

# **New Directions in Advanced RFID Systems**

DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO  
THE SCHOOL OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING  
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE

BY

**Damith Chinthana Ranasinghe**

IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE  
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

January 2007

# Abstract

A combination of Radio Frequency Identification technology and ubiquitous computing are revolutionising the manner in which we look at simple objects. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) allows RFID labeled objects to be identified at a distance without physical contact, and ubiquitous computing provides a virtually connected environment for the objects. RFID labels are frequently referred to as the next generation barcodes.

RFID Systems provide increased productivity, efficiency, convenience and many advantages over bar codes for numerous applications, especially global supply chain management.

RFID labeling has a number of advantages over conventional bar code systems. The optics based bar code systems could be rendered useless by common everyday environments containing dirt, dust, smoke, grease, condensation and by misorientation and misalignment. Furthermore bar codes are subject to fraudulent duplication and counterfeiting with minimal effort.

However, there are limitations and constraints inherent to RFID technology: semiconductor thresholds, limits on transmitted power, costs, antenna and coupling inefficiencies. Thus it is important for RFID designers to understand these limitations and constraints in order to optimise system designs and overcome inefficiencies where possible. Therefore the work presented in this dissertation seeks to improve the performance of advanced RFID systems by overcoming a number of these limitations.

Prior to a discussion of improving performance, the author's interpretation of a modern RFID system along its evolutionary path as a ubiquitous RFID network and its application to supply chain management is described. Performance improvements are achieved by: the development of electromagnetic theory for RFID system analysis and optimisation; design and development of interrogator antennas; analysis of electrically small and tiny antennas for RFID labels; and development and utilisation of a design methodology for creating high performance label antennas and antennas for tagging metallic objects.

Implementations of RFID systems have raised concerns regarding information security and possible violations of end-user privacy. The most profound concerns are raised against low cost RFID technology because of its potential for mass scale deployment, its pervasive nature, and the resource limitations preventing the provision of strong cryptographic solutions. There is a growing need in the RFID community to discover and develop techniques and methods to overcome various hurdles posed by the above-mentioned concerns.

Thus, the thesis also considers the vulnerabilities of low cost RFID systems and associated insecurities and privacy concerns resulting from the latter. Prior to addressing such concerns impeding the deployment of low cost RFID technology, a framework within

which to provide security services is also detailed. It has become important to both define and identify a framework based around low cost RFID systems since RFID has become a “catch all” phrase for various other forms of technology.

Addressing security and privacy of low cost RFID systems requires novel thinking. The later parts of the thesis outline design considerations for security mechanisms and a number of practicable solutions for providing the features of: mutual authentication; confidentiality; message content security; product authentication; anonymity and untraceability, that are necessary for low cost RFID systems to overcome the weaknesses identified in this dissertation. Implementing these security mechanisms requires the generation of true random tag parameters and true random numbers. Achieving these objectives using a hardware based true random number generator is also described and analysed.

A final part of the thesis focuses on active RFID labels and improving their performance. The primary concern with active labels is the life of the onboard battery. Turn-on circuits provide a method of turning “on” and “off” an active label remotely to conserve valuable battery power. Analysis, development and testing of a turn-on circuit concept, based on interrogator field sensing, have provided a means of remotely activating and deactivating active RFID labels and conserving battery power. The final chapter of this thesis provides a detailed analysis, based on coupling relations between electromechanical systems, for evaluating the feasibility of a theft detection sensor, based on a turn-on circuit for an active RFID label, for preventing the theft of high value items.

While low cost RFID needs to overcome certain security and privacy related barriers, RFID technology does provide novel and valid approaches to such security related applications as product authentication, anti-counterfeiting and theft detection. It is believed that the contributions from this thesis will extend and elaborate on the existing knowledge base, paving the way forward to allow further significant deployment of advanced RFID technology.

# CONTENTS

<b><i>Chapter 1</i></b>	<b>29</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>29</b>
1.1 Overview.....	30
1.2 Problem Statements .....	31
1.3 Thesis Contributions .....	33
1.4 Thesis Organisation .....	34
1.4.1 Part One: Electromagnetic Coupling.....	35
1.4.2 Part Two: Vulnerabilities and Solutions.....	36
1.4.3 Part Three: Turn-on Circuits.....	36
1.5 Publications.....	37
1.6 Notational Aspects.....	39
<b><i>Chapter 2</i></b>	<b>43</b>
<b>NETWORKED RFID SYSTEMS .....</b>	<b>43</b>
2.1 RFID Systems Overview.....	44
2.2 RFID Labels.....	45
2.2.1 Label to Interrogator Communication.....	47
2.2.2 EPC Concept .....	48
2.2.3 Label Hierarchies.....	49
2.2.3.1 A Classless RFID Label Society .....	50
2.3 Interrogators .....	50
2.4 Back-End Systems .....	51
2.5 Anti-Collision.....	51
2.6 Conclusion .....	54

<b>Chapter 3</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>EPC NETWORK ARCHITECTURE.....</b>	<b>57</b>
3.1 Introduction.....	58
3.1.1 N-tier Service Oriented Architecture.....	58
3.2 EPC Network .....	59
3.3 RFID Components.....	62
3.4 Application Level Event (ALE) Engine .....	62
3.4.1 EPC Data Encapsulation and Reporting.....	63
3.5 Object Name Service .....	64
3.6 EPC Information Service .....	67
3.7 An EPC Network Application .....	68
3.8 Supply Chain Management .....	69
3.9 Solutions to Grey-Market Activity and Counterfeiting .....	70
3.10 Product Recall and Other improvements.....	71
3.11 Conclusion .....	72
<b>Chapter 4</b>	<b>73</b>
<b>ELECTROMAGNETICS AND COUPLING .....</b>	<b>73</b>
4.1 Electromagnetic Fields.....	74
4.2 Fundamental Laws of Electromagnetics.....	74
4.2.1 Faraday's Law.....	74
4.2.2 Ampere's Law as Modified by Maxwell.....	74
4.2.3 Gauss' Law for Electric Flux .....	75
4.2.4 Gauss' Law for Magnetic Flux.....	75
4.2.5 Concept of a Source and a Vortex.....	75
4.3 Boundary Conditions .....	76
4.4 Electromagnetic Waves.....	77
4.5 Retarded Potentials .....	79
4.6 Radiation.....	79
4.7 Electric Dipole.....	80
4.8 Magnetic Dipole.....	80
4.9 Transmitting Antenna Concepts .....	81

4.10	Characteristics of Near and Far Fields .....	81
4.11	Near and Far Field Measures.....	82
4.12	Reciprocity.....	82
4.13	RFID Label Antenna and Reader Antenna Coupling .....	83
4.13.1	Near Field Coupling - Magnetic Field.....	84
4.13.2	Near Field Coupling - Electric Field .....	84
4.13.3	Far Field Coupling .....	84
4.14	Development of Coupling Volume Theory .....	86
4.14.1	Near Field – Magnetic Field .....	86
4.14.1.1	Coupling Volume of a Magnetic Loop .....	87
4.14.1.2	Coupling Volume of a Solenoid.....	87
4.14.2	Near Field – Electric Field.....	87
4.14.2.1	Coupling Volume of a General Shape .....	88
4.14.2.2	Coupling Volume of a Rectangular Capacitor.....	89
4.14.3	Far Field Coupling Volume Theory .....	90
4.15	A Relation Between Electrostatic and ElectrodynamiC Theory .....	91
4.16	Conclusion .....	91

## *Chapter 5* 93

NEAR FIELD INTERROGATOR ANTENNA DESIGN.....	93	
5.1	Electromagnetic Compatibility Constraints.....	94
5.2	Near Field Creation Interrogator Antennas.....	95
5.3	Interrogator Antenna Equivalent Circuits.....	97
5.4	Wedge Above a Ground Plane Antenna.....	98
5.5	A Relation between Electrostatic and ElectrodynamiC Theory.....	102
5.6	Large Loop Antennas.....	104
5.6.1	Practical Construction of a Large Loop Antenna .....	106
5.6.2	Large Loop Antenna Model.....	112
5.7	Experimental results .....	114
5.8	Interrogation at a Large Distance.....	115
5.9	Conclusion .....	116

<b>Chapter 6</b>	<b>119</b>
<b>FAR FIELD RFID LABEL ANTENNA DESIGN .....</b> <b>119</b>	
6.1    RFID Label Antennas .....	120
6.1.1    Magnetic Field Sensitive Antennas .....	120
6.1.2    Electric Field Sensitive Antennas .....	122
6.1.3    Electromagnetic Field Antennas .....	122
6.2    Label Antenna Design Considerations .....	123
6.2.1    Nature of Antennas for RFID .....	124
6.2.2    Label Antenna Equivalent Circuits .....	126
6.2.3    Matching to an RFID Chip Impedance.....	127
6.2.4    Environmental Constraints .....	130
6.2.5    Performance Measure.....	131
6.3    Label Antenna Design.....	133
6.3.1    Design Requirements .....	133
6.3.2    Design Methodology.....	134
6.4    Illustrating a Novel Antenna Design.....	136
6.4.1    Antenna Requirements, Material and RFID IC Impedance .....	136
6.4.2    Antenna Type .....	137
6.4.3    Bow Tie Antenna Design .....	141
6.4.4    Bow Tie Antenna with a Parallel Tuning Inductor.....	142
6.4.5    Bow Tie Antenna with a Series Tuning Inductor .....	146
6.5    Conclusion .....	154
<b>Chapter 7</b>	<b>155</b>
<b>SMALL FAR FIELD RFID LABEL ANTENNAS .....</b> <b>155</b>	
7.1    Introduction.....	156
7.2    Radiation Quality Factor.....	156
7.2.1    Bandwidth .....	159
7.2.2    Matching .....	161
7.3    Antenna Quality Factor.....	161
7.3.1    Bandwidth .....	162
7.3.2    Efficiency .....	162

7.4	Difficulty: Narrow Bandwidth Antennas and Impedance Matching ....	163
7.5	A Novel Electrically Small Antenna for Tagging Metallic Objects .....	164
7.5.1	Antenna Requirements, Materials and RFID IC Impedance.....	165
7.5.2	Antenna Design .....	166
7.5.3	Simulation .....	167
7.5.4	Measured Results.....	168
7.5.5	Performance .....	172
7.6	Conclusion .....	173

***Chapter 8*** 175

<b>TINY ANTENNAS AND FAR FIELD COUPLING VOLUME THEORY .....</b>		<b>175</b>
8.1	Far Field Coupling Volume Theory.....	176
8.1.1	Analysis of a Tiny Loop.....	176
8.2	Application to Antenna Comparison.....	178
8.2.1	Loop Antenna Structure .....	179
8.2.2	Bow Tie Antenna Structure .....	180
8.2.3	Comparison .....	181
8.3	Application to Power Transfer Analysis .....	181
8.3.1	Miniature antenna properties .....	182
8.3.2	Reactive Power Density per Unit Volume.....	183
8.3.3	Label Coupling Volume .....	183
8.3.4	Reactive Power in Short Circuit Label .....	184
8.3.5	Power Delivered to a Tuned Label.....	184
8.3.6	Reactive Power in Tuned Coil .....	184
8.3.7	Reactive Power Needed in the Depletion Layer Capacitance .....	185
8.3.8	Analysis Results.....	185
8.4	Conclusion .....	188

***Chapter 9*** 191

<b>SECURITY AND PRIVACY .....</b>		<b>191</b>
9.1	Introduction.....	192

9.2 Characteristics of a Low Cost RFID System .....	192
9.2.1 A Low Cost Tag .....	192
9.2.1.1 RF Front-end.....	193
9.2.1.2 Memory Circuitry.....	193
9.2.1.3 Finite State Machine (Logic Circuitry).....	194
9.2.2 Tag Cost .....	194
9.2.2.1 Manufacturing Costs .....	195
9.2.3 Tag Power Consumption .....	195
9.2.4 Physical Protection (Tamper Proofing) .....	196
9.2.5 Standards.....	196
9.2.6 System Operational Requirements .....	196
9.2.7 Communication Range.....	197
9.2.8 Frequency of Operation and Regulations .....	197
9.2.9 Security Provided by Class I and Class II labels .....	198
9.2.9.1 Security Features of Class I Generation 2 Labels .....	199
9.2.9.2 Security Features Expected from Class II Labels .....	199
9.2.9.3 Backend System Services: Track and Trace Capability .....	200
9.3 Vulnerabilities of Low Cost RFID Systems .....	200
9.3.1 Eavesdropping and Scanning.....	200
9.3.1.1 Passive Eavesdropping .....	202
9.3.1.2 Scanning (Active eavesdropping).....	203
9.3.2 Cloning.....	203
9.3.3 Man-in-the-Middle.....	204
9.3.4 Denial of Service .....	204
9.3.4.1 Code Injection.....	204
9.3.5 Communication Layer Weaknesses .....	205
9.3.6 Physical Attacks.....	206
9.3.6.1 Non-Invasive Attacks .....	206
9.3.6.2 Invasive Attacks.....	207
9.3.7 Privacy Violations.....	207

9.3.7.1	Profiling.....	207
9.3.7.2	Tracking and Surveillance .....	208
9.4	Addressing Vulnerabilities .....	208
9.5	Addressing Security Issues.....	210
9.5.1	Confidentiality.....	210
9.5.2	Message Content Security .....	211
9.5.3	Authentication .....	211
9.5.3.1	Tag and Interrogator Authentication.....	211
9.5.3.2	Product Authentication .....	211
9.5.4	Access Control.....	212
9.5.5	Availability.....	212
9.5.6	Integrity.....	212
9.6	Addressing Violations of Privacy .....	212
9.6.1	Anonymity.....	214
9.6.2	Untraceability (Location Privacy).....	214
9.7	Cryptography.....	215
9.7.1	Cryptographic primitives.....	215
9.7.2	Classification of Attacks.....	217
9.7.2.1	Attacks on Cryptographic Primitives.....	217
9.7.2.2	Attacks on Protocols.....	218
9.7.3	Level of Security.....	218
9.8	Low Cost RFID and Cryptography.....	220
9.8.1	Challenges .....	220
9.9	A Survey of Solutions.....	223
9.9.1	Cryptographic Hash Functions .....	223
9.9.2	Cellular Automata.....	225
9.9.3	Linear and Non Linear Feedback Shift Registers.....	225
9.9.4	Message Authentication Codes.....	225
9.9.5	NTRU .....	226
9.9.6	Tiny Encryption Algorithm .....	226
9.9.7	Scalable Encryption Algorithm.....	227

9.9.8 Re-encryption.....	227
9.9.9 Lightweight Cryptography .....	228
9.9.9.1 Lightweight Hardware.....	228
9.9.9.2 Lightweight Protocols.....	229
9.9.10 Minimalist Cryptography .....	229
9.9.10.1 Pseudonyms .....	229
9.9.10.2 One Time Pads and Random Numbers .....	230
9.9.11 Exploiting Noise .....	231
9.9.12 Radio Fingerprinting .....	231
9.9.13 Distance Implied Distrust.....	231
9.9.14 Authentication Protocols .....	232
9.10 Conclusion .....	232
<b><i>apter 10</i></b>	<b>235</b>
<b>EVALUATION FRAMEWORK.....</b>	<b>235</b>
10.1 Evaluation Framework.....	236
10.2 Evaluating Security Measures .....	236
10.3 Evaluating Cost and Performance Objectives.....	237
10.3.1 Tag Implementation Cost .....	237
10.3.2 Backend Resources and Overhead Costs.....	238
10.3.3 Power Consumption.....	239
10.3.4 Performance .....	239
10.4 Security Model .....	240
10.4.1 Authorised and Legitimate .....	240
10.4.2 Tamper Proofing .....	240
10.4.3 System Model.....	241
10.4.4 Adversary Model .....	243
10.4.5 Objectives of an Adversary .....	243
10.4.6 Level of Interference.....	243
10.4.7 Presence .....	244
10.4.8 Available Resources.....	244

10.5 Conclusion .....	245
<b><i>Chapter 11</i></b>	<b>247</b>
<b>SECURITY AND PRIVACY BASED ON LIGHTWEIGHT CRYPTOGRAPHY .....</b>	<b>247</b>
11.1 Introduction.....	248
11.1.1 Notation.....	248
11.2 Related Work .....	249
11.2.1 XOR Operation.....	249
11.2.2 CRC Generation .....	249
11.2.3 Stream Ciphers .....	250
11.2.3.1 Linear Feed Back Shift Registers .....	252
11.2.3.2 Implementation Considerations.....	253
11.2.3.3 Nonlinear Filter Generators.....	254
11.2.3.4 Clock Controlled Generator.....	255
11.2.3.5 Power Consumption .....	257
11.2.4 Physically Uncloneable Functions .....	259
11.2.4.1 Circuit Implementation.....	261
11.3 Authentication .....	262
11.3.1.1 Challenge-and-Response Protocols .....	263
11.3.1.2 Constructing a Challenge-and-Response Protocol.....	263
11.3.1.3 Tag Authentication .....	264
11.3.1.4 Tag and Reader Authentication (Mutual Authentication) .....	266
11.3.1.5 Hash Based Tag Authentication.....	267
11.3.1.6 Evaluation.....	268
11.3.1.7 Removing Barriers to Performance .....	269
11.3.1.8 Evaluating the Improved Performance .....	269
11.3.1.9 Addressing Reliability Issues .....	271
11.3.1.10 Practical Issues.....	273
11.3.1.11 Possible Attacks .....	274
11.3.1.12 Conclusion.....	274

11.4 Confidentiality and Authentication.....	275
11.4.1 Secure Forward Link.....	275
11.4.2 Tag and Reader Authentication (Mutual Authentication).....	276
11.4.3 Evaluation .....	277
11.4.4 Practical Issues .....	279
11.4.5 Possible Attacks.....	279
11.4.6 Conclusions .....	279
11.5 Anonymity and Untraceability .....	280
11.5.1 Pseudonyms.....	280
11.5.2 Re-encryption .....	280
11.5.2.1 Evaluation.....	283
11.5.2.2 Practical Issues.....	285
11.5.2.3 Possible Attacks.....	286
11.5.3 Randomly Varying Object Identifiers .....	288
11.5.3.1 Evaluation.....	289
11.5.3.2 Practical Issues.....	290
11.5.3.3 Possible Attacks .....	292
11.6 Anonymity, Untraceability, and Product Authentication.....	292
11.6.1 Product Authentication.....	293
11.6.1.1 Evaluation.....	295
11.6.1.2 Practical Issues.....	297
11.6.1.3 Possible Attacks .....	297
11.7 Acknowledgements.....	297
11.8 Conclusion .....	298
 <i>Chapter 12</i>	 301
<b>HARDWARE BASED RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR .....</b>	<b>301</b>
12.1 Introduction.....	302
12.2 Sources of Randomness .....	303
12.3 Metastability.....	304
12.4 Random Number Generator Design.....	305

12.4.1	Circuit Implementation .....	305
12.4.2	Design Analysis .....	306
12.4.3	Increasing the Dynamic Range of Operation .....	307
12.5	Evaluation of the Generator.....	308
12.5.1	Chaos Theory (Dynamic System Analysis) .....	308
12.5.1.1	Attractors .....	309
12.5.1.2	Phase Space Reconstruction.....	309
12.5.2	Statistical Testing.....	310
12.5.2.1	Hypothesis Testing.....	310
12.5.2.2	Statistical Test Suite .....	311
12.6	Analysis and Interpretation of the Test Results .....	312
12.6.1	Post Processing .....	312
12.6.2	System Analysis.....	313
12.6.3	Statistical Testing.....	316
12.6.3.1	Parameters Used in the Test Suite .....	316
12.6.3.2	Evaluation of Test Results .....	316
12.6.3.3	Proportion of Sequences Passing a Test.....	318
12.6.3.4	Uniform Distribution of <i>P</i> -values .....	319
12.7	Acknowledgements.....	320
12.8	Conclusion .....	321
<b><i>Chapter 13</i></b>		<b>325</b>
<b>TURN-ON CIRCUITS FOR ACTIVE LABELS.....</b>		<b>325</b>
13.1	Introduction.....	326
13.2	Turn on circuits .....	326
13.2.1	Evaluating Turn-On Circuit Concepts .....	327
13.2.2	Turn on Range Estimation for a Zero Power Turn on Circuit .....	333
13.2.3	Turn on Range Estimation for a Low-Power Turn on Circuit.....	335
13.3	Design and Implementation.....	336
13.3.1	Zero Power Turn-On Circuit .....	337
13.3.2	Low Power Turn-On Circuit.....	340

13.4 Acknowledgements.....	340
13.5 Conclusions .....	340
 <i>Chapter 14</i>	 343
<b>AN APPLICATION OF A MEMS BASED TURN-ON CIRCUIT .....</b>	<b>343</b>
14.1 Introduction.....	344
14.2 Theft Detection Circuit .....	344
14.3 Magnetic-Electroacoustic Energy Conversion System.....	345
14.4 Analysis .....	348
14.4.1 Electroacoustic Energy Conversion .....	348
14.4.2 Electrical Power.....	349
14.4.3 Mechanical Power.....	351
14.4.4 Mechanical Resonance.....	352
14.4.5 Zero Power Turn-On Requirements.....	353
14.5 Practical Evaluation.....	353
14.6 Acknowledgements.....	358
14.7 Conclusions .....	358
 <i>Appendix A</i>	 361
<b>LIST OF FORMULAE AND SPICE MODEL.....</b>	<b>361</b>
A.1 Inductance Calculations .....	361
A.2 Axial Field of a Circular Coil.....	362
A.3 Skin Effect .....	362
A.4 Radiation Resistances .....	362
A.5 SBD SPICE Model .....	363