

LAW AND STATE

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REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN THE THIRD WORLD: DIMENSIONS, CAUSES, PERSPECTIVES

by

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I. Introduction

When the UN General Assembly, on the occasion of its 40th anniversary, placed its main emphasis and that of its members on the “promotion and realization of the peace ideal” by proclaiming 1986 to be the “international year of peace” and calling upon all peoples “to work jointly with the United Nations in a determined effort to secure the peace and the future of mankind”, the reaction was ambivalent. The pessimists saw it as the “symbolic action” of a “papermill”. For the optimists, on the other hand, it was a sign that the UN, as the universal international organization, was in the process of re-asserting its function of securing the peace and collective security which for a long time had taken a back seat to economic questions, particularly those of the Third World.¹

Upon closer examination it appears that both reactions were somewhat justified. On the one hand, the UN has thus far been unable to prevent the 160 wars which have taken place since its inception, mainly in the Third World,² despite the fact that the Preamble to its Charter expressed the organization’s determination “to liberate future generations from the scourge of war”.³ Even in the “year of peace” over five million soldiers from forty-one states were participating in wars or armed conflicts.⁴ On the other hand, the UN can point to a series of successful attempts to limit the damage. It has also succeeded in containing some regional conflicts and preventing a confrontation between the superpowers.

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It is impossible to tell at the present time what the positive effects of the proclamation of October 1985 will have on the future work of the UN. Nevertheless the UN can make a contribution by directing attention to a phenomenon which has reached epidemic proportions but which for a long period of time has not received adequate attention; i. e., the growing number of wars which have taken place since the Second World War, particularly within or between states in the Third World.

Up to now research on the economic and development problems of the Third World has produced such a wide range of materials and findings that it has become impossible for political scientists, economists, and sociologists to have complete knowledge of it. Information concerning the dimensions and causes of violent conflicts in the Third World since the Second World War, on the other hand, represents "a blank spot on the map of the research landscape of social science."⁵ Nowhere in the world, including the Federal Republic, are there approaches capable of describing, let alone explaining, the development of smaller or larger conflicts or violent confrontations.

Discussions in the eighties regarding peace and security policy have also failed to produce new initiatives. This can be explained on the one hand by their Germano- or Euro-centric concentration on slogans such as "Fight Nuclear Death," "Fight the NATO Rearming Efforts," and "Fight Star Wars (SDI)". On the other hand, this has been the result of the fact that Europe, thanks to NATO and its strategy of deterrence, is experiencing the longest period of peace in its history. Even in those cases in which attention has been turned to wars taking place in the Third World, this has occurred more out of concern that these conflicts could lead to a repeat of the crisis of July 1914 and a "Sarajevo effect".⁶ To sum up briefly: By emphasizing world peace the UN has once more made it a central issue that at the core of all politics must lie the prevention of all types of wars, not only those specifically taking place in Central Europe or involving nuclear weapons.

The urgency of such a long overdue "new beginning" are revealed particularly in attempts to compile an "accounting ledger" listing the dimensions of the wars that have taken place since 1945.⁷ The numerous causes and reasons for wars and conflicts also call for a "reorientation" in the search for patterns of conflict resolution. All past instruments of conflict resolution, especially those employed by the UN⁸ – the application of mandatory measures, arbitration through offering good services and mediation, and the dispatching of peace troops – have obviously become inadequate. This is particularly the case if the UN wants to live up to its main task as outlined in Article 1, Section 1, of its Charter; i. e., to "eliminate and end, via peaceful means, situations which can lead to a break in peace."⁹ First some comments concerning the dimension of wars since World War II.

II. *Armed Conflicts since 1945 – Empirical Findings*

The greatest problem in seeking to come up with a reasonably reliable picture concerning the number and types of violent conflicts since the Second World War undoubtedly rests on the fact that research conducted to date differs with regard to the periods studied.¹⁰

In addition, considerable differences exist with regard to both the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of these wars (such as, for example, the number of victims, the type and nature of the groups, the intensity and length of the conflict, etc.) as well as in the definition of war itself.

Our own thoughts are based on the list compiled by the Hungarian social scientist Istvan Kende¹¹. It has proven to be relatively reliable and offers a solid foundation for further empirical work. Kende's compilation is based on the definition of war as an armed mass conflict which has the following characteristics:

- a) two or more armed military forces are involved in the battles, of which at least one must be a regular army or other government troops;
- b) the activities of both participants unfold in a centrally guided, organized fashion, even if this does not mean more than organized armed defence or strategically planned attacks (guerilla operations, partisan wars);
- c) the armed conflict is not based on spontaneous, sporadic clashes. Both participants work according to a planned, systematic strategy independent of whether the war takes place inside the territory of one single country or in several countries, whether the war is short or longer.¹²

Table 1 – *Frequency of Wars*

Author	Period studied	Number of wars
1. Sorokin (1959)	1100 to 1925	862
2. Wright (1965)	1480 to 1941	278
3. Richardson (1960)	1820 to 1949	317
4. Butterworth/Scranton (1976)	1945 to 1974	310
5. Kende (1978)	1945 to 1976	120
6. Kende/Gantzel/Fabig (1982)	1945 to 1982	148
7. Small/Singer (1982)	1816 to 1980	224
8. Gantzel/Meyer-Stamer (1986)	1945 to 1984	159

Source: Compiled from: M. Mendler, et al., (Note 10), p. 13; R. L. Butterworth/M. E. Scranton, *Managing Conflict 1945–1974, Data with Synopses*, Pittsburgh, 1976; K. J. Gantzel/J. Meyer-Stamer, eds., (Note 7).

The rather narrow definition of war according to international law is “*that condition of relations between two states – or between groups of states or between a state and a group of states – under which the effectiveness of normal international law – the so-called general peace law – has been suspended between them.*”¹³ Kende’s definition has the undoubted advantage that its openness permits the inclusion of such phenomena as wars within states or the efforts on the part of ethnic minorities to gain their autonomy. On the other hand the limitation to organized armed conflicts does not allow for the inclusion of, for example, internal elite conflicts in the form of successful or attempted coups d’etat, of which there have been 350 to date – 159 of them successful.¹⁴

Table 2 gives a survey of the 160 wars, broken down into four different types, which have been “registered” thus far on the basis of this definition.¹⁵ The table also offers a regional breakdown (Europe/Third World) as well as a differentiation as to whether the intervention took place with or without foreign participation.

The list shows some of symptoms of “teething troubles”, however, both in terms of the creation of types and in the establishment of foreign interventions. Thus it is impossible, for example, to include terrorism – “the weapon of the weak”¹⁶ – or the new phenomenon of “hostage taking” as a “continuation of politics by other means” or “the mixing in of other means” (Clausewitz).

Even more problematic appears to be the inclusion of wars of secession in “internal wars”, since ethnic conflicts, though viewed as internal conflicts by international law, are seen as external wars from the ethnic perspective. This can certainly be explained by the fact that the distinction between international and internal wars has fallen prey to a fixation on the state, as K. J. Gantzel has noted self-critically.¹⁷

The characteristic of “foreign intervention” also gives a distorted view of reality, however, since in this case only direct participation in the fighting is included but not weapons shipments, more subtle forms of intervention such as counterinsurgency or low-intensity warfare.¹⁸ Also not included are indirect forms of intervention such as the use of personnel¹⁹ or telecommunication instruments such as radio transmitters, for example, about which Henry Kissinger once commented that they can represent “a more effective form of pressure in the relations with many internally not particularly stable countries than a fleet of strategic B-52 bombers.”²⁰

It would exceed the scope of this article to go beyond the data provided in Table 2 and carry out statistical evaluations regarding the characteristics of wars.²¹ Instead we will here simply point to the most important aspects of wars. The “war ledger” to date shows that:

Table 2 – *Armed Conflicts since 1945*

Decade	State	Wars total	Anti-Regime wars (Type A)						Wars within countries based on religion, secession, tribes (Type B)						Interstate wars, border wars (Type C)						Wars of decolonization (Type D)						Total (+) = multiple centres		
			A 1*)			A 2**)			B 1*)			B 2**)			C 1*)			C 2**)			D 1*)			D 2**)					
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)			
1945–54	78	32	3	1	0	2	2	9	0	0	0	0	0	5	1	0	1	0	0	5	3	0	0	0	0	6	38 (+ 6)		
1955–64	128	49	5	3	1	1	0	15	3	2	2	2	0	6	1	1	1	0	0	9	1	0	2	0	1	8	64 (+15)		
1965–74	150	36	2	3	4	0	0	9	0	0	2	1	0	11	1	1	0	0	0	8	1	1	0	0	0	1	45 (+ 9)		
1975–85	172	43	2	10	3	0	0	13	1	2	1	0	0	10	0	6	2	0	0	9	0	1	0	0	0	0	60 (+17)		
Total	–	160	12	17	8	3	2	46	4	4	5	3	0	32	3	8	4	0	0	31	5	2	2	0	1	15	207 (+47)		

*) With foreign participation

(1) Industrialized countries

(2) Third World countries

(3) Industrialized and Third World countries jointly

(4) In Europe

**) Without foreign participation

(5) In Europe

(6) In the Third World

Source: Own calculations on the basis of the list compiled by U. Borschardt et al. (Note 2).

1. since the Second World War the globe has only been without a war for a few days, to wit, for 26 days in September 1945;
2. besides the highly publicized wars in Lebanon, in Afghanistan, and in the Persian Gulf at the end of the "Year of Peace" twenty-six other "forgotten" wars continued, such as that in Eritrea (since 1961), in Chad (since 1966), in the Philippines (since 1970), in Northern Ireland (since 1969), and in Cambodia (since 1978);
3. depending upon the calculations, these wars have taken the lives of between 25 and 35 million human beings. This justifies the thesis that, in comparison to the losses in World Wars I and II of 12 and 56 million respectively, the much-feared third world war is already taking place in the form of Third World wars;
4. of the current 172 states in the global community 54 % have been involved in at least one war, with a total of 335 participations in war, while in 80 of these conflicts third countries were involved;
5. South Asia and Southeast Asia, Black Africa, and the Middle East are the regions most affected;
6. ninety of the wars ended by 1984 were settled through military victory, while only 39 ended via negotiations;
7. the aggressors were able to win in roughly a quarter of all wars and in only roughly one-third was a military stalemate reached;
8. the number of wars carried out annually is growing continuously: 1945: 3; 1955: 15; 1965: 24; 1975: 21; 1985: 33.
9. the number of those wars which are difficult to identify has grown disproportionately, as reflected in Table 2. This is undoubtedly evidence of the fact that, besides methodological problems in assigning the conflicts, there has been a growing fusion of conflict reasons;
10. finally, the location of almost all wars (151 out of 160) is in the Third World, of which three-quarters (140 cases) of the cases studied have been pure Third World wars, be they civil wars or wars in the form of intervention by other states (31 cases).

The tendency of Third World countries to conduct their conflicts among themselves even without the co-operation or participation of industrialized states will certainly have to lead to a rethinking in the search for the causes of war frequency. Elevating the theses that "the Third World . . . is at war with itself" while the "industrialized societies are a bastion of peace" to the level of absolute truth, however, is nevertheless wrong.²² The industrialized countries were or are openly and directly involved in 57 cases, including wars of decolonization, either by themselves or with the aid of other Third World countries.

III. *The Causes of Wars in the Third World: An Attempted Survey*²³

As already intimated, no systematic findings concerning the “objective” causes and the “subjective” reasons exist to date as to why states or groups of states solve their disagreements in violent ways. In view of this fact, it goes without saying that current research is still far from being able to offer a convincing theory about the causes of all wars and types of wars, or to discover underlying laws. Due to the multiplicity of reasons for wars the additional question poses itself as to whether this will ever be possible, beyond such generalizations arguing that human behaviour is “determined by aggression” or by the “foolishness of those in power”, as Barbara Tuchmann entitled her book.²⁴

With all due caution regarding the preliminary nature of past diagnoses and explanatory approaches, we will now examine some of them more closely, despite the fact that initially they raise more questions than they answer. It is precisely because the possibility of resolving or arbitrating conflicts not only depends primarily on the means applied, but also on the causes of each conflict and the behaviour patterns exhibited by the conflicting parties,²⁵ that no further justification for such an undertaking, albeit incomplete, is needed.

1. *Wars as “Southern Dimensions of the East-West Conflict”*

This approach is based on an interpretation of wars as “puppet wars” of the superpowers, who wish to avoid being involved in any direct confrontation because of strategic considerations. This view has gained a certain amount of plausibility due to efforts undertaken by the superpowers since the seventies to transfer some of the interventionist tasks which they are unable to carry out themselves for political and strategic reasons.²⁶ The decisive weakness of this exaggerated emphasis on “strategic thinking”, however, undoubtedly lies in making the international factor an absolute one in which everything happening in the world is determined by superpower rivalry.²⁷ Because of this exclusive orientation to the East-West conflict all findings concerning the causes of conflict derived to date are of little explanatory value. This is particularly the case since local and regional sources of conflicts are generally excluded, just as is the internal dynamic of the conflict itself.

It is undoubtedly true that in a deteriorating international situation or in the case of a worsening global political conflict between the two superpowers an “internationalization of such conflicts beyond their own level of importance”²⁸ is possible. It may even be the case that a superpower cannot afford to be without an interest anywhere in the world,²⁹ as Otto von Bismarck once formulated it. It nevertheless appears to be missing the point to look at the

Third World merely as the object of superpower interests, or to concede to it at most a secondary function within the East-West conflict by offering a monocausal explanation based on security considerations. This is emphasized by the fact that most wars and conflicts have not been started directly by the superpowers.

It is true that a number of neocolonial ruling elites actively engage themselves in the East-West conflict because they are dependent upon the aid of the superpowers for securing their rule against internal and external opponents.³⁰ For at least an equally large number of Third World states the East-West conflict constitutes a source of annoyance, however, since they would be able to dominate their region without the meddling of the superpowers.³¹

Suspicious about this approach are confirmed by a CIA study which states that "despite the intentions of some governments in underdeveloped countries to establish a 'socialist' system . . . they generally wish to realize their own ideas about socialism and . . . were attracted to Soviet communist ideology neither by economic nor by military aid."³² To put it bluntly, as far as this exaggerated emphasis on the East-West conflict is understandable from the European perspective, the blind perception of the three pathologies "fear of encirclement," "fear of a vacuum", and "striving for status"³³ explains the lack of understanding about the fact that this conflict at best gives Third World elites a certain latitude to play off the superpowers against each other for their own purposes. This has been amply confirmed by the large number of games of "musical chairs" played in the states of the Third World.

2. *The more States, the more Wars*

Also of little use for further research is the assumption that a direct connection exists between the growing number of states as a result of decolonization and the frequency of wars.³⁴ It is certainly plausible to note that between 1945 and 1965 the international community grew from 66 to 125, while the number of borders grew from 404 to 778 and international neighbourhoods expanded from 166 to 412. Nevertheless, no immediate connection exists between the growing number of states on the one hand and the number of internationalized wars on the other. In fact, a certain positive correlation exists between the tripling of the number of states in the world community during this period and the number of wars started or still ongoing between states.³⁵

This approach at best points to a potential increase in violently conducted conflicts. It does not, however, provide convincing proof of the "functionality" of war in Clausewitz's sense, since being neighbours alone does not cause wars.

3. *Wars as a Consequence of the Hegemonical Crises of the Superpowers*

The increase in the number of states since 1945 from 66 to 172 today has nevertheless brought visible changes to the development of global society after the Second World War, which had effects not only within the framework of the United Nations.³⁶ It also contributed to the growing deterioration in the power of the superpowers. One cannot say for certain at this point whether this process is analogous to the decline of world empires³⁷ in that it represents the consequence of qualifying contests for the leading global role as hinted at by Senghaas³⁸. Possibly it is only a temporary phenomenon in the sense of Kondratieff's theory of long waves, as argued by Bühl.³⁹ Because it is based on a concept of a development brought about by a diffusion of power within the international system, this approach is able to offer a more convincing explanation of the growing frequency of wars, although it also is not their cause but simply one of several contributing factors.

Evidence in this direction is supplied when looking at the international "crisis management" of the superpowers, especially the United States, in the last decade. While the US was able until the late seventies successfully to force many conflicting parties to concede (1964 in the case of Turkey, when it threatened to invade Cyprus, 1965 in the Indo-Pakistan war, or in the fourth Middle East war in 1973), its capacity to exert influence has been reduced considerably. Likewise, the Soviet Union in 1976 was unable to prevent Syria from intervening in Lebanon. The US has not been able to induce the Israeli government to respect clearly articulated American wishes with regard to the Lebanon conflict, the Palestinian problem, the status of Jerusalem, or its settlement policy. Neither superpower has had any influence in the Iran-Iraq war, which appears to mark a turning point toward a larger degree of independence in Third World conflicts.⁴⁰

These indicators, although only roughly outlined here, can be traced back to a few factors which themselves in turn allow inferences about the willingness and ability of Third World states to start and conduct their own wars:

1. Both superpowers are prevented from fully utilizing their might due to a number of circumstances, since both must avoid the risk of direct confrontation that might result from their arms and military policies.⁴¹ Of importance here also is the inappropriateness of their "nuclear monomania"⁴² within the framework of local conditions. Military instruments are useless against social movements and currents such as Islamic "revitalization efforts". Nuclear weapons help even less. Neither the intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan nor that of the United States in Central America and in Lebanon has contributed toward helping their clients achieve a complete military or political victory.

2. They have thus far been unable to agree on a solution to acute conflicts and to push this through vis-a-vis their clients. The opposite is actually the case: the more they move in the direction of negotiating among themselves important aspects of a compromise peace, the stronger the resistance will be from the respective parties to the conflict. Thus opportunities for a solution will decrease. Should they become advocates of their clients' demands, it is to be feared that even less willingness to compromise would emerge.⁴³
3. The capacities and organizational possibilities of the superpowers are limited due to their overcommitment.⁴⁴ Neither superpower has enough resources to honour all the global commitments into which it has entered.⁴⁵ It is becoming increasingly clear that any power which considers all parts of the globe to be equally vital is confronted with the problem of squandering power. It is self-evident that by only being able to exercise their roles in a limited fashion, their ability to honour obligations becomes less and thus also the credibility of the guarantee vitiated.⁴⁶ It is precisely because the possibilities and credibility of the superpowers as guarantor powers is today more limited than ever before that it is becoming ever more difficult for them to control their clients, including preventing them from starting wars. At best they have a "reactive" ability to intervene in situations in which the balance has been temporarily upset and they are called in for the restoration of the status quo.
4. The influence of the superpowers on the quantitative and qualitative expansion of arms exports of Third World states⁴⁷ and the diversification of sources for arms imports is dwindling.⁴⁸ Added to that is the creation of arms production inside many Third World countries.⁴⁹ This development is of decisive importance for a decline in superpower influence to the extent that historically major powers could only influence their clients to reduce crisis-inducing activities when the former also held a monopoly over weapons shipments. These conditions prevail in only relatively few regions of the world today.

It remains to be seen whether these developments will lead to a complete loss of the weapons monopoly held by Western and Eastern industrial societies, with this serving as the base for the Third World (analogous to the arming in the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1965 which broke the nuclear monopoly of the US) to "create a counterforce", such as is suspected by Senghaas.⁵⁰ At the moment, in any case, the arms production in Third World states is still limited and amounts to only 2 – 2.5 percent of global production of major weapons. Stanley Hoffman's call nevertheless holds true that we should correct the anachronistic picture which maintains that "the audacity of the pygmies is the result of the deterioration of American power". This should

be done by checking whether “the deterioration is not the result of the growth of the pygmies.”⁵¹

Even if the approaches discussed so far do not offer convincing explanations for most of the wars in the Third World, much nevertheless argues in favour of a decoupling of rivalry between the two superpowers from regional conflicts. Senghaas rightly emphasizes that this “discommitment” actually favours the Third World “since the danger of excessive burdens from the political conflicts between East and West can be counteracted.”⁵² The following approaches will make it clear that there nevertheless still exist plenty of reasons for conflicts and “situations pregnant with wars”⁵³ in these regions which can lead to “homemade” wars.

4. *Wars as a Consequence of Underdevelopment*

The view that internal social conflicts can be traced directly to socio-economic inequality, misery, poverty, and hunger – in short to “structural violence”⁵⁴ – has prevailed for some time now in research on developing countries as well as in official government development policies. Thus, for example, the view that development policy is part of a global peace policy, as was expressed in the Sixth Report of the West German federal government in March 1985, is not a recent phenomenon. Instead, development was always seen as an instrument “for the long-term securing of peace through the promotion of economic and social progress in developing countries.”⁵⁵ The motivations behind these declarations are clearly transparent since the fear exists that the causal chain of “poverty – social conflict – destabilization – a threat to peace” also poses a threat to peace in the West⁵⁶. This approach nevertheless suffers particularly from its inability to explain whether and how individually experienced dissatisfaction and injustice is collectivized and politicized. If in fact the degree of “economic and social discrimination . . . determined the political stability or revolutionary tendencies of a population” then the world would stand in flames.⁵⁷

Despite this objection this very generalized perception regarding the connection between economic crises and military conflicts gains in plausibility in three respects:

Firstly, due to a “pentagonal” crisis that has emerged in the Third World:

1. the penetration crisis, which deals with the extent of effective control exercised by the central government;
2. the participation crisis, which is based on the question as to who is involved in the decision-making process of the government, or who does or does not have influence;

3. the legitimacy crisis, i.e. to what extent are decisions made by the government accepted or even acknowledged by the citizens of a country;
4. the distribution crisis, which concerns the question as to the extent to which government measures are used to distribute or redistribute material and other goods;
5. and finally the national identity crisis, which refers to the "definition" of that number of people who are assumed to fall within the area of the decision-making process of the government.⁵⁸

Secondly, the tendency of elites in the Third World to externalize internal conflicts and instabilities. In doing so their goal is to generate integrative effects inside the country and possibly also to overcome internal pent-up aggression toward their rule which may result in organized opposition. Here the preference is for conflicts with neighbours who have long been seen as having opposing interests and whose government acts on the premise that its policies rest on the broad agreement of the people.

Thirdly, based on observations it appears that the greater the degree of political instability with regard to socio-economic and social conflicts, the more vulnerable are states to interventions from abroad, and the more frequent and intensive are the verbal and non-verbal attacks from neighbouring countries on the internally weakened regime. This leads to the danger of violent clashes.⁵⁹

5. *Wars as a Result of the Colonial Past*

The so-called colonialism hypothesis is relatively useful, especially because of the tendency described above of shifting responsibility for conflicts to the outside.

This approach is based on the premise that conflicts taking place in the Third World at the present time have historical roots which reach far into the precolonial past. Indeed, as revealed in Table 2, in a surprisingly large number of wars of type B and C the "factor of conquest at some point in the past" appears to have played a part.⁶⁰ The "after-effect of the historical principle of conquest" is seen here to be the fundamental precondition for the emergence of many conflicts, although they certainly take on an multiplicity of variations.⁶¹

The colonial past becomes a triggering factor not only when one examines retrospectively the precise way in which colonialism proceeded. The same holds true with regard to conflict rationalizations advanced by the parties involved. Surprisingly enough, this is also the case in those conflicts in which the parties are of a "progressive-socialist" persuasion. Finally, its importance

becomes clear in the finding that states with many borders drawn by the colonial powers are involved in wars particularly often, while the connection between non-colonial borders and participation in war does not appear to be significant.⁶² These mechanisms can be traced to at least three factors:

Firstly, they are due to the circumstance under which the colonial powers created artificial borders (for example, at the Berlin Congo Conference in 1884). These were to prove to be problematic later from an ethnic, political, and economic perspective. The division into respective colonial zones of influence without regard for the linguistic and religious membership of the inhabitants proved to have particularly catastrophic consequences for the subsequent states as well as local ethnic groups. Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), for example, was founded in 1919 by separating the territory from the French Sudan and shortly thereafter annexing it to the Ivory Coast until 1947. Then it was given the status of autonomous French possession until independence in 1960. It is against the background to this colonial practice and its transfer to the "neocolonial" states that it becomes apparent, why, for example, in West Africa the Mande peoples are divided between Gambia, Senegal, Guinea, Mali, Sierra Leone, and the Ivory Coast. The Ewe live in Ghana, Togo, and Benin, and the Wolofs in Gambia, Senegal, and Mauritania. The fact that in the Sahara region alone ten countries covering 14,000 kilometres were created with a ruler⁶³ caused the historian Ki-Zerbo of Burkina Faso to comment, with justification: "One gets outraged at the wall of shame in Berlin but one forgets all of the Berlin walls which dismember Africa."⁶⁴

Secondly, they come from the tendency of the colonial powers to exploit already existing conflicts as they established their colonial rule and gave themselves the appearance of arbitrators. As a rule this permitted them to settle conflicts temporarily through the order of "pax colonialica"⁶⁵, which also served their own imperial interests. An example of this was the British/Russian effort to settle the fight between the Ottomans and the Persians regarding the establishment of the border in Shatt al Arab in 1823.⁶⁶

Of even graver importance is, *thirdly*, that the colonial powers, due to their ignorance concerning the historical backgrounds to these conflicts, did not have appropriate criteria regarding the future. Thus they were unable to decide in whose favour they ought to settle the numerous conflicts, assuming they were even willing to arbitrate in this fashion. They therefore limited themselves to the practice of supporting those local forces who were willing to maintain internal peace in co-operation with the colonial powers or who subordinated themselves to the new powers with limited resistance. This practice, of course, had devastating consequences for later development.

In view of this mechanism of "conflict conservation" during the colonial era it is thus of little wonder that many of these conflicts immediately broke out

again in the postcolonial phase. This was especially the case where the political and social consequences of these conflicts had not been sufficiently mastered so that they could have become legitimated by the conditions of ruling established through them.

6. *Wars as the Result of Internal Colonialism*

This view of the origins of conflict appears to be especially applicable for Type B wars. It refers to the observation that may religiously, linguistically, or racially defined groups lead wars of secession because they feel underprivileged vis-a-vis a ruling elite of a different ethnic origin and consider this situation as foreign rule or internal colonialism.⁶⁷ This interpretation of such wars surely requires a more detailed differentiation. The real problems begin with the definition of the concept itself. As Kimminich⁶⁸ has correctly pointed out, labels such as “national minorities”, “ethnic minorities”, “nationality”, and “ethnic groups”, are as difficult to define as terms such as “people”, and “nation”. This holds true even though they share the same characteristics according to international law: a common language, culture, historical fate. In short, they are in principle the same as a nation but without a state. In addition conclusive evidence concerning the utility of this interpretation can only be provided by differentiating according to social characteristics. Among these are, for example, the size and number of the minorities inside a respective society, the degree of discrimination, the type of social interaction between the minorities and the dominant groups, and, finally, the various objectives for which the minorities are fighting and for which the dominant groups are persecuting them. In this regard at least three variations for the start of a conflict are possible:

firstly, when an oppressed and exploited minority claims for itself the democratic right to political participation and thus enters into conflict with the ruling majority;

secondly, when a population group which makes up the majority in a geographic region is refused political rights (for example, autonomy) or these are withdrawn after a short period of time; and

thirdly, when a majority which was oppressed by precolonial traditional ruling structures acts against the ruling autochthonous minority after the attainment of national independence.⁶⁹

It is particularly with regard to the third variant that it becomes crucial to examine the goals of the group more closely. This avoids lumping together such differing types of minorities as “pluralist”, “integrating”, “secessionist”, and “militant”, with their often very different and even contrary objectives.

7. *Wars as a Process of Catching Up*

Differentiating between the various objectives of minorities would also provide further information concerning the utility of the “catching up” hypothesis. According to this hypothesis territorial disputes in the final analysis present a “process of catching up” as part of consolidating the artificial nation state as it was left behind by the colonial powers.⁷⁰ It is undoubtedly true that many of the wars within and between Third World countries can also be traced to the fact that colonialism – as outlined briefly above – left behind in many regions of the world not only underdeveloped and deformed economic structures, but also often a barely sustainable microstate system splintered into many national units. As Krippendorff has correctly argued,⁷¹ what needs to be reconstructed historically is the degree to which other non-territorial state alternatives of political organizations existed in postcolonial societies. It should be noted, however, that the concept of “nation” or “nation state” which was introduced in the postcolonial era by the colonial powers or small elites as a constitutional prerequisite for independence often runs counter to its impact on territorial, ethnic, religious, and geographic traditions.

As a rule national structures were not a part of the political and cultural heritage of the “old empires with tributary modes of production.” Apart from Korea, China (with minorities in South and East), Persia and Turkey (each with national minorities), and Somalia, no state in the South of the Old World consisted of only one people.⁷²

This circumstance, as well as the political and administrative division of these societies into “national states”, seems to confirm the suspicion that in many Third World countries the same process of national consolidation is being carried out through wars of secession and border wars as those which took place in Europe during the last two to three hundred years.⁷³ Even in Europe the nation state became the mode of expression for national demands as a result of the territorial consolidation of the nation state. This contributed to the internal consolidation of states (while maintaining ethnic and religious diversity), although the fundamental question poses itself as to whether a “catching up” with European development is either justified or even possible. The experiences gained with the failed attempts to transfer Western or Eastern concepts of modernization contradict in any case the view that “the nation, by legitimizing political rule internally and externally, and the nation state providing the institutional framework, appears at present to be the only historically viable alternative as the organizational form for development policy in order to solve the problems of the colonial and semicolonial countries in the direction of emancipating them.”⁷⁴

In this regard the question poses itself as to whether the currently growing

discomfort of many development specialists brought about by the failure of past efforts cannot be traced to mistakes made by the “development experts” themselves. To date they have laid a one-sided emphasis on economics and the state as the constitutional precondition for development and have thought only about “structural heterogeneity”, the role of “the state” and “state elites in peripheral capitalism”. They have filled entire libraries with publications regarding the possibility, or lack thereof, of “transferring Western development models” to the states of the Third World. The deeper problem of many states, however – the “digestion” of the transfer of the European state concept in the form of the “nation state” principle – has been insufficiently addressed. The treatment of such fundamental historical “misdevelopments” or “debts” gains in importance to the extent that one might find out that past failed development efforts may, in the final analysis, be the logical or unavoidable consequence of the deceptive hopes of the postcolonial era. These hopes were based on the idea that the creation of nations (“nation building”) would enable the homogenization of heterogeneous societies analogous to the European and American experiences, in order to create better conditions for democracy and development in these regions as well.

Overall this brief outline of conditions confirms the supposition that, in addition to current global political factors, locating the cause of armed conflicts and determining which situations are “pregnant with war” in the Third World will only be possible with a more thorough reevaluation of the region’s historical developments. Not only development specialists but also peace researchers appear to have put the fact out of their minds that “the United Nations are as little united as most of their members are nations.”⁷⁵

The narrow perspectives employed to date led to the internalization of the “state” as the unquestionable or rather unquestioned main form of collective existential security as well as the uncritical following of trends. Whatever may have been the reasons for that, research on the causes of war must urgently overcome not only the ideological persistence of “state” and “matters of state”⁷⁶, but also Western and Eastern interpretations of war.⁷⁷ In short, a scholarly treatment of this topic that expects to be taken seriously cannot avoid crossing discipline frontiers any more than it can avoid attempting to look for and overcome invariances⁷⁸ if it wants to pose the right questions or even to recognize them in the first place.

IV. *Perspectives*

To point to perspectives in the final analysis is nothing more than to project past and present situations and trends into the future. The risk is, of course, that future developments will prove one wrong. This applies without a doubt

especially to predictions concerning the Third World. However, a pessimistic – realistic – look at past developments points in the direction that, in the short and medium term, a reduction in violently-conducted conflicts in the Third World should not be anticipated. The opposite development is more likely, since

1. differing resource endowments and in some cases resource scarcity of individual countries, as well as a greater degree of differentiation between individual Third World countries, promote rather than dampen potential conflicts over social structures and territorial borders;
2. in view of the socio-cultural and socio-economic dimensions of many conflicts, it is to be expected that the causes of armed conflict will multiply. This is based on the fact that the economic situation in most countries of the South will intensify internal unrest and social conflicts and will create tendencies to overthrow and to attempt to externalize conflicts by provoking tensions and conflicts between states;
3. due to the complexity of the causes and as a consequence of the limited possibilities of influencing these political and social processes from the outside, one should not anticipate a decrease in wars in the near future – quite the contrary!
4. finally, in view of the polyethnic organization of states⁷⁹, the development to date appears to be only the tip of the iceberg.

NOTES

¹ For more detailed information, see E.-O. Czempel, *Friedensstrategien*, Munich 1986, p. 64 ff.

² For a list of wars until 1985, see U. Borschardt, G. Kaouras, A. Malanowski, U. Niebling, in *Vereinte Nationen*, Nr. 2/1986, pp. 69-76.

³ UN Charter, reprinted in: Peter J. Opitz, V. Rittberger, eds., *Forum der Welt, 40 Jahre Vereinte Nationen*, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Vol. 249, Bonn 1986, p. 318.

⁴ SIPRI Yearbook 1987, *World Armaments and Disarmament*. Quoted in SIPRI press release of 17 June 1987.

⁵ V. Matthies, "Kriege in der Dritten Welt: Zur Entwicklung und zum Stand der Forschung", in: F. Nuscheler, ed., *Dritte Welt Forschung. Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, special Nr. 16, Opladen 1985, p. 362.

⁶ Cf. M. Kahler, "Wenn Großmächte sich treiben lassen. Das warnende Beispiel des Jahres 1914 – eine Analogie zur gegenwärtigen Orientkrise", in: *Die Zeit*, 18. April 1980. For more information on the "Sarajevo effect" see H. Afheldt, *Atomkrieg. Das Verhängnis einer Politik mit militärischen Mitteln*, Munich 1984, p. 36 ff.; D. Frei, *Der ungewollte Atomkrieg. Eine Risiko-Analyse*, Munich 1983, p. 19 ff.; H. Howard, *The Causes of War*, Cambridge, Mass. 1983; H. Apel, "Dritte-Welt-Konflikte und europäische Sicherheit", in: *Vierteljahresberichte*, Bonn (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung), Nr. 95, 1984, p. 7.

⁷ K. J. Gantzel, J. Meyer-Stamer, eds., *Die Kriege nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg bis 1984. Daten und erste Analyse*, Munich 1986.

⁸ On UN instruments for securing peace, see V. Rittberger, "Zwischen Weltregierung und Staatsanarchie: Vereinte Nationen und internationale Friedenssicherung", in: Opitz and Rittberger, *op. cit.* (Note 3), p. 87 ff.

⁹ See note 3, p. 318.

¹⁰ For an overview, see M. Mendler, W. Schwegler-Rohmeis, "Kriegsursachenforschung als empirische Sozialwissenschaft," in: *Politische Vierteljahresschrift – Literatur*, Nr. 1/1986, p. 12 ff.

¹¹ Istvan Kende, *Kriege nach 1945. Eine empirische Untersuchung. Militärpolitik Dokumentation*. Nr. 27, Frankfurt/Main 1982.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 5 f.

¹³ On this as well as a dozen other definitions of war since antiquity, see F. Berger, *Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts*, Vol. 2: Kriege, Munich 1962, p. 2 ff.

¹⁴ For further detail see M. Fernandez Baeza, "Militärregime" in: D. Nohlen, ed., *Lexikon Dritte Welt*, Reinbek 1984, p. 401 ff.

¹⁵ In Kende's initial list, war type D was part of the "anti-regime wars" (type A).

¹⁶ See G. Grohs, "Theorien der Revolution in der Dritten Welt," in: *Das Argument*, Nr. 59/1970, p. 556 ff.

¹⁷ K. J. Gantzel, "Tolstoi statt Clausewitz!? Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Staat und Krieg seit 1816 mittels statistischer Beobachtungen," in: R. Steinweg, ed., *Kriegsursachen. Friedensanalyse 21*, Frankfurt/Main 1987, p. 79.

¹⁸ For a survey of US actions see J. Hippler, *Kriege im Frieden*, Cologne 1986, as well as the series "Du sollst dich nicht erwischen lassen" about the secret operations of American Presidents since World War II in *Der Spiegel*, Nrs. 51, 52/1986 and 2, 3/1987.

¹⁹ Exemplary of this is the diary of General Robert E. Huyser, *Putschen Sie, Herr General! Wie Washington den Iran retten wollte*, Reinbek 1986.

²⁰ H. Kissinger, *Amerikanische Außenpolitik*, Vienna 1969, p. 82.

²¹ For a thorough and comprehensive evaluation see Gantzel et. al, *op. cit.* (Note 7), pp. 61-143. The following data are largely based on this work.

²² On these and subsequent evaluations of the statistical material, see, *inter alia*, D. Senghaas, "Militärische Konflikte in der Dritten Welt," in: U. Menzel, D. Senghaas, *Europas Entwicklung und die Dritte Welt. Eine Bestandsaufnahme*, Frankfurt/Main 1986, pp. 240-252.

²³ This part is based on preliminary work done on a research project under the auspices of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) about the "Determinants of the Iran-Iraq War". These causes are to be tested via this project.

²⁴ B. Tuchmann, *Die Torheit der Regierenden. Von Troja bis Vietnam*, Frankfurt/Main 1984.

²⁵ For a more detailed discussion of this see Czempiel, *op. cit.* (Note 1).

²⁶ An example of this is the "Nixon Doctrine" of the early seventies. See E.-O. Czempiel, C.-Ch. Schweitzer, *Weltpolitik der USA nach 1945*. Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Vol. 210, Bonn 1984, p. 338 (D 54).

²⁷ Typical of this type of thinking are 27 contributions to the 22nd

Annual Conference of the IISS in Stresa, Italy in September 1980, in: Ch. Bertram, ed., *Dritte-Welt-Konflikte und internationale Sicherheit*, Bonn 1981; also the so-called "Directors' Study" by K. Kaiser, W. Lord, T. de Montbrial, D. Watt, *Die Sicherheit des Westens. Neue Dimensionen und Aufgaben*, Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Bonn 1981. Although this work is not necessarily in agreement with the above, see also R. Hamann, ed., *Die "Süddimension" des Ost-West-Konfliktes. Das Engagement der Supermächte in Krisen und Kriegen der Dritten Welt*, Baden-Baden 1986.

²⁸ D. Senghaas, *op. cit.* (note 22), p. 247. At the same time it has to be conceded that the situation is not as anarchic and confused as it appears. Both the US and the USSR have on occasion shown discretion and caution. A very important element of this informal "behaviour code" for them is, for example, the willingness to live with failures, as the Soviet Union did in Egypt in 1973 and in Somalia in 1977, as well as the US in Iran and Nicaragua 1979. With reference to Nicaragua and Afghanistan J. Krause rightly points out that even in the case of regional conflicts which take place on the immediate "doorsteps" of one of the two superpowers, a form of co-operation has crystallized which consists of a reciprocal game of, on the one hand, silently holding back while at the same time each delineating its own interests. See J. Krause, "Supermachtkooperation bei Drittweltkonflikten", in: *Sicherheit und Frieden*, Vierteljahresschrift, Nr. 2/1986, p. 82 ff.

²⁹ For the Soviet Union this claim is documented in the "Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU" at the XXVth Party Congress, which states: "There is not one corner of the globe where conditions must not be considered in this or that way by our foreign policy." See insert to *Sowjetunion heute* (The Soviet Union Today), Nr. 5/1976, p. 4. The American position was described most impressively by Secretary of Defense Weinberger in a speech before the National Press Club on 28 November 1984. He said, *inter alia*, that "although we do not attempt to prevent all conflicts in this world or to eliminate them, we must be aware of the fact that we are a superpower and that our obligations and interests have reached such a breadth that we can only still afford in a few cases to ignore an area of tension." *Amerika-Dienst. Dokumentation*. United States Information Service, Embassy of the United States of America. Bonn, 5 December 1984, p. 4.

³⁰ For a discussion of the problems associated with such a policy, see B. Kiernan, "Der Mythos von Frieden durch Stärke," *Der Spiegel*, Nr. 2/1982, p. 92. The fact that such a policy is counterproductive is described by Kiernan as follows: "The demonstrations of our power in the Third World . . . have not at all brought us respect. On the contrary, they have produced that fanatical hostility of which the Iranian crisis is a typical example . . . From Chiang Kai Shek to Batista, from Somoza to Rhee, from Diem to the Shah of Iran, from Lon Nol to Duvalier we have attempted to force upon the Third World our economic and military might by creating "pro-American" regimes . . . When these pro-American regimes continuously provoked precisely that revolutionary power and anti-Americanism which they were actually supposed to prevent we simply thought up an appropriate fairytale in order to explain the situation. It was, after all, we were told over and over again, a communist conspiracy which led to the toppling of a dictator."

³¹ For more detail see J. Betz, V. Matthies, "Der Ost-West Konflikt als sicherheitspolitische Herausforderung für die Dritte Welt", in: L. Brock, B. Meyer, eds., *Die Zukunft der Sicherheit in Europa*, Jahrbuch der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Vol. XI, Baden-Baden 1984, pp. 141-157.

³² Cited from *Militärpolitik Dokumentation: USA-UdSSR. Supermächte zwischen Intervention und Selbstüberschätzung. Dokumentation der inneramerikanischen Diskussion*, Centre for Defence Information, "Extra 2", Frankfurt/Main (n. d.), p. 80.

³³ W. L. Bühl, *Das Ende der amerikanisch-sowjetischen Hegemonie? Internationale Politik im Fünften Kondratieffschen Übergang*, Munich 1986, p. 36.

³⁴ An example of this can be found in M. Stark, B. A. Most, "A Return Journey: Richardson, "Frontiers and Wars", in: *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 22/1978, pp. 441-467.

³⁵ K. J. Gantzel, *op. cit.* (Note 17), p. 76 f.

³⁶ On this see, *inter alia*, Peter J. Opitz, "Die Vereinten Nationen im Wandel: Struktur- und Funktionsveränderungen," in Opitz and Rittberger, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-76.

³⁷ In the 16th century (1475-1588) Portugal and Spain were the leading colonial powers, although the Dutch and British were constantly at their heels. In the 17th century (1588-1701) the Dutch clearly led world trade but always had the inconvenient rival England in pursuit. The 18th century was largely determined by the almost uninterrupted war for hegemony between England and France (1701-1815). Although England was victorious and advanced to become the larger trade and colonial power in the 19th century, it had to share "global rule" with Russia (1815-1917). At the latest after the Second World War England had to cede its power to the United States, which since that time has advanced to the position of "superpower" along with the USSR in place of the old colonial powers.

³⁸ D. Senghaas, *Die Zukunft Europas. Probleme der Friedensgestaltung*, Frankfurt/Main 1986, Chapter 1, pp. 23-89.

³⁹ W. L. Bühl, *op. cit.* (Note 33)

⁴⁰ For an analysis of the positions taken and roles played by the superpowers in this war see Mir A. Ferdowski, *Ursprünge und Verlauf des iranisch-irakischen Krieges*, Forschungsinstitut für Friedenspolitik, Starnberg 1985.

⁴¹ Robert S. McNamara, *Blindlings ins Verderben. Der Bankrott der Atomstrategie*, Reinbek 1987.

⁴² W. L. Bühl, *op. cit.*, (Note 33) p. 14.

⁴³ For a more detailed discussion, see Krause, *op. cit.* (note 28). The peace initiatives to end the conflicts in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Angola, and Nicaragua which were presented to the Soviets by President Reagan in a speech to the UN General Assembly of 24 October 1985 have not to date led to notable successes. This may well be a reflection of how this principle functions. Regarding the specifics of the recommendations, see the text of the speech in *Amerika-Dienst*, special issue of 24 October 1985, pp. 13/14, United States Information Agency, Embassy of the United States of America, Bonn.

⁴⁴ S. Feldmann, "Die Sicherheitsgarantien der Supermächte in den 80er Jahren," in Ch. Bertram, *op. cit.* (Note 27), p. 97.

⁴⁵ For a complete overview of the supraregional treaties and agreements

concerning security policy, see O. Buchbinder, H. Bühl, H. Quaden, *Sicherheit und Frieden*, Herford 1985, pp. 49-98.

⁴⁶ A good example of this is the "irritations" which resulted from the "Irangate" of the US Administration, especially in the Middle East. As was expressed by the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah el-Ahmad in an interview with *Der Spiegel*; "I do not know how serious and credible US policy can still look to me. Washington cannot be relied upon 100 percent." *Der Spiegel*, Nr. 48, 24 November 1986, p. 132.

⁴⁷ See especially *SIPRI Rüstungsjahrbuch 4: Waffenexport und Krieg*, Reinbek 1984, Part 3, pp. 197-261. An review of regional distribution of arms trade is provided by L. Kölner: *Rüstung und Entwicklung. Forschungsberichte des BMZ*, Vol. 81, Munich, pp. 195-214.

⁴⁸ For example, since 1980 a total of fifty-three states have participated in weapons shipments involving the Iran/Iraq war. According to the *SIPRI 1987 Yearbook* (note 4), twenty-eight of these states supplied arms products to both countries.

⁴⁹ This trend becomes clear when one considers that the total value of weapons produced in the Third World between 1950 and 1969 was roughly the same as for one single year in the 1980s. The total value for the last five years alone (1980-84) is roughly twenty-five times higher than the value for the fifteen years between 1950 and 1964. See *SIPRI Rüstungsjahrbuch 6, Waffenproduktion in der Dritten Welt*, Reinbek, 1986, Part II, pp. 144-172, See also J. E. Katz, ed., *Arms Production in Developing Countries*, Toronto 1984; as well as *österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, Nr. 6/1986, p. 568 ff.

⁵⁰ D. Senghaas, *op. cit.* (note 22), p. 247.

⁵¹ S. Hoffmann, "Sicherheit in einer Periode der Spannungen: Reaktionsmodelle", in: Ch. Bertram, *op. cit.* (Note 27), p. 54.

⁵² D. Senghaas, *Regionalkonflikte in der internationalen Politik. Versuch einer Trendanalyse*, in: *Leviathan*, Nr. 3/1987, p. 405.

⁵³ For a more extensive treatment of this concept see R. Ruloff, *Wie Kriege beginnen*, Munich 1985.

⁵⁴ On the genesis and premises of the concept "structural violence" see, *inter alia*, Mir A. Ferdowsi, *Der positive Frieden*, Munich 1981.

⁵⁵ Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit ed. *Vierter Jahresbericht zur Entwicklungspolitik der Bundesregierung*, Bonn 1980, p. 83.

⁵⁶ This was stated, for example, by the former West German Minister of Economic Co-operation, Jürgen Warnke, in "Die Entwicklungspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Leitlinien, Ziele, Schwerpunkte," in: G. Rüther, ed., *Die notwendige Hilfe*, Research Report Nr. 48 of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Melle 1986, p. 15.

⁵⁷ J. Betz, "Militärische versus entwicklungspolitische Stabilisierung der Dritten Welt," in: R. Hamann, *op. cit.* (Note 27), p. 220.

⁵⁸ For further details see S. Verba, "Entwicklungskrisen und ihre Abfolge," in: M. Jänicke, ed., *Politische Herrschaftskrisen*, Cologne 1973, p. 269 f.

⁵⁹ On this subject see the study of S. Moser, *Ethnischer Konflikt und Grenzkriege*, Diessenhofen 1983.

⁶⁰ I. Geiss, "Historische Voraussetzungen zeitgenössischer Konflikte," in: *Fischer-Weltgeschichte: Das Zwanzigste Jahrhundert III*, Vol. 36, Frankfurt/Main 1981, p. 30.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁶² B. Moser, *op. cit.* (Note 59), pp. 231-241.

⁶³ See the essay by R. Meyer, "Die Bürde des schwarzen Mannes. Grenzen in Westafrika," in: *Der Überblick – 100 Jahre Berliner Kongo-Konferenz*, Nr. 1/84, p. 45.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁶⁵ I. Geiss, *op. cit.* (Note 60), p. 54.

⁶⁶ On the historical roots of this conflict see the study by U. Gehrke and G. Kuhn, *Die Grenzen des Irak. Historische und rechtliche Aspekte des irakischen Anspruchs auf Kuwait und des irakisch-persischen Streits um den Schatt al-Arab*, Stuttgart 1963.

⁶⁷ For the concept of "internal colonialism" see M. Khan Khushi and V. Matthies, "Kriegerische Konflikte in der Dritten Welt. Problemhorizonte und Forschungsansätze," in: M. Khan Khushi and V. Matthies, eds., *Regionalkonflikte in der Dritten Welt. Ursachen, Verlauf und Internationalisierung*, Cologne 1981, p. 47 ff.

⁶⁸ Otto Kimminich, "Neuere Entwicklungen des Minderheiten- und Nationalitätenrechts," in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Nr. 43/1985, p. 14.

⁶⁹ For more information see I. Geiss, *op. cit.* (Note 60), p. 47 ff.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 23. See also D. Senghaas, "Transcending Collective Violence, the Civilizing Process and the Peace Problem," in: R. Väyrynen, D. Senghaas, C. Schmidt, eds., *The Quest for Peace. Transcending Collective Violence and War among Societies, Cultures and States*, Beverly Hills/London 1987.

⁷¹ E. Krippendorff, *Staat und Krieg. Die historische Logik politischer Unvernunft*, Frankfurt/Main 1985, p. 142. For an initial attempt in this direction see the contributions to the volume edited by R. Hanisch and R. Tetzlaff, *Historische Konstitutionsbedingungen des Staates in Entwicklungsländern*, Frankfurt/Main 1980; see also H. Elsenhans, *Abhängiger Kapitalismus oder bürokratische Entwicklungsgesellschaft. Versuch über den Staat in der Dritten Welt*, Frankfurt/Main 1984.

⁷² H. Elsenhans, *Nord-Süd-Beziehungen. Geschichte – Politik – Wirtschaft*, Stuttgart 1984, p. 55.

⁷³ For studies concerning the development of Europe, see, *inter alia*, Th. Veiter, *Nationalkonflikt und Volksgruppenrecht im 20. Jahrhundert*, Vol. 1: *Entwicklungen, Rechtsprobleme, Schlußfolgerungen*, Bayer. Landeszentrale für politische Bildung, Munich 1977, p. 12 ff.; A. Bleckmann, "Zur Entwicklung des modernen Souveränitätsdenkens," in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Nr. 43/1985, p. 3 ff.; B. Tibi, *Vom Gottesreich zum Nationalstaat. Islam und panarabischer Nationalismus*, Frankfurt/Main 1987. The most comprehensive survey of European history from the beginnings to the 20th century is probably provided by J. Bowle, *Geschichte Europas*, Munich 1985.

⁷⁴ B. Tibi, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁷⁵ T. Hanf, "Kulturelle Vielfalt als politische Herausforderung," in: D. Oberndorfer, T. Hanf, eds., *Entwicklungspolitik*, Stuttgart 1986, p. 78.

⁷⁶ For a connection drawn between "social structure" and "scientific structure" see J. Galtung, *Methodologie und Ideologie*, Frankfurt/Main 1978, p. 13 ff.

⁷⁷ More information on this is provided by J. Lider, *Der Krieg. Deutungen und Doktrinen in Ost und West*, Frankfurt/Main 1983.

⁷⁸ For such a "methodology" see J. Galtung, "Wissenschaft als Suche und Überwindung von Invarianzen," in: J. Galtung, *op. cit.*, p. 96 ff.

⁷⁹ Such an interpretation appears justified in the sense that only 9% of all existing states are ethnically homogeneous. In another 19% one group constitutes a majority of over 90%. In another 19% there is an ethnic majority of between 75 and 89%, and in roughly 31 states (23%) an ethnic majority of 50 to 74%. Roughly 34 states (30%) consist of ethnic groupings in which not one constitutes a majority in the state. See, *inter alia*, W. Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism", in: *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 27, No. 1/1973, pp. 1-21. Also A. H. Birch, "Minority Nationalist Movements and Theories of Political Integration", in: *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 3/1978, pp. 325-344.