

Public Abstract**First Name:**Douglas**Middle Name:**Roy**Last Name:**Moore**Adviser's First Name:**Matthew**Adviser's Last Name:**McGrath**Co-Adviser's First Name:**Peter**Co-Adviser's Last Name:**Markie**Graduation Term:**SP 2017**Department:**Philosophy**Degree:**MA**Title:**Looks are Situation-Dependent Properties

This paper concerns the distinction between appearance and reality. Traditionally, much of what we see has been taken to be mere appearances. Things have different looks depending on the conditions in which they are viewed. The object themselves, though, do not change under those conditions, or so the usual story goes. Most philosophers have thought, given the above considerations, among others, that what we are aware of in perception is something other than external, mind-independent objects and their properties. I break with this tradition. We can explain the change in appearances with conditions by identifying the way things look with properties objects have of projecting light of a certain informational character to a viewpoint, given the conditions in which the object is situated. This view has implications for the metaphysics of perception generally while providing an account of what looks are that may be useful in an epistemology according to which we know about mind-independent objects through the ways they look.