

'I AM A LIBERAL AS WINSTON CHURCHILL AN

Winston Churchill, in his notorious election radio address of 4 June 1945, claimed that a socialist government, if elected, 'would have to fall back on some form of *Gestapo*, no doubt very humanely directed in the first instance'. Less well remembered, but of considerable significance, are the passages in the broadcast that Churchill devoted to the Liberal Party. **Richard Toye** examines how Churchill frequently summoned up the memories of 1906 to bolster his own position in politics.

Punch, 21 May 1913: **Under his master's eye**

Scene – Mediterranean, on board the Admiralty yacht *Enchantress*

Mr Winston Churchill: 'Any home news?'

Mr Asquith: 'How can there be with you here?'



UNDER HIS MASTER'S EYE.

SCENE—Mediterranean, on board the Admiralty yacht "*Enchantress*."
MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL. "ANY HOME NEWS?"
MR. ASQUITH. "HOW CAN THERE BE WITH YOU HERE?"

'AS MUCH AS A TORY' AND THE MEMORY OF 1906

IN MAY, after the Allies had achieved victory in Europe, the Liberals (with the exception of Gwilym Lloyd-George) had withdrawn from Churchill's governing coalition, at the same time as Labour. He now castigated them for this, at the same time emphasising that although there was 'a great doctrinal gulf' between Tories and socialists, 'There is no such gulf between the Conservative and National Government I have formed and the Liberals.' He argued, 'There is scarcely a Liberal sentiment which animated the great Liberal leaders of the past which we do not inherit and defend.'² In a speech at Oldham a few weeks later, he reiterated these sentiments. 'I am a Liberal as much as a Tory', he claimed. 'I do not understand why Liberals pretend they are different from us. We fight and stand for freedom and we have succeeded in bringing forward a programme that any Liberal government led by Mr Lloyd George or Mr Asquith would have been proud to carry through in a Parliament.'³

The claims about the Liberals could be seen as rather desperate stuff – almost as desperate, perhaps, as the 'Gestapo' allegation. Fuming Liberal

supporters might well have reflected that Churchill, who had in the past advanced his own career by twice switching party, was now trying to cloak his habitual opportunism in rhetoric of a particularly hypocritical kind. He laid claim to Liberal values in order to win votes, whilst at the same time he accused the Liberals themselves of having put party before country: 'I am sorry to tell you that they have yielded to the tactical temptation, natural to politicians, to acquire more seats in the House of Commons, if they can, at all costs.'⁴ As if Churchill himself had ever disdained to grub for a vote!

Whatever the merits of his claims to uphold Liberal values, however, his efforts to present himself as an heir to the party's traditions were more than a flash in the pan. They were, rather, part of a strategy that he had used intermittently over the previous twenty years, and which he would employ systematically with much fervour throughout the final decade of his career. He deployed his own history as a Liberal, and the memory of the Asquith-Lloyd George glory days, as a rhetorical resource in support of his current priorities.

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This article explores Churchill's use of the 'heritage of 1906' during his post-Liberal phase, in order to show how interpretations of the pre-1914 Liberal governments remained relevant to British politics for decades after Liberal England's 'strange death'.⁵ Such interpretations were highly contested: Churchill had to defend his record as well as exploit it, and he often did both things at the same time.

By 1945, of course, Churchill's career as a Liberal in the formal sense was long over. It had begun in April 1904 when as a young MP – having had the Conservative Whip withdrawn from him that January – he accepted an invitation from the Liberals of North-West Manchester to contest the seat at the next election. He made the symbolic gesture of crossing the floor of the House of Commons on 31 May. But how long did he remain a Liberal? With the benefit of hindsight, it might seem that his decision to join David Lloyd George's coalition government (in 1917, as Minister of Munitions) put him beyond the pale of true Liberalism. But this was not necessarily how it seemed at the time, for the full, drastic consequences of the 1916 split between Lloyd

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George's supporters and those of former Prime Minister H. H. Asquith were not immediately apparent. At any rate, the 1923 reunion of the Asquithians with the former Coalition Liberals secured Churchill's place within the fold, albeit only temporarily. The reconciliation was attended by an element of comedy. The National Liberal Club's portraits of Lloyd George and Churchill had been taken down in 1921 and consigned to the cellar; now they were brought up again and restored to their former glory.⁶ It is not clear whether the picture of Churchill was again removed in 1924 when, at the start of February, he declined the offer to fight Bristol West for the Liberals. That moment should be seen as his definitive break with the party; by the end of the year he had been appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer in a Conservative government.

In December 1905, when Britain's last Liberal government was formed, Churchill had been appointed Under-Secretary for the Colonies. In 1908, he had replaced Lloyd George as President of the Board of Trade, when the latter was made Chancellor of the Exchequer. In his new role Churchill made significant contributions to social reform, notably through the creation of trade boards to enforce minimum wages in the 'sweated' trades, the introduction of labour exchanges, and (in collaboration with Lloyd George, who dealt with the health side) the introduction of National Insurance to protect workers against unemployment and sickness. In 1910 Churchill had been appointed Home Secretary and the following year First Lord of the Admiralty. In other words, he had developed a wide range of ministerial experience; but we may note that, in later years, when Churchill talked about his pre-1914 career in his speeches, it was generally his contribution to social policy and his alliance with Lloyd George of which he made most.

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A sign of this was seen during the 1923 election – the last he fought as a Liberal – when he strove, not for the last time, to demonstrate that he was not merely a 'warmonger'. According to *The Times* report of a speech he made at Leicester, 'He described the social legislation which had been passed between 1905 and 1914, and said that he did not think that there was any important modern Act of social legislation in which he had not been concerned.'⁷ It is a little surprising that during this election, which was fought on the issue of Conservative plans to introduce protectionism, he did not evoke the memory of the 1906 'free trade' election more explicitly.⁸ Perhaps he sensed that there was little political capital to be gained from doing so.

When he was at the Treasury, Churchill continued to refer to the 1906 era and to play up its social reforming aspect. He did so in order to secure a 'progressive' lineage for the measures he now put forward. (It was of some relevance that Lloyd George and Asquith were, at the time of his appointment, both still in active politics, although the latter at last retired from the Liberal leadership in 1926.) As Martin Dauntton has argued, Churchill 'consciously seized the mantle of David Lloyd George' and aimed 'to appropriate the ideology of "new Liberalism" which had, to a large extent, migrated into the Labour Party'.⁹

An example of this occurred in April 1925, when Churchill presented his first Budget. One of its features was the announcement that the government would soon introduce a bill to establish an insurance-based pension scheme for the aged and for widows. This was a significant extension of the welfare state. 'The old *laissez-faire* or *laissez-aller* ideas of mid-Victorian radicalism have been superseded, and no one has done more to supersede them than the right. Hon. Member for Caernarvon Boroughs [Lloyd

George]', Churchill said in his speech. 'I am proud to have been associated with him from the very beginning of those large insurance ideas.'¹⁰ Lloyd George, in his initial response to the Budget, expressed his pleasure that Churchill had undertaken to complete the scheme of insurance that the pre-war Liberal government had only been able to establish in limited form: 'I am very delighted that my right hon. Friend, who was associated with me at that time in carrying through that scheme has in his first year of Chancellorship undertaken the completion of the scheme.'¹¹ Churchill may therefore not only have succeeded in appealing to progressive opinion in general, but also in blunting some of Lloyd George's own political attacks. On the other hand, he could sometimes be damaged by suspicions within his own party that he was 'playing up to Lloyd George', who was very much distrusted by other Conservatives.¹² The memory of the 1906 era was a double-edged sword.

But if Churchill sought to appeal to liberal opinion, in the broadest sense, this did not prevent him attacking the Liberal Party when he thought it right to do so. Even though, until at least 1931, he remained open to the idea of renewing his political cooperation with Lloyd George, he clashed with him repeatedly in public, notably over Britain's 1925 return to the Gold Standard, the 1926 General Strike, and the Liberal Party's ambitious proposals for public works. These last were a major point of controversy in the 1929 general election, and showed how 'Liberal traditions' were subject to multiple interpretations. Lloyd George, for his part, now harked back less to the pre-1914 New Liberalism than to the period of his own wartime leadership, as he sought to establish his credentials as a man who could get things done. Churchill, for his part, harked back to the late nineteenth century. ('We should

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Liberals together:
David Lloyd
George and
Winston Churchill,
ca. 1910

not try to compete with L.G.', he remarked to his officials, 'but take our stand on sound finance.'¹³ In one election speech he claimed that 'The Liberals are being committed against all the traditions of Gladstonian finance to an absurd, erroneous and vicious policy. If the Liberals succumb to the temptations Lloyd George is now offering them for party purposes it will not be because they are Liberals, but only because they are electioneering politicians.'¹⁴ The obvious implication was that the Conservatives could be trusted to uphold Gladstone's legacy, even if Mr. G's own party could not.

In 1931, the Liberal Party fractured into three groups: the followers of John Simon (known as the Liberal Nationals), those of Herbert Samuel, and those of Lloyd George. The Lloyd George 'family group' was only four-strong, and far less significant than the other two, both of which joined the Conservative-dominated National Government, although the Samuelites withdrew the following year. Churchill did not entirely give up hope of future collaboration with individual Liberals,

such as his friend Archibald Sinclair (who led the party in 1935–45). Yet, to the extent that he remained eager to court Liberal opinion, he does not appear to have used the memory of 1906 – or other aspects of the 'Liberal tradition' – as a significant point of reference. This in part reflected the issues – India and then rearmament – on which he campaigned during the 1930s, and which were not easily susceptible to such treatment. Indeed, he dismissed government proposals to grant greater self-government to India as 'this bouquet of faded flowers of Victorian Liberalism'.¹⁵

After the fall of Neville Chamberlain in May 1940, the Liberals were generously represented – relative to their numbers in the Commons – in Churchill's new coalition government, Sinclair becoming Secretary of State for Air. Churchill, understandably, devoted little thought to the party and its affairs for most of the war. On occasion he felt the government was getting inadequate support from the Liberals, and in 1942 he reprimanded Sinclair for this, at the same time reassuring him that 'I have never measured the strength

of the Liberal Party by its Parliamentary representation.'¹⁶ It seems fair to say that Churchill's announcement in 1945 that he was a Liberal as much as he was a Conservative was not completely without precedent in his rhetoric; on the other hand, he had not felt compelled to articulate this particular aspect of his political identity for some considerable time previously. It was, however, to become a familiar trope in the years to come.

There were some compelling reasons for him to resurrect the theme. First, although his caretaker government was heavily dominated by Conservatives, Churchill was eager to make as much as he could of the fact that some non-Tories, including the remnants of the Simonites, had agreed to join it. One of these was the sixth Earl of Rosebery, son of Lord Rosebery, the former Liberal Prime Minister, who became Secretary of State for Scotland. Another recruit was Lloyd George's son Gwilym who, just a few days before his father's death in March 1945, made a public statement of his intention to fight the next election 'as a Liberal candidate supporting the National Government'.¹⁷ Therefore, when the other Liberals left office, he continued in post as Minister of Fuel and Power. This Liberal veneer may have been thin, but it allowed Churchill to claim that his administration had a non-party, 'National' character, suitable to cope with the still ongoing war with Japan. In his 'Gestapo' broadcast, he emphasised that the government still had 'a Rosebery and a Lloyd-George to carry forward the flags of their fathers'.¹⁸ There was also a second reason. Declaring his liberalism allowed Churchill to stress not only his bipartisan approach, but also his progressivism. This was essential in the face of a credible Labour challenge based on promises of radical economic and social reform. To a degree, Churchill was forced to deploy the memory

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of 1906 because he had so little else to play with. His domestic record in the 1920s had some things to recommend it, but his Chancellorship (and, in particular, his decision to return to the Gold Standard) was now too closely associated with the perceived failures of the inter-war years to be of much use to him politically.

Churchill's claim to the tradition was, of course, contested. Lloyd George's daughter Megan, an MP on the left of the Liberal Party, claimed that she, as an opponent of the government, was upholding her father's beliefs: 'I am a David-Lloyd-George Liberal', she declared.¹⁹ By contrast, one Labour tactic was to claim that there was indeed an analogy between Lloyd George and Churchill. 'If Mr Churchill were to win this election the consequences would be exactly what they were after the Tory victory of 1918', argued Harold Laski, Chairman of Labour's National Executive Committee. 'They would use Mr Churchill for their purposes and would then throw him over in the same way as the Tory party threw over Lloyd George [in 1922] when they had squeezed out of him the last drop of utility they could get.'²⁰ Laski's comments were part of a wider strategy. Churchill was undoubtedly popular as an individual. Labour's best hope, therefore, was to acknowledge his strengths as a war leader, and avoid personal attacks on him, whilst suggesting that if returned to power he would be in hock to a reactionary Tory party and no good as a peacetime premier. This approach certainly did not do Labour any harm. When the results were announced on 26 July it turned out that Labour had won a landslide victory.

The Liberals won only twelve seats. There was little reason to imagine that the decline was not utterly terminal, and Churchill might have been expected to ignore the party entirely from now on. Yet, as Leader of the Opposition, he showed himself

eager to work with it. He wanted to do so in order to build a broad anti-socialist front as a means of regaining office. Failing that, he wanted to win the votes of former Liberal supporters by emphasising the Tories' claims to be the true heirs of Liberalism. The contested legacy of Lloyd George was of continued importance, as the Liberals themselves recognised. Clement Davies had replaced Sinclair as Liberal leader, because the latter had lost his seat in the election. Sinclair wrote to Davies in December 1945 about Gwilym Lloyd-George: 'Gwilym is behaving badly. What are we to do about him? – leave him to smoulder on the Tory bonfire, or try to snatch him from the burning?' Sinclair favoured trying to win him back – which in fact was a lost cause. One of his arguments for doing so was that otherwise 'The Tories will boast, at the next Election – as Winston boasted in the last Election – of having a Lloyd George in their ranks.'²¹ This was a sound prediction, although the Conservatives found other Liberal cards to play too, even going so far as to secure an endorsement from Gladstone's grandson.²²

Churchill, for his part, took the view that 'A Party is not a club, becoming more and more eclectic. It ought to be a "snowball starting an avalanche".'²³ He therefore stressed in public that Conservatives and Liberals should work together as 'co-belligerents' against the Labour government.²⁴ He achieved mixed success. In May 1947, under the so-called Woolton-Teviot pact, the residuum of the Liberal Nationals agreed to form joint constituency associations with the Conservatives.²⁵ However, a subsequent approach by Churchill to the Liberal Party proper was rebuffed;²⁶ and the Liberal leaders were enraged when parliamentary candidates were selected by the new joint constituency associations to run under the label 'Liberal and Conservative' or some variant

thereof. (There were around fifty such candidates, including Gwilym Lloyd-George, in the 1950 election, although even in his case a large section of the local Conservative Association would have much preferred a genuine Tory.²⁷) The Liberals thought their party name was being misappropriated. This led, during the 1950 election campaign, to a public exchange of letters with Clement Davies, in which Churchill ridiculed the latter's complaints: 'As you were yourself for eleven years a National Liberal and in that capacity supported the Governments of Mr Baldwin and Mr Neville Chamberlain, I should not presume to correct your knowledge of the moral, intellectual and legal aspects of adding a prefix or a suffix to the honoured name of Liberal.'²⁸ This was certainly amusing, but it did nothing to assist Churchill's hopes of cooperation with the independent Liberals.

There were some within the Liberal Party, such as Violet Bonham Carter (Asquith's daughter), who were sympathetic to the idea of cooperation, but there was considerable hostility from others, including Clement Davies, who had been alienated by Churchill's personal conduct.²⁹ In August 1947 Lord Woolton, the Conservative Party Chairman, sent Churchill some extracts from recent Liberal speeches. 'They are as violently partisan and anti-Tory as anything the Socialists have ever perpetrated', he wrote, 'and I think we delude ourselves if we imagine that such people will enter into any agreement with us.'³⁰ Churchill responded robustly, urging Woolton to do everything in his power 'to promote unity of action with the Liberals on the basis of an Independent Liberal Party. On this being achieved depends the future revival of Britain.'³¹ Moreover, in 1948, he expressed to his Shadow Cabinet 'the wish that Liberals who wished to join the Conservative Party

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should be given every facility to get seats.³² In the general election of February 1950, the Liberals put forward 475 candidates. This threatened to split the anti-Labour vote. There was an extremely limited number of local pacts with the Conservatives, but the idea did not spread – rather, we may imagine, to Churchill's chagrin.

Although Churchill may have over-rated the chances of securing direct cooperation with the Liberal Party, his quest for the support of Liberal *opinion* in general was perfectly rational. As Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska has shown, a research report commissioned by the Tories in 1949 indicated strong similarities between self-declared Liberals and the typical floating voter. It seemed that, although in 1945 only 2.5 per cent of 'the Doubtfuls' had voted Liberal, nearly a quarter of them identified strongly with the Liberal Party. The report argued that 'the label "Liberal" is being used as a convenient cover ... the characteristic "Floater" as described above should prove a highly profitable subject for Conservative attention.'³³ During the election campaign itself Churchill went so far as to offer one of the Conservative Party's broadcast slots to Bonham Carter, who had not been one of the Liberal Party's own chosen broadcasters. She turned it down, seemingly at the behest of Davies, and with apparent regret.³⁴ In his speeches, Churchill had to make efforts to rebut the allegation that, when Home Secretary in 1910, 'he had sent troops to shoot down Welsh miners' in the Tonypandy riots.³⁵ (In fact, no one had been killed.) He also sought to make more positive use of the memory of the past, in order to claim some credit himself for Labour's popular reforms:

I was the friend and comrade of the most famous Welshman of our time, David Lloyd George ... He it was who launched the Liberal forces of

this country effectively into the broad stream of social betterment and social security along which all modern parties now steer. Nowadays this is called 'the welfare State'. We did not christen it, but it was our child.

At the same time he made oblique reference to Aneurin Bevan who, as Attlee's Minister of Health, had pioneered the National Health Service. Labour liked to portray Bevan as 'a second Lloyd George', but Churchill emphasised 'There can be no greater insult to his memory'.³⁶ Churchill thus deployed the heritage of the New Liberalism in part in order to prevent his political opponents from laying claim to it themselves.

Labour won the 1950 election, but with a greatly reduced majority. (Labour could take a small amount of comfort from its candidate's narrow defeat of Gwilym Lloyd-George at Pembroke.) The Liberals lost three seats – a quarter of their total representation – and 319 deposits. Yet Churchill's enthusiasm for cooperation with the Liberals remained undimmed. 'I am having a very difficult time with Churchill', wrote Woolton that September:

He is determined to bring about some arrangement with the Liberals ... A month ago he asked me to see him, and I told him that I saw no prospect of the Party finding his views acceptable. It was a difficult meeting, in which he told me that of course he would resign if he could not have his way: I told him that I thought perhaps we had better both resign, and then there need not be any further conversation about it.³⁷

Neither man did resign, but stalemate had been reached.

It seems unlikely that the Tories could, at this stage, have gained much from a pact or alliance. When the next election came, in October 1951, the

Churchill perceived the Liberal Party both as an electoral threat and as a potential ally and, crucially, he clearly felt that there was a body of 'liberal opinion' in Britain that deserved to be courted.

Liberals could muster only 109 candidates. Churchill, seeking to sweep up as many ex-Liberal voters as possible, continued to play the Lloyd George card. He lent strong support to Gwilym Lloyd-George, who, despite deep divisions in the local party association, stood and won as a Conservative at Newcastle. Elsewhere, Conservative leaflets quoted a 1925 denunciation of socialism by David Lloyd George – he had described it as 'the very negation of liberty' – and also included a picture of him. Megan Lloyd George protested against this attempt by the Tories to claim her father's endorsement from beyond the grave.³⁸ She herself was narrowly defeated at Anglesey. Churchill also emphasised the Asquith connection by speaking for Bonham Carter, who had no Conservative opponent, at Colne Valley. She lost anyway.

The Conservatives won the general election with a majority of seventeen. In those seats where a Liberal had stood in 1950, but not in 1951, the Tories took the bulk of the Liberal vote – which may suggest that Churchill's efforts to court Liberal opinion had in fact paid off.³⁹ Although the Liberals won only six seats, he offered a Cabinet post to Clement Davies (albeit only as Minister of Education, a post to which Churchill did not attach much importance). Davies, in refusing, helped to safeguard the future of the Liberals as an independent force. Churchill made Gwilym Lloyd-George Minister of Food and then, in 1954, Home Secretary. We should not of course imagine that he was motivated in these appointments exclusively by the belief that the Lloyd George name won votes. Nonetheless, debates over the Lloyd George legacy continued, even after Churchill finally retired as Prime Minister in April 1955, at the age of 80. Anthony Eden, who succeeded him, called an election, which took place in May. During the campaign Churchill – who

remained an MP – ridiculed Megan Lloyd George's recent decision to join Labour. (In 1957 she won a by-election for the party at Carmarthen.) 'This is a big jump for anyone, especially for her father's daughter, to take', he said.⁴⁰ Even at this late date, there was still a vestigial 'Lloyd George factor' in British politics.

It remains to us to ask: when Churchill asserted that he was a Liberal as much as a Conservative, was he sincere, and if so, what did he mean? It would be easy to dismiss his remarks as a transparent electioneering stunt. However, during the 1940s and 1950s, Churchill did pay the Liberal Party the compliment of his attention. He perceived it both as an electoral threat and as a potential ally and, crucially, he clearly felt that there was a body of 'liberal opinion' in Britain that deserved to be courted.

What were those sentiments 'which animated the great Liberal leaders of the past' that he claimed to inherit and defend? One of his most important themes was, of course, the memory of the New Liberal welfare reforms, which he deployed as a guarantee that a future Tory government would continue to ride 'the broad stream of social betterment'. By contrast, he did *not* present himself as a defender of that key Liberal value, free trade, any more than he raised that other totem of the 1906 election, the issue of Chinese labour in South Africa. It would have been difficult for him to do so, because the Conservative Party as a whole – although, interestingly, not the National Liberals – remained hostile to it.⁴¹ (None-theless, by the end of his final term as Prime Minister, his government had moved significantly in the direction of freer trade.⁴²) Yet, arguably, the most important element in his 1940s and '50s vision of Liberalism was his appeal to the concept of 'freedom' more broadly. This was at the centre of his argument as to why Liberals and Conservatives should band together to defeat

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Labour. As he put it in his public letter to Davies in 1950: 'No one can be at once a Socialist and a Liberal. The establishment of a Socialist State controlling all the means of production, distribution and exchange, is the most complete contradiction of Liberal principles that now exists.'⁴³ This was why the memory of Lloyd George in particular was so useful to him, as an example of a politician who had combined belief in social improvement with an equally strong conviction that socialism and liberty were fundamentally incompatible.

Indeed, it was no coincidence that Churchill's 4 June 1945 broadcast contained not only the 'Gestapo' allegation but also an appeal to Liberals. The two aspects were intertwined. Churchill is generally thought, when suggesting that a Labour government would be obliged to rely on totalitarian methods, to have been drawing (in a clumsy fashion) on the ideas of F. A. Hayek, whose book *The Road to Serfdom* had been published the previous year. In doing so, he was attempting to ensure that Liberals fell down on his side of the 'doctrinal gulf' that separated the Conservatives from socialists. Calling on Liberals to 'search their hearts' he declared:

My friends, I must tell you that a Socialist policy is abhorrent to the British ideas of freedom. Although it is now put forward in the main by people who have a good grounding in the Liberalism and Radicalism of the early part of this century, there can be no doubt that Socialism is inseparably interwoven with Totalitarianism and the abject worship of the State.⁴⁴

As his rhetorical use of the memory of the 1906 government shows, his interpretation of early twentieth-century liberalism and radicalism was a selective one. We may also doubt that the Conservative Party he led was, as he made out, really much

of a repository for enlightened liberal values. Nevertheless, if it was not, that was not necessarily entirely Churchill's own fault; and, even if he was motivated in part by opportunism, he still deserves credit for making the liberal ideals of freedom and social betterment a key element of his post-1945 political discourse.

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- 1 I am grateful to David Dutton and J. Graham Jones for helpful comments and suggestions. Any errors that remain are, of course, my own responsibility.
- 2 "'Vote National, Not Party': Prime Minister's Broadcast Attack on Socialism", *The Times*, 5 June 1945.
- 3 'Mr Churchill in the North', *The Times*, 27 June 1945.
- 4 "'Vote National, Not Party'", *The Times*, 5 June 1945.
- 5 *The Strange Death of Liberal England* was, of course, the title of a famous book by George Dangerfield which was published in 1936.
- 6 'Out of the Tomb', *The Times*, 22 Nov. 1923.
- 7 "'An Electioneering Cry." Mr Churchill On The Capital Levy', *The Times*, 5 Dec. 1923.
- 8 His speech on 16 November 1923 at the Free Trade Hall in Manchester did include some remarks observing that Joseph Chamberlain's dire predictions about what would happen if his plans were not adopted had not come true. Robert Rhodes James (ed.), *Churchill Speaks: Winston S. Churchill in Peace and War: Collected Speeches, 1897–1963* (Windward, Leicester, 1981), p. 426.
- 9 Martin Daunton, *Just Taxes: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1914–1979* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002), p. 135.
- 10 Speech of 28 Apr. 1925. Unless otherwise stated, all Churchill's speeches cited are to be found in Robert Rhodes James (ed.), *Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 1897–1963*, 8 vols. (Chelsea House, New York, 1974).
- 11 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series, Vol. 183, 28 April 1925, col. 95.
- 12 William Bridgeman to M.C. Bridgeman, 29 July 1928, in Philip Williamson (ed.), *The Modernisation*

- of *Conservative Politics: The Diaries and Letters of William Bridgeman 1904-1935* (The Historians' Press, London, 1988), p. 215.
- 13 Keith Middlemas (ed.), *Thomas Jones: Whitehall Diary Vol. II: 1926-1930* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1969), pp. 175-76 (entry for 6 March 1929).
- 14 'The exploitation of unemployment: Mr Churchill on "One of the meanest things"', *The Times*, 14 May 1929.
- 15 Speech of 5 June 1935.
- 16 Winston Churchill to Archibald Sinclair, 31 Jan. 1942, in Ian Hunter (ed.), *Winston and Archie: The Letters of Sir Archibald Sinclair and Winston S. Churchill, 1915-1960* (Politico's, London, 2005), pp. 338-39.
- 17 'Major Lloyd-George's Future', *The Times*, 20 March 1945.
- 18 "'Vote National, Not Party'", *The Times*, 5 June 1945.
- 19 'In West Riding Valleys', *The Times*, Wednesday, 4 July 1945.
- 20 'Government Hopes in Scotland', *The Times*, 5 July 1945.
- 21 Archibald Sinclair to Clement Davies, 3 Dec. 1945, Thurso Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge, THRS IV 1/10. It should be noted that, after 1945, Gwilym Lloyd-George hyphenated his surname, whereas his sister Megan Lloyd George did not; she had objected to her father's acceptance of a peerage, as Earl Lloyd-George of Dwyfor, in the last weeks of his life, and her refusal to use the hyphen reflected this.
- 22 Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska, 'Rationing, Austerity and the Conservative Party after 1945', *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 173-97 at p. 192.
- 23 Churchill to Lord Woolton, 3 Aug. 1946, Conservative Party Archive, Bodleian Library, Oxford, CCO 3/1/64.
- 24 'Dangerous Economic Position: Mr Churchill's Attack On The Government', *The Times*, 17 May 1947.
- 25 See Michael Kandiah, 'Conservative Leaders, strategy - and "Consensus"?' 1945-64, in Harriet Jones and Michael Kandiah (eds.), *The Myth of Consensus: New Views on British History, 1945-64* (Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, 1996), pp. 58-78, at 62-63.
- 26 Alan Watkins, *The Liberal Dilemma* (MacGibbon and Kee, 1966), p. 48.
- 27 E. C. Bradbury to the General Director of the Conservative Party (Stephen Pierse), 21 Jan. 1950, Appendix B, Conservative Party Archive, CCO 4/3/43.
- 28 Churchill to Davies, 25 Jan. 1950, quoted in Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill*, vol. VIII: 'Never Despair', 1945-1965 (Heinemann, London, 1988), p. 504.
- 29 See Davies to Sinclair, 30 May 1946, Thurso Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge, THRS IV, 1/10. It is possible that Davies warmed more to the idea as time went on given that, by 1950, he was reported as saying that he would not mind if individual constituency parties made their own local agreements for cooperation spontaneously. (I am grateful to David Dutton for this information.) This may, however, have reflected his recognition that he could not control the situation on the ground.
- 30 Lord Woolton to WSC, 7 Aug. 1947, Churchill Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge, CHUR 2/64/21.
- 31 Churchill to Lord Woolton, 11 Aug. 1947, Churchill Papers, CHUR 2/64/19-20.
- 32 Conclusions of Consultative Committee, 14 July 1948, Conservative Party Archive, Bodleian Library, Oxford, LCC 1/1/3.
- 33 'The floating vote', 6 Dec. 1949, quoted in Zweiniger-Bargielowska, 'Rationing, Austerity and the Conservative Party after 1945', p. 191.
- 34 H. G. Nicholas, *The British General Election of 1950* (Macmillan, London, 1951), pp. 86-87.
- 35 *Ibid.*, p. 94.
- 36 Speech of 8 Feb. 1950.
- 37 Woolton to Lord Salisbury, 28 Sept. 1950, Woolton Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS Woolton 21, ff. 73-83.
- 38 D. E. Butler, *The British General Election of 1951* (Macmillan, London, 1952), p. 95.
- 39 *Ibid.*, p. 247.
- 40 Speech of 17 May 1955.
- 41 National Liberal Policy, *The Times*, 6 Oct 1951.
- 42 See Scott Kelly, *The Myth of Mr. Butskell: The Politics of British Economic Policy, 1950-55* (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2002), pp. 159-71.
- 43 Churchill to Davies, 25 Jan. 1950, quoted in Gilbert, *Never Despair*, p. 504.
- 44 "'Vote National, Not Party": Prime Minister's Broadcast Attack on Socialism', *The Times*, 5 June 1945.
- memorandum by J.A. Spender', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 45 (1972), pp. 283-302; Wilson, CB, pp. 423-66; Spender, *Life*, ii, pp. 188-205.
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- 19 A. J. A. Morris, 'Bannerman, Sir Henry Campbell- (1836-1908)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004)
- 20 *Dunfermline Press*, 13 Jan. 1906
- 21 Harris and Hazlehurst, 'Campbell Bannerman as Prime Minister', p. 381; Wilson, CB, pp. 549-66, esp. 562.
- 22 George. L. Bernstein, *Liberalism and Liberal Politics in Edwardian England* (London, 1986), pp. 30-31.
- 23 Rowland, *The Last Liberal Governments*, pp. 55, 132.
- 24 Quoted by Wilson, CB, p. 78.
- 25 NLS, Rosebery MSS, MS 10002, ff. 13-14, Campbell-Bannerman to Rosebery, 27 Oct. 1884.
- 26 Quoted by Wilson, CB, p. 155.
- 27 NLS, Rosebery MSS, MS 10002, ff. 184-85, Note by Campbell Bannerman, 16 Mar. 1894.
- 28 *Scotsman*, 22 Dec. 1905, p. 5.
- 29 John Brown, 'Scottish and English land legislation', *Scottish Historical Review*, 47 (1968).
- 30 The following section is based on Ewen A. Cameron, *Land for the People? The British Government and the Scottish Highlands, c. 1880-1925* (East Linton, 1996), pp. 124-43.
- 31 *Parliamentary Debates*, 4th series, vol. 180, col. 988, 13 Aug. 1907.
- 32 B.L., Add. MS, 41230, f. 208, Campbell-Bannerman to Sinclair, 1 Jan. 1908.
- 33 Quoted by Wilson, CB, p. 588; Spender, *Life*, ii, p. 321; *Glasgow Herald*, 26 Jan. 1907.
- 34 G. R. Searle, *A New England? Peace and War, 1886 to 1918* (Oxford, 2004), p. 362; Bernstein, *Liberalism*, pp. 83-86; Wilson, CB, pp. 554-60.
- 35 Quoted by Wilson, CB, p. 115.
- 36 Patricia Jalland, 'A Liberal Chief Secretary and the Irish question: Augustine Birrell, 1907-1914', *Historical Journal*, 19 (1976), pp. 426-30.
- 37 Harris and Hazlehurst, 'Campbell Bannerman as Prime Minister', pp. 377-81.

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- 5 Although the apparent prospect of a Gordon Brown premiership has induced some sections of the Scottish media to reacquaint themselves with the Scots who have made it to No 10 Downing St.; see Allan Burnett, 'The Scottish Premier League', *Sunday Herald*, 7 Jan. 2007, 'Seven days' section, pp. 14-15.
- 6 Edinburgh, National Library of Scotland, Rosebery MSS, MS 10002, ff.40-43, Campbell-Bannerman to Rosebery, 10, 12 Jun. 1886.
- 7 BL, Add. Mss, 44117, f.55, Campbell-Bannerman to Gladstone, 11 Jun. 1886.
- 8 Wilson, CB, 122. In making this remark he did not refer to whisky but to Scottish produce, such as the soft fruit grown on the farms around his home at Meigle.
- 9 Wilson, CB, 349; Spender, *Life*, i, 336; George L. Bernstein, 'Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and the Liberal Imperialists', *Journal of British Studies*, 23 (1983), pp. 111-13.
- 10 For an assertion of the unity of the party see a speech at Dalkeith in October 1900, *Scotsman*, 2 Oct. 1900, p. 6.
- 11 Quoted by Paul Readman, 'The Conservative party, patriotism and British politics: the case of the general election of 1900', *Journal of British Studies*, 40 (2001), p. 116.
- 12 Edinburgh, National Library of Scotland, Murray of Elibank MSS, MS 8801, f. 29, Campbell-Bannerman to Murray, 12 Sep. 1903.
- 13 B.L., Add, MS 41252, ff. 235-39, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's leadership, notes from Scotland, by W[illiam] W[ebster], Jun. 1922.
- 14 Wilson, CB, 354.
- 15 David W. Gutzke, 'Rosebery and Campbell-Bannerman: the conflict over leadership reconsidered', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 54 (1981), 241-50.
- 16 I was forcibly reminded of this point at the conference from which this article arises by David Howarth, Alan Beith and Duncan Brack. I am grateful for their comments.
- 17 T. Boyle, 'The formation of Campbell-Bannerman's government in December 1905: a