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Semeioneiron –
On the Similitude of Dream and Symbol in the Cultural System
Master's Thesis

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I have written the Master's Thesis myself, independently. All of the other authors' main viewpoints and all data from other resources have been referred to.

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INTRODUCTION

Semiotics of culture recognizes the analogous structure and function of the human intellect, text and culture (Lotman 1991) as well as the isomorphism of the cultural system and individual genetic memory (Lotman 1990). Both of the latter are formed and shaped by their respective symbols that play the part of mediator between spheres of semiosis. This affords the presumption that dream would have played a significant part in the phylogenesis of anthropo-semiotic modelling and by extension in cultural evolution. This thesis revolves around the phenomenon and ambit of consciousness in the light of dreams in order to dissertate their role in propagating consciousness *compos mentis* and what has followed.

The thesis consists of four parts. Firstly, a metatheoretical framework of consciousness and its symbolologic function will be sketched out to be used as the basis for a theoretical model of semeioneiron¹ in order to encompass symbol in two semiotic spheres. Secondly, the elementary semiotic mechanisms and organizing principles of the generative trajectory of dream-formation will be outlined in accordance with the semiotic square. Thirdly, a hypothetical dream-syntagm will be treated as a finalized text in and as a result of autocommunication to show the inescapability of narrativizing, i.e. structuring and organizing the random produce of passive consciousness. Fourthly, on the basis of cultural typology supplemented by the framework of types of traditional thinking and cultural traditions, the analogous structure and function between dream as symbol of consciousness and symbol in the cultural system will be made evident.

Lastly, I intend to venture forth a proposition that symbols in culture abide to the same principles as symbols with regard to consciousness as exemplified by dreams and are nothing more than spatio-temporal extensions of consciousness itself

¹ from Greek *sēmeion* 'sign' (from *sēma* 'mark') + *oneiros* 'dream'

which thus possesses an independent, ever-developing existence in which the human mind may be just a periodic stage.

0.1. Hats off to the Psychoanalytic ring

Dreams and dreaming are supposedly intuitively familiar phenomena to the majority of people as well as the notion that these dimensions are separate. Generally, we do not dream awake nor are we awake in our dreams in such a manner that the dreamer would be aware of his or her individual existence in the sense that “I” as such is indistinguishable from the surroundings – “I” is its surroundings and vice versa. Hence, any separation of significant elements from insignificant ones that would facilitate semiotic recognition is excluded during a dream, it occurs only upon awake.

Due to the eternal presence of dreaming in humans – regardless when the two spheres were recognized as distinct – dreams have always aroused interest in the dreamer and in several cases in more ancient times, in society as a whole; interpretations or rather, repercussions of dreams are abound in world history, in myths and religions as well in the arts and science. Alas, the question as to how or why we dream is still in want of satisfactory explanation. As a sidenote, this thesis does not contend for an exhaustive explanation of dreams but only strives to supplement some aspects left out by previous authors.

In addition to the study of dreams and their meaning in ancient times, the more recent study can be traced to have its beginning or rather re-surgence in the works of Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) and especially his *Die Traumdeutung* (1900) (*The Intepretation of Dreams* (1965)) in which he offered a fairly wholesome picture of the human psyche for his time. Claiming to have solved the puzzle of dreams and their effect on the mind, in his theory he brought about the idea that natural phenomena may be treated as compositions of/in consciousness, characteristic to human nature; with which the task of transforming the sub-conscious² into consciousness is evoked and by this taking the human into a new state of conscious experience. In general terms the “Freudian psychoanalytical model is constructed as a chain at one end of which are subconscious libidinal notions and at the other the verbal testimony of the

² Note that in this section the terms sub-conscious and unconscious are used interchangeably depending on the author in question and his/her choice of word.

patient” (Lotman 1976: 301). Between the extreme points of this chain, there is a sequence of different sign substitutions, symbolic equivalents and transformations.

The major flaw with this was of course that upon the transformation it became obvious that sub-conscious is that which “was” before becoming conscious and it is only in this sense that the distinction or comparison between sub-conscious and conscious is at all possible. The sub-conscious has meaning only insofar as it is itself a specific element of previous, unacknowledged consciousness; ‘previous’ being used here in a tentative manner because some things can be positioned on the temporal axis, some things on the spatial axis – in this sense it would be just as right to call sub-conscious not ‘previous’ but ‘becoming’ as well. It is the process of (psycho)analysis that separates the sub-conscious from the conscious to make the analytic understanding of consciousness more substantial.

But the problematic character of the (psycho)analytic comprehension of consciousness became evident exactly by the bringing about of the notion ‘sub-conscious’ which culminated in the ‘homologous’ understanding of consciousness. The Freudian interpretation of sub-conscious is utterly rational, a masked consciousness belonging to the expression plane alone; “it does not differ in content from the categories of texts of consciousness, merely masking them in other symbols of the expression plane [...] and is totally translatable into the language of consciousness” (Ibid. 304). Sub-consciousness was like consciousness, only unknown of; later on, it became to be seen as being structured like a language (cf. Lacan 1998). By and in language, which is a semio-linguistic modelling system, the whatever that is possible to be discussed and thought of must be facilitated therein according to the rules of said language. As is known, semiotics of culture tends to view cultural phenomena as (results of) secondary modelling systems; the primary one for the human subject being natural language and thus, it is no surprise that the sub-conscious and not only the sub-conscious is seen to be structured like a language because the Freudian sub-conscious is “constructed by the investigator’s metamodels and, naturally, is translated into them” (Lotman 1976: 304 [emphasis original]).

As the Wittgensteinian saying goes, whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. That is, comprehending consciousness as something onto which nothing would be conjoined from beyond the subject-object relations in/of consciousness became renounced partially due to the subjecting of all aspects of consciousness to straightforward rationalism afforded by language and the models it

facilitates. The Freudian “psychoanalyst deciphers dreams, unintentional utterances, and other involuntary texts; and he finds, upon substitution of a system of symbols, a content adequately expressible in the terms of the language of consciousness” (Ibid.). It may be noted that the act of thought is in itself paradoxical. In order to know something, we need to know what we want to know and factually to know we need to know how can we know and why it needs to be known; but to know why we need to know we need to know what we want to know and so forth indefinitely.

On what comes to dreams in Freud’s theory (1965) which laid a firm basis for then-future elaborations of psychological, semiotic and other theories of dreaming, the major contributions lie in his concept of dreamwork (*Traumarbeit*) whence four basic mechanisms are recognized:

- i) Condensation (*Verdichtung*) or over-determination, the process by which latent meanings are condensed into one as manifest elements of the dream narrative;
- ii) Displacement (*Verschiebung*), according to which the most significant latent meanings present themselves as unimportant or senseless in the dream;
- iii) Considerations of representability (*Rücksicht auf Darstellbarkeit*), or the way abstract, latent ideas are transformed into dramatic and concrete scenes, and;
- iv) Secondary revision (*sekundäre Bearbeitung*), the replacing of true connections between latent dream-thoughts by false connections on the manifest level.

(Freud 1965: 381–651)

From thereon dreams have been viewed and interpreted in accordance with the above mechanisms, each theoretician naturally effected by his or her own distinct point of view on their respective fields of study; most notable for us are Carl Jung (1875–1961), Jacques Lacan (1901–1981) and Julia Kristeva (1941–).

Though allegedly Jung’s theories have somewhat lost their academic relevance they deserve to be mentioned here on what comes to generalizations. Jung is most notably known for his archetypes which are defined as developed elements of the collective unconscious. The collective unconscious is “the deepest layer of psyche that is one and the same in all of us” (Jung 1968: 74). As all bodies are similar to one

another with only slight differences in blood and tone, then accordingly all psyches are similar with only slight differences. “The deepest collective level is a whole that cannot be segmented” (Ibid.). Starting from this level, all individual psyches are constructed (or rather, from all individual psyches it is possible to venture to this level) beginning from the ectopsychical sphere (perceptions, thoughts, feelings, intuition) and the endopsychical sphere (memory, subjective components of functions, affections, invasions). The endopsychical sphere constitutes for Jung the individual unconscious, a part of the psyche “consisting of such material that might as well be placed in consciousness” (Ibid. 77) – unlike his predecessor’s.

The archetypes, that belong to the unconscious include (but are not restricted to) recurrent images and motifs to be found in myths and religions, dreams and art as well as by examining a person’s behaviour that is supposedly effected by these archetypes; the more noteworthy ones would be figures: the Mother, the Father, the Trickster, the Child, etc.; events: Birth, Death, Separation from the parents, etc. and motifs: the Flood or Deluge, the Apocalypse, the Creation etc. transformations of all of which are to be found in nigh all cultures one way or the other. Accordingly, the number of such archetypes is indefinite though some are more prominent than the others, for example the Shadow that represents the individual unconscious as a whole – the dark side of human being – and the aforementioned Mother and Father (perchance in the guise of the Wise Old Man). The Self for Jung is the sum total of psychic phenomena in (an individual) human. Also, Jung’s theory introduces the concepts of Anima (the contrasexual, i.e. feminine part in the male psyche) and Animus (the contrasexual, i.e. masculine part in the female psyche).

Drawing from Aristotle’s classification of the elements of the dramatic plot, dreams for Jung consist of the Exposition phase – the whereabouts, set and setting, actors and actants and sometimes time of the dream – the initial situation though it is at times quite difficult to pinpoint the beginning of a dream. Exposition is followed by Development as the dream’s plot thickens, situations becoming more complex; this then leads to Culmination (*peripeteia*) when something decisive happens or some essential change takes place. “The final phase is the Solution or Result (*lysis*), which shows the final situation; this phase is sometimes lacking” (Jung 1974: 81). Technically, Culmination can also manifest as a new Exposition provided it is the same dream.

On what comes to the effects of dreams, for Jung, “natural transformation processes announce themselves mainly in dreams” (Jung 1972: 76) that is, provided that one is subjected to personal growth or withering it is – according to Jung – often times announced in dreams to the person for example by ways of inner transformation(s) and/or as rebirth into another being or it may also be casually announced to one. “This “other being” is the other person in ourselves – that larger and greater personality maturing within us, whom we have already met as the inner friend of the soul” (Ibid.). It must be noted that for Jung, the impressiveness of dreams does not guarantee or entail that they would be somehow more significant and/or transformative than regular, dull dreams (and by extension, it should not matter either whether the more transformative dreams are remembered or not). That is, “the most beautiful and impressive dreams often have no lasting or transformative effect on the dreamer [...] these more aesthetic forms of experience must be carefully distinguished from those which indubitably involve a change of one’s nature” (Ibid. 60).

Not delving that much deeper into Jungian analytic psychology, it pays to mention one last thing with regard to the problematics of consciousness and sub-, or unconscious and the possibilities to discuss them which already models the whatever from therein onto the plane of language – the issue already presented. For Jung the great plane upon which the “unconscious life of the psyche is constructed is so inaccessible to our understanding that we can never know what evil may not be necessary in order to produce good by enantiodromia, and what good may very possibly lead to evil” (Ibid. 111). Again, whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent, regardless that also this thesis falls prey to the same dilemma as its predecessors.

As consciousness in general along with the whole of the universe, all theoretical stabs at it and its aspects are in constant change of becoming something else than they were becoming. Basing his claim on Lévi-Strauss’ structuralist anthropology as well as Saussure’s linguistic theory, Jacques Lacan distanced himself from the Freudian view of the sub-conscious by arguing that “*the unconscious is structured like a language*” (Lacan 1998: 20). That is, based on the socio-linguistic and symbolic order of the surrounding culture one is born into, then in accordance with structuralism and “linguistics, whose model is the combinatory operation, functioning spontaneously, of itself, in a presubjective way – it is this linguistic

structure that gives its status to the unconscious” (Ibid. 20–21). By the same token, Lacan became convinced that there indeed was something definable and objectifiable underneath the unconscious that would be accessible to the ample analyst.

Consequently, while Freud’s sub-conscious was more or less exactly like consciousness albeit a masked one which has no order or structure before being hoisted to consciousness i.e. the sub-conscious was “that which is excluded from language” (Homer 2005: 12), Lacan nudged the comprehension of the term towards a more decipherable terminology. However, this should not be taken so that the Lacanian unconscious would be simply constructed as Volapük or Esperanto, or unraveled like an actual natural language. An opposite example would be between the major differences between the grammatical rules that govern speech and language, and the ones governing society and culture; the organizing principles in both are similar due to their common origin and yet vastly different.

Lacan’s unconscious, as opposed to Freud’s, is based on a gap, which in its turn is “the revelation that at the level of the unconscious there is something at all points homologous with what occurs at the level of the subject” (Lacan 1998: 24) by way of dreams, *lapses* and the like that intrude the conscious subject and its doings. That is, impediment and failure, a split creates the gap and “what is *produced* in this gap is presented as the *discovery*” (Ibid.). This gap then renders the unconscious pre-ontological by way of discontinuity and the unconscious presents itself, manifesting as vacillation, as the gap within the symbolic chain. Interestingly, when the subject of unconscious manifests itself in such a fashion, Lacan also argued “that it thinks before it attains certainty” (Ibid. 36) and after having attained this certainty, the whatever flowed from the unconscious disappears to where it came from. Or, as will be explicated, the structure of consciousness abstracted from a state of consciousness dissolves into it.

Without that much specificity here, Lacan divides the realms of subjects into three: the imaginary; the symbolic, and the real. Because our interest is not bent towards the development of subjects and egos therein, a superficial account of these must suffice. The imaginary comes to be by way of the mirror stage, i.e. an individual’s capability to distinguish in itself between subject and ego as well as between itself and others. “In other words, for a person to identify themselves as an autonomous coherent self they must first distinguish themselves from others and from their social environment” (Homer 2015: 21). The mirror stage is named such because

it presupposes the subject identify its reflection in the mirror as an independent being in the world – the acknowledgment of *Dasein* by and in the flesh if one pleases. The imaginary in general terms is “the realm of the ego, a pre-linguistic realm of sense-perception, identification and an illusory sense of unity” (Ibid. 31). In passing it may be noted that this – along the rest of psychoanalytic theory – gave basis for Kristeva’s definition of the semiotic *chora* explicated below.

As was mentioned, Lacan drew quite heavily from Lévi-Strauss and Saussure. In addition to his claims concerning the unconscious being structured like a language, he also found significant “the way in which women [among other things] were transformed into signs and operated within a system of *symbolic exchange*” (Ibid. 35) constituting the symbolic function intruding into all facets of (social) life if by no other means than by way of the symbolic order which defines and delimits our universe – language. If the ego is an imaginary function founded on one’s body, the “subject, on the other hand, is constituted in the symbolic order and is determined by language” (Ibid. 45). “I” is “I” only because it is afforded by language.

The real is that which escapes from the imaginary as well as symbolization but it nevertheless exists and supports our everyday reality, which in its turn yields from the social order and symbolic reality. “The real is the unknown that exists at the limit of this socio-symbolic universe and is in constant tension with it” (Ibid. 81). By the real is not meant the physical reality but rather a trauma of sorts; the real does not exist in that sense but serves as a basis for this or that function. This is closely related to repetition of the real as trauma in several ways; the real “is that which always comes back to the same place – to the place where the subject in so far as he thinks, where the *res cogitans*, does not meet it” (Lacan 1998: 49). Pre-linguistic and based on trauma, the real is a void, it is “that which resists symbolization; it is the traumatic kernel at the core of subjectivity and the symbolic order” (Homer 2015: 94). It may be noted already here that some aspects of Lacan’s real are curiously reminiscent of the concept of symbol of consciousness used in this thesis albeit the present author finds the latter much more comprehensible.

Dreams for Lacan are partially what constitute the all-human phenomenon of doubt by way of “an obvious gap between what was experienced and what was recounted” (Lacan 1998: 35). This doubt yields its essence from the unconscious that in its turn “is the unknown that lies beyond doubt” (Homer 2015: 67) and thus, logically, doubt does not exist within the dream itself due to the lack of meta-

awareness, i.e. awareness of being aware as will be pointed to later on. The dream is real. This is quite essential to notice because this thesis is not concerned with the specificities of dream-formation or dreamwork nor is it absolutely of any concern how this or that dream could or should be interpreted.

With regard to dream-analysis, for Lacan there is always an impenetrable core sprouting from the (trauma of) the real and may manifest in dream. It is “what Freud calls the navel – *the navel of the dreams* [...] to designate their ultimately unknown centre” (Lacan 1998: 23). This navel originates, or rather is “that gap of which I have already spoken” (Ibid.) – the gap being the unconscious as already mentioned. For Freud, dreams are often seen as outcomes of repressed emotions or as fulfilments of wishes whereas for Lacan they may also be viewed as manifestations of the “repressed element as *the representative of the representation*, or *das Ding* (the Thing)” (Homer 2015: 84) expressible only in dreams (and escaping symbolization upon awakening). However, for practical reasons we will not indulge ourselves further in the psychoanalytic approach proper but essay towards a slightly different approach albeit the navel of the dreams has an eerie echo of similarity with the concept of nucleus used in the present thesis as did Lacan’s real and the symbol of consciousness along with the pre-thinking thought.

Dreams for Kristeva, who approaches psychoanalysis from her widely specific point of view of production as (one) core aspect of semiotics, the dreamwork “becomes a theoretical concept that triggers off a new research, one that touches on pre-representative production, and the development of ‘thinking’ before *thought*” (Kristeva 1996a: 84). For Kristeva, psychoanalytic theories brought about the possibility to construct a semiotics of production that enables the study of ‘the other scene’ where human desires become enacted before they become products (in the Marxian sense), language or communication.

Semiotics of production emphasizes the dynamics of production itself instead of the final product (as opposed to Marxist theories). As a theory of discourse, semiotics of production is simultaneously a theory of itself and “it consequently rebels against representation even as it uses representative models, and overthrows the very formalization that gives it substance with an unstable theory of the unrepresentable and the unmeasurable” (Ibid. 85). That is, semiotics strives to represent that which by definition can not be represented and “consequently, one talks

of the *unobserved object*” (Ibid.) which in the psychoanalytic tradition belongs to the domain of the sub-conscious (or unconscious).

Discussing Freud’s dreamwork and the way dreams come about in that given frame, Kristeva notes the essential aspect of transposition, or “the signifying process’ ability to pass from one sign-system to another” (Kristeva 1996b: 112) which then leads to production (of dreams) by way of exchanging and permutating the respective sign systems’ elements; the elements consisting of certain measures of representability, which for Kristeva is “the specific articulation of the semiotic and the thetic for a sign-system” (Ibid.). Consequently, transposition takes place in a state of sleep in which the conditions for dreaming are present and it plays an essential role in so far as “it implies the abandonment of a former sign-system, the passage to a second via an instinctual intermediary common to the two systems and the articulation of the new system with its new representability” (Ibid.).

The major lack in the usefulness of transposition for us is that the sign-systems are seen somehow as being separate whereas nothing in consciousness is ever separate; even the sub-conscious (or unconscious) is within the sphere of consciousness just as much as everything else one is not aware of. Transposition does not take into consideration the all-penetrating analogy and isomorphism of structure and function between the human intellect and culture. That is, we are concerned of the most elementary part(s) as the smallest common denominator between ourselves and culture; dream in the former, symbol in the latter. It is the concept of symbols as sign-like formations possibly serving as the basis for sign-ness we are interested of, not that much of the production – not to mention interpretation or meaning – of dreams albeit a frame for generation will be offered.

Partially on the same page with Kristeva, we abandon transposition echoing intersemiotic translation, for that would require we know what is the sign-system of dreams. No one knows. To an extent psychoanalysis has offered explanations but since it is not the field of interest of the present author (who admittedly is not that well educated in said field either), we mainly exclude this tradition, throw the hat into the ring and resort to a different strategy. However, Kristeva’s distinction between the semiotic and the symbolic as well as the concept of the semiotic *chora* will be adopted and heavily abused as operational terms.

Our approach is from a slightly different angle, it is more mechanistic by production and although the concept of ‘individual’ or ‘subject’ must be used to

discuss dreaming, the final outcome stretches from the individual level to the level of culture by way of showing the similitude of symbol in the cultural system and dream. That said, it would certainly do no harm to the reader to hold one under consciousness when the other is discussed. In this sense, this thesis has nothing to do with dreams, at least what comes to their (psychoanalytic) interpretation. Dreams are taken as a mechanism founded upon us that has the function to mould the individual and by extension and analogy, ‘dreams’ of culture manifested as symbols mould their system.

0.2. Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology

Though its exact mode of being is still open to debate (cf. Bayne et al. 2009) consciousness is nevertheless defined as “the state of being aware of and responsive to one’s surroundings; a person’s awareness or perception of something; the fact of awareness by the mind of itself and the world” (ODE *sub* **consciousness**). Here the latter half of the first sentence applies to nigh all animate beings individually and in a sense to all organic matter; the second applies to persons, people. It is otherwise a nigh analogous definition except for the human or anthroposemiotic qualifier which then leads to the third argument and by that distances from the organic/material receiver or perceiver. It no longer concerns perceptions acquired by the senses and only slightly – if necessary – the becoming aware of something through them. It is concerned only of itself by way of ‘mind’, awareness of being aware. What interests us is consciousness as oner, as a factual existant (?) regardless of its ambit or mode, that has its ways of going about; especially in people according to themselves, provided the third sentence be stressed.

This paper does not concern itself with the neurological aspect of consciousness; after all, all brains are as different as people in whom they are so what for example neurophenomenology gives us is generalizations, models derived from the variance found within the physical world or individual aspects of the workings of the brain. Granted, all (human) brains work neurologically in the same fashion but this does not entail that all the bearers of these brains would work or behave, act, think etc. in the same fashion. Even if we were to define all the semiotic (or any other) models, mechanisms and functions of human action and thought, there would still be plenty of room for individual variance – otherwise it would be a case of

mental simulacra which would nullify the necessity and indeed possibility for communication between individuals. Two or more things that are and know the exact same have no ambiguity in between them.

Nevertheless, a few words with regard to consciousness or mind therein are in order. Traditionally, in philosophy of mind, there are two kinds of problems with regard to consciousness, the simple ones and the more hard one. The former are many, concerning issues such as how does the brain handle the information it receives from its surroundings, how is this information integrated in the brain, what are the mechanisms upon which the inner ‘reports’ of one’s situation become known, how are we able to access this information and how we use it to orientate our behaviour and all other things. These more simple problems are explainable to an extent by conventional science(s) by merely describing the mechanism that a given function fulfills.

In philosophy of mind, functional reduction is a fairly clear-cut method in which one defines the reducible quality (or quale) functionally and then finds out what mechanism exactly fulfills this role. For example:

Let M be the reducible quality.

Firstly, M is functionalized, that is, M is defined functionally – to have M is a function for fulfilling a certain (causal) role C;

Secondly, what realizes M is asserted, that is finding out what are the properties that fulfill the (causal) role C;

Thirdly, a theory is created that would explain how what realizes M fulfills the (causal) role C.

However, the question whether properties of mind can be functionalized remains. This may be the case with regard to intentional properties but not when it comes to qualia, quales cannot be functionalized because they can vary without entailing functional differences (cf. Kim 2005)

The hard problem of consciousness still remains – why does the fulfilling of functions entail a subjective experience which is something more than all the functions related to consciousness. Functionalism then explains “how information is distinguished, integrated and expressed but not how it is experienced” (Chalmers 1999: 1414). Technically then, a solution for the hard problem should offer an understanding of the relationship between physical processes and consciousness, i.e.

explain how and why the physical processes are related to (states of) consciousness. Two main approaches to this problem are the reductionist and non-reductionist.

In the former only physical principles are used and consciousness is not held to be a primitive (also the materialistic or physicalist understanding treats consciousness as a physical process) whereas in the latter consciousness is incorporated as a fundamental part in the explanation.

According to Chalmers (2003), answers to epistemic arguments with regard to both reductionism (or physical-materialism) and non-reductionism may be divided into three types each; of which will be given here a short overview:

A-type materialism denies that consciousness poses a hard problem and can be completely explained by way of solving all simple, i.e. functional problems. By this, all and any epistemic breaches between the physical and phenomenal truths are denied (cf. eliminativism, analytical functionalism, logical behaviorism);

B-type materialism recognizes a breach between the physical and phenomenal but denies that this would entail an ontological breach, phenomenal states are identical with physical states but this identity is not the outcome of conceptual analysis but is discovered empirically – consciousness differs from the concepts of physicalism and functionality but it is empirically possible to show that they point to the same thing (cf. aposterior materialism);

C-type materialism recognizes an epistemic breach between the physical and phenomenal in hope that it may be breached [*sic*] in principle. This type is unstable in that inasmuch the describing structure does not encompass consciousness, a new physics should be created that consists of more than just structure and dynamics. By this, consciousness as such should be brought into physics, transforming the C-type materialism into D-type dualism or F-type monism;

D-type dualism or interactionism, according to which physical states propagate states of consciousness and vice versa. This is in harmony with substance dualism, property dualism and emergentism, no physical experiment has as of yet revealed a basis that would be purely of the mind albeit it hasn't been excluded either. Physics may be complemented by adding mental forces into the fundamental forces (cf. interactive dualism);

E-type dualism or epiphenomalism, according to which phenomenal properties differ from physical properties and do not effect the physical, the physical world is

closed but defines phenomenal facts. This also is in harmony with substance dualism, property dualism and emergentism;

F-type monism argues that consciousness is formed by the inner qualities of fundamental physical entities rather than their relational or dispositional properties. These properties are phenomenal and thus the basis of physical reality are (proto)phenomenal properties (cf. pan-psychism).

Provided that consciousness is not reducible to anything physical, then it must be something independent in the world. After all the physical facts have been fixed, the truth with regard to consciousness also needs to be fixed. There are mainly two ways to go about it: either consciousness itself is a fundamental trait of the world like time-space and mass or, consciousness itself is not fundamental but is conditioned by some more primitive, fundamental trait(s) that in themselves are not conditioned by physical facts. Such trait(s) may be said to be protophenomenal properties and by the same token, protophenomenal properties are fundamental properties. In this sense, though steering clear from any and all philosophy, the theme of this paper is more bent towards the non-reductionist view.

Also not the concern of this paper and yet requiring mention, another wide field studying consciousness is phenomenology. Phenomenology is a systematic term introduced in to the field of science by Hegel (1807) in his book *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (*Phenomenology of Mind* first published in English in 1910), and it has come to be both a school of thought and a scientific discipline that studies phenomena as distinct from the nature of being. A general outline of consciousness in phenomenology: “In a *broadest sense*, the expression *consciousness* comprehends (but then indeed less suitably) *all* mental processes” (Husserl 1983: 64). Consciousness is a trait often enough accredited to the Ego, the actual human Being or “I”, a real object existent in-the-world (*In-der-welt-sein*). In a sense, all there is – objects physical, mental or transcendental – would not exist without the experiencing subject or, more precisely, the Ego as an individual consciousness susceptible to be subjected to a systematic, eidetic analysis in order to effect “the insight *that consciousness has, in itself, a being of its own which in its own absolute essence, is not touched by the phenomenological exclusion*” (Ibid. 65). It is the human ‘consciousness as such’ which is the primary concern of phenomenology although “there are, after all, brute animal Ego-subjects” (Ibid. 72).

Before jumping to transcendental conclusions, we note that all mental processes should be considered “*in the entire fullness of the concreteness* within which they present themselves in their concrete context – *the stream of mental processes* – and which, by virtue of their own essence, they combine to make up” (Ibid. 69). In order for this stream to become, perception – being basic and primary with regard to cognition and action – is required. Husserl distinguishes between three ways of intending an object or state of affairs:

- i) *signitive*, i.e. linguistic acts which intend the object via a contingent representation;
- ii) *imaginative (pictorial)*, i.e. acts which intend the object via a representation, and;
- iii) *perceptual* i.e. intention which presents us with the object itself in its physical presence.

(Gallagher, Zahavi 2012: 100)

The objects intended to are not to be confused with the mental processes of consciousness “which are consciousness *of* those objects” (Husserl 1983: 71). But to perceive requires that that, which is to be perceived have meaning, have concept – have noesis. “Fulfilling their intentional *function* of sense-bestowal, noeses *constitute consciousness-objectivities*” (Špet 1991: 103). What characterizes consciousness when consciousness – precisely by the fact that it is consciousness – points to something of which it is the consciousness; or in other words, what Husserl calls the noetic moment or sense-bestowal, “a stratum by which precisely the concrete intensive mental processes arises from the *sensuos, which has in itself nothing pertaining to intentionality*” (Husserl 1983: 203). Not delving deeper into the ambiguities of ‘consciousness-objectivities’, it will suffice here to say that as perceptions forming a part of the mental process, these objectivities like all sides of any mental processes one turns to are perceivable to the reflecting Ego due to the mode of being of the mental process itself and as such, the mental process does not ‘appear’ from ‘somewhere’ but is always ‘ready’ to be perceived. Thought in advance of its certainty in a sense.

It is safe to say that everything perceived is constituted and is in a relation to consciousness; consciousness itself contributes to the process of constitution thus

allowing the manifestation or appearance of objects and their signification to appear and present themselves in consciousness as what they are – or rather how they appear to be – as correlates of experience, emphasizing the first-person perspective’s intrigue to phenomenology, driven by queries pertaining to the transcendental philosophic. Due to the structure of consciousness in phenomenology, objects are constituted the way they are and in order to alleviate the phenomenologist’s transcendental philosophic concerns, phenomenology “makes use of a distinction between the subject conceived as an object *within the world* and the subject conceived as a subject *for the world*, i.e. considered as a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of possibility for cognition and meaning” (Gallagher, Zahavi 2012: 26).

Phenomenology, then, concentrates on the study of consciousness as well as the study of objects of direct experience. By means of reductive operations, the final object of phenomenology – consciousness – becomes ‘pure’, transcendental consciousness and it leaves the ‘being of its own’ of consciousness as “the *“phenomenological residuum”*” (Husserl 1983: 65) – the field and region of phenomenology proper. It is useful to note, that Husserl uses the term ‘phenomenological reduction’ in two senses. When referring to “excluding” and “parenthesizing” (the transcendental epoché), the plural form ‘reductions’ is used, whereas the singular ‘reduction’ is used when referring to them in their collective unity.

Though an intriguing field in where to get transcended and reduced, at present we cast aside phenomenology; were we to include the field it would cause a phenomenal dent to the framework by way of complicating the issue of consciousness as an operational term (explicated below) which, as such, is still undefined both in the philosophy of mind and phenomenology. Thus, seeing that neither field has offered a satisfactory explanation for and of (and in) consciousness, both will be excluded and a different approach – which does not contend for an explanation either but is used as purely operational to suit the needs of the present author – is presented.

This exclusion is done in a most intentional way. By intentionally directing our mental state towards a different approach than the ones above, we note in passing that “not all our mental states are [...] directed or Intentional” (Searle 1979: 74). Interestingly enough, regardless of one’s knowledge and beliefs which by no means need not (ever) be acknowledged, it may also be noted that “not all of our Intentional states are even conscious states” (Ibid.). For Searle, there is a strong connection, an

analogy to be found and used in theory between “Intentional states [that] represent objects and states of affairs in exactly the same sense that speech acts represent objects and states of affairs” (Ibid. 80). Though it must be noted that Intentionality (Searle capitalizes the word Intentionality in order to distinguish it from its ordinary usage) is not essentially linguistic, but is treated in this way by Searle only heuristically.

Intentionality in a very broad sense is the directedness of our mental states; alas, in the present thesis we are not very concerned of this but will reserve the right to use the term if or when required. What concerns us – in a sense – is the what that brings about this or that directability of mental states within consciousness. Having noted that Intentional states are analogous to speech acts, need not be acknowledged and that “every Intentional state consists of a representative content in a certain psychological mode” (Searle 1979: 74.) we may also note that in our framework for consciousness, not that much (or at all) notice is paid to language but to symbols; in our consciousness, the content(s) need not necessarily be representative, or to say the least, they are not called forth or abstracted by something that would be representative or representable by way of signs or words. Although, taking into consideration that the ontological aspect with regard to the problems of Intentional states are irrelevant on what comes to the logical properties of these states – thus making all mental states reducible to or to be seen as Intentional – “it doesn’t matter how an Intentional state is realized, as long as the realization is a realization of its Intentionality” (Ibid. 81).

That is, by excluding the ontological requirement for explaining intentions and Intentionality, the mental states that need not be acknowledged; we free ourselves from a dent similar that would have been caused by phenomenology or philosophy of mind or psychoanalysis proper. Though as mentioned, the present author intends to – if necessary – make use of the thoughts and terms provided in all of the above fields.

1. METATHEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF CONSCIOUSNESS

A thing and a non-thing among things and non-things, consciousness can not be said to be static. As a thing (and non-thing) it is as are all other known or unknown of things: “everything is always becoming something other than what it was becoming” (merrell 2013: 273). That is, nothing is what it was or will have been but becomes something else than it was becoming. In spite of that, we may render the concept of consciousness operational by giving it a metatheoretical form along with some functions by which we exclude intentionality and agency as well as philosophy and phenomenology, none of which play an important part in this thesis. The proverbial instability of consciousness becoming on what comes to some of the changes in experiencing the state of consciousness are intuitively familiar to all humans; even a stable mood muses and oscillates. In general, different states of consciousness cover a wide variety of “naturally occurring states, such as deep sleep and dreaming, pathological states such as mania or coma, and states induced by drugs, hypnosis, meditation and other mental practices” (Bayne et al. 2009: 26). In addition to consciousness awake, it is the naturally occurring states that interest us, especially dreaming asleep. Before discussing dreams however, we need a suitable context for them. Or rather, we need a ‘somewhere’ they can be positioned, regardless that they are not physical in their being and moreover, are not reducible to the workings of the brain, at least what comes to experiencing them.

Consciousness in semiotics has been claimed to be a very simple thing when studied as general as possible and by this avoiding to err ‘mind’ or mentation and intentionality as consciousness. It is important to “take care not to make the blunder of supposing that Self-consciousness is meant, and it will be seen that consciousness is nothing but Feeling, in general, – not feeling in the German sense, but more generally, the immediate element of experience generalized to its utmost” (CP 7.365). Feeling, generalized or not, is on the other hand equal to First, which is “that whose

being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor lying behind anything” (CP 1.356). In short, consciousness *is*.

Consciousness – regardless of its ‘true’ mode of being – requires a theoretical framework to be rendered operational. This frame is drawn from the metatheory of consciousness as presented by Mamardašvili and Pjatigorski (2011). Within a metatheoretical framework, consciousness can be brought about as a certain measure, a dimension of sorts in which objects and occurrences of the world are described. Similarly, as the objects and occurrences of the world may be positioned as existing and concretized in space and time; and as spatio-temporal being in a certain way qualifies things and occurrences, so does the measure/dimension of our awareness set some delimitations to the objects and occurrences relationally positioned by us in consciousness. It may be argued that wherever there is consciousness, there is memory whereas the opposite is not (necessarily) true.

Consciousness is not a psychological process in the strict, physiological sense of the term albeit – and this is pays to keep in mind – all psychological processes may be described in the objective schema as well as in the schema of consciousness. This is enabled by the fact (presumption, really) that consciousness is not a psycho-physiological process but a plane of sorts upon which all concrete psycho-physiological processes are synthesized which leads them to no more being identical with themselves but belonging to consciousness. Take for example memory. In case of recall, the remembered fact is a fact of consciousness because the acknowledging subject is able to explicate the fact of remembering; the factual occurrence of an event (what is remembered), the fact of memorizing and the fact of remembering // the fact of remembering and the fact of recall // all belong to the psychological/physiological mechanism of memory. But when they present themselves on the plane of their correlation in a unified flux, they can no longer be viewed solely objectively.

That is, taken individually, memorization and remembering have happened objectively in the scientific sense, but their correlate is to a ‘something,’ in which there is no distinction between ‘how’ and ‘what’ and the ‘something’ functions as a certain integral whole of ‘awareness.’ It is ‘aware’ insofar that something that occurs within it is not only a fact but is also acknowledged by us.

It must be stressed that in this paper, the possibility for the description of consciousness is presumed outside any exact placement, without any endowment of subjectivity or objectivity because both subject and object of consciousness present

themselves – whether we wish them to or not – as an actual state of affairs organized in a given fashion with regard to consciousness. The given metatheoretical framework is of a symbolic character; its symbolic nature is stressed by way of emphasizing the characteristics that are revealed in consciousness, which have already been empirically revealed – the characteristics of (an) object.

The characteristics/attributes of the object do not submit to a determinist analysis and simultaneously slip away from all semiotic analyses that are based on the claim that there exists a signifier as an actually extractable element and that there exist a signified as the former's denotation. The concept of the sphere of consciousness (and its constituents) taken in use here 'symbolize' the circumstance that in the given research there is no signifier, no signified nor that which/whom signifies (signiftee?). We have only an intuitive experience of semiotizing in which the three elements exist but they are impossible to be met as distinct in time and space; it may be presumed that there is a continuous bond between signifier and signified but they are inseparable from one another. If the psychoanalytic dream has a navel, then an inner umbilical cord is tantamount to the sign.

In what follows, it must be stressed time and again that consciousness as such is left undefined in a sense. That is, the ambit of consciousness (the sphere of consciousness) is not by default restricted solely to the human being. This on the basis that there exists at least three classes of intellectual objects: "natural human consciousness (in the sense of an individual human consciousness), text [...] and culture as a collective intellect. These objects are analogous by structure as well as by their functional principle" (Lotman 1991: 401 [my translation]).

1.1. Sphere, state, and structures of consciousness

Here is presented – in paraphrasing – a framework of consciousness and its essential factors drawn from the metatheory of consciousness. In essence, consciousness is a whole consisting of three areas as defined by Mamardašvili and Pjatigorski (2011):

- I. The sphere of consciousness
- II. The state(s) of consciousness
- III. The structure(s) of consciousness

All and each consciousness is pragmatically situated in the sphere of consciousness in a manner they can be situated at and it is not possible for consciousness to be situated elsewhere – there is no consciousness beyond the sphere of consciousness. The sphere of consciousness in itself does not possess a spatial nor a temporal definition and each consciousness is situated in its own situation; the location of which is not static as is not consciousness itself. The sphere of consciousness is not endowed with any localization nor is it concretized in any fashion – henceforth the states and structures will be viewed as localized and fixed in the sphere of consciousness. Factually by this, the concept of the sphere of consciousness is of a symbolic nature whereas the concepts of state and structure of consciousness are interpretations of this symbolically articulated existent. The state of consciousness will be seen as an interpreted and concretized being of the sphere of consciousness, as its localization or occupation – or even its entrapment.

Mainly, states of consciousness are in themselves empty. Not as the opposition of form and content, a state of consciousness is not the antithesis of content in relation to it. “The states of consciousness can in no case be thought of as forms in which consciousness could be realized as content” (Mamardašvili, Pjatigorski 2011: 58³). In principle, a state of consciousness may be induced by any phenomenon, occurrence or circumstance that engages an individual psyche with the content of consciousness; however, when this engagement has occurred, the factor that induced it loses its own content – metaphorically, the content dissolves into the state of consciousness. Susceptible to alterations, it is the state(s) of consciousness in which there is a correspondence for each notional construct with the subject’s given psychic state – a structure of consciousness.

State of consciousness is whence a structure of consciousness is abstracted from; structures of consciousness are as a rule non-individual. The structure is situated in the state of consciousness and it facilitates or is itself a suitable content or fact of consciousness upon which one may reflect. Structure of consciousness can be defined as both content and form. In relation to the state of consciousness, the structure of consciousness is or facilitates a content that is abstracted from the state – provided there is something that does not exist without being in relation to an

³ All direct quotations of Mamardašvili and Pjatigorski are my translations.

individual consciousness, say for example a thought or an idea. Accordingly, due to the known rule of complementarity in observation, to experience a fact or content of consciousness simultaneously as a structure is impossible. “This is why we cannot say, that where there is a fact, there is a structure of consciousness, a structured fact of consciousness, because we are unable to attribute the interpretation of being structured upon every fact of consciousness” (Mamardašvili, Pjatigorski: 2011: 68-69). As a metatheory of consciousness, it must be presumed that the contents of consciousness can present itself as a structure.

In short, a state of consciousness is required for a structure of consciousness, which itself can become present as content or it can facilitate a content; a structure of consciousness is abstracted from a state of consciousness albeit both structure(s) and state(s) can be said to exist independent from each other. Structures of consciousness are spatio-temporally scattered, a characteristic without which they could not be said to exist. From the point of view of the sphere of consciousness, a structure of consciousness is the constant location of the place of consciousness that bears content which is revealed in relation with the state of consciousness. Consciousness, when realized in a state of consciousness that affords the abstraction of a structure of consciousness which in its turn is a spatial situation in relation to itself bearing the content fact or material – the spatial spread of the material of consciousness as such regardless whether it is physical or not – brings about the notion that structure of consciousness is itself a space in relation to itself. One such structure would be “the structure of the “I” [that] is one of the basic indices of culture” (Lotman 2009: 147)

This in the sense that regardless all “I’s” are individual (you, me and even them), the notion of “I” – whether psychologically, linguistically or philosophically – is non-individual. Each acknowledged “I” may also be said to (be able to) exist in the sphere of consciousness and provided they are, they also oscillate between the two main states of consciousness: awake and asleep. Also, for each it is impossible to be located anywhere else – provided we exclude the odd chances of out-of-body experiences induced by either meditation or certain drugs; in either case, it is usually appreciated by the given individual that the “I” returns to where it left.

What comes to the definition of consciousness as generalized Feeling / First, the sphere of consciousness as a term may be likened to it. States of consciousness come and go and from them suitable structures are abstracted not always willingly, not always by volition; this applies to both. Though blatantly obvious, one has (some)

control over the comings and goings of these states and structures by way of thought and/or substance. However, the two fairly distinct and general categories of unavoidable states – awake and asleep – are familiar to all; the former being where and when “I” exists on a day-to-day basis in familiar reality, the latter a torpid psycho-physiological state during which “I” at times ends up in a different reality – dream. The dream is as real as reality as will be shown and depending on its manifest form, it is what defines the dream “I” to an extent – different reality generates different “I” with specific existential relations in said reality albeit meta-awareness is not present.

Excluding individuals, it may be stated that both awake mentation and asleep dreaming exist within the sphere of consciousness as two distinguishable states from and in which structures of consciousness as conglomerates of form and content abstract themselves. It is also useful to note the awake or asleep are in no way static states – the state of consciousness may change when awake and by extension (or the other way around) also asleep. The situation may be compared with the relation of hypernym (for example ‘color’) and hyponyms (‘red, yellow, blue’ etc.). In the light of Feeling, acknowledged mentation, mind, thought and intention as well as (remembered) dreams are already a Third – it is only their potentiality to become realized in order to become known that may be collocated with the sphere of consciousness. All the rest that follows, regardless of the state, are structures of consciousness carrying or being a content, the detailed analysis of which may be done according to a science of choice; here the semiotic and symbolology.

Though intentionality was excluded above, it must be noted that henceforth we allow ourselves to distinguish between active consciousness and passive consciousness – respectively, states of awake and asleep of which only the former may be said to facilitate intentionality. All individuals, in addition to naturally and/or artificially oscillating between states of consciousness are subject to their surroundings and what is therein, for example symbols and especially symbols of consciousness.

1.2. The dual singularity of Symbol

According to Mamardašvili and Pjatigorski, consciousness is a symbolic apparatus. To avoid further terminological confusion, it must be noted and stressed that symbol for Mamardašvili and Pjatigorski *is not* the same as symbol in the Peircean sense. The symbol, for Peirce, is a triadic sign, it is a function of the object relation whereas for Mamardašvili and Pjatigorski symbols are not signs in the true sense of the word. For them, symbols are an independent category existing outside of signs that can be comprehended (or pseudocomprehended) but which can not be epistemically understood. A distinction is made between two general categories of signs and/or sign-relations: “if a sign is something that is always positioned on the level of functioning dualisms – “sign – meaning”, “subject – object”, then symbols are certain *sign-like* formations” (Mamardašvili, Pjatigorski 2011: 57)

Symbols are sign-like in that they may use material supports similar to the ones signs make use of such as words, or materially organized situations (communication, communicable forms such as gestures, spatial figures, sound waves etc.) that we abstractly presume to be or take as bearers of information and use as material or textual signs. “Symbols in their turn are not the meanings of things and occurrences, of material structures, but meanings of the premisses of consciousness, of outcomes of consciousness” (Ibid.) By this, symbols can present themselves as immediate ‘meanings’ of consciousness as well as denote something similar to things (via signs) that circuitously represent consciousness. In this sense symbols relate to comprehension and that is why when operating with symbol as sign, it does not necessitate the reconstruction of its denotation but the reconstruction of the subjective situation where both denotation and sign are generated; that is, the situation of comprehending⁴.

Point being that nowadays symbols are as a rule taken in the framework of logical (or pseudological) knowledge; we perceive and receive them critically as signs by way of anamneses, diagnoses and other pragmatically necessary processes and presume that they exist only in order to expand our understanding of ourselves (that is, of culture), of our psyches, behaviors and prognoses of tendencies. All symbols are ‘meaningfied’ in the sense that they latch onto our automatic regime that operates

⁴ There is a very faint echo here of the dualist distinction Kant makes between the two cognitive faculties – ‘understanding’ (*Verstand*) or concepts, thought and discursivity, and ‘sensibility’ (*Sinnlichkeit*) or intuitions/non-conceptual cognition, sense perception and mental images.

with signs; a system where they do not belong to by their very nature. They are de-symbolized within our sign-systems, i.e. they lose their own immediate content (with regard to consciousness) and “transform into signs of “don’t know what” because as symbols they had their orientation, but we transform them into signs in our positive/positivist understanding” (Ibid. 59).

This premiss lessens the necessity to pay that much notice to linguistic factors, although parts such as narrativity must at points be brought up. This is because dreams, when pushed away from sleep, become nigh wholly linguistic, provided that one reflects on them in words of thought. Also, language is the primary modelling system⁵ of human beings. That is, provided we not take into account Sebeok’s claim that language “is phylogenetically as well as ontogenetically secondary to the non-verbal; and, therefore, what they [Tartu-Moscow School] call “secondary” is actually a further, tertiary augmentation of the former” (Sebeok 1991: 333).

Here there is an echo of what Kristeva has defined as the difference between the semiotic and the symbolic. From the very beginning of a subject, the relations that may be represented as topological spaces that facilitate the world in which ‘things’ (and ‘non-things’) are connected via and in the zones of the fragmented body (my feet are not my hands etc.), “this type of relation makes it possible to specify the *semiotic* as a psychosomatic modality of the signifying process; in other words, not a symbolic modality but one articulating [...] a continuum.” (Kristeva 1996b: 96) Though never very explicitly defined, the dynamic signifying process can be taken to mean “the ways in which bodily drives and energy are expressed, literally discharged through our use of language, and how our signifying practices shape our subjectivity and experience” (McAfee 2000: 14).

The semiotic as a part of the signifying process has its origins (in the human) in the body or, semiotic *chora*; a receptacle of sorts that is based on the rhythms of the body in the wide sense of the word. “The *chora* is not yet a position that represents something for someone (i.e. it is not a sign); nor is it a *position* that represents someone for another position (i.e. it is not yet a signifier either); it is, however, generated in order to attain to this signifying position” (Kristeva 1996b: 94). The *chora*, as it is, is a non-expressive, pre-verbal functional state governing the

⁵ A modelling system is “a structure of elements and of rules for combining them that is in a state of fixed analogy to the entire sphere of an object of knowledge, insight or regulation.” (Lotman 1967 quoted in: Sebeok 1991: 327)

connections between and in the body, the objects that surround it as well as others like it (we won't dabble in the psychoanalytic notion of 'family structure' here). As such, the semiotic may be distinguished from the symbolic and symbolic operations offered primarily by language; primarily in the sense that all other (symbolic) systems are based on language one way or the other. "The kinetic functional stage of the *semiotic* precedes the establishment of the sign; it is not, therefore, cognitive in the sense of being assumed by a knowing, already constituted subject" (Ibid. 95). In this sense, the semiotic of each individual is as slightly different as are their *chorae*.

In addition, the semiotic *chora* may be likened to the situation that facilitates states of consciousness, the flesh and its world, *Fleischwelt* if one pleases. "I" am and am not my body but something beyond it at the same time; the *chora* is whence and where the subject is simultaneously generated and negated by way of a unity that succumbs the subject before the (symbolic, social) process(es) that produces the subject. The semiotic is "a *distinctiveness* admitting of an uncertain and indeterminate articulation because it does not yet refer or no longer refers to a signified object for a thetic consciousness" (Kristeva 1980: 133). The semiotic is then chronologically anterior to sign, syntax, denotation and signification, but it crosses them synchronically whereas the symbolic subsumes (in language) everything that belongs under sign.

"The symbolic, as opposed to the semiotic, is this inevitable attribute of meaning, sign, and the signified object for the consciousness of Husserl's transcendental ego" (Ibid. 134)⁶. That is, the symbolic labels under itself syntax, signification and denotation; in a sense, all that is representational in language and art. Related mainly to poetic language (and art) on what comes to the distinction between the symbolic and semiotic, the former of which "designates language as it is defined by linguistics and its tradition, language in its normative usage" (Ponzio 2010: 250) whereas the latter "refers to primary processes and to the pulsions that enter into contradiction with the symbolic" (Ibid.) thereby constituting the signifying process; we nevertheless adapt this distinction which, by way of *chorae* and consciousnesses therein is ultimately of phylogenetic origin.

It must be noted that in the signifying process, by which meaning (and all) is generated, the semiotic and the symbolic are inseparable. The subject (of utterance) as

⁶ We allow ourselves to presume that consciousness as defined in this thesis carries similar attributes as the transcendental ego in phenomenology.

well as all the signifying systems that have been produced by such subjects is always and simultaneously both semiotic and symbolic. There is no escaping neither, in all human signifying systems both are present and are always dominated by one of the two tendencies; in each signifying process the subject (or system) is always marked by an indebtedness to both aspects. Thus, it is only in theory that such processes and relations may be situated “diachronically within the process of the constitution of the subject precisely because *they function synchronically within the signifying process of the subject himself*, i.e., the subject of *cogitatio*” (Kristeva 1996b: 96).

The body and its rhythms or the semiotic *chora* is a place of permanent scission, one which here may be likened to the situation of (an individual) consciousness in which the oscillation of states of consciousness happens that are, as such, non-signifying and/or empty by themselves. That is to say, the *chora* is in which and the ‘what’ that facilitates states of consciousness and in which structures of consciousness may (or may not) be abstracted from to enter and present themselves therein as either being or facilitating a content. The *chora* can be defined as the place where the subject is both generated and negated – in a much similar sense as Lacan presents to us the essence of doubt; there is no doubt beyond the real but only in dreams “I” is actual, precisely because it is not known of, not doubted in the same fashion as it is awake.

This is to point towards the possibility that despite the triadic sign being one basic tenet in semiotics, one should not grow too keen on it for it does its tricks mainly in and according to us and provided that other categories and/or definitions of sign or sign-ness apply, then the relations should also be reversible to an extent. That is, it pays to keep in mind that symbols are not signs but sign-like formations – an independent category beyond signs. Symbols exist both in the cultural system as well as with regard to consciousness and are in this sense somewhat inseparable – provided that culture has its origins in the doings of conscious humans.

Symbol as such and its functions, the way it relates to something defined in the contents of consciousness will be defined in accordance with Mamaradašvili and Pjatigorski (2011), and France and Piatigorsky (1976) whereas the semiotic structure and function of symbol in the cultural system will be taken from Lotman (1990). It must be noted that the authors’ definitions and understanding of symbol verge on each other; both of the more essential theorists – Pjatigorski and Lotman – were members of the Tartu-Moscow school (and allegedly got along very well) so it may be

presumed that they engaged in discussion over this theme. In addition, it is mentioned in the preface to the second edition of *Simvol i soznanie* that it is “factually a third edition, if taking into account the “conversational” version published by Juri Lotman in Tartu” (Mamardašvili, Pjatigorski 2011: 9).

Below are presented the properties of a symbol of consciousness that amount up to the postulates of symbolology as stated by Mamardašvili and Pjatigorski:

- I. In its natural thingness, no symbol can directly relate with the concrete contents (or structure) of consciousness;
- II. When we say that we comprehend or do not comprehend an object in the sense of knowing it, then this comprehension or non-comprehension depends in some sense of us. But when we say that we do not comprehend or do comprehend a symbol in its relation with the contents of consciousness, it depends on the symbol itself;
- III. When from the point of view of linguistics, a word is in an arbitrary relation with what it signifies, then from the point of view of the metatheory of consciousness, a symbol is absolutely non-arbitrary in relation to the structure of consciousness to which it corresponds to;
- IV. A symbol is a thing, which has the power to induce states of consciousness, through which the psyche of the individual is conjoined to certain contents (structures) of consciousness. Or: upon the accumulation of states of consciousness on behalf of the psyche of an individual, a symbol evinces the power to take the psyche into certain structures of consciousness. (Mamardašvili, Pjatigorski 2011: 179-192)

To avoid confusion it must be noted that ‘thing’ is used in a very broad sense by the authors and it is not preordained to be understood as a physical thing and ethologically speaking “both the ‘thingness’ and ‘non-thingness’ of symbols could exist *in relation to me as to a psychical mechanism* in quite an autonomous way” (France, Piatigorsky 1976: 150). In other words, in its natural thingness, a symbol is “a concrete thing, which concretely and appropriately relates with something *defined* in the contents of consciousness” (Mamardašvili, Piatigorski 2011: 163). In accordance with the above, the three functions of symbols with regard to consciousness may be presented:

I. The ‘referential function’ of symbols, where a symbol represents something, it expresses an idea, an experience, an individual, a proposition, another object etc.;

II. The ‘existential function’, the communication of roles, attitudes and personal identity which are ascribed to the individual who admits the symbol into his field of attention evoking appropriate attitudes and behavior in the perceiver;

III. The ‘dispositional function’ acting as a commentary on the other two and could in that sense be said to be ‘metasymbolic’. It is the *organization* of symbolic objects in a context, defining symbolic themes, relations and values, giving prominence to some and evoking associations and contrast among all.

(France, Piatigorsky 1976: 141–142)

Above are presented the qualities of being a symbol, a ‘thing’ and ‘non-thing’ along with their functions with regard to consciousness. However, as mentioned, symbol of consciousness and symbol in the cultural system albeit belonging to different measures or dimensions (of consciousness) or modelling systems (man is not culture) are inseparable. Naturally, there may exist symbols that serve no (blatant) function nor play a distinct role in the cultural system but are essential to consciousness and vice versa. This presumption is afforded by the fact that regardless that the human intellect (in consciousness) is analogous by structure and function with culture, they are vastly different in their being.

That is, we are biological entities of fat, flesh, blood and bone swathed in skin whereas culture is a somewhat abstract mechanism that can not be said to possess acknowledged being at least through perception; nevertheless, culture(s) may become aware of themselves but the purely physical fact remains that due to the vast difference between the material beings of humans and cultures, parts of the semiotic in each is different.

Though a linguistic-semiotic theory, the argument afforded by the distinction between semiotic and symbolic still applies; there is a phylogenetic and by the same token an ontogenetic evolutionary continuum in the sophistication of what we call language and hence the more sophisticated modeling systems are beyond comprehension from so-to-say lower levels regardless that in the case of the human

intellect and culture they are analogous. We hardly understand each other, let alone other beings. It is in a sense a similar incomprehensibility one may feel when far removed from home to another, alien culture; the distance between being of course of a more 'vertical' type (expand really).

That clarified, in general it may be said that "a symbol, being a finalized text, does not have to be included in a syntagmatic chain, and if it is included in one, it preserves its own semantic and structural independence" (Lotman 1990: 103 103). It may be noted that the origin of symbols goes back to archaic times and they "are as a rule elementary space-indicators" (Ibid.). In culture, these elementary space-indicators serve the function of encapsulating "the condensed mnemonic programmes for the texts and stories preserved in the community's oral memory" (Ibid.). That is, they are places that often times are seen as being situated in the center of the world and "being an *axis mundi*, it is regarded as the meeting place of heaven, earth and hell" (Eliade 1954: 12). A symbol is a finalized text both in its expression level and content level, "it has a single, self-contained meaning value and a clearly demarcated boundary which makes it possible to isolate it from the surrounding semiotic context" (Ibid.).

Regardless of the isolatability of symbols and their capability to not be included in a syntagmatic chain in order to be, the meaning of a symbol is never quite obvious due to its structure – it has "a content that in its turn serves as expression level for another content, one which is as a rule more highly valued" (Ibid.). A symbol as such, before it has been de-symbolized in this or that sign system, cannot directly relate with consciousness; hence its unavoidable transformation into signs to become representable as and by way of signs which reduces it into a pseudosymbol, the representation(s) of which are in accordance with the inner logic of the sign system in question. Nevertheless, it still carries the same content but it is susceptible to both commutation⁷ and permutation⁸ depending on the sign system as well as the interpretation(s) that it affords or calls forth. It must be noted, that due to the dual structural nature of symbols (primary expression-content/secondary expression-

⁷ "Commutation is simply the explicit form of the relation of solidarity between the expression plane and the content plane of a semiotic system, according to which a change of content must correspond to every change of expression, and inversely" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 40).

⁸ "Permutation is a procedure comparable to that of commutation, except that the relation noted between the changes which occur on the two planes of language does not concern changes between paradigmatic terms but transpositions within syntagmas" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 229).

content) the depth of commutation and/or permutation can never reach the symbol as such which remains unchanged.

A practical example of (cultural) de-symbolization would be a ritual – that is a finalized text – yielding its script for representing a culture’s beliefs and/or the established order from said culture’s myth(s) and often enough portray the re-enactment of an episode, usually that of a new Creation or the repetition of the cosmogonic act; wherever the *axis mundi* is seen to be situated by way of an elementary space-indicator, it is “the zone of absolute reality” (Eliade: 17). Rituals are invariably founded by and handed down to mortals “by gods, civilizing heroes or mythical ancestors” (Ibid. 21). Moreover, all rituals may be seen as abstractions and/or transformations of “the single mythological invariant of ‘life – death – resurrection (renewal)’, or, on a more abstract level, ‘entry into a closed space – emergence from it’” (Lotman 1990: 160). Much like falling asleep and waking up.

Thus, all symbols are unobtainable without the interference of signs which transform them into pseudosymbols; regardless that they strive to convey the secondary content by way of primary expression, it never happens. Symbols are only sign-like and become distorted by any and all attempts to describe them. Also, symbols can not relate directly with consciousness or its contents but nevertheless, symbols as such are capable to relate with something defined in the contents of consciousness and may (or may not) be comprehended or pseudo-comprehended that depends on the symbol itself. Naturally, any and all attempts to think what it was that was or was not comprehended submits the symbol to the sign system afforded by thought – linguistic or not – and as a structure of consciousness, the whatever defined therein changes due to complementarity possibly leading one to become aware that there was a symbol; it does not relate to consciousness directly but may correspond in a non-arbitrary fashion to a given structure that may present itself as content, one that would – by necessity – be abstracted from a state of consciousness induced by the symbol itself. By the same token, a symbol is ontologically and psychologically “by itself and in itself *a significant thing* with respect to consciousness, which means that it possesses, of its own essence, both significance as an *especial thing* and meaning in its reference to consciousness” (France, Piatigorsky 1976: 150 [emphasis original]).

Submitted to a sign system, reduced into signs to be decipherable and transformed into a pseudosymbol in order to become representable, the (primary) expression of symbol varies, it belongs to the mundane domain of culture whereas the

(secondary) invariable content belongs to the sacred or esoteric domain which means that it is inexpressible as such; a symbol is not identical in each situation “but involves rather the presence in each semiotic system of a *structural position*, without which the system is incomplete because certain essential functions cannot be realized” (Lotman 1990: 102 [emphasis original]). In addition, from a temporal point of view, the unnecessary for a symbol to be included in a syntagmatic chain means that it “never belongs only to one synchronic section of a culture, it always cuts across that section vertically, coming from the past and passing on into the future” (Ibid. 103). In a sense a-temporal or eternal, symbols are one of the more stable elements of culture and hence the variance of its expression(s) and invariance of content in time that make a symbol “a kind of condenser of all the principles of sign-ness and at the same time goes beyond sign-ness” (Ibid. 111). That is, symbols are sign-like at best.

A symbol is then a certain something that has the capacity of being all and nothing simultaneously; a concrete and quite autonomous ‘thing’/‘non-thing’ that can not directly relate to consciousness because consciousness also is and is not – we know it exists but are unaware of what it is exactly that exists – in a similar manner with the secondary content of symbol. The essence of symbol is to function as “a mediator between different spheres of semiosis, and also between semiotic and non-semiotic reality” (Ibid.). Finally cutting to the chase and jumping the gun with regard to dreams and their function, “in general terms we can say that the structure of symbols of a particular culture shapes the system which is isomorphic and isofunctional to the genetic memory of an individual” (Ibid.).

That is, provided that symbols in culture as well as in other semiotic systems function as structural positions that enable certain essential functions and are structurally dual – the essence of which remains beyond – then it seems plausible that dreams would serve the same function for the human intellect. The manifestation of a dream (already distorted and transformed upon remembering) is structurally analogous to the varying primary expression that represents, has as its (primary) content say, a tree, which in its turn serves as a secondary expression for something beyond reach or, the secondary content. The secondary content is unobtainable both from the dream itself (even if “I” would be present) as well as from awake and in this sense, it may be collocated with the notion of symbol of consciousness as such.

From what has been stated, it may be inferred that taking dreams structured like symbols as defined above, they shape the mode of being of individual psyches by

way of the signifying process that consists both of the semiotic and the symbolic; the former based on the ‘shape’ of individual *chorae* functioning as pulsions introducing contradiction to the symbolic; the ordering of dream-imagery (which may be said to be symbolic) changes according to the rhythm of the semiotic that is considerably more rigid awake whereas asleep the chains of order are lifted allowing imagery we can only dream of to surface. It is in a similar manner that the secondary content of a symbol – though unobtainable as such – that ultimately relates (or motivates to relate) to consciousness by way of inducing this or that state of consciousness as a mediated ‘non-thing’ to another by way of, and to a ‘thing.’ As has been noted, the same happens in culture and its (distorted and transformed) symbols as structural positions.

1.3. Dream here and today

First and foremost, to already emphasize the similarity of dreams and symbols, the aforementioned single mythological invariant as manifest in cultures echoes the claim that “dream is the elementary mystical experience binding us with another reality; the reality of asleep and the reality of awake are opposed in our consciousness one way or the other” (Uspenskij 2013: 46). Excluding the purely physical, neuro(-phenomeno-)logical aspect – what materially goes on in the brain – then as of yet, there exists no satisfactory explanation as to why or how people dream. In general, dreaming may be defined as “the creation of percepts during sleep, in a format which the dreamer tends to experience as a participant rather than a mere observer” (Blom 2010: 157). The content of dreams is as multifarious as are the dreamers and their memories – the structures, contents and/or facts of consciousness afforded by them. Nevertheless, the content of dreams “tends to be primarily visual in nature [...] although the other sensory modalities may be involved as well” (Ibid.). Regardless of the primarily visual nature of dreams, the *Traumwelt*⁹ is a polylingual semiotic space which is immutable by conscious action due to nescience of existence¹⁰ or, it is as mutable as mundane reality by will of thought. The dream “does not immerse us in visual, verbal,

⁹ *Traum* + *welt*; from German *traum* ‘dream’; from German *welt* ‘world’.

¹⁰ Occasions of lucid dreaming – a dream where one knows s/he is dreaming and can control their behavior and environment to an extent – are excluded here alongside hypnagogic/hypnopompic hallucinations.

musical and other spaces but rather in the space of their coalescence which is analogous to real space” (Lotman 2009: 145).

That is, the coalescence of representational categories that emerge as *Traumwelten* may be seen as the ways in which “dream images can stand for linguistic sounds and shapes (for example *I = eye*) and, conversely, linguistic sounds and shapes can stand for images (for example *0 = circle*) etc.” (Bauer 1986: 774). Then duly in a dream, even more so than when awake, “the *form of meaning* articulates a substance which *cannot* be empirically observed” (Petitot 2004: 191). Naturally, the curiosity of science remains if there is a phenomenon lacking explanation, especially if the phenomenon is an unavoidable trait common to nigh all humans¹¹ as well as other (‘higher’) mammals.

In general, we and other dreaming beings have three main behavioural states and the emergence of “wakefulness, quiet sleep and rapid eye movement (REM) sleep is one of the most significant aspects of brain maturation” (Mirmiran 1995: 13). It is interesting to note that REM sleep begins to appear both in prematurely born infants as well as fetuses in utero after around 30 weeks of postconceptional age. Approximately from thereon a preterm/term baby spends about 10 h in this state every day which points that REM sleep, i.e. dreaming serves an important function in the human among other animals. A function that might be fulfilled by “the endogenous activation of the brain to influence: (1) neuronal growth; (2) synaptic plasticity; (3) learning and unlearning; (4) genetic read-out and individual differences; and (5) cardiorespiratory and thermoregulatory centers” (Ibid. 20). Of what the unborn (and pre-born) infant dreams of remains unknown and by the same token lessens the necessity to consider dream imagery in detail.

Also, suggestions have been made with regards to the question why we dream and non-exhaustive answers have been provided, such as the ‘threat simulation thesis’ (TST) claiming that “dream consciousness is essentially an ancient biological defense mechanism, evolutionarily selected for its capacity to repeatedly simulate threatening events” (Valli et al. 2005: 188). The authors base their claim mainly on the content analysis of dreams of severely traumatized children, thus showing dreaming to serve a function as a coping mechanism with regards to previously experienced threatening

¹¹ There are people who cease to dream due to some brain-problems resulting from for example bilateral occipital infarction that causes what is known as the Charcot-Wilbrand syndrome (CWS) which is characterized by “visual agnosia (i.e. the inability to make sense of visual images and to revisualize images) and a reported global cessation of dreaming” (Blom 2010:92)

events in real life. This approach seems somewhat too specific and much too exclusive of dreams not containing life-threatening simulations and does not take into account pleasant dreams which more often than not would be the dreamer's dream of choice as is evident in the proverb.

“The salience of dream emotions is evident to all dreamers; often after waking, the emotion of a dream is the only memorable detail” (MacDuffie, Mashour 2010: 194). Hence, it may be deduced that dreams would rather simulate emotional than actual threats that is reflected in the intensity of the dream and its content regardless that the *Traumwelt*, the actants and actors therein may change rapidly and illogically, “the accompanying emotions usually follow a more predictable trajectory” (Ibid. 195). Consequently, dream emotion may then be argued to drive the dream “providing a link between experiences of the past and neural preparation for the future” (Ibid.).

Another popular approach stresses the strong (functional) relationship between dreams and memories as the underlying motivation for dreaming, and argue that “dream recall regards such peculiar form of episodic information as dream content, which is encoded in declarative memory during sleep” (Marzano et al. 2011: 6674). The authors found in their study certain electrophysiological mechanisms in the sleeping brain that are similar to the ones during wakefulness upon successful encoding of episodic information as well as a correlation of brain oscillations with regards to recalling of dreams upon awakening. This, then, strengthens or weakens memory/-ies during sleep.

Though “the influential notion that dreaming is virtually synonymous with REM sleep has dominated neuroimaging work for the past several decades” (Siclari et al. 2017: 5), recent study has shown that in humans, dreams occur both in REM and NREM sleep which points to the possibility that we would dream the whole night through instead of just a few hours. Considering the novelty of this discovery, it enables us to not pay that much notice to the neurophysiological aspects of the brain while dreaming, a field of study now in unsure turmoil. The study found that dreaming in both REM and NREM sleep “require a localized activation of a posterior hot zone, irrespective of the EEG in the rest of the cortex” (Ibid.). That is, whatever goes on in the brain physically during sleep and dreaming, dreams so-to-say gather in the back of the head. The study also showed a contrast between the absence of experiencing and remembering a dream, and experiencing a dream without recalling

any specific content; “this finding further suggests that the activation of this posterior hot zone was a marker of experiences themselves, rather than of the recall of experiences” (Ibid.).

With regard to the emotional link between body and language or the semiotic (*chora*) and the symbolic, i.e. the way emotions are felt in the body and expressed in language, it is interesting to note that “different emotional states are associated with topographically distinct and culturally universal bodily sensations” (Nummenmaa et al. 2014: 646). That is, both basic (anger, fear, disgust, happiness, sadness, surprise, neutral) and non-basic emotions (anxiety, love, depression, contempt, pride, shame, envy) are felt as bodily sensations topographically in the same areas irrespective of culture. This is noteworthy because it affords the presumption that dreaming or the posterior hot zone would share a similar relation manifest in language; though dreams are not sensible, they are predominantly emotional and due to the absence of somatosensory experience proper, the topographical bodily sensation may be proposed to have lurched into language. In several languages¹², the expression that one has a feeling or doubt or rage or thought (emotion nevertheless) “in the back of my head” is widespread.

With regards to temporality and the experiencing of time, it may also be noted that when dreaming, “the past, present, and future are no longer perceived as three discrete, easily separable dimensions” (MacDuffie, Mashour 2010: 190). In this sense, as opposed to awake reality where we are able to distinguish between the temporal dimensions, dreams are an a-temporal experiential state of consciousness wherein the merging of the three functions inevitably changes the organizing principles of one’s memory from whence a “virtual simulation of a world” (Siclari et al. 2017: 5) is derived. One main difference “between the two states is that only waking consciousness is modulated by external input” (MacDuffie, Mashour 2010: 190). When dreaming, we are unable to distinguish it as a dream but take it as real as reality because asleep “we process internally generated sensory stimuli free from the restrictions of endogenous cognitive control and exogenous sensory stimuli” (Ibid. 192).

It must be specified with regard to presence of “I” as a structure of consciousness in dreams that we still experience the dream phenomenally and that

¹² Finnish, Estonian, English, Swedish, German to the knowledge of the present author.

there is also self-awareness present, i.e. the “active perception of external or internal environment [and] the knowledge of being oneself” (Ibid.) are present in the dream whereas the “third component of meta-awareness (awareness of being aware) is absent” (Ibid.). In general terms, dream is a temporal bridge across the three experiential dimensions of (awake) time in which the “experiencing the present, processing the past, and preparing for the future [...] appear as overlapping windows, not as a continuous time line” (Ibid. 195). Accordingly, the authors suggest that the psychoanalytic as well as the AIM model¹³ theories of dreaming “are no longer competing for an explanation of a single dream function; they are simply focused on different temporal dimensions” (Ibid. 196).

Thus, it may be questioned whether remembered dreams actually were anything like they seem to be upon recall, which also places hitherto theories of dreams under question. That is, though impossible to prove as of yet, there is no reason not to suggest that dream-imagery would emerge only upon awakening whereas the whatever happening in the back of one’s head would have been utterly amorphous and incomprehensible – a similar (structural) relation as there is with symbols with regard to states and structures of consciousness, as well as with symbol in the cultural system with regard to their dual structure.

Besides this and the fact that other animals sleep and dream as well, it may be postulated that we are the sole beings who distinguish between the realms of dream and awake – or to say the least, we are able to discuss about both. The existence of (verbal, natural) language “transcending the individuals who use it” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 169) thus freeing us from the immanent, noumenal world, carries with it the problem that “this freedom must adapt itself with each step of its realization to the communication of the preceding” (Rothschild 1962: 461). That is, there is an evolutionary continuum of sorts stretching from the primordial soup to the present and on the way, one of the more efficient ‘stops’ was the birth of language, laid on “a more archaic system” (Ibid. 460) – our (and everything else’s) material being. Or, in a

¹³ Activation, Input Gating, and Modulation (AIM) model of dreaming highlights the uniqueness of the neurobiological environment of the dreaming brain identifying specific brain areas that are differentially modulated during REM sleep and also the deactivation of the prefrontal cortex that leads to decreased insight and judgment, self-awareness and working memory functions simultaneously activating the pontine tegmentum that accelerates the creation of pontine-geniculo-occipital waves, a hallmark of REM sleep. “The amygdala and paralimbic cortex are also activated, resulting in the increased emotional valence of dreams. Finally, the parietal operculum is activated, an area implicated in visuospatial imagery.” (MacDuffie, Mashour 2010: 191)

similar manner, it is a question of dominance between the semiotic and the symbolic as dictated and positioned in the *chora*.

For the time being, a fairly open suggestion of dreaming will suffice. As was noted, we reserve the right to call awake (states of) consciousness active and asleep ones passive. By this elementary distinction, it may be argued that irrespective of the manifestations or forms of dream-imagery, they sprout from the memory – in the wide sense of the term – of the dreamer. “Fragments of memories are retrieved and recombined in bizarre, illogical ways”(MacDuffie, Mashour 2010: 195). Whatever organized information the memory holds, it transgresses during the passive state of consciousness thereby reducing the orderliness or semiotic of one’s knowledge within the *chora* transforming the symbolic into “feasibly transformable, semantically polyvalent potential imagery that is able to associate, coalesce and intertwine in a variety of indeterminate ways” (Uspenskij 2013: 38). During a dream, the potential manifestations of this polyvalent imagery corresponds structurally to the secondary expression level of symbols (provided we take awake as reality) in that the unobtainable secondary content remains beyond reach in the dream and furthermore, is twice removed upon awakening and remembering the dream; the point when it is impossible to anymore discuss *the* dream but *of* dream due to it being subjected to thought and language, to a sign system. In such a “translation of a whole text by another whole text [...] the act of translation is accompanied by a semantic reduction of the text” (Lotman 1976: 302).

The gist of the matter being that though even trees have circadian rhythms, i.e. they ‘sleep’ (cf. Puttonen et al. 2016) and ‘language’, i.e. communication or the exchange of information present in all life-forms – phytosemiotics, zoosemiotics – it does not necessarily entail the presence of ‘dream’ in two senses: i) dream supposedly requires a certain level of organismic sophistication, and ii) with no abstract language, other creatures may be quite unaware that there exists two (distinct) semiotic spaces. The former as the most original abstracted replica of the world, it is plausible that the appearance of dream (alongside speech) as distinct from the ‘real’ facilitated in consciousness the “temporary break between the receipt of information and reaction to it” (Lotman 2009: 142). Whereas the latter, with demur, may be due to animals’ incapacity to ‘neutral relations’ in the real as explicated by Uexküll (see below).

It has been argued (Lotman 2009) that “the moment a temporary space (the pause) between impulse and reaction appeared represented a turning point in the

history of consciousness” and that this new state of being “required the development and improvement of memory” which, in its turn brought forth “the transformation of the reaction to an immediate action into a sign” thus shifting the orientation to reaction from the basic biological schema ‘stimulus – response’ towards information, creating “an independent structure capable of assimilation into an ever more complex and self-developing mechanism” (Ibid. 142). Intuitively – consciousness as we (don’t) know it or, language as the primary modelling system.

Before language however, phylogenetically speaking, we had dreams and one “might say that dream is the father of semiotic processes” (Lotman 2009: 145). This on the basis that when discussing signs or representations of any sort, dream is by far the most comprehensive; dream consists of “signs in their pure form” (Ibid. 143), the meaning of which is indeterminate. “The dream itself has no prominent thirdness; it is, on the contrary, utterly irresponsible; it is whatever it pleases” (CP 1.342) and as such, require meaning to be endowed upon them, require interpretation. Furthermore, “the object of experience as a reality is a second. But the desire in seeking to attach the one to the other is a third, or medium” (Ibid.). In this sense, the evolving cleavage between dream and awake may be argued to have been a motivating factor with regard to our semiotic being. It is by this necessity that dream “is extremely well suited to the generation of new information” regardless that “the possibility of being interpreted precedes the concept of correct interpretation” (Lotman 2009: 144). We won’t tackle the various ways a dream may be interpreted and also leave the ‘correctness’ of interpretations open. What is of interest, is the form of signs in dreams – signs in their pure form.

1.4. Intimations of purity

For Lotman (2009), dream is “a semiotic window” (Ibid. 142), a polylingual “psychological state where thoughts and behavior are inseparable [...] a sphere where it would be impossible to break these down into independent, isolated experiences” (Ibid.). Consequently, the dream is a “semiotic mirror and each of us sees in it the reflection of our own language” (Ibid. 144). Language and the operations it affords is – in general terms – symbolic as noted above whereas the signifying process is always more heavily marked by the semiotic or symbolic, both of which are present in each

utterance or signifying process regardless whether we are discussing verbal or written language or the languages of art. In this sense, dreams are symbolic by their representative nature although distinctly semiotic in the sense that the existing, established order of things with regard to the subject's memory and knowledge of the world becomes freer due to the passive state of consciousness and whatever the individual psyche holds within has the potential to coalesce in unpredictable, indeterminate ways. "A fundamental property of this language lies in its extreme unpredictability" (Ibid.). Hence, before the existence of language or in a sense consciousness, the dream, demanding to attach the one to the other as a third can be suggested to carry traces of the origins of birth of the symbolic in the human intellect by way of shifting the semiotic connections as opposed to their order in reality; the *chora* is not (yet) a sign nor signifier but only generated to attain this sort of a position.

Phylogenetically then, the *chora* is and remains a non-expressive kinetic functional stage of development where there are no subject-object relations (as there are none in consciousness) onto the contents of which symbols as elementary space-indicators (whether geographical or of two distinct realities) are able to relate and induce states of consciousness before – in time – becoming de-symbolized by way of being subjected to a sign-system in the making. A sign-system of dreaming in which they become transmuted and distorted propagating an equal effect to be imposed to 'things' and 'non-things' in the corporeal reality; by way of recollecting dreams, memory itself is improved and developed – "the transformation of the visual into narrative leads to an unavoidable increase in the degree of organisation" (Ibid. 36) which inevitably is reflected in the organization of awake reality.

As the potential 'father of semiotic processes consisting of signs in their pure form,' dream needs somehow to be distinguished from the awake reality to purify the sign and to eventually point to the similitude of dream and symbol as mediators between spheres of semiosis. First and foremost, semiosis as "that operation which, by setting up a relationship of reciprocal presupposition between the expression form and the content form [...] produces signs" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 285) must be called out to play. Also, it needs to be treated as static (which it never is). For this, Piatigorsky's (1974) view in that semiotics, instead of emphasizing 'sign-system' or 'sign,' should rather concentrate on 'sign-ness' as its central concept is adopted:

But sign-ness is not the PRIMARY (or ELEMENTARY) concept of semiotics since it is the abstraction of a particular QUALITY, namely, to formulate it in the most general terms, the abstraction of THE QUALITY OF BEING A SIGN, or, in a more expanded formulation, of SOMETHING'S QUALITY OF BEING A SIGN OF SOMETHING FOR SOMEONE IN SOME PLACE. The semantic aspect of the problem is expressed in the words 'to be a sign of something', the pragmatic by 'to be a sign for someone', the communicative by 'to be a sign somewhere'. (The syntactic aspect is not expressed here, since the concept 'sign system' is not being considered.) (Piatigorsky 1974: 185 [emphasis original])

It is well known that intra- and interspecific boundaries as well as the boundaries of more abstract and/or concrete semiotic spaces can never be experientially transgressed, penetrated into and comprehended in their totality. Depending on the semiotic subject's modalities and competence with regard to the meaning(s) of a given sign, "the relations [...] are of a *radically different eidetic type* in the logical and the semiotic universes" (Petitot 2004: 210 [emphasis original]). That is, 'sign-ness' in human *Umwelten* is not necessarily 'sign-ness' in nature or other semiotic spaces and vice versa. Hence, for one sign there must be different dimensions of semiosis. Disregarding the syntactic aspect, i.e. sign function and theorizing over a single sign by dissecting it onto four categories of existence, each will be shown to have its own peculiar semiotic modes or conditions for 'sign-ness.' Though completely irresponsible and without prominent thirdness, the dream has its way(s) of coming about along certain lines as will be shown.

2. ELEMENTARY SEMIOTIC MECHANISM OF DREAM FORMATION

As has been noted with regard to (cultural) de-symbolization by way of myths and rituals, it is interesting that “it has been remarked often enough that dreams are, in a sense, individual myths, and myths collective dreams” (Kuper 1979: 645). Disregarding the narrative specificities, myths in a wide sense are texts that embody the cosmogony of culture(s) and provide explanation of the origin of everything and are well suited to be subjected to structural analysis which has also been deployed in the analysis of dreams for “there is a powerful psychological consensus that the dream code is in fact a medium of communication open to systematic analysis” (Ibid. 646).

In addition, as was noted above, dreams tend towards atemporality or the suspension of real time whereas mythological texts, by “their subjection to cyclical-temporal motion” (Lévi-Strauss 1968 in: Lotman 1979: 161) also harbor very peculiar temporal relationships. Mythological texts or myths narrate “events which were timeless, endlessly reproduced and, in that sense, motionless” (Lotman 1979: 163). For the structuralist, myths and mythologies in (archaic) societies are “an instrument for the obliteration of time” (Lévi-Strauss 1969: 16). That is, time in myths is wholly cyclical and lacks the distinction of past, present and future available to us and in this sense, the time in myths is not time at all much in the same sense that in a dream there is no and simultaneously all time. The temporally cyclical world of myths also “creates a multi-layered mechanism with clearly manifested features of topological organization” (Lotman 1979: 162) the manifest forms of which in the narrative (night/winter/death; morning/spring/birth etc.) are “one and the same thing (or rather, transformations of one and the same thing)” (Ibid.). Much in the same sense as dreams as will shortly be presented.

In this light, dreams are not necessarily as ‘unsystematic’ (or can be treated as such in a structuralist approach) as they are usually considered to be “with the dream elements as transformations of elements of reality [...] the processes of symbolisation, of condensation, displacement and representation, so central in the Freudian approach, are at this stage of marginal relevance” (Kuper 1979: 647). This thesis does not deal with the analysis of mythological texts nor with the

psychoanalytic processes. For us, the question whether dream elements are transformations of reality is insignificant; it does not actually matter considering that dream itself is a reality. Despite that our approach is not a strictly structuralist one, the aim to “reveal the internal unity of the dream and the existence of an underlying ‘grammar or structure’ [...] and that they are the same as the rules which have been found to generate the transformations which occur in and between myths” (Kuper 1979: 647) is – if not the same – very similar at least from the point of view of symbolology. Though here we refrain to state any specific narrative aspects, we must agree with the purely structuralist approach in that “in principle it should be possible to state the rules by which the transformation from one situation to another is effected” (Ibid.). It may also be noted that there is a distinction to be made between a dream dreamt and the retold version “which is a social rather than a psychological fact” and it may cautiously be argued “that ‘real’ dreams are social facts which exist in the context of language” (Ibid.).

Except recapitulation, dreams as such are hardly obtainable to anyone else except the dreamer and furthermore, they are known as dreams only from memory in the sense that it is often the case that the dreamer is not aware s/he is dreaming; save for instances of lucid dreams. Consequently, as a class of presumed entities with recognizable discrete units – here the dream and its trajectory that follow “are constructed semiotic beings and therefore no longer belong to the object semiotic system [...] but to the descriptive metalanguage” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 356). That is to say, we deal here not with interpretation nor meaning of dreams but one potential way they come about and in the last leg, their effect on you and also, by way of the analogous structure and function of the human intellect and culture, were we to collocate a de-symbolized symbol, i.e. a symbol submitted to a given sign system, for example by way of myth and ritual, the generative structural equivalence between them with regard to the symbol’s secondary content and the nucleus of dream should become evident in what is to be presented.

In order to theorize over the possible course(s) a dream may manifest by, the semiotic existence of dreams as entities must be presumed. Entity designates “that ‘existant’ the semiotic existence of which is presumed” (Ibid. 102). Entities may be classified depending on the necessity to study a given class of objects – glasses, pipes, literature and the like. Accordingly, dreams are an intuitively familiar phenomena to most people save for those who suffer from Charcot-Wilbrand syndrome. As such,

dreams may be postulated to be real albeit non-existent in the strict, Peircean sense and as recollections – depending on the dreams’ pertinence in memory and its recapitulatability (which as a rule effects the synopsis by way of translation accompanied by a semantic reduction of the text) – are present in a more or less whole narrative form. “When we recall dreams [...] to our memory we almost always – unintentionally and without noticing the fact – fill in the gaps in the dream-images” (Freud 1965: 79). This narrative is in a sense pre-given – it comes to the dreamer upon awakening rather than in the dream itself where there is no “I” albeit this may also happen.

The presumption of dreams as entities possessing semiotic (pre-) existence as a class of ‘objects’, made prior to any analysis, will enable us to “recognize therein a discrete unit” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 102). The final form of this unit is naturally derived from the properties of the class of objects, each class restricted by the mode of being(s) of its objects whether physical – blood is thicker than water – or linguistic – better safe than sorry – or in more general – semiotic. There does not exist such a thing as ‘the’ dream – dreams are more often than not different from each other, it is unlikely to dream the exact same dream in an exactly same fashion than it is to have a recurring theme in dreams. Most dreams ‘take place’ in places, there are other actors and time is irresponsible. This does not of course mean that recurring dreams would never happen as in the case of repetitive dreams or nightmares but for the sake of convenience this option is excluded for now.

A common dream theme is for example falling in the wide sense of the word. It may be postulated that all people have an innate understanding of falling regardless whether they have ever fallen from any higher altitude. This is based on our basic spatial categories – up, down, left, right, back, forth and all in between – by which we comprehend ourselves as being positioned in this or that point; where the flesh containing the structure “I” is positioned and can not be positioned anywhere else simultaneously. That is, in addition to other rhythms derived from the body and instilled in the *chora*, the kinetic experience of vertical drop, in addition to being non-expressive as such (not a sign nor signifier as of yet) tends more towards the semiotic than the symbolic as a non-individual structure of consciousness. In essence, falling is (a category of) an object of knowledge that can be described in formulated terms and by this it, among others, “constitute the bases for what can be called the pragmatic dimension” (Ibid. 167).

The pragmatic dimension serves as internal referent(s) for the cognitive dimension that is hierarchically superior to it. The pragmatic dimension corresponds “to the descriptions which are made there of signifying somatic behaviors, organized into programs and taken [...] as “events” independently of their possible utilization at the level of knowing” (Ibid. 240). The articulation of these “events” belongs under the symbolic and is regulated as well as organized (into programs) by the semiotic, whereas (some of) them originate in the *chora*. In practice, all our somatic behavior i.e. (potential) movements of the body – intentional or not – belong to the pragmatic dimension. Some have become ritualized (handshakes etc.) and some are or at least can be known or dreamt of, such as flying or its more plausible alternative on what comes to aerial verticality – falling.

It is only under the condition that the pragmatic dimension implies the cognitive dimension when the former may act as the latter’s internal referent whereas “the reciprocal is not true: the cognitive dimension, which can be defined as the taking in charge, by knowing, of pragmatic actions, presupposes them” (Ibid. 32). That is, we need to be aware of what the body can withstand, what can be done with it or what can it do, a process that takes place mainly during the time when one slowly but surely comes to the conclusion that s/he is separate from the world as the relations representable as topological spaces facilitating the world in which ‘things’ (and ‘non-things’) are connected via and in the zones of the fragmented body clearly show. The limits of the human body have been tried time and again as is evident in several rites of passage in more archaic societies (which, incidentally are transformations of the single mythological invariant, the program(s) for which are derived from symbol(s) by way of de-symbolization and some may even become to serve as content(s) and/or structures of consciousness provided there be a (pseudo)symbol to induce appropriate state(s) of consciousness as there is during rituals), or in modern-day body-modification practices. The cognitive dimension develops “in parallel fashion with the increase in knowing (as a cognitive activity) attributed to the subjects” (Ibid.).

Or, upon the constitution of the subject, the semiotic and symbolic function diachronically in the never-ending signifying process of the *cogitatio* in the making. The more gruesome and painful rites and hobbies dealing with the mutilation, suspension and in extreme cases amputation of (parts of) the body are a case in point. That aside, we know that it is rare for anyone to survive a fall high enough during

which the person would reach terminal velocity (ca. 55 m/s.) before hitting the ground.

Here, dreams involving falling will be taken as the discrete unit or, the class of dreams in which the dreamer (or why not ‘stuff’ too) is falling. To render this operational, the (dream) phenomena of falling will be treated as the invariable part of dream, or its nucleus that is “the minimal constitutive unit [...] of the “primitive” parts making it up” (Ibid. 167). These primitive parts (what- and wherever may fall) are taken as belonging to the proprioceptive¹⁴ order, that is, knowledge of them is derived from the pragmatic dimension. As a sidenote, the proprioceptive order as opposed to exteroceptive¹⁵ or interoceptive¹⁶ properties of culture or individual humans are fairly similar as the distinction made between the *chora* (proprioceptive), the symbolic (exteroceptive) and the semiotic (interoceptive). This in the sense that the semiotic *chora* is indeed based on one’s body with regard to others and the things surrounding it; the symbolic, when taken either as language or social order is indeed imposed from the exterior world and exists before the subject, and; the semiotic, being merely the organizing principles for the subject are, as such, non-figurative.

2.1. Ways to dream the nucleus on semiotic square

To make our way towards a model of the (generative) trajectory of dreams of falling, the nucleus will be projected onto the semiotic square (Figure 1.) as presented by Greimas and Courtés (1982: 308–311). In order to do so, falling as the invariable part, as the nucleus must be defined within a network of relations as a term that is “an intersection point of the relations of contrariety, contradiction, and complementarity” (Ibid. 338) on the semiotic square, which enables the study of (or search for) “the elementary structure of meaning” (Ibid.). The square requires the presence of two

¹⁴ “[...] to classify the set of semic categories which denotes the semanticism resulting from the perception which humans have of their own bodies” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 248)

¹⁵ “[...] the classification of the semic categories which articulate the semantic universe considered as coextensive with a culture or with a given human being [...] distinguishes exteroceptive properties, as coming from the exterior world, from interoceptive data which have no correspondence in that world and which are presupposed, on the contrary, by the perception of the former” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 114)

¹⁶ “The set of semic categories which articulates the semantic universe taken to be co-extensive with either a given culture or individual [...] whether or not they have corresponding elements within the semiotic system of the natural world [...] we propose to designate those categories as non-figurative (or abstract)” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 158)

contrary terms (S_1 and S_2) that characterize the paradigmatic axis and define the semic category (= semantic category) constituting the content plane. Essentially, falling (S_1) will acquire as its contrary term rising (S_2). The semic category on the axis of contraries then constitutes the (abstract) category of vertical movement by subsuming the two contrary terms and by this, it is “the minimal context necessary for establishing an isotopy” (Ibid. 163) that assures the homogeneity of a given trajectory’s final reading.







Figure 1. The term ‘falling’ as projected onto the semiotic square. In which:

-  : Relation of contrariety
-  : Relation of complementarity
-  : Relation of contradiction

The category of vertical movement establishes a paradigm consisting of an unspecified or variable number of terms “but it does not thereby allow for the distinction, within this paradigm, of semantic categories founded on the isotopy of distinctive relations which can be recognized therein” (Ibid. 308). That is, the established paradigm constituted on the axis of contraries would then afford only up-and-down movement that is strictly vertical directed along a single pole like a firefighter. Consequently, the square alone seems somewhat insufficient to explain the generative trajectory of percepts conjured as a dream but the isotopies it gives rise to are sufficient to begin with.

Isotopy as a general, operational concept designates the iterativity of *classemes*¹⁷ in a syntagmatic chain whereas iterativeness itself is “the reproduction along the syntagmatic axis of identical comparable entities” (Ibid. 166). The individual variance of dreams of falling is iterative in that each may be compared with one another as entities belonging to the same class constituting a unit treated as the nucleus. In other words, falling is “the isotopic but disseminated manifestation of a theme” (Ibid. 343) defining the thematic orientation of the generative trajectory.

All “four terms of the semiotic square are called isotopes” (Ibid. 163) and can give rise to different thematic trajectories accordingly. This said, it must be noted that the nucleus then covers all the isotopes and that the orientation of the trajectory is – for now – unpredefined. Technically, in addition to falling and rising, the dreams’ trajectory may also orientate its point of origin from and towards the axis of sub-contraries in accordance with the terms non-falling ($-S_1$) and non-rising ($-S_2$), neither of which strictly belongs to the established paradigm constituted on the category of vertical movement. But this is due to the very nature of the semiotic square that presupposes the presence of two contrary terms on the axis of contraries which in its turn has as its counterpart the negation of both terms; this leads the terms $S_1 / -S_1$ and $S_2 / -S_2$ into a relation of contradiction, “the impossibility for [the] two terms to be present together” (Ibid. 309).

Regardless, the nucleus as projected onto the semiotic square brings about pluri-isotopy by potentially superposing the different isotopies in a given trajectory of dream by way of isotopic connectors or ‘shifters’ that introduce either a single or several different readings afforded by the terms. In essence, movement in any direction in accordance with the terms – instead of falling, the trajectory might orientate to rising, which may manifest as hovering, floating, flying etc. Notwithstanding the (emotional) experience of vertical dreams, there is also no reason why the thematics could not overlap in a given dream. In such a case, “it is the polysemic character of the discursive unit functioning as connector which permits the superposition of different isotopies” (Ibid. 52). As knowledge has it, falling and the other isotopes in a dream may come about in several ways or in other words, the potential manifestations in the class of dreams of falling is polysemic by character.

¹⁷ “[...] designates contextual semes as *classemes*, that is to say, those semes which are recurrent in the discourse and which guarantee its isotopy” (Ibid. 29–30)

“Polysememy [trad. polysemy] exists however—excepting the case of pluri-isotopy—only in a virtual state” (Ibid. 238).

It must be noted that the two contrary terms, when conjoined by a syntagm – as in a recollected dream – may also be treated as semic figures either of the expression or of the content: “the definition of figure can be made more precise, by reserving this term solely for the figures of the content which correspond to the figures of the expression plane” (Ibid. 120). This equals the innate knowledge of the existence of the vertical category and (possible) movement therein as content that facilitates the primarily visual expressing of it in a dream.

2.2. Generative trajectory and Narrative

Above are roughly the components that conjure up a dream and “since every semiotic object can be defined according to its mode of production [...] the components that enter into this process are linked together along a “trajectory”” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 132) that goes from the most abstract to the most concrete in their generation. Any semiotic object may thus be defined¹⁸ by way of its generation that explains the way in which it is produced. In other words, it is the generative trajectory that designates “the general economy of a semiotic [...] theory, that is, the way in which its components fit together” (Ibid.). To generalize, in order to attribute the property ‘falling’ to “a limited number of entities [...] to a whole class” (Ibid. 128), the class of dreams involving falling as their nucleus, we find that – in consciousness in general – each is a paraphrasing, a thematic repetition of a “unit which is semantically equivalent to another unit previously produced” (Ibid. 225). It may also be seen as the iterativity of such dreams throughout the history of dreaming consciousness, provided we allow our phylogenesis to be placed on the syntagmatic (that is, temporal) axis. This, of course holds true only in the deep semantic levels of dream or in general, discourse.

Paraphrasing enables us to go semantically deeper which is necessary in order to bypass the process of interpretation within the generative trajectory of dreams and venture to “the deepest generative domains [that] appear to be constituted by logico-

¹⁸ “Identified with paraphrasing, definition corresponds to a metalinguistic operation (or its result) which either passes from a term to its definition (in expansion) or passes from a syntagm (or atextual unit) to its name.” (Ibid. 70)

semantic forms (permitting the elimination of the concept of interpretation) which, once transformed, generate surface forms” (Ibid. 133). In other words, we are dealing with semio-narrative structures constituting “the most abstract level, the starting point of the generative trajectory” (Ibid. 133) consisting in general of two components, the syntactic and semantic, both endowed with two levels of depth; the fundamental on the deep level, and narrative on the surface level. However, though slightly in contradiction with the distinction between semiotic/symbolic, it must be noted that “all categories, even the most abstract (including syntactic structures), are semantic in nature and thereby are signifying” (Ibid. 133). It is the semantic signification, the generative semantics in “the cognitive dimension, which can be defined as the taking in charge, by knowing, of pragmatic actions” (Ibid. 32) that is sought after, not the syntactic aspect of dreams.

As a recollection, a dream is always in the form of a narrative one way or the other and as such, it has had its starting point somewhere on the semio-narrative level. In order to become narratable, the dream needs to consist of narrative programs constituting a narrative trajectory – the synopsis of which is recalled awake. The narrative trajectory is “a hypotactic series of either simple or complex narrative programs (abbreviated NP), that is, a logical chain in which each NP is presupposed by another, presupposing NP” (Ibid. 207). Though the dream is endowed with logicity only afterwards, it nevertheless is, or becomes a logical chain of events. The narrative program(s) (NP) in its turn is “an elementary syntagm of the surface narrative syntax, composed of an utterance of doing governing an utterance of state” (Ibid. 245).

For example, at the supposed outset of a dream that ends up in or has as its climax falling, the figurativization process would go somewhat in the fashion that the subject – dream ‘I’ – is separate from the object that is the obtainable goal: $S\bar{U}0$. (S: subject; \bar{U} : separate; 0: object). The object – whence the falling happens – is (or will be) only a syntactic position (in the final reading) that stands invested with a value – “falling”: $S\bar{U}0_v$ (: falling). It is from this sorts of basic positions that the dream may become what it may by way of fulfilling a “narrative program [that] consists in joining the subject with the value it seeks” (Ibid. 118). The problem is, of course, that such a dream may be dreamt in a myriad of ways.

It is “at the moment when the syntactic object (0) receives a semantic investment which will permit the enunciatee to recognize it as a figure” (Ibid.), as a

mile-high platform, a tree, a cliff or the like. The dream that expresses falling from a given figure in its discourse is recognized in (awake) memory through general knowledge of the vertical category which enabled it to be manifested and is a figurative discourse.

2.3. Figurativization and Onomastics

It is the thematic nucleus' pluri-isotopical nature that virtually poses "several figurative trajectories [that] can give rise to different and simultaneous readings, on the condition, however, that the figurative units, at the level of manifestation, be not contradictory" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 236). That is, falling in a dream is unlikely expressed as 'anti-gravitational' i.e. feeling falling upwards (which would still be falling) and yet, the contrary term of falling – rising – facilitates upward movement which may be experienced as if falling; as vertical, unnatural impossible movement. "It is not until we try to reproduce a dream that we introduce order of any kind into its loosely associated elements" (Freud 1965: 80).

Due to dreams being more or less asyntactic, the aspect of grammatical isotopy is somewhat neglected here and more attention is paid to the semantic isotopy "which makes possible a uniform reading of the discourse as it results from the partial readings of the utterances making it up and from the resolution of their ambiguities which is guided by the search for a single reading" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 164). However, as dreams are known and despite their sometimes odd synopses that are remembered, they are single in their being (provided nothing is added or removed, which is often not the case) and as a reading, they are "first and foremost a semiosis, primordial activity the effect of which is to correlate a content with a given expression and to transform a chain of the expression into a syntagmatic system of signs" (Ibid. 254).

Whatever the reason is for dreaming, a dream requires to be remembered so that it may be seen as a reading. Before this, however, a dream needs to be dreamt, it needs to become a narratable discourse and as such, will be made subject to figurativization. In general, all discourses are divisible into two classes – figurative and non-figurative (or abstract) ones. By way of figurativization, it is possible to construct a model of dream-discourse production – a preliminary generative trajectory

– affording to constitute “a general framework within which one can seek to inscribe, in an operational and tentative manner, subject to invalidations and reconstructions, the figurativization procedures of a discourse posed first as neutral and abstract” (Ibid. 118).

For this, our dream to become must be treated as the final reading of a discourse, a concept identifiable “with that of semiotic process. In this way the totality of semiotic facts [...] located on the syntagmatic axis of language are viewed as belonging to the theory of discourse” (Ibid. 81). Moreover, to nudge the terminology closer to cultural semiotics, it must be noted that “text and discourse may be indifferently applied to designate the syntagmatic axis of non-linguistic semiotic systems” (Ibid. 340). In our case, the non-linguistic semiotic system is the system of dreams treated as text(s).

Considering the dream as a text which is the outcome of unvolitional, progressive production of meaning(s) that at every moment had the potential to diverge from the ‘final’ form of manifestation, during “the course of which structures and semiotic figures come into place, detail by detail” (Ibid. 119) it is useful to divide the figurativization procedure into two levels, figuration and iconization. The former is “the setting up of semiotic figures” whereas the latter “aims at decking out the figures exhaustively so as to produce the referential illusion which would transform them into images of the world” (Ibid.). The referential illusion in its turn creates the meaning effect “reality” which from the generative point of view has no *a priori* referents unlike objects of the “real” or “imaginary” worlds.

But meaning effect remains incomplete or unreal without the onomastic sub-component that characterizes the figurativization of a narrative by specifying and particularizing the abstract discourse of dream “insofar as it is grasped in its deep structures, and by the introduction of anthroponyms, of toponyms, and of chrononyms [...] going from the generic to the specific” (Ibid. 119). By way of anthroponyms, toponyms and chrononyms, the onomastic sub-component presents the required degree of reproduction of that which is real by permitting “a historical anchoring, the effect of which is to form the simulacrum of an external referent and to produce the meaning effect “reality” (Ibid. 219).

2.4. *Semeion purus* or, the fourway triadic sign

Having intimated the pure sign in dreams, or a sign without established meaning, then it must somehow differ from the everyday sign(s) by which we go about and which go about in and around us; when we are awake, when we are alive (irrespective that biosemiosis does not cease within the deceased) and when we are about. But what of the sign when we are asleep and not aware there are such things as ‘signs’ or better yet, such a thing as “I” – we know dreams are real but only when they have ended. Hence, the sign must have different relations depending on its dimension.

This will be clarified with the aid of the semiotic square that is fit for establishing a preliminary typology of relations necessary “to distinguish intrinsic features, those which constitute the category, from those that are foreign to it” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 308) with regards to major semiotic dimensions. As one may note, Piatigorsky’s definition of ‘sign-ness’ echoes Peirce’s definition of a sign: “[A] sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity” (CP 2.228 [emphasis original]). In addition to this similarity, the triadic sign at its simplest definition is commonplace in semiotics, and duly its elements – *representamen* (**R**), *object* (**O**) and *interpretant* (**I**) – are used also in this thesis.

In general, object is anything we can think or talk about. It pays to notice that objects do not need to be physical and that the lack of an object would deprive the sign of its being a sign, i.e. representamen at all: “it is a vehicle conveying into the mind something from without. That for which it stands is called its *object*; that which it conveys, its *meaning*; and the idea to which it gives rise its *interpretant*” (CP 1.339 [emphasis original]).

Signs – according to semiotics – are very real and responsible for reality itself; they make their way so that “the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretation again” (CP 1.339). The infamous infinite series created in this fashion is halted via ‘ontologization’ of the semiotic square and hence, on the axis of sub-contraries, instead of calling (**I̅**) non-interpretant and (**O̅**) non-object which would be in accordance with the inner logic and terminology of the semiotic square, we designate (**I̅**) to point to the absence of interpretation under will and (**O̅**) to the absence of

knowledge of objects, though at points the prefix ‘non-‘ is used. However unorthodox, the triadic sign is projected onto the semiotic square.

The diagram (Figure 2.) below is an adaptation of the semiotic square as presented by Greimas and Courtés (1982: 308–311). In the diagram, representamen (**R**), or ‘sign-ness’ is placed in the middle for the following reasons:

- i) we and according to us all other beings have no access to anything without it being (an interpretation of) a representation, i.e. a sign, and;
- ii) by extension this argument applies both to nature and culture.




Figure 2. Relations of (**R**) representing triadic ‘sign-ness’ in four dimensions as projected onto the semiotic square. In which:

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>↔ : Relation of contrariety</p> <p>↑ : Relation of complementarity</p> <p>↔↔ : Relation of contradiction</p> <p>⋯↔ : Relation of simple presupposition</p> <p>↕ : Relation of reciprocal presupposition</p> | <p>R: Representamen</p> <p>O: Object</p> <p>I: Interpretant</p> <p>N: Nature</p> <p>C: Culture</p> <p>A: Awake</p> <p>Z: Asleep</p> |
|--|--|

The first point concerns the elementary proposition of (anthropo-) semiotics and the minimal requirement for something to be interpreted or function as a sign. Here however, there is no function. The representamen and its constituents irrespective of the dimension discussed are treated as static. The second point is that the use of the same mark for representamen (**R**) and ‘sign-ness’ is applicable in all aspects. The relations, albeit iconically depicted with dissimilar placement of the arrows from those of the original, remain the same as those shown on the diagram’s legend. There are, however, some alterations.

First of all, this is not “the visual representation of the logical articulation of any semantic category” (Ibid. 308) nor exactly does it concern “the elementary structure of signification, when defined [...] as a relation between at least two terms [which] rests only on a distinction of opposition which characterizes the paradigmatic axis of language” (Ibid.). The latter definition is somewhat closer to what is being done here; to distinguish ‘dimensions’ of semiosis as understood by human cognition, i.e. the elementary mechanisms and functional principles of distinct semiotic spaces where we consider signs to be the elements that enable activity.

On the axis of contraries, object (**O**) and interpretant (**I**) are in opposition – were it possible to distinguish a single semiosis in actuality, then strictly speaking the interpretant is never the object. However, they are both presupposed and “can be present concomitantly [...] they are said to enter into a relation of reciprocal presupposition or which comes to the same thing, a relation of contrariety” (Ibid., 309). In other words, were there no (representations of) objects, the interpretations (of representations) would not exist either although in cases their categorial positions are interchangeable.

Including from the middle representamen (**R**) we find the traditional triad ‘**R–O–I**’ forming a sign, i.e. the utmost minimal requirement for constituting (conscious, cognitive) semiosis in the human mind. For a person to receive a representation of an object, s/he needs to be awake (**A**) for interpretation (**I**). “In order that an *interpretant* might emerge, it must enter into interaction with some interpreter” (Merrell 2013: 28). That is, were I unconscious, I would not know I (can) think. Thus, by incorporating the awake state (**A**) we end up with the quadruple ‘**R–O–I–A**’, which may be said to be our basic dimension of acknowledged being, the existential whereabouts and semiotic elements by which I know “I” am when awake.

On the positive deixis, there is in addition to the representamen (**R**), an object (**O**) but there is no interpretant (**Ī**) in the human sense. As one may infer, the semiotic dimension of the positive deixis is that of nature (**N**). The lack of freedom for abstract endowment of meaning and/or arbitrary interpretation in nature is based on Uexküll's (1982: 28) claim that "because no animal ever plays the role of an observer, one may assert that they never enter into relationships with neutral objects." This is adopted to apply to all of nature; it is only in the human semiotic that "[Through] every relationship the neutral object is transformed into a meaning-carrier, the meaning of which is imprinted upon it by a subject" (Ibid.). It may be said that in nature, the objects' relations to subjects are limited by their physical being – there are no immaterial or imaginary objects in nature. This is not to say that nature (**N**) would totally lack interpretations, but that it is considerably more narrow and restricted on what comes to creating new information in this way. Or rather, it is slow to happen within aeons unobservable for the human intellect. Allowing this, it may be said that the quadruple '**R–O–Ī–N**' forms the semiotic dimension of beasts and organic matter, including our bodies.

On the negative deixis, we find as proper only interpretation (**I**) of representation (**R**) but no object (**Ō**). This is based on the presumption that culture (**C**) – whether seen as a semiospheric phenomenon of a mnemonic mechanism or as any other terminological construct – cannot with certainty be said to be conscious of its (physical) self through senses in order to receive information via or of objects but only their representations interpreted: "The history of culture is reflected as an evolution of interpreting culture – on one side by its contemporary auditorium, on the other by next generations, including the scientific tradition of interpretation" (Lotman 1999: 39 [my translation]).

Culture is to itself simultaneously a subject and an object, neither of which overlaps the other in a single semiosis. For the sake of argument, physical objects with regard to 'sign-ness' in culture are treated as elements that from the point of view of culture are not bearers of meaning, as it were do not exist. "The fact of their actual existence recedes to the background in face of their irrelevance in the given modelling system. Though existing, they as it were cease to exist in the system of culture" (Lotman 1990: 58). Excluding the overlapping boundaries and the typology of culture for the sake of convenience, culture's elementary functional mechanism can be said to be interpreting itself through representations (of non-objects) within itself,

constituting the semiotic dimension of culture ‘**R- \bar{O} -I-C**’; a supra-individual monad of its own rank.

On the axis of subcontraries, there is no object (\bar{O}) nor an interpretant (\bar{I}) proper but only a representation (**R**) in and of a physically unreal dimension – dream (**Z**)¹⁹. Analogous to real space, dream may be said to form for us a second(ary) sphere of semiotic existence ‘**R- \bar{O} - \bar{I} -Z**’ in which we are incapable of action and not aware that “I” exists or to say the least, the ‘am’ of “I” is different due to different surroundings in a different setting experientially wholly as real. “I” is not a sign, fact nor content or structure of consciousness in the *Traumwelt*. Yet, interestingly enough, the dream becomes known – for “I” – in retrospect in the awake dimension where it intrudes as a memory of and in itself.

The absence of the “I” as an acknowledged structure of consciousness is based on the fact that “any act of semiotic recognition must involve the separation of significant elements from insignificant ones in surrounding reality” (Lotman 1990: 58). There is no distinction between ‘things’ in dreams, there are no subject-object relations – much like as was postulated with regard to the general metatheoretical framework of this thesis – the structure of the “I” is inseparable from the surrounding elements and thus can not be recognized therein. The *Traumwelt* is both form and content displaying ‘sign-ness’ before it becomes a memory of triadic signs; it is in this sense that the dream as structure(s) of consciousness abstracted from the state of consciousness can be seen as signs in their pure form; there is nothing to distinguish beyond representation alone due to the absence of “I.”

However, provided that “we only know dreams from our memory of them after we are awake” (Freud 1965: 76), then through recollection, despite the randomness and different order of things than in the accustomed to awake surroundings, the bygone experiencing yet unacknowledged “I” of *Traumwelt* was by force of circumstance the exact same as the one you think you are best acquainted with daily, only existing in a different reminiscential world than that of awake. The dream as structure of consciousness is an agglomerate of form and content manifested as pure signs before “I” becomes aware of it awake transmuting their indeterminacy which makes it “necessary to establish a meaning for them” (Lotman 2009: 143). That

¹⁹ There are two reasons why the term dream is marked with (**Z**). Firstly, it is presumed that in a dream everything may represent something else and secondly, it is visually customary to use (**Z**) to point out that someone is sleeping which is the minimal requirement for dreaming proper.

is, what is remembered of the *Traumwelt* is mediated to the awake “I” in a condensed form from a different sphere of semiosis, or even – due to the indistinguishable being of elements in a dream – from a non-semiotic reality to a semiotic reality; in a similar way as symbols function.

And so, we have at least four separate²⁰ semiotic dimensions for ‘sign-ness’ according to some very general principles and as was proposed, the ‘something’s quality of being a sign of something for someone in some place’ within each domain is unbreachable as the exact same sign from one dimension to the other due to the specific qualities of the dimensions. The four in essence:

that of awake (**R–O–I–A**), in which conscious (anthropo-) semiosis occurs;

that of nature (**R–O–Ī–N**), in which organic (bio-) semiosis occurs;

that of culture (**R–Ō–I–C**), in which inorganic (cultural) semiosis occurs;

that of dream (**R–Ō–Ī–Z**), in which unaware (oneiric) semiosis occurs.

So far it has been presumed that the presence of elements of a given sign oscillate according to ‘sign-ness’ in each of the four dimensions. However, this is not the case in the strict sense – especially what comes to the lack of interpretation in nature and lack of object in culture. It would be somewhat absurd to claim that the triadic sign would retain its ‘sign-ness’ or enable semiosis if crippled into a twopartite triadic sign. Indeed, were it the case that interpretation did not exist in nature, and object in culture, evolution in both would be excluded.

Hence for the sake of clarity, the sign so far has been treated as static and the proposed lack is not an unconditional one but a purely theoretical one that serves to point to the dominant element of semiosis in each dimension. “The dominant may be defined as the focusing component [...] it rules, determines, and transforms the remaining components” (Jakobson 1981: 751). More generally in tetralemmic terms, in nature the object either is or is not (affirmation / negation) for a given subject whereas in culture the object is and is not (equivalence); in dream the object neither is nor is not (neither) whereas awake the object’s mode of being depends on the contextual situation of a given sign – a discussion which we will not enter here.

²⁰ Granted, nature and culture are interdependent and all dimensions are interconnected in human existence, but here they are viewed as distinct for the sake of argument.

Based on the subject's overall knowledge, an individual's *Umwelt* and *Lebenswelt* forms a *Traumwelt* of which we are aware as well as of the other dimensions only by default of our own peculiar semiotic mode. It must be noted that in addition to their separate natures, all four dimensions are embodied by the human essence; the body is of nature, mind of awake, the dream an intersection and culture an extension. It is also worth noting that remembered dreams are sometimes puzzling and may show "an extraordinary persistence in memory" (Freud 1965: 76). Suggestively speaking, a core phylogenetic function of this mnemonic translatory cycle may have been to bridge the gap between *ens realis* (body) and (pre-) archaic *ens rationis* (mind), sealing the structure of the "I" as a structure of consciousness.

In light of the above and general knowledge of semiotics, it may be said that what is received of a sign by a semiotic entity is its representamen (**R**). Granted, the way the semiotic square has been used so far, it remains a first generation square regardless that the positioning of the dimensions is visually similar to the second generation of terms as in the original. Albeit omnipresent, the dimensions belong to different semantic and overall semiotic categories. Strictly, (**A**) and (**Z**) are two main states of consciousness available and comprehensible to all but, as is obvious, the majority of people are part nature (**N**) part culture (**C**) and thus, however semiosis occurs in either or both, it is applicable to the human and its intellect in consciousness.

Moreover, it may be argued that nature (**N**) and culture (**C**) are in a relation of simple presupposition – the relation between the presupposing term and the presupposed term: "By presupposed term is understood that term, the presence of which is the necessary condition for the presence of the presupposing term, while the presence of the presupposing term is not the necessary condition for the presupposed term" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 243). Chronologically speaking, culture (**C**) could not have evolved were there no nature (**N**), whereas nature does not require the presence of culture (**C**) in order to exist.

Awake (**A**) and dream (**Z**) on the other hand are in a relation of reciprocal presupposition, both terms (or dimensions) being simultaneously presupposing and presupposed. The relation between them as states of consciousness and semioses therein is predominantly "either that of combination, on the syntagmatic axis, or that of opposition, on the paradigmatic axis" (Ibid.) emphasized according to the potential assortment of facilitatory forms of meaning or structures of consciousness.

It may also be noted that there is no reason why the above diagram could not be viewed as a diagram of the signifying process. By replacing (**Z**) with the semiotic and (**A**) with the symbolic in a situation where a given natural-cultural (**N/C**) subject receives a representamen (**R**) constituting a signifying process. This in the sense that dreams – remembered or not – do or have had an effect on the subject, the way its identity has come to be by way of strengthening or weakening memory; that is, dream as function in the mnemonic mechanism partaking in the constituting of a subject is omnipresent albeit unnoticed in the being of all subjects, much like the semiotic is omnipresent as “the extra-verbal way in which bodily energy and affects make their way into language” (McAfee 2005: 17). whereas only awake are we aware of the existence of signs and capable of using them according to our (linguistic) competence much like the symbolic “is a mode of signifying in which speaking beings attempt to express meaning with as little ambiguity as possible” (Ibid.).

In essence, the way dreaming as a function has moulded the being’s identity does not disappear or cease to do so awake but is as present as the real world in dream-imagery – the effects of both dimensions in each are inseparable though usually either dominates in one.

It may also be noted that all this can be viewed as structure(s) of consciousness as well which, as a rule are non-individual. We all gather the same sign or representamen but what we make of it, their individual interpretations vary. These varying interpretations then become this or that content(s) of consciousness sharing similarities across individual psyches and yet, they all share the same foundation and basis as afforded by the sign itself. However, this is not the case with symbols of consciousness – all symbols are what they are and cannot be anything else but it is a question of comprehending (or pseudocomprehending) the symbol, which depends on the symbol itself and by way of (pseudo-)comprehension of this or that symbol, it becomes subjected to a sign system and by the same token, becomes de-symbolized.

This is to say that although dreams are predominantly symbolic when recalled, they are largely semiotic by function, i.e. rather non-expressive during the dream itself due to the absence of the “I” which makes them ‘pure signs’ without meaning; when recalled, they need to have meaning endowed upon them or, the predominance of the non-expressive semiotic within the passive consciousness inflicted by symbol(s) of consciousness becomes – by way of de-symbolization due to being subjected to a sign system in the awake – symbolic by expression.

As the agglomerate of content and form or a world of ‘pure signs,’ the dream resembles reality in which there is no particular reason to doubt its truthfulness though some people are curious as to what is this thing called ‘existence’ or ‘being’ – what is the meaning of life etc. That is, the real world has meaning as it is whether one ponders it or not. The problem is that “the concept of meaning is undefinable” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 187). Reality in itself is produced by our senses when they (we) are in contact with meaning and it may be said that “the world of common sense is the meaning effect produced by the encounter of the human subject and the world as object” (Ibid.).

“Meaning effect is the impression of “reality” produced by our senses when confronted with meaning [...] with an underlying semiotic system” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 187). The problem with “reality” and especially meaning by which it becomes known to us is that although meaning exists, nothing can be said about it and thus meaning must be taken as ““meaning effect,” which is the only reality that can be grasped, but which cannot be directly apprehended” (Ibid. 97).

For example, provided that our vision is one of the more predominant senses when it comes to orienting and positioning ourselves in the world and acquiring information from it and that the content of dreams being primarily but not solely visual; the *Traumwelt* is “analogous to real space” (Lotman 2009: 145) then by the same token, the (cognitive) boundary that makes their separate modes of existence explicit (awake) may be even more diminished by calling to play the meaning effect experienced in dreams, created by the referential illusion therein. By way of iconizing the origin of the content of dreams they become decked out “exhaustively so as to produce the referential illusion which would transform them into images of the world” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 119). The referential illusion in its turn creates the aforementioned meaning effect ‘reality’ which from the generative point of view has no *a priori* referents unlike objects of the ‘real’ or ‘imaginary’ worlds. The lack of pre-given referents may be emphasized by pointing to the absence of prominent thirdness and the purity of signs in dreams. The meaning effect ‘reality’ of dream while dreaming is, then, equivalent to that of everyday reality. Except that there is no One there.

Besides historical anchoring that set up the spatio-temporal indices in figurativization, the term anchoring itself may also be used to designate “the establishment of relation(s) among semiotic entities belonging either to two different

semiotic systems [...] or to two distinct discursive phenomena” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 13). In addition to dreams being presupposed entities, we may agree that the real world, regardless of its mode or of the ways it is understood as a “reality” constitutes another dimension (class?) of entities. “The effect of anchoring is to transform one of the entities into a contextual reference, thus allowing the second to be disambiguated” (Ibid.).

3. DREAM AND “I”

In the part that follows, the basic communicational scheme is introduced and compared with that of autocommunication in order to lay out the distinction between these two distinct albeit similar modes of communion. Also, the purity of dreams as/with potential sign-ness will be explicated. The similitude of dream and symbol, both being finalized texts will be made evident. Before the finalization, the dream must first be shown to be possible to be treated as a text; after which it will be shown to be structurally similar with symbol. By sieving dream through autocommunication, the inescapability of narrativizing and the introducing of order upon its elements will be shown in order to beg the question of the inavoidable syntagmatization of dreams upon remembering inevitably leading to narrative structures at large thus hoping to shed some light in the role and relation of dreams to consciousness with regards to the restructuring of the actual “I” itself. Also, functions of language upon reflection of a dream will be taken into account.

By establishing a hypothetical dream, the manifest imagery of which is here left for the reader to concoct in their mind, and view it as the (de-symbolized) primary expression level which somehow due to its imaginary representation for consciousness requires meaning to be allotted upon it. Expressing the expression (its mechanism) affords a preliminary outline to approach the dream as an (open) text or generator of meaning – a symbol functioning as a void, i.e. pure sign – through the autocommunicative interpretation of which the imagery is endowed with a relation to whatever happens to correspond to it in the something defined in the contents of consciousness. However, before being able to treat a (remembered) dream as text, its relating to consciousness as de-symbolized sign(s) requires a theoretical form that we will abstract from the phenomenological presuppositions of semiotic theory with regard to sign-ness. “Things, usable by living beings as signs, objectively present the possibility of such usage as a result of the fact that they possess the qualities of duality, position, and projection” (Pjatigorsky 1974: 186–187).

In the light of our nucleus, the interpretations of such dreams is fairly subjective and somewhat culture-specific guarded by the spread of knowledge

afforded by one's surroundings (despite today's widespread visuality in culture due to the internet etc.). The spectrum of potential manifestations of dream imagery originates from their polyvalence that varies according to subjects in the sense that one falls off a tree, the other from a skyscraper whereas the essence, the nucleus is shared knowledge by way of semiotic *chorae* and also in part derived from a given culture; both of which are subjectively comprehended. There is consensus that experiencing consciousness is subjective in the sense that we can never know others in their totality but it does not mean that we couldn't agree that the manifestations of our dreams share similarities derived from reality.

The meaning effect reality is equal in both, the dream imagery is the result of semantic polyvalence as afforded by the knowledge of the subject in the general frame of the nucleus whereas this knowledge is derived from the real of awake; hence, in an abstract sense, there are $real^Z$ and $real^A$. Or, as a symbol of consciousness subjected to either sign system – that of dream (**Z**) or that of awake (**A**) – in its potential sign-ness the dream possesses duality that is “the quality ‘of being at any moment one and another’, i.e., the quality of being TWO different things [...] only by being two things at once can it appear as itself” (Piatigorski 1974: 186). The dream was a duplication of reality and its ‘itself’ exists only in relation to the dreamer, its manifest imagery is not real but dreamt from the real to where it is brought back to.

Yielding from its duality is the dream's quality of position, the imaginability of the thing used as a sign “outside its *locus* (and in abstraction from *spatio*) [which] may be interpreted as its simultaneous being in a series of concrete SITUATIONS or POSITIONS (*positio*) which change in accordance with the movements of the subject using this thing” (Ibid.). The situations or positions that amount up to the dream as sign's quality of position derives from the very fact that the concept total of dream, i.e. both the $real^Z$ and $real^A$ can be imagined “outside the place (*locus*) it occupies, although the very CONCEPT of that thing presupposes its specific spatial characteristics (coordinates, measurements, and so on, which can be summarily designated as *spatio*)” (Ibid.). The concept of dream as distinct from the awake reality indeed presupposes sleep. The potential to imagine it outside said place (*locus*) may come about as reminiscing of a dream, suspicion whether experiencing something in reality might be a dream or by way of something causing the subject to recall a dream for no apparent reason, etc.

For example, as a mnemonic mechanism the dream effects memory and by extension learning and forgetting (regardless of the manifest content); as such it always belongs to the past – like a symbol – but may resurface either as it was remembered or by way of effecting the form and mode of one’s behavior in reality via memory. Thus the dream possesses “the capacity of a thing ‘to be included’, at any given moment, in the actual situation of the subject using it, as a FACT known to have existed before this (or any imaginable) situation” (Ibid.). That is, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically dreams are primary abstractions of the world, the effect of which, regardless whether remembered, is a fact that allows them to be included in any situation or, more precisely, it is wholly impossible to completely exclude them from one’s existence. It is by this very fact of the fixation of the thing in time that “presupposes both the possibility of its being ‘thrown forward’ (*projectio*), the possibility of its future situational use, and its assimilation by the subject in a series of concrete situations [...] designated as THE QUALITY OF PROJECTION” (Ibid.). The throwing forward may be done by volition or by way of this or that concept lodged in memory; also, as others have argued, one function of dreams is to simulate real-life threats in order to avoid them in the future.

Accordingly, dreams possess the possibility or potential of becoming signs but this does not by default entail that this or that dream would be used or would become a sign or acquire meaning upon it eventually lodged in the subject’s psyche; “they are merely ‘pure possibilities’ of sign-ness, possibilities which are converted by the psychic and behavioural mechanism of living beings (subjects) into sign reality in acts of communication and autocommunication” (Ibid. 187).

3.1. Autocommunication and dominance

This section is the closest to traditional or psychoanalytic interpretations of dreams. Note however, that because this thesis has no actual dreams – that by way of translation would become semantically reduced and distorted – to analyze, the replacing of true connections between latent dream-thoughts by false connections on the manifest level, i.e. secondary revision is not taken into account. That would lead to interpretations of dreams which is not our aim; our aim is rather more simple, just to point to the necessity and inescapability of what Kristeva would call transposition,

the signifying process' passing from one sign system to another – intersemiotic translation in other words.


To avoid subjecting the dream possessing the nucleus 'falling' to a wholly different sign system of natural language by which it then would be retellable to others in order to be fitted in for example an analyst's metamodel. We will merely bring out the main aspects concerning the passing from a passive state of consciousness to an active state of consciousness, from asleep to awake by which the dream as symbol of consciousness becomes de-symbolized by being subjected to another sign system in which it is endowed with a (new) more clear syntax; one which in reality may be fairly indifferent whether it corresponds to whatever was dreamt of. This is clear in the fact that what is remembered of dreams changes in time and it may be argued that it is possible to remember a dream one has never dreamt as it is possible to not remember a dream dreamt. "The transfer of the sphere of dreams into an area of consciousness itself entails a fundamental realignment of its nature" (Lotman 2009: 35).

As has been noted, the *Traumwelt* is a space analogous to real space and one of its special features "lies in the fact that the categories of speech are transferred into visual space" (Ibid.). In essence, a (remembered) dream affords manifestations only in accordance with one's language; this is clearly a reciprocal relation in that depending on the subject's linguistic competence depends also the amount of narrative detail that may be invested in the retelling of the dream. It must be noted that "in the recounting of a dream, an obvious increase in the degree of organisation occurs; a narrative structure is imposed on speech" (Ibid.). That is, again, we must remain sceptic on what comes to retold dreams and the trustworthiness of the tale. Hence the unnecessary for secondary revision.

Regardless of the correspondence of a remembered dream to what was dreamt, all such synopses may be viewed in the light of communication despite the fact that communication in the strict sense is not present in a dream; any dream is nevertheless new information generated unknowingly within the sleeping mind's eye provided it is a dream one has never dreamt before. As such, all dreams may be placed on the communicational model. The basic communication model as presented by Roman Jakobson consists of six components, each of which has its specific function that may play the part of dominant in the communication act, the dominant defined as the

focusing component that rules, determines, and transforms the remaining components.

The model with its functions looks like this:




In which the emotive function expresses the feelings, emotions and/or attitudes of the Addresser, his/her take on the message and characterizes him/her as well as tries to call forth emotions in the receiver of the message, the Addressee; it is then the conative function that (possibly) influences the behaviour of the Addressee. Naturally, to facilitate any communication, the two require to be able to be in Contact one way or the other – the phatic function emphasizes Contact itself and ‘checks’ whether the channel of communication works or not. It also enables the participants to engage in communication, to lengthen or shorten it for example by way of ritualized forms, as in some dialogues; non-linguistic signs also play an essential part.

In addition to being in contact, for the Addresser and Addressee to communicate and exchange information, they need to share a Code – a common language, terminology etc. – which refers to the nature of interaction for example by genre. The metalingual function, then, focuses on the Code itself which may at times become ambiguous like: ‘You didn’t just use *that* expression.’ The (textual) features of the Message itself are foregrounded by the poetic function, that places the Message in focus in the act of communication. Whereas the referential function, oriented towards Context, imparts information; for a Message to be operational, it requires a referential Context that is understandable for the Addressee in addition that the Message be verbal or verbalizable (or, in our case, narratable which is roughly the same thing). This would mean language in the most general sense, not concrete, natural language for then it would belong under the metalingual function.

In general terms, all five functions are more or less present in the referential function and, although we distinguish six basic aspects of language, it is nigh impossible to find (verbal) messages that would fulfill only one function. In this basic model there are no ‘arrows’ pointing the direction of communication, it is only to show the essential components present in an act of communication that takes place between subjects and thus it may be said that the conveyed information is transferred in space between the subjects rather than in time.

Communication is an (acknowledged) act between a subject ‘I’ and object ‘s/he’ or then it is autocommunicative within ‘I.’ Thus there are two directions in transmitting the message, the ‘I–s/he’ in which “it is assumed that before the act of communication there was a message known to ‘me’ and not known to ‘him/her’.” (Lotman 1990: 21). Whereas in the ‘I–I’ situation, it is the case of “a subject transmitting a message to him/herself, i.e. to a person who knows it already [which] appears paradoxical” (Ibid.).

In autocommunication, as opposed to communication between Addresser and Addressee, the information is “transferred in time” (Ibid.) rather than in space. The main difference between the ‘I–s/he’ communication system in comparison to the ‘I–I’ system is that in the former the positions of the framing elements – addresser and addressee – may be changed while at the same time the code and the message remain invariable. “The message and the information contained in it are constants, while the bearer of the information may alter” (Ibid. 22). As for the latter, the bearer of information is constantly the same and despite the functional similitude of the processes, the message itself is reformulated in the autocommunication process thus acquiring new meaning(s). “This is the result of introducing a supplementary, second, code; the original message is recoded into elements of its structure and thereby acquires features of a *new* message” (Ibid.). Below is the diagram for autocommunication:



“The ‘I-s/he’ system allows one merely to transmit a constant quantity of information, whereas the ‘I-I’ system qualitatively transforms the information, and this leads to a restructuring of the actual ‘I’ itself” (Ibid. 22). As has been postulated, during a dream there is no cognizing subject in the same sense as there is awake and by this, communication as an act nor autocommunication can be said to be present in the strict sense. Before tackling the specificities of the source(s) for dreams, we’ll sieve our constructed dream through the process of autocommunication upon awakening.

Despite that “dreams are in most cases lacking intelligibility and orderliness” (Freud 1965: 77), remembered dreams are most often endowed with some sort of syntactic order regardless of how odd a dream might have been. Even inexplicable sudden changes of scenery (toponyms), familiar strangers or strange familiars (anthroponyms) and changes in the ‘time of day’ (chrononyms) in dreams are accepted both in the dream as well as awake; these are of course often questioned due to their potentially uncanny nature, but only when awake. This naturally changes the dream because when we “recall dreams to our memory we almost always – unintentionally and without noticing the fact – fill in the gaps in the dream-images” (Ibid. 79). By filling in the gaps, parts of the dream become substituted by other, supposedly similar parts. From the point of view of figurativization this poses no problem as long as the figurative units, at the level of manifestation, be not contradictory.

Reflecting upon a dream the subject simultaneously transforms it by introducing “supplementary codes from outside, and by external stimuli which alter the contextual situation” (Lotman 1990: 22). The dream is segmented into the (dominant) elements making up its structure (the selection of which is in part done upon autocommunication). As proposed, we have a dream that either ends up in or has falling as its climax in accordance with the above figurativization, parts of which are more essential than others, depending on the dreamer’s take. In autocommunication “the addresser inwardly reconstructs his/her essence, since the essence of a personality may be thought of as an individual set of socially significant codes, and this set changes during the act of communication” (Lotman 1990:22).

3.2. Dream and symbol

Theoretically similar with the discrete unit in a class of semantically and structurally independent entities, and never belonging to one synchronic section of a culture, the secondary content of symbol may be functionally and structurally collocated with the nucleus of a dream as symbol of consciousness. The isotopes upon which the nucleus is constituted are rigidly organized (albeit their positions may be changed in the semiotic square) and never, as such, offer a clear, indistinct meaning but provide the possibility for generating different readings, all of which generate from one semic (semantic) category. The outcome of any final reading of the nucleus is similar to the being of symbol in that “the content of a symbol irrationally glimmers through the expression level” (Lotman 1990: 102). The variance of the primary expression level of a symbol with regard to the invariable secondary content is then analogous (iterative) with dreamt dreams with regard to //originating from// the nucleus.

Much like our dream theme that has several ways to manifest (and several ways to be remembered and forgotten) as iterative paraphrasings in all consciousness, the symbol “actively correlates with its cultural context, transforms it and is transformed by it” (Ibid. 104). Our nucleus also correlates with the contexts of individuals or, the structures abstracted from individuals’ states of consciousness facilitate the nucleus in a myriad of ways. To enable the collocation of dream and symbol (in the cultural system) even further, dream needs firstly to be defined as a text. Text is a fairly open term in cultural semiotics but in very general terms it may be said to be the entire sum of the structural relations that found expression.

To narrow this down a bit, text may also be defined “by pointing to a concrete object having its own *internal* features which cannot be deduced from anything else apart from itself” (Lotman, Piatigorsky 1978: 232). It must be postulated that a dream can not become anywhere except for in a sleeping consciousness, it can not be daydreamt for then it is no longer a dream but musing. Each dream is individual and subjective in each consciousness and has its individual and subjective internal features – an illocution ‘dream of this’ is not effective or at least it requires some effort. The internal features of a dream in addition to the semio-narrative nucleus revolve around the figurativized semic figures in accordance with the thematic, narrative trajectory generated and cannot be deduced from anything else; this inavoidably creates a

structure of some sort, regardless whether we are talking about the organization of the initial semantic values of a dream or of its re-syntagmatization upon awakening.

A text requires to be coded (at least) twice and in order to dream, it must be presumed that the individual psyche needs to be in possession of knowledge²¹ upon which the pragmatic dimension as the internal referent for the cognitive dimension is based. This knowledge can be said to ‘exist’ in consciousness – where there is always memory – as a whole and during sleep it regresses so that its internal relations defining its structural and organizational character become freer, as is evident in the polylingualism of the *Traumwelt* where the form/content of representational categories is pragmatically indifferent and semantically polyvalent without a predestined trajectory to the extent afforded by the nucleus’ trajectories.

In other words, dream has potential ability to transform and conjoin any knowledge into any imagery by breaching the rift ‘whence-to-where’ according to certain rules which in their turn orientate the precession of imagery in the same sense that (poetic) text has “potential ability to transfer any word from the reserve of semantic capacity (h_1) to the subset that determines the flexibility of the language (h_2) and vice versa” (Lotman 1977: 78). The vice versa naturally applies to recalled dreams as well, especially if we take dream to be “fundamentally, a “language for one person”” (Lotman 2009: 146). It is this freedom of association in dream-as-text and dream-as-language that facilitates the translation of knowledge of ‘who-knew-what’ into the secondary code or language of dream as schematizable ‘signs-in-their-pure-form’ and by extension, propagates the creation of (primordial) text, the meaning of which is established awake and which may or may not be dreamt of.

“We should note that the properties of structure and demarcation are interrelated” (Lotman 1977: 53). As distinct semiotic spaces, the boundary between dream and reality is – at least today – clearly demarcated. This is quite obvious even phylogenetically in that dream binds us with another reality; the reality of asleep and the reality of awake that are opposed in our consciousness one way or the other. Besides this, dream – like text – opposes “signs not entering into its composition, in

²¹ “Communication may be considered, from a certain point of view, as the transmission of knowledge from one domain of enunciation to the other. Such a transfer of knowledge (about which little can be said, except that it may be intuitively compared to the concept of signification) first presents itself as a transitive structure: it is always knowledge about something, it is inconceivable without the object of knowledge.” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 167–168)

accord with the principle of inclusion–exclusion” (Lotman 1977: 52). That is to say, the potentially generated thematically oriented (figurative) trajectories afforded by the nucleus oppose, at the level of manifestation, all contradictory figurative units.

On the other hand, text also “resists all structures not marked by a boundary” (Ibid. 52), meaning that the figurative units must by default arise from somewhere else than the dream itself, from the subject’s knowledge, from the nucleus; the (a)syntactic organization of imagery being in accordance with the NP’s hypotactic relation(s) – “the hierarchical relation linking two terms situated at two different stages of derivation” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 145). By distancing from the nucleus, the majority of imagery in the final reading of a dream most often does not (iconically, experientially) correspond solely to the initial starting point for then it would be only one term on the square; nor does it (always) correspond to reality for that matter albeit it affords the same meaning effect ‘reality’. – a synopsis is required

As text, the dream does not accommodate structures from within its unpredestined ‘self,’ from its trajectory that is syntagmatically (re-)organized upon awakening. As a dynamic symbol – ‘thing’ – a remembered dream can not directly relate with the concrete contents (or structure) of consciousness; whereas as a ‘non-thing’ it ‘concretely and appropriately relates with something *defined* in the contents of consciousness’ (from or by which it supposedly came) – or, backtracking from the final, single reading of dream, it ultimately relates to the nucleus as defined in consciousness. Which is an analogous structural position as that of symbol’s in the cultural system. Moreover, with regard to the ‘something *defined*’ in consciousness, dream (and symbol) as “a text possesses an indivisible textual meaning, and in this respect can be viewed as an integral signal unit” (Lotman 1977: 52). That is, as far as the figurative units are not in contradiction with the nucleus (or any of its isotopes) on the level of their manifestation, they need not be in a relation of (iconic) correspondence with regards to the secondary content as defined in the contents of consciousness.

A text’s boundaries are irregularly distributed over different semiotic levels or across different points in the semiosphere and the same applies to dreams which have the meaning effect “reality” although the *Traumwelt* consists of imagery drawn from the ‘real’ and ‘unreal’ by way of transference of significant features with regard to the nucleus. It is their irregularity that necessitates typologies of texts in order to decipher the content (of text) in an adequate fashion.

As has been postulated, “I” can hardly be considered to be a structure, fact or content of consciousness in dream – “I” is not a distinguishable sign in a space consisting only of signs within the subject (‘I’) itself. By the same token, the primary ‘supplementary code’ that alters the contextual situation boils down to the resurgence of “I” as a structured fact of consciousness, as an active sign to which the world is sieved. It is then first and foremost the “I” of dream that is transformed into the “I” of awake, the former’s experiences still echoing in the latter and this echo has the effect to restructure.

3.3. Dream restructuring “I”

Provided that the syntagmatic principles applied to the remembered dream that is slowly vanishing are taken as asemantic (though ‘all categories including syntactic structures are semantic in nature’) they can be treated as external codes, the effect(s) of which is to restructure the message, i.e. dream as text. “However, for the system to work there has to be a confrontation and interaction between two different principles: a message in some semantic language and the intrusion of a purely syntagmatic, supplementary code” (Lotman 1990: 25).

The nucleus of our dream as a semio-narrative structure on the fundamental semantic level whence the generative trajectory originated is wholly indifferent on what comes to its form of manifestation and yet, provides us with a message in some semantic language, the dream-text; the final reading of which depends wholly on the subject. It is by way of the syntagmatic code introduced upon the initial structure that the nucleus becomes narratable to others and one’s self, even if the falling would have been vertical, it still felt like rapid, horizontal movement. In general, taking the class of dreams of falling, it can not be said that the nucleus would somehow automatically acquire the position of dominance in all such dreams remembered. Granted, it most always would play an essential part but for a given subject, other aspects of the dream may play a more prominent role depending on the figurativization.

A dream is a purely semantic language, it consisting solely of signs in their pure form. Upon the recollection that revolves around the nucleus a “purely formal organization” (Ibid. 28) is introduced as a supplementary code that is a syntagmatic construction thus shifting the onomastic sub-components of the ‘original’ dream

along with the anchoring effect (meaning ‘reality’?) Provided that ‘falling’ and its usual repercussions – injury, death – is a fact of consciousness or more specifically, it is an object of knowledge in the cognitive dimension that has its internal referent derived from the pragmatic dimension, then the puzzlement called out by this absence of injury or death upon falling may be treated as another primary factor introducing new, formal organization onto the recollected dream.

But this confusion disappears swiftly due to the pressing of awake/active consciousness that acknowledges being in another dimension. Similarly, the parcels of dreams that do not disappear instantaneously but remain lodged into memory, become dislodged from the original dream-narrative. Or rather, they or some parts hold their ground in memory whereas the other parts vanish which alters the wholeness of the dream synopsis. This newly introduced construction caused partially by the incompatibility of the internal referent ‘falling’ in the pragmatic dimension and the (awake) cognitive dimension was “either totally without semantic value or tending to be without it” (Ibid. 29). The effect itself of surprise means nothing. This ‘reality shift’, albeit unvolitional and taken as a given, may be seen as cognitive doing, which “corresponds to a transformation which modifies the relation of a subject with the known object” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 33) calling forth a change in the subject’s cognitive state by introducing “a break, [that] is the locus of transformation” (Ibid. 311).

By cognitive doing, the onomastic components and semic figures of the dream are shifted (by way of isotopic connectors) in accordance with awake “reality,” and the junction²² between subject (dreamer) and object (dream) is modified along with the positioning of (historical) anchoring in/from memory. By the relational ambiguity between the internal referent in the pragmatic dimension with regard to the cognitive dimension, the reproduction of ‘that which is real’ in and from the dream acquires either a different external referent – a simulacrum formed by historical anchoring – or it refers to it in a different fashion. That is, the meaning effect “reality” created in the dream by the referential illusion that transformed the semiotic (semio-narrative?) figures into images of the world via historical anchoring is shifted in accordance with the (cognitive dissonance of the?) newly introduced external code (ultimately ‘I’) to correspond to something in “reality.” Or, ‘falling’ in the pragmatic dimension as

²² “Junction is defined as that relation which joins the subject with object. It is the constitutive function of utterances of state” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 166).

internal referent with regard to the cognitive dimension is distorted/expanded by the former's intrusion to the latter; the semiotic's pulsation to the symbolic.

The new syntagmatic construction creates a certain tension between the original dream and the secondary code: "the effect of this tension is the tendency to interpret the semantic elements of the text as if they were included in the supplementary syntagmatic construction and have thereby acquired new, relationary meanings from this interaction" (Lotman 1990: 28). That is, the nucleus' elementary signification seems somehow derived from the order of things in reality, now based on the outside world, or pragmatic dimension in the strict sense. Hence the necessity to interpret dreams. They are 'as if' real due to the *Traumwelt* and everything therein being analogous to real space so the two must be interconnected somehow – for example symbolically – and if they are, then whatever was experienced in a dream, must have its counterpart in reality one way or the other.

Provided that the separate semiotic existence of the two spaces is recognized and a dream re-syntagmatized, this "secondary code aims to liberate the primary signifying elements from their normal semantic values" (Ibid. 28). This, however, does not happen. The secondary code of "reality," though having reassured that no actual falling took place is unable to efface the primary signifying elements from memory. Moreover, the elements were originally generated from the nucleus (or one of the isotopes) and manifested as the final reading, the 'normal semantic values' of which were by necessity in accordance with the generative/narrative trajectory. Ultimately, the 'normal semantic values' as such were normal only in the *Traumwelt* (except for the nucleus as constituted in the (experiential) pragmatic dimension) and so, to erase or lose a memory is one thing and can be done by the human intellect in several ways but the root, the semio-narrative structure whence it arose is ineradicable.

By way of (re-)narratization, the "growth of the syntagmatic connections within the message stifles the primary semantic connections and, at a certain level of perception, the text may behave like a complex a-semantic message" (Ibid. 28). The syntagmatic growth creates firstly confusion – the abstract category of vertical movement figurativized already as a dream becomes a re-interpretation of an interpretation which in its turn is again translated back to language. "The translation of the dream into the languages of human communication is accompanied by a decrease in the level of uncertainty and by an increase in the level of

communicability” (Lotman 2009: 145). It may seem that the dream-narrative makes no sense whatsoever and by this the primary semantic connections generated from the nucleus and presented in the dream become stifled and insignificant; in a word, become a-semantic and disappear – melt away. All dreams are memories – nothing more, nothing less. That is the issue; when dreaming, it’s a real world you’re in. And suddenly it vanishes without you actually knowing or rather, noticing.

What is left of the dream in memory must (should) be somewhat deeply connected with the nucleus, regardless whether the dreamt images (semic figures) correspond to it or not. That is to say, even if all semic figures corresponding to falling were to become a-semantic and forgotten, the semio-narrative structure, the nucleus, remains invariable. Thus it may be proposed that the nuclei remain/are deposited in memory as (objects of) knowledge, quite regardless whether they are acknowledged or not. In other words, the symbol’s secondary content remains beyond reach and comprehension lest it be subjected to a sign system and de-symbolized.

Indeed, besides language they can not be formulated elsewhere than in a dream and in this sense they, as structures as for example on the semiotic square above, may be said to be rigid to the utmost; they also serve as the bases for the elementary structure of signification(s). In this sense, as semio-narrative structures projected onto the semiotic square, they are formal structures (the four isotopes can be said to be syntagmatically organized to the highest degree) and yet lack a uniform meaning. “But a-semantic texts, with a high degree of syntagmatic organization, tend to become organizers of our associations” (Lotman 1990: 28).

As was noted, meaning effect is the only reality that can be grasped but not directly apprehended and as has been pointed out, remembered dreams are practically invariably endowed with supplementary syntagmatic construction – if in no other sense, then in the sense that a dream is never remembered in its totality as it happened (like everything else, save for eidetic memory). The recognition of two distinct analogous spaces brings about a reciprocal effect upon the organization as perceived by consciousness in both spaces, shifting the impression of “reality” as it is produced by our senses when confronted with meaning by way of dynamic onomastics between dreams and the real. “The more the syntagmatic organization is stressed, the freer and more associative will be our semantic connections” (Ibid. 28). That is, the more notice is paid to dreams, the elements that constitute “reality” become freer and more associative.

4. DREAM AND SYMBOL IN THE CULTURAL SYSTEM

The fourth part concentrates on the proposition of the isomorphic and isofunctional relation of the cultural system and the individual genetic memory and their relation as constituted by and in their respective symbols. The cultural system is shaped by the structure of symbols in a given culture and consequently, the genetic memory of an individual should also be susceptible to change according to the structure (and organizing principles) of its symbols. Dreams, fairly irrespective of their manifestations, along with dreaming itself serve an essential function in the development and maturation of the brain in all mammals. It is especially for the human being that dreams are of utmost importance by effecting memory and by the same token identity; the elementary semiotic mechanism of which is describable in theory.

Whether dreams propagated consciousness and language is one thing but their function serving as structural positions by way of primordial symbols (of consciousness and culture) that can be collocated with the concept of nucleus seems undeniable. As was mentioned, we spend our time in REM sleep even before we are born; more so than other mammals with comparable brains. This is again another reason to look by the psychoanalytic tradition for it may be argued that before being born, there is no psyche to analyze nor is there one in culture; also, as has been pointed out, the nuances in recounted dreams depend heavily on the subject's linguistic competence and the models to which these tales are then subjected to.

As is well-known, the cerebral cortex supposedly plays an important role in consciousness and is also responsible for our 'higher' cognitive actions – imagination, language etc. Accordingly, it may be inferred that what goes on in one's mind (rather, consciousness) especially in the back of one's head, in the posterior hot zone of dreaming, can have effect on the physical nuances of the cerebral cortex (and the brain in general) by way of neuronal growth and synaptic plasticity that in their turn effect learning and unlearning or memory where the structure of consciousness "I" is in constant yet subtle turmoil. The outcomes manifest in personalities, identities and behaviour, how each individual subject constituted in their respective *chorae*

comprehends things (slightly) differently from others. For argument's sake, dreams, translations therein and their recollections may be proposed to have accelerated different aspects of consciousness which is physically reflected by the complexity of our cerebral cortex in comparison to other mammals'.

A sidenote in passing may be made with regard to the structure and common core of the vertebrate brain. Ours, consisting of two hemispheres upon both of which there is a pair on the other side (at present, nothing will be said of the processes happening therein) in a similar manner with all vertebrae; except for the pineal gland which is the only azygous, i.e. unpaired or singular organ in the brain. Though there is "a high degree of morphological variability in mammalian pineal organs, both across and within species" (Macchi, Bruce 2004: 178), practically all vertebrae brains harbor the pineal gland and one of its main functions is to produce melatonin and by that regulate sleep patterns. In pseudo-science, it is also referred to as 'the third eye' and due to its singularity and central location in the human brain along with its extensive vascularization gave way to "the foundation of René Descartes' conceptualization of the pineal as the 'seat of the soul,' or as the organ coordinating psychophysiological functions" (Ibid.). That is, besides the utter complexity and sophistication of our brain, our sleep nevertheless shares a common root with others. Also, the pineal gland may become calcified resulting in 'brain sand' (cf. Baconnier et al. 2002).

Regardless, this is not to say that *homo sapiens sapiens* would be a figment of imagination, at least on what comes to its flesh, but as is obvious, we live in a world regulated by non-existence, by the socio-symbolic which can hardly be said to be graspable as pointed out also in the psychoanalytic tradition's impenetrability through the symbolic order into the real. We do not contend ourselves to anything but only point towards the intuition that dreams – phylogenetically preceding language as the primordial unacknowledged modelling system in want of prominent thirdness striving to attach the one to the other as a third – due to their nature and function as well as their structure of primary expression/content serving as secondary expression for a more highly valued content would be a key element, a doorstep even to explicate "the hidden power, concealed in the mysterious depths, which controls man" (Lotman 2009: 146).

As has been noted, dream becomes acknowledged only upon awakening when we regain meta-awareness. It is in this sense that the isomorphism and isofunctionality becomes evident between dream as symbol of consciousness and

symbol in the cultural system; both of which (as (finalized) texts) during their process of creation, that is a suggestive mnemonic mechanism, are “perceived by the reader as a reminiscence, since the processes of creating and of perceiving move in opposite directions: to the creative process the final text is a summation, to the perceiving process it is a point of departure” (Lotman 1990: 105–106).

Text fulfills a twofold function in culture, it conveys and generates meaning, information. In order to convey or transmit information as unchanged as possible from one semiotic entity to another, the text needs to be as univocal as possible and coded in such a language that it coincides between addresser and addressee. Dream is not included in a syntagmatic chain in the strict sense, there is no continuance; due to the lack of meta-awareness and by extension absence of anthroposemiotic sign-ness proper, there is no strict organization in dream before it is recalled; i.e. it is asyntactic and does not ‘belong’ anywhere much like consciousness and even when recalled, dreams preserve (or acquire) their independent structure and meaning to the extent that affecting them can be avoided by the awake mentation. Though a distortion of reality based upon knowledge from reality, dream is, in a sense, completely univocal (addresser *is* addressee despite that dream cannot be said to be auto- or any communication) and when viewed as de-symbolized symbolic representations of something (else), dreams are absolutely non-arbitrary in relation to their content in that they originate from the secondary content of symbol(s), or the nucleus (or in psychoanalysis, the navel). Note that this does not necessitate that the content of a dream represented symbolically would have a presupposed relation to its manifestation.

Whereas the latter function of text as generating new information is better off when the code is not (completely) shared but requires some amount of translation resulting from the distortion of the text’s content. As was mentioned, the ‘real’ and ‘unreal’ of *Traumwelt* comes from the dislocating of the inner relations of knowledge as a whole giving rise to semantic polyvalence of dream-imagery – the semiotic in its relating to the symbolic posing contradiction therein is granted a wider scope thus generating imagery anew – a reciprocal relation with the ‘real’ for that – it is functionally analogous with “one of the essential methods [of text] for forming new meanings [...] transferring a feature to *another text*” (Lotman 1977: 52). A text fulfilling the function (or having it as dominant characteristic) of generating meaning, should be internally heterogeneous and should exist in a continuum of heterogeneous

semiotic spaces enabling the interaction between the structures of both the text itself and the semiotic space surrounding it.

By virtue of its predominantly asyntactic nature, the semiotic space of dream is heterogeneous and provided that the recurrence of ‘sleep-awake’ can be viewed as two discrete spaces forming a continuum (of (a) life), it becomes inevitable that their respective structures are bound to interact – on the level of language at least. It is hard to imagine someone having a dream without any knowledge and it is as hard to imagine someone to not have the faintest recollection of a dream or of ever having dreamt; though the latter is, of course, more likely. The *Traumwelt* is internally heterogeneous (if not chaotic) by structure and organization whereas a recalled dream, as was mentioned, behaves in a similar manner as symbol, as a finalized text. Depending on the classificatory feature(s) “distinguishing text from nontext, it should be remembered that these concepts may be reversible as far as the limit in each given case is concerned” (Lotman 1977: 235).

Broadly speaking, whether (or to what extent) one (person, community or culture) regards the world as text/non-text or the dream as text/non-text is derived on the basis of their respective functions in a given world-view, “the mutual relationship among the system, its realization, and the addresser-addressee of the text” (Ibid. 233). Taking dream as a text on what has been presented, a noteworthy sidenote from the point-of-view of expression is in order; from the point of view of expression, a text always consists of sign(s) and “expression, in contrast to non-expression, forces us to view a text as the realization of a system, as its material embodiment” (Lotman 1977: 52). That is, dream as radix of afflatus – a source of inspiration on what to make of the world.

4.1. Dream from Antiquity – in place of secondary revision

Albeit today the question of addresser/addressee with regards to dream is largely unquestioned [*sic*], in ancient times, “in more developed mythological structures, the dream is identified with the *alien’s* prophetic voice, i.e., represents the turning of *her/him to me*” (Lotman 2009: 143). Here is offered a short case study as an example that the symbolologic model-in-the-making as presented in this thesis is indeed applicable on what comes to dreams and their effect on subjects, at least in retrospect.

Alas, the thematic of this dream is not in accordance with the nucleus ‘falling’ as has been presented here but it should not matter, for the dream in question serves as a prime example to tie it all together due to its effect on the dreamer and his effect on culture.

Quintus Ennius (239 B.C. – 169 B.C.) was one of the more renowned poets of his time in Rome, where he was brought to as a slave by Marcus Porcius Cato around 204 B.C.; he lived a humble life teaching and writing and was very much liked by several influential senior citizens of Rome such as Scipio Africanus, Scipio Nasica and Marcus Fulvius Nobilior; of whom the last Ennius accompanied on a war campaign to Aetolia and later eulogized him as conqueror of Ambracia in the *praetexta Ambracial*. With the aid of his supporters, Ennius acclaimed the rights of Roman citizenship.

His most renowned work are the *Annales* or, ‘Yearly books’ which deal with the history of Rome presented in hexameter. Ennius replaced the Roman saturnian verse with the (Greek) hexameter, which required great mastering of the Latin verse-structure and subsequently, by his superb use of Homeric formulaics and epithets, the created Latin hexameter became the official verse to be used in the Roman epic.

The *Annales* begins with a description of a dream in which Homer appears to Ennius – a brief synopsis: Ennius, having been taken to the Hill of Muses is confronted by Homer, who speaks of pythagorean metempsychosis alongside a tale of the fate of his own soul, which now rested itself in Ennius’ body.

Whether the introduction is to be seen as poetic fable orienting the reader towards what is to come or as a factual description of Ennius’ dream is a question of choice – either way, as one of the more widespread fragments of what’s left of the *Annals* it is better known than the work itself, which also had quite the impact on literature. Here, this occurrence will be associatively overviewed in a cursory manner under the terminology and framework provided above.

Allowing that there exist an idea, a notion of quality of superb authorship as such – the smallest (or largest) common denominator shared among all authors which can be said to be distributed unevenly among them and this is reflected in Ennius’ appreciation of their work. The intrinsic meaning of whatever notion of quality according to which Ennius defined good or bad authorship is known to him as a relation of ‘SOMETHING’S QUALITY OF BEING A SIGN OF SOMETHING FOR SOMEONE IN SOME PLACE’.

Excluding the necessity of syntax, or the ‘putting-into-words’ of this attribute by way of the given definition of sign and provided that this whatever notion of superb authorship (henceforth marked by **(X)**) was (an object of) knowledge acknowledged by Ennius; **(X)**, then (as dreamt of by Ennius), it can be said to be a symbol or a finalized text and as such does not have to be included in a syntagmatic chain, and if it is included in one, it preserves its own semantic and structural independence in the sense that the stable meaning of **(X)** is quite indifferent on what comes to its expressions.

It has a single, self-contained meaning value and a clearly demarcated boundary which makes it possible to isolate it from the surrounding semiotic context in the sense that where the **(X)** of authorship is not under consideration, the necessity and intensity of its invariable meaning which ultimately relates to consciousness lessens or disappears wholly. Homer, as the epicentre of excellence in authorship, both historically and supposedly personally adored by Ennius as well was, as such, *a significant thing* with respect to consciousness that exists *in relation to me as to a psychical mechanism* in quite an autonomous way and thus can be said to possess both significance as an *especial thing* and meaning in its reference to consciousness.

To specify, the (secondary) meaning of **(X)** is and remains unable to relate to consciousness or its contents (or structure) directly, but as a concrete thing, i.e. the sign-ness of the knowledge of (the works of) Homer as symbol enables it to relate to consciousness. A content – Homer’s authorship (I ignore here how it was grasped by Ennius on the primary expression level) which in its turn serves as expression level for another content – the **(X)** of authorship which concretely and appropriately relates with something *defined* in the contents of consciousness – the desired criterion with regard to authorship for Ennius as it came to him in a dream in the form of Homer. We here point out the structure of the main aspects of Ennius’ dream consisting of Homer as primary expression; Hill of Muses (Homer’s legacy *sensu lato*) as primary content/secondary expression as the **(X)** of authorship for Ennius. The last is that which, by being a symbol’s meaning proper, relates to the **(X’)** defined in the contents of consciousness and it is also that which ultimately propagates the threefold function of said symbol.

Including the short dream-narrative’s eventuations, it can be said that it represented something individual (referential function) as embodied by Homer (primary expression/content), expressing the idea of **(X)** of authorship as represented

by the Hill of Muses (secondary expression/content); the tale of Homer's metempsychosis in the dream as symbol communicated a role, an attitude and an addition to the personal identity of Ennius (existential function), evoking appropriate attitudes and behavior in him (dispositional function), that became consolidated as a type of thinking by way of restructuring the "I" when he awoke (and indeed, became realized as the measure-of-verse in the future of Roman epic).

The last, dispositional or metasymbolic function, can intuitively be said to have 'come-to' or have effect only in the awake mind of Ennius. Acting as commentary on the other two as the *organization* of symbolic objects in a context, i.e. defining the parameters of understanding the dream, upon awake it defined and positioned for Ennius the symbolic themes, relations and values of the dream, giving prominence to some as the metempsychosis of Homer to Ennius shows and evoking associations and contrast among all. It was surely a pleasurable albeit not an easy task to accept that thou *art* Homer.

This is possibly what or how it was for Ennius Quintus as experienced subjectively; his dream in total was – as all recalled dreams – a text and in addition, unlike the layman's dreams usually, was weaved into a textual form and propagated the generation of not just new information with regards to Ennius' personality but also a new language were we to take the otherwise nigh inexplicable shift in Roman literature from the saturnian verse to hexameter as language in the wide sense of the word. Generalizing, it can be said that Ennius' dream as text was a hypertext for Ennius subjectively – dream is in a sense, the generation of random associations of knowledge – whereas on the level of (Roman) culture as a whole, it was and served as the basis of intertextuality by virtue of motivating Ennius to apply hexameter in Latin, a strategic and intentional means of association as intended by the author.

Ennius' dream is a text in both senses of the word and as a finalized text originating from the knowledge of Ennius in accordance with what has been suggested, it possesses an indivisible textual meaning – the (X) of authorship manifested as a dream – which, at least in retrospect, had definite internal features not deducible from anything else apart from itself due to its subjectivity; and as intertext functioning on the level of culture, it is reducible only if at all to the one-person-language or dream of Ennius. Whether a true account or made-up fable, as a text the dream was doubly coded and as such, clearly demarcated – as a dream it is not a part of the historical account of the *Annales* and as a (made-up) text, it is not part of dream

irrespective of whether it is viewed in accordance with the aspect of truthfulness of text. Whether either or, the introduction to the *Annales* presents itself as text to the reader being in opposition to signs not entering into its composition, in accord with the principle of inclusion–exclusion.

By resisting all structures not marked by a boundary, the dream-fable acquires its meaning, its authority to be voiced and leave a mark in history from beyond; it was Homer himself who delegated the authority (of himself) to Ennius to apply the Greek verse as means of expression and their syntagmatics to the Latin language. Provided that dream and reality can be said to be two different semiotic spaces or semiospheres in both of which the boundaries of (X) as represented symbolically by Homer are irregularly distributed upon different points, it may be noted that the authority of (X) as Homer as presented by Ennius in the introduction is an outcome of transferring a feature to another text thus motivating and propagating the use of hexameter.

In spite of all this, what is presented in the introduction by Ennius – regardless whether as a dream or a text – it has an innate quality of truthfulness in the full sense of the word; the work as a whole reversed the positioning of the concepts ‘text’/‘non-text’ and transformed (or regressed) Latin verse as a whole by creating a new text point-of-view in the metric sense, a position from which the truth is known and from which falsehood is impossible, thus legitimizing the use of hexameter and by the same token contributing to its truthfulness on the level of culture by opposing itself to non-text, written in saturnian verse.

Other similar incidents are abound also in more recent history, one of the most notable ones being the case of Dmitri Mendeleev, to whom the solution on how to finalize the periodic table of elements came in a dream (cf. Kedrov 1967) or the case of Otto Loewi, to whom the correct form of a hypothesis with regard to chemical transmission of nerve impulses – which landed him the Nobel prize for medicine in 1936 – came in a dream, though with an incubation period of seventeen years (Valenstein 2005: 57–58). Unfortunately, due to inaccessibility to proper literature at present, other similar occasions with regard to science, history, religion, literature and music cannot be pointed to.

Regardless, it stands that the recollection of a dream-text – structurally analogous to symbol – has usually at best only its primary content distorted upon translation from a subjective point-of-view and thus can be said to be the generator of information whereas the secondary content may remain unknown or latent (hard to

say whether it is obtainable in cases). From this, it follows that irrespective of differing imagery, the *Traum-an-sich* may still be the same, indivisible meaning striving towards unification of different levels into a single, comprehensible whole able to relate with something *defined* in the contents of consciousness and as a mechanism, the above echoes the two mutually opposed mechanisms of culture:

(a) The tendency toward diversity – toward an increase in differently organized semiotic languages, the “polyglotism” of culture.

(b) The tendency toward uniformity – the attempt to interpret itself or other cultures as uniform, rigidly organized languages.

(Lotman et al. 1973: 76)

4.2. *Chora* for Culture

As has been mentioned, asleep and dreaming, whilst consciousness is passive, the rigid organization of an individual’s knowledge i.e. memory become freer which gives rise to semantic polyvalence of (potential) imagery therein; so much so that even the “I” is no longer a rigid structure or, the “I” of *Traumwelt* acquires different existential relations with regard to its surroundings that it itself is or generates; simultaneously being deprived of meta-awareness. Regardless whether we take dreams to be signs – symbolic or any other – and not specifying the way they have come about, their general structure nevertheless adheres to the general structure of symbol in the cultural system in that both have a primary expression and content; the latter of which serves as secondary expression to something inexpressible by any means, the symbol as such.

As in our example of ‘falling’ above, the feeling of falling is of proprioceptive origin and as such falls under the semiotic by way of *chora* instead of the symbolic and due to its origin, is non-expressive in the same manner as a state of consciousness that would facilitate the abstraction of the structure ‘falling’ within it. It remains true (?) however, that dreams – especially remembered ones – are indeed symbolic by their representation, sometimes overwhelmingly so, but the central idea here is exactly that the passivity of consciousness loosens the organization and structure of memory, and simultaneously grants the semiotic more leeway with regard to the (re-)

organizing of the semantically polyvalent potential that in its turn accelerates the symbolic aspect of dream imagery in the signifying process thereby shaping the dreamer's subjectivity and experience.

Considering that there are two modes of signification operating in each signifying process; one “an expression of clear and orderly meaning” and the other “an evocation of feeling [...] a discharge of the subject's energy and drives” (McAfee 2000: 16) or, the symbolic and semiotic respectively, then it may be argued that the dimensions of awake (**A**) and dream (**Z**) as explicated above may be likened to these two modes by way of analogy with our primary modelling system – natural language. That is, in a similar manner as in average everyday (verbal) language use, we are happily unaware of any grammar or rules (lest they be broken), unaware of the specificities of *langue* during *parole* if one pleases and yet both are present. Provided we dream, irrespective whether dreams are remembered or not, and that conscious language use is not the sole thing present in the consciousness of the speaker, it may be allowed in accordance with “the fact, observed by linguists, that the conscious and unconscious factors form a constant bond in verbal experience” (Jakobson 1985: 160) – knowledge as a whole, i.e. memory in addition to talk – that any given representamen abide to and “are organised in patterned sets so as to incorporate coded information in a manner analogous to the sounds and words and sentences of a natural language” (Leach 1989: 10). In psychoanalysis, this constant bond would be a part forming the gap i.e. unconscious manifesting as vacillation – *lapsus* and the like.

Tautological to an extent but the point remains; in a similar manner as dreams may be subjected to structural analysis only to reveal similarities with mythological texts which in their turn are narrative manifestations of de-symbolized symbols of consciousness. As such manifestations, myths may be likened to the primary expression and content although as is obvious, they cannot be said to be symbols for they are myths; specific sign-systems that distort and narrate the symbol. Therefore, as knowledge has it, humans have (had) the tendency to create fetishes of all sorts on the basis of myths (ultimately, on the basis of symbols) by way of metaphoric/metonymic ritual condensation, “the material representation of abstract ideas through the symbolisation of metaphysical entities that started out as inchoate concepts in the mind” (Ibid. 37).

It may be noted in passing with regard to ritual condensation and the constant bond between conscious and unconscious in verbal experience that a (linguistic)

metaphor does not state a direct comparison but uses a different word or expression to denote another term on the same paradigm by way of substitution whereas metonymy is “the use of a term for one thing applied to something else with which it is usually associated” (Homer 2005: 43). That is, metaphor – whether linguistic or any other – is an act of substitution corresponding to the paradigmatic axis whereas metonymy, also regardless of the sign system in question, is a relation of contiguity that corresponds to the syntagmatic axis. In psychoanalysis, these correspond to the formation(s) of dreams as condensation – “the process whereby two or more signs or images in a dream are combined to form a composite image that is then invested with the meaning of both its constitutive elements” (Ibid.) – and displacement as “the process through which meaning is transferred from one sign to another” (Ibid.). This is just to show, once again, the analogous nature of the human intellect and culture.

Thus we have a somewhat clear picture of the similarities between the two, the structure of their (respective) symbols, their signifying processes and the semiotic and symbolic aspects in each. What is lacking, however, is culture’s analogue for the semiotic *chora*. Granted, as has been mentioned, culture does not feel nor does it succumb to the ways that the *chora* is formed. Hence the overlooking of psychoanalysis as such, culture does not have a psyche to analyse. What may be done however, is to bring about the notion of cultural models: “the descriptions of cultural texts which are constructed with the help of methods of spatial modeling, and in particular, topological ones” (Lotman 1975: 103). That is, the descriptions of cultural texts that are constructed according to the evaluative (spatial, structural, organisatory, linguistic, etc.) semantics as defined in the cultural model, the structure and organization of which depends on the universal space based on abstract (topological) categories orientating the culture in its evolution.

In very general terms, each culture has its definition of the universal space that it ‘occupies’ in accordance with types of fragmentation of said universal space, its dimension(s) and by the same token, orientation therein. These as well as the cultural model are constructed on the basis of cultural texts. The cultural text by default possesses an “elevated degree of textual significance [which] is interpreted as a guarantee of truth” (Lotman, Piatigorsky 1978: 237) regardless whether one is discussing paradigmatic or syntagmatic expressions, or semantic or syntactic (types of) cultures. Depending on the classificatory feature(s) “distinguishing text from

nontext, it should be remembered that these concepts may be reversible as far as the limit in each given case is concerned” (Ibid. 235).

To answer questions like ‘How is it constructed?’ with regard to world-order (natural, social, religious, ethical, etc.) or ‘What happened and how?’ set forth (?) by a community or culture, the cultural text is divided into two types of sub-texts: “Those characterizing the structure of the world [...] Those characterizing the place, disposition and activity of man in the surrounding world” (Lotman 1975: 102). In the light of analogy with regard to the human *chora*, our emphasis lie with the former because of its immobility and discreteness of space, and its enantiomorphic potential. The sub-texts of this type, “if they reproduce a dynamic view of the world, then this is an immanent change according to the system: universal set A is transformed into universal set B” (Ibid. 102).

With regard to rituals as sign systems that have de-symbolized this or that symbol by reducing an elementary space-indicator into an *axis mundi* by way of enantiomorphic transformation, i.e. “that” world into “this” world – provided it “reproduces a scheme of the structure of the world” (Lotman 1975: 102) – allows us to axiologically deduce that accordingly, the gods and others beyond behave in the same manner as we because the decree for our way-of-life was handed down to us from them; this as well as other similar events is then re-enacted in various ways. This vertical positioning of peoples-and-gods (manifest in sub-text characterizing the place, disposition and activity of man in the world) already contains a hierarchy, a given structure of the world (yielding from sub-texts characterizing the structure of the world).

Allowing that the vertical axis as such (and objects of the natural world thereupon) is part of a universal cultural model, the orientation of which (direct, inverse, twofold) is derived in accordance to the point-of-view of a given cultural text and that this axis facilitates the level(s) of content acting as the plane of expression in relation to other (inner orientations of) models; it alludes to an *a priori* vertical dispositioning of value in a homeomorphic world. Or, a structurally similar position with the relations represented as topological spaces facilitating the world and generating means for pulsation and rhythm as afforded by the *chora* in the human subject.

To emphasize, the cultural text is also based on abstract topological categories functioning as the orienting aspect in relation to the culture’s worldview; it’s inner

organizing principles serve as the basis for the principal mode of (structure(s) of) thinking as expressed in the culture's language(s) via the investments of semantic values onto the axes of spatial categories (among others). This spatial model functions as a metalanguage, whereas the spatial structure itself functions as a text. These spatial characteristics become the "level of the content of a universal cultural model which acts as the plane of expression in relation to others" (Lotman 1975: 101–102). Or, in which direction is 'good' and 'bad' and why; how are they expressed; these spatial characteristics are or have the potentiality to be enantiomorphic with regards to evaluations due to the heterogeneity and asymmetry of the(ir) semiotic space(s) i.e. something 'bad' may also exist on the plane of 'good', 'good' can become 'bad' etc.

Redundant as it is, the spatial model functions as a metalanguage, (for example is up is good) whereas the spatial structure itself (s/he(ro) go underworld sky) functions as a text – both manifest in myth, the chronotopic mapping of which would give a more general idea of a culture's values (a more in-depth analysis might show other things as well). The cultural model on the other hand defines *how* the universal space of a culture is divided, *what* and *where* exists and *which* directions are possible to take – abstract or concrete (which in cases overlap). In other, more general words, "a semantic interpretation of a cultural model consists in establishing the correspondences of its elements [...] to phenomena in the objective world" (Ibid. 104).

On what comes to the cultural type, it is defined by the nature of spatial characteristics of the cultural model, the points of correlation (of/in the universal space) between what's Internal and what's External from the culture's point-of-view – "the position from which the truth is known and from which falsehood is impossible" (Lotman, Piatigorsky 1978: 236). The truthfulness of this position yields from its textual expression and, being Internal resists what's External in the same fashion as the parallel opposition of 'text – non-text' and 'truth' – 'non-truth', the latter two creating a 'text point-of-view' by which "in determining the simple correspondence between any points of one space and the points of another, we can easily model the relations of meaning as spatial relations" (Lotman 1975: 115).

What is the level of content, what is the plane of expression for and in the culture at hand and how did they come to be such. Though strictly speaking, this would fall under the symbolic. By allowing that a culture locates some semantic value upon the vertical axis as defined in its cultural text, it may be said that the

organizational principles of the semantic values abide to the evaluative structures upon the vertical axis among others; in parallel, as has been postulated, there does not exist a human being who has never fallen, i.e. there does not exist a *chora*, the semiotic of which would not be affected by the vertical axis.

The semantic significance and effect of the vertical axis becomes clear in mythological texts as well as in language itself. The all too familiar proverbial fall from grace, or paradise lost may serve as an example. Back in the day, according to the Old Testament, the first (man) and second (woman) human beings were banished from Paradise by the furious Semitic God for they were persuaded to eat the forbidden fruit from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil by the infamous Serpent; caught wearing leaves, the Almighty sent them away and never to return. Though on the level of narrative characterizing the place, disposition and activity, the events take place horizontally; on the level characterizing the sudden change in the structure of the world, the human being is cast vertically downward (though still atop of all beasts and land). An opposite example of such text: storming the Heavens to overthrow the Almighty, Lucifer was cast down (hence He is the Lord of this world). Similar examples drawing on the semantic value of the vertical axis are found practically in every culture's mythological texts which, by extension and analogy may be argued to serve the function of structural position as de-symbolized symbols as finalized texts forming the system as dreams of culture.

4.3. Types of Culture and Traditional Thinking passed on

In the light of cultural typology, some very general assumptions can be made with regard to the isomorphism and isofunctionality of the human intellect and culture. As has been noted above, both entities possess their respective semiotic *chorae*; in the human it originates and is based on the fragmented body, its motions and rhythms whereas in culture it comes about by the definitions of the fragmentation of the universal space. In the former, the semiotic regulates the symbolic whereas in the latter, the symbolic of culture is manifest in myths, outcomes of the desperate need to locate and define the human's position in the world.

This may be carried further by resorting to cultural typology as presented by Lotman (2010) whose typology is as follows:

1. I (+) II (-)	2. I (-) II (+)
3. I (-) II (-)	4. I (+) II (+)

In which:

I = Semantic meaning; II = Syntactic meaning.

1. – Cultural code is organised purely according to semantics;
2. – Cultural code is organised purely according to syntactics;
3. – Cultural code is the denial of both, and thus the denial of signs in general;
4. – Cultural code is a synthesis of both organisational forms.

(Lotman 2010: 39 [my translations])

“The idea of the world as being an order of real facts which are the expression of the spirit’s fervent motion duplicates the meaning endowed upon each event: semantic – the connection of physical life-phenomena with their hidden meanings – and, syntactic – their connection with the historical whole” (Ibid. 58). With regard to human’s position and status in the cosmological order, depending on the culture’s text and model, it is often either predominantly syntactic on the basis “that something exists, because it is a part of something more important than it is itself” (Ibid. 38) or predominantly semantic on the basis that “something exists, because it substitutes something more important than it is itself” (Ibid.). Based on the analogous structure and function of the human intellect and culture, it may be argued that a similar division exists in the subjects’ minds.

From the viewpoint of semantic dominance, the “most highly valued sign is the one with zero-expression – a non-spoken word” ((Lotman 2010: 45). In the semantic type, the meaning of a given sign is created on the basis of hierarchy, one and the same expression may be endowed with a different content on different levels. “This is why movement towards the truth is not a transition from one sign to the other but a deepening into the sign” (Ibid. 46). Whereas the syntactic type discards

symbolic meanings which propagates a mentality that sets “for themselves realistic, achievable goals and never sacrifices the practical interests for – from their point-of-view – putative, symbolic interests” (Ibid. 47).

There is an intuitive resonance between the types of culture and what has been stated above with regard to sign-ness originating from symbols (of consciousness), the signifying process along with the semiotic/symbolic divide as well as with the *chorae* of the intellectual objects natural human consciousness and culture as collective intellect. In order to propose a way to amplify this resonance for a larger auditorium than the present author’s person, it may be suggested that in order to be able to show the connection (or the lack of it for that matter), the “three-dimensional understanding of what culture is, how it is possible, and why it is inevitable from a particular point of thinking” (Zilberman 1988: 305) could perchance be used to bridge this gap.

The notion that the typology into which a given text belongs to is intuitively present as an essential element of the code in the consciousness of both addresser and addressee becomes somewhat intriguing raising potential questions of the origin of dream in both the human being and by extension, the system of culture. According to the type a culture belongs to, this question could be further researched by way of “types of traditional thinking, according to the possible combinations in modal transitions” (Ibid. 1988: 309). There are three types of modalities which subsume all other possible modalities or, “the rest can presumably be reduced to the three mentioned” (Ibid. 311). Before explicating these modalities, we will have a short overview of the typology of understanding i.e. the way(s) a thing can be thought of, grasped and comprehended in various cultural traditions that consists of three levels of modal reality:

- A) the level of absolute reality, or the metaphysics of tradition;
- B) the level of phenomenation, or the phenomenation of tradition i.e. culture;
- C) the level of absolute irreality, or the non-thinking of tradition i.e. intra-cultural absurdity.

That is, what there is or can be, how is it manifested and what there is not; or in other words, whether a culture is more bent towards semantics or syntactics, their synthesis or toward denial of signs in general. The modalities in their turn may be projected onto a scheme:

$$\frac{(A) B}{C}$$

In which:

A = Apodictic or Deontic or Hypothetic;

B = Apodictic or Deontic or Hypothetic;

C = Apodictic or Deontic or Hypothetic.

What comes to modal denotation, the apodictic modality denotes “the understanding of cultural *ideas* – since every scheme of discourse [...] can be constructed only in this modality, so that we are able to make the ‘knowables’ apparent and identifiable with specific objects of knowing” (Zilberman 1988: 311) That is, it is the modality in which understanding in the last leg ‘takes place’ whereas the deontic modality is “reserved for a denotation of the understanding of the cultural *norm*, since the effect of normativeness can be comprehended only under the condition of its obligatory [...] realization” (Ibid. 310). Lastly, the hypothetic modality denotes “a ‘striving’ for understanding cultural *values* – since only value can be identified through the implied [...] aspiration for possessing it” (Ibid.). That is, by applying modal methodology, the central premise of which is “that any fixable modal relation may be denoted by symbols but that in no case should it be understood as a *sign* of something” (Ibid. 307) we arrive at modal semiotics. With regard to the triadic sign, “the very way of constructing the triangle implies a dogmatic belief in ‘existent’ or ‘real’ things, language and thinking” (Ibid. 313) which become dispensable in modal semiotics; the elements of the triadic sign or “significance, signification and meaning may be treated as separable” (Ibid.). At present there is no reason for captiousness with regard to terms used to denote the elements of sign.

Furthermore, from the subjective point of view, since occurrence in the apodictic modality “indicates the object as subversive to both action and the subject performing it” (Ibid. 313) which presents the real structure of knowledge, it also denotes the meaning of action. Also subjectively, the deontic modality “denotes the

significance of action completely devoid of any signability” (Ibid. 312) whereas the hypothetic modality – due to for example the conventionality of signs that renders the signs insignificant by themselves – “subjectively denotes the *significations* of action” (Ibid. 312–313). From the schema above, a sixfold typology of philosophical identities, i.e. types of thinking is yielded: the methodological; the conceptual; the projective; the phenomenological; the axiomatic, and; the axiological.

The line of thought is then carried over to identify six basic types of cultural tradition by way of collocating the modalities of thinking with mental behaviours. The apodictic modality in which the understanding of cultural ideas and (subjective) meaning or knowledge occurs with the notion of interest of mental behaviour; interest is “a mental behavioral correlate of ‘discursion’, as its enactment leads to a change of the ‘inertial frame of reference’ by inducing presentations of modalities in various traditions, in some cognitive sense” (Ibid. 316).

The deontic modality in its turn along with the understanding of cultural norms and (subjective) significance will have as its correlate the temperament of mental behaviour; temperament should be understood via its etymological meaning as “something similar to ‘natural composition’, ‘structure’, or ‘pure’ functioning [...] ‘temperation’ precludes any thought of development but allows change, for example, in the natural-genetic order” (Ibid.).

Lastly, the hypothetic modality striving for understanding of cultural values (which, when obtained, is removed, i.e. dissolves) and (subjective) significations corresponds to the character of mental behaviour; also approached etymologically by way of Greek and Sanskrit, “i.e., ‘scraping, furrowing’, ‘specification’ or ‘characterization’ and ‘individuation’ (are presumed the qualifying marks of a temperament by the manner of its manifestation)” (Ibid.). That is, were we to manufacture for example a seal, the process would be “the ‘temperation’ of its material as a matrix, while putting signs on things with the former is the ‘characterization’ of the latter” (Ibid.).

These nine denominations may then be presented as a table and projected onto the scheme in a similar manner as the modalities above. The denominations:

I = Idea, Interest, Meaning or Knowledge

N = Norm, Temperament, Significance

V = Value, Character, Signification

From which six basic types of cultural tradition are yielded. Namely:

Indian-Methodological; Tibetan-Conceptual; Chinese-Projective; Japanese-Phenomenological; Hellenic-Axiomatic; Western-Axiological.

From hereon, were one to merge the cultural typology as presented by Lotman with modal semiotics (which in a sense verges symbolology as presented by Mamardašvili and Piatigorski), the present author's bones feel a premonition of potentiality for advancement in the fields of science. The question is then, how to bridge the gap?

By collocating the fourway triadic sign as presented above with the semiotic and symbolic thus viewing the diagram as signifying process (or semiosis), there technically seems to be little obstacles to place the scheme of modalities upon the diagram, divided and placed as follows: (A) = object (**O**), B = interpretant (**I**) and C = dream (**Z**). This in the sense that in the light of dreams' mnemonic function restructuring the "I" (taken as the non-expressive semiotic) that to an extent defines the possible expressions in awake thought (**A**); then by extension and analogy the same should apply to signifying processes in culture as well. In other words, there is no reason not to suggest that what the semiotic and symbolic is to the human, the syntactic and semantic are their equivalent in culture; this suggestion is afforded by the establishment of *chora* both in the human subject and its analogue in culture, based on the parameters of its universal space.

That is, the level of absolute reality or the metaphysics of tradition require to be objects, either physical or metaphysical, stones or gods; the level of phenomenation of tradition or culture is indeed a chain of interpretations as postulated above. What comes to the level of absolute irreality or non-thinking of tradition, i.e. intra-cultural absurdity, it need not even be argued that dreams are irreal – at least physically from the point of view of awake – and as such, the function they serve, whether as unobtainable albeit de-symbolized symbols or as semiotic (re-) organizing principles of the mnemonic "I", the function of which in itself is non-expressive amounts up to also being non-thinking. Though it can only be said not to exist. Hence the necessity of modal semiotics which allows a closer look at thought.

Alas, at present this inkling may be said to hint only towards the possibility of conjoining the fourfold diagram with types of traditional thinking but, as has been shown, culture and your intellect are not that different by structure and function and,

in cases, the elements effecting them are the same. Hence, there may be presumed to be a way – in theory – to push further this line of thought in theory. Unfortunately, due to lack of space and time, the present author must abstain from venturing any further and leave the reader – along with the author – dissatisfied.

CONCLUSION

In the introduction, after having postulated the premises of analogy, a short overview of the psychoanalytic understanding of (un-, sub-) conscious was given along with some main aspects of hitherto work done with regard to dreams in said field. However, psychoanalysis was deemed illfit due to its complexity and inner imbalance (which may be just subjective views) along with the present author's insufficient knowledge on how to apply it in a scientific manner; its overt dependence on verbal, second-hand accounts of dreams and its subject-centerdness distancing it from objectivity and potential all-penetrability afforded by the more strictly semiotic terminology. In addition, were psychoanalysis taken into more thorough use in this thesis, it would have just added to the potential confusion of terminology as is; psychoanalysis' terminology being omnifariously tainted with sexual connotations – the present author wishes not to taunt the reader with more awkward words than absolutely necessary. Next, an overview of the philosophy of mind and phenomenology was provided – both of which were also excluded, partially because in the past 2400 years approximately (that is, taking into account only western philosophies), the former has not, in a sense, made very much progress with regard to consciousness nor has the latter during its 200-odd years of existence. It may be noted again that this thesis did not contend to do so either.

Hence, a slightly different approach in the guise of the metatheory of consciousness was applied. In the first chapter, an overview of consciousness as such and as a symbolic apparatus, its sphere, states and structures was provided. In essence, all consciousness – including the psychoanalytic and other conceptions of the sub-, or unconscious – exists within the sphere of consciousness which does not harbor a spatial nor temporal existence. Irrespective whether consciousness is reserved to be viewed as a solely human trait which often happens when confusing it with self-consciousness or meta-awareness expressable in the natural human language; on what comes to the human being, states of consciousness oscillate in their psyches and are mainly empty in themselves. State of consciousness remain empty lest a structure of consciousness – which either is or may facilitate a content or fact of consciousness

that is an agglomerate of form and content – that are as a rule non-individual, is abstracted from therein one way or the other. Accordingly, to suit the needs of the present thesis, the structure “I” was taken into use. Though both states and structures of consciousness can be said to exist independently, they nevertheless are closely knit. States of consciousness may become evoked by way of symbols of consciousness that have the potential to conjoin the individual psyche with a given structure of consciousness abstracted from the state of consciousness.

Symbols are sign-like formations existing outside the realm obtainable by way of signs. However, symbols may be subjected to this or that sign system in which they become distorted and transformed into signs or pseudosymbols. Though simultaneously the symbol becomes de-symbolized propelling its way towards a dual structure of primary expression/content that serves as secondary expression for a more highly valued content in said sign system, for example culture at large, where the secondary expression – symbol (of consciousness) proper – serves the function of a structural position manifesting itself as finalized text(s) leading a life of its own. A coarse oversimplification would be to postulate that all philosophy in the proper sense of the word hold the same secondary content that to date remains incomprehensible regardless of millennia of effort.

This part also contained the explication of the semiotic *chora* originating from the subject’s fragmented body, the space it occupies, its reach and functions and what it can withstand also including and affected by what the space (symbolic, social etc.) it occupies contains. The *chora* is not yet a sign nor signifier – it is non-expressive – it is the ‘what’ that enables the subject to attain to a signifying position, to the signifying process(es). A distinction was made between the semiotic that precedes the establishment of the sign as the (kinetic) functional stage protruding its rhythms and pulsions to the symbolic, that in its turn is the attributed meaning, sign and signification; both together found the signifying process in which bodily drives and energy are discharged through the use of language.

In addition to their dual structure, on what comes to symbols and their threefold function – referential, existential, dispositional – with regard to consciousness as well as the properties of symbol were explicated. As was noted, no symbol, due to it being a thing and non-thing (like consciousness) can relate to consciousness directly but can relate only to something defined in the contents of consciousness and as such, symbols display the power to take the psyche into this or

that structure of consciousness. However, whether the symbol is comprehended or not does not depend on the subject but of the symbol itself; by the same token, symbol is absolutely non-arbitrary in relation to the structure of consciousness it corresponds to. In this sense and as the most archaic condensed mnemonic programmes of culture, it may be suggested that further research would contribute to the generating of a classification of cultures – by way of cultural typology – proper.

In addition to more subtle states of consciousness, we resorted in focusing our attention on the two most clearly distinguishable, even categorial ones – awake or active consciousness that facilitates meta-awareness, intentionality, agency, will and the like, and asleep or passive consciousness during which one is not aware of being aware which rules out intentionality, volition etc. However, the latter facilitates the peculiar phenomenon of dream. The dream is the elementary mystic experience that affords the recurring and inescapable experiencing of another reality – despite that the human being dreams before s/he is born – the *Traumwelt* therein is a polylingual space characterized by the transference²³ of the categories of natural language into visual space. Though the exact reason or purpose why or how we dream remains unanswered, by way of REM sleep being closely connected to the maturation and development of the mammal brain and the functional relationship between dreams and memory allowed dreaming to be postulated as a mnemonic mechanism.

It may be noted that dreaming occurs also during NREM sleep; during both of which the activity in the posterior hot zone of the brain is highlighted. With respect to the *chora* it may also be noted that emotions are salient in dreams; furthermore, the topography of emotional bodily sensations is culturally universal. Love is in the same place everywhere (as are hate, disgust, pride, anxiety etc.). The temporal aspect of dreams was shown to be an amalgamation of past, present and future i.e. achronic (or panchronic, doesn't really matter), the correspondence of which is manifest in myths and mythological texts more general; neither in dreams nor in mythological texts is there linear time.

Consequently, in addition to absence of meta-awareness and three-dimensional time, knowledge as a whole of/in a given subject was defined to become freer in its organization by way of passive consciousness lifting the proverbial chains of knowledge allowing (visual) semantic polyvalence more leeway to associate and

²³ Transference is not meant here in the psychoanalytic sense where emotions originally felt in childhood are redirected to a substitute in the 'transference neurosis' phase of the analysis.

coalesce in most unimaginable ways and – since the dream harbors no prominent thirdness but upon awakening seeks to attach the one to the other – by this dreams were pointed to be well suited for generating new information regardless whether one is or ever becomes aware of it. Consisting of pure signs, i.e. due to the absence of “I” and prominent thirdness, with regard to their mnemonic function as well as their discrete semiotic spaces, dream was proposed to be the origin of anthroposemiotic processes proper by resorting to the concept of sign-ness. A thought elaborated in more depth in the end of the second chapter.

Yielding partially from atemporality, the second chapter pointed out the structural similarity between dream and myth in the sense that there is no reason why – instead of the psychoanalytic approach – say for example a more rigid structuralist approach could not be applied to dreams and the way(s) they come about. Dreams were postulated as presumed semiotic entities and as such, they fell into category of descriptive metalanguages. The difference between the pragmatic dimension where our somatic experience occurs and the cognitive dimension that has as its internal referent the former was explicated and collocated by way of proprioceptivity with the semiotic *chora*. Based on the semiotic *chora* as defined in the previous chapter and to acquire as premiss something intuitively familiar (whether in dreams or reality) to all readers, the term ‘falling’ was chosen as an operational term. It may also be noted that the vertical axis in the existence of both humans and cultures is significant.

‘Falling’ was treated as the nucleus, i.e. the minimal constitutive unit of a hypothetical dream by projecting it onto the semiotic square in search for the elementary structure of meaning by way of defining the semic (semantic) category on the basis of distinction of opposition characterizing the paradigmatic axis of language. Consequently, this created isotopy which designates the iterativity or ‘recurrence’ of comparable entities on the syntagmatic axis; or the individual variance of dreams of ‘falling’ and in accordance with the inner logic of the semiotic square – all terms upon which are isotopes – this gave rise to pluri-isotopy. In short, dreams in possession of the nucleus ‘falling’ also facilitate dream-themes of its opposite ‘rising’ and by the same token, dreams of ‘non-falling’ and ‘non-rising’ – the vertical axis of dreams and movement therein may thus be deduced to share the same nucleus irrespective of the dream-imagery. This was due to the polysememic (trad. polysemic) character of pluri-isotopy which then leaves the manifestations of vertical dream-imagery for the

dreamer to dream. It may be noted that this is, in essence, the same thing as semantic polyvalence afforded by the passive consciousness.

All vertical dreams dreamt throughout the ages within consciousness are in theory analyzable according to their mode of production or, their respective generative trajectories from the most abstract to the most concrete, from the polyvalence of the nucleus to each individual vertical dream-image. That is, each such dream is a paraphrasing of the other; paraphrasing enables the elimination of interpretation (along with secondary revision) because of its being located on the deepest generative domain. Due to the exclusion of interpretation, the trajectory is freer in generating surface forms from semio-narrative structures, that hold both the syntactic and semantic components, each harboring the fundamental or deep level and the narrative or surface level. The dream then, may be said to consist of a series of narrative programs organized in accordance with the narrative trajectory (the orientation of which was left unspecified) in a hypotactic series; moreover, their relation is reciprocal in that each narrative program is presupposed by another, presupposing narrative program, all of which are elementary syntagms of the surface narrative syntax.

But dreams wouldn't be so enticing were they not filled with all sorts of actors and actants in somewhat odd sets and settings where there is no sense of time nor meta-awareness. Hence, the concept of figurativization which can be used to analyze said dream-components was introduced albeit not extensively elaborated – that would have required we have a dream involving falling and unfortunately none such was available from reliable sources at the time of the writing of this thesis; in addition, it would have nevertheless fallen prey to the original dreamer's linguistic competence and by extension faltered toward the psychoanalytic method. It may be mentioned that for the present author, what is interesting about dreams is in the dream, not in its recollection regardless that it remains beyond reach of the aware consciousness. Figurativization in dreams takes place by way of onomastics as the sub-component characterizing the figurativization, specifying, particularizing and introducing anthroponyms, toponyms and chrononyms of the dream. By way of figuration, these figures are put to place in a dream whereas on the other hand iconization makes them seem so real as to create a referential illusion transforming them into images of the world. This then calls forth the meaning effect reality and as is known, dreams possess a sufficient amount of reproduction of the real which permits a historical

anchoring forming a simulacrum of an external referent rendering the dream as real as reality itself seems to be.

In order to show the purity of signs in dream, their lack of meaning and signification within the dream due to absence of meta-awareness by and in the structure of consciousness “I”, the semiotic square was taken into further use along with the triadic sign which was projected onto the slightly adapted square. By postulating four separate dimensions for sign-action or semiosis – nature, culture, dream and awake – embodied in the human, it became possible to dissect sign-ness according to the logic of the semiotic square by way of resorting to other major theorists in semiotics; most notably Uexküll – which afforded the presumption that in nature there is no interpretation proper but that semiosis is dominated by face-value of objects therein. In culture, semiosis is predominantly interpretative according to Lotman and hence the essentiality of object therein was lessened. On what comes to our active and passive states of consciousness of awake and dream, it was shown that in the former semiosis is restricted solely according to the wholeness of signs therein. That is, we are free to see things as we please and think of them as something else if necessary to the extent of sign-ness in the anthroposemiotic being. Whereas in dreams it was postulated that due to the lack of “I” there can not be neither interpretation nor object in the *Traumwelt*, which is an agglomerate of content and form (like the symbol) leaving the (recollection of) representation of dream open to signification and meaning-making at large. The signs are pure only within the dream because they are not recognized nor is there any doubt of anything therein. Naturally, the representations of dreams become corrupted upon recall and tainted by mind. That is, the purity of signs is based on the absence of a cognizing subject proper in the signifying processes that occur during sleep.

In addition to this, it was proposed that the two states of consciousness – which can be present concomitantly – were somewhat equivalent to the distinction between the semiotic and the symbolic. This also enabled to suggest that the diagram presented may also be viewed in the light of the signifying process. Due to the dream being analogous to real space both visually and experientially (save for meta-awareness), it was further bolstered that the meaning effect ‘reality’ is as efficacious in both dimensions thus affording anchoring which allows the experienced reality of either of the two dimensions become disambiguated. Consequently, as there is no “I” in dream, the reality of awake can not be questioned from therein then logically, it

must be the other way around. This constitutes doubt also awake and as far as the present author is aware, it is only the human being that questions the reality of the world and itself. Hence, the dream may indeed be said to be the origin of our peculiar semiotic processes tainted by signs and their systems.

The third chapter concentrated on the autocommunicative aspects of (recalled) dream further emphasizing their purity. Though there was no actual dream-narrative presented, the author relies on the reader's ability to having been able to conjure that in their mind. Also, by way of explicating the postulates of sign-ness, the equivalence of reality in both dimensions was made evident as well as the possible functional concomitance, especially what comes to dream effecting awake reality as experienced and/or interpreted by a given subject which further supported the claim that dreams and dreaming would have played an essential part in forging the anthroposemiotic during our species' phylogenesis. It may be noted that in order to effect the subject and its mind or awareness, there is no reason why a dream should be remembered or acknowledged; in a similar sense as the semiotic goes about pulsating into the symbolic acknowledged within a given *chora* or, as the sub-/unconscious does its tricks according to psychoanalysis. Dream is just a possibility.

Excluding secondary revision, a hypothetical dream 'falling' was sieved through the autocommunicative process which occurs in time rather than in space and which inevitably restructures the "I" – it may be noted that the process of recalling and especially recapitulating dreams is fairly dependent on the subject's linguistic competence. The other way around, because in dreams the categories of natural language are transferred into visual space, then whether the ambit of dream-imagery is somehow restricted or defined according to linguistic competence was not considered. Regardless, the autocommunicative process of recalling a dream imposes a narrative structure upon it which increases its degree of organization and by the same token, its allowed effect upon the subject.

The similitude of dream and symbol was elaborated on the basis of the structural similarity between nucleus => manifest dream and the dual structure of symbol after which the dream was shown to possess also textual features in accord with the textuality of symbol, i.e. both are finalized texts with internal features that cannot be deduced from anything else apart from themselves and both are doubly coded. Dream was also shown to behave in a similar manner as text (rather the other way around chronologically), both possessing an indivisible meaning and potential to

transfer the expressions afforded by their respective semantic capacities into the subset defining the flexibility of their respective languages. Accordingly, the dream and/as text are analogous.

On what comes to the restructuring of the “I” proper, it was shown to be based on the structure and organization of dream taken to be given in a more or less purely semantic language; as recollection it is restructured by the intrusion of a purely syntagmatic, supplementary code – whether the sign-system of awake language or just that of awake cognition. In this sense, transposition is a one-way process, at least when it is acknowledged. In essence, the “I” is restructured because of its resurgence into existence from another reality. Whether it is emotionally experienced as death in the back of one’s head is a question not asked here. The intrusion of the secondary code leads to the interpreting of the semantic elements of the dream-text as if they were included in the anewed syntagmatic organization and by this, the meanings of the semantic elements become endowed with new, relationary ones. The re-syntagmatization may go so far as to render the dream to be seen as an asemantic text and interestingly, such texts tend to organize our associations; build-up of identity via the mnemonic effect of dream is susceptible to alterations and by emphasizing the syntagmatic order (how things are in the world), the semantic (what things are in the world) acquires associational leeway.

The fourth chapter concentrated on the proposition of the isomorphism and isofunctionality of the human intellect and culture, both shaped according to the structure of their respective symbols which in the former was suggested to be carried out by dreams by way of their mnemonic function whereas in the latter it takes place according to a given culture’s symbols; both of which are of dual structure. Symbols in culture are archaic in a similar manner as dreams are phylogenetically anterior to language; from the point of view of their final reading, the processes of creating both move in opposite directions as well, hence their collocation.

A case study of sorts was provided in order to show the applicability of symbolology in analysing dreams. Unfortunately, at the time of writing the author was not able to locate a dream ‘falling’ that would have had as severe repercussions in reality as did Quintus Ennius’ dream; the effect of which – both on the individual level and on the level of culture – was stupefying. The usefulness of symbolology was shown by way of analysing the dream that made Ennius consider himself *as* Homer, whose primary expression in the dream had as its secondary content literary

authorship *par excellence* as defined in the contents of Ennius' consciousness. In addition to that, such an attribute may be said to exist quite independently as well as a structure, fact, or content of consciousness. Taken as a symbol of consciousness, it then induced within the passive state of consciousness a suitable state by whatever means from which said structure was abstracted and changed his and his contemporary culture's essence. It may be noted that the dream was taken by Ennius at face value, without secondary revision or doubt of its truthfulness. In this sense, the dream was more real than the real for Ennius, who incidentally altered the way of the real real by accepting the fact that he indeed *is* Homer. Also as was mentioned, similar events are several in the history of mankind when a subject's dream provides a solution, an epiphany or inspiration etc. that have had their effect on the surrounding world, the mortal flesh functioning as merely an instrument in realizing the dream. From this, it was proposed that the two mutually opposed mechanisms of culture – tendency toward diversity and tendency toward uniformity – echo the mechanism of dream.

So far, the human intellect and culture were discovered to harbor similar semiotic traits and attributes but what was lacking, was the equivalent of the semiotic *chora* for culture. Consequently, it was shown that the way a culture comes to be in accordance with the universal space in cultural models, i.e. with the descriptions of cultural texts based on spatio-topological modelling. Cultural texts in general possess an elevated degree of textual significance attributing to them the position of a text's point of view that guarantees their truthfulness and from which the truth is known and falsehood is impossible. With regard to 'falling,' in order to grant the vertical axis to have semantic valence in culture generated by way of the universal space as defined by the semantic interpretation of the cultural model, it became clear that in general, all cultural types are defined partially by the semantic axis and by the same token, the horizontal as well; the analogy between the human intellect and culture was shown by indicating to the fact that no *chora* can be said not to have been effected by the vertical axis. Also, having established dream as text with similar temporal characteristics to mythological texts, it was possible to propose that the latter are the analogue of the former; that is, mythological texts may be viewed as dreams of culture.

In the last part, some possible future elaborations of what has been done so far were proposed in accordance with cultural typologies and modal semiotics, that could

quite possibly be merged applying the central diagram depicting the fourfold dimensions of sign-ness; the gap could in theory be breached by comparing the distinction between the semiotic and the symbolic in the human with the distinction between syntactic and semantic in culture – both of which possess their respective *chorae*. Before that however, some elaboration on what comes to modal semiotics would be necessary. Modal semiotics enables a three-dimensional understanding of culture by way of types of traditional thinking that can be abstracted in accordance with the threefold level of modal reality which is then tripled into nine denominations of said modalities hoisting the researcher beyond traditional semiotics. It is the central premiss of modal semiotics that any relation may be denoted by signs but it should in no case to be understood as a sign of something. Consequently, the present author’s intuition is that modal semiotics and symbolology could indeed be merged and this could deepen and widen our understanding of the three intellectual objects human intellect, text and culture.

Conclusion is “the end or finish of an event, process, or text; the summing-up of an argument or text; the formal and final arrangement of an agreement; a judgement or decision reached by reasoning; [logic] a proposition that is reached from given premises” (ODE *sub conclusion*) In some sense, this thesis will not have a conclusion proper. Taking this as an event (whether the writing or reading of it), it will indeed end but as an outcome of a process ending up on paper or screen, finding its way about and out of the present author’s consciousness will not cease. Whether for good or for ill, and mayhap this writing has made its way to the reader’s consciousness provided a suitable structure was forged therein in the process of reading the text. As such, it should carry on doing whatever it is that text does – convey and create information.

On what comes to the summing-up of the main argument in this text, it can be found on the first page where it holds the place of the first sentence of this work – in summation, the analogous structure and function of the human intellect and the cultural system along with the isomorphism and isofunctionality between the cultural system and individual genetic memory as shaped by the structure of their respective symbols. Taking the first sentence as argument, as an agreement put forth by other minds into the present author’s, then from thereon to the last word is its formal and final arrangement – at least for the time being – along with the judgement reached by reasoning. We overlook [logic] because as is well-known, nothing new can be said

within it. In essence, what was strived towards in this thesis was to point out the obvious in the first sentence by using dream as an example and in this sense, the thesis had nothing to do with dreams proper but it only proposed some of their effects and outcomes both in you and your whereabouts.

All things considered, myths share temporal aspects with the ones present in dreams, and they need not follow any logic besides their own and as far as the basic ones as cultural texts go, they are structurally similar and share the same structural position as symbols of consciousness with the human and its dreams. Provided that symbols in the cultural system indeed are its most archaic elements which one way or the other propagated or motivated mythological texts, myths alongside rituals that orientate the way the human world lies, in light of what has been presented, then from the point of view of semeioneirology to come it may be argued that (parts of) culture are dream-like in their function; culture is partially a dream come true. By the same token, it seems plausible to suggest that consciousness as such should not necessarily be confined to the human flesh alone.

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RESÜMEE

Semeioneiron – unenäo ja sümboli sarnasusest kultuuri süsteemis

Selle magistratöö eesmärgiks on konstateerida ja selgitada kultuurisemiootika teesi kolme intellektuaalsete objektide klassi – inimteadvus individuaalteadvuse mõttes, tekst ning kultuur kui kollektiivintellekt – analoogiat nii oma struktuurilt kui funktsioneerimisprintsibiilt.

Sissejuhatuses antakse ülevaade varasematest psühhoanalüütilistest teooriatest seoses unenägede uurimisega ning samuti visatakse pilk teadvuse uurimise ajalukku nii vaimufilosoofias kui ka fenomenoloogias. Kõik kolm teooriat välistatakse sellest tööst intentsionaalselt.

Oma eesmärkide täitmiseks võtab autor kasutusele teadvuse metateooria sellisena nagu see on esitatud Merab Mamardašvili ja Aleksandr Piatigorski poolt. Arvestades sellega, et nende järgi on teadvus sümboliline aparaat, selgitatakse teadvuse sümboli olemust koos tema funktsioonidega ning kõrvutatakse see kultuuri sümboli struktuuri ning mõistega, mis omakorda pärinevad Juri Lotmani teooriast. Lisaks antakse põhjalik ülevaade unenäost kui sellisest, selle (mnemoonilisest) funktsioonist ning selle seosest sümboli mõiste(te)ga. Julia Kristeva poolt loodud eristus semiootilise ja sümboolse vahel aitab avada uusi võimalusi püstitatud probleemide lahendamisel, eriti tähtis ära märkida semiootilise *chora* olulisus inimolemuses ja inimteadvuses. Antakse eelvaade unenäos esinevate märkide puhtusele, nii nagu see on välja pakutud Juri Lotmani poolt.

Tuginedes Algirdas Greimasi teooriale, toob autor välja unenäo moodustumise elementaarsed semiootilised mehhanismid koos koostisosadega, millest nad tolle teooria raames moodustuksid. Kajastades hüpoteetilise unenäo üdi 'kukkuma' semiootilise ruudu peal, tuuakse välja vertikaalse telje olulisus nii unenägedes kui ka reaalsuses ning selgitatakse selle manifestatsioonide potentsiaalsed ulatuvused. Peatatakse põhjalikumalt unenäo moodustumise generatiivsel trajektooriga ning narratiivsusele (ja vihjatakse juba selle vältimatusele); unenäo trajektoori ning narratiivi moodustumist täpsustatakse figurativisatsiooni ja onomastika läbi, mis garanteerivad unenäo reaalsusefekti teoorias.

Näidatakse et unenägu on sama reaalne kui ärkvel kogetav reaalsus. Sama teooria raames pakub autor välja triaadilise märgi neljamõõtmelise olemuse määratluse, mille abil on võimalik väita, et unenäod tõesti koosnevad puhastest märkidest ilma tähenduseta ning on sellistena andnud oma panuse inimteadvuse tekkele läbi unenägede mnemoonilise funktsiooni.

Kolmas peatükk keskendub autokommunikatsiooni mõistele, läbi mille inimese “mina” saab restruktureeritud; samuti näidatakse narrativiseerimise vältimatust inimteadvuses, kasutades näitena unenägu. Selleks et unenägu sümboliga tihedamalt omavahel siduda, näidatakse unenägusid olevat (lõpetatud) tekstid, mis ei kuulu ühtegi süntagmaatilisse ahelasse. Unenäo mäletamise kaudu võib see muutuda asemantiliseks tekstiks ärkveloleku süntagmaatilise koodi tõttu ning hakkab subjekti assotsiatsioone organiseerima.

Neljandas peatükis antakse ülevaade kultuuri ja inimese olemuste sarnasusest tuginedes eelmaintud semiootilise *chora* mõistele – inimesel pärineb see kehast, kultuuril tema universaalse ruumi jaotustest. Autor esitab ka ajaloolise *case study*, et näidata kokkuvõtvalt unenägede (potentsiaalset) mõju nii üksikindiviidi kui ka – mõningatel juhtudel – terve kultuurikorra jaoks. Viimasena pakub autor välja mõningaid võimalusi antud raamistiku edasiarendamiseks läbi Juri Lotmani kultuuritüpoloogiate ning David Zilbermani modaalsemiootika, mida on teoreetiliselt võimalik omavahel ühildada töös esitatud raamistikus triaadilise märgi neljamõõtmelise olemuse kaudu.

Lihtlitsents lõputöö reprodutseerimiseks ja lõputöö üldsusele kättesaadavaks tegemiseks

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Semeioneiron – On the Similitude of Dream and Symbol in the Cultural System,

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