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THE ROLE OF BOHDAN KHMELNYTSKYI AND OF THE KOZAKS
IN THE RUSIN STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE FROM THE
POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH: 1648-1649

by

A n d r e w B. P e r n a l, B. A.

A Thesis Submitted to the Department of History
of the University of Windsor in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master
of Arts

Faculty of Graduate Studies
1967

UMI Number: EC52671

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A B S T R A C T

By the beginning of the seventeenth century the Kozaks were established as an anomalous military class of freemen in the southeastern confines of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. These Kozaks were predominantly of the Rusin ethnic strain; Rusin being contemporary name for Ukrainians. To the Commonwealth these Kozaks were as useful as they were dangerous, and its government tried vigorously to subordinate them. Pressured by the ruling class to that end, the government finally resorted to severe measures. Following the Kozak pogroms in 1637 and in 1638, it reduced the Kozaks to the status of serfs. The decade after 1638 was characterized by mounting crisis and great dissatisfaction, when the Kozaks experienced intolerable conditions of life. At the same time the Rusin people as a whole suffered religious persecution, economic exploitation and varying degrees of social and political oppression.

Emerging as the leader of the Kozaks in 1648, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi provided a spark to this explosive combination

of issues which set off the greatest of all the Kozak rebellions in the Commonwealth. Initially Khmelnytskyi had no irredentist plans. He would have been satisfied with concessions to the Kozaks and to the Orthodox Church, and with the establishment of an autonomous Kozak territory. But the Kozak victories moved the Rusin society into action. Thus, the Kozak rebellion soon became transformed into the national struggle of liberation against the Commonwealth. These developments, combined with fresh military successes and the influence of the Rusin intellectual circles at Kiev, changed Khmelnytskyi's aims and plans. He now visualized himself as the leader of the Rusin people and set before himself two main goals: to liberate all the Rusin people within the Commonwealth; and to erect a Rusin state on the ruins of the medieval Kievan Rus.

Khmelnytskyi next convinced himself that the ruling class would not agree to any reforms. He could not hope to change the existing dual structure of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth into a tripartite state in which the Rusin segment would be guaranteed both equality and autonomy. He was therefore left with only one course of action: to establish an independent state by severing all ties with the Commonwealth.

Since Khmelnytskyi decided that he could not defeat it with his own resources, he resorted to the usual expedient of political manipulations. He played off the neighbouring powers against one another and formed alliances with those which he considered the least dangerous. In August 1649 Khmelnytskyi was abandoned by his Tatar allies, just when a victory was within his grasp. He then had to negotiate with King Jan Kazimierz and to conclude the Treaty of Zboriv. This treaty made great concessions to the Kozaks, but failed to satisfy the expectations of the Rusin people as a whole.

P R E F A C E

In the third and in the fourth decades of the seventeenth century, the majority of the nobles of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth boasted that the international position of their state was extremely favourable. They pointed out, on the one hand, that the neighbouring states were either plagued by disastrous wars, or were weakened as the result of participation in these wars, or in general, were passing through crises in one form or another. The Holy Roman Empire was ruined by the Thirty Years War, which also greatly undermined the military strength of Sweden. Muscovy's scars were still visible from the anarchy of the Time of Troubles; moreover, it received fresh wounds during the 1632-1634 war with the Commonwealth. Similarly, the Ottoman Empire was weakened by the recurrent dynastic upheavals, and its military strength was sapped by the conflicts with Persia and Venice. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, enjoyed the times of "golden peace", stability and prosperity.

That great religious war which engulfed Western Europe and the internal struggles within such countries as England, France and Spain, only reaffirmed the faith of these

nobles in the excellence of the political and the social institutions of the Commonwealth. It took the start of the terrible "Deluge" of wars in 1648 not only to expose to them the superficial strength of the Commonwealth, but also to convince them that its domestic affairs were not in good order. Some of these nobles began to realize that their chivalry, fighting spirit, prowess and even patriotism was corrupted by their wealth and egotism. The unexpected catastrophies and calamities revealed to them the facts that their precious "golden liberties" rested on the deprivation of the rights of other classes of population; and that their flourishing parliamentarianism made the executive impotent and passed the real power to the hands of the magnates. Moreover, they also saw that they were poor examples of that "bastion of Christianity" against the enemies of the Church; that they were brought up in the spirit of religious exclusiveness and intolerance; and that the harmony among the various ethnic groups of the Commonwealth did not exist. Finally, as the Kozak "Hydra" reared its heads again in 1648, it became obvious to most of the gentry that repression and serfdom did not solve the overall Kozak problem in 1638.

In 1648 Bohdan Khmelnytskyi provided a spark to the explosive combination of issues, which first set off a Kozak rebellion and then spread rapidly into a great fire of national liberation of the Rusin people. The aim of this monograph is to give an all-sided description and analysis of events during this struggle within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, in the period 1648-1649.

The broad subject area of this monograph occupies a prominent -- frequently controversial -- position in Polish, Russian and Ukrainian historiography. But in the English-speaking world, this subject matter did not receive the deserving attention of scholars. This monograph therefore also attempts to contribute to this relatively unexplored topic in the English language historiography.

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

Many individuals have aided me in the writing of this monograph. I wish to express my sincere thanks to the director of my research, M. N. Vuckovic, Ph.D., Associate Professor of History; to Rev. D. J. Mulvihill, C.S.B., Ph.D., Professor and Head of the History Department; to V. C. Chrypinski, Ph.D., Professor of Political Science and to A. I. Mouratides, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of History, for their critical readings of this monograph and for their valuable comments. I am especially indebted to Dr. Vuckovic, who supervised all of my work. I have benefited greatly from his kindness, patience and advice; from his careful criticism of the structure of this monograph; from his helpful suggestions with regard to source materials; and from his encouragement in overcoming the many frustrating aspects of research and composition.

I am also grateful to A. V. Mate, M.A., A.M.L.S., Head of Public Services at the University of Windsor Library, for his letters of introduction; as well as for the kindness of the staffs of the Libraries at the Universities of Michigan (Ann Arbor), Toronto, Wayne State (Detroit)

and Windsor, and for their help in my research.

I should also like to thank my uncle, Mr. Jan Pernal, who has given me a great deal of help by supplying me with certain source materials from England and Poland. Acknowledgment is likewise due to the many individuals in Poland, all of whom I have not met, but who provided me with many source materials in the form of books, microfilms and photocopies. I should like to extend my appreciation to the directors and staffs of the University of Wroclaw Library, the National Institute Library of the Ossolinskis (Wroclaw), the National Library (Warsaw), and to the Archives of the Czartoryskis at the National Museum (Krakow); to the staff of the book department of the Foreign Trade Enterprise "Ars Polona" (Warsaw); and to the many bookdealers throughout Poland.

During the past few years, I have been awarded two fellowships: Province of Ontario Graduate Fellowship and also a Fellowship in the Department of History of the University of Windsor. I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to both the Government of Ontario and to the University of Windsor for this much-needed financial aid.

Finally, I am extremely thankful for the infinite

patience and the hard work of my wife; who, with two small children, managed to survive the harsh struggles of the twentieth century, while I led an absorbing life in the seventeenth century.

I take the full responsibility for all views expressed in this monograph, as well as for any errors within it.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

In this monograph the spelling of Muscovite (Russian), Rusin (Ukrainian) and Belorusin (Byelorussian or White Russian) names follows the now common English transliteration of the Cyrillic alphabet, which is more or less adapted to correct pronunciation. I have used the system of transliteration as prescribed by the United States Library of Congress, omitting only such minor details as apostrophes, diacritical marks and ligatures. Thus, for example, I use Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, Aleksei Mikhailovich Lvov and Syluiian Muzhylovskyi; instead of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, Aleksei Mikhaïlovich L'vov and Syluiān Mužhylovs'kyi. In the Polish proper names, since the Poles use a Latin alphabet, I have retained the original Polish spelling (or as it appeared in edited documentary collections), but without the diacritical marks. This rule also applies to other languages which use a Latin alphabet.

Usage has made a completely consistent spelling of proper names impossible. In an attempt to solve this difficult problem, I have adopted the following system:

I. Generally I have endeavoured to retain the

contemporary Ukraine, i.e., Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Additional explanation of these terms follow on pp. 1-2 of the text and in Appendix III.

III. I have based the spelling of most place names located within the 1648 boundaries of the Commonwealth largely on its four main ethnic divisions: Polish, Lithuanian, Rusin and Belorusin (see map following p. 1). Thus, for example, I have used the following: Krakow, Vilnius, Chernivhiv and Smalensk. This rule also applies to names of persons. But, in cases where I have found some difficulty in determining the ethnic origin of persons, I have spelled their names in Polish. In other cases where persons were of an ethnic origin other than Polish, but they were best known by the Polonized versions of their names, I have also spelled their names in Polish. Thus, for example, I have spelled Jeremi Wisniowiecki, rather than Iieremia Vyshnevettskyi (Ukrainian).

IV. There is one principal departure from the method described in section III above. It concerns place names which have acquired forms now firmly established in English. Such names as Warsaw, Moscow, Kiev and Dnieper are less confusing than Warszawa, Moskva, Kyiv and Dnipro. Thus, some

nomenclature of the seventeenth century. For this reason I have used the older terminology in this monograph; for example, Muscovy instead of Russia; and Crown instead of Poland. The expression "Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth" comes nearer to the official term Rzeczpospolita than any other term given to the specific land area. When it is necessary to distinguish the two component parts of the Commonwealth, the terms "Crown" and "Grand Duchy" are used for Polish and Lithuanian territories respectively.

II. The meaning and use of the following terms in this monograph: Rusin and Ukraine, deserve a special clarification and attention. The term Rusin has been deliberately chosen and employed throughout this monograph to denote both the particular ethnic group within the Commonwealth and the particular qualities, and even certain specific territory inhabited by these people. In the second half of the nineteenth century the descendants of these people adopted another name for themselves -- Ukrainians. The term Ukraine, as used in this monograph, does not denote the name of the territory inhabited by all the Rusins, but only a specific area inhabited by some of them. The Ukraine of the middle of the seventeenth century also should not be confused with

well-known place names retain the form now generally accepted in English usage.

V. The spelling of proper names other than within the 1648 boundaries of the Commonwealth varies with location. Thus, I have used the Russian spelling for Muscovy, the German spelling for Prussia, etc. I have generally followed the system adopted by the editors of the Encyclopaedia of Islam regarding the spelling of Tatar and Turkish names.

VI. Because of the length of some titles, to save time and space, I have adopted the following system for footnotes:

(a). After citing the first two or three words of a title, I have added etc for the rest of that title. Each of such shortened titles is entered in full in the bibliography.

(b). I have dispensed with citing the names of compilers, editors, publishers and translators, since they are entered in the bibliography. The names of publishers, however, are not listed in bibliography if books are over a hundred years old.

(c). I have adopted the following order when citing correspondence (as well as generally other documents): names of both the addresser and the addressee; place from

where the letter was sent (but omitting such words as "near", "in the camp near", etc); and the date of the letter. For the sake of uniformity, all dates are adjusted to the Gregorian, or the New Style, calendar, which in the seventeenth century was ten days in advance of the Julian or the Old Style, calendar.

(d). Stipulations in sections (a) and (b) above do not apply to a title which is not listed in the bibliography. Each such title will be listed in full in the initial footnote.

(e). Since the bibliography contains most titles in the Slavic languages, I have also translated each title from Slavic into English. Titles, as well as words and phrases in French and Latin, are not translated into English. I have purposely avoided long quotations in these languages. I also saw no reason to retain the Latin of the so-called "macaronism", i.e., sentences with the mixture of Latin and Polish. In the footnotes, I have translated only the titles which are not listed in the bibliography.

Finally, Appendix II offers a selective index of the names of persons of importance, or of those frequently referred to in this monograph during the years 1648-1649.

In the same index I have listed the names of all the contemporary authors whose works appear in the bibliography of this monograph. The glossary (Appendix III) is for the purpose of further amplifying certain names and terms used in this monograph. The two maps are for the purpose of clarifying the historical geography of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the middle of the seventeenth century.

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CHAPTER I

THE SOCIAL, LEGAL AND RELIGIOUS CONDITIONS OF THE KOZAKS IN THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH TO THE THIRD DECADE OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

I

In 1569 the Act of the Union of Lublin fused the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into one confederate state called the Commonwealth. As a result of this new political arrangement, the remnant of the medieval principalities of the Kievan Rus hitherto under the direct control of Lithuania, was incorporated into the Polish part of the confederation. The territories along both banks of the middle Dnieper River, comprising the southeastern borderlands of the Commonwealth, were called Ukraine.¹ The southernmost extremities of Ukraine's settled life extended to the beginning of the steppes, while still further south stretched vast tracts of "wilderness" which were almost void of population. The suzerainty of the

¹The name Ukraine (Ukraina) literally means "borderland". As used in this monograph, the name Ukraine is applied to the area comprising the Palatinates of Kiev and Bratslav (from 1569) and Chernihiv (from 1635).



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Polish Crown over these areas was only nominal. Zaporozhe -- the land beyond the cataracts of the Dnieper -- and the Wild Plains were in reality a no man's land. The steppes ended at the shores of the Black Sea; here began the Tatar world.

Various ethnic groups and people of heterogenous origin inhabited the newly-acquired territories of the Crown. The main elements among them were the following: Rusins, Belorusins (sic), Poles, Lithuanians, Muscovites and Tatar-Turk admixtures.² The Rusins, who formed the bulk of the population in these areas, also constituted the dominant ethnic strain in other southern palatinates of the Commonwealth. They were the descendants of the various peoples who at one time had occupied the territories of the

²In this monograph the name Rusin(s), used as an adjective and as a noun, is applied to that ethnic group which lived in the south-eastern palatinates of the Commonwealth. The vast majority of these people inhabited the Crown's Province of Little Poland (from the Palatinate of Rus in the west to the Palatinate of Kiev in the east). Variations of this name found in various monographs and works include the following: Russian(s), Little Russian(s), Ruthenian(s) and Ukrainian(s). The name Belorusin(s) is applied to that ethnic group which during the same time inhabited most of Grand Duchy of Lithuania (excluding the northern palatinates). The most common variations of this name are the following: Byelorussian(s) and White Russian(s). As used in this monograph, the noun form Rus refers to the territory inhabited by Rusins; and Belorus to the territory inhabited by Belorusins.

Kievan Rus. They possessed a distinctive language and culture, and most of them were Orthodox Christians. The social and military element, known as the Kozaks,³ was also closely related to and identified with the Rusins.

The origin and development of the Kozaks within the Polish-Lithuanian state was an organic outcome of the peculiar conditions of life along the borders of the steppes in close proximity to the Tatars. The frontier regions were virtually unprotected against the lightning strikes of the Tatar hordes from the northern shores of the Black Sea or those from Crimea. The aim of these Tatar raids was not only to spread destruction by means of fire and sword among the Christian "infidels", but also to gather plunder and to sieze human merchandise for the slave markets of Kaffa. Under these circumstances the settlers of the borderlands were unable to pursue their normal cultural and economic activities. On the whole, their lives and occupations were radically conditioned by the existence of the Tatar menace. Left primarily on their own resources, these people learned

³ Kozak and Cossack are synonymous terms. The former term is used throughout this monograph. The West European form, Cossack, according to Barthold, is the result of Little Russian (i.e., Ukrainian) and Polish pronunciation of the Turkish word Kazak, which means robber, disturber of peace and adventurer. See W. Barthold, "Kazak", Encyclopaedia of Islam, II (1927), 836.

how to live with a sword by imitating their enemies. From the Tatars they adopted their way of life, methods of waging war, distinctive dress and even their name -- Kozaks.⁴

In this way began the evolution of a distinctive group of people within the Commonwealth. Already at the close of the fifteenth century the Kozaks formed certain types of "hordes", which differed little from the hordes of their deadly Tatar enemies. Throughout the sixteenth century this process of evolution continued, and it was characterized by the coalescence of multifarious social and ethnic elements. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, due to the rapid increase in the numbers of the Kozaks, their social and ethnic backgrounds still resembled a mosaic. Notwithstanding this development, the Kozaks as a whole were at this time established as a definite class of unique military freemen, and the Rusin element became the dominant ethnic strain among them.⁵

⁴See Aleksander Jablonowski, Pisma Aleksandra Jablonowskiego [The Works of Aleksander Jablonowski], 7 vols (Warsaw: E. Wende, 1910), II, 12-13.

⁵See Wladyslaw Tomkiewicz, "O skladzie spolecznym i etnicznym Kozaczyzny Ukrainnej na przelomie XVI i XVII wieku" [On the Social and the Ethnic Composition of the Kozaks of Ukraine at the Turn of the XVI and on the Beginning of the XVII Centuries], Przeglad Historyczny [Historical Review], XXXVI (no. 1, 1948), 249-60.

The shifting boundaries and the political instability of the borderlands freed the Kozaks from the responsibilities and restraints borne by the burgesses and the serfs. The majority of these Kozaks had no permanent homes or avocations. Some of them found seasonal work in the towns of Ukraine. Others used the steppe "wilderness" for various occupations: fishing, hunting, trapping, bee-keeping and the like. Still others were engaged in steppe trade, or became, after a Tatar fashion, wild steppe herdsmen. With the approach of winter, these men gathered the fruits of their labour, returned to the inhabited areas of Ukraine and settled in various towns, particularly in those towns close to the steppes.

But the "Kozaks' life" was not limited only to such peaceful pursuits. Adventurous men formed bands and took part in various exploits: attacks on Tatar herdsmen and seizure of their flocks of sheep and herds of cattle or horses. They robbed Armenian and Turkish caravans and carried out military expeditions against the Tatars by land. They also plundered Muslim towns, freed Christians from the slavery of the "infidels", and destroyed Turkish galleys during their sea-raids on the Crimean coasts and on the shores of Asia Minor.

These Kozak military freemen formed an anomalous fourth class within the social structure of the Polish-Lithuanian state. The nobles, burgesses and serfs constituted the only three legally-recognized social classes of the Commonwealth. For the time being, the Commonwealth's government simply tolerated the existence and growth of this Kozak anomaly, and left its status undefined and uncertain. The primary concern of the government was to curb the activities of the Kozaks. Since the governmental policies made for this purpose were often characterized by curious indecisiveness, lack of initiative and imagination, the control of the Kozaks proved to be a matter of extreme difficulty. Furthermore, by neglecting the affairs and the needs of the far-removed frontier regions, the government not only made possible for the anomalous Kozak military class to exist and to develop, but also by its inertia helped to create grave problems for the Commonwealth.

By handling the affairs and needs of the far-removed borderlands with certain disinterest, the government failed to provide for them sound systems of defense and administration. The destruction of the Tatar nest in Crimea was never seriously considered in Warsaw; while the

other alternative, the building of a chain of fortresses and the stationing of a strong regular army along the frontier, was thought to be too costly. The government was content more or less to abandon the claims to the lower Dnieper region and to leave it to the contest of arms between the Kozaks and the Tatars. It was also satisfied with the existing arrangement, whereby the defense and the administration of the border areas was left almost totally in the hands of royal officials known as sheriffs. Since the government supplied insufficient funds and troops to them, these officials were charged with a herculean task. In order to forestall or to retaliate^{against} the frequent Tatar incursions, the sheriffs had no choice but to thrust the burdens of defense upon the local population and to call the Kozaks to the colours. Certain warlike sheriffs also enlisted the Kozaks into their own contingents and for the sake of their own ends, carried out military "expeditions" into the Muslim world.

Since these officials were in a position to obey orders from Warsaw phlegmatically, or to ignore them completely, their administration was characterized by frequent disorder. Under these circumstances, the frontier areas were open to the Tatar raids and were kept continually

aflame by guerilla warfare; their administration was chaotic; and the authority of the government in them, was also non-existent. By leaving the borderlands without sound systems of defense and administration, the government not only provided for the Kozaks a firm basis for the existence, but also created for them ideal conditions for their development and growth. The colonization policy of the government was still another factor which contributed to this evolutionary process of the Kozaks. Furthermore, it was also largely responsible for making the Kozaks become a problem for the Commonwealth.

Prior to 1569, as long as Ukraine belonged to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, no outsiders had the right to acquire landed estates there. This obstacle was abolished when the south-eastern territories were incorporated with the Crown. Thus, soon after the Union of Lublin took place, Ukraine, "the promised land" which "flowed with [rivers of] milk and honey",⁶ became the spoil of great Polish and Rusin lords. With little guidance and restriction

⁶As described by the sixteenth-century French traveller, Blaise de Vigenere, in La description du Royaume de Pologne (Paris, 1573). Cited by Leszek Podhorodecki, Sicz Zaporoska [Zaporozhian Sich] (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1960), p. 5.

from the government, these magnates soon carved out the south-eastern palatinates into immense latifundiae. In securing land monopoly, the new owners also gained control of the highest administrative offices. Furthermore, they introduced serfdom in a land without a landlord, and their swarms of rapacious officials began a system of economic exploitation. Since the Kozaks presented a problem not only to the expansionist policies of these "kinglets", but also to the system of manorialism in general, these potentates attempted to reduce the Kozaks into serfs. In this way, apart from the Tatars, the Kozaks encountered a new brand of enemies in the borderlands, who threatened to destroy their status of military freemen. The Kozaks had little choice but to oppose the new order.

Even though the officials accused the Kozaks of "unsubmissiveness and rebellion", or called them "disobedient", this did not mean lawlessness in all cases. Some of the Kozaks preferred the shelter of the borderland fortresses. They attempted to gain the rights of the landed gentry and to free themselves from the jurisdiction of sheriffs and their deputies. Living side by side with Polish or Rusin petty gentry, these Kozaks fared as well as

these neighbours of theirs who possessed coat-of-arms. These petty squires frequently tilled the soil with their own hands and suffered, just like the Kozaks, under the heavy hands of the officials. If an oligarch showed desire for their land, he was in a position to acquire it either by "law" or by "lawlessness". Because of all of these circumstances, the Kozaks cared little for the honours of ennoblement.

On the other hand, the Kozak malcontents who preferred to face the extremes of climate and Tatar danger, rather than to bear the ever-increasing impositions thrust upon them by the authorities, fled to Zaporozhe. There they established themselves as a military-monastic community. Operating from their fortified island camp -- Sich -- beyond the rapids of the Dnieper, they feared neither the threats of the Crimean Khan and the Turkish sultan, nor obeyed the fiats of the Polish king. The Sich, formed as a reaction to the borderland officials and the Tatar danger, became the centre for all dissatisfied elements. This illegal "commonwealth" produced warriors who not only dared to take up arms against their suzerain, but who also carried out fantastic land and sea exploits in the

Muslim world.⁷

Both the governments of the Commonwealth and of the Ottoman Empire sought to reduce the power and the attraction of the Sich. The former could not ignore the activities of an illegal "state", which hatched rebels, received foreign envoys, formed alliances and carried out fire and sword into the neighbouring countries. To the latter, the Sich was a nest of pirates, who plundered and destroyed its Anatolian and Crimean possessions. But neither of the two powers was able to destroy the Sich completely. The Zaporozhian "knights" had no problem in finding recruits to fill their ranks. To them came adventurous men, outcasts of society and those who thirsted glory and feats of arms. There were also mass flights of fugitive serfs who searched for the Kozak fairyland.

Following each campaign of the Zaporozhians, the High Porte issued threats of war to the Commonwealth.

⁷See [Mustafa] Naima, "Zatargi z Ottomanami z powodu Kozakow i Dziennik Wyprawy Chocimskiej z Rocznikow Naima Efendi" [Conflicts with the Ottomans on Account of the Kozaks and the Journal of the Khotyn Campaign from the Annals of Naima Effendi], in J. J. S. Sekowski, ed. and tr., Collectanea z Dziejopisow Tureckich Rzeczy do Historji Polskiej Sluzacych [Collectanea of Events from Turkish Historiographers Pertaining to Polish History], 2 vols (Warsaw, 1824), I, 126-27, 177-82.

Ultimatums sent from Constantinople to Warsaw left two choices: the Kozaks as a military organization, must be destroyed, or the Kozak piratical habits must be effectively curbed. The predicament of the Commonwealth became a "very hard knar, a knot strangely twisted", for which it required "not the sword of Alexander the Great . . . but the wisdom of Solomon".⁸ The main reason for this difficulty was in the fact that the Commonwealth had no desire to become involved in an armed confrontation with the Muslim world; yet, it was in no position to carry out the demands sent from Constantinople. On the one hand, to destroy the Kozaks -- even if that was possible -- for the sake of pleasing the infidels, also meant to destroy the only real defense against the Tatars. On the other, all efforts to subordinate the Kozaks failed to produce results.

The steps taken thereafter by the government of the Commonwealth amounted only to a series of inconsistent policies, which had the effect of actually intensifying

⁸ Evaluation of the Kozak problem by Krzysztof Palczowski in his pamphlet O Kozakach, jezeli ich zniesc, czyli nie -- Discurs [On the Kozaks: Should they or should they not be done away with? A Discourse] (Krakow, 1618). Cited by Jablonowski, op. cit., II, 200.

the difficulties of the state. On the one hand, the Tatar raids of the borderlands were considered by the government as an unavoidable evil for which there existed no solution. The government's envoys were instructed to make formal protests before the sultan, even though it was common knowledge that these fell on deaf ears. The Khan of Crimea was bought off by the payment of "presents", a thinly-disguised humiliating tribute. Solemn pledges of friendship were renewed with the sultan and his vassal, and assurances were given to them that all Kozak offenders would be suitably punished. Such policies proved to be futile. Since the Zaporozhians were out of the reach of the government, their piratical sea-raids continued. The "presents" also failed to stop the incessant Tatar depredations.

On the other hand, equally futile were the steps taken by the government to bring the Kozaks under discipline. Given a definite status and organization, the Kozaks could have brought incalculable advantages to the Commonwealth. As excellent soldiers and sailors, the Kozaks could have extended the boundaries of the Polish-Lithuanian state to the shores of the Black Sea and protected them against the Tatars and the Turks:

The Counsels of Poland were in a great error, when they resolved to change the life, and alter the humour of the warlike people, which being protected by their Priviledges, and encouraged in their Wars, would at all times, as occasion served, have been ready to have ejected great numbers of good souldiers into the Ottoman Territories, and might have conserved to balance the Power of the Tatars, which now daily infest and ruine the Borders of Poland. These people were like ill humors, which being vomited out into the Dominions of the Turk, eased and made healthy the Body politick of Poland; but being conserved within the stomach, caused Syncopes, Convulsions, and such Commotions, as have of late years shaken the whole Body of the Polish Kingdom.⁹

The government of the Commonwealth, however, failed to recognize such a positive significance of the Kozaks to the state. Under the pressure of the magnates the government pursued a blind course of action, by seeking to repress and to reduce the Kozaks to the status of serfs. Since it was still unable to cope with Kozak power, it resorted to various short-term measures. These measures, often contradictory, were in most cases never executed. They also served as a source which nurtured the warlike characteristics of the Kozaks. The overall result of these actions of the government was that it only succeeded in alienating the Kozaks and caused them to rebel.

⁹P. Rycant, The History etc (London, 1680), [1], p. 68. (Italics in the original).

II

One of the ways by which the government attempted to bring the Kozaks under its control was the establishment of the registered Kozaks. Although this was a step in the right direction, it was too inadequate to solve the overall Kozak problem or even to subordinate all Kozaks under the authority of the government.

The Kozak register accentuated the divisions of the Kozaks into camps of opposing interests, and caused antagonisms and conflicts between them. However, the advent of the register brought about the clearer emergence of three general groups: the loyal registered Kozaks; the Zaporozhian outlaws; and the mass of common Kozaks, who gravitated between the two extremes. Even though this rift among the Kozaks was advantageous to the government, its frequent contradictory policies minimized the successful use of the stratagem of divide et impera.

The registered Kozaks were in a far more advantageous position than the Zaporozhians or the common Kozaks. From a small percentage of Kozaks the register created officially-recognized Kozak regulars -- His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Army. This Kozak Army was divided into

regiments and attached to designated towns of Ukraine. The main tasks of the registered Kozaks were to keep order in Ukraine, to prevent the sea-raids of their Zaporozhian brethren and to protect the frontier against the Tatar inroads.

Because the registered Kozaks performed military service for the state, the government granted them certain privileges. These were the basis for the evolution, especially among the officer-class, of a Kozak "aristocracy", or a comparatively wealthy military elite. Their views on property were the same as those of the privileged classes of the Commonwealth. Since the vacancies in the Kozak register were rigidly controlled and restricted to persons whose loyalty was beyond question, the registered Kozaks were thereby inclined to favour the established order and to live on good terms with the authorities.

The basis for the legal status of the registered Kozaks within the Commonwealth rested on their "rights and privileges" which were recognized by the government. No such basis existed for the clear definition of the legal status of the vast majority of the non-registered, or common Kozaks. Yet, these common Kozaks not only regarded themselves as freemen, but in many cases also claimed the

privileged status of the registered Kozaks as their own. The main reason for this development was the failure of the government to define clearly their status.

The common Kozaks who lived in the border areas of Ukraine, were bound by the impositions of serfdom if they settled on private estates of the nobles. But no such burdens existed for them if they chose to live on crown lands. Thus, as the government sought to subject all the common Kozaks to all the laws, regulations and customs that were imposed on the serfs at the same time, it also acknowledged that these Kozaks were freemen. These contradictory governmental policies caused the common Kozaks to vacillate between law and lawlessness.

Even the legal status of those Kozaks who were enticed into the Sich was not clearly defined. On the one hand, the government regarded those Kozaks who lived outside the pale of the law more or less as fugitive serfs, who must be suppressed and whose servile status must be re-established. On the other hand, the government frequently looked upon these Kozaks as a collection of dregs from various countries, and who were not even the subjects of

the King of Poland.¹⁰

The registered Kozaks were unable to carry out their duties, not only because they lacked sufficient strength, but also because the government failed to give them its full support. Only a small force of the registered Kozaks was kept by the government; therefore, in addition, it was forced to enlist common Kozaks whenever a war broke out. On occasions, even some of the Zaporozhians were "rehabilitated" and induced to serve alongside the registered Kozaks. In this way thousands of Kozaks and Zaporozhians could find their way into the elite of the Kozak Army. Once a campaign ended, however, the same thousands were expected to return to "peaceful" occupations.

Such governmental practices resulted in the loss of prestige associated with the register and in the undermining of the authority of the registered Kozaks. The common Kozaks were provided with an opportunity to clamour for the "rights and privileges" enjoyed by the registered Kozaks. By enlisting the Zaporozhians the government also gave a kind of silent approval of the illegal activities

¹⁰See M. Hrushevskyi, Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy, 10 vols (New York, 1956), VII, 325; and Tomkiewicz, op. cit., pp. 255-57.

and independent actions carried out by those remaining at Zaporozhe. In this way, the frequent governmental reversals of policy degraded the registered Kozaks, provided the basis for the claims of the common Kozaks and enhanced the power of the lawless elements represented by the Sich.

Various other contradictory policies of the government, as well as the malversations of its officials, undermined the loyalty of the registered Kozaks, erased sharp distinctions among all Kozaks and made possible greater co-operation among them. The chronic lack of funds in the exchequer meant that the registered Kozaks were frequently not paid for their services. For this reason many of them fell under the spell of the Sich, and together with the Zaporozhians, endeavoured to find plunder in the Ottoman Empire. In the same way, the too frequent reductions of the quota of the registered Kozaks and the rapacity of the officials, drove others to support the causes of their malcontent brethren during rebellions. In 1638, when the government abolished most of the rights and privileges of the Kozak Army, it succeeded in completely alienating the registered Kozaks, and thereby set the stage for the hostilities of a decade later.

Both the government and the vast majority of the

nobles underestimated the role and the value of the Kozaks as a whole to the Commonwealth. The Kozaks were tolerated by the ruling class because it was neither able to find a suitable place for them within the organism of the state, to bring them under discipline, to crush their power completely, nor to reduce them to the status of serfs.

Because of these circumstances, the Kozaks were able to continue their existence and growth as an anomalous fourth stratum within the three legally-recognized social strata of the Commonwealth.

The Kozaks constituted a definite class of freemen. Since the Kozaks had no political rights and could hold no public office, they did not enjoy the rights and privileges of the nobles. However, by the fact that they possessed personal rights, could own land and were free from many of the restrictions and obligations borne by the burgesses and the serfs of the Commonwealth, the Kozaks thereby somewhat resembled the privileged status of the nobles. The Kozaks also considered themselves to be "men of knightly rank", even though this distinction legally belonged only to the nobles. The Kozak claims to knighthood were never officially confirmed by the government. Nevertheless, on occasions when the Kozak services were needed for war, writs

issued by the royal chancery to the Kozaks frequently stressed their knightly characteristics. Furthermore, the same writs addressed the Kozaks by titles only proper to the nobility.¹¹ The Kozaks therefore resembled in many ways the status of nobles, the highest estate of the Commonwealth.

One of the most obvious solutions for the overall Kozak problem was the extension of all the rights of the nobles to the Kozaks. The nobles, however, were decidedly opposed to any plan by which they would have to share their "golden liberties" with the Kozaks. This very issue was raised at the Convocation Diet of 1632. The delegates of the Kozak Army argued, that as men of knightly rank the Kozaks formed part of the Commonwealth's body politic, and as such they should have the right to participate in the election of a new king. Since this was a demand for political rights, the representatives of the Commonwealth's ruling class found no reason to initiate any dangerous precedents. The Senate issued a statement to the effect that the Kozaks were simply commoners and had no right to make

¹¹See K. Szajnocha, Dwa lata dziejow naszych 1646. 1648., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1900), I, 1, 62-64; and Tomkiewicz, op. cit., p. 253.

such demands. The Chamber of Deputies acknowledged that the Kozaks were part of the Commonwealth's body -- but only as hair and nails which had to be cut off if they grew too long.¹² Thus ended this far-reaching Kozak proposal which aimed to transform the Kozaks into a stratum equal to that of the nobility.

By rejecting the plan which would extend political rights to the Kozaks, the government failed once again to take advantage of a possible solution to the pressing Kozak problem and also created more difficulties for itself. One serious consequence of the governmental failure to settle the Kozak affairs was the entanglement of the already thorny Kozak problem with the grievances and the aspirations of the Rusin people. As a result of this development, the government was unable to deal with the Kozak problem solely on the basis of satisfying the interests of the Kozaks alone.

The Kozaks were not an isolated class of people, but an integral part of the Rusin society. The Kozaks

¹²See Zbigniew Wojcik, Dzikie Pola w ogniu. O Kozaczyźnie w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej [Wild Plains in Flames. On the Kozaks of the Old Commonwealth], 2nd ed (Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1961), pp. 114-15; and Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VIII, 1, 150-51.

thereby not only expressed the desires of the "dissatisfied" Rusin elements within their ranks. They also shared the aspirations of all the Rusin people. Among all these aspirations, those affecting the Rusin Orthodox faith were extremely significant. Orthodoxy provided a common cause for all the Rusin people and thereby was able to foster Rusin nationalism. In this way the Kozaks were drawn into the crucial religious struggle between the Orthodox and the Uniates within the Commonwealth.

III

The religious conflict between the Orthodox and the Uniate Churches began following the Union of Brest. In 1596 a church council was summoned to Brest-Litovsk to proclaim the union of the Commonwealth's Orthodox Church with Rome. The church union was supported by a majority of the Orthodox hierarchy, including the Metropolitan of Kiev. Two bishops, together with a large number of delegates from the monasteries and the parish clergy, as well as with representatives of the laity, desired to remain members of the Orthodox Church. The two sides among the Orthodox failed to reach an agreement on the question of union, and concluded their deliberations by excommunicating and

anathematizing each other.

Only the decisions of the Roman party at the Council of Brest were recognized by the government. Therefore, it sanctioned the existence of the new Uniate Church, making it the sole representative of all the Orthodox Rusin and Belorusin people, and treated the Orthodox Church as legally non-existent. The result of this governmental policy was the persecution of the Orthodox: churches, monasteries and church lands were siezed and given to the Uniates; church services were suppressed; and many of those who remained Orthodox lost their civil and political rights.¹³

Twenty-five years after the Union of Brest the Uniate Church possessed twice the number of churches the Orthodox Church had; yet, according to a report of a papal nuncio, the Uniate Church remained "almost without fold".¹⁴ Thus, an absurd situation evolved and prevailed: the

¹³See the speech of the Orthodox deputy from Volynia, Lavrentyi Drevynskyi, at the Diet of 1620, in Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VII, 445-47.

¹⁴Instruction to Msgr. Lancellotti (1622). Cited by Jozef Tretiak, Historja wojny chocimskiej (1621) [History of the Khotyn War (1621)], new rev. ed. (Krakow: Krakowska Spolka Wydawnicza, 1921), p. 85.

Uniates had a hierarchy, many empty churches and a small flock of faithful; while the Orthodox "Schismatics" had one bishop, very few churches and a countless number of the faithful.

It was through the actions of these faithful that the Orthodox Church managed to respond to the challenges of its Uniate rival. Although the Eastern Church was abandoned by most of the Rusin aristocracy, it found other able leaders in its monasteries and in the ranks of its vigorous laity, chiefly composed of lesser Rusin nobles and of Rusin burgesses. They prevented the Orthodox Church from falling into a deeper state of degeneration and its ecclesiastical affairs from becoming more disorganized. They took up the challenge of its regeneration. The Rusin serfs only played a passive role by being tenaciously attached to their traditional faith. The incalculable contributions of still one more segment of the Rusin society, the Kozaks, made possible for the Orthodox Church to redouble its missionary activities and to organize its own defense in depth against all "Latinist encroachments".

The Kozaks were not always the staunch supporters of Orthodoxy or the irreconcilable enemies of Uniatism. Even as late as the close of the sixteenth century their

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religiousness could only be measured by the antithesis with the world of Islam.¹⁵ Many Kozaks paid little attention to the solemn pronouncements at the Council of Brest. They were unconcerned about the religious polemics between the Orthodox and the Uniates and even about the plight of the Orthodox Church. For this reason they were considered to be men "without religion" and religious "rebels" even by the most enlightened representatives of the Eastern Church.¹⁶ Nevertheless, by the second decade of the seventeenth century the Kozaks as a whole assumed an active role in the affairs of the Orthodox Church. One factor responsible for this change of direction was the revival of the influence of Kiev, which attracted Kozak support. Another major reason why the Kozaks began to support the Orthodox Church was because in their ranks were found many Rusins who experienced persecution for their faith.

¹⁵ See Jablonowski, op. cit., II, 23.

¹⁶ These were the opinions of the Orthodox magnate, Adam Kysil, and the Orthodox Metropolitan Bishop of Kiev, Petro Mohyla. According to the views of the Ukrainian historian P.A. Kulish, the role of the Kozaks in religious matters was negligible. He remarked that their part in religious affairs differed little from that of the bandits of all times and of all nations. See Jablonowski, op. cit., II, 37, 101.

From 1610, when the Kozaks made the first major public manifestation of their support for the Orthodox Church, they continued to play a vital role in the church affairs. The Kozaks helped to restore the Orthodox hierarchy and thereby secured the continuity of the life of the church. They acted as arbitrators between the quarrelling Orthodox factions; they cooperated with the Orthodox clergy, nobles and burgesses and championed before the government for the rights of the Eastern Church; and they were prepared to draw their swords in defense of their faith. Because of their protection Kiev became the center from which radiated Rusin cultural, religious and national life.¹⁷ The Kozaks were therefore no longer mere adventurers, but doughty exponents and preservers of the traditions of the Kievan Rus:

[The Kozaks] are the sons of the glorious Rusin people, from the seed of Japheth, who waged war against the Greek Tsardom [i.e., Byzantium] both on the Black Sea and on the land. This host is [a descendant] of that generation which during [the reign of] Oleh, the Rusin monarch, . . . attacked Constantinopole. They [are the descendants of those, who] during [the reign of] Volodymyr, the sainted Rusin monarch, waged

¹⁷See W. Lipinski, Stanislaw Michal Krzyczewski etc (Krakow, 1912), pp. 46-54.

war against Greece, Macedonia and Illyria. Their ancestors, together with Volodymyr, were baptized, accepting the Christian faith from the Church of Constantinople, and even to this day are born, live and die in this faith.¹⁸

Because the Kozaks were so involved in the affairs of the Orthodox Church, they were partly responsible for its gains in 1632 from the newly-elected King Wladyslaw IV. One of the most significant concessions to the Orthodox was the legalization of their hierarchy and the designation for it a number of episcopal sees. In the years that followed the Orthodox Metropolitan of Kiev, Petro Mohyla, a prelate of high birth, superior character and great learning, inaugurated a period of rapid growth for the Orthodox Church. Even under these circumstances its free development was hampered by various restrictions.

Some of the Orthodox faithful considered that they suffered greater oppression than the Orthodox Christians under Islam, because their churches have been taken over by the Uniates; they did not have the freedom of worship; and because they were denied sacraments and even public burials. Other intolerable conditions included the leasing of the Orthodox churches to the Jews, who collected fees

¹⁸Memorandum of the Orthodox hierarchy to the Commonwealth's government in 1620. Cited by Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VII, 391.

for b^pat^aisms, marriages, and even for opening of the churches on Sundays and holy days.¹⁹ Under these circumstances, all efforts to create a meaningful union of churches within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth failed to produce results.²⁰ "The union", wrote the Lithuanian Chancellor to the Uniate Archbishop of Polatsk, "has not produced joy, but only discord, quarrels and disturbances. It would

¹⁹Travelling through Ukraine in the 1650's the Arch-deacon Paul of Aleppo, no doubt reflected the typical Orthodox attitude, when he wrote in his diary: [The accursed Poles] have shewn themselves more debased and wicked than the corrupt worshippers of idols, by their cruel conduct to Christians, thinking to abolish the very name of Orthodox. God perpetuate the Empire of the Turks for ever and ever! for they take their impost, and enter into no account of religion, be their subject Christians or Nazarines, Jews or Samaritans: whereas these accursed Poles were not content with taxes and tithes from the brethren of Christ, though willing to serve them; but, . . . they subjected them to the authority of the enemies of Christ, the tyrannical Jews, who did not even permit them to build churches, nor leave them any Priests that knew the mysteries of their faith; but, on the contrary, violated their wives and daughters, if they at all appeared abroad in the public exercise of their religion". Paul of Aleppo, The Travels etc., 2 vols (London, 1831), 1, 2, 165.

²⁰King Wladyslaw IV endeavoured to create, in place of the Union of Brest, a lasting union of churches. One of his far-reaching plans was to affect a religious compromise between the Orthodox and the Uniates and to create for them a separate patriarchate within the Commonwealth. On the background and issues see Mikolaj Andrusiak, "Sprawa patrijarchatu kijowskiego za Wladyslawa IV" [The Question of the Kievan Patriarchate During the Reign of Wladyslaw IV], in Prace historyczne etc (Lviv, 1934), 269-85.

have been better if it never existed".²¹

The results of the overall religious struggle between the Orthodox and the Uniates and the persecution of the Orthodox faithful were extremely significant. Those who attacked the Orthodox Church were actually contributing to the solidification of all segments of the Rusin society. The cultural, social and ethnic cleavages, which existed between Polish or Polonized ruling class and the majority of the Rusin people, were further deepened by religious differences. The religious cleavage caused a pronounced Polish-Rusin antithesis. The attempts to force Uniatism on the Orthodox Rusin population awakened its national consciousness and hastened the formation of the Rusin nationality.

Since the religious and the national aspirations of the Rusins were fused with the Kozak problem, the Kozaks became the representatives of the Rusin society as a whole. In the Kozak ranks one definitely found Rusin nobles, burghesses and serfs; and on the whole the Kozaks received support of the Orthodox clergy. Furthermore, through the

²¹L. Sapieha's letter to I. Kuntsevych, Warsaw, April 13, 1622. Cited by Valerian Krasinski, Sketch of the Religious History of the Slavonic Nations, 2nd ed (Edinburgh, 1851), p. 205.

Kozaks -- these heirs of the Kievan Rus, the armed representatives of the Rusin people and the faithful members of the Orthodox Church -- the most enlightened Rusin circles attempted to re-establish the severed political and national traditions of the old Kievan state. Thus cemented, the "alliance" of the Kozaks with the Orthodox Church posed new problems for the Commonwealth.

CHAPTER II

THE NEW STATUS OF THE KOZAKS, AND THE OPPRESSED CONDITION OF THE KOZAKS AND OF THE RUSIN PEOPLE IN THE COMMONWEALTH, 1638-1648

I

The repercussion of the Kozak "alliance" with the Orthodox Church was felt by the Commonwealth both in its foreign relations and in its domestic affairs. Religious conflicts within the Commonwealth provided the Ottoman Empire and Muscovy, as well as other powers, with opportunities to agitate the Kozaks and the Orthodox in order to carry out their own designs.¹ For this purpose the High Porte used various high-ranking Orthodox clergymen, or simply ordered its pawn, the Patriarch of Constantinople, to follow its bidding. Even though the Patriarch of Constantinople, who exercised jurisdiction over the Commonwealth's Orthodox faithful, was physically the subject of the Turkish sultan, he was spiritually the subject of

¹This aspect is well treated in Franciszek Suwara, Przyczyny i skutki kleski cecorskiej 1620 r [Causes and Effects of the Defeat at Tsetsora in 1620] (Krakow: Gebethner and Wolff, 1930).

the Muscovite tsar.² Since the Patriarch of Moscow was also becoming the instrument of the tsar, and since the Muscovite Patriarchate served as a magnet for the whole Orthodox world, the influence of Muscovy was much more dangerous for the Commonwealth.

The Commonwealth's government used various means to counteract the influences of these hostile powers. It placed high hopes in the Union of Brest. The religious Union of Brest would both supplement the political Union of Lublin, and would create more stable foundations for the coexistence of all four main ethnic groups within the Commonwealth -- Poles, Lithuanians, Rusins and Belorusins. These expectations of the government failed to materialize.

The religious union damaged the political union. It also created a deeper rift between the Roman Catholic Poles and Lithuanians, and the Orthodox Rusins and Belorusins. Furthermore, during the religious conflicts between the Orthodox and the Uniates, the Kozaks became a formidable weapon of the Eastern Church. Under the direction of the Orthodox clergy the Kozaks began to

²See Wladyslaw Konopczynski, Dzieje Polski nowozytnej [History of Modern Poland], 2 vols., 2nd ed (London: B. Swiderski, 1958), I, 190.

gravitate closer to Muscovy. Both the clergy and the Kozaks began to send their representatives to Moscow and appealed to the Orthodox tsar to extend his protection over them and over the persecuted Orthodox within the Commonwealth.³

These contacts facilitated for Muscovy the attainment of its religious and political aims at the expense of the Commonwealth. On the one hand, Moscow, the "Third Rome", could carry out its messianic role of dispensing Orthodoxy throughout the Commonwealth. On the other hand, Muscovy was provided with an opportunity to fulfill the "testament" of Tsar Ivan I "Kalita" -- to consolidate all lands of the Kievan Rus which were part of the Commonwealth.

The involvement of the Kozaks into the religious conflicts on the side of the Orthodox Church also caused serious domestic problems for the Commonwealth. By the 1630's the Kozak rebellions became more frequent than in former years. One of the main reasons for this

³See K. G. Guslistyi, "Istoricheskie sviazi Ukrainy s Rossiei do osvoboditelnoi voiny 1648-1654 gg" [Historical Ties of Ukraine with Russia Prior to the 1648-1654 War of Liberation], in A. I. Baranovich et al. eds., Vossoedinenie etc (Moscow, 1954), pp. 36-41.

development was in the fact that the Kozaks made good use of their "alliance" with the Orthodox Church. In order to secure more support from the Orthodox people during their rebellions, the Kozaks began to use religious slogans. Typical of such slogans were those used by the Kozaks their rebellions of 1637 and 1638. In their proclamations, the Kozak rebels claimed of taking up arms, not only in the defense of their "golden liberties", but also in the defense of their "Christian faith".⁴

Such Kozak slogans as "against these adversaries of our Greek [Orthodox] faith"⁵ stirred the Rusin society as a whole into action. These calls were answered by Orthodox priests, monks and even nuns, who then fomented revolt among the Rusins. Both the burgesses and the nobles of "Greek [Orthodox] faith" provided war materials to the Kozaks and participated in the rebellions. The Rusin serfs needed little encouragement to rise against "their own

⁴Manifesto of Pavliuk But to the Kozaks, Moshny, December 15, 1637, in Szymon Okolski, Dyaryusz transackcyi wojennej miedzy wojskiem koronnem i zaporoskiem w r. 1637 [i w r. 1638] [A Diary of the Hostilities Between Crown and Zaporozhian Armies in 1637 and 1638], ed. K. J. Turowski (Krakow, 1858), pp. 46-47.

⁵Manifestoes of Karpo Pavlovych Skydan to the Kozaks, Chyhyryn, October 24, 1637; and Moshny, November 29, 1637, in ibid., pp. 26-27.

lords". Furthermore, the Kozak rebels renewed their contacts with Muscovy: they petitioned the tsar to become their sovereign and to permit the Don Kozaks to aid them.⁶

Since the Kozaks succeeded, time after time, in inciting "nearly all of Ukraine to rebellion",⁷ the Commonwealth's government sanctioned severe measures against them. Thus, in 1630 Crown Grand Hetman Stanislaw Koniecpolski called on the loyal gentry of Ukraine "to extinguish [this fire of revolt] with the blood of these serfs".⁸ In 1637 Koniecpolski permitted the officials to vent their fury on the wives and children of the "scoundrels" who eluded capture, and even to raze their homes. He reasoned that it was "more preferable for nettle to grow on such sites, than to have the traitors of His Royal Majesty and of the Commonwealth multiply there".⁹ To King Wladyslaw IV the Kozak "lawlessness" merited "only that it be extirpated

⁶Ibid., pp. 14-15, 90.

⁷Instruction of King Zygmunt III for the Diet of 1631, Warsaw, January 19, 1631, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., 3 vols (Moscow, 1954), I, 96.

⁸Manifesto of S. Koniecpolski to the nobles of Volynia, Bar, April 7, 1630, in ibid., I, 80.

⁹Manifesto of S. Koniecpolski to the officials of Ukraine, Bar, September 3, 1637, in Okolski, op. cit., p. 14.

with the sword and every severity".¹⁰

The Crown Army and the private armies of the "kinglets" followed these guides and managed to suppress all rebellions. On the wake of the quellings came the bloody "pacification" of Ukraine and the confiscation of lands belonging to the rebels. The final act was performed by the Diet which passed ordinances to keep the rebels under control. The same steps were taken after the Kozak progroms of 1637 and 1638. At this time, however, the severe ordinance, unlike all others, which for the most part were not executed,¹¹ had the distinction of being the first one to be brought to a successful conclusion.

The Ordinance of the Registered, Zaporozhian Army, in the service of the Commonwealth,¹² was the foundation

¹⁰Manifesto of King Wladyslaw IV to the officials of Ukraine, Warsaw, December 1, 1637, in ibid., p. 63

¹¹Such constitutions or ordinances were passed by the Diets in the years 1590, 1593, 1596, 1601, 1607, 1609, 1611, 1613, 1618, 1619, 1620, 1623, 1624, 1626 (two), 1627, 1628 and 1635. For the summaries of these ordinances see A. K. Zeglicki et al. comps., Inwentarz nowy praw, statutow, konstytucyi koronnych, y W. X. Litew: Znayduiacych sie w Szesciu Tomach Voluminis Legum [A New Catalogue of Laws, Statutes and Constitutions of the Crown and of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Contained in Six Volumes of the Volumina Legum] (Warsaw, 1754), pp. 257-60.

¹²For the text of this Ordinance of 1638 see Vossoedienie Ukrainy etc., I, 255-57.

upon which rested the whole weight of the "final solution" to the Commonwealth's Kozak problem. Passed by the Diet of 1638, this new Kozak Ordinance was practically a word-for-word repetition of Koniecpolski's earlier memorandum to the government.¹³ It reduced the quota of the registered Kozaks to 6,000, formed into six regiments. The former Kozak "Elder" of the Army was replaced by an appointed commissioner of gentle birth, an individual of considerable military experience. His chief task was to keep strict discipline among the registered Kozaks and to administer justice to them. A special guard detachment was established for his safety which consisted of non-Kozaks. Polish or Rusin nobles who were experienced in military matters and who proved themselves to be men of "virtue and trust", could be appointed as senior-ranking officers in the Kozak Army.

The junior-ranking posts were available to the Kozaks,¹⁴ but only to those who had no blemish on their

¹³See Wladyslaw Tomkiewicz, "Ograniczenie swobod kozackich w roku 1638" [Restriction of Kozak Liberties in 1638], Kwartalnik Historyczny [Historical Quarterly], XLIV (no. 1, 1930), 142-44, 146.

¹⁴The only departure from the Ordinance, was the establishment at a later date of the posts of six regimental adjutants, one for each regiment. These posts were available to the Kozaks. See Okolski, op. cit., p. 194.

records of service to the Commonwealth. All six registered Kozak regiments were assigned alternating tours of duty at Zaporozhe. Their chief task was to guard the frontier against Tatar incursions. They were also to prevent all "lawless men" who would attempt to carry out sea-raids into the Ottoman dominions. No Kozaks were to venture into Zaporozhe without the commissioner's "passports". Those failing to comply with this regulation would be apprehended and then executed by the "governor" of Kodak fortress.

Konieczpolski's recommendations dealing with non-military matters were also accepted. The registered Kozaks were to suffer no ill-treatment from the civil authorities. The Kozaks were forbidden to meddle in civil matters even in those involving their own interests. If disputes arose between them and the burgesses on crown lands, these disputes were to be settled by both the military and the civil authorities. In order to prevent such disputes from arising, a royal commission would define clearly the boundaries of Kozak landholdings.

The commission of the Diet which draughted this Kozak Ordinance added to Konieczpolski's recommendations three major proposals of its own. The burgesses were forbidden to allow their sons to enter Kozak ranks and to give

their daughters in marriage to Kozaks. The Kozaks were not permitted to settle in the more remote areas of Ukraine, but only in the districts of Cherkasy, Chyhyryn and Korsun of the Palatinate of Kiev. The third proposal called for the restoration of all land, "illegally" possessed by the Kozaks, to the rightful owners. The commission hoped that these restrictions would eventually isolate the registered Kozaks from their environment, create a separate caste out of them, and thereby minimize chances of future rebellions.¹⁵

This Kozak Ordinance also introduced two major changes. By abolishing the self-government of the Kozak Army, this Ordinance completely altered the Army's character. In 1625 and in 1636 the government attempted to curb the self-dependence of the Kozak Army, but there was no governmental attempt to interfere in the Army's internal organization. The only exception was the intrusion of the Crown Grand Hetman, who nominated or approved the appointment of the commander of the Kozak Army. All other senior and junior officers were Kozaks who were elected by the Kozak rank-and-file.

The Kozak Army heretofore was a closed organization

¹⁵See Tomkiewicz, op. cit., p. 146.

which carried out its own affairs: it had its own chancery, court, ordinance officers and adjutants. The government provided the Kozaks with pay and uniforms; in return, they performed military service for the Commonwealth. Now, the Ordinance of 1638 brought important innovations, for it took away from the registered Kozaks the "rights and privileges" heretofore de facto possessed by them. An appointed commissioner, a non-Kozak, replaced the elected "Elder" of the Kozak Army; and all of its senior-ranking posts were also filled by non-Kozak appointees. Although the Kozaks were permitted to hold junior-ranking posts in the Army, these posts were non-elective and therefore were also controlled by the Kozaks' superiors. Finally, the judicature and the chancery of the Kozak Army was also abolished.¹⁶

By abolishing the autonomy and the "democracy" of the Kozak Army, this Ordinance took away from the registered Kozaks their most precious privileges. They still possessed certain personal rights, but in reality, these rights elevated them only a step higher than their enserfed brethern. The former Kozak "aristocracy", men who

¹⁶See ibid., pp. 148-49.

petitioned for the rights of the nobles in 1632, were now reduced to common soldiers. They had neither the personal liberties, prestige nor the authority of the past years. They were separated from their environment, restricted to live only in certain areas, kept under strict discipline and cut off from the Kozaks at Zaporozhe. Under this arrangement the government expected to prevent future rebellions, because neither the serfs would be able to rise without the leadership of the registered Kozaks, nor the registered Kozaks without the support of the serfs.¹⁷

The second important change introduced by the Ordinance of 1638 was the abolition of the personal rights of all non-registered Kozaks. All Kozaks not in the service of the Commonwealth were thereby reduced to the status of serfs. The opening statement of this Ordinance emphasized this change:

We deprive them for all times of all of their former jurisdictions, seniorities, prerogatives, incomings and other dignities acquired by their faithful service from our forefathers, but now forfeited through this rebellion, wishing to have those, whom the fortunes of war left among the living, as commoners reduced to serfs.¹⁸

¹⁷See ibid., pp. 150-51.

¹⁸Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., I, 255.

If this new arrangement of the Ordinance of 1638 was to bear fruit, it had to be effectively implemented. Little effort was spared by government to find men suitable for such a task. The appointed officers of the Kozak Army were men who were guided by the spirit of vengeance, repression and excesses. Their frequent acts of malpractice and malfeasance caused their grip on the registered Kozaks to become weaker.

At the same time the Kozak serfs were exploited by the magnates or by their officials. Both Kozak elements were degraded, and living under intolerable conditions, were hardly pacified. Up to 1638 the government was able to use, with some success, its policy of divide et impera. The rift between the registered and common Kozaks was one of the reasons why the Kozaks were largely unsuccessful during their rebellions. The effect of the Ordinance of 1638 was that it erased most of the distinctions which formerly existed among the Kozaks, and fused them into one group, making possible united action by them in the future.

Furthermore, the innovations introduced by this Ordinance were enforceable only if the Commonwealth

maintained peace with its neighbours. Peace enabled it to dispense with Kozak services and to quarter Crown troops in Ukraine to keep order among the Kozaks. An outbreak of war would shatter these arrangements. Since the Crown Army consisted of only some 4,000 men, many Kozak serfs would have to be recalled to the colours. They would be given an opportunity to clamour for their "rights and privileges" and for the repeal of the intolerable Ordinance.

Since the regulars would also have to be withdrawn from the Kozak territories, there was always the possibility that the remaining Kozak serfs would hatch a rebellion. It was therefore in the interest of the ruling class, which busied itself with the economic exploitation of Ukraine, to ensure that its times of "golden peace" prevailed.

Most of the nobles believed that the Ordinance of 1638 effectively cauterized the wounds of the decapitated Kozak "Hydra". According to their popular saying, the Kozaks were finally driven to their burrows and there they would remain.¹⁹ The anomalous fourth class ceased to exist. The majority of Kozaks tilled the soil of their masters' estates as serfs. The fortress Kodak was

¹⁹See K. Szajnocha, Dwa lata dziejow naszych. 1646. 1648., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1900), I, 1, 122.

rebuilt²⁰ by the first cataract of the Dnieper and checked both "Kozak lawlessness and Tatar incursions".²¹ It made possible rapid colonization of the borderlands, enabled the ruling class to pursue its economic interests and guaranteed for it the times of "golden peace".²² Ukraine, formerly characterized by chaos and violence, now became "as peaceful as any town within the Crown".²³ As far as the nobles were concerned, the thorny Kozak problem was finally solved. This proved to be only wishful thinking.

II

The metamorphosis of Kozak "aristocracy" to common

²⁰Kodak was built in 1635. In the same year the Kozaks under the leadership of Ivan Sulyma attacked it and razed it to the ground.

²¹Cited by Aleksander Czolowski, "Kudak. Przyczynki do zalozenia i upadku twierdzy" [Causes for the Establishment and for the Fall of the Fortress Kodak], Kwartalnik Historyczny, XL (no. 2, 1926), 175.

²²See ibid., pp. 174-75. See also Tomkiewicz, op. cit., pp. 174-75; and Maryan Dubiecki, Kudak, twierdza kresowa i jej okolice [The Borderland Fortress Kodak and its Environs], rev. and enl. ed (Warsaw: Gebethner and Wolff, 1900), pp. 81-91.

²³Z. S. Koniecpolski, "Rodowód Domu Koniecpolskich, herbu Pobog, to jest Krzyz na podkowie, pisany w roku 1651" [Genealogy of the Koniecpolski Family of the Armorial Bearings Pobog, or Cross over a Horseshoe, Written in 1651], in Pamietniki o Koniecpolskich etc (Lviv, 1842), p. 179.

soldiers and of Kozak "knights" to common tillers of soil, paralleled other significant developments in Ukraine.

Following the successful programs of the Kozaks in 1637-1638 and the passage of the severe Ordinance, the magnates secured land monopoly, great wealth, unprecedented influence and ominous power.²⁴ "To become absolute sovereigns", claimed one contemporary, "they only want the privilege of coining".²⁵

The "states" of these "kinglets" transformed the Commonwealth into a federation or conglomeration of many

²⁴See I. P. Krypiakewych, Bohdan, Khmelnytskyi (Kiev, 1954), pp. 14-22; and Stanislaw Sreniowski, "Panstwo polskie w polowie XVII w. Zagadnienia ekonomicznej i politycznej wladzy oligarchow" [Polish State in the Middle of the XVII Century. On the Problems of the Economic and of the Political Power of the Oligarchy], in K. Lepry et. al. eds., Polska w okresie drugiej wojny polnocnej 1655-1660, [Poland at the Time of the Second Northern War, 1655-1660], 2 vols (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1957), I, 13-39. See also the interpretation of Adam Kersten, "Problem wladzy w Rzeczypospolitej czasu Wazow" [The Question of Authority in The Commonwealth During the Times of the Wazas], in O naprawe Rzeczypospolitej etc. (Warsaw, 1965), pp. 23-26.

²⁵Sieur de Beauplan, "A Description of Ukraine, Containing several Provinces of the Kingdom of Poland, Lying between the Confines of Muscovy, and the Borders of Transylvania. Together with their customs, Manner of Life, and how they manage their Wars", in A Collection etc., 6 vols., 3rd ed (London, 1744), I, 477.

republics and monarchies which existed side by side on the principle of non-intervention.²⁶ They were largely responsible for the perpetuation of unique conditions which made the Commonwealth a state where a lack of order prevailed;²⁷ and which served as a heaven for nobles, paradise for Jews, purgatory for kings and hell for the serfs.²⁸ The rise of this magnate class into the most prominent position within the Commonwealth was accompanied by the increased oppression of the Rusin people, especially of the unprivileged classes.

The magnates took advantage of the times of "golden peace" to consolidate and to extend their landholdings in Ukraine. At the same time as they founded new settlements, villages and towns, they also initiated an intensive campaign of exploitation. Their next step was to thrust

²⁶See Aleksander Jablonowski, Pisma Aleksandra Jablonowskiego, 7 vols (Warsaw: E. Wende, 1910), II, 90.

²⁷This state of affairs was especially noted by foreigners. Typical of the critical remarks made by them were those of John Barclay. See Lukasz Opalinski, "Polonia Defensa contra Ioan. Barclaium, ubi, occasione ista, de Regno Genteque Polonia multa narrantur, hactenus litteris non traditia" (Gdansk, 1648), in Stanislaw Grzeszczuk ed., Wybor pism [Selected Works] (Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy im. Ossolinski, 1959), pp. 125-232.

²⁸See Jan Ptasnik, Miasta i mieszczanstwo w dawnej Polsce [Towns and Townspeople of Old Poland] (Krakow: Polska Akademia Umiejetnosci, 1934), p. 376.

the impositions of serfdom on the local population. In the western palatinates, where the ruling class was firmly entrenched, the yoke of serfdom was the heaviest.²⁹

In Ukraine, the burdens were lighter. The settlers who were enticed by the magnates into the frontier areas in former years, were granted exemptions from tribute and duties for long periods of time. In return for these concessions, the settlers were required to provide defense against the Tatars. After the periods of free-settlement expired, they were obliged to pay only moderate tribute and rents to their masters. This was the state of affairs even in the 1640's on the left bank of the Dnieper. At the

²⁹The duties and the hardships of the serfs are vividly illustrated in Krzysztof Opalinski's satire, "Na ciezary i opressyja chlopska w Polsce" [On the Burdens and the Oppression of Serfs in Poland], in Satyry (Wroclaw, 1953), Book I, Satire 3, 11, 1-140, pp. 23-29. Similarly, see the various "inventories" of villages in the 1630's and the 1640's, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., I, 104-05, 168-69, 340-41, 395-96. See also the following detailed studies. Stanislaw Sreniowski, "Wies polska w polowie XVII w" [Polish Village in the Middle of the XVII Century], in K. Leprzy et al. eds., Polska w okresie drugiej wojny polnocnej 1655-1660, 2 vols (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1957), I, 41-82; Edward Trzyna, Polozenie ludnosci wiejskiej w krolewszczyznach wojewodztwa krakowskiego w XVII wieku [The Situation of the Rural Population on the Crown Lands of the Palatinate of Krakow in the XVII Century] (Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy im. Ossolinski, 1963), pp. 222-94; and Zbigniew Cwiek, Z dziejow wsi koronnej XVII wieku [From the Times of a Crown Village in the XVII Century] (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1966), pp. 136-81.

same time however, conditions worsened for those living in certain districts of the right bank of the Dnieper. These people were burdened not only with tribute and rents, but also with labour and other special services.³⁰

In the 1640's more and more Rusin people began to feel the tentacles of serfdom. The magnates leased certain rural and urban areas of their estates to anyone who could guarantee to them a specified annual income.³¹ The magnates also appointed poor petty gentry as administrators of their estates, and accepted Jews as their tenants, intermediaries and agents. All these individuals had the task of raising adequate revenue for the magnates. At the same time they sought to reap maximum profits for themselves. In this way the magnates' officials and tenants began an excessively heavy system of exploitation of the rural and the urban population of Ukraine. They exacted revenue from every available source; and their methods were often

³⁰See Krypiakevych, op. cit., pp. 23-33.

³¹See for example the following contracts: M. Kalinowski and J. Dements, Liatychiv, July 9, 1638; S. Koniecpolski and M. Dluski, Hadiach, November 15, 1643; M. Kalinowski and K. Kozlowski, Vinnytsia, March 18, 1647; and J. Wisniowiecki and A. Zamojski, Lokhvytsia, November 1, 1647, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., I, 230-33, 359-62, 458-60, 477-79.

nothing more than thinly-disguised lawlessness and violence.³² Furthermore, apart from the rapacity of the magnates' creatures who waged a "war" of economic plunder with the inhabitants of Ukraine, the local population also experienced periodical ravages from the undisciplined soldiers of the Crown Army.³³ As the years of the "golden peace" continued, the conditions of the Rusin people of Ukraine were becoming unbearable:

The peasants there are very miserable, being obliged to work three days a week, themselves and their horses, for their lord; and to pay proportionately to the land they hold, such a quantity of wheat, abundance of capons, pullets, hens and goslings; that is at Easter, Whitsontide and Christmas: besides all this, to carry wood for the said lord, and a thousand other jobs they ought not to do; besides the ready money they exact from them, as also the tithe of their sheep, swine, honey, and all sorts of fruit, and every third year the third beef. In short, they are obliged to give their masters what they please to demand; so

³²For examples of the actions of various officials and leaseholders in Ukraine and in other Rusin ethnic territories during the 1630's and the late 1640's see Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., I, 115-16, 157-58, 161-62, 171-73, 287-89, 301-07, 322-25, 329-31, 339-40, 352-53, 369-74, 378-79, 383-84, 472, 475-77. See also Krypiakevych, op. cit., 21-34; Jablonowski, op. cit., II, 84-85; III, 242-43, 280, 309-10; and W. Lozinski, Prawem i lewem etc., 2 vols., 4th ed (Lviv), 1931, I, 375-426.

³³See S. Koniiecpolski's letter to K. Odrzywolski, Brody, October 24, 1643, in Pamietniki o Koniiecpolskich etc., pp. 282-84; and M. Hrushevskyi, Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy, 10 vols (New York, 1956), VIII, 2, 127-28.

that it is no wonder those poor wretches never lay aside anything, being under such hard circumstances. Yet this is not all, their lords have an absolute power, not only over their goods, but their lives; so great is the prerogative of the Polish nobility (who live as if they were in heaven, and the peasants in purgatory) so that it happens that those wretched peasants fall under the servitude of bad lords, they are in a worse condition than galley-slaves.³⁴

During this period the conditions of the urban population of Ukraine also worsened. Due to various actions and to restrictions of the magnates or their representatives, the towns in Ukraine, rather than becoming centres of commerce and industry, became merely centres of agricultural districts. Apart from Kiev, the towns of Ukraine made little contribution to the cultural, political or social life. There were many reasons for this curious development. The ruling class failed to recognize the value of the towns for the state as a whole. Many towns in Ukraine claimed self-government under the Magdeburg Law, as well as various privileges based on royal charters; yet, these were often disregarded by the officials. The burgeses were often treated no better than serfs. In many districts of Ukraine, they were compelled to pay various

³⁴Beauplan, in A Collection etc., I, 449. (Italics in the original).

taxes and tribute, and even to perform labour services. Their treatment in the "private" towns of the "kinglets" was even worse.³⁵

Apart from the serfs and the burgesses, the magnates also oppressed their "brethern", or members of their own class. The often-repeated maxim about the equality among the nobles -- a country squire, as poor as he may be, is equal to a palatine -- never applied in practice. The magnates demonstrated by countless examples that they regarded petty nobles merely as their pedestals. If the oligarchs were able to challenge their monarch, then the country squires presented no obstacle for them. It was characteristic of the times that the strong gained their ends by violence; only the weak had to resort to seek justice in the courts. It mattered little to a magnate that a petty noble possessed a charter from the royal chancery which confirmed his title to a certain estate.

³⁵For examples on the situation of the burgesses in Ukraine and in other Rusin ethnic territories during the 1630's and the 1640's see Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., I, 132-33, 135-37, 174, 291-92, 309, 345-46, 385-94, 404-05, 428-31, 468-70. See also K. Opalinski, "O sposobach pomnozenia miast i niezad w nich" [On the Ways of Increasing Towns and on the Disorder within Them], op. cit., Book V, satire 1, ll. 1-338, pp. 231-45; Krypiakevych, op. cit., pp. 34-42; Jablonowski, op. cit., III, 257-70; and Ptasnik, op. cit., pp. 358-87.

Unless the petty noble had the backing of some powerful patron, the charter was merely a piece of paper. In the majority of cases a magnate was in a position to seize the property of a petty noble by force. Moreover, he was able to take even more drastic action against his weaker neighbour: he could deny the squire's rights as a noble and force him to bear all the burdens and obligations imposed on his serfs.³⁶

Thus, not only the Rusin serfs or even the Rusin burgesses, but also the Rusin petty nobles, had various reasons for hating the "absolute" rule of the magnates and the rapacity of their creatures. The emergence of the magnate class into the prominent position of the Commonwealth also coincided with the severe oppression of the Kozaks. In this way, by the 1640's, the process of fusion of the overall social, economic, religious and national aspirations of the Rusin people, with the issues of the Kozaks, was complete. The Kozaks were for some time a

³⁶See Lozinski, op. cit., I, 231-71, 297-99. In his Vol. II, subtitled "Wojny prywatne" [Private Wars], Lozinski examined the armed clashes among the nobles in great detail. See also W. Lipinski, Stanislaw Michal Krzyczewski etc (Krakow, 1912), pp. 64-68; Krypiakewych, op. cit., pp. 48-49; and Jablonowski, op. cit., III, 317-18.

kind of representative of the Rusin people as a whole. From their ranks could come the most likely leadership; and they were still in the best position to call the Rusins to arms. The Kozaks were themselves in a very difficult predicament. Yet, for the first time, they were also in a position to fully appreciate the conditions under which most of the Rusins lived.

III

Since the implementation of the Ordinance of 1638, the registered Kozaks, as well as their enserfed brethern, experienced intolerable conditions of life. The posts of commissioner and of senior regimental officers of the Kozak Army were filled by nobles, and more and more Polish soldiers appeared in its rank-and-file.³⁷ The high-ranking officers were men characterized by avarice. Commissioner Jacek Szemberg, for example, paid 30,000 zloty for his appointment. In order to make his tenure a profitable one, he "thought of unbearable lootings and extortions of the

³⁷ Report of G. Kunakov to Muscovite Department of Foreign Affairs (1649), in Akty otносиashchiesia etc., 15 vols (St. Petersburg, 1861), III, 280.

Kozaks".³⁸ All junior-ranking posts in the Kozak Army were sold for profit to the highest bidder.³⁹ The officers began to regard the registered Kozaks more or less as their servants and as objects of exploitation. Furthermore, the Kozaks did not only face "the avarice of the colonels and their tyrannical treatment",⁴⁰ but also that of the civil authorities. The commissioner and the colonels, who were bound by common class interests with the officials of Ukraine, caused the Kozaks to fall prey to the autocracy of the local administrative authorities. They were burdened by illegal taxes, restricted in their rights to husbandry, their properties were confiscated and they were saddled with many other oppressive measures.⁴¹

There was an uninterrupted flow of Kozak grievances to the military and the civil authorities. In 1639, the

³⁸Report on the Death of Wladyslaw IV and on the Defeat of the Crown Army, Warsaw, June 1, 1648. Cited by Hrushevskiyi, op. cit., VIII, 2, 131-32, n. 3.

³⁹See S. Grondski, Historia belli etc (Pest, 1789), p. 31.

⁴⁰L. Miaskowski's letter to anonymous, Bar, April 3, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc (Krakow, 1864), p. 10.

⁴¹See the list of Kozak grievances prepared for Wladyslaw IV, Bila Tserkva, June 12, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc (Kiev, 1961), pp. 36-37.

Kozaks complained that their farms, meadows and properties were confiscated by the authorities.⁴² When Crown Grand Hetman Stanislaw Koniecpolski went on a tour of inspection through Ukraine in 1643, he was forced to dismiss the colonel of the Chyhyryn Regiment from his post for his excesses.⁴³ At the same time he saw the need to issue strict orders to stop the harassment of the Kozaks by undisciplined soldiers.⁴⁴ Kozak complaints came frequently to the royal chancery.⁴⁵ Koniecpolski's successor, Mikolaj Potocki, received almost daily complaints about the excesses of the administrative authorities.⁴⁶

Orders issued by the king or the hetman to curb the excesses of officials fell on deaf ears. In Ukraine there was no power which could execute such commands.

⁴²See Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VIII, 2, 138.

⁴³See Stanislaw Oswiecim, Stanislawa Oswiecima Dyaryusz 1643-1651 [The Diary of Stanislaw Oswiecim, 1643-1651], ed. Wiktor Czermak (Krakow: Akademia Umiejetnosci, 1907), p. 15.

⁴⁴See S. Koniecpolski's letter to K. Odryzywolski, Brody, October 24, 1643, in Pamietniki o Koniecpolskich etc., p. 284.

⁴⁵See Wladyslaw IV's letter to A. Koniecpolski, Warsaw, June 24, 1647, in L. Kubala, "Dodatki" [Appendices], Jerzy Ossolinski, 2nd rev. ed (Lviv, 1924), p. 494.

⁴⁶See M. Potocki's letter to J. Ossolinski, Bar, November 21, 1647. Cited by Lipinski, op. cit., pp. 197-98.

Potentates of the stature of Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki or Aleksander Koniecpolski ruled absolutely within their "states". They "distributed Ukraine among the Laszczowczyks,⁴⁷ who reduced the Kozaks, the meritorious servants of the Commonwealth into serfs, robbed them, pulled their beards and harnessed them into plows".⁴⁸ Too few of the privileged class fully saw "the Kozaks oppressed more than common serfs".⁴⁹ Too late came the realization that the Kozaks would "venture even into hell itself in order to cast off such bondage and oppression as the poor wretches evidently experienced".⁵⁰

⁴⁷This is a reference to the lawless nobles, named after Samuel Laszcz. This individual was no less than a bandit, having been sentenced by the courts two hundred seventy-three times. Notwithstanding these sentences, he managed to exist outside the pale of the law and to carry out his terroristic activities, chiefly because he enjoyed the protection of one "kinglet" -- Crown Grand Hetman Stanislaw Koniecpolski. See J. Jerlicz, Latopisiec etc., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1853), I, 49-51.

⁴⁸Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereiaslav, February 20, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 106.

⁴⁹A. Kysil's letters to M. Potocki, Kobyshiv, March 16, 1648, in Sprawy i rzeczy etc (Lviv, 1914), p. 83; and to M. Lubienski [Hoshcha], May 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 26.

⁵⁰Speech of A. Kazanowski at the Convocation Diet, Fourth Session, Warsaw, July 20, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 118-19.

The registered Kozaks realized that the magnates' policy of repression and servitude threatened the very existence of them as a military class. Their appeals for justice produced little results. Seeing the impotence of the king and the growing influence and power of the "kinglets", they had little choice but to resort to arms. The Kozak leaders seized an opportunity to initiate steps for an uprising late in 1645. Not trusting their own strength to be sufficient for the task, they began to negotiate a military alliance with the Tatars.⁵¹ The Kozak-Tatar alliance failed to materialize, but in 1646 a better opportunity arrived to win back their liberties.

In that year King Wladyslaw IV requested their aid for his planned war with the Ottoman Empire.⁵² The delegates of the Kozak Army, who proceeded to confer with the king in Warsaw, were somewhat doubtful of the whole business. The very secrecy in which the king conferred with them suggested the weakness of his position. He had no power to annul the Ordinance of 1638 without consulting

⁵¹See Oswiecim, op. cit., pp. 135-36.

⁵²See Wiktor Czermak, Plany wojny tureckiej Wladyslawa IV [Wladyslaw IV's Plans of the Turkish War] (Krakow: Akademia Umiejetnosci, 1895).

the Diet; and the Diet would never consent to repeal the Kozak restrictions. Yet, if the king emerged a victor from the war against the Muslim world, he would be in a position to establish an absolute monarchy and thereby to fulfill all his promises to the Kozaks. Under these circumstances the delegates of the Kozak Army agreed to carry out the wishes of the king and pledged the support of all the Kozaks. Ivan Barabash was named the commander of the naval expedition, while one Bohdan Khmelnytskyi received the post of secretary.⁵³

As a secretary, Khmelnytskyi was in charge of preparing Kozak enlistments.⁵⁴ He was hardly able to accomplish his task in secrecy. Furthermore, the plans of Wladyslaw became obvious once construction of sea vessels and a general preparation for a naval campaign began. Rumours began to circulate among the Kozaks that all posts in the Kozak Army would be changed. These grew in such an intensity, that Potocki interpreted them as "sedition" and "turbulence", and took steps to restore discipline.⁵⁵

⁵³ See Kubala, op. cit., p. 258.

⁵⁴ See ibid., p. 257.

⁵⁵ M. Potocki's letter to B. Leszczyński [Bar, ca. May 31, 1646], in Szajnocha, "Zrodla" [Sources], op. cit., I 2, 403.

The nobles saw the Kozak activities and their sudden hostile attitude towards them as a conspiracy between the Kozaks and the king against them. They decided that all adventures of the king must be stopped, for only fatal consequences would follow. Wladyslaw's defeat would be disastrous to the Commonwealth; his victory would bring grave danger to the precious liberties of the gentry.⁵⁶ The nobles thus waited impatiently for the October opening of the Diet. The Diet put an end to their fears.

By December, 1646, amid their preparations for war, the Kozaks received unwelcome news: the Diet forbade the king to wage war with Turkey; he was compelled to demobilize his mercenaries and to forbid the Kozaks to raid the shores of the Black Sea.⁵⁷ The Kozaks thus lost all their confidence in the king, whose "power was not only limited, but nearly taken away from him".⁵⁸

⁵⁶The fears of the gentry are typically illustrated in K. Opalinski's letter to L. Opalinski, Tuliszkow, October 3, 1646. See Listy Krzysztofa Opalinskiego do brata Lukasz 1641-1653 [Letters of Krzysztof Opalinski to his Brother Lukasz, 1641-1653], Roman Pollak et al. eds. (Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy im. Ossolinskich, 1957), p. 363.

⁵⁷See Volumina Legum etc (Warsaw, 1737), IV, 83-85.

⁵⁸G. Tiepolo's letter to the Venitian government in 1646. Cited by Szajnocha, op. cit., I, 1, 377.

After gaining victory over the king, the magnates and their supporters began to vent their fury upon the Kozaks. The magnates declared themselves against the king and his plans; therefore, they saw the need of destroying the potential weapon of royal absolutism. The Kozaks were "king's men", and the chief instrument of king's designs. It was virtually impossible for Wladyslaw to establish absolute monarchy without the support of the Kozaks. For this reason the ruling class began treating Kozaks as bondsmen, preparing for them conditions which were worse than those of slaves on Turkish galleys and intending even to eradicate the Kozak name itself.⁵⁹ Out of hundreds of similar cases of injustice inflicted upon Kozaks during this time, that of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi was typical.

⁵⁹See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Wladyslaw IV, Bila Tserkva, June 12, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 33-34.

CHAPTER III

THE EMERGENCE OF BOHDAN KHMELNYTSKYI: HIS LEADERSHIP AND AIMS IN THE INITIAL PERIOD OF CONFLICT

I

Bohdan Znovii Khmelnytskyi was typical of the half-noble and half-Kozak well-to-do landowning officer class, serving in the Kozak Army.¹ Khmelnytskyi was a Rusin noble: he considered himself a noble by birth, used the coat-of-arms of "Abdank" on his seal and professed himself to be an Orthodox Christian. Khmelnytskyi was also a Kozak: he served in the Kozak Army; and was strongly bound to the Kozak stratum by common ideals, language, religion,

¹The reconstruction of this biographical sketch of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi to 1647 is primarily based on the following sources:

(a) Letters: B. Khmelnytskyi's letters to M. Potocki, Zaporozhe, March 13, 1648; and to Jan Kazimierz, Zboriv, August 15, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc (Kiev, 1961), pp. 23-26, 122-23.

(b) Charters: Charter of Wladyslaw IV confirming B. Khmelnytskyi's title to Subotiv, Warsaw, July 22, 1646, in Akty otносиashchiesia etc., 15 vols (St. Petersburg, 1878), X, 465-67. Some historians question the authenticity of this document. See F. Rawita Gawronski, Bohdan Chmielnicki etc., 2 vols (Lviv, 1906), I, 354-60.

(c) Reports: G. Kunakov's report to Muscovite

class solidarity and family ties.

Bohdan, the son of a Rusin squire Mykhailo

Khmelnyskyi, was born approximately in 1595 and most

Department of Foreign Affairs (1649), in Akty odnosiash-chiesia etc., III, 278-80; and H. Pinocci's "Relatia o Chmielnickim i rzeczach Kozackich" [Report on Khmelnytskyi and on Kozak Matters] (1654), in Ojczyeste spominki etc., 2 vols (Krakow, 1845), I, 138. For a corrected version of this document see W. Lipinski, Stanislaw Michal Krzyczewski etc (Krakow, 1912), pp. 111-12, n. 1.

(d) Miscellanea: E. I. Chrzaszcz, "Pierwszy okres buntu Chmielnickiego w oswietleniu uczestnika wyprawy zoltowodzkiej i naocznego swiatka wypadkow", in Prace historyczne etc (Lviv, 1934), pp. 257-62; S. Grondski, Historia belli etc (Pest, 1789); Natan Hannower, "Jawein Mecula t.j. Bagno Glebokie. Kronika zdazen z lat 1648-1652, napisana przez Natana Hannowera z Zaslavia i wydana po raz pierwszy w Wenecyi w r. 1656" [Iavein Metsula, that is, the Deep Mire. A Chronicle of Events During the Years 1648-1652, Written by Natan Hannower of Zaslav and Published for the First Time in Venice in 1656], tr. and ed., Majer Balaban, in Sprawy i rzeczy etc (Lviv, 1914), pp. 16-20; V. Kochowski, Annalium Poloniae etc (Krakow, 1683); "Kratkaja Letopis o wojnach Polakow z Kozakami 1647-1656" [A Short Chronicle of the Wars of the Poles with the Kozaks, 1647-1656], in Pamiatniki etc., 3 vols., 2nd rev. ed (Kiev, 1898), I, 173-75; Szymon Okolski, Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej miedzy wojskiem koronnem i zaporoskiem w r. 1637 [i w r 1638], ed. K. J. Turowski (Krakow, 1858); and Zbigniew Switalski, "Nieznana wiadomosc z biografii Bohdana Chmielnickiego przed 1648 rokiem" [An Unknown Item from the Biography of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi Prior to 1648], Kwartalnik Historyczny [Historical Quarterly], LXVI (no. 3, 1959), 855-57.

Since the 1850's there appeared hundreds of biographies and biographical sketches on Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, chiefly in Polish, Russian and Ukrainian. The latest biography was written by the Ukrainian historian Ivan Krypiakevych, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (Kiev: Akademia Nauk Ukrainskoi R.S.R., 1954).

likely in Chyhyryn. Mykhailo endeavoured to give his son an upbringing and an education befitting the status of a noble. Bohdan therefore first passed through a school of one of the Orthodox brotherhoods; and later continued his studies at a Jesuit college in Lviv. Shortly after completing his studies, Bohdan began his military career. In 1620 he joined his father and took part in Crown Grand Hetman Stanislaw Zolkiewski's disastrous Moldavian campaign against the Turks. The elder Khmelnytskyi fell on the fields of Tsetsora; the younger was taken prisoner.

After two years of captivity in the Muslim world Bohdan returned to Subotiv, the estate acquired by his father. Soon after his arrival he enlisted as a registered Kozak in the Chyhyryn Regiment. Little is known about the following years of his military service until 1637. He must have participated in the various campaigns of the Kozak Army; proven himself to be a loyal, able and brave soldier; and won promotions steadily. At the time of Pavliuk's rebellion in 1637 he was already a senior-ranking officer, for he occupied the responsible administrative post of a secretary of the Kozak Army. In this capacity he signed the Kozak capitulation to Crown Field Hetman Mikolaj Potocki in December 1637.

The duties of a Kozak officer in peacetime were not too demanding. Bohdan was thus able to devote his attention to his family and his estate. He married Hanna Somko, a girl of a good Kozak family, and began to raise a large family. Careful management of Subotiv and the adjacent land he acquired brought him prosperity, so that by the 1640's he became quite a wealthy country squire. During this time he identified himself with the loyal and conservative Kozak element -- the Kozak "aristocracy" -- which sought to establish a modus vivendi with the government by means other than the resort to arms. By his own admission, he "never took part in any rebellion". His appointment to a junior-ranking post in the Chyhyryn Regiment following the progroms of Ostrianyn and Hunia in 1638 and his later reinstatement to the secretaryship of the Kozak Army, signified that the military authorities did not question his loyalty. Bohdan also enjoyed the confidence and favour of King Wladyslaw IV and of Crown Grand Chancellor Jerzy Ossolinski, who was one of the most influential men in the Commonwealth.

By virtue of his rank in the Kozak Army, Khmelnytskyi was himself an individual of considerable influence among the Kozaks and wielded authority among them. He was

frequently chosen to represent the interests of the Kozak Army before the king and the government. In September 1638, the Kozak Council held at Kiev elected him a member of a delegation which proceeded to Warsaw early the following year and petitioned the king to either repeal or to modify the Kozak Ordinance of 1638. He was also included in another delegation which brought similar petitions to the Diet late in 1639.

Later on, it was a mark of distinction for Bohdan to be called to serve in the mercenary Kozak unit hired by the government of Cardinal Richelieu in 1645, which took part in the operations against the Spaniards in Flanders and in the siege of Dunkirk. In April 1646 Bohdan was again a delegate of the Kozak Army. This time he took part in the secret negotiations at Warsaw with King Wladyslaw IV, when the latter solicited Kozak support for the war against the Turks. On this occasion Bohdan received a charter from the king which confirmed his rights to Subotiv. In 1647 he was contacted by Ossolinski, who revealed his secret mission to Bohdan: the king requested him to prepare the Kozaks for a naval expedition into the Ottoman dominions. As a reward for his part in the royal schemes, the king bestowed new honours on Bohdan.

Khmelnyskyi was thus a man of substance, conservative in his outlooks, loyal to the state and an individual who enjoyed the confidence of his superiors, and even the king and of the chancellor. But in contrast to Bohdan's record and environment, his destiny also amply illustrates the shortcoming of the "kinglet" rule in Ukraine.

Following the passage of the Kozak Ordinance and the Kozak programs in 1638, and especially after the capitulation of the king before the hostile Diet of 1646 which discovered his "conspiracy" with the Kozaks, even men like Khmelnytskyi began to experience intolerable conditions of life. Khmelnytskyi himself became a victim of the lawlessness of Aleksander Koniecpolski, a typical borderland magnate, and of his creatures. They inflicted a series of injustices upon him: he was materially ruined, made a fugitive and finally was declared an enemy of the state. These injustices caused Bohdan to take unprecedented steps, the kind of which he avoided so carefully in the past years.

Khmelnyskyi's misfortunes began at the time when Aleksander Koniecpolski decided to increase the size of his own latifundiae. Koniecpolski, as Sheriff of Korsun and

Chyhyryn, controlled a vast territory in the heart of the Kozak country. Since greater landholdings made the owner powerful and increased his revenue, Koniecpolski took advantage of every opportunity to acquire more land. The case of Khmelnytskyi provided this magnate with such an opportunity. He was able to make gains at the expense of his weaker neighbour both by law and lawlessness.

There were "legal" ways by which Koniecpolski could come to possess Khmelnytskyi's estate. Owning land in the Tiasmyn region, this magnate could claim Subotiv as part of his Mliiv property. A more effective method in dealing with Khmelnytskyi was simply to declare him a nulle iure possessor. Koniecpolski discovered that Bohdan had no proper documents to prove his title to the ownership of Subotiv. There were also no records to show that he registered any formal deed which could prove his rights. Under these circumstances, even the charter of King Wladyslaw proved to be worthless. Koniecpolski, as Sheriff of Chyhyryn, could therefore dispose of Subotiv as he pleased.

Koniecpolski was encouraged to take action in this matter by two men: Zachariasz Sabilenki and Daniel Czaplinski. Both men denounced Khmelnytskyi before their master. The former, a wealthy Jew of Chyhyryn, attributed

loss of business profits to his competition with Khmelnytskyi; the latter, a Deputy Sheriff of Chyhyryn coveted Subotiv for some time. Furthermore, a bitter feud began between Czaplinski and Khmelnytskyi over a woman of questionable virtues, with whom Bohdan lived after the death of his wife.

By pledging to increase Koniecpolski's revenues, Czaplinski induced his master to grant him the property rights to Subotiv. Having the support of such a powerful "patron", this borderland firebrand then attempted to take possession of Bohdan's estate. This whole matter could not be settled peacefully because Khmelnytskyi refused to give up his rights to Subotiv for a paltry sum apportioned to him as compensation for the upkeep of the land.

When this method failed, Czaplinski and his henchmen tried more drastic steps: increasing the collection of taxes, carrying out various requisitions, pillaging of stocks, damaging the manor house and even by flogging Bohdan's son. Czaplinski also pursued after his rival's mistress. Eventually he succeeded in luring her from Khmelnytskyi and subsequently married her. When Khmelnytskyi still resisted his enemy, Czaplinski hired an assassin; and when the latter failed to carry out his task, he

continued to plot on Khmelnytskyi's life. The final act came when Czaplinski resorted to the usual violence of the times: gathering an armed band he raided Subotiv, drove Bohdan out and then forcibly siezed his land.

Khmelnytskyi was determined to defend his rights through all legal means possible. He made frequent complaints about the harassment and violence he suffered to his superiors. Koniecpolski, who permitted these outrages of Czaplinski, simply ignored all complaints against his servant. Bohdan's appeals to Crown Grand Hetman Mikolaj Potocki also proved futile. Failing to obtain redress at local courts, Bohdan journeyed to Warsaw and attempted to seek justice there. Here, again, the decisions were not in his favour. Finally, he appealed to the king. Wladyslaw IV was sympathetic to the complaints of outrage inflicted upon his loyal servant, but even he was powerless to help. The king was supposed to have given only a desperate advice to Khmelnytskyi: violence must be fought with violence.

When all avenues to escape ruin failed, Bohdan returned to Ukraine. At this time dissatisfaction was smouldering among the Kozaks, aggravated by the disappointment in the king's schemes of war with the Turks. That dissatisfaction could be easily fanned into an open

rebellion. Wladyslaw IV, whose thirst for military conquest was not abetted, still did not relax his efforts to gain the Kozak support for his cause. It was for that purpose that he sent Crown Grand Chancellor Jerzy Ossolinski to Ukraine in August 1647.

Ossolinski attempted to sway the Kozaks to start a naval campaign in order to provoke hostilities with the Turks. He assured them that they should not fear any reprisals from the authorities. During this time he also contacted Khmelnytskyi and handed over the insignia of a commander of the entire expedition to him. Bohdan, however, took a dim^mer view of the whole matter. He thanked the chancellor for the royal favour, but refused to accept the honours. He told Ossolinski that many of the Kozaks would be reluctant to act because they were kept under extremely strict discipline by the military authorities. All steps would have to be carefully thought out. The Kozaks would have to be convinced of the feasibility of such an undertaking. Military supplies would have to be prepared. Thus, explained Khmelnytskyi, all this required considerable time and effort. He did promise, however, to carry out the wishes of the king as best as he could.

It is uncertain whether Khmelnytskyi was responsible

for the intense agitation which developed among the Kozaks following Ossolinski's departure from Ukraine. If he was responsible, there is no evidence that his actions were for the purpose of hatching a rebellion and not on behalf Wladyslaw's plans. It is also uncertain whether he was a leader, organizer or even a member of that group of registered Kozaks which planned a rebellion in October 1647. To many of his contemporaries, and especially to his enemies, no one else but Khmelnytskyi was responsible.

Bohdan's energetic attempts to defend his rights made him a suspect in many of the eyes of the nobles. Hating him as a royalist, unable to get rid of him by legal means or by attempts on his life, and having no knowledge of Wladyslaw's renewed interest in war or Khmelnytskyi's part in it, his enemies saw an opportunity to indict him on political grounds. Bohdan was accused of agitating the Kozaks for a rebellion, plotting a sea-raid and even of conspiring on the life of Koniexpolski, who at that time was campaigning against the Tatars. Koniexpolski ordered Khmelnytskyi's arrest and demanded no less than capital punishment for him. Since Koniexpolski had no jurisdiction over the registered Kozaks, he had to leave the accused and his fate in the hands of a military tribunal.

Khmelnyskyi's friends vouched for his innocence. The military authorities heeded their appeals and decided to place Khmelnytskyi for the time being under the custody of his commanding officer, Colonel Stanislav Krychevskyi of the Chyhyryn Regiment. Bohdan's position was desperate: his life, or at least his liberty, was in danger. Krychevskyi, however, proved to be a true friend. After hearing Bohdan's pleas, he allowed him to escape. There was only one road open to Bohdan Khmelnytskyi -- to Zaporozhe. There he fled at the close of 1647, accompanied by a number of followers, to join the ranks of malcontents.

II

Early in January 1648, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi appeared in Zaporozhe at the head of several hundred of his followers.² He then took immediate steps to capture the Sich from the registered Kozaks. The chief reason for these hostile steps of Khmelnytskyi was because the Sich would

²See M. Potocki's letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun], March 31, 1648; V. Unkovskii's report to the Muscovite government (1650), in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., 3 vols (Moscow, 1954), II, 15, 433; and A. Kysil's letter to Iu. Dolgorukov, Kobyzhcha, March 28, 1648, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., III, 166-67. Concerning the correct place of issue and the date of M. Potocki's letter, see K. Szajnocha, Dwa lata dziejow naszych. 1646. 1648., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1900), II, I, 27.

provide for him a firm foothold in Zaporozhe, as well as a suitable base for his intended operations. With this in mind, he directed his followers to occupy one of the islands on the Dnieper in close vicinity of the Sich, and instructed them to fortify it. Once the island was secure, he sent several of his men to the Sich to agitate the garrison of the registered Kozaks stationed there. The efforts of his emissaries were successful. When the commandant of the garrison saw that the registered Kozaks were on a verge of mutiny, he assembled his guard detachment and made a hasty flight. Early in February Khmelnytskyi and his followers took possession of the Sich without any opposition of the registered Kozaks.³

Following this initial bloodless victory, Khmelnytskyi began to direct a campaign of intense agitation throughout Zaporozhe and Ukraine. One of the main reasons for the success of this campaign was because Khmelnytskyi carried it out under a cloak of "legality". Even as Khmelnytskyi arrived at Zaporozhe there were rumours among the Kozaks that King Wladyslaw IV entrusted him with some

³See L. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, Balabanivka, February 16, 1648, in Lipinski, "Annexa" [Appendices], op. cit., p. 353; and Chrzaszcz, op. cit., p. 262.

important commission. Khmelnytskyi and his supporters also spread other fantastic rumours of their own. Some of these rumours were to the effect that Wladyslaw commanded Khmelnytskyi to organize a Kozak army; that the king was in sympathy with the Kozak cause; that he was their ally against the magnates; that he would not oppose the Kozaks even if they took up arms to fight the "kinglets" for their lost liberties; and finally, that the king would embrace Orthodoxy, and upon his arrival in Kiev, he would compel all Poles to accept the "Christian Orthodox faith".⁴

⁴Archdeacon Paul of Aleppo noted a typical rumour: "Between him [Khmelnytskyi] and his friend the Cral [King Wladyslaw IV] a secret agreement was planned, that Akhmil [Khmelnytskyi] should raise his head in rebellion, and that the Cral should assist him with troops; in order to eradicate the Polish Grandees [magnates] one and all, and to allow him to become king in his own right, who should rule, and not be ruled by them", See Paul of Aleppo, The Travels etc., 2 vols (London, 1831), I, 2, 173.

For other versions of these rumours, see the reports of G. Klimov (1648) and G. Kunakov (1649) to Muscovite Department of Foreign Affairs, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., III, 216, 279; and the letters of Voevoda F. Arsenev, S. Bolkhovskii, Z. Leontev, I. Kobylskii, N. Nashchokin, N. Pleshcheev and N. Meshcherskii (May to July, 1648) to Muscovite Department of Defense, in Akty Muskovskago gusodarstva, 3 vols (St. Petersburg, 1894), II, 218-20, 222, 227-28, 231-32; Sobieski's report to the Convocation Diet, Fifth Session, Warsaw, July 21, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc (Krakow, 1864), pp. 120-21; and B. Khmelnytskyi's manifesto to the Rusin people, Bila Tserkva [ca., May 26 to June 12], 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 648. Concerning the correct date and the authenticity of

These rumours and stories were the more credible to the Kozaks and to the Rusin people because Khmelnytskyi possessed the banner of King Wladyslaw and his "charters".⁵ With such proof, Khmelnytskyi had little trouble in convincing the Kozaks in Zaporozhe that they should enlist under the "royal colours".⁶ In turn, these Kozaks had no

this document see L. Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, 2nd rev. ed (Lviv, 1924), p. 448, n. 57. For a contrary evaluation see Gawronski, op. cit., I, 213. These rumours are also pointed out by M. Golinski, MS. Biblioteki Zakladu Narodowego im. Ossolinskich, Wroclaw, Poland, 189, f. 127 [Hereafter cited as MS. B.Z.N.Ossol.]; P. Chevalier, A Discourse etc (London, 1672), p. 59-60; S. Temberski, Stanislawa Temberskiego etc (Krakow, 1897), p. 101; and Grondski, op. cit., p. 46.

⁵This whole matter is shrouded with great uncertainty. The contemporaries agree on two points: (a) Khmelnytskyi possessed some kind of documents; (b) which he had stolen from Ivan Barabash. See for example Chrzaszcz, op. cit., pp. 260, 262; and the Record of the Election Diet, Twenty-Sixth Session, Warsaw, November 6, 1648, in Ksiega pamietnicza etc., pp. 299-300. There is no evidence that King Wladyslaw IV issued any special "charters" to the Kozaks which restored their liberties. Khmelnytskyi probably possessed a letter or letters of the king, who wrote to the Kozaks at the time he was preparing to launch his campaign against Turkey. The king probably solicited Kozak aid, authorized new Kozak enlistments and ordered the construction of sea-craft for a naval campaign on the Black Sea. According to Kysil, Khmelnytskyi only pretended to have new letters from the king. He actually had the letters written by Wladyslaw in 1646. See the Record of the Convocation Diet, Second Session, Warsaw, July 17, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 105. This whole matter is discussed at some length by Gawronski, op. cit., I, 118-125.

⁶See L. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, Balabanivka, February 16, 1648, in Lipinski, "Annexa", op. cit., p. 353.

doubt that Khmelnytskyi enjoyed confidence and favour of the king; thus, they formally elected him as their leader.⁷ Furthermore, Khmelnytskyi's recruitment programme was also carried out in Ukraine by his inflammatory manifestoes and by his extremely able emissaries. The effects of these manifestoes and the accomplishments of these "conspirators of all [the registered] Kozak regiments and of all [the people of] Ukraine",⁸ can be best illustrated by the following developments.

By the middle of February Crown Grand Hetman, Mikolaj Potocki, distrusted the loyalty of all the registered Kozaks still under his command.⁹ A month and a half later, Potocki claimed that a "deadly fire" of rebellion was ignited in Ukraine: "there was neither a village nor

⁷ See the report of Iu. Mynevskyi and others at Muscovite Department of Foreign Affairs (1657), in Akty odnosiasia etc., IV, 58.

⁸ M. Potocki's letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun], March 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., p. 15. Typical of such manifestoes is the one from Chyhyryn, early in 1648. See Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 625-26.

⁹ See L. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, Balabanivka, February 16, 1648, in Lipinski, "Annexa", op. cit., p. 354. This explains why the registered Kozaks had to take an oath of loyalty before the beginning of the campaign in April. See Chraszcz, op. cit., p. 264.

a town in which there were no cries for lawlessness".¹⁰

Finally, while the serfs armed themselves and awaited for the outbreak of hostilities, many "Kozaks, nobles and free-men" began to flock into Zaporozhe to Khmelnytskyi's aid."¹¹

Khmelnytskyi proceeded with extreme caution even under these favourable circumstances. He was not yet ready to wage war. On the one hand, he underestimated the military preparedness and the potential of the Rusin people. On the other hand, he decided that the troops under his disposal were not strong enough to be matched against the combined forces of the Crown Army and the private armies of the magnates. Khmelnytskyi therefore decided to seek military aid from the neighbouring countries. His appeals to Muscovy, particularly for the aid of the Don Kozaks, proved to be fruitless.¹² Khmelnytskyi, however, was more successful in his dealings with Crimea. In February, he sent his envoys to Khan Islam III. His appeals for military aid coincided with a time when various circumstances pressed

¹⁰M. Potocki's letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun], March 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., p. 15.

¹¹G. Kunakov's report to Muscovite Department of Foreign Affairs (1649), in Akty odnosiaschiesia etc., III, 281.

¹²See Krypiakevych, op. cit., pp. 122-23; and V. Golobutskii, Diplomaticheskaia istoriia etc (Kiev, 1962), p. 96.

Tatars for war.

Moreover, Khmelnytskyi made another good use of the "charters" of King Wladyslaw. These documents which served as an evidence of Wladyslaw's anti-Tatar designs, had the effect of abetting the khan to war with the Commonwealth. Khan Islam III realized that by supporting the Kozak rebellion, he would automatically paralyze the plans of the Polish king. It was in the khan's interest to give military aid to the Kozaks, even though he would face grave consequences for it, because such action was expressly forbidden by his Turkish suzerain. The khan, therefore, decided to defy the sultan. He ordered a vanguard under Tuhay Bey to march to Khmelnytskyi's aid as soon as possible, and then prepared to follow it at the head of the whole Tatar horde. Thus came into being a Kozak-Tatar military alliance.¹³ This

¹³See B. Baranowski, "Geneza sojuszu kozacko-tatarskiego z 1648 r", Przeglad Historyczny, XXXVII (no. 1, 1648), 285-86; O. Gorka, "Nieznana kronika tatarska lat 1644-50", Kwartalnik Historyczny, LXII (no. 3, 1955), 113; and Golobutskii, op. cit., pp. 103-06. According to Naima, Khmelnytskyi himself took part in the negotiations in Crimea. See [Mustafa] Naima, "Zatargi z Ottomanami z powodu Kozakow i Dziennik Wyprawy Chocimskiej z Rocznikow Naima Efendi", in J. J. S. Sekowski, ed. and tr., Collectanea z Dziejopisow Tureckich Rzeczy do Historyi Polskiej Sluzacych, 2 vols (Warsaw, 1824), I, 201-02. All other sources point to the contrary. See for example, T. Buturlin's letter to Muscovite Department of Defense, Belgorod, April 17, 1648, in Akty Muskovskago gosudarstva, II, 201; and A. Trubetskoi and others to A. Kysil, Moscow, April 20, 1648, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., III, 180.

Tatar military aid would bring incalculable advantages, as well as great many ^{dis}advantages, to Khmelnytskyi.

During the first three months of 1648, if Khmelnytskyi was unsuccessful in concealing his aims from the authorities, he was successful in confusing these aims for them. One way in which he achieved his goal was by writing letters to various persons of importance. In these letters he listed his personal grievances and the hardships of the Kozaks, and then justified his and their actions. Khmelnytskyi emphasized that neither he nor his companions in Zaporozhe wanted bloodshed. They came to Zaporozhe not to indulge in lawlessness of any sort; on the contrary, they were driven there by the injustices of various officials and by the intolerable conditions of life they had to lead in Ukraine. They had but one aim: to send a delegation to Warsaw with a petition to have their former rights and liberties restored to them.¹⁴ It therefore, appeared that

¹⁴See the following letters of B. Khmelnytskyi from Zaporozhe: to J. Szemberg, January 6, 1648; to M. Potocki, January 8, 1648; to A. Koniecpolski, January 9, 1648; to M. Potocki, March 13, 1648 (and another letter to him on the same date written in the name of the Kozak army), in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 23-26, 28-30, 640-44. In the opinion of the editors of this documentary collection, Khmelnytskyi was not the author of the first three letters. These were most likely composed by the chronicler Samiilo Velychko. See p. 640, n. 1.

Khmelnyskyi attempted to quiet the apprehensions of the authorities and to win back their confidence in him.

But the real purpose of Khmelnytskyi's letter writing was more than that; he played for time. This became obvious to the gentry of Ukraine.¹⁵ These nobles recognized unmistakable signs of another rebellion, and sent frantic appeals to Potocki "to extinguish the deadly fire" before it was too late.¹⁶ But the king and other influential individuals interpreted Khmelnytskyi's actions as the initial step in the war against the Tatars and the Turks.¹⁷ Moreover, the vacillation of Potocki between the pressure of panicky nobles and the pressure of those who counted on war with the Muslim world, only helped Khmelnytskyi to gain time to further his plans.

Potocki did not attach any special significance

¹⁵See the anonymous letter from Cherkasy, April 2, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 9

¹⁶See M. Potocki's letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun], March 31, 1648 in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 15.

¹⁷Kysil warned Muscovite officials that Khmelnytskyi might attempt to lure the Don Kozaks to carry out a sea-raid against the Turks. See A. Kysil's letter to Iu. Dolgorukov, Kobyzhcha, March 28, 1648, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., III, 167.

As late as ca., April 20, 1648 King Wladyslaw IV issued an order to Potocki not to take any hostile steps against the Kozaks, and even sent part of the pay due to the registered Kozaks. See Gawronski, op. cit., pp. 263, 266-67.

to Khmelnytskyi's flight to Zaporozhe at the close of 1647.¹⁸ He became more concerned with the activities of Khmelnytskyi at the beginning of February, 1648. By this time the first mutiny of the registered Kozaks took place; Khmelnytskyi was in control of the Sich; and there were also definite signs of unrest among the Rusin people in Ukraine. Potocki decided to solve matters by ordering the regiment of the registered Kozaks stationed nearest Zaporozhe to sieze Khmelnytskyi, to disperse his followers and to reoccupy the Sich. But another unexpected event took place: these registered Kozaks mutinied and joined the ranks of their disaffected comrades-in-arms.¹⁹

Similar orders were then issued by Potocki to other regiments of registered Kozaks,²⁰ but again, apart from fresh deflections to Khmelnytsky, his orders were not carried out. Potocki then attempted to induce those in

¹⁸In the important letter of M. Potocki to M. Ostrorog, Bar, December 24, 1648, cited by Lipinski, op. cit., p. 221, n. 2, there is no reference to Khmelnytskyi.

¹⁹L. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, Balabanivka, February 16, 1648, in Lipinski, "Annexa", op. cit., pp. 353-54.

²⁰See M. Potocki's letter to the Colonel of the Kaniv Regiment, Verbych, February 13, 1648. Cited by M. Hrushevskyi, Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy 10 vols (New York, 1956), VIII, 2, 180, n. 1.

Zaporozhe to abandon Khmelnytskyi by threats of serious reprisals on their families, and on destruction and confiscation of their properties and lands.²¹ When this stern manifesto failed to make any impression on the Kozaks, Potocki then reversed to kindness and concessions. He promised to them that he would remove from their posts the commissioner and all the colonels against whom the Kozaks had any just grievances; to take severe action against those tenants by whom they were oppressed; and to insure that they would have a free access to their steppe occupations. He also tried to lure Khmelnytskyi out of Zaporozhe with offers of safe conduct, forgiveness for his actions and restoration of his estate. Both the Kozaks and Khmelnytskyi, however, turned down his offers.²²

One of the serious mistakes made by Potocki was that he paid too little attention to the Kozak-Tatar contacts, even though he knew about them in February.²³ He

²¹See M. Potocki's manifesto to the Kozaks at Zaporozhe, Korsun, February 20, 1648. Ibid.

²²See M. Potocki's letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun], March 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, pp. 15-16; and Chrzaszcz, op. cit., p. 263.

²³See the anonymous diary in Pamiatniki etc., 2nd rev. ed., I, 175.

dismissed all news of the Kozak-Tatar alliance as rumours, preferring to believe various reports that Sultan Ibrahim I would not permit the Tatars to invade the Commonwealth.²⁴ After he received official confirmation that the Tatars would support the Kozaks,²⁵ the aim of Khmelnytskyi's delaying tactics became obvious to him. The Kozaks were not planning a naval raid into the Ottoman dominions; instead, they were prepared to march into Ukraine and with the Tatar help to fight for their demands. At the close of March, Potocki already received these demands from Khmelnytskyi: withdrawal of the Crown Army from Ukraine; removal of the colonels from their posts; disbanding of their guard detachments; and the restoration of all former Kozak liberties by repealing the Ordinance of 1638.²⁶

Potocki still underestimated the role of the

²⁴See V. Lupul's letter to L. Miaskowski, Iasi, February 1, 1648, in Lipinski, "Annexa", op. cit., p. 354; and A. Kysil's letters to Iu. Dolgorukov, Kobyzhcha, January 24 and February 23, 1648, in Akty otnosiashchesia etc., III, 109, 142-53.

²⁵Muscovite officials informed Kysil that the Kozak-Tatar military alliance was concluded on March 15th. See the letter of A. Trubetskoi and others to A. Kysil, Moscow, April 20, 1648, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., III, 180. Potocki knew about this development before the end of March.

²⁶See Potocki's letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun], March 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 16.

Tatars. Moreover, he was induced by the friendly overtures of the khan into believing that the Tatars wanted peace.²⁷ Not expecting Tatar intervention, Potocki decided to march against the rebels and crush them. By taking this step he ignored the orders of the king and the advice of others, who were decidedly against such a risky step.²⁸ Potocki reasoned, however, that he had to crush the rebels before they managed to enter the settled areas of Ukraine. He visualized the rising of the serfs: with the influx of serfs into the rebel Kozak ranks, Khmelnytskyi's "three

²⁷See B. K. Maskiewicz, "Pamietniki Boguslawa Kazimierza Maskiewicza" [Memoirs of Boguslaw Kazimierz Maskiewicz], in Pamietniki etc (Wroclaw, 1961) 237-38; and A. Kysil's letters to A. Trubetskoï and others, Kobyzhcha, March 31 and April 3, 1648, in Akty odnosiaszchiesia etc., III, 169-71. See also Kubala, op. cit., p. 265; and Tomkiewicz, Jeremi Wisniowiecki (1612-1651) (Warsaw, 1933), pp. 181-83.

²⁸M. Potocki's letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun], March 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 15-17 shows clearly that the king ordered Potocki not to initiate hostilities against the Kozaks. The letters of B. Khmelnytskyi to Wladyslaw IV, A. Kazanowski and W. Zaslowski, Bila Tserkva, June 12, 1648, and to Z. Czerny, Korsun, May 27, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 34, 40, 42, 31 also show that Potocki acted against the orders of the king. From the following letters there is additional evidence that other individuals were against Potocki's plans: M. Ostrorog to J. Ossolinski, Lviv, May 26, 1648 and A. Kysil to Wladyslaw IV, Hoshcha, May 27, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 378, 382; and A. Kysil to M. Lubienski, [Hoshcha], May 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 26.

thousand men would quickly become one hundred thousand". If the Kozak rebels were defeated the serfs would not dare to rise.²⁹

He planned to deal with Khmelnytskyi's rebels in Zaporozhe. Potocki considered that his task would be accomplished without bloodshed. The rebels would be overawed with his show of strength and be compelled to capitulate. He was so confident of success that he refused to wait for the arrival of the magnate private armies and he appointed his son Stefan to lead a vanguard into Zaporozhe. Late in April one detachment of the vanguard, comprising mainly still loyal registered Kozaks, sailed down the Dnēiper by boats; the other, commanded by young Potocki, proceeded south by land. Both detachments were to combine at Kodak fortress, and then the vanguard would begin its operations against the rebels. The main body of the Crown Army was concentrated near Korsun and it would aid the vanguard if it became necessary.

Khmelnytskyi was informed about the movements of the Crown Army. He acted before the rendezvous of the

²⁹See M. Potocki's letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun], March 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 15-16.

vanguard took place. At Zhovti Vody he surrounded the detachment of Stefan Potocki. Once this was accomplished he was concentrating on the movements of the flotilla of the registered Kozaks on the Dnieper. He did not need to march against the registered Kozaks, for many of them were in sympathy with the rebel cause. At Kamiany Zaton there occurred a third mutiny; these registered Kozaks killed their loyal officers and deserted to Khmelnytskyi. During the following days of battle the remaining registered Kozaks and squadrons of dragoons in young Potocki's camp also deserted their commander. From May 15 to the 16th, as the Tatars joined Khmelnytskyi's forces, the remnants of the vanguard were annihilated. The vanguard of the Crown Army thus ceased to exist.³⁰

Meanwhile, Crown Grand Hetman Mikolaj Potocki waited anxiously for news from the vanguard. Receiving no word for some time, he decided to march southward. On

³⁰For the Battle of Zhovti Vody (April 29 to May 15 or 16, 1648), see the following sources and monographs: K. Grodzicki's letter to M. Potocki [Kodak], May 9, 1648, in Pamiatniki etc., I, 3, 21-24; J. Belchacki's letter to Anonymous, Cherkasy, May 20, 1648, in Sprawy i rzeczy etc., pp. 110-12; Anonymous letter from Cherkasy, May 20, 1648, in Lipinski, "Annexa", op. cit., p. 355; Chrzaszcz, op. cit., pp. 264-67; Gorka, op. cit., p. 114; and Iu. Tys-Krokhmaluk, Boi Khmelnytskoho etc (Munich, 1954), pp. 51-64

May 3 he finally received a message that his son's detachment was surrounded and was defending itself against great odds. Appealing for additional troops, Potocki then advanced to Chyhyryn. Here news reached him about the mutiny of the registered Kozaks on the Dnieper. On May 19, he received the tragic news about his son. Ordering a retreat, Potocki decided to meet the enemy in a fortified camp near Korsun. Upon the sight of such a large Kozak-Tatar force, however, he changed his mind and resumed the retreat. This was a fatal mistake: he led the Crown Army into a skillfully-prepared ambush. On May 26, 1648 it suffered an overwhelming defeat.³¹

These military disasters brought to an end the decade of that "golden peace" in effect since the Kozak Ordinance of 1638. The best troops of the Commonwealth, and the mainstay of the magnate rule in Ukraine, ceased to exist. Mikolaj Potocki, and the second-in-command, Crown

³¹For the Battle of Korsun (May 24 to 26, 1648), see the following sources and monographs: Anonymous report on the defeat of the Hetmans, [n.p.], May 26, 1648, K. Rajecki's letter to K. Lubomirski, Polonne, May 28, 1648; and the letter of J. Ulinski and S. Jaskolski to [M. Lubienski], Bar, June [8], 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 17-24, 36-38. See also Krokmaluk, op. cit., pp. 67-81. Concerning the correct address and date of letter of Ulinski and Jaskolski see Kubala, op. cit., p. 447, n. 48.

Field Hetman Marcin Kalinowski, became Tatar prisoners. To make the matters even worse, at the time when the Commonwealth needed a strong leader, it was to experience the chaos of the interregnum, for on May 20 King Wladyslaw died. To add to these misfortunes of the ruling order, the south-eastern palatinates were engulfed by a terrible fire -- the rising of the serfs. These events were indeed a "terrible rerum metamorphosis".³²

Many nobles were convinced that these catastrophic developments were visible signs of God's wrath and punishment for their sins. Some of them were driven into desperation by the thought that "the serfs will now rule over us", and fled in panic into the interior parts of the Commonwealth. Others saw no hope and expected that they would perish. The south-eastern palatinates were left to the ravages of the serfs. There was no force to stop the Kozak rebels.³³ Yet, at such a time Khmelnytskyi actually

³²A. Kysil's letter to M. Lubienski [Hoshcha], May 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 25.

³³See ibid., W. Zaslowski's letter to M. Lubienski, Dubno, June 2, 1648; and A. Kysil's letter to M. Lubienski, Hoshcha, June 7, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 392, 403; Anonymous letter from Lviv, June 4, 1648, and B. Leszczynski's speech at the Convocation Diet, Third Session, Warsaw, July 18, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 32-34. 112; and J. Jerlicz, Latopisiec etc., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1853), I, 62.

halted his victorious advance at Bila Tserkva. To the optimistic nobles this move was an act of "moderation" on his part. The pessimist saw it only as an attempt to prepared a death blow to the Commonwealth.³⁴

III

Early in June, 1648 Bohdan Khmelnytskyi found himself in a position similar to that of a man who attempted to vault into a saddle, but who jumped over a horse instead.³⁵ Khmelnytskyi expected to carry out a successful military campaign, but certainly not to annihilate the Crown Army in two main engagements. Although he counted on the rising of the serfs in Ukraine, he anticipated neither such a spontaneous outburst of the "serfs' fury", nor an eruption of a movement of such great proportions, which threatened with the extirpation of the ruling class. These unexpected developments made possible for Khmelnytskyi the

³⁴See Letter of S. Kishevyeh [Lviv], July 13, 1648, cited by Lipinski, op. cit., p. 238; A. Kysil's letter to M. Lubienski [Hoshcha], May 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 25; Zolkiewski's letter to J. Ossolinski, Dubno, June 8, 1648, and W. Zaslowski's letter to the Convocation Diet, Dubno, June 14, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 405; X, 197-203.

³⁵See Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VIII, 3, 9'.

attainment of his boldest aims. The Kozak leader, however, had still no clearly defined plans at this time. Contrary to the beliefs of many panicky nobles, Khmelnytskyi could not throw all caution to the winds. He was also in no position to send an ultimatum to the government, or to deal a death-blow to the Commonwealth. Furthermore, he had no intention to march at Warsaw.

Khmelnytskyi halted the victorious Kozak advance at Bila Tserkva for a definite purpose. His Tatar allies, laden with plunder and numerous captives, returned to Crimea in the middle of June.³⁶ Although Khan Islam III promised to send back his hordes in August,³⁷ Khmelnytskyi was uncertain of Tatar military aid in the future. It was no secret to him that Khan received strict orders from the Turkish government to return to Crimea and not to

³⁶See Islam III's letter to Wladyslaw IV [Zubzhytsa], June [11], 1648 (sic), in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 41. Concerning the correct place and date of issue of this letter see Kubala, op. cit., p. 449, n. 61. The Khan must have pretended not to know about the death of the king (May 20th) at the request of Khmelnytskyi. See n. 44 below.

³⁷See Gorka, op. cit., p. 116.

invade the Commonwealth again.³⁸ This order meant in fact that the Kozak-Tatar alliance came to an end. Were the Khan to ignore the orders of his suzerain, he had to face the consequences from Muscovy. If the Tatars entered into the territories of the Commonwealth, Muscovy would send its troops against them. Both Khmelnytskyi and Islam III were aware that the Muscovite government was prepared to honour the defensive anti-Tatar alliance, which was concluded with the Polish-Lithuanian state in 1647.³⁹ Neither of them wished to involve Muscovy in the conflict.

Apart from these adverse developments, Khmelnytskyi

³⁸Ibid. See also Ahmed Pasha's letter to Potocki [Constantinople, ca., late May or early June, 1648]; [L. Miaskowski's letter to J. Ossolinski, Kamianets, ca., June 11, 1648], in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., X, 293-94, 267-68; and the summary of Ahmed Pasha's letter to J. Ossolinski [Constantinople, ca., June 11, 1648], in Zygmunt Abrahamowicz ed., Katalog dokumentow tureckich. Dokumenty do dziejow Polski i krajow osciennych w latach 1455-1672 [A Catalogue of Turkish Documents. Documents Pertaining to History of Poland and to the Neighbouring Countries in the Years 1455-1672] (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1959), pp. 326-27. Concerning the correct names, places and dates of issue of these letters see Szajnocha, op. cit., II, 1, 107-08, 110-11.

³⁹See A. Kysil's letter to M. Lubienski [Hoshcha], May 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 26; S. Bolkhovskii's letter to A. Kysil, Khotmyzhsk, June 14, 1648, in Akty odnosiaschiesia etc., III, 204; and B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to S. Bolkhovskii, Chyhyryn, June 30, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 54.

still faced danger from other sources. He speculated that King Wladyslaw issued a general mobilization order for the gentry of the Commonwealth, and that the king had ordered the troops of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to march against the Kozaks. Would the Kozaks dare to take up arms against the king? He also had some evidence that the nobles were preparing to offer some resistance. The initial step was taken by Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki, who began to make attempts to quell the rising of the serfs. This magnate began to rally the panicky nobles to his side and encouraged them to follow his examples.⁴⁰

Under these circumstances Khmelnytskyi found no reason to press his army towards Warsaw. The march into Polish ethnic territories might drive the gentry into a desperate defence of their fatherland. Moreover, his troops were weary after a strenuous campaign. Many of them were ill-equipped, unorganized and untrained. Khmelnytskyi thought more about defence and consolidation of his gains. At this early stage of struggle he achieved already, considerably more than he expected. The Kozak military successes and the rising of the serfs would help him to

⁴⁰ See Kubala, op. cit., p. 276; and Tomkiewicz, op. cit., p. 187.

satisfy his personal ambitions and to secure official confirmation of the rights of the Kozak Army.⁴¹ He thus saw no need to jeopardize his bargaining position upon the outcome of some major battle during the Kozak drive to Warsaw.

During this period of inaction, Khmelnytskyi received an important message from Adam Kysil, the Palatine of Bratslav. This Orthodox magnate advised him to cease all hostilities, make no further advance, rupture the Tatar alliance and to send a delegation to Warsaw with assurance of loyalty to the Commonwealth. At the same time the delegates should acquaint the government with Kozak grievances and present to it definite demands. Kysil promised to Khmelnytskyi to use his influence in Warsaw on Kozak behalf, if the conditions he proposed were carried out.⁴²

⁴¹See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Wladyslaw IV, Bila Tserkva, June 12, 1648 (*sic.*, see n. 44 below); in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 33-34; and the Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereiaslav, February 23, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 108.

⁴²See A. Kysil's letter to B. Khmelnytskyi [Hoshcha], June [7], 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 46-48. In this collection of documents Kysil's letter is dated June 12th; while the same copy of this letter, in Pamatniki etc., I, 3, 140-48, is dated June 14th. Both dates are incorrect. The correct date is June 7th, as evident from the following correspondence: A. Kysil's letter to M. Lubienski, Hoshcha, June 7, 1648. See Szajnocha, "Zrodla", *op. cit.*, II, 2, 398-403; and Kubala, *op. cit.*, p. 448, n. 50. Kysil's letter to Lubienski is also found in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 65-68, but again is dated

Khmelnyskyi siezed this opportunity to strengthen his new position which resulted from the recent victories. He agreed to accept Kysil's proposals and to enter into negotiations with the government.⁴³ In order to gain greater concessions, he pretended to know nothing about the death of King Wladyslaw.⁴⁴ In a humble letter to the late king he emphasized that he was not responsible for starting of the conflict. He only acted in self-defence when Potocki marched against him. Khmelnytskyi assured the king of his faithfulness and loyalty to his person, and even alluded to their common interest in combatting the tyranny

incorrectly -- June 30th. Concerning the correct dates of these letters see Szajnocha, op. cit., II, l. 116-17; and Kubala, op. cit., p. 448, nn. 50, 53.

⁴³See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to A. Kysil, Bila Tserkva, June 13, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 44-45; and A. Kysil's letter to M. Lubienski Hoshcha, June 16, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 50.

⁴⁴King Wladyslaw IV died on May 20, 1648; yet, on June 12th Khmelnytskyi still addressed a letter to him. There is enough evidence to show that Khmelnytskyi knew about the death of the king well before June 12th. Some of the contemporaries believed that Khmelnytskyi played a game of pretense. See A. S. Radziwill, Pamietniki etc., 2 vols (Poznan, 1839), II, 293. He must have asked Khan Islam III to help him in this game of pretense. See n. 36 above. Khmelnytskyi's motives were obvious. He knew who would read his letter. He was able to refer specifically and to allude to various "promises" of Wladyslaw IV without fear of contradiction. See Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VIII, 3, 16.

of the magnates. The Kozak Army would also remain loyal to the king; it wished to be placed exclusively under his protection. He emphasized that peace was possible if the demands of the Kozaks were taken into consideration.⁴⁵

At the same time he also wrote humble letters to several influential magnates, asking them for intercession upon Kozak behalf.⁴⁶

That at this time Khmelnytskyi formulated great political designs were only alarming rumours, without foundation, circulating among the panicky nobles. They saw Khmelnytskyi as a "Rusin prince" who intended to carve out of the south-eastern palatinates of the Commonwealth a "sovereign Rusin principality", or to establish a "Rusin monarchy" with Kiev as his capital.⁴⁷ Nothing of the sort

⁴⁵ See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Wladyslaw IV, Bila Tserkva, June 12, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 33-34.

⁴⁶ See B. Khmelnytskyi's letters to A. Kazanowski and to W. Zaslowski, Bila Tserkva, June 12, 1648, ibid., pp. 39-43. He also wrote to J. Ossolinski and to A. Radziwill. See Radziwill, op. cit., II, 296.

⁴⁷ See the following letters: A. Kysil to M. Lubienski [Hoshcha], May 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 25; Anonymous letter from Lviv, June 4, 1648; J. Ulinski and S. Jaskulski to [M. Lubienski], Bar, June [8], 1648; and the speech of B. Leszczyński at the Convocation Diet, Second Session, Warsaw, July 17, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 34, 39, 109. See also the following:

was advanced by him to the government. Khmelnytskyi did not expect to gain complete independence. The rebellion he led was not a premeditated death blow to the Polish-Lithuanian state. The only anti-state -- or more properly anti-magnate -- design proposed by him, was his desire for strengthening the authority of the monarch.⁴⁸ On the whole, he made very moderate claims. These amounted more or less to his desire of reaching a compromise with the government.

The chief aim of Khmelnytskyi, as well as that of all the Kozaks, was to secure the repeal of the Ordinance of 1638 and the official confirmation of all former Kozak liberties. This is evident from the demands of the Kozak Army brought to Warsaw by its delegates. Apart from

Extract from the letter of L. Miaskowski to anonymous, Kamianets, June 8, 1648; anonymous despatch from Brody, June 10, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla" op. cit., II, 407, 409, M. Ostrorog to J. Ossolinski, Lviv, June 4, 1648, in Pamietniki o Koniiecpolskich etc., p. 424; and MS. B.Z.N. Ossol., 189, f.77.

⁴⁸ See B. Khmelnytskyi's letters to the following: Z. Czerny, Bila Tserkva, May 27, 1648; Wladyslaw IV, Bila Tserkva, June 12, 1648; and Jan Kazimierz, Zamostia, November 15, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., 32-34, 80. See also Sobieski's report at the Convocation Diet, Fifth Session, Warsaw, July 21, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 121; and the Diary of W. Miaskowski Pereiaslav, February 22, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, p. 108.

numerous examples of grievances against the injustice of various officials, the Kozaks listed only four items of greater importance. For their Army the Kozaks asked the doubling of the quota of registered Kozaks to 12,000; they demanded pay which they failed to receive for the past five years; and the restoration of their former military self-government. Finally, on behalf of the Orthodox clergy the Kozaks also wanted the establishment of full authority of the Orthodox Church, as well as the restoration ^{of} Orthodox churches held in certain towns of the Crown and the Grand Duchy by the Uniates.⁴⁹

The Kozaks also wanted an autonomous territory beyond Bila Tserkva under the jurisdiction of the Kozak Army, which would be free from various Crown officials and in which the Crown Army would not be stationed.⁵⁰ This wish, no doubt, was the source of the alarming rumours about Khmelnytskyi and his "sovereign Rusin principality",

⁴⁹See the Grievances and Demands of the Kozak Army, Bila Tserkva, June 12, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 36-37.

⁵⁰See M. Potocki's letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun], March 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., pp. 15-16; and J. Ulinski and S. Jaskulski's letter to [M. Lubienski], Bar, June [8], 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 39.

which circulated among the nobles.⁵¹ Since nothing of this sort was specified in the official demands of the Kozak Army to the government, this must have been matter of secondary importance.

To Khmelnytskyi and to the Kozaks religious freedom was the only important "national" question. As had been customary since the 1620's, the Kozaks championed for the rights of the Orthodox Church. They were little concerned with other "national" questions of the Rusin people. This is best illustrated by their egotistical demands. They failed to mention the needs of the unprivileged classes. As far as the Rusin populace was concerned, it was a handy tool to be used in gaining concessions for the Kozak Army. They cared little about the rights of the submerged agrarian population. It was this element, however, which radically changed the nature of the Kozak revolt. As the rising of the serfs took greater dimensions and a more terrible form, Khmelnytskyi was left with two choices: to flow with the tide, or to make attempts to dam it.

At the close of June he summoned a general council of the Kozak Army at Chyhyryn to deal with this problem.

⁵¹See Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VIII, 3, 12.

Most Kozaks expressed hope that their delegates would return from Warsaw with a favourable answer to their demands, and that peace would result eventually. They were, however, prepared to accept even the worst news. For this reason they had to decide on a definite course of action. The Kozak officers were generally against the continuing on with the hostilities. They proposed to move supplies of all available foodstuffs to Zaporozhe; Khmelnytskyi was even prepared to flee into the Don district of Muscovy. From here negotiations could be carried on without danger with both the Poles and the Turks. If agreement was reached with the Poles, they would fight the Turks again; if negotiations brought no fruit, they would accept the protection of the sultan and continue to fight the Poles. Others argued that all "lawless bands", serfs and Tatars should be called for support at the first indication of hostility of the Poles. The common Kozaks were decisively against negotiations; and they openly clamoured for the continuation of war.⁵²

⁵²See the Report of Rev. P. Lasko, Chyhyryn, June 29, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 44-46; the Interrogation of Kozak Prisoners, Halych, July 29, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 93; and S. Karpinski's letter to Anonymous, Bar, June 25, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 430-32.

The Kozak general staff decided to adopt a policy of caution. Khmelnytskyi, as well as many of the Kozak officers, belonging as they did to the gentry, were watching the rising of the serfs with apprehension. This group was not altogether pleased with the massacres of the nobles. Would the serfs accept Kozak masters in place of the eradicated Polish or Rusin lords? Would the serfs return to the tilling of the soil and to the burdens of corvee once peace was concluded? The Kozaks were not interested in any drastic changes of the existing socio-economic order. Khmelnytskyi decided that he did not want to dam the serf deluge; he only wanted to control its flow. If he allowed himself to be carried with the serf deluge, his personal position and the interests of his own class, as well as those of the Kozaks, might perish. Thus, on the one hand, the serf rising aided his plans; on the other, it hampered his negotiations with the government. He had to come to terms with the government before matters would go beyond his control.

At this time Khmelnytskyi had little control over the serf movement. The serfs acted independently and frequently paid no heed to his manifestoes. Khmelnytskyi received news that the serfs on the left bank of the Dnieper

intended to select another leader for themselves. He began to have serious misunderstandings with the popular serf leader Maxym Kryvonis. In order to establish his authority, secure his own gains and that of the Kozaks, and to quiet the apprehensions of the nobles, Khmelnytskyi decided to carry out dangerous and unpopular measures. He seemed to create a rift between the Kozaks and the serfs by restricting serf entry into the Kozak Army, denouncing the actions of the "lawless bands", sending manifestoes to restore order in the countryside and by executing several of the serf leaders. He even claimed that if the government agreed to meet the Kozak demands he was willing to assist the ruling class to check the deluge of the serfs.⁵³ This was only the one side of the coin.

Past experience, however, taught Khmelnytskyi of the many dangers and disadvantages of being the weaker partner during the negotiations. He had no intention of being forced into that position. The Kozak leader led

⁵³See B. Khmelnytskyi's manifestoes to the Kozaks and Serfs, Chyhyryn, June 27 and July 12, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 54-57; Report of Rev. P. Lasko, Chyhyryn, June 29, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 45; and the Anonymous despatch [n.p., ca. July 7-8, 1648], in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 422.

certain men of influence to believe that he would obey the demands of the government and that he was prepared to settle all differences over the conference table.⁵⁴ He was too shrewd, however to place his complete trust in the promises of the ruling order, especially when there were still many voices raised in Warsaw against the "humiliation" of making too many concessions to the lowest riffraff of the Commonwealth".⁵⁵ To follow the demands of the government to the letter was to invite disaster. Khmelnytskyi decided first to consolidate his own position among the Kozaks and the serfs. He would then find a way by which he could apply pressure on the government to gain Kozak demands. Finally, he decided to organize a strong army which would guarantee that all the promises of the government would be kept. In order to accomplish all this, Khmelnytskyi agreed to an armistice. All hostilities were to be suspended until Kozak delegates returned from Warsaw with the reply of the

⁵⁴See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to A. Kysil, Chyhyryn, June 27, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 51-52.

⁵⁵See the speech of B. Leszczynski at the Convocation Diet, Second Session, Warsaw, July 17, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 109.

government to the demands of the Kozak Army.⁵⁶ The armistice, however, rested on a weak foundation: both sides built the agreement on distrust and deceit.

⁵⁶See M. Lubienski's letters to J. Tyszkiewicz and J. Sisniowiecki, Warsaw, June 24, 1648, ibid., pp. 62-63; Senate's letters to J. Tyszkiewicz and J. Wisiowiecki, Warsaw, June 24, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 425-28, and in Pamiatniki etc., I, 3, 102; and B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to A. Kysil, Chyhyryn, June 27, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 51-52.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONFLICTING POLICIES OF THE OSSOLINSKI-WISNIOWIECKI GROUPS, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE KOZAK REBELLION INTO THE NATIONAL STRUGGLE OF THE RUSIN PEOPLE

I

At a time when unity of action for the government was of the utmost importance to prevent further bloodshed in the south-eastern palatinates, the Commonwealth was plagued by additional difficulties. A solution how to deal with the Kozaks and the serfs was yet to be found; new army commanders to replace the captive hetmans were still to be appointed; and a new monarch was still to be elected. Worst of all, at such a difficult time the Commonwealth did not have a strong leader. The Interrex, Primate Maciej Lubieski, was only a nominal head of state. This feeble old man was unable to provide strong leadership, or even to unite all the hostile factions among the nobles of the Commonwealth.¹ As a result of these conditions, there emerged two main groups among the nobles: one was led by

¹See L. Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, 2nd rev. ed (Lviv, 1924), p. 267.

the Crown Grand Chancellor, Jerzy Ossolinski; the other was dominated by the Palatine of Rus, Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki. Both groups agreed on the accomplishment of one basic aim: the restoration of the staus quo of the old order in the south-eastern palatinates of the Commonwealth.² Each group, however, proposed a different programme on the ways and means of dealing with the Kozak-serf problem; clashed on the issue of appointment new army commanders; and supported different candidates for the Polish throne. The Kozak-serf problem proved to be the chief source of disagreement between the two groups.

Jerzy Ossolinski attempted to save the Commonwealth from the impending catastrophe by acting for the indecisive Lubieski. Driven and guided by the love of his country and by his personal ambitions, Ossolinski steered the ship of state during the interregnum by half-legal measures.³ His primary concern was to prevent the fusion of the Kozak rebellion with the rising of the serfs and to rupture the

²See Zofia Libiszowska, "Stosunek polskich mas ludowych do walki narodowo-wyzwolenczej na Ukrainie w latach 1648-1654" [The Relation of the Polish Popular Masses to the Struggle for the National Liberation in Ukraine During the Years 1648-1654], in Sesja naukowa etc (Warsaw, 1956), p. 38.

³See Kubala, op. cit., pp. 268-74.

Kozak-Tatar military alliance. He believed that these were the sources of grave danger to the Commonwealth. But these sources of danger could be averted by governmental concessions to the Kozaks, designed to pacify them by satisfying their narrow class interests. Moreover, Ossolinski reasoned that the pacified Kozaks, in order to safeguard their newly-gained governmental concessions, could be easily induced to quell the rising of the serfs.

Once the domestic strife ended within the Commonwealth, Ossolinski planned to revive the old animosities between the Kozaks and the Tatars, to smash their "unholy" alliance and then to direct the Kozaks against Crimea. But there was also another reason why Ossolinski sought to set into motion the war plans of the late King Wladyslaw IV against the Muslim world. He attempted to strengthen the power of the candidate for the Polish throne of his own choice. The Crown Grand Chancellor therefore planned to make use of the Kozaks as an instrument in the royalist reaction against the anti-monarchical faction of oligarchs and nobles of the Commonwealth.⁴

⁴See ibid., pp. 279-80. See also Libiszowska, op. cit., p. 38; W. Tomkiewicz, Jeremi Wisniowiecki (1612-1651) (Warsaw, 1933), p. 191; and Wladyslaw Czaplinski, Dwa sejmy w roku 1652. Studium z dziejow rozkladu Rzeczypospolitej

For these reasons Ossolinski and his supporters initiated a programme of "contentment", or a programme of conciliatory policy towards the Kozaks.⁵ The immediate aim of this group was to halt all hostilities with the Kozaks and to settle all difficulties by negotiations. Ossolinski encouraged the Orthodox magnate, the Palatine of Bratslav, Adam Kysil, to act as a mediator between the government and the Kozaks.⁶

The major aim of the other group, to use the words of one demagogue, was to ensure that "our bondsmen would not rule over us".⁷ The loudest spokesman for this group

szlacheckiej w XVII wieku [The Two Diets in the Year 1652. A Study from the Times of the Declining Commonwealth of the Gentry in the XVII Century] (Wroclaw: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolinskich, 1955), pp. 32-34. On the renewed plans of war with the Turks, see E. Latacz, Ugoda Zborowska a plany tureckie Jana Kazimierza (Krakow, 1933).

⁵This policy is clearly stated in an anonymous circular entitled "An opinion of One Polish Noble on the Pacification of the Zaporozhian Army". It was most likely composed by Ossolinski or Kysil. See Sprawy i rzeczy etc (Lviv, 1914), pp. 119-23.

⁶See J. Ossolinski's letter to A. Kysil [Warsaw, June 7, 1648], in K. Szajnocha, "Zrodla" [Sources], Dwa lata dziejow naszych. 1646. 1648., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1900), II, 2, 420. Concerning the correct date of this letter see Kubala, op. cit., p. 448, n. 49.

⁷S. Lubomirski's letter to [A. Kysil], Wisnicz, June 14, 1648. Cited by Zbigniew Wojcik, Dziki Pola w ogniu. O Kozaczyznie w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej, 2nd ed (Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1961), p. 176.

was Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki. He was a Polonized Rusin "kinglet", who in his youth rejected Orthodoxy for Roman Catholicism, and who owned vast latifundiae and thousands of serfs in Ukraine.⁸ In Wisniowiecki's evaluation, the conflict within the Commonwealth was nothing more than an insurrection of slaves, against whom must be raised the severe arm of justice.⁹ The Kozaks must first be subdued; then suitably punished for their treason; and only then could certain concessions be offered to them. This meant in fact to resort to sword and bloodshed in quelling the Kozaks and the serfs, and then to dictate conditions of peace to the vanquished. Wisniowiecki saw in the policy of "contentment" of the Kozaks the ultimate ruin of the Commonwealth. He believed that the rebels would only be encouraged to continue their lawlessness and rebellion, as their ambitions would never be satisfied. The result of such policy would be catastrophic: "the continual oppression of the nobles". Wisniowiecki would rather die than to tolerate the rule of "the bondsmen and the most foul

⁸See Tomkiewicz, op. cit., pp. 6-8, 57-113; and I. P. Krypiakevych, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (Kiev, 1954), p. 18.

⁹See Tomkiewicz, op. cit., p. 208.

masses".¹⁰

Notwithstanding the opposition of Wisniowiecki and other intransigents, the programme of Ossolinski seemed to be successful. It appeared that Adam Kysil managed to arrange an armistice. It also appeared that Khmelnytskyi agreed to cease hostilities and that he was prepared to negotiate. At first most of the gentry of the Commonwealth hailed these unexpected developments with satisfaction. Some individuals even began to search for answers as to the causes of the conflict within the Commonwealth.

The most common conclusion, as that of K. Opalinski, was that God punished them for their sins, especially for their ill-treatment of serfs. The Lithuanian magnate, Prince A. Radziwill, described this punishment in terms of retributive justice. "Formerly in this country the poor were oppressed; now they oppress the rich. Formerly the lords used various means in order to squeeze blood from their own serfs; now the serfs are reciprocating in kind".

¹⁰J. Wisniowiecki's letter to A. Kysil, Horochky, June 21, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc (Krakow, 1864), pp. 55-56.

¹¹See K. Opalinski, "On the Burdens and the Oppression of Serfs in Poland", Satyry (Wroclaw, 1953); Book I, Satire 3, ll. 1-140, pp. 23-29.

Convinced that "Our Merciful Lord punished us less for our sins than we deserved", he concluded that it was imperative "to limit our liberties, or rather the abuse of them".¹²

Other individuals also echoed his conclusion: the nobles of the Commonwealth, claimed one contemporary, equate "liberty" with "licence".¹³ An anonymous noble pointed out the main cause of the conflict within the Commonwealth in the following way: "The nobles in our country have so much freedom, / That little of it was left for the burgesses, and hardly any for the serfs".¹⁴ Another noble claimed that the "kinglets", or "those who formed sovereign states [in Ukraine], and infringed upon the rights of not only the serfs, but also of the nobles", should be held responsible for the conflict.¹⁵ These were the opinions of individuals who considered compromise or concessions to the Kozaks as a

¹²A. S. Radziwill, Pamiętniki etc., 2 vols (Poznan, 1839), II, 391.

¹³K. Opalinski, "On the Lame or Rather on the Dead Execution of Our Laws", op. cit., Book III, Satire 8, l. 48, p. 158.

¹⁴"A Noble to Another on the Kozak War in the Years 1648 and 1649". Cited by Janina Bieniarzowna, Walka chłopow w kasztelanii krakowskiej [The Struggle of the Serfs in the Castellany of Krakow] (Warsaw: Ludowa Spoldzielnia Wydawnicza, 1953), p. 32.

¹⁵Speech of S. Kobierzycki at the Coronation Diet (1649). Cited by Czaplinski, op. cit., p. 15.

solution to the conflict. But these were only the voices of a small minority of the nobles of the Commonwealth.

The great majority of nobles of the Commonwealth viewed Ossolinski's policy of "contentment" with suspicion and regarded it extremely dangerous for themselves and for their state. There were several reasons for these attitudes. First of all, when some of these nobles heard that Kysil arranged an armistice and that Khmelnytskyi was prepared to negotiate, they became ashamed of their former panic. Interpreting Khmelnytskyi's unexpected actions and his willingness to negotiate as a sign of Kozak weakness, these nobles decided that the danger was over. At this point they would not "dishonour" themselves or their state by allowing the "riffraff" to remain unpunished. Had not the lowest refuse of society deserved punishment for their foul deeds and crimes? Were the laments and the bloody tears of the nobles, the desecrated churches and the treason and perjury of the Kozaks to be forgotten?¹⁶

Another reason why the policy of compromise was

¹⁶See J. Wisniowiecki's letter to A. Kysil, Horochky, June 21, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 55-56; and W. Zaslowski's letter to the Convocation Diet, Dubno, July 14, 1648, in Karol Szajnocha, "Zrodla"[Sources], Dziela Karola Szajnochy [The Works of Karol Szajnocha] (Warsaw: J. Unger, 1878), X, 197-203.

unpopular among the majority of the nobles was because they believed that it paved the way for Khmelnytskyi to create his "sovereign Rusin Principality".¹⁷ Even if Khmelnytskyi failed in his plans of separatism, there still existed another danger: the Commonwealth of the gentry would face a radical transformation. Khmelnytskyi, it was said, favoured to change the status of the king from primus inter pares among the nobles to an absolute monarch, as well as to drastically curtail the liberties of the nobles.¹⁸

Finally, the initial successes of Ossolinski's policy failed to silence his greatest critics and opponents. On the contrary, these individuals redoubled their efforts to spread their point of view among the nobles of the Commonwealth. These intransigents had no faith in negotiations. They advised the gentry to expect a long struggle with the rebels.¹⁹ They wanted to make use of the armistice

¹⁷See for example D. Slugocki's letter to Niezabitowski, Cholhanskyi Kamian, ca. September 8, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 182-83.

¹⁸See for example D. Sobieski's report at the Convocation Diet, Fifth Session, Warsaw, July 21, 1648, ibid., pp. 120-121; and the reaction to this report, in M. Golinski, MS. B.Z.N.Ossol., 189, f. 123.

¹⁹See S. Lubomirski's letter to the Dietine of the Palatinate of Krakow, Wisnicz, June 24, 1648, in Adam Przybos ed., Akta sejmikowe wojewodztwa krakowskiego [Records of

by raising a strong army; at the same time, however, they also wanted some military action against the enemy.²⁰ It mattered little to these supporters of the policy of the sword what was promised to the Kozaks, because they believed that "frangenti fidem, fides frangatur eidem".²¹

Wisniowiecki and his supporters took advantage of the Dietines, which began their first sessions on June 25, 1648 throughout the Commonwealth. They not only spread their credo among these assemblies of the gentry, but also launched a strong campaign in order to discredit the policy of Ossolinski.²² Moreover, these intransigents were responsible for spreading malicious rumours against the late King Wladyslaw IV and the Crown Grand Chancellor. They claimed that the king sought revenge on the nobles because

the Dietine of the Palatinate of Krakow], 2 vols (Krakow-Wroclaw: Polska Akademia Umiejtnosci-Zaklad Narodowy im. Ossolinskich, 1953-1955), II, 345.

²⁰See the letter of J. Tyszkiewicz and others to the Senate, Kolchyn, July 30, 1648; and J. Wisniowiecki's letter to M. Ostrorog, Zbarazh, August 12, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 98-100, 154-55.

²¹W. Zaslowski's letter to the Convocation Diet, Dubno, July 14, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., X, 202.

²²Typical of this action is S. Lubomirski's letter to the Dietine of the Palatinate of Krakow, Wisnicz, June 24, 1648, in Akta sejmikowe wojewodztwa krakowskiego, II, 344-48.

in 1646 they wrecked his plans of war with the Turks; thus, in retaliation he incited the Kozaks to rebellion against them. In another version of these rumours, the king was supposed to depend upon the Kozaks in order to establish a hereditary monarchy and to extend absolute rule at the expense of the liberties of the nobles. Khmelnytskyi, it was said, acted with the permission and the knowledge of the king; and the third party in that arrangement was Ossolinski, the "author" of the Kozak rebellion.²³

In this way the opponents of the policy of "contentment" of the Kozaks gained a great deal of support from the gentry as a whole, and especially from those of the eastern palatinates, who either lost or were threatened with the loss of their estates to the "riffraff". Most of the

²³See for example the lampoon, "Compendium consiliorum of Jerzy Ossolinski, Crown Chancellor", which was composed in 1649 by Wisniowiecki or by one of his followers. See Pamietniki o Koniecpolskich etc (Lviv, 1842), pp. 422-27. In the same year appeared "Ad nugacem militem responsio", which refuted all the charges made against Ossolinski in the above lampoon. See Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 476-83. Another interesting document is B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Jan Kazimierz, Chyhyryn, June 6, 1651, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc (Kiev, 1961), pp. 631-32. This letter is an obvious forgery. It was written by some supporter of Wisniowiecki and therefore an enemy of the royal court. The main value of this letter is that it contains many charges against King Wladyslaw IV, Ossolinski, and other individuals. See also J. Jerlicz, Latopisiec etc., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1853), I, 52-53.

deputies elected at the Dietines to attend the sessions of the Convocation Diet at Warsaw were instructed by their electors to wreck all the "machinations" of Ossolinski.²⁴

²⁴Ossolinski's emergency measures were extremely unpopular with the gentry of the Commonwealth. Contrary to law and custom, he attempted to transform the assembly of the nobles of the Palatinate of Mazowsze at Warsaw, into a kind of Convocation Diet. Under pressure of Ossolinski, this assembly issued on June 9, 1648 a manifesto addressed to the whole country. This manifesto contained three controversial items: faster election of a new king; immediate mobilization; and appointment of three regimentaries (W. Zaslawski, M. Ostrorog and A. Koniecpolski) in place of the captive hetmans.

The majority of the nobles were enraged at this manifesto. They held Ossolinski responsible for it. They did not view his actions as an attempt to save the Commonwealth from an impending catastrophe. On the contrary, they saw Ossolinski's measures as a deliberate attempt on his part to settle his personal differences with his enemies, as well as to elect a king of his own choice. The new monarch would undoubtedly try to extend "absolutum dominium" and thereby curtail their liberties. For these reasons, the Pre-Convocation Dietines rejected all of this manifesto of June 9, or parts of it.

For typical attitudes of the gentry see the Resolutions and Instructions to the deputies of the Dietine of the Palatinate of Krakow, Proszowice, June 25, 1648, in Akta sejmi-kowe wojewodztwa krakowskiego, II, 354-58; the Dietine of the Palatinates of Poznan and Kalisz, Sroda, June 24, 1648, and an extract from the letter of an anonymous noble from the Palatinate of Lublin [n.p.], July 7, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 63-64, 73. See also Kubala, op. cit., pp. 282, 450, n. 7; and W. Lipinski, Stanislaw Michal Krzyczewski etc (Krakow, 1912), pp. 260-61.

II

While the pacifists and the intransigents fought verbal battles, the nominal leader of the latter group, Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki, decided to act on his own with the sword. Wisniowicki was one of the few men of importance who had not lost their heads after the military disasters of the Crown Army, the death of King Wladyslaw and the rising of the serfs. Ukraine was virtually without defense, for the nobles left it to the prey of the Kozaks, Tatars and serfs. These nobles, rather than organizing some kind of resistance, simply fled for their lives and sought shelter in the fortresses of the western palatinates. Most of them were demoralized and only echoed words of despair. Under these circumstances Wisniowiecki decided to save what could be yet saved. In his own way he proceeded to evolve order out of chaos.

For proper understanding of Wisniowiecki's intransigency to the Kozaks and the serfs, it is necessary to remember that the source of that intransigency dated from the annihilation of the Crown Army at Korsun (May 26, 1648). At that time he was trapped in his own latifundiae on the left bank of the Dnieper by the rising of his own serfs, and by the Kozak-Tatar forces on the right bank of the Dnieper.

He issued manifestoes to the gentry to flock under his colours, and then began to escape from his "cage". He made a spectacular march to the north with some six thousand troops and with great numbers of nobles and Jews. Turning westward, he crossed the rivers Desna, Dnieper and Prypiats, marched south, and reached the northern borders of the Palatinate of Kiev by the middle of June. Wisniowiecki then undertook to oppose force by force and to check the rising of the serfs with all the resources at his disposal.²⁵

At the close of June, Wisniowiecki began a counter-offensive against the roaming bands of serfs. To the cruel actions of the serfs he retaliated with even worse cruelties. "Discharge your duties in such a way", Wisniowiecki instructed his troops regarding all those who opposed him, "that they may feel they are being put to death".²⁶ Leaving a trail of hangings, empalings and

²⁵See B. K. Maskiewicz, "Pamiętniki Bogusława Kazimierza Maskiewiczza" [The Memoirs of Boguslaw Kazimierz Maskiewicz], in Pamiętniki etc (Wrocław, 1961), pp. 243-46; Natan Hannover, "Jawein Mecula t.j. Bagno Glebokie. Kronika zdarzen z lat 1648-1652, napisana przez Natana Hannovera z Zaslavia i wydana po raz pierwszy w Wenecyi w r 1656", in Sprawy i rzeczy etc., p. 22; and Tomkiewicz, op. cit., 184-87, 196-97.

²⁶J. W. Rudawski, Historja polska etc., 2 vols (St. Petersburg, 1855), I, 37.

decapitations in the Palatinate of Kiev, he then marched to Volynia. There his organized and disciplined body of troops performed feats of "miraculous valour" against the motely serf masses commanded by Maksym Kryvonis.²⁷ This guerilla warfare in 1648, was waged to the close of August.²⁸ Both leaders adopted a policy of an eye for an eye: Kryvonis' terrible atrocities were answered by even more terrible pogroms of Wisniowiecki.²⁹

By fighting fire with fire, Wisniowiecki acted

²⁷Some historians have attempted to prove that Kryvonis was a Scotsman and a secret agent of the Protestant powers. Their claims rest on very weak foundations. See Lubomyr Wynar, "The Question of Anglo-Ukrainian Relations During the Rule of the Great Ukrainian Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi", Ukrainian Review, X (Spring, 1963), 37-39.

²⁸See Maskiewicz, in Pamietniki etc., pp. 247-54; and Tomkiewicz, op. cit., pp. 194-34.

²⁹Kryvonis is characterized by Golinski as "the great tyrant and murderer, pillager of towns, villages, churches, priests, nobles, Jews, women and children". M. Golinski, MS. B.Z.N.Ossol., 189, f. 113. Kryvonis' massacres of the Jews are described in great detail by Hannower, in Sprawy i rzeczy etc., pp. 28-43.

The pogroms of Wisniowiecki are described in M. Kryvonis' letter to W. Zaslavski [Polonne?], July 25, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 88; B. Khmelnytsky's letters to the Senate, Zamostia, November 15, 1648, and to the Commissioners, Uladivka, August 19, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 82, 66; and S. Muzhylovskyi's report to Aleksei Mikhailovich [Moscow], February 14, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., 3 vols (Moscow, 1954), II, 129.

against the orders of the government.³⁰ While in Warsaw attempts were made to arrange an armistice and to open negotiations with Khmelnytskyi, Wisniowiecki took deliberate counter-steps in order to paralyze these attempts.³¹ On the one hand, by these counter-steps Wisniowiecki settled his personal accounts with Ossolinski and his group, especially for not having been given the command of the Crown Army.³² On the other hand, his steps resulted also from his love of his country. Wisniowiecki sincerely believed that the policy of the pacifists was a disgrace for the Commonwealth, and that the crimes of the "riffraff" could only be atoned by their blood. Regarding parleys as a waste of time, he endeavoured to convince the pacifists that "the more we deliberate, the more . . . we perish", and pointed out that the enemy used the armistice to grow

³⁰Wisniowiecki received an informal note from Kysil about the armistice and the negotiations, who asked him "not to provoke the enemy". See A. Kysil's letter to J. Wisniowiecki, Hoshcha, June [ca., 10-15], 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 54-55. Officials' announcements were sent to Wisniowiecki by the Primate and the Senate. See M. Lubienski's letter to J. Wisniowiecki, Warsaw, June 24, 1648, ibid., p. 63; and Senate's letter to J. Wisniowiecki, Warsaw, June 24, 1648, in Pamiatniki etc., 4 vols (Kiev, 1845), I, 3, 102.

³¹See Tomkiewicz, op. cit., p. 194.

³²See ibid., pp. 188-94.

stronger and to commit more atrocities.³³ He was right; but he failed to see that much of this resulted from his own irresponsible actions. These actions also contributed to the failure of negotiations and made the attainment of peace impossible.

Wisniowiecki was a remarkable man, an individual with an iron will, and an extremely gifted military commander. He was also a typical borderland "kinglet", who was hated by magnates and by courtiers in Warsaw, But he was idealized by the gentry and the Jews, who saw in him the saviour of the Commonwealth.³⁴ Although Wisniowiecki managed to hold his own against the overwhelming numbers of the serfs, he had insufficient strength to crush the rising of the serfs by striking a blow which would decide the conflict. Thus, rather than extinguishing the fire, he only added fuel to it. His cruel actions, which even alarmed some of his closest collaborators, were called as

³³See J. Wisniowiecki's letter to A. Kysil, Horochky, June 21, 1648, and the letter of J. Tyszkiewicz and others to the Senate, Kolchyn, July 30, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 55-56, 99-100. See also Hannover, in Sprawy i rzeczy etc., p. 35.

³⁴See the "Verses on the Pogrom of the Hetmans at Korsun" (1649), in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 476; and Hannover, in Sprawy i rzeczy etc., p. 22.

a "provocation of the enemy".³⁵ Even before he initiated his campaign of terror and pogroms, it seemed as if every serf in Ukraine took up arms and either killed or drove out his own master. By the beginning of July the serfs "neither sowed nor plowed, but only wandered about armed". While some serfs were engaged in independent fighting, looting and killing, other serfs banded together and formed a great army. As this army moved westward, towns and castles fell on its path; and fresh risings of the serfs began to erupt in the western palatinates.³⁶

Wisniowiecki's irresponsible actions contributed greatly to three important developments. First of all, his actions caused the "serfs' fury" to intensify and to spread into the neighbouring palatinates. To the nobles every serf was a potential enemy; and every hamlet or town a

³⁵Cited by Szajnocha, op. cit., II, 1, 201.

³⁶See the letter of J. Ulinski and S. Jaskolski to [M. Lubienski], Bar, June [8], 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 10; Zolkiewski's letter to J. Ossolinski, Dubno, June 8, 1648, and S. Karpinski's letter to Anonymous, Bar, June 25, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 405, 430-31; Rev. P. Lasko's report, Chyhyryn, June 29, 1648, and S. Muzhylovskiy's report to Aleksei Mikhailovich [Moscow], February 14, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 45, 129; and B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to A. Kysil, Chyhyryn, June 27, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 52.

potential enemy's nest.³⁷ Moreover, as the struggle took greater dimensions and a more terrible form, it began to gain support from all classes of the Rusin people. Finally, by August, as the deluge of the serfs inundated the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav, Chernihiv, the greater portions of Podolia and Volynia and the southern areas of several of the palatinates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Kozaks were also forced to move into action.³⁸

While Wisniowiecki was perpetrating reprisals against the serfs in Volynia, the Convocation Diet (July 16 to August 1, 1648) began its sessions in Warsaw. Right from the first session the pacifists of Ossolinski and the intransigents of Wisniowiecki became engaged in a verbal duel. Because of the great friction between the two groups, precious time was wasted on needless debates. The most

³⁷See the letter of J. Tyszkiewicz and others to the Senate, Kolchyn, July 30, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 100.

³⁸See the list of captured towns, Session of the Senate Council, Warsaw, August 22, 1648, ibid., pp. 158-59; Hannover, in Sprawy i rzeczy etc., pp. 46-47; K. F. Obuchowicz, "Dyaryusz Kazimierza Filipa Obuchowicza Wojewody Smolenskiego i Marszalka Kola Rycerskiego" [The Diary of Kazimierz Filip Obuchowicz, Palatine of Smalensk and Marshal of the Chamber of Deputies], in Pamietniki historyczne etc (Vilnius, 1859), p. 20; and E. Kotlubaj, Zycie Janusza Radziwilla etc (Vilnius, 1859), pp. 112-16.

pressing problems received little attention. In general, the Kozak matters were badly handled. Rather than sending the delegates of the Kozak Army with a hopeful answer as soon as possible after their arrival in Warsaw, the wrangling Diet kept them needlessly for two weeks and then sent them back with a vague reply. If the Kozaks showed signs of repentance and were willing to make reparations for their crimes, they would then merit forgiveness. In order to show their good faith to the government, the Kozaks were required to surrender all prisoners and leaders of serf bands, as well as to break their alliance with the Tatars. At a later date a commission would be appointed which would study all Kozak grievances and which would also acquaint the Kozaks with the additional demands of the government.³⁹ Considering the military successes of the Kozaks, this was a preposterous answer.

At the same time as the Diet resolved the terms under which peace was to be negotiated with the Kozaks,⁴⁰

³⁹See the Convocation Diet's letter to the Kozak Army, Warsaw, July 22, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 85-86.

⁴⁰The peace terms with the Kozaks were resolved by the Diet on July 26th. The following were the main terms: the Kozaks had to surrender all prisoners, leaders of serf bands, captured cannon and arms (Arts. 1, 2 and 7); to

it received alarming reports. The south-eastern palatinates of the Crown, as far west as Volynia, and the bordering areas of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, were falling under the control of the "riffraff". Moreover, according to various despatches, Muscovy was also sending military aid to the Kozaks. These serious adverse news had the effect of speeding up the phlegmatic proceedings of the Diet. With certain promptness the Diet agreed to appoint Adam Kysil to head a commission. He was given plenipotentiary powers and entrusted with the impossible task of halting the advance of the enemy by concluding peace with the Kozaks. The Diet also voted to continue military preparations. At the end of July it approved Ossolinski's three appointed regimentaries in place of the captive

bring to an end their military alliance with the Tatars (Art. 3); to lift the siege of Kodak Fortress (Art. 6); and to reaffirm their loyalty to the Commonwealth and to serve it faithfully (Arts. 4 and 5). The commission received plenipotentiary powers (Art. 11). It was to hear the grievances of the Kozaks (Art. 8); and to promise them pay only if they swore loyalty to the Commonwealth and surrendered the letters of King Wladyslaw IV, in which he allegedly granted them permission to increase the quota of the registered Kozaks to 12,000 (Arts. 8 and 9). The commission was to offer to the Kozaks the same terms as those of 1638, but if they refused to accept them, it could offer them those of 1630 or even of 1625. See Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 462-64; and Radziwill, op. cit., II, 309.

hetmans, but as a precaution named thirty-two commissioners to aid them. On August 1st the Convocation Diet ended its deliberations.⁴¹

News of the rising of the serfs taking greater dimensions and a more terrible form brought fear into the hearts of many deputies lest the Kozaks, who were still relatively quiet, side with the serfs. This situation caused even the most ardent intransigents to re-evaluate their position. In the end the deputies were forced to vote for the plans of Ossolinski, which they fought so strongly against. Both Ossolinski and Kysil spared no arguments to convince the deputies that they made the right decision. It was wiser, they claimed, to pacify the Kozaks with some concessions and to separate them from the Tatars and the serfs, rather than to have to face the combined Kozak-Tatar-serf menace.

Both of those men maintained that Khmelnytskyi really wanted peace. Kysil assured his colleagues that he would be able to negotiate peace without "dishonouring" the

⁴¹See the Record of the Convocation Diet, Eighth to Fourteenth Sessions, Warsaw, July 24 to August 1, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 126-44; Radziwill, op. cit., II, 309-16; Obuchowicz, in Pamietniki historyczne etc., pp. 19-20; and M. Golinski, MS. B.Z.N. Ossol., 189, f. 112 et seq.

Commonwealth by some radical concessions to the Kozaks. Both Ossolinski and Kysil led the Diet to believe that once the Ordinance of 1638 was repealed, the Kozaks would easily accept terms similar to those offered to them in 1625 or 1630. In order to satisfy their opponents Ossolinski and Kysil voted for a mobilization of an army. They expected, however, that this army would be used simply for the purpose of overawing the Kozaks with its show of strength and thereby forcing them to come to terms more quickly.⁴² It appeared that Ossolinski won a major victory at the Convocation Diet and that he would be able to put all of his policy into effect. Ossolinski, however, did not win a victory: the Diet merely accepted the lesser of two evils.

III

Three basic phases can be distinguished in the heretofore described conflict within the Commonwealth in 1648. The first phase was the Kozak rebellion under Khmelnytskyi. The rising of the serfs began the second phase. In the third phase all the social strata among the Rusin people coalesced into a united front. In this way the Kozak rebellion was transformed into a Rusin national

⁴²See Kubala, op. cit., pp. 290-91, 298-99.

struggle for independence from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

The Kozak rebellion was the first phase of the conflict within the Commonwealth. The Kozak rebellion was an armed protest of one Rusin stratum against the intolerable conditions of life. The aims of the Kozaks were narrow and specific: they now wanted the government to repeal the Ordinance of 1638 and to confirm their former liberties. The Kozaks seemed to show little concern for the rights and the aspirations of the unprivileged classes of the Rusin people. They considered religious freedom the only important Rusin national question. One of the main results of the "dreadful [Kozak] rebellion" was that it set into motion a far more terrible "war of the serfs".⁴³

The rising of the serfs was the second stage of the conflict within the Commonwealth. The beginning of this "serfs' fury" was almost spontaneous. Although it was prepared by Kozak slogans and set into motion by Kozak victories of May 1648, the rising nevertheless erupted

⁴³A. Kysil's letter to Wladyslaw IV, Hoshcha, May 27, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 382.

without Kozak organization or aid.⁴⁴ From the "hell of the serfs" emerged a great social movement which threatened to destroy the existence of the "heaven of the nobles".⁴⁵ During this "brigantage of the serfs" began "unheard-of turmoils and massacres". The Rusin serfs reacted savagely against their exploiters and oppressors: Polish and Rusin nobles and Jews, and all their families, servants, dependents and agents.⁴⁶ Wisniowiecki's pogroms, from June to August 1648, opened wider the dykes for a deluge of serfs.

⁴⁴The effects of these slogans are illustrated in M. Potocki's letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun], March 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 15-16. The serfs took up arms immediately after the Battle of Zhovti Vody. See Maskiewicz, in Pamietniki etc., p. 239. The captive serfs of the Kamianets area, for example, testified under torture that "nullam sibi commercium et societatem cum Cosacis esse, but themselves, out of their own free will, taedio servitutis et Poloniae dominationis impatientes arma adversus immodica usurpantes corripuerunt". Letter of S. Kushevych [Lviv], August 26, 1648. Cited by Lipinski, op. cit., p. 82, n. 3.

⁴⁵In the opinion of Pacichelli, an Italian who visited the Commonwealth in the middle of the seventeenth century, "Clarum regnum Polonorum est coelum nobiliorum, est infernus rusticorum". Cited by Lipinski, op. cit., p. 18, n. 1.

⁴⁶See Jerlicz, op. cit., I, 61-62; Zolkiewski's letter to J. Ossolinski, Dubno, June 8, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 405; Rev. P. Lasko's report, Chyhyryn, June 29, 1648, and S. Muzhylovskiy's report to Aleksei Mikhailovich [Moscow], February 14, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 45, 129; and J. Jelicki's letter to the Sherif of Dybiv, Ustyluh, September 3, 1648, in Sprawy irzeczy etc., p. 113.

These pogroms also set the stage for the third phase of the conflict.

The third phase of the conflict within the Commonwealth was characterized by the coalescence of all the social strata among the Rusin people and by the emergence of a common Rusin front. The Kozak rebellion, which was first changed by the rising of the serfs, was now completely transformed by the active participation of other strata of the Rusin people -- nobles, burgesses and clergy.

Although there were many nobles, the so-called "gente Rutheni, natione Poloni", in the opposing camp, many others chose to support the aspirations of the Rusin "riff-raff".⁴⁷ Those nobles who actively participated in the rebellion did so for various reasons and acted in various roles. The "military" element figured prominently as officers in the Kozak Army. Other nobles played an extremely important part as organizers and leaders of serf movements, especially in Rusin ethnic territories which were not yet occupied by the Kozaks. Still others, assumed administrative, judicial and diplomatic duties in the areas

⁴⁷On the participation of the Rusin nobles and on their role in the conflict, see Lipinski, op. cit., pp. 12-332.

controlled by the Kozak Army. The presence of nobles in the Kozak Army was readily admitted both by Khmelnytskyi and his adversaries. These nobles, who "became Kozaks", were often contemptuously referred to by their opponents as leaders of "bands of rabble", or "traitors" who "betrayed God and the Commonwealth".⁴⁸ Many of these nobles displayed great hostility to the Commonwealth and urged Khmelnytskyi to resume hostilities.⁴⁹

Just as the nobles, the Rusin burgesses also assumed important roles, both in the leadership of the Kozak Army and in that of the serfs.⁵⁰ Many municipalities established contacts with Khmelnytskyi and aided both the Kozaks and the serfs.⁵¹ Khmelnytskyi's appeals to the burgesses for

⁴⁸See A. Kysil's letter to J. Ossolinski, Rovne, August 12, 1648 and the anonymous report on the activities of Khmelnytskyi, n. p., July 30, 1650, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 150, 554; L. Miaskowski's letter to W. Miaskowski, Kamianets, August 17, 1648 and W. Zaslowski's letter to the Convocation Diet, Dubno, July 14, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 457-58; X, 202.

⁴⁹See G. Kunakov's report to Muscovite Department of Foreign Affairs (1649), in Akty odnosiaschiesia etc., 15 vols (St. Petersburg, 1861), III, 404; and Hannover, in Sprawy i rzeczy etc., p. 22.

⁵⁰Interrogation of Kozak prisoners, Halych, June 29, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 91-94; and Lipinski, op. cit., pp. 126-27.

⁵¹See A. Konecpolski's manifesto to the gentry [n.p.], May

the surrender of their towns to him were received by them with enthusiasm.⁵² A contemporary noted that if this trend continued, "there would be no town [left] which would defend itself against Khmelnytskyi".⁵³ By such frequent examples of "treachery", the Rusin burgesses facilitated for the "rebels" their movement into the interior of the western palatinates.

In many cases, the messengers sent from Rusin burgesses to Khmelnytskyi were Orthodox priests.⁵⁴ With religious differences so pronounced between the combatants, it is not difficult to imagine the role played by the Orthodox clergy. The "bishops, archimandrites, abbots, archpriests, priests and other servants of the houses of God", whom Khmelnytskyi called to defend their "ancient

31, 1648, in Pamiętniki etc., I, 3, 44-45; Interrogation of Kozak prisoners, Halych, July 29, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 93-94; Maskiewicz, in Pamiętniki etc., pp. 247, 252; and Hannover, in Sprawy i rzeczy etc., pp. 29 et seq.

⁵²See A. Kysil's letter to M. Lubienski [Hoshcha], May 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 25-26.

⁵³Letter of J. Ulinski and S. Jaskolski to [M. Lubienski], Bar, June [8], 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 40.

⁵⁴See Aleksander Czolowski, "Relacya o oblezeniu miasta Lwowa przez Bohdana Chmielnickiego 1648 roku", Kwartalnik Historyczny, VI (no. 3, 1892), 549; and Lipinski, op. cit., pp. 84-85.

Greek [Orthodox] faith",⁵⁵ responded to his appeals. The lower clergy played an especially important role in the conflict. They were the "priests conspirators"⁵⁶ who fomented the Rusin people with religious slogans and encouraged them to take up arms "for the faith".⁵⁷ They organized serf bands, and even served as their leaders.⁵⁸ They set up a network of communications among themselves and sent frequent reports to Kiev.⁵⁹ They were also the emissaries of Khmelnytskyi.⁶⁰ They were "more a hinderance than aid" to those who attempted to resolve the conflict by

⁵⁵B. Khmelnytskyi's manifesto to the Rusin people, Chyhyryn [ca. early 1648], in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 625.

⁵⁶W. Miaskowski's letter to L. Miaskowski, Lviv, September 27, 1648. Cited by Lipinski, op. cit., p. 22.

⁵⁷This is typically illustrated in F. Arsenev's letter to Muscovite Department of Defense, Volnov, June 7, 1648, in Akty Moskovskogo gosudarstva (St. Petersburg, 1894), II, 222; and in W. Zaslowski's letter to the Convocation Diet, Dubno, July 14, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., X, 200.

⁵⁸See W. Lozinski, Prawem i lewem etc., 2 vols., 4th ed (Lviv, 1931), I, 420.

⁵⁹See the interrogation of Kozak prisoners, Halych, July 29, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 93.

⁶⁰See W. Miaskowski's letter to L. Miaskowski, Novosilka, February 1, 1649, ibid., p. 365.

negotiations.⁶¹ The ruling order suspected most of the Orthodox clergy of secretly supporting the "rebels"⁶² An apprehended "priest conspirator" suffered savage reprisals for the part he played.⁶³

Thus on the whole the third phase of the conflict within the Commonwealth was characterized by the transformation of the Kozak rebellion into the national struggle of all the strata of the Rusin people. Both sides in the struggle emphasized that the conflict did not concern the people of the same nationality. Khmelnytskyi used national-religious slogans effectively in order to gain support for the Kozak rebellion. He stirred all those of "the same faith and blood" to rise against the "Poles, the enemies of our [Rusin] people". To those in the camp of the ruling class -- Poles or Polonized Rusins -- everything "Rusin" was detested, feared, suspected or distrusted.

⁶¹Letter of A. Kysil and W. Miaskowski to Jan Kazimierz, Vasylkiv, February 11, 1649, in Ojczyzste spominki etc., 2 vols (Krakow, 1845), II, 10. See also M. Golinski, MS. B.Z.N.Ossol., 189, f. 210

⁶²See Lipinski, op. cit., p. 85, n. 7.

⁶³See M. Kryvonis' letter to W. Zaslowski [Polonne?], July 25, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 88; and B. Khmelnytskyi's letters to the Commissioners', Uladivka, August 19, 1648 and to the Senate, Zamostia, November 15, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 66, 82.

In their correspondence, the nobles of the Commonwealth stressed the fact that it was the "Rusin Kozaks" and the "Rusin dragoons" who mutinied, deserted the Crown Army and then joined the ranks of the rebels. "We are all in extreme danger from the treacherous Rusins, our serfs", complained one noble to another. Prince Wisniowiecki was also endangered by the rising of his own "Rusin" serfs; moreover, he was unable to trust all of his own troops because many of them were "Rusins". In the opinion of one noble, most "Rusins" were either in sympathy with the rebels, or took an active part in the rebellion. Still another noble complained that it was very difficult to spy among the "Rusins" because "all of them are traitors". It was therefore obvious to the contemporaries that a "Rusin rebellion" was taking place, in which "the conspiracy of all the Rusins" was evident.⁶⁴

⁶⁴See B. Khmelnytskyi's manifesto to the Rusin people, Chyhyryn [ca. early 1648], *ibid.*, p. 625; Z. Czerny's letter to J. Ossolinski, Bila Tserkva, May 25, 1648, M. Ostrorog's letter to J. Ossolinski, Lviv, June 12, 1648 and the letter of Lviv burgesses to Karol Ferdynand, Lviv, September 15, 1648, in *Pamiętniki etc.*, I, 3, 25-26, 94, 269; Anonymous despatch from Ukraine, Pidhortse, May 21, 1648, Z. Czerny's letter to Anonymous, Bila Tserkva, May 26, 1648, W. Miaskowski's letter to P. Gembicki, Lviv, May 28, 1648, and the Anonymous letter from Lviv, June 4, 1648, in *Jakuba Michalowskiego etc.*, pp. 17, 25-26, 32; M. Ostrorog's letter to J. Ossolinski, Lviv, May 26, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla",

The conflict within the Commonwealth was thus not a civil war, because it concerned mainly two ethnic groups --- Polish and Rusin -- which were sharply divided by religious, linguistic and cultural differences. For the Rusins this was a struggle for national liberation.

IV

The third phase of the conflict within the Commonwealth was characterized by the emergence of the Rusin united front, which coalesced from all the social strata among the Rusin people. The Rusin ethnic solidarity alone would not have been sufficient to bring about this common front and to transform the Kozak rebellion into a national struggle for liberation. Rather, the most important and dominant single factor which bound all the Rusins together, and which gave cohesion to the whole movement for their liberation, was their common religion. Religious, more than ethnic differences, deepened the gulf between the Poles and the Rusins. For the latter, Orthodoxy emphasized their ethnic origin, and in the majority of cases the

op. cit., II, 2, 380; M. Ostrorog's letter to J. Ossolinski, Zbarazh, July 3, 1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 54; and W. Zaslowski's manifesto to the the Crown Army, Dubno, July 19, 1648, cited by Lipinski, op. cit., p. 99.

cleavage in the social structure of the Commonwealth. At the same time, the Orthodox faith was the main factor which fostered the national consciousness of all the classes of the Rusin people.

No better example can be found of this fact than by examining the actions and the attitudes of the many Polonized Rusin nobles, who were still Orthodox, yet who chose to take up arms against their Orthodox brethern. At the Convocation Diet the Orthodox deputies were prepared to declare "every noble" who took part in the rebellion as "an enemy and a betrayer of the fatherland". They also were ready "to shed blood" fighting along with the Polish nobles against "the lawless [Rusin] serfs".⁶⁵ The same men, however, at a time when their "fatherland" seemed to be on the brink of disaster, took advantage of this predicament to demand concessions for the Orthodox Church. They clamoured for the abolition of the Uniate Church and for the restoration of all rights to the Orthodox Church.⁶⁶

⁶⁵Record of the Convocation Diet, Eighth Session, Warsaw, July 24, 1648. Cited by Lipinski, op. cit., p. 28.

⁶⁶See the Record of the Convocation Diet, Seventh and Eighth Sessions, Warsaw, July 23-24, 1648 and the Record of the Election Diet, Thirteenth Session, Warsaw, November 12, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 122-23, 126-27, 311-14. See also Radziwill, op. cit., II, 340.

When similar demands were brought by the Kozak delegation before the Diet, many Polish nobles suspected their Orthodox colleagues and other Orthodox nobles of secret collaboration with Khmelnytskyi or of influencing the course of the conflict.⁶⁷ Only the nobles, reasoned one magnate, were sufficiently enlightened to concern themselves with religious matters. It was certainly not the concern of all "the perjurers, tyrants, rebels, bandits, invaders and profaners of churches". It would be ridiculous to assume that the serfs, "who have no knowledge about God and who have no faith . . . [and who] live not only like barbarians, but also like wild beasts", would demand the restoration of Orthodox churches held by the Uniates.⁶⁸ Contrary to his opinion, the religious issues concerned not only the Rusin nobles, but all strata of the Rusin society.

The scrupulous and detailed reports of the Muscovite envoy Grigorii Kunakov to the Posolskii Prikaz illustrate the significance of the religious factor. According to him, the senators at the Election Diet were prepared to pass a resolution which called for the abolition of the rights of

⁶⁷See Lipinski, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

⁶⁸W. Zaslowski's letter to the Convocation Diet, Dubno, July 14, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., X, 200.

the Orthodox Church. They argued that "one faith in the whole state" would prevent future "strife and quarrels . . . among lords, nobles and common people" within the Commonwealth. The Catholic Primate was against it. He advised them not to adopt such dangerous measures, for "all of them [i.e., Rusin nobles] will join Khmelnytskyi and the Kozaks. He also pointed out that even at this time there was "much blood being shed for the [Orthodox] faith".⁶⁹

Khmelnytskyi also fully realized that the common religion of the Rusin people gave the cohesion to the whole movement against the Commonwealth. He therefore made use of religious slogans to stir the Rusins into action. The Kozaks, it was said, were fighting the Poles "for the [Orthodox] faith".⁷⁰ These slogans were re-echoed by the

⁶⁹G. Kunakov's report to Muscovite Department of Foreign Affairs (1649), in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., III, 304.

⁷⁰Archdeacon Paul had no doubt that Khmelnytskyi "fought for the cause of religion [and therefore] . . . God gave him strength, and assisted his endeavours from the beginning of his career till the end; and hurled destruction, by his sword, on the vanity and discord of his enemies". Paul of Aleppo, The Travels etc., 2 vols (London, 1831), I, 2, 73, 175.

This slogan, "for the faith", appeared frequently in Muscovite sources. See for example the reports of Muscovite voevodas to the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defense, as well as letters of private individuals, from May to August 1648, in Akty ontosiashchiesia etc., III, 212-13,

Orthodox priests to the Rusin populace.⁷¹ The serfs therefore regarded Khmelnytskyi as a "Saviour", who would free them from the yoke of serfdom and who would safeguard their religion.⁷² The serfs, as well as other "people of Greek [Orthodox] faith", anxiously awaited the arrival of Kozak troops into their districts, in order to surrender towns to them or to participate with them in the conflict.⁷³ Since it seemed that "all the Rusins" reacted with hate "against the Catholics and the Poles",⁷⁴ it is little wonder that one Polish magnate wrote: "all hope lies only in our Catholic people; . . . only these we can trust".⁷⁵

216, 227, 237, 229-30; in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 50-51; and in Akty Moskovskogo gosudarstva, II, 222.

⁷¹See W. Zaslowski's letter to the Convocation Diet, Dubno, July 14, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., X, 200.

⁷²M. Ostrorog's letter to J. Ossolinski, Lviv, June 4, 1648, in Pamietniki o Konicpolskich etc., p. 423; and Anonymous letter from Lviv, June 4, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 33.

⁷³Anonymous letter from Lviv, June 4, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 34.

⁷⁴Anonymous letter from Lviv, September 7, 1648, Cited by Lipinski, op. cit., p. 22.

⁷⁵L. Opalinski's letter to Borowski, Poznan [June] 2, 1648, ibid., p. 20. This letter is dated May 2nd, but June 2nd makes more sense.

The ruling class thus began to equate "Orthodox" with "treason".⁷⁶

The nature and the intensity of the rebellion against the Commonwealth started by the Kozaks was first changed by the participation of the serfs, and then by the participation of the Rusin people as a whole. It was therefore, a "Rusin rebellion". During this rebellion the most important single factor which bound all the Rusins together, and which gave cohesion to the whole movement, was their common religion. The chief aim of the Rusins engaged in belligerence was to gain independence from the Commonwealth. Both of the opposing sides emphasized that the conflict was concerned with this issue.

Already at the eleventh hour of the Kozak rebellion the ruling class expressed grave fears that the Kozaks wanted "absolute rule in Ukraine".⁷⁷ Following the first Kozak victories the gentry grew more alarmed. Rumours began to circulate among them that the Kozaks intended to create an independent state, and that Khmelnytskyi was

⁷⁶See M. Ostrorog's letter to J. Ossolinski, Lviv, June 4, 1648, in Pamietniki o Koniecpolskich etc., p. 423.

⁷⁷M. Potocki's letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun], March 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 15.

prepared to assume the title of "Prince of Rus" and to declare Kiev as his capital.⁷⁸ By September 1648 some contemporaries analysed the conflict within the Commonwealth as "the Rusin rebellion and the deluge of the serfs, allied with the heathen", which "already gained control over all of Ukraine".⁷⁹ In these words they described a national rising of the Rusin people in which the social element still predominated, and which was strengthened by a political alliance with the Tatars. At present time the Rusins gained control of Ukraine. Fresh rumours began to circulate among the nobles of the Commonwealth that these "traitors" also had the intention of "separating Rus from the Crown".⁸⁰ Their aim was then to secure independence for all of the Rusin ethnic territories. These developments influenced the course of action and the plans of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, who began to assume control of the whole movement for Rusin liberation.

⁷⁸Typical of these rumours is A. Kysil's letter to M. Lubinski [Hoshcha], May 31, 1648, ibid., II, 25.

⁷⁹Letter of Lviv burgesses to Karol Ferdynand, Lviv, September 15, 1648, in Pamiatniki etc., I, 3, 269.

⁸⁰D. Slugocki's letter to Niezabitowski, Cholhanskyi Kamian, ca. September 8, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 183.

CHAPTER V

KHMELNYTSKYI'S DIPLOMACY PRECEDING THE BATTLE OF PYLIAVTSI AND THE CHANGE OF HIS AIMS FOLLOWING THE FRESH KOZAK MILITARY SUCCESSES

I

The Convocation Diet ended its deliberations on August 1, 1648. This Diet appointed Adam Kysil as the head of a commission, instructing him to proceed to Kiev and to negotiate peace with Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. The efforts to solve the grave difficulties of the Commonwealth by diplomatic means were, however, hindered by several obstacles.

One of these obstacles was the overconfidence of the government that the conflict would be resolved over a conference table. For this reason the Diet issued a vague reply to the Kozak demands, and formulated a series of highly unrealistic counter-demands of its own.¹ Furthermore, because of the phlegmatic proceedings of the Diet and the needless debates, the delegates of the Kozak Army were

¹See Convocation Diet's letter to the Kozak Army, Warsaw July 22, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc (Krakow, 1864), pp. 85-86.

kept waiting in Warsaw to July 22nd.² This two week delay created serious misunderstandings between the two sides. Khmelnytskyi, who despatched the Kozak delegates to Warsaw on June 12, still awaited for their return with the answer from the government at the end of July.³ To make matters worse, malicious rumours began to circulate among the Kozaks that their delegates were executed in Warsaw.⁴ Thus, this unnecessary delay led only to the worsening of tensions and the the resumption of the hostilities.

Another serious obstacle was the renewal of the hostilities between the two sides before the term set for an armistice expired. Many nobles disregarded the orders of the government and began to wage a guerilla war against the serfs. Prince Wisniowiecki, the leader of the reaction, being alarmed at the steady gains of the "riffraff" and the general lack of resistance of the gentry, redoubled his

²See the Record of Convocation Diet, Sixth Session, Warsaw, July 22, 1648, ibid., p. 121; and A.S. Radziwill, Pamietniki etc., 2 vols (Poznan, 1839), II, 302.

³See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to W. Zaslowski, Pavoloch, July 30, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc (Kiev, 1961), p. 62.

⁴See M. Kryvonis' letter to W. Zaslowski [Polonne?], July 29, 1648; and A. Kysil's letter to J. Ossolinski, Khorlupie, August 9, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 88, 152. See also Radziwill, op. cit., II, 318.

terroristic activities. Vindicating his own cause and that of his timid "brethren", he continued to provoke the serfs with his particular brand of atrocities.⁵ These actions came at a time when Kysil sought contact with Khmelnytskyi to begin negotiations.

Finally, after having to fight his way through the roaming bands of serfs,⁶ Kysil began to realize that there existed yet another obstacle. The success of the negotiations and the attainment of peace did not depend on the goodwill of Khmelnytskyi alone, but also on that of "the multitude of riffraff". Reports reached him that "lawless men" gained the upper hand in the Kozak camp; they did not want peace but war. Kysil speculated that if Khmelnytskyi was not killed during the disturbances among the Kozaks, then he surely remained "in the discretion of [these]

⁵See M. Kryvonis' letter to W. Zaslowski [Polonne?], July 29, 1648; J. Wisniowiecki's letter to M. Lubienski, Cholhanskyi Kamin, August 30, 1648, and A. Kysil's letter to M. Lubienski, Ukhane, September 29, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 88, 175, 204. See also B. Khmelnytskyi's letters to the Commissioners, Ulađivka, August 19, 1648 and Kumanivtsi, August 28, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 66, 68.

⁶See A. Kysil's letter to J. Ossolinski, Rovne, August 2, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 149.

congregated multitudes".⁷ Thus, it was the "rabble", the common Kozaks and serfs, that constituted the greatest menace to the Commonwealth.

Yet, Kysil remained optimistic; he was certain that all his efforts would not be in vain. He was also encouraged by the willingness of Khmelnytskyi to meet the demands of the government. The Kozak leader claimed to have sent the Tatars back to Crimea. He released all nobles which were captive in the Kozak camp, and either executed or punished many of the serf leaders. Khmelnytskyi even showed goodwill by agreeing to accept the mediation of the Metropolitan Bishop of Kiev, Sylvestr Kosiv. Finally, even at the end of August his letters still expressed hope that reconcilliation was possible.⁸ This was, however, only the

⁷See A. Kysil's letters to J. Ossolinski, Khorlupie, August 9, 1648; to M. Lubienski, Ukhanie, September 29, 1648, *ibid.*, pp. 149, 204; to B. Khmelnytskyi [Lutsk], August 12, 1648, in K. Szajnocha, "Zrodla" [Sources], Dwa lata dziejow naszych. 1646. 1648., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1900), II, 2, 451; and to S. Potocki, Karchivka, September 7, 1648, in Karol Szajnocha, "Zrodla" [Sources], Dziela Karola Szajnochy [The Works of Karol Szajnocha] (Warsaw: J. Unger, 1878), X 220. See also M. Krosnowski's letter to S. Zadorski, Lviv, September 1, 1648, and A. Szoldrski's letter to Anonymous, Warsaw, September 23, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 178, 199-200.

⁸See B. Khmelnytskyi's letters to the Commissioners, Uladivka, August 19, 1648, and Kumanivtsi, August 28, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 66-68. See

one side of a coin.

The other side was entirely different. Khmelnytskyi must have decided sometime in July that the whole business of negotiations would come to naught. The Poles were not ready to make concessions; they were acting in bad faith, for while Kysil was sent to negotiate with him, a new army was being mobilized.⁹ He was, however, prepared either to carry on negotiations, or in case this failed, to wage war. He was not inactive during the term set for the armistice. On the contrary, just like his enemies, Khmelnytskyi also took advantage of the armistice and planned out his strategic moves. His diplomatic policy was devised to gain time.

At the same time as Khmelnytskyi sent manifestoes to restore order among the serfs, denounced their "lawlessness" before the officials of the Commonwealth and punished or executed some of their leaders, he also encouraged the

also the following letters: A. Kysil to J. Ossolinski, Rovne, August 2, 1648 and Nadhoryn, August 22, 1648; A. Kysil et al., to M. Lubienski, Cholhanskyi Kamin, September 13, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 149, 160, 186; and the Anonymous despatch from Hlyniany, August 13, 1648 and [M. Lubienski] to W. Zaslowski [Warsaw], August 10, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 454; X, 210.

⁹See B. Khmelnytskyi's letters to A. Kysil, Chyhyryn, June 27, 1648, and to S. Bolkhovskii, August 8, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 52. 65.

the serf movement. His emissaries and agitators fomented revolt among Rusin and Belorusin people in the territories where serfdom was firmly entrenched. From the Kozak Army he sent small detachments of troops into areas where the serfs took up arms. These provided leaders for the serf bands, organized them and took possession of towns or fortresses captured by the serfs.

Although Khmelnytskyi complained to the government about the atrocities committed by Wisniowiecki, he excused the actions of Kryvonis. He also made no definite steps to restrain the activities of other popular leaders, -- Hanzha, Holovetskyi, Nebaba, Topyha, Vysochan and Morozovetskyi -- who spread the rising of the serfs into all Rusin and Belorusin ethnic territories of the Commonwealth.¹⁰ Khmelnytskyi thus created a barrier of serfs between the Kozak troops and those of the Commonwealth. He was protected by the serfs, and made a coordinated Polish-Lithuanian military action against him extremely difficult. At this time he was also able to devote his attention to other matters, especially

¹⁰See S. Muzhylovskyi's report to Aleksei Mikhailovich [Moscow], February 14, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., 3 vols (Moscow, 1954), II, 129; W. Lipinski, Stanislaw Michal Krzyczewski etc (Krakow, 1912), pp. 86-98; and I. P. Krypiakevych, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (Kiev, 1954), pp. 134-38.

to the building and reorganization of the Kozak Army.

While Khmelnytskyi's "bands of riffraff" intensified the serf rising within the southern palatinates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania,¹¹ the Kozak leader also attempted to create a rift between Polish and Lithuanian nobles and to paralyze any common military undertakings. He established contacts with Belorusin Orthodox clergy, burgesses and nobles, and sought their aid. As far as the gentry was concerned, he contacted those who expressed little hostility to the Kozak revolt and disenchantment with their Polish "brethern". By his declarations of goodwill to the Lithuanian magnates, Khmelnytskyi hoped to gain their sympathies for the Kozak cause.¹²

Of particular interest to him were the men who were known for their views of "separatism" from the Crown. The leading figure of this group was the Lithuanian Field Hetman Janusz Radziwill, the head of the Calvinists in

¹¹See K. F. Obuchowicz, "Dyaryusz Kazimierz Filipa Obuchowicza Wojewody Smclenskiego i Marszalka Kola Rycerskiego", in Pamiętniki historyczne etc (Vilnius, 1859), pp. 19-20; and E. Kotlubaj, Zycie Janusza Radziwilla etc (Vilnius, 1859), pp. 112-14.

¹²See B. Khmelnytskyi's manifesto to the Zaporozhian Army, Pavoloch July 27, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 58.

Lithuania and the "protector" of Protestants within the Commonwealth. Some kind of secret understanding was reached between Khmelnytskyi and Radziwill, for although the latter initiated limited action against the rising of the serfs, he still showed no desire to march against the Kozaks.¹³ By these steps Khmelnytskyi was able to confine the troops of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania within its own territories. Furthermore, he rekindled the antagonisms among the gentry of the Commonwealth.

During the same time Khmelnytskyi attempted to convince other magnates or men of influence of his good intentions. By writing humble letters to them, Khmelnytskyi hoped to gain their support and intercession on Kozak behalf, as well as to camouflage his true intentions.¹⁴

¹³See G. Unkovskii's report to Muscovite Government (1649), in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 160-61; Lipinski, op. cit., pp. 270-71; and Kotlubaj, op. cit., pp. 113-16.

¹⁴See B. Khmelnytskyi's letters from Bila Tserkva and Natashka, to A. Kazanowski, June 12; to W. Zaslowski, June 12; to A. Kysil, June 13; and to W. Zaslowski, June 14, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 39-47. He also wrote to A. Radziwill and to J. Ossolinski on approximately the same dates. See Radziwill, op. cit., II, 296; and J. Ossolinski's letter to the Kozak Army, Warsaw, July [9], 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 86-87. In this documentary collection the letter of Ossolinski is dated July 22, but it is evident from the text that this date is incorrect. The correct date should be July 9. See L. Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, 2nd rev. ed (Lviv, 1924), p. 451, n. 20.

He wrote to Wisniowiecki that he had no quarrel with him; the serfs, not the Kozaks, were responsible for all the ravages. Being aware of the feuds among the "kinglets", he tried to set one against the other. To his most obvious enemies he wrote soothing letters, and attempted to win their confidence and to quiet their apprehensions by promising that no harm will come to their estates.¹⁵

Khmelnyskyi's greatest success, however, was that he was able to convince such men as Ossolinski and Kysil that he was ready to settle everything by means of negotiations. By arranging an armistice he gained time to further his plans.

Although Khmelnytskyi was protected from the interior of the Commonwealth, he still faced danger from the east. According to the treaty concluded in 1647, Muscovy was obliged to send military aid to the Commonwealth if it were invaded by the Tatars.¹⁶ When the Tatars came to aid the Kozaks, the Commonwealth appealed to

¹⁵See B. Khmelnytskyi's letters to S. Laszcz, Pavoloch, July 29, 1648, and to W. Zaslowski, Pavoloch, July 30, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 59-60, 62-63; and Rev. P. Lasko's report, Chyhyryn, June 29, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 440.

¹⁶See the terms of the treaty in Akty odnosiaschiesia etc., 15 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1861), III, 128-30.

Muscovy to honour its obligations.¹⁷ This the Muscovites were prepared to do.¹⁸ Khmelnytskyi was thus compelled to take quick steps to prevent the materialization of the Muscovite military intervention. Even though the Muscovites were to fight the Tatars only, a blow against the Tatars was also a blow against the Kozaks.

Khmelnytskyi began by cutting the communication lines between Warsaw and Moscow: he intercepted the envoys from both sides and seized their letters. He flattered Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich by referring to him as the protector of Orthodoxy; and tempted the tsar with the vacant throne of Poland, the recovery of Smalensk territories, and with the vague suggestions that the Kozaks wished to accept him as their protector. Khmelnytskyi also appealed for tsar's troops to support the Kozak cause; shamed the Muscovites that they, the strong defenders of Orthodoxy, even considered giving aid to the Poles against people of the same faith; and emphasized that Muscovy should expect only

¹⁷See A. Kysil's letter to N. Pleshcheev, Hoshcha, May 11, 1648, ibid., III, 188-90.

¹⁸See A. Kysil's letter to M. Lubienski [Hoshcha], May 31, 1648, Decree from the Department of Defense to N. Pleshcheev [Moscow], May 30, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 26, 496, n. 21.

goodwill from the Kozaks. He issued threats, that if no troops were sent from Muscovy to the Kozak aid, the Kozaks would be forced to co-operate with the Tatars against the Muscovites.¹⁹

Khmelnyskyi was fortunate that internal disturbances broke out in Muscovy.²⁰ The tsar, whether he wished to take advantage of the Commonwealth's predicament to carry out the traditional wishes of Ivan Kalita, or really to come to its aid, now was in no position to send his troops out of Muscovy.²¹ Early in August Khmelnyskyi learned that no

¹⁹See B. Khmelnyskyi's letters to Aleksei Mikhailovich, Cherkasy, June 18, to S. Bolkhovskii, Chyhyryn, June 30, and to N. Pleshcheev, Rosava, July 11 and Pavoloch, August 3, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnyskoho etc., pp. 48-50, 54-55, 57, 64. See also G. Klimov's report to Muscovite Department of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, June 26, 1648 in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., III, 215-17; and A. Buinosov-Rostovskii and S. Veliaminov's letter to Muscovite Department of Defense, Iabl'nov, July 6, 1648, in Akty Moskovskogo gosudarstva, 3 vols (St. Petersburg, 1894), II, 232-33.

²⁰See A. A. Novoselskii and A. N. Speranskii, "Gorodskie vosstaniia v Russkom gosudarstve v seredine XVII v. Zemskii sobor 1648-1649 gg." [Town Risings in the Russian State in the Middle of the Seventeenth Century. Land Assembly of the Years 1648-1649], in Ocherki istorii S.S.S.R. etc (Moscow, 1955), pp. 224-49. These uprisings, the first which began in June, 1648 in Moscow, continued to spread in 1649 and 1650. See M. N. Tikhomirov, "Vosstaniia v Novgorode i Pskove v 1650 g." [The Risings in Novgorod and Pskov in 1650], ibid., pp. 249-56.

²¹See Aleksei Mikhailovich's decree to Z. Leontev and I. Kobylskii, Moscow, July 6, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 53; and Radziwill, op. cit., II, 287.

Muscovite troops were being sent to aid the Poles.²² He was therefore also safe from the east.

From the south Khmelnytskyi was protected by his Tatar allies. It was not in their interest that peace should materialize; therefore, they urged Khmelnytskyi to continue the hostilities.²³ Khan Islam III pledged to send Tatar troops for a new Kozak campaign, even though he knew that this would be against the orders of his suzerain. The High Porte was at war with Venice; thus, it had no desire to antagonize the Commonwealth. Even before official protests arrived in Constantinople against the actions of the Tatars, the khan received strict orders not to invade the territories of the Commonwealth again.²⁴ Once

²²See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to S. Bolkhovskii, Kostiantyniv, August 8, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 65.

²³See Rev. P. Lasko's report, Chyhyryn, June 29, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 439-40.

²⁴See M. Ostrorog's letter to J. Ossolinski, Hlyniany, August 4, 1648; [L. Miaskowski's letter to J. Ossolinski, Kamianets, June 11, 1648]; and Ahmed Pasha's letter to M. Potocki, Constantinople [ca. late May or early June, 1648], in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., X, 206, 267-68, 293-94. See also Ahmed Pasha's letter to J. Ossolinski, Constantinople [ca. June 11, 1648], in Zygmunt Abrahamowicz ed., Katalog dokumentow Tureckich. Dokumenty do dziejow Polski i krajow osciennych w latach 1455-1672 (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1959), pp. 326-27.

Khmelnyskyi learned of this decision, he spared no efforts in Constantinople to secure permission for the Tatar military aid. Favourable circumstances brought him success again.

Early in August the government of Grand Vezir Ahmed Pasha was overthrown, and Sultan Ibrahim I was dethroned during a mutiny of the Janissaries and later executed.²⁵ The new government accepted Khmelnytskyi's irresistible offers; money, troops, prisoners for Turkish galleys and cession of the Podolian fortress Kamianets. In return it officially approved the Kozak-Tatar alliance and the anti-Commonwealth enterprises of Khan Islam III. On August 28 Kalga Crim Giray led the Tatar hordes from Crimea to Khmelnytskyi's aid.²⁶

²⁵See P. Rycout, The History etc. (London, 1680), [2], pp. 33-34; Radziwill, op. cit., II, 318; Despatch of [D. Cieklinski?], Hlyniany, August 26, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 461; and M. Golinski, MS. B.N.Z. Ossol, 189, f. 141

²⁶See Radziwill, op. cit., II, 318; L. Miaskowski's letter to W. Miaskowski, Kamianets, October 27, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 211; Despatch of [D. Cieklinski?], Hlyniany, August 26, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 461; and O. Gorka, "Nieznana kronika tatarska lat 1644-50", Kwartalnik Historyczny, LXII (no. 3, 1955), 116-17. The hostile attitude of the new government of the Ottoman Empire to the Commonwealth is well expressed in the letter of the new Grand Vezir Sufi Mehmed Pasha to J. Ossolinski, Constantinople, [ca. August or September, 1648], in Abrahamowicz, op. cit., p. 328.

Even as the Tatars marched, Khmelnytskyi continued to call for parleys and expressed hope that reconciliation with the Commonwealth was still possible.²⁷ However, the commission, led by Kysil, found so many obstacles on its path, that it was virtually impossible for it to begin negotiations. By the middle of September -- after a month and a half since the commission departed from Warsaw -- the two sides had not met. Even the over-optimistic Kysil became skeptical of the whole business.²⁸ By this time it became clear that Khmelnytskyi was only playing for time and that the whole issue would have to be resolved by the force of arms.

During this diplomatic game of Khmelnytskyi, the rising of the serfs took even a more menacing form and spread over vaster areas. At the close of July, a great

²⁷See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to the Commissioners, Kumanivtsi, August 28, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 67-68.

²⁸See the various letters and reports of Adam Kysil and the Commissioners during the months of August and early September: in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 149-53, 159-66, 169-74, 177; and Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 449-53, 464-66; X, 209, 220-21. The following are the final reports: A. Kysil et al., to M. Lubienski, Chohhanskyi Kamin, September 13, 1648, and A. Kysil to M. Lubienski, Kostiantyniv, September 15, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 184-86, 192-93.

battle was fought near Staro-Kostiantyniv between the forces of Wisniowiecki and Kryvonis. Although neither side won a decisive victory, the battle proved to be more advantageous for the "riffraff". Wisniowiecki had insufficient troops to carry on the hostilities; he was thus forced to withdraw beyond the Horyn River.²⁹ More and more fortresses and towns fell to the serfs; early in August they captured the "impregnable" arsenal-fortress of Bar.³⁰ By this time Khmelnytskyi began a slow march with the Kozak Army into Volynia. It was to be opposed by an army of "deer"; a disorganized, but a splendid assembly of the gentry.

Most of the magnates and the country squires, among the antagonists of Khmelnytskyi, entered the concentration area at Cholhanskyi Kamin as if they were attending some sort of a celebration. Their camp was filled with luxurious tents, furniture, gold and silver plate and expensive clothes. Immense transport brought in rich food supplies.

²⁹On the Battle of Staro-Kostiantyniv (July 26 to 28, 1648) see: Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 97-100, 145-48; Sprawy i rzeczy etc (Lviv, 1914), pp. 97-98; B. K. Maskiewicz, "Pamietniki Boguslawy Kazimierza Maskiewicza", in Pamietniki Maskiewiczow etc (Wroclaw, 1961), pp. 250-54; and W. Tomkiewicz, Jeremi Wisnioweicki (1612-1651) (Warsaw, 1933), pp. 216-20.

³⁰See the correspondence in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 149-211.

The magnates tried to outdo each other by giving great feasts; at the same time, their old feuds were renewed. Even though attempts were made to reconcile them, little cooperation resulted. Thus, in the camp of Khmelnytskyi's antagonists quarrels continued, disorganization prevailed and general military discipline vanished.

Many of the nobles regarded their presence in the camp as a mere formality. They believed that negotiations between Kysil and Khmelnytskyi would eventually lead to the cessation of hostilities and then to the re-establishment of peace. Arriving in this state of mind in the camp, they expected to witness this event. At the same time they also expected that by their large numbers they would strengthen the bargaining position of the commission. Moreover, they would make sure that the rebels did not ask for too many concessions.

Others, while not ruling out a conflict, showed great contempt for the Kozaks and the serfs. If they failed to overawe the enemy with their numbers and splendour, then they thought, they would use whips, not swords, against the "rabble". Finally, still others, were not too happy at the prospect of destroying their own serfs. Who would replace

the serfs and do their work?³¹

While the Kozak Army had in Khmelnytskyi one leader who possessed extraordinary powers during the time of war, nothing of the kind existed in the camp of the gentry. There was no unity of command. The three regimentaries, who received temporary command of the army while the hetmans were Tatar captives, had little talent and experience as military commanders. The Kozaks gave each of them appropriate labels; "Feather bed" to Prince Wladyslaw Zaslowski, the Palatine of Sandomierz; "Latinist" to Mikolaj Ostrorog, the Crown Cup-Bearer; and "Babe" to Aleksander Koniecpolski, the Crown Ensign.³² To make matters worse, thirty-two commissioners were appointed by the Convocation Diet to aid these three regimentaries. This sufficed not to lose one, but thirty-five battles in all.³³

³¹See V. Kochowski, Annalium Poloniae etc., 4 vols (Krakow, 1683), I, 53; S. Grondski, Historia belli etc (Pest, 1789), 75; S. Temberski, Stanislawa Temberskiego etc (Krakow, 1897), pp. 87-90; and M. Golinski, MS. B.Z.N.Ossol., 189, f. 149.

³²Zaslowski ("Feather bed") was a pleasure-loving magnate; Ostrorog ("Latinist") was a man of learning; and Koniecpolski ("Babe") was still a young man. See Kowalski's letter to his father, Warsaw, November 22, 1648, in Sprawy i rzeczy etc., p. 116; and Grondski, op. cit., p. 72.

³³See Kubala, op. cit., p. 289.

A contemporary observed that an army of deer led by a lion was worth much more than an army of lions commanded by a deer.³⁴ Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki was this "lion". He had the admiration respect and confidence of the mass of quarrelsome country squires, among whom could be found every shade of opinion. But he was excluded from the high command by his opponents. It mattered little to them that this "lion" had the necessary military experience and excellent leadership qualities, and that he alone was able to restore discipline among this "deer" army of the nobles. Wisniowiecki was an opponent of Ossolinski's policies; the latter considered that power in Wisniowiecki's hands was the same as a sword in the hands of a madman.³⁵ Wisniowiecki thus observed the military preparations of the regimentaries with ironic aloofness.

This was the state of affairs of an army of the gentry which became engaged in "pursuit" of the Kozaks in the middle of September. After a few successful skirmishes, it came face to face with the main Kozak strength at Pyliavtsi. The enormous and poorly-located camp of the gentry

³⁴See Radziwill, op. cit., II, 320.

³⁵See F. Rawita-Gawronski, Bohdan Chmielnicki etc., 2 vols (Lviv, 1906), I, 292.

"could not be fortified in any manner". While waiting for the Kozaks to attack, the gentry made use of this time by carrying on drunken revelries. On September 23 alarms were sounded that the Kozaks were advancing, but "the army cared nothing about this". Disorderly groups rushed out against the enemy. The battle lasted the entire day without a decisive result for each side. The gentry was greatly disturbed by the shouts of "Allah". They believed that great numbers of Tatars joined the Kozaks. The result was that "the army nearly lost its heart". To make matters worse, rumours began to circulate during the night that its officers were deserting. The effects of these rumours was catastrophic: the gentry panicked and fled in all directions. The regulars that remained by their posts were annihilated.³⁶

Such was the fate of the brilliant and seemingly powerful army. The country squires, who came prepared to defend their Fatherland, to terrify any foreign invaders and to compell the rebellious serfs and Kozaks to fall on their knees, were now no more than disorderly bands of

³⁶On the Battle of Pyliavtsi (September 20 to 23, 1648) see Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 200-10; Sprawy i rzeczy etc., pp. 117-19; M. Golinski, MS. B.Z.N.Ossol., 189, ff. 146-51; and Iu. Tys-Krokhmaliuk, Boi Khmelnytskoho etc. (Munich, 1954), pp. 85-103.

fugitives. The way to the heart of the Commonwealth was opened once more to the Kozak-serf-Tatar forces. "We have perished totally", despaired one noble, adding that the only hope for the Commonwealth lay in the Divine Providence.³⁷

II

After the disaster at Pyliavtsi, the remnants of the nobles gathered in Lviv and entrusted the command of the decimated army to Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki. Doubting that the city could be defended, Wisniowiecki left the burgesses to their own resources and retreated with most of his troops to Zamostia. He was more confident that this strong fortress would stop the enemy's drive toward Warsaw.³⁸ Furthermore, he was faced with a new problem; the Palatinate of Rus became engulfed by a rising of all classes of the Rusin population.³⁹ While Wisniowiecki made a hasty retreat, Khmelnytskyi began a slow march towards Lviv. His lack of

³⁷Anonymous letter from Lviv, September 29, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 200.

³⁸See Tomkiewicz, op. cit., pp. 248-257; and L. Kubala, Szkice historyczne, 1st ser., 5th ed (Lviv, 1923), pp. 53-58.

³⁹See W. Lozinski, Prawem i lewem etc., 2 vols., 4th ed. (Lviv, 1931), I, 419-26; and Volumina Legum (Warsaw, 1737), IV, 302-03.

haste can be explained by the fact that he awaited the arrival of the main Tatar horde under Crim Giray. When the Tatars appeared, the combined armies then marched to Lviv and besieged it.⁴⁰

Khmelnyskyi was not particularly eager to capture Lviv, since this would expose that city to the merciless sacking by his savage allies. He thus agreed to lift the siege when the burgesses proposed to pay an enormous indemnity, most of which went to the Tatars. At the close of October he sent the bulk of the Tatars to Crimea; at the same time he ordered the Kozak Army to march to Zamostia.⁴¹ Khmelnytskyi reached his objective early in November and laid siege to it. The Kozak Army now stood on the ethnographic frontiers of Poland, facing the last obstacle of some strength before Warsaw.

During this time the Election Diet (October 6 to November 25, 1648) was in session at Warsaw. Most of the deputies regarded the fiasco at Pyliavtsi as a direct

⁴⁰See Gorka, op. cit., p. 117.

⁴¹See ibid. On the siege of Lviv (October 6 to 26, 1648) see: A. Czolowski, "Relacya o oblezeniu miasta Lwowa przez Bohdana Chmielnickiego 1648 roku", Kwartalnik Historyczny, VI (no. 3, 1892), 544-50; and Kubala, Szkice historyczne, op. cit., pp. 53-66.

result of Ossolinski's conciliary policy to the Kozaks. Their temper indicated that this Diet would not only bury the conciliary policy, but also that any candidate for the Polish throne who supported it would not be elected. In November only the two remaining brothers of the late king were competing for the crown: Jan Kazimierz, ex-Jesuit, ex-cardinal and the hereditary "King of Sweden"; and his younger brother Karol Ferdynand, Bishop of Wroclaw and Plock. The former was supported largely by the conciliary group at the head of which stood Ossolinski; the latter, by the intransigents headed by Wisniowiecki.

Jan Kazimierz established contacts with Khmelnytskyi sometime in August.⁴² In October, while the Kozak-Tatar forces were besieging Lviv, the Kozak leader declared his support for the candidacy of Jan Kazimierz.⁴³ While under the walls of Zamostia, Khmelnytskyi received promises from Jan Kazimierz that once elected he would satisfy all Kozak demands and would enforce their rights.⁴⁴ Khmelnytskyi responded by his renewed pledges of support for Jan Kazimierz.

⁴²See Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. cit., p. 322.

⁴³See Czolowski, op. cit., p. 549.

⁴⁴G. Kunakov's report to Muscovite government (1649), in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., III, 285.

This he revealed in his letters to the nobles and the burgesses of Zamostia, to the Senate and to various other individuals.⁴⁵ In the diplomatic maneuvering which surrounded the election, Khmelnytskyi thus cast the decisive vote for Jan Kazimierz. The rest was accomplished by the much-talented Jerzy Ossolinski. On November 14 the younger brother officially withdrew his candidacy. On November 20, 1648 Jan Kazimierz became the King of Poland and the Grand Duke of Lithuania.⁴⁶

On November 15, before his official election, Jan Kazimierz sent his envoy Jakob Smiarowski to the Kozak camp with the announcement that he was elected king. He also requested Khmelnytskyi to show his goodwill by ceasing all hostilities and by marching back with his army to

⁴⁵See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to the Nobles and the Burgesses of Zamostia, November 6, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 72. The contents of this letter of Khmelnytskyi became known in Warsaw by November 12. See the Record of the Election Diet, Thirtieth Session, Warsaw, November 12, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 312. The following sources reveal that Khmelnytskyi wrote to other persons: Kochowski, op. cit., I, 95; W. Rudawski, Historia polska etc., 2 vols (St. Petersburg, 1855), I, 45; and A. Kysil's letter to an Anonymous Kozak Colonel, Hoshcha, May 18, 1649, in Ojczyście spominki etc., 2 vols (Krakow, 1845), II, 27.

⁴⁶See Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. cit., pp. 301-28.

Ukraine.⁴⁷ On the same day, Khmelnytskyi sent his envoys to Warsaw.⁴⁸ The Kozak envoys, headed by Reverend Andrzej Mokrski, -- Khmelnytskyi's former professor at a Jesuit college -- arrived in Warsaw on November 24, missing the envoy Smiarowski on the way to Khmelnytskyi.⁴⁹ They brought two letters: one for the senators, the other for Jan Kazimierz.

In his letter to the senators Khmelnytskyi defended his position and actions, begged for forgiveness and requested the punishment of the magnates, especially Koniecpolski and Wisniowiecki, whom he blamed for the existing conflict.⁵⁰ He wrote to Jan Kazimierz that he was prepared to serve him, and claimed that the only reason he marched to Zamostia was to ensure that no one else was elected king.⁵¹ Khmelnytskyi also instructed his envoys to

⁴⁷See A. Kraushar, "Poselstwo Jakoba Smiarowskiego do Bohdana Chmielnickiego pod oblezony Zamosc w r. 1648 (Ze zrodel rekopismienych)", Kwartalnik Historyczny, V (no. 4, 1891), 818-21; and Radziwill, op. cit., II, 350.

⁴⁸See Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. cit., p. 331.

⁴⁹See the Record of the Election Diet, Forty-first Session (Senate only), Warsaw, November 24, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 359.

⁵⁰See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to the Senate, Zamostia, November 15, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 81-82.

⁵¹See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Jan Kazimierz, Zamostia, November 15, 1648, ibid., p. 80.

negotiate directly with Jan Kazimierz. They were to inform the government that if any other candidate was chosen king, it should expect neither negotiations nor peace.⁵²

The envoy Mokrski presented the following demands to the king-elect: amnesty to all participants in the rebellion; confirmation of the rights and privileges of the registered Kozaks; increase of their number to 12,000; dependence of the Kozak Army on the king alone, not on the government; sheriffs and other officials would have no jurisdiction over the Kozaks; they were to be judged by the same laws as the nobles; free election of officers of the Kozak army; blanket permission to send naval expeditions to the Black Sea; free access to and unrestricted use of the steppes; a land grant for Khmelnytskyi; official confirmation of his office as a Kozak Hetman; no punishment to the rebel serfs; legal recognition of the Orthodox Church; restoration of all churches and benefices belonging to it; and the abolition of the Uniate Church.⁵³ These demands did not differ greatly from those Khmelnytskyi sent to Warsaw

⁵²See Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. cit., p. 331.

⁵³See the Demands of the Zaporozhian Army, Zamostia, November 15, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 83-84. See also Jan Kazimierz's letters to B. Khmelnytskyi, Warsaw, December 1, 1648, in Szajnocha,

in June.⁵⁴ Thus, even after three decisive victories the Kozak leader limited himself to very moderate demands.

Not too many of the senators shared this opinion. After a great deal of heated debate, they decided to postpone the answer on the grounds that Khmelnytskyi's envoys were not sent to the king-elect, but only to the candidate for that office. In order to receive their decision, he must send new envoys with petitions to the king-elect. Using this pretext, they prepared an anti-dated manifesto in the name of the king and addressed it to the Kozak Army.⁵⁵

The manifesto announced the election of Jan Kazimierz; the king-elect ordered the cessation of all hostilities; and commanded the Kozak Army to retire to its territories in Ukraine, to send the Tatars to Crimea and

"Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 473-75, and December [11], 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 217-19; (Concerning the correct date of this last letter see Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. cit., p. 462, n. 25); Record of the Election Diet, Forty-first Session (Senate only), Warsaw, November 24, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 359; and Radziwill, op. cit., II, 350.

⁵⁴ See the Instructions to the Delegates of the Kozak Army, Bila Tserkva, June 12, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 37.

⁵⁵ See the Record of the Election Diet, Forty-Second Session (Senate only), Warsaw, November 25, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 359; and Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. cit., p. 330-33.

to despatch new envoys to Warsaw with assurances of fidelity. In return, the king pledged to confirm all the Kozak liberties and to send a commission which would examine all Kozak grievances and begin negotiations with them.⁵⁶

Jan Kazimierz did not see the value of such proceedings. He thus called the envoy Mokrski for a conference without the knowledge of the senators. Following the secret discussions with the king, Mokrski left Warsaw on December first. He carried a letter in which Jan Kazimierz agreed to accept all of Khmelnytskyi's demands.⁵⁷ Shortly after his departure the royal envoy Smiarowski returned; with him also arrived new Kozak envoys. These announced that Khmelnytskyi lifted the siege of Zamostia, sent the Tatars to Crimea and ordered the Kozak Army to march to Ukraine. The Kozak leader also asked the king to appoint a commission so that peace negotiations could be

⁵⁶See Jan Kazimierz's manifesto to the Kozak Army, Warsaw, November [21], 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 471-73. Concerning the correct date of this document see Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. cit., p. 461, n. 22.

⁵⁷See Jan Kazimierz's letter to B. Khmelnytskyi, Warsaw, December 1, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 472-75.

started.⁵⁸

In his reply Jan Kazimierz repeated the offers he made in his previous letter. He also added the following instructions: Khmelnytskyi and his officers should arrive at a place designated by the commissioners to take an oath of fealty; there he would receive the insignia of his office and begin negotiations. Once this was accomplished, Kozak envoys should bring the petitions of the Kozak Army to the Coronation Diet, where they would be ratified. The king again insisted that Khmelnytskyi must send the Tatars back to Crimea, himself retire to Ukraine with the Kozak Army, order all the serfs to return to their homes and issue manifestoes banning lawless bands. Neither the Crown nor the Lithuanian armies would hinder him in carrying out the royal orders.⁵⁹

Jan Kazimierz was now satisfied that peace would materialize. On December 12, he issued a manifesto declaring an end of all hostilities.⁶⁰ Following this he

⁵⁸See G. Kunakov's report to Muscovite government (1649), in Akty odnosiaszchiesia etc., III, 284.

⁵⁹See Jan Kazimierz's letter to B. Khmelnytskyi, Warsaw, December [11], 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 217-19.

⁶⁰See Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. cit., p. 334.

appointed members to a commission, at the head of which he placed Adam Kysil. Negotiations with the Kozaks were scheduled to begin at the end of January, 1649, in Kiev.⁶¹ It thus appeared that the Commonwealth would be spared further strife and bloodshed. In Warsaw the unexpected "moderation" of Khmelnytskyi was attributed to the divine intervention.⁶²

III

Thus, at the height of his success Khmelnytskyi halted his advance, supported the candidacy of Jan Kazimierz, entered into negotiations with him, limited himself to modest demands, left all the decisions at the hands of the king, sent back his Tatar allies and began a return march to Ukraine. Khmelnytskyi's motives were quite plain. By taking these steps he found a good opportunity to settle matters without continuing war. In Jan Kazimierz and his advisors, he found men who would follow his bidding. Furthermore, his troops were weary after a long campaign, and as it was not customary for the Kozaks to undertake a winter campaign, Khmelnytskyi decided to halt all military

⁶¹See ibid., p. 335.

⁶²See ibid., p. 336.

operations.

Moreover, the Kozaks had penetrated the ethnographic boundary of Poland; thus, they were faced with a more hostile population. More important still, Khmelnytskyi wanted to gain time to further his ambitious plans, which began to take shape after the victory at Pyliavtsi. By accepting the offers of the king, Khmelnytskyi also assured himself a safe return to Ukraine with all the plunder. He therefore issued manifestoes throughout all territories under Kozak control, which announced the end of war. The nobles were urged to return to their estates; the serfs, to obey their masters.⁶³ At the same time he began to march to Kiev.

No palatine of Kiev ever received such a welcome from the Kievan burgesses as had Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, when he entered Kiev on the Orthodox Christmas Eve.⁶⁴ On the outskirts of the city he was welcomed by all the inhabitants. He was met by the visiting Patriarch of Jerusalem

⁶³See B. Khmelnytskyi's manifesto to the Rusin people, Ostoroh, December 12, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 85-86. See also S. Oldakowski's letter to A. Sieniawski, Sokal, January 2, 1649, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 479.

⁶⁴See Joachim Jerlicz, Latopisiec etc., 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1853), I, 72.

and the Metropolitan Bishop of Kiev, who gave him a place of honour in his sleigh. They proceeded to the gates of Kiev through the processions formed by the Orthodox clergy; the crowds cheered, the bells pealed and the guns roared. The professors and students of the Kievan Academy honoured him with "orations and acclamations". They welcomed him as "Moses, saviour and liberator of the Rusin people from the Polish bondage, and as a good omen called Bohdan -- God Given". On this occasion the Patriarch bestowed the title "Illustrious Prince" upon him. The archmandrite of the Monastery of the Caves prepared a feast in his honour. There were foreign envoys seeking to confer with him.⁶⁵

Khmelnyskyi was profoundly stirred by this enthusiastic reception by the Kievans. He was welcomed by all classes of the Rusin society in Kiev, "the mother of the cities of Rus"; the capital of old Kievan Rus, at one time a metropolis which was a rival to Constantinople, from whence Grand Princes Volodymyr and Iaroslav ruled a vast territory and where the monuments of their times were still visible -- Golden Gate, Cathedral of St. Sofiia, Monastery

⁶⁵See the Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereiaslav, February 23, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 109-10.

of the Caves. Kiev was also the cradle of the Orthodox Church among the East Slavs. Even in Khmelnytskyi's time it was the most progressive centre of the religious and the intellectual life in the whole Orthodox world. By his triumphant entry into Kiev, Khmelnytskyi sanctified his military and political leadership with the halo of historical tradition.⁶⁶

Moreover, it was through the discussions with the enlightened Rusin ecclesiastical and lay circles at Kiev, that he grasped the magnitude of his achievements. Bohdan Khmelnytskyi thus began to view his position and responsibility in a new light. He realized that he was no longer merely a leader of rebel Kozaks, but the head of all the Rusin people, with wider duties and more lofty political ideals. If at Zamostia he still took advantage of his military successes for the benefit of the narrow interest of the Kozak class, then at Kiev he changed his plans radically.⁶⁷ This he revealed to Adam Kysil and the commissioners upon their arrival at Pereiaslav in February 1649.

⁶⁶See G. Vernadsky, Bohdan, Hetman of Ukraine (New Haven, 1941), p. 58.

⁶⁷See M. Hrushevskyi, Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy, 10 vols (New York, 1956), VIII, 3, 122-29.

Even at their first meeting Kysil observed a change in the attitude and plans of Khmelnytskyi. First of all, he insulted the commissioners by not receiving them at Kiev, but making them travel to Pereiaslav. Although he received them with great pomp and ceremony, he accepted the royal insignia of his office without enthusiasm, almost indignantly. Kysil's efforts to begin negotiations on the basis of Khmelnytskyi's declarations at Zamostia brought no results. Khmelnytskyi ended the first session by a long denunciation of the "kinglets". The following day he announced that the Poles had no right to "Ukraine and all Rus". He even tried to persuade the commissioners to renounce their loyalty to the Crown and to cast their lots with the Kozaks, prophesying that "Poland will perish and Rus will rule very soon this year".⁶⁸

At the third round of negotiations Kysil attempted to use his old stratagem of divide et impera by appealing to the personal interests of Khmelnytskyi and to the class interests of the Kozaks. He stated that the king was prepared to satisfy all the grievances of Khmelnytskyi and

⁶⁸See the Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereiaslav, February 19-22, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 105-08.

those of the Kozaks. As a bait he proposed to increase the number of the registered Kozaks to fifteen thousand. Kysil stated that the Kozaks were men of knightly rank; therefore, they should concern themselves with military matters and with the waging of war. The Kozaks had nothing in common with the serfs; they must sever all ties with the "rabble" and leave them to the tilling of the soil. Finally, Kysil attempted to rekindle the Kozaks' hate of the Tatars by appealing to their "patriotism" and faith. His aim, of course, was to rupture the Kozak-Tatar alliance; he also aimed at turning them against the Turks. The Kozaks should be aware of the fact that while they laid waste to Poland and Lithuania, they also destroyed Rusin ethnic territories. By acting with the infidels, the Kozaks endangered their faith and the Orthodox Church. Rather than destroying the Commonwealth, the Kozaks should wage wars in foreign lands; rather than destroying Christians within their own country, the Kozaks should destroy the infidels.⁶⁹

One member of the Commission, the Chamberlin of Lviv, Wojciech Miaskowski, summarized Khmelnytskyi's answer to Kysil. In it Khmelnytskyi refuted Kysil's arguments and

⁶⁹See ibid., II, 108.

outlined his new political credo:

It is useless to talk too much. . . . Now there is no time [to negotiate]. Hitherto I have undertaken tasks which I had not thought through; henceforth, I will pursue aims which I have considered with care. I will free all the Rusin people from the Polish bondage. Up to now, I have fought because of wrongs done to me personally; now, I will fight for our Orthodox faith. All the people as far as Lublin and Krakow will help me. I will not abandon them, for they are our right hand. In order that you may not subdue the serfs and then attack the Kozaks, I will maintain two to three hundred thousand men, as well as all of the Tatar horde. . . . The Kozak friendship with them [Tatars] is eternal, . . . I will neither wage foreign wars, nor will I draw my sword against the Turks or the Tatars. I have enough to do in Ukraine, Podolia and Volynia; and now I am enjoying sufficient ease, wealth and benefit from my land and principality as far as Lviv, Kholm and Halych. When I will reach the Wisla [River], I will say to the rest of the Poles: "Be still and keep silent Poles!" I will drive the wealthier Poles and the dukes and the princes beyond the Wisla, and if they become too unruly there, I will seek them out there too. Not a single noble or prince will I permit to set foot here in Ukraine, and if any one of them will desire to eat our bread, he must be obedient to the Zaporozhian Army, and must make no outcries against the king.⁷⁰

Khmelnyskyi also emphasized that he no longer considered himself only the leader of the Kozaks. He became "by the will of God . . . the independent ruler of Rus".⁷¹ Thus, Khmelnyskyi seemingly wanted to rule an independent Rusin state. At this time he did not wish to sever all ties

⁷⁰Ibid., II, 108-09.

⁷¹Ibid., II, 108.

with the Commonwealth, because he still professed allegiance to Jan Kazimierz. This, however, was a very thin link.

Khmelnyskyi was unprepared to send the commissioners back to Warsaw with a declaration of war. Playing for time, he signed an agreement with them. It declared that an armistice was arranged to last till May 22. The negotiations were not completed because Khmelnyskyi faced grave logistical problems; therefore, he was neither able to compile the lists of the registered Kozaks, nor to send back the commoners back to their homes. Because of this problem, the nobles were requested not to return to their homes, until May 22. By this date Khmelnyskyi would be ready and a new commission could resume negotiations. During the term of the armistice neither the Crown, the Lithuanian nor the Kozak Armies were to cross into each others territories; the boundaries being the Rivers Horyn and Prypiats and a line running north to Horyn from Kamianets in Podolia. Finally, Khmelnyskyi consented to return all prisoners-of-war, on condition that his enemy Daniel Czaplinski would be surrendered to him.⁷²

⁷²See the Agreement between the Commission and B. Khmelnyskyi, Pereiaslav, February 24, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnyskoho etc., pp. 103-04; and Commission's manifesto to the Crown Army, Pereiaslav, February 24, 1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 13-14.

In another document Khmelnytskyi really dictated his conditions for peace. It took the form of a humble "petition" to the king: abolition of the Uniate Church; guarantee of all the rights of the Orthodox Church, and the restoration of all of its former churches, foundations and benefices; appointment of the Kievan palatine and castellan to be restricted to Rusins of the Orthodox faith; at least three seats in the Senate for the Rusin people which would go to the Kievan Metropolitan bishop, the palatine and the castellan. In Kiev all churches were to remain as they were at this time; the Jesuits were to be expelled from that city; Czaplinski was to be surrendered by the commissioners to Khmelnytskyi; and Prince Wisniowiecki was not to be given command of the Crown Army.⁷³

The commissioners saw that Khmelnytskyi had no intention of compromising any further. It became clear to them that they failed: Khmelnytskyi dared to dream "about a duchy and rule"; he would be satisfied with nothing less than an independent state.⁷⁴ His attitude during the

⁷³Articles of Petition of the Zaporozhian Army to Jan Kazimierz, Pereiaslav, February 24, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 105-06.

⁷⁴See Commission's letter to Jan Kazimierz [Hoshcha], March 8, 1649. Cited by Lipinski, op. cit., p. 294.

negotiations was enough evidence for them that he also had no intention of keeping any agreement.⁷⁵ The line of demarcation, the truce and the absence of nobles from their estates would give Khmelnytskyi enough time to forge a strong army without any interference. During this time he would also look for new allies. His excuses for not demobilizing the Kozak Army were too obvious: Khmelnytskyi had no intention of weakening his army; at the same time he had no desire of creating dissensions in its rank-and-file by excluding the serfs. Furthermore, although Khmelnytskyi knew that the magnates in Warsaw would declare his demands as impossible, he gambled that neither the king nor the "peace party" would flatly reject them. Both Jan Kazimierz and Ossolinski would try to humour him as long as possible. During this time he would gain the needed time to prepare for a new campaign in the spring of 1649.

⁷⁵See the Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereiaslav, February 23-26, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 108-13.

CHAPTER VI

KHMELNYTSKYI'S FRESH PREPARATIONS FOR WAR, THE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES AND THE TREATY OF ZBORIV

I

When the commissioners submitted their report on the outcome of the negotiations with Khmelnytskyi at Pereiaslav to King Jan Kazimierz, he still had hope that all difficulties would be eventually resolved in one way or another. Both the king and the Crown Grand Chancellor, Jerzy Ossolinski, realized that there were several reasons for Khmelnytskyi's negative attitude to negotiations, and for his general lack of confidence in the goodwill of the government.

The Coronation Diet (January 19 to February 13, 1649) failed even to discuss Khmelnytskyi's demands which he submitted from Zamostia. The resolutions of this Diet also must have made him suspicious. While the commissioners were on the way to open negotiations with Khmelnytskyi, the Coronation Diet proposed to increase the strength of the Crown Army and even authorized the king to call a general

levy of nobles. Furthermore, although Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki was not appointed a temporary hetman, he was successful in recruiting more adherents to his intransigent camp. The intransigent nobles issued threats against Khmelnytskyi and also expressed vehement objections to any proposed concessions for the Kozaks.¹

Both Jan Kazimierz and Ossolinski wanted peace at all cost. They still harboured the old war plans of King Wladyslaw IV.² A war with the Ottoman Empire, at a time when it was engaged in hostilities with Venice, was both desirable and necessary for the Commonwealth. It would employ the energies of the Kozaks and thus solve most of the internal problems of the Polish-Lithuanian state. In order for such plans to materialize, peace had to be first concluded with the Kozaks. Contrary to the advice of many senators and even some of the commissioners, but pressed into action by Ossolinski, Jan Kazimierz decided to remove

¹See L. Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, 2nd rev. ed (Lviv, 1924), pp. 340, 347-48; and Jozef Leszczynski, "Projekty reformy panstwa polskiego na sejmie koronacyjnym Jana Kazimierza w 1649 r." [The Draft of Reforms of the Polish State at the Coronation Diet of Jan Kazimierz in 1649], in O Naprawe Rzeczypospolitej etc (Warsaw, 1966), pp. 90-91.

²See Kubala, op. cit., pp. 279-80, 337-39; and E. Latacz, Ugoda Zborowska a plany tureckie Jana Kazimierza (Krakow, 1933), pp. 10-11.

all the existing obstacles from the road leading to negotiations.

Since the Commonwealth was to reap great benefits from the successful war with the Turks, no sacrifice was too great for it in order to satisfy the demands of Khmelnytskyi.³ With the exception of refusal to surrender Czaplinski, whom he promised to punish severely, Jan Kazimierz agreed to accept all other main demands of Khmelnytskyi.⁴ The king also attempted to win Khmelnytskyi's confidence and goodwill by granting him titles to various estates.⁵

Khmelnytskyi took advantage of this policy of "contentment" pursued by the king and the chancellor, and used it effectively to camouflage his far-reaching aim: to prepare the final blow for the Commonwealth, both from within and from without. In order to gain time for his plans and to keep the Commonwealth unprepared for war, Khmelnytskyi

³See Kubala, op. cit., p. 349.

⁴See Jan Kazimierz's letter to B. Khmelnytskyi, Warsaw, March 27, 1649, in Ojczyście spominki etc., 2 vols (Krakow, 1845), II, 113-17.

⁵See Jan Kazimierz's charter for B. Khmelnytskyi, Warsaw, March 27, 1649, in Akty odnosziaszchiesia etc., 15 vols (St. Petersburg, 1878), X, 462-63.

continued to lull the king and other influential men to sleep with his offers of peace.⁶ He also initiated some steps by which he sought to sow dissention among the gentry of the Commonwealth, in addition to other steps by which he attempted to prevent the coordinated action of Crown and Lithuanian armies against him. Externally, his plans were very ambitious: he sought to isolate the Commonwealth and to draw into the struggle against it as many of the neighbouring countries as possible. Khmelnytskyi's diplomacy was a series of schemes or intrigues, carried out in a true Kozak fashion.

Khmelnytskyi made numerous attempts to persuade Moscovy to take a hostile stand against the Commonwealth. Through his letters, by means of his envoys and by his conversations with Muscovite envoys, Khmelnytskyi begged Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich not to aid the Poles; to give him permission to engage the Don Kozaks against the Commonwealth; to protect the rights of the Orthodox Christians; and to use diplomatic intervention in his favour. He also

⁶See B. Khmelnytskyi's letters to S. Lanckoronski and A. Kysil, Chyhyryn, April 20, April 24, and May 13, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc (Kiev, 1961), pp. 109-10, 114-15, 118-19. See also A. Kysil's letter to B. Khmelnytskyi [Hoshcha, ca. late March or early April, 1649], in Ojczyście spominki etc., II, 30-33.

did not fail to tempt the tsar. Khmelnytskyi pointed out that a good opportunity existed to regain the lost Muscovite lands from the Commonwealth. Furthermore, he claimed that if the tsar would heed his pleas, the Kozaks were prepared to accept his overlordship over them.⁷

The Muscovite government rejected all these tempting offers. During the 1640's it adopted a policy of extreme caution in its foreign relations. Furthermore, Muscovy itself was faced with serious domestic problems: agrarian and religious disorders were rife throughout the country. Muscovite nobles also viewed, somewhat with apprehension, the social radicalism of the conflict within the Commonwealth. The tsar was therefore advised against undertaking any foreign adventures and urged to ratify peace with the new Polish king.

The attitude of Muscovy was thus one of "wait and

⁷See for example B. Khmelnytskyi's letters to Aleksei Mikhailovich, Pereiaslav, February 18; Chyhyryn, May 2 and May 13, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 94-95, 115-16, 117-18. See also the Report on the Mission of the Patriarch of Jerusalem at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, December 11, 1648 to August 7, 1649; S. Muzhylovskyi's report to Aleksei Mikhailovich, Moscow, February 14, 1649; and the Report of G. Unkovskii to the Muscovite government, Moscow-Chyhyryn, March 23 to June 1, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., 3 vols (Moscow, 1954), II, 81-104, 127-31, 145-62.

see". The Muscovite government answered Khmelnytskyi's appeals only with general assurances and vague promises. Khmelnytskyi was praised for his good intentions, but would not receive military aid because "eternal peace" existed between Muscovy and the Commonwealth. The tsar agreed to extend his protection over the Kozaks and to become their sovereign, but only under the condition that King Jan Kazimierz would agree to this arrangement.⁸

Khmelnytskyi made the best of these circumstances. Even though Muscovy remained strictly neutral, he began to spread rumours that he succeeded in concluding a military alliance with it. The tsar consented to send him 20,000 troops; the Muscovite armies would protect him from the Lithuanians by not allowing them to cross the Dnieper to fight the Kozaks.⁹ These rumours caused serious difficulties between the Commonwealth and Muscovy. The bulk of

⁸See the Reply of Prince A. Lvov to the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Moscow, May 19, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 100-01. See also Aleksei Mikhailovich's letters to the Senate, Jan Kazimierz and B. Khmelnytskyi, Moscow, January 4, May 18 and June 23, 1649, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., III, 25-26 (Dopolneniia), 309-11, 320-21.

⁹See Olszewski's report to the Commissioners [Taikury May 25, 1649]; and the Senate Council, Warsaw, June 4, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc (Krakow, 1864), pp. 396, 405.

Lithuanian troops was left to guard the Muscovite frontier. Khmelnytskyi thus capitalized on false rumours. He strained the relations between the Commonwealth and Muscovy, and prevented the coordinated action of the Crown and Lithuanian Armies against him.

He was, however, more successful in his other undertakings. Late in 1648, he sent his envoys to Constantinople with a tempting proposition to the Turkish government. He offered to the sultan all of the territories of the Commonwealth under Kozak control and begged him to accept the Kozak Army as vassals of the High Porte. In return for these offers Khmelnytskyi expected to get permission for the Tatars to support him in the forthcoming campaign, as well as some Turkish military aid, and consent for his appointment as the ruler of Moldavia.¹⁰ The High Porte thought it wise to sanction the whole project. If the Kozaks were turned down, they could conclude an agreement with the Polish king, who then would be in a good position to seek revenge for the Tatar depredations in his realm by

¹⁰See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Muhammed IV, Stare Selo, November 28, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 626-27. The editors of this documentary collection believe that this is not an authentic letter of Khmelnytskyi, but that it was fabricated by some of his enemies. See p. 627, n. 9.

declaring war against the Turks.¹¹

Khan Islam III's envoys supported Khmelnytskyi's schemes at Constantinople, and in response to Khmelnytskyi's frequent letters,¹² the khan agreed to embark on a new campaign as soon as possible. At the close of May, 1649 the Tatar hordes left Crimea and marched northward.¹³ Khmelnytskyi was therefore successful in gaining the support of the Muslim world. His prospects were further brightened by the upheavals within the Turkish government early in May. Since a belligerent faction was now in power. Khmelnytskyi hoped that he would be able to involve the Turks directly in the conflict with the Commonwealth.¹⁴

¹¹See W. Bieczynski's letter to L. Miaskowski, Constantinople, January 30, 1649; and S. Lanckoronski's letter to [the Deputy Judge of Lviv, Manachyn, May 13, 1649], in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 363-64, 408. Concerning the correct address, place and date of Lanckoronski's letter see W. Lipinski, Stanislaw Michal Krzyczewski etc. (Krakow, 1912), p. 278, n. 1.

¹²See B. Khmelnytskyi's letters to Antimir, Peri Aga and Crim Giray, Chyhyryn, April 10, 11, and 20, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 110-11, 113-14, 112. There are frequent references to this effect in the correspondence of various nobles: see Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 388-89, 392; and Ojczyzste spominki etc., II, 17, 19, 35, 49, 51-52.

¹³See O. Gorka, "Nieznana kronika tatarska lat 1644-50", Kwartalnik Historyczny, LXII (no. 3, 1955), 117.

¹⁴See L. Kubala, Wojna moskiewska r. 1654-1655 [The

The other vassal states of the High Porte -- Moldavia, Walachia and Transylvania -- also played a significant part in Khmelnytskyi's plans. Acting on the advice of the visiting Patriarch of Jerusalem, Khmelnytskyi sought to take advantage of his military successes and his power by inducing Muscovy, Moldavia and Walachia to form an alliance.¹⁵ Once this league of Orthodox states materialized, Khmelnytskyi hoped to direct it against the Commonwealth, or if need arose, even against the Ottoman Empire. To this end he initiated an intensive diplomatic action.

Muscovy, however, preferred to be uncommitted at this time. The Hospodar of Walachia seemed to favour the idea and even promised some military assistance to Khmelnytskyi. The warmest response came from Hospodar Vasyl Lupul of Moldavia. Lupul seemed to show his wholehearted approval by pompously addressing Khmelnytskyi as the "Prince of Rus", by showering him with gifts, by promising him substantial military aid, and by expressing

Muscovite War of 1654-1655] (Warsaw: Gebethner and Wolff, 1910), pp. 26, 346, n. 86.

¹⁵See M. Golinski, MS. B.Z.N.Ossol., 189, f. 212 and Paul of Aleppo, The Travels etc., 2 vols (London, 1831), I, 2, 173.

willingness even to abdicate in favour of Khmelnytskyi.¹⁶

With Princes Gyorgy and Zsigmond Rakoczy of Transylvania Khmelnytsky again concluded an alliance to cooperate in military action against the Commonwealth. He also had a very tempting offer for the Rakoczys: after the rout of the Crown Army he promised to elevate Zsigmond to the Polish throne.¹⁷

At the Transylvanian court Khmelnytskyi's envoys learned that the Rakoczys had many supporters within the Commonwealth. Moreover, Khmelnytskyi was assured by the envoys of the Rakoczis that many nobles of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as well as most of the Protestants, were in sympathy with the Kozak cause. The head of all these malcontents was the Lithuanian Field Hetman Prince Janusz

¹⁶See W. Bieczynski's letter to L. Miaskowski, Constantinople, January 30, 1649; and W. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, Novosilka, February 1, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 363, 365.

¹⁷See B. Khmelnytskyi's letters to the Rakoczys, from November, 1648 to May 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnyts-hoho etc., pp. 84-85, 91, 93, 97, 97-98, 98-99, 99-101, 120-21. See also L. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous [Kamianets?], April 23; S. Lanckoronski's letter to [the Deputy Judge of Lviv, Manachyn, May 13]; Senate Council, Warsaw, June 4, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 389, 405, 407, 408; and S. Lanckoronski's letter to the Deputy Judge of Lviv [Manachyn], May 5, 1649, in Ojczyeste spominki etc., II, 19.

Radziwill; he would also support Zsigmond Rakoczy to gain the Polish throne.¹⁸

It was no secret to Khmelnytskyi that this magnate supported Rakoczy's candidacy during the interregnum, and that he continued to keep contact with the Transylvanian ruler who was declared an enemy of the Commonwealth at the Coronation Diet.¹⁹ Radziwill hated Jan Kazimierz, for whom he prophesied a short life. If the King did not die, he would be dethroned as a result of the civil war, which would take place even if Jan Kazimierz managed to pacify the Kozaks.²⁰ Radziwill was publicly accused of trying to separate Lithuania from Poland and to set up a sovereign duchy with the help of Rakoczy. In Warsaw his name was synonymous with treason.²¹

Khmelnytskyi thus found a perfect opportunity to reestablish good relations with the Lithuanian magnate and

¹⁸See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to the Rakoczys, Pereiaslav, February 20, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 100-01.

¹⁹See S. A. Radziwill, Pamietniki etc., 2 vols (Poznan, 1839), II, 357; and Kubala, Wojna moskiewska etc., op. cit., p. 247.

²⁰See Kubala, Wojna moskiewska, op. cit., pp. 247, 415, n. 24.

²¹See Radziwill, op. cit., II, 371; and E. Kotlubaj, Zycie Janusza Radziwilla etc. (Vilnius, 1859), p. 135.

to make use of his ambitions. There were frequent exchanges of envoys between the Kozak and Lithuanian hetmans. Furthermore, some sort of secret understanding was reached between them.²² At the same time Khmelnytskyi contacted other Lithuanian men of importance. His envoys requested the Lithuanian senators to use their influence not to send the troops of the Grand Duchy to aid the Poles.²³ By denouncing the serf rising in Lithuania, he hoped to establish friendly relations with the Lithuanian nobles.²⁴ The aim of all these activities was to sow dissention between the nobles of the Crown and of the Grand Duchy. He also wanted to contain the Lithuanian troops within the boundaries of the Grand Duchy while the Kozak Army marched against the Crown Army.

²²See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to J. Radziwill, Pereiaslav, February 19, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 96; G. Kunakov's Report to the Muscovite Government (1649); and the letters to the Muscovite Department of External Affairs of N. Pleshcheev, Putivl, April 16, 1649; and Z. Leontev and N. Kirillov, Sevsk, June 9, 1649, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., III, 299-300, 307, 62 (Dopelniia). See also Lipinski, op. cit., pp. 274-75, 277-79.

²³See G. Unkovskii's report to the Muscovite Government (1649), in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 161.

²⁴See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to H. Czyz, Kiev, December 31, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 87; and D. Horski's letter to K. Chodkiewicz, Zalesie, January 30, 1649, in Ojczyστε spominki etc., II, 7-10.

On the whole, Khmelnytskyi seemed to have accomplished his aims by diplomatic means. True, he was unable to rouse Muscovy out of its lethargy. Its statesmen were interested in his propositions, but they were cautious and in no hurry. They were proverbially "measuring the cloth seven times before they cut it". Khmelnytskyi at least had the satisfaction that while Muscovy would not support him, it would not aid his enemies either. Khmelnytskyi seemed to have secured the support from the High Porte and all its vassals: he was certain about the whole-hearted cooperation of Crimea; he was assured of some military aid from Moldavia, Walachia and Transylvania; and he imagined that the Turks would enter into the hostilities with the Commonwealth in spite of their war with Venice. Finally, Khmelnytskyi seemed to utilize all the hostile elements within the Commonwealth for his ends.

The realization of Khmelnytskyi's new political plans did not only depend on the support of foreign powers or the hostile factions within the Commonwealth; he had a vast reservoir of "riffraff" at his disposal. At the same time as he roused the Commonwealth's neighbours, he also appealed to the Rusin people. Issuing calls for aid to "all the common people and the Kozaks who believed in God",

Khmelnyskyi promised them freedom from their masters after a victory over the Poles.²⁵ In response to his appeals "the rebellious serfs thronged together".²⁶ Having already experienced "freedom from labour and tribute, the rabble armed itself"; their slogan was: "no lords forever".²⁷ They did not even want to hear any talk about negotiations with their oppressors.²⁸ This was to be a conflict to the last drop of blood. Khmelnyskyi declared that his aim was "to exterminate the Polish name and race";²⁹ his militant followers cried out defiantly: "human tongues will first turn backward before the Poles will rule over us".³⁰ This

²⁵Despatch of L. Sapieha [Loeu, ca. August 1, 1649], in Ojczyście spominki etc., II, 42.

²⁶T. Obuchowicz's letter to L. Sapieha, Manashyn, May 22, 1649, ibid., II, 29.

²⁷Journal of W. Miaskowski, Hoshcha, March 7, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 385.

²⁸See Anonymous letter to A. Szoldrski, Warsaw, March 23, 1649, and A. Kysil's letter to B. Khmelnyskyi [Hoscha, late March or early April, 1649], in Ojczyście spominki etc., II, 16, 30-32; Revelations of Kozak prisoners, Treshyn, April 18, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 387; and M. Golinski, MS. B.Z.N.Ossol., 189, f. 210.

²⁹Senate Council, Warsaw, June 4, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 406.

³⁰L. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, [Kamianets?], April 23, 1649, ibid., p. 389.

movement was also supported actively by Rusin nobles, clergy and burgesses.³¹ In April Khmelnytskyi announced the final orders for a general mobilization of his forces. His manifestoes designated all regiments to concentrate at Masliv Stav.³²

II

So far Khmelnytskyi was successful in "lulling the Commonwealth to sleep with the hope of peace and uncertain negotiations".³³ By May he was ready; he had no further need of his mask. Early in June there was no question about his true motives and plans even in Warsaw. The royal envoy Smiarowski reported that Khmelnytskyi received him indignantly, treated him with contempt and showed no respect for the letter of the king. Furthermore, the

³¹See W. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, Novosilka, February 1, 1649, and the Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereiaslav, February 26, 1649, ibid., pp. 365, 383. See also Commissioners' report to Jan Kazimierz, Vasylkiv, February 11, 1649, in Ojczyeste spominki etc., II, 10-12; M. Golinski, MS. B.Z.N. Ossol., 189, f, 210; and J. Jerlicz, Latopisiec etc., 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1853), I, 95-96.

³²See the various reports, despatches and letters in Akty odnoszashchiesia etc., III, 45, 54, 58 (Dopolneniia); VIII, 289, 294-95; Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 389, 397; and in Ojczyeste spominki etc., II, 17.

³³S. Lanckoronski's letter to the Deputy Judge of Lviv [Manachyn], May 5, 1649, in Ojczyeste spominki etc., II, 19.

astonished royal envoy heard a declaration of war. Khmelnytskyi stated that no further compromise was possible; "two walls will collide: one will fall in; the other will remain standing". In Smiarowski's opinion, the hostilities could only be prevented if the government consented to humour Khmelnytskyi with the creation of a "sovereign Principality of Rus".³⁴

Already in February 1649 Khmelnytskyi -- this "Zaporozhian Machiavelli"³⁵ -- revealed to the commissioners that "by the will of God" he became "the independent ruler of Rus".³⁶ Yet, at that time he still considered himself to be a "loyal" subject of the Polish King. Three months later, however, he decided to sever even this weak link with the Commonwealth, for he refused to acknowledge allegiance to Jan Kazimierz. This he revealed to the Muscovite envoy Giŕgorii Unkovskii in the following form:

In Poland and in Lithuania Jan Kazimierz was elected king. . . . and the Poles and the Lithuanians crowned

³⁴Senate Councils, Warsaw, June 4, 1649; and Olszewski's report [Taikury, May 25, 1649], in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 397, 405-06.

³⁵Letter of T. Obuchowicz to[L. Sapieha?], Taikury, May 25, 1649, ibid., p. 396.

³⁶Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereiaslav, February 22, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 108.

him and swore fealty to him, and the king swore an oath to them, and God delivered us from them. The king was neither elected nor crowned by us. We have not kissed the cross [i.e., swore by the cross] for him. And they had neither written nor notified us about this; and in this way, by the will of God, we have gained freedom from them. . . . And we do not wish to remain under their subjection and in their bondage.³⁷

Thus, in all the Orthodox churches within the territories controlled by the Kozaks, the Orthodox faithful ceased to recite the king's name in their common prayers.³⁸ All traces of the former magnate rule were slowly disappearing.³⁹ Khmelnytskyi aimed to unite all Rusin ethnic territories within such boundaries as were ruled by the Kievan grand princes.⁴⁰

Even the greatest optimist among the "peace party" began to realize that such "madness" of Khmelnytskyi must be checked. The king called his ministers to counsel how

³⁷G. Unkovskii's report to the Muscovite Government, Chyhyryn, April 29, 1649, ibid., II, 152, 154.

³⁸See I. P. Krypiakevych, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (Kiev, 1954), p. 338.

³⁹See the various letters and report to the Muscovite Government in Akty otносиashchiesia etc., III, 211, 227, 232, 242, 21 (Dopolneniia).

⁴⁰See G. Unkovskii's report to the Muscovite Government (1649), in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 154.

"to save and to protect the institutions of the Fatherland, . . . because not only the sleeve of the gown, or the gown itself is at stake, but the whole body of the Fatherland".⁴¹ Realizing that the armies of the Commonwealth would be matched against the "fearless soldiers" of the Kozak Army, the government sought as many troops as possible. German mercenaries were to be recruited; Prussian regiments were ordered to march south; all existing troops were to mass together; and a general call to arms was issued for the gentry.

In order to gain military aid, diplomatic support and to secure confirmation of various treaties, envoys were dispatched from Warsaw to Muscovy, Sweden, Transylvania, the Empire, the Holy See, Spain and France.⁴² All these efforts came too late. In hope of peace with the Kozaks, Jan Kazimierz demobilized many regiments; now he had no time to build a strong army.⁴³ Thus, as the term of the armistice expired, the Commonwealth was "neither prepared for war nor

⁴¹Jan Kazimierz's summons of the Senators, Warsaw, May 5, 1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 20.

⁴²See the Senate Councils, Warsaw, June 4, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 408; and Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. cit., p. 351.

⁴³See K. F. Obuchowicz, "Dyaryusz Kazimierza Filipa

for peace negotiations".⁴⁴

The government still tried to gain time in order to raise a strong army. It thus proposed to Khmelnytskyi to extend the term of armistice from May 22 to July 1st. The other steps it took were desperate. The royal envoy Smiarowski was sent to bribe the Kozak colonels. Kysil also wrote letters to them in an attempt to discredit Khmelnytskyi and to turn them against him. All these attempts failed: Khmelnytskyi would not hear any arguments against the extension of the truce; the Kozak officers did not desert their leader; there was no mutiny in the Kozak Army. Khmelnytskyi retained his command and his iron grip on the Army and Smiarowski paid for the provocation with his life.⁴⁵

Obuchowicza Wojewody Smolenskiego i Marszalka Kola Rycerskiego", in Pamiętniki historyczne etc., (Vilnius, 1859), p. 28.

⁴⁴A. Kysil's letter to J. Ossolinski, Hoshcha, May 11, 1649, in Ojczyście spominki etc., II, 21.

⁴⁵See H. Pinocci's report on Khmelnytskyi and the Kozaks (1654); Anonymous letter to A. Szoldrski, Warsaw, March 23, 1649; A. Kysil's letters to J. Ossolinski and to the Kozak Colonels, Hoshcha, May 11, 15 and 18, 1649; and K. Przyjemski's letter to A. Kysil, Zviahel, June 15, 1649, ibid., I 142; II, 14, 21-23, 24-26, 26-29, 45-46. See also the Senate Councils, Warsaw, June 6, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 404; B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Jan Kazimierz, Zboriv, August 16, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 125; and Jerlicz, op. cit., I, 98.

Hostilities were resumed by both sides even before May 22. Khmelnytskyi sent various regiments to harass the Crown Army; at the same time he massed his troops near Bila Tserkva and awaited the arrival of his Tatar allies.

The forces of the Commonwealth were grouped in three divisions. The first was commanded by the new Regimentaries, Castellan of Belz, Andrzej Firlej and Castellan of Kamianets, Stanislaw Lanckoronski. It was engaged in sporadic skirmishes in the region of Sluch and Horyn Rivers. As the Kozak-serf pressure mounted, this division was forced to withdraw westward and finally to seek shelter of Zbarazh, a fortress in Podolia. There it was strengthened by the arrival of several magnate regiments and finally by the private army of Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki. Wisniowiecki soon became the de facto commander of the troops. The second division, commanded by King Jan Kazimierz, acted as a reserve and marched to the aid of the first. The third division, comprising troops of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and commanded by Field Hetman Prince Janusz Radziwill, was poised to enter Ukraine from the northeast.⁴⁶

⁴⁶See the various despatches, letters and reports in Akty odnosiaszchiesia etc., III, 315, 325, 392, 45, 48, 54, 58, 71 (Dopolnieniia); VIII, 289, 294-95; X, 243; Ojczyeste spominki etc., II, 37-50, 57-58; and in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 398, 409-10.

Late in May the whole Kozak Army was on the move. By July 10 the Kozak-Tatar forces appeared before the walls of Zbarazh. As the siege began, the assaults at the fortress and the defence of it were characterized by unparalleled acts of bravery.⁴⁷ During this siege Khmelnytskyi received disturbing news. The Kozak forces in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were routed, and Radziwill, whom he expected to remain passive, was preparing to march south. At the same time he learned that Jan Kazimierz was also marching towards Zbarazh to save the besieged first division.

Khmelnytskyi could not allow himself to be trapped between two fires. He reacted quickly by dividing his army into three parts and assigning to each a specific task. A strong force under Colonel Stanislav Krychevskyi marched into Grand Duchy of Lithuania. His mission was to prevent Radziwill's penetration into Ukraine. On July 31 a battle was fought near Loeu, on the Dnieper, and the Kozaks suffered a disastrous defeat. Krychevskyi, however,

⁴⁷On the siege of Zbarazh (July 10 to August 22, 1649) see the following accounts found in Akty odnosiaszchiesia etc., III, 392-93; Ojczyzste spominki etc., II, 53-58; Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 413, 428, 448-70. See also Kubala, Szkice historyczne, op. cit., pp. 73-88, 105-09, 116-18; and Gorla, op. cit., pp. 118-19.

accomplished his mission; for the Lithuanian troops suffered so many casualties that Radziwill thought it unwise to march south.⁴⁸

The second part of Khmelnytskyi's army continued to lay siege to Zbarazh. Although the fortress repulsed all attacks, its defenders were in a desperate state: their ranks were decimated; they were short of food supplies and of ammunition. Thus, the issue of the campaign was to be decided by the clash between the third Kozak force under Khmelnytskyi himself, together with the Tatars led by Khan Islam III, and the division commanded by the king. It was this division that the Kozak-Tatar allies sped to intercept.

King Jan Kazimierz departed from Warsaw on June 24; and on July 3 he entered Lublin. If he had previously any misgivings about the whole campaign, he gained more and more confidence upon his arrival in Lublin. His envoys returned from Muscovy and from Transylvania, and informed him that neither country would support the Kozaks. Lupul of Moldavia, himself a born intriguer, was never a true ally of Khmelnytskyi and would not hesitate to turn against

⁴⁸On the Battle of Loeu (July 31, 1649) see the following accounts: Lipinski, op. cit., pp. 284-322, 355-69; and Kotlubaj, op. cit., pp. 140-48, 367-71, 416-19.

him if he could profit by it. The Hospodar of Walachia was more concerned in keeping his throne secure than to embark on an uncertain adventure. Furthermore, the Venetian envoy announced that his countrymen won a resounding naval victory over the Turks at the Dardanelles.

Under these circumstances, the High Porte would not dare to permit the Tatars to support the Kozaks or to make any plans about invasion of the Commonwealth. There were also despatches for the king: these announced the early victories of both the Crown and the Lithuanian armies over the Kozaks. Jan Kazimierz now did not need to fear about the intentions of Radziwill. This magnate, upon learning of the adverse predicaments of Khmelnytskyi, would have no other choice but to march against the Kozaks.⁴⁹

These reports and the advice of Ossolinski made Jan

⁴⁹See G. Rakoczy's letter to Jan Kazimierz, Alba Iulia, June 4, and M. Ostrorog's letter to J. Ossolinski, Zbarazh, July 3, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 398-99, 410-12; Despatches from Kamianets [ca. end of June], from Lublin, July 14, 1649, in Ojczyzste spominki etc., II, 51-52, 62; Aleksei Mikhailovich's letter to Jan Kazimierz, Moscow, May 18, 1649, in Akty odnosiaschiesia etc., III 309-11; J. Radziwill's letter to Jan Kazimierz, Kaz. Slaboda, June 28, and Jan Kazimierz's letter to J. Radziwill, Lublin, July 13, 1649, in Kotlubaj, "Dodatki" [Appendices], op. cit., pp. 365-67, 357; Radziwill, op. cit., II, 277-80; Latacz, op. cit., p. 4; and W. Rudawski, Historia polska etc., 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1855), I, 80.

Kazimierz overconfident. He ordered Radziwill to lay waste to Ukraine and to capture Kiev; in the meantime, he would deal with Khmelnytskyi himself.⁵⁰ Another rash act on the king's part was to march against the vastly superior forces of the enemy with insufficient intelligence and strength.

Ossolinski did not wish to expose the king to the tumultuous gentry. Their military worthlessness was clearly shown at the Battle of Pyliavtsi; furthermore, the king might have to change his plans under their pressure, and now there was no time for that. He advised the king to rely more on foreign mercenaries and the various contingents of the magnates.⁵¹ Jan Kazimierz agreed. He thus called to his colours only the gentry militia of the Palatinates of Rus, Belz and Lublin, which were nearest to the base of operations; the rest were to report a month hence.⁵² Obviously, he did not want their presence, for he considered the campaign to be terminated by that time. Later, when the danger became obvious to him, the king did issue the customary third call.

⁵⁰See Jan Kazimierz's letter to J. Radziwill, Lublin, July 13, 1649, in Kotlubaj, "Dodatki", op. cit., pp. 357-58.

⁵¹See Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. cit., pp. 355-57.

⁵²See Jan Kazimierz's manifesto to the nobles, Lublin, July 13, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 414-15.

to arms to all the gentry; by that time, however, it was too late.⁵³

Having made up his mind to proceed to the rescue of the first division at Zbarazh, Jan Kazimierz marched on without being able to gather the necessary information about the activities of the enemy. He discredited all despatches which stated that Khmelnytskyi was supported by many Tatars.⁵⁴ The reports of various Kozak prisoners, and others, were conflicting, but on the whole encouraging;⁵⁵ The despatches from Grand Duchy of Lithuania announced that Radziwill was on his way to Kiev.⁵⁶

His advisers assured him that Khmelnytskyi would not dare to resist the will of anointed monarch, the representative of God upon earth. The very presence of the king among the troops would strike fear into the hearts of the serfs. The Rusin burgesses would open the gates of their towns at his command without so much as a

⁵³See Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. cit., p. 359.

⁵⁴See A. Trzebicki's letter to Anonymous, Sokal [ca. July 31, 1649], in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 424-25.

⁵⁵See the various letters in ibid., pp. 421-26, 429-31.

⁵⁶See A. Szoldrski's letter to Anonymous, Poznan, August 9, 1648, ibid., p. 430.

murmur.⁵⁷ In his manifestoes to the Rusin populace the king thus promised the grant of amnesty and the restoration of all liberties, if they abandoned Khmelnytskyi.⁵⁸ The Kozak hetman was declared a traitor and an enemy of the state, and a price was placed on his head. He was replaced by the Kozak Semen Zabuskyi, whom the king appointed to command the Kozak Army after great ceremonies.⁵⁹

By the end of the first week of August Jan Kazimierz was notified that the defenders of the Zbarazh fortress were in a desperate situation. The king, even though he knew by this time that the Tatar khan supported the Kozaks at Zbarazh with all his hordes, decided not to wait for the gentry militia to assemble in full force, but to press with his relatively small army to Zbarazh.⁶⁰ In doing so he led his army into a skillfully-prepared ambush near

⁵⁷See Radziwill, op. cit., II, 378; Rudawski, op. cit., I, 76; and V. Kochowski, Annalium Poloniae etc., 4 vols (Krakow, 1683), I, 69.

⁵⁸See M. Golinski, MS. B.Z.N.Ossol., 189 f. 264.

⁵⁹See Radziwill, op. cit., II, 368; and Rudawski, op. cit., I, 83.

⁶⁰See A. Szoldrski's letter to Anonymous, Poznan, August 9, 1649; and Regimentaries' letter to Jan Kazimierz [ca. early August, 1649], in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 430, 428-29.

Zboriv.⁶¹

On August 15 the royal army was crossing the River Strypa. The main part of the army, as it approached the river, was attacked by a Kozak-Tatar force from the rear and both flanks. Since its progress forward was blocked by the great variety of vehicles in the baggage train and then by the river, this part of the army had no chance at all to make an organized stand against the enemy. As a terrible confusion resulted, these troops were systematically decimated. Following this massacre the victors siezed the baggage train and most of the guns.

Meanwhile, that part of the army which crossed the river also came under a surprise attack, but was in a better position to organize a hasty defense. Nevertheless, some regiments faltered under the pressure of the superior strength of the enemy and began to retreat in confusion. During these critical moments the king made frantic efforts to inspire his army to resist. Moved by his gallantry,

⁶¹On the Battle of Zboriv (August 15 to 16 1649) see the following accounts: Akty odnosiaszchiesia etc., III, 409-10; Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 435-39; and M. Golinski, MS. B.Z.N.Ossol., 189, f. 267. See also Kubala, Szkice historyczne, op. cit., pp. 88-105, 119-22; Gorka, op. cit., 119-21; and L. Frasz, "Bitwa pod Zborowem w r. 1649", Kwartalnik Historyczny, XLVI (nos. 3-4, 1932), 350-70.

the soldiers rallied to defense.

At sunset the fighting ceased. During the night Jan Kazimierz again managed to calm his panicky troops, many of whom were on a verge of flight after hearing rumors that the king and their leaders planned to desert them. As order was restored, the king commanded that stronger fortification be erected around the camp. "For several hundred of years neither Poland nor any king had been in such straits as on August 15", remarked one participant of the battle. "It almost came to the repetition of disasters at Varna or Legnica, or of the times when the Tatar Batu Khan lived twelve weeks in Krakow".⁶²

During the night more Kozak troops arrived. By dawn, on August 16, the royal army was surrounded, and assaults were renewed mainly by the Kozaks, for the main Tatar horde received orders from the khan not to take part in the fighting. The royal troops continued to resist these attacks, but in the process of fighting suffered heavy casualties. By noon, as the fighting subsided, the morale of these soldiers was low, for they realized that their

⁶²W. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, Zboriv, August 22, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 439.

position was almost hopeless. Jan' Kazimierz also saw the dangerous position. He therefore, decided to extricate his army from an impending disaster by negotiating peace with the enemy.

III

During the night of August 15, following the critical moments of the first day of the battle, King Jan Kazimierz assembled his council of war. The king, his ministers and other high-ranking officers discussed various courses of action. In the end they agreed that the plan of the Crown Grand Chancellor would save them all. Jerzy Ossolinski sought to create a rift between the Kozaks and the Tatars. He believed that Khan Islam III would be induced by suitable concessions to withdraw the Tatar support from the Kozaks, and perhaps even to turn his hordes against them.⁶³

At the conclusion of the meeting Jan Kazimierz sent a messenger with his letter to Islam III. The king wrote that he was dismayed that the khan should support his rebel subjects, especially when there were no causes for

⁶³See Rudawski, op. cit., I, 84-85; and V. Golobutskii, Diplomaticheskaia istoriia etc (Kiev, 1962), p. 205.

hostilities between Crimea and the Commonwealth. He assured the khan of his friendship and reminded him that the late King Wladyslaw IV was extremely kind to him. The king also proposed to the Tatar ruler that negotiations be started and offered him suitable indemnities.⁶⁴

Islam III was interested in the proposals of Jan Kazimierz. The khan therefore replied that he was prepared to extend his own friendship to the king. At the same time he reproached the king for his failure to notify him that he was elected the King of Poland. But the khan decided to overlook this lack of tact, and requested the king to send his chancellor to confer with his own vezir on matters of mutual interest.⁶⁵

After being informed about the khan's demands by his envoy, Jan Kazimierz answered that he agreed to accept them and that he would send his chancellor to a designated place between the two armies. He also urged the khan to stop all hostilities without delay.⁶⁶

⁶⁴See Jan Kazimierz's letter to Islam III, Zboriv, August 15, 1649, in Pamiatinki etc., 4 vols (Kiev, 1845), I, 3, 454-55.

⁶⁵See Islam III's letter to Jan Kazimierz, Zboriv, August 15, 1649, ibid., I, 3, 456-58.

⁶⁶See Jan Kazimierz's letter to Islam III, Zboriv, August 16, 1649, ibid., I, 3, 459-60.

At sunset on August 16, as the fighting of the second day of the battle subsided, Jerzy Ossolinski and Sefer Gazi Aga met for the first round of negotiations. The vezir then made the following demands: the Tatars will have the right to plunder and to take prisoners along their return march to Crimea; and they will be paid ransom for the king's army and tribute due to them for several years. He also stated that the khan wished that the Kozaks be pacified, that a territorial autonomy be guaranteed to them, that their quota be increased to forty thousand and that they be paid for their services. At this point the negotiations were suspended because Ossolinski wanted time to discuss these demands with the king. Jan Kazimierz, however, had little choice but to accept them. Moreover, as the negotiations resumed on August 17, he even agreed to a new demand that additional ransom be paid to the Tatars by the defenders of Zbarazh. On the following day both sides prepared the texts of their agreements. On August 19 the signed copies of the treaty were exchanged between the king and the khan.⁶⁷

⁶⁷See the anonymous journal (1649), in Akty odnosziasz-chiesia etc., III, 412-13; W. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, Zboriv, August 22, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 437-38 (a more complete text of a similar letter

Both Jan Kazimierz and Khan Islam III agreed to maintain peace between their states and to give mutual support against their common enemies. The king pledged himself to observe the following terms: never to wage war against the Ottoman Empire; to pay annual tribute to the Khan; to recognize Tatar pasture rights along the northern shores of the Black Sea; and to permit the Tatars an unobstructed passage to Crimea through the south-eastern palatinates of the Commonwealth. Jan Kazimierz also pledged to grant amnesty to all Kozaks, to confirm Khmelnytskyi's post as Hetman of the Kozak Army, to restore all Kozak rights and liberties and to ensure that they no longer suffered injustice from officials and nobles. In turn, the khan pledged to cause the least possible damage to the territories the Tatars passed en route to Crimea and to forbid all his subjects to make incursions into the Commonwealth.⁶⁸

is listed in Kubala's "Dodatki" [Appendices], Szkice historyczne, op. cit., pp. 119-22, but the dates are different from the two accounts cited above); and Gorka, op. cit., pp. 120-21.

⁶⁸For the treaties between Jan Kazimierz and Islam III, Zboriv, August 19, 1649, see Akty odnoszashchiesia etc., III, 413-15; and Kubala, "Dodatki", Szkice historyczne, op. cit., p. 122. The Muscovite envoy to the Commonwealth was convinced that a secret alliance was concluded between the king and the Khan directed against Muscovy. See G. Kunakov's report to the Department of Foreign Affairs (1649), in

These shameful and difficult conditions clearly indicate that Ossolinski did not effect a split between the Kozaks and the Tatars. Nevertheless, Khmelnytskyi was surprised that the khan decided to negotiate with the king, whom he intended to capture, send to Crimea and then to negotiate an enormous sum for his ransom. Obviously, Islam III now changed his mind because he decided that he would gain more by negotiations. It was certainly not in his favour to have one of the hostile sides completely overpower the other. The khan also favoured the old device of divide et impera.

It was therefore for a definite reason that his main horde did not take part in the second day's battle. He was content to watch the Christian "infidels" as they attempted to destroy each other, and decided to intervene only when it became obvious that the Kozaks would emerge victorious. At this time he ordered Khmelnytskyi to cease hostilities and to begin negotiations with the king. Khmelnytskyi therefore had little choice but to yield to the pressure of the Tatar ruler. Were he to refuse to heed

Akty odnosiaschiesia etc., III, 404-05. Nothing of the sort is mentioned in other sources, including the Tatar chronicle. See Gorka, op. cit., p. 121.

the khan, he faced the possibility of the Tatars turning against him.⁶⁹

Khmelnyskyi was already contacted by the king on August 15. Jan Kazimierz declared in his letter that he was astonished that Khmelnyskyi dared to lift the sword against him, the anointed representative of God. He ordered Khmelnyskyi to stop all fighting and to withdraw his troops from the field of battle. Once he complied with this order, he should send his envoys with Kozak grievances. At this time the king would appoint a commission to resolve all difficulties. Jan Kazimierz promised that if Khmelnyskyi heeded him, he would do everything in his power to restore the Kozak rights and liberties.⁷⁰

Khmelnyskyi's answer to the king was delivered together with the khan's letter. The Kozak hetman claimed that both he and his father were always faithful servants of the Crown. He did not take up arms against the king; on the contrary, this was his last resort to seek justice from

⁶⁹See G. Kunakov's report to the Department of Foreign Affairs (1649), in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., III, 395; and Gorka, op. cit., pp. 120-21.

⁷⁰See Jan Kazimierz's letter to B. Khmelnysky, Zboriv, August 15, 1649. Cited by Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VIII, 3, 199-200.

the tyranny of the magnates. Khmelnytskyi emphasized that he would gladly place himself under the protection of the king and would obey his commands to the letter, were it not for the lawlessness of the nobles, who wielded more power than their own monarch. He concluded his remarks to the king by repeating the proposal he made at Zamostia: the Kozaks want to serve the king faithfully and want to free him from the bondage of the "kinglets".⁷¹

Jan Kazimierz responded the following day by admonishing Khmelnytskyi for the fate of his envoy Jakob Smiarowski, but the king was even willing to overlook this atrocity. He offered Khmelnytskyi another chance to earn royal favour and to keep his post of Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army. Jan Kazimierz proposed that Khmelnytskyi carry out several conditions. Khmelnytskyi must swear an oath of fealty; and he must prove himself a loyal subject by ceasing to carry on relations with foreign rulers, by pledging not to stir the serfs, by withdrawing all his troops from the battle area and by sending all the serfs back to their homes.⁷² Khmelnytskyi's

⁷¹See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Jan Kazimierz, Zboriv, August 15, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 122-23.

⁷²See Jan Kazimierz's letter to B. Khmelnytskyi, Zboriv, August 16, 1649. Cited by Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VIII, 3, 203-04.

answer was delivered to the king the same day. He explained in detail why Smiarowski deserved his fate, and added that he was prepared to discuss all other matters with the Crown Grand Chancellor.⁷³

Khmelnytskyi did appear during the second round of Ossolinski-Sefer Gazi negotiations. At this time he attempted to introduce Kozak matters into discussion. Ossolinski, however, told him to prepare all his demands in writing and to submit them to the king.⁷⁴ Khmelnytskyi followed this instruction by sending Kozak envoys with two letters. In his own letter Khmelnytskyi assured the king of his loyalty and asked him for a personal favour: 'capital punishment for his enemy Daniel Czaplinski.'⁷⁵ The other letter had the form of an eighteen-article petition of the Zaporozhian Army to the king, which was to serve as the basis for the

⁷³See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Jan Kazimierz, Zboriv, August 16, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 124-25.

⁷⁴See W. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, Zboriv, August 22, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 438; Anonymous journal (1649), in Akty odnosiaschiesia etc., III, 413; and Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VIII, 3, 206.

⁷⁵See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Jan Kazimierz, Zboriv, August 17, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 126-27.

forthcoming negotiations.⁷⁶

Jan Kazimierz gave his verbal assurances to the Kozak envoys that the petition would receive his consideration. He made similar promises in a letter to Khmelnytskyi, adding that he would send the commissioners as soon as possible. He again emphasized that all troops and field artillery must be withdrawn.⁷⁷ On August 18 Khmelnytskyi answered that he was delighted that finally all the difficulties would be settled amicably. He had already removed the guns; he had not yet withdrawn his troops because of the danger from the roving bands of Tatars.⁷⁸

On the same day Ossolinski and other commissioners began to negotiate with Khmelnytskyi. Late at night the terms of peace were finally agreed upon by the two sides. On August 19 Khmelnytskyi was called to take an oath. The commissioners had considerable difficulty in administering

⁷⁶ See the Petition of the Zaporozhian Army to Jan Kazimierz, Zboriv, August 17, 1648, ibid., pp. 128-30.

⁷⁷ See the Anonymous journal (1649), in Akty otnosiash-chiesia etc., III, 413. Jan Kazimierz's letter to B. Khmelnytskyi has perished. It is evident from Khmelnytskyi's letter to the king of August 18 (see n. 78 below) that he did write such a letter and made these comments.

⁷⁸ See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Jan Kazimierz, Zboriv, August 18, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 131-32.

the oath to Khmelnytskyi, because he demanded that the king take a similar oath and that his enemy, Daniel Czaplinski, be immediately surrendered to him. Next day the whole proceedings ended with a ceremony in the king's tent. Khmelnytskyi appeared before Jan Kazimierz did homage to him and asked for his pardon.⁷⁹ Finally, with the lifting of the siege of Zbarazh on August 22, the whole campaign came to an end.⁸⁰

The agreement concluded at Zboriv between Jan Kazimierz and the Commonwealth, on the one side, and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and the Zaporozhian Army, on the other, was de facto a treaty. Officially, however, it was regarded only as an act of royal grace: the king merely consented to approve the petitions of his subjects. Its official name was "A Declaration of His Royal Majesty's Grace, given [in response to] the Articles of Petition of the Zaporozhian Army".⁸¹

⁷⁹See W. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, Zboriv, August 22, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 438-39; and the anonymous journal (1649), in Akty odnoszashchiesia etc., III, 413.

⁸⁰See the anonymous diary on the siege of Zbarazh (1649), in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 469.

⁸¹For the full text of the Treaty of Zboriv see Appendix I.

The "Declaration" was divided into three main parts. Articles 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 11 dealt exclusively with Kozak matters. The chief provisions of these articles were the following: all former rights and liberties of the Zaporozhian Army were restored; the king issued a separate charter in confirmation of this article;⁸² The new quota of the registered Kozaks was raised to forty thousand; Kozak territories roughly comprised the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv; neither the Crown Army nor the Jews were to have access into areas where Kozak regiments were stationed; the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army was responsible for the preparation of the new register; and he was granted the district of Chyhyryn.

Articles 4 and 5 stated that all Kozaks and their supporters were granted a general amnesty. Articles 8, 9 and 10 dealt with other matters. All questions dealing with the abolition of the Uniate Church and with the restoration of the rights and the benefices to the Orthodox Church were to be discussed at the forthcoming Diet. The metropolitan

⁸² See Jan Kazimierz's charter to the Zaporozhian Army, Zboriv, August 18, 1649, in Akty odnosiaszchiesia etc., X, 453-54. This charter is incorrectly dated August 18, 1650. This must have been a simple case of a clerk's slip of the pen as this charter was entered into the Kievan records.

bishop of Kiev was to receive a seat in the Senate. All offices in the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv were to be restricted to nobles of the Orthodox faith. The Jesuits were neither to reside nor to found schools throughout Ukraine. Finally, all these articles were to be ratified by the Diet.

The aims, desires and slogans of the Kozaks and of the Rusin people found their expression -- at least in part -- in the terms of the Treaty of Zboriv. This treaty was not a complete failure. On the contrary, it was a bold experiment. The following analysis will show that the individuals who draughted the terms of the Treaty of Zboriv attempted at once to solve the pressing Kozak problem and to remedy the chief aims of the Rusin society as a whole.

In the past the government of the Commonwealth never made such sweeping concessions to the Kozaks as it had by the Treaty of Zboriv.⁸³ This in itself was a useful precedent for the future. Articles 1 and 2 of the treaty, as well as the royal charter, fulfilled the aims and satisfied the interests of all those in the ranks of the Kozak Army.

⁸³In the view of E. Latacz, these concessions were made to the Kozaks because Jan Kazimierz wanted to gain their support for his planned war with the Turks. See Latacz, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

The Commonwealth retained the registered Kozaks in its service and their quota was increased from six thousand to the nominal figure of forty thousand. They secured the repeal of the draconic Ordinance of 1638. Thus, this meant that they regained such rights as their military self-government and the election of their own officers. Jan Kazimierz also issued a special charter which confirmed all former Kozak liberties.

Ukraine gained political autonomy within the framework of the Commonwealth. Its new status was stressed by the royal charter and articles 2, 6, 7 and 9 of the treaty. Comprising the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv, the new Kozak territories were to be ruled by the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army. By the virtue of his office he assumed great powers. Kozak troops were responsible for the defense of their lands; and the Crown Army was denied access to them. As the Kozaks gained control of Ukraine, their military system of government and administration was introduced. Thus, a kind of military republic was born. Its links with Warsaw were very weak. Even these links emphasized the autonomy of Ukraine, for only Rusin nobles of Orthodox faith were eligible to hold appointments within it.

Articles 8 and 10 of the treaty were further

expanded by a special royal charter issued in Warsaw on January 12, 1650. It stressed that "all the Rusin people" -- churchmen and laymen, nobles and commoners -- retained their national, religious and cultural rights and liberties throughout the Commonwealth. The Orthodox Church was guaranteed its rights; the Orthodox clergy were granted a number of concessions; and the Orthodox faithful were promised freedom of worship. Special reference was made to the rights of the burgesses. Finally, all Rusin schools and printing presses were permitted to function without any obstruction.⁸⁴ No concessions of importance were made to the serfs, because neither the ruling class nor the Kozaks intended to liberate them.

The circumstances surrounding the agreements reached at Zboriv by all the combatants were highly unusual. Khan Islam III emerged as the central figure. By concluding a separate peace with King Jan Kazimierz, the khan betrayed his Kozak allies. Moreover, he "mediated" peace between Jan Kazimierz and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, and became the guarantor of the terms of the treaty between the King of Poland and his subjects. The khan therefore made the real gains at the

⁸⁴See Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VIII, 3, 262-63.

expense of the two combattants. Apart from the enormous ransom, renewal of the payment of tribute, great amount of plunder and the useful alliances, he left the two warring sides in a weakend position and still hostile to each other. Furthermore, he secured permission from the king to plunder and to sieze captives from the Rusin ethnic territories. This Khmelnytskyi previously would not allow to him.⁸⁵

The treaty of Zboriv between Jan Kazimierz and the Commonwealth, on the one side, and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and the Zaporozhian Army, on the other, was built on very weak foundations. Both sides were compelled to accept its terms: the Polish king, by the exigencies of war; the Kozak hetman, by Tatar threats of retalliation. Neither side was satisfied with the treaty. Most of the Commonwealth's nobles considered its terms humiliating. These terms also neither corresponded with the actual successes of Kozak arms, nor satisfied the expectations of the Rusin society, especially the serfs. It was clear to all that the treaty was merely a temporary arrangement and that the issues would have to be resolved once more in the near future by the force of arms.

⁸⁵ See Gorka, op. cit., p. 115.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The religious persecution, the economic exploitation and the varying degrees of oppression of all classes of the Rusin people within the Polish-Lithuanian state, combined with the degeneration of the "Commonwealth of the gentry", caused a terrible conflict in 1648 and in 1649. Some nobles of the Commonwealth described these beginning years of the reign of King Jan Kazimierz as the "Initium Calamitatis Reipublicae".¹ It was a suitable label for a period during which their Commonwealth experienced many serious reversals. True, the Commonwealth managed to survive the worst ravages of the storm: fluctuat nec mergitur. But in the process the Commonwealth also received unparalleled military, political and ideological blows, as well as incalculable extremely severe wounds.

There were many shades of opinion among the contemporaries about the causes and the issues of the conflict within the Commonwealth. Most of those who searched for

¹A pun on the royal cipher I.C.R. (Ioannes Casimirus Rex) which appeared on coins.

answers as to the cause of the conflict, or who sought to find explanations for the great calamities, invariably concluded that God punished them for their sins, especially for their ill-treatment of serfs. Most of those contemporaries who attempted to analyse the nature of the conflict generally stressed its social aspect. In their correspondence, diaries and memoirs, they described some kind of antithesis between the nobles on the one hand, and the serfs on the other. But still there were those who saw the real issues of the great conflict. They admitted that the struggle within the Commonwealth concerned the Rusin people, who for the most part were fighting for three main goals: political independence, religious freedom and socio-economic improvement. There was, however, little disagreement among the contemporaries on two points: that the Kozaks played a decisive role in the struggle; and that the greatest enemy of the Commonwealth was that "Zaporozhian Machiavelli" -- Bohdan Khmelnytskyi.

Bohdan Khmelnytskyi was an individual of exceptional genius. It was he who managed to unite the "perfidious" Kozaks, the "traitorous" nobles, the "conspirant" clergy, the "senseless" and "embittered" burgesses and the "blood-thirsty" serfs -- all the social strata of the Rusin people.

For all these people, who represented conflicting interests, he found a common aim. He alone managed not only to demand obedience from them, but also to hand out punishment to them. He was a talented military commander, an able administrator and, above all, extremely dexterous diplomat. Much of his success resulted from his ability of finding gifted individuals to assist him. If all his difficulties are considered and the steps he took to overcome them, then Bohdan Khmelnytskyi certainly deserves more credit for his accomplishments than another of his contemporaries in somewhat similar situation -- Oliver Cromwell.

One of the greatest tasks before Khmelnytskyi was the fulfilment of his chief aim: to build a Rusin state on the ruins of the medieval Kievan Rus. This was an extraordinary task. Khmelnytskyi was therefore faced with a mass of problems. He had no trained civil service to carry out the administration. He had to rely on two patterns with which he was familiar: the Kozak military organization and the Commonwealth's form of government. But neither of these two patterns exactly suited for the structure of the new Rusin state. The organization of its administration, finances, justice, police, as well as solutions to the many social problems, especially those dealing with the serfs, therefore

rested in his hands.

Despite all these difficulties and lack of precedents to fall back on, Khmelnytskyi proceeded to carry out his aim. Already following his first military successes, a "separate Commonwealth" began to take shape in the territories under Kozak control. Khmelnytskyi's immediate concern was to provide his troops with food and ammunition; but, in doing this, he also had to organize an effective system of administration, finances, justice and police. In this way he organized a nucleus of state machinery.

Khmelnytskyi's chief helpers were the Kozaks. The composition of this Rusin stratum was radically changed during the conflict by the mass influx of serfs, burgesses and nobles into its ranks. The Kozaks therefore became the most important group among the Rusin people: their leading class; their spokesmen; their dominant military force; and even the state authority in the territory controlled by them. By this time the meaning of the Zaporozhian Army was becoming synonymous with the emerging Rusin state. Khmelnytskyi endeavoured to consolidate the position of the Kozaks and to bind the other Rusin social classes with the Kozaks.

Under these circumstances it is no wonder that Khmelnytskyi commenced to organize a kind of Kozak military

republic. This was especially clear after the signing of the Treaty of Zboriv. The territory within the boundaries delineated by the Treaty of Zboriv was divided by him into sixteen regiments, and each regiment into a number of hundreds. The regiments and hundreds functioned both as military and territorial units. In each of these units administration, legislation, finances, justice and police functions were carried out by the Kozaks. The Kozak general council became the highest popular representative body. It shared legislative and executive powers with the Kozak hetman.

This council played an extremely important part in the years 1648-1649, and influenced many of Khmelnytskyi's decisions. The representatives of the general council consisted of the secretary general, the quartermaster general, the judge general and the two adjutants general. They were the chief military and civilian officers, and they acted as a sort of permanent cabinet or chief advisers to Khmelnytskyi. Each one had specific function or functions to carry out: the secretary directed Khmelnytskyi's chancery; the quartermaster maintained the register of the Kozak Army and frequently acted as a census taker; the judge dealt with all matters of justice; and the two adjutants organized

military councils and participated in the reception of foreign envoys.

The government consisted of the council of Kozak officers. It was this council that was frequently called into session by Khmelnytskyi, for it was easier to work with and influence it than the unruly general council. The Kozak officers examined all major military, legislative, administrative, economic and general political matters. They also pronounced on such matters as war and peace, embassies and diplomatic contacts. Finally, the office of the Kozak hetman was vested with great power. Khmelnytskyi therefore became the supreme military commander and at the same time a kind of prime minister and minister of foreign affairs.

At the same time as Khmelnytskyi began to lay foundations for the Rusin state, he was undecided whether it should be part of the Commonwealth or whether it should lead a separate existence. He seriously considered a plan whereby the dual structure of the Polish-Lithuanian state would be transformed into a tripartite state, and in which the position of the Rusin segment would be both equal and autonomous. This transformation was possible only if the position of the king was changed from a mere primus inter pares among the nobles to an absolute ruler.

A strong monarch would be able to guarantee the existence of an autonomous Rusin state and to protect the rights of his Rusin subject. "We pray to God, that Your Majesty, Our Gracious Lord, may become an autocrat, as other kings", he wrote to Jan Kazimierz before his election, "and not just as the late predecessors of Your Majesty, who really were in the bondage [of the nobles]".² In February 1649, during his negotiations with the commissioners at Pereiaslav, Khmelnytskyi pursued the same theme: "The king is a king in order to have the liberty to do whatever he pleases; and [even] to punish and to behead the nobles, the dukes and the princes. If a prince disobeys [the king], off with his head; if a Kozak disobeys, off with his head as well".³ In these words Khmelnytskyi described a monarch who must be obeyed by all his subjects, regardless of rank or position, and who must be in a position to effectively curb the lawlessness of the magnates and of the gentry.

² B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Jan Kazimierz, Zamostia, November 15, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc (Kiev, 1954), p. 80. Khmelnytskyi addressed Jan Kazimierz as "Your Majesty" because he assumed the title of "hereditary King of Swedes, Goths and Vandals" after the death of his brother, Wladyslaw IV.

³ Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereiaslav, February 23, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., 3 vols (Moscow, 1954), II, 109.

Furthermore, Khmelnytskyi sought to insure that the monarch would be able to guarantee the "rights and liberties" of his Orthodox Rusin subjects. Khmelnytskyi's support for Jan Kazimierz was only a temporary measure. By casting his vote for the candidate of the party of conciliation, Khmelnytskyi was certain of gaining certain concessions and time to carry out his plans. A non-Catholic king would be more sympathetic to the faith of the Orthodox "Schismatics", he would be in a better position to resist the pressure of the Holy See and the Roman Catholic hierarchy of the Commonwealth, and he could be more easily persuaded to abolish the Uniate Church. For these and other reasons Khmelnytskyi plotted the dethronement of Jan Kazimierz with Prince Rakoczy of Transylvania, to whom he promised the Polish throne. Khmelnytskyi's envoys made this proposition to Rakoczy as early as November 1648; then repeated it again in January and March 1649; and again in September 1649, one month following the signing of the Treaty of Zboriv.

But the transformation of the Commonwealth into a trialist state proved to be impossible chiefly because of the opposition from the nobles and the Catholic hierarchy. Khmelnytskyi was therefore left with one choice: to cut off all ties with the Commonwealth and to establish a Rusin

state outside of it. Such a step was a radical departure from the past. Prior to 1648 there was no movement for national liberation among the Rusin people as a whole. The Kozaks, who evolved as national spokesmen for the Rusin people, clamoured for autonomy only within the state organism of the Commonwealth. Even the most rebellious elements among the Kozaks, no matter that they acted independently by interfering into questions of the neighbouring states or by receiving foreign envoys and subsidies from the foreign monarchs, still acknowledged the nominal authority of the King of Poland and of the government of the Commonwealth. By pursuing this course of action Khmelnytskyi was therefore faced with an extraordinary task and with a mass of problems.

Khmelnytskyi saw clearly that, once separated from the Commonwealth, the Rusin state would be encircled by rival and unfriendly powers. Under these circumstances it could neither wage war nor lead an independent existence completely on its own resources for a long time. With this in mind, Khmelnytskyi resorted to the usual expedient of political manipulations -- playing off the threatening powers against one another and forming alliances with those which were presumably the least dangerous. His first most pressing problem was to secure protection against the

Commonwealth which would strive to regain its lost territories. Khmelnytskyi therefore appealed to Muscovy for military aid. But Muscovy, using its "eternal peace" with the Commonwealth as an excuse, appeared rather reluctant to be involved in a matter it considered a domestic problem of the Commonwealth. In the years 1648-1649 Muscovy remained neutral and adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude.

Khmelnytski then turned to the Muslim world for support. He was successful in concluding a military alliance with the Tatars. No matter how costly and how unpopular this alliance proved to be, its advantages were great. Khmelnytskyi was assured that he would not be attacked from both sides at once. By accepting the protection of the Turkish sultan, Khmelnytskyi also checked the potential aggressive actions of both Muscovy and the Commonwealth. Furthermore, by becoming a vassal of the High Porte, Khmelnytskyi secured a firm foothold on the Danube. Here he planned to establish buffer states out of Moldavia and Walachia. By these steps he began to alter the balance of power in Eastern Europe.

Bohdan Khmelnytskyi realized that the declaration of independence and the establishment of a Rusin state would lead his people into a long struggle with the Commonwealth.

But he had no other choice. In 1649 he failed to achieve his two basic aims: to "free all the Rusin people from the Polish bondage"; and to extend the boundaries of the Rusin state "as far as Lviv, Kholm and Halych". Then, on the one hand, the Rusin people expressed a firm desire for an independent existence; while on the other hand, there was no room for an independent Rusin state within the Commonwealth.

These attitudes were clear within the few months following the Treaty of Zboriv. The great majority of the Commonwealth's nobles would not hear any plans about constitutional changes in their state. They already gave an indication how they felt in this matter when they bitterly fought against "projects of absolutism" during the reign of King Wladyslaw IV. Even the smallest changes were considered radical by them, and as infringement on their "golden liberties". These nobles dismissed compromise or concessions as a solution to the problem; on the contrary, they were prepared to defend their privileged position to the utmost. Every conceivable vile epithet was hurled at Jerzy Ossolinski because he dared to warn them not to imitate the example of the King of Spain, who did not want to seek compromise with his Dutch "fishermen" and later on was forced to entitle them "My Gracious Lords" in his letters.

Ossolinski's main supporter, Adam Kysil, was likewise "an individual . . . most unpopular in the Commonwealth".

Furthermore, the Roman Catholic hierarchy was not in favour of granting too many concessions to the Orthodox "Schismatics"; and resisted all pressure which was directed against the abolition of the Uniate Church. Both of these groups would never consent to the election of a non-Catholic king. The Diet of 1649 (November 22, 1649 to January 17, 1650) echoed these attitudes. Although it ratified the Treaty of Zboriv, three major provisions were not carried out: the Orthodox Metropolitan Bishop of Kiev was humiliated by being refused a seat in the Senate; the Uniate Church was not abolished; and the amnesty was granted only to those nobles who "unwillingly" took part in the conflict against the Commonwealth.

Thus, on the one hand, the majority of the Commonwealth's nobles remained obstinate and refused to profit from the lessons of the two years of bloody struggles. On the other hand, the Rusin people had gone too far to be satisfied with promises. The serfs were unwilling to accept the hated regime of landlords. Moreover, both sides had too many grievances against each other, for the two years of conflict made deep wounds. It became clear to all that the

two walls must collide again to resolve issues.

The Treaty of Zboriv did not bring lasting peace; on the contrary, it proved to be only another armistice. In the years that followed the times of fire, sword and bloodshed reappeared in the Commonwealth. Bohdan Khmelnytsky again led the Rusin people in their fight for independence. But by 1651 he felt himself losing ground. He failed to achieve his aims, and in the process saw much of the national strength exhausted. He had to secure new allies and to obtain their military aid against the Commonwealth.

Because Muscovy remained non-committal, Khmelnytskyi was forced to turn to the Muslim world. But his Tatar-Turkish orientation brought him fresh disappointments, not the desired results. He failed to organize a great coalition against the Commonwealth; the Tatars continued to pursue their policy of treachery. In 1653 he made a decisive change in his policy. He dropped his orientation toward the Muslim world as an ally, and instead he re-established close contacts with Muscovy. In 1654 these contacts culminated in the Treaty of Pereiaslav, by which Khmelnytskyi accepted the protection of the tsar and all the territories under the control of the Kozak Army became part of the expanding Muscovite state.

APPENDIX I

TREATY OF ZBORIV¹

(Translation with a Commentary)

A Declaration of His Royal Majesty's Grace, given [in response to] the Articles of the Petition of the Zaprozhian

¹The original text of the Treaty of Zboriv has perished. The following translation is based on copies of this treaty found in these three sources:

(a). Akty odnosiaschiesia etc., 15 vols (St. Petersburg, 1861), III, 415-16 [Hereafter cited as Text 1]. The text of this version of the Treaty of Zboriv is written in Russin (i.e., old Ukrainian). It was prepared for the Muscovite government in 1649. Although this text is the best composed version of the three versions of the treaty listed below, it is uncertain that it is a true copy of the original document.

(b). Akty odnosiaschiesia etc., 15 vols (St. Petersburg, 1878), X, 455-58. [Hereafter cited as Text 2]. The text of this version of the Treaty of Zboriv is written in Muscovite (i.e., old Russian). It was made from the penal records (Polish: ksiegi grodzkie) in Kiev. On March 8, 1650 the keeper of these records copied the charter of King Jan Kazimierz, issued at Warsaw on January 12, 1650, which confirmed the articles of the Treaty of Zboriv. The king issued this charter after the Crown General Diet of 1649 ratified the Treaty of Zboriv, and this charter contained the full text of the treaty. This entry in the Kievan penal records was recopied for the use of the Muscovite government, in connection with the Kozak-Muscovite Treaty of Pereiaslav (1654).

(c). J. Jerlicz, Latopisiec etc., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1853), I, 105-18 [Hereafter cited as Text 3]. The text of this version of the Treaty of Zboriv is written in old Polish (but modernized somewhat by the editor K. W. Wojcicki). It

Army.²

1. His Royal Majesty has preserved for His Zaporozhian Army all [its] former liberties in accordance with former charters [granted to it], and at the same time, for [the confirmation of] them, has graciously issued His own charter.³

2. [With regard to] the numbers [of the registered Kozaks] in the Army, His Royal Majesty [has given] the following instructions: wishing to fulfill the petition of His subjects and to retain them in His service, [His Royal Majesty] has consented [to increase the strength of] the Zaporozhian Army to forty thousand,⁴ and has entrusted the

is uncertain where Jerlicz obtained the copy of this treaty. Since this chronicler spent some time in Kiev and made use of the Kievan penal records, he most likely copied it from these records.

²See the Articles on the Needs of the Zaporozhian Army addressed to Jan Kazimierz, Zboriv, August 17, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc (Kiev, 1961), pp. 128-30. These eighteen articles were the basis of the Treaty of Zboriv.

³See the Charter of Jan Kazimierz for the Zaporozhian Army, Zboriv, August 18, 1650 (sic; it should be 1649), in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., X, 453-55.

⁴According to the summaries of the royal chancery, there were listed 40,447 names of Kozaks in the completed Register. See S. Oswiecim, Stanislawa Oswiecima Dyaryusz 1643-1651 [The Diary of Stanislaw Oswiecim, 1643-1651], ed. W. Czermak (Krakow: Akademia Umiejetnosci, 1907), p. 221.


Hetman with the preparation of the Register of His Zaporozhian Army. [The names of] the Kozaks will be entered [into the Register] according to rank, and whoever will qualify for this, on the estates of the nobles, as well as on the estates of His Royal Majesty, [in the territory] designated by the following towns, [his name] will be accepted into the Kozak Register: beginning from this side of the Dnieper [River]⁵ at Dymer, Hornostaipol, Korostyshiv, Pavoloch, Pohrebyshe, Pryluky, Vinnitsa, [and] Bratslav, and thence from Bratslav to Iampil toward the Dniester [River], also included will be [the territory] from the Dniester to the Dnieper and also from the other side of the Dnieper,⁶ at Oster,⁷ Chernihiv, Nizhyn, Romny [and] as far as the Muscovite border and the Dnieper.⁸ With regard to other towns of His Royal Majesty and of the nobles, [located] beyond the delination described in this article: no Kozak will live in

⁵i.e., the right bank of the Dnieper.

⁶i.e., the left bank of the Dnieper.

⁷In Text 3 the town of "Ostrog" is listed. This is either the mistake of the chronicler or of the editor, for there was no town of that name on the left bank of the Dnieper.

⁸i.e., roughly the territory comprising the areas of the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv, including Zaporozhe.



them; it will be permitted, however, for any one [living] in them, who wants to remain a Kozak and who[se name] will be accepted into the Register, to move with all his possessions into Ukraine without any hindrance from his master. The Register will be drawn up by the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army. It will be completed, at the latest, by the Rusin feast of the New Year⁹ [and prepared] in the following way: the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army, ^{will list in the Register the names of all those who} will be enrolled as [registered] Kozaks, [and upon completion] will subscribe [it] with his own hand and [stamp it] with the seal of the Army. This [procedure] will be required [to be carried out] in order [to ascertain] that all those who became [registered] Kozaks might enjoy Kozak liberties, and that all others be subject to [the officials of] the castles of His Royal Majesty, and those [living] on the estates of the nobles, to their own masters.

3. The [Hetman's] mace of the Zaporozhian Army will

⁹ i.e., the beginning of the Orthodox ecclesiastical calendar, or September first, according to the Gregorian calendar. The Register was completed on October 27, 1649. See W. Lipinski, Stanislaw Michal Krzyczewski etc (Krakow, 1912), p. 324. Kozak envoys presented it to Jan Kazimierz at a private audience on January 7, 1650. See Oswiecim, op. cit., p. 212.

Text 3 has the following additional passage: ". . . New Year, if God will grant us life till the coming year 1650".

always retain, in its present boundaries, the town of Chyhyryn, which has been conferred also on the present Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army, the noble¹⁰ Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, by His Royal Majesty, [who has also] restored him as His faithful servant and [as the faithful servant] of the Commonwealth.

4. Whatever has taken place by the disposition of God during the present disorder will pass into oblivion; and the masters will neither punish nor seek revenge on their serfs.

5. His Royal Majesty has pardoned and condoned the actions of those nobles, both of Greek [Orthodox] and Roman [Catholic] faith, who in whatever capacity, have served in the Zaporozhian Army. And if any one of them has his estates confiscated, whether hereditary or those held by tenure, or if anyone has been declared infamous, because all of this has occurred during the present disorder, [all such proceedings] will be eradicated by a constitution of the Diet.¹¹

¹⁰Khmelnytskyi was entitled a noble of the highest order, i.e., "of noble birth" (Latin: generosus; Polish: urodzony).

¹¹Although this treaty was ratified by the Diet of 1649, the original article 5 was amended by the Diet of 1650. This amendment specified that the amnesty, etc., would be extended only to those nobles who were compelled to serve -- or served "unwillingly" -- in the Zaporozhian Army. See Volumina Legum, 8 vols (Warsaw, 1737), IV, 332-33.

6. The Crown Army will not be stationed in the towns which were assigned to the Kozaks by the Register.

7. The Jews will not dwell, [and] be neither tenants nor leaseholders, in the towns of Ukraine where Kozak regiments will be stationed.

8. With regard to the abolition¹² of the [Church] Union¹³ in the Crown [Kingdom] of Poland, as well as in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; also with regard to the safety of the [Orthodox] Church lands, foundations, belonging to them, and, as well as the rights of the [Orthodox] Church: as [all these matters] will be discussed and resolved by the Most Reverend Father Metropolitan [Bishop] of Kiev¹⁴ and the [Orthodox] clergy at the forthcoming Diet,¹⁵ His Royal

¹²In Text 3 the word "zamieszanie" (disorder, disturbance, turmoil, confusion) is used instead of "zniesienie" (abolition). This is obviously a mistake of the chronicler or of the editor, for in the article 3 of the Articles on the Needs of the Zaporozhian Army addressed to Jan Kazimierz, Zboriv, August 17, 1649, there is a specific reference made to the abolition of the Union. See Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 128.

¹³i.e., of the Uniate Church.

¹⁴Sylvestr Kosiv, who was elected the Metropolitan Bishop of Kiev, following the death of Metropolitan Petro Mohyla in 1647.

¹⁵Text 1 has the following additional passage: ". . . forthcoming Diet, -- all [these matters] were supposedly allowed for [already] upon the request of Father Metropolitan and the [Orthodox] clergy --".

Majesty is prepared to honour His promises, so that all [of His subjects] will enjoy their rights and liberties. His Royal Majesty has [also] consented to grant a seat in the Senate to the Metropolitan [Bishop] of Kiev.

9. In accordance with former laws, His Royal Majesty has promised to distribute all dignities [and] offices of the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav [and] Chernihiv among the resident nobility of the Greek [Orthodox] faith.

10. Since there are chartered Rusin schools in the town of Kiev, as well as in other towns of Ukraine, the Jesuit Fathers will not be established there,¹⁶ but be moved elsewhere. All other schools¹⁷ which were in operation there, in former times, will be preserved entirely.¹⁸

11. The Kozaks will not deal in whiskey: [they may

¹⁶i.e., will not found schools there.

¹⁷In Text 3 this passage reads as follows: "All other Rusin [my italics] schools" etc; and in Text 2: "All other [Roman Catholic] churches and schools" etc. The word Rusin in the former version changes the meaning of the text completely; while the latter version does not change the meaning of the text.

¹⁸Articles 8 and 10 were further expanded by more concessions to the Orthodox Church. See the summary of this charter, which was issued at Warsaw on January 12, 1650, in M. Hrushevskyi, Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy, 10 vols (New York, 1956), VIII, 3, 262-63.

distill it] , but only [in such quantities] as to fill their own needs, and which they may sell wholesale. The dealing in mead, beer and other [beverages] , however, will be in accordance with the customs.

[Conclusion]. These articles will be ratified by the Diet.¹⁹ All rancor [will pass] into oblivion; and at the present time only concord and love will prevail among the residents of Ukraine and the Zaporozhian Army of His Royal Majesty and of the Commonwealth.

Sigillum

Maioris Cancellariae

Jan Kazimierz, by the Grace of God, King of Poland; Grand Duke of Lithuania, Rus, Prussia, Samogitia, Mazovia, Livonia, Smalensk, Chernihiv; [and the Hereditary King of Swedes, Goths and Vandals].²⁰

¹⁹It was ratified by the Crown General Diet of 1649 (its sessions lasted from November 22, 1649 to January 17, 1650). The Diet of 1650 amended article 5 and ratified this treaty again. See Volumina Legum, IV, 258, 332-33.

²⁰This was the full title of the king. See ibid., IV, 203 et seq.

[Dated at Zboriv, August 20, 1649].²¹

²¹Some historians date the Treaty of Zboriv from the time when its text was completed, i.e., Wednesday, August 18; or from the event on Thursday, August 19, 1649, when Khmelnytskyi swore an oath of fidelity. The final act, however, took place on Friday morning, August 20, 1649, when Khmelnytskyi paid homage to Jan Kazimierz and asked for his pardon. See the anonymous diary, in Akty odnosiaschiesia etc., III, 413; and W. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, Zboriv, August 22, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc (Krakow, 1864), p. 438.

NOTE: For other sources where copies of the Treaty of Zboriv are found, see Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VIII, 3, 217, n. 1; and L. Kubala, Szkice historyczne, 1st sér., 5th ed (Lviv, 1923), p. 114, n. 131.

APPENDIX II

INDEX OF PERSONS

NOTE: Dates in brackets indicate the reigns of kings, sultans, tsars, etc. Date in parenthesis indicates the year of appointment to, or of investment with, an office, a dignity or a function. This applies only to the officials of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

1. A listing of the names of persons most frequently mentioned in this monograph during the years 1648-1649:

Ahmed Pasha: Turkish Grand Vezir.

Aleksei Mikhailovich: Tsar of Muscovy [1646-1676].

Arsenev, Fedor Iurevich: Voevoda of Volnyi Volnov .

Bolkhovskii, Prince Semen Nikitich: Voevoda of Khotmyzhsk.

Czaplinski (Czaplicki), Daniel: Deputy Sheriff of Chyhyryn.

Dolgorukii (Dolgorukov), Prince Iurii Alekseevich: Voevoda of Putivl.

Firlej, Andrzej: Castellan of Belz; Regimentary (1649);
Palatine of Sandomierz (1649); died in 1650.

Gembicki (Gebicki), Piotr: Bishop of Krakow (1643).

Giray, Crim: Crimean Kalga.

Grodzicki, Krzysztof: "Governor" of Kodak (1640).

Gyorgy II Rakoczy: Prince of Transylvania [1648-1660].

Ibrahim I: Sultan of Turkey [1640-1648].

Islam III: Khan of Crimea [1644-1654].

Jan II Kazimierz: King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania
[1648-1668]. Abdicated in 1668; died in 1672.

- Kalinowski, Marcin: Palatine of Chernihiv; Crown Field Hetman (1646).
- Kazanowski, Adam: Crown Court Marshal (1643); died in 1649.
- Khmelnyskyi, Bohdan Zynovii: Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army (officially in 1649).
- Klimov, Grigorii: Starodubets.
- Kobylskii, Ivan Semenovich: Voevoda of Sevsk.
- Konieczpolski, Aleksander: Crown Ensign; Regimentary (1648).
- Konieczpolski, Krzysztof: Palatine of Belz.
- Kosiv (Kosov), Sylvestr: Orthodox Metropolitan Bishop of Kiev (1647).
- Krychevskyi, Stanislav Mykhailo: Colonel of Chyhyryn Regiment (1643); died in 1649.
- Kryvonis (Kryvonos), Maksym: Kozak colonel; died in 1649.
- Kunakov, Grigorii: Diak.
- Kysil, Adam: Palatine of Bratslav (1648); Palatine of Kiev (1649).
- Lanckoronski, Stanislav: Castellan of Kamianets; Regimentary (1649); Palatine of Bratslav (1650).
- Lasko, Petronii: Orthodox Priest from Hoshcha.
- Leontev, Zamiatnia Fedorovich: Voevoda of Sevsk.
- Leszczynski, Andrzej: Bishop of Chelmno (1646); Crown Vice Chancellor (1645).
- Leszczynski, Boguslaw: General of Great Poland; Marshal of the Chamber of Deputies (1648, 1649); Crown Treasurer (1650).
- Lubienski, Maciej: Archbishop of Gniezno and Primate (1641); Interrex (1648).
- Lubomirski, Stanislav: Palatine of Krakow (1638); died in 1649.
- Meshcherskii, Prince Nikifor Fedorovich: Voevoda of Briansk.
- Miaskowski, Lukasz: Judge of Podolia.
- Miaskowski, Wojciech: Chamberlin of Lviv; Secretary of Jan Kazimierz.
- Muhammed IV: Sultan of Turkey [1648-1687].
- Nashchokin, Nikifor Nikitich: Voevoda of Trubchevsk.
- Obuchowicz, Teodor Michal: Chamberlin of Mazyr.
- Ossolinski, Jerzy: Crown Grand Chancellor (1643); died in 1650.
- Ostrorog, Michal: Crown Cup-Bearer; Regimentary (1648).
- Pleshcheev, Nikifor Iurevich: Voevoda of Putivl.

Potocki, Mikolaj: Castellan of Krakow (1646); Crown Grand Hetman (1646).

Potocki, Stanislaw "Rewera": Palatine of Podolia.

Prozorovskii, Matvei: Voevoda of Viazma.

Radziwill, Janusz: Field Hetman of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (1646).

Sapieha, Kazimierz Leon: Vice Chancellor of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (1645).

Smiarowski, Jakob: Deputy Sheriff of Cherkasy; died in 1649.
Szenberg (Szemberk), Jacek: Kozak Commissioner; died in 1648.

Szoldrski, Andrzej: Bishop of Poznan (1636).

Trubetskoi, Prince Aleksei Nikitich: Boiarin.

Tyszkiewicz, Janusz: Palatine of Kiev; died in 1649.

Unkovskii, Grigorii: Muscovite envoy.

Vasyl IV Lupul (Vasile Lupu): Hospodar of Moldavia [1634-1653].

Velikoganin, Danila: Voevoda of Velikie Luki.

Waza, Prince Karol Ferdynand: Bishop of Wrocław and Plock; brother of Kings Wladyslaw IV and Jan Kazimierz.

Wladyslaw IV: King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania [1632-1648].

Wisniowiecki, Prince Jeremi: Palatine of Rus (1646); Regimentary (1648, 1649).

Zagriazhskii, Ivan: Voevoda of Viazma.

Zaslavski-Ostrogski, Prince Wladyslaw Dominik: Palatine of Sandomierz (1645); Regimentary (1648); Palatine of Krakow (1649).

2. Selected authors listed in the bibliography:

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Golinski, Marczyn (Golinski, Marcin): Councillor of Kazimierz, a town near Krakow; chronicler; compiler of documents.

Grondski, Samuel (Gradski, Samuel): Polish Protestant who spent much of his life in Transylvania; writer; historian.

Hannower, Natan (Hannover, Nathan): Jewish chronicler; kabbalist.

Jemilowski, Mikolaj: Polish noble; diarist.

Jerlicz, Joachim: Rusin noble; a typical "gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus"; chronicler.

Kochowski, Vespasiano (Kochowski, Wespazjan): "Royal historiographer"; poet.

Le Vasseur, Guillaume, Sieur de Beauplan: French noble; army officer; engineer-cartographer in the service of Polish kings; writer.

Maskiewicz, Boguslaw Kazimierz: A petty noble from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; diarist.

Michalowski, Jakub: Castellan of Biecz; compiler of documents.

Obuchowicz, Kazimierz Filip: Marshal of the Chamber of Deputies (1648); Secretary of Lithuania (1649); Palatine of Smalensk (1653); diarist.

Opalinski, Krzysztof: Palatine of Poznan (1637); satirist.

Pastorius, Ioachimus (Pastoriusz, Joachim): Clergyman; historian; teacher; physician.

Paul of Aleppo: Archdeacon; secretary to Patriarch Macarius III of Antioch.

Radziwill, Prince Albrecht Stanislaw: Chancellor of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (1623); diarist.

Rudawski, Wawrzyniec Jan: Clergyman; doctor of laws; historian.

Temberski, Stanislaw: Clergyman; professor and official historiographer of the University of Krakow.

Twardowski, Samuel: Soldier; historian; poet.

APPENDIX III

GLOSSARY OF NAMES AND TERMS

Abbreviations

Bel.	Belorussian
Cze.	Czech
Ger.	German
Lat.	Latin
Lit.	Lithuanian
Pol.	Polish
Rus.	Russian
Tur.	Turkish
Ukr.	Ukrainian

ARCHMANDRITE: (Rus. Arkhimandrit; Ukr. Arkhymandryt).

A monk charged with the spiritual supervision of several Orthodox monasteries, or the superior of a monastery of special importance.

CASTELLAN: (Lat. Castellanus; Pol. Kasztelan). With the emergence of sheriffs at the end of the thirteenth century, castellans lost most of their authority and functions. In the Commonwealth of the middle of the seventeenth century, castellans retained certain of their military functions; other than that, they held honorary offices for life, which entitled them to seats in the Senate.

CONSTITUTION: (Lat. Constitutum; Pol. Konstytucja). Resolution arising from the legislative activity of the Diet of the Commonwealth appeared as a constitution. Unlike the conception of a modern constitution, it comprised even the smallest and most trifling resolution. From the middle of the sixteenth century, constitutions originated in the Chamber of Deputies. They were read before the king and the Senate, approved, and published immediately after the last session of the Diet.

CROWN: (Pol. Korona). One of the two component parts of the Commonwealth. Poland proper, as opposed to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

CROWN ARMY: or regular army (Pol. Wojsko Koronne, or more properly Wojsko Kwarciane). One-quarter (Pol. kwarta) of revenue from royal estates (one-fifth from 1638) was assigned for the upkeep of this army. It was formed in 1562-1563 and 1567. In 1648 its strength was 3,410 men.

DIAK: (Rus.) Secretary of Central Muscovite government; immediate superior of clerk. The Secretaries of Council (Rus. Dumnye Diaki) had high social status.

DIET: (Pol. Sejm). Central organ legislating for the whole Commonwealth. Several kinds of Diets may be distinguished:

1. Crown General Diet (Pol. Sejm Walny Koronny). It was composed of "three estates": the king; the Senate (archbishops, bishops, palatines, castellans, and other high officials of the state or ministers; and the Deputies (elected representatives from General and Territorial Diets). As the Chamber of Deputies contained no representatives of the towns or of the clergy, it was purely an assembly of the gentry. Crown General Diets were held in Warsaw. Apart from legislation, other functions of these Diets included: control of finance; levy of taxes; reception of foreign envoys; formulation of foreign policy; call of general levy to arms; conferment of ennoblement; and grant of mercy and amnesty. At times, these Diets sat as judicial bodies. In addition there were: (a) "Ordinary" Crown General Diets, which were called into session regularly every two years and lasted for six weeks; and (b) "Extraordinary" Crown General Diets, which were summoned in case of sudden need and sat for a fortnight.

2. Convocation Diet (Pol. Sejm Konwokacyjny). It was summoned into session by the Primate during an interregnum. Under his presidency the Diet, in fact a "confederation", had the task of safeguarding the Commonwealth against internal and external danger, and to prepare for an election of a new monarch.

3. Election Diet (Pol. Sejm Elekcyjny). It was summoned by the primate on a date and to a place (usually near Warsaw) decided by the Convocation Diet. Its main task was to elect

a new monarch. This body prepared the text of the pacta conventa. It consisted of the Senate, the Deputies and of all the nobles in attendance. Once the primate received the consent of all the electors, he then announced the name of the new king-elect.

4. Coronation Diet (Pol. Sejm Koronacyjny). It was summoned to Krakow, the former capital of Poland. The king-elect first swore to abide by the pacta conventa; he was then crowned and took the coronation oath. The Coronation Diet followed, at which all acts of the interregnum were confirmed.

DIETINES: (Pol. Sejmiki). These were assemblies of all the gentry from a given region. Several kinds of Dietines may be distinguished:

1. General Dietines (Pol. Sejmiki Generalne). These were assemblies of deputies elected at Territorial Dietines and senators from certain regions (e.g., Great Poland, Little Poland, Mazovia, Rusin Lands or Lithuania). They held joint consultations and deliberations over their positions in the Crown General Diets.

2. Territorial Dietines (Pol. Sejmiki Ziemskie). These were assemblies of all the gentry from a certain district or region. They were summoned by the king (or by the Primate during an interregnum). Their chief role was to elect deputies for the Crown General Diets, to draw up instructions for them and to deal with all local matters. There were the following kinds of Territorial Dietines: (a) Pre-Diet (Pol. Przedsejmowe), which elected deputies to the Crown General Diets; (b) "Hooded" (Pol. Kapturowe), which exercised temporary power, determined defense, organized judicature, etc., in their districts during an interregnum; (c) Deputation (Pol. Deputackie), which selected deputies or judges for the tribunals; (d) Election (Pol. Elekcyjne), which elected local officials; and (e) Report (Pol. Relacyjne), at which the deputies gave an account of their activities during the Diets they attended.

HETMAN: From the Lat. Capitaneus, and via the Low Ger. Hoedman, High Ger. Hauptman and the Cze. Hejtman, came the Pol. form Hetman, Lit. Atmonas or Etmonas and Ukr. Ataman and Hetman. In the Commonwealth it designated the ranks of its highest military commanders. There were two in the Crown and two in the Grand Duchy: Crown Grand

Hetman and Crown Field Hetman; Lithuanian Grand Hetman and Lithuanian Field Hetman. Prior to 1649 the Kozak commander was officially called "Elder"; in that year he was officially named Hetman. Lesser Kozak officers were also called Ataman or Otaman.

HOSPODAR: (Ukr.) Lord; a title often applied to the princes or rulers of Moldavia and Walachia. The Rus. gospodin is close in derivation.

INTERREGNUM: (Lat.) In the Commonwealth it was a period of time which lasted from the death of a king to the coronation of his successor.

INTERREX: (Lat.) In the Commonwealth, this office was held from 1572 by the Primate. He was therefore the representative of a king, and wielded power as the head of the state during an interregnum.

KOZAKS: (Pol. and Ukr. Kozak; Rus. Kazak). An occupational rather than ethnic designation. The West European form, Cossack, is the result of Pol. and Ukr. pronunciation of the Tur. word Kazak, which means robber, disturber of peace and adventurer.

1. Origin and Evolution: The so-called Codex Cumanicus (1303), a lexicon of the language of Polovtsy (Cumans, Kipchaks), defined "Kozak" as a sentry, guard and escort. To the Mongols (Tatars), from thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, "Kozak" signified a free man, or one who was independent, as well as an adventurer, vagabond, robber and waylayer. During the same period "Kozaks" were also known in Crimea. In the chronicle of the Genoese town of Soldaia (Sudak), reference was made to a "Kozak", a brigand, who killed a youth in the year 1308. The statutes of the towns of Soldaia and Cembalo (Balaklava) also mention "Kozaks". In the middle of the fifteenth century they were performing various duties: some were armed guards of consuls of Kaffa (Theodosia); others were paid as escorts of caravans; still others were engaged in brigandage. At the same time, in Muscovy, the southern boundaries of the Riazan lands were protected by settlements of "Riazan Kozaks".

By the middle of the fifteenth century the south-eastern borderlands (i.e., "Ukraine") of Grand Duchy of Lithuania began to suffer from the raids of "Tatar Kozaks", who occupied

Crimea and the northern shores of the Black Sea. The Slavic population of the Lithuanian borderlands, being in constant struggle with the Tatars, adopted from them their manner of warfare, way of life, dress and even their name. The first official mention of these "Ukrainian Kozaks" seems to have been made in 1492. In that year Khan Mengli Giray of Crimea complained to the Grand Duke Aleksander of Lithuania that men from Kaniv and Cherkasy wrecked and plundered his vessel and siezed ten horses. In response to this complaint the Lithuanian ruler promised to call these "Kozaks" into account. The Muscovites called the Kozaks of the Commonwealth by another name -- Cherkasy -- after a town of that name, which is often referred to as the "cradle of Kozakdom". In a broad sense they also applied this name to the population of Ukraine in general. On the development of Kozaks in the Polish-Lithuanian state in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, see Chapter I.

2. Registered Kozaks: Starting in 1572 a certain number of Kozaks, varying from time to time, was enrolled for the service of the Commonwealth. The names of those accepted were entered into an official register (i.e., "Registered"), and they formed special regiments of the regular army. The Registered Kozaks received extensive privileges: apart from pay and uniforms, they were exempt from the jurisdiction of royal officials and were able to elect their own officers (this right was taken away for the period 1638-1648). Since they were recognized by the government, such rewards as grants of land and even ennoblement for meritorious service to the state, were within their reach.

3. Kozak Army: The official Kozak Army, called His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Army, was composed of Registered Kozaks. It was divided into regiments which were attached to designated towns in Ukraine; these into hundreds; and finally into tens. In 1638 the 6,000 Registered Kozaks formed six regiments: Cherkasy, Pereiaslav, Kaniv, Korsun, Bila Tserkva and Chyhyryn. In 1649 over 40,000 Registered Kozaks formed sixteen regiments: to the six already listed were added, Uman, Bratslav, Kalnyk, Kiev, Kropnyvna, Myrhorod, Poltava, Pryluky, Nizhyn and Chernihiv. The Kozak Army was a closed organization and carried out its own affairs. Except for the period 1638-1648, it had its own commander, court, chancery and ordinance officers; these, as well as all other regimental posts, were elective. The Army as a whole, under the guidance of the general staff, acted as an assembly. Similar internal organization was found at the Sich.

LEGATUS NATUS: (Lat.) A person who is a legate, or a representative of the Holy See, by his very office. This position was held in the Commonwealth by the Primate, the Archbishop of Gniezno.

MAGDEBURG RIGHTS: Common Law of Magdeburg (Ger. Magdeburger Weichbild; Lat. Jus municipale Magdeburgense) was introduced into Poland in the thirteenth century by German immigrants. It established civil rules, affected urban administration and social organization.

MANIFESTO: (Pol. Uniwersal; Rus. and Ukr. Universal). The announcement of regulations and laws; message or proclamation of general information.

METROPOLITAN: (Rus. Metropolit; Ukr. Mytropolyt). The title of a bishop in the Orthodox Church, who has jurisdiction over bishops of subordinate sees, and who ranks above the archbishop, but below the patriarch. In the Commonwealth, this title belonged to the bishops of Kiev.

PACTA CONVENTA: (Lat.) A bi-lateral agreement between the king-elect and his electors, which contained the individual obligations of the king-elect. If the king failed to fulfill the agreed conditions, then his electors had the right to withhold obedience. This was covered by the articulus de non praestanda oboedientia. This agreement was first formulated in 1573 at the election of King Henri de Valois.

PALATINE: (Lat. Palatinus; Pol. Wojewoda). The title of a governor of the largest administrative unit of the Commonwealth; literally leader of an army. As its highest-ranking official, he presided over the Election Dietine, commanded the army (i.e., the mass levy of the gentry), supervised the towns (weights and measures) and acted as the judge for the Jews. He was appointed by the king for life and by the virtue of his office received a seat in the Senate.

PALATINATE: (Pol. Wojewodztwo). A territory administered by the palatine.

PRIKAZ: (Rus.) Central government department or office in Muscovy.

1. Posolskii Prikaz: Department of External Affairs; Foreign Office; or literally, Office of Ambassadors.

2. Razriadnyi Prikaz: Department of Defence; it concerned itself chiefly with matters of military nature.

PRIMATE: (Lat. Primus). In 1417 the Archbishop of Gniezno became "primas regni Poloniae", a title by which he was able to exercise jurisdiction over all bishops in the country. In 1515 he was also a legatus natus; and from 1572 he exercised the functions of an interrex.

REGIMENTARY: (Pol. Regimentarz). A military post created for replacement of Hetman; a vice-Hetman. Created for the first time in 1648, when both the Crown Grand Hetman and Crown Field Hetman became Tatar prisoners.

SHERIFF: (Lat. Capitaneus; Pol. and Ukr. Starosta). This official was appointed by the king; he was a local official bestowed with full powers over the district of his jurisdiction, with the exception of granting privileges or charters. From the beginning of the fourteenth century there evolved the following: General Sheriff, a viceroy in certain large regions (for example, in Great Poland); Castle Sheriff, with authority over a castle and surrounding districts; and Non-Castle Sheriff, a leaseholder of royal estates. An official ranking below the Sheriff was called Deputy Sheriff (Pol. Podstarosta; Ukr. Pidstarosta).

SICH: (Ukr.) (Pol Sicz; Rus. Sech). A fortified Kozak camp on one of the islands south of the Dnieper's cataracts. The first Sich was began ca. 1553 by Prince Dmytro Vyshnevetskyi, on the Island of Khortytsia; it served as prototype and model for later structures of this nature. The Zaporozhian Sich served as a military center for all Kozaks, and it was moved from island to island as conditions demanded.

UKRAINE: (Pol., Rus. and Ukr. Ukraina). The name (literally borderland) is of considerable age. The oldest known example dates from the middle of the eleventh century. In reference to the Polish-Lithuanian state, the geographic area of Ukraine underwent frequent changes. From the sixteenth century, this name was generally applied to the southern Dnieper region, or the south-eastern

confines of Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In 1569 Ukraine became part of the Province of Little Poland and passed under the authority of the Crown. This nomenclature began to appear in official acts (frequently not capitalized, i.e., "borderland"). It was almost restricted to geo-topographic use, for the name Ukraine was never used to designate a political area in the same sense as, for example, Podolia or Volynia had been. In a more restricted use in the middle of the seventeenth century, Ukraine encompassed the steppe areas of the Palatinates of Kiev and Bratslav; in the broadest use, the area comprising the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv.

UNION OF BREST: (Bel. and Rus. Brest; Pol. Brzesc; Ukr. Berest). As the result of the Union of Brest (1596) the Orthodox Church within the boundaries of the Commonwealth (i.e., Kievan Metropolitan See) became the Greek Catholic or Uniate Church. The Uniates accepted papal supremacy; they retained the traditional Eastern liturgy, including the use of Slavonic language, communion of two kinds and marriage of lower clergy. The Uniate bishops and priests were to enjoy the rights and privileges of their Roman Catholic counterparts.

UNION OF LUBLIN: In 1569 the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania united to form "The Commonwealth of both Nations" (Lat. Respublica; Pol. Rzeczpospolita). The union turned the hitherto purely personal union of the two countries into something resembling a confederation, similar to that of England and Scotland. Both Poland and Lithuania had a common king (who retained his title of grand duke in Lithuania), Diet, currency and foreign policy. Each part of the Commonwealth had separate ministers, armies, treasuries and courts; and Lithuania retained its judicial codes and its official language. At the time of the union Lithuania ceded to Poland the Palatinates of Podlachia, Volynia, Bratslav and Kiev.

VOEVODA: (Rus.) Muscovite military governor of urban district having judicial, financial and police functions.

VOEVODSTVO: (Rus.) A Muscovite territory or province administered by voevoda.

ZAPOROZHE: (Pol. Zaporoze; Rus. Zaporozhe and Ukr. Zaporozhzhia or Zaporizhzhia) (Ukr. za = beyond; porohy = rapids, cataracts, i.e., literally land beyond the Dnieper's rapids or cataracts). In the strict use of this term, it was the steppe area south of the Dnieper's cataracts, on both banks of the river, to the shores of the Black Sea. In a broader use, it comprised the whole lower drainage basin of the Dnieper: south of Tiasmyn on its right bank and Orel on its left; and the Vast area stretching from S. Buh on the west, to the watershed of Donets on the east. The Zaporozhian steppe "wilderness" was called "Wild Plains" or "Wild Fields".

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V I T A A U C T O R I S

- Family: Andrew Boleslaw Pernal, eldest son of Antoni Pernal and his wife, Maria Pernal; born November 28, 1936 at Milow, Tarnopol, Poland (now in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic); married Nan Barton Robertson, September 1961; issue, Andrew Robert; born June 1962; and Stephen Francis; born June 1966.
- Education:
- 1943-1955 Received elementary education in Tanganyika (now Tanzania), Scotland and Canada (Alberta and Ontario); secondary education at St. Joseph's and Corpus Christi (now F. J. Brennan) High Schools, Windsor, Ontario. Junior Matriculation, 1955.
- 1955-1959 Registered as undergraduate in the General Course in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Assumption College (from 1956 Assumption University of Windsor), Windsor, Ontario. Bachelor of Arts Degree, in History, conferred Spring 1959.
- 1959-1960 Attended Ontario College of Education, Toronto, Ontario to complete requirements for an Interim High School Assistants' Certificate, Type B.
- 1963-1967 Admitted to the faculty of Graduate Studies at the University of Windsor as a candidate for the Degree of Master of Arts, in History, September 1963. Course work completed, May 1965. Thesis submitted, August, 1967.
- Awards:
- 1963-1965 Department of History Graduate Fellowship; and Province of Ontario Graduate Fellowship

Employment: Instructed in History, Geography and English at Notre Dame School and Loretto High School (now Bishop Macdonell High School), Guelph, Ontario; September 1960 to June 1963; and at Vincent Massey Collegiate Institute (now Vincent Massey Secondary School), Windsor, Ontario; September 1965 to June 1966. Employed by Ford Motor Company of Canada Limited, Windsor, Ontario; from September 1966.

1960-1963

1965-1967

Other Activities: Member of the University of Western Ontario Contingent of the Canadian Officers' Training Corps. Commissioned as Second-Lieutenant in the Canadian Army (Supplementary Reserve), 1958.

1955-1958