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# Demand Spillovers and Market Outcomes in the Mutual Fund Industry\*

Alessandro Gavazza<sup>†</sup>

March, 2011

## Abstract

When consumers concentrate their purchases at a single firm, a firm that offers more products than its rivals can gain market share for all its other products, as well. These spillovers induce firms to compete by offering a greater variety of products rather than lower prices, and a natural form of industry concentration with few large firms offering many products can arise if spillovers are strong enough.

This paper presents a simple model that illustrates this mechanism explicitly. The empirical analysis documents strong demand spillovers in the retail segment of the U.S. mutual fund industry, in which fees are non-trivial, families offer a large number of funds, and the market is quite concentrated. Instead, spillovers are weaker, fees are lower, families offer fewer funds, and the market structure is more fragmented in the institutional segment. The current design of employer-sponsored defined-contribution retirement plans likely accounts for these differential demand patterns between the retail and the institutional segments.

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
# 1 Introduction

In many industries, buyers concentrate their purchases at a single supplier, because of transaction or switching costs. For example, many consumers shop at a single supermarket; several airlines acquire aircraft from a single manufacturer; most individuals hold checking and savings accounts with the same bank. Thus, in such industries, firms' product lines are important strategic tools that vertically differentiate competing firms. The goal of this paper is to investigate how these features—consumers deal with a single firm, and the number of products is a measure of vertical differentiation between firms—determine market conduct and market structure, with a special focus on the mutual fund industry.

With this goal in mind, the paper sets up a model that builds on Sutton's (1991) seminal endogenous sunk costs theory. On the supply side, the key idea is that offering a large number of products affects fixed rather than variable costs. On the demand side, consumers prefer firms that offer a greater variety of products. In this setting, a firm that offers more products than its rivals gains market share for its other products, as well (Klemperer and Padilla, 1997). These spillovers induce firms to compete by offering more and more products, in an escalation mechanism akin to the form of competition observed in markets characterized by network effects (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). The intensity of consumers' preferences for a firm's variety of products critically determines the importance of spillovers and, thus, firms' conduct and market structure. If consumers' preferences for a firm's variety of products are strong, then a family gains a proportionally larger market share when offering more products than its rivals—i.e., demand spillovers are strong. Hence, in equilibrium, firms offer a large number of products at relatively high prices. This mode of competition implies that incumbent firms incur high fixed costs, and new entrants must pay substantial setup costs to be able to compete with incumbents. Hence, the industry sustains only a few large firms and a natural form of market concentration arises. Instead, if consumers' preferences for a firm's variety of products are weak, then a firm gains a small market share when offering more products than its rivals—i.e., demand spillovers are weak. Thus, each firm offers a more-limited number of products, prices are lower, and the industry is more fragmented.

The mutual fund industry provides an ideal candidate for investigating the role of firms' variety of products and demand spillovers. First, industry data suggest that they play a role. Figure 1 documents some aggregate trends over the period 1992 to 2007 for the retail (i.e., non-institutional) segment of the industry. The growth of the industry in the last couple of decades has been explosive: The total number of retail funds available to investors grew

FIG. 1: Trends in the Mutual Fund Industry, Retail Funds



from a little over 2,000 funds in 1992 to slightly under 14,000 in 2007, a six-fold growth in a 15-year period (top-left panel). Concurrently, the total assets managed by retail funds grew from approximately 1.5 trillion dollars in 1992 to approximately 7.5 trillion dollars in 2007. Obviously, the industry’s total growth attracted entry by some new families of funds. (A family of mutual funds is a group of funds marketed under a single brand name. Usually, the family is the distributor of its funds—i.e., sells and redeems shares of its funds in transactions with investors—and an investment advisor, as well. Examples of families are Vanguard, American Funds, and Fidelity. Examples of mutual funds are Vanguard Equity Income Fund, American Balanced Fund, and Fidelity Dividend Growth Fund.) On aggregate, the number of families increased by approximately 50 percent from 1992 to 2007 (top-right panel), but the increase weakened throughout the period, in particular after 1999. Instead, the six-fold growth of the total number of funds was fueled by a four-fold increase in the average number of funds per family (bottom-left panel). Moreover, the largest families

grew disproportionately more than other families. As a result, the total market share of the largest four families almost doubled over the period 1992-2007 (bottom-right panel).

Second, the mutual fund industry fits the key demand and supply assumptions of our model well: 1) Most investors confine their mutual fund holdings to a single fund family, for two main reasons. First, employer-sponsored retirement plans frequently offer funds belonging to a single family. For example, Huberman and Jiang (2006), Elton, Gruber and Blake (2006) and Cohen and Schmidt (2009) study samples of 401(k) plans and document that most of them offer funds of a single family. Second, “shopping” costs (i.e., transaction, search and switching costs) induce investors to hold funds of a single family.<sup>1</sup> Some of these costs are monetary—a family often charges load fees when investors move assets out of the family, but not when they move assets within the family. Other costs could be psychological—the process of searching among a large number of funds across many families may be daunting.<sup>2</sup> As a result, Stark and Yates (2008) find that investors tend to buy funds from a single family even when they are investing through a discount brokerage firm. 2) The number of funds that a family offers plays a key role in determining choice among families. For example, when offering a retirement plan to a large number of employees with heterogeneous preferences over their portfolio choices, a family with a larger number of funds will better suit these employees. Similarly, shopping costs imply that moving money across funds of the same family is cheaper than moving money across families (Massa, 2003). The higher the number of funds in a family, the lower are investors’ costs since more funds provide greater liquidity services. In summary, the number of funds is a key characteristic that vertically differentiates families. 3) The costs structure of the industry is well described by large fixed costs and low variable costs. Indeed, the main expenses to operate a fund—such as the compensation of the fund manager and administrative costs—do not grow proportionally with total net assets.

Third, the mutual fund industry is composed of two distinct segments—retail and institutional—that cater to different types of investors. In particular, institutional investors are usually larger and more sophisticated than retail investors (Section 3 provides more detail on the differences between segments). Hence, the difference between the benefits of finding a higher-performance or a lower-priced fund and the costs of switching across families is larger for institutional investors than for retail investors. Therefore, firms’ variety of products and,

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<sup>1</sup>Several authors document the importance of such costs in the mutual fund industry (e.g., Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Massa, 2003; and Hortaçsu and Syverson, 2004). As the existence of these costs has already been established, this paper does not offer direct evidence on them. Rather, the paper derives implications of these costs for competition in the industry.

<sup>2</sup>Klemperer (1995) offers a rich illustration of these shopping costs.

thus, spillovers arguably play a different role in the two segments.

The empirical analysis of the paper starts by showing aggregate mutual fund data that reveal striking differences between the retail and institutional segments of the market. Specifically, in the retail segment, families offer more funds; funds have higher fees; the market is more concentrated; and the total number of funds is larger than in the institutional segment. These patterns are exactly the outcomes predicted by the theoretical model if preferences for firms' variety of products and spillovers are stronger in the retail segment than in the institutional segment. Thus, the empirical analysis seeks to measure and compare spillovers in the two segments of the market. In particular, using CRSP data for the period 1999-2006, we examine whether families that offer a larger number of funds or a larger number of categories of funds gain a more-than-proportional market share. The main challenge to this analysis is to properly distinguish demand for firms' product portfolios from other factors—such as supply-side economies of scale—that may generate a similar relationship between number of funds/categories and market share. Hence, as in a standard demand and supply estimation, in order to identify *demand* for firms' product varieties, we employ variables that shift the number of funds offered by a family for *supply* reasons. More precisely, an influential literature has empirically documented the spatial agglomeration of firms belonging to the same industry (for a summary, see Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999), and a few papers have shown that firms located in these areas where an industry concentrates are, on average, larger than firms in the same industry outside such areas (for evidence across industries, see Holmes and Stevens, 2002; for evidence on the mutual fund industry, see Table 1 in Christoffersen and Sarkissian, 2009). Thus, everything else equal, the *supply* of funds/categories should be higher if a family is located where employment in the financial sector is higher. Hence, we retrieve from CRSP the zip code of the headquarters of each family, and we match it to the total employment in the financial sector (and to the total number of establishments) of the corresponding county, retrieved from the County Business Patterns, a U.S. Census database, to obtain a measure of the density of the financial sector relative to other industries.

We find clear evidence that demand for firms' variety of products and spillovers are stronger in the retail segment than in the institutional segment of the market. More precisely, a family that offers ten percent more funds (categories) than its rivals has a 4.8 (10.1) percent higher average per-fund market share in the retail segment, but does not gain a higher average per-fund market share in the institutional segment. We also perform our analysis at the fund and at the category level, and we find even stronger results. We further check the robustness of our results to potential concerns about the validity of the instruments using an alternative

set of instrumental variables, and we find identical results.

The paper makes a number of contributions. First, the mechanisms identified in this paper are not unique to the mutual fund industry, but also help explain the role of firms' product portfolios and spillovers in a wide range of markets. In many industries, the largest firms are frequently the most successful in launching new products or entering new markets, and this paper is among the first to investigate market outcomes when consumers value firms' product-line breadth. More generally, the paper illustrates how markets operate when vertical differentiation between firms is important. Second, this paper is one of the first to investigate market conduct and market structure in the mutual fund industry, an important industry that manages a large fraction of retirement savings in the U.S. While there have been other important trends in the mutual fund industry in recent years—such as the growth of index funds and ETFs—the paper connects the industrial organization of the U.S. mutual fund industry with its largest component of demand—i.e., retirement accounts (Cohen and Schmidt, 2009). In doing so, the paper provides a coherent explanation for why, given the industry's total growth, the entry of new families has been limited, and the introduction of new funds by incumbent families has been more substantial. The model also provides a simple economic rationale for the limited price competition observed in the industry and for the existence of a large number of funds, both of which have been viewed as “puzzles” in the mutual fund literature (Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú, 2009; Massa, 1997). The economic mechanism proposed also matches well with key features of the industry and comments from market participants. For example, *The No-Load Fund Investor*,<sup>3</sup> a popular investment newsletter, writes: “The tremendous increase in the number of funds has been propelled by investor demand and by the need for fund groups to each offer a complete array of funds.”

## 2 Related Literature

This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, an influential literature studies the determinants of market structure. Most theoretical explanations focus on supply-side reasons. Sutton's seminal work highlights how endogenous sunk costs—such as advertising and R&D—affect market structure and concentration (Sutton, 1991 and 1998). Ellickson (2006) provides an interesting empirical application of Sutton's theory to the supermarket industry, in which competition in large markets induces supermarkets to expand the array of products offered to consumers, thereby reducing the entry of new firms. Berry and Wald-

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<sup>3</sup><http://www.noloadfundinvestor.com/>.

fogel (2010) investigate the relationship among market size, product quality, and market concentration in two contrasting industries—daily newspapers and restaurants—that differ in whether quality is produced mainly with fixed or variable costs, respectively. The present paper displays some key differences from these empirical papers: While they exploit variation in market size to understand the nature of supply (i.e., sunk costs), we focus on two segments of the same industry that differ in their demands—more precisely, in their valuations of the endogenous characteristic supplied through fixed costs.

Some papers use demand-side arguments to explain patterns of market concentration and market power. The most closely related papers are those that investigate the effects of switching costs on firms’ incentives to offer multiple products (Klemperer, 1995; Klemperer and Padilla, 1997). Starting with Borenstein (1989 and 1991), several empirical papers investigate the “hub-premium” in airline markets—whereby an airline with a dominant presence at an airport obtains a higher market share and charges higher prices on *all* trips originating from the dominant airport—and the role of switching costs, such as frequent flyer programs, in generating this premium (Lederman, 2008). Also related is the literature on network externalities and, in particular, the papers that investigate the effects of product compatibility on market outcomes (Katz and Shapiro, 1985 and 1994; Matutes and Regibeau, 1988; Economides, 1989)—more precisely, the empirical papers that consider the effects of ATM surcharge fees on banks’ optimal ATMs network size and deposit account pricing (Knittel and Stango, 2008 and 2009; Gowrisankaran and Krainer, 2011). One contribution of the present paper is to empirically document that the mutual fund industry shares some key features with network industries.

This paper contributes to a second strand of literature on multiproduct firms and product-line breadth. The theoretical literature suggests that firms offer multiple products to prevent the entry of rival firms (Schmalensee, 1978; Shaked and Sutton, 1990) and to increase their market share and profitability (Lancaster, 1979). A few papers empirically investigate the impact of a product-line extension, finding that firms are able to increase prices and sales once they extend their product line (Kadiyali, Vilcassim and Chintagunta, 1999; Draganska and Jain, 2005). Unlike these papers, we illustrate how an industry’s institutional arrangements can generate demand for firms’ varieties, as well as their implications for competition, industry equilibrium, market structure and concentration.

Finally, the paper is related to the literature on mutual funds. Most papers analyze mutual funds’ returns and/or portfolios, and only recently have a few papers focused on the role of families and on the industrial organization of the industry. Khorana and Servaes



(1999) empirically examine the determinants of mutual fund starts and find that economies of scale and scope, the family’s prior performance, and the overall level of funds invested are the main factors that induce families to set up new funds. Khorana and Servaes (2007) investigate the determinants of market shares and document that families that charge lower fees, perform better, and start more funds relative to the competition have a higher market share. Massa (1998 and 2003) argues that families use market segmentation and fund proliferation to exploit investors’ heterogeneity, to limit competition, and to increase market coverage. Wahal and Wang (2011) examine the impact of the entry of new funds on incumbents, and show that competition lowers management fees and investor flows. Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004) and Ivković (2004) investigate the importance of spillovers arising from the stellar performance of other funds in the same family. Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) examine how search costs affect the proliferation of mutual funds and the dispersion of their fees. Pollet and Wilson (2008) investigate how funds and families respond to asset growth, finding that family growth is correlated with the introduction of new funds and that families with more funds diversify less rapidly as they grow. Park (2008) examines how advertising affects the market structure of the mutual fund industry. Some of these papers mention demand-side spillovers (in particular, Massa, 2003), but none of them considers the supply side of the market, thereby characterizing industry equilibrium, market structure and concentration.

### **3 Background: Retail and Institutional Funds**

The purpose of this section is to shed light on the key differences between the retail and institutional segments of the mutual fund industry. For a more thorough description of the industry, see Gremillion (2005).

Retail mutual funds are aimed toward individual investors—i.e., households—and tax-advantaged individual retirement accounts have been instrumental in the growth of the retail segment in the last decades.<sup>4</sup> According to the Investment Company Institute (ICI, 2008), many of today’s mutual fund owners were introduced to mutual fund investing through retirement plans. For example, 59 percent of mutual fund-owning households indicated that they purchased their first fund through an employer-sponsored retirement plan, and that fraction increases to 68 percent for households that purchased mutual funds after 2000. Thus, retirement plans are, today, the most common source through which individuals invest

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<sup>4</sup>Sialm and Starks (2009) investigate whether the characteristics, investment strategies, and performance of mutual funds held by taxable investors differ from those of funds held primarily in tax-deferred retirement accounts.

in mutual funds: Fifty-one percent of households that owned mutual funds viewed retirement plans as their main fund-purchase source (ICI, 2008). As a result, Cohen and Schmidt (2009) report that in 2004, more than 60 percent of new flows into non-money market mutual funds were due to retirement accounts.

Two main types of individual retirement plans exist: 1) employer-sponsored defined-contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans, and 2) IRA/Keogh plans. Both types have an almost 50-percent share of total retirement assets, but they differ in several aspects.<sup>5</sup> An employer-sponsored plan is a benefit an employer provides to its employees. Thus, the employer initiates the plan, chooses the plan rules (eligibility, vesting, etc.), and arranges for its administration, commonly outsourcing it to an external organization, such as a mutual fund company, an insurance company, or an HR-benefit firm. The administrator is in charge of setting up an individual account for each plan participant, recording the participant's investment choices, buying and selling shares in particular mutual funds, etc. While the function of administrator and of investment provider are sometimes separate, the same company more frequently provides both. Gremillion (2005) explains: "Administering a defined contribution plan, particularly performing participant record keeping, costs a great deal, often more than can be recovered in administration fees. Mutual fund companies that perform defined contribution record keeping—Fidelity, Vanguard, Putnam, etc.—do so primarily to gather assets into the funds, not to make money on record keeping." Indeed, Cohen and Schmidt (2009) find that inclusion in a 401(k) plan has a large positive effect on a family's inflows. The employer and the administrator negotiate over the investments available to the employees, thus restricting employees' choice set. For example, until recently, Vanguard allowed plans for which it performed record keeping to choose Vanguard mutual funds only. Indeed, Huberman and Jiang (2006), Elton, Gruber and Blake (2006) and Cohen and Schmidt (2009), using different samples, document that most 401(k) plans offer funds of a single family only. Hence, a fund family with a larger number of funds is appealing to employers with a large number of employees, who may have heterogeneous preferences over their portfolio choices (because of age, income, or idiosyncratic taste). For instance, Agnew, Balduzzi and Sundén (2003) study allocations in retirement accounts and find that equity allocations are higher for males, married investors, younger investors, investors with higher earnings, and those with more seniority on the job.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Total individual-account retirement assets amounted to \$6.767 trillion in 2004, according to the Employee Benefit Research Institute (2008). These assets were almost equally split between the two main forms of retirement plans: \$3.384 trillion in employer-sponsored defined-contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans, and \$3.383 trillion in IRA/Keogh accounts.

<sup>6</sup>Huberman and Jiang (2006) report these additional facts about investors' choice among retirement funds:

An IRA plan, however, is not linked to employment, and any individual can open such a plan at a mutual fund company or a brokerage firm. Nonetheless, if the individual chooses to open an IRA with a mutual fund company, investment choices are still restricted exclusively to a family’s funds. Similarly, if the individual chooses to open an IRA with a brokerage firm, families’ offerings still affect investment choices through load fees.

Institutional investors—nonfinancial businesses, financial institutions, nonprofit organizations, state and local governments, and funds holding mutual fund shares—mainly purchase fund shares directly from fund companies that often create special share classes or funds expressly for them. Nonfinancial businesses and financial institutions use mutual funds primarily as a tool to manage their cash, thus investing the majority of their assets in money market funds. Instead, the investments of nonprofit organizations, state and local governments, and funds holding mutual fund shares are more evenly split across the main categories of funds (equities, fixed-income, hybrid and money market funds). Institutional investors are larger and, on average, more sophisticated than individual investors (Hortaçsu and Syverson, 2004). Moreover, their investment choices are not restricted to a single family, and their costs of switching across families are small relative to the gains of finding a higher-performance or a lower-priced fund.

Overall, these considerations suggest that the number of funds that a family offers plays a different role in determining market shares in the retail and in the institutional segments. Thus, we expect that demand spillovers differs across the two segments. The next Section presents a simple model that investigates how these demand spillovers affect market structure and market conduct. The model will guide the empirical analysis of Section 5.

## 4 A Simple Model

In this section, we introduce a simple model that adapts the theoretical framework of Sutton (1991) to the mutual fund industry. The main goal of the model is to investigate in the simplest way how the demand for a firm’s product portfolio shapes competitive outcomes in the industry. More precisely, we make the simplest assumptions on the demand-side of

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“First, participants choose to invest their savings in a small number of funds—typically no more than three or four—regardless of the number of funds their plans offer. Second, a substantial fraction of participants tend to allocate their contributions evenly among the funds they choose. Third, there is little relation between the proportion of contributions that participants allocate to equity funds (equity allocation) and the proportion of equity funds that their plans offer (equity exposure).” See, also, Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2004) for the impact of 401(k) plan design on saving outcomes.

the model (assuming, in particular, that the decision-maker chooses funds of a single family, rather than deriving it from first principles—i.e., shopping costs), and focus on two key families’ supply choices: the number of funds offered and the fees. In turn, these choices determine the equilibrium number of families and, thus, market concentration. The main advantage of this setup is that it delivers testable implications that have intuitive empirical counterparts.

**Demand**—Consider a decision maker selecting a mutual-fund family—for example, an employer with a large number of employees with heterogeneous preferences over portfolio choices. The decision maker chooses among families of funds that are vertically differentiated, differing by the number of funds offered  $N_j$  and the price  $p_j$ . The decision maker’s indirect utility from choosing family  $j$  is equal to:

$$u_j = \alpha_N \log N_j - \alpha_p p_j + \epsilon_j.$$

The parameter  $\alpha_N$  measures the importance of demand spillovers: A higher  $\alpha_N$  makes the number of funds  $N_j$  that a family offers more important for the decision maker.  $\epsilon_j$  is a preference shock, assumed to be i.i.d. across consumers and families, distributed according to the type I extreme value distribution (McFadden, 1974). Thus, the market share of family  $j$  is equal to:

$$s(N_j, p_j) = \frac{\exp(\alpha_N \log N_j - \alpha_p p_j)}{\sum_j \exp(\alpha_N \log N_j - \alpha_p p_j)}. \quad (1)$$

**Supply**—The industry is populated by a large number of homogeneous potential entrants (families) that compete by offering funds and by charging fees. A family  $j$  offering  $N_j$  funds has a cost function equal to

$$C(N_j) = K + FN_j, \quad (2)$$

where  $K > 0$  is a set-up cost and  $F > 0$  is a fixed cost per fund. Thus, the cost function  $C(N_j)$  assumes that fixed costs are strictly positive (so there are always economies of scale) and that the introduction of each fund affects families’ fixed costs exclusively.

Using the market share (1) and the cost function (2), we obtain family profits as

$$\pi(N_j, p_j) = p_j s(N_j, p_j) M - C(N_j),$$

where  $M$  is the exogenous size of the market. Each family  $j$  chooses the number  $N_j^*$  of funds and the price  $p_j^*$  that maximize its profits  $\pi(N_j, p_j)$ . The first-order conditions for optimality

are:

$$\begin{aligned} p_j &: Ms_j - p_j^* M \alpha_p s_j (1 - s_j) = 0 \\ N_j &: \frac{p_j^* M \alpha_N s_j (1 - s_j)}{N_j^*} - F = 0, \end{aligned}$$

where  $s_j = s(N_j^*, p_j^*)$ .

Free entry determines the number  $S^*$  of active families in equilibrium. Thus, ignoring integer constraints, free entry drives down profits to zero—i.e.,  $\pi(N_j^*, p_j^*) = 0$ .

**Proposition 1** *In a symmetric equilibrium, in a large market  $M$ :*

- (i) *If  $\alpha_N > 1$ , the number  $N^*$  of funds offered by each family is equal to  $\frac{(\alpha_N - 1)M}{\alpha_p F}$ , the price  $p^*$  is equal to  $\frac{\alpha_N}{\alpha_p}$ , and the number  $S^*$  of families is equal to  $\frac{\alpha_N}{\alpha_N - 1}$ .*
- (ii) *If  $\alpha_N \leq 1$ , the number  $N^*$  of funds offered by each family is equal to  $\frac{\alpha_N K}{(1 - \alpha_N)F}$ , the price  $p^*$  is equal to  $\frac{1}{\alpha_p}$ , and the number  $S^*$  of families is equal to  $\frac{(1 - \alpha_N)M}{\alpha_p K}$ .*

**Proof.** In a symmetric equilibrium,  $p_j^* = p^*$  and  $N_j^* = N^*$ . Thus,  $s_j^* = 1/S^*$ , and we can rewrite the first-order conditions as:

$$p^* \alpha_p \left(1 - \frac{1}{S^*}\right) = 1, \quad (3)$$

$$p^* M \alpha_N \left(1 - \frac{1}{S^*}\right) = FN^* S^*, \quad (4)$$

and the free-entry condition as:

$$\pi(N^*, p^*) = \frac{p^* M}{S^*} - K - FN^* = 0. \quad (5)$$

We can substitute equations (3) and (4) into the zero-profit condition (5), rearrange and obtain:

$$M = \frac{\alpha_p K S^* (S^* - 1)}{\alpha_N + S^* (1 - \alpha_N)}. \quad (6)$$

(i) Consider a large market—i.e.,  $M \rightarrow +\infty$ —and suppose  $S^* \rightarrow +\infty$ . Then, the left-hand side of equation (6) diverges to positive infinity, while the right-hand side of equation (6) diverges to negative infinity since its sign is equal to  $\frac{\alpha_p K (S^* - 1)}{1 - \alpha_N} < 0$ . However, this is impossible. Thus, the only possibility is  $\alpha_N + S^* (1 - \alpha_N) = 0$ , which we can solve for  $S^*$  as

$$S^* = \frac{\alpha_N}{\alpha_N - 1}.$$

Substituting  $S^* = \frac{\alpha_N}{\alpha_N - 1}$  into equations (3) and (4), we obtain that the price  $p^*$  is equal to  $\frac{\alpha_N}{\alpha_p}$  and the number  $N^*$  of funds is equal to  $\frac{(\alpha_N - 1)M}{\alpha_p F}$ .

(ii) In a large market—i.e.,  $M \rightarrow +\infty$ —the left-hand side of equation (6) diverges to positive infinity and the right-hand side has a positive sign. Thus,  $S^*$  has to diverge to positive infinity, as well. Moreover, letting  $M \rightarrow +\infty$  and  $S^* \rightarrow +\infty$  into equations (3) and (4), we obtain that the price  $p^*$  is equal to  $\frac{1}{\alpha_p}$  and the number  $N^*$  of funds is equal to  $\frac{\alpha_N K}{(1 - \alpha_N)F}$ . Substituting  $p^* = \frac{1}{\alpha_p}$  and  $N^* = \frac{\alpha_N K}{(1 - \alpha_N)F}$  into equation (4), and noting that  $\frac{1}{S^*} = 0$ , we obtain


$$S^* = \frac{(1 - \alpha_N)M}{\alpha_p K}.$$

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Proposition 1 highlights the stark effects of demand-side spillovers on firms' equilibrium strategies. In particular, two distinct types of equilibria arise, depending on whether the parameter  $\alpha_N$  is larger or smaller than one—i.e., the rate at which fixed costs increase as families add new funds. If demand spillovers are strong ( $\alpha_N > 1$ ), competition induces families to offer a large number of funds rather than low fees. As a result, the industry is concentrated even in large markets. However, if demand spillovers are weak ( $\alpha_N \leq 1$ ), the number of funds that each family offers is limited, fees are lower, and the industry is more fragmented in larger markets. In particular, the number  $S^*$  of families converges to a finite constant when spillovers are strong; instead  $S^*$  grows at the same rate as market size  $M$  when spillovers are weak, implying that the number of families is larger if spillovers are weak. Figure 2 further displays equilibrium outcomes in markets of moderate sizes, confirming the comparisons of Proposition 1.

The intuition for the results of Proposition 1 closely follows the arguments of Shaked and Sutton (1987). When decision makers place a high value on the number of funds—i.e., the dimension of vertical differentiation between families—a family that offers more funds than its competitors can undercut their fees and gain a proportionally larger market share since offering more funds affects fixed rather than marginal costs. Thus, only a few large families can survive in equilibrium, and the industry stays concentrated even in a large market. When, instead, decision makers place a relatively low value on the number of funds ( $\alpha_N \leq 1$ ), increasing its funds offerings and undercutting rivals' fees is not profitable, in particular when firms are already choosing low fees that almost equal marginal cost—i.e., zero. Moreover, in a large market, even very low fees generate enough variable profits to cover fixed costs. Thus, many families survive in equilibrium, and the industry is fragmented.

FIG. 2: Comparative Statics



Notes: This figure compares market outcomes when spillovers are weak (dashed line) and when spillovers are strong (solid line). The parameters are  $K = 150$ ,  $F = 25$ ,  $\alpha_p = 1$ , and  $\alpha_N = 1.2$  (solid line) or  $\alpha_N = 0.9$  (dashed line).

Proposition 1 suggests that strong spillovers provide a potential explanation for the limited price competition observed in the mutual fund industry (Sirri and Tufano, 1993; Khorana and Servaes, 2007; Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú, 2009). Moreover, the strength of spillovers also affects the aggregate number of funds offered to investors, providing a theoretical explanation for the existence of a large number of funds, which has been viewed as a puzzle (Massa, 1997).

**Corollary 2** *The total number of funds  $N^*S^*$  is higher and the market share  $\frac{M}{N^*S^*}$  of each fund is lower if spillovers are higher (higher  $\alpha_N$ ).*

**Proof.** Using the expressions for  $N^*$  and  $S^*$  derived in the proof of Proposition 1, we obtain that  $N^*S^* = \frac{\alpha_N M}{\alpha_p F}$ . Thus,  $N^*S^*$  is increasing and  $\frac{M}{N^*S^*}$  is decreasing in  $\alpha_N$ , the extent of

demand-side spillovers. ■

In summary, although the life cycle of the mutual fund industry, like that of any other industry, is clearly more complex than our simple theoretical framework, the model can explain salient features of competition among fund families. Furthermore, the analysis of Shaked and Sutton (1987) and Sutton (1991) indicates that the substance of the results does not depend on some of the simplifying assumptions imposed. In particular, the results are robust to several important extensions: 1) heterogeneous preference  $\alpha_N$  across consumers; 2) additional horizontal or vertical characteristics that affect investors' utility function; 3) heterogeneous fixed costs  $F$  across firms; and 4) sequential entry of firms.

## 5 Empirical Analysis

This section first describes the data employed in this study. It then illustrates some striking differences between the institutional and retail segments of the mutual fund industry. In particular, in the retail segment, families offer more funds, funds have higher fees, the market is more concentrated, and the total number of funds is larger than in the institutional segment. These patterns are exactly what Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 imply if spillovers are stronger in the retail segment than in the institutional segment. Thus, the following subsections measure and compare demand spillovers in the two segments.

### 5.1 Data

The empirical analysis is based on the mutual fund database compiled by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). This dataset provides mutual-fund data for all funds, including defunct funds. We include in the sample all active funds for which the main fund characteristics—total net assets, returns, turnover ratio, expense ratio, load, etc.—and their family identifier are available.

CRSP also reports the zip code of the headquarters of each fund family. We use this information to complement the CRSP Mutual Fund Database with data from the County Business Patterns (CBP).<sup>7</sup> Specifically, we match the zip code of the headquarters of each family to the corresponding county in CBP. The CBP dataset is unique in its coverage of all private sectors of the economy and its link to location. In particular, for each county

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<sup>7</sup>The CBP is available at <http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/index.html>.



and four-digit industry pair, the CBP reports total number of plants, total employment, and total payroll.

Since CRSP reports family headquarters' zip codes starting from 1999, we restrict our regression analysis to the period from 1999 to 2007, although we present some general industry trends for the period 1992 to 2007.

### 5.1.1 Variables and Summary Statistics

We follow the CRSP Mutual Fund Database and previous literature for the construction of most of variables. CRSP treats multiple share classes offered by a fund as separate entities, and we define each single share class as a separate fund.<sup>8</sup> (Since this definition may be arbitrary, we also perform our analysis using an alternative classification that does not depend on this definition; see below.) CRSP classifies each fund as retail or institutional, and we follow this definition. We then treat retail and institutional funds as separate segments. In particular, we include only funds within each segment when we calculate aggregate variables.

From CRSP, we obtain FUND TNA (fund's total net assets), and we construct FUND MARKET SHARE<sub>*jt*</sub>, the market share of fund *j* in year *t*, as  $\frac{100 * \text{FUND TNA}_{jt}}{\sum_j \text{FUND TNA}_{jt}}$  where  $\sum_j \text{FUND TNA}_{jt}$  is computed summing over retail or institutional funds only. CRSP reports each fund's monthly return  $r_{jikmt}$ , and we construct a FUND RETURN as  $R_{jikt} = \prod_{m=1}^{12} (1 + r_{jikmt})$  where *j* denotes a fund, *i* denotes a family, *k* denotes a category/investment objective (i.e., money market, U.S. equities, etc.), *m* denotes a month and *t* denotes a year. FUND FEES are equal to regular expenses, plus one seventh of front- and rear-end fees charged by the family. Hence, we are assuming a seven-year investment horizon, as in previous studies (Sirri and Tufano, 1989; Khorana and Servaes, 2007). FUND TURNOVER follows the CRSP definition.

We construct most family-level variables by averaging the fund-level variables of all funds within a family and within each segment (retail or institutional), weighting each fund by its assets. Moreover, in order to partially take into account the heterogeneity in family strategies across different categories of funds, we construct some family-level variables by taking the weighted average of fund characteristics calculated as deviations from the average

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<sup>8</sup>Fund sponsors frequently offer different share classes of a single portfolio to investors, primarily load or no-load classes. The three share classes commonly offered by multiple-class funds are denoted A, B and C. The A class is the traditional class in which investors pay a front-end load and an annual 12b-1 fee of 25 to 35 basis points to compensate brokers. In comparison, the B and C classes have no front-end loads but may charge a contingent deferred sales load (CDSL) upon exit and usually charge higher annual 12b-1 fees of about 1 percent. See Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2009) for an analysis of funds' decision to issue multiple share classes.

characteristics of all funds in the same category. For example, the aggregate performance of family  $i$  in year  $t$  is measured as the FAMILY EXCESS RETURN:

$$\text{FAMILY EXCESS RETURN}_{it} = \sum_j \omega_{jikt} \left( R_{jikt} - \sum_l \omega_{l.kt} R_{l.kt} \right),$$

where, as before,  $j$  denotes a fund,  $i$  denotes a family,  $k$  denotes a category/investment objective and  $t$  denotes a year.  $\omega_{jikt}$  is fund  $j$ 's share of family  $i$ 's total assets in year  $t$ ;  $R_{jikt}$  is the return of fund  $j$  of family  $i$  belonging to category  $k$  in year  $t$ ; and  $\omega_{l.kt}$  is fund  $l$ 's share of category  $k$ 's assets in year  $t$ . Thus,  $\sum_l \omega_{l.kt} R_{l.kt}$  is the weighted average return of all funds belonging to category  $k$  in year  $t$ , and  $R_{jikt} - \sum_l \omega_{l.kt} R_{l.kt}$  is the year  $t$ -abnormal return of fund  $j$  of family  $i$  belonging to category  $k$ . Thus, FAMILY EXCESS RETURN $_{it}$  adjusts for all factors that may affect all funds in the same investment category (Khorana and Servaes, 2007). Moreover, we also construct the variable FAMILY VARIANCE EXCESS RETURN as  $\sum_j \omega_{jikt} (R_{jikt} - \sum_l \omega_{l.kt} R_{l.kt})^2$  to control for the heterogeneity of fund returns within a family. Similarly, we construct the variable FAMILY FEES and FAMILY TURNOVER as  $\sum_j \omega_{jikt} x_{jikt}$ , where  $x_{jikt}$  is the fee or the turnover, respectively, of fund  $j$  of family  $i$  belonging to category  $k$  in year  $t$ .

The main explanatory variables of interest measure the number of products offered by a family in the corresponding segment (retail or institutional), and we measure it in two complementary ways. The first one—FAMILY FUNDS—is the total number of funds offered by a family. Since we are treating each share class offered by a fund as a separate entity, FAMILY FUNDS may, perhaps, overestimate the number of funds available to investors. Thus, we also construct a second measure that is not affected by this potential mismeasurement: FAMILY CATEGORIES, the total number of categories/investment objectives in which a family offers at least one fund. Hence, FAMILY CATEGORIES performs an important robustness check (which we could have performed by defining a fund as the aggregation of all share classes of a unique portfolio), and has the additional advantage of providing a measure of families' offerings that emphasizes product-line breadth across different investment objectives. CRSP offers several distinct classifications of funds' categories/investment objectives. We employ the most-detailed classification available, the Lipper objective codes classification. Thus, the variable FAMILY CATEGORIES is a count of the number of distinct Lipper objective codes offered by a fund family.

Finally, we obtain from the CBP some variables that we use as instruments in our empirical analysis: TOTAL ESTABLISHMENTS and EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL SECTOR are defined

exactly as in CBP, where the financial sector refers to either SIC 60 or NAICS 52; WAGE is calculated as total payroll divided by total employment, and WAGE FINANCIAL SECTOR is total payroll in the financial sector divided by EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL SECTOR. All these variables refer to the county in which the zip code of the family’s address reported in CRSP is located. Moreover, we also calculate the distance of the family headquarters from New York City as  $d_i = \sqrt{(lat_i - lat_{NY})^2 + (long_i - long_{NY})^2}$ , where  $lat_j$  and  $long_j$  are the latitude and longitude of zip code  $j$ . Zip code 10012 is used for all families located in New York City.

Table 1 provides summary statistics of the main variables used in the empirical analysis. The first two columns of data refer to the retail segment of the market. There are 66,270 fund-year observations in this segment. On average, a retail fund has a market share of approximately one percent, and there is considerable heterogeneity in the size of funds: The standard deviation of the market share is equal to 5.5 percent. The (unweighted) average fee in the retail sector equals 1.92 percent and the average return 7.6 percent. The average retail fund belongs to a family with 120 funds spanning 27 different categories. The heterogeneity across families is substantial: The standard deviations of FAMILY FUNDS and FAMILY CATEGORIES are equal to 93 funds and 16 categories, and all other family variables exhibit significant variations across families.

The last two columns present summary statistics for the institutional segment of the market. As Section 3 argues, demand spillovers should not play the same role in the two segments of the market. Indeed, Table 1 presents some suggestive patterns. The average institutional fund has a larger market share, is cheaper and younger, yields a higher return, and has a lower turnover than a retail fund. Interestingly, the average institutional fund belongs to a smaller family than a retail fund does—a family with 60 funds spanning 18 different categories.

## 5.2 A Graphical Comparison

Figure 3 displays striking differences between the institutional and retail segments of the market over the period 1992-2007. First, the top-left plot shows that families offer a larger (asset-weighted) number of funds in the retail segment than in the institutional segment. Second, the top-right plot shows that (asset-weighted) fees are higher in the retail segment. Third, the bottom-left plot shows that the retail segment is less concentrated than the institutional segment: The market share of the largest four families of institutional funds is about only half of the market share of the largest four families of retail funds. Moreover,

while the retail segment has become *more* concentrated over time, the institutional segment has become *less* concentrated. Fourth, the bottom-right panel documents that the total number of funds is larger in the retail than in the institutional segment.

These patterns match exactly the predictions of the simple model presented in Section 4 if spillovers are stronger in the retail segment than in the institutional segment. Thus, the goal of the next subsections is to measure these spillovers by estimating a demand system in each segment, enriching the demand system given by equation (1) of the theoretical model.<sup>9</sup>

### 5.3 Demand Spillovers in the Retail Segment

We proceed in three complementary ways to measure demand spillovers in the retail segment of the industry. First, we investigate whether a family that offers more funds or categories than its rivals has a proportionally larger market share (and assets under management). Second, we investigate whether a fund whose family offers more funds or categories than its rivals has a larger market share. Third, we investigate whether a family that offers more funds or categories than its rivals has a larger market share in the categories that it offers.

#### 5.3.1 Family-level Evidence

To investigate the importance of demand spillovers at the family level, we estimate a demand system rearranging the market share equation (1) of the theoretical model (see Berry, 1994), also including additional variables that control for factors that the model does not consider. Specifically, we estimate the following regression equation:<sup>10</sup>

$$\text{LOG}(\text{FAMILY MARKET SHARE}_{it}) = \alpha \text{LOG}(\text{VARIETY}_{it}) + \gamma Z_{it} + \eta_t + \epsilon_{it}. \quad (7)$$


The dependent variable  $\text{LOG}(\text{FAMILY MARKET SHARE}_{it})$  is the log of a family’s aggregate market share—i.e., the total net assets of family  $i$  in year  $t$  divided by the total net assets of all families in year  $t$ . The key variable of interest is  $\text{VARIETY}_{it}$ , defined as either  $\text{FAMILY FUNDS}$ —i.e., the total number of funds offered by a family—or  $\text{FAMILY CATEGORIES}$ —i.e., the total number of categories/investment objectives in which a family offers at least one

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<sup>9</sup>An alternative empirical design may be to perform one family-level regression and one fund-level regression, using dummy variables to distinguish the key coefficients of retail funds from institutional funds. While this is certainly feasible, the main advantage of the empirical design followed below is that it does not constrain the coefficients of the additional control variables to be the same in the retail and institutional segments.

<sup>10</sup>More precisely, equation (7) obtains after taking logs in equation (1), recognizing that the log of the denominator of the right-hand side is constant within a year. Thus, the year fixed effect in equation (7) captures it.

FIG. 3: A Graphical Comparison: Institutional Funds vs. Retail Funds



Notes: This figure presents several comparisons between Institutional Funds (dashed line) and Retail Funds (solid line). The top-left plot displays the asset-weighted average number of funds per family. The top-right plot displays the asset-weighted average fee. The bottom-left plot displays the market share of the largest four families. The bottom-right plot displays the total number of funds. All plots correspond to the period 1992-2007.

fund—offered by family  $i$  in year  $t$ .  $Z_{it}$  is a vector of variables specific to each individual family, such as the average return of all funds, the variance of returns of all funds, and the (log of the) age of the family, measured as the age of the oldest active fund.  $\eta_t$  is a year fixed effect that capture aggregate trends in the industry (e.g., the growth of ETFs or the inflows by new, and perhaps less sophisticated, households).  $\epsilon_{it}$  is an idiosyncratic unobserved component. Since the regression equation (7) includes year dummies, the estimated coefficients are identical if  $\text{LOG}(\text{FAMILY TNA}_{it})$  is the dependent variable.

The use of the variables `FAMILY FUNDS` and `FAMILY CATEGORIES` creates a potential challenge to identifying the effects of the demand spillovers in equation (7). The reason is that both measures of varieties/product-line breadth are chosen by each profit-maximizing family and, thus, are endogenous. In particular, any observed correlation between our measures of a family’s varieties and a family’s aggregate market share could be due to either demand or supply reasons, or both. For example, if supply-side economies of scale—i.e., lower research, product development, marketing, advertising, and various administrative costs—and economies of scope—i.e., cost complementarities—are significant, larger fund families may enjoy lower costs per fund and, thus, offer more funds (Khorana and Servaes, 1999).

Hence, the previous *supply-side* arguments could invalidate the tests of our predictions. Thus, as in a standard demand and supply estimation, in order to identify *demand-side* spillovers, we employ variables that shift `FAMILY FUNDS` and `FAMILY CATEGORIES` for *supply-side* reasons. Specifically, an influential economic geography literature has empirically documented the spatial agglomeration of firms belonging to the same industry (for a summary, see Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999), and a few papers have shown that firms located in these areas where an industry concentrates are, on average, larger than firms in the same industry outside such areas (for evidence across industries, see Holmes and Stevens, 2002; for evidence on the mutual fund industry, see Table 1 in Christoffersen and Sarkissian, 2009). The general reason is that firms located where an industry concentrates enjoy larger labor pools and larger flows of ideas (Marshall, 1920), thereby growing in size. Indeed, applying these insights to the mutual fund industry, Christoffersen and Sarkissian (2009) emphasize the difficulty of hiring fund managers away from financial centers and the positive information spillovers of these financial centers. Hence, everything else equal, the *supply* of funds/categories should be higher if a family is located where employment in the financial sector is higher. Thus, we retrieve from CRSP the zip code of the headquarters of each family, and we match it to `EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL SECTOR` (and to `TOTAL ESTABLISHMENTS`) of the corresponding county to obtain a measure of the density of the

financial sector, also relative to other industries. Moreover, we further employ as an instrument  $\text{LOG}(\text{DISTANCE FROM NYC})$ , the distance of each family’s headquarters from New York City. Table A1 in the Appendix reports the “first-stage” regressions of the endogenous variables  $\text{FAMILY FUNDS}$  and  $\text{FAMILY CATEGORIES}$ . The key findings are that, on average, families located in counties with a larger employment in the financial sector (relative to the total number of establishments) offer a larger number of funds or funds in a larger number of categories.

The validity of these instruments relies on two key assumptions: 1) each fund family represents a small fraction of  $\text{EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL SECTOR}$  in the cross-section of U.S. counties; and 2) the exclusion restriction that, for example,  $\text{EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL SECTOR}$  in Los Angeles or Boston does not *directly* affect the demand and the market share of American Funds or Fidelity, whose headquarters are in Los Angeles and Boston, respectively.<sup>11</sup> Since fund families tend to locate in large financial centers such as New York, San Francisco and Chicago (Christoffersen and Sarkissian, 2009), while competing to attract investors nationwide, these assumptions seems reasonable features of the mutual fund industry. Nonetheless, in Section 5.5, we check the robustness of our results against potential concerns about the validity of these assumptions and, thus, of the instruments. In addition, it is important to note that the thrust of our empirical analysis relies on the comparison between spillovers in the retail and institutional segments of the market. Our results will differ across these two segments, and reasonable arguments against the validity of the instruments should account for this difference.

Furthermore, we also instrument  $\text{FAMILY FEES}$ —the other endogenous variable in the model—using the instruments introduced by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) to estimate utility functions with unobservable characteristics: summary measures of other families’ characteristics in the current year. In particular, we use average returns and variance of returns. These instruments capture the effect of a family’s relative position in characteristics space, assumed to be exogenous, on their endogenous decisions, independent of the family’s unobservable characteristics.

Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 present IV estimates of the coefficients of equation (7). The positive coefficients of  $\text{LOG}(\text{FAMILY FUNDS})$  and  $\text{LOG}(\text{FAMILY CATEGORIES})$  indicate that investors are more likely to allocate their assets in families that offer more funds, consistent with our demand spillovers arguments. However, strictly speaking, the

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<sup>11</sup>The instruments may also affect the market share of the family if, for example, higher wages attract more-skilled managers, who, in turn, generate higher returns. All our regressions include returns, thus controlling directly for this effect.



positive coefficients of LOG(FAMILY FUNDS) and LOG(FAMILY CATEGORIES) in columns (1) and (2) do not necessarily imply demand spillovers. For example, if, for whatever reason, investors allocate their money randomly across funds, then, mechanically, families that offer more funds would have a higher market share. Nevertheless, the coefficients are estimated to be statistically larger than one, indicating that families that offer more funds (categories) have a proportionally larger market share. The magnitude of the effects is also non-trivial: A family that offers ten-percent more funds has a 14.8-percent higher market share, and a family that offers ten-percent more categories has a 20.1-percent higher market share.

### 5.3.2 Fund-level Evidence

To investigate the importance of demand-side spillovers at the fund level, we enrich equation (7) as follows:

$$\text{LOG}(\text{FUND MARKET SHARE}_{jkit}) = \alpha \text{LOG}(\text{VARIETY}_{it}) + \beta X_{jkit} + \gamma Z_{it} + \zeta_k + \eta_t + \epsilon_{jkit}. \quad (8)$$

The dependent variable LOG(FUND MARKET SHARE<sub>jkit</sub>) is the log of the market share of fund  $j$  in category  $k$  belonging to family  $i$  in year  $t$ . VARIETY<sub>it</sub> is either FAMILY FUNDS or FAMILY CATEGORIES offered by family  $i$  in year  $t$ .  $X_{jkit}$  is a vector of variables specific to each individual fund, such as the annual return of the fund, the (log of the) age of the fund, the turnover.  $Z_{it}$  is a vector of variables specific to each individual family, such as the average return of all funds, the variance of returns of all funds, and the (log of the) age of the family, measured as the age of the oldest active fund.  $\zeta_k$  is a category fixed effect,  $\eta_t$  is a year fixed effect and  $\epsilon_{jkit}$  is an idiosyncratic unobserved component. Hence, equation (8) is similar to equation (7), but it uses a richer set of characteristics at the individual fund level, thus more carefully controlling funds' observable heterogeneity across families.

Table 3 reports IV estimates of the coefficients. In all specifications, the endogenous variables FAMILY FUNDS or FAMILY CATEGORIES are instrumented with the same *supply-side* shifters described in Section 5.3.1. Similarly, we instrument FUND FEES using the average excess return and average variance of excess returns of rival families, as well as average returns of other funds operated by rival families in the same category. Specifications (1) and (2) do not include category fixed effects; specifications (3) and (4) include them; and specifications (5) and (6) include category-year fixed effects. The coefficients of the two variables capturing the family variety of funds—LOG(FAMILY FUNDS) and LOG(FAMILY CATEGORIES)—are significantly higher than zero in all specifications. The signs of these coefficients indicate



that, on average, the market share of a retail fund is larger if the number of funds (categories) offered by its family is larger. This is a strong confirmation of the results of Table 2 and reinforces the idea that demand spillovers play an important role in the retail segment of the market. For example, according to the coefficients of specifications (5) and (6), a family that offers ten-percent more funds than its rivals has a 3.7-percent higher market share for each fund of the same family, and a family that offers ten-percent more categories than its rivals has a 5.3-percent higher market share for each fund of the same family. Furthermore, the coefficients of FAMILY EXCESS RETURN is positive in all specifications, although sometimes not significant, confirming the importance of within-family performance spillovers, as in Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004) and Ivković (2004).

Columns (7) and (8) of Table 3 report the estimates of the coefficients of equation (8) obtained on a sample of S&P 500 index funds only. These regressions are particularly interesting because the sample is restricted to (almost) homogeneous products that passively follow an index. Thus, we should expect the effect of demand spillovers on this sample of S&P 500 index funds to be greater than on the entire sample, for two main reasons. First, fund heterogeneity (observed and unobserved) should play a limited role on index funds. Second, an S&P 500 index fund may be a “focal” fund in which investors “park” their assets when they unload them from other funds within the family. Indeed, the coefficients reported in columns (7) and (8) exactly indicate that the effect of spillovers is greater on this sample of S&P 500 index funds: The coefficients of the two variables capturing the family variety of funds—LOG(FAMILY FUNDS) and LOG(FAMILY CATEGORIES)—are significantly larger in columns (7) and (8) than in columns (5) and (6), confirming the importance of demand spillovers. More precisely, the market share of the S&P 500 index fund offered by a family that offers ten-percent more funds than its rivals is 7.6-percent higher, and the market share of the S&P 500 index fund offered by a family that offers ten-percent more categories than its rivals is 14.6-percent higher.

### 5.3.3 Category-level Evidence

We now investigate the importance of demand-side spillovers by examining how the number of family products affects the family’s market share in each Lipper objective code. These regressions serve two main purposes: 1) Perform a robustness check. Since the fund-level regressions treat each share class offered by a fund as a separate entity, the results reported in Table 3 may overestimate the number of independent observations, potentially biasing some coefficients. 2) Investigate the role of spillovers across different investment objectives,

rather than across different funds.

With these goals in mind, we estimate the following regression:

$$\text{LOG}(\text{CAT-FAM MARKET SHARE}_{kit}) = \alpha \text{LOG}(\text{VARIETY}_{it}) + \beta X_{kit} + \gamma Z_{it} + \zeta_k + \eta_t + \epsilon_{kit}. \quad (9)$$

The dependent variable is the log of the market share of all funds in category  $k$  belonging to family  $i$  in year  $t$ .  $\text{VARIETY}_{it}$  is either `FAMILY FUNDS` or `FAMILY CATEGORIES` offered by family  $i$  in year  $t$ .  $X_{kit}$  is a vector of variables specific to each individual family-category pair, such as the funds' average return, the variance of funds' returns, and the (log of the) age of the category, measured as the age of the oldest active fund.  $Z_{it}$  is a vector of variables specific to each individual family, such as the average return of all funds, the variance of returns of all funds, and the (log of the) age of the family, measured as the age of the oldest active fund.  $\zeta_k$  is a category fixed effect,  $\eta_t$  is a year fixed effect and  $\epsilon_{kit}$  is an idiosyncratic unobserved component.

Table 4 reports IV estimates of the coefficients. Columns (1) to (6) reports the results for all retail category-family pairs. Specifications (1) and (2) do not include category fixed effects; specifications (3) and (4) include them; and specifications (5) and (6) include fixed effects for each category-year pair. The endogenous variables—i.e., `FAMILY FUNDS` or `FAMILY CATEGORIES`, and `FAMILY-CATEGORY FEES`—are instrumented with the *supply-side* shifters used in the fund-level regressions reported in the previous Section. The coefficients of the two variables capturing the family variety of funds—`LOG(FAMILY FUNDS)` and `LOG(FAMILY CATEGORIES)`—are significantly higher than zero in all specifications. The signs of these coefficients indicate that, on average, the market share of a category of funds is larger if the number of funds (categories) offered by its family is larger. This confirms the results of Tables 2 and 3 that demand spillovers play an important role in the retail segment of the market, and indicates that those results were not an artifact of measurement error. In particular, the coefficients of specifications (5) and (6) imply that a family that offers ten-percent more funds than its rivals has a 6.3-percent higher market share for each category of funds of the same family, and a family that offers ten-percent more categories than its rivals has a nine-percent higher market share for each category of funds of the same family.

Columns (7) and (8) of Table 4 report the estimates of the coefficients of equation (9) obtained on the category of S&P 500 index funds only. In these specifications, we use our supply shifters only to instrument the endogenous variables `FAMILY FUNDS` or `FAMILY`

CATEGORIES, since instrumenting FAMILY FEES generates unstable results. With this caveat in mind, the coefficients reported in columns (7) and (8) confirm that the effect of spillovers is greater on this sample of S&P 500 index funds: The coefficients of the two variables capturing the family variety of funds—LOG(FAMILY FUNDS) and LOG(FAMILY CATEGORIES)—are larger in columns (7) and (8) than in columns (5) and (6), confirming the importance of demand spillovers. More precisely, the market share of the S&P 500 index category of funds offered by a family that offers ten-percent more funds than its rivals is 11-percent higher, and the market share of the S&P 500 index category of funds offered by a family that offers ten-percent more categories than its rivals is 22-percent higher.

## 5.4 Demand Spillovers in the Institutional Segment

We now measure the magnitude of demand spillovers in the institutional segment of the market and compare it with the magnitudes estimated previously in the retail segment. This comparison is useful to understanding the differential patterns between the institutional and retail segments highlighted in Figure 3. In particular, Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 of our simple model suggest that these differential patterns are the natural equilibrium outcomes if demand spillovers differ in the two segments of the market.

We investigate the magnitude of demand spillovers in the institutional segment by estimating the same equations (7), (8) and (9) on the sample of institutional funds, instrumenting the endogenous variables—i.e., FAMILY FUNDS or FAMILY CATEGORIES and FAMILY FEES—with the same *supply-side* shifters described in Section 5.3.1: total employment in the financial sector; the total number of establishments; the distance of the headquarters from New York City; and the average excess return and average variance of excess returns of rival families.

Table 5 reports the estimates of the coefficients of equation (7)—i.e., the family-level regressions—on the sample of families of institutional funds. The dependent variable in specifications (1) and (2) is (the log of) the aggregate market share of the family—i.e., LOG(FAMILY MARKET SHARE<sub>it</sub>). The table shows that we cannot statistically reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of the two variables capturing the variety of families’ funds—LOG(FAMILY FUNDS) and LOG(FAMILY CATEGORIES)—are lower than one in specifications (1) and (2). Thus, there is no evidence that families that offer more funds (categories) have a proportionally larger market share. This suggests that demand spillovers do not play an important role in the institutional segment, in sharp contrast to the evidence from the retail segment reported in Table 2.

Table 6 reports the estimates of the coefficients of equation (8)—i.e., the fund-level regressions—on the sample of institutional funds. The dependent variable in the specifications (1) to (8) is the log of each fund’s market share—i.e.,  $\text{LOG}(\text{FUND MARKET SHARE}_{jkit})$ . The coefficients of the two variables capturing the family variety of funds— $\text{LOG}(\text{FAMILY FUNDS})$  and  $\text{LOG}(\text{FAMILY CATEGORIES})$ —are negative and/or not significantly different from zero. Thus, these coefficients confirm the results of Table 5: On average, the market share of (and the assets managed by) an institutional fund is not higher when the number of institutional funds (categories) offered by its family is higher. This corroborates that demand spillovers do not play an important role in the institutional segment, in sharp contrast to the evidence from the retail segment reported in Table 3. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the coefficients of all other family-level variables—i.e.,  $\text{FAMILY EXCESS RETURN}$ ,  $\text{FAMILY VARIANCE EXCESS RETURN}$ , and  $\text{FAMILY TURNOVER}$ —are insignificant in almost all specifications, reinforcing the idea of weaker within-family spillovers in the institutional segment than in the retail segment of the market.

Table 7 reports the estimates of the coefficients of equation (9)—i.e., the category-level regressions—on the sample of institutional funds. The dependent variable in the specifications (1) to (8) is (the log of) each family category’s market share—i.e.,  $\text{LOG}(\text{CAT-FAM MARKET SHARE}_{jkit})$ . The coefficients of the two variables capturing the family variety of funds— $\text{LOG}(\text{FAMILY FUNDS})$  and  $\text{LOG}(\text{FAMILY CATEGORIES})$ —are again negative and/or not significantly different from zero. Thus, these coefficients confirm that the family market share in a category of funds is not higher when the number of institutional funds (categories) offered by the family is higher. The difference in the signs of the coefficients and/or in their statistical (in)significance across specifications indicates that demand spillovers do not play an important role in the institutional segment, in contrast to the evidence from the retail segment reported in Table 4. Furthermore, the coefficients of all other family-level variables—i.e.,  $\text{FAMILY EXCESS RETURN}$ ,  $\text{FAMILY VARIANCE EXCESS RETURN}$ , and  $\text{FAMILY TURNOVER}$ —are insignificant in most specifications, providing further evidence that within-family spillovers in the institutional segment are not as relevant as in the retail segment of the market.

## 5.5 Robustness Checks and Alternative Hypotheses

We now present robustness checks using an alternative set of instruments and discuss in detail two leading alternative hypotheses, presenting arguments against them.

**Alternative Instruments.** We now verify the robustness of the results to several potential concerns about the validity of the instruments. As highlighted in Section 5.3.1, the validity of the instruments relies on two main assumptions: 1) each fund family represents a small fraction of EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL SECTOR in the cross-section of U.S. counties; and 2) the exclusion restriction that, for example, EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL SECTOR in Los Angeles or Boston does not *directly* affect the demand and market share of American Funds or Fidelity, whose headquarters are in Los Angeles and Boston, respectively. While, in principle, we could subtract each family’s employees from EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL SECTOR to directly avoid any reverse causality concern, CRSP does not, unfortunately, report this information, and we are not aware of another public dataset that does. Moreover, this alternative procedure would not directly address concerns about the plausibility of our exclusion restriction. Furthermore, another potential concern about our instruments is that families’ location is endogenous. For example, EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL SECTOR could affect the number of family funds—as this paper posits—and other unobserved dimensions of a family’s “quality” of offerings, such as financial advice. If this is the case, the estimates of demand spillovers may be biased.

To address all these concerns, in the spirit of the empirical literature on differentiated products following Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), we use supply-side variables of other families as instruments for each family’s endogenous measure of varieties. Specifically, for each family  $i$ , we compute the average EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL SECTOR, TOTAL ESTABLISHMENTS and DISTANCE FROM NYC of all families whose headquarters are located in a *different* county than family  $i$ , and we use those as instruments for FAMILY FUNDS and FAMILY CATEGORIES of family  $i$ . In oligopoly markets, these are valid instruments since rival families’ cost shifters affect equilibrium best-responses and, thus, families’ equilibrium characteristics, such as product varieties. In addition, by construction, these instruments do not suffer from reverse causality and do not directly affect families’ demands and market shares. Moreover, as the empirical literature on differentiated products since Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) advocates, they are arguably uncorrelated with each family’s unobservable characteristics.

Table 8 reports the second stage of the family-level regressions using these alternative instruments. Columns (1) and (2) refer to retail funds, columns (3) and (4) to institutional funds. The Table shows that the estimates of the coefficients are almost identical to those reported in Tables 2 and 5, respectively, indicating that our results are robust to potential concerns about the validity of the instruments.

We have also performed the fund-level and category-level regressions using this alternative

set of instruments. The results (omitted) confirm that, on average, the market share of a fund or of a family’s category of funds is larger if the number of funds (categories) offered by its family is larger in the retail segment, but not in the institutional segment. These additional checks further corroborate the robustness of our results on the importance of demand spillovers in the retail segment, but not in the institutional segment.

**Economies of Scale and Scope.** Khorana and Servaes (1999) suggest that economies of scale and scope are important in the mutual fund industry. These economies may induce larger families to launch more new funds, and they may also constitute a barrier to entry for new families, thus potentially explaining some of the empirical patterns documented. Similarly, in an influential paper, Schmalensee (1978) argues that incumbent firms may choose to offer multiple products in order to “fill the product space,” thus crowding out additional entrants. (Bonanno, 1987, analyzes Schmalensee’s argument, showing that incumbents deter entry through product *specification*, rather than through product *proliferation*.)

While economies of scale and scope are key features that shape competitive outcomes in the mutual fund industry, we reiterate that our empirical model identifies investors’ *demand*, since the instruments used in our empirical model exploit exogenous supply-side shifters of the number of funds and number of categories offered by each family. In addition, our analysis reveals striking differences between the retail and institutional segments of the market. All supply-side factors—including economies of scale and scope—should not differ between retail and institutional funds. Moreover, our results stand when we restrict our analysis to (almost) homogenous products such as S&P 500 index funds. Furthermore, several families offer funds in both the retail and the institutional segments of the market, presumably sharing any costs savings due to lower research, product development, and administrative costs. Thus, it is not clear why the two segments of the market exhibit such stark differences. But our argument rests on demand spillovers, and we highlighted in Section 3 why these spillovers differ between the retail and institutional segments.

**Advertising and Research Expenditures.** Sutton’s (1991 and 1998) seminal work focuses on two main types of endogenous sunk costs: advertising and research outlays. Thus, a natural question is whether these costs can account for the empirical patterns documented. In particular, Park (2008) documents that advertising expenditure has increased over time in the mutual fund industry (in particular, for no-load funds), and this increase may have fostered concentration. However, it is unlikely that this alternative hypothesis can explain *all* our empirical findings, for several reasons. First, we wish to emphasize that our empirical

model is designed to precisely control for spurious correlations due to unobserved factors, including advertising and research expenditures. In particular, the instruments that we employ in the empirical analysis exploit exogenous variations in the number of funds and number of categories offered. Second, many families offer funds in both the retail and the institutional segments of the market, and, presumably, the effects of advertising and research (in particular) are not confined to a single segment of the market. Thus, it is not immediately obvious why market conduct and market structure respond differently to the same input. Third, and perhaps most important, Gallaher, Kaniel and Starks (2009) investigate patterns of advertising in the mutual fund industry and find that families with funds in more objective classes advertise *less* than families with fewer objectives. Hence, if advertising were the key determinant of market structure and concentration in the retail segment, their finding would imply that families with funds in more objective classes should have a *larger* market share, in sharp contrast to the results of our analysis of Section 5.3.1. Thus, we conclude that advertising and research expenditures cannot explain our empirical findings.

## 6 Conclusions

This paper investigates, both theoretically and empirically, the role of demand for firms' product varieties and demand spillovers in determining market conduct and market structure in the mutual fund industry. The model adapts Sutton's (1991) endogenous sunk costs theory, highlighting that the magnitude of spillovers determines the industry equilibrium. If demand for firms' product portfolios and, thus, demand spillovers are strong, competition induces families to offer a large number of funds rather than low fees. As a result, the industry remains concentrated even in large markets. Instead, if demand for firms' product portfolios and spillovers are weak, the number of funds that each family offers is limited, fees are lower, and the industry is more fragmented in larger markets.

Aggregate empirical patterns reveal striking differences between the retail and institutional segments of the market: in the retail segment, families offer more funds; funds have higher fees; the market is more concentrated and the total number of funds is larger than in the institutional segment. These patterns are exactly the outcomes predicted by the theoretical model if spillovers are stronger in the retail than in the institutional segment. Indeed, the empirical analysis provides strong evidence that these spillovers are stronger in the retail segment of the market.

The ideas of this paper are potentially useful in understanding several market outcomes in all industries in which consumers prefer to purchase from a single supplier (banking,



commercial aircraft, supermarkets, etc.). For example, an interesting question, left for future research, is what are the determinants and the effects of mergers in such markets.

## A First-stage Regressions

Table A1 reports the results of the first-stage regressions of the endogenous variables FAMILY FUNDS—i.e., the total number of funds offered by a family—or FAMILY CATEGORIES—i.e., the total number of categories/investment objectives in which a family offers at least one fund—offered by family  $i$  in year  $t$  in the respective segment (retail or institutional) on the following instruments: EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL SECTOR, the total employment in the financial sector in the same county in which the family has its headquarters; TOTAL ESTABLISHMENTS, the number of establishments in the same county in which the family has its headquarters; DISTANCE FROM NYC, the distance of the family headquarters’ address from New York City; AVERAGE EXCESS RETURN OTHER FAMILIES, the average FAMILY EXCESS RETURN of all other families; and AVERAGE VARIANCE EXCESS RETURN OTHER FAMILIES, the average FAMILY VARIANCE EXCESS RETURN of all other families. Specifications (1) and (3) refer to retail funds, and specifications (2) and (4) refer to institutional funds.

The signs of the coefficients of the instruments are largely as expected. In particular, on average, a larger employment in the financial sector, relative to the total employment, in the same county in which the family has its headquarters corresponds to a larger number of funds or to a larger number of categories offered by the family. This is true in both the retail and institutional segments. Moreover, the instruments are jointly significant: the  $F$ -tests are equal to 24.06, 14.07, 23.91, and 13.22, respectively, in specifications (1)-(4).

To appreciate the magnitude implied by the coefficients, we construct the fitted number of funds from the coefficients of column (1). These fitted values imply, for example, that the average number of funds offered by a family whose headquarters are in New York, NY is twice as large as a family’s whose headquarters are in Austin, TX: 33 funds versus 16.6 funds.

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TABLE 1: Summary Statistics

	RETAIL FUNDS		INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS	
	MEAN	ST. DEV.	MEAN	ST. DEV.
FUND MARKET SHARE	.0106	.0558	.0207	.0993
FUND FEES	.0192	.0080	.0099	.0046
FUND AGE	9.043	8.695	6.868	4.936
FUND RETURN	1.076	.1782	1.0869	.1674
FUND TURNOVER	1.044	2.022	.9587	1.129
FAMILY FUNDS	120.0	93.71	60.57	58.84
FAMILY CATEGORIES	26.8	15.90	18.54	9.90
FAMILY EXCESS RETURN	-.0050	.0670	-.0003	.0437
FAMILY VARIANCE EXCESS RETURN	.0117	.0706	.0059	.0233
FAMILY TURNOVER	.8463	.8601	.8540	.6097
EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL SECTOR	122,397	117,365	121,274	113,971
TOTAL ESTABLISHMENTS	53,661	48,473	59,889	59,373
WAGE (\$1,000)	54.8	18.0	53.8	18.6
WAGE FINANCIAL SECTOR (\$1,000)	109.4	60.9	108.5	63.4
DISTANCE FROM NEW YORK	11.4	15.1	13.3	16.8
# OBS	66,271		22,524	

Notes: This table provides summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis. Most fund variables follow the exact definition of the CRSP Mutual Fund Database. CRSP classifies each fund as retail or institutional fund, and we follow this definition. FUND MARKET SHARE is the market share of a fund in a given year, equal to  $\frac{100 * \text{FUND TNA}_{jt}}{\sum_j \text{FUND TNA}_{jt}}$  where FUND TNA is the fund's total net assets. FUND FEES are equal to regular expenses, plus one seventh of front- and rear-end fees charged by the family. FUND AGE is the number of years since the fund was established. FUND RETURN is the annual return of the fund. FUND TURNOVER is the fund turnover ratio, expressed as a percentage of the fund. FAMILY FUNDS is the number of funds offered by the fund family. FAMILY CATEGORIES is the number of Lipper categories in which the fund family offers at least one fund. FAMILY EXCESS RETURN is the asset-weighted, objective-adjusted average family abnormal return. FAMILY VARIANCE OF EXCESS RETURN is the asset-weighted, objective-adjusted variance of family abnormal returns. FAMILY TURNOVER is the asset-weighted average turnover across all the family's funds. TOTAL ESTABLISHMENTS is the number of establishments in the county corresponding to the zip code of the family address reported in CRSP. EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL SECTOR is the total employment in the financial sector in the county corresponding to the zip code of the family address reported in CRSP. WAGE is total payroll divided by total employment in the county corresponding to the zip code of the family address reported in CRSP. WAGE FINANCIAL SECTOR is total payroll in the financial sector divided by EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL SECTOR in the county corresponding to the zip code of the family address reported in CRSP. These last four variables are obtained from the County Business Patterns. DISTANCE FROM NEW YORK is the distance of the family address from New York City. All data refer to the years from 1999 to 2007.

TABLE 2: Demand Spillovers: Family Regressions, Retail Segment

	(1)	(2)
LOG (FAMILY FUNDS)	1.4816 (.2003)	
LOG (FAMILY CATEGORIES)		2.0126 (.2962)
LOG(FAMILY FEES)	-2.9583 (.5871)	-2.6735 (.6467)
FAMILY AGE	.0330 (.0092)	.0248 (.0089)
FAMILY EXCESS RETURN	.9222 (.3150)	.9911 (.3397)
FAMILY VARIANCE EXCESS RETURN	.2458 (.3139)	.2581 (.3244)
FAMILY TURNOVER	.0143 (.0394)	.0128 (.0412)
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS	YES	YES
# OBS	3,753	3,753
# FAMILIES	528	528

Notes: This table reports the results of Instrumental Variable regressions that investigate whether a family that offers more funds or categories than its rivals in the retail segment has a proportionally larger market share in the retail segment. Each observation corresponds to a family-year pair. The dependent variable is LOG(FAMILY MARKET SHARE), the log of a family's aggregate market share. All independent variables are defined in Section 5.1. The endogenous variables FAMILY FUNDS, FAMILY CATEGORIES, and FAMILY FEES are instrumented using the instruments described in the text. All regressions further include year fixed effects. The data refer to the years from 1999 to 2007. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the fund family level.

TABLE 3: Demand Spillovers: Fund Regressions, Retail Segment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
LOG (FAMILY FUNDS)	.2479 (.0936)		.4087 (.1060)		.3757 (.1077)		.7692 (.4042)	
LOG (FAMILY CATEGORIES)		.3170 (.1365)		.6008 (.1608)		.5345 (.1622)		1.4686 (.7969)
LOG(FUND FEES)	-1.8956 (.2639)	-1.8237 (.2628)	-4.0068 (.6715)	-3.8006 (.6625)	-2.2786 (.8219)	-2.0771 (.7934)	-1.2280 (.3137)	-1.2394 (.3103)
FUND RETURN	1.3359 (.1043)	1.3239 (.1040)	.6554 (.0636)	.6524 (.0635)	1.0942 (.1441)	1.1086 (.1413)		
FUND TURNOVER	-.0480 (.0118)	-.0428 (.0105)	-.0518 (.0118)	-.0459 (.0121)	-.0630 (.0112)	-.0555 (.0117)		
FUND AGE	.0830 (.0050)	.0823 (.0051)	.0724 (.0065)	.0711 (.0067)	.0866 (.0077)	.0861 (.0078)	.1753 (.0325)	.1504 (.0364)
FAMILY EXCESS RETURN	1.2196 (.3058)	1.2279 (.3053)	.3956 (.4213)	.4354 (.4203)	1.1267 (.4698)	1.1651 (.4637)	2.2998 (1.9101)	2.5717 (2.1219)
FAMILY VARIANCE EXCESS RETURN	-.2237 (.2664)	-.2350 (.2448)	.2569 (.2433)	.2531 (.2403)	-.1697 (.2717)	-.1909 (.2705)	-3.0000 (3.9430)	-1.3135 (4.9756)
FAMILY TURNOVER	.0453 (.0536)	.0475 (.0550)	.0428 (.0610)	.0587 (.0632)	.0096 (.0605)	.0218 (.0630)	-.9059 (.4624)	-.8483 (.4671)
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS	YES	YES	YES	YES	N/A	N/A	YES	YES
CATEGORY FIXED EFFECTS	NO	NO	YES	YES	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
CATEGORY-YEAR FIXED EFFECTS	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	N/A	N/A
# OBS	66,271	66,271	66,271	66,271	66,271	66,271	497	497
# FUNDS	10,768	10,768	10,768	10,768	10,768	10,768	78	78

Notes: This table reports the results of Instrumental Variable regressions that investigate whether a retail fund whose family offers more funds or categories than its rivals in the retail segment has a larger market share. Specifications (1)-(6) employ the sample of all retail mutual funds. Specifications (7) and (8) employ the sample of all retail S&P500 index funds. Each observation corresponds to a fund-year pair. The dependent variable is LOG(FUND MARKET SHARE), the log of a fund's market share, in all specifications. The independent variables are defined in Section 5.1. The endogenous variables FAMILY FUNDS, FAMILY CATEGORIES, and FUND FEES are instrumented using the instruments described in the text. All specifications also include year fixed effects; specifications (3) and (4) further include Lipper categories fixed effects; specifications (5) and (6) include fixed effects for each Lipper category-year pair. The data refer to the years from 1999 to 2007. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the fund family level.



TABLE 4: Demand Spillovers: Category Regressions, Retail Segment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
LOG (FAMILY FUNDS)	.4340 (.0862)		.6418 (.1437)		.6328 (.1381)		1.1477 (.5670)	
LOG (FAMILY CATEGORIES)		.6353 (.1338)		.9491 (.2180)		.9063 (.2117)		2.2886 (1.0852)
LOG(CATEGORY-FAMILY FEES)	-1.0530 (.3288)	-.9280 (.3331)	-1.5045 (.6750)	-1.3351 (.6975)	-1.6820 (.6399)	-1.3202 (.6615)	-.8889 (.2816)	-.9100 (.2485)
CATEGORY-FAMILY RETURN	1.5624 (.1071)	1.5415 (.1086)	.9452 (.0759)	.9629 (.0770)	1.4146 (.0759)	1.4099 (.1615)		
CATEGORY-FAMILY TURNOVER	-.0324 (.0105)	-.0261 (.0106)	-.0421 (.0114)	-.0331 (.0116)	-.0404 (.0113)	-.0306 (.0115)		
CATEGORY-FAMILY AGE	.0604 (.0048)	.0601 (.0048)	.0538 (.0068)	.0531 (.0067)	.0555 (.0064)	.0553 (.0064)	.1189 (.0595)	.0608 (.0741)
FAMILY EXCESS RETURN	.6460 (.2944)	.6920 (.2985)	1.0464 (.3044)	1.0603 (.3089)	.4889 (.3462)	.6087 (.3489)	6.0218 (2.3719)	6.6240 (2.6481)
FAMILY VARIANCE EXCESS RETURN	-.5217 (.2319)	-.4854 (.2470)	-.3207 (.3092)	-.2441 (.3320)	-.3704 (.2943)	-.3765 (.3198)	-12.1359 (5.1826)	-9.9457 (5.8704)
FAMILY TURNOVER	.0191 (.0408)	.0317 (.0425)	-.0067 (.0480)	.0126 (.0511)	-.0073 (.0456)	.0003 (.0487)	-1.3496 (.8537)	-1.4084 (.9225)
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS	YES	YES	YES	YES	N/A	N/A	YES	YES
CATEGORY FIXED EFFECTS	NO	NO	YES	YES	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
CATEGORY-YEAR FIXED EFFECTS	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	N/A	N/A
# OBS	23,888	23,888	23,888	23,888	23,888	23,888	285	285
# CATEGORY-FAMILY PAIRS	3,493	3,493	3,493	3,493	3,493	3,493	39	39

Notes: This table reports the results of Instrumental Variable regressions that investigate whether a category of retail funds offered by a family that offers more funds or categories than its rivals in the retail segment has a larger market share. Specifications (1)-(6) employ the sample of all retail category-family pairs. Specifications (7) and (8) employ the category of retail S&P500 index funds. Each observation corresponds to a category-family-year tuple. The dependent variable is LOG(CAT-FAM MARKET SHARE), the log of a family-category's market share, in all specifications. The independent variables are defined in Section 5.1. The endogenous variables FAMILY FUNDS, FAMILY CATEGORIES, and CATEGORY-FAMILY FEES are instrumented using the instruments described in the text. All specifications also include year fixed effects; specifications (3) and (4) further include Lipper categories fixed effects; specifications (5) and (6) include fixed effects for each Lipper category-year pair. The data refer to the years from 1999 to 2007. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the fund family level.

TABLE 5: Demand Spillovers: Family Regressions, Institutional Segment

	(1)	(2)
LOG (FAMILY FUNDS)	1.1540 (.4407)	
LOG (FAMILY CATEGORIES)		1.3750 (.5783)
LOG(FAMILY FEES)	-4.1425 (1.5450)	-4.4301 (1.5682)
FAMILY AGE	.0187 (.0259)	.0071 (.0243)
FAMILY EXCESS RETURN	1.5126 (.5478)	1.4366 (.5570)
FAMILY VARIANCE EXCESS RETURN	1.0796 (1.4942)	1.2517 (1.5843)
FAMILY TURNOVER	-.0355 (.1463)	-.0148 (.1483)
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS	YES	YES
# OBS	1,574	1,574
# FAMILIES	231	231

Notes: This table reports the results of Instrumental Variable regressions that investigate whether families that offer more institutional funds or categories have a proportionally larger aggregate market share in the institutional segment. Each observation corresponds to a family-year pair. The dependent variable is LOG(FAMILY MARKET SHARE), the log of a family’s aggregate market share. All independent variables are defined in Section 5.1. The endogenous variables FAMILY FUNDS, FAMILY CATEGORIES, and FAMILY FEES are instrumented using the instruments described in the text. All regressions further include year fixed effects. The data refer to the years from 1999 to 2007. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the fund family level.

TABLE 6: Demand Spillovers: Fund Regressions, Institutional Segment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
LOG (FAMILY FUNDS)	-.2580 (.2069)		-.4259 (.2670)		-.6434 (.3018)		.5880 (.4456)	
LOG (FAMILY CATEGORIES)		-.2560 (.3331)		-.6014 (.5363)		-.6984 (.5227)		.6319 (.4060)
LOG(FUND FEES)	-.8573 (.3810)	-.7669 (.4028)	-4.6212 (1.8641)	-4.5437 (2.1978)	-4.7364 (1.7431)	-4.0997 (1.9553)	-1.9303 (.6410)	-1.7120 (.3819)
FUND RETURN	.6165 (.2492)	.5201 (.2587)	.3964 (.1166)	.3883 (.1216)	.0354 (.2660)	.1711 (.2380)		
FUND TURNOVER	-.0603 (.0456)	-.0683 (.0445)	.0899 (.0888)	.0850 (.1064)	.0913 (.0847)	.0660 (.0976)		
FUND AGE	.1576 (.0224)	.1593 (.0220)	.1441 (.0326)	.1561 (.0320)	.1310 (.0325)	.1530 (.0310)	.1943 (.0474)	.1800 (.0450)
FAMILY EXCESS RETURN	.7631 (.5670)	.9190 (.5671)	-.9832 (.9095)	-1.0248 (1.1689)	-1.1178 (.9458)	-.9921 (1.1599)	-1.9303 (.6410)	-3.0160 (2.1930)
FAMILY VARIANCE EXCESS RETURN	-.4352 (1.7760)	-.5835 (1.6737)	3.2676 (2.1138)	3.4026 (2.3287)	2.9026 (2.0922)	2.7966 (2.2593)	20.3174 (14.4468)	8.8663 (11.4196)
FAMILY TURNOVER	.0467 (.1520)	.0375 (.1541)	.1986 (.2414)	.1847 (.2609)	.2191 (.2305)	.1953 (.2475)	-.8458 (.3486)	-.9633 (.2445)
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS	YES	YES	YES	YES	N/A	N/A	YES	YES
CATEGORY FIXED EFFECTS	NO	NO	YES	YES	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
CATEGORY-YEAR FIXED EFFECTS	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	N/A	N/A
# OBS	22,524	22,524	22,524	22,524	22,524	22,524	424	424
# FUNDS	4,366	4,366	4,366	4,366	4,366	4,366	67	67

Notes: This table reports the results of Instrumental Variable regressions that investigate whether an institutional fund whose family offers more funds or categories than its rivals in the institutional segment has a larger market share. Specifications (1)-(6) employ the sample of all institutional mutual funds. Specifications (7) and (8) employ the sample of all retail S&P500 index funds. Each observation corresponds to a fund-year pair. The dependent variable is LOG(FUND MARKET SHARE), the log of each fund's market share, in all specifications. The independent variables are defined in Section 5.1. The endogenous variables FAMILY FUNDS, FAMILY CATEGORIES, and FUND FEES are instrumented using the instruments described in the text. All specifications also include year fixed effects; specifications (3) and (4) further include Lipper categories fixed effects; specifications (5) and (6) include fixed effects for each Lipper category-year pair. The data refer to the years from 1999 to 2007. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the fund family level.

TABLE 7: Demand Spillovers: Category Regressions, Institutional Segment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
LOG (FAMILY FUNDS)	-.0177 (.2551)		-.3148 (.4459)		-.5099 (.4268)		.6529 (.5881)	
LOG (FAMILY CATEGORIES)		-.2752 (.3215)		-.3402 (.4610)		-.5285 (.4549)		.4375 (.9822)
LOG(CATEGORY-FAMILY FEES)	-1.4793 (.4454)	-1.5673 (.4477)	-4.5194 (1.7139)	-4.2032 (1.3311)	-6.2816 (1.8303)	-5.6920 (1.4888)	-1.5826 (.7525)	-1.6001 (1.0976)
CATEGORY-FAMILY RETURN	1.3569 (.2309)	1.3761 (.2332)	.6256 (.1323)	.6351 (.1219)	1.0448 (.2388)	1.0656 (.2372)		
CATEGORY-FAMILY TURNOVER	-.0527 (.0373)	-.0464 (.0361)	.0441 (.0642)	.0304 (.0510)	.0890 (.0665)	.0654 (.0542)		
CATEGORY-FAMILY AGE	.1238 (.0211)	.1238 (.0213)	.0898 (.0272)	.0922 (.0266)	.0933 (.0276)	.0959 (.0271)	.1191 (.0904)	.1129 (.1413)
FAMILY EXCESS RETURN	-.5278 (.5941)	-.6100 (.5952)	-.8515 (.6864)	-.8302 (.6540)	-1.8038 (.8612)	-1.7185 (.8214)	.1494 (1.8640)	1.3338 (1.7066)
FAMILY VARIANCE EXCESS RETURN	-.9032 (1.3842)	-1.0242 (1.3162)	1.5460 (1.6390)	1.4454 (1.5791)	2.7747 (1.7132)	2.5603 (1.6431)	-.1875 (9.9345)	-.6705 (9.7873)
FAMILY TURNOVER	-.0097 (.1511)	.0134 (.1461)	.0095 (.1991)	.0025 (.1872)	.1081 (.2048)	.0866 (.1928)	-1.0749 (.5240)	-.8771 (.5302)
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS	YES	YES	YES	YES	N/A	N/A	YES	YES
CATEGORY FIXED EFFECTS	NO	NO	YES	YES	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
CATEGORY-YEAR FIXED EFFECTS	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	N/A	N/A
# OBS	12,061	12,061	12,061	12,061	12,061	12,061	263	263
# CATEGORY-FAMILY PAIRS	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	38	38

Notes: This table reports the results of Instrumental Variable regressions that investigate whether a category of institutional funds offered by a family that offers more funds or categories than its rivals in the institutional segment has a larger market share. Specifications (1)-(6) employ the sample of all institutional category-family pairs. Specifications (7) and (8) employ the category of institutional S&P500 index funds. Each observation corresponds to a category-family-year triple. The dependent variable is LOG(CAT-FAM MARKET SHARE), the log of a family-category's market share, in all specifications. The independent variables are defined in Section 5.1. The endogenous variables FAMILY FUNDS, FAMILY CATEGORIES, and CATEGORY-FAMILY FEES are instrumented using the instruments described in the text. All specifications also include year fixed effects; specifications (3) and (4) further include Lipper categories fixed effects; specifications (5) and (6) include fixed effects for each Lipper category-year pair. The data refer to the years from 1999 to 2007. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the fund family level.

TABLE 8: Alternative Instruments: Family Regressions

	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
LOG (FAMILY FUNDS)	1.5098 (.1939)		1.2186 (.5326)	
LOG (FAMILY CATEGORIES)		2.0809 (.2889)		1.0190 (.6178)
LOG(FAMILY FEES)	-2.982 (.5895)	-2.6904 (.6672)	-3.4199 (1.3596)	-3.5357 (1.3459)
FAMILY AGE	.0337 (.0093)	.0258 (.0091)	.0298 (.0256)	.0125 (.0224)
FAMILY EXCESS RETURN	.9060 (.3126)	.9725 (.3402)	1.5424 (.5509)	1.4645 (.5387)
FAMILY VARIANCE EXCESS RETURN	.2614 (.3068)	.2772 (.3178)	.5687 (1.3881)	.2540 (1.4170)
FAMILY TURNOVER	.0186 (.0405)	.0196 (.0430)	-.0652 (.1330)	-.0476 (.1368)
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS	YES	YES	YES	YES
# OBS	3,753	3,753	1,574	1,574
# FAMILIES	528	528	231	231

Notes: This table reports the results of Instrumental Variable regressions that investigate whether families that offer more funds or categories have a proportionally larger aggregate market share. Specifications (1) and (2) refer to the retail segment; specifications (3) and (4) refer to the institutional segment. Each observation corresponds to a family-year pair. The dependent variable is LOG(FAMILY MARKET SHARE), the log of each family's aggregate market share in a given segment. The independent variables are defined in Section 5.1. The endogenous variables FAMILY FUNDS, FAMILY CATEGORIES, and FAMILY FEES are instrumented using the instruments described in the text. All regressions further include year fixed effects. The data refer to the years from 1999 to 2007. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the fund family level.

TABLE A1: The Relationship Between Family Product Variety and the Instruments

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	LOG (FAMILY FUNDS)		LOG (FAMILY CATEGORIES)	
FAMILY AGE	-.0301 (.0017)	-.0336 (.0042)	-.0182 (.0013)	-.0224 (.0031)
FAMILY EXCESS RETURN	-10.5670 (2.3411)	-6.6371 (5.5696)	-6.7710 (1.8144)	-7.9637 (4.5459)
FAMILY VARIANCE EXCESS RETURN	-9.6742 (5.1218)	-71.726 (20.0828)	-8.3555 (3.8464)	-57.9082 (16.3562)
FAMILY TURNOVER	-.0148 (.0145)	.0223 (.0394)	-.0182 (.0013)	.0143 (.0318)
LOG(EMPLOYMENT FINANCIAL SECTOR/100000)	1.0205 (.1118)	.9400 (.1499)	.7604 (.0814)	.7216 (.1181)
LOG(TOTAL NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS/100000)	-1.2996 (.1659)	-1.0196 (.2308)	-1.0166 (.1220)	-.8258 (.1772)
AVERAGE EXCESS RETURN OTHER FAMILIES	-4521.2 (982.2)	-1273.3 (984.8)	-2920.5 (763.9)	-1496.7 (806.0)
AVERAGE VARIANCE EXCESS RETURN OTHER FAMILIES	-3604.8 (2084.3)	-11751.7 (3408.7)	-3131.1 (1559.3)	-9477.9 (2778.2)
DISTANCE FROM NYC	.0026 (.0016)	.0037 (.0021)	.0025 (.0012)	.0028 (.0017)
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS	YES	YES	YES	YES
INDUSTRY SEGMENT	RETAIL	INSTITUTIONAL	RETAIL	INSTITUTIONAL
# OBS	3,753	1,574	3,753	1,574
# FAMILIES	528	231	528	231

Notes: This table reports the results of the first-stage regressions. The dependent variable is the log of number of retail funds offered by a family in specification (1); the log of number of institutional funds offered by a family in specification (2); the log of number of Lipper categories in which the fund family offers at least one retail fund in specification (3); and the log of number of Lipper categories in which the fund family offers at least one institutional fund in specification (4). The independent variables are defined in the text. All regressions further include year fixed effects. The data refer to the years from 1999 to 2007. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.