BOOK REVIEWS

Élements d'Introduction Générale à l'Etude des Sciences Juridiques: I. La Définition du Droit. By Henri Lévy-Ullmann, Professor of Civil Law at the University of Lille. Paris, Rec. Sirey, 1917. pp. 176.

It has been aptly said that the definition of law is the battle ground of jurisprudence. The author of the work under review has undertaken, as part of a task involving a fundamental reëxamination of the definition, classification and general survey, theory and evolution of law, to present a criticism of existing French definitions of law and to offer what he considers a satisfactory all-embracing single definition of the chameleonic term *droit* (law or right).

The difficulty of his task is enhanced by the varying meanings attached in civil law countries to the abstract word *droit, derecho, diritto, Recht* or *jus*. It is used, first, with an ethical connotation of "right,"; second, in the analytical sense of a personal claim (right) to the performance of a correlative act or to forbearance by another (duty), a concept described by civilians by prefixing to "right" the word "subjective"; and third, as a body of rules of action enforcible by the State, that is, law in general. Another set of words has also been used to denote law, namely, *loi, ley, legge, Gesetz, lex*. In his exposition and criticism of the various definitions of law which have been adopted by different jurists, and in which now one and now the other of these two sets of words have been emphasized, the author has failed to point out, as Roscoe Pound has so ably done, that the preponderance of the former set (*jus, droit*) is identified with those periods of legal history in which the traditional element, involving reason and justice or juristic reasoning, has prevailed; whereas the latter set (*lex, loi*) is identified with periods of marked legislative activity, such as followed the Reformation, the French Revolution and the growth of the national State, that is, periods in which the imperative element has prevailed. Definitions which contain both elements, e. g. those of Cicero, Blackstone and others, evidence the transition period in which they lived.

Professor Lévy-Ullmann begins with the Romans. While paying tribute to their superiority as the founders of the technique of legal science, he charges them with having failed to bequeath to posterity a good definition of law. Nevertheless, he shows that the Institutes of Justinian, borrowing from the rules of Ulpian (himself, in this respect, the follower of Celsus) begin by definitions of *justitia, jurisprudentia* and *jus*. Ulpian having lived in the classical age of Roman legal development, we may well expect to find that reason and justice prevail in his definition of law. Thus, *justitia* is "the constant and perpetual will to assign to each his due" (*jus suum*); *jurisprudentia* is "the knowledge of things divine and human, the science of what is just and unjust"; and *jus* is "the art of what is right and equitable." The author might have begun with Cicero (*De Legibus*) who lived in the intermediate period between the Twelve Tables and the classical age when the imperative element was a virile source of law. But the classical emphasis upon ethical standards in the law, notably the maxims, *honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere* laid the seed, in large degree, for the later development of natural law—in which international law had to find its inspiration—and from which positive law as the creation of the sovereign was subsequently distinguished; and for the growth, beginning with Grotius, of schools of jurists concerned with the origin and basis and, in more modern times, with the function of law. From the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, law has been deemed to rest successively on theology, reason, the nature of man, and history. Whether

justice is the aim or the handmaid of law has been an element of controversy among jurists who have essayed a definition of law. To this factor the author has paid little attention in presenting definitions.

The general interest in Professor Lévy-Ullmann's work is greatly diminished by reason of the facts (1) that he has not covered the period between Justinian's Code and the beginning of the nineteenth century in France; (2) that the definitions of modern French jurists, therefore, lack that historical explanation which would vitalize their formal character; (3) that the philosophical theories underlying the definitions are but rarely mentioned, and without these the author's criticism is necessarily inadequate; and (4) that it is confined almost solely to French jurists, whereas the theory and definition of law can hardly be treated satisfactorily without a full discussion of the contributions of the Historical School of Savigny, who identified "right" and "law," the Analytical School of Austin and his followers, and the various disciples of the modern Social-Philosophical School in Germany and elsewhere. He does mention the definitions of Kant, Zachariae and Jhering, but without that comprehensive setting in the history of legal thought which others have given and without which one cannot intelligently evaluate their contributions to legal science.

Inasmuch as Professor Lévy-Ullmann professes to have prepared only an elementary work for the use of first-year students—Americans will not find it easy to understand that a book of 175 pages on the "definition of law" is elementary—we can hardly hold him to account for the defects just mentioned, which deprive the book of any general value to the more advanced student. He divides the French authors of the nineteenth century who have defined law (*droit*) into three categories:

(1) Those commentators of the *Code Civil* who identify law with *loi* (enacted law), to whom *droit* is merely an appendage of *loi,* either subordinate or superimposed or confused with it. This is perhaps natural in a period following the Revolution and the enactment of the French civil code, generally regarded as the apotheosis of codification. In such a period it is usual for legal thought to remain sterile. "Jurisprudence is the science of laws (*lois*)"; "*Loi* is a rule established by a superior will to direct human actions" (Touillier); *droit* is "the art of applying the *lois*"; or it is that "absolute justice" toward which "laws" aim (Laurent). All this is not unnatural to a time when the imperative element in law predominated, and in a country where judge-made law has little if any force in establishing binding rules.

(2) Those writers who, instead of adopting one definition of law, enumerate the principal aspects of *droit* and endow each with a special definition. This school—among whom are Beudant, Vallette, Gény, Baudry-Lacantinerie, Planiol and Surville, whose method now seems to prevail in French legal education—distinguished natural law from positive law and from "objective" law and "subjective" right (*droit*). When we find an authority like Planiol defining "subjective right" (*droit*) as "a faculty recognized in a person by the law, which permits him to accomplish certain acts, e. g. a right of property," we can appreciate that analytical jurisprudence has made but little impression in France. The French seem to make no distinction between "right" and "privilege."

(3) Those who give a single comprehensive definition of law. The author approves in principle the single definition, but criticises those he quotes for one reason or another. In the case of Aubry and Rau, who followed Zachariae, our author concludes that law governs other relations than those merely of men, and that external constraint may emanate from other authorities than the State. Here, of course, he would find himself in opposition to Salmond, Holland and most of the Anglo-American writers. Bufnoir's definition of law as "a body

of rules to which the liberty of the individual is subjected in conflict with other individuals," meets qualified approval. He emphasizes Bufnoir's original characterization of "liberty" as the measure of law, although Kant in 1797, as the author later admits, made "liberty" the purpose of law. He then criticizes the utilitarians like Bentham and the sociological definitions of Richard, Tanon, Jhering and Duguit who define law teleologically. Whereas Jhering proceeded from the formal to the sociological, Lévy-Ullmann undertakes to reverse the process. Definition by content or aim he disapproves. Demogue's definition that "whatever is imposed by organized force, against which there is no recourse" is law, while perhaps suited to modern international relations, will hardly command general juristic support. Nor is it always the case, as J. C. Gray and others have said, that enforcement in courts is necessary to make a rule law. Indeed, in *ex parte Larrucea* (1917, S. D. Cal.) 249 Fed. 981, the rule laid down by the court was expressly reversed by the Executive as Commander-in-Chief, as in conflict with a treaty immunity.

While admitting that law may be studied from the various points of view above mentioned, the author then proceeds, on the basis of his previous criticism, to present his own formal definition, which he believes embraces the various aspects of *"droit"* (*law* as well as *right*). Beginning with a delimitation, a legal rule and a legal sanction, an object and a subject, he posits this definition: "Law is the delimitation of what men or groups have the liberty to do and not to do, without incurring a penalty or damages or any particular exercise of force."

Just as Austin's characterization of positive law as a command set by a determinate sovereign to political inferiors, was too narrow, as excluding the traditional element in law and those many rules which were never prescribed or "set" by a sovereign, so Lévy-Ullmann's definition seems too wide as embracing in its permissive scope all rules of morals, ethics and religion. It is therefore of little utility, it would seem, as a definition of law. It was recognition of this weakness of formal definitions that has led modern jurists, like Jhering and Vinogradoff, impressed by the growth in the imperative element in law, to define law by its aim and function. While an individual act that is not prohibited, i. e., that one is under no duty not to do, is privileged, one can hardly say with profit to the understanding that the sum of all privileged acts constitutes law. The definition is also defective in omitting all reference to the authority restricting liberty. As a matter of fact, study of Lévy-Ullmann's work indicates the futility of attempting to define law conclusively for all time. It will necessarily change in form, content and function in different periods, as the point of view, the agencies which determine its content, and its purpose, ideals and standards change. Again, at a given time men will disagree as to its essential elements. For example, whether international law is law depends on your definition of law, a fact which some controversialists on this subject have not recognized.

But Lévy-Ullmann's work does arouse thought. Why should a book on the definition of law appear in the midst of a great war? Because, as the author intimates, great cataclysms in history have been marked by a renewed search for fundamentals, and nations will, among their social institutions generally, rethink their law. The period before us will doubtless witness a readjustment of the relation of the individual to society and to the State and many phases of the national and international economic system will undergo a metamorphosis. These changes will necessarily be reflected in the law, which is merely a regulative agency to delimit according to the *mores* of the time the conflicting interests of individuals and of groups. It is not necessarily an instrument of justice, but, primarily, of order and convenience, for the protection of the social

interest in the security of transactions. In times of stress and rapid change, with the growth in the imperative element in law there comes also a tempering of the rigorous technicality of its rules in the administration of justice by a larger exercise of judicial discretion. The greater the change the less technical becomes the law and its administration, until, as in communistic Russia, in times of martial law, and in extremes of backward society, as in certain parts of the Orient, it is found possible to dispense with law in the administration of justice. The extent of the political and economic change of the coming period will measure the body of new rules which the law will assimilate.

EDWIN M. BORCHARD.

James Madison's Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 and Their Relation to a More Perfect Society of Nations. By James Brown Scott. New York. 8vo. Oxford University Press. 1918. $2.00.

In Paris there is gathered a group of men representing many peoples, engaged upon the formidable task of creating a feasible league of nations. In the year 1787, the City of Philadelphia was the place of meeting of delegates sent by the various States on the American continent.

In the book under review, the author has endeavored to find a precedent for the former in the latter. Before developing his argument, he writes entertainingly of the Convention of 1787, of the occasion that called it into being, and of the qualifications and services of James Madison in reporting its proceedings.

The argument of the book is that the government created was a mere federation of states, and such being the case it is a proven fact that a league of nations could exist without endangering the liberties of its constituent members. It is therefore necessary that the author show that we have a Federated and not a National government. This is the burden of the book.

Mr. Scott says that the Convention of 1787 was a conference between representatives of independent nations . . . . "a group apart from the society of nations and held only loosely together by their common consent." In the sense that the Constitution was assented to by people of independent nations, this is so. But what they agreed to was not a treaty. It was an instrument of government . . . . nothing more and nothing less. By ratifying it, the people merely shifted powers of government from one agency to another. It was an act in furtherance of progressive development, not a mere restraint. He then says that the Constitution created what he calls a Federation of States, not a National Government of a common people. His idea is that the delegates represented States and not the people of America; that "the term 'people' . . . . means the people of the States, not the people without reference to the States." The Preamble is dismissed with the statement that it is not a delegation of authority and therefore affords no evidence as to what is meant—a pure *non sequitur.*

The author finds evidence of this in the fact that the delegates were originally sent to represent the States; in the system of voting in the Convention; in the suggestion made in the Convention that there was no necessity for the creation of inferior Courts as uniformity could be obtained by allowing a direct appeal from the State courts to the Federal Supreme Court; and in the rejection of the plan to coerce the States through a Council of Revision. He argues it on the fact of division of powers between the State and the National Government, of the admission of new States on an equality with the old, of the theory of representation in the House and Senate and their methods of voting, and

on the compromises of the Constitution. And he considers the Constitution as an elaboration of the Virginia plan rather than the mere basis on which proceedings began.

The Articles of Confederation constituted a compact, pure and simple—and therein lay its defects. The Virginia plan presented to the convention was of a similar nature. The Constitution, on the contrary, was an instrument, national in character, in the same sense as the State constitutions. In some respects the States are sovereign; in others the government created. And this is all that the cases cited by the author show.

It is true that the Constitution was not adopted by the people at large. They acted in units determined by State lines. But when adopted, it became the act of the entire people, not of the State governments, and operated as in that instrument intended. This idea is made plain by James Madison himself in his speech before the Convention of Virginia, of June 6, 1788. It was elaborated on by him in the 39th Federalist wherein he points out that the system of government proposed was Federal in the manner of its adoption. "It must result from the unanimous assent of the several States that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves." Prior to amendment, the mode of election of Senators and of President specified in the Constitution was Federal, but the election of members of Congress was national. In that both State and Central governments are sovereign in their spheres, the Constitution is in a sense Federal. In the method of amendment, it partakes of the nature of both, and yet it is strictly neither. In its essential characteristics, the government created is national, exercising a direct, exclusive authority over the individual citizen within the sphere of its delegated powers.

No useful purpose can be served in pursuing the argument further. It is sufficient to say that at one time in the history of this country the question was widely discussed. For the arguments on both sides, the student is referred to the speeches of Calhoun, of Hayne, of Webster and of others of that bygone time. The proposition has long since been settled adversely to the theory of the author. In fact, the Civil War finally terminated the argument.

The author then discusses the judicial system in this country and refers to the fact that it is limited to judicial questions in contradistinction to political questions; that our courts pass upon the constitutionality of acts of legislation and have even decided cases to which different States were parties. He says that a political question, while not judicial, may be made justiciable by agreement, and therefore that the history of our country shows an international judiciary under a Federation of Nations to be feasible. He even suggests the use of the United States Supreme Court Reports by such a court.

In short, Mr. Scott believes our form of government offers a framework for a league of nations, a United States of the world.

It may be that such a confederation might be successful. But our experience does not prove it practicable in that the cases are not parallel. The Constitution of the United States does not constitute a Federation of Nations. It is an instrument of national government and not a mere league. It was created by transferring from similar governments part of the authority in them vested by peoples of independent states. But these peoples were descended from a common stock, spoke the same language and were inspired by a common history. They had been nurtured in the atmosphere of the Common Law of England under identical governmental institutions, and for generations their trend of political thought had been determined by the same considerations. A union such as they formed was a normal condition.

A league of nations, on the contrary, is a diplomatic arrangement. It will

be composed of all kinds and conditions of peoples, varying in language, ideals, traditions, mode of political thought, even in civilization, some of whom cannot even understand the aspirations and motives of others.

The conditions are so different and the institutions created and to be created so dissimilar that an argument can hardly be drawn from the one to prove the practicability of the other.

The book, however, is an interesting contribution to the literature of the subject. It is well written and well bound. The quality of paper used is good and the type of fair size. Inserted in it is an Appendix containing the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution of the United States.

FRED B. HART.

Oakland, California.

Chamberlayne's Handbook on Evidence. By Charles Frederick Chamberlayne. Edited by Arthur W. Blakemore and DeWitt C. Moore. Albany, Matthew Bender & Co. 1919. pp. xxxiv, 1024.

This handbook is a condensation of the five-volume work of Charles Frederick Chamberlayne, entitled "The Modern Law of Evidence." It consequently has most of the virtues and faults of the original work. It shows no serious attempt to correct or modify those parts of the original text which have been made the subject of criticism; for example, the errors in sections 75 and 154 of the original text, pointed out by the late Dean Thayer in his review of the first two volumes of the work (25 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 483-485), are repeated in sections 41 and 61 of the handbook. The work also repeats Mr. Chamberlayne's confusing use of the term "res gestae." On the other hand, Mr. Chamberlayne's acute analysis of the subject is, of course, preserved and his fault of excessive repetition is to a large extent cured. There is little new material in the handbook, although, of course, many cases decided since the publication of the larger work have been cited. The editorial work shows a lack of proper care and supervision; in many cases official citations are omitted, and in a few instances cases are miscited. On the whole, however, the work will be of great use to the profession, particularly to those practitioners who have become acquainted with and accustomed to using the five-volume work.

EDMUND M. MORGAN.

Washington, D. C.

The Statute Law of Municipal Corporations in Massachusetts, with Historical Introductions Tracing the Development of the Law from its Beginning in every Department of Municipal Government. By Frederick Huntley Magison and Thomas Tracy Bouve. Albany, Matthew Bender & Co. 1917. pp. xlv, 1031.

The title page of this volume correctly sets forth the extent and limitation of the contents. The great mass of statutes—the authors say over twenty-three hundred provisions are quoted—on municipal law (except as to taxation and election) are set forth *verbatim.* The historical introductions are both interesting and instructive from period to period, and time and again demonstrate the tremendous growth in the number of functions and the mass of business of modern cities and towns as compared with those of the eighteenth and even of

the first half of the nineteenth centuries. It is a pity that the authors felt it necessary to limit their original contributions to historical matter. Municipal law is a specialty; the average lawyer knows very little about it; there are very many of the statutes which are blind to him, and many which perplex even the experienced city solicitor or town counsel. There is need for text book work to explain and correlate. One fears that the inexperienced may have difficulty in getting the correct statute law, even though it be all in one volume instead of in fifteen or so. To take an example or two at random; What is a relocation as distinguished from an alteration of a way? The county commissioners and the selectmen have concurrent jurisdiction to relocate county ways (highways) and bridges. Who can relocate a town way? The statutory provisions are scattered. The only index notation of relocation is as to the item of expense in connection with the relocation of highways. Chapter 263 of the General Acts of 1915 seems to permit takings by cities and towns for any municipal purposes. What is the effect of it on the various special provisions as to libraries, schools, water-works, parks, playgrounds and town hall sites? There is no cross reference. All of these provisions, except as to town hall sites, though referring equally to cities and towns, are contained in that part of the chapter on Cities which deals with eminent domain. The provision as to taking land for a town hall site is set forth in the chapter on Towns, under the heading of "Corporate Powers" and is not in the index under eminent domain.

The confused state of the statutes themselves has perhaps inevitably led to difficulties of arrangement, classification and indexing. As illustrations, Chapter 401 of the Acts of 1913 admitting in land damage cases certain evidence of assessed valuations, is twice referred to in the text, but has not been found in the table of statutes nor in the index. Chapter 1 is entitled "Towns," Chapter 2 is entitled "Cities," yet a small fraction of town law is included in the former and the bulk of the statutes in the latter concern both cities and towns, as do the rest of the chapters, each of which is devoted to some municipal department or function. In the chapter on Municipal Finance, improperly called "Municipal Indebtedness," Part V. on "Auditing of Municipal Accounts" set forth the law as to the appointment of city auditors but not as to the appointment of town accountants, or the election of town auditors. The Town Accountant Act is in Part III. of the same chapter, but the law as to town auditors is in the first chapter in the parts on town elections and town officers. The lack of even an explanatory foot-note or cross reference is confusing. There is comment in the introduction to the chapter on Roads and Bridges on the alternative offices of highway surveyors and road commissioners, but no mention there of the third and modern method of handling the street department through a superintendent of streets. This last official is incorrectly included in page 5 among the officers chosen by election at Town Meeting, and again on page 28 the law as to his appointment is inserted under the incorrect heading "Appointment if not Elected."

A score or more of archaic or misleading provisions in Massachusetts municipal law have just been revised in pursuance of a bill reported by a Commission to Revise and Codify the Laws relating to Towns. It is to be hoped that as a result of the further recommendations of that Commission and as a result of the work of the Commission now sitting to consolidate the general laws of the Commonwealth, its municipal law may be brought to an orderly and comparatively modern condition. It is also to be hoped that the authors of the present work may then issue a second edition with an enlarged index and with text interpreting the statutes in the light of practice and decisions. In the

meantime, municipal officers and lawyers are indebted to them for much assistance in tracing the development of the law and in cornering it between the covers of one volume.

CHARLES F. DUTCH.

Boston, Mass.

A Source-Book of Military Law and War-Time Legislation. Prepared by the War Department Committee on Education and Special Training. St. Paul, West Publishing Co. 1919. pp. xviii, 858. $4.50.

This book was prepared for a special purpose—to supply, with the *Manual of Courts-Martial,* material for a course in Military Law and War-Time Legislation which formed part of the prescribed curriculum of law school units of the Student Army Training Corps. The termination of the war before the book came from press has deprived the publishers of that special class of readers to whom it was primarily addressed, and has rendered unnecessary any critical analysis of it as teaching material for the proposed course. But the book is not without interest to a broader public, for it collects in convenient form war legislation and judicial opinions on a number of topics which are of importance to practicing attorneys. Notably of this character is the section dealing with the effect of war on civil rights and liabilities. The collection of opinions of the Judge Advocate General is also useful because only digests of such opinions are published elsewhere.

T. W. S.

The Armed Neutralities of 1780 and 1800. A Collection of Official Documents. Edited by James Brown Scott. New York, Oxford University Press. 1918. pp. xxxi, 697. $5.00.

Les Conventions et Declarations de la Haye de 1899 et 1907. Dotation Carnegie pour la Paix Internationale. New York, Oxford University Press. 1918. pp. xxxiii, 318. $2.50.

Federal Military Pensions in the United States. By William H. Glasson. Edited by David Kinley. New York, Oxford University Press. 1918. pp. xii, 305. $2.00.

Early Economic Effects of the European War upon Canada. By Adams Shortt. Early Effects of the European War upon the Finance, Commerce, and Industry of Chili. By L. S. Rowe. New York, Oxford University Press. 1918. pp. xvi, 101. $1.00.

Une Cour de Justice Internationale. By James Brown Scott. New York, Oxford University Press. 1918. pp. vi, 269.

The Treaties of 1785, 1799, and 1828 between the United States and Prussia. Edited by James Brown Scott. New York, Oxford University Press. 1918. pp. viii, 207. $2.00.

The Financial History of Great Britain, 1914-1918. By Frank L. McVey. New York, Oxford University Press. 1918. pp. v, 101. $1.00.

Economic Effects of the War upon Women and Children in Great Britain. By Irene Osgood Andrews. New York, Oxford University Press. 1918. pp. x, 190. $1.00.

German Legislation for the Occupied Territories of Belgium. Official Texts. Edited by Charles H. Huberich and A. Nicol-Speyer. The Hague, Martinus Nyhoff. 1918. 15th series, pp. 518, 16th series, pp. 649.

Reports of the Forty-first Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association. Vol. xliii. 1918. Charles A. Morrison, Official Reporter. Baltimore, The Lord Baltimore Press. 1918. pp. 867.

The Quit-Rent System in the American Colonies. By Beverley W. Bond, Jr. New Haven, Yale University Press. 1919. pp. 492. $3.00.

Constitutional Power and World Affairs. By George Sutherland. New York, Columbia University Press. 1918. pp. vii, 202. [To be reviewed.]

Problems of the War. Papers read before the Grotius Society in 1918. London, Sweet and Maxwell. pp. lvi, 293. [To be reviewed.]

Law as a Vocation. By Frederick J. Allen. With an introduction by William Howard Taft. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 1919. pp. viii, 84. $1.00. [To be reviewed.]

A Practical Treatise on Title to Real Property. By George W. Thompson. Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1919. pp. lxxxii, 1112. $7.50. [To be reviewed.]

American Labor and the War. By Samuel Gompers. New York, George H. Doran Company. 1919. pp. x, 377. [To be reviewed.]

A History of the United States. By Cecil Chesterton. New York, George H. Doran Company. 1919. pp. xix, 333.

American Business in World Markets. By James T. M. Moore. New York, George H. Doran Company. 1919. pp. xi, 320.

The Freedom of the Seas. By Louise Fargo Brown. New York, E. P. Dutton & Company. 1919. pp. xvi, 262. [To be reviewed.]

A Society of States. By W. T. S. Stallybrass. New York, E. P. Dutton & Company. 1919. pp. xvi, 243 [To be reviewed.]

A Manual of Maine Probate Law and Practice. By Ralph W. Leighton. Boston, Little, Brown & Company. 1919. pp. xxi, 499. $5.00. [To be reviewed.]

Clark on Interstate Commerce. Testimony given before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce. By Edgar E. Clark. Washington, John Byrne & Company. 1919. pp. lxxix, 262. [To be reviewed.]

Legal and Political Status of Women in Iowa. By Ruth A. Gallaher. Iowa City, The State Historical Society of Iowa. 1918, pp. xii, 300. $2.50.

Effects of the War upon Insurance. By William F. Gephart. New York, Oxford University Press. 1918. pp. viii, 302. $1.00.

Traditions of British Statesmanship. By Hon. Arthur D. Elliot. New York, Dodd, Mead & Company. 1919. pp. x, 231. $3.50. [To be reviewed.]

A Treatise on Federal Taxes. By Henry Campbell Black. Fourth Edition. Kansas City, Vernon Law Book Company. 1919. pp. xxxi, 704. $6.00. [To be reviewed.]

The Army and The Law. By Garrard Glenn. New York, Columbia University Press. 1918. pp. iv, 197.