

**HUME'S LIBERALISM:
AN EARLY THEORY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL**

by

ZEYNEL ABIDIN KILINC

BA, ORTA DOGU TEKNIK UNIVERSITY, 1993

MA, OHIO UNIVERSITY, 1998

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY OF
ARTS AND SCIENCES
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

2004

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

This dissertation was presented

by

Zeynel Abidin Kilinc

It was defended on

September 27, 2004

and approved by

Andrew Valls

Michael Goodhart

B. Guy Peters

Dissertation Director: Frederick G. Whelan

HUME'S LIBERALISM: AN EARLY THEORY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

Zeynel Abidin Kilinc, Ph. D.

University of Pittsburgh, 2004

This study examines the relation between Hume's justice and his moral theory in regard to the role of a virtuous body of citizenry in politics. It is often argued that classical liberals detached the connection between virtue and politics and relied on enlightened interest and the state to establish and maintain social order. Yet, Humean liberalism reveals that this is a misleading generalization. In this study, I argue that Hume's politics has two fundamental components: the state (institutions) and a virtuous body of citizenry. Hume's developmental view of human nature allows him to argue that in parallel to the development of human society and because of private training and education, our moral sense improves. The improvement of moral sense creates new motives in individuals which cannot be reduced to self-interest. Hume relies on the improvement of moral sense to facilitate social cooperation in large modern society in addition to the state and self-interest. This study reveals that liberal thought cannot be reduced to its Hobbesian version.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	vi
INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.0 HUME'S THEORY OF JUSTICE.....	24
1.1. Introduction:	24
1.2. Justice: Theoretical Account:	29
1.3. Social Cooperation and Government: Theoretical Account: ..	36
1.4. Justice: Historical Account:	39
1.5. Social Cooperation and Government: Historical Account: ..	51
1.6. Conclusion:	60
2.0 SOCIAL CAPITAL AND THE COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM.....	65
2.1. Introduction:	65
2.2. Social Capital: Definition, components, and causal mechanism:	69
2.3. Social Capital and Hume:	83
2.4. Social Capital, Human Nature, and Moral Sense:	86
2.5. Social Capital as Civic Virtue:	88
2.6. Types of Social Capital:	97
2.7. Social Capital and "A new way of doing politics":	102
2.8. Conclusion:	110
3.0 HUME'S MORAL THEORY.....	111
3.1. Introduction:	111

3.2. Hume's Notion of Morality:	114
3.3. Education, Training and Integrity:	122
3.4. Historical Account of Morality:	124
3.5. Humean Virtues:	133
3.6. Human Nature:	140
3.7. Individual Preference and Moral Development:	145
3.8. Moral Theory and Collective Action:	146
3.9. Hume's Moral Theory and Social Capital:	159
3.10. Conclusion:	165
4.0 HUME'S POLITICS	167
4.1. Introduction:	167
4.2. Hume's Critique of Republican Politics:	169
4.3. Institutions, Morality, and Factions:	174
4.4. Factions as Bad Social Capital:	191
4.5. Conclusion	192
5.0 CONCLUSION	194
BIBLIOGRAPHY	199

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my advisor Prof. Frederick G. Whelan for his support and patience. He has always been available for me.

I would also like to thank my committee members, Prof. Andrew Valls, Prof. Michael Goodhart, Prof. B. Guy Peters for their comments and time.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my wife, Sibel Kilinc, for her continues support and I also want to thank my small boy, Kerem, for bringing joy in difficult times.

I would like to thank Turkish community for their help when I needed it.

I would like to thank my parents for their endless love.

INTRODUCTION

There has been a resurgence of scholarly interest in the characters of citizens in regard, among other things, to social cooperation since the publication of Putnam's *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (1993)¹. Question of how a liberal system should and can respond to the collective action and free-rider problem has gained new insights. In particular, the role of the qualities of individuals in dealing with the collective action problem has questioned the adequacy of rational choice theory and the institutional solution. Social capital asserts that some actual conduct of individuals violates the logic of the collective action. In other words, predictions of rational choice theory do not always hold (Putnam 1993; Boix and Posner 1998). Social capital provides an approach to account for this type of individual conduct by introducing the role of certain qualities, skills, and a sense of duty in social cooperation. In accordance with this conviction and to facilitate cooperation, social capital advocates the development

¹ This subject is broader than social capital implies. Indeed, neo-republicans and communitarians criticize liberals as ignoring the connection between politics and virtue. Social capital is related, at least indirectly, to this discussion, yet its specific aim is to analyze the relation between character of citizens and the collective action in particular and the quality of social life in general in liberal systems (For the broader connection between virtue and politics, see Wallach 1992; Callan 2003; Kymlicka and Norman 1994).

of certain qualities in individuals in addition to institutional design.

The difference between rational choice and social capital goes back to their concepts of human nature and individual motive in essence. The former assumes that the individual is a rational agent who seeks to maximize his utility. It uses an abstract notion of individual whose only motive is self-interest. Rational choice theory analyses the question of social cooperation as an interaction of such abstract agents by "market metaphor" (Monroe 1995). Both the character of analysis and the unit of analysis are abstract (Zuckert 1995; Rosenberg 1995). Social capital assumes that the self-interested individual is capable of developing motives in an appropriate environment which cannot be reduced to self-interest. The development of new motives and qualitative changes in individual preferences are features of human nature in social capital (Boix and Posner 1998). Social capital locates individual conduct in actual daily life.² Theorizing about individual conduct in an abstract model with a narrow concept of self-interest leaves out some factors which have significant impacts on individual conduct (Zuckert 1995). As a result two different assumptions about human nature

² Social capital locates the individual in his cultural, institutional, as well as historical context. Not just institutional but also cultural and historical environments are significant in social capital. According to Monroe (1995) and Rosenberg (1995), rational choice theory's analytical situation in which individuals interact with each other is "the market place" in which self-interest determines individual conduct.

lead to two different methods of theorizing about individual conduct.

Although social capital has a short history as a concept, its core idea that assumes a close link between the qualities of citizens and politics has a long history in political thought. The role of a virtuous body of citizenry in politics goes back to classical political theory (Burt 1993; Wallach 1992). Classical republican thought assumes this connection between politics and the quality of citizens. Although it has a wide currency among contemporary scholars that classical liberals detached this connection between virtue and politics and relied on institutional design to establish and secure cooperation, this is a misleading generalization which ignores the existence of different traditions in liberalism since its beginning (Kymlicka and Norman 1994; Galston 1988). It is usually accepted that Mill and Tocqueville recognized the significance of the qualities of individuals in politics, yet Hume is seen as similar to Hobbes who is credited with using rational choice assumptions in his theory.³ Some scholars (Gauthier 1990&1992; Taylor 1987) argue that, in spite of his moral theory, Hume uses contractarian logic and basic assumptions of the rational choice model in his theory of justice and the state. He relies on manipulation of self-interested agents by creating an

³ Moss argues that central insights of Hume about social cooperation show a clear influence of Hobbes (1991).

appropriate structural environment and incentives to establish and perpetuate social order. They deny that there can be a connection between his theories of justice and the state and his moral theory which is "non-contractarian" in essence (Gauthier 1990a, 57). In parallel to this interpretation, some scholars argue that Humean politics has not been touched by any idea of virtue. His politics relies on well-designed institutions and good laws (Forbes 1975; Frey 1995; Cohen 2000).

The application of the rational choice to Hume is not completely unreasonable, for Hume recognizes the collective action and free-rider problem in society and his analysis contains significant elements of the rational choice as his analytical tools. For example, in the following example known as the Farmer's Dilemma, Hume argues that in case of uncertainty, individuals chose to defect;

Your corn is ripe today; mine will be to-morrow. 'Tis profitable for us both, that I shou'd labour with you to-day, and that you shou'd aid me to-morrow. I have no kindness for you, and know you have as little for me. I will not, therefore, take any pains upon your account; and shou'd I labour with you upon your account, in expectation of a return, I know I shou'd be disappointed, and that I shou'd in vain depend upon your gratitude. Here then I leave you to labour alone: You treat me in the same manner. The seasons change; and both of us lose our harvest for want of mutual confidence and security. (T 334)⁴

⁴ In this study, I refer to Hume's works in the following way: *A Treatise of Human Nature* (T), *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (En), and *Essays* (Es).

In this example, Hume formulates the coordination problem as a one-shot prisoners' dilemma game (Valls 1995; Vanderschraaf 1998). The absence of adequate information about each other among individuals leads them to defect. Hume thinks that the solution for this type of coordination problem is to place individuals in a repeated game situation. Indeed, as Vanderscraft (1998, 225) argues Hume considers coordination problems as more "repeated games" rather than one-shot game. In such repeated games individuals chose to cooperate as a rational strategy in order to prevent exclusion from future cooperation. As Taylor (1987, 161) argues Hume turns one-shot games into repeated games by recognizing the role of "time" in social cooperation.

Hence I learn to do a service to another, without bearing him any real kindness; because I foresee, that, he will return my service, in expectation of another of the same kind, and in order to maintain the same correspondence of good offices with me or with others. And accordingly, after I have serv'd him, and he is in possession of the advantage arising from my action, he is induc'd to perform his part as foreseeing the consequences of his refusal. (T 335)

Hume also recognizes the role of size factor in cooperation. He thinks that in small society where individuals have adequate information about each other and social sanctions function effectively against defectors, individuals cooperate as a rational strategy. On the other hand, in a large society

individuals do not have adequate information about each other and thus have the opportunity to be free-riders. Hume explains these two different situations as follows:

Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common; because 'tis easy for them to know each others mind; and each must perceive, that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is, the abandoning the whole project. But 'tis very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons shou'd agree in any such action; it being difficult for them to concert so complicated a design, and still more difficult for them to execute it; while each seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble and expense, wou'd lay the whole burden on others. (T 345)

In this example, Hume sees two particular problems of the cooperation question: First, the increase of the number of agents leads to the absence of adequate information among agents. This refers to the coordination problem in a large society. The larger the number of agents, the more difficult to cooperate. Individual defection is a rational strategy in this situation. The second problem is that increase of society creates an appropriate environment for those who choose to benefit from cooperation without contributing. This refers to the free-rider problem. Hume argues that in a small society the coordination problem can be solved without the government, whereas in larger society individuals need the government to overcome uncertainty and coordination problem (T 346).

These examples show that Hume is aware of the complexity of the coordination problem and also his analysis contains significant aspects of the rational choice model (Bruni and Sugden 2000, 28).

Based on these examples some scholars argue that Hume's justice and the government depend on a contractual logic. Among these authors, Gauthier derives the most damning conclusion for Hume. According to Gauthier, in spite of his criticism of the contractual model, Hume's theory of justice and the state relies on a contractual logic. He argues that the only reason that Humean agents cooperate and obey the state is to serve their private interest:

Hume [assumes] our consent binds us, only because of our interest in being thereby bound, consent obligates, because the stability of society requires that it should, and our interests require the stability of society... Nothing in this argument is incompatible with hypothetical contractarianism. (1990a, 56)

He maintains that Humean agents curb their interest to serve their interests: "Hume is sensibly aware of men's interest curbing interest. It is this awareness which makes his thought contractarian, for the essence of the social contract is found in the mutual advantage of restraining the pursuit of advantage" (1990a, 75).

According to Gauthier, although self-interest as a motive leads to cooperation, it also creates a particular problem for

Hume. Individuals recognize the general utility of a stable society, yet they also as self-interested agents recognize "the particular advantages of injustice" for their private interest (1990b, 141). This refers to the sensible knave in Hume. The sensible knave is someone who obeys the rule in general, yet takes advantage of those cases where he can get away with unjust conduct.

In the case of justice, where a man, taking things in certain light, may often seem to be a loser by his integrity ... a sensible knave, in particular incidents, may think that an act of ingenuity or infidelity will make a considerable addition to his fortune, without causing any considerable breach in the social union and confederacy. *That honesty is the best policy*, may be a good general rule, but it is liable to many exceptions; and he, it may be thought, conducts himself with most wisdom, who observes the general rule, and takes advantage of all the exceptions. (En 122)

Here Hume refers to the free-rider problem. Thus, although he thinks that self-interest is the origin of justice, in the final analysis, it is not a sufficient motive for a complete compliance of individuals with the rules. Gauthier asserts that "Hume's sensible knave, like Hobbes's Foole, perceives the fundamental instability included in justice", for "both the obligation and the inclination, it should be noted, rest on interest" (1990, 65).

According to Gauthier, Hume presents two different arguments to the sensible knave's challenge: In the *Treatise*

Hume thinks that the failure of self-interest is related to our "short-sightedness" which leads individuals to forget their enlightened interest, yet "the real interest remains" (Gauthier, 1992 417). He sees "the interested obligation to justice ... as unproblematic" (Gauthier 419). On the other hand, in the second *Enquiry*, Hume thinks that the sensible knave is not a short-sighted agent at all. Rather, Hume recognizes the real problem is that self-interest requires that type of injustice (Gauthier 418). Yet, Hume thinks that he could provide an answer to the sensible knave. He argues that the sensible knave sacrifices "the invaluable enjoyment of a character ... for the acquisition of worthless toys and gewgaws" (En, 122).

Gauthier argues that Hume "appeals to the heart" as a response. Yet, this is not a real response, rather a rhetorical one (418), for the sensible knave does not see such a loss in his act. Given that the sensible knave is not interested in Hume's moral sense, even though some people find it attractive and reasonable, maintains Gauthier, "the sensible knave's message is that human society ... lacks any moral foundation" (422). As a result, for Gauthier, Hume's appeal to our moral sense cannot overcome the free-rider problem in society.

In parallel to this contractual reading of Humean theory, some scholars argue that Hume's politics is untouched by any

idea of virtue. Rather Hume relies on well-designed institutions and good laws to perpetuate cooperation. This interpretation also relies on Hume's notion of the "sensible knave" (Forbes 1975; Frey 1995, Cohen 2000). As a result, both contractual and institutionalist interpretations detach Humean justice and the state from his moral theory.

However, this detachment cannot explain certain components of Humean justice and the state (Bagolini 1981; Ponko 1983; Baier 1991&1992; Miller 1981& 1997; Taylor 1998; Gill 2000; Hursthouse 1999). Hume thinks that though the original motive of the individual is self-interest, in time, individuals see justice as virtue and injustice as vice. Gauthier's interpretation cannot explain how such self-interested agents come to see individual acts as the subject of moral evaluation at all. Yet, Hume thinks that individuals develop this moral outlook over time as a result of many different factors, such as training and education in the family, increase of interpersonal relations and sociability, the practice of rule following, and commerce and industry. Here he relies on the evolutionary character of the rules of justice in particular and the development of civilized society in general. According to Hume, the rules of justice develop over time as an unintended consequence of individual choices. In a contractual model, individuals invent the rules as a result of bargaining and

consent among themselves at a hypothetical situation and certain time (Valls 1995, 229).

Another issue ignored by Gauthier is Hume's understanding of human nature and the nature of individual motives and preferences. Hume has a developmental or "progressive" concept of human nature. Gill (2000, 99-100) asserts that Hume's notion of human nature is a "dynamic or progressive view" which discards the Hobbesian "static" view which assumes that "the basic elements of human motivations are fixed" and "we could change human behavior only by changing the circumstances in which those original motives" operate. Hume, On the other hand, assumes that "original motives can evolve into other motives of different kinds. He believes we can develop new motives, ones that were not part of our original endowment". This progressive quality of Humean human nature has significant implications for his theory of justice in particular and politics in general. Bagolini argues that (1981, 88) the process of the development of justice in particular and of civilized society in general is the process of "a modification and alteration of individual self-interest". This modification refers to the development of non-instrumental motives and thus the changing nature of individual preferences. Taylor (1998, 7) calls this process as "the cultural transformation of instinct". Similarly, Hursthouse

(1999, 70) argues that this process is the process of the development of "a second nature" in the individual:

We human beings can develop, through education and reflection, a second nature such that we take a particular pleasure and pride in certain things, and come to regard certain things as worth pursuing and having". Relying on his dynamic view of human nature, Hume assumes that "humans are typically able to act from significantly different motives. (Norton 1999, 160)

In Hume, how a society responds to the collective action problem is a function of the interaction of the level of the development of human nature and its institutional as well as cultural and moral environment. Gauthier takes both Humean human nature and environment as static concepts. Yet, both are dynamic concepts in Hume. Hume's account of justice at its origin can be captured by Gauthier's interpretation, yet it cannot explain the development of moral sense as well as the impact of cultural environment on individual conduct. This brings us to another significant issue ignored by Gauthier. Hume criticizes precisely the Gauthierian-style abstraction in theorizing about individual conduct. He argues that "the love of simplicity [parsimony]" leads to errors in our understanding of human nature and individual motives in many philosophers (En 141). A proper understanding of individual conduct requires observation of the individual in his actual daily life rather than using an abstract model. He thinks that we observe many individual

actions in our daily life that cannot be explained by abstract self-interest-oriented models (En 143). According to McIntyre (2001, 458), "his view of human nature is empirical ... regularities [about human nature] revealed through careful observation. It is history, not reason that reveals regularities of human nature in society".

Another issue is that Hume tells different stories in different places in his works. In the *Treatise*, he explains the origin of justice and the state by self-interest and his analysis is more abstract and theoretical. In the second *Enquiry* and *Essays*, he is interested in explaining the moral sense we observe in our daily life. He recognizes the failure of enlightened interest in motivating individuals in certain cases, yet he wants to explain why many people in their daily life violate this expectation and rather obey the rules or cooperate. This observation about individual conduct in its daily context is the starting point of Hume's criticism of those who reduce individual motive to self-interest.

Thus, Hume's appeal is not a simple escape from reality or just a rhetorical answer. Rather it is a necessary part of his theory. His appeal to a moral sense as a response to the sensible knave is a reasonable one within this larger framework. Hume does not think that the free-rider is typical of every member of society. Rather, he is someone who lacks any moral

sense. As Baier puts it (1992, 431), there are two different perspectives from which we could evaluate the sensible knave problem. First, the sensible knave perspective which values "material gains" over integrity of character. Second, "the sensible non-knave" perspective which "dismisses the material rewards of judicious injustice as 'worthless toys and gewgaws'". As a result, "there is not Archimedean 'rational point of view' from which judgment could be made between the knave's version and the non-knave's version of self-interest". That's why Hume's appeal to moral sense is "a perfectly satisfactory reply" not for the sensible knave but for "the virtuous dues-paying member of the party of humankind".

As a result, Hume's dynamic notion of human nature and individual motive, the evolutionary quality of justice, and the complexity of moral theory and its role in his larger theory cannot be captured by rational choice theory. In this study, I analyze these factors ignored by institutionalist and rational choice interpretations to show the close connection between Hume's politics and his moral theory.

In order to make my case, I utilize Putnam's idea of social capital. But, before I justify my usage, I present some criticisms of social capital. Although social capital has gained a wide currency in many branches of social sciences and policy recommendations of national and international institutions,

there have been also significant criticisms since the publication of Putnam's *Making Democracy Work*.

It is argued that empirical evidence is inadequate for the causal relation among different components of social capital. His causal mechanism among different components of social capital and between social capital and efficiency of cooperation has been subject to criticism. Jackman and Miller (1998) argue that he conflates associations, trust, and generalized reciprocity. They maintain that he selectively uses data and appeals to theoretical explanation where he cannot support his views with empirical data. Similarly, Boix and Posner (1998) argue that social capital suffers from an inadequate explanation about its origin and the mechanisms. Putnam's account of how social capital develops in certain places is problematic. Putnam's assumption that repeated interactions of individuals increase social capital and the high level of social capital facilitates cooperation is a circular explanation. It cannot explain the origin of social capital. Woolcock (1998) criticizes Putnam as ignoring the role of the state in developing social capital. Putnam sees social capital as a bottom-up process which needs to be supported by a top-down perspective.

Mouritsen (2003) and Levi (1996) argue that Putnam attaches equal value to membership in a bird-watching group and membership in a political or civic association. Mouritsen claims

that we need a more politics-oriented notion of associations to develop civic virtues. On the other hand, Portes (1998) reduces social capital to the development of enlightened interest and denies its moral aspects, in spite of Putnam's appeal to the idea of "better citizens" or the development of "sense of duty" as individual motive. Putnam thinks that social capital is "moral resource" which transform individuals into "better citizens" whose motives involve "sense of duty" as well as self-interest (1993).

Chambers and Kopstein (2001) and Stolle and Rochon (1998) criticize Putnam as not providing adequate argument about how social capital created in one group could be extended to non-members.

Although these criticisms show many problems in social capital, it still provides a useful perspective to approach Hume's theory for several reasons. First, as Boix and Posner put it,

The concept's [rational choice] widespread acceptance as a descriptive and diagnostic tool, however, cannot obscure the fact that its predictions do not always hold. Co-operation sometimes does take place in contexts where, according to the theory, actors should have little incentives to engage in it.

They maintain that to explain this type of individual conduct, theorists have developed social capital. Putnam also makes the very same point to justify his search for an alternative

approach to rational choice (1993). Hume also criticizes the abstract-static model presented by Hobbes as inadequate to explain individual conduct in some cases. To explain this type of behavior social capital introduces moral sense. The development of motives that develop within associations and cannot be reduced to self-interest provides a useful perspective to approach Hume's moral theory.

Second, Hume presents a comprehensive account of how moral sense develops. Family, politicians, practice of cooperation and rule following, liberal arts and sciences, increase of interpersonal relations, and the general improvement of material and cultural development of human society are all related to moral development. In his moral theory, sociability and increase of interpersonal relations play a significant role in the development of moral sense. In that respect Putnam's social capital provides a useful analytical tool to make this component of Humean moral theory explicit. The values of associations advocated by social capital could be classified into two groups: Instrumental values and intrinsic values. The former refers to certain skills and the development of enlightened interest necessary for more efficient cooperation. In associations individuals develop necessary skills and recognize that all benefit from cooperation. The latter refers to social connectedness and the development of public spiritedness.

Neither social connectedness nor sense of duty is related to self-interest. Rather, in regard to the free-rider problem, these two factors create a tendency in individuals contrary to their interest. Putnam sees social connectedness as creating the sort of ties among individuals which cannot be reduced to self-interest or expectation of utility in the future. Social connectedness seems to be an intrinsic human need in social capital. Public spiritedness or sense of duty becomes possible on the basis of social connectedness as an intrinsic value for individuals. This aspect of social capital is significant for my purpose; it can explain Hume's ideas on the relation between the increase of interpersonal relations especially in modern commercial cities and the increase of our moral sense. Social connectedness is one of the major sources of the development of moral sense in Humean theory. Although we cannot find voluntary associations in Hume, he talks about "clubs and societies" in newly emerging commercial cities as a medium in which sociability and moral sense (sense of humanity) are enhanced.

Third, closely related to the second reason is that as Boix and Posner (1998) put it, social capital can affect the "nature of citizens' preferences". A shift of focus from material to non-material values is one of the components of social capital. For instance, a sense of duty opposes one's own regard to his personality to his interest. We see a similar shift of focus in

individual preference in Hume's moral theory. This shift is related to a dynamic view of human nature both in Hume and social capital. While Gauthier simply rejects Hume's appeal to our moral sense as an "appeal to heart", it is not that simple. It becomes a reasonable appeal on the basis of a complex moral theory which relies on his a "progressive view" of human nature.

Fourth, social capital helps us to clarify a common confusion in the Hume literature which argues that Hume's politics is untouched by any idea of virtue and depends on well-designed institutions. This conviction is based on Hume's criticism of classical republican virtues as inhumane and obsolete. Yet, Hume advocates a set of qualities as functional equivalent of republican virtues for modern commercial societies. Social capital helps us to have a better grasp of Humean qualities as virtues and their function in politics. For instance, social capital sees any sort of association as significant rather than only political ones, which can provide some insights why Hume attaches so much value to sociability, conversation, and increase of interpersonal relations as sources of a moral sense.

Scholarly Contribution of the Study:

This study attempts to contribute to Humean literature by showing that it is not possible to detach Hume's moral theory from his theory of justice and the state in regard to the cooperation problem in society. Hume's moral theory facilitates cooperation by introducing a moral sense. The success of this depends on the creation of a moral environment in society. Otherwise, Humean politics has to rely solely on institutions. Humean understanding of the development of civilized society provides the general framework for such an environment. I attempt to show that rational choice and institutionalist interpretations distort Humean theory by providing a more comprehensive interpretation of his theory which attempts to show links between different components of his thought. His response to the free-rider becomes reasonable within this larger framework.

In addition to this major contribution, this study also contributes to the contemporary discussion of social capital by revealing that the core idea of social capital is not a new one. Hume can provide some useful insights for contemporary discussion, for he is one of the early theorists who uses basic assumptions and tools of game theory yet he also has a moral theory. In particular, Hume provides some insights that can fill

some theoretical gaps in Putnam's social capital. Our awareness of the historical roots of contemporary concepts can enrich our understanding and broaden our perspective.

Outline of the Study:

In the first chapter, I present and analyze Hume's theory of justice. Hume discards the contractarian idea of justice and endorses a historical approach. He thinks that justice develops as a convention over time in society. Although Hume thinks that the origin of justice is self-interest, self-interest cannot provide an adequate motive for cooperation. For this reason, Hume endorses the state to force individuals to cooperate. Yet, he thinks that even the state faces an enforcement problem with individuals because of the increasing size of society and its wealth. In the first chapter, my analysis is limited to show that although Hume considers the state as an external party to force individuals to cooperate, he does not consider it an adequate solution to the collective action problem.

In the second chapter, I analyze Putnam's theory of social capital. First, I analyze the central themes of social capital

such as networks, social trust, and generalized reciprocity and the causal relation between social capital and an effective response to the social cooperation problem. In addition, I analyze and criticize Putnam's appeal to the republican notion of virtue to describe social capital to show that qualities that develop in networks are liberal rather than republican. In the second chapter, I limit my comparison of Hume and Putnam to their understanding of the state. In particular, I argue that Putnam's understanding of the state as a solution to the collective action problem is similar to Hume's in respect to its limits on social cooperation.

In chapter three, I introduce Hume's moral theory. In particular, I argue that there is a close link between his moral theory and his theory of justice. His theory of justice reveals the limits of the state as a solution to social cooperation, which allows us to argue that Hume's theory has two components to deal with the collective action problem: institutions and a virtuous body of citizenry. In this chapter, I criticize the common institutionalist interpretation of Hume's theory and compare his catalog of virtues to Putnam's to show the similarities between them.

In chapter four, I introduce Hume's politics. Hume advocates moderation as a primary virtue of political life in dealing with conflicts. I argue that his idea of politics relies

on both institutional design and a particular notion of virtue (moderation) which reveals that Hume's way of doing politics is very similar to Putnam's "new way of doing politics" in overcoming political deadlocks and destructive conflict. In particular, both Putnam and Hume rely on moderation, for both argue that political questions are very complex and solutions lie in the middle. Also, both discourage ideological and partisan politics.

1.0 HUME'S THEORY OF JUSTICE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I introduce and analyze Hume's theory of justice. He presents two different accounts of justice; theoretical and historical. In the former account, he utilizes the idea of a "golden age" to determine features of human condition that leads to the development of justice. In particular, the idea of "golden age" refers to a counterfactual situation in which individuals do not face the scarcity of goods and thus the collective action problem. In the latter account, he sees justice as a convention developing gradually over time.

Hume discards the contractarian account of justice which conditions his ideas on social cooperation. In particular, Hume denies that development of enlightened self-interest and establishment of the state secure efficient cooperation among individuals. Although Hume endorses both enlightened interest and the state in his theoretical account, he thinks both factors fall short in motivating individuals for cooperation in final

analysis. Therefore, he argues that besides enlightened interest and the state, an efficient response to the collective action problem requires improvement of morality among individuals. His historical account of justice ties efficient cooperation to development of morality in society.

Hume's two separate responses to the collective action problem can be seen in his two different accounts of the origins of justice and the role of government in social cooperation. In this chapter, I introduce Hume's theory of justice and government to show these two different solutions. This distinction is significant for several reasons: First, it allows us to determine the proper place of rational choice in Hume's theory; his theoretical account endorses a notion of justice primarily as a "one-shot game". And Hume's solution to the collective action problem in this account is the establishment of the state. This account endorses the classical Hobbesian solution in general, which relies on institutions and legal punishment to prevent defection. Both the development and the execution of the rules of justice are formulated as games in Hume's theoretical account.

Second, this line of argument is not the whole story Hume tells about the origin of justice and the collective action problem. His historical account endorses an evolutionary concept of justice that develops through a series of repeated games that

sees the development of the rules of justice as more convention building than a "one-shot game" among individuals. The gradual development of the rules of justice in time creates a habit of rule following in individuals. Individuals develop the rules over time by a process of trial and error rather than formulation as a one-shot game among them.

In respect to the collective action problem, the historical account also endorses the state. In this account, the state develops as a response to wars among different tribes rather than as a response to the collective action problem in society in the first place. In time, the state comes to play a role in dealing with this problem. This account advocates an additional solution to the collective action problem that relies on improvement of the moral sense among people rather than solely on the state as a classical Hobbesian solution (institutions and legal force). In his historical account of justice Hume claims that once the rules of justice develop, individuals come, in time, to see compliance with those rules as a moral duty not just an issue of self-interest. Although the initial purpose of individuals in developing the rules of justice is to serve their interests better, in time they come to consider rule following as a moral duty.

This moral sense is the starting point of Hume's moral theory and he then goes on to present many different factors that lead

to its further development. As a result, besides self-interest, individuals come to have an improved moral sense as the motive for their conduct in society.

Third, Hume's historical account that relies on improvement of the moral sense shows clearly the close connection between his theory of justice and moral theory. This is significant for my larger concern that I argue when we follow Hume's historical account of justice and the solution to the collective action problem that relies on improvement of the moral sense in society shows that Hume presents an early liberal formulation of the idea of social capital to deal more effectively with the collective action problem and to increase the quality of social life.

In this chapter, my concern is limited presenting these two accounts of the origin of justice and introducing the particular solutions to the collective action problem each account endorses. I do not reach to definitive conclusions in this chapter in respect to these solutions; especially for the moral solution we need to see Hume's moral theory that I present in chapter 3.

The plan of the chapter is as follows; First, I present Hume's theoretical account of the origin of justice and the role of government in social cooperation. Although Hume's main account of justice is a historical one, he also presents an

abstract account of justice which I call theoretical account. He sees the development of the rules of justice as product of the interaction of selfishness of human nature and the scarcity of goods in this account. It is underlined by Hobbesian logic in terms of its understanding of individual conduct. I argue that Hume's theoretical account of justice endorses a notion of justice as a game in contemporary sense. And Hume's response to the collective action problem is also structured by his perception of justice as a game among self-interested agents in this account. The function of this theoretical account in Hume is, I argue, limited to its supportive role for rather than being an alternative one to his historical account. Second, I introduce Hume's historical account of the origin of justice and the role of government in social cooperation. In this section, I argue that Hume sees the development of the rules of justice as a convention building in society. The development of the rules provides a set of shared rules in respect to property relations to regulate individual conduct and thus provide regularity and certainty in interpersonal relations in society. I analyze how Hume thinks that social cooperation is realized without a central authority in a small tribal society and that once society becomes larger individuals appeal to the state to assure cooperation. The primary characteristic of Hume's argument is evolutionary in this part.

1.2 JUSTICE: THEORETICAL ACCOUNT

In addition to his historical account of the origins of justice and government, Hume presents a theoretical account of these two issues. His purpose in this account is to show that his historical account is a reasonable one. Hume utilizes the idea of a "golden age" for this purpose, even though he thinks that it is just philosophical fiction.

In this account, Hume emphasizes the acquisitive faculty of man as the source of conflict among individuals and sees self-interest as the origin of justice. The acquisitive faculty and limited benevolence of human nature are the two basic factors whose interaction with scarcity of the goods creates conflict among individuals in regard to property issues. The instinctive interest of the individual requires him to defect.

Hume thinks that there is no remedy for this "natural infirmity" of individual in human nature on which we can rely. As a solution, he endorses the state as an external authority to regulate individual conduct in society. Individuals agree to establish the state in order to serve their enlightened, true, or long-term interest.

In this account, Hume seems to endorse a notion of justice that formulates the collective action problem as a game among self-interested strategic agents. Justice as a game conditions his analysis of the collective action problem and the solution he proposes for it. I present his theoretical account of justice in this section. In the next section I analyze how he sees the conflict among individuals as a game and endorses the state a solution to the collective action problem.

Hume argues that there are two basic qualities of human nature that are relevant to the question of the origin of justice: First, self-interest or the avidity of man. Second, limited benevolence. According to Hume, "'tis only from the selfishness and confin'd generosity of man, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its origin" (T 318). The idea of self-interest does not refer to interest of an isolated agent in Hume. Rather, it refers to an agent located in a web of family members, friends, and relatives. An agent's interest includes that of himself, his family, relatives, and friends. The idea of limited benevolence refers to one's limited concern for strangers; one is concerned most for his family, friends, and relatives as well as for himself. Strangers are the competitors for this agent. And the conflict that happens in society is among such strangers rather than among isolated Hobbesian individuals.

According to Hume, the acquisitiveness of man is the object of the rules of justice:

This avidity alone, of acquiring goods and possessions for ourselves and our nearest friends, is insatiable, perpetual, universal ... There scarce is anyone, who is not actuated by it; and there is no one, who has not reason to far from it, when it acts without any restraint, and gives way to its first and most natural movements. (T 316)

The natural or instinctive course of man's avidity rejects the needs of strangers; Strangers are not recognized as fellow human beings with the same needs as one's family and friends. Hume thinks that the natural course of avidity is destructive for social life. In order to have a society, the avidity of man must be regulated by common rules:

No one can doubt, that the convention for the distinction of property, and or the stability of possession, is of all circumstances the most necessary to the establishment of human society, and that after the agreement for the fixing and observing of this rule, there remains little or nothing to be done towards settling a perfect harmony and concord. All the other passions, beside this of interest, are either easily restrain'd, or are not of such pernicious consequence, when indulg'd. (T 316)

Hume thinks that no other passion in human nature can control or prevent avidity from its instinctive conduct. Rather he argues that avidity can provide the solution for itself by redirecting its functioning in accordance with an idea of enlightened interest. Limited benevolence reinforces the avidity of man rather than regulating or controlling of avidity, for the

role of limited benevolence in Hume is to broaden the scope of avidity to include the interests of one's close circle in one's own interest.

There is no passion ... capable of controuling the interested affection, but the very affection itself, by an alteration of its direction. Now this alteration must necessarily take place upon the least reflection; since 'tis evident, that by preserving society, we make much greater advances in the acquiring possessions, than by running into the solitary and forlorn condition, which must follow upon violence and universal license. (T 316)

The redirection of avidity refers to the role of understanding in regulating the conduct of avidity. Understanding refers to the development of enlightened self-interest among individuals. Individuals recognize that the natural or instinctive conduct of avidity is destructive of society.

Human nature being compos'd of two principal parts, which are requisite in all its actions, the affections and understanding; 'tis certain, that the blind motions of the former, without the direction of the latter, incapacitates men for society. (T 317)

Hume discusses the idea of a "golden age" to show that the common situation of man requires the rules of justice to establish and perpetuate society. The common situation of man refers to the scarcity of goods and two basic qualities of human nature (limited benevolence and self-interest). He clearly states that the idea of a state of nature is "a mere philosophical fiction" and in their savage condition individuals

are incapable of undertaking a social contract such as presented by Locke or Hobbes. However, the idea of a "golden age" as a philosophical fiction is useful to reveal basic principles of human nature and external circumstances of individuals. A theoretical abstraction is realized by this model to add further plausibility and delineate the relevant principles of human nature as well as outer circumstances of individuals (T 317).

Hume discusses the idea of a "golden age" to show that his conjectural account is plausible. Golden age refers to a situation in which either individuals have a tender regard for strangers or nature provides abundantly all their needs. Thus, a change in human nature that obliterates selfishness and limited generosity and establishes universal benevolence instead, or a change in outer circumstances that obliterates scarcity of goods and establishes abundance of goods would put individuals in a different position towards each other than the present situation of scarcity and selfishness. Universal benevolence would turn human society into a big family in which all goods would be common and there would be no private property. The absence of scarcity of goods would also make the rules of justice useless, for abundance of goods would meet all individuals' needs. Hume mentions marriage and "cordial affections" among friends as real life cases that come very close to such extensive benevolence and water and air as examples of goods not subject to conflict

among individuals even though they are vital for everybody (T 317-18). Hume, thus, maintains that "the common situation of society is a medium amidst all these extremes. We are naturally partial to ourselves, and to our friends; but are capable of learning the advantage resulting from a more equitable conduct" (En 21). As J. Moore puts it "the theoretical relevance of the golden age model ... for Hume was that [it] assisted him in clarifying the conditions in which justice and society would be unnecessary and unattainable" (482).

As a result, individuals perform their parts of duties without bearing "any real kindness" to each other: "Hence I learn to do a service to another, without bearing him any real kindness; because I foresee, that he will return my service, in expectation of another of the same kind, and in order to maintain the same correspondence of good offices with me or with others" (T 334-35). Mutual expectation of cooperation is the reason individuals perform their parts. Individuals are strategic actors seeking to protect and promote their interest without any intrinsic regard or benevolence to strangers. Neither a sense of duty nor public interest but self interest is the motive of individuals. Interpersonal relations are instrumental in essence.

Yet, individuals fail to act in accordance with their enlightened interest even if they have the necessary rules for

that purpose. The reason for this breach of the rules is that "he is seduced from his great and important, but distant interest, by the allurements of present, though often very frivolous temptations. This great weakness is incurable in human nature" (En 38). Individuals are short-sighted and they prefer short-term interest over long-term ones. Short-term interest refers to the instinctive conduct of individuals, which leads them to defect rather than cooperate. That's why individuals act contrary to their real or true interest and prefer trivial or short-term ones. They think that the consequence of violation of the rules is remote and benefits are close:

And as all men are, in some degree, subject to the same weakness, it necessarily happens, that the violations of equity must become very frequent in society, and the commerce of men, by that means, be render'd very dangerous and uncertain. You have the same propension, that I have, in favor of what is contiguous above what is remote. You are, therefore, naturally carry'd to commit acts of injustice as well as I. Your example both pushes me forward in this way by initiation, and also affords me a new reason for any breach of equity, by showing me, that I shou'd be the cully of my integrity, if I alone shou'd impose on myself a severe restraint amidst the licentiousness of others. (T 343)

Thus, recognition of the necessity of cooperation is not sufficient; short-sightedness leads man to defect even if he understands that social cooperation is necessary for social existence. Hume emphasizes that execution of the rules poses a problem for individuals. Those who cooperate first become the

prey of the rest. In response to the coordination problem and shortsightedness Hume endorses the state as solution.

1.3 SOCIAL COOPERATION AND GOVERNMENT: THEORETICAL ACCOUNT

In this section I present Hume's theoretical account of government and its role in social cooperation. In this account Hume endorses a Hobbesian notion of government in the sense that government appears as an external authority to achieve cooperation in society. Individuals appear more potent in regard to reason and judgment by which they establish a government which forces individuals to cooperate.

According to Hume, as we saw above, one of the fundamental features of human nature is its shortsightedness. The remedy for this "infirmity of human nature" comes from reflection or reason; when individuals reflect on any action in the distance, they prefer "the greater good". They are able to see the destructive results of breaching the rules (i.e., preferring the short-term interest over the long-term). But when they act, they choose the immediate interest over the distant ones. Hume believes it is not possible to change any fundamental quality of human nature. Yet it is possible to change one's environment in such a way that the distant interest becomes one's immediate

interest: "the utmost we can do is to change our circumstances and situation, and render the observance of the laws of justice our nearest interest and their violation our most remote" (T 344).

Hume's solution refers to the rulers (the government) whose immediate interest, argues Hume, is to maintain their power by executing the rules of justice:

They must institute some persons, under the appellation of magistrates, whose peculiar office it is, to point out the decrees of equity, to punish transgressors, to correct fraud and violence, and oblige men however reluctant, to consult their own real and permanent interest". (Es 38)

Hume asks what makes the governors execute the rules of justice rather than use their power and authority to further their short term interests. "The love of dominion" is his answer:

The love of dominion is so strong in the breast of man, that many, not only submit to, but court all the dangers, and fatigues, and cares of government; and men, once raised to that station, though often led stray by private passions, find, in ordinary cases, a visible interest in the impartial administration of justice. (Es 39)

The governors are the few whose circumstances change in such a way that their concern for protecting their own interests creates a mechanism to execute the rules of justice in society.

Men are not able radically to cure, either in themselves or others, that narrowness of soul, which makes them prefer to the remote. They cannot change their natures. All they can do is to change their situation, and render

the observance of justice the immediate interest of some particular persons, and its violation their remote. (Es 344)

In other words, the state uses legal punishment to force individuals to comply with the rules. Thus the state appears as an external authority that forces individuals to comply with the rules. Interest of the rulers is to perpetuate their power, which depends on the execution of the rules or social order. The state creates a new structural environment in which individuals feel forced to choose their remote yet true interest in order to prevent punishment. Thus, the rulers' environment is different than ordinary citizens. Each group has different interests. Yet, the existence of the legal punishment changes ordinary citizens' environment also. And compliance with the rules by the ruled becomes the immediate interest of both groups. In addition, in a sense the state becomes an institutionalized rationality in society whose members instinctively forget to act rationally and follow their passions in their conduct. The state forces individuals to act in accordance with their reasoned judgment and understanding or enlightened self-interests rather than instinctive self-interests.

1.4 JUSTICE: HISTORICAL ACCOUNT

In this section, I present Hume's historical account of the origin of justice. In this account Hume's notion of justice refers to development of the rules of justice as the creation of a convention in society that makes social cooperation possible among individuals. The rules of justice are the product of a long trial and error process in regard to property relations among individuals. They are not the product of a social contract as described by Hobbes or Locke. The idea of social contract presents a timeless concept; once justice develops, it is permanent. For Hume, individuals in their savage state are not capable of such a contract. Rather in parallel to the development of human society, individuals gradually develop some common rules to regulate property relations in society. The rules gradually develop in response to the inconvenience of the absence of any rules that regulate property relations among individuals.

The notion of justice as convention is significant for several reasons: First, the idea of social contract endorses "a one-shot game" among self-interested agents. Once the rules of the game are established, individuals follow their enlightened interest. On the other hand, the notion of justice as convention endorses a different type of game, given that we see it as a

game; it is almost an infinitely repeated game rather than a one-shot game. However, there are certain elements in this account that cannot be captured by even the idea of repeated games. In addition, the long process of development of the rules as convention is also the process through which many faculties of human nature have been developed in such a way that individuals are in a better position to achieve cooperation more efficiently than they are at the beginning of the process.

Second, at the beginning, individual agents' concern is to serve their interests better in developing the rules. Yet, Hume's interest in justice is not limited to the development of rules that makes social cooperation possible. He is also interested in development of a sense of duty to compliance with the rules of justice. The notion of justice as convention and the development of sense of duty are closely linked to each other and have significant results for the collective action problem. While individuals cooperate to serve their interests better at the beginning, which leads to the development of rules, in time they develop a moral motive for cooperation.

The development of the moral motive for social cooperation is significant for my larger concern; Hume relies more and more on improvement of a moral sense among individuals for social cooperation, especially in large modern society. This moral development refers to the transformation of self-interested

agents into moral beings, which I argue has significant results for social cooperation in society in general and politics in particular. I follow this line of Hume's theory in chapters 3 (Hume's Moral Theory) and 4 (Hume's Politics) to show that Hume endorses a particular solution based on this moral development that is similar to Putnam's concept of social capital in dealing with the collective action problem.

Hume's notion of justice primarily refers to individuals' "abstinence from the possession of others" (T 315) and has three rules: stability of possession (T 322), its transference by consent (T 330), and promise-keeping (T 331).

Hume's historical account overlaps with his account of the origin and development of society. The earliest stages of human society are the medium in which the rules of justice gradually develop.

Hume's historical account starts with an observation about the human condition at its earliest stage, which is the "savage condition". Human condition refers to human nature and its natural environment at that specific stage. In other words, the earliest stage of human society is the natural-original setting in which the rules of justice start to develop gradually. The idea of the savage condition indicates that we see human nature with its original-primitive features, that is, without any culture and institution that we see in the latter stages of

societal development. The significance of this is that Hume works with the natural features of human nature in its most natural condition. As J. King puts it "in defining his first task, that of accounting for the origin of justice, Hume has his reader imagine a condition of human existence from which all the familiar institutions of justice are absent" (188-89).

Hume argues that man has "numberless wants and necessities" such as food, clothes, and protection from injuries from both other creatures and nature. Yet man has "slender means" in his natural capacity to meet these needs alone; "he is provided neither with arms, nor force, nor other natural abilities, which are in any degree answerable to so many necessities" (T 312). Unlike other creatures whose natural abilities endow them with adequate means to meet their relatively fewer needs, man has to form a society to overcome his weakness. In particular, man faces three inconveniences in his savage condition: man's labor is not adequate to meet all his needs, given that he labors alone. He can not excel in all the arts and skills necessary to meet his needs, and failure in meeting those needs can lead to his ruin and misery. Society provides solutions to these inconveniences: "By the conjunction of forces, our power is augmented: By the partition of employments, our ability increases: And by mutual succour we are less exposed to fortune and accident" (T 312). Thus, according to Hume, individuals by

nature cannot live alone or without a society. The division of labor, mutual help, and collective power of individuals provide material necessities and protect them from fortune and accident. "'Tis by society alone he is able to supply his defects, and raise himself up to an equality with his fellow-creatures, and even acquire a superiority above them" (T 312).

However, Hume maintains that in order to form it, individuals must recognize both the necessity and the benefits of society, yet "'tis impossible, in their wild and uncultivated state, that by study and reflection alone, they shou'd ever be able to attain this knowledge" (T 312). Without observation and experience of the benefits of society, reason alone is not sufficient for this task, contrary to the claim endorsed by the social contract model.

On the other hand, according to Hume, even in their savage condition, in the earliest stage of human life, individuals are not isolated strangers. The first form of human society is family and it comes into existence due to "natural appetite betwixt the sexes". This "natural appetite" is "the first and original principle of human society". Children create an additional bond ("natural affection") between parents and children and turn family into "a more numerous society". Parents have authority over their offspring in regulating issues among them within the family. Thus, "natural appetite", "natural

affection" and parental authority are natural principles that create and perpetuate the original human society. This original form of society makes children sensible to the advantages of cooperation as well as the necessity of some rules for living in a society (T 312).

The family as the original human society does not confront the question of justice, for Hume's notion of justice as the rules regulating property relations among strangers has no place in the family. Natural principles, such as benevolence, parental authority, sharing, and parental affection are adequate principles to create and perpetuate the family. "The bare minimum of social life, the family, is held together by sexual and parental feelings" (Haakonssen 13).

On the other hand, "harmonious relations between different families do not arise from such natural appetites and affections" (Buckle and Castiglione 460). According to Hume, "...there are other particular in our natural temper, and in our outward circumstances, which are very incommodious, and are even contrary to the requisite conjunction" (T 313). "Natural temper" refers to "selfishness" and "limited benevolence" in human nature, while "outward circumstances" refers to the scarcity of goods and the instability of their possession. The benevolent individual in the family turns out to be a self-interested actor in his relations with strangers or members of other families.

Scarcity of goods creates conflict among self-interested individuals, which is "the chief impediment" before development of the newly formed original human society (T 313).

At this stage, argues Hume, individuals have no idea of justice in the sense individuals have in modern societies: "That virtue, as it is now understood, wou'd never have been dream'd of among rude and savage men" (T 314) Thus, we reach a situation in the growth of human society where the rules of justice are necessary for the its functioning, yet individuals have no idea of justice. The reason for this is that at this stage individuals are uncultivated and savage creatures, although they are not amoral beings; "in uncultivated nature" and the "savage condition" individuals' notions of vice and virtue follow "the original frame" of their minds:

in the original frame of our mind, our strongest attention is confin'd to ourselves; our next is extended to our relations and acquaintance; and 'tis only the weakest which reaches to strangers and indifferent persons. This partiality, then, and unequal affection, must not only have an influence on our behavior and conduct in society, but even on our ideas of vice and virtue; so as to make us regard any remarkable transgression of such a degree of partiality, either by too great an enlargement, or contraction of the affections, as vicious and immoral ... From all which it follows, that our natural uncultivated ideas of morality, instead of providing a remedy for the partiality of our affections, do rather conform themselves to that partiality and give it an additional force and influence. (T 314)

Interfamily relations refer to relations among strangers in the sense that individuals' limited benevolence has no role in regulating property relations among them. Rather, Hume "points out that families naturally develop a tribal morality, which includes a strong partiality against other such societies (all men are governed by self-love and a confined generosity - confined to the family)" (Haakonssen 13).

Scarcity of goods and possibility of seizure of goods by force among individuals form circumstances of families in this stage. In addition, individuals' uncultivated/natural perceptions of vice and virtue or morality foster their partial and harmful conduct to social coexistence. Hume does not see a social contract as a viable option for such individuals, for neither their intellectual capacity nor their moral understanding is adequate for a social contract at this stage. Rather, Hume endorses a different and evolutionary solution that relies on the improvement of individual sensitivity to and understanding of the necessity of some shared rules regulating property relations in society based on their experience.

In order to overcome this obstacle, argues Hume, individuals appeal to their experience and observation: due to their "early education" in the family, individuals have come to recognize the advantages of society and rule-following and also have developed "a new affection to company and conversation" (T 316). Although

the rules of justice primarily refer to property relations among strangers, Hume claims that "first rudiments of justice" appear in the family: "In order to preserve peace among children" parents apply some rules and their subsequent development occurs "as the society enlarges" (T 316).

Thus, Hume thinks that individuals are already familiar with some rules in the family. This familiarity provides a notion of the necessity for rule following in interpersonal relations in the larger society as well. This is significant, for when individuals interact with others outside of the family, they are, unlike Hobbesian agents, in a better condition to recognize the necessity for some rules that can regulate their relations with each other.

On the other hand, natural or instinctual individual conduct tends to disregard the needs of others due to the tendency of natural conduct and original notion of vice and virtue. However, even though this tendency leads to the conflict among individuals, it also provides valuable experience and observation about the necessity for some sort of rules to regulate their conduct. This is a learning process in Hume, which makes individuals better equipped with sensitivity and understanding to develop such rules. Vandershcraft asserts that the rules of justice are a product of "repeated games" or "a sequence of trial and error practice" (107). In other words, it

is "not just a one-shot change, from nature to civilized cooperation and culture, but a series of changes, and that each convention alters the conditions, both by its success and by its limitations" (235).

And, argues Hume, the knowledge necessary to recognize the necessity of some rules is not beyond the reach of individuals even in their savage state. What is needed is that "a very little practice of the world" and "vulgar sense and slight experience are sufficient for this purpose" (En 28). As a result, individuals recognize that

Instead of departing from our own interest, or from that of our nearest friends, by abstaining from the possessions of others, we cannot better consult both these interests, than by such a convention; because it is by that means we maintain society, which is so necessary to their well-being and subsistence, as well as to our own. (T 314)

This learning process leads to the development of enlightened self-interest which sees social life as a common good. As J. Day puts it "men accept the laws of justice from intelligent self-interest. Instinctive self-interest may direct a man to seize his neighbor's possessions" (163).

Once individuals recognize that "without justice, society must immediately dissolve, and every one must fall into that savage and solitary condition, which is infinitely worse than

the worst situation that can possibly be suppos'd in society" (T 319),

Every one expresses this sense to his fellows, along with the resolution he has taken of squaring his actions by it, on condition that others will do the same. No more is requisite to induce any one of them to perform an act of justice, who has the first opportunity. This becomes an example to others. And thus justice establishes itself by a kind of convention or agreement; that is, by a sense of interest, suppos'd to be common to all, and where every single act is perform'd in expectation that others are to perform the like. (T 319-20)

Here it is clear that Hume thinks justice as convention relies on mutual expectation of cooperation among individuals. Yet agents do not enter into a contract; rather, they develop a sensitivity that it is in everyone's interest that each cooperates. In other words, "human society and its necessary rules arise ... as the result of human interaction, but ... not from promises" (Buckle and Castiglione 460). Agents are ready to cooperate rather than defect and take advantage of those who first cooperate. This reasoning is contrary to the logic of game theory which assumes that those who first cooperate would be victims of the rest. In other words, game theory assumes that the dominant tendency in individual behavior is to take advantage of opportunities rather than to cooperate. Hume's notion of justice as convention discards this reasoning and also shows that justice as the convention has a different logic than

that of game theory. Hume describes this process as formation of a convention among individuals to regulate property relations: "a convention enter'd into by all the members of the society to bestow stability on the possession of those external goods, and leave every one in the peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and industry" (T 314).

That's why Hume considers the transition from recognizing the necessity for the rules to compliance with the rules as almost a spontaneous one. Individuals become sensible to the advantages of the rules of justice due to their repeated experience of inconveniences in the absence of them in their relations with strangers and their education and training in the family. As Baier puts it, for Hume there is not a

'natural' general problem of aggression or bloodthirstiness, parallel to the problem of dispossession or thirst for gain. Like Rousseau's more solitary savages, Hume's pre-civilized persons are perfectly tolerant of each other's presence, unless and until squabbles over possessions break the peace. Not only is their condition not 'the Warre of every man against every man': it is not a condition of war at all, even against unfamiliar strangers. It is more a condition of intermittent scuffles over possessions. (222-23)

Rather, argues Baier, "Hume's justice initiators face and solve a much milder problem, that of insecurity of possession of transferable goods" (212). As a result, the task is not "to eliminate a climate of violence against persons, but a climate

of incommensurable insecurity of possession of material goods" (Baier 223).

Hume compares the rise of convention to the development of language and the use of gold and silver as mediums of exchange. All are products of human experience; they develop gradually as a result of repeated experience of the disadvantages of their absence, not as the result of abstract reasoning and a contract among individuals (T 315). "The long-term effect of individual men's 'selfish' actions is thus something very far removed indeed from what they did have, could have, in mind. The idea of justice 'would never have been dreamed of among rude and savage men'" (Haakonssen 19). In the social contract model, individuals are assumed to know what they are doing at the outset: They are about to invent the rules of justice and establish the state.⁵

1.5 SOCIAL COOPERATION AND GOVERNMENT: HISTORICAL ACCOUNT

In this section, I analyze Hume's notion of social cooperation and the role of government in social cooperation presented in his historical account. The Humean agent confronts the collective action problem in two subsequent forms of society,

⁵ Although Hume claims that justice is a convention here, as we will see in chapter 3, he accepts that justice is not a true convention, for in a true convention such as language it is not possible to be a free-rider and benefit from the convention. In justice, one can benefit and become a free-rider also.

both of which naturally develop beyond the family. The first form of society is the small-tribal society. The second form of society is the larger society that develops beyond tribal society. These two forms are natural stages in the development of human society. Crucial factor that conditions the particular responses to collective action that Hume formulates for each society is size.

Individuals do not need a central authority for cooperation in a small tribal society in which they rely on the effectiveness of social sanctions made possible by the availability of adequate information about each other due to the smallness of the society, even though this form of society establishes a temporary central authority for its defense against other tribes. In the larger society, Hume endorses the state as a solution for the collective action problem. The former society relies on traditional form of trust, "thick trust" (Putnam, 1993, 71), whereas the latter has to establish legal trust by the state. Yet Hume thinks that the state provides just a partial response in this larger society, for enlightened self-interest fails in motivating individuals due to their shortsightedness where they can avoid the legal punishment.

For Hume, society in the sociological sense is prior to government. Contrary to the Hobbesian state of nature in which

individuals are isolated agents who invent the state, for Hume there is not such state of nature in human history. Rather, individuals are, from the beginning, members of a family which is the original form of human society. Also contrary to the Hobbesian model which sees society coming into existence after establishment of the state by a social contract, Hume believes that tribal society, composed of many families having blood ties among them, is the next natural stage of human society and develops without any social contract beyond the family. This tribal society is neither an invention of isolated individuals nor made possible by a central authority. Hume asserts that this form of small tribal society without government is what we could expect as a particular stage in the development of human society: "the state of society without government is one of the most natural states of men, and may subsist with the conjunction of many families, and long after the first generation" (T 346).

Humean individuals confront the collective action problem for the first time in this tribal society which has no constant central authority. However, individuals establish a temporary central authority for defensive reasons against other tribal societies. For Hume, the first and original role that government plays in society is related to its defense rather than to social cooperation. Hume relies on certain features of tribal society in dealing with the collective action problem. There are two

problems Humean agents confront at this stage: First, the absence of a common set of rules to regulate property relations. Second, the absence of a central authority to execute such rules once they develop.

As explained in the previous section, Hume thinks that development of the rules of justice creates a convention which provides a set of shared rules to regulate property relations in society. The rules provide a shared guide for individuals in pursuing their interests. Solution of the second problem is conditioned by two factors: Size of the society and the simplicity of individuals' needs at that stage of human societal development. In the small society individuals would have enough information about each other because of the small number of agents. Interpersonal relations are much more personalized in this society. The availability of such information about individuals would make defectors known in society, thus creating an appropriate environment for the effectiveness of social sanctions. As Miller puts it "size is important because an act of rule-breaking is likely to have greater visible repercussions in a small group and so men feel a more immediate interest in acting justly" (87). In such an environment, defectors would face non-cooperation in the future. In other words, individuals face the collective action problem without having a central authority to force them to cooperate.

The second feature of the small society is the nature of the needs individuals have at that stage of human societal development; Individual needs are few and mostly related to basic material living conditions and individuals are in a relatively equal position to each other in obtaining these needs. Hume explains this state of the needs as follows:

Men, 'tis true, are always much inclin'd to prefer present interest to distant and remote ... But still this weakness is less conspicuous, where the possessions, and the pleasures of life are few, and of little value, as they always are in the infancy of society. An Indian is but little tempted to dispossess another of his hut, or to steal his bow, as being already provided of the same advantages; and as to any superior fortune, which may attend one another above in hunting and fishing, 'tis only casual and temporary, and will have but small tendency to disturb society. (T 345-46)

Thus simplicity of needs or absence of riches in society would facilitate social cooperation among individuals. In a sense, individuals do not face the collective action problem in this society, for they seem to not to face the problem of the scarcity of goods. Everyone could attain his basic needs relatively easily. Hume asserts that individuals would be tempted not to cooperate when riches appear. He sees this temptation as a natural weakness of the individual.

As a result, due to the personalized quality of interpersonal relations and the effectiveness of social sanctions, social cooperation becomes possible even without a centralized

institutional authority in such a society. The collective action problem, thus, is solved at that stage by the effectiveness of social sanctions and the availability of adequate information about agents. This is facilitated also by simplicity of needs. Hume does not offer the classical Hobbesian solution (the state) for social cooperation for such a small society at that particular stage of development. This form of cooperation creates "thick trust" which does not need the state; rather, it depends on the effectiveness of social sanctions. According to Baier, "the role of the first convention is to extend trust beyond the confines of friendship and family" (230).

According to Hume, this form of society and social cooperation last for many years. At this stage or in "a small uncultivated society", "nothing but an encrease of riches and possessions cou'd oblige men to quit it" but "so barbarous and uninstructed are all societies on their first formation, that many years must elapse before these cou'd encrease to such a degree, as to disturb men in the enjoyment of peace and concord" (T 346).

There are two particular factors that lead to the collapse of social cooperation in this society: Increase of size and riches. These two developments change the structural environment of individuals in a way that they do not have adequate information about each other, and this leads to the collapse of social

sanctions. In another words, the two decisive factors (small size and simplicity of needs) that make social cooperation possible without government in a small society would be obliterated. As a result, the traditional form of trust would decline in the larger society. Hume explains these two different environments and their subsequent results for cooperation as follows:

Two neighbors may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common; because 'tis easy for them to know each other's mind; and each must perceive, that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is, the abandoning the whole project. But 'tis very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons shou'd agree in any such action; it being difficult for them to concert so complicated a design, and still more difficult for them to execute it; while each seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble and expence, and wou'd lay the whole burden on others.
(T 345)

Although individuals develop the rules of justice and cooperate to seek more effectively their interest, increase of society and the riches create two particular problems that lead to the collapse of social cooperation. The first problem refers to coordination problem among individuals. Increase of society leads to uncertainty among individuals by leading to absence of adequate information about agents. The reason for individual defection is not their irrationality; rather, they are uncertain whether once they perform their parts others would do the same or take advantage of them. In order to protect their interest,

individuals choose to defect as a rational strategy. As we saw above in small society, those who first cooperate are sure that others would follow. Yet, on the other hand, the increase of society provides an appropriate environment for individuals to be free-riders, for they can benefit from cooperation without contributing to it. Thus, the larger society faces both coordination problem and free-rider problem.

Second factor refers to rise of the riches which increase opportunities and tempt individuals to defect. This problem is related to shortsightedness of individuals. In other words, defection caused by the riches is not a rational strategy to protect one's interest. It is a result of temptation created by increasing wealth.⁶

Since every individual is subject to the same shortsightedness, the result would be non-cooperation and destruction of society. Once more Humean agents confront the collective action problem. According to Hume, if every individual had enough "sagacity" and "strength of mind" to seek his enlightened self-interest "in opposition to the allurements of present pleasure and advantage", there would be no need for a government (En 39). Thus,

the reciprocally sanctioning acceptance of the rules of justice breaks down. We have come back practically

⁶ Hume seems to think that defection caused by temptation is not a rational conduct. This type of defection is not product of rational calculation.

to Hobbes's position after all; everyone could rationally obey the laws of nature as a means to his own welfare, if he could trust others to do so too, but no one can trust anyone else without some further sanction. (Mackie 107)

Hume's solution to the collective action problem in this large and somewhat wealthy society is the establishment of government. Yet Hume does not think that individuals invent government solely to solve the collective action problem they face at this stage. Rather, Hume argues that even tribal society from time to time establishes a central authority to defend itself against other tribal societies. The origin of government is not conflict among individuals in society but conflict among different tribal societies. Hume asserts that "the first rudiments of government to arise from quarrels, not among men of the same society, but among those of different societies. A less degree of riches will suffice to this latter effect, than is requisite for the former" (T 346). Thus, tribes not individuals fight over scarce goods and when faced such conflicts, tribal societies choose a leader to execute the war. They defend their goods against other tribes. After the war the chiefs lose their power. Yet the practice of even a primitive central authority makes individuals recognize the advantages of such an authority in other disputes among themselves:

This authority, however, instructs them in the advantages of government, and teaches them to have

recourse to it, when either by pillage of war, by commerce, or by an fortuitous inventions, their riches and possessions have become so considerable as to make them forget, on every emergence, the interest they have in the preservation of peace and justice. (T 346)

Thus, Hume endorses the state as a solution to the collective action problem individuals face due to increase of society and the riches. The state provides solution to defections stemming from rational strategy to protect one's interest and shortsightedness. Hume, thus, endorses the classical Hobbesian solution for social cooperation. The state provides certainty and forces individuals to follow their enlightened interest. In other words, Hume sees peace and order as a collective good.

1.6 CONCLUSION

As we have seen in this chapter, the notion of justice as convention refers to the process of development of the rules of justice in which individuals are transformed in a way that they develop a tendency to cooperate rather than to defect in social life even though they are still self-interested strategic agents. In other words, Humean agents develop a form of individual conduct that tends to violate the logic of collective action in small society. On the other hand, Hume's theoretical

account in general and historical account about large society exemplify the logic of collective action; that is, individuals' main tendency is to defect rather than cooperate. In order to cooperate, even though they recognize the necessity of the rules for social coexistence, they need a central authority to force them.

In particular, in several respects justice as convention can be differentiated from justice as game. First, justice as convention relies on a process. Second, a particular form of individual conduct appears. Third, justice as convention leads to the development of two different forms of trust, whereas justice as game creates just one form of trust in society. In other words, justice as convention cannot be captured even by the idea of repeated games.

Justice as convention relies on a process which has a developmental impact on human nature or narrow self-interest.⁷ In particular, this process is a learning process by trial and error. Individuals gradually become aware of the necessity for rules of social coexistence. The development of the rules is facilitated by the familiarity of individuals with some rules that regulate their conduct in the family. They recognize that if they simply follow their instinctive interest (or act

⁷ Although Hume argues that it is not possible to change any fundamental quality of human nature, his notion of human nature is a developmental one. In parallel with the development of the rules of justice and society, many faculties of human nature develop and become cultivated.

naturally), they would destroy society. Thus, there are two particular sources individuals utilize to develop the rules of justice. First, their familiarity with the rules in the family. Second, experience and observation outside the family in regard to interpersonal relations. In other words, Humean agents, unlike Hobbesian agents, do not invent the rules at one point in time by theoretical reasoning.

As a result of this trial and error process Hume assumes that individuals would develop a tendency to cooperate rather than defect. Individuals are ready to cooperate and once one of them performs his part, the rest see it as an example to cooperate rather than as an opportunity to take advantage of that particular person. This tendency in Humean agents seems to violate the logic of collective action. Yet, this tendency becomes possible in small tribal society. In other words, although Hume considers the process of the development of the rules of justice as a learning process that creates such a cooperative tendency in individuals, social cooperation is also facilitated by effectiveness of social sanctions. On the other hand, Hume's theoretical account simply endorses the logic of the collective action in individuals; their dominant tendency is to defect rather than to cooperate. And in his historical account, once society becomes larger, Humean agents start acting similarly to those in his theoretical account. In other words,

in both account, in large society, individual tendency is to defect for two reasons: Uncertainty about others' intention (coordination problem) and individual shortsightedness.

Hume endorses the state as a solution to overcome this particular problem in both accounts. Yet as we will see in chapter 3 (Hume's Moral Theory), even after the establishment of the state, individuals tend to take advantage of those opportunities in which they can avoid punishment. In other words, for Hume enlightened interest which leads to the establishment of the state cannot maintain efficient cooperation in society. In response to the failure of enlightened interest to motivate individuals to cooperate, Hume this time endorses the moral improvement of the individual in order to recreate the cooperative tendency. In particular, as a response to the free-rider problem after the establishment of the state, he appeals to the improvement of morality in society. The improvement of morality refers to self-restraint in individuals even they have the opportunity to be free-riders. In other words, Hume's final answer to the free-rider would be the recreation of this cooperative tendency by moral improvement which would be possible due to the development of civilization for Hume.

The third issue in justice as convention is the type of trust that appears in society. The first form of trust is traditional one which is commonly described as "thick" trust.

This form of trust appears in the small tribal society which has no central authority. The second form of trust is legal trust that comes into existence with the establishment of the state. In his theoretical account, the only form of trust that appears is legal trust.

Justice as convention is different at least on these three issues from justice as game. The critical difference is the development of a cooperative tendency that appears in the small society. Education, training, experience and observation indicate a different line of thought in Hume in dealing with the collective action problem. These differences indicate that Hume is not a rational choice theorist, even though he uses Hobbesian logic in respect to the larger society; rather, he follows a different line of thought which will be clearer once we analyze his moral theory.

In the next chapter, I analyze Putnam's notion of social capital. In Putnam, I argue, the role of social capital is to create a Humean cooperative tendency in individuals to facilitate collective action in society.

2.0 SOCIAL CAPITAL AND THE COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM

2.1 INTRODUCTION

According to Putnam every society confronts the collective action problem. "In all societies ... dilemmas of collective action hamper attempts to cooperate for mutual benefit, whether in politics or in economics" (1993, 177). In order to prevent the free-rider problem and secure social cooperation in a liberal democratic society two alternative approaches have appeared: First, the institutional solution. Second, an informal, moral-cultural solution. The institutional solution refers to a central authority (the state) which creates an appropriate institutional environment for self-interested agents to cooperate and uses legal punishment in case of defection. As Callan puts it this approach sees

political institutions that operate as an invisible hand, producing valued collective outcomes by exploiting individual traits that entail no intention to contribute to such outcomes ... citizens will act politically - if they act politically at all - on the basis of narrow self-interest, and the genius of democratic institutional design is to channel self-

interest in ways that predictably contribute to regime stability. (73-4)

Putnam sees this approach as the classical solution to the free-rider problem. Putnam asserts that this classical solution faces two particular problems in modern society: First, the state enforcement is expensive. Second, this classical solution ignores the role of voluntary associations in regard to the collective action problem (1993, 65). Putnam then proposes his idea of social capital by claiming that in addition to the institutional solution a liberal society needs an informal, moral-cultural solution to deal more effectively with the collective action problem and increase the quality of social life (1993, 11). Putnam sees these two solutions as complementary rather than competing approaches. In particular social capital both facilitates the role of the state and beyond that contributes to the quality of social life. While the state relies on the enlightened self-interest of individuals, social capital aims at turning self-interested agents into better citizens in dealing with the collective action problem by utilizing moral sources. As Callan puts it "Moral sources of citizenship" are also necessary for social cooperation besides self-interest (74).

I argue that Putnam's critique of the institutionalist solution to the collective action problem and his informal-moral

solution as a more adequate approach have striking similarities with Hume's understanding of the role of the state and its limits in dealing with the collective action problem and Hume's informal solution that relies on improvement of morality in society. In this chapter my aim is limited to an analysis of Putnam's idea of social capital and the similarity between Putnam and Hume in respect to their understanding of the role of the state in social cooperation. I leave the analysis of the second similarity between Putnam and Hume, the necessity of an informal, moral-cultural solution that relies on the transformation of individuals from being simply self-interested agents into better citizens to chapter three in which I present Hume's moral theory.

The plan of this chapter is as follows; in the first section, I introduce Putnam's idea of social capital as presented in *Making Democracy Work* (1993) and *Democracies in Flux* (2000) and analyze different components of social capital such as trust, networks, generalized reciprocity, solidarity, and sociability and the causal relation among these concepts. Then I analyze how Putnam thinks that social capital provides a more adequate solution to the social cooperation problem and prevents the free rider-problem by turning individuals into better citizens. In the second section, I compare Putnam's analysis of the shortcomings of the state as an institutional

solution to the free-rider problem to Hume's understanding of the role of the state in social cooperation. In the third section, I analyze Putnam's claim that his idea of social capital endorses a republican-civic community. I criticize Putnam's appeal to a republican idea of civic community to describe social capital. In particular, I argue that his idea of social capital endorses a more liberal concept of community or voluntary associations as well as virtues, skills, and understanding rather than a republican community and virtues, skills, and understanding. Yet, my critique is limited to his conceptual confusion. I argue that once we clear this conceptual confusion we could determine more appropriately the features of Putnam's notion of community and virtues necessary to turn individuals into better citizens in a liberal society. In the fourth section, I present Putnam's notion of "a new way of doing politics" based on the existence of social capital in society. According to Putnam, the existence of social capital has positive impacts on the political conduct of individuals in politics. In particular, such individuals do not see political conflict as a zero-sum game; rather, they value tolerance, compromise, technical knowledge, and pragmatism as valuable qualities in dealing with conflict in politics. I argue that Hume also endorses a particular notion of politics that relies on similar principles in order to perpetuate a liberal system.

Yet I analyze this similarity between Putnam and Hume in chapter four in which I present Hume's politics. In the final section, I analyze Putnam's distinction of good social capital vs. bad social capital.

2.2 SOCIAL CAPITAL: DEFINITION, COMPONENTS, AND CAUSAL MECHANISM

Putnam defines social capital as "features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, which can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions" (1993, 167) or "social networks and the norms of reciprocity associated with them" (2000, 3). "The idea at the core of the theory of social capital is extremely simple: Social networks matter" (Putnam, 2000, 6).

"Social networks matter" on several different levels; First, they create sociability or social connectedness among individuals. Second, networks create generalized reciprocity and trust among individuals. Third, networks improve individual judgment and lead to the development of certain skills and habits among people. Putnam sees generalized reciprocity as the core of social capital.

Although he does not analyze social connectedness adequately, I argue that at the root of generalized reciprocity lies social connectedness as an intrinsic value for individuals. To see social connectedness as the underlying factor of social capital is significant for two reasons; first, it clarifies why any sort of association rather than just political associations is significant for social capital. Second, it makes possible to argue that sociability as an intrinsic value for individuals provides us a new perspective to analyze the role and the place of self-interest in social cooperation. In other words, sociability has a regulative impact on individual self interest by creating generalized reciprocity and bringing "moral sources of citizenship" into social cooperation. This aspect of social capital refers to the social-moral transformation of self-interested agent.

Social networks refer to many different types of associations for Putnam. They are not necessarily political ones. For example, bird-watching groups, recreational groups, even nodding acquaintances in a local market are networks for Putnam. The basic underlying assumption in any sort of network is the idea of sociability that appears among individuals. When people come together in an association or acquire acquaintances in a market or an elevator, social connectedness is created among them. According to Putnam, "the nodding acquaintance you

have with the person you occasionally see waiting in line at the supermarket, or even a chance encounter with another person in an elevator" creates social connectedness and "(e)ven these very casual forms of social connection have been shown experimentally to induce a certain form of reciprocity" (2000, 10). Any sort of association, thus, not just political ones is important for social capital. That's why Putnam's notion of networks includes non-political and even socially-politically trivial ones such as bird-watching groups or acquaintance acquired in a local market rather than just political associations established for political reasons. Togetherness of individuals for any reason is assumed to have a transformative impact on individuals in such a way that they come to have ties among them for non-instrumental reasons. In other words, togetherness of individuals by itself aside from explicit reason of togetherness (for example, bird-watching) is significant for Putnam. Social connectedness creates good will, sympathy, honesty, and friendship among individuals. These values or sentiments are by-products of togetherness and also it is reasonable to assume that people expect these values and sentiments from each other when they engage in any sort of activity together. These values and sentiments are more likely to develop among individuals in non-profit or less formal, spontaneous, recreational activities. This feature of associations indicates that the individual is a

social being and seeks company for the sake of togetherness or friendship. This feature of Putnam's associations does not require us to discard explicitly issue-oriented networks. Rather, it requires us to see that even, at their most basic level, issue-oriented associations rely on social connectedness among their members. We could see this quality of associations as their non-instrumental value for individuals. The link that Putnam sees between associations and their positive impact on the collective action problem relies on this intrinsic value of networks at a deeper level.

Networks create generalized reciprocity. Putnam sees generalized reciprocity and trust as the product of social connectedness. Once social connection develops among individuals, it leads to generalized reciprocity among them. According to Putnam, the idea of generalized reciprocity is the core idea of the social capital theory. The idea of generalized reciprocity refers to trustworthy conduct of individuals toward each other: "I'll do this for you now without expecting anything immediately in return, because down the road you (or someone else) will reciprocate my goodwill" (2000, 7). Thus generalized reciprocity sees others ready to cooperate rather than to defect. One's cooperation does not lead the rest to take advantage of him. Rather they take that individual's conduct as

a sign of his trustworthiness. In other words, networks create a cooperative tendency (disposition) in individuals.

As Mouritsen puts it "the basic idea of social capital is that synergy effects arise when individuals do certain things together in local associations or other less formal contexts. As a by-product, interpersonal relations ... improve, turning people into better citizens in the process" (651).

Generalized reciprocity leads to the development of a particular form of trust among individuals. In Putnam there are three forms of trust that facilitate social cooperation in society: Traditional trust, legal trust, and moral trust.

Traditional trust refers to a form of trust that develops in a small society. In this form of society, individuals have adequate information about each other due to the small number of agents. The availability of adequate information creates effective social sanctions for free-riders. "In small, highly personalized community ... the threat of ostracism from the socioeconomic system is a powerful, credible sanction" (Putnam, 1993, 168). The development of a reputation for honesty is a rational strategic choice that allows one benefit from social cooperation (Bruni and Sugden 25). This form of trust is known as "thick trust" (Putnam, 1993, 171). In modern society this form of trust tends to disappear, for society increases, which makes adequate information about individuals less and less

available and in turn social sanctions loose their effectiveness.

In order to respond to this problem, modern society creates legal trust by the state. The state establishes "the rules of the game" and enforces individuals to cooperate. Legal punishment fills the gap created by the collapse of social sanctions. Legal trust sees individuals as primarily narrowly self-interested agents whose dominant tendency is to defect rather than cooperate. According to Putnam legal trust forms the core of the classical solution that sees the state as "third party" to the collective action problem. "Hobbes, one of the first great social theorists to confront this perplexity, offered the classic solution; third-party enforcement ... The state enables its subjects to do what they cannot do on their own - trust one another" (1993, 165). The state creates a structural environment by institutional design and incentives to lead individuals to cooperate.

Putnam asserts that legal trust falls short in motivating individuals to cooperate. In particular, it faces two particular problems: First, the increase of society makes legal enforcement a very expensive attempt. According to Putnam, game theorists agree that cooperation would be easier in "indefinitely repeated games" and in those games where a small number of players engaged in cooperation who have adequate information about each

other's past behavior (1993, 165). The increase of society poses a problem to game theory, for it primarily obliterates the availability of such information about individuals. And given that self-interested agents would take advantage of opportunities where they can avoid punishment, the state cannot provide an adequate solution to social cooperation problem. As a result, Putnam asserts that the increased size of society and the assumption of self-interest that underlies legal trust create a vicious circle in society. If individuals have the opportunity to defect and prevent punishment, it is rational for them to defect. Also, their compliance is conditional; they watch each other as strategic actors and defect if others defect. Thus, the dominant strategy will be "never cooperate" in society (Putnam, 1993, 165).

The second problem is the actual state of social cooperation in modern societies. Contrary to the expectation of game theory, argues Putnam, defection is not endemic in large modern societies. This is a pathological situation from the standpoint of game theory. Game theorists' reasoning implies that "impersonal cooperation should be rare, whereas it seems to be common in much of the modern world. How come?" (Putnam, 1993, 168).

As a result, Putnam argues that "sadly the solution is too neat ... this theory proves too much, for it underpredicts

voluntary cooperation ... 'We should ask why uncooperative behavior does not emerge as often as game theory predicts'" (1993, 165). Putnam presents the rotating credit associations found in many societies as examples that violate the expectation of game theory: "Rotating credit associations clearly violate the logic of collective action: Why shouldn't a participant drop out once he has received the pot?" (1993, 167).

According to Putnam, we can explain this cooperation by another factor:

Success in overcoming dilemmas of collective action and the self-defeating opportunism that they spawn depends on the broader social context within which any particular game is played. Voluntary cooperation is easier in a community that has inherited a substantial stock of social capital, in the form of norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement. (1993, 167)

As a response to this problem formal or legal trust faces in modern society Putnam advocates informal-moral trust created by social capital. In modern society informal-moral trust has two sources; "norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement". Norms are not legal rules. They are informal rules developed among individuals: "Norms are inculcated and sustained by modeling and socialization (including civic education) and by sanctions" (Putnam, 1993, 171). Networks create small groups that personalize relations among their members within impersonalized large modern society. Individuals could have

adequate information about each other and sanction is immediate for defectors. And a society which has many such networks could deal more effectively with the collective action problem, for they "reduce incentives to defect, reduce uncertainty, and provide models for future cooperation" (Putnam, 1993, 177). He defines trust created in networks as a "moral contract" among individuals (1993, 183).

This form of trust does not rely just on self-interest. Rather it takes into account the possibility of moral improvement of self-interested agents. In other words, moral trust sees individuals capable of developing moral motives which regulates one's conduct in accordance with a notion of morally right or wrong conduct. Even one has the opportunity to defect, which is rational in rational choice model; he would not defect for moral reasons. This form of trust stems from the voluntary conduct of individuals in networks. It does not rely on legal force. Callan argues that this approach assumes that "the nature of citizenship and the education suited to its realization" is a significant subject to be considered in relation to the collective action problem rather than see individuals as narrowly self-interested agents and manipulate their interest to assure cooperation in society (71). Networks provide such a moral education in Putnam.

Networks create certain skills, habits, and understanding among individuals. Besides social connectedness and reciprocity, networks "instill habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public spiritedness" (Putnam, 1993, 189). Putnam appeals to Tocqueville's terms to explain the impact of networks on individual judgment and feeling: "'Feelings and ideas are renewed, the heart enlarged, and the understanding developed only by the reciprocal action of men one upon another'" (1993, 190).

These impacts of networks on individuals depend on social connectedness as well as increased interpersonal relations among individuals. As explained before, friendship, good-will, and fellow-feeling develop among individuals in networks. In addition, individual judgment improves in respect to social cooperation. Putnam's notion of the development of public-spiritedness is product of both the improvement of feeling and judgment among individuals. The improvement of judgment refers to development of awareness about social order as public good among individuals. Public-spiritedness does not mean the sacrifice of private ends to public ends in Putnam.

Citizens ... are not required to be altruists ... However, citizens pursue what Tocqueville termed 'self-interest properly understood', that is, self-interest defined in the context of broader public-needs, self-interest that is 'enlightened' rather than 'myopic' self-interest that is alive to the interests of others. (Putnam, 1993, 87)

On the other side, there is the opposite concept of self-interest: maximize your own advantage without any regard to the interests of others. According to Putnam, the idea of public-spiritedness advocates a form of conduct between two extremes, that is, between altruism and narrow self-interest. It is more demanding than narrow self-interest yet less demanding than altruism (1993, 88). "Even seemingly 'self-interested' transactions take on a different character when they are embedded in social networks that foster mutual trust" (Putnam, 1993, 89). As a result, "fabrics of trust enable the civic community more easily to surmount what economists call 'opportunism', in which shared interests are unrealized because each individual, acting in wary isolation, has an incentive to defect from collective action" (Putnam, 1993, 89).

According to Putnam social capital has "a self-enforcing and cumulative" quality and creates "virtuous circles" in society: "trust, reciprocity, civic engagement" increase and spread as they are used. In the absence of social capital, "vicious circles" develop in society: individuals choose to defect and it also becomes self-enforcing. In this situation, legal force is the only available instrument individuals could appeal. If the state functions properly it could provide order in general: This Hobbesian [solution] has at least the virtue

that it is attainable by individuals who are unable to trust their neighbors", yet "society is worse off than in a cooperative outcome" (Putnam, 1993, 178). If the state does not function properly, then "privatized Leviathans" (mafia) would appear. "Although a coercive state and mafia are inferior to civic community, they are still preferable to anarchy" (Putnam, 1993, 177).

In regard to causal relation among the components of social capital, Putnam assumes that networks provide a medium in which individuals come together. Togetherness creates social connections among individuals, which in turn leads to the development of generalized reciprocity and trust. Once trust and generalized reciprocity develop among individuals they cooperate much more easily and effectively, which in turn increases the stock of social capital by reinforcing norms and trust. The more individuals use it, the more it increases. This causal model primarily explains the reciprocity among members of networks. In regard to non-members individuals face same uncertainty created by the absence of information about past behavior of non-members.

As a response to this problem, Putnam asserts that trust created in a network can be used in the larger society: "Social networks allow trust to become transitive and spread: I trust you, because I trust her and she assures me that she trust you"

(1993, 69). Networks provide "connections among individuals to help circumvent problems of imperfect information and enforceability" (Putnam, 1993, 69). In other words, networks allow "reputations to be transmitted" in society (Putnam, 1993, 74). Yet this transitive model is limited in use, for it is limited to those who can have information about others. It cannot explain those cases in which there is neither such transmission of reputation for honesty nor common membership.

Although Putnam does not analyze this question, I argue that individuals develop a tendency to cooperate in networks and a dense networks of associations create a moral environment in society in a way that individuals tend to cooperate in larger society without having information about others' past behavior in general. In other words, the general environment has changed in a way that individuals tend to trust each other until they face defection or cheating from others. Indeed, Putnam seems to endorse this by claiming that "in communities where people can be confident that trusting will be requited, not exploited, exchange is more likely to ensue" (1993, 172). Cooperation, both in networks and the larger society, is "eased by the expectation that others will probably follow the rules. Knowing that others will, you are more likely to go along, too, thus fulfilling their expectations" (Putnam, 1993, 111).

Putnam asserts that a particular form of reasoning that develops in networks is indeed contrary to the logic of collective action. Collective action assumes that individuals as rational strategic players would take advantage of any opportunity to further their interest. Yet, according to Putnam, social capital leads individuals to act in a very different manner; individuals would cooperate without expecting immediate return from the others. And the rest would also cooperate instead of taking advantage of those who put themselves in a disadvantageous position by performing first in society. Putnam argues that both individual conducts violate the logic of collective action. Putnam asserts that we observe often this type of behavior in everyday life, which poses a problem for game theory. Putnam endorses social capital theory to explain precisely this type of individual conduct.

Thus, networks would change structural environment of individuals or create an informal-moral environment:

Dense networks of social interaction appear to foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity –“I’ll do this for you now without expecting anything immediately in return, because down the road you (or someone else) will reciprocate my goodwill”. Social interaction, in other words, helps to resolve dilemmas of collective action, encouraging people to act in a trustworthy way when they might not otherwise do so. When economic and political dealing is embedded in dense networks of social interaction, incentives for opportunities and malfeasance are reduced. A society characterized by generalized reciprocity is more efficient than a distrustful society, for the same reason that money is more efficient than barter. Trustworthiness lubricates social life. If we don’t have to

balance every exchange instantly, we can get a lot more accomplished". (Putnam, 2000 7)

According to Putnam, individuals do not act in this way because they are selfless saints. Rather they still seek their interest; yet they consider their interest in a broader context of social life rather than see it without any regard for the interests of the rest.

2.3 SOCIAL CAPITAL AND HUME

In this section I compare Hume and Putnam in regard to the limits of the institutionalist solution to the collective action problem.

Both theorists endorse a similar argument in regard to the social cooperation problem in both small and large societies. In particular, both think that in a small society, social sanctions are effective and prevent defection, which becomes possible because of the availability of adequate information about individuals. Both also think that the state is a "third-party" solution to the social cooperation problem in a large society. Finally, both think that the state cannot provide an adequate solution to the collective action problem in a large society.

In Hume, as we have seen in chapter one, in tribal society there are two different factors that facilitate cooperation: First, training and education in the family and observation and experience outside the family. Second, small number of agents who face the collective action problem. In this small society, the primary source of defection is instinctive interest or "limited benevolence" or natural partiality of individuals. Hume endorses training and education in the family and observation and experience outside the family to overcome natural partiality to ourselves, family, and friends. The availability of adequate information about individual's past behavior and the simplicity of individual needs facilitate their cooperation. In other words, this society does not face the collective action problem as a coordination problem.

Hume's solution that depends on training and education in the family and observation and experience outside the family is underlined by a learning process that leads individuals to develop enlightened interest. Although Hume relies on the effectiveness of social sanctions in this society, he also endorses the education of individuals to overcome their natural partiality.

In the larger society, there are two sources of defection for Hume: Individual shortsightedness or "natural infirmity" and increase of society. Shortsightedness of individual reveals that

enlightened interest fails in motivating individuals to cooperate. In other words, this individual shortsightedness is not a rational strategy, for it leads individuals to act contrary to their long-term interest. On the other hand, increase of society refers to coordination problem; in coordination problem individuals act rationally when they defect; that is

because of uncertainty about others intention, they choose to defect in order to protect their interest. The state forces individuals to choose their long-term interest and provides certainty among individuals who have inadequate information about each other.

In Putnam, the primary source of defection is individual shortsightedness in a small society. The effectiveness of social sanctions forces individuals to cooperate. Unlike Hume, Putnam does not mention a learning process in one's family to overcome individual shortsightedness. On the other hand, Putnam, like Hume, thinks that there are two sources of defection in a large society: Individual shortsightedness and increase of society. The former refers to the failure of enlightened interest in motivating individuals to cooperate where individuals can cheat. The latter factor refers to coordination problem because of the increase of agents in society. Putnam also endorses the state to overcome both problems to achieve cooperation.

Both see the state as a partial response to the collective action problem. Especially individual shortsightedness persists as a source of defection among individuals after the establishment of the state. This is the source of the free-rider problem in society. As a result, Putnam endorses social capital to overcome the inadequacy of enlightened interest. As we will see in chapter three, Hume's final response to the shortcomings of enlightened interest relies on development of a moral sense among individuals.

2.4 SOCIAL CAPITAL, HUMAN NATURE, AND MORAL SENSE

Social capital theory relies on a more benign and complex notion of human nature than that of game theory. In institutional design, self-interest is the only fundamental quality of individuals considered as relevant to the collective action problem. This gives neatness to game theory. Yet, it also limits the resources that we can use for social cooperation.

Contrary to this somewhat static concept of the agent institutional design assumes, social capital theory assumes a developmental concept of the agent. In both institutional design and social capital theory, the individual is a self-interested agent, yet he stays self-interested in the former, whereas he

develops moral sense in time in the latter. Putnam sees social capital as a "moral resource" of society. It provides moral motives for individuals in their conduct. In other words, the role of social capital is not simply enforcing enlightened interest; rather, social capital leads individuals to develop a new motive. Thus, the individual in social capital theory comes to acquire some critical additional qualities to his selfishness, which becomes decisive for collective action problem.

The development of a moral sense creates a self-control mechanism in the individual. He considers defection as immoral even though it enhances his private interests. Moral sense has a different character than enlightened self-interest which determines individual conduct in accordance with incentives and others' conduct. Moral sense requires one to watch his conduct. Putnam's claim that social capital turns individuals into better citizens relies on the possibility of the moral improvement of individuals, which, in the final analysis, relies on his developmental concept of human nature.

2.5 SOCIAL CAPITAL AS CIVIC VIRTUE

In this section, I criticize Putnam's claim that social capital creates a civic or republican community and individual qualities that develop as a result of social capital are civic or republican virtues. In particular, I argue that social capital creates certain skills, virtues, and understanding among individuals and also leads to the development of a community, yet these qualities and community are not republican in character at all. Rather Putnam's social capital creates a liberal civil society as well as liberal virtues and understanding in society. Once we clarify the character of social capital and see that it is a liberal concept rather than a republican concept, we could determine more adequately how social capital as a liberal concept performs the role Putnam expects from it in regard to the collective action problem and political life. Also this conceptual clarification would help us to see the similarity between Putnam's social capital and its role in social cooperation and Hume's virtues and informal-moral solution to the collective action problem. As we will see in chapter 3, Hume presents a set of virtues against the republican virtues for the newly emerging commercial society.

Putnam asserts that the quality of a society and how this society deals with the collective action problem depends on "the

character of the citizens, or the 'civic virtue'" (1993, 86-7). Putnam presents several factors as features of civic community: civic engagement, political equality, solidarity, trust, tolerance, sense of duty, and voluntary associations. Civic engagement refers to the interest of individuals in public issues and understanding of their interest in the broader context of public needs: "Citizens in a civic community though not selfless saints, regard the public domain as more than a battle ground for pursuing personal interest". In a civic community citizens are in an equal position to each other in respect to rights and liberties: "Citizens interact as equals, neither as patrons and clients nor as governors and petitioners" (Putnam, 1993, 88). They are "helpful, respectful, and trustful toward one another". They are tolerant to each other in respect to conflictual issues in political life (Putnam, 1993, 89). The existence of voluntary associations instills in citizens "habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public spiritedness". The interaction of individuals with each other in voluntary endeavors for common goods develops their feelings, understanding, intellectual sophistications, and shared responsibility for public issues. They abhor being free riders even they have the opportunity (Putnam, 1993, 86-91). Civic community is not a conflict-free society. Rather, civic attitudes, equality, and political participation enable citizens

to reach constructive conclusions rather than deadlocks among opposing groups in political life (Putnam, 1993, 118).

Putnam's notion of civic-republican community refers to voluntary associations. And his notion of civic-republican virtues refers to qualities that develop in associations. These qualities, as we saw above, are tolerance, honesty, compromise, public spiritedness, sense of duty, social connectedness or sociability, and improved judgment and understanding. Also, social, economic, and political conditions must be conducive to egalitarian interpersonal relations.

According to Mouritsen, Putnam's notion of civic community and civic virtues do not reflect republican ideals in several respects: First, Putnam's notion of community is "a grass-roots phenomenon" and "voluntaristic" that emerges naturally. "In traditional liberal fashion, civil society comes first, with private individuals voluntarily associating, civilizing politics from below". Second, Putnam's community is "local and society centered", whereas republican community refers to "a society of citizens oriented towards (national) politics and institutions". Third, Putnam's community is primarily oriented to civility and tolerance; whereas a republican one advocates explicitly political virtues, especially the sacrifice of private ends to public ends (655). Mouritsen argues that Putnam's civic community and virtues are not political enough to claim a

republican character (653). Rather, his notion reflects the traditional liberal ideal of "polite society" (Mouritsen 655) in which individuals' understanding and manners are civilized, refined, and improved and they follow their private ends. As a result, Mouritsen asserts that Putnam's idea of "civicness is not enough" for the role Putnam expects from it in regard to "trust and cooperation" in society. Mouritsen thinks that a more robust republican set of virtues primarily political in nature is necessary to perform the functions that Putnam expects from social capital (664). Political participation rather than social participation is seen as more conducive to create public spiritedness and civic virtue among citizens. In other words, political participation refers to public activity of citizens, whereas social participation refers to their private activities. That's why political activity has a central place in republican thought.

Mouritsen's critique is helpful in clarifying the character of Putnam's social capital in several respects, yet Mouritsen is wrong in his claim that Putnam's social capital with its liberal notion of community and virtues cannot perform the functions Putnam expects. In particular, as Mouritsen asserts Putnam's network is any sort of association that brings people together. As we saw above Putnam's associations do not have to be political with explicit political purposes. For example,

Putnam's example of social capital that develops in a local market among customers or in a bird-watching group has nothing to do with the republican notion of civic community. What arises among customers is social connectedness and trust. It is a spontaneous and voluntaristic network and social connectedness that develops in it is also a by-product of togetherness or face-to-face relations without any explicit political purpose. Contrary to this view of essentially non-political associations, republican associations are organized for political purposes.

Also, the republican ideal advocates explicitly political virtues such as public spiritedness (priority of public good over private ends) and a tighter solidarity among individuals than Putnam's sociability and generalized reciprocity require. According to Burtt, "the [republican] qualities that make a citizen virtuous, while variously described, hinge on a mindset in which the goods of the public realm, the world of political action and deliberation, are given priority over private goods" (361). The republican citizen is a public figure with a strong political identity whose main interest is political. In other words, political participation in Putnam does not amount to an almost cardinal virtue unlike in the republican view. According to Kymlicka and Norman "the feature that distinguishes civic republicans from other participationist ... is their emphasis on

the intrinsic value of political participation for the participants themselves" (362).

In Putnam, social capital develops independently from politics in any sort of association and it facilitates cooperation in the larger society as well as in politics. Politics has not a special status in social capital. Putnam's notion of virtue reflects, indeed, the understanding of virtue held by some classical liberals. As Pocock argues the process of the rise of liberal politics was also the process of the decline of republican politics:

As the individual moved from the farmer-warrior world of ancient citizenship or Gothic *libertas*, he entered an increasingly transactional universe of 'commerce and the arts' ... Since these relationships were social and not political in character, the capacities which they led the individual to develop were called not 'virtues' but 'manners'. (48-9)

Besides these differences between republican and liberal notions of networks and citizenship, Putnam's virtues such as tolerance, compromise, sense of duty, public spiritedness, solidarity, and enlargement of mind are also liberal in character. In particular, tolerance is a liberal virtue that makes the individual accept differences in regard to not just technical questions in politics but also, more importantly, the plurality of substantial ways of life as a fact of modern

society⁸. Another such virtue is compromise. It refers to recognition of the complexity of political questions and thus necessity of negotiation among different groups and parties. It requires technical knowledge as well as a pragmatic approach to political conflict to prevent destructive conflicts among groups. Even republican citizens need compromise in dealing with conflict in politics; it does not make Putnam's social capital a republican concept. It is an instrumental value that can find a place in both republican and liberal politics. Yet, it would fit more easily to liberal politics, for liberal society could recognize and accommodate differences, especially moral differences among people, more than a republican model could. In other words, the liberal system could accommodate a much greater variety of differences than a republican system could. Especially, republican community tends to enforce more homogeneity on its citizens in regard to substantial values than liberal society.

I think Putnam's appeal to the republican model relies on an assumption that since republican model assumes that the health of society depends on the character and qualities of its citizens, he thinks that social capital is also a republican concept, for it also assumes this connection. It is a common

⁸ According to Gutmann, the republican notion of virtue requires a "more conservative" mindset in individuals, which would create a less tolerant society which cannot accommodate substantial moral differences that are just a fact of life for liberals (309, 319). The plurality of comprehensive worldviews is one of the fundamental premises of Rawls' liberalism (1999).

misconception in contemporary political thought that liberals are not interested in the character of individuals; rather they rely on an institutional structure such as a constitution with a balance and check system and separation of powers to assure peace and order in society.⁹ In other words, it is assumed that the liberal individual tends to stay as an isolated agent who sees society as an instrument for his private ends. Such individuals are not good candidates to form a coherent body of citizenry with shared ideals and practices in society (Sandel 87). On the other hand, the primary character of the republican agent is that he is a citizen of the republic. As Wallach puts it republicans think that "virtue could only be fully realized in a rightly constituted political community" (616). The republican notion of citizenship requires certain qualities that turn the individual into a citizen and those qualities are not the qualities that are valued in liberal thought. I think Putnam follows this line of thought in his appeal to the republican ideal in describing his notion of civil society that stems from social capital. Yet this is not a correct assumption, for although some liberals advocate an instrumentalist notion of

⁹ Galston succinctly puts the common, yet mistaken, conviction about the relation between virtue and politics in liberalism: "For two generations, scholarly inquiry has been dominated by the belief that liberal polity does not rest on individual virtue. On the theoretical plane, liberalism has been understood as the articles of a peace treaty among individuals with diverse conceptions of the good but common interests in preservation and prosperity. On the level of basic institutions, the liberal constitution has been understood as an artful contrivance of countervailing powers and counterbalancing passions. In the arena of liberal society, individual behavior has been analyzed through the prism, and public policy guided by the precepts, of neoclassical economics" (1277).

society which relies on manipulation of self-interested agents to assure cooperation and ignore qualities of individuals, this is not the case for all liberals. The classical example of individualistic liberalism is Hobbes, and Putnam mentions Hobbes in his critique of the rational choice model. On the other hand, as we will see in chapter four and five Hume represents another tradition in liberalism which tries to bring both interest and virtues together in both social and political life. In addition to these two different liberal traditions, liberalism endorses a different set of virtues than the republicans do. As Galston puts it,

the liberal citizen is not the same as the civic-republican citizen. In a liberal polity there is no duty to participate actively in politics, no requirement to place the public above the private and to subordinate personal interest to the common good systematically, and no commitment to accept collective determination of personal choices. But neither is liberal citizenship simply the pursuit of self-interest, individually or in factional collusion with others of like-minded. Liberal citizenship has its own distinctive restraints - virtues that circumscribe and check, without wholly nullifying, the promptings of self-aggrandizement. (1284)

Putnam's appeal to the republican model downgrades the significance of his model and prevents him from recognizing its liberal character.

Mouritsen's claim that Putnam's virtues cannot achieve the ends that Putnam expects from them in regard to the collective

action problem since they are not republican enough misses the point also. Mouritsen assumes that the health of social life can be achieved by a rigorous set of republican values that takes politics more seriously than social capital. In order to achieve a republican society it is reasonable to argue that we need a body of citizenry with a set of republican virtues, yet this does not mean that liberal virtues advocated by Putnam's social capital fail. Rather we need to see that each tradition advocates different forms of society based on different sets of virtues. As I will argue in chapter 3, Hume is a case in point that he advocates a form of liberal society which considers that the health and quality of society have a close tie to the character of individuals.

2.6 TYPES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

Putnam's theory of social capital has been criticized for its optimistic appraisal of networks. In particular some scholars argue that Putnam ignores that many associations do not create social capital that is good for a liberal system. Indeed, some associations breed hatred, factionalism, racism towards certain groups in society. Yet the very same associations also develop those virtues (the generalized reciprocity, trust, solidarity)

among their members. These scholars argue that we cannot simply rely on the existence of dense networks of associations; rather we need to know how the virtues necessary for a liberal system can be created in associations without leading precisely those qualities that are bad for liberal society.

Chambers and Kopstein argue that the question is not between participation and isolation; rather "the more important question facing us is what type of civil society promotes democracy. In other words, the choice is not really between isolation and participation but rather between different types of participation" (838). They argue that both bad and good civil societies create the same values (reciprocity, trust, solidarity). Yet "bad civil society" leads to "particularist civility" which limits the use of social capital to its members and "often encourages the opposite sort of attitude to members outside of the group". On the other hand, good social capital creates "democratic civility" which "extends the goods learned in participation to all citizens regardless of group membership" (841). They criticize Putnam by claiming that Putnam does not take up these kinds of questions in his analysis. Yet, bad social capital is "worse than the disease" (isolation of individuals). In order to differentiate bad social capital from good, they argue, we need to look at "the ideological content

and substantive messages that members receive" in an association (842)¹⁰.

Stolle and Rochon also criticize Putnam as ignoring bad social capital. In order to differentiate bad social capital from good, they look at whether social capital created in networks is extended to non-members. They argue that networks that create social capital yet fail to extend it to people outside the group create "private or personalized civicness". On the other hand, networks which create social capital and extend it to non-members create "public civicness" (48). They argue that the Mafia, religious fundamentalist groups, even the terrorist groups create social capital among their members. That's why "we do not automatically see virtue in an association that establishes trust, cooperation, and norms of reciprocity among its members if it does not also do so in a more generalized sense" (49).

As a response to his critics Putnam has attempted to differentiate bad social capital from good. Putnam presents two different classifications of social capital: The first classification is about a fourfold distinction of different forms of capital. These are as follows: Formal versus informal, thick versus thin, inward-looking versus outward looking, and

¹⁰ Chambers and Kopstein argue that the Weimar Republic had very dense and vibrant networks which led to the Nazi movement (842).

bridging versus bonding social capitals. Some voluntary organizations are formal such as labor unions which have regular meetings, officers, dues, and membership requirements. On the other hand, some organizations are informal such as "people who gather at the same pub". Some organizations are "closely interwoven and multistranded, such as a group of steelworkers who work together everyday at the factory, go out for drinks on Saturday, and go to mass every Sunday" (2000, 10). On the other hand, "the nodding acquaintance you have with the person you occasionally see waiting in line at the supermarket, or even a chance encounter with another person in an elevator" refers to thin social capital (2000, 10). Some associations promote the interest of their members such as labor organizations. Some other associations can promote the interest of non-participants such as charitable groups. Bonding social capital includes people similar to each other in significant respects such as race, ethnicity, or social class. Bridging networks include people who are unlike each other. Putnam asserts that in real life we find all or some of these forms of social capital in associations in most cases, yet there might be some associations that represent just one form of these social capitals. Among these types of social capital, argues Putnam, bonding social capital could create bad social capital due to its homogenous membership. On the other hand, bridging social capital is suited

especially to extend trust and reciprocity among diverse people (2000, 9)

The second classification is about bad versus good social capital. Putnam asserts that not all associations create social capital that is good for liberal politics, rather bad social capital subverts "the rules and traditions of liberal democracy" (2000, 9). Bad social capital refers to norms of reciprocity and trust as well as solidarity and social connectedness that develop in particular groups such as the Ku Klux Klan. This association also develops social capital, yet it is internally oriented in such a way that creates group solidarity against supposed enemies. Good social capital refers to values and norms that are not created for "self-defensive" reasons against enemies; rather good social capital leads individuals to use their habits, trust, skills, and norms of reciprocity in larger society to facilitate social cooperation.

Putnam's distinction of bad vs. good social capital indicates that networks are instrumental in the sense that they can serve liberal as well as non-liberal systems. Networks do not have a transformative impact on people's ideological identity; rather they simply provide a medium in which liberals as well as fundamentalists can develop social capital to endorse their causes. The critical factor that determines whether associations would develop good or bad social capital is, as

Chambers and Kopstein argue, the content of the messages individual take in associations. This indicates that a dense network of associations which endorse illiberal or anti-liberal visions of society would turn society into a cluster of antagonist groups. In order to have a dense network of good associations, society must be liberalized culturally to a large extent. Associations that target the fundamental tenets of liberalism simply would pose a threat to the system rather than contribute social cooperation. Indeed, Putnam's notion of bad social capital that subverts "the rules and traditions of liberal democracy" refers to this requirement. Effective social cooperation, in the final analysis, relies on the liberalization of society.

2.7 SOCIAL CAPITAL AND "A NEW WAY OF DOING POLITICS"

In this section I analyze how social capital influences individuals' political conduct in a way that leads to development of a particular way of doing politics. Although Putnam's social capital is social in essence, it has a positive impact in politics.

In *Making Democracy Work*, Putnam seeks to explain differences between north and south Italy as well as differences

within each region in terms of effectiveness of governmental institutions introduced in the 1970s. He analyzes how and to what extent institutions as independent variables change political behavior by changing the structural environment or incentive structure in which individuals act. Putnam also analyzes the role of socioeconomic modernity as an independent variable by taking institutions as dependent variables in individual political behavior. He argues that both factors come short in explaining the differences. He then uses social capital as a more adequate explanatory model to explain the differences. He introduces "the social context within which they [institutions] operate": "Just as the same individual may define and pursue his and her interests differently in different institutional contexts, so the same formal institution may operate differently in different context" (1993, 8).

In Italy a massive institutional reform was initiated in 1970, which established 15 regional governments. Later in 1976-77, 5 more regional governments were established and in time these governments had gained authority over a wide array of issues such as "urban affairs, agriculture, housing, hospitals, and health services, public works, vocational education, and economic development" (Putnam, 1993,6). Although the same types of institutions were established in all these regions, these

regions had different socioeconomic development levels and political traditions (Putnam, 1993, 7).

As expected by reformers, argues Putnam, "institutional socialization" taught the politicians "the virtues of patience and practicality and reasonableness. Just as its advocates had hoped, the regional reform nurtured 'a new way of doing politics'" (1993, 38). In particular, the establishment of the regional governments with authority over a broad array of issues had led some changes in "elite political culture" (Putnam, 1993, 28). Before the reforms, Italian politics had been polarized and ideological. "A conception of politics and social relations as essentially zero-sum, revolving about conflicts that were ultimately irreconcilable" was the dominant behavior of the political elite. They approached political issues in terms of "ultimate goals" with "theoretical and utopian" overtones (Putnam, 1993, 34). This traditional political culture started to decline after the reforms:

the accumulation of evidence is overwhelming: The first two decades of the regional experiment witnessed a dramatic change in political climate and culture, a trend away from ideological conflict toward collaboration, from extremis toward moderation, from dogmatism toward tolerance, from abstract doctrine toward practical management, from interest articulation toward interest aggregation, from radical social reform toward 'good government'. (Putnam, 1993, 6)

Yet, in terms of governmental performance the north and the south had different results: almost in all the northern regions citizens were satisfied by governmental performance, whereas the southern governments had not realized this result (Putnam, 1993, 54). Some of the regional governments were consistently more successful than others in spite of the existence of "identical structures and equivalent legal and financial resources" (Putnam, 1993, 82). The northern governments as a group were more successful than the southern ones.

In particular there were differences in two points between the regions: First, there were different types of participation in different regions. Second, some regions had social capital, whereas others had not. Both the north and the south had participatory political life, yet "it is not so much the quantity of participation as the quality that differs between them. The character of participation varies because the nature of politics is quite different in the two areas." In some regions politics refers to "collective deliberation on public issues", whereas in some other regions it refers to hierarchically organized activity that narrowly focused on personal gain (Putnam, 1993, 96). In the former regions, individuals are policy-oriented in their political conduct and try to influence political outcome, whereas in the latter regions individuals seek private interest via "patron-client

networks". In other words, the former individuals see politics as a medium of reaching decisions among opposing groups, while the latter groups see politics as a means for personal gain without any regard to public life. The first group has more information about policy issues than the latter group; they try to obtain information about political issues (Putnam, 1993, 97). "Authority relations in these regions mirror authority relations in the wider social setting" (Putnam, 1993, 101). In some regions, political leaders had less sympathy for political equality than politicians in other regions. Rather than political participation, leaders in the former regions value leadership and elitism. They have skepticism about "the wisdom of the ordinary citizen" (Putnam, 1993, 102). And, citizens of these regions feel "exploited, alienated, and powerless" (Putnam, 1993, 109).

Expectation of fairness in interpersonal relations shows a stark difference between different regions: In some regions, political corruption is the highest and citizens appeal to the police or the legal force as the only available source "to solve the fundamental Hobbesian dilemma of public order, for they lack the horizontal bonds of collective reciprocity that work more efficiently in the civic regions. In the absence of solidarity and self-discipline, hierarchy and force provide the only alternative to anarchy" (Putnam, 1993, 112). In other regions

citizens have greater confidence and trust in their fellow citizens (Putnam, 1993, 111).

According to Putnam, these differences among regions reveal a deeper difference:

These remarkably consistent differences go to the heart of the distinction between civic and uncivic communities. Collective life in civic regions is eased by the expectation that others will probably follow the rules. Knowing that others will, you are likely to go along, too, thus fulfilling their expectations. In the less civic regions nearly everyone expects everyone else to violate the rules. It seems foolish to obey the traffic laws or the tax code or the welfare rules, if you expect everyone else to cheat. (1993, 111)

He also argues that citizens in civic regions are more satisfied with their political life and "happier with life in general" than those in less civic regions: "Happiness is living in a civic region". Individual happiness is closely related to the type of one's community (1993, 113-4).

Putnam evaluates socioeconomic modernization to account for the differences. This model sees effective government as a product of the "social and economic transformation" of society; economic prosperity, education of citizens, and formation of the middle-class are preconditions of a well-functioning democratic system. When the reforms were introduced the north was more modernized than the south. This approach, argues Putnam, explains the differences between advanced northern regions and underdeveloped southern ones. Yet, it cannot explain the

differences within each region; in addition to the differences between the north and the south, there were intra-regional differences in terms of governmental performance. In both regions some less developed regions were more effectively governed. Putnam's conclusion is that "wealth and economic development cannot be the entire story" (1993, 86). According to Putnam, the relation observed between socioeconomic development and effective governance disappears when civic community is taken into account as an independent variable: "economically advanced regions appear to have more successful regional governments merely because they happen to be more civic" (1993, 98-9).

As a result, Putnam argues that the existence of social capital creates "a new way of doing politics" by creating certain qualities among political agents. In other words, certain qualities are necessary in political life to deal more effectively with the collective action problem. As we have seen in this chapter, these qualities are tolerance to one's opponents, compromise in decision making, a pragmatic approach to political issues, public spiritedness in the sense that one sees social order as a common good. In short, Putnam advocates moderation in political life.

Putnam advocates these virtues by relying on two assumptions: The complexity of political questions and existence

of some sort of consensus on liberal system among different groups. According to Putnam, in political conflicts, "one should avoid extreme positions because the proper solution usually lies in the middle" (1993, 33). Recognition of the complexity of political questions necessarily leads one to seek compromise with his opponents. It is assumed that, each group can provide some insight for political problems. As a result, moderation appears to be primary virtue social capital creates in society in Putnam.

Putnam considers ideological conflict as another factor that leads to destructive conflict in political life. Ideological principles lead individuals to have uncompromising positions in conflict, for they think that they represent the truth. They see compromise as "betrayal of one's position" (1993, 33).

Putnam's claim that social capital leads to the development of "a new way of doing politics" rests on an unstated assumption; parties or groups agree, at least on a minimal basis, on the fundamentals of the system. In other words, individuals must have some sort of agreement on the legitimacy of liberalism as their political system or accept liberalism as providing "the rules of the game" in politics. Otherwise, people would have conflict on the fundamentals of the system. In some regions of Italy, according to Putnam, politicians had utopian

visions with messianic expectations. This refers to conflict on the fundamentals of the system. The role of social capital is limited in such fundamental issues. That's why individuals must have some agreement on the fundamental tenets of the system to be able to utilize social capital.

2.8 CONCLUSION

For Putnam, the transformation of individuals into better citizens is the function of social capital. Social capital activates and utilizes "moral sources" of society. Although social capital endorses enlightened interest in general, its function is not limited to this. Rather, the development of a moral sense or a sense of right and wrong is primary character of social capital, for enlightened interest requires one to defect when his interest is in conflict with public good, given that he could avoid punishment. That's why social capital can create a tendency to cooperate in individuals which can override self-interest.

3.0 HUME'S MORAL THEORY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

As we have seen in chapter two, Putnam thinks that in order to overcome the free-rider problem and achieve efficient cooperation in modern society we have to have both the state and a virtuous body of citizenry. Putnam's works on social capital have reintroduced one of the classical questions of normative political theory into contemporary political discussions: "The nature of citizenship and the education suited to its realization have traditionally figured among the basic questions of normative political theory" (Callan 71). Hume is one of those philosophers who see a close link between the efficient response of society to the collective action problem and the character of citizens.

In this chapter, I introduce and analyze Hume's moral theory to show two things: First, there is a close link between Hume's theory of justice and moral theory in the sense that Hume considers both institutions and a virtuous body of citizenry as

necessary to overcome the free-rider problem and thus achieve efficient cooperation in society. Second, Hume's moral theory advocates a set of virtues, skills, and understanding that are strikingly similar to Putnam's social capital, both in their essentially social character and the role they play in respect to the collective action problem in society. In other words, Hume's moral theory represents an early liberal theory of social capital. While we can appreciate the value of Hume's moral theory by using Putnam's idea of social capital, on the one hand, we can also provide some further plausibility to show that Putnam's virtues are liberal in essence rather than republican, on the other.

The plan of this chapter is as follows: First, I analyze how Humean agents whose primary motive for cooperation is self-interest come, in time, to see cooperation as a moral duty. Hume presents two different principles to explain this transition: First, the sympathy principle in the *Treatise*; second, fellow-feeling or sense of humanity in the second *Enquiry*. These two principles are used to explain the initial development of a moral sense in society.

Then, I present how Hume thinks historically human society morally develops. Hume's moral theory is an historical one which assumes that human race develops a shared moral sense as a result of many different factors such as the practice of

cooperation, education and training, and the overall development of human society. I argue that the process of the development of a common moral sense is also the process of the development of a virtuous body of citizenry or the development of social capital in Hume.

Then, I analyze how Hume thinks that the improvement of morality would facilitate social cooperation in society. In particular, I argue that "the sensible knave" represents the logic of collective action for Hume. As a response to "the sensible knave", Hume relies on a particular form of individual conduct that develops as a result of moral improvement and violates the logic of collective action.

Finally, I compare Hume's moral theory with Putnam's theory of social capital to show the similarities in several respects: First, I argue that Hume's moral theory also relies on social connectedness or sociability at its most basic level among individuals. Second, both assume that individuals can be better citizens as a result of moral improvement. Both theorists think the self-interested individual could develop a disposition to cooperate, which violates the logic of collective action. For both theorists, the efficiency of social cooperation depends on the possibility and realization of this assumption. Third, the particular virtues, skills, and understanding Hume advocates for moral improvement are similar in character and function in

respect to social cooperation to Putnam's virtues, skills, and understanding.

3.2 HUME'S NOTION OF MORALITY

According to Hume, morality as an objective set of rules to regulate interpersonal relations is not an innate idea inherent in human nature or in the essence of nature. And such moral rules cannot be discovered by reason (T 294). Rather, Hume presents an historical account of the development of morality as an objective set of rules. In general, he thinks that moral principles develop in parallel with the development of human society. This does not mean, however, that the Humean agent is an amoral being in his savage state.

According to Hume, "the chief spring or actuating principle of the human mind is pleasure or pain" and "moral distinctions depend entirely on certain peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure, and that whatever mental quality in ourselves or others gives us satisfaction, by the survey or reflection, is of course virtuous; as every thing of this nature, that gives uneasiness, is vicious" (T 367). Hume's understanding of morality is sentiment oriented and the source of moral

distinctions is neither education nor abstract reasoning. Rather, he asserts that human nature is the source of moral feeling and judgment: "The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains that morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of appropriation; and vice the contrary" (En 127).

As presented in the first chapter, the Humean individual in a pre-just society is not an amoral agent. He has a moral sense, yet at this savage stage morality follows one's natural tendencies of judgment and passions. Individual is benevolent, yet his benevolence is limited to his family and friends. Hume sees the moral sense at this stage as uncultivated and natural. This natural morality does not provide a set of objective rules among individuals to regulate their interpersonal relations in an impartial manner. That is why Hume considers it an obstacle to enforce the natural partiality of humans before the development of the objective or impartial rules of justice. Rather than to prevent or regulate natural selfish tendencies of individual, it endorses and justifies them at the pre-just stage. As Taylor puts it "the natural operations of both sympathy and our uncultivated evaluative attitudes reinforce partiality in a way that makes it difficult for people to

recognize that others not of their immediate circle have similar interest" (11).

The development of a common moral sense in society depends on the development of human society in general and starts with the development of the rules of justice in particular. It is a product of many different forces associated with the process of the development of civilization. In Hume, the development of a common moral sense among people has two stages: the first stage refers to the initial development of such morality, which stems from certain features of human nature. Hume presents two different principles to explain this initial stage; In the *Treatise* he talks about the principle of sympathy. In the second *Enquiry*, he talks about the principle of humanity. The second stage refers to the development of human society in general.

In the *Treatise*, Hume asserts that although a common moral sense is not an innate idea in human nature or in the essence of nature, certain features of human nature make men receptive to moral improvement; in particular the principle of sympathy and our natural tendency to generalize or formulate general principles based on limited experience and observation are two relevant features of human nature that lead to the initial improvement of morality for Hume.

According to Hume, an impartial moral sense starts to develop after the establishment of the rules of justice. He asks

"why we annex the idea of virtue to justice and of vice to injustice?", even though the origin of justice is self-interest (T 320). According to Taylor, Hume's "real interest in his account of the establishment of justice lies in his further explanation of how those conventions transform our moral psychology" (5).

For Hume, at the beginning individuals comply with the rules of justice to promote their interest:

They are at first mov'd only by regard to interest; and this motive, on the first formation of society, is sufficiently strong and forcible". As we saw in chapter one, as society becomes larger over time, individuals fail to comply with the rules due to their shortsightedness. (T 320)

Yet even though individuals prefer their immediate interest, and thus breach the rules, they differentiate an unjust act from a just one and feel an uneasiness to see the violation of the rules by others. The reason for this paradoxical situation, according to Hume, is that when individuals' interest is not involved in such a case, they observe a violation from an impartial position: When their interest is not involved they are not "either blinded by passion, or byass'd by any contrary temptation" (T 320). They are in a position to recognize objectively a breach of the rules and its destructive impact on social order. They observe that an injustice was done to an individual. Since their interest is not involved, that is

promoted or prevented; they are able to see the unjust act from an objective position. Thus, they become impartial observers or "spectators" in Hume's term. Besides this impartial observation, they also feel an uneasiness to see that an injustice is done to someone. It displeases them. They feel the uneasiness of the individual to whom injustice is done. Why do they feel uneasiness even though the injustice is not done to them and their interest is not involved? According to Hume, people feel the same uneasiness even when they read about such cases in history also. This is an awkward situation indeed.

The second factor, the feeling of uneasiness, introduces a moral sense to our objective observation: "We partake of their uneasiness by sympathy; and as every thing, which gives uneasiness in human actions, upon the general survey, is call'd vice" (T 320). Thus, he explains why self-interested individual feels this uneasiness by his principle of sympathy. Sympathy principle refers to a psychological process: when we observe an unjust or just act done to someone, we feel or sense its negative or positive impact on the relevant person. Although we do not experience the impact as intensively as that person does still we have a sense of the impact on that person. This process works also in our feeling and judgment of beauty. For example, when we see a beautiful house we feel a sort of satisfaction knowing that it pleases its owner:

[T]he conveniency of a house, the fertility of a field, the strength of a horse, the capacity, security, and swift-sailing of a vessel, form the principal beauty of these several objects. Here the object, which is denominated beautiful, pleases only by its tendency to produce a certain effect. That effect is the pleasure or advantage of some other person. Now the pleasure of a stranger, for whom we have no friendship, pleases us only by sympathy. (T 368)

According to Hume, the very same principle produces a feeling of satisfaction when we observe a virtuous quality in others: "The same principle produces, in many instances, our sentiments of morals, as well as those of beauty" (T 369). For Hume, this sympathy principle is a part of human nature: "The minds of all men are similar in their feelings and operations; nor can anyone be actuated by any affection, of which all others are not, in some degree, susceptible" (T 368). Thus, the impartial observer has a pleasing sentiment in observing that others comply with the rules of justice due to sympathy with the relevant individuals on whom just act has impact. "This principle is not to be confused with the sentiments of compassion, which is merely one of its products. The principle is the one that enables us to participate in the emotional life, and the pleasures and pains, of others" (Penelhum 134). Thus, our impartial judgment is accompanied by our feelings: "Each of us is able, through sympathy, to be conscious of the unpleasant

results of unjust actions for those who suffer from them" (Penelhum 136).

However, the impartial observer fails to feel uneasiness when he himself breaches the rules. It is in time that the impartial observer comes to see his own unjust act as vice and feel dissatisfaction about it:

And tho' this sense, in the present case, be deriv'd only from contemplating the actions of others, yet we fail not to extend it even to our own actions. The general rule reaches beyond those instances, from which it arose; while at the same time we naturally sympathize with others in the sentiments they entertain of us. (T 320)

Our natural tendency to generalize refers to a particular quality of mind. According to Hume, the human mind has a natural tendency to formulate general rules applicable to similar cases based on limited experience and observation. Due to this tendency, individuals extend the notion of just and unjust to their own conduct once they make such judgments about others' behavior. As a result of the practice of the convention, "we both redirect natural motivational propensities (interest and partiality) and extend natural evaluative sentiments beyond their original narrow bounds", although the practice of the rules was at first adopted for "prudential reasons" (Taylor 9, 24). Hume defines this process of the development of a moral sense as the natural "progress of the sentiments" (T 321).

In the second *Enquiry*, Hume explains this initial development of morality by another principle, the principle of humanity. Indeed Hume uses sympathy interchangeably with humanity and he also refers to the same feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction we have when we observe a virtuous or vicious act. He asserts that that same feeling operates in our approbation of beautiful things, such as houses or animals. He defines the principle of humanity as follows: "All mankind so far resemble the good principle, that, where interest or revenge or envy perverts not our disposition, we are always inclined, from our natural philanthropy, to give the preference to the happiness of society, and consequently to virtue above its opposite" (En 62). Hume thinks that the source of moral feeling and judgment is inherent in our nature.

In regard to extending moral judgment to one's own conduct, Hume endorses increase of interpersonal relations in society. He argues that this original moral feeling needs to be corrected in such a way that it overcomes individual natural partiality. He thinks that "the more we converse with mankind, and the greater social intercourse we maintain, the more shall we be familiarized to these general preferences and distinctions" (En 63), and we would form "some general unalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of characters and manners" (En 64). Social life seems to be the medium in which individuals

recognize, in time, what sort of rules they need to have to perpetuate society. In a sense, increase of interpersonal relations refers to the social-moral transformation of self-interested agents in a way that they are in a better condition to perpetuate society.

Besides this natural progress of morality, Hume presents some other factors that promote further development of morality historically. These factors are politicians, parents, one's regard for his own integrity and character, and the general development of human society on every front.

3.3 EDUCATION, TRAINING AND INTEGRITY

According to Hume "the artifice of politicians", "private education", and "the interest of our reputation" strengthen individual morality.

Politicians, by public praise of virtue and blame of vice, and role-modeling could "produce esteem for justice and an abhorrence of injustice" (T 321). Yet Hume cautions that the effect of politicians should not be exaggerated; "The utmost politicians can perform, is, to extend the natural sentiment beyond their original bounds; but still nature must furnish the

materials, and give us some notion of moral distinction" (T 321).

Private education and training refer to education and instruction in the family. Parents observe that it is to the advantage of their offspring to follow the rules of justice in promoting their own interest. They would be useful both to themselves and to others if they have a moral sense. Parents teach their children that virtue is "worthy and honorable" and vice is "base and infamous". Indeed, Hume argues that even in the pre-just state parents teach some rules to their offspring to regulate their relations with each other in the family. And he sees this education as inculcating a sense of rule-following in interpersonal relations and relates it to the development of the rules of justice (T 312).

The idea of reputation, argues Hume, strengthens the moral sense. Once individuals see the unjust act as vice and the just act as virtue, one's concern to his reputation for honesty becomes a significant motive that supports the rules of justice in society (T 321).

There is nothing which touches us more nearly than our reputation, and nothing on which our reputation more depends than our conduct, with relation to the property of others. For this reason, every one, who has any regard to his character, or who intends to live on good terms with mankind, must fix an inviolable law to himself, never, by any temptation, to be induc'd to violate those principles, which are essential to a man of probity and honour. (T 321)

3.4 HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF MORALITY

Hume also sees a close and causal link between moral improvement and the development of civilization in general. In particular, the rule of law (peace and order) and personal liberty, commerce, the arts and sciences, learning and study, and the rise of the modern city are causes of moral improvement.

The rule of law, as Danford puts it, is "the critical factor" which provides security for private property and personal liberty (122). A peaceful social order starts with the development of the rules of law. According to Hume, "Avarice, or the desire of gain, is a universal passion, which operates at all times, in all places, and upon all persons" (Es 113). Yet in a peaceful environment, it exerts its power best and follows its natural course: "From Law arises security; From security curiosity: And from curiosity knowledge. The latter steps of this progress may be more accidental; but the former are altogether necessary" (Es 118). Individuals seek their own interest to better their material conditions. Wealth is a product of the selfish economic activities of individuals. Individuals get acquainted with commodious living conditions. In Hume "the driving forces of human nature were self-love, a desire for action, and a natural desire to improve the material conditions of life" (Marshall 633). In the absence of personal

liberty, argues Hume, the result is poverty: "The poverty of common people is a natural, if not an infallible effect of absolute monarchy" (Es 265). Thus, Hume thinks that "if one takes people as they are, given law and liberty, the natural course of improvement towards civilization will lead to a commercial society in the absence of distorting factors (like slavery or superstition)" (Cohen 121). Their desire to obtain commodious living conditions is the crucial factor that further develops commerce: "In Hume's account of the early stages of economic development, the key phenomenon is ... a kind of expanding circle of consumer demand" (Davis 273). In such an environment, as Hundert puts it, "Engaged in the pursuit of their own interest, men better themselves materially and satisfy a desire for work and improvement common to the race" (42). The creativity of individuals is unleashed by economic activity; otherwise they produce just enough to live, which creates "indolence" (Brewer 80).

Yet, Hume believes that the beneficial impacts of commerce are not limited to material abundance and commodious living conditions it creates: He recognizes "the important social changes brought about by the rise of commerce" (Davis 289). Hume's interest in commerce has a philosophical dimension. As Schuler and Murray argue that "Hume was arguably the first great thinker to embrace commercial life as a point of philosophical

principle ... for Hume, commerce is a forceful cultivator of the human nature" (589).

Commerce creates the necessary material conditions for more equal socio-economic relations among individuals which, according to Hume, are "most suitable to human nature". The wealth must be widespread in society:

A too great disproportion among the citizens weakens any state. Every person, if possible, ought to enjoy the fruits of his labour, in a full possession of all the necessaries, and many of the conveniences of life. No one can doubt, but such an equality is most suitable to human nature, and diminishes much less from the happiness of the rich than to that of the poor. (Es 265)

The increase of wealth, argues Hume, frees traditionally oppressed groups such as farmers and workers and enlarges the middle-class which is "that middling rank of men, who are best and firmest basis of public liberty. They neither submit to slavery nor tyrannize over others. Rather they try to secure their property and support equal laws in society" (Es 277-78). Such individuals are more interested in their private interest, yet their conduct unintentionally serves the social order. Frey asserts that "pursuit of one's own advantage or happiness fortunately, not as a matter of benevolent motivation but as an unintended by-product of self-interested motivation, furthers the advantage or happiness of others" (286). Hume maintains that

middle-class' life activities and station in society provide the best position for them to acquire necessary skills, habits, and judgment for the perpetuation of order and promotion of the quality of social life in society:

These form the most numerous Rank of Men, that can be suppos'd susceptible of Philosophy; and therefore, all Discourses of Morality ought principally to be adress'd to them. The Great are too much immers'd in Pleasure; and the Poor too much occupy'd in providing for the Necessities of Life, to hearken to the calm Voice of Reason

... The middle Station is here justly recommended, as affording the fullest Security for Virtue; and ... it gives Opportunity for the most ample Exercise of it, and furnishes Employment for every good Quality, which we possibly be possest of ...

We may also remark of the middle Station of Life, that it is more favourable to the acquiring of Wisdom and Ability, as well as of Virtue, and that a Man so situated has a better Chance for attaining a Knowledge both of Men and Things, than those of a more elevated Station. He enters, with more Familiarity, into human Life: Every Thing appears in its natural Colours before him: He has more Leisure to form Observations; and has, beside, the Motive of Ambition to push him on in his Attainments; being certain, that he can never rise to any Distinction or Eminence in the World, without his own Industry ... the middle Station shou'd be the most favourable to the improving our natural Abilities. (Es 546-47)

Thus, Hume thinks that "both individual and sociopolitical interests are best served when a large portion of the members of a society are also property holders" (Venning 146).

Commerce awakens individuals' creativity, improves their judgment, and satisfies their natural appetite for work: "The

mind acquires new vigour; enlarges its powers and faculties; and by an assiduity in honest industry, both satisfies its natural appetites, and prevents the growth of unnatural ones, which commonly spring up, when nourished by ease and idleness" (Es 270). Hume maintains that once individual mind is awakened, it leads to improvement in other areas:

the minds of men, being once roused from their lethargy, and put into fermentation, turn themselves on all sides, and carry improvements into every art and science. Profound ignorance is totally banished, and men enjoy the privilege of rational creatures, to think as well as to act, to cultivate the pleasures of the mind as well as those of body. (Es 271)

Industry and commerce, thus, lead to improvement in arts and sciences as well as individual rationality. Improvement of individual rationality is a product of its application to commercial activities and arts and sciences. The improvement of judgment, argues Hume, is closely linked to social order: "Laws, order, police, discipline; these can never be carried to any degree of perfection, before human reason has refined itself by exercise, and by an application to the more vulgar arts, at least, of commerce and manufacture" (Es 279).

Livingston argues that Humean rationality in civilized society refers to the increase of "critical self-consciousness" of persons. Hume's notion of the philosopher who has the appropriate perspective to see both "men and the things in their

true colours" is, in a sense, democratized and made an attribute of ordinary, or rather of middle-class, persons by the rise of "critical self-consciousness":

Civilization, then, is a process whereby by the conventions of common life are raised to the level of critical self-consciousness. The difference between the barbarous man and the civilized man is not marked by a difference in political regimes, for any regime may be barbarous. The difference is a cognitive one. The barbarous man is lost in the conventions of common life; the civilized man has some critical understanding of them. The self-knowledge of the civilized man is identical to that of the philosopher since Hume holds that: 'philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life, methodized and corrected'. Philosophical understanding, for Hume, is a social act. The more civilized a people become, the more philosophical they become. (128)

Mechanical arts and commercial activities lead to improvement in more sophisticated and refined activities such as "the liberal" arts. This process of improvement starts in ruder activities and moves to more refined ones, whether intellectual, mechanical, and commercial activities or interpersonal relations. Hume believes that "Commercial life wrenches us out of what Marx unkindly calls 'rural idiocy' and habituates us to an enlarged, unbiased point of view" (Schuler and Murray 594). For Hume, material abundance is prerequisite to "intellectual and cultural refinements which distinguish a people of advanced civilization from those of more barbaric times and circumstances" (Venning 142).

Other advantages commerce creates are increase of "sociability", softening of tempers, refinement of interpersonal relations, and the rise of the modern commercial city.

The more these refined arts advance, the more sociable men become; nor is it possible, that, when enriched with science, and possessed of a fund of conversation, they should be contented to remain in solitude, or live with their fellow-citizens in that distant manner, which is peculiar to ignorant and barbarous nations. They flock into cities; love to receive and communicate knowledge; to show their wit or their breeding; their taste in conversation or living, in clothes and furniture. Curiosity allures the wise; vanity the foolish; and pleasure both. Particular clubs and societies are everywhere formed: Both sexes meet in an easy and sociable manner: and the tempers of men, as well as their behavior, refine apace. So that, beside the improvements which they receive from knowledge and the liberal arts, it is impossible but they must feel an increase of humanity, from the very habit of conversing together, and contributing to each other's pleasure and entertainment. Thus industry, knowledge, and humanity, are linked together by an indissoluble chain, and are found, from experience as well as reason, to be peculiar to the more polished, and, what are commonly denominated, the more luxurious ages. (Es 271)

According to Hume, activities associated with commerce have a transformative impact on individuals in many respects: Sociability develops, individual temper softens, fellow-feeling or sense of humanity increases, and individual rationality improves. In other words, individuals come to acquire certain qualities in a way that they are in a better condition both psychologically and rationally to live in peace and order with each others.

The modern commercial city arises as the site of civilized life as a result of the process ushered in by the rise of commerce and activities associated with commerce. The modern commercial city is the medium in which the middle-class appears and most of the population is above and beyond bare minimum living conditions. The middle-class rises as the backbone of every sort of creativity and productivity from economic to intellectual activities; individuals' taste for both material and literary goods as well as for philosophical understanding has improved; the place of rationality is larger now in individuals' lives compared to earlier stages, especially to the savage condition; and also individuals sociability as well as moral sense or humanity increases. The city represents the ideal place for Hume's civilized agent. As Robertson succinctly puts it "as wealth increases and extends through society, so, Hume suggested, more and more of its members would tend to acquire the material independence and moral attributes that, in civic terms, equip men to be citizens" (454).

Although the initial factor that unleashes the development of civilized life is the love of gain or avidity which is self-interested and directed to the betterment of one's own economic conditions, the end result, civilized life, has created an agent whose judgment and taste are improved and refined and whose sense of humanity and sociability are increased. Improvement of

judgment, rationality, refinement of taste, and increase of humanity or moral feeling and sociability, coupled with a more convenient and equal socio-economic situation, create a new structural environment for individuals in their relation with each other in society:

When the tempers of men are softened as well as their knowledge improved, this humanity appears still more conspicuous, and is the chief characteristics which distinguishes a civilized age from times of barbarity and ignorance. Factions are then less inveterate, revolutions less tragical, authority less severe, and seditions less frequent. (Es 274)

Hume maintains that the civilized society is in a better position to check the avidity of man which is the origin of the rules of justice as well as the driving force of development that ushered in the development of civilization: "Nor can any thing restrain or regulate the love of money, but a sense of honour, and virtue; which, if it be not nearly equal at all times, will naturally abound most in ages of knowledge and refinement" (Es 276).

The improvement of morality means, for Hume, the formation of certain virtues in individuals or a virtuous body of citizenry. Hume advocates a set of virtues that he thinks would develop as a result of this moral improvement. I present and analyze the Humean catalog of virtues in the next section.

3.5 HUMEAN VIRTUES

The subject of moral sense and judgment, argues Hume, is human character or quality of mind:

If any action be either virtuous or vicious, 'tis only as a sign of some quality or character. It must depend upon durable principles of the mind, which extend over the whole conduct, and enter into the personal character. Actions themselves, not proceeding from any constant principle ... are never consider'd in morality.(T 367)

Thus, Hume's moral theory takes individual personality or character as its subject.

In Hume, individuals have certain durable qualities which form their personality and determine their conduct in private and public life. For example, generosity as a quality makes one generous or industriousness makes one industrious. One's personality is composed of a set of many such qualities; one might be both lazy and smart or industrious and miserly. How one behaves depends on his qualities. A public spirited individual's approach to public issues would be different than that of selfish individuals.

According to Hume, a character or quality becomes a part of one's personality if it creates a disposition in that person. And this disposition or durable quality determines his conduct in society. According to McIntyre "the concept of character is

central to Hume's moral philosophy". It makes "some actions more probable" and serves "as the basis of our moral evaluations" (450). In Hume's usage every individual has a personality composed of his dispositions or durable qualities. Hume classifies such qualities as either virtuous or vicious. For example laziness is a vicious quality and moderation is a virtuous one. Whether an individual is a virtuous person thus depends on whether he has virtuous qualities as dispositions. One might perform a virtuous act without having that quality as a disposition in his personality: For example, compliance with the rules of justice is a virtuous act in Hume. Yet one can comply with the rules out of fear of legal punishment. This compliance is not a product of his disposition as a judicious person. "If any action be virtuous or vicious, 'tis only as a sign of some quality or character. It must depend upon durable principles of the mind, which extend over the whole conduct, and enter into personal character" (T 367). These qualities acquire the status of virtues or our approbation because of their tendency to the good of mankind (T 369).

How do such qualities become dispositions in individuals? Some qualities become durable principles or dispositions as a result of repetition, conscious choice, training, and education such as industriousness, moderation, and cleanliness. Some other qualities are natural to individuals such as parental affection

towards offspring, benevolence to our family and friends, and wit and intellectual capability. Individuals receive training and education in the family, school, and society that teach or imply how to behave in social life. This training and education is not limited to formal schooling; it involves every practice and learning that leads to the acquisition of such qualities. Repetition of qualities, in time, turns them into dispositions (Flage 374). For example, by repetition we can become an industrious person; industriousness becomes a disposition in our personality. Indeed, the socialization process is a process of disposition forming in individuals. We come to have certain dispositions via our familial training and education. Some other qualities are acquired more consciously; we deliberately choose to have moderation in our judgment and conduct due to personal experience. The same quality could be acquired unconsciously because of familial training. Natural qualities such as parental affection and benevolence to our friends are instinctual. These learned and natural qualities together form our personality. In this sense, personality formation is inevitable for every individual: every individual that lives in a society comes to have a personality.

In the *Treatise* Hume divides virtues into artificial and natural virtues. Artificial virtue develops as a result of social experience and observation; it is not an instinctive

quality of human nature such as compliance with the rules of justice. Natural virtue refers to those qualities that we approve instinctively such as benevolence (T 369). In the second *Enquiry* he divides virtues into four groups: Virtues useful to oneself, virtues agreeable to oneself, virtues useful to others, and virtues agreeable to others. Usefulness refers to the utility it creates and agreeableness refers to its pleasing quality without utility or material benefit either to oneself or others. Virtuous qualities are those "advance a man's fortune in the world [useful to oneself], render him a valuable member of society [useful to others], qualify him for the entertainment of company [agreeable to others], and increase his power of self-enjoyment [agreeable to himself]" (En 108). Hume argues that "Personal Merit consists of altogether in the possession of mental qualities, useful or agreeable to the person himself or to others" (En 108).

Whether a quality is virtuous or vicious is determined by the impartial observer's feelings about its impact on relevant persons. In other words, whether a quality is vicious or virtuous is not determined by the person who has that specific quality. For example, a free-rider can see cheating as useful and agreeable for him, for it advances his interest. Yet, if an impartial observer feels uneasiness because of the conduct of a free-rider due to its harmful impacts on the interest of those

to whom injustice is done, it is a vice. "Virtues are 'character' or character traits that are welcomed from the special point of view that we take when we make moral judgments" (Baier 193).

Qualities useful to oneself are those that "advance a man's fortune in the world"; that is, "their merit consists in their tendency to serve the person, possessed of them, without any magnificent claim to public and social desert" (En 78-9). Hume mentions following qualities as useful to oneself: discretion, honesty, fidelity, truth, caution, enterprise, industry, assiduity, frugality, economy, good sense, prudence, discernment, temperance, sobriety, patience, constancy, perseverance, forethought, considerateness, secrecy, order, insuniation, address, presence of mind, quickness of conception, and facility of expression. These and "a thousand more of the same kind...tend only to the utility of their possessor, without any reference to us, or to the community" (En 78-9). These qualities are necessary for success and happiness in private life. Absence of them would make one incapacitated for "business and action" and lead to "continues error and misconduct in life!" (En 76).

Hume defines qualities agreeable to oneself as follows "there is another set of mental qualities, which, without any utility or any tendency to further good, either of the community

or of the possessor, diffuse a satisfaction on the beholders, and procure friendship and regard" (En 86-7). These qualities are greatness of mind or dignity of character, or a certain degree of generous pride or self-value, courage, philosophical tranquility, humanity, and clemency (En 90, 92).

Qualities useful to others are those virtues that provide benefit to others such as generosity and benevolence.

Qualities agreeable to others are the rules of good manners and politeness among individuals. They "render a man perfect good company" such as wit, ingenuity, cleanliness, modesty, decency, a proper regard to age, sex, and character, and station in the world. They regulate and soften or refine interpersonal relations by primarily checking one's pride. They are qualities of well-bred people according to Hume (En 99).

Moderation is the underlying theme of Hume's virtues as well as a virtue itself. Besides these qualities, he argues, one should not be "swayed by temper of any kind" (En 72). For example "a reasonable frugality" is a virtue, which prevents both avarice and prodigality. Or one should be both cautious and enterprising; excessive caution might kill enterprise or enterprise without caution would lead to disaster. Both would be vice rather than virtue. Thus a proper balance among virtuous qualities is virtue itself. (En 74). As Baier puts it, in Hume's notion of virtue,

Human happiness is the touchstone ... Consistently with this test, he includes in his catalogue of virtues all and only the qualities of head, heart, and expressive body that he believes we will agree do make a person a welcome fellow, whether in 'that narrow circle, in which any person moves' or in the 'greater society or confederacy of mankind'. (Baier 219)

Hume compares his catalog of virtues with Christian virtues and the classical-republican or military virtues to show that his catalog is more humane and fitted to the newly emerging commercial society. He argues that the Christian virtues serve no purpose or incapacitate man in the world. On the other hand, military virtues are violent and somewhat contrary to human nature (T 382-83). Humean virtues are designed for ordinary man in his daily life. They promote individual happiness and comfort or a commodious and cultivated life in this world rather than a pious life or heroism. A due pride rather than humility or business and enterprise rather than martial virtues are necessary for the ordinary citizen to have a commodious and cultivated as well as humane and socialized life. According to Solomon, Hume's virtues are "domesticated and democratized", fit for ordinary persons in their daily life and they are "within reach of ordinary persons" (130-36) rather than the privilege of the few.

3.6 HUMAN NATURE

Hume's moral theory is underlined by a developmental notion of human nature on which the development of a virtuous body of citizenry depends.

According to Miller, Hume discards two rival concepts of human nature: Hobbes' selfish human nature and the classical republican public-spirited human nature. Against these, Hume endorses a concept of human nature based on both self-interest and a moral sense. He rejects both "egoism as a hypothesis" and "pure altruism" about human motivations (Miller 106).

In "Of Self-love", Hume criticizes the selfish hypothesis which assumes that

... whatever affection one may feel, or imagine he feels for others, no passion is, or can be disinterested; that the most generous friendship, however sincere, is a modification of self-love; and that, even unknown to ourselves, we seek only our own gratification, while we appear the most deeply engaged in schemes for the liberty and happiness of mankind. (En 138)

Hume asserts that this hypothesis denies any disinterested or benevolent conduct either toward our closest friends or other people. He argues that this hypothesis is contrary to our observation and common feeling in our daily life: "To the most careless observer there appear to be such dispositions as benevolence and generosity; such affections as love, friendship,

compassion, gratitude" (En 140). He maintains that some other regarding passions can even override self-interest. "What interest can a fond mother have in view, who loses her health by assiduous attendance on her sick child, and afterwards languishes and dies of grief, when freed, by its death, from the slavery of the attendance?" Hume believes that "these and a thousand other instances are marks of a general benevolence in human nature, where no real interest binds us to the object" (En 143). According to Hume, in spite of endorsing the selfish hypothesis, Hobbes and Locke both "lived irreproachable lives" (En 138).

He maintains that the reason for endorsing the selfish hypothesis is "love of *simplicity* which has been the source of much false reasoning in philosophy" (En 141)¹¹. Contrary to this reductionist hypothesis, Hume offers to observe human conduct in actual life to determine the basic qualities of human nature.

... his view of human nature is empirical. Hume rejected the view that human beings had an essence, function, or purpose that could serve to define human excellence or virtue. But although there is no essence of human nature, there is human nature - regularities revealed through careful observation. It is history, not reason that reveals regularities of human nature in society. (McIntyre 458)

¹¹ According to Monroe, rational choice view of agent limits "our conceptualization of the human potential" in terms of altruistic conduct. He claims that many people had rescued Jews during the World War II, which endangered their own lives (9).

On the other hand, Hume also denies that individuals are capable, in a normal environment, of perfection in public-spiritedness. Although human nature contains benevolent and disinterested motives, these motives are limited in determining human conduct.

He sees each man as standing at the center of a web of social relationships, made up of family, friends, acquaintances, dependents, etc. and as proportioning his generosity to the strength of each tie ... being thus acquainted with the nature of man, we expect not any impossibilities from him (Miller 106)

Thus, Hume sees human nature as more complex than either the selfish or altruistic hypotheses assume. Neither of these approaches captures the complexity of human nature: One denies the generosity of human nature, while the other denigrates selfish sides.

Besides seeing both self-interest and other-regarding as features of human nature, Hume also sees human nature as capable of improvement. According to Cohen, "the capacity of transcending one's nature is indeed a part of human nature. The artifice does not create a new principle; it permits natural sympathy and passions to be realized, spread out, and liberated from primitive limits" (115). Hume's account of the convention's transformative impact as well as the development of civilization reveals that his notion of human nature is not a static one. Rather, depending on the current environment and the level of

development human nature has been transformed. The direction of this transformation is from original-primitive principles to cultivated-civilized principles:

In the sphere of civil relations, the room for change is great. As a person becomes civilized, his or her taste (or judgment) as to what is good or bad act in civil relations will improve" and "the historical context and the level of civilization reached by a society will condition the quality of people's morality.(Cohen 120)

Similarly, Gill compares Hume's notion of human nature with the selfish theories of Hobbes and Mandeville. According to Gill, selfish theories are underlined by "a static or originalist view of human nature", whereas Hume's notion is "a dynamic or progressive one". The former assumes that "the basic elements of human motivation are fixed. Experience and socialization can alter the focus or direction of the original human motives, but they cannot create a new kind of motive altogether. The ultimate driving motive forces of human conduct stay the same" (Gill, 99). On the other hand, the progressive view allows that "original motives can evolve into other motives of different kinds. Hume believes we can develop new motives, ones that were not part of our original endowment" (Gill, 100) such as our moral commitment to the rules of justice which develops after establishment of the convention and has nothing

to do with the origin of the convention. The motive that creates the convention is self-interest, but our regard to the convention is product of the practice of the convention and further development of our moral sense. Thus, as Ponko puts it, Hume believes "man's ability to develop a sense of societal and public interest" (52).

In civilized society, the primary qualities of Hume's moral agent are enlightened self-interest, impartial moral sense, sympathy, improved judgment, refined taste and emotions, sociability, and a civilized culture. Self-interest is neither ignored nor sacrificed in that moral agent. Hume starts with an uncultivated human nature and reaches a cultivated or civilized human nature. Once these qualities develop they are as decisive as self-interest in individual conduct. And they cannot be ignored in theorizing about individual conduct in society.

In institutional design, human nature is a static concept defined essentially as self-interested both in the pre-just state and the civilized stage. There is not any essential difference in human nature between these two qualitatively different situations. The crucial factor is to change the structural environment of individuals to change their behavior. As a result, institutional design ignores the possibility of improvement of individual morality. For Hume, this assumption is too simple to capture the complexity of motives in individual

conduct. This static concept limits our theorizing about individual conduct. As we will see in his response to the free-rider problem, Hume relies on his developmental notion of human nature.

3.7 INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCE AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT

The development of human nature has a significant impact on our preferences. As human nature develops, individual preference also develops; a shift of focus from material interest to non-material interest is evident in Hume's theory. In the savage condition, primarily material interest determines individual conduct in its relation to strangers. Individuals fight over scarce resources. The enlargement of the mind and the improvement of morality in parallel with the rise of a civilized society bring qualitative change in the individual's understanding of his interests; emphasis is on more and more non-material gains and practices such as conversation with friends, reading, maintaining and improving one's integrity, and even the pleasure of sight-seeing. As Hursthouse puts it, Hume believes that "we human beings can develop, through education and reflection, a second nature such that we take particular pleasure and pride in certain things, and come to regard certain

things worth pursuing and having, which relate to our fellow human beings as much as to our individual selves- a point that Hume shows every sign of endorsing" (70). Yet these moral agents do not choose poverty. Rather, the change in their preference relies on the rise of prosperity in society as its material condition. Individuals must be able to meet their basic material needs relatively easily. And beyond that they must reach a convenient level of living conditions. Some sort of economic security and abundance are necessary for this change in persons' preferences.

The institutional interpretation assumes that material interest would be, in general, the primary object of individual preference. Social and economic development does not lead to any essential difference in human nature and conduct. As we will see in the next section, when Hume responds to the sensible knave, he appeals to certain goods that are non-material, which relies on his developmental concept of human nature and the improvement of individual preferences.

3.8 MORAL THEORY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION

As we saw above, the process of the improvement of morality refers to the process of the development of moral motives in

self-interested agents. Hume assumes that both the efficiency of social cooperation and the quality of social life depend on this development. As we will see in this section, Hume thinks that even enlightened interest would not provide an adequate answer for the free-rider problem. That's why his final response is to endorse moral improvement to overcome this problem. Some scholars argue that Hume's moral theory cannot provide an adequate response to the free-rider problem. In other words, enlightened self-interest would discard Humean morality in the case of a conflict between self-interest and public good and choose to defect.

In this section, I criticize this argument by claiming that Hume's response to the free-rider provides a solution similar to Putnam's social capital in the sense that given that self-interested agents are transformed into better citizens, they choose not to defect when their self-interest and public good conflict. On the other hand, if individuals are not transformed, they would choose to defect in case of such a conflict between self-interest and public good. These two different groups resemble Putnam's civic and uncivic communities in the sense that the decisive factor is whether individuals are transformed into better citizens. I take Hume's sensible knave as representing those who are not transformed into better citizens, whose primary motive is narrow self-interest.

Hume describes "the sensible knave problem" as follows:

Treating vice with the greatest candour, and making it all possible concessions, we must acknowledge that there is not, in any instance, the smallest pretext for giving it the preference above virtue, with a view to self-interest; except, perhaps, in the case of justice, where a man, taking things in a certain light, may often seem to be a loser by his integrity. And though it is allowed that, without a regard to property, no society could subsist; yet according to the imperfect way in which human affairs are conducted, a sensible knave, in particular instances, may think that an act of iniquity or infidelity will make a considerable addition to his fortune, without causing any considerable breach in the social union and confederacy. The honesty is the best policy, may be a good general rule, but is liable to many exceptions; and he, it may perhaps be thought, conducts himself with most wisdom, who observes the general rule, and takes advantage of all exceptions. (En 122)

The sensible knave problem refers to the individual who takes advantage of opportunities to defect, given that he can get away with his defection, although in other instances he complies with the rules of society. The significant factor in the sensible knave problem is that he has no genuine moral concern about his conduct; rather his only concern is whether he can avoid punishment and sanction when he cheats. In that respect the sensible knave represents the logic of collective action. He would cheat if he can get away with it. His only motive is self-interest.

From the standpoint of rational choice theory, the sensible knave is not naturally an evil or bad individual. He represents

every single member of society, for it is assumed that all agents are self-interested by nature. Thus, we face a significant problem which could lead to endemic defection in especially prosperous large modern societies. Hume recognizes that both the size and the material conditions of a large commercial society provide ample opportunity for the sensible knave.

Hume confesses that even after improvement on every front, if one chooses to be a sensible knave there would not be a satisfactory answer for that individual:

I must confess that, if a man think that this reasoning much requires an answer, it would be a little difficult to find any which will to him appear satisfactory and convincing. If his heart rebel not against such pernicious maxims, if he feel no reluctance to the thoughts of villainy or baseness, he has indeed lost a considerable motive to virtue; and we may expect that this practice will be answerable to his speculation. (En 123)

Yet, legal punishment still is a possibility for the sensible knave and Hume argues that when he is caught, he would lose his reputation and be excluded from future cooperation.

While they purpose to cheat with moderation and secrecy, a tempting incident occurs, nature is frail, and they give into snare; whence they can never extricate themselves, without a total loss of reputation, and the forfeiture of all future trust and confidence with mankind. (En 123)

However, Hume also presents another sanction which is indeed denied by the sensible knave:

But in all ingenuous natures, the antipathy to treachery and roguery is too strong to be counterbalanced by any views of profit or pecuniary advantage. Inward peace of mind, consciousness of integrity, a satisfactory review of our own conduct; these are circumstances, very requisite to happiness, and will be cherished and cultivated by every honest man, who feels the importance of them. (En 123)

And Hume's conviction is that

But were they ever so secret and successful, the honest man, if he has any tincture of philosophy, or even common observation and reflection, will discover that they themselves are, in the end, the greatest dupes, and have sacrificed the invaluable enjoyment of a character, with themselves at least, for the acquisition of worthless toys and gewgaws. How little is requisite to supply the necessities of nature? And in a view to pleasure, what comparison between the unbought satisfaction of conversation, society, study, even health and the common beauties of nature, but above all the peaceful reflection on one's own conduct; what comparison, I say, between these and the feverish, empty amusements of luxury and expense? These natural pleasures, indeed are really without price; both because they are below all prices in their attainment, and above in their enjoyment. (En 124)

Thus, Hume's ultimate response to the sensible knave, as Gauthier argues, is to appeal to "the heart". According to Gauthier, Hume's politics lacks any moral foundation. Gauthier argues that Hume presents two different answers to the sensible knave problem. In the *Treatise*, Hume relies on enlightened self-interest which requires the individual to comply with his long

term interest. And even "as society increases, our shortsightedness leads us not to see the interest we have in maintaining social order, but that the real interest remains" (417). In the second *Enquiry*, on the other hand, maintains Gauthier, "Hume does not accuse the sensible knave of mistaking his interest. He confesses that" his answer based on enlightened self-interest is not satisfactory for the sensible knave and "appeals to the heart, to the 'consciousness of integrity ... cherished and cultivated by every honest man'" (417). Therefore, "the sensible knave's message is that human society ... lacks any moral foundation" (422).

R. G. Frey also presents a similar objection to Hume's solution to the sensible knave problem. Hume thinks that the sensible knave loses "a good deal to obtain very little" (284). Hume appeals to integrity of character and turns away from interest to convince the sensible knave in the *Enquiry*. Yet, "for the present appeal to work, Hume must make realistic the losses he envisages. After all, we all know people who break their promises or lie, yet have neither incurred nor produced anything like the losses Hume cites" (Frey 284). Therefore, "unless it is true that our own advantage or happiness coincides with the advantage or happiness of others, we certainly have a motive to behave as a sensible knave would (Frey 286). According to Frey, the sensible knave is not "a special breed of man",

rather he is someone who finds himself in a situation in which his desire for his own interest conflicts with the interest of others. "And what is true of him is true of each of us" (284).

Both Gauthier and Frey consider Hume's appeal to a non-material concept of integrity as a failure. The individual is a self-interested agent and in case of conflict between his interest and social order, he chooses his interest. In other words, the notion of self-interested human nature leaves no room for Humean moral language in such a conflict. Gauthier and Frey's critiques deny that moral improvement is a realistic assumption about individual conduct. Yet, Hume's response depends on the possibility of this moral improvement. Gauthier and Frey simply assume that we must take individuals as selfish agents. This assumption represents, in Hume's terms, "love of simplicity" which, according to him, is a source of many philosophical errors. This assumption leads Gauthier and Frey necessarily to reach an unwarranted general conclusion about individual conduct. They think this assumption represents every individual's conduct. Yet as we will see below, Hume discards this generalization about individual conduct. Rather, he thinks that even though individuals are self-interested by nature, they also are capable of developing a moral sense. The decisive factor, for Hume, then is not that individuals are self-

interested by nature but whether such self-interested agents can improve morally. As Stilz asserts

self-interest is the driving force behind civilization and progress in Hume's account. But such civilization could not exist for long if naked self-interest was allowed and acknowledged as its sole foundation, because there would be no obligation to abide by the rules of this wider society as soon as they are at odds with individual self-interest or the interest of our smaller group. (25)

As Whelan argues, Hume's final response to the free-rider problem depends on the moral education of citizens. According to Whelan, Hume's theory of justice fails precisely because of the human nature that underlies it and leads to its growth: "The thesis of self-interest seems to fail in the first place, then, on a psychological ground internal to Hume's science of nature. Reason, or simply the ability to engage systematically in Hume's restricted conception of correct reasoning, is not counted on" (264). Therefore, "a theory of moral education, it emerges, is essential to Hume's doctrine of the artificial virtues and thus to his understanding of political life, although he does not develop such a theory quite as fully as he does the alternative doctrines of sympathy and self-interest" (Whelan 275).

Hume's notion of the development of moral sentiment from a primitive or uncultivated natural moral sentiment to an impartial and cultivated one refers to the moral education of people. This process, indeed, happens at two different levels:

Social-historical and personal-individual. Hume's account of moral progress in his works is primarily about the social-historical level which refers to the transformation of society from the primitive stage to the civilized stage. The personal-individual level refers to the moral education of individuals from childhood in a family to a moral being in social life. This second level, indeed, reveals the necessity of moral education of every single individual to achieve the moral perspective. The first level provides the environment in which the second process becomes a possibility for every individual. These two processes form the ground on which Hume envisions his catalog of virtues, impartial moral perspective as well as his moral agent. He believes that in spite of his optimism, degeneration of people also is a possibility. In other words, "training of this nature is essential to insure the continuation of the practice of justice" (Ponko 55). Family, schools, and politicians should educate people. Every child in a sense lives the process at the private level that human society historically has lived. And whether one chooses to be a free-rider or not depends on this education and training. Also, this moral education would determine whether Hume's appeal to moral sense would work in society against the sensible knave problem.

Hume's response to the sensible knave contains very significant normative assertions. Before presenting them, we

should notice that the sensible knave's notion of interest is essentially material. He seeks "luxury and expense" at the cost of his integrity. I think Hume's assertion about the sensible knave's notion of interest as essentially material captures the general notion of interest that game theory or institutional design holds about the individual. Hume presents almost exclusively non-material activities as higher or nobler or more humane interests one should pursue. These are "inward peace of mind, consciousness of integrity, the invaluable enjoyment of a character, conversation, society, study, even health and the common beauties of nature, but above all the peaceful reflection on one's own conduct" (En 124). In Hume's understanding these are goods and needs a civilized man should pursue in order to acquire them. Moreover they are more valuable than material goods. According to Miller, Hume "is more impressed by the political, social and intellectual results of commercial progress than by its material results" (180). Miller maintains that Hume does not regard "infinite desire as either rational or morally permissible" (174). And society, for Hume, is not "a series of market relations" (Miller 176). Although he recognizes "the desire for wealth and consumer goods" as a significant motive of human nature, he does not consider it "an ultimate desire" (Miller 170). He "clearly believes that the desire for society is intrinsic and omnipresent" (Miller 171). He expects

individuals to see society as more than an instrument or market place for their material gains and appeal to more and more non-material goods, such as refinement of their literary, intellectual, and moral taste.

In other words, Hume assumes that some sort of hierarchy of goods and interests can be constructed. In this classification of goods, he relies on the improvement of human nature in general as he presents its development in parallel with the development of society. At the savage stage, individuals' concerns are limited almost exclusively to providing bare minimum living conditions. Yet in civilized society, individual rationality, moral sense, and taste improve. Besides improvement of his faculties, the wealth created by commerce provides a more commodious living condition for the individual. Thus, the individual in such an intellectual, moral, and material condition, Hume assumes, would choose higher goods. Those higher goods reflect the needs for the nobler and more humane aspects of human nature.

Theoretically, it is possible to argue that the sensible knave is a typical of every member of society. Given that it is rational to defect for self-interested calculating agents, we expect them to defect when they have the opportunity. Yet Hume tends to think that the sensible knave is not typical of every member of society. Rather, the sensible knave is someone whose

moral sense is not improved as assumed by Hume. He is untouched by the improvements made possible by the development of civilization; he is still primarily interested in material gains. In his response to the sensible knave Hume appeals to aspirations of civilized-moral agents whose motive is different than that of the sensible knave.

The consumption of these non-material goods by an individual depends on their consumption by more and more individuals. In other words, the more individuals who value these goods, the more these goods would be available. These goods are not scarce in nature, unlike material goods, and consumption of them by one does not exclude others. The more they are consumed, the more they are available. For example, conversation or our concern for our integrity does not require others to have less of either. On the contrary, if more and more individuals are concerned with their character and integrity, a more appropriate moral environment will be created for individuals to obtain these goods. In other words, the underlying logic of this conduct is the same as the underlying logic of legal trust: the more selfish agents cooperate, the more strategic trust they have among themselves. In regard to non-material goods, the more people pursue them, the more moral trust among such individuals would appear. Yet, there is also a significant difference between legal trust and moral trust: In

the former, defection leads to defection. In the latter, defection of one agent would cause a different reaction in other agents given that they care about their integrity. They would think that those who defect indeed cheat themselves. As Martin puts it, "those who are secure in their sense of self-worth do not need constant reassurance of it from others" (386).

The institutional solution (legal trust) and the moral solution (moral trust) both face the very same problem. Legal punishment would not detect every single defection in society, yet social order would be maintained if there are enough people who comply with the rules (Whelan 266). Similarly, moral trust would persist in society if enough people care about their character.

According to Baier, Hume's response to the sensible knave in the second Enquiry is "a perfectly satisfactory reply", yet not for the sensible knave but for "the virtuous dues-paying member of the party of humankind" (430). There are two different perspectives from which we could evaluate the sensible knave problem: the sensible knave's perspective which values "material gains" over integrity of character and "the sensible non-knave" perspective which "dismisses the material rewards of judicious injustice as 'worthless toys and gewgaws'". In other words, "there is not Archimedean 'rational point of view' from which judgment could be made between the knave's version and the

non-knave's version of self-interest. So Hume's reply [in the Enquiry] to the sensible knave is exactly what it should be" (Baier 431).

3.9 HUME'S MORAL THEORY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

As we have seen in chapter two, Putnam's social capital leads to the development of a particular form of individual conduct which violates the logic of collective action. Indeed, the development of this conduct is the aim of social capital theory. Otherwise we are left with self-interest which, whether enlightened or instinctive, cannot be the source of efficient social cooperation in a large modern society. In this section, I argue that the thrust of Hume's moral theory is the development of a cooperative tendency in individuals. Hume, as we have seen earlier, recognizes that enlightened interest cannot be the source of efficient cooperation in society. And the final response to the free rider depends on the transformation of individuals into better citizens. Otherwise we would have an "uncivic community" in Putnam's terms.

As we have seen before, Putnam's social capital relies on social connectedness at its most basic level. For Hume, also, social connectedness is an intrinsic value for humans. He argues

that "it is impossible but they must feel an encrease of humanity, from the very habit of conversing together, and contributing to each other's pleasure and entertainment" (Es 271). Thus, togetherness of individuals, for Hume, like Putnam, has a transformative impact on individuals. A feeling of humanity is the principle by which Hume, as we have seen, explains the initial development of morality in society.

Also, Hume's explanation of the development of general moral rules by using increasing sociability indicates that social connectedness or sociability leads to the development of generalized norms among individuals. He explains this development as follows: "the more we converse with mankind, and the greater social intercourse we maintain, the more we be familiarized to these general preferences and distinctions" (En 63). "General preferences and distinctions" refers to the development of generalized reciprocity and norms; individuals extend the notion of just and unjust or virtue and vice to their own conduct as well as to others' conduct.

For Putnam, networks provide the medium in which individuals come together. Although Hume does not talk about associations, he talks about "clubs and societies" formed by people who "flock into cities" as a result of the development of commercial society. These "clubs and societies" provide the medium for individuals to come together. According to Hume, "the

tempers of men, as well as their behavior, refine apace" (Es 271) in these clubs and societies.

Humean clubs and societies are not political; rather they are social and cultural. In order to have a transformative impact, associations do not have to be political as we saw in Putnam. Similarly, Hume's associations perform the same function without being political.

The transformation of selfish agents into better citizens does not require explicitly political virtues for Putnam. Rather, his virtues are essentially social ones. For Hume also, virtues or morals and manners are essentially social. Indeed, Hume was one of the theorists who advocate civility, politeness, sociability, refinement of taste and judgment, and improvement of morality against the political virtues of the classical republicans. The development of a virtuous body of citizenry does not require either political or military virtues.

Humean virtues could be classified in terms of their relevance to public life. Qualities useful to oneself and qualities agreeable to oneself and others are essentially private qualities and do not have a direct impact on political life. They are not typically political virtues in the sense that they do not direct one's political conduct. Rather, they promote one's private interest and refine relations with others in the larger social life. On the other hand, qualities useful to

others have a mixed character; some promote public order and are typically political, such as compliance with the rules of justice. Others, such as benevolence or generosity, are not necessarily political qualities though they promote others' interest. The primary quality of Humean virtues is their social character.

However, these four categories of virtues, together, have another impact; they create a virtuous moral agent and this has significant implications for public life in general and political life in particular. In other words, the aim of Humean virtues is to form virtuous agent who has a different mode of thought and conduct in public life. Specifically, he has different concerns than that agent we see in institutional design. Theorizing with this moral agent about politics in particular and collective action in general would yield different results than theorizing with selfish agents. He would have different manners and reasoning as well as different priorities, incentives and preferences. The selfish agent would see social life as instrumental without any intrinsic value to his private interest. For the moral agent on the other hand, social life has an intrinsic value beyond its instrumental value. It certainly has an instrumental value that regulates and promotes the selfish side of an individual, yet beyond that society is the medium in which the individual realizes his

higher or intimately humane nature. For example, society provides friendship, conversation, and learning. For Hume these represent the nobler sides of a human being. A fully developed human nature is what Hume's moral theory advocates. Society is the medium in which the individual achieves happiness. Individual well-being includes material prosperity, yet it does not see seeking ever increasing amounts of material wealth as a part of well-being (Miller, 166). Hume does not require one to denounce material interest or wealth. Rather, he advocates the development or cultivation of human nature.

The significance of the moral agent, for Hume, is that he would not rely on legal force to perform his duty in society. Indeed, his understanding of a citizen's duty is much broader than defined by institutional design. It involves manners and morals as one's duty in addition to legal obligations. Moral concern would guide his conduct in both private and public life. Such agents would form a trust that would be moral in essence. Unlike strategic trust created by the state, moral trust does not require legal force. Every moral agent's regard for his character would be his guide in his conduct. A moral agent's regard for his character is inward-looking; it is not self-interest-oriented. Rather one's own judgment about him comes into play here. In institutional design, the reputation for trust would serve one's interest even if one were indeed not

honest at all, given that he has such a reputation. In Hume's moral theory, one does not need judges external to him; he would be his own judge if he has such a regard for his character. It is not about acquiring a reputation for honesty, but being really honest. And such an agent cannot defect and consider himself honest.

Hume's catalog of virtues allows us to think that a virtuous society is an alternative to a simply institutionalist one. Indeed, Hume's entire argument about the development of civilization is to explain "progress of the sentiments" (T 321). The "progress of the sentiments" is the story of an uncultivated selfish individual's transformation into a moral agent, and Hume's lesson is that civilized societies must be working with that moral agent, not with the one that leads to development of the rules of justice. Yet, the contemporary assumption widely held by rational choice theory does the opposite; it still sees agents as essentially amoral or selfish. Although this assumption is the safest assumption in dealing with the collective action problem, it ignores too much about human nature. The possibility of such moral improvement with its implication for social cooperation is significant. Putnam's idea of social capital can provide an outlet that allows us to go beyond that restricting assumption. Putnam observes that we do not find defection by individuals in common everyday life as

often as game theory predicts. And he searches for the source of compliance of individuals with the rules. The result, argues Putnam, is the existence of a moral contract among agents produced by the existence of social capital. Hume makes the same assertion that we see many people practice those virtues in everyday life contrary to the selfish theory.

The final outcome of Humean morality, like Putnam's social capital, is the development of a cooperative tendency in individuals which violates the logic of collective action. Both Putnam and Hume make the observation that some people do not act as expected by the rational choice (selfish hypothesis) theory. Both explain this type of individual conduct by the development of a virtuous body of citizenry.

3.10 CONCLUSION

As we have seen in this chapter, Hume's solution to the collective action problem is similar to Putnam's social capital. Both theorists assert that the ultimate solution for efficient social cooperation depends on the development of particular individual conduct which violates the logic of collective action. Both make an observation about individual conduct in everyday life and claim that some people do not act as assumed

by rational choice or "selfish hypothesis". They explain this type of conduct by the improvement of individual judgment and morality.

Although Hume's notion of virtue is social in essence, its function is not limited to social life. Rather, he thinks that virtuous agents would have a different way of doing politics. I will analyze Hume's politics and the role virtue plays in it in the next chapter. Hume advocates a particular way of doing politics which is similar to Putnam's "new way of doing politics" made possible by social capital.

4.0 HUME'S POLITICS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

It is a widely held conviction in Humean literature that, for Hume, institutions and good laws are primary in securing peace and order rather than morality or a virtuous body of citizenry. Although this conviction can be supported by many remarks on the significance of good laws and institutions in Hume's works, it ignores too much of his theory on politics. It represents a selective reading of Hume's arguments on politics rather than a comprehensive reading. This conviction, I think, partly relies on Hume's rejection of the classical republican idea of virtue. The classical republican idea of politics considers institutions as well as a virtuous body of citizenry as essential for politics. Although Hume rejects the classical set of virtues as inhumane, this should not lead us to see Hume's politics as wholly untouched by any idea of virtue. Rather, Hume advocates a new set of virtues that he thinks will suit the needs of the modern era. In other words, two issues are confused in this

conviction which needs to be analyzed separately: the first is Hume's critique of the classical republican idea of virtue and the second is the relation between institutions and morals and manners. A comprehensive analysis of Hume's politics would reveal that Hume considers a virtuous body of citizenry as significant as institutions and good laws in politics.

In this chapter, I argue that Hume's politics has two fundamental components; institutions and virtues. Yet Humean virtues are different than those of the classical republicans. In the first section, I analyze Hume's critique of the republican idea of politics and virtue. This will clear the confusion that since Hume rejects the classical idea of virtue, his politics is untouched by morals and manners. In the second section, I criticize the institutionalist interpretation of Hume's politics as a reductionist reading of his theory which ignores too much of his arguments. In particular, Hume's notion of factions reveals the role virtue (manners and morals) plays in his politics. This critique is necessary to have a more accurate and balanced view of Hume's politics. It will also reveal that Hume's politics has significant similarities to Putnam's idea of "a new way of doing politics" made possible by the existence of social capital in society. In the third section, I analyze Hume's notion of factions as an example of "bad social capital". As we have seen in chapter two, Putnam's

social capital is commonly criticized as not discriminating between bad and good social capital. Hume's notion of factions provides some significant insights on bad social capital in respect to its sources and how to deal with it.

4.2 HUME'S CRITIQUE OF REPUBLICAN POLITICS

Hume presents a new vision or way of doing politics for a new era. The newly emerging commercial modern society provides the setting for which he formulates a new way of doing politics. Hume believes that the rise of commercial modern society has changed the fundamental structures and culture of traditional society in such a way that a regular and humane vision and practice of politics would become possible. (Manzer 492). The very same process, asserts Hume, would make the classical republican vision of politics obsolete. As Moore puts it "Hume's political science can best be understood as an elaborate response to the political science of the classical republicans" (810).

According to Robertson, classical republican politics assumes that the well-being of society depends on the existence of a constitution and public-spirited citizens in a particular social-economic setting. In other words, it focuses upon "the

institutional, moral and material conditions of free citizenship in a political community". The constitution provides the institutional framework in society. Moral condition refers to the existence of a public-spirited body of citizenry which depends on "the possession of material independence or autonomy". In this society, "only those - assumed to be few in number - in a position to satisfy their needs without making themselves dependent on others were capable of the requisite civic virtue. Conversely, failure to observe these material and moral conditions brought corruption" (Robertson 452). According to Moore, this vision believes that "the political virtue and a spirit of independence were most likely to be found in the ranks of country gentlemen, uncorrupted by the urban world of commerce, manufacturing and finance" (829).

In "Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations", Hume argues that in ancient states most people were not participants in political life. They were reduced to "slavery and subjection" to provide the material independence of citizens, which turned every citizen into "a petty tyrant" in his domestic life (Es 383-84). This classical practice as seen in ancient states, argues Hume, can be explained with their particular situations in that era.

They were free states; they were small ones; and the age being martial, all their neighbors were continually in arms. Freedom naturally begets public spirit, especially in small states; and this public spirit ... must encrease, when the public is almost in continual alarm, and men

are obliged, every moment, to expose themselves to the greatest dangers for its defense. A continual succession of wars makes every citizen a soldier. (Es 259)

The possibility of citizen-soldier depends on certain conditions both within society and among different states. The former requires an independent body of citizenry. The latter refers to almost constant wars among states. This kind of international relations led to the rise of a body of citizenry whose primary qualities were military virtues. They excelled in public spirit.

Although ancient citizens had material independence, claims Hume, they were "unacquainted with gain and industry" (Es 259). Since military virtues were esteemed, commerce and industry were not developed. "The barbarity of the ancient tyrants, together with the extreme love of liberty, which animated those ages, must have banished every merchant and manufacturer" from society (Es 419). Since ancient politics contain "so little humanity and moderation" (Es 414), "their governments [were] more factious and unsettled" (Es 421). This form of societal regulation, asserts Hume, was "violent, and contrary to the more natural and usual course of things" (Es 259).

Against this vision and socio-economic structure Hume advocates commercial society and formulates his politics which, he believes, "would reflect more accurately the conditions of [commercial] society" (Moore 834). Hume asserts that the

principles of ancient politics, such as exclusive public-spirit and the abstinence of citizens from commerce and industry, are not possible any more in commercial society; "these principles are too disinterested and too difficult to support", for in a more peaceful environment the animating principle of human conduct is "a spirit of avarice and industry, art and luxury" (Es 263). And the strength of the state as well as the well-being of citizens depends on commerce.

The greatness of a state, and the happiness of its subjects, how independent so ever they may be supposed in some respects, are commonly allowed to be inseparable with regard to commerce; and as private men receive greater security, in the possession of their trade and riches, from the power of the public, so the public becomes powerful in proportion to the opulence and extensive commerce of private men. (Es 255).

Hume's politics advocates "foreign commerce" among states as opposed to ancient warlike international relations. International trade has a benevolent impact on domestic politics. First, the absence of war among states allows individuals to engage in commercial activities. Second, foreign trade provides both new goods and a market for society. Of special importance, international trade can lead to the rise of commerce and industry in a traditional society and becomes the source of subsequent developments.

Thus men become acquainted with the pleasures of luxury and the profits of commerce; and the delicacy and industry, being once awakened, carry them on to farther improvements, in every branch of domestic as well as foreign trade. And this perhaps is the chief advantage

that arises from commerce with strangers. It rouses men from their indolence. (Es 264)

For Hume, commerce not only fits "the common bent of mankind" within society but also in international relations (Es 260). Hume's humane society, thus, is a commercial free society. As Moore puts it

The society which underlies Hume's model of republican government was quite explicitly a commercial society of manufacturers, merchants and financiers, and the laborers, porters and clerks who worked in their service. And the sources of military and political power in such a society no longer depended on the ability of the gentry to bear arms: it depended rather on the surplus of laborers made available for recruitment into military service in wartime, and on the wealth made available from commerce for subsidies to allies and for domestic political support. (834)

For Hume, commercial society provides a much better environment than ancient republics for a nonviolent and humane form of politics; as we saw in chapter three, commerce increases and spreads wealth in society, which transforms all people into political agents. This contrasts with the republican model in which citizens represent just a small portion of society and their virtues made possible by their material independence which is maintained by extensive slave labor. Hume sees a tendency in commercial society that extends material as well as intellectual and moral requirements of citizenship to all individuals.

Hume's critique of classical republican thought is limited to its notion of virtue and human excellence. He sees the

republican virtues as creating inhumane dispositions in individuals. Yet he does not discard the institutional component of the republican system. Once Hume discards both desirability and the possibility of such republics in the modern era, he formulates a new model of politics that, he believes, fits "the common bent of mankind".

4.3 INSTITUTIONS, MORALITY, AND FACTIONS

As we saw above, Hume denies that the classical republican virtues can be a viable alternative for modern society by claiming that they become possible only in certain national and international environments and are inhumane. Yet some scholars argue that Hume does not see any role for virtue in politics in general. Rather, he is an institutionalist who sees social order as depending solely on institutions and good laws.

In this section, I introduce and criticize this interpretation of Hume's politics. Then I argue that Hume's politics has two essential foundations: institutions and morality. I also argue that Hume's understanding of politics as having two foundations is similar to Putnam's idea of politics as depending on both institutions and a virtuous body of citizenry.

Indeed, in many places in his works, Hume endorses an institutionalist concept of politics that seems to discard any role for virtue in political life. In "Of the Independence of Parliament", Hume asserts that in theorizing on politics or establishing a government "every man must be supposed a knave" who "has no other end, in all his actions, than private interest" (Es 42). In accordance with this belief, a mixed governmental system with check and balance and separation of powers is the most appropriate system to secure peace and order in society (Es 43). For Hume, lesson of this maxim is that an appropriate institutional framework is necessary to maintain peace and order and we cannot rely on the public spiritedness of man for this purpose.

In his essays, Hume discusses whether manners, morals, and education of the rulers and the people or the institutions are more significant in the well functioning of the state. In "That Politics may be reduced to a Science", he distinguishes "absolute governments" from "a free and republican government"; the former depend on manners, morals, and education of the rulers, whereas the latter primarily depends on well-formed institutions (check and balance system, separation of powers, and the rule of law). "The very same [absolute] government, in different hands, has varied suddenly into the opposite extremes of good and bad". On the other hand,

a republican and free government would be an obvious absurdity, if the particular checks and controuls, provided by the constitution, had really no influence, and made it not the interest, even of bad men, to act for the public good. Such is the intention of these forms of government, and such is their real effect, where they are wisely constituted. (Es 15-16)

He asserts that institutions' impact in politics is independent of "the humours and tempers of men". And, moreover, they direct individuals to act in certain ways in society.

... so little dependence has this affair on the humours and education of particular men, that one part of the same republic may be wisely conducted, and another weakly, by the very same men, merely on account of the difference of the forms and institutions, by which these parts are regulated. (Es 24)

In a similar fashion, in "Of the Origin of Government", Hume argues that private virtue is not related to public order; "a bad neighbor" does not necessarily mean "a bad citizen and subject". Rather "experience ... proves that there is a great difference between the cases. Order in society, we find, is much better maintained by means of government" (Es 38). Hume's conviction is that the force of laws and institutions is so great that "consequences almost as general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them, as any which the mathematical sciences afford us" (Es 16). Therefore, "Legislators ... ought to provide a system of laws to regulate the administration of public affairs to the latest posterity" (Es 24).

Hume in these passages endorses a notion of politics that exclusively relies on the regulatory impact of institutions on political behavior and seems to discard any role for virtue in politics. As we will see below, the institutionalist interpretation of Hume's politics mostly relies on these passages. And as Chabot puts it, "scholarly opinion leans toward the view that Hume looked rather to good laws and institutions than to morality or citizenship" to secure order in society (336).

Cohen presents an institutionalist interpretation of the relation between morality and politics in Hume. He argues that Hume's politics relies on institutions rather than manners and morals, although Hume believes that improvement in manners and morals is product of social development. The relation between institutions and manners and morals is one-sided. Institutions are primary and create the appropriate environment for the rise of civilized manners and morals. Yet manners and morals have no significant impact on the functioning of institutions. He asserts that

thus if political institutions have a great effect in determining manners, manners do not have the same influence on the proper functioning of a constitution. Correctly modeled constitutions function independently of the manners of the people, making it the interest even of bad men to act for public good. (Cohen 123-24)

In Cohen's account, moral progress is a product of the improvement of society in general. Therefore, the morals of individuals do not have an "active role" in this social development. Rather, "politics, economics, sciences, and the arts are the main causes of the gradual progress of improvement" (Cohen 125). As a result, Cohen asserts "the political scientist is not concerned with manners and morals, but with the balancing of separate interest and skillful division of power in order to best secure the public interest... Therefore, Hume's political scientist is not mainly concerned with the morality of people because the fate of nations depends on their institutions, not on their manners and morals" (124).

Forbes also endorses an institutionalist interpretation of Hume's politics. He argues that Hume's constitutionalism reveals the importance of institutions in "determining human behavior in politics and national character" (224). He maintains that form of government determines manners and morals, yet "manners have not the same influence on the proper functioning ... of constitution" (227). Therefore "Hume's political scientist is not concerned with the moral health of a people at all because the fate of nations depends on their institutions, not on manners and morals" (Forbes 229). Forbes' conviction is that "Hume at any rate was wholly untouched by that Machiavellian moralism" (224).

These scholars emphasize the regulatory significance of institutions on individual conduct. Yet this interpretation is reductionist for, at least, two reasons: First, it does not evaluate Hume's many arguments which see morals and manners as having significant roles not just in politics but also in larger social life. Second, the remarks that Hume makes on the significance of institutions are related to mostly theoretical-general reasoning on institutions. There are certain other issues for which Hume does not endorse institutions; rather he endorses the improvement of morality.

Indeed, Hume's endorsement of institutions as primary factors in politics is closely linked to general-theoretical statements about politics. When he compares absolute governments to free governments and different regions with different forms of governments in a country, he emphasizes the impact of institutions on individual conduct. In particular, the underlying assumption in Hume's institutional argument is that he endorses the safest assumption to provide the minimal requirements of peace and order; individuals are supposed to be selfish agents and a well-balanced constitutional system backed by legal force directs self-interested agents to cooperate. Yet this is not the only major problem Hume deals with in politics. In addition to providing at least a minimum level of peace and order, he thinks that even a well-balanced institutional system

could collapse due to a particular problem it faces. This problem is factionalism in politics. When it comes to factions Hume does not endorse institutions. Rather he endorses a particular way of doing politics which has nothing to do with institutions and also shows both the proper place and the limits of institutions and the role of manners and morals in political life.

In "Of Parties in General", Hume classifies parties into two groups; "Personal" and "Real". Personal factions depend on "friendship or animosity" among opposing groups. Real factions stem from "some real difference of sentiment or interest". He cautions that these are not purely personal or real parties. In real life parties are mixed. Yet, depending on the dominance of principle, a party can be seen as real or personal. Personal parties, asserts Hume, appear mostly in small republics and almost anything can lead to the rise of such parties. He believes that individuals have a tendency to create such parties.

Men have such propensity to divide into personal factions, that the smallest appearance of real difference will produce them. What can be imagined more trivial than the difference between one colour of livery and another in horse races? Yet this difference begat two most inveterate factions in the GREEK empire, the PRASINI and VENETI, who never suspended their animosities, till they ruined that unhappy government.
(Es 57)

Hume divides real factions into three groups: faction from interest, faction from principle, and faction from affection. Among these three, Hume finds the faction from interest "the most reasonable, and the most excusable", for it stems from differences of interest among different groups. "The distinct orders of men, nobles and people, soldiers and merchants, have all a distinct interest" (Es 59-60). Parties from principle stem from "speculative" principles: "Parties from principle, especially abstract speculative principle, are known only to modern times, and are, perhaps, the most extraordinary and unaccountable phenomenon, that has yet appeared in human affairs" (Es 60). Parties from affection refer to those that stem from "the different attachments of men towards particular families and persons, whom they desire to rule over them" (Es 63).

Although, Hume argues, parties can appear in any state, they appear and spread easily in free governments which provide the best environment for them (Es 55). In "Of the Coalition of Parties", he maintains that to abolish parties is neither "practicable" nor "desirable, in a free government". Yet he believes a particular type of party is very dangerous for social order and must be avoided:

The only dangerous parties are such as entertain opposite views with regard to the essentials of government ... where there is no room for any compromise

or accommodation, and where the controversy may appear so momentous as to justify even an opposition by arms to the pretensions of antagonists. (Es 493)

Here Hume refers to factions; although factions are parties, not all parties are factions. Parties are legitimate and inevitable, yet once a party turns itself into a faction it is dangerous for society. For Hume, parties from principles have the tendency to create factions. In particular, parties from principles refer to two types of principles; secular ideologies and religious principles. Both principles dispute the legitimacy of the fundamentals of a (liberal) system. Factions for Hume have the potential to override institutions. In other words, an institutional framework may not contain conflict created by factions in society. According to Hume, while institutions provide peace and order, factions have the contrary tendency:

As much as legislators and founders of states ought to be honoured and respected among men, as much ought the founders of sects and factions to be detested and hated; because the influence of faction is directly contrary to that of laws. Factions subvert government, render laws impotent, and beget the fiercest animosities among men of the same nation, who ought to give mutual assistance and protection to each other. (Es 55)

Thus, for Hume, factions have a contrary and destructive tendency to good laws and institutions; In other words, institutions and good laws are not the solution for factions. Contrary to the claim that Hume sees institutions and good laws

as sufficient for political life, factions show that institutions are not sufficient. The regulatory impact of institutions mainly targets individual conduct. Yet factions represent groups of individuals. As we will see below, for Hume, factions have a transformative impact on individuals in a way that the regulatory impact of institutions and laws loses their influence on individuals. Rather, Hume looks to the improvement of morality among individuals to prevent parties turning themselves into factions.

For Hume, although parties are inevitable in a free society, the kind of conflict that leads to the destruction of social order is not inevitable. In other words, political conflict is a fact of political life. It does not necessarily lead to animosity among parties or to the destruction of social order. What makes conflict destructive of social order is not necessarily related to the mere existence of parties or to conflict among parties. Rather, such destructive conflict stems from factions. First, factions dispute the fundamentals of the system; second, factions provide group-based moral justifications for their members' conduct which leads them to deny that social order is public good; and third, factions create a particular disposition among their members.

According to Hume, when an individual acts alone, he is concerned with the results of his conduct from the standpoint of

society. In other words, some common notion of appropriate form of conduct makes the individual consider his conduct within the requirements of social life; he is concerned with his reputation: "Honour is a great check upon mankind" (Es 43). Yet, when an individual acts as a member of a group, he may not be worried about such a sense of appropriate conduct. Rather, he may justify his conduct according to some principles or understanding provided by his party. Hume explains this as follows; "But where a considerable body of men act together, this check is, in a great measure, removed; since a man is sure to be approved of by his own party, for what promotes the common interest; and he soon learns to despise the clamours of adversaries" (Es 43).

Hume, here, seems to argue that even though individuals participate in different parties, larger society must provide some common understanding of appropriate conduct and sense of right and wrong. Differences in political approaches must not lead them to discard some shared mode of conduct among themselves and what public good means. Otherwise, if every single party endorses its own particular understanding of right and wrong for its members, political conflict would be a conflict among tribes which do not have any common language among them. According to Phillipson, for Hume, factions provide individuals "with confined and partial views of the public

interest" which leads them to forget that peace and order is public good (315).

Conflict about fundamentals of the system by its nature creates a destructive conflict for Hume. According to Stewart, Hume's notion of justice provides "the rule of game" in society (159). If individuals fight over "the rule of game", they would not have any shared principle according to which to regulate their relations with each other. Similarly, the fundamentals of a system must provide such shared rules for parties which can act within certain limits and prevent destructive conflict among them (Stewart 159). For Hume, the rule of law, check and balance system, separation of powers, and individual freedom, in short, a constitutional system provides "the rule of game" for parties. As a result, both a shared sense of right and wrong and an institutional framework are necessary to prevent factions in politics.

The third factor refers to a particular perception and disposition created by factions in individuals. In his Essays, Hume presents many cases of conflict among different parties that are not necessarily destructive for social order, yet how parties understand those conflicts transforms them into animosity.

For Hume, speculative principles create uncompromising position in individuals, for individuals assume that their

principles or positions on a subject reflect the truth. Once we assume certainty for our position and judgment, we necessarily see our opponents as completely wrong or even evil. Due to the certainty of our perception of our principles, we develop a radical disposition in our conduct. In other words, factions "translate political questions into moral crusades" (Letwin 123). As a result, tension among opposing groups increases and conflict could lead to destruction of social order.

According to Boyd, Hume is worried about the claim of certainty for one's position that endorses "rational visions of society". This vision posits "a world of universal and logical consistency-one abstracted from the ambiguities, tensions, and particular traditions of the real world" (115). According to Boyd, this rationalistic vision that depends on the certainty of one's principles shifts "the balance of society away from civility and toward what the modern world has come to call 'ideological politics'" (116).

In order to prevent this outcome, Hume endorses moderation:

There is not a more effectual method of promoting so good an end, than to prevent all unreasonable insult and triumph of the one party over the other, to encourage moderate opinions, to find the proper medium in all disputes, to persuade each that its antagonist may possibly be sometimes in the right, and to keep a balance in the praise and blame, which we bestow on either side. (Es 494)

According to Wulf, in order to prevent radicalization of political arguments, Hume endorses moderation in both “political discourse” and “dispositions of political actors”. Hume tries to prevent both “the unreflective sensibilities of common life” and “radical philosophy” from guiding politics (89). To accomplish this, Wulf maintains, Hume uses his political essays to show that political questions are “more complex and balanced” than opposing groups assume (91). According to Hume, a philosopher could teach people how to develop moderation in both judgment and conduct. In “Of the Protestant Succession”, he asserts that

It belongs ... to a philosopher alone, who is of neither party, to put all the circumstances in the scale, and assign to each of them its proper poise and influence. Such a one will readily, at first, acknowledge that all political questions are infinitely complicated, and that there scarcely ever occurs, in any deliberation, a choice, which is either purely good, or purely ill. Consequences, mixed and varied, may be foreseen to flow from every measure: And many consequences, unforeseen, do always, in fact, result from every one. Hesitation, and reserve, and suspence, are, therefore, the only sentiments he brings to this essay or trial. (Es 507)

Factions provide perfect theoretical solutions to political problems by creating utopian visions which create uncompromising dispositions in individuals. For Hume both religious and secular principles are dangerous precisely for this reason; both types of principles advocate uncompromising positions in individuals, which makes them unaware of the complexity of political questions. That’s why Hume endorses “an undogmatic approach and counsels bargaining and compromise” for political practice (Letwin 394).

Hume here endorses moderation in our judgment as well as in our conduct. Awareness that our opponents can be sometimes right is, according to Hume, an appropriate position in dealing with conflict in political life. It creates moderate conduct and eases the tension among groups. Thus, not just the mere existence of conflict but how we approach it is a critical factor that eases or increases tension in political life. How we react to conflict determines how we are responded to. Increase of tension may create a vicious circle: "One extreme produces another" (Es 415). Hume "pleads not for an end to conflict, but, for restraint in our language" (Conniff 387) by endorsing "a more skeptical civic mentality" in individuals by confronting them with the complexity of political questions as well as their inevitability (Chabot 337). Hume urges party-men to "detach themselves from their partisan commitments without surrendering them" in order to see the narrowness of their perspective (Chabot 339).

Hume also assumes that social order is a common good for all parties. In other words, peace and order provide a shared ground for all parties, which would also moderate our perception, judgment, and conduct in political life. As Whelan puts it:

His intention in his essays on parties and the prevailing party ideologies was to moderate partisan zeal by calling attention to plausible elements in the

competing doctrines, and thus to confine partisan conflict to forms that were compatible with the survival of the constitutional regime as a whole. (327)

Jones classifies Hume's notion of moderation under four aspects: First, moderation as "a condition of understanding". Second, moderation as "a rhetorical means to secure communication and conviction". The third and the fourth aspects are linked to the role of moderation in moral and political life. Moderation as "a condition of understanding" refers to the necessity of obtaining some sort of "impartiality" to recognize the complexity of issues. Moderation as "a rhetorical means" refers to our attitude in relation to our opponents. Unreasonable insult and accusations would create tensions with our opponents. Rather, civilized language in presenting our position and considering our opponents as having a legitimate perspective though different than ours softens political discourse and ease the tension among parties (154-56). Jones argues that the recognition of complexity of political questions and necessity of a civilized argument among parties would lead to moderation in our judgment and conduct in political life, which is "integral to peace, stability, law and order" (157).

Hume's analysis of factions or partisanship as a problem in political life has a striking feature: He does not appeal to institutions or the state to solve this problem. Yet

institutionalist interpretations of his theory ignore this fact. In regard to factions, Hume appeals neither to an appropriate form of institutional design nor to legal punishment. Moreover, he thinks that this type of conflict could destroy the institutional structure. Rather, he endorses moderation in judgment and conduct in political life. Letwin asserts that Hume was "committed to a particular style of politics. For it was not any political principle or doctrine, but his preference for a disposition that gave form to his politics" (94). In other words, Hume endorses a new way of doing politics to overcome partisanship in political life: "He ... attempts to counteract the polarization" of politics (Schmidt 291).

Wulf asserts that Hume's strategy to teach party men moderation relies on the improved culture in civilized society and the beneficial impact of activities associated with civilized life style (92). According to Wulf, the Humean notion of civilized society, or "liberal commercial republics" provides the best environment for the rise of moderate judgment and disposition in political agents (94). As Phillipson noted, Hume believes "that the future of liberty and prosperity ... depended on cultural not constitutional reform" (23). This development provides the ground on which Hume constructs his new way of doing politics.

4.4 FACTIONS AS BAD SOCIAL CAPITAL

Humean factions are similar to Putnam's associations which create bad social capital for two reasons: First, as we saw in chapter two, bad social capital refers to norms, solidarity, and trust created among members yet not extended to non-members. The reason that these associations limit social capital to their members is that they dispute the essentials of the liberal system. In other words, such associations advocate alternative visions of society to a liberal system by relying on some speculative principles. For example, the Ku Klux Klan is a racist association. Religious fundamentalist groups also use their principles as a blueprint for an alternative society. Since these types of associations oppose the essentials of liberalism they limit social capital to their members.

Hume's claim that factions provide group-based moral justification is also related to their rejection of the essentials of liberalism. Since they deny the legitimacy of societal regulations based on liberal principles, factions use their own principles to justify their claims and conduct.

As we saw in chapter two, in less civic regions of Italy, political actors had utopian visions with messianic expectations which led those actors to have uncompromising positions on political issues. Hume's worry about factions refers to

development of this type of disposition in individuals. Factions instill uncompromising dispositions in individuals, for they advocate utopian visions of society by using speculative principles. Either religious principles or ideological principles are used to transform society in accordance with utopian models.

Hume's solution to prevent parties from becoming factions is similar to Putnam's "new way of doing politics". In his politics, Putnam also endorses toleration, compromise, and pragmatism as appropriate skills and techniques by claiming that political questions are very complex and solutions lie in the middle in general. Hume endorses a similar pragmatic approach to political conflict by arguing that such conflicts are very complicated and cannot be solved on the basis of speculative or dogmatic principles.

4.5 CONCLUSION

Contrary to the institutionalist interpretation of Hume's politics, Hume endorses certain skills, understanding, and dispositions to advocate a new way of doing politics. Factions reveal the necessity and the role virtue plays in his politics. As we have seen in this chapter, the institutionalist

interpretation does not analyze Hume's notion of factions. The regulatory significance of institutions cannot perform its role against factions which create alternative visions of society against liberal system.

Hume rather endorses a new way of doing politics which relies on moderation, compromise, and sensitivity to social peace and order as public good. This shows that Hume advocates both institutions and a virtuous body of citizenry as necessary to achieve efficient cooperation not only in the larger social life but also in political life.

5.0 CONCLUSION

In this study, I attempted to show that the application of rational choice theory to Hume distorts his theory. Unlike Hobbesian liberalism, the Humean problem cannot be reduced to a coordination problem and security in society. Hume's project relies on a conviction that the individual is a progressive being with a wide array of needs, preferences, and faculties. Hume assumes that besides material needs and interest, individuals have characteristically human needs such as sociability, learning, friendship, and integrity which need to be satisfied. Social coordination problem is one of the issues Hume analyzes in his theory.

Hume seems to classify individual needs into two groups: Material needs and non-material needs. Each group of needs creates interpersonal relations in society which are qualitatively different from each other. Material needs put individuals against each other as competitors, for such goods are scarce in nature and individuals are self-interested agents. The basic individual motive activated by material needs is self-interest. This leads to a coordination problem in society. The

most Hume hopes for from such agents is to develop enlightened interest and act in accordance with it. Yet, he is not very optimistic about the power of enlightened interest to affect individual conduct for two reasons. First, individuals are short-sighted agents who forget their enlightened interest. Thus, they need the state to force them to pursue their enlightened interest. The second reason concerns the free-rider problem to which enlightened interest leads. Enlightened interest requires individuals to defect as a rational strategy to increase their interest if they have the opportunity to get away with their defections. Within the logic of material needs, Hume accepts that there is no solution to the free-rider problem; that is, enlightened interest simply fails.

In regard to material needs Humean agents are similar to Hobbesian agents. The essential quality of interpersonal relations is instrumental and "the market metaphor" or the game theoretical analysis provides some insights here. Self-interest has a significant function as the driving force of economic development in society. Yet, to see Hume's theory as limited to this aspect of individual needs and human nature is misleading.

Although Hume assumes that individuals by nature seek commodious living conditions, human needs cannot be reduced to material gains. For Hume there are other characteristically human needs required by characteristically human faculties. The

development of these capacities and the satisfaction of these needs create interpersonal relations among individuals different from those of material needs. They do not lead to competition among individuals or a coordination problem, because Unlike material ones, satisfaction of these needs does not depend on scarce resources. Rather, sociability, friendship, conversation, and integrity assume that the more individuals consume these, the more these would be present in society. One's integrity or sociability does not require the rest to have less of these. Hume assumes that these are inherently human needs required by our nature. He assumes that there are higher pleasures worthy of humans to follow in life.

While the material needs lead to the development of the rules of justice and the state or the development of an institutional-structural environment, the non-material needs require the development of a cultural-moral environment in society. While the former manipulate self-interest to overcome the destructive tendencies of individuals, the logic and the essence of the non-material needs cannot be captured by "the market metaphor" or the game theoretical assumptions. The individual is not only an economic being but also a moral one. Yet, the interest of the individual as economic being conflicts with its interest as moral being. The former sees defection as rational in some cases, whereas the latter sees gains due to

such deception as "worthless toys". Hume assumes that this tension can be overcome by the moral education of individuals. Thus, the lesson of Hume's moral theory is that training and education of individuals are necessary to prevent the whole sphere of social life from becoming a market place.

This study reveals that Hume's theory is not limited to a narrow view of politics. Rather, he is interested in the full-fledged development of humans in the newly emerging commercial societies. He thought that commercial society could have both the necessary material conditions and moral-cultural-intellectual requirements of an alternative life to classical and Christian models. That's why we find so much emphasis on sociability, friendship, conversation, integrity or learning besides the more technical analysis of institutions and the rules in society in regard to politics. Politics is not isolated from the social, cultural, moral, or of economic spheres of society. This larger framework is consistent with Hume's perception of human nature as located in a web of interpersonal relations in daily life and different institutional, economic, cultural, and moral contexts as stages of history. Hume's theory is not only about the securing of peace and order but also the development of better citizens. Within this general framework, his response to the free-rider problem, as Baier puts it, is "perfectly intelligible".

This study reveals that liberal thought cannot be reduced to its Hobbesian version. The significance of this conclusion is that in dealing with the coordination problem as well as the quality of social life, Hume provides significant insights that could enrich our understanding of these issues in contemporary society. As Berkowitz puts it "FOR SOME TIME NOW, the conviction has been growing among both politicians and professors that the fate of liberal democracy ... is bound up with the quality of citizens' characters" (ix). Hume's response to the "sensible knave" depends on this conviction about the role of virtue in politics in particular and in society in general.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bagolini, Luigi. 1981. Legal Obligation in Hume. *Hume Studies* 7 (1):85-93.
- Baier, Annette. 1988. Hume's Account of Social Artifice: Its Origins and Originality. *Ethics* 98 (4): 757-78.
- Baier, Annette. 1991. *The Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Baier, Annette. 1992. Artificial Virtues and the Equally Sensible Non-Knaves: A Response to Gauthier. *Hume Studies* 18 (2): 429-39.
- Boix, C. and Daniel Posner. 1998. The Origins and Political Consequences of Social Capital. *British Journal of Political Science* 28 (4): 686-693.
- Boyd, Richard. 2000. Reappraising the Scottish Moralists and Civil Society. *Polity* 33 (1): 101-25.
- Brewer, Anthony. 1998. Luxury and Economic Development: David Hume and Adam Smith. *Scottish Journal of Political Economy* 45 (1): 78-98.
- Bruni, L. and R. Sugden. 2000. Moral Canals: Trust and Social Capital in the Work of Hume, Smith and Genovesi. *Economics and Philosophy* 16: 21-45.
- Buckle, S. and D. Castiglione. 1991. Hume's Critique of the Contract Theory. *History of Political Thought* 12 (3): 475-480.
- Burt, Shelley. 1993. The Politics of Virtue Today: A Critique and a Proposal. *The American Political Science Review* 87 (2): 360-399.
- Callan, Eamonn. 2003. Citizenship and Education. *Annual Rev. Political Science* 7: 71-90.
- Capaldi, Nicholas and Donald W. Livingston, eds. 1990 *Liberty in Hume's History of England*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Chabot, Dana. 1997. At Odds with Themselves: David Hume's Skeptical Citizens. *Polity* 39 (3):323-43.
- Chambers, S. and J. Kopstein. 2001. Bad Civil Society. *Political Theory* 29 (6): 837-865.

- Chitnis, Anand C. 1976. *The Scottish Enlightenment: A Social History*. New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Cohen, Alix. 2000. The Notion of Moral Progress in Hume's Philosophy: Does Hume Have a Theory of Moral Progress? *Hume Studies* 26 (1): 109-27.
- Conniff, James. 1997. Hume's Political Methodology: A Reconsideration of 'That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science'. In *Hume* Vl. I., John Dunn and Ian Harris, ed. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited: 376-96.
- Danford, John W. 1989. Hume on Development: The First Two Volumes of the History of England. *The Western Political Quarterly* 42 (1): 107-27.
- Day, John. 1997. Hume on Justice and Allegiance. In *Hume* Vl. I., John Dunn and Ian Harris, ed. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited: 161-82.
- Davis, Gordon F. 2003. Philosophical Psychology and Economic Psychology in David Hume and Adam Smith History of Political Economy 35 (2): 269-304.
- Flage, Daniel E. 1992. Hume's Hobbism and His Anti-Hobbism. *Hume Studies* 18 (2): 369-382.
- Forbes, D. 1975. *Hume's Philosophical Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Frey, R. G. 1995. Virtue, Commerce, and Self-Love. *Hume Studies* 21 (2): 275-87.
- Galston, William A. 1988. Liberal Virtues. *The American Political Science Review* 82 (4): 1277-1290.
- Gauthier, David. 1990a. David Hume: Contractarian. In *Moral Dealing: Contract, Ethics, and Reason*, David Gauthier, ed. Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 45-76.
- Gauthier, David. 1990b. Three Against Justice: The Foole, the Sensible Knave, and the Lydian Shepherd. In *Moral Dealing: Contract, Ethics, and Reason*, David Gauthier, ed. Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 129-49.
- Gauthier, David. 1992. Artificial Virtues and the Sensible Knave. *Hume Studies* 18 (2): 401-28.
- Gill, Michael. 2000. Hume's Progressive View of Human Nature. *Hume Studies* 26 (1): 87-108.
- Gutmann, Amy. 1985. Communitarian Critics of Liberalism. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 14 (3): 308-322.
- Haakonssen, Knud. 1981. *The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Hume, David. 1985. *Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary*. Edited by Eugene Miller. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics.
- Hume, David. 1999. *An Enquiry Concerning The Principles of Morals*. 9th ed. Edited by John B. Stewart. La Salle: Open Court.
- Hume, David. 2000. *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Edited by David F. Norton and Mary J. Norton. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hundert, E. J. 1991. The Achievement Motive in Hume's Political Economy. In *Hume as Philosopher of Society, Politics, and History*, Donald Livingston and Marie Martin, ed. Rochester: University of Rochester Press: 40-4.
- Hursthouse, Rosalind. 1999. Virtue Ethics and Human Nature. *Hume Studies* 25 (1&2): 67-82.
- Jackman, R. and Ross A. Miller. 1998. Social Capital and Politics. *Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci.* 1: 47-73.
- Jones, Peter. 1982. Hume's Sentiments: Their Ciceronian and French Context. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- King, James. 1981. Hume's Classical Theory of Justice. In *Hume* VI. II., John Dunn and Ian Harris, ed. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited: 186-208.
- Kymlicka, Will and W. Norman. 1994. Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory. *Ethics* 104 (2): 352-381.
- Letwin, Shirley R. 1965. *The Pursuit of Certainty*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Levi, Margaret. 1996. Social and Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work. *Politics and Society* 24 (1):45-55.
- Livingston, Donald W. and Marie Martin. 1991 *Hume as Philosopher of Society, Politics and History*. Rochester: University of Rochester Press.
- Manzer, Robert A. 1996. Hume's Constitutionalism and the Identity of Constitutional Democracy. *The APSR* 90 (3): 488-496.
- Marshall, M.G. 2000. Luxury and Economic Development, and Work Motivation: David Hume, Adam Smith, and J. R. McCulloch. *History of Political Economy* 32 (3): 631-48.
- McIntyre, Jane L. 2001. Character: A Humean Account. In *Hume: Moral and Political Philosophy*, Rachel Cohon, Ed. Aldershot: Ashgate: 449-62.
- Miller, David. 1981. *Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's Political Thought*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Miller, David. 1997. Hume and Possessive Individualism. In

- Hume* Vl. II., John Dunn and Ian Harris, ed. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited: 168-85.
- Monroe, Kristen R. 1995 Psychology and Rational Actor Theory. *Political Psychology* 16 (1): 1-21.
- Moore, James. 1976. Hume's Theory of Justice and Property. *Political Studies* 24 (2): 103-19.
- Moore, James. 1977. Hume's Political Science and the Classical Republican Tradition. *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 10 (4): 809-39.
- Mouritsen, Per. 2003. What's the Civil in Civil Society? Robert Putnam, Italy, and the Republican Tradition. *Political Studies* 51: 650-668.
- Moss, Laurance S. 1991. Thomas Hobbes's Influence on David Hume: The Emergence of a Public Choice Tradition. *History of Political Economy* 23 (4): 587-612.
- Norton, David F. 1999. Hume, Human Nature, and the Foundations of Morality. In *The Cambridge Companion to Hume*, David F. Norton, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 148-81.
- Penelhum, Terence. 1999. Hume's Moral Psychology. In *The Cambridge Companion to Hume*, David F. Norton, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 117-47.
- Phillipson, Nicholas. 1989. *Hume*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Phillipson, Nicholas. 1993. Politics and Politeness in the Philosophy of David Hume. In *Politics, Politeness, and Patriotism*, Gordon J. Schochet, ed. Washington: The Folger Institute:
- Pocock, J. G. A. 1985. *Virtue, Commerce, and History*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Ponko, Red A. 1983. Artificial Virtue, Self-Interest and Acquired Social Concern. *Hume Studies* 9 (1): 46-58.
- Portes, Alejandro. 1998. Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology. *Ann. Rev. Soc.* 22: 1-24
- Putnam, Robert D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Putnam, Robert D. 2002. *Democracies in flux: the evolution of social capital in contemporary society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rawls, John. 1999. *A Theory of Justice*. Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Robertson, John. 1983. The Scottish Enlightenment at the

- limits of the civic tradition. *History of Political Thought* 4 (3): 451-82.
- Rosenberg, Shawn W. 1995. Against Neoclassical Political Economy: A Political Psychological Critique. *Political Psychology* 16 (1): 99-137.
- Sandel, Michael J. 1984. The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self. *Political Theory* 12 (1): 81-96.
- Schmidt, Claudia M. 2003. *David Hume: Reason in History*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University.
- Schuler, Jeanne and Patrick Muray. 1993. Educating the Passions: Reconsidering David Hume's Optimistic Appraisal of Commerce. *History of European Ideas* 17 (5): 589-97.
- Solomon, Graham. 2000. Hume on 'Greatness of Soul'. *Hume Studies* 26 (1): 129-42.
- Stewart, James B. 1992. *Opinion and Reform in Hume's Political Philosophy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Stilz, A. B. 2003. Hume, modern patriotism, and commercial Society. *History of European Ideas* 29: 15-32.
- Stolle, D. and Thomas R. R. 1998. Are All Associations Alike? *American Behavioral Scientist* 87 (2): 360-368.
- Taylor, Jacqueline. 1998. Justice and the Foundations of Social Morality in Hume's Treatise. *Hume Studies* 24 (1): 5-30.
- Taylor, Michael. 1987. *The Possibility of Cooperation*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Valls, Andrew. 1995. *Hume and the Foundations of Liberalism*. Ph. D. Dissertation. University of Pittsburgh.
- Vanderschraaf, Peter. 1998. The Informal Game Theory in Hume's Account of Convention. *Economics and Philosophy* 14: 215-47.
- Venning, Corey. 1991. Hume on Property, Commerce, and Empire in the Good Society: The Role of Historical Necessity. In *Hume as Philosopher of Society, Politics, and History*, Donald Livingston and Marie Martin, ed. Rochester: University of Rochester Press: 137-150.
- Wallach, John R. 1992. Contemporary Aristotelianism. *Political Theory* 20 (4): 613-641.
- Whelan, Frederick G. 1985. *Order and Artifice in Hume's Political Philosophy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Woolcock, Michael. 1998. Social Capital and Economic Development: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework. *Theory and Society* 27 (2):151-208.
- Wulf, Steven J. 2000. The Skeptical Life in Hume's

Political Thought. *Polity* 33 (1): 77-99.

Zuckert, Catherina H. 1995. On the 'Rationality' of
Rational Choice. *Political Psychology* 16 (1): 179-198.