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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Modernist and/or avant-garde theatre turned its face towards language of the body to set theatre free from representing the text. One of the characteristics of avant-garde theatre is its emphasis on unconscious, instincts, dreams and thus on what is primitive. Theatre which is experienced physically, in other words, through the body, can touch the primitive side of human-being. Artaud considers physicality as an important aspect to find the unique voice of theatre as an art form. Artaud searched for a theatrical language which is free from the intentions of the author and text. He asserted that instead of representing another language, for instance the language of literature, theatre should find its own language. The language of the body was underlined as one of the ways to free theatre from the text. Artaud asserted that “speech before words” and physicality which cannot be expressed through words should be found. Thus, Artaud assumes that language of the body is equal to the physicality of the body and that the body and language are two distinct categories; there is a physicality which cannot be expressed through the words. All of these assumptions bring three important questions: where the body starts and language ends or vice versa, are the body and language distinct categories, can the physicality of the body be involved in language. Language of the body was frequently perceived as being equivalent to the physicality of the body. This perception considers the body and language as two distinct, separate categories. It is as if on the one hand, there is a written text and on the other hand, the physicality of the body. In a way, non-representational theatre was thought as if it frees itself from the text through the body. The fundamental distinction here is between the body and language. Beckett, in his plays, puts forward the fact that the physical existence of the body is not necessary for involving the physicality of the body on stage by blurring the boundary between the body and language. In other words, as well as language is presented as involving the physicality of the body, the body is portrayed as a textual

production by Beckett. After all, what does it mean to free theatre from literature? Since where the text starts and body ends or vice versa cannot be strictly determined, searching for a theatrical language by means of freeing it from the text is not the most convenient method.

There is difference between the performativity in everyday life and in theatre which can be explained through the theatrical frame. Other than constructing itself, Beckett's texts put themselves forward as a construction. The texts stage themselves through performing themselves as a construction. Inspired by Deleuze, one can say that Beckett's texts do not mean and represent anything definite, but act themselves out through making meaning and representation indefinite and/or impossible. Analyzing schizophrenic language is necessary to give an example for what it means for a text to act itself out. In this thesis, I analyze schizophrenic language through its power in blurring the distinction between the body and language. What comes from the inside, the body, and the outside, language, gets blurred in schizophrenic language. The physicality and materiality of language as creating meaning and meaning as being physical and material reveal themselves through schizophrenic language. The distinction between materiality and language cannot be attained in schizophrenic language. By making materiality and meaning "function together", schizophrenic language acts itself out rather than meaning and representing anything definite.

The poststructuralist theorists are significant to refer to discuss how it is impossible to draw a strict boundary between the body and language. First of all, the constructive and performative aspects of language together with the corporeality of language discussed by Derrida and Deleuze are necessary to refer to. After that, schizophrenic language will be analyzed in detail.

Chapter 2

A POSTSTRUCTURALIST CRITIQUE: LANGUAGE, REPRESENTATION AND REALITY

The distinction between representative and performative aspects of language can be delineated with reference to Derrida's and Deleuze's theories. Despite many differences between these two poststructuralist theorists, they both oppose the belief that language represents things. On the contrary, they emphasize how it constructs or makes things possible. Derrida asserts that meaning and subjectivity are produced by the endless play of signification and that everything is subjected to the system of differences. According to Deleuze, there is no origin and first term to be repeated, but the repetition of differences makes things appear. For both philosophers, things emerge as the result of the endless play of signification or as the result of the repetition of differences. According to Deleuze, linguistic differences is one of the many other 'imperceptible' differences while Derrida uses the concept 'difference' primarily in a linguistic context.

I will follow Derrida's category of the 'Western philosophical tradition' while referring to Aristotle's and Plato's conceptualizations of 'representation'. For Derrida, thinking through presence, "metaphysics of presence", is basically the first thing to be questioned while analyzing the Western tradition of thinking. What is the 'Western philosophical tradition' and how does Derrida oppose the thinking process of this tradition? It is useful to start discussing the general oppositions Western tradition has based its reasoning upon. Culler (1997) summarizes these as follows: "...Western philosophy has distinguished 'reality' from 'appearance', *things* themselves from *representations* of them, and *thought* from *signs* that express it" (Culler, 1997, p.9). Plato's and Aristotle's approaches illustrate the oppositions between reality and appearance, things and representations, thought and signs.

Plato defines reality and appearance as opposites. "Well sure, I could make the appearances, but not the reality and the truth of them" (Plato, 1998, p.361). Plato

(1998) starts discussing this by asking the meaning of 'portrayal'. He uses the objects couch and table as examples to display his thought. He distinguishes between couch/table and couchness/tableness. It can be inferred from Plato that couchness or tableness is reality, whereas couch or table is appearance. He distinguishes among the "couch in nature" (couchness, real couch, the aspect itself), the couch made by the craftsman and the couch made by the painter. According to Plato, couchness is the reality, the couch made by the craftsman is the appearance, and the one made by the painter is the reproduction of the appearance. Thus, the appearances that artists reproduce are at a "third remove from nature" (Plato, p. 363). Therefore, artistic representation is the portrayal of an appearance or an image rather than being the portrayal of reality. Plato defines reality as the aspect of something that makes it itself. He indicates that it is the couchness or tableness, not a couch or a table. Through his 'allegory of the cave', Plato (1998) states that the things we see in this world are actually illusions of reality. The shadows of the objects on the wall of the cave are perceived as real objects by the people living in the cave. What we see around us are not the real things, they are only illusions. While talking about the example of the couch, Plato says that "there are different ways it appears, but it's not different itself". "The way it appears" is how it is seen by the viewer. Thus, the visual images of objects are appearances, they are not reality. "Is a couch any different from itself if you look at it from the side or from the front or from any other angle? That is, there's no difference in it, even though it appears different" (Plato, p.363). Then, according to Plato, our visual sense is not reliable; truth cannot be acquired through sensory experience. He indicates that the way physical characteristics of the objects appear to us through visual experience are subjective while the objective can only be reached through measurement, which is "a function of the reasoning aspect of the soul" (Plato, p.370). This is a dualistic approach to the mind-body problem. Body as the totality of sense organs is not a reliable source of knowledge and truth. Thus, according to Plato, truth can only be grasped through the reasoning aspect of the mind. The body and/or sensory experiences are not reliable. It can be said that the mind is involved with reality whereas the body perceives and interacts with appearances. Thus, according to Plato, there may be different ways a couch as a visual image appears to our senses, but in reality the couch is not different. The mind/body opposition corresponds to the reality/appearance

opposition.

As well as Plato, Aristotle who conceptualizes mimesis as an imitation and representation of the original defines art as mirroring and representing reality: “In his *Poetics*, Aristotle follows Plato in defining all art as mimesis. His list of imitative arts includes such disparate forms as poetry, painting, theater, dance, music, sculpture, as well as epic and other kinds of narrative” (Puetz, 2002). The other opposition which is fundamental to our discussion in this thesis is that between reality and language. Aristotle defines language as a medium of imitation. Signs are defined by their function of representing reality in Western traditional thinking. Thought, truth and reality are represented by signs.

Signs or representations, in this view, are but a way to get at reality, truth, or ideas, and they should be as transparent as possible; they should not get in the way, should not affect or infect the thought or truth they represent.
(Culler, p.9).

Aristotle's remarks on imitation in poetry emphasize the transparency issue Culler mentions. Heath (1996) summarizes Aristotle's ideas as follows: “Poetry is imitation; it seeks to create likenesses, and the likeness is greater if the words involved in the action are presented directly rather than being mediated by a narrator” (Heath, 1996, p.xii). The language and reality opposition can be clearly seen in Aristotle's conception of 'mimesis', which is an imitation of an object on the basis of likeness. The definition of the concept mimesis by Aristotle shows that there are objects and imitations of them. Aristotle defines imitation as a natural possession giving us pleasure. Aristotle asserts that imitation is pleasurable, because understanding is pleasant. Heath (1996) explains the relation between imitation and understanding as follows : “A likeness is likeness of something; to take part in the activity of making and responding to likenesses we must recognize the relationship between the likeness and its object” (Heath, p.xiii). In other words, there should be some familiarity with the object to understand and take pleasure from its imitation. While referring to painting, Aristotle indicates that the visual images in the painting are imitations of objects. It can be inferred from this that there are real objects in the world and representations of these objects. In painting, the medium of imitation is color and shape, whereas in other arts the “medium of imitation is rhythm, language and melody” (Aristotle, 1996 p.3). Language is defined as a medium of imitation, so reality is imitated and represented through language. Here too, the strict

distinction between reality and language can be seen. After the general overview of reality/appearance, things/representations and thought/sign oppositions, I would like to talk about poststructuralists' approach to these oppositions.

First, Derrida asserts that all the oppositions which form the basis of our reasoning process should be deconstructed. These binary oppositions belong to metaphysical thought. According to Derrida (1978), metaphysical thinking depends on the assumption of “a foundation, a first principle, an essence” which grounds thinking. The assumption that there is a truth, and an essence that grounds knowledge and representation is the “metaphysics of presence”. Any system of thought that is based on the existence of a center pointing to a fixed origin is metaphysical. “If this is so, the entire history of the concept of structure, before the rupture which we are speaking, must be thought of as a series of substitutions of center for center...” (Derrida, 1978 p.279). Then, Western metaphysics is the history of a “series of substitutions of center for center”. The center which is assumed to be existing takes on different names in Western philosophy up to Derrida. However, when we think of displacements and substitutions in the signification system, we see that “a central presence...has always already been exiled from itself into its own substitute” (Derrida, p.280). The absence of the center makes the endless play of signification possible. There is no center and origin that 'grounds the play of substitutions'. The sign replaces the center, which is absent and which must be supplemented. Derrida indicates that “the sign which replaces the center in the absence of center” is a supplement. Thus, there is an excess, a surplus on the part of signifiers compared to signifieds. Derrida asserts that the movement of signification supplements a lack on the part of the signified: “The movement of signification adds something, which results in the fact that there is always more...” (Derrida, p.289). “The substitute does not substitute itself for anything which has somehow existed before it” (Derrida, p.280). Then, the substitute is not the substitute of an origin or a center. This is very important, because it means that there is no hidden truth or origin behind substitutions and meaning is always being produced through the movement of substitutions. For instance, Derrida indicates that Therese -Rousseau's lover- about whom Rousseau in his *Confessions* write about cannot be thought as the substitute of Rousseau's mother since the love towards the mother is also a supplement rather than being an origin and/or natural love: “*Therese herself be already a*

supplement. As Mamma was already the supplement of an unknown mother, and as the “true mother” herself...was also in a certain way supplement” (Derrida, 1998 ,p.156). The psychoanalytic view would interpret Therese as the substitute for the real mother. Thus, according to this view, there is a real mother, independent of substitutions, and her lack is supplemented through the substitution of Therese. Derrida reverses this causal relationship and he indicates that there is not any original, real mother that is substituted by Therese, but the play of substitutions in language in the absence of a center produces the sense of the real mother. To put it simply, it can be said that the existence of the mother is dependent on the play of substitutions, it is not that there is a real mother independent of substitutions or system of differences. There is not any transcendental real that exceeds the text; the excess itself is created through the endless substitutions.

Derrida underlines the binary oppositions behind Rousseau's reasoning. The first opposition is that of presence and absence. Derrida indicates that Rousseau equates speech and voice with presence while equating writing with absence and death. This equation leads him to define writing as something that is added to speech: “...speech being natural or at least the natural expression of thought...writing is added to it, is adjoined, as an image or representation” (Derrida, 1998, p.144). Derrida indicates that Western philosophical tradition has always valued speech over writing; because speech comes directly from the body of the speaker, it is immediate and vivid. Thus, speech is thought to be the authentic and unmediated way of communication. Derrida opposes this understanding by asserting that writing is prior to speech. The reason for assuming the priority of speech is the assumed connection between presence and speech. Derrida says that the assumed naturalness of presence is self-sufficient according to Rousseau. Thus, there is no need for it to be supplemented, because substitution will never be equal to the real; presence is the essence and it cannot be replaced. Writing means absence while speech is to be present. He points out how "voice becomes a metaphor of truth and authenticity, and a source of self-presence" (Sarup, 1996, p.65). Speech, however, does not denote presence, because presence and absence are possible only through the system of differences. Thus, we cannot talk about any presence which is independent of language. It exists as the outcome of the system of differences. Yet since meaning is deferred endlessly, presence can never be present or it is present as well as

absent. Sarup (1996) states that from Nietzsche to Derrida, the human subject is being abandoned and that there is a shift from the subject to the text. Everything is language. Meaning is not there as an origin, and a ground, it is created through the system of differences. Plato says that “there are different ways it appears, but it's not different itself” while talking about the couches that craftsmen make. However, according to Derrida, it is the difference that makes it a couch. The “difference” and “deferral” within the “movement of supplementarity” makes meaning impossible. However, meaning itself is created through the “endless play of significations”, thus meaning, as well as being impossible, is made possible through the signification system. “Something promises itself as it escapes, gives itself as it moves away, and strictly speaking it cannot even be called presence...The supplement is maddening because it is neither presence nor absence...” (Derrida, 1998, p. 155). Derrida criticizes Saussure by saying that there is not a stable and predictable relationship between a signifier and a signified. Signifier becomes signified and signified signifies another signifier and this goes forever. Thus, meaning travels along the signification chain, “the chain of supplements”. It is not that there is a thing, a real referent in the outside world and a signifier signifies that real thing. Things are created/constructed, and recreated/reconstructed everytime. Derrida puts forward the concept “différance” which makes meaning impossible, because there is always going to be an excess. According to him, play disrupts presence, because there is always an excess when you think of play of significations, there is something that escapes “the structurality of the sign”. The possibility of presence and absence through language is significant to argue against the assumption that writing simply represents what was present in itself: “...the signifier 'dog' indicates the idea 'dog', but the real dog, the referent, is not present. In Derrida's view the sign marks an absent presence” (Sarup, p.69). The present is impossible. Because of the excess, meaning will always be deferred. Yet, meaning is produced through deferral and difference, thus it is there. The coexistence of presence and absence deconstructs the presence/absence opposition. Also, we cannot talk about any presence and absence outside of the text. This is why the real dog, the referent is not present, because the signifier dog, by differing from other signifiers, slides along the signification system as a supplement. The signifier dog neither represents 'real dog' nor complements it. The signifier is within the text and since there is nothing outside of the

text, there is nothing that can be called as the 'real dog'. Here too, the opposition reality/language -in terms of reality being the real and language being the representation of the real- gets deconstructed. The 'real dog' is actually nothing other than the 'signifier dog'. We are in the reality of the text. Language creates the dog. Thus, language is performative.

Austin defines performative utterances as utterances which perform and do something and which are not to be evaluated on the basis of truth or descriptive value. He gives the statement 'I do' in wedding ceremonies as an example to the performative utterance. By saying 'I do' in a wedding ceremony, the person becomes married. Thus, the statement 'I do' does something. However, the difficulty of trying to draw a strict boundary between performative and constative utterances causes Austin to leave this dichotomy aside. Miller (2001) indicates that the most important discovery of Austin in *How to Do Things with Words* was the abandonment of this dichotomy and the awareness that the two categories are actually contaminated. In other words, every constative claim is performative and every performative claim is constative to some extent. To summarize; more than doing things with words, words do things. In other words, language does not represent reality but it constructs reality. It performs an act.

Deleuze is another poststructuralist philosopher who questions the concept representation in relation to the constructive aspect of language. Deleuze (1994) says that movement is repetition which generates itself through the disguises. In other words, repetition constitutes itself by moving from one mask to the other. This movement includes the differences since repetition is actually the repetition of differences. When a work produces movement within itself, it produces something new. When it is the repetition of differences, nothing can represent the other. New connections form and then break away in the continuous movement and flow of energies. Repetition takes the place of representation. Nothing represents the other, everything does something. By way of illustration, Deleuze, cites Nietzsche, whom he sees as one of those philosophers who found new ways of doing philosophy. The production of action and movement lies at the center of this new philosophy.

They want to put metaphysics in motion, in action. They want to make it act, and make it carry out immediate acts. It is not enough, therefore, for them to propose a new representation of movement; representation is already mediation. Rather, it is a question of producing within the work a movement

capable of affecting the mind outside of all representation... it is a question of making movement itself a work...They invent an incredible equivalent of theatre within philosophy...(Deleuze, 1994, p.8)

Philosophy becomes the production of movement and action. No element of reflection or representation takes part in it. Then it could be concluded that movement as a repetition is staged in Nietzsche's philosophy. It is not represented, but it emerges as it is being acted out. According to Deleuze, philosophy is an act of creation and construction, and what it creates and constructs are the concepts. However, it is not to say that there is an idea that is represented via dramatization. It is to say that a concept is constructed and created through staging and movement. "It [repetition] is not underneath the masks, but is formed from one mask to another..." (Deleuze, p.17). Deleuze (1994) defines Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* as "theatre within philosophy" because everything in the text is put into action and is visualized, thus it can be thought of as a text for the stage as well as philosophy.

Remember the song of Ariadne from the mouth of the old Sorcerer: here, two masks are superimposed- that of a young woman, almost of a Kor which has just been laid over the mask of a repugnant old man. The actor must play the role of an old man playing the role of the Kore. Here too, for Nietzsche, it is a matter of filling the inner emptiness of the mask within a theatrical space: by multiplying the superimposed masks and inscribing the omnipresence of Dionysus in that superimposition... When Nietzsche says that the Overman resembles Borgia rather than Parsifal, or when he suggests that the Overman belongs at once to both the Jesuit Order and the Prussian officer corps, we can understand these texts only by taking them for what they are: the remarks of a director indicating how the Overman should be 'played'" (Deleuze, p.9)

The movement from one mask to the other, from the mask of Ariadne to the mask of the sorcerer gives birth to new connections. Deleuze says that a work should produce, or rather be this movement. Deleuze indicates that the superimposition of two masks, masks of a young woman and of an old man and the multiplication of masks with the presence of Dionysus in that imposition appears via the movement from one mask to the other. Repetition constitutes itself by moving from one mask to another, from one point to the other and this movement includes the differences. Everything is in a state of becoming, and in a state of flux, nothing is 'is'. That is to say, the text does not describe, explain and represent how to be the Overman, but it acts it out.

Description and explanation of a text is related to finding a coherent meaning in the text. Deleuze indicates that meaning is an interpretation which closes the zones of indetermination. The zones of indetermination, and the zones of indiscernibility appear only when all the possibilities exist together. Deleuze indicates that what cannot be codified and what escapes meaning can only be found through the zones of indetermination, and the zones of indiscernibility. He opposes interpretation, because it is to say 'this means that, but not the other'. His logic is not exclusive, it is inclusive; one possibility does not exclude the other. This is why it cannot be said 'this means that, but not this other'; it could be both this and the other and none of them, all at the same time (Bogue, 1989). Protevi (1999) makes a distinction between exclusive and inclusive disjunction. The traditional oppositional logic is exclusive operating through 'either-or' while the schizo logic is inclusive operating through 'either...or...or..or'. Thus the schizo logic includes "system of possible permutations and differences that amount to the same as they shift and slide about" (Protevi, 1999, p.2). The disjunctive synthesis is the togetherness of the possibilities that does not seem to match; either x or y or z or... Deleuze says that schizo-logic is inclusive by being open to all the possibilities and connections by "either..or...or...or..." while classical logic excludes all the possibilities and/or reduces them into two by "either...or". Thus, the reason why Deleuze opposes interpretation is that it is a process of exclusion. Only one possibility among the many is chosen and the text is not permitted to multiply, because that one possibility excludes and effaces the others. Thus is the aim should be not to find representations, symbols, analogies, metaphors that signify some definite meaning. On the contrary, his aim is to make meaning indefinite and to find out how each time new connections form and then break down.

It will be useful at this point to review Deleuze's distinct way of reading Freud's case study "wolf-man", because his objection against the psychoanalytic method reveals his ideas on how to multiply the text. My aim here is not to criticize psychoanalytic theory through using Deleuze's theory. However Deleuze's way of reading Freud's case analysis is important to notice how he subverts the representational value of a text. Psychoanalytic method is concerned with substitutions and metaphors. In psychoanalysis, the wolf, horse or any other symbol is perceived as a substitute that masks a threatening reality. Dream analysis is the most apparent indicator of the search

for metaphors and substitutions. The threat of a conflict prevents any direct signification, so there are displacement and condensation in dreams. The psychoanalytic view deals with the psychic reality which is concealed behind different masks. Psychoanalytic view tries to reveal the hidden meaning and logic behind the symbols. Freud (1899/2004) makes a distinction between manifest and latent dream content. As the name implies, the manifest dream content is the apparent meaning of dreams. In other words, it is the actual story as it is seen by the dreamer. The latent dream content is the hidden meaning which reveals itself only after the analysis of the dreams. Freud (1899/2004) talks about the tools of representation in dreams. These are condensation, displacement, representation and symbols. In his case study of the “wolf-man”, he indicates that the wolf in the dream symbolizes “wolf-man's” father and he explains the “wolf-man's” anxiety with reference to the castration anxiety and the oedipal complex (Freud, 1914/1998). Thus, according to the psychoanalytic view, behind the rich imagery of the dream there is one, major problem which is the fixation in the oedipal stage. Deleuze (1980/1988) opposes Freud by saying that he reduces multiplicities to one; to the father, oedipal complex, or castration anxiety. The enriching visuality of the dream is being reduced to the father-child relationship. Deleuze (1980/1988) asserts that the wolf-multiplicity cannot be reduced to the oedipal complex. On the contrary, it is a state of becoming; of becoming wolf. According to Deleuze, the wolf is not a metaphor hiding some reality that is behind it. He asserts that masks do not hide anything, but other masks. Deleuze does not read Freud's “wolf- man” to find out what the wolf symbolizes, represents or signifies. He does not take the wolf as a metaphor and does not try to find out any hidden reality behind the dream. Deleuze (1988) says that things are not metaphors or representations, but everything remains within itself. There are beings in themselves. He indicates that the wolf should not be taken as symbolizing the father, but the text should be read without effacing the state of becoming. “Becoming-wolf” is a multiplicity that should not be reduced to one definite meaning (Deleuze, 1988, p.28). The zone of becoming-wolf is the zone of indetermination and it gives birth to new possibilities. Thus, the wolf does not mean anything, it is a multiplication. Deleuze thinks that Freud's “wolf-man” should be read in terms of “becoming-wolf”, becoming inhuman; the deterritorialization of the human through “becoming wolf” and of the wolf through becoming human. “Lines of flight or of deterritorialization,

becoming-wolf, becoming-inhuman, deterritorialized intensities: that is what multiplicity is. To become wolf or to become hole is to deterritorialize oneself following distinct but entangled lines” (Deleuze, p.32). For instance, a wasp becomes deterritorialized when it is on an orchid because it becomes part of the flower's reproductive system. But at the same time, it reterritorializes the orchid, which was also deterritorialized by the wasp when the wasp became part of it, by carrying its pollen. Again, the orchid reterritorializes the wasp by making it carry its own pollen, because the wasp feeds on pollen. There is a continuous deterritorialization and reterritorialization among things. Just as we cannot talk about a wasp and an orchid as separate beings, we should not think of the wolf and the human being as two separate entities, -one of them representing the other. There is no origin, no first term that is to be substituted, displaced, and disguised. Repetition repeats difference. There is no representation and mimesis of the original: “There is only repetition that constitutes itself by disguising itself”(Deleuze, p.17). So, there is repetition repeating difference, there is no first thing that can be isolated and repeated. In other words, the father in Freud's case study is not an origin or a first term which is represented by the wolf. According to Deleuze, the wolf-multiplicity cannot be reduced to the father, it is state of becoming.

Deleuze also refers to Freud's case study of Dora by indicating that Freud explains the disguised repetition from Dora's father to Herr. K. by means of the notions of id, ego and superego. Thus, according to Freud, this “disguised repetition” is the result of some first, basic oppositions. Deleuze opposes Freud's theory by saying that “there is no first term which is to be repeated”. According to Freud, K. in Dora's case is the father substitute, and therefore Dora imagines K. seducing her. In this kind of analysis, the young girl's love towards her father is perceived as existing independently of repetition. However, according to Deleuze, there is nothing independent of repetition and no first thing to be repeated. Using the word 'cause' may be wrong, because repetition and difference are not origin according to Deleuze, however for the purpose of explanation, it could be said that repetition is the cause of Dora's love for her father. In other words, only through repetition, Dora's love for the father appears. Thus, Dora's love for the father is not an origin or first term, but it is a repetition and can only be understood in “relation to masks”. Thus the repetition makes things appear. For instance, the child's love for the mother is not to be repeated and substituted by love for

another woman. On the contrary, repetition gives birth to the love of the mother:

even our childhood love for the mother repeats other adult loves with regard to other women...There is therefore nothing repeated which may be isolated or abstracted from the repetition...There is no bare repetition which may be abstracted or inferred from the disguise itself” (Deleuze, 1994, p.17)

The distinction between psychoanalytic perspective and Deleuze's theory is not discussed to value one over the other, however Deleuze's reading of a text, *wolf-man* or *Dora*, suggests a completely new way of reading which prevents the reader from searching for metaphors, symbols and analogies that represents any hidden reality. Thus, Deleuze's perspective enables the reader to explore the text as a construction which creates new ways of thinking instead of sticking to any pre-determined meaning. Deleuze puts forward the importance of the coexistence of distinct possibilities against the descriptions, explanations and definite meanings. Thus, instead of searching for a definite meaning, Beckett's texts will be analyzed on the basis of its formal qualities through the new way Deleuze opens in terms of reading a text.

Despite many important distinctions between Derrida and Deleuze, they both argue against the idea of 'representation', they both deconstruct reality and appearance, thing and representation, thought and sign oppositions. Most importantly for our discussion here, they attribute to language both a constructive and a deconstructive force. They do not theorize language only as representing reality. For both of them every work of art or literature does something, rather than being the representation of reality. Derrida and Deleuze differ in their ideas of how to read and write, but in terms of not looking for metaphors, substitutions, and representations, they resemble each other. However, they both put forward distinct and interesting ideas about how to read and write a text. If we return to the discussion of what it means for a text to do something, there is one very clear distinction between how Plato, and Aristotle on the one hand, and Derrida and, Deleuze on the other hand -without forgetting the fact that the pairs also differ among themselves- conceive any work of art and literature. This distinction can be explained through the concept 'representation'. Plato and Aristotle protect the strict boundary between fiction and reality whereas the boundary is effaced or blurred in Derrida and Deleuze. To generalize and simplify, the distinction between these two ways of thinking can be summarized as the difference between influence and

construction. A work of art or literature influences the viewer, performer, writer or reader in terms of their ideas and feelings in Plato and Aristotle whereas they construct and form what is called 'reality' in Derrida and Deleuze. Thus, both for Derrida and Deleuze there is no reality that can be represented. However, there is one thing that I would like to emphasize strongly: Derrida and Deleuze are used as pairs not to equalize them. These two theorists are quite different from each other. However, even though through distinct ways, they both oppose the representative, mimetic nature of language and they free themselves from the traditional ways of thinking and doing philosophy.

Chapter 3

CORPOREALITY OF LANGUAGE AND LANGUAGE OF CORPOREALITY SCHIZOPHRENIA AS A CORPOREAL LANGUAGE

Deleuze says that other than being a philosophical text *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* can also be thought of as a work for the stage. It is actually the “equivalent of theatre within philosophy”. According to Deleuze (1994), *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* can only be understood if it is perceived as the notes of a director on how the character Overman should be played. It should be understood to the extent that we as readers should be hearing the “cries of the higher man”. The text does not describe, explain and represent how to be the Overman, but acts it out. In other words, the text acts itself, it is “put into motion” (Deleuze, p.8) The Overman is made visible and audible through the corporeality of language or rather through the language that is made corporeal in the text. A text is put into action or it acts itself out only if it resists being evaluated within the constraints of meaning and representation. Similar to what Deleuze says for Nietzsche's text, schizophrenic language by resisting to meaning and representation transforms language into a gesture through making language act itself out. Schizophrenic language resists being attributed a definite meaning as well as resisting any kind of interpretation by continuously deconstructing itself. Schizophrenic language effaces the boundary between the body and language by making corporeal and incorporeal elements function together. The relationship among signifiers in schizophrenic speech is not constituted on the basis of meaning but rather on the basis of the materiality of words. By being devoid of meaning, schizophrenic language deterritorializes the social norms, laws and rules of major language. Thus, schizophrenic language may be defined as a “foreign language”. Deleuze (1988) talks about placing linguistic, incorporeal and non-linguistic, corporeal elements in variation while creating a “foreign language”. Putting incorporeal and corporeal elements in variation means to

make them “function together”. In other words, it is to make corporeal and incorporeal elements interact each other. Gestures, speeds, and intervals are some examples of non-linguistic elements. There can be gestures, cries, and silences in a text, but according to Deleuze, writing means to transform a text into a gesture, cry and silence. It can be concluded, inspired from Deleuze, that the text becomes a constructed or a self-constructing body. However, this is different from claiming that language constructs the body or that everything is language. On the contrary, the text can be made to act to the extent that language becomes a gesture, cry or silence. According to Deleuze, when a text is put into action, it does not represent these non-linguistic, corporeal elements but transforms itself into them or becomes them. I think when language is made to act instead of mean, the distinction between the body and language gets effaced. Schizophrenia is a good example to illustrate what is meant by the effacement of the boundary between the body and language, because it is the inability to coordinate between materiality and signification. Materialization of the fragmented body and subject through the physicality of language is where the distinction between the body and language gets lost. What does it mean to make language corporeal? How is language made to act?

Deleuze makes a distinction between making language stammer and stammering in speech: “It's easy to stammer, but making language itself stammer is a different affair; it involves placing all linguistic, and even non-linguistic, elements in variation, both variables of expression and variables of content” (Deleuze, 1988, p.98). As it was mentioned in the preceding paragraph, putting non-linguistic and linguistic elements in variation is to put these elements into interaction. Deleuze gives the example of knife cutting the flesh to the corporeal transformations: “When knife cuts flesh, when food or poison spreads through the body, when a drop of wine falls into the water, there is an intermingling of bodies” (Deleuze, p. 86). The connection between knife and flesh, food/poison and internal organs, wine and water is the corporeal transformation. On the other hand, there are incorporeal transformations. The statement “knife is cutting the flesh” can be given as an example to incorporeal transformations. The statement “knife is cutting the flesh” does not represent or signify the corporeal elements. Thus, there is not any signifier-signified relation between corporeal and incorporeal elements. Deleuze states that there is a continuous interaction between them. For instance, the juridical

decision does not represent or signify the defendant's guilt. The judgement given in the form of a death sentence does not represent the guilt of the defendant. Let's suppose that the crime of the defendant was to shoot someone in the head. Here the connection between the hand machine, gun machine and head machine can be thought of as a corporeal transformation. Or suppose that the defendant is condemned to death and that he will be hanged. When the rope actually squeezes his neck, the connection between the rope machine and the neck machine is built. Because this connection is bodily, it is a corporeal transformation. However, the statement of the jury as "he is condemned to death" is an example to incorporeal and non-linguistic elements. If there is not any representational relation between incorporeal and corporeal elements, then what does it mean to place them in variation? Putting these elements in variation means to provide an interaction between gesture, speed, interval and linguistic elements. In other words, it is to make corporeal and incorporeal elements function together to the extent that language becomes the "cries of the higher man", "silence", "music", and "painful waiting". According to Deleuze, linguistic and non-linguistic elements should be placed in variation to make language stammer. Making language stammer means "to draw from it [language] cries, shouts, pitches, durations, timbres, accents, intensities" (Deleuze, p.104). Foreign language by making corporeal and incorporeal elements function together transforms language into "cries of the higher man", "silence", "music", and "painful waiting".

Deleuze says that writing means pushing the language, the syntax, all the way to a particular limit, a limit that can be a language of silence, or a language of music, or a language that's for example, a painful waiting.
(Stivale, 2003)

The relationship among signifiers in schizophrenic language is not constituted on the basis of meaning but rather on the basis of the materiality of words. Schizophrenic language resists being evaluated within the constraints of meaning and representation, thus schizophrenic language makes it impossible to find representations, symbols, analogies, metaphors that signify some meaning. By making language physical and material, schizophrenic language puts a text into action. How can we define schizophrenic language and how does schizophrenic language make language material and physical?

Before explaining schizophrenia as a psychotic disorder in detail, I would like to clarify that I do not propose schizophrenia as a positive or a negative state of being. The way schizophrenic people experience the world is usually expressed as very painful, thus I do not propose schizophrenia as a sublime state of being as well as not labeling this kind of an existence as negative or abnormal. I just approach schizophrenic language as a different and distinct way of language use and evaluate schizophrenic language as it is without making any interpretation on the difficulty of the emotional state of being schizophrenic. As a psychotic disorder, schizophrenia is the fragmentation of the body and the subject in relation to the loss of the distinction between the self and the other, the inside and the outside, the subject and the object. The absence of the sense of an unified self determines the distinct way of language use in schizophrenic people. Schizophrenia, which is the absence of a stable identity, is a continuous 'becoming'. Like the wolf-multiplicity that Deleuze explains by criticizing Freud's approach, schizophrenia is a multiplication of identities in the absence of a stable ego and unified self. The relationship between the formation of the ego and language acquisition is significant to understand the relation between schizophrenic language and the fragmented self. Jameson's approach to schizophrenia is very different from Deleuze's, but the part in which he explains language use by schizophrenic people sheds light on Deleuze's idea of placing linguistic and non-linguistic elements in variation. Jameson follows Lacan's conceptualization of schizophrenia as a language disorder. According to Lacan, the mirror stage is a pre-linguistic stage where there is a complete unification with the mother and where the child does not have any identity independent of the mother; s/he is the desire of the mother. The child can have his/her own desire only after s/he is subjected to the rules of language in the symbolic order. When s/he is separated from the mother by the name of the father, the child is transformed from being the desire of the mother to an individual who desires the mother (Tura, 1996). In other words, the child can have his/her own desire only after s/he enters the symbolic stage in which language acquisition occurs. Only after the separation, the mother becomes a lack for the child. Schizophrenic individuals lack the necessary lack to have a separate identity, because they do not complete the oedipalization process and enter the symbolic order. The necessary identification with the law of the father through whom the norms and rules of the society is recognized is

absent in schizophrenic individuals. This absence prevents the formation of the superego and ego. According to Lacan, the fixation in the mirror stage and the rejection of the symbolic order due to the absence of the name of the father are the reasons that lie beneath schizophrenia. Wrobel also attracts attention to the problematic relationship between schizophrenic individuals and their fathers: "Conversations with schizophrenic subjects have shown that the word 'father' is used and understood by them in a very special way" (Wrobel, 1990, p.41). In the mirror stage, the child hits another child, but s/he indicates that it was the other who hit him/her: "He says Francois hit me, whereas it was him who hit Francois" (Welton, 1999, p. 213). An individual who does not have a sense of self cannot have a sense of the other. In schizophrenia, the results of the absence of any distinction between subject/object, inside/outside, self/other and the breakdown of time-space unity are depersonalization, derealization and detemporalization. The communication conventions "I-here-now" of the 'normal' subject do not exist in schizophrenic language: 'I' becomes equal to 'he/she/other', 'here' to 'there/somewhere' and 'now' to 'before/after' (Wrobel, 1990). Thus, as Wrobel emphasizes, schizophrenics do not care to whom they are talking to, and about what and how they are talking. Wrobel states that for a speech or a text to communicate any meaning, there should be a sender, receiver, topic, purpose and style. When there is no difference between the sender and receiver, in other words, when I is equal to you and s/he, we cannot talk about any topic, purpose or style of communication.

Lacan indicates that "meaning emerges only through discourse...displacements along a signifying chain" (Sarup, p. 23). Thus, as Jameson mentions "what we generally call the signified is...generated and projected by the relationship of signifiers among themselves" (Jameson, 1998, p. 26). Then, the 'signified' is the relation between signifiers. In schizophrenic language there is no relationship of signifiers among themselves and this is the breakdown in the signifying chain that Jameson mentions: "When that relationship breaks down, when the links of the signifying chain snap, then we have schizophrenia in the form of a rubble of distinct and unrelated signifiers" (Jameson, p.26). As Jameson indicates, there are pure material signifiers and signifiers in isolation in schizophrenic communication. Because signifiers are circulated continuously without any relation among themselves in schizophrenic language, the meaning that would have arisen from this relationship is effaced. Felman's (2003)

interpretations about how madness takes place in discourse are parallel to Jameson's: "...as a passion for the signifier, as a repetition of signs -without regard for what is signified" (Felman, p. 108). Thus, schizophrenic communication can be defined by the eclipse of signifieds or referents. Felman describes the madman's discourse as the "functional possibility of permutation of signifiers". Distinct signifiers are combined on the basis of their sounds, rhythm and musicality, which arises from the materiality of words.

Again, in normal speech, we try to see through the materiality of words (their strange sounds and printed appearance, my voice timbre and peculiar accent, and so forth) towards their meaning. As meaning is lost, the materiality of words becomes obsessive..." (Jameson, p. 138).

The absence of the signifieds and the different possibilities of combination of signifiers on the basis of the materiality of words prevent schizophrenic language from signifying anything other than itself. Language stops being a tool of communication in the absence of signifieds. Language refers back to its own materiality and physicality. Communicating a coherent meaning is not the ultimate goal of language use when signifiers are combined on the basis of their materiality. The sound, rhythm and musicality of the words determine the flow of the sentences in schizophrenic communication instead of the motivation and goal of the speaker. It is as if language is speaking without taking the speaker into consideration or as if the speaker finds out what s/he is going to say through the physicality of the words. The examples that Andreasen (1979) gives are crucial to quote here to see the sentence flow in schizophrenic language:

*question: Can we talk for a few minutes?
answer: Talk for a few minutes.*

I'm not trying to make noise. I am trying to make sense. If you can't make sense out of nonsense, well, have fun.

I'll think I'll put on my hat, my hat, my hat, my hat, my hat, my hat... ("Ask Dr-Robert", 2008)

The poetic language with the repetitions and harmony of the sounds shows that the materiality of one sentence determines the second sentence. Materiality of the signifiers

are not of course the sole determinant of the way a sentence is formed, but the dominance of the material and physical aspects of the signifiers in the formation of a sentence can be observed much more clearly in schizophrenic language than in normal communication.

Jameson's statement that "in normal speech, we try to see through the materiality of words...towards their meaning. As meaning is lost, the materiality of words become obsessive" makes a distinction between the materiality and meaning of the words. The distinction between relationship among signifiers based on the materiality of words and based on the meaning of words is actually artificial. However, this distinction puts forward an important insight in terms of the constructive and performative aspects of language. It could be claimed that schizophrenic language puts forward and/or stages what the poststructuralist view states about the absence of signifieds. As the poststructuralists state, the signifieds are already absent regardless of schizophrenic or 'normal' communication. However, it could be claimed that there is one difference; 'normal' language gives the sense that there are signifieds which the signifiers signify whereas the schizophrenic language by preventing any direct relation between signifiers and what they signify, by making any definite meaning impossible, stages this absence as it is. It reveals the absence of signifieds through its unfamiliar signifier combinations and thus opens up a reality which can only be constructed by schizophrenic language by invalidating any definite meaning and representation differently from 'normal' language. As it was briefly mentioned at the beginning of the paper, according to Derrida, the only reality is the reality of language. Jameson by making reference to Lacan also indicates that the formation of meaning is the result of the relationship among signifiers. It is not really the complete absence of the meaning that distinguishes schizophrenic language from normal language. If meaning is generated through the relationship among signifiers, as long as there are signifiers, there will be some meaning. However, normal language does not allow the listener to notice this distinction, because it deals with the meaning not with the materiality of the words. Yet, schizophrenic language puts forward the distinction between materiality and meaning. Schizophrenic communication is not distinguishable from the normal in terms of the loss of meaning but it differs from the normal in terms of operating through this distinction as well as revealing the distinction. Deleuze's theory on making corporeal, non-linguistic and incorporeal,

linguistic elements function together can also be explained through this revelation since materiality is corporeal. It can be said that schizophrenic language makes language 'stammer' by drawing "from it [language] cries, shouts, pitches, durations, timbres, accents, intensities" (materiality) to the extent that it becomes a gesture. The word 'noise' in the first sentence of the third example above determines the word 'sense' in the second sentence. The third sentence repeats the word 'sense' which generates the word 'nonsense'. Thus, as Andreasen (1979) points out, the sounds rather than the meanings of the words govern the sentence. Yet, the sentence makes some sense; it is not a totally irrelevant statement. The perceptibility of the materiality of the words together with the meaning that the words generate reveals the constructive power of language. With the constructive aspect of language theorized and developed by poststructuralist thinkers, the presence of an unified, self-conscious individual who can express himself in a fully conscious manner through using language gets deconstructed. According to the poststructuralist view, the subject is constructed by the language s/he uses. The possibilities that the materiality of signifiers open by distinct combinations reveal themselves through schizophrenic language, because it is as if language finds its own way through its rhythm and musicality without much intervention of the subject. As the poststructuralist thinkers assert, the subject is being constructed as s/he is using language. Schizophrenic language reveals this construction through blurring the distinction between materiality and meaning. However, blurring this distinction is the only way to reveal the existence of the distinction, because in normal communication, meaning is the only thing that is searched for, while schizophrenic language makes meaning and materiality coexist. The repetitive use of the word 'hat' is a clear example to the coexistence of the meaning and materiality of the words in schizophrenic language. The speaker says that s/he will think that s/he will put his hat on. The grammatical incorrectness of the sentence makes it somewhat ambiguous, but it makes sense. Even if it is indefinite, the sentence has a meaning. In terms of pure meaning, the repetitive use of the word 'hat' does not make any difference; however, the needless and excessive use of the word attracts the attention of the reader to the materiality of the word 'hat'. When the word 'hat' is used for the first time, the reader hears the meaning of the word, but as it gets repeated, the reader starts to read the materiality of the word. The form of the word replaces the content and the act of repetition takes the place of

what is repeated. In other words, the act of repetition (materiality) exists together with the meaning of the word, one could say, borrowing the phrase from Deleuze, by deterritorializing and reterritorializing each other. Through the reciprocal relationship between meaning and materiality, the constructive power of language in the formation of meaning can be easily observed. Schizophrenic language transforms language into a material that one can play with by giving it many different forms as if playing with dough. In other words, language becomes material and the material becomes language. The distinction between materiality and meaning gets effaced to the extent that the materiality and physicality of language and language of physicality and materiality are equalized. Saying that they are equalized is actually another way of claiming that the boundary between the body and language gets blurred. As well as language involves the physicality of the body, the body involves the physicality of language. In other words, as well as the body is a textual production, the text is a bodily production. It is impossible to distinguish or draw a strict boundary between the two. By saying language of physicality and materiality, I am talking about language of the body which makes language physical. However, since the boundary between the body and language cannot be strictly determined, we cannot talk about language of the body independently from language. One could see through schizophrenic language that sounds make up the meaning and meaning has sounds. That is what makes language visible and audible. In other words, the physicality and materiality of language generates meaning as well as the materiality has a meaning.

When language is made to act, new concepts are created. According to Deleuze, philosophy is an act of creation and construction of new concepts. Schizophrenic language, which makes language act by making language corporeal and by making corporeality language creates new connections and concepts without staying within the limits of representation and meaning. Deleuze states that instead of asking the meaning of a work of literature, one should ask what it does (Bogue, 1989). It could be claimed that schizophrenic language displays the fact that talking and writing are acts that create and construct new concepts. Schizophrenic language effaces the distinction between doing and saying. It creates its own ways of thinking through the materiality of language. Saying does something, saying performs an act by creating new connections and ways of thinking. By making materiality and meaning 'function together',

schizophrenic language makes meaning indefinite and thus it prevents language from being perceived as representing reality. It prevents us from thinking of reality and language as distinct categories, because schizophrenic language, through the distinct combination of signifiers, creates its own reality, which is not familiar to us.

However, schizophrenic language is not completely unrelated to the language 'normal' people use. The same signifiers are used with different combinations in schizophrenic language. Schizophrenic language through its connection to the normal makes some characteristics of normal language visible. The goal-directedness of normal language as communicating our thoughts leads us to perceive language as if it were a tool that is being used to express ourselves, and to perceive ourselves as having an existence that is independent of language. Through the materiality which governs meaning, schizophrenic language makes us notice that signifieds are nothing other than relationships among signifiers and that distinct combination of signifiers will generate distinct, indefinite meanings. The structure of language, which could be said to hide itself behind meaning in normal communication, reveals itself through the grammatical incorrectness and the rhythmical pattern of the sentences in schizophrenic language.

To conclude, schizophrenic language effaces the distinction between materiality and meaning by making them function together. Schizophrenic language transforms language into a “silence”, “music”, “painful waiting” by “drawing from it cries, shouts, pitches, durations, timbres, accents, intensities”. However, rather than saying that language becomes corporeal, one should assert that corporeality and/or materiality becomes language as well as language becomes corporeal and/or material.. Schizophrenic language deconstructs the body and language distinction. It is no longer possible to talk about the body independently from language and language independently from the body.

Chapter 4

BECKETT'S PLAYS

4.1 Introduction

Staging a Beckett play requires a director to adhere to every little detail of Beckett's texts. I think Beckett displays the fact that to create a theatrical language independent of other forms of art, it is not necessary to be free of the intentions of the author and the text. Beckett removes the boundary between the body and language through the physicality and materiality of language. Beckett's language is physical and on stage he transforms every bodily movement into language. By effacing the distinction between the body and language, Beckett creates a physicality which can be expressed through language as opposed to Artaud who asserts that to make theatre independent of other forms of art, a kind of physicality which cannot be expressed through words, should be created. Artaud dreams of a non-representational theatre which distinguishes itself from the other forms of art, for instance literature. Artaud opposes classical theatre which is representational and text-bound. He asserts that instead of representing another language, theatre should find its own language. He puts forward the importance of pure sensibility and visibility through physicality of the body: "Theatricality must traverse and restore existence and flesh in each of their aspects. Thus, whatever can be said of the body can be said of the theatre" (Derrida, 1978, p.232). Beckett shows that we cannot talk about the body as a distinct category and that the physical existence of the body is not necessary for the physicality of the body. Also, physicality of the body is not the only way to find the "speech before words". Beckett shows that even if there is something as "speech before words" as Artaud claims, it can also be attained through language.

Beckett's plays are analyzed as involving existentialist themes questioning the meaning of existence in relation to death extensively. Also, the theatre of the absurd

cannot be overlooked while making a contextual and a formal, stylistic analysis of Beckett's plays. However, working on Beckett through these perspectives is a recurring and thus in a way no longer qualified and exciting way of trying to understand his plays. Actually, the richness and complexity of the plays are being reduced to certain themes and this prevents the texts from opening the reader and audience their deeper layers. Thus, instead of discussing Beckett from these widely known perspectives, I will analyze the formal qualities of his plays rather than the content and what the texts mean to get a sense of Beckett's means of creating his own distinct theatrical language.

I do not categorize Beckett's language as schizophrenic even though many similarities may be found. I examined schizophrenic language as an example to discuss what it means to efface the boundary between the body and language. Also, because schizophrenia is the absence of the distinction between the self and the other, -we cannot talk about any unified subject who uses language to express himself/herself. Materialization of the fragmented body and subject through the physicality of language is where the distinction between the body and language gets lost. As opposed to classical theatre, there are no characters in Beckett's plays. There is no unified subject whose self is organized around a certain goal, motivation and desire. The subjects do not use language to express themselves or to communicate any coherent meaning. The absence of an unified character makes Beckett distinct in terms of language usage. While analyzing the plays, I will draw attention to the similarities between schizophrenic language and Beckett's language, but I will avoid using the term schizophrenic for Beckett's language, because that would set a limit to the analysis of the plays.

In this thesis, I analyze four Beckett plays which are *Not I*, *Act Without Words II*, *What Where*, and *Play*. *Not I* is an important play in terms of blurring the distinction between I and the other or inside and the outside. The loss of boundaries between I and the other makes meaning indefinite. In other words, it makes the coexistence of distinct possibilities of meaning possible. The words as being the action of the mouth is significant to analyze to see how Beckett blurs the boundary between the body and language. *Act Without Words II* stages the materiality and physicality of the body as generating meaning and/or materiality and physicality as meaning. There is no dialogue in the play, thus the body is the only material that is used in creating meaning. The

stylized and unnatural bodily gestures refer to the performative dimension of movement. *What Where* is analyzed in terms of constructive power of language or as how meaning is impossible as well as possible. Lastly, *Play* is an important play to see how language involves the physicality of the body.

Deleuze defines Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* as “theatre within philosophy” because everything in the text is put into action and motion and is visualized. Thus, the text should be read “as the remarks of a director indicating how Overman should be played”. Deleuze's argument on Nietzsche reveals and displays the basic elements of theatre. When this is connected to Deleuze's “Postulates of Linguistics” where he talks about placing linguistic, corporeal elements and non-linguistic, incorporeal elements in variation, it could be concluded that theatre puts things into motion and action by making corporeal and incorporeal elements function together. Based on Deleuze, I think what replaces representation and meaning with acting and doing or what makes us search for what a text does instead of what it means is the *theatre* within philosophy or literature. How does Beckett's texts create a theatrical frame or how does Beckett put forward theatre as a frame? It could be claimed that through making reference to its own construction or itself as a construction, Beckett puts forward theatre as a frame. Through the the frame of theatre, Beckett discusses that language is constructive and performative while the plays construct and perform their own reality. Thus, in Beckett's plays, the only reality is the reality of the theatrical frame. Beckett's theatrical language will be analyzed as it performs and stages the constructive and performative aspects of language. Yet, first of all, what is a theatrical frame?

Brooks indicates that “for a theater to take place, an actor walks across an empty space while someone else is watching” (Brooks, 1996). According to Brooks, for us to call something as theatre, the conditions that should be met are the existence of an empty space, an actor and a viewer. It can be inferred from Brooks that theater is about viewing and being viewed. The use of the word 'actor' shows that the actor is aware of the fact that he is being viewed and that the viewer knows that s/he is watching an actor. The Greek root of the word 'theater' also displays the central importance of the viewing practice: “The Greek ancestor of *theater* is *theātron*, 'a place for seeing, especially for dramatic representation, theater'. *Theātron* is derived from the verb *theāsthai*, 'to gaze

at, contemplate, view as spectators, especially in the theater', from *theā*, 'a viewing'" (<http://www.answers.com/topic/theater>). What if the viewer thinks that the person walking across an empty space is an actor whereas s/he is actually a stage technician? Can we call this theatre? The reverse is also valid. The viewer can think that the play has not begun yet and that the person walking across an empty space is a stage technician while he is actually an actor playing his part in the costume of a technician. Or assume that you are sitting on a bank in a street and someone passing by attracts your attention and you look at the way s/he moves very carefully. S/he can either be aware or unaware of your gaze and either be a performance artist performing in the street or someone going to work. In which conditions should we define it as belonging to the category of performing arts? Someone crying in the middle of the street may be watched by many people and some people may try to help that person while the others may pass by glancing. If the one crying is a performer and if some people try to help him/her and then move away from him/her without any acknowledgment of the event as performance, can we still call it performance? Or if some people somehow realized that it is a performance, can we say that it is performance for some of them and not for the others?

All of these possibilities can be multiplied and can get more complicated . Each assumption will increase the confusion about how theater and/or performance art should be defined. To an extent, Schechner's distinction between 'as performance' and 'is performance' clarify the discussion above. Schechner (2002) states that the performing arts *are* performances, but "any action can be studied *as* performance". When everyday practices and regular life are assessed via the concepts theatricality and performativity, everything can be studied *as* performance. The metaphor of *theatrum mundi* that "all the world is a stage" which Shakespeare wrote in his play *As You Like It* is actually another way of saying "anything can be studied as performance". The concept performance becomes the framework for analysis, thus the statement "anything can be studied as performance" is more than being a mere description or definition. Marking and framing an action as performance transforms the action into performance. In other words, anything can be received *as* performance. However, performativity in everyday life is different than it is in performance arts. We can think of a very simple, everyday act like brushing our teeth. A performer can choose to perform the act of

brushing. However, there should be something that separates the act of brushing in performance from the act of brushing in everyday life. What separates an action in performance from the everyday life is the frame of an action which says “this is performance”. Thus, we can say that the performer acts out the act of brushing. What distinguishes an everyday action from an everyday action in performance is then this performative gesture:

Happenings, a term coined by Alan Kaprow in the late 1950's, define an art form in which the action is extracted from the environment, replacing the traditional art object with a performative gesture rooted in the movements of everyday life.

For something to be called as theatre or performance, I think it should define and display itself as theatre and performance. Yet, I do not talk about different styles within theater, like Brechtian distancing or alienation effect. I am talking about theater or performance art in general. The frame of a performance as 'this is performance' is determined by the stage, text, tickets, costumes, scenery, and performers. Even if all of these elements are missing, performative gesture will communicate the message “this is a performance”. Bateson (1972) indicates that he had encountered two young monkeys playing at the zoo. The way these two monkeys interacted with each other was very similar to combat or fight. However, he says it was obvious that they were not fighting with each other, so it was 'not combat', they were playing. Bateson (1972) says that play is possible only when the participants exchange the message 'this is play'. “Expanded, the statement 'this is play' looks something like this: 'These actions in which we now engage do not denote what those actions for which they stand would denote’” (Bateson, p.180). The actions of monkeys stand for combat while these actions do not denote combat. The signal 'this is play' is exchanged between them and as observers we also receive the message 'this is play'. (Bateson, 1972). In normal conditions, to be bitten is painful and thus the bite is used for defense and attack, but the transmission of the signal 'this is play' through the playful bite causes the monkeys to receive the bite on the basis of 'as if'. When one of the monkeys bites the other to invite him to play, the other one receives the implicit message that he is not bitten to be defeated and as viewers we also get the signal that they are not fighting but playing. Bateson says “...it is evident to the human observer that to the participant monkeys this was not combat”

(Bateson, p.179). Then the frame transforms the action into something other than itself. The bite is received as if it is a bite by the observers and participants: “Not only does the playful nip not denote what would be denoted by the bite for which it stands, but, in addition, the bite itself is fictional” (Bateson, p.182). Because the bite is perceived *as if* it is a bite, it is fictional. Yet, monkeys do not play to exhibit or present their play. Human-beings also do not play for the purpose of exhibition. For instance, children play with their toys, but they do not exhibit their play to the others as performance. They may be playing for the satisfaction of their fantasies or their fantasies may be emerging as the result of the act of playing. For whatever reason animals and human-beings play, they do not play for the sake of exhibition or presentation of what they play. When human-beings play to exhibit what they play, their play transforms into performance. Thus, other than transmitting the message 'this is play', performance art should transmit the message 'this is play which is exhibited as play' or shortly 'this is performance'. Also this message should be received by the viewers. Thus, whether the empty space Brooks mention is a classical stage or street, something is performance only when an actor or performer walks across an empty space when there is someone watching him with the knowledge that he is performing. I think the awareness of the fact that 'this is performance' both by the performer and viewer is necessary for something to be called as performance. Thus, the distinction between art and life should be maintained. I think the space which the frame that separates everyday life from performance makes performers and viewers to receive the performance at a distinct level of consciousness from that of everyday life. I think Beckett creates this space by staging itself as a performance through performing the constructive and performative aspects of language and the body.

I will analyze the plays based on the theatrical productions of the play as well as using the texts. More than being written to read, Beckett's plays are written to be staged. This is of course valid for all the plays, but the plays of Beckett as an author who created an independent theatrical language through transforming language into the body and the body into language should be analyzed on stage since there are many parenthesis defining the movements of performers. The bodily movements strictly defined as stage directions by Beckett are necessary to watch to get a complete sense of what Beckett does as a writer. Beckett's ways of using human body on stage is an

important part of his theatrical language. The language Beckett creates through the visuality of the bodily actions lies at the core of his distinct theatrical language. Thus, one can say that Beckett's plays are required to be seen on stage more than the classical plays which have a certain theme, plot and unified characters.

4.2 Not I

Beckett's *Not I* operates through 'schizo-logic', because the text resists being assigned any definite, single meaning. Beckett effaces the distinction between the self and the other and thus overlaps many possibilities in terms of meaning. In other words, distinct possibilities of meaning exist together in the play. Beckett's text prevents the reader from staying within the constraints of meaning and representation by continuously deconstructing itself in the existence of multiple identities. Other than the multiplication of identities through the loss of distinction between the self and the other, Beckett prevents the reader from staying within the constraints of meaning and representation through the materiality of words. By making the materiality of words exist together with different meanings, the text effaces the distinction between the body and language. Through making language material, the text stages the constructive and performative aspects of language.

How does Beckett efface the distinction between the self and the other? In Beckett's short play, there are the mouth speaking on the stage and the auditor downstage. Beckett describes the auditor as "dead still throughout but for four brief movements where indicated". In the text, there are four places where the mouth says: ". . . what? . . . who? . . . no! . . . she! . . . [Pause and movement]". It is the auditor who does the movement in the parenthesis. Beckett explains the movement in *Not I* (1972/1993) as follows:

Movement: this consists in simple sideways raising of arms from sides and their falling back, in a gesture of helpless compassion. It lessens with each recurrence till scarcely perceptible at third. There is just enough pause to contain it as MOUTH recovers from vehement refusal to relinquish third person.

(Beckett, p.236)

The movement that the auditor does comes right after the mouth's "what?....who?.....no!.....she!.....". Beckett's stage direction which says there should be

"enough *pause* to contain it as mouth recovers from vehement refusal to relinquish third person" clearly shows that the mouth refuses that it is actually talking about itself. The mouth talks about 'she', however the mouth talks about itself while referring to the third person. When the mouth says "what?...who?.....no!.....she!....", it is as if the mouth asserts that the person it is referring to is not itself but someone else. In other words, the mouth refuses to leave third-person narration. The mouth says "no idea what she's saying...and can't stop" while it is the mouth itself who cannot stop and have any control over itself. The mouth says "whole body like gone...just the mouth..." while referring to the third person, but it is the mouth whose whole body is gone and who is just the mouth. The mouth is talking about itself while using the pronoun 'she' or 'her'. It cannot distinguish between itself and the other. In the text, 'she' becomes equal to 'I'.

How does the loss of distinction between the self and the other in Beckett's short play prevent the text from being reduced to a definite, single meaning and open the text to the coexistence of many possibilities in terms of meaning? In *Not I*, the mouth tells the story of a woman in her seventies wandering in a field to find cowslips to make a ball in an early April morning light, but suddenly the mouth says "what? ...who?...no!...she!" and the woman finds herself in the dark.

...drifting around . . . when suddenly . . . gradually . . . all went out . . . all that early April morning light . . . and she found herself in the— . . . what? . . . who? . . . no! . . . she! . . . [Pause and movement 1.] . . . found herself in the dark. (Beckett, p.237)

The loss of reality, the reality of an early april morning light, by finding herself in the dark and the fragmentation that the woman in the story experiences intersects with the fragmentation that the mouth experiences while telling the story of the woman. While telling the story of the woman, the mouth suddenly says "*what? . . . who? . . . no! . . . she!*" and continues to tell the story as follows:

. . . in the ears . . . and a ray of light came and went . . . came and went . . . such as . . . the moon might cast . . . drifting . . . in and out of cloud . . . but so . . . dulled . . . feeling . . . feeling so dulled . . . she . . . did not know . . . what position she was in . . . imagine! . . . what position she was in! . . . whether standing . . . or . . . sitting . . . but the brain— . . . what? . . . kneeling? . . . yes . . . whether standing . . . or sitting . . . or kneeling . . . but the brain— . . . what? . . . lying? . . . yes . . . whether standing . . . or sitting . . . or kneeling . . . or lying . . . (Beckett, p.237)

There are five possibilities and combinations of different meanings in this part. First of all, the mouth could be telling the story of the woman but suddenly the mouth gets fragmented on the stage and jumps to the present time of telling the story on the stage. At the present time, the mouth is on a dark stage where the light falls on itself and because it is only a mouth, it cannot know whether it is standing, kneeling or sitting: "...found herself in the dark...what position she was in!...whether standing...or sitting...or kneeling...or lying" (Beckett, p.237). Secondly, the mouth could be telling its own story by using third-person narration like she (the mouth) was once wandering in a field and suddenly found herself in the dark in the field and could not know what position she was in, in the field. The third possibility is that the mouth could be telling its own story by referring to the past time as it was once wandering in the field, but suddenly the mouth finds herself in the dark on the stage at the present time and detaches from reality so that the mouth cannot know which position it is in on the stage. The fourth possibility is that the mouth could be telling the story of the woman who really -without detaching from reality- finds herself in the dark while wandering in the field. Lastly, the mouth could be telling the story of the woman who while wandering in the field suddenly gets detached from the reality of the field. All these possibilities exist together without excluding each other. The loss of the distinction between the mouth and the woman in the text multiplies the meaning of the text. The coexistence of distinct possibilities and/or different meanings prevents the reader from searching for metaphors, analogies and symbols. According to Deleuze, to make meaning indefinite and to find out how new connections form and then break down in a text, one should not ask the meaning of the text or what the text actually represents. Beckett's language does not permit the reader to understand and interpret the text. Everytime the reader feels closer to any stable or coherent meaning in Beckett's *Not I*, the text transforms itself into something different through the distinct possibilities that the text produces.

While reading Beckett's *Not I*, we cannot distinguish between the mouth and the woman in the story. The mouth continuously transforms itself into the other. There is no subject that can distinguish itself from the object, there is no inside that excludes the outside and there is no self through which the other is situated. The mouth is a body orifice, thus what is outside can go inside and what is inside can go outside through the mouth. Winnicott (1971/1997) indicates that the child sucks his/her mother's breast as if

the breast belongs to himself/herself and the mother gives milk to the baby as if the baby is part of her own body. Then the mouth is the site of unification between the two bodies that cannot separate one from the other. The mother-infant dependency is important, because schizophrenia results from the failure of separation from the mother. In infantile language, the other becomes I and I becomes the other. Schizophrenic communication with all the repetitions, pauses, silences, fragmented sentences, and discontinuities is poetic and child-like. Similarly, *Not I* is a play with long silences, pauses, fragmented sentences and repetitions.

Can we talk about pure material signifiers, signifiers in isolation, loss of signifieds or the breakdown of relationship among signifiers in *Not I*? Since the result of the breakdown of relationship among signifiers is the effacement of meaning, is there a loss of meaning in *Not I*? Jameson reminds the reader that he uses the word schizophrenia in a descriptive and metaphorical sense, not in clinical terms. What does Jameson mean by saying "schizophrenic writing in descriptive but not in diagnostic sense" (Jameson, 1998, p.135)? He gives an example of the poem *China* by Bob Perelman in terms of schizophrenic writing and he states: "One may object that this is not exactly schizophrenic writing in the clinical sense; it does not seem quite right to say that these sentences are free-floating material signifiers whose signifieds have evaporated." (Jameson, p.140).

It cannot be claimed that the meaning is completely lost or that it is not transmitted to the reader. Then what similarities do Beckett's text and schizophrenic writing in literary context share? . Schizophrenic language in literary context contains the features of schizophrenic language in the clinical sense, but at the same time it displays the existence of these features. Thus, the meaning in schizophrenic language in a literary text arises from the exhibition of these features. In other words, there is a breakdown in the signifying chain but at the same time, this breakdown is displayed as a breakdown. The basic thing that connects the signifiers in isolation and that in a way reconstructs the relationship among signifiers in literary schizophrenic language is this act of referring to its own fragmentation. Through displaying this breakdown, meaning is reconstructed. The same could be claimed for Beckett's *Not I*. The examples below display how the mouth in *Not I* refers to its own fragmentation:

her lips moving . . . imagine! . . her lips moving! . . as of course till then she

had not . . . and not alone the lips . . . the cheeks . . . the jaws . . . the whole face . . . all those— . . . what? . . . the tongue? . . . yes . . . the tongue in the mouth... (Beckett, p. 240)

whole body like gone . . . just the mouth . . . lips . . . cheeks . . . jaws . . . never— . . . what? . . . tongue? . . . yes . . . lips . . . cheeks . . . jaws . . . tongue . . . never still a second . . . mouth on fire . . . stream of words . . . in her ear . . . (Beckett, p.241)

and the whole brain begging . . . something begging in the brain . . . begging the mouth to stop... (Beckett, p. 241)

and the brain . . . raving away on its own... (Beckett, p.241)

According to Lacan, the superiority of the sense of sight of an infant over other senses is important for him/her to construct a body-image of himself/herself in the mirror stage. When the child looks at the mirror, s/he sees herself/himself as having a coordinated body, but in reality, the infant does not have motor coordination:" ...the infant experiences its body as consisting of discrete parts without a sense of their interrelation...at one moment as a hand, at another as a foot, a leg, or an arm".

(Welton, 1999, p.234). As it is clearly seen in the quotations above, the body is fragmented into lip, ear, cheek, jaw, tongue, brain, and face. These fragmented parts cannot form a unified body image. It is as if all parts of the body are experienced as discrete parts. For instance, the brain begs the mouth to stop. However, the mouth is aware of the bodily fragmentation that it experiences to the extent that it can refer to its own fragmentation and this referral constructs a new meaning. Thus instead of claiming that the play is devoid of meaning, it should be said that it is devoid of single and coherent meaning.

In Beckett's play, there is nothing on the stage other than the speaking mouth. The mouth as a character is made up of words. The mouth can utter words only through the bodily action of the tongue and lips. The movement of the tongue and lips enable the sound to come out as a meaningful word. The mouth can speak to the extent that it acts. Language is the only action of the mouth whose existence is dependent on the sound it makes, whether the sound comes out as a scream, laughter or word. By making language a bodily action, Beckett transforms language into the body and by making language the only action of the mouth, he transforms the body into language. The

words are physical and material since the movement of the tongue and lips enable the words to exist. Also, the mouth as a part of the body has a language since it speaks. *Not I* is a play which stages the coexistence of the corporeality of language and language of corporeality. By showing language as the action of the mouth, Beckett stages the performative aspect of language. Language is an action that does something. Isolation of a speaking mouth without much difference of what the mouth says is a simple and clever way of expressing language as an action.

The sole existence of a speaking mouth is not natural. It is impossible to face a speaking mouth which does not have a body in everyday life. It is this unnaturality that transmits the message that *Not I* is a play. There is not any coherent story, definite meaning and any character through which the audience can have the illusion of reality. From beginning to the end of the play, it is impossible for the audience to forget that it is a performance which they are watching. The stylized scenery and setting also helps preventing any illusion. Ionesco defines this as showing the strings of the puppets rather than hiding them. The frame created through the play saying 'this is performance' changes the way the audience receives the play. Other than being staged, the play stages itself as a play through the unnaturality of the dark stage except for the mouth.

The relation between the words is constituted on the basis of the rhythm of the text. It is as if the text is written by the words instead of an author. Telling a coherent story with a beginning, and an end gives the sense of an unified subject who had decided on what s/he is going to say while telling the story. It seems as if the speaker has a total control over his/her words. However when the story is absent and when there are fragmented sentences with a rhythmical pattern, the illusion of total control gets lost. In other words, the words gain their authority back from the author. *Not I* reveals that all the fragmented and unrelated words cannot be decided on before starting to talk. It is the act of speaking which determines the sentence flow. The musicality and poetic language in the play show that other than the meaning of the words, it is the materiality of the words that make them combine in a certain way. Below are some parts taken from the play to show how the rhythm and musicality of the words dominate the sentence flow.

but so dulled . . . feeling . . . feeling so dulled . . . she did not know . . . what position she was in . . . imagine! . . . what position she was in! . . . whether standing . . . or sitting . . . but the brain— . . . what? . . . kneeling? . . . yes .

*whether standing . . . or sitting . . . or kneeling . . . but the brain— . . . what?
 lying? . . . yes . . . whether standing . . . or sitting . . . or kneeling . . .
 ..as foolish . . . was perhaps not so foolish . . . after all . . . so on . . . all that .
 vain reasonings . . . till another thought . . . oh long after . . . sudden flash .
 . . very foolish really but— . . . what? . . . the buzzing? . . . yes . . . all the time
 buzzing . . . so-called . . . in the ears . . . though of course actually . . .
 not in the ears at all . . . in the skull . . . dull roar in the skull . . . and
 all the time this ray or beam . . . like moonbeam . . . but probably not . . .
 certainly not . . . always the same spot . . . now bright . . . now shrouded . . .
 but always the same spot . . . as no moon could . . . no . . . no moon . . .*
 (Beckett, p.237)

In the second example, the mouth says 'foolish', but then after hearing the word 'foolish', the mouth decides that 'was perhaps not so foolish' and then after few words, the mouth says 'very foolish really but'. Also, the mouth says 'all the time buzzing...in the ears.....not in the ears at all'. Another similar example is that the mouth says 'probably not' and then 'certainly not'. Other than making the possibilities that are impossible to exist together in classical logic exist together (it can be foolish and not so foolish and very foolish really) and thereby preventing any definite meaning, these examples display language as constructive. Saying 'foolish' makes the mouth say 'not so foolish' which causes the mouth to say 'very foolish really but'. The mouth changes its idea from being 'foolish' to 'very foolish really' as it utters the words. If we take 'very foolish really' as the last decision of the mouth, we see that the mouth arrives this last decision through saying 'foolish' first and 'not so foolish' afterwards. We witness each step that makes the mouth say or arrive the conclusion 'very foolish really but'. Thus, the reader or audience witnesses how the mouth thinks through using language. All of these possibilities of being foolish exists through language. Also, “so foolish....was perhaps not so foolish.....very foolish really but” is a poetic statement, so other than hearing the meaning, the audience hear the rhythm of the sentence. It is the rhythmical pattern that makes the words combine in this way. Some other word than 'foolish' may be used to give the same rhythm to the sentence “so.....was perhaps not so.....very really but”. For instance “so angelic....was perhaps not so angelic.....very angelic really but”. Even if the words foolish and angelic have very different connotations, the meaning of the sentence does not change much, because more than the meaning, it is the sentence structure that we hear. The grammar as a skeleton that holds the meaning reveals itself naked without hiding behind any meaning. By making the structure and grammar the

determinant factor of the meaning, Beckett shows the power of language in the formation of meaning. Thus, language is displayed as constructing the meaning by Beckett.

It can be concluded that the non-linguistic elements and the materiality of the words form the basis of the play. Beckett's language makes the text act to the extent that the text becomes the gestures of the mouth. The materiality of the words dominates the meaning of the words in the text. It can be concluded that Beckett makes corporeal and incorporeal elements function together through the rhythm of the fragmented sentences, the repetitious pauses, screams, silences and laughters between the words, the unrelatedness of the words that do not even form a sentence, the absence of a coherent story and meaning, the absence of a character, the existence of a speaking mouth without the body, the continuous transformation from the self to the other, and the loss of the distinction between the self and the other. Through the materiality of the words, Beckett prevents the reader from reading the text to find out what the text means or represents or from searching for metaphors, symbols and analogies that signify some definite meaning. The mouth which speaks, screams and laughs on the dark stage is what is left over from the play without any story.

4.3 Act Without Words II

The body is the basic design that Beckett uses in his plays. All the ideas take the form of bodily gestures. In other words, Beckett converts abstract, philosophical ideas into concrete visual designs. The human body is an irrevocable material for these visual designs. However, the bodily gestures of the ordinary actions are not the same as the everyday gestures. As Esslin (1999) quotes from Ionesco, when something which is ordinary and natural is staged as a performance, it should not be natural as it is in everyday life, because theatre in its nature is not pure and natural. *Act Without Words II* is a Beckett play which stages this unnaturality.

Beckett transforms the physical and material into language by transforming the body into language in *Acts Without Words II*. In addition to what schizophrenic language does as making it untenable to view the body and language as distinct categories, Beckett stages this untenability through the stylized actions which adhere to

certain rules Beckett puts forward in the play. Because the way bodily actions are carried out cannot be received exactly by reading the text, it is necessary to watch the play to see how the body is portrayed depended on Beckett's strict stage descriptions. In the play, the body has its own text. It seems like the body follows up a certain procedure in each movement that it does throughout the play. The body is portrayed as it is a textual production in Beckett's play. Schechner indicates that everyday life cannot be thought independent of performing. Schechner calls the performative aspect of any action as 'twice-behaved behavior' or 'restored behavior'. Thus we usually perform an 'already behaved behavior'. Beckett abstracts 'already behaved behavior' from its context and presents it as the performative dimension of movement. The play stages performativity of the body. However, Schechner implies that world can be perceived as a performance and the performative dimension of anything can be explored and studied. Does the performative dimension of everyday life erase the boundary between life and art? What is the distinction between performative aspect of everyday life and art? How can we distinguish art from non-art? I will analyze *Act Without Words II* as a play that puts forward this distinction. It could be said that Beckett's play stages the concept performativity through staging the stylized actions.

As the name of the play implies, there are nothing other than the actions of the actors. The actions which are repeatedly done by the two actors in the play are halting, brooding, taking bottle of pills, praying, eating carrot, putting on clothes, picking up sacks, looking at the watch, brushing teeth, looking at the mirror, doing exercises, rubbing scalp, combing hair, consulting a map and a compass, and taking off clothes. The actions of both actors are very similar to each other with some little differences. The basic difference between the two is that A is “slow, awkward, absent” while B is “brisk, rapid, precise”. There are three positions that A, B and C (little pile of clothes) take throughout the play. These positions are drawn by Beckett as CBA at the right, CAB in the middle, and CBA at the left of the stage. C stays the same except for moving from right to the left while A and B (the two actors) change their places as moving from right to the left as BA, AB, and BA once again. Other than the two actors who continuously carry out certain actions, there is a goad which enters the stage three times throughout the play. Beckett defines the first entrance as follows:

Enter goad right, strictly horizontal. The point stops a foot short of sack A.

Pause. The point draws back, pauses, darts forward into sack, withdraws, recoils to a foot short of sack. Pause. The sack does not move. The point draws back again, a little further than before, pauses, dart forward again into sack, withdraws, recoils to a foot short of sack. Pause. The sack moves. Exit goad.
(Beckett, p.20)

The third entrance is the same with the first one with the only difference of the goad being the longest of all and being supported with two wheels. It is the longest goad, because the two sacks are at the left of the stage and the goad enters from the right. The second entrance in which the goad 'darts forward' into the sack B to the contrary of the first and third entrances in which the goad 'darts forward' into the sack A, differs from the others in terms of the movement of the sack. The sack B moves at the first time the goad darts forward while the sack A moves at the second time the goad darts forward into the sack. Beckett's play may be defined by the existence of certain rules. The goad puts the actors A and B in the sacks A and B into the motion through a certain rule. The rule to make the sack A move is to dart forward into the sack A for two times whereas the rule that makes the sack B move is to dart forward into the sack B for one time. The second rule is that the actors crawl out of sack when the goad darts forward into their sacks. The third rule is that the actors carry out certain actions when they crawl out of their sacks and after the actions they crawl into their sacks. These actions are strictly coded by Beckett's definitions. After the audience watch the actors A and B respectively crawl out of their sacks, carry out certain actions, and crawl into their sacks, the play turns to the beginning where the goad darts forward into the sack A. The same things are repeated; A crawls out the sack, and after repeating few actions that it does at the beginning of the play, the lights go off. The end of the play displays that if the play continues it will be the same as the one audience had watched. Thus, we get the idea that the rules Beckett puts forward are valid for all the situations. If the end of the play had not been the same with the beginning, the audience would not know how the play would continue if it was not ended. This unknowability would weaken the validity of the rules in the play. We would not be sure if A and B was going to behave the same under the same conditions regardless of repetitions. Beckett's rules resemble to scientific rules; A will always repeat the same behavior pattern when the goad darts forward into the sack A for two times and B will always repeat the same behavior pattern when the goad darts forward into the sack B for one time under the same

conditions provided by the play.

What do the rules do in the play? First of all, they prevent the text to be received on the basis of meaning and representation. The rules of the play do not mean anything. The relationship between the goad and the sacks as why the sacks move when the goad hits to them cannot be explained on any rational basis. If there were for instance two wheels instead of the two people on the stage, the movement of the wheels when the goad darts forward into them would be explained by physical rules. However, in normal conditions, the goad cannot make two people move by its physical force. Thus, instead of giving any rational explanation for why the actors A and B move, the audience should accept the rule that they move and start carrying out certain actions when the goad hits them. It is just the rule of the play that should be accepted as a rule. The rules do not signify any meaning and do not represent any reality. They just construct their own reality which is valid under the conditions of the play. The rules of the play are precise and any disobedience will ruin the game. Through making the rules the impulsive force of the play as making the goad an impulsive force for the movement of A and B, Beckett stages the play *Act Without Words II* as a play. In other words, when it is staged, other than the play being staged, the play stages the play as a play through revealing the rules that make it a play. The play makes self-reference through the revelation of the rules which makes it a play, so it signifies itself by making any signified impossible. The text which creates its own rules is the only thing which can be used while making an analysis about the play. In other words, the play explains itself and prevents it to be explained by any other method.

The performativity of the body whose materiality is transformed into language can be clearly observed through the stylized actions of the performers. What do we mean by saying stylized actions? There is nothing on the stage other than two sacks with two actors hiding in them. These sacks are moved by a goad which gets longer as the sacks move from right to the left. Thus, first of all the setting is stylized. Secondly, the series of actions that do not normally follow each other in everyday life are performed successively by the actors. The actions are abstracted from their everyday context. For instance, the act of brushing teeth takes place in a bathroom or in a place where there is water and a washbasin in everyday life. However, in the play the actor looks towards the audience while brushing his teeth on the stage where there is not any water and

washbasin. Also, the actor takes out a toothbrush from the pocket of his shirt and he uses it without putting on any toothpaste. Lastly, the act lasts for only few seconds which is far shorter than its average time in everyday life. Thus rather than the actor brushing his teeth in a realistic way, he shows the act of brushing teeth to the audience. The actor does not make the viewers believe that he is brushing his teeth. He only makes us understand that what he shows is the act of brushing teeth. The other important aspect of the actions in the play is that some actions are repeated overabundantly. Consulting a watch is one of the acts that the actor repeats excessively: "...consults a large watch, puts watch back, does exercises, consults a large watch, puts watch back, does exercises, consults watch...". If we had encountered someone who consults his watch like the actor in the play in everyday life, we would label that person as having psychological problems. Thus, the repetition of the action would be received as a sign for a psychological disorder. For instance, psychoanalytic discipline would try to find out the psychic problems which cause the person to behave like that. As well as in everyday life, the excessive repetition of the act in a realistic play will also make the viewers label the character and maybe search for the reasons behind the act. However, Beckett prevents the viewer from receiving the repetitions as a sign for something else. There is no meaning which can be attributed to the repetitive act of consulting a watch. The repetitions in the overall structure of the play make the act deprive of its meaning which is to learn what time it is. Thus, the form of the act gets ahead of the content of the act of consulting a watch. What is important is the repetition itself rather than what is repeated and why it is repeated excessively. This is valid for all the repetitions in the play.

All the actions in the play may be replaced by different actions by conforming the rules and the repetitions. For instance, actor A "halts, broods, prays, broods, gets to his feet, broods, takes a little bottle of pills, broods, swallows a pill, puts bottle back, broods" at the beginning of the play. Instead of these actions, actor A could have yawned, scratched an itchy place, looked at his clothes, scratched an itchy place, jumped, scratched an itchy place, taken out a mirror, scratched an itchy place, looked at himself in the mirror, put the mirror back, and scratched an itchy place. Beckett uses the act of brooding repeatedly. Thus, the rule is that while replacing the actions with different ones, the act that is going to replace brooding should be repeated as much as

the act of brooding. In the example above, brooding is replaced with scratching an itchy place. To express it in a mathematical formula; to brood = to scratch an itchy place. Similarly, to yawn = to halt, to pray = to look at his clothes. There is also a second rule which is about the act of swallowing a pill. Beckett divides the action into 3 parts as taking a little bottle of pills, swallowing a pill, and putting the bottle back. In the example, these acts are replaced by taking out a mirror, looking at himself in the mirror and putting the mirror back. If these actions were replaced by 3 unrelated actions like walking, sneezing, and laughing, the structure of the play would have changed. However, replacing the actions by adhering to these rules does not make any difference. Even if all the actions are replaced with other actions by keeping the structure same, the play would not change. It is not the content of the actions that determines Beckett's language, it is how the play is constructed. In other words, the meaning of the actions is not important. The actions do not signify anything and they are not carried out on the basis of a certain goal, motivation or desire. All those actions are nothing other than themselves. They do not have any meaning. The text acts itself out rather than representing and signifying the reality and the text puts forward its own reality as a construction. The form as constituting the material structure of the play reveals itself through the rules that Beckett puts forward in the stage directions and in his distinct use of language. The text puts forward this materiality as its meaning which is actually nothing other than the material structure of the play. The materiality of the play as the actions that are organized around certain rules is the only meaning of the play. The play stages the materiality as it is constructed on it. *Act Without Words II* constructs its own reality which cannot be defined through any meaning. By making any meaning impossible, the play shows how things continuously act out themselves only for the sake of acting out themselves. The actions of the actors are not connected to each other by any goal. For instance, the 3 actions that constitute the act of swallowing a pill are separated from each other by the act of brooding: "...broods, takes a little bottle of pills, broods, swallows a pill, puts bottle back, broods". By putting the act of brooding within the actions, which if not separated by another act would together constitute the act of swallowing, Beckett prevents the existence of any intentional act. In everyday life, the act of swallowing a pill is usually not interrupted by any other act or even if it is interrupted, there is a reason that lies beneath the interruption. The same actions as

Beckett writes “...broods, takes a little bottle of pills, broods, swallows a pill, puts bottle back, broods” may take place in everyday life, but the reason behind brooding reveals itself in everyday life. For instance, the character may have decided to commit suicide, so the act of brooding may be signifying the character's hesitation before killing himself/herself. If the play was a classical and traditional play, the act of brooding between the parts of the act of swallowing a pill would also signify some other reality. The act of brooding would mean something more than itself. If the act signifies the character's hesitation for killing himself/herself, the content of the act as what the character thinks would be more important than the act itself. However, in Beckett's play the act of brooding does not signify anything and does not mean anything. It is just an act of brooding. The actor does not think of anything when he broods, because the act does not have an intentionality. Like the other acts Beckett lists one after another, the actor broods to show that he broods. In other words, the audience does not watch the actor brooding, but watches him as showing the act of brooding. Beckett abstracts those actions from their context. The way these actions are carried out and their speed are stylized. The actors carry out the stylized actions by facing toward the audience for the most part. Thus, the actions are performed by putting forward the fact that they are carried out to be staged. In other words, more than being performed, the actions are shown and presented to the audience in their stylized forms. Thus the way they are presented and staged is much more important than the content of the actions. It can be concluded that they are deprived of their meanings through the stylized forms. It is the forms of the actions that we watch not what the actions signify.

If we cannot interpret the play on the basis of meaning and representation, inspired by Deleuze we should ask what the play does. What does the play do? How does it do what it does? First of all, as discussed in the preceding paragraph, all the actions are presented to the viewers through stylized actions which put forward their own performativity. Through the distinct bodily movements, the actors put forward the performative aspect of the body. If the actions were intentional and natural, rather than watching the acts, we would watch their meanings. However, in this play, we watch the way they are portrayed, because the actors portray the way they are carried out rather than doing the actions in a realistic way. It can be claimed that Beckett abstracts the form of the actions or the way they are carried out by leaving aside the reasons behind

doing those actions. It is necessary to use the abstraction of ordinary and mundane actions which take place in everyday life to tell that nothing is original and that everything was done before. The way these actions are performed is also not unique and original. As the actors' bodies which adhere to the definitions which are coded very strictly in the text, the human body follows an already written text while doing something. It could be concluded that the performativity of everyday life is performed in the play. In everyday life, people do things, but in Beckett's play, the actors show that they do things. Thus, the reason why *Act Without Words II* perform the performativity is that it shows doing things rather than doing.

The actors' bodies express themselves through showing the actions rather than doing them. Showing doing something, for instance brushing teeth, converts the physicality of the body into language. Brushing teeth in everyday life is done in order to clean the teeth, but in the play the reason of brushing teeth is not to clean them. Actually the actor does not brush his teeth, but he shows himself as brushing. Then, the body parts which act or work while brushing teeth in everyday life do not work the same in the play. The ordinary gesture of brushing teeth is very different than the one in the play. It is evident that the actor is conscious of the fact that he is showing the behavior rather than doing it. Even if these actions are performed without any sign which says that it is performance, for instance on a bank in the street, the actions will inevitably display themselves as belonging to a performance through their unnaturality and impurity. While showing the act of brushing teeth, the body makes reference to its own movements which it does while brushing teeth. There is a rupture between the ordinary act and stage act, I think it is this rupture which displays the act as it is performative gesture. Because of the actor using this performative gesture, the body is not natural as it is in everyday life. The act of brushing teeth is also performative in everyday life. It can be defined as 'already-behaved behavior' by Schechner's definition. Yet, it is not displayed as 'already-behaved behavior' in everyday life. By displaying the body as following a certain procedure while doing something, Beckett converts the body into language and into a text. He writes his plays through using the body as a materiality and physicality which talks. The performative gesture which shows the act of brushing rather than doing the act puts forward the performativity of everyday life.

Other than using the body as a language, Beckett uses the materials other than the human body. It could be claimed that the materiality of objects and the body are equalized in Beckett's plays. The human body as well as the inorganic objects become the parts of a bigger machine which functions with certain rules. The goad in *Act Without Words II* may be given as an example to a material which has an existence like the human bodies in the play. The goad enters the stage for 3 times; “enter goad right strictly horizontal, enter goad right on wheeled support (one wheel), enter goad right on wheeled support (two wheels)”. The goad is like a character which gives the impulse to the human bodies to start their actions. In the absence of the goad, the play cannot start, because it is the goad which starts the play by darting forward into sack A. Also, the goad makes the play continue by darting forward into sack B after the actor A crawls into his sack. The movement of the goad is similar to the human bodies in the play and its role and existence is necessary for the existence of the play. The play that Beckett constructs can only be constructed through some materials. The human body is a material as well as the goad and these materials create visual designs which acts and talks.

4.4 What Where

There are 5 characters named as Bam, Bem, Bim, Bom, and the voice of Bam (V) in Beckett's short play *What Where*. In the stage directions, it is written that all the characters should look alike. The voice comes from a megaphone which the viewers see on the stage. 4 seasons pass throughout the play. The play starts at spring and ends in winter. There is a diagram, a visual demonstration of the stage design which is drawn by Beckett at the beginning of the play. There are 3 corridors which open to the backstage and the actors go in and out of the stage from these corridors that are named as N, W, and E. On the diagram, there are also numbers as 1, 2, and 3 to explain where the actors should stand during the play. He defines the space which is enclosed within the rectangle he had drawn as a playground. In *What Where*, Beckett constructs a play which is more complicated to figure out in comparison with his other plays.

The play starts with the light of the megaphone (the voice of Bam) going on. After saying that they are the last 5 and that they are in the present as they are still, the

voice says that it is spring. Then we hear the following words: "Time passes. Without words first. I switch on". The lights on Bam and Bom go on. The voice says "Not good. I switch off". The lights go off and the voice says "I start again". The first 6 lines of the play which starts with "we are the last 5" and ends with "I switch on" is repeated after the voice says "I start again". In the second time, the voice says "good". Then the voice says few lines and finishes his part by saying "in the end Bob appears. Reappears". Then there is a long part in which the characters Bom, Bim, Bem, Bam go in and out of the stage as Beckett writes in detail. This part involves all the entrances and exits that the actors do throughout the play. It is a condensed version of the entrances and exits of the actors in the play. The actors by following a rule and an order go in and out of stage without saying any word. After this part finishes, the voice says "good", "I switch off" and "I start again". The part at the beginning is repeated and the lights go on after the voice says "I switch on". Now there is only Bam on the stage. The voice says "good" and then continues talking: "I am alone. It is spring. Time passes. Now with words. In the end Bob appears. Reappears" (Beckett, p.325). From this part to the end of the play, the actors talk to each other and go in and out of the stage in the same way they had done without words. Yet this time, there are the words as the voice says "now with words".

The play as a whole is like a rehearsal with the voice directing. The voice directs the play and makes the actors repeat the parts he does not like by saying "not good". The voice switches off the lights if he finds it "not good" and he says "I start again". In the first part, the voice makes the actors enter and exit the stage without saying any word. The way they enter and exist the stage is the same with the way they enter and exist the stage in the consequent parts. However, the actors talk before each entrance and exit in the consequent parts. After the actors enter and exit the stage with pauses by following a certain order, the voice says "I start again" and turns to the beginning of the play once more and makes the actors continue the play with words. The repetition of the statements "I start again", "I switch off" and "I switch on" make us receive the play as it is a rehearsal of the play we watch. Thus, we cannot watch the actors as if it is the first time they are talking. It is like they are following a text and like they know what they are going to do and say with some short directions of the voice. It makes the viewers realize that the actors had repeated what they say in the play over and over again. In

other words, we realize that every word was said before and every action was done before. Actually the viewers witness how the characters go back in the text and start again. The voice says “I start again” for six times in the play. By staging itself as a repetition of what was said and done before, the play stages itself as a repetition and at the same time it puts forward the impossibility of repetition through the repetitions in the play. Everytime something is repeated, it starts to exist as a repetition, and if the same thing is repeated once again, it starts to be the repetition of repetition and this goes forever. Every word creates something new when it is uttered even if it is a repetition and every act creates something new even if it is the repetition of some preceding act. It is impossible to repeat while repeating. Thus, it could be said that every repetition is original. The play *What Where* stages itself as a repetition while repeating the same things. It is as if the play says that it was performed many times before. However, the performance that takes place at the present time will always, inevitably be new. While staging itself as a play which stages its own rehearsal, staging the rehearsal as a play and staging the play as it had been performed many times before, the play discusses the concept performativity. The play makes sense if it is the repetition of what exists before in terms of the form and content. *What Where* discusses that as the actors on stage, we perform in our everyday life, yet with one difference, theatre can perform the performativity of everyday life by making a self-reference. In other words, theatre reveals the performativity in everyday life. To conclude, *What Where* stages itself as if it is a rehearsal which in turn stages the play as a performance through the voice which directs the actors by his “I switch off”, “I switch on”, “good”, “not good” and “I start again” statements.

The play makes us realize that the meaning of the play is elusive or impossible. The play puts forward the impossibility of any meaning. After the voice says “It is spring. Time passes. Now with words. In the end Bob appears. Reappears”, Bom enters the stage from N, stands at 1. The dialogue between Bam and Bom is as follows:

Bam: Well.

Bom: Nothing

Bam: He did not say anything.

Bom: No.

.....

Bam: It is lie. (Pause). He said it to you. (Pause). Confess he said it to you. (Pause). You'll be given the works until you confess. (Beckett, p.327).

After this dialogue, the voice says “good” and “in the end Bim appears” and Bim enters the stage from E, stands at 2. Now there are Bam, Bom and Bim on the stage. The dialogue between Bam and Bim is as follows:

Bam: Are you free?

Bim: Yes

Bam: Take him away and give him the works until he confesses.

Bim: What must he confess?

Bam: That he said it to him.

Bim: Is that all?

Bam: Yes

Voice: Not good. I start again.

Bam: Take him away and give him the works until he confesses.

Bim: What must he confess?

Bam: That he said it to him.

Bim: Is that all?

Bam: And what.

Voice: Good. (Beckett, p.328)

After few lines, Bim exits from E and Bom also exits by following him. The voice says “Good. I am alone. It is summer. Time passes. In the end Bim appears. Reappears”. Bim enters from E and stops at 2. Then, Bam and Bim talk as follows:

Bam: Well?

Bim: Nothing.

Bam: He did not say it?

Bim: No.

....

Voice: Not good. I start again.

Bam: Well?

Bim: Nothing?

Bam: He did not say where?

Voice: Good.

Bim: Where?

Voice: Aaa.

Bam: Where.

Bim: No.

...

Bam: It is lie ... You'll be given the works until you confess.

Voice: Good. In the end Bem appears.

Bam: Are you free?

Bem: Yes.

Bam: Take him away and give him the works until he confesses. (Beckett, p.329)

Bem asks what Bim should confess and Bam says that Bim should confess that “he said

where to him” and “where”. Bem exists from N and Bim follows him. Then the voice says that it is autumn and that Bem appears. Bem states that Bim did not say where. Bam again says that Bem is lying and says that he'll be given the works until he confesses. Bam says that Bem should confess that Bim said where to Bem. However this time, Bam exists from W and Bem follows him. At the end of the play there is no one left on the stage. The voice indicates that it is winter and after few words of the voice the play ends.

The meaning of the play is absent for the actors, viewers and the writer. Bam questions Bom about what he said, but Bom says nothing and then Bam orders Bim to make Bom confess that he said it to Bom. Bom and Bim exit the stage together, and then Bim comes alone back to the stage. However, Bim says that Bom did not say where he is. Then Bem enters the stage and Bam orders Bem to make Bim confess that “he said where to him” and “where”. And then Bem and Bim exit the stage together. After some time passes, Bem comes alone back to the stage and says that Bim did not say anything. Bam says that Bem should confess that Bim said where to him. Bam and Bem exit the stage together and the voice ends the play. In the first dialogue between Bam and Bom, we learn that “he did not say it”. We do not know whom the writer talks about by saying “he”. The viewers just know that “he did not say it”. Bam wants to learn that “he” said it to Bom and what “he” said from Bim, that Bom said where to Bim from Bem and that Bim said where to Bem from Bem. The “he” that Bam asks Bom at the beginning is someone unknown, however the other “he's” and “him's” that Beckett uses refer to Bom, Bim and Bem. Instead of using the names, Beckett uses the subject and object pronouns he and him. The questions that Bam asks are written below.

He did not say it? to Bom
That he said to him? to Bim
He did not say where? Bim
That he said where to him? to Bem
He did not say where? to Bem
That he said where to you? to Bem

The pronouns that refer to an unknown person starts to refer to Bom and Bim respectively in the play. As no one says anything in the play, the information that Bam wants to receive, changes as Bom, Bim and Bem enters and exists the stage. The

unknown changes its form throughout the play. There is something missing and the play is based on this absence. In the beginning of the play, this absence is the “he” which Bam refers. However, as the play continues, the pronoun “he” and “him” does not signify the absence at the beginning. What is unknown is unknown in the play. At first, Bam wants to learn what “he” said, but at the end Bam exists the stage with Bem to make Bem confess that Bim said where to Bem. As it is at the beginning of the play, something is absent at the end. Even though, it is not the same absence with the beginning, the absence at the end is created and constructed by the absence at the beginning. Whom the person Bam refers as “he” is not known. Thus, the first thing which no one knows is who “he” is and what “he” said. The other unknowns rely on this unknown. However, as the unknown at the beginning of the play is being transferred from one character to the other, it changes. Each unknown starts to differ from the previous one and as it differs, it becomes more difficult to figure out. If we think of the unknown as the meaning of the play because that is what is being tried to figure out by the characters, then we reach the conclusion that it cannot be attained. One year passes and no one figures out the answer of any of the differing questions. Also the play ends with the voice saying “Time passes. That is all. Make sense who may. I switch off”. The play ends with a deepened unknown. As the time passes it is being more difficult to find an answer, because the questions differ. However, the way questions are asked, and the words do not differ much. The same questions are repeated, but in each repetition, the meaning of the questions changes. For instance, Bam asks both to Bim and Bem “he did not say where?”. The “he” and “saying where” signify distinct things in both questions. All the questions differ from each other depending on to whom, after whom and when the questions are asked. Also the answer is deferred each time a character is questioned. All the characters look alike as Beckett writes in the notes and they face with the same questions, so as the time passes it is being more difficult to follow the questions and the answers. However the viewers can realize how the questions override and create one another, because the questions and the movements of the actors follow the same rule. Thus, it is like a mathematical problem, if one works on the play, each question can be formulated and expressed clearly by changing the pronoun with the names of the actors. In the end, we are left with this long unknown; we do not know if “he” said it to Bom and if Bom said that he said it to

Bim, if Bim said that Bom said that he said it to Bom to Bem, and if Bem said that Bim said that Bom said that he said it to Bom to Bam. The last one includes all the others. To summarize, we do not know what and where he said it, and if Bem said that Bim said that Bom said that he said it to Bom to Bam. We can continue writing the play with some other characters as Bum, Bum2, Bum3...Bum infinite by adhering the same structure and as more characters are used the unknown will get longer. There is no way to solve this equation, as we use any character to receive an answer, the equation gets longer and more difficult. Thus, the answer is deferred ad infinitum. However, the answer changes everytime it is deferred by creating new questions. The only way to receive the next question is not to receive any answer to the preceding one. Also, there is no way of getting any answer, because there is not any answer. Everytime Bam asks the question to the actors, they answer by saying “nothing”. The answer is nothing, because there is no answer and nothing to say. There is not any answer. It is what makes us talk without stopping.

The characters Bom, Bim, and Bem cannot make any change. Everyone is faced with the same question and give the same answer. There is no difference between Bom, Bim and Bem, however the situation they are in differs as the play keeps going. Each time one of the actors exit the stage, the unknown changes. If the characters do not change and if they continue to give the same answers to the repeating questions, what makes the change? What transforms the unknown? It is the language which transforms the unknown. Language moves the play. Each answer adds something to the equation “X said that Y said that Z said that...”. Bam, Bem, Bim, and Bom are nothing other than being the variables in this equation. The structure of language forms this equation as it is. The variables X, Y and Z can be replaced by A, B and C, it will not make any difference. What is important is the equation “....said that....said that...said that”. Every “said that” will make a difference. Without taking the characters into consideration, the language transforms the unknown. The characters find themselves in a changing situation only when they talk. Beckett puts forward language as constructing the subjects through constructing its own reality.

The grammatical structure of the language reveals itself through the “said that...said that...said that” formula that the play can be reduced to. Beckett makes the viewers and readers aware of the grammatical structure by constructing his own play on

a definite formula. By using which may be named as Beckett's formula in *What Where*, anyone can add more characters and continue writing the play from where Beckett left. The play can be written ad infinitum. More than the meaning of the words, the grammatical structure of language determines the content of the play.

When we look at a building under construction, we see the structure of the building with the colons as the vertical elements that hold the building, crossbeam as connecting the colons horizontally and ground as the horizontal plane on the colons. However, the same structure cannot be seen in a building which is not under construction. The building under construction reveals the basic constructive elements that constitutes the building. *What Where* may be thought as a completed building covered with glass which does not hide the constructive elements. We can say that there is no one living in the building, thus no memories and nothing. The only thing we witness is the construction as it is. Such as the glass stages the building through revealing how it was once, *What Where* reveals the constructive elements of language and language as a constructing the play through theatrical frame. Thus, *What Where* does not stage something other than itself, it does not represent anything, but exhibits itself as a construction. In other words, it stages itself as a construction through the constructive aspect of language. Its only meaning is itself or itself as performing itself. Language performs itself without signifying anything other than itself. While constructing a world, Beckett stages the construction as a world.

It is clear that analyzing the play through the concepts repetition, difference, deferral, meaning, absence is in a way following the poststructuralist way of thinking. Schechner summarizes some key concepts in poststructuralist thinking as follows.

Poststructuralists regard each phenomenon as part of an endless stream of repetitions with no "first voice" of ultimate authority. In their insistence on process, poststructuralists are Heraclitean and Nietzschean – everything is in flux...Unstable "iteration" - repetition, but not exactly- replaces stable representation. On the one hand postmodern repetition and recombination, on the other, poststructuralist difference. (Schechner, p.126 2002)

Theorizing language as being constructive and performative is necessary to discuss repetition, meaning, absence through difference and deferral. Beckett discusses the similar things in his plays. It can be claimed that Beckett stages the constructive and performative aspects of language in his plays. What distinguishes Beckett as a writer is

in his power to deconstruct the world he constructs through revealing his own construction. *What Where* is a play which faces the viewer with the constructive power of language.

4.5 Play

Like in all plays of Beckett, the stage design in *Play* is a necessary element of the play to discuss in detail. In *Play*, there are three identical urns in which there are the three characters named as woman1 (w1), woman2 (w2), and man (m). Their bodies are concealed in the urns. The viewers only see their faces which are lightened by spotlights. They face the audience without moving their heads. Beckett indicates that their faces are indeterminate in terms of age and appearance, so they seem as if they are the part of the urns. It is the light which makes the characters start speaking. As the light is transferred from one character to the other, the one who has the light at the present time starts talking. Beckett indicates that the faces should be devoid of feelings and the voices should be toneless.

The stylized scenery determines the form of the play. If the same story was told in a different setting, for instance in a realistic stage design, the meaning of the play would change completely. The large urns are the bodies of the characters. We do not see the bodies of the two women and the man. The performers' bodies are hidden in large urns with their faces sticking out of the urns. There are unemotional faces and hidden bodies in *Play*. Then, the bodily and facial gestures are absent in the bodies and the faces. However, it can be claimed that the distinct usage of language in Beckett's play is corporeal. Bodily and facial gestures are revealed through language. How and why is Beckett's text corporeal?

The play is about a love affair between a man and two women. The event that the two women and the man talk about is a well-known, familiar and recurring event. The summary below involves all that takes place in *Play*.

From the moment when the man tried to escape his tired marriage and odious professional commitments by taking a mistress, [events took a predictable enough course:] the wife soon began to 'smell her off him'; there were painful recriminations when the wife accused the man, hired a private detective, threatened to kill herself....The man renounced the mistress, was forgiven by his wife who 'suggested a little jaunt to celebrate, to the Riviera or ... Grand

Canary, ' and then, [true to form], returned to the mistress, this time to elope with her. [In time] their relationship too became jaded, and the man abandons" her. (<http://www.answers.com/topic/play-play-1>).

There is nothing surprising, interesting and unfamiliar in the story. It is very likely for everyone to hear or read this kind of a story so many times in their lives. However, probably, no one has watched or read this story in the way it is told in the urns. Also not any women and man whose faces and voices are devoid of emotion told the story. Then, there is something unnatural with the way it is told. In the stage notes, Beckett indicates that there should be "a rapid tempo throughout" the play. In other words, the performers should speak very fast since there are no bodies which can move fast. The tempo Beckett mentions is the speed of the way language is used by the characters.

What can be the reason of making the characters speak so fast, unemotionally and in the urns? One of the reasons is to abstract the story from its everyday context. Abstraction and stylization are the two key concepts which one should discuss while analyzing Beckett's play. Abstracting an ordinary story from its everyday context and telling it in a stylized manner creates new ways of thinking, because it creates new ways of talking. First of all, there is a physical difference between talking on the chair and talking in the urn. Secondly, the tone, rhythm, musicality of language changes when the characters speak so fastly and unemotionally. The unfamiliarity of the tone, rhythm and musicality force the viewers to really hear the language. More than hearing the meaning, the viewers hear the sounds. The poetry of the sounds reveal themselves through this unfamiliar way of speaking. The way they speak is unfamiliar, because there is a discrepancy between the content of the story that the performers tell and how they tell it. In everyday life, this kind of an event is not told to the other people like the way it is in the play. In everyday life, there is a harmony and consistence between the content of our talk and the feelings that urge us to talk. For instance, the tone, rhythm and musicality of language that two people uses, one of whom lost his loved one and one of whom got married cannot be the same. If the one in pain is made to talk like the one who got married and the other way around, there will be a discrepancy between the content and form. How and where the two women and the men talk are not consistent with what they talk in *Play*. Thus, it can be claimed that what, where and how they talk is fictionary and stylized. Since what they talk or the content of the play determine the

meaning of *Play* as well as where and how they talk determine the form of the play, it can be claimed that there is a discrepancy between the meaning and the form that transfers the meaning. How the performers talk is about the way they use language. The tone, rhythm and musicality of the way they talk determine the way they use language. What was said of schizophrenic language as making the meaning and materiality of language function together can also be claimed for Beckett's *Play*. It could be said that materiality and meaning construct and deconstruct each other continuously in the play. That is what makes the text corporeal.

Below are some examples from the play which are going to be discussed by following the distinction put forward as meaning and materiality.

W1: I said to him. Give her up. I swore by all I held most sacred--

[Spot from w1 to w2]

W2: One morning as I was sitting stitching by the open window she burst in and flew at me. Give me up, she screamed, he's mine. Her photographs were kind to her. Seeing her now for the first time full length in the flesh I understood why he preferred me.

[Spot from w2 to m]

M: We were not long together when she smelled the rat. Give up that whore, she said, or I'll cut my throat-- [Hiccup] pardon --so help me God. I knew she could have no proof. So I told her I did not know what she was talking about.

[Spot from m to w2]

W2: What are you talking about? I said stitching away. Someone yours? Give up whom? I smell you off him, she screamed, he stinks of bitch.

W1: Though I had him dogged for months by a first-rate man, no shadow of proof was forthcoming. (Beckett, p.171).

The way the two women and the man talk is poetic. In the example above, there are rhymes like “flew at me” “preferred me”, “the rat” “throat” and “stitch” “bitch” as well as repetitions like “I said to him. Give her up”, “Give me up”, “Give up that whore, she said”, “Give up whom” and “I did not know what she was talking about”, “what are you talking about?”. With all the repetitions and rhymes, the language Beckett uses is poetic. The tone, musicality and rhythm are the material and physical characteristics of language. We hear the distinct sounds while reading or listening to Beckett's play. The rhythmical pattern of the play determines the combination of the words. It is as if the story gets completed by its own rhythm, because there is also a rhyme between the speeches of different characters. It is like one character finds out what s/he is going to say after hearing the previous one.

In terms of meaning, what the woman1, woman2 and the man talk about complete each other even though everyone tells the story from her/his point of view. The viewer witnesses how the meaning of the story starts to make sense each time one character adds something to the previous sentences from her/his point of view. The meaning of the preceding sentences are created or constructed anew when something new is added from the other's point of view. For instance, in the example above, the meaning of the woman1's first sentence "I said to him. Give her up. I swore by all I held most sacred--" deepens with the man's "we were not long together when she smelled the rat. Give up that whore, she said, or I'll cut my throat--" statement. We receive the information that the man and the woman were not long together when the woman swore by all she held and that she was going to cut her throat if the man does not leave the other woman when we read or listen to the man's sentence. Thus, after hearing what the man says, the meaning of the first sentence of the woman1 changes. Similarly, after hearing the woman say "...no shadow of proof was forthcoming", we become aware that the man was right when he said "I knew she could have no proof" beforehand. If the story was told by one character to the audience, the things that we were going to hear would change depending on which character is telling us the story. If it was the first woman, we would not know; the man "told her [he] did not know what she was talking about", because he "knew she could have no proof". Thus, making three characters tell the story reveals how the meaning gets deepened or transformed from one sentence to the next. This way of telling the story makes us aware of how things can get omitted and be understood differently by each character. Connecting this with Derrida's remarks, it could be claimed that Beckett shows how meaning is impossible because it gets deferred everytime but also how it is possible, because it is this deferral that creates the meaning.

To turn back to the question asked above, what is it that makes Beckett's text corporeal in the absence of the body? Language that is made corporeal in a text removes the necessity of the physical existence of the body to search for the language of the body. Language always involves the physicality of the body. Beckett's language reveals the physicality of the body similarly to the schizophrenic language by making materiality and meaning function together. Instead of only hearing the meaning of the words, we also hear the distinct sounds, rhythm, tone and musicality of language.

Speaking itself is a bodily act. For instance, the body gives different sounds when one talks from diaphragm, chest or nose. Language involves all these differences, but all those differences gets hidden behind meaning. Beckett's text puts forward this corporeality by revealing it through the form of the play. The body in physical means is absent, because it is hidden in the urns, but it reveals itself through language or through the sounds and rhythm we hear while reading or listening the text. Being in the urn itself is a physical condition that makes the body talk in a different way than when one is not in the urn. The sounds that we hear comes from a body which is really in the urn. There are two physical things that the actors should adhere to. First of all, they should be in the urn and secondly they should talk toneless and unemotionally. These two things which cannot take place in everyday life make the actors talk in a different way from everyday life. To put it better, in everyday life it seems as if the physicality of the body is absent in the language. However, a person who sits cannot talk the same way as the person who talks walking. These two physical conditions will inevitably change the way one utters the words. However, because it is the meaning that we concentrate on while listening to the other, the different sounds are not heard. Or even if the tone of the speech changes, we perceive it as a change on the basis of meaning. Beckett, by making the actors face these two physical conditions make the viewer aware of the distinction between materiality and meaning. As well as the meaning, the materiality of language, the way words are uttered determines the speech. Most importantly, Beckett shows that the distinction between the body and language cannot be attained. Where the body starts and ends or where the language starts and ends cannot be found out. The body and language cannot be evaluated as two distinct categories as most of the thinkers claim as they are.

Thus, maybe it is not necessary to talk about the physicality of the body as the physical existence of the body. The physicality of the body may be the language or language may be the physicality of the body. Then, the statements like theatre should make itself free from the intentions of the literature gets invalid. Who knows where the literature starts and body ends? By hiding the bodies in *What Where*, Beckett discusses this unknowability.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

Can we talk about the language of physicality independent of speech or text? If we define this physicality as unconscious, sensual and unsymbolized feelings, is the physicality before words the only way to reach these feelings or can it be a way? Is there any way to reach to unsymbolized feelings? All of these questions are based on the perception of the body and language as distinct and separate categories. The assumption that the body has a physical reality which is independent of language form the basis of the questions above. If the body has a physical reality which is independent of language, then the only way to reach this reality is formulated as it is through the physicality of the body. I think Beckett makes his texts reveal the physicality of the body through language. However, it does not mean that the semiotic, which Kristeva defines as the organization of drives in language or the bodily, non-linguistic elements, reveal itself through language. Physicality of the body does not take place in Beckett's language as bodily drives or unconscious feelings. Beckett does not make any distinction between the language of the body and the words. In other words, he does not use the words as they are revealing the bodily elements. Thinking of the bodily drives and instincts as being the motivations of using language makes a distinction between the words and the body. It is as if there is something that comes from inside the body to the outside through the words. Beckett may be defined as deconstructing the inside and outside opposition. The boundary between the inside (the body) and outside (the language) gets blurred in Beckett's plays. The body becomes language and language becomes the body. In other words, one cannot make any distinction between the two. It was claimed that Beckett stages the constructive and performative aspects of language as well as making his texts construct and perform their own reality in the preceding section. Differently from what Derrida asserts, this does not mean that language constructs the subject and reality. In other words, Beckett does not stage

language as the only reality. When the body and language cannot be perceived as distinct realities and when the distinction between inside and outside gets lost or blurred, what does it mean to claim that language constructs the reality and the subject? What is language and where is the body? I think Beckett writes from this loss of distinction as well as writing the loss.

All of these discussions also lead us to question the relationship between visibility and language. Deleuze talks about pushing language to the limits of painful waiting, silence and music. Deleuze's distinction between stammering in speech and making language stammer also brings an important insight to the visibility and language discussion, because making language corporeal could be explained through this distinction. When language stammers, it is being reduced to a for instance painful noise or maybe a hysteric trembling. It is at this point where we can talk about language as being visual. I think Deleuze's distinction between stammering in speech and language stammering also distinguishes between the content and form. For instance, telling the story of a hysteric women is different than making language tremble like a hysteric women. This distinction also differentiates between visibility of text and text being visual. For instance, we can talk about the visibility of the texts which are full of imagery and description. However, saying that the text is visual is as if saying that the text is a hysteric women. It can be claimed that Beckett's texts are visual rather than there is a visibility in Beckett's texts. Thus, as well as erasing the boundary between the body and language, he effaces the distinction between visibility and language.

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