INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND THE DETERMINANTS OF MEMBER STATE INTEREST CONVERGENCE

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In this dissertation, I ask: *Which attributes of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are conducive to member state interest convergence?* Scholars testing the effects of IGOs on state behavior usually control for state interests in order to counter realist arguments. However, by doing so, they may be missing one channel through which IGOs ultimately affect state behavior – through changes in state interests. While research on socialization informs the study of interest convergence, it is insufficient to answer the question of which attributes of IGOs make them conducive to state interest convergence. These studies consist largely of case studies with which one cannot easily control for material factors that affect member state interests and they focus on the induction of new member states into an existing community. I argue instead that all states are subject to the acceptance of ideas (both normative and cognitive) that can affect how they define their interests and that it is more appropriate to look at pairs of states to assess their interaction affects their similarity to each other.

I argue that greater interaction between member states provides more opportunities for the transmission of ideas between them and therefore greater convergence in how they define their interests. I therefore expect IGOs with more substructures and covering more issues to be more conducive to interest convergence. I also propose that different types of similarity between states (regime type and cultural similarity) can make states predisposed to the acceptance of

ideas from one another and thus enhance the degree to which intra-IGO interaction may lead to interest convergence.

The aforementioned hypotheses are tested in statistical models, using an original dataset of IGOs or IGO structures as the key independent variables. The findings provide support for the theory that more interaction within IGOs leads to greater interest convergence. The findings with regard to dyadic attributes are mixed, providing support for the idea that dyads with common cultural attributes experience greater interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs than other dyads, while domestic regime type similarity has the opposite effect to that expected.

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1.0   INTRODUCTION

In this dissertation I ask: *Which attributes of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are conducive to a convergence in their member states' interests over time?* Answering this question also means responding to the more general question of whether member states' interests converge over time as a result of joint IGO membership and, if so, *how*. While much research has been done on the question of whether and how membership in IGOs affects state *behavior*, the idea that they may do so by first leading to changes in state *interests* has largely been ignored.   However, the question of whether interests are endogenous to interaction within IGOs is not new. In fact, more than two decades ago, Stephen Krasner broached the issue of whether international regimes have feedback effects on the basic causal variables that have led to their creation, which include not only the distribution of power but also state interests (Krasner 1982: 500). Constructivist scholars have also argued for treating interests as endogenous to interaction, especially through work on socialization within IGOs. Yet neoliberal institutionalist scholars continue to control for interests when examining the effects of IGOs on state behavior. By doing so, they may be missing part of the effect of IGOs on behavior.

The work of scholars studying socialization within IGOs goes some way toward explaining how state interests may become more similar over time, but is insufficient to answer the question of which attributes of IGOs lead to a convergence of interests at the *state* level. First, most studies of socialization either provide evidence of the socialization of individuals

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within one IGO or focus on a few cases of normative change within one or a few IGOs. The former does not necessarily lead to changes in how interests are defined at the *state* level. The latter does not allow for a robust assessment of which attributes of IGOs are conducive to interest convergence between member states, since there is not sufficient variation across IGOs. Case studies also limit one's ability to find evidence for the causal role of ideas while controlling for the various material factors that affect state interests. Second, the majority of work on socialization focuses on IGOs in Europe and therefore does not explore how intra-IGO interaction can affect state interests in other regions or within global IGOs.

Finally, I argue that answering the question of how IGOs lead to a convergence in member states' interests requires a shift away from the focus on socialization, which has been defined as "a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community" (Checkel 2005: 804). This focus on socialization limits one's analysis to changes in how new members of IGOs converge toward the norms of the existing community. I argue for a focus on IGOs as structures within which all member states interact with each other and have the opportunity to both persuade other actors and take on new ideas themselves. In addition, both normative ideas and cognitive ideas about cause-and-effect relationships can lead to changes in how states' define their interests and ultimately the policies that they pursue.

The literature on policy diffusion and learning can also be informative regarding how ideas spread between actors. However, explaining diffusion requires both that one specify the logic by which actors take on new ideas or policies and the channels through which they get this information. While some work on policy diffusion argues that actors simply use information to mimick successful policies, other work does argue for a prior diffusion of ideas that make certain policies legitimate. However, there is very little discussion of where this information comes

from in the international system. I argue that much diffusion occurs within IGOs and therefore, in this dissertation, I attempt to answer the question of how interacting within IGOs can lead state agents to take on new ideas, transmit them to the domestic context, and thus redefine state interests. This ultimately results in changes in state policy, although this process takes time.

1.1 THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF

In order to explain how interaction within IGOs is conducive to interest convergence between member states, I set forth a theory in this dissertation which focuses on IGOs as structures within which individuals in different states interact. My theory is based on the simple proposition that more interaction provides greater opportunities for actors to exchange ideas. While I have offered the process of persuasion as one causal mechanism through which ideas are transmitted from one actor to another, it is certainly viable that actors take on new ideas as a result of their interaction within IGOs even when there is no purposive attempt to persuade them by other actors.

This is not a dissertation about socialization. First, not all socialization at the individual level should lead to interest convergence at the *state* level. An individual may be socialized into certain norms of behavior within an IGO, but this has little to do ultimately with how states define their interests outside of the context of that particular IGO. Second, I argue in subsequent chapters that new ideas about cause-and-effect relationships as well as norms can be accepted by state actors and lead to a change in how state interests are defined.

Consequently, I argue that changes in identity are not required for changes in how states define their interests to occur. However, I do argue that common characteristics of states that

lead actors to have a common identity may heighten the degree to which persuasion occurs. This is based on the idea from reference group theory that actors who will be more likely to consider the merits of information provided by other actors that they deem to be in their peer group.

In this dissertation, I not only seek to explain how membership in IGOs may lead to interest convergence, but also which attributes of IGOs make this process more likely. Beginning with the proposition that more interaction leads to more opportunities for actors to take on similar ideas about what they want, how best to achieve what they want, and which options are legitimate for achieving those goals, I propose that IGOs that foster greater interaction between member states should be the most conducive to interest convergence. I hypothesize that pairs of states will experience a greater convergence in their interests the more they interact within IGOs with a high number of substructures and the more they interact within IGOs covering more than two main issue areas as these two dimensions are proxies of the amount of interaction that goes on within IGOs. A change in states' interests requires that the ideas taken on at the IGO level be transmitted to the domestic context and become institutionalized in the domestic setting. Therefore, I also hypothesize that IGO structures involving high-level leaders should be more conducive to interest convergence since the actors involved in this interaction have more power to change how the states' interests are defined.

Finally, I do not expect all pairs of states to experience interest convergence to the same degree as a result of interaction within IGOs. Based on the proposition discussed above stating that more similar actors should be more susceptible to persuasion by one another, I hypothesize that states that are both liberal democracies, that have a similar score on the democracy/autocracy scale, and that have common cultural attributes should experience greater

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interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs and IGO substructures found to be conducive to interest convergence.

1.2   THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL SIGNIFICANCE

There are a number of ways in which this dissertation contributes both to the literature on international relations and to our understanding of how intergovernmental organizations can enhance the prospects for cooperation and peace between states. The key contribution of this dissertation is to demonstrate, using rigorous research methods, that state interests are endogenous to interaction and to examine how the interests of different states become more similar as a result of their interaction within IGOs. While the theory presented here builds on existing theory on socialization, learning, and the diffusion of innovations, it represents a deductive and generalizable theory of interest convergence focused, not on individuals, but on the process through which ideas exchanged at the international level affect interests at the state level.

From an empirical perspective, the dissertation is innovative in that it provides one of the first tests (and surely the most comprehensive test) of the endogeneity of interests resulting from IGO membership using statistical methods and a global sample of IGOs. This is an important step, which I hope will advance the dialogue between international relations scholars on both sides of the issue. The choice to use a large-N study allows for an assessment of IGO effects net of changes in material factors and for a rigorous test of the theory across IGOs and across regions of the world. What one loses with this method is the ability to trace the process through which interest convergence occurs. It is my hope that the findings provided herein will be the

starting point for deeper analysis, helping to guide future research. The findings generally provide support for my theory, but also raise new questions, which I will discuss in the concluding chapter.

In addition, I have created an original dataset of IGOs, which can be used for future research on this and other questions. By coding IGOs based on attributes related to the amount of interaction that they foster between member states, I open up the black box of the IGO and allow for more detailed analyses of IGO effects within the realm of large-N research as well. In this way, one can avoid using a simple count of IGOs, the use of which assumes that the impact of all IGOs "accumulates in a quasi-linear fashion" (Gartzke et al. 2006: 8). While I offer count variables, these are based on IGOs that meet certain thresholds for fostering a high amount of interaction, which allows one to capture a dimension on which IGO effects should accumulate. In addition, I provide measures of total IGO substructures which allows for a more direct measure of the amount of fora within which individuals from two member states interact.

1.3   LAYOUT OF THE DISSERTATION

The dissertation proceeds with five additional chapters. In this chapter, I have presented the research question and briefly outlined my theory of how interaction within IGOs leads to a convergence of member state interests over time. In Chapter 2, I discuss the existing literature on socialization, learning, and policy diffusion in more detail and explain how each is insufficient to answer the question at hand.

In Chapter 3, I lay out my theory of interest convergence resulting from intra-IGO interaction. I begin with a discussion of what interests are and briefly describe which

organizations meet the criteria for being considered IGOs. I then present a more detailed version of the theory outlined above. I present both hypotheses regarding attributes of IGOs that should be conducive to interest convergence and hypotheses about similarity in dyadic attributes that should condition the degree to which two states experience interest convergence as a result of their interaction within IGOs.

Chapter 4 presents the results of a series of statistical tests of the hypotheses regarding IGO attributes presented in Chapter 3. I begin with a more in-depth discussion of the appropriate level of analysis when looking for the effects of IGO interaction on member state interest similarity. I then describe the use of Gartzke's Affinity data (Gartzke 1998; Gartzke and Jo 2002) as a measure of interests for the dependent variable. Next, I describe the other variables and specification of the models. Finally, I present the results of these tests and discuss the implications of these findings. The findings are supportive of my theory regarding attributes of IGOs that are conducive to interest convergence.

In Chapter 5, I present the results of a series of tests of the remaining hypotheses presented in Chapter 3 regarding the conditioning effects of dyadic attributes on the degree to which interaction within IGOs leads to member state interest convergence. I first describe the additional variables added in this chapter and the specification of these models, which employ interaction terms between the conditioning variables and two of the key IGO variables from Chapter 4. The results of these tests are mixed. However, they provide some support for the proposition that existing similarities between states cause actors to see each other as peers and therefore to be more susceptible to persuasion, resulting in an increase in their interest similarity to a greater degree than for dyads without existing similarities. The findings also raise new

questions regarding whether joint democracy and certain cultural similarities are dimensions on which individual actors from different member states mutually identify.

I conclude the dissertation with a summary of the theory and findings and a discussion of their implications for both academic researchers in the field of international relations and policy-makers interested in the design and functioning of international institutions. Finally, I discuss a series of extensions to this project as well as new projects that can enhance the findings presented here and can further explore this research agenda.

2.0   TREATING INTERESTS AS ENDOGENOUS

This project asks the question: *Which attributes of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are conducive to member state interest convergence as a result of their interaction within these institutions?* The idea that interests are endogenous to interaction is not novel. In fact, more than two decades ago, Stephen Krasner broached the issue of whether international regimes have feedback effects on the basic causal variables that have led to their creation, which include not only the distribution of power but also state interests (Krasner 1982: 500). Yet Institutionalist scholars continue to control for interests when examining the effects of IGOs on state behavior. By doing so, they may be missing part of the effect of IGOs on behavior. While the main proponents of treating interests as endogenous to interaction within international institutions have been constructivist scholars, there are other bodies of literature that relate to the question of how actor interests converge. This literature informs the theory that will be presented in Chapter 3, but is insufficient to answer the question of how IGOs lead to a convergence in member state interests and which attributes of IGOs are most conducive to this process. In this chapter, I will discuss each of these bodies of literature, how they relate to the question at hand, and in what ways they are insufficient to answer the question of how IGOs lead to interest convergence over time.

I begin with a discussion of the literature on socialization, a process through which states come to accept new norms, thus leading to a change in how they define their interests. The

literature on socialization is insufficient to answer the question of how IGOs lead to member state interest convergence for several reasons. First, much literature on socialization focuses on the conditions under which the socialization of individuals is likely to occur within IGOs, without considering how the new norms internalized by these actors will affect how *states'* interests are defined. Second, there a number of empirical limitations, including a focus on case studies within one IGO or a handful of IGOs that do not allow one to determine which attributes of IGOs are most conducive to interest change. Large-N studies that attempt to test the socialization hypothesis are inadequate to answer the question of this project because they either do not focus on interest convergence as the dependent variable or do not delve into the question of what it is about IGOs that makes them conducive to socialization. Finally, in explaining state interest convergence I argue for a shift in focus from that provided by the concept of socialization as it has traditionally been defined. Most importantly, I argue, interaction between state agents within IGOs might cause actors to take on new ideas about cause-and-effect relationships as well as normative ideas.

With this broader focus in mind, I then discuss how literature on the diffusion of innovations can usefully inform the study of interest convergence resulting from intra-IGO interaction. However, this literature includes a variety of theories for how policy practices are spread to different states. Some of this work does not focus on the spread of cognitive and normative ideas as a key factor underlying the process of policy diffusion. Others do so, but fail to sufficiently test diffusion through networks of communication, especially through IGOs. Finally, this literature does not aim to explain interest convergence, but rather the implementation of similar policy preferences.

In Chapter 3, I will put forth a theory of how interaction within IGOs leads to a convergence of interests between member states, attempting to rectify the shortcomings of the existing literature. First, I will address each of the aforementioned sets of literature and how they are insufficient to answer the question at hand.

2.1   SOCIALIZATION

As noted in the previous chapter, constructivist scholars' main critique of realist and institutionalist studies of IGO effects is that they treat interests as exogenous to the interaction of states within IGOs, with interests defined primarily in terms of material factors. One research agenda emanating from the constructivist approach focuses on socialization, a macro-process through which states come to accept new norms, which ultimately changes how they define their interests (e.g. Finnemore 1996; Beyers and Dierickx 1998; Checkel 1999; Johnston 2001; Kelley 2004; Beyers 2005; Checkel 2005; Hooghe 2005; Lewis 2005). Socialization has been defined as "a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community" (Checkel 2005: 804).

Socialization scholars have set forth several causal mechanisms under various names, which Checkel (2005) and his co-contributors to a special issue of *International Organization (IO)* have boiled down to three main causal mechanisms through which actors can come to internalize the same norms: strategic calculation, role playing, and persuasion/normative suasion (Johnston 2001; Checkel 2005; Lewis 2005; Johnston 2005). Essential to socialization theory is the notion that actors sometimes follow not a "logic of consequences," but a "logic of appropriateness," meaning that an actor behaves in a certain way because they believe that is the

right thing to do, rather than simply because there is some material reward/punishment for doing so/failing to do so. "Embedded in a social collectivity, they do what they see as appropriate for themselves in a specific type of situation" (March and Olsen 2006: 804). However, actors may at first follow the norms of an IGO for strategic reasons, whether involving social or material rewards, and then come to internalize those norms, continuing to follow them when material incentives to do so no longer exist (Checkel 2005: 804).

Drawn from the organizational and social psychology literature, another path to socialization is referred to as role playing. Role playing is thought to occur when an actor, being unable to calculate the costs and benefits of all possible actions, takes a shortcut from the cues of the organization or group. In other words, actors are "boundedly rational" (March and Simon 1981). As Checkel (2005: 810) acknowledges, this does not involve a "process of reflective internalization driven by communicative processes," but it does involve "noncalculative behavioral adaptation". Such role playing can eventually lead to the acceptance of a certain role and certain behaviors as appropriate. Finally, these scholars lay out a third path to the internalization of norms through persuasion, in which actors actively put forth arguments and attempt to persuade each other to accept something as "the right thing to do" (Checkel 2005: 812).

Despite the usefulness of the aforementioned theoretical developments, these causal pathways to socialization do not necessarily lead to a convergence of interests at the *state* level. These processes cannot have fundamental effects on state-level interests unless state agents and/or IGO bureaucrats come to see a certain issue (and therefore their state's interests) differently, leading to a change in how they define their state's interests and those individuals bring their new perspectives back to the state. If these conditions are not met, then we can only

say that this socialization of state agents affected particular bargaining outcomes within a particular IGO, an important finding nonetheless, but one that does not explain the subject of the present study: state interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs. Keeping these conditions in mind, I present a theory in the following chapter aimed at explaining state interest convergence rather than simply individual-level socialization.

2.1.1 Limitations of Empirical Tests of Socialization

The socialization literature is also insufficient to answer the question of which IGO attributes are conducive to member state interest convergence due to a number of empirical limitations. One limitation of the socialization literature derives from the fact that most empirical studies of socialization use the small-N approach, looking at only a few specific cases of IGO-induced socialization. Although these are valuable studies, one cannot sufficiently control for the various factors that affect changes in state interests when analyzing a small number of cases and without looking at IGOs with varying attributes. There have been some large-N studies of socialization, but they have focused on the socialization of individuals within a particular IGO (Beyers and Dierickx 1998; Kelley 2004; Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005). Because of the level of analysis of such studies, they fail to explain and test for a long-term convergence of state interests as a result of intra-IGO interaction, but rather explain only the socialization of individual state agents and/or the effect this has on particular bargaining outcomes.

In addition to limitations due to sample size, most studies of socialization have restricted their analyses to the effects of European institutions, which some argue to be a "relatively easy case," (Johnston 2005) for testing socialization theory (e.g. Beyers and Dierickx 1998; Kelley 2004; Beyers 2005; Gheciu 2005; Hooghe 2005; Lewis 2005; Schimmelfennig 2005). These

studies have contributed in important ways to theorizing about socialization, but there is an open question as to whether the attributes of these European IGOs that they propose to be conducive to socialization can be found to have the same effects when present in IGOs across various regions.

Bearce and Bondanella (2007) attempt to rectify these shortcomings by testing the socialization hypothesis in a global sample, using a statistical model. They provide evidence that joint IGO membership leads states' interests to converge over time. In this project, I go beyond simply looking for evidence that IGOs lead to interest convergence and ask which institutional attributes of IGOs are most conducive to state interest convergence.

Some rationalist scholars have begun to take more seriously the notion that interests may be endogenous to interaction by testing implications of constructivist theory alongside their hypotheses about the effects of international institutions on state behavior (e.g. Gartzke et al. 2006; Mitchell 2006). However, while they allow for the possibility that interests are endogenous to interaction within IGOs, these studies are not aimed at explaining interest convergence and they do not delve into the question of *how* overlapping IGO membership might lead to interest convergence. Therefore, this project is meant to fill a gap in the literature not only by presenting a generalizeable theory of how interaction within IGOs leads to interest convergence, but also by providing a test of this theory across IGOs and across regions.

2.1.2 Beyond Socialization into Community Norms

In addition to proposing a more generalizable theory and tests of state interest convergence, I argue that explaining state interest convergence requires more than a focus on socialization as it is traditionally defined. Socialization has been defined as "a process of inducting actors into the

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norms and rules of a given community" (Checkel 2005: 804) and as "the internationalization of new group norms through persuasion and communicative action" (Johnston 2001: 1014). The latter definition is less restrictive because it does not imply that socialization occurs only when new actors are inducted into the existing norms of a community. Indeed, norms change over time within a community of states and I argue that all actors are constantly subject to persuasion, which may lead to new beliefs affecting how they define their interests. However, as evidenced by both of these definitions, the term socialization is associated with an internalization of *group norms*. I argue that the interaction between state agents within IGOs, leading to persuasion and communicative action, may not always involve community norms about appropriate behavior, but also the diffusion between member states of *ideas* regarding cause-and-effect relationships. As Campbell (1998: 384) points out, ideas can be either cognitive or normative: "At the cognitive level ideas are descriptions and theoretical analyses that specify cause-and-effect relationships whereas at the normative level ideas consist of values and attitudes." As I assert in the following chapter, a change in either of these types of ideas can lead to a change in interests.

This means not only that interest convergence can result from the acceptance of new ideas as well as norms, but also that, in order to understand this process, one should focus on IGOs not only as existing communities into which new members are inducted, but also as structures within which individual states interact. After all, while IGOs may sometimes be agents of ideational or normative diffusion, they are also structures within which state actors interact. In addition, the norms held by a community of states are subject to change over time. Therefore, it would be a mistake to conceive of socialization as a process that occurs when a new member joins an IGO and then ends.

As Finnemore (1996) points out, certain actors create norms for consequentialist reasons, but then other actors are socialized to accept them and behave accordingly. The "norm entrepreneurs" can be one or more states or state agents as well as actors within the IGO bureaucracy/secretariat. Therefore, one member state can have an effect on how another state or group of states define their interests through their interaction within the IGO, without a shift in the ideas and norms of the IGO as a whole community. What this implies for the study of state interest convergence is that the unit of analysis should be pairs of states, rather than IGOs, a subject to which I will return in subsequent chapters.

2.2   DIFFUSION AND LEARNING

In addition to the socialization literature, scholarly work on diffusion and learning deals with convergence in the ideas held by state policy-makers and a resulting convergence of their policy practices. As noted above, the adoption of new beliefs does not necessarily involve the acceptance of community norms leading to a new "logic of appropriateness" (March and Olsen 2006), but may simply involve the diffusion between member states of *ideas* regarding cause-and-effect relationships (Campbell 1998). Theories about the diffusion of innovation originating in the American and comparative politics literatures (e.g. Gray 1973; Collier and Messick 1975; Berry and Berry 1990; Rogers 1995) can be quite usefully applied to international relations. In fact, there is much work in international relations examining diffusion (e.g. Starr 1991; True and Mintrom 2001; Jörgens 2003; Simmons and Elkins 2004; Weyland 2005; Lee and Strang 2006; Simmons et al. 2006). Diffusion can be defined as "the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system"

(Rogers 1995: 5). An innovation can be thought of as an idea that is new to an actor (Gray 1973: 1174).

While work on socialization sometimes discusses socialization as involving a diffusion of norms (e.g. Johnston 2001), the extensive work on diffusion has not been called upon to address the question of whether and how interests may be endogenous to interaction. This is probably because the diffusion literature focuses on the diffusion of *policy practices*. However, some scholars argue that the diffusion of policy practices occurs through a diffusion of norms and ideas. To the extent that this is the case, then the diffusion of policy practices is really a diffusion of ideas leading to interest redefinition reflected by the implementation of new policies.[1]

Despite its relevance to the present study, the existing scholarly work on diffusion is not sufficient to answer the question of how interaction within IGOs leads to interest convergence. First, much of this research proposes that diffusion occurs through causal pathways that do not involve the spread of ideas through communication networks, but rather simple learning from newly available information. Second, to the extent that diffusion is theorized to occur through communication networks, this causal pathway has not been sufficiently tested empirically. Finally, while some of the theoretical developments from the diffusion literature can be usefully applied to the study of interest convergence between IGO member states, these studies neither focus on interaction within IGOs as a key explanandum nor aim to explain interest convergence as the outcome of such interaction.

Explaining the spread of similar policies requires that one specify the logic by which states come to adopt innovative policies of other states, but also the channels through which

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[1] The definition of *interests* and its relationship with policy preferences will be further discussed in the following chapter.

those innovations spread. Some work focuses on diffusion that involves emulating the policies of other states, without necessarily affecting ideas. For example, Simmons and Elkins (2004) argue that states adopt the same liberal economic policies as other states because the other state's policy alter their payoff to adopting the policy themselves and/or because they gain information from the success or failures of other states' policies and therefore mimick the successful cases. This "vicarious learning" (Simmons et al. 2006) is similar to mimetic isomorphism, in which states, being uncertain about the likelihood that certain policies will have their preferred outcomes model their policies on those of successful states (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).

Borrowing from cognitive psychology, the concept of bounded rationality (Simon 1985) has been applied in political science to describe the process through which actors, unable to calculate the costs and benefits of every possible policy option, seek cues from other actors as to which policies to enact. For example, Weyland (2005: 282) explains the spread of pension reform in Latin America as the result of cognitive heuristics:

> Since attention is finite and scanning the environment for relevant information is costly, people simply cannot meet the ideal-typical standards of rational choice. To proceed efficiently despite the inherent limits on information processing, they commonly resort to inferential shortcuts.

Citing the shortcuts known as availability, representativeness, and anchoring (Kahneman et al. 1982), he argues that states use these shortcuts to copy the policies of other states that are readily available to them, often mistakenly take the cases on which they model their policies as more representative than they are, and therefore do not sufficiently adapt the model to their specific needs (Weyland 2005). This is meant to explain why we see a diffusion of similar policies to states with very different levels of economic, social, and political development.

Similarly to the process that leads states to use the availability and representativeness shortcuts, some scholars, drawing on reference group theory from social psychology, argue that

policy emulation is the result of actors modeling their behavior on that of others that they deem to be in their peer group (Strang and Meyer 1993; Rogers 1995; Axelrod 1997; Lee and Strang 2006; Simmons and Elkins 2004).

All of the aforementioned theories offer an explanation of diffusion involving simple learning and the updating of an actor's information, but they do not tell us much about where the information comes from. I will argue not only that some sort of interaction within the international system is required for actors to gain this information, but also that a process of persuasion rather than simple information gathering is involved.

Some diffusion scholars do argue that the diffusion of policy practices involves the diffusion of norms and ideas that make the adoption of policy practices more likely. For example, in examining changes in the size of the public sector, Lee and Strang (2006) find that only successful cases of downsizing were mimicked, whereas neither failed cases of downsizing nor successful cases of upsizing were influential. As they infer from this finding, emulating only cases that confirm existing beliefs is not evidence of simply gathering new information to update beliefs. They argue instead that neoliberal discourses made upsizing a legitimate practice while downsizing was believed to be illegitimate during the period under study. Indeed, work emanating from organizational sociology indicates that practices spread more rapidly when they are "theorized" which means that there exists a "self-conscious development and specification of abstract categories and the formulation of patterned relationships such as chains of cause and effect" (Strang and Meyer 1993: 492).

Related to the socialization literature, it may then be the diffusion of norms and ideas that engenders the spread of similar policy practices (see Johnston 2001). For example, acceptance of a norm that liberal economic policies are good can facilitate the diffusion of specific liberal

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practices. Although such work does treat the diffusion of norms as prior to the diffusion of specific policy practice, this literature also fails to tell us much about the channels through which the ideas diffuse.

So far I have discussed theories regarding the logic by which actors come to adopt new policy practices, but some diffusion literature focuses on the channels through which innovations diffuse. Collier and Messick (1975: 1306) discuss two types of diffusion: hierarchical and spatial. Hierarchical diffusion takes place as the most advanced countries adopt an innovation and it is then adopted by successively less advanced states, whereas spatial diffusion occurs along lines of geographical proximity or along major lines of communication. Collier and Messick find evidence of spatial proximity in state adoptions of social security, but they do not specifically test for the effects of major line of communication between states. As Soule and Strang (1998: 275) point out, geographic proximity facilitates all kinds of interaction and influence so it is difficult to discern a distinctive logic from simple spatial proximity. In addition, it is often difficult to distinguish between geographic regions and "communication regions" (Starr 1991). Starr cites the example of the Arab countries, which are geographically proximate, but are also involved in a number of common IGOs.

Indeed, although there may be some diffusion of ideas and policies through geographic proximity, I argue that much diffusion occurs through IGOs. In addition to the socialization literature referenced above, the literature on epistemic communities and some of the literature on diffusion focuses more specifically on non-geographic channels through which innovations are spread.

Peter Haas (1989, 1992) argues that, because decision-makers have a desire for information due to their uncertainty about their interests and how best to realize them, they are

therefore subject to influence by "epistemic communities" of experts that push certain ideas about which problems exist and how best to deal with them. Haas and other scholars, who have been referred to as "weak cognitivists" (Hasenclever et al. 1996), discuss a process of "learning" through which actors "reevaluate cause-effect relationships and arrive at new interpretations of the social world" (Adler 1991). Although epistemic communities often function through IGOs, this work does not test which attributes of IGOs lead to a convergence in state interests. In addition, the empirical work on epistemic communities is subject to many of the same limitations as the socialization literature discussed above, including the restriction to small-N analysis, and the failure to allow for the effects of interaction between specific member states of an IGO on those states' interests.

In their study on the diffusion of liberal economic policies, Simmons and Elkins (2004) attempt to test learning through communication channels such as IGOs. However, they only include preferential trade arrangements (PTAs) and bilateral investment treaties in their model. If it is the diffusion of ideas through interaction within multiple IGOs that makes two states' interests (and therefore policies) more similar over time, then their model fails to account for a good deal of the communication networks through which such diffusion occurs. Ingram, Robinson, and Busch (2005) demonstrate that even social and cultural IGOs can have an impact on trade, which they take to be evidence that IGOs foster awareness, trust, and a sense of common purpose between states. Their dependent variable is trade between states, rather than liberal policies adopted in individual states, but the essential argument regarding the potential effects of IGO connectedness between two states on their relations can be extended to the spread of ideas between them, leading to a convergence in how they define their interests. In the following chapter, I will develop such an argument.

While some diffusion theory should apply to the diffusion of ideas that affect states' interests, the above referenced literature is focused on explaining the emergence of similar policies, rather than similar interests. The purpose of this project is to explain how interaction within IGOs can facilitate persuasion and therefore the spread of similar ideas between states, leading to a convergence in how they define their interests.

2.3   CONCLUSION

As noted above, the purpose of this project is therefore to provide a generalizable theory of how interaction within IGOs leads to a convergence in state interests and, based on that theory, to test which attributes of IGOs are most conducive to this process. My theory goes beyond a focus on socialization defined as the internalization of community norms and incorporates the possibility that persuasion involving ideas about cause-and-effect relationships can also lead to interest convergence through intra-IGO interaction. While the theories on socialization, diffusion, epistemic communities, and learning can be usefully applied in theorizing about the effects of intra-IGO interaction on states' interests, the existing literature is insufficient to answer the above question. In the following chapter, I will lay out a theory of how interaction within IGOs leads to a convergence of state interests over time. In that chapter, I will also put forth a set of hypotheses derived from that theory to be tested in subsequent chapters.

3.0 EXPLAINING MEMBER STATE INTEREST CONVERGENCE

In this chapter, I set forth a deductive theory to answer the following question: which attributes of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are conducive to member state interest convergence? In Chapter 2, I discussed the existing literature that could inform a theory of interest convergence, but which is insufficient to answer the question of how interaction within IGOs causes states to define their interests more similarly over time. I argue for a move away from the concept of socialization, which implies that only new actors are subject to normative change. Instead, I maintain that all member state agents are subject to ideational change and that this could involve new ideas about cause-and-effect relationships as well as normative ideas. Furthermore, unlike the case for much of the socialization literature, the present question requires a focus on *state* interest convergence. Therefore, what is needed to answer the present question is a theory that can explain how interests converge at the state level as a result of interaction within IGOs. With regard to the literature on policy diffusion, I point out that, to the extent that policy diffusion occurs through the spread of innovative ideas, the spread of policy practices is the result of interest redefinition, an idea to which I will return below. However, the literature on diffusion of innovations has not sufficiently focused on the spread of ideas and practices through networks of communication such as IGOs, which I propose to have a large role to play in the process of policy diffusion.

As mentioned above, the process that eventually leads to a convergence in state interests involves the interaction of individual state agents or IGO bureaucrats from different member states and an internalization or acceptance of new ideas by those individuals. A change in the state's interests, however, does not occur unless these agents transmit their new beliefs to the domestic arena. The question of how IGO interaction leads to state interest convergence therefore calls for a focus on *states'* interests and factors that make the individual to state-level transmission of ideas more likely. In this chapter, I will lay out a theory of how the interaction of individuals from different states within IGOs leads to a change in state interests and then I will generate hypotheses about which IGO attributes are conducive to this process. Essentially, I argue that what matters most is the amount of interaction facilitated by the IGOs in which two states are jointly members. I also propose that certain state attributes condition the effects of IGOs on interest convergence between pairs of states and I therefore put forth hypotheses regarding the conditioning effects of these state attributes.

A theory of interest convergence within IGOs must necessarily begin with a discussion of what interests are, which is presented in the first subsection below. After establishing what the term *interests* means for this study, I continue with a brief definition of IGOs. In the third subsection, I discuss persuasion, a causal process through which intra-IGO interaction may lead to interest convergence. In that section, I also lay out three useful categories of ideas that may be transmitted between state agents within IGOs and discuss which of them should become institutionalized within states thereby changing how they define their interests.

The fourth subsection presents a general proposition regarding what it is about IGOs that makes them conducive to interest convergence – the amount of interaction facilitated by the IGOs - from which I generate three hypotheses regarding specific attributes of IGOs that should

facilitate greater interaction. These attributes include the total number of substructures, the number of structures within which member state ministers interact, and the number of issue categories covered by the IGO.

In the final subsection, I put forth a proposition regarding how state attributes may condition the degree to which interaction within IGOs leads to a convergence in interests between two states. I propose that different types of similarity between two states can make state agents predisposed to the acceptance of new ideas from one another and thus enhance the degree to which intra-IGO interaction may lead to state interest convergence over time. Dyadic attributes hypothesized to condition the effects of interaction on interest convergence include joint liberal democracy, regime type similarity, and common culture.

3.1   WHAT ARE "INTERESTS"?

Before proceeding with a theory of how member state interests converge, it is important to establish what is meant by *interests*. When one is asked to define interests or to distinguish interests from preferences, one is almost unfailingly advised to see Frieden's (1999) piece on preferences in search of an answer. However, Frieden (1999: 46, fn. 4) distinguishes only between *preferences* and *policy preferences*, defining preferences as "preferences over outcomes" and policy preferences as "preferences over strategies (policies)". He argues that it is important to separate the strategic environment from an actor's preferences. In other words, we cannot deduce an actor's preferences by looking at their indicated preference (or actions) in a given situation because the strategic environment may lead the actor to indicate a preference for some policy that will get them closer to their preferred outcome than the policy for which they

have the highest utility. To deduce an actor's preferences, Frieden (1999: 61) suggest that one look at a prior "box": "If we want to know a firm's preferences over trade protection, we start one level up, in a bigger box, in which the firm's properties and environment are known, and which lead it to order its trade preferences". He makes no distinction between interests and preferences, but only a difference between preferences and policy preferences.

One is still left searching for a clear definition of what interests/preferences are. Indeed, whether there is even a difference between interests and preferences depends on how one defines interests. Even if we define interests as preferences over outcomes, the difference between interests and *policy* preferences is really a matter of the level of abstraction used to define interests. We can think of three points on a continuous ladder of abstraction (Sartori 1970). At the most abstract level, interests could be defined as what an actor values in terms of ultimate outcomes. For example, with regard to states' interests, it is commonly accepted that states want power, security, and wealth (Finnemore 1996). Similarly, Wendt (1994: 385) discusses an actor's "corporate identity", which "refers to the intrinsic, self-organizing qualities that constitute actor individuality," and the four interests generated by that identity: physical security; ontological security (predictability in relationships to the world); recognition as an actor by others; and development (aspiration for a better life). These interests represent the desires of states at their most abstract level. However, as Finnemore (1996: 1-2) points out, states have different beliefs about what constitutes power, security, and wealth and how they can best attain them. States' definitions of what constitutes and facilitates the attainment of these more fundamental desires would be lower on the ladder of abstraction. At the least abstract level would be specific and detailed policies that state decision-makers believe to be the best strategy for achieving those core desires in a given situation. All of these would be included in what I

refer to as interests. However, as one moves down the ladder of abstraction, every type of interests becomes an expression of more fundamental (and abstractly defined) interests found higher on the ladder.

The implementation of (or voting on) specific policies is essentially behavior that expresses interests at the least abstract level. The difficulty, as Frieden (1999) points out, is to distinguish these expressions of interests from the strategic environment that may affect whether true interests are expressed or are rather masked by some strategy employed to obtain an outcome that brings one closer to achieving one's true interests. This does not mean that the interests found at this least abstract level (which could be called policy preferences) should not be included in the definition of interests. The problem noted by Frieden is actually a matter of measurement, not of conceptual definition. In other words, one must be careful to control for factors in an actor's strategic environment, when trying to obtain a measure of true interests.

This is especially important for the present project, which aims to explain the convergence in states' interests resulting from interaction with other states and the acceptance of new ideas and *not* from changes in the strategic environment. Some research questions may require an examination of interests at some specific level of abstraction, but, as will become clear with the elaboration of my theory below, this is not necessary here. What is important is to show that changes in material factors or strategic situations are not the only path ultimately leading to changes in state behavior as a result of IGO membership, but that changes in the ideas held by state decision-makers and the definition of state interests resulting from intra-IGO interaction do so as well. Furthermore, the goal of this project is to determine what attributes of IGOs facilitate this process. The need to separate strategic behavior from interests, however, will be dealt with in the discussion of measurement in the following chapter.

Scholars differ in the meanings they attach to the term *interests* and many scholars of international relations (IR) would use this term to refer only to the most abstract, core values of a state that I discussed above, using the term *preferences* to refer to more concrete desires for specific outcomes. To reiterate, I include both core desires and specific preferences under the concept of interests because, as I argue above, these are all expressions of what a state wants at more or less specific levels of abstraction. Each more specific expression of what a state desires is based on how the states' interests are defined at a more abstract level. In the simplest terms, interests are what a state wants. In the empirical work that tests my theory in subsequent chapters, I use measures that may fit under what is traditional labeled as preferences, but in the theory laid out below, I argue that changes in the ideas held by state agents can change what those preferences are because they have changed how a state defines what it wants (i.e. the empirical implications of a change in a states' interests at a more abstract level can be found in changes in how they express those interests at a less abstract level). Having clarified what is meant by interests, I now move on to define another term that is essential to my theory: intergovernmental organizations.

3.2   INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

IGOs are organizations that are created by three or more sovereign states to accomplish some common objective(s). To be considered an IGO for the purposes of this project, such organizations must hold regular plenary sessions at least once every ten years and possess a permanent secretariat and corresponding headquarters (Pevehouse et al. 2003). IGOs therefore bring together the agents of member states within various IGO bodies and they also bring

together individuals from various member states to work within IGO secretariats. Through interaction within these bodies, state agents can transmit new ideas to each other, thus changing how they define their states' interests.

There are a variety of IGOs that fit into the above description. Many of the same types of structures come up repeatedly as one looks across IGOs, although the number or presence of various structures differs from one IGO to the next. There are often, but not always, structures for representatives of states. If such a structure exists, it is often accompanied by some sort of executive body that manages the agenda on a more regular basis. IGOs often have a number of committees and working groups which work on specific issues. In addition to secretariat divisions that carry out the administration of the IGO itself, some IGOs also have technical divisions made up of bureaucrats or experts who carry on regular IGO functions such as research or special programs.

IGOs can also differ on such dimensions as membership restrictions, purpose, and decision-making structure. For example, there are a series of IGOs with global membership, many of which were developed in the post-World War II era. Several of these IGOs are specialized agencies of the United Nations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). There are also several IGOs designed to accomplish regional integration on a range of issues. These organizations include, among others, the European Union (EU), Mercosur, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). In addition to those aimed at regional integration, there are IGOs designed to deal with specific issues faced by states in a given region such as the International Red Locust Control Organization (IRLCO). Some IGOs have restricted membership that is defined not by spatial

proximity, but by the common production of specific products such as cotton, coffee, or jute products. While some IGOs, such as the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold, are designed to accomplish very specific goals, most are designed to foster continuing cooperation in a given field or set of fields.

Whether differences on the aforementioned dimensions matter for how the IGO affects state behavior is a question for another project. As will become evident below, the theory put forth here is deduced from the idea that more interaction should lead to greater interest convergence between pairs of states. To the extent that the various functions or purposes of an IGO discussed above affect the degree to which states interact within the IGO, then these dimensions will be accounted for in this study. Essentially, if the proposition that more interaction leads to greater interest convergence is correct, then the amount of interaction that occurs within the IGO and who is involved in that interaction should be the only dimensions that matters insofar as testing the hypotheses set forth below.

3.3   IDEATIONAL CHANGE

I argue that interaction within IGOs facilitates a process by which individuals from different states exchange ideas with one another such that state agents accept new ideas that may change the way in which they define their states' interests. I identify persuasion as one causal mechanism through which this may occur. There may be other causal mechanisms that lead from interaction to the transmission of ideas and result in interest convergence. To the extent that there are others, they should push in the same direction as persuasion. Here I focus on persuasion as the major mechanism through which ideational change occurs within IGOs, but

one can imagine, for example, that a process of ideational change can also result from learning as discussed in the previous chapter.

Persuasion differs from learning only insofar as the actors involved are *intentionally* trying to transfer ideas to other actors. Following Gheciu's (2005: 981) definition, persuasion can be described as follows:

> Persuasion typically occurs in social interactions between actors who have drawn different conclusions regarding the nature, merits, and/or implications of X action or policy, and in which one or more of those parties attempt, through arguments, to get their interlocutors to rethink their conclusions.

If an actor persuades another actor that X is in their interest because it leads to Y, which is something they value, then this constitutes a change in their interests. As noted above, it is commonly accepted that states want power, security, and wealth, but states have different beliefs about what constitutes power, security, and wealth and how they can best attain them (Finnemore 1996: 1-2). State agents can therefore be persuaded to change their beliefs about what types of actions or policies are in the best interest of their state.

I maintain that persuasion does not have to involve induction into community *norms* in order to lead to interest convergence. As I stated in the previous chapter, IGO interaction can also lead to the acceptance of new ideas about cause-and-effect relationships from one or a subset of member states as a result of their interaction within the IGO. For the purpose of theorizing about state interest convergence, I categorize the new beliefs that actors can internalize as a result of IGO interaction into those involving: 1) norms about behavior within the IGO; 2) norms about appropriate behavior that constrain policy options on a specific issue or set of issues; 3) and ideas about cause-and-effect relationships. This distinction is not meant to imply different causal mechanisms. Causal mechanisms are "*recurrent processes* linking specified initial conditions and a specific outcome [*emphasis in original*]" (Mayntz 2004: 241).

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The causal process proposed here is persuasion, the explanandum is the structures of IGOs that facilitate interaction and thus allow for the process of persuasion to take place and the outcome is a convergence in state interests. However, there are different types of ideas that can be transmitted through the persuasion process. Only some of them, I argue, lead from the micro level acceptance of new ideas to the macro-level redefinition of state interests. By specifying different types of ideas, I intend to demonstrate that not all changes in ideas held by individuals lead to changes in the definition of state interests and that a change in *identities* is not required for a change in state interests, although it does enhance the likelihood of interest convergence, as I will discuss below.

As stated above, new beliefs/ideas taken on by an actor can be usefully classified into three categories. First, state agents or IGO bureaucrats may be socialized to accept the norms of a given IGO or of a subset of member states within an IGO regarding their behavior within that organization. For example, Lewis (2005) examines and provides evidence for the socialization of state agents within the European Union's Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) into norms against the use of certain instrumental behavior within the negotiating structure of the COREPER itself. This type of socialization is important because it can alter the outcomes of intergovernmental bargaining within the EU, and therefore affect the extent of cooperation between EU member states. However, since these new behavioral norms are specific to the context of one IGO and do not pertain to some specific issue that may be encountered within other fora, they should not have an effect on a state's definition of its interests.

Second, individuals may be persuaded to accept norms about appropriate behavior that constrain the policy options available to them. As discussed in the previous chapter, once

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internalized, norms tell an actor which behavior is acceptable. An actor, following a norm, therefore behaves in a certain way because they believe that it is the right thing to do. In addition to the norms falling into the first category regarding behavior within an IGO, member states can come to internalize more general norms of behavior that reach beyond the context of the IGO. If certain actions are no longer viewed as appropriate, then this changes the set of policy options that the actor will even consider and therefore changes what they believe to be in their interest. One example of this would be the acceptance of a norm regarding human rights practices. Human rights norms, once accepted/internalized, not only lead to a change in the behavior of the state toward its citizens, but also affect the state's interests more profoundly. For example, once a state has accepted the norm that the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, that state may eventually come to support actions against the use of the death penalty by other states and come to believe that it is in their interest to keep other states from using it.

In addition to these two types of normative ideas, individuals from various states may also be persuaded to accept new ideas about cause-and-effect relationships (i.e. "cognitive ideas" to use Campbell's (1998) terminology) as a result of their interaction with individuals from other member states within IGOs. Once persuaded, these actors thus come to change their beliefs about certain cause-and-effect relationships. Unlike norms, these are not ideas about appropriate behavior, but rather ideas about how best to attain something they value or ideas that change what they believe to be of value to them.

When actors from different states interact within IGOs, they are likely to learn and be persuaded by others to take on new ideas about cause-and-effect relationships as well as norms of appropriate behavior. For example, agents from a state whose policies widely reflect a belief that free trade is good for one's economy could, over time, by interacting with agents from

another state working on trade policy in various fora, come to persuade that state that pursuing freer trade policies would lead to economic prosperity for their state.[2] Therefore, this process of persuasion is more appropriately theorized with regard to pairs of states, rather focusing only on IGOs as whole communities that affect all of the member states' interests in the same way. This is not to say that persuasion and the acceptance of norms by an entire IGO community does not occur. However, by focusing on pairs of states belonging to a number of the same IGOs, one can more accurately assess their effects on each other individually and as part of larger groups within which they interact.

Most theory regarding the acceptance and internalization of norms comes out of the constructivist literature, which proposes that identity change is an important part of this process. While I have not addressed identity in my discussion of persuasion, I do not reject the notion of identity change. To paraphrase Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 6), the issue is not whether identities matter but *how* they matter.

This project is about how interaction within IGOs leads to the internalization of new ideas and the institutionalization of those ideas in the domestic context leading to a redefinition of state interests. This does not necessarily require identity change. Identity has been invoked by constructivists to explain how a state defines its interests vis-à-vis other actors (Wendt 1992, 1994). I argue that it is not necessary for two states to develop a collective identity in order to transmit new norms and ideas to one another and that the development of a collective identity may not necessarily change how a state defines its interests outside of the context of their its relationship with that particular state. As discussed above, interest convergence can result from

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[2] The idea that states should implement free trade practices could also be considered a norm, but it does not necessarily have to be accepted as the "appropriate" thing to do. Rather, this could be considered the best way to achieve economic prosperity.

the transmission between individuals from different states of ideas about cause-and-effect relationships and not only from the acceptance of normative ideas about acceptable behavior. Furthermore, the acceptance of new norms by individuals from different states does not always lead to changes in interests and behavior at the *state* level. For example, norms about appropriate behavior vis-à-vis other actors within an IGO should not affect the states' interests outside of the IGO context. Therefore, since my theory is about the acceptance of new ideas and changes in the definition of interests at the state level, I do not focus on identity change, which, I argue, is not necessary for a change in states' interests.

Some sense of common identity between two states, however, should magnify the diffusion of ideas between agents of the two states since, as we know from social psychology and related research in political science, actors are more likely to be persuaded by and take on new ideas from actors that they identify as peers or as part of an in-group (Mackie et al. 1992; Strang and Meyer 1993; Strang and Soule 1998; Simmons and Elkins 2004; Lee and Strang 2006). In this sense, common identity has more of an interactive effect with opportunities for persuasion on the degree to which two states' interests converge. I will return to this argument below when I discuss state attributes and their effects on the process of interest convergence. However, I will first discuss which attributes of IGOs should, by providing more opportunities for interaction and persuasion, lead to greater interest convergence between member states.

3.4   WHAT MAKES IGOS CONDUCIVE TO INTEREST CONVERGENCE?

I have argued that state interest convergence occurs through a process of persuasion of individual state agents that ultimately leads to a change in how states define their interests. So what is it

about IGOs that facilitates these processes and, more specifically, which attributes of IGOs make state interest convergence more likely? Drawing on the social psychology literature, constructivist scholars have proposed that socialization is more likely to occur under certain conditions. However, the terminology varies by scholar, while some terms appear to refer to the same concept and some concepts overlap. Interaction that is proposed to be conducive to socialization is described as necessarily intense, frequent, dense, systematic, long, sustained, time-demanding, and of long duration (Beyers 2005; Checkel 2005; Gheciu 2005; Johnston 2005; Lewis 2005). Although this fine-tuning of socialization theory is useful for lower levels of analysis, most of these conditions essentially condense into the same concept: the amount of interaction between state agents. Only if state agents are involved in frequent interactions for long periods of time can they be persuaded to accept new ideas, and only if this occurs can the new interests they develop be transmitted to the state.

The theory proposed herein is a deductive theory of interest convergence. I start with the idea that more interaction should lead to greater interest convergence by providing more opportunities for persuasion, through which ideas are transmitted between actors leading to changes in state interests. Then I draw hypotheses from this proposition regarding which specific attributes of IGOs should facilitate more interaction.

Proposition 1: The two states interact within IGOs, the more the states' interests will converge over time.

Despite the above proposition, interaction may not always lead to interest convergence because interaction will not always lead to attempts at persuasion and such attempts may not always be successful. However, I maintain that increased levels of interaction between states

within dense networks of IGOs should increase the possibilities for states to take on new ideas, leading to an increased likelihood of interest convergence on the whole.

What about cases of interest divergence? New issues may arise as a result of interaction within IGOs and these may lead pairs of states to experience greater conflict as a result (see, for example, Fausett and Volgy 2009). However, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which two states discussing a given issue could actually move farther apart on that same issue in the absence of changes in other factors that affect their strategic situation. In other words, it is unlikely for two actors to convince each other or learn from each other to move even farther away one from the other in how they define their interests and therefore in what they prefer in a given situation. Conceptually, therefore, interaction and the transmission of new ideas should not lead to a divergence of interests, but other factors that also result from interaction may lead to a divergence in states' interests with regard to other issues. On the whole, however, I theorize that more interaction should lead to greater interest convergence. In order to test whether the above proposition holds, we need hypotheses regarding the effects of specific institutional attributes that should lead to increased interaction between individuals from different member states.

First, IGOs with more sub-structures should facilitate more interaction between member state agents and bureaucrats from various member states. The logic behind this expectation is twofold. The more structures for interaction that exist within an IGO, the more fora there are for interaction of state agents and other individuals from different states. Also, having a high number of sub-structures is an indication that an IGO is active, which means that IGOs with a high number of sub-structures are those that have sub-structures in which state agents interact frequently and intensely over a long period of time. In other words, it is unlikely that states will

create multiple sub-structures of an IGO if they do not interact frequently under the auspices of that IGO. The mere existence of a number of sub-structures requires that the member states interacted to create them and normally implies that state agents have already or will continue to meet under the auspices of each of those substructures. Therefore, I make the following hypothesis:

H1: The more IGOs with a large number of sub-structures to which two states jointly belong, the more their interests will converge over time.

It may seem obvious that interaction within IGOs with more substructures would lead to greater interest convergence, but this is not a foregone conclusion for many IR scholars. It is important to note that the alternative hypothesis to Hypothesis 1, as for the more specific hypotheses that will be laid out below, is the null hypothesis, which would lead us to expect no relationship between the number of substructures of IGOs within which two states interact and changes in the similarity of their interests.

Those who are willing to accept the possibility of interest convergence resulting from interaction within IGOs, would not expect convergence to be associated with the number of structures within which they interact, but rather with such factors as the degree of formalization of the institution or the depth of integration associated with the IGO, etc. This is the reason why no dataset exists that counts structures for interaction within IGOs at such a detailed level. If the amount of interaction within IGO structures does not lead to interest convergence, then there would be no relationship between the number of substructures and the degree to which two member states' interests become more similar over time and the null hypothesis would be supported. By contrast, evidence of a relationship between the number of substructures of IGOs within which two states interact and the degree to which the two states' interests converge over

time would provide support for Hypothesis 1 and for the notion that more interaction leads to greater interest convergence.

As noted above, in seeking to explain *state* interest convergence, it is not enough to focus only on factors that should be conducive to the acceptance of new ideas by individuals, but also on factors that make it more likely that those ideas will be translated into the definition of state interests, which will be reflected in state policies. More specifically than the number of substructures that an IGO has, which could include secretariat and technical divisions and other bodies that involve either international bureaucrats or only a small subset of state representatives, I propose that interest convergence will be more likely the more an IGO has structures for meetings of high-level state representatives that have the power to change how the state's interests are defined and therefore how it approaches different issues.

These high-level leaders are member state ministers[3] that are involved in important ways in determining what is in the interest of their states in their specific domains. These ministers also continue to interact with other decision-makers in the domestic context. Therefore, they should be more likely to transmit the new ideas that they may obtain through intra-IGO interaction to other important actors at the state level and they should be more influential in applying them to the redefinition of state interests than individuals from different member states interacting within IGO structures such as secretariat divisions. Most individuals interacting within IGO secretariats or other permanent bodies that do not involve high-level representatives of all member states do not return to the domestic policy-making forum on a regular basis (some never) and most are not in as important a position to affect the definition of state interests when they do. In order to assess the validity of this idea, I will test the independent effect of meetings

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[3] For some states these officials are not referred to as ministers, but as high-level leaders of cabinet agencies. From this point forward I will refer to them simply as "ministers."

of ministers of member states on the degree to which states' interests converge over time, based on the following hypothesis:

H2: The more structures of IGOs in which ministers of two states interact, the more their interests will converge over time.

It is important to note that, while the substructures of IGOs within which member state ministers interact form part of the total structures of the IGO, Hypothesis 2 is different from Hypothesis 1 in that it sets the expectation that more interaction of this specific type of state agent should be conducive to interest convergence. Support for H2 can provide further support for H1, but if it is specifically interaction between this type of state agent that is conducive to interest convergence then one would expect to find a stronger relationship between the number of bodies in which member state *ministers* interact and a change in interest similarity than for the total number of structures within which two states interact.

That more interaction of high-level member state representatives is conducive to interest convergence is not an accepted fact. In fact, socialization scholars argue that the internalization of new normative ideas is more likely to occur in less politicized, more insulated settings (Checkel 2005; Lewis 2005). This would apply to some meetings of representatives such as bodies that bring together permanent representatives, but would not apply to many of the meetings of member state ministers. In addition, much of the literature relating to changes in interests focuses on IGO bureaucracies and epistemic communities of experts, rather than high-level leaders. Although the acceptance of new norms and ideas by individuals may be more likely within such bodies of experts, I argue that this is less likely to lead to interest redefinition at the state level because these individuals are not as likely return to the domestic policy-making arena and to have the power to implement new ideas.

The above hypotheses relate to attributes of IGOs that facilitate greater interaction between member states and therefore provide more opportunities for persuasion of state agents to take on new ideas, but the I have also offered a more specific hypothesis with regard to the types of structures that should be important in making IGO interaction conducive to member state interest convergence. The last two hypotheses condition which types of individuals are more likely to have the power to translate new ideas taken on at the IGO level into the definition of *state* interests, which are then pursued at the international level and which ultimately shape the formation of state policy.

Another indicator of a high amount of interaction within IGO structures is the number of issue areas covered by the IGO. It has been proposed that issue density within an IGO can enhance socialization because it is not only the quantity of contact that matters but also the quality of interaction (Lewis 2005: 946-947) and/or the type of interaction (i.e. deliberation and joint problem-solving rather than intense bargaining) (Checkel 2005: 807). However, while Lewis (2005) refers to the density of issues dealt with by one set of state agents, I argue that this is simply another indicator of the amount of interaction between those individuals. This may have an effect on the degree of socialization of state agents into the norms of the institution itself, but it may actually have a lower impact on the degree to which agents are subject to being persuaded on any particular issue, especially since issue density lends itself to issue linkage and horse-trading. If issue linkage is at play, then this mechanism itself would actually lead to changes in immediate state behavior on specific issues, but would not be reflected in a long-term change in how the states' interests are defined and therefore in their future expressions of their interests through behavior.

The issue coverage of an IGO, however, can also tell us something about the amount of interaction of state agents within the IGO. The more issues that the IGO deals with, especially as issues cut across traditional issue domains, the more communication between state agents is required to manage them. Therefore, I make the following hypothesis:

H3: The more IGOs with a larger issue coverage to which two states jointly belong, the more their interests will converge over time.

Attributes of the states themselves may also affect the degree to which the diffusion of ideas between state agents occurs and/or the degree to which this diffusion leads to a redefinition of interests at the state level. I address these attributes in the following section.

3.5   THE CONDITIONAL EFFECTS OF STATE ATTRIBUTES

Although the aforementioned attributes of IGOs should be conducive to interest convergence between states that interact within IGO structures, the degree to which those member states' interests converge may be conditioned by certain attributes of the states themselves. I propose that interest convergence should be greater between states whose attributes make them predisposed to being persuaded by each other.

Ideas are more likely to diffuse between two states that already share core values and perceive each other as peers, which make persuasion more likely. In his seminal work on diffusion, Rogers (1995: 287) discusses this phenomenon under the concept of *homophily*:

> When two individuals share common meanings, beliefs, and mutual understandings, communication between them is more likely to be effective. Individuals enjoy the comfort of interacting with others who are similar. Talking with those who are markedly

different from ourselves requires more effort to make communication effective. Heterophilous communication between dissimilar individuals may cause cognitive dissonance because an individual is exposed to messages that are inconsistent with existing beliefs, an uncomfortable psychological state. Homophily and effective communication breed each other. The more communication there is between members of a dyad, the more likely they are to become homophilous; the more homphilous two individuals are, the more likely that their communication will be effective.

Attributes of states that make them, and consequently their individual agents, more similar in their existing values and beliefs should make the process of persuasion more effective and therefore yield greater interest convergence between two states.

Proposition 2: Interest convergence resulting from intra-IGO interaction should be greater for states that are pre-disposed to being persuaded by one another.

In explaining the socialization of Central and East European states into liberal-democratic norms, Schimmelfennig (2005) hypothesizes that persuasion requires that discussion participants be "liberal-minded." Liberal-minded actors should be more susceptible to persuasion because "the essence of liberalism is tolerance and reason – openness to new, but convincing evidence," which fits the requirement for actors in Habermas' theory of communicative action (Johnston 2005: 1016). If liberal-minded actors are required for persuasion, then individuals from liberal democratic states should be more susceptible to persuasion. Therefore, I expect that pairs of democratic states will be more susceptible to interest convergence. I thus make the following hypothesis:

H4: The effect of joint membership in more IGOs with attributes that are conducive to interest convergence should have a greater effect on interest similarity for dyads in which both states are liberal democracies.

It is possible, however, that it is not the liberal-mindedness of democracies that makes them more susceptible to interest convergence. Rather than requiring liberal-minded participants, persuasion may be more effective between democracies because of their shared set of core values. Several scholars call upon such an argument to explain the phenomenon referred to as the democratic peace, an empirical reality that democracies almost never fight one another. These scholars argue that the reason that democracies do not fight each other is that the shared norms by which they operate domestically lead them to seek non-violent means of resolving international conflict (Doyle 1986; Sørensen 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994; Raymond 1994; Weart 1994). Calling upon Immanuel Kant, whose ideas form the basis for the aforementioned scholars' arguments, Sørensen (1992: 399) reminds us that the mechanisms that restrain democracies from going to war are only effective in relations with other democracies, which share their values.

Weart (1994) notes that, historically, not only democratic republics but also oligarchic republics (those granting equal rights to certain groups while excluding others) have been peaceful toward other republics of the same type. This, he argues, indicates that, "Leaders who negotiated with fellow citizens as equals invariably treated foreign leaders in the same non-violent manner, provided that they perceived the foreigners too as political equals" (Weart 1994: 299). In other words, these shared values regarding the treatment of individuals only lead states to seek the same practices in international relations with those states they deem to be in their peer group. While the aforementioned democratic peace scholars argue that the shared values and norms of democracies condition their action toward each other, I argue that these same norms make it easier for them to persuade each other.

One of the conditions for persuasion-induced socialization set forth by Checkel (2005: 813) is that the "target has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the socializing agency's message." Since democracies already share core values, this should make it less likely that new ideas with which they are presented will conflict with their existing norms and ideas to an extent that they experience cognitive dissonance. Persuasion should be even more effective between democracies because the fact of sharing these values leads them to perceive each other as peers and therefore to more easily accept and evaluate arguments from one another. Research in social psychology has shown that persuasive messages from others perceived to be in one's peer group (in-group) receive content-focused processing, while messages from those in an out-group produce very little attitude change, regardless of the strength of the argument (Mackie et al. 1992). Therefore, I propose that the distance between two states in terms of their democratic values should affect the degree to which they are open to being persuaded by each other or are susceptible to acceptance of the same norms and ideas advocated within IGOs.

H5: The closer together two states are on the democracy/autocracy scale, the more their interests should converge over time as a result of joint membership in IGOs with attributes that are conducive to interest convergence.

While Hypotheses 4 and 5 seem similar, there are two distinct logics and that underpin these two hypotheses and thus they produce two slightly different expectations. Hypothesis 4 is based on the logic that persuasion requires liberal-minded actors. If this is the case, then the expectation is that dyads involving two liberal democratic states should experience greater interest convergence over time than other dyads. Hypothesis 5 is based on the notion of similarity more generally – states with an existing similarity in terms of their regime type (and therefore norms and values – including liberalism) should be more likely to persuade each other

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and therefore should experience even greater interest convergence than other pairs of states because they view each other as being in their peer group. So, if Hypothesis 5 is correct, two democracies that are closer together on the democracy scale should experience greater interest convergence than another pair of democracies that is further apart on the democracy scale.

One could imagine that this could function even for non-democracies that are close in terms of their regime type. While two non-democracies with a similar regime type may not necessarily have shared norms and values to the extent that two democracies do, they may view each other as being in the same peer group. Therefore, to reiterate, Hypothesis 4 is about joint democracies while Hypothesis 5 is about the degree of similarity in regime type between pairs of states.

By the same logic that underlies the argument regarding shared democratic values, cultural affinity between two states could make them more susceptible to persuasion by one another. The diffusion of social practices (which, as I propose above, reflect the diffusion of ideas) is argued to be more rapid when there is a common culture between groups (Strang and Meyer 1993). There is some evidence that cultural similarity affects policy diffusion in international relations because states with shared cultural attributes serve as peer-based reference groups for each other, especially when two states share a common religion (Simmons and Elkins 2004; Lee and Strang 2006). A common culture would also make agents from two states more susceptible to internalization of the same norms and beliefs developed within an IGO. Therefore, I hypothesize that the effect of IGOs on states interest convergence will be greater for dyads with cultural similarities such as a common language, ethnicity, and religion.

H6: The effects of being jointly members of more IGOs with attributes that are conducive to interest convergence should be greater for two states with a common language, ethnicity, and/or religion.

In the following chapter, I will discuss and conduct a set of empirical analyses to test the above hypotheses.

3.6   CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have put forth a theory of how interaction within IGOs leads to member state interest convergence over time. First, in order to explain state interest convergence, one must establish what interests are. Interests can be equated to preferences in terms of being the outcomes preferred by states, but they can be expressed at any level of abstraction from very basic desires of states for security and prosperity to preferences for very specific policies. Policy implementation and voting are expressions of interests, but one must take steps empirically to disentangle strategic behavior from actual interests when these concrete expressions of interests are used to measure interests. The measurement of interests will be discussed in the following chapter.

Joint memberships in IGOs, I have argued, provide the opportunity for individuals from different states to persuade each other to accept new ideas. Both normative and cognitive ideas may be diffused between state agents within IGOs, but only certain ideas are likely to affect a state's definition of its interests. While interaction within IGOs may also lead state agents to develop a common identity, this matters for interest convergence only insofar as it heightens the likelihood that persuasive attempts will be effective, since actors are more likely to be persuaded by messages from other actors deemed to be in their peer group.

One of the main goals of this dissertation is not only to explain how IGO membership leads to interest convergence, but also which attributes of IGOs make interest convergence more likely. I have argued that IGOs with a larger number of sub-structures should be more conducive to interest convergence since the existence of these structures facilitates greater interaction between each pair of member states. The amount of interaction between representatives of member states should be even more important than simply the number of substructures of the IGO, especially representatives at the ministerial level, who are perhaps best positioned to implement new ideas, thus changing how their states' interests are defined. I also hypothesize that membership in IGOs with greater issue coverage should be conducive to greater interest convergence between states over time, since IGOs that cover more issues involve more interaction between actors from different states.

Interaction within IGOs, however, may not have the same impact on all pairs of states. State agents from two liberal democratic states are expected to be more open to the evaluation of new arguments, which should make persuasion more effective and lead to the internalization of new ideas. Also, smaller differences between two states in terms of their regime type are expected to increase the degree to which interaction within IGOs will lead to interest convergence because states that hold similar values may view each other as being in the same peer group and their similar core values may lead them to experience less cognitive dissonance. By the same logic, cultural similarity is expected to facilitate persuasion and thus enhance the degree to which IGO interaction leads to member state interest convergence.

In this chapter, I have attempted to generate a deductive, generalizable theory of how joint membership in IGOs leads to a state interest convergence, while keeping in mind how specific attributes of states and of dyads may affect the degree to which the theorized process

occurs. In the following chapter, I will describe and conduct a set of empirical tests of the hypotheses relating to IGO attributes. In Chapter 5, I will present tests of the remaining hypotheses regarding the conditional effects of state and dyadic attributes on the degree to which interaction within certain IGOs leads to interest convergence over time.

4.0 TESTING IGO ATTRIBUTES

In Chapter 3, I present a theory of how interaction within intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) may lead to a convergence in member state interests over time and, more specifically, which attributes of IGOs are conducive to that process. With regard to the effects of intra-IGO interaction on the similarity of states' interests, I argue that IGOs that facilitate greater interaction are more conducive to interest convergence. Drawing from that proposition, I generated three hypotheses regarding specific attributes of IGOs that foster greater interaction between state agents, positing that IGOs would be more conducive to interest convergence: the more substructures they have, the more substructures they have for meetings of member state ministers, and the more issue areas they cover (these hypotheses are listed in Table 4.1). In this chapter, I will discuss a series of statistical models that I have conducted in order to test these hypotheses, present the results of these tests, and draw conclusions from these findings.

Table 4.1. List of Hypotheses regarding IGO Attributes

Label	Hypothesis
H1	The more IGOs with a large number of sub-structures to which two states jointly belong, the more their interests will converge over time.
H2	The more structures of IGOs in which ministers of two states interact, the more their interests will converge over time.
H3	The more IGOs with a larger issue coverage to which two states jointly belong, the more their interests will converge over time.

4.1   EMPIRICAL MODELS

In this section, I will discuss the statistical models that will be used to test the hypotheses put

forth in Chapter 3. The unit of analysis is dyad-year and the sample includes all dyad-years for

the period 1975-1991.[4] Since I am testing whether joint membership in IGOs that have certain

attributes leads to a convergence in state interests over time, I use the similarity in two states'

interests as the dependent variable. For some of the independent variables, I count the number of

IGOs with specific attributes to which the two states are members or the total number of certain

types of structures that exist within all IGOs to which two states are both members. Gartzke et

al. (2006: 8) question the use of count variables for testing IGO effects because a simple count of

IGOs does not allow one to model the specific attributes of IGOs and instead assumes that all

IGOs are alike and that their impact "accumulates in a quasi-linear fashion." The goal of this

project is precisely to code and test the effects of specific IGO attributes on interest convergence,

but it is necessary to do so by counting the number of IGOs with those specific attributes to

which the two states both belong. This does not treat the IGOs as all being alike, but rather

counts only IGOs that meet some theoretically-determined criteria. Despite the appropriateness

of using a count of IGOs, I also use variables that count the total number of substructures of all

IGOs to which the two states belong, thus better capturing the amount of interaction between the

two states within IGOs.

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[4] Although the data covers the period 1970-1995, the tests effectively cover 1975-1991 because of the five year
time lag on the key independent variables, as will be discussed below, and the limitation of data for important
control variables.

Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004) have coded IGOs into three categories corresponding to increasing levels of institutionalized structure. However, because I am testing for IGO effects on interest convergence, it is more appropriate to distinguish IGOs by attributes that are expected to be conducive to interest convergence rather than simply those that may lead to the absence of conflict or some other type of state behavior. I have therefore created an original IGO dataset from which the key independent variables are drawn, which I will discuss further below.

Gartzke et al. (2006) use the IGO-state-year unit of analysis in their test of IGO effects on international conflict behavior, claiming that this allows them to evaluate the impact of each IGO on each member state. There are two potential problems with such an approach. First, if one focuses on each IGO separately for each state, how does one control for the effects of all of the other IGOs to which the state belongs? Second, I assert that IGOs have an affect on state interests because they promote interaction. It would not be appropriate for the present project to look at states by themselves because interest convergence is a relational process. In other words, one would not expect a state to be more likely to converge in interests with another state as a result of being a member of *some* IGO, but rather that they are more likely to take on more similar interests with a particular state that also belongs to that same IGO or a network of common IGOs. Because I expect that states' interests converge as a result of their interaction within IGOs to which they jointly belong, it makes sense to expect a cumulative effect as a result of joint memberships in more of the same IGOs. Of course, as mentioned above, not all IGOs are alike and one should not expect a simple count of joint IGO memberships to have a cumulative linear affect on state interest similarity. However, given the theory laid out above, it does make sense to expect an overall cumulative effect of joint memberships in IGOs with

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higher levels of *specific institutional attributes* theorized to be conducive to the process that leads to interest convergence.

4.1.1   Dependent Variable

I will now discuss the measurement of each of the variables to be included in the model. The dependent variable, which is interest similarity between two states, will be measured using Gartzke's AFFINITY measure. The AFFINITY measure is an S-score calculated using roll-call votes within the United Nation's General Assembly (UNGA) (Gartzke 1998; Gartzke and Jo 2002). The AFFINITY variable does not capture UNGA votes, but instead captures the similarity of the voting decisions of two states, which is calculated using an S statistic. For each pair of states, the S statistic basically calculates one minus twice the distance between the policy position of the two states in relation to the maximum distance between positions on that issue and sums those measures for all issues (i.e. for all UNGA votes in that year) (Signorino and Ritter 1999).[5] Therefore the minimum possible Affinity score is -1 and the maximum possible score is 1.

Admittedly, this is not a perfect measure of interests. Choosing measures that match with the concepts involved in social science theories is very important, but social scientists are rarely able to find measures that perfectly match their concepts. The key to good social scientific research is to find measures that are linked closely enough to the concepts they are meant to operationalize that they can be expected to move together so that the observable measure can tell us something about the relationships between the concepts in question. The AFFINITY measure does this for state interest similarity better than any measure available that could be used for

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[5] A more complete explanation can be found in Signorino and Ritter (1999).

cross-country comparison in a large sample and I maintain that it sufficiently captures state interest similarity for the purposes of testing my theory. First, states are relatively free to vote their interests within the General Assembly due to the explicitly non-binding character of UNGA resolutions. Second, UNGA resolutions encompass a wide variety of issues and the AFFINITY score is calculated based upon all votes of each state across all of the issues addressed within each year. Therefore, high similarity of two states' voting portfolios should serve as a good indicator of similar interests of the two states.

It is important to note that there is a difference between what the Affinity measure *is* and what it represents. This project is not about voting in the United Nations. Rather, states' votes in the UNGA were used to compile an indicator of the similarity between states' interests. Furthermore, this is the measure widely used by Institutionalist scholars to control for interests when looking for the effects of IGOs on state behavior. Using the AFFINITY measure is therefore all the more appropriate for a dissertation that seeks to put into question the practice of controlling for interests while looking for the effects of cooperation within IGOs on state behavior.

A simple examination of AFFINITY measures presents some face validity. As noted above, this measure scores dyadic interest similarity along a -1 to 1 range with higher values indicating greater similarity (Gartzke and Jo 2002). Bearce and Bondanella (2007) illustrate this face validity by looking at the average AFFINITY score for dyads including the United States (US), based on the assumption that most readers will be familiar with the foreign policy interest of this state. Figure 4.1 reproduces the diagram from Bearce and Bondanella (2007) showing these average AFFINITY scores for 30 US dyads covering the range of AFFINITY values and containing states from all regions of the world. As one would expect, the United States-United

Kingdom (UK) dyad scores relatively high in terms of interest similarity while US pairings with states like North Korea score relatively low.

Despite the face validity of the AFFINITY measure, some may be concerned that the non-binding character of UNGA resolutions leads states to engage in strategic and symbolic bloc voting. To significantly reduce bias that may result from bloc voting, however, one can model it directly by using dyadic fixed effects, thus removing its effect from the coefficient on the primary independent variable. In other words, if a pair of states is involved in bloc voting, this effect will be captured by a dummy variable that is coded 1 if the observation is for that pair of states. Therefore, the effect of the IGO variables should not reflect the effects of bloc voting. To be more certain that bloc voting is not an issue, one can also show that the results do not differ significantly when the sample is constrained to exclude those dyads scoring at the ends of the AFFINITY range (i.e. cases near 1 where the two states almost always voted together and cases near -1 where the two states almost never voted together). For all of the above reasons, the Affinity variable is a good and appropriate measure of interest similarity between states and will serve as the dependent variable in the various models herein.

Figure 4.1. Average AFFINITY for thirty U.S. dyads

This figure originally appeared in Bearce and Bondanella (2007).

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4.1.2   Key Independent Variables

To test the various hypotheses, I have coded all IGO-years for the period 1970-1995 based on the various attributes hypothesized to be conducive to interest convergence[6] and then created various measures based on joint IGO membership.   The descriptions of these IGO variables are summarized in Table 4.2 for ease of reference.

Table 4.2. List of IGO Variable Descriptions

Variable Name	Variable Description
High Structures IGO Membership	Number of IGOs with more than nine total substructures in which two states share membership
Joint IGO Substructures	Total number of substructures of all IGOs in which two states share membership
Ministerial Bodies	Total number of substructures that bring together ministers/heads of cabinet agencies of all member states of all IGOs in which two states share membership
Secretariat and Technical Divisions	Total number of secretariat and technical divisions of all IGOs in which two states share membership
High Issue IGO Membership	Total number of IGOs that cover more than two main issue areas in which two states share membership
High Economic Issue IGO Membership	Total number of IGOs that cover more than two economic issues in which two states share membership
High overall issue IGO Membership	Total Number of IGOs that cover both more than two main issue categories and more than two economic issues in which two states share membership

Hypothesis 1 states that the more IGOs with a high number of substructures to which two states belong, the more these states should experience interest convergence over time.   In order to test this hypothesis, I created two different measures. First, I generated a count of the number of IGOs with more than nine substructures to which two states jointly belong (HIGH STRUCTURES

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[6] For detailed information on how IGOs were coded, see Appendix A.

IGO MEMBERSHIP).[7] Substructures that were counted here include all of the main organs of the IGO as well as committees, sub-committees, working groups, and secretariat and technical divisions.[8] If individuals from different member states interact more within IGOs with more structures, which results in a greater convergence in their interests over time, then the more such IGOs within which two states belong, the more their interests should be expected to converge over time.

I created the aforementioned variable to count joint membership in IGOs that meet certain criteria because my theory states that IGOs with more substructures should be more conducive to member state interest convergence. However, there are many ways in which one could define a "high" number of substructures and it is necessary to choose one in order to count joint IGO memberships with a dyad-year unit of analysis. But since my theory is essentially about the amount of interaction between two states within IGOs, this can be captured by pooling the different structures together. I thus also coded a variable that counts the total number of substructures of all IGOs to which the two states jointly belong. This measure (JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES) more accurately captures variation between dyad-years in terms of the number of structures within which they interact, but is not a count of IGOs themselves since the substructures of all IGOs to which two states belong are pooled together in the measure. Substructures that were counted for this variable include all of the main organs of the IGO as well as committees, sub-committees, working groups, and secretariat and technical divisions.[9] If my theory is correct, then the more individuals from two states interact within IGO substructures, the more their interests should be expected to converge over time.

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[7] IGO-years with more than five substructures account for about 20% of the IGOs in the dataset.
[8] For more detailed information, see Appendix A.
[9] For more detailed information, see Appendix A.

In addition to the proposition that more interaction leads to more opportunities for persuasion and thus more state interest convergence over time, the next hypotheses to be tested in this chapter is more specific with regard to the type of substructure of IGOs that should be most conducive to interest convergence. This hypotheses is based on the idea that what may be essential to interest convergence is interaction within IGO bodies that bring together the ministers of all member states who have the power to influence how their states' interests are defined and ultimately to shape state policy, which is a reflection of interests (see discussion of interests and policy preferences in Chapter 3).

Hypothesis 2 states that the more IGO bodies for meetings of ministers of all member states within which two member states' agents interact, the more similar those two states' interests should become over time. To test this hypothesis (H2), I created a variable that counts the total number of bodies for meetings of ministers of all member states (MINISTERIAL BODIES) within IGOs in which the two states in a dyad share membership. One should note that bodies for meetings of member state ministers are a subset of the total number of substructures captured in the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable (see Figure 4.2).

With regard to the aforementioned variable (MINISTERIAL BODIES), it is important to note that the word "bodies" is used somewhat loosely here: if there is one formal IGO organ such as a Council, but there are two or more formations of the Council, each of which brings together certain ministers on a regular basis, then each formation is counted as a body. This is the case not only for the European Union (EU), but also for other IGOs as diverse as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Union of Banana Exporting Countries (UPEB), and the Commonwealth. The reason for this coding choice is an attempt to give each "body" equal weight in terms of the amount of

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interaction that it facilitates. In other words, for the MINISTERIAL BODIES variable, an IGO with a Council of Ministers that brings together only ministers of agriculture three times a year would not receive the same weight as the EU's Council of Ministers, for which frequent meetings of Agriculture Ministers make up only one of up to 19 such formations in the 1990s.

Figure 4.2. IGO Substructures

In order to test an alternative hypothesis to H2, I counted the total number of secretariat and technical divisions of all IGOs to which two states in a dyad jointly belong (SECRETARIAT AND TECHNICAL DIVISIONS). (Just as with MINISTERIAL BODIES, the substructures counted in the variable SECRETARIAT AND TECHNICAL DIVISIONS are a subset of the total JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable - see Figure 4.2). If interest convergence results mainly from interaction of high-level state agents, then the count of secretariat and technical divisions alone

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should be associated with member state interest convergence to a lesser degree than interaction between member state ministers.

Finally, I created a set of variables measuring joint IGO membership in IGOs covering high levels of issues. First, I created a variable that measures the number of joint IGO memberships in IGOs covering more than two main issue categories (HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP). These categories include: security issues, political issues, economic issues, social and cultural issues, environmental issues, and disaster prevention and relief.[10] It is, of course, possible for an IGO to cover only one or two of these issue categories yet to cover many specific issues within those categories, thus fostering more interaction than within an IGO that covers three main issue categories, with less specific issues within each category. Coding each specific issue for every IGO would be a monumental task, which is why, to my knowledge, no such dataset exists. However, in coding the data, I found very few examples of IGOs that would cover more than two main issue areas without also covering many sub-issues within each of these, whereas most IGOs covering only one issue category, actually tend to cover less overall specific issues. An example of this would be the commodities groups which obviously cover economic issues, but which cover issues relating to only one product.

However, since the majority of the IGOs do cover some type of economic issue, I also broke down the economic issue category in order to create a variable that measures the number of economic issues covered by the IGO. The HIGH ECONOMIC ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP variable measures the number of joint IGO memberships in IGOs covering more than two economic issues. The economic issue categories include: trade, money and banking, economic development, science and technology research (although a function of most IGOs is conducting

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[10] For a more detailed explanation of the issue coverage variables, see Appendices A and B.

some type of research, I coded IGOs for this category only if one of the IGO covers cooperation in scientific and technological research), commodities (coded separately from trade to indicate marketing, etc. for that product), and other regulatory issues (a category that captures other types of economic issues not covered by the other categories).

I have no theoretical expectation that interaction on economic issues would have a greater impact on interest convergence than interaction to manage other types of issues, but this variable allows a slightly more specific coding of issue coverage. In addition, I created a third variable which I label HIGH OVERALL ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP, that measures the number of joint IGO memberships in IGOs covering both more than two main issue categories and more than two economic issues. As illustrated in Figure 4.3, the HIGH OVERALL ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP variable measures the number of joint IGO memberships in IGOs that fall into both the set of IGOs with a high coverage of the main issue categories and the set of IGOs with high economic issue coverage.

High Issue Coverage IGOs

High Overall Issue Coverage IGOs

High Economic Issue Coverage IGOs

Figure 4.3. High Issue Coverage IGOs

I did not pool together IGO-issues as I did with IGO-substructures for each dyad for two reasons. First, while each IGO substructure more directly captures a somewhat functionally equivalent amount of interaction, it might be misleading to equate six one-issue IGOs with one IGO covering all of the main issue categories. Issue coverage is only a proxy for the amount of interaction and an in-depth look at the raw data makes it clear that IGOs covering more main issue categories foster exponentially more interaction than a one- or two-issue IGO. In other words, an IGO covering four issue areas does not foster only four times the amount of interaction as a one-issue IGO. Therefore, it is more accurate to count IGOs with a high issue coverage than to pool together the count of issues for all of the IGOs to which two states belong. Secondly, it is not necessary to pool issues to capture variation because there are only a few issue categories, whereas with the structure variables, there were hundreds of structures and various subsets that one could choose to include or not to include, making it difficult to make any kind of coding choice for which IGOs to include in a count variable.

4.1.3   Control Variables[11]

My statistical model includes a number of control variables. In order to control for any movement in the global system that affects the similarity of interests between pairs of states other than that caused by interaction within IGOs, I include a variable that counts years, starting with 0 in 1975 and increasing by 1 with each additional year (TIME). Theoretically, I cannot think of anything aside from other types of state interaction outside of IGOs that would cause a global convergence in interests, but I include TIME to ensure that the coefficients on the IGO

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[11] Unless otherwise specified, control variables are taken from EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000).

variables are not simply capturing such a trend. Since the degree to which states are integrated in the international system may affect the degree to which their interests converge or diverge from those of other states independently of their interaction within IGOs, I also include a variable labeled DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS LOW, which identifies the lower number of diplomatic missions for the two states within the dyad-year.[12] The higher the number of diplomatic missions of the state that has less diplomatic missions in the dyad, the more integrated the two states are in the international system.

Scholars have shown domestic regime type to be a strong predictor of state interests as expressed through UNGA voting (see, for example, Oneal and Russett 1999). Also, socialization scholars argue that domestic factors may affect the degree to which states experience socialization within IGOs (Beyers 2005: 933). In order to control for the difference in domestic political systems within the dyad, I therefore include a measure of domestic regime difference, which is the absolute difference of the two overall Polity scores (Democracy – Autocracy) within the dyad-year (DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE) (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).

To control for economic interactions, I include a measure of dyadic trade dependence (DYADIC TRADE DEPENDENCE) (Gleditsch 2002). This variable measures the trade dependence of the less dependent state. Bilateral trade dependence is total imports from the other state in the dyad plus total exports to that state, divided by the first state's gross domestic product (GDP).[13]

Since North-South differences have been found to affect differences in state interests expressed through UNGA voting (Kim and Russett 1996), I also include a measure of relative economic development (RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT). Relative economic development

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[12] Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004, 20.
[13] Bearce and Bondanella (2007) also experimented with other trade specifications, including the sum of state 1 and state 2's trade/GDP ratios. All of these specifications produced a similar statistical result.

is simply the GDP per capita of the poorer state divided by the GDP per capita of the richer state (Gleditsch 2002). Higher values of this variable therefore indicate more equal levels of economic development.

To address realist concerns, I include two measures of relative state power. First, I include a measure of relative economic size (RELATIVE ECONOMIC SIZE) (see Summers and Heston 1991; Maddison 1995). This is the natural log of the GDP of the larger state in the dyad relative to the GDP of the smaller state (Gleditsch 2002). I also include a measure of relative military power, which is the natural log of the more powerful state's capabilities divided by those of the other state in the dyad (RELATIVE MILITARY POWER). Each state's capabilities are calculated using data from the Correlates of War's Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) (Singer et al. 1972), which weighs equally the states' military personnel, military expenditures, energy production, iron/steel production, nominal urban population, and nominal total population.

Since military alliances should affect states' interests, I control for joint military alliances by including a dummy variable coded 1 if the two states in the dyad had any kind of alliance (ententes, neutrality pacts, and defense pacts) in that year and 0 otherwise (JOINT MILITARY ALLIANCE) (Gibler and Sarkees 2004). Since scholars have argued that national interests and therefore UNGA voting patterns have changed significantly since the end of the Cold War (Kim and Russett 1996)[14], I also include a dummy variable coded 1 for all dyad-years prior to 1991 and 0 otherwise.

To control for geopolitical factors as well as the possibility of spatial diffusion (i.e. the diffusion of ideas between neighbors that may affect how they define their interests) I also

[14] Bearce and Bondanella (2007) found a significant positive relationship between the Cold War years and dyadic interest similarity.

include a variable coded 1 if the two states in the dyad are contiguous and 0 otherwise (CONTIGUITY).

4.1.4   Model Specification

The base model for each hypothesis test is a panel data regression with fixed dyad effects and robust standard errors clustered on the dyad.[15]   Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in the models. It is also important to note that the key independent variables are lagged by five years for both theoretical and methodological reasons. Since I seek to explain state interest convergence, it makes sense that I look at the effect that membership in IGOs with certain institutional attributes has on interest similarity five years later. As discussed in Chapter 3, the acceptance of new ideas is expected to occur as the result of repeated meetings over long periods of time, which is consistent with theories of socialization discussed in Chapter 2 (Checkel 2005: 807). Therefore, I expect the effects of interaction to take several years to be reflected in state interests. Indeed, when looking at the effects of structured IGOs on interest convergence, Bearce and Bondanella (2007) illustrated that the IGO effect increased with each additional time lag up to four years.

    With regard to methodological considerations, it is important to use a long time-lag in order to avoid results that could be contaminated by reverse causality. Without a lag, one could argue that any supportive findings can be explained by the fact that states with more similar interests are more likely to form or join the same IGOs. While it is typical to use a one-year time

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[15] Fixed effects were used to control for factors specific to certain dyads that may affect interest convergence. A Hausman test also showed that this is the appropriate modeling choice.

lag to deal with potential problems of endogeneity, it is more appropriate to use a longer time lag

in the models presented here for the reasons specified above.

Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Affinity$_t$	0.700	0.301	-0.947	1
High Structures IGO Membership (t-5)	10.23	3.04	0	32
Joint IGO Substructures (t-5)	606.75	152.41	0	1773
Ministerial Bodies (t-5)	1.19	2.47	0	37
Secretariat and Technical Divisions (t-5)	164.78	63.91	0	451
High Issue IGO Membership (t-5)	3.55	1.24	0	13
High Economic Issue IGO Membership (t-5)	5.24	1.32	0	13
High overall issue IGO Membership (t-5)	3.15	0.80	0	8
Time	13.15	4.81	5	21
Diplomatic Missions Low	33.19	22.57	1	146
Domestic Political Difference	8.12	6.96	0	20
Dyadic Trade	0.0005	0.0031	0	0.166
Relative Economic Development	1.23	0.87	0.000004	4.784
Relative Economic Size	2.15	1.60	0.000048	9.802
Relative Military Power	2.02	1.51	0	9.00
Joint Military Alliance	0.08	0.26	0	1
Cold War	0.94	0.23	0	1
Contiguity	0.04	0.20	0	1

I also include a lagged dependent variable (AFFINITY$_{t-1}$) on the right-hand side of the

statistical model in order to control for any temporal dependence. Despite arguments against

including a lagged dependent variable (LDV) (e.g. Achen 2001), it makes sense to include the

LDV here for several reasons. First, I expect past values of AFFINITY to have a substantive effect

on current values of AFFINITY and therefore it is more appropriate to treat the substance of the

temporal processes rather than the nuisance (Beck and Katz 1996). Second, the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable makes this a conditional change model, which is equivalent to a partial adjustment model (Finkel 1995: 10-11). A partial adjustment model is appropriate when some unknown target value (Y^*_t) for the dependent variable is assumed to be accounted for by the explanatory variables. In this case, the change in Y, which is equivalent to Y_t-Y_{t-1}, differs to some extent from the difference between the lagged dependent variable and the target value $(Y^*_t$-$Y_{t-1})$ and so the change in Y in each time period is only a partial adjustment of the difference between the actual value and the target value. Because I theorize that interaction within IGOs leads to a convergence in how two states define their interests, but that this process takes time to show effects in the similarity of their expressed interests, there is likely to be inertia and in each year between t-1 and t, we should only see a partial adjustment toward that unknown value. (For an example of a partial adjustment model in IR, see Braumoeller 2008). Therefore the conditional change model is the appropriate model given my theory.

4.2   FINDINGS

4.2.1   Testing Hypothesis 1

Table 4.4 presents the results of the models used to test Hypothesis 1, which states that the more IGOs with a high number of substructures to which two states both belong, the more their interests will converge over time. The base model is laid out in Equation 4.1 below, with HIGH STRUCTURES IGO MEMBERSHIP as the key independent variable.

Equation 4.1

$$\text{AFFINITY}_{XT} = B_0 + B_1 * \text{AFFINITY}_{XT\text{-}1} + B_2 * \text{ HIGH STRUCTURES IGO MEMBERSHIP}_{XT\text{-}5}$$
$$+ B_3 * \text{TIME} + B_4 * \text{DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS LOW} + B_5 * \text{DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE}_{XT}$$
$$+ B_6 * \text{DYADIC TRADE}_{XT} + B_7 * \text{RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT}_{XT}$$
$$+ B_8 * \text{RELATIVE ECONOMIC SIZE}_{XT} + B_9 * \text{RELATIVE MILITARY POWER}_{XT}$$
$$+ B_{10} * \text{JOINT MILITARY ALLIANCE}_{XT} + B_{11} * \text{COLD WAR}_{XT} + B_{12} * \text{ CONTIGUITY}_{X} + u_x + e_{xt}.$$

For this first test of Hypothesis 1, I use a measure of joint IGO memberships in IGOs that have more than nine substructures. The results for Model 1 (listed in Table 4.4) provide support for the hypothesis that membership in more IGOs with a high number of substructures should lead to greater interest convergence between two states five years later. The coefficient for HIGH STRUCTURES IGO MEMBERSHIP is positive and statistically significant (0.00058). Multiplying that coefficient by the standard deviation for this variable produces a substantive effect of 0.0018, meaning that a one standard deviation increase in the number of joint memberships in IGOs with more than nine substructures leads to a 0.0018 increase in the change in interest similarity five years later. Although this substantive effect may seem small, there are a few reasons why the effect is not insignificant. First, one should note that the dependent variable ranges only from -1 to 1. Also, the other variables in the model are similarly small in terms of their substantive effects. For example, a one standard deviation increase in dyadic trade is associated with a 0.0021 increase in AFFINITY. Relative capabilities has the strongest substantive effect with a 0.021 increase in AFFINITY associated with a one standard deviation increase in relative military power.

It is important to note that the theory put forth in Chapter 3 is not meant to replace Realist or Institutionalist theory. Like Liberal Institutionalist scholars, I do not question the explanatory power of Realist factors such as military power, but I seek to complement Institutionalist theory

by adding one more pathway through which IGOs *also* influence state behavior. The fact that the HIGH STRUCTURES IGO MEMBERSHIP variable holds up in the face of so many important control variables, provides strong support for the hypothesis that states that belong to more IGOs with a high number of substructures will experience greater interest convergence over time, rather than the null hypothesis that this joint membership has no significant effect. Therefore, the results of Model 1 provide support for the theory that more interaction within IGOs leads to greater interest convergence.

All of the control variables in Model 1 achieve statistical significance, with the exception of CONTIGUITY. The coefficient on the TIME variable is negative and statistically significant, which would indicate that there is a global divergence in interest similarity, controlling for all other factors in the model. As stated above, I do not have any theoretical reason why there would be any global movement in interest similarity over time independent of interaction between states in the system, which is precisely what I am trying to capture with a theoretical variable: IGO interaction. However, I included the TIME variable in order to be conservative and assuage any worries that my IGO variables are capturing a positive time trend.

The coefficient for the DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS LOW variable is negative and statistically significant, which indicates that the more the states in a given dyad are integrated in the international system, the more their interests diverge. If there is some omitted variable causing a global divergence in interests over time, then it makes sense that states that are more integrated in the system will experience divergence over time.

Table 4.4. Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence (Testing H1)

	Model 1	Model 2
Constant	0.183**	0.161**
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV)	0.709**	0.709**
	(0.006)	(0.006)
High Structures IGO Membership (t-5)	0.00058**	
	(0.00026)	
Joint IGO Substructures (t-5)		0.000064**
		(0.000006)
Time	-0.00072**	-0.0018**
	(0.00013)	(0.0002)
Diplomatic Missions Low	-0.00086**	-0.00089**
	(0.00004)	(0.00004)
Domestic Political Difference	-0.00096**	-0.00095**
	(0.00011)	(0.00011)
Dyadic Trade	0.681**	0.603*
	(0.341)	(0.340)
Relative Economic Development	-0.0034**	-0.0018
	(0.0015)	(0.0016)
Relative Economic Size	0.0072**	0.0069**
	(0.0014)	(0.0014)
Relative Military Power	0.014**	0.014**
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Joint Military Alliance	0.061**	0.061**
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Cold War	0.024**	0.027**
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Contiguity	-0.0022	-0.0022
	(0.0110)	(0.0111)
N	145,888	145,888
R^2 within	0.51	0.51
R^2 between	0.95	0.96
R^2 overall	0.88	0.88

Notes: Cell entries are generated from panel data regressions with fixed effects and have robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses.
* indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence.
** indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.

The coefficient for DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE is negatively signed, which indicates

that dyads with more distant regime types are less likely to experience interest convergence over

time. This finding is consistent with the proposition that states that are already have similar

values will experience even greater interest convergence over time than other pairs of states. The

coefficient for RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT indicates that dyads with more equal levels of economic development are less likely to converge in their interests over time. The negative sign could indicate that the explanatory power of this variable is captured by the RELATIVE ECONOMIC SIZE variable. Indeed, in several of the subsequent models, the coefficient for RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT loses statistical significance. The RELATIVE ECONOMIC SIZE and RELATIVE MILITARY POWER variables have positive coefficients, indicating that greater disparity in economic and military capabilities leads to greater levels of interest convergence over time. This is not surprising, given that these variables are included to control for any interest convergence resulting from coercion. A higher number of military alliances between two states is also associated with greater interest convergence over time, as indicated by the positive coefficient for JOINT MILITARY ALLIANCE. Finally the COLD WAR dummy has a positive coefficient, indicating that interest convergence is greater during the Cold War years.

In order to more accurately capture variation in the number of substructures within which each pair of states interact in each year, I run a second test of H1, using a measure of the total number of IGO substructures within which two states interact. The base model is the same as that laid out in Equation 4.1, except the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable is substituted for HIGH STRUCTURES IGO MEMBERSHIP. The results for Model 2 (listed in Table 4.4) also provide support for the hypothesis that interaction within more IGO substructures leads to interest convergence over time. The coefficient for JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES is positive and statistically significant and a one standard deviation increase in this variable is associated with a 0.0098 increase in AFFINITY. This substantive effect is higher than that of the HIGH STRUCTURES IGO MEMBERSHIP variable, used in Model 1, which is likely due to the more accurate variation captured in this second measure. None of the coefficients for the control variables in Model 2

change signs from the first model and only RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT loses statistical significance.

4.2.2 Testing Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 2 states that the more bodies for ministers of all member states that exist within IGOs to which two states jointly belong, the more those two states interests can be expected to converge over time. Hypothesis 2 is tested in Model 3. The results for Model 3 (listed in Table 4.5) provide support for the hypothesis that the more bodies within which member state ministers interact, the more two states interests will converge. The coefficient for the MINISTERIAL BODIES variable is positive as expected (0.00029) and achieves statistical significance within the 90% confidence interval. A one standard deviation increase in the number of structures for meetings of ministers is associated with a 0.0007 unit increase in the similarity of the two states' interests. This substantive effect is considerably smaller than that of the IGO variables tested in the other models. Therefore, it is possible that, while Hypothesis 2 is supported, the idea that meetings of ministers would be more important than other IGO bodies for the translation of new ideas taken on at the IGO level into the definition of interests at the domestic level is incorrect. Interaction within other bodies of IGOs must also be important in leading to state interest convergence. This would be consistent with much of the socialization literature, which focuses on the transmission of ideas between individuals from different states interacting with IGO secretariats and technical bodies.

In Model 4, I therefore test the effects of interaction within SECRETARIAT AND TECHNICAL DIVISIONS on interest similarity. The results of Model 4 (listed in Table 4.5) show that the number of secretariat and technical divisions of IGOs to which two states belong has a positive

and statistically significant impact on the degree to which the two states' interests converge over time (0.000085). The substantive impact (coefficient*standard error) of the SECRETARIAT AND TECHNICAL DIVISIONS variable is 0.0054. Therefore, it is seems that both bodies for meetings of high-level state agents and interaction of lower level bureaucrats and experts have an impact on the degree to which member state interests converge over time. In order to assess the effect of the various IGO variables comparatively, I include both MINISTERIAL BODIES and SECRETARIAT AND TECHNICAL DIVISIONS in Model 5. In this model, while both IGO variables remain positively signed, MINISTERIAL BODIES loses its statistical significance, again indicating that IGO substructures for meetings of high-level leaders are not the most conducive to member state interest convergence.

Table 4.5. Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence (Testing H2)

	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Constant	0.161**	0.188**	0.184**	0.184**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV)	0.709**	0.708**	0.708**	0.708**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Joint IGO Substructures (t-5)	0.000064**			
	(0.000006)			
Ministerial Bodies (t-5)		0.00029*		0.000034
		(0.00017)		(0.000174)
Secretariat and Technical Divisions (t-5)			0.000085**	0.000084**
			(0.000024)	(0.000024)
Time	-0.0018**	-0.00054**	-0.0015**	-0.0015**
	(0.0002)	(0.00008)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Diplomatic Missions Low	-0.00089**	-0.00084**	-0.00088**	-0.00088**
	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)
Domestic Political Difference	-0.00095**	-0.00096**	-0.00096**	-0.00096**
	(0.00011)	(0.00011)	(0.00011)	(0.00011)
Dyadic Trade	0.603*	0.672**	0.669**	0.667*
	(0.340)	(0.343)	(0.342)	(0.344)
Relative Economic Development	-0.0018	-0.0036**	-0.0034**	-0.0034**
	(0.0016)	(0.0015)	(0.0015)	(0.0015)
Relative Economic Size	0.0069**	0.0072**	0.0073**	0.0073**
	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0014)
Relative Military Power	0.014**	0.014**	0.014**	0.014**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Joint Military Alliance	0.061**	0.060**	0.061**	0.061**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Cold War	0.027**	0.023**	0.026**	0.026**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Contiguity	-0.0022	-0.0020	-0.0024	-0.0023
	(0.0111)	(0.0113)	(0.0111)	(0.0111)
N	145,888	145,888	145,888	145,888
R^2 within	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.51
R^2 between	0.96	0.95	0.95	0.95
R^2 overall	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88

Notes: Cell entries are coefficients generated from panel data regressions with fixed effects and have robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. *indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence. ** indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.

4.2.3 Testing Hypothesis 3

So far I have presented tests of the first two hypotheses relating to the various substructures of IGOs in which two states share membership as indicators of the amount of interaction that two states experience within IGOs. Another indicator of the amount of interaction that occurs within IGOs is the issue coverage of the IGO, since IGOs covering more issues necessitate more interaction. Hypothesis 3 states that the more IGOs with a high issue coverage in which two states share membership, the more their interests will converge over time.

In Model 6 (listed in Table 4.6), I replaced the IGO structures variable from Equation 4.1 with HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP, which counts the number of joint IGO memberships in IGOs covering more than two main issue categories. The results for Model 6 provide support for Hypothesis 3. The coefficient for HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP is positive and statistically significant (0.0024) and a one standard deviation increase in the number of joint memberships in IGOs covering more than two issues is associated with a 0.0030 increase in AFFINITY. The other variables in the model retain the same sign and statistical significance as most of the previous models.

In Model 7, I substituted the HIGH ECONOMIC ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP variable as the key independent variable. The results for this model are very similar to those of Model 6. The coefficient for HIGH ECONOMIC ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP is positive and statistically significant and the substantive effect is almost identical to that that of HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP, which is based on main issue categories rather than economic issues. I do not believe this necessarily has something to do with the fact of these being economic issues rather than sub-issues of one of the other main categories, but rather the result is an indication that this more specific coding accurately captures joint membership in IGOs that foster more interaction.

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Next, I substituted the measure that counts only IGOs that meet both the criterion that it cover more than two main issue categories and the criterion that it cover more than two economic issues. This variable, HIGH OVERALL ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP, is the key independent variable in Model 8 in Table 4.6, and should be the best indicator of IGOs that promote more interaction because it counts only IGOs that cover several main issue categories and several specific issues within the most frequently occuring issue category in the dataset. The results for Model 8 provide additional support for Hypothesis 3 as the coefficient for HIGH OVERALL ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP is positive and statistically significant (0.0032).

The results of the aforementioned tests provide support for the hypothesis that joint membership in IGOs that cover a high number of issues are conducive to member state interest convergence over time. This is robust to three different indicators of joint membership in IGOs with high issue coverage.

Table 4.6. Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence (Testing H3)

	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Constant	0.179**	0.177**	0.178**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV)	0.709**	0.708**	0.709**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
High Issue IGO Membership (t-5)	0.0024**		
	(0.0005)		
High Economic Issue IGO Membership (t-5)		0.0023**	
		(0.0004)	
High overall issue IGO Membership (t-5)			0.0032**
			(0.0006)
Time	-0.00071**	-0.00067**	-0.00064**
	(0.00009)	(0.00009)	(0.00008)
Diplomatic Missions Low	-0.00085**	-0.00087**	-0.00086**
	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)
Domestic Political Difference	-0.00096**	-0.00096**	-0.00096**
	(0.00011)	(0.00011)	(0.00011)
Dyadic Trade	0.677**	0.688**	0.687**
	(0.341)	(0.341)	(0.341)
Relative Economic Development	-0.0028*	-0.0029*	-0.0028**
	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0016)
Relative Economic Size	0.0071**	0.0072**	0.0071**
	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0014)
Relative Military Power	0.013**	0.014**	0.014**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Joint Military Alliance	0.061**	0.061**	0.062**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Cold War	0.025**	0.024**	0.024**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Contiguity	-0.0037	-0.0032	-0.0035
	(0.0114)	(0.0112)	(0.0110)
N	145,888	145,888	145,888
R^2 within	0.51	0.51	0.51
R^2 between	0.96	0.95	0.95
R^2 overall	0.88	0.88	0.88

Notes: Cell entries are coefficients generated from panel data regressions with fixed effects and have robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence. ** indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.

4.2.4 Robustness Check

Table 4.7 reproduces the results of Model 2 from Table 4.4 along with two other tests using the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable. In Model 9, I restricted the sample to those dyad-years for which the AFFINITY score was neither -1, which indicates perfect dissimilarity, nor 1, which indicates perfect affinity. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is important to control for strategic behavior when examining a state's expressed interests. Although, as I explained above, AFFINITY is an appropriate measure of state interest similarity, I present these results in order to illustrate that the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable can still explain increases in interest similarity when controlling for possible cases of bloc voting in the sample. All of the other IGO variables retain their sign and substantive significance in this model, although I only present the results for the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable, since it is the most inclusive measure of the number of IGO substructures within which two member states interact. The results for Model 9 confirm that interaction within more IGO substructures has a positive and statistically significant effect on dyadic interest similarity.

The coefficients for the various control variables remain relatively stable, although the coefficient for RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT loses statistical significance. The coefficient on the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable even remains positive and statistically significant even after restricting the sample to cases in which the AFFINITY score is between -0.7 and 0.7, therefore eliminating cases that come close to the extremes (Model 10). While Model 10 is obviously not the best model given that the sample was restricted based on values of the dependent variable, it indicates not only that the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable retains its significance in the absence of bloc voting but also that it does so in a much smaller sample,

whereas the RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT and DYADID TRADE variables lose their statistical significance in this model.

Table 4.7. Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence

	Model 2 (Base model)	Model 9 (With restricted sample)	Model 10 (With restricted sample)
Constant	0.161**	0.163**	0.028**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.014)
Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV)	0.709**	0.709**	0.647**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Joint IGO Substructures (t-5)	0.000064**	0.000057**	0.000050**
	(0.000006)	(0.000006)	(0.000016)
Time	-0.0018**	-0.0016**	-0.0026**
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0004)
Diplomatic Missions Low	-0.00089**	-0.00088**	-0.00063**
	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00006)
Domestic Political Difference	-0.00095**	-0.00104**	-0.00172**
	(0.00011)	(0.00011)	(0.00021)
Dyadic Trade	0.603*	0.587*	-0.702
	(0.340)	(0.316)	(0.779)
Relative Economic Development	-0.0018	-0.0030*	0.000047
	(0.0016)	(0.0015)	(0.00429)
Relative Economic Size	0.0069**	0.0066**	0.0116**
	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0040)
Relative Military Power	0.014**	0.012**	0.036**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Joint Military Alliance	0.061**	0.063**	0.100**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Cold War	0.027**	0.031**	0.035**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Contiguity	-0.0022	-0.0026	-0.1205**
	(0.0111)	(0.0117)	(0.0026)
N	145,888	144,260	53,566
R^2 within	0.51	0.52	0.49
R^2 between	0.96	0.96	0.64
R^2 overall	0.88	0.88	0.64

Notes: Cell entries are generated from panel data regressions with fixed effects and have robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses.
* indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.
** indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.

4.3   CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I present the findings of tests of the three hypotheses put forth in Chapter 3 regarding which IGO attributes make them conducive to member state interest convergence. The theory is based on the proposition that IGOs that facilitate more interaction between individuals from different member states are more conducive to an increase in member state interest similarity over time. The first hypothesis derived from that proposition is that IGOs with more substructures are more conducive to member state interest convergence over time. The second hypothesis is based on the same logic as the first, but specifies that high-level state agents are the most likely to transmit new ideas to the domestic context that actually translate into changes in state interest definition. Based on that idea, Hypothesis 2 states that the more bodies for ministers of all member states of IGOs to which two states jointly belong, the more interest convergence they would experience over time. The third hypothesis states that joint membership in IGOs that cover a high number of issues should be more conducive to member state interest convergence over time.

I tested each of these hypotheses separately in panel data regressions with fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on the dyad, using Gartzke's AFFINITY measure as an indicator of member state interest similarity. In order to test the four hypotheses, I created an original IGO dataset and generated several dyadic measures based on joint membership in IGOs with various attributes.

All of the hypotheses regarding IGO attributes and the degree to which IGOs with those attributes is associated with increases in member state interest similarity are supported by the results of the respective tests used to determine their validity. The substantive significance of these IGO variables is similar in magnitude to that of other variables in the different models.

While the magnitude of the substantive effect of the IGO variables is surpassed by some of the realist and institutionalist control variables, this does not weaken support for the theory being tested here, which was never meant to replace material factors as an explanation for changes in state interests. Rather, the point of this project is to add another important factor back into the equation – interaction within IGOs and the resulting changes in ideas that affect the definition of state interests – and furthermore to determine which attributes of IGOs make this process most likely.

As expected, the results indicate that IGOs with a high number of substructures as well as those with a lot of bodies for meetings of ministers of all member states are positively related with increases in member state interest similarity. Surprisingly, the number of secretariat and technical divisions of IGOs to which two states share membership is also positively related with interest convergence and has a greater substantive impact on interest similarity than the number of bodies for meetings of member state ministers.

Tests of Hypothesis 3 provide strong support for the notion that IGOs covering more issue areas are conducive to member state interest convergence over time. The results are robust to several specifications of issue coverage. The theory set forth herein is that IGOs that foster greater interaction between member states are conducive to member state interest convergence on the whole because they provide more opportunities for individuals from various member states to interact and therefore to transmit ideas to one another that may be translated into a more similar definition of state interests. The various tests provided in this chapter provide support for that theory.

Finally, I restricted the sample in order to ensure that these results would hold up while controlling for any possibility of bloc voting that could be reflected in the AFFINITY variable. As

discussed in Chapter 3, one can use expressed interests as an indicator of interests as long as one controls for strategic behavior. Therefore, I restricted the sample to exclude cases of extreme dissimilarity and of extreme similarity and the coefficients for all of the IGO variables remain positive and statistically significant, although I presented only the results for the most inclusive and detailed measure of the number of IGO substructures within which two states interact. These tests also demonstrate that the IGO variables retain their statistical significance in a smaller sample.

The findings of the aforementioned tests are largely supportive of my theory that more interaction within IGOs leads to greater interest convergence over time and that IGOs with more substructures and/or higher issue coverage are therefore more conducive to member state interest convergence. In Chapter 5, I will test the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 3 regarding the conditional effects of state and dyadic attributes on the degree to which new ideas are spread through persuasion between agents of different states and the degree to which those ideas lead to a redefinition of state interests, making two states more similar in their interests as a result of interaction within IGOs.

5.0   TESTING THE CONDITIONING EFFECTS OF DYADIC ATTRIBUTES

This dissertation asks which attributes of IGOs are conducive to member state interest convergence. In Chapter 3, I put forth a theory based on the proposition that IGOs that foster greater interaction between member states should lead to greater interest convergence. Based on that proposition I made three hypotheses regarding IGO attributes associated with greater interaction and tested them in Chapter 4. The findings from Chapter 4 generally support the hypotheses that IGOs with more substructures and those with greater issue coverage are associated with interest convergence between member states over time. While the those hypotheses represent the crux of my theory, I also address, in Chapter 3, the possibility that the effects of intra-IGO interaction on changes in state interests may not be the same for every pair of states. In that chapter, I also proposed that, for states that already share some common attributes, the effect of interacting within IGOs with the aforementioned attributes should be greater than for other dyads. I then made three hypotheses regarding the conditional effects of dyadic attributes on the degree to which interaction within IGOs leads to member state interest convergence over time. These hypotheses (listed in Table 5.1 for ease of reference) state that intra-IGO interaction should lead to greater interest convergence between pairs of states that are both liberal democracies, between pairs of states that are closer together on the democracy/autocracy scale, and between pairs of states that share common cultural attributes

such as language, ethnicity, and religion. In this chapter, I present a series of tests of these hypotheses, discuss the findings, and draw some conclusions from these findings.

Table 5.1. List of Hypotheses regarding Conditional Effects of Dyadic Attributes

Label	Hypothesis
H4	The effect of joint membership in more IGOs with attributes that are conducive to interest convergence should have a greater effect on interest similarity for dyads in which both states are liberal democracies.
H5	The closer together two states are on the democracy/autocracy scale, the more their interests should converge over time as a result of joint membership in IGOs with attributes that are conducive to interest convergence.
H6	The effects of being jointly members of more IGOs with attributes that are conducive to interest convergence should be greater for two states with a common language, ethnicity, and/or religion.

5.1   EMPIRICAL TESTS

In this section, I will discuss the statistical models that will be used to test the remaining hypotheses put forth in Chapter 3. As with the models in Chapter 4, the unit of analysis is dyad-year and the sample includes all dyad-years for the period 1975-1991. Since these hypotheses set expectations regarding the conditional effects of dyadic attributes on the degree to which interaction within IGOs leads to member state interest convergence, the models herein include interaction terms using two of the key IGO variables from Chapter 4. I focus on the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES and HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP variables, since these represent the main operationalizations of the two key attributes of IGOs: the number of joint IGO substructures and

the number of IGOs covering more than two issue areas within which the two states interact. The findings are generally the same for the other key IGO variables in Chapter 4.[16]

5.1.1 New Variables

I introduce eight new measures of dyadic attributes to be used in interaction with the IGO variables in order to test Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6. These variables and their descriptions are listed in Table 5.2 for ease of reference. Hypothesis 4 states that dyads in which both states are liberal democracies will experience greater interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs. As a measure of whether the two states in a dyad are both liberal democracies, I created a dummy variable coded 1 if both states in the dyad have an overall Polity score (Democracy – Autocracy) of 7 or higher and 0 otherwise (JOINT DEMOCRACY) (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). Although Hypothesis 4 is specifically about joint liberal democracies, I also use a measure of joint autocracies in order to distinguish the effects of IGO interaction on joint autocracies from those of mixed dyads.[17] This variable is coded 1 if the two states in a dyad both have an overall Polity score of -7 or below (JOINT AUTOCRACY) (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).

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[16] Results available upon request.
[17] The omitted category actually includes both dyads with one democracy and one autocracy and any dyads involving states that fall between -6 and 6, but I will refer to these as mixed dyads from this point forward.

Table 5.2. List of Dyadic Attribute Variable Descriptions

Variable Name	Variable Description
Joint Democracy	Coded 1 if both states in a dyad have a Polity score (Democracy-Autocracy) of 7 or higher and coded 0 otherwise
Joint Autocracy	Coded 1 if both states in a dyad have a Polity score of -7 or lower and coded 0 otherwise
Domestic Political Difference	Absolute value of the difference between the two states overall Polity scores
Common Culture (dichotomous)	Coded 1 if the two states in a dyad share any of the following cultural attributes: language, ethnicity, and religion.
Common Cultural Attributes (ordinal)	The total number of cultural attributes that the two states in the dyad share, including common language, ethnicity and religion.
Common Language	Coded 1 if the largest linguistic group of the two states is the same and 0 otherwise
Common Ethnicity	Coded 1 if the largest ethnic group of the two states is the same and 0 otherwise
Common Religion	Coded 1 if the largest religious group of the two states is the same and 0 otherwise

Based on the notion from reference group theory that actors give serious consideration to information from other actors they deem to be in their peer group, Hypothesis 5 states that the closer together the regime types of two states, the more intra-IGO interaction will lead to interest convergence. In order to test this hypothesis, I employ the DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE variable from Chapter 4, which is created using Polity data (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). However, as will be noted in the discussion of the models below, I lag the variable five years in order to interact it with the IGO variables, which are lagged five years. If it takes about five years for the effects of interaction within IGOs to affect the change in state interest similarity from time t-1 to time t, then an expectation that this effect will be greater if those two states are closer together on the Polity scale requires that one examine their domestic political difference at

the same time of the interaction. Since all component parts of an interaction must also appear separately in the model, this control variable will also be lagged five years.[18]

Hypothesis 6 states that dyads in which the two states share cultural attributes such as language, ethnicity, and religion will experience greater interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs. To test this hypothesis, I created five different variables using data from Ellingsen (1995, 2000). First, I created a dichotomous variable for common language, which I coded 1 if the largest linguistic group as a percentage of the population of the state is the same for both states and 0 otherwise (COMMON LANGUAGE). I created a similar variable, which is coded 1 if the largest ethnic group of both states is the same and 0 otherwise (COMMON ETHNICITY). The third variable is coded 1 if the largest religious group of both states is the same and 0 otherwise (COMMON RELIGION). Using these variables, I then created a fourth variable which is coded 1 if the dyad scores a 1 on any of the three aforementioned variables (i.e. if the two states share at least one of these common cultural attributes) and 0 otherwise (COMMON CULTURE). Finally, I created an ordinal measure to count the number of common cultural attributes that the two states share based on the first three variables (COMMON CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES).

5.1.2 Model Specification

The base model for each hypothesis test is a panel data regression with fixed dyad effects and robust standard errors clustered on the dyad. As in Chapter 4, the AFFINITY score is used to measure member state interest similarity for the dependent variable. The models described

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[18] See Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) for a good discussion of why it is important to include all component parts of an interaction term.

below also include all of the same control variables as in Equation 4.1, except that the DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE variable is excluded from the models that include JOINT DEMOCRACY and/or JOINT AUTOCRACY to avoid problems of multicollinearity.[19] The descriptive statistics for all of the variables are listed in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3. Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Affinity$_t$	0.700	0.301	-0.947	1
Joint IGO Substructures (t-5)	606.75	152.41	0	1773
High Issue IGO Membership (t-5)	3.55	1.24	0	13
Joint Democracy (t-5)	0.08	0.27	0	1
Joint Autocracy (t-5)	0.34	0.47	0	1
Domestic Political Difference (t-5)	7.94	6.99	0	20
Common Culture (t-5)	0.37	0.48	0	1
Common Cultural Traits (t-5)	0.44	0.64	0	3
Common Language (t-5)	0.05	0.21	0	1
Common Religion (t-5)	0.35	0.48	0	1
Common Ethnicity (t-5)	0.04	0.19	0	1
Time	13.15	4.81	5	21
Diplomatic Missions Low	33.19	22.57	1	146
Domestic Political Difference	8.12	6.96	0	20
Dyadic Trade	0.0005	0.0031	0	0.166
Relative Economic Development	1.23	0.87	0.000004	4.784
Relative Economic Size	2.15	1.60	0.000048	9.802
Relative Military Power	2.02	1.51	0	9.00
Joint Military Alliance	0.08	0.26	0	1
Cold War	0.94	0.23	0	1
Contiguity	0.04	0.20	0	1

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[19] For a discussion of the variables used in the baseline models, see Chapter 4.

5.2   FINDINGS

5.2.1   Testing Hypothesis 4

Hypothesis 4 states that joint liberal democracies should experience greater interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 present the results from a series of tests of Hypothesis 5. The first test of this hypothesis is Model 1, which is specified in Equation 5.1:

Equation 5.1

$$\text{AFFINITY}_{XT} = B_0 + B_1 * \text{AFFINITY}_{XT-1} + B_2 * \text{JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES}_{XT-5}$$
$$+ \ B_3 * \text{JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES}_{XT-5} * \text{JOINT DEMOCRACY}_{XT-5}$$
$$+ B_4 * \text{JOINT DEMOCRACY}_{XT-5} + B_5 * \text{TIME} + B_6 * \text{DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS LOW}$$
$$+ B_7 * \text{DYADIC TRADE}_{XT} + B_8 * \text{RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT}_{XT}$$
$$+ B_9 * \text{RELATIVE ECONOMIC SIZE}_{XT} + B_{10} * \text{RELATIVE MILITARY POWER}_{XT}$$
$$+ B_{11} * \text{JOINT MILITARY ALLIANCE}_{XT} + B_{12} * \text{COLD WAR}_{XT} + B_{13} * \text{CONTIGUITY}_X + u_x + e_{xt}.$$

As noted above, the JOINT DEMOCRACY variable and both components of the interaction between JOINT DEMOCRACY and JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES are lagged five years for both methodological and theoretical reasons.[20]

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[20] See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the five-year time lag.

Table 5.4. Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence (Testing H4)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Constant	0.153**	0.158**	0.157**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV)	0.705**	0.708**	0.707**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Joint IGO Structures (t-5)	0.000068**	0.000054**	0.000057**
	(0.000006)	(0.000006)	(0.000006)
Joint IGO Structures (t-5)* Joint Democracy (t-5)	-0.000013**		-0.000013**
	(0.000003)		(0.000003)
Joint IGO Structures (t-5)* Joint Autocracy (t-5)		0.000029**	0.000029**
		(0.000002)	(0.000002)
Marginal Effect of Joint IGO Structures for Joint Democracy=1	0.000055**		0.000044**
	(0.000006)		(0.000007)
Marginal Effect of Joint IGO Structures for Joint Autocracy=1		0.000083**	0.000085**
		(0.000006)	(0.000006)
Joint Democracy (t-5)	-0.0070**		-0.0073**
	(0.0018)		(0.0018)
Joint Autocracy (t-5)		0.0047**	0.0046**
		(0.0010)	(0.0010)
Time	-0.0018**	-0.0016**	-0.0016**
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Diplomatic Missions Low	-0.00089**	-0.00091**	-0.00091**
	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)
Dyadic Trade	0.670**	0.611**	0.643*
	(0.343)	(0.341)	(0.342)
Relative Economic Development	0.00025	-0.00043	0.00022
	(0.00156)	(0.00156)	(0.00157)
Relative Economic Size	0.0064**	0.0064**	0.0063**
	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0014)
Relative Military Power	0.014**	0.013**	0.013**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Joint Military Alliance	0.066**	0.063**	0.065**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Cold War	0.026**	0.023**	0.022**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Contiguity	0.00099	-0.00039	0.00005
	(0.01134)	(0.01238)	(0.01245)
N	145,229	145,229	145,229
R^2 within	0.51	0.51	0.51
R^2 between	0.96	0.96	0.96
R^2 overall	0.88	0.88	0.88

Notes: Cell entries are generated from panel data regressions with fixed effects and have robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence. ** indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.

The results for Model 1 (listed in Table 5.4) do not provide support for Hypothesis 4. In order to determine the effect of JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES on member state interest similarity for dyads that are not joint democracies, one simply has to look at the coefficient on the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES, which is 0.000064. The coefficient is also positive and statistically significant, with a substantive effect that is very similar to the coefficient for JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES in the models in Chapter 4. This is the effect of joint substructures on member state interest similarity for joint autocracies and mixed dyads. In order to determine the effect of JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES when the dyad is a joint democracy, one must add together the coefficients for both JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES and the interaction term. In Table 5.1, I have listed the combined coefficients for JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES and JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES*JOINT DEMOCRACY, as well as the standard error for the combined coefficient, which is used to determine the statistical significance of the conditional coefficient. The effect of JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES for dyads that are joint democracies is therefore 0.000055, which is positive and statistically significant. However, counter to the expectation set forth in Hypothesis 4, this indicates that interaction within more joint IGO substructures actually has a lesser effect on interest similarity for joint democracies than it does for other dyads.

It is possible that joint liberal democracies do not experience much interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs because they are already so close together in terms of how they define their interests. However, it appears that the logic behind Hypothesis 4 is incorrect in that interest convergence does not require liberal-minded participants, at least in terms of the state having liberal democratic policies. This will be discussed further below. First, since the omitted category in Model 1 is all other dyads that are not joint democracies, one cannot distinguish between joint autocracies and mixed dyads in terms of whether one or the other or

both are experiencing a greater effect of joint IGO substructures on interest similarity. I therefore test the conditional effect of joint autocracies and then put both in the same model so that the omitted category is simply mixed dyads.

In Model 2, JOINT AUTOCRACY is interacted with JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES. The specification of Model 2 is laid out in Equation 5.2:

Equation 5.2

$$AFFINITY_{XT} = B_0 + B_1 * AFFINITY_{XT-1} + B_2 * JOINT\ IGO\ SUBSTRUCTURES_{XT-5}$$
$$+ B_3 * JOINT\ AUTOCRACY_{XT-5}$$
$$+ B_4 * JOINT\ IGO\ SUBSTRUCTURES_{XT-5} * JOINT\ AUTOCRACY_{XT-5} + B_5 * TIME$$
$$+ B_6 * DIPLOMATIC\ MISSIONS\ LOW + B_7 * DYADIC\ TRADE_{XT}$$
$$+ B_8 * RELATIVE\ ECONOMIC\ DEVELOPMENT_{XT} + B_9 * RELATIVE\ ECONOMIC\ SIZE_{XT}$$
$$+ B_{10} * RELATIVE\ MILITARY\ POWER_{XT} + B_{11} * JOINT\ MILITARY\ ALLIANCE_{XT}$$
$$+ B_{12} * COLD\ WAR_{XT} + B_{13} * CONTIGUITY_X + u_x + e_{xt}.$$

The results of Model 2 indicate that joint autocracies experience greater interest convergence as a result of interaction with joint IGO substructures than do joint democracies and mixed dyads. The coefficient for JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES alone is 0.000054, which is statistically significant. This is the effect of JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES for joint democracies and mixed dyads. However, the coefficient of JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES for joint autocracies, which is the combined value of the coefficients of JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES and the interaction term, is 0.000083. This statistically significant effect is higher than that of the other dyads. The coefficients for the control variables are not significantly different from those of Model 1 or from those of the various models in Chapter 4, with the exception of RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, which is not statistically significant in either Model 1 or Model 2. It is not

surprising that RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT loses statistical significance, because joint democracies tend to have more similar levels of economic development and therefore the democracy/autocracy variables may be sucking up the explanatory effects of RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

In Model 3 (listed in Table 5.4) I included both JOINT DEMOCRACY and JOINT AUTOCRACY. This model is laid out in Equation 5.3:

Equation 5.3

$$\text{AFFINITY}_{XT} = B_0 + B_1 * \text{AFFINITY}_{XT-1} + B_2 * \text{JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES}_{XT-5}$$
$$+ B_3 * \text{JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES}_{XT-5} * \text{JOINT DEMOCRACY}_{XT-5}$$
$$+ B_4 * \text{JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES}_{XT-5} * \text{JOINT AUTOCRACY}_{XT-5}$$
$$+ B_5 * \text{JOINT DEMOCRACY}_{XT-5} + B_6 * \text{JOINT AUTOCRACY}_{XT-5}$$
$$+ B_7 * \text{TIME} + B_8 * \text{DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS LOW} + B_9 * \text{DYADIC TRADE}_{XT}$$
$$+ B_{10} * \text{RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT}_{XT} + B_{11} * \text{RELATIVE ECONOMIC SIZE}_{XT}$$
$$+ B_{12} * \text{RELATIVE MILITARY POWER}_{XT} + B_{13} * \text{JOINT MILITARY ALLIANCE}_{XT}$$
$$+ B_{14} * \text{COLD WAR}_{XT} + B_{15} * \text{CONTIGUITY}_X + u_x + e_{xt}$$

In this model, the coefficient for the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable alone represents the effect of joint IGO substructures on interest similarity for mixed dyads. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant (0.000057). The coefficient of JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES for joint democracies (listed in the row marked $B_2 + B_3$ in Table 5.4) is 0.000044 and statistically significant, but is actually lower than for mixed dyads. Finally, the coefficient of JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES for joint autocracies (listed in the row marked $B_2 + B_4$ in Table 5.4) is 0.000085, which is higher than that of both joint democracies and mixed dyads.

Table 5.5 presents the results of a series of similar tests using interactions of the JOINT DEMOCRACY and JOINT AUTOCRACY variables with HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP. Model 4 is identical to the model presented in Equation 5.1 except that HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP is substituted for the IGO variable. In this model, the coefficient of HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP is 0.0027 for joint autocracies and mixed dyads and is statistically significant. However, the coefficient of HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP for joint democracies, while lower than that for other dyads (0.00033), is not statistically significant.

In Model 5, I interacted JOINT AUTOCRACY with HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP, and therefore this model is identical to that in Equation 5.2, except that HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP is substituted for the IGO variable. In this model, HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP has a positive and statistically significant relationship with AFFINITY, which represents the effect of membership in IGOs with high issue coverage on interest similarity for joint democracies and mixed dyads. For joint autocracies, however, the coefficient on HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP is 0.0021 and is statistically significant, which indicates that the effects of joint membership in more high issue coverage IGOs is lesser for joint autocracies than for joint democracies and mixed dyads.

Table 5.5. Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence (Testing H4)

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Constant	0.173**	0.172**	0.172**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV)	0.705**	0.705**	0.705**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
High Issues IGO Membership (t-5)	0.0027**	0.0025**	0.0029**
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
High Issue IGOs(t-5) Joint Democracy (t-5)*	-0.0024**		-0.0026**
	(0.0010)		(0.0010)
High Issue IGOs(t-5) Joint Autocracy (t-5)*		-0.00041	-0.00084
		(0.00051)	(0.00052)
Marginal Effect of Joint IGO Structures for Joint Democracy=1	0.00033		0.00033
	(0.00103)		(0.00103)
Marginal Effect of Joint IGO Structures for Joint Autocracy=1		0.0021**	0.0021**
		(0.0006)	(0.0006)
Joint Democracy (t-5)	0.00082		0.0018
	(0.00427)		(0.0043)
Joint Autocracy (t-5)		0.0066**	0.0081**
		(0.0024)	(0.0024)
Time	-0.00071**	-0.00071**	-0.00070**
	(0.00009)	(0.00009)	(0.00009)
Diplomatic Missions Low	-0.00085**	-0.00085**	-0.00086**
	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)
Dyadic Trade	0.742**	0.726**	0.748**
	(0.343)	(0.342)	(0.343)
Relative Economic Development	-0.0011	-0.0017	-0.0014
	(0.0015)	(0.0015)	(0.0015)
Relative Economic Size	0.0061**	0.0061**	0.0060**
	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0014)
Relative Military Power	0.014**	0.013**	0.013**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Joint Military Alliance	0.064**	0.064**	0.064**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Cold War	0.025**	0.025**	0.025**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Contiguity	-0.00099	-0.00264	-0.0025
	(0.01160)	(0.01146)	(0.0115)
N	146,412	146,412	146,412
R^2 within	0.51	0.51	0.51
R^2 between	0.96	0.96	0.96
R^2 overall	0.88	0.88	0.88

Notes: Cell entries are generated from panel data regressions with fixed effects and have robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence. ** indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.

The last model in Table 5.5 (Model 6) includes interaction terms for HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP with both joint democracy and joint autocracy and is identical to the model in Equation 5.3, except that HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP is substituted for the IGO variable. The results of this model are similar to those of the previous two models. The coefficient of HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP for joint democracies is not statistically significant, while the coefficient for joint autocracies is again 0.0021 and is statistically significant. However, this model shows that the effect of joint membership in high issue IGOs on interest similarity is greater for mixed dyads than for joint autocracies as the coefficient on the HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP variable when both JOINT DEMOCRACY and JOINT AUTOCRACY are 0 is 0.0029 and is statistically significant.

The results of Models 1-6 seem to indicate that dyads involving autocracies are actually more prone to interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs than are joint liberal democracies, although they provide somewhat mixed results with regard to whether mixed dyads or joint autocracies experience greater interest convergence due to interaction within these IGOs. This is a puzzling finding, but the lack of a statistically significant effect of joint IGO membership for joint democracies is most likely due to the fact that coherent liberal democracies already hold such similar ideas and values that, aside from changes in material factors, which are controlled for in these models, there is not much convergence that can be picked up by the IGO variable. These findings may also indicate that states that are new to the international system (since new states tend not to be coherent liberal democracies) more rapidly take on new norms and ideas and therefore experience greater interest convergence over the time period of the sample than do other dyads. This is an interesting finding that should be the subject of future research, as will be discussed in Chapter 6.

5.2.2 Testing Hypothesis 5

Hypothesis 5 states that the smaller the difference between two states on the democracy scale, the more their interests should converge as a result of interaction within IGOs. Table 5.6 presents the results of two tests of this hypothesis. In Model 7, I included an interaction term for JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES and DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE, with both component parts lagged five years as discussed above. This model is specified in Equation 5.4:

Equation 5.4

$\text{AFFINITY}_{XT} = B_0 + B_1*\text{AFFINITY}_{XT-1} + B_2*\text{JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES}_{XT-5}$

$+ \ B_3*\text{JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES}_{XT-5}*\text{DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE}_{XT-5}$

$+ B_4* \ \text{DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE}_{XT-5} + B_5*\text{TIME}$

$+ B_6*\text{DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS LOW} + B_7* *\text{DYADIC TRADE}_{XT}$

$+ B_8*\text{RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT}_{XT} + B_9*\text{RELATIVE ECONOMIC SIZE}_{XT}$

$+ B_{10}*\text{RELATIVE MILITARY POWER}_{XT} + B_{11}*\text{JOINT MILITARY ALLIANCE}_{XT}$

$+ B_{12}*\text{COLD WAR}_{XT} + B_{13}* \ \text{CONTIGUITY}_X + u_x + e_{xt}.$

The results of this model do not support Hypothesis 5. While JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES has a positive and statistically significant effect when there is no difference in Polity scores (0.0000574), the coefficient for JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES is actually increasing and statistically significant over increasing differences in the Polity scores of two states. This is illustrated in Figure 5.1.

Table 5.6. Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence (Testing H5)

|	Model 7	Model 8
Constant	0.164**	0.178**
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV)	0.706**	0.705**
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Joint IGO Structures (t-5)	0.0000574**	
	(0.000006)	
*Joint IGO Structures (t-5)*Domestic Political Diff(t-5)*	0.0000012**	
	(0.000000)	
High Issue IGO Membership (t-5)		0.002213**
		(0.0005)
*High Issue IGOs(t-5)*Domestic Political Diff(t-5)*		0.000014
		(0.000044)
Time	-0.0018**	-0.00070**
	(0.0002)	(0.00009)
Diplomatic Missions Low	-0.00090**	-0.00084**
	(0.00004)	(0.00004)
Domestic Political Difference (t-5)	-0.0011**	-0.00050**
	(0.0002)	(0.00019)
Dyadic Trade	0.672**	0.720**
	(0.341)	(0.342)
Relative Economic Development	-0.00099	-0.0017
	(0.00154)	(0.0015)
Relative Economic Size	0.0058**	0.0061**
	(0.0014)	(0.0014)
Relative Military Power	0.014**	0.014**
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Joint Military Alliance	0.063**	0.063**
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Cold War	0.026**	0.025**
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Contiguity	-0.00097	-0.00304
	(0.01141)	(0.01160)
N	146,412	146,412
R^2 within	0.51	0.51
R^2 between	0.96	0.96
R^2 overall	0.88	0.88

Notes: Cell entries are generated from panel data regressions with fixed effects and have robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence. ** indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.

▲ Denotes statistical significance with 95% confidence.

Figure 5.1. Marginal Effect of Joint IGO Substructures conditioned on Domestic Political Difference

As with joint democracies, it may be that the more similar two states are in terms of their level of democracy, the less room there is for convergence. However, it is interesting to note that, over increasing levels of JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES, the negative effect of DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE on interest similarity is decreasing. This is illustrated in Figure 5.2. This means that the more IGO substructures within which two states interact, the less the differences in their Polity score is associated with interest divergence, indicating that interaction within IGOs may mediate the effects of differences between states that differ in terms of their ideas.

▲ Denotes statistical significance with 90% confidence.

Figure 5.2. Marginal Effect of Domestic Political Difference Conditioned on Joint IGO Substructures

In fact, as one can see from Figure 5.2, when two states interact in 1400 or more IGO substructures, the difference in their democracy scores is actually associated with interest convergence, while for cases in between dyads with more than 800, but less than 1400 joint substructures, DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE has no statistically significant effect. If states interacting in a very high number of IGO substructures are more likely to converge and states that are farther apart in terms of their ideas and values have more room to converge, then this makes perfect sense. In general, the more two states interact, the less their domestic political differences will lead them to have different interests and the more their interaction with each other will affect how they define their interests.

Model 8 is also a test of Hypothesis 5, but employs the HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP variable in place of the JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES variable in Equation 5.4. The results for this model lead to the same finding as Model 7. HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP is positively associated with interest similarity with a statistically significant coefficient of 0.002213. As one can see from Figure 5.3, the conditional effect of DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE is the opposite of the expectation from Hypothesis 5. The more two states differ in terms of their Polity score, the more their interests converge as a result of interaction within IGOs that cover more than two main issue areas.


▲ Denotes statistical significance with 95% confidence.

Figure 5.3. Marginal Effect of High Issue IGO Membership Conditioned on Domestic Political Difference

Figure 5.4 illustrates the conditional effect of joint membership in more IGOs with a high issue coverage on the effects of differences in Polity scores on interest similarity. The marginal

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coefficients of DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE become smaller negative numbers as HIGH ISSUE

IGO MEMBERSHIP increases, which means that the more IGOs with a high issue coverage within

which two states interact, the less their differences on the democracy scale lead to a divergence

of their interests. However, the coefficients for DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE are not

statistically significant for cases in which two states are members of more than eight such IGOs.

In other words, when two states are members of more than eight IGOs covering more than two

issues, the difference in their level of democracy does not have a statistically significant effect on

the similarity of their interests.

▲ Denotes statistical significance with 95% confidence.

Figure 5.4. Marginal Effect of Domestic Political Difference conditioned on High Issue IGO Membership

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5.2.3 Testing Hypothesis 6

Hypothesis 6 puts forth the expectation that states with common cultural attributes will be more likely to experience interest convergence the more they interact within IGOs. Tables 5.7 through 5.10 present the results of a series of tests of Hypothesis 6. Model 9 in Table 5.7 includes an interaction between JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES and COMMON CULTURE, which is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the two states share any of the following attributes: largest linguistic, largest ethnic, or largest religious group. Model 9 is laid out in Equation 5.5:

Equation 5.5

$$\text{AFFINITY}_{XT} = B_0 + B_1 * \text{AFFINITY}_{XT-1} + B_2 * \text{JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES}_{XT-5}$$
$$+ \; B_3 * \text{JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES}_{XT-5} * \text{COMMON CULTURE}_{XT-5}$$
$$+ B_4 * \text{COMMON CULTURE}_{XT-5} + B_5 * \text{TIME} + B_6 * \text{DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS LOW}$$
$$+ B_7 * \text{DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE}_{XT} + B_8 * \text{DYADIC TRADE}_{XT}$$
$$+ B_9 * \text{RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT}_{XT} + B_{10} * \text{RELATIVE ECONOMIC SIZE}_{XT}$$
$$+ B_{11} * \text{RELATIVE MILITARY POWER}_{XT} + B_{12} * \text{JOINT MILITARY ALLIANCE}_{XT}$$
$$+ B_{13} * \text{COLD WAR}_{XT} + B_{14} * \text{CONTIGUITY}_X + u_x + e_{xt}.$$

The results for Model 9 provide support for Hypothesis 6. For states that do not share a common language, ethnicity, or religion, interaction within IGO substructures is positively associated with interest similarity with a statistically significant coefficient of 0.000062. However, as one can see from the row marked "$B_2 + B_3$," the coefficient of JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES for states with at least one common cultural attribute is higher than for other states (0.000067). Substantively, the difference is small, with a one standard deviation increase in JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES associated with a 0.0094 unit increase in AFFINITY for states

without shared cultural attributes compared with a 0.0100 unit increase in AFFINITY for states that have at least one common cultural attribute. However, it is quite interesting to note that COMMON CULTURE only has an effect on interest convergence by conditioning the effect of JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES and does not on its own have a statistically significant effect on interest similarity at any level of JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES.[21] The results of this model therefore support Hypothesis 6, indicating that states that already have common cultural attributes may be more likely to take on new ideas from each other and therefore converge in how they define their interests as a result of interaction within IGOs.

In order to further explore this issue, I used an ordinal measure of common culture in Model 10, interacting the variable COMMON CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES with JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES (Model 10 is identical to Equation 5.5, except that the ordinal variable is substitute for the dichotomous culture variable). This new variable counts each common cultural attribute, including shared language, religion, and ethnicity and therefore it ranges from 0 to 3. The results of Model 10 confirm the findings from Model 9. As one can see from Figure 5.5, the more common cultural attributes two states have, the more their interaction within IGO substructures is associated with interest convergence. The differences, however, are again substantively small, given that a one standard deviation increase in with JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES for states with no shared cultural attributes is associated with 0.0096 unit increase in AFFINITY and for states with all three common cultural attributes, a one standard deviation increase in JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES results in a 0.0099 unit increase in AFFINITY.

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[21] Results available upon request.

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Table 5.7. Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence (Testing H6)

	Model 9	Model 10
Constant	0.163**	0.161**
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV)	0.709**	0.709**
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Joint IGO Structures (t-5)	0.000062**	0.000063**
	(0.000007)	(0.000006)
*Joint IGO Structures (t-5)*Common Culture(t-5)*	0.000005	
	(0.000005)	
Marginal Effect of Joint IGO Structures for Common Culture=1	0.000067**	
	(0.000006)	
*Joint IGO Structures (t-5)*Ordinal Common Culture(t-5)*		0.000002
		(0.000003)
Marginal Effect of Joint IGO Structures for Ordinal Common Culture=1		0.000065**
		(0.000006)
Common Culture (t-5)	-0.0024	
	(0.0040)	
Ordinal Common Culture (t-5)		-0.00015
		(0.00307)
Time	-0.0018**	-0.0018**
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Diplomatic Missions Low	-0.00090**	-0.00090**
	(0.00004)	(0.00004)
Domestic Political Difference	-0.0010**	-0.0010**
	(0.0001)	(0.001)
Dyadic Trade	0.703*	0.623*
	(0.340)	(0.342)
Relative Economic Development	-0.0022	-0.0020
	(0.0016)	(0.0016)
Relative Economic Size	0.0069**	0.0068**
	(0.0014)	(0.0014)
Relative Military Power	0.014**	0.014**
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Joint Military Alliance	0.060**	0.060**
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Cold War	0.026**	0.027**
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Contiguity	-0.0028	-0.0029
	(0.0110)	(0.111)
N	144,217	143,669
R^2 within	0.51	0.51
R^2 between	0.95	0.95
R^2 overall	0.88	0.88

Notes: Cell entries are generated from panel data regressions with fixed effects and have robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence. ** indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.

▲ **Denotes statistical significance with 95% confidence.**

Figure 5.5. Marginal Effect of Joint IGO Substructures conditioned on Common Cultural Attributes

Next, I tested each attribute separately, to see if they would have different conditioning effects on the effect of intra-IGO interaction on interest similarity. The results for these models can be found in Table 5.8. The results for Model 11, which substitutes COMMON LANGUAGE in place of the cultural variable in Equation 5.5, indicate that states with the same largest linguistic group actually experience less interest convergence as a result of interaction within joint IGO substructures than do states that do not share the same major language.

Model 12 shows that COMMON ETHNICITY actually has the strongest substantive conditioning effect on the coefficient of JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES, increasing from 0.000064 for states whose largest ethnic groups are not the same to 0.000076 for states that have the same largest ethnic group. This means that the effect of a one standard deviation increase in JOINT IGO

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SUBSTRUCTURES is associated with a 0.0098 unit increase in AFFINITY for states without a common ethnicity, while this is associated with a 0.0116 unit increase for states with a common ethnicity.

Finally, the results of Model 13, in which COMMON RELIGION is interacted with JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES, indicate that shared religion of the two states' largest religious groups has a small, but positive effect on the degree to which states experience interest convergence as a result of interaction within more IGO substructures. For states without a common religion, the coefficient on is 0.000063, while for states with a common religion, the coefficient is 0.000066.

Almost all of the results thus far support Hypothesis 6, despite the relatively small substantive conditioning effect of the common cultural variables. In the final set of models, I test the conditioning effects of these cultural variables on the effect that joint membership in IGOs with a high issue coverage has on member state interest similarity. Model 14 is specified in Equation 5.6:

Equation 5.6

$\text{AFFINITY}_{XT} = B_0 + B_1 * \text{AFFINITY}_{XT-1} + B_2 * \text{HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP}_{XT-5}$

$+ \ B_3 * \text{ HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP}_{XT-5} * \text{COMMON CULTURE}_{XT-5}$

$+ B_4 * \text{COMMON CULTURE}_{XT-5} + B_5 * \text{TIME} + B_6 * \text{DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS LOW}$

$+ B_7 * \text{DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE}_{XT} + B_8 * \text{DYADIC TRADE}_{XT}$

$+ B_9 * \text{RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT}_{XT} + B_{10} * \text{RELATIVE ECONOMIC SIZE}_{XT}$

$+ B_{11} * \text{RELATIVE MILITARY POWER}_{XT} + B_{12} * \text{JOINT MILITARY ALLIANCE}_{XT}$

$+ B_{13} * \text{COLD WAR}_{XT} + B_{14} * \text{ CONTIGUITY}_X + \mathbf{u}_x + e_{xt}.$

Table 5.8. Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence (Testing H6)

	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13
Constant	0.166**	0.161**	0.161**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV)	0.709**	0.709**	0.709**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Joint IGO Structures (t-5)	0.000064**	0.000064**	0.000063**
	(0.000006)	(0.000006)	(0.000007)
*Joint IGO Structures (t-5)*Common Language (t-5)*	-0.000003		
	(0.000008)		
Marg. Effect of Joint IGO Structures for Comm. Lang.=1	0.000061**		
	(0.000010)		
*Joint IGO Structures (t-5)*Common Ethnicity (t-5)*		0.000012	
		(0.000010)	
Marg. Effect of Joint IGO Structures for Comm. Ethnic.=1		0.000076**	
		(0.000010)	
*Joint IGO Structures (t-5)*Common Religion (t-5)*			0.000003
			(0.000005)
Marg. Effect of Joint IGO Structures for Comm. Relig.=1			0.000066**
			(0.000006)
Common Language (t-5)	-0.083**		
	(0.014)		
Common Ethnicity (t-5)		-0.0045	
		(0.0100)	
Common Religion (t-5)			-0.00031
			(0.00414)
Time	-0.0018**	-0.0018**	-0.0018**
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Diplomatic Missions Low	-0.00089**	-0.00091**	-0.00089**
	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)
Domestic Political Difference	-0.00095**	-0.00103**	-0.00095**
	(0.00011)	(0.00011)	(0.00011)
Dyadic Trade	0.602*	0.621*	0.602*
	(0.340)	(0.342)	(0.340)
Relative Economic Development	-0.0019	-0.0019	-0.0019
	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0016)
Relative Economic Size	0.0068**	0.0069**	0.0069**
	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0014)
Relative Military Power	0.014**	0.014**	0.014**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Joint Military Alliance	0.061**	0.060**	0.061**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Cold War	0.027**	0.027**	0.027**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Contiguity	-0.0020	-0.0025	-0.0024
	(0.0111)	(0.0111)	(0.0111)
N	145,888	143,669	145,888
R2 within	0.51	0.51	0.51
R2 between	0.95	0.95	0.96
R2 overall	0.88	0.88	0.88

Notes: Cell entries are generated from panel data regressions with fixed effects and have robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence. ** indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.

The results for Model 14 are listed in Table 5.9. The results provide support for the hypothesis that states with common cultural attributes experience greater interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs. The coefficient of HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP for states with no common cultural attributes is 0.002176, whereas for states with at least one common cultural attribute, the coefficient for HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP is 0.002509.

Model 15 tests the conditioning effect of common culture on HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP using the ordinal measure, COMMON CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES. The results of Model 15 also provide support for Hypothesis 6. As illustrated in Figure 5.6, each additional common cultural attribute of a dyad is associated with an increase in the effect that HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP has on AFFINITY and these coefficients are statistically significant at all levels of COMMON CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES. As with the models in which the key IGO variable was JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES, neither COMMON CULTURE nor COMMON CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES have any statistically significant *direct* effect on interest similarity over any level of HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP. However, as I expected, common culture does enhance the positive effect of interaction within certain types of IGOs on interest similarity and therefore Hypotheses 6 is supported.

Table 5.9. Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence (Testing H6)

	Model 14	Model 15
Constant	0.181**	0.180**
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV)	0.709**	0.709*
	(0.006)	(0.006)
High Issue IGO Membership (t-5)	0.002176**	0.002273**
	(0.000583)	(0.000561)
High Issue IGOs(t-5)*Common Culture(t-5)	0.000333	
	(0.000574)	
Marginal Effect of High Issue IGOs for Common Culture=1	0.002509**	
	(0.000540)	
High Issue IGOs(t-5)*Ordinal Common Culture(t-5)		0.000058
		(0.000347)
Marginal Effect of High Issue IGOs for Ordinal Common Culture=1		0.002331**
		(0.000487)
Common Culture (t-5)	-0.00066	
	(0.00337)	
Common Culture Traits (t-5)		0.00069
		(0.00264)
Time	-0.00070**	-0.00070**
	(0.00009)	(0.00009)
Diplomatic Missions Low	-0.00086**	-0.00086**
	(0.00004)	(0.00004)
Domestic Political Difference	-0.00101**	-0.00105**
	(0.00011)	(0.00011)
Dyadic Trade	0.679**	0.699**
	(0.341)	(0.343)
Relative Economic Development	-0.0032**	-0.0031
	(0.0016)	(0.0016)
Relative Economic Size	0.0071**	0.0070**
	(0.0014)	(0.0014)
Relative Military Power	0.014**	0.014**
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Joint Military Alliance	0.060**	0.060**
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Cold War	0.025**	0.025**
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Contiguity	-0.0040	-0.0040
	(0.0113)	(0.0113)
N	144,217	143,669
R^2 within	0.51	0.51
R^2 between	0.95	0.95
R^2 overall	0.88	0.88

Notes: Cell entries are generated from panel data regressions with fixed effects and have robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence.   ** indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.

▲ Denotes statistical significance with 95% confidence.

Figure 5.6. Marginal Effect of High Issue IGO Membership conditioned on Common Cultural Attributes

Finally, I test the conditioning effect of each of the cultural attributes on the degree to which membership in more IGOs with a high issue coverage affects interest similarity in separate models. The results for Model 16 (listed in Table 5.10) indicate that the marginal effect of HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP on AFFINITY is actually lower for dyads in which both states have the same largest linguistic group (COMMON LANGUAGE) (0.00172) than it is for dyads in which the two states do not have the same largest linguistic group (0.00254). Although all of the various control models have remained quite stable in terms of sign, statistical significance, and substantive effect across the various models presented in this Chapter, it is noteworthy that, in this model, DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE is not statistically significant and RELATIVE DEVELOPMENT DIFFERENCE is statistically significant.

Table 5.10. Estimates of Dyadic Interest Convergence (Testing H6)

	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18
Constant	0.184**	0.180**	0.180**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV)	0.709**	0.709**	0.709**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
High Issue IGO Membership (t-5)	0.00254**	0.00230**	0.00226**
	(0.00049)	(0.00051)	(0.00057)
*High Issue IGOs(t-5)*Common Language (t-5)*	-0.00082		
	(0.00084)		
Marginal Effect of High Issue IGOs for Comm. Lang.=1	0.00172**		
	(0.0008)		
*High Issue IGOs(t-5)*Common Ethnicity (t-5)*		0.00007	
		(0.00117)	
Marginal Effect of High Issue IGOs for Comm. Ethnic.=1		0.00237**	
		(0.00110)	
*High Issue IGOs(t-5)*Common Religion (t-5)*			0.00039
			(0.00058)
Marginal Effect of High Issue IGOs for Comm. Relig.=1			0.00265**
			(0.00055)
Common Language (t-5)	-0.088**		
	(0.014)		
Common Ethnicity (t-5)		-0.0007	
		(0.0102)	
Common Religion (t-5)			0.000050
			(0.003450)
Time	-0.00070**	-0.00069**	-0.00071**
	(0.00009)	(0.00009)	(0.00009)
Diplomatic Missions Low	-0.00085**	-0.00086**	-0.00085**
	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)
Domestic Political Difference	-0.00096	-0.00104**	-0.00096**
	(0.00011)	(0.00011)	(0.00011)
Dyadic Trade	0.674**	0.699**	0.677**
	(0.341)	(0.343)	(0.341)
Relative Economic Development	-0.0030*	-0.0031*	-0.0029*
	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0016)
Relative Economic Size	0.0070**	0.0070**	0.0071**
	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0014)
Relative Military Power	0.013**	0.014**	0.013**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Joint Military Alliance	0.061**	0.060**	0.061**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Cold War	0.026**	0.025**	0.025**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Contiguity	-0.0031	-0.0039	-0.0039
	(0.0112)	(0.0113)	(0.0114)
N	145,888	143,699	145,888
R^2 within	0.51	0.51	0.51
R^2 between	0.95	0.95	0.95
R^2 overall	0.88	0.88	0.88

Notes: Cell entries are generated from panel data regressions with fixed effects and have robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence. ** indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence.

This may be due to the fact that states that are former colonies have the same major languages as their former colonizers. Therefore, common language is not a good indicator of attributes that would cause different actors to see each other as being in the same peer group. In addition, this measure may be proxying differences in the level of democratization of the two states, which normally has a statistically significant, negative effect on interest similarity. In order to further explore this relationship, one would need to look more in-depth at the various language groups of each state.

Model 17 tests the conditioning effect of common ethnicity of the largest ethnic groups of the two states (COMMON ETHNICITY) on the effect of HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP on interest similarity. For dyads without a common ethnicity, the coefficient of HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP is 0.00230, while for dyads with a common ethnicity the coefficient is 0.00237, which represents a small increase in the substantive effect of HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP on AFFINITY. A one standard deviation increase in HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP leads to a 0.00285 increase in AFFINITY for dyads without a common religion, but a 0.00294 increase in AFFINITY for dyads that do have a common religion.

The results of Model 18 indicate that states with a common largest religious group (COMMON RELIGION) also experience greater interest convergence as a result of joint membership in more IGOs with a high issue coverage. The coefficient of HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP for states without a common religion is 0.00226, whereas for states with the same largest religious group, it is 0.00265. This means that a one standard deviation increase in HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP is associated with a 0.0028 increase in AFFINITY for dyads without a common

religion, whereas it is associated with a 0.0033 increase in AFFINITY for dyads that share a common religion of the largest religious group.

With the exception of the models including COMMON LANGUAGE, the various models presented above provide support for Hypothesis 6. In other words, states that have common cultural attributes generally experience greater interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs with attributes that were found to be conducive to interest convergence in Chapter 4.

5.3   CONCLUSION

In Chapter 4, I tested a set of hypotheses regarding how more interaction within IGOs should lead to greater interest convergence between member states. The findings of those tests provided strong support for the notion that greater interaction within IGOs leads to greater interest convergence between member states. In that chapter, I also provided evidence that member states experience greater interest convergence over time the more IGOs with a high number of substructures within which they interact, the more total joint IGO substructures within which they interact, and the more IGOs with a high issue coverage within which they interact. In this chapter, I then used two key indicators of intra-IGO interaction from Chapter 4 to test three hypotheses regarding dyadic attributes that may condition the degree to which certain pairs of member states experience interest convergence as a result of interaction within these IGOs. These hypotheses set forth the expectation that dyads in which both states are liberal democracies, dyads that are closer together on the democracy scale, and dyads that have common cultural attributes should experience greater interaction as a result of interaction within IGOs or

IGO structures that are conducive to interest convergence. The first two hypotheses were not supported by the results of these tests, but rather showed the opposite relationship to that which was expected. The results of the last series of tests provide support for the hypothesis states with common cultural attributes experience greater interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs.

The first set of statistical models presented in this chapter test the hypothesis (Hypothesis 4) that dyads in which both pairs of states are liberal democracies will experience greater interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs than other pairs of states. I tested this hypothesis using both the measure of the total number of joint IGO structures within which two states interact (JOINT IGO SUBSTRUCTURES) and the measure of joint memberships in IGOs that cover more than two main issue areas (HIGH ISSUE IGO MEMBERSHIP). I interacted these IGO variables with measures of joint democracy and joint autocracy, which I created using data from the Polity IV dataset (Democracy-Autocracy). The results of these tests did not provide support for Hypothesis 4, but rather showed that being a joint democracy actually dampens the effect of the IGO variables on interest similarity.

With regard to joint autocracies and mixed dyads, the results were somewhat mixed depending on which IGO variable was used in the interaction. However, for all of the models mixed dyads and joint autocracies experienced greater interest convergence as a result of intra-IGO interaction than did joint democracies. This finding runs counter to the notion that persuasion requires liberal-minded participants and to the expectation that joint democracies would experience greater interest convergence. However, this is most likely due to the fact that states that are both coherent, liberal democracies tend to already have quite similar interests and therefore there is little change to be picked up after controlling for changes in material factors.

However, the question of why joint democracies experience interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs to a lesser degree than other dyads should be further explored in future research.

Hypothesis 5 states that dyads that are closer together on the democracy scale (Democracy-Autocracy from Polity IV) should experience greater interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs. The tests of this hypothesis on both IGO variables yield results that did not support Hypothesis 5. As with the joint democracy variable, increasing levels of DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFERENCE are associated with higher coefficients on the IGO variables, meaning greater interest convergence. Once again, it may be that states that are farther apart in terms of their ideas and interests have more room to converge as a result of interacting within IGOs. The lack of support for this hypothesis could mean that the notion that actors are more likely to take on new ideas from other actors that they deem to be in their peer group is wrong. However, it may be that the level of democracy of two states is not the dimension on which individuals from those states will view each other as being in the same peer group.

Based on the same logic regarding the likelihood that actors will use others that they deem to be in their peer group as a reference when taking in new ideas, Hypothesis 6 states that dyads in which the two states have common cultural attributes should experience greater interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs. I conducted several tests of this hypothesis using the two IGO measures and various operationalizations of common culture. The results of these tests provide consistent support for Hypothesis 6, with the exception of the tests in which COMMON LANGUAGE is interacted with the IGO variables. In general, dyads with shared cultural attributes experience greater interest convergence as a result of interaction within more IGO substructures and IGOs with a high issue coverage than do other dyads. However, COMMON

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LANGUAGE is associated with a lesser degree of convergence resulting from IGO interaction. This result is most likely due to conceptual and/or measurement issues. First, states that have a former colonial relationship may share the same largest linguistic group, despite the fact that they have different ethnicities and may not view each other as being in the same peer group. Second, to delve further into the question for future research, one should consider other language groups besides the largest group and perhaps the number of different languages.

What the results of these tests do show is that COMMON ETHNICITY and COMMON RELIGION do enhance the effect of interaction within IGOs on member state interest similarity. This may be evidence that these two cultural attributes are more important dimensions for determining how individuals from different states view each other in terms of peer groups.

The results of the empirical tests presented in this chapter provided mixed support for the proposition that states with existing similarities should experience greater interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs found to be conducive to interest convergence. The findings in this chapter have also provided some interesting questions for future research. In the following chapter, I conclude with a discussion of the overall findings of the dissertation, the implications of these findings for research in the field of international relations, the policy implications of these findings, and the possibilities for future research on the question of how membership in intergovernmental organizations affects the similarity of member state interests over time.

6.0   CONCLUSION

In this dissertation project, I seek to answer the question of which attributes of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are conducive to a convergence in member state interests over time. In this chapter I conclude with a summary of the argument and key findings of the dissertation with regard to the aforementioned question. I then discuss the implications of these findings for academic research on international relations and for policy-makers involved in the design and functioning of international institutions. Finally, I discuss how the research presented in this dissertation can be extended to further explore both the initial question and new questions that arise from the empirical findings presented in Chapters 4 and 5.

6.1   SUMMARY OF THE BASIC ARGUMENT AND FINDINGS

The goal of this dissertation is to answer the question of how membership in IGOs leads to member state interest convergence. This question speaks to the larger question in international relations regarding whether and how international institutions affect member state behavior. The vast majority of work on this question from institutionalist scholars has ignored interest convergence as a possible channel through which membership in IGOs can ultimately affect state behavior by controlling for interests when looking for the effects of IGOs on behavior. The idea

that interests are endogenous to interaction is not new and work in that vein has typically been associated with constructivist work, especially with work on socialization.

While the socialization literature has informed the theory that is presented herein, it is insufficient to answer the question of how interaction within IGOs leads to member state interest convergence. Research on socialization within IGOs has focused on a small number of cases that does not allow one to sufficiently control for a series of material factors that affect state interests or to compare across IGOs with different attributes. In addition, much of this work seeks to explain and find evidence of socialization at the individual level of analysis within one IGO, which, as I argue in previous chapters, may not necessarily lead to a change in the definition of *state* interests. I also argue for a move away from the focus on socialization as the process of inducting *new* actors into the *norms and rules* of a given community. Instead, I argue that all actors are subject to the acceptance of new ideas and that these ideas may not be normative in nature, but may also be ideas about cause-and-effect relationships.

In Chapter 2, I also address the literature on policy diffusion and learning, which may be usefully applied to research on interest convergence in international relations. However, this literature is insufficient to answer the question of how IGOs lead to interest convergence because, in much of this work, there is a lack of focus on communication networks as a channel through which ideas diffuse in the international system. Those studies that do explore the spread of ideas/innovation through networks of communication either suffer from the same empirical limitations as the socialization literature or focus only on one specific type of intergovernmental organization. Bearce and Bondanella (2007) attempt to rectify these shortcomings by looking for evidence of interest convergence in a global sample, but do not delve into the question of which attributes of IGOs are conducive to this process.

In Chapter 3, I present a theory of member state interest convergence, focusing on IGOs as structures within which state actors interact and take on new ideas that ultimately get translated into the definition of state interests. The theory begins with the proposition that more interaction within IGOs provides more opportunities for the spread of ideas and therefore results in greater interest convergence. I choose to use the term *interests* rather than *preferences*, because, as I argue in Chapter 3, what a state wants or seeks to achieve at any level of abstraction is an expression of what it wants at a greater level of abstraction. My theory is based on the notion that ideas spread between individuals from different states and ultimately become institutionalized in domestic settings, thus affecting how state interests are defined. While these changes are ultimately expressed in more specific situations, the expressions of preference for a certain outcome or the actions of a state are simply visible implications of a deeper change in interests.

Based on the proposition that more interaction leads to more opportunities for actors to persuade each other to accept new ideas, I generate three hypotheses regarding attributes of IGOs that should be conducive to interest convergence. I hypothesize that states should experience greater interest convergence, the more they interact within IGOs with a high number of substructures, the more they interact within IGO substructures that bring together ministers of all member states rather than simply bureaucrats from different member states, and the more they interact within IGOs with a high issue coverage.

However, all pairs of states may not experience the same degree of interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs. I propose that states that already share common attributes that make their agents pre-disposed to being persuaded by each other should experience greater interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs. From this proposition, I hypothesize

that dyads in which both states are liberal democracies, dyads with a lower distance between the two states on the democracy/autocracy scale, and dyads in which the two states share common cultural attributes should experience greater interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs.

In Chapter 4, I test the first set of hypotheses regarding attributes of IGOs expected to be conducive to member state interest convergence. The various tests of these hypotheses are generally supportive of my theory across different measures of intra-IGO interaction. While the substantive effects of intra-IGO interaction are small, they are not inconsequential and are similar to the substantive effects of other variables in the models. While some of the realist and institutionalist variables surpass the IGO variables in terms of substantive effects on changes in interest similarity, this does not weaken support for my theory, which was never meant to replace material factors as an explanation for changes in state interests. In fact, the null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between interaction within more IGO substructures or more IGOs with a high issue coverage on interest similarity. Rather than attempting to debunk existing institutionalist theory, the goal of this dissertation is to highlight and explore another causal pathway through which IGOs ultimately affect member state behavior, which has heretofore been largely ignored. In other words, the purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate that interest convergence occurs as a result of interaction within IGOs and the resulting transmission of ideas, rather than simply from changes in material factors, and to determine which attributes of IGOs are conducive to that process.

In Chapter 5, I tested the second set of hypotheses regarding which dyadic attributes enhance the degree to which interest convergence results from interaction within IGOs. The hypothesis that joint liberal democracies would be more likely to experience interest

convergence as a result of more interaction within IGOs was not supported. In fact, the results of various models indicate that joint autocracies and mixed dyads generally experience greater interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs found to be conducive to interest convergence. Tests of the hypothesis that states that have a more similar score on the democracy scale also showed the opposite relationship to that expected. The larger the distance between two states' Polity scores, the greater the degree of interest convergence is associated with their interaction within more IGO substructures and within more IGOs with a high issue coverage. While somewhat puzzling, this finding may indicate that states that are already quite similar have little room for convergence. However, the positive relationship between intra-IGO interaction and interest similarity holds across all dyads. In addition, this interaction seems to mediate the negative effect of domestic political differences on interest similarity. It may also be the case that similarity in democracy levels is not an important dimension on which individuals assign other actors to their peer group, thus making them more susceptible to persuasion by those actors. The conditioning effects of similar levels of democracy on the degree to which states experience interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs can be better assessed with a deeper examination at lower levels of analysis.

In Chapter 5, I also tested the hypothesis that states with common cultural attributes would be more likely to experience interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs with attributes found to be conducive to interest convergence. This hypothesis is also based on the idea from reference group theory that actors give more consideration to new ideas that come from other actors they deem to be in their peer group and are therefore more likely to accept these new ideas. The various tests using different measures of common culture were largely supportive of this hypothesis. The more cultural attributes two states share the greater the

interest convergence they experience as a result of interaction within IGOs. However, I found that dyads with a common language actually experience a lesser degree of interest convergence resulting from intra-IGO interaction than do other dyads. While this finding is puzzling, it is possible that common language of the largest linguistic groups of the two states in a dyad may not accurately capture a dimension on which individuals from two states identify with one another, especially since certain states have several different linguistic groups and states with a common major religion may be quite different on other dimensions. What this finding may indicate as well is that ethnicity and religion are more important dimensions of mutual identification between actors. This is an interesting question to be explored in future research, as I will discuss at the end of the chapter. In the following section, I will discuss the implications of these findings for academic research on international relations.

6.2   IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS RESEARCH

This dissertation asks which attributes of IGOs are conducive to member state interest convergence. The work presented here builds on my previous research showing that joint IGO membership is indeed associated with increases in interest similarity between pairs of states (Bearce and Bondanella 2007). In this project, I have put forth a theory to explain how IGOs lead to interest convergence and have provided evidence to support that theory by demonstrating that IGOs that foster greater interaction between states have a positive effect on member state interest similarity over time. This is a significant contribution to the question of whether interests are endogenous to interaction. Most institutionalist research looking at the effects of

IGOs on state behavior treats interests as exogenous to joint membership in IGOs by controlling for interests when looking for IGO effects.

While constructivist scholars and others studying socialization and learning within IGOs have long argued for treating interests as endogenous to interaction, their work has focused almost exclusively on a small number of cases, often within the context of Europe. It is not my intention to criticize small-N research, which I believe to be invaluable to the exploration and demonstration of causal pathways through more in-depth analysis. However, to paraphrase Fearon and Wendt (2002), the debate between these two research communities has to a large extent been a "dialogue of the deaf" due in large part to differences in preferred research methodology. It is my hope that this dissertation will be a step toward integrating some of the ideas from these two bodies of work, by demonstrating the degree to which interests are endogenous to interaction using the preferred research methodology of rationalist scholars and by providing a theory to explain how interaction within IGOs affects interests at the *state* level. I argue that interest change resulting from interaction does not require identity change, but that mutual identification may enhance the degree to which ideas are transmitted between actors within the context of IGOs.

For socialization scholars, the findings of this dissertation can serve as confirmation of the basic hypothesis regarding the positive relationship between the amount of interaction between actors and an increase in their interest similarity. However, the question and focus of this dissertation is somewhat different from that of socialization scholars. If one wants to know specifically how joining an existing IGO or international community affects a state, then a focus on the induction of *new actors* into the norms and rules of an existing community is sufficient. However, the more general question of how IGO membership affects states' interests cannot be

answered without considering that IGOs are structures within which states interact. IGOs provide channels of communication within which actors from different states, both existing and new members, continually interact and are thus subject to interest convergence over time.

I also argue that a focus solely on the acceptance of *norms* as the process through which interest convergence occurs may miss a portion of the convergence that occurs through a transmission of ideas regarding cause-and-effect relationships. While I have not distinguished between different types of ideas in the tests of these hypotheses, I provide a coherent theory of interest convergence that does not require identity change. Indeed, much of the policy diffusion and learning literature examines the diffusion of ideas absent identity change. As I will discuss below, future qualitative research should examine how the transfer of ideas regarding cause-and-effect relationships can affect not only specific instances of policy choice or bargaining, but also more fundamental interests of a state, with lasting effects on the policies of the state.

The findings of Chapter 4 show that, counter to my expectation, interaction within more secretariat and technical bodies has a stronger substantive effect on the interest similarity of two states than do bodies of high-level leaders, which may provide support for the argument of socialization scholars that the internalization of new normative ideas is more likely to occur in less politicized, more insulated settings (Checkel 2005; Lewis 2005).

At the same time, however, I demonstrate that interaction within more bodies for meetings of high-level leaders is conducive to interest convergence as well. This expectation is based on my theory that the ideas exchanged at the IGO-level should be more likely to become institutionalized in the domestic setting if they come through state agents who have the power to change the orientation of state interests. However, it is clear from the findings that this is not the only channel through which intra-IGO interaction ultimately affects state interests. More

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research into this question at a deeper level of analysis is needed to parse out how interests are transmitted from the international to the domestic context. In fact, one shortcoming of the literature looking at both learning and socialization within IGOs is that they fail to analyze how new ideas and norms taken on at the international level may ultimately affect state interests in the long-run, instead focusing on specific outcomes of bargaining or the socialization of individuals within an IGO. While the level of analysis of this dissertation has not allowed for a deeper look at this process, the finding that both interaction within secretariat and technical divisions and bodies that bring together high-level state agents is conducive to interest convergence suggests that this should be the focus of future research.

With regard to the vast majority of rationalist institutionalist work, the findings of the dissertation suggest that controlling for interests when looking for the effects of IGO membership on state behavior actually underestimate the effects of IGOs over time by ignoring one channel through which IGOs ultimately affect state behavior – as structures providing opportunities for the acceptance of new ideas resulting in member state interest convergence. While the substantive effects of interaction within certain types of IGOs or IGO structures are small, the effects over time are not inconsequential. Interest convergence is a gradual process and even material factors have similarly low substantive effects on interest similarity when looking at the change from one year to the next. Since interest change is a gradual process, it may not always be necessary to treat interests as a moving part. Depending on one's research question, it may sometimes be necessary and efficient to take interests as given when looking for the effects of IGO membership on state behavior over relatively short periods of time. However, if IGO interaction leads to a convergence in states' interests, as the findings of this dissertation

suggest, then it is important to think through how one might conduct further research on IGO effects by treating interests as a moving part.

One of the main contributions of this dissertation is the creation of a dataset in which IGOs are coded according to different attributes that proxy the amount of interaction that IGOs foster between member states. Research on the effects of IGOs on state behavior such as conflict and trade should employ such variables rather than a simple count of IGOs, especially if, as some of the findings suggest, membership in IGOs may also lead to interest divergence or provide opportunities for low-level conflict. It may be that some factors related to IGO membership push in the direction of greater conflict, but that the processes of persuasion and learning that occur between pairs of states experiencing a great deal of interaction within IGOs mediates those effects. This would explain the positive relationship between joint membership in IGOs covering a high number of issue areas while one sees a negative relationship between a simple count of IGOs involving economic issues (which would be the majority of all IGOs).

Finally, the theory and findings of this project speak to the literature on similarity within the international relations literature. In addition to examining how IGOs affect member state interest similarity, I examine how similarity between pairs of states may actually make interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs more likely. The findings with regard to how similar levels of democratization affect the degree to which intra-IGO interaction affects interest similarity do not provide support for the hypothesis that states with a similar scores on the democracy scale will experience greater convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs, but rather show the opposite relationship. It may be that coherent liberal democracies are already so close together that they have less room for interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs. The results indicate that they do experience interest convergence through membership in

a large number of IGO substructures, but they do not do so to a greater extent than do other dyads.

The findings with regard to common culture suggest that common culture is such a dimension. In fact, the finding that common language does not enhance the degree of interest convergence resulting from interaction within IGOs while common ethnicity and religion do so indicates that the causal mechanism between common culture and affinity is related to identity. A common language may facilitate communication between actors, which is more of an information mechanism, whereas common religion and ethnicity are more tied in to an actor's identity. If this is the case, then the finding that common language does not facilitate greater interest convergence as a result of interaction within IGOs while common religion and ethnicity do actually implies that the theory is correct in expecting these dyadic attributes to facilitate persuasion due to the actors' mutual identification as part of the same peer group.

The findings in Chapter 5 suggest that scholars of international relations should not assume that similarity breeds affinity[22], but rather, they should test which types of similarity cause actors to have an affinity for and therefore to behave differently toward each other. This should be applied to work not only on interest convergence and the effects of international organizations on behavior, but also to the conflict literature, in which similarity is sometimes expected to be synonymous with affinity and therefore to reduce conflict. Recent work on cultural similarity and conflict has headed in the direction of breaking down cultural similarity into more meaningful categories (e.g. Leng and Regan 2003; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006; Mishali-Ram 2006). The findings herein confirm that cultural similarity *tout court* may not have

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[22] The term "affinity" used here should not be confused with the variable "Affinity" which is simply the name that the dependent variable in this study was given by its creator – in other words, interest similarity should not be equated with concept of affinity. Whether interest similarity between actors leads them to have an affinity for one another is an empirical question.

a substantively strong impact on interest similarity and that the relationship between cultural similarity and affinity needs to be further explored.

6.3   POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The findings of this dissertation have important implications for global governance. If the goal of global governance is not only to manage problems that cross borders, but also to promote cooperation and peaceful relations between states, then insight into the questions of whether and how certain structures of IGOs affect state behavior and cooperation should inform the design of international institutions. The results of various tests presented in this dissertation provide evidence that IGOs are more likely to facilitate interest convergence between member states the more they foster interaction between individuals from the member states.

This not only suggests that policy-makers involved in designing and reforming the structure of intergovernmental organizations should create structures that involve more frequent interaction, but it also strengthens the arguments of policymakers who advocate joining or maintaining memberships in IGOs. In fact, even the United States Army appears to be interested in how socialization might be useful as "a process where sustained interactions change how countries view the United States and their own security interests" (Marquis et al. 2006). In addition to thinking about how a state might want to foster greater interaction with other states through IGOs to promote more similar interests and therefore peace, it is also important to note that these results show that the existing academic research on IGOs have underestimated the effects of IGOs on state behavior and possibly on preventing conflict.

The finding that interaction within large numbers of secretariat and technical divisions of IGOs is conducive to member state interest convergence is actually good news for advocates of greater international cooperation. Greater cooperation on technical matters, which have the possibility to be less political, should be easier to achieve. The findings of this dissertation also suggest that IGOs with a high issue coverage are conducive to member state interest convergence. This indicates that, rather than dealing with issues one by one or in separate IGOs, states should attempt to deal with several issues within the framework of one IGO, since this facilitates greater interaction between state agents to manage those issues. This should not only reduce transaction costs, but should also lead to greater interest convergence over time.

6.4   FUTURE RESEARCH

There are a number of ways in which this dissertation can and should be extended into further research on the question of how interaction within IGOs leads to interest convergence between member states. The first important extension of this project would be to elongate the time series of the dataset by coding the IGOs in the dataset for all post-World War II years. This elongation of the time series could be important in testing whether the relationship between membership in IGOs that foster a high amount of interaction and interest convergence holds over a longer period of time. It may also be useful for assessing the effects of time or of certain periods of time prior to the 1970s.

There are a series of research projects that can be done to further this research agenda, three of which are particularly important. The first project would be to study the effects of IGO interaction on state interests within specific issue areas. This requires that one break Gartzke's

Affinity data (Gartzke and Jo 2002), which is used to measure state interest similarity, into the similarity of interests in specific issue areas. The Affinity data are a series of S-scores (see Signorino and Ritter 1999) which essentially measure the distance between states' votes in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on all issues voted on in each year. This measure is typically used to measure state interest similarity in the IR literature. In order to look at interest similarity within specific issue areas, one could code all UNGA votes by issue area and then recalculate S-scores of state interest similarity by issue area. Correspondingly, one should further code my sample of IGOs into those covering these same issue areas and test the effects of interaction within IGOs covering specific issues with interest convergence in those same areas.

In addition to testing for interest convergence within specific issue areas, it is important to test the implications of my theory with regard to the ultimate effect of IGO-induced interest convergence on state behavior, including behavior in areas such as human rights and trade. While the first project proposed above aims at providing more specific evidence of interest convergence resulting from a convergence of interests in the same issue areas, it is not clear that interacting within IGOs in one issue area cannot affect two states' interest similarity and behavior in other areas. In fact, Ingram, Robinson and Busch (2005) demonstrate that economic behavior is affected even by connectedness in IGOs that were formed for social or cultural purposes. Therefore, future research should to test the effects of greater interaction within networks of IGOs on state behavior in various issue areas through the causal mechanism of interest convergence.

Finally, while the findings of this dissertation provide empirically robust evidence of interest convergence resulting from greater interaction within certain IGOs, a deeper analysis of this process may shed some light on how both normative and cause-and-effect ideas that are

exchanged at the IGO level become institutionalized in the domestic context. Case studies could also help to illuminate how this process may differ or may be more or less effective through interaction of bureaucrats v. high-level state leaders.

In this dissertation, I provided a theory of how interaction within IGOs leads to member state interest convergence, which is generalizable across IGOs and across regions. From the theory, I generated a set of hypotheses regarding attributes of IGOs that should be conducive to interest convergence and attributes of dyads that condition that process. Although my theory draws on some core ideas from the existing literature on socialization, policy diffusion, and learning, I depart from the existing literature by providing an explanation of interest convergence that focuses on IGOs as structures within which member states interact with each other and are constantly subject to the acceptance of new ideas regarding both norms and cause-and-effect relationships. The empirical tests also depart from existing work arguing that interests are endogenous to interaction by testing the hypotheses in a global sample with which it is possible to control for the various material factors that also affect interests. The findings have important implications for both academic research in international relations and policy-related issues. While there is much work to be done to further our knowledge of how IGOs affect member state interests, this represents an exciting point of departure.

APPENDIX A

CODING IGO SUBSTRUCTURES

In order to test my theory regarding how interaction within intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) leads to member state interest convergence, I needed to code IGOs based on the number of various types of structures that they have. The units in the raw dataset are IGO-years, which includes all IGOs for the period 1970-1995. I used the IGO-years listed in the Correlates of War (COW) IGO dataset (Pevehouse et al. 2003) as a base for this dataset. Therefore, IGOs are defined as organizations whose members include three or more sovereign states, that have a permanent secretariat and corresponding headquarters, and that hold regular plenary sessions at least once every ten years (Pevehouse et al. 2003).

For each of the IGO-years in the dataset, I collected information regarding several variables that were used in this chapter: the total number of substructures, the number of bodies for meetings of ministers of member states, the number of secretariat and technical divisions, the number of main issue categories, and the number of economic issue categories. As noted above, the measures of the total number of substructures include all main bodies of the IGO in a particular year, including general/plenary assemblies, executive bodies, bodies for meetings of various types of representatives, tribunals, committees, subcommittees, working and study groups, and secretariat and technical divisions. Since my goal is to measure the amount of

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interaction between individuals from different states I counted all main divisions of secretariats or other technical divisions mentioned separately, rather than counting them all under one body as the secretariat, which would make them equivalent to bodies within small IGOs that truly do have only one office/division that serves as its secretariat.

There are some cases in which the entry for an IGO-year mentions only "committees" or "working groups" without giving a specific count of such structures. If the preceding and/or following years' entries do give a more specific count, that number is used as an estimate of the number of committees, etc. in that year. If no more complete information is available, I counted one for each type of structure that is mentioned. In other words, if the entry mentions "committees" this means that there is at least one committee so I counted one more body. This is relatively unproblematic since the IGOs that do not give complete information tend to be those which do not have a lot of structures and the variable related to this measure counts joint dyadic membership in IGOs that have more than five substructures, rather than being a measure of all structures within which the two states interact. The dyadic level variables used for empirical analysis in this chapter are based on COW's IGO membership data, but counts joint dyadic membership only for IGO-years in which the IGO meets the criteria of having more than five substructures.

As mentioned in the text of the chapter, the data for the number of bodies for meetings of ministers of all member states include a count for each formation of each body. This means that a Council of Ministers with many different formations to bring together ministers in different issue areas on a regular basis would be counted several times to capture the number of formations. The purpose of this counting method is to give as even a weight as possible to each "body" in terms of the amount of interaction that it facilitates between state agents.

In order to measure issue coverage of the IGOs I started by creating six categories of issue areas: security issues, political issues (which includes various types of foreign policy cooperation and issues such as immigration and border control), economic issues, social and cultural issues (including sub-issues such as education, health, and social development), environmental and animal welfare issues, disaster prevention and relief (which includes sub-issues such as relief for natural disasters, disease control, and pest control). Although there are a myriad of ways in which one could categorize issues, I believe that these categories cover distinct types of issues and that counting these issues separately for each of these categories allows for a reliable indication of IGOs that foster greater interaction between member states. In order to delve into a more specific sub-set of issues, I coded economic issues into several categories: trade, money and banking (which includes finance, banking, and investment), commodities groups (which, although it may be considered more of a type of IGO, is distinct from trade in the types of issues that are covered for specific commodities), economic development, science and technology, and other regulatory issues. For a detailed listing of how specific issues fit into both the main issue categories and economic issue categories, see Appendix B.

The data was drawn largely from the Union of International Association's (UIA) *Yearbook of International Organizations*. However, during the 1970s, the *Yearbook* was not published for every year, but usually for two year periods (e.g. 1970-1, 1972-3, etc.). When structures changed from one edition to the next, I made an effort to find out in which year it changed using later editions of the *Yearbook* as well as the IGOs' websites, when possible. If the exact year of the change was still uncertain, I applied the same information to both years of the two year period in which the *Yearbook* was published. For example, if the number of structures

was different in the 1970-1 edition than in the 1972-3 edition, the information from the 1972-3 edition would be applied to both 1972 and to 1973. However, the main bodies of the IGOs are relatively sticky so this should not pose too much of a problem for the variables counting bodies for meetings of all representatives or bodies for meetings of ministers. The number of committees, technical divisions, and other bodies included in the variable counting the total number of substructures of the IGOs are a bit less sticky, but imputing the data to consecutive years for certain cases should not be too problematic. Furthermore, testing all different types of structures ensures that results do not depend on the use of a particular measure. Although each test is based on a particular hypothesis, they are all derived from the proposition that interaction within more substructures leads to greater member state interest convergence.

Finally, if data was missing altogether for an IGO-year and the number of bodies could not be discerned from later editions of the *Yearbook* or from the IGO's websites, then the IGO-year was coded as missing and was therefore not counted in the joint IGO membership variables. Since my variables are meant to code the amount of interaction that states have within IGOs, it is actually appropriate not to count IGO-years in which IGOs were not active enough for UIA to obtain information as to their activities or changes in their structures.

APPENDIX B

CODING IGO ISSUE COVERAGE

While I cannot guarantee that the specific issues listed below are completely exhaustive of every very specific issue covered by each IGO, it is a fairly complete representation of issues. The issues are categorized by the main issue categories under which they fell for purposes of coding IGOs for issue coverage. Some specific issue could pose a problem in that they could be placed in two different main categories or in two different economic issue categories. If indeed, they indicate that the IGO covers both categories of issues and therefore should foster greater interaction to deal with both sets of issues, then the IGO was coding for both categories. For example, "sustainable development" entails both economic development and environmental issues.

B.1   SECURITY ISSUES

B.1.1   Security

- Alliance
- Armament
- Arms Control
- Confidence- and security-building measures
- Defense planning and budgets
- Defense policy and strategy
- Disarmament
- Military cooperation
- Nuclear installations
- Nuclear weapons (prohibition; non-proliferation)
- Peacekeeping assistance
- Preventive diplomacy
- Radiation and nuclear safety
- Security impacts of economic developments

B.2   POLITICAL ISSUES

B.2.1   Foreign Policy and other political issues

- Conflict/crisis management/resolution
- Dispute settlement
- Foreign policy cooperation
- Opposition of colonial domination/anti-colonialism
- Political integration/cooperation
- Rights of states to sovereignty and territorial integrity

B.2.2   Interior/internal Affairs, Border control, Crime prevention, and Police cooperation

- Arms smuggling
- Art theft
- Border control
- Border development
- Control of firearms, ammunitions, and related materials
- Cyber crime/IT crime
- Drug trafficking/drug control
- Economic crime
- Human security
- Illicit trade
- Immigration/migration
- Money laundering
- Organized crime
- Penal system
- Terrorism
- Sea piracy

B.2.3   Legal Issues

- Law
- Legal cooperation/legal harmonization
- Legal and constitutional affairs
- Legal consultation
- Judicial/Juridical cooperation and Justice

B.2.4   Democracy Promotion/democratization

- Civil service
- Elections/electoral observation
- Freedom/civil rights
- Good governance
- Institution-building
- Legislative and constitutional reform
- Political reform/corruption
- Representative democracy
- Rule of law
- Social justice

B.3   ECONOMIC ISSUES

B.3.1   Trade

- Commerce
- Trade/Trade liberalization
- Trade of specific commodities

B.3.2   Money and Banking

- Banking
- Finance
- Investment
- Loans and debt
- Macro-economic policy
- Monetary Relations
- Regional stock exchange

B.3.3 Commodities

- Cooperation on specific commodities or in specific sectors
    - Policy/regulation
    - marketing/promotion
    - price stability

B.3.4 Economic Development

- Capital assistance/development aid
- Cultural Development
- Development of SMEs
- Development of entrepreneurship
- Development of market infrastructure
- Economic development
- Human Resource Development
- Industrialization
- Infrastructural development
- IP infrastructural development
- Natural resource development
- Science and technology development/IT development
- Spatial planning/spatial policy

B.3.5 Science and Technology Research/Cooperation

- Air conditioning/heating
- Astronomy
- Automation
- Bioethics (human cloning)
- Cartography
- Chemistry/science
- Ethics of scientific knowledge and technology
- Genetic engineering and biotechnology
- Geography
- Geophysics
- Hydrography
- Marine technology
- Measurement
- Meteorology
- Molecular biology
- Oceanography
- Particle physics/nuclear physics/atomic energy
- Refrigeration
- Seabed exploration
- Space
- Technical cooperation

B.3.6 Other Regulatory/Other Economic

- Aeronautical
- Agriculture
- Agro-business
- Acquaculture
- Enterprise affairs
- Exhibition regulation
- Fishing
- Industry/industrial relations/industrial policy
- Information and Communications
    - Information and communication technology
    - Media policy
    - Multimedia
    - Postal Services
    - Public relations
    - Space communication
    - Telecommunications
- Insurance and reinsurance
- Intellectual Property
- Manufacturing
- Privatization/market transition
- Services and public works
- Taxation/fiscal policy

B.4   SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES

B.4.1 Cultural Cooperation

- Culture/cultural relations/affinities
- Cultural activities
- Cultural heritage protection

B.4.2   Education

- Education in public administration
- Examination standardization
- Higher education
- Literacy
- Technical education
- Vocational training

B.4.3   Health/Public Health

- Consumer affairs/protection/safety/health
- Disease control
- Drug addiction/drug abuse prevention
- Health education
- Medicine
- Nomenclature
- Nutrition
- Tobacco use (health issues)

B.4.4   Social issues

- Family
- Housing and reconstruction
- Labor issues/labor market
- Minorities/indigenous populations
- Population policies
- Recreation
- Social issues of immigrants and emigrants
- Social security and social welfare
- War graves/memorials
- Women's issues/women's equality
- Youth issues

B.4.5 Human Rights

- Civil rights
- Humanitarian issues
- Privacy/data protection

B.5   ENVIRONMENTAL AND ANIMAL WELFARE ISSUES

B.5.1 Animals

- Animal disease control
- Dolphins
- Endangered species
- Safety in trade in animals and animal products
- Veterinary service and infrastructure improvement
- Whaling regulation and conservation
- Wildlife

B.5.2 Environment

- Biodiversity
- Ecological safety
- Marine resource conservation/marine environment
- Natural resource management/exploitation
- Ozone
- Pollution
- Reforestation
- Soils conservation
- Sustainable development

B.6 DISASTER PREVENTION AND RELIEF

B.6.1 Disaster Prevention/Control/Relief/Emergency relief

- Natural disaster relief
- Humanitarian aid
- Demining
- Civil defense/protection/safety and civil emergency planning
- Radiation protection
- Drought and desertification
- Pest control

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