

**RECORDS AND THE UNDERSTANDING OF VIOLENT EVENTS: ARCHIVAL  
DOCUMENTATION, HISTORICAL PERCEPTION, AND THE *NO GUN RI*  
MASSACRE IN THE KOREAN WAR**

by

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Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of  
The Department of Library and Information Science  
School of Information Sciences  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

University of Pittsburgh

2007

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH  
DEPARTMENT OF LIBRARY AND INFORMATION SCIENCE  
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University of Pittsburgh, 2007

The archival community has long shown an interest in documenting history, and it has been assumed that archival materials are one of the major sources of historical research. However, little is known about how much impact archival holdings actually have on historical research, what role they play in building public knowledge about a historical event and how they contribute to the process of recording history.

The case of the *No Gun Ri* incident provides a good example of how archival materials play a role in historical discussions and a good opportunity to look at archival contributions. This dissertation examines how archival materials were discovered and used in the process of identifying the controversies raised in *No Gun Ri* research by examining the earliest to the most recent publications, their authors' patterns of conducting their research and their perceptions on using archives. In doing so, a content analysis of *No Gun Ri* publications was employed and interviews with *No Gun Ri* researchers were conducted for this study.

In *No Gun Ri* research, archival documents were essential source materials for details about the incident and a major player in stimulating heated controversies and discussions and, consequently, provided the impetus for further publications by *No Gun Ri* researchers. Archival documents were especially critical for specific details of the incident as well as a good source for background and circumstantial information. General record keeping situations - such as missing documents - also provided a circumstantial context of the incident. However, *No Gun Ri* researchers agreed that oral history was the most valuable and influential evidence for their major ideas and used archival documents to provide hard facts about the details of oral history. There are some unique research patterns of *No Gun Ri* researchers identified in this study which are different from typical assumptions of archivists.

Archival programs should have an accurate understanding about how their holdings are

used (or not used) and why; consequently, this study regarding the use of archival materials in the evolution of the discussion of the *No Gun Ri* massacre will provide the fundamental information within an empirical framework.

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## PREFACE

This research would not have been completed without the generous support, helpful guidance and good wishes of many people.

First and foremost, I would like to show my eternal appreciation to my advisor, Dr. Richard J. Cox, who tolerated my never-ending doctorate years with a great deal of patience. It has been an honor and privilege for me to work with such a talented and pleasant man. I am immensely grateful to him for his thoughtful guidance, encouragement, and inspiration throughout these doctoral years. Also, I owe a debt to gratitude to the members of my dissertation committee: Ellen G. Detlefsen, Karen F. Gracy and Jeannette A. Bastian, for giving me invaluable comments and suggestions about this study and sharing their knowledge and experience throughout the whole process of the dissertation.

Also, I am very much indebted to the interviewees of this study who talked to me with great passion about their research only because I put my foot in the same river of their interest: *No Gun Ri* history. Without them, my study would not be fulfilled and enriched.

I am very grateful to my sincere friends who were there for me, listened to me, shared both the happiness and sadness of life, and offered me help whenever I needed it. My Korean friends, Jaeyoun Shin, Sungmin Kim, Sueyeon Syn, Sujin Kim and Joohyun Lee have provided a very nice escape for me from the stressful life of a doctoral student in another country. I also want to thank my colleague students in archives: Jennifer Marshall, Tywana Whorley, and Lekoko Kenosi, who encouraged and helped me during the course of my study by sharing experiences and ideas for research. I was especially extremely fortunate to meet Eylem Ozkaramanli who has been the closest friend in my life in Pittsburgh. Her friendship, faith in me, pleasant conversations, and countless days spent in Hillman library have been a precious source of strength for me to complete my study. Also, I want to thank Nimo Tirimanne who was an excellent editor for this dissertation.

I would like to thank my husband, Yun-Suk Jung, for his unfailing love and support in this long journey. He has held me up whenever I encountered frustration and disappointment with myself and the dissertation process. Most especially, his extraordinary skill with computers saved me and my files many times whenever my computer broke down or crashed. I also thank my son, Tyler (Junwoo) Jung, who had to spend so much time in daycare due to a busy mom and her studies. His existence made me stand up whenever I felt like collapsing and his smile gave me the strength to go through this process of sleep-deprived nights of study.

I would like to thank my parents and family for their never-ending love and support. They have always offered great guidance in life and the warmest place to go even for the most hopeless of times. Their visits to me in Pittsburgh or my visits to them in Seoul have been a great joy and served as energy to cope with difficulties.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this dissertation to the unseen and uncounted victims of *No Gun Ri* who were not afforded the opportunity to tell their stories. Your silenced voices will now be forever alive as a form of public memory.

## **TRANSLITERATION FOR KOREAN NAMES OF PERSONS AND PLACES**

The Korean alphabet is not rooted in a Roman script. It has its own characters (letters) which are dissimilar to any belonging to a Western language. Therefore, a consistent method to transliterate Korean names of persons and places into the Roman alphabet of English is necessary for this study. There are several standards to Romanize Korean characters: one regulated by the South Korean government and one by the OCLC in the U.S. called the “McCune-Reischauer system.” In this study, the McCune-Reischauer system from OCLC is adopted since it is more commonly used in the United States and the transliteration of the Korean language is easier and simpler than the South Korean standard. However, if Korean authors publish their work in the U.S. and use their own method to transliterate their names, this study will utilize that personal transliteration in its citation.

A Korean personal name consists of a family name and a given name in a different order to that of the U.S. In Korea, a family name normally precedes a given (or first) name, and Koreans usually do not have middle names. Therefore, the way to present a Korean name is as follows: [family name] [given name] such as Sinn Donghee (신동희); Sinn as the family name and Donghee as the given name. However, in this study, personal names will be written using the Western naming pattern, a family name following a given name, to be consistent in citations.

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 STATEMENT OF PROBLEMS

In the 1990s, thirty South Koreans filed several petitions to the U.S. government, alleging a mass killing of refugees by American soldiers at *No Gun Ri*, a small village in South Korea, during the Korean War. For these claims and for their demands for an investigation of this incident and compensation for the victims, the South Korean petitioners only received denials from the U.S. government on the ground that there was no evidence to substantiate the Koreans' claims. More frustratingly, their claims about the massacre did not have much resonance within Korea either, partly due to the exceptionally suppressive atmosphere of Korean society in the past and partly due to the passive attitude of the Korean government, thereby maintaining their traditional friendship with the U.S. Therefore, the victims' families and other survivors had to take an indirect route to publicize their story.

These Korean survivors of the massacre not only filed legal petitions, but also collected, over the years, all information available to them about this incident, constructing a public memory of the event. Some of the victims and families collected survivors' oral histories repeatedly over the years. They took pictures of the traces of gun fire on the massacre site not long after the event. They collected copies of newspaper articles and chapters from history books if they found anything related to the refugee killing or the battle in Yong-dong to which *No Gun Ri* belongs. They even collected genealogical documents showing the same death date of

villagers who were killed at this incident. Their efforts at collecting all available evidence finally resulted in the publication of a book.

Eun-yong Chong, a survivor's husband, published a factual novel called *Do You Know Our Agony?*(그대, 우리의 아픔을 아는가 *Kudae, Uri Ui Apumul Anunga*) based on his own research and collection of information about the incident, in the spring of 1994 at the age of seventy three. This novel caught the eye of some Korean journalists and the story was finally reported, albeit in an unpopular political magazine. From his research, the author of the novel figured out that the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division was stationed in the area at the time of the massacre.<sup>1</sup> The survivors' efforts to inform the public of their story did not stop with this publication. The son of the novelist contacted journalists as much as he could to spread the word of the *No Gun Ri* story and about the novel that his father published for the same purpose. Among those journalists contacted was one from the Associated Press (AP) who resided in Korea.

Sang-Hun Choe, the Korean reporter for the AP, submitted the *No Gun Ri* story, including the petition of the victims and denial from the U.S. government, to his headquarters in New York. AP headquarters found this event a newsworthy story and started its own research within the archival materials at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and at other military archives and also began to collect victims' and veterans' interviews. Finally, in 1999 the AP published a story about the *No Gun Ri* massacre citing some war records that discredited the U.S. governments' assertion that there was no proof "to show that the U.S. 1<sup>st</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> With further research it was subsequently revealed that the specific army unit of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division engaged in this killing was the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment.

Cavalry Division was in the area where the incident allegedly occurred.”<sup>2</sup>. The story published by the AP finally garnered an active reaction from both governments.

The massacre was alleged to have occurred in the middle of a refugee evacuation operation by American soldiers during the last week of July, 1950, at an early and chaotic phase of the Korean War. During the operation, the American soldiers opened fire on the refugees. The veterans say that they thought there were North Korean infiltrators among the refugees. The survivors claim they were searched for prohibited items such as weapons and nothing suspicious was found among their belongings. The survivors said the massacre lasted for four days with hundreds of people killed.

From the beginning of its publicity, this politically and diplomatically sensitive incident caused considerable controversy and engendered bitter arguments about the account of the massacre itself, the veracity of sources involved, and the interpretation of declassified military documents. Other than the fact that the massacre itself was shocking news, the whole process of how the story was researched and broken was notable. In various research attempts there emerged controversy regarding the testimonies of the victims and veterans. The accounts from victims widely differed from those of participating veterans. Korean survivors seemed to recollect more vividly what they went through with accentuated memories of their own particular experiences of the incident. An American researcher even asserted that the victims’ memories tended to be distorted or exaggerated in relation to their compensation claims.<sup>3</sup> American veterans’ accounts also vary one from another. Some researchers questioned the sincerity of the

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<sup>2</sup> United States Armed Forces Claims Service-Korea, letter to Chongju District Compensation Committee. Dec. 1997. The U.S. Army later accepted that their efforts to discover the truth were incomplete and that their initial statement was based on faulty research conducted at that time and published in its final investigative report, *Report of the No Gun Ri Review*. Department of Army, *Report of the No Gun Ri Review* (January 2001), 3.

<sup>3</sup> Robert L. Bateman, *No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident* (PA: Stackpole Books, 2002), 126.

US government in seeking the truth of the incident because the Army Secretary, Louise Caldera, announced at the beginning of the investigation that soldiers who testified to their criminal behaviors could be charged in a court of law, an announcement that could have influenced the truthfulness of interviews with veterans.<sup>4</sup> Since subsequent *No Gun Ri* researchers had to deal with varying versions of the event, archival materials became a critical element of *No Gun Ri* history.

There remain some military documents related to this event, but most of them contain contextual and circumstantial information rather than direct description about the event. These documents were created during the war and contain some general information such as rigid refugee policies and cases of harsh orders from higher commanders to treat refugees as the enemy which can be interpreted or inferred as applying to the case of *No Gun Ri*. However, there are no records directly mentioning the *No Gun Ri* massacre. This lack of military documentation relating to the specific massacre was used to support some researchers' arguments asserting that there was no deliberate massacre in *No Gun Ri*. These researchers take the narrowest interpretation of those documents, accepting that no documentary evidence mentioning the killing at *No Gun Ri* to mean there was no killing there, not taking oral history of the victims into account. The U.S. government's investigation, the *No Gun Ri* Review, also takes a similar position and concludes that there were an unknown number of people killed and injured during this period of time at *No Gun Ri* but that this was an unfortunate tragedy inherent to war and not a deliberate killing since there was no clear documentary evidence found to substantiate the

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<sup>4</sup> Ku-do Chong, "The Questions raised from the Government Investigation," *Issues on Modern History* 12 (Feb. 2001): 57. (정구도, "노근리사건 조사결과보고서의 문제점: 한미공동 발표문"과 한국정부"노근리사건 조사결과보고서"를 중심으로," *근현대사강좌* 12, (Feb. 2001): 57).

assertions of the petitioners.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, other researchers insist that the massacre itself cannot be disputed because of the availability of the oral histories of victims and military documents that support oral history with attendant background information. The controversy over the interpretation of the records underlies the whole process of *No Gun Ri* research from 1999 to the present.

Another problem related to the interpretation of archival documents is that all the remaining official documents were those created by American soldiers while very few records initiated by Koreans exist. Due to this anomaly, some doubts about the objectivity of war records were raised since these records were created by so called “offenders of the massacre,” suggesting why it is very hard to find records directly related to the massacre. Some researchers insist that the possibility of American soldiers not willingly recording their wrongdoings vigorously, if not purposely deleting them, should not be ignored. Furthermore, some mention the incompleteness of documents. These researchers cite an example of an entry for a certain document within the G-2 Journal of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division that was not left in the file folder. Of special importance, they note, many war diaries of the 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment, whose soldiers allegedly participated in this event during the last week of July, were missing.<sup>6</sup>

The history of researching the *No Gun Ri* incident has generated a series of controversies and arguments related to the use of archival materials and other historical sources; specifically, there was an incident during the *No Gun Ri* discussions that directly related to the use and manipulation of archival materials arising from false testimony. The Associated Press’ first publication on the event turned out to contain false testimonies by American veterans. Right after

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<sup>5</sup> Department of the Army Inspector General, *No Gun Ri Review* (January 2001), 185.

<sup>6</sup> Hwan-jun Lee, “The Truth and Lessons of the *No Gun Ri* Incident,” *Military History* 42 (Apr. 2001): 199-200. (이 환준, “노근리 사건의 진상과 교훈,” *군사* 42 (Apr. 2001): 199-200).



the Pulitzer Prize was awarded to the AP reporters for their investigative work, two journalists from *U.S. News and World Report* and *Stars and Stripes*, a military newspaper, who are veterans of the 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division, reported on the fallacies of the interviews. One of the interviewees in the AP article testified that he fired upon the Korean civilians under an order from higher officers. However, it was later proved that he was not at *No Gun Ri* and did not belong to the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division during the time of the massacre.<sup>7</sup> This discrepancy was corroborated by his military records. After these reports, the AP needed to prove that their original publication was not completely fictitious and still carried some truth regarding the event. The whole probing process of reporting over the veracity of the interview was carried out by adducing evidence from military records. This process provides some insights to archivists because this interviewee even manipulated his own military records. In the 1970s, the Army's Personnel Record Center in St. Louis lost a large portion of its holdings due to fire. This institute collected copies of letters and documents from veterans about their military careers to fill in the gap in their military personnel records.<sup>8</sup> In the course of such an event, the manipulation of military records was possible and it threatened the reliability of records located in the archives.

As more vigorous research began with various perspectives, researchers tried to explore more evidence. In fact, the research process of reviewing this event was aggressive and competitive among researcher groups, especially journalists, who were eager to obtain critical documentary evidence to support their arguments and dispute those of others. Researchers began to put together all the clues of this tragedy in an attempt to disclose more evidence. They

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<sup>7</sup> For major articles on question and arguments of these false testimonies, see Sang-hun Choe, Charles J. Hanley, and Martha Mendoza, "War's Hidden Chapter: Ex-GIs Tell of Killing Korean Refugees," *The Associated Press* (Sept. 29, 1999), at <<http://wire.ap.org/APpackages/nogunri/>> and Joseph L. Galloway, "Doubts about a Korean 'Massacre'," *US News & World Report* 128:21 (May 29, 2000), also available at <[http://www.usnews.com/usnews/culture/articles/000522/archive\\_016967.htm](http://www.usnews.com/usnews/culture/articles/000522/archive_016967.htm)>. (last accessed on June 5, 2006)

<sup>8</sup> Galloway, "Doubts about a Korean 'Massacre'."

included previous efforts by the survivors and their families to uncover the event. More archival records in the National Archives and Army Archives in the U.S. were being discovered or were receiving new attention by researchers. Other evidence from the incident site in Korea and interviews of the survivors and veterans were also examined by academics and government investigators. On some occasions, controversy induced the exploration of new documentary evidence and at other times newly recognized documents stimulated new controversy about *No Gun Ri*. Archival materials were the key to the investigation and to the development of knowledge regarding this event. Therefore, chronological examination of the developing knowledge of the massacre could provide a sense of the role and meaning of archival records in researching this event. A good analysis of the correlation between the evolution of discussion and emerging archival materials provides a clear view of the value of archival materials for disclosing the facts surrounding a historical event.

The archival community has long shown an interest in documenting history, and this has been a major purpose of the archivists' tasks. However, how much the documentation efforts of archivists have been used to clarify historic events may be more important to address. Archival programs cannot be meaningfully evaluated on their performances and roles without taking the usage of archives into account. In addition, it has been assumed that archival materials are one of the major sources of historical research. However, little is known about how much impact archival holdings can make on historical research, how they play a role in building public knowledge about a historical event, and, therefore, how archival materials contribute to the process of writing history. Many archival researchers assert that the archival community needs to pay more attention to the impact of archival materials' use after research is done by users.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Paul Conway, "Facts and Frameworks: An Approach to Studying the Users of Archives," *American Archivist* 49

The case of *No Gun Ri* provides a good example of how archival materials play a role in historical discussions, providing a good opportunity to look at archival contributions in this sense. This dissertation examines how archival materials were discovered and used to either overcome or reduce the controversies raised in the process of *No Gun Ri* research by examining the earliest to the most recent publications and their authors' patterns of conducting their research and using archives. Therefore, the archival contribution to *No Gun Ri* research and researchers' perceptions of using archives for their research are demonstrated in a detailed way. Archival programs may accurately observe how their holdings are used (or not used) and why from the patterns of use of archival materials in the evolution of the discussion on the *No Gun Ri* massacre.

## 1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The significance of this study is threefold. First and foremost, this study presents how archival documents contributed to the historical research of the *No Gun Ri* massacre in a detailed manner. There has been little archival research to date that seeks to study the impact of archival materials on research from the point of view of publications. This study addresses, in the case of the *No Gun Ri* massacre, how archival materials influence the development of discussions and the building of knowledge of an incident from the analysis of *No Gun Ri* publications. The focus of the study is on archival materials used to understand and interpret this historical event. This study examines the process of the development of the *No Gun Ri* research and checks every step in the use of archival records in this process and finally establishes the concrete contribution of

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(Fall 1986): 398; Jacqueline Goggin, "The Indirect Approach: A Study of Scholarly Users of Black and Women's Organizational Records in the Library of Congress Manuscript Division," *Midwestern Archivist* 11:1 (1986): 65.

archival materials in the actual research of the *No Gun Ri* massacre.

Second, it will add significant new insight into how historical researchers perform their research activities with relation to using archives in general. This study intends to reveal in-depth understanding of researchers' use of archival materials, their perception of archival materials, and their research patterns. In other words, this study provides a realistic picture of archives users and their use of archival materials. As new source material emerges or as new uses for long known sources develop, new insights and understanding about an event emerge. Inversely, as researchers acquire new knowledge on their research topic, they recognize new uses of old materials. Some archival researchers report that archives users, especially historians, often discover "the relevance of materials that they had previously rejected as unimportant," as they gain more knowledge on their topic.<sup>10</sup> Still, users' research patterns relating to archives have not been identified comprehensively in archival literature. Therefore, understanding the actual process that *No Gun Ri* researchers followed offers practical insights to archivists and archival researchers about how archival materials are used in actual research.

There is an additional aspect of significance to this study. In the case of *No Gun Ri* research, it was not academic historians who discovered the military records and initiated the research, but rather, the victims and families of survivors of the massacre and journalists. Historians, in this case, joined the research later. This study addresses how journalists and the general public, as well as historians, use archival materials and conduct research on a historical event. Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of archives users as a whole is presented. It is further believed that a study about specifically defined users within a topic is extremely helpful for archival programs to serve their users practically.

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<sup>10</sup> Wendy Duff and Catherine A. Johnson, "Accidentally Found on Purpose: Information-Seeking Behavior of Historians in Archives," *Library Quarterly* 72:4 (2002): 492.

### 1.3 TERMINOLOGY

This study uses conceptual terms of “public knowledge” and “public memory.” The explanation of these terms is necessary to provide an understanding of how they are utilized within this study.

“Public Knowledge” can be explained as knowledge of a certain fact or an event that is understood and developed by general members of society.<sup>11</sup> In this study, public knowledge is used to refer to a more contemporary idea by the public about a certain fact. The public knowledge of *No Gun Ri*, therefore, means the general knowledge of this event in a contemporary time frame, which has been accepted by the general readers through published news articles, academic works, as well as government reports. The full-dress research of *No Gun Ri* massacre began in 1999 even though the survivors had collected oral histories and conducted their own research since the massacre happened. Therefore, the public knowledge of *No Gun Ri* massacre indicates the knowledge of this event as it was researched and revealed in recent years (since 1999), excluding the survivors’ collective efforts to research it. This study, in part, attempts to understand how the knowledge of the *No Gun Ri* incident has been developed by historians, journalists, government officers, law scholars, and the general public, including survivors and families. Since this study does not only look at historians as major researchers, the term “public” was used to denote the knowledge of the *No Gun Ri* incident.

On the other hand, the term “Public Memory” signifies memory, or beliefs, or ideas, which were developed and constructed within a group of people in a society about a certain event

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<sup>11</sup> “Knowledge” is defined as “In general sense: The fact or condition of being instructed, or of having information acquired by study or research; acquaintance with ascertained truths, facts, or principles; information acquired by study; learning; erudition” in the *Oxford English Dictionary*. This definition does not imply any time frame for understanding, but in this study, the author adds the time frame of “contemporary” to distinguish this term from public memory.

over a long period of time.<sup>12</sup> The term is used in this study to refer to the accumulation and construction of memory of the *No Gun Ri* massacre over the years subsequent to the massacre. As the *No Gun Ri* incident has been remembered and recorded by the survivors and veterans and stored in various archives over the years, a public memory for the *No Gun Ri* incident was constructed as time passed by. Therefore, the term public memory is used to indicate the whole process of remembering, accepting, and interpreting the incident based on the accumulation of oral histories and archival evidence in military documents, and not limited to the vigorous research of recent years. However, even though this study differentiates the concept of public knowledge from that of public memory for convenience, it could be extrapolated that public knowledge is part of the broader meaning of public memory. The process of arriving at the recent understanding of the *No Gun Ri* massacre is not really different from the process of building public memory in terms of gathering all available evidence including the accumulated oral histories and memories from the victims' community and remaining archives.

#### **1.4 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

Archival materials are assumed to play a major role in historical research. However, little is known about how much archival materials influence public knowledge of a historical event as will be discussed in the second chapter of this study. Within this framework, the purpose of this study is to address how the debates and the development of knowledge about the *No Gun Ri*

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<sup>12</sup> This general definition which contains notions of constructed ideas by a group of people within a social context is accepted by many researchers. Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, edited, translated, and with an introduction by Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1992), 22; Kenneth Foote, "To Remember and Forget: Archives, Memory, and Culture," *American Archivist* 53 (Summer 1990): 380; David Thelen, "Memory and American History," *Journal of American History* 75 (March, 1989): 1119.

massacre have evolved according to the emergence of new information, especially from archival materials, and how and why archival materials play a role in this process.

Based on this purpose, this study considers the following research questions:

1. As seen in the *No Gun Ri* massacre research, how do researchers use archival materials?
2. Has the research of the *No Gun Ri* massacre changed in light of an expansion of available archival resources?
3. What does the use of archival materials in the building of knowledge about the *No Gun Ri* massacre reveal about the actual state of researchers' archival use in conducting research on recent history?

These research questions were raised to establish a framework from which to evaluate the development of knowledge and discussions about the *No Gun Ri* massacre and to analyze the interaction of that knowledge with the emerging available source materials; and to discover how researchers learn, approach, identify, and finally use archival materials and how much credibility they assign to archival materials in comparison to other sources available for their research.

## **1.5 STRUCTURE AND OUTLINE**

This section provides an outline for the dissertation starting with the literature review.

Chapter 2 comprises a literature review on the issues of public memory in relation to war memories and archival evidence, archival records as evidence and democratic accountability, and user studies in archives. One element that emerged from this literature review was how the archival community included the public memory paradigm in their academic literature. It was further noted that many archival researchers utilized conceptual and methodological approaches

to connect the concept of public memory to archives in an effort to emphasize the social function of archives or to see archives as an artifact of public memory. There have not been many studies that examined the actual relationship between the public memory building process and archival contributions. In addition, this section illustrates the way the archival community has accepted the concept of record as evidence throughout history as well as in current discourses. The notion of the democratic accountability of a society by recordkeeping was addressed as well with relation to the concept of record as evidence. The use/user study part identifies that archival use/user studies have contributed to a broader knowledge about archival users and provides practical understanding about how frequently archival holdings are used and how users approach archival holdings. However, it was also noted that many archival researchers still expect more active research about their users by investigating particular user groups and actual research publications.

Chapter 3 describes the theoretical background and methodology of this study. It provides the description of the concept of “Grounded Theory” as theoretical background and its applicability to this research. It then provides the methodological framework of the study. The chapter explains the methodologies that this study employed (content analysis and interview) and the reason why this study utilizes them. It describes the specific process of content analysis of publications of *No Gun Ri* research and the interviews of the authors of those publications, in detail. For publication analysis, all published research on the *No Gun Ri* massacre were collected and analyzed. From among the authors of *No Gun Ri* research, those who had published in-depth research were selected and interviewed.

Chapter 4 presents the historical sketch about the *No Gun Ri* massacre. It is a necessary process to understand the incident first with available historical materials. In the chapter, the



focus was set on the general comprehension about *No Gun Ri* in addition to the narratives of how this story came into light. The survivors' allegations about the massacre were briefly described along with how historical research had been processed and developed.

In chapters 5 and 6, the findings of the study are presented. Chapter 5 provides findings of the analysis of the publications regarding the *No Gun Ri* incident. This chapter addresses how the public knowledge of the *No Gun Ri* incident developed over time and how archival evidence affected this development. It also exhibits some quantitative data about which archival materials and secondary literature were used more frequently. Chapter 6 describes the researchers' perceptions of archival evidence and of the use of archives, mostly based on interviews of *No Gun Ri* researchers. For the content analysis of publication and interview transcripts, coding schemes were created, and the data analysis was performed according to these schemes. In these chapters, the results of data analysis are presented in order to provide a context for the research results.

The final chapter summarizes the major findings of this study. The research questions are once more stated and the findings for each question are presented. Through answering research questions, the implications of the final results of the study are discussed. Following the discussions of the implications and research findings, limitations of the study that were not identified in the beginning of this study are explored and suggestions for further study are presented.

## **1.6 LIMITATIONS**

There are some limitations in this study. First, since this study is not a historical study to obtain

information about the massacre itself, it is limited to the issues of the use of documents, the development of knowledge about the incident, and the evolution of discussions. There are a great many contradictions about the war and the massacre, but this study only deals with the evolution of discussions without questioning the event itself.

This study has another limitation on the subject of the research, confining itself to researchers in South Korea and the United States alone. In fact, Korea and America were the major countries involved in the Korean War, and since the *No Gun Ri* incident occurred in the course of American troops' evacuation of the Korean people, it is naturally assumed that people in these two countries would be the primary researchers on this issue.

## 2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review addresses several major issues related to this study. First, a general review of public memory in relation to war memory and archives is described. For the analysis of developing knowledge of the *No Gun Ri* massacre, a basic understanding about the formation of public memory of a historical event cannot be overlooked. The *No Gun Ri* incident happened more than 50 years ago, and the survivors and the victims' families have remembered and researched this event through the intervening years. Later, when this event became known to the public, more research was conducted, adding more evidence and new understanding which constituted the building blocks of the public memory of this event. In this chapter, the literature of public memory is reviewed in the context of understanding the building process of public memory of the *No Gun Ri* incident.

Secondly, the value of archival records for evidence and accountability is reviewed. From the beginning of the investigation of the *No Gun Ri* massacre, accountability issues have challenged the debates on reliable recordkeeping and the use of archival materials. The veracity of some sources was questioned and debated as more research was conducted. The accountability of research sources including archival documents and oral testimonies was the central issue of the whole process of the *No Gun Ri* research. Thus, the review of literature on documents as evidence and accountability is necessary to understand the *No Gun Ri* incident.

Finally, this section considers archival use and user studies. This study pursues a specific

type of usage evaluation of the archival records of a specific event. The *No Gun Ri* researchers are central to this study while learning about their process and perception using documents and archives. Therefore, basic understanding of how the archival community has studied users of archival holdings is of benefit to this study.

## 2.1 PUBLIC MEMORY, WAR HISTORY, AND ARCHIVES

Public memory, also called collective memory and social memory, is often defined within the notion of a social framework. Maurice Halbwachs, a French sociologist, considered memory in a social context in the 1930s. He states that memories are constructed socially by groups of people, and social groups determine which public events will be memorable and how. In his words, “every collective memory requires the support of a group delimited in space and time.” He also emphasizes that “While the collective memory endures and draws strength from its base in a coherent body of people, it is individuals as group members who remember.”<sup>13</sup> Halbwachs’ idea of the social construction of public memory has been widely accepted since then. Kenneth Foote also defines public memory as “beliefs and ideas held in common by many individuals that together produce a sense of social solidarity and community.”<sup>14</sup> Similarly, David Thelen in his article “Memory and American History,” published in a special issue of the *Journal of American History* on memory, addresses how people construct and narrate memories within the social dimensions of memory. Here he claims that memory, individual or collective, is constructed, not

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<sup>13</sup> Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, edited, translated, and with an introduction by Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1992), 22.

<sup>14</sup> Kenneth Foote, “To Remember and Forget: Archives, Memory, and Culture,” *American Archivist* 53 (Summer 1990): 380.

merely reproduced, and this construction is not made in isolation, but in correlation within the context of community, broader politics, and social dynamics.<sup>15</sup>

In the context of a social framework for memory, the past is a social construction reshaped and reorganized by the concerns of the present. Public memory in a social context concerns itself with what should be remembered, how it should be remembered, and what intellectual, social, and political traditions and conditions make public memory important. Problems and issues in the present are the starting points to address discussions regarding the past. This connection of the present to the past was illustrated by Paul Connerton when he said, “we may say that our experiences of the present largely depend upon our knowledge of the past, and that our images of the past commonly serve to legitimate a present social order.”<sup>16</sup> Patrick Geary also explains why this connection exists. He states, “Individuals and communities copied, abridged, and revised archival records, liturgical texts, literary documents, doing so with reference to physical reminders from previous generations and a fluid oral tradition in order to prescribe how the present should be because of how the past had been.”<sup>17</sup> Looking back from this vantage point in 2007, it is possible to see renewed interest in World War II and the Korean War as they neared and passed their 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary. The proximity of a major anniversary generated many discussions and revisitings on the meanings and lessons of the wars and its aftermath.<sup>18</sup> The *No Gun Ri* massacre could have more attention from the public in this

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<sup>15</sup> David Thelen, “Memory and American History,” *Journal of American History* 75 (March, 1989): 1119.

<sup>16</sup> Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 3.

<sup>17</sup> Patrick J. Geary, *Phantoms of Remembrance: Memory and Oblivion at the End of the First Millennium* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 8.

<sup>18</sup> A number of mass communication media had special programs to memorialize the World War II and the Korean War, and a number of works about those wars have come out with new findings. Many organizations, including the National Archives and Records Administration and Library of Congress had special exhibitions about the memory of the WW II or the Korean War, either online or as physical displays. Several conferences on the Korean War, World War II, and Cold War Era were held.

atmosphere. If this event came to light in a different time period or in another social context, it would have not have received this much interest from the American people.

However, a simple connection between the past and the present cannot be regarded as history. The connection draws on the notion of memory as a base of history, but is not the same as history. Patrick Hutton differentiates memory from history in a book where he investigates the history of how memory has been conceived, cumulated, tested, and used in societies, as follows:

Memory confirms similarities between past and present. There is a magic about memory that is appealing because it conveys a sense of the past coming alive once more. It touches the emotions. History, by contrast, establishes the differences between past and present. It reconstructs the past from a critical distance and strives to convey the sense that its connections with the present are devoid of emotional commitment. . . . The images retrieved by memory are protean and elusive, whereas the data of history are durable and verifiable.<sup>19</sup>

Jacques Le Goff, in *History and Memory*, underscores, “It is true that history involves a rearrangement of the past which is subject to the social, ideological, and political structures in which historians live and work.”<sup>20</sup> He articulates the relationship between history and memory as follows: “memory is the raw material of history. Whether mental, oral, or written, it is the living source from which historians draw. Because its workings are usually unconscious, it is in reality more dangerously subject to manipulation by time and by societies given to reflection than the discipline of history itself. Moreover, the discipline of history nourishes memory in turn, and enters into the great dialectical process of memory and forgetting experienced by individuals and

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<sup>19</sup> Patrick H. Hutton, *History as an Art of Memory* (Hanover, NH: University of Vermont, 1993), 76.

<sup>20</sup> Jacques Le Goff, *History and Memory*, translated by Steven Rendall and Elizabeth Clamon (NY: Columbia University Press, 1992), xi.

societies.”<sup>21</sup> Hutton again specifies that “Historical understanding is selective, but collective memory is sustaining. If popular mores and manners were ignored by an official historiography, they remained alive in the oral traditions that have recently recaptured the historians’ attention.”<sup>22</sup>

Literacy or writing/printing is not a prerequisite condition for social memory. Paul Connerton observes that social memory is conceptually different from historical reconstruction, which is a more specific practice. Historical reconstruction is seen to be built predominantly with written texts and treated with a focus on inscribed transmissions of memories. He tries to prove how practices in non-recorded methods are transmitted in traditions, and images and recollected knowledge of the past are conveyed and sustained by ritual performances. With this unique approach to memory, he points out, “one of the limitations of documentary evidence is that few people bother to write down what they take for granted.”<sup>23</sup> In a similar context, Daniel Woolf agrees with Paul Connerton’s idea that literacy is not always necessary for memory; rather, memory and literacy are exclusive and contradictory techniques of recording knowledge. Woolf writes, “it is also true that this master-servant relationship between memory and writing would be subverted and ultimately inverted as time wore on by increasing literacy, by the advancing ubiquity of the printed word, and the evolution and expansion of what is here termed the social memory.”<sup>24</sup>

From this historical study about memory, Jacques Le Goff demonstrates that memory is naturally political. He asserts that collective memory is a conquest, an instrument, and an

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<sup>21</sup> Le Goff, *History and Memory*, xi.

<sup>22</sup> Patrick Hutton, *History as an Art of Memory* (Hanover, NH: University of Vermont, 1993), 2.

<sup>23</sup> Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 18.

<sup>24</sup> Daniel Woolfe, “Memory and Historical Culture in Early Modern England,” *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association* 2 (1991): 291.

objective of power for the best chance of understanding the struggle for domination over remembrance and tradition, which is the manipulation of memory.<sup>25</sup> In his book, *Phantoms of Remembrance: Memory and Oblivion at the End of the First Millennium*, Patrick Geary agrees that public memory is essentially political. He claims the simple dichotomy of memory and history ignores the political dimensions of collective memory and history. “Historians write for a purpose, essentially to shape the collective memory of the historical profession and ultimately of the society in which they live.” He goes on to say that, “If the writing of modern historians appears analytic, critical, and rational, the reason is that these are the rhetorical tools that promise the best chance of influencing the collective memory of our age. Similarly, if historical memory is essentially political, so too is collective memory.”<sup>26</sup>

In this context, if memory is essentially political, forgetting might be another activity forming public memory. David Lowenthal asserts, “Features recalled with pride are apt to be safeguarded against erosion and vandalism; those that reflect shame may be ignored or expunged from the landscape.”<sup>27</sup> Kenneth Foote attempts to address interrelationships between cultural landscape and collective memory. He argues that cultural landscapes can be another way to look at a representation of the past because “human modifications of the environment are often related to the way societies wish to sustain and efface memories.”<sup>28</sup> Especially when there is an event of violence and tragedy, a society is more likely to efface such an event and leave the memory behind. Foote argues, “If the violence fails to exemplify an enduring value, there is greater likelihood of the site, artifacts, and documentary record being effaced, either actively or

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<sup>25</sup> Le Goff, *History and Memory*, 98.

<sup>26</sup> Geary, *Phantoms of Remembrance: Memory and Oblivion at the End of the First Millennium*, 12.

<sup>27</sup> David Lowenthal, “Past Time, Present Place: Landscape and Memory,” *The Geographical Review* 65 (1975): 31.

<sup>28</sup> Kenneth Foote, *Shadowed Ground* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1997), 33.



passively.”<sup>29</sup> He also claims that, “Mass murder is the most common event to result in obliteration.”<sup>30</sup> The effort to maintain written evidence is likely more neglected, if not discouraged, in cases of events that are illegal or reflect shame. An English historian, Peter Burke, identifies memory as a historical phenomenon in terms of the modes of transmission of public memories and the uses of these memories. He uses the concept of “social amnesia”<sup>31</sup> as the opposite of social memory and argues that social memory and social amnesia are related to who preserves the history or the past, the conflicts of memories, official censorship of the past and the strength of unofficial memory throughout history. He asserts that memory, or amnesia, of the past has not been stopped by writing and print, and in this context, he asserts, that historians should return to being “remembrancers” whose job it is to remind people of what they would have liked to forget.

Pierre Nora and James Young assert that through commemoration activities, people attempt to forget what they do not want to remember as they delegate their responsibility of remembrance to the memorials, monuments, or even archives.<sup>32</sup> One of the compensations for the *No Gun Ri* victims that the American government offered was building a memorial for those killed and injured during the Korean War, not particularly honoring the victims of the *No Gun Ri* massacre. In fact, survivors and families of victims complained of the fact that the American government tried to obscure their specific responsibility of this massacre by displaying regret of

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<sup>29</sup> Kenneth Foote, “To Remember and Forget: Archives, Memory, and Culture,” *American Archivist* 53 (Summer, 1990): 385.

<sup>30</sup> Foote, *Shadowed Ground*, 26.

<sup>31</sup> Peter Burke, “History as Social Memory,” in *Memory: History, Culture and the Mind*, ed. by Thomas Butler (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989), 105-110.

<sup>32</sup> Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire,” *Representations* 26 (Spring, 1989): 13; James E. Young, *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 2.

all war victims of the Korean War.<sup>33</sup> In addition, the reporting of the *No Gun Ri* incident also reflects the dereliction of the responsibility of remembrance, by labeling the incident as a superficially representative atrocity to negate all other wrongdoings.<sup>34</sup> The *No Gun Ri* incident was the only negative incident labeled as an atrocity and remembered by the American people for the entire period of the Korean War.

Certain public memories and histories, in its construction, often reflect different aspects of tragic events such as violence, war, and massacres. As a matter of fact, the approaches to war history or catastrophic events have been a way for ethnic or cultural groups to establish their identity in conjunction with building memorials and the memorial's influence on contemporary historical interpretation. In Ian Buruma's *The Wages of Guilt*, the author discusses the memory and attitudes of Japanese and German peoples on the legacy of World War II and shows how the citizens of these countries saw their past and raised questions of moral responsibility and national identity in the creation of a public memory of those people.<sup>35</sup> Like the Holocaust, a national traumatic event certainly contributes to the formation of a national identity. The whole process of identity seeking usually involves commemorative activities. Arthur Neal states that, "National traumas also provide the raw material for shaping national identities and revitalizing values for promoting the collective good."<sup>36</sup> In the case of the Holocaust, the identity-seeking process has been conducted on two planes: the public recognition of the crimes of Germans and Austrians and the public expression of the suffering of the Jews. In *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust*

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<sup>33</sup> Junho Hwang, "The Second Chapter of the History War surrounding *No Gun Ri* has begun," *Pressian* June 1, 2006. (황준호, "노근리를 둘러싼 한-미 역사전쟁의 2 막이 올랐다," *프레시안* 6/1/2006.) at

<<http://usacrime.or.kr/maybbs/showview.php?db=us&code=news&n=3884&page>> (last accessed at Aug. 4, 2006).

<sup>34</sup> Marilyn B. Young, "An Incident at *No Gun Ri*," in *Crimes of War: Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth Century*, ed. by Omer Bartov, Atina Grossmann, and Mary Nolan (NY: The New Press, 2002), 245.

<sup>35</sup> Ian Buruma, *The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994).

<sup>36</sup> Arthur G. Neal, *National Trauma and Collective Memory: Major Events in the American Century* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 203.

*Memorials and Meaning*, James Young brilliantly demonstrates how commemorative activities are charged with a problematic struggle between collective memory and national identity, and the aspiration toward a future through the memorials and monuments whereby the meaning of the Holocaust is to be redefined from generation to generation. He pronounces that “If part of the state’s aim, therefore, is to create a sense of shared values and ideals, then it will also be the state’s aim to create the sense of common memory, as the foundation for a unified polis. Public memorials, national days of commemoration and shared calendars thus all work to create common loci around which national identity is forged.”<sup>37</sup> Halbwachs’s idea that collective memory is crucial for the identity of groups such as families, believers of a religion, or social classes seems to be proven true in the case of the Holocaust and national traumatic events. Therefore, public memory of war history is mutually related to public commemoration, political ideology, and official history.

There have also been some works about Japan’s public memory for war history in particular. In her doctoral dissertation, Hiroko Okuda examines Japan’s public memory in memorializing World War II as evidenced in national and local/regional memorial discourses. She demonstrates the ways in which political institutions develop the therapeutic function of memory in healing the historical traumas of Japan’s defeat in war and the atomic bombing on Hiroshima. Okuda mentions,

A rhetoric, memorializing the recent past, fosters and maintains identification among the members of a community by appealing to a re-invented historical continuity over time. A governing apparatus may attenuate the complexity and diversity of personal memories through inviting symbolic participation in ritual

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<sup>37</sup> Young, *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning*, 6.

acts. Such collective acts predominate in institutional versions of answers to fundamental questions of re-inventing collective identity: who does the inclusive pronoun ‘we’ refer to and why are ‘we’ who ‘we’ are.<sup>38</sup>

This viewpoint considers the ideological and identity-seeking function of public memory to be that of holding society together. Lewis Coser writes, “When it comes to historical memory, the person does not remember events directly; it can only be stimulated in indirect ways through reading or listening or in commemoration and festive occasions when people gather together to remember in common the deeds and accomplishments of long-departed members of the group.”<sup>39</sup>

If history and public memory of the past are woven and written in a way of addressing the present within the context of a social framework, there needs to be a form of institutionalizing information and memory to be kept and handed down as part of public memory. The efforts to connect archives and public memory usually begin with an emphasis on the cultural function of archives in institutionalizing information to establish public memory. Kenneth Foote connects archives and memory within a broadened view of communication and culture. He observes archives as places that can be valuable means for “extending the temporal and spatial range of human communication.”<sup>40</sup> He explains that social pressure on a historical event can influence and shape the archival records and tries to persuade readers of the cultural role of archives in a society.

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<sup>38</sup> Hiroko Okuda, *Memorializing World War II: Rhetoric of Japan’s Public Memory, 1945-1949* (Ph D. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Evanston, 2001), 2.

<sup>39</sup> Lewis A. Coser, “Introduction,” in Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, edited, translated, and with an introduction by Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: the University of Chicago, 1992), 24.

<sup>40</sup> Foote, “To Remember and Forget: Archives, Memory, and Culture,” 379.

An archives is an institution to which is delegated the responsibility of remembering, by a society. A French sociologist, Pierre Nora, articulates that

Modern memory is, above all, archival. It relies entirely on the materiality of the trace, the immediacy of the recording, the visibility of the image . . . Memory has been wholly absorbed by its meticulous reconstitution. Its new vocation is to record; delegating to the archive the responsibility of remembering, it sheds its signs upon depositing them there, as a snake sheds its skin.<sup>41</sup>

The responsibility that “we are the result of the past and cannot easily jump out of its main current” involves the notion of “total archives,” where a diversified and contemporary documentary base for future historians is garnered with a global vision of the society and its component parts.<sup>42</sup> In this relation with history, archivists “hold the keys to the collective memory,” as Jean-Pierre Wallot mentions. He continues to say, “In this world of superficiality and ‘instant’ everything, they must, more than ever before, develop the treasures of our ‘houses of memory,’ enriching them and making them more available and more visible to as many people as possible. An archives is about the past.”<sup>43</sup> Through the examination of the general history of archives in relation to the concept of collective memory and heritage, Hugh Taylor asserts that archives need to work in interdepartmental cooperation within museums, art galleries, and local societies in the heritage spectrum to broadly contribute to the public memory of society and play a role as a public social service.<sup>44</sup> In discussing the archivist’s role in the global context

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<sup>41</sup> Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire,” 7.

<sup>42</sup> Jean-Pierre Wallot, “Building a Living Memory For the History of Our Present: New Perspectives on Archival Appraisal,” *Journal of Canadian Historical Association* (1991): 263-282

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 282.

<sup>44</sup> Hugh A. Taylor, “The Collective Memory: Archives and Libraries As Heritage,” *Archivaria* 15 (Winter 1982/83): 124-125.

of the information age, Jean-Pierre Wallot also maintains that archivists serve two competing and complementary functions: as keepers of evidence and information of their parent institutions, and their “ultimate and essential role of long-term memory, identity, and values formation and transmission. This totality or combination of these missions, linked through the concept of memory, is greater than the sum of the parts.”<sup>45</sup>

As a cultural institution and a place for social memory, archives may not be free from politics in the process of exploration of the past. Francis Blouin analyzes the argument that archives are not neutral in the process of historical inquiry because they are complicit in fostering certain perceptions based on institutional definitions and particular concepts of the state. He writes, “Absences [of archives] may, in fact, be purposeful in a way that skews the historical record. Some scholars argue that archivists are in actuality complicit in affirmations of existing political structures and power relationships.”<sup>46</sup> Richard Brown and Beth Davis-Brown also emphasize a political role of archives in terms of ordinary daily function. This is because the awareness of political characteristics of documents unmask archivists’ “struggle to build a reflective, democratic society.”<sup>47</sup>

The political nature of archives has been further accentuated in the most recent discourse with a postmodern perspective to archival work in which the importance of archives is stated as dependant on the fact that it shapes the understanding of the world through archival holdings. This new discourse emphasizes the social role of archives. Among those with a postmodern perspective, Verne Harris and Brien Brothman take the position of viewing records within

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<sup>45</sup> Jean-Pierre Wallot, “Limited Identities for a Common Identity: Archivists in the Twenty-First Century,” *Archivaria* 41 (Spring 1996): 23.

<sup>46</sup> Francis X. Blouin, Jr., “Archivists, Mediation, and Constructs of Social Memory,” *Archival Issues* 24:2 (1999): 104.

<sup>47</sup> Richard Harvey Brown and Beth Davis-Brown, “The Making of Memory: The Politics of Archives, Libraries, and Museums in the Construction of National Consciousness,” *History of the Human Sciences* 11:4 (Nov. 1998): 30.

broader contexts and pluralizing dimensions, deeply influenced by the famous French philosopher, Jacques Derrida.<sup>48</sup> A South African archivist, Verne Harris, challenges a common notion that archives reflect reality and provide an image of an event or an action. He argues that documentary records provide only a sliver of a window into the event. Rather, they are an expression and instrument of prevailing relations of power. He views archivists as active documenters of society and shapers of social memory and “a shaping of the record as the carrier of memory rather than a participation in the processes of memory formation and storytelling.” Harris asserts that archives have been in a political power relation from the beginning. He states “the structure of archiving, then, involves a trace being consigned to a substrate, a place (and it can be a virtual place) of consignment. And consignment, structurally, involves the exercise of power, what Derrida calls archontic power: the power to consign; the power over the place of consignment; so that in all archiving, the diarist making an entry, the rock painter at work, the person sending an e-mail to a friend, archontic power is in play. And archivists, from the beginning and always, are political players.”<sup>49</sup> Because of the characteristic of archivists and records having major power to form or influence social memory, he asserts that a more proactive role can be imposed on an archivist for the sake of justice. He states,

Archivists, wherever they work and however they are  
positioned, are subject to the call of and for justice. For the archive

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<sup>48</sup> For more discussion on the postmodernism perspective, other than those by these two researchers, see the following articles. Terry Cook, “Archival Science and Postmodernism: New Formulations for Old Concepts,” *Archival Science* 1 (2001): 3-24; Eric Ketelaar, “Tacit Narratives: The Meanings of Archives,” *Archival Science* 1 (2002): 131-141; Mark A. Greene, “The Power of Meaning: The Archival Mission in the Postmodern Age,” *American Archivist* 65 (Spring/Summer 2002): 42-55; Elisabeth Kaplan, “Many Paths to Partial Truths: Archives, Anthropology, and the Power of Representation,” *Archival Science* 2 (2002): 209-220; Berndt Fredriksson, “Postmodernistic Archival Science – Rethinking the Methodology of a Science,” *Archival Science* 3 (2003): 177-197.

<sup>49</sup> Verne Harris, “Seeing (in) Blindness: South Africa, Archives and Passion for Justice,” opening keynote speech at the August 2001 Silver Jubilee annual conference of the Archives and Records Association of New Zealand (ARANZ), *Records: The Power, Passion and Politics*, in Wellington, New Zealand. Also available at <<http://www.caldeson.com/RIMOS/harris01.html>>. (last accessed at July 20, 2006)

can never be a quiet retreat for professionals and scholars and craftspersons. It is a crucible of human experience, a battleground for meaning and significance, a babel of stories, a place and a space of complex and ever-shifting power plays. Here one cannot keep one's hands clean. Any attempt to be impartial, to stand above the power-plays, constitutes a choice, whether conscious or not, to replicate if not to reinforce prevailing relations of power. In contrast, archivists who hear the calling of justice, who understand and work with the archival record as an enchanted sliver, will always be troubling the prevailing relations of power.<sup>50</sup>

Though it may not be as obvious as in Harris's work, Brien Brothman also takes a page from postmodernism on archives and memory. He focuses heavily on the concept of records in this perspective, and by explaining the characteristics of records he further emphasizes the social context of archives working with social and organizational memory. His explanation on the contrast between the relations of memory and history to archives offers a clear picture that is easy to follow. He states,

It is critical to emphasize . . . that memory's time and history's time, memory's past and history's past, although different, can both mark an archives' mission. . . . This move provides our warrant for developing a distinctive view of time and the past within the context of (organizational) memory. The approach attempts to dissolve, or, more precisely, to suspend, the apparent antithesis between the concepts of memory and archives. This will allow us to identify a role that archives may be suited to play in the working of social and organizational memory. At the conceptual level, being memory's archivist and being history's archivist may

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<sup>50</sup> Verne Harris, "The Archival Silver: Power, Memory, and Archives in South Africa," *Archival Science* 2:1-2 (2002): 85.



each involve radically different attitude to time and its objects. Memory's archivist is interested in the past's residue as material for promoting integrated knowledge, social identity, and the formation of group consciousness; history's archivist is interested in finding records and, in them, uncovering evidence to develop a linear narrative about a past that is ours, yet different from us.<sup>51</sup>

In a similar vein, Tom Nesmith argues that communication through the mediation that we have shaped human understanding and, therefore, rational communication is the basis of intellectual social progress. Based on this concept, he views archivists as key mediators or constructors of the knowledge available in archives and archives as a product of mediations of communication which will ultimately determine the intellectual understanding of a society.<sup>52</sup>

In 2002, an archival journal, *Archival Science* devoted all the issues of that year to the theme of "archives, records, and power." In this collection, authors argue that the power that archives imply and archivists wield over societal memory need to be recognized. With this perspective, archivists are viewed as "performers in the drama of memory-making" and "memory is not something found or collected in archives, but something that is made, and continually re-made."<sup>53</sup> By refusing the traditional view of archives as a neutral institution, Joan Schwartz and Terry Cook assert that archives should serve as "one foundation of historic understanding" and "validate our experience, our perceptions, our narratives, our stories," for our memory.<sup>54</sup> They view records as political, and the context and information of records in archives

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<sup>51</sup> Brien Brothman, "The Past that Archives Keep: Memory, History, and the Preservation of Archival Records," *Archivaria* 51 (Spring 2001): 62.

<sup>52</sup> Tom Nesmith, "Seeing Archives: Postmodernism and the Changing Intellectual Place of Archives," *American Archivist* 65 (Spring/Summer 2002): 26-27.

<sup>53</sup> Terry Cook and Joan Schwartz, "Archives, Records, and Power: From (Postmodern) Theory to (Archival) Performance," *Archival Science* 2:3-4 (2002): 172.

<sup>54</sup> Joan M. Schwartz and Terry Cook, "Archives, Records and Power: The Making of Modern Memory," *Archival Science* 2 (2002): 1-19.

imply “power” over collective memory and national identity. The “power” they argue is naturally generated in the relationship between archives and the societies that create and use them. They also assert that archivists themselves should maintain transparency in their archival work and be accountable since political power is involved. In this sense, Verne Harris suggests that this power should be shared so that archives users participate in this power yield process to control and check archivists’ exercise of the power and to shape society’s memory and knowledge together.<sup>55</sup>

On a more practical level, there have been some efforts to link archival tasks to the process (or the formation) of public memory. Richard Cox suggests the possibility of adopting the concept of public memory to specific archival work for public programming. He identifies archives as institutions and as definite products of public memory activities. The foundations of many archives, especially college and university archives as well as state archives, seem to be directly connected with centennial and bicentennial celebrations or other related activities. Richard Cox argues that, “a large portion of our archival and historical manuscript repositories are themselves artifacts (or documents?) of public memory discussions and activities.”<sup>56</sup> Given the idea of a product of public memory, he suggests archives need to be part of public memory through the actual archival work and principles of acquisition, preservation, and use, rather than by trying to be theoretically utilized. Through the commitment of archivists to public programming, the image, awareness, and success of archives can be determined within the context of how society views its past; that is public memory. At the same time, he warns, “Such archival outreach activities will take root and sprout while the climate is right, but they will be greatly susceptible to mood swings by the public unless archivists build a solid appreciation of

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<sup>55</sup> Wendy M. Duff and Verne Harris, “Stories and Names: Archival Description as Narrating Records and Constructing Meanings,” *Archival Science* 3 (2002): 275-280.

<sup>56</sup> Richard J. Cox, “The Concept of Public Memory and its Impact on Archival Public Programming,” *Archivaria* 36 (Autumn 1993): 126.

what they actually stand for in their work.”<sup>57</sup>

For other archival tasks, Wendy Duff and Verne Harris explore archival description as a field of archival thinking and practice in a broader context. They argue that traditional archival description and descriptive standards, including crucial archival notions of *respects des fonds*, provenance, and original order, only reflect rigid information of record creation and use. They state that with the arrangement and description of records, archivists tell stories about records. Each story they tell about their records changes the meaning of the records and re-creates them. They maintain “records are always in the process of being made, that ‘their’ stories are never ending, and that the stories of those who are conventionally called records creators, records managers, archivists, users and so on are (shifting, intermingling) parts of bigger stories understandable only in the ever-changing broader contexts of society.”<sup>58</sup>

In relation to memory, the most relevant archival task seems to be appraisal and selection. Barbara Craig suggests the idea of archives as a physical space for memory in which it is recalled or made in a social-construction sense. She views linking memory to archives leads to emphasis on the selection of archives and the function of archival appraisal. “Appraisal emerges as the foremost responsibility of the archivist” because it “manifest[s] our sensitivity to the importance of archives in making public memory and in its nourishment.”<sup>59</sup>

Records are created for reasons. Ciaran Trace rejects the positivist assumptions that archival documents are “authentic as to procedure and impartial as to creation because they are

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<sup>57</sup> Cox, “The Concept of Public Memory and its Impact on Archival Public Programming,” 131.

<sup>58</sup> Duff and Harris, “Stories and Names: Archival Description as Narrating Records and Constructing Meanings,” 265.

<sup>59</sup> Barbara L. Craig, “Selected Themes in the Literature on Memory and Their Pertinence to Archives,” *American Archivist* 65 (Fall/Winter 2002): 287-289

created as a means for, and as by-product[s] of, action, and not for the sake of posterity.”<sup>60</sup> She illustrates records as socially constructed and maintained entities created for reasons far from impartial. Moreover, they are often considered inauthentic and very cognizant of posterity. As records are created for reasons, there is a necessary process to interpret them to construct memory. In the case of the *No Gun Ri* incident, most of the records discovered are war records by American soldiers. In this case where there are two parties at stake: victims and American soldiers, this inauthentic and cognizant aspect of the records was the center of major arguments of this incident while being used as primary evidence at the same time. The interpretation of war records has always been an essential part of investigating the *No Gun Ri* incident because in many cases only contextual information was retained in the documents. This viewpoint of records as manifestations of political and social power with relation to public memory should be taken into consideration when examining *No Gun Ri* research and history since history is written with what has remained in archives.

Individuals’ acceptance of a historical event occur differently, based on their own experiences, but as their stories are cumulated and interpreted, the whole process becomes part of the public memory in understanding their past. Edward Linenthal concludes in the case of the Oklahoma bombing incident that “the bombing moved from ‘event’ to ‘story,’ as family members of those killed and survivors lived out several stories: a progressive narrative, a redemptive narrative, a toxic narrative, and a traumatic narrative. These private, intimate narratives became public stories through which the event was interpreted.”<sup>61</sup> Individual stories of the *No Gun Ri* massacre have been repeatedly told in the survivors’ communities for more than fifty years and,

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<sup>60</sup> Ciaran Trace, “What Is Recorded Is Never Simply ‘What Happened:’ Recordkeeping in Modern Organizational Culture,” *Archival Science* 2:1-2 (2002): 137.

<sup>61</sup> Edward T. Linenthal, *The Unfinished Bombing: Oklahoma City in American Memory* (Oxford University Press, 2001), 4.

later, researchers collected and interpreted them in their research. These cumulated stories, in conjunction with the documentary evidence and American soldiers' accounts, have formed the public memory of this event and been used in the investigation. Some literature of the *No Gun Ri* story illustrate that *No Gun Ri* research literally began on the basis of public memory that family members of survivors had constructed with the information and evidence that survivors had accumulated over the years.<sup>62</sup> Since there are no manifest documents or other sources that reflect the whole event without any subjective interpretation, the whole process of the *No Gun Ri* research involves visiting all the possible traces of public memory including archival materials, oral history, and the incident site. Therefore, the whole process of researching *No Gun Ri* and building the blocks of knowledge of this event resembles the process of building public memory. In effect, it is a part of forming the public memory of this event in a broader context.

## 2.2 DOCUMENTS AS EVIDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN LEGAL AND ARCHIVAL ASPECTS

Throughout history, archival documents have been recognized as a means of verifying the activities of their creators. According to Luciana Duranti, as early as the Roman era, an archives was defined as “*locus publicus in quo instrumenta deponuntur* (i.e., the public place where deeds are deposited), *quatenus incorrupta maneant* (i.e., so that they remain uncorrupted), *fidem faciant* (i.e., provide trustworthy evidence), and *perpetua rei memoria sit* (i.e., and be continuing

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<sup>62</sup> Early works on the *No Gun Ri* research were in many cases began with what victims have collected and produced. It is well described at Chung, Ku-do, *No Gun Ri Is Still Alive* (Seoul: Paeksan Sodang, 2003). (정구도, *노근리는 살아있다*, 백산서당, 2003).

memory of that to which they attest).”<sup>63</sup> Duranti focuses on archives as a place where trustworthy records are physically held, but the prime purpose of an archives was to provide trustworthy documents, which have the “capacity of serving as evidence and continuing memory of actions.”<sup>64</sup> The conceptual discussion about archives as evidence, rather than as place, began to be accepted in archival tasks from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Dutch archivists, Muller, Feith, and Fruin (1898), had clearly defined the concept of record as “organizational evidence,” and similarly Margaret Cross Norton and T. R. Schellenberg of America developed the concept of an archival theory of the evidential value of documents in the function of appraisal. In Germany, Adolf Brenneke defined archives as “the whole of the writings and other documents that were accumulated by physical or juridical persons by reason of their practical or juridical activity, and that, as documentary sources and evidence of the past, are destined to permanent preservation in a determined place.”<sup>65</sup> Duranti also insists that the mission of archives is to protect “reliable evidence of action and decision” through accountable recordkeeping of “authentic documents embodying complete transactions.”<sup>66</sup> Richard Cox has the same notion that the fundamental mission of the archival profession “should be to ensure that the essential evidence of organizations will be maintained, in whatever form is necessary—including electronic.”<sup>67</sup> All of them accept a record to be equal to evidence. Consequently, Cox concludes that, “Thus, by the mid-twentieth century, there was a firm sense of a record as a transaction and as evidence of transactions.”<sup>68</sup> This sense of a record continues to be accepted by

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<sup>63</sup> Luciana Duranti, “Archives as a Place,” *Archives and Manuscripts* 24:2 (1996): 243.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>65</sup> Adolf Brenneke, *Archivkunde; Ein Beitrag zur Theorie und Geschichte des Europäischen Archivwesens*, Koehler & Amelang (Leipzig, 1953), 97, quoted in Duranti, “Archives as a Place,” 249.

<sup>66</sup> Luciana Duranti, “The Concept of Appraisal and Archival Theory,” *American Archivist* 57 (Spring 1994): 336.

<sup>67</sup> Richard Cox, “Re-Discovering the Archival Mission: The Recordkeeping Functional Requirements Project at the University of Pittsburgh, A Progress Report,” *Archives & Museum Informatics* 8:4 (1994): 294.

<sup>68</sup> Richard Cox, “The Record: Is it Evolving?,” *The Records and Retrieval Report* 10:3 (March 1994): 1-16.

contemporary researchers in repeating the importance of the characteristics of evidence in archives.<sup>69</sup> Glenda Acland maintains the “pivot of archival science is evidence, not information,”<sup>70</sup> and Peter Hirtle asserts, “A document may contain lies, errors, falsehoods, or oversights—but still be evidence of action by an agency . . . Pure archival interest in records depends not on their informational content, but on the *evidence* they provide of government or business activity.”<sup>71</sup> Finally in 2001, the International Standard Organization in Geneva defined a record as “information created, received and maintained as evidence and information by an organization or person, in pursuance of legal obligations or in the transaction of business.”<sup>72</sup>

The concept of a record with the added element of evidential value is also explained through a philosophical approach. Heather MacNeil tries to understand the archival notion of the truth-value of records as evidence from the empiricism of John Locke, using judgments of probability. Judgments are grounded by conformity with one’s experience, and for judgments, all possible testimonies are taken into consideration. Assent to any proposition is to be based on the strength of the evidence. The ideas of Locke significantly influenced the western philosophical and social background of the emerging disciplines of law and history, “because it was assumed that documentary evidence constituted a form of testimony and thus fell under their general theory of evidence and knowledge.”<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> For another opinion on this issue, see Brien Brothman’s recent works. “Afterglow: Conceptions of Record and Evidence in Archival Discourse,” *Archival Science* 2:3-4 (2002): 311-342. He asserts that this evidential characteristic of a record was emphasized and evidence became part of archivists’ everyday vocabulary only within the last ten years. He cites an example that the word “evidence” does not appear in the table of contents and in the index of the classic archival works by Jenkinson and Shellenberg.

<sup>70</sup> Glenda Acland, “Managing the Record Rather than the Relic,” *Archives and Manuscripts* 20:1 (1992): 58.

<sup>71</sup> Peter B. Hirtle, “Archival Authenticity in a Digital Age,” in *Authenticity in a Digital Environment*, ed. by Council on Library and Information Resources, May 2000, at <<http://www.clir.org/pubs/abstract/pub92abst.html>> 11. (last accessed June 5, 2006).

<sup>72</sup> International Standards Organization, ISO 15489, *Information and Documentation – Records Management*, International Standards Organization, Geneva (2001): 3.

<sup>73</sup> Heather MacNeil, “Trusting Records in a Postmodern World,” *Archivaria* 51 (Spring 2001): 38.

The concept of record as evidence advocates that records are solely evidence of transactions; they imply impartiality and objectivity in their contents, and therefore, they are kept for purposes of administration and accountability. However, the firm notion of record as evidence has been challenged in recent years. Some archival researchers dispute that this concept only limits the characteristics of record to “recordness” indicating objectivity and truthfulness as a feature of record and, therefore, exclude the possibility of other qualities or attributes of record. This understanding is based on the epistemological concept of records in a societal context, or record as memory paradigm, which was a product of postmodernism discourse in the archival field. Within this perspective, the way to look at records is broadened to include the valuable and irreplaceable documentary heritage of a society.

Brien Brothman proposes the concept of records as cognitive memory artifacts rather than merely as legal, evidence-bearing artifacts. In this way, he opens up a potentially endless expansion of the functions of archives. He argues that archives with cognitive science and cognitive technology and records as cognitive artifacts can provide new opportunities for archivists to form a vital part of the memory of a society.<sup>74</sup> Evidence, the core value of records in traditional archival practice, is questioned and recognized as socially contingent. He argues that the concept of evidence has become implicated in the concept of record because of the record keepers’ effort to avoid the enumeration of specific kinds of media in definition to accommodate the complexities of record media including electronic means. He maintains that there are significant differences between record and evidence and the differences are temporal in nature. The elusiveness of the temporal relationship between record and evidence naturally appears at the practical level and it exemplifies, in his term, the “complex politics of temporality.” This is

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<sup>74</sup> Brien Brothman, “The Past that Archives Keep: Memory, History, and the Preservation of Archival Records,” *Archivaria* 51 (Spring 2001): 52.



because the ambiguity of the concepts emerges during the interrelated pursuit of institutional power, social influence and knowledge. The core idea of his argument is that the effort “to fix these two concepts’ semantic value and relationship are maneuvers to bolster professional identity and to establish the nature of our social commitments.”<sup>75</sup>

The concept of record as memory or cultural heritage does not deny the function of record as evidence. Both the evidential value of record and the broader value as item of cultural heritage are clearly characteristics of record and explain its creation and use. A philosophical background of records and how to view them certainly controls how records should be treated in archival tasks. Obviously, where the emphasis lies determines the hegemony within the recordkeeping paradigm and attitudes toward archival tasks, and that emphasis will certainly influence every step of business in the field of archives. However, as previously mentioned, these characteristics only represent different aspects of records. These two values are not always in conflict with each other; therefore it does not imply that one is more important than the other or that one is illegitimate in anyway with regards to the other.<sup>76</sup> On a practical level, a record can function as either of them or both of them, at different times and in different contexts. What is incontrovertible is that records have served and will serve as documentary evidence for transactions and, further, guarantee accountability in public sectors even under the paradigm of record as memory. Moreover, the term of “evidence” can imply a spectrum of meanings, from the specific to the general. In the general sense of evidence, which is not limited to the evidence

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<sup>75</sup> Brien Brothman, “Afterglow: Conceptions of Record and Evidence in Archival Discourse,” *Archival Science* 2:3-4 (2002): 312-315.

<sup>76</sup> Mark A. Greene explains these two different viewpoints of record as recordkeeping paradigm (record as evidence) and archival paradigm (record as memory). He also does not imply more importance to one paradigm over the other. However, he insists that an archival paradigm appraisal decision will produce “an archival residue of value, utility, and effectiveness for a constituency that is large, diverse, and growing,” rather than “a representative record of human experience or objectively authentic and inviolably contextualized records of business activity pruned of non-transactional documentation.” Mark A. Greene, “The Power of Meaning: The Archival Mission in the Postmodern Age,” *American Archivist* 65 (Spring/Summer 2002): 54.

of somebody's activity within certain period of time, it might not be too complicated to say that a record can be used as evidence (as a tool to remember) of human experience from the past in a social context.

In the narrowest concept of record as evidence, accepting a record as evidence in court did not develop along with the archivists' positivist concept of record. Paper documents were not admissible in court until relatively recently because this evidence could not be cross-examined.<sup>77</sup> It was "oral testimony by honorable citizens" that courts regarded as the strongest evidence, and therefore, "accountability was socially constructed and communally enforced."<sup>78</sup> Over several centuries, textual evidence was very slowly introduced as a secondary source of evidence, such as endorsements of oral testimony, rather than the content of the evidence. Finally, in modern society, written records have taken the place of oral testimony as major evidence of judicial facts, and records have become a basic element for accountability. The U.S. Best Evidence rule accepts admissibility of the original document to prove its content. The Federal Rule of Evidence only grants a duplicate in courts as follows: "a duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original."<sup>79</sup> In the case of hearsay, records are not admissible in any case. Hearsay is defined by the Federal Rule of Evidence as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or

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<sup>77</sup> Traditionally, the common law system considered direct evidence as the most reliable evidence. "Direct evidence was defined as live oral testimony of the witness as opposed to hearsay evidence, whether oral or written. Documents were considered hearsay, and it was not possible to subject documents to cross-examination. This is why the courts traditionally excluded documentary records as evidence. Exceptions to the hearsay rule allowed documents to be accepted as judicial evidence if certain requirements were met." (*Managing Legal Records*, International Records Management Trust, 1999: 17). Actually, this hearsay rule tradition hindered introducing new forms of records as legally acceptable evidence. Therefore, technological progress in documentation has been slow to gain legal recognition in terms of the hearsay rule.

<sup>78</sup> Sara J. Piasecki, "Legal Admissibility of Electronic Records as Evidence and Implications for Records Management," *American Archivist* 58 (Winter 1995): 55.

<sup>79</sup> Federal Rule of Evidence, Rule 1001 & 1003.

hearing, offered in evidence to include a written assertion.”<sup>80</sup> According to Michael Buckland, as regulated in various legislations, “society seems to have decided that you can make people honest by requiring enough documentation – or, at least, that you can make them more accountable,”<sup>81</sup>

The notion of accountability of records in court cases also requires accountable recordkeeping systems, emphasizing the social roles of archives. The National Archives of Australia (NAA) prepared a document to assist archivists in dealing with the implications of legislation ensuring the admissibility and reliability of records. In this document, the NAA maintains the importance of authentic recordkeeping systems regulated by a formal policy for accountable records and states that “To ensure that records are authentic, accurate and reliable, an agency must maintain a comprehensive, credible information and recordkeeping regime. Such a regime requires formal organizational arrangements and clarification of responsibilities in relation to the management of records. These should be stated in policies and guidelines relating to records management and recordkeeping systems.”<sup>82</sup>

The traditional focus on unbroken custody for the authenticity of records has shifted toward democratic accountability, social memory, and identity through accountable recordkeeping. Two Australian researchers, Sue McKemish and Glenda Acland, identify five important functions that accountable recordkeeping serves; (1) facilitating good governance; (2) underpinning an accountability mechanism; (3) constituting corporate, national, and social memory; (4) constructing individual, community, and national identity; and (5) providing

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<sup>80</sup> Federal Rule of Evidence, Rule 801(c).

<sup>81</sup> Michael K. Buckland, “Records Management in Its Intellectual Context: Experience at Berkeley,” *Records Management Quarterly* 16 (October 1982): 26.

<sup>82</sup> National Archives of Australia, “The Impact of the Evidence Act on Commonwealth Recordkeeping,” at <[http://www.naa.gov.au/recordkeeping/overview/evidence/records\\_in\\_evidence.htm](http://www.naa.gov.au/recordkeeping/overview/evidence/records_in_evidence.htm)>. (last accessed June 7, 2007)

authoritative sources of information.<sup>83</sup> They adopt a broad concept of accountability that “encompasses historical and cultural accountability as they relate to memory and identity, as well as democratic accountability.”<sup>84</sup>

Democratic accountability of a society through legitimate recordkeeping is more challenging in the digital age when online information is known to be ephemeral and vulnerable. Adrian Cunningham and Margaret Phillips review the challenges of archives associated with e-government and e-democracy in the Australian arena. They argue democracy and governance depend on the availability of authentic and reliable information. However, there are technical, organizational, legal, financial, and political factors that make digital information vulnerable. To deal with these factors that make information at risk of loss, they demand archivists and librarians to “become more proactive in influencing the behavior of government agencies to ensure that important evidence of democratic governance is created and managed in ways that facilitate their accessibility and long-term preservation.”<sup>85</sup>

A series of recent cases, such as the PROFS case in the United States, the Somalia affair in Canada, and the Heiner Affair or “Shreddergate” in Australia, demonstrate the importance of democratic accountability through reliable and authentic evidence in records.<sup>86</sup> Brien Brothman argues that the reason why the archival community has been emphasizing more and more, the accountability and evidence of record in recent years is because of “the waning of faith in symbols of public authority and public institutions. . . and a loss of faith in effectiveness of

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<sup>83</sup> Sue McKemmish and Glenda Acland, “The Smoking Gun: Recordkeeping and Accountability” paper presented at the 22<sup>nd</sup> Annual Conference of the Archives and Records Association of New Zealand, Dunedin, New Zealand, 3-5 September 1998, available at <<http://tcrgr.dstc.edu.au/publications.recordscontinuum/smoking.html>>.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Adrian Cunningham and Margaret Phillips, “Accountability and Accessibility Ensuring the Evidence of E-governance in Australia,” *Aslib Proceedings: New Information Perspectives* 57:4 (2005): 301-317.

<sup>86</sup> Terry Eastwood, “Should Creating Agencies Keep Electronic Records Indefinitely?” *Archives and Manuscripts* 24:2 (1996): 261.

government-driven social and economic engineering during periods of financial duress and social distress.”<sup>87</sup> Marion Renehan asserts that records should be considered a tool for proving government accountability. She provides an example of a record’s function as a “watchdog” for the government during an investigation of documents in the audit process in Australia. Records and their management, in her opinion, are the basis of proving accountability between government and citizens. She concludes, “If records provide the evidential basis upon which this role [providing evidence in the audit process] is executed, equal recognition needs to be given to the significance of the regulation of recordkeeping practices within the public sector.”<sup>88</sup> Peter Hirtle also emphasizes,

Records as evidence provide internal accountability for an agency and make it possible for the agency to determine what it has done in the past. More important, archives—when they contain records that can serve as evidence—can force leaders and institutions to be accountable for their actions. Government archives that contain evidence of the actions of the government can ensure that the rights of individual citizens are protected.<sup>89</sup>

The importance of archives for holding public officials accountable and protecting the rights of individual citizens forms the basis of a current vision statement of the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, with a view to ensuring continuing access to essential evidence of the rights of American citizens, the actions of federal officials, and national

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<sup>87</sup> Brothman, “Afterglow: Conceptions of Record and Evidence in Archival Discourse,” 330.

<sup>88</sup> Marion Renehan, “Unassailable Evidence: The Nexus between Recordkeeping and Public Sector Accountability,” *Archives and Manuscripts* 21:1 (1993): 62- 76.

<sup>89</sup> Peter B. Hirtle, “Archival Authenticity in a Digital Age,” in *Authenticity in a Digital Environment*, ed. by Council on Library and Information Resources, May 2000, at < <http://www.clir.org/pubs/reports/pub92/hirtle.html> >, 11 (last accessed July 20 2006).

experiences.<sup>90</sup> Records are now recognized as essential for the establishment of public trust in government. As a Canadian government archivist claims, records are “instruments of accountability,” and “without records there can be no demonstration of accountability. Without evidence of accountability, society cannot trust in its public institutions.”<sup>91</sup>

However, as David Wallace points out, the American archival community has overlooked this aspect of archives’ role for democratic accountability in the past.<sup>92</sup> Most of the codes of ethics for archivists and information professionals include broad objectives to resist government secrecy. However, archival literature shows that the archival community has focused mainly on everyday tasks of archives such as cataloging, indexing, appraising, creating guides, and so on. Susan Steinwall investigates the archival appraisal of the FBI case files and writes, “the judge ruling in *American Friends v. Webster* clearly believed that archivists’ loyalty should be to the American public. ‘The thrust of the laws Congress has enacted,’ wrote Judge Greene, ‘is that governmental records belong to the American people and should be accessible to them . . . for legitimate historical and other research purposes.’”<sup>93</sup> Along the same line, Terry Eastwood, an archival educator in Canada, believes archival institutions have gone through three stages (archives as cultural artifacts, legal authorities, and administrative agencies) and suggests that for the fourth stage, archivists need to do their task within a broader context of accountability. He declares that “It is the archivist’s task to spirit an understanding of the idea of archives as

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<sup>90</sup> Vision statement of the National Archives and Records Administration, at <<http://www.archives.gov/about/info/mission.html>> (last accessed July 20 2006).

<sup>91</sup> John McDonald. ‘Accountability in Government in an Electronic Age.’ Paper given for *The Transition to Electronic Records as a Strategic Resource*. Organized by the International Records Management Trust (IRMT) and the National Archives of Malaysia in co-operation with the Malaysian Administrative and Management Planning Unit (MAMPU), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (22-24 June 1998): 3.

<sup>92</sup> David Wallace, “Archivists, Recordkeeping, and the Declassification of Records: What We Can Learn From Contemporary Histories,” *American Archivist* 56 (1993): 814.

<sup>93</sup> Susan D. Steinwall, “Appraisal and the FBI Files Case: For Whom Do Archivists Retain Records?” *American Archivist* 49:1 (1986): 63.

arsenals of democratic accountability and continuity into society and into its very corporate and social fabric.”<sup>94</sup>

Related to the idea of archives as a watchdog of democracy in a society, archival tasks presumably support this function of archives. Terry Eastwood set the goal of archival appraisal for the preparation of democratic governance. He contends that archival appraisal serves two functions. Appraisal is a tool of for the enlightenment of citizens for retrospective understanding of the actions of government in a democratic polis; further, it should meet the demand to foster the recognition and identity of cultural communities in pluralistic democratic societies.<sup>95</sup>

Verne Harris asserts the *raison d'être* of archives is the call for justice in a society, and he urges archivists to serve the interests of justice in their work. Based on his own experience as an archivist in South Africa through the period of dramatic shift from apartheid to democracy, he saw that archives existed in the middle of conflicting political power relations, working against a systematic forgetting which would only secure an extraordinary degree of opacity in government. In this sense, archives could not be an impartial custodian by any means. He suggests the concept of “deconstruction” to be melded into archival practice within the notion of archives for justice because it inspires a radically activist practice for archives. He argues,

. . . archivists of deconstruction are without certainty or clear-cut destination. They move outside of binary oppositions. They see no hard boundaries between concepts and conceptual realms. . . . They know that every move they make is a construction of knowledge, and exercise of power. They feel compelled to disclose their complicity in these constructions and

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<sup>94</sup> Terry M. Eastwood, “Reflections on the Development of Archives in Canada and Australia,” in *Archival Documents: Providing Accountability through Recordkeeping*, ed. by Sue McKemmish and Frank Upward (Melbourne: Ancora Press, 1993), 36.

<sup>95</sup> Terry Eastwood, “Reflection on the Goal of Archival Appraisal in Democratic Societies,” *Archivaria* 54 (2002): 59-71.

exercises. Of crucial importance, they are bound by the principle of hospitality of otherness. They respect every other, invite every other in. So that whether they are making records available, or describing records, or appraising recordkeeping systems, they listen intently for the voices of those who are marginalized or excluded by prevailing relations of power.<sup>96</sup>

When it comes to dealing with war records, archives and archivists need to adopt a more proactive role because more often than not they relate closer to classification/declassification and passive information policies of government in releasing them. In a report from the U.S. Department of Defense, the current situation of the classification of military documents is addressed. It reads that “There is evidence that a number of 1950s-era documents which had been declassified in the 1970s were reclassified in the 1980s under the Reagan order’s interpretation of ‘foreign government information.’”<sup>97</sup> Within this framework, the Cold War of past years and national security against terrorism in recent years were the reasons used to restrain active information requests. This situation obviously affected the declassification of Korean War records. Wilbur Edel, a professor of political science, argues,

Thanks in part to the Cold War, the more recent tendency in Washington has been to delay for longer and longer periods the release of post-World War II records. This country’s more active participation in world affairs and complications involved in seeking the cooperation of an increasing number of government agencies also add to the time required to complete each project. The interval widened first to twenty years, then twenty-five. With

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<sup>96</sup> Harris, “Seeing (in) Blindness: South Africa, Archives and Passion for Justice.”

<sup>97</sup> United States Department of Defense Legacy Resource Management Program, *The Declassification Backlog of Historic Records: A Problem for Both the Department of Defense and All Those Who Seek a Better Understanding of the Cold War*, prepared in cooperation with the Organization of American Historians, at <<http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/legacy.html>>, 4. (last accessed Oct. 20 2006).



the publication of the 1952-54 Korean War volumes [of Federal Records of the U.S.] during the Reagan Administration, the lag grows to thirty years.<sup>98</sup>

In his book, *A Culture of Secrecy: The Government versus The People's Right To Know*, Athan G. Theoharis worries about the possible distortion in historical research in such a situation. He states,

This culture of secrecy did not merely foreclose contemporary awareness of the most important presidential decisions and intelligence agency programs of the cold war era. Historical research was thereafter adversely affected. Classification restrictions in effect ensured a distorted understanding of presidential decisions and priorities. The selective release of formerly classified documents and the release of sentences or isolated paragraphs of other documents pose a further research dilemma: how to interpret a knowingly incomplete record? Researchers are thereby denied an understanding of the context, and thus the general purpose, of the disclosed program or decision.<sup>99</sup>

In the case of the *No Gun Ri* massacre, military documents have been the main source in the development of the knowledge base about the incident. In fact, in the process of investigating the incident, researchers revealed there was a veteran who manipulated his military career with military documents and caused a major controversy over the veracity of evidence. The *No Gun Ri* research, from the beginning, has been a process to discover related war documents, to cause controversy over the veracity of evidence, to compete and argue with various interpretations of

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<sup>98</sup> Wilbur Edel, "Diplomatic History—State Department Style," *Political Science Quarterly* 106:4 (1991/92): 697.

<sup>99</sup> Athan G. Theoharis ed., *A Culture of Secrecy: The Government versus the People's Right to Know* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 4.

the contents of those documents, to realize the current status of researchers' archival use and the current status of military recordkeeping, and consequently, to confirm the importance of accountability in archives. Furthermore, this incident clearly demonstrates that democratic accountability is also another aspect that archivists need to consider to provide trustworthy evidence to researchers because it demonstrates that justice and truth could be realized and understood through documents.

### **2.3 USER STUDIES IN ARCHIVES**

This study is not a conventional user study, but shares the purpose of a user study by intending to look at how *No Gun Ri* researchers use archival materials to bolster their arguments in research. This study aims to address how archival documents have contributed to the process of *No Gun Ri* research and within this context, the actual status of archival use for *No Gun Ri* research is examined concomitantly. Thus, learning how the use of archival holdings has been studied within archival community generally provides insights on better understanding the relationship between *No Gun Ri* research and archival contribution. Therefore, the literature of use and user studies is reviewed in this study within such a context.

From the late 1970s, use and user studies began to be developed by many archival researchers. These studies made a great effort to illustrate practical pictures of archival programs and produce clear suggestions for a better understanding of who uses archives for what purpose and by what methods. Thanks to these studies, the archival community was able to accumulate a great deal of important information about their users. These studies address the necessity to

move attention from materials to clients<sup>100</sup>; patterns of archival users' information-seeking processes<sup>101</sup>; irrelevance of current reference and access systems for research use; the importance of use and user studies<sup>102</sup>; researchers' citation patterns of archival materials<sup>103</sup>; and experienced users' archival knowledge.<sup>104</sup> These studies provide valuable understanding about archival users in the traditional view of archival use studies.

These use and user studies not only address the status of users and use of archival holdings, but also suggest a variety of possibilities to improve archival services in a practical way, besides making better decisions on acquisition and appraisal based on better understanding of their users. One of the popular recommendations is archival education for the users. Many proposed this should include information literacy on primary sources beyond imparting knowledge about the local archives.<sup>105</sup> Helen Tibbo suggests that archival institutions need to advertise their holdings and features more proactively while at the same time, archivists need to

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<sup>100</sup> Mary N. Speakman, "The User Talks Back," *American Archivist* 47:2 (Spring 1984): 164-171; Elsie T. Freeman, "In the Eye of the Beholder: Archives Administration from the User's Point of View," *American Archivist* 47:2 (Spring 1984): 110-123; Bruce W. Dearstyne, "What is the Use of Archives? A Challenge for the Profession," *American Archivist* 50, (Winter 1987): 76-87; Barbara C. Orbach, "The View From the Researcher's Desk: Historians' Perceptions of Research and Repositories," *American Archivist* 54 (Winter 1991): 28-43.

<sup>101</sup> Michael Stevens, "The Historian and Archival Finding Aids," *Georgia Archives* 5 (Winter 1977): 64-74; Margaret Stieg, "The Information Needs of Historians," *College and Research Libraries* 42 (November 1981): 549-560; Paul Conway, "Research in Presidential Libraries: A User Survey," *Midwestern Archivist* 11:1 (1986): 35-56; Fredric Miller, "Use, Appraisal, and Research: A Case Study of Social History," *American Archivist* 49 (Fall 1986): 371-392; Helen R. Tibbo, "Primarily History in America: How U.S. Historians Search for Primary Materials at the Dawn of the Digital Age," *American Archivist* 66 (Spring/Summer 2003): 9-50; Wendy Duff and Catherine A. Johnson, "Where Is the List with All the Names? Information-Seeking Behavior of Genealogists," *American Archivist* 66 (Spring/Summer 2003): 79-95; Wendy Duff and Catherine A. Johnson, "Accidentally Found on Purpose: Information-Seeking Behavior of Historians in Archives," *Library Quarterly* 72:4, (2002): 472-496; Wendy Duff, Barbara Craig, and Joan Cherry, "Historians' Use of Archival Sources: Promises and Pitfalls of the Digital Age," *Public Historian* 26:2 (Spring 2004): 7-22.

<sup>102</sup> William J. Maher, "The Use of User Studies," *Midwestern Archivist* 11:1 (1986): 15-26; Paul Conway, "Facts and Frameworks: An Approach to Studying the Users of Archives," *American Archivist* 49 (Fall 1986): 393-407; ; Janice E. Ruth, "Educating the Reference Archivist," *American Archivist* 51 (Winter/Spring 1988): 266-276;

<sup>103</sup> Clark A. Elliot, "Citation Patterns and Documentation for the History of Science: Some Methodological Considerations," *American Archivist* 44:2 (Spring, 1981): 131-142; Diane L. Beattie, "An Archival User Study: Researchers in the Field of Women's History," *Archivaria* 29 (Winter 1989/90): 33-50.

<sup>104</sup> Elizabeth Yake and Deborah A. Torres, "AI: Archival Intelligence and User Expertise," *American Archivist* 66 (Spring/Summer 2003): 51-78.

<sup>105</sup> Stieg, "The Information Needs of Historians"; Yake and Torres, "AI: Archival Intelligence and User Expertise."

be experts on archival information retrieval in general, not limited to their collections.<sup>106</sup>

Revising and improving search tools in archives is one of the implications drawn from user studies. Especially where digital information and electronic records prevail, new tools and methodologies, including finding aids and published guides in print or on the web, to inform on the holdings and facilitate their use, need to be designed reflecting the demands of the people who use them. These new insights from user studies enable archivists to envision and design various critical methods to improve archival services, but there are still some aspects to consider when evaluating archival users studies.

By and large, these existing studies warn that simple studies about the frequency of use are not meaningful enough to understand the use of archives, in any detail. An archival educator, Bruce Dearstyne, articulates that, “Archivists have traditionally measured use in terms of how many times a collection or document is used or how many researchers call, write, or visit during a given period of time. This focus on numbers rather than significance has obscured the need for a more realistic measure of the adequacy of use.”<sup>107</sup> Similarly, Karen Benedict strongly alleges that “frequency of past use is not a valid determinant of the archival or research value of records . . . It is ahistorical and anti-intellectual . . . to determine that, because a group of records has not been used within a limited period of time, those records are valueless.”<sup>108</sup>

In order to step around the limit of superficial numbers and frequencies of use in user studies, archival researchers have employed topical approaches. Until the 1980s, “Most articles on particular subjects or repositories [were] mainly concerned with reporting achievements or

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<sup>106</sup> Helen R. Tibbo, “Primarily History in America: How U.S. Historians Search for Primary Materials at the Dawn of the Digital Age,” *American Archivist* 66 (Spring/Summer 2003): 29.

<sup>107</sup> Bruce W. Dearstyne, “What is the *Use* of Archives? A Challenge for the Profession,” *American Archivist* 50 (Winter 1987): 82.

<sup>108</sup> Karen Benedict, “Invitation to a Bonfire: Reappraisal and Deaccessioning of Records as Collection Management Tools in an Archives – A Reply to Leonard Rapport,” *American Archivist* 47 (Winter 1984): 47-48.

outlining needs and opportunities,” as Susan Grigg noticed.<sup>109</sup> A study that concentrates on the use of a collection is mostly about how a user group approaches the materials rather than how they interact with materials and use them in their research. Usually topical approaches were taken in research to improve acquisition and collection development in a certain area. Research employing the topical use study approach consists of history of science, women’s history, and social history. In these studies, archival researchers proved that all the materials users had seen in archives might not always be relevant to their research. In addition, all of the materials that a user sees or even cites cannot be considered to have the same value. Therefore, Jacqueline Goggin maintains the importance of “the quality of use” in evaluating archival use. She states, “Scholarly users may look at numerous collections and find nothing of value for their particular research topic. . . . On the other hand, a researcher could make numerous meaningless citations of archival sources to dress-up the footnotes in a scholarly publication. The publication must be read and analyzed to determine the quality of use.”<sup>110</sup> Her notion of the quality of use is “analyzing the role of documentation in the final product to determine whether or not the authors made use of the great variety of primary source materials available to them,” and in her research, she “judged the authors by how well they used the collections of organizational records they cited – by the quality of use.”<sup>111</sup>

More recently, archival use and user studies have introduced various kinds of subject approaches and methodologies. William E. Brown, Jr. and Elizabeth Yakel recruited academic

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<sup>109</sup> Susan Grigg, “A World of Repositories, a World of Records: Redefining the Scope of a National Subject Collection,” *American Archivist* 48:3 (Winter 1987): 288.

<sup>110</sup> Jacqueline Goggin, “The Indirect Approach: A Study of Scholarly Users of Black and Women’s Organizational Records in the Library of Congress Manuscript Division,” *Midwestern Archivist* 11:1 (1986): 65.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, 60.

administrators for a user study, instead of historians.<sup>112</sup> They again broke the prejudice that major archival users are historians, a concept Elsie Freeman challenged more than 20 years ago. They interviewed fifteen administrators in five colleges and universities to evaluate the way in which academic administrators use their archives. They found several important facts: administrators tend to assume the information delivered by the archives to be authentic and reliable and they expect the information to be extracted, packaged, and filtered for the core information. It turns out again from Brown and Yakel's research that archivists need to be more proactive in determining their users and providing information that users demand. William Jackson employed a methodology that is not typical in archival research. He used Trueswell's 80/20 rule from library science, which states that 80 percent of the use in a library involves only 20 percent of the collection. This rule was proved to be also true in an archival setting. He asserts that "use" should not simply be the "indicator" for appraisal or disposal, but from a study of "use" archivists should attempt to find ways to play an active role in appraising, accessing, and disposing archives, to make non-users users, and to make this 80% of unused material usable.<sup>113</sup>

In terms of the methodology of use and user studies, citation analysis has been one of the most popular methods. However, in citation analysis, a user's determination toward citing materials does not identify the materials most critical to his or her research. In this method, there is still a question about whether the author used the best sources or all of the available sources.<sup>114</sup> Accordingly, new methodologies must be developed to obtain these answers, and various attempts should be tried with combinations of multiple methodologies. In a

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<sup>112</sup> Brown, William E., Jr. and Elizabeth Yakel, "Redefining the Role of College and University Archives in the Information Age," *American Archivist* 59:3 (Summer 1996): 272-287.

<sup>113</sup> William J. Jackson, "The 80/20 Archives: A Study of Use and Its Implications," *Archival Issues* 22:2 (1997): 133-145.

<sup>114</sup> Clark A. Elliott, "Citation Patterns and Documentation," *American Archivist* 44:2 (1981): 133.

benchmarking article with this perspective, Paul Conway writes, “By identifying systematically both the physical use of archival materials and the impact of archival information beyond a single repository, archivists can better evaluate and plan archival programs and more clearly realize the value of the services they provide.”<sup>115</sup> He also lamented that there have not been many studies that cover researchers in multiple repositories and the impact of archival materials’ use after the research is done.<sup>116</sup>

William Maher questions the typical methodologies in use studies and maintains that methodologies for use studies need to be able to answer the following questions; “What is the relationship between the number of questions asked, the number of records series and collections used and the ‘satisfaction’ of users? What is an appropriate measure of user satisfaction? What would users like to see an archives do to improve access to its holding?”<sup>117</sup> Since the ultimate purpose of a use and user study is the users’ satisfaction with their work in archives, research design should be reflected more inclusively from the users’ perspective. Dearstyne also states, “Here the objective is to look beyond ‘use’ in the elementary sense – directly seeking and deriving information from archival material. Instead, the focus turns to ultimate users and beneficiaries – ‘people who may never visit an archives but utilize archival information indirectly.”<sup>118</sup>

Unfortunately, archivists have taken a long detour to learn this. They recently began to understand the need to learn about the users’ research patterns. Fredric Miller confirmed from his research that, “They (historians) do not use as many sources as they could, or find and use

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<sup>115</sup> Paul Conway, “Facts and Frameworks: An Approach to Studying the Users of Archives,” *American Archivist* 49 (Fall 1986): 398.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>117</sup> William J. Maher, “The Use of User Studies,” *The Midwestern Archivist* 11:1 (1986): 19.

<sup>118</sup> Bruce W. Dearstyne, “What is the *Use* of Archives? A Challenge for the Profession,” *American Archivist* 50 (Winter 1987): 80.

records exactly as archivists would prefer.”<sup>119</sup> Miller determined that, “historical research is not intellectually archives-driven . . . While social historians may sometimes ask archivists to save everything, in reality they have concentrated on reinterpreting existing holdings. Their research is primarily question centered, not material centered.”<sup>120</sup> In this context, archivists need to know “at what point researchers turn to archival materials, and where, how, and why such materials are used,” and “what are historians’ patterns of use of primary, secondary, and tertiary sources and how do these interplay with the formulation of ideas, hypotheses, and arguments?”<sup>121</sup> That is, use and user studies should be designed to observe users’ actual research and the actual application of records in publications, following the questions of how users perform their research and how archival materials interact and influence this process of research. Only with this perspective of research design will archival researchers be able to learn concretely how history is researched by using archival materials, and as a result, how archives contribute to the building blocks leading to an understanding of history.

More specifically, a topical user study with a specifically targeted user group may be necessary to see the relationship between researchers and documents. Many archival educators and practitioners have identified the needs of research employing a focused group of users as a form of research agenda.<sup>122</sup> Similarly, Donald Case emphasizes that information professionals need to try to avoid typical library or archives user studies and “focus our studies of information

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<sup>119</sup> Fredric Miller, “Use, Appraisal, and Research: A Case Study of Social History,” *American Archivist* 49 (Fall 1986): 391.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Barbara C. Orbach, “The View from the Researcher’s Desk: Historian’s Perceptions of Research and Repositories,” *American Archivist* 54 (Winter 1991): 29.

<sup>122</sup> Paul Conway, “Facts and Frameworks: An Approach to Studying the Users of Archives,” *American Archivist* 49 (Fall, 1986): 393-407; Richard J. Cox and Helen Samuels, “The Archivists’ First Responsibility: A Research Agenda for the Identification and Retention of Records of Enduring Value,” *American Archivist* 51 (Winter/Spring 1988): 28-42; Lawrence Dowler, “The Role of Use in Defining Archival Practice and Principles: A Research Agenda for the Availability and Use of Records,” *American Archivist* 51 (Winter and Spring 1988): 74-86.



needs and uses more closely on the behaviors of specific communities of scholars . . . We need in-depth studies of particular groups of scholars – much narrower than the vague collections of ‘humanists’ studied elsewhere, and narrower even than the varied ‘American historians’ examined here.”<sup>123</sup> However, not many archival researchers actually have tried to conduct a use/user study with focused user groups. There has not been prolific research to review how much archival materials influence or contribute to historical research,, especially evaluating archival impact from the publications of archival users within narrowed topic.

In this study, those who have conducted any kind of in-depth research on the *No Gun Ri* massacre are chosen as a specific target group for study. This study adapts the basic concept and purpose of a use study and is inspired by the research design of seeking to learn about users’ research patterns with documentary evidence and their perception of using archives. As a method to examine the contribution of archival materials to the knowledge of the *No Gun Ri* massacre, the ways *No Gun Ri* researchers conduct their research are investigated in this study. This study aims to learn how *No Gun Ri* researchers knew of the existence of the materials they used, which methods they took to discover documentary evidence for their argument, and how they interpreted and used these materials in their research. All these implications are drawn from the published research works and from the authors of the publications. Therefore, the data from these concrete sources present the most specific picture on archival use of *No Gun Ri* research. Only through an understanding of the tangible information about the communication of *No Gun Ri* researchers and archival materials, should how and why archival materials played a role in building knowledge of the *No Gun Ri* massacre be completely comprehended.

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<sup>123</sup> Donald Owen Case, “The Collection and Use of Information by Some American Historians: A Study of Motive and Methods,” *Library Quarterly* 61:1 (1991): 80.

### **3.0 METHODOLOGY**

To collect data for the examination of the evolution of developing knowledge about the *No Gun Ri* massacre and the role of archival materials in the knowledge development, this study employed two methods: content analysis and interviews. These methodologies provided quantitative and qualitative data on the descriptive analysis of the role of archival materials in historical knowledge development.

#### **3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN**

Archivists have long tried to understand users from a viewpoint of their archival collections. However, such an approach misses very important perspectives about use in and users of archives, which are how they perform their research and develop knowledge on their research subjects while using archives, and how much weight they give to archival materials relative to their other sources. Only when archivists and archival scholars understand how their users utilize archival materials for the purpose of building their knowledge can archival programs finally provide adequate services to users.

This study was inspired by the research design of some archives and library users' studies that encourage archivists and librarians to better understand users from their work patterns, interpretation processes, hypotheses-building methods, and final results of their research

products.<sup>124</sup> This study was, therefore, designed to achieve an understanding of archival materials from users' perspectives, using, for a descriptive analysis, how information on the *No Gun Ri* massacre became known to the public and was researched within archives. It was also designed to provide both qualitative and quantitative evidence on the various archival factors affecting the developing knowledge of the *No Gun Ri* incident, from the research process to the research findings.

## 3.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

### 3.2.1 Grounded Theory Approach

Many descriptive studies rooted in the social sciences are hard to set up to develop a concrete hypothesis; the research questions of this study do not fit into a scientific framework to prove a hypothesis either. In fact, this study tries to find a pattern (or a theory) of how knowledge develops from an empirical situation of actual research and how researchers learn and accept knowledge. In doing so, this study applied grounded theory as the theoretical foundation for analysis. Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss first proposed this approach in 1967. Grounded theory is “an inductive theory discovery method that allows a researcher to develop a theoretical account of the general facets of a research question and to ground that account in empirical observations or data.”<sup>125</sup> Library and Information Science has been using this approach for some

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<sup>124</sup> For those that influenced this study, see the following: Donald Owen Case, “The Collection and Use of Information by Some American Historians: A Study of Motive and Methods,” *Library Quarterly* 61:1 (1991): 61-82; Karl Weintraub, “The Humanistic Scholar and the Library,” *Library Quarterly* 50 (Winter 1980): 22-39; Fredric Miller, “Use, Appraisal, and Research: A Case Study of Social History,” *American Archivist* 49 (Fall 1986): 371-392.

<sup>125</sup> Elizabeth Hewins, *Impacts of Bibliographic Information on Veterinary Clinical Decision Making* (PhD dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1997), 100.

time because much research in these fields is often best accompanied by findings from qualitative data.<sup>126</sup> It is known that qualitative data in social science is more beneficial because this method allows the discovery of a “theory from data systematically obtained from social research. . . . [and] theory in sociology is a strategy for handling data in research, providing modes of conceptualization for describing and explaining.”<sup>127</sup>

In grounded theory, a theory is “grounded” in data. Concepts, theories, and hypotheses related to data are discovered through the process of collecting and analyzing the data. With grounded theory, no preconceived idea or extant theory is adopted in a study as a way to verify it. Such an approach requires a researcher to discover a grounded theory rather than to frame a study within a hypothesis and test it with an existing theory. Grounded theory analysis is processed during the collection of data, not at the end of it. Therefore, it allows for flexibility in the construction of a theory and also in the direction of the research influenced by what is discovered in the research process.

In generating a theory from data, concepts and hypotheses that emerge from the data are systematically worked out in relation to a theory, during the course of the research. The way to derive a theory that is grounded in data is through constant comparison which is a procedure to compare phenomena being coded under a certain category so that a theoretical elaboration of that certain category can begin to emerge. Therefore, comparative analysis of collected data is conducted continuously along with the process of conceptualizing, categorizing, and coding the data. A researcher is required to generate conceptual categories from evidence or to establish the

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<sup>126</sup> See the following for examples: Elizabeth Hewins, *Impacts of Bibliographic Information on Veterinary Clinical Decision Making* (PhD diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1997); and Lucy Kuntz, *Online Resources and the Information Seeking Process* (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1999).

<sup>127</sup> Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967): 2-3.

generality of a fact. Subsequently, the researcher finishes a comparative analysis based on the distinctive empirical elements distinguishing the units of comparison on the level of data. Once the analyst turns to theoretical concerns, the analyst continually checks out theories that the researcher looks for as the data become available.<sup>128</sup> Analysis of qualitative data in grounded theory means “a nonmathematical process of interpretation, carried out for the purpose of discovering concepts and relationships in raw data and then organizing these into a theoretical, explanatory scheme.”<sup>129</sup> Based on interpretation of data, conceptual categories and theoretical schemes, concepts, theories, and/or realities of social behaviors or phenomena will be revealed.

### **3.2.2 Applicability to this Research**

This study is an analysis of developing knowledge recognized by the public and researchers on the *No Gun Ri* massacre. It is a descriptive and explanatory study. From this perspective, grounded theory is a good match for the theoretical background of this study since grounded theory and its constant comparative analysis provides a framework for generating a descriptive theory. As a library science researcher mentioned, grounded theory is an inductive theory discovered within a contextual and process approach. Elizabeth Hewins states that, “[t]he focus of the theory building is not to provide an objective and static description, but rather to provide a process-oriented, within-context description of the phenomenon of using electronic bibliographic databases to obtain information for patient-care problem-solving tasks,” for the justification of her study.<sup>130</sup> Similarly, grounded theory was used for the descriptive analysis of evolving

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<sup>128</sup> Glaser and Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research*, 23-31

<sup>129</sup> Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin, *Basics of Qualitative Research* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1998), 11.

<sup>130</sup> Hewins, *Impacts of Bibliographic Information on Veterinary Clinical Decision Making*, 100.

knowledge of the *No Gun Ri* massacre. The context for the analysis is the knowledge of the *No Gun Ri* massacre derived from published research by various researchers including academics, journalists, families of victims, and government investigators. This study intends to look at the process of the knowledge building and argument development of the *No Gun Ri* incident and the *No Gun Ri* researchers' work patterns by investigating information within publications and by interviewing the researchers about their perceptions on archives. It does not try to simply address an objective and static description of a story on *No Gun Ri*.

Grounded Theory is especially applicable to this study because this author did not simply extract key words and scan them in the text as a means of processing analysis for coding the data automatically. Rather, in this study, the author thoroughly read the publications to detect the contents of a certain category and identify/link them according to a coding scheme. While reading and analyzing the contents, the interplay between the author and the data was better worked out and the analysis process became “the foundations for making comparisons and discovering properties and dimensions” of data.<sup>131</sup> The description of the development of *No Gun Ri* knowledge, therefore, is examined with constant comparisons to a meaningful coding scheme based on conceptual categories of the contents, and it finally addresses the purpose of this study, which is to identify the impact and roles of archival materials among other information used in researching the *No Gun Ri* massacre.

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<sup>131</sup> Strauss and Corbin, *Basics of Qualitative Research*, 5.

### **3.3 DATA COLLECTION AND CONTENT ANALYSIS**

In order to investigate the proposition underlying the study and the related questions, two major steps of research were required. The first stage of research was to understand how recognition of the *No Gun Ri* massacre developed and how and why archival materials have interacted with the expanding and emerging knowledge about the incident. To understand these factors, this study adopted content analysis as its methodology. In the second stage, the research process and the role of archival materials were addressed by in-depth interviews with the researchers who conducted research on the *No Gun Ri* massacre. In this process the researchers' notions of archival materials and their value in the research were examined.

#### **3.3.1 Data Set of Historical Description: Contents of Research**

At the initial stage of research, content analysis was conducted on all the published research about the *No Gun Ri* massacre in Korea and the United States. This process was designed to identify how discussions of the massacre changed and evolved according to the expansion and emergence of new documents and information and how researchers informed readers about their use of sources.

The most common type of studies employed to understand the relationship between research and source materials is citation analysis. The citation analysis method offers great advantages in learning what kinds of materials have been used in research and how frequently. However, this method, which merely shows the types and the frequency of use of materials, was not considered sufficient to understand how research progressed and knowledge changed on the topic of the *No Gun Ri* massacre. Therefore, this study adopted content analysis to seek deeper

knowledge than mere citation analysis.

The content analysis methodology describes the complete progress of discussions on the topic of the *No Gun Ri* massacre and its knowledge development process. Content analysis also shows the subtle significance of how and why researchers find and use certain archival materials; therefore, their impact is described in a more detailed way than citation analysis would be. *No Gun Ri* researchers described, in footnotes or in the text, why they use (or do not use) certain materials to support their arguments and how they interpret archival materials.

The goal of this examination was to produce a detailed description of the development of knowledge related to the massacre and the interaction of that knowledge with the emerging available source materials. Particular questions to be addressed during a content analysis of published research products include the following:

- How did the knowledge of the *No Gun Ri* massacre develop chronologically?
- What kind of archival documents were discovered in the process of conducting *No Gun Ri* research? What were the major documents used in the research?
- How does the expansion of available archival materials affect the development of knowledge of the *No Gun Ri* massacre?

The scope for the content analysis in this study was all of the research publications on the subject. The *No Gun Ri* incident is a narrow topic and the number of publications was manageable for a dissertation study. The research publication included (1) news articles from major news companies, (2) academic research, (3) research by survivors and their families, and (4) governmental investigation reports, published either in print or online. Research publications were collected in Korea and America. This author tried to collect only original news articles from major news agencies since there are tremendous numbers of copies of specific news reports on the Internet, often from one original source. In all cases, only research-oriented publications were included. The analyzed publications for news articles from major news publications were



approximately four hundreds thirty two articles from the *Associated Press*, *US News and World Reports*, the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and other such major publications in the United States, and *Hankyoreh*, *News Maker*, *Sin-Dong-a*, *Monthly Mal*, and other major Korean publications, published as of May 2006. Academic research publications included approximately forty-five journal articles, eight monographs, one symposium proceeding, and four theses, available as of May 2006. Two governmental reports, one from the United States and one from Korea were examined as well. Detailed information about these publications is given in Appendix A of this dissertation.

### **3.3.2 Data Set of User Perception: Interview of Researchers**

The second stage of research was an interview with researchers who published original research on this event. To fill the gap that could not be addressed from content analysis and to support and enrich the findings of this methodology, the interview method was employed as a follow up step. Donald Case challenges that, “Interviews are time-consuming and are based on unreliable self-reports of thought, motivation, and action.”<sup>132</sup> However, interviews also have major advantages for investigating informal methods of research; that is, methods of using archival materials not only for direct reference but also for the impression and influence of the materials to the researchers. In fact, the interview method has high design flexibility. Thus, this method can be applied when a study has to answer problems that are difficult to fit in a fixed frame or have a large number of variables.

By combining interviews with reading and examination of the products of *No Gun Ri*

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<sup>132</sup> Donald Owen Case, “The Collection and Use of Information by Some American Historians: A Study of Motive and Methods,” *Library Quarterly* 61:1 (1991): 80.

massacre research, this author collected comprehensive information about how researchers learn, approach, identify, and finally use archival materials and how archival materials play a role in research about the event. These interviews implied considerable significance in indicating the concrete ideas of researchers and their work patterns with archival materials through focused responses about their research. Therefore, interview results addressed major objectives of this study in a detailed way.

The interview process was performed to answer the following questions:

- What were the research processes of the *No Gun Ri* massacre researchers?
- How did the researchers on the *No Gun Ri* massacre identify, locate, and finally use archival materials?
- How much weight and credibility did the researchers grant archival materials, among other resources, for research of the *No Gun Ri* massacre?
- What is the contemporary researcher's perception of using archival holdings for understanding the *No Gun Ri* massacre?

The subjects were defined as researchers who have produced published works on the *No Gun Ri* massacre using historical inquiries. In the process of content analysis, subjects for interview were practically identified from the research publications. Researchers in both Korea and the United States were included as interview subjects. The subject groups included journalists from major newspapers and news magazines, academic researchers (in disciplines of history, social science, and law), survivors and families of victims, and government investigators in Korea and the United States. There were a considerable number of researchers who published research on this event: approximately twenty six academic researchers, forty two journalists, and two survivors and families, identified as of May 2006.<sup>133</sup> The researchers interviewed were selected from among those who had written major news reports and journal articles, those who

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<sup>133</sup> The number of government investigators is not known from the investigation reports.

had written multiple articles, or those who had published a significant number of pages of research such as books or research reports. Finally, a total of eleven researchers were interviewed; four journalists, four historians, one military officer, one law scholar, and one victim's family. Among those interviews, five interviews were held in person, four in written form, and two on the phone. The list of the interviewed subjects is provided in Appendix C.

Even though these two methodologies (content analysis of publications and interview) were described in this section as distinct and separate procedures from each other, in effect, they were performed simultaneously in many cases. Before having an interview, the publications of the interviewee was read, if not fully analyzed, for a better understanding of what the writers mention in terms of their own experience of researching in archives and of using archival materials for their argument.

### **3.4 DATA ANALYSIS PROCESS AND TECHNIQUE**

#### **3.4.1 Publication Analysis**

The first step of the content analysis of publications was to identify all the publications on the *No Gun Ri* incident by searching databases in the U.S. and Korea, such as LISA, ERIC, Academic (Lexis Nexis), America: History and Life, JSTOR, KINDS (Korean Integrated News Database System) and the national bibliographic databases of Korea.

Location and analysis of comments about major discussions on the *No Gun Ri* incident as well as using sources, archival records, or other artifacts for the inference of *No Gun Ri* history were performed in the content analysis. Detailed objects for analysis were citations, comments in footnotes, and the text bodies of research. With such an analysis, this study could address a more

dynamic and richer history of the emerging recognition of this massacre. The analysis was performed while reading all the publications, by marking specific discussions and using source materials of each discussion. Also, during the analyzing process any comments about authors' argument building process and their perceptions on supporting evidence were identified. The analyzed data were saved in a Word Processing program and later converted into qualitative data analysis software, NVivo. In this process, categories of contents were elaborated in terms of their properties and dimensions and a coding scheme was developed based on the categories. By using NVivo, linking contents to a code was automatically processed and the collected data were easily organized, sorted and counted to draw findings and insights in a process to finalize research results.

While processing the content analysis of publications, a serious problem was discovered. Researchers used different formats to cite archival materials with different levels of fullness. For example, many publications cited war diaries a great number of times, but the details of those citations varied from an entry for a specific date to a collective entry that covered several months. The *No Gun Ri Review*, an investigation report by the American government, cited war diaries in a form as "War diary, 1st Cavalry Division, 25 June-November 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, Military Historian's Office, Organizational History Files, Box 42, RG 338, NARA." This citation did not specify the date or the time of the diary entry and contained diary entries over a long period time. As the above example illustrates, citations were not clear in indicating which document was referred to or whether citation referred to the same document cited in other publications. Therefore, in this study, anything in doubt was confirmed with text and the context of text.

### **3.4.2 Interviews**

Interviews were conducted in accordance with the regulations and requirements of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) for human subjects' research and the guidelines recommended by the Oral History Association. Selected interview subjects were informed of the purpose and procedure of the study prior to the interview. The subjects were also informed of the anticipated uses of their interviews and their possible contributions to this particular project. The interview subjects were also notified that if they required a copy of their transcripts and/or a copy of this dissertation, one would be gladly provided. Some interviewees willingly gave a permission to release their identification along with their comments, and one interview respondent suggested that he would be happy if his transcript was deposited in an archives for future use.

A detailed procedure for interviews follows. First, this author identified the interview subjects from the research they published. Next, their contact information was acquired, primarily from the Internet, with one case where contact information was acquired from a publisher. Email was the main method of contact. Once the interview subjects agreed to participate in this study, interviews were conducted in person, using a written form, or on the phone. The interviews were recorded utilizing voice recording equipment and personally transcribed by the researcher.

The interview questions were designed to encourage interview respondents' spontaneous and open responses and discussions and were not meant to elicit yes or no answers. The questions were loosely structured with open-ended questions to draw out personal experiences and perceptions from the subjects. The interview respondents talked as freely as possible, and in many cases an answer for a question led to another question or covered several questions. Therefore, questions were not asked in the same order of each interview subject. The following

questions were asked of the interview respondents:

1. How did your research involve the use of archives and historical material about the *No Gun Ri* massacre?
2. Did you need to use archives for the *No Gun Ri* research and if so, how did you locate the materials you used?
3. What kinds of archives and historical materials did you use for your research on the *No Gun Ri* massacre?
4. Can you describe your research procedure during your *No Gun Ri* research?
5. How much weight and credibility did you give archival materials relative to other resources you used?
6. For the building of your major points and arguments concerning the *No Gun Ri* research, how much do you think you have been influenced by archival materials relative to other resources?
7. Have your views of and research about the massacre changed as new archival materials have been discovered? Can you describe the specific archival documents that changed your research results?
8. What were the barriers that you experienced in using archives? For example, were these barriers preservation issues, accessibility issues, classification/declassification issues, or others?
9. How did you deal with any practical problems of approaching and using archives, such as traveling to the United States or Korea and language differences?

After the interviews were transcribed, the analysis of the transcripts was performed. This process was very similar to the publication analysis; categorizing the contents (primarily based on each interview questions) and developing a code scheme with the categories. According to the code scheme, the transcripts were coded and analyzed by using NVIVO. Then, the coded data were interpreted to draw a picture of the individual researchers' work patterns on *No Gun Ri* research and their perception on using archives.

#### 4.0 NO GUN RI MASSACRE: HISTORICAL SKETCH

*In the Korean War that had been fought from June 25, 1950 to July 27, 1953, more than 3 million Koreans died while millions of refugees remained homeless and distraught. About 37,000 United States Soldiers were dead in the war. The ironic aspect of war is that the primary victims are civilians rather than the soldiers. Mass destruction, pain and sufferings are the fate of the innocent people in war.<sup>134</sup>*

Any historical research requires understanding an event from all angles, but in the case of the *No Gun Ri* incident, it is particularly important to know about the war situation preceding the incident and other related social and political circumstances to understand the incident. It is very unlikely that there is a single document that reveals a direct description of the killing of Korean civilians in the Korean War; thus, the best method to find the history of *No Gun Ri* seems to be checking and interpreting all possible political, social, tactical and historical military records and resources. Byong-su Choi and Ku-do Chong repeat that it is extremely crucial in the case of *No Gun Ri* to get evidence from all related documents and historiography, circumstantial or descriptive, to discover the truth.<sup>135</sup>

Son-ju Pang, a Korean-American historian, similarly insists that it is necessary to know the war situation in July 1950 during the opening weeks of the Korean War because it might

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<sup>134</sup> Tae-Ung Baik, *A War Crime against an Ally's Civilians: the No Gun Ri Massacre* (Master's thesis, Notre Dame Law School, 2000), 1-2.

<sup>135</sup> Pyong-su Choi and Ku-do Chong, "A Study on a Massacre of Civilian in Yong-dong area, Chung-chong Province, in the Early Stage of the Korean War (1)," *Journal of Humanities* 17:1: (1999): 245-283. (최병수, 정구도, "6.25 동란 초기 충북 영동지구의 민간인 살상사건에 관한 연구 (1): 노근리의 미국 대양민 집단살상사건을 중심으로," *인문학지* 17:1 (1999): 245-283)

have affected later activities of the U.S. soldiers.<sup>136</sup> Before early July, the American soldiers were confident about achieving victory because they believed that the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) had not experienced modern warfare. Bruce Cumings, a historian and Korea War specialist, describes this confidence as "American G.I.s were told, and believed, that as soon as Korean soldiers saw the whites of Yankee eyes, they would turn tail and run."<sup>137</sup> This misjudgment about North Korean troops, in fact, began at the top. The Commander of the United Nation forces, General Douglas MacArthur, expressed extreme confidence about the war in a conversation with John F. Dulles, stating that MacArthur could handle the war with one arm tied behind his back and repulse North Koreans with only the first Cavalry Division.<sup>138</sup> In the same vein, the First Cavalry Division Commander, Major General Hobart Gay, told a press conference that "he did not intend to take the ROK Army into consideration at all in making his estimates and disposition."<sup>139</sup> A historian, Philip West, remarked that MacArthur was "blind to Korean and Chinese realities from the outbreak of the war to his dismissal, with devastating results for all sides."<sup>140</sup> The fact that the American Army did not correctly view the reality of the Korean War and the consequent result of ill-prepared troops were frequently mentioned as major factors for the *No Gun Ri* incident by many researchers.

In battlefield situations, the North Korean Army's war forces had proven extremely effective from the beginning of the war. The 24<sup>th</sup> Division's Commanding General, William F.

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<sup>136</sup> Sunju Pang said in an interview with Younhap News that it is necessary to understand the situation in July 1950, quoted in Pil-su Lim, "No Gun Ri, a massacre as a military operation," *Hyonjang eso Mirae* 49 (Nov. 1999): footnote 1, at <<http://kilsp.jinbo.net/publish/99/991108.htm>>. (Last accessed January 27<sup>th</sup> 2007). (임필수, "노근리, '군사작전' 으로서의 양민학살," *현장예서 미 래* 49(Nov, 1999): 각주 1, <<http://kilsp.jinbo.net/publish/99/991108.htm>>)

<sup>137</sup> Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korea War II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950* (Yoksabipyungsa, Seoul, Korea, 2002), 693.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, 692.

<sup>139</sup> Harold Joyce Noble, *Embassy at War* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1975), 152-153.

<sup>140</sup> Philip West, "Interpreting the Korean War," *The American Historical Review* 94:1, Supplement to vol. 94 (Feb. 1989): 82.



Dean, stressed that the American war force was not effective and dangerously disappointing compared to the North Koreans after the first engagement. He warned MacArthur that “the North Korean Army, the North Korean soldiers, and his status of training and the quality of his equipment have been underestimated.”<sup>141</sup> As a matter of fact, the majority of North Korean soldiers had fought with the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Army in World War II, and they were equipped with heavily armored tanks and very effective ammunition from Russia.<sup>142</sup> A series of defeats of U.S. troops and the superiority of the NKPA affected the morale of U.S. soldiers and spread fear among them. This was exemplified in Taejon, approximately 120 miles south of Seoul, where American troops engaged North Korean troops with heavy casualties inflicted on the U.S. Army’s 24<sup>th</sup> Division in July 19<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> 1950. The losses included Major General Dean’s disappearance and 1,150 casualties out of the 3,933 soldiers of the 24th Division which is nearly 30 percent of manpower lost and virtually all the equipment of the troops.<sup>143</sup> The Taejon battle was partially valued later for holding up the frontline for a short time period to buy additional time for further reinforcements. However, after this battle, the North Korean Army was considered tactically dominant, and the American soldiers were extremely terrified of the North Korean troops. A Korean military historian mentions that the battle at Taejon was the direct cause for the re-disposition of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry to Yongdong. North Korean infiltrators and guerrilla bands in South Korea, from that point on, caused panic among the American soldiers.<sup>144</sup> Roy Appleman, a military historian, states about the Taejon defeat that “On the American side, the lack of information of the true state of affairs caused by the almost complete breakdown in

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<sup>141</sup> James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972), 85.

<sup>142</sup> Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (Center of Military History, United States Army; Washington D.C., 1992), 8-12.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, 180.

<sup>144</sup> Hwan-jun Lee, “The Truth and Lessons of the *No Gun Ri* incident,” *Military History* 42 (2001): 185-220. (이환준, “노근리사건의 진상과 교훈,” *군사* 42 (2001): 185-220).

all forms of communication was the major factor leading to the disaster.”<sup>145</sup> At Taejon, American soldiers clearly experienced the front assault and guerrilla warfare from the back, and from this point onward, the U.S. troops began “burning villages suspected of harboring partisans; in some cases they were burned merely to deny hiding places to the guerrillas.”<sup>146</sup>

The suspicion of refugees, caused by infiltration and the harboring of spies, became more intense among American soldiers as they encountered refugee columns everywhere. The refugee problems stemmed from military policies and the incorrect expectations of the war. The 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division Commander, Hobart R. Gay, stated in a press conference that “his solution for the Communists’ infiltration tactics was to force every Korean out of the division’s area of responsibility, on the theory that once they were removed, any Korean caught in the area would be an enemy agent.”<sup>147</sup> This simple solution adversely caused brutal results. Hundreds of thousands of refugees shared the roads on which U.S. troops’ supplies and ammunitions were transported and thus provided a method for North Korean infiltration. Dongchun Kim, a Korean historian, also maintains that a great percentage of Korean people actually became refugees due to evacuation by U.S. troops for war operations, U.S. Air Force’s large-scale air attacks and combat activities related to the infiltration tactics of the enemy.<sup>148</sup>

The chaotic situation due to the refugee problems and North Korean infiltration was quite well known during wartime. American newspapers reported refugee-related problems in Korea everyday in July 1950, as one of articles in the *New York Times* reported:

Hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing before the  
advancing Red armies clogged the roads of South Korea today, and

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<sup>145</sup> Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, 180.

<sup>146</sup> Cumings, *The Origins of the Korea War II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950*, 687.

<sup>147</sup> Noble, *Embassy at War*, 152-153.

<sup>148</sup> Dongchun Kim, *War and Society; What Does the Korean War Mean to Us* (Seoul, Korea: Tolbegae, 2000), 106. (김동춘, *전쟁과 사회; 우리에게 한국전쟁은 무엇이었나*, 돌베개, 서울, 2000, 106).

hidden in their midst was a small core of Communist sympathizers, spies and infiltrating guerrillas. Although the number of Communist sympathizers among South Korea's 20,000,000 people actually is small, their ranks still can be expanded by the Northern Reds if they desire. The pro-Reds in South Korea inhabit almost inaccessible mountain areas, which make up almost three-fourths of the peninsula. Trained organizers from the north have drawn heavily from these regions for their guerrilla bands and their replacements.<sup>149</sup>

Descriptions of the U.S. troops' consequent reactions toward this situation continued to fill the pages of newspapers in July and August 1950. Another well known news article was by John Osborne, a correspondent of *Time* and *Life* magazines. He states that North Korean tactics had a brutalizing effect on American soldiers: "To attempt to win it [the war against Communists] so, as we are now doing in Korea, is not only to court final failure but also to force upon our men in the field an attitude of the utmost savagery. This means not the usual, inevitable savagery of combat in the field, but savagery in detail – the blotting out of villages where the enemy may be hiding; the shooting and shelling of refugees who may include North Koreans in the anonymous white clothing of the Korean countryside, or who may be screening an enemy march upon our positions."<sup>150</sup> Another journalist, Walter Sullivan, a war correspondent from the *New York Times*, reported that "The American G.I. is now beginning to eye with suspicion any Korean civilian in the cities or countryside. 'Watch the guys in white' – the customary peasant dress – is the cry often heard near the front."<sup>151</sup> Keyes Beech, another American correspondent, also wrote,

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<sup>149</sup> "Refugees Choking Traffic in Korea," *New York Times* (July 16 1950): pg. 12.

<sup>150</sup> John Osborne, "War in Asia," *Time* (August 21, 1950): 20.

<sup>151</sup> Walter Sullivan, "Men Who Paid the Price in Taejon Fight and Force Way to New Center," *New York Times* (Jul 22 1950).

“It is not the time to be a Korean, for the Yankees are shooting them all. . . nervous American troops are ready to fire at any Korean.”<sup>152</sup>

It is easily assumed that the rumors and the fear about North Korean troops, their tactics and war operations’ efficiency affected the American soldiers’ morale and activities, especially the green recruit soldiers of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division who had just arrived in Korea. These American soldiers were not familiar with the Korean people, land, culture and weather, and in fact, the Korean War was totally different from any wars that they had heard or experienced, as it was guerrilla warfare. Due to the prevalence of guerrillas, they found themselves in “a new kind of war, in which the enemy and the people became indistinguishable.” Bruce Cumings connects this characteristic of the Korean War and how American soldiers would feel, stating that “The average G.I. arrived in Korea with the barest knowledge of where he was, who he was fighting, and why; he was thrown into battle in the steaming humidity, frequently rain squalls and muddy terrain of midsummer; he slogged through rice paddies fertilized with human waste, something common in peasant societies but overwhelming at the first scent; if he slaked his thirst with paddy water he got amoebic dysentery. In this UN ‘police action’ he faced an enemy who fought a total war, using every resource to turn Korean weakness into strength. Sometimes this meant using little kids to ferry ammunition; sometimes it meant driving weeping refugees into American lines to cover an infantry assault.”<sup>153</sup> Then he prudently introduces another aspect of a racial attitude to consider how American soldiers treated the Korean civilians, which has not been addressed extensively in other Korean War research: “The average G.I. also came from an American society where people of color were subjugated and segregated, and where the highest law officer in the land, Attorney General McGrath, had called communists ‘rodents.’ It thus did

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<sup>152</sup> Recited from Jon Holliday and Bruce Cumings, *Korean: The Unknown War* (NY: Pantheon Books, 1988), 88.

<sup>153</sup> Cumings, *The Origins of the Korea War II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950*, 690-1.

not take long for soldiers to believe that Koreans were subhuman, and act accordingly.”<sup>154</sup> He continues to address this approach as follows;

In contrast to the war in Vietnam, barely a voice was raised against such racism. . . . the same American society that fought for freedom in Korea prohibited Koreans from entering the country to reside in 1950 under existing racial quotas, and denied naturalization to 3,000 Koreans who came to the United States before 1924; fifteen states prevented Korean-Caucasian marriages, eleven states refused to allow Koreans to buy or own land; twenty-seven occupations in New York City were proscribed to Koreans. . . .

Such attitudes shaped the battle, pitting young American soldiers by the thousands against an enemy that they were unprepared to fight, one which fought with rare courage, tenacity, and cunning. And these attitudes shaped the behavior of the enemy, who commonly remarked that “the Americans do not recognize Koreans as human beings,” and who needed nerves of steel to cope with an American army that, as the war ground on, increasingly seemed capable of anything.<sup>155</sup>

A few days after the Taejon battle, the American troops again engaged North Korean troops in Yongdong County where *No Gun Ri* was located. Refugees were still very crowded in Yongdong and became objects of military attention. Roy Appleman mentioned that refugees were again used by North Koreans in Yongdong, “On 24 July, for example, a man dressed in white carrying a heavy pack, and accompanied by a woman appearing to be pregnant, came under suspicion. The couple was searched and the woman's assumed pregnancy proved to be a

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<sup>154</sup> Cumings, *The Origins of the Korea War II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950*, 691.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, 696-7.

small radio hidden under her clothes. She used this radio for reporting American positions. The Eighth Army tried to control the refugee movement through the Korean police, permitting their movement only during daylight hours and along predetermined routes.”<sup>156</sup> This type of inhumane tactics of the North Koreans - using refugees to break through the American lines - have been well described in the official Korean War history of the U.S. and Korea. Stories like this relate that North Koreans drove several hundred refugees ahead of them through American mine fields,<sup>157</sup> or that North Korean forces began their attack by making several hundred refugees approach a bridge near Yongdong that American troops had mined against an attempted crossing by the North Korean troops.<sup>158</sup>

For these reasons, the U.S. Army as well as South Korean troops tried to control the refugees and did not allow them to approach any friendly lines. On July 25, a day before the *No Gun Ri* massacre, the South Korean Government announced that all civilians who make “enemy-like action” in the war zone would be executed, all civilians must travel by special trains, civilians in the war zone would only be allowed two hours of daily liberty, and “all those found violating this regulation will be considered enemies and will be executed immediately.”<sup>159</sup> This specific regulation was issued on the day prior to the *No Gun Ri* massacre, and American soldiers who encountered refugees at *No Gun Ri* might have been minding this regulation and other similar U.S. refugee policies issued during these days, stoking the fear of North Koreans’ guerrilla warfare.

Yongdong was held by the 24<sup>th</sup> Division until the Taejon battle, when it was then released

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<sup>156</sup> Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, 200; First Cavalry Division Association, *The First Team: The First Cavalry Division In Korea, July 18 1950 -- July 18 1952* (Paducah, KY: Turner Pub. Co, 1994).

<sup>157</sup> Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, 204; Korea Military Academy, *History of the Korean War*, 1987 (육군사관학교 편, *한국전쟁사*), 309-10; Institute of Military History of Japan, *The Korean War*, 1986 (일본 육사연구보급회 편, *한국전쟁*), 250-1.

<sup>158</sup> Richard J. H. Johnston, “Guile Big Weapon Of North Koreans,” *New York Times* (July 27, 1950): pg. 1;

<sup>159</sup> “South Koreans Curb Civilian Movement,” *New York Times* (July 26 1950): pg. 3.

to the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division which had recently arrived from Japan. On the second day in Yongdong there was an unknown disturbance among the new soldiers of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, which is the alleged army unit responsible for *No Gun Ri*, on the night before the *No Gun Ri* killing, which Appleman describes as follows:

Reports reached them the night of 25-26 July of enemy gains in the 27th Infantry sector northward, which increased the uneasiness of the untested staff and troops. After midnight there came a report that the enemy had achieved a breakthrough. Somehow, the constant pressure under which the 27th Infantry fought its delaying action on the Poun road had become magnified and exaggerated. The 7th Cavalry Regiment headquarters immediately decided to arouse all personnel and withdraw. During the withdrawal the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, an untried unit, scattered in panic. That evening 119 of its men were still missing.

In this frantic departure from its position on 26 July, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion left behind a switchboard, an emergency lighting unit, and weapons of all types. After daylight truck drivers and platoon sergeants returned to the scene and recovered 14 machine guns, 9 radios, 120 M1 rifles, 26 carbines, 7 BAR's, and 6 60-mm. mortars.<sup>160</sup>

The reason for this disturbance has not been identified but it was known later that there was no enemy contact with the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment. Then came the *No Gun Ri* incident on July 26. Charles Grutzner, who reported the war for the *New York Times*, said that “Fear of infiltrators led to the slaughter of hundreds of South Korean civilians, women as well as men, by some U.S. troops and police of the Republic. One high-ranking United States officer condemned as

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<sup>160</sup> Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, 204.

‘panicky’ the shooting of many civilians last July by one United States regiment.”<sup>161</sup> This report did not particularly mention any more details about the slaughter, but this report could imply a similar incident or some clues of the general status of the U.S. soldiers in the summer of 1950, if not directly for the *No Gun Ri* incident.

At this confused and chaotic moment, the *No Gun Ri* killing occurred. It was alleged to have happened from July 26 - 29, 1950. According to the survivors, on July 23<sup>rd</sup>, a few American soldiers and a Korean police officer came in a jeep and evacuated the villagers of Chu-Gok Ri because of the possibility of a battle taking place in the area. The villagers moved south to Im-Gye Ri, a secluded mountain village. On July 25<sup>th</sup>, 1950, a group of U.S. soldiers came to Im-Gye Ri and ordered the villagers to evacuate again. Around 500 people, including children, gathered with their belongings on their ox-carts and their backs. The soldiers escorted them to the south toward Pusan. When they arrived at Ha-Ga Ri that night, the soldiers led them to a dry streambed nearby and ordered them to stay overnight. Survivors said some people who strayed away from the group were shot. Overnight from 25<sup>th</sup> to 26<sup>th</sup>, there was an unknown disturbance and the American troops left and moved to the east. The villagers continued to go to the south by themselves in the morning. When they arrived near *No Gun Ri*, another group of American soldiers approached them with guns. The soldiers forced them to go onto the railroad tracks and searched their belongings. No prohibited items like weapons were found, and any farm tools and kitchen knives were confiscated. Then American soldiers communicated with someone by radio and left. Shortly afterwards, air crafts flew overhead and started to strafe and drop bombs on the refugees. In a moment, the railroad tracks were destroyed and ox-carts were bombed to pieces.

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<sup>161</sup> Charles Grutzner, “Stranded Enemy Soldiers Merge With Refugee Crowds in Korea: ‘Gentlemen in White’ Pose Political Problem for Civil Authorities in South – G. I.’s Find That Screening Is Difficult,” *New York Times* (September 30, 1950): 3.



Approximately 100 people died from this strafing. The rest of the refugees ran off in confusion and narrowly reached a railroad bridge tunnel over a stream.<sup>162</sup>

The air attack in Yongdong was described in some Korean War history literature. Cumings quoted a Korean soldier's diary to describe the air attack that "The diary of a dead Korean named Ch'oe Söng-hwan, either a KPA soldier or a guerrilla, noted on July 26<sup>th</sup> that American bombers had swooped over Yöngdong and 'turned it into a sea of fire.'"<sup>163</sup> In fact, the overwhelming large-scale air attack of the U.S. Air Force was often regarded as one of the marked aspects for the Korean War. Reginald Thompson, a journalist, found himself sickened by "the carnage of the American air war, machined military might used against an almost unarmed enemy, unable to challenge the aircraft in the skies."<sup>164</sup>

The refugees at *No Gun Ri* jumped into the twin railroad overpass tunnels to avoid the air strafing. Some refugees who sought shelter in other nearby areas were directed to move and join the refugees at the tunnels under the railroad by U.S. soldiers. One survivor recalled, "We thought it was safe. The tunnel I was in was packed with people. I saw people from my village and thought it was okay. Then the shooting came. . . . the shooting was from both sides. When there was shooting coming from one side, we rushed to the other side. But the bullets came from that side, too. We could not even raise our heads. We just dug under dead bodies."<sup>165</sup> The survivors said that shooting took place on and off for three more days. People attempted to escape at night, but if they were caught, they got shot. Survivors said among hundreds of people in the tunnels on the first night, most of the young people ventured to escape at night. "As the

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<sup>162</sup> This brief narrative is written based on a book, Ku-do Chung, *No Gun Ri Is Still Alive* (Seoul: Paeksan Sodang, 2003), 25-37. (경구도, *노근리는 살아있다*, 백산서당, 2003: 25-37).

<sup>163</sup> Quoted from Cumings, *The Origins of the Korea War II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950*, 687.

<sup>164</sup> Recited in Jon Holliday and Bruce Cumings, Korean: *The Unknown War* (NYL Pantheon Books, 1988), 88

<sup>165</sup> Hae-sook Yang spoke to the A.P. Sang-hun Choe, "Korean villagers recall death and terror beneath a bridge," at <<http://www.pulitzer.org/year/2000/investigative-reporting/works/AP2.html>>. (Last accessed on January 20, 2007).

time passed, dead bodies were piled up in both entrances and the stream of blood abounded within the tunnel. Survivors also testified that while shooting was in respite, some soldiers came up to the tunnels and helped some injured people. In such a way, the massacre continued for four days. When U.S. troops retreated and NKPA arrived there on July 29, North Koreans said ‘the U.S. army is gone. Any person alive can return to your home now.’ But, the cold corpses were silent,” Eun-yong Chung, a survivor’s husband and the representative of the *No Gun Ri* Survivors’ Organization, related.<sup>166</sup> As the Associated Press report depicted, “it was a story no one wanted to hear.”<sup>167</sup> Thanks to the AP’s report, the story finally became known to the American public and received more attention from the Korean people.

The way in which this story was finally revealed to the public is painfully slow and frustrating. The survivors and the families of the victims could not speak out about what they went through during the Korean War, a war caused by conflicting political ideologies resulting in an exceptionally suppressed society on the subject of communism. The repressive postwar political climate in South Korea forced one not to mention any illegal deeds of Korean and American soldiers who served and died in the Korean War to keep the “freedom” in this country. Under such circumstances, when survivors tried to talk about their stories, the only reaction they received was that “they must have been communists if U.S. soldiers killed them”. Likewise, the *No Gun Ri* survivors were tacitly forced not to raise their voices about their story. A survivor, Haechan Yang, had tried to claim his loss in the massacre, but he was politically investigated two

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<sup>166</sup> Sang Yong Park, “Rethinking the *No Gun Ri* Massacre on the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Korean War,” *The Associated Press* (Sep. 29, 1999), at <<http://www.kimsoft.com/1997/nogun13.htm>>. (Last accessed on January 20, 2007).

<sup>167</sup> Sang-Hun Choe; Charles J. Hanley; Martha Mendoza, Associated Pres, “G.I.'s Tell of a U.S. Massacre in Korean War,” *New York Times* (Sep. 30, 1999): A01

times because he was considered a communist sympathizer.<sup>168</sup> Moreover, in the course of publicity about this incident within South Korea, *No Gun Ri* was intentionally ignored by the passive Korean government in order to maintain their traditional friendship with the United States. One survivor states that he could not accept the fact that a government would not actively investigate an incident in which its own people were killed.<sup>169</sup>

When the Democratic Party won the Korean election in 1960, the political situation in Korea became a little bit more lenient than before. The survivors and victims' families filed a claim for disclosure of the massacre and compensation for the dead and injured with a U.S. claims office in Seoul in October of that year. However, this claim was rejected due to the lack of evidence and the expiration of the statute of limitations.<sup>170</sup> The victims attempted to file claims once more in December 1960, but they were also denied. In the 1970s and 1980s, South Korea was ruled by U.S. backed military-oriented dictators, so survivors and family members of the killed were not able to raise their voices. More than 30 years later, in 1994, affected families inquired again about receiving an apology and compensation from the U.S. government, but no reply was given. In the meantime, the survivors and family members did their own research and found that it was the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division that was stationed in the area at the time of the massacre. In August 1997, families once again filed for compensation from the U.S. government through the Korean government at the Chongju District of Justice Department, accusing the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division of the massacre. The reply they received from the United States Armed Forces

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<sup>168</sup> Sun-gu Hwang, "The Scene of Tragedy Everywhere in No Gu Ri," *Hankyoreh*, (Oct. 1, 1999). (황순구, "노근리 양민학살 곳곳에 참극 상흔, 온가족 몰살 호적정리도 못해," *한겨레* Oct.1,1999).

<sup>169</sup> Sun-gu Hwang, "Chong Eun-Yong, the representative of *No Gun Ri* Victims' Organization, Indignation with Our Government's Indifference," *Hankyoreh* (Sep. 29, 1999). (황순구, "노근리 양민학살 대책위원장 정은용씨, 우리정부의 무관심 분통, 미국배상 받아낼 터," *한겨레* Sep. 29, 1999).

<sup>170</sup> Sun-gu Hwang, "Treat them as enemy: American Documents Discovered," *Hankyoreh* (Sep. 29, 1999). (황순구, "노근리 피난민 적으로 취급하라, 미군 양민학살 공식문서 확인," *한겨레* Sep.29,1999).

Claims Service-Korea stated that “there is no evidence to support the claims nor is there evidence to show that the U.S. 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division was in the area where the incident allegedly occurred.”<sup>171</sup> However, many historical books and archival records that have been discovered by victims and researchers indicate that the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division was in *No Gun Ri*. Bruce Cumings states that it took him only five minutes to find the evidence of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division’s station in that area.<sup>172</sup> In December 1997 and early 1999, more petitions were submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of the Army, but they were all rejected with the same reason of “no proof.”<sup>173</sup>

Besides these legal claims, the victims have tried to gain the public’s attention in many ways. One survivor’s family, Eun-yong Chung, published a factual novel called *Do You Know Our Agony?* (그때, 우리의 아픔을 아는가) in the spring of 1994, based on his research and oral history that he had collected from his family and villagers about the incident. This novel won the attention of Korean news reporters and inspired them to research the subject. Finally, several news publications about the incident appeared that year in Korea. One reporter recalled that when he first read this novel, he felt instinctively that it was not just a simple novel because of the fact that the author was a 73-year-old man who had never written a novel before.<sup>174</sup> In July 1994, this reporter wrote a special report about the *No Gun Ri* massacre in a political magazine, *Monthly Mal* (월간 말), entitled, “First Testimony – the Massacre of 300 Villagers by the American Soldiers.” This report was mainly based on the interviews of survivors and included

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<sup>171</sup> United States Armed Forces Claims Service-Korea, letter to Chongju District Compensation Committee. Dec. 1997. The U.S. Army later accepted that the efforts to discover the truth was incomplete and the statement was based on faulty research in its final investigation report, *Report of the No Gun Ri Review* (Jan. 2001), 3.

<sup>172</sup> Bruce Cumings, “Korean My Lai,” *The Nation*, Oct. 25 1999. Also available at <<http://www.thenation.com/doc/19991025/cumings>> (Last accessed on January 20, 2007).

<sup>173</sup> The U.S. Army also agreed with the comment that research was severely limited in scope and did not fully address the concerns raised by the Koreans. *Report of the No Gun Ri Review*, 3.

<sup>174</sup> Yeon-Ho Oh, “Do You Know Our Agony?: Massacre of Villagers by the U.S. Soldiers During the Korean War,” *Asia Solidarity Quarterly* 2 (Fall 2000): 80.

the list of the victims' names. From this time onward, the story of the *No Gun Ri* massacre began to appear in some Korean newspapers and political magazines.

However, this story did not receive wide public attention in Korea and did not spread to America until the Associated Press reported it in 1999. Sang-Hun Choe, a Korean reporter for the Associated Press, reported a story to its headquarters in New York when survivors and relatives of victims were rejected over a petition in 1998. This report, covering the survivors' allegations and the U.S. military's denial, was a compelling story to the AP itself. The AP began its own research, found records discrediting the denial, and obtained interviews from veterans who participated or witnessed the incident.<sup>175</sup> Finally, the AP produced a story that caught great attention throughout the world on September 29, 1999, which appeared on the front pages of major newspapers including the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*. The AP's story finally prompted both American and Korean governments to react. The sensational AP story eventually won the Pulitzer Prize for investigative reporting in April 2000.

Since the AP's report, much research about the *No Gun Ri* incident, including two government investigative reports, has been published in the U.S. as well as Korea. In Korea, the first focus of academic research was a legal approach to the incident concerning whether compensation for victims of the massacre was still possible.<sup>176</sup> In addition, some Korean

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<sup>175</sup> Beth Gardiner, "Associated Press Expose of Korean War Killings Wins Investigative Pulitzer," at <[http://www.asianweek.com/2000\\_04\\_20/news\\_nogunripulitzer.html](http://www.asianweek.com/2000_04_20/news_nogunripulitzer.html)>. (Last accessed on January 20, 2007)

<sup>176</sup> Si-hyon Cho, "The Statute of Limitation for the Significant Human Rights Cases," *A Discussion for Democratic Society* 33, 1999. (조시현, "증대한 인권침해행위에 대한 시효문제," *민주사회를 위한 변호* 33, 1999); Si-hyon Cho and Chang-hee Lee, *50 Years After the Korean War; Issues of International Humanity Law* (Seoul: Asian Social Science Institution, 2000). (조시현 이장희 편저, "한국전쟁 50년이 남긴 국제인도법적 문제," 사단법인 아시아 사회과학 연구원, 2000); Si-hyon Cho, "Adaptation of the International Humanity Law for the *No Gun Ri* Massacre," *A Proceeding of Symposium for the Investigation of the No Gun Ri Massacre, the 9<sup>th</sup> Policy Symposium for the International Human Rights*, 2000. (조시현, "노근리 학살사건에 대한 국제 인도법의 적용", 국회인권포럼 제9회 정책 심포지움; *노근리 사건 진상규명과 해결 방향에 관한 심포지움자료집*, 2000); Si-hyon Cho, "The *No Gun Ri* Massacre and the International Humanity Law," *Songsin Journal of Law* 1 (Feb. 2001): 65-106. (조시현, "'노근리'학살사건과 국제인도

academic researchers sought information about the massacre from the historiography of the Korean War for circumstantial information and the on-site investigations for physical evidence.<sup>177</sup> Previous research by survivors and families was slowly exposed and used by other researchers. The son of a survivor and a university professor, Ku-do Chung, actively published academic articles as well as opinion essays based on what he and his father had collected and researched.<sup>178</sup> Some Korean journalists who had reported the event in earlier years published lengthy articles again in political journals and symposiums, compiling all the information and evidence they obtained. Symposiums and conferences were held in Korea under the topic of *No Gun Ri*. The issue of the statute of limitations for compensation and the investigation of the true circumstances of the incident were discussed in those meetings.

In the United States researchers who had previously shown interest in the Korean War or other war atrocities prompted further research on *No Gun Ri*. They tried to analyze the nature of the incident in a broader context of the Korean War and war atrocities.<sup>179</sup> Some previous research that could imply similar atrocities and provide clues for the incident was revisited

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법,” *성신법학* 1, Feb. 2001, 65-106); Tuk-jin Choi, “A Massacre of Civilians by American Soldiers During the Korean War,” *Chungang Journal of Legal Issues* 49 (Jan. 2001): 12-40. (최득진, “한국전쟁 중 미군에 의한 민간인 학살사건,” *중앙대 법정논총* 49, Jan. 2001: 12-40).

<sup>177</sup> Pyong-su Choi and Ku-do Chong, “A Study on a Massacre of Civilians at Yong-dong area, Chung-chong Province, in the Early Stage of the Korean War (1),” *Journal of Humanities* 17:1 (1999): 245-283. (최병수, 정구도, “6.25동란 초기 충북 영동지구의 민간인 살상사건에 관한 연구 (1): 노근리의 미국 대양민 집단살상사건을 중심으로,” *충북대 인문학지* 17:1 (1999): 245-283); Pyong-su Choi, “A Study on A Massacre of Civilians in Young-dong area, Chung-chong Province in the early Korea War (2),” *Journal of Humanities* 19:1 (Feb. 2000): 261-283. (최병수, “노근리 양민학살사건에 관한 몇 가지 검토: 6.25동란 초기 충북영동지구의 민간인 상해사건에 관한 연구,” *충북대 인문학지* 19:1 (Feb. 2000): 261-283)

<sup>178</sup> Ku-do Chong, *No Gun Ri is Still Alive* (Seoul: Paeksan Sodang, 2003). (정구도, *노근리는 살아있다*, 백산서당, 2003); Ku-do Chong, *The Truth and Lessons of the No Gun Ri Incident* (Seoul: Tunam, 2003). (정구도, *노근리사건의 진상과 교훈*, 두남, 2003). Ku-do Chong published series reports about his research and legal experience related to the *No Gun Ri* incident in *News Maker*, a Korean weekly news magazine, for 13 months from June 2001 to July 2002. He put all the reports together and published them as a book, *No Gun Ri is Still Alive*, in 2003.

<sup>179</sup> Bruce Cumings, “Occurrence at Nogun-ri Bridge: An Inquiry into the History and Memory of a Civil War,” *Critical Asian Studies* 33:4 (2001); Marilyn B. Young, An Incident at *No Gun Ri*,” in ed. by Omer Bartov, Atina Grossman, and Mary Nolan, *Crime of War: Guilt and Denial in the twentieth Century* (New York: The New Press, 2002), 242-258.

during this process.<sup>180</sup> The AP news reporters continued further research with more documents. Law scholars produced much research on *No Gun Ri* from legal perspectives.<sup>181</sup> Later, military historians joined the research process on *No Gun Ri*, some from the view of the American military.<sup>182</sup> The tension between the survivors' side and the American military side brought controversy among the researchers, especially when one of the news sources used for the AP's first report was questioned for its veracity. Overall, *No Gun Ri* research has been conducted steadily with various controversies and discussions emerging as new information and sources are found.

Investigation from both governments was conducted extensively. The American government has changed its attitude from rejections and rebuttals of the petitions in the 1990s to the statement of regret made by President Bill Clinton. In January 2001, the U.S. Department of the Army published *The No Gun Ri Review* as a result of U.S. government investigation. The Department of the Army announced that it conducted comprehensive research on the incident with review of a great deal of military and government documents and interviewing almost 200 veterans, but their investigation report presents only a passive and narrow interpretation of such materials. The U.S. report concludes that a tragic incident occurred at *No Gun Ri* with the killing of unknown numbers of Korean refugees by the U.S. force; however, it was not a deliberate

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<sup>180</sup> Cumings, *The Origins of the Korea War II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950*.

<sup>181</sup> Christopher D. Booth, "Prosecuting the 'Fog of War?'" Examining the Legal Implications of an Alleged Massacre of South Korean Civilians by U.S. Forces During the Opening Days of the Korean War in the Village of *No Gun Ri*," *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 33:4 (2000): 933-986; Tae-ung Baik, *A War Crime Against an Ally's Civilians: The No Gun Ri Massacre* (Master's Thesis, Notre Dame Law School, May 2000); T. U. Baik, "A War Crime Against an Ally's Civilians: The *No Gun Ri* Massacre," *Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy*, 15: part 2, 2001.

<sup>182</sup> Moo-bong Ryoo, *No Gun Ri Incident: Implications for the U.S. Army* (School of Advanced Military, Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College, January 2001); Robert L. Bateman, *No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2002); Dale C. Kuehl, *What Happened At No Gun Ri? The Challenge of Civilians on the Battlefield* (Master's Thesis U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2003).

incident by an order from the chain of command. The Korean government's reaction immediately after the AP report was "fact finding through thorough investigation," but high ranking officials were still worried about causing a crack in the traditional Korea-American amicable relationship by this situation.<sup>183</sup> However, the final report of the Korean Ministry of National Defense, *the Report of the No Gun Ri Investigation* (노근리사건 조사결과 보고서), had a more open conclusion in favor of the victims' claim about the killings than the American investigation. The *No Gun Ri* Review team from the U.S. and the Korean investigation team published the statement of mutual understanding about the incident based on the obvious and basic facts that both parties agreed on, excluding the complicated and sensitive aspects of the incident, such as the number of the refugees who died or were injured and the existence of the orders from the chain of command. Despite the thorough investigation, many questions remained unanswered.<sup>184</sup> Researchers of *No Gun Ri* are still asking the same questions that the first AP reporters asked: "What chain of officers gave open-fire orders? Did GIs see gunfire from the refugees or their own ricochets? How high in the ranks did knowledge of the events extend?"<sup>185</sup> A *No Gun Ri* researcher stated that "Clearly there are still many unanswered questions over American involvement in Korea, questions that were not answered by the narrow view of the US Army's investigation."<sup>186</sup>

Following the investigation, the U.S. government offered to establish a memorial at *No Gun Ri* for the general victims of the Korean War, not indicating it was in specific honor of the

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<sup>183</sup> Pil-su Lim, "No Gun Ri, a Massacre as a Military Operation," *Hyonjang eso Mirae* 49 (Nov. 1999) at <<http://kilsp.jinbo.net/publish/99/991108.htm>>. (임필수, "노근리, '군사작전'으로서의 양민학살," *현장에서 미래를* 49 (Nov. 1999), <<http://kilsp.jinbo.net/publish/99/991108.htm>>) (Last accessed on January 20, 2007)

<sup>184</sup> Sahr Conway-Lanz, "Beyond *No Gun Ri*: Refugees and the United States Military in the Korean War," *Diplomatic History* 29:1 (January 2005): 56.

<sup>185</sup> Tae-Ung Baik, "A War Crime Against An Ally's Civilians: The *No Gun Ri* Massacre," *Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy* 15:part 2 (2001): 471

<sup>186</sup> BBC, "Kill'em All: the American Military in Korea" <[http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/korea\\_usa\\_07.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/korea_usa_07.shtml)> (last accessed on Feb. 26<sup>th</sup> 2007)



*No Gun Ri* victims, and to provide scholarships for those who wish to study in the U.S. The survivors and journalists criticized this offer for diluting the responsibility of the *No Gun Ri* killings and framing it as an inevitable tragedy of the Korean War. However, once the governmental investigation was finished, the survivors and the victims' families had no remaining options but to file a lawsuit for civil procedure with the U.S. government. Currently, in 2007, the lawsuit is still in process.

The compensations for the survivors and victims' family on an individual level were finally settled by the Korean government. A special legislation for *No Gun Ri* investigation and compensation was accomplished and survivors and victims' family were to receive reparation payments and further research was to launch including the excavations of remains of the victims. On the contrary, the compensation plan from the American government was not implemented and actually refused by survivors in the end. The plan to build a memorial and to establish a scholarship fund was set up with a four million dollar budget, but this offer was turned down by the survivors citing the reason that they could not accept the U.S. government's intention to avoid the responsibility of *No Gun Ri* by expanding such compensation to honor all the Korean War victims.

Since the *No Gun Ri* story came to light, various cultural approaches by the general public to the *No Gun Ri* killing have been attempted and these includes film-making, publishing a cartoon, publishing a children's book on *No Gun Ri* and exhibitions of photographs. The site of *No Gun Ri* has been visited by many people including college students from all around the world.

## 5.0 NO GUN RI INCIDENT: ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTATION

*The records do exist in fact: they just need to be deconstructed/read, not through objective lenses, but through subjective ones.*<sup>187</sup>

There have been three benchmark events since the first *No Gun Ri* research. These benchmark events are directly related along with source materials to substantiate discussions on *No Gun Ri* and, therefore, exerted a great deal of influence on subsequent researchers. This study uses these benchmark events as perimeters for the analysis of the contents of *No Gun Ri* research in order to more easily identify the flow of *No Gun Ri* discussion and its correlation with source materials. Publications on *No Gun Ri*, therefore, were analyzed along with the four time-frames divided by these three perimeters for specific discussions and supporting source materials. The first benchmark event is the Associated Press's publication of the *No Gun Ri* story on September 29, 1999. The first time-frame is set from the first publication concerning *No Gun Ri* in 1994 to just before the AP's report in 1999. There were few publications in the U.S. during this time but in Korea survivors and their families had researched the event as a desperate method to publicize their story; in this course, some progressive journalists became aware of the event and reported it. After the AP's *No Gun Ri* story was published, major discussions were led by the AP's research which included the documents and interviews that the AP team discovered and conducted. This period constitutes the second time frame of the analysis: September 29, 1999 to May 10, 2000. In

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<sup>187</sup> Carolyn Heald, "Is There Room For Archives in the Postmodern World?" *American Archivist* 59 (1996): 101.

May 11, 2000, there was another benchmark event when journalists from *US News and World Report* and *Stripes.com* (an online news service for veterans) published lengthy articles disputing the veracity of AP's research sources. This event produced much controversy over the reliability of news sources and resulted in the discovery of yet more military records. The last perimeter was the publication of both governments' investigatory reports on January 12, 2001; thus the final time frame is set from this time until the present. The U.S. government's investigative team announced that it reviewed more than a million pages of military documents and, in turn, disclosed many such documents in its report. Accordingly, the Korean government's report provided other valuable approaches to the incident. Later researchers, consequently, would benefit from exposure of this abundance of source materials due to both governments' research.

Table 1. Timeframes for Analysis

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1. Before September 28, 1999 (Beginning of the early discussions)
  2. September 29, 1999 to May 10, 2000 (AP story's predominance)
  3. May 11, 2000 to January 11, 2001 (Veracity discussions concerning news sources)
  4. After January 12, 2001 (Governments' Investigation Reports)
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For analysis of publications, there was a two-step process: *reading* and then *analyzing* the contents of publications and citations. The lists of publications for each time frame are provided in Appendix A. All of the publications were read and analyzed by marking major discussions and source materials used. Journalistic publications do not follow a formal fashion of quoting source materials, so this researcher only counted evident source materials if the authors clearly state names of interviewees or what archival documents or secondary pieces of literature were used. If the journalistic research did not mention the title of a document but included its content - which was identifiable - it was marked and included for analysis.

Another aspect to consider before the analysis phase should be some guidelines of determining whether source materials are primary materials or secondary literature. This researcher considered newspaper articles from the time of the Korean War as the primary materials because *No Gun Ri* researchers utilized those materials for primary clues of the incident, rather than to seek their secondary arguments. In the same vein, official histories of the Korean War by military-oriented institutes or military historians of the U.S. and Korea were regarded as secondary literature since they provided authors' arguments about the war and do not suggest any primary evidence of a certain event as other secondary literature does.

There were some cases wherein authors published their writings in several places. For example, one author would publish an article in a newspaper, and later he would publish a collective book with his previous writings to include the newspaper article with or without additional arguments and revisions. In those cases, this researcher considers such writings as individual publications because the chance of the public's being exposed to them is higher; thus, their influence to consequently build the public knowledge of this incident could increase.

In analyzing the contents of publications, another point begs clarification before presentation of the data. When a certain discussion on *No Gun Ri* was identified in a publication, it was marked according to the scheme of categories of discussions. Any source material used in the discussion was then also marked. One discussion which used source materials composes a set as a unit for analysis. A set of a discussion and source materials is called a "passage" in this study. A passage is a semantic unit for a certain discussion, which could be comprised of a few sentences to a sub-chapter of a book.

## 5.1 BEFORE SEPTEMBER 29, 1999: Beginning Of the Early Discussions

There is not much research in the first time period. The total number of journalistic publications is nine in addition to two academic products, including a novel that a survivor's family wrote.<sup>188</sup> Among them is one journalistic publication in the United States - all others are published in Korea.

Table 2. The Number of Publications before September 29, 1999

	Journalistic Publications	Academic Publications
Published in Korea	8	2
Published in the U.S.	1	
Total	9	2

\* The list of publications in this period is provided in Appendix A. 1.

During this time period, the research on *No Gun Ri* was mainly conducted or encouraged by survivors or victims' families. One novel was written by a survivor's husband and one academic article was co-authored by a son of a survivor, all contained in academic publications. Other journalistic publications seem to be inspired by the novel or report legal claims that the survivors' organization has pursued.

The first publication about the *No Gun Ri* incident in Korea is a novel from 1994. This novel was written based on what the author, his family and his villagers went through during the Korean War with accounts based mostly on oral history and some support from secondary

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<sup>188</sup> Academic publications indicate in-depth research products such as articles in academic journals or monographs on *No Gun Ri*. In this study, a novel by a victim's family is included in this category. The author of the novel articulates that it is a research product based on oral history of his villagers and what the author experienced rather than simple fiction. There are also books that do not follow a strict format of academic writing in later time frames, but those are regarded as a result of in-depth research and categorized in "Academic publications," rather than having another category.

literature. He mentioned in the prologue that he tried to reflect the true story based on the oral history that he had collected for forty years from his villagers. After this novel was published, some Korean news reporters expressed interest in this incident for their news coverage. However, this interest was limited to a local newspaper, short paragraphs of major papers, and a progressive political news magazine; therefore, there was no grand response from the public. The authors of these news articles heavily depend on interviews only with survivors to describe a picture of the incident and unfortunately did not expand their research to discover many archival documents. Some reporters simply covered the legal petitions that the survivors and victims' families have filed. Other academic research was conducted through survivors' efforts. A family member of a survivor, Ku-do Chong, co-authored an article with Byong-su Choi, a historian, in which the major arguments lay in seeking the Army unit responsible for the killing and compiling all the mosaic fragments from archival documents and secondary literature in order to provide a bigger picture of what survivors insist happened. In the United States, there was only one report by the Associate Press, addressing the submission of petitions by the survivors and the ultimate rejection of such petitions by the Pentagon in 1998.

### **Who Was at *No Gun Ri*?**

*No Gun Ri* was not a well-known incident during this period of time. Researchers on *No Gun Ri* were not sure which U.S. Army unit was responsible for this incident. Researchers' arguments, therefore, often began with an attempt to discover detailed war situations during the last week of July in the Yongdong area as a way to identify the U.S. divisions and regimental positions around *No Gun Ri*. Their research depended on official histories of the Korean War to finally determine that 5<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup>, and 8<sup>th</sup> Regiments of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division were in the area nearby *No*

*Gun Ri* until the day of their retreat, July 29<sup>th</sup>. The fact that front lines were formed several miles from *No Gun Ri* was ascertained and consequently corroborated the survivors' claim that the *No Gun Ri* killing did not occur in the midst of an ongoing battle. In this course of addressing the war situation in Yongdong, other circumstantial evidence was also discussed based on secondary literature, including the devastating Taejon battle and the general status of U.S. soldiers who were ill-prepared and prone to panic about infiltration. The refugee situation and specific instances of North Korean infiltration were also mentioned.

For the background discussions, archival documents were used on three occasions and secondary publications were used six times. The documents were a *communication log* of the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment and a military record for operation, *Operation Plan Number 10-50*, and these documents were used to substantiate its position in addition to refugee contact on July 25<sup>th</sup>. The *communication log* of the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment read "1950.7.25 01:35 Msg to CO 5 Cav as fol: An est 50 natives w/ ox carts rptd earlier to have been near this unit in hills coming out & headed toward rear. None appear armed; we have not opened fire; req an immed answer. CO 2<sup>nd</sup> bn. 1950.7.25 2:00 To CO 2 Bn (msg 1): re natives w/ ox carts – round them repeat round them immediately. CO 5 Cav."<sup>189</sup> This document showed that the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment encountered a group of refugees but did not have any more information on what happened next. The 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division's *Operation Plan Number 10-50* called for the 5<sup>th</sup> Cavalry to support the 8<sup>th</sup> Cavalry's disengagement from the NKPA and rearward movement out of Yongdong toward Hwanggan, and the 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry's mission charged them with preventing enemy infiltration while also supporting the 5th Cavalry as the Divisions Reserve. As shown, the U.S. troops' positions and missions were explained in these documents and *No Gun Ri* researchers used them for their supporting materials for this

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<sup>189</sup> S-2-3 Journal, the 5<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment: Ka-Ri, Korea, 1950. 7. 25-29. (The details of this document are provided in Appendix B.2)

discussion. Two North Korean newspaper articles were also used for corroborating the fact that the North Korean Army arrived at *No Gun Ri* on July 29<sup>th</sup> and for a general description of the killing. Secondary literature used in this time was mostly official histories of the Korean War from Korea, Japan, and the U.S.<sup>190</sup>

*No Gun Ri* researchers had only limited archival materials (a total of four documents) discovered in this period, and major supporting evidence for the details of the incident was interviews with the survivors. It was understandable that discovered documentary evidence was limited because it was discovered by survivors on an individual basis as the dearth of resources constrained the ability to search in other countries. Researchers contemplated reasons or factors for the killing and set forth several hypotheses: confused and panicked soldiers' reactions in retreat; one way to solve the refugee problem and potential infiltration; and a revenge-laden reaction to the Taejon battle where a great portion of U.S. Army forces and war strength was damaged. In detailing the incident, survivors' interviews were the predominant sources for researchers. Thirty-eight passages in six journal articles and twelve passages in two academic works were written for possible substantiation of the killing and the evolution of the incident based on two archival documents, one secondary material, and 28 quotations of survivors' interviews. Major issues surrounding the killing include the evacuation on the previous night by warning and escort of American soldiers, the status of evacuating refugees, examining the refugees' belongings, and air attacks on railroad tracks (around 100 people were killed by air strafing). Additional issues concerned survivors' individual experiences under the railroad

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<sup>190</sup> Korea Military Academy, *History of the Korean War*, 1987 (육군사관학교 편, *한국전쟁사*, 1987); Ministry of National Defense, *History of the UN Troops in the Korean War* (국방부편, *한국참전 UN군 전사*; Institute of Military History of Japan, *The Korean War*, 1986 (일본 육전사연구보급회 편, *한국전쟁*, 1986); Roy E. Appleman, *South to Naktong, North to Yalu* (Center of Military History, United States Army; Washington D.C., 1992); First Cavalry Division Association, *The First Team: The First Cavalry Division In Korea, July 18, 1950 -- July 18, 1952* (Paducah, KY: Turner Pub. Co., 1994).



overpass tunnels during the time of the massacre, i.e. where the shooting came from, how survivors avoided the shooting, how they were injured, how they escaped from the tunnels, and what they saw and heard in the tunnels. The aftermath and trauma of the killing is of particular and compelling interest.

Some other aspects of the incident were also argued. One controversial episode was an interview with a survivor who witnessed his cousin, a college student who spoke English, actually talking with one of the soldiers who indicated that he was only following an order to kill any suspected refugees. With this instance, researchers carefully raised the argument of an order-issue to kill refugees. There were also considerable efforts to estimate the number of deaths. North Korean newspaper reports captured during the war by the U.S. military were a back-up source for this discussion because these reports included an estimated number of killed. The reports were written in an enraged and exaggerated style since they were used as a propaganda device to raise the morale of North Korean soldiers during wartime. However, *No Gun Ri* researchers gave significant credibility to these sources since they were written right after the incident by reporters of first-hand witnesses of the scene, which one would assume to be more accurate. Researchers also inserted discussions about North Korean infiltration tactics and the confusing refugee situation. Many official histories described North Korean troops' using a refugee group to breakthrough a mine field or similar tactics. However, some *No Gun Ri* researchers interpreted them as an attempted deflection of the American atrocity, intentionally described like this to whitewash the refugee killing. In addition, the fact that these villagers have been honoring their dead the same day, year after year, for 50 years was noted by a researcher.

Archival documents were used with significant credibility by some *No Gun Ri* researchers. On some occasions, researchers directly stated that they considered American

documents more credible if there were content conflicts with other sources. Researchers indicated the reason for this was that *No Gun Ri* was under the control of the American Army and archival documents of the American Army show very specific information of time and place, while secondary literature had only an overall description of general situations during longer periods of time and over wider places. In another example, some researchers used the *communication log* of the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment from the night before the *No Gun Ri* incident, stating that the Commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment encountered about fifty refugees and reported this fact to his Regimental Commander who told him to stop them.<sup>191</sup> The document does not have any further information after this, but the researchers carefully assumed that the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment might have been the soldiers at *No Gun Ri* and the refugees in the document would have been the same refugees at *No Gun Ri*. They also presumed the number of refugees in the document (fifty) may have been mistaken for 500 if the refugees were the same group of people. However, it was later known that the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment, 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division had participated in the incident even though it was still arguable that soldiers who evacuated the refugees might not have been the same soldiers who fired at them at *No Gun Ri*. This interpretation could be seen as one that suggested researchers seemed to prioritize the use of archival documents; therefore, they endeavored to explain the incident using the limited evidence in those documents.

The following table (Table 3) presents the number of passages in publications which were assigned for *No Gun Ri* discussions and the number of source materials that were used in those passages. This table is only a brief version of what has been described in this chapter. As

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<sup>191</sup> S-2-3 Journal, the 5<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment: Ka-Ri, Korea, 1950. 7. 25-29; The 1st Cavalry Division, Operation Plan Number 10-50, Hwanggan (1088-1483), 1950. 7. 24. 23:15. (The details of these documents are provided in Appendix B.2)

already portrayed, the discussions about *No Gun Ri* in this period do not show variety in details and could be summarized in one table. In the table, specific discussions about *No Gun Ri* are enumerated on the left side. The number of publications and the number of passages that contain such discussion are exhibited next to each discussion. The next column displays what kind of supporting source materials were used and how many times they were used for this discussion. In this column, A stands for “archival materials,” S is for “secondary materials” such as published journal articles and books, and I stands for “interview testimony” of survivors and veterans. As shown in the first row of this table, the discussion about the fact that U.S. soldiers were ill-trained and the general military was not well-prepared for a war was included as one of the factors for the incident in publications in this period. In one academic publication (the article by Byong-su Choi and Ku-do Chong in early 1999), there was one passage for this discussion and one archival document (a military document of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division; Operation Plan Number 10-50; Hwanggan(1088-1483); 1950. 7. 24. 23:15) was used as supporting material in the passage and no other materials were used. In a larger category, the general battle situations including the status of U.S. soldiers, the Taejon battle and the U.S. troops’ positions were discussed in a total of 3 passages in 3 journalistic articles and 8 passages in 2 academic works using archival documents 3 times, secondary literature 6 times and no interview testimony. Over the whole period, there were 60 passages in 8 journalistic articles and 27 passages in 2 academic publications that discuss the *No Gun Ri* killing, and in those passages archival documents were used 9 times, secondary materials 15 times and survivors’ interview testimony was used 30 times.

Table 3. *No Gun Ri* Discussions in the First Period

Discussions		Numbers of passages and publications	Source materials
General battle situations	Status of U.S. Soldiers: unprepared and under-equipped	Journalistic (0 passages in 0 articles) Academic (1 passage in 1 articles)	1 A 0 S 0 I
	Disastrous Taejon Defeat	Journalistic (0 passages in 0 articles) Academic (2 passages in 1 article)	0 A 1 S 0 I
	U.S. troops' position and war situation at <i>No Gun Ri</i>	Journalistic (3 passages in 3 articles) Academic (5 passages in 2 articles)	2 A 5 S 0 I
Refugee Problems	NK infiltration and suspecting refugees	Journalistic (3 passages in 3 articles) Academic (2 passages in 1 article)	1 A 2 S 0 I
Reason for the killing	Military operation/ revenge for Taejon defeat/mistaken attack	Journalistic (4 passages in 3 articles) Academic (3 passages in 2 articles)	0 A 1 S 3 I
Evolution of <i>No Gun Ri</i>	Evacuation	Journalistic (5 passages in 4 articles) Academic (1 passage in 1 article)	1 A 0 S 3 I
	Air Strafing	Journalistic (5 passages in 4 articles) Academic (1 passage in 1 article)	0 A 0 S 3 I
	Shooting under the tunnels	Journalistic (17 passages in 3 articles) Academic (3 passages in 1 article)	0 A 0 S 14 I
	Order to Shoot	Journalistic (1 passage in 1 article) Academic (1 passage in 1 article)	0A 0S 1 I
	Assuming the number of casualties	Journalistic (4 passages in 3 articles) Academic (1 passage in 1 article)	1 A 0 S 2 I
	Aftermath: survivors	Journalistic (2 passages in 1 article) Academic (1 passage in 1 article)	0 A 0 S 2 I
	Post U.S.-retreat	Journalistic (0 passages in 0 articles) Academic (1 passage in 1 article)	
<i>No Gun Ri</i> Research	Credibility of source materials/interpretation	Journalistic (3 passages in 2 articles) Academic (3 passages in 1 article)	3A 6 S 0 I
	Governments' attitudes	Journalistic (4 passages in 3 articles) Academic (0 passages in 0 articles)	
	Survivors' Efforts	Journalistic (8 passages in 6 articles) Academic (2 passages in 1 article)	0 A 0 S 2 I
	Other	Journalistic (1 passage in 1 article) Academic (0 passages in 0 articles)	
Total		Journalistic (60 passages in 8 articles) Academic (27 passages in 2 articles)	9 A 15 S 30 I

(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony)

Because this time period evidenced only a small amount of publications, the arguments and discussions on *No Gun Ri* were also quite sketchy and less extensive. Arguments about circumstances around *No Gun Ri* were mainly supported by secondary literature, and major discussions about detailed descriptions of the refugee killing were primarily based on the oral testimonies of survivors and their families. There were four archival documents discovered from this time. These documents were used with significant credibility to identify the participating U.S. Army unit for the killing and war/refugee situation in Yongdong. These archival documents included a military document for war operations of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, a communication log of the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, and two North Korean newspapers in August 1950.<sup>192</sup> North Korean news reports were cited as evidence that *No Gun Ri* was not just an allegation of Korean survivors but a real atrocity committed by U.S. troops since the stories were written by first-hand witnesses and used as supporting materials to assume the number of the dead.

## 5.2 SEPTEMBER 29, 1999 TO MAY 11, 2000: AP Story's Predominance

Once the Associated Press published a story about *No Gun Ri*, the world reacted with a surprising interest about this event. Major newspapers, including *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, headlined their front pages with the *No Gun Ri* story from the news wire. In following weeks, major news magazines like *Times* and *Newsweek* also reported this incident in

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<sup>192</sup> S-2-3 Journal, the 5<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment: Ka-Ri, Korea, 1950. 7. 25-29; The 1st Cavalry Division, Operation Plan Number 10-50, Hwanggan (1088-1483), 1950. 7. 24. 23:15; Chon Uk (전욱), an article in *Choson Inminbo* (조선인민보, *Korean People's Daily*), Aug. 10, 1950; Chon Uk (전욱), an article in *Choson Inminbo* (조선인민보, *Korean People's Daily*), Aug. 19, 1950). (The details of these documents are provided in Appendix B.2)

detail with their own interviews with related people. Once again in Korea, the story of *No Gun Ri* was reported by major news agencies, finally resulting in sensational interest by the public. Some newspapers reported the AP's article and some cited the fact that American major newspapers reported the event, and both ways of reporting shared the spotlight and attention of the public one way or the other. There were a total of 126 research-oriented publications: among them were 113 news reports and 13 academic writings published from September 29, 1999 to May 10, 2000.<sup>193</sup> There were a great number of news articles with only a few paragraphs that simply reported segmental facts of the incident without any involvement of research activities, especially in this time period, and those articles were excluded in this analysis.

Table 4. The Number of Publications from September 29, 1999 to May 10, 2000

	Journalistic products	Academic products
Published in Korea	66	11
Published in the U.S.	47	2
Total	113	13

\* The list of publications is provided in Appendix A.2.

The AP's report was written based on interviews with survivors and American veterans and archival documents from the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and other military archives. Among the AP's documents, some contained very important messages on policies toward Korean refugees which included treating them as the enemy if approaching American lines. This AP report prompted many news reporters to seek more historical details of the incident based on secondary literature and opinions of experts in the Korean War and

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<sup>193</sup> News articles that reports fragmental aspects of the incidence in a short paragraph are not regarded as research-oriented. This study regards news articles which contain any substantiating evidence or interviews or any research activities about the incident as research-oriented.

additional interviews with survivors and American veterans. In Korea, the materials that survivors and families discovered in previous years were revisited by researchers and received new attention. News reporters also tried to include diverse opinions about the incident from various groups of people, conducting interviews with academic historians, legal experts, religious leaders, representatives of veterans associations, and spokesmen in governmental departments.

In a matter of days, higher officers in the U.S. Department of Defense and the Korean National Ministry of Defense had press conferences about conducting full investigations. Louis Caldera, Army Secretary, promised a “complete and thorough review” of the accounts of mass killings of South Korean civilians. In the following weeks, the methods for government investigation revolved around whether the investigation would be either one investigative inquiry shared by both governments (Korean government’s request) or a bilateral coordinating group (American government’s request). Later, the fate of the investigation was decided in favor of the American government. A legal approach to the incident was also attempted in terms of the statute of limitation for criminal charges, compensation requests and a grant of blanket amnesty to all American military personnel for expediting the investigation. In this sensational atmosphere, *The Washington Post* published another report of *No Gun Ri* with its original research of American veterans’ interviews and new archival documents about the refugee problems and other related matters concerning *No Gun Ri*. Undoubtedly, there were opinionated articles that reflected the voice of American soldiers and the inevitability of this kind of incident during a harsh war situation. However, the common agreement during this time period among researchers was that the archival documents about policies promoting the treatment of refugees as the enemy was granted as a major contributory factor of *No Gun Ri*.

In December 1999, the AP published another eye-catching report that described the large-scale aerial bombardment during the Korean War and introduced some related U.S. Air Force documents that also imply the allegation of strafing *No Gun Ri* refugees. For the following several months, journalists continued to report specific facts on the process of both governments' investigations and on particular opinions of legal experts about the handling of this incident. In January, 2000, Army Secretary Caldera advised ex-soldiers of their rights if they testified and came under criminal jeopardy. His comment made survivors upset because it might have led veterans to be very passive or to outright refuse to testify. At last, in April 2000, the AP team won the Pulitzer Prize with the *No Gun Ri* story and several other U.S. and Korean prizes for investigative journalism.

Some journalists in Korea republished their previous articles about *No Gun Ri* as a book with additional research during this period of time. Similarly, the AP team republished their report in an academic journal with some revisions in the U.S. Thus, the analysis of publications separates the categories between journalistic publications and academic publications, but the actual contents of research in both categories are somewhat overlapped. The AP's *No Gun Ri* report has definite influence on the research following this time period by either providing substantiating source materials or inspiring other researchers to endeavor on the subject. Still a great deal of research heavily relied upon the survivors' oral history for the details of the incident process.

### **Ill-prepared, Ill-trained, Under-equipped Soldiers**

During this period of time, discussions about the background of *No Gun Ri* were prolific. Researchers conducted extensive analysis of historical materials for the background research.



They considered the circumstantial understanding about the general situation of the war in Yongdong at that time as essential information to explain the incident. Various aspects of this background include the general status of U.S. soldiers (ill-trained, under-equipped, ill-prepared in general and highly sensitized to the point of panic regarding North Korean infiltration), the Taejon battle, the specific battle situation in Yongdong and U.S. troops' positions, and overwhelming large-scale aerial strikes at that time.

Researchers argued that ill-preparedness for war and misunderstanding about the real war strength of North Korean People's Army laid the general foundation of U.S. soldiers' confusion and fear. The soldiers had little understanding of Korea and were not able to distinguish a friend from a foe. Also, the North Korean infiltration tactic made the soldiers extremely nervous when constantly confronting the refugee columns, especially after the dreadful Taejon battle. One *No Gun Ri* researcher described the soldiers involved in the killing as "raw recruits, rushed into combat from Japan, and they were in headlong retreat. These are circumstances that, in many wars, have made for both rage and panic, emotions more easily directed against the civilian population than the attacking army. Frightened and inexperienced soldiers are more likely to kill both brutally and randomly; military discipline reduces civilian casualties."<sup>194</sup> *No Gun Ri* researchers made a point of this background as an essential element to view the incident. This situation of the U.S. troops was well discussed in 21 passages of 11 journalistic articles and 11 passages in 5 academic works based on secondary literature and veterans' interviews.

The local history of Yongdong related to guerrilla activities was identified by *No Gun Ri* researchers in this time period. One of the researchers reported the fact that local guerrillas in the Yongdong vicinity harassed the retreating Americans from the Taejon defeat. There was no

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194 Michael Walzer, "The Bridge at *No Gun Ri*: Responses," *Dissent* 47:2 (Spring 2000): 44-46.

further implication to link this argument directly to *No Gun Ri*; however, it seems that *No Gun Ri* researchers attempted to look at the incident from all possible angles. *The New York Times* news articles during wartime in 1950 provided space for this discussion.

Like early research before September 1999, still many publications devoted their arguments to the U.S. troops' dispositions and the war situation near Yongdong. This time, *No Gun Ri* researchers were finally able to exhume more specific information from archival documents to determine that it was the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment, 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division that was stationed at *No Gun Ri* at the time of the incident. It was proved by the discovery of archival documents such as map coordinates of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, war diaries of the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment, and communication logs of nearby U.S. units, in addition to several secondary pieces of literature. A total of eighteen passages in eleven publications argued that the 5th Regiment, 7th Regiment, and 8th Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division were stationed in Yongdong and the 7th Regiment, in particular, was in *No Gun Ri* until July 29<sup>th</sup>. A U.S. military intelligence report indicated the North Korean's front line was four miles from *No Gun Ri* on July 26<sup>th</sup>. A 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment war diary which was discovered by the AP team proved that 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment retreated at dawn on July 29<sup>th</sup> and further indicated that North Korean troops arrived at *No Gun Ri* in the afternoon on that day. North Korean newspapers also reported the *No Gun Ri* killing in early August 1950 stating that North Korean troops arrived on July 29<sup>th</sup> and found 400 bodies of civilians.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment arrived at Yongdong on July 25<sup>th</sup> – still in their very first week in Korea. Some documents were explored along with several secondary materials which indicate the soldiers retreated to *No Gun Ri* in disarray as word of an enemy attack on their flank the night of their arrival was received. This wartime “baptism by fire” resulted in a

very confusing and disorganized situation with 119 soldiers missing and major weapons left behind. The U.S. official history of the Korean War by Roy E. Appleman, *South to Naktong, North to Yalu*, was used as a major source for this information.

During the Korean War, aerial bombardment was one of the most widely executed war operations. Since the survivors alleged that they were air strafed before being fired upon under the railroad overpasses, *No Gun Ri* researchers searched supporting sources to confirm the circumstantial evidence that air strikes might have targeted refugees. Some Air Force after-mission reports from late July and early August 1950 were used for this argument. These documents clearly stated that pilots sometimes strafed “people in white” or “people appear[ing] to be evacuees” or people who “could have been refugees.”<sup>195</sup> In Korea, one of the major broadcasting companies aired a TV program with aerial films of American F-80 fighters of the 25<sup>th</sup> Fighter Bomber Group in July 29<sup>th</sup>, 30<sup>th</sup>, and August 13<sup>th</sup> 1950 documenting firing on refugee boats trying to cross a river.<sup>196</sup> This film was not directly related to *No Gun Ri*, but still showed this aspect of war. This discussion was also supported by interviews with Koreans and American ex-pilots.

The following table explains the specific numbers of passages and the number of publications for each discussion for the general background of *No Gun Ri*, including the status of U.S. troops, the Taejon battle, local history of communism, U.S troops’ position, the 7th Regiment’s status on the night of July 25, and large-scale air attacks, along with the number of times source materials were used. There were a total of 58 passages in 19 journalistic articles and

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<sup>195</sup> After-mission report, 35<sup>th</sup> Fighter Bomber Squadron, 8<sup>th</sup> Fighter Bomber Group, Mission 35-1, July 20, 1950; After-mission report, 35<sup>th</sup> Fighter Bomber Squadron, 8<sup>th</sup> Fighter Bomber Group, Mission 35-4, July 20, 1950; After-mission report, 35<sup>th</sup> Fighter Bomber Squadron, 8<sup>th</sup> Fighter Bomber Group, Mission 35-3, Contour Roger, July 31, 1950.

<sup>196</sup> “Discovered U.S. Aerial Films for Indiscriminating Attack on Refugees During the Korean War,” *Segye Ilbo*, Oct 24, 1999: pg. 2. (“한국전 당시 미전투기 무차별 공격필름 발굴,” *세계일보*, Oct. 24, 1999; pg. 2)

25 passages in 9 academic works for the background discussions, and archival documents were used 39 times, secondary material 21 times and interview testimony of survivors and veterans 20 times.

Table 5. Discussions on the Background of *No Gun Ri* in the Second Period

Discussions	Number of passages and publications	Source materials
Status of U.S. troops	Journalistic (19 passages in 10 articles) Academic (9 passages in 5 articles)	0 A 2 S 8 I
Disastrous Taejon Defeat	Journalistic (2 passages in 2 articles) Academic (2 passages in 2 articles)	1 A 0 S 0 I
Local history of communism and battle situation in Yongdong	Journalistic (5 passages in 4 articles)	2 A 0 S 0 I
U.S. troop positions around <i>No Gun Ri</i>	Journalistic (11 passages in 7 articles) Academic (7 passages in 4 articles)	15 A 13 S 2 I
Disorganized 7 <sup>th</sup> Regiment on the night before the incident	Journalistic (5 passages in 5 articles) Academic (2 passages in 2 articles)	5 A 5 S 1 I
Large-scale air attack during the Korean War	Journalistic (16 passages in 8 articles) Academic (5 passages in 4 articles)	16 A 1 S 9 I
Total	Journalistic (58 passages in 19 articles) Academic (25 passages in 9 articles)	39 A 21 S 20 I

(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony)

### **No Refugees to Cross the Front Line.**

The archival sources that the AP discovered from the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) for refugee policies in the Army were heavily reused by other researchers during this time. These documents stated various straightforward expressions of harsh refugee policies, such as, “No refugees to cross the front line. Fire [on] everyone trying to

cross lines. Use discretion in case of women and children”<sup>197</sup>; “No repeat no refugees will be permitted to cross lines at any time”<sup>198</sup>; “All civilians seen in this area are to be considered as enemy and action taken accordingly”<sup>199</sup>; “all civilians moving around the combat zone will be considered as unfriendly and shot.”<sup>200</sup> The documents are dated from July 24 to 27 which was before and during the time of *No Gun Ri* and issued by the Eighth Army headquarters (the top command of the U.S. in Korea) to front-line units, by the 8<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, a neighbor regiment, and by the 25<sup>th</sup> Division. Considering the issue dates and sources, most *No Gun Ri* researchers in this time period including the AP reporters linked these documents directly to the incident. Due to the series of refugee policies and the fear about the North Korean infiltrators prevalent at the time, Korean refugees were the target for suspected North Korean infiltrators. A great number of *No Gun Ri* researchers noted this confusing situation of suspecting refugees and the difficulty of controlling refugee flows. A *Washington Post* reporter discovered another document of July 24 1950, stating “No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers transporting ammunition and heavy weapons in farm wagons and carrying military equipment in packs on their backs. They were observed many times changing from uniforms to civilian clothing and back into uniform.

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<sup>197</sup> Communication Log, the 8<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, July 24 1950. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 42, RG 338, NARA. (The details of this document are provided in Appendix B.2)

<sup>198</sup> Message, EUSAK, CNR: G 20578 KGP, 26 Jul 50, sub: Controlled Movement of All Refugees. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Korean Military Advisory Group, Box 23, RG 338, NARA. (The details of this document are provided in Appendix B.2)

<sup>199</sup> Memorandum, Commander, 25th Infantry Division, 27 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA. (The details of this document are provided in Appendix B.2)

<sup>200</sup> Journal, HQ 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, July 26 1950. (The details of this document are provided in Appendix B.2)

There were so many refugees that it was impossible to screen and search them all.”<sup>201</sup> This aspect of the *No Gun Ri* incident, combined with harsh refugee policies, North Korean infiltration and suspecting refugees as the enemy was discussed in much research (a total of 38 passages in 27 journalistic articles and 12 passages in 7 academic publications) and was the sentinel discussion exhibiting the predominance of archival documents as supporting materials for *No Gun Ri* arguments. The following table indicates the details of the discussions about the numbers of passages in publications and the numbers of source materials that were used.

Table 6. Discussions of Refugee Problems and Policies in the Second Period

Discussions	Numbers of passages and publications	Source materials
Rigid Refugee policies	Journalistic (14 passages in 13 articles) Academic (5 passages in 5 articles)	26 A 0 S 5 I
North Korean Troops’ infiltration and U.S.’s suspecting refugees	Journalistic (24 passages in 20 articles) Academic (7 passages in 4 articles)	13 A 8 S 10 I
Total	Journalistic (38 passages in 27 articles) Academic (12 passages in 7 articles)	39 A 8 S 15 I

(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony)

### **Under the *No Gun Ri* Railroad Bridge Tunnels**

The reasons for this killing or factors that might have caused this tragedy were what many *No Gun Ri* researchers attempted to address in their publications, including survivors’ inquiries. However, the arguments about the reasons for the killing were mainly based on researchers’ opinions with vague clues from circumstantial information. Several reasons and factors were assumed by *No Gun Ri* researchers. Very similarly to previous arguments, the

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<sup>201</sup> War Diary, 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, 24-30 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries), 1949-1954, 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division History Jul 50, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA. (The details of this document are provided in Appendix B.2)

factors assumed were the disastrous effect of ill-trained and panicked soldiers and the revenge-fueled feeling after the Taejon battle in a situation where friend and foe were undistinguishable. Also, researchers identified the combination of North Korean spies among refugees and troublesome refugee situations might have been a lethal mix. By and large, the complicated mixture of fear, feelings for revenge, untested military spirits of ill-trained soldiers, and very troublesome refugee situations seemed to culminate at *No Gun Ri*. The road was blocked with countless refugees and it was reported to be very difficult for American soldiers to screen them for possible enemy infiltration. Thus, researchers carefully raised a question that in searching for a way to solve this problem, the killing might have been one of the easiest ways for U.S. military operations. These researchers used archival documents to support their argument that harsh refugee policies were the basis for this operation. Some historians argued that there was also another factor to view this incident: a racially-based issue. A historian mentioned that “The gooks meant not merely the Communists, but all Koreans. Communist atrocities provoked callousness in many Americans, fighting a desperate struggle for survival, toward the Asians around them, creatures from another planet whose language they could not understand, whose customs bewildered them, whose country seemed most vividly represented by the universal stench of human excrement manuring the fields.”<sup>202</sup> It was in the early 1950s after all, and the attitude toward Koreans and other non-Caucasians was less than enlightened as some secondary materials proved.

The details of the incident process were discussed based on interviews with survivors and veterans as an absolutely dominating source. The process of evacuation on the previous day and the screening of refugees on the railroad tracks on July 26<sup>th</sup> were all described from the accounts

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<sup>202</sup> Craig R. Whitney, “No Place for Civilians,” *New York Times* (Oct. 03, 1999).

of survivors. However, the discussion about air strafing onto the railroad tracks where refugees rested was supported by some archival evidence. As addressed in an earlier part of the section, archival documents had supported that air strikes prevailed over the whole war period, but there was no specific record indicating the area, *No Gun Ri*, on July 26<sup>th</sup>. Therefore, the discussion relied heavily on survivors and veterans' interviews, including 26 cases of quoting interviews. A *Washington Post* article introduced an intelligence report of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division that refers to a P-80 war plane "with allied markings" strafing the railroad in the vicinity of *No Gun Ri* on the morning of July 25<sup>th</sup>.<sup>203</sup> The description in that document does not match with the date of the survivors' allegation, but it still shows vestiges of evidence. Another document describing the strafing in fine detail was a North Korean soldier's diary, stating that "U.S. bombers had swooped over Yongdong and turned it into a sea of fire" on July 26<sup>th</sup>.<sup>204</sup>

Survivors and American veterans' interviews were particularly critical in discussing the evolution of the killing at the tunnels since interview accounts were used 71 times while archival documents and secondary literature were used only two or three times. American veterans explained to *No Gun Ri* researchers about how they were positioned, how the shooting started or what they witnessed when the shooting took place. Survivors also told their own experiences during the killing about how their family and relatives were killed, how they became injured, how the killing began and lasted, how they tried to stay alive under the dead bodies, etc. Many survivors testified to researchers that the majority of the refugees were elderly, women, and children, and some veterans even said they were not convinced these people were the enemy.

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<sup>203</sup> Michael Dobbs, Roberto Suro, "Army Dismissed Massacre Allegation; Koreans Sought Redress for 5 Years; Cohen Orders Probe," *The Washington Post* (Oct. 1, 1999).

<sup>204</sup> Bruce Cumings, "Korean My Lai," *The Nation* (Oct. 25, 1999). Also available at <<http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=19991025&s=cumings>>. (Last accessed on January 20, 2007)



Twenty-six journalistic publications discussed the description of the shooting under the tunnels in 53 passages, and four academic publications had 24 passages for this discussion.

Some researchers addressed a question of whether there were any North Korean soldiers among the refugees or any gun fire emanating from the tunnels. This discussion was keenly contentious and very difficult to conclude because the accounts for both opinions conflicted with each other. Some U.S. soldiers noted that they thought they saw gunfire coming from the tunnel. These accounts with support of the guerrilla warfare tactics of the general North Korean troops were mentioned in *No Gun Ri* research. However, survivors strongly denied these accounts based on the fact that they were searched and the majority was women, children and the elderly. Researchers used interviews 29 times for this discussion and no other sources were used in 31 passages of 11 publications.

Whether there were orders to shoot those refugees was also a contentious discussion in the entire *No Gun Ri* body of research over the whole time, not limited to this period. Since the remaining refugee policy documents and messages in war diaries were from neighboring units or from the Army command structure in Korea, and there exists no evidence that the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment actually received these orders, the documents were used as rather circumstantial implications rather than direct orders for *No Gun Ri*. In some research, veterans testified that they received an order such as “nobody comes through, civilians, military, nobody”<sup>205</sup> with one veteran even recalling the name of a runner who delivered such an order. The interview with a survivor, who remembered that his cousin talked with an American soldier who said he was only following an order, was used again this time. Oral history testimony was still used heavily for this discussion.

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<sup>205</sup> Sanghun Choe, Charles J. Hanley, and Martha Mendoza, “War’s Hidden Chapter: Ex-GIs Tell of Killing Korean Refugees,” *The Associated Press* (Sep. 29, 1999).

Researchers in eight publications tried to assume the number of casualties. For this discussion, a North Korean newspaper source was used since it was written just after the incident and reported that there were about 400 bodies piled in the tunnels. This was the only archival document for this discussion, cited two times, and the rest of the support was from interview testimony of survivors. Some other issues about the post traumatic stress of veterans as well as survivors were mentioned in *No Gun Ri* research that was based mainly on interviews. As shown in the following table, the discussions about the specific details on the evolution of the incident were seen in a great deal of passages in publications (a total of 246 passages in 42 publications), and interviews with survivors and veterans were the foremost sources (used 211 times).

Table 7. Discussions on the Evolution of the *No Gun Ri* in the Second Period

Discussions	Numbers of passages and publications	Source materials
Factors and reasons that caused the killing	Journalistic (12 passages in 6 articles) Academic (9 passages in 5 articles)	8 A 2 S 10 I
Evacuation and screening of the villagers	Journalistic (8 passages in 7 articles) Academic (6 passages in 2 articles)	2 A 6 S 11 I
Air attacks on the railroad near <i>No Gun Ri</i>	Journalistic (25 passages in 18 articles) Academic (6 passages in 4 articles)	3 A 3 S 26 I
Shooting at the <i>No Gun Ri</i> bridge tunnels	Journalistic (53 passages in 26 articles) Academic (24 passages in 4 articles)	2 A 3 S 71 I
Suspecting refugees as enemy	Journalistic (23 passages in 9 articles) Academic (9 passages in 2 articles)	0 A 0 S 29 I
Orders to shoot refugees at tunnels	Journalistic (18 passages in 12 articles) Academic (12 passages in 6 articles)	4 A 0 S 24 I
Assuming the number of casualties	Journalistic (7 passages in 6 articles) Academic (4 passages in 2 articles)	2 A 0 S 9 I
Aftermath of the killing (survivors and U.S. soldiers)	Journalistic (13 passages in 8 articles) Academic (4 passages in 4 articles)	0 A 0 S 21 I
Other accounts	Journalistic (8 passages in 4 articles) Academic (4 passages in 2 articles)	2 A 0 S 10 I

Total	Journalistic (162 passages in 37 articles) Academic (84 passages in 5 articles)	23 A 14 S 211 I
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(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony)

### **About *No Gun Ri* Research**

In some cases, *No Gun Ri* researchers discussed their research in detail, including how their research was initiated and its development, by which research they were influenced, what motivated them to conduct such research, which research methods they used, and how they searched related materials and conducted interviews. Researchers oftentimes expressed their preference toward giving credibility to a certain material and some barriers that they encountered when they performed research.

Some *No Gun Ri* researchers, especially in Korea, initiated a discussion about early Korean research in their publications to address how the incident was researched prior to the AP story. When the AP's report was published, there were some introspective voices that voiced an opinion that this incident became known to the public only by another country's news agency and reflected on the negligence of Korean news agencies. Under this atmosphere, Korean researchers addressed early research in a defensive way to prove that there were efforts to publicize and research this incident in Korea. The early news reports, which were published in local papers and a progressive political magazine, now received new and long overdue attention and influenced later research. Thus, the source materials they used at this time also received new attention.

*No Gun Ri* researchers also mentioned Korean and U.S. governments' attitude toward the event. Both governments were very passive about the investigation when the *No Gun Ri* story was first publicized. The U.S. government repeatedly denied that it found no basis for the guilty

allegation and rejected the petitions of the survivors. Similarly, the Korean government also reacted very passively toward an investigation because it could harm the traditional friendly relationship with the U.S. government. In 1994, when the story was first published as a novel and in some newspapers and magazines in Korea, the Korean Ministry of National Defense secretly conducted an in-house investigation. This investigation was later revealed in a news report but still was not released to the public. Even when the Korean government articulated that it would perform an investigation for finding the truth, it emphasized that the investigation would not be confused or diluted with American soldiers' blood that was shed for the freedom of Korea and the importance of an alliance with America.

From an individual level of research, some researchers expressed that their research was motivated mainly from journalistic reports about survivors' petitions and the denials and early Korean reports before the AP. Researchers said that they wanted to know more about the truth, especially when they found that the U.S. government's denial was on the basis of "no proof." The researchers mentioned that with only basic research they could find information discrediting the U.S. government's denial. One researcher wrote that he became interested in *No Gun Ri* because of his previous research interest in a similar area. A survivor's novel on *No Gun Ri* was also mentioned as a motivation by another researcher.

It was also revealed how *No Gun Ri* researchers sought their source materials. Some said they filed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and searched a variety of archives. Researchers mentioned that they looked through hundreds of boxes at the National Archives and other repositories. They searched archives not only for any related information about *No Gun Ri*, but also further information that could direct researchers to other source materials, such as lists of veterans' names. From the list of veterans identified from archival documents, they conducted

interviews. The AP reporters stated that they even reconstructed military map coordinates to locate the army units' movement. In a total of 13 passages in 6 publications, research methods were discussed.

Some research barriers were also identified in *No Gun Ri* research. Some researchers stated that the incident happened too long ago and it was not always easy to find hard evidence and to assemble small pieces of information for a big picture of the incident even though there remained some. One researcher pointed out a financial problem to continue his work. The distance between America and Korea was also a barrier to share and search materials. Korean survivors pointed out that the politically repressive climate was the major barrier as they could not research and publicize their story earlier. One survivor testified that "We could not utter a single word about our family members murdered then, as if it were we who were guilty. If we told anyone that they were killed by American troops, then he would suspect that they must have been communist collaborators."<sup>206</sup> Given this situation, a survivor decided to publicize the story as a form of a novel partly to avoid political attention. Due to this reason, survivors requested compensation and an apology to the American government, and the apology implied a particular importance to them because their complaints had been seen as pro-communism.

Research in law fields and journalistic reports about legal issues were prolific in this period of time. It seemed partly due to the potential criminal charges of the offending soldiers and legal compensation of the survivors. Researchers discussed the Geneva Convention and the Hague Convention as the legal basis of judging the incident. A few researchers also mentioned the International Humanitarian Law and the Nuremberg Tribunal regulations. Many legal experts articulated that the incident was clearly illegal if there was an order to fire on civilians according

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<sup>206</sup> Wonsup Lee, "Madness at Nogun-ri and Bein Hoa," *Korea Focus* 7:6 (Nov/Dec 1999): 112-114.

to the above regulations. Some asserted that the presence of a few combatants still could not justify the killing of a large number of noncombatants. They also maintained that if the incident were considered as a war crime, the statute of limitations would not be applicable and even retro-applicability of later regulated laws to charge for the war crime would be possible. A uniqueness of the incident in a law-related situation was discussed since *No Gun Ri* happened against an ally's civilians, a situation not addressed or regulated in any war-related laws. One law scholar maintained that this could be dealt with on the state or collective level of responsibility, not imposing the responsibility on individual soldiers. Law-related issues were discussed in a total of 33 passages in 15 publications, but these discussions were not supported by many archival resources. Laws and regulations in the *No Gun Ri* case were cited 15 times.

Noticeably, there were some comments of researchers about which source materials they gave more credibility to and why. In many cases, researchers considered oral testimonies of survivors and veterans as credible, especially when those testimonies were supported by other archival evidence such as military documents or news reports from the time of the war (the latter being considered the most credible). North Korean news reports were regarded quite credible by many researchers because the contents of these reports were very close to survivors' accounts and other recently disclosed facts. There were some interesting points about the interpretation of specific material for understanding the incident. Some researchers interpreted the atrocities of North Korean troops, such as using refugees as a shield from a mine field. Such incidents were described in official histories of the Korean War as a way to distract from the American soldiers' wrongdoings. Interestingly, the North Korean news reports were inversely regarded by most Americans as "a clumsy attempt to divert attention from amply documented communist atrocities

against both South Korean civilians and American POWs.”<sup>207</sup> Understandably, many researchers complained that it was not easy to research because either there was no direct information about *No Gun Ri* in archival documents or no documents remained from the offending army units. Interesting archival evidence was Korean victims’ birth/death records. In documents, some people were still alive at the point of *No Gun Ri* research because the whole family was killed at *No Gun Ri* and there were no survivors to file a death record. In death records, one was required to put a place of death and in some documents the location was mentioned as “under the *No Gun Ri* railroad bridge.” Some researchers used these death records to prove that the *No Gun Ri* incident really existed. Similarly, the fact that *No Gun Ri* villagers honored the dead on the same day every year was regarded as another evidential aspect. The table below indicates the details of discussions about the frequency of source materials in research.

Table 8. Discussions on the *No Gun Ri* Research in the Second Period

Discussions		Numbers of passages and publications	Source materials
<i>No Gun Ri</i> research	Early Research in Korea	Journalistic (2 passages in 2 articles) Academic (4 passages in 3 articles)	1 A 11 S 0 I
	Government’s Attitudes	Journalistic (23 passages in 16 articles) Academic (4 passages in 3 articles)	2 A 1 S 0 I
	Survivors’ efforts and research	Journalistic (24 passages in 16 articles) Academic (10 passages in 5 articles)	2 A 0 S 18 I
	Research Motivation	Journalistic (7 passages in 5 articles) Academic (2 passages in 2 articles)	0 A 0 S 0 I
	Research Methods	Journalistic (9 passages in 5 articles) Academic (4 passages in 1 articles)	2 A 0 S 0 I
	Research Barriers	Journalistic (10 passages in 8 articles) Academic (4 passages in 3 articles)	2 A 0 S 9 I

<sup>207</sup> Michael Dobbs, “Shoot Them All; Half a century after the Korean War, members of the 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment had hoped for recognition; instead they are having to account for what happened at *No Gun Ri*,” *The Washington Post* (Feb. 06, 2000).

Legal Research	Legal Research	Journalistic (11 passages in 8 articles) Academic (22 passages in 7 articles)	0 A 2 S 1 I 15 L
Understanding <i>No Gun Ri</i> research	Credibility of Materials in Interpreting the Incident	Journalistic (19 passages in 14 articles) Academic (9 passages in 5 articles)	11 A 3 S 6 I
	Understanding <i>No Gun Ri</i> from various sources	Journalistic (13 passages in 11 articles) Academic (1 passages in 1 articles)	4 A 0 S 0 I
	Other issues	Journalistic (15 passages in 13 articles) Academic (4 passages in 2 articles)	4 A 0 S 3 I
Total		Journalistic (103 passages in 43 articles) Academic (60 passages in 12 articles)	24 A 17 S 20 I 15 L

(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony, L: Laws and Regulations)

Research on *No Gun Ri* in this time period bears testimony of the great influence that the AP's *No Gun Ri* story had since later researchers used the archival documents and interviews discovered and conducted by the AP. Immediately after this report, additional documents were discovered, implying the grand scale of attention this incident drew. Many archival documents were used to support background information about circumstances of the battle situation in the nearby area, U.S. troops' disposition, the situation of the Army units stationed at *No Gun Ri*, and refugee policies. Many researchers saw refugee policy documents as the direct cause of the tragedy. Details of the evolution of the incident relied heavily on the interviews of survivors and American veterans. Obviously, in many cases, it was agreed that when oral history of the incident was corroborated with related evidence, archival documents or any other possible materials, the oral history was seen as the most credible.

A total of 366 passages in 113 journalistic publications and 172 passages in 13 academic works were devoted to *No Gun Ri* discussions in this period. Archival documents were used 128 times for *No Gun Ri* discussions and secondary materials were used 70 times. Interview



testimony with survivors and veterans was used as the overwhelming majority -- 266 times. The most used archival document was a *Communication Log* from the 8<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division on July 24<sup>th</sup> 1950, which was used a total of 16 times throughout the publications in this period.<sup>208</sup> The next most used archival document was a memorandum by the Commander of the 25th Infantry Division on July 25<sup>th</sup> 1950.<sup>209</sup> The third most used archival document was a captured North Korean newspaper article of August 19<sup>th</sup> 1950.<sup>210</sup> For the secondary materials, the most used was the official history of Korea, *History of the Korean War*, by the Korean Military Academy in 1987, used 11 times for this period. The 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division's history, *The First Team: The First Cavalry Division In Korea, July 18 1950 -- July 18 1952*, was the next most used secondary material. A Japanese history of the Korean War was used 6 times and ranked third.

Table 9. Most Used Archival and Secondary Materials in the Second Period

Rank	Archival Materials	Secondary Materials
1	Communication Log, 8 <sup>th</sup> Regiment, 1 <sup>st</sup> Cavalry, July 24 1950. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 42, RG 338, NARA. (16)	Korean Military Academy, <i>History of the Korean War</i> , 1986. (11)

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<sup>208</sup> This document reads “No refugees to cross the front line. Fire everyone trying to cross lines. Use discretion in case of women and children.”

<sup>209</sup> This documents reads, “Korean police have been directed to remove all civilians from the area between the blue lines shown on the attached overlay and report the evacuation has been accomplished. All civilians seen in this area are to be considered as enemy and action taken accordingly.”

<sup>210</sup> This document describes that North Korean troops moved into *No Gun Ri* and found about 400 bodies of elderly, young people and children. The stream under the railroad bridge was bloody from the bodies and entrances of the bridge tunnels were piled with about 400 dead bodies.

2	<p>Memorandum, Commander, 25th Infantry Division, 27 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA. (14)</p> <p>Choson Inminbo (조선인민보, Korean People's Daily) Aug. 19<sup>th</sup> 1950. (14)</p>	<p>First Cavalry Division Association, <i>The First Team: The First Cavalry Division In Korea, July 18 1950 -- July 18 1952</i>, 1994. (8)</p>
3	<p>Message, EUSAK, CNR: G 20578 KGP, July 26<sup>th</sup> 1950, sub: Controlled Movement of All Refugees. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Korean Military Advisory Group, Box 23, RG 338, NARA. (8)</p> <p>After-mission report, 35<sup>th</sup> Fighter Bomber Squadron, 8<sup>th</sup> Fighter Bomber Group, Mission 35-1, July 20, 1950 (8)</p> <p>S-2-3 Journal, 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment: Ka-Ri, Korea, July 25-29, 1950 (8)</p>	<p>Institute of Military History of Japan, <i>The Korean War</i>, 1986 (6)</p>
4	<p>Journal, HQ 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, July 26, 1950. (5)</p>	<p>Oh, "First Testimony – Massacre of 300 Villagers by the American Soldiers in Yong-dong Chung-buk in the Korean War," <i>Monthly Mal</i>, July 1994: 36-45. (5)</p>
5	<p>Map Coordinate (4)</p> <p>Petition submitted by Survivors' Organization, December 29<sup>th</sup> 1997. (4)</p>	<p>Chong, <i>Do You Know Our Agony?</i> (Seoul: Tari Media) 1994. (4)</p> <p>Choi and Chong, "A Study on A Massacre of Civilians in Young-dong area, Chung-chong Province in the Early Stage of the Korean War (1)," <i>Journal of Humanities</i> 17:1 (1999): 245-283. (4)</p> <p>Appleman, <i>South to Naktong, North to Yalu</i> (4)</p> <p>Hastings, <i>The Korean War</i>, 1987. (4)</p> <p>Choe, Hanley, and Mendoza, "War's Hidden Chapter: Ex-GIs Tell of Killing Korean Refugees," the Associated Press, Sep 29<sup>th</sup> 1999. (4)</p> <p>Choe, Hanley, and Mendoza, "Korean, U.S. Witnesses, Backed by Military Records, Say Refugees Were Strafed," the Associated Press, Dec 28<sup>th</sup> 1999. (4)</p>

(The number in parenthesis is the number of those materials used.)

### 5.3 MAY 11, 2000 TO JANUARY 12, 2001: Veracity Discussions Concerning News Sources

In May 11<sup>th</sup> 2000, there was a news article in an online newspaper (*Stripes.com*) for U.S. veterans. This report raised issues based on archival research that some of the sources that the AP used for the *No Gun Ri* report were questioned as to their veracity. This report was relayed by a *U.S. News and World Report* article, questioning the same issues. *Stripes.com* was a news service for veterans and did not have a wide range audience. Therefore, when the *U.S. News and World Report's* report was published, it received great attention in the U.S. as well as in Korea. Not long after the public's interest on the veracity of sources on the *No Gun Ri* story, CBS broadcasted archival evidence that substantiated potential air attacks by requests from the Army on civilians during the Korean War. Soon after CBS' broadcasting, the AP reporters again revealed additional captured North Korean news reports from August and September 1950, not very long after the incident. Some of these newspapers were already published in Korea but were now the recipients of U.S. attention. The *No Gun Ri* was well discussed due to a series of archival evidence-associated events during this period of time.

From July to the end of 2000, news publications from time to time reported upon ongoing government investigations and that there were no important issues discussed. However, in November two American veterans who testified, under oath and by sworn statements for the government's investigation, said they believed they received an order to shoot refugees at *No Gun Ri*. Their interviews were cited in a great number of news articles and academic publications in addition to military records for refugee policies. At the end of the year, government investigation reports were about to be published, news reporters showed interest on how the

investigation would result and whether and how the U.S. government would compensate the survivors of the *No Gun Ri* killing.

During the period of time from May 11, 2000 to January 10, 2001, there were a total of 112 publications with 98 journalistic articles and 14 academic writings. Of the 98 journalistic articles, 54 news reports were published in the U.S. and 44 were published in Korea. Six academic publications were from the U.S. among the 14 academic writings and 8 were from Korea.

Table 10. The Number of Publications from May 11, 2000 to January 12, 2001

	Journalistic products	Academic products
Published in the U.S.	54	6
Published in Korea	44	8
Total	98	14

\* The whole list of the research products is provided in the Appendix A.

As mentioned above, the discussions in this time period are directly related to the emergence of new archival evidence in many cases, and archival materials constitute a large portion of the entire collection of supporting materials. Still, interviews with survivors and American veterans are used many times for the description of the killing. Similar to what was observed in the previous timeframe, secondary materials continue to be used mainly in history and legal studies.

### **Roger's Memo**

During the time from May 11, 2000 to January 10, 2001, the discussions on the background of the *No Gun Ri* were not much different from the previous discussions. *No Gun Ri* researchers continued to address the fact that U.S. soldiers were not ready for a war due to the lack of proper

training and budget cuts in the military, and they used secondary materials for this background information. The soldiers of the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment, 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division were not an exception to this situation. As a reporter describes, the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment - “the storied regiment of George Custer and Little Bighorn- were largely untested. Many of the troops were no more than frightened teenagers with no combat experience, led by too few battle-tested officers and sergeants.”<sup>211</sup> The situation was worsened when the regiment “lost 750 Non-commissioned officers to fill-out the 24<sup>th</sup> when that division had first been sent from Japan.”<sup>212</sup> These soldiers heard circulated rumors of guerrilla warfare and feared North Korean soldiers’ infiltration tactics. In addition, North Koreans forces were proved more effective than the U.S. from major defeats of Task Force Smith in Chukmiryong and the 24<sup>th</sup> Division in Taejon. The chaotic withdrawal of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment on the night of July 25 was addressed by some *No Gun Ri* researchers mainly using secondary literature for their supporting materials.

The specific discussion of how and how long the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division was positioned in Yongdong, including particular locations of each regiment and neighbor divisions, was continued not in a way to identify who was at *No Gun Ri*, but rather in a way to find more information about detailed battle lines and smaller units’ positions to picture the incident in hopes of clarifying an explanation for reasons or factors that caused the incident. Naturally, for this discussion, many archival documents were used (32 uses of archives with 12 cases of secondary literature) as supporting materials and among the archival documents, war diaries of army units well described their positions and missions. One interesting point to mention is that

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<sup>211</sup> Joseph L. Galloway, “Doubts about a Korean ‘Massacre’,” *U.S. News and World Report*, May 12, 2000, on their web-site: May 22, 2000 in the magazine.

<sup>212</sup> Christopher D. Booth, “Prosecuting the “Fog of War?”; Examining the Legal Implications of an Alleged Massacre of South Korean Civilians by U.S. Forces During the Opening Days of the Korean War in the Village of *No Gun Ri*,” *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* Vol. 33 (Oct. 2000): 943.

some archival documents were only used by Korean researchers while not at all by American researchers even though the documents are from the American military. Korean researchers used a war operations document from the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division on July 24, 1950, which detailed arranging new positions of the retreating 5<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> Regiments and assigning the role of those regiments for securing points east and north of Yongdong against enemy penetration. This document also assigned the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment the preparations against any enemy penetration as Division Reserve and for patrolling on high ground.<sup>213</sup> This document was used to identify the positions of regiments of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division and to understand that the role of the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment was for Reserve rather than being frontline battle units. It seems that American researchers did not fully refer to other *No Gun Ri* research from Korea.

As another aspect of circumstantial elements for the incident, the air operations during the Korean War were also discussed. In June 2000, CBS correspondent David Martin reported a declassified document, termed the “Rogers’ Memo,” dated July 25, 1950, just a day before *No Gun Ri*. This document was created by Col. Turner Rogers and noted: “It is reported that large groups of civilians, either composed of or controlled by North Korean soldiers, are infiltrating U.S. positions. The army has requested that we strafe all civilian refugee parties that are noted approaching our positions. To date we have complied with the army request in this respect. . . . Our operation involving the strafing of civilians is sure to receive wide publicity and may cause embarrassment to the U.S. Air Force and to the U.S. government in its relations with the United Nations.” Then he recommended changing the policy to one where Air Force pilots would not attack civilian refugee groups “unless they are definitely known to contain North Korean soldiers

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<sup>213</sup> The 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, Operation Plan Number 10-50, Hwanggan (1088-1483), 1950. 7. 24. 23:15. (The details of this document are provided in Appendix B.2)

or commit hostile acts.”<sup>214</sup> One cannot rush to draw a conclusion directly connecting this document to the *No Gun Ri* incident, but many researchers agreed that the contents reveal general aspects of military policy and operations toward Korean refugees in terms of air attacks, which in part corroborate survivors’ claims of being attacked by aircraft while staying on railroad tracks without posing any hostility. The table below shows how many publications discussed the background of the incident along with the source materials used. A total of 20 passages in 13 journalistic publications and 44 passages in 10 academic works described circumstances around the event and used archival documents 55 times, secondary materials 68 times and interview testimony of veterans 2 times.

Table 11. Discussions on the Background of *No Gun Ri* in the Third Period

Discussions	Numbers of passages and publications	Source materials
Status of U.S. Soldiers: ill-prepared and panicked	Journalistic (3 passages in 3 articles) Academic (11 passages in 4 articles)	1 A 35 P 1 I
Disastrous Taejon Defeat	Journalistic (1 passage in 1 article) Academic (2 passages in 2 articles)	0 A 3 P 0 I
Situation of 7 <sup>th</sup> Regiment on the night before the incident	Journalistic (2 passages in 1 article) Academic (2 passages in 1 article)	2 A 13 P 0 I
1 <sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division’s position and the battle situation during <i>No Gun Ri</i>	Journalistic (7 passages in 4 articles) Academic (18 passages in 9 articles)	32 A 12 P 0 I
Large scale air attacks during the Korean War	Journalistic (7 passages in 7 articles) Academic (11 passages in 7 articles)	20 A 5 P 1 I
Total	Journalistic (20 passages in 13 articles) Academic (44 passages in 10 articles)	55A 68 P 2 I

(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony)

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<sup>214</sup> Memorandum to General Timberlake, “Policy on Strafing Civilian Refugees,” Colonel T.C. Rogers, DCS/Operations, HQ 5AF Advance, 25 Jul 50. (The details of this document are provided in Appendix B.2)

## Using More Documents than Oral History

Inevitably, *No Gun Ri* researchers in this time period still discussed the major elements of the incident and explained the evolution of the incident from evacuation to arrival of the North Korean troops. The amount of discussion on this specific topic was not as great as that in the previous time period. There were a total of 151 passages in journalistic and academic publications now for the evolution of *No Gun Ri*, compared to a previous total of 245 passages. However, it is notable that researchers now utilized more archival documents than interviews while previously the case of using interviews dominated the investigative efforts. The number of archival sources concerning discussions about *No Gun Ri* increased from 23 occasions in the previous time period to 80. The general refugee policy documents which were disclosed by the AP reporters in 1999 and the Rogers' memo were the major documents used here, which can lead to the assumption that more researchers attempted to tie the incident to those policy documents directly or indirectly. North Korean wartime newspapers in 1950 were also used significantly by many researchers. The AP reporters additionally discovered more North Korean documents. Thus, *No Gun Ri* researchers during this time could use a greater variety of archival documents for supporting their arguments.

To come to the specifics of the discussion, researchers attempted to understand the reasons or any factors that could cause or contribute to the killings at *No Gun Ri* again at this time. The reasons or factors that researchers drew to explain the killing did not deviate much from the previous time: panicked soldiers' reactions in a confusing retreat; a result of war operations based on refugee policies; and racial attitudes toward Koreans. Some researchers argued that such rigid refugee policies toward all Koreans to be treated as enemies would not have been issued if it were for the civilians in Europe. Air attacks on Korean refugees at *No Gun*



*Ri* were also a part of discussions for the evolution of *No Gun Ri*. Many researchers used Rogers' memo to address air strafing at *No Gun Ri*. They agreed that the document provides at least circumstantial information that could have led to the incident, while others argued that there was no further information to tie the memo to the incident.

Similar to previous research, the details of the shooting under the *No Gun Ri* railroad bridge tunnels were discussed mainly based on interviews of survivors and veterans who either participated in or witnessed the event. Their testimonies were still in the same vein of the previous research. However, this time some veterans testified that the shooting was only brief and lasted for a short time. These veterans were interviewed for reports that questioned the veracity of news sources for the AP, and these reports underscored that the shooting was not as large in scale and intentional or deliberate as survivors alleged, rather implying that there was hostile gunfire from the refugees. The discussion regarding the veracity of the news sources will be discussed in a later section of this chapter. During a journal article interview, one of the members of the outside advisory group for the U.S. government investigative team mentioned that the U.S. team agreed that the killing was not deliberate and was instead incidental and a mistaken reaction to a panicked retreat. This was also used by *No Gun Ri* researchers, some in criticism and some in favor.

Whether there were any North Korean infiltrators among the *No Gun Ri* refugees was one of the most arguable discussions for *No Gun Ri*. Survivors asserted that they were screened and there were no North Korean infiltrators among them while veterans were divided in their accounts. Some veterans said they were not convinced the group was the enemy while some said they assumed there were North Korean soldiers amongst refugees *or* later found North Korean rifles or soldiers' dead bodies. Researchers took whichever testimony substantiated their own

arguments, but without any more archival evidence or other corroborating evidence it will be difficult to draw a clear line on this discussion. Another controversial issue was whether there was an order to shoot the refugees under the tunnels, which was the major discussion in this time period. Refugee policy documents<sup>215</sup> dated one or two days before *No Gun Ri* were primary archival sources for this argument, and were repeatedly used 29 out of 31 times. Researchers agreed that those documents provided certain guidelines for U.S. soldiers' treatment of refugees in the least even though they were not direct orders. Some researchers stated that soldiers might have assumed that "do not allow refugees to cross line" as firing upon them if they do cross. Interviews with veterans were divided into two groups: "orders were issued" and "no order given". Later in the process of the U.S. government's investigation, two veterans said there were orders from higher officers in a sworn testimony (Lawrence Levine and James Crume), which fueled the controversy even more.

North Korean news reports and military documents from 1950 were the main archival sources for the discussion of assuming the number of the killed and injured at *No Gun Ri*. Those North Korean materials were captured by the U.S. troops during wartime and later microfilmed and housed in one Korean repository, and one of the news reports was first found by a survivor's family and introduced in his publication. During this timeframe, more North Korean news reports and military documents were discovered and used as a whole.<sup>216</sup> The authors of the news

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<sup>215</sup> Those documents are the 8<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment's communication log stating "No refugees to cross the front line. Fire everyone trying to cross lines. Use discretion in case of women and children"; a message sent from the Eighth Army Headquarters, titled "Controlled Movement of All Refugees," saying "No repeat no refugees will be permitted to cross lines at any time."; a memo from the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division commander, saying "All civilians seen in this area are to be considered as enemy and action taken accordingly."; a 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division headquarter journal, saying "all civilians moving around in combat zone will be considered as unfriendly and shot." (The details of these documents are provided in Appendix B.2)

<sup>216</sup> Kim Chae-Uk, Military Affairs Committee, Choe Chong-Hak, OIC, Cultural Section, Headquarters First Army Camp, "Cultivation of Hatred to Obtain Revenge," to All Units Under this Command, Aug. 2, 1950; Kim Chae-Uk, Military Affairs Committee, Choe Chong-Hak, OIC, Cultural Section, Headquarters First Army Camp, "Precautions

reports came to *No Gun Ri* immediately after U.S. troops withdrew on July 29<sup>th</sup>, 1950 and reported what they saw and heard from the survivors. They described how many dead bodies were piled up in the tunnels and the accounts from the survivors of how the killing occurred. Many researchers used such materials to approximate the number of the casualties at *No Gun Ri*, in all 17 cases of using archival evidence. The confiscated North Korean military documents were translated and circulated within 40 units of the U.S. Army, according to a document attached to one of the North Korean documents. The fact that *No Gun Ri* was known to the Army from the time of the war was mentioned by two researchers. Detailed information about how many passages in how many articles there were for discussion and how many supporting materials were used among three types of sources are shown in the Table below.

Table 12. Discussions on the Evolution of the *No Gun Ri* in the Third Period

Discussion	Numbers of passages and publications	Source materials
Factors and reasons that caused the Killing	Journalistic (4 passages in 4 articles) Academic (8 passages in 5 articles)	3 A 4 P 1 I
Evacuation and screening of the villagers	Journalistic (2 passages in 1 article) Academic (12 passages in 7 articles)	3 A 11 P 7 I
Air attacks on the railroad near <i>No Gun Ri</i>	Journalistic (3 passages in 3 articles) Academic (10 passages in 8 articles)	12 A 4 P 4 I
Shooting at the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Bridge tunnels	Journalistic (21 passages in 14 articles) Academic (9 passages in 5 articles)	0 A 4 P 13 I
Suspecting refugees as enemy	Journalistic (5 passages in 5 articles) Academic (6 passages in 5 articles)	1 A 4 P 4 I
Orders to shoot refugees at tunnels	Journalistic (37 passages in 23 articles) Academic (11 passages in 8 articles)	31 A 4 P 20 I

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To the Troops,” Aug. 8, 1950; Chon Uk (전욱), an article in *Choson Inminbo* (조선인민보, *Korean People’s Daily*) (Aug. 10, 1950); Chon Uk(전욱), an article in *Choson Inminbo*, Aug. 19, 1950; Yi Tae-jun (이태준), “To the Frontlines,” *Rodong Sinmun* (노동신문, *Newspaper of the Workers*) (Aug. 5, 1950); Pak Ung-gol (박웅걸), “Diary from a frontline: from Yongdong to Kimchon,” *Minju Choson* (민주조선, *Democratic Korea*) (Sep. 7, 1950).

Assuming the number of casualties	Journalistic (6 passages in 6 articles) Academic (10 passages in 6 articles)	17 A 6 P 1 I
Other accounts	Journalistic (8 passages in 6 articles) Academic (4 passages in 3 articles)	13 A 0 P 3 I
Total	Journalistic (81 passages in 37 articles) Academic (70 passages in 12 articles)	80 A 37 P 51 I

(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony)

### **Killing 25 Civilians to Every Enemy Soldier**

Refugee policies during the Korean War were discussed in this period in a similar manner as before, using the existing policy documents. One notable example was an air-dispersed leaflet that read, “Movement of refugees is forbidden. Return to your homes or move off roads to the hills and remain there. Any persons or columns moving toward the United Nations Forces will be fired on. Commanding General UN Forces.”<sup>217</sup> These leaflets were used in January 1951 when Chinese troops occupying Seoul were moving southward. This document, which was not directly related to *No Gun Ri*, was used in the discussion for a general policy toward Korean refugees by *No Gun Ri* researchers. The problems of controlling refugees and North Korean troops’ infiltration tactics were also addressed, citing some secondary materials including Appleman’s official history of the Korean War, *South To Naktong, North To Yalu*. Son-ju Pang, a Korean-American historian, introduced a letter by an AP correspondent in the Korean War which depicted the emotional scenes of the war. He said, “The most horrifying part of this last advance has been the hundreds of refugees killed by our strafing. . . women and children, mostly. . . . I have seen a lot of war but this has been one of the most horrifying spectacles of all. The air force

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217 Recited from Son-ju Pang, “*No Gun Ri* Incident Seen from North Korean Materials from the Korean War,” *Korean Studies Quarterly* 79 (Summer 2000): 41. (방선주, “한국전쟁당시 북한자료로 본 노근리사건,” *정신문화연구* 79: 41).

says it is necessary: enemy troops infiltrate refugee columns. Sometimes they do. That I grant. But I would estimate that when we strafe refugee columns on the road (as opposed to tactical air strikes on designated enemy targets superintended by a forward air controller), I would estimate we kill 25 civilians to every enemy soldier. Is it worthwhile?”<sup>218</sup> Some news reports in 1950 were used to describe the situation of suspecting refugees for North Korean guerrillas. According to those news reports, it seems that suspecting refugees as harborers of infiltrators was a well-known aspect of war from that time. The following table presents the number of passages that discussed this issue with the number of used source materials.

Table 13. Discussions of Refugee Problems and Policies in the Third Period

Discussion	Numbers of passages and publications	Source materials
Rigid Refugee policies	Journalistic (3 passages in 3 articles) Academic (7 passages in 5 articles)	22 A 0 S 0 I
North Korean Troops’ infiltration tactic and U.S.’s suspecting refugees	Journalistic (2 passages in 2 articles) Academic (5 passages in 3 articles)	8 A 8 S 1 I
Total	Journalistic (5 passages in 5 articles) Academic (12 passages in 5 articles)	30 A 8 S 1 I

(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony)

### **He Was Not at *No Gun Ri***

The foremost discussion in this period was about questioning the veracity of some news sources. Three veterans among those who were interviewed by the AP were later questioned about their participation in or witnessing of the incident by other news reporters based on their military records. Ed Offley from *Stripe.com* and Joseph Galloway from *U.S. News and World Report* introduced some morning reports and military personnel records for those veterans. The newly

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<sup>218</sup> S. M. Swinton Collection (AP correspondent), Box 1, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.

disclosed documents indicated one of the veterans, Edward Daily, was not a machine gunner of the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment, but instead a mechanic from the 27<sup>th</sup> Ordnance Maintenance Group who just arrived at Pohang from Japan at the time of *No Gun Ri*.<sup>219</sup> Two other veterans, Delos Flint and Eugene Hesselman, were concerned that they might have not been at *No Gun Ri* because morning reports and a war diary note they were sent to a rear hospital due to an injury on the first day of *No Gun Ri*.

Later, it was revealed that Daily even fabricated his military records, pretending to hold medals for valor and combat actions, to have been in a prisoner of war held by North Korean troops, and an important person in the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment War Veterans Association. The discrepancies of the other two veterans were even more difficult to conclude. A war diary says Flint was sent to a hospital on July 25<sup>th</sup>,<sup>220</sup> and in a morning report he was allegedly sent on July 26<sup>th</sup>.<sup>221</sup> Some researchers confirmed that morning reports tend to be more accurate than war diaries because the former is created daily from the front and the latter is written later at the regimental level. According to another morning report, Hesselman was wounded and transferred to a medical unit on July 26<sup>th</sup> – not detailing *when* on 26<sup>th</sup> he was sent - leaving a possibility that he might have seen the killing.<sup>222</sup> Daily later accepted the accounts that he provided to the AP could have been heard secondhand, and he could not dispute the archival evidence. The other two veterans did not agree to follow-up interviews by other researchers. This discussion was the most vigorous among all other discussions for *No Gun Ri*, and a total of 133 passages in 40 publications with 52 uses of military records were devoted to this discussion.

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<sup>219</sup> Morning Report Mar. 24, 1951 of 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment; Morning Report Mar. 22, 1951 of 27<sup>th</sup> Ordnance Maintenance Company. (The details of this document are provided in Appendix B.2)

<sup>220</sup> War Diary of 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment, July 25 1950.

<sup>221</sup> Morning Report July 27, 1950 of 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment.

<sup>222</sup> Morning Report July 27, 1950 of 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment.

Along with the discussion questioning the reliability of these veterans' account, an issue of the journalistic misuse of certain sources was also raised. *Stripes.com* and *U.S. News and World Report* reporters also had interviews with other veterans from the list of the AP's interviewees and some of them said their accounts were truncated or quoted in the wrong context. However, the AP, in defense, noted that the important question was *What Happened at No Gun Ri?* and their original report was dependent on distant records and showed all the ambiguities that would arise from unclear information from records and interviews. Another interesting discussion to highlight was that a few Korean academic publications were still using those veterans' accounts that were questionable. There was no further explanation provided, but it could be assumed that usually academic work takes more time to publish and such publications might have been written before the controversy over the veracity of some sources.

Even though the controversy over the interviewees' veracity was being questioned, the consensus of researchers in this period seem to accept that *No Gun Ri* stands as it was, because these veterans were not the only sources for the AP, and thus discrediting some sources did not entirely discredit the incident itself. The central element of the AP story - that American troops fired on refugees - was confirmed by other researchers including the U.S. government's investigation team. The Pulitzer Committee reaffirmed its award to the AP regardless of the controversy over the sources.

The legal efforts to lodge petitions and the research by survivors to publicize their story were again mentioned by some *No Gun Ri* researchers, as in previous research. More specific comments on researchers' individual efforts for their research were also stated. A researcher expressed that the novel on *No Gun Ri* motivated him to begin his research, and another wrote that she began her research to clarify the ambiguity over the existence of *No Gun Ri* with special

interest over the controversies rampant at this time. Researchers also mentioned searching archives and conducting interviews as their major research methods, and some related that they double-checked the news reports in 1950 in addition to scrutinizing their search of archives. *No Gun Ri* researchers continued to have difficulty finding hard evidence of the killing, and survivors' struggles in the past under the postwar repressive climate were still mentioned as research barriers.

Research by governments was vividly addressed by *No Gun Ri* researchers as the completion of the investigation drew to a close. Some of the conclusions of both governments' investigations were released to the press and many journalists reported further implications of the incident along with their conclusions. The existence of the incident and the general outline of events that led to the incident were confirmed by both governments. However, some major issues about the incident were still very contentious and an agreement could not be reached between the two governments. The U.S. government came to the conclusion that American soldiers killed an unspecified number of Korean refugees near *No Gun Ri*, but found no definitive evidence they fired under orders. The Korean government insisted that there was sufficient evidence that such orders were issued and at least 248 refugees were killed, wounded or missing. Other issues like compensation for the survivors and a formal apology were not easily addressed either. Finally, the governments prepared a statement of mutual understanding on the incident – but only on those issues agreed to by both governments. A member of the outside advisory group for the U.S. team, former Representative Pete McCloskey, strongly disagreed with the U.S. conclusion that there was no evidence of orders to fire on refugees and also denounced the Pentagon's over reliance on documents and not enough on the testimony of veterans. Also, the survivors' organization criticized that "There's only one truth but they're trying to make it into two." A



spokesman of the organization said if the investigation reports did not reflect the whole truth, they would launch a joint investigation team of domestic and international human rights groups and scholars. The governments' investigations were already generating controversy even before the publication of their reports. The extent and depth of the research process and methods of both governments were briefly identified by news reporters.

*No Gun Ri* researchers provided a discussion about using source materials and their credibility. While many researchers afforded more credibility to archival documents, others insisted written records could also be unreliable particularly in the case of the early weeks of the Korean War. The captured North Korean documents and newspapers were regarded as especially credible because the contents were in accordance with recently known facts of the incident and survivors' accounts. Some other researchers stated they considered the oral history of survivors and veterans more credible, but the possibility of misleading oral histories was also raised. The fact that appropriate military records did not survive, including the entries in the official log of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment for the period from July 26<sup>th</sup> through July 28<sup>th</sup> was mentioned by a *No Gun Ri* researcher.

There was another discussion about recordkeeping-related issues regarding *No Gun Ri* research. This could be a partial reason why critical military records did not survive or how the fabrication of an ex-soldier's military career was possible. Many 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment records were destroyed in a fire in Tokyo in the early 50s, and again in 1973 with 80 percent of individual files for soldiers in the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis destroyed due to a major fire. The National Personnel Records Center invited veterans to help reconstruct their records by providing copies of letters from the military. Edward Daily was one who did so enthusiastically and in this process he was able to manipulate his military career by providing fabricated letters

about his awards and military careers. It was later known that the letters from the 1950s at the time of the Korean War that he had provided to St. Louis Record Center contained a zip code, which began to be utilized in 1963. In such letters, his military rank was a lieutenant rather than his actual rank of corporal, and it was mentioned that he received medals for valors for combat actions while in fact he only received some medals as an ordnance mechanic for maintenance work. He was captured by the North Korean troops and was a prisoner of war in those letters, and those that he manipulated. He created a brand new military career through this chance of fabrication of his military records.

Legal research during this time was not much different from previous ones; however there was much more in this timeframe. The Geneva Convention, the Hague Convention, and the International Humanitarian Law were still the most quoted regulations for the basis of a legal remedy for this incident. Researchers again identified that the incident was clearly illegal according to not only those aforementioned regulations but also Korean and American legal systems. Various methods for legal remedies were discussed and specific issues of criminal charges for offending soldiers and the statute of limitations were addressed. There were some legal barriers identified even with the Geneva Convention but the researchers provided other ways to deal with the incident based on a great deal of secondary materials. For the specific numbers of passages and the frequency of using source materials for each discussion, see the following table.

Table 14. Discussions on the *No Gun Ri* Research in the Third Period

Discussion		Numbers of passages and publications	Source materials
<i>No Gun Ri</i> Research	Veracity of Sources	Journalistic (127 passages in 36 articles)	52 A
		Academic (6 passages in 4 articles)	1 S 35 I

	Survivors' efforts and research	Academic (7 passages in 5 articles)	0 A 5 S 1 I
	Research Motivation	Journalistic (1 passage in 1 article) Academic (1 passage in 1 article)	0 A 0 S 0 I
	Research Methods	Journalistic (3 passages in 2 articles) Academic (4 passages in 1 article)	0 A 0 S 0 I
	Research Barriers	Journalistic (1 passage in 1 article) Academic (6 passages in 4 articles)	0 A 3 S 0 I
Government Research	Previous Attitude and Research	Journalistic (3 passages in 3 articles) Academic (3 passages in 3 articles)	0 A 0 S 0 I
	Government Investigation of the U.S. and Korea	Journalistic (55 passages in 23 articles) Academic (2 passages in 2 articles)	1 A 1 S 0 I
	Government Investigation Process and Methods	Journalistic (9 passages in 6 articles) Academic (3 passages in 3 articles)	2 A 0 S 0 I
Other issues to understand <i>No Gun Ri</i> Research	Credibility of Materials in Interpreting the Incident	Journalistic (26 passages in 18 articles) Academic (4 passages in 4 articles)	29 A 2 S 0 I
Legal Research	Legal Research	Journalistic (14 passages in 10 articles) Academic (46 passages in 6 articles)	1 A 30 S 22 I 37 L
Other issues		Journalistic (2 passages in 2 articles) Academic (7 passages in 5 articles)	2 A 9 S 0 I
Total		Journalistic (241 passages in 66 articles) Academic (89 passages in 10 articles)	87 A 51 S 58 I 37 L

(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony, L: Laws and Regulations)

*No Gun Ri* researchers at this time were exposed to prolific archival evidence. Many new archival documents emerged and they influenced the discussion of *No Gun Ri*. One piece of obvious evidence for the role of archival documents on *No Gun Ri* discussions was the controversy concerning the veracity of some of the veterans' accounts. Discovery of some documents led to *No Gun Ri* discussions, and the discussions disputing some source materials led

to the discovery of even more military documents. In many cases, the use of archival documents for supporting materials was witnessed more often than other types of sources in this period. The discussions that archival materials were used as a major source were for background information about U.S. troop position in Yongdong and air bombardment; discussions about orders to fire on refugees and refugee policies of the U.S. Army; veracity discussions on some veterans' accounts; and credibility of confiscated North Korean documents. Overall, the use of archival documents was superior to the secondary materials or interviews by more than double in number. This situation was reversed from the previous timeframe. The fact that the more documents emerged – and the less oral testimony was used - was increased in this period.

A total of 347 passages in 98 journalistic publications and 215 passages in 14 academic writings discussed *No Gun Ri*-related issues in this period. Archival documents were used 250 times, secondary materials were used 162 times, and interviews were used 112 times. As seen before, the *Communication Log* from the 8<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division on July 24<sup>th</sup> 1950 was used the most (21 times total) times by researchers. The Rogers' memo was used the second most frequently and explained the general situation of air attacks as well as *No Gun Ri* survivors' allegations of air strafing while on the railroad. The third most used archival documents were North Korean newspapers of 1950. Among these three most used documents, two of them were from the previous time period, showing their impregnable position in *No Gun Ri* research. The most used secondary material was the AP's original report by three reporters, Sanghun Choe, Charles Hanley, and Martha Mendoza. Even though there are veracity disputes for some of their interview sources, the report was the most used in this period, a total of 16 times. The second most used literature was Clay Blair's *The Forgotten War* in 1987. A legal research by three Korean researchers tied with Blair's book for the second in rank. This literature

was used only within Korea, but still ranked as second. The following table highlights source materials ranked highly in this time period.

Table 15. Most Used Archival and Secondary Materials in the Third Period

Rank	Archival Materials	Secondary Materials
1	Communication Log, 8 <sup>th</sup> Regiment of the 1 <sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, July 24 1950. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 42, RG 338, NARA. (21)	Choe Sang-Hun Charles J. Hanley and Martha Mendoza, “War’s Hidden Chapter: Ex-GIs Tell of Killing Korean Refugees,” Associated Press Sep. 29 <sup>th</sup> 1999. (16)
2	Memorandum to General Timberlake, “Policy on Strafing Civilian Refugees,” Colonel T.C. Rogers, DCS/Operations, HQ 5AF Advance, 25 Jul 50. (20)	Lee, Chae-gon et al, “International Legal Regulation for the Protection of Civilians in Armed conflict with Special Emphasis on the case of <i>No GunRi</i> Bridge in the Korean War” <i>Chungnam Law Study</i> 10:1 1999: 111-136. (이재곤, 정구도, 오윤석, “전시 민간인 보호를 위한 국제법적 규제: 한국전쟁 시 소위 ‘충북,영동군 황간면 노근리 민간인 살상사건’과 관련하여” <i>충남대 법학연구</i> 10:1 1999: 111-136.) (9)  Clay Blair, <i>The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953</i> (NY: Times Books) 1987. (9)
3	Chun Uk, an article from <i>Choson Inminbo (Korean People’s Daily)</i> , Aug. 19 <sup>th</sup> 1950. (13)	Donald Knox, <i>The Korean War: Pusan to Chosin: an Oral History</i> , (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich) 1985. (8)  Michael Dobbs, Roberto Suro, “Army Dismissed Massacre Allegation; Koreans Sought Redress for 5 Years; Cohen Orders Probe,” <i>The Washington Post</i> , Oct 1 <sup>st</sup> 1999: A01. (8)
4	Memorandum, Commander, 25th Infantry Division, 27 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA. (12)	Korean Military Academy, <i>History of the Korean War</i> , 1986. (5)
5	Message, EUSAK, CNR: G 20578 KGP, July 26 1950, sub: Controlled Movement of All Refugees. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Korean Military Advisory Group, Box 23, RG 338, NARA. (11)	

(The number in parenthesis is the number of those materials used.)

#### 5.4 AFTER JANUARY 11, 2001: Governments' Investigation Reports

Finally, in January 2001, government investigative reports from the U.S. and Korea were published in an atmosphere of great interest generated by the public as well as survivors' group. Both governments established an investigative team and published the results respectively based on their positions and viewpoints. At the same time, they arranged mutually agreed-upon statements on some major issues of the incident and published the "Statement of Mutual Understanding Between the United States and the Republic of Korea on the *No Gun Ri* Investigations." In the statement, the basic aspect of the incident was understood by both governments, but still many controversial issues failed to be agreed upon, especially issues directly related to the number of casualties at *No Gun Ri* and the existence of orders issued from the chain of command.

The investigation reports of the U.S. and Korea reflected various aspects of the incident, not only for the results of their fact-finding efforts but also for other potential legal and political implications of the incident in their mind. The *Report of the No Gun Ri Review* of the U.S. team employed very passive viewpoints of the incident in which the U.S. government imposed the responsibility of the incident on the confusing war situation and the unreadiness of the U.S. troops for war, making it an unfortunate but largely unavoidable accident. This report's narrowest interpretation of source materials and the most conservative standpoint were the major targets of the critiques later on by journalists and academic researchers as well as the survivors. This report was followed by President Clinton's statement on the *No Gun Ri* killing using the term of "regret" rather than "apology" in a way to avoid a legal burden. He said that "I deeply regret that Korean civilians lost their lives at *No Gun Ri* in late July, 1950." acknowledging that U.S. troops had participated in the *No Gun Ri* killing, but still did not forget to also mention that "American

and Korean veterans fought shoulder to shoulder in the harshest of conditions for the cause of freedom, and they prevailed.”<sup>223</sup>

The U.S. government refused any compensation to the survivors on an individual level. Instead, it would build a memorial and establish a scholarship fund which later caused a strong reaction of refusal from the survivors. Survivors insisted that the U.S. government tried to shirk its responsibility of the incident by making a memorial and scholarship honoring all war victims during the Korean War, not particularly for *No Gun Ri* victims. The Korean government’s report, *Report of the No Gun Ri Investigation* (노근리 사건 조사결과 보고서), had much more liberal viewpoints on the incident than its counterpart and recognized a large part of what survivors had alleged but was not able to clarify all the unclear parts of the incident. Still the survivors were not satisfied with their own government’s report and asserted it failed to investigate their allegations, had critical limitations about acquiring essential evidence and simply followed the lead of the U.S. government in terms of the archival materials and veterans’ interviews.

Even though the critiques on the governmental reports were harsh, they were evaluated to contribute revelations of a great amount of military documents and other source materials that could be used for further research. Since the publications of the governments’ investigations, the source materials that *No Gun Ri* researchers used were abundant in quantity and rich in quality. During this period of time, publications of journalistic and academic works were copious - reaching more than two hundred journal articles and more than forty academic publications including many monographs. However, the journalistic interest on *No Gun Ri* began to diminish in the U.S. after the termination of the U.S. government’s investigation while the Korean press began another way of reporting it, such as publishing a series of survivors’ stories. Academic

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<sup>223</sup> President Clinton Statement on *No Gun Ri*, January 11 2001, <[http://seoul.usembassy.gov/clinton\\_statement.html](http://seoul.usembassy.gov/clinton_statement.html).> (last accessed Feb. 25th 2007).

writings about *No Gun Ri* still continued to be published more than ever in both countries from various perspectives including historical, military, legal and political.

Following the termination of government research, there was a dispute between two researchers on the *No Gun Ri* incident. Robert Bateman, then a history educator at West Point, and Charles Hanley, one of the AP team members, debated *No Gun Ri*. The argument began from the veracity controversy over Edward Daily and later expanded to the general aspects over the incident. Robert Bateman was an acquaintance of Daily, and himself a soldier of the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment. When the AP published the *No Gun Ri* story, he felt something about Daily did not make sense. As a historian, Bateman began his own research using the FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) and found that Daily was not at *No Gun Ri* at the time of the incident, and he provided this information to journalists who he knew and who were veterans of the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment. These journalists reported the questions about Daily in *Stripes.com* and *U.S. News and World Report*. Bateman and Hanley were at first not disputing the other's argument, but rather sharing each other's opinions and giving advice on the Daily discussion as researchers on the same topic. Later, Bateman himself worked on a book about *No Gun Ri* and in the process of publishing this book, Hanley found that Bateman's book reflected the most conservative interpretation of *No Gun Ri* and disputed the work of the AP as a gross example of journalistic misconduct. Hanley sent a letter to the future publisher of the book with hopes of revealing his side of the story; it then devolved into a battle between the two.

In 2004 and 2005, Korean governmental efforts to compensate the survivors and victims' families materialized. Special legislation for the *No Gun Ri* investigation and compensation was enacted and the Korean government finally opened a way to address survivors' demands. The excavations of remains at *No Gun Ri* and compensation payments are planned for 2007



according to this legislation. Other various approaches to *No Gun Ri* besides research in this period were attempted including publications of cartoons and children’s books on this story and filmmaking in Korea.

In 2006, the AP reported another piece of archival evidence which had been previously used in a historical study and ignited yet another round of discussion on *No Gun Ri*, mainly in Korea. The document was written by John J. Muccio, U.S. Ambassador to Korea, saying that there was a meeting among the highest officials of the U.S. Army in Korea to discuss refugee problems in the Korean War and during those talks the use of lethal forces to control refugees in order to end the threat of North Korean infiltration was discussed. According to the *No Gun Ri* Review, the meeting, however, was held to find a way to protect refugees as well as U.S. troops. This letter at least implied that the top officials of the U.S troops had an understanding of using fire force for refugee control. The survivors petitioned a further investigation, but the U.S. government refused.

A total of 212 journalistic reports and 42 academic works were published in this period, which is more than double the amount compared to other periods of time. Among them were 29 news articles published in the U.S. and 183 in Korea; 11 academic works produced in the U.S. and 31 in Korea. Many previous researchers published more lengthy works during this time such as books or as a chapter in an edited collection.

Table 16. The Number of Publications after January 2001

	Journalistic products	Academic products
Published in the U.S.	29	11
Published in Korea	183	31
Total	212	42

## **To Whom (or what) Does the Responsibility of *No Gun Ri* Go?**

In this period, the discussion on the background of the incident was to primarily see what potentially or directly caused the incident as a whole, not simply for shooting at the tunnels. Both governments' reports, the *No Gun Ri Review* and the *Report of the No Gun Ri Investigation*, assigned an especially significant amount of their pages to understanding all the surroundings of *No Gun Ri*: the confusing war situation, U.S. troops readiness, 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Divisions and other close units' positions, North Korean troops' positions and their strength, and details of the specific activities of smaller units in the vicinity of *No Gun Ri*. The U.S. report especially emphasized the confusing situation related to refugee problems, North Korean infiltration tactics, the condition of the U.S. troops as not fully ready and effective for the war, and green recruits among the soldiers untested in battle as major factors of the *No Gun Ri* massacre. A journalist stated that the Army report did not seek to assign blame to any officials or soldiers, and instead "the 192-page report describes a period of disarray, poor leadership and confused troops in the early deployment of U.S. Army divisions in the Korean War, and says the passage of 50 years 'greatly reduces the possibility that we will ever know all of the facts' of *No Gun Ri*."<sup>224</sup> Ill-preparedness, lack of proper training and equipment, and little battle experience were identified as major characteristics with the support of various archival documents and secondary literature. Circulating rumors of North Korean infiltration was easily spread throughout the soldiers and instilled fear in them. The North Korean war strength was well above that of U.S. troops and initially the U.S. top officials poorly misjudged their strength. War diaries and intelligence reports were used significantly for archival evidence, and secondary materials of history books and articles were practically the major source for this discussion (used 66 times in 39

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<sup>224</sup> Charles J. Hanley, "Investigation leaves key question unanswered," *The Associated Press* (January 11<sup>th</sup> 2001).

publications).

Particular positions of U.S. troops in the vicinity of *No Gun Ri* were also fruitfully discussed along with the battle line situation around the incident. The discussion began from the Taejon battle in which U.S. troops received considerable damage to their manpower and ammunition. The chaotic withdrawal situation of the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment on the night of July 25<sup>th</sup> again was discussed as a way to see the real situation of the unit. The 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment conducted a disorganized and undisciplined withdrawal from a position east of Yongdong to *No Gun Ri* without specific orders but believing they were being enveloped. This unit spent the next day, which was the first day of shooting the refugees at *No Gun Ri*, recovering abandoned soldiers and equipment. These facts were again well discussed in detail due to the comprehensive investigation of both governments.

Both government reports maintained that the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division constantly had contact with the enemy during *No Gun Ri* and described that the situation at *No Gun Ri* was intense between the enemy and U.S. troops. The *No Gun Ri Review* used military records, particularly war diaries, stating “The records indicate by this time that the 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry had been told that there were no friendly forces to the west and south of *No Gun Ri* (i.e. back toward Yongdong).”<sup>225</sup> However, it was also noted by many other researchers as well as the Review team that the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division was not in immediate contact with the enemy and the battle lines were formed several miles from *No Gun Ri* in the direction to North and West toward Yongdong until July 29<sup>th</sup>, when the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division retreated and the North Korean troops advanced. The *No Gun Ri Review* asserted that “To eliminate the growing threat of envelopment, the 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry received orders at 8:30 PM on July 28 to withdraw to the

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<sup>225</sup> Department of the Army Inspector General, *Report of the No Gun Ri Review*, January 2001. Also available at <<http://www.army.mil/nogunri>> (last accessed on Feb. 21<sup>st</sup> 2007).

southeast at first light on July 29.” Some researchers also noted a relatively quiet battle situation of the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment during this time, using a war diary of the July 27<sup>th</sup>, as follows: “Now, on July 27, the two battalions were receiving sporadic long-distance artillery and mortar fire from the North Koreans, but the regiment generally reported ‘all quiet on both battalion fronts.’”<sup>226</sup> Another researcher viewed that the enemy contact and probes in the neighboring area of *No Gun Ri* kept the civilians trapped inside the tunnels over the four day period.<sup>227</sup> Researchers cited Army intelligence reports to determine the North Korean front line. The intelligence reports placed North Korean troops four miles up the road from *No Gun Ri* at midnight on July 26<sup>th</sup> and showed that the North Korean troops moved forward only less than two miles toward *No Gun Ri* on July 28.<sup>228</sup> The general consensus of Korean researchers was that there was pressure from NKPA and possible danger from indigenous guerillas but there was no engagement with enemy directly in *No Gun Ri* during the four day period of the killing. Therefore, they discussed that the *No Gun Ri* killing was not an unavoidable accident which happened as collateral damage in the middle of battle taking place, but rather *No Gun Ri* occurred as a result of rigid refugee policies that were issued just before the incident from various levels of army command.

In seeking the cause of the killing, *No Gun Ri* researchers also addressed the potential reason and factors that would have affected or resulted in the killing in the same vein as addressing the war situation and American positions around *No Gun Ri*. Major factors identified in previous periods were again discussed by researchers in this period in a similar manner: fear of North Korean infiltration, refugee policies, revengeful feelings toward all Korean people after the Taejon defeat and racial attitudes to Asians.

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<sup>226</sup> Charles J. Hanley, Sang-hun Choe, and Martha Mendoza, *The Bridge at No Gun Ri* (NY: Henry Holt, 2001), 141.

<sup>227</sup> Dale C. Kuehl, *What happened at No Gun Ri? The Challenge of Civilians on the Battlefield* (The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Master of Military Art and Science, Military History, 2003), 85-6.

<sup>228</sup> Hanley, Choe, and Mendoza, *The Bridge at No Gun Ri*, 43.

In this period, the discussion about the background of *No Gun Ri* was based on a variety of source materials including various archival materials as well as secondary historical works. Due to governmental investigation, especially that of the U.S., a great amount of military documents and archival evidence was identified and released, and later used by other researchers. The number of archival materials used for the discussions of the background of *No Gun Ri* in this period was 226 times with secondary materials used 197 times. In relation to other periods of time, interview testimony of survivors and veterans was not used as much as other source materials. The elevated frequency of citing source materials is partly due to the significant increase of publications in this period - significantly more than those in other times. Another interesting aspect is that the number of passages for the background discussions in journalistic publications is a lot less than academic publications, indicating that academic works were the major players in *No Gun Ri* research this time. The following table shows the specific numbers of passages which discussed particular issues in the background of the incident and the numbers of source materials used in those discussions.

Table 17. Discussions on the Background of *No Gun Ri* in the Fourth Period

	Discussions	Numbers of passages and publications	Source materials
Background	Status of U.S. Soldiers: ill-prepared and panicked / blindness about war reality and North Korean forces	Journalistic (12 passages in 12 articles) Academic (95 passages in 27 articles)	49 A 66 S 19 I
	Disastrous Taejon Defeat	Journalistic (0 passage in 0 article) Academic (12 passages in 12 articles)	2 A 9 S 0 I
	War situation in Yongdong area around <i>No Gun Ri</i> / U.S. positions and enemy contacts	Journalistic (1 passage in 1 article) Academic (83 passages in 24 articles)	133 A 87 S 30 I
	Withdrawal of 7 <sup>th</sup> Regiment on the night before the incident	Journalistic (1 passage in 1 article) Academic (19 passages in 9 articles)	31 A 18 S 25 I
	Local history of communism	Journalistic (0 passages in 0 articles) Academic (5 passages in 2 articles)	2 A 5 S 0 I

Factors/ Reasons for <i>No Gun Ri</i> killing	Racial Attitudes	Journalistic (3 passages in 3 articles) Academic (12 passages in 9 articles)	9 A 11 S 2 I
	North Korean infiltration/ Revengeful feelings	Journalistic (1 passage in 1 article) Academic (10 passages in 5 articles)	0 A 1 S 0 I
	Total	Journalistic (18 passages in 16 articles) Academic (236 passages in 32 articles)	226 A 197 S 76 I

(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony)

## Muccio Letter

Discussions on the general refugee policies over the whole war period were more vigorous than ever in this period of time. This is due to more discoveries of archival documents that contained the rigid refugee control policies during the whole war period. The AP research team later published a book, *The Bridge at No Gun Ri*, based on the expansion of their original research. In this book, they introduced numerous documents of rigid refugee policies and standing orders to fire, issued generally over the whole war period. Some of those documents described outright expressions such as “refugees on this side of the north firing line are fair game,”<sup>229</sup> “orders all the refugees to be fired on,”<sup>230</sup> or “any refugees approaching our defense position will be considered to be En[emy] and will be disper[sed] by all available fires including art[illery].”<sup>231</sup> The rigid and harsh refugee control policy was found not only in the documents of the Army. Some documents mentioned that the Navy received information that refugees in a group of more than eight to ten were to be considered troops and to be attacked<sup>232</sup> or giving complete authority “to stop all civilian traffic” which indicated the responsibility of firing or bombing refugees

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<sup>229</sup> The 61 Field Artillery Battalion of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, *Journal*, Aug 29<sup>th</sup>, 1950.

<sup>230</sup> The Field Artillery Command of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, *Journal*, Aug 29<sup>th</sup> 1950.

<sup>231</sup> The 35<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, *War Diary*, Aug 17<sup>th</sup> 1950.

<sup>232</sup> U.S.S. Valley Forge (CV-45), *The Report of Operation for the U.S. Navy Carrier Valley Forge for 16 July to 31 July 1950*, Aug. 9<sup>th</sup> 1950.

rested with all corps of units of the Eighth Army in Korea.<sup>233</sup> In one document, some writers of declarations in Army records for destroying villages were even asked to use qualifying adjectives to avoid embarrassment of the Air Force and Navy. Researchers pointed out that “The devastation prompted the Army’s public relations office in Washington to contact Tokyo about ‘rumors that there is promiscuous bombing in Korea.’ The declassified record shows the Pentagon strongly recommended that the command stop the reporting of villages bombed in its communiqués, and instead called them ‘military targets.’”<sup>234</sup> These archival documents of rigid policies of refugee controls and air attacks on refugees in large scale and sometimes of indiscriminate bombardment became major sources for this discussion, in addition to Roger’s memo and other previously discovered materials.

Also, there was a letter introduced in this time which was written by John J. Muccio, then U.S. Ambassador of Korea, to Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State, indicating that a meeting of top officials of the U.S. in Korea agreed on a rigid refugee policy which implied using lethal forces on refugees if they approached U.S. lines.<sup>235</sup> This document became crucial evidence for the general refugee discussions, especially because the *No Gun Ri Review* described how refugee control had been established as forbidding them to cross battle lines and paradoxically noting that such a rule was for the protection of refugees as well as the U.S troops. Also, *the No Gun Ri review* constantly insisted that the Army records of refugee policies did not mean to authorize the use of deadly forces against refugees crossing the lines, but rather it was the *misinterpretation* of battlefield soldiers to use their weapons for refugee control. However, from this document, *No*

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<sup>233</sup> Message, from Headquarters of the Eighth United States Army Korea, Office of the Adjutant General to X Corps, C/S ROKA, IX Corps, I Corps, Jan. 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1951

<sup>234</sup> Hanley, Choe, and Mendoza, *The Bridge at No Gun Ri*, 164.

<sup>235</sup> American Ambassador John Muccio’s Letter to Assistant Secretary of States Dean Rusk, 26 July 1950, Box 4266, Central Decimal Files 1950–54, Record Group 59, National Archives, College Park, MD.

*Gun Ri* researchers then learned that top officials of the U.S. Army already had a general understanding of using lethal forces to control refugees. The *No Gun Ri Review* team maintained no documents on refugee control policies remained in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment, and therefore that no evidence existed that soldiers in that unit received such an order; instead, it assumed the incident happened due to North Korean infiltration and South Korean refugee problems in addition to the ill-preparedness of the U.S. troops. The Muccio letter was first introduced to *No Gun Ri* researchers in 2005 by a historian in a diplomatic history journal. Only after the AP reported this discovery of the document in 2006, however, did many other journalists and researchers begin to have interest and further report it.

As exemplified here, the new emergence of archival documents undeniably led to vigorous discussions in research. New documents resulted in even more usage of previously used military records such as the refugee policy issued by the Eighth Army of Korea born of the meeting at Taegu on July 25<sup>th</sup> 1950.<sup>236</sup> Archival materials were used 377 times in a total of 206 passages in 61 publications. Secondary materials were used a relatively small amount for the refugee policy-related discussions.

Table 18. . Discussions of Refugee Problems and Policies in the Fourth Period

Discussion	Numbers of passages and publications	Source materials
Rigid Refugee Policies	Journalistic (36 passages in 31 articles) Academic (73 passages in 20 articles)	206 A 24 S 1 I
North Korean Troops' Infiltration and U.S. suspicions about refugees	Journalistic (3 passages in 3 articles) Academic (55 passages in 21 articles)	86 A 2 S 41 I
Large Scale Air Bombardment	Journalistic (0 passages in 0 articles) Academic (39 passages in 17 articles)	85 A 25 S 3 I

<sup>236</sup> Message, EUSAK, CNR: G 20578 KGP, 26 Jul 50, sub: Controlled Movement of All Refugees. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Korean Military Advisory Group, Box 23, RG 338, NARA.



Total	Journalistic (39 passages in 31 articles) Academic (167 passages in 30 articles)	377 A 51 S 45 I
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(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony)

### **U.S. Soldiers Killed or Injured an Unconfirmed Number of Korean Refugees**

*No Gun Ri* discussions on the evolution of the incidents were very prolific due to both governments' investigation reports. Both governments announced that they had conducted extensive research on the incident reviewing more than a million pages of archival documents, conducting interviews with almost 200 veterans and 75 survivors, and examining all possible forensic evidence. These two governments conducted *No Gun Ri* investigations and published their reports respectively. However, they published cooperatively the "Statement of Mutual Understanding Between the United States and the Republic of Korea on the *No Gun Ri* Investigations" based on the facts that they both agreed on. In the statement, they concluded,

In the desperate opening weeks of defensive combat in the Korean War, U.S. soldiers killed or injured an unconfirmed number of Korean refugees in the last week of July 1950 during a withdrawal under pressure in the vicinity of *No Gun Ri*. The diligent and conscientious bilateral efforts of both countries in this review represent a significant contribution to the maintenance of the vital and long-standing ROK-U.S. alliance. Bearing in mind the long-lasting sorrow of victims as well as the sacrifice of U.S. soldiers during the Korean War, the ROK and U.S. teams firmly believe that this investigation on an incident that occurred during the Korean War will not only help maintain a more stable ROK-U.S. alliance but also is an example of two nations working together to realize the value of democracy and recognize the importance of human rights.

Even with abundant information and source materials discovered and examined by both

countries' investigation teams, they were only able to draw an unclear conclusion that “unconfirmed number of Korean refugees” were killed or injured by U.S. soldiers in the last week of July 1950 in *No Gun Ri*. However, their extensive research certainly contributed to *No Gun Ri* history in terms of discovering the tremendous number of archival documents and other evidence. The amount and frequency of source materials used in this period of time for the details of the killing are large in extent compared to the previous periods. Therefore, the discussions in this period were supported by a variety of evidence and deepened the understanding of the knowledge of *No Gun Ri*.

The evacuation and screening of the refugees at *No Gun Ri* were discussed by *No Gun Ri* researchers, and the major sources for their arguments were interview testimony with survivors and veterans. The fact that U.S. soldiers evacuated and escorted refugees from nearby villages (Im Gye Ri and Chu Gok Ri) and whether these soldiers forcefully moved the refugees with their weapons were carefully addressed by government investigators. The Korean team stated that U.S. soldiers might have coerced refugees when they refused to evacuate. The Korean team gave the most credit to survivors' oral testimony for supporting this conclusion based on the fact that some of veterans' interviews were coincident with that of survivors on this issue.<sup>237</sup> The U.S. team concluded in a different way that they “cannot rule out the possibility that U.S. soldiers told the villagers at Im Gae Ri to evacuate the village” even though there was no reason for soldiers to travel a few miles off their pathway to evacuate civilians in a quick withdrawal. Also, it stated that soldiers based on the interviews of veterans never used deadly force while evacuating civilians.<sup>238</sup> But other researchers asserted the 5<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment was not in a fast-paced retreat on July 25 but instead that they established defensive positions in the vicinity of Im Gae

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<sup>237</sup> *No Gun Ri* investigation Team, *Report of the No Gun Ri Investigation* (Seoul: Korea, January 2001), 67-8.

<sup>238</sup> Department of Army Inspector General, *Report of the No Gun Ri Review*, 121-2.

Ri. There were no specific documents discovered with information about this evacuation operation, and consequently researchers relied more on oral history regarding this issue. Some remaining documents only stated that a large group of refugees was found east, north, and south of Yongdong.<sup>239</sup> From these documents, researchers assumed that they might have evacuated and attempted to control refugees' movement due to the possibility of being used as enemy infiltration.

The discussions about air attacks on July 26<sup>th</sup> before the killing were supported by newly available archival documents. *No Gun Ri* researchers used *After Mission Reports* of the 5<sup>th</sup> Air Force on July 26<sup>th</sup> and 27<sup>th</sup>.<sup>240</sup> These documents did not mention anything about strafing refugees on railroad tracks, but the locations that they indicated were strafed were very close to *No Gun Ri* - including an unidentified target - and the result was "good." The time indicated in the remaining documents did not exactly accord with the description of the survivors. However, aircraft conducted their missions many times a day in this period of time and researchers expanded their reasoning about the air strafing at *No Gun Ri* from these documents.

When the refugees arrived near *No Gun Ri*, soldiers approached them and forced them to relocate to the railroad to secure the road for U.S. supply transits. Soldiers screened the belongings of the refugees. The testimony of survivors that they saw some soldiers talking on a radio and leaving before strafing from aircraft was another major discussion. The survivors assumed that American soldiers called on an attack to the refugees by radio. The U.S. and Korean investigation teams found it very difficult to request an air attack from the ground directly to the pilots of aircraft due to the technology and equipment available during wartime. It was said that it is not impossible to do so, but it took too much time to be done as survivors

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<sup>239</sup> 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, G-2 Periodic Intelligence Report #4 251800K-261800K July 1950.

<sup>240</sup> "Fighter-Bomber After Mission Report" missions 35-11, 35-12, 35-7 for 26 and 27 Jul 50.

described. The U.S. team also supposed that if there were an air attack, it would have been an accidental air strike caused by the misidentification of targets and not a pre-planned strike. However, it was revealed by the Roger's memo that ground forces often requested air strikes by the Air Force to fire on civilians and the Air Force complied. There was no evidence whether Air Force pilots strafed civilians at *No Gun Ri* following the Roger's memo, but many survivors' testimonies were consistent on this issue. In this sense, a military historian proposed a scenario to explain the relationship with radio communication and air attacks that survivors witnessed.

Koreans rest on the railroad embankment while the soldiers check their belongings and an officer or NCO, using an SC-300 radio, requests instructions on what to do with the refugees.

The officer received orders to keep the civilians there; they were not to pass through friendly lines. These instructions are consistent with the new refugee policy just then promulgated. After all of the withdrawing vehicles pass through the roadblock, these soldiers return to their units.

About this time, the 8th CAV calls in an air strike previously planned to support the withdrawal from the forward positions. Before the air attack, the regiment calls for white phosphorous rounds from the division artillery to mark the target for the aircraft. Tragically, the artillery lands short among the refugees on the railroad embankment. The F-80s, flying too fast to accurately determine the target, identifies the smoke and engage the civilians.<sup>241</sup>

Many *No Gun Ri* researchers tried to address what caused the shooting by the U.S. soldiers. Both government investigation reports blamed the confusing war situation and the lack of leadership and proper training of the soldiers for this matter. Whether there was any hostile

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<sup>241</sup> Kuehl, *What happened at No Gun Ri? The Challenge of Civilians on the Battlefield*, 81-2.

fire from the refugees was clearly conflicted between survivors and veterans' testimony. Vague evidence included the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion's war diary, stating that "Mortar fire and patrols eliminated the threat of guerrilla activities from nearby villages." One explanation identified by a military historian was that there were guerillas among the refugees at *No Gun Ri*. He used a captured North Korean document which described that Yongdong area was "liberated" during the time of *No Gun Ri*. From this source, he assumed that there would have been many North Korean soldiers around in this area. He also used a piece of evidence from the Korean War history book by Bruce Cumings on the local history of communism. Therefore, he guessed that among refugees there must have been some communist sympathizers. He took as evidence the fact that there were Russian-made bullets discovered at the scene and army documents reported that a Japanese rifle and a Russian submachine gun were submitted to the higher commander.<sup>242</sup> However, this was disputed by a later researcher who claimed that indigenous guerillas played no major role at *No Gun Ri* and that it was not a hotbed for communists before the war or a stronghold of guerilla bands. He argued that the substance of guerilla activities was not to fire on the main defensive positions, and the entry on the Regimental S 4 log for July 27<sup>th</sup> that was used for proof about the submission of the enemy weapons merely stated that soldiers turned in two enemy weapons and did not state where they captured them.<sup>243</sup>

The description of the details about the shooting under the tunnels was primarily on the basis of survivors' testimony in this time period, too. Both governments' investigation reports cited a great deal of oral history of survivors and veterans, and they provided abundant sources for descriptions of the shooting. The interviews of survivors and veterans for the discussions

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<sup>242</sup> Robert L. Bateman, *No Gun Ri: a Military History of the Korean War Incident* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2002), 121.

<sup>243</sup> Kuehl, *What happened at No Gun Ri? The Challenge of Civilians on the Battlefield*, 79.

about the shooting were cited more than 400 times by *No Gun Ri* researchers. This discussion was also supported by forensic analysis of bullet marks and shells that were embedded in the tunnels. The Korean investigation team provided information about this forensic data analysis which showed that the majority of bullet shells were U.S.-made but several Russian-made bullets were also discovered. Some researchers explained that these Russian bullets could have come from other battles during the later period of the Korean War.

Whether the firing on refugees was conducted following an order from higher officers was another contentious discussion in this period because it determines the legal responsibility and grounds for compensation. The U.S. and Korean investigation reports said the investigators found no evidence of direct ‘kill’ orders issued at *No Gun Ri*. The U.S. report said the previously discovered documents of a “fire everyone” order in neighboring units were only a “guideline” to keep refugees from the U.S. lines. They mentioned that they did not find any similar entries in the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment records so they could not be sure if the regiment had received the same message, while Korean investigators did not rule out the possibility of the order issuance. A U.S. report said the soldiers might have interpreted such an order on their own regarding these guidelines of not allowing refugees to cross lines and to fire on them if they do, *or* it might have been initially misinterpreted by a liaison officer who delivered the message.<sup>244</sup>

Additional archival documents were used by *No Gun Ri* researchers other than previously discovered materials about the issuance of orders. One is a letter by a veteran who helped a seriously injured Korean boy at *No Gun Ri* during the killing. George Early, a veteran of the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment, found that a survivor’s description about how he was injured and helped by a U.S. soldier exactly matched what he experienced himself at *No Gun Ri*. While he was responding to

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<sup>244</sup> Department of Army Inspector General, *Report of No Gun Ri Review*, 26-7, 189-90.

an interview with the British Broadcasting Company for a special documentary program on *No Gun Ri*, he had a chance to look at the survivor's interview and convinced himself that the survivor might have been the boy he helped. He sent a letter to this survivor with sympathy, and this letter contained information about the potential of order issuance. The letter read that "He was going to execute me, for refusing to shoot at civilians, with a machine gun, one night." This letter was not used by American researchers at all, but it was cited many times by Korean researchers in their works. Muccio's letter was also used for the argument that the rigid refugee policy was discussed among the top officers of the U.S. Army. It is notable that the actions of the 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry were consistent with the policy. Interviews were still used with a significant weight for this discussion, especially interview testimony by veterans.

The *No Gun Ri* investigation team of the U.S. did not determine how many refugees were killed and only stated that an "unknown number" of Koreans were killed and injured. However, it did mention that it was far less likely than survivors alleged. The Korean team tried several methods to extrapolate the number of casualties using all archival and secondary source materials based on the genealogical information prepared by the local government and the list of graves for those killed and buried, and concluded that 248 people died or were injured or ended missing at *No Gun Ri*. Major archival evidence used for this discussion was captured North Korean newspapers and military documents which were created in early August 1950, right after the incident. These captured North Korean documents, part of which was already discovered earlier, had the after-scene description including how many bodies were there. Researchers also pointed out once again that the U.S. military knew of the *No Gun Ri* incident because in these documents there was a notice to be circulated to 40 army units. A team of researchers stated that "In an internal communication dated August 2, North Korean officers reported the discovery of

‘barbaric’ killings of civilians by American troops around Yongdong, including many found dead in a nearby tunnel. That document was seized by U.S. troops, translated by Army intelligence and distributed within the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division command on August 17 and at Eighth Army headquarters and Tokyo’s Far East Command by August 22. The declassified record gives no indication of any follow-up investigation.”<sup>245</sup>

Copious source materials that were discovered and assembled by government researchers permitted *No Gun Ri* researchers to address more substantial discussions on the details of the incident. Still there are many unanswered aspects of the incident, but those source materials definitely contributed to building the knowledge of *No Gun Ri* history. Archival documents were cited a total of 409 times, secondary materials were cited 244 times, and the interviews were the most highly-used at 1,224 times, for the discussion of the evolution of the *No Gun Ri* killing during this time.

Table 19. Discussions on the Evolution of the *No Gun Ri* in the Fourth Period

Discussion	Numbers of passages and publications	Source materials
Evacuation	Journalistic (2 passages in 2 articles) Academic (62 passages in 23 articles)	20 A 39 S 175 I
Screening	Journalistic (1 passage in 1 article) Academic (30 passages in 16 articles)	3 A 11 S 107 I
Air attacks on the railroad near <i>No Gun Ri</i>	Journalistic (15 passages in 13 articles) Academic (87 passages in 27 articles)	126 A 99 S 288 I
Suspecting refugees as enemy	Journalistic (1 passage in 1 article) Academic (35 passages in 17 articles)	6 A 10 S 45 I
Shooting at the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Bridge tunnels	Journalistic (13 passages in 11 articles) Academic (113 passages in 27 articles)	31 A 32 S 410 I
Orders to shoot refugees at tunnels	Journalistic (44 passages in 36 articles) Academic (94 passages in 28 articles)	157 A 36 S 118 I

<sup>245</sup> Hanley, Choe, and Mendoza, *The Bridge at No Gun Ri*, 169-70.



Assuming the number of casualties	Journalistic (9 passages in 9 articles) Academic (45 passages in 24 articles)	49 A 17 S 30 I
Other accounts	Journalistic (2 passages in 2 articles) Academic (18 passages in 9 articles)	17 A 0 S 51 I
Total	Journalistic (87 passages in 51 articles) Academic (484 passages in 33 articles)	409 A 244 P 1224 I

(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony)

### **Judicial Prosecution of the U.S. Veterans Cannot Be Excluded**

In this period, many *No Gun Ri* researchers stated that their motivation of *No Gun Ri* research is from their previous interest in a similar topic. Some researchers conducted their research based on their earlier projects, and a historian wrote an article as an extension of his dissertation research. Still, many noted that they were motivated by survivors and their families to conduct research. The methods of how *No Gun Ri* researchers gained information for their research were identified as: searching archives, filing Freedom of Information Act requests, interviews with survivors and veterans, checking news reports at the time of war, being exposed to information by other researchers (especially survivors and their families), and reading secondary literature. Survivors' efforts to publicize their stories were also mentioned by researchers during this period of time.

Research barriers detected in the *No Gun Ri* publications included financial problems, the paucity of hard evidence, a suppressive climate of Korean politics, and culture and language differences as well as political and legal difference in these two countries. As an example of not recognizing a cultural difference, one researcher was not aware that the way to write a person's name in Korea (placing a given name after a family name) is different from that of the western style and continued to use the last syllable of the given name of a survivor as the family name throughout his book. Another interesting aspect in research barriers was the sensitivity of the

incident. This was a politically and diplomatically sensitive topic for news agencies; so when some journalists tried to publish their research, their supervisors would not accept them. Another barrier identified during this time was the different processes of the government investigation in the two countries. The U.S. and Korea teams could not reach an agreement to form a joint investigation team which the Korean government initially requested and decided to run two investigation teams as a bilateral coordinating group. Many *No Gun Ri* researchers saw that this way of investigation had many limitations in efficiency, in fully sharing evidence and information from each side. This way of investigation prevented one party from conducting their own interviews and reviewing the documents of its counterpart. Also, these investigation teams did not have any judiciary authority to solve the problems with compensation, to make the process of fact-finding more responsible, and to consider the blanket immunity of veterans who testified as *No Gun Ri* researchers pointed out.

The research process that government investigation teams took was announced to be very extensive with the review of more than a million pages of military documents and interviews with a number of veterans and survivors. There were some critiques on the acquisition of evidence in the investigation process: that each team only depended on the materials and transcripts the other party provided, and some suspicion that document sharing was not fully performed was recognized. The Korea investigative team was particularly criticized for relying solely on the documents that the U.S. government provided, without question. A team of researchers wrote that “Despite the Korean investigator’s request, the American investigators did not share with their Korean counterparts the mission reports of the U.S. Air Force’s 35th Fighter-Bomber Squadron; nor did they discuss the documents’ contents in the U.S. report. The 35th Squadron documents showed that apparent civilian groups were targeted during this period;

noted pilots' concerns that they were killing refugees; and reported three air attacks in the *No Gun Ri* area on July 26-27, 1950."<sup>246</sup>

Government investigation reports received critiques not only on their research process but also on their interpretation and presentation of evidence. Many researchers supposed the U.S. investigation team was very cautious about taking legal responsibility and too passive about making a precedent for other similar incidents. Therefore, their interpretation of evidence was very strict: if a document did not specifically contain the terms "*No Gun Ri*" or "fire on refugees," they did not take it into consideration as evidence of this incident. A historian criticized that "The Pentagon inquiry had not been able to find any direct evidence of orders to fire on civilians. The AP team had found several such orders in their archival searches, but the Pentagon used a narrow definition that would have required such an order to say, in effect, 'See those innocent civilians over there? Shoot them.'"<sup>247</sup> Some Korean researchers criticized that the U.S. investigators were using two different criteria of weighing evidence and that they did not take the narrowest interpretation in, for example, blaming the North Korean infiltration. They said government investigators discussed the threat of North Korean infiltration among refugees but failed to link it to *No Gun Ri* by not providing any hard evidence of finding infiltrators among the *No Gun Ri* refugees. It was also indicated that the U.S. team depended heavily on military documents for their arguments and interpreted that if they did not find any related documents on a certain fact, they regarded it as not having happened. The team did not place much weight on oral history even though it conducted interviews with almost two hundred veterans and reviewed transcripts of all interviews with survivors. In fact, it did not use

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<sup>246</sup> Hanley, Choe, and Mendoza, *The Bridge at No Gun Ri*, 286.

<sup>247</sup> Bruce, "Occurrence At Nogun-Ri Bridge -An Inquiry into the History and Memory of a Civil War," *Critical Asian Studies*, 33:4 (2001): 512.

survivors' interview transcripts as a whole due to the ambiguity, they said, of the criteria of conducting the interviews.

Many Korean researchers, however, called attention to the fact that veterans' interviews might have been affected by Army Secretary Louis Calder's advice on their legal rights. In early 2000, he advised veterans of "their rights if they make testimony that could put them in criminal jeopardy,"<sup>248</sup> and he announced that he did not want to use different criteria for this case as with other war-related incidents. Obviously, this advice seemed to influence veterans' interviews and those who had actively testified to the AP reporters either did not respond to the team's phone calls, or vaguely described passive versions of the story. In fact, the Korean report mentioned that one of the veterans actually stated that "nobody will give clear testimony about it because of the statement of Louis Caldera, the U.S. Secretary of the Army."<sup>249</sup>

Other legal issues related to the incident were discussed in a similar manner in previous research. The Geneva Convention and the Hague Convention were still the most frequently mentioned to explain the legal process of the incident. This time around legal remedy for the survivors and victims' families was discussed more often. After special legislation for the *No Gun Ri* investigation and compensation were enacted in Korea in 2004, the Korean press reported these law-related issues and the further implications. According to this legislation, another extensive investigation of *No Gun Ri*, including the excavation of remains and compensation from the Korean government, would be possible to implement. In 2007, the Korean government plans to launch a further investigation of *No Gun Ri* and will begin to pay the survivors and victims' family compensation.

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<sup>248</sup> Sang-hun Choe, "U.S. Army head rules out investigation of every Korean War-era allegation" *the Associated Press* (January 19<sup>th</sup> 2000).

<sup>249</sup> These wording is re-translated in English from a translation of the veteran's interview in Korean. *No Gun Ri* investigation Team, *Report of the No Gun Ri Investigation* (Korea: Seoul, January 2001), Appendix III. 69.

The veracity discussions of interview sources were still mentioned by researchers in this period of time. The U.S. team expressed concern that Edward Daily, who made a falsified statement about *No Gun Ri*, might have influenced other veterans' recollection of the event after speaking with them. The veracity of other interviewees, Eugene Hesselman and Delos Flint, who may not have been at *No Gun Ri* since military records showed they were injured on the previous day or the first day of the incident and sent to the rear, were also discussed at this time. It was still not proven with certainty whether they were present at *No Gun Ri*. But many researchers used their testimony about the killing for their research, indicating the researchers seemed to grant the content of their testimony to be reliable as a source.

In this sense, the credibility of the military records was argued in conjunction with the controversy over the veracity of sources that had been raised in previous research. Some *No Gun Ri* researchers argued that a certain type of military documents could be more reliable than other types of documents. Once the veracity discussion began (based on a war diary of July 26<sup>th</sup> stating that Flint was injured and sent to the rear on July 25), the AP reporters cited a morning report of July 27<sup>th</sup> that said he was sent off July 26<sup>th</sup>, the first day of the killing. The AP team therefore asserted that he was at *No Gun Ri* based on this morning report because morning reports are created on a daily basis and a regimental diary is created after the fact (a day, a week, or sometimes weeks after the fact). A military historian pointed out that the situation of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment was confusing from the previous night of unorganized retreat and “only limited and incomplete reports were ever sent in that day.”<sup>250</sup> He continued to mention that Flint was off the roster for this company as of the morning report of the 26<sup>th</sup>, interpreted from the military terminology of “RA[regular army] 6250045 [identification number] Pvt [private in rank],

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<sup>250</sup> Bateman, *No Gun Ri: a Military History of the Korean War Incident*, 164.

Dy [duty] to 15<sup>th</sup> Med Clr Bn [15<sup>th</sup> Medical Clearing Battalion] WIA [Wound in Action] Rockin-Ri [*No Gun Ri*] off 26 Jul 50.”<sup>251</sup> Another military historian, however, maintains that morning reports created in a confusing situation also could not be relied upon as fact. He mentioned that “An Eighth Army after action report on administrative matters revealed that units often made up these reports weeks, sometimes months later trying to reconstruct events from notebooks and memory. Furthermore, an examination of the F Company morning report for 27 July gives further indications that the battalion may have reconstructed these reports at a later date. One report stated that on 26 July the company ‘moved fr[om] Rokin-Ri assembled near Yongdong encountered enemy 1 EM MIA.’ The same report said the company returned to *No Gun Ri* on the 27<sup>th</sup>. These entries were clearly one day off. Therefore, although records indicate Hesselman and Flint were not at *No Gun Ri*, the possibility exists that they were there, and one should weigh their testimony with the appropriate grain of salt.”<sup>252</sup>

Another discussion notable to archival researchers was the fact that critical documents from the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment were not found at their assigned place at the National Archives. The 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment communication logs and other documents were missing from the record boxes, including the log that might have contained evidence of any orders or standing instructions from above and on the spot communications within the chain of command. This was discussed more vigorously when the Korean investigation team cited an interview transcript that a veteran remembered he saw a report that said they fired on three hundred refugees who came along the road. He also stated that he remembered this because he typed it in a document a day later. Based on this information, some researchers showed suspicion that those documents could have been intentionally hidden. However, the U.S. investigative team did not mention anything related

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<sup>251</sup> Morning Report, F Company, the 7<sup>th</sup> Cav. July 27 1950.

<sup>252</sup> Kuehl, *What happened at No Gun Ri? The Challenge of Civilians on the Battlefield*, 78.

with this matter in their report nor in any later statements.

Some researchers, including the U.S. investigation team, did not place much weight on oral history due to the possible fallibility of human memory, while others, including the Korean team, considered the collective memory of survivors more credible than recollections of individual veterans. A researcher gave no credibility to Korean accounts because a multi-million dollar compensation would be a significant incentive to modify and exaggerate testimony and saw collective memory as a way of forming folklore which was not trustworthy as evidence.<sup>253</sup> On the contrary, other researchers regarded Koreans' accounts as very accurate because their collective and repetitive recollection of the event gave them more chances to think about and remember. In fact, the Korean team noted that the contents of their accounts are consistent for the whole time from the earliest petition some of the survivors filed in 1960s. The following table shows how many *No Gun Ri* researchers talked about their research and source materials in detail.

Table 20. Discussions on the *No Gun Ri* Research in the Fourth Period

Discussion		Numbers of passages and publications	Source materials
<i>No Gun Ri</i> Research	Research Motivation	Journalistic (1 passage in 1 article) Academic (4 passages in 3 articles)	0 A 0 S 0 I
	Research Methods	Journalistic (14 passages in 12 articles) Academic (40 passages in 8 articles)	0 A 6 S 0 I
	Survivors' efforts and research	Journalistic (8 passages in 7 articles) Academic (22 passages in 13 articles)	1 A 3 S 0 I
	Research Barriers	Journalistic (3 passages in 2 articles) Academic (38 passages in 16 articles)	0 A 8 S 1 I

<sup>253</sup> This multi-million dollar compensation was not actually for paying at an individual level but for establishing a monument and a scholarship fund, which survivors finally refused to accept due to the reason that such compensation was not meant to honor *No Gun Ri* victims particularly, but general victims of the Korean War.

	Veracity of Sources	Journalistic (11 passages in 9 articles) Academic (43 passages in 15 articles)	12 A 46 S 17 I
Government Research	Previous Attitude and Research	Journalistic (6 passages in 4 articles) Academic (9 passages in 7 articles)	0 A 2 S 0 I
	Research Process of Government Investigation of the U.S. and Korea	Journalistic (92 passages in 66 articles) Academic (77 passages in 21 articles)	4 A 14 S 12 I
Legal Research	Legal Research	Journalistic (21 passages in 16 articles) Academic (124 passages in 18 articles)	14 A 76 S 1 I 50 L
Other issues to understand <i>No Gun Ri</i> Research	Credibility of Materials in Interpreting the Incident	Journalistic (13 passages in 10 articles) Academic (87 passages in 22 articles)	62 A 26 S 4 I
	Other Evidence	Journalistic (5 passages in 5 articles) Academic (20 passages in 6 articles)	9 A 0 S 0 I
Other issues		Journalistic (5 passages in 5 articles) Academic (15 passages in 12 articles)	13 A 22 S 0 I
Total		Journalistic (179 passages in 102 articles) Academic (479 passages in 37 articles)	115 A 203 S 35 I 50 L

(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony)

As addressed, this period of time witnessed tremendous source materials, and *No Gun Ri* researchers were exposed to this source for their own research. The results of the government investigation reports of the two countries did not satisfy many researchers, but these reports still contributed in a way that could save a great deal of time and effort that researchers would otherwise have expended searching for such evidence. The amount of publications on *No Gun Ri* research, especially academic publications, was significantly larger than those in other periods of time, and thus the discussions on the specifics of *No Gun Ri* and its research deepened. The number of passages of *No Gun Ri* discussion in journalistic publications in this period was 323, and the number of passages in academic publications was 1,366. Archival materials were used 1,127 times in those discussions, secondary materials were used 695 times, and interviews were utilized 1,380 times.



Since the amount of publications in this period is larger than those in other periods of time, the numbers of source materials is consequently higher. Further, the investigation of the U.S. and Korean governments contributed to expose more documents that *No Gun Ri* researchers could review for their own work. In this period, it was shown that some newly available archival documents played a major role in *No Gun Ri* discussions, and those new documents brought more attention to the previously known materials. Therefore, the most highly cited archival materials overlap with those from the previous time frame. In this sense, these highly ranked archival documents can be seen as the most critical archival evidence for *No Gun Ri*'s history. The *Communication Log* from the 8<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division on July 24<sup>th</sup> 1950<sup>254</sup> was used the most (69 times total), the Rogers' memo was ranked second with it being used 67 times. The third most used archival document was the message from the Eighth Army on the U.S., sent to the front line units and based on the results of the meeting at Taegu with the highest officials of the Army, on July 25<sup>th</sup> 1950. The fifth most used material was the war diary of a neighboring Division, which cited that civilians in the war zone should be "considered as unfriendly and shot." The first and second most used secondary materials were, not surprisingly, the investigation reports of both governments. The next most used was the U.S. official history of the Korean War, *South to Naktong, North to Yalu*, by Roy E. Appleman. The original AP story of *No Gun Ri* and early survivors' publications were ranked fourth and fifth in usage respectively.

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<sup>254</sup> This document reads "No refugees to cross the front line. Fire everyone trying to cross lines. Use discretion in case of women and children."

Table 21. Most Used Archival and Secondary Materials in the Fourth Period

Rank	Archival Materials	Secondary Materials
1	Communication Log, the 8 <sup>th</sup> Regiment of the 1 <sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, July 24 1950. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 42, RG 338. (69)	Korean Ministry of National Defense, <i>Report of the No Gun Ri investigation</i> , January 2001. (110)
2	Memorandum to General Timberlake, "Policy on Strafing Civilian Refugees," Colonel T.C. Rogers, DCS/Operations, HQ 5AF Advance, 25 Jul 50. (67)	Department of the Army Inspector General, <i>No Gun Ri Review</i> , January 2001. (98)
3	Message, EUSAK, July 26 <sup>th</sup> 1950, sub: Controlled Movement of All Refugees. (56)	Roy E. Appleman, <i>South to Naktong, North to Yalu</i> (27)
4	Memorandum, Commander, 25th Infantry Division, 27 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA. (39)	Choe, Hanley, and Mendoza, "War's Hidden Chapter: Ex-GIs Tell of Killing Korean Refugees," <i>the Associated Press</i> , Sep 29 <sup>th</sup> 1999. (23)  Lee, Chong, and Oh, "International Legal Regulation for the Protection of Civilians in Armed conflict with Special Emphasis on the case of No-GunRi Bridge in the Korean War" <i>Chungnam Law Study</i> 10:1 1999: 111-136. (이재곤, 정구도, 오윤석, "전시 민간인 보호를 위한 국제법적 규제: 한국전쟁 시 소위 '충북,영동군 황간면 노근리 민간인 살상사건'과 관련하여" <i>충남대 법학연구</i> 10:1 1999: 111-136.) (23)
5	Journal, HQ 25 <sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, July 26, 1950. (32)	Choi and Chong, "A Study on A Massacre of Civilians in Young-dong area, Chung-chong Province in the Early Stage of the Korean War (1)," <i>Journal of Humanities</i> 17:1 (1999): 245-283.(최병수 정구도, "6.25 동란 초기 충북 영동지구의 민간인 살상사건에 관한 연구 (I): 노근리의 미국 대 양민 집단살상사건을 중심으로," <i>충북대학교 인문과학연구소</i> 17:1 (1999): 245-283.) (19)

(The number in parenthesis is the number of those materials used.)

## Conclusion

Over the whole period, there are a total of 432 journalistic articles and 71 academic publications on *No Gun Ri* research analyzed in this study. In those publications, 1096 passages

in journalistic publications and 1780 passages in academic works were devoted to specific *No Gun Ri* discussions. For such discussions, archival documents were used 1514 times, secondary materials 942 times and interview testimonies of survivors and veterans 1788 times. As seen from these numbers, archival documents were used more often than secondary literature for *No Gun Ri* discussions. The number of passages on *No Gun Ri* discussions in publications and the number of source materials used for such discussions is as shown in the following table (Table 22). In the first period before the AP's publication of the *No Gun Ri* story (before September 1999), there were 60 passages in 9 journalistic articles and 27 passages in 2 academic works. In those publications, archival materials were used 9 times, secondary literature 15 times, and interview testimonies of survivors 30 times, for specific *No Gun Ri* discussions. In the second period, from the AP's publication about the *No Gun Ri* story to the veracity discussions concerning some veterans' testimony (September 1999 to May 2000), 366 passages in 113 journalistic articles and 172 passages in 13 academic works were discussed, and 128 archival documents, 70 secondary materials and 266 interview testimonies from survivors and veterans were used. In the third period, after the controversy over some veterans' testimony to the publication of Korean and U.S. governments' investigation reports (May 2000 to January 2001), 347 passages in 98 journalistic articles and 215 passages in 14 academic publications were devoted to *No Gun Ri* discussions and these publications utilized archival materials 250 times, secondary literature 162 times, and interview testimonies 112 times. In the last period, after the governments' investigation reports (after January 2001 to 2006), there were 323 passages in 212 journalistic articles and 1366 passages in 42 academic publications on *No Gun Ri* research (including two government reports), archival documents were used 1127 times, secondary materials 695 times, and interviews 1380 times.

The portion for secondary materials for the whole period is relatively small - equivalent to 22.2% - while archival documents and oral testimonies of survivors and veterans reached 35.67% and 42.13% respectively. The superficial dependency on archival documents in the *No Gun Ri* discussion is seen in the increasing frequency of use, from 16.67% in the first period to 27.57% in the second period, 47.71% in the third period and 35.2% in the last period. Meanwhile, the researchers' tendency to use the interviews with survivors and veterans decreased over time (from 55.56% in the first period to 57.32% in the second period, 21.37% in the third period, and 43.1% in the fourth period); however, the usage of such sources still occupied a significant portion for a considerable period of time. In the second period, when the controversy over the veracity of some veterans' interview testimonies was raised, the number of archival documents in *No Gun Ri* discussions outpaced interview testimonies by more than double.

Table 22. Total Number of *No Gun Ri* publications and Used Source Materials

	<i>No Gun Ri</i> publication		Frequency of source materials used for <i>No Gun Ri</i> discussions		
	Journalistic	Academic	Archives	Secondary Materials	Interview
period 1	60 passages in 9 publications	27 passages in 2 publications	9 (16.67%)	15 (27.78%)	30 (55.56%)
period 2	366 passages in 113 publications	172 passages in 13 publications	128 (27.59%)	70 (15.09%)	266 (57.33%)
period 3	347 passages in 98 publications	215 passages in 14 publications	250 (47.71%)	162 (30.92%)	112 (21.37%)
period 4	323 passages in 212 publications	1366 passages in 42 publications	1127 (35.20%)	695 (21.71%)	1380 (43.10%)
Total	1096 passages	1780 passages	1514 (35.67%)	942 (22.20%)	1788 (42.13%)

Overall, archival documents were extremely important to *No Gun Ri* researchers for specific information on locations, time, dates, and names, as these documents were used for maximum credibility. Circumstantial information in archival documents was used with different weights by different researchers. Especially, refugee policy and air strike policy-related

documents were interpreted differently and given different credibility by researchers. Many researchers viewed them as the most important background evidence that would have caused the atrocity while some conservative researchers, including the U.S. government's investigation team, did not consider them as critical evidence for *No Gun Ri*. There were some cases where the interpretation of certain military documents was the major controversy in *No Gun Ri* research, such as checking the veracity of Edward Daily's testimony and on the information in Roger's memo about the air strafing at *No Gun Ri*. The Korean and the U.S. government investigation reports contributed to the archival evidence that would benefit future research on *No Gun Ri*. By and large, archival documents were the most fundamental source materials along with survivors' and veterans' interview, working together as warp and weft in the fabric of *No Gun Ri* research.

## 6.0 THE NO GUN RI INCIDENT: HISTORICAL PERCEPTION

*The document does not open itself nor speaks for itself, but only by inference from its semantic genealogy. It does not speak for itself neither because it merely echoes what the researcher whispers, it only tells what the researcher wants the document to tell him or her.*<sup>255</sup>

*Official records are indispensable for fixing dates and time of major events and troop movements. But anyone familiar with the way the records of combat units during battle are made up will know that they seldom tell the essential facts of what happened, and how, and why. They are often the products of indifferent clerks transcribing, at places remote from the scene of action, a minimum of messages for something – anything – that will satisfy the official requirement for a report. Those who know the most about an action or an event seldom take the time to tell, or write, about it. They are too tired, or too nearly dead, or they are dead.*<sup>256</sup>

This chapter presents the findings of the interviews conducted by this researcher with *No Gun Ri* researchers. These interviews were conducted to better understand how the previous researchers actually performed *No Gun Ri* research in terms of using archives and archival materials and to comprehend the perception of the researchers in using such materials. There were a total of eleven researchers who participated in the interviews for this research. Six people published their research products in the U.S., four people published in Korea, and one person published in both countries. All of them published either multiple articles or lengthy works such as monographs and theses. The fullness of their responses varied from two-page written answers, including a short paragraph for each question, to two-hour long interviews in person. Among them are four journalists, four historians (including one military historian), one military officer, one law scholar,

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<sup>255</sup> Eric Ketelaar, "Tacit Narratives: The Meanings of Archives," *Archival Science* 1 (2001): 139. (131-141)

<sup>256</sup> Roy, G. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (Center of Military History, United States Army; Washington D.C., 1992): x.

and one survivor's family member. All interviews were transcribed and Korean interviews were translated into English after transcription by this researcher.

## 6.1 RESEARCH PROCESS IN TERMS OF USING ARCHIVES

Most *No Gun Ri* researchers responded that they used archival materials in their research. However, not all of them actually went to archives to search for materials. Many of them said they used materials that were available to them online or made available by other researchers. For these *No Gun Ri* researchers, one source for reviewing actual documents was the Internet, through the web sites of a news agency, the Associated Press, and of Henry Holt, the publisher of *Bridge at No Gun Ri*, the book by the AP team. When the first AP report was published, the AP maintained a web site for the images and contents of archival documents that had been used for their research. Subsequently, these materials were transferred to the Henry Holt web site with additional documents that were later discovered and used for the book. The publisher displayed major documents related to *No Gun Ri* and the general refugee policies during the Korean War on its web site. For foreign researchers who could not come to the U.S., such a display facilitated viewing the critical documents through the click of a computer mouse. This unique situation of publicizing those documents promoted the use of them by *No Gun Ri* researchers to a higher level. They did not have to make the effort of going to an archives to search for evidence. As some researchers in the archival field anticipated, the potential of digital reproduction of archival materials was practically utilized in the case of *No Gun Ri*.<sup>257</sup>

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<sup>257</sup> Wendy Duff, Barbara Craig, and Joan Cherry, "Historians' Use of Archival Sources: Promises and Pitfalls of the Digital Age," *Public Historian* 26:2 (Spring 2004): 22.

In many cases, *No Gun Ri* researchers initially turned to the topic of *No Gun Ri* as their research project when they encountered or were provided related source materials. On the matter of broader, shared, or similar interests, they decided to research *No Gun Ri* when they obtained important source materials.

I started my research with general interest. Usually, journalists have wide interests rather than deep knowledge, unlike academic researchers. Based on a general interest, we journalists start our research for journalism when we encounter some evidence, documents, cases, or any motivation about an event. So to speak, it's a process to obtain materials and confirm those materials and supplement those materials. For example, if there is a document, we search for other sources to confirm and supplement the document. For me, Sanghun [an AP reporter] and the survivors' organization were two major sources for my research. (Interview #7)

One researcher discovered a very important archival document about *No Gun Ri* while he was working on another, larger project. When he later realized the importance of the document, he began to work on an article incorporating *No Gun Ri* and this document. Even though the importance of the document was only later recognized, the document was the initial impetus for his research on *No Gun Ri*.

Just in doing the research for the dissertation, which we can go into more detail, I came across the Muccio letter which is particularly important for *No Gun Ri*. And I came across it in 1998. It was even before the *No Gun Ri* story came out. . . I found the document, and I was just looking for anything that has to do with civilian casualty, anything talking about targeting or killing civilians, killing refugees, anything like that. I found this particular letter in the State Department records. I just photocopied it, put it in my file, put it away and I didn't realize that I had this important letter until I went back to write my dissertation several years later and realized that this document was quite important particularly in the light of the Pentagon report that was released in 2001. Because they focused so much on this meeting on July 25 that dealt with the refugee control policy, which this Muccio letter is essentially another account of what went on in that meeting. So I guess it was somewhat fortuitous that I ended up uncovering anything



that was relevant to *No Gun Ri*. I hadn't set out to study *No Gun Ri* specifically. When I went into this project, I knew nothing about *No Gun Ri* because the AP story hadn't been released yet. It was only later on that I realized the importance of the document that I found. (Interview #5)

In the same vein, no matter what the initial purpose was for a *No Gun Ri* researcher, archival documents served as a medium of encouragement for researchers on this topic. In the case of survivor researchers, the initial purpose of collecting archival materials was to provide journalists reliable evidence in order to promote publicity of the incident. Then they were motivated to further research on their own from the accumulation of collected archival materials.

So to speak, my father collects archival materials to write his book, and I collect materials to publish the story. But while collecting materials to search for new evidence to provide to journalists, I realized I had enough materials to write a research paper myself. (Interview #4)

The survivors' efforts finally resulted in more publications on this topic. Their efforts would not be the only reason for other researchers to be motivated to perform more *No Gun Ri* research; however, it surely was one of the major catalysts and major sources for related evidence.

I wanted to write some opinion articles about where legal responsibility lay, how this incident needs to be handled legitimately and so on. I started to publish some opinion articles in newspapers. Then, I had a chance to meet Kudo Chung, the spokesman of the survivors' organization, and he encouraged me to research more of the legal aspects. He provided me with much material. I didn't search for materials myself. Rather, what I did was evaluate those materials and interpret them in legal terms. (Interview #2)

Quick recognition that the U.S. government's response to the survivors' previous petitions was not truthful – a conclusion arrived at from a simple search of source materials -- also led some journalists to conduct further research. These journalists very easily found a piece of evidence that discredited the U.S. government's denial of the U.S. troops' staying at *No Gun Ri* at the time of the incident. This finding provided the impetus for them to work on this subject

as journalists.

The next step we took, the first archival step, so to speak, was Randy Herschaft [the AP's investigative researcher] checking the US army's official history of the Korean War. And he checked that because the U.S. military rejected the *No Gun Ri* survivors' claim for compensation in early 1998. When they rejected it, they said there was no evidence that the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division was in the area. And so the first step Randy took was to check on that fact. And the U.S. Army's official history, which was actually available online on the Internet, showed the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division was indeed in that area, in that general area, at that time. It of course didn't say anything about *No Gun Ri*, but simply said this was the area of operation. So once we saw that, then we knew that we had to take further action because, in fact, the U.S. military had used an untruth to defend and reject this claim. And we saw what they said was not true and so as journalists we felt obliged to check further. (Interview #6)

Having suspicions regarding the insincere attitude of the U.S. government due to the revelation of discrepancies in response to the survivors, the journalists performed further archival research for any related evidence on *No Gun Ri*, and finally found some strong refugee policy memos that supported survivors' allegations. This whole process spurred them to research further for future publication of an investigative report. This was done despite the objections from the supervisors in their news agency about such publication.<sup>258</sup>

In general, *No Gun Ri* researchers had previous research interests on similar topics and, due to those interests, the incident caught their attention. One journalist said he had reported the crimes that American soldiers had committed in Korea for several years before even knowing of *No Gun Ri*. When he first encountered the novel that a survivor's family wrote, he wanted to know more about the incident and finally conducted formal research as an extension of his interests. As mentioned earlier, another historian responded that his *No Gun Ri* research stemmed

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<sup>258</sup> Robert Port, "The Story No One Wanted to Hear," in *Into the Buzzsaw* (NY: Prometheus Books, 2004): 239-251.

from his larger project, a dissertation about collateral damages and the refugee policy during and after World War II.

My article on *No Gun Ri* ended up coming [out] well. The article itself is not simply about *No Gun Ri*. It was more about the refugee policy throughout the Korean War in the U.S. military and how they dealt with the Korean refugees in the war. So, it's trying to both introduce this new evidence about *No Gun Ri* but also trying to place the killings at *No Gun Ri* into a broader context of how the U.S. military had problems handling refugees throughout the War. But the article actually came out of my dissertation research as a graduate student. I've written a dissertation - which actually will now be published as a book (by Routledge Press) – and that larger project was about the American attitude toward the civilian casualties, collateral damage, and mass destruction of warfare. (Interview #5)

As exemplified by a researcher (Interview #7), the process - “with general interests on this event, I began my research by obtaining some materials and proceeded in confirming those materials and enlarging the range and depth of data collection to report it” - seems to be the general protocol for the research process of *No Gun Ri* researchers.

Archival documents were actively sought out by *No Gun Ri* researchers in various ways. Researchers checked archival holdings not only for direct and/or indirect information of *No Gun Ri*, but also for searching the names of the veterans they would have needed for interviews; these became one of the major supporting sources for their future arguments. Further, after U.S. and Korean governments finished their investigations, these researchers returned to the National Archives to corroborate the materials that the Pentagon used. Some researchers mentioned filing FOIA requests for military documents and for the transcripts of the veterans' interviews conducted by the Pentagon.

In the meantime there was a whole separate avenue of archival work that Randy got involved in. That was primarily in St. Louis. That was when we determined that there were four battalions of interest. Then Randy submitted a Freedom of Information Act

request to the St. Louis National Personnel Records Center. And he went out there and he got the rosters with the list[s] of names of soldiers for those four battalions. So with that, we were able to start hunting for the men. So we could interview them and ask them, “Do you remember something like this?” (Interview #6)

Then the U.S. Army conducted its investigation 14 months later from 1999 in 2001. When they completed their investigation, the Inspector General of the U.S. Army, all of their files, except for their interview transcripts, but all of their archival files, everything that they found in the archives, and had made copies of, were put back in the archives as a new unit, as a new section in the archives, as now the U.S. Army’s Investigation of *No Gun Ri*. So, all of their source documents were suddenly available to us. And Randy went down there to see what we might find in their investigation. And what he found was about fifteen new documents that we have not seen before because we didn’t have as many people working on this as the Pentagon did. (Interview #6)

Another thing comes to my mind is the FOIA request that we did. The survivors’ organization has a counsel team for the defense. This counsel team filed FOIA requests for some documents and the interview transcripts which were produced in the process of the Department of Defense’s investigation. They requested FOIA twice, and at the first request the Department of Defense provided some transcripts. But they denied the second request. (Interview #4)

However, not all *No Gun Ri* researchers were eager to obtain new archival evidence for their research. Some researchers were rather more passive in searching archives and mainly depended on materials easily available to them. An interviewee said exerting more effort to discover new archival materials was beyond the scope of his research.

Later I learned some more information about the location of some documents by Sanghun Choe and Kudo Chung, but I was not able to look them up myself; information not only about the *No Gun Ri* massacre, but also about many other similar mass killings. But I couldn’t do all these things. I can evaluate materials from the standpoint of law, but I simply can’t put forth too much effort to explore them. I don’t think that’s my job to do. I only wanted to expose the fact that it is extremely important to address the responsibility of a country for war crimes in the research of law. (Interview #2)

This participant emphasized that the collaborative work with researchers in other related areas as an effort for interdisciplinary research should be considered in this matter. Overall, even though researchers did not go to an archive themselves for actively searching of new materials, they were still checking and citing archival materials which were available to them. A journalist said he depended on 80-90% of archival documents among all his sources (Interview #7) while others said they simply relied on the book by the AP team or materials from the U.S. government report (Interviews #10 and #11).

While researching *No Gun Ri*, interviewees shared difficulties on the process of their research. One of the difficulties was related to accountability issues in documenting the incident. Among the military documents housed in the NARA, it was reported that certain documents of the Army unit responsible for *No Gun Ri* were missing from record boxes while all other units' documents remained. Those missing documents were simply recognized as such by researchers at first, but after the U.S. government finished their investigation, researchers realized that there was a chance those documents might have been *intentionally* removed. Therefore, some researchers doubted the accountability of the Pentagon investigation and archival documentation of this event.

The missing log was the most likely document to say something about *No Gun Ri*. In fact, quite recently, it's a year and half to two years ago now, it was much later, even a couple of years after the book was published, that we found the person who was a clerk at the 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment. He said that he told the Pentagon investigator and he told us that he remembered getting a message from lower units saying they had opened fire on 300 refugees. It was at this time. It had to be *No Gun Ri*. And he made an entry in the log of that. This is the log that's missing. So we know that that log did talk about *No Gun Ri*. But as I say, it's missing. Otherwise, there is no other archival reference to *No Gun Ri*, at least not in any explicit way, any clear way. (Interview #6)

Some researchers mentioned declassification and restriction of certain documents as another research barrier they encountered. The Korean War began in 1950 and the records created at this time would have already been declassified for research use. However, *No Gun Ri* researchers found that there were still many documents restricted.

You know, the Korean War documents were primarily declassified at the beginning of the 1970s and into the 1990s. But there is still some classified material. To give you an example, the one Randy remembered specifically was communications between the Defense Department at the Pentagon and the Far East Command in Tokyo. A lot of the wired traffic, a lot of the communication remains classified. We are trying to get it unclassified because obviously we are interested in whether there's some reference to *No Gun Ri* in some message. So that's one example. (Interview #6)

With the military stuff, I often found that a lot of it was still restricted. There wasn't any clear indication in the finding aids that it was restricted. So you have to request the boxes and often they wouldn't come. (Interview #5)

Researching anything about the U.S. government, its military, State Department, economic advisers, etc. can be very frustrating because of the shifting norms of classification. I am grateful to the National Security Archives for their constant monitoring of the declassification process and filing of FOIA requests. (Interview #11)

Other than this suspicion of missing documents and declassification, *No Gun Ri* researchers identified that the rejection of FOIA requests was also a research barrier. Even in those cases where documents were released as a result of an FOIA request, much important information was blacked out due to the Privacy Act. (Interviews #3, #4, #6)

Also, some practical issues in using archives were mentioned as hindrances. Researchers often encountered difficulties related to the poor maintenance of archives and documents. Some said materials in the archives were not well organized, and one researcher said that sometimes the physical condition of materials made them illegible. (Interviews #3, #4, #5, #6) A researcher

also complained about the procedure of using documents in the archives in terms of making a photocopy.

If you had worked at the National Archives, you would have known how difficult it can be, painstaking. If you are going through a lot of materials, and you have to make a lot of copies, it's very difficult because you have to get each page authorized. And you can only basically copy one page at a time, sort of thing. So it's very arduous work by Randy. (Interview #6)

More practical problems that *No Gun Ri* researchers encountered included financial problems, language issues, and the inability of traveling abroad. Some researchers stated that the cost for FOIA requests was too much for an individual researcher and were too time-consuming.

(Interviews #4, #6) One historian said that he had to move to Washington D.C. because traveling to the NARA several times was not enough for his research – he even had to apply for grant money for this purpose. (Interview #5) Many Korean researchers mentioned that they were not able to travel to the U.S. for research due to financial problems as well as a shortage of time. (Interviews #3, #7, #9)

## **6.2 IDENTIFYING, LOCATING, AND SEARCHING ARCHIVES**

The findings from the interviews with *No Gun Ri* researchers indicate major researchers used archival materials from a great number of different archives. The archives they utilized for searching materials included the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), the National Personnel Records Center, the United Nations Archives, Records Service Centers in various locations, the Truman Library, the Army War College, the Air Force Historical Research Agency, the National Assembly Library in Korea, the North Korean Collection (북한자료실) in

the Ministry of Unification, the Military and Defense Research Center (국방군사연구소) in Korea, and several major university libraries in Korea where some diplomatic documents had been deposited. The materials *No Gun Ri* researchers reviewed for their research contain various types of military documents, military photographs, captured North Korean military documents, wartime news reports, official Army history, war correspondents' personal records, some veterans' medical records (with their permission), United Nations' documents, the *Foreign Relations of the United States*, diplomatic documents, and even military weather reports. These researchers conducted very active searches in seeking archival materials. This included traveling to various archives destinations (and even moving to Washington D.C. for many months), filing FOIA requests, and asking for others' assistance. In one example, a Korean researcher could not travel to an archive location abroad, so he deployed acquaintances to retrieve the archival materials.

I sent all of these materials to Taekgon [a journalist] in Washington D.C and wrote a letter to him. I couldn't afford to go to the U.S. myself to search for materials, so I asked him to search for materials there for me. In the letter, I gave him some information about when it happened and which units of American soldiers were involved. So with this information, he went to the National Archives many times and searched. When he returned to Korea, he gave me about 40-50 kinds of archival documents. Those documents included about 100 pages of communication logs, some of which were later used by the AP for their publication. (Interview #4)

However, not all of the researchers were active and aggressive in seeking new evidence in archives. As addressed earlier, many researchers passively used only archival materials readily available to them. Many participants noted being provided archival materials as well as other source materials by survivors. As a tool to gain public attention of the *No Gun Ri* story, survivors' organizations provided the materials and oral history that they had collected and accumulated for more than fifty years. *No Gun Ri* researchers' appetite for this information was



satiated not only by the materials from survivors, but also from other research colleagues. Interestingly, the findings of the interviews with *No Gun Ri* researchers revealed that even journalists, who generally had been seen as very competitive in acquiring evidence exclusively, shared their archival materials with other journalists. The AP reporters gave their newly-discovered evidence to journalists in other news agencies who had similar viewpoints of the incident, for further research; likewise, journalists of the *U.S. News and World Report* and *Stripes.com* shared materials compiled by a fellow researcher who had similar arguments on certain aspects of the *No Gun Ri* incident.<sup>259</sup> Faced with two conflicting opinions of *No Gun Ri*, the survivors' side and the U.S government's side, researchers seemed to help each other within the boundaries of similar opinions. Also, public interest seemed to precede institutional interest in the case of *No Gun Ri* as journalists shared their primary materials when they could not continue further research due to objections from superiors for reasons of sensitivity and controversy. A journalist mentioned that the leadership of his news agency did not want to get involved in a controversial matter with their publication and thus it was very difficult for him to finally get his research published and, furthermore, follow-up publications were impossible as additional research was equally impossible. (Interview #6) Thus, he shared the newly-discovered documents with other journalists.

For me, Sanghun and the survivors' organization were two major sources for my research. It was very hard for me to go to the U.S. to collect materials and confirm them. . . The AP team wanted to write more on *No Gun Ri*, but the AP had an organizational problem in doing so. So they had to give up these uncovered documents for their future publications. In this situation, Sanghun wanted us to work on more journalism with these documents. He explained each document to me regarding how they should be interpreted and what

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<sup>259</sup> Robert L. Bateman, *No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2002), 160-1.

they would mean in relation to the *No Gun Ri* incident. So to speak, I ended up gathering news from another journalist. (Interview #7)

The source material provider, a survivor's family, also mentioned that he was helped by another researcher in locating related materials.

I respect her highly in this sense because most journalists wrote articles only with what I had provided them, but she tried to obtain more materials by herself and even requested the Ministry of National Defense for related materials. Anyway, I knew of this research center due to her and went there for more materials. (Interview #4)

Those who actually went to an archives for new evidence mentioned that they began their research "from scratch" with no previous knowledge of the event. These researchers said that they had some help in searching archives and other materials from librarians or archivists.

How I located that material was I was at the National Archives II, and I was looking at lots of different collections, like I said, looking for information about American attitudes towards civilian casualties, any government documents that talked about these kinds of issues and I found the Muccio letter and the State Department documents in their central decimal files. They have one decimal that was devoted to Korea and I was introduced to this material through an archivist at the National Archives. He told me about the central decimal file. (Interview #5)

As I said, I was told by a librarian in the National Assembly Library [in Korea]. I first looked for books, and then looked for journal or newspaper articles. But I couldn't find much. I asked a librarian, and she told me that much of material in the 50s, especially newspapers, had been microfilmed. She also suggested that I might find something about the incident from the North Korean Collection in the Ministry of Unification. (Interview #4)

Having done extensive research in the past I knew that (for a historian anyway) knowing the subject-matter experts among the archivists is invaluable. Fortunately I knew both the head of military archives at NARA (who also happened to be the President of the Society for Military History that year), Dr. Nenner, from my earlier research into the interwar period (between WWI and WWII), and through him I got to know the lead archivist on

Korea. These connections helped guide me to not just the “normal” sources, but provided astute recommendations for supplementary research. (Interview #1)

As for more concrete methods taken by *No Gun Ri* researchers to procure relevant materials, the researchers agreed that they sought potentially relevant materials from the citations of other, previously published works.

Regarding the use of archives, I do remember that I was quite clueless about the whole process. Largely [I] started by looking for citations and other works and trying to track down archival collections that other people previously used that I felt relevant to the project. And that was actually probably the most fruitful approach that I took in finding relevant collections. (Interview #5)

After the AP published their journalism, there were so many publications - in Korea as well as in the U.S. - I read them all. And I found clues from them to search for further materials. Among the publications about *No Gun Ri*, there was an article by Sonju Pang, a Korean-American historian. She published this article in one of the Korean history journals and used some archival materials that were in the U.S. I wanted to look at those materials, so I asked Manyol Lee, a history professor, to get them for me when he went to the U.S. on a business trip. He brought me some materials that were related directly or indirectly to *No Gun Ri*. Those were the materials that I used for my next publication. (Interview #4)

Using published reference tools or finding aids at archives was also identified as a searching and locating method for materials. A team of journalists considered finding aids as helpful, possibly due to the fact that they had an investigative researcher in their team whose job was searching materials and researching in archives. (Interview #6) However, a historian confessed that he felt published reference tools were not very useful and the situation of the finding aids was no better than reference tools.

The other thing that I did before actually getting to the archives was looking at the National Archives Guide to Federal records which was published. I found it pretty frustrating to use because they talk about these record groups but it's very hard to

correlate the record groups in this published guide with the actual shelf locations in the National Archives. So even with that help of an archivist at the National Archives, it's very difficult to get from the Federal records to specific record groups. . . . The finding aid situation is kind of haphazard. What I found to be the most useful approach for finding material was once I actually got to the archives and was doing research myself, spending a lot of time with unpublished work, none of stuff was digitized as far as I know and certainly wasn't when I was doing my research years ago. They have a room in the National Archives II which was filled with binders that have these very rough finding aids, and if you flip through the finding aids, you find record groups that look like they might be relevant to what you were working on. And they have information there in the shelf location, so you can fill out the slip and you can actually get access to the archival material. (Interview #5)

One interesting point discovered from the interviews with *No Gun Ri* researchers was that they wanted archivists to do more proactive outreach to advertise their holdings, such as more specified reference tools and digitized finding aids and/or actual documents. Many researchers expressed that if there would have been any publication or advertisement about archival holdings on this specific subject, it would have been a great help to the researchers.

There is a project in progress in NARA for releasing documents related to war crimes. I heard that they are now publishing a book about documents for Japanese war crimes during World War II. I think they need to do something like this for the Korean War. (Interview #2)

In 2003, the National Archives published a book, called "National Archives records relating to the Korean War." So all of the Korean War documents, different record groups and what they all include are all in this book. It's like a 250 page book which I wish we had had in 1998 when we started working on the journalism because what Randy had to do was to go through the finding aids folders which were not very organized. Now this book puts it all together in one volume with an index and all sorts of things. (Interview #6)

One of these researchers mentioned the advantage of using Internet databases for their research in searching for veterans who might remember *No Gun Ri*.

With this list of names, first we went to something called *Korean War Casualty Database* on the Internet which is maintained by a Korean War Veterans group. It lists all of the men who were killed in Korea. So we could eliminate those names and didn't bother wasting time trying to find those names. Then Randy also went to the Social Security Administration death records on the Internet where we can find out if somebody has died. So we could eliminate those because most of the men we are talking about would be in their late sixties or early seventies. So many of them have died. And then Randy and Martha, primarily Randy, looked for unusual names. That way we were more likely to find him quickly. And Randy had other methods to narrow it down. He could figure out the ages of people in this way and that way. That was the key to get those rosters. (Interview #6)

Helen Tibbo addressed the importance of the archivists' more active approach to archives users using the Internet, stating that "Archivists professionwide not only need to mount more finding aids and other instructive material so that their Web sites become reliable sources of extensive information, they also need to advertise the presence of this information to their user community . . . if all repositories in academic institutions actively advertised their Web sites and their features to the historians and other user groups on campus, much would be gained."<sup>260</sup> This account seems to be true at least for the *No Gun Ri* case.

### **6.3 CREDIBILITY OF SOURCE MATERIALS**

In the interviews, the credibility that *No Gun Ri* researchers actually gave to archival materials was not as much as they mentioned in their publications. Only one researcher expressed absolute credibility with regard to military archives.

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<sup>260</sup> Helen R. Tibbo, "Primarily History in America: How U.S. Historians Search for Primary Materials at the Dawn of the Digital Age," *American Archivist* 66 (Spring/Summer 2003): 29.

Amongst many resources, I believe that the primary materials have the most credibility since they capture the most facts and truth of each account. The military records and official documents recording the facts about each operation can be reliable materials. (Interview #10)

However, many other researchers noted that they trusted only hard facts and information fragments of the event in archival documents. Vague descriptions about the surroundings of the incident were a matter of interpretation depending on researcher's individual arguments, especially for the *No Gun Ri* case where there exist two conflicting versions of the story. In this situation, researchers tried to find absolute facts that could be trusted by anyone.

I didn't trust the documents 100%. Because those documents were created by American soldiers, and I thought that those documents could not be ensured for 100% objectivity. Nevertheless, there are facts in those documents. Of course there is a possibility that those facts would be distorted. But still those facts are fragments of the incident. I tried to use these facts expressed in documents. I believe when these facts are related to each other logically and reinterpreted as a whole, one can use them for journalism. (Interview #7)

When you answer a question of "Were the American troops there?" then a document is sufficient evidence for this. But when you answer questions like "Were there any military operation in the given area?", "How was the range of military operation?", "Did the American soldiers kill civilians in the area?" something like this, documents would not be able to directly answer them. (Interview #2)

The military documents were very often not trustworthy in many ways, not even aside from *No Gun Ri*, as military documents are often [manipulated by] officers who are trying to make themselves and their units look good because they know these documents will be read by their superiors. So they are not the most reliable thing except for such things as map coordinates, reporting where they are, and such things as morning reports, reporting casualties. When you get into hard factual things like that, they are reliable. (Interview #6)

A journalist mentioned that he trusted some documents only when they had plain expressions on

the matter of harming refugees since these expressions would be unlikely to emphasize or exaggerate the event; they would likely be the minimal expression for an atrocity.

I should say the military documents became extremely important at a certain point when we found them finally being candidly truthful like when they say “shoot all refugees” which was put in one document we turned up eventually, just as flared up “shoot all refugees who come near or across the river.” So when you have something like that, it becomes extremely important, and carries a lot of weight. But otherwise, generally they weren’t totally reliable. (Interview #6)

Some researchers mentioned general characteristics of archival documents as the reason why they could not grant full credibility to the information therein. An archival document would reflect the opinion of its creator or reflect the bias of the creator as experienced during the creation of the document, and therefore was often considered not very objective even though it was expected to be so. Some documents regarding refugees as combatants were especially problematic in this sense because such references could be the result of intentional misunderstanding, cultural differences or even ignorance about local people. (Interview #3)

Many researchers agreed on the fact that *No Gun Ri* was the result of a series of negative deeds committed by American soldiers, so there could have been some effort to hide any direct expression of the event, if not active embellishment or encoding within the documents. Also, the confusion surrounding the war situation would not have allowed a record creator to record an event in detail. These suspicions were stronger among the Korean researchers, but some American researchers shared the same opinion.

There are a couple of references that looked like euphemisms. There was a reference to “clearing out”, I can’t remember the precise wording now, something about clearing out guerrilla strongholds. And we suspect this was their cover-up, their whitewash of what happened at *No Gun Ri*. (Interview #6)

Somewhat obviously, I could not trust entirely the documents in the archives with regard to the events themselves, because in that case those creating the original documents were themselves the ones who had the most reason to hide (in theory) any malfeasance. (Interview #1)

In the military, in common sense, if they committed a war crime, I guess they wouldn't record it as it is. I think they would use a different expression, or an encoded expression to decorate or hide what really happened. In a case where encoded or euphemized military terms were in question, oral testimonies by veterans or survivors would be extremely important. (Interview #2)

There are so many unclear parts to this event when you only see it through documents. The combat situation at that time, which was very complicated and very tense, might have caused this unclear recording of the event in the war documents. (Interview #3)

Very interestingly, the majority of researchers who participated in the interviews answered that they gave the same or more credibility to oral history as opposed to actual research. A publication analysis showed that the flow of discussions on *No Gun Ri* was inspired and encouraged mainly by the new emergence of archival materials and not very often according to different accounts of interviewees. *No Gun Ri* researchers regarded archival documents as secondary supporting materials to those of survivors' and veterans' oral histories. This perception is in the same vein as the fact mentioned above: that *No Gun Ri* was an incident by American troops and therefore it would not have been actively documented in American military documents. A researcher said that "They may have recorded what happened partly, but it must have been very hard to document it truthfully with their conscience. So, in my experience, archival documents are crucial for research in history or in international law, but I don't think they are more important than oral history in this case." (Interview #4) In fact, researchers searched archival evidence to substantiate survivors' allegations, rather than searching substantiating survivors' accounts to confirm archival evidence. Researchers clearly noted that



they considered oral history the most reliable when it was backed by substantiating archival evidence. (Interview #9)

But as I say, the interviews were the key and the way we have described it is that the whole *No Gun Ri* story rests on three pillars. One is the Korean survivors and what they have to say. Then the soldiers we found. We now say we have at least twenty six soldiers who have told us about *No Gun Ri*. And the fact that those two corroborated each other because many of the details were describing the same things. Things like the fact that soldiers remembered that the people under the bridge were crying out for water, using the Japanese word for water. Some of the soldiers understood Japanese. Little details like that matched on two sides of world. That was extremely important. The documents, the archives were probably the least important of the three pillars because they did not talk about *No Gun Ri*. But they provided the context. And add it to the credibility. Because we found all these orders to shoot refugees. So obviously this would've happened. They ordered to shoot refugees all over the warfront. And the archival work added to the credibility in other ways as well because we could show that these men were there. We have the rosters, we have the morning reports that say "*No Gun Ri*" on them, so that establishes the credibility of the men even further. And remember as I said in the beginning, we couldn't have gotten the interviews without archives. (Interview #6)

When I interviewed the survivors, I heard similar stories from those who went through the event themselves. I felt that there would not be more vivid records than the survivors' collective memory itself . . . I tried to do my best to cross-check the testimony to get common facts. I found that they described the event in very great detail and most parts of the contents of the individual interviews were similar to one another. I actually met people who were injured from the massacre. Many families in the given area shared the same anniversary date for death of their family members for the last 50 years. And it is true that many people disappeared since the massacre. Those facts from the testimony are the most important elements to prove the massacre which the archival records couldn't prove. (Interview #9)

There was one researcher among those interviewed for this study who did not put much weight on survivors' oral histories. His opinion about oral history was that survivors' and veterans' accounts were collected about fifty years after the fact and therefore could be seen as

doubtful sources for his research. He articulated that “There are lots of things they don’t remember, there are lots of things that they are confused about, there are lots of reasons which contradict themselves just in the course of an interview.” (Interview #5)

Even though many researchers considered oral history as the major source for their arguments and regarded archival documents only as a supporting source for oral history, a majority of researchers noted that archival documents played a major role in the building of their arguments. Some researchers seemed to think that citing more documents in their research would be a way to ensure the objectivity and to strengthen their arguments. Some mentioned their research was influenced overall by archival materials (Interviews #1, #9), and some mentioned that in certain controversial discussions in their research, such as the veracity of veterans’ oral testimony or the existence of orders issued by a higher commander, archival evidence was extensively used:

But in regards to how much I relied on documents, I can say it was absolute. In journalism, oral testimony is regarded as very important, but when oral testimony is supported by documents, the truthfulness or the effectiveness can be ensured at maximum. Especially in a case like *No Gun Ri* where there are conflicting opinions between Korean victims and American soldiers, it would be very weak for one party to refute only with oral testimony to the opposing party. (Interview #7)

I think archival documents influenced every part and bit of my argument. I used all documents that I could ever access or obtain. I cross-checked the documents with other possible evidence to support my arguments. Even though there were some documents that could not be cross-checked, they still implied the importance. . . . Anyway, my basic concept is that the more documents I used, the more I would be able to add to the value of my research. More evidence would help to provide the objectivity of the research in core contents. (Interview #4)

The discovery that the veteran, Edward Daily, was a complete fraud came to me purely through a combination of my own understanding of infantry tactics and war, and my ability to read the military documents in the archives with an infantryman’s eye. These

made me suspicious. But the archives themselves provided me with the ability to prove that Ed Daily was not who he said he was, but was instead a complete fraud, because his claims about his own personal history should have been replicated in dozens of places in the archival records...and wasn't, thereby demonstrating that he was lying. (Interview #1)

Obviously, most of the *No Gun Ri* researchers who responded were significantly influenced by archival documents, and the role those materials played, directly or indirectly, was invaluable to their research. They mentioned that they used all possible archival documents for their arguments. They also noted that when new archival evidence emerged, most researchers mentioned that their arguments, viewpoints and conclusions were not changed; instead, they became clearer, solidified and were reconfirmed. The researchers also commented that the *No Gun Ri* incident could be comprehended against a bigger picture due to further discovery of documents.

(Interviews #8, #9, #10)

Well, I described earlier how in 2001 we, Randy, discovered all these kill orders, at least 15. We now say a total of 19. I guess 15 or 16 of those were discovered by Randy at that point. So are our views changed because of that? We knew that it was even more of a widespread phenomenon that refugees were being shot all over the place. Our other point is that our views were changed because the Pentagon did its investigation and interviewed many soldiers, many veterans, and many we did not talk to in a very difficult way. It's been a very slow process, not nearly complete, but we have gotten access to some of these transcripts of the Pentagon interviews. The Pentagon simply lied in its investigative report about what it was told by many of the veterans. The Pentagon said none of the pilots that they interviewed said they had orders to shoot refugees, to strafe refugees, but that was not true. We have the transcript of one pilot who told them that, but they covered these things up. Since we've been able to obtain these transcripts from, mostly from, the year 2000, that has changed our view and solidified the whole picture for us. (Interview #6)

At first, my father figured out that it was the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division involved in the massacre. And then it was me who figured out more concrete information in the 1<sup>st</sup>

Division, such as which regiment and battalion was at *No Gun Ri*. Then the AP team made it more concrete about which individual soldiers were there with the documents uncovered from the National Archives. There were no changes in the viewpoint of our arguments. The emergence of new archival documents provided more concrete and detailed information and refined my research. (Interview #4)

When we first published the *No Gun Ri* article, we didn't have that many documents. We found them later on. And these documents allowed us to see the *No Gun Ri* massacre in a bigger picture. We've learned that the *No Gun Ri* massacre was not the only incident of the kind in the Korean War. And it provided us an opportunity to see the *No Gun Ri* incident with the perspectives of the American methods in fighting wars and the American mentality in fighting wars. (Interview #3)

Finding that researchers were influenced by archival documents does not seem to be surprising. However, archival documents were not the only supporting materials they used, nor were they a major source. Many researchers indicated their attitude toward archival documents was neutral and required the reading and referencing of all possible sources to finally draw a conclusion. (Interview #11) In this process, the ability to interpret materials for their arguments became of importance in *No Gun Ri* research. With the *No Gun Ri* incident, when two, major, conflicting opinions existed, researchers attempted to identify more evidence from the archival documents and oral histories to bolster their personal point of view. Therefore, the interpretation of documents became a key issue, allowing one document's use in different contexts for each researcher's argument. Also, the dependence solely on archival evidence influenced the interpretation of the incident. In the course of interpreting the incident and developing the discussions on *No Gun Ri*, often a new understanding of a document was raised and new attention to a document was paid.

However, the Korean side felt differently. The Korean government felt that they couldn't promptly draw a conclusion only because there is no document saying so. The Pentagon insists that there was no order from a higher officer because there was no document

saying so, and there were no veterans stating that there was a massacre there. The Korean government has taken a different stance. They have taken into account the testimonies of some veterans who said that there was such an order from a higher officer. They have also taken into the account the testimonies of the survivors. They said that they cannot deny the fact of the event solely based on the non-existence of the relevant documents. I think the Korean government is taking the right position. In this case, archival documents play a very important role to both parties. Both sides are using different interpretations of archival documents to promote their conclusions. Sometimes to further their argument they don't publish certain documents or even refuse to shed any light on the existence of contradictory documents. I even think that they would choose interviewees who can give them a story more favorable towards their argument. (Interview #3)

Even when there was no new discovery of or within archival documents, there were cases when researchers placed new attention to already-known materials. In such cases, social interests and government attitudes toward the compensation of survivors influenced the research focus and, through this process, archival documents played a new role in research. A researcher phrased his experience of having new understanding of documents in *No Gun Ri* research:

After these episodes, I wrote my articles focusing on whether this massacre was accidentally initiated by the lowest level of soldiers or through the refugee policy ordered from the highest commander of the 8<sup>th</sup> Army in Korea. I used the same documents but this time I used them with a different focus. Early's letter read that his commander threatened to shoot him if he refused to shoot the refugees. In my earlier articles, I used some documents among the 25 to support my focus on the gaps between the Pentagon report and the truth of the massacre detailed in the documents that I had. Now this time I wrote my articles about the existence of the commander's order to shoot the refugees using other documents among the 25 which didn't have great influence in my early articles. So I think there was no emergence of additional documents, but as time goes by, some existing documents, which were not meaningful at a certain time, became meaningful at another time with a new focus and renewed interest about the massacre in my research. (Interview #7)

Regarding *No Gun Ri* research in general, archival documents were not the most important

materials on which researchers built their arguments. However, researchers needed these documents to support their arguments, which they said were based basically on the oral history of the survivors and veterans. In other words, archival documents were used as a method of propping up their argument's objective. Researchers gave archival documents covering the *No Gun Ri* incident a level of credibility similar to or less than that given to oral history, but they did not deny the importance of using archival documents in their research and the importance of such documents as supplementary evidence for confirming and cross-checking the oral histories they used. Thus, there was a discrepancy in the researchers' perceptions between the actual usage of archival documents in the research process and the recognition of its credibility.

#### **6.4 RESEARCHERS' PERCEPTION OF USING ARCHIVES**

Several researchers did not seem to be very aware of the existence of archives, especially researchers in fields other than history. Basically, they did not have much of an idea about archives and the using of primary documents even though they used archival materials directly or indirectly in their research. Some Korean researchers said they did not know about the existence of the national archives in Korea (the National Archives and Records Service) when they first began their research. In fact, the National Archives and Records Service was still a small, yet fast-growing institute when the *No Gun Ri* story first broke in Korea. Under such circumstances, it is very likely these researchers did not have many ideas on the concept of "archives," or their idea of "archives" may have been slightly different from that of archivists due to their lack of awareness.

Actually, I didn't know much about the National Archives of Korea. I was not aware that they would have many materials about the event. If I had searched that place, then I might have been able to find something, but I didn't. I went to the National Assembly Library instead, wishing to obtain some materials from there. (Interview #4)

I didn't have any idea about the National Archives in mind when I did my research. (Interview #2)

I knew that the AP team had spent more than a year and a half or two years collecting data and interviewing survivors before they published their reports. Compared to that, I didn't spend so much time in interviewing the survivors. But I had interviews with some. I don't know if you call this type of oral history an archival material in a broader definition, but I used them. In general, most parts of my journalism very much relied on archival documents. (Interview #7)

One researcher who did extensive archival research also seemed to be subtly confused in using the term "archival materials" since he referred to old newspaper articles and personal papers as historical materials while differentiating them from archival materials.

And of course, on the other side, you asked about historical materials, naturally there are many books including the official history of the U.S. Army and the Korean Military. Sang-hun checked the Korean history. We checked many many old newspaper files from that time, and periodicals and magazines because we wanted to make sure nobody had reported it at that time. We even went to various universities, either went there or they cooperated with us, we checked on a journalist who left personal papers at universities. These journalists we know were in the area at that time. And we wanted to make sure their notebooks didn't include something about *No Gun Ri*, so we got to hold their personal papers. You know, universities Xeroxed pages from those notebooks. (Interview #6)

*No Gun Ri* researchers responded that they were shared with archival documents, first by survivors' organization and later by researchers who had similar viewpoints. Some researchers mentioned sharing information not only with fellow researchers but also with the general readership. While they said they benefited from the Internet and various databases, they further

stated they could now take advantage of this network technology to get closer to their general readership as well as other researchers with tangible evidence.

And additionally, the Internet databases were very important in searching for the names today. We probably would not have been able to do the *No Gun Ri* journalism without the Internet. If this had come up 10 years earlier, we may have not been able to do it because we wouldn't have been able to find so many men so quickly. So we could make all these calls - dozens of dozens of them. I think we ended up talking with more than 200 soldiers, so we wouldn't have been able to do that so quickly. Just a random point, one is that with the Internet today, what the AP was able to do with the journalism when we published the journalism - it went into the newspaper in the traditional way - but we also constructed a very elaborate online presentation that gave people the documents. So they can see the documents themselves. So the archives were brought directly to the media audience and that adds tremendous credibility to the journalism. They could even hear the video interviews with the soldier and such. (Interview #6)

In conclusion, the findings of the interviews with *No Gun Ri* researchers on their perception of using archives and assigning credibility to source materials indicate several important aspects. First and foremost, researchers did not trust archival documents as fully as they described the documents in their publications. They only exhibited partial trust in the contents of documents – only for obvious facts and clear evidence of certain activities from documents -- as addressed in the previous section. The way they formed their conclusions, which were very understandable, is a methodical process of collecting all possible evidence, including archival documents, oral history and even forensic evidence.

The second clearly identified finding is that *No Gun Ri* researchers depended more on oral history for the comprehension of the event as a whole. They gave more credibility to oral history, especially the collective memory of survivors, for the whole picture of the incident, and attempted to place the oral history at the center of their arguments. They then attempted to find substantiating, supplementary evidence from archival documents.



The third important finding was that not all *No Gun Ri* researchers actively searched archival documents. There was only a small group of researchers who explored and discovered archival evidence, and others then used those already-discovered documents. This became especially possible and more encouraging to researchers because these materials were made available on the web - not just the contents but the entire image of them. Later researchers, therefore, had the privilege of using them without expending any particular efforts on a trip to an archive. Although digitizing archival materials in general involves a great number of maintenance problems of various forms, it surely is a great method to promote the usage of archival holdings by researchers, at least it was so in the *No Gun Ri* case.

Another finding from the experiences of *No Gun Ri* researchers is that most who responded used archival materials not just for a specific description for the incident, but also for looking at general information surrounding the *No Gun Ri* incident. They visited a great number of archives and checked various types of materials to search for any hints on the incident. For example, archival documents were used as a tool to seek the names of veterans who participated or witnessed the incident, for later interviews by researchers. Archival documents were also sought to find any evidence on general policies toward refugees during the general period of the Korean War. This phenomenon was quite frequently seen in historical research and was already exemplified in another user study in the archival field, as follows: “The historians to whom we talked expressed interest not only in the information that was directly related to their topic but also in any information that tangentially threw light on it. These historians wanted to know about the people, organizations, events, and the general background of their topic because they do not merely seek information, they interpret it. No interpretation is possible without a solid

appreciation for the meaning of, or the reasons why, records were created.”<sup>261</sup>

The findings from the interviews with *No Gun Ri* researchers revealed one last and very important point. Since the incident happened, the survivors and victims have collected and collated an oral history and their own collective memory. Through this process, they accumulated their own archives on this event, including their petition letters and denial responses, an oral history of the villagers, and photographs from the early 1960s. One survivor’s family conducted extensive research on *No Gun Ri* under the rigid and repressive social and political atmosphere in Korea, without much knowledge regarding searching archives and other materials. Over time, he wrote novels about the event, collected an oral history, and compiled lists of the victims and other damages. Based on his efforts and other survivors’ collaboration, the *No Gun Ri* story finally received long overdue publicity in Korea and in the U.S.

Korean people do not value recording culture very strongly. It was not like this until 100 years ago. However, my father was very keen to record what he went through. From 1960, he has accumulated records on his own about the *No Gun Ri* massacre. He did spot investigations in 1960 and even took pictures of the bridge tunnels which had tons of bullet marks. . . He wrote down everything about what he discovered or what he went through to seek the truth about *No Gun Ri*. He preserved all the documents he created and receipts for legal claims for disclosure of the incident. He created his own document for the incident summary and details of damages and casualties. He collected his villagers’ testimonies and all other documents. He preserved them for more than 43 years. I think his book, my research and our claims were possible thanks to his great effort to document all these activities. There is no one else who did this job of documenting *No Gun Ri* incident among other survivors. (Interview #4)

The survivors’ efforts to publicize their story extended to collecting more substantiating material and making available these materials to researchers. From understanding the survivors’ efforts,

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<sup>261</sup> Wendy M. Duff and Catherine A. Johnson, “Accidentally Found on Purpose: Information-Seeking Behavior of Historians in Archives,” *Library Quarterly* 72:4 (2002): 487.

archivists may be able to learn a way to promote the usage of archives and provide outreach to their patrons and potential researchers of their invaluable holdings.

## 7.0 IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS

The preceding two chapters described the role of archival documents in the *No Gun Ri* research and the historical perceptions of the *No Gun Ri* researchers about using archival materials for their research. These chapters were designed to find the answers to the research questions proposed earlier in this study:

1. As seen in the *No Gun Ri* massacre research, how do researchers use archival materials?
2. Has the research of the *No Gun Ri* massacre changed in light of an expansion of available archival resources?
3. What does the use of archival materials in the building of knowledge about the *No Gun Ri* massacre reveal about the actual state of researchers' archival use in conducting research on recent history?

The first question was specifically addressed in Chapter Five, in the analysis of *No Gun Ri* publications, and the third question was dealt with in Chapter Six regarding interview results with *No Gun Ri* researchers. The second question was answered generally throughout the entire data analysis process of publications and *No Gun Ri* researchers' interviews. In Chapter Five, a total of 503 publications (including journalistic articles and academic materials) were analyzed to determine any correlation between archival documents and *No Gun Ri* discussions. Those publications were collected from the United States and Korea and dated from 1994 to 2006. Chapter six consisted of the analysis of the interviews with some of the major *No Gun Ri* researchers. Eleven researchers were interviewed by this author with nine open-ended questions

regarding their research process and their perception of using archives. This chapter now builds upon the analysis of the preceding two chapters. The research results are presented as responding to the research questions to address how each question was answered and what were the major findings of this study.

## 7.1 FINDINGS OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS

**Research Question 1:** As seen in the *No Gun Ri* massacre research, how do researchers use archival materials?

In general, the *No Gun Ri* researchers used archival materials. Some researchers sought out archival evidence more vigorously than others, but basically most of the researchers referenced, used, and/or cited (or recited) archival materials. The methods regarding how they approached those materials were not particularly different from those for usual historical research. Many of them began their search of relevant sources by tracing the citations of their colleagues' publications. *No Gun Ri* researchers used published reference books as search tools for further information. They went to archives and looked up finding aids. They also filed FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) requests and sometimes even deployed their acquaintances to obtain archival documents abroad.

There were a total of 432 journalistic articles and 71 academic publications on *No Gun Ri* research analyzed in this study. In those publications, 1,096 passages in journalistic articles and 1,780 passages in academic works were devoted to *No Gun Ri* discussions for the overall time period of 1994 to 2006. Within such discussions, archival documents were used 1,514 times, secondary materials 942 times and interview testimonies of survivors and veterans 1,788 times.

As seen from these numbers, archival documents were used almost as significantly as oral histories for *No Gun Ri* discussions. The proportion of secondary materials used was relatively small - equivalent to 22.2% - while archival documents and oral testimonies of survivors and veterans reached 35.67% and 42.13%, respectively. The dependency of archival documents regarding *No Gun Ri* discussion, as seen from the frequency of use, increased from 16.67% in the first period (before September 1999) to 27.57% in the second period (September 1999 to May 2000), 47.71% in the third period (May 2000 to January 2001), and 35.2% in the last period (January 2001 to 2006). Meanwhile, the researchers' tendency to use interview testimonies of survivors and veterans as a supporting source generally decreased over time (from 55.56% in the first period to 57.32% in the second period, 21.37% in the third period, and 43.1% in the fourth period); however, usage still occupied a significant portion for a considerable period of time. In the second period, when the controversy over the veracity of some veterans' interview testimonies was raised, (which was one of the top discussions in this period), archival evidence was used as a major source to prove the truthfulness/untruthfulness of these veterans' testimonies. In addition, there sometimes were controversies over the military documents related to these veterans on how to interpret them for this discussion. Therefore, the usage of archival documents in *No Gun Ri* discussions in this period seemed to significantly outnumber interview testimonies.

Overall, archival documents were extremely important for *No Gun Ri* research, including factual information about locations, time, dates, and names, as archival documents were used to establish maximum credibility. Circumstantial information in archival documents was used with differing weights by different researchers but still used extensively throughout *No Gun Ri* research. Refugee policy and air strike policy-related documents provided for divergent interpretation by researchers. Most *No Gun Ri* researchers viewed them as the most important

background evidence for the atrocity while some conservative researchers, including the U.S. government's investigation team, did not consider them as providing evidence for *No Gun Ri*.

There were a variety of researcher groups involved in understanding and comprehending *No Gun Ri*. However, all of these researchers were not keen to access archival evidence on *No Gun Ri*. Some researchers were more eager to obtain crucial evidence than others. This phenomenon is probably repeated in any historical research. In the *No Gun Ri* case, some researchers' vigorous efforts to unearth important evidence practically benefited the work of other colleagues. *No Gun Ri* survivors and their families accumulated and constructed related evidence and the collective memory in oral histories and made available the results to journalists in Korea for the purpose of getting publicity on such an event. Many Korean journalists, including one of the AP reporters, received related materials from the survivors and used such materials for their basic research.

Once the AP reporters published their *No Gun Ri* articles, they shared military documents and other materials, which they discovered during the process of their research, with readers and other researchers through the Internet by posting such documents and materials on their websites. Journalists from *U.S. News and World Report* also shared the documents they used for their arguments on the web. With the convenience of easy distribution and access of information via the Internet, many researchers were able to use already-discovered documents that just happened to be available to them without any effort expended for extensive archival search. The information shared on the web and provided by survivors invited more researchers from various fields to this subject. In fact, *No Gun Ri* attracted researchers with a variety of expertise in areas such as law, sociology, political science, media studies, and the military as well as general journalism. Researchers other than those who had a history background do not seem to have had

much experience using archives and not all researchers seem to have had enough resources to travel abroad for archival searching, but they still could use archival materials for their research due to the active information sharing in this subject.

The researchers of *No Gun Ri* used archival materials in their publications with special emphasis, and research publications which contained substantiating archival evidence seemed to be more influential on later research. Early research depended heavily on oral testimonies of survivors because there were only a few archival documents discovered at that time. This small amount of archival documents provided the uniqueness to research and such documents were given more credibility and emphasis. Korean researchers, specially, gave special emphasis to archival documents since archival documents found in American archives were very rare at that time since the *No Gun Ri* incident was still relatively unknown.

Later, after the first AP's article was published, the incident gained sensational attention both nationally and internationally partly because it introduced some important documentary evidence on the incident. Following this publication controversies and discussions also emerged and were argued along the same lines, particularly with the expansion of newly-discovered archival documents and new attention to existing materials. In many cases, archival documents were the catalysts for discussions on the subject and the impetus for further research. *No Gun Ri* researchers used archival materials more often, with credibility, to prove circumstantial facts and fragments surrounding the incident. For example, in the discussions of specific facts - such as identifying the participating army unit involved in the killing, actual frontlines at that time, general refugee policies and air bombardment policies issued before and during the incident - archival materials were used as major supporting material. In some cases, military documents themselves were targets of controversy in terms of how to interpret them.



There were no noticeable differences in using archival documents between Korean researchers and American researchers. American researchers did have more access to the archives in the U.S. and in fact, they had the opportunity to discover more documents on *No Gun Ri*. However, the images and contents of documents on the Internet and information sharing among researchers made it easy for Korean researchers to review such documents as well. Even though Korean researchers were not able to expand the archival evidence on the event, they still had tried to visit archives and records centers in Korea to search for documentation. In terms of discovering archival evidence, Korean researchers had only limited outcomes, but in the use of them there were no big differences between the researchers.

**Research Question 2:** Has the research of the *No Gun Ri* massacre changed in light of an expansion of available archival resources?

The analysis of the relationship between the *No Gun Ri* discussions and the emergence of archival materials in publications explicitly displayed that archival documents definitely influenced research on *No Gun Ri*. The *No Gun Ri* discussions emerged and developed along with the expansion of new and available archival documents or new recognition of already-known documents. When a new archival document was discovered, researchers' interest on *No Gun Ri* was heightened and subsequent new documents further inspired research on specific aspects suggested by those documents. Edward Daily-related military documents, the Roger's memo and Muccio's letter were clear examples of such cases.

Archival evidence was the main source for generating controversy, as especially seen in the controversy over the veracity of the interview testimony of Edward Daily. Daily finally accepted that he could not dispute the archival evidence and said what he had originally testified

might have been heard secondhand and was *not* his direct experience. As another example, refugee-related policy and air strike policy documents provided the contextual information on the incident to *No Gun Ri* researchers. As more researchers became involved in this project, more policy documents were discovered, and it was finally understood that harsh refugee-related policies were issued for the whole war period. The exodus of refugees nationwide was very troublesome throughout the war in Korea, and *No Gun Ri* was merely one more place that saw the same problem.<sup>262</sup> These circumstances offered the researchers a clearer understanding of the incident, from a bigger picture, as articulated by the researchers in the interviews with this author.

A pattern generally seen from the earliest research to the most recent, and as explored supporting source materials on the *No Gun Ri* research diverged and increased, *No Gun Ri* discussions became more specific and focused. At first, survivors' oral history was the most used source for researchers, but as more archival evidence was discovered, it was used more often than other source materials. Early research concentrated on the discussions of the general descriptions of how the incident happened, but later discussions were developed on more focused issues, such as which army unit participated, the veracity of some veterans' interview testimony, various approaches to understand the actual war situations in the broader area, how refugee policies worked on lower army units, the relations between the ground force and the air force in war operations, reasonable inference for the number of victims, other possible causes for the atrocity, and the interpretation of certain military records. On these focused and detailed discussions, archival materials were more influential than other source materials.

However, the level of archival materials' influence seemed to be different between that shown from actual research and that perceived by researchers. Many *No Gun Ri* researchers in

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<sup>262</sup> In fact, after *No Gun Ri* was publicized, there were many other similar incidents (more than 60) that were alleged to have happened in Korea.

interviews with this author confessed that they did not consider archival documents more important than the oral histories of survivors and veterans. They considered oral history as the most important source for building their arguments and tried to use archival materials as supplementary evidence to support the oral histories. Even though their perception on archival documents was not exactly in accordance with what they expressed in their research, the impact of the archival sources cannot be overlooked. Obviously, *No Gun Ri* researchers cited archival materials a great number of times in their publications. Archival materials definitely played an important role in the *No Gun Ri* research as it was a device to draw researcher's attention, as an impetus for further research, and as evidence for specific discussions on the event.

In this sense, archival sources became an important foundation on which to build and influence the public knowledge of *No Gun Ri*. In the whole of *No Gun Ri*'s public knowledge building process, archival documents certainly played a role to lead, expand, and refine discussions and, in a larger sense, archival documents played a role in establishing the *No Gun Ri* history and its public memory, particularly as one of the major sources for related and collaborative evidence. Even before *No Gun Ri* became known to the general public, survivors had accumulated their own archives and used the information therein to bolster their allegations. They also provided the archives to other researchers, and these archives thus became the basis of materials for the early research on *No Gun Ri*. Later, researchers discovered more archival documents and shared them with other researchers and the general readership, with additional information such as video clips of the interviews with survivors, veterans, and other experts in law and the military, through the Internet. Such information, by and large, became the fundamental building blocks of *No Gun Ri*'s history, embracing all the supporting source materials thereby creating the controversies and promoting the discussions in research. As a

whole, the public memory of *No Gun Ri* has been built based on the discovery of related archival materials, the accumulation of survivors' and veterans' collective memories and their own archives, and through the sharing of such information.

The expectation that archival materials should imply “the truthfulness” of a certain event actually did not seem to exist in researchers' minds regarding the *No Gun Ri* case. The importance of interpretation of archival documents for *No Gun Ri* research was one of the issues that researchers mentioned. Even though they gave significant credibility to archival materials for specific discussions, researchers still warned that archival documents could be very subjective and biased. Especially since *No Gun Ri* was a wrongdoing perpetrated by American soldiers, many researchers saw that honest and accurate military records may not have been created by those same soldiers. Therefore, the paradigm of truthfulness as a component of an archival record was not applicable in *No Gun Ri* research. In this sense, the concept of “record” could be revisited through the process of *No Gun Ri* research. As Brien Brothman suggested while considering the weak sense of record, other interpretive contexts – economic, institutional, political, sociological, philosophical, psychological, cultural, historical and so on - around a record would “determine the nature of those very documents that have served to entrench the primacy of juridical conceptions of record and record making in the first place,”<sup>263</sup> and this concept of record works better in the case of *No Gun Ri* research.

The interpretation of and the contentions over the records were two of the many contributing elements of *No Gun Ri* research particularly in the process of seeking the truth of the incident. In this process, there were disputes among researchers about the untruthfulness or insufficiency of evidence in documents and there also was a different recognition (of weight) of

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<sup>263</sup> Brien Brothman, “Afterglow: Conceptions of Record and Evidence in Archival Discourse,” *Archival Science* 2 (2002): 321.

certain documents by different researchers. Many controversies and discussions over the details of *No Gun Ri* were raised, argued, and developed due to different interpretations of some archival documents, especially military records, among researchers. Depending on the point of view on the incident, some documents were considered more important than others and interpreted differently. As a quick example, many researchers considered a document from a neighboring regiment that read “No Refugee to cross the frontline. Fire everyone trying to cross lines” as important evidence to provide a context around *No Gun Ri*, but the U.S. government’s investigative team did not take that observation into account for *No Gun Ri* based on the fact that the document did not come from the same army unit as that accused of perpetrating the crime. Due to the ambiguous aspects of the incident, interpretation of documents had a great impact on *No Gun Ri* discussion.

**Research Question 3:** What does the use of archival materials in the building of knowledge about the *No Gun Ri* massacre reveal about the actual state of researchers’ archival use in conducting research on recent history?

The methods that *No Gun Ri* researchers utilized for using archives and conducting their research did not seem to be very different from any other historical research. Similar to other existing archival user studies, *No Gun Ri* researchers used informal sources more often than formal sources to seek relevant materials. This is especially due to the efforts of the survivors’ organization and some journalists in sharing related materials. This finding is in accordance with earlier user studies conducted in the archival field with other subject groups of users such as genealogists and historians. It was noted that these groups “relied more heavily on colleagues

and an informal network than on archivists.”<sup>264</sup>

*No Gun Ri* researchers developed strong networks of source information sharing with other researchers who shared a similar viewpoint about the incident. They provided their own information to colleague and researchers and in some cases, they seemed to have prioritized the public interest or the honor for their own military group over the institutional interest in terms of sharing information. When the AP reporters encountered a problem with publishing further research, they shared their own discovered archival documents with some Korean journalists. A military historian shared what he discovered from military documents from the standpoint of American veterans with other journalists who shared the same understanding about the event and who themselves were veterans of this army unit. Therefore, informal networking for information was vividly seen in *No Gun Ri* research.

This pattern of the use of archival materials for *No Gun Ri* research suggests one very important concern to archivists. As mentioned, in the process of *No Gun Ri* research, it was survivors and journalists who approached other researchers with related archival materials as a way to expand social awareness of the event and to advertise the story. The majority of other researchers were passively provided such materials. These passionate, initial researchers discovered, advertised, and brought the archival materials to their colleagues. Therefore, the delivery of archival materials to potential archives users was not carried out by archivists or any information professionals in the *No Gun Ri* case. However, *No Gun Ri* researchers admitted and agreed in the interviews with this author that they still wished archives had provided a more proactive outreach to let researchers know about their archival holdings and wished archival searching tools were more efficient both in format and in content.

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<sup>264</sup> Wendy M. Duff and Catherine A. Johnson, “Where Is the List with All the Names? Information-Seeking Behavior of Genealogists,” *American Archivist* 66 (Spring/Summer 2003): 93-94.

One phenomenon identified as a result of this study was that digitizing archival documents and making them available online greatly promoted researchers' use of them. It was the result of a few news agencies' endeavors in the *No Gun Ri* case that placed the images and contents of related archival documents on the web; this in turn resulted in greater efficiency in research by other colleagues who were not able to travel abroad to search materials or who were not familiar with archives. In fact, the archival community has discussed more active approaches to their patrons by utilizing digital technology of their holdings for some time. However, it was shown in the case of *No Gun Ri* that archivists and the archival community were still not very proactive in promoting and making available archival materials to researchers. Rather, it was journalists who did the work that archivists should have considered. Various proactive services made available to archival users will definitely bring more users to archives. As Helen Tibbo maintains, making archives' web sites more reliable sources of extensive information will promote the use of archives (and it was proven true in the *No Gun Ri* case). She also addresses the importance of advertising the presence of this information to the user community as a proactive approach to patrons; in other words, it is time to think about creating such an archival database.<sup>265</sup>

Another interesting finding is that the active archival users in *No Gun Ri* research were not typical archives users. The general public (survivors and family) and journalists were some of the most frequent archives-goers in addition to historians (including military historians). These researchers were the heaviest contributors to the discovery of new archival documents and expanded interests in such materials among other researchers. Even though one law scholar did not discover any critical documents, he mentioned that he went to search for the United Nations

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<sup>265</sup> Helen Tibbo, "Primarily History in America: How U.S. Historians Search for Primary Materials at the Dawn of the Digital Age," *American Archivist* 66 (Spring/Summer 2003): 29.

documents and other diplomatic documents in some archival collections himself. Additionally, when a researcher needed to seek critical archival documents, he showed such an active interest that he actually moved to the Washington D.C. area for many months to conduct such a search. Another researcher deployed his acquaintances to archives abroad when he was not able to travel for further archival searching.

*No Gun Ri* researchers also wished to have topically-prepared information reference materials about archival holdings. With regard to library materials, there have been various published subject-reference tools dealing with many different approaches to subjects. Library reference tools now include a great many different databases for a variety of topical indexes and catalogues. If there was a reference tool for Korean War records covering various record formats from multiple archives, it would have been a great source for *No Gun Ri* researchers. The *Foreign Relations of the United States* was used for *No Gun Ri* research, but more specific subject coverage might have been a better source for researchers. Even with regards to a representative reference tool of archives, finding aids, some researchers mentioned difficulty or unfamiliarity using them. One way to solve this problem would be a more proactive archival user education program. Another possible approach could be to develop archival description and descriptive standards as a way to provide contexts and processes surrounding records with a value-driven selection of facts that could display a story on record contents, as asserted by Wendy Duff and Verne Harris.<sup>266</sup> This approach would have been more helpful for the *No Gun Ri* research, *if* it had been materialized in archives.

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<sup>266</sup> Wendy Duff and Verne Harris, "Stories and Names: Archival Description as Narrating Records and Constructing Meanings," *Archival Science* 2:3-4 (2002): 263-285.



## 7.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND FURTHER RESEARCH DIRECTION

### Limitations

During the process of this study, the author encountered unexpected limitations which were not identified at the beginning. The following are the limitations and how they affected this study.

Interviewees sometimes talked in general about their experience of using archives and archival materials. Some *No Gun Ri* researchers conducted their *No Gun Ri* research as a part of bigger research projects. When *No Gun Ri* research appeared as a part of an article, a book, or other work, the researchers tend to talk about their experiences in archives in general, not just about *No Gun Ri* in particular. Therefore, interview results, in part, describe a more comprehensive experience of using archives than as a specific case of *No Gun Ri* research. No specific patterns on general archival searching compared to that of *No Gun Ri* searching were identified, but these researchers used broader terms and tended to mention a generalized idea about archives.

American news articles were retrieved from the LexisNexis database (LexisNexis Academic) for the publication analysis in this study; this database also includes news transcripts. Oftentimes some of the news transcripts were not actually chosen to be published in an actual newspaper. Therefore, the news articles analyzed here might have included some news transcripts that would not have been read by readers; however, these situations occurred mostly with short, fact-describing news articles, rather than lengthy, research-oriented articles. The author assumes, therefore, the influence of this limitation to this study is extremely small.

Government researchers were not always easy to identify. In the case of the U.S. government's investigation report of the incident, there was no mention about who the actual researchers were. The names identified in the report were only the higher ranking officers who

were in charge of this case, such as the Secretary of the Army and the Inspector General, and those who were in the outside advisory group. There was a similar situation with the case of the Korean report, but this author could determine that some of the top officials of the investigation published articles later in journals about the incident and the process of the government investigation. However, it was again not easy to identify their contact information or receive a response from them. Therefore, the author was only able to conduct interviews with journalists, historians, a survivor's family member, and academic researchers in other areas, excluding government investigators in both countries.

### **Further Research Direction**

In the phase of ending the study, it was understood that the findings of this study only confirmed that more research needs to be done to understand about archives' users from their research point of view and how archival services can satisfy their needs. A topical approach to archives users will allow one to observe who the active archival users are (who have not been previously identified as typical archives users from usual user studies), how they locate/approach/use archival materials and how archival holdings influence their research. In the *No Gun Ri* case, there were many different groups of researchers other than historians who went to archives to search for materials. It was identified that *No Gun Ri* researchers exhibited very positive attitudes in searching for archival evidence. Archival materials considerably influenced discussions on the incident throughout the most publications. These are valuable findings about archives users from the *No Gun Ri* study, but the need still exists for more topical user studies to identify generalizable findings from empirical situations of the actual users and the actual research products. In fact, the archival community has shown little interest on the archival user as seen

from actual historical research. More research with a narrowed topical approach like this study would generate empirical insights on the realistic status of the usage of archival holdings.

This study also raised more questions than it actually answered about drawing a clear picture of the correlation between archival documents and the public knowledge and/or public memory of an event. Archival documents previously had been seen as one of the most influencing source materials on public memory through research in the archival field. However, there has been little research in the archival field that addresses the empirical understanding on the impact of archival materials on the public memory of a certain event. In the *No Gun Ri* case, it was proved that archival materials played an important role in creating public knowledge and played a part in building public memory. However, *No Gun Ri* is still an on-going event which has not been yet settled legally and whose history needs more accumulation and comprehension in research. Therefore, it would be meaningful to research an analysis of the relationship between archival materials and public memory in selecting another historical event that has already been researched/ remembered/ revisited/ reconstructed for some time. It could provide a better understanding for the current role of archival materials in creating public memory in an empirical setting.

However, even though *No Gun Ri* became known quite recently, it drew a great attention from the public as well as researchers in various fields. Therefore, as more publicity about the incident was gained in Korea as well as in the U.S., more approaches to the incident from various aspects have been attempted. Since the first publicity, books have been written, conferences and symposiums convened, cartoons created, a movie filmed, and numerous exhibitions held about the *No Gun Ri* massacre. With the understanding that all these activities of remembering and recollecting work as building blocks for public memory, further research about the public

memory of *No Gun Ri*, presented through these activities, can be performed. In this way, more diverse approaches to the *No Gun Ri* history could be possible beyond seen from archival materials.

In addition, users' perceptions of record should be understood by archivists and applied to archival services. In the *No Gun Ri* case, archival records were used to increase the credibility of evidence, mainly with absolute facts or circumstantial information. Records were not perceived to represent the truthfulness of a certain activity. Some records, whose contents could be interpreted in multiple ways, were not given full credibility by researchers. In fact, *No Gun Ri* research exhibited two different versions of the story - Korean survivors' and the U.S. government's - and interpretation of military records from one point of view was different from that of another's. Due to this situation, researchers considered records as supplementary evidence for oral history and as accountable evidence only for factual information. They instead regarded the context surrounding records more important (for example, missing records from the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment) and believed the interpretation process to be an essential step of their research. In this sense, researchers' perceptions about the property of a record, its characteristics, and its definition should be considered in further research in the archival field because *how* they think of records will determine *how* they use them. Thus, if *how* users think of archives is different from how archivists think of them, the service that archivists offer their users might not be fully effective and helpful to their users. Therefore, further research about the concept of records perceived by archival researchers in an empirical situation should be attempted to better understand their archives' users and their research and finally provide truly helpful and efficient services.

### 7.3 CONCLUSION

In this study, there was no preconceived idea or extant theory to verify in the first place. From the collected data by content analysis of publications and interview, the author tried to find an explanation and tendency of researchers' work patterns and the relationship and impact of archival materials in their work. By understanding the uniqueness of the *No Gun Ri* massacre, about the massacre itself and the research process, this study began with the basic premise that archival documents played an important role in the process of building public knowledge of the incident. In fact, archival documents were essential source materials to researchers for their publications and a major player for stimulating heated controversies and discussions and, consequently, providing the impetus for further publications to *No Gun Ri* researchers.

In this process of understanding the *No Gun Ri* research and the researchers, some specific aspects and phenomena were identified. The following is a brief summary of these findings learned from this study.

1. From the publication analysis, it was revealed that archival materials were used to support the details of researchers' arguments an enormous number of times. However, in the interviews it was determined that many researchers, in reality, considered oral history as the most valuable and influential evidence for their major ideas and they used archival documents to provide hard facts related to the details of oral history. That is, major arguments were built based on the oral histories of survivors and veterans, and then later, researchers sought archival evidence for specific facts and details that, in part, confirmed their arguments. Oral history was the primary source for building arguments of the majority of researchers in their perception, unlike the assumption that archival materials would be the chief source in research. Also, the researchers acknowledged that there could be many cases of incompleteness and bias of archival

documents, especially military records created in a harsh war situation. The U.S. government's investigative team and an American military historian announced their suspicions of "collective memory" and the infallibility of human memory, but most other researchers seemed to accept oral history as a major source.

2. Not everyone was aware of archives and eager to search for evidence at the same level. Some researchers were more intent on obtaining archival evidence than others. These major discoverers of archival documents showed very active attitudes for searching within archives. However, the majority of other researchers only passively approached archival documents due to information sharing by survivors and other journalists and web postings of the image files of major documents. The major archival researchers for *No Gun Ri* were survivors and families of the incident (none of them had a history or research background), some journalists from major news agencies and some historians (including a military historian). The portion of historians among the active archival researchers was rather small, unlike archivists' preconceptions about users.

3. There was no big difference in the behavior of *No Gun Ri* researchers, in general, in searching archives and conducting research. Many researchers began their research on *No Gun Ri* when they first obtained critical archival documents (either through their own discovery or by being provided by other researchers). All of them had a general interest in the incident. From such interest, the incident at *No Gun Ri* caught their attention. Thus, when they were then exposed to related evidence, they finally began further and more indepth research. Many researchers often began their research by "tracking down" relevant materials from other related research's citations. Then they attempted narrowing their searches within archives. Some researchers with a history background seemed to be more familiar with using archives than

others. However, even historians with a number of prior archival experiences still met with difficulty when using searching tools that finally lead to the actual archival evidence and also in terms of a practical approach to making copies of actual documents.

4. Archival materials played a critical role in understanding the *No Gun Ri* incident. Archival documents were the critical pieces of evidence for specific information about the incident as well as a good source for the background and circumstantial information. Dates, military positions and movements, the war situations at Yongdong, as well as the general refugee policies and the air bombardment policies during that time and over the whole wartime were confirmed and proved through the use of archival documents. General record keeping situations such as missing documents (not the actual contents of them) also provided a circumstantial context of the incident. Major controversies over the incident were raised and argued based on the new discovery of archival documents.

5. Even though archival materials were used heavily in the *No Gun Ri* research, their truthfulness was not fully accepted by the researchers. Interpretation of archival documents was the most important procedure in the *No Gun Ri* research, and a certain record could be used in different contexts with different interpretations according to a researcher's argument. In fact, for the *No Gun Ri* massacre where there exist two conflicting versions of the story, interpretation of documents varied according to a researcher's argument. The fact that military documents were created and maintained by those who were responsible for the *No Gun Ri* killing made researchers suspicious about the trustworthiness of the documents. Therefore, many researchers tried to find and use only hard facts and absolute details from documents. In this sense, *No Gun Ri* researchers did not give full credibility to all archival documents as evidence to understanding the incident.

These aforementioned findings provide concrete ideas of how archival materials were used in the actual research, the impact of archival sources on the *No Gun Ri* research, the actual research patterns of *No Gun Ri* researchers and how they located and approached archival materials for their research. From these findings, additional insights could shed light on future directions of archival activities to approach potential archives users.



**APPENDIX A.**

**LIST OF PUBLICATIONS ON THE *NO GUN RI* MASSACRE**

**A.1 LIST OF PUBLICATIONS BEFORE SEPTEMBER 29 1999**

**<Journalistic Publications>**

	Author	Title	Journal Title/ Publisher, Publication Year	Page
1	Oh, Yeon-ho 오연호	First Testimony – Massacre of 300 Villagers by the American Soldiers in Yong-dong Chung-buk in the Korean War 최초증언 6.25 참전 미군의 충북 영동 양민 3 백여명 학살 사건	Monthly Mal, July 1994 월간 말 1994 년 7 월호	36-45
2	Hwang, Sun-gu 황순구	Survivors of <i>No Gun Ri</i> Claim Compensation to the U.S. 미군 노근리 양민 학살 피해 유가족/ 미에 손해배상 요구계획	Hankyoreh, July 3 1994 한겨레 July 3 1994	pg. 15
3	Hwang, Sun-gu 황순구	American Massacre/ Time for Memorials of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Victims 미군 양민학살' 노근리의 제사철	Hankyoreh, July 21 1994 한겨레 July 21 1994	pg. 17
4	Hwang, Sun-gu 황순구	U.S. Soldiers' Massacre of Refugees/ Survivors Organization Legal Claim to Government 한국전 당시 미군 양민집단학살/ 노근리대책위 국가상대 손배소	Hankyoreh, August 25 1994 한겨레 August 25 1994	
5	So, Chung-gwon 서중권	Refugee Killing by US Soldiers in the Korean War/ Legal Claim to Government 6.25 때 미군이 양민학살/ 국가 상대로 손배소 제기	Munhwa Ilbo, August 27 1997 문화일보, August 27 1997	pg. 29
6	Chi, Chang-eun 지창은	The Massacre of Korean Refugees by American Solders, Need to Claim for Compensation 미군 양민학살, 국가 배상하라	Hankyoreh 21, 174, Sept. 11 1997 한겨레 21, 174 호, Sept. 11 1997	

	Yi, Sung-han 이승한	40년 전 집단학살, 왜 쏘았나	Kungmin Ilbo June 15 1998 국민일보 June 15 1998	pg. 21
7	Yi, Sung-han 이승한	Seeking for Truth and Compensation/ Eun-yong Chong, President of Survivors' Organization 진상밝히고 피해보상을/ 노근리학살사건 대책위원장 정은용씨	Kungmin Ilbo June 15 1998 국민일보 June 15 1998	pg. 21
8	Yun, Sang-ho 윤상호	Eun-yong Chong, President of Survivors' Organization 정은용 '노근리 사건' 대책 위원장	Tong-A Ilbo July 27 1998 동아일보 July 27 1998	pg. 17
9	Oh, Yeon-ho 오연호	American Soldier Finally Testify the Massacre of 400 Refugees in Yongdong in July 1950 50년 7월 영동주민 400명 학살관련 미 제 1기병사단 병사들 마침내 입을열다	Wolgan Mal 156, June 1999 월간 말 156, June 1999	77-79

### <Academic Publications>

	Author	Title	Journal Title/ Publisher, Publication Year	Page
1	Chong, Eun-yong 정은용	Have You Heard of Our Agony? 그대, 우리의 아픔을 아는가	Seoul: Tari Media, 1994 다리 미디어, 1994	
2	Choi, Pyong-su and Ku-do Chong 최병수, 정구도	A Study on A Massacre of Civilians in Young-dong area, Chung-chong Province in the Early Stage of the Korean War (1) 6.25 동란 초기 충북 영동지구의 민간인 살상사건에 관한 연구(1): 老斤里의 美軍 對良民 集團殺傷事件을 중심으로	Journal of Humanities 17:1 (1999) 人文學誌 - 충북대학교 인문과학연구소 17:1 (1999)	245-283

## A.2 LIST OF PUBLICATIONS FROM SEPTEMBER 29 1999 TO MAY 10 2000

### <Journalistic Publications>

	Author	Title	Journal Title/ Publisher, Publication Year	Page
1	Choe Sang-Hun Charles J. Hanley and Martha Mendoza	War's Hidden Chapter: Ex-GIs Tell of Killing Korean Refugees	Associated Press 9/29/1999	

2	Choe Sang-Hun Charles J. Hanley and Martha Mendoza	Korean Villagers Recall Death and Terror Beneath A Bridge	Associated Press 9/29/1999	
3	Charles J. Hanley and Martha Mendoza	It's been good to talk about these things	Associated Press 9/29/1999	
4	황순구 Hwang Sun-gu	노근리 양민학살 대책위원장 정은용씨 우리정부의 무관심 분통 미국배상 받아낼 터 Chong Eun-Yong the Representative of <i>No Gun Ri</i> Victims' Organization Expresses Indignation with Our Government's Indifference	한겨레 Hankyoreh 9/29/1999	
5	황순구 Hwang Sun-gu	노근리 피난민 적으로 취급하라: 미군 양민학살 공식문서 확인 Treat Them as Enemy: American Documents Discovered	한겨레 Hankyoreh 9/30/1999	Pg. 1
6	황순구/ 오철우 이본영	피난민 500 여명 모아놓고 무자비한 전투기 폭격/ 체네바 협약 근거로 정부가 협의 나서야	한겨레 Hankyoreh 9/30/1999	Pg. 14
8	김의구	6.25 '노근리 비극' 실체 벗겨지나	국민일보 9/29/1999	Pg. 19
10	지명훈, 이기진	AP 통신, 한국전 ㄷ때 '미군의 양민 대량 학살사건' 특집기사	동아일보 9/30/1999	pg. 21
11	유태중	AP '노근리 사건' 보도: 미군 6.25 때 양민학살 문서확인	조선일보 9/30/1999	pg. 29
12	김영이	50 년만에 드러난 미군 만행	경향신문 9/30/1999	pg. 23
13	Elizabeth Becker	Pentagon Says It Can Find NoProof of Massacre	New York Times 9/30/1999	A16:5
16	황순구	노근리학살 폭로한 AP 최상훈 기자	한겨레 Hankyoreh 10/1/1999	pg. 7
17	황순구 Hwang Sun-gu	노근리 양민학살 곳곳에 참극 상흔 온가족 몰살 호적정리도 못해 The Scene of Tragedy Everywhere in No Gu Ri	한겨레 Hankyoreh 10/1/1999	
18	황순구	노근리 양민학살/ 굴다리입구 기관총설치 무차별 발포	한겨레 Hankyoreh 10/1/1999	pg. 6
19	승인배	미 킨 사단장 명령서	조선일보 10/1/1999	pg. 29
20	조무주	노근리 양민학살' 호적에도 흔적	국민일보 10/1/1999	pg. 5
21		노근리 사건 생존자 증언	서울신문 10/1/1999	pg. 21
22	Charles J. Hanley	Korean Vets Could Have Been Court- Martialed But Not Today, Experts Say	Associated Press 10/1/1999	
23	David Briscoe	Review of 50-Year-Old Korean Incident Could Take a Year	Associated Press 10/1/1999	

24	Paul Richter	Pentagon Will Investigate Vets' Massacre Story	Los Angeles Times 10/1/1999	pg. 1
25	Elizabeth Becker	U.S. to Revisit Accusations of a Massacre By G.I.'s in '50	New York Times 10/1/1999	A3:4
26		A Dark Korean War Episode Belatedly Comes to Light	USA Today 10/1/1999	18A
27	Michael Dobbs, Roberto Suro	Army Dismissed Massacre Allegation; Koreans Sought Redress for 5 Years; Cohen Orders Probe	Washington Post 10/1/1999	A01
28	윤희영	한국인 기자의 숨은 노력 있었다; ap '노근리' 보도	조선일보 10/2/1999	pg. 35
29	오일만, 최철호	노근리 양민학살 규명 급진전 배경	서울신문 10/2/1999	pg. 21
30	국기연	노근리 학살/ 미 칼데라 육군장관 긴급 회견	세계일보 10/2/1999	pg. 5
31	윤승용	[노근리학살] 미 언론 "학살 의심 여지없다"	한국일보 10/2/1999	pg. 26
32	박두식	노근리 사건' ap 보도 파장	조선일보 10/2/1999	pg. 33
33	유태중	노근리 사람들' 그후의 삶	조선일보 10/2/1999	pg. 33
34	한민수	[노근리사건] 정부 '진상조사' 표현조차 인색	국민일보 10/2/1999	pg. 5
35		미 교회 협의회 '노근리' 정의의 대가 받아야	국민일보 10/2/1999	pg. 5
36	홍은택	[노근리 재조사] '반인륜 대량학살' 미 언론에 밀려	동아일보 10/2/1999	pg. 30
37	김학준	[김학준 칼럼] '노근리 학살'과 국가 기록	동아일보 10/2/1999	pg. 6
38	김도연	노근리' 보도 최상훈씨 "진실규명 역사 바로쓰고파"	문화일보 10/2/1999	pg. 5
39	Charles J. Hanley, Martha Mendoza	Unanswered Questions Still Haunt Korean Killing Field	Associated Press 10/2/1999	
40	Sang-hun Choe	South Korean President Seeks U.S. Cooperation in Probing Reported Killings	Associated Press 10/2/1999	
41	Calvin Sims	South Koreans Call on U.S. To Apologize For Killings	New York Times 10/2/1999	A6:6
42	Richard T. Cooper and Judy Pasternak	Fear, Confusion Fueled Korean Massacre; War: Ill-trained and Under Attack, U.S. Soldiers Agonized but Followed Order	Los Angeles Times 10/3/1999	pg. 1
43		The Atrocity Allegations	New York Times 10/3/1999	pg. 4.16
44	Craig R. Whitney	No Place for Civilians	New York Times 10/3/1999	pg. 4.4

45	원재연	노근리 양민학살 사건 의문점 투성이	세계일보 10/4/1999	pg. 4
46	김영이	시신매장 참여 이근복옹이 전한 '노근리 학살' 참상	경향신문 10/4/1999	pg. 27
47	Michael Munk	Nogun-ri Massacre: The Record of the First Cav's 2nd of the 7th in Korea	<a href="http://www.kimsoft.com/1997/nogun.htm">http://www.kimsoft.com/1997/nogun.htm</a> 10/4/1999	
48	오연호	노근리와 AP 와 사대주의	한겨레 Hankyoreh 10/5/1999	
49	김도형	노근리 한미 공동조사 추진, 정부 미에 제의키로. 중순이전 합조단 발족	한겨레 Hankyoreh 10/5/1999	pg. 2
50		[LA 타임스] "노근리사건 오판등 복합적인 결과"	한국일보 10/5/1999	pg. 22
51		노근리학살 무지, 오판서 비롯 -- LA 타임스 분석	경향신문 10/5/1999	pg. 2
52	Kim Yong Geun	A Korean's View of <i>No Gun Ri</i>	The Christian Science Monitor 10/6/1999	pg. 8
53	James Webb	The Bridge at <i>No Gun Ri</i>	Wall Street Journal 10/6/1999	
54	최보식, 장일현	노근리 생존자 증언,미군, 주민 700 여명 나흘간 인솔 철길 내몬뒤 기총소사-매복 사격	조선일보 10/6/1999	pg. 31
55	최보식, 장일현	노근리 사건' 밝혀야할 쟁점; 이웃마을 주민은 왜 끌고 갔나	조선일보 10/6/1999	pg. 4
57	지명훈	노근리 학살' 시신 발굴한다	동아일보 10/7/1999	pg. 22
58	진철수	<미군 '노근리'양민학살> 당시 참전병사 2 인의 증언	문화일보 10/7/1999	pg. 5
59	홍은택	노근리 총격가담 미 병사 증언, "부대장 전원사살 명령"	동아일보 10/8/1999	pg. 5
60	윤희영	노근리 미군들 잇단 증언	조선일보 10/8/1999	pg. 4
61	Carl F. Bernard	Commentary; Perspective On Warfare; "We Were a Speed Bump for the North Koreans"; If Civilians Were Massacred at <i>No Gun Ri</i> , It Was By Untrained and Under-equipped U.S. Soldiers Under Brutal Assault	Los Angeles Times 10/8/1999	pg. 9
62	황순구, 김규원	노근리 희생자 사망장소 "철교아래" 기록 발견	한겨레 Hankyoreh 10/9/1999	pg. 22
63	David Steinberg(?)	<특별기고> '노근리' 저변에 깔린 인종편견	문화일보 10/9/1999	pg. 7
64	조호연	정부, '노근리학살' 자료 방치	경향신문 10/11/1999	pg. 1

65		"I've Tried to Repent"	Newsweek 10/11/1999	58
66		I Still Hear Screams	Newsweek 10/11/1999	59
67	Joseph L. Galloway	New light on an old atrocity	U.S. News & Work Report 127:14 10/11/1999	49
68	노향란	[사이버세계] 노근리 학살사건 반응	한국일보 10/13/1999	pg. 7
69	이승철, 김석구	<들어봅시다> 정해주 노근리사건 대책단장, 국무조정실장	경향신문 10/13/1999	pg. 7
70	Sang-hun Choe	Top U.S. Official Promises Close Coordination in <i>No Gun Ri</i> Investigation	Associated Press 10/13/1999	
71	배연해 Pae Yon-hae	충북 영동 노근리 양민학살 미군은 피란민을 적으로 취급했다 : AP 통신 한국전쟁 당시 미군 작전명령서 최초 확인 American Soldiers Treat <i>No Gun Ri</i> Villagers as Enemy: The AP Confirmed Operational Records of the Korean War for this Issue	주간한국 Weekly Hanguk 1791 10/14/1999	44-45
72	이주훈	분명 학살인데 우리는 왜 침묵했나	주간한국 1791 Weekly Hanguk 1791 10/14/1999	46-47
73	이기봉	노근리 학살의 진상, 사건진실 일부 부풀려졌다	주간동아 Weekly Donga 204 10/14/1999	
74	김의구	노근리' 특종보도 AP 통신 최상훈 기자	국민일보 10/16/1999	pg. 5
75	유병권	<노근리 양민학살' 화두풀기> 전문가 5인 사이버 대담	문화일보 10/16/1999	pg. 8
76	Robert Burns	Cohen Sets Up Oversight Group for Alleged Massacre in Korea	Associated Press 10/16/1999	
77	김상운	" <i>No Gun Ri</i> " 와 "제 7 기병대"	국민일보 10/21/1999	pg. 6
78	황순구	노근리 학살 미군 국군도 적으로 간주'	한겨레 Hankyoreh 10/22/1999	pg. 14
80	Col. David Hughes, USAP(ret)	The Harder Lessons of <i>No Gun Ri</i>	Voice of the Grunt 10/22/1999	
81	Paul Richter	Deal Weighed in Korean War Slaying Probe; Military: Pentagon may grant blanket immunity for all GIs connected to alleged massacre of civilians. Some legal experts question move.	Los Angeles Times 10/23/1999	

82	Peter Hong	In L.A., Response Muted to Reports of GI Atrocities; War: Korean American leaders say community suspected crimes, but is reluctant to criticize ally.	Los Angeles Times 10/25/1999	pg. 1
83	Bruce Cuming	Korean My Lai	The Nation 10/25/1999	
84		한국전 당시 미전투기 무차별 공격필름 발굴	세계일보 10/25/1999	pg. 2
85	국기연	노근리사건 관련자 일괄기소면제 검토	세계일보 10/25/1999	pg. 4
86	정운현	[인터뷰] '노근리사건' 첫보도 말지 오연호 기자	서울신문 10/27/1999	pg. 15
87	Doug Struck	Airing an Ugly Secret; U.S., Seoul Fear Massacre Reports May Harm Relations	Washington Post 10/27/1999	A. 24
88	Robert Burns	No Decision Yet on Legal Immunity for Korea War Vets	Associated Press 10/28/1999	
89	정은용 Chong Eun-yong	중화기로 난민 학살' 증인 있다 : 노근리 대책위원장 정은용씨 '부풀려졌다'에 반론...미군 6 명도 자인 '공개토론하자' There Is Evidence for the Massacre: Refutation for the 'Exaggeration in Testimony' and Admission by Six American Soldiers	주간동아 Weekly Donga 206 10/28/1999	48-49
90	박창식 Park Chang-sik	쌍굴다리에 먹구름이 낀다 : 노근리 학살 공동조사단 구성 좌절...학계 관 중심 대책반에 문제제기 Clouded in the Bridge Culvert: Problems Raised by Academics and Governments for the Formation of Cooperative Investigation Committee	한겨레 21 Hankyoreh21 280 10/28/1999	28-30
91	이원섭 Lee, Won-sup	Madness at Nogun-ri and Bein Hoa [Korean War tragedy]	Korea Focus(Seoul) 7:6 11/1/1999	112-114
92	David Briscoe	Experts Join Pentagon Investigation into <i>No Gun Ri</i> Killing	Associated Press 11/2/1999	
93	김수혜	노근리학살' 기관총사수 데일리씨 단독 인터뷰	조선일보 11/3/1999	pg. 3
94	Sang-hun Choe	Ex-GI meets Korean Survivors of Alleged Mass Killing	Associated Press 11/4/1999	
95	William J. Aceves	Investigating War Crimes: The Struggle for Accountability Hits	San Diego Union-Tribune	

		Home	11/4/1999	
96	박중현	피해자는 용서와 화해, 가해자는 회한과 참회	조선일보 11/5/1999	pg. 31
97	김수혜	노근리 피해자 - 데일리 5 시간 만남	조선일보 11/5/1999	pg. 29
98	공동취재단	[노근리] 가해자-피해자 '49 년만의 만남'	한국일보 11/5/1999	pg. 22
99	Sang-hun Choe	Three Survivors of Korean War Killings Leave For U.S. Visit	Associated Press 11/8/1999	
100	최영재 Choi Yong-Jae	학살 미군 응징할 수 없다?: 국제법으로 풀어본 '노근리 사건'/미국의 전쟁 범죄 다룬 국제 재판 전무 Cannot Punish the Soldiers who Killed Civilians? Understanding 'No Gun Ri Incident' with International Law/ There is Actually No Case to Have Dealt with American War Crime	Sisa Journal 시사저널 524 11/11/1999	64-65
101	William Claiborne	Unhealed Wounds of Korean War: Survivors of Incident Meet With U.S. Vets	Washington Post 11/11/1999	A03
102	Gustav Niebuhr	50 Attack in Korea Remembered	New York Times 11/11/1999	A14:4
103	Sang-hun Choe	Korean Survivors Tell Pentagon Stories of Mass Killing By U.S. Troops	Associated Press 11/12/1999	
105	최갑수	[대한광장] 기록과 국가	서울신문 11/15/1999	pg. 7
106	Tom Verdin	Korean-Americans Remember <i>No Gun Ri</i>	Associated Press 11/16/1999	
107	K. Connie Kang	Koreans Give Horrifying Accounts of Alleged Attack	Los Angeles Times 11/17/1999	pg.1
108	Kyong-hwa Seok	North Korea Proposes Working With South On Killings Probe	Associated Press 11/20/1999	
109	Sang-hun Choe	U.S., South Korean Investigators Meet to Discuss <i>No Gun Ri</i>	Associated Press 12/14/1999	
110	Jason Ma	<i>No Gun Ri</i> : Exploring Reactions to the Korean War Tragedy	Asian Week 21:18 12/23/1999	
111	Sang-hun Choe, Charles J. Hanley, and Martha Mendoza	Korean, U.S. Witnesses, Backed by Military Records, Say Refugees Were Strafed	Associated Press 12/28/1999	
112	조무주, 한민수	[미군 민간인 공습] "한눈에 피란민 알아봤지만 폭격"	국민일보 12/30/1999	pg. 5
113	지명훈	[미공군 양민공습] "피란민 무차별 총격 ... 300 명 희생"	동아일보 12/30/1999	pg. 3
114	Choe Sang-hun	U.S. Army Head Rules Out	Associated Press	



		Investigation of Every Korean War-era Allegation	1/9/2000	
115	김현수	조사 상반기 마무리 노력/ 공동회견 일문일답	한겨레 Hankyoreh 1/12/2000	pg. 2
117	Chong-suk Han	What Happened at <i>No Gun Ri</i> ?	International Examiner 27(2) 2/1/2000	pg. 11
118	Dobbs, Michael	Shoot Them All; Half A Century After the Korean War Members of the 7th Cavalry Regiment Had Hoped for Recognition; Instead They Are Having to Account For What Happened at <i>No Gun Ri</i>	Washington Post Magazine 2/6/2000	pg. W08
119	김수혜	일징용- 노근리 손배소 '마이클최' 변호사	조선일보 2/8/2000	pg. 31
120	윤승용	[위싱턴저널] WP 사이트 '노근리사건' 공방	한국일보 2/10/2000	pg. 11
121	Beth Gardiner	AP Expose of Korean War Killings Wins Investigative Pulitzer	Associated Press 4/10/2000	
122	권혁철	노근리보도로 풀리처상 받은 최상훈 AP 통신 특파원	한겨레 Hankyoreh 4/12/2000	pg. 15

### <Academic Publications>

	Author	Title	Journal Title/ Publisher, Publication Year	Page
1	오연호 Oh, Yeon-ho	노근리 그후 : 주한미군범죄 55 년사 : 20 세기 야만과의 결별을 위한 현장보고서(제 1 부 노근리의 진실, 1 장 경부선은 안다) After <i>No Gun Ri</i> , the 55 Years History of the Crime of American Soldiers: Spot Investigation Report to Farewell to the Savageness in the 20th Century	Seoul: Monthly Mal 월간말 10/28/1999	
2	임필수	노근리, 군사작전으로서의 양민학살 < <a href="http://kilsp.jinbo.net/publish/99/991108.htm">http://kilsp.jinbo.net/publish/99/991108.htm</a> >	현장에서 미래를 49 Nov. 1999	
3	오연호 Oh, Yeon-ho	노근리, 그리고 힘의 질서 <i>No Gun Ri</i> , the Order of Power	Contemporary Critiques 당대비평 9 12/1/1999	189~ 202
4	김찬규	노근리 사건과 시제법	국제법평론 12 12/1/1999	85-89

5	이재곤, 정구도, 오윤석 Lee, Chae-gon et al	전시 민간인 보호를 위한 국제법적 규제: 한국전쟁 시 소위 ‘충북,영동군 황간면 노근리 민간인 살상사건’과 관련하여 International Legal Regulation for the Protection of Civilians in Armed conflict with Special Emphasis on the case of No-GunRi Bridge in the Korean War	Chungnam Law Study 충남대 법학연구 10:1 12/30/1999	111- 136
6	정창인 Chong Chang-in	‘노근리’ 어떻게 볼 것인가 How to Interpret the ‘No Gun Ri Incident’	자유 317 1/1/2000	18-20
7	최득진 Choi, Tuk-jin	한국전쟁 중 미군에 의한 민간인 학살사건 A Massacre of Civilians by American Soldiers During the Korean War	Chung-ang Journal of Legal issues 중앙대법정논총 49 1/1/2000	12-40
8	이기봉	북한은 노근리 사건을 어떻게 보는가	북한 338 2/1/2000	
9	최병수 Choi, Pyong-su	노근리 양민학살사건에 관한 몇 가지 검토 : 6.25 동란 초기 충북영동지구의 민간인 상해사건에 관한 연구Ⅱ A Study on A Massacre of Civilians in Young-dong area, Chung-chong Province in the Early Stage of the Korean War (2)	Journal of Humanities 人文學誌 - 충북대학교 인문과학연구소 19:1 2/1/2000	261- 283
10	Sang-hun Choe, Charles J. Hanley, and Martha Mendoza	The Bridge at <i>No Gun Ri</i>	Dissent 47:2 3/1/2000	39-43
11	Walzer, Michael and Marilyn B. Young	The Bridge at <i>No Gun Ri</i> : Responses	Dissent 47:2 3/1/2000	44-46
12	강정구 Kang, Chong-gu	노근리의 해원을 넘어 베트남 학살의 참회로 To the Confession of the Massacre in Vietnam Over the Wide Ocean of <i>No Gun Ri</i> Mass Killing	Hwanghae Cultures 황해문화 26 3/1/2000	430- 441
13	조시현	노근리 등 미군에 의한 민간인 학살사건에 대한 올바른 대응을 위한 의견서 < <a href="http://www.humanrights.or.kr/HRLibrary/HRLibrary_15-shcho2.htm">http://www.humanrights.or.kr/HRLibrary/HRLibrary_15-shcho2.htm</a> >	4/24/2000	

### A.3 LIST OF PUBLICATIONS FROM MAY 11 2000 TO JANUARY 11 2001

#### <Journalistic Publications>

	Author	Title	Journal Title/ Publisher, Publication Year	Page
1	Ed Offley	New Evidence Challenges <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre Charges	The Stars and Stripes 5/11/2000	
2	Steven Butler	Too Frightened Even to Cry	US News & World Report vol.128, no.20 5/12/2000	52
3	Galloway, Joseph L.	Doubts about a Korean 'Massacre'	US News & World Report vol.128, no.21 5/12/2000	
4		Reliable Sources?: Examining the Discrepancies in Eyewitness Accounts	US News & World Report 5/12/2000	
5	송상근	"노근리증언 미군 2명 당시 현장에 없었다"	동아일보 5/12/2000	1면
6	윤승용	미성조지 '노근리는 우발사건' 보도 의미	한국일보 5/12/2000	29면
7		"AP 노근리 충격 보도 허위"	조선일보 5/12/2000	2면
8	서영석	노근리사건/ 참전 미군등 증언청취, 미정부 배상 적극자세 '청신호'	국민일보 5/12/2000	2면
9	정진성	<포럼> 노근리 해법 '인권존중'	문화일보 5/12/2000	6면
10	여시동, 최원석	미 성조지 "노근리보도"에 문제제기	조선일보 5/13/2000	4면
		미 국방부, AP 통신 '노근리 진상' 설전	국민일보 5/13/2000	
11	Paul Richter	Questions Raised About <i>No Gun Ri</i> ; Korea: Army Probe into Alleged 1950 Massacre Finds Contradictory Accounts. One Witness is described as 'Not Credible'	Los Angeles Times 5/13/2000	pg. 5
12	Michael Dobbs, Thomas E. Ricks	Account of GIs' Korean War Massacre Challenged	Los Angeles Times 5/13/2000	pg. A4
13	Becker, Elizabeth, and Felicity Barringer	Report Disclosing Massacre By G.I.'s Is Under Question	New York Times 5/13/2000	Pg.A1
14	Felicity Barringer	Reporters and Editors Defend A.P. Story on Korea Massacre	New York Times 5/14/2000	Section 1, Pg 6
15	국기연	노근리 대책위' 재미변호사 마이클 최 인터뷰	세계일보 5/15/2000	10면
16	윤국환	노근리' 미 언론 논란	한겨레 hangyoreh	11면

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17	한기홍	노근리 사건/ 미군 데일리 증언 진위 논란 확산	동아일보 5/15/2000	2 면
18	Matthew Rose	Questions Arise About AP Article On Korea Massacre	Wall Street Journal 5/15/2000	pg. 1
19	홍은택	NYT 지 "P 노근리 학살 기사 빛 못 볼 뻔 했다"	동아일보 5/16/2000	12 면
20	최철호	미언론 '노근리' 보도 논란	서울신문 5/16/2000	25 면
21	Felicity Barringer	A.P. Releases Files in Debate Over Massacre in Korean War	New York Times 5/16/2000	Pg A 12
22	Howard Kurtz	At the Associated Press, a Drawn-out Battle Over Korean War Story	Washington Post 5/16/2000	pg. C01
23	유숙렬	AP 노근리 보도, 미 언론계 '한편의 드라마'	문화일보 5/17/2000	28 면
24		AP '노근리보도 의혹' 반박	국민일보 5/17/2000	2 면
25	Michael Dobbs	War and Remembrance; Truth and Other Casualties of <i>No Gun Ri</i>	Washington Post 5/21/2000	pg, B01
26	Berringer, Felicity	A Press Divided ? Disputed Account of a Korean War Massacre	New York Times 5/22/2000	Pg. C1
27		한국전쟁 50 돌 학술포럼, '노근리사건' 전시인도법 위반	서울신문 5/25/2000	7 면
28	Felicity Barringer	Ex-G.I. in A.P. Account Concedes He Didn't See Korea Massacre	New York Times 05/26/2000	
29		Vet Admits He Learned of <i>No Gun Ri</i> Secondhand	Los Angeles Times 05- 26-2000	pg.19B
30	박완규	노근리 사건 증언 미참전용사 증언 번복	세계일보 5/27/2000	10 면
31	주용중	데일리씨 증언 번복; 노근리 학살 결론엔 영향없어	조선일보 05-27-2000	4 면
32	Charles J. Hanley	Ex-Soldier Admits He Wasn't at <i>No Gun Ri</i>	Washington Post 05-27-2000	pg.A19
33	Brian Duffy, Joseph L. Galloway	A Soldier's Story Stirs Things Up	US News & World Report vol.128, no.21 05-29-2000	20
34	Michael Moss	The Story Behind a Soldier's Story	New York Times 05- 31-2000	pg.A1
35		Incident At <i>No Gun Ri</i>	PBS Online NewsHour 05-31-2000	
36	Charles J. Hanley	Ex-GI Acknowledges Records Show He Couldn't Have Witnessed Killings	The Associated Press 06-01-2000	
37	Joseph L. Galloway	The Mystery of <i>No Gun Ri</i>	US News & World Report vol.128, no.22 06-05-2000	32
38	Robert Burns	Air Force Memo Says U.S. Strafed Korean Civilians At Army's Request	The Associated Press 06-06-2000	

39	신치영	미군 6.25 양민학살 물증 첫 발견 -- 당시 미장교 보고서	동아일보 06-07-2000	1 면
40	박선호	노근리사건 현장기록 발견, 본보 당시상황 보도 '조선인민보' 단독입수	문화일보 06-07-2000	
41	최철호	노근리 양민학살사건 미군지시 증거 첫발견	서울신문 06-07-2000	1 면
42	최철호	미 노근리학살 문서 발견	서울신문 06-07-2000	25 면
43	Paul Richter	Memo Discusses Korean War Strafing; Investigation: Air Force Attacked Civilians Because Enemy Soldiers Might be Present, According to Newly Found Document. Pentagon is Seeking corroboration	Los Angeles Times	pg. 9
44		US Studies Link Between Strafing Memo, <i>No Gun Ri</i>	Washington Post 06-07-2000	pg. A08
45	윤국한	미, 한국전때 민간인 학살 인정	한겨레 Hankyoreh 06-08-2000	8 면
46	Brian Duffy	Memory and Its Flaws	U.S. News 06-12-2000	
47	Choe Sang-Hun and Martha Mendoza	Captured North Korean Document Describes Mass Killing by U.S. Troops	The Associated Press 06-15-2000	
48	박선호	노근리사건 현장증언 --AP 통신 종군기자 편지 공개	문화일보 06-16-2000	
49	Sang-hun Choe	Pentagon Hands Over Interviews With U.S. Verterans	The Associated Press 06-22-2000	
50	Jerry Lembcke	No Good News from <i>No Gun Ri</i>	The Asian Reporter 06-27-2000	pg.7
51	최영재 Choi Yong-Jae	미국은 노근리 사건을 50 년 당시부터 알고 있었다 American Government Knew of the Massacre from the Time of the Korean War	Shindonga 新東亞 490 07-01-2000	236-249
52	Sang-hun Choe	Korean Investigators Collect Bullets at <i>No Gun Ri</i>	The Associated Press 07-20-2000	
	박선호, 정충신	노근리 사건 94 년 국방부 무성의 조사	문화일보 07/26/2000	28 면
53	Paul Shin	South Koreans commemorate anniversary of alleged killings at <i>No Gun Ri</i>	The Associated Press 07-26-2000	

54	이창곤 Lee Chang-gon	진실만 캐라 진실만! : 국방부의 '노근리 사건 조사결과' 단독 입수 진상조사에 미군 기여도 재조명이 웬말 Tell the Truth!: An Exclusive for the Final Report of Investigation by the Ministry of National Defense	한겨레 21 Hankyoreh 21 320 08-10-2000	12- 15
55	Sang-hun Choe	Korean Investigators Determine U.S. Troops Killed Korean Civilians	The Associated Press 08-18-2000	
56	Ackerman, Seth	Digging Too Deep at <i>No Gun Ri</i> ; AP's Massacre Exposes Survived Corporate Pressure and Criticism ? but not Apathy	Extra 09-01-2000 <a href="http://www.fair.org/extra/0009/nogunri.html">http://www.fair.org/extra/0009/nogunri.html</a>	
57		양성철 주미대사 Korea Times 회견내용	Korea Times 09-20-2000	
58	류태종, 송동훈	양 주미대사 "우발적 사건"	조선일보 09-23-2000	33 면
59	최현미, 김충남, 강연곤	양성철 주미대사 발언'에 시민 단체들 분노	문화일보 09-23-2000	
60	부형권	양성철 주미대사 '노근리' 발언 과문/ 시민단체 반발	동아일보 09-24-2000	5 면
61	박혜경	강력한 사퇴요구에 직면한 양성철 주미대사	이원컴 09-25-2000	
62	Rachel E. Dry	Professor Affirms Massacre Report	The Harvard Crimson 10-25-2000	
63	Richard Pyle	Ex Gis: U.S. Troops in Korea War Had Orders to Shoot Civilians	The Associated Press 11-21-2000	
64	Richard Pyle	Ex-Gis Tell of Orders to Fire on Korean Civilians	Los Angeles Times 11-22-2000	
65		"노근리 발포 상급부대서 명령"	한국일보 11-23-2000	1 면
66	Richard Pyle	Two Former Gis Give Accounts of <i>No Gun Ri</i> ; Soldiers Tell Pentagon Investigators that American Troops Were Ordered to Shoot Korean Civilians	The Washington Post 11-24-2000	pg. A.18 A Section
67	Sang-hun Choe	U.S., Koreans Differ Over Refugee Killings in Korean War	The Associated Press 12-01-2000	
68	Ed Offley	<i>No Gun Ri</i> Probe Nears Finish Amid New Conflicting Allegations	12-04-00 <a href="http://www.intellnet.org/news/2000/12/21/1954-1.html">http://www.intellnet.org/news/2000/12/21/1954-1.html</a>	

69	Kyong-hwa Seok	Lawmakers Call on U.S. to Conduct Open, Fair Inquiry	The Associated Press 12-05-2000	
70		<i>No Gun Ri</i> : Update	PBS Online NewsHour 12-06-2000 <a href="http://www.pbs.org/newshour/media_watch/nogunri_12-6.html">http://www.pbs.org/newshour/media_watch/nogunri_12-6.html</a>	
71	Christopher Torchia	U.S.-Korean Officials Trying to Narrow Difference Over <i>No Gun Ri</i>	The Associated Press 12-06-2000	
72	Christopher Marquis, Steven Lee Myers	U.S. Report Confirms Killings of Civilians by G.I.'s in Korean War	The New York Times 12-06-2000	Section 1, pg. A.7
73	Thomas E. Ricks	<i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre Blamed on Panic; Korean War Probe Finds No Proof of U.S. Orders to Shoot	The Washington Post 12-06-2000	Section A, Pg. A01
74	Robert Burns	Army Concludes Soldiers Killed Unarmed Refugees in Korean War	The Associated Press 12-06-2000	
75		미 노근리 민간인 위협사격 인정	국민일보 12-07-2000	2 면
76	유용원	한미 진상대책회의 오늘 발표, '노근리 발포' 고의성 못가려 진통	조선일보 12/7/2000	4 면
77		U.S. and Korean Officials Meet to Discuss Wartime Massacre	The New York Times 12-07-2000	A Section, pg. A.8
78	Christopher Torchia	South Koreans Say Progress Made in Talks with U.S. on <i>No Gun Ri</i>	The Associated Press 12-07-2000	
79	하태원	한미 노근리 합의 실패, 연내 2 차회담 갖기로	동아일보 12-08-2000	2 면
80	Samuel Len	South Koreans Grow Impatient With U.S. Stand on '50 Massacre	The New York Times 12-08-2000	Section A;Pg5;Column ; Foreign Desk
81	Robert Burns	U.S. and South Korea Reach 'Understanding' on Events at No Gun Ri	The Associated Press 12-08-2000	
82	Robert Burns	US, South Korean Negotiators Reach 'Understanding' on <i>No Gun Ri</i>	The Associated Press 12-09-2000	
83	Sang-hun Choe	South Korean Civilian Advisers Head For Washington to Review <i>No Gun Ri</i> Probe	The Associated Press 12-12-2000	
84	진재학	노근리' 사격명령 여부 평행선	한겨레 12-13-2000	5 면
85		Official: Gis Weren't Ordered to Kill; <i>No Gun Ri</i> Report Disputes Allegation	The Washington Post 12-15-2000	pg. A.18

86	지명훈	미 육군장관 "포 상부지시 증거없다"	동아일보 12-16-2000	2 면
87	한기흥	미국, 노근리 직접배상에 난색, 20 일 공동발표문 논의	동아일보 12-18-2000	2 면
88	조계완 Cho Kye-wan	노근리 진실 '의도적 은폐': 미국의 논리에 휘말려 정치적 타협책 모색... 주권국가 자존심 버리고 양민학살에 면죄부 안길 건가 'Intentional Suppression' of the Truth about <i>No Gun Ri</i> : Seeking Political Compromise Tangled by American Logic?	Hankyoreh 21 한겨레 21 338 12-21-2000	20-22
89	윤국한	대책위 주장/ '미 노근리사건 보고서는 속임수'	한겨레 12-21-2000	2 면
90	Paul Richer	U.S. Won't Apologize for <i>No Gun Ri</i> , Officials Say	Los Angeles Times 12-22-2000	Sec A; Pt 1; pg 4
91		No Formal Apology by the U.S. For Korean War Civilian Deaths	The New York Times 12-22-2000	Section A; p.5; column 3
92	진재학	노근리진실' 미 법정서 가리나	한겨레 12-23-2000	4 면
93	국기연	막내린 노근리사건 워싱턴 회의	세계일보 12-23-2000	5 면
94	국기연	[특파원리포트]노근리 해법' 공수표?	세계일보 12-25-2000	3 면
95		Forever Cloaked in Smoke of War	Los Angeles Times 12-27-2000	PtB. Pg.B.8
96	이용욱	노근리 진상조사 결과 곧 발표, 미 "양민사상" 시인	경향신문 12-28-2000	5 면

### <Academic Publications>

	Author	Title	Journal Title/ Publisher, Publication Year	Page
1	Baik, Tae-ung	A War Crime Against an Ally's Civilians: The <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre	Master's Thesis, Notre Dame Law School 5/1/2000	
2	방선주 Pang, Son-ju	한국전쟁 당시 북한 자료로 본 '노근리'사건 <i>No Gun Ri</i> Incident Seen from the North Korean Documents During the Korean War	Korean Studies Quarterly 정신문화연구 79 6/1/2000	19-47
3	강정구	한국전쟁전후 민간인 학살의 실태 한국전쟁전후 민간인학살	6/21/2000	3- 22



		심포지움 : 전쟁과 인권 -학살의 세기를 넘어서		
4	Stephen R Schuit	First Person: The Grapes of <i>No Gun Ri</i>	The Humanist vol.60, no.4 07-01-2000	45-47
5	강정구	한국전쟁과 양민학살	현장에서 미래를 58 8/1/2000 <a href="http://kilsp.jinbo.net/publish/2000/0008914.htm">http://kilsp.jinbo.net/publish/2000/0008914.htm</a>	
6	오연호 Oh, Yeon-ho	Do You Know Our Agony? Massacre of Villagers by the U.S. Soldiers During the Korean War	Asian Solidarity Quarterly (Seoul) 2, 9/1/2000	80-90
7	조시현, 이장희 Cho, Si-hon, and Chang-hee Lee	한국전쟁 5년이 남긴 국제인도법적 문제 50 Years After the Korean War; Issues of International Humanity Law 제 28 회 학술 심포지움	Asian Social Science Institution 사단 법인 아시아 사회과학 연구원 9/1/2000	
8	Christopher D. Booth	“Prosecuting the ‘Fog of War?’ Examining the Legal Implications of an Alleged Massacre of South Korean Civilians by U.S. Forces During the Opening Days of the Korean War in the Village of <i>No Gun Ri</i> ,”	Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law Vol.33, no. 4 10/1/2000	933-986
9	이만열	노근리사건의 진상과 그 성격 (in A Proceeding of the Symposium for the Investigation of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre, the 9th Policy Symposium for the International Human Rights )	국회인권포럼 제 9 회 정책 심포지움; 노근리 사건 진상규명과 해결 방향에 관한 심포지움 12/4/2000	1-20
10	정진성	인권침해 문제로서의 노근리 사건 (in A Proceeding of the Symposium for the Investigation of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre, the 9th Policy Symposium for the International Human Rights )	국회인권포럼 제 9 회 정책 심포지움; 노근리 사건 진상규명과 해결 방향에 관한 심포지움 12/4/2001	23-44
11	조시현	노근리 학살사건에 대한 국제인도법의 적용 Adaptation of the International Humanity Law for the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre (in A Proceeding of the Symposium for the Investigation of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre, the 9th Policy Symposium for the International Human Rights )	국회인권포럼 제 9 회 정책 심포지움; 노근리 사건 진상규명과 해결 방향에 관한 심포지움 12/4/2002	47-80

12	박선원	노근리사건과 한미관계의 발전적 재조명 (in A Proceeding of the Symposium for the Investigation of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre, the 9th Policy Symposium for the International Human Rights )	국회인권포럼 제 9 회 정책 심포지움; 노근리 사건 진상규명과 해결 방향에 관한 심포지움 12/4/2003	83-101
13	Hanley, Charles J., and Martha Mendoza	The Bridge at <i>No Gun Ri</i> : Investigative Reporting, Hidden History, and Pulitzer Prize	Harvard International Journal of Press/ Politics vol.5, no.4 9/1/2000	112- 117
14	Gregg, Donald P..	Looking Back: The Incident at <i>No Gun Ri</i> [Korean War]	Korea Society Quarterly (New York) vol.1, no.2 Summer 2000	4-5, 44

#### A.4 LIST OF PUBLICATIONS AFTER JANUARY 10 2001

##### <Journalistic Publications>

	Author	Title	Journal Title/ Publisher, Publication Year	Page
1	Roberto Suro, Thomas E. Ricks	Clinton to Express Korean War Regret; U.S. Fails to Take Responsibility for Deaths of Unarmed Refugees at <i>No Gun Ri</i>	The Washington Post 1/11/2001	A7
2	Sang-hun Choe	<i>No Gun Ri</i> Report: U.S. Soldiers Killed Civilians, but No Proof of Orders to Fire	The Associated Press 1/11/2001	
3	Robert Burns	Army Says GIs Killed South Korean Civilians, Clinton Expresses Regret	The Associated Press 1/11/2001	
4	Charles J. Hanley	Investigation Leaves Key Question Unanswered	The Associated Press 1/11/2001	
5	Robert Burns	Clinton Expresses Regret for GIs' Killing of S. Korean Civilians	The Associated Press 1/11/2001	
6		Joint <i>No Gun Ri</i> Report Released	PBS Online NewsHour 1/11/2001	
7		<i>No Gun Ri</i> : Clinton's Statement	PBS Online NewsHour 1/11/2001	
8		Timeline of the Korean War	The Associated Press	

			1/11/2001	
9	김용태	노근리 유족들 반응/ "보상 미비 ... 알맹이없어 분통"	문화일보 1/12/2001	30 면
10	이태희, 유병권	미 노근리학살 공식 사과	문화일보 1/12/2001	1 면
11		노근리 희생자위해 위령비 건립, 기금 조성/ 클린턴 유감성명	한겨레 1/12/2001	1 면
12	구정은	"더 늦기전에" 미국식 과거사 청산	문화일보 1/12/2001	3 면
13	Elizabeth Becker	Army Confirms G.I.'s in Korea Killed Civilians	New York Times 1/12/2001	A1
14		Statement on Koreans: 'Refugees Were Killed or Injured'	New York Times 1/12/2001	A6
15	Norman Kempster	Clinton 'Regrets,' Doesn't Apologize for, <i>No Gun Ri</i> ; Asia: South Korean Survivors Denounce the President's Statement. Defense Secretary Details Findings of Inquiry.	Los Angeles Times 1/12/2001	A4
16	Robert Burns	U.S. Mindful of Need to Preserve Alliance with South Korea	The Associated Press 1/12/2001	
17	Sang-hun Choe	Survivors of <i>No Gun Ri</i> Dismiss U.S. Army's Findings as a Whitewash	The Associated Press 1/12/2001	
18	Joohee Cho, Doug Struck	U.S. Statement on Killings Disappoints South Koreans; 'Regret' for Civilian Deaths Falls Short of an Apology	The Washington Post 1/12/2001	A18
19	김영식, 한기홍	"개별 소송에 도움될 것" 한미 노근리조사책임자 문답	동아일보 1/13/2001	3 면
20	부형권, 한기홍	한-미 공동조사결과 발표/ 미국 '노근리 사살' 첫 인정	동아일보 1/13/2001	2 면
21	지명훈	노근리사건 피해자들 분노, 허탈 "돈이나 몇푼 주겠다니..."	동아일보 1/13/2001	31 면
22	안수찬 Ahn, Su-chan	[뉴스인물]노근리대책위 정은용 위원장/진실가린 '유감' 표명 유감	한겨레 Hankyoreh 1/13/2001	2 면
23	이원섭 Lee, Won-sup	결에서 본 '노근리' 규명 성과와 한계/ 두터운 은폐 뚫고 '절반의 규명'	한겨레 Hankyoreh 1/13/2001	4 면
24	윤국한, 진재학, 안수찬	미 '노근리 학살' 공식인정	한겨레 Hankyoreh 1/13/2001	1 면
25	진재학	노근리' 발표 내용, 의미	한겨레 Hankyoreh 1/13/2001	3 면
26	김희승, 오윤주	미 노근리 사과 반응/ 부실한 '사과' 50년 한 풀리겠다	한겨레 Hankyoreh 1/13/2001	19 면

27	이만열	[특별기고] 노근리 아픔은 끝나지 않았다	한국일보 1/13/2001	8 면
28	이태희, 정녹용	노근리조사 발표 의미/ 학살인정 '절반의 성공'	한국일보 1/13/2001	3 면
29	이태희	미, 노근리학살 실체 인정	한국일보 1/13/2001	1 면
30	이태희	노근리 조사, 협상 뒷얘기/ 단어선택 하나하나 '신경전'	한국일보 1/13/2001	4 면
31	윤승용	한미 노근리조사 미 입장/ "전투중 일어난 불행한 사고"	한국일보 1/13/2001	4 면
32	최진환	"발포 책임자 규명 안됐다", AP, 문제지적	한국일보 1/13/2001	4 면
33	이용욱	노근리 학살 '유감' 남긴 "유감" 표명	경향신문 1/13/2001	3 면
34	이승철	노근리 학살 한-미 '진상조사' 뒷얘기- '사격지침' 확인에 분위기 반전	경향신문 1/13/2001	4 면
35	이하원	노근리 한미공동조사 발표 의미	조선일보 1/13/2001	3 면
36	유태종	노근리 사건/ 피해자 유족, 현지 반응 - "사과, 보상 형식적" 분노	조선일보 1/13/2001	8 면
37		Regret for <i>No Gun Ri</i>	The Washington Post 1/13/2001	A20
38	이장희	[시론] 물을 수 없는 '노근리 진실'	경향신문 1/15/2001	7 면
39	유병화	[기고] '노근리 배상' 이제부터 시작	동아일보 1/15/2001	6 면
40	현홍주	[시론] 노근리, 그 비극을 넘어	조선일보 1/15/2001	6 면
41	박용욱	[발언대] 노근리 사건, 이제 매듭짓자	한국일보 1/15/2001	7 면
42	Bernard E. Trainor	The Anguish of Knowing What Happened at <i>No Gun Ri</i>	The Washington Post 1/21/2001	B1
43	Joseph L. Galloway	A Verdict in a Korean Tragedy	U.S. News & World Report 130:3 1/22/2001	32
44	윤승용	"노근리 양민학살 전쟁범죄 아니다"	한국일보 1/23/2001	2 면
45	박찬운 Park Chan-wun	노근리 배상 법정싸움은 이제부터: 명백한 범죄 전쟁에 관한 국제법 직접 적용해 미 법원에 소송해볼 만	Weekly Donga 주간동아 269 1/25/2001	26-28
46	조계완 Cho Kye-wan	작은 성과 큰 실망... : 한-미 양국 노근리 진상조사반 결과 발표... 양민학살 인정, 그러나 책임회피 의도 역력	한겨레 21 Hankyoreh 21 343 2/1/2001	16-17

47	한홍구 Han Hong-gu	우리는 무덤위에 서 있다: 죽이는 이야기 - 한국 사회 건설의 기초 한국전쟁에서의 학살 1 We Are Standing on the Graves: Killing Stories ? A Massacre in the Korean War I	한겨레 21 Hankyoreh 21 354 4/19/2001	86-88
48	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (1)- 양민학살 전모를 실화소설로 펴내다-	뉴스메이커 426 5/31/2001	
49	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (2)- 미국을 상대로 인권 회복에 나서다-	뉴스메이커 427 6/7/2001	
50	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (3)- 조선인민보에서 양민학살 단서를 찾다	뉴스메이커 428 6/14/2001	
51	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (4)- 드디어 미국 CNN 방송서 보도하다-	뉴스메이커 428 6/21/2001	
52	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (5)- '골리앗 미국'에 대적할 원군을 얻다-	뉴스메이커 429 6/28/2001	
53	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (6)- 한국 정부도 손해배상 신청 기각 했다-	뉴스메이커 430 7/5/2001	
54	안수찬 Ahn, Su-chan	트루먼에게 유죄를 선고함: 한국전쟁 당시 미군에 의한 민간인 학살을 법의 이름으로 단죄한 '코리아 전범재판	한겨레 21 Hankyoreh 21 365 7/5/2001	10-12
55	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (7)- AP 통신 노근리 보도로 풀리처상을 받다-	뉴스메이커 431 7/12/2001	
56	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (8)- 뉴욕타임스와 워싱턴포스트 1면기사로 '노근리' 보도-	뉴스메이커 432 7/19/2001	
57	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (9)- 미 정부 드디어 조사 착수를 발표하다 -	뉴스메이커 433 7/26/2001	
58	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (10)- 미국은 '망자의 절규'가 들리지 않는가-	뉴스메이커 434 8/2/2001	
59	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (11)- 한국 정부 공동조사 요구 묵살당했다-	뉴스메이커 435 8/9/2001	
60	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다	뉴스메이커 436	

		(12)- 용서 구한 가해 미군, 드디어 열린 미 방문길-	8/16/2001	
61	김충남	<기획취재> 미 '노근리' 이틀간 공중폭격	문화일보 8/20/2001	1 면
62	김충남, 오남석, 유희연	<기획취재: 노근리의 진실> 1950년 7월 26, 27일, 노근리의 진실	문화일보 8/20/2001	5 면
63	김충남, 오남석, 유희연	노근리 법정투쟁으로 가면	문화일보 8/21/2001	
64	안수찬 Ahn, Su-chan	미공군 노근리 공습은 사실	한겨레 8/21/2001	15 면
65	안수찬 Ahn, Su-chan	노근리 공중폭격 문서 과장	한겨레 8/21/2001	14 면
66	김충남	취재수첩: 진실 외면하는 국방부	문화일보 8/22/2001	
67	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (13)- 법적 책임 회피한 '클린턴 성명'에 허탈-	뉴스메이커 437 8/23/2001	
68	오남석	기획취재: 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (상): '억울한 희생' 누군가가 책임져야	문화일보 8/23/2001	28 면
69	차세현 Cha, Se-hyon	[특집] 美 정부 '노근리 보고서' 축소조작	뉴스메이커 News Maker 438 8/23/2001	32-35
70	차세현 Cha, Se-hyon	[특집] 지금이라도 진실 인정하고 적절한 조치 취하라!"	뉴스메이커 News Maker 438 8/23/2001	36-37
71	김충남	기획취재: 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (하): "진상 규명돼야 진정한 화해"	문화일보 8/24/2001	28 면
72	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (14)- '한국 정부 보고서'도 왜곡 투성이였다-	뉴스메이커 438 8/30/2001	
73	차세현 Cha, Se-hyon	정부, 과연 노근리 진실규명 의지 있는가	뉴스메이커 News Maker 439 8/30/2001	
74	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (15)- 쌍굴다리의 비극, 그리고 49년만의 해후-	뉴스메이커 439 9/6/2001	
75	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (16)- 가해 미군 데일리와 유족들의 '용서와 화해'-	뉴스메이커 440 9/13/2001	
76	Choe Yong-shik	Unfortunate Encounters of U.S. Forces and Korean Civilians in 1950	The Korea Herald 9/18/2001	
77	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (17)-피해자 대표들 드디어 미국	뉴스메이커 441	

		방문길에 오르다-	9/20/2001	
78	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (18)- 가해 미군들과 화해 기원 예배를 드리다-	뉴스메이커 442 9/27/2001	
79	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (19)- '용서와 화해'의 길은 아득히 멀었다-	뉴스메이커 443 10/4/2001	
80	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (20)- 한국전쟁 참전기념탑에 헌화하다-	뉴스메이커 444 10/11/2001	
81	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (21)- '철용성' 펜타곤 드디어 우리를 받아들이다-	뉴스메이커 445 10/18/2001	
82	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (22)- 내셔널 프레스클럽에서 기자회견 하다-	뉴스메이커 446 10/25/2001	
83	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (23)- 피해자들의 애절한 증언 큰 반향 불러-	뉴스메이커 447 11/1/2001	
84	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (24)- '노근리 청문회' 열리기를 염원하다-	뉴스메이커 448 11/8/2001	
85	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (25)- '노근리 학살' 저변엔 미국의 인종 편견이...-	뉴스메이커 449 11/15/2001	
86	Richard Pyle	New Book Details Still More Killing of Civilians During Korean War	the Associated Press 11/19/2001	
87	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (26)- 유대인 인권단체장의 '노근리 충고'-	뉴스메이커 450 11/22/2001	
88	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (27)- 노근리 대책위, KNCC 인권상 받다-	뉴스메이커 11/29/2001	
89	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (28)- 노근리 자문위원단과의 첫만남-	뉴스메이커 12/6/2001	
90	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (29)- 정은용 위원장, 미 육군성 장관 논박하다-	뉴스메이커 12/13/2001	
91	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (30)- "민간인 사격명령 거절했다가 중대장에 총살당할 뻔했다"-	뉴스메이커 12/27/2001	
92	Lee Williams	Kill'em All!: American Military Conduct in the Korean War	BBC 1/2/2002	

93	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (31)- 미 정부와 '또 한 판의 체스' 준비하다-	뉴스메이커 News Maker 1/10/2002	
94	김충남	노근리 학살' 부대원 속죄편지	문화일보 1/14/2002	31 면
95	김충남	노근리 학살거부자 처형 위협'	문화일보 1/14/2002	1 면
96	최기수	"노근리학살 명령따라 발포"... 미군병사 '속죄 편지'서 밝혀져	한국일보 1/15/2002	31 면
97	오윤주	51년간 고통속에 살았습니다'/ 노근리 현장 주둔 얼리 발포명령 첫 증언	한겨레 1/15/2002	18 면
98	김용태	노근리 사죄' 편지 받은 서정갑 씨	문화일보 1/15/2002	31 면
99	김충남	노근리 학살 재조사 요구	문화일보 1/16/2002	
100	최호원	"노근리 학살 미군 책임" 현역장교 논문서 주장	동아일보 1/24/2002	29 면
101	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (32)- '노근리' 한.미 정상회담 의제로 요구하다-	뉴스메이커 News Maker 1/24/2002	
102	김충남	미국, 여러곳서 양민학살	문화일보 1/25/2002	
103	김충남	BBC 한국전 다크서 드러난 새사실/ 작전지역 모든 민간인 '적' 간주	문화일보 1/25/2002	31 면
104	김충남	작전지역 민간인 적 간주	문화일보 1/25/2002	
105	김충남	노근리 진실 외면하는 미국	문화일보 1/26/2002	
106	최기수	영 BBC, 6.25 관련 문서, 증언 발굴 "미군, 여러곳서 양민학살"	한국일보 1/26/2002	27 면
107	윤양섭	"미군 6.25 때 양민 무차별 학살"	동아일보 1/26/2002	4 면
108	김충남	노근리'은폐- 축소자 처벌요구	문화일보 1/26/2002	
109	김충남	노근리 전쟁일지 있다	문화일보 2/1/2002	
110	김충남	적-피란민 구별 안해 학살 방조	문화일보 2/2/2002	
111	김충남	미 육군성 양민학살 조직적은폐	문화일보 2/2/2002	1 면
112		미군 노근리 전쟁일지 작성'	한겨레 2/2/2002	19 면
113		The World; BBC Cites U.S. Killings in Korea; Report: Up to 400 People	Los Angeles Times 2/2/2002	A7



		Died on a Beach at the Start of War in 1950, Documentary Contends.		
114	최기수	영 BBC 방송주장, 미 국방부 '노근리 사건' 은폐의혹	한국일보 2/4/2002	30 면
115	김충남	범국민위 한국전 학살 진상조사 촉구	문화일보 2/4/2002	
116	김충남	노근리 사죄편지' 받은 서정갑씨 답장 공개	문화일보 2/6/2002	31 면
117	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (33)- 국제봉사단체 젊은이들의 노근리 현장 방문-	뉴스메이커 News Maker 2/7/2002	
118	Christopher Marquis	Korean Veteran Is Charged With Fraud	New York Times 2/9/2002	A14
119		The Nation; Korean War Veteran Charged with Defrauding Government	Los Angeles Times 2/9/2002	A16
120	차세현 Cha, Se-hyon	노근리사건은 우발적' 미 주장 허위로	뉴스메이커 News Maker 11:7 2/14/2002	22~23
121	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (34)- 미 정부 추모비 건립 약속 왜 안 지키나-	뉴스메이커 News Maker 2/28/2002	
122	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (35)- 노근리대책위는 반미단체가 아니다-	뉴스메이커 News Maker 3/7/2002	
123	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (36)- 미의 쌍굴다리 총알 적출 저지하다-	뉴스메이커 News Maker 3/14/2002	
124	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (37)- 미 일부 언론 AP 보도를 반격하다-	뉴스메이커 News Maker 3/21/2002	
125	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (38)- 미국 내 음모세력 AP 보도를 공격하다-	뉴스메이커 News Maker 3/28/2002	
126	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (39)- 제동 걸린 미국 내 노근리 음모세력-	뉴스메이커 News Maker 4/4/2002	
127	Michael Taylor	A War of Words on a Prize-Winning Story; <i>No Gun Ri</i> Authors Cross Pens on First Amendment Battlefield	San Francisco Chronicle 4/7/2002	D3
128	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (40)- 보스워스 대사를 면담하고 강력히 항의하다-	뉴스메이커 News Maker 4/18/2002	

129	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (41)- 서울 도심에서 미국의 무성의를 성토했다-	뉴스메이커 News Maker 4/25/2002	
130	정구도	[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (42)- 미 CBS 방송이 공중폭격 문서 공개했다-	뉴스메이커 News Maker 5/2/2002	
131		Another Side to the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Tragedy	Korea Times 5/7/2002	
132		US Students Urge Bush to Apologize for Nogun-ri Massacre	Korea Times 5/14/2002	
133	Lisa Stein	Witness to Nothing	U.S. News & World Report 133:12 9/30/2002	34
134	이종도	"피난민은 적, 사살하라"/ MBC, BBC 노근리 특종다큐 "킬 템 올" 방송	한국일보 11/13/2002	45 면
135	김용태	노근리 사건' 연극무대에 극단 새벽 영동국악당서	문화일보 11/13/2002	28 면
136	노형석	노근리 다리, 서울시청사 등록문화재 지정	한겨레 4/25/2003	
137	심은정	6 월의 하나됨 7 월의 평화로/ 3 부 공존, 노근리의 진실과 화해	문화일보 6/27/2003	
138	엄경용, 김신일	끝나지 않은 '노근리' 고통	내일신문 12/3/2003	
139	이재명	"노근리사건 피해보상 꼭 이뤄져야" 진상조사-특별법제정 이끈 정구도 대책위 대변인	동아일보 7/6/2004	29 면
140	윤영철	"노근리 명예회복 사업 서둘러야"	내일신문 8/13/2004	21 면
141	장기우	[충북] 노근리 희생자 총 152 명, 충북도 심사 실무위 현장검증	동아일보 3/2/2005	12 면
142	오윤주	노근리 피해자 2428 명 명단확정	한겨레 3/16/2005	12 면
143	유태중	노근리 희생자 늘어 충북도 69 명 추가 인정	조선일보 3/16/2005	16 면
144	장기우	[충북] 노근리사건 피해자 모두 2428 명 인정	동아일보 3/17/2005	14 면
145	정혁준	노근리 희생자/ 218 명 공식인정	한겨레 5/24/2005	11 면
146	엄경용	노근리 찾은 한, 미 대학생 '역사아픔 나누기'	내일신문 6/3/2005	21 면

147	유대중	노근리 현장서 한미 대학생 평화캠프; 노근리 인권 평화연대 주최	조선일보 6/8/2005	12 면
148		[충북] 노근리에 평화, 인권 싹 틔운다	한국일보 6/16/2005	
149	오윤주	노근리에 선 미국 청년들/ "전쟁은 끝났지만 유족, 희생자 전쟁은 계속"	한겨레 6/22/2005	12 면
150	오윤주	노근리 참상 55년 흘렸건만/ 명예회복, 보상 언제쯤이나	한겨레 6/24/2005	15 면
151	이미경	함께하는 교육-출판인이 뽑은 책/ "노근리 그해 여름"	한겨레 9/26/2005	29 면
152	김은형	노근리'로 영화감독 데뷔하는 연극연출가 이상우씨/ "초등생 시선으로 '악몽같은 사건' 풀어헤쳐"	한겨레 11/15/2005	23 면
153	오윤주	노근리 위령공원 청사진 나와	한겨레 12/13/2005	15 면
154	한정숙	[세상읽기] 다시 노근리를 생각하며	한겨레 1/10/2006	31 면
155	고광일	노근리 일대 3 만 5000 평에 2009 년까지 역사공원 조성	문화일보 2/7/2006	12 면
156	윤민용	미, 한국전 관련 해제 문서 다시 '기밀' 묶어...'반미 키올라' 내용 숨기기	경향신문 3/1/2006	12 면
157	유영대	[역경의 열매] 노근리사건 대책위 부원장 정구도 광운대 교수 (1) '노근리사건' 해결은 하나님이 맡긴 사명	국민일보 3/1/2006	27 면
158	유영대	[역경의 열매] 노근리사건 대책위 부원장 정구도 광운대 교수 (2) 가족 4 명 잃은 부친이 첫 사과, 손배 청구	국민일보 3/2/2006	30 면
159	유영대	[역경의 열매] 노근리사건 대책위 부원장 정구도 광운대 교수 (3)	국민일보 3/3/2006	31 면
160		[현장메모] 미국, 기밀문서 재분류 싸고 시끌	세계일보 3/6/2006	
161	유영대	[역경의 열매] 노근리사건 대책위 부원장 정구도 광운대 교수 (4)	국민일보 3/6/2006	35 면
162	유영대	[역경의 열매] 노근리사건 대책위 부원장 정구도 광운대 교수 (5)	국민일보 3/7/2006	30 면
163	유영대	[역경의 열매] 노근리사건 대책위 부원장 정구도 광운대 교수 (6)	국민일보 3/8/2006	33 면
164	유영대	[역경의 열매] 노근리사건 대책위	국민일보	30 면

		부원장 정구도 광운대 교수 (7)	3/9/2006	
165	유영대	[역경의 열매] 노근리사건 대책위 부원장 정구도 광운대 교수 (8)	국민일보 3/10/2006	31 면
166	유영대	[역경의 열매] 노근리사건 대책위 부원장 정구도 광운대 교수 (9)	국민일보 3/13/2006	35 면
167	유영대	[역경의 열매] 노근리사건 대책위 부원장 정구도 광운대 교수 (10)	국민일보 3/14/2006	31 면
168	유영대	[역경의 열매] 노근리사건 대책위 부원장 정구도 광운대 교수 (11)	국민일보 3/15/2006	35 면
169	유영대	[역경의 열매] 노근리사건 대책위 부원장 정구도 광운대 교수 (12)	국민일보 3/16/2006	30 면
170	유영대	[역경의 열매] 노근리사건 대책위 부원장 정구도 광운대 교수 (13)	국민일보 3/17/2006	31 면
171	유영대	[역경의 열매] 노근리사건 대책위 부원장 정구도 광운대 교수 (14)	국민일보 3/20/2006	35 면
172	김신일	충북 영동 노근리 유족모임 결성	내일신문 4/24/2006	5 면
173	Hyun-Joo Jin	Film to Depict <i>No Gun Ri</i>	Korea Herald 5/23/2006	
174	장기우	[충북]열살 '짱이'가 본 '노근리의 참상'	동아일보 5/24/2006	16 면
175	Kwang-tae Kim	South Korean Victims' Group Calls for UN Probe into <i>No Gun Ri</i>	the Associated Press 5/29/2006	
176	Charles J. Hanley & Martha Mendoza	Letter Reveals Policy on Shooting Refugees	the Associated Press 5/29/2006	
177	The Associated Press	U.S. Ambassador's 1950 Letter Policy on Shooting Refugees	the Associated Press 5/29/2006	
178	안동환	미, 한국전때 피란민 총격 명령	서울신문 5/30/2006	3 면
179	고태성	6.25 피난민 사격허용 대책회의 한국 정부 고위급도 참석	한국일보 5/30/2006	
180	이명희	한국전때 피란민 총격... 당시 미대사 서한 발견	국민일보 5/30/2006	
181	고광일	미군 6.25 때 피난민에 총격 허용: 당시 미대사 서한 공개, 노근리학살 재점화	문화일보 5/30/2006	4 면
182	김진호	주한 미대사 서한 발견, 56 년만에 드러난 '노근리의 진실'	경향신문 5/30/2006	2 면
183		Survivors of <i>No Gun Ri</i> Killings Demand Apology	Morning Star 5/30/2006	
184		[사설] 노근리 사건 진상 재조사해야 한다	경향신문 5/31/2006	27 면
185	정동식, 김종목, 김영이, 이고은	미군 '총격허용' 회의때 내무부 관리, 치안국장 등 참석	경향신문 5/31/2006	2 면

186	Jae-soon Chang	South Korea Seeks Details on 1950 Letter	the Associated Press 5/31/2006	
187	박신용철	노근리 양민집단학살 '의도적' - 한국전쟁 당시 계획적 총격... 미 사실 왜곡, 축소	시민의 신문 652 6/1/2006	1 면
188		노근리, 진정 잊혀진 전쟁인가- [사설] 국민아픔, 이제 정부가 대답할 차례다	시민의 신문 652 6/1/2006	5 면
189	황준호	"노근리 둘러싼 한-미 역사전쟁의 2 막이 올랐다" [인터뷰] 정구도 노근리 대책위 부위원장	프레스리안 Pressian 6/1/2006	
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191	이하원	정부, '무초 서한' 확인 요청... 미 "노근리 사건 재조사 계획 없어"	조선일보 6/1/2006	23 면
192		"미 정부, 노근리사건 재조사하고 공식 사과해야" [인터뷰] '무초 대사 서한' 발굴한 란즈 연구원	프레스리안 Pressian 6/2/2006	
193	Song-wu Park	Seoul Awaits US Explanation on <i>No Gun Ri</i>	Korea Times 6/2/2006	
194	Liane Hansen	Haditha Incident Renews Interest in <i>No Gun Ri</i>	National Public Radio 6/4/2006	
195		North Korea Criticizes U.S. Over Mass Civilian Killing During Korean War	the Associated Press 6/4/2006	
196	강신욱	노근리사건 현장에 역사공원 조성	국민일보 6/21/2006	
197	손제민	"한국전쟁 민간인 학살 한국정부·미국 가해 좌익보다 10 배는 많다"	경향신문 6/23/2006	19 면
198	한홍구 Han Hong-gu	주미 대사도 외면한, 아아 노근리 : 생존자 정은용씨와 <AP 통신> 취재로 세상에 알려진 그날의 끔찍한 학살... 가해자 미국보다 한술 더 떠 사건 은폐에 열올린 한국 정부가 더 밋다	한겨레 21 618 7/18/2006	100-103
199	전예현	전세계 주목받은 노근리 추모사업 백지화 위기	내일신문 7/20/2006	20 면
200	전예현	[내일의 눈]노근리사건 외면하는 국무조정실	내일신문 7/21/2006	20 면
201	황준호	진실'도 '위로'도 없이 다시 돌아온 '노근리의 그날': 26 일 노근리	프레스리안 Pressian 7/24/2006	

		위령제... '무초 서한'은 어떻게 됐나		
202	황준호	외교부 "미국은 '무초서한' 해명 아직 안했다": "확인 받는 즉시 국민들에게 알리겠다" 약속	프레스시안 Pressian 7/25/2006	
203	이고은, 김유진	노근리 유해발굴 의미 -- 56년 묻혔던 '진실' 캐기	경향신문 7/25/2006	6면
204	이고은	노근리학살 '피란민 유해' 찾는다 - 국무조정실 문서 "내년 3월 발굴 착수"	경향신문 7/25/2006	6면
205	김유진	"노근리가 풀려야 한,미 관계 풀려" 피해자 법정대리인 마이클 최	경향신문 7/25/2006	6면
206	전예현	노근리 사건' 예술로 재조명	내일신문 7/25/2006	20면
207	정택용	[화보] 지워지지 않는 상처, 노근리	민중의 소리 7/26/2006	
208	황준호	외교부 "노근리 조사 재협상 검토 없다": 장맛비 속에 노근리 56주기 위령제 열려	프레스시안 Pressian 7/26/2006	
209	정택용	"한미정부는 노근리사건 진상조사를 다시 실시하라": 제 8회 노근리사건 희생자 합동위령제 열려	민중의 소리 7/26/2006	
210	김정수, 김학준	정부지원 노근리 유해발굴/ 이르면 내년 봄에 착수할듯	한겨레 7/26/2006	
211	이고은	['노근리' 56주기] 정부 "시간없다" 미는 '...'	경향신문 7/27/2006	
212	이고은	['노근리' 56주기] 침묵의 위령제 "눈물도 말랐다"	경향신문 7/27/2006	

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1	Department of the Army, Inspector General	The <i>No Gun Ri</i> Review	Jan. 11, 2001	
2	노근리사건조사반, 국무조정실 Committee of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Investigation, Office for Government Policy	노근리 사건조사결과보고서 Report of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Investigation	Jan. 11, 2001	

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3	Moo-bong Ryoo	<i>No Gun Ri</i> Incident: Implications for the U.S. Army	School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2001	
4	유병용	노근리 사건의 의의 (권두언)	근현대사강좌 Issues on Modern History 12, 2001	6-10
5	박선원	미국의 노근리 사건 최종보고서 비판	근현대사강좌 Issues on Modern History 12, 2001	15-46
6	정구도	노근리사건 조사결과보고서의 문제점- "한미공동 발표문"과 한국정부 "노근리사건 조사결과 보고서"를 중심으로	근현대사강좌 Issues on Modern History 12, 2001	47-122
7	이장희 Lee, Chang-hee	전시 민간인 피해에 대한 국제 인도법적 검토 A Study for the Damage to Civilians in War Time with an Approach of International Humanity Law	근현대사강좌 Issues on Modern History 12, 2001	123-158
8	조시현 Cho, Si-hon	노근리'학살사건과 국제인도법 The <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre and the International Humanity Law	Songsin Journal of Law 성신법학 1, 2001	65-106
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10	민경길, Min, Kyong-gil	전시 민간인 보호에 관한 국제법규 연구:노근리 사건을 중심으로 A Study About the International Regulations for the Protection of Civilians Under War Situation: With a Focus on the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Incident	인도법논총 Journal of Humanity Law 21, 2001	109-148
11	노근리미군양민 학살사건 대책위원회	노근리사건에 관한 한국정부보고서 한미공동발표문에 대한 반론서	Apr. 20, 2001	
12	Baik, T. U.	"A War Crime Against an Ally's Civilians: The <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre	Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy, 15: part 2, 2001	455-506
13	오연호	제 10 장 노근리, 그리고 힘의 질서 (20 세기 한국의 야만 - 평화와 인권의 21 세기를 위하여)	도서출판 일빛, 2001	283-299

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16	Cumings, Bruce	Occurrence At Nogun-Ri Bridge: An Inquiry Into the History and Memory of a Civil War	Critical Asian Studies [Great Britain] 33:4, 2001	509-526
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18	Sang-hun Choe, Charles Hanley, and Martha Mendoza	노근리 다리	2003	
19	박명림	한국 1950: 전쟁과 평화, The Korean War, 1950: A Reflection on War and Peace	나남출판, 2002	330-339
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22	Marilyn B. Young	An Incident at <i>No Gun Ri</i> ,” in ed. by Omer Bartov, Atina Grossman, and Mary Nolan, <i>Crime of War: Guilt and Denial in the twentieth Century</i>	New York: The New Press, 2002	242-258 (Chap. 13)
23	이만열, 김윤정	노근리 사건'의 진상과 그 성격	노근리사건의 진상과 교훈, Truth and Lessons of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre, by 정구도, 두남, 2003	21-60
24	이재곤, 정구도, 오윤석	전시 민간인 보호를 위한 국제법적 규제 - 한국전쟁시 소위 "충북 영동군 황간면 노근리 민간인 살상사건"과 관련하여	노근리사건의 진상과 교훈, Truth and Lessons of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre, by 정구도, 두남, 2003	325-359



25	최병수	노근리 양민학살사건에 관한 몇가지 검토: 6.25 동란 초기 충북영동지구의 민간인 학살사건에 관한 연구 (II)	노근리사건의 진상과 교훈, Truth and Lessons of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre, by 정구도, 두남, 2003	121- 142
26	최병수, 정구도	6.25 동란초기 충북 영동지구의 민간인 살상사건에 관한 연구 (I): 노근리의 미국 대 양민 집단살상사건을 중심으로	노근리사건의 진상과 교훈, Truth and Lessons of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre, by 정구도, 두남, 2003	61-91
27	박선원	미국의 노근리사건 최종보고서 비판 - 제국의 은전론과 한미동맹의 재조정	노근리사건의 진상과 교훈, Truth and Lessons of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre, by 정구도, 두남, 2003	209- 243
28	정구도	노근리사건 조사결과의 문제점 비판- 한국정부 "노근리사건 조사결과 보고서"와 "한미 공동발표문"을 중심으로	노근리사건의 진상과 교훈, Truth and Lessons of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre, by 정구도, 두남, 2003	143- 208
29	정구도 Chong, Ku-do	<i>No Gun Ri is Still Alive</i> 노근리는 살아있다	Seoul: Paeksan Sodang 백산서당, 2003	
30				
31	박성희	노근리사건 유감표명 성명서의 수사학	노근리사건의 진상과 교훈, Truth and Lessons of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre, by 정구도, 두남, 2003	509- 540
32	방선주	한국전쟁기 북한자료로 본 '노근리 사건'	노근리사건의 진상과 교훈, Truth and Lessons of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre, by 정구도, 두남, 2003	93-120
33	이장희	국제인도법의 원칙과 노근리 양민살해 사건	노근리사건의 진상과 교훈, Truth and Lessons of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre, by 정구도, 두남, 2003	293- 323

	Baik, T. U.	“A War Crime Against an Ally’s Civilians: The <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre	노근리사건의 진상과 교훈, Truth and Lessons of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre, by 정구도, 두남, 2003	
34	정진성	인권의 관점에서 본 노근리사건의 재해석	노근리사건의 진상과 교훈, Truth and Lessons of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre, by 정구도, 두남, 2003	419-447
35	조시현	노근리'학살사건의 국제법적 성격	노근리사건의 진상과 교훈, Truth and Lessons of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre, by 정구도, 두남, 2003	245-291
36	차재영, 이영남	미디어의 공공의제 형성과정에서 정보원이 행하는 역할에 관한 연구 - 노근리 미군 양민학살사건 대책위원회를 중심으로	노근리사건의 진상과 교훈, Truth and Lessons of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre, by 정구도, 두남, 2003	449-472
37	현용수	노근리사건을 기억해야하는 교육학적인 이유	노근리사건의 진상과 교훈, Truth and Lessons of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre, by 정구도, 두남, 2003	473-508
38	Park, Katrin Eun-Myo	It is always difficult to serve more than one master: Investigation of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre Reports	노근리사건의 진상과 교훈, Truth and Lessons of the <i>No Gun Ri</i> Massacre, by 정구도, 두남, 2003	541-551
39	Dong Choon Kim	Forgotten War, Forgotten Massacre: The Korean War (1950-1953) as Licensed Mass Killings	Journal of Genocide Research 6:4, 2004	523-544
40	J. Robert Port	The Story No One Wanted to Hear	Into the Buzzsaw, 2004	239-251
41	Dale C. Kuehl	What Happened At <i>No Gun Ri</i> ? The Challenge of Civilians on the Battlefield	Master's Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2003	
42	Sahr Conway-Lanz	Beyond <i>No Gun Ri</i> : Refugees and the United States Military in the Korean War	Diplomatic History 29:1, 2005	49-81

## **APPENDIX B**

### **MILITARY DOCUMENTS**

#### **B. 1. GLOSSARY FOR MILITARY DOCUMENTS USED FOR *NO GUN RI* RESEARCH**

##### **Communication Log (Journal)**

Communication logs are chronological records of communication messages, usually through radio transmission. A communication log records date, time, senders, and messages. For *No Gun Ri* research, communication logs of the 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment and other neighboring units were used to identify refugee policy that was received through radio communication from higher commanders.

##### **Intelligence Report**

An intelligence report is defined as “a specific report of information, usually on a single item, made at any level of command in tactical operations and disseminated as rapidly as possible in keeping with the timeliness of the information” by the Department of Defense.<sup>267</sup> Intelligence reports were useful for evaluation of the positions and war effectiveness of enemy and extensively used by the U.S. investigation team for the *No Gun Ri* research.

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<sup>267</sup> <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/i/02750.html>. (last accessed October 25 2007)

## **Map Coordinate**

A coordinate is “one of a series of two-digit numbers shown on a map grid in order to produce grid references.”<sup>268</sup> It was usually used to check the marks for the movement of units in the broader area around *No Gun Ri*. The map coordinates were used mainly by the AP team for locating the army unit at *No Gun Ri* at the time of massacre.

## **Mission Report**

A mission report is defined as “a standard report containing the results of a mission and significant sightings along the flight route” by the Department of Defense.<sup>269</sup> Some after mission reports of aircrafts were discovered in the process of the *No Gun Ri* research and they provide evidence that air strafing on refugees was prevailed during the Korean War as well as during the time for the killing at *No Gun Ri*.

## **Morning Report**

The morning report is well described in Wikipedia as “a document produced every morning for every basic unit of the Army, by the unit clerk, detailing personnel changes for the day. The morning report details changes in the status of soldiers in the unit on the day the change occurs, including transferring to or from the unit, temporarily assigned elsewhere, on leave, absent without official leave or deserted, in custody, promoted or demoted, and other such information. When a soldier is transferred to or from another unit, his or her orders specifying the exact date that the soldier is counted as leaving one unit and officially entering the other. In this fashion, the morning report provides a complete history of changes in a unit's personnel.”<sup>270</sup> Morning reports were especially importantly utilized to prove the veracity of some veterans’ testimony about their participation in the *No Gun Ri* killing.

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<sup>268</sup> Bowyer, Richard. *Dictionary of Military Terms* [electronic version], 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., s.v. “coordinate.”  
<<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/pitt/Doc?id=10022155&ppg=54>>

<sup>269</sup> <http://www.fas.org/news/reference/lexicon/dem.htm>. (last accessed October 25 2007)

<sup>270</sup> Excerpted from the entry, Morning Report,  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morning\\_report\\_\(United\\_States\\_military\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morning_report_(United_States_military)) (last accessed October 25, 2007)

## **Operation Plan**

Operation Plan is also called a military plan or a war plan. It is “a formal plan for military operations, as drawn up by leaders to plan action against likely enemies. Military plans are an aspect of military doctrine.”<sup>271</sup> The operation plan document that was used for the *No Gun Ri* research described the plans in the broader area of Hwanggan two days before the killing. This document says the 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment’s mission is as Division’s reserve to support the 5<sup>th</sup> Cavalry and 8<sup>th</sup> Cavalry.

## **Roster**

Oxford English Dictionary defines roster as “a list or plan exhibiting the order of rotation, or turns of duties and service, of officers, men, and bodies of troops.” Also, it describes, “esp. U.S., a simple list or register of officers, divisions of a regiment, etc., with various particulars relating to them” in the military sense.”<sup>272</sup> The AP reporters tried to identify veterans’ names from rosters to find those who were at *No Gun Ri* or who heard about *No Gun Ri*.

## **War Diary**

War diary is “a unit journal compiled during combat operations as an historic narrative to accompany official records.”<sup>273</sup> While communication logs or journals focus on messages that are received or sent, war diary is more narrative to explain the situation that a unit faces or the unit’s implementation of military operation. For the *No Gun Ri* case, refugee related situation of the units around *No Gun Ri* was well described in war diaries. Also, the 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment’s war diary showed the fact that this unit withdrew on July 29 1950 from *No Gun Ri*.

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<sup>271</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation\\_plan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_plan). (last accessed October 25 2007)

<sup>272</sup> *Oxford English Dictionary* [electronic version], s.v. “roster.”

<sup>273</sup> (<http://www.combat.ws/S4/MILTERMS/MT-W.HTM>). (last accessed October 24 2007)

## **B. 2. MAJOR MILITARY DOCUMENTS USED FOR *NO GUN RI* RESEARCH**

### **(Chronological Order)**

**Memorandum, Headquarters (HQs) 1st Cavalry Division (1CD), 23 Jul 50, sub: Control of Refugee Movement. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, Box 127, RG 338, NARA.**

This is the general policy for the refugee movement that was issued a few days before the *No Gun Ri* incident. It explains the evacuation rules for refugees. This document was reported by the U.S. Army report, *No Gun Ri review*. Following is the text from the document.

Movement of civilians and refugees in the 1st Cavalry Division area was permitted from 10:00 AM to 12:00 noon only;

no ox carts, trucks, or civilian cars were allowed to operate on highways;

no fields could be worked;

no schools, shops, or industries could be operated unless they were essential to the war effort;

and municipal authorities, local police, and National Police were to enforce this directive.

The National Police would collect all refugees from the countryside and highway and carry them by rail or trucks to screening points. Division Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) personnel, including an attached Korean CIC Team, would screen the refugees at established roadblocks and checkpoints. Units within the Division had instructions to turn over refugees to CIC or G-2 (Intelligence) Interrogation for screening.

**Communication Log, the 8<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, July 24<sup>th</sup> 1950. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.**

This document was discovered by the AP team and records the instructions from the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division headquarters for controlling refugees, which is described as “fire everyone trying to cross lines” at 1000 hours, or 10 a.m. on July 24, 1950. Following is that actual text from the document.

- 0900 2<sup>nd</sup> Bn Co E sighted 300 NK's yds in front of Co E position. Arty FO contacted abs plane. If confirmed, will use arty. Will keep contact with us. Notified S-3.
- 1000 G-3 Ln No refugees to cross the front line. Fire everyone trying to cross lines. Use discretion in case of women and children.
- 1020 Div Arty Suspected Korean carrying radio at 1073.5-1475.4.

**War Diary, 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, 24-30 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries), 1949-1954, 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division History Jul 50, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.**

This war diary on July 24 1950 from a neighbor Division displays the army units' concerns about refugee problems. Washington Post reporters reported this document. Following is the text from the document.

The control of refugees presented a difficult problem. No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers transporting ammunition and heavy weapons in farm wagons and carrying military equipment in packs on their backs. They were observed many times changing from uniforms to civilian clothing and back into uniform. There were so many refugees that it was impossible to screen and search them all.

**The 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division; Operation Plan Number 10-50; Hwanggan(1088-1483); 1950. 7. 24. 23:15)**

This document is for a war operation plan on a broader area of Hwanggan where *No Gun Ri* is located two days before the incident. This document indicates the 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment as Division's Reserve to support the 5<sup>th</sup> Cavalry and 8<sup>th</sup> Cavalry. This document was discovered and reported by a Korean survivor's family. Following is the text from the document.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division; Operation Plan Number 10-50; Hwanggan(1088-1483); 1950. 7. 24. 23:15)

Task Organization

...

2. This division will secure the high ground east of Yongdong (1076-1476), and prevent the movement of the enemy to the east.
3. Scheme of Maneuver
  - a. The Bns of 5<sup>th</sup> Cav and 8<sup>th</sup> Cav will take new positions and disengage from contact with the enemy as follows:
    - b. 8<sup>th</sup> Cav.
      - (1) ...
      - (2) Disengage and secure the high ground east of yongdong and North of road to prevent enemy penetration to the east.
    - c. 5<sup>th</sup> Cav.
      - ...
    - d. 7<sup>th</sup> Cav.
      - (1) Div Reserve prepared to counter any enemy penetration of our lines.
      - (2) Conduct aggressive and continuous patrols on high ground parallel with HWANGGAN-YOUNGDONG road to prevent enemy infiltration and harassing fire on road.

**Memorandum to General Timberlake, "Policy on Strafing Civilian Refugees," Colonel T.C. Rogers, DCS/Operations, HQ 5AF Advance, 25 Jul 50.**

This document is a memo from Col. Turner C. Rogers, U.S. 5<sup>th</sup> Air Force officer. He noted that Air Force planes were strafing refugee groups approaching U.S. positions, complying with an Army request. This memo was written one day before (July 25, 1950) the refugees were strafed at *No Gun Ri*. He concerned that such activities could receive wide publicity and may cause embarrassment to the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. government. This document was reported by a CBS correspondent in June 2000. Following is the full text of the document.

FIFTH AIR FORCE  
APO 970, Unit 1

25 July 1950

MEMO TO GENERAL TIMBERLAKE  
Subject: Policy on Strafing Civilian Refugees

I. THE PROBLEM:

1. To determine the policy for guidance of all Fifth Air Force units in regard to strafing of civilian refugees on the highways.

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

2. It is reported that large groups of civilians, either composed of or controlled by North Korean soldiers, are infiltrating U.S. positions.

3. The army has requested that we strafe all civilian refugee parties that are noted approaching our position.

4. To date, we have complied with the army request in this respect.

III. DISCUSSION:

5. Our operations involving the strafing of civilians is sure to receive wide publicity and may cause embarrassment to the U. S. Air Force and to the U. S. government in its relation with the United Nations.

6. It appears that such civilian groups are marching on the highways through U.S. ground positions. It is not understood why the army is not screening such personnel or shooting them as they come through if they desire such action. Further, it is felt that more suitable targets are available for the air effort, the destruction of which would be of more value to the army in the long run.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS:

7. For the protection of the Air Force, it is recommended that a policy be established whereby Fifth Air Force aircraft will not attack civilian refugees, unless they are definitely known to contain North Korean soldiers or commit hostile acts.

8. It is further recommended that we so inform 8th army headquarters.

TURNER C. ROGERS



Colonel, USAF  
D C/S Operations

**S-2-3 Journal, 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment: Ka-Ri, Korea, July 25-29 1950**

This document records the situation at Ka-ri, a nearby area of *No Gun Ri*, about refugee groups passing by the U.S. units on the previous night of the killing. This document was discovered by a survivor's family member from the NARA.

S-2-3 Journal  
5<sup>th</sup> Cav

251305/K July 50  
Ka-ri, Korea

Time In	Time Out	No. dated	Incidents, Msgs, Orders, & c.	Action Taken
25 JULY	(n)15	251305/K	Msg fr Adapt Red to CO Adapt – request arty fire on forward high ground occupied by Able. Bn shooting down wounded fr position.	
1350K	(p)16	1339	CO 1 <sup>st</sup> Bn: Req at least 10 ambulances or trucks for wounded. S-P	
1445	(q)17	1430	CO 1 <sup>st</sup> Bn: In answer to disp of trucks to be used for ambulances – they are to be sent to 1 <sup>st</sup> Bn rear CP.	
...				
1720	(u)21	1720	Alerted for air alert: five(5) on aircraft in the air.	S
1815	(v)22	1815	Capt Pickering rptd in at CP & said Lt Rand and his Plt got caught in roadblock; only 6 got out alive. States his 1 <sup>st</sup> Sgt is missing.	S
-----	(w)23	2400	Journal closed 252400/K July 50.	
...				
0200	26 JUL	1	0135/KMsg to CO 5 Cav as fol: An est 50 natives w/ ox carts rptd earlier to have been near this unit in hills coming out & headed toward rear. None appear armed; we have not opened fire; req an immed answer. CO 2 <sup>nd</sup> bn.	S-P
0210	2		0200 To CO 2 Bn (msg 1): re natives w/ ox carts – round them repeat round them immediately. CO 5 Cav.	SF
0310	3		0220 CO 2d Bn: Outpost rpts on tanks & infantry.	SF
0410	4		0340 Fr CO 2d Bn: Fire defending 035 to 0355.	SF
0455	5		0410 2d Bn: req concentration at the fol cords: (80.5-79.5), (81.0-74.0), (86.5-73.5)	SF

**Journal, Headquarters 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, July 26, 1950.**

A 25th Infantry Division headquarters journal shows that at 10 p.m. on July 26 1950, the first day of the *No Gun Ri* massacre, General Kean has decided civilians in the war zone should be “considered as unfriendly and shot.” This document was also discovered by the AP team. Following is the actual text from the document.

2145	735	Tel Call fr Col Crenelino to Maj McGovern re request for personnel and auth for 2 constrt teams in Sig co.
2200	736	CG (KEAN) directed me notify Chief of Police that all civilians moving around in combat zone will be considered as unfriendly and shot.
2200	737	Periodic report no 13, this hq.

**Message, EUSAK, CNR: G 20578 KGP, 26 Jul 50, sub: Controlled Movement of All Refugees. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Korean Military Advisory Group, Box 23, RG 338, NARA.**

On July 25, 1950, a conference took place at the Capitol Building in Taegu. Participants from the Republic of Korea Government, American Embassy, National Police, United Nations, and the Eighth U.S. Army Korea (EUSAK) agreed upon a plan to control refugee movement. As a result of this meeting, EUSAK issued a four-part, detailed message on July 26, 1950, just hours before the refugee killing at *No Gun Ri*. Following is the full text of the document.

Ser No-80 – Fm: 8A: Controlled movement of all refugees. 261000K Jul 50  
THIS MSG IN FOUR PARTS, SUBJECT: Controlled movement of All Refugees.

Part I: Effective immediately the following procedure will be adhered to by all commands relative to the flow or movement of all refugees in battle areas and rear areas. No repeat no refugees will be permitted to cross battle lines at any time. Movement of all Koreans in groups will cease immediately. No areas will be evacuated by Koreans without a direct order from Commanding General EUSAK or upon order of Division Commanders. Each division will be assigned three National Police liaison officers to assist in clearing any area of the civilian populace that will interfere with the successful accomplishment of his mission.

Part II: Procedure for clearing areas. Division commanders will inform National Police Officers of the area or sector to be evacuated, the route, and the time the area will be cleared. National Police will immediately clear the area. Food, water, and comfort items for these refugees will be provided by the Vice Minister of Social Affairs through the National Police. All refugees will move along their predetermined route to selected concentration areas from sunup until

sundown. This will be a controlled movement under the direction and supervision of the National Police and representatives from the office of Korean Welfare Affairs.

Part III: Movement of Korean civilians during hours of darkness. There will be absolutely no movement of Korean civilians, as individuals or groups in battle areas or rear areas, after the hours of darkness. Uniformed Korean police will rigidly enforce this directive.

Part IV: To accomplish the procedure, as outlined in this directive, leaflets will be prepared and dropped in all areas forward and rear of the battle line to effectively disseminate this information. National Police will further disseminate this information to all Korean civilians by means of radio, messenger, and the press.

**American Ambassador John Muccio's Letter to Assistant Secretary of States Dean Rusk, 26 July 1950, Box 4266, Central Decimal Files 1950-54, Record Group 59, National Archives, College Park, MD.**

This document was discovered by a historian, Sahr Conway-Lanz. It described how the American Embassy felt about the refugee policy after the meeting at Taegu on July 25 1950. Conway-Lanz mentioned that this letter at least implied that Ambassador Muccio had an understanding that the top officials of the U.S troops had decided to use fire force for refugee control. Following is the full text of the document.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERIC

PERSONAL - CONFIDENTIAL

American Embassy  
July 26, 1950

Dear Dean:

The refugee problem has developed aspects of a serious and even critical military nature, aside from the welfare aspects. Necessarily, decisions are being made by the military in regard to it, and in view of the possibility of repercussions in the United States from the effectuation of these decisions, I have thought it desirable to inform you of them.

The enemy has used the refugees to his advantage in many ways: by forcing them south and so clogging the roads as to interfere with military movements; by using them as a channel for infiltration of agents; and most dangerous of all by disguising their own troops as refugees, who after passing through our lines proceed, after dark, to produce hidden weapons, and then attack our units from the rear. Too often such attacks have been devastatingly successful. Such infiltrations had a considerable part in the defeat of the 24<sup>th</sup> Division at Taejon.

Naturally, the Army is determined to end this threat. Yesterday evening a meeting was arranged, by 8<sup>th</sup> Army HQ request, at the office of the Home Minister at the temporary Capitol. G-1, G-2, Provost Marshall, CTC, the Embassy, the Home and Social Affairs Ministries, and the Director of National Police. The following decisions were made:

1. Leaflet drops will be made north of US lines banning the people not to proceed south, that they risk being fired upon if they do so. If refugees do appear from north of US lines they will receive warning shots, and if they then persist in advancing they will be shot.

2. Leaflet drops and oral warning by police within US combat zone will be made to the effect that no one can move south unless ordered, and then only under police control, that all movement of Korean civilians must end at sunset or those moving will risk being shot when dark comes.

3. Should the local tactical commander consider it essential to evacuate a given sector he will notify the police liaison officers attached to his HQ, who through the area Korean National Police will notify the inhabitants, and start them southward under police control on specified minor roads. No one will be permitted to move unless police notify them, and those further south not notified will be required to stay put.

4. Refugee groups must stop at sunset, and not move again until daylight. Police will establish check points to catch enemy agents; subsequently Social Ministry will be prepared to care for, and direct refugees to camps or other areas.

5. No mass movements unless police controlled will be permitted. Individual movements will be subject to police checks at numerous points.

6. In all cities, towns curfew will be at 9 p.m., with effective enforcement at 10 p.m. Any unauthorized person on streets after 10 p.m. is to be arrested, and carefully examined. This last item is already in effect.

Sincerely,

John J. Muccio

**Memorandum, Commander, 25th Infantry Division, 27 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.**

This is a memo that Gen. Kean ordered to the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division to consider civilians as enemy. This document was issued the second day of the massacre. It was discovered by the AP team. Following is the full text of the document.

Headquarters 25<sup>th</sup> Inf Div  
Sangju, Korea  
27 July 1950

MEMO TO:

Commanding Officers, All Regimental Combat Teams  
Staff Sections, This Headquarters

Korean police have been directed to remove all civilians from the area between the blue lines shown on the attached overlay and report the evacuation has been accomplished. All civilians seen in this area are to be considered as enemy and action taken accordingly.

OFFICIAL:

KEAN

Maj Gen USA

**War diary (July 29 1950), 1st Cavalry Division, June-July 1950. In the Records of U. S. Army Commands, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 131, RG 338, NARA.**

This war diary described the 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry division's withdrawal operation from *No Gun Ri* on July 29, 1950. There is no mention of the event at *No Gun Ri* in this entry, but this document implies that this unit stayed in the area from July 26 to 29 during the period the *No Gun Ri* killing occurred. This document was discovered by the AP team. Following is the text from the document.

At 0530 hours the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 7<sup>th</sup> Cav Regt received the order to withdraw. During the night movement they received tank and artillery fire. The 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion withdrew ahead of the 2d Battalion, slightly misting up the plan and causing some delay. By 0820 hours elements of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2d Battalions had passed the Hwanggan railroad station heading into their new area. Extensive patrols to the front as well as flanks were initiated. Refugees continued to be evacuated and caused much trouble. A 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion patrol located 6 enemy soldiers moving south on a trail at (92.85-76.75). At 2100 hours the I&R Platoon was dispatched to block the road between the 8<sup>th</sup> Cav Regt on their right and the 2d Battalion, 7<sup>th</sup> Cav Regt.

During this day's action, considerable confusion existed. The 27<sup>th</sup> Regt was being relieved by elements of the 5<sup>th</sup> RCT. Other elements of the Division were ordered to withdraw. The infiltration tactics of the enemy and the large numbers of refugees made movement and communications very difficult. Units were not aware, in all cases, of proposed movements of adjacent elements of the Division. This resulted in flanks being exposed and units who though they were in reserve found themselves to be facing the enemy.

**News Report from *Choson In Min Bo* (조선인민보, Korean People's Daily), by Chon Uk (전옥). Aug 19 1950.**

A North Korean newspaper reported *No Gun Ri* in August 1950 after correspondents visited the site of massacre. This newspaper was collected by the U.S. army and housed in the NARA. One Korean archives has a microfilm copy of this newspaper and a Korean survivor's family found and reported this article. Following is the Korean text of the news article.

방금 패전에 패전을 거듭하고 있는 미군은 우리 조국의 많은 도시와 농촌을 무차별적으로 맹폭하여 우리의 아름다운 강산을 우리의 사랑하는 부모 형제 재마들의 피로써 물들이고 있는 바 놈들은 지난 7 월 29 일 충청북도 황간에서도 수많은 무고한 인민들을 학살하였다.

즉, 29 일[7 월 29 일을 말함] 해질 무렵이었다. 대구 방면으로 진격하는 우리 인민군 부대 장병들이 황간역 북쪽 로우리에 다달았을 때 들과 철교 밑에서 무엇이라고 형용할 수 없이 참혹한 장면에 부닥쳤다. 동지점 일대의 들의 초목과 철교밑 시냇물은 피로 물들여 있고 두겹 세겹씩 덮인 시체로서 처참한 수라장을 이루어 우리 인민군 전투원들의 가슴을 어지럽게 하였다. 발디딜 곳조차 없는 현장에는 늙은이 젊은이 어린이 약 400 명의 시체가 널려져 있었고 그중의 젊은 여성들은 반라체가 되어 거꾸러져 있었다. “아저씨 아저씨” 우리들은 별안간에 어린애 목소리에 놀랐다. 6, 7 세 가량으로 보이는 소녀가 등에 젖먹이를 업고 별별 기어 나오는 것이었다. 그 뒤에 머리가 흰 로파가 따라 기어 나오는 것이었다. 우리들은 그들에게 달려들어 사유를 물었더니 그들은 얼빠진 사람처럼 멍하니 우리들을 쳐다 보고만 있었다. 우리들은 재빨리 부대로 뛰어가 우선 우유와 빵을 가져다 그들에게 먹이었다. 그랬더니 차차 정신이 드는 모양이었다. 조금씩 조금씩 말을 주고받고 보니 소녀는 계산리에 사는 최순자였고 그 등에 업은 젖먹이는 자기 동생이라는 것이었다. 그리고 머리가 흰 로파는 소녀들의 이웃집에 사는 김사랑씨였다.

로파의 말에 의하면 자기의 여섯 식구가 모두 들에서 학살되었고 최순자 소녀의 일곱식구도 학살되어 자기들은 간신히 살아 남았다는 것이었다. 이들은 계속 동지점에서 벌어진 미군의 입에도 담지 못할 학살 사건을 우리들에게 이야기하며 눈물을 흘리는 것이었다.

**Morning Report Mar. 18, 1949 of the 27<sup>th</sup> Ordnance Maintenance Company.**

**Morning Report Mar. 22, 1951 of 27<sup>th</sup> Ordnance Maintenance Company.**

**Morning Report Mar. 24, 1951 of 7<sup>th</sup> Cav. Regt.**

Several morning reports show Edward Daily was not at *No Gun Ri* during the time that the incident occurred. These documents describe that he arrived at the the 27<sup>th</sup> Ordnance Maintenance Company to serve as a mechanic on March 18, 1949 and left this company to join



## **APPENDIX C**

### **INTERVIEWS**

#### **C.1 LIST OF INTERVIEW SUBJECTS (AUTHORS OF PUBLICATIONS)**

Robert Bateman

Si-hyon Cho

Sanghun Choe

Ku-do Chong

Sahr Conway- Lanz

Charles Hanley

Chung-nam Kim

Yun-jong Kim

Yon-ho Oh

Moo-bong Ryoo

Marilyn B. Young



## C.2 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. How does your research involve using archives and historical material about the *No Gun Ri* massacre?
2. Did you need to use archives for the *No Gun Ri* research and if so, how did you locate the materials you used?
3. What kinds of archives and historical materials did you use for your research on the *No Gun Ri* massacre?
4. Can you describe your research procedure for your *No Gun Ri* research?
5. How much weight and credibility did you give archival materials among other resources you used in general?
6. For the building of your major points and arguments concerning the *No Gun Ri* research, how much do you think you have been influenced by archival materials among other resources?
7. Have your views of and research about the massacre changed as new archival materials have been discovered? Can you describe the specific archival documents that changed your research results?
8. What were the barriers that you experienced in using archives? For example, were these barriers preservation issues, accessibility issues, classification/declassification issues, or others?
9. How did you deal with any practical problems of approaching and using archives, such as traveling to the United States or Korea and language differences?

### C.3 COVER LETTER SAMPLE

September 00, 2004

Dear

As a major writer in the area of the *No Gun Ri* history, I would like to interview you with regard to my Ph D dissertation research at the University of Pittsburgh. My objective is to examine how archival records play a role in historical research about the *No Gun Ri* massacre with the consideration of research patterns, hypothesis-building, interpretation process, and as a whole the results of research products.

From the publications about the *No Gun Ri* massacre, I identified you as a major researcher in this area, and I am writing to enlist your participation and your input in my dissertation study, "Records and the Understanding of Violent Events: Archival Documentation, Historical Perception, and the *No Gun Ri* Massacre in the Korean War."

The results will aggregate the information obtained, and, of course, no individual participant will be identified.

To permit a careful consideration of your responses to my questions, and to minimize mistakes on my part, I hope that you will agree to permit me to tape record the interview. This is a standard practice in studies of this sort and I would be pleased to provide you with a copy of the transcript if you wish. Should you prefer to be interviewed without the tape recorder, however, I will certainly oblige. Your participation will be very much appreciated and add significantly to the value of my doctoral dissertation.

I plan to visit you in June through October 2004 at your convenient. I will email or telephone you to see whether you will be free for an interview during this period. Alternatively, you may contact me to arrange a time by email or phone at [dosst22@pitt.edu](mailto:dosst22@pitt.edu) and 412-XXX-XXXX.

Sincerely,

Donghee Sinn

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