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Perspectives on climate change mitigation

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Abstract

1. Warming and associated climate effects from CO₂ emissions persist for decades to millennia. In the near-term, changes in climate are determined by past and present greenhouse gas emissions modified by natural variability. Reducing the total concentration of atmospheric CO₂ is necessary to limit near-term climate change and stay below long-term warming targets (such as the oft-cited 3.6°F [2°C] goal). Other greenhouse gases (for example, methane) and black carbon aerosols exert stronger warming effects than CO₂ on a per ton basis, but they do not persist as long in the atmosphere; therefore, mitigation of non-CO₂ species contributes substantially to near term cooling benefits but cannot be relied upon for ultimate stabilization goals. (*Very high confidence*)

2. Stabilizing global mean temperature below long-term warming targets requires an upper limit on the accumulation of CO₂ in the atmosphere. The relationship between cumulative CO₂ emissions and global temperature response is estimated to be nearly linear. Nevertheless, in evaluating specific temperature targets, there are uncertainties about the exact amount of compatible anthropogenic CO₂ emissions due to uncertainties in climate sensitivity, the response of the carbon cycle including feedbacks, the amount of past CO₂ emissions, and the influence of past and future non-CO₂ species. (*Very high confidence*)

3. Stabilizing global mean temperature below 3.6°F (2°C) or lower relative to preindustrial levels requires significant reductions in net global CO₂ emissions relative to present-day values before 2040 and likely requires net emissions to become zero or possibly negative later in the century. Accounting for the temperature effects of non-CO₂ species, cumulative CO₂ emissions are required to stay below about 800 GtC in order to provide a two-thirds likelihood of preventing 3.6°F (2°C) of warming, meaning approximately 230 GtC more could be emitted globally. Assuming global emissions follow the range between the RCP8.5 and RCP4.5 scenarios, emissions could continue for approximately two decades before this cumulative carbon threshold is exceeded. (*High confidence*)

4. Successful implementation of the first round of Nationally Determined Contributions associated with the Paris Agreement will provide some likelihood of meeting the long term temperature goal of limiting global warming to “well below” 3.6°F (2°C) above preindustrial levels; the likelihood depends strongly on the magnitude of global emission reductions after 2030. (*High confidence*)

5. Climate intervention or geoengineering strategies such as solar radiation management are measures that attempt to limit or reduce global temperature increases. If interest in geoengineering increases with observed impacts and/or projected risks of climate change, interest will also increase in assessments of the technical feasibilities, costs, risks, co-benefits, and governance challenges of these additional measures, which are as yet unproven at scale. These assessments are a necessary step before judgments about the benefits and risks of these approaches can be made with high confidence. (*High confidence*)

1 **14. Perspectives on Climate Change Mitigation**

2 **KEY FINDINGS**

- 3 1. Warming and associated climate effects from CO₂ emissions persist for decades to
4 millennia. In the near-term, changes in climate are determined by past and present
5 greenhouse gas emissions modified by natural variability. Reducing the total
6 concentration of atmospheric CO₂ is necessary to limit near-term climate change and stay
7 below long-term warming targets (such as the oft-cited 3.6°F [2°C] goal). Other
8 greenhouse gases (for example, methane) and black carbon aerosols exert stronger
9 warming effects than CO₂ on a per ton basis, but they do not persist as long in the
10 atmosphere; therefore, mitigation of non-CO₂ species contributes substantially to near-
11 term cooling benefits but cannot be relied upon for ultimate stabilization goals. (*Very*
12 *high confidence*)
- 13 2. Stabilizing global mean temperature below long-term warming targets requires an upper
14 limit on the accumulation of CO₂ in the atmosphere. The relationship between cumulative
15 CO₂ emissions and global temperature response is estimated to be nearly linear.
16 Nevertheless, in evaluating specific temperature targets, there are uncertainties about the
17 exact amount of compatible anthropogenic CO₂ emissions due to uncertainties in climate
18 sensitivity, the response of the carbon cycle including feedbacks, the amount of past CO₂
19 emissions, and the influence of past and future non-CO₂ species. (*Very high confidence*)
- 20 3. Stabilizing global mean temperature below 3.6°F (2°C) or lower relative to preindustrial
21 levels requires significant reductions in net global CO₂ emissions relative to present-day
22 values before 2040 and likely requires net emissions to become zero or possibly negative
23 later in the century. Accounting for the temperature effects of non-CO₂ species,
24 cumulative CO₂ emissions are required to stay below about 800 GtC in order to provide a
25 two-thirds likelihood of preventing 3.6°F (2°C) of warming, meaning approximately 230
26 GtC more could be emitted globally. Assuming global emissions follow the range
27 between the RCP8.5 and RCP4.5 scenarios, emissions could continue for approximately
28 two decades before this cumulative carbon threshold is exceeded. (*High confidence*)
- 29 4. Successful implementation of the first round of Nationally Determined Contributions
30 associated with the Paris Agreement will provide some likelihood of meeting the long-
31 term temperature goal of limiting global warming to “well below” 3.6°F (2°C) above
32 preindustrial levels; the likelihood depends strongly on the magnitude of global emission
33 reductions after 2030. (*High confidence*)
- 34 5. Climate intervention or geoengineering strategies such as solar radiation management are
35 measures that attempt to limit or reduce global temperature increases. If interest in
36 geoengineering increases with observed impacts and/or projected risks of climate change,

1 interest will also increase in assessments of the technical feasibilities, costs, risks, co-
2 benefits, and governance challenges of these additional measures, which are as yet
3 unproven at scale. These assessments are a necessary step before judgments about the
4 benefits and risks of these approaches can be made with high confidence. (*High*
5 *confidence*)

6 **Introduction**

7 This chapter provides scientific context for key issues regarding the long-term mitigation of
8 climate change. As such, this chapter first addresses the science underlying the timing of
9 when and how CO₂ and other greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation activities that occur in the
10 present affect the climate of the future. When do we see the benefits of a GHG emission
11 reduction activity? Chapter 4: Projections provides further context for this topic. Relatedly,
12 the present chapter discusses the significance of the relationship between cumulative CO₂
13 emissions and eventual global warming levels. The chapter reviews studies of the climate
14 effects of the first round of national contributions associated with the Paris Agreement if
15 fully implemented. Looking beyond the first round of national contributions (which do not
16 set emission reduction targets past 2030), what global-scale emissions pathways are
17 estimated to be necessary by mid-century and beyond in order to have a high likelihood of
18 preventing 3.6°F (2°C) or 2.7°F (1.5°C) of warming relative to preindustrial times? In
19 response to this question, this chapter briefly reviews the status of climate intervention
20 proposals and how these types of mitigation actions could possibly play a role in avoiding
21 future climate change.

22 **14.1 The Timing of Benefits from Mitigation Actions**

23 **14.1.1 Lifetime of Greenhouse Gases and Inherent Delays in the Climate System**

24 Carbon dioxide (CO₂) concentrations in the atmosphere are directly affected by human
25 activities in the form of CO₂ emissions. Atmospheric CO₂ concentrations adjust to human
26 emissions of CO₂ over long time scales, spanning from decades to millennia (Ciais et al.
27 2013; Joos et al. 2013). The IPCC estimated that 15% to 40% of CO₂ emitted until 2100 will
28 remain in the atmosphere longer than 1,000 years (Ciais et al. 2013). The persistence of
29 warming is longer than the atmospheric lifetime of CO₂ and other GHGs, owing in large part
30 to the thermal inertia of the ocean (Collins et al. 2013). Climate change resulting from
31 anthropogenic CO₂ emissions, and any associated risks to the environment, human health and
32 society, are thus essentially irreversible on human timescales (Solomon et al. 2009). The
33 world is committed to some degree of irreversible warming and associated climate change
34 resulting from emissions to date.

35 The long lifetime in the atmosphere of CO₂ (Joos et al. 2013) and some other key GHGs,
36 coupled with the time lag in the response of the climate system to atmospheric forcing

1 (Tebaldi and Friedlingstein 2013), has timing implications for the benefits (i.e., avoided
2 warming or risk) of mitigation actions. Large reductions in emissions of the long-lived GHGs
3 are estimated to have modest temperature effects in the *near term* (e.g., over one to two
4 decades), because total atmospheric concentration levels require long periods to adjust
5 (Prather et al. 2009), but are necessary in the *long term* to achieve any objective of
6 preventing warming of any desired magnitude. Near-term projections of global mean surface
7 air temperature are therefore not strongly influenced by changes in emissions but rather
8 dominated by natural variability, the Earth system response to past and current GHG
9 emissions, and by model spread (i.e., the different climate outcomes associated with different
10 models using the same emissions scenario) (Kirtman et al. 2013). Long-term projections of
11 global surface temperature (after mid-century), on the other hand, show that emissions
12 scenario choice, and thus the mitigation pathway, is the dominant source of future
13 uncertainty in climate outcomes (Paltsev et al. 2015; Collins et al. 2013).

14 Some studies have nevertheless shown the potential for some near-term benefits of
15 mitigation. For example, one study found that, even at the regional scale, heat waves would
16 already be significantly more severe by the 2030s in a non-mitigation scenario compared to a
17 moderate mitigation scenario (Tebaldi and Wehner 2016). The mitigation of non-CO₂ GHGs
18 with short atmospheric lifetimes (such as methane, some hydrofluorocarbons [HFCs], and
19 ozone) and black carbon (an aerosol that absorbs solar radiation; see Ch. 2: Physical Drivers
20 of Climate Change), collectively referred to as short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs), has
21 been highlighted as a particular way to achieve more rapid climate benefits (e.g., Zaelke and
22 Borgford-Parnell 2015). SLCPs are substances that not only have an atmospheric lifetime
23 shorter (for example, weeks to a decade) than CO₂ but also exert a stronger radiative forcing
24 (and hence temperature effect) compared to CO₂ on a per ton basis (Myhre et al. 2013). For
25 these reasons, mitigation of SLCP emissions produces more rapid radiative responses. In the
26 case of black carbon, with an atmospheric lifetime of a few days to weeks (Bond et al. 2013),
27 emissions (and therefore reductions of those emissions) produce strong regional effects.
28 Mitigation of black carbon and methane also generate direct health co-benefits (Anenberg et
29 al. 2012; Rao et al. 2016). Reductions and/or avoidances of SLCP emissions could be a
30 significant contribution to staying at or below a 3.6°F (2°C) or any other chosen global mean
31 temperature increase (Hayhoe et al. 1998; Shah et al. 2015; Shindell et al. 2012; Rogelj et al.
32 2015). The recent Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol seeks to phase down global
33 HFC production and consumption in order to avoid substantial GHG emissions in coming
34 decades. Stringent near-term SLCP mitigation could potentially increase allowable CO₂
35 budgets for avoiding warming beyond any desired future level, by up to 25% under certain
36 scenarios (Rogelj et al. 2015). However, given that economic and technological factors tend
37 to couple CO₂ and many SLCP emissions to varying degrees, significant SLCP emissions
38 reduction would be a co-benefit of CO₂ mitigation.

39

1 14.1.2 Stock and Stabilization: Cumulative CO₂ and the Role of Other Greenhouse 2 Gases

3 Cumulative CO₂ emissions in the industrial era will largely determine long-term, global mean
4 temperature change. A robust feature of model climate change simulations is a nearly linear
5 relationship between cumulative CO₂ emissions and global mean temperature increases,
6 irrespective of the details and exact timing of the emissions pathway (see Figure 14.1; see
7 also Ch. 4: Projections). Limiting and stabilizing warming to any level implies that there is
8 an upper limit to the cumulative amount of CO₂ that can be added to the atmosphere (Collins
9 et al. 2013). Eventually stabilizing the global temperature requires CO₂ emissions to
10 approach zero (NRC 2011). Thus, for a 3.6°F (2°C) or any desired global mean temperature
11 target, an estimated range of allowable cumulative CO₂ emissions from the current period
12 onward can be calculated. The key sources of uncertainty for any compatible, forward
13 looking CO₂ budget associated with a given future warming objective include the climate
14 sensitivity, the response of the carbon cycle including feedbacks (for example, the release of
15 GHGs from permafrost thaw), the amount of past CO₂ emissions, and the influence of past
16 and future non-CO₂ species (Collins et al. 2013; NRC 2011). Increasing the probability that
17 any given temperature target be reached therefore implies tighter constraints on cumulative
18 CO₂ emissions. Relatedly, for any given cumulative CO₂ budget, higher emissions in the near
19 term imply the need for steeper reductions in the long term.

20 **[INSERT FIGURE 14.1 HERE]**

21 Between 1870 and 2015, human activities, primarily the burning of fossil fuels and
22 deforestation, emitted about 560 GtC in the form of CO₂ into the atmosphere (Le Quéré et al.
23 2016). According to best estimates in the literature, 1,000 GtC is the total cumulative amount
24 of CO₂ that could be emitted yet still provide a two-thirds likelihood of preventing 3.6°F
25 (2°C) of global mean warming since pre-industrial times (Collins et al. 2013; Allen et al.
26 2009). That estimate, however, ignores the additional radiative forcing effects of non-CO₂
27 species (that is, the net positive forcing resulting from the forcing of other well-mixed GHGs,
28 including halocarbons, plus the other ozone precursor gases and aerosols). Considering both
29 historic and projected non-CO₂ effects reduces the estimated cumulative CO₂ budget
30 compatible with any future warming target (Rogelj et al. 2015), and in the case of 3.6°F
31 (2°C) it reduces the aforementioned estimate to 790 GtC (Collins et al. 2013). Given this
32 more comprehensive estimate, meeting the 3.6°F (2°C) target means approximately 230 GtC
33 more CO₂ could be emitted globally. To illustrate, if one assumes future global emissions
34 follow the RCP4.5 scenario, this cumulative carbon threshold is exceeded by around 2037,
35 while under the RCP8.5 scenario this occurs by around 2033. To meet a 2.7°F (1.5°C) target,
36 the estimated cumulative CO₂ budget is about 590 GtC (assuming linear scaling with the
37 compatible 3.6°F (2°C) budget that also considers non-CO₂ effects), meaning only about 30

1 GtC more of CO₂ could be emitted. Further emissions of 30 GtC (in the form of CO₂) are
2 projected to occur in the next few years (Table 14.1).

3 **[INSERT TABLE 14.1 HERE]**

4 **14.2 Pathways Centered Around 3.6°F (2°C)**

5 In December of 2015 in Paris, the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
6 Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted the Paris Agreement, under which all Parties committed
7 to prepare and communicate successive Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to
8 mitigate climate change. The first NDCs extend to 2025 or 2030 and take a wide range of
9 forms. The Agreement contains the long-term goal of “holding the increase in the global
10 average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to
11 limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.”

12 Estimates of global emissions and temperature implications from a successful
13 implementation of the first round of NDCs (Rogelj et al. 2016; Sanderson et al. 2016;
14 Climate Action Tracker 2016; Fawcett et al. 2015; UNFCCC 2015) generally find that: 1) the
15 first round of NDCs reduces GHG emissions growth by 2030 relative to a situation where
16 these goals did not exist, though emissions are still not expected to be lower in 2030 than in
17 2015; and 2) the NDCs are a step towards meeting a 3.6°F (2°C) target, but the NDCs are, by
18 themselves, insufficient to achieve this ambitious target. According to one study, the NDCs
19 imply a median warming of 4.7°–5.6°F (2.6°–3.1°C) by 2100, though year 2100 temperature
20 estimates depend on assumed emissions between 2030 and 2100 (Rogelj et al. 2016). For
21 example, Climate Action Tracker, using alternative post-2030 assumptions, put the range at
22 5.9°–7.0°F (3.3°–3.9°C).

23 Emissions pathways consistent with the NDCs have been evaluated in the context of the
24 likelihood of global mean surface temperature change (Figure 14.2). It was found that the
25 likelihood of meeting the 3.6°F (2°C) or less target was enhanced by the NDCs, but
26 depended strongly on subsequent policies and measures. The chief finding was that even
27 without additional emission reductions after 2030, if implemented successfully, the NDCs
28 provide some likelihood (less than 10%) of preventing a global mean surface temperature
29 change of 3.6°F (2°C) relative to preindustrial levels (Fawcett et al. 2015). Greater emissions
30 reductions beyond 2030 (here, based on assumed higher decarbonization rates past 2030)
31 increase the likelihood of achieving the 3.6°F (2°C) or lower target to about 30%, and almost
32 eliminate the likelihood of a global mean temperature increase greater than 7°F (4°C).
33 Scenarios that assume even greater emissions reductions past 2030 would be necessary to
34 have at least a 50% probability of limiting warming to 3.6°F (2°C) (Fawcett et al. 2015), as
35 discussed and illustrated further below.

36 **[INSERT FIGURE 14.2 HERE]**

1 There are only a limited number of pathways which enable the world to remain below 3.6°F
2 (2°C) of warming (see Figure 14.3), and almost all but the most rapid near-term mitigation
3 pathways are heavily reliant on the implementation of CO₂ removal from the atmosphere
4 later in the century or other climate intervention, discussed below. If global emissions are in
5 line with the first round of NDCs by 2030, then the world likely needs to reduce effective
6 GHG emissions to zero by 2080, and be significantly net negative by the end of the century
7 (relying on as yet unproven technologies to remove GHGs from the atmosphere) in order to
8 stay below 3.6°F (2°C) of warming. Avoiding 2.7°F (1.5°C) of warming requires more
9 aggressive action still, with net zero emissions achieved by 2050 and net negative emissions
10 thereafter. In either case, faster near-term action significantly decreases the requirements for
11 negative emissions in the future.

12 **[INSERT FIGURE 14.3 HERE]**

13 **14.3 The Role of Climate Intervention in Meeting Ambitious Climate** 14 **Targets**

15 Achieving a 3.6°F (2°C) target through emissions reductions or adapting to the impacts
16 of a greater-than-3.6°F (2°C) world have been acknowledged as severely challenging
17 tasks by the international science and policy communities. Consequently, there is
18 increased interest by some scientists and policy makers in exploring additional measures
19 designed to reduce net radiative forcing through other, as yet untested actions, which are
20 often referred to as geoengineering or climate intervention (CI) actions. CI approaches
21 are generally divided into two categories: CO₂ removal (CDR) (NAS 2015a) and solar
22 radiation management (SRM) (NAS 2015b). CDR and SRM methods may have future
23 roles in helping meet global temperature targets. Both methods would reduce global
24 average temperature by reducing net global radiative forcing: CDR through reducing
25 atmospheric CO₂ concentrations and SRM through increasing Earth's albedo.

26 The evaluation of the suitability and advisability of potential CI actions requires a
27 decision framework that includes important dimensions beyond scientific and technical
28 considerations. Among these dimensions to be considered are the potential development
29 of global and national governance and oversight procedures, geopolitical relations, legal
30 considerations, environmental, economic and societal impacts, ethical considerations, and
31 the relationships to global climate policy and current GHG mitigation and adaptation
32 actions. It is clear that these social science and other non-physical science dimensions are
33 likely to be the major part of the decision framework and ultimately control the adoption
34 and effectiveness of CI actions. This report only acknowledges these mostly non-physical
35 scientific dimensions and must forego a detailed discussion.

36 By removing CO₂ from the atmosphere, CDR directly addresses the principal cause of
37 climate change. Potential CDR approaches include point-source CO₂ capture, direct air

1 capture, currently well-understood biological methods on land (for example,
2 afforestation), less well-understood and potentially risky methods in the ocean (for
3 example, ocean fertilization), and accelerated weathering (for example, forming calcium
4 carbonate on land or in the oceans). While CDR is technically possible, the primary
5 challenge is achieving the required scale of removal in a cost-effective manner, which in
6 part presumes a comparison to the costs of other, more traditional GHG mitigation
7 options. In principle, at large scale, CDR could measurably reduce CO₂ concentrations
8 (that is, cause negative emissions). Point-source capture (as opposed to CO₂ capture from
9 ambient air) and removal of CO₂ is a particularly effective CDR method. The climate
10 value of avoided CO₂ emissions is essentially equivalent to that of the atmospheric
11 removal of the same amount. To realize sustained climate benefits from CDR, however,
12 the removal of CO₂ from the atmosphere must be essentially permanent—at least several
13 centuries to millennia. In addition to high costs, CDR has the additional limitation of long
14 implementation times.

15 By contrast, SRM approaches offer the only known CI methods of cooling Earth within a
16 few years after inception. An important limitation of SRM is that it would not address
17 damage to ocean ecosystems from increasing ocean acidification due to continued CO₂
18 uptake. SRM could theoretically have a significant global impact even if implemented by
19 a small number of nations, and by nations that are not also the major emitters of GHGs;
20 this could be viewed either as a benefit or risk of SRM.

21 Proposed SRM concepts increase Earth's albedo through injection of sulfur gases or
22 aerosols into the stratosphere (thereby simulating the effects of explosive volcanic
23 eruptions) or marine cloud brightening through aerosol injection near the ocean surface.
24 Injection of solid particles is an alternative to sulfur and yet other SRM methods could be
25 deployed in space. Studies have evaluated the expected effort and effectiveness of
26 various SRM methods (NAS 2015b; Keith et al. 2014). For example, model runs were
27 performed in the GeoMIP project using the full CMIP5 model suite to illustrate the effect
28 of reducing top-of-the-atmosphere insolation to offset climate warming from CO₂
29 (Kravitz et al. 2013). The idealized runs, which assumed an abrupt, globally-uniform
30 insolation reduction in a 4 × CO₂ atmosphere, show that temperature increases are largely
31 offset, most sea-ice loss is avoided, average precipitation changes are small, and net
32 primary productivity increases. However, important regional changes in climate variables
33 are likely in SRM scenarios as discussed below.

34 As global ambitions increase to avoid or remove CO₂ emissions, probabilities of large
35 increases in global temperatures by 2100 are proportionately reduced (Fawcett et al.
36 2015). Scenarios in which large-scale CDR is used to meet a 3.6°F (2°C) limit while
37 allowing business-as-usual consumption of fossil fuels are likely not feasible with present
38 technologies. Model SRM scenarios have been developed that show reductions in

1 radiative forcing up to 1 W/m^2 with annual stratospheric injections of 1 Mt of sulfur from
2 aircraft or other platforms (Pierce et al. 2010; Tilmes et al. 2016). Preliminary studies
3 suggest that this could be accomplished at a cost as low as a few billion dollars per year
4 using current technology, enabling an individual country or subnational entity to conduct
5 activities having significant global climate impacts.

6 SRM scenarios could in principle be designed to follow a particular radiative forcing
7 trajectory, with adjustments made in response to monitoring of the climate effects (Keith
8 and MacMartin 2015). SRM could be used as an interim measure to avoid peaks in global
9 average temperature and other climate parameters. The assumption is often made that
10 SRM measures, once implemented, must continue indefinitely in order to avoid the rapid
11 climate change that would occur if the measures were abruptly stopped. SRM could be
12 used, however, as an interim measure to buy time for the implementation of emissions
13 reductions and/or CDR, and SRM could be phased out as emission reductions and CDR
14 are phased in, to avoid abrupt changes in radiative forcing (Keith and MacMartin 2015).

15 SRM via marine cloud brightening derives from changes in cloud albedo from injection
16 of aerosol into low-level clouds, primarily over the oceans. Clouds with smaller and more
17 numerous droplets reflect more sunlight than clouds with fewer and larger droplets.
18 Current models provide more confidence in the effects of stratospheric injection than in
19 marine cloud brightening and in achieving scales large enough to reduce global forcing
20 (NAS 2015b).

21 CDR and SRM have substantial uncertainties regarding their effectiveness and
22 unintended consequences. For example, CDR on a large scale may disturb natural
23 systems and have important implications for land use changes. For SRM actions, even if
24 the reduction in global average radiative forcing from SRM was exactly equal to the
25 radiative forcing from GHGs, the regional and temporal patterns of these forcings would
26 have important differences. While SRM could rapidly lower global mean temperatures,
27 the effects on precipitation patterns, light availability, crop yields, acid rain, pollution
28 levels, temperature gradients, and atmospheric circulation in response to such actions are
29 less well understood. Also, the reduction in sunlight from SRM may have effects on
30 agriculture and ecosystems. In general, restoring regional preindustrial temperature and
31 precipitation conditions through SRM actions is not expected to be possible based on
32 ensemble modeling studies (Ricke et al. 2010). As a consequence, optimizing the climate
33 and geopolitical value of SRM actions would likely involve tradeoffs between regional
34 temperature and precipitation changes (MacMartin et al. 2013). Alternatively,
35 intervention options have been proposed to address particular regional impacts
36 (MacCracken 2016).

37 GHG forcing has the potential to push the climate farther into unprecedented states for
38 human civilization and increase the likelihood of “surprises” (see Ch. 15: Potential

1 Surprises). CI could prevent climate change from reaching a state with more
2 unpredictable consequences. The potential for rapid changes upon initiation (or ceasing)
3 of a CI action would require adaptation on timescales significantly more rapid than what
4 would otherwise be necessary. The NAS (2015a, b) and the Royal Society (Shepherd et
5 al. 2009) recognized that research on the feasibilities and consequences of CI actions is
6 incomplete and call for continued research to improve knowledge of the feasibility, risks,
7 and benefits of CI techniques.

8

FINAL DRAFT

1 TRACEABLE ACCOUNTS

2 **Key Finding 1**

3 Warming and associated climate effects from CO₂ emissions persist for decades to millennia.
4 In the near-term, changes in climate are determined by past and present greenhouse gas
5 emissions modified by natural variability. Reducing the total concentration of atmospheric
6 CO₂ is necessary to limit near-term climate change and stay below long-term warming
7 targets (such as the oft-cited 3.6°F [2°C] goal). Other greenhouse gases (for example,
8 methane) and black carbon aerosols exert stronger warming effects than CO₂ on a per ton
9 basis, but they do not persist as long in the atmosphere; therefore, mitigation of non-CO₂
10 species contributes substantially to near-term cooling benefits but cannot be relied upon for
11 ultimate stabilization goals. (*Very high confidence*)

12 **Description of evidence base**

13 The first statement is supported in the literature, including by Joos et al. (2013) and Ciais et
14 al. (2013) (see Box 6.1 in particular), describing the climate response of CO₂ pulse
15 emissions, and further by Solomon et al. (2009), NRC (2011), and Collins et al. (2013),
16 describing the long-term warming and other climate effects associated with CO₂ emissions.
17 Paltsev et al. (2015) and Collins et al. (2013) describe the near-term vs. long-term nature of
18 climate outcomes resulting from GHG mitigation. Myhre et al. (2013) synthesize numerous
19 studies detailing information about the radiative forcing effects and atmospheric lifetimes of
20 all GHGs and aerosols (see in particular Appendix 8A therein). A recent body of literature
21 has emerged highlighting the particular role that non-CO₂ mitigation can play in providing
22 near-term cooling benefits (e.g., Shindell et al. 2012; Zaelke and Borgford-Parnell 2015;
23 Rogelj et al. 2015). For each of the individual statements made in Key Finding 1, there are
24 numerous literature sources that provide consistent grounds on which to make these
25 statements with very high confidence.

26 **Major uncertainties**

27 The Key Finding is comprised of qualitative statements that are traceable to the literature
28 described above and in this chapter. Uncertainties affecting estimates of the exact timing and
29 magnitude of the climate response following emissions (or avoidance of those emissions) of
30 CO₂ and other GHGs involve the quantity of emissions, climate sensitivity, some uncertainty
31 about the removal time or atmospheric lifetime of CO₂ and other GHGs, and the choice of
32 model carrying out future simulations. The role of black carbon in climate change is more
33 uncertain compared to the role of the well-mixed GHGs (see Bond et al. 2013).

34

1 **Assessment of confidence based on evidence and agreement, including short description**
2 **of nature of evidence and level of agreement**

3 Key Finding 1 is comprised of qualitative statements based on a body of literature for which
4 there is a high level of agreement. There is a well-established understanding, based in the
5 literature, of the atmospheric lifetime and warming effects of CO₂ vs. other GHGs after
6 emission, and in turn how atmospheric concentration levels respond following the emission
7 of CO₂ and other GHGs.

8 **Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates the above information**

9 The qualitative statements contained in Key Finding 1 reflect aspects of fundamental
10 scientific understanding, well grounded in the literature, that provide a relevant framework
11 for considering the role of CO₂ and non-CO₂ species in mitigating climate change.

12

13 **Key Finding 2**

14 Stabilizing global mean temperature below long-term warming targets requires an upper limit
15 on the accumulation of CO₂ in the atmosphere. The relationship between cumulative CO₂
16 emissions and global temperature response is estimated to be nearly linear. Nevertheless, in
17 evaluating specific temperature targets, there are uncertainties about the exact amount of
18 compatible anthropogenic CO₂ emissions due to uncertainties in climate sensitivity, the
19 response of carbon cycle including feedbacks, the amount of past CO₂ emissions, and the
20 influence of past and future non-CO₂ species. (*Very high confidence*)

21 **Description of evidence base**

22 The qualitative statements made in Key Finding 2 are based on evidence synthesized, most
23 notably, by both the National Academy of Sciences (NRC 2011) and by the IPCC (Collins et
24 al. 2013).

25 **Major uncertainties**

26 The NRC (2011) and IPCC (Collins et al. 2013) discuss the uncertainties associated with the
27 Key Finding 2 statement, “The relationship between cumulative CO₂ emissions and global
28 temperature response is estimated to be nearly linear.” The ratio of global mean temperature
29 response to cumulative emissions is relatively constant over time and independent of
30 scenario, but the exact magnitude still depends on key assumptions in the future such as
31 climate sensitivity. The IPCC also points out that a constant ratio of cumulative CO₂
32 emissions to global mean temperature does not hold for stabilization scenarios on millennial
33 time scales and that it is unknown if this constant ratio would hold for scenarios exceeding
34 2,000 GtC of cumulative CO₂. The other major uncertainties are identified in Key Finding 2.

1 **Assessment of confidence based on evidence and agreement, including short description**
2 **of nature of evidence and level of agreement**

3 Key Finding 2 is made with *very high* confidence because it consists of qualitative statements
4 that represent fundamental elements of scientific understanding, supported by different
5 literature sources for which there is high agreement.

6 **Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates the above information**

7 The qualitative statements contained in Key Finding 2 reflect aspects of fundamental
8 scientific understanding, grounded in the literature, that provide a relevant framework for
9 considering the role of CO₂ in mitigating climate change.

10

11 **Key Finding 3**

12 Stabilizing global mean temperature below 3.6°F (2°C) or lower relative to pre-industrial
13 levels requires significant reductions in net global CO₂ emissions relative to present-day
14 values before 2040, and likely requires net emissions to become zero or possibly negative
15 later in the century. Accounting for the temperature effects of non-CO₂ species, cumulative
16 CO₂ emissions are required to stay below about 800 GtC in order to provide a two-thirds
17 likelihood of preventing 3.6°F (2°C) of warming, meaning approximately 230 GtC more
18 could be emitted globally. Assuming global emissions follow the range between the RCP8.5
19 and RCP4.5 scenarios, emissions could continue for approximately two decades before this
20 cumulative carbon threshold is exceeded. (*High confidence*)

21 **Description of evidence base**

22 Key Finding 3 is a case study, focused on a pathway associated with 3.6°F (2°C) of warming,
23 based on the more general concepts described in Key Finding 2. As such, the evidence for the
24 relationship between cumulative CO₂ emissions and global mean temperature response (NRC
25 2011; Collins et al. 2013; Allen et al. 2009) also supports key finding 3.

26 Numerous studies have provided best estimates of cumulative CO₂ compatible with 3.6°F
27 (2°C) of warming above preindustrial levels, including a synthesis by the IPCC (Collins et al.
28 2013). Sanderson et al. (2016) provide further recent evidence to support the statement that
29 net CO₂ emissions would need to approach zero or become negative later in the century in
30 order to avoid this level of warming. Rogelj et al. 2015 and the IPCC (Collins et al. 2013)
31 demonstrate that the consideration of non-CO₂ species has the effect of further constraining
32 the amount of cumulative CO₂ emissions compatible with 3.6°F (2°C).

33

1 Table 14.1 shows the IPCC estimates associated with different probabilities (>66% [the one
2 highlighted in Key Finding 3], >50%, and >33%) of cumulative CO₂ emissions compatible
3 with warming of 3.6°F (2°C) above preindustrial levels, and the cumulative CO₂ emissions
4 compatible with 2.7°F (1.5°C) are in turn linearly derived from those, based on the
5 understanding that cumulative emissions scale linearly with global mean temperature
6 response (as stated in Key Finding 2). The IPCC estimates take into account the additional
7 radiative forcing effects—past and future—of non-CO₂ species based on the RCP emission
8 scenarios (available here:
9 <https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/RcpDb/dsd?Action=htmlpage&page=about#descript>).

10 The authors calculated the dates shown in Table 14.1, which supports the last statement in
11 Key Finding 3, based on Le Quéré et al. (2016) and the publicly available RCP database. Le
12 Quéré et al. (2016) provide the widely used reference for historical global, annual CO₂
13 emissions from 1870 to 2015 (land-use change emissions were estimated up to year 2010 so
14 are assumed to be constant between 2010 and 2015). Future CO₂ emissions are based on the
15 RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 scenarios; annual numbers between model-projected years (e.g., 2020,
16 2030, 2040, etc.) are linearly interpolated.

17 **Major uncertainties**

18 There are large uncertainties about the course of future CO₂ and non-CO₂ emissions, but the
19 fundamental point that CO₂ emissions need to eventually approach zero or possibly become
20 net negative to stabilize warming below 3.6°F (2°C) holds regardless of future emissions
21 scenario. There are also large uncertainties about the magnitude of past (since 1870 in this
22 case) CO₂ and non-CO₂ emissions, which in turn influence the uncertainty about compatible
23 cumulative emissions from the present day forward. Further uncertainties regarding non-CO₂
24 species, including aerosols, include their radiative forcing effects. The uncertainty in
25 achieving the temperature targets for a given emissions pathway is in large part reflected by
26 the range of probabilities shown in Table 14.1.

27 **Assessment of confidence based on evidence and agreement, including short description 28 of nature of evidence and level of agreement**

29 There is *very high* confidence in the first statement of Key Finding 3 because it is based on a
30 number of sources with a high level of agreement. The role of non-CO₂ species in particular
31 introduces uncertainty in the second statement of Key Finding 3 regarding compatible
32 cumulative CO₂ emissions that take into account past and future radiative forcing effects of
33 non-CO₂ species; though this estimate is based on a synthesis of numerous studies by the
34 IPCC. The last statement of Key Finding 3 is straightforward based on the best available
35 estimates of historic emissions in combination with the widely used future projections of the
36 RCP scenarios.

1 **Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates the above information**

2 Fundamental scientific understanding of the climate system provides a framework for
3 considering potential pathways for achieving a target of preventing 3.6°F (2°C) of warming.
4 There are uncertainties about cumulative CO₂ emissions compatible with this target, in large
5 part because of uncertainties about the role of non-CO₂ species, but it appears, based on past
6 emissions and future projections, that the cumulative carbon threshold for this target could be
7 reached or exceeded in about two decades.

8

9 **Key Finding 4**

10 Successful implementation of the first round of Nationally Determined Contributions
11 associated with the Paris Agreement will provide some likelihood of meeting the long-term
12 temperature goal of limiting global warming to “well below” 3.6°F (2°C) above preindustrial
13 levels; the likelihood depends strongly on the magnitude of global emission reductions after
14 2030. (*High confidence*)

15 **Description of evidence base**

16 The primary source supporting this key finding is Fawcett et al. (2015); it is also supported
17 by Rogelj et al. (2016), Sanderson et al. (2016), and the Climate Action Tracker. Each of
18 these analyses evaluated the global climate implications of the aggregation of the individual
19 country contributions thus far put forward under the Paris Agreement.

20 **Major uncertainties**

21 The largest uncertainty lies in the assumption of “successful implementation” of the first
22 round of NDCs; these are assumed to be fully successful but could either over- or
23 underachieve. This in turn creates uncertainty about the extent of emission reductions that
24 would be needed after the first round of NDCs in order to achieve the 2°C or any other target.
25 The response of the climate system, the climate sensitivity, is also a source of uncertainty;
26 the Fawcett et al. analysis used the IPCC AR5 range, 1.5° to 4.5°C.

27 **Assessment of confidence based on evidence and agreement, including short description
28 of nature of evidence and level of agreement**

29 There is *high* confidence in this key finding because a number of analyses have examined the
30 implications of the first round of NDCs under the Paris Agreement and have come to similar
31 conclusions, as captured in this key finding.

32 **Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates the above information**

1 Different analyses have estimated the implications for global mean temperature of the first
2 round of NDCs associated with the Paris Agreement and have reached similar conclusions.
3 Assuming successful implementation of this first round of NDCs, along with a range of
4 climate sensitivities, these contributions provide some likelihood of meeting the long-term
5 goal of limiting global warming to well below 2°C about pre-industrial levels, but much
6 depends on assumptions about what happens after 2030.

7

8 **Key Finding 5**

9 Climate intervention or geoengineering strategies such as solar radiation management are
10 measures that attempt to limit or reduce global temperature increases. If interest in
11 geoengineering increases with observed impacts and/or projected risks of climate change,
12 interest will also increase in assessments of the technical feasibilities, costs, risks, co-
13 benefits, and governance challenges of these additional measures, which are as yet unproven
14 at scale. These assessments are a necessary step before judgments about the benefits and
15 risks of these approaches can be made with high confidence. (*High confidence*)

16 **Description of evidence base**

17 Key Finding 5 contains qualitative statements based on the growing literature addressing this
18 topic, including from such bodies as the National Academy of Sciences and the Royal
19 Society, coupled with judgment by the authors about the future interest level in this topic.

20 **Major uncertainties**

21 The major uncertainty is how public perception and interest among policymakers in climate
22 intervention may change over time, even independently from the perceived level of progress
23 made towards reducing CO₂ and other GHG emissions over time.


24 **Assessment of confidence based on evidence and agreement, including short description 25 of nature of evidence and level of agreement**

26 There is *high* confidence that climate intervention strategies may gain greater attention,
27 especially if efforts to slow the buildup of atmospheric CO₂ and other GHGs are considered
28 inadequate by many in the scientific and policy communities.

29 **Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates the above information**

30 The key finding is a qualitative statement based on the growing literature on this topic. The
31 uncertainty moving forward is the comfort level and desire among numerous stakeholders to
32 research and potentially carry out these climate intervention strategies, particularly in light of
33 how progress by the global community to reduce GHG emissions is perceived.


1 **FIGURES**



2

3 **Figure 14.1:** Global mean temperature change for a number of scenarios as a function of
 4 cumulative CO₂ emissions from preindustrial conditions, with time progressing along each
 5 individual line for each scenario. (Figure source: IPCC 2013; ©IPCC. Used with
 6 permission).

7



1

2 **Figure 14.2:** Global CO₂ emissions and probabilistic temperature outcomes of Paris. (a)

3 Global CO₂ emissions from energy and industry (includes CO₂ emissions from all fossil fuel

4 production and use and industrial processes such as cement manufacture that also produce

5 CO₂ as a byproduct) for emissions scenarios following no policy, current policy, meeting the

6 NDCs with no increased future ambition and meeting the NDCs with continually increasing


7 ambition. (b) Likelihoods of different levels of increase in global mean surface temperature

8 during the 21st century relative to preindustrial levels for the four scenarios. Although (a)

9 shows only CO₂ emissions from energy and industry, temperature outcomes are based on the

10 full suite of GHG, aerosol, and short-lived species emissions across the full set of human

11 activities and physical Earth systems. (Figure source: Fawcett et al. 2015).



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Figure 14.3: Global emission pathways for GHGs, expressed as CO₂-equivalent emissions, which would be consistent with different temperature targets (relative to preindustrial temperatures). (a) shows a set of pathways where global mean temperatures would likely (66%) not exceed 2.7°F (1.5°C). A number of pathways are consistent with the target, ranging from the red curve (slowest near-term mitigation with large negative emission requirements in the future) to the black curve with rapid near-term mitigation and less future negative emissions. (b) shows similar pathways with a 66% chance of exceeding 2.7°F (1.5°C) for only 50 years, where (c) and (d) show similar emission pathways for 3.6°F (2°C). (Figure source: Sanderson et al. 2016).

	Dates by when cumulative carbon emissions (GtC) since 1870 reach amount commensurate with 3.6F (2C), when accounting for non-CO2 forcings:		
	>66% = 790 GtC	>50% = 820 GtC	>33% = 900 GtC
RCP4.5	2037	2040	2047
RCP8.5	2033	2035	2040

1

2

	Dates by when cumulative carbon emissions (GtC) since 1870 reach amount commensurate with 2.7F (1.5C), when accounting for non-CO2 forcings:		
	>66% = 593 GtC	>50% = 615 GtC	>33% = 675 GtC
RCP4.5	2019	2021	2027
RCP8.5	2019	2021	2025

3

4

5 **Table 14.1:** Dates illustrating when cumulative CO₂ emission thresholds associated with
 6 eventual warming of 3.6°F or 2.7°F above preindustrial levels might be reached. RCP4.5 and
 7 RCP8.5 refer, respectively, to the low and high emission scenarios used throughout this
 8 report. The estimated cumulative CO₂ emissions (measured in Gigatons (Gt) of carbon)
 9 associated with different probabilities (e.g., >66%) of preventing 3.6°F (2°C) of warming are
 10 from the IPCC (Collins et al. 2013). The cumulative emissions compatible with 2.7°F (1.5°C)
 11 are linearly derived from the estimates associated with 3.6°F (2°C). The cumulative CO₂
 12 estimates take into account the additional net warming effects associated with past and future
 13 non-CO₂ emissions according to the RCP scenarios. Historic CO₂ emissions from 1870–2015
 14 (including fossil fuel combustion, land use change, and cement manufacturing) are from Le
 15 Quéré et al. 2016. See Traceable Accounts for further details.

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