disadvantages with regard to measuring culture, my method adopts grid and group dimensions as variables for measuring culture for two reasons, considering the level of measurement of the g/g theory.

According to the measurement theory, the g/g dimensions are the ordinal level of measurement. Although the units of distance are not equal, there are continuum scales between variables: high and low g/g. Meanwhile, if culture is valued according to the four cultural types, it is hard to maintain the continuum orders. Thus, bearing in mind the comparability of the theory, I have adopted the g/g dimensions as variables for measuring culture with the g/g theory in this study. Properties of g/g dimensions were well developed by 9 predicates of Gross and Rayner (1985), and Mars (2005). In need of the structural cultural analysis, how to combine properties of g/g dimensions raised by Gross and Rayner, and Mars and factors raised in organizational and institutional theories discussed in issue 3) above should be developed in my method for measuring prison service risk control culture. However, in comparison with cultural types, measuring prison service culture with the g/g dimensions has some disadvantages.

Firstly, most previous studies in public administration have used the theory based on the typology. More cases in public service institutions have already been analysed based on the four cultural types which provide concrete images of how they

can be coded for prison services: for example, what high/low grid and group scores indicate about public service institutions. Thus, even in the process of coding g/g variables, the understandings of high/low grid and group scores developed in previous studies should be referred to here in order to consider what high/low dimensions tell us about the relevant prison services.

Secondly, if culture is measured with the g/g dimensions, it is not clear how the idea of hybrid cultures can be considered. Previous studies which analysed culture by g/g dimensions was not considered the concept of hybrid. There is a lack of clarity about how hybrid cultures can be measured in the g/g framework. Hence how to define outcomes which are considered as hybrid as a result of measuring risk control culture by g/g dimensions should be developed in the process of the method for measuring prison service organizational risk control culture.

4) Measurement techniques and levels of measurement

The final issue is the level of measurement and the influence it has over the g/g visual map. The original g/g theory is considered to be the "ordinal" level of measurement because the grid and group dimensions and the four cultural typologies are defined in terms of high- or low- order. As well as assigning analytical codes to the g/g dimensions, it is also important to consider these scales to quantitatively measure culture by these dimensions based on measurement theory..

The level of measurement also relates to issues of which appropriate statistical techniques can be used for analysis (see Table1.1). With the exception of Gross and Rayner (1985), most previous studies have not used quantitative analysis based on the g/g framework. By contrast, Gross and Rayner (1985) used mean scores of nine g/g predicates in order to demonstrate the g/g levels of social group units.   However, since these predicates were viewed as being measured on ordinal scales, average scores used by Gross and Rayner were questioned. Therefore, it can be concluded that in addition to considering the properties and scales of variables, it is also important to consider available statistical techniques in response to the level of measurement at the stage of demonstrating results in the method for measuring culture by the g/g theory. Taking this approach to the properties and scales of variables is crucial to the development of a method of measuring culture using the g/g theory.

This summary shows that, within those four issues, issues 2), 3) and 4) should be developed in order to design the method measuring prison service risk control culture.

Moreover, within those three issues, the issue 3) defining properties (analytical codes) for g/g dimensions is the most essential part to be developed in my method; because issue 2) and 4) can be considered in the discussion to define properties of those basic g/g variables. Accordingly, the next section discusses the properties and scales of g/g variables in order to measure the organizational risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services.

## 2.3: Properties and scales of grid and group variables

The previous section showed that coding g/g variables is the most important to issue as regards measuring culture in real cases. In order to define analytical codes for measuring cultures of risk control in prison services using g/g variables, it is necessary to consider the following issues: what g/g represents in reality and how it is measured on the ordinal scale. Thus, the following sections respond to these two issues by discussing the properties and scales of g/g variables, taking account of previous works along the way.

### 2.3.1: Properties for grid

Theoretically speaking, grid represents rules which constrain individual choices (Douglas 1982; Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 1990). Rules exist in every social unit either formally or informally. Thus, I would like to insist that the grid dimension can help to measure rules which define the risk control structures in the organizations. According to previous studies, two major aspects for analysing rules define the organizational risk control structures are considered: 1. rules define the system or the process of organizational risk control behaviour; and 2. rules specifically define roles and the specializations of members of organizations.

### 1. Rules for risk control systems (excluding member roles)

The first grid aspect for analysing organizational risk control structures is rules which define the risk control systems in the organization. According to previous studies above (see Sec. 2.2), these rules for risk control systems consist of three components; 1) rules relate to *information* in the organization, 2) rules which *standardise* behaviour of members in organizational risk control process, and 3) rules which *enforce* members of the organization to follow those rules.

Firstly, rules which relate to *information* are originally found in *Risk and Culture* by Douglas and Wildavsky (1983). They discussed *information* about risk as *knowledge* shared among members, which determines types of risk control in social groups (see Sec. 1.2.3). Following this, Mars (2005) raised ways of allocating or controlling *information* in the social group unit as a grid predicate in his *listorg* (Mars 2005; see Sec. 2.2.2). Furthermore, Hood *et al (*1999 and 2001) raised *information-gathering* as part of control components in public services institutions (see Sec. 2.2.3*).* Hood focused on structures intended to gather information, and Mars focused on the structure to allocate it within organizations. Either way, rules concerning *information* can be considered an important factor in risk control systems.

Secondly*,* rules which standardise behaviour of members in the organizational risk control process concerns with rules for unifying behaviour of members in the process of risk control; such as stating guidelines or targets of control in the organization. First, it corresponds to *standard- setting* by Hood *et al* (1999 and 2001; see p. 64 above). Second, Pugh (1973) also defined *standardization* as a factor of the formal structures of organizations discussed in previous chapter 1 (see Sec. 1.2.1). *Standardization* is the degree to which an organization lays down standard rules for organizational behaviour (Pugh 1973), and it is similar to the idea of *standard-setting* by Hood *et al*. Although the Pugh did not discuss this factor in relation to risk, it does provide an account of rules for the risk control systems in organizations. Third, although Mars did not directly discuss grid properties as rules for standardizing organizational behaviour, some factors in *listorg* suggest subjects for being controlled by this type of rules: o*bjects* and *resources* (Mars 2005; see Sec. 2.2.2). How far the organization standardises ways of allocating those objects and resources in relation to risk by rules can be discussed as part of the risk control system which standardise organizational behaviour. Mars (2005) took the view that if these *objects* and *resources* are allocated by central and standardized decisions, this indicates high grid characteristics for the organization in question. By contrast, if they are allocated by way of divisional and situational decisions, this indicates low grid characteristics. Hence those can be discussed as subjects of control in rules which standardise organizational behaviour.

Thirdly, rules which enforce members of the organization to follow rules were originated in *behaviour-modification* by Hood and *et al* (1999 and 2001; see p. 64 above). According to Hood and *et al* (1999 and 2001), it refers to rules that are intended to modify organizational behaviour through regulating compliance (see Sec. 2.2.3). In relation to other two types of rules, those rules which define the system in which

members are enforced to follow rules discussed as above should be involved as part of the risk control systems.

Therefore, the first grid aspect, rules which define the risk control systems in organizations can effectively cover risk control and organizational factors raised in previous studies by Mars (2005), Hood *et al* (1999) and Pugh (1973). It provides structural understanding of risk control systems, which represent a grid property in the structure of risk control culture. Table 2.2 is summary of the discussion above. This table shows how previous studies by those researchers relate to each other in the category of the risk control systems.

*2. Rules define the roles of members in the risk control structure*

Another aspect of the grid dimension for analysing risk control structures is "rules define the roles of members" for controlling risk. This aspect of grid dimensions is based on understanding of grid properties by Gross and Rayner (1985). They have defined four aspects of the roles played by members of groups in order to measure the grid level of the social group unit: *specialization, entitlement, asymmetry*, and *accountability* (see Sec. 2.2.1)

*Specialization* refers to the extent to which members are given specific roles to play in groups (Gross and Rayner 1985). In response to their idea, Pugh also has analysed *specialization as the degree to which an organization's activities are divided into special roles* in his study of organizational structure (Pugh 1973; see Sec. 1.2.1). Furthermore, Mars (2005) has considered *the division of labou*r as a grid variable (see p. 62). He has analysed rules governing how roles are given to group members in terms of the *division of labour* in *Listorg*. More specifically, he has focused on whether specific tasks (*labour*) are assigned according to rank (high grid), or based on the criteria of performance, adaptability, availability, and urgency (low grid) (*ibid.*). As part of risk control structures, these ideas of specialization should be analysed in terms of what kind of roles are assigned to whom in order to control specific risks in the organizations.

*Entitlement* analyses criteria for assigning roles to members in the social group unit, particularly in regard to whether selection processes are based on *achievement* or *ascription* (Gross and Rayner 1985). Gross and Rayner (1985) have analysed roles in this way by focusing on the processes and criteria whereby they are assigned within groups (see Sec. 2.2.1). Furthermore, Gross and Rayner analysed the flexibility of those roles between members by *asymmetry (ibid.).* This code analysed how far assigned roles are flexibly changeable between members in the social group unit. If these roles are

fixed and cannot be exchanged between members, this indicates a high asymmetry level and a high grid level for the unit *(ibid.)*. Regarding those criteria for assigning roles to members, Pugh (1973) has also highlighted *standardization of employment practices* (*ibid*.; see Sec. 1.2.1) as a factor of the organizational structure.

Moreover, Gross and Rayner (1985) have considered the relationship between roles and power in terms of *accountability*: that is, whether roles come with coercive or non-coercive power (see Sec. 2.2.1). In regard to this relationship, Pugh's (1973) concept of *configuration* also takes account of how far members with high-profile roles have power over their subordinates (see sec. 1.2.1). Additionally, although these works mainly focus on powers to penalise subordinates which come with certain roles, it should be added that the allocation of blame when things go wrong is also an important consideration in this respect. Indeed, the allocation of blame is a key issue for the g/g theory (Thompson *et al*, 1990; Hood *et al*, 2001). Thus, it is important that this study considers how blame is assigned in relation to the roles of group members.

Therefore, the second grid aspect of risk control structures, rules which define roles of members in the structure cover risk control and organizational factors raised in previous studies by Gross and Rayner (1985), Mars (2005), Pugh (1973), and Hood *et al* (1991 and 2001). Table 2.2 is summary of the discussion above. This table shows how previous studies by those researchers relate to each other in the category of the roles of members Thus, the properties for grid dimension in the risk control structure are defined according to two factors: 1. the risk control system; and 2. the roles assigned to members for controlling risk. The summary of predicates is as follows (see Table 2.2):

Table: 2.2 Summary of properties for grid variables

| List of properties for grid variable | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | G/G theories | P.A analysis | Organizational theories |
| Rules define control systems | Information (Mars) | Information Gathering ( Hood) | |
| | Object (Mars) | Standard setting (Hood) | Standardization (Pugh) |
| | | Behaviour modification (Hood) | |
| | Resource (Mars) | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| Rules define roles of members | Specialization (Gross and Rayner) | | Specialization (Pugh) |
| | Division of Labour (Mars) | | Configuration |
| | Asymmetry (Gross and Rayner) | | |
| | Entitlement (Gross and Rayner) | | Standardization for employment practices (Pugh) |
| | Accountability (Gross and Rayner) | (Blame) | |

The next issue for measuring the grid level of the organizations is the scales of grid variables. Based on these properties for the grid dimension discussed above, it is now necessary to define the measurement standards which indicate high or low grid levels for these aspects of the risk control structures. In terms of rules which define risk control systems, firstly, as a simple observation and comparison, institutions which set larger numbers of rules in terms of their risk control structure will score higher grid levels than institutions which set smaller numbers of rules.

Secondly, referring to previous studies of the g/g theory and organizational structure theory, it should be noted that the grid level is determined by the flexibility and formality of rules. Mars (2005) defined that levels of grid are determined by how far subjects of control defined in *listorg* are flexibly (*i.e. information* and *objects*; see Sec. 2.2.2). Furthermore, Pugh (1973) has analysed the degree to which rules are written down as *formalization* which is a factor of the organizational structure he defined (see Section 1.2.1). Those previous works suggest that grid levels can be defined by the flexibility of changing rules for members in organizations. In this respect, as Pugh (1973) suggested, formally written rules are less flexible than informal unwritten rules because they are less easily changed by group members. Hence formal and less flexible rules are considered as the higher grid level than informal and flexible ones. In the case of public service institutions, this flexibility and formality can also be measured in terms of how extensive institutional procedures are required for changing rules. For example, prison staff members can more flexibly change prison service ordinance issued inside of the service than parliamentary legislation issued for the prison service by the legislature according to the penal legal structures. Thus, for this criterion higher grid rules are rules which are less flexible and cannot be easily changed by members of the organization.

This criterion is possibly criticised because it does not recognise that informal local habits can be inflexible and resistant to change sometimes. However, this scale focuses on the flexibility of rules according to the formally required procedures when it needs to be changed. Informal customs invariably exist in organizations, but, by virtue of them being informal, there is no need to establish formal procedures to change them. Although informal customs are easily changeable in legal terms, it can often be difficult to change them for a variety of other reasons such as group resistance. Therefore, as far as it concerns with a grid variable, formality is measured only in terms of the degree of flexibility for changing rules based on existing legal procedures within organizations.

Thus, when formality/flexibility determine the grid level, formality represents how easily or how much flexibility members of organizations have for changing relevant rules. Higher formality and inflexibility of rules means a higher grid level. In this respect, As regards the method developed here for measuring culture in prison services, the legal structures of the English and Japanese penal codes are taken into account in this study in order to determine how formal the rules are governing each body as well as whether rules are written or unwritten.

Finally, in regard to scales for rules which define the roles of members, the grid level of roles of members is also measured by the similar standards to that of risk control systems: the number of roles and flexibility of those. According to previous works, three points need to be made in regard to this scale criterion particularly for rules for roles of members. The first point, the more roles organizations assign to their staff members in order to control risk, the higher their grid levels will be and *vice versa* if they assign fewer roles to their staff. The second point, the flexibility of assigned roles in relation to tasks and activities should be considered to determine the grid level of the organization. Gross and Rayner (1985) considered this issue by *asymmetry* (see Sec. 2.2.1). If specific tasks or activities are only given to members who are assigned particular roles, this indicates a smaller degree of flexibility within the organization. The third point, the employment practice in terms of the process of assigning roles to different group members should be also considered to decide this flexibility in roles of members. Gross and Rayner further discussed how it relates to the grid level by *entitlement* (see Sec. 2.2.1). If roles that are only given to group members according to ascription based conditions which cannot be easily changed by candidates, such as gender, race, and seniority, are therefore less flexible. By contrast, if roles are given in regard to members' achievements, such as good performance in business competition, they are more flexible because they can be gained through changeable behaviour.

### 2.3.2: Properties for group

Theoretically, the group dimension represents how far members are incorporated into groups (Thompson, Ellis and Wildaveky 1990). Douglas (1982) has argued that the group dimension measures the extent to which individual behavioural choices are constrained by group incorporation. The issue then is how group-imposed constraints on individual choices can be observed as a group attribute in reality. This section discusses the properties of the group variables based on group factors identified in previous

studies discussed in Section 2.2 above and organizational studies discussed by Pugh (1973) in Section 1.2.1 of Chapter 1.

With regard to the issue that how properties for group are observed in reality, Gross and Rayner (1985) used the EXACT model. The model analysed the relationship between individual choices and group constraints in terms of time and space as environmental settings in organizations (see Sec. 2.2.1). Accordingly, they observed the ways in which members of social groups share time and space in order to measure the group level. In contrast to Gross and Rayner, Mars (2005) defined time and space as grid properties in *listorg* and focused on them as topics of control (provision of these in the organization). However, for the purposes of this study, I shall adopt Gross and Rayner's view of the time and space variables. The group level of organizations can be coherently observed in terms of the choices their members make about how to use time and space. Even the group predicates raised by Mars (2005) become more coherently understood in the context of these time and space as defined by Gross and Rayner (1985). Therefore, the following discussion is intended to show that group pressures (incorporation) can be observed through variations of individual choices about 1. time and 2. space in the organizations.

The first factor, "time" can be defined here in two ways: 1. it is the frequency with which members perform certain tasks; and 2. it is the proportion of time spent by members performing tasks in the social unit. These definitions respectively correspond to *frequency* (Gross and Rayner, 1985; see Sec. 2.2.1) and *overlap of work and leisure in listorg* by Mars (Mars 2005; see Sec. 2.2.2). If a majority of group members frequently participate in the same activities together, they spend more time with each other. To illustrate this point, in one prison all staff members worked equally more than 14 hours per day. Additionally, outside of their work, they frequently spent leisure time together. In this situation, the choice of behaviour for these members is smaller than in other prisons where working hours vary depending on job status and staff members spend more of their leisure time apart. In the latter case, the overlap between work and leisure is smaller and staff members have more freedom of choice about how they spend their time.

Another aspect of time is history. Mars (2005) has considered whether members of organization*s* maintain *shared histories* in order to measure the group level (see Sec. 2.2.2). One way of defining shared histories is as the extent to which members can choose to know or not know historical information. In a situation in which all members equally share historical information about their organization, individual

members will lack the option of not knowing. On the other hand, if members do not share information equally, this indicates that they have a greater degree of choice to not know about their organizations. In relate to organizational structures, Pugh (1973) has also highlighted *origin* and *history* as contexts of the organizational structure. He defined origin and history experiences which are gained by the organization (see Sec. 1.2.1).

The second factor which is observed the group level is space among members in the organization. Firstly, my definition of space refers to physical and metaphysical space in organizations. Physical space mainly concerns distance between group members. In regard to physical space, Gross and Rayner (1985) have measured "*proximity*" between group members while Mars (2005) has insisted that *residential propinquity* indicates high group characteristics within organizations. In this way, they all agree that less distance between members indicates a higher group level (see Sec. 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). If I apply these factors, concerning physical distances between members raised by Gross and Rayner, to the behaviour of group members, those reflect to the choices they can make about how much distance they put between themselves and other members. If there are equally small distances between group members, this indicates that they have limited or no choices about keeping different distances between themselves.

To illustrate this point, the Japanese prison service prepares staff residences adjacent to prisons (*i.e.* the workplace), and normally most staff members live in these residences (Hamai 2006). Hamai has explained that although there are no office codes restricting where prison staff live, there is group pressure between colleagues to live in staff residences (*ibid*.). In these circumstances, prison staff members have limited choices about how much distance they keep from each other. By contrast, if there is greater variation between the distances between prison staff members in and outside of their workplace, this suggests that they have more control over how much distance they keep from each other.

Concerning physical space, Pugh (1973) also raised *location* and *size* as contextual factors determining organizational structure (see Sec. 1.2.1). For example, a Japanese prison officer whom I interviewed for this study explained that in the case of small prisons situated in rural areas, almost all staff members, including Governors, live in staff residences adjacent to the prisons. Meanwhile, in the case of large prisons situated in large urban areas, staff members have more choice about where they live. In

this way, location and size can be contextual factors which determine the distance between staff members.

On the other hand, metaphysical space is concerned with a more abstract sense of "space" in organizations. For this study, it relates to the relationship with outsiders of the organization in terms of membership and relevant activities, and also to ways of having specific activities with other members inside of the organization. Firstly, in terms of the relationship with outsiders, Mars (2005) raised the issue of kinship in *Listorg* in order to identify the group level. According to him, if a majority of group members share kinship with other group members in the organization, the group level becomes high (*ibid.*). Therefore, if all members share kinship with other members, individuals outside the group who do not share kinship with any of its members cannot by themselves choose to become members and thus have few possibilities of gaining membership. Gross and Rayner (1985) also analysed this issue in terms of insiders and outsiders. They used the term "*impearmeability*" to analyse the openness of organizations to expanding their membership. If social units are closed to membership from outsiders, there tend to be fewer choices available for gaining membership than for units which are open to outsiders.

Furthermore, *scope* concerns the extent to which group members are allowed to join in activities with outsiders (Gross and Rayner 1985: see Sec. 2.2.1). As with *impermeability*, when group members are allowed to do more activities with outsiders, the behavioural choices available to them increase. Thus, group members in this kind of position are not highly incorporated in their organizations (low group). Pugh (1973) also raised *interdependence* as a contextual factor which determines organizational structure in his study of organizational structures (see Sec. 1.2.1). *Interdependence* measures to what extent organizations are influenced by external factors such as customers, suppliers, trade unions and owners (Pugh 1973). It closely linked to Gross and Rayner's concepts of group discussed above. Additionally, Hood (1998) has also mentioned the significance of the group level in relation to forms of *oversight* control. He showed that the group level of oversight control may differ according to whether the oversight control is given from outsiders or insiders (Hood 1998: p.54).

Secondly, in regard to ways of having specific activities with other members inside the organization, Mars (2005) has analysed the range of behavioural choices available to group members in terms of *shared tasks* and *decision making*. If specific tasks and decision-making are shared more widely within organizations, substantial behavioural choices available to individual members get decreased. In turn, this kind of

situation indicates high group incorporation within organizations. Gross and Rayner (1985) analysed this issue in terms of *transitivity* and *scope*. First, transitivity is the extent to which group members are equally able to do specific activities. If an activity is equally shared among group members, this indicates fewer choices of behaviour among them. Meanwhile, in relation to behavioural choice of members in organizations, Pugh raised (1973) c*entralization* as the degree to which the top end of the management hierarchy can control the direction of their organization (see Sec. 1.2.1). If the organization is centralised under the control of the top of the management, subordinates members do not have substantial choice of behaviour. They need to equally follow the direction of the top manager. Thus, it is involved as a metaphysical space issue.

Thus, previous studies used the g/g theory and the study of organizational structures showed that group level is measured by variation in substantial choices of members in relation to ways of sharing time and space with other members and outsiders. In comparison with grid properties, properties of group dimension concerns with more informal aspects of organizational control structures. Additionally, this way of observing choices of members and their behaviour provide an effective method for observing institutionalising process in organizations (Donaldson, 1999; and Tolbert and Zuker,1996) discussed in Chapter1 (see Sec. 1.2.1). Group is considered as dimension which can involve informal process brought by substantial behaviour of members. Table 2.3 is the summary of discussions concerning the group properties above.

Table 2.3: Summary of properties for group variables

| | G/G theory | | Organizational and Institutional factors |
|---|---|---|---|
| Time: | | | |
| Histories: | Shared histories (Mars) | | Origin and History (Pugh): Context |
| Frequency: | Frequency (Gross and Rayner) | Overlaps of work and leisure (Mars) | |
| Space: | | | |
| Physical: | Residential propinquity (Mars) | | |
| | Proximity (Gross and Rayner) | | Size and location ( Pugh):context |
| Metaphysical | Kinship (Mars) | Shared tasks and decision-making (Mars) | |
| | Impermeability (Gross and Rayner) | Transitivity (Gross and Rayner) | Interdependence (Pugh) |
| | Scope (Gross and Rayner) | | Centralization (Pugh) |

The next issue for measuring the group level is the scales of group variables. In regard to the properties of group variables, it is necessary to define the standards which determine high/low group levels for the purposes of this study. Based on previous studies discussed above, I define that the group level can be measured in terms of the diversity of group members and their behaviour in relation to time and space discussed

above. The standard view is that the group level negatively correlates with the diversity or variation of members and their behaviour in the organization. Thus, more diversity indicates a lower group level for organizations while less diversity indicates a higher group level. For example, in regard to shared histories (time), if historical information is shared equally among members of organizations, the variation of members' approaches in response to this information is small. The group level for those organizations will be higher than for organizations in which historical information is less well-shared among members. Similarly for space, organizations in which group members live equal distances apart will gain higher group scores than organizations whose members live more varied distances apart.

The degree to which organizations are open to outsiders can also be measured through this diversity of members and their behaviour. Organizations that close their membership to outsiders are less diverse and thus gain a high group level. Meanwhile, organizations whose membership is open to outsiders allow a greater variety of membership and thus gain a low group level. In the study of public administration, Hood (1998) specifically stated that when organizations are overseen by insiders, the control shows low group differentiation within them. When they are overseen by outsiders, there is high group differentiation within the control (Hood 1998: p.54). His view is also met with the group scale measured by the diversity of members in the organization. If the organizational control does emphasise or allow differences of members and their behaviour in the control process, the diversity of members and their risk behaviour get increased. If the organizational control does NOT emphasise or allow those differences, the visible diversity of members get decreased. As he stated, insiders/outsiders are good indicator to measure whether the organizational control emphasises group differentiations in the organization or not. Hence the diversity of group members and their behaviour can be used to measure the group level of the organization, and the relationship between insiders and outsiders will help to measure this diversity.

### 2.3.3: Properties of the g/g variables in prison service risk control structures

This section discussed the properties and scales of the g/g variables as they relate to organizations. It suggested that the grid dimension is measured according to the formality/flexibility of rules, which define the risk control systems, and the speciality of roles given to members in order to control risk measured by the criteria of assigning roles to members in organizations. Meanwhile, the group dimension is measured in

terms of the diversity of members and their behaviour in relation to time and space assigned within organizations. In comparison with the grid dimension which measures the rules for risk control structures, the group dimension mainly analyses informal aspects of organizational control structures, observance substantial variation of members in organizations. Building on these methodological discussions, I would like to develop properties for the g/g variables more focused on measuring risk control structures within prison services.

Firstly, the risk control systems operated by prison services are measured on the grid scale as part of overall prison service risk control structures. Based on three components of the risk control systems (see Sec. 2.3.1), I will analyse following three topics of prison risk control systems: rules which define information of risk in the prison service, rules which defines standards of risk control behaviour in the prison service, and rules which enforce those rules to members in the prison service. Accordingly, the risk control systems operated by the English and Japanese prison services are analysed here in terms of these issues. I have named this aspect of risk control *formalization* (Y1) in my method.

Secondly, the means by which specific roles are assigned to staff members as part of risk control structures operated by the relevant prison services is also measured here on the grid scale. Based on previous studies discussed in Sec. 2.3.1, this grid will analyse the degree to which the prison services assign roles to staff members in order to control specific operational risks, and criteria for gaining those roles. In my method this aspect of risk control structures is named *specialization* for risk control (Y2). Therefore, two grid aspects are defined in the risk control cultural analysis.

Next, it is necessary to define the group aspects of prison service risk control analysis. As noted above, the factors for the group variable identified by previous studies have been somewhat abstract or topical. Hence, following the criteria discussed in the last section, it is necessary to focus on ways of measuring the group level of risk control culture in prison services which correspond to the two aspects of the grid variable discussed above.

In response to the *formalization* (Y1) of risk control, the first group aspect of risk control structures will measure how members, as subordinate units of the prison service organization, are unified their behaviour in response to risk control relevant rules discussed in *formalization*. According to institutional approaches, the prison service risk control structures should be analysed both formally and informally. Hence this method mainly analyse the approach of members in response to rules defined in the

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prison service as a group aspect which represents informal factors of risk control structures. With regard to the properties of the group dimension, the degree of compliance among members can be categorised in terms of the diversity of their behaviour in relation to the metaphysical space of their organization. If a majority of members follow rules defined by the risk control system equally, this indicates a high group level for their organization. By contrast, if there is more variation in how members or any subordinate units follow rules defined as the risk control system, this indicates a lower group level. In my method, this aspect of risk control structures is named *compliance level of subordinate units* (X1).

The second group aspect of risk control structures responds to *specialization* (Y2). This other group aspect measures the extent to which members are allowed to show variations of their risk control behaviour within the area where they exercise their assigned roles in the prison service. For example, some staff members are assigned the special roles for specific risk control tasks in a prison. If they show wider variations in the process of achieving their assigned tasks, this indicates that the risk control structure allows the members to freely behave in the risk control process, and the low group unity for the overall prison. By contrast, if staff members above do not have or show variations in the process of achieving their tasks, this indicates high group pressure within the prison. In my measurements this factor is named *autonomy* (X2).

Table 2.4: Four Aspects of risk control analysis

| Risk control structures | G/G dimensions | Aspects of risk control structures | Key observations |
|---|---|---|---|
| Risk Control Systems | Grid 1 (Y1) | Formalization | The number of rules and their formality which define the risk control systems |
| | Group1 (Y2) | Compliance | The diversity of the compliance level among members (subordinates) in response to the rules defines the risk control systems |
| Roles of members in risk control structures | Grid 2 (Y2) | Specialization | the roles assigned to staff members for risk control |
| | Group 2(X2) | Autonomy | the diversity of members and their behaviour in the areas where they perform their assigned roles |

## 2.4: Conclusion

This chapter has discussed various methods of measuring culture using the g/g theory. It has made several key points which can be listed here. First, the g/g theory analyses culture in terms of collective forms of behaviour in organizations. Second, the purpose of measuring culture with the g/g theory should be to comparatively demonstrate its existence in different organizations Third, the g/g theory provides a more effective means for analysing established organizations than it does for unstructured and un-established organizations. Finally, in regard to organizational structure, the g/g theory is strongly linked to organizational and institutional studies.

In order to measure risk control culture in the English and Japanese prison services, I have discussed the issues of how to select risks, variables which can be applied to the g/g framework, and those properties of those variables. Firstly, in order to measure culture, risks should be specified within the organizations of interest. The official aims of public service institutions can help us to select risks that are relevant to them and which describe their cultures effectively. Secondly, in view of the measurement theory, g/g dimensions were selected as variables for measuring culture. Previous studies have shown that the grid dimension is represented by rules for risk control systems and roles assigned to members. Meanwhile, the group dimension is represented by the diversity of members as subordinate units of organizations in relation to how time and space are assigned within organizations. Finally, based on this framework I defined four aspects of organizational risk control structures: formalization (Y1), compliance (X1), specialization (Y2) and autonomy (X2). These aspects will be used to measure risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services. Chapter 3 further develops the method discussed in this chapter for measuring risk control culture with more details.

# Chapter 3
## Methodology
## How can the Grid and Group Theory be used to Identify Prison Service Risk Control?

This chapter explains the details of the methodological procedures, as discussed in chapter 2 (see Sec. 2.3.3), which are used in this study to measure the risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services. This method proceeds in four stages: 1. setting the purpose of the measurements, the level at which the prison service culture will be observed, and specific risk to be analysed; 2. coding g/g aspects of prison risk control structures; 3. assigning numerical scores for those codes; and 4. mapping and demonstrating results. The first section of this chapter sets out the purpose of measuring prison service risk control culture in this study, the unit of observation and selection of risk in prison operation in order to measure g/g levels. Based on those settings for measuring culture, the second section explains the coding processes. The third section explains the scoring process in response to those codes. Finally, the fourth section explains the ways of demonstrating results.

## 3.1: Setting the purpose of measuring culture and the levels of observation and risk

The first step to be taken here is to define the purpose of measuring culture and the unit of observation, and to specify risk in the relevant organizations. Dealing with these issues helps to clarify why and what I will measure in the English and Japanese prison services.

### 3.1.1 Political backgrounds of the English and Japanese prison services

In order to measure prison risk control culture, this section gives a preliminary discussion of the political context of the Japanese and English prison services. The World Prison Brief, published by the International Centre for Prison Studies (ICPS) based at King's College London, has reported that the rate of imprisonment in England

and Wales as 156 per 100,000 of the national population[1], and for Japan that the rate of imprisonment is 58 per 100,000 of the national population[2] (ICPS 2011). These figures show that the rate of imprisonment is much lower in Japan than in England and Wales.

In both England and Japan, the purpose of imprisonment is to punish and rehabilitate persons who commit crimes according to judgements handed down by courts (Coyle, 2005; HMPS 2011a; and C.B. 2008). The English penal system uses imprisonment in cases where criminals habitually reoffend or commit serious crimes thus taking away some of their liberties (Coyle, 2005). The Japanese penal system is based on a similar principle. Criminals are sent to prisons when the courts judge that they habitually commit serious crimes (JMOJ 2008). Furthermore, Japanese penal institutions and their policies are deeply related to the control of traditional Japanese criminal gangs called *yakuza* [やくざ] or *boryokudan* [暴力団] (JMOJ 2009a). Due to the highly organized and serious nature of criminality linked to these groups, the courts tend to have a strict policy of sending criminals who are members to prison. According to the Japanese prison service, approximately 20% of the total prison population were reported as being members of criminal gangs at the times when they committed the crimes leading to their prison sentences (C.B. 2007, 2008a, and 2009).

In regard to the operational standards of the English and Japanese prison services, HMPS has been strongly affected by the standards of International Human Rights since the 1970s (Coyle, 2005). Accordingly, HMPS is under constant pressure from human rights activist groups to provide humanitarian-focused service provision towards its inmates (*ibid*.). Moreover, as with other public institutions in England and Wales, HMPS has been subject to private competition since 1991 (Hood *et al* 1999): eleven local establishments are currently run by private contractors (HMPS 2011d).

By contrast, the Japanese prison service has been described as "semi-hidden world" since very little was known about its institutional practices in the public sphere until very recently (Nishio, 2004). Crucially, in 2003 The Prison Law and basic regime underwent their first reforms since 1908 (C.B. 2008). In the intervening period, the standards of the Japanese prison service system were occasionally criticised in parliament as being antiquated and failing to meet International Human Rights standards (Nishio 2004; and C.B. 2008). However, these criticisms did not have any

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[1] The rate is based on an estimated national population of 55.85 million at beginning of December 2011.

[2] The rate is based on an estimated national population of 127.9 million at mid-2010.

substantial impact on the operational standards of the Japanese prison service until 2003. The current penal system is based on the reforms instituted in 2003. These reforms included the introduction of privately run prisons. At present, four local establishments are operated by private contractors (C.B. 2008). Although the reforms brought these structural changes to the Japanese prison service, it continues to be criticised for not fully conforming to International Human Rights standards (AIJ 2011).

In this way, it can be seen that although the English and Japanese prison services share the similar institutional purpose, they have developed in very different ways. The purpose of this study is thus to use the grid-group framework to measure how these differences are reflected in the risk control cultures of each prison service.

### 3.1.2: The aims and utility of measuring prison culture

It is important to clarify the functions and aims of measuring risk control culture in prison services using the method I have developed in this study. As discussed in chapters 1 and 2, culture is a highly contingent factor and too complex to be explained simply in terms of the relationship between independent and dependent variables. Accordingly, this study is not intended to clarify the causal mechanism of culture for specific organizational changes. Rather, it is aimed at measuring the patterns of risk control behaviour in the English and Japanese prison services using the g/g framework.

Following Douglas' understanding of the g/g theory (Douglas 1999), I assume that measuring prison risk control culture, using the g/g theory, can contribute to identify the weaknesses and strengths of the aforesaid prison services in terms of risk and thereby contribute towards improving their risk control regimes. Hence this thesis will measure how grid and group forms of control work in the risk control structures of the English and Japanese prison services. As mentioned by Douglas (Douglas 1999: see p. 53), it will identify patterns of risk control behaviour observed within the grid and group comparative framework and thus clarify the strengths and weaknesses of prison risk control structures. Crucially, it will provide understanding of issues linked to risk control in prison service institutions and point towards improvements that can be made therein in the cases of the English and Japanese prison services.

### 3.1.3: Setting units for observing culture in the prison services

Previous studies have shown that organizational culture should be measured by g/g variables. Chapter 2 discussed that grid level for the organization is measured by the

extent to which rules for risk control systems are formally defined, and the extent to which organizations assign special roles to members in order to control risk. Meanwhile, the group level is measured by the diversity of staff members and their behaviour within time and space assigned inside of the organization.

These g/g scales are all relative, and the results may differ according to the unit in which culture is observed in the organization. To illustrate, the grid level is measured by the formality of rules according to how easily members can change them, while the group level is measured by the diversity of members and their behaviour in the organization. On both the g/g scales, relevant key factors for measuring g/g levels can differ depending on the unit of observation: easiness of changing rules, membership, time and apace. In the case of the English and Japanese prison services, if I measure culture in a local prison establishment, membership, time, and space are defined within that prison. In this unit, if I measure the grid level of risk control systems, the easiness of changing rules is only discussed in members in the local establishment. On the other hand, if I measure these factors as they apply to national prison services as total institutions, they become wider and more diverse than in local prison levels. If I measure the grid levels of their risk control systems, the easiness of changing rules is discussed in relation to overall prison service staff members can change Therefore, setting a fixed area (unit) of the organization in which g/g levels are observed is highly important.

In regard to this issue, Hood *et al* (2004) have provided an overview of the general character of national prison services based on their studies of different countries. According to them, firstly, prison services are the total institutions. The internal control structure is defined by the relationship between central government (National Head Quarters) and local prison establishments. Secondly, these internal systems are controlled by external or independent performance assessment bodies. Furthermore, some prison services install regional offices and directors between national HQs and local prisons as means of exerting more control over local establishments (Nishio, 2004; and James, 2004).

In the case of England, firstly, Her Majesty's Prison Service (HMPS) currently consists of three internal layers of service delivery units: the HMPS HQ offices, 11 area offices, and 134 local establishments (HMPS, 2010a). Secondly, subject to monitoring by multiple external performance assessment bodies: HM Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP), the Independent Monitoring Board (IMB), and the Prison and Probation Ombudsman (Hood and *et al*., 1999; and Bennett, 2007). The current system in England

was established in the 1990s, prior to which prisons were run locally under the control of magistrates (Coyle, 2005). The prison system underwent modernization between 1914 and 1970 in response to this decentralised prison management style (ibid.). Centralization advanced further after a riot in HMP Strangeways in 1990. Thus, by the early 1990s local establishments and governors became subject to centralized policies and internal regulations such as Prison Service Ordinance (Coyle, 2005). Currently, HMPS is embedded in the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) which is an executive agency of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and the probation service (HMPS 2010b).

Meanwhile, the Japanese prison service has a similar institutional structure to HMPS. The basic structure can be summarized in terms of the relationship between The Correction Bureau (C.B) of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and local penal intuitions (prisons) (Nishio 2004). In between these two control bodies, there are regional offices. The service currently has 187 penal institutions and 8 regional offices (C.B 2008). This traditional prison service structure was established by The Prison Law and Penal Code in 1908 which still provides the basis of the current prison system (JMOJ 2011). The traditional system and its laws were not modernized until 2003. Although the out-dated prison system was often raised as an issued for reform in the Japanese parliament, these motions never became drivers for essential penal reform (C.B 2008). Reform was ultimately brought about by wide criticisms of the public against death incidents of prisoners in Nagoya prisons and injuries to prisoners in Nagoya prison between 2000 and 2003 (*ibid*.). In response to severe criticism from the public and media, the JMOJ established the Correctional Administration Reform Committee (CARC) in December 2003 in order to modernize the prison service.

In the Committee, revising the Prison Law and Penal Code was the main issue for this body. As a result, a new prison service act, named the Act of the Penal Institutions and the Treatment of Sentenced Inmates (shortened as the Penal institution Act), was approved by parliament in 2006. At present, prison operation in Japan is based on this law (Nishio 2004: C.B 2008: and JMOJ 2011).Even under the new penal system, the performance of local establishments is not actively controlled by external performance assessment regimes. Currently,, only one independent external monitoring body, the Penal Institution Visiting Committees (PIVC), is authorised monitoring local establishments in the Japanese prison service. (JMOJ 2007).

These overviews of the English and Japanese prison services suggest that modern prison services have three main organizational units: local establishment levels,

regional level, and national prison service level, including all of those. The first unit is to measure g/g levels at local establishments. At this level, culture can be measured within single or multiple prisons in England and Japan. Comparing single prisons in England and Japan could contribute to analysing the details of each prison. Nevertheless, this approach seems too focused to make generalisations about the risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services. By contrast, comparing multiple prisons could provide a better overview of risk control in the English and Japanese prison services. That is, if more prisons are analysed, the results can be taken to reflect the overall cultures of the English and Japanese prison services. Nevertheless, as I explained in the introduction to this study, gaining access to local prison establishments in either case has proven very difficult. Although I submitted official research applications requesting that I conduct my study in local prison establishments in England and Japan, I was not granted access to any local establishments. In order to measure g/g levels at local establishments, it is necessary to get detailed data about them. Hence for these reasons it was technically difficult to measure the g/g levels of local establishment in England and Japan.

The second choice for units of observation is measuring risk control culture at regional level. This unit allows comparisons of g/g levels to be between single or multiple regional areas of the English and Japanese prison services. In both English and Japanese prison services, regional offices are in charge of local establishments following the national prison service policy. By analysing these units of control, it is possible to gain a structural perspective of risk control culture in both prison services. However, taking account of the national structures and histories of the English and Japanese prison services, there is no particular need or reason to compare their cultures at the level of their regional offices. These offices are generally highly involved in central control. In HMPS prisons are currently divided into 11 areas, but area managers are based in the central HQs (Coyle, 2005). The area or regional offices and managers should be seen as parts of the national control structure.

The third choice is measuring g/g levels at the national prison service level, involving all levels discussed above. Considering the issues posed by setting the units of observation for the other two levels, the national prison service is the best unit for measuring g/g levels. As Hood *et al* (2004) have found, prison services are generally totally centralised institutions. Thus, their risk control structures may be effectively observed in entire prison service institutions. The influence of local prison establishments and regional offices can be discussed as subordinate units in the overall

structures of the national prison services: for example, the procedures by which national HQs or area managers can intervene in local establishments. Accordingly, I will measure the g/g levels of the national prison service risk control structures in place in England and Japan (see Figure 3.1) .

Figure 3.1: Units of observation for measuring grid and group levels



### 3.1.4 Setting specific prison risks: suicide and violence

This section discusses the specific risks within the prison services which are measured in this study. Institutional risks can be identified from officially stated aims or objectives. HMPS and the Japanese prison service define their official aims as follows.

### Objectives (HMPS 2011a)

*To protect the public and provide what commissioners want to purchase by:*
- *Holding prisoners securely*
- *Reducing the risk of prisoners re-offending*
- *Providing safe and well-ordered establishments in which we treat prisoners humanely, decently and lawfully.*

***Objectives of the Japanese prison service (C.B 2011)***
- *Security and safety (hoan keibi:*保安警備*)*
- *Correctional Treatment (bunrui hogo:* 分類保護*)*
- *Prison workshop (sagyou:*作業*)*
- *Education and training (kyouiku* 教育*)*
- *Health and Hygiene (Iryou eisei:*医療衛生*)*

These objectives show that the Japanese and English prison services do not share exactly the same stated aims. However, both prison services identify maintaining security and safety in prisons, and reducing re-offending rates through correctional treatment, as key objectives. Of these two objectives, it is more difficult to define the risk of re-offending in relation to the prison services' control structures than it is to define the risks of security and safety. Therefore, I will analyse the cultures of safety and security in both prison services.

Although safety and security may vary as risks in each prison service, the official security incident reports they both maintain provide relatively clear ideas of what these risks are.   The Japanese prison service keeps annual records of safety and security incidents. These records distinguish between five types of incident: escape, serious assault, fire, suicide, and riot (JMOJ 2009; see Table. 3.1). Meanwhile, HMPS and the National Offender Management Service (NOMS), which is the executive agency of HMPS, publishes "*Safety in Custody Statistics*". According to this report, MOJ and HMPS monitor three types of incidents as indicators of overall safety in prisons: deaths, including suicide, self-harm, and assaults by prisoners (MOJ 2010; see Table 3.2).

Table 3.1: Security and safety incidents in Japanese prisons

Security and safety Incident in Japanese prisons

| | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prison Population*1 | 75286 | 77932 | 80335 | 80684 | 78533 |
| Escape | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Fire | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Riot | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Serious Assault on staff*2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 4 - | |
| Serious Assault on inmates*3 | 10 | 15 | 25 | 12 | 8 |
| Suicide | 20 | 15 | 18 | 21 | 25 |

*1 MoJ Kyosei Tokei: http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=00000106
*2 CB (2008) *Penal Institution in Japan.*
*3 CB (2008) *Kyosei no genjo* .

Table 3.2: HMPS Safety incidents statistics.

| | | | | | | | | | | England and Wales |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 |
| Prison Population[1] | 64,602 | 66,301 | 70,778 | 73,038 | 74,657 | 75,979 | 78,127 | 80,216 | 82,572 | 83,461 |
| Deaths in prison custody[2] | 147 | 142 | 164 | 183 | 208 | 174 | 153 | 185 | 165 | 168 |
| Self-inflicted | 81 | 73 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 78 | 67 | 92 | 60 | 60 |
| Natural Causes | 62 | 68 | 66 | 86 | 102 | 88 | 83 | 91 | 99 | 105 |
| Other non-natural | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 9 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| Homicide | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 |
| Self-harm incidents[3] | - | - | - | - | 19,550 | 23,776 | 23,395 | 22,875 | 24,686 | - |
| Assault incidents[4] | 9,423 | 10,695 | 11,515 | 11,835 | 12,558 | 14,406 | 15,054 | 15,231 | 15,847 | - |

(1) Population statistics are derived from the Ministry of Justice- Offender Management Caseload Statistics. The prison population figure shown for 2009 is provisional.
(2) Deaths in prison custody statistics are derived from the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) deaths in the custody database which contains details of all deaths in prison custody for England and Wales from 1978.
(3) Self-harm statistics are derived from the NOMS incident reporting system. A new system for monitoring self-harm
(4) Assault statistics are also derived from the NOMS incident reporting system. As with self-harm, the final assault

[from *Table 1: Summary statistics, England and Wales*. MOJ (2010)]

By comparing the security incident categories on both tables, it can be seen that violent behaviour, including assault and serious assault, is commonly held to be a risk to

security and safety by the English and Japanese prison services. Suicide and "self-inflicted deaths" (tom use HMPS terminology) are also identified as hazards of prison operation by both prison services. Accordingly, suicide and violence among prisoners are considered here as suitable risks for measuring culture in the English and Japanese prison services.

Additionally, *Safety in Custody Statistics* of HMPS suggests that self-harm is a major safety risk in prisons and should thus be taken into account here (MOJ 2010 and 2010a). The continuity between self-harm and suicide has been critically discussed in criminology (Liebling, 1992). HMPS also recognises self-harm as an important indicator of the risk of suicide and thus provides extra care for prisoners who self-harm (HMPS, 2011b). By contrast, the Japanese prison service punishes self-harming behaviour for the reason that it is considered a breach of safety in prisons (Art. 74, *Penal Institutions Acts*). Thus, institutional approaches to self-harm should be considered as part of the process of measuring risk control culture in the English and Japanese prison services. Finally, this study classifies safety risks in terms of either suicide including self-harm or violence including serious assaults committed by prisoners. The relevant prison services' risk control cultures are measured in terms of these risks.

## 3.2: Coding suicide and violence risk control with g/g variables

It was decided in the previous section that the g/g levels for the national prison services will be measured in terms of suicide and violence control. Based on these settings, this section provides analytical sub-codes in response to four aspects of risk control defined in Chapter 2 (see Sec. 2.3.3): *formalization, compliance, specialization* and *autonomy* .

### 3.2.1: Risk control system: Grid1: formalization (Y1)

The first code concerns formalization in terms of suicide and violence control. Accordingly, this code focuses on whether the English and Japanese prison services define rules for the relevant risk control systems, and to what extent these rules are formalised in legal terms linked to prisons. As I discussed in chapter 2, formalization measures the rules of the risk control systems consisting of three components (see Sec. 2.3.1).Based on those basic components, in order to measure the suicide and violence risk control systems of the relevant prison services, I have assigned 5 sub-codes to

them: 1. discipline and order in prisons; 2. definitions of risky behaviour; 3. the uses of punishment and reward for prisoners; 4. key national guidelines which cover overall risk control processes in prisons; and 5. guidelines for incident recording systems. In order to reduce coders' bias, these sub-codes will simply analyse whether there are any rules covered by the sub-codes just mentioned.

Sub-code 1: discipline and order in prisons

The first sub-code concerns with rules which define behaviour of prisoners in prisons. In order to study hazardous behaviour in prisons, it is necessary to know the general rules which govern prison life. According to King (2008) "*Order refers to a relatively stable set of relationships which most participants of prisons find acceptable and worth maintaining*" (King, 2008). Risk is recognised as unacceptable behaviour in response to discipline and order in prisons. This sub-code analyses whether and how the prison service defines discipline and order in prisons.

Sub-code 2: definitions of risk behaviour

The second sub-code concerns with rules define information about risk. It analyses the formality of the rules defining suicide and violence in the prison services. Whereas Douglas and Wildavsky (1983) discussed forms of risk control in terms of knowledge and information, risk must be defined according to whether knowledge and information about hazardous behaviour among prisoners are defined by the rules maintained by the prison services.

Sub-code 3: the uses of punishment and reward for prisoners

The third sub-code concerns with rules which define the use of punishment and reward for prisoners. Hood *et al* define rules for *behaviour-modification* that modify members' behaviour (Hood, 1999 and 2001; see Sec. 2.3.1). In the case of the prison service, the punishment and reward system is considered as rules which enforce prisoners to maintain order and discipline defined in prisons. Accordingly, this sub-code analyses whether the prison services uses punishment and reward systems for prisoners in response to hazardous behaviour among prisoners.

Sub-code 4: key national guidelines which cover overall risk control processes in prisons

The fourth sub-code relates to key national guidelines for controlling risk. Pugh (1973) has analysed *standardization* in order to measure the extent to which organizations standardize specific behavioural processes among their members. Hood *et al* (1999 and 2001) also raised *standard-setting* as a component of control which refers to the guidelines or targets that organizations set for themselves (see Sec. 2.3.1). In light of these studies, this sub-code analyses whether the prison services have national guidelines which standardize risk control behaviour: for example, pre-and post-incident procedures to be followed in cases of suicide and violence in local establishments. In different words, this sub-code analyses whether the overall guidelines for controlling the risks of suicide or violence are defined by rules kept within the prison services.

Sub-code 5: risk related information record system.

The fifth sub-code for formalization concerns the systems operated by the relevant prison services for recording and documenting information. Hood *et al* (1999 and 2001) have drawn attention to *information gathering* as a facet of risk control regimes (see Sec. 2.3.1). This sub-code is applied to the systems maintained by each prison service for recording and documenting information about suicide and violence control. It covers pre- and post-incident information gathering, risk monitoring records, incident report systems, and any forms of documentation required to make reports about risk control. The ways in which the prison services ask local establishments to record information about suicide and violence control, including whether the information is defined by formal or informal rules, are also analysed by this sub-code.

### 3.2.2: Risk control system: Group1: Compliance (X1)

The second aspect code is the "*compliance*" level of the prison service which corresponds to the *formalization* codes (Y1) on the grid axis. Whereas the *formalization* code measures the formality of rules defining suicide and violence risk control behaviour along the grid axis, the compliance code (group 1) measures how far these rules are upheld by local establishments and their staff members.

Ideally, it is good to measure the level of this code in relation to individual staff members in the prison service. However, since it is extremely difficult to know the attitudes of all staff members, I have measured this code in terms of local establishments which are subordinate units of the national prison services.

Accordingly, diversity in the approaches of local establishments to maintaining these rules is measured by this code. Based on the earlier discussion of group properties in chapter 2, my measurements show that group control within prison services becomes weaker if more variation is observed among local establishments in their ways of complying with relevant risk control rules.

Sub-code 1: order and discipline

The first sub-code measures diversity in the behaviour of individual prisoners in response to order and discipline. Although "order" refers to stability in prisons, this sub-code analyses the extent to which order *unifies* the behaviour of prisoners. If stability in prisons is a maximum priority, heavy constraints are placed on the individual behaviour of prisoners. By contrast, if order and discipline are moderated according to the particular needs of individual prisoners, their behaviour may vary more widely inside the prison. Hence the extent to which order and discipline constrain the individual behaviour of prisoners is analysed by this sub-code.

Sub-code 2: ways of identifying risk

The second sub-code concerns the ways in which risk is identified by local establishments. Whereas the *formalization* sub-codes cover the formality of definitions or risk followed in local establishments, this sub-code analyses how local establishments identify risk based formal definitions thereof and to what extent their ways of identifying risk are unified in response to the rules defined risk in the prison service. If the ways of identifying risk are standardised among a majority of local establishments based on the rules defined risk, this indicates a high degree of group unity within the prison service. On the other hand, if there is a high level of variation in how local establishments identify risk, this indicates a lower group level for the prison service. Therefore, this sub-code measures diversity in how local establishments identify risk.

Sub-code 3: appropriate use of punishment and reward

The third sub-code analyses whether punishment and reward are used appropriately by local establishments in line with national rules. Whereas the formalization sub-codes analyse whether systems of punishment and reward are defined in the prison rules, this sub-code considers how they are operated in local establishments. If majority of local

establishments appropriately conduct punishment or reward systems, it indicates the high group level for the prison service, and *vice-versa*.

Sub-code 4: implementation of key national guidelines in local establishments
The formalization sub-codes discuss whether the prison services have key national guidelines which cover the overall processes of suicide and violence control. In response, the present sub-code analyses to what extent local prisons implement these guidelines appropriately for the purposes of risk control. If a majority of establishments enforce these guidelines, this indicates a high standardization (high group) level for the national prison service.

Sub-code 5: accountability for recording and documenting risk related information
The final sub-code for compliance analyses the accountability of prison record keeping systems concerning suicide and violence. In particular, it considers how far the recording system is accountable in local establishments. If the systems of record-keeping and documentation in local establishments are adequate according to national standards / guidelines, this indicates, this indicates high compliance and group levels for the prison service. If the quality of documentation and information recording varies between local establishments, this indicates lower group and compliance levels.

### *3.2.3: Leadership: Grid 2: The roles of governors (Y2)*

The second category code for the grid dimension concerns the roles played by governors in local risk control strategies. As noted in chapter 2, specialization of staff members is the second grid aspect. In this study, I will focus on how governors specialize in relation to local suicide and violence risk control strategies. As I discussed in chapter 1, it is difficult to measure culture in relation to abstract situations (see Sec. 1.1.4). Thus, by focusing on the specific roles played by specific staff members in prisons, it is possible to make a more concrete study of how *specialization* influences suicide and violence control in local prison establishments. Moreover, governors are leaders of local establishments, in which respect analysing their roles in the risk control structure can help to clarify how their roles as leaders are viewed by the prison service.

Those roles of governors as leaders in local establishments can be discussed as leadership of governors in the prison risk control structures, being discussed with their autonomy within local prison establishments. Although the concept of leadership varies among different researchers, it is worth bearing in mind Stogdill's classic definition:

"leadership may be considered as the process (act) of influencing the activities of an organized group in its efforts toward goal setting and goal achievement" (Stogdill, 1950, p. 4). Leadership in these terms can be measured with a pair of grid and group variables: *roles of governors* (Y2) and *autonomy* (X2) in local risk control strategies. The former variable measures the roles assigned to governors on the grid axis while the latter measures how governors behave (act) in the areas where they exercise their roles in local suicide and violence control strategies on the group axis. In this way, the leadership process can be discussed in terms of the g/g dimensions.

Accordingly, the specialization code measures the roles played by governors as leaders of local establishments in suicide and violence risk control strategies and how these roles reflect the relationship between local establishments and central HQs. Based on previous studies which have defined the roles of leaders, the roles of governors are analysed here according to the following five sub-codes.

Sub-code 1: specialization of general staff members

The first sub-code concerned with roles of governors is the general approach of the prison service for assigning special roles to staff members in order to control risk. Section 2.3.1 in Chapter 2 discussed that specialisation is measured by the extent to which the organizations assign special roles to staff members for controlling risk. Hence I analyse the general attitude of the prison service in use of specialization of staff members in risk control structure as the context of analysing roles of governors. If the prison service specialised roles to staff members in local establishments in order to control suicide and violence risk, this indicates a high level of speciality (high grid) in the prison service. By contrast, if specialised roles in risk control are not given to specific staff members, this indicates a low level of speciality (grid) in controlling risk.

Sub-code 2: promotion criteria for governors

The second sub-code analyses the selection criteria for governors. Sec. 2.3.1 in Chapter 2 discussed that the grid level for the aspect of *specialization* is determined by the flexibility of criteria for assigning the roles to members in the organization. Hence the promotion criteria to be governors should be considered as part of specialization of governors. Referring to Parsons (1970) and Gross and Rayner (1985), this sub-code analyses whether the career system for appointing governors is based on *achievement* (high grid) or *ascription* (low grid). If governors are appointed through ascription (*e.g.* gender, seniority, length of joining the service), this indicates a high grid level for the

prison service. Meanwhile, if they are appointed because of their achievements, this indicates a lower grid level.

Sub-code 3: interpersonal roles of governors.

In regard to the leadership roles of governors, the method developed in this study measures the number of leadership roles assigned to governors in suicide and violence risk control structures. The more roles assigned to governors, the higher the grid level will be for the relevant risk control structure. Mintzberg's (1973) classic definition of executive roles provides a clear and distinctive image of leaders. He pointed out that executives in organizations tend to assume three types of managerial roles: *interpersonal, informational* and *decisional*. The present sub-code analyses the first of these roles, namely *interpersonal* roles. According to Mintzberg, the *interpersonal* roles are consisted for following three roles: 1. *figurehead*; 2. *leaders*; and 3. *liaison*. Figurehead refers to the executive's role as a symbolic head who is obliged to perform a number of routine duties of a socio-legal nature (Mintzberg, 1973). In prison service institutions, these duties correspond to the tasks assigned to governors by the rules and regulatory codes of their prison services.

The second interpersonal role, *leader*, refers to the responsibility of executives for motivating and activating subordinates through their duties. (Mintzberg, 1973). For the purposes of this study, I will consider the extent to which governors are formally required to be in charge of this role as part of local risk control strategies. The third interpersonal role, *liaison*, refers to the activity of leaders to maintain or develop own networks with outsiders of the organization, providing them with favours and information (Mintzberg, 1973). In relation to the aims of this study, this factor analyses whether governors are required to maintain the external networks in relation to local suicide and violence control strategies.

Sub-code 4: informational roles

The fourth sub-code, *informational* roles, is understood here in terms of the second leadership roles proposed by Mintzberg (1973). Hood *et al* (1999) and Douglas and Wildavsky (1983) all considered information to be a key element of risk control structures. Accordingly, this sub-code analyses the kinds of roles that are assigned to governors in response to information about risk control.

In addition to sub-code 3, "interpersonal roles", this sub-code also measures the number of informational roles assigned to governors in the prison risk control structure. The more roles assigned to governors, the higher the grid level will be for the risk control structure in question. According to Mintzberg (1973), informational roles consist of three roles of leaders in relation to their management activities: 1. *monitor*; 2. *disseminator*; and 3. *Spokesperson*. *Monitor* describes the activity whereby leaders seek and receive special information in order to develop a thorough understanding of their organization and its environment. This role forms the nerve centre where internal and external information is gathered / exchanged within organizations (Mintzberg, 1973). For the purposes of this study, "internals" refers to subordinate staff members within local establishments. Meanwhile, "externals" refers to officials or bodies outside of local establishments: for example, central HQs, area managers, other local establishments, or independent inspectorate bodies. Hence this monitoring activity is analysed here in terms of the extent to which governors are in charge of seeking relevant information throughout internals/externals in the process of local suicide and violence control strategies.

The second activity, *disseminator*, transmit information gained from externals/internals to internals/externals of the organisations (Mintzberg, 1973). This includes factual or interpreted information (*ibid*.). In regard to the prison services, this activity is analysed in terms of the extent to which governors are required to disseminate information about local suicide and violence control in their establishments to external officials or bodies, and information about national suicide and violence policy to subordinate staff members in their local establishments. The third activity, *spokesperson*, refers to how executives communicate information about their organisations to outsiders, such as plans, policies, actions, and results. They represent the organizations as a first expert on the industries in which their organizations are involved (*ibid.*). In the case of prison governors, this activity should be considered in terms of the extent to which they are in charge of conveying information about suicide and violence control in their local establishments to outsiders.

Sub-code 5: decisional roles
The final type of roles played by leaders can be labelled as *decisional*. According to Mintzberg (1973), there are four kinds of decisional role: 1. *entrepreneur*; 2. *disturbance handler*; 3. *resource allocator*; and 4. *negotiator*. Further to sub-codes 3 and 4 concerning the leadership roles of governors (Y2), this sub-code measures the

number of decisional roles assigned to governors by prison risk control structures. The more decisional roles governors are assigned, the higher the grid level will be for the stated risk control structure.

Firstly, *entrepreneur* involves searching within organizations and in their environments for opportunities to set in motion *"improvement projects"* which can bring about positive changes: (Mintzberg, 1973; and Finkelstein *etal,* 2009). Accordingly, this study measures whether governors are in charge of this activity in relation to local suicide and violence control strategies. Secondly, *disturbance handler* involves taking responsibility for corrective actions when organizations are faced with important or unexpected disturbances (*ibid.*). For prison governors, this activity becomes necessary when acts of suicide or violence occur in their areas of responsibility. This activity also relates to the role of accepting blame which was discussed in chapter 2. Thus, the extent to which governors are in charge of handling disturbances and accepting blame thereof should be analysed according to this sub-code.

Thirdly, *resource allocator* is the activity whereby leaders assume responsibility for directly allocating, or granting approval for the allocation of, organizational resources (*ibid.*). This activity is analysed here in terms of whether governors have the authority to allocate or approve the allocation of resources to suicide and violence risk control strategies at a local level. This activity is considered not only as regards goods or budgets, but also human resources within local establishments. Fourthly, *negotiator* is the activity whereby leaders represent their organizations on major occasions such as negotiating with externals. Regarding this activity, "internals" and "externals" are defined in the same ways as they are for the informational role (see p. 97 above). This category takes account of whether governors are assigned the role of representing their local establishments in major negotiations with external bodies, including area offices, other local establishments, and national HQs.

### 3.2.4 Leadership: Group2: Autonomy in local risk control strategies (X2)

The second category code for the group dimension is the autonomy of local establishments in terms of local suicide and violence control strategies. It was explained in the previous section that this aspect measures the autonomy of local establishments as a part of leadership in the prison services.

As chapter 2 discussed, autonomy analyses the extent to which local establishments have the freedom to modify risk control behaviour in response to the roles assigned to their staff members. Since my method focuses on the roles played by

governors, for the purposes of this study autonomy relates to the discretion of governors in local suicide and violence control strategies. As I discussed in chapter 2 (see Sec. 2.3.3), autonomy is measured here in terms of the diversity of members' risk control behaviour in the area where they perform assigned roles. Accordingly, in the case of governors, it is measured by the degree of variation of local risk control strategic process in local establishments where governors exercise their leadership roles discussed in roles of governors (Y2; see Sec. 3.2.4 above).

If local establishments as subordinate units of the national prison service showed large diversity in the process of local suicide and violence control strategies, it indicates lower group unity for the national prison service. Five sub-codes have been set for measuring autonomy (X2): 1. the proportion of governors who are promoted from outside of the prison service; 2. the participation of external performance assessment bodies; 3. the existence and influence of prison officers' trade unions; 4. internal performance competition and main performance assessment indicators; and 5. key strategies for risk control and their diversity between local establishments.

Sub-code 1: the proportion of governors who are promoted from outside of the prison service

The first sub-code for autonomy concerns membership in local establishments. It was mentioned in chapter 2 that Gross and Rayner have drawn attention to the relationship between the openness of group members and group unity (Gross and Rayner 1985). For example, their concept of *impermeability* (Gross and Rayner, 1985; see Sec. 2.2.1) indicates that organizations that are closed to outside participation tend to exhibit high group characteristics.

In regard to the relationship between local strategies and the recruitment of governors, James *et al* (2010) have noted that the previous managerial experiences of executives are coloured by whether they have been promoted from the inside or outside of organizations. This factor, in turn, affects their managerial strategies and performance. Therefore, this sub-code analyses, first, whether the prison services in question recruit governors from outside of themselves and, second, the influence of the balance between insider and outsider governors on the diversity of local risk control strategies. If a prison service accepts more outsider governors, it is considered to be more strategically diverse which in turn indicates lower group unity within it.

Sub-code 2: the participation of external performance assessment bodies

The second sub-code for autonomy concerns the participation of external performance assessment bodies in monitoring local establishments as part of the national prison service suicide and violence performance control structure. Hood (1998) considered this performance assessment as to be a type of oversight, in regard to which he has also mentioned the impact of insider and outsider differentiation on the group dimension. Hood took the view that if organizational performance is assessed by an external body, this indicates a lower group level (*ibid.*). Following this idea, the current sub-code measures whether the prison services in question accept having the performance of local establishments on violence and suicide control assessed by external bodies. If more external bodies get involved in the control of specific risks, the diversity of group members concerned with those risks will increase and the group unity will decrease. Accordingly, this sub-code considers the variety of risk performance controllers as a factor influencing local risk control strategies in the prison services.

Sub-code 3: the existence and influence of trade unions

The third sub-code analyses the existence and influence of trade unions. Pugh (1973) has highlighted the influence of trade unions as an example of *interdependence* which determines the structure of organizations (see p.78). Discussions of the influence of trade unions in the context of prisons vary widely in relation to several aspects of prison service control structures.   The present sub-code focuses on whether prison staff trade unions exist in the relevant prison services, and to what extent they can influence local suicide and violence control strategies as part of the autonomy (X2) of local establishments. If trade unions exist, and if they affect local and national suicide and violence control strategies through actions such as striking or criticising weak performance, these factors indicate low group unity within the prison service. Furthermore, if the approaches taken by governors to trade unions vary among local establishments, this reflects a greater degree of diversity between local risk control strategies and thus indicates lower group unity within the prison service.

Sub-code 4: internal performance competition between local establishments and assessments and main performance assessment indicators

The fourth sub-code analyses internal performance competition between local establishments and the indicators used to measure performance. Hood (1998) originally explained that the performance control based on competition is taken account of

individualism which relate to both low grid and low group (Hood 1998). Surely, competition generally occurs in the circumstance where fewer rules exist.

However, if I focus on the impact of internal performance competition in the prison risk control structure, the use of competition rather affects for the diversity of local establishments risk control behaviour in the national prison risk control structures. For example, if local prison establishments compete against each other in terms of their local risk control performances, they are and thereby emphasized differences according to their levels of performances; such as "good", "bad" and "ok" prisons. Accordingly, the diversity of local establishments is increased by the internal performance competition, and the group unity of the national prison service gets decreased. Emphasizing this impact of competition on the prison service risk control structure, my method used here analyses internal performance competition as a group predicate.

According to Hood (1998), forms of competition can mainly be categorised in two ways: 1. orthodox market competition; and 2. quasi-market limited competition inside organizations. In the case of suicide and violence control in prison services, attention should fall on the latter of these categories. Internal performance competition means competition between local establishments within a particular prison service. How far the relevant prison services use this kind of competition is analysed by this sub-code. Firstly, in order to measure the diversity of the prison services in terms of suicide and violence control, this study analyses whether they use performance competition between local establishments. As I explained above, this kind of competition emphasize differences between local establishments. Hence if the national prison service use internal performance competition between local establishments as part of suicide and violence control, the group level of the national prison service is lower than the prison service where does not use any internal performance competition.

Secondly, if the prison services use internal competition between local establishments, the indicators they use to measure performance, especially in regard to suicide and violence control, need to be taken into account in the group level. My method defines two types of these performance indicators: process oriented and outcome oriented. If the indicators assess the appropriateness of local suicide and violence risk control processes, this suggests that those processes are unified under the direction of the national prison service. These indicators are intended to standardise risk control behaviour and thus to limit the autonomy of governors in regard to local strategies. This kind of arrangement indicates higher group unity for the prison service. By contrast, if the indicators only assess the achievements or outcomes of local risk

control strategies, this shows that the prison service grants greater freedom to local establishments to design their own strategies for achieving targeted outcomes. Local establishments are thereby allowed to take a wider variety of actions in order to achieve better outcomes, and thus their autonomy is increased. This kind of situation indicates lower group unity for the prison service.

Sub-code 5: diversity of key local strategies

The final sub-code for autonomy concerns diversity among key local risk control strategies. Whereas the other sub-codes focus on factors of the control structures which increase the autonomy and discretion of local strategies, this sub-code analyses the extent to which local strategies vary between prisons in reality. More specifically, it analyses two particular things: whether any key strategies are held in common for controlling suicide and violence in local establishments, and how differently they are operated in local establishments.

## 3.3: Scoring and calculation of total risk control scores

My method examines the four category codes and the 20 sub-codes discussed above by assigning numerical scores to them. Concerning the general rules of the scoring process, firstly, scores are given on the ordinal scale based on the attributes of the g/g dimensions. The construction of ranking orders for these scores is discussed in this section in regard to four aspects of risk and the sub-codes (see Sec. 3.2). Secondly, these scores are given on the ordinal scales. Unlike interval and ratio scales, measurement theory did not discussed the necessity of defining zero in the ordinal scales. However, I would like to define the score of 0 as the lowest possible grid and group points for each sub-code.

The g/g ranking orders and scores are assigned in relation to these hypothetical situations which indicate that no rules and no group pressures exist in prison service risk control. Hence all scores for the g/g aspects and sub-codes are assigned above 0. Based on these two general rules, the next section outlines how risk control system scores consisted of formalization (Y1) scores and compliance (X1) scores are assigned in my method. Meanwhile, leadership scores based on the roles of governors (Y2) scores and autonomy(X2) scores are discussed in the later section.

### 3.3.1: Risk control system scores: Formalization (Y1) and Compliance (X1) scores

*Formalization score (Y1)*

It was noted in chapter 2 that the grid scale is associated with the number and formality of rules (see Sec. 2.3.1: pp.74-75). Firstly, if more rules, which define topics discussed in the sub-codes for formalization, are found in the prison service, a higher grid score is assigned to it.

Secondly, as discussed in chapter 2, the formality is measured according to how easily members are able to change rules through legal procedures within their organizations. This factor is measured here in reference to the legal structures of the English and Japanese prison services. It is of fundamental importance that everybody inside prisons, including staff members and visitors, are entitled to the protection of the law (Coyle 2005). For example, if the prisoner kills other prisoners in prisons, the Criminal Law is applied to this murder case. Nevertheless, the aspect of formalization specifically focuses on the rules defined for prison services in this study. As with other public service organizations, prison services are normally subject to chief pieces of parliamentary legislation. For example, HMPS is committed to following The Human Rights Act 1998 and The Prison Act 1952 (Payne, 2008), while the Japanese prison service is committed to following the Act of the Penal Institutions and the Treatment of Sentenced Inmates [*Keijishisetu oyobi Hishyuyosha no Shogu nikansuru Horitsu*: 刑事施設及び被収容者の処遇に関する法律].

In order to define the day to day administration of prisons under the authority of major pieces of legislation, statutory instruments are issued by the relevant parental ministries (*e.g.* Ministry of Justice) because the parliamentary legislation only gives general overviews of prisons (Louks, 2008). For HMPS, these statutory instruments correspond to *The Prison Rules 1999* and *Young Offender Institutions (YOI) Rules* (ibid.). Meanwhile, for the Japanese prison service the relevant statutory instruments are The Rules of the Penal Institutions and the Treatment of Sentenced Inmates [*Keijishisetu oyobi Hishyuyosha no Shogu nikansuru Kisoku*: 刑事施設及び被収容者の処遇に関する規則] and The Rules of Organizational structures in Prisons, Juvenile Prisons and Remand Centre [*Keimusho, shonen keimusho oyobi Kouchisho Soshiki Kisoku*: 刑務所、少年刑務所及び拘置所組織規則].

These statutory instruments are followed by further detailed operational codes called prison service ordinances which are long-term or permanent directives concerning the day-to-day operation of prisons (Louks, 2008). In HMPS these

ordinances are called Prison Service Orders (PSOs). Additionally, although The National Security Framework informs governors of how they should interpret the prison rules, it is not generally available to the public (ibid.). The ordinances are called *kunrei* [訓令] in the Japanese prison service. Furthermore, in both cases ordinances are supplemented by short-term directives called instructions: specifically, Prison Service Instruction (PSIs) or Agency Instruction (AIs) for HMPS (Louks, 2008: HMPS 2011a) and *tsutatsu* [通達], *imei-tsutatu* [依命通達], or *tsuchi* [通知] for the Japanese prison service.

In order to determine the formality of these rules in prisons based on these penal legal structures, it is necessary to consider their legal status and how easily they can be changed. Firstly, as regards the relationship between the parliamentary legislation and statutory codes, the chief legislation is considered more formal than the statutory codes. Whereas the parliamentary legislation needs to be passed through the legislature, the statutory codes are issued by the relevant ministry (Louks, 2008). Moreover, it is harder for members of the prison service to change the primary legislation than it is for them to change the statutory codes. Therefore, parliamentary legislation should be understood as setting the most formal rules for prison services.

Secondly, among the statutory codes, the prison rules should be considered the second most formal. These rules define the general procedures of prison operation, and provide specific guidelines about subordinate rules. Ordinances can be less formal than prison rules but more formal than instructions and other lower regulatory codes. This is because ordinances are defined as long-term operational guidelines and instructions whereas other forms of advice are considered to be more short-term. Therefore, the former should be understood to be less flexible for members of the prison service to change than the latter.

In addition to statutory codes, the prison services publish guidebooks for prisoners and staff. These guidebooks are less formal than the statutory codes because legal procedures are generally not required to change their content. In HMPS, pocket guides on approaches to suicide control (HMPS 2011b) or prisoners' information books (HMPS 2011c) can be categorised as this type of document. They are edited by central HQs and issued to local establishments. In this way, other nationally edited non-legal documents which provide guidelines on risk control are ranked lower in terms of formality than statutory codes.

Furthermore, written rules which are defined by local establishments should be considered parts of the overall rule structure of the prison services. The Japanese prison service has prepared guidebooks and rulebooks for prisoners at different local establishments. The contents of these books are similar throughout the Japanese prison service. However, they are still edited locally within different establishments. (Fuchu Prison, 2006). In comparison with the HMPS guidebooks, the Japanese prison guidebooks are less formal because they are edited and distributed locally. By contrast, the HMPS guidebooks are edited national HQ standards. In this situation, the rules maintained by HMPS are less flexible than those of the Japanese prison service. Local establishments can edit the contents of their guidebooks without taking any formal legal procedures (JMOJ, 2003).

Finally, unwritten informal rules and beliefs should be taken into account when considering the overall formality of rule structures. Sometimes informal rules can strongly affect the behaviour of staff members. For example, a majority of Japanese prison officers share some informal maxims: "no fire, no escape, non-natural causes of death in custody" [*yakuna-nigasuna-korosuna*] (Hamai, 2006) or "five minutes before spirit" [*go fun mae seishin*].[3] Informal maxims such as these considerably affect patterns of risk control behaviour among Japanese prison staff hence it is worth examining them in this study. Legal procedures are not required to change these maxims or other informal rules. If enough staff members in the prison service agree to change them, they are easily changed. Therefore, they are ranked as the least formal rules on the grid level. The formality of prison rules is ranked as stated in the above discussion, a summary of which is shown on Table 3.3:

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[3] Original interview data.

Table 3.3: Formality of prison service regulations

| Formality | Penal legal sources | England | Japan |
|---|---|---|---|
| High | **Parliamentary Legislation** | Human Right Act 1998 Prison Act 1952 | The Act of Penal Institutions and the Treatment of Sentenced Inmates ( 2006-) |
| | **(Statutory Instruments)** **Secondary Legislation** | Prison Rules YOI rules | The Rules of Penal Institutions and the treatment of Sentenced Inmates (2006-) The Rules of Organizational Structures in Prison, Juvenile Prison and Remand Centre. |
| | **Ordinance** | Prison Service Orders | Ministerial Ordinance (Kunrei) |
| | **Instruction** | Prison Service Instructions (PSIs) Agency Instructions ( AIs) | Ministerial Instructions: *Tsutatsu, Imei-tsutatsu, and Tsuchi* |
| | **Written Advice and Manuals** | Prison performance Manuals (nationally edited )Prisoner's Information book | Ministerial Advice |
| | **Local written rules and manu** | rules set by local establishments | rules set by local establishments (e.g. local prisoners 'guidebook and rule book) |
| | **Informal unwritten rules: rituals, habits** | Informal unwritten belief or guidelines shared among prison staff members Local informal manuals | |
| lowest | **Rules do NOT define relevant subjects of the risk control** | No rules exist in terms of the subject | |

The formalization scores follow the structure of prison legal sources. The highest formality rank is represented by the highest grid level and vice versa for the lowest formality rank. Subordinate laws are plotted along this scale depending on their level of formality. The scores for formalization respond positively to this grid rank. If a rule exists at any level of prison regulations which relates to the formalization sub-codes, as discussed above (see Sec. 3.2.1), the formalization (Y1) score given for that rule will correspond to the formality rank (see Table 3.3). Detailed texts and legal expressions relating to any such rules (*e.g.* legal terms used to describe enforcement) are not considered in these measurements. If there are no rules which define subjects of those sub-codes for controlling risk, the score given will be zero (0). Informal rules and customs are given the lowest score (+1) since formality means flexibility for changing rules based on the formal institutional process. By contrast, parliamentary legislation is assigned the highest grid level and scores (+7) according to the formality rakings of

penal regulation (see Table 3.3 and Appendix 1). In the scoring process, if different levels of rules define the same things, the highest ranking scores among them will be selected. Scores are given in response to each code based on these scoring criteria. Appendix 1 provides a summary of the grid scores for formalization (Y1) (see Appendix 1).

*Compliance Score (X1)*

The scoring of the compliance level (X1), as the group aspect of risk control system scores, reflects diversity among local establishments in implementing the suicide and violence regulations analysed by the formalization (Y1) code (see Sec. 2.3.3). If most local establishments implement these regulations appropriately, this indicates a high group level for the national prison service.

Due to the limited access I was able to gain to prison establishments for this study, it is difficult here to accurately analyse the compliance levels of all local establishments in the English and Japanese prison services. Therefore, the compliance level is analysed here in terms of whether there is reliable evidence available in both countries, which suggest the relevant risk control regulations are inappropriately operated across local establishments. Specifically, in cases where the national prison service officially insists that local establishments generally comply with the relevant rules, it is necessary to make certain assumptions. Thus, if no reliable data is available indicating that local establishments implement rules inappropriately, it is assumed that majority of local establishments appropriately comply with those rules as claimed by the national prison services. .

The first sub-code, "discipline and order", is scored by the extent to which risk control regulations restrict the individual behaviour of prisoners in local establishments. As the previous section explained, discipline and order are defined as maintaining group stability in prisons. There are four basic types of scenario which reflect the influence of discipline and order on local risk control operational process as they have just been defined.: 1. acceptable individual behaviour among prisoners is generally minimised in order to maintain group stability within prisons; 2. acceptable individual behaviour among prisoners is constrained in order to maintain group stability, but restrictions are imposed on a case-by-case basis; 3. acceptable individual behaviour among prisoners is maximised and group stability is minimised; 4. there is no sense of group stability within the prison and there are no restrictions on prisoners' behaviour with regard to group stability.

Among those 4 types of situations, the fourth of these types can be given the lowest compliance and group rank and scored 0 because it reflects a total lack ("zero") of discipline and order as defined here. The diversity of prisoners' behaviour is maximised in this situation which indicates the lowest compliance and group level. Meanwhile, type 3 can be given the second lowest compliance and group level and assigned a score of +1. Type 2 can be ranked as the second highest compliance and group level and assigned a score of +2. Finally, type 1 can be given the highest compliance and group rank and assigned a score of +3 (see Appendix 2).

The second sub-code, "ways of identifying risk", takes account of whether hazardous behaviour is identified in local establishments using the rule which define risk. In this regard, I define four basic types of situation which reflect different compliance levels: 1. ways of identifying risk are uniformly standardised among all local establishments; 2. ways of identifying risk are commonly shared among a majority of local establishments; 3. ways of identifying risk vary widely among local establishments; and 4. ways of identifying risk do not exist at all in local establishments. Group ranking scores are assigned to these four basic types of compliance level.

Firstly, type 4 can be given the lowest compliance level and group ranks for the prison service and group level, and assigned a score of zero because it reflects a total lack of means for identifying risk. Alternatively, it can be stated that if definitions of risk do not exist, it is not possible to measure the compliance level. Type 3 can be given the second lowest compliance and group level and assigned a score of +1. Type 2 is ranked as the second highest compliance and group level and assigned a score of +2. Finally, although it can rarely happen in reality, type 1 is ranked as the highest compliance and group level and assigned a score of +3 (see Appendix 2).

The third sub-code, "punishment and reward", is ranked and scored by the extent to which local establishments use punishment and reward to control the risks of suicide and violence. If a high proportion of local establishments use these control mechanisms appropriately, a higher compliance score is given to the total prison service institution. Punishment and reward are scored separately using the same standard units of ranking and scoring. The final sub-code score is produced by adding up the results gained for each factor. Four basic types of situation are possible in regard to if and how punishment and reward are used by prison services: 1. all local establishments use punishment (reward) appropriately; 2. a majority of local establishments use punishment (reward) appropriately; 3. the appropriateness of how punishment (reward) are used in local establishments varies widely; and 4. punishment (reward) are not used

for controlling risk, and the sub-code is not applicable, or all local establishments inappropriately conduct punishment (reward). Group ranking scores for punishment and reward are assigned in relation to these four types of compliance level.

Firstly, type 4 represents the lowest compliance and group rank, and is assigned a score of 0 because punishment and reward are not used appropriately in any local establishments. Alternatively, if punishment and reward are not used at all to control risk in local establishments, it is not possible to measure the compliance level. Type 3 is the second lowest compliance and group level for punishment and reward, and is assigned a score of +1. Type 2 is ranked as the second highest compliance and group level, and assigned a score of +2. Lastly, type 1 is the highest compliance and group level, and is assigned a score of +3. The scores for this sub-code are produced through the addition of the group scores assigned by punishment and reward based on four types of compliance situations in local establishments discussed above. Hence a maximum score of 6 and a minimum score of 0 are possible for this sub-code (see Appendix 2).

The fourth sub-code, "implementation level of key national guidelines", is ranked and scored by the extent to which local establishments implement key national guidelines adequately. If a high proportion of local establishments do implement these guidelines adequately, high ranks and scores for the compliance code and group dimension are assigned to the relevant prison service. Five types of situation are defined here concerning the implementation level of local establishments and the understanding of their members: 1. all local establishments fully implement key national guidelines; 2. a majority of local establishments fully implement key national guidelines; 3. a majority of local establishments implement key national guidelines, but the quality varies between them; 4. the implementation and quality of key national guidelines varies widely among local establishments; and 5. no local establishments implement key national guidelines.

Of these types of situation, type 5 can be given the lowest compliance rank and assigned a score of 0, because in this situation key national guidelines do not affect any local establishments. Next, type 4 can be given the second lowest compliance rank and assigned a score of +1. Type 3 is ranked as the second highest compliance level and assigned a score of +2. Type 2 is given the third highest compliance rank and assigned a score of +3. Finally, type 1 can be considered the highest compliance level and assigned a score of +4 (see Appendix 2).

The fifth sub-code, "accountability of information recording and documentation", is scored and ranked according to the extent to which information

about suicide and violence risk control is recorded and documented by the prison services in question. If a high proportion of local establishments keep accountable records and documentation about suicide and violence, high group ranks and scores are assigned to the relevant prison service. The compliance level is divided into four situations: 1. all local establishments keep accountable records and documentation about risk; 2. accountable records and documentation about risk are kept by a majority of local establishments; 3. the quality of accountable records and documentation about risk varies widely among local establishments; and 4. no local establishments keep records and documentation about risk.

Among these types of situation, type 4 can be given the lowest compliance rank and assigned a score of 0. Type 3 can be given the second lowest compliance rank and assigned a score of +1. Type 2 is ranked as the second highest compliance level, and assigned a score of +2. Finally, type 1 has the highest compliance rank, and is assigned a score of +3. The compliance level (X1) is ranked and scored in the ways discussed above. Appendix 2 provides a summary of compliance ranks and group scores for the prison services (see Appendix 2).

### 3.3.2: Leadership of governors: Scores for the roles of governors (Y2) and autonomy (X2)

The second set of g/g codes analyse the leadership of governors in the national prison service risk control structures. Scores for the grid codes, roles of governors (Y2) and group as autonomy (X2) in local risk control strategies, are assigned as follows.

*Roles of governors (Y2)*

The second grid aspect concerns the roles of governors. As I discussed in chapter 2, this grid level reflects specialization in the roles played by governors, and is measured in terms of the number of roles assigned to individual staff members, and the formality/flexibility of assigned roles measured by the flexibility of those roles in relation to the selection process and tasks assigned to those roles (see Sec. 2.3.1: p. 75).

The scores for the first sub-code reflect the extent to which staff members are assigned special roles as part of suicide and violence control measures in local establishments. Concerning specialization among staff members in local establishments, three basic types of situation are defined here: 1. the prison service allocates special roles or entitlements to prison staff for controlling the risks of suicide and violence in local establishments; 2. the prison service does not generally allocate specialized roles

to staff members for controlling the risks of suicide and violence; however, they are assigned specific roles for more general purposes; and 3. the prison service does not allocate any positions or entitlements for prison staff. Grid ranking scores are assigned in relation to these three types of situation. First, type 3 indicates situations in which there are no rules concerning the roles of prison staff hence it is assigned a score of 0. Next, type 2 is assigned a score of +1 because it suggests a higher specialization level than is the case for type 3. Lastly, type 1 is plotted as the highest grid rank and assigned a score of +2 (see Appendix 3).

The second sub-code concerns how flexible the criteria for appointing governors are. Three basic types of situation linked to two basic types of promotion situations are raised here: 1. governors are mainly appointed according to ascription-based criteria (e.g. length of service, gender, or age); 2. governors are appointed in light of their achievements (i.e. their performance as prison staff) as well as ascription-based criteria; and 3. governors are mainly appointed in light of their achievements. Finally there is a fourth possible situation which is that none of these criteria apply.

In terms of grid ranking and scores, ascription-based criteria should be understood as the least flexible conditions for the appointment of candidates because they only reflect who people are as opposed to what they have done. Accordingly, ascription-based criteria are assigned the highest grid level. By contrast, achievement-based appointment systems are more flexible because they select candidates in light of what they have done. Therefore, these criteria are assigned the lowest grid level. The grid scores for specialization are assigned in relation to these four types of situation. Type 4 is assigned the lowest grid level for the reason that it marks a total absence of the promotion criteria raised above, and is thus given a score of 0. Type 3 has the second lowest grid level because it reflects a high degree of flexibility in the promotion of group members, and is given a score of +1. Type 2 is assigned the second highest grid level and a score of +2. Finally, type 1 is assigned the highest grid level and given a score of +3 (see Appendix 3).

The third sub-code concerning the *interpersonal* roles is ranked and scored according to how many roles governors are required to be played for local suicide and violence control strategies in regard to three types of interpersonal roles defined by Mintzberg (see Sec. 3.2.3). Representing those interpersonal roles are drawn upon here to define five basic types of situation involving governors and informational roles: 1. governors are required to be in charge of all three roles; 2. governors are required to be

in charge of two of these roles; 3. governors are required to be in charge of one of these roles; 4. governors are required to be in charge of some of these roles, but those roles are very weak; and 5. governors are not in charge of any of these roles. Scores are assigned in response to these situations. Firstly, type 5 is considered to have the lowest grid level since in this case prison services do not require governors to take part in any of the relevant activities. Thus, it is assigned a score of 0. Next, type 4 is ranked as the second lowest grid level and assigned a score of +1. Type 3 is ranked as the third lowest grid level and assigned a score of +2. Type 2 is ranked as the second highest grid level and assigned a score of +3. Lastly, type 1 is ranked as the highest grid level and assigned a score of +4 because governors are required to take part in all three activities (see Appendix 3).

The fourth sub-code concerning the *informational* roles of governors is also ranked and scored on the grid level in the same way as the third sub-code. If governors are not required to be in charge of any of the three roles defined as the informational roles (see pp.97-98), the prison service is assigned a score of 0. If governors are required to be in charge of some of these roles, but they play those roles very weakly the prison service is assigned a score of +1. If governors are in charge of one activity out of the three, the prison service is assigned a score of +2 score. If governors are in charge of two of these activities, the prison service is assigned a score of +3. Finally, if governors are required to be responsible for all three activities representing the informational role, the prison service is ranked at the highest grid level and assigned a score of +4.

Finally, the fifth code, concerning the *decisional* role played by governors, is also scored according to the number of roles defined by Mintzberg (1973). Mintzberg (1973) has defined four types of *decisional* roles of leaders (see p.99 of this chapter). Thus, if governors are assigned all four of these activities, the prison service is ranked as the highest grid level and assigned a score of +5. If governors are required to be responsible for three of these activities, the prison service is ranked as the second highest grid level and assigned a score of +4. If governors are in charge of two of these activities, the prison service is assigned a score of +3. If they are in charge of only one of these activities, the prison service is assigned a score of +2. If governors are required to take charge of some of decisional roles but they play these very weakly. The prison service is assigned a score of +1. Lastly, if governors are not responsible for any of these activities, a score of 0 is given to the prison service. In summary, the grid score table for the roles of governors is shown in Appendix 3.

*Autonomy and discretion score (X2)*

The final aspect of the prison risk control structure concerns the autonomy of local establishments in the prison service. As with compliance, the key scale of this code is the diversity level of organizational behaviour within local establishments in regard to each sub-code. A greater degree of diversity is considered here to reflect a higher degree of autonomy within local establishments and to indicate a lower group ranks and scores for the total prison service institution.

The first sub-code responds to the proportion of governors who were recruited from inside and outside of the prison service institution. If a higher proportion of governors are appointed from the outside, there is an increase in the diversity of members while the group unity of the total prison service institution decreases. There are three basic types of situation in this regard: 1. all governors are insiders and the prison service does not promote any governors from outside of itself; 2. governorships are open to outsiders, but a majority of governors are insiders; 3. governorships are open to outsiders and the proportion of insider and outsider governors is approximately equal; 4. a majority of governors are outsiders; and 5. all governors are promoted from outside of the prison service. In regard to providing group scores and ranks for these types, type 5 should be given the lowest group rank and assigned a score of 0 for the prison service. In this situation, only outsiders are appointed to governorships and the diversity of members is maximised while the group unity of the prison service institution is minimized. Meanwhile, type 4 is ranked as the second lowest group level and assigned a score of +1. Type 3 is ranked as the third highest group level and assigned a score of +2. Type 2 is ranked as the second highest group level and assigned a score of +3. Lastly, type 1 is given the highest group level and assigned a score of +4 (see Appendix 4).

The second sub-code, "participation of external performance assessment bodies", is also ranked and scored by the openness of the prison service to external performance assessment bodies. The more prison services allow external performance assessment bodies to check the strategies and performance of local establishments, the lower the group level for the national prison service will be. This sub-code analyses the existence of external performance assessment bodies, and also the number of major assessment bodies and how much influence they have over the risk control strategies of local establishments.

There are five basic types of situation relevant to this sub-code: 1. external participation is closed and external performance assessment bodies do not exist; 2. There are a few external performance assessment bodies but they lack influence over

local risk control strategies and performance; 3. there are multiple external performance assessment bodies, some of those have substantial influences over local performance and risk control strategies; 4. there is a large number of external performance assessment bodies which are highly influential for local performance and risk control strategies; 5. anybody from outside the prison service can participate in assessments of local performance and all of their activities are highly influential for prisons.

Of these situations, type 5 should be identified as having the lowest group rank and assigned a score of 0. If any external body can participate in assessments of the performance of local establishments, the diversity of members involved in local suicide and violence control strategies is maximised while the control of the central HQ is diminished. Next, type 4 is ranked as the second lowest group level and assigned a score of +1. Type 3 is ranked as the third highest group level and assigned a score of +2. Type 2 is ranked as the second highest group level and assigned a score of +3. Type 1 is ranked as the highest group level and assigned a score of +4 (see Appendix 4).

The third sub-code, "the existence and influence of trade unions", is ranked and scored according to whether prison staff trade unions exist and how influential they are. Five basic types of situation are relevant to this sub-code: 1. trade unions do not exist at all; 2. trade unions exist but their activities do not hold much influence over local performance and risk control strategies; 3. trade unions exist and their activities influence the performance and operation of risk control strategies in some local establishments; 4. trade unions exist and their activities are highly influential over the performance and operation of a majority of local establishments; and 5. trade unions exist and have total control over the operation and performance of local establishments.

Among these types of situation, type 5 is ranked as the lowest group level and a score of 0 is assigned for the prison service. The reason for this is that if all local establishments are run according to the interests and activities of trade unions, the group unity of local establishments and the prison service is minimised. Following this, type 4 is ranked as the second lowest group level and assigned a score of +1. Type 3 is ranked as the third lowest group level and assigned a score of +2. Finally, type 2 is ranked the second highest group level and scored +3 points and type 1 is given the highest group level and scored +4 points (see Appendix 4).

The fourth sub-code, "performance competition and main indicators", is ranked and scored in relation to four basic types of situations: 1. internal performance competition does not exist; 2. internal performance competition exists, but performance is measured by *process-oriented* indicators; 3. internal performance competition exists

and local performance is measured by *outcome-oriented* indicators; and 4. pure market competition exists in the prison service. Among these circumstances, type 4 is ranked as the lowest group level. This is because if the prison service is open to pure market competition, the diversity of local establishments is maximised depending on their performance and the group unity for the total prison service institution is minimized. Meanwhile, between the other three types of internal competition, type 3 is ranked as the second lowest group level and assigned a score of +1. Type 2 is ranked as the second highest group level and assigned a score of +2. Finally, if there is no competition, local establishments do not show any differentiation hence type 1 is ranked as the highest group level and assigned a score of +3 (see Appendix 4).

The fifth sub-code, "diversity of key local strategies", is scored and ranked in regard to the following five basic types of situation which reflect either diversity or uniformity between key approaches and strategies to controlling specific risks: 1. key local strategies to risk control are identical between all local establishments; 2. there are common key strategies for controlling the risks which are followed by a majority of local establishments; 3. there are common key strategies, but approaches in those strategies vary by local establishments; 4. common key strategies towards the control of specific risks do not exist, strategies widely vary by local establishments; and 5. risk control strategies cannot be observed at either local or national levels.

Among these situations, type 5 is considered to represent the lowest group level and is assigned a score of 0. The reason for this scoring is that strategies for controlling suicide or violence vary between individual prison staff, in which case the diversity of risk control strategies is maximised and the group unity for the total prison service institution is minimised. Next, type 4 is ranked as the second lowest group level and assigned a score of +1. Type 3 is ranked as the third highest group level and assigned a score of +2. Type 2 is ranked as the second highest group level and assigned a score of +3. Last of all, type 1 is ranked as the highest group level and assigned a score of +4 (see Appendix 4).

### 3.4: Total category and institutional risk control scores: demonstrating the outcomes

It is now necessary to discuss how the outcomes of the coding and scoring processes for the sub-codes discussed above can be demonstrated. Scores are assigned to each sub-code according to the ranking orders by types of situations in each sub-code discussed in the previous section (see Sec. 3.3; and Appendix 1-4.). According to the measurement theory, the addition of scores based on ranking orders does not show exact statistical meaning for analysing results because the units of distance between scales of scores are not equal (Hoover and Donovan, 2004; also see Sec.1.2.2) .

The key strength of the g/g theory is that it provides a coherent visual image of all cultural types on the g/g map. Therefore, bearing in mind the limitations of ordinal measurement scales and the need for effective ways of demonstrating results, three ways of displaying results are now considered: 1. instead of adding up the scores for each sub-code, the results of all scores assigned to all sub-codes are displayed by the different kinds of institutional risk in each country; 2. Those risk control scores are standardized and the results are displayed on a radar chart; and 3. scores are added up and standardized in terms of different aspects of risk control and g/g dimensions with the assumption that the units of distances between scales are equal across all sub-codes. The results are then displayed as they relate to the English and Japanese prison services on the g/g map.

### 3.4.1: Demonstration technique 1: the table representing all scores for sub-codes

Instead of adding up the scores for each sub-code, the first demonstration technique involves simply displaying all outcomes of g/g scores by 20 sub-codes on one table. This table has four columns which display results for the suicide and violence control structures in the English and Japanese prison services, and twenty rows which display 20 sub-codes assigned by this study.

Demonstration technique 1: simple display of outcomes by a table

*Xnia= group scores for sub-codes*

*Ynia= grid scores for sub-codes.*

*x=group, y=grid, n=code.no., i=country, a= type of risk*

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Table 3.4: Grid-group scores for the English and Japanese prison services

| Grid/group | Aspects | No. | Sub-codes. | Suicide | | Violence | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | England | Japan | England | Japan |
| Grid.1 | Formalization | y1 | Order | y1es | y1js | y1ev | y1jv |
| | | y2 | Definition of Risk | y2es | y2js | y2ev | y2jv |
| | | y3 | punishment and reward | y3es | y3js | y3ev | y3jv |
| | | y4 | Key national guidelines | y4es | y4js | y4ev | y4jv |
| | | y5 | Information record and documentation system | y5es | y5js | y5ev | y5jv |
| Group.1 | Compliance | x1 | Order | x1es | x1js | x1ev | x1jv |
| | | x2 | Definition of Risk | x2es | x2js | x2ev | x2jv |
| | | x3 | Punishment and Reward | x3es | x3js | x3ev | x3jv |
| | | x4 | Implementation of national guidelines | x4es | x4js | x4ev | x4jv |
| | | x5 | Accountability of risk related information record a | x5es | x5js | x5ev | x5jv |
| Grid.2 | Roles of Governors | y6 | Specialization of staff members | y6es | y6js | y6ev | Y6jv |
| | | y7 | Selection criteria to be Governors | y7es | y7js | y7ev | y7jv |
| | | y8 | Interpersonal roles | y8es | y8js | y8ev | y8jv |
| | | y9 | Informational roles | y9es | y9js | y9ev | y9jv |
| | | y10 | Decisional roles | y10es | y10js | y10ev | y10jv |
| Group.2 | Autonomy | x6 | Proportion of outsider leaders (governors) | x6es | x6js | x6ev | x6jv |
| | | x7 | Participation of external performance bodies | x7es | x7js | x7ev | x7jv |
| | | x8 | Existence and influence of trade unions | x8es | x8js | x8ev | x8jv |
| | | x9 | performance competition and main indicators | x9es | x9js | x9ev | x9jv |
| | | x10 | Diversity of local strategies | x10es | x10js | x10ev | x10jv |

### *3.4.2: Demonstration technique 2: standardization of scores and radar charts*

The second demonstration technique involves standardizing the scores for each sub-code and placing them on radar charts. This standardization process is not considered the substantial impact of each sub-code on forming risk control culture in the prison service. As I explained that culture is contingent factors, and it is difficult to assign weights to scores in response to sub-codes, by the degree of impact on the formation of culture.

Thus, setting this issue aside, I have simply standardized the scores for each sub-code between a range of 0 and 10. Loads were calculated in terms of the proportion between the raw score range and the standardized score range (*i.e.* min. 0; max. 10). Details of loads and scores are as follows (see Table. 3.5). These standardized scores can be further demonstrated on radar charts. To illustrate, when the sub-codes are assigned g/g scores between the minimum 0 and maximum 10 values, the outcomes of this process for all 20 sub-codes can be displayed as follows (see Figure 3. 2).

Table 3.5: Standardized scores with loads for aspects and sub-codes

| Grid/group | Aspects | No. | sub-codes | Raw scores | | Standardized scores | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Min. | Max. | Max, | Loads. |
| Grid.1 | Formalization | y1 | Order | 0 | 7 | 10 | 1.43 |
| | | y2 | Definition of Risk | 0 | 7 | 10 | 1.43 |
| | | y3 | Use of punishment and reward | 0 | 14 | 10 | 0.71 |
| | | y4 | Key national guidelines | 0 | 7 | 10 | 1.43 |
| | | y5 | Information record and documentation system | 0 | 7 | 10 | 1.43 |
| Group.1 | Compliance | x1 | Order | 0 | 3 | 10 | 3.33 |
| | | x2 | Definition of Risk | 0 | 3 | 10 | 3.33 |
| | | x3 | Punishment and Reward | 0 | 6 | 10 | 1.67 |
| | | x4 | Implementation of national guidelines | 0 | 4 | 10 | 2.50 |
| | | x5 | Accountability of risk related information record | 0 | 3 | 10 | 3.33 |
| Grid.2 | Roles of Governors | y6 | Specialization of staff members | 0 | 2 | 10 | 5.00 |
| | | y7 | Selection criteria | 0 | 3 | 10 | 3.33 |
| | | y8 | Interpersonal roles | 0 | 4 | 10 | 2.50 |
| | | y9 | Informational roles | 0 | 4 | 10 | 2.50 |
| | | y10 | Decisional roles | 0 | 5 | 10 | 2.00 |
| Group.2 | Autonomy | x6 | Proportion of outsider leaders (governors) | 0 | 4 | 10 | 2.50 |
| | | x7 | Participation of external performance bodies | 0 | 5 | 10 | 2.00 |
| | | x8 | Existence and influence of trade unions | 0 | 4 | 10 | 2.50 |
| | | x9 | performance competition and main indicators | 0 | 3 | 10 | 3.33 |
| | | x10 | Diversity of local strategies | 0 | 4 | 10 | 2.50 |

Figure 3.2: Sample g/g radar chart in which values between 1 and 10 are assigned to the 20 sub-codes.



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
It is necessary to consider what the results shown by this kind of radar chart mean in relation to the g/g framework. As discussed in the previous section (see Sec. 3.3), the lowest grid and group levels are assigned scores of 0. Although the highest g/g scores vary between the different sub-codes as a result of the standardization process, the highest possible g/g level for any sub-code is indicated by a score of +10. When I transfer these scale and score ranges to the g/g map, the four corners of the map represent the highest (+10) and lowest (0) grid and group levels. Thus, the highest grid and group scores (10, 10) represent the most *hierarchist* culture possible in relation to prison service risk control. The highest grid and lowest group scores (10, 0) represent the most *fatalist* culture possible. The lowest grid and highest group scores (0, 10) represent the most *egalitarian* culture possible. Finally, the lowest group and grid scores (0, 0) represent the most individualist culture possible in terms of prison service risk control (see Fig. 3.3).

Figure 3.3: Cultural types according to the g/g scales for each sub-code



Highest grid/lowest group:
$(Xn, Yn) = (10, 0)$

highest grid/ group:
$(Xn, Yn) = (10, 10)$

Grid $(Yn)$

Fatalist        Hierarchist

Individualist        Egalitarian

$(Xn, Yn) = (0, 0)$
lowest grid/group

Group $(Xn)$

$(Xn, Yn) = (10, 0)$
Lowest grid/
highest group:

Based on these understandings of the g/g scores and cultural types, I will demonstrate the sample results using the radar chart shown above. Thus, Figure 3.4 is a radar chart showing the most hierarchist culture possible (highest g/g) within the g/g framework. Each slice of the chart is fully shaded and the balance between the g/g sub-codes is maintained. This model represents the most extreme case of the hierarchist cultural type. Likewise, if most of standardized scores results come close to the edge of the circle, this indicates a largely hierarchist culture (see Figure 3.4). The next chart

represents the most individualist culture possible (lowest g/g) within the g/g framework (Figure 3.5). It shows a situation in which the scores for every sub-code fall on the zero point. The g/g scores are spread evenly across this chart. If the results mostly come close to zero, this indicates a largely individualist culture. The chart for the most egalitarian culture (lowest grid and highest group) shows the highest scores for the group (x) variables clustered together (Figure. 3.6). Results clustered in this way indicate an egalitarian culture as regards prison service risk control. Meanwhile, the chart for the most fatalist culture (highest grid and lowest group) shows the highest scores for the grid (y) variables clustered together (Figure 3.7) in a manner diametrically opposite to that of the chart representing the most egalitarian model. Results are similar to those displayed on Figure 3.6 indicate a fatalist culture.

*Hybrid cultures involving mixtures of the four basic cultural types*

In chapter 2 I discussed how the idea of hybrid cultures can be used to help measure culture on the g/g dimensions (see Issue No. 4 in Sec. 2.2.4). The models of the four cultural types demonstrated below with radar charts provide a way of doing so. As I explained, these models can represent the four cultural types in terms of the twenty sub-codes defined in this chapter. Bearing this all in mind, hybrid cultures can thus be defined as results which display a mixture of the aforesaid models. For example, a hybrid individualist and hiearchist culture could be displayed on the radar chart as a relatively small but evenly dispersed circle. A hybrid hierarchist and egalitarian culture could be displayed as a circle skewed towards the group variables: or alternatively, a hybrid hierarchist and fatalist culture could be displayed as a circle skewed towards the grid variables. Thus, hybrid cultures are explained in this study using the radar chart.

Figure 3.4: a model of the most *hierarchist* culture



Figure 3.5: a model of the most *individualist* culture

Figure 3.6: a model of the most egalitarian culture



Figure 3.7: a model of the most fatalist culture

### 3.4.3: Demonstration technique 3: standardization, additions, and plotting the total risk control scores

Having established the standardized scores, the third demonstration technique calculates total risk control scores by adding up the scores for each sub-code based on the assumption that the units of the scales are equal. Next, the results of this method are charted on the g/g map. For the purposes of this study, my method examines three sets of results as follows: 1. risk control systems: formalization (Y1) and compliance (X1); 2. leadership of governors in risk control: roles of governors (Y2) and autonomy (X2); and 3. total g/g risk control structure scores for the English and Japanese prison services.

The first set of results concerning risk control systems relates to the codes for formalization (Y1) and compliance (X1). By adding up the standardized scores, the maximum score for each aspect code is 50 and the minimum score is 0. The risk control system scores for the English and Japanese prison services (X1, Y1) are demonstrated in terms of suicide and violence risk control. The details of the formulae used for calculating the g/g scores are as follows (see Table 3.6).

Table 3.6: Total scores for formalization (Y1) and compliance (X1)

| Grid/group | Aspects | No. | sub-codes | Raw scores | | Standardized scores | | Total Scores | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Min. | Max. | Max, | Loads. | Min. | Max. |
| Grid.1 | Formalization | y1 | Order | 0 | 7 | 10 | 1.43 | 0 | 50 |
| | | y2 | Definition of Risk | 0 | 7 | 10 | 1.43 | | |
| | | y3 | Use of punishment and reward | 0 | 14 | 10 | 0.71 | | |
| | | y4 | Key national guidelines | 0 | 7 | 10 | 1.43 | | |
| | | y5 | Information record system | 0 | 7 | 10 | 1.43 | | |
| Group.1 | Compliance | x1 | Order | 0 | 3 | 10 | 3.33 | 0 | 50 |
| | | x2 | Definition of Risk | 0 | 3 | 10 | 3.33 | | |
| | | x3 | Punishment and Reward | 0 | 6 | 10 | 1.67 | | |
| | | x4 | Implementation of national guidelines | 0 | 4 | 10 | 2.50 | | |
| | | x5 | Accountability of information record | 0 | 3 | 10 | 3.33 | | |

1. The risk control systems formulae

   1.1) Formalization scores

   *Y1ai= Formalization score for risk (a) control in the prison service (i)*

   *Y1ai= 1.43y1ai+1.43 y2ai+0.71 y3ai+1.43 y3ai+1.43 y5ai*

   *0 <Y1ai<50*

1.2) Compliance scores

*X1ai= Compliance (X1) score for risk (a) in the prison service(i)*

*X1ai=3.33 x1ai+ 3.33 x2ai+1.67 x3ai+2.50 x4ai+3.33 x5ai*

*0<X1ai<50*

The second set of results concerns the leadership of governors and consists of the codes for the roles of governors (Y2) and autonomy (X2). Once again, as a result of adding up the standardized scores, the maximum score for each aspect code is 50 and the minimum score is 0. The leadership scores for the English and Japanese prison services are demonstrated (X1, Y1) in terms of suicide and violence risk control. The details of the formulae used for calculating the g/g scores are as follows (Table 3.7).

Table 3.7: Total scores for roles of governors (Y2) and autonomy (X2) :

| Grid/group | Aspects | No. | sub-codes | Raw scores | | Standardized sc | | Total Scores | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Min. | Max. | Max, | Loads. | Min. | Max. |
| Grid.2 | Roles of Governors | y6 | Specialization of staff members | 0 | 2 | 10 | 5.00 | 0 | 50 |
| | | y7 | Selection criteria | 0 | 3 | 10 | 3.33 | | |
| | | y8 | Interpersonal roles | 0 | 4 | 10 | 2.50 | | |
| | | y9 | Informational roles | 0 | 4 | 10 | 2.50 | | |
| | | y10 | Decisional roles | 0 | 5 | 10 | 2.00 | | |
| Group.2 | Autonomy | x6 | Proportion of outsider governors | 0 | 4 | 10 | 2.50 | 0 | 50 |
| | | x7 | Participation of external performance bodies | 0 | 5 | 10 | 2.00 | | |
| | | x8 | Existence and influence of trade unions | 0 | 4 | 10 | 2.50 | | |
| | | x9 | performance competition and main indicators | 0 | 3 | 10 | 3.33 | | |
| | | x10 | Diversity of local strategies | 0 | 4 | 10 | 2.50 | | |

2. Formulae for the leadership scores

  2.1) Roles of Governors scores

    *Y2ai= Roles of Governors (Y2) for risk(a) in the prison service(i)*

    *Y2ai= 5.00 y6ai+3.33 y7ai+ 2.50y8ai+2.50 y9ai+2.00 y10ai*

  2.2) Autonomy scores

    *X2ai= Autonomy (X2) for risk(a) in the prison service(i)*

    *X2ai=2.50x6ai+2.00x7ai+2.50x8ai+3.33x9ai+2.50x10ai*

The final set of results relates to the total g/g scores for risk control in the prison services. It is calculated by the addition of the previous two sets of g/g scores: formalization (Y1) and roles of governors (Y2) for the grid dimension, and compliance (X1) and autonomy(X2) for the group dimension. As a result, the prison service risk control scores for each dimension can go up to a maximum of 100 or down to a minimum of 100 (0<X<100, 0<Y<100).

3. Total g/g risk control scores for the prison services

    3.1) Total risk (*a*) control Grid (Y) score for the prison services (*i*)

$$Yai=Y1ai+Y2ai \quad (0<Yai<100)$$

    3.2) Total risk (*a*) control Grid (Y) score for the prison services (*i*)

$$Xai=X1ai+X2ai \ ( 0<Xai<100)$$

These scores are then placed on the g/g map. In regard to the g/g map, since scores are assigned based on the meaning of zero in the ranking order, the zero point is placed at the bottom left corner of the map (0, 0). Accordingly, all of the results for the grid and group variables are positive (+X, +Y). The risk control system (formalization and compliance) and leadership (roles of Governors and autonomy) scores are plotted on the map and assigned scores of between 0 and 50 (Figure 3.8). Meanwhile, the total g/g risk control scores are plotted on the map and assigned scores of between 0 and 100 (Figure 3.9).

Figure 3.8: The map for the risk control system and leadership scores

Figure 3.9: The map for plotting the total risk control scores



*Hybrid: centre of the map*

In addition to the radar charts, I would also like to define hybrid cultures using the current model. Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show that the corners of the g/g map express extreme cultural types according to the minima and maxima score ranges of 0-50 and 0-100: that is, the most hierarchist, individualist, fatalist, and egalitarian cultures possible. In other words, the further away results are from each of these corners, the less pure they are in terms of the four cultural types as defined by the g/g theory. Therefore, results that are closer to the centre of the map are more indicative of hybrid characteristics. The outcomes measured by the methods discussed in previous sections of this chapter are demonstrated in the three following ways: 1. The score table; 2. scores are standardized and displayed on the radar chart; 3. standardised scores for each g/g dimension are added up (assuming the units of distance between all scales are equal) and placed on the g/g map.

## *3.5: Conclusion*

This chapter has discussed the details of the method which is used in this study to measure the risk control cultures of the Japanese and English prison services based on discussions in chapter 1 and 2. To conclude, it is briefly worth revisiting the main points covered in this chapter. Firstly, this study measures prison culture at the national prison service level, in relation to which local establishments are considered subordinate units. Evidence for local establishments is discussed here in relation to the impact it has on the g/g levels for the national prison service organizations.

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Secondly, this study measures prison culture in terms of suicide and violence risk control. In particular, four aspects of risk control are covered: the formalization of rules (Y1), the compliance level of subordinate units in response to those rules (X1), the roles and specialization of governors (Y2), and autonomy in local risk control strategies (X2). The formalization and compliance codes analyse the risk control systems maintained by the relevant prison services. Meanwhile, the roles of governors and autonomy codes analyse the leadership of governors in local risk control strategies and their influence on national risk control structures. Twenty analytical sub-codes have been assigned to these codes, the details of which have been discussed throughout this chapter. These sub-codes are examined further in each of the empirical chapters that follow.

Finally, my method assigns numerical scores in response to the aforesaid sub-codes. These scores are assigned according to the ranking order of g/g levels in each sub-code, and they are considered to be the ordinal level of measurement. They are demonstrated in three ways: 1. displaying raw scores by risks in the relevant prison services on the table; 2. by displaying standardized scores on radar charts; and 3. by adding up the standardized scores for the g/g dimensions, assuming the units of distances between all scales are equal, and placing them on the g/g map. Having established the method used throughout this study, the following chapter discusses the empirical case studies of suicide and violence risk control in the English and Japanese prison services.

# Chapter 4

## Risk Control System1:

## Formalization of Suicide and Violence Control (Grid 1)

Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter of this study. Based on the method discussed in chapter 3, this chapter analyses the formalization (Y1) of the suicide and violence risk control systems operated by the English and Japanese prison services. Formalization (Y1) is one aspect of the grid dimension for measuring prison risk control structures. Furthermore, the formalization level is analysed here in terms of five sub-codes. Section one of the chapter analyses the formalization level of order and discipline; section two of the chapter analyses that of definitions of risk; section three analyses that use of punishment and reward; section four analyses that of key national guidelines; and section five analyses that of risk-related information and documentation systems.

## 4.1: Order and discipline in prisons

As discussed in chapter 3, the terms, order and discipline, are used here to refer to the degree of stability and safety in local prison establishments (see p. 94). In this respect, they are taken to reflect how well risks such as suicide and violence are managed at a local level. Accordingly, this section discusses how formally order and discipline are defined within the legal structures of the English and Japanese prison services.

**England**

The highest statutory codes for HMPS, namely *The Prison Rules 1999*, provide definitions of order and discipline. Rule 6 of *the Prison Rules 1999* defines order and discipline. According to these rules, order and discipline should be firmly upheld as part of well-ordered community life in prisons, but not in ways that endanger the safety of individual prisoners. Furthermore, they stress the importance of encouraging self-respect and personal responsibility among individual prisoners as a means of maintaining order and discipline.

*Maintenance of order and discipline: Rule 6 of the Prison Rule 1999*

> *(1) Order and discipline shall be maintained with firmness, but with no more restriction than is required for safe custody and well-ordered community life.*
> *(2) In the control of prisoners, officers shall seek to influence them through their own example and leadership, and to enlist their willing co-operation.*
> *(3) At all times the treatment of prisoners shall be such as to encourage their self-respect and a sense of personal responsibility, but a prisoner shall not be employed in any disciplinary capacity.*

This relationship between communal life and issues affecting individual prisoners is also reflected in the less formal rules of the prison service. The *Prisoners' Information Book* informs prisoners about the information and services available to them in prison life (HMPS, 2008). The main aim of this book is to guarantee the informed consent of prisoners living within the prison community. The book clarifies for prisoners why they are sentenced and what kinds of rights they have as inmates. Less formal guidelines for prisoners, such as these, can be considered institutional responses to self-respect and individual responsibility among prisoners, as defined in Rule 6 cited above (*The Prison Rules 1999*). Thus, in light of the grid rank and score table proposed in chapter 3(see Appendix 1), The Prison Rule is ranked the second highest grid rank, and assigned a score of +6 for this sub-code..


**Japan**

In the Japanese prison service, order and discipline are defined by Article 73 of *The Act of the Penal Institutions and the Treatment of Sentenced Inmates Act* (*The Penal Institutions Act* hereafter) as issued by the Japanese parliament. In brief, the penal institution act defines order and discipline in the Japanese prison service as follows:

> *(Discipline and Order in Penal Institutions)*
> *Article 73   The discipline and order in the penal institution shall be maintained appropriately.*
> *(2)   Measures taken in order to achieve the purpose set forth in the preceding paragraph shall not exceed the limit necessary for securing the custody of inmates and maintaining both adequate conditions for the treatment of inmates and a safe and peaceful community life there of the prison.*

(*The Penal Institutions Act*, 2005)

Much like The Prison Rule 6 for HMPS, Article 73 formally declares that discipline and order should be maintained in prisons, and prisons should not be operated in ways that risk the safety of prisoners and peaceful community life. Moreover, this article is followed by Article 86 of *The Penal Institutions Act* that emphasises the principle of group treatment of prisoners in necessity for the effective implementation of correctional programmes (Section1 of Article 86, *The Penal Institution Act*). This article shows that the Japanese prison service group more strongly emphasise order and discipline based on the collective life than HMPS.

This basic principle of prison service provision by Art. 86 is also emphasised by less formal rules. To illustrate, each local prison establishment in Japan edits the rule books which it issues to its prisoners. These rule books can be considered equivalent to the *Prisoners' Information Book* in HMPS (HMPS 2008). However, unlike HMPS, the Japanese version of the local information book for prisoners mainly defines disciplinary rules which apply in prison life. For example, Fuchu (府中) Prison situated in a suburban area of Tokyo is the one of the biggest prisons in Japan. The first page of the local rule book for prisoners is written thus: *"1. Since the prison life is the communal life, abandon your own way, and behave appropriately as a member of the prisoners' group."* [my translation] (Fuchu Prison: *Shonai Seikatsu no Tebiki*, 2006, p.3). This passage demands that prisoners abandon the lifestyles they had outside of prison. Unlike HMPS, self-respect and other individual rights of prisoners are not mentioned in this rule book. In the rules of local establishments, greater emphasis is placed on communal order and discipline than the individual well-being of prisoners.

Thus, in order to understand how order and discipline are defined in the Japanese prison service it is necessary to consider not only Art. 73, but also 86 which stresses that group-based service provision in prisons. According to the formalization rank and score table (see Appendix 1), these articles of *The Penal Institutions Act* are considered the highest grid rank, and the Japanese prison service is assigned a score of + 7 for this sub-code.

## *4.2: Defining risk*

The second sub-code concerns how risk is defined. In order to identify the risks of suicide and violence in prisons, this section discusses the extent to which the prison services in question formally define hazardous behaviour.

### *4.2.1: Suicide*

**England**

HMPS defines self-harm and suicide by written statutory codes. Firstly, self-harm is defined by Prison Service Order (PSO hereafter) 2700 (*Suicide and Self-harm Prevention*) as "*any act where a prisoner deliberately harms themselves irrespective of the method, intent or severity of any injury*" (Chap. 3 in PSO 2700).

Secondly, HMPS describes death as a result of suicide as self-inflicted death. Furthermore, self-inflicted death is defined as *"any death of a person who has apparently taken his or her own life irrespective of intent"* (MOJ, 2010). This definition can be found in the *Safety in Custody Statistics 2009* (MOJ, 2010), and it was originally recorded in PSO 1400 (*Incident Reporting System*). PSO 1400 is not accessible to the public for security reasons hence I could not confirm exactly how self-inflicted death is defined in the original statutory code.

Nevertheless, PSO 2700 defines self-harm, and the *Safety in Custody Statistics 2008/09* show that a written definition of self-inflicted death does exist in HMPS as above (MOJ 2010). It can be seen from these documents that HMPS defines self-harm and suicide in peculiar ways. That is, the words self-harm and suicide are not used in such careful ways in everyday life as they are within HMPS. In response to these peculiarities, PSO 2700 declares that its purpose is to identify prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm, and to provide subsequent care and support for them. That is, self-harm and suicide are defined as above in order to identify and control risk, for which reasons it is useful that they are distinguished from the terms we use in daily life.

As I discussed in chapter 3, when different levels of rules define the subject of sub-code, the measurers for the sub-code will be based on the most formal rules (see Sec. 3.3.1: p. 107). Hence, according to the formalization ranks and scores table (Appendix 1), taking account of PSO 2700 which defines self-harm, HMPS can be ranked at the third highest grid level and assigned a score of + 5 for this sub-code.

**Japan**

For the Japanese prison service, self-harm and suicide are defined by Ordinance [*kurnrei*] 332 which sets guidelines for correctional statistics (*Homusho Shishikun 332 go Daijin Kunrei:*法務省司司訓 332 号大臣訓令). This ordinance lists categories of prison incidents and types of anti-disciplinary behaviour for the purposes of producing the national correctional statistics. Suicide and self-harm are also listed in this ordinance.

However, unlike HMPS' PSOs, this ordinance does not give any particular definitions of behaviour which count as suicide and self-harm. These two words are listed in Ordinance 332 without any specific explanation of behaviour applied to suicide and self-harm in Japanese prisons. In comparison with definitions of suicide and violence in HMPS, the Japanese prison service has not adopted any unusual definitions of self-harm and suicide. It suggests that, instead, they are used in much the same ways as they are outside of prisons. Although formal written definitions of self-harm and suicide do not usually apply to daily life, people are able to understand what these words mean through common understanding within social groups. These "common sense" unwritten rules are informally shared in society. Thus, the lack of specific definitions of suicide and self-harm listed in *kunrei 332* can be seen to informally follow conventional understandings of those words in Japanese society.

According to the formalization rank and score table (see Appendix 1), the definitions of self-harm and suicide provided in the Japanese prison service correspond with the second lowest grid level (risk is informally defined), and thus the Japanese prison service is assigned a score of +1 for this sub-code.

### 4.2.2: Violence

**England**

Highly formal definitions of violence and serious assault are maintained by HMPS. PSO 2750 defines violence as *'Any incident in which a person is, abused, threatened, or assaulted.   This includes an explicit or implicit challenge to their safety, well-being or health. The resulting harm may be physical, emotional or psychological'* (Chap. 4 in PSO 2750). Moreover, PSO 2750 notes several types of violence and also provides a brief definition of vulnerable prisoners:

*Bullying: 'Conduct motivated by a desire to hurt, threaten or frighten someone. It can be physical, verbal, psychological, emotional or economical and often very subtle. It is usually repeated behaviour, unprovoked and intended to cause fear or harm to the victim.' Bullying cannot be mutual: it always involves a power imbalance. This distinguishes bullying from fights and assaults.*

*Anti-social behaviour: 'Acting in a manner that causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons'.*

*Racist Incident: 'A racist incident is defined as any incident that is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person.' Link to PSO 2800*

*Vulnerable prisoners: In this context vulnerable can be used to describe anyone who has difficulty coping with the prison environment and/or likely to be a target of abuse/victimisation*

(PSO 2750 Violence Reduction)

Furthermore, *the Safety in Custody Statistics* (MOJ, 2010) classifies serious assault as any incident resulting in serious injury to victims. PSO 2750 explains that different types of serious assault are defined in PSO 1400 (Incident Reporting System). As discussed earlier in regard to self-inflicted death, PSO 1400 is not disclosed to the general public. Nevertheless, according to the *Safety in Custody Statistics 2009* (MOJ 2010), it provides the following classifications of assault:

*An assault is classified as serious if:*
- *it is a sexual assault*
- *it results in detention in outside hospital as an in-patient*
- *it requires medical treatment for concussion or internal injuries*
- *the injury is a fracture, scald or burn, stabbing, crushing, extensive or multiple bruising, black eye, broken nose, lost or broken tooth, cuts requiring suturing, bites or temporary or permanent blindness.*

*When an assault results in one of these types of injury it is classified as serious even if the actual damage was superficial.*

(MOJ, 2010)

Thus, as with self-harm and suicide, HMPS provides careful definitions of violence which cover a wide range of hazard behaviour relevant to prison life. Referring to the formalization rank and score table (see Appendix 1), PSO 2750 can be ranked at the third highest formality level and HMPS can be assigned a score of +5 for this sub-code.

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**Japan**

As with suicide and self-harm, the Japanese prison service has not set out formal regulations concerning the terminology of violence. Ordinance 332 lists violence and serious assault as matters that should be reported for the national correctional statistics. More general rules for identifying violence and assault in the Japanese prison service are set out by Article 74 of *The Penal Institutions Act*. Specifically, this article suggests that definitions of these terms in prisons should follow those laid down in *The Japanese Criminal Acts*. Thus, the Japanese prison service does not maintain its own formal and original definitions of violence and assault risk.

However, unlike in the case of suicide control, informal criteria are available to Japanese prison staff for assessing the risk of violence in prisons. For example, Tomiyama (2005) has explained that experienced prison officers assess security risks by monitoring unusual daily behaviour among prisoners. For example, these officers claimed that subtle changes in prisoners' cells are signs for anti-disciplinary incidents; such as their ways of hanging up dust-cloths in cells (*ibid*.). They consider subtle differences in the behaviour of prisoners to be suitable means of monitoring their safety while they are in custody.

Therefore, although the Japanese prison service does not does not maintain formal definitions of violence and assault, but have informal unwritten agreements about how risk can be identified exist among staff members in local prison establishments. In light of these details, according to the formalization rank and scores table ( see Appendix 1), the Japanese prison service can be ranked at the second lowest grid level and assigned a score of +1.

## *4.3: Use of punishment and reward*

The third sub-code, "the use of punishment or reward for prisoners and staff members", analyses whether punishment and reward are used to control suicide and violence and if so, which level of rules define those punishment and reward systems.

*4.3.1: Suicide*

**England**

PSO 2000 (*Adjudication*) states that self-harming behaviour, including committing suicide, should not be categorised as anti-disciplinary behaviour and not subject to punishment. HMPS takes the view that it has a duty of care to prisoners at risk in self-harm and suicide. Furthermore, PSO 2000 states that punishment should not be used as a strategy for controlling suicidal or self-harming behaviour. Thus, in the balance between maintaining order and safety in prisons and dealing with prisoners' individual needs, suicide is considered a target of care.

In exceptional cases where self-harming behaviour is intentionally used to bring about serious safety issues, it is possible for prisoners to be penalised: for example, in cases involving fire or resulting in serious damage to property (PSO 2000). PSO 2000 specifies a limited number of situations involving self-harm in which penalties are authorised. In such circumstances, order and discipline of prisons are prioritised over the individual issues affecting prisoners. However, it should be noted that HMPS does not generally use punishment to control suicide and self-harm.

> *"Disciplinary charges should not normally be brought either in respect of deliberate self-harm or of preparations for this. This applies equally to repetitive acts of self-harm. The Prison Service's response to self-harm or attempted self-harm must be to look to the care of the individual prisoner as its priority....The threat of punishment should not form part of the strategy for dealing with such behaviour.*
> *Exceptionally a disciplinary charge may be brought in respect of endangering the health and safety of others arising from attempting self-harm, (for example, by setting a fire). The person managing the incident should decide whether it is likely that the prisoner intended to cause injury to others or was reckless as to this. If s/he is satisfied about intention or recklessness, a charge may be brought (see Annex O.19 for interpretations of "intentionally or recklessly")."*
> *(2.19: PSO 2000 Adjudication)*

Likewise, HMPS does not sanction the use of rewards to control suicide. Rule 8 of *The Prison Rules* (1999) states that a system of privileges can be granted to prisoners if they reach and maintain specified standards of conduct and performance. Details of operating incentives for prisoners are defined by PSO 4000 (*Incentives and Earned Privileges* (IEP)). PSO 4000 asserts that some items defined as privileges should be given to prisoners deemed to be at risk of suicide or self-harm irrespective of their achievements in prison. These cases are exceptional within the IEP system.

Thus, HMPS does not use punishment and reward systems to control the risks of suicide and self-harm among prisoners. Instead, they define duties of care for managing those risks. According to the formalization rank and score table (see Appendix 1), HMPS can be given the lowest grid rank (HMPS does **not** use of punishment and reward systems for controlling suicide and self-harm), and it is assigned a score of 0 for this sub-code.


**Japan**

In the Japanese prison service, acts of attempted suicide or self-harm are only punished with the authorization of prison governors. Circumstances in which prison staff may punish acts of suicide and self-harm are formally defined in parliamentary legislation. Articles 74, and 150 of *The Penal Institutions Act*. According to Article 74, self-harm is prohibited by prison rules with which all prisoners should comply. The priority given to order and discipline in prisons, as discussed in the first sub-code (see Sec.4.1), can affect whether self-harm and suicide are defined as anti-disciplinary behaviour or not. In cases where communal order comes before individual well-being, self-harming behaviour is considered a disruption of collective stability within prisons.

> *(Compliance Rules)*
> *Article 74   The warden of the penal institution shall determine the rules to be complied with by inmates (hereinafter referred to as "compliance rules" in this Chapter).*
> *(2)   The compliance rules shall stipulate in a specific manner such matters as are set out under the following items in accordance with respective status as an inmate:*
> *(i)   Prohibition against criminal acts;*
> *(ii)   Prohibition against any behaviour or statement in a rude or outrageous manner, or any act imposing trouble on the others;*
> *(iii)   Prohibition against self-injurious activities;*
>
> (*Conditions of Disciplinary Punishments*)
> *Article 150   In cases where an inmate refused to comply with either the compliance rules or the special compliance rules …the warden (Governors) of the penal institution may impose disciplinary punishments to the inmate.*   [My underlinings]

Thus, these articles define circumstances in which penalties may be imposed against prisoners who have injured themselves. According to the formalization ranks and score table (see Appendix 1), *The Penal Institutions Act* can be ranked at the highest grid level and the Japanese prison service can be assigned a score of +7 in regard to the use of punishment to control self-harm and suicide.

Meanwhile, in regard to rewards, the Japanese prison service grants privileges to well-behaved prisoners. These privileges may include relaxing restrictions on the behaviour of prisoners, increasing the number of outside phone calls they can make, or allowing them greater freedom to buy snacks at their own expense. The current Incentives and Earned Privilege system came into place following reforms in 2003 (JMOJ, 2003). These reforms were mainly concerned with the content of privileges, since the old privileges were out of date and did not provide effective incentives for prisoners (*ibid.*).

Although the primary legislation covers the general definition of the reward system, substantial operational criteria are set out by Ordinance [*kunrei*：訓令] 3323, and supplemented by temporary instructions containing further details [*tsutatsu:* 通達]. According to Ordinance3323, prisoners are divided into five tiers: 1. prisoners whose behaviour is distinctively good; 2. prisoners whose behaviour is good; 3. prisoners whose behaviour is competent; 4. prisoners whose behaviour is occasionally inappropriate; and 5. prisoners whose behaviour is consistently inappropriate *(Ordinance 3323)*. Additionally, art. 6 of this ordinance states that privileges are decided in relation to the following issues: 1. the overall attitudes of the prisoner in daily prison life; 2. record of punishment; 3. participation and achievement in the prison workshop; 4. performance in the correctional programme; and 5. achievement in terms of skills and qualifications (*ibid.*). For example, if any given prisoner has a record of being punished for self-harming behaviour or attempted suicide, this record will affect what privileges s/he can gain.

Thus, the Japanese prison service defines rewards for controlling suicide and self-harm according to these standards. In regard to the formality level of these rules for applying punishment and reward to cases of self-harm and suicide, *kunrei 3323* can be placed on the third highest level while the prison service can be assigned a score of +5 (See Appendix 1). As a result of summarizing this score for the reward system and the score for the punishment system discussed above (+7), the Japanese prison service is assigned a total score of + 12 for this sub-code.

### 4.3.2: Violence

**England**

In HMPS violence is considered an offence against discipline. Cases of assault are punished through the authorization of prison governors. Different types of violence are

defined by Rules 51 and 55 of *The Prison Rules* (1999). Rule 51 defines 25 types of anti-disciplinary behaviour, of which assault and particularly racially aggravate assault are listed as the most severe. According to the formality ranks and score table, these rules can be ranked at the second the second highest formality level while a score of +6 can be assigned to HMPS in consideration of how it punishes instances of violence.

*(Offences against discipline)*

*51.   A prisoner is guilty of an offence against discipline if he—*

*(1) Commits any assault;*

*(1A) commits any racially aggravated assault.*

*(2) detains any person against his will;*

*... . (Prison Rule 51)*


*(Governor's punishments)*

*55.—(1) If he finds a prisoner guilty of an offence against discipline the governor may, subject to paragraph (2) and to rule 57, impose one or more of the following punishments:*

*(a) caution;*

*(b) forfeiture for a period not exceeding 42 days of any of the privileges under rule 8;*

*….*

*(g) in the case of a prisoner otherwise entitled to them, forfeiture for any period of the right, under rule 43(1), to have the articles there mentioned.*

*(Rule 55 of The Prison Rules 1999)*


In regard to the reward system for controlling violence, the essential details of the IEP system for controlling the risk of violence are defined by PSO 4000. In particular, PSO 4000 asserts that the IEP scheme should be operated on at least three tiers: *basic*, *standard*, *and enhanced*. Prisons can operate systems using more than these three tiers with the agreement of their respective area managers (Paragraph 2.1: PSO 4000). Thus, prisoners can be given several privileges defined by PSO 4000 and local criteria. The basic privileges are: 1. extra and improved visits; 2. eligibility to earn higher rates of pay for works; 3. access to in-cell television; 4. opportunities to wear own clothes, 5. access to private cash; and 6. time outside of cell for socialization (PSO 4000). The criteria for gaining and loosing privileges relate to the behaviour of prisoners (*ibid.*). For example, prisoners who commit assault are likely to lose their

privileges and to have their IEP class down-graded (Para.2.20: PSO 4000). It can be seen from these rules that HMPS uses a system of rewards to control the risk of violence in local establishments.

Although Prison Rule 8 provides the original legal grounds for the reward system operated by HMPS, the specific details of how it should be used to control violence are defined by PSO 4000. Once again, according to the formality ranks and score table (see Appendix 1), PSO 4000 can be ranked at the third highest formality rank, and HMPS is assigned a score of +5. As a result of summarising scores for reward (+5) and punishment (+6) systems, HMPS is assigned a total score of +11 for this sub-code.

**Japan**

As with suicide control, the Japanese prison service also uses punishment to control the risk of violence. Article 74 of *The Penal Institutions Act* prohibits criminal acts in prisons (Section i-2, Art. 74; see p. 136 above), including violence and assault. Furthermore, Article 150 states that violent behaviour can be punished with the authorization of governors. Accordingly, it can be seen that appropriate ways of using punishment to control violence in Japanese prisons are defined by highly formal rules. According to the formalization ranks and score table (see Appendix 1). The Japanese prison service is placed in the highest level, and assigned the score of +7 in the use of the punishment system for controlling violence risk.

In terms of the reward system, as noted above, Art. 6 of Ordinance [*kunrei*] 3323 states that records of punishment affect prisoners' privilege levels (see Sec.4.3.1). Similarly in the case of violence control, the privileges available to prisoners are affected by whether they have records of punishment as a result of violence or assault. According to the formalization rank and score table (see Appendix 1), *kunrei* 3323 can be placed on the third highest level and a score of +5 can be assigned to the Japanese prison service for the reward system. As a result of summarizing scores given for the reward (+5) and punishment (+7) systems, the Japanese prison service is assigned a total score of +12 for this sub-code.

## 4.4: Key national guidelines: standardization of risk control procedures

The fourth sub-code for formality concerns the existence of key national guidelines. This sub-code analyses whether the prison services in question provide overall guidelines which define pre- and post-incident procedures for controlling violence and suicide and, if so, their level of formality.

### 4.4.1: Suicide

**England**

The methods for controlling the risks of suicide and self-harm in HMPS are defined by PSO 2700 (*Suicide and self-harm Management*). This order provides a huge volume of strategic guidelines about self-harm and suicide management in local establishments. PSO 2700 consists of 15 Chapters with 95 Annexes. It is intended to standardize suicide and self-harm control procedures across HMPS. Local establishments are requested to develop local suicide control strategies based on this guideline. The overall process laid out by PSO 2700 is named the Assessment Care in Custody Teamwork (ACCT) procedure, which requires all prison staff members to contribute towards caring for prisoners at risk of suicide or self-harm (PSO 2700).

PSO 2700 defines the details of procedural flows within the timeline of incidents of self-harm and suicide. All members of staff are required to be trained in the ACCT guidelines so that they can operate the corresponding procedures (Chap. 12, PSO 2700). When prison staff members find prisoners at risk, they must open the ACCT plan document for their prison. Local establishments must review cases of self-harm and suicide within 24 hours of opening their ACCT plans, which involve enable care plans for the prisoner, called CAREMAP (Annex 8G, PSO 2700). The first and subsequent case reviews are required to follow all care actions defined in PSO 2700 (*ibid*.). While the ACCT document is open, any prisoners at risk must be monitored and given appropriate care or treatment: this may include being transferred to another prison, kept under surveillance, or provided with extra medical care.

The ACCT document can only be closed once all of these actions planned in care plans actions have been completed, and the ACCT Case Review Team in the prison judges that it is safe to do so (*ibid*.). PSO 2700 defines several restriction criteria which should be taken into account before closing the plan. For example, ACCT Plans should not be closed within the 72 hours leading up to the transfer of a prisoner to another establishment (*ibid*.). Local prison establishments can close their plans when all of these

criteria have been met. Figure 4.1 illustrates the procedures of the ACCT plan as explained above.

Figure 4.1: Flow chart of ACCT procedures for prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm (Annex 8G, PSO 2700)

## ACCT Flowchart

Complete **Concern and Keep Safe** form (Page 3 of ACCT)

Obtain log number and inform ACCT administrative support officer

Pass to Unit Manager (or Night Orderly Officer)

Unit Manager completes **Immediate Action Plan** (Page 4 of ACCT)

Maintain on normal location

Refer to healthcare

Refer for assessment (Page 7 of ACCT) and Case Review within 24 hours of concern raised

**Assessment Interview** carried out by trained Assessors

Refer for Assessment (Page 7 of ACCT) and Case Review within 24 hours or as soon as well enough to be interviewed (see guidance on page 12 of ACCT)

**First Case Review**

Chaired by Unit Manager within same 24-hour period.

Estimation of risk by Case Review team.

Refer to healthcare for mental health assessment if mental health problems and/or high risk and/or actual self-harm.

Arrange next Case Review and appoint Case Manager (self or minimum grade of SO or Nurse Grade 5).

ACCT can be closed at any Case Review

**Post-closure arrangements**

PSO 2700 also provides instructions and advice on ways of managing the risks of suicide and self-harm among individual prisoners in local establishments. It fully covers all stages of custody in prisons, from "*pre-prison and time at court*" (Chap. 3,

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PSO 2700) to "*discharge and resettlement*" (Chap. 15, PSO 2700). All relevant regulatory codes defining techniques for preventing suicide are integrated in this PSO; for example, risk assessments of cell sharing, placing prisoners in segregation and protection cell units, using force, and transferring pioneers at risk of suicide and self-harm.

In terms of cell sharing risk assessment, cell sharing is considered a factor which increases the risk of suicide (6.4:Chap. 8, PSO 2700). Hence PSO 2700 recommends that local establishments place prisoners at risk of suicide in single cells where any materials with which they may easily harm themselves have been removed (Chaps 8 and 10, PSO 2700). If local establishments cannot provide single cells to the prisoners at risk in suicide and self-harm, they have to assess the risk based on Cell-Sharing Risk Assessment (CSRA) scheme (*ibid.*). Furthermore, PSO 2700 requests that local establishments place prisoners in single cells under 24 hour daily observation by staff members, mainly using CCTV (7.3: Chap. 8, PSO 2700).

In terms of segregating prisoners in local establishments, PSO 2700 notes that prisoners who are at risk of suicide or self-harm must not be routinely held in the segregation units since isolated environments can increase the risk of suicide. In exceptional cases, however, segregation is considered appropriate under PSO 2700:

> *If no other suitable location is appropriate;* or if where *all other options have been tried, but considered inappropriate, and only where it is possible to provide the degree of continual care identified as necessary in the prisoners' care plan.*
> (PSO 2700).

PSO 2700 also places restrictions on confining prisoners considered to be at risk of suicide and self-harm to special unfurnished cells, the latter procedure being defined by PSOs 1600 (*Use of Force*) and 1700 (*Segregation*) (4.1.3.2: PSO 2700). With the important exception of prisoners who are also identified as being violent, local establishments must not place prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm in these special cells (*ibid*). These restrictions against use of force and segregation shows that placing prisoners in isolated circumstances is considered an inappropriate way of managing suicide and self-harm in HMPS. Alternatively, PSO 2700 also sanctions permanent transfers of prisoners considered to be risks to themselves to more appropriate establishments. PSO 2700 defines such transfers as "*an integral part of the support plan*"

for prisoners at risk of self-harm or suicide (4.3: PSO 2700). This measure may involve locating prisoners closer to home where they can receive stronger family support.

PSO 2700 also defines procedures to be followed in the event of incidences of self-harm and suicide in local establishments. These procedures cover immediate actions that should be taken (13.2: Chap. 13, PSO 2700), follow-up actions and care for prisoners who have self-harmed (13.3, *ibid.*), how serious cases should be investigated (13.4, *ibid.*) and reported (13.5, *ibid.*), and post-incident support which should be given to staff and other prisoners (13.6, *ibid.*). In regard to post-incident support and care for staff and other prisoners, PSO 2700 refers to PSO 2710 (*Follow up to Deaths in Custody*) and PSO 8150 (*Post Incident Care for Staff*). In this way, PSO 2700 is integrated with other prison regulatory codes which are relevant to the control of suicide and self-harm in local establishments.

It can be seen from the above discussion that HMPS has overall guidelines in place which stipulate in considerable detail how self-harm and suicide should be managed in local prisons both before and after the event. PSO 2700 integrates all relevant techniques and regulatory codes concerning suicide and self-harm control procedures in local establishments. For their part, local establishments are required to implement the guidelines set out in PSO 2700. According to the formalization rank and scores table (see Appendix 1), PSO 2700 counts as an ordinance in the penal legal structure, in which respect it is ranked at the third highest grid level and scored +5 for this sub-code.


**Japan**

The Japanese prison service does not have any written key national strategic guidelines which define overall suicide control procedures in local establishments. Although some formal rules define relevant procedures for controlling suicide and self-harm, unlike in HMPS, they are not integrated into a single set of national guidelines. Accordingly, this section introduces the rules which relate to suicide risk control in local establishments of the Japanese prison service.

Firstly, the Japanese prison service issued Prison Instruction [*tsutatsu:* 通達] 61, (*reminder for suicide prevention*), in 1960. It recommends that local establishments prevent suicide incidents, but does not provide any specific procedural guidelines stating how. Instruction 770, issued in 1973, implemented a Suicide Risk Assessment Sheet [*Jisatsu Yochuisha Hanteihyou:* 自殺要注意者判定表］which defines twelve

behavioural criteria that prison staff should monitor in prisoners considered to be at risk of suicide.

Another relevant technique for controlling suicide in Japanese prisons is to transfer prisoners at risk to the special protection cell. Article 76 of the Penal Institution defines segregation of prisoners. According to the article, when the prisoner's behaviour is considered to disrupt discipline and order of prisons, governors can segregate the prisoner from other inmates (Art. 76 of the Penal Institution Acts). As I discussed in Section 4.3.1 above, committing suicide and self-harming behaviour are considered to harm the collective discipline and order in the Japanese prison service. Hence segregation is considered to be used for prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm. In relation to segregation, Art. 79 of *The Penal Institutions Act* authorises the use of special protection rooms in cases where an inmate is likely to commit self-injurious acts. As with Art. 76, local establishments are allowed to segregate prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm in these protection cells. These protection rooms are designed to be as safe as possible for self-harming prisoners: for example, they do not contain any hard furniture or other items which prisoners can use to hurt themselves. Prisoners in protection cells must be monitored through CCTV 24 hours a day (Instruction [*tsutatsu*] 3405).

Meanwhile, unlike in HMPS, prisoners in Japan are only transferred to other establishments once they have changed their correctional programmes (*tsutatsu* 3315). Hence the Japanese prison service does not transfer prisoners between prisons in order to control suicide and self-harm. With regard to the use of force, in order to control the risk of suicide among prisoners, Article 78 of *The Penal Institutions Act* declares that prison officers may use arresting ropes, leather handcuffs, or strait jackets in cases where prisoners are likely to commit self-injurious behaviour (Art. 78, *The Penal Institution Act*). Section 15 of *kunrei* 33258 states that prison officers must record whether they have used any restraining equipment in the assigned report form (Ordinance 33528)

In regard to post-incident procedures, disciplinary charges can be given to prisoners in response to suicidal behaviour and self-harm. Furthermore, it is stated in Article 155 of *The Penal Institution Act* that each local establishment's adjudication committee can decide whether prisoners should be punished for committing such offences. If it is decided that a prisoner should be punished, the governor of the relevant penal institution must still authorise the punishment and give notice of it to the prisoner in question (Article 154, *The Penal Institution Act*). If a prisoner dies as a result of

committing suicide, the local establishment must follow procedures concerning deaths in prisons defined by the relevant ordinances [*kunrei*] and instructions [*tsutatsu*]. Firstly, Ordinance 3379 requests that governors investigate cases of suicide. The cause of death should be clarified and, if necessary, a medical doctor should be included in the investigation (*ibid.*). Secondly, if an investigation confirms that a death was the result of suicide, *tsutasu* 210 requires the local establishment involved to announce the case to the public through the media.

These regulatory codes show that the Japanese prison service maintains several formal procedures concerning suicide control, and it varies across all stages of suicide and self-harm control process. However, bearing in mind that the sub-code covered by this chapter is intended to analyse overall guidelines, it should be noted that the Japanese prison service does not maintain any overall guidelines on suicide control in written form. When asked about this fact, the Japanese prison staff with whom I conducted interviews explained that although the Japanese prison service does not have any formal guidelines defining the overall procedural flow for controlling suicide in local establishments, there are some informal guidelines in place.

> *About the suicide prevention and post-incident control, I just followed assigned procedures as a prison officer.*
>
> *[In regard to the flow of these procedures] we do not have details of them, but it [the informal procedure] works based on common sense [joshiki:常識] [in the prison service and society].*

(Original interview data)

Thus, with regard to this sub-code, the Japanese prison service is considered to have informal unwritten guidelines such as *Joshiki*. According to the formalization rank and scores table (see Appendix 1), the Japanese prison service is assigned the second lowest formality rank and a score of +1 for this sub-code.

### 4.4.2: Violence

**England**

In addition to suicide prevention, HMPS also maintains strategic and procedural national guidelines for controlling violence and serious assault in local establishments. PSO 2750 (*Violence Reduction*) defines the national violence reduction guidelines for local risk control strategies.

Firstly, chapter 2 of PSO 2750 declares that governors of local establishments are responsible for designing and maintaining local violence reduction strategies. Chapter 9 of PSO 2750 defines the standard criteria for the development of local violence reduction strategies. Specifically, they must cover the following issues: *1. the definition of violence for the Prison Service, A policy statement reflecting the national safer custody principle, 2. Systematic collection of information and intelligence about all fights and assaults, 3. Regular analysis of this information highlighting the problem areas and an action plan to improve safety, and 4. robust monitoring and evaluation procedures to measure progress o*f *local violence control strategies* (Chap. 9, PSO 2750). Accordingly, local establishments should design strategies which meet these criteria.

Secondly, in order to prevent violence in prisons, PSO 2750 requires local establishments to review cases of violence and identify trends in violence and assault in different local establishments. These procedures may include investigating gang involvement in violence and profiling vulnerable prisoners who tend to be victims (Chap. 3, PSO 2750). PSO 2750 also recommends using the Cell-Sharing Risk Assessment (CSRA) scheme as a means of assessing trends in violence (Chap. 5, PSO 2750). PSO 2750 also defines the details of the post-incident procedures which should be followed in local establishments where cases of violence and assault have occurred. Chapter 4, in particular, states that local establishments must clearly record and investigate any incidences or patterns of unacceptable behaviour on each prisoner's history sheet. It also defines how the needs of victimised prisoners should be met, following the guidance given in Annex C of PSO 2750 (*ibid.*). Relevant actions may include monitoring victims with the ACCT plan, and keeping them under observation.

Thirdly, in addition to PSO 2700 (*Suicide and Self-harm prevention*), PSO 2750 integrates all relevant regulatory codes which define techniques and processes for controlling violence in local establishments. To illustrate, local establishments must report incidents following the guidelines set out in PSO 1400 (*Incident Reporting System*). If incidents are racially motivated, local establishments must report them based on the guidelines provided by PSO 2800 (*Race Equality*). Furthermore, referring to PSO 1700 (*Segregation*), PSO 2750 states that local establishments should effectively and appropriately make use of prisoner transfers, especially for prisoners whose behaviour is highly difficult, as part of local violence control strategies (Chapter 7, PSO 2750).   For example, if a prisoner is frequently bullied in a local establishment, permanently transferring him/her to another establishment may be considered an appropriate course

of action. Similarly, if the prisoner has serious behavioural issues, permanent transfer to a local establishment which has a special behavioural management programme may be considered appropriate.

Thus, HMPS has in place overall guidelines for controlling violence in local establishments. According to the formalization rank and scores table (see Appendix 1), PSO 2750 is an ordinance, in which regard it is ranked at the third highest grid level and a score of+5 is assigned to HMPS for this sub-code.


## Japan

The Japanese prison service does not provide formal national guidelines which standardise overall violence control strategies in local prison establishments. Although some guidance about controlling violence in local establishments is provided by relevant *kunrei* and *tsutasu,* there is no integrated set of formal guidelines covering this issue.

Firstly, where HMPS requires local establishments to identify the backgrounds of prisoners as part of local risk control strategies, the Japanese prison service takes a similar but more informal approach. According to Hamai (2006), identifying Japanese prisoners who are members of Japanese gangs [*yakuza* やくざ; or *boryokudan:* 暴力団] is a basic strategy for maintaining safety and security in local establishments. Hamai (2006) has explained that prisoners who belong to gangs are one of the main targets of violence control because they bring gang culture into prisons. Persistent problems in this regard include gang rivalry and attempt to bribe both other prisoners and prison staff. In order to control gang members in prison, local establishments have a custom of placing the letter "G" on the records of prisoners who belong to gangs (Hamai, 2006). This strategy is used in most local establishments (Hamai, 2006). However, it is not defined in any written rules hence it can be considered an informal rule.

Secondly, the Japanese prison service defines segregation as a technique for controlling suicide. Article 76 of *The Penal Institutions Act* states that segregation is authorised in cases where contact between certain prisoners is considered to be a risk to discipline and order in local establishments (Section 2: Art.76, *The Penal Institutions Act*). Furthermore, in relation to this segregation, Article 79 of *The Penal Institutions Act* states that local establishments can use special protection cells in cases where inmates are likely to inflict injuries on others (ii-b: Article 79 of *The Penal Institutions Act*). Alternatively the Japanese prison service also allows prisoner transfers as a means

of controlling violence. Instruction [*tsutatsu*] 3316 defines the procedures for transferring prisoners belonging to Japanese gangs who are deemed to pose a threat to, or be at threat from, other prisoners. This *tsutasu* shows that the Japanese prison service considers controlling prisoners who have backgrounds in Japanese gangs an essential part of maintaining safety in prisons.

Thirdly, with regard to how force may be used to control violent prisoners, Article 77 of *The Penal Institutions Act* asserts that prison staff can use defence tools in cases where prisoners have inflicted injuries on other prisoners or staff. These defence tools are listed by *kunrei* 33258. There are several types of authorised defence tools: truncheons (*keibou*:警棒, and *keijo*:警杖), man-catcher (*sasumata*:さすまた), shields, tear gas, and tear gas bombs. In addition to suicide control, Article 78 of *The Penal Institutions Act* sanctions the use of arresting ropes, leather handcuffs, and strait jackets in cases where prisoners are likely to injure others (Art. 78, *The Penal Institutions Act*). In the Japanese prison service rules, defence tools and restraining devices are distinguished from weapons. Additionally, the appropriate uses of weapons are defined separately from defence tools in the Japanese prison service. Article 80 of *The Penal Institutions Act* authorises the use of hand guns in the following cases: where an inmate or group of inmates have instigated a riot or are about to do so; where an inmate has inflicted serious injuries on others or is about to do so; where an inmate maintains possession of a dangerous weapon in spite of being ordered to surrender it by a prison officer (Art. 80, *The Penal Institutions Act*). Only hand guns are used as weapons against prisoners in Japanese prisons.

Thus, in addition to suicide control, the Japanese prison service defines relevant techniques and procedures for controlling violence in local establishments. Nevertheless, there are no key national guidelines which formally integrate the flow of violence control measures in written rules. As Hamai (2005) has shown in regard to pre-incident control, certain informal rules are shared in local establishments. According to the formalization rank and score table (see Appendix 1), the Japanese prison service is ranked at the second lowest grid level for the violence sub-code and assigned a score of +1.

## 4.5: Information recording and documentation systems

The fifth sub-code concerns the formalization of the rules stipulating how information about the risks of suicide and violence should be recorded and documented in the English and Japanese prison services.

### 4.5.1: Suicide

**England**

PSO 2700 states that local establishments need to record ACCT plans for prisoners who are at risk of suicide or self-harm as soon those risks have been identified (Chap. 8, PSO 2700). This record must include a Suicide/Self-harm Warning Form and the prisoner's clinical records and history form of the prisoner (Chap4, PSO 2700). Chapter 4 of PSO 2700 provides details about these forms including their style and colour. Overall, all relevant documents defined in PSO 2700 are called ACCT documents (PSO 2700).

In regard to post-incident recording requirements, all incidences of suicide and self-harm must be recorded in the Security Information Reports (SIRs). PSO 2700 refers to PSO 1400 (*Incident Reporting System*) on this matter. Although PSO 1400 is not open for the public, it is stated in chapter 13 of PSO 2700 that all cases of self-harm must be recorded on the SIRs. The same chapter also specifies the forms and styles of documents for reporting incidents (Chap. 13, PSO 2700) and declares that any serious incidents in which prisoners need to be resuscitated or transferred to external hospitals as a result of self-harm must be reported to National Operational Units by telephone (*ibid*.). Hence it can be seen that the post-incident information recording and documentation system maintained by HMPS is defined by a highly detailed formal set of written rules.

In regard to their formality level, these rules are defined by PSOs. Based on the score criteria discussed in chapter 3, they can be ranked at the third highest formality level and a score of +5 can be assigned to HMPS for this sub-code.

**Japan**

The Japanese prison service does not have detailed guidelines about recording risk related information which is equivalent as ACCT documents in HMPS. However, some rules do exist for controlling post incident documentation on suicide and self-harm. These rules were put in place following a discussion in the penal reform led by the Correctional Administration Reform Committee (CARC) in 2003. In relation to reporting cases of suicide and self-harm, the poor and inconsistent quality of

adjudication and incident statistics reports in local establishments became an main issue in the CARC 2003 (JMOJ 2003).

As a result, in addition to existing Ordinance 332 (*the guidelines for the correctional statistics*), Instruction 542 (*enactment of the correctional statistics guideline*) was issued on 23rd May2006. This instruction provides standard formats of reporting relevant correctional statistics about local prison operational incidents to the national HQs, including incidents of self-harm and suicide. Moreover Ordinance 3351 supplements these ordinance and instruction by defining reporting forms of adjudication. The Japanese prison service issues punishments in response to incidences of self-harm As I discussed in Section 4.3.1, suicide attempts are punished as interdisciplinary behaviour. Hence this ordinance also concerns with documentation for suicide and self-harm control. Additionally, Instruction [*tsutatsu*] 3346 states that prison staff must record whether prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm have been placed in segregation or protection cells, when such measures were taken, and for how long. This process must be repeated if these measures are later renewed for the same prisoners ( *kyosei* 3346 *kysei kyokucho imei-tsutatsu*). In regard to the use of protection cells, *tsutatsu* 3405 states that prison staff   must record the start and finish of periods spent in protection cells on the utilization record of protection cells (Chap. 3, *tsutatsu* 3405).

Thus, it can be seen that the Japanese prison service has a system in place for recording and documenting relevant information about prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm. Most of this system is defined by *kunrei* and *tsutatsu*. In terms of the formality level, it was pointed out in Chapter 3 that the more formal rules are adopted when different levels of rules define the same subject (see Sec. 3.3.1: p. 107). Thus, taking *kunrei* (*i.e.* ordinances) as rules defining the topic of this sub-code, according to the formalization rank and scores table (see Appendix 1), they can be ranked at the third highest formality level and a score of +5 can be assigned to the Japanese prison service.

### 4.5.2: Violence

**England**

PSO 2750 asks local establishments to record information about violence relevant to themselves. Furthermore, it stresses that maintaining accurate and clear information is important for controlling violence effectively (PSO 2750). Key documents in this regard are use of force report forms, adjudication and disciplinary charge records, and incident records.

The use of force for managing violent behaviour among prisoners should be recorded, as stated by PSO 2750, in line with guidance given about keeping records of what kinds of force have been used to quell violence in PSO 1600 (*Use of Force*). In terms of the segregation and transfer of bullied or violent prisoners, PSO 1600 refers to the reporting requirements defined in PSO 1700 (*Segregation*). All report forms used for these procedures are attached to PSO 1700. If a prisoner who has assaulted other prisoners is punished, the relevant information for the adjudication process must be recorded in line with the rules set out by PSO 2000 (*Adjudications Manual*) . In addition to suicide and self-harm, incidences of violence and serious assault are recorded using the SIRs (PSO 1400).

Thus, the rules maintained by HMPS for recording and documenting information about violence are defined by PSOs. These rules, they can be ranked at the third highest formality level and a score of +5 can be assigned to HMPS for this sub-code.


**Japan**

The procedures for recording and documenting information about violence are also defined by written rules in the Japanese prison service. As well as suicide control, the poor and inconsistent quality of adjudication and incident reports in local establishments became a main issue in the CARC 2003, including these relates to assault and violence incidents (JMOJ 2003).

In response to this issue, Ordinance [*kunrei*] 332 (*The Guidelines for Correctional Statistics*) and Instruction [*tsutasu* 542] (*Enactment of the Correctional Statistics*) request that local establishments periodically submit statistics about incidences and adjudications of violence and serious assault to the national HQ using specific forms (*ibid.*). Additionally, *kunrei* 3351 states that adjudications linked to violence should be recorded on appointed adjudication record forms (Chap. 4 and Annexes 1 and 9, *kunrei* 3351). Cases in which violent prisoners have been segregated from others must also be recorded according to prison instructions. Specifically, Ordinance [*tsutatsu*] 3346 states that prison staff should record the dates at which every period of segregation starts and finishes on prisoners' observation forms.

When prisoners belonging to gangs are transferred to other establishments, the governor of the prison from which the prisoner is being transferred must submit a prescribed transfer request form to the area manager and the governor of the prison to which the prisoner is being transferred. In turn, the latter governor must accept the

prisoner into his establishment. These procedures are all defined by Instruction [*imei-tsutatsu*] 3316 (Transferring Prisoners). In regard to the use of force, *kunrei* 33258 defines the forms required for recording the use of defence tools, such as handcuffs and strait jackets, in local establishments.  In particular, article 14 of *kunrei* 33258 states that the use of defence tools must be recorded on prisoners' observation records. Meanwhile, the use of handcuffs and strait jackets must also be recorded on the list of usage of those implements.

Hence the Japanese prison service clearly has a system in place clarifying how information about violence in local establishments should be recorded and documented. Most of the relevant procedures in this regard are defined by *kunrei* and *tsutatsu*. Again, in terms of the formality level, chapter 3 stated that more formal rules are adopted when different levels of rules define the subject (see Sec. 3.3.1: p.107). Thus, taking ordinances as the rules defining the topic of this sub-code, the rules discussed in this section can be ranked at the third highest grid level and a score of +5 can be given to the Japanese prison service for this sub-code.

## 4.6: Conclusion

This chapter discussed the formalization of the suicide and violence risk control systems operated by the English and Japanese prison services according to 5 sub-codes. The above discussion shows, firstly, that both prison services have highly formal sets of rules defining order and discipline. However, the ways in which order and discipline are defined by the English and Japanese prison services suggest that the relationship between communal stability in prisons and issues affecting individual prisoners is understood differently in each institution.

Secondly, HMPS defines the risks of suicide and violence by PSOs with the key intention of identifying targets of control. It is noteworthy that both definitions of suicide and violence are highly disconnected from everyday usage of that word outside of prisons. By contrast, the Japanese prison service does not have any formal detailed definitions of relevant behaviour comparable to those observed by HMPS. Moreover, suicide is recognised that the term is defined by the Japanese prison service in much the same way as it is outside of prisons. Although the Japanese prison service does not formally define violence, the views of prison staff members indicate that they follow informal routines for identifying the risk of violence among prisons. Thus, the

testimony of Japanese prison staff shows that peculiar ways of understanding violent behaviour do exist in Japanese prisons as part of risk control procedures; however it exists in informal way as well as suicide.

Thirdly, HMPS does not use punishment or reward to control the risk of suicide. Therefore, the punishment and reward sub-code is not applicable to HMPS in the case of suicide control. In other words, there are no rules in HMPS sanctioning the use of punishment and reward for suicide control. Based on the formalization ranks and scores table discussed in chapter 3, HMPS should be given the lowest grid rank and assigned a score of 0 for the use of punishment and reward in suicide control. Meanwhile, punishments are issued for acts of violence in HMPS in line with Rule 51 of *The Prison Rules* 1999, thus indicating the second highest grid level on the scales being used here. HMPS also uses the IEP system, as defined in PSO 4000, for controlling violence. By contrast, the Japanese prison service uses both punishment and reward systems to control suicide and violence. The appropriate uses of punishment, in particular, are defined by a parliament act, in which respect the Japanese prison service's rules for issuing punishments can be ranked at the highest formality level. Meanwhile, details of rewards which may be granted to prisoners are given by Ordinance [*kunrei*].

Fourthly, HMPS' overall strategic guidelines for controlling the risks of violence and suicide are set out by PSOs. These orders stipulate the risk control procedures and processes that must be followed in local establishments, thereby integrating all relevant rules. Likewise, the Japanese prison service also defines all relevant techniques and processes for controlling the risks of suicide and violence in written rules. Nevertheless, these rules are and not integrated through overall written guidelines as is the case for HMPS. The Japanese prison service does not have national strategic guidelines in the form of written rules. In response to this lack of written guidelines, my interview data and Hamai (2006) suggest that prison officers follow informal but consistent risk control routines at a local level. One officer used the expression, "common sense" *[joshiki]* to describe the risk control routines as he understood them and suggested that although they are not written down, they are shared informally throughout the prison service.

Finally, HMPS has several forms and systems in place, as implemented by PSOs, for recording and reporting incidences of suicide and violence which cover a wide range of pre- and post-incident procedures. The styles of the aforesaid forms are defined in considerable detail. The Japanese prison service also defines the procedures

for reporting and documenting cases of suicide and violence with *kunrei* and *tsutatsu*. Particular attention is given in this regard to how punishments and periods of segregation issued to prisoners should be recorded. One peculiarity of the Japanese system for recording information about violence control is the rule that the letter "G" is placed on the records of prisoners who have backgrounds in Japanese gang culture. However, this routine is not found in written rules hence it may be considered an informal rule. Among the various rules active in Japanese prisons, the most formal are the *kunrei*.

Following these discussions, I have assigned numerical ranking scores for each institution according to the topic of every sub-code. The results are displayed on Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Table 4.1 is a visual map of the results for the formalization (Y1) scores. The five columns represent the sub-codes discussed in this chapter. Moreover, two sets of scores are given for the third sub-code in relation to punishment and reward. The positions of the shaded blocks reflect the grid level of the English and Japanese prison services in the case of each sub-code. The letter "S" represents suicide risk control while "V" represents violence risk control. Meanwhile, Table 4.2 shows the formalization (Y1) score results as numbers. The five sub-codes are listed twice in the left-hand column and two sets of figures are given for each: the first are raw scores and the second are standardized scores as discussed in chapter 3 (see Table 3.5, p. 118). The four columns to the right show the results for the English and Japanese prison services in the cases of suicide and violence.

Results show that the most formal rules are used by the Japanese prison service to define order and punishment: that is, parliamentary rules. By contrast, HMPS uses statutory codes to define all of these rules: specifically The Prison Rules 1999 or PSOs. With the exception of the order and punishment sub-code, the formality level of the Japanese prison service's risk control regulation is generally lower than that of HMPS. Whereas HMPS defines risk and national risk control strategic guidelines according to PSOs, the Japanese prison service does not use written rules to define either of them.

Table 4.1: Summary of formalization grid scores for suicide and violence control in the English and Japanese Prison Services

| Formality ranks | Grid Scores | 1. Order | 2. Risk | 3 | | 4. National guidelines | 5. Information Record system |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Punishment | Reward | | |
| High | 7 | Japan | | Japan (S)&(V) | | | |
| | 6 | England | | England (V) | | | |
| | 5 | | England (S) & (V) | | Japan (S)& (V) \| England (V) | England (S)&(V) | England (S) &(V) \| Japan (S) &(V) |
| | 4 | | | | | | |
| | 3 | | | | | | |
| | 2 | | | | | | |
| | 1 | Japan (S)&(V) | | | | Japan (S)& (V) | |
| Low | 0 | | | England (S) | | | |

(S): suicide control. (V): violence control.

Table 4.2: Formalization scores for suicide and violence control

| Formalization scores (Y1) | | Suicide | | Violence | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sub-codes | | England | Japan | England | Japan |
| Raw Scores | | | | | |
| 1 | Order | 6 | 7 | 6 | 7 |
| 2 | Definition of Risk | 5 | 1 | 5 | 1 |
| 3 | Use of punishment and reward | 0 | 12 | 11 | 12 |
| 4 | Key national guidelines | 5 | 1 | 5 | 1 |
| 5 | Information record and documentation system | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Standardized scores  for formalization | | | | | |
| 1 | Order | 8.6 | 10.0 | 8.6 | 10.0 |
| 2 | Definition of Risk | 7.1 | 1.4 | 7.1 | 1.4 |
| 3 | Use of punishment and reward | 0.0 | 8.6 | 7.9 | 8.6 |
| 4 | Key national guidelines | 7.1 | 1.4 | 7.1 | 1.4 |
| 5 | Information record and documentation system | 7.1 | 7.1 | 7.1 | 7.1 |

In summary, this chapter has discussed the formalization level of suicide and violence risk control in the English and Japanese prison services, and indicated that although both prison services' risk control systems are defined by rules, the formality levels of those rules differ for each prison service and in relation to their topic. The Japanese prison service showed the highest formality level in regard to discipline and punishment, but its definitions of suicide and violence were less formal than recognised

by the English prison service. Furthermore, the risk control systems maintained by the English prison service are generally defined by statutory codes. In response to these findings, chapter 5 discusses the compliance level of local establishments in terms of how they implement relevant risk control strategies relative to national guidelines. Then, taken as a set, the results of chapters 4 and 5 are used to analyse both prison services' risk control systems using the g/g framework.

# Chapter 5

# Risk Control Systems 2:

# Compliance Level of Local Establishments (Group1)

This chapter discusses the compliance level (X1) of the rules which control risk in the English and Japanese prison services by focusing on the extent to which those rules are followed by staff members in local establishments. The compliance level of the prison services is measured, with reference to five sub-codes, in terms of how far the aforesaid rules are operated appropriately in local establishments. This is in contrast to chapter 4 which discussed rules concerning suicide and violence control systems. Section one analyses the compliance level of order and discipline in local establishments; section two analyses that of ways of identifying risk in local establishments; section three analyses that of punishment and reward systems; section four analyses that of national guidelines, and section five analyses that of risk related information records and documentation system.

As I discussed in chapter 3, the compliance level is analysed here in terms of the extent to which relevant risk control regulations are appropriately followed in local establishments in England and Japan. Bearing in mind the difficulties involved in accessing local data. Measurements are made in this chapter in light of official evidence showing how far national rules and guidelines are followed at a local level as discussed in chapter 3 (see p.107). Specifically, in cases where the national prison service officially insists that local establishments generally comply with the relevant rules, it is necessary to make certain assumptions. Thus, if no reliable data is available indicating that local establishments implement rules inappropriately, it is assumed that majority of local establishments appropriately comply with those rules as claimed by the national prison services.

## 5.1: Order and discipline

This section identifies the compliance level of local establishments in response to order and discipline by analysing how far the individual interests and activities of prisoners are constrained for the purposes of maintaining order and discipline. As discussed in

chapter 4, the order and discipline sub-code reflects the relationship between group stability and individual freedom in prisons. Therefore, the group dimension of order and discipline is examined here in terms of constraints on the behaviour of prisoners.

**England**

Order and discipline in HMPS is based both on the collective stability of the prison group and the individual well-being of prisoners. It is widely recognised in local establishments that maintaining safety and good order in prisons should be built on a positive relationship between prisoners and staff members (HMIP, 2009a).

Prison staff members interpret this positive relationship as *decency* of prisons, which means humanization or normalisation of prisons and prisoners (Bennett, 2007). Prison staff with whom I conducted interviews expressed how important it is for them to treat prisoners as normally as prison staff members can while they are in the prison. For example, a prison governor recalled from his own experiences that prisons can be well-ordered and safe places when prisoners and staff members watch football matches together in a relaxed atmosphere. In this kind of environment, prisoners are treated as individuals with respect, and their needs and concerns are accepted as far as they do not disrupt the safety and security of prisons. Prisoners can expect to be treated as individuals and afforded privileges such as daily showers, clean clothes and bedding for maintaining their health and hygiene, and being able to buy snacks in prison canteens (HMIP 2009a).

Hence the services provided to prisoners by local establishments in HMPS depend upon the balance between collective stability and the level of decency with which individual prisoners are treated. According to the compliance ranks and scores table (see Appendix 2), the approach of HMPS to order and discipline can be ranked at the second highest group level, (acceptable behaviour among prisoners is constrained but restrictions are imposed on a case-by-case basis), and assigned a score of +2.

**Japan**

Chapter 4 showed that the Japanese prison service mainly defines order and discipline in terms of group stability in prisons (see Sec. 4.1). As a result, prisoners are required place collective rules above individual issues and respect. This way of controlling prisoners is widely observed in local establishments in the Japanese prison service.

Unlike in HMPS, decency within prison life or normalization is not actively considered to be the base of Japanese prison control. In 2003 a former prisoner

explained to the *Correctional Administration Reform Committee* (CARC) that Japanese prisons traditionally control prisoners by depriving them of all freedom of behaviour when they first arrive. Individual freedoms are then gradually restored by prison staff if they are not considered to threaten prison order (JMOJ 2003). The same prisoner stated that he was only allowed to do two things when he first arrived in prison: breathing and dreaming (*ibid*.).

In these circumstances, prisoners must follow group order. Behavioural restrictions vary widely in all aspects of day-to-day life. Prisoners have a daily duty of meditating with other prisons. They are prohibited from exchanging catered food among themselves. While they are in the training workshop prisoners cannot look away from their tasks or talk to each other (*ibid.*). Prison officers inspect prisoners' diaries and the seating list in cells requires prisoners to sit in the seats assigned to them (JMOJ, 2003).

It is understood by prison staff that the wide range of restrictions placed upon prisoners is necessary to maintain order and discipline. Prison officers who testified to the CARC in 2003 stressed that prison life is based on group life. They emphasized that restrictions prevent prisoners from bullying or fighting with each other. For example, reflecting on a prison rule stating that prisoners should march in ranks outside of their cells, a prison officer explained that if prisoners can walk freely, the more aggressive ones among them would start conflicts with each other (JMOJ 2003). The prison staff also insisted that detailed rules regarding the daily movements of prisoners help them to identify unusual situations efficiently with only a limited number of staff. For example, during cell inspections during the day and at night prisoners have to sit in the Japanese *seiza* position [正座], meaning that they sit upright on the floor with their legs folded back under themselves (JMOJ, 2003). This way of sitting prevents prisoners from attacking prison officers while cells inspections are taking place. Officers leave cell doors open during inspections (*ibid*.).

Thus, in the Japanese prison service, order and discipline are prioritized in terms of collective stability within prisons. Acceptable behaviour among prisoners is minimised, and staff members fully understand why prisoners should be controlled in this manner. According to the compliance ranks and scores table (see Appendix 2), the Japanese prison service can be ranked at the highest group level; (acceptable behaviour of individual prisoners among prisoners is generally minimised), and given a score of +3 for this sub-code.

## 5.2: Ways of identifying risk

Chapter 4 discussed how formally risk is defined by each of the relevant prison services. This section analyses how local establishments identify risk according to formal definitions in reality, and to what extent these definitions are unified.

### 5.2.1: Suicide

**England**

HMPS defines self-harm as, "*any act where a prisoner deliberately harms themselves irrespective of the method, intent or severity of any injury*", and suicide as, "*any death of a person who has apparently taken his or her own life irrespective of intent*" (MOJ 2010 and 2010a). These definitions are very peculiar terminologies for controlling risk; however these also involve broad hazardous behaviour of prisoners. Hence local establishments need to develop ways of identifying risk based not just on these definitions, but also on local experiences. However, according to HMCIP reports, the extent and quality of such developments in local establishments varies widely.

Some local establishments were reported to have successfully developed their own ways of identifying prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm. For example, HMP Kirkham (HMCIP, 2009i) had found some situations where prisoners tended to commit suicide and self-harm such as on their first day in the prison. This information was well-received by staff members and actively used for identifying prisoners at risk. Other prisons highlighted several issues relevant to the effective identification of the risks of suicide and self-harm at a local level. Reading through HMCIP reports, four main issues were found in this regard: 1. collecting information on incidences of self-harm and suicide; 2. analysing trends and patterns of suicide and self-harm in local establishments; 3. developing definitions of suicide and self-harm relevant for each establishment; 4. sharing new information among staff members. A number of establishments have been criticised for not addressing these issues sufficiently.

Table 5.1 offers a summary of ways of identifying suicide risk by local establishments mentioned in HMCIP reports (see p. 162). The first column from the left displays the types of issues in local establishments raised above, while the second and third left columns show the names of prisons and the years in which HMCIP inspections took place. The details of issues raised for different establishments are summarised in the last column. In regard to the first issue, HMP Haverigg was reported that the prison did not collecting enough monitoring data which can help to identify trends and patterns in suicide and self-harming behaviour among prisoners

(HMCIP, 2009g). Similar issues have also been flagged up with HMP East Sutton Park (HMCIP, 2006c: see Table. 5.1). A lack of information can prevent local establishments from developing their own ways of identifying the risks of suicide and self-harm. As the cases of the second issue, HMPs Full Sutton and Wellingborough were criticised for not sufficiently analysing information indicating trends and patterns in self-harm and suicide among their prisoners (HMCIP, 2007e; and 2008h respectively). As a result, the ways in which prisoners at risk were identified were inadequate in both institutions (see Table 5.1).

As the case of the third issue, HMP Peterborough was found that the prison has not developed clear definitions of suicide and self-harm based on local experiences (HMCIP, 2006e). Prison establishments need to define suicide and self-harm in response to information and experiences of those risks gathered within them. However, HMP Peterborough did not cover near-fatal incidents as a result of self-harm in its definitions of suicide and self-harm. As a result, investigations into near-fatal incidents at Peterborough were inadequate because they missed out information which could provide understanding of patterns of self-harm (*ibid.*: see Table 5.1 ).

Lastly, HMPs Liverpool and Pentonville were criticised for not sufficiently sharing information among staff members in order to identifying prisoners at risk of self-harm and suicide. Firstly, in regard to HMP Liverpool it was reported that even though prisoners at increased risk were enrolled in suicide prevention meetings, more than half of them did not regularly attend the meetings (HMCIP, 2009j; see Table 5.1). Secondly, in regard to HMP Pentonville it was reported that although there was awareness of the heightened risks of suicide and self-harm in the early days of custody, managers did not pay enough attention to vulnerable prisoners during this time thus leading to some of them self-harming (HMCIP, 2009m). Furthermore, various mixtures of these issues were flagged up in other local establishments. For example, it was reported that HMP Frankland (HMCIP 2008d) did not conduct sufficient analyses of information collected about incidences of suicide and self-harm and also did not share this information adequately among staff members. Thus, the case of HMP Frankland reflects a mixture of the second and fourth issues noted above (see Table 5.1).

Hence, the quality of definitions of the risks of suicide and self-harm vary between local establishments. While some establishments are able to develop effective definitions of these risks based on their own local experiences, others are less so. Some establishments do not collect enough information for developing these definitions and some do not analyse the data they have collected adequately. Finally, some

establishments do not share up-to-date information among staff members properly. Thus, according to the compliance level and score table (see Appendix 2), HMPS can be ranked at second lowest group level, (ways of identifying risk vary widely among local establishments, and assigned a score of +1 for this sub-code.

Table 5.1: Case studies: ways of identifying suicide risk and related issues in local establishments

| Issues | Prisons | Years of inspections | Reviews |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Insufficient information collection | East Sutton Park | 2006 | Rarely any incidents of self-harm were reported from the prison. Profiling of incidents was insufficient. |
| | Haverigg | 2009 | The prison started to produce monitoring data for suicide prevention committee meetings. However, these statistics remained basic and did not cover all useful indicators |
| 2. Insufficient information analysis | Full Sutton | 2007 | Little use of historical information to identify, trends or patterns of self-harming or suicidal behaviour |
| | Wellingborough | 2008 | Investigations were carried out following self-harm incidents. They identified lessons learned but were not always of good quality. |
| 3. Insufficient definition of risk | | | |
| | Peterborough | 2006 | There was no clear definition of near-death incidents as a result of self-harm. |
| 4. Poor information sharing between staff | Liverpool | 2009 | The suicide prevention meeting, chaired by the head of safer custody, met monthly. Fewer than half the members attended regularly. Little acknowledgement that recalled prisoners were at increased risk. |
| | Pentonville | 2009 | There was awareness of the risk of suicide and self-harm in the early days of custody; however, managers neglected vulnerable prisoners at risk at this time and which led to self-harm. |
| 5. Mixture of those issues above | | | |
| | Frankland | 2008 | Information collected monthly was not analysed for trends and patterns. Management checks did not include effective assessments of quality. Research shows that violent prisoners are more at risk of suicide than non-violent prisoners and rates of self-harm were high…, but there had been no shared learning from this. |

**Japan**

As chapter 4 explained, the Japanese prison service does not have formal definitions of suicide and self-harm, but it does have informal ones. Due to the limited access to local establishments in Japan, it was difficult to identify how information about suicide and self-harm is gathered within them. However, the issue discussed in the CARC 2003 suggests that local establishments do not have particular ways of identifying suicide and self-harm risk.

When the issue of deaths in custody was discussed by the CARC in 2003, the testimony given to the committee showed that many local establishments categorised the causes of deaths in custody, including self-inflicted deaths, inappropriately (JMOJ, 2003). According to the report made by the representative of the Centre of Prisoners' Right (CPR) on the CARC 2003, in most cases local establishments listed the cause of deaths in custody as cardiac insufficiency (*i.e.* heart failure). In the terminology of Japanese autopsy reports, this label only indicates that the heart stopped beating. This is recognised as an unacceptable explanation of deaths in medicine (JMOJ, 2003).

Many unexplained deaths in custody are thought to be caused by suicide. For example, one prisoner who died within a day of being transferred into a protection cell had begged a prison officer to be transferred into the cell in Osaka prison in the 1990s (JMOJ, 2003). If effective ways of identifying risk had been established in the prison, the possibility that the prisoner would commit suicide should have been investigated in this case. Moreover, if prison officers had shared relevant information about ways of identifying prisoners at risk of suicide, the prison officer involved in the case just cited should not have sent the prisoner into the protection cell. Accordingly, this case indicates that staff in Osaka prison could not effectively identify suicidal behaviour among prisoners around the time that the incident in question took place.

Other cases also show a lack of understanding among local Japanese prison staff of trends and patterns of suicide and self-harm among inmates. The most significant example concerns the management of prisoners who are suffering from eating disorders or mental depression. According to the representative of the CPR testified on the CARC 2003, prisoners tend to suffer from eating disorders or depression when they are confined to single cells (JMOJ, 2003). However, this information was not shared in a majority of local establishments. The representative of the CPR reported that 20 deaths, all considered to have been self-inflicted as a result of refusing food, were reported from local establishments across the country in 2003. As I mentioned above,

the cause of death in most of these cases was reported as cardiac arrest (JMOJ, 2003). These deaths were not investigated or reviewed by local establishments or the national prison service HQs in order to assess trends and patterns in self-inflicted deaths among prisoners.

Those cases of deaths in custody discussed above suggest that local prison establishments in Japan do not generally develop ways of identifying the risks of suicide and self-harm based on local experiences. At least from available official data, their ways of identifying risk was not observed. According to the compliance ranks and scores table (see Appendix 2), the Japanese prison service can be given the lowest group rank meaning (ways of identifying risk do not exist at all local establishments), and assigned a score of 0 for this sub-code.

### 5.2.2: Violence

**England**

Chapter 4 explained that HMPS defines violence and serious assault by PSO 2750: *"Any incident in which a person is abused, threatened, or assaulted. This includes an explicit or implicit challenge to their safety, well-being or health. The resulting harm may be physical, emotional or psychological."* In addition to this general definition of violence and assault, PSO 2750 also gives details of the relevant categories of violent behaviour: bullying, anti-social behaviour, and racist incidents.

Recent HMCIP reports have reported how well local establishments have developed ways of identifying these risks based on the definitions provided by PSO 2750. According to these reports, some local establishments were reported that they develop the effective ways of assessing the risk of violence. For example, it was reported that HMP Hewell had developed a scale for measuring the stages of bullying in the prison based on the experiences of its staff members (HMCIP, 2009h). This scale helped staff members to identify the risk of bullying more effectively.

However, the quality of local methods for identifying the violent risks generally varies widely among local establishments. Majority of local establishments showed some issues in ways of identifying risks of violence in their local establishments. Reading through HMCIP reports, three issues were found in this regard: 1. collecting sufficient information for identifying violence; 2. redefining violence and assault to fit the realities of local establishments; and 3. sharing relevant information among prison staff members.

Table 5.2 is a summary of ways of identifying violence risk by local establishments reviewed in HMCIP reports.   As with Table 5.1, the first column from the left displays types of issues in local establishments raised above. The second and third left columns show the names of prisons and the years in which HMCIP inspections took place.   The details of issues raised for different establishments are summarised in the last column. In regard to the first issue listed above, the case of HMP Gartree showed that daily observation records on bullying kept by staff at HMP Gartree were unsatisfactory (HMCIP, 2009f). Most officers just wrote "No bullying today" (*ibid.*). Thus, in this case frontline staff was failing to collect a sufficient amount of information about bullying to help them develop ways of identifying that risk in their establishment. A similar case was also seen in HMP Durham (HMCIP 2006b) where it was found that violent incidents were apparently being underreported. This conclusion was reached because a high number of prisoners felt unsafe even though reports of bullying in the prison were significantly lower than the national average. HMCIP reported that the prison was missing trends in bullying among its prisoners who were frequently hiding the fact that they were being bullied (*ibid.*). Hence it can be seen that HMP Durham was not collecting enough information to properly identify the risk of bullying.

With regard to the second issue, the case of HMP Dartmoor shows that the risk of bullying was identified only through either single complaint forms submitted by prisoners or reports made by individual officers. As a result, the standard for assessing incidences of bullying varied from case to case (HMCIP, 2008c). Therefore, in this case HMP Dartmoor could not develop a coherent definition of bullying, as part of violence,which could be applied to all cases in the prison (see Table 5.2).

In terms of the third issue, the case of HMP Buckley Hall shows that information was poorly shared among its staff members. According to HMIP, problems with bullying and anti-social behaviour in HMP Buckley Hall were deeply linked to drug-related issues among the prisoners. However, staff members were not much aware of these issues and thus investigations of bullying and anti-social behaviour were poor (HMCIP, 2007b). This case shows that information which can help to identify the risk of violence should be effectively shared between prison staff.

Therefore, the quality of local methods for identifying risk varies (see Table 5.2). Most establishments have problems with identifying the risk of violence, but these problems are different for each prison. According to the compliance ranks and scores table (see Appendix 2), HMPS can be given the second lowest group rank (ways of

identifying related hazard behaviour vary depending on local establishments) and assigned a score of +1 for this sub-code.

Table 5.2: Case studies in which issues were raised about how risk is identified in local establishments

| Types of errors | Prisons | Years of Inspections | Reviews |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Insufficient information Collection | Durham | 2009 | The reported rate of bullying were surprisingly low. It suggested under-reporting; because, 1. relatively high number of prisoners reported that they had felt unsafe at some point during their time at Durham, and 2. A survey on bullying had been carried out in October 2005. One of the findings was that victims tend to hide the fact they bullied rather than seek help from others. This was an area that required further investigation. |
| | Gartree | 2006 | Officers recorded daily comments on the dossier. The most commonly repeated entry was 'no evidence of bullying today'. |
| 2. Poor definitions of risk | Dartmoor | 2008 | The identification of bullying or potential bullying was determined by a complaint from a prisoner or an officer. This meant that there were inconsistencies across the prison. |
| 3. Poor understanding of staff members | Buckley Hall | 2007 | The extent and nature of bullying and anti-social behaviour in Buckley Hall appeared closely linked with the prevalence of illegal drugs⋯ but staff awareness was poor, application inconsistent, and there were few investigations into allegations of bullying. |

**Japan**

The Japanese prison service does not have any formal written definitions of violence. Instead, there are some informal techniques for identifying the risk of violence shared between prison staff. Unlike in the cases of suicide and self-harm, Japanese prison staff showed a good understanding of how behaviour indicative of the risks of violence or serious assault can be spotted among prisoners in local establishments.

One of these informal methods for assessing the risk of violence was noted in chapter 4: that is, the ways in which prisoners hang up dust cloths in their cells (Tomiyama, 2005; see Sec. 4.2.2). Although they had worked as prison staff in different local establishments, most members of Japanese prison staff with whom I conducted

interviews were aware of this way of identifying the risk of violence. One interviewee explained that inexperienced prison officers learned this and other techniques from senior colleagues.

Additionally, I found from the interviews I conducted that this kind of informal information is frequently shared between prison staff outside of the workplace. Interviewees explained that most Japanese prisons have seasonal parties where staff members from all ranks participate including governors. How often these parties are held varies between local establishments. However, official parties take place at least four times a year to mark each season (*i.e.* spring, summer, autumn, and winter). These parties are considered by prison staff to provide opportunities to exchange the latest information about human relations in the prisons where they work: for example, which prisoners are vulnerable and to what or whom. In this way, these events help prison staff to identify the risk of violence and bullying. It could be noted that one member of prison staff I interviewed gave a very negative impression of this kind of informal information sharing among his colleagues: but even so, he still accepted its importance of those parties in order to share risk relate information, and maintain close relationship between colleagues.

Those data I collected show that although the Japanese prison service does not have formal definitions of violence and serious assault, its staff members in local establishments seem to share some standardized ideas of what these terms mean. Furthermore, knowledge and information for identifying the risk of violence is passed on from senior to junior prison officers. According to the compliance ranks and scores table (see Appendix 2), these results are applicable to the third lowest group rank (ways of identifying risk are commonly shared among a majority of local establishments) and thus the Japanese prison service can be assigned a score of +2 for this sub-code.

## 5.3: Appropriate use of punishment and reward

The third sub-code concerns the compliance levels of the English and Japanese prison services in terms of their systems for punishing and rewarding prisoners. This section analyses how appropriately these control measures are used in local establishments.

### 5.3.1: Suicide

**England**

HMPS uses neither punishment nor reward to control suicidal behaviour hence its compliance level in this regard cannot be measured. In brief, this sub-code is not applicable to suicide control in HMPS. For this reason, HMPS is assigned score and gains a score of 0 for this sub-code, (the punishment is not used for controlling suicide in prisons), according to the compliance ranks and scores table (see Appendix 2).

**Japan**

As chapter 4 discussed, the Japanese prison service uses punishment and reward to control the risks of suicide and self-harm. Nevertheless, it is difficult to investigate how appropriately these measures are used in each prison because the Japanese prison service does not grant access to the relevant information to the public, concerning each establishment. Hence this section considers the appropriateness of these measures from the available national and official data.

*Punishment:*

The appropriateness of punishments meted out to prisoners was investigated by the prison reform led by the CARC in 2003. Tomiyama, the chief investigator on the CARC 2003 insisted that his investigations had shown that most prisons used disciplinary charges against prisoners appropriately following the assigned legal procedures (JMOJ, 2003).

The national correctional statistics show that the number of punishments issued for acts of self-harm is much higher than the annual number of self-inflicted deaths(C.B. 2009; JMOJ, 2007, 2008, and 2009) (see Table 5.3). This discrepancy suggests that punishment may be overused to control the risk of suicide in local establishments. However, self-harm generally includes a broader range of behaviour, most of which does not lead to death. Accordingly, it is uncertain whether punishment is overused in relation to suicide control from this data.

Table 5.3: National statistics: N of self-inflicted deaths and punishments issued against self-harm in
 the Japanese prison service between 2002 and 2008

| Years | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Self-inflicted deaths*1 | 18 | 15 | 20 | 15 | 18 | 21 | 25 |
| Punishment against self-harm*2 | 684 | 744 | 1000 | 1070 | 1010 | 1349 | 1441 |

*1Table 12, p.52 in C.B (2009). *2 Table 34 in JMOJ (2007, 2008 and 2009)

More recently, the Penal Institution Visiting Committees (PIVCs) have reported that punishment is used inappropriately in some local establishments (C.B 2010). These Committees were established in 2006 as a result of the penal reform led by CARC 2003 (JMOJ, 2003: also see Sec. 7.2.1). Each committee consists of between 4 and 10 members, and is responsible for one prison. Committee members are professionals and citizens who are selected from outside of the prison service (JMOJ, 2006). A report of the committees' investigations is published annually by the Ministry of Justice.

According to PIVC members, 10 local establishments out of 164 across the county were reported as having issues in regard to the operation of punishment: Miyazaki (宮崎), Kobe (神戸), Kyoto(京都), Ichihara (市原), Morioka (盛岡), Nagoya (名古屋), Kumamoto (熊本), Tochigi (栃木), Wakayama (和歌山),and Yamagata（山形） (JMOJ 2010; Table. 5.4). The main issues reported by prisoners in these establishments were sorted into two categories: 1. complaints from prisoners about punishments they had received; and 2. the appropriateness of adjudication procedures. However, none of the reports mention the details of complaints: in particular, how many prisoners complained about each of these issues and what kinds of disciplinary charges they had received. Thus, it is uncertain how far these issues are concerned with suicide and self-harm control. Moreover, the number of local establishments reported to have issues with the use of punishment was small compared with the number for which no problems were reported. Therefore, the available evidence does not cover enough of the Japanese prison service for me to draw general conclusions about how appropriately punishment is used in local establishments.

Table.5.4: Issues raised about the use of punishment in Japanese prisons (JMOJ 2010)

| Prisons | Issues about punishment |
| --- | --- |
| Ichihara | 1. Overuse of punishment |
| Kobe | 1. overuse of punishment<br>2. Appropriateness of adjudication procedures |
| Kumamoto | 2. Appropriateness of adjudication procedures |
| Kyoto | 1. Overuse of punishment<br>2. Appropriateness of adjudication procedures |
| Miyazaki | 1. Over use of punishment<br>2. Appropriateness of adjudication procedures |
| Moriok YOI | 2. Appropriateness of adjudication procedures |
| Nagoya | 2. Appropriateness of adjudication procedures |
| Tochigi | 2. Appropriateness of adjudication procedures |
| Wakayama | 2. Appropriateness of adjudication procedures |
| Yamagata | 2. Appropriateness of adjudication procedures |

Thus, available reliable data did not particularly suggests that punishment is inappropriately issued in local establishments. In the absence of clear evidence from other sources, this sub-code follows the measurement criteria discussed in chapter 3, (in cases where the national prison service officially insists that local establishments generally comply with the relevant rules; if no reliable data is available indicating that local establishments implement rules inappropriately, it is assumed that majority of local establishments appropriately comply with those rules) (see p. 107). As a result of accepting Tomiyama in the CARC discussed in the beginning of this section (JMOJ, 2003) that a majority of Japanese prisons punish their inmates in an appropriate manner, according to the compliance rank and scores table (see Appendix 2) the Japanese prison service should be ranked at the second highest group level, (majority of local establishments appropriately conduct punishment), and assigned a score of +2 for this sub-code.

*Reward:*

In regard to the reward system, as chapter 4 explained, the Japanese prison service maintains an Incentives and Earned Privileges (IEP) system for prisoners. PIVCs reported issues with six local establishments concerning the operation of the IEP system in 2010: Hachioji, Ichihara, Matsumoto YOI, Sasebo, Toyama and Wakayama Prisons (C.B. 2010). The reports sorted these issues into three categories: 1. the fairness of IEP provision; 2. inappropriate measures taken in decisions about the IEP level; and 3. the contents of privilege. However, according to the PIVC reports, none of these issues were strongly related to suicide control (see Table 5.5).

Hence, in regard to the reward system, the issues raised in the PIVC reports do not indicate that the IEP system was widely misused in Japanese prisons for controlling suicide and self-harm. Thus, it can be concluded that a majority of local establishments used the IEP system appropriately. Therefore, in regard to the use it makes of reward to control the risks of suicide and violence, the Japanese service can be ranked at the second highest group level and assigned a score of +2, (majority of local establishments appropriately conduct reward). (see Appendix 2). By combining this score with the one for punishment, the Japanese prison service can be assigned a total score of +4 for this sub-code.

Table 5.5: Issues raised about the IEP system in PIVC reports in 2010 (JMOJ 2010)

| Prisons | Issues raised for the IEP system in local establishments |
|---|---|
| Hachioji | 1. Equality of the IEP system<br>If prisoners change their training programmes from the normal training workshop to the occupational therapy, they are dropped their privilege from tier.3 to tier.4. Some prisoners complained about this. |
| Ichihara | 1. Equality of the IEP system<br>The IEP is not considered in the decision of the parole release. Although some prisoners have penalty records, they get the parole release. Other prisoners who are ranked tier.1 without any adjudication records, could not get the parole. |
| Matsumoto YOI | 3. Contents of privileges<br>The IEP should be the privilege for purchasing variety of snacks |
| Sasebo | 3. Contents of privileges<br>The prison should provide the privilege for purchasing snacks in the prison |
| Toyama | 2. Inappropriate measures for the IEP<br>In order to decide the IEP levels for prisoners, the prison forces prisoners to record the time they went to the toilet during the prison workshop. It is considered as the violation of prisoners' human right. (The record was abolished in 2011) |
| Wakayama | 3. Contents of privileges<br>The prison should install air conditioners or electric fans in all cells irrespective of the IEP level, considering the high temperatures and humidity of the area where the prison is situated. |

## 5.3.2: Violence

**England**

*Punishment:*

HMPS gives prisoners disciplinary charges in response to violent behaviour. The compliance level of HMPS regarding the operation of punishment and reward systems is measured here in terms of the performance ratings provided by HMCIP reports into local prisons.

HMIP assesses the appropriateness of the adjudication procedures for issuing punishments according to four criteria: 1. fairness; 2. reasonableness; 3. informed consent for prisoners; and 4. sufficiency of procedures (HMIP, 2009a). Following these criteria, it was reported that the systems in place for issuing punishments, including the nature of the punishments and adjudication records, are satisfactory in most local establishments. I overviewed the latest HMCIP full inspection reports for 74 local establishments, of which only one, HMP Brixton, was seriously criticised for the ways in which it disciplined prisoners. In particular, it was found that prisoners were being punished informally and that adjudication procedures were inadequate (HMCIP 2008b).

A few minor issues were also raised about the use of punishment in some local establishments. HMCIP suggested that some prisons should use alternative control methods. For example, it was reported of HMP Pentonville (HMCIP, 2009m) that although the disciplinary procedures were generally appropriate, prisoners were being confined to their cells too regularly as a form of punishment. Alternative or more effective forms of punishment were recommended by the inspector. It was found that formal adjudication procedures were being used in HMP Cookhamwood in cases where problems could be solved through an informal minor caution to prisoners. Nevertheless, it was still reported that disciplinary procedures were conducted fairly at the prison (HMCIP, 2009d). Similarly, it was suggested that HMP Isle of Wight (HMCIP, 2010f) should use the IEP system instead of issuing punishments as a way of controlling certain types of anti-disciplinary behaviour. Thus, it can be seen that the report made suggestions to some local establishments about alternative ways of disciplining prisoners. This type of action should be considered part of efforts to improve disciplinary procedures in HM prisons rather than evidence of those procedures being misused.

Therefore, it can be concluded that a majority of local establishments in HMPS operated their adjudication systems appropriately. According to the compliance rank

and scores (see Appendix 2), HMPS can be ranked at the second highest group level and given a score of +2 for this sub-code.

*Reward:*

It was noted in chapter 4 that HMPS used the IEP system for controlling violence in local establishments. According to HMCIP reports, the appropriateness in use of the IEP varies among local establishments. Reading through HMCIP reports, mainly three issues were found in relation to the appropriateness of operating the IEP system in local establishments: 1. poor understanding of the IEP system among staff members and prisoners in local establishments, 2.unfair or inappropriate procedures and assessments for prisoners in operating the IEP; and 3. contents of privileges do not motivate prisoners. Most local establishments showed one or more those issues.

Table 5.6 is a summary of ways of operating the IEP systems by local establishments mentioned HMCIP reports. Again, the first left column displays types issues in local establishments raised above, and the second and third left columns display names of prisons and the years in which inspections took place. Details of issues corresponding to each establishment are summarised in the last column (see p.175). In regard to the first issue, I refer to the cases of HMPs Bristol (HMCIP, 2010d), Wandsworth (HMCIP, 2009p), Style (HMCIP, 2008f), Peterborough (HMCIP, 2006e) and Stocken (HMCIP, 2010g). It was reported that neither prisoners nor prison staff understood the IEP system in any of these establishments. Moreover, staff members in HMPs Style and Wandsworth used the IEP system as a negative means of warning prisoners whose behaviour was not good (HMCIP, 2008f and 2009p: see Table 5.6). These cases also suggest that prison staff bends the IEP system in negative ways in some establishments.

In regard to the second issue, I refer to the cases of HMPs Pentonville (HMCIP, 2009m), Preston (HMCIP, 2009n), Ryehill (HMCIP, 2007g), Whatton (HMCIP, 2007h), and Brixton (HMCIP, 2008b). It was reported that the IEP system was being used in these establishments in ways that did not reflect prisoners' behaviour, or that the procedures were inconsistent (see Table 5.6). For example, HMP Preston was criticised for inconsistencies in how it operated the IEP procedures. The IEP levels of prisoners in the prison were determined by a monthly behavioural rating system. However, this system was not monitored well by managers, and prisoners could not get high enough ratings to gain privileges (HMCIP, 2009n). Inappropriate ways of using the IEP system

were also found in the other prisons noted above. (see Table 5.6). IEP procedures were misused by prison staff in all of these establishments.

Lastly in regard to the third issue, I refer to cases reported about HMPs Cookhamwood (HMCIP, 2009d) and Risely (HMCIP, 2006f). Firstly, it was reported that prisoners in HMP Cookhamwood did not view the IEP system as motivational because the rewards on offer were not attractive to them (HMCIP, 2009d). Similarly, it was found that the IEP system operated by HMP Risely did not work sufficiently towards the end of modifying prisoners' behaviour (HMCIP, 2006f) (see Table 5.6). All of these local establishments showed that the IEP system is not appropriately used as the system is originally intended to.

Thus, the appropriateness of the IEP scheme varies between local establishments. For this reason, according to the compliance ranks and scores table (see Appendix 2), HMPS can be ranked at the second lowest group level and assigned a score of +1 for the use of reward. Combining the scores for punishment (+2) and reward, HMPS can be given a total score of +3 for this sub-code.

Table 5.6: Case Studies: issues raised about the operation of the IEP scheme in local establishments

| issues | Prisons | Years of Inspect. | Reviews |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. poor understanding of the IEP system among staff and prisoners | Bristol | 2010 | The IEP is clear but not always consistently applied. Prisoners were not always set improvement targets or routinely invited to attend review boards |
| | Wandsworth | 2009 | Staff and prisoners generally perceived the IEP scheme as a system of warnings with sanctions attached. |
| | Style | 2008 | The IEPpolicy was not fully understood by all staff . |
| | Peterborough | 2006 | The IEP policy was up to date and thorough but complicated by too many forms, most of which were unused. |
| | Stocken | 2010 | The IEP was generally understood by staff but prisoners were unsure how it worked, other than in a punitive way. |
| 2. Unfair or inappropriate procedures and assessments | Pentonville | 2009 | Most prisoners had little engagement with the IEP scheme. –Prisoners had to wait too long to apply for the enhanced level. –Some prisoners were downgraded a level after being charged with offences against prison rules even before the charge was heard. – monitoring was inadequate and other than ethnic monitoring there was no general monitoring of the fairness or operation of the scheme. |
| | Preston | 2009 | A monthly behavioural rating system for all prisoners was not sufficiently consistent, nor adequately supported and checked by managers.There was some evidence that minority groups may have been disadvantaged in the application of the IEP scheme. |
| | Ryehill | 2007 | The (IEP) scheme was not an effective means of managing behaviour and too many prisoners remained inappropriately on one of the two enhanced levels. |
| | Whatton | 2007 | The recently revised IEP scheme was applied inconsistently across the prison. |
| | Brixton | 2008 | The lowest level of the scheme was overly punitive and there were insufficient monitoring and safeguards to ensure each prisoner's welfare. |
| 3. Incentives do not motivate prisoners | Cookhamwood | 2009 | None of the young people that we spoke to felt there was sufficient differential between the levels to provide incentive for them. |
| | Risely | 2006 | The IEP scheme was not being used sufficiently to help encourage and control prisoner behaviour |

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**Japan**

In addition to suicide control, the Japanese prison service uses punishment and reward to control violence in prisons. Unlike HMPS, it is difficult to investigate the appropriateness of the disciplinary and incentive systems operated in each prison because the Japanese prison service does not make information available on each establishment. Therefore, this section uses the available national prison service data to analyse how appropriately punishment and reward are used to control violence in local establishments.

*Punishment:*

As I mentioned in the previous section on suicide control (see Sec. 5.3.1), the Japanese prison service insists that punishments are issued strictly in line with the appropriate adjudication procedures in most prisons (JMOJ, 2003). Nevertheless, the available data suggests that prisons generally overuse punishment as a means of controlling violence.

Firstly, Amnesty International Japan (AIJ) (1998) has reported that Japanese prisons generally use punishment as a way of warning other prisoners rather than penalising the aggressive behaviour of individual prisoners. For example, some prisoners were punished for slightly anti-social behaviour by being confined to segregation cells (*ibid*.). The AIJ was supported by evidence given by an anonymous prison officer about his experiences working in Japanese prisons. This officer claimed to have sent many prisoners to segregation units as a punishment for anti-social behaviour even though most of them were not seriously violent (*ibid*.). Hence punishment is overused in Japanese prisons as a way of making examples of prisoners who have committed even minor offences with the aim of maintaining control over the behaviour of all prisoners.

This issue was raised by the CARC in 2003, and a representative of AIJ provided supporting testimony (JMOJ, 2003). Nevertheless, statistical data show that punishment continues to be overused following the 2003 reforms. Table 5.7 compares the number of punishments conducted against incidences of violence and serious assault based on national correctional statistics of the number of reported assaults and punishments issued thereof between 2002 to 2007 (C.B., 2009; JMOJ, 2007, 2008, and 2009). The table shows that the number of punishments issued for violent behaviour is significantly higher than the number of recorded assaults over the same period. Table 5.7 also shows the relationship between the number of self-inflicted deaths and punishments issued for self-harm over the 2002-8 period. By comparing these figures, it

can be seen that the number of punishments issued for violence is excessively high in relation to the number of assaults.   This tendency has not changed since the penal reform in 2003.

Table 5.7: National statistics: N of assaults and punishments issued for violent behaviour between 2002 and 2008 in the Japanese prison service

| Years | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N of Assault incidents* | 9 | 7 | 10 | 15 | 25 | 12 | 8 |
| N of Punishment given to Violent behaviour*1 | 7119 | 7607 | 7639 | 7391 | 7559 | 6997 | 5132 |
| N of Self-inflicted deaths incidents*1 | 18 | 15 | 20 | 15 | 18 | 21 | 25 |
| Punishment to self-harm*1 | 684 | 744 | 1000 | 1070 | 1010 | 1349 | 1441 |
| Total N of Punishment* 1 given to all anti-disciplinary behaviour | 42313 | 45759 | 50149 | 56182 | 62306 | 70436 | 71450 |
| Prison Population*1 | 67354 | 71889 | 75289 | 77932 | 80335 | 80684 | 78533 |

*C.B（2009）*Kyosei no Gen jo. Tokyo, C.B*

 *1 JMoJ（2007 2008, 2009, and 2010）*Kyosei Tokei Nenpo*. 2006,2007, 2008, and 2009

Table 5.8: National statistics: N of assaults and punishments issued for violent behaviour between 2004 and 2008 in HMPS[1]

| HMPS* | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N of Assault incidents | 12613 | 14411 | 15057 | 15272 | 15959 |
| N of Punishment against violent behaviour | 17040 | 18134 | – | 17677 | 18788 |
| POPULATION | 74657 | 75979 | 78127 | 80216 | 82572 |

Additionally, Table 5.8 shows the national statistics concerning the number of serious assaults and punishments issued against violent behaviour in HMPS between 2004 and 2008. In comparison with the Japanese prison service, the balance between the numbers of reported incidents and punishments issued are consistently close. This may be taken as a further indicator that Japanese prisons generally make excessive use of disciplinary measures to control violence. As AIJ reported, these statistics may include

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[1]  Data gained from Table. 9.3 of Home Office( 2005 and 2006) *Offender Management Caseload Statistics* 2004 and 2005 ; and MOJ (2008,2009, and 2010b) *Offender Management Caseload Statistics* 2007, 2008 and 2009

cases in which punishment was used to make examples of individual prisons for minor offences.

It can thus be concluded that Japanese prisons generally overuse punishment to control prisoners' behaviour. This situation suggests that disciplinary procedures are not standardized throughout the prison service and that there is variation in local decision-making about how punishments should be issued (for example, as way of warning other prisoners against committing certain offences). Accordingly, the Japanese prison service can be ranked at the second lowest group level ("the appropriateness of punishment varies between local establishments") and assigned a score of +1 for this sub-code.

*Reward:*

In regard to reward systems, PIVC reports show that there is no strong evidence to indicate that the IEP system is used inappropriately in Japanese prisons to control the risks of suicide (see Sec. 5.3.1 and Table 5.4). Meanwhile, as I mentioned above, it was difficult to collect information about how the IEP system is used in all local establishments in the Japanese prison service. In cases of violence control, the PIVC reports did not raise any issues of the IEP system within local establishments in relation to local violence control (see Table. 5.5). Hence, as with suicide control, it can be concluded here that a majority of local establishments in Japan make appropriate use of the IEP system for the purposes of violence control. In terms of the compliance rank and scores table, this result can be ranked at the second highest group level and a score of +2 can be assigned to the Japanese prison service. Next, by adding this result with the score given for punishment, the Japanese prison service can be assigned a total score of + 3 for this sub-code.

## 5.4: Implementation of key national guidelines in local establishments

The fourth code concerns the compliance level of the English and Japanese prison services in regard to key strategic national guidelines on suicide and violence control.

### 5.4.1: Suicide

**England**

It was noted in chapter 4 that the key strategic guidelines for suicide control are defined in PSO 2700 (*Self-harm and Suicide Prevention*). According to HMCIP reports, all local establishments must follow the first requirement of PSO 2700. All local establishments define local suicide control strategies following the guidelines set out in PSO 2700 and the ACCT approach. No exception was found among local establishments in this first stage.

Although local establishments mainly follow the national guidelines, the quality of the local strategies they develop for controlling suicide based on the guidelines set out in PSO 2700 varies between them. Reading through HMCIP reports, four main issues were found concerning the development of adequate local suicide and self-harm strategies: 1. collecting and analysing a sufficient amount of information for ACCT and cases of suicide and self-harm; 2. updating and developing adequate and coherent strategies based on local experiences; 3. providing sufficient training for staff members; and 4. Ensuring that prison staff understand and participate in local suicide strategies. HMCIP reports reported that most local establishments failed to achieve at least of one of these standards.

Table 5.9 provides a summary of data gathered from HMCIP reports about the ways in which different local establishments implement national suicide control guidelines. The first column from the left displays the types of issues raised above. The second and third columns show the names of prisons and the years in which inspections took place. Details of issues corresponding to each establishment are summarised in the last column. In regard to the first issue, I refer to the cases of HMPs Altcourse (HMCIP, 2010), Birmingham (HMCIP, 2007a), Stoke Heath (HMCIP, 2010g), and Wandsworth (HMCIP, 2009p). It was reported of these local establishments that the procedures for collecting and analysing data about cases of suicide and self-harm were inadequate (see Table 5.9). In regard to the second issue, I refer to the cases of HMPs Ashfield (HMCIP, 2010a), Ashwell (HMCIP, 2010b), Blantyre House (HMCIP, 2010c), and New Hall (HMCIP, 2008). The HMCIP reports

state that the suicide and self-harm control strategies operated by these establishments were inadequate or inconsistent. Of these prisons, HMPs Ashfield, Ashwell, and New Hall showed some common problems which meant they fell short of the guidelines on suicide control provided by PSO 2700 and the ACCT scheme (HMCIP, 2010a, 2010b, and 2008e). By contrast, HMP Blantyre House's suicide control strategy was evaluated as too complex and not coherent for staff members (HMCIP, 2010c). In all these cases, the suicide control strategies were not considered to meet the quality of local suicide control strategies is not adequate in response to standards set out in PSO 2700 (see Table 5.9)..

The third issue concerns whether prison staff are given sufficient training to implement the ACCT guidelines effectively. PSO 2700 requires local establishments to provide their staff with adequate training for the ACCT scheme. However, it was reported of HM Preston that too few staff had received the relevant ACCT training (HMCIP, 2009n). In order to fully implement PSO 2700 and the ACCT approach, local establishments must fulfil the necessary training requirements. As well as insufficiency of ACCT training for staff members, poor understanding and participation of ACCT procedures, as the fourth issue, were also reported of many local establishments. For example, staff at HMP Aylesbury was reported to be poorly engaged in the local suicide control policy (HMCIP, 2009). Meanwhile, poor staff attendance at necessary meetings and a lack of understanding of local suicide control strategies were flagged up as issues for HMPs Acklington and Buckley Hall (HMCIP, 2006 and 2007b: see Table 5.9).

Poor understanding of ACCT procedures was also highlighted among staff at HMP Brixton. In response to the suicide prevention strategy based on PSO 2700, some staff members commented as follows: *"only recently staff have started to see one to one on ACCTs. Doing it by the book all of a sudden but it won't last at all for the inspection."*, and *"I was told to clear my own blood up (for self-harm and suicide control). It's just a box ticking exercise with ACCT and they just don't bother with you"* (HMCIP, 2008b). These remarks suggest that staff members do not only have a poor understanding of suicide control strategies based on the national guidelines, but also tend to take a negative view of them. Moreover, some of the governors with whom I conducted interviews showed similar ways of thinking about national suicide control guidelines. In particular, they considered PSO 2700 and the ACCT guidelines to be too complex, ignoring the realities of local establishments, and too difficult for anybody except key staff members specialised for ACCT to understand. This evidence suggests

that PSO 2700 does not effectively modify how staff members think about local suicide control strategies.

Finally, several of the problems raised above were found with some local suicide control strategies. For example, HMP Mount was found not to be providing sufficient training for a majority of its staff members and the quality of ACCT documents was not inadequate but the quality was varied (HMIP, 2009k). In this case a insufficient data collection was combined with a lack of staff training. Meanwhile, HMP Wymott was found not to analysing trends of suicide and self-harm, and their local suicide control strategy was inadequate level (HMCIP 2008h; see Table 5.9). Hence the quality of the approaches taken by local establishments to suicide control in response to strategic national guidelines varies from prison to prison.

Thus, in terms of the compliance level, although all local establishments establish local suicide control strategies, following PSO, the quality and approaches varies by local establishments. According to the compliance rank and scores table (see Appendix 2), these circumstances can be ranked at the second lowest group level; (a majority of local establishments implement key national guidelines. But the quality varies between them), and HMPS can be assigned a score of + 2 in terms of suicide control for this sub-code.

Table 5.9: Case studies of the implementation of local suicide control strategies

| | Prisons | Years of Inspec. | Reviews |
|---|---|---|---|
| **1. collecting and analysinginformation** | Altcourse | 2010 | Action plans from previous deaths in custody were not reviewed periodically. |
| | Birmingham | 2007 | the quality of entries and of some reviews was frequently poor and the focus was on process rather than quality. |
| | Stoke Heath | 2010 | The level of self-harm was relatively high, but there was little analysis of trends or patterns. |
| | Wandsworth | 2009 | No investigations were carried out into near-death incidents. |
| **2. updating and developing adequate and coherent strategies** | Ashfield | 2010 | There were inconsistencies in the（ACCT）process as part of the general management of vulnerable young people. |
| | Ashwell | 2010 | there were no protocols to support Listeners, who did not have sufficient freedom of movement within the prison. |
| | Blantyre House | 2010 | The self-harm and suicide policy was over-detailed. |
| | New Hall | 2008 | ACCT procedures did not sufficiently include other disciplines or harness. |
| **3. Staff members were not trained for the ACCT scheme.** | | | |
| | Preston | 2009 | Too few staff were ACCT trained. |
| **4. Poor understanding of staff members** | Acklington | 2006 | The suicide prevention coordinator had not attended regularly, although he provided a monthly statistical report. |
| | Aylesbury | 2009 | There was a multidisciplinary approach to caring for those at risk, but also examples of poor practice and lack of staff engagement in self-harm monitoring documents |
| | Buckley Hall | 2007 | The last four meetings of the suicide prevention team had been chaired by different senior managers; Attendance at team meetings by some departments was poor. |
| | Brixton | 2008 | Prison Officers' views: 'Only recently staff have started to see one to one on ACCTs. Doing it by the book all of a sudden but it won't last as all for the inspection.' 'Self-harm is shocking; I was told to clear my own blood up. It's just a box ticking exercise with ACCT and they just don't bother with you.' |
| **5. The local strategies include multiple issues** | Mount | 2009 | Too few staff had been trained in ACCT procedures. The quality of ACCT documents varied. |
| | Wymott | 2008 | Identification and analysis of safer custody data were underdeveloped. The safer custody strategy was too long and inaccessible. Attendance at the safer custody meeting was generally good, but health services staff often did not attend . |

**Japan**

Unlike HMPS, the Japanese prison service does not have any formal strategic guidelines concerning the control of suicide and self-harm, but have formal ordinance [*kunrei*] and instructions [*tsutatsu*] which define relevant techniques to control suicide in prisons. Chapter 4 concluded that it is considered to have informal agreement which integrate all relevant rules (*kunrei* and *tsutatsu*) (see Sec. 4.4.1). Based on this discussion in chapter 4, this section analyses and measures the compliance level of local establishments in response to those relevant regulatory codes relating to suicide and self-harm control as introduced in chapter 4.

Firstly, Instruction [*tsutatsu*] 61 (*reminder of suicide prevention*) reminds local establishments to take measures to prevent prisoners from committing suicide. This instruction is only a general reminder to local establishments that they should manage suicide and self-harm. It does not place any specific requirements on them hence it is not suitable for measuring their compliance level. Secondly, a "suicide risk assessment sheet" has been introduced by Instruction [*tsutatsu*] 770 in order to assess prisoners at risk of committing suicide. Although there is no official data to indicate the overall compliance level of local establishments in regard to the risk assessment sheet, according to staff in the national HQs with whom I conducted interviews the frequency with which it is used varies from prison to prison.

Thirdly, in regard to the compliance level of segregating prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm, and the use protection cells (Art. 76 and 79, *the Penal Institutions Act;* and *tsutatsu 3405*), JMOJ and National Police Agency (NPA) published *The Report of the Status of Enforcement of The Penal Institutions Act* [*Keijishisetu oyobi Hishyuyoshato no Shogu ni Kansuru Horitsu no Shikojokyo ni tsuite*] in order to assess the impact of the penal reform and new primarily legislation issued in 2006 (JMOJ and NPA, 2011)[2]. In this report, the national N of reported segregation and use of protection cells between 2006 and 2010 are published (see Table 5.10 and 11). Table 5.10 shows that the number of recorded cases of segregation dramatically decreased between 2007 and 2009. Meanwhile, Table 5.11 shows that the use of protection cells is not fluctuated after *the Penal Institutions Act* was issued in 2006.

In terms of the appropriate use of segregation protection cells, JMOJ and NPA reported that most local establishments generally have generally used segregation and protection cells appropriately over the recent 5 years (JMOJ and NPA, 2011). This

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[2] In regard to the background of the new primarily legislation (*Penal Institutions Act*), see pp. 87-88, Chapter 3.

evaluation does not necessarily guarantee that protection cells are used properly in local establishments. However, other data available on this matter do not show any widespread abuse of protection cells. Hence, following the general assumption which measure the compliance level discussed in chapter 3, (in cases where the national prison service officially insists that local establishments generally comply with the relevant rules; if no reliable data is available indicating that local establishments implement rules inappropriately, it is assumed that majority of local establishments appropriately comply with those rules.) (see p. 107). Additionally, in regard to the use of force (Art. 78, *The Penal Institutions Act*, and Ordinance 33528), JOMJ and NPO have also published national statistics on the use of handcuffs and straitjackets to control the risks of suicide and self-harm (JMOJ and NPA, 2011: see Table. 5.12). However it is not clear to what extent this equipment was considered to have been used appropriately in local establishments.

Table 5.10: National statistics on the reported number of cases of segregation between 2006 and 10 (JMOJ and NPA, 2011)

| Years | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N of segregation | 100 | 95 | 35 | 37 | 22 |

Table 5.11: National statistics on the reported N of uses of protection cells (JMOJ and NPA 2011)

| | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N of reported use of protection cells (National statistics) | 9778 | 10769 | 10023 | 10109 | 9828 |

Table 5.12: National record of how often handcuffs and straitjackets were used to control the risks of suicide and self-harm between 2006 and 2010 (JMOJ and NPA 2011)

| Years | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| handcuffs | 326 | 308 | 250 | 297 | 264 |
| straitjackets | 10 | 12 | 1 | 9 | 12 |
| Total | 336 | 320 | 251 | 306 | 276 |

In regard to post-incident procedures, firstly, *kunrei* 3379 requests serving governors to investigate deaths in prisons. The available data did not show how well this rule was followed in local establishments. Meanwhile, Instruction [*tsutasu*] 210 defines to announce self-inflicted deaths to the public through media. The prison service did not particularly mention about how far local establishments follow this instruction when suicide incident occurs. @Nifty News Search brings up 131 articles on suicide in

Japanese prisons published in the major national newspapers in Japan between March 2007 and April 2008 (@Nifty 2011[3]). As a result of excluding articles covering the same incidents and totally irrelevant ones, 25 cases of suicide incidents were reported from 16 relevant local establishments. Those reported incidents throughout the media met the number of suicide incidents reported by the Japanese prison service in 2008 (see Table 5.3). Hence *tsutatsu* 210 is considered to be followed by the most relevant establishments.

Overall, the compliance level of the Japanese prison service in regard to relevant rules concerned with local suicide control strategies varies depending on which rules should be followed. Instruction 770 showed that the compliance of local establishments varies. On the contrary, segregation and the use of protection cells are assumed that majority of local establishments adequately use protection cells according to the report by JMOJ and NPA. Also, media reports suggested that Instruction 210 was complied with relevant local establishments. Meanwhile, the compliance level of use of force was uncertain according to accessible data. These results do not fully fit the compliance ranks and scoring criteria outlined in chapter 3 (see Appendix 2). Nevertheless, by emphasizing variations in the compliance level depending on which rules are relevant, I have provisionally assigned the second lowest group level (the implementation of key national guidelines varies widely among local establishments ) and a score of + 1 to the Japanese prison service for this sub-code.

### 5.4.2: Violence

**England**

HMPS sets out guidelines for controlling violence in PSO 2750 (*Violence Reduction*). As well as suicide guidelines, PSO 2750 requests that local establishments set local violence control strategies, suggesting several possible criteria for doing so. All establishments are expected to follow these guidelines to some extent in establishing their local violence control strategies.

However, as with suicide control strategies, the quality of those local violence control strategies varies between local establishments. Reading through HMCIP reports, five main issues were found concerning the development of adequate local suicide and self-harm strategies: 1. information collection and analysis: monitoring or reviewing data; 2 development of coherent and sufficient violence reduction strategies based on

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[3] Keywords used for the search: Suicide [自殺] and Prisons [刑務所].
Period: 01/04/2007 and 31/03/2008 (This period is based on the Japanese business and financial calendar year).

local experiences; 3. appropriate use of force and segregation units; 4. involvement of relevant staff teams and participation of staff members and prisoners; 5. Histories and contexts of local establishments in relation to violence .

Table 5.13 summarizes data gathered from HMCIP reports about how different local establishments operate violence control guidelines.   The first column from the left displays the types of issues raised above. The second and third columns show the names of prisons and the years in which inspections took place.   Details of issues by establishments are summarised in the last column. In regard to the first issue, I refer to cases in HMPs Castington, Exeter, Lancaster Castle, and Usk (HMCIP, 2009c, 2009e, 2007f, and 2010h). It was reported that information collection and analysis were insufficient in all of these prisons. HMPs Exeter and Usk monitored cases of violence poorly (HMCIP, 2009e and 2010h). Meanwhile, HMPs Castington and Lancaster Castle did not assess trends in violence and bullying based on local experiences of those problems (HMCIP, 2009c and 2007f) (see Table 5.13).

In regard to the second issue, I refer to cases in HMPs Bristol (HMCIP, 2010d), Brixton (HMCIP, 2009b), and East Sutton Park (HMCIP, 2006c). It was reported that although local violence control strategies did exist in these prisons, they were not sufficiently coherent. In particular, the staff guidelines provided by HMP Bristol were reported to be overly detailed (HMCIP 20010d). Meanwhile, the violence control strategies operated by HMPs Brixton and East Sutton Park were found to be underdeveloped and not to reflect issues in those prisons (see Table 5.13).

In regard to the third issue, I refer to the case of HMP Chelmsford. Importantly, PSO 2750 (*Violence Reduction*) refers to PSO 1700 (*Use of Force*), stating that local violence control strategies should not rely on excessive use of force.   HMP Chelmsford was reported to be overusing force to prevent violence. Specifically, the use of body belts to control prisoners was considered to be excessive (HMCIP, 2007d).

In regard to the fourth issue, I refer to cases in HMPs Lowdham Grange (HMCIP, 2006d) and Warren Hill (HMCIP, 2009q). It was reported that there was not sufficient involvement of staff members and prisoners in violence control strategies in these prisons. For example, staff members at HMP Lowdham Grange were found to be poorly trained in a newly launched local anti-bullying strategy (HMCIP, 2006d). Meanwhile, at HMP Warren Hill it was reported that prisoners did not understand the violence reduction strategies (HMCIP, 2009q). As with suicide control, in order to appropriately implement local violence control strategies based on the national

guidelines, it is necessary to make sure staff members understand the relevant policies in local prisons.

Lastly, the fifth issue concerns the effects and outcomes of local violence control strategies. Prison inspectors have found that some local establishments have difficulty demonstrating the effects of their violence control strategies. Although the strategies in question were basically adequate in terms of the four issues raised above, the prisons could not effectively reduce violence. For example, HMP Brinsford was found to have its own well-established anti-bullying strategy, yet the level of violence and bullying in the prison was still high (HMCIP, 2009a). Similarly, it was reported of HMP Pentonville that many prisoners felt unsafe in spite of a formal violence control strategy launched by the prison (HMCIP 2009m).

When asked about the ineffectiveness of violence reduction strategies, one governor whom I interviewed explained that their success depends on the characteristics and historical contexts of different prisons. According to him, some prisons have long-term issues with violence whereas others do not. For example, the Howard League has reported that HM Pentonville has been performing poorly in the implementation of a range of violence reduction measures for a long time (Howard League, 2007). The causes of these failures are complicated and reflect different circumstances in the prison: for example, drug culture among prisoners and poor morale among staff members (*ibid.*). This case showed that the success of formal strategies based on national guidelines depends on the contexts of different prisons.

The final issue concerning local violence reduction strategies is that they often underperform in more than one of the criteria discussed above. Indeed, some prisons have failed to meet more than two of these criteria. For example, a violence reduction strategy operated by HMP Liverpool was not well developed, but predominant culture in particular units of prisons made prisoners difficult to believe local violence control procedures protect them, and it made governor more difficult to effectively develop local violence strategies (HMCIP 2009j). In these respects, HMP Liverpool had complex problems with issue 2 (development of coherent and sufficient violence reduction strategies based on local experiences), issue 4 (involvement of relevant staff teams and participation of staff members and prisoners), and issue 5 (histories and context). Other relevant cases are listed in Table 5.13 including those in which multiple problems were found.

Table 5.13 Case studies: issues raised about violence reduction strategies in local establishments

| | Prisons | Years of inspection | Reviews |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Information collection and analysis | Castington | 2009 | The opportunity to understand the extent of violence and bullying was not fully used. |
| | Exeter | 2009 | Systems that had been introduced to monitor bullying and violence reduction were not being used. There was insufficient investigation of safety issues, |
| | Lancaster Castle | 2007 | There was a low incidence of bullying. The low number of violent incidents suggested that there was some under-recording. |
| | Usk | 2010 | The monthly safer prisons meeting did not sufficiently address patterns and trends, and the policy needed to be updated and more widely publicised |
| 2. Sufficiency and Coherence of local establishments | Bristol | 2010 | Some guidance for staff was over-complicated. |
| | Brixton | 2008 | Anti-bullying and violence reduction procedures were underdeveloped. Gang culture and violence were not addressed effectively. There was no central register for indicators of violence. |
| | East Sutton Park | 2006 | The strategy and policies did not reflect the specific issues in an open prison environment. Staff rarely resorted to formal bullying procedures but addressed problems early and resolved them effectively through mediation. |
| 3. Inappropriate use of force | | | |
| | Chelmsford | 2007 | The use of force by staff was high, and did not always appear justified: There had been four uses of the body belt in the six months before the inspection. |
| 4. Poor involvement of staff team and prisoners | Lowdham Grange | 2006 | Anti-bullying procedures were improving and prisoners reported low levels of bullying. But the formal procedures were under used and staff were not sufficiently trained. |
| | Warren Hill | 2009 | A new anti-bullying policy had been introduced very recently, but there was already evidence that it was not being implemented properly. Staff did not understand the basis of the policy and had not been adequately trained. |
| 5. Ineffectiveness of strategies in prisons | Brinsford | 2009 | The number of violent incidents was high. Although anti-bullying measures were well established, many prisoners reported that bullying was a problem. |
| | Pentonville | 2009 | Many prisoners felt unsafe. Violent incidents associated with trading in drugs and mobile telephones had been identified as a concern and efforts were being made to address this. the formal strategy for responding to bullying and violent behaviour was not used effectively. |
| Mixture of some of those | Liverpool | 2009 | Governance of the violence reduction committee and tackling anti-social behaviour meeting needed improvement. The strategy to address anti-social behaviour and bullying was ineffective and not robustly managed. The predominant culture in residential areas did not give prisoners confidence that procedures would protect them. |
| | Northallerton | 2005 | Too little facility time was provided for safer custody work. The standard of investigation into alleged incidents was mixed. One-to-one support was not always available to victims and there was no intervention programme for bullies |

These cases studies show that although all local establishments generally follow the relevant national guidelines, the quality of local violence reduction strategies varies between them. The issue of effectiveness, in particular, indicates that some prisons have difficulties controlling violence using formal strategies based on the national guidelines. Therefore, according to the compliance rank and scores chart, HMPS can be given the second lowest group rank and assigned a score of +2 for this sub-code.

**Japan**

Unlike HMPS, the Japanese prison service does not have formal national guideline concerning local violence control strategies. Thus, this section analyses the compliance level of local establishments in response to subordinate regulatory codes (*i.e. kunrei* and *tsutasu*) on violence control. As well as suicide control, the local level of information was not available in the Japanese prison service. Hence I analyse the compliance level according to the national level of data.

Firstly, informal strategies for controlling prisoners who have histories of belonging to Japanese gangs (Hamai, 2006) were introduced in chapter 4 (see p.147). As I explained, local establishments put the letter "G" on the records of these prisoners. According to Hamai (2006), the standard way of recognising prisoners as gang members varies between local establishments. Some prisons mark prisoners' records with "G" only if they are currently gang members. Meanwhile, other prisons recognise prisoners as gang members only if they have belonged to gangs within the past 10 years. Thus, this rule is operated differently according to the standards of each local establishment.

Secondly, in terms of the compliance level of local prisons in regard to the segregation of violent prisoners and the use of protection cells (Arts 76 and 79, *The Penal Institutions Act*), JMOJ and NPA reported that that most local establishments generally have generally used segregation and protection cells appropriately over the past 5 years (JMOJ and NPA, 2011) as discussed in Section 5.4.1 above. Since other data available on this matter, it should follow the general assumption rules which measure the compliance level, (it is assumed that majority of local establishments appropriately comply with the relevant rules in cases where the national prison service officially insists that local establishments generally comply with the relevant rules, if no reliable data is available indicating that local establishments implement rules inappropriately,).

Thirdly, in terms of the use of force, Articles 77 and 78 of *The Penal Institutions Act* have defined how tools, including handcuffs defence, should be used in prisons. Also, Article 80 defines how light weapons should be used. In regard to use of the force, JMOJ and NPA published national record of the number of cases in which defence tools and light weapons were used between 2006 and 2010 (JMOJ and NPA, 2011). Table 5.14 displays these figures according to the types of weapons involved over the 2006-10 period: Figure 5.1 shows these statistics in the form of a line graph.

Table 5.14: Record of types of defence tools used between 2006 and 2010 (JMOJ amd NPA 2011)

| years | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| tear gas | 0 | 5 | 86 | 142 | 164 |
| tear gas bombs | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| handcuffs | 326 | 308 | 250 | 297 | 264 |
| other weapons | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 326 | 313 | 336 | 440 | 428 |

Figure.5.1: Trends in the use of defence tools



Table 5.14 shows that the total number of incidents in which force was used increased between 2006 and 2010. Figure 5.1 shows that whereas the use of handcuffs decreased, the use of tear gas increased from 5 to 86 between 2007 and 2008. In response to these figures, the Japanese prison service has only stated that they will make further efforts to ensure that force is used appropriately without analysing trends in local establishments (JMOJ, 2011). Accordingly, the extent to which force was used appropriately in the incidents covered by the 2006-10 statistics is not clear.

Thus, the compliance level of local establishments in response to relevant violence control rules varies depending on those rules. Firstly, the way of marking prisoners who have histories of belonging to gangs across the Japanese prison service varies among local establishments. Secondly, the report published by JMOJ and NPA show that the rules defining the procedures for segregating prisoners and the use of protection cells are complied with majority of local establishments. Thirdly, the compliance level of local establishments in regard to the use of force is uncertain because no detailed information has been made available about how appropriately force is used to control prisoners in them.

These results do not fully fit with the criteria for the compliance rank and scores table (see Appendix 2). However, the results discussed above show that the compliance level varies depending on which rules it covers. Thus, in response to the variations between the results for the relevant violence control rules discussed above, I have provisionally assigned the second lowest group level (the implementation of the suicide control strategy varies between local establishments) and a score of + 1 to the Japanese prison service for this sub-code.

## 5.5: Accountability in information recording and documentation systems

The final sub-code concerns the profiling level of the relevant information recording and documentation systems. In response to the rules defining those issues, this section measures the accountability of how information is recorded and documented in local establishments.

### 5.5.1: Suicide

**England**

PSO 2700 requires local establishments to maintain self-harm control strategies; recording ACCT documents and incident records based on SIRs (see Sec. 4.5.1). According to HMCIP reports, the accountability of documentation of these relating to PSO 2700 and ACCT is generally adequate in a majority of local establishments. Although a few problems were raised in most prisons, standards were still considered to be at an acceptable level.

In order to assess the accountability of documentation in local establishments, I reviewed HMCIP full inspection reports on 74 local establishments out of a total of 134 HM prisons. The standard of documentation was reported to be inadequate in only 7 of these prisons: namely HMPs Birmingham (HMCIP, 2007a), Doncaster (HMCIP, 2010e), East Sutton Park (2006c), Rislye (HMCIP, 2006f), Rye Hill (HMCIP, 2007g) Wandsworth (HMCIP, 2009p), and Winchester (HMCIP, 2007i). Those establishments were mainly underreporting self-harm incidents, or keeping poor and inadequate quality of ACCT documents (HMCIP 2006c, 2006f, 2007a, 2007g, 2007i, 2009p, 2010e). Meanwhile other majority of local establishments were reported that the quality of relevant is reasonably consistent.

Hence, it is considered here that information recording and documentation were sufficiently accountable in a majority of local establishments according to the standards set out in PSO 2700. According to the compliance rank and scores table, HMPS can be ranked at the second highest group level and given a score of +2 for this sub-code.

**Japan**

It was difficult to identify accountability of information records and documentation within each local establishment in Japan because the Japanese prison service does not disclose data about local establishments. Therefore, the profile level is analysed here using the reported issues concerning the accountability of relevant information records and documentation in the CARC 2003 and the latest national correctional statistical reports.

In relation to reporting cases of suicide and self-harm, the poor and inconsistent quality of adjudication and incident statistics reports in local establishments became an main issue in the CARC 2003 (JMOJ 2003). In response, the Japanese prison service issued the standardized guidelines and document formats for the relevant reports above by Ordinance 332 and 3351 with Instruction 542 since 2006 (see Sec. 4.5.1). In response to those guidelines, the correctional caseload statistics between 2002 and 2007 (JMOJ, 2008) show a slight improvement in terms of reporting punishments issued for acts of self-harm and suicide attempts. Although there was very little change in the number of self-inflicted deaths reported during this period, there were sharp increases in the number of reported punishments issued for self-harm in 2004 and 2007 (see Table 5.15 and Figure 5.2). Evidently, these statistics reflect the facts that 2004 was the first financial year after the CARC published its findings and 2007 was the first financial

year after Instruction 542 was issued. These figures indicate that the information recording and documentation systems operated by local establishments changed to some extent. Nevertheless, it is still not clear how far these records are accountable across local establishments in the Japanese prison service.

On the other hand, the accountability of local records on the use of segregation units and protection cells, as defined by Instructions 3346 and 3405, is not known by each local establishment. As I mentioned in Section 5.4.1, Table 10 and 11 showed the national statistics of recorded segregation and the use of protection cells (see Table 10 and 11). Although Table 10 suggests that the number of reported segregation was dramatically decreased between 2004 and 2007, it was not clear the influence of the relevant instruction over the compliance level of local establishments. The number of reported use of the protection cells did not show particular changes during the period (see Table 5.11). Additionally, JMOJ and NPA (2011) did not particularly mention how far local establishments keep accountable records of those procedures in the report. Accordingly, the compliance level of these rules is not certain.

Table 5.15: Annual national prison statistics: N of adjudications and self-inflicted deaths

| Years | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Self-inflicted deaths | 18 | 15 | 20 | 15 | 18 | 21 | 25 |
| Punishment against self-harm | 684 | 744 | 1000 | 1070 | 1010 | 1349 | 1441 |

Figure 5.2 Trends of N of recorded adjudications and self-inflicted deaths



Overall, the results are mixed. The CARC had reported that the quality of adjudication and incident records varies among local establishments in 2003. In response to this, latest national statistics regarding those records showed that local

establishments clearly responded positively to guidelines for incident and adjudication. Nevertheless, it is still unclear how far the quality and accountability of incident and adjudication reports had been improved across local establishments since 2003. Additionally, the compliance level of local establishments regarding segregation and protection cells is uncertain from available data.

Thus, it should be understood that although some improvements have been observed since 2003, the accountability of information recording and documentation still varies between local establishments. Thus, according to the compliance rank and scores table (see Appendix 2), this situation can be ranked at the second lowest compliance level, (the quality of accountable records and documentation about risk varies widely among local establishments), and the Japanese prison service can be assigned a score of +1 for this sub-code.

### 5.5.2: Violence

**England**

PSO 2700 requires large quantities of paperwork to be completed by prison staff about cases of violence and adjudication records where punishments have been issued. Furthermore, it requires databases to be kept on incidences of violence and bullying and the use of force and segregation.

The accountability of records of adjudication proceedings and punishments issued thereof were discussed in this chapter in section 5.3.2, specifically in regard to the appropriateness procedures of issuing punishment. This earlier discussion indicated that a majority of local establishments kept adequate records in this regard. Accordingly, this section focuses on the quality of the information recorded about the use of force and segregation to control prisoners (PSO 1700) and SIRs (PSO 1400).

According to HMCIP reports, a majority of local establishments kept adequate records on the use of force and segregation and incident reports. Again, I reviewed the most recent HMCIP full inspection reports for 74 local establishments. Only four of these prisons were reported to be keeping poor or insufficiently accountable records of the use of force, segregation and incident records which were not adequate for assessing trends in violence: namely HMPs Brixton (HMCIP, 2008b), Lancaster Castle (HMCIP 2007f), Risley (HMCIP, 2006f) and Rye Hill (HMCIP, 2007g). More specifically, it was reported of these establishments that report forms were either thoroughly incomplete or lacked details of incidents (HMCIP, 2008b, 2006f, and 2007g).

Alternatively, some cases of slight bullying, which were not causes of injuries for victims, were under-reported in the local establishment (HMCIP 2007f).

Nevertheless, a majority of local establishments were found to be keeping generally accountable documentation and information records during HM inspections. Hence, according to HMCIP reports, a majority of local establishments managed records and documentation properly. In regard to the compliance rank and scores table, these circumstances can be ranked at the second highest group level (accountable records and documentation about risk are kept by a majority of local establishments) and a score of +2 can be assigned to HMPS for this sub-code.

**Japan**

As explained in chapter 4, the Japanese prison service has a number of rules concerning violence-related information recording and documentation systems: incident and adjudication reports for the purpose of correctional statistics (Ordinance 332, Instruction 542 and 3351); segregation records (Instruction 3346 and 3405); records for transferring prisoners (Instruction 3316), and records for use of force (Ordinance 33258) (see Sec. 4.5.2).

Firstly, in regard to the compliance level of incidents and adjudication reports, the CARC was reported that the quality of relevant documentation was varied across local establishments in 2003 (JMOJ 2003). The prison service issued the relevant regulatory codes shown above in order to improve this problem in 2006 (see Sec. 4.5.1 and 4.5.2) In relation to the violence control, Table 5.7 (National statistics: N of assaults and punishments issued for violent behaviour between 2002 and 2008 in the Japanese prison service) and Figure 5.3 showed trends of incident and adjudication reports between 2002 and 2008. Figure 5.3 showed that the number of serious assaults and punishments showed no fluctuation since the new statistical guidelines were published in 2006. Additionally, as I mentioned in Sec. 5.3.2, the number of reported adjudication is constantly high than that of reported serious assault. Hence, it is not clear to what extent local establishments comply with these rules, or whether they had improved the quality of relevant documents since 2003.

Figure 5.3: N of assaults and punishments issued for violent behaviour between 2002 and 2008 in the Japanese prison service. (This graph is made of data in Table 5.7)



Secondly, in terms of the accountability of local records on the use of segregation units and protection cells is not known by each local establishment as I discussed in Section 5.5.1 above. JMOJ and NPA (2011) do not particularly mention how far local establishments keep accountable records of those procedures in the report. Thirdly, records of prisoner transfers were not accessible to the public so it is not clear whether these documents are accountable or not. Finally, in regard to records for the use of force, Table 5.14 and Figure 5.1 show, there was a national increase in the number of reported incidents in which force was used against prisoners between 2006 and 2010. However, it is not clear whether these reports are accountable in local establishments because the Japanese prison service does not make information available about individual prisons.

Thus, in terms of violence control, the available data showed mixed results. Firstly, in regard to incidents and adjudication records, the CARC 2003 showed that the quality of relevant documents were varied in local establishments, and latest data did not show this situation was improved after the new instructions were issued. Secondly, accountability of documentation for segregation, transfers and use of force in local establishments in local establishments was uncertain according to the available data. Therefore, bearing in mind the situation raised in the CARC 2003, it should be understood that the accountability of relevant information recording and documentation still varies between local establishments. According to the compliance rank and scores

table (see Appendix 2), this case can be ranked at the second lowest group level and a score of +1 can be assigned to the Japanese prison service.

## *5.6: Conclusion*

This chapter has discussed the compliance levels of local establishments in England and Japan in response to suicide and violence control regulations by analysing the extent to which local establishments operate the risk control systems defined by those rules appropriately and sufficiently.

The findings of this chapter are as follows. Firstly, in terms of discipline and order, HMPS showed that the normalization and decency of prisoners are as important as discipline and order in local establishments. By contrast, the Japanese prison service showed that prison staff members in local establishments view collective order and stability as more important than the interests of individual prisoners. Accordingly, tighter restrictions are placed on individual prisoners in Japan than in England. In terms of group levels, HMPS accepts a wider variety of behaviour than the Japanese prison service which takes the view that prisoners' behaviour should be unified through tight controls and discipline.

Secondly, in terms of ways of identifying risk in local establishments, HMPS' showed that ways of identifying risk of suicide and self-harm varies among local establishments in response to suicide and self-harm defined by PSOs. Case studies showed several problems in the process of identifying risk were observed, and risk identification is not unified under the formal definition of risks discussed in chapter 4. Meanwhile, the Japanese prison service does not provide formal definitions of suicide and self-harm in order to identify them as risks, and collected data also suggests that there is no clear consensus among prison staff about how these risks should be defined. In brief, local establishments did not show any particular ways of identifying the risks of suicide and self-harm.

In regard to violence control, HMPS showed that ways of identifying violence risk varies among local establishments. As well as suicide control, each local establishment showed different issues in regard to identifying risk of violence. Those problems also vary depending on local establishments. Meanwhile, although chapter 4 showed that the Japanese prison service does not have formal definitions of violence

and serious assault for the purposes of controlling them as risks, prison officers do share some informal ways of identifying these risks among themselves.

Thirdly, with regard to the appropriateness of punishment and reward systems, suicide and self-harm control in HMPS are not applicable to this sub-code because punishment and reward are not used to control them. In the Japanese prison service, the prison service insists that there is no inappropriate use of punishment in local establishments. In response to this, alternative sources suggest that local establishments generally overuse punishment; however, this evidence was not specific enough to support this tendency in controlling suicide and self-harm. Similarly, available data did not show the inappropriate use of reward system among local establishments in the Japanese prison service. According to the rule for measuring the compliance rank discussed in chapter 3, it can be concluded that the appropriateness of punishments issued for cases of suicide and self-harm in the Japanese prison service varies between local establishments.

In regard to how punishment and reward are used to control the risk of violence, it was found that most local establishments in HMPS used punishment appropriately and with sufficient adjudication procedures. In comparison, there was more local variation in how well the IEP system was used. Meanwhile, the reports in the CARC 2003 was found that some Japanese prisons traditionally overused punishment not for disciplining violent prisoners, but rather for deterring other prisoners from committing certain offences. The excessive number of punishments recorded in the national correctional statistics suggests that this tradition still continues in most local establishments. Therefore, it is concluded here that most local establishments in the Japanese prison service use disciplinary measures intended for violence control inappropriately. In regard to the reward system in the Japanese prison service, since there was no reliable evidence to insist that the IEP system is inappropriately operated in local establishments, it is assumed that majority of local establishments appropriately conducts the IEP according to the rule for measuring the compliance rank discussed above.

Fourthly, in response to the national risk control guidelines, it was found that all local establishments in HMPS had introduced suicide control strategies as required by PSO 2700. Nevertheless, the quality of these strategies varies between local establishments. Meanwhile, the Japanese prison service does not have any formal integrated guidelines for controlling suicide and self-harm. Accordingly, I measured the compliance level of the subordinate regulations (*i.e. kunrei* and *tsutasu*) covering these

issues. As a result, the compliance level of local establishments varies depending on which rules need to be followed. However, this conclusion took into account uncertain results.

All local establishments in HMPS have developed local violence control strategies following the guidelines set out in PSO 2750. Nevertheless, as with suicide and self-harm control, the quality and extent to which these strategies have been developed varies between local establishments. Most issues with the development of local strategies were similar to those raised about suicide control strategies. Meanwhile, peculiar issues were found with the violence control strategies operated by some local establishments. For example, the case of HMP Pentonville, discussed in section 5.4.2.above, shows that the contexts and histories of some prisons make violence control especially difficult. Formal strategies only following the national guidelines may not be enough to solve issues with violence in these prisons.

Since the Japanese prison service does not have formal integrated guidelines concerning violence control, I assessed the compliance level of the relevant written regulations (*i.e. kunrei* and *tsutasu*). Additionally, data available to assess the compliance level was limited: specifically information on local establishments was not available. Therefore, given the limited availability of data, the compliance level of local establishments varies depending on which rules should be followed.

Finally, the information recording and documentation systems in place throughout HMPS were sufficiently accountable in a majority of local establishments for both suicide and violence control. In regard to the Japanese prison service, the CARC reported that the quality of relevant documentation for both suicide and violence control varied among local establishments. Relevant regulatory codes raised in chapter 4 were issued for improving this problem in local establishments. Nevertheless, the available data suggests that the accountability of record-keeping and documentation at a local level has not particularly improved since 2003. Hence it was considered that the accountability of documentation still varies among local establishments.

Based on these findings, I assigned compliance ranks and scores to the English and Japanese prison services which reflect the extent to which local establishments follow the various risk control regulations discussed in chapter 4. Separate scores were assigned to each prison service for suicide and violence control. Table 5.16 displays these results and Table 5.17 gives a summary of the compliance group scores, including raw and standardised ones.  Table 5.16 offers a visual map of the results for the compliance (X1) scores. As with Table 4.1, each of the five columns represent the

sub-codes discussed in this chapter. The positions of the shaded blocks reflect the group level of the English and Japanese prison services for each sub-code, and "S" represents suicide risk control while "V" represents violence risk control. Meanwhile, Table 5.17 shows the compliance (X1) score results as numbers. Again, the five sub-codes are listed twice in the left-hand column and two sets of figures are given for each: the first are raw scores and the second are standardized scores as discussed in chapter 3 (see Table 3.5, p. 118).

Table 5.16: Compliance (X1) levels of the English and Japanese prison services for suicide and violence control

| Ranks | Group Scores | Sub-codes 1. Order | 2. Risk | 3 Punishment | Reward | 4. National guidelines | 5. Information record |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| high | 4 | | | | | | |
| | 3 | Japan | | | | | |
| | 2 | England | Japan: (V) | England (V) | Japan (S) | Japan (S)& (V) | England (S) &(V) | England (S) & (V) |
| | 1 | | England (S)&(V) | Japan(V) | England (V) | Japan (S) and (V) | Japan (S) &(V) |
| low | 0 | | Japan (S) | England (S) | England (S) | | |

(S): suicide, and (V):violence

Table 5.17: Raw and standardized scores for the English and Japanese prison services in response to suicide and violence control

| Compliance Score (X1) | Suicide | | Violence | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sub-codes | England | Japan | England | Japan |
| Raw Scores | | | | |
| 1 Order | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| 2 Identifying risk | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 3 Punishment and Reward | 0 | 4 | 3 | 3 |
| 4 National guideline | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| 5 Information record | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Standardized score | | | | |
| 1 Order | 6.7 | 10.0 | 6.7 | 10.0 |
| 2 Identifying risk | 3.3 | 0.0 | 3.3 | 6.7 |
| 3 Punishment and Reward | 0.0 | 6.7 | 5.0 | 5.0 |
| 4 National guideline | 5.0 | 2.5 | 5.0 | 2.5 |
| 5 Information record | 6.7 | 3.3 | 6.7 | 3.3 |

In summary, these results show that the Japanese prison service has been given a higher group level than HMPS in response to: 1. order and discipline in prisons; 2. ways of identifying the risk of violence; and 3. the appropriateness of the punishment and reward system. In regard to the punishment and reward system, the violence and suicide scores for the Japanese prison service were assigned higher group scores than those of HMPS, because the available data did not indicate that the reward system was being used inappropriately in Japanese local establishments. However, in comparison with HMPS, detailed data was not made available by the Japanese prison service hence the score which I have given here should be considered as provisional. Finally, HMPS was given a score 0 for the use of punishment and reward to control suicide because these measures are not used to control suicide in local establishments. Overall, excluding order and discipline in the Japanese prison service, the English and Japanese prison services both received moderate group levels reflecting the extent to which local establishments complied with the rules discussed in chapter 4.

## *Chapter 6*
## *Leadership 1: Roles of Governors*
## *in Local Risk Control Strategies (Grid 2)*

This chapter discusses the specialization (Y2) of governors in local risk control strategies. As was noted in chapter 3, for the purposes of this study I have focused only on the roles played by governors in local risk control strategies within the broader context of the national risk control structures. To what extent governors are in charge of leadership roles within local risk control strategies in the national risk control structures and how those roles are assigned to them are discussed as the grid aspect of risk control structure in this chapter. This aspect of risk control is discussed here in terms of five sub-codes. Section one of this chapter analyses specialization of staff for controlling risk; section two analyses criteria for selecting governors; section three analyses interpersonal roles of governors in local suicide and violence control strategies; section four analyses informational roles of governors in local suicide and violence strategies; and section five analyses decisional roles of governors.

## *6.1: Specialization of staff members*

The first sub-code analyses the general approach of the English and Japanese prison services to the specialization of staff members in local establishments. In particular, it considers to what extent each prison service assigns special roles to staff members in order to control the risks of suicide and violence. This general approach provides contextual understanding of the specialized risk management roles played by prison governors at a local level, and of the extent to which these roles are assigned to them by the national prison services.

### *6.1.1: Suicide*
**England**

HMPS employs a variety of staff members: prison officers, workshop trainers, healthcare specialists, psychologists, and security officers among others. A national list

of prison staff compiled in 2005 shows that about half of staff members at that time were either prison officers or governor grade officers (*i.e.* including serving governors): the remainder were all non-officer staff members (HMPS 2006: see Table 6.1).

Table 6.1: Breakdown of HMPS staff according to job titles (HMPS, 2006)

| Job titles | Proportion (%) |
|---|---|
| Prison Officers (non-Governors grade) | 50 |
| Governors grade officers | 2.8 |
| Operational support staff | 15.2 |
| Administration staff | 15.3 |
| Healthcare | 2.2 |
| Chaplaincy | 0.6 |
| Psychology staff | 1.9 |
| industrial staff (trainers) | 7 |
| other civil staff | 4 |

A similarly high level of specialization among HMPS staff can also be observed in specific risk control process in local establishments. For example, PSO 2700 (*Suicide Reduction*) defines jobs and teams specialising in local suicide and self-harm control: the Safer Custody Team (SCT), SCT leaders, Suicide Prevention Co-ordinators (SPC), and ACCT Trainers (2.7.5, PSO 2700). The SCT leader is responsible for ensuring that the local suicide prevention strategy is fully integrated and compatible with the local violence reduction strategy. Moreover, they are also responsible for the development of a self-harm management strategy   and for making sure that all other local policies, procedures, and strategies reflect the holistic nature of the wider safer custody strategy (Annex1-8, PSO 2700). This post is normally filled by governors. Suicide Prevention Co-ordinators (SPCs) are responsible for co-ordinating the overall suicide prevention and self-harm management procedures of their local establishments. Lastly, ACCT trainers are required to develop a training strategy in agreement with their governors (*ibid.*). As was discussed in chapter 4 and 5, staff members need to have special training in order to operate the ACCT monitoring scheme (see Sec. 4.4.1 and 5.4.1). Accordingly, ACCT trainers are responsible for directing and refreshing these training programmes for all the staff in their establishments who work with prisoners.

HMPS assigns specialised roles to its staff members for controlling suicide in these ways. Thus, according to the specialisation rank and scores table (see Appendix 3), the suicide prevention roles defined by PSO 2700 can be ranked at the highest grid level

(the prison service allocates special roles prison staff for controlling the risks of suicide in local establishments) and a score of +2 can be assigned to HMPS for this sub-code.

**Japan**

In comparison with HMPS, the degree of specialization among Japanese prison staff is significantly lower. A majority of staff members are prison officers who specialise in security. According to a breakdown of Japanese prison staff in 2007, more than 95% were security officers. The other 5% were listed as either healthcare staff or administrators (JMOJ, 2007: see Table 6.2). Additionally, the employment of private citizens in Japanese prisons is significantly limited, even among trainers and teachers (JMOJ, 2007).

Table 6.2: Breakdown of Japanese prison staff 2006/07

| Job titles | population | proportion (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Security officers | 17934 | 95.3% |
| Administration officers | 208 | 1.1% |
| Administration support | 55 | 0.3% |
| Healthcare | 614 | 3.3% |
| total | 18811 | |

Although a majority of Japanese prison staff are security officers, they are not assigned special roles for controlling specific risks. In terms of suicide and self-harm, prison staff are not usually given specialised job titles or assigned to teams relevant to these risks in local establishments. Instead, the Japanese prison service has traditionally controlled these risks with general-purpose officers, known as *tanto* (担当) officers, who are in charge of the overall care of prisoners. The Japanese word, *tanto*, refers to anybody who is in charge of performing set duties. The *tanto* system is intended to control prisoners by keeping them in small groups while they are in different areas of prisons such as workshops and group cells (JMOJ, 2003a). *Tanto* officers are normally not high ranking operational managers, but non-grade low ranking officers. Each *tanto* officer is normally in charge of groups of between 60 and 80 prisoners (*ibid*.). Each group of prisoners is usually controlled by two *tanto* officers who work together in a shift pattern: one works a day shift while the other works a night shift (JMOJ, 2003a).

The *tanto* system is not grounded in any formal legal sources concerning prisons. Instead, it is built on the informal customs which have developed throughout the history of Japanese prisons (Ozawa, 2007). *Tanto* officers are responsible for

covering all day-to-day issues concerning prisoners: that is, from security and safety issues to the emotional care of prisoners (Ozawa, 2007). Due to the close but paternalistic relationship they have with prisoners, *tanto* officers are informally called "*oyaji*" [father] or "*tanto-san*" [Mr. *tanto*] by prisoners (Ozawa, 2007; and Nishio, 2004). In this context, the control and care of prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm are informally recognised as the responsibilities of *tanto* officers. If a case of self-harm or suicide occurs, healthcare staff and governors are in charge of post-incident care and procedures. However, the main strategies for preventing and following up incidences of self-harm and suicide largely rely upon *tanto* officers (JMOJ, 2003a).

According to the specialization rankand scores table (see Appendix 3), the *tanto* officer system can be ranked at the second lowest grid level (staff members are assigned specific roles for more general purposes) and the Japanese prison service can be assigned a score of +1 for this sub-code.

### 6.1.2: Violence

**England**

HMPS uses the power of governors and specialised staff to control the risk of violence. PSO 2750 states that governors are responsible for implementing and maintaining their local violence reduction strategies. It also requires governors to chair special monthly meetings, called The Violence Reduction Meeting, in their local establishments (PSO 2750).

PSO 2750 defines specialised staff roles and teams for controlling violence in local establishments. In addition to its role in suicide control, as mentioned by PSO 2700, The Safer Custody Team (SCT) is also defined by PSO 2750 as an essential part of the violence control strategies operated by local establishments. As members of the SCT, governors need to appoint *Violence Reduction Co-ordinators* (VRC) and *Safer Custody Officers* for their local establishments. Thus, as with suicide control, HMPS relies on specialised staff members, each of whom is given a particular job title and description, to implement violence control strategies in local establishments.

According to the specialization rank and scores table (see Appendix 3), HMPS can be ranked at the highest grid level (the prison service allocates special roles prison staff for controlling the risks of violence in local establishments) and assigned a score of +2 for this sub-code.

**Japan**

The Japanese prison service does not assign specialised jobs to prison staff in order to control the risk of violence in local establishments. Instead, *tanto* officers are largely relied upon to control violence. In comparison with suicide control, *tanto* officers generally believe that violence control is one of their main tasks: in contrast, they do not usually take this view with suicide control. This is probably a result of their original speciality since, as the 2007 breakdown of prison staff shows the majority of prison staff are security officers (see Table 6.2). Most of the Japanese prison staff with whom I conducted interviews had worked previously as *tanto* officers. According to these interviewees, maintaining a non-violent environment in prison was one of the main demands placed upon them as *tanto* officers. The importance placed on violence control was also observed in the testimonies given by prison officers to the CARC 2003 (JMOJ, 2003a). These testimonies focused on how individual *tanto* officers manage to maintain control over 50-60 prisoners, avoiding any conflicts, assaults, or cases of bullying between them.

Thus, in comparison with suicide control, the Japanese prison service shows a high degree of specialization in using *tanto* officers to control violence. According to the specialisation rank and scores table (see Appendix 3), the *tanto* officer system, when applied to violence control, can be ranked at the highest grid level (the prison service allocates special roles prison staff for controlling the risks of violence in local establishments) and a score of +2 can be assigned to the Japanese prison service for this sub-code.

## 6.2: Promotion criteria for governors: ascription or achievement

As Gross and Rayner (1985) have shown with their EXACT model, the grid level of organizations is indicated by how their members gain entitlements within them: specifically, whether the selection criteria are ascription or achievement based. Therefore, this section analyses whether governors are appointed according to ascription or achievement based criteria.

**England**

The entry schemes for governors in HMPS have been constantly changing since the prison service reforms of the 1980s (Coyle, 2005). In general, there are two career paths for governors: 1. internal promotion based on length of service; and 2. direct or fast-track promotion (PSO 8100; and Leech, 2010).

Some HMPS governors are appointed in light of their experiences of working inside the prison service. Most of these governors entered the prison service as non-graded officers. Candidates for the role of governor must pass the relevant tests at the Senior Operational Manager Job Simulation Assessment Centre (SOMJSAC) (Leech, 2010) before they can be appointed. In these circumstances, promotion to a governorship is based on around 20 years of service. For example, Gov. Mick Bell joined HMPS as a non-graded officer in 1977 and was promoted as governor of HMP Aylesbury in 2001 (Leech, 2010).

Meanwhile, the direct or fast-track route allows for governors to be promoted from among experienced professionals outside of the prison service, including university graduates who may be potential candidates for governorships (HMPS, 2011). This career path is currently called the Intensive Development Scheme (IDS), having thus replaced Accessorized Promotion (APS), Direct Entry (DE), and Cross Hierarchical Move (CHM) (Leeach 2010; and PSO 8100). A good example of somebody who has benefited from this entry scheme is Gov. Peter Wright who is currently governor of HMP Nottingham. He joined HMPS in 1992 after working as a civil servant in the Home Office, whereat he was directly promoted to a senior management post in HMP YOI Glen Parva and later appointed governor of HMP Stafford in 1998 (Leech 2010).

In terms of the merits of promoting governors in this way, one governor whom I interviewed explained that length of service in HMPS does not necessarily correlate with the potential to be a good governor. Less experienced candidates often prove to be better at managing prisons than more experienced officers.

*Recruiting good candidates who are natural leaders is more important than promoting experienced officers as governors. In my experience longer experience does not necessarily correlate with higher capability as governors. It is commonly observed that officers, who have just joined HMPS perform much better than officers who have been working in prisons for more than 10 years.*

Accordingly, the two types of promotion scheme maintained by HMPS (*i.e.* 1. internal promotion based on length of service; 2. direct entry or fast-track promotion) show that governors can be promoted in regard to both their achievements and ascription values. However, governors cannot be appointed only on the basis of ascription values (*e.g.* age, qualifications, or experiences). Instead, in order to be promoted governors also need to perform well in the prison service.

According to the specialisation rank and scores table (see Appendix 3), the system that HMPS has in place for appointing governors can be ranked at the second highest grid level (promotion of governors is based on ascription and achievement) and a score of +2 can be assigned to HMPS for this sub-code.


**Japan**

Unlike HMPS, the Japanese prison service does not directly promote governors from outside of the prison service among external professionals. The current system for appointing governors only considers existing staff with long records of service as suitable candidates.

Thus, in order to become governors, all candidates need to rise up through the ranks after joining the prison service as prison officers: there are no exceptions. Applicants to join the Japanese service need be aged between 18 and 35 (JMOJ, 2003d). Furthermore, applicants are classified depending on their educational backgrounds: 1. high school graduates who have passed the prison officer entry selection exam; 2. university graduates who have passed the civil servant exam (type B) set by the National Personnel Authority [*Jinji-in:*人事院]; and 3. university graduates who have passed the high-ranking civil servant exam (type A) also set by the NPA (*ibid.*).

Applicants' entry grades depend on the level of the entry exams they have taken. There are a total of 11 grades within the Japanese prison service. Applicants who pass the basic prison officer entry exam start their careers from the first grade (non-graded prison officer). Applicants who pass the type B civil servant exam start from the second grade (junior officer). Lastly, applicants who pass the high-ranking civil servant exam (type A) start from the third grade (operational manager) (*ibid*). In all cases, appointed prison staff must rise up through the officer graded ranks to the top: *i.e.* to become serving governors at grades 10 and 11 (see Table 6.3).

The promotion of governors within the Japanese prison service is tightly connected with the ages of applicants. For example, the official literature of the Japanese prison service states that although the eligibility of candidates for promotion

depends on their ability, most officers can take the middle level training at around 29 years old (JMOJ 2003c). Table 6.3 which follows illustrates the typical career path followed by Japanese prison governors as reported by the Correction Bureau (JMOJ, 2003d). This chart shows the case of a prison officer who joined the service at 18 years old and rose up through ranks until he retired.

Table 6.3: Career development sample in the Japanese prison service: the case of a prison officer who joined the service at 18 years old

| Officer Ranks | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Grades | Non grade officers | Junior managers | | Middle managers | | | Senior managers | | | Governing Governors | |
| **ages** 18 | ◼ | | | | | | | | | | |
| 19 | ◼ | | | | | | | | | | |
| 20 | ◼ | | | | | | | | | | |
| 21 | ◼ | | | | | | | | | | |
| 22 | ◼ | | | | | | | | | | |
| 23 | ◼ | | | | | | | | | | |
| 24 | ◼ | | | | | | | | | | |
| 25 | ◼ | | | | | | | | | | |
| 26 | ◼ | | | | | | | | | | |
| 27 | ◼ | | | | | | | | | | |
| 28 | ◼ | | | | | | | | | | |
| 29 | ◼ | | | | | | | | | | |
| 30 | | ◼ | | | | | | | | | |
| 31 | | ◼ | | | | | | | | | |
| 32 | | ◼ | | | | | | | | | |
| 33 | | | ◼ | | | | | | | | |
| 34 | | | ◼ | | | | | | | | |
| 35 | | | | ◼ | | | | | | | |
| 36 | | | | | ◼ | | | | | | |
| 37 | | | | | ◼ | | | | | | |
| 38 | | | | | | ◼ | | | | | |
| 39 | | | | | | ◼ | | | | | |
| 40 | | | | | | | ◼ | | | | |
| 41 | | | | | | | ◼ | | | | |
| 42 | | | | | | | ◼ | | | | |
| 43 | | | | | | | | ◼ | | | |
| 44 | | | | | | | | ◼ | | | |
| 45 | | | | | | | | ◼ | | | |
| 46 | | | | | | | | ◼ | | | |
| 47 | | | | | | | | ◼ | | | |
| 48 | | | | | | | | | ◼ | | |
| 49 | | | | | | | | | ◼ | | |
| 50 | | | | | | | | | ◼ | | |
| 51 | | | | | | | | | ◼ | | |
| 52 | | | | | | | | | ◼ | | |
| 53 | | | | | | | | | | ◼ | |
| 54 | | | | | | | | | | ◼ | |
| 55 | | | | | | | | | | ◼ | |
| 56 | | | | | | | | | | | ◼ |
| 57 | | | | | | | | | | | ◼ |
| 58 | | | | | | | | | | | ◼ |
| 59 | | | | | | | | | | | ◼ |
| 60 | | | | | | | | | | | Retirement |

[Table 2.8, p.13 in JMOJ (2003d) *HR of prison staff in Japan* (*keimukan no jinji kanri ni tsuite:*刑務官の人事管理について)]

When asked about the system for appointing governors, a retired governor whom I interviewed explained that, if provided candidates for governorships are not obviously unsuitable for the role, they are considered to be good candidates. He stressed that the career system is based on seniority, in which respect the performance of

governors in local establishments is not of utmost concern to the Japanese prison service. Thus, alongside the sample of career development in the Japanese prison service illustrated by Table 6.3, his views suggest that the promotion criteria for governors are deeply connect to the age of candidates. As he stated:

> *If you are ordinarily capable, you can be a governor because the career system is seniority based in the Japanese prison service...if they [governors] are not stupid, they should be able to maintain prison operation.*

Thus, the data concerning the usual career paths taken by Japanese prison staff shows that the promotion criteria for governors largely rely on the age and length of service of applicants. In this case, age and length of service are typical examples of an ascription based criteria. Evidently, the Japanese prison service promotes governors based on such criteria. According to the specialisation rank and scores table (see Appendix 3), the career system maintained by the Japanese prison service can be ranked at the highest grid level (promotion of governors is based on ascription) and a score of +3 can be assigned to the Japanese prison service for this sub-code.

## 6.3: Interpersonal roles

The third sub-code concerns the interpersonal roles of governors. This code is analysed here in terms of three activities which governors are supposed to perform: *figurehead*, *leaders*, and *liaison* (Mintzberg, 1973; and see p.97). Each activity is judged according to whether governors are supposed to perform them weakly or strongly as part of their suicide and violence risk control strategies.

The first *interpersonal* role, as mentioned above, is *figurehead*. As I explained in chapter 3, *figurehead* involves performing a number of routine socio-legal duties in the capacity of head of an organization (Mintzberg, 1973). This kind of activity can be analysed here in terms of the duties linked to suicide and violence control assigned to governors by prison rules. The second interpersonal role, *leader*, refers to the activity of heads of organizations for motivating and activating their subordinates (*ibid.*). Accordingly, this section analyses the extent to which governors are required to fulfil this role in relation to suicide and violence control strategies in local establishments. The third role, *liaison*, refers to the activity of leaders for maintaining and developing self-developed networks of external contacts that can provide them with favours and

information. In regard to the English and Japanese prison services, I will analyse whether governors are required to maintain networks outside of their local establishments which impinge upon suicide and violence control at a local level.

### *6.3.1: Suicide*

### England

In regard to the *figurehead* role, HMPS assigns several duties to governors as part of local suicide control procedures, in which respect governors are required to be active figureheads. PSO 2700 assigns several duties to governors in their capacity as strategic heads of local establishments. In particular, it states that governors must take overall responsibility for local suicide prevention strategies (Sec.1.7.4, PSO 2700).

Firstly, governors must be responsible for fully staffing the SCT team and appointing staff members for the specialised jobs defined in PSO 2700 (Annex 1D: PSO 2700): that is, SPCs and ACCT trainers. Furthermore, if governors do not appoint particular SCT leaders, they are assumed to be in charge of this position themselves (PSO 2700). Secondly, in the process of implementing local suicide control strategies which follow the overall suicide control guidelines defined in PSO 2700, governors must publish a local policy statement which also follows the guidelines set out in PSO 2700. This policy statement must include specific references to suicide prevention, self-harm management, and any other arrangements relating to safer custody and safeguarding (Sec. 1.7.7, PSO 2700).

Thirdly, governors are in charge of authorizing several procedures in their local suicide control strategies: transferring prisoners at risk to protection cells or other establishments (PSO 1810), placing prisoners at risk in segregation units (PSOs 2700 and 1700), and overseeing post-incident investigations (PSO 2700). PSO 1810 states that governors must develop local strategies for appropriately transferring prisoners at risk to other establishments. Meanwhile, PSOs 1700 and 2700 declare that governors are responsible for authorizing the segregation of prisoners at risk of suicide following the ACCT guidelines. Furthermore, governors are in charge of building flexible post-incident action plans explaining what actions must be taken and by whom in the event of an apparent death in custody (Chap. 2, PSO 2700) or serious self-harm.

In terms of the *leader* role, PSO 8480 (*Performance Recognition*) is intended to recognise the performance and achievements of staff members in local establishments in ways that motivate them. It outlines several prize-giving bodies and awards which may be given to individual prison staff: these include the Queen's Birthday and New

Year's Honours, the Imperial Service Medal (ISM) Nominations, the Director General's Prison Officer of the Year Awards, and the Butler Trust Award Scheme (PSO 8480). PSO 8480 asks governors to plan and manage local performance recognition schemes in their local establishments whereby appropriate candidates may be selected for the awards mentioned above. Governors need to appoint performance recognition coordinators and consult the Prison Officers Trade unions about how the awards are arranged (1.2: PSO 8480). Thus, governors are required to take leading roles in the construction of local performance recognition plans in order to effectively motivate staff members in local establishments.

In regard to the impact of PSO 8480 on suicide performance control, some awards raised above includes commends for the prison staff members who performed well in managing suicide in prisons. To illustrate, candidates for the Director General's Prison Officer of the Year Award in 2008 were selected according to the five following nomination categories: 1. working with young people; 2. suicide prevention; 3. reducing re-offending; 4. managing difficult prisoners; 4. security; 5. diversity; and 6. staff support (CJP, 2007). Evidently, governors are required to motivate staff members in all of these areas of local performance and to recognise outstanding staff accordingly. This indicates that governors are expected to active assume the role of *leader*.

In regard to the third role, *liaison*, HMPS outlines how important it is that prison governors are able to act as effective leaders in the official recruitment web pages (HMPS, 2010). Particular attention is drawn to two types of leadership: 1. *leaders value achievement and are motivated by hope of success or fear of failure*; and 2. *leaders value harmony and are motivated by hope of affiliation or fear of rejection* (HMPS, 2010). HMPS describes the first type of leader in terms of personalities as action-oriented, rational, directive, assertive, efficient, and expedient. It is further explained that these leaders are good at controlling and planning the activities of their organizations and competing with others (*ibid.*). Meanwhile, the second type of leader is described as more relationship-oriented, in which respect their personalities are more emotional, consultative, receptive, effective, and qualitative (*ibid.*). In terms of personalities, this type of leader is said to be good at negotiating, networking, tackling diplomacy, supporting, facilitating, developing, and team-building. MPS has concluded that governors must have both types of personality in order to be suitable for the role (*ibid.*). Given that the second type of personality is concerned with maintaining personal networks with others, it can be concluded here that HMPS governors are required to act out the liaison role.

This discussion has focused on rather general criteria concerning the ideal leadership traits of HMPS governors. Thus, it should be noted that personal networks can play major roles in some suicide control strategies. To illustrate, PSO 2700 states that if other local establishments are able to provide more appropriate environments for prisoners at risk of suicide, governors can arrange for those prisoners to be transferred to the other local establishments. Such decisions may be based on factors like whether the receiving establishments are situated closer to the prisoners' hometowns or are able to provide better care and support (PSOs 2700, 1700, and 1810). Transfers are usually arranged between the two establishments involved and sometimes, if necessary, with the approval of Area Managers (PSO 1700). Thus, personal networks between governors, and occasionally area managers, can play an important role in transferring prisoners who are at risk to themselves.

To conclude, HMPS governors are expected to be actively engaged in all three of the interpersonal roles outlined above for the purposes of operating their local suicide control strategies: that is, *figurehead*, *leaders*, and *liaison*. Therefore, according to the specialization ranks and scores table (see Appendix 3), HMPS can be ranked at the highest grid level and assigned a score of +4 for this sub-code.

**Japan**

In regard to the *figurehead* role, Japanese prison governors are not formally in charge of strategic responsibilities because the Japanese prison service does not have formally targeted national strategic guidelines for suicide control (see Sec. 4.4.1). However, they are in charge of relevant legal sources which are assigned to them as part of suicide and self-harm control procedures.

Firstly, governor authorises segregation and the use of protection of at risk of suicide and self-harm when it is considered that the prisoner harms communal order and discipline according Article 76 and 79 of *The Penal Institutions Act*s. Governors must grant their approval in any cases in which prisoners are confined to protection cells because they are likely to harm themselves (*ibid*.). Furthermore, governors can decide when and for how long such prisoners should be in confinement, and if they should be placed back in confinement (*ibid*.).As part of post-incident control in local establishments, Article 150 of *The Penal Institutions Act* states that governors must authorise punishments issued against prisoners who have harmed themselves. Furthermore, governors are responsible for investigating cases where prisoners have killed themselves by Ordinance [*kunrei*] 3379. Thus, in spite of the lack of national

written strategic guidelines, certain rules within the Japanese prison provide the *figurehead* in the process of local suicide control strategies.

In regard to the *leader* role, the Japanese prison service has never officially clarified whether governors are responsible for actively motivating subordinate staff in their establishments. However, Professor Koichi Hamai, who retired from the Japanese prison service as a governor grade officer in 2004 and is now a professor of Law at Ryukoku University, has suggested that governors are moderately and informally required to motivate staff within local establishments (Hamai, 2005). Hamai has outlined the abilities expected of Japanese prison governors as follows: 1. *kikubari*—being aware of the emotional states of prisoners and staff; 2. *mekubari*—being generally aware of what is going on in their prison; and 3. *kokorokubari*—being considerate of other staff. According to his view, *kikubari* and *kokorokubari* can be considered ways of motivating prison staff in local establishments. Nevertheless, the available data do not particularly show that governors are required to motivate staff members in local suicide control processes. Thus, it is unclear to what extent governors are expected to assume a leader role in local suicide control strategies.

In regard to the *liaison* role, formal written rules or instructions do not state that governors are required to maintain or develop their own external networks. However, data gathered for this study suggest that in practice governors do need to develop and maintain external networks in order to effectively run their local establishment. For example, a retired governor grade officer whom I interviewed claimed that having informal networks can affect the capability of governors to carry out their duties. Unlike in HMPS, such networks are inherited through family ties. Thus, some governors develop vertical and horizontal networks. As the aforesaid interviewee explained:

> *Having informal networks is very profitable for governors [in the Japanese prison service]...As far as I knew, many governors had fathers who had worked as governors [of prisons in Japan]. Due to their family backgrounds, they already have informal networks with other governors who have similar backgrounds. They also have networks with senior staff in HQs or area offices who had worked under their fathers. Needless to say, the promotion of staff and governors is based on meritocracy; however, those informal networks strongly affect the ability of governors to operate prisons.*

According to this view, maintaining informal networks outside of local establishments is important for Japanese prison governors. Nevertheless, it is not clear how far these networks influence local suicide and self-harm control strategies. Relevant procedures

used for local suicide control procedures (see Sec. 4.4.1) did not actively indicate that governors are required to motivate staff members. Hence it can be concluded here that the *liaison* role of Japanese prison governors is uncertain.

Therefore, it can be seen that Japanese prison governors are actively in charge of the figurehead role in local suicide control strategies. By contrast, the informational and liaison roles are weaker or uncertain as far as they apply to suicide control in local establishments. Thus, according to the specialization ranks and scores table (see Appendix 3), the Japanese prison service can be ranked at the third lowest grid level and assigned a score of +2 for this sub-code.

### 6.3.2: Violence

**England**

In regard to the *figurehead* role, PSO 2750 assigns several duties concerning violence control to governors in their capacity as leaders of local establishments. These duties include taking overall responsibility for the implementation and development of local violence reduction strategies (2.1, PSO 2750).

In regard to pre-incident control, governors need to ensure that the SCT is fully staffed and that staff members are appointed to specialised jobs defined by PSO 2750. Governors must publish a local violence reduction policy statement following guidelines set out in PSO 2750. Additionally, governors are in charge of authorizing several procedures within local suicide control strategies: transferring prisoners whose behaviour is particularly difficult to segregation units or special protection cells (Rule 45, *The Prison Rules 1999*; PSOs 1700 and 2750), transferring prisoners who are being bullied or difficult to other establishments (PSO 2750), authorizing and monitoring punishments issued against violent behaviour and rewards issued for good behaviour (Rule 55, *The Prison Rules 1999*; and PSO 4000 ).

PSO 1700 states that local establishments can use segregation units or special cells to hold violent prisoners for short periods of time in order to prevent them from injuring other prisoners or staff. The segregation system was originally based on Rule 45 of *The Prison Rules 1999*. This rule states that governors can authorise the segregation of violent prisoners at their discretion. Meanwhile, PSO 2750 stresses that prisoners who are permanently transferred to other establishments due to violence or bullying must benefit from the move. For their part, governors are in charge of determining the local standards by which transfers are authorised. In regard to punishment and reward as measures against violent behaviour, first, Rule 55 of *The*

*Prison Rules 1999* places the responsibility for authorising punishments issued to violent prisoners in the hands of governors. Second, PSO 4000 states that governors must ensure that the IEP system is used fairly. Overall, governors have many legal duties which they must fulfill within local violence control strategies throughout pre-post- risk control process. Hence they are required to be in charge of the *figurehead* role.

Meanwhile, HMPS does not formally define the *leader* role of governors in terms of violence control. However, as with suicide control, PSO 8480 requests that governors take a leading role in their local performance recognition schemes (see Sec. 6.3.1). Specifically in regard to local violence control, prison officers are awarded the Prison Officer of The Year Award in the *Safety in Custody* category, according to their efforts for violence reduction in local establishments (HMPS 2009). Thus, in relation to violence control, governors are required to motivate staff members throughout the local performance recognition arrangements. This evidence suggests that they are expected to assume an active *leader* role as part of local violence control strategies.

Similarly, HMPS does not formally discuss the *liaison* role in regard to governors and violence control. However, governors are required to maintain and develop informal networks outside of their own local establishments in order to facilitate prisoner transfers. Furthermore, in addition to suicide control, PSO 2750 states that transfers of difficult or bullied prisoners should be arranged between the two establishments concerned and, if necessary, with the agreement of the Area Manager (7.4, PSO 2750). Hence in this respect HMPS governors are expected to actively assume the *liaison* role for the purposes of controlling violence in their local establishments.

Therefore, in regard to violence control, the above discussion shows that HMPS governors are to some extent required to assume all three interpersonal roles*: figurehead*, *leader*, and *liaison.* According to the specialization rank and scores table (see Appendix 3), HMPS governors may be assigned the highest specialization rank in regard to the extent to which they assume the three interpersonal roles discussed above and HMPS can be given a score of +4 for this sub-code.

**Japan**

First, in regard to the *figurehead* role, Japanese prison governors are assigned several duties within the violence control procedures operated in their local establishments. These duties mainly involve granting approval for the segregation of violent prisoners,

transferring prisoners to protection cells, issuing punishments, and various other pre- and post-incident procedures.

Governors are assigned the duty of giving approval for the segregation of prisoners who are likely to harm other prisoners and staff members (Art. 76, *The Penal Institutions Act)*. The beginning, end, and renewal of periods of segregation must be authorised by local governors (*ibid*.). Similarly, governors are able to order prison officers to use special protection cells in cases where prisoners are likely to inflict injuries upon others (ii-b, Art. 79, *The Penal Institutions Act*). Second, governors should authorise punishments issued to violent prisoners based on decisions made by the relevant local adjudication committees (Art. 150, *The Penal Institutions Act)*. Governors should also grant permission for transfers of prisoners belonging to Japanese gangs to other establishments for security reasons stated in Instruction 3316 [*imei tsutatsu:* 依命通達 3316]. These legal duties show that Japanese prison governors are expected to actively assume the *figurehead* role in relation to local violence control procedures.

In regard to the *leader* role, the Japanese prison service does not officially discuss the responsibilities of governors for motivating local prison staff. Interview data and relevant academic studies do not indicate very much in this regard either. However, as I mentioned earlier in this section, Hamai (2005) has stated that governors are generally required to motivate their staff members in order to control the risk of suicide (see Sec. 6.3.1). Even so, the extent to which governors are required to assume the *leader* role as part of local violence control strategies is unclear from the available data. Accordingly, as with suicide control, it can only be concluded here that it is uncertain whether governors actively assume the *leader* role in local violence control strategies.

Lastly, in regard to the *liaison* role, the interview with retired prison officers shows that some Japanese prison governors develop and maintain their own networks with other governors and staff in area offices, often thanks to their family backgrounds (see Sec. 6.3.1). Although it is not clear to what extent these networks are required for the purposes of suicide control, they certainly have some role to play in local violence control procedures. For example, Instruction 3316 [*imei-tsutatsu* 3316] states that local establishments can transfer prisoners, who are members of Japanese gangs to other local establishments, in order to avoid conflicts with other prisoners, who belong to other gangs. Such transfers are arranged between the governors of the establishments involved and, if necessary, the relevant area managers (Sections 4 and 5, *tsutasu* 3316). These arrangements suggest that informal networks between governors can help to

make the process of transferring prisons between local establishments smoother. Hence, in this respect, governors are required to actively take on the *liaison* role as part of local violence control strategies.

To conclude, Japanese prison governors are required to assume two out of three of the interpersonal roles discussed above: that is, the *figurehead* and *liaison* roles. Thus, according to the specialization rank and scores table (see Appendix 3), the extent to which Japanese prison governors assume interpersonal roles for the purposes of violence control can be ranked at the second highest grid level and a score of  +3 can be assigned to the Japanese prison service for this sub-code.

## 6.4: Informational roles

The fourth sub-code concerns the *informational* roles of leaders, as defined by Mintzberg (1973): namely, *monitor*, *disseminator*, and *spokesperson* roles (*ibid.*; also see p. 97). The first role, *monitor*, means activities of leaders to seek and receive a wide variety of special information from which they can develop a thorough understanding of their organization. The second role, *disseminator*, refers to activities of leaders to transmit information they have received from outsiders or subordinates to other members of their organization. The third role, *spokesperson*, describes activities of leaders to transmit information about their organisation's plans, policies, activities, and achievements to outsiders, in which respect they must act as experts on the industries in which their organization is involved. Accordingly, this section analyses whether governors are required to take charge of these roles in their capacity as leaders of local prison establishments specifically for the benefit of local suicide and violence control strategies.

### 6.4.1: Suicide

**England**

In regard to the *monitor* role, PSO 2700 indicates that governors are responsible for gathering significant information about suicide control strategies in their local establishments. PSO 2700 specifically states that governors must monitor and annually review the implementation of local suicide control policies and procedures (1.4.2, PSO

2700). It can thus be inferred from these rules that HMPS governors are formally required to be in charge of the monitor role in relation to suicide control strategies.

In regard to the *disseminator* role, governors are usually required to transmit information from outside and inside of their local establishments. Having interviewed 42 HMPS governors, Bryans, himself a retired governor, found that his interviewees generally considered themselves to have a distinctive role as governors in the interpretation of information coming from both inside and outside of their local establishments for the benefit of staff and prisoners (Bryans 2007: p. 125). In terms of suicide and self-harm control, governors need to effectively transmit detailed information and policy criteria, as defined in PSO 2700, to staff members within local establishments. In this way, they must ensure that staff members have an adequate understanding of their local suicide risk control strategies (Chap.1, PSO 2700). PSO 2700 is in this respect considered external information since it is determined within national HQs. Governors are in charge of interpreting this information for their staff as part of suicide control.

Furthermore, in regard to transmitting information to external bodies, governors must publish local policy statements outlining their multi-disciplinary and multi-agency approaches to safer custody, including specific references to suicide prevention, self-harm management, and any other safer custody and safeguarding arrangements in their establishments (Chap. 1, PSO 2700). These local policies published by governors are referred to by HM Inspectorate of Prisons for England and Wales as part of their inspections (*ibid.*). HMIP is an external of local establishments, and (HMIP, 2009) and thus considered an external body. HMPS governors are also required to act out the disseminator role in response to the requirements and information issued by this body on local suicide control strategies.

Lastly, in regard to the *spokesperson* role, Bryans has also found from his interviews with HMPS governors that they are expected to act as the public faces of their respective prisons (Bryan, 2007). That is, they represent their establishments to the general public, the media, and at official functions with local dignitaries. As one of the governors whom Bryans interviewed explains:

> *I think the Governor's job is to represent the prison to the world,… speaking on what goes on in the prison to public meetings and to groups and associations and virtually anybody that will invite you, any non-political group that will invite you, and generally be the persona of the establishment, the embodiment of the establishment.*
> (Bryans, 2007: p.124).

In regard to suicide and self-harm control, governors need to represent or make reports on the performance of their local establishments. If the performance level is good, governors are required to publicize this fact through the media. For example, governors often published comments for an article in a newspaper in response to a positive HMCIP reports on suicide and self-harm control in their local establishment (Pegden, 2008). Furthermore, in cases where local establishments or their staff members receive awards in recognition of good performance (the relevant awards being defined in PSO 8410 (*Performance Recognition*), the governors of those establishments or staff are required to pass comment in their capacity as representatives of their prisons and staff members (HMPS, 2002, 2002a and 2009). Likewise, governors also need to be spokespeople or representatives of their prisons in response to weak performance assessments. For example, if a prisoner dies as a result of committing suicide, it is strongly recommended that the governor of the relevant establishment attends their funeral as its representative (HMIP, 1999). Hence in this respect also HMPS governors are expected to act out the *spokesperson* role for their local establishments.

Thus, HMPS governors are required to be actively responsible for all three types of informational role discussed above: that is, *monitor*, *disseminator*, and *spokesperson.* According to the rank and scores table (see Appendix 3), HMPS can be ranked at the highest grid level and assigned a score of +2 for this sub-code.

**Japan**

As I discussed above in regard to the *figurehead* in interpersonal role, Japanese prison governors have the power to authorise main relevant procedures for controlling suicide: segregation, the use of protection cells and adjudication (see Sec. 6.3.1 above). In this sense, governors seem to be responsible for *monitoring* formal suicide-prevention procedures. Nevertheless, their substantial *monitor* role is weakened in relation to the *tanto* system.

As I explained in section 6.1.1 above, *tanto* officers are principally in charge of any issues concerning communal life in prisons. As a result, they are widely recognised as the best-informed staff members about the conditions affecting prisoners in the Japanese prison service (Hamai 2006; and Ozawa 2007, and JMOJ 2003a). Accordingly, higher ranking officers, including governors, tend to leave major decisions affecting prisoners to *tanto* officers (JMOJ2003a). This aspect of the Japanese prison system has been frequently discussed among Japanese criminologists. Although this system has

some problems, it continues to be used because it is an effective and efficient way of controlling large prison populations with only a small number of prison officers (JMOJ, 2003). As just noted, *tanto* officers are considered to have a substantial role in monitoring the risk of suicide.

The formal regulation, which concerns with suicide control, premises this substantial *monitor* role of *tanto* officers. For example, Although Article 79 of *the Penal Institutions Act* defines governors has power to authorise the use of protection cells, section 2 of Article 79 also states that prison officers can confine prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm to protection cells without the permission of their governors in urgent cases where there is not enough time to wait for permission (Sec. 2 of Art. 79, *The Penal Institutions Act*). Such decisions are approved by governors retrospectively according to reports filed by the prison officers involved. Hence this rule grants discretion to prison officers for confining prisoners to protection cells, and is more effective for prison officers based on the *tanto* system. Article 79 substantially allows *tanto* officers to send prisoners at risk of suicide to protection cells without the permissions of their governors. In light of the exceptional role in suicide prevention granted to *tanto* officers, the extent to which governors assume the *monitor* role for the purposes of suicide prevention is considered here to be weak.

In regard to the *disseminator* role, Japanese prison governors need to act as conduits of information moving in and out of their local establishments as part of the general process of day-to-day prison operation. Although the Japanese prison service does not formally state that governors should act as *disseminators* of information to and from their local establishments, the national prison structure and relevant statutory codes suggest that they need to assume this role for the purposes of local suicide control. To illustrate, when new statutory codes are issued by the national HQ offices, governors need to interpret and disseminate the relevant information to their staff members. As I explained in chapter 4, the Japanese prison service defines several operational procedures through statutory codes (see Sec. 4.4.1). Those codes are provided from the national HQs to local establishments at any time. As leaders of local establishments, governors need to transmit information to the relevant divisions within them.

Governors also need to transmit information about what is going on inside their local establishments to external bodies. Ordinance 518 (*Guidelines for Periodical Correctional Operational Reports*) requires governors to report trends of local prison operation within their local establishments to their area managers. Details of the suicide control procedures in place in local establishments should be reported as follows: the

number of cases of suicide and self-harm and punishments issued thereof, records of the use of protection cells and force used to restrain prisoners. In these respects, governors are in charge of the *disseminator* role as part of local suicide control strategies.

Lastly, in regard to the *spokesmen* role, Japanese prison governors are required to act as public spokespeople for their prisons, but normally only in cases where the performance of their establishment has been poor. For example, if a self-inflicted death occurs in a local establishment, the governor of that establishment must report the case to the public through the media according to the procedures set out in Instruction 210. Governors often issue apologies and comments as representatives of their local establishments (@Nifty Search 2011). Hence, unlike HMPS governors, Japanese prison governors must only assume the *spokesperson* role in cases where they must report negative events or poor performance in their local establishments to the public media. It should thus be understood that the spokesperson role is moderated in the Japanese prison service as far as it applies to governors.

Overall, it can be seen that Japanese prison governors are actively in charge of one informational role in local suicide control structures: that is, *disseminator*. As a result, according to the roles of governors rank and table (see Appendix 3), the Japanese prison service can be assigned the third highest grid rank and given a score of +2 for this sub-code.


### 6.4.2: Violence

**England**

In regard to the monitor role, PSO 2750 states that governors must monitor the implementation and development of their local violence reduction strategies (2.1, PSO 2750). Thus, governors are formally expected to assume the *monitor* role for the purposes of overseeing the operation of risk control procedures in their local establishments.

In regard to the *disseminator* role, PSO 2750 outlines the national violence reduction guidelines which governors, as leaders of local establishments, must transmit to their subordinate staff appropriately (8.2, PSO 2750). Furthermore, governors must ensure that their staff members recognise any comments or recommendations relevant to their duties made in external reports about local violence control strategies: the relevant external bodies making such reports include the PPO, IMB, and HMIP (2.6, PSO 2750). Meanwhile, governors must also regularly transmit information about the implementation of local violence control strategies to their area managers for the

purposes of reviewing and developing them (2.9, PSO 2750). These duties indicate that HMPS governors are in charge of the *disseminato*r role as part of local violence control strategies.

Finally, in regard to the *spokesperson* role, as discussed in suicide control, governors consider themselves as the spokesperson and representative of prisons (Bryans 2007: see Sec. 6.4.1). In relation to local violence control, governors need to represent or make reports on the performance of their local establishments. If the performance level is good, governors are required to publicize this fact through the media. For example, in cases where local establishments or their staff members receive awards in recognition of good performance (the relevant awards being defined in PSO 8410 (*Performance Recognition*), the governors of those establishments or staff are required to pass comment in their capacity as representatives of their prisons and staff members (HMPS, 2002, 2002a and 2009). Likewise, governors also need to be spokespeople or representatives of their prisons in response to weak performance assessments. For example, governors often provide comments or statements in response to the negative reports by HM Inspectorate of Prisons throughout the media; such as inappropriate violence management strategies or ineffectiveness of those in local establishments (Wilkinson 2008; and McKeegan 2011). Hence in this respect also HMPS governors are expected to act out the *spokesperson* role as part of local violence control.

Therefore, it can be seen that HMPS governors are required to actively assume all three of the informational roles discussed above for the purposes of local violence control: that is, *monitor*, *disseminator*, and *spokesman.* According to the roles of governors rank and scores table (see Appendix 3), HMPS governors can be ranked at the highest grid level and a score of +4 can be assigned to HMPS for this sub-code.


**Japan**

In regard to the *monitor* role, as I discussed earlier, the extent to which governors can assume the *monitor* role for the purposes of suicide control is undermined by the *tanto* system (see Sec. 6.4.1 above). As well as suicide control, substantial operation of confining violent prisoners is relying on the *tanto* officers, and relevant violence control procedures formally involve these substantial roles of *tanto* officers; such as segregation and the use of protection cells (Article 76 and 79 of *The Penal Institutions Act*)

Particularly concerning violence control, the use of force defined by Articles 77 and 80 of *The Penal Institutions Act* also grant *tanto* officers the discretion to use force

and defence tools to subdue violent prisoners in urgent situations. Governors ultimately need to retrospectively authorise any cases where *tanto* officers have, at their own discretion, subdued prisoners with force. However, as I explained above, *tanto* officers are usually recognised as the best-informed staff members with regard to the conditions affecting prisoners. Governors tend to rely on the decisions made by *tanto* officers about prisoners. Therefore, the *monitor* role assumed by Japanese prison governors in terms of local violence control is weak in comparison with that of HMPS governors.

Meanwhile, concerning the disseminator role, Japanese prison governors need to actively take on the *disseminator* role as part of local violence control as with suicide control. When relevant regulatory codes are newly issued from the National HQs, these information should be transmitted to local staff members through governors in local establishments. Additionally, as stated by Ordinance 518, governors need to relay information about trends of local violence control from their local establishments to externals (*i.e.* area managers). In these respects, Japanese prison governors assume the *disseminator* role for the purposes of violence control.

Lastly, concerning the *spokesperson* role, Japanese prison governors are not required to comment about good performance in their local establishments to the public media. However, they do need to make appropriate announcements in response to poor performance within their local establishments. Specifically, Instruction [*tsutatsu*] 3178 states that local establishments must report serious security incidents to the public through the media. Examples of incidents that should be reported in this way include severe injuries sustained through serious assaults, escapes, and riots (Instruction 3178). It is noteworthy that no local establishments have reported cases of severe injury through the public media in the past 10 years. Meanwhile, the case of a prisoner who nearly escaped from *Kurobane* [黒羽] prison was announced in 2005 (Osaka Regional Office, 2005). This announcement was officially made by the governor of the prison to the media. Hence it is considered that governors need to represent the prison when they announce serious assault incidents to the public according to Instruction 3178. Thus, Japanese prison governors are in charge of the *spokesperson* role, but unlike HMPS governors they only represent their local establishments when negative events occur within them. It should again be understood that the *spokesperson* role assumed by Japanese prison governors is moderated in the Japanese prison service.

In conclusion, Japanese prison governors are actively in charge of one informational role in regard to violence control: that is, *disseminator*. According to the

role of governor rank and table (see Appendix 3), the Japanese prison service can be assigned the third highest grid rank and given a score of +2 for this sub-code.

## *6.5: Decisional roles*

The fifth sub-code concerns the *decisional* roles of leaders as defined by Mintzberg (1973): namely, *entrepreneur*, *disturbance handler*, *resource allocator*, and *negotiator* (see p.98). Firstly, the *entrepreneur* role means activities of leaders for searching within organizations and their environments for opportunities and to initiate "improvement projects" which bring about changes: this role also involves supervising the design of certain projects. Secondly, the *disturbance handler* role refers to activities of leaders for taking corrective actions when their organizations face important or unexpected disturbances. Thirdly, the *resource allocator* role refers to activities of leaders for allocating, or giving approval for the allocation of, any kind of significant organizational resources. Fourthly, the *negotiator* role means activities of leaders for representing their organizations in major negotiations with external bodies (Mintzberg, 1973). This section analyses whether governors are required to be actively in charge of these roles in local suicide and violence control strategies.

### *6.5.1: Suicide*

**England**

In regard to the *entrepreneur* role, HMPS governors need to build local suicide and self-harm prevention strategies (1.7, PSO 2700). The structure of these strategies includes organizational and environmental changes deemed necessary for improving how the risks of suicide and self-harm are managed (*ibid*.). Moreover, Bryans (2007) has found that governors are in charge of creating strategic visions for their local establishments. This duty may be considered a further aspect of the *entrepreneur* role assumed by governors. Hence it is considered here that governors are required to be actively in charge of the *entrepreneur* role for the purposes of local suicide control strategies.

In regard to the *disturbance handler* role, Bryans (2007) has mentioned that governors need to take command of incidents in their local establishments. As Bryans has pointed out, incidents in Prisons are often characterised by ambiguous and

conflicting information, shifting goals, time pressures, dynamic conditions, complex operational team structures, and poor communication. His interviews with governors show that most of them accept they should take control of the command role in response to complex situations in their areas of responsibility (*ibid*.) Specifically in regard to death results of suicide among prisoners, governors are expected to take command of providing care for the affected families and staff and for investigating any such incidents (PSO 2710, *Follow up to death in custody*; and PSO 8150, *Prison Service Post Incident Care for Staff*). Therefore, it can be concluded here that governors are required to be actively in charge of the *disturbance handler* role as part of local suicide control strategies.

In regard to the *resource allocator* role, PSO 2700 states that the allocation of resources should change appropriately to facilitate the implementation local suicide control strategies based on the guidelines also set out in PSO 2700. In this respect, governors should ensure that necessary staff members are available and that the relevant facilities are properly maintained: for example, Suicide Prevention Coordinators need to be appointed and protection cells and segregation units need to be refurbished as necessary. Thus, it is clear that governors are required to be actively in charge of the *resource allocator* role as part of local suicide control strategies.

In regard to the *negotiator* role, firstly, as I explained in section 6.3.1 above, when governors transfer prisoners at risk of suicide or self-harm to other more appropriate establishments, they need to make arrangements with the governors of the receiving establishments and Area Managers (PSO 2700 and 1700). Hence, in addition to having networks with other governors, individual governors also need to have good negotiation skills in order to make prisoner transfers successful. Secondly, it is important that governors can assume the *negotiator* role in their dealings with prison officers' trade unions (Bryans, 2007). In terms of suicide and self-harm control, that trade union have taken action against HMPS and relevant managers in response to poor security performance in prisons, including weak performance on suicide reduction (Leech, 1990; also see Sec. 7.3.1). Thus, governors need to negotiate with the trade union on matters such as poor performance in suicide control.

Thus**,** HMPS governors are actively in charge of four decisional roles in local suicide control. According to the roles of governors rank and scores table (see Appendix 3), the extent to which HMPS governors assume the decisional roles can be ranked at the highest grid level and a score of +5 can be assigned to HMPS for this sub-code.

**Japan**

The Japanese prison service does not actively assign the *entrepreneur* role to governors. Indeed, this role is considered an unwelcome personality trait among governors in the Japanese prison service. According to Hamai (2005), the role of governors is to preserve the existing control structures of local establishments. Hence any behaviour which may change local establishments is considered inappropriate for governors: this includes governors pursuing active reforms of local operational structures. Similar views were expressed by staff working at the national HQ whom I interviewed. In general, they thought that the main responsibility of governors is to keep local establishments as they are. By contrast, they felt that *entrepreneur* activities should be driven by lower grade officers such as middle level managers. The available data on suicide control corroborates the views expressed by Hamai and my interviewees. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is active opposition within the Japanese prison service to governors assuming the *entrepreneur* role.

In regard to the *disturbance handler* role, governors have a comparatively weak role to play in managing non-fatal cases of self-harm including suicide attempts. As I explained above, *tanto* officers are in charge of handling day-to-day security issues in local establishments. Governors only get information from *tanto* officers through routine reports after incidents have been dealt with. On the other hand, governors often make apologies through the public media in response to cases of self-harm which have proven fatal (see Sec. 6.4.1 above). Thus, it can be seen that there is a discrepancy between the levels of practical and official responsibility accepted by Japanese prison governors for managing cases of self-harm and suicide in local establishment. This makes it difficult to explain the role played by governors in handling disturbances linked to self-harm and suicide. Although the meaning of apologies in Japanese society was not often discussed in academic research, it is widely accepted in Japanese society that if an organization faces important or unexpected disturbances, the leader of that organization should be the first to apologize to the public in order to avoid further blame being placed upon the organization from external sources. During and after the apology, they should investigate cases inside of the organisation. If this custom applies to the Japanese prison service, it can be concluded that Japanese prison governors are in charge of the *disturbance handler* role, but in a distinctly Japanese way.

In regard to the *resource allocator* role, Japanese prison governors are assigned a partial role in the allocation of staff members for local suicide control duties. To illustrate, Instruction 3351 states that governors can appoint members of local

Adjudication Committees according to their discretion. In the process for selecting members of these committees that issue punishments in local establishments, governors have the role of resource allocator. By contrast, governors do not have substantial powers to allocate appropriate *tanto* officers to the prisoners' group as part of suicide and self-harm control in local establishments. My interviews with Japanese prison managers suggest that middle ranking managers have more power in this respect.

> *The allocation of appropriate tanto officers in the proper place, considering their personalities, was the most important job for the operational managers. Prisoners know who are the most powerful and respectful officers to them, and who are not. Some officers were not good to be slotted in the night shift because their personalities are not strong enough to maintain the proper tension of the prison unit.* (Interview with a former middle-ranking manager in a local establishment)

Hence the most important decisions about the allocation of *tanto* officers are made by middle-ranking managers who are more familiar with the personalities of individual staff members working in local establishments. Thus, it is considered here that although governors do assume the role of *resource allocator*, they have limited powers in this regard over the *tanto* system.

In regard to the *negotiator* role, firstly, as was noted in sec. 6.4.1 above, the Japanese prison service does not transfer prisoners at risk of suicide or self-harm to other establishments. Accordingly, governors are not required to act as negotiators in prisoner transfers. Secondly, unlike HMPS, the Japanese prison service does not need to negotiate with a prison officers' trade union because unionisation is prohibited among prison officers by the Civil Servant Law (Act. 108-2; also see Sec.7.3.1). Therefore, Japanese prison governors have very little need to assume the *negotiator* role for the purposes of suicide and self-harm control.

Japanese prison governors are actively in charge of one decisional role in regard to suicide and violence control in manners of Japanese society: *disturbance handler*. Thus, according to the specialization rank and scores table (see Appendix 3), the extent to which Japanese prison governors assume the decisional roles can be ranked at the third lowest grid level and a score of +2 can be given to the Japanese prison service for this sub-code.

### 6.5.2: Violence

**England**

In regard to the *entrepreneur* role, governors need to build local violence reduction strategies (PSO 2750; also see Sec. 4.4.2). These strategies should promote safe and healthy prison environments and foster a culture of non-violence (9.2, PSO 2750). This suggests that governors are expected to make positive changes to prison culture as part of local violence control strategies, in which respect they need to assume the *entrepreneur* role.

With regard to the *disturbance handler* role, governors are assigned the command role for the post-incident control procedures following violent incidents in their areas of responsibility: care for the families of prisoners and staff affected by violence and investigation of violent incidents (1.6, *PSI 08/2010 Post Incident Care*). Thus, governors are in charge of the *disturbance handler* role in local violence control strategies. In regard to the *resource allocator* role, PSO 2750 mentions that the implementation of local violence control strategies leads to the reallocation of resources. According to the national guidelines, governors are in charge of allocating several kinds of resources in local establishments for the purposes of violence control: staff, including a *Violence Reduction Co-ordinator* (VRC) and *Safer Custody Team (SCT) members*, and a budget for maintaining the quality of segregation units and other security equipment. Thus, it can be seen from these duties that governors must assume the *resource allocater* role as part of local violence control strategies.

In regard to the *negotiator* role, firstly, governors need to negotiate with other governors and area mangers as part of the process of transferring prisoners whose behaviour is particularly difficult between local establishments (as I discussed in Sec. 6.4.1 above). As well as maintaining personal networks outside of their local establishments, governors must also have good negotiation skills in order to effectively move difficult prisoners away from their local establishments as part of their local suicide control strategies. Secondly, governors are required to act as negotiators when dealing with the prison officers' trade unions as I mentioned above in regard to suicide control. In regard to violence control, the security of the work environment in prisons is directly affected by their performance in managing violence and serious assault. In cases where prison officers have suffered injuries as a result of being assaulted by prisoners, the trade union has taken action against HMPS and the governors of the prisons involved (Meredith, 1998). Hence governors also need to assume the role of negotiator in relation to trade unions in order to avoid conflicts with them.

In conclusion, governors are required to be actively in charge of four *decisional* roles for the purposes violence control: *entrepreneur*, *disturbance handler*, *resource allocator*, and *negotiator*. According to the specialization rank and scores table (see Appendix 3), the extent to which HMPS governors assume the decisional roles can be ranked at the highest grid level and a score of +5 can be assigned to HMPS for this sub-code.

**Japan**

The Japanese prison service does not actively assign the *entrepreneur* role to governors as part of violence control. As I explained above in regard to suicide control (see Sec. 6.5.1), Japanese prison governors are mainly expected to maintain the *status quo* within local establishments. Hamai (2005) has explained that governors are ideal examples of Japanese prison staff in the respect that they fully fit the Japanese prison service organization: they neither deviate from the existing order of the organization nor back away from dealing with problems. Hence Japanese prison governors are not required to actively assume the *entrepreneur* role for purposes of local violence control.

In regard to the *disturbance handler* role, the role played by governors in handling cases of violence and serious assault is very weak when compared to that of *tanto* officers. As I explained above (see Sec. 6.5.1), *tanto* officers are in charge of handling day-to-day security issues. Governors only get information from these officers through routine reports after incidents have been dealt with. In terms of serious assault, as I explained in Section 6.4.2, Instruction3178 states that local establishments must report serious security incidents to the public through the media. In the media report concerning the attempted escape from *Kurobane* (黒羽) prison in 2005, the governor only apologised for the incident without giving any details of how the escape came about and how it was prevented in the report (Osaka Regional Office, 2005; also see p.223 above). This case suggests that the serious incident report, as set out by *tsutasu* 3178, informally obliges governors to apologise for any security disturbances, including violence, in their areas of responsibility. Hence it can be concluded that governors are in charge of the *disturbance handler* role as part of violence control strategies.

In regard to the *resource allocator* role, governors can appoint members of Adjudication Committees at their discretion as I mentioned above in sec. 6.5.1. Meanwhile, the staffing of *tanto* officers is the responsibility of middle ranking managers in local establishments (this system was also explained in sec. 6.5.1 above).

Therefore, it can be concluded again that although governors have a role to play as *resource allocators*, it is limited by the *tanto* system.

Lastly, in regard to the *negotiator* role, the Japanese prison service has strict procedures for transferring prisoners who are members of Japanese gangs between local establishments in order to avoid conflicts among prisoners (*tsutasu* 3316). Such transfers are arranged between the governors of the establishments involved and the relevant area managers if necessary. Thus, governors must have good negotiation skills as well as networks with other governors in order to effectively transfer prisoners away from their establishments. In this respect, they need to assume the *negotiator* role as part of their local violence control strategies.

Overall, Japanese prison governors are required to be actively in charge of two decisional roles in relation to violence control: *disturbance handler* and *negotiator*. According to the roles of governors' ranks and scores table (see Appendix 3), the extent to which Japanese governors assume decisional roles can be ranked at the third highest grid level and a score of +3 can be assigned to the Japanese prison service for this sub-code. Table 6.4 provides a summary of the roles assumed by governors as leaders of local establishments discussed in Section 3, 4, and 5 in this chapter. The results show that HMPS governors assume strong leadership roles both in regard to suicide and violence control while Japanese prison governors generally assume more moderate leadership roles for the same purposes.

Table 6.4: Summary of leadership roles of governors based on Mintzberg's definitions of leaders (Mintzberg, 1973)

| | | Suicide | | Violence | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 types of roles | Roles | England | Japan | England | Japan |
| Interpersonal roles | Figurehead | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Leaders | ○ | – | ○ | – |
| | Liaison | ○ | – | ○ | ○ |
| | Monitor | ○ | × | ○ | × |
| Informational roles | Disseminator | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Spokesman | ○ | △ | ○ | △ |
| | Entrepreneur | ○ | × | ○ | × |
| | Disturbance Handler | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Decisional roles | Resource Allocator | ○ | △ | ○ | △ |
| | Negotiator | ○ | × | ○ | ○ |

○: active, △: moderate, ×: weak, ─: uncertain.

*6.6: Conclusion*

This chapter has analysed the extent to which governors are assigned specialised roles in local suicide and violence control strategies as part of the overall prison service risk control structures. The first finding is that HMPS assigns specialised suicide and violence control roles to staff members in local establishments. By contrast, the Japanese prison service does not assign specialised roles to local staff members specifically for the purposes of controlling suicide and violence in local establishments. The Japanese prison service does assign a key role to *tanto* officers who are in charge of the day-to-day management of prisoners in local establishments. However, *tanto* officers tend to be more focused on controlling the risks of violence and conflict among prisoners than self-harm and suicide. Hence it has been concluded in this chapter that *tanto* officers mainly specialise in violence control.

Secondly, concerning the promotion criteria for governors, the career path to becoming a governor in the Japanese prison service is strictly ascription-based. Specifically, the level at which staff entered the prison service and their length of service are considered to be the most important factors for selecting governors. Meanwhile, HMPS takes account of achievement- and ascription-based criteria when selecting governors.

Thirdly, in regard to the *interpersonal* roles, HMPS requires governors to be actively responsible for all three of the interpersonal roles discussed in this chapter as part of local suicide and violence control strategies. Meanwhile, the Japanese prison service certainly assigns the role of *figurehead* to its governors for the purposes of suicide and violence control: it is less clear from the available evidence whether this is also the case for the *leader* role. Furthermore, my interview data shows that the capability of Japanese prison governors in assuming the *liaison* role is linked to the external networks they keep. Although it is not clear how these networks affect suicide control, it is certainly the case that they play an important role for Japanese prison governors in managing violence by aiding the process of transferring especially difficult prisoners to other establishments.

Fourthly, in regard to *informational* roles, HMPS governors are required to be actively engaged in all three of the *informational* roles discussed above as part of their local violence and suicide control strategies. By contrast, Japanese prison governors have only a weak role to play in monitoring suicide and violence control: as discussed above, *tanto* officers have much more influence in this respect. In terms of the

*disseminator* role, the Japanese prison service assigns active duties to its governors for transmitting information between local establishments and external bodies such as the public media. Lastly, Japanese prison governors only assume the *spokesman* role in a weak form both for the purposes of suicide and violence control because they are only required to represent their local establishments if the latter have performed poorly.

Finally, in regard to the *decisional* roles, HMPS governors are required to be in charge of all four of these roles for both violence and suicide control. Meanwhile, the Japanese prison service does not assign the *entrepreneur* role to its governors for the purposes of either suicide or violence control. Unlike in HMPS, it is not considered the place of Japanese prison governors to initiate changes within the organizations for which they are responsible. In terms of the role of the *disturbance handle*, the Japanese prison service informally assigns governors the role of apologizing to the public for serious incidents which have occurred in their areas of responsibility. In this respect, the apologies issued by governors are a manner of diverting blame away from the organization where they are leaders (as explained above in Sec. 6.5.1). Accordingly, Japanese prison governors can be seen to assume the disturbance handler role when they make public apologies for poor performance in their local establishments. Finally, Japanese prison governors are assigned an active negotiator role for the purposes of controlling violence in the sense that they must liaise with other governors to transfer prisoners belonging to Japanese gangs away from their establishments.

Overall, governors in the Japanese prison service are assigned weaker leader roles those of governors in HMPS. It should be stressed that the extent to which Japanese prison governors can assume these roles is moderated by the t*anto* system. For their part, *tanto* officers play a general-purpose role in managing security issues. They are in charge of substantial roles for controlling overall risks related to prisoners in local establishments, including violence and suicide. These findings demonstrate the relatively limited use that the Japanese prison service makes of specialized staff members for the purposes of controlling the risk of suicide and violence. This in turn reflects the relatively weak leadership roles assumed by governors in the Japanese prison service. Meanwhile, HMPS governors were formally assigned several leading roles in the national risk control structures. Moreover, my interviews show that it is widely believed within HMPS that governors are leaders of local establishments.

Based on these findings, numerical scores have been assigned for suicide and violence control in the English and Japanese prison services. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 display the results for all of the specialization ranks and scores assigned for the sub-codes discussed

in this chapter. Table 6.5 shows a visual map of the results for the leadership roles (Y2) scores. Yet again, the five columns represent the sub-codes discussed in this chapter. The positions of the shaded blocks reflect the grid level of the English and Japanese prison services for each sub-code, and "S" represents suicide risk control while "V" represents violence risk control. Meanwhile, Table 6.6 shows the leadership roles (Y2) score results as numbers. The five sub-codes are once again listed twice in the left-hand column and two sets of figures are given for each: the first are raw scores and the second are standardized scores as discussed in chapter 3 (see Table 3.5, p. 118). In regard to the number of leadership roles defined by Mintzberg (1973), I have only counted roles when they are considered to be active (see Table 6.4).

Table 6.5: Leadership Roles of Governors (Y2) ranks and grid scores for all sub-codes

| Roles of Governors ranks | Grid Scores | Sub-codes | | | | |
| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| | | Specialization of staff members | selection criteria to be Governors | Interpersonal roles | Informational roles | Decisional roles |
| Highest | 5 | | | | | England (S) and (V) |
| | 4 | | | England (S) and ( V) | England (S) and (V) | |
| | 3 | | Japan | Japan (V) | | Japan(V) |
| | 2 | England (S)&(V) \| Japan (V) | England | Japan (S) | Japan (S) and( V) | Japan (S) |
| | 1 | Japan (S) | | | | |
| Lowest | 0 | | | | | |

(S): suicide, and (V): violence

Table 6.6: Raw and standardized leadership role scores for governors

| Risks | Suicide | | Violence | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prison services | England | Japan | England | Japan |
| Raw scores | | | | |
| Specialization of staff members | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| Selection criteria to be  governors | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| Interpersonal roles | 4 | 2 | 4 | 3 |
| Informational roles | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 |
| Decisional roles | 5 | 2 | 5 | 3 |
| Standardized scores | | | | |
| Specialization of staff members | 10.0 | 5.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 |
| Selection criteria to be  governors | 6.7 | 10.0 | 6.7 | 10.0 |
| Interpersonal roles | 10.0 | 5.0 | 10.0 | 7.5 |
| Informational roles | 10.0 | 5.0 | 10.0 | 5.0 |
| Decisional roles | 10.0 | 4.0 | 10.0 | 6.0 |

In summary, the outcomes show that with the exception of the promotion criteria for selecting governors, HMPS generally has higher grid levels for the high specialization of governors as leaders of local establishments than the Japanese prison service. Meanwhile, the Japanese prison service was generally given lower grid ranks than HMPS with the exception of the sub-code concerning promotion criteria in regard to which the Japanese prison service was ranked higher. The reason for this discrepancy is that Japanese prison governors are promoted in accordance with a seniority system. Otherwise, the general pattern held that HMPS governors showed stronger leadership roles than Japanese prison governors.

## Chapter 7

## Leadership2:

## Autonomy of Local Risk Control Strategies (Group2)

This chapter analyses the autonomy (X2) of local establishments in relation to national prison service risk control structures. Whereas the previous chapter discussed the roles of governors, this chapter considers the extent to which governors exercise discretion and autonomy in local risk control strategies. As a group predicate, the autonomy level is measured in terms of the diversity of local risk control strategies. It was noted in chapter 3 that this diversity can be analysed according to their openness to outsiders and what influences this has on their risk control, and the national risk control structures which allows variation of local risk strategies. Five sub-codes were outlined in chapter 3 to reflect this concept of diversity. Section one of this chapter analyses the proportion of insider and outsider governors; section two analyses the participation of external performance assessment bodies; section three analyses the existence and influence of trade unions; section four analyses the internal performance competition indicators; and section five analyses the diversity of local risk control strategies for violence and suicide.

### 7.1: The proportion of insider and outsider governors

The first sub-code concerns the proportion of insider and outsider governors in the English and Japanese prison services. The criteria for selecting governors in both prison services were discussed in the last chapter as a grid variable. For the purposes of this chapter, these selection criteria are analysed as a group variable according to the proportions of insider and outsider governors in the relevant prison services.

**England**

It was noted in chapter 6 that HMPS has two career paths for appointing governors: 1. prison staff may rise up through the ranks over a long period of service; or 2. experienced professionals outside of the prison service may be fast-tracked to governorships (see Sec.6.2). It was found in chapter 6 that external candidates need to

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spend a few years within HMPS before they can be promoted to governorships. Strictly speaking, there are no pure outsider candidates for governorships in HMPS. However, relatively speaking, governors promoted via fast-track entry schemes may be considered outsiders to a greater extent than governors who have risen up through the ranks within the prison service. Thus, this section analyses the extent to which these relative outsiders are given opportunities to become governors within HMPS and what proportion of governors they make up.

Table 7.1 places governors into two categories according to how many years they spent in the prison service before they were promoted to governorships for the first time: 1. more than 10 years; and 2. between 3 and 9 years. This table reflects the information given about 87 current HMPS governors in *The Prison Hand Book 2010* (Leech, 2010: pp. 372-382). The categories are based on the criteria for fast-track entry. HMPS states that current staff must have served a minimum of three years within the prison service before they become eligible to be promoted to governorships (PSO 8100). It can be seen from Table 7.1 that more than 70% of governors spent more than 10 years in HMPS before they were first promoted to governorships. This figure indicates that a majority of HMPS governors are insiders.

Table 7.1: Time spent by governors in years in HMPS before gaining their first promotions to governorships

| Years spent in HMPS by the first promotion | N of Governors | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| more than 10 years | 66 | 75.9% |
| from 3 to 9 years | 7 | 8.0% |
| Unknown | 14 | 16.1% |
| Total | 87 | 100.0% |

Next, Table 7.2 places the aforementioned 87 governors into two categories which reflect the two possible career paths stated above: rising up through the ranks and fast-track entry. Although the entry statuses of some governors are unknown, the table shows that more than half of them rose up through the ranks before they were appointed to their first governorships. By contrast, only 15% of them were appointed to their first governorships through the fast-track entry scheme. Again, this indicates that a majority of HMPS governors are insiders.

Table 7.2: The percentages of governors who gained their positions through conventional and fast-tack entry schemes

| Types of Promotion | N of Governors | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| Risen up through ranks | 59 | 67.8% |
| Short-cut entries | 13 | 14.9% |
| Unknown | 15 | 17.2% |
| Total | 87 | 100.0% |

*fast-track entry includes the *Direct Entry*, *Fast Track*, and *Accessorized Promotion* schemes.

Thus, although the opportunity to become an HMPS governor is open to outsiders, a majority of current governors are insiders who have risen up through the ranks. According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), the proportion of insider to outsider governors in HMPS can be ranked at the second highest group level (governorship is open to outsiders but a majority of governors are insiders) and HMPS can be assigned a score of +3 for this sub-code.

**Japan**

As I explained in chapter 6, prison governors can only be promoted from among existing staff within in the Japanese prison service (see Sec. 6.2). All governors are expected to rise up through ranks after joining the service between the ages of 18 and 35. I also explained that grades are assigned to prison officers when they initially join the prison service. These grades differ depending on which type of entry exam they have taken: 1 basic prison officer selection exam; 2. type B civil servant selection exam; and 3. type A high-ranking civil servant selection exam. Prison staff who take the basic prison officer selection exam must rise up through the ranks from the lowest grade.

Table 7.3 shows a breakdown of prison officers who entered the Japanese prison service in 2003. It can be seen from this table that the number of officers who took the types A and B civil servant selection exams is less than 1%. Meanwhile, the remaining staff members took the basic prison officer selection exam (see Table 7.3). Thus, although there are three points of entry into the Japanese prison service, nearly all staff members enter at the lowest level.

Table 7.3: Paths of entry into the Japanese prison service in 2003

| Types of entry exam | N of staff | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| Prison Officers Selection | 467 | 99.2% |
| Typ.A High class civil servant | 4 | 0.8% |
| Type.B Civil Servant | 0 | 0.0% |
| Total Staff joined the service in 2003 | 471 | 100.0% |

*JMOJ (2003d) *Keimukan no Jinji Kanri ni Tuite,* p. 6.

These figures indicate that most governors rise up through the ranks from the lowest prison officer grade after joining the Japanese prison service. According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), the ratio of insider to outsider governors in the Japanese prison service can be ranked at the highest group level (all governors are insiders and promotion is closed to outsiders) and the Japanese prison service can be scored +4 for this sub-code.

## 7.2: Participation of external performance assessment bodies

The second sub-code concerns the participation of external performance bodies in the management of suicide and violence control structures at a local level.  As I mentioned in chapter 3, Hood (1998) has discussed types of audit or performance inspection in terms of whether the people conducting the assessments are insiders or outsiders of the organizations they are assessing.  Following this method, this section analyses how far the performance of local establishments on suicide and violence control is monitored by external performance assessment bodies.

### 7.2.1: Suicide

**England**

In HMPS the performance of local establishments is mainly assessed by three official independent organizations: the Prison and Probation Ombudsman (PPO), the Independent Monitoring Boards (IMBs), and the HM Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP). In addition to these bodies, there are many voluntary groups which monitor HM prisons. However, this study focuses only on how the three main external performance assessment bodies influence suicide and violence control in local establishments.

The first independent auditing body, the PPO, investigates complaints from prisoners and any deaths among prisoners (PPO, 2011). PPO officers are appointed by

the Secretary of State for Justice and fully independent of the prison service (*ibid.*). In terms of suicide control, the fatal incidents team of the PPO investigates every kind of death in local establishments: that is, deaths from natural causes, self-inflicted deaths, homicides, and accidental deaths (PPO, 2011a). Investigations are conducted by named investigators in order to clarify as far as possible the circumstances in which deaths have occurred.

HMPS does not any have legal obligations to take action in response to reports or advice given by PPOs (Harding, 2007; and Shaw, 2008). Liebling (2004) has explained that although the activities of PPO officers are an important mechanism for investigating any errors in the treatment of prisoners and complaints made by prisoners against the prison service, it lacks the power to force prisons to act on its findings and accept responsibility. Coyle (2005) has also argued that the PPO lacks authority in prisons. I could not find strong evidence to support the claims of either author. However, it is noteworthy that during the period between 2009 and 2010, the PPO received 4050 complaints from prisoners, of which only 48% were accepted as "eligible complaints" (PPO, 2010). These figures suggest that the function of the PPO is limited in terms of the resources available to follow up complaints. This may indicate that the PPO is, as Liebling and Coyle claim, weak.

The second independent body, the IMBs, was formerly known as the Boards of Visitors (BoVs). The BoVs was re-launched as the IMBs in April 2003 since the former body did not fit with the modern performance-driven prison service (Liebling, 2004). The IMBs currently consists of lay representatives from the local community who are appointed to specific prisons for three years by the Home Secretary (Haines, 2008). Members of the IMBs are independent, unpaid, and work an average of 2-3 days per month (Liebling, 2005; IMB, 2010). The current role of the IMBs is to monitor daily life in prisons, particularly to check that prisoners are being treated decently and humanely (*ibid.*).

The IMBs do not have any formal powers to monitor local suicide control. Annual IMBs reports mention the number of self-inflicted deaths or the suicide control structures based on the ACCT approach in the prisons they monitor. However, the quality of the reports and the information they contain varies depending on which establishments they cover. Additionally, the independence of the IMBs is not consistent across all local establishments. A governor whom I interviewed stated that the distance between governors and IMBs members varies in different areas. Some IMBs members have closer relationships with the governors of the establishments they monitor than

others. Coyle (2005) has also noted some instances in which IMBs members have been too close to the prisons they were supposed to monitor. Based on his experiences as an HMPS governor, he has suggested that IMBs should be understood as an "expression of the British tradition of people volunteering for the public service without a committed and dispassionate manner" (Coyle, 2005: p. 75). Thus, although the IMBs are assigned the function of monitoring prisons, their influence over local suicide control may be considered to be low.

The third auditing body, HMIP, is an independent inspectorate which reports on conditions and the treatment of prisoners in prisons. The post of HM Chief Inspector of Prisons (HMCIP) is appointed by the Justice Secretary from outside HMPS for a term of five years (HMIP, 2009). The appointment of the Chief Inspector in this way also shows the involvement of voluntary organizations representing the human rights of prisoners in monitoring local establishments. For example, the former HMCIP of prisons, Dame Anne Owers, was formerly director of JUSTICE, a UK-based human rights and law reform organization (BBC, 2001). The HMIIP has six inspection teams working under a Deputy Chief Inspector. Each team specializes in inspecting specific types of custodial establishment such as young offender institutions (YOIs), immigration removal centres, and adult women's or men's prisons (HMIP, 2009b). The frequency of inspections is determined by the resources available to HMIP teams. However, full inspections of adult prisons and YOIs have traditionally been conducted every five years (Newcomen, 2008). According to an official statement, HMIP aims "to provide independent scrutiny of the conditions for and treatment of prisoners and other detainees, promoting the concept of 'healthy prisons' in which staff work effectively to support prisoners and detainees to reduce reoffending or achieve other agreed outcomes" (HMIP, 2009a).

In comparison with the other performance auditing bodies discussed above, the work carried out by HMIP is generally recognised to be of high quality (Liebling, 2004; and Newcomen, 2008). HMIP has the right to visit any part of any prison at any time regardless of whether notice has been given in advance. The reports made by HMIP are authorised by the Chief Inspector whereat they become HMCIP reports. Governors take the findings of HMCIP reports seriously as evaluations of the performance of their local establishments (*ibid*.). Moreover, HMCIP reports are used as indicators for the prison service performance benchmarking system (PIAG, 2010). HMIP have defined *expectations* for prisons which are essentially performance criteria based on the UN standards for "healthy prisons" (HMIP, 2009a). These expectations focus on four key

areas of prison activity: 1. safety; 2. respect; 3. purposeful activity; and 4. resettlement. Each of these areas of prison activity is then tested in terms of nine aspects of prison life: 1. arrival in custody; 2. environment and relationship with staff in the prison; 3. duty of care (including violence and suicide control); 4. health service; 5. activities; 6. good order; 7. services; 8 resettlement; and 9. special units (HMIP 2009a). HMIP also specifies what kinds of evidence are suitable for assessing these criteria: for example, relevant documentation (*e.g.* Adjudication records or SIRs), interviews with staff and prisoners, and observation inside local establishments. Local establishments are given one of four ratings reflecting their level of performance: level four indicates the highest performance level while level one indicates the worst performance level.

HMIP tests local suicide control performance in terms of "duty of care". HMIP defines 10 expectations for local suicide control strategies (see Appendix 5). Those expectations asses the implementation of the ACCT approach, the adequateness of local suicide control strategies, and the appropriateness of any other relevant suicide prevention techniques as defined in PSO 2700 (HMIP, 2009a: see Appendix 5). Evidence considered suitable for assessing suicide control includes relevant documentation kept by prison staff (i.e. ACCT documents), interviews with prison staff, observation records of suicide reduction meetings, and prisoner surveys (HMIP, 2009a). Hence HMIP uses standardized and well-established auditing criteria to monitor local suicide control strategies.

Thus, the performance of HMPS prisons in regard to suicide control is assessed by several independent auditing bodies, of which HMIP has the strongest influence over local establishments. According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), the diversity of the system in place for monitoring HMPS prisons can be ranked at the third highest group level (there are multiple officially selected external auditing bodies some of whose activities are influential for local establishments) and HMPS can be assigned a score of +2 for this sub-code.


**Japan**

External monitoring bodies have traditionally had very little influence over the Japanese prison service. Although there have long been several administrative overseers of prisons outside of the Ministry of Justice, they have never been authorised by the prison service and their influence over the day-to-day running of local establishments is very limited (Nishio, 2004). In response to this lack of external performance control, the Penal Institution Visiting Committees (PIVCs) were established as part of the 2003

Penal Reforms led by the CARC. PIVCs began functioning as the official monitoring committees for local establishments in 2006. Each committee consists of between 4 and 10 members and covers one local establishment. Committee members are selected from among externals professionals and citizens (JMOJ, 2007a). Their reports are published annually by the Ministry of Justice.

PIVC reports and activities do not particularly focus on suicide prevention in local establishments. Although the committees have made reports on problems in each prison since 2006, as of yet problems with suicide control have not been identified in any prisons (JMOJ, 2010: see Sec. 5.3.1). In fact, the authority of PIVCs over the prison service and the amount of access they should have to local establishments are still unclear. Furthermore, local establishments do not have any formal duties to improve their performance in response to PIVC reports. For my research I interviewed one member of the Japanese prison service's internal auditing staff. He explained that since the PIVC system had only recently been launched in 2006, the prison service was still unsure how to understand its role in the prison service control structure.

Other than the PIVCs, officially-approved independent auditing bodies do not exist in the Japanese prison service. There are a few unofficial human rights activist groups which monitor how appropriately prisoners are treated in local establishments: these include AIJ and the CPR. These groups have repeatedly criticised the poor conditions in which prisoners are kept in Japanese prisons. Nevertheless, they have not highlighted suicide as a serious issue (AIJ, 1998; and CPR 2011). In my interviews I asked a staff member at the national HQ about the types of claims that external interest groups make about suicide control in local prisons. He explained that most of the criticisms the Japanese prison service received in this regard came from activist groups which were concerned that prisoners were not allowed to commit suicide rather than the management of suicide control.

Overall, although there are a few external bodies which monitor suicide control in the Japanese prison service, their influence is generally weak. According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), the influence of external auditing bodies over the Japanese prison service can be ranked at the second highest group level (there are a few external performance assessment bodies, but these lack influence over local establishments.) and the Japanese prison service can be assigned a score of +3 for this sub-code.

*7.2.2: Violence*

**England**

In regard to monitoring violence control in prisons, the PPO, IMB, and HMIP are authorised as independent auditing bodies as mentioned above in Sec.7.2.1. Firstly, the PPO investigates complaints from prisoners who claim to have been inappropriately restrained as part of violence control procedures (PPO, 2010). In this respect, the main purpose of the PPO is to respond to prisoners' complaints rather than to influence how violence is controlled in local establishments. HMPS is not obliged to follow the advice and recommendations of the PPO as was also explained above in Section 7.2.1 above. Thus, the influence of the PPO over local violence control should also be considered weak.

Secondly, the IMBs are more involved in the implementation local violence control strategies. In particular, board members monitor how segregation units are used in local establishments (PSO 1700) and attend violence reduction meetings in prisons as part of local violence reduction strategies (PSO 2750). Board members represent prisoners and their concerns, monitor whether force and segregation units are used appropriately, and provide support to both the victims and perpetrators of violence and bullying (*ibid.*). Nevertheless, in spite of the high level of involvement of IMB members in local violence control strategies, a lack of knowledge of who they are and what they do has been identified among prisoners. According to HMIP reports, in some prisons more than 30% of prisoners do not know who their local IMB members are (see Table 7.4). These reports cover some remand prisons where it may not be so important for prisoners to understand the IMB system. However, this lack of awareness of the IMB system was also found in prisons where inmates serve long custodial sentences such as HMPs Liverpool and Wandsworth. Thus, it can be concluded that the influence of IMBs over local violence control varies between different local establishments.

Table 7.4: Awareness of IMBs among prisoners according to HMIP full inspections

| How easy or difficult is it for you to see the Independent Monitoring Board (IMB)? | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prisons | don't know who they are (%) | very easy | easy | neither | difficult | very difficult |
| HMP Acklington (2009) N=133 | 24 | 10 | 25 | 25 | 13 | 3 |
| HMP Bedford (2009) N=237 | 37 | 4 | 14 | 24 | 13 | 9 |
| HMP Bristol (2010) N=129 | 30 | 5 | 20 | 21 | 14 | 10 |
| HMP Doncaster ( 2010) N= 219 | 32 | 10 | 29 | 38 | 18 | 15 |
| HMP Exeter (2009) N=127 | 40 | 4 | 12 | 23 | 15 | 6 |
| HMP Ford (2010) N=218 | 17 | 5 | 34 | 31 | 10 | 3 |
| HMP Haverigg (2009) N=135 | 37 | 4 | 12 | 23 | 14 | 10 |
| HMP Holloway ( 2010) N=196 | 26 | 9 | 23 | 17 | 18 | 9 |
| HMP Isle of Wight ( 2010) N=190 | 20 | 5 | 14 | 35 | 16 | 10 |
| HMP Kirkham (2009) N=138 | 38 | 8 | 19 | 26 | 6 | 3 |
| HMP Liverpool (2009)  N=140 | 40 | 6 | 16 | 15 | 10 | 13 |
| HMP North Sea Camp ( 2009) N=114 | 15 | 14 | 43 | 21 | 5 | 3 |
| HMP Pentonville ( 2009) N=190 | 44 | 2 | 13 | 15 | 17 | 9 |
| HMP Portland (2009) N=143 | 35 | 8 | 23 | 21 | 6 | 6 |
| HMP Preston ( 2009) N=137 | 41 | 5 | 19 | 21 | 10 | 4 |
| HMP Stoke Heath ( 2010) N=1668 | 29 | 4 | 20 | 26 | 15 | 6 |
| HMP Stoken ( 2010) N=208 | 22 | 5 | 21 | 31 | 13 | 7 |
| HMP The Mount ( 2009) N=126 | 14 | 9 | 27 | 27 | 16 | 7 |
| HMP Wandsworth (2009) N=145 | 36 | 7 | 21 | 20 | 12 | 4 |
| HMP YOI (2010) Feltham N=115 | 33 | 5 | 17 | 26 | 8 | 10 |

*survey data collected from local establishments by HMIP between 2009 and 2010 (N= number of samples in establishment)

Thirdly, as noted above in regard to suicide control, HM Prison Inspection reports are taken very seriously by governors of local establishments. HMIP monitors the quality and efficiency of local violence control strategies in terms of nine "expectation" criteria (see Appendix 6). The types of evidence used to evaluate local violence control strategies in this way include interviews with prisoners and staff members, observation of violence reduction meetings, and relevant internal documentation (HMIP, 2009 and 2009a). The findings of HMIP reports are used as indicators for the prison service performance benchmarking system (PIAG, 2010). Thus, governors of local establishments need to seriously take account of HMIP reports.

HMPS has authorised several independent auditing bodies, some of which are more influential than others, to monitor violence control in local establishments. According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), these circumstances can be ranked at the third highest group level (there are multiple external performance assessment bodies. Some of those have substantial influences), and HMPS can be assigned a score of +2 for this sub-code.

**Japan**

The involvement of external performance assessment bodies in monitoring local violence control strategies is weak in the Japanese prison service by comparison with HMPS. As I mentioned in regard to suicide control (see sec. 7.2.1), the Japanese prison service has authorised the activities of the PIVCs. Nevertheless, over the past four years the reports made by the PIVCs have had very little to say about local violence control strategies. In this respect, it seems that they do not have much influence over local violence control strategies.

Meanwhile, unlike in the case of suicide control, voluntary groups representing the rights of prisoners have shown a high level of interest in the perceived overuse of force by prison staff to control violence in local establishments. AIJ (1998) has reported that segregation is overused in local establishments to prevent conflicts between prisoners. As I explained in chapter 5, segregation is often used not just as a way of punishing violent prisoners, but also of making examples of prisoners who have committed minor offences (see, p.175). This issue has been reported by other major voluntary groups as well as AIJ. According to Emi Akiyama, a director of the CPR, her organization has also repeatedly reported cases in which excessive control measures have been used to restrain prisoners such as body belts (Akiyama, 2010).

The activities of these interest groups have not been taken seriously by the Japanese prison service and local establishments for a long time. However, their involvement in publicizing the deaths of two prisoners in Nagoya (名古屋) prison in 2001 and 2002 was a factor which led to the establishment of the CARC in 2003. The prisoners in question both died as a result of excessive force being used to restrain them by prison officers (Akiyama, 2010). These incidents were heavily criticised in public due to the out-dated methods which were still being used to subdue unruly prisoners. In response, in 2002 the Public Prosecutors' Office announced an investigation into these cases in Nagoya prison. Furthermore, as just stated, the CARC was established in 2003. The findings of this committee ultimately led to major reforms in how force is used to restrain prisoners in Japanese prisons (JMOJ, 2008). Hence the series of events which led to the establishment of CARC in 2003 suggests that voluntary groups can have some influence over how violence is controlled in the Japanese prison service. However, it should also be stressed that reform was brought about through the combined influences of public opinion, the Public Prosecutors' Office, and the aforementioned voluntary groups. It may thus be concluded that although voluntary groups can have some

influence over local violence control strategies, this influence is not in itself enough to bring about serious change.

Overall, there are one official and several unofficial external performance assessment bodies monitoring violence control in Japanese prisons. However, the influence of all of these bodies is limited. According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), these circumstances can be ranked at the second highest group level (there are a few external performance assessment bodies, but lack influence over local establishments.) and the Japanese prison service can be assigned a score of +3 for this sub-code.

## 7.3: *The existence and influence of trade unions*

The activities of trade unions affect the autonomy of governors in local establishments and the overall group unity of prison service institutions. This section analyses whether the prison services in question authorise unionisation among their staff, especially prison officers, and how trade unions influence local suicide and violence control strategies.

### 7.3.1: Suicide

**England**

Unionisation among prison officers has been authorised by HMPS since 1938 (Coyle, 2005). The largest trade union is the Prison Officers' Association (POA) which represents 96 per cent of all prison officers across HM prisons (Bennett, 2008). The relationship between the POA and local governors and the national prison service is often difficult. Since it was authorised, the activities of the POA have regularly been blamed for disruptions to the day-to-day operation of local prisons (Bennett, 2008). The approaches taken to local branches of the POA vary according to the discretion of each governor. The governors whom I interviewed explained that some governors try to oppose the actions of their local POA branches while others take a more cooperative stanch towards them. Additionally, one of my interviewees noted that the quality of the relationships between local governors and POA branches often depends on the histories of different local establishments. Some establishments have very active POA branches which regularly oppose the actions or policies of their local governors.

If governors of local establishments ask certain staff members to take on additional responsibilities as part of local suicide control strategies, this can lead to conflicts between the governor and the POA. For example, in one case HMIP reported that security officers in HMP Lindholm were not properly patrolling cells during the night in order to check on prisoners at risk of suicide or self-harm (HMCIP, 2000). The reason for this problem was that the local branch of the POA had insisted that asking prison officers to patrol cells for the purposes of suicide control meant demanding extra work from them which was considered to be in breach of their working agreements with HMP Lindholm (*ibid.*). This case shows how the activities of the POA can affect local suicide control strategies and also that governors need to consider the impact of the POA when designing such strategies.

Thus, HMPS authorises unionisation among its prison officers and other staff and that staff unions such as the POA can have a major impact on suicide control strategies at a local level. According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), this situation can be ranked at the third highest group level (trade unions influences operation of risk control strategies in some local establishments) and HMPS can be assigned a score of +2 for this sub-code.


**Japan**

As discussed earlier in chapter 6, unionisation is not permitted among Japanese prison governors and officers. More specifically, unionisation among national security professionals, including prison officers, is prohibited by Article 108-2 of *The National Civil Servant Act* [*kokkakomuin ho*: 国家公務員法]. This rule was criticized by the 2003 CARC which suggested that the existence of a prison officers' trade union could improve the work environment in prisons (JMOJ, 2003). Nevertheless, this article has not been amended and there are no signs that it will be anytime soon.

When asked about this situation, the Japanese prison staff whom I interviewed did not express any clear dissatisfaction with the lack of a trade union for their profession. One retired governor-graded officer stated that even if a trade union was authorised, not many officers would participate in it because of the history of trade unions in Japanese society. According to him, Japanese trade unions are traditionally yellow unions meaning that companies have a substantial degree of control over them. Accordingly, they rarely cause any disruptions. The lack of a prison officers' trade union probably reflects the historical weakness of Japanese trade unions in general.

Thus, according to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), the lack any approved trade unions for Japanese prison officers' can be ranked at the highest group level (trade unions do not exist) and a score of +4 can be applied to the Japanese prison service for this sub-code.

### 7.3.2: Violence

**England**

As with suicide control, the POA has a major interest in local violence control strategies which can affect the security and safety of its members. Local violence control policies are often a major cause of conflict between the POA and HMPS and have occasionally led to strikes by POA members. There are usually two main causes of conflict in this regard: national or local violence control policies and specific incidents which have occurred in local establishments.

The first course of action taken by the POA is to raise issues with national or local violence control strategies through policy statements which are often announced in the media. For example, PSO 1600 (*Use of Force*) places tight restrictions on which kinds of defence tools can be used against prisoners who are under 18 years old in YOIs. In response to PSO 1600, the POA has insisted that prison officers need more protection against attacks from young offenders referring to the number of their members who were attacked and injured while working in YOIs in 2007 (Slack, 2007). Again, this kind of action suggests that the activities of the POA can influence national violence control policies in HMPS. The second course of action taken by the POA, the POA has criticized weak performance in local violence control in the media. For example, a severe riot occurred on the 1st of January 2011 in HMP Ford. In response to this incident, the POA publically criticized understaffing and a drinking culture among prisoners in the prison as well as recent budget cuts within HMPS (Bowcott, 2011).

Thus, the activities of the POA can influence local violence control strategies and performance. According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), the influence of the POA in this regard can be ranked at the third highest group level (trade unions exists, and influences operation of risk control strategies in some local establishments) and HMPS can be assigned a score of + 2 for this sub-code.

**Japan**

As discussed above, the Japanese prison service does not authorise unionisation among prison officers hence there are no unions to intervene in national or local violence

control strategies and policies. Therefore, as with suicide control, the Japanese prison service is ranked at the highest group level and assigned a score of +4 for this sub-code.

## *7.4: Internal performance competition and the main indicators thereof*

The fourth sub-code concerns internal performance competition and the main indicators for measuring it. This sub-code firstly analyses whether the English and Japanese prison services use internal competition as a means of encouraging local establishments to improve their handling of violence and suicide control. Secondly, where relevant this section measures the autonomy of local suicide and violence control strategies in relation to the overall prison service structures by analysing what kinds of internal performance indicators are used by either prison service.

### *7.4.1: Suicide*
**England**

HMPS has been assessing the performance of local establishments since the 1990s. The names of the performance assessment systems and indicators used by HMPS have changed regularly over the past 20 years. The indicators for suicide control in particular have not been consistent during this period.  Therefore, for the purposes of this study I refer only to the indicators defined by the Prison Service Performance Rating System (PRS) which was used between 2004 and 2010 (PIAG, 2010). The PRS was a benchmarking system used to evaluate the overall performance of local establishments on a quarterly basis (PIAG, 2010). According to this system, local establishments were given ratings on a scale of one to four: level 4 being the best and level 1 being the worst performance ratings. The PRS indicators changed constantly over the six year period that the system was used. The performance of local establishments in terms of suicide and self-harm control was measured according to the results of internal self-harm performance audits and HMIP healthy prison tests (PIAG, 2010).

Local establishments were obliged by national rules to conduct self-harm performance audits to assess their own processes for preventing suicide and self-harm among prisoners (HMPS, 2007). This performance standard mainly assessed whether local establishments were following the procedural guidelines defined in the ACCT plan and PSO 2700. The suicide and self-harm performance indicators defined by *Performance Standard 60* are as follows:

**Suicide and self-harm performance indicators**
• *Audit compliance*
• *Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork (ACCT) CAREMAPs specify how each individual at-risk prisoner will be kept safe and what support they will be provided with.*
• *Actions specified in the ACCT CAREMAPs are carried out by named members of staff within required timescales.*
• *Staff are trained and supported to meet the requirements of PSO 2700.*
• *A F213SH is completed for every incident of self-harm and all required details are entered onto the Incident Reporting System (IRS).*
• *Every initial case review is held no later than 24 hours after the ACCT has been opened.*
• *Local data on suicide and self-harm incidents are analysed monthly and the continuous improvement plan is updated.*
(HMPS 2007 *Performance Standard 60: Suicide and Self-harm Management*)

This list shows that most internal performance audit indicators used while the PRS system was in place measured the extents to which local establishments appropriately implemented the suicide and self-harm prevention procedures defined by PSO 2700 and the ACCT plan. Similarly, the HMIP test for suicide and self-harm prevention assessed local suicide control processes. As I explained in sec. 7.2.1 of this chapter, HMIP monitors whether local establishments implement the ACCT approach and national suicide control guidelines properly (HMIP, 2009a). Thus, it can be seen that HMPS measures local suicide control performance in terms of process-oriented indicators rather than outcome-oriented indicators such as suicide and self-harm rates in local establishments.

In conclusion, HMPS uses internal competition to encourage local establishments to improve their suicide control performance. Furthermore, the indicators used by HMPS to measure internal performance are mainly process-oriented. According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), the extent to which HMPS makes use of internal competition can be ranked at the second highest group level (internal performance competition Exists and performance is measured by process-oriented indicators) and a score of + 2 can be given for this sub-code.

**Japan**

The Japanese prison service does not make use of internal performance competition to encourage local establishments to improve their suicide control performance. A director of the Japanese prison service whom I interviewed commented that although the prison service has been considering introducing a performance assessment system for some

time, it is highly unlikely to happen in his view. He stressed that internal competition is not a good way of controlling the performance of local establishments because it highlights differences in the quality of the service delivered by different prisons and reduces overall unity within the prison service. Additionally, he forcefully stated that performance assessments based on statistical data and numerical scales do not reflect the reality of prisons in any way.

Although the Japanese prison service does not use competition between local establishments, the national auditing unit must inspect the overall performance of local establishments at least once a year (Article 5 of *The Penal Institutions Act*). Auditors are appointed by the Minister of Justice from staff members at the national HQs (*ibid.*). Unlike in HMPS, auditors do not have formal written performance standards for monitoring local suicide control strategies. Staff members in the national HQs whom I interviewed explained that most auditors have worked as prison officers in local establishments before being moved to the national HQ offices. Accordingly, they conduct inspections of local establishments based on their experiences as prison officers. I interviewed one of these auditors for this study. He explained that in his view all local establishments have some problems and that he audits prisons by observing the customs and patterns of behaviour of governors and managers. In comparison with the assessment standards maintained by HMPS, the auditing system used in the Japanese prison service is rather general and no clearly defined standards have been set for checking local performance.

Thus, the Japanese prison service does not use internal performance competition to control suicide prevention strategies in local establishments. According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), the lack of internal performance competition in the Japanese prison service can be ranked at the highest group level (internal performance competition does not exist) and the prison service itself can be assigned a score of +3 for this sub-code.


*7.4.2: Violence*

**England**

In contrast to the case of suicide control, HMPS has been using relatively well-established performance competition indicators for controlling violence. Since the 1990s HMPS has introduced Key Performance Indicators and Targets (KPIs and KPTs) (Bennett, 2008). KPIs are national indicators for measuring the quality of service in prisons and KPTs are local performance targets for each establishment.

In terms of violence control, KPTs set serious assault targets relative to the size of the prisoner populations in different local establishments. These targets are also defined locally and renewed every year in consideration of local violence incident records. Achievement is measured according to the relationship between targeted assault rates and the actual performance of local establishments. For example, the serious assault KPT for HMP Exeter in 2010 was set at 1.28 cases per prisoner (PIAG, 2010). In response, HMP Exeter recorded 0.77 cases of serious assault per prisoner in the first quarter of 2010 (*ibid.*). In this way, HMP Exeter performed 160% better than the target set for it: in other words, it achieved its target for that quarter.

Thus, it can be seen that HMPS measures performance on violence and serious assault in terms of outcome- rather than process-oriented indicators. According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), the system used by HMPS to measure performance on violence and serious assault can be ranked at the second lowest group level (internal performance competition exists for controlling violence, and the indicators are outcome-oriented) and a score of +1 can be assigned for this sub-code.

**Japan**

As with suicide control, the Japanese prison service does not have any performance assessment methods for monitoring violence control in local establishments. Also, the national audit does not have a specific agenda or criteria concerning violence control performance levels in local establishments. According to national HQ staff members, auditing is based on the experiences of the auditors as explained in suicide control (see Sec. 7.4.1 above). In any case, the Japanese prison service does not use competition between local establishments to control violence hence it is ranked at the highest group level and assigned a score of + 3 for this sub-code.

## 7.5: Diversity of key local strategies

The final sub-code concerns the diversity of key local strategies. Previous sections analysed how much discretion local establishments and their governors have in setting local risk control strategies and to what extent this process is open to external influence. Following this course, this section analyses how far key suicide and violence control strategies indicate diversity among local establishments.

*7.5.1: Suicide*

**England**

It was found in chapter 6 that HMPS governors are assigned several leadership roles in local establishments as part of local suicide control strategies. Nevertheless, there is not much diversity between local suicide control strategies across HMPS because they all based on the national suicide control structure.

The first key strategy for controlling suicide is operating the ACCT process for prisoners at risk. PSO 2700 states that local suicide control procedures should be based on the ACCT scheme as discussed in chapter 4. Accordingly, ACCT is one of the key strategies for controlling the risk of suicide in local establishments. There are external and internal performance indicators for assessing the compliance level of local establishments in regard to ACCT. As discussed in sec. 7.2.1, HMIP reviews the appropriateness of how ACCT is operated in different local establishments. Moreover, as explained in sec. 7.4.1, HMPS uses process-oriented indicators to measure local suicide control performance. These checks constrain local autonomy in establishing more varied strategies for controlling suicide. Governors need to concentrate on implementing the ACCT scheme in their areas of responsibility as stated in PSO 2700.

The second key strategy for preventing suicide is confining prisoners at risk to special cells or segregation units as was already explained in chapter 4 (PSOs 2700 and 1700). Any decisions to confine prisoners due to these risks require the authorisation of the relevant governor (Rule 45 of *The Prison Rules 1999*; PSOs 2700 and 1700). Governors may also place prisoners at risk in confinement according to their own discretion. Nevertheless, the discretion of governors in this regard is restricted by PSOs 2700 and 1700. PSO 1700 emphasises that 12% of self-inflicted deaths in prison custody over the period 2001-2006 occurred while the prisoners involved were being held in confinement (PSO 1700). Based on this data, PSOs 2700 and 1700 stated that governors should only place prisoners at risk of suicide in confinement if there are no other effective means of dealing with them in line with the ACCT scheme.

Following these rules, HMIP tends to strictly evaluate the use of segregation units in HM prisons for the purposes of preventing suicide and self-harm. Establishments where relatively high numbers of prisoners at risk in the aforesaid ways are confined to segregation units are required to prove that this form of treatment is necessary according to the ACCT scheme. In any case, it seems that segregation is not favoured by HMIP as a way of controlling the said risks. This can be seen from the following cases reported of HMPs Brixton and Parc:

*Twelve ACCTs had been opened in recent months on prisoners held in the segregation unit... The prison argued that segregation had been the only viable option at the time, and some prisoners had been involved in acts of indiscipline before the self-harm.*
(HMCIP 2008b HMP Brixton)

*Five prisoners a month subject to ACCT procedures were held in the segregation unit. ACCT procedures were implemented quickly when risks were identified but there was no routine consideration of the suitability of remaining in segregation and no evidence that mental health assessments were completed promptly.*
(HMCIP 2009l HMP Parc)

These reports show that the discretion of governors for segregating prisoners at risk of suicide or self-harm is limited by PSO 2700 and HMIP.

The third key approach is transferring prisoners at risk to other establishments. As with segregation, PSOs 2700 and PSO 1810 state that local establishments can transfer prisoners to other establishments if the transfers are considered to be beneficial to the prisoners at risk. Chapter 6 discussed how transfers are arranged between the governors of local establishments. It was noted that governors are in charge of deciding and negotiating prisoner transfers. Nevertheless, HMIP strictly monitors prisoner transfers: particularly of prisoners at risk of suicide or self-harm. A report made by HMIP to HMPS concerning a loop transfer of prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm between HMPs Wandsworth and Pentonville is enlightening in this regard.

In May 2009 six prisoners were moved from HMP Pentonville to HMP Wandsworth immediately prior to an HMIP inspection of Pentonville. Then in June five of the same prisoners were transferred back to Pentonville immediately prior to an HMIP inspection of Wandsworth (MOJ, 2010c). This system of transferring prisoners between the two establishments, evidently to avoid HMIP criticizing their treatment, was found by HMIP and reported to HMPS and the MOJ. In this case, firstly HMIP stated that the two establishments had abused the transfer system. Secondly, they specifically focused on two prisoners out of six prisoners who had been transferred between the two prisons. These two were found to be at serious risk of self-harm or suicide, and HMIP particularly criticised that the transfers had increased self-harming and suicide risk of those prisoners (HMCIP, 2009m and 2009q). These reports subsequently led to an investigation of loop transfers between local establishments by the MOJ (MOJ, 2010c). This case shows that although governors are formally assigned

leadership roles in transferring prisoners at risk of suicide or self-harm, such transfers are in fact constrained by the national suicide control guidelines and strictly monitored by HMIP. Thus, it is difficult for governors to exercise discretion in using prisoner transfers and confinement to control the risks of suicide and self-harm. Instead, they are expected to generally follow key national guidelines.

Overall, main key local suicide control strategies (*i.e.* segregation and transfers) where governors can exercise their discretion were highly intervened by the national HQs and HMIP. Those interventions are intended to unify local suicide control strategies under the national suicide control policies. According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), these circumstances can be ranked at the second highest group level (there are common key strategies followed by a majority of local establishments for controlling the risks of suicide and self-harm) and HMPS can be assigned a score of +3 for this sub-code.


**Japan**

It was noted in chapter 4 that the Japanese prison service generally does not have formal risk control guidelines. Additionally, chapter 6 showed that the strategic leadership roles played by governors in controlling risk in local establishments are weakened by the *tanto* system. Hence this section discusses whether *tanto* officers share common key strategies for controlling suicide and, if so, how far any such approaches vary between *tanto* officers in different local establishments.

According the Japanese prison staff whom I interviewed, when they were working as *tanto* officers in local establishments they did not follow any significant common strategies along with their colleagues for controlling the risk of suicide. One of these interviewees explained that he was fully responsible for all general duties required of him as a *tanto* officer: for example, patrolling cells at night and consulting prisoners who had problems. He concluded that, in these circumstances, if a prisoner successfully committed suicide, the case would be considered unavoidable because the supervising officer had conducted all of his assigned duties. Similarly, another interviewee explained that prison officers generally do not consider suicide among prisoners to be an active control target. He emphasized that even if a suicide occurred, the *tanto* officers and duty managers involved would not be reprimanded unless they had clearly failed to perform their assigned duties.

Thus, the prison staff whom I interviewed did not think that suicide should be an active control target. This view corresponds to the findings of chapter 5 on how risk is

identified by local establishments in Japan. Specifically, sec. 5.2.1 showed that local establishments do not have particular ways of identifying the risks of suicide and self-harm. Therefore, it can be concluded that there are no formal or informal strategies within Japanese prisons for controlling the risks of suicide and self-harm. According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), this situation can be ranked at the lowest group level (risk control strategies cannot be observed at either local or national levels) and a score of 0 can be assigned to the Japanese prison service for this sub-code.

### 7.5.2: Violence

**England**

Chapter 6 showed that governors are assigned several roles as leaders of local establishments as part of local violence control strategies. Additionally, in comparison with suicide control, local establishments are allowed to maintain a variety of approaches to segregating prisoners for the purposes of preventing violence, in which regard governors can exercise their discretion.

Firstly, PSO 2750, referring to PSO 1700, requests that governors establish effective ways of segregating prisoners as part of their overall violence control strategies. Unlike with suicide control, there are no strong conditional requirements preventing governors from segregating prisoners where there is danger of violence. Providing governors follow the appropriate procedures set out in Rule 45 of *The Prison Rules 1999* and their purpose *is* to prevent violence, they can separate prisoners at their discretion. Thus, it can be seen that PSO 2750 assigns greater discretion to governors for segregating prisoners than PSO 2700.

Secondly, HMPS uses outcome-oriented indicators to measure violence performance in local establishments as I explained in sec. 7.4.2. This suggests that local violence reduction processes are not strictly assessed or constrained by internal performance competition. So, unlike with suicide control, local establishments are allowed to try various ways of reducing violence in order to achieve KPTs. Thirdly, as was explained in sec. 7.2.2 above, HMIP monitors local violence control strategies. However, in terms of using segregation for the purposes of controlling violence, HMCIP reports mainly focus on the appropriateness of segregation procedures and conditions in segregation cells rather than reviewing whether decisions to send prisoners to segregation units were appropriate. Again, unlike suicide control, decisions to use segregation units in response to the risk of violence rely heavily on the discretion of governors in local establishments.

In reality, segregation units are used in different ways by different local establishments. To illustrate, some local establishments, such as HMPs Ashfield, Buckley Hall, and Wayland (HMCIP, 2010a, 2007b, and 2006g respectively), use segregation to protect prisoners who are being bullied. Other local establishments, such as HMPs Castington and Liverpool (HMCIP, 2009c and 2009j respectively), mainly use segregation to punish prisoners who have assaulted others. Yet others, such as HMPs Wandsworth and Dartmoor (HMCIP 2009p and 2008c respectively), use segregation units at the request of individual prisoners as a form of protection. Interview data with governors also indicate that they have a high level of discretion over how segregation should be used as part of local violence control strategies. One retired governor confirmed that the segregation of prisoners is essential to local violence control strategies and that governors have a lot of discretion over how it should be used. In contrast, another governor stated that although segregation can be helpful in reducing violence, it is better to let prisoners live life as normally as possible within prisons rather than using segregation units to control them. Hence the discretion of governors can affect how segregation is used in local establishments as part of their violence control strategies.

In conclusion, in comparison with suicide control, there is greater diversity in how segregation is used as part of violence control strategies in HMPS prisons. According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), these circumstances can be ranked at the third highest group level (there are common key strategies for controlling violence, but approaches in those strategies vary among local establishments) and HMPS can be assigned a score of + 2 for this sub-code.


**Japan**

It was noted in chapter 6 that Japanese prison governors are not assigned strong leadership roles in local violence control strategies. Instead, substantial strategic roles in this regard are assigned to *tanto* officers and middle ranking managers. Accordingly, this section analyses the diversity of local violence control strategies operated by *tanto* officers.

A number of salient points have been made over the course of this study which should be recounted here. First, as discussed in chapter 4, the Japanese prison service does not have any formal national guidelines concerning violence control in local establishments. Second, it was pointed out in chapter 6 that prison officers have a substantial amount of discretion in how segregation units are operated at a local level

(Art. 76, *The Penal Institutions Act*). Third, sec. 7.2.2 of this chapter showed that, unlike in HMPS, external auditing of violence control in Japanese prisons is weak. And fourth, sec. 7.4.2 showed that the Japanese prion service does not use internal performance competition to control violence and even the internal auditing system does not have any established performance standards for monitoring local violence control procedures. Therefore, it can be concluded here that there is very little external or internal interference in how local establishments control violence.

Nevertheless, in practice *tanto* officers working in different establishments tend to deal with violence in similar ways. Hamai, who interviewed *tanto* officers for his 2006 book, asked them about the basic approaches to violence control they were instructed to follow when they first entered the Japanese prison service (Hamai, 2006). He has summarised their views in this regard as follows:

> *If you are newly appointed as a* tanto *officer to a group of prisoners, these prisoners will not want you to change how they have been controlled previously. If you try something new soon after you are appointed, your prisoners will feel that you are looking down on them. If you have a subordinate officer, he will not like it if you change the existing regime maintained by the previous officer…You could try to make changes to how you control the prisoners once you understand them as a group; such as the place of yakuza prisoners in relation to the whole group.*
> (Hamai, 2006: p. 211; my translation)

According to this summary, although there is no formal restriction or external interventions about how violence among prisoners should be controlled, *tanto* officers should not try to change the systems put in place by their more senior colleagues. Additionally, this pressure comes not only from staff members, but also from prisoners. In regard to the latter point, one member of prison staff whom I interviewed explained that local security control is based on informal mutual expectations about violence control shared by prisoners and *tanto* officers. *Tanto* officers make prisoners aware in an informal manner about where the boundaries sit between soft and hard controls: for example, in what circumstances prisoners will be constrained by physical force or just receive verbal warnings. In order to maintain this kind of mutual recognition, *tanto* officers should not make major changes to the *status quo*.

Thus, although *tanto* officers are possible to examine various ways of local violence control strategies within formal risk control structures in theory; there is very little variation between local violence control strategies due to informal pressures between staff members and prisoners. One informal strategy seems to be commonly

shared among prison officers throughout Japan: do NOT modify existing strategies taken by previous *tanto* officers. According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), these circumstances can be ranked at the second highest group level (there are common key strategies followed by a majority of local establishments for controlling the risk of violence) and the Japanese prison service can be assigned a score of +3 for this sub-code.

## *7.6: Conclusion*

This chapter has discussed the autonomy of governors and local establishments in relation to local violence and suicide control strategies. Several conclusions can now be drawn from the above discussions. Firstly, in regard to the ratio of insider to outsider governors, although HMPS provides some opportunities for outsiders to become prison governors, a majority of HMPS governors are insiders who have risen up through the ranks. By contrast, there are no possibilities for outsiders to become prison governors in the Japanese prison service because governors are only appointed from among insiders who have risen up through the ranks.

Secondly, in regard to external monitoring, HMPS has authorised several independent external performance assessment bodies: the PPO, IMB, and HMIP. Of these bodies, HMIP has the strongest influence over local suicide and violence control strategies because it has well-defined assessment systems. Meanwhile, the Japanese prison service has authorised one external performance assessment body, namely the PIVC. However, it does not have a substantial impact on violence and suicide control strategies in local establishments. In addition to the PIVC, there are also some unauthorised voluntary groups which monitor local suicide and violence control strategies in the Japanese prison service. As was noted above, these groups have very little impact on the management of Japan prisons.

Thirdly, in regard to trade unions, in England the POA is able to intervene in the implementation of suicide and violence risk control strategies at a local level. Governors can exercise discretion in how they approach local branches of the POA. By contrast, the Japanese prison service does not authorise unionisation among prison officers and the level interest in unions shown by the prison staff whom I interviewed was low. Accordingly, the daily management of Japanese prisons is not disrupted by the activities of trade unions.

Fourthly, HMPS currently uses internal performance competition to control the quality of local suicide and violence control strategies. The indicators for measuring suicide control performance are mainly process-oriented. On the other hand, the indicators for measuring local violence control performance are outcome-oriented. In comparison, the Japanese prison service does not use internal performance competition in order to manage suicide and violence control strategies in local establishments.

Finally, in regard to the diversity of local suicide and violence control strategies, very little evidence of variation was found between local suicide control strategies in HMPS. This is because all HMPS prisons must base their suicide control strategies on national guidelines and take account of performance monitoring systems which check whether they are following these guidelines. Therefore, individual governors have very little influence over the design of suicide control strategies in their areas of responsibility. By contrast, there is more variation between local violence control strategies, particularly in regard to the use of segregation. The national violence control guidelines and HMIP inspection criteria allow governors to establish local ways of using segregation for the purposes of violence control. Moreover, HMPS internal performance monitoring criteria are outcome-oriented so they do not particularly check how segregation is used in this regard.

Meanwhile, local violence and suicide control strategies in Japanese prisons largely rely on the *tanto* system. *Tanto* officers generally do not show much interest in local suicide control strategies. Interview data show that Japanese prison staff members do not consider suicide to be something that they should actively try to control as part of the overall prison service risk control structure. On the other hand, the formal violence control structure allows *tanto* officers a large amount of discretion in how they deal with violence because of low intervention from outsides and national HQs. However, in practice there is very little variation between the violence control methods used by *tanto* officers. As discussed above, this is because there is a large amount of informal pressure on individual *tanto* officers to maintain existing violence control strategies in their local establishments.

Numerical scores have been assigned to each sub-code discussed above according to the autonomy ranks and scores table (see Appendix 4). The outcomes of this process can be seen in Tables 7.5 and 7.6. Table 7.5 gives a visual map of the results for the autonomy (X2) scores. As previously, the five columns represent the sub-codes discussed in this chapter and the positions of the shaded blocks reflect the group levels of the English and Japanese prison services in the case of each sub-code. The

letter "S" represents suicide risk control and "V" represents violence risk control. Meanwhile, Table 7.6 shows the autonomy (X2) score results as numbers, with the five sub-codes listed twice in the left-hand column and two sets of figures given for each: the first being raw scores and the second standardized scores as discussed in chapter 3 (see Table 3.5, p. 118).

As I explained in chapter 3, there is an inverse relationship between the autonomy of local establishments and the overall group control of the national prison services. Thus, if more autonomy is given to local establishments, the overall group level of national prison services decreases. The results displayed below show that the Japanese prison service has been ranked at a higher group level than HMPS for the five sub-codes for violence control and the four sub-codes for suicide control. This is because the Japanese prison service is generally closed to outsiders and does not use internal performance competition. In regard to the fifth sub-code, local suicide control strategies were not actively observed in the Japanese prison service hence the score given was 0. Meanwhile, the diversity of violence control strategies was ranked at a higher group unity level in consideration of the influence of informal group pressures from both colleagues and prisoners on individual officers.

Table 7.5: Summary of autonomy (X2) in suicide and violence control strategies and group scores

| Autonomy of establishments | Group Scores (national) | Sub-codes | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| | | Insiders/ Outsiders (governors) | external performance assessment bodies | Existence and influence of trade union | performance competition and indicators | Diversity of local key strategies |
| Smallest | 4 | Japan | | Japan (S)&(V) | | |
| | 3 | England | Japan (S) & (V) | | Japan (S) & (V) | England (S) / Japan (V) |
| | 2 | | England (S)& (V) | England (S)& (V) | England (S) | England (V) |
| | 1 | | | | England (V) | |
| Largest | 0 | | | | | Japan (S) |

(S): suicide, (V): violence.

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Table 7.6: Summary of raw and standardized autonomy (X2) scores

| Risks | suicide | | Violence | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prison Services | England | Japan | England | Japan |
| Raw scores | | | | |
| Insiders and outsiders | 3 | 4 | 3 | 4 |
| External performance assessment bodies | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| Existence and influence of trade unions | 2 | 4 | 2 | 4 |
| Internal performance competition and indicators | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| Diversity of local strategies | 3 | 0 | 2 | 3 |
| Standardize scores | | | | |
| Insiders and outsiders | 7.5 | 10.0 | 7.5 | 10.0 |
| External performance assessment bodies | 5.0 | 7.5 | 5.0 | 7.5 |
| Existence and influence of trade unions | 5.0 | 10.0 | 5.0 | 10.0 |
| Internal performance competition and indicators | 6.7 | 10.0 | 3.3 | 10.0 |
| Diversity of local strategies | 7.5 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 7.5 |

In summary, HMPS showed less group unity and more autonomy in local suicide and violence control strategies in comparison with the Japanese prison service. Local risk control structures in HMPS are relatively open to the scrutiny of outsiders. As a result, the diversity of participants in risk control increases and the group unity of the national prison service decreases. Higher group levels for the fourth and fifth sub-codes were given to HMPS for suicide control than for violence control. The reason for this difference is that local suicide control strategies are highly constrained by internal and external performance assessments which monitor whether local establishments are complying with the national suicide control guidelines. In conclusion, the autonomy of local establishments in HMPS was generally higher than that of local establishments in the Japanese prison service. This finding in turn indicates that the national group unity of HMPS is lower than that of the Japanese prison service.

## *Chapter 8*
## *Analysis:*
## *How Can Prison Risk Control Culture Be Demonstrated Using the Grid and Group Theory?*

This chapter provides a summary and further analysis of the findings of chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 showing how it can be used to apply the g/g theory in two distinct ways based on the approach discussed in chapter 3. The g/g theory has been used in previous empirical chapters to measure the risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services by analysing the organizational structures of these institutions aimed at controlling the risks of suicide and violence. Four grid and group aspects along with a further twenty sub-codes have been used for the purposes of this study. The findings of chapters 4-7 are analysed in this chapter according to the three demonstration techniques outlined in chapter 3. The first section of this chapter provides a qualitative summary of the grid and group levels assigned to the English and Japanese prison services over the course of this study. The second section offers a quantitative summary of the numerical scores assigned for the 20 sub-codes which is developed further in the third section through a further quantitative summary. The fourth section offers yet another quantitative demonstration of the suicide and violence control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services. Lastly, the final section evaluates the results and method used in this study.

## *8.1: Qualitative summary: g/g analysis of the risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services*

It was noted in chapter 1 that culture can be defined in two ways: individual values and collective patterns of behaviour. I concluded in chapter 2 that the g/g theory focuses on the latter definition of culture. Accordingly, in chapter 3 I outlined a method for using the g/g theory to identify culture as collective patterns of behaviour in relation to specific risks. Firstly, I asserted that prison risk control cultures can be measured in terms of four g/g aspects: formalization (Y1), specialization (Y2), compliance (X1) and

autonomy (X2).    However, I also noted that the results of these four g/g aspects tend to differ depending on the unit of observation. Accordingly, I decided that this study should measure the g/g levels of the national risk control structures of the English and Japanese prison services, thereby taking account of the characteristics of each prison service as total institutions.

Therefore, the grid aspects were measured according to the formality of the rules defining risk control systems (formalization) and the leadership roles assigned to governors within them (specialization or roles of governors). The formality level was measured in terms of how easily prison staff can change the rules that bind them in relation to the overall penal legal structures. More formal rules indicate higher grid level for the prison service institutions. The group aspects were measured according to the diversity and behaviour of prison service staff at a local level, first, in regard to the implementation of the rules defined by risk control systems (compliance) and, second, in regard to how much discretion they have in exercising their assigned leadership roles within the overall risk control structures (autonomy). Overall, this method measures two key aspects of the suicide and violence risk control structures of the English and Japanese prison services: 1. the risk control system as a whole (Y1 and X1); and 2. the leadership of governors (Y2 and X2).

### 8.1.1: Risk control systems; formalization (Y1) and compliance (X1)

Chapter 4 discussed formalization (Y1) as a grid aspect of risk control systems. HMPS formally defines all of the issues covered by the 5 formalization sub-codes in written rules: order, definitions of risk, punishment and reward, national guidelines, and information recording and documentation systems. HMPS rules specifically stated that punishment and reward should not be used to control the risk of suicide. Moreover, the risk control systems used by HMPS to control suicide and violence are clearly defined by statutory instruments, which is to say secondary legislation: *The Prison Rules 1999* and PSOs. By contrast, the Japanese prison service generally does not have a formal risk control system set out in written laws. Most rules are instead agreed informally between staff members in local establishments often with the tacit agreement of prisoners. However, there are two important exceptions, punishment and order, which are defined by the most formal rules within the Japanese legal system, namely parliamentary acts. Thus, the rules defining suicide and violence control systems maintained by the Japanese prison service are generally less formal than those maintained for the same purposes by HMPS.

Next, chapter 5 analysed the compliance level of local establishments in response to the same rules discussed in chapter 4. A major problem was encountered in this chapter in the respect that very little information about the local compliance level of local establishments is available for the Japanese prison service. Furthermore, the Japanese prison service and HMPS provide very different types of information about local establishments which are not easy to compare. In response to this difficulty, I assumed that local establishments appropriately comply with relevant rules in cases where the national prison service officially insists that local establishments generally comply with the relevant rules, and if no reliable data is available indicating that local establishments implement rules inappropriately. Five sub-codes were set to analyse the extent of compliance within local establishments.

The first sub-code analysed how far local establishments enforce order and discipline among prisoners. HMPS generally allows prisoners a lot of individual freedoms. Accordingly, order and discipline are maintained through a balance between collective security and the well-being of individual prisoners. Meanwhile, the Japanese prison service tends to restrict the individual behaviour of prisoners in order to maintain order and discipline. That is, the individual interests of prisoners are constrained by the demands of strict communal discipline.

The second sub-code focused on how the risks of suicide and violence are identified. In spite of having relatively formal definitions of suicide and violence, there is wide variation in the methods, and their quality, used by local establishments in HMPS to identify the aforesaid risks. My case studies showed that many local establishments have issues with identifying these risks. These findings suggest that the definitions of risk provided by HMPS have not led to a uniform system for identifying them in local risk control processes. On the other hand, the significant differences were observed between how the risks of suicide and violence are identified in local establishments in Japan. In particular, it was found that local establishments do not have well-defined ways of identifying the risk of suicide. The limited data available on this matter shows that information and knowledge which can help to identify prisoners at risk of suicide are not shared across local establishments. By contrast, local prison staff members do share informal knowledge about how the risk of violence can be identified.

The third sub-code focused on the appropriateness of punishment and reward systems. HMPS does not use punishment or reward to control the risk of suicide hence a score of 0 was given for this sub-code. Meanwhile, it was found that a majority of local establishments in HMPS make appropriate use of punishment as part of their local

violence control measures. By contrast, greater variation was observed in how reward is used in local establishments to control violence hence a lower compliance level was given. In regard to the punishment and reward systems, no substantial evidence could be found to show whether local establishments in Japan use punishment and reward systems appropriately or not for controlling the risk of suicide. Accordingly, as stated above, I assumed that a majority of local establishments generally followed the punishment and reward systems for controlling suicide set out in the relevant statutory codes. Conversely, on the one hand the available data suggest that local establishments overuse punishment in order to control violence. On the other hand, the data concerning the reward system for controlling violence were inconclusive. Therefore, I assumed that the compliance level was generally good in this respect.

The fourth sub-code analysed the compliance level of local establishments in response to the national risk control guidelines. In regard to HMPS, it was found that although all local establishments primarily follow the relevant guidelines on designing local suicide and violence control strategies, the quality of the actual strategies they developed varies widely. Indeed, staff members in some local establishments openly expressed doubts about the efficacy of the ACCT scheme for reducing suicide thus suggesting low group unity in its implementation at a local level. Meanwhile, in terms of violence control, the case of HMP Pentonville shows that it is difficult to control violence through formal national strategic guidelines because violence-related issues are often intimately linked to the specific histories and characteristics of local establishments. Cases such as this show the limitations of formal violence risk control guidelines. In comparison, the Japanese prison service does not have any formal national strategic guidelines concerning suicide and violence control in local establishments. Therefore, I analysed the compliance level in terms of how far the relevant statutory codes defining violence and suicide control procedures and techniques are followed in local establishments. My findings in this regard show that the compliance level varies from rule to rule: that is, some rules are followed more diligently than others in local establishments.

Lastly, the fifth sub-code analysed the accountability of incident information recording systems. A high level of accountability for documenting incidences of both suicide and violence control was found in a majority of local establishments in HMPS. By contrast, the 2003 CARC highlighted a general lack of accountability in local information recording systems. In light of this evidence, as well as a lack of more recent data suggesting that the situation has improved, I have concluded here that the

accountability of procedures for recording information about cases of violence and suicide varies between local establishments.

In conclusion, the findings of chapters 4 and 5 show, first, that although HMPS provides very formal guidelines on the design of local suicide and violence risk control systems, the compliance level for these guidelines varies between local establishments. Second, it was found that with the exceptions of order and punishment, the formalization and compliance levels of the Japanese prison service were generally low. Thus, it can be concluded that the main risk control system in place in Japanese prisons involves tight and wide-reaching restrictions being placed on prisoners with the intention of maintaining order and discipline as defined in Japanese parliamentary law.

### 8.1.2: Leadership; the roles of governors (Y2) and autonomy (X2) in local establishments

The second set of g/g aspects measured the risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services in regard to the leadership of governors: specifically, they represented the roles of governors (grid) and autonomy in local establishments (group). Accordingly, the specializations of governors as leaders of local risk control strategies were discussed in chapter 6 and the level of autonomy and discretion of governors in local establishments were discussed in chapter 7.

Chapter 6 shows that HMPS maintains a common approach to suicide and violence in regard to the specialization of its staff members and governors. Specialised roles are assigned to staff members in order to control specific risks. In comparison with HMPS, the Japanese prison service does not assign specialized roles to staff members in suicide and risk control strategies. Instead, Japanese prisoner officers assume a general-purpose role in maintaining order among prisoners as part of the *tanto* system.

The leadership roles of Japanese prison governors in managing suicide and violence control are moderated by this system. Furthermore, Japanese prison officers commonly understand that governors are in a senior position of authority and are thus not concerned with gaining any more performance-related promotions. By comparison, HMPS governors are assigned highly specialised roles as leaders of local risk control strategies. It is formally and informally recognised within HMPS that governors are leaders of prisons both in name and in practice. Relevant local risk control procedures discussed in chapter 4 are designed, premising strong strategic leadership roles of governors in local establishments. Prison staff members generally take the view that the

capability and performance of governors is very important to the effectiveness of violence and suicide control in local establishments.

Chapter 7 discussed the autonomy of local establishments in regard to the areas in which governors exercise their leadership roles. The autonomy level in this respect was measured according to the diversity of staff members in local establishments, specifically in terms of whether they are insiders or outsiders and what effect the ratio of insiders to outsiders has on local risk control strategies. My findings show, firstly, that HMPS allows outsiders a greater degree of influence over local risk control strategies than the Japanese prison service. Moreover, HMPS appoints a small proportion of governors from among outsiders whereas the Japanese prison service does not appoint any outsider governors. Secondly, in regard to external monitoring, this study has shown that HMPS has authorised several independent external assessments bodies to monitor local violence and suicide control strategies, of which HMIP has a particularly strong influence over governors in local establishments. Moreover, the prison officers' trade union, the POA, can have a major impact on the management of local suicide and violence control strategies. Meanwhile, the Japanese prison service is generally closed to outsiders. As just stated, governors are only promoted from among insiders and the influence of external monitoring bodies is generally weak: this is including the one officially authorised monitoring body, the PIVC. Additionally, the Civil Servant Act prohibits unionisation among prison officers hence there are no trade unions of which to take account. Thus, the day-to-day running of local suicide and violence control strategies in Japanese prisons is rarely interrupted by the activities of external bodies.

Next, chapter 7 considered whether the English and Japanese prison services use internal competition between local establishments to manage local violence and suicide control strategies and performance. The Japanese prison service does not use any form of internal performance competition for the aforesaid purposes hence the highest group score was given for group unity. On the other hand, HMPS does use internal performance competition to manage local suicide and violence control strategies. The main indicator used by HMPS to measure local performance in suicide control concerns the extent to which local establishments follow national suicide control guidelines. Thus, HMPS uses process-oriented indicators to monitor local suicide control strategies. Conversely, HMPS measures local violence control performance through serious assault rates in local establishments, in which regard performance is measured in terms of outcome-oriented indicators.

This difference between the types of performance indicators used by HMPS affects the diversity of local suicide and violence control strategies. First, the suicide control performance indicator measures how far local establishments implement the national suicide control guidelines. Furthermore, the external performance assessment body, HMIP, strictly monitors whether local establishments are following the said national guidelines. This kind of control structure limits the local authority of governors because it places checks on processes over which they nominally have discretion such as placing prisoners at risk of suicide in segregation units. As a result, the autonomy of local establishments in setting their own suicide control strategies is restricted by national guidelines and HMIP.   Thus, the diversity of local suicide control strategies is small and the group level is high for HMPS in this respect.

Meanwhile, the national violence control guidelines maintained by HMPS grant local establishments a greater degree of autonomy over the design of their local violence control strategies. As stated above, HMPS uses outcome-oriented indicators to monitor internal performance in violence control. Although HMIP monitors the implementation national violence control guidelines, the guidelines themselves allow governors to establish their own ways of using segregation units to prevent violence in their areas of responsibility. Thus, the violence control strategies operated by local establishments in HMPS are more diverse than the corresponding suicide control strategies. As a result, the group level for HMPS is lower in this respect than for suicide control.

As stated in chapter 6, in this study I have focused on the autonomy and discretion of *tanto* officers in local suicide and violence control strategies because the authority of governors is weak. Chapter 7 showed that local establishments are closed to outsiders. External intervention to the local risk control process is extremely low. Additionally, the Japanese prison service does not use internal performance competition to manage local suicide and violence control strategies, and internal audit systems do not have standardised manuals or methods for auditing local establishments. Thus, in theory, it has been concluded here that *tanto* officers are allowed to take various ways of controlling risk in local establishments. Nevertheless, in terms of suicide control, it was found that *tanto* officers do not have specific strategies for managing suicide and self-harm among prisoners. Indeed, many of them take the view that suicide and self-harm are not active control targets within the context of local prison operation. By contrast, *tanto* officers consider violence control to be an essential part of their duties. However, local violence control strategies are very similar across the Japanese prison

service due to informal group pressures which exist between *tanto* officers working in local establishments. Prison officers informally choose not to develop their own violence control strategies in response to the expectations both of their colleagues and the prisoners under their supervision. Thus, the autonomy of local violence control strategies is limited by group pressures in local establishments, in respect of which the Japanese prison service was ranked at a high group level.

Therefore, in conclusion it can be stated that HMPS places strong leadership roles on governors in order to control the risks of suicide and violence. However, there is a discrepancy in the respect that HMPS governors have much more autonomy over violence control strategies than they do over suicide control strategies. This is because HMPS uses different internal performance indicators to monitor local suicide and violence control strategies. Moreover, HMIP intervenes in local suicide control strategies to a much greater extent than it does in local violence control strategies. By contrast, the Japanese prison service assigns the key roles in suicide and violence control to *tanto* officers rather than governors. For this reason, the leadership roles assumed by Japanese prison governors are fairly weak in both suicide and violence control. The autonomy of *tanto* officers is potentially high due to a lack of external intervention in their everyday duties. However, they do not seem to take much interest in controlling suicide beyond fulfilling immediately necessary tasks. There are no obvious uniform strategies for preventing suicide and self-harm hence I scored the Japanese prison service 0 in this respect. Meanwhile, local violence control strategies are not very diverse due to the informal pressures mentioned above, in regard to which the Japanese prison service was ranked at a high group level.

## 8.2: *Quantitative summary 1; grid-group score table*

This section summarises the institutional numerical scores assigned throughout this study to the grid (Y) and group (X) sub-codes. Chapter 3 discussed the scoring criteria for the formalization (Y1), compliance (X1), roles of governors (Y2), and autonomy (X2) aspects and the sub-codes for each of them. Scores tables were also provided for each aspect of the g/g dimensions (see chapter 3 and Appendices, 1, 2, 3, and 4).

It should be emphasised that the sub-code scores were assigned on the ordinal scale of measurement and scored on different scales to reflect variations in the ranks representing the g/g levels. Therefore, the units of distance between the variables are not

equal for all 20 sub-codes. Ranking orders were assigned to reflect the conclusions drawn in chapter 2 about what g/g represent in relation to organizations. Sub-codes were generally scored above 0 (X, Y > 0). Additionally, for the purposes of this study 0 represents situations where there was either no evidence indicating the relevant grid or group characteristics, the sub-code was not applicable, or the g/g levels were absolutely minimized (*i.e.* there are no rules whatsoever or there is a total absence of group pressure). Table 8.1 displays the overall results of the g/g scores for all 20 sub-codes.

Table 8.1: Scores assigned to the 20 sub-codes for each g/g aspect

| Grid/group | Aspects | No. | Sub-codes. | Suicide | | Violence | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | England | Japan | England | Japan |
| Grid.1 | Formalization | y1 | Order | 6 | 7 | 6 | 7 |
| | | y2 | Definition of risk | 5 | 1 | 5 | 1 |
| | | y3 | Use of punishment and reward | 0 | 12 | 11 | 12 |
| | | y4 | Key national guidelines | 5 | 1 | 5 | 1 |
| | | y5 | Information record and documentation system | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Group.1 | Compliance | x1 | Order | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| | | x2 | Identifying risk | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| | | x3 | Punishment and Reward | 0 | 4 | 3 | 3 |
| | | x4 | National guideline | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| | | x5 | Information record | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Grid.2 | Roles of Governors | y6 | Specialization of staff members | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| | | y7 | Promotion criteria for governors | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| | | y8 | Interpersonal roles | 4 | 2 | 4 | 3 |
| | | y9 | Informational roles | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 |
| | | y10 | Decisional roles | 5 | 2 | 5 | 3 |
| Group.2 | Autonomy | x6 | Insiders/outsiders governors | 3 | 4 | 3 | 4 |
| | | x7 | Participation of external performance bodies | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| | | x8 | Existence and influence of trade unions | 2 | 4 | 2 | 4 |
| | | x9 | Internal performance assessment and main indicators | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| | | x10 | Diversity of local strategies | 3 | 0 | 2 | 3 |

It can be seen from this table that HMPS was given a score of 0 score for the suicide control codes y3 and x3 because punishment and reward are not used in local establishments for controlling suicide. Meanwhile, the Japanese prison service was given scores of 0 for the suicide control codes x2 and x10 because there was no evidence to suggest how the risks of suicide and self-harm are identified or controlled in local establishments (x2), and what kinds of local suicide control strategies are taken by local staff members (x10).

## 8.3: Quantitative summary 2; standardized scores and radar charts

The second quantitative summary standardises the raw scores outlined above by multiplying their loads.   As chapter 3 explained, the scores assigned to each sub-code are standardized on a scale of 1 to 10 (see Table 3.5: loads for each sub-code for standardization). Table 8.2 displays the results of this process. Figures 8.1-8.4 display radar charts of these standardized scores representing the g/g levels of the suicide and violence risk control structures maintained by the English and Japanese prison services. Furthermore, Figure 8.5 displays model radar charts of absolute hierarchist, egalitarian, fatalist and individualist cultures. Bearing in mind the model radar charts (Figure 8.5; also see p.119 in Chapter 3), several conclusions can now be drawn from the process of standardizing the scores for each sub-code.

Table 8.2: Standardized scores assigned to the 20 sub-codes for each g/g aspect

| G/G | Aspects | No. | Sub-codes | Suicide | | Violence | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | England | Japan | England | Japan |
| Grid.1 | Formalization | y1 | Order | 8.6 | 10.0 | 8.6 | 10.0 |
| | | y2 | Definition of risk | 7.1 | 1.4 | 7.1 | 1.4 |
| | | y3 | Use of punishment and reward | 0.0 | 8.6 | 7.9 | 8.6 |
| | | y4 | Key national guidelines | 7.1 | 1.4 | 7.1 | 1.4 |
| | | y5 | Information record and documentation system | 7.1 | 7.1 | 7.1 | 7.1 |
| Group.1 | Compliance | x1 | Order | 6.7 | 10.0 | 6.7 | 10.0 |
| | | x2 | Identifying risk | 3.3 | 0.0 | 3.3 | 6.7 |
| | | x3 | Punishment and reward | 0.0 | 6.7 | 5.0 | 5.0 |
| | | x4 | National guideline | 5.0 | 2.5 | 5.0 | 2.5 |
| | | x5 | Information record | 6.7 | 3.3 | 6.7 | 3.3 |
| Grid.2 | Roles of Governors | y6 | Specialization of staff members | 10.0 | 5.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 |
| | | y7 | Promotion criteria for governors | 6.7 | 10.0 | 6.7 | 10.0 |
| | | y8 | Interpersonal roles | 10.0 | 5.0 | 10.0 | 7.5 |
| | | y9 | Informational roles | 10.0 | 5.0 | 10.0 | 5.0 |
| | | y10 | Decisional roles | 10.0 | 4.0 | 10.0 | 6.0 |
| Group.2 | Autonomy | x6 | Proportion of insiders/outsider governors | 7.5 | 10.0 | 7.5 | 10.0 |
| | | x7 | Participation of external performance bodies | 5.0 | 7.5 | 5.0 | 7.5 |
| | | x8 | Existence and influence of trade unions | 5.0 | 10.0 | 5.0 | 10.0 |
| | | x9 | Internal performance assessment and main indicators | 6.7 | 10.0 | 3.3 | 10.0 |
| | | x10 | Diversity of local strategies | 7.5 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 7.5 |

Figure 8.1: Suicide control in HMPS



Figure 8.2: Suicide control in the Japanese prison service

Figure 8.3: Violence control in HMPS



Figure 8.4: Violence control in the Japanese prison service

Figure 8.5: Models of radar charts corresponding to the four cultural types



Firstly, in regard to the radar chart for suicide control in HMPS, scores of 0 were given to HMPS for the suicide control codes y3 ("punishment and reward") and x3 ("appropriateness of punishment and reward") because HMPS does not use punishment and reward to control suicide. (Figure 8.1). In comparison with the four model radar charts (Figure 8.5), the chart generally shows the form of radar, which represent the *hierarchist* cultural type (x = 10, y = 10), but skewed towards the *fatalist* (x = 0, y = 10 positions) (Figure 8.1). Hence the suicide control structure operated by HMPS can be considered a hybrid of the *hierarchist* and *fatalist* cultural types. Accordingly, HMPS' suicide risk control structure generally has a high grid level (from variables y1 to y10) while the group level is more moderate (from variables x1 to x10).

Secondly, the radar chart for suicide control in the Japanese prison service (Figure 8.2) displays more fractured results than the one for HMPS. In comparison with the model radar charts (Figure 8.5), this chart shows some extreme *hierarchist* characteristics for a few sets of variables: 1. y1 and x1 ("order and discipline" and compliance of those rules); 2. y3 and x3 ("punishment and reward" and compliance of those rules); and 3. y7 ("promotion criteria for governors") and x6 ("proportion of

insider/outsider governors") (see Figures 8.2). The same chart also shows *egalitarian* characteristics for x8 ("trade unions") and x9 ("internal performance competition"), and slight tendency of *fatalist* in y5 and x5 (information record system and its compliance). Conversely, the remaining x and y variables are close to 0 which indicates strong *individualist* characteristics: that is, y2, y4, y6, y8, y9, x2, x3, x4, and x10. This is because there is a lack of formal rules and standardised organized behaviour among staff members in local establishments aimed at controlling the risks of suicide and self-harm. Therefore, the radar chart for suicide control in the Japanese prison service displays largely the hybrid of *hierarchist* and *individualist*, but with a slight mixing with features of other two cultural types.

Thirdly, the radar chart for violence control in HMPS (Figure 8.3) displays a slightly more balanced mix of the different cultural types than was found for suicide control. While high scores were generally given for the grid (y) variables (see the right-hand side of Figure 8.3), comparatively lower scores were given for the group (x) variables (see the left-hand side). HMPs showed significantly low scores in two group variables, x2 ("identifying risk") and x10 ("diversity of local strategies"). Thus, in comparison with the model radar charts (Figures 8.5), the results displayed by Figure 8.3 can be considered to reflect a hybrid of the *hierarchist* and *fatalist* cultural types. That is, whereas grid control is strong, group control is only moderate in the violence control structure operated by HMPS.

Finally, the radar chart for violence control in the Japanese prison service (Figure 8.4) also displays mixed results. Specifically, there is a mixture of high grid and high group (hierarchist) cores in a majority of x and y variables: grid (y1, y5, y6, y7, and y8) and group (x1, x2, x6, x7, x8, x9, and x10) (see Figure 8.4). There is a slight tilt towards the group variables hence this chart indicates moderate *egalitarian* characteristics, but mixed with *hierarchist* features. There are also some middling scores for a mixture x and y variables: y2 ("definitions of risk"), y4 ("national violence control guidelines"), x4 ("compliance with national guidelines"), and x5 ("compliance level for information recording"). Overall, the results for the violence control structures maintained by the Japanese prison service indicate moderate *egalitarian* and *hierarchist* characteristics combined with slight individualist features (see Figures 8.4 and 8.5).

## 8.4: Quantitative summary 3; demonstration technique 3, the grid-group map

The third quantitative summary involves charting the g/g scores on the original g/g map. According to measurement theory, the numerical scores for the 20 sub-codes should not be added up because they are based on the ordinal scales meaning the units of distance between them are normally not equal. Nevertheless, the scores are added up here so that they can be plotted on the g/g map. This process is based on the assumption that the scales have been equalized as a result of the standardization process. This section demonstrates the mapping results in three ways: 1. the risk control system scores are represented by the formalization (Y1) and compliance (X1) scores; 2. the leadership scores are represented by the roles of governors (Y2) and autonomy (X2) scores; and 3. the overall risk control scores are represented by the addition of the X1 and X2 scores, and the Y1 and Y2 scores.

### 8.4.1: Prison risk control system; formalization (Y1) and compliance (X1)

The formalization (Y1) and compliance (X1) scores are calculated here by adding up the scores for the 10 sub-codes assigned to these two aspects. The resulting scores have been plotted onto the g/g map as the risk control system scores (see Figure 8.6). The calculation methods used for these purposes, which were outlined in chapter 3, are cited below in more detail.

1. Risk control system scores: *F(Ai)*

1.1) Formalization scores (*Y1ai*)

*Y1ai= Formalization score for risk (a) control in the prison service (i)*

*y'nai= standardised formalization score for sub-code (n) in terms of risk (a) in the prison service (i) (n=1, 2, 3, 4, 5)*

*Y1ai=y'1ai+y'2ai+y'3ai+ y'4ai+ y5ai*

*0 <Y1ai<50*

1.2) Compliance scores (*X1ai*)

*X1ai= Compliance (X1) score for risk (a) in the prison service (i)*

*x'nai= standardized compliance score for sub-code (n) in terms of risk (a) in the prison service (i).*

$X1ai=x'1ai+ x'2ai+x'3ai+ x'4ai+ x'5ai$

$0<X1ai<50$

1.3) Risk control system scores for suicide and violence

Suicide control scores:    *F (Si)= (X1si, Y1si)*

England: *F (Se) = (21.7, 30.0)*

Japan: *F (Sj) =(22.5, 28.6 )*

Violence control scores: *F(Vi)= (X1vi, Y1vi).*

England: *F (Ve)= (26.7, 37.8)*

Japan: *F (Vj) = (27.5, 28.6)*

Figure 8.6: Scores for the suicide and violence control systems operated by the English and Japanese prison services



The results displayed in Figure 8.6 indicate high grid levels for both the English and Japanese prison services in regard to suicide and violence control. All of the scores for risk control on the formalization scale (Y1) were above 25.0. The relatively weak group

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level for suicide control assigned to HMPS indicates weak *fatalist* characteristics. However, since the results are situated around the centre of the map, the fatalistic characteristics are diluted by aspects of the other cultural types: especially the individualist type. Meanwhile, the violence control score for HMPS shows a higher grid and group level than is the case for suicide control. Accordingly, violence control in HMPS can be considered mainly *hierarchist,* but with a slightly *fatalistic* character. So, in brief, the risk control culture of HMPS for both suicide and violence control is broadly high grid.

The Japanese prison service was given relatively low grid and group levels for suicide control thus indicating weak fatalistic characters with a slight tilt towards individualistic characteristics. As with HMPS, the results for the Japanese prison service in regard to suicide control are concentrated around the centre of the map which indicates that its individualistic characteristics are offset by aspects of the other cultural types. Meanwhile, a low grid and high group level was given for violence control thus indicating mainly egalitarian characteristics. Overall, the Japanese prison service was generally given lower grid levels than HMPS for the control of both risks. On the other hand, the group levels for both prison services varied according to the type of risk.

### 8.4.2: Leadership scores; the roles of governors (Y2) and autonomy (X2)

The second grid and group mapping concerns the leadership scores represented by the codes for the roles of governors (Y2) and the autonomy of local establishments (X2). The X2 scores measure the group level of the national prison services in regard to their risk control strategies. Therefore, a set of high autonomy scores indicate a high level of group unity within a given national prison service and, conversely, a low level of autonomy within its local establishments. The results of the Y2 and X2 scores for suicide and violence control in the English and Japanese prison services are plotted on the g/g map as the risk control system scores (see Figure 8.7). The calculation methods for the leadership scores, which were originally outlined in chapter 3, are cited below in more detail.

2) Leadership scores: *L(Ai)*

2.1) Roles of governors scores

*Y2ai= Roles of governors (Y2) for risk (a) in the prison service (i)*

*y'nai=standardised score for sub-code (n) of roles of governors for risk (a) in the prison service(i) (n=6,7,8,9,10)*

$Y2ai=y'6ai+ y'7ai+ y'8ai+ y'9ai+ y'10ai$

$0<Y2ai<50$


2.2) Autonomy scores

*X2ai= Autonomy (X2) for risk (a) in the prison service (i)*

*x'nai=standardised score for sub-code (n) of autonomy for risk (a) in the prison service (i) (n=6, 7, 8, 9, 10)*


*X2ai=x'6ai+x'7ai+x'8ai+x'9ai+x'10ai*

*0<X2ai<50*


2.3) Leadership scores: *L (Ai) = (X2ai, Y2ai)*

Leadership scores for suicide control

England: *L (Se)= (31.7, 46.7)*

Japan: *L(Sj)= (37.5, 29.0)*


Figure 8.7: Leadership scores for suicide and violence control in the English and Japanese prison services



The results show that both the English and Japanese prison services fall within the *hierarchist* quadrant of the g/g map. Furthermore, all scores are plotted above 25.0 on both axes. HMPS was given significantly high grid levels and slightly lower group

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levels for both suicide and violence control. Thus, in comparison with the Japanese prison service, HMPS showed weak fatalist characteristics for suicide control and more so for violence control. The suicide control score for the Japanese prison service is plotted at the lowest grid level of all of the four scores. This result reflects the weak leadership roles of governors in local risk control strategies and thus suggests that suicide control has slight individualist characteristics in the Japanese prison service. By contrast, the violence control score for the Japanese prison service indicates that there is greater group pressure and little autonomy in this area of risk control. Accordingly, in comparison with the results for HMPS, the results for the Japanese prison service indicate lower grid and higher group levels in which respect it is more egalitarian.

### 8.4.3: Total grid (Y) and group (X) scores for suicide and violence risk control

Based on the risk control system scores [*F(Ai)*] and leadership scores [*L(Ai)*], this section demonstrates the total suicide and violence risk control scores for the English and Japanese prison services.  As chapter 3 discussed, the total prison service risk control scores are expressed as *T(Ai )*.   When *T(Ai)* scores are expressed in terms of the group (X) and grid (Y) scores, they become *T(Ai)= (Xai, Yai).* The method for calculating *T(Ai)* scores is explained as follows (Figure 8.8 is a map of the plotted results).

*3. Total risk control scores for the prison service*

*3.1) Total risk control scores for the prison service: T (Ai)= (Xai, Yai)*

*A=risk (suicide or violence)*

*i=the prison service (England or Japan)*

*Xai= X1ai+X2ai*

*Yai=Y1ai+Y2ai*

*0<Xai<100*

*0<Yai<100*

*3.2) Total suicide and violence risk control scores for the English and Japanese prison services*

*Suicide Control*

*England: T(Se)= (Xse, Yse)=(53.3, 76.7)*

*Japan: T(Sj)=(Xsj, Ysj) =(60.0, 57.6)*

*Violence Control:*

*England: T(Ve)= (Xve, Yve)= (52.5, 84.5)*

*Japan: T(Vj)=(Xvj, Yvj) =(73.5, 67.1)*

Figure 8.8: Total risk control scores for suicide and violence control in the English and Japanese prison services



Again, the total risk control scores for the English and Japanese prison services all fall within the *hierarchist* quadrant of the map. In comparison with the Japanese prison service, HMPS was given higher grid levels and lower group levels for both suicide and violence control. These results indicate weak fatalist characteristics for HMPS in both respects. Meanwhile, the suicide control score for the Japanese prison service is placed at the lowest grid level (with a middling group level) of the four results plotted above. Hence this result indicates that suicide control within the Japanese prison service has the slight tilt towards *individualistic* characteristics based on hierarchist control. The violence control score for the Japanese prison service has the highest group level of the four results plotted above and a moderate grid level. Therefore, the result for violence control in the Japanese prison service sits most squarely within the *hierarchist* quadrant, but the group level is the highest among those four results.

Overall, the English and Japanese prison services both show generally *hierarchical* characteristics for suicide and violence control. Nevertheless, every result

indicates hybrid tendencies of one type or another. The suicide and violence control scores for HMPS clearly lean towards the *fatalist* quadrant. On the other hand, the suicide control score for the Japanese prison service tends towards the *individualist* quadrant and the violence control score has the strongest *hierarchist* result (but with a very slight tilt towards the *egalitarian* quadrant). Therefore, it can be seen from these findings that the g/g framework can used to effectively represent key differences between the suicide and violence risk control structures maintained by the English and Japanese prison services.

## 8.5: Conclusion

My method has made use of the g/g theory to measure the risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services. Furthermore, over the course of this study I have demonstrated the value of several techniques for presenting the results of research based on the g/g theory. This section provides a final evaluation of the findings of this study and raises some issues which need to be solved in future research.

### 8.5.1: Evaluation of qualitative results

This chapter has analysed the qualitative and quantitative results gathered for this study following the g/g theory. The qualitative summary highlighted differences between the ways in which the risks of suicide and violence are controlled in the English and Japanese prison services. The results for HMPS indicate a high level of grid control and a moderate level of group unity for the national prison service in terms of both violence and suicide control. HMPS mainly controls the risks of suicide and violence through written guidelines and by assigning strong leadership roles to governors. There were some slight differences between the g/g levels for suicide and violence control. In particular, a higher grid level and lower group unity were indicated for violence control, which reflect the greater autonomy of local establishments in setting their own violence control strategies.

In comparison, the grid results for the Japanese prison service are lower than those for HMPS thus reflecting the less formal rules and weaker leadership roles of governors in Japan. Meanwhile, the group results for the Japanese prison service show a high autonomy score for local establishments and a moderate compliance level.

Analysis of the scores for each sub-code suggests that the Japanese prison service mainly controls suicide and violence by means of tight discipline and punishment.

The suicide control scores show that the Japanese prison service generally lacks a formal system for controlling the risk of suicide. This finding is supported by interview data which show that staff members in local establishments tend not to recognise suicide as an active control target. In stark contrast, the violence control scores indicate that there are clear strategic rules shared among local staff members for controlling violence. My further research supports these findings by showing that although there is a lack of written rules in this regard, informal group pressures between prison staff and prisoners ensure that broadly uniform violence control strategies are followed in local establishments.

### 8.5.2: Evaluation of quantitative results

In order to give a quantitative evaluation of the qualitative results discussed in the previous section, numerical scores were assigned to the sub-codes for each g/g aspect based on the ranking orders discussed in chapter 3. This chapter has used three demonstration techniques to quantify the qualitative data.

Firstly, the table of raw scores provides an overview of all 20 sub-codes assigned to the four g/g risk control aspects: formalization (Y1), compliance (X1), roles of governors (Y2), and autonomy of local establishments (X2). However, this demonstration technique does not provide a clear understanding of the differences between suicide and violence control in the English and Japanese prison services.

Secondly, the radar charts, which are based on the g/g method, offer a much clearer view of the relevant differences between the English and Japanese prison services. The four model radar charts (see Figure 8.5) help us to understand how the actual results gained for the English and Japanese prison services relate to the four model cultural types and different variations of hybridity between them. The results for HMPS show that suicide and violence control are largely based on hierarchical forms control with slight fatalistic characteristics. It suggests that group level of the English prison service is relatively weak in both suicide and violence control structures. The results for the Japanese prison service show that whereas suicide control is mostly based on individualism with elements of hierarchism and fatalism, violence control is mainly based on hierarchism with some features of egalitarianism. Overall, the Japanese prison service shows relatively high group pressures with low grid level in both suicide and violence control.

Thirdly, I generated results which can be plotted onto the g/g map by adding up the scores for each sub-code with the assumption that the units of distance between them all are equal. The results of this demonstration technique show that the English and Japanese prison services generally control suicide and violence in hierarchical ways, but each having slight tendencies towards different parts of the hierarchist quadrant. These results generally support those shown by the corresponding radar charts. This outcome suggests that the process of adding up the sub-code scores on the assumption that the units of distance between them all are equal does not distort the overall results. Moreover, the third demonstration technique provides more detail about the main and subordinate forms of control than the radar charts which only show hybridity. For example, whereas the radar chart for violence control in Japan shows a hybrid of hierarchism and egalitarianism, the g/g map shows that this form of control is mainly hierarchist with only a very slight tilt towards egalitarianism. Hence, as far as the g/g scales ensure equal units of distance across all sub-codes, plotting the added up g/g scores on the g/g map is the most effective way of identifying types of organizational risk control culture.

### 8.5.3: Overall contribution of this study

Thus, my method for measuring risk control culture has provided a comparative analysis and coherent overview of the institutional structures of the relevant aspects of the English and Japanese prison services. The g/g theory offers a clear framework for analysing the structural characteristics of risk control cultures in prison services including formal and informal control mechanisms. Moreover, those findings in this study demonstrated by the g/g theory contribute to shed light on their weakness and strengths of the English and Japanese prison services, which are embedded in their patterns of risk patterns of risk control management, and frequently overlooked by their staff members.

For example, qualitative and quantitative analysis in this chapter showed that HMPS generally controls violence with high grid control measures such as formal risk control regulations and strong leadership roles of governors. By contrast the group unity of HMPS is generally moderate. These results reflect two competing facets of risk control in HMPS: strong national rules and relatively large local autonomy. This outcome may be considered a weakness of HMPS' violence control methods as well as a characteristic of its national risk control structure. In order to improve the violence performances, it will be helpful to consider the effect of group pressures which are

tended to be neglected in the current risk control structures.

Meanwhile, the results for the Japanese prison service show that the formal grid control concerning suicide and violence control are weak. In the case of violence control, these rules are supported by informal customs and group pressures shared among local staff members. This tendency suggests the prison service should focus on developing the formalized violence control structures when they need to improve prison performances. On the contrary, suicide control in the Japanese prison service shows that prison staff members do not consider suicide is the active target of control. Paying attention this existing risk perception shared among staff members will help the prison service to improve suicide control performance as well as developing the formal suicide control structures. In this way, my research method can help the prison service institutions to draw attention to their peculiar problems and potential failures embedded in their patterns of risk control behaviour measured by the g/g framework. These organizational tendencies of both the English and Japanese prison services highlight problems in their risk control structures and also suggest possible ways of improving them.

# *Conclusion*

This study has developed a method based on the g/g theory for analysing the risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services. Four key research questions were identified and addressed by this study: 1. what is culture?; 2. why is the g/g theory better than other cultural theories?; 3. how can organizational culture in the English and Japanese prison services be observed in reality and how can the g/g theory be used to identify this kind of culture?; and 4. why should culture be analysed in the study of public administration? This chapter now reviews each one of these questions in light of the findings of this study and concludes by suggesting some possible directions for future research.

## 1. What is culture?

Chapter 1 showed that culture can be defined in two ways: 1. the values of individuals in social groups; and 2. collective behavioural patterns commonly shared in social group units. Previous studies have mixed these two definitions. To this end, they tried to identify culture as collective behavioural patterns according to the sum of the individual values of members of social groups. Hofstede and Inglehart have conducted large surveys of individual values, added up all the results, and then taken the aggregate of those results to be representative of the cultures of the social groups to which the individuals they surveyed belong.

However, as pointed out in chapter 1, those surveys to measure individual values tend to interpret subjective scale units differently depending on backgrounds of respondents. According to measurement theory, those answers from respondents based on unequal scale units should not be added up, because results do not show any comparable values. This outcome shows that culture as collective behavioural patterns cannot necessarily be identified by adding up the individual values of members of social groups. Accordingly, for the purposes of this study I made a clear distinction between the two definitions of culture cited above and then specifically chose to focus on only the second one (*i.e.* collective behavioural patterns commonly shared in social group units).

**2. Why is the g/g theory better than other cultural theories?**

This study showed that the g/g theory has great advantages than other cultural theories. Firstly, in response to culture defined as above, chapter 2 showed that Mary Douglas originally defined culture as the collectively shared patterns of behaviour within social group unit in her g/g theory. Hence, unlike other cultural theories, the g/g theory can avoid possible errors to analyse culture by mixing up with individual values discussed in the first research question above. Furthermore, Douglas and Wildavsky developed the g/g theory in relation to risk for the social group units. As a result, the g/g theory can more tightly discuss culture in relation to risk, which provides specific situations where the social group unit show particular patterns of collective behaviour, than other cultural theories.

Thirdly, the g/g theory has methodological advantages in relation to level of measurement according to measurement theory. It was noted in chapter 1 that previous studies have tried to establish clear typologies of culture in order to analyse culture in reality. According to measurement theory, these typologies represent the nominal level of measurement because there are not any comparable scales between the types of culture they identify. Meanwhile, it was pointed out in chapter 2 that the g/g theory has the advantage over other cultural theories of allowing researchers to apply abstract concepts such as cultural types to the ordinal level of measurement. This advantage was actively reflected in the choice of variables chosen for this study.

Chapter 2 discussed that the variables for measuring culture should be based on the g/g dimensions rather than the four cultural types in order to preserve the advantages offered by the ordinal scales. Chapters 4-7 used the g/g theory in this way to analyse how the risks of suicide and violence are controlled in the English and Japanese prison services. Accordingly, all of the qualitative information gathered for those chapters was examined along the ordinal scales. Additionally, discussions in chapters above showed that the g/g dimensions are able to involve not only formal but also informal aspects of risk control structures by degrees of grid and group levels. For example, chapter 5 showed that the English prison staff members had negative views against the national suicide control guidelines. This fact was involved as an indicator of the low group level for the prison service. Meanwhile, the Japanese prison service showed that informal *tanto* system and unwritten rules (*i.e.* common sense) are key risk control factors. These informal systems were also involved by the high group level and low grid level for the prison service.

Furthermore, chapter 8 showed that the g/g theory is useful to quantitatively summarise all of those detailed information into simple but coherent visual images. Radar charts and g/g maps in this chapter showed visual understanding of risk control culture in the English and Japanese prison services. Thus, the method developed in this study for measuring the risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services has demonstrated, more generally, that the g/g theory provides a valid comparative framework, based on the ordinal scales, for analysing formal and informal structures within organizational cultures. In this respect, the g/g theory may be considered better than other cultural theories.

**3. How can organizational culture in the English and Japanese prison services be observed in reality and how can the g/g theory be used to identify this kind of culture?**

Chapter 1 discussed that culture is observed at any level of social group units, and it is important to the social group unit which is best to effectively identify the existence of culture. Social group units are multi-layered and encompass various other discrete groups. Previous studies about national culture have shown that it is more difficult to identify culture in large social group units because they present more variables than smaller units. Therefore, I chose to focus on public service institutions rather than national cultures.

Chapter 1 and 2 discussed that public service institutions are appropriate subjects for testing the g/g theory because they have formally established organizational structures described in written rules and clearly defined membership criteria. The specific subjects selected for this study were the English and Japanese prison services. Furthermore, previous studies have shown that in order to identify culture using the g/g theory, it is important to set fixed units of observation. This is because g/g levels may differ depending on the levels at which organizations are being observed. Hence the unit of observation for this study was set at the level of national prison service institutions, including the relationships between local establishments and central HQs.

It was noted in chapters 1 and 2 that it is ineffective to analyse culture in abstract situations because unlimited numbers of variables can be identified. As I discussed in the previous research question above, Douglas and Wildavsky have argued that the ways in which organizations try to control certain risks present good opportunities to identify their organizational cultures. Following Douglas and Wildavsky's suggestions, chapter 2 discussed how the g/g dimensions are revealed in

organizational risk control structures. Previous studies of the g/g theory, public administration, and organizational and institutional theories have shown that the grid dimension is reflected by the rules defining risk control systems and the roles assigned to staff members in risk control structures. On the other hand, the group dimension is defined by the diversity of subordinate units in relation to the time and space they share together within organizations.

Based on the general understanding of the g/g dimensions outlined in chapter 2, chapter 3 presented four aspects representing each of the g/g dimensions specifically in regard to the relevant prison service risk control structures: 1. risk control systems consisted of formalization (Y1) and compliance (X1), and 2. leadership of governors in risk control consisted of the roles of governors (Y2), and the autonomy of local establishments in setting their own risk control strategies (X2). A total of 20 subordinate sub-codes were assigned to Y1, X1, Y2, and X2.

In regard to scales of measuring those aspects of g/g risk control structures, it was asserted in chapter 3 that grid levels are measured by the formality of rules defining risk control systems (Y1), and the number and selection criteria of leadership roles assigned to prison governors (Y2) in local risk control structures. The formality of rules was measured according to how easily prison staff can change the rules that bind them in relation to the overall penal legal structures. Higher grid ranks and scores were given to greater formality in the rules defining risk control systems. In terms of roles of governors (Y2), the grid level was measured the number of specialised roles assigned to governors and the flexibility of criteria for gaining governorship. If more roles are assigned to governors, or the governorship is gained according to more inflexible criteria for candidates (*i.e.* ages and lengths of joining the service), it indicates higher grid level for the prison service.

Meanwhile, the group level (X1 and X2) was measured according to the diversity of risk control behaviour in local establishments that are considered as subordinate units in the national prison service institutions. Thus, lower group ranks and scores were given to larger variations of local risk control behaviour. In order to measure this variation, the compliance level (X1) measured to what extent the implementation of local establishments varies in response to risk control rules discussed in formalization (Y1). Meanwhile, the autonomy of local establishments (X2) measured the diversity of local risk control strategies according to the intervention of externals to local risk control strategies in the prison service risk control structures.

The suicide and violence risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services were measured according to the method above. The results demonstrate that both prison services show particular patterns of behaviour in relation to specific types of risk control. To illustrate, in terms of the risk control system consisted of formalization (Y1) and compliance (X1), the English and Japanese prison services maintain very different approaches towards rules for risk control systems. HMPS tends to use formal national rules to control specific risks whereas the Japanese prison service tends to use more informal rules shared among local establishments for the same purposes.

The English prison service formally defines terms suicide and violence, which are peculiarly used only inside the prison service, for the purpose of identifying risk. Additionally, the service provides overall risk control guidelines, which formally define details of local risk control procedures (*i.e.* PSO 2700 and 2750). On the contrary, the Japanese prison service does not have these original definitions of risk in formal forms. Moreover, unlike HMPS, the Japanese prison service does not define any of those in written forms. Staff members in the Japanese prison service used the words of *common sense* [*joshiki*] in regard to these overall risk control procedures; it suggested that the Japanese prison service informally defines those guidelines. Furthermore, those levels of formalization (Y1) and compliance (X1) showed differences not only by the prison services but also by risk. The English prison service showed that suicide is controlled by lower grid and group levels of risk control system than those of violence control. This result reflected that the English prison service did not use punishment and reward systems for controlling suicide, and the national suicide control guideline was sceptically accepted by staff members in local establishments.

In terms of leadership measured by roles of governors (Y2) and autonomy of local risk control strategies in local establishments (X2), the English prison service showed that governors are formally assigned significantly strong leader roles for local risk control strategies. In comparison, leader roles of governors are significantly weak in the Japanese prison service. This weak leader roles of governors are due to the ascription based career systems and the *tanto* system, which assigns substantial risk control roles to non-graded prison officers in local establishments. In response to the active leader roles of governors, the English prison service showed that the violence control structure allows local establishments and governors to exercise more discretion than that of suicide control. This difference was significant concerning local performance assessment indicators and the use of segregation units. Local performance

of violence control is measured by outcome oriented performance indicators, and governors are allowed to examine various ways for hitting targets. Additionally, ways of using segregation units are largely relied on discretion of governors as parts of local violence control strategies. Both discussions showed that the level of intervention from externals to local violence control strategies is lower than that of suicide control.

Meanwhile, the Japanese prison service showed that local establishments are unified under the central prison service control. Internal and external performance controls over local establishments were significantly weak, and the prison service is generally closed from outsiders. In addition to the structural unification of local establishments, violence control of the Japanese prison service showed that local violence strategies tend to be unified in existing ways taken by previous officers, due to informal pressures between staff members and prisoners in prisons. It indicated high group pressure in the Japanese prison service for violence control. Meanwhile, suicide control showed that local establishments generally lack visible local suicide control strategies due to significantly low interest of local and national staff members and outside society. It suggested that the Japanese prison service generally considers suicide is not target to be actively controlled. Overall, the English prison service was assigned lower group scores than the group scores for the Japanese prison service due to the larger autonomy of local establishments observed in HMPS.

Thus, this study shows that culture as patterns of organizational behaviour can be more effectively observed in relatively small and discrete social group units, such as prison services, by focusing on specific risk-related issues (*e.g.* suicide and violence). Moreover, the relative prison services showed that these risk control culture is slightly different depending on types of risk in the same institution. Considering those different results depending on units of observation and risk, this study insists that culture should not be analysed in non-fixed units of organizations in regard to abstract situations of the organization, but in the fixed and limited unit of organizations in regard to specific risk for them.

## 4. Why should culture be analysed in the study of public administration?

Chapter 1 showed that there is an indefinite number of contingent factors in any given culture hence it is difficult to explain specific outcomes within that culture in terms of independent variables. In response, it was pointed out in chapter 2 that studies of the g/g theory insist that cultural analysis needs to identify the characteristics of organizations in order to study them effectively. G/g theorists have argued that instead of identifying

the causality of specific outcomes, cultural analysis draws attention to the strengths and weaknesses of organizations in their members' patterns of behaviour. Bearing this argument in mind, this study has analysed risk control culture in terms of the organizational patterns of risk control behaviour within the English and Japanese prison services.

The empirical chapters of this study (*i.e.* 4-7) showed that there are particular patterns of organizational behaviour within the English and Japanese prison services which can be identified with risk control culture. Furthermore, qualitative summary of empirical chapters in chapter 8 showed that peculiar organizational strengths and weaknesses can be observed in these patterns of behaviour. For example, the English prison service tends to show relatively weak group unity in response to high grid levels of the risk control structures. This weak group pressures suggest a possible cause of failures in suicide and violence risk control. Meanwhile, the Japanese service largely relies on the high group unity between members in local establishments, however, the grid level, including leader roles of governors and rules for controlling risk, was significantly weak in both suicide and violence control. This weak grid level is considered as potential weakness of the Japanese prison service in the risk control structures. Chapter 8 concluded that the prison service institutions can improve or solve their institutional problems by focussing on those weaknesses embedded in their patterns of risk control.

Thus, the case studies covered here show that although the g/g theory cannot reveal culture through the causation of specific outcomes, it can enable researchers to effectively identify collective patterns of risk control behaviour in public service domains. This method for identifying organizational culture may in turn help public service institutions, such as prison services, to recognise and address problems within their own organizational structures and which are embodied by the behaviour of their members. Hence the g/g theory presents a strong case for analysing culture in terms of collective patterns of organizational behaviour.

## *For further research*

This study discussed the method to measure culture, using the g/g theory. The method was developed based on not only the g/g theory, but also previous cultural studies, measurement theory, institutional and organizational theories, and showed quantitative ways of operating the g/g theory in order to analysed suicide and violence risk control culture of the English and Japanese prison services. The results discussed in this study show that the g/g theory can provide a coherent comparative framework for identifying organizational patterns of risk control in the English and Japanese prison service. However, it also involved some unsolved issues in the method I used for this study. In this section I will now highlight some issues that this study has raised about how the g/g theory can be used to measure organizational culture and make some suggestions about how these issues might be solved in further research.

The first issue is coders' bias. For present purposes, coders' bias relates to how the g/g rankings can be determined in light of the relevant data. The same data could potentially be ranked different by different coders depending on their research objectives or interests. Although I could not completely rule out the possibility of coders' bias in this study, I tried to assign ranks to the 20 sub-codes based on facts which are not affected by my subjective values such as the ratio between insider and outsider governors. Even so, the rankings assigned to some sub-codes were necessarily based on subjective judgements such as the compliance level of local establishments discussed in chapter 5. In future research, I recommend that g/g ranks and orders are assigned and measured by multiple coders in order to offset the possibility of individual biases.

The second issue concerns the selection of sub-codes. Although I assigned 20 sub-codes in response to the four risk control aspects represented by the g/g dimensions, more or less sub-codes could potentially be identified in similar research projects. It is possible to vary the number of sub-codes because culture is highly contingent on all levels. Consequently, the results of g/g analysis can differ depending on the number and type of sub-codes set. In any case, the 20 sub-codes I set for this study effectively reflect the organizational structures of the relevant prison services. The 20 sub-codes set for this study are based on the general risk-related factors representing the g/g dimensions discussed in chapter 2: that is, the formalization of rules and the roles of staff members represent the grid aspects of risk control culture, and the diversity of subordinate units in relation to organizational time and space represent the group aspects of risk control culture. Once the general factors representing the g/g dimensions are established, it is

acceptable to some extent to vary the details of the sub-codes. Moreover, the general factors should be applicable to other public service institutions (that is, not just prison services). Thus, in future research it will be useful to examine other sets of sub-codes which follow these general factors.

The third issue concerns the quality and reliability of data. Although I tried to collect data from reliable sources on both the English and Japanese prison services, the quality of available information was not equal between the two of them. This issue is particularly significant in regard to my analysis of the compliance level of local establishments in chapter 5. Whereas HMPS discloses a good amount of information about local establishments through HMIP, the Japanese prison service discloses almost no information about its local establishments. In this study, I had assigned the provisional scores for some codes for the compliance level of the Japanese prison service based on available data. As a result, the overall standards for assigning group ranks and scores were not fully equal between the English and Japanese prison services. Accordingly, it would be beneficial for future research to explore ways of offsetting unavoidable imbalances in the quality of the information gathered about different organizations.

The fourth issue concerns overlapping information. The empirical chapters showed that some facts about the English and Japanese prison services relate to more than one of the 20 sub-codes. For example, I analysed the formality of the risk control system in chapter 4 and the leadership roles of governors in chapter 6. However, most of the roles of governors described in chapter 6 were revealed in the formal rules of the risk control systems discussed in chapter 4. This means that in some cases I analysed the same information more than once in different sub-codes. This issue does not have a major impact on the qualitative analysis of the results of this study. Moreover, it does not affect the results of the radar charts, which are quantitative, because they treat each sub-code independently. On the other hand, if the quantitative scores are added up as total g/g scores, the overlapping information becomes a problem because information that is counted more than once has a greater impact on the overall result. This problem again illustrates the contingency of culture by showing that different facets of culture overlap with each other in unpredictable ways. Accordingly, future studies will need to consider how such information imbalances can be avoided or offset.

The fifth issue concerns the appropriateness of standardizing scores. As I explained in chapter 3 and this chapter, the loads for the raw standardized scores for each sub-code did not have a significant impact on the overall results for each prison

service. All scores were adjusted so that they could be placed on a scale of 0-10. The results in this respect do not reflect the substantial impact of each sub-code on the organizational culture in question. This weakness in my method may cast some doubt over the accuracy of the total cumulative scores demonstrated in this chapter.

The latter issue also relates to the sixth issue concerning the limitations of the ordinal level of measurement. Although my method measured culture in terms of the g/g theory and using the ordinal scales, it also highlighted some statistical limitations in how the kind of data it produces can be analysed. Most pressingly, it is not possible to use several statistical techniques such as mean variables, z scores, and standard deviation. If I can develop the g/g score scales at the interval level of measurement, the accuracy of the g/g theory may dramatically increase. Therefore, in order to achieve this goal, the units of distance between scales should be equalled across all sub-codes for each g/g dimension. The contingency of culture, as explained above, poses a major challenge to the development of such a method. However, the g/g theory has some strengths which make this goal achievable: most significantly, it already includes the ordinal scale in the g/g dimensions unlike other cultural theories.

As such, this study has raised several issues with the g/g theory which can be tackled in future research. Some of these issues reflect the essential difficulties with measuring something as contingent as culture. Nevertheless, the findings of this study sheds light on patterns of risk control management in the English and Japanese prison services which are frequently overlooked by their staff members. Based on the g/g theory, organizational tendencies of both the English and Japanese prison services highlight weakness and strengths in their risk control structures and also suggest possible ways of improving them. Thus, although there are several issues with my method that need to be addressed, it can be concluded for now that the g/g theory is able to effectively highlight patterns of risk control within organizations and problems embedded within those patterns. In this way, the g/g theory can be a valuable tool for assessing the characteristics of organizational risk control cultures and highlighting areas in which they can be improved.

Finally, as the potential to measure risk control culture by the g/g theory, my method is not only applicable to the English and Japanese prison services, but also to a wide range of other public service institutions. For example, Hood *et al* (2004) have used the g/g theory to analyse the prison services of several OECD countries including France and Germany. However, unlike this study, they focused on the general control structures in each prison service rather than structures tailored to deal with specific

types of risk. In this way, Hood *et al* were able to identify basic cultural types for each institution (*e.g.* the French prison service is hybrid of hierarchist and egalitarian, and the German prison service is also hybrid of those), but not to highlight more subtle tendencies such as this study has been able to do (*e.g.* the English prison service is predominantly hierarchist but with a strong tendency towards fatalism). Therefore, it can be seen that my method for using the g/g theory provides more detail about different types of culture than previous attempts to use it.

Hood *et al* (2004) have also used the g/g theory to analyse the control structures of higher education institutions in various OECD countries. Again, they focused on general control structures and provided basic definitions of the cultural types of each institution. My method can be used to develop this approach to higher education institutions further, but some modifications to the sub-codes based on the g/g aspects would be essential for any such future research. Furthermore, specific types of risk relevant to higher education institutions would need to be identified. This kind of further research would benefit the institutions involved in the respect that it would highlight problems with their organizational structures and also help to develop my method by adapting it to deal with different types of organization.

# Appendices

## Appendix 1: Summary of formalization (Y1) ranks and grid scores for the prison service

| Penal Institutional legal sources | Formality ranks | Grid Scores | England | Japan |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Parliamentary Legislation | 1 | 7 | Human Right Act 1998 Prison Act 1952 | The Act of Penal Institutions and the Treatment of Sentenced Inmates |
| (Statutory Instruments) Secondary Legislation | 2 | 6 | Prison Rules YOI rules | The Rules of Penal Institutions and the treatment of Sentenced Inmates. The Rules of Organizational Structures in Prison, Juvenile Prison and Remand Centre. |
| Ordinance | 3 | 5 | Prison Service Orders (by 2009) | Ministerial Ordinance (*Kunrei*) |
| Instruction | 4 | 4 | Prison Service Instructions (PSIs) Agency Instructions (AIs) | Ministerial Instructions: *Tsutatsu*, *Imei-tsutatsu*, and *Tsuchi* |
| Written Advice and Manuals | 5 | 3 | Prison performance Manuals (nationally edited )Prisoner's Information book | Ministerial Advice |
| Local written rules and manuals | 6 | 2 | rules set by local establish | rules set by local establishments |
| Informal unwritten rituals, habits | 7 | 1 | Informal unwritten belief or guidelines shared among prison staff members Local informal manuals | Informal unwritten belief or guidelines shared among prison staff members Local informal manuals |
| No rules define the relevant subject of risk control. | 8 | 0 | | |

## Appendix 2: Summary of compliance (X1) ranks and group scores for the prison service

| Compliance ranks | Group Scores | Sub-codes | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1 | 3 | 2 | | 4 | 5 |
| | | Order | Definition of Risk | Punishment | Reward | Implementation of key national guidelines | Accountability of risk related information record |
| High | 4 | | | | | All local establishments fully implement key national guidelines | |
| | 3 | Acceptable behaviour of individual prisoners among prisoners is generally minimised | ways of identifying risk are uniformly standardised among all local establishments. | All local establishments appropriately conduct punishment | All local establishments appropriately conduct reward | a majority of local establishments fully implement key national guidelines | All local establishments keep accountable records and documentation about risk |
| | 2 | acceptable behaviour among prisoners is constrained but restrictions are imposed on a case-by-case basis | ways of identifying risk are commonly shared among a majority of local establishments | Majority of local establishments appropriately conduct punishment | Majority of local establishments appropriately conduct reward | a majority of local establishments implement key national guidelines. But the quality varies between them | accountable records and documentation about risk are kept by a majority of local establishments |
| | 1 | acceptable individual behaviour is maximised and group stability is minimised | ways of identifying risk vary widely among local establishments | The appropriateness of punishment vary by local establishments | The appropriateness of reward vary by local establishments | the implementation of key national guidelines varies widely among local establishments | the quality of accountable records and documentation about risk varies widely among local establishments |
| Low | 0 | No restrictions on prisoners' behaviour with regard to group stability. | ways of identifying risk do not exist at all local establishments | No establishment appropriately conduct punishment. Or the punishment system is not used for controlling the risk | No establishment inappropriately conduct reward. Or the reward system is not used for controlling the risk | No local establishments implement key national guidelines | No local establishments keep records and documentation about risk. |

## Appendix 3: Summary of roles of governors (Y2) ranks and grid scores

| Roles of governors ranks | Grid Scores | Sub-codes | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| | | Specialization of staff members | selection criteria | Interpersonal roles :1.Figurehead 2. Leader 3.Liaison | Informational roles: 1.Monitor 2.Disseminator 3.Spokesman | Decisional roles: 1.Entrepreneur 2.Disturbance Handler, 3.Resource Allocator, 4. Negotiator |
| high | 5 | | | | | Governors are required to be in charge of 4 roles |
| | 4 | | | Governors are required to be in charge of 3 roles | Governors are required to be in charge of 3roles | Active in 3 roles |
| | 3 | | Ascription | Active in 2roles | Active in 2roles | Active in 2roles |
| | 2 | the prison service allocates special roles prison staff for controlling the risks of suicide and violence in local establishments | Achievement and Ascription | Active in 1 role | Active in 1 role | Active in 1 role |
| | 1 | they are assigned specific roles for more general purposes | Achievement | Governors plays some of those roles but very weak | Governors plays some of those roles but very weak | Governors plays some of those roles but very weak |
| Low | 0 | the prison service does not allocate any positions or entitlements for prison staff. | None of these | Governors are in charge of none of those | Governors are in charge of none of those | Governors are in charge of none of those |

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# Appendix 4: Summary of autonomy (X2) ranks and group scores for the prison service

| Autonomy ranks | Group Scores (national) | 1 Proportion of outsider leaders (governors) | 2 external performance assessment bodies | 3 Existence and influence of trade union | 4 performance competition and main indicators | 5 Diversity of local key strategies |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Smallest autonomy at local levels | 4 | all governors are insiders | external performance assessment bodies **do not** exist | Trade unions do **not** exist | | Key local strategies to risk control are identical. |
| | 3 | governorships are open to outsiders. But a majority of governors are insiders | A **few** external performance assessment bodies. Lack influence over local establishments. | trade unions **exist.** But their activities **do not** hold much influence | Internal performance competition does not exist | Common key strategies followed by **a majority of local establishments** |
| | 2 | Opened and the proportion of outsiders and insiders are close to equal | there are **multiple** external performance assessment bodies. Some of those have substantial influences. | trade unions influences operation of risk control strategies in **some** local establishments | Exist. Performance is measured by **process-oriented indicators** | There are common key strategies, but **approaches** in those strategies **vary.** |
| | 1 | Opened. Majority of governors are outsider | **A large number of** highly influencial external performance assessment bodies. | Trade unions exist. Their activities are **highly influential** on a **majority** of local establishments | Exist And local performances are measured by outcome oriented indicators | Common key strategies **do not exist,** strategies **widely vary by local establishments** |
| Largest autonomy at local levels | 0 | All governors are promoted from outside of the prison service. | Anybody from outside the prison service can participate in assessments of local performance | Trade unions **have total control over** local establishments | Pure market competition between local establishments is used to assesses the prison service performance | Risk control strategies cannot be observed at either local or national levels |

## *Appendix 5 HMIP Expectations for Suicide and Self-harm Control*
**(HMCIP 2009a: pp. 45-48)**

1. *A safer custody strategy is in place that recognises the risks to prisoners, particularly in the early days in custody and sets out procedures which help to reduce the risk of self-harm. The specific needs of different prisoner groups are recognised, as are the levels of risk in different areas of the establishment.*

2. *A multi-disciplinary committee effectively monitors the prison's suicide prevention policy and procedures. The committee is chaired by a manager responsible for the policy and membership includes prisoners, staff representatives from a range of disciplines and a member of the local community mental health team.*

3. *Prisoners' families, friends and external agencies are encouraged, through local arrangements, to provide sources of information which may help identify and support those prisoners likely to be bullied or who have a history of self-harming behaviour.*

4. *A detailed care and support plan is prepared with input from the prisoner, which identifies need as well as the individuals responsible including a key worker. Personal factors or significant events which may be a trigger to self-harm have been identified. Regular reviews take place involving staff from a range of disciplines and family and friends as appropriate, which provide good support and care for all prisoners at risk. Arrangements are in place for following up after a care and support plan has been closed.*

5. *Prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm are held in a supportive and caring environment with unhindered access to sources of help including peer supporters. A care suite is available to support the work of Listeners.*

6. *Prisoners are encouraged to express any thoughts of suicide and/or self-harm, and are encouraged to take part in all purposeful activities as part of the support plan.*

7. *All staff, including night staff, are fully trained in suicide prevention and are clear what to do in an emergency. A programme of refresher training is in place.*

8. *Incidents of self-harm are closely monitored and analysed at regular intervals to establish any trends and to implement preventive measures. Serious incidents are properly investigated to establish what lessons could be learnt and to promote good practice. Where appropriate family or friends of the prisoner are informed through a family liaison officer.*

9. *An action plan is devised and acted upon promptly as a result of an investigation into an apparent self-inflicted death. This is reviewed following subsequent findings of an inquest jury.*

10. *All information about prisoners at risk of self-harm or suicide is communicated to people who are able to offer support in the community.*

***Appendix 6 HMIP Expectations for Bullying and Violence Reduction***
(HMIP 2009a: pp. 41-44)

1. *The prison has developed an effective strategy to reduce violence and intimidation which has earned the commitment of the whole prison and has drawn on multi-disciplinary consultation including feedback from prisoners.*

2. *Prisoners are consulted and involved in determining how their lives in the prison can be made safer, how bullying, verbal and physical abuse, racial abuse and threats of violence are confronted, how conflicts can be resolved and what sanctions are appropriate.*

3. *Staff supervise and protect prisoners throughout the prison from bullying, verbal and physical abuse, racial abuse and threats of violence. Staff are consistent in challenging these behaviours.*

4. *Prisoners' families and friends are encouraged to make suggestions about how the prison could better protect prisoners from victimisation and to provide information to help identify those prisoners likely to be at risk.*

5. *An effective strategy is in place to deal with bullying which is based on an analysis of the pattern of bullying in the prison and is applied consistently throughout the prison.*

6. *Allegations of bullying behaviour are treated consistently and fairly. They are investigated promptly. Outcomes of investigations are recorded and the prisoner who reported the bullying is supported.*

7. *Prisoners are made aware of behaviour that is unacceptable through a well-publicised policy and are made aware of the consequences of bullying. Inappropriate behaviour is consistently challenged.*

8. *Anti-bullying measures support the victim and take the victim's views about their location into account.*

9. *Appropriate interventions are in place to deal with bullies and support victims.*

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