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Author(s): Lynette G. Mitchell and P. J. Rhodes

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FRIENDS AND ENEMIES IN ATHENIAN POLITICS¹

By LYNETTE G. MITCHELL and P. J. RHODES

I. NEW FOR OLD: FRIENDSHIP NETWORKS IN ATHENIAN POLITICS

By LYNETTE G. MITCHELL

Introduction

The Greeks divided their world into a number of contrasting categories which cut across and dissected each other: Greek and barbarian, slave and free, friend and enemy, insider and outsider, us and them. This essentially bipartite view of the world (although the dualism changed according to circumstance) affected the way Greek society worked, and the way that the Greeks thought about themselves. In this pair of papers, Professor Rhodes and I will be concerned only with one of these oppositions, friends and enemies.

The dictum 'help friends and harm enemies' pervades the whole of Greek literature from Homer to Alexander, and was a basic moral principle for determining behaviour. We will be particularly concerned with only one manifestation of this code: its effect on political activity in democratic Athens and the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. In my paper, I will concentrate on the part friendship had to play in fourth-century political activity at Athens, while Professor Rhodes will look at the place of enmity in politics of the classical period.

In the developing years of democracy in the fifth century, political power rested in the political groups. These were groups of friends (*philoî*) and associates who clustered around political leaders such as Pericles, Alcibiades or Nicias. Although there was generally not a party policy which united all the members of the group under a single party ideology, the political leaders themselves had policies which their supporters helped to have adopted in the assembly and through the law-courts.² A personal connection of friendship tied the supporters to the leaders and guaranteed their support in political situations.

These political groups were modelled upon the *hetaireiai*. In origin, these had been groups of men of the same age and status with common interests who met together at *symposia*.³ They were not necessarily political, but could easily become politicized. By the end of the fifth century, the *hetaireiai* had developed oligarchic overtones (though they were not oligarchic by nature), and were notorious for their involvement in the oligarchic coup of 411/10 (Thuc. 8.48.3–4, 65.2, 92.4: though here the variant *synomosia*), and the rule of the Thirty in 404/3 (Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.46; Lysias 12.43–5).

Yet not all political groups were *hetaireiai*, though they would have formed the nucleus for many groups. Political groups were essentially groups of friends (*philoî*), whether companions (*hetairoi*), family (*oikeioi*), intimates (*epitēdeioi*), associates (*koinōnoi*), or combinations of all of them: they were groups united by bonds of common obligation to each other.

Political dynasties were also important. For example, the Cimonids, Alcmaeonids, and Ceryces dominated the fifth-century political scene, producing political leaders such as Xanthippus, Pericles and Alcibiades, Miltiades or Cimon. These men had all the benefits of birth, wealth, and position to launch them on their political careers, as well as ready-made hereditary friendship networks. Politically ambitious men also married into politically important families, and a Cimonid/Alcmaeonid/Ceryces power bloc was formed by intermarriage between the three families.⁴

Another means for the wealthy to acquire political influence was through patronage and the distribution of largess.⁵ Cimon opened his fields to his demesmen ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 27.3), while Pericles used the public purse to similar effect, offering jury-pay and the building programme in return for political support ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 27.3–4; Plut. *Per.* 9.2–3, 11.4–12.1).

Yet by the end of the fifth century the importance of wealth for securing political influence was on the decline, and ability to speak in the assembly was growing ever more important.⁶ What is more, the end of the fifth century was a period of political instability, and in 411/10 and again in 404/3 there were two brief and disastrous periods of oligarchy, after which oligarchy was never again a serious option in Athens.

To all intents and purposes, the restored democracy of the fourth century was run on much the same principles as it had been in the fifth. However, the fourth-century democracy was different: it was more cynical, and was, at least in theory, more deliberately democratic.⁷ Yet there were changes which affected the patterns of political behaviour. This paper will look at political activity in the fourth century and how it differed from that

of the fifth. It will consider, firstly, the place of friendship and the 'help friends/harm enemies' ethos in fourth-century politics; secondly, explore the nature of political groups; and, finally, discuss the tension between public policy and personal friendship. It will concentrate, for the most part, on the mid-fourth century since this is a period which is well attested in the sources, but is also thrown into high relief by the rather ill-defined threat Philip of Macedon presented to Athens, and the strong political reactions he provoked.

Firstly, personal friendships remained important in public life in the fourth century. You could call upon your friends to support your case in court (e.g., Dem. 34.52), and to speak on your behalf, as the friend (*epitēdeios*) of Phormio does in Demosthenes' *For Phormio* since Phormio himself is inexperienced at speaking (Dem. 36.1; cf. 57). Likewise, your friends could support and advise you in financial matters. Androcles lent money to two Phaselian men on the encouragement of Thrasymedes and Diophantus, who were friends (*epitēdeioi*) of his and particularly intimate with him (Dem. 35.6–7). The implication is that since they were his friends, they themselves were treating him honourably as friends should, and were not involved in the evil deeds of the others.

The 'help friends/harm enemies' ethos also underpinned political thinking, and helped to define social justice. Polyaeus, a soldier wrongly indicted for non-payment of a fine, claims that he is being accused by his enemies (Lysias 9.10). However, this is not surprising, he says, and only a cause of moderate annoyance, since it is ordained that one should harm enemies and help friends (Lysias 9.20). In former times, Aeschines says, it was not so. In the 'good old days' if a person wronged the city, indictments were made not only by political rivals, but also by friend against friend, *philos* against *philos* (Aeschin. 3.194);⁸ 'in these days', one helps friends and harms enemies. The plaintiff in the trial against the younger Alcibiades, in 395, speaks in support of a certain Archestratides (otherwise unknown) who has already delivered the main accusation in another speech. The speaker claims that, in giving his speech, he is seeking to help his friend (*philos*), Archestratides, and harm his enemy (*echthros*), Alcibiades (Lysias 15.12; cf. 14.1–3). The speaker in Lysias' *Defence of Callias* says that it would be shameful not to speak in defence of Callias, since Callias is his friend (*philos*) and was also the friend of his father (Lysias 5.1). When Timotheus, the Athenian general, was indicted by Callistratus and Iphicrates for not fulfilling his orders, he was acquitted because of the intercessions of his friends and family (*epitēdeioi kai oikeioi*),⁹ although his treasurer, Antimachus, was condemned and put to death ([Dem.] 49.9–10;

cf. 13, 40). Demosthenes says, in condemnation of Meidias' accusation against his former friend, Aristarchus, that if friends (*philoï*) seem to do something wrong, one should no longer associate with them, but should leave vengeance and prosecution to their victims and their enemies (Dem. 21.118).

Failure to help friends could also be used in court as a proof of viciousness of character. In his speech against Andocides in 399, the speaker claims that Andocides deceived many people on his ambassadorial missions, although not Dionysius of Syracuse. He realized that Andocides was a man who harmed not only his enemies, but his friends as well (Lysias 6.7; cf. 23). The speaker against Alcibiades claims that he is a man who harms his friends (Lysias 15.10; cf. 14.27: Alcibiades tried to drown his friends). Aeschines says that Demosthenes is a man who writes speeches against his friends (Aeschin. 1.131),¹⁰ and charges him with being one of the accusers of Cephisodotus, although Demosthenes was a hereditary friend (*patrikos philos*) of his (Aeschin. 3.52).

It was also more convincing to use men as witnesses who were not your personal friends, as a jury could believe more readily that they were telling the truth. It was even better if one could present friends of the defence in support of the prosecution. In his third speech against his guardian, Aphobus, Demosthenes presented three witnesses: Aphobus' brother; Phanus, who was the friend (*epitēdeios*) and fellow-tribesman of Aphobus; and Philip, who was neither his friend nor his enemy (Dem. 29.23). Their deposition should be believed, Demosthenes claims, since they were not poor, so they could not have been bribed, or friends of Demosthenes or enemies of the plaintiff: how then could they be accused of bearing false witness (Dem. 29.22–4)? Aeschines, at the trial of Timarchus, presents as witnesses neither friends of his own, nor enemies of Timarchus and Misgolas, nor strangers of both, but their friends (Aeschin. 1.47). The exploitation of friends and friendship was an important part of political manoeuvring.

The next issue we need to deal with is the nature and structure of the political groups. One major change in the fourth century was the composition of the political groups. By and large, the political dynasties disappeared. Many of the wealthy families of the fifth century had lost their money in last years of the Peloponnesian War,¹¹ and, as Davies notes,¹² it was clearly no longer thought necessary for one's political career to make marriages into the great political families. Athenian society in the fourth century was more homogeneous than it had been before, and this was reflected in the backgrounds of some of the most prominent

politicians: men of relatively little means could now rise to political heights which had generally been inaccessible to this class in the previous century.¹³

Aeschines himself provides a good example of this.¹⁴ Born the son of a poor man who married well,¹⁵ he himself married above his station into a family of liturgical class (Dem. 18.312),¹⁶ served in the army (Aeschin. 2.167–9), had a career as an actor (Dem. 18.129, 265, 19.200, 246) and clerk (Dem. 18.127, 19.249, 314), before entering politics.¹⁷ Both Aeschines' brothers also established public careers, one as a general and the other as an ambassador (Dem. 19.237; Aeschin. 2.149). Demades is another who rose from relative poverty to political prominence (Demad. F 55; Suda Δ 414–415),¹⁸ and there is a collection of other mid-fourth century politicians of similarly humble backgrounds.¹⁹ These 'new men' did not belong to the established friendship networks of the wealthy and great families, yet they did in fact still exercise political influence through the medium of the political group.

As in the fifth century, friends and friendship formed the basis of these groups, yet the structure of the fourth-century groups differed from those of the fifth. Sealey has argued that part of the problem arises since different political groups might pursue the same policy, but still try to attack each other.²⁰ For example, Eubulus and Aristophon were generally political opponents (Dem. 18.162), but could still sometimes pursue the same or similar policies (Dem. 18.70, 162).

In addition, a law passed probably in the early fourth century made the formation and membership of *hetaireiai* for the overthrow of democracy an indictable offence (Dem. 46.26; Hyperid. 4.8). This law was clearly a reaction to the part played by the *hetaireiai* in both periods of oligarchy, and probably belong to the review of the laws which took place in 403 (Lysias 30.2–5; Andoc. 1.81–7).

So what happened to the *hetaireiai*? The main problem is one of definition. Political groups based on similarity of age and status (as the *hetaireiai* had been) could legitimately be given other labels: the generic *philoï* (e.g., Dem. 34.52, 56.50), for instance, or *epitēdeioi* (e.g., Dem. 43.7, 45.60), or even *hēlikiotai* (e.g., Aeschin. 2.184, Dem. 53.4). So some *hetaireiai* would simply have been called another name. Yet some political groups were still called *hetaireiai*,²¹ and the terms *hetaireia* and its cognates could be still used in a neutral sense.²² For example, Demosthenes claims, in the third speech against Aphobus, that those who give false testimony do so either because they have been bribed, or because of their *hetaireia*, or because of their enmity for their opponents (Dem. 29.22–3). He says that

the witnesses he has produced cannot be giving false testimony because of their *hetaireia*, since they do not spend any time together nor are they of the same age (Dem. 29.23–4), the prerequisites for being *hetairoi*.²³

However, the point of the new law against *hetaireiai* was to prevent them being used to dissolve the democracy; but whether a *hetaireia* was aiming to put down the democracy or not was a subjective judgement, and a claim that could easily be made against one's political opponents.²⁴ For example, Demosthenes claims that many of Meidias' alleged victims kept quiet about his treatment of them because of his brashness, his *hetairoi*, his wealth, and everything else that pertained to him (Dem. 21.20), and Demosthenes talks about Meidias' 'paid labourers', and his *hetaireia* of witnesses (Dem. 21.139). Ariston says that Conon's fellow-revellers, who supported him when he was prosecuted by Ariston, were his *hetairoi* and *philoï* (Dem. 54.34–5).

Another difficulty is identifying the membership of the political groups. Although some political opponents can easily be identified (for example, the enmity between Demosthenes and Meidias or Eubulus and Aristophon), not all those who have been identified as belonging to one group are seen to consistently support the policies of that group and to oppose the policies of their adversaries. Indeed, some individuals seem to vacillate between political groups and policies. It would be impossible to look at all the politicians in this period, so I will limit the discussion to those two notorious antagonists, Aeschines and Demosthenes, and their associates in the peace negotiations of 346. These alone will provide an indication of some of the problems we are dealing with, and are all the more interesting because, despite their claims to the contrary, both groups were involved in encouraging the Athenians towards peace with Philip (albeit for their own reasons). However, they were apparently not from the same political group, and were later to become political enemies.

Demosthenes, for example, had encouraged war with Philip from 351 until 348. Aeschines claims that Demosthenes was the *hetairos* of Philocrates (Aeschin. 2.19),²⁵ and when Philocrates was tried in 348 for proposing an allegedly unconstitutional decree to open peace negotiations with Philip, Demosthenes spoke in his defence (Aeschin. 2.13–14, 3.62). When moves towards negotiating peace with Philip finally went ahead, Philocrates proposed the decree that ten men should be sent to Philip, and nominated Demosthenes as one of the ambassadors (Aeschin. 2.18–19). This was done with the help of Demosthenes, who was a member of the Council of 500 in 347/6 (Dem. 3.62, 21.111, 114). What is more, Demosthenes co-operated with Philocrates in all the peace negotiations in

Athens, persuading the assembly to agree to peace and alliance (Aeschin. 1.174, 3.80; cf. Dem. 19.15), and to the exclusion of the Thracian king, Cersobleptes (Aeschin. 3.64–5, 72–4).²⁶ Yet it all went wrong, and Demosthenes was among those denouncing the peace when Philip sent to Athens for help against the Phocians (Aeschin. 2.137). Demosthenes and Philocrates fell out for reasons which, Aeschines says, everyone suspected, and Demosthenes immediately set out to ruin Philocrates. Aeschines claims that Demosthenes, although treacherous to friends and a rogue, made himself appear faithful to the people (Aeschin. 3.81). A productive political partnership came to an end. Philocrates was indicted on a charge of bribery and fled, while Demosthenes became virulently anti-Macedonian.

Aeschines, on the other hand, was associated with Eubulus. He was an ambassador with Eubulus in 347 to the Greek cities to try to form a common resistance to Philip (Aeschin. 2.79; Dem. 18.304, 19.10–11). Demosthenes, for his part, says that Aeschines, Eubulus, and Cephisophon supported Philocrates in the peace with Philip (Dem. 18.21), while Eubulus threatened the assembly that, if they did not support the resolution, the theoric fund would have to be used for financing their wars (Dem. 19.291). Surely what we have in 346 is two different political groups, that of Aeschines and Eubulus and that of Demosthenes and Philocrates, coalescing to make peace (whatever their motivations). These two groups then break from each other, and the Demosthenes/Philocrates partnership itself splits up, so that we find in the wake of 346 both Demosthenes and Aeschines trying to dissociate themselves from Philocrates and his policies.

Aeschines, however, continued to associate himself with Eubulus, and when Aeschines was put on trial for bribery in 343, he called on Eubulus, Nausicles, and Phocion to support him (Aeschin. 2.170, 184). The way that Aeschines describes these three men is interesting. He says that he calls Eubulus as a representative of the statesmen and prudent men, and Phocion as a representative of the generals, but Nausicles as one of his friends and contemporaries (*ek philōn kai tōn hēlikiotōn*). We will return to the possible implications of this distinction later on.

Finally, the general Nausicles: he belonged to the liturgic class, although the source of his wealth is obscure.²⁷ As we have just seen, Aeschines describes him as one of his *philoī*, one of his friends, in 343, and he also served on the embassies to Philip in 346, and nominated Aeschines for the mission as well (Aeschin. 2.18). Later Nausicles became a political associate of Demosthenes and pursued a more anti-Philip policy after 342 (Aeschin. 3.159; Plut. *Dem.* 21.3; [Plut.] *Mor.* 844f).²⁸ Was Nausicles a member of

Eubulus' political group? Davies thinks so, although he concedes that Nausicles later moved away from Eubulus' policies.²⁹

More recently, Sealey is sceptical since he objects to a political group which would include Eubulus, Phocion, and Diophantus, the man who proposed the decree giving thanks for Nausicles' expedition against Philip at Thermopylae in 352 (Diod. 16.37.3; Dem. 19.86 with schol. [199 Dilts]).³⁰ Phocion may have been a supporter of Aeschines in 343, and was involved in 348 in Euboea with Meidias and Hegesileos (Plut. *Phoc.* 12–13; Dem. 19.290 with schol. [513 Dilts], 21.164), who were both friends of Eubulus (Dem. 19.290, 21.205–7). However, in 348, Phocion sought to expel the tyrant of Eretria, Plutarchus (Plut. *Phoc.* 13.7), whom Meidias supported (Dem. 19.110, 200). He also had a close connection with the general Chabrias,³¹ becoming a guardian of Chabrias' son on Chabrias' death (Plut. *Phoc.* 7.3–4).³² Consequently, Phocion's connection with Eubulus becomes more insecure.³³ Diophantus, on the other hand, was involved in the theoric fund (schol. Aeschin. 3.24 [65 Dilts]), although this may not have been as an associate of Eubulus, and he is indeed earlier associated with Callistratus, and should probably be viewed independently of Phocion.³⁴

So, although it is reasonably simple to find political associates of Aeschines, it is difficult to put them together in a coherent group. Similar problems hamper any attempt to put together political groups: men who apparently support each other in one context are seen to supporting others in another context, but the two groups cannot be combined because of known enmities.

Yet all one's political supporters did not necessarily belong to one's political group. Of course, there were all sorts of situations where one could call on one's friends for support in *ad hoc* situations, without them necessarily being consistently identified as members of one's political group. For example, Pittalacus, a state slave who was taking Hegesander to court but had then been illegally enslaved by Hegesander, appealed to a citizen called Glaucon to help him (Aeschin. 1.62–6). Glaucon, along with Amphisthenes, took the case to trial, and the matter was submitted to Diopieithes for arbitration. But Diopieithes was a fellow-demesman of Hegesander, and had been intimate with him when they were young men, and so kept putting the case off in order to gratify Hegesander and Timarchus, who had been the source of the trouble. Eventually the matter was settled out of court. For our purposes, the point is that Diopieithes was prepared to help Hegesander because of an old association with him, not because he is to be identified with a political group (and the same, of course, must be said for Glaucon and Pittalacus).

So, what is the nature of political activity in the mid-fourth century, and how did it differ from the fifth? Firstly, as in the fifth century, political activity was based on the political groups, but these groups are more fragmented than they were in the previous century. One can more readily identify twosomes or threesomes who form political partnerships than large groups, such as seem to have been operated by Alcibiades or Nicias in the fifth century. This, I suspect, is to be associated with the demise of the *hetaireiai*. Not only was it now a derogatory name for one's opponents, but, more particularly, I suspect that men no longer tended to group themselves politically in this way. Instead, they formed close personal associations with only a very small number, sometimes perhaps just one or two others. These men could then call on other friends to support them in times of political need, or formed loose associations with the larger groups. But political groups were not the only political supporters one could have: one could also have other friends in addition to the political group, who did not necessarily form part of the political group, but still lent political support. Thus, Aeschines has a personal bond with Nausicles: Nausicles alone is called Aeschines' *philos* and *hēlikiotēs*. Yet Nausicles is not necessarily to be associated with Eubulus or any others in that political group. Nausicles is attached to Aeschines, not Aeschines' political group. Although a lone politician cannot survive without a political group in the fourth century, his attachment to the group is more fragile and easily broken.

This brings us to my final point: that the old ethos of friends and friendship was no longer adequate for fourth-century political demands. Politics and political activity had now become too sophisticated and the tension with policy has become too strong for the 'help friends/harm enemies' ethos to remain viable. That is not to say that this principle did not serve to define justice or was not exploited for political ends: I have shown that it was. The problem is that it no longer works in real terms. Nausicles drifts away from Aeschines and towards Demosthenes. Philocrates and Demosthenes, who had been *hetairoi*, fall out with each other and become political opponents. Friends are accused of betraying friends and supporting enemies; enemies are accused of only pretending to be enemies, where in fact they are friends. In a speech among the Demosthenic corpus, but clearly not written by Demosthenes, the plaintiff says:

That you ought not acquit Theocrines contrary to all the laws concerning criminal informations, either on account of the indictments that have been read out or for any other reason, is reasonably clear from what has been said. I assume that the excuses of these men, their accusations, and their pretended enmities have not escaped your notice. You have seen them not infrequently in the law-courts or on the dais alleging that they are enemies, but in

private they do the same things, have a share in profits, and then revile and abuse each other in abominable language, and then a little later celebrate the same festivals together and share in the same sacrifices. ([Dem.] 58.39–40)

Friends were important as political supporters, and the principle of ‘help friends/harm enemies’ could be exploited for political purposes. But in the fourth century, it seems, it was not always so clear who one’s friends were: the new shoes did not fit the old political feet so well.

NOTES

1. This pair of papers was read to the annual meeting of the Classical Association in St Andrews in April 1995. We thank each other for encouragement and comments on preliminary drafts: and we thank those who heard and discussed our papers at St Andrews.

2. G. M. Calhoun, *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation* (Austin, 1913), 128; W. R. Connor, *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens* (Princeton, 1971), esp. 25–32; P. J. Rhodes (*Historia* 44 [1995], 153–67) *contra* M. H. Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford, 1991), 266–87.

3. Connor (n. 2), 26; see also H. Hutter, *Politics as Friendship* (Waterloo, 1978), 27–8.

4. Cimon married Isodice, daughter of Euryptolemus, an Alcmaeonid; Callias, son of Hipponicus, of the Ceryces, married Elpinice, who was probably Cimon’s half-sister (see J. K. Davies, *Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens* [New York, 1981], 119; hereafter, I will cite as: Davies, *Wealth*; cf. id. *Athenian Propertied Families* [Oxford, 1971], 302–5; hereafter, I will cite as: Davies, *APF*; for Thucydides’ marriage to a sister of Cimon: 232). This was further strengthened by the marriage of Cimon’s sister to Thucydides, son of Melesias, but see also Connor (n. 2), 17 for the implication of the rivalry between Thucydides, son of Melesias, and Pericles.

5. Connor (n. 2), 18–22.

6. Davies, *APF* 318–19.

7. In practice, however, there were certain undemocratic developments, such as the official in charge of administration (*ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει*): see P. J. Rhodes, *CJ* 74 (1979/80), 305–23.

8. We should note here the manipulation of this device. Elsewhere, Aeschines complains that Demosthenes writes speeches against his friends (Aeschin. 1.131, 3.52), the very thing that he now finds meritorious: on this kind of manipulation, see p. 14.

9. Note however that M. H. Hansen (*Eisangelia* [Odense, 1975], 91) argues for Timotheus’ conviction from Lysias fr. 228 Sauppe.

10. This is a reference to Demosthenes’ connections with Aeschines and Philocrates: see Rhodes below, p. 27.

11. See R. Sealey, *JHS* 75 (1955), 79 n. 81 (= *Essays in Greek Politics* [New York, 1967], 181 n. 81).

12. Davies, *Wealth* 119–20: although, as I will argue in this paper, I do not entirely agree with his conclusion that these men relied ‘instead on their professional skill as orators and administrators to carry them towards a position of political pre-eminence’. Although oratorical ability was, of course, important, it does not provide the whole answer.

13. Rhodes, *JHS* 106 (1986), 144; Davies, *Wealth* 116–17.

14. See R. Lane Fox in R. Osborne and S. Hornblower (edd.), *Ritual Finance, Politics: Athenian Democratic Accounts Presented to David Lewis* (Oxford, 1994), 135–55.

15. See Davies, *APF* 543–7; Lane Fox (n. 14), 138.

16. Lane Fox (n. 14), 139 is tempted ‘to see the marriage as Aeschines’ route to success’.

17. Lane Fox (n. 14), 140–1.

18. Davies, *APF* 99–100.

19. Archdemos of Peleces, Epicrates, and Aristogeiton: see Davies, *Wealth* 117.

20. Sealey (n. 11), 80 (= 176).

21. It has been argued that the word *hetairoi* did not have its technical meaning of membership of a

hetaireia and can be interchanged with *philos* (Connor [n. 2], 298 n. 43). This is misunderstanding the generic nature of *philos*, and of the non-political nature the *hetaireia* still could have. Yet if you called someone your *hetairos* in the fourth century, the political overtones of this surely could not be missed.

22. B. S. Strauss, *Athens After the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1986), 20–1, claims that many of the political leaders in this post-war era did not belong to *hetaireiai*, but formed new kinds of *philia*-networks. This is largely an argument *ex silentio*, and, I think, trying to make a *hetaireia* an entity which could not be described in other terms.

23. Cf. Dem. 52.14–15.

24. See Sealey, *Demosthenes and his Time* (Oxford, 1993), 35.

25. Aeschines must surely have been aware of the overtones of this term: whether it was intended as a slur on Demosthenes or not, Demosthenes and Philocrates were certainly political associates between 348 and 346.

26. Although, of course, all the negotiators realized that there could only be peace on Philip's terms.

27. Davies, *APF* 397–8.

28. See Lane Fox (n. 14), 142; Davies, *APF* 396–7; compare E. M. Harris, *Historia* 43 (1994), 378–84, who denies that Nausicles became a member of Demosthenes' group.

29. Davies, *APF* 396.

30. Sealey (n. 24), 117–18.

31. See L. A. Tritle, *Phocion the Good* (London, 1988), 97–8, 101–7.

32. See Sealey (n. 24), 117.

33. Tritle (n. 31), 101–3, 106.

34. Sealey (n. 24), 118; though cf. Dem. 19.198 (and schol. on 197), 20.137.

II. PERSONAL ENMITY AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN ATHENS¹

By P. J. RHODES

Dr Mitchell and I are trying to flesh out the commonplace doctrine that political allegiance in Athens was more a matter of commitment to a person and his circle of friends than of commitment to a party and its programme. She looks particularly at ways in which the fourth century differed from the fifth, with a move towards small, overlapping groups, and critical situations in which old allegiances might fail to hold. I want to stress that enmity was as important as friendship.

The ancient world, unlike our own, was a world in which it was as natural to regard some people as one's enemies as to regard others as one's friends. We were reminded when John Smith died in 1994 that in modern Britain political opponents can be personal friends; but that would have seemed very strange in antiquity. Dover remarked in his *Greek Popular Morality*, 'Few of us expect to be involved for long in a relationship deserving the name of enmity, and a man who spoke of "my enemies" could

fairly be suspected of paranoia. Athenians took enmity much more for granted.² To turn to another ancient society, it is striking that in the parable of the wheat and the tares in St Matthew's Gospel the farmer's immediate reaction to the news that there are weeds in his crop is to say, 'An enemy hath done this' (Matt. 13. 24–30, quoting 28).

The main tradition on Themistocles and Aristides represents them as persistent political opponents and personal enemies. Plutarch claims that they were opposed from boyhood (*Arist.* 2. 2), and repeats from the third-century writer Ariston of Ceos a story that both were in love with the same boy (*Them.* 3. 2, *Arist.* 2. 3–4 = Ariston frs. 19–20 Wehrli). Then Themistocles, 'striving from the beginning to be first, boldly submitted to the hatred (*apechtheia*) of those who were powerful and first in the city, particularly Aristides, son of Lysimachus, who always went the opposite way to him' (*Them.* 3. 1). Stories derived from writers like Ariston are not very likely to be true, and I have argued that in fact Themistocles and Aristides were involved in a three-cornered rivalry with Xanthippus in the 480s and were politically on the same side as opponents of Cimon in the 470s.³ But the view of Themistocles and Aristides as personal enemies, at any rate before 480, is as old as Herodotus, and there may well be truth in that: when Herodotus reports that Aristides came to Themistocles on Salamis to report that the Greeks were surrounded by the Persians, he comments that he did this although Themistocles 'was not a friend of his, but very much an enemy' (Hdt. 8. 79, quoting § 2).

Later in the fifth century, we read in Thucydides that, in the debate at Athens in 425 prompted by the news from Pylos, Cleon attacked not the generals as a body but specifically Nicias, 'being an enemy of his', and that is how Nicias came to resign his command to Cleon (Thuc. 4. 27. 5).

Alcibiades also became an enemy of Nicias. In 420, when Nicias was trying to preserve Athens' peace and alliance with Sparta after the embarrassment of Sparta's dealings with Boeotia, Alcibiades opposed reconciliation, not only because he thought an alliance with Argos would be better for Athens, but also through ambitious rivalry (*phronēmati philonikōn*), because the Spartans had negotiated the peace through Nicias and Laches and not through himself (5. 43. 2). From then until 415 Nicias and Alcibiades were strongly opposed in matters of policy; their rivalry is shown also in Nicias' leading of Athens' great delegation to the festival of Apollo on Delos in 417 and Alcibiades' entering seven teams in the chariot race at Olympia in 416;⁴ the ostracism which I date to 415 was probably envisaged by many as an opportunity to choose between Nicias and Alcibiades and between their policies, though Alcibiades used it to

eliminate Hyperbolus while putting Nicias in his debt.⁵ In the debate on the Sicilian Expedition in the spring of 415 Thucydides clearly depicts Nicias and Alcibiades as men who were not only political opponents but personal enemies: Nicias uses his first speech to make a personal attack on Alcibiades (6. 12. 2–13. 1); and Alcibiades ‘wanted to set himself against Nicias, both because he was a political opponent in general and because Nicias had made an attacking reference to him, *diabolōs emnēsthē*’ (6. 15. 2; cf. 16. 1).

Later Phrynichus was a personal enemy of Alcibiades. The one consistent feature in his activities in 411 is that he was never on the same side as Alcibiades. He was at first opposed to the plan to recall Alcibiades to Athens and change from democracy to oligarchy, because he thought (correctly, according to Thucydides, and I should agree) that Alcibiades was no more attached to oligarchy than to democracy but simply wanted to secure his own return at the invitation of his *hetairoi* (8. 48. 4).⁶ Phrynichus was afraid that Alcibiades if he were recalled would do him some harm, as a man who was an obstacle (*kōlytēs*) to him (8. 50. 1), and so he set about trying to betray Alcibiades to the Spartans, not realizing how far the Spartans had already ceased to trust Alcibiades. Alcibiades made counter-charges against Phrynichus, but these were disbelieved, since they were thought to be prompted by personal enmity (*echthra*) (8. 51. 3). Pisander on his first visit to Athens, when he was arguing for a deal which would include the return of Alcibiades, induced the assembly to depose Phrynichus from his generalship, ‘thinking that he was not well disposed (*epitēdeios*) to those negotiating with Alcibiades’ (8. 54. 3). But the negotiations with Alcibiades and with the Persian satrap Tissaphernes broke down. Pisander and the other oligarchs decided to go ahead without Alcibiades, and now Phrynichus is listed among the oligarchic leaders, ‘because he was afraid of Alcibiades’ (8. 68. 3).

In 2. 65 Thucydides contrasts with his (unrealistic) picture of Athens united under the leadership of Pericles a picture of post-Periclean Athens in which the Sicilian Expedition was ruined ‘through private attacks (*kat’ idias diabolās*) concerning the leadership of the *dēmos*’, and Athens eventually lost the war ‘through private quarrels (*kat’ idias diaphoras*)’ (§§ 11–12). Similarly in the fourth century personal enmity and political disagreement were often intertwined. For instance, Demosthenes’ quarrel with the rich and arrogant Meidias began as a personal feud, but it seems very likely that by the 340s Meidias was one of a group of politicians to whom Demosthenes was opposed.⁷ In 330 Demosthenes claimed that in making a major issue of Ctesiphon’s proposal to honour him Aeschines was

motivated not by the public interest (because, of course, it was not Aeschines but Demosthenes who was devoted to the public interest) but by ‘private hostility (*idias echthras*) and jealousy and pettiness’ (Dem. 18. 277–9); and in this case I suspect that we have the reverse of what happened with Demosthenes and Meidias, that what had begun as political opposition developed into personal hatred. In fact, though neither man emphasizes it, things could have turned out very differently, since there was a family connection between the two men, which might have led to their becoming political associates: Aeschines mentions in passing that Philodemus, who presented the orphan Demosthenes for admission to his deme on coming of age, was the father of Aeschines’ own wife (Aeschin. 2. 150–2).

There are features of Athens’ political and judicial institutions which reinforced this tendency for political opposition and personal enmity to go together. It is a notorious fact that the Athenians did not distinguish as we should wish between political misjudgement and illegal behaviour, and that political and military leaders frequently found themselves prosecuted in the law-courts.⁸ An opponent of a decree of the assembly could attack it and its proposer in a *graphē paranomōn* (literally a ‘prosecution for illegality’), and in the fourth century, when laws were distinguished from decrees, an opponent of a law could attack it and its proposer in a *graphē nomon mē epitēdeion theinai* (literally a ‘prosecution for enacting an inexpedient law’); but in spite of those titles it could in fact be alleged against either a decree or a law that it was either illegally enacted or inexpedient.⁹ There were also charges such as *apatē*, ‘deceiving the *dēmos*’; and through the special prosecution called *eisangelia* (sometimes translated ‘impeachment’) it could be alleged that a man had taken bribes not to speak in the best interests of Athens – bribery being invoked because it was thought that what was in Athens’ best interests was self-evident and that no Athenian would betray Athens’ interests unless he had been bribed to do so. Similarly a commander who lost a battle, or who refused to fight a battle which his critics thought he should have fought and won, could be charged with taking bribes from the enemy; and so Cimon, for instance, was prosecuted on a charge of taking bribes when he failed to attack Macedon after completing the suppression of Thasos in 463/2 (Plut. *Cim.* 14. 3–4, etc.).

These prosecutions were almost always a matter of private initiative. There may have been a few circumstances in which public prosecutors could be appointed,¹⁰ but usually, even for offences against the state rather than against an individual, prosecution was left to *ho boulomenos*, any

citizen in full possession of his rights who wished to prosecute. Moreover, prosecutors and defendants might employ specialists to write speeches for them, and they might bring friends to make supporting speeches on their behalf, but essentially they were expected to plead their cases in person. No legal officers or hired advocates intervened, but the trial was a direct clash between the prosecutor and the defendant. After the verdict had been given, a death sentence would be carried out by agents of the state, and the prison was not privatized;¹¹ but if a man was sentenced to pay a fine and did not pay it, it was left to a volunteer (*ho boulomenos*) to prosecute him as a public debtor in default;¹² and if one litigant was sentenced to make any kind of payment to the other (and this includes the handing over of ships' equipment which belonged to the state by one trierarch to another), this again was not done through the agency of public officials, but it was left to the recipient to obtain what was due to him, by force if necessary.¹³ Going to law in Athens was a highly personal matter.

The view that it was right to help one's friends and to harm one's enemies persisted into the period of the orators, and a prosecutor, even on a public issue, would sometimes state unashamedly that the man whom he was prosecuting was his enemy. Demosthenes 22, *Against Androtion*, was written for a man called Diodorus, who together with Euctemon was prosecuting Androtion in a *graphē paranomōn*, for illegally proposing a degree to honour the council of which he was a member. Diodorus and Euctemon had both in the past been prosecuted by Androtion, and Diodorus at the beginning of this speech says that he is now trying to obtain revenge (Dem. 22. 1–3). Androtion was probably acquitted. The feud continued, and a little later Euctemon and Diodorus again cooperated, and Diodorus again commissioned a speech from Demosthenes, to prosecute one of Androtion's political associates, Timocrates – but again probably without success (Dem. 24, *Against Timocrates*).¹⁴

Certainly in some Athenian law-suits, and probably in all, litigants were supposed to keep to the matter at issue;¹⁵ but the speeches which have been preserved do not to modern western minds satisfy that requirement. Litigants in fact tried to demonstrate that they were more satisfactory citizens, more deserving of the jury's support, than their opponents, and this inevitably led them to make personal attacks on their opponents. So, when Aeschines prosecuted Ctesiphon for making an allegedly illegal proposal to honour Demosthenes, and Demosthenes defended Ctesiphon, Aeschines attacked the family of Demosthenes' mother, and Demosthenes' own career (Aeschin. 3. 171–3),¹⁶ and in reply Demosthenes painted a lurid picture of Aeschines' slave-cum-schoolmaster father and prostitute-cum-

priestess mother, as well as dwelling on Aeschines' lowly career as an actor and an under-secretary (Dem. 18. 129–31, 257–66, 284).¹⁷

Thus even a 'political' prosecution, on a 'public' charge, took the form of a personal conflict between two individuals. And the concept of a 'political' prosecution should not be limited to cases in which the charge is of a 'public' offence:¹⁸ in a society in which personal enmity and political opposition frequently go together, and litigation is frequent, any prosecution of one politically active man by another is likely to have both a personal and a political dimension, and the degree of personal involvement in judicial proceedings will have tended to reinforce personal hostility where it already existed and to produce it where it did not.

Ostracism is another institution in which the line between political opposition and personal enmity was blurred. In an ostracism there was no list of candidates, but each voter put on an *ostrakon* the name of the man whom he most wanted to remove from Athens. Men who attracted large numbers of votes must have been public figures, who will have attracted most of their votes because of their public *persona*, even if this sometimes meant votes cast by a man who did not recognize Aristides when he saw him but was simply tired of hearing him called Aristides the righteous (Plut. *Arist.* 7. 7–8). As Plutarch tells the story, Aristides thought the man might be voting against him for personal reasons, and asked what harm Aristides had done him. There surely will have been some men who voted as they did for personal reasons, who most wanted to remove from Athens the neighbour who had encroached on their land or who had raped their daughter; and it is likely enough that some of those who voted against the major public figures voted against them for personal reasons instead of, or as well as, for public reasons. In making sense of Athenian politics we have to reckon not only with enmity between one active politician and another but also with enmity between an ordinary citizen and a politician.

Epilogue

Friendships and enmities both tended to persist, and were reinforced by the ways in which friends helped one another and enemies harmed one another; but friendships could be broken and enmities could be healed. Themistocles and Aristides were enemies until 480, but for the years after that a number of stories go against the main tradition to show them cooperating, and I believe that they were reconciled, and in the 470s were politically on the same side against Cimon.¹⁹ Another biblical parallel: Herod Antipas and Pontius Pilate were at enmity (*en echthrai*) until their

involvement in the trial of Jesus, but then became friends (*philoî*) (Luke, 23. 12).

In the 340s I believe Athens came closer than at most other times to a party division, between those who wanted to concentrate on resisting Philip of Macedon, even if that required heavy expenditure, and those who wanted to concentrate on restoring Athens' financial health, even if that required trusting Philip and hoping for the best.²⁰ The division produced some changes in allegiance within Athens, which have already been mentioned in Dr Mitchell's paper.²¹ Demosthenes is notorious as the opponent of Philip, but, paradoxically, between 348 and 346 he was in favour of a treaty with Philip – not, I believe, because he wanted peace but because he thought that Philip's conduct after a treaty had been made would show that Demosthenes had after all been right to distrust Philip. In 348 Philocrates proposed that an offer of negotiation from Philip should be followed up; he was prosecuted, and Demosthenes successfully defended him. In 346 Philocrates nominated Demosthenes to serve on the first embassy to Philip, and could be called a companion (*hetairos*) of Demosthenes (Aeschin. 2. 18–19); Philocrates and Demosthenes wanted a treaty on more or less the same terms (Aeschin. 2. 67–8; cf. 56, 64). But, once the treaty had been made, Demosthenes proceeded to distance himself from it, and to attack those associated with it, including not only Aeschines but also Philocrates: not surprisingly, Aeschines complained that Demosthenes was now writing speeches against his friends (Aeschin. 1. 131), that there was a quarrel between Demosthenes and Philocrates, and that Demosthenes was jealous of the bribes Philocrates had received from Philip and had become a betrayer of his friends (Aeschin. 3. 80–1). Demosthenes complains of another broken friendship: a man called Pythocles used to be friendly with him, but since Pythocles had gone over to Philip he was going about with Aeschines and avoiding contact with Demosthenes, because Philip's influence over his supporters was so great that 'each of them, as if Philip were standing beside him, . . . must regard as friends those decided by that man, and as not friends likewise' (Dem. 19. 225–6).

I end with one of the most striking instances of the opposite phenomenon, an enmity, both personal and political, which was turned into a friendship: that of Timotheus and Iphicrates in the first half of the fourth century. Iphicrates (ironically, the son of a man called Timotheus) was certainly from a lower-class background, and it may be true that his father was a cobbler; Timotheus, the son of Conon, was from a rich and at any rate a fairly long-established family.²² The naval battle in which

Iphicrates first distinguished himself (Plut. *Sayings of Kings and Commanders* 187a) may well have been the battle of Cnidus, in 394, at which Conon commanded; and Iphicrates was the first commander of the mercenary force established in the Corinthiad by Conon in 393 (Androt. *FGrH* 324 F 48 = Philoch. 328 F 150²³); but Iphicrates and Conon's son Timotheus became bitter enemies. In the 370s Timotheus cooperated with Callistratus and Chabrias in the development of the Second Athenian League, while Iphicrates was conveniently away from Athens, fighting for the Persians in Egypt. But (as Dr Mitchell has mentioned²⁴) in 373 Timotheus found himself in trouble for lingering in the Aegean to collect men and money when he was needed in Corcyra, and Iphicrates fell out with the Persians and returned to Athens. Timotheus was deposed from his generalship; Iphicrates joined Callistratus in prosecuting him and his treasurer ([Dem.] 49. 9–10, 13); Timotheus was acquitted²⁵ and went to Egypt to take over the position which Iphicrates had abandoned; Iphicrates took over the Athenian command from which Timotheus had been deposed, and in 372 he went to Corcyra – taking with him as colleagues Callistratus and Chabrias, although they were his opponents (*antipaloi*) and Callistratus in particular was ‘not at all well disposed (*epitēdeios*) to him’ (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 2. 39).

Iphicrates fought for Athens in the north from 368/7 to 365/4; and Timotheus, back from Egypt, fought in the eastern Aegean in support of the rebel satrap Ariobarzanes from 367/6 to 365/4. In 365/4 Iphicrates was deposed or at any rate not reelected, and retired to his connections in Thrace, and Timotheus took over his northern command (Dem. 23. 149–52). At some point Timotheus announced his intention of prosecuting Iphicrates on a charge of being an alien who was posing as a citizen.²⁶ But then, probably in 362, the two men were reconciled, and Iphicrates' son married Timotheus' daughter ([Dem.] 49. 66).²⁷ In Athens opponents could easily find themselves serving together, if there was a division of opinion and each man had a significant number of backers: the appointment of both Alcibiades and Nicias to command the great Sicilian Expedition of 415 is an obvious example. As far as we know Iphicrates and Timotheus had managed to avoid that – yet in 355 we do find the two men serving together for the first time: in the Social War they and Iphicrates' son were sent out with reinforcements to the general Chares; when Chares fought in the battle of Embata they pleaded bad weather and refused to fight: after the defeat they were deposed and prosecuted (Diod. Sic. 16. 21. 3–4), and both Iphicrates and Timotheus died soon afterwards.

Here, then, are enemies who became friends, and who appear to have

cooperated after the change as they had not before. The message of these papers is that both friendships and enmities were important in Athenian politics, and that the ways in which they worked need to be explored with some care.

NOTES

1. See also on this subject my 'Enmity in Fourth-Century Athens' in P. A. Cartledge, P. C. Millett, and S. von Reden (edd.), *Kosmos: Order, Individual and Community in Classical Athens* (Cambridge, forthcoming).

2. K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford, 1974), 181.

3. *Cambridge Ancient History* V² (Cambridge, 1992), 63–4.

4. Nicias: Plut. *Nic.* 3. 5–8, dated by F. Courby, *BCH* 45 (1921), 174–241 at 179–85. Alcibiades: Thuc. 6. 16. 2, etc., dated by Dover in *Hist. Comm. Thuc.* IV (1970), 246–7. The connection between the two episodes is well brought out by D. Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition* (Ithaca, 1981), 153–5.

5. See Rhodes in *Ritual, Finance, Politics*, 85–98.

6. The manuscripts are divided between *hetairōn* = 'comrades', defended by Andrewes *ad loc.*, and *heterōn* = 'the others'.

7. D. M. MacDowell, *Demosthenes against Meidias* (Oxford, 1990), 11–13, 409, refuses to come to this conclusion, but it seems to me reasonably certain that in and after 349 Meidias was one of a number of leading Athenians linked with Eubulus and that Demosthenes was opposed to those men on matters of policy. Cf. Rhodes in *Kosmos* (above, n. 1).

8. On 'political trials' in Athens see especially P. Cloché, *Hist.* 9 (1960), 80–5 (trying to prove that political trials were not frequent in Athens, but effectively showing that they were); M. H. Hansen, *Eisangelia* (Odense, 1975), 58–65; J. T. Roberts, *Accountability in Athenian Government* (Madison, 1982), *passim*; R. A. Knox, *G&R* 32 (1985), 132–61.

9. Cf. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford, 1981), 545; Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford, 1991), 205–12.

10. Pericles is said to have been one of a number of public prosecutors in the trial of Cimon in 463/2 (Plut. *Per.* 10. 6).

11. This is stressed by Dem. 23. 69. Cf. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 52. 1; and see, e.g., Plat. *Phaed.* 116b–118a, on the execution of Socrates.

12. Arist. *Pol.* 6. 1321b40–1322a19 remarks on the invidiousness of collecting fines.

13. In Plato, *Laws*, 12. 958a–c, if the unsuccessful litigant does not pay what he owes to the successful by the end of the month after the trial, the successful litigant may apply to the magistrate who presided over the trial for enforcement.

14. Cf. Rhodes in *Kosmos* (above, n. 1).

15. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 67. 1, in connection with 'private' suits (those in which prosecution was not open to *ho boulomenos* but was restricted to the injured party).

16. Aeschin. 2. 22, 93, alleges that Demosthenes is not of citizen ancestry but does not explain the basis of the charge.

17. Dem. 19. 199–200, 249–50, 281, when Aeschines' parents were still alive, is much less wild (schoolmaster and priestess, but not slave and prostitute). For Aeschines' own account of his family see Aeschin. 2. 78, 147–52.

18. Cf. Hansen, *The Sovereignty of the People's Court in Athens . . . and the Public Action against Unconstitutional Proposals* (Odense, 1974), 22; S. C. Todd, *The Shape of Athenian Law* (Oxford, 1993), 154–5.

19. Cf. above, p. 22.

20. Cf. Rhodes, *LCM* 3 (1978), 207–11.

21. Cf. above, pp. 16–19.

22. Cf. Davies, *APF*, 248–9, 506–7.

23. Translated by P. Harding, *Translated Documents of Greece and Rome*, ii. *From the End of the Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsus* (Cambridge, 1985), 22. A.

24. Cf. above, p. 13.

25. [Dem.] 49. 10. Against Hansen, *Eisangelia* (above, n. 8), 91 no. 80 n. 12, I am not confident that the contrary can be inferred from Lys. fr. 228 Sauppe.

26. On this see Davies, *APF* 250.

27. Arguments for earlier dates for [Dem.] 49, or for the marriage which §66 mentions, have been presented by L. Kallet, *GR&BS* 24 (1983), 239–52 (marriage but not speech); E. M. Harris, *AJP* 109 (1988), 44–52 (both). The traditional date for the speech has been defended by J. C. Trevett, *Phoen.* 45 (1991), 21–7; cf. *Apollodorus the Son of Pasion* (Oxford, 1992), 35–6 n. 19. See also Sealey, *Demosthenes and his Time*, 83 with 289 n. 33 (earlier date for marriage), 252–3 (traditional date for speech). An earlier date for the marriage would not affect the point which matters here, that these men who for a long time had been enemies were reconciled at some time and afterwards cooperated.