# The Impacts of Activism: Women's Social Movement Organizations and Parliamentary Representation

by

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Representation

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Women's movements – both domestic and international – have made enormous political gains

just in the past century. Gender inequality persists, however, in institutionalized politics around

the world. The proportion of women in national legislatures or parliaments serves as a useful

indicator and basis for cross-national comparison of political, as well as social, (in)equality;

numerous scholars have offered explanations for the relative lack of women's political

representation in parliaments and for the global differences in that representation. This field,

however, has not fully analyzed women's social movements as factor increasing women's

legislative presence. Likewise, social movement theory, although it has often grappled with

operationalizing movement outcomes, has not fully addressed outcomes that are both political

and cultural, as is women's political representation. Using data from women's organizations that

are registered with the United Nations, this paper employs OLS multiple regression to analyze

the effect of women's social movement organizing on the percentage of women in parliament,

using a sample of countries from around the world. Location in Scandinavia and national quota

threshold are consistently significant factors, which supports previous research. Although

organizations are not initially a strong explanatory factor for the proportion of women in politics,

interactions between organizations and civil liberties, GDP, and the regions of sub-Saharan

Africa and Eastern Europe are significant variables. This study find that the presence of

women's organizations lessens and can even reverse the negative relationship between civil

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liberties and percent female legislators. GDP and women's political representation are positively related, but the presence of women's organizations increases the strength of the relationship, where even a small increase in GDP leads to substantial gains in women's political representation. Past research has found that countries in sub-Saharan Africa often have higher proportions of female legislators, and that finding is borne out here; women's organizations, however, actually moderate that relationship, such that African women's organizing is negatively associated with political representation. Finally, this paper finds that, although Eastern Europe is negatively associated with women's political representation, the presence of women's organizations attenuates that relationship.

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#### **PREFACE**

I would like to convey my appreciation to everyone who lent their time, patience, and insight to helping me write this thesis. My committee was indispensible; thank you to Kathy, Melanie, and Rachel for your comments, advice, and encouragement. Thank you also to John Markoff and my workshop peers for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this paper – hopefully it's come a long way since you last saw it! I am indebted to all of you for making this thesis what it is.

#### 1.0 INTRODUCTION

Women's movements – both domestic and international – have made enormous political gains just in the past century. Inequality persists, however, in terms of policy, cultural expectations, economic standing, and in political representation; indeed, women currently make up only 19% of national legislators around the world (IPU 2010). Explanations for the persistence of this political gender gap cover a wide range from the cultural to the structural. One of the understudied topics in this area is the role of social movement activism in increasing women's political presence in national legislatures. Scholarship analyzing the disparity in political representation often fails to address social movement activity, and social movement theory has not developed sufficient models for studying movements' political or cultural successes, particularly not for women's political presence – an outcome that I argue is reflective of both political and cultural changes. Exploring and establishing connections between movement organizing and increased political participation will bridge social movement theory and feminist political science and political sociology. In addition, globalized, macrocomparative research is a fast-growing subfield within both of these areas in need of continued study.

To this end I conduct a quantitative analysis of the relationship between domestic women's organizations registered with the United Nations and the proportion of women in national legislature in nations around the world. Using a sample of countries from each region, I regress the percent of female legislators on a count of women's social movement organizations,

controlling for other variables found relevant in previous research. I hypothesize that higher levels of women's movement organizing is associated with higher levels of women in politics.

Addressing the gaps in the literature outlined below, I argue that the presence of more women in national politics is a combination of both political and cultural outcomes for women's movements. The makeup of the political system changes with the inclusion of more women, but this also both indicates and affects cultural change. Cultural ideals about women must change so as to allow for their political involvement, meaning that women's political presence is a marker of change, but the presence of women in these positions of power also serves to further challenge traditional cultural ideas about women's subordinate status. The proportional presence of women in national legislatures, therefore, is both a measure of and a driving force for change in cultural ideas about women. I am more directly analyzing the indicator role, but this thesis is also motivated by and advocates a need for continued change.

I theorize a causal relationship between women's social movement organizations and presence in national politics that is fundamentally one-way. Certainly, female politicians could increase women's activism by contributing to women's organizations or supporting policy that fosters social movement organizing, for example. However, the scholarship on women's substantive representation, though admittedly underdeveloped, does not address the effect female politicians have had on social movement organizing (Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes 2007). Some scholars find that women are more likely to prioritize bills related to children, family, women's issues, and social services (e.g. Thomas 1991, Little, Dunn, and Deen 2001);

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> As opposed to formal (mere presence of women in politics) or descriptive (numeric parity between legislature and population in terms of gender) representation, substantive representation is "substantive" in that higher proportions of women lead to more woman-friendly and progressive policies.

these policies may increase social movement activity indirectly, but existing research has not established such linkages.

On the other hand, social movement activity can directly lead to individuals' politicization as well as the overall cultural and structural prerequisites for more women in the legislature. Social movement activism not only has a biographical impact on activists (Auyero 2003, Fendrich and Lovoy 1988, McAdam 1999) that may politicize them, but also fundamentally alters cultural perceptions and discourses (Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006). In addition to dramatic cultural change, women's organizations also change both the supply of and the demand for female candidates. Movements can increase the pool of female candidates through creating networks and public role models, giving civic skills, increasing political knowledge, and even by bringing women into the public sphere (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001, Kirkpatrick 1974). Movements also alter political institutions in ways that may be favorable for women, through advocating for gender quotas and supporting sympathetic parties and politicians. These effects on activists, culture, supply, and demand provide the foundation for the hypothesized causal effects of women's organizing on political representation. This is the first global study to test the effects of domestic women's organizations on women's representation.

I find that the hypothesized relationship does, in fact, exist. Although the number of women's organizations is not on its own the strongest predictor of women's political representation, there is a positive relationship between the two. Moreover, this relationship is also influenced and implicated in several others. The interaction between women's organizations and civil liberties is a significant one, supporting past research that has emphasized the importance of the civil society component of democracy in affecting women's political

participation. I explore regional differences and regional interactions with organizations, as well; organizations have significant effects in sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe, in particular.

#### 1.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

The study of women in politics and the study of social movements are both extremely rich fields of research, covering a broad spectrum of sub-topics and themes. This project acts as a bridge between these two related, but rarely unified, fields. Women have been – and largely still are – excluded from formal political systems across the globe, as evidenced by the widespread absence of women in positions of substantial political power. Scholars explain this absence in national legislatures in terms of "supply" and "demand" factors within political structures as well as the overall culture; the emphasis is on the nation-state and national government.

Much of the empirical research on women in national legislatures, however, does not address women's social movements as an important explanatory factor. Social movement theory also posits the state as a central player, especially in the study of outcomes, but the internationalization of economies, political bodies, and movements speaks to the increasing importance of international actors and fora. Women's movements registered and/or in consultative status with the United Nations represent just this intersection of national and global. Using a database of these organizations and their effect on the numbers of women in legislatures, I also draw on social movement scholarship on outcomes. Most scholars discuss legal, legislative, and political changes as structural, as opposed to cultural, outcomes. Increased numbers of women in positions of power, as a component of state-based change, is structural, but

it also marks a cultural change. I argue that women's presence in the legislature represents a different kind of success – in that it is both cultural and structural – for social movement organizing than has previously been theorized.

#### 1.1.1 Women in Politics

Although some current women's movements, particularly in Western nations, have in many ways moved away from state-centered organizing and toward cultural politics, the battle for national political representation, much less national advocacy for women's issues, is far from won. Feminist theory and feminist organizing have since their very beginnings analyzed and mobilized around the role of the state in legislating change and women's role within the state and polity. The state is fundamentally male not only in a theoretical sense (e.g. Brush 2003, MacKinnon 1989, Pateman 1988, Phillips 1991, Young 1990), but in specific terms of representation and policy. The modern state is founded on and its power legitimated by claims of objectivity and impartiality, which feminist scholars regard as not only false (that the state is subjectively male), but as erasing difference and delegitimating dissent. The classical liberal subject is an abstracted ideal, treated as if sovereign and isolated, "decontextualized from the unequal conditions of our lives" (Brown 1995: 110). This abstraction leaves little room for other types of citizens.

In more concrete terms, gender differences are still prevalent, and very pronounced, in terms of heads of state, cabinets, national legislatures, and local politics around the world, not to mention in policy.<sup>2</sup> Chowdhury and Nelson et al (1994) place this political disparity at the forefront, referring to the "ubiquity of women's secondary political status" (3). Theory on women in politics is greatly concerned with explaining the roots of these disparities, their exceptions, and their implications (e.g. Hughes 2009, Kenworthy and Malami 1999, Kirkpatrick 1974, Matland 1998, Matland 2010, Oakes and Almquist 1993, Paxton 1997, Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006, Paxton, Hughes, and Painter 2010, Rule 1987, Yoon 2001). This project, too, uses as a starting point and theoretical motivation the conception of the state as exclusionary to women, but also an integral site of contestation and opportunity.

Much of the research mentioned above puts a particular emphasis on explaining the lack of women in positions of power, particularly legislatures. The explanations for the relative absence of women are wide ranging. They are usually delineated as supply-side or demand-side (Paxton 1997, Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes 2007, Randall 1987). Supply-side includes factors that "supply" viable female candidates, such as political knowledge, political ambition, education, financial resources, and female role models (Wolbrecht and Campbell 2006). Gender imbalances in each of these areas lead to a smaller supply of female than male candidates. For example, professional occupations – as a marker of financial resources and power – are often predominantly held by men. Also, the low number of women in positions of power perpetuates itself because there are fewer role models for young women interested in politics than for young men. These factors help shape the "pool" of women who are qualified and motivated to run for office, as well as their chances of winning elections.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Assessing the presence, implementation, and success of woman-friendly policies, ranging from sexual assault and domestic violence laws to maternity leave provisions, is another, extremely rich area of research that overlaps with the women in politics field. Unfortunately, this project does not have the space to address this other component of gender imbalances in politics.

Demand-side focuses more on political institutions and structures. Scholars in this area study the governmental system itself or the role of party dynamics. Many focus on the role of democracy, usually finding it to be relatively insignificant in accounting for proportions of female legislators (Kenworthy and Malami 1999, Paxton and Kunovich 2003, Paxton 1997), although Paxton, Hughes, and Painter (2010) find that democracy as a processual, rather than static variable, does indeed positively influence women's political representation; they also find that the civil liberties component of democracy is much more important indicator. Viterna and Fallon (2008), among others, also examine the role of democratization in increasing women's political participation, and find that its importance varies by different components of the democratization process and women's movements.

The type of electoral system has been found to be another important explanatory variable. Multiple studies have highlighted the importance of proportional representation systems in increasing the proportion of women in legislatures (e.g. Norris 1997, Paxton 1997, Paxton, Hughes, and Painter 2010, Rule 1987). This type of electoral system matches the proportion of seats for a party to the proportion of votes the party won; voters cast ballots for parties, rather than candidates, so minority candidates do not stand alone. More recent work has questioned the effect of proportional representation system in new democracies (Viterna and Fallon 2008) but it remains an important variable.

Finally, the gender quota, which mandates a certain proportion of female candidates or legislators, is a significant factor in determining women's level of political representation (e.g. Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005, Paxton and Hughes 2007). This may seem to be self-evident, but there is notable variation in the proportion of women mandated, enforcement, and whether quotas are by party or by political body (Krook 2010; Paxton, Hughes, and Painter 2010). The

context of the adoption of quotas is another separate subfield, and it is important to note that Beckwith (2003) and Matland (2010) do acknowledge the role of women's social movement organizing in advocating and establishing a quota system, and Krook (2006) addresses the transnational role of movements in diffusing strategies and information about quotas. None, however, measure women's movements cross-nationally as an explanatory factor for women's political representation. In general, the systematic study of the role of social movements is left out of these political explanations of women's political representation.

Culture, a concept somewhat harder to define, also plays a major role in determining the number of both potential and elected female legislators. Measured with variables such as region or religion, culture is usually conceived as operating outside of or indirectly through more structural supply and demand factors (Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes 2007). I agree with Paxton and Kunovich (2003) that culture influences both supply and demand, and also operates independently. For instance, cultural ideals affect the perception of women as legitimate and capable political actors, and concretely affect whether women have the resources to run for office. The dichotomization of culture and structure is a shortcoming in the literature, with few works attempting to address both components simultaneously. Norris and Inglehart (2001) are a notable exception, maintaining that "structural and institutional explanations need to be supplemented by accounts emphasizing the importance of political culture" (2001: 131). I will discuss what I see as the mutually influential spiral of culture and politics in greater detail below.

I draw on these theories of women's presence in politics, using many of the above factors as control variables in my analysis. I depart from them, however, in that I posit the level of domestic social movement organizing as a significant factor explaining proportions of women in parliaments, which has been understudied in the field of women and politics. A corollary to

explanations of barriers to women's political representation are the explanations of the means used to overcome these barriers. Social movement organizing provides a particularly effective means to effect change both in political structures and in the larger society. <sup>3</sup>

#### 1.1.2 The State, Globalization, and Women's Social Movements

The women in politics literature outlined above addresses representation inequalities specifically within the state and is, in general, expressly concerned with state-level problems and explanations. The state has long been a primary location of interest for feminist (and social movement) scholars. If gender inequality is so pervasive (Burn 2000), why privilege the study of the state as a site of inequality? First, on the most basic level, both gender inequality and the state are fundamentally rooted in questions of power. Brush (2003) draws a useful analogy with banks: people use money all the time, but banks are consolidated centers of money that are therefore often the target of those seeking to take money. Likewise, people are constantly engaging in microsocial acts structured by power, but power is more concretely consolidated in the state apparatus; it is therefore often the target of those wishing to take or redistribute power.

The state is a theoretically useful concept for what it represents, but also because that representation also makes it a concrete target and site of opposition. Social movements use that same perception of the state to make it a primary target. Similarly, inequality within national

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Many women are in places where "social movements" as defined in the West (i.e. public, organized contentious politics) are not really possible, and they often participate in more everyday methods of attempting to change society, sometimes called non-movements (Bayat 2007). These are fascinating cases of resistance and in need of much more study, but since my sample includes only democratic or semidemocratic nations, these places are excluded.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Like much of the women in politics literature, I am studying national legislatures – both upper and lower houses – as a proxy for "the state" writ large. The state operates in multiple other venues and its power is manifested in many ways, but the legislature is (theoretically) the most accessible to its citizens.

legislatures is often the most visible manifestation of gender inequality, in that the state is explicitly public and made up of public figures. This readily apparent difference becomes useful as a mobilization tool – which I address below – and as a measure of gender parity in a larger sense – which helps form the foundation of this study. The state understood as a center of power and gender understood as a differential of power in many ways flattens out the nuances of both, but is representative of people's lived experiences, understandings, and of concrete mobilizations in much of the world.

Those concrete mobilizations by social movements also speak to the significance of the state. Many social movements explicitly engage the state, targeting political systems with tactics such as petitions, electoral campaigns, and marches on national capitols. Even if a movement is not explicitly state-oriented, it must interact with the state; it is a component of society and of the political system itself. More important for this study, movements often have state-centered goals or outcomes, such as the passage of legislation, the creation of commissions or committees regarding an issue, or ending involvement in an international conflict, to name only a small few. Even definitions of social movements are often premised on the presence of a state target (e.g. Tarrow 1995, Tilly 1990). More specifically, in judging the "success" of a movement, change in legislation is often the first place theorists look (Amenta et al 2010, Guigni 1998). Although I do not study these outcomes specifically, I do address the importance of change within the state via change in the number of female representatives.

The placement of movements within the political structure is also conceptualized in a wide variety of ways. Social movements are traditionally seen as operating outside the state, as external factors attempting to act on and influence the state, which is seen as an independent, separate body. Other theorists question this separation and dichotomization of social movement

and state. The relationship may actually be more synergistic and interactional. For example, some scholars argue that the way the legislative system itself works affects how social movements work; state-level suffrage movements in the U.S. varied in their effectiveness because of how state governments operated (King, Cornwall, and Dahlin 2005). In a different vein, Markoff (forthcoming) advocates for a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between movements and states, maintaining that social movements are an integral part of the way democratic political systems work, rather than operating externally from that political system. Similarly, Paxton (2002) sees social movements as a component of social capital, which she argues is interdependent with democracy.

#### 1.1.2.1 Globalization and Transnational Activism

In addition to this state focus, social movements are increasingly concerned with and engaging with international and transnational issues and actors, and women's movements have been at the forefront of this internationalization. States remain significant actors in an increasingly globalized and interconnected world,<sup>5</sup> and movements often straddle or hybridize these two scales. Social movements operate at the crux of local and global in many ways, from relating local issues to struggles occurring in other countries, to cooperations between groups or individuals across boundaries, to diffusion of specific tactics to other groups. Della Porta and Tarrow (2005) group transnational activism processes into: internalization, or the making local

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> "Globalization" in itself is a contested term, used variously to reference increasing economic, social, and political interactions across state boundaries, and the continued salience of the nation-state (as a primary economic, social, or political unit) is the subject of much debate in a variety of disciplines. Frameworks such as world-system theory (Wallerstein 2004), concepts like "global cities" (Sassen 1999) or the "transnational capitalist class" (Sklair 2001) emphasize global interconnectedness, particularly in terms of economics and economies, at different scales than the nation-state – implicitly or explicitly arguing for the waning importance of the national scale. I advocate a middle ground that recognizes the resilience and significance of the nation-state while still addressing international phenomena, much like Keck and Sikkink (1998) or Boli and Thomas (1999).

of some international problem; diffusion, or the sharing of tactics, issues, targets, and ideas; externalization, or the action of a domestic group on an international level; and the newer field of transnational collective action, or coordinated international campaigns against non-domestic targets. Or as Tarrow (2005) more efficiently describes, we see the local in the global and the global in the local. The field of social movement studies analyzing transnational activism has rapidly expanded in recent years, but, based on my primary data source, this study is limited to engaging those aspects that address the role of and interactions with the United Nations.

The United Nations is a dynamic and unique force in globalization. It represents and facilitates international connectedness and the exchange or diffusion of international norms between states, and is also an important forum for non-state actors – NGOs in particular, and increasingly more so. Since its creation, the United Nations has been an extremely important advocate for women and women's rights (Pietila and Vickers 1994), contributing in particular to the spread of norms about (women's) human rights, which have been powerful forces of change (e.g. Htun and Weldon 2010). Ratification of international treaties and regulatory documents, such as the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), help hold governments accountable for implementing women's rights policies, leading to better conditions for women (Pietila and Vickers 1994, Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz 2006). International conferences organized or hosted by the UN, such as Beijing 1995, have directly helped improve conditions for women around the world (Smith, Mueller, and Kutz-Flamenbaum forthcoming). In both of these arenas, non-governmental organizations have played an integral role, and have in turn themselves been affected by the UN and its actions. <sup>6</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> I am using NGO interchangeably here with social movement organization, or SMO. As non-state, nonprofit, public, voluntary associations that advocate for specific groups or issues to state and international actors, NGOs are

The UN has been actively increasing its engagement with NGOs, especially as per the recommendations of the 2004 Cardoso Report. This panel called for a deepening of relations with civil society organizations, leading to what Weiss, Carayannis, and Jolly (2009) call the growth of the "Third UN." This third component of the UN system, made up of NGOs and outside consultants, exists in a "symbiotic relationship" (Coates 2009: 154) with the first and second – intergovernmental bodies made up of member states and the secretariats made up of civil servants, respectively. Although Willetts (2006), among others, has called for a reform of this civil society system and how organizations are accredited, the relationship between the UN and NGOs in states across the globe remains extremely strong and vibrant. NGOs have largely been responsible for the success of conferences such as Beijing, and these conferences create and reinforce ties between different groups and activists, as well as use those organizations to aid the diffusion of international norms.

The organizations that are affiliated with the UN exist squarely in that intersection between the state-based and international realms discussed above. They are the product of local organizing and represent the interests of people within a country or region, but are connected to and international network and forum. The organizations registered with the UN, specifically those addressing the issue of the advancement of women, form my independent variable of interest, with the number of women's organizations serving as a proxy for movement strength in each country. These data directly link local and international, which speaks to the current state of social movement organizing across the globe.

defined very similarly to SMOs. They are seen as more hierarchical than grassroots SMOs, but this categorization is oversimplified (see Smith 2008, esp. 247n2).

#### 1.1.3 Social Movement Outcomes and Success

Regardless of scale, one of the primary questions facing investigations of social movements is that of outcomes or success. Measuring or even conceptualizing success for movements has been notoriously difficult. Tarrow succinctly addresses the heart of the issue: "everyone who has worked on social movements knows how important it is to try to understand their outcomes. Almost everyone admits the extreme difficult of doing so" (1999: vii). Reviews of social movements literature regarding outcomes and success too acknowledge that rigorous study of outcomes has been limited, and advocate for continued work in this area (Amenta et al 2010, Earl 2000, Guigni 1998). Felix Kolb calls the scholarly work in this area "a literature that grows but does not accumulate" (2007:6). These scholars have created numerous typologies and taxonomies for outcomes, but two differentiations are key for this project – internal/external and political/cultural.

Internal, inter-movement, and biographical consequences are somewhat easier to trace than external, but extra-movement outcomes remain both widely sought and difficult to operationalize. Social movement theorists often study specific outcomes or "successes" of social movements in terms of policy change, though they are increasingly emphasizing cultural outcomes as well (Earl 2000, Gamson 1998). Outcomes are framed, however, as one or the other, which is a conceptual shortcoming. As mentioned above, increasing numbers of women in political positions represents an inseparable mix of both cultural and political change.

A further difficulty in measuring success is that the political presence of women does not necessarily, immediately translate into concrete social transformation for women. Higher numbers of female representatives may aid in agenda-setting, but as Lovenduski and Norris (1993) remind us, it is often the case that institutions change women before women change

institutions. One outcome that movements may specifically seek or seek to avoid is state feminism, variously defined as feminists in government (Sawer 1990), feminism in public agencies (Eisenstein 1990), the ability of the state to follow a feminist agenda (Stetson 1987), and the advocacy of movement demands from within the state (Lovenduski et al 2005). State feminism is a contested terrain, with some feminists equating it with co-optation and weakening of the women's movement by the state, and others lauding its ability to get woman-friendly legislation discussed and passed.

Sometimes tied in with state feminism, the presence of woman-friendly policy is an external, additional and complementary measure of movement success. Again, policy change is often an important component of social movement outcomes, the more so for women's movements that must work to even get women's issues on the table. This influence on agenda-setting may occur in a variety of ways. For example, Lycklama à Nijeholt, Vargas, and Wieringa (1998) theorize the "the triangle of empowerment" made up of the women's movement, feminist politicians, and feminist civil servants. The policy effects of women holding positions in national legislatures, albeit fascinating and in need of more study, is unfortunately outside of the scope of this paper. I study the percentage of women in legislatures as the outcome of interest of women's social movement organizing.

#### 2.0 METHODS

#### 2.1.1 Research Design

My primary research question is: does women's organizing result in concrete gains for women in terms of political representation? My unit of analysis is the country. Using OLS multiple regression, I examine the relationship between the number of women's organizations and the percentage of women in the lower or only house of the legislature, controlling for other variables found relevant in past research on women in politics. These include level of development, presence of national quotas, percentage of women in the labor force, Human Development Index score, type of electoral system, and region. All analyses are performed using SAS 9.2.

The models below are based on a process of stepping other variables in and out of the regression, while avoiding using collinear variables, monitoring the overall strength of the model and standard errors of the variables, and employing variables with small amounts of missing data whenever possible.

#### 2.1.2 Sampling

As discussed above, social movement organizing is intimately tied up with democracy. I therefore limit my sample to democratic and semidemocratic nations – those with the laws, civil society, and civic space to allow for social movement activity. This classification is based on Freedom House's freedom scores for 2010. This NGO assigns to each country a score between 1 and 7, where scores between 1 and 2.5 are designated "free," 3 to 5 as "partly free," and 5.5 to 7 as "not free." These values are based on a series of questions about the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, government functioning, freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. The overall score is based on the average of the categories "political rights" and "civil liberties."

Since the countries denoted as not free – those scoring higher than a 5 – lack the protected civic space needed for organized social movement activity, they were excluded from the sample. My analyses here use the sample based on the full Freedom House score; civil liberties are more important for social movement organizing, but political rights are also an important factor in determining women's access to political office. Although the tables below reference the total Freedom House score, I also gathered data and ran regressions on a sample based on only the civil liberties score, again limited to those countries that are free or partly free.<sup>7</sup> To facilitate analysis, however, these were then reverse coded, so that a higher civil

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See Appendix A for a list of countries in each sample.

liberties score means a higher level of civic freedom.<sup>8</sup> Where there are notable differences between the two samples, those are described below.

Freedom House lists and gives scores for 195 countries, with 148 of these scoring in the free or partly free ranges. The total population here is in dispute, as some nations are recognized by some bodies while others are not. Taiwan, for example, is a territory in dispute, rated by Freedom House but not included in the Inter-Parliamentary Union's listing of parliaments. The Holy See is included in the UN database as an independent nation, but is not rated by Freedom House. Although slight variations such as these exist, they are not a significant problem or indicative of sampling error.

My sample of only free and partly free states is based on an admittedly simplified notion of civil society and democracy; like other democracy indicators, Freedom House does face criticism about its indices. First, measuring levels of democracy is fraught with methodological difficulties; the primary issues are conceptualization, operationalization, and aggregation (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Defining a concept like democracy, particularly in light of the extremely varied historical and cultural contexts in the world, is a complex undertaking, compounded by the difficulty of assigning numerical values and weights to the various components of that definition. In addition, in a different vein of critique, Bowman, Lehoucq, and Mahoney (2005) point to data-induced measurement error, in which index data are based on inaccurate or incomplete information. Data, particularly about unstable or inaccessible states, are often difficult to come by, and the sources of that data may not actually be case experts. Specifically regarding Freedom House, Mainwaring, Brinks, and Perez-Liñan (2001) examine its

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Within my main sample, overall Freedom House rating had a mean of 2.43, meaning there were approximately equal numbers of free and partly free countries. In the reverse-coded civil liberties sample, civil liberties scores had a mean of 3.39.

shortcomings in comparison to their own classification index. They maintain that Freedom House lacks explicit coding rules, and that the organization has a bias against leftist governments that has skewed some of its categorization. They are, though, drawing from measurements from 1945 to 1999, so these criticisms may be outdated.

Despite all of these critiques, the Freedom House index remains a useful indicator of democracy and civil society. Any measure will necessarily be somewhat limited, as it pulls together different indicators, but its utility remains. Researchers continue to use Freedom House as a means for a variety of projects. Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel (2002), for example, use the Freedom House democracy ratings specifically as a factor in examining women's political participation. For the purposes of this project, using the Freedom House ratings simply for sample boundaries bypasses the criticisms of the index. Most sources would agree on what general categories states would fall into, while they might differ on exact scores or rankings. In addition, I included democracy scores from *The Economist* as a mechanism for checking the sample. Only full and flawed democracies, or scores of 6 and above, were included in the sample.

In addition, countries with populations of less than one million are excluded. The legislatures of these countries are extremely small, in which the addition of one female legislator would increase the percentage by large amounts. For example, in St. Kitts and Nevis or Tuvalu, both with legislatures of only 15 people, an increase of one woman results in an increase of almost 7%. Therefore these countries were excluded from the final model.

#### 2.1.3 Measurement

#### 2.1.3.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable, percentage of female legislators, is taken from the Inter-Parliamentary Union. This international organization of parliaments publishes an array of statistics on national legislatures in its database. The Women in National Parliaments section includes a listing of each country, date of last election, and the number and percentage of women in the lower or single house, as well as the upper house or senate, if applicable. I gathered both sets of data, and created an average of the two for each country (which is simply the lower house if that is the only house). I use both in separate analyses, reporting results for the lower house to stay consistent with prior women in politics research, but with the differences noted below. These proportions are current as of January 2011. Data are missing for the Central African Republic, which held its most recent election in January, and for Guinea, as the parliament was dissolved in 2008 following a coup. Brunei does not have an elected parliament; its 29 members are appointed by the Sultan. These countries, however, are not included in my primary sample. Niger is also not listed in the IPU table, but had a percentage of 9.7 as of January 2010.

#### 2.1.3.2 Independent Variable

As stated above, my main independent variable of interest is the number of women's organizations in each country. The counts of domestic women's organizations come from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. The UN offers free access to its Civil Society Database, a listing of non-governmental organizations that are registered with the UN. This registration can aid organizations in a number of ways; perhaps most importantly, it "facilitates the application procedure for consultative status with the Economic and Social

Council (ECOSOC), and assists accredited NGOs in submitting quadrennial reports and in designating representatives to the United Nations" (UN 2010).

A subset of these organizations fall under the purview of the Commission on the Status of Women, and are classified as for the "advancement of women," which is the database that I employ. The database includes the name, year of registration, organization type, and address, as well as any past meeting participation. The database is readily accessible, and all of the organization information must be submitted in English or French, which I speak and read. Because organizations self-select into the database, using this source helps to avoid many of the conceptual or terminological difficulties associated with identifying women's social movement organizations globally. For example, the term "feminist" is often derided in the developing world as a Western invention (Mohanty 1988), but the organizations included in this subset of the database are explicitly advocating "the improvement of the status of women in the world, and the achievement of their equality with men" (UN 2010). This designation effectively bypasses getting mired in a debate on terms that might exclude relevant organizations.

This database is useful for a number of other reasons, as well. Not only does the database lend access to countries that might otherwise be hard to include in the sample because of lack of access to information, but also the organizations included are those that are established and formalized. The accreditation process is straightforward and routine, meaning that organizations are not precluded from registering based on access or resources, but their accreditation also means that these are the most likely to produce female legislators since they are more likely to be closely tied to the political process. In addition, these organizations have

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> See Bob (forthcoming) for a discussion of some very interesting conflicts and contentions around the symbolic significance of UN consultative status.

made a concerted effort to establish some international ties and a voice in an international forum. By emphasizing organizations with linkages to the international women's movement, I build on research in this field and also draw from an arena that is more established, and again, more likely to effect political change. Yet this approach is distinct from previous research since I analyze domestic organizations tied to an international actor, rather than transnational organizations; this is the first global study to test the effects of domestic women's organizations on women's representation. These groups have the level of formalization, organization, and prestige of being connected to greater transnational organizing, but operate within countries, in a space much more closely connected with the national political scene and therefore more likely to affect the proportion of women in the legislature.

Some organizations listed in the database that did not appear to be legitimate are excluded from the sample. For example, a few organizations had fake websites and unintelligible addresses listed, such as "asdfghkj." Organizations were included only if they had an intelligible name, description, address, and did not simply select every language and every option for "Areas of Expertise and Fields of Activity." Finally, only groups that were registered prior to 2005 were included, in an attempt to account for the time delay before the political effects of increased movement organizing are felt. In addition, to account for population variation I created an organizations per capita variable, which I then logged to reduce skew.

#### 2.1.3.3 Control Variables

The model also includes a number of control variables, chosen based on existing scholarship on women in politics. Population, as of July 2010 and taken from the CIA World Factbook, is included to calculate per capita proportions for different variables, to control for differences based on country size. GDP per capita, also taken from the CIA World Factbook, is included as

a simple measure of development, and is logged to reduce skewness. Region classification is based on the United Nations geographical region groupings, which I then organized into larger regions – Latin America (South and Central America) and the Caribbean, Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, Eastern Europe, Western Europe and the US and Canada, and Scandinavia. These regional groupings are used in most women in politics research to account for cultural and political similarities within regions, as well as variance between regions. Scandinavia, for instance, is a separate region because of its distinct culture that emphasizes gender parity. The countries of the Middle East and North Africa share many cultural and religious characteristics that influence the perception and position of women within those countries. I also created a variable comparing the "developing world" to the industrialized West, based on which countries are high-income members of the OECD.

Countries were also coded for the presence of a proportional representation system, according to IDEA International, and for the presence of national quotas (along with thresholds for quotas), taken from the database created by Mona Lena Krook (Krook 2009, quotaproject 2010). There were not substantial differences between using the quota dummy versus the threshold measure, but I used the threshold to capture more of the variation between different levels of quotas. The UN's Human Development Index was included as another measure of development to check for robustness; there were no substantial differences between models using GDP and those with HDI. Since some developing countries receive more funding in general, which might lead to increased funding and therefore proliferation of NGOs, I also collected recent official development assistance totals for each country, which I then standardized per capita and logged to reduce skew. Countries giving rather than receiving aid were given values of 0.

In addition to these structural variables, I included the percentage of women in the labor force, according to the World Bank as of 2008, as somewhat structural and cultural. Participation in the labor force means greater access to resources and wealth and independence from family or spouse, but also indicates cultural ideals of women as able to participate in the working world outside the home. In auxiliary analysis, I also included maternal mortality rates to signify overall level of women's health, fertility rates to act as a proxy for both attitudes about women's role as mothers and time and resources for political participation, and the prevalence of contraceptive use to employ in much the same way. Finally, percent of the population who identifies as Muslim (as found in the Pew survey from 2009 and augmented with data from the U.S. State Department) and Roman Catholic (according to the same sources) served as general cultural indicators. Appendix A includes my correlation matrix and univariate statistics for all variables included in the regression models.

#### 2.1.4 Missing Data, Multicollinearity, Heteroskedasticity, and Outliers

One problem I initially faced was missing data; information for some countries is simply much harder to access. My sampling method, however, removed many of the cases that would have proved problematic, leaving only quota threshold with a missing data point. My sample size then decreased from 108 to 107 cases for my full score sample, and from 129 to 127 for the civil liberties auxiliary sample.

I ran mulicollinearity diagnostics, and found strong multicollinearity between Africa and GDP in particular. Aid and GDP also had a high bivariate correlation, but are too conceptually different to act as proxies for one another. I therefore ran auxiliary models

excluding GDP, to monitor changes in the Africa variable, and excluding aid. Where this made a difference in the results, those differences are discussed or included in footnotes below.

Heteroskedasticity diagnostics did not return significant results, and using White's heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors did not substantively alter my findings. In fact, the organizations variable only became more significant, supporting the robustness of my model. Similarly, although three potential influential outliers were identified, the removal of those outliers did not alter my results.

#### 3.0 RESULTS

#### 3.1.1 Women's Organizations

My independent variable of interest, women's organizations, shows considerable variation across the world; it has a mean of about 95 organizations, but a standard deviation of 228. The median, a more representative measure of central tendency in this case, is 33. Some countries, such as East Timor, had no women's organizations registered with the UN. India had over 800, the second highest overall – although when standardized for population, this was not particularly high. With 2,104 organizations, the U.S. had the maximum number, although adjusting for population somewhat changes the picture. A few countries were outliers, even after controlling for population differences. Switzerland, the US, and the UK, for example, were high outliers; the greater number of registered organizations per capita in these countries may be in large part due to their housing the physical headquarters of so many international organizations, rather than, necessarily, an extraordinarily strong women's movement. It is a shortcoming of my data and analysis that I cannot directly control for such factors.

As mentioned above, women's organizations per capita was considerably skewed and was logged to standardize. I use this transformed variable in my regression models. Logged women's organizations per capita ranges from 0 to 0.74, and has a mean of 0.14 and standard deviation of 0.11. Skewness was greatly reduced, but the transformed variable is still slightly

skewed; the median is 0.11. As shown in the table in Appendix B, the log of women's organizations per capita is correlated with other variables in the bivariate. With the dependent variable of percent female legislators in the lower house, organizations has a positive correlation coefficient of 0.257. This relationship is not the highest of the correlation coefficients for the women's organizations variable, but does show that there is some positive relationship between the two. It is slightly weaker than the correlations between organizations and GDP, HDI and civil liberties score, which show that development, democracy, and women's organizing are positively related. I had expected a higher correlation between aid and organizations, but it is only -0.178.

### 3.1.2 Baseline Regression Model

My baseline, Model 1, includes the effects of women's organizations, women's labor force participation, GDP, foreign aid, religion, region, electoral system, and quota threshold on the proportion of women in the lower house of parliament. Only Scandinavia and quota threshold are positively significant. With a standardized coefficient of 0.31, Scandinavia has the strongest effect on women's political representation. Scandinavia has been found to be a significant factor influencing women's political representation in past scholarship, and that influence is clearly evidenced here as well. Quotas and quota thresholds are specifically created and instituted in order to increase the proportion of women in politics, so the positive effect is to be expected here; although, it is important to acknowledge that past research has qualified the importance of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Auxiliary analyses were run with the average of the lower and upper houses. Few substantial differences were found, although organizations were more significant, especially in the overall Freedom House score sample, as opposed to the civil liberties sample. Since countries with lower overall scores have more political openness and freedom, perhaps their upper house legislators are more likely to also be elected, rather than appointed.

quotas, based on implementation and type. The variable used here is a simplified understanding of quotas. Women's labor force participation is only marginally significant (p=0.11); I had expected this relationship to be stronger. Also, proportional representation system, a factor that past studies have been found to be important, is not significant here. The organizations variable is not significant in this initial model, though its importance may just be mediated by other factors, as will be discussed below in subsequent models. Overall, the model has an adjusted R<sup>2</sup> of 0.30, suggesting that the baseline model accounts for 30 percent of the variance in women's legislative representation; this is not strikingly high, considering these are mostly structural variables. With such a limited number of cases, however, I cannot add more explanatory variables.

Table 1 below shows the coefficients, standard errors, and standardized estimates for this baseline model as well as the interaction models. These interactions between logged women's organizations per capita and civil liberties, percent Muslim, aid, and GDP are also discussed in further depth below.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> In the auxiliary civil liberties sample, labor force participation is a much stronger predictor of women's political representation. It is significant at the 0.01 level and has a standardized coefficient of 0.30. Since the civil liberties sample includes more developing countries, perhaps this difference shows that labor force participation is a more important factor in women's advancement in developing countries than in the more politically stable countries.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> In the auxiliary civil liberties sample, PR system is in fact significant and has a standardized coefficient of 0.15. Again, the additional countries included in this sample are developing nations, with less political rights. With lower levels of institutional democracy, the presence of a PR system may play a greater role in increasing women's access to positions of political power.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> It is also important to note that I ran auxiliary models without aid and without GDP, due to concerns about multicollinearity. In the model with only GDP, that variable is significant at 0.1. If only aid is included, the organizations variable becomes marginally significant, with a p-value of 0.11. The coefficients and standardized estimates are slightly different, but directionality does not change.

Table 1. Baseline and Interaction Models Regressed on Percent Female Legislators in Lower House

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		
	b (Std Error)	β	b (S.E.)	β	b (S.E.)	β	b (S.E.)	В	b (S.E.)	β	
(Log) Women's Organizations	10.82 (8.92)	0.12	-39.09 (26.84)	-0.41	17.4 <sup>t</sup> (9.89)	0.19	19.80 <sup>t</sup> (11.62)	0.21	2.81 (9.91)	0.03	
Percent Women in Labor Force	0.15 (0.09)	0.19	0.13 (0.10)	0.16	0.15 (0.09)	0.19	0.11 (0.10)	0.14	0.11 (0.10)	0.13	
(Log) GDP	4.19 (3.33)	0.23	4.61 (3.75)	0.26	4.79 (3.33)	0.27	4.11 (3.33)	0.23	4.70 (3.31)	0.26	
(Log) Aid Received	-0.09 (0.73)	-0.02	-0.05 (0.74)	-0.01	0.03 (0.73)	0.01	0.57 (0.91)	0.11	-0.02 (0.72)	-0.004	
Percent Muslim	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.05	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.07	0.05 (0.07)	0.16	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.07	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.08	
Percent Catholic	0.04 (0.04)	0.13	0.03 (0.04)	0.10	0.05 (0.04)	0.15	0.03 (0.04)	0.11	0.03 (0.04)	0.09	
Latin America	-2.41 (3.13)	-0.09	-1.71 (3.23)	-0.07	-2.11 (3.12)	-0.08	-1.82 (3.16)	-0.07	-1.51 (3.14)	-0.06	
Asia	0.66 (3.83)	0.02	0.33 (3.87)	0.01	0.15 (3.82)	0.004	0.76 (3.82)	0.02	0.60 (3.78)	0.02	
Africa	1.88 (3.89)	0.08	2.95 (3.94)	0.12	2.84 (3.92)	0.12	2.70 (3.94)	0.11	3.05 (3.91)	0.13	
Eastern Europe	-2.05 (3.38)	-0.07	-1.15 (3.41)	-0.04	-1.33 (3.39)	-0.04	-1.62 (3.39)	-0.05	-1.42 (3.36)	-0.05	
Scandinavia	16.78** (5.19)	0.31	16.35** (5.19)	0.30	16.70** (5.16)	0.31	16.52** (5.19)	0.30	16.40** (5.14)	0.30	
Middle East	-5.12 (5.01)	-0.10	-4.19 (5.18)	0.00	-3.79 (5.06)	-0.08	-4.94 (5.00)	-0.10	-4.98 (4.96)	-0.10	
PR System	2.95 (1.95)	0.14	2.62 (2.05)	0.13	2.27 (1.99)	0.11	2.50 (1.98)	0.12	2.43 (1.95)	0.12	
Quota Threshold	0.17* (0.07)	0.23	0.18** (0.07)	0.25	0.15* (0.07)	0.21	0.18** (0.07)	0.24	0.19** (0.07)	0.26	
Civil Liberties			-1.56 (1.41)	-0.19							
Civil Liberties Interaction			12.10 <sup>t</sup> (7.74)	0.64							
Muslim Interaction					-0.66 (0.44)	-0.26					
Aid Interaction							-5.03 (4.18)	-0.19			
GDP Interaction									26.79 <sup>t</sup> (15.14)	0.18	
Intercept	-10.4	15	-5.1	14	-13.	-13.87		-9.17		9.06	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.30	)	0.3	0	0.3	1	0.30		0.32		
N	107	<u>'</u>	10	7	10	7	10	7	1	07	

 $<sup>*</sup>p < 0.05 \quad **p < 0.01 \quad ***p < 0.001 \quad {}^tp < 0.1 \text{ (two-tailed tests)}$ 

#### 3.1.3 Civil Liberties Interaction

Drawing on research that stresses the importance of civil liberties for both movement organizing and women's political presence, I created a model with an interaction between women's organizations and the Freedom House civil liberties score. This is shown above in Model 2, where we see that the previously significant variables, Scandinavia and quota threshold, remain significant and strong predictors, and both organizations and the civil liberties interaction are significant.<sup>14</sup> This interaction is shown below in Figure 1.<sup>15</sup>




Figure 1. Civil Liberties Interaction on Percent Female Legislators

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> These findings are also robust to the inclusion and exclusion of the different development variables, which were tested in auxiliary models since aid, GDP, and civil liberties are likely correlated. Also, in the auxiliary civil liberties score sample, the interaction, the civil liberties variable, and the organizations variable were all significant.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> In the predicted equations for this and subsequent interactions, I used the means of the other quantitative variables and zeroes for the dummy variables.

The solid line in the graph above shows the main effect of civil liberties; if there are no women's organizations, then a higher civil liberties score (which means a higher level of democracy) is associated with lower numbers of women in parliament. Although this relationship may seem surprising, past research on democracy and women in politics supports this finding. More autocratic regimes often have higher numbers of women in politics. However, more recent research has qualified that finding in various ways, arguing, for example, for more nuanced definitions and measures of the different components of democracy and their change over time. As shown by the other lines in the graph, the effect of democracy on women in politics is indeed mediated, here by women's movement organizations.

Even a small number of women's organizations, which is illustrated by the dotted line, lessens the negative effect of democracy. A low civil liberties score, or less civic freedom, is still linked to more women in parliament, but the effect of increasing civil liberties occurs at a less steep rate. As the number of organizations increases, that effect is moderated even more. With an average number of organizations, which in this case is about 95, the relationship between democracy and female legislators begins to reverse. The dashed line shows that less democratic nations have slightly fewer women in parliament. Finally, a large number of women's organizations, denoted by the long-dash line, distinctly reverses the initial trend. Here higher levels of democracy are correlated with higher numbers of women in parliament. The combination of a high level of democracy and a strong women's movement relates positively to higher proportions of women in the legislature.

#### 3.1.4 Muslim Interaction

The percentage of the population identifying as Muslim is an important marker of a nation's overall culture, particularly regarding ideals about women and women's role in society. Because the effect of organizations may vary by Muslim population size, I created an interaction variable between Muslim and log of organizations per capita. Shown in Model 3, both Scandinavia and quota threshold remain significant and positive. However, the interaction fails to reach conventional values of statistical significance (p=0.13).

#### 3.1.5 Aid Interaction

Since NGO organizing may affect access to and amount of foreign funding received and international ties, I also tested the interaction between aid and organizations. This is shown in Model 4. Again, quota threshold and Scandinavia are both positive and significant. However, the interaction term is not significant.

## 3.1.6 GDP Interaction

A country's level of development may also affect both women's parliamentary representation, as shown in previous research, and, presumably, the strength of women's organizing. Model 5 shows the regression for this interaction model.<sup>17</sup> Again, Scandinavia and quota threshold

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> I ran an auxiliary model with an interaction between percent Catholic and women's organizations, but only Scandinavia and threshold were significant, and none of the other relationships changed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> There was extreme multicollinearity between the linear and interaction terms, so I mean-centered both variables to get more representative coefficients. Model 5 shows the mean-centered values.

remain significant. The main effects of the interaction variables show us that without women's organizations, GDP has a positive effect on women in parliament. This is illustrated in Figure 2, with the solid line. There is a slight positive association between GDP and the proportion of women in parliament.




Figure 2. GDP Interaction on Percent Female Legislators

The presence of women's organizations, however, alters that association. With an average number of women's organizations per capita, the positive effect of GDP is increased, as shown by the dotted line. The dashed line has an even steeper slope, illustrating that with an above average number of women's organizations, the positive correlation between GDP and women in politics increases still further.

## 3.1.7 Regional Interactions

I created interaction variables between each region and the log of the number of women's organizations per capita. With such a small sample size, a model with this many variables can only suggest very tentative results, but the findings are consistent with existing research on women's organizing and women's representation. Table 2 shows us that like the past models, quota threshold is significant. There are some other substantial changes, however. Neither the Scandinavia nor the Scandinavia interaction variable are significant. Of the regional variables, only Eastern Europe is significant. Of the interaction variables, both Africa and Eastern Europe are significant, though in opposite directions. These interactions variables will be discussed in more depth below.

Table 2. Region Interaction Model Regressed on Percent Female Legislators in Lower House

Model 6

	Mo	Model 6					
	b (Std Error)	β					
(Log) Women's Organization	12.95 (10.81)	0.14					
Percent Women in Labor Force	0.12 (0.10)	0.15					
(Log) GDP	3.87 (3.28)	0.21					
(Log) Aid Received	-0.33 (0.72)	-0.06					
Percent Muslim	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.03					
Percent Catholic	0.03 (0.04)	0.11					
Latin America	-4.22 (4.95)	-0.16					
Latin America Interaction	17.36 (26.49)	0.10					
Asia	-4.73 (5.74)	-0.14					
Asia Interaction	75.11 (58.60)	0.19					
Africa	7.69 (4.85)	0.32					
Africa Interaction	-45.25* (23.31)	-0.28					
Eastern Europe	-9.79 <sup>t</sup> (5.83)	-0.31					
Eastern Europe Interaction	92.28 <sup>t</sup> (52.61)	0.29					
Scandinavia	15.07 (30.11)	0.28					
Scandinavia Interaction	6.57 (117.66)	0.03					
Middle East	-2.96 (10.05)	-0.06					
Middle East Interaction	-17.73 (49.36)	-0.07					
PR System	2.99 (1.93)	0.14					
Threshold of Quota	0.18** (0.07)	0.25					
Intercept	-7.61						
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0	0.33					
N	1	107					

p < 0.05 \*\*p < 0.01 \*\*\*p < 0.001 \*p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests)

First, Africa, which has been positively correlated to female legislators, is again positive here, when organizations is 0.<sup>18</sup> The interaction between Africa and organizations is significant at 0.05, and is negative, meaning that organizations seem to have a moderating influence on African women's election to parliament. As shown in Figure 2, organizations do, in fact, decrease the "effect" of Africa on levels of women in politics. In the West, represented by the solid line, increased women's organizing is linked to increased political representation. In Africa, increased organizing is actually linked to decreased political representation for women, as shown by the dashed line. Some research supports this finding; women in the NGO sector tend to stay within that sphere, feeling that they can accomplish more there than within the often inefficient, unstable, or corrupt state.




Figure 3. Regional Interaction - Africa

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Because of the collinearity between GDP and Africa, I ran an auxiliary model without GDP. Africa remained significant, as did the other pertinent variables. The standardized coefficient for Africa did decrease, however.

This is opposite of the other significant relationship in the regional interaction model, Eastern Europe. In other models, as in this one, there has been a negative relationship between Eastern Europe and the dependent variable. Here this relationship, which is significant at the 0.1 level, shows that when there are no women's organizations, Eastern European countries are less likely to have higher proportions of women in parliament. But the positive, significant interaction shows that women's organizing is actually having a positive effect on women's representation in Eastern Europe. As shown by the steeper slope of the dashed line in Figure 3, the effect of women's organizing on political representation is much stronger in Eastern Europe than it is in the West.




Figure 4. Regional Interaction – Eastern Europe

## 3.1.8 Reverse Regression

In order to check that the relationship I hypothesized did indeed go in only one direction, I ran a limited number of auxiliary models using the number of organizations as the dependent variable, and percentage of women in parliament as my primary independent variable. Here I used the Inter-Parliamentary Union's archives, gathering legislator percentages from January 2000, in order to account for the time lag between women being elected to parliament and their effect on organizing. Using GDP, labor force participation, percentages of Muslim and Catholic, civil liberties score, and regional variables, I found that the proportion of female legislators did not, in fact, significantly affect the number of women's organizations. GDP and Freedom House scores were the best predictors of number of organizations. Of course, my initial data collection was geared toward explanation of political representation, so model specification problems may be at play here. This does, however, support my claim that women's organizing influences the number of women in the legislature, rather than the other way around.

#### 4.0 DISCUSSION

My findings reinforce, challenge, and expand past research on women in politics. I found some factors, such as the Scandinavia region and quota thresholds, to be consistently strong predictors of women's political representation in parliament. Countries in Scandinavia have cultures that greatly value gender parity, policies that reflect that, and long histories of being trailblazers in women's political rights and milestones. Past research has found support for this strong relationship between Scandinavia and women's political representation time and again, and my models do the same. This relationship does not seem to be attributable to women's organizing, however, as the interaction between Scandinavia and organizing was not significant. Or, since Scandinavia has a long history of women in politics, and in many ways has been an international norm-setter in this area, perhaps women's organizing was more important for political representation at an earlier time. As the norms, cultural ideas about women in politics, and policy changes have become more institutionalized, perhaps women's organizing has become less important to maintaining high numbers of women in political positions. More research would be needed on this, however, to make conclusive claims.

Quotas are a more recent addition to the field, and research has found more varied results regarding correlations between quotas and women's representation. Although quotas would seem to be a straightforward and direct indicator of higher numbers of women in politics, the type of quota, the threshold set, and enforcement are all important factors in determining the

success of a quota. My measure here is simplified, counting both candidate and seat quotas at the national level. Finding a strong correlation between threshold and percentage of female legislators is in line with previous research, although a more complex variable, perhaps taking into account enforcement, might yield different results. Some research has mentioned the role of movements in advocating for quota legislation without fully investigating that linkage; I attempted an analysis that might help explain the relationship between the two by running an auxiliary model with an interaction between organizations and quota thresholds; neither the interaction nor the individual variables were significant. There remains more to be explicated regarding the relationship between quotas and women's organizations.

My findings regarding interactions also support existing theories on the topic, as well as my own assumptions about organizing and political representation as being closely linked with culture. Most of my interactions are attempts to address those linkages. I start with the interaction between civil liberties score and organizations. Without women's organizations, there is a negative association between level of democracy and percent of female legislators. The interaction between the two is significant, and shows that organizations have a lessening effect on that negative relationship between democracy and women's political representation. Organizations are a significant factor in increasing the proportion of women in parliament, particularly as level of democracy increases. A high number of organizations actually reverses the relationship between democracy and women in politics, so that increasing civil liberties is associated with increasing numbers of women in politics.

Some of my findings were unexpected, or go against what past scholarship has found. I expected a higher percentage of women in the labor force, for example, to be significantly correlated with more women in politics, as work gives women financial resources and

independence, as well as serving as an indication about attitudes about women and gender roles and spheres. In this sample, however, labor force participation was not significant. As mentioned above, in the expanded, civil liberties sample, labor was a significant predictor of women in parliament, perhaps due to the inclusion of more developing countries with restricted political rights. In countries where it is not unusual for women to work outside the home and be independent, to have access to resources, other factors seem to be more important in affecting women's political presence. This finding is also supported by the fact that I found a similar difference between the two samples when I substituted fertility rate for labor participation rate.

I also expected the presence of a PR system to be positively correlated with more women in politics. Although the relationship was positive, it was not significant in any of my models. As with labor force participation, however, proportional representation was significant at the 0.1 level in several of the models with the civil liberties sample. In some of the interaction models it lost that significance, but the difference between the two samples speaks to, again, the different mechanisms at play in developing countries, especially those with more restricted political rights.

Since Islam plays such an important cultural role, especially in terms of gender roles and expectations, percentage of the population that identifies as Muslim seems like a good predictor of the proportion of women in the legislature. My analyses, however, did not support this expectation. I found that although higher percentages of Muslims were associated with lower numbers of women in politics, these relationships were not significant. The interaction between percent Muslim and women's organizations was likewise not significant. Organizations did become significant in this interaction model, meaning that if percent Muslim was 0, organizations would have a positive, significant effect on the proportion of women in the

legislature. This seems to support my assumptions about the role of cultural factors in mediating not only political representation but also levels of organizing.

Finally, my analyses expand the existing scholarship on women in politics and on social movements. I employ a variable that is not usually included in research on women in politics, and I attempt to build an empirical model of a social movement outcome that is both cultural and political. My findings show that, when important interactions are taken into account, women's social movement organizations do in fact have a positive impact on the proportion of women in parliament. Increased women's movement organizing does lead to increased proportions of women in parliament when the relationships between organizing and civil liberties, religion, aid, and region are taken into account. Official aid is an important factor that is linked to, but conceptually different from, basic definitions of development; it is also related to the level of NGO activity within a country and those organizations' access to funding sources. This is not a totally determining relationship, though; more women's organizations still help to increase women's political participation even when aid is 0. The interaction between the two is not significant, but an analysis of effect of increased development assistance just on level of organizing might elucidate some of this relationship.

I also investigate the relationships between this new variable – women's organizations – and region. Region is a useful, albeit imperfect, proxy for culture, which I maintain plays an integral role both in social movement organizing and in increasing the percentage of female legislators. Both Africa and Eastern Europe were found to be significant regional interactions with women's organizations, although in different ways. Without social movement organizing, Africa as a region is positively correlated with higher numbers of women in parliament; Eastern Europe, on the other hand, is negatively correlated with higher number of women in politics

when there is no social movement organizing. The interactions for these two variables show a dramatic shift, however. The interaction between organizations and Africa is negative, suggesting that women's movement organizations are actually moderating the influence of the region variable on political representation. This is supported by recent research that discusses the prevalence in Africa of women choosing the sphere of NGOs over politics; not only are these very distinct spheres, working in one might preclude working in the other. As more women are drawn to these women's NGOs, then, there will be fewer women going into formal politics. However, this does somewhat contradict Tripp's (2001) account of the role of women's organizations in helping to democratize and increase women's representation in many African states.

For Eastern Europe, the trend is the opposite; social movement organizing seems to be increasing women's political representation disproportionate to the region itself. Much of the region has a recent past dominated by Soviet communism, where democracy and civil society were weak or nonexistent. Women's movement organizations have helped to build up that civil society, which is contributing to women's political representation. However, I should reiterate – the regional interaction model in particular, but actually all of my models, have a limited sample size and too many variables. These findings are tentative and definitely need more investigation.

#### 4.1 FUTURE RESEARCH

Because of this and other shortcomings, this is only the first step in a larger research endeavor. Future research should attempt to use more sophisticated methodology, as there are likely some reciprocal relationships and feedback loops between some of these variables that are not being explored here. These relationships might also shift significantly over time, so longitudinal analysis would provide some insight into the ongoing dynamics.

In addition, the project is in need of better measures of culture, in order to address how culture is affecting both organizing and women's political presence. Using region or religion provides some useful comparisons, but I cannot explore the actual mechanisms that are responsible for why regional interactions, for instance, work as they do. With a better measure of culture, perhaps an expanded World Values Survey, some of these relationships could be explored and explained further. Organizations in this dataset are obviously interacting with many other factors, and cultural differences may be at the heart of those interactions. In addition, future research may augment these more developed methods with more developed case study analyses in order to address more of the detailed processes that lead from social movement organizing to political representation. Studying individual activists and politicians or specific groups, may yield a richer explanation of the actual processes at work to augment the quantitative analysis.

I also recognize that the data source may be skewed. Many social movements are small and local, perhaps even underground. I recognize that without extensively traveling in and around each country (and probably even then) I cannot get a count that is truly representative of the level of women's organizing. I am employing a count for the measure of scope, which in many ways oversimplifies the depth and variety of movement organizing. In attempting to do

such a broad survey, however, the depth will necessarily be limited. Ideally, future projects will compile more comprehensive counts of organizations to give a more nuanced understanding of the scope of movement activity. In a similar vein, further measures of movement success, such as the passage of woman-friendly legislation, would be a useful contribution.

#### 5.0 CONCLUSION

Although women have made substantial political gains, and there is wide variation among different countries, the fact remains that "in no country do women have political status, access, or influence equal to men's" (Chowdhury et al 1994, emphasis in original). And political inequality in particular, albeit not the only form of gender inequality by far, has profound implications for women. Women's issues are not represented well, or often even placed on the agenda, by male politicians, yet laws and policy have extremely broad implications for women's lives – from the wages they earn to the reproductive freedom they have to the judicial recourse and protections they have against assault. The presence of female representatives, then, can have far-reaching impact. Knowing more about the specific factors that help increase the proportion of women elected to parliaments can contribute to increasing those proportions, and the research on women in politics has in fact been focused on investigating those factors. For the most part, this field has not, however, studied women's social movement organizing as one of these explanatory factors.

Social movement organizing has been an important field for women to effect change, particularly since traditional, institutionalized politics was for so long officially, or now often implicitly, closed to women. The dramatic growth of the international women's movement over the past century has been one of the defining features of the modern world, occurring both parallel to and interdependently with the intensification of economic, political, and social

globalization. Social movements, and women's movements in particular, exist at an interchange with the transnational, and often work to bridge the local and global, in much the same way that they bridge the cultural and the political.

With these observations in mind, I investigated the role of women's social movement organizations registered with the United Nations – which represent that combination of both local and international – in increasing the proportions of women in parliaments around the world. I found that, when important interactions are taken into account, women's organizations are positively associated with higher levels of women's political representation. The interaction between democracy, measured by Freedom House civil liberties score, and women's organizations, for example, shows that together, more organizations and more civil liberties contributes to more women in politics. Similarly, a stronger women's movement, measured simply in terms of a greater number of organizations, increases the positive effect of GDP on percent of female legislators.

The study also finds that there are interactions occurring with some of the cultural variables, as well, here captured mostly by region variables. Organizations interact significantly with sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe, though in very different ways. In Africa, where women's political participation tends to be higher, organizations actually have a moderating effect on that regional association. This may be due to the more distinct separation between NGOs and national governments in the region. In Eastern Europe, a region that is negatively associated with women's political representation, the presence of women's organizations reverses that trend. In countries with a history of communism and nominal women's political participation, the post-communist growth of the civic sphere, and women's organizing with it, is perhaps playing a significant role in increasing the number of women in parliament.

These findings are tentative. The models are somewhat over-specified due to the small sample size, and more sophisticated analyses of some of the reciprocal relationships between these variables are needed. In addition, a better conceptualization and measure of culture – which plays an important role in influencing women's political participation and as a movement outcome and facilitator – is needed to fully address the complicated role of culture in these models. Despite its shortcomings, however, this paper makes two contributions. On a methodological and conceptual level, I provide a bridge between social movement studies and political sociology about women in politics. On a more concretely applicable level, I provide evidence for movement success, and that shows the need for continued social movement organizing by women for women.

## APPENDIX A

## TABLE OF COUNTRIES IN SAMPLE

Albania	Dominican Rep.	Kuwait	Papua New Guinea	Ukraine
Algeria	East Timor	Kyrgyzstan	Paraguay	United Arab Emirates
Angola	Ecuador	Latvia	Peru	United Kingdom
Argentina	Egypt	Lebanon	Philippines	<b>United States</b>
Armenia	El Salvador	Lesotho	Poland	Uruguay
Australia	Estonia	Liberia	Portugal	Venezuela
Austria	Ethiopia	Lithuania	Romania	Vietnam
Azerbaijan	Finland	Macedonia	Russia	Yemen
Bangladesh	France	Madagascar	Rwanda	Zambia
Belgium	Gabon	Malawi	Senegal	
Benin	The Gambia	Malaysia	Serbia	
Bolivia	Georgia	Mali	Sierra Leone	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Germany	Mauritania	Singapore	
Botswana	Ghana	Mauritius	Slovakia	
Brazil	Greece	Mexico	Slovenia	
Bulgaria	Guatemala	Moldova	South Africa	
Burkina Faso	Guinea-Bissau	Mongolia	South Korea	
Burundi	Haiti	Morocco	Spain	
Cambodia	Honduras	Mozambique	Sri Lanka	
Canada	Hungary	Namibia	Swaziland	
Central African Rep.	India	Nepal	Sweden	
Chile	Indonesia	Netherlands	Switzerland	
Colombia	Ireland	New Zealand	Tajikistan	
Congo	Israel	Nicaragua	Tanzania	
Costa Rica	Italy	Niger	Thailand	
Cote d'Ivoire	Jamaica	Nigeria	Togo	
Croatia	Japan	Norway	Trinidad and Tobago	
Cyprus	Jordan	Oman	Tunisia	
Czech Republic	Kazakhstan	Pakistan	Turkey	
Denmark	Kenya	Panama	Uganda	

Note: Nations in bold make up the full FH score sample; the others are those only in the civil liberties sample.

APPENDIX B
BIVARIATE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	Percent women in lower house	Average of lower and upper	Women's orgs	Women's orgs per capita	Log women's orgs per capita	Log GDP	Log Aid	Women in labor force	Percent Muslim	Percent Catholic
Percent women in lower house	1.000									
Average of lower and upper	0.988	1.000								
Women's orgs	0.010	0.008	1.000							
Women's orgs per capita	0.227	0.238	0.167	1.000						
Log women's orgs per capita	0.257	0.279	0.178	0.947	1.000					
Log GDP	0.276	0.268	0.182	0.310	0.355	1.000				
Log Aid	-0.272	-0.260	-0.259	-0.172	-0.178	-0.742	1.000			
Women in labor force	0.181	0.215	-0.074	0.011	-0.011	-0.396	0.205	1.000		
Percent Muslim	-0.278	-0.279	-0.042	-0.093	-0.099	-0.315	0.264	-0.217	1.000	
Percent Catholic	0.179	0.183	-0.030	-0.001	-0.017	0.150	-0.117	-0.090	-0.440	1.000
Latin America	0.021	0.027	-0.100	-0.046	-0.024	0.028	0.117	-0.159	-0.276	0.567
Asia	-0.112	-0.115	0.106	-0.167	-0.214	-0.059	-0.100	-0.137	0.126	-0.258
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.096	-0.084	-0.093	-0.111	-0.121	-0.705	0.487	0.545	0.264	-0.245
Eastern Europe	0.556	-0.079	-0.133	-0.138	-0.163	0.110	-0.005	-0.010	-0.136	-0.083
Scandinavia	0.400	0.401	-0.039	0.142	0.208	0.255	-0.238	0.094	-0.105	-0.189
Middle East and North Africa	-0.207	-0.225	-0.039	0.029	0.059	0.134	0.017	-0.346	0.422	-0.171
PR system	0.232	0.204	-0.190	0.051	0.033	0.221	-0.184	-0.204	-0.113	0.216
National quota	0.141	0.125	-0.045	-0.093	-0.088	-0.138	0.104	-0.026	0.059	0.262
Quota Threshold	0.224	0.217	-0.028	-0.033	-0.021	0.003	0.034	-0.033	-0.003	0.366
HDI	0.259	0.255	0.162	0.291	0.341	0.967	-0.714	-0.391	-0.394	0.181
Freedom House Civil Liberties	0.335	0.327	0.164	0.315	0.360	0.742	-0.640	-0.111	-0.394	0.161
Mean	19.60	19.66	94.81	0.42	0.14	3.88	2.36	54.76	17.08	34.13
Standard Deviation	10.37	10.33	228.34	0.52	0.11	0.58	1.95	13.02	29.63	34.42
Minimum	0.9	0.9	0	0	0	2.54	0	21	0.1	0
Maximum	45	45	2104	4.49	0.74	4.79	5.87	91	99	98
N	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108

# Bivariate and Descriptive Statistics, continued

	Latin America	Asia	Sub- Saharan Africa	Eastern Europe	Scandi navia	Middle East and North Africa	PR system	National quota	Quota Threshold	HDI	Freedom House Civil Liberties
Latin America	1.000										
Asia	-0.174	1.000									
Sub- Saharan Africa	-0.277	-0.199	1.000								
Eastern Europe	-0.182	-0.131	-0.208	1.000							
Scandina via	-0.096	-0.069	-0.110	-0.073	1.000						
Middle East and North Africa	-0.108	-0.078	-0.124	-0.020	-0.043	1.000					
PR system	0.192	-0.249	-0.194	0.186	0.189	0.036	1.000				
National quota	0.210	0.070	-0.066	0.109	-0.136	-0.058	0.113	1.000			
Threshol d of quota	0.256	0.010	-0.131	0.055	-0.121	-0.108	0.151	0.882	1.000		
HDI	0.053	-0.030	-0.775	0.177	0.241	0.095	0.222	-0.075	0.048	1.000	
Freedom House Civil Liberties	-0.080	-0.203	-0.396	0.152	0.246	-0.103	0.330	-0.108	0.042	-0.737	1.000
Mean	0.19	0.11	0.24	0.12	0.04	0.05	0.52	0.32	8.68	0.66	2.60
Standard Deviation	0.40	0.32	0.43	0.33	0.19	0.21	0.50	0.47	14.19	0.19	1.28
Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.26	1
Maximu m	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	50	0.94	5
N	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	107	108	108

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