

**Calling Shotgun: The History and Politics of Japan's Bid for a
Permanent United Nations Security Council Position**

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Since the founding of the United Nations and the establishment of the Security Council there have been no changes to the makeup of the permanent membership. Indeed, with the exception of one amendment to increase the size of the rotating membership from six to ten the Security Council has continued unchanged. In the fifty-plus years since the founding of the world body and the victory over the Axis Powers that served as the impetus for its creation, the world has changed dramatically. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has ceased to exist; the Republic of China has been exiled to Taiwan and undergone remarkable economic and democratic changes; the British Empire has morphed into the Commonwealth and the French Empire has collapsed. New states have come to the forefront to challenge the post-war status quo. Some, like Egypt and India, were colonial possessions of the imperial powers. Others, like Germany and Japan, were the defeated powers of the Second World War.

Japan in particular has a unique economic, financial, political and military history that deserves special consideration as it relates to its ambition for a permanent United Nations Security Council position. Furthermore, the motives and justifications for why it pursues such a seat and the opposition it has received deserve just as much attention. This thesis traces the views of the leading figures in Japanese politics from the founding of the United

Nations to the present and demonstrates that from the beginning Japan realized that the UN was a legitimizing force for their new place in the new post-war world. It also demonstrates clearly that lacking a clear definition of what a permanent UN Security Council contender looks like aspirant states are forced to create their own portfolios. Therefore Japan relies heavily on its strengths as an undisputed economic and financial power. Furthermore, it shows that despite strict Constitutional constraints on the use of the military Japan's force is modern, well-funded and well-maintained. Finally, it catalogues opposition to expanding the Security Council into three distinct categories and explains them in their modern geopolitical context.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface.....	ix
1.0 Introduction.....	1
2.0 Part I – History of Japan within the United Nations.....	8
2.1 The United Nations Security Council – Postwar Security Anachronism.....	8
2.2 Japan joins the United Nations.....	9
2.3 Contention within the United Nations:.....	12
3.0 Part II - The Present Environment.....	17
3.1 Economic and Financial Power in Comparison.....	17
3.2 Japan’s Political and Military Situation.....	23
3.3 Recent Developments.....	30
4.0 PART III - Plans for Expansion and Opposition.....	35
4.1 Getting a Larger Table.....	35
4.2 Opposition takes Form.....	38
5.0 Conclusions.....	51
6.0 Citations.....	58
7.0 Appendix I: Data Tables and Figures.....	62
8.0 Appendix II: Language Notes.....	67
9.0 Bibliography of Works Cited.....	68

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. GDP of the Five Permanent Security Council Members and Japan	62
Table 2. GDP by PPP of the Five Permanent Security Council Members and Japan	62
Table 3. Active Troops by Nations, Top Nine Nations	63
Table 4. Top 5 Global Military Spenders	63
Table 5. Naval Power of the Five Permanent Security Council Members and Japan	64

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Mandatory Contributions to the United Nations Regular Operating Budget	65
Figure 2. Assessment Scale for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations	66

PREFACE

I would first and foremost like to thank the staff of the Asian Studies Center for their tireless support on my behalf, and especially for their generous awards allowing me to conduct my graduate studies at the University of Pittsburgh without a single penny of my own spent. To all the donors and the taxpayers who make that possible, my sincerest appreciation is due.

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This work is dedicated to my family. To my great-grandfather Harold Wayne Taylor, who fought in World War II and from whom I took the greatest part of my name; to my grandmother Helen Holmes and to my father Eric Holmes. I am keenly aware that I owe them for where I stand today.

With that, a few notes on the style of the Japanese language used throughout this work. The author has used the Asian style of presenting names throughout the document. The family name precedes the given name of the individual without regard to the individual’s historical

notoriety outside Japan. Furthermore, all translations are the author's own unless indicated in the citation.

Finally, an explanation of the title is in order. The title *Calling Shotgun* derives from the faux Old West phrase "riding shotgun", but try as you might you will not find that phrase used once in the entire thesis. As residents of the American southwest (such as the author) and English speakers around the world influenced by American popular culture are no doubt aware, to "call shotgun" is to claim the front passenger seat in someone else's car. Imagine that the United Nations Security Council is the driver's seat of an automobile (either a classic Thunderbird or an Edsel depending on your viewpoint) and the permanent members are on their way to get in when Japan pushes past France, Britain, Russia and China, triumphantly shouts "shotgun!" and takes their seat by the driver. "Sorry", says the United States as it puts the key in the ignition and starts it up, "Japan called it first. Besides, you've had it long enough, give somebody else a turn...there's always plenty of room in the back".

1.0 Introduction

In January of 2000 an official foreign policy team from Japan held an informal meeting with the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China where it attempted, and failed, to gain support from China for Japan's long sought after bid for United Nations Security Council Permanent Membership. Responding to the outcome of the attempt, an unnamed foreign ministry official noted how "difficult it is to gain sufficient public support for payment of its heavy 20 percent share of UN contributions when Japan's bid to become a permanent member remains unrealized".¹

Indeed, since 1956² Japan has made various public statements and international relations "feelers" in an attempt to establish international support for its bid to become a permanent veto-wielding member of the United Nations Security Council. Since the time when Japan first began its phoenix-like rebirth to prominence on the world stage, Japan has been seeking legitimacy for its new role in a new world.³ To Japan, the United Nations Security Council is the prestigious embodiment of that legitimacy. Since the founding of the United Nations, no new permanent members have been added to the Security Council. This means that the only standard for permanent membership in the body is that you were a victor in the Second World War. Of course, since the end of that war the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics no longer exists, the Republic of China was exiled to Taiwan and the British and French Empires have passed into history. Yet these powers remain enshrined in the Charter

as the permanent five members, and no changes have been made to their official status. Due to the lack of a commonly accepted modern standard for states seeking permanent membership on the Council, states are forced to design their own campaigns. For Japan, the campaign is one which emphasizes economic and financial power, with a lesser emphasis on their post-war status as a pacifist state.

If permanent Security Council membership is the pinnacle of international prestige and legitimacy, a certain sign of having attained and surpassed not only your regional neighbors but also all others across the globe, recognition that you have ascended to a position of unequivocal world prominence, then the logical place from which to examine how Japan fits into the current order is by comparing it against the permanent members of the Security Council. Three accepted elements of national power: the economic, political and military strength of the nation will be used in this regard.

Economically, Japan has very strong credentials for a seat on the UN Security Council. Japan is assessed the second highest amount of mandatory payments for the UN regular operating budget behind only the United States of America, and donates more than any other nation to the voluntary budget for peacekeeping operations. Japan donates billions of Yen annually in Official Developmental Assistance grants including aid to nations who already enjoy permanent membership on the Council. Furthermore, in almost every instance Japan ranks higher in premier economic indicators than all other permanent members of the Security Council save the United States. Japan is also a member of the group of eight nations, the so-named “G8” forum that brings together the leaders of the world’s largest economies to discuss matters related to international growth and development. Economically, there is no member of the Security Council, permanent or otherwise, who could legitimately claim Japan

has no place in it.

In military terms Japan has the potential to be a great power. Despite Constitutional limitations, some would say a complete Constitutional bar, Japan has a very modern, well-funded and well-maintained force that is non-military in name only. Though Japan does not have standing force totals equal to other major powers it still has a larger standing force than one permanent member of the Security Council and is clearly capable of supporting a larger force should it be required, or mandated. The restrictions on the use of these forces, and the longstanding political issues deeply scarring Japan's national consciousness, are frequently mentioned by detractors both from within and without to prove that Japan is not ready for the burdens of international leadership that permanent council membership carries. The resolution of this uniquely Japanese characteristic will be key to Japan realizing its goals, and also for easing the uncertainty Japan's allies have towards the country's ambitions.

Japanese politics has been described as being driven by consensus and bureaucracy, preferring broad concessions to bold, individual leadership.⁴ Japan also possesses a parliamentary body designed along Western lines but quite dissimilar from anything the West is used to in terms of both style and substance. This presents a clear predicament for Japan and the nations which support its aspirations. Namely, whether Japan can be counted on to offer its support when global crises arise in a manner consistent with the extemporaneous needs of the moment. Japan's most notable encounter with such a situation, to be elaborated upon later in this analysis, occurred in the Gulf Crisis, later the Gulf War, of 1990-1991. This formula of government, coupled with an international body charged with reacting quickly to threats, has led some to question the efficacy of such a union. Some politicians have been crying from within the framework of this system for changes, and as this relates to

the problems of Japan's ambitions it will be explored, but the problem is much larger than this minor work can fully articulate.

Japan does not exist in a vacuum, and as such it cannot separate its political aspirations from those of the rest of the world. Japan does seek a permanent seat on the most powerful body in the United Nations, but others do as well. These other states, such as fellow World War II phoenix Germany, South American giant Brazil, sub-continental tiger India, and successful Muslim states like Egypt demand what they see as better regional, ethnic, economic, historic and popular representation on the permanent membership on the Security Council. The current "great five" jealously guard their positions, and are able to utilize the difficulty of amending the United Nations' Charter to their advantage to maintain the status quo. Aiding them in this is the undeniable fact that there has never been a mutually agreed upon definition of what constitutes a clear candidate for a new Security Council member, since there has never been an expansion of the permanent membership to set precedent. Japan must, therefore, try her national oratorical skills in a completely new endeavor and win favor from a majority of the world's states, as is necessary to amend the United Nations' Charter at one stage, and her regional rivals, one of whom possesses a veto, at another.

Opposition to expansion of the permanent membership of the Security Council comes from many parts of the world and takes on many different forms. The weaker nations of the present permanent membership adopt the argument that the Council currently acts well enough to represent whatever interests the newcomers are seeking to represent, therefore no reform is necessary. The middle-tier regional powers, those that are somewhat influential in their neighborhood yet are not being considered for permanent seats, argue that reform is

necessary, but not by adding their regional rivals to positions of influence. For the purposes of this analysis, this is useful in understanding the intense, targeted opposition Japan has received from every angle. From Article Nine of the Constitution, to Japan's inability to "atone" for past sins, to the undoubtedly political nature of the invective and scorn heaped upon Japan by her most powerful regional rivals, Japan is facing an uphill battle against entrenched opposition to attaining its goals. Indeed, China hopes to use Japan's strong security ties with the United States to undermine the country's bid by playing up the image of the country as a deferential lap-dog, thereby giving the US a second veto and depriving the developing world of a voice it could have had in its place. South Korea, despite its historic alliances with both the United States and Japan as a bulwark against communist aggression and Pacific security, has for the record stated that it will do everything it can to keep Japan from its ambition.

In economic and financial terms there is no nation that could argue legitimately that Japan has no place on the Security Council. Militarily there is no nation that could argue that Japan is incapable of fielding a force should it be called upon. Politically, the situation becomes more uncertain. The political restraints on the military, and the political structure itself, are the biggest liability the nation faces and are often used by detractors to counter the country's strong economic position. That is the primary reason that economic and financial matters are not come upon in the opposition Japan encounters on its road to ascension, rather, Japan's rivals target the weak points of military and historical matters.

This paper does not take a position on the suitability of Japan for a permanent United Nations Security Council position, nor does it argue that Japan's contentions are without merit. This thesis will trace the history of Japan within the United Nations in Part I,

demonstrating the rapid ideological change that the leadership demonstrated in its first few years as it realized the legitimizing force the world body was. Then in Part II it will analyze Japan's past, present, and potential future political and military situation to show the difficulties the nation faces from within and without on the way to fulfilling its ambition. In Part III it will show the three types of opposition to expanding the Security Council the author has identified and catalogued, especially as they relate to Japan. This information will be used to underscore the author's main contentions, which are quite simply:

1. Since the permanent membership has never expanded there is no standard by which to judge new aspirants, leading Japan and its fellow hopefuls to create and argue from their own strengths.
2. These "strengths" are not universally acknowledged. Some believe the new Security Council should be representative of the world's regional diversity. Others, notably China, believe the expanded Council should take into account the developing world.
3. Economically, financially, and militarily Japan "looks like" the present permanent members of the Security Council. This becomes even more important as the traditional great powers continue their steady decline and new powers continue to emerge.
4. Japan's unique political and Constitutional situation provides a worrisome barrier for even its staunchest allies, like the United States.
5. Finally, for all of Japan's hopes and dreams of gaining absolution for its past China holds the keys to the Security Council through the veto, and one element of opposition, that which the author has termed "opposition from

history”, will not be overcome for it acts as a convenient tool of absolutist states to consolidate popular sentiment against Japan.

Much work has been done in the past comparing Germany and Japan; their postwar recovery, their readmission into the international community, their historical memory, etc. This thesis purposefully breaks with such work in order to do a targeted, focused analysis on Japan and Japan’s unique political condition.

To begin, an analysis of the roots of the United Nations Security Council and Japan’s history within it shall be presented, for it is impossible to explore Japan’s perceptions of a Security Council seat without first exploring its functions, powers, and associated responsibilities. Therein lies the roots to the Council’s prestige in the Japanese perception. Furthermore, it is useful to understand the history of Japan within the world body and how Japan’s past informs its future.

2.0 Part I – History of Japan within the United Nations

2.1 The United Nations Security Council – Postwar Security Anachronism

The United Nations was formed in the aftermath of World War II in an attempt to provide a forum for peaceful and multilateral decision making on issues affecting the world's collective security. It was hoped that the United Nations could serve;

“To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”⁵

The General Assembly of the Security Council was designed to incorporate all member nations of the world into an egalitarian body which could collectively control the organization as well as monitor the world's political situation. The United Nations Security Council, on the other hand, was set up to be an exclusive body of five permanent members which represented the major victorious powers of the Second World War. These nations, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Republican China, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were originally joined by six non-permanent members elected on a two-year rotation.⁶

The Security Council has a unique design characteristic that lingers today as a reflection of the immediate post-war world. All Security Council resolutions require a simple majority vote of the rotating members as well as the affirming votes of all five permanent members⁷. This design, technically termed “great power unanimity” but more colloquially and commonly termed the “veto” power⁸, was built around the politics of the Cold War that appeared almost immediately after the end of the Pacific War. It was concluded in policy circles that the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and

Republican China, being the principle ideological allies at the end of the war, would dominate the council. The Soviet Union, however, would have considerable influence through use of the great power veto to keep it at the table and grant the Security Council legitimacy. The creation of the veto was in part a reflection of the ongoing turmoil in a world torn between Capitalism and Communism and the future of their states. Since the Security Council is the only body which can theoretically force member states, through resolutions, to participate in military action it was agreed that unanimity would be required among all five permanent members⁹. This design would keep turmoil limited to only the major communist versus the major capitalist worlds, while allowing the council to react unanimously against minor threats to the Cold War order from without.

Since the creation of the Security Council, it has always been the subject of debate for various de jure reforms which, with the exception of one proposal to increase the size of the rotating membership from six to ten in 1963¹⁰, have ended in failure. That is not to say that other, de facto, reforms have not taken place. The Republic of China, the official name for Taiwan, had its seat on the council stripped by the United Nations General Assembly and granted to the communist People's Republic in 1971.¹¹ When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 her permanent seat transferred to Russia¹², though many elements of Russia's prestige and power have gone the way of her breakaway republics.¹³ The world has changed quite dramatically since the days of the Cold War. In some cases that change has been recognized by the world body. In others, it has been ignored.

2.2 Japan joins the United Nations

Japan was occupied by the United States from its defeat in 1945 until the restoration of sovereignty with the *Treaty of Peace with Japan*, popularly known as the *San Francisco*

Peace Treaty, in 1952. In the preamble to the treaty itself, Japan declared its intention to join the United Nations;

“WHEREAS Japan for its part declares its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations and in all circumstances to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; to strive to realize the objectives of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; to seek to create within Japan conditions of stability and well-being as defined in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations and already initiated by post-surrender Japanese legislation; and in public and private trade and commerce to conform to internationally accepted fair practices”.¹⁴

Although this public statement was made, Japan was unsure about the nature of the role the United Nations should play in the country’s future. Some Japanese imbued the world body with an almost messianic quality, while others thought the UN would be so contentious an arena of world politics that Japan could not legally or morally involve itself within it.

Soon after the various parties concluded the treaty with Japan, formally ending hostilities, the United States signed with Japan a treaty of mutual defense, obligating the United States to defend Japan in the future.¹⁵ With no defense budget to speak of, Japan was free to begin rebuilding its economy and infrastructure that had been ravaged by the war.

Even before Japan had its sovereignty restored with the peace treaty in 1952, as early as 1946 it had begun deliberations on joining the United Nations.¹⁶ As Drifte explains, a major point of contention in the Diet at the time was how to reconcile Article Nine of the new Constitution with various articles in the United Nations’ Charter relating to defense and war-fighting capabilities. This will be important later when the issue of Peacekeeping Operations and military support is discussed. To understand these issues it is necessary to understand Article Nine, which reads;

“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized”.¹⁷

Contrast this with Article 43 of the Charter of the United Nations and an important dichotomy emerges. Section one of the article states;

“All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security”.¹⁸

Drifte goes on to explain that many on the Left in Japanese politics “owing to their strong pacifism, were even doubtful whether Japan should get involved in the UN as an arena of power politics” at all.¹⁹

Japan eventually joined the United Nations in 1956²⁰, and the debate continued about the proper role Japan should play in the world body. The eventual decision by the government was that Japan would discharge its duties related to UN membership “within [the] limits of Japanese law”²¹ and with “appropriate reservations”.²² When Japan formally applied for membership in the United Nations Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo wrote that Japan would meet its responsibilities “by all means at its disposal” acknowledging the limitations of Article Nine. Interestingly enough, this was the same wording used when Japan first publicly announced its candidature for a permanent UN Security Council seat.²³

Some in Japan were able to rectify the discrepancies between Article 43 of the UN Charter and Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution with their belief that in the future the

United Nations would have its own military forces, making their renouncement of the use of force, even in self-defense, appear principled and natural.²⁴ Others, like Prime Minister Yoshida posited that Article Nine could be used in Japan's favor in immediate terms by allowing Japan to pursue economic growth at the expense of any real self-defense capability.²⁵

Once Japan joined the United Nations, they immediately began work on restoring their prestige and place in the world community. They also hoped they could reform the UN from early-on to bring it in line with their new position of economic power. Within the UN framework, however, was a glaring reminder of Japan's past that served as a psychological stumbling block to the future.

2.3 Contention within the United Nations: The Enemy Clauses, Article Nine, and the Early Maneuvers

Depending on how one chooses to define diplomatic normalcy determines how one views Japan's current diplomatic situation. With the possible exception of the Constitutional limitations on military force to settle disputes ("hard power"), Japan has the same sovereign rights as any other nation to independently negotiate solutions to outside issues and engage other nations on its own terms. However, in the international community there is still a lingering remnant of the Second World War that serves to remind Japan of its previous period of humiliation and submission. For Japan, removing this glaring reminder is a high priority.

A particular sore point for Japan is what are collectively called the "enemy state" clauses in the Charter of the United Nations. These clauses, articles 53, 77, and 107 allow the original signatories to engage in any necessary "enforcement action" against "any state

which during the Second World War [was] an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter”.²⁶ Though some in Japan see these articles as null and void²⁷ now that Japan is a full UN member, others remain adamant for revision of the clauses, calling it “a psychological issue”.²⁸

Government officials pay particularly close attention to the clauses and how they relate to eventually permanent membership. A Japanese official stationed with the Japanese permanent mission to the UN in New York stated “the United Nations faces important reforms as the world enters the 21st Century. With the end of the Cold War, there must be changes in the 50-year-old structure as the needs of the world are different”.²⁹

Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, who served from November 1982 until November 1987, once confided in his Foreign Minister:

“Immediately when I became Prime Minister, I ordered the Gaimusho (外務省 - Foreign Affairs Ministry)···[to] delete the enemy clause! We have to become a permanent Security Council member! I told the Gaimusho about these two ideas. But the Gaimusho practically refused it. Then [I ordered them to] delete the enemy clause first! Consult with Germany about it, with [German Chancellor] Kohl, that is what I ordered the Gaimusho. The Gaimusho did not really agree, and probably did not consult that much with Germany.”³⁰

More recently, at a speech before the General Assembly in 2005 Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro touched upon both issues again when he stated:

“The world has changed dramatically over the last sixty years...Japan has determinedly pursued a course of development as a peace-loving nation, making a unique and significant contribution to the peace and prosperity of the world.
The composition of the Security Council must reflect these fundamental changes. Japan is convinced that Security Council reform is a just cause for the international community – as is the deletion of the long obsolete ‘enemy state’ clauses from the UN Charter.”³¹

In both these instances we see Japanese Heads of Government linking deletion of the enemy state clause with attaining a Security Council permanent membership, that is, we see diplomatic normalization linked with international recognition of Japan's post-war power. For Japan, diplomatic normalization is not being seen as equal to other nations, diplomatic normalization is being a permanent Security Council member. A primary step towards this goal is removing the residual "enemy clause" which still remains in the UN Charter to this day, though not for lack of effort on Germany or Japan's part. As recently as December 2004 an advisory panel to then-Secretary General Kofi Annan reported the enemy state clauses "are outdated and should be revised" so that the Charter reflects "the hopes and aspirations of today, not the fears of 1945".³² Three days before the report was issued, then-Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichiro and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder met in Tokyo and agreed on the need to delete the enemy clause from the UN Charter.³³

As Japan worked toward reforming the UN Charter, they were also working on reforming the country domestically and internationally. Successive Japanese Governments have taken different views of Japan's role in the United Nations, many of which can be interpreted as early harbingers of Japan's eventual desire for a permanent Security Council seat. Over time, these objections changed from interpreting Article Nine as banning all use of force to banning only offensive force,³⁴ eventually to allowing Japan to participate in Peacekeeping Operations.

Early on, the Japanese Government publicly and adamantly proclaimed that Article Nine effectively forbade Japan from defending itself. This statement, made by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru in 1946³⁵, contrasts sharply with a statement he made just nineteen years later when he wrote;

“For Japan, a member of the UN and expecting its benefits, to avoid support of its peacekeeping mechanisms is selfish behavior. This is unacceptable in international society. I myself cannot escape responsibility for the use of the Constitution as a pretext for this way of conducting national policy.”³⁶

Cooney explains that politicians in Japan did not try to amend the Constitution to realize their plans for progressive normalization of national defense and the Self-Defense Forces, but rather chose to reinterpret the meaning and intent of Article Nine as time passed to be in-line with their stated goals.³⁷ This met with fierce resistance from the Left-wing of Japanese politics.³⁸ Some officials even went so far as to discuss the possibility of possession of nuclear weapons in a purely defensive capacity as a deterrent. The government of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke proclaimed;

“The Government intends to maintain no nuclear weapons, but speaking in terms of legal interpretation of the Constitution there is nothing to prevent the maintaining of a minimum amount of nuclear weapons for self-defense.”³⁹

Later, Kishi’s Government made an official statement where it further broadened the official interpretation of Article Nine;

“In the event an attack is waged...and there are no other means of defense, counter attacks on enemy bases are within the scope of self-defense. With the right of self-defense retained as an independent nation, the Constitution does not mean for the nation to sit and do nothing and await its death.”⁴⁰

It did not take long for Japanese politicians to realize the legitimating power of the United Nations and the inadequacy of strict adherence to Article Nine in the evolving geopolitical climate. This rationale is a logical stepping stone to Japan’s eventual belief in the constitutional legality of Peacekeeping Operations.

Before getting to widespread public agreement on the military and political nature of Security Council permanent membership, Japan had other rationales supporting its argument. Economically and financially Japan has very impressive credentials underlying its ambitions.

These two factors were much safer politically, both domestically and internationally, in driving for permanence, and were the first set out, and the most widely discussed, among advocates and opponents. Since that is the case, it is now useful to compare Japan's economic and financial power with the states Japan would like to sit alongside at the circular table.

3.0 Part II - The Present Environment

3.1 Economic and Financial Power in Comparison

Economic indicators are especially noteworthy when comparing Japan to the nations which currently serve as permanent members of the Security Council. As discussed in the introduction, lacking a consensus on a clear definition of a permanent Security Council contender, nations are forced to design and argue their own definitions. For Japan, the obvious argument is an economic and financial one. This is where Japan stands strongest against the other contenders who are not yet permanent members but seek such a position, and where Japan can comfortably demonstrate its similarity to the present permanent membership in a wide variety of commonly accepted economic and financial indicators. Economically and financially, Japan can confidently argue it “looks” like a permanent member.

Japan is a member of the “Group of Eight” or “G8” nations who meet annually to discuss major global “economic and political” issues. Membership in this exclusive club includes, in no particular order, the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and Canada. Together these represent 66.5% of the world’s economy.⁴¹ When specific indicators are ranked a pattern will begin to emerge.

If Gross Domestic Product, the value of all goods and services from a nation in a given year, is analyzed the economic disparities between Japan and the other permanent members is evident. According to the International Monetary Fund, the United States and Japan are securely in the number one and number two spot, respectively. The United States far exceeds Japan, \$13.7 trillion to \$4.4 trillion, but Japan alone exceeds all other nations permanently on the Security Council. The People’s Republic of China holds a GDP of \$3.2

trillion, the United Kingdom \$2.75 trillion, France \$2.5 trillion, and Russia \$1.2 trillion in US Dollars.⁴²

Nominal GDP is not always the best indicator of economic power or efficiency. In such cases GDP by Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is a useful value to consult. PPP goes further than nominal GDP by comparing the exchange rates of different currencies and seeking to determine the relative value of each to buy a similar basket of goods in each country. One dollar in the United States would buy considerably less than one US Dollar would buy in China. PPP seeks to take this exchange into consideration when computing economic power and growth. Again using the International Monetary Fund rankings we see a disparity between permanent Security Council members and their overall economic rankings. The United States once again ranks first with \$13.5 trillion US dollars, while this time the People's Republic of China follows with \$11.6 trillion, recognizing China's rapidly modernizing and expanding economic power. Japan is in third with \$4 trillion while the United Kingdom is in sixth place with \$2.3 trillion, France in seventh with \$2 trillion, and Russia in ninth with \$1.9 trillion.⁴³

Economically, a real disparity exists between the world's largest economic powers and those that serve as permanent members of the Security Council. That disparity also extends to financial contributions. As previously discussed, the Japanese have linked diplomatic normalcy with permanent membership. In financial terms, their record of financial support to various diplomatic agencies and funds also underlies their normalcy and what they perceive the end result should be.

Logically, it is easy to understand how a nation that pays huge sums of money to the UN Budget, voluntarily donates billions more to Peacekeeping Operations, and actively

engages in ODA grants and loans to developing states, would feel that its voice was being underrepresented at best, or ignore at worst, on what is arguably the most important body in the international community.

Financial power stems from economic power, for the economy of a state must be able to produce the wealth that can be sent abroad. Using both of these elements, Japan is a great power. Japan contributes the equivalent of millions of dollars annually in assessed payments to the United Nations, both the Regular Operating Budget (ROB) and in voluntary payments to fund peacekeeping operations. Japan also donates significant sums in grants and loans under the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as Official Developmental Assistance (ODA) to modernizing states around the world. In most every indicator of economic strength, Japan ranks at either the near top, or the top. These factors are frequently referenced underlying rationales in Japan's ambition.

In terms of assessments to the United Nations ROB, Japan is rivaled only by the United States for total contributions to the United Nations as a whole. Of the approximately \$1.6 Billion United States Dollar regular operating budget of the United Nations in 2006, the United States was assessed \$423.5 million, or 22% of the total budget. Japan, the second largest contributor to the overall mandatory operating budget, was assessed \$374.7 million, or 19.47% of the total budget.⁴⁴

These amounts are striking, but they become even more so when they are compared to the contributions of other member states both permanent members of the Security Council and regular member states. Starting with the other permanent membership, a clear and definite pattern begins to take shape.

Of the other permanent members of the Security Council, in terms of payments to the

UN ROB, the United States places first (as previously discussed). From the pinnacle of mandatory payments the other permanent members drop off sharply. The United Kingdom was assessed \$104.6 million, or 6.13%, placing 4th overall; followed by France at \$102.9 million, or 6.03%, placing 5th; then the People's Republic of China at \$35 million, placing 9th; then Russia, assessed \$1.1 million, placing below Mexico, Canada, Italy, and even the Netherlands in total payments. In fact, half of the mandatory UN assessed budget comes from the United States, Japan, and Germany, in that order, which pay approximately \$946 million, or 50.13% of the ROB. The remaining four permanent members of the Security Council pay approximately \$263.7 million, or 15.31%.⁴⁵

These figures have not escaped the notice of the Japanese at all levels of society. Prime Minister Nakasone reportedly told a meeting of the National Research Committee that "Japan was the second biggest contributor to the UN and therefore had no need to be shy"⁴⁶ about their aspirations for permanent membership.⁴⁷ Other officials in the Japanese government have reportedly stated "the country's acceptance into the Security Council is long overdue, considering that Japan is the second largest contributor."⁴⁸ Additionally, the youth of Japan are also inclined to favor the ascension of Japan to the world's economic stage. According to Professor Kuniko Inoguchi of Sophia University;

"Many younger Japanese brought up in economic prosperity do believe that Japan is ready to play an active role in world affairs, especially through the United Nations to which Japan pays a lot of money".⁴⁹

Outside of Japan, observers have noted the "United Nations payments as impetus" rationale for Japan's bid. Brad Glosserman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies stated of Japan's UN role;

Japan provides too much money to the UN for it not to have a real voice...the [Security Council] is the only place that voice is not heard. Japanese

diplomats chafe when they are not privy to those discussions. They feel they have a right to be there, they may be right.⁵⁰

The Japanese government has been accused of using its immense payment scale to the United Nations as leverage in driving for a permanent seat. In 2005 Prime Minister Koizumi announced that Japanese citizens pressured his government to scale back funding to the United Nations because they did not feel they were getting their money's worth. Critics contended this was a political move designed to show Japan's displeasure at having never attained a permanent seat on the Security Council.⁵¹

If we delve further into Japan's financing of the United Nations, the Peacekeeping Operations budget shows itself to be an interesting indicator of a financial foundation for permanent membership. The UN Peacekeeping Budget, while separate from the regular operating budget, follows a similar funding assessment formula with an extremely important difference, it is weighted toward permanent members. It is assumed that since PKO's require the support of all permanent members, they should bear the brunt of the dues necessary to fund them. A very low cap is placed on the poorest nations, while the permanent members are assessed at a higher rate similar to the regular operating budget.⁵²

Even with assessments weighted towards the permanent members of the Security Council, Japan once again is assessed the second highest overall payments. Of the top ten highest contributors to the special peacekeeping budget, the United Kingdom placed fourth, France fifth, China seventh, and Russia not at all.⁵³

Another element of Japan's contributions to the world that officials trumpet when speaking of their grand ambition is in the area of Official Developmental Assistance (ODA) through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Prime Minister Koizumi put it succinctly when he stated;

After the Second World War, Japan experienced a dramatic economic recovery, with the help of the international community. On the basis of our own experience, we are keenly aware that, in promoting international cooperation, self-help efforts are essential to overcoming difficulties and achieving a prosperous society. Japan's official developmental assistance therefore has been based on the principle of "ownership and partnership."⁵⁴

In 2005, following the familiar pattern, Japan was second behind only the United States in total ODA grants and loans. According to the OECD, in that year Japan donated \$13 billion to not only East Asia but around the world. Of the permanent membership of the UN Security Council, the United States donated \$27 billion, firmly in first place; the United Kingdom donated \$10.77 billion, in third place; followed by France in fifth with \$10 billion.⁵⁵

It is interesting to note that China has received ODA from Japan for many years, a fact which will be further elucidated upon later in this analysis. In economic terms, though, sending ODA to a country with which Japan has had such historically antagonistic relations is interesting. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, China received ¥5.85 billion in 2007 to finance "The Project for Human Resource Development".⁵⁶ In 2006 China received ¥16.14 billion in aid,⁵⁷ ¥10.45 in 2005,⁵⁸ and ¥23.44 in 2004.⁵⁹ Yet China remains opposed to Japan's bid for permanent membership.

The financial basis of Japan's bid is not, of course, limited to arguments founded on UN payments or voluntary contributions. Since assessments by the UN are a function of economic performance, however, those payments and percentages tell a great deal about what kind of state Japan is, and its potential for future advancement and leadership on the world stage.

3.2 Japan's Political and Military Situation

Japan has for almost six decades been locked with a Constitution not of their own choosing, but one which the population overwhelmingly supports. After Japan surrendered to the Allied Powers following World War II, the United States, through the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers, began reconstructing Japanese society in its own image. The new Constitution established a bicameral parliament, or Diet, composed of a House of Representatives and a House of Councilors. The chief executive would be a Prime Minister, chosen from among the members of the houses. The Emperor was relegated to purely ceremonial status. He would reign but not rule.

From that point on Japan would be a pacifistic state that would never again use nor never again have need of military forces for the resolution of conflicts or the attainment of state goals. It seemed that with the end of the Pacific War the Japanese had “learned their lesson” about the horrors of war and would never again support military action or even the idea of standing military forces. The security of the nation would be guaranteed by the United States, and the new United Nations.

Unfortunately for Japan, permanent members of the Security Council are the final arbiters of the use of force under the United Nations' framework. Permanent Members are not only required to sit in judgment of the relative merits of the use in force in given situations, but are also supposed to contribute money, supplies, and troops to carry out the orders of the council. For the other permanent members, this is not a problem. For Japan, such responsibilities would violate six decades of the national character, a national ideology built upon the two paragraphs of Article Nine.

Article Nine, as well as the constitution and the government as a whole, was designed

by the United States after the failure of the Japanese establishment to return a Constitution that suited the occupation authorities. The Constitution has put serious limits on the ability of the Japanese to maintain military forces and to project force in pursuit of national goals, leading to criticism of Japan's ability to meet Security Council obligations. "Permanent members are not supposed to flinch from overseas combat," says Jamie Miyazaki writing in the Asia Times, "but fight if necessary to maintain international peace and security". Permanent membership implies that the country "is willing and fully able to shoulder all responsibilities of members in maintaining international peace and security - that means taking part in peacekeeping missions and even military intervention."⁶⁰

Although the United States under the presidency of George W. Bush publicly supports Japan's aspirations for permanent membership,⁶¹ there have always been reservations. Former Senator William Roth of Delaware sponsored a resolution in the Senate stating the sense of the United States Congress that the government "should support ...Japanese permanent membership" but that Japan should not be permitted to join the Security Council as a permanent member unless it resolves issues relating to the use of force.⁶² Speaking on the floor of the US Senate, Senators Roth and Kent Conrad of North Dakota inserted into the record the following statement;

Until...Japanese political leaders are willing to confront this issue squarely (and for Japan, which has failed to come to terms with its wartime record, this will involve not only domestic debate, but close consultation with the country's Asian neighbors) [the] country will be able to participate in the type of peacekeeping operation outlined above, just as [it did not participate in] Operations Desert Shield or Desert Storm. Until Tokyo resolves this problem, it is difficult to see how the government can press for membership in the Security Council, particularly since such membership would allow the country to vote in favor of U.N. military operations which could endanger the lives of American servicemen but in which their own armed forces *would play no part*. [emphasis added]

Here we see the two Senators identifying what will later be termed “opposition from responsibility”, as well as identifying and understanding the international derision and domestic embarrassment the Japanese government received for its “checkbook diplomacy” in the its handling of the Gulf Crisis. They went on;

In closing, we must stress that we do strongly support a permanent Japanese and German presence, with full voting rights, in the Security Council. The exclusion of two such potent nations makes little sense. However, the fundamental causes of these exclusions were manufactured in [former West German capital] Bonn and Tokyo, not in New York. Bonn and Tokyo must now dismantle the obstacles to their Security Council membership which they, themselves, have manufactured. Then New York should move ahead and welcome both nations to full and permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council.⁶³

Oddly enough, despite the well-known opposition from the West to Japan joining the Security Council as a permanent member because of the pacifist issue, thus far the Japanese Government has been unwilling to inextricably tie UN Security Council permanent membership with revision of the Constitution.⁶⁴

Additionally, according to the Economist magazine, the recent elections of September 11, 2005 which reelected Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichiro in a landslide “buried what remained of the pacifist left in Japanese politics”.⁶⁵ That is where Japan finds itself politically today, even though Koizumi stood down as Prime Minister, there is still a position of “conspicuous agreement between Japan's two major parties, the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), over Japanese participation in UN PKOs.”⁶⁶ Given that Ozawa Ichiro currently leads the opposition Democratic Party of Japan in the House of Councilors, and he has demonstrated public support for normalization,⁶⁷ Japan could soon domestically push past this issue.

Japan certainly is not wanting for military spending. Besides the aforementioned mandatory and voluntary payments to the United Nations for peacekeeping and other dues directly related to the use of force, Japan spent \$46 billion dollars in 2007 on defense alone. It is admittedly difficult to compare defense spending by nation because China and Russia do not publicly disclose total spending leading experts to be forced to estimate total expenditures. Experts are forced to estimate total expenditures for allied states such as France and the United Kingdom as well, often from previous years. The Central Intelligence Agency estimates that for the 2007 budget year Japan spent less than China, at \$81.47 billion; the United Kingdom, at \$67.5 billion; and France, at \$61 billion. Japan spent more than Russia, which the CIA estimates spent \$21 billion on defense in 2007.⁶⁸

In a broader scope, Japan's contribution to the total collective defense budget of US allies in East Asia was more than half. If Japan's defense budget is compared against that of the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Japan's budget is 15% of their 2007 total of \$297.14 billion. If the top three members of NATO Europe, the permanent members France and the United Kingdom and the normalized German military, then the total defense budget for NATO in Europe drops by more than half, leaving \$131.14 billion. In this instance, Japan's lone defense budget is equivalent to 35% of NATO Europe. Finally, if Japan is compared to the fifteen nations the Center for Defense Information lists as "Countries of Vital Interest to the U.S.," their combined defense budgets total \$25.47 billion, slightly more than half of Japan.⁶⁹

For a focused example of military disparity in East Asia, take the Republic of Korea and Japan as examples. Both nations rely on the United States for significant areas of their defense. As of September 30, 2006, Japan hosts 33,453 US military personnel and South

Korea hosts 29,086.⁷⁰ South Korea has fully normalized military forces but is allied with the United States to deter future North Korea attempts at annexing the South. In terms of real military expenditures, Japan spent nearly double what the Republic of Korea did in 2006, though South Korea expended more as a percentage of its Gross Domestic Product. South Korea, which faces a hostile North Korea along its only land border and with whom it is still technically at war, spent \$21 billion on defense, or 2.7% of its GDP. Japan spent \$46 billion, or .80% of its GDP, on defense in 2006.⁷¹ Basically, that means an island nation which has no “military forces” and a Constitution which forbids it from exercising the use of military power to solve international disputes spent more than a country with a completely normalized military force facing a hostile enemy directly on its northern border. This also demonstrates that Japan’s powerful economy allows it to spend a great deal of money on both a small force, thereby ostensibly purchasing high-quality equipment, and also do so at under 1% of their GDP.

Taking comparisons of Japan’s military capability to other nations beyond abstract spending totals into more concrete terms shows a similar interesting trend. By focusing on military strength in specific force totals Japan’s aforementioned military capability vis-à-vis the permanent members of the Security Council is once again elucidated.

It is not just in military expenditures that Japan is on par with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council. In terms of standing military forces, that is, active troops by nation, we see that Japan has less active forces than four permanent members of the Security Council, but more than one permanent member. Using the most recent data available, The People’s Republic of China has approximately 2.25 million standing forces,⁷² about double that of the United States with approximately 1.4 million troops.⁷³ India and

North Korea round out the spots three and four, respectively, with 1.3 and 1.1 million active duty military personnel.⁷⁴ Russia still maintains a respectable 1 million personnel, but after that the numbers drop off sharply.⁷⁵ France has roughly 361,085 personnel, putting it in sixth place.⁷⁶ In eighth place is Japan with 239,000 active duty forces.⁷⁷ The United Kingdom, with a long tradition of military power, has even less than Japan with only 195,900 personnel on active duty.⁷⁸

According to London's International Center for Strategic Studies, in 2005 Japan had sixteen attack submarines, fifty-three major surface warships, three hundred combat aircraft, and ninety attack helicopters. Compared with the resources of the United States, this is quite low, compared with the resources of the permanent membership of the Security Council, this is either equivalent, or quite high.⁷⁹

The United Kingdom has a long and rich history of seaborne military power, the British Navy long being a symbol of the empire itself. Even so, the United Kingdom has fewer major surface warships than Japan, thirty four, nineteen fewer than Japan. It has eleven attack submarines, five fewer. It does exceed Japan in the number of attack helicopters and combat aircraft, 126 and 354, respectively. The People's Republic of China is in a similar situation. China far outpaces Japan in terms of its rapidly modernizing Air Force, which possesses a staggering 2,643 combat aircraft to Japan's 300. Granted, this does not take into account technology, Japan being on the cutting edge, but China has undergone major advancements itself in air power. China also exceeds Japan on two other force totals, possessing nineteen more guided missile destroyers and fifty-two more attack submarines. Japan's closest neighbor in terms of military power is France, which possesses two attack helicopters, 319 combat aircraft, thirty-four major surface warships, and six attack

submarines. If one looks back at the totals, France possesses eighty-eight fewer helicopters, nineteen more combat aircraft, the same number of major surface warships, and five fewer attack submarines.⁸⁰

What this means for Japan is that even as a nation without a military, it still has more personnel in, and spends more on, its non-military in name only “Self-Defense Forces” than most every other nation. In many cases, as documented above, it does so more than permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. There is something else here worthy to note, Japan recently joined the exclusive club of aircraft carrier nations. On 23 August 2007 the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces launched the *Hyuga*, a 13,500 metric ton displacement aircraft carrier outfitted with the Aegis air-defense system, 2 Phalanx Close-in Weapons System (CIWS) cannons, 64 advanced RIM-162 ESSM Sparrow Missiles and 6 anti-submarine torpedo tubes. It has the capability, with a flushed flight deck, runway design and large hangar bay, to accommodate more than the attack helicopters the Japanese government insists it was designed for. The Japanese government, in fact, classifies it as a “helicopter-carrying destroyer” although by the appearance, classification and capabilities listed it is most certainly not a destroyer in any classical definition of the term.⁸¹ The *Hyuga* is also the largest craft launched by the Japanese since the end of the Second World War, and places the country’s non-military in an exclusive club with the United States, Great Britain, France and India, among few others, as a nation operating the gigantic warships.

3.3 Recent Developments

There have been some positive developments on Japan's road to military normalization. The Defense Agency, which succeeded the wartime Ministries of the Navy and the Army, was not treated as a cabinet ministry for constitutional purposes in keeping with Article Nine.⁸² However, on 9 January 2007 the Diet authorized the transformation of the Defense Agency into a full-fledged Cabinet Ministry of Defense.⁸³ This allows the representatives of the Ministry to receive equal status with their foreign counterparts, as well as allowing them to attend regular meetings of the Cabinet within the confines of the Constitution and the laws. Among other developments, in 2006 Japan launched its own spy satellites. More interestingly, Japan openly now states that it considers the independence and security of Taiwan to be in its common interest with the United States, and the United States has a treaty with the island guaranteeing its security against the mainland, security which "a senior American official admits...could not be accomplished without using bases in Japan".⁸⁴

There have also been proposals for altering Article Nine from various sources, ranging from outright abolishment to moderate revision. In his thorough tract on the need to rebuild Japanese politics, Ozawa Ichiro discussed the confusion surrounding how to interpret the article in light of Japan's desire to participate in Peacekeeping Operations, or how the Constitution would allow Japan to respond in an emergency situation. Ozawa argued "we find ourselves forever mired in arguments about constitutional interpretation" because "the current constitution does not...give us clear guidelines governing Japan's response to international developments". To rectify this Ozawa proposed a third paragraph to Article Nine which would read;

“Paragraph 2 should not be interpreted as prohibiting the maintenance of a Self-Defense Force for peace-building activities; the maintenance of a United Nations reserve force for actions under United Nations command when requested; and action by the United Nations reserve force under United Nations command”.⁸⁵

The daily Yomiuri, a widely-read national newspaper in Japan, published their recommendations for amending Article Nine. In response to the Gulf crisis, discussed in the third section, the editorial staff of the daily Yomiuri proposed the following:

“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people shall never recognize war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of force as means of settling international disputes. Seeking to eliminate from the world inhuman and indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction, Japan shall not manufacture, possess, or use such weapons. Japan shall form an organization for self-defense to secure its peace and independence and to maintain its safety. The Prime Minister shall exercise supreme command authority over the organization for self-defense. The people shall not be forced to participate in organizations for self-defense.”⁸⁶

This draft proposal, which did not become reality, sought to remedy a few notable deficiencies of the present Constitution. Notably, even with the establishment of the Japanese Ministry of Defense, the Constitution does not establish the Prime Minister as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. In fact, the last Japanese Constitution to do so was the Constitution of the Empire of Japan which invested in the Emperor the right of supreme command. Secondly, this draft sought to permanently prohibit compulsory military service and all nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Finally, this draft sought to end the ambiguous nature of the Self-Defense Forces under Japanese law, which has been a point of contention in the past with other political parties in Japan.⁸⁷

This may soon be a non-issue, as recent polls show that a majority of the Japanese public supports Japan “normalizing” its military forces, although they are unsure of what

form this should take. There is strong support nationally for officially recognizing the existence of the Self-Defense Forces, “an organization that protects the nation yet is not mentioned in the supreme law”. In a public opinion poll conducted by the national *Daily Yomiuri* on 11 and 12th March of 2006, seventy-one percent of respondents answered that they believe “the Constitution should clarify the existence of the Self-Defense Forces”.⁸⁸

This overwhelming support does not extend to the war-renouncing Article Nine. In the same poll, as well as in previous polls, the public is divided. Among those polled, thirty-nine percent favored revision, thirty-three percent favored the status quo, and twenty-one percent opposed revision. Article Nine, as discussed in the previous section, has gone through several interpretations as history necessitated, and that is important in understanding those who answered with their support of the status quo. Their answer meant “the article should be handled as it has been so far”. In other words, Article Nine should remain unaltered, but its interpretation should be malleable to the needs of contemporary necessity. Those who supported revision, on the contrary, expressed understanding that there was a “limit to interpreting the article and putting it into practice”. The minority who opposed revision also opposed watering down the article “through changing interpretations”. To put this in practical terms, this means that through either overt Constitutional action or subtle changes in understanding, seventy-two percent of respondents seem to support some form of military normalization.⁸⁹

In a more recent poll conducted 17 and 18th March 2007, forty-six percent of respondents supported revising the Constitution while thirty-nine percent did not. It marked the fifteenth straight year that a majority of the Japanese public supported amending the Constitution to reflect realities “such as contributions to the international community”.

When asked about Article Nine directly, the public answered with an even split. Thirty-six percent of respondents answered in support of some sort of revision, “because limits have been reached on how interpretations and applications of the article can deal with contemporary problems”. On the other side, thirty-six percent opposed revision because “problems should be handled through interpretations and applications of the current article”.⁹⁰

Despite the support of a majority of the population for Constitutional revision, by design the amendment process in Japan is difficult. The proposal to clarify the existence of the Self-Defense Forces enjoys overwhelming support, seventy-one percent in the Yomiuri poll, but it will still need to pass Constitutional muster. Article Ninety-six requires that an amendment pass by a supermajority, or two-thirds, of both houses of the Diet, and then be sent via referendum to the people who must pass it by a simple majority of all votes cast. Following approval by the people, the amendment is promulgated by the Emperor in the name of the people, but he does not have the authority to veto it.⁹¹ Since the ratification of the Japanese Constitution in 1947, it has never been amended.

Were the proposal regarding the Self-Defense Forces to pass the Diet, it looks to be popular enough to pass the popular threshold, but it could still become hostage to politics. The Japanese public remains dubious about their country’s participation in security actions. In a recent survey conducted in 2007, a full fifty percent of respondents answered that it was “okay not to exercise the right of collective *self-defense* [emphasis added]”.⁹² In a survey conducted a year before, forty-four percent stated “the right of collective-defense should not be exercised”.⁹³ Back in early 2002, soon after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United

States when then-Prime Minister Koizumi had promised aid to his ally in an unprecedented step, thirty-two percent opposed the right of collective self-defense.⁹⁴

Were Japan to try and pass a Constitutional amendment to fundamentally alter or abolish Article Nine to ease some of the criticisms it encounters from other states, notably those that sit as permanent members on the Security Council, and thereby move closer to attaining their long-sought ambition, the most recent polls do not show the public would grant them the Constitutional revisions they desire. There is support for altering Article Nine to allow for what would be known as a military in modern understandings. The difficulty is that about half of that support is for structural change and the other half is for change to the understanding and interpretation of the article. It is unlikely that all those who support the “revision by interpretation” faction would vote in favor of an amendment, denying them the simple majority they would need to meet Constitutional requirements.

4.0 PART III - Plans for Expansion and Opposition

4.1 Getting a Larger Table

Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, speaking before Georgetown University in Washington, DC in 2006, eloquently summed up the views of many of the emerging states seeking recognition on the Council when he stated;

“A Security Council which has France as a permanent member, but not Germany; Britain, but not Japan; China, but not India — to say nothing of absence of proper representation from Latin America or Africa — cannot be legitimate in the modern world”.⁹⁵

Indeed, in theory there is great support for expanding the Security Council. In practice, however, there has been opposition at every stage from every permanent member. This opposition has taken several forms and has accompanying underlying rationales. As mentioned previously, Japan’s aspirations and those of the other nations vying for seats on an expanded council are linked and cannot be taken individually in a vacuum. For that reason, the arguments that have arisen against one nation or another, or against reform of the Security Council as a whole, are presented here. Furthermore, since Japan has thus far been the focus of this report it would be useful to present some of the other plans that countries have presented for expansion of the permanent membership of the Security Council, and how they have been received. Finally, should Japan ever achieve its ambition of a permanent seat, it would undoubtedly affect the security policy of the body, and the nations which sit within it. Views of such scenarios, both from within and without, will be presented.

There are two main barriers to Security Council reform, one technical and one political. It should not be read that the political barrier is somehow more important, or the technical somehow less, in the overall narrative for Japan. Rather, it will be shown that both

issues must be independently resolved for Japan's goals to be realized. The main technical issue which any state must face when seeking an enlargement of the Security Council is amending the United Nations Charter. As Japan and Germany have encountered in trying to delete the obviously anachronistic "enemy clauses", this is a very difficult task. The UN Charter lays out the procedure;

"Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council."⁹⁶

In general terms, for Japan to ascend to permanent membership, its proposal would have to be adopted by two-thirds of the General Assembly, and then two-thirds of the world's member nations would have to sign on using their respective processes. Finally, all the present permanent members would have a great-power veto over the change. To date, this complicated and time-consuming procedure has only been successfully implemented four times. The first being the aforementioned increase in the size of the rotating membership from six to ten in 1963 and, in that same year, the expansion of the United Nations Economic and Social Council from eighteen to twenty-seven members.⁹⁷ This was followed ten years later by another successful proposal to increase the size of the Economic and Social Council yet again from twenty-seven to fifty-four.⁹⁸ The last successful amendment to the United Nations Charter was an amendment to Article 109, which provides for the calling of a general meeting for the purposes of proposing amendments to the Charter, as well as the present system of ratifying them.⁹⁹

The main political problem that has arisen with the plan to enlarge the Security Council is the debate over which states should receive the expanded permanent seats. The

developing states in the general membership want to get something out of the deal, so to speak, before they cast their votes to expand the Council's membership. China summarized this position when it announced that any expansion of the Council must;

“Focus on redressing imbalanced regional representation, particularly serious inadequacy in the representation of developing states. It must in no way further aggravate such imbalance...therefore, no reform plan that excludes or discriminates against developing countries will even be accepted by the general membership of the UN, including China”.¹⁰⁰

For Japan to ascend to veto-wielding seats at the circular table, then, politics will have to be played with the countries that were left out of the room. In the last decade, several proposals have been presented to the United Nations on how best to proceed with making the Security Council more equitable and representative of contemporary realities. The three most well-known draft proposals were the “Group of Four plus Two”, the “African Union”, and the “United for Consensus” drafts.

The “Group of Four plus Two” proposal was a plan by the accepted new powers of Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil to ascend to permanent membership by supporting two new permanent seats for Africa in 2005. This proposal called for the creation of six new permanent non-veto wielding members, plus four new rotating seats, increasing the size of the Security Council from fifteen to twenty-five members.¹⁰¹ It was “a desperate attempt to secure permanent membership” by agreeing “to forego their right of veto for at least fifteen years”.¹⁰² The proposal was not successful despite the strong support of the United Kingdom and France, but also not due to the strong opposition of China,¹⁰³ and was tabled in that same year.¹⁰⁴ It is certainly interesting to note that the “G4+2” nations thought they could pacify opposition by agreeing to waive their veto rights for fifteen years. As will be demonstrated later, controversies surrounding the veto are one of the key elements of the

“opposition from efficiency” arguments.

A second popular proposal for expansion came from the African Union. The fifty-three member AU, composed of every African nation except Morocco¹⁰⁵, supported a similar plan to the “Group of four” idea except that the new permanent members would have the veto from the outset and there would be five new rotating seats, instead of four. This would create a twenty-six member council¹⁰⁶. This proposal was also tabled in 2005.¹⁰⁷

The third draft proposal came from the group of nations calling itself “United for Consensus”. This group, led by Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Kenya, Algeria, Italy, Spain, Pakistan and the Republic of Korea¹⁰⁸, is notable in how it formed in opposition to specific regional countries becoming permanent members. According to Ian Williams, “Argentina and Mexico are not sure how a permanent Brazil would represent Latin America; Spain and Italy look askance at Germany, and Pakistan and Indonesia fail to see how a permanent India represents them”.¹⁰⁹ Mindful also of the high level of prestige that permanent membership grants, these nations have sought to deny any new nation the prize and restrict permanent membership to the present five, instead limiting expansion to a total of twenty two-year rotating members eligible for reelection.¹¹⁰

4.2 Opposition takes Form

Since the three most well-known and documented plans for Security Council enlargement have been presented, the next step for our purposes is to document the three main forms of opposition to Security Council enlargement that have been identified and categorized by the author. The first form is opposition to expanding the Security Council by adding any member, not just Japan, and will be termed “opposition from efficiency”. This

opposition is not directed at any specific party of nation and is built on various arguments, such as the added difficulty in passing resolutions or overcoming the expanded veto.

The second and third forms of opposition are directed at Japan in particular, but quite different in overall scope. The second category is leveled at Japan for its unique political system, including the lack of a standing military and the presence of Article Nine, will be termed “opposition from responsibility”. It is important to note that this opposition may not be permanent and could conceivably be surmounted were Japan to overcome the constraints of its political system. The last form of opposition targets Japan specifically for its activities in World War Two, its perceived inability to “atone” for its past crimes, et cetera. This will be termed “opposition from history”.

The first identified form of opposition to Security Council enlargement, “Opposition from efficiency,” takes a single, basic form. It is the belief that should the council be enlarged with more permanent members its functions would be hampered to the point that it would become too difficult for it to operate effectively. There is also the belief among some current permanent members, notably France and England in the past, that the smooth functioning of the United Nations Security Council is more important than its makeup being representative of the world’s contemporary political, popular, or economic power. This opposition, unlike the type discussed below, is not targeted specifically at Japan but is rather applied to all plans for expansion of the Security Council.

In 1993, the United Kingdom summed up the “opposition from efficiency” position quite well when they stated “the first priority must be to safeguard the effective operation of the Council and its ability to fulfill its primary responsibilities under the United Nations

Charter”.¹¹¹ France echoed the sentiment when it stated that it saw no real reason to expand the Council since;

“The ten non-permanent members of the Council already ensure an equitable geographic representation of member states, and they have contributed to the Council’s primary role now at last restored to its previous character”.¹¹²

In the end Russia’s position was similar to that of Britain and France, it “emphasized improving the Council’s working relationship rather than expanding its membership”¹¹³ and later stated that they did not want the Security Council to become a “discussion club”.¹¹⁴

James Paul and Celine Nahory, writing for the Global Policy Forum, argue that expansion of the Security Council’s permanent membership would “exclude virtually all topics from the Council’s agenda” therefore “making effective Council action all but impossible”.¹¹⁵

In the end, once the United States signed on to supporting Japan’s bid, and made assurances that there would be no change in the status of the current permanent five members, Britain and France softened their opposition and began to accept the prospect of adding Japan, as well as Germany.¹¹⁶

The United States has publicly supported Japan’s aspirations under the administrations of both Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush. In June 1993 the United States announced;

“The current permanent members of the Council are countries with global and economic influence and a capacity as well as a will to contribute to global peace and security through peacekeeping and other activities. Their status on the Council should remain unaltered. The United States supports permanent membership for Japan...fully recognizing that that permanent membership entails assuming an active role in global peace and security initiatives.”¹¹⁷

The last part of the quote above is vital to understanding “opposition from responsibility”, and appears multiple times in statements regarding Japan’s political situation. Staying in the United States, former Senator William Roth of Delaware presents an erudite

commentary. The Senator sponsored a resolution in the Senate stating the sense of Congress that the government “should support...Japanese permanent membership” but that Japan should not be permitted to join the Security Council as a permanent member unless it resolves issues relating to the use of force.¹¹⁸ The aforementioned statement by Senators Roth and Conrad are vital to understanding this.

Miyazaki echoed that sentiment by stating “Permanent members are not supposed to flinch from overseas combat, but fight if necessary to maintain international peace and security”. Furthermore, permanent membership implies that the country “is willing and fully able to shoulder all responsibilities of members in maintaining international peace and security – that means taking part in peacekeeping missions and even military intervention”.¹¹⁹ In 1993 British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd stated that British support for permanent membership could only come when Japan had fully embraced Peacekeeping Operations.¹²⁰ The next year Alain Juppe, the French Foreign Minister, agreed with his British counterpart when he stated;

“All those who aspire to be permanent members of the Security Council must accept all the obligations as well as the rights. I am thinking here about Peacekeeping Operations”.¹²¹

A subcategory of this “opposition from responsibility” is indeed Japan’s history in Peacekeeping Operations. There are two areas which are worth focusing on here. One is Japan’s domestic situation caused by Article Nine and the mechanisms by which the country must operate in order to use its Self-Defense Forces, namely a special authorization by the Diet. Passing a bill in the Diet is a long and involved process, and hinders Japan’s ability to quickly respond to crises as they arise. The second is Japan’s use of its immense economic

power as a substitute for personnel and equipment in responding to international situations, what has been derisively called “Checkbook diplomacy”.¹²²

These issues came to a dual head in the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991 when former Iraqi Dictator Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and the United States assembled an international force to expel him. The United States requested manpower from Japan¹²³ which Japan was unwilling or unable to dispatch. Japan eventually moved to send forces to support the multinational intervention against Iraq, again awakening the decades-old debate on the nature of the Self-Defense Forces under Japanese law, but by the time the bill cleared the Diet combat operations had ended. In the end, Japan was humiliated in that although it had provided \$13 billion dollars to fund the effort¹²⁴, it was perceived as being stingy since it initially only offered \$400 million.¹²⁵ In the end, it was excluded from a list of supporters in a full-page ad taken out by the Kuwaiti Government thanking those nations which had worked to free it.¹²⁶ The Japanese public felt equally frustrated, and pressed the government for a resolution.¹²⁷ In the end, the only military manpower Japan sent to Iraq was a fleet of minesweepers in June of 1991.¹²⁸

After the Gulf War diplomatic fiasco, Japan moved toward revising the rules of operation for the SDF to allow it to be used in United Nations’ Peacekeeping Operations. Again, Article Nine reared its head as a potential stumbling block. Cooney tells us that in order to use the SDF overseas and still remain within the boundaries of the present political interpretation of Article Nine, the force could only be used in instances where the threat of force was non-existent, or at least so minimal that SDF forces would not be in imminent danger. In the eventual PKO bill that became law five standards were laid down as prerequisites for the use of SDF. They are:

1. Agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties in the conflict
2. The parties to the conflict...shall have given their consent to the deployment of peace-keeping forces and Japan's participation in such forces
3. The peace-keeping forces shall retain strict impartiality
4. Should any of the above guideline requirements cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may withdraw its contingent
5. The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimal necessary to protect personnel's lives, etc.¹²⁹

Such guidelines are self-evidently restrictive, and the author suggests that they are so restrictive as to make Japanese participation in peacekeeping operations tenuous and prone to unreliability in the event that actual conflict arises in the event that the ceasefire breaks down. Such guidelines would appear to limit Japan to an observer role only, making their numbers pointless to maintaining peace and security as any breach of the peace would necessitate their immediate withdrawal. Under these guidelines, Japanese participation in PKO's would be symbolic only. For example, in July of 2003 the Diet authorized the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces to Iraq for humanitarian assistance operations¹³⁰, where they operated in Samawa in the southern part of the country doing non-military activities like road-repair work.¹³¹ By June 20, 2006 the government had decided to end the deployment with the transfer of security in region to the new Iraqi government.¹³² While this deployment as a whole was monumental for post-war Japan, one analyst noted that "the 600 [Japanese SDF] troops there" were "embarrassingly constrained in their actions" and were "in effect, protected by Australian peacekeepers nearby"¹³³ in keeping with the abovementioned principles.

These restrictive guidelines could have been predicted by any seasoned political observer with knowledge of the system within Nagata-chō, and are also a compelling component of the opposition from responsibility argument. Lawmaking in Japan is

noticeably different from parliamentary systems in the rest of the world, especially systems with which the West would be most familiar, mainly the British Westminster System. Most importantly, unlike the British model of a strong, central Cabinet with a supreme executive who presides and guides the government through his union with the legislative branch, allowing him or her to act as head of government and party head simultaneously to quickly and efficiently manage the affairs of state with little or no input from the minority, especially if the party in power holds an absolute majority of seats, the Japanese system presents a stark contrast. A system some have struggled to define. A system some have labeled a “bureaucratic polity”.¹³⁴

One of the key criticisms of Japanese policy making is the marked propensity for diffusion of responsibility. Ozawa Ichiro, a former member of the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the House of Representatives and now leader of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in the House of Councilors described it thusly;

“The government...is itself scattered among many institutions and interests. Its ministries and agencies are discrete entities. No overarching institution exists to coordinate and control the whole. The cabinet, of course, technically plays this role, but it has never actually been expected to do so and has therefore never developed the necessary procedures. Put another way, the hands and feet of the political structure were created, but the “brain” to govern them was not.

Numerous problems result. The cabinet meeting, for example, nominally Japan’s supreme decision-making body, is an empty institution. Substantive debate does not take place. “Final decisions” are made in advance, and the cabinet meeting is reduced to mere ritual.

In point of fact, it is not entirely clear just where decisions *are* made...policy, in other words, is decided without anyone’s taking responsibility for it”.¹³⁵

Stockwin echoed this sentiment, albeit more diplomatically, when he stated;

“whereas in the classic case the Westminster model was been found to be compatible with a dominant prime minister...very broadly speaking it seems reasonable to describe Japanese prime ministers as ranging between weak and

moderately effective. Moreover, the Japanese Cabinet has not been the central locus decision making that one would expect".¹³⁶

The bureaucratic nature of Japan's government has been noted previously, but deserves special elaboration here. Japan is a constitutional republic, but the strong influence of the bureaucracy in decision-making, to the point of the ministries' bureaucrats authoring and vetting legislation, has led some scholars to struggle to classify the system under which the country operates. For example, when Cabinet Ministers answer questions before the Diet it is the rule rather than the exception for them to read their responses verbatim from an answer sheet prepared by ministry bureaucrats who received the questions beforehand and prepared the appropriate responses, all the while accompanied by a seasoned high-level ministry bureaucrat who can take over for the Diet member in the event they are asked anything about their ministry portfolio beyond their expected limited knowledge.¹³⁷

As Stockwin explains, at the end of the Second World War the general disdain in which the military was held, and the manner in which the bureaucracy survived intact to aid in reconstruction by the occupation forces, served to elevate the civilian bureaucracy to newfound prestige. Coupled with new powers granted by the sovereign government following the restoration, the bureaucracy became the elite of the new Japan. Bureaucrats were, and still are, a "carefully selected, highly educated elite"¹³⁸ who are viewed as "superior to politicians".¹³⁹ It is no surprise then that the bureaucracy became major players in a legislative system of diffused powers and responsibilities.

Recently Japan has been involved in another internal division over use of the SDF overseas. As of this writing, there is "divided government"¹⁴⁰ in Japanese politics as the House of Representatives is controlled by the Liberal Democratic Party and the House of Councilors is controlled by the opposition Democratic Party. Under a law which expired on

1 November 2007 the Maritime SDF was refueling allied vessels en route to support the multi-national force in Afghanistan.¹⁴¹ The opposition Democratic Party in the House of Councilors has succeeded in preventing a reauthorization of the bill leading the MSDF contingent to be withdrawn.¹⁴² Such domestic unreliability is undoubtedly a hindrance to Japan's aspirations and further underscores the existence of the "opposition from reliability" doctrine.

The final form of opposition identified and expounded upon here as it relates to Japan and the expansion of the Security Council is the "Opposition from History" problem. As previously mentioned, this is the criticism that Japan receives from her Asian neighbors, for her perceived inability to properly atone for her militarist past. China and the two Koreas are very vocal opponents of Japan's bid. China, of course, possesses a veto over any changes to the United Nations Charter. As such, Japan must pay careful heed to what direction the political winds are blowing in Beijing.

That wind, unfortunately for Japan, will not take a clear direction. China has stated that it is "understanding of Japan's wishes" but "showed no change in its position" on whether or not to support Japan. China will not state outright that it will support or block any proposals in the UN, up to and including use of the veto power.¹⁴³ It is mostly understood, though, that China opposes Japan's aspirations¹⁴⁴ and it is entirely feasible that China would use the veto to block any change in the UN Charter that would jeopardize its place as the sole Asian state with permanent membership and the supremacy that brings. The Chinese public has made its opinion on the matter known as well. According to the Economist, a petition of 24 million Chinese was signed in the spring of 2005 opposing Japan's bid for a permanent seat.¹⁴⁵

China has frequently used militarist imagery in both domestic and international explanations of their opposition. For example, very early on in Japan's internal debate over how to properly participate in Peacekeeping Operations under the United Nations banner, China quickly censured the idea as a "design for resurgent Japanese militarism".¹⁴⁶ Another very common theme of Chinese opposition is that Japan is too close to the United States in political, economic, and security arrangements to be a truly independent seat on the Council. As such, China might say, giving Japan a permanent seat would be akin to giving the *USS Ronald Reagan* one in former Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro's famous pledge to turn his country into an "unsinkable aircraft carrier in the Pacific".¹⁴⁷

A 2004 editorial in the state-controlled *People's Daily* opined;

"If an obsequious country dancing to the US' tune becomes a permanent member it is not different from giving the US two seats. In terms of being representative India and Indonesia in Asia and several countries in continental Africa are obviously more qualified than Japan. Even Germany is more qualified than Japan in terms of morality and justice and human concept".¹⁴⁸

Touching upon the familiar criticism that Japan has yet to face up to his past, the editorial continued;

"The Japanese militarism [sic] committed monstrous crimes on Asian peoples during WWII and brought tremendous suffering to the Asian peoples, which is a historical fact that no one can write off. However instead of self-examination the Japanese Rightist forces are attempting to tamper with and delete this part of [their] bloody invasion history. The Japanese Prime Minister, Cabinet members, parliament members and ordinary politicians keep on creating troubles on questions such as the invasion history and the Yasukuni Shrine, preaching and advocating [a] false historical outlook... This standing-facts-on-their-heads and confusing-right-and-wrong behavior tremendously hurt the feeling of Asian peoples and of course [was] met with the resolute opposition from righteous and peace-loving countries worldwide [sic et al]".¹⁴⁹

Soon after the September 11th, 2001 attacks on the United States Prime Minister Koizumi met with Chinese President Jiang Zemin over the Prime Minister's plan to support

the US with SDF contingents against international terrorism. To his admitted surprise the meeting was “extremely positive” and “very open and relaxed”. Koizumi explained that “the SDF's activities will be restricted to provide relief and medical care to refugees as well as giving logistic support to U.S. forces in their war against terrorism”. Jiang responded "That kind of support operation is easier to accept" than use of the SDF for military purposes, but then rejoined “I want you to remember that Asian people are wary [of an expanded military role for Japan]”. At an earlier conference with Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, Koizumi was told "I want Japan to be careful about expanding the SDF's role" because of slippery-slope fears that Japan would use strikes on Afghanistan to accelerate its deployments of the SDF.¹⁵⁰

Unlike China, the Republic of Korea has been very forthcoming officially in its opposition to Japan’s desires. According to Ambassador Kim Sam Hoon, quoted by the Korean Yonhap News Agency, “we do not think Japan has the qualifications necessary to become a UN Security Council member, and we will try to make sure that it does not [become one].” He added “there are difficulties for a country that does not have the trust of its neighboring countries because of its lack of reflection on the past to play the role of a world leader”.¹⁵¹

Japan and the Republic of Korea have had a recent dispute that aptly illustrates this lack of trust, and how even what would seem a minor disagreement to an outside observer must be viewed in light of regional animosity. This also provides a case-study for our purposes. There are two islets known by three different names, highlighting the delicacy of the situation, disputed fiercely by Japan and the Republic of Korea. Known as Takeshima (“Bamboo islands”) by the Japanese, Dokdo (“Solitary Islands”) by the Koreans, and

Liancourt or Hornet Rocks by the West, they have been a focal point of renewed national outrage. Situated in the Sea of Japan (unless you are Korean, in which case they are situated in the Eastern Sea) roughly equidistant at 133 miles (215 kilometers) from the mainland of the Republic of Korea, and 131 miles (211 kilometers) from Shimane Prefecture on the Japanese mainland¹⁵², both countries claim them as part of their sovereign territory. The roots of these claims are worth understanding, and basically it stems from history. As Koichi Kosuge explains writing for the Asahi Shimbun, in 1946 the General Headquarters that administered Japan following its defeat removed Japan's authority over the islets but did not include them in the San Francisco Peace Treaty as areas to which Japan renounced all claims, such as Korea and Taiwan. As such Syngman Rhee, President of South Korea at the time, drew a now famous line bringing the islands within his country's control a year later in 1952.¹⁵³ Both countries claim ancient use of the islets for fishing and stopovers, and to have discovered them first.¹⁵⁴ The most important issue may be that Japan first incorporated the islands into their territory during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, the same year that Japan began the annexation of Korea that would be fully completed five years later with the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty of 1910.¹⁵⁵

The modern incarnation of the dispute stems from an incident in April of 2006 when the Japanese Government ordered the Coast Guard to dispatched two unarmed vessels, the *Meiyo* and the *Kaiyo*, to map the seabed around the islets before an international conference at which South Korea was to propose Korean names for some underwater features. The Republic of Korea, outraged, dispatched two armed naval vessels to the same area. Japanese officials offered to meet for a diplomatic conference, but were immediately rebuffed. Soon after, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun went on national television and explained to

the nation that "Japan's present claim to Dokdo is an act of negating the complete liberation and independence of Korea...no compromise or surrender is possible, whatever the costs and sacrifices may be". Eventually a deal was reached between the two governments whereby Japan withdrew its surveyors in exchange for South Korea withdrawing its proposed names for the features at the hydrographical conference.¹⁵⁶

Though the People's Republic of China and South Korea have stated their opposition to Japan's end goals, not every nation in Asia has expressed similar attitudes. In September of 2005 the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), a supranational body which promotes "economic growth, social progress, and cultural development in the region"¹⁵⁷ and includes Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam as members,¹⁵⁸ announced that it would officially support Japan's bid for a permanent UN Security Council seat, though it remained quiet on supporting any of the other announced candidates, stating that "supporting Japan and supporting [other aspirants] are different [matters]".¹⁵⁹

5.0 Conclusions

What has been presented here is an analysis of the history and politics of Japan's rationale for a permanent United Nations Security Council seat and what has informed that ambition. Additionally, opposition to Japan's bid from three different viewpoints was discussed. These views are the most important stumbling block to Japan's ascension to the Council.

In the beginning it was seen that many in Japan were not sure whether it should be a member of the United Nations at all, a far cry from where it now stands as a seeker of permanent membership. Since that time Japan has developed what the Japanese themselves call a "UN-centric" diplomacy which prizes cooperation and subordination to the world body in international disputes. Given that Japan places such high priority on UN cooperation, it is no surprise that Japan seeks such an unambiguous position of power within it.

Is Japan's ambition for a permanent position on the Security Council, a driving force since the early stages of the restoration of Japanese sovereignty, a drive for self-determination in military matters? There is certainly a realist element to their pursuit. Deference to the UN is an article of faith in Japanese politics, and high-level politicians have gone so far as to say that only UN-sponsored force is legitimate. Ozawa Ichiro did so when he explained his rationale for making the Self-Defense Forces completely and totally subordinated to United Nations control. A permanent Japanese position on the Security Council would allow Japan to hold both positions simultaneously – a nation with sovereign command over its own defense forces through its position on the Council on one hand, and a nation utterly deferential to United Nations control on the other. The former would allow Japan to sidestep the difficult and politically inconvenient issue of amending Article Nine,

and the latter would allow it to remain true in spirit to its long post-war history.

As speeches and writings from major political figures such as Prime Ministers Kishi and Nakasone show, Japan did not wait long before it attempted to reassert itself on the world stage. Kishi in reevaluating the limitations of Article Nine, and Nakasone pushing the Foreign Ministry to begin working to delete the enemy clause as a stepping stone to permanent membership. The existence of the enemy clauses to this day underscores the difficulty in amending the UN Charter, a necessary step to both deleting the enemy clauses and changing the composition of the permanent members of the Council. The fact that the present Charter contains references to the “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” as well as Republican China shows that both countries are more comfortable with a *fait accompli* than with expending the international political capital necessary to enshrine their current statuses within the Charter. Japan, on the other hand, is in it for the long haul and seems to be willing to “wait it out” for the rest of the membership to come into line with their ambitions and to expend both political and financial capital to buy the support they need.

Japan has undertaken humanitarian aid and other efforts in Iraq and logistical support in Afghanistan in the aid of the United States and the coalition forces involved there. In the case of Iraq Japan provided assistance without a direct UN mandate, a major step away from Japan’s pacifist historical conditioning. It seems that former Prime Minister Koizumi’s efforts to reshape Japan’s military and regional role will continue with limited opposition domestically, but with cautious, and often dubious, attention from her regional rivals. Recent election results have been taken to show that the Japanese public supports plans to “normalize” Japan both militarily and internationally, as both parties in power support eventual normalization of the country’s military situation. A successful revision of Japan’s

Constitution would undoubtedly ease some of the tension the Western powers have towards Japan's ability to fulfill United Nations Security Council commitments. These activities can help reduce some of the anxiety the parties that hold to the "opposition from reliability" problem experience, but the future of that remains to be seen. In many eyes, regardless of Japan's military or economic capability, its potential remains stagnant so long as it is hindered by domestic constitutional constraints. Contrarily, however, those same constitutional constraints that hinder Japan's ambitions also pacify the concerns Japan's regional neighbors have towards a rearmed, remilitarized former aggressor.

Economically, Japan has a strong case for its bid for a permanent seat. Japan is the world's second largest economy and a major contributor to the United Nations in both the general operating budget and for special peacekeeping operation budgets. Japan's levies from the United Nations surpass all other permanent members of the Security Council except the United States. Many foreign commentators have commented on the fact that Japan is a valuable member of the organization but that it seems to be sidelined out of discussions that are within its spheres of influence and concern (Security Council meetings over Taiwan, for example). If Japan were to become too frustrated over repeated denials of its ambition, would it simply cease playing the game altogether? This is unlikely. What is more likely is that if Japan is repeatedly rebuffed, by a Chinese veto, for example, it would take its influence elsewhere. It could work toward peddling its considerable resources in regional security apparatuses or regional trade deals. It could likewise shift its attention towards gaining positions of prominence in the affairs of regional geopolitical organizations like ASEAN. If Japan is rebuffed after it has proceeded toward military normalization it would be in a better position to become involved in regional security frameworks than it is now,

operating, by choice, under its UN-centric model. Another noteworthy possibility is for Japan to join with the “Group of Four” nations and apply pressure to the United Nations, be it economic, financial, or other. Japan, Germany, India and Brazil could rephrase the debate in the international community in their favor. Instead of being passive and trying to make their respective cases, like this thesis has done in some instances, for a permanent seat they could go on the offensive and argue that it is up to the present permanent members and the countries trying to deny them a promotion to prove they do not deserve it. Japan’s immense economic, financial, and military power would surely be missed should Japan decide to play politics with even a fraction of it.

Internationally, Japan has been successful in gaining some support for its permanent seat, even support independent of the other countries of the world who are seeking concurrent expansion, such as Germany and India. Japan can count the support, as of this writing, of the Association of South East Asian Nations and the United States. Indicators point that the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth would also support Japan’s expansion. Much of this support could be because no one actually expects it to happen. Every proposal that has come up to expand the Council has been tabled. Every regional leader has a regional rival. Japan’s regional rival has a veto.

Japan is not, obviously, without hindrances on the road to expansion. China, although not officially, has stated it will oppose any enlargement of the Security Council beyond the present membership. France and the United Kingdom originally opposed any enlargement of the Council on the grounds that it would muck up the efficiency of the Council’s operations. As time has passed this “opposition from efficiency” has changed form from “any enlargement” to “who should be included?” Changing the question may be a

convenient ruse, designed to allow the competitors to jockey amongst themselves for supremacy while the current members wait it out, conscious of the fact that by the time one or more of the present contenders is in a position to move forward it has burned too many bridges with the regional blocs and allies of its opposition to garner the Charter muster it needs to gain permanency on the Security Council.

There are also concerns that Japan's current political activism for expansion is unsustainable and will eventually fizzle out by the characteristic seven-year-itch syndrome. Right now, for Japan, legitimacy rests with the United Nations but it may not always. Although the desire for a permanent seat is there, Japan may be willing to abandon the pursuit altogether if a more immediately tenable solution is found. This is, even by the author's own admission, a long-shot scenario.

In the great power game of East Asian regionalism, Japan does not believe it can legitimize its regional power without the Security Council, and the People's Republic of China holds the keys, through the veto, to Japan's ascension. Unfortunately for Japan, China and South Korea adhere to the "opposition from history" argument strongly. Japan wants to adhere to its own version of official history and for China to move on with life, so to speak. China wants Japan to publicly fess up for its actions in the war and to make acknowledgement of militarist history part of the nation's core curriculum. Japan has publicly, repeatedly, apologized for its role in Asian militarism but in the eyes of the Japanese East Asia always wants more. China is advancing economically and militarily and does not want a confident, powerful Japan next door. Additionally, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are uncharacteristically united in their opposition to the expansion of the Security Council to include Japan. South Korea, for its

part, has stated it will use its considerable economic and diplomatic leverage to work to make sure Japan's ambitions are left unrealized. Despite the shared security interests of the two countries against China's designs on Taiwan or North Korea's continued bellicosity, they cannot come to an agreement on official history. That is the utility of the "opposition from history" argument: it is infinitely malleable to the situation at hand, substantively empty, and deeply embedded in popular passions. It is a useful tool for maligning Japan because it covers the actual issues with a unified chorus from the continent chanting the historical wrongs committed by Japan, furthering the pulpit nation's goals. It is the author's belief that China hopes that this tactic holds long enough for their political and military superiority over the region to be a certainty. China's possession of the veto, gained by bypassing the machinery of the United Nations Charter it now stands sentinel over, guarantees Japan will not ascend to the Council without a truly odd development in which China sees a confident and remilitarized Japan on the international scene as being in their own self-interest.

It has been speculated that Japan's only real hope may be when the great powers abandon the veto, allowing the decision to be made solely on the decision of the General Assembly's membership. The Great Powers will never give up their vetoes, as it was designed to keep them at the table of an organization that is often accused, domestically, of slowly trying to undermine their sovereignty. For great powers, the United Nations is more a forum to project power, and simultaneously to defend your own, than it is to share in an egalitarian assembly. Japan's unique history, its utter defeat at the hands of the United States in World War II and its reconstruction into a pacifist state, has caused Japan to see the United Nations more from the viewpoint of a minor power than from the viewpoint of the world power it actually is. Therefore, Japan will have to convince the present permanent members,

most of whom it far exceeds in economic, financial, and military potential, that they have more to gain from letting Japan sit with them than they have to lose from denying them a seat at the table, playing the game.

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7.0 Appendix I: Data Tables and Figures

Table 1
GDP of the Five Permanent Security Council Members and Japan

Country	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
China	1,931.65	2,243.69	2,644.64	3,248.52	3,713.30
France	2,061.18	2,137.51	2,252.21	2,515.24	2,656.53
Japan	4,608.14	4,557.11	4,366.46	4,345.95	4,552.20
Russia	591.861	764.068	984.925	1,223.74	1,480.18
United Kingdom	2,169.39	2,246.33	2,398.95	2,755.92	2,933.25
United States	11,685.93	12,433.93	13,194.70	13,794.22	14,305.70

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2007

Scale: in Billions of US Dollars, GDP, current prices

Note: Values after 2006 Estimated by IMF

Table 2
GDP by PPP of the Five Permanent Security Council Members and Japan

Country	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
China	7,768.88	8,853.99	10,147.33	11,606.34	12,988.64
France	1,767.61	1,855.95	1,952.63	2,040.11	2,116.97
Japan	3,747.92	3,942.21	4,155.55	4,346.08	4,494.66
Russia	1,438.40	1,579.91	1,738.98	1,908.74	2,068.08
United Kingdom	1,925.91	2,024.70	2,148.07	2,270.88	2,363.97
United States	11,473.38	12,207.78	12,954.71	13,543.33	14,045.51

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2007

Scale: in Billions of US Dollars, GDP, valuation of currency

Note: Values after 2006 Estimated by IMF

Table 3
Active Troops by Nations, Top Nine Nations

Country	Standing Force Totals
China	2,255,000
United States	1,415,289
India	1,325,000
North Korea (DPRK)	1,106,000
Russia	1,037,000
France	361,085
Germany	284,500
Japan	239,000
United Kingdom	187,970

Source: Multiple, see Citations and Bibliography

Table 4
Top 5 Global Military Spenders

United States	\$518
United Kingdom	\$81
France	\$45
China	\$44
Japan	\$42

Source: Marte, Ana and Winslow Wheeler, ed. *CDI Military Almanac 2007*

Scale: Billions of US Dollars

Note 1: A percentage of Japan's military spending is used to offset the presence of US forces defending Japan under the US-Japan security treaty.

Note 2: China's military budget is classified and must be estimated by outside observers.


Table 5
Naval Power of the Five Permanent Security Council Members and Japan

Nation	Aircraft Carriers	Combat Aircraft	Major Surface Warships	Attack Submarines
United States	11	3856	118	54
United Kingdom	2	354	34	11
Japan	1 ^(see Note)	300	53	16
France	1	319	34	6
China	0	2643	63	68
Russia	1	2118	66	46

Source: Marte, Ana and Winslow Wheeler, ed. *CDI Military Almanac 2007*


Note: Japan's "Helicopter carrying destroyer", the JDS *Hyuga*, is discussed in Part II

Figure 1
Mandatory Contributions to the United Nations Regular Operating Budget



Source: United Nations Association of the United States, 2006
Scale: Millions of US Dollars

Figure 2
Assessment Scale for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations



Source: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, 2006

Scale: Percentage of total Peacekeeping budget members requested to pay

Notes: Scale weighted towards permanent membership (see Part II)

8.0 Appendix II: Language Notes

Note A

Prime Minister Nakasone's statement that "Japan was the second biggest contributor to the UN and therefore had no need to be shy" about its aspirations used the following Japanese phrase: 「恥ずかしい顔をする必要じゃない」 or "*hazukashi kao wo suru hitsuyo ja nai*" which literally translates as "do not need to have a shamed face". This translation was done by the cited source in the main document.

Note B

The phrase "Divided Government" when referring to different parties controlling different houses of a bicameral legislature is an English expression. The original Japanese was 「ねじれ国会」 or "*nejire kokkai*" which literally translates as "twisted Diet". This translation was the author's.

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