ABSTRACT

PLURAL TEMPORALITIES OF VISION
TEMPORALITIES AND FRAGMENTATIONS IN ART AND BEYOND
Zeynep Berik
M. F. A., Visual Arts Visual Communication Design
Supervisor: Lewis Keir Johnson
JUNE 2002, v + 104 pages.

This thesis aims to look at various possible ways in which temporality is concerned in visual arts. I consider that time exceeds being an object of perception and leads to an emergence of a fragmented notion of 'otherness', which interrupts constitution of a projective difference between the subject and the object. I chose my examples from the contemporary art practices – since the early sixties – which have been critical of the ways in which art was understood as an object of a single thought or belief. My examples may look as if they were analysed according to a specific history. However, they are critical of conceptualisation of things according to a single order that introduces an illusionary belief of space and time as if they were concrete things. Rather, I consider an emergence of multiple temporalities communicating with its viewer significant since such an understanding introduces a sense of becoming replaced by being not only in art but also in everything. Fragmentation is considered not as a distorted version of unity but as that which introduces the divisibility of a conception of unity.

Keywords: time , temporality, duration, differentiation, fragmentation, perception, space, movement.

ÖZ

GÖRÜNTÜNÜN ÇOĞUL ZAMANSALLIĞI

Zeynep Berik

Görsel Sanatlar Görsel İletişim Tasarımı

Tez Yöneticisi: Yard. Doç. Lewis Keir Johnson

HAZİRAN 2002, v + 104 sayfa

Görsel sanatlarda birbirinden farklı bir takım işler çoğul zaman algılarına yol açabilir. Zamanın kendisi algılanabilirliğin ötesine geçebilir ve bu da 'öteki' nin nesne ve obje ilişkisi içerisinde algılanmasına müdahale eder. Tezde belirtilen sanat işleri 60'lar sonrası sanatına yöneliktir. Örnekler, her ne kadar dönemsel bir çerçevede ele alınıyor görünseler de, bu işler zaman ve mekanın sabit ve tek bir yapıya yönelik algılanmasına eleştirel bir nitelik taşırlar. Tek bir zamansal ve mekansal doğru yerine, iş ve 'bakan' arasındaki iletişimde sözkonusu olan zamanın çoğulluğudur; süreç 'varlık' ın yerini alabilir. Tezde belirtilen 'ayrışma' nın rolü bütünün parçalanması değil, bütünün oluşumunda 'ayrışma' nın önemini göstermektir.

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Fig. 1, Robert Smithson, *Gypsum Non-Site*, gypsum, steel, photograph, (Benton, California) Dimensions Variable, 1968.

INTRODUCTION

The second half of the century, having witnessed two big Wars, opened a broader and a rapid changing conception of the world. People started to accept that there is a possibility of an emergence of more than one truth, which also introduced the possibility of incomprehension rather than the conception of a knowing subject. Therefore, varieties rather than singularities, sameness rather than differences emerged. The belief in modernism, which had promoted a break with historical bounds that aimed to bring a significance of a sense of authenticity in everything, became irrelevant. A desire for the authentic and the original in modernism, which depended on the idea of 'change' which would not have a relation with past. However, such an attempt for the new was again a rationalised and a preconditioned argument in the conception of change. Contrary to modernist belief that situated a place for itself every time it declared the new, the criticism of modernity came up with elimination of the new or an entirely centreless universe. The failure of the modernist claim could be said to be that the modernist reaction against the previous had chosen the same way, which the previous claimed to follow and modernists opposed. Cornelius Castoriadis states that "the term modern is very infelicitous, and its inadequacy is bound to appear with the passage of time." He finds the problem of the modern in its claim of centerlessness and he argues that "the term modern expresses a deeply self-centered attitude." The problem is the proclamation of "we are moderns". In this sense, Castoriadis' argument takes us to the problem of naming in modernism.[1] The self-conscious attitude is also seen in modern art, which claims to come up with the new and the authentic for the scene of art. It can be said that modernism fails in its trying to announce the new and rationalise it by making it acceptable in a universal sphere.

In 'The Time of the King'[2] Derrida argues that time is not a thing. It is not an object but is objectified and is considered in the economy of giving and taking. Time is not the property of someone or something, while it is not also possible to get a sense of time without considering time as that which gives a sense of temporality of the substances. It is neither inside nor outside.

In this sense, time may be considered to have an aspect of "parergonality". Parergon is the term Derrida introduces in *The Truth in Painting.*[3] Derrida refers to the frame of a painting and issue of framing in art as parergon. He is critical of the notion of frame as a limit. The "parergon" says Derrida stands outside "both from the ergon (the work) and the from the milieu, it stands out first of all like a figure on a ground." (Derrida: 1987, 61) In "Parergon" he argues that frame stands neither inside nor outside. It is not a property of frame that makes it both inside and outside but a notion of outside and inside itself. The conception of an inside and outside is the abstraction. Derrida is against interpretation and he is critical of "thinking art according to the terms of inside/outside" since it makes art something intelligible. "Trying to understand what art means is to take it into a very determined regime of interpretation." (Derrida: 1987, 22) The way to free art from such logic of regime is to deconstruct the binary oppositions and the search for a meaning in art. Frame is not a limit of painting, nor it is a limitless thing. Thus, such aspect of frame is not something that could be considered with reference to the presence or absence of frame as the limit of something outside itself. Instead, the boundaries of frame are drawn in their ability to go beyond frame as the representation of a teleology of something else.

What could be the relationship between time and frame? Time neither includes nor excludes things. In its parergonality, standing both outside and inside, it does not indicate a sense of presence that could be grasped in its immediacy. It is not intelligible. Non-presence of time does not negate time as absence, but it introduces an unfixed notion of time, which is not marked by space.

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[1] Castoriadis, Cornelius, *World in fragments: writings on politics, society, psychoanalysis, and the imagination* ed. and trans., Ames Curtis, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997) 33.

[2] Derrida, Jacques, 'The Time of the King', *Given Time*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

[3] Derrida, Jacques, *The Truth in Painting,* trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod, Chicago: Uni. of Chicago Press, 1987.

The issue of presence is not only a matter of time. Rather such concern of presence and absence conveys the history and criticism of modernity. Modernity has privileged presence over absence and space over time. The modernist belief in dichotomies, dualities have taken a lot from the implication of presence and absence as the manifestation of space. Such concern with presence, which is derived from Enlightenment ideas, is reflected in many areas from arts to science, the everyday life, concerning subjective and objective field of being. The modernist concern with presence has been carried into debates after the second half of the twentieth century in the emergence of a criticism of modernity. Sight, vision and the look were very important issues in modernity, which was regarded as the manifestation of presence. Donald Lowe in 'History of Bourgeois Perception' has given a brief explanation of the interaction between the change in the visual culture and history, by dividing the historical change into five main periods in the context of visual understanding.

In the first period, which is the Middle Ages, hearing and touching were the privileged senses over vision. The Renaissance witnessed the emergence of linear perspective and the sight gained importance. The third phase belongs to a period of representation, and the fourth is the age of space and time as an effect of bourgeois society. Lowe describes the twentieth century as "corporate capitalism".[4] The Western "look" depended on the perspectivalist notion that centred the eye in the structure of the subject, which referred to a "knowing body." To "know", epistemologically, is related to "see". The roots of the former is "eidenei" and the latter is "idein."[5] In 'Scopic Regimes of Modernity' Martin Jay states that Cartesian perspectivalism depends on the representation of reality in mind as 'idea' and declares such notion as the understanding of "modern scopic regime." [6] The emergence of the perspectival structure considers the look as static, singular, unblinking and fixated which "followed the logic of gaze rather than glance." The fixing ability of the gaze, regarded as the property of the subject, conveys a notion of control over the object. Jay argues about the problematic of the subject position in a Cartesian perspective as articulated below. According to Cartesian perspectivalism:

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[4] Mirzoeff, Nicholas, 'What is Visual Culture?', *The visual culture reader*, ed. Nicholas Mirzoeff, (London: Routledge, 1998) 20.

[5] Simon Goldhill 'Refracting Classical Vision Changing Cultures of Viewing', *Vision in Context*, ed. Teresa Brennan and Martin Jay , (New York: Routledge, 1996) 40.

[6] Jay, Martin, *Downcast Eyes,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.

> The monocular eye at the apex of the beholder's pyramid could be construed
> as transcendental and universal - that is exactly the same for any human viewer occupying
> the same point in time and space - solely dependent on the particular, individual vision of
> distinct beholders, with their own concrete relations to the scene in front of them.
> (Jay: 1994, 70)

In this sense, the fixed and direct gaze gains a function of 'establishing' a hierarchical relationship with the object of the gaze. Thus, the knowing subject emerges as the power mechanism. The fixed gaze has so many implications along with any kind of gaze, which could also be the look that glances. The importance given to the ocular is the importance given to presence that introduces things in a spatial order. In the absolute understanding of space, time is produced as an absolute material. This is the conception of time, which conveys as an absolute mode of thought the reality of which is bound to space. In this sense, Descartes considered body and mind as different from each other and seen a causal relation between time and space. Descartes also brought the dualism between time and duration. He regarded time as "the abstract mode of thought which measured the duration of created substances." [7] As Descartes separated time between the physical and the intelligible, Newton distinguished between the 'absolute time', which is mathematical and true time, and the relative time that is separate "from its sensible measures." Newton's dualism depended on the conception of absolute time, which was exterior to the movement of things, matter and motion. Relative time as the internal time as the measure of duration "by means of motion." (Turetzky: 1998, 74) Relative time, according to Newton, depended on the relationship between time and the "sensible objects." The concerns with the sensible, which could be considered as a reference to intelligible things and the unintelligible brings the notion of "true time" as the ideal time. Newton also considered real time as the time of God, and God as time, arguing that "time is uncreated that is caused by the emanation from God's existence." (Turetzky: 1998, 72) In this sense, Newton introduced a transcendental notion of time outside the world, which was the manifestation of things in the world. The existence of time was bound to the existence of God as time was understood to be "arising from the fact of God's existence and God has the property of temporal location." (Turetzky: 1998, 72-73) Thus, it was considered that time was a transcendental signified which was unreachable like God. In this sense, time was conceived as a property of God and what was left in this world was the abstracted and ideal time. As the aim was to reach the ideal, it was not possible to get a sense of true time

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[7] Turetzky, Philip, *Time,* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998) 71.

in this world. Modernity and the conception of vision in modernity has developed under the influence of theories of Cartesian metaphysics (1595-1650), Galileo's (1564-1642) conception of the world through a geometrical point of view and Newtonian (1642-1727) principle of the absolute. In this sense, the truth of modernity could be said to be the truth of an absolute scientific truth that privileged the stable and the unchanging. A trust in the scientific knowledge introduces a single way of understanding for everything in the world. This 'single truth' calls for everything to line up in a linear existence and brings a notion of destiny. An understanding of time according to space empowers this relation, which declares existence as a dialectics of non-existence that is dependent on a beginning and an end.

Henri Bergon (1859-1941) who has asserted his theories of time as dureé, has brought the notion of time which "cannot be captured by the traditional concepts of unity and multiplicity." (Turetzky: 1998, 194) In this sense, Bergson's attempt was on the side of elimination of a unified approach, which was a criticism of privileging of spatial dialectics over time. Bergson did not deal with a difference between the ideal and the real. His theories could eliminate the hierarchy of absolute time over worldly time conceived as "duration" in Newton. Rather dureé brings a fluid conception of the virtual and the actual and the measured and the unmeasured. He introduces two kinds of multiplicities, the quantitative and the qualitative. The quantitative is dependent on the measurement of things in absolute space, which means a coherent understanding of things. This is the measurement of space and things in space, which are distinguished from each other according to numerical differences. On the other hand, the qualitative is able to introduce infinite divisions in space differing in kind by its not being abstracted through a system of measurement. In Bergson, the notion of dureé as divisible replaces an understanding of an exterior and unique time. Dureé as a difference in kind is not the actual thing since it differs virtually. Bergson's notion of time as dureé does not consider reality as the manifestation of being in differentiating between the virtual and the actual. Instead, the virtual does not differ from the actual by being less real than the actual. The difference between the virtual and the actual is more than a differentiation in degree by a measure of amount. So reality is not considered as external to being and it is not built upon a stable and "pre-existing element". The difference between the virtual and the actual are considered as a passage from pure memory to memory-images. In this sense, he does not leave memory in the virtual, but considers an alteration of memory in the actual, which turns into memory-image. "We actualise memory by detaching ourselves from the present

leaping into the past." (Turetzky: 1998, 203) In this sense, Bergson gives an account of memory that is activated in the actual, which does not allow past to be left in the past, but introduces past that coexists with the present. Bergson's conception of dureé seems to eliminate the dualism between the imaginary and the real as well as the sensible and the imaginable.

Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) has taken from Bergson's notion of dureé concerning the relationship between the virtual and the actual a notion of difference in kind. Deleuze argues that time could be considered according to the first, second and the third synthesis of time. "The first synthesis of time produces the living present, by connecting successive instants as past and future." (Turetzky: 1998, 212) However, according to Deleuze, these instants are not constituted as the abstracted and isolated pieces of time taken from past and future but they fuse into past and the future. In this sense, it has the function of both connecting and distinguishing past, present and future. The second synthesis is the pure and passive one, which is a "transcendental synthesis." However, time is neither the first nor the second synthesis, since it is neither the virtual nor the actual. At this point, Deleuze introduces the third synthesis of time, which is the crystallisation of time that both has the aspect of the virtual and the actual. Crystallisation of time occurs in the multiplication of the present. This is constituted as the cyclical and continuous emergence of the actual and the virtual. They both displace and occur in each other as the possibility of differing tendency. The crystallisation of time is important since it is what distinguishes Deleuze's conception of duration from Bergsonian 'dureé'. The third synthesis of time introduces time as perceptible in the crystal-image. It is the emergence of a transcendental understanding of temporality, which is heterogenous and is in a becoming that is not conceived in a unique sense of present, past or future. In the conception of the third synthesis of time, the ideal is not abstracted but the ideal conveys an ideal reality.

The Problem With "Presence" and Beyond

Rosalind Krauss states that modernist visuality wants nothing more than to be the display of reason, of the rationalised, the coded, the abstracted and the law. [8] The scopic field is examined according to modernist discourse as the manifestation of truth in this

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[8] Krauss, Rosalind, *The Optical Unconscious*, Cambridge: Masacchusetts Inst. of Technology, 1993.

way. The privilege given to the precision of the visible in modernity emerges as the way to reach knowledge. The seeing subject becomes the knowing subject and seeing becomes the conscious act. Modernist conception of vision has divided the spatial and the temporal according to the rules of outside and inside. In the arts, there is also a conception of the outside and inside that introduces time as the tool of space. The emphasis on space is a consequence of the modernist desire for presence, the immediate, the rational and the concrete rather than a fluid and continuous notion of the world. In modern art, there is also a strong emphasis on this preserved space, which distinguishes between the sensible and the intelligible. Modernist approach considers a binary opposition between inside and outside and situates the temporal as an outside effect of space. Spatial understanding allows for the conception of a "form" and figuration. The implication of form brings a concrete aspect to space. In modern art, form contradicts the formless - *informe* - and time is regarded as the formless thing. Space gives an ideal form to time, in a way space idealises time. On the other hand, the elimination of binaries allow the formless - *informe* - to be understood as "what form itself creates, as logic acting logically to act against itself" and form produces a "heterologic." (Krauss: 1993, 167) Formless is form deprived of a concrete and unchanging self-identity. Nevertheless, formless is not outside a notion of identity. Rather it does not refer to a notion of a stable, self-identity and it is able to divide in itself. It may be thought as the way in which a conception of time is freed from any figuration outside itself. Space in this sense may not be the negation of time. Rather it may be part of a temporal alteration in a continuous becoming rather than a figure. Continuity of time in modernism is 'observed' in the shaped space of the visual and the observable. Therefore, it only exists as long as it is perceivable by a subject. Such a conception introduces time as reified and internalised by the looking subject and gives time's existence as a matter of consciousness. Modernist painting calls for a fixed look, which is determined according to geometrical coordinates of the picture plane. Motion becomes an outside effect contributing to space. Krauss states that such an understanding of the "temporal as necessarily outside the visual" is an "idea of the separation of the senses on which modernism's logic is built." (Krauss: 1993, 217)

Deleuze introduces the problematic of immanence and a conception of a temporality through intuition. According to Deleuze time is not exterior to space. In

Bergsonism [9] Deleuze asserts "intuition as the method" of getting a sense of duration rather than a concrete time. In this sense, the privileging of perception, which introduces time as the immediate form of space is questioned. A sense of scepticism about perception is because Deleuze does not leave room for the immediacy and the implication of "now" as the point in space. Rather duration is regarded as a process of "becoming", which is the succession of repetition that does not stop repeating. Such a conception does not exclude perception from getting a sense of temporality of things, but does not constitute perception as the condition of time. This is because memory and recollection contribute to the actualisation of perception. In this sense, the concrete act of immediate perception is replaced by unfolding of things in time. Deleuze states that:

> Perception merges with the object from which it has abstracted only that which did not interest us. It is not a difference in kind, rather a difference in degree between the faculty of the brain and the function of the core, between the perception of the matter and the matter itself. (Deleuze: 1988, 25)

Such a relation between perception and memory eliminates the division between the domains of perception as consciousness and memory as unconsciousness. The body is not that which needs 'realisation' according to geometrical proportions, but it is in affection with its environment in a temporal unfolding. Deleuze's conception of "recollection of memory" activates memory in consciousness and links the instants to each other interpolating the past in the present. In this sense, Deleuze rejects being on the side of the ones who argue for a spatial reserve for perception and memory. His opposition to Freudian psychoanalysis is also because of Freud's constitution of perception in the topographies of the subject. The Freudian subject contradicts the Deleuzian subject in the sense that the Deleuzian subject is not constituted upon spatial determinants, which might be an implication of an "erect" position of being. Rather, the subject has no place and the formation of the subject is due to an alteration, a repetition that repeats itself by differentiating in itself. Deleuze's notion of a temporal body allows memory to contribute to the constitution of the subject and allows for a temporal unfolding of the body free from an instantaneous understanding of space. Deleuze does not consider a specific place for such a conception of

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[9] Deleuze, Gilles, *Bergsonism*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, New York: Zone Books, 1988.

the body. In this sense, the body is introduced as that which does not have to give a sense of totality. Accordingly, there is not a concern for the ego and the formation of a self in the relationship with the other.

The notion of self-identity has been an important issue in modernist discourse. Self-identity is the rigid structure, the knowing subject and the seeing subject at the centre of the universe. Self-identity is formed according to linear history and the historicisation of being. This is also the way in which the space functions as a shaping and forming principle of history of human being. On the other hand, duration is concerned with a cyclical unfolding between the virtual and the actual and in difference in kind. It does not allow something concrete to emerge as the manifestation of truth. It is that which is left to continuous division and becoming and gains a nomadic character. In this sense, such conception of time as flow neither includes nor excludes a sense of being in itself. It does not have a structure and does not indicate a linear time-line. Therefore, it does not constitute a space for individual historicisation of being which is determined according to the position of the individual in a teleological structure.

In *The Consequences of Modernity* [10]Anthony Giddens argues that the modern condition is based on narrative. There is a sense of "binding" between space and time that is based on the social systems of modernity. These systems are the constitution of a law indicating where and how the subject should stand in the social system. "Self-identity" says Giddens is a way of self-evidential being that implies space in modernity and time is bound to that space as it abstracted as a calculable and measurable thing. Giddens states that the conception of self-identity in modernity is the result of the problematic of presence, which introduces the issues of evidentiality, biography, narrative and individual historicisation. Individual historicisation is "fragile and it keeps one history specific to this self-identity." Giddens' reading of the relationship between self-identity and modernity seems to have a sense of keeping the record of time that anchors the subject to a narrative space of historicisation. Such a notion brings anticipation of future in the present. However, it excludes the possibility of regarding present time as a mode of alteration. A sense historicisation of the subject is "the problem of identity" which is concerned with the question of how to express the self to the other. Simarly, Kellner in 'Postmodern Identities' [11] asserts that identity is as a problematic of "constitution, perception, interpretation, and presentation of our self to ourselves and to others." (Kellner: 1998, 125) Kellner also argues that identity in modernity is social and 'Other' related. Identity has been regarded a mutual recognition in modernity, dependent on the other which implies self-consciousness. Modernity increases a mechanism of 'Other' directedness.

The problematic of the other depends on the spatial and temporal separations between the other and the self in modernity. Language is one of the significant aspects in the formation of the other which introduces the specular subject of modernity as "I". In this

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[10] Giddens, Anthony, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990.

[11] Kellner, Douglas, 'Postmodern Identities', *Modernity and Identity***, ed. Scott Lash and Jonathan Friedman**, Oxford, UK and Cambridge, USA: Blackwell, 1998.

sense, the self is determined in its relation to the other. In *Modernity and Self-identity*[12] Giddens refers to linguistic differentiation of I/me/you which he sees as the "anchoring discursive feature" of self-identity. He states that the I/me relation is one internal to language.

> 'I' is a linguistic shifter, which gets its meaning from the networks of the terms
>
> whereby a discursive system of subjectivity is acquired. The ability to use 'I',
>
> and other associated terns of subjectivity, is a condition for the emergence of
>
> self-awareness. (Giddens: 1991, 53)

The constitution of self-identity, which requires recognition by the other brings a state of anxiety. Giddens states that anxiety is the emergence of "being against non-being" which is, in Freud, related to the "fear of the loss of the other, and is connected to the early mastery of absence." (Giddens: 1991, 49) The construction of self-identity as motivated by a sense of loss, which causes anxiety in the 'modern subject' is because of the anticipation of the future event in the present. Thus, the individual historicisation is guaranteed. On the other hand, a conception of a temporality of the subject that is not constituted on beginning and ending is not concerned with an idea of 'the loss'. The loss is the loss of the other, which is regarded as the site on which the subjective desires are anchored. In a way, the loss of the other, is the loss of the object of desire. The separation is built on a structure of loss that is regarded as the cause of desire. The body is the agent of desire and one's desires are reflected in the other's body and the other's desire. There is a precise foundation for desire, which is found in the organs. Oedipus was blamed for that, for desiring his mother, and being unaware of his 'direction' of his desires. The desire was the desire for copulating with the mother to return to a condition of being whole, which once was there in the 'beginning.' The Mother's desire was also directed to what she could 'not have' and this is the penis as the power of masculinity. Deleuze and Guattari's 'Anti-Oedipus'[13] breaks the myth on which desire is suspended. "Anti-Oedipus" rejects the tragedy of Oedipus, who is blamed for desiring his mother. Deleuze and Guattari are critical of the division between production and the product. They argue that production and the product are in the same body, and this body is "without organs." Deleuze mentions that desiring machines are also the productions, which produce desires that are mechanised. There is a consumption, which Deleuze also mentions, that takes place in the cycle of production. Then the products of these bodies are "immediately consumed" that leads to a repetition in the production of desire. "Desire causes the current to flow, it constantly couples continuous flows and partial objects that are by nature fragmentary and fragmented." (Deleuze &Guattari: 1997, 405) One flows to incorporate with the other, desiring for the other. Deleuze and Guattari see the psyche as a machine and regard a conception of psychiatric materiality, which addresses desire as a mechanism. The desiring machines produce desire, stem from desire, and they produce "psychic reality." The desire and its objects are one and the same thing; as machine. The body both as the product and the production at the same time turns into an apparatus which does not desire another object outside itself. Krauss states that "the production of flows by the same machine, the breast, say, provide the continuum into which next machine, the mouth, can

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[12] Giddens, Anthony, *Modernity and Self-identity,* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991.

[13] Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix, 'Anti-Oedipus', *From Modernism to Postmodernism*, ed. Lawrence E. Cahoone, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997) 401-21.

cut, thereby setting up the precondition of the mechanical, which is to articulate matter." (Krauss: 1993, 316) Repetition is the motive of this machine. An important aspect of 'Anti-Oedipus' is the introduction of the Klenian "part-object" which conveys "non-productive and formless" aspect of body. This body is "without organs" and it leads to the "decoding of the flow of desire at the same time setting up the illusion that they themselves are the agents of production." (Krauss:1993, 316)

'Anti-Oedipus' could be regarded as a criticism of self-identity in modernity. The subject it introduces is not subjectified by the existence of the other located as the focal point of desire. The subject is not constituted through differentiating its object from itself – in differing in degree. The subject also becomes the object of desire. It is also not a self-seeing entity, who knows the other by situating it in the limit of vision. The subject is the site of self-destruction, which does not refer to a finishing point. Rather it differentiates in a repetitive mode, which is not located in a place. It is open to process that goes between the virtual and the actual.

Différance as a Question About Presence

Derrida's notion of différance does not work a binary opposition between two things. He is critical of the "metaphysics of presence" on which Western philosophy depends. He is against the logocentric notion of western philosophy, which is based on thought, truth, reason and logic. Deconstruction of difference is the deconstruction of the relationship between the self and the other, which western metaphysics articulated according to the rules of presence and absence. Derrida takes difference away from the linguistic boundaries of difference and introduces "différance". Différance does not have a single and equivocal meaning which corresponds a phonetic or lingustic understanding of difference. Différance does not belong to present or any "being-present." Différance is not originated from a 'being' before itself and is itself not original. It stands out by rejecting a conception of "essence" and "existence" as well as a word or a concept. Différance has a reference to the Latin word differer, one of the meanings of which is "the action of putting off until later." In this sense, differer is temporization itself:[14]

> Differer is to take recourse, consciously or unconsciously in the temporal and temporizing
> mediation of a detour that suspends the accomplishment of fulfilment of "desire"
> or "will." This temporization is also temporalisation and spacing, the becoming-time of
> space and the becoming-spaceof time, "the originary constitution" of time and space…
> the use of language that here is criticized and displaced. (Derrida: 1982, 8)

In his constitution of différance, Derrida is critical of western metaphysics, which privileges presence over absence, instance over continuity, speech over writing since there is a conception of hierarchical oppositions between activity and passivity. In that sense he is also critical of the way in which psychoanalytic practices is concerned with the opening and closing of the unconscious for the constitution of the subject. In Freudian psychoanalysis consciousness has the privileged position as the manifestation of self-presence. Derrida argues that "the privilege granted to consciousness is the privilege granted to the present". Accordingly, the subject in psychoanalysis is constituted on the notion of the real and the unreal as well as dividing the psychical from the physical, the conscious and the unconscious in different spatial positions. In this sense, Derrida is

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[14] Derrida, Jacques, *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.

critical about Freud's conception of "difference", which directly refers to the 'concepts' based on spacing. Freud conceptualises difference while he refers to differing, which is accompanied by separation between two forces where mind is privileged over the intuition and the body. To defer on the other hand addresses temporization, which introduces "breaching" rather than closure, "trace" rather than instance and self-presence. Différance is the temporalisation of space and spatialisation of time.

Derrida seems to argue that Freud's theorisation of psyche is based on différance, whereas Freud is not aware of that. Freud was never able to give a clear explanation of his theories. At the base of Freud's 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle', there is différance since replacement of pleasures by realities is regarded as an outcome of the deferred action. However, Freud does not allow a space for the unconscious to have a role in consciousness by tending to treat the unconscious as passified, set away from consciousness. Freud misses difference and sees the unconscious as passive, in so far as it is repressed, while retaining tied to "evidence" of presence, absence and loss. Différance is delayed in itself, which "exceeds presence and absence." Derrida says that a constitution of différance is not based on desires, needs or demands. It is rather open for breaching, then it does not desire the other to reach the ultimate presence and wholeness. Derrida asks, what if difference is divided in itself?

Derrida's approach to the unconscious then, does not exclude the unconscious in an isolated, unreachable space, which would thus regard it as "masked consciousness". The temporal mode of the unconscious then, is not timeless, but is "past that has never been present, never will be, whose future to come will never be a production or a reproduction in the form of presence." (Derrida: 1982, 20) As long as there is movement and alterity there cannot be presence in the conception of difference. Therefore, Derrida brings the conception of différance instead of difference, which is also an interruption to the "historical and ontological unfolding of being." (Derrida: 1982, 22) Relationship of trace to presence can be towards a "simulacrum of presence" which is the constitution of "dislocation and displacement" of trace in itself. Nevertheless, presence can only be the trace of presence that passes, defers and differentiates from itself.

Changing Times in Contemporary Art

In this section I will be considering the ways in which similar objects reveal different senses of temporalities. Some of the works differ from each other in the sense that there is a similar understanding in the process of their making but the technique is different in each works. I consider spatial factors as significant in changing the way in which the temporality of the objects are revealed. However, the spatial understanding also differs in these works from that of the conventional formation of space which modern art claims. Most of the art practices since the second half of the twentieth century introduce different relations between the work and the viewer. It could be said that art after modernism has been critical of modernist discourse, which is reflected in modernist art practices. Within the contemporary art practices, contrary to what the modernist works claim, the conventional linear narrative form is distorted by destroying the elements of a narrative structure such as the unity of time, space and action. There is no longer a concern for the ideal work of art but art becomes what it is. For this reason, most of the people dealing with contemporary art practices have contributed to the art scene with a claim of revealing the importance or "thingness" of the object itself. They were against the comprehension of the things in a relation of representation by means of their resemblances and samenesses with the real. In this sense, such a claim introduces the use of the media not as the medium,

as an agent to express something, but as the work itself. Therefore, the works, most of the time, achieves going beyond a narrative position.

In referring to different works, I aim to chose the objects that give a sense of temporality which could be considered away from being a representation of space. Such an understanding of temporality could sometimes be seen as duration having taken the place of time. Accordingly, the conception of time in the modernist work of art as a fact that is revealed in the immediacy of perception is distorted by duration. I will be considering the ways in which the modernist factuality of space is replaced by actuality of duration. It is also not the only concern with time and a different understanding of temporality as duration that causes the shift from a modernist work of art into contemporary art. Rather, I will be arguing that the conception of duration changes the way in which the object and the subject of art is understood. In addition to this, it is important to note that, these objects do not only give an account of duration that is only relevant and specific in the condition of art. On the contrary, these works aim to introduce a conception of temporality that is fragmented and unbound from space as long as time is argued to be exterior to space. Rather than being considered as the mimetic representation of reality, these objects have their own realities. These objects sometimes go beyond a sense of the real that is considered as that which is outside art by interrupting, sometimes disturbing an awareness of self-presence on the side of the viewer. Such aspects could be regarded as the common traits of the objects I chose, which might also create differences.

The first chapter is concerned with the temporal and spatial aspects of minimal objects. In this chapter some of the characteristics which are considered specific to the relationship between the viewer and the minimal objects are discussed. The characteristics that distinguish minimal objects from modernist painting and sculpture is considered to be that these objects do not claim to be the included in a specific genre or movement. The minimal objects differ from modernist painting or sculpture by emphasising duration rather than instance, scale rather than size, an individualising and particularisation of relationship with the viewer. The process of their making is also important in the sense that the use of industrial materials introduce an altered relationship between the work and the viewer. In the elimination of an expressive traits observable in the surface of a painting, the traces refer to a machinic process which cannot be referred back to the autographic material. There is no longer a surface of a painting that carries expressive traits of its author. In that sense, there is also a consideration of a process, which allows a process to occur between the viewer and these objects. There is an emphasis on the viewer's perception and bodily involvement in process in the gallery space. However, minimal objects reject having a sense of representation and the space they occupy does not convey a sense of narration. The emphasis on a literal character of these objects, which introduce an individual experience, is criticised by the defenders of modern art such as Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried. I take Fried's criticism about the theatricality of these objects to be important since it is ambiguous to consider an aspect of theatricality on the side of minimal art. I consider Fried's notion of theatricality inconsistent since he tries to exclude art from what he considers literal as theatrical. Fried is on the side of modern art since it looks as if he considers art as an object of consciousness and that which is able to constitute a truth in life. In addition to that, the dependence on a notion of perception is questioned according to how perception is conceived. Does the emphasis of perception address a sense of consciousness about the work, space and temporality on the side of the viewer? Or could people who claimed the importance of perception in minimal art have meant something else other than a state of consciousness?

There is an important point, which is common in all of the chapters, although presented through some various kinds of examples: time is not a matter of consciousness

and movement is not an outer effect of time. It does not have to be visible and implied through the spatial dialectics. Although there is not a visible 'action' on the side of the minimal objects, we can talk about a movement in a temporal mode, which introduces delay. The operation of delay rather than instance is present in the works, which also brings a sense of fragmentation to the relationship between the viewer and the work. In this sense, delay interrupts a stable position and a conception of a fixed notion of the viewer as the subject and the minimal object as the object under the control of the gaze. The unclarity of positions is not only between the object and its viewer, but also is revealed in the making of the minimal objects. In that sense, Robert Smithson's *Non-site* (1968) and Robert Morris' *Mirrorred Cubes* (1965) are referred to as having such characteristics. They introduce mobilisation of space, an impossibility of constituting an identity either on the side of the viewer or the object, a delayed notion of temporality, and a fragmented relationship between the space and the viewer.

In the second part of the chapter Bruce Nauman's corridor installation, *The Live/Taped Video Corridor* (1968) is introduced. The concern in this installation is similar to the notion of delay and inability to constitute a stable relationship between the subject and object. The corridor is important since the way the video monitors are installed in the corridor interrupts a notion of presence and it makes delay visible by not representing a single possible appearance of one walking in the corridor.

The way it differs from the temporality of minimal objects and most other installations is that it cuts the relationship with the gallery space, which is able to take the participant into another realm out of gallery space. Although this work is often announced as installation, it interrupts an understanding of a relationship which installation space communicates with its viewer. This space is not a specific place: it is not marked by an unchanging territory that is enclosed inside the borders. There is a common point in these works and in corridor installation and that is the way in which space is divided and mobilised by the possibility of different temporalities operating 'at the same time.' In this chapter the temporal characteristics of the gallery space and as the space of installation as well as the objects relation to the viewer are considered.

In the second chapter, the movement-image and the time-image are introduced. These terms belong to Deleuze who is concerned with the representation of movement and its relation to duration in cinema. Deleuze argues that the movement-image introduces an indirect representation of the image in cinema, while the time-image is a direct representation. The time-image rejects a notion of a coherent narrative film that is based on a plot. Rather, there are irrational cuts, which creates the time-image. The time image is not a mental image that is produced by the cut. The time-image does not allow sensory motor links to develop on the side of the spectator of the film. The time-image introduces a temporal rather than a spatial cinematic experience, which does not constitute events following a sequential temporal order. I consider Andy Warhol's films *Empire, Eat* (1963) and *Sleep*(1963) according to the time-image. These films interrupt a conventional mode of participation of the spectator in the film. The time-image in this sense, changes one's relation with cinematic space as well as the notion of identification in cinema. In this chapter some of the video performances, Slo-Mo films and other films by Bruce Nauman are also considered as some examples of "moving image" which also stand out by means of the use of film as a

temporal material. It can be said about the films in this chapter that the notion of the "moving image" is an illusion and the time-image is at some point able to break this illusion in cinema. In addition to this the examples of moving images in this chapter have a concern similar to the minimalist's use of the materials not as part of the narrative structure but as that which become entity. In Warhol's use of long shots as well Nauman's films, there is a tendency to use the normal duration of film material without a manipulation to the event through cuts or other effects or changing the position of the camera. We see that the film material, the film stock as well and the subject of the film do not constitute a narrative form and the manipulation of these techniques differ from their usual usage. In this sense, the media become present not only as the agent to tell the story but as 'itself' which does not make a story but become a story.

In the third chapter, there is a description of a short film by Kerstin Cmelka. She is a contemporary artist who makes experimental films. The film I analyse is *With Me*. In this film there is a depiction of two women copulating with each other. However, these two women appear to be the same women. *With Me* is not performed by two different women. Cmelka achieves this by making a double exposure on the same film stock, by performing two of the women in different times and displaying the film as if the women are there simultaneously. In this sense, I argue that such a film interrupts a sense of identification on the side of the spectator which psychoanalytic film theory does not help to explain. In the copulation scene, the subject and the object are unclear since they are both the same and two separate persons at the same time. The Lacanian theory of identification, which treats the relation to the screen by analogy to the relation with the mirror in the mirror stage. commonly used with reference to the relation of screen as the mirror in the mirror stage does not coincide with the fragmented notion of the subject and the object in this film. *With Me* disrupts a unique understanding of space, time and action which introduces an oscillation between the real and the phantasmatic. The film also reveals a fragmented notion of space and time. Time does not extend in a spatial dimension but it multiplies into different temporalities that meet in a single duration of the film. The film lasts three minutes. However, these three minutes do not explain the operation of delay that enables us to see different takes at different times in a single duration. *With Me* represents the particular and the singular at the same time while it gives a sense of detachment from and attachment to the temporal unfolding, to the image and to the screen.

The examples from the minimal objects, the films and the video installations meet in the sense that they interrupt a stable sense of perception on the side of the spectator. What these objects introduce is not an unreal or illusionary side of perception. Rather these objects contribute to an understanding of perception by being critical about the 'nature' of perception, which is conceived as immediate and as a work of mind. In this sense, these objects could change the conventional attitude of perception, which is associated with a conception of consciousness in psychoanalysis. These works do not deny the importance of perception and consciousness but they do try to tell that perception and consciousness, the intelligible and the comprehensible are not the prior conditions for communicating between each other. In this sense, time does not become an external element of space. Unlike a modernist attitude, which seeks for the stable, the unified and the whole and privileges spatial concerns as the manifestation of this belief, the contemporary articulation of space has shifted from a singular understanding of space into plural one. Such a conception breaks the rules of self-identity, subjectivity, directionality and teleology as the truth of being. The conception of the notion of differentiation no longer considers a central position for difference to emerge. In this sense, the other is conceived as that which is eliminated from being understood from the position of the self. Modernist art promoted a sense of the importance of space as the concrete and a single dimension to 'understand' the work of art. Contrary to such a belief, contemporary art brings a mobile sense of space that unfolds in a temporal alteration rather than space as a container of things. An understanding that goes beyond a conception of concrete space as being is the way in which temporality and duration are conceived as becoming. Such shift from the spatial into a temporal understanding changes the understanding of the real, which modernity depicted as the negation of the unreal. Rather, reality is not the major concern of being. Time is no longer the abstraction of space and space is not the manifestation of reality. In this sense, they both become distinct and together within the space-time, which Cornelius Castoriadis regards as the opening of several scales and compares space-time to foam. "This 'foam' of space-time introduces at one and the same time both discontinuities and perpetual changes in its very topology." (Castoriadis: 1997, 365)

CHAPTER I

34 years ago, in 'Art and Objecthood'[15] Michael Fried declared a war going on between theatre and modernist painting, "between theatrical and pictorial art". This declaration has received a lot of attention by the art critics of the period. Fried stated in 'Art and Objectood' that the success of "modernist art" was that it had been able to defeat theatre. He stated that theatricality distorted modernist painting and sculpture. Fried's statement seems to depend on a transcendental notion of art that escapes a literal of the work of art, since he regards theatre as weakening the power of art. Fried's argument was an attack on what he called minimal art as "literalist art" for its being theatrical and literal. In this sense Fried attacked the group of people who were dealing with minimal art. Robert Morris and Donald Judd were among the group of people Fried was against. When Fried called the works of Judd and Morris theatrical in 'Art and Objecthood' these artists who were dealing with Minimalism had not made a claim about their art to be considered as theatrical or not. Donald Judd's statement that minimal art was "neither painting nor sculpture" might be considered as an aspect of what these artists claimed to do in their works. Donald Judd and other people included in minimal art were critical of the previous discourses since they argued that their works had to be considered away from the discourse of modernist painting or sculpture. In 'Complaints: Part I'[16] (1969) Donald Judd states that he does not have a specific preference for any "kind of art" and he adds, "I prefer art that is not associated with anything." (Judd: 1965, 245) Although there are some points that distinguish minimal art from the previous movements, it is not clear whether minimal art could go beyond some discourses.

Accordingly, minimal art became the subject of the critics who considered minimal art as 'ABC art' by Barbara Rose and Lucy Lippard's 'The Silent Art'. At the same time, it was also artists who were dealing with Minimalism who have brought different kinds of unspecific classifications for their works such as Donald Judd's 'Specific Objects', Morris' 'Anti-form'.[17] Such classifications also referred to the process of the making of these objects.

The relationship between the space these "objects" were installed and the outcome of this relationship as a process, which was open to the viewer of these objects, were the critical points which minimal art brought. In 'Specific Objects' Judd states that the minimal objects revealed a sense of singleness. Such an aspect of the minimal object "has a duration, but it is only beginning and has a better future outside of painting." (Judd: 1965, 207) However, an emphasis on the significance of spatial factors in minimal art was not an elaboration of space. Rather it is not the function of space to present minimal objects in a different way from what modernist painting or sculpture did. The difference is the way in which these objects introduce different relations as an outcome of a communicative process with the viewer. One of the important aspects that change the relation between the viewer and the work is related to the process of the making of these objects. The concern with the industrial, mass-produced and 'untouched' process of the making of minimal objects also changed the notion of the space these works were installed. For example, modernist painting was regarded to have an internal relation of space between the value of

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[15] Fried, Michael, 'Art and Objecthood', *Art and Objecthood* , Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998.

[16] Judd, Donald, 'Specific Objects', *Minimalism*, ed. James Meyer, (London: Phaidon, 2000) 207-10.

[17] Morris, Robert, 'Anti-Form', *Minimalism*, ed. James Meyer, (London: Phaidon, 2000) 243-4.

colours on the picture place or a kind of balance between the elements of painting. Again in 'Specific Objects' Judd states that "the problem with painting is that it is a rectangular plane faced against the wall." In this sense, the characteristics of rectangle as a shape itself becomes "overpowered" (Judd: 2000, 207) by painting while rectangle is made the limit of painting. However, minimal objects free the shape from being a limit to painting. Thus, the shape as itself becomes important in art. Accordingly, Judd distinguishes 'Specific Objects' from paintings since he states that "almost all paintings are spatial." He gives a chance to Yves Klein's blue paintings to be considered as "unspatial" as well as Stella's works. However, the fact that these paintings have a surface does not allow these paintings to be considered away from spatial concerns.

The artists dealing with Minimalism claimed that the work had to introduce the spatial factors of the place in which they were installed. In this sense, the internal and enclosed relational character of the modernist work of art claimed to be replaced by contribution of space to the process of the making of the work. Since there is an aspect of construction in these objects, which is concerned with an architectural structure, the gallery space is not the protective, preserving body that keeps these objects within it. Thus the relation of these objects within the gallery space is not a conforming one but they communicate a sense of contention with the space. In this sense, the foundation of the minimal objects in the gallery space is a matter of conflict with the idea of a gallery and the architectural structure of gallery. The scale, the process of their making, the way they speak for the viewer and the characteristics of place minimal objects occupy can be regarded as some of the aspects that contradict the modernist approach to the notion of museum. It can be said that minimal objects achieve going beyond the notion of protective, indicative and representational space, which modernist works convey in gallery spaces. As a consequence of such relation, the massive objects bring hierarchal structure of the gallery space over the work of art into question. Such a shift also influences the way the work communicates to its viewer as well as changing the position of the viewer which modernist tradition used to provide as the beholder of the work of art. In this sense, minimal objects activate space and reveal a temporal dimension, which used to be repressed by the represented space and be regarded as exterior to the space of installation. Thus, the emphasis of a comprehensible work in a totality of space is replaced by the fragmentation of space through the multiplication of different temporalities. Such activation interrupts the relationship between the work of art and the "beholder" as well as a formation of a coherent meaning enclosed in the gallery space.

The activation of the communication between the work and the beholder, which emphasises process and performance rather than a notion of a complete being is what Michael Fried is critical. This is because he associates "minimalist tendency" in art with the "literalist sensibility" in theatre. He sees theatre as a threat to the "identity" of modern art. Fried regards an aspect of literalness on the side of minimal art as a consequence of its resemblance to the ways in which a theatrical work sets a relationship with its audience. In 'Art and Objecthood' Fried says "literalist sensibility is theatrical because, to begin with, it is concerned with the actual circumstances in which the beholder encounters literalist work." The "actual circumstances" according to Fried, causes the disappearance of the aesthetic distance between the work and the beholder. In this sense, theatre becomes threatening for the modernist painting and sculpture. Performances are also concerned with the closure of an imaginary or physical distance between the work and the beholder. Most of the time, a performance does not indicate an intelligible linear narrative structure to be understood by the viewer. Rather, interpretation is replaced by the active participation of the viewer to the process. Fried seems anxious about minimal art that communicates with its viewer and he states that like theatre:

literalist art possesses an audience, though a somewhat special one: that the beholder
is confronted by literalist work within a situation that he experiences as his means that
there is an important sense in which the work in question exists for him alone, even if he
is not actually alone with the work at the time. (Fried: 1998, 83)

In this sense, a minimalist object reveals a space particular to its viewer and provides the temporal and spatial elements, which communicate between the viewer and the work. Such an aspect of communication that emphasises the duration of space could be said to have an aspect of theatricality. However, Fried's approach to minimal art as theatre has a reductionist intention since he is concerned with theatre as if it interrupts the formation of a conventional and true relationship between the work and the beholder. In a discussion with Fried and Buchloch concerning Fried's essay 'Art and Objecthood', Krauss states that Fried's notion of situating "theatre between the arts" is an articulation of "gap and void" on the side of theatre.[18] Krauss also criticises Fried for being logocentric because of his conception of "good" art, which is considered according to an ethical basis since there are dualities concerning good and bad, true and false, outside and inside. Similarly Jon Thomson in 'New times, new thoughts, new sculpture'[19] argues that the aspect of theatricality which Fried is concerned is a notion of "theatricalisation" of space. The relation of work to the viewer is rendered unclear which brings the moral concerns into the scene of art. Thomson adds that Minimalism "can no longer lay claim to being a model of rightness and so continue to speak on behalf of good art." (Thomson: 1993, 17) Thomson also differentiates between two temporal modes, which he regards significant in bringing up ethical concerns. Referring to Kantian notion of time that searches for a transcendental moment in art, which Fried is also interested in, Thomson argues that:

> There is normal time which means the unreflected upon passage of time in which we
> exist and experience everyday events- the illusory version of which is the proper
> condition of theatre – and "present time" experienced as a compression
> rather than continuum. (Thomson: 1993, 18)

Kant's argument about time is also what Fried is concerned in the sense that Fried follows the way in which Kant privileges the transcendental time over the phenomenological time. Kant constitutes the phenomenal world as that which exactly appears to us, as apprehended in our experience. The noumenal world is "the world and its objects as they exist "independently of our minds grasp" that requires knowledge for intuitions to be structured. (Thomson: 1993, 19) Such an argumentation also sees dualities and moral sense of aesthetic experience as a privileged notion in art. Fried is critical of what he considers to be theatrical since it turns the experience of minimal art into a performance. Such an experience brings a conception of process taking the place of the instantaneous and analytical experience of a modernist work of art.

Site in Motion

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[18] Buchloch, Benjamin; Fried, Michael; Krauss, Rosalind, 'Theories of art after Minimalism and Pop:
1967/87 Geneologies of art and theory', *Discussions in Contemporary Culture*, ed. Hal Foster, (Seattle: Bay
Press, 1987) 57-88.
[19] Thomson, Jon, 'New times, new thoughts, new sculpture', *Gravity and Grace: The changing condition of
sculpture 1965-1975*, London: South Bank Centre, 1993.

The better new work takes relationship out of the work and makes them a function of space, light and the viewer's field of vision. The object is but one of the terms in the newer aesthetics. It is some way more reflexive because one's awareness of oneself existing in the same space as the work is stronger than the previous work with its many internal relationships.

Robert Morris, 'Notes on Sculpture'

In 'Notes on Sculpture'[20] Robert Morris is critical about the way in which modern art causes allusion by means of setting an internal relation between the properties of color, light and texture. Morris is against the way in which modern sculpture communicates with its viewer. In this sense, his argument about the modern sculpture is that it cuts the unity of perception since it takes the attention to the internal relations. He refers to sculptural objects, which convey internal comparison depending on the compositional proportions of these objects. These objects are dependent on a specific size enclosing a relation of space specific to the objects. On the other hand the interest in scale, which can be found in monumental characteristics is a way in which communication is possible between the work and the viewer. An "awareness of scale" Morris states is "a function of the comparison made between one's body size and the object." In this sense, the encounter between the viewer and the object gains a sense of literalness since scale gains in importance as well as space that stands outside a notion of composition. Morris says that scale becomes an element itself rather than a property of matter. Accordingly, there could not be a difference between the size and the scale as separate entities. Rather, the size of the modernist sculpture is questioned because of its obedience to the traditional compositional structure and the ideal proportions. The problematic of the size of modernist sculpture introduces a care for the relation of the parts of the sculpture to have a proper measurement to fit between the sides. The scale does not consider such a compositional relation between the sides. Thus, the relation between the work and the viewer is not only a function of eye and mind but also the body of the viewer, which participates in the work that develops in time. The body gets a sensation of scale in the course of time since it has to go around the object and experience it rather than look at it. In this sense, the encounter gains a performative aspect with its emphasis on duration. There is also a sense of proximity to the object as if the object could also participate to the bodily involvement of the viewer.

Happenings can be said to be the early examples of art where process and the participation of the beholder in this process are emphasised. Nevertheless, the beholder does not only remain the beholder, who just sees and examines the work, but also the one who participates in a process of becoming. In performance there is a bodily involvement of the viewer in a specific action while the viewer contributes to the "event" going on between the work and the him or herself as participant. On the other hand in his article 'Performativity and Minimalism in recent American art'[21] Maurice Berger states that:

Açıklama: Insert… But

performative encompasses the broader range of human enactments and interactions -the performances of our everyday lives, the things we do to survive, to communicate, to thrive, to manipulate, to procreate, to love; it charts the direct and seemingly ordinary interaction between the individual and society and culture at large.(Berger:1997, 15)

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[20] Morris, Robert, 'Notes on Sculpture Part I', *Minimal Art*, ed. Gregory Battcock, London: University of California Press, 1968.
[21] Berger, Maurice, *Minimal Politics,* Baltimore: Maryland, 1997.

Berger gives an account of the relationship between performance and performativity as the "infiltration of performance into the social and cultural sphere." (Berger: 1997, 15) In this sense Berger's argument encourages us to consider the notion of theatricality in minimal art as a kind of reductionist account of behaviour limiting it to a relationship between the audience and stage that is based on a specific event planned by its author. Rather, Berger prefers to consider the aspect of performance in minimal art as that which is more close to everyday life. However, his emphasis on performativity does not refer to the unconscious, unconditioned or inborn act. He states that the sense of infiltration does not have an aspect "less than meaningful" nor "less than ideological". (Berger: 1997, 15) Instead, performativity is in life and as part of life such that it goes parallel with the concerns of the period in which Minimal art emerged. Berger states that:

> Not surprisingly, then, minimalist performativity, embodied by a temporal,
> experiential and spectator driven style directly influenced by the anti-establishment,
> pro-individual, and liberatory ideologies of its age, has meshed with the interests
> of those artists whohave wished to explore or contest the social relationships
> of identity, power, and selfhood. (Berger: 1997, 15)

Judith Butler's argument about performativity is somewhat different from Berger's. In *Gender Trouble*[22] Butler is concerned with the issue of gender and sexuality in giving an account of performativity. According to Butler, gender roles are dependent on performative acts. In her use of "performativity", there is a criticism of logocentric and phallogocentric society, in which patriarchal authority functions according to the privileged condition of binaries. She argues that gender and sex cannot be binaries that are totally separate from each other. However, together they form the representative part of the person. And she also says that "gender is neither the causal result of sex nor as seemingly fixed as sex." (Butler:1990, 6) These terms are not binaries and there is no wall between gender and sex, though they constitute different aspects of sex as something both biologically and culturally defined. She states that these terms become free floating artifices that are the part of a performative faculty as representation. (Butler:1990, 6) Therefore, Butler's argument of performativity does not indicate a distinction between representation and presentation, sexuality and gender. Contrary to Berger's emphasis on performativity, which requires social recognition by the other person, Butler gives an account of performativity, which does not provoke a relationship between the fixed identities. In this sense, a person might reveal performative traits to him or herself. Butler's account of performativity announces rather a less conscious position than Berger's emphasis on self. It might be the relationship between the minimal object and its viewer calls for opening of the unconscious rather than a self-conscious state on the side of the viewer. In this sense, the aspect of performativity in Minimalism may rather be said to be a non-event compared to performance.

The concern with the non-event in Minimalism also challenges Fried's notion of theatricality in art. Fried seems to be anxious about "theatricalisation of space" which he regards as the end of modern art or the end in the way in which art should be. Minimal objects also do not emphasise a state of consciousness on the side of the viewer while they are on the border of art and non-art. The notion that they could be regarded as non-art is again the parameter of a conventional approach to art. In this sense, minimal art contradicts Fried's concern of how art should be presupposing the ethical aspects.

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[22] Butler, Judith, *Gender Trouble: feminism and the subversion of identity,* New York: Routledge, 1990.

Contrary to ethical concerns, the performative aspect of Minimalism interrupts all the notions concerning what art should be or should not be. The hierarchical structure of composition and the relationship between the museum space and the work of art are important factors. These are the conditions of the discourses about how and where a work of art should be, already specifying its place as the modern art museum. One of the criticisms has been towards the notion of work enclosed in the museum or gallery space. The dominant tendency in the relationship between the gallery space and the work of art was to consider painting as something to be hung on the wall or sculpture to be stood on a pedestal in the gallery. In this sense, the position of the work of art would be limited in gallery space. "Minimalists" have been critical of such "silent" spaces and tried to make sense of the spaces, not as "void" but as substance that would communicate between the "participant" and the work. In this sense, not only the "story" inside a painting or that has been figured by a sculpture but also what Morris stated as "space, light and the viewer's field of vision" have become important elements contributing to "performativity." It seems as if such contributions go beyond being a part of a process that is only concerned with the production of the work. The process of the reception of the work also becomes an element of activity. In addition to this, light, space, perception, scale gains a different character than they do in modernist works. As Judd also argued in 'Specific Objects', the rectangle gains importance not as the support but as the shape itself, all of these elements – light, space, perception, scale - themselves become the work. Dan Flavin is one of the artists who manipulated light as the subject of his work. His use of fluorescent tubes can be said to have connotations of industrial and mass- produced materials. In this sense, not only light but also the source of light gains importance, while light functions as more than just illumination around.

Most of the artists included in minimal art were interested in the work and its relationship with the gallery space. There is an emphasis of the work and the bodily involvement in the work that is a matter of process. The interest in bodily involvement as well as mind led to a concern with phenomenology while perception was claimed privileged in the experience. The work calls for the bodily involvement and there is an emphasis on process which contributes to the process of the making of the work that makes it continuous in another dimension.

In Robert Smithson's *Non-Site*[23] (1968) we are introduced to the concern of space, site and the limits of site. Accordingly, there is an interest in the limitations coming out of the notion of space as a function of a specific site and place. In *Non-Site* (1968) Smithson ends up with the impossibility of a conception of limitlessness or a specific site enclosed in itself. He is concerned with the limits of gallery space, which functions as a criticism of gallery as an institution in identifying spaces. *Non-Site* (1968) consists of two works, *Gypsum* and *Double Non-Site*. In *Gypsum* (gypsum, steel, photograph) Smithson has gathered three different elements referring to a location in Benton, California. On the floor is a steel container filled with gypsum specimens; on the wall is a photograph superimposed on a map of this location. *Double Non-Site* consists of steel, obsidian and lava from California and Nevada. [24]

Nick Kaye in *Site-specific art*[25] describes Smithson's work:

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[23] See fig, 1&2.
[24] Meyer, James, ed., *Minimalism,* (London: Phaidon, 2000) 155.
[25] Kaye, Nick, *Site-Specific art,* London and New York : Routledge, 2000.

Robert Smithson's series of *Non-Site* present materials, which have been collected from **designated outdoor sites**, deposited in bins whose **construction** echoes simple, clean, minimalist aesthetic, and set in the gallery beside information **tracing out** the **geographical** or **geological** characteristics of the area from which they have been removed. (Kaye: 2000, 92)

Non-Site (1968), Kay argues draws an interest in site and "site-specificity" while these materials have been displaced and taken from the territories they belonged to. There is a shift from one site to another, while the displacement of the materials evokes a sense of detachment that interrupts a notion of identity and belonging. The inability to locate these pieces in a specific site also prevents conveying a notion of site in *Non-Site* (1968) that is specified in the limits of gallery. Kaye states that *Non-Site* (1968) reproduces the gallery's contradictory attempt to recollect, and so limit the "de-differentiated" site. Then the motive of site achieves being present as a dialectics of site, where the absence of –a reference to- site becomes a limit of the present site as a gallery space. Unspecified in none of the sites, the site is not "available as an object for it is not static," says Kaye. Kaye refers to Smithson's notion of site as "mobile" and that is "always in a process of appearance and disappearance." Kaye seems to bring a kind of limit to the conception of site while considering it as an outcome of a matter of appearance or disappearance and his account then becomes that which is thought according to a thought of presence. On the contrary, what Smithson refers to that which could be regarded as a process in this work, is the mobility of site. It is not a continuum supported through loss of reference and return of reference. As Kaye also seems to state truly in the following lines the "mobility of site, its capacity to elude resolution into a static object, is discovered even in the most literal" addressing *Non-Site* (1968) as an index of site.

Rather than an issue of appearance or disappearance, a conception of site appears as a means of a fragmented one, which is the nomadic character of site itself. Smithson also sees it as an impossibility of a notion of destination in *Non-Site (1968)*. The rigid and spatial time is replaced by discontinuity of a temporal flow. In this sense, *Non-Site* (1968) does not let the viewer identify with a place through associations or referring to other similar sites that "map" the space. The way the work is installed in the gallery space forms a relation with the space as well as referring to the indefinite sites these materials once "belonged to". Only information about the places is the indication that they are taken from Benton, California and Nevada addressing several unpredictable futures and pasts. The gallery space then remains insufficient to define a new space or give a sense of belonging for these materials and this work. It may be because of that the 'definition' by a map of the territory these materials belonged to and indication of the 'housing' of these materials blur the sense of identification with space or with some place. This work in a sense mirrors a kind of presence fragmented into many presences, which might not be reduced to a single specific fact. The encounter with the work in *Non-Site* (1968) tends to suggest an experience of a travel in continuous shifting temporalities. Such an experience mirrors one's perception of the work in a sense of discontinuous memories of one's own together with a kind of anticipation. The opaque surface of gypsum doesn't give a sense of decay. It is as if the gypsum is "structured" inside industrial construction of boxes and seems to call for a detachment from the context these materials once had. Thus, there is an ambiguity both in the contextual sense and also in defining a territory for these materials. *Gypsum* is placed into a container, which consists of a structure of repetitive combination of rectangles and *Double Non-Site* made up of five separate pieces symmetrically installed to form a square. Through installing these earth pieces into industrial and rigid boxes, time seems to be halted inside the gallery. The specification of site both gives a sense of sterilisation of the materials, a kind of isolation, and also dislocates the notion of site itself

at the same time. These materials neither 'belong' to the gallery space nor to the geography they were taken from.

Two years before *Non-Site* (1968), Smithson writes an article called 'Entropy and the New Monuments'.[26] In this article, he describes his views of the condition of Minimalism that has emerged out of the changes which the second half of the twentieth century has gone through. Smithson gives an account of how things have changed during the second half of the twentieth century while he refers to "entropy" as that which leaves a mark on this era. Addressing some facts from cinema, art and post-war architecture he states that entropy is a term definitive of the fragmentations in time, space, being, society and culture. Smithson mentions the loss of architectural value in the new age, which is replaced by a sense of monumentality. He indicates that such architectural structure is close to the aspect of monumentality in Minimalism. Smithson states that "instead of causing us to remember the past like the old monuments, the new monuments seem to cause us to forget the future" for "they are built against ages." Smithson refers to artists such as Judd, Lewitt, Flavin whose works addresses a kind of "inactive history" which is seen in their use of inorganic, cold, industrial and artificial materials that resist tracing a passage of time through the ages. In these works, the dullness and emptiness of materials without a sense of change in the materials is a part of this entropy while time is constituted as the lack of motion. Smithson formulates this as "time = place-motion"

Smithson's formulation of time, which does not indicate a motion in space, is a characteristic of the relation of materials in spaces that resist historicisation. Such an approach might be said to be a general attitude of these artists. Artists such as Donald Judd, Morris, Smithson, Flavin had most of their works made in factories or used industrial, mass-produced materials, - ready-mades - such as Flavin's use of fluorescent tubes. In this sense, these works leave nothing traceable about the process of their making, the time passed in this process as well as a reference to galleries that remakes a time for the materials inside the produced spaces of galleries. Only possible time seems to be that which is away from linearity while a sense of past becomes present and the future at the same time and this "same time" also goes beyond perception. There is no evolution in these materials that are only able to mirror an interval, a pause which does not get into movement as dialectics but allows a passage of time in that pause without a kind of historicisation.

Robert Morris's *Mirrored Cubes*[27] (1965) consist of four cubes installed on the wooden floor of Green Gallery reflecting the wooden floor and the white walls of the gallery. The conception of the work demands a journey around the mirror. The outcome of this experience is the reflection of the space and the viewer while the gallery space occupies the biggest part in the reflection of the mirror. What moves and changes in the mirror is one's reflection in the gallery space looking at the mirror reflecting the gallery. In this sense while the gaze always has the chance to see other places in the gallery, it might sometimes cause one to forget one's self in the mirror. The fact that the surface is a mirror that does not indicate a sign of its author referring to the process of its making allows a process in which the work is visualised. As the cubes are shorter than a level of eye-sight (each side 21 cm high from the floor) the viewer has to move in order to see more than what appears in the mirror. In a way, the viewer moves and activates his or her own vision

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[26] Smithson, Robert, 'Entropy and the New Monuments', *Minimalism*, ed. James Meyer, (London: Phaidon, 2000) 223-26.

[27] See fig 3.

in the mirror rather than staring directly at the mirror. The work becomes an outcome of what and from which direction the mirror reflects and how the viewer sees the work. One does not always see one's self in the mirror but also other people and the material surface of the floor and the walls as well. The work both refers to the mirrors, which are shaped as cubes and the cubes indicating a mirroring effect which reveal the space of the gallery and other materials in that space other than itself. The mirror also mirrors itself in its cubic formation. The mirror is not a flat surface hung on the wall but has a cubic shape and disturbs the fixation of the eye. It requires a kind of travel around the cube while the edges interrupt a continuity of the appearance in the mirror and direct the appearance to another side of gallery space. The cubes become a part of a process which is unfinished and fragmented into incomprehensible pieces of time. Such time and interval, is between the virtual and the actual causing a missing identification with the object since there is not a single object.

Contrary to Fried's notion of theatricalisation of space, it is rather a time passing between the work and the viewer. There is a process but it does not indicate a kind of stage performance. However, theatre is not the correct term for such encounter, since it is a matter of the virtual as well as the actual. Time is not linear but embodies a fragmented setting for this play; there is not a stage, not an end of nor a suspension of disbelief activated in this space. Time and space are ambiguous and floating. This is similar to what Derrida calls 'becoming-time of space' and 'becoming-space of time' in a continuum while self-consciousness is always deferred in leaving the traces of moments behind and drawing them to future. The place as an outcome of such experience is 'any place' in its nomadic and virtual mode. Fried has made a remark about a kind of anthropomorphism of minimal objects; this is not only the object, which is anthropomorphic but also the viewer who leaves a notion of self-consciousness in the delay of movement. Space is multiple and it goes beyond a notion of 'inside'. It is nobody's space and everybody's, not only personal space but the material surface included in this space.

Robert Smithson is critical of fragmented and indefinite spaces in science fiction films and also the contemporary architectural constructions, where there is no value of quality of space. Smithson gives an account of space, which does not embody any sense of identity since these spaces are not static and are groundless. The objects of minimal art bear a sense of groundless and unidentified space, which is close to Smithson's definition of entropy. Entropy, which is marked by a non-sense of destination, does not indicate an end of fragmentation. Referring to the loss of spatial values, which construct homogeneity of time, entropy stands on the other side of the argument. The mirroring effect of the mirrored cubes also gives a sense of blankness that is marked in the surface of the mirrors. On the other hand, the notion of outside and inside is also broken in the mirrors. Smithson states that the temporal mode such objects reveal is that which "makes a hole in one's self"[28]. *Mirrored Cubes* (1965) might also be said to simulate the space and time around themselves. This simulation is not a part belonging to another story but constitutes a story of its time that develops during the encounter with the work.

Delay and Recentness of *Mise en scene*

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[28] In the same article Smithson writes about the experience of movie in a movie house "time is compressed in a movie house, to spend time in a movie house is like making hole in one's self" says Smithson.

In the latest issue of <u>Oxford Art Journal</u> the theme was 'Installation.' Briony Fer and Alex Potts in their articles[29] concerning installation since the sixties have discussed the areas which installation art has been concerned with and the condition of installation art today. Unlike the conventional belief that considers the experience of minimal art as theatrical in Fried's terms, Fer's and Potts' article both compare installation and the experience of cinema.

Alex Potts writes about the experience of installation, which is not only close to theatre but is also similar to cinematic experience. However, Potts is concerned with a specific part of installation that has a narrative aspect. According to him installations tell a kind of story to the viewer as well as pulling the viewer inside this story which he calls "intimate engulfment". He argues that Antonio Canova's sculpture *Cupid and Psyche* (1787-93) which is a neoclassical sculpture, made for a Baroque sculpture gallery, necessitates moving around the three dimensional object in a way which is not different than the experience of installation. He states that the close and bodily relationship between the viewer and the work is not specifically an aspect new to installation art. In this sense Potts says "the shift from the classical display of sculpture to recent installation is not entirely clear-cut" what matters is "not a structural break but a change in the modes of display." As Potts points out, this is not a small change despite its similarity to the sculptural experience during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The change in the mode of display is the shift from a notion of self-sufficient sculptural object to the work that is open to a sense of development in a process of encounter with the viewer. Another important point is the contribution of empty space not as void but as that which "has its own materiality and definition." (Potts: 2002, 15) Potts' argument about the installation and sculptural experience might also be related to the experience of painting. However, it does not mean that we should regard a same medium for these ways of representation. Rather Potts gives an account of art that has crossed the boundaries of discourses specific to an art historical period. Potts states that "the element of staging and theatricality are integral to almost any three-dimensional work." The encounter with an installation work is a process, which Richard Serra argues it as not only being an outcome of looking "but looking and walking, walking through it and not just around it." (Potts: 2002, 20)

Briony Fer's article is also an argument for a sense of the similarity between installation and cinematic experience. In 'The Somnambulist's Story: Installation and the Tableau' she gives an account of installation that is enclosed in one's personal realm as the specific space of the viewer. She argues that installation experience is close to cinematic experience because there is an aspect of tableau effect in both. Fer's argument is similar to Potts' articulation of installation experience in the way that cinematic space takes the viewer inside its realm. Fer argues that installation evokes a kind of tableau effect as if it is a "cinematic cut" and she sees installation functioning to entrap the viewer. The "cinematic cuts" take the viewer inside the narrative space of installation and back to the physical space which one is in. Fer's statement that installation experience is close to cinematic experience in the sense that both reveal a sense of mise en scene and tableau is a limited articulation of such experience. Rather installation reveals a different relation with space than cinema since it pulls one inside a story through opening a window and letting one fictionalise the story inside the installation space. While, installation space calls for a bodily involvement in the narrative space, the cinematic space creates a physical distance

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[29] Alex Potts, 'Installation and Sculpture', <u>Oxford Art Journal</u>, (Vol. 24, no.2) 5-25 and Briony Fer 'Somnmbulist's Story', <u>Oxford Art Journal</u>, (Vol. 24, no. 2) 75-93.

between the spectacle and the spectator as a consequence of its architectural structure. In this sense, cinematic spectacle is in the imaginary space of story looking through where one sits and directing attention to the spectacle. The temporal mode of classical narrative films might have an aspect of linear narrative structure in which the action develops in a sequential order. On the other hand, it is hard to situate such a temporal mode for installation. Since installation introduces both an imaginary space and the physical space at the same time, the temporality this space reveals becomes a disjoint one.

At one point Fer refers to Robert Smithson and states that Smithson sees installation as mise en scene but the one "with an empty place for the protagonist." This may be a legible account of installation while it is not limited to that. Smithson's articulation of entropy is similar to cinematic experience and he states that cinematic experience "opens a hole in one's self" since time is compressed in such an experience. Rather, installation space deepens that hole through activating the physical space as well as the imaginary.

In *Cinema 2: The time-image* Deleuze is concerned with the time-image, which breaks with sensory motor links. It also addresses a break with a linear narrative system, while space is introduced as fragmented and mobile. In this sense, a fragmented temporality emerges replacing a coherent movement and action. However, the relationship between installation and cinema again are distinguished from each other since the installation takes the viewer not only inside the story but also to the physical space of the elements of story. An experience of installation becomes a matter of making one's self believe in the reality of this simulated atmosphere of story that is between the virtual and the actual -no matter what the object is. Fer's statement about the "unclarity of the object of attention" is similar to the statements made by Smithson and Deleuze. According to these arguments, the viewer is not the one who looks but is also the part of this game in which the subject and object are not clear. What is constituted between the work and the viewer is a kind of delay of enunciation the author of which is not defined.

Time becomes not an instrument of passage that brings decay as it unfolds towards the future. Rather there is a lack of futural development of things in time as well as a detachment from a particular and proper space. This is the experience of *Alice in Wonderland*, the girl in a story opening other stories within its time, either it is digging a hole in her reality or making her reality bigger than a mind can grasp. Looking for a static and structured place for an articulation of minimal art is as empty as asking a question to Alice as to which part her reality belonged. This is rather a matter of the reality of the virtuality that goes beyond perception.

Fragment(ation)s

In 'Cultural logic of the late capitalist museum'[30], Rosalind Krauss writes about one of her visits a museum in 1990 in Paris. There she comes across Dan Flavin's works but she describes this visit differently from her early encounters with the same works. This time the "museum becomes the object" while the "international style columns" of the museum enter her point of view. The architecture of gallery interrupts vision and perception of the works. Krauss' concern about the "cultural logic" of capitalism is the notion of collectors of art and the collections, which in a way bring a sense of reinstallation

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[30] Krauss, Rosalind, 'Cultural logic of the late capitalist museum', *Minimalism*, ed. James Meyer, (London: Phaidon, 2000) 285-9.

to minimalist objects. Museums and collectors such as Count Panza finds the way to "keep" the works for themselves in making an agreement with the artists to reproduce their works, legitimising it with a certificate. Some of the artists such as Donald Judd and Carl Andre resist it.

Krauss addresses to Tony Smith's description of his car ride on the New Jersey Turnpike, which Smith described as an unfinished experience concerned with bodily involvement in the action. Such experience is regarded as the basis of self-perception as well as an announcement of the end of the function of museums. On the contrary, "minimalists" had not claimed an end to the museums, but they helped conventional notion of museum shift to reveal a different kind of spatial and temporal relation with the viewer. They were critical of the preserving and keeping aspect of museums. "Minimalists" considered artwork as a means of seriality, non-gesture, non-originality, which are the aspects of mass-produced industrial materials. These were the characteristics of mass production and the consumption, which controlled the society. Minimalists were critical of these aspects. "Minimalists" used the mass-produced materials and the mentality of mass-production in making their works. Minimalist 'revolt' might be that they attacked the idea that mass-production brought a sense of distraction and detachment. In this sense, they achieved to make sense out of non-sense. However, they did not consider a sense of totality in their works. This is the condition of minimal art and the artist who creates utopian relations between the subject and object of Minimalism that goes beyond a homogenous and a total relation. In this sense, the future of Minimalism becomes not a constitution of a fragmented object of the capitalist mode of production but also the subject that is fragmented and reprogrammed. Thus, Minimalism announces its break with an art historical consciousness of the past. The sense of presence, past and future are in a continuous affection which interrupts an isolation of these times in themselves. Then, experience of "Minimalist" objects in the museums thirty years after the sixties not only distort the logic of the sixties but also the notion of perception and bodily involvement of the works.

Although "Minimalists" denied having a notion of aura in the works, it could be said that the "Minimalist" work reveals a kind of ritualistic experience in which one's perception is emphasised evoking a sense of aura of such experience. The notion of "aura" in the "work of art" which Walter Benjamin conceptualised is existence of aura as a condition of originality. On the other hand it seems the notion of aura seems to have shifted from the notion of originality of an object into the originality of experience specific to its viewer. What could interrupt the auratic experience of "Minimalist" objects, if there was any, becomes the reinstallation of the work in another place, which leaves no chance for the conception of reality of perception. This remark suggests that making one believe in the reality of perception was the utopia of the sixties.

There are some different aspects of installations or minimalist objects, which have the chance to give a different relation to the environment of the work. Some of the works might create a sense of closure of experience, which is specific to the space of installation. In 'The Body, the Image and the Space in Between: Video Installation Art'[31] Margaret Morse gives an account of two different relationship of installations which the video installation communicates with its viewer. One type of video installation is a closed circuit one, which records and displays "the actions and sounds of the visitors in charged positions in installation space to one or more monitors." These works, Morse states, manipulate "presence" and "explore the fit between images and the built environment and the process of mediating identity and power". Another kind of video installation is the "recorded

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[31] Morse, Margaret, 'The Body, the Image and the Space in Between: Video Installation Art', *Television, Media Art and Cyberculture, Bloomington:* Indiana Uni. Press, 1998.

video-art installation that can be compared to the spectator wandering about on a stage, in a bodily experience of conceptual proportions and imaginary worlds of memory and anticipation."

Although these two conceptions of video installations refer to a kind of bodily involvement in the experience of the work, since the video screen has a sculptural aspect as well as constituting a relation with what appears on the screen, the body reacts differently in these different kinds of works. In the former, the body functions in two ways both by looking at the object and being a part of the object looked at. The two kinds of video installations also lead to different temporal experiences of the work. In the former the body functions in two ways both by looking at the object and being a part of the object looked at. In the former the temporal relation with the viewer is activated more than it is in the latter. Thus, time is more indeterminate and subordinate to change.

I will be considering Bruce Nauman's closed-circuit video installation, which is known as *Live/Taped Video Corridor[32]*, by means of the emergence of the temporal modes interacting with its viewer. According to Morse's definition of video installation, Nauman's installation is in the first group. The fact that this installation is a closed circuit one and meets the viewer in a closed space isolated from the gallery space makes it different from the experience of an installation of minimalist objects. We can say that minimalist objects activate and are activated by the space of installation. On the contrary, closed-circuit video installation cut the relationship with the environment of installation. Such a closure also effects interruption of the architecture of the museum.

Scattered: Inside the Corridor

A series of walls dividing the space into six passages, only three of which were passable. Three live video cameras were mounted at the top of the walls, and corresponding monitors offered images of empty corridors as well as of any visitors who might enter always seen from behind. Feeling of "dread" and "invisibility" as well as the very notion of being under the video surveillance causing "the back of your neck to prickle slightly as if someone was watching."[33]

In one of the corridors, entering in and walking towards the screen at the end of the corridor, one is supposed to see oneself approaching the screen. There are two monitors at the end of the corridor one of which is placed on top of the other. One of the monitors display the corridor empty and the other displays one's self getting further away, while one is approaching towards the monitor. Such an experience is different from one may expect to see on the screen. The screen has a role of false mirror since it displays one getting further away when one walks towards the screen. There is a reverse way of representation

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[32] See fig 4.

[33] Adams, Parveen, 'Bruce Nauman and the Object of Anxiety' October, (Winter 98, no. 83), 97-114. In this article Adams writes about the corridor installation by Nauman in Nick Wilder Gallery in 1970. The installation consisted of six corridors. One of the corridors was named *Live/Taped Video Corridor,* which was one of Nauman's earlier works. He had made this installation before in 1968 and remade this corridor piece in the installation in Nick Wilder gallery in 1970.

of one's self in the screen that causes one to see one's self smaller instead of getting bigger as one comes near the screen. A mirror is supposed to reflect the position from where one looks at it. In a sense, what the mirror often is supposed to reflect is the inclusion of the act of looking in the mirror. Such a relation set between the mirror and screen is the way in which the interaction between one's self and the one's reflection in the mirror is regarded as a means of identification in psychoanalysis. It is the Lacanian notion of the mirror stage, which addresses to the relationship between the gaze and the formation of the subject and object.

Contemporary of Lacan, Foucault introduced the concept of gaze as the manifestation of bodily power. The beholder of the gaze is the authority as the seeing-knowing body over the weak. The gaze, the look and the politics of the gaze are described as the signs of power mechanisms, which are embodied in the subject. Foucault referred to the history of the gaze and the shifting power mechanisms in the course of history, by giving the example of the "panopticon" architectural plan for a prison, which was structured by Bentham. In 'Panopticism'[34] Foucault carried this model into social sphere. He asserted that panopticon was not only an architectural model, but was also a disciplinary project. "The major effect of 'Panopticon' is to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power." (Foucault: 1995, 201) He states that this is the emergence of a "real subjection" which is "born mechanically from a fictitious relation." (Foucault: 1995, 202)

Foucauldian understanding of discipline is that of the internalised discipline. The individual is regarded as the object of the gaze by the authoritative agents, and is under the control of this invisible gaze that is made visible in one's body. In the panopticon model of prison the inmate is not conscious of when he is seen or when not. So the inmate produces an inner discipline. In this sense, he would always be controlling himself rather than an outer agent of physical control. The panopticon model was an example for the lack of communication between the one who was watching from the top of the tower, and who was being watched. The inmate becomes his own communicating agent while he is aware of the other(s) watching him. Out of this structure, Foucault states, there emerges a system where power is internalised inside one's own body. It is

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[34] Foucault, Michel, 'Panopticism', *Discipline and Punish,* trans. Alan Sheridan, (N.Y.: Vintage, 1995) 195-228.

no longer a physical power exerted by the other. Thus it results in bringing an ever-present self-control of one's own behaviours. Out of this conception of self-control, the gaze shifts from being regarded as having a relation within the field of the other, into an internalised invisible one. While the gaze is considered to function as an apparatus between the subject and the object in Lacan, Foucault does not consider an apparatus, a machine that is situated outside the body. In this sense, gaze is not physically detached from the body.

The consideration that one internalises power in one's self brings a conception of subject inseparable from the object. There is not employment in different spatial positioning of the gaze directed towards a specific object. Martin Jay states that Deleuze regarded Foucault's notion of the gaze as dependent on Roussel's account of "the fold of vision". Accordingly, 'Panopticism' introduces a phenomenological subject through the privileging of an embodied vision. What Deleuze found in Foucault is a conception of an "ontological Visibility, forever twisting itself into a "self-seeing" entity, on to a different dimension from that of the gaze or its object." (Jay: 1994, 398) Detaching itself from an external object, the gaze both becomes its own object and subject, which is attributed a transcendental character. Although the panoptic device as the modality of self-discipline brings a conception of self-evidence, ironically there is not an object of evidence. An anchorage of vision to a spatial point does not seem possible in such an articulation.

Foucault seems to free the notion of subject and object theorised according to spatial formulations such as a notion of distance, perspective etc. In this sense, the gaze becomes that which is fragmented between the object and the subject and is no longer a property of the subject. On the other hand, such fragmentation finds its totality in one's own body which suggests a relationship between the virtual and the actual when conceived according to Deleuze's notion of difference in kind. However, while Deleuze takes difference in kind away from a consideration of hierarchical foundations, there is a remark of disciplining principle and the virtuality of the gaze being situated at the top of the hierarchy of visibilities in Foucault. In this sense, Foucault seems to bring a conception of the invisible Other as virtual and this Other manipulates the actions of the actual. It looks as if there is a way out of this hierarchical distribution of power mechanisms, which is realised between the self and the other. Rather the multiplication the gaze might cause a fragmentation of the subject and the object of the gaze, which would not be identifiable as "the gaze." There is a shift in the sequence of display since

the camera is placed in the way that it does not follow one's movement towards the corridor. The camera records one from the back and displays it in the direction of walking to the end of the corridor. Considering one's look associated with the gaze, there emerges two things to sort out; one is the impossibility of controlling the other, or having a sense of control with the other when gaze is associated with the camera apparatus. This is when the gaze lacks the object to look at and also lacks the control on the object. It is because what is shown on the screen is the one who gazes but is unable to meet his or herself as an image. Secondly, the inability of having a control over one's representation on the screen may be associated with Foucault's notion of panopticon. In this sense, the seer as the power mechanism has lost a physical power over the inmate, and the power is internalised by the inmate. In the application of this theory to the social disciplines, Foucault has argued that the disciplined self is not left under the physical exercise of power of another body. Then, there is a possibility that one becomes the object of the gaze as well as the one who looks. In a way, such a situation evokes a sense of anxiety since the gaze can no longer orient itself in relation to what Lacan calls "the field of the other" where the subject should constitute itself.[35]

According to the psychoanalytic conception of the subject, the source of anxiety is regarded as that which is caused by the fear of castration and gaze is associated with the symbolisation of the phallus. Lacan argues that "the gaze is presented to us only in the form of a strange contingency, symbolic of what we find on the horizon, as the thrust of our experience, namely the lack that constitutes castration anxiety." (Lacan: 1973, 208) In this sense, anxiety emerges when the gaze is no longer the property of the subject. However, in the corridors, there emerges a duality and the multiplication of the gaze, as it is doubled on both sides. It is not in a Lacanian sense "I see myself seeing myself" but in the sense that the gaze threatens the field of the subject. The relationship with the object through the temporal disorder and delay are caused by the way in which camera and monitor are situated in relation to the participant. One does not see oneself seeing oneself, but a part of one's body, which one might not realise as one's own.

Nauman has stated that "he liked to control the space one is in".[36] It is questionable whether he is the one who controls the space, while the space itself is no longer stable and it controls the movement of the body through the separation and dissociation of the gaze.

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[35] Lacan, Jacques, *The four fundamental concepts of psycho-analysis*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981) 208.
[36] Walker Art Center, *Bruce Nauman: exhibition catalogue and catalogue raisonné*, Minneapolis: Walker Art Center, 1994.

There emerges a sense of paranoia. At the same time, among the six corridors, only three of them are broad enough to enter in and walk towards the end of the corridor. Nauman is the author of the construction of the corridors, but the – missed - encounter with one's representation on the screen is caused by the temporal non-control.

What he does is not the direct control of one's movement and perception in the corridor space, rather this is a way in which participant is left to deal with a shift in temporality, memory and a delay of anticipation. Memory becomes that which is not left in the past and emerging in the present in a different way. Rather it takes the present to the past of the experience of walking inside the corridor as well as locating past in the present. The futural expectations are delayed in a way that makes future impossible to grasp. There are various remarks to make about *Live/Taped Video Corridor* (1968) in terms of what lies as the motive for this shift: anxiety, uncanniness, alienation, which are the outcomes of shift in temporal and spatial phenomenon inside the corridors.

In considering the aspect of interaction between the viewer and the work inside the corridors, Lacan's notion of the subject and formation of the self operates as that which helps an understanding of this ambiguity. Lacan's subject is formed out of "discontinuity" as "the essential form in which unconsciousness first appears to us as a phenomenon." (Lacan: 1973, 25) Lacan's account of discontinuity is not a conception of a detachment from the real but seems to be an articulation of another spatial dimension.

What Lacan tends to miss and Freud totally rejects is that discontinuity is also another kind of continuity, the motive of which might not be the lack of continuity. Rather, there can be a conception of discontinuity as a heterogenous and multiple temporalities, which indicate a sense of in-betweenness. Such a notion of in between-ness does not convey a sense of destination in the unconscious.

On the other hand, contrary to the notion that regards the unconscious as a timeless process enclosed in itself, the temporality of consciousness is not sudden. Rather it starts to continue, to divide and differ in the unconscious. Then the temporal mode of consciousness does not depend on the future of the past memories but the repetition of the memories in the unconscious, which are to be actualised in consciousness. Deleuze's notion of the virtual and the actual functions as that which gives an account of a transcendental subject in relation to the object. On the other hand, Freud sees the unconscious as passive, and as the "storehouse of memory", Lacan regards the unconscious

as active and changeable in the formation of psyche. Nevertheless the unconscious is still not articulated as fully activated, rather it is what Lacan calls "in limbo", which is "unrealised and vacillates between the subject and object." It is "neither being, nor non-being." Unlike Freud's description of the unconscious as timeless, vitality of the unconscious comes from its contribution to time, rather than the "timelessness" of it. The notion of time, regarded as the property of consciousness, is the trace of a temporal becoming in unconsciousness, which does not follow topographies of the subject.

Contrary to what Freud says about the unconscious as "unreal" and Lacan regards as "unrealised", the unconscious does not need its subject to be realised, neither it is the subject to realise. Realisation is not a matter of reality. Realness of things depends on their ability to unfold in time differing and changing in themselves. It is unclear that psychoanalysis could give a satisfactory explanation for how the unconscious stands in relation to the real. Unlike Freud, whom Lacan situates in "traditional psychoanalysis", Lacan allows the unconscious to be activated and transformed in the consciousness. However, he still makes this division from the quantitative factors regarding its other as an illusion starting from the mirror stage. In this sense, Lacan seems to propose a notion of other whose otherness is realised in an act of spatial differentiation. In Lacan, the subject is oriented according to where the subject stands in relation to the object.

Eye/sight

Lacan argues that subject is firstly formed in the unconscious which is realised by the subjects seeing himself in the mirror. This mirror is that which creates the virtual space of the subject through contemplating the other's space. He adds that the image of the subject in the mirror stage is realised as the real "I" rather than the image, then this subject is "misrecognised" and it is illusion. The mirror stage is regarded as the step to the social being and introduction of language as well as an articulation of representation of the subject to itself in the linguistic field of language as "I". In this case, the issue of language is emphasised in the emergence of the virtual subject. Lacan regards the formation of the subject in the mirror stage as fictional. It has two aspects, when thought with reference to Deleuze's notion of the virtual, which then would clarify how Deleuze's notion of 'the real' differs from a psychoanalytic approach to the unconscious. Deleuze's conception of the virtual is the term, which depends on the qualitative aspect of difference. In this sense,

virtual is not localised in the place of the unreal. What differentiates the virtual from the actual is not the hypocrisy of the virtual as the unreal. Rather, the virtual is that which is not objectified in the domain of the subject. Unlike Lacan, who follows the traces of psyche towards the real, Deleuze's real is not rooted in the imaginary and then passing to the symbolic. Having regarded language as the building block of the unconscious, Lacan produces a notion of the realisation of the subject, which is depends on representation. The subject is articulated as neither being nor non-being, but as a 'concept' of being. Such conceptualisation of being itself proves to be an illusionary apprehension of a theory of the subject.

"In the scopic relation" says Lacan "the object on which depends the fantasy from which the subject is suspended in an essential vacillation is the gaze." The subject's need occurs as a consequence of the split between the demand and then desire for the other. Lacan separates the realisation of subject into stages and regards the realisation of self in the mirror stage as identification, declaring such identification is "specular."[37] During this stage, the "ideal ego" develops as the reflection of the self in the mirror. However, what the subject realises is regarded as unreal. This real is the virtual, which, Deleuze says, "has not been actualised" because there is no conception of the object. Contrary to Deleuze who does not separate the virtual from the actual, Lacan announces the coming of a subsequent stage, where the subject becomes conscious of a notion of self, which leads to an operation of the ego. During this stage mimicry develops as the result of identification with the mirror image. Lacan says then, " the function of the mirror stage is to establish a relation between the organism and its reality." (Lacan: 1970, 4) The importance of mirror stage as a means of articulation of temporality is that this phase is regarded as a first step of "formation of the individual into history", which addresses a kind of individual historicisation. The mode of identification is "spatial", which is with the image in the mirror. This is the "succession of phantasies that extend from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality." (Lacan: 1970, 4) This is also the first step in alienation.

Lacan writes about his following observations in mirror stage and the identification with the image of the counterpart and the drama of primordial jealousy. (Lacan: 1970, 5) Desire for the other, the object of desire, also leaves its marks during the mirror-stage, where jealousy occurs as a consequence of a dependence on the other's desire. The formation of ideal ego in the mirror as self, is the first stage of narcissism or "primary narcissism." Narcissism is the first step of identification of the subject with the object of its desire. This is the case where "libidinal investment characteristics" start to function. "I" is alienated from the whole of being, and is in relation with the "narcissistic libido". This stage is also cited as an emergence of autoeroticism. There is a sense of identification with the other as the object of desire. However, the subject is in question in its relationship to ego formation. Freud considers autoerotism before narcissism, where the object of

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[37] Lacan, Jacques, *Ecrits*, trans. Alan Sheridan, (London: Routledge, 1970) 2.

desire is internalised in the subject's organism. So, the part of the body is made a fetish object, with reference to the sexual object choice, where the body becomes a representation in relation to the desire for the other.

Fragmentation is both the fear of castration and also the motive to live. Fragmentation causes dislocation together with castration anxiety. After the mirror-stage, if one sees his replica facing himself - this time not the image in the mirror, but the separated other - this results in anxiety. Anxiety is caused by the return to the mirror stage, which is not possible after the mirror stage, because "I" has its other on the other side, as the object. The subject is anxious because the object threats the position of the subject. The implications of narcissism seem to be dependent on the spatial formations where "the imagery of the ego develops". (Lacan: 1970, 27)

Primary narcissism is also "the state of unity with the environment, in which internal and external are not distinguished." [38] Lacan also regards the subject prior to the mirror stage still in the "state of nature" where the baby still feels union with environment. Alan Bass in his book *Difference and Disavowal* brings the Freudian "pleasure principle" into question. Quoting from Freud he says that "unconscious mental processes are in themselves timeless and time does not change them in any way, and idea of time can't be applied to them." He does not accept such an articulation of time: consciousness of time is a defence against the tension of unconscious time. (Bass: 2000, 84) If this is the case, then the unconscious cannot be timeless. If there is not a break considered between the unconscious and consciousness by means of separating them in different parts of psyche, the unconscious does not have to be isolated with the unpleasant and repressed memories of psyche.

In considering the experience in the *corridor* according to Lacan's notion of subject formation and Freud's articulation of the unconscious as the never changing structure, what happens in the corridor would become a traumatic experience. One of the reasons is the corridor's alienating effect on the participant, which is caused by the interruption of one's appearance on the screen while walking in the corridor. There is a "disparity between what was seen on the video monitors and what was actually experienced in the corridor." There emerges two separate entities identification of which are not possible. What is displayed on the screen while one walks towards the screen is divided into two different sights at the same time. One's movements are simulated on the screen in a reverse way, while vision is multiplied. Accordingly, there emerges a relation of indifference between the one who is walking towards the end of the corridor and seeing one's self walking back - on the screen. The placements of the cameras both challenge a kind of possibility of meeting the self on the screen while a notion of meeting the ideal-ego remains halted.

The unexpected, rather than the expected, controls the direction of the gaze that turns back on the subject in an unidentifiable way. The Lacanian conception of the realisation of self in the operation of the scopic field does not work here because of the delayed interruption of temporality in the work. According to the connection between desire and its object, the monitors control the space and the sight, thus controlling the variety of possible encounters on the side of the subject.

The activation of the virtual would not remind us to regard this situation as an interruption between the unconscious and the conscious. Perception is not a privileged aspect of being. Deleuze's argumentation of the virtual is the notion that subject is also

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[38] Bass, Alan, *Difference and Disavowal*, (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2000) 104.

an image among other images. Mind is also an image as it functions through the "recollection images". The virtual and the actual gain a relation of becoming in a continuum that does not happen in a linear time for the actual does not refer to a sense of an isolated presence. Rather the actual takes it actuality from the virtual while constituting a relationship of difference in kind. Such understanding does not situate time into a linear pastness, presence and future, but allows things to unfold. Deleuze defines this as a "succession of duration" rather than space. Similarly one of the screens in the corridor displays one from the reverse side while the other displays an empty corridor. It looks as if such an experience cannot make one's self feel present in the corridor. Introducing an uncanny experience, the installation introduces another sense of exclusion, which is achieved by the presence and walk of someone in the corridor. In this sense, space does not mark one's existence as a consequence of presence in space. Therefore, there emerges a fragmentation of a spatial and temporal unity, which interrupts the notion of presence as well as past and future. Seeing the back on the screen while walking towards the corridor brings a sense of pastness in the present and a notion of future that depends on past again. A conception of "now" becomes impossible untied from the past. Perception becomes that which could only claim to catch the immediate and the instantaneous. Nevertheless, this is an illusion since perception itself is not immediate.

Alan Bass, in *Difference and Disavowal*, states that Freudian understanding of time is also Kantian time who sees time as the formation of "necessary forms of thought". He adds that temporal modes are not only attributed to consciousness as a form of thought. The implication of the bounding of time as if it were a function of thought is the understanding of time that depends on the significance of presence. Such notion of presence is considered to be a sign of reality. Alan Bass also calls it Newtonian time as the "objective time of the infinite series of now points objective space coordinating with it."(Bass: 2000, 85) This is firstly because Freud tries to eliminate the continuous delaying aspect of time. "Freud's time" does not consider an alteration of temporal flow, yet it is linear and is based on the "scenes" that are taken out from the reality of a temporal flow.

There is a stable and sticky consciousness working only through perception that resists the forces of the unconscious. Freud accepts a notion of difference in the development of subject, but he seems to leave difference in different places divided between the unconscious and consciousness. His conception of delay and difference is

regarded to have quantitative aspects, which creates a system of differences and stabilises it. The participant meets his or her previous step towards the corridor, instead of the present step, which is reflected on the screen as one is getting away instead of getting closer. Nauman's work breaks with linear time and space. There is not a negation of time or space, but a displacement of these notions. Since time is not a thing and is not a fixed being which reveals a kind of truth, there is not a false time that contradicts a truth of time. Time is not the fact but it shakes the ground of proper facts.

This work conveys an encounter with the participant himself or herself, at the same time, changes the notion of encounter. This time, encounter is not a matter of facing one's image like one's other or self. Rather, there is an undefinable representation of the self. While the work cuts the notion of perception with a sense of delay, it reflects the characteristics of time as continuum, by reminding the participant of his step from the back. Accordingly, the time lapse, which is supposed to have been left behind, is seen in its delayed recurrence.

The encounter with the reverse image from the back is the result of the placement of cameras and the image relayed through the cameras. Seeing the self from the back reveals an opening of the action in its delayed sense rather than creating an illusion of instantaneous perception. There are two aspects of this installation in this sense, because of the possibility of an already delayed aspect of delay and also doubling of this case with the implication of it, as the control of time in the corridors. If the participant sees himself getting closer to the screen as he is walking towards the screen, the encounter would again be missed because of the different rhythms. The temporal flow does not follow a linear order. Time manifests itself as becoming and as the things themselves, and time is not excluded from the temporality of beings.

To situate something in a realm of an immediacy of perception is an isolating attempt which is cut from a notion of pastness and futurality. The experience of the temporal mobility in Nauman's corridor is caught in a notion of encounter which misses its object. Hence it does not formulate a ground for the viewer where one can focus on the object of perception. This work also gives a sense of the impossibility of a pure instance isolated from the past and the past from the present. Screening from the reverse side offers two possible times the primacy of which is ambiguous. Is the real time represented as the one going further away from the screen, or the one coming close to screen? The gaze is regarded as separate from the subject. Distance from the object is the illusion created on the side of the subject so that the subject would separate itself from the object. The cinematic gaze is associated with the scopophilic instinct where the eye becomes the symbol for incorporation. As incorporation is a sense of uniting with the other, then psychoanalysis is already concerned with a distance in the beginning. On the other hand, the corridor does not let this imaginary distance to take place between the subject and object. What the gaze catches or misses is one's self. It can be said that one's representation in the screen takes the place of one's position in the gaze.

Another play with time is realised on another screen, which shows the corridor empty. The camera is again controlling the temporal and spatial experience in the corridor space. The empty screen showing noone while there is someone inside displaces the subject and object positions by leaving the experience outside the marked space in the corridors. As a consequence what is displayed on the screen does not correspond to a reflection of one's own image but brings a kind of anxiety while interrupting the operation of linear spatial dynamics. It is not a direct impression of past as past or present as present.

In this sense, there is also an interruption according to Margaret Morse's argument about such video works suggests, which record and reflect a viewer's action revealing a sense of presence.

Parveen Adams 'Bruce Nauman and the object of anxiety' writes of the anxiety which Nauman's works evoke in the participants. Referring to Lacan she argues that Nauman's works are the mediums for object of anxiety and alienation:

The object of anxiety that is outside me nonetheless bears the most intimate relation to me…

But why do I speak of objects of anxiety? It is quite simple--when the object approaches me

(and that is what the uncanny is, the approach of the object), I am threatened in my status as

subject. Anxiety describes a relation of overpowering proximity to the object, within which the object is still curiously ill defined. It is certain that it is too close to me, that it is sitting on my chest, that it is gripping my insides. What is not certain is what it is--to the point that I can say that the effect it is having on me is a function of not knowing what it is. In anxiety, I am threatened with extinction; I do not have sufficient space to breathe. In uncanny situations, then, the object devours my space as subject. (Adams: 1998, 109)

In these works, as Adams emphasises, the "dislocation of gaze" has the power to create an object of anxiety. The temporal as well as the spatial shifts have important effects on the loss of a sense of space. The reverse image of the participant on the screen follows the traces in the corridor, while representing one's trace within the following step. The step forward is that which loses its trace as 'present' as soon as it steps. In this sense, there is not a present step that could be considered in the immediacy of the action. The influence of the space represented on the screen interrupts a sense of 'here' introducing a halted experience of forward or backward movement in the corridor. There is not a relevant "way" indicating direction towards something. This is because that there is a sense of temporality functioning for the alteration of perception that dislocates space as the foundation for time. In this sense, the following step forward hesitates to be a new one that leads to the other new one leading to the end of the corridor. It is also not only an interruption of the represented space on the screen. The sense of hesistation is there in the obscure realm between two spaces. There is an interaction between what is displayed and what is physically experienced, which introduces what is displayed in the screen as something beyond the representation of the same space. Rather the screen displays what a step forward is supposed to miss beyond what it catches.

The Freudian thesis about unconscious time in Alan Bass' terms is a "quasi-traumatic internal stimulus". In the conception of this corridor installation, the is actualised in consciousness and one may result in feeling that one is "kicked out of time" as well as "kicked out of space". Time is the continuum not in an Husserlian method as "continuum of nows" but in a flow of duration. What causes ambiguity in the corridors are the different rhythms, which cause anxiety that brings confusion in considering whether the rhythm belongs to one's own temporality or the others.

The strong interruption of the video space in the physical experience of space divides the subject and object in themselves as well as causes the emergence of the multiple sites at the same time. There is also not a sense of rhythm that catches and is caught by anything in the doubling of the spaces and the bodies. The time lapse in the corridors is neither lost nor found as the rhythm of differentiation allows it to be. On the other hand, temporal flow becomes neither the representation of another static time in the unconscious, nor the original in its experience.

Installation/Space

This closed circuit installation space is a space which one participates and becomes a part of performance. Despite its being placed in a gallery, the communication between a person in the corridor and the gallery is cut. Therefore, memory and perception of a sense of space work differently than they do in installations, which come to be known with the architecture of the places. On the one hand, an installation space is regarded as a sited space and it introduces a kind of experience, which looks as if it is for the one in that story. On the other hand, an installation space is multiplied and takes the viewer into another realm between fiction and non-fiction. One goes beyond the position of the observer of something represented as art. Rather one is involved in the process in which one loses any sense of space of belonging and a time of that proper space. In this sense consideration of perception as a medium for an experience of installation misses all these spaceless experiences of space and timeless experiences of time. The notion of encounter is always that which is missed as soon as one faces the other. Perception is that which is delayed in its constitution through which the body is only able to involve the trace of itself and the object of perception as trace. According to such a conception of a perception, the video installation is both a closed-circuit and a closed space in the corridors. It takes one out of a conception of an alert state of consciousness of a gallery space when one is inside the corridor. The corridor introduces a conception of delay rather than a sense of a change in constant spaces. In addition to this, it contradicts with a notion of involvement, which is described as the aspect of minimal works, that privileges perception and a state of consciousness about a gallery space.

Robert Morris' *Mirrored Cubes* (1965) give a sense of oscillation between the physical and the non-physical. The *Mirrored Cubes* (1965) achieve it by connecting the physical space to another spatial and temporal dimension in the mirrored space. There is one thing that makes the corridor distinct from the installations that emphasise the gallery space as the plots of the story installations tell us. The corridor space, which takes one inside itself, cuts the relation to the gallery space in its construction. The construction of gallery space and the architecture of the gallery as part of this work have the minimum effect in setting a relation with the viewer. At the same time, it becomes difficult to consider such installation similar to a cinematic experience or a theatrical one. Although the corridor has a physical presence in the gallery space, it does not make the same sense when it is seen from outside without entering. On the other hand, the fact that the corridor is installed in a gallery space does not mean that such a work denies having an impact on the experience of someone inside the corridor. The limits of the corridor addresses not only to inside but also to the outside of the construction. The corridor has a visual and material presence as something that occupies a space in the gallery. It also addresses a gallery experience by which the corridor installation makes sense in the gallery space. One is not able to meet one's image as something included in the experience of a work of art in the

gallery space through which the corridor installations makes sense in the gallery space. As a consequence of delay, one meets one's appearance on the screen as soon as one misses it and as soon as the image is dislocated and one becomes the image. There is nothing to look since what is looked at is not a thing. The other is not something that one makes absent and present through looking and not looking at.

CHAPTER II

TEMPORALITIES OF NON-MOVEMENT

In his article 'Mortality of the Image', Bill Viola mentions that the term "moving image" is misleading. He states that it is not the images moving but "the art of cinema lies more in the combination of image sequences in time (montage) than it does in making the images move" [39] Viola's argument makes some correct points in considering time as the medium for "moving images", while such an articulation refers only to the power of the technique, which manipulates time as the tool for the representational means of cinema. Viola argues that late twentieth century art has gone through a break with the dramatic

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[39] Viola, Bill, 'Mortality of the Image', Fifer, Sally Jo, *Illuminating video: an essential guide to video art*, (New York, N.Y.: Aperture in association with the Bay Area Video Coalition, 1990) 482.

narrative structure "based on Aristotle's theories." Such a break with narrative is actually the outcome of the conception of reality and is critical about the notions of presence, perception and the linear perspective. This is an argument concerning mimetic means of representation. The changing worldview through the ages, which affected the way "the real" is conceived, made its impact on art and cinema in the twentieth century. The moving aspect of the "moving image" comes out of the technical apparatus, where the ability to control the image belongs to the artist but also to the limit that the camera allows. The "moving image" misses one point; in its being an 'image', when understood in a Platonic sense, it is unable to free itself from only being the re-production of the real substance out "there". The problem with representation is the consideration that an image is the resemblance of the real thing. Image is considered as an outer effect of reality. The shift from such notion of representation to the "presentational arts" has freed the work of art from its reference to the pre-conditioned notion of representation. Then, the artwork is considered as itself, without a necessity to be identified with an object outside itself. Such a shift from representation to presentation takes place towards the middle of the twentieth century, which derives from the changes in the beginning of the twentieth century. It is necessary to make a remark about the two World Wars, which introduced the possibility that there is not a single stable truth. The notion of grasping reality and truth by scientific observation and a fixed status of reality proved impossible.

As can be seen in Viola's argumentation of the moving image and the conception of reality in art reality is no longer valued through the representational quality and the proximity of the representation to the real. Rather, the work of art starts to take its reference from itself. The change from such notion of representation to the presentation is also a shift from the question of "what" to "how". It does not also seem possible to say that all of these changes in philosophical and social means are sudden and they emerged out of nothing. The altered perceptions also are important in breaking the boundaries between the fictional and the real. The urge to grasp the ideal thing in the work of art in relation to the real, brings the question of "what", which is directed to the object. Instead, "how" is an open question. "How" is the tendency to experience the process rather than to understand the teleology of things.

In considering cinematography and the issue of representation, there emerges a question whether cinematography creates an image the reality of which is outside the frame and it creates its own reality unbound with the object. Cinematography, says Maya

Deren, is the "creative use of reality"[40]. This reality is not an issue concerning a value of quantity in comparing cinematographic reality with other things. Referring to photography, Maya Deren argues that photograph must be differentiated from the real object as it has a different order than the real object and it manifests itself as a form of reality. Therefore, such an argument also shows that trying to find a truth and meaning of resemblance within an artwork with reference to the "real object" is a meaningless effort on the side of the spectator. In this sense, a conception of a real thing as if it were an image of something is a reference to its other outside itself. Accordingly, a conception of reality outside reduces the work of art to the field of resemblances and idealities. It is not only for the moving image or cinematography but art in a general sense, which is dominated by the modernist tendency to distance art from the real life. In this sense, the attitude of distancing the real from the unreal becomes a metaphor of reality. Such an attitude introduces a conception of metaphysics in art that also brings dualities between the space and time, which becomes an effect of a narrative discourse that is based on fiction.

Through the manipulation of reality and various ways of shooting, cinematic experience may not be considered as the site where the spectator is made to believe in the unreal for a time being. Such concern with the real and the unreal is an argument whether there is a direct contradiction between these two notions. Are they closed terms or are there any quantitative difference between these two? In fact, this opens a broad range of interests where reality of the unconscious or consciousness, the virtual and the actual are concerned.

Deleuze's argumentation concerning the virtual and the actual eliminates the quantitative difference between the real and the unreal. None of them is considered privileged over the other. Rather, Deleuze suggests that the relation between the virtual and the actual have qualitative differences. The conception of the virtual and the actual is the development in the process of what Deleuze calls "different/ciation". Similar to Derrida's notion of difference as "différance", different/ciation does not refer to an understandable or conceivable term about difference. Therefore, such an attitude avoids the notion of representation of the real, which happens in the virtual. Even différance differentiates and thus separates itself from the associations, which depend on a comparison with the other in considering difference as the manifestation of truth. Different/ciation is a sense of difference, which is irreducible to difference between two things. It is the difference between the virtual and the actual. It does not consider a beginning before difference itself, for it is that which different/ciates in itself. An elimination of a beginning and ending questions a conception of authenticity before difference.

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[40] Deren, Maya, 'Cinematography: The Creative Use of Reality', Daedalus, Winter 1960.

In 'Ontology of the Virtual'[41] Constantin Boundas argues that Deleuze's notion of the virtual depends on tendencies, which are not "thought according to the spatial terms nor can they be represented." "Tendencies", says Boundas, have the reality of the virtual, which exist in order to be actualised. In addition to their being virtual and real, tendencies are not possibilities. Possibilities have to do with resemblances and representations of the real. In considering the virtual as real, the possible as the resemblance, Boundas means that the possible has a futural aspect, which announces the reality to come but does not have a trace of it in the virtual. On the other hand, Boundas accepts Deleuze's notion of tendency, which has an aspect of reality but not actualised. The Virtual, which is real but not a thing, may also be that which is not objectified by a subject concerning outside and inside. It is that which different/ciates through unfolding and it becomes actualised.

The problem with time in the moving images is the problematic of the philosophical arguments about time in general. It questions the notion of perception, persona, being, existence. The cinematic operation of time considers the temporal becoming as a means of the apparatus, which introduces the idea of the screen and the entity behind the screen. It is necessary to see how "difference" and "differences" are taken in the temporal order in and outside the moving images. Time is an aspect of trace of temporality by means of which Derrida calls "différance".

Deleuze's studies about the notion of time in cinema assists in the sense that he is concerned with the relation of movement and image. Deleuze differentiates between two kinds of images in cinema, which he calls the movement-image and the time-image. He is interested in the Bergsonian notion of duration, which he regards as the originary point in his arguments. It is also the criticism of representation of image in spatio-temporal understanding. In this sense, Deleuze makes a division between the time-image and the movement-image which considers Deleuzian notion of differentiation, that is in kind.

Time, Movement, Image- Space

The term "moving image" can be helpful in getting a conception about the implication of the factors of movement in cinematography. Such a concern is the movement-time relationship, where the spatial relationships are questioned. In this sense, there appear two questions about the image in cinema. Is time an object of movement or is movement an outcome of temporal differentiation?

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[41] Boundas, Constantin, 'Ontology of the Virtual', *Deleuze : a critical reader*, ed. Paul Patton, Oxford, UK and Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell, 1996.

The most important difference between the movement-image and the time-image is the notion of indirect representation of time in the former. In 'Image Movement and its Three Varieties'[42] Deleuze mentions the ways in which psychoanalysis is concerned with the conception of image. Deleuze is critical of psychoanalytic understanding of image since psychoanalytic reality "consisted of placing the images in consciousness and movements in space." Such a division causes the articulation of consciousness as the field of "qualitative, unextended images", whereas space offers the operation of "extended, quantitative movements." (Deleuze: 1986, 3) Deleuze's is critical of the historicism of "being" according to western metaphysics. The historical being has brought dualism between the image and matter, as well as the "confrontation between idealism and materialism." Such an opposition refers to the "duality of image and movement, of the conscious and the thing." Deleuze sees an elimination of such dualism in Husserl's approach to phenomenology. Husserl brings the conception of consciousness and being together and regards consciousness as the consciousness of something. This is a way to close the gap between the matter and mind. Nevertheless, Husserl still puts consciousness as an agent between matter and mind. Rather, Deleuze follows Bergson who regards "all consciousness" as "something." In this sense, Deleuze seems to close the gap between the virtual and the actual as well as matter and mind. In the conception of Husserl's methodology of "internal time consciousness" the privilege is given to the "self" as the agent of the perception of time. If Husserl is concerned with the notion of "internal", then he is concerned with the external as the limit of time. The privilege given to the self is the privilege of a fixed being and presence where the locations are introduced other than "trace" or flux. Derrida is critical of Husserl because of his concerns about self-presence and consciousness of time, that is the foundation for phenomenological being. Such an approach to phenomenology has an emphases on identity, which privileges "natural perception" that brings a "ground" for the notion of the "perceiving subject", which demands its object of perception.

Deleuze is critical about the operation of natural perception, because he is sceptical about the notion of self and subject, which phenomenology regards as the basis of perception. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze sees the articulation of "ground" that is concerned with "determination" and "logos", which are the highest references to the dualism of mind and body. [43] Similarly, Derrida is critical of natural perception because it introduces self-consciousness, which reinforces "the knowing subject" and he deconstructs the ideal self-presence and temporal presentness and a notion of "internalisation." [44] Deleuze says that the notion of "image equal to movement" depends on the virtual where "my body is an image, thus an aggregate of actions and reactions." (Deleuze:1986, 5) At this point, the conception of the knowing subject is no longer there as the outcome of dualities. In Deleuze's sense, "matter is not something, which would be hidden behind the image, but on the contrary, the absolute identity of image and of movement." (Deleuze:1986, 5)

There are differences and similarities between the movement-image and the time-image. In the former there is a dialectical representation of time and in the latter there is a direct representation of time. The movement-image is in an indirect relationship with time, which depends on the compression of images to give a sense of dialectical end points inside the narrative. Technically, such narrative structure is achieved by the use of cut and montage to represent images as part of a composition. Then, composed scenes lead to a detachment from reality, which become entangled in tableau and mise en scene. The temporal mode of the movement-image is determined according to the movement of the camera, which shoots a sequence of combination of spaces. In addition to that, the duration of such films depend on the narrative structure of plot. Contrary to the movement-image, which considers time as a tool of space, Deleuze says "time is no longer a measure of movement but movement is the perspective of time." The time-image is where time is not deployed as movement of something; rather movement occurs in time and through the flow

[42] Deleuze, Gilles, 'Image, Movement and its three Varieties' http/mailbase.ac.uk/lists/films-philosophy/files/ from [*Cinema 1: the movement-image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, London: Athlone, 1986.]

[43] In Deleuze,Gilles, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) 272. Deleuze brings the argument of ground in his articulation of difference's relation to image. At this point, he is critical about the ground, which is there as the foundation for "identical."

[44] Lloyd, Genevieve, *Being in time: selves and narrators in philosophy and literature*, (New York: Routledge, 1993) 4.

of duration in time. Therefore, spatial determinants become inefficient to give a sense of temporality. What such an image brings is the "recollection image", which has its past, present, and future within itself. It does not constitute itself in an instant. In the time-image, montage does not operate to represent dialectical ends of the image in a causal relationship. For example, the time-image does not constitute itself as the beginning or end points in the composition of the narrative. The time-image does not also convey a hierarchical foundation for the setting of the plot. Talking about a single dimension of duration would be a failure, since what emerges is the multiplicity of different temporalities. Such a sense of time brings a notion of spatialisation since space brings forms to things, while the time-image does not have a form. In this sense, time does not refer to a sense of belonging or non-belonging. Derrida describes such time as that which is not obliged to have a priority over things; it is not a matter of having or not having.[45] Derrida often emphasises the significance of trace as temporisation, which differentiates in itself. Rather than "differ" or "differentiate" Derrida uses the word "defer" which means delay. According to such a conception of time, time becomes what it is not. In this sense, it is not possible for it to be considered as an object of perception. Rather, a conception of time unbound to the subjective or objective reserves is possible unless it represents a spatial quality. Time is that which is not stable and sudden, but in a flow of becoming. If we consider the conception of time as a property of consciousness, then we have to accept it as a reified substance of space. Correspondingly, as time is not a thing, it is defined as the undefinable, which is paradoxical. The concern with the time-image leads to a similar trap of definition, but provides a conception of time in its conditions independent from a plot of the story or an inscribed meaning. Then, what happens in the time-image does not remain complete, which is not a prerequisite of a truth of interpretation. Rather temporality replaces a particular conception of time, and it does not demonstrate a sense of wholeness but is considered as a state of heterogenous alteration. The time-image does not allow a space for interpretation. Deleuze explains the difference between two different understandings of the time-image and the movement-image. He states that "the movement-image occurs in the gap between received and the executed movement" and "recollection image fills the gap", it goes to perception, "not to generic movement".[46] In this sense, to see the image as if it is an outcome of the gaps is to constitute an illusionary sense of reality. The time-image is able to shift this illusion into reality since it does not consider gaps because it does not consider unity at all.

Warhol's early films such as *Empire(1965), Eat*(1963)and *Sleep* (1963) can be examples to see Deleuze's conception of the time-image since there is an emphasis of process and duration which has broken with the narrative structure. Warhol refuses to use montage technique in a dialectical sense, which often introduces mise en scene. Deleuze refers to the political and social implications of the time-image and the movement-image. The emergence of the time-image is also considered as a criticism of contemporary art and culture beginning with neo-realism of fifties in cinema. It is important to note that, although Deleuze seems to historicise the time-image as the aspect of post-war films, a

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[45] Derrida's concern is the economy of time concerning the notion of "givenness" and considering time as something that is given and taken, as discussed in this chapter, see Derrida: 1992.

[46] Deleuze, Gilles, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, (London: Athlone, 1992) 47-8.

consideration of the movement-image as also the time-image introduces an altered sense of history, which deterritorialises a sense of time.

The time-image does not often refer to a meaning that could coincide with a unity of action, space and time. It is motion based and it depends on the representative qualities of the dialectical notion of scenes. In this sense, the rejection of these notions introduce another articulation of meaning where the void is not reduced to emptiness and meaninglessness but is present as much as the visible and overloaded images of movement. This may not also be the means of finding a "new" reality in the void, but taking the already existent "meaning" into the locus of what can be counted as the material for art. For instance, *Empire* (1965) is a film that does not seem to be concerned with a sense of coherence of plot. *Empire* (1965) allows the development of questions rather than solutions. *Empire* (1965) is a film, the duration of which lasts eight hours of shooting of the Empire State Building from a single angle. Nothing depicts a sense of movement except the movement of the sun and the shades. The movement is in the temporal flow and the film that continuously shoots. There is not an event or a plot depicted in *Empire* (1965). While showing the repetitive scenes from one angle position for hours, does Warhol try to bore us or does he say something else rather than cinema, which prevents a sense of anticipation on the side of the spectator? Both as the content of the film and the mode of experience of the film on the side of the spectator, does not conform to what a "normal" process of feature films offer to the spectator. The blankness of the image seems to resist the actualisation of the virtual. It is against what consciousness would situate on a meaningful basis. *Empire* (1965) calls the spectator for a mode of contemplation and alteration without giving any resolution in the story. It also does not demand a sense of perceptual realisation. Rather it says that this time this film is not a matter of looking at and understanding. It is an event, which does not face its spectator. The film becomes the idea that haunts the privileging of experience as that which reveals a sense of encounter.

Changing times, changing temporalities

The motive for the art of the sixties was to consider art as part of everyday life. In this sense, artists during the period were critical of institutional structures, which specified the ways in which art had to be. In his article 'Raiding the Icebox' Peter Wollen writes

about the atmosphere of the sixties. It is the time when Warhol's art and his films were made. Wollen argues that mass culture, the roots of which depends on the Fordist mass production, has lead to the emergence of the "production of images". Pop art of the sixties refers primarily to this intense use of images.[47] Warhol and other Pop artists were critical about the images brought by mass society. Wollen states that during the sixties art had political as well as aesthetic concerns. He talks about John Cage's fascination with silence, "which posited duration with a special intensity" rejecting the "traditional appeal of music as melody". Wollen is concerned with the emergence of the importance of the unheard – as the musical notation - in the space of the music experience. Wollen states that art according to Cage should be brought back into relationship with everyday life. (Wollen: 1989, 14) Most art done during the sixties was against the conventional and accepted notions of mass society. However, pop art in which Warhol was interested, is an ambiguous situation since pop artists were making the art of the images of popular culture. Warhol's attitude about the images both had a conforming and critical aspect of mass society. In his art, he used everything mass-produced, from Coke to Campbell soup cans, celebrities, Brillo boxes and many more commodity materials. Warhol did not detach himself from the culture he was living in. In his works and his life, it looks as if he has a tendency to become the part of the images of popular culture. Such a tendency of his seems to have two sides: on the one hand, he was part of the images, which were not unique and distinguished from each other everything being an outcome of a machine product. On the other hand, he had a particular approach to the multiplicities around him. His films, as well as other works have such an attitude in which he used the existing material in an unexpected way. Warhol's use of camera and his approach towards filmmaking had such an aspect. Being the man behind the camera, he is critical of the common way of film production and the Hollywood star system. In this sense, he chose unconventional subjects even non-subjects, which do not have specific plots as he did in *Empire* (1965), *Eat* (1963) and *Sleep* (1963). There is an ironic situation since these "unconventional subjects" stand out being indifferent to the narrative aspects of cinema. He does not offer a possibility of getting lost in the story 'out there.' The stories and the people shown in his films are the stories of themselves. *Eat* (1963) is an example for that, since in this film there is an actor, Robert Indiana, who eats one mushroom for about half an hour. However, his experience of eating a mushroom is not a matter of making the spectator believe in the fact that he eats it. The film is between

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[47] Wollen, Peter, 'Raiding the Icebox', *Andy Warhol: film factory*, ed. Michael O'Pray, (London: British Film Institute, 1989), (14-28) 14.

fictional and non-fictional space since Indiana's experience exceeds being a part of a narrative and a sense of acting. The act of eating turns into one that gets out of an experience of eating and is not obliged to a sense of eating something, but eating itself.

There is also not editing or any other sound effect added on the meaning of the eating scene. In *Sleep* (1963)*,* John Giorno does not act as if he was sleeping, but he says he sleeps throughout the film that lasts six hours. Warhol places the camera in the corner of the room and does not make any focus change and he does not edit the film. Warhol changes the direction of the camera in every three hours but he decides about the placement of the camera randomly.[48] What Peter Wollen sees in Warhol's films different from the commodity films is his "reluctance to edit" his films, his rejection of plot or narrative and choice on the side of the "situation" and "incident". (Battcock: 1989, 43) That Warhol does not control the actions according to a plot allows the scene to develop in a temporality, which follows the duration of the performance – of eating, of sleeping. The time-image is appropriate in considering Warhol's attitude towards filmmaking since duration in these films do not depend on the narrative space of action. There is an interest in a notion of incident, which allows an alteration of image by differing in itself. The filming of *Empire* (1965) takes eight hours, which is concerned with the duration that is marked by a passage from day to night time. Gregory Battcock argues that the purpose of *Empire* (1965) is to present the essential character of film as a medium.[49] In the article "Four Films by Andy Warhol" Battock refers to the editing process as the "distortion through compression." In *Empire* (1965), there is a different kind of distortion, which is on the side of the image. In this sense "the cinematic narration of time is distorted." (Battcock: 1986, 44) In the films *Eat* (1963) and *Sleep*(1963) there can be references to distortion of the "narration of time" in Warhol, not only because of the long shots without editing but also because of the introduction of intervals through slow motion. For example, displacement from the 24 frame to 16 frames per second during the shot can be regarded as one of the ways in which Warhol interrupts duration and the movement of substances. It also rejects a sense of time that dependent on an emergence of a narrative structure. The

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[48] Evans, Kim, dir., *Andy Warhol*, London: Phaidon, 1992. (79 minutes)

[49] Battcock, Gregory, 'Four Films By Andy Warhol', *Andy Warhol Film Factory,* ed. Michael O'Pray, (London: British Film Institute, 1989), (42-52) 44.

movement of the substance is represented without being manipulated by montage after the time of shooting.

Warhol's films are similar to Cage's music. Both of the artists do not apply the "formal" techniques to their creation. Rather they change the medium of creation. Cage brings "silence" to music as part of a notation and Warhol is concerned with films, which have no plot, the images are in a way "silent" in Warhol. However, such silence becomes louder than sound. The images are muted in Warhol, frozen, which reveal a non-movement rather than movement. Such an attempt marks the flow of duration and emphasise the interval rather than a dialectical understanding of scenes in a sequence that have the aim of a resultant meaning. Jonas Mekas writes that he finds the secret of Warhol's scenes in duration. According to Mekas "there are certain ideas and feelings, certain contents, which are structured in time" and Warhol's films are the examples for that temporal formation." He finds "the real meaning," which goes beyond "literal meaning" and that "can be caught only through structuring in time." Such an attitude "applies equally to feelings and thoughts":

> One of the essential misunderstandings about art and thought has been belied that thought is opposed to aesthetic activity, to art. And particularly thought has no place in cinema….The structure of thought and art is similar; that is, both occur by pace, rhythm and duration: duration and repetitions of thoughts and feelings and actions.[50]

Mekas' statement about the importance of thought in the operation of cinematic image comes close to Deleuzian notion of "the thought image." The thought-image does not consider a separation between thought and image. There is no need for an external reference to another image to get a sense of image. Rather the image occurs between action and reaction. If we say that the thing is same with the perception of the thing, we are in Bergson's direct implication of perception as something. In addition to that, while such a statement addresses a becoming and alteration, it preconditions an emergence of another aspect of replacement. Such a notion of replacement is the direct relationship between the thing and the perception of the thing. Rather, in the time-image, there are intervals, which are not marked by perception. He says, "interval is not only defined by the specialisation of the two side limits" which are "perception and action." (Deleuze: 1986, 6) "Affectivity", then is the notion that provides the activation of "between–the-two without filling it or completing it".

In his article, Michael O'Pray distinguishes between the cinema where montage takes place as the major element of the narrative and realist cinema, which is concerned with direct image. He states that Eisensteinian montage technique - which works according to the dialectical sequence of the frames in the narration of the story - on the one hand, and

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[50] Mekas, Jonas, 'Notes After Reseeing the Movies of Andy Warhol', *Andy Warhol Film Factory*, ed. Michael O'Pray, (London: British Film Institute, 1989), (28-42) 33.

the Bazinian realism on the other. Warhol, according to O'Pray, is a realist since he uses the "fixed camera, unedited reels and the non-staged events". [51] Eisenstein's cinema is the first example of the successful operation of montage for the outcome of a meaning that needs interpretation on the side of the spectator. In this sense, Eisenstein's understanding of cinema fails to be regarded as the time-image, as it privileges an importance of time and space that are the parts of compositional structure.

> In the time-image, there is not a distinction between the real and the unreal and it does not oblige one to
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> "understand" and get a meaning out of the logical sequence of images. Rather, it is the time of becoming
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> and meaning is not a production of something outside itself.

Warhol's early films, in this sense, function according to a sense of the time-image, which is not preoccupied by the privileging of a narrative structure, depended on the manipulation of images. In *Sleep* (1963) 100 foot rolls of film were used. Warhol used different angles for each of the rolls. The rolls were permutated at very great length, projected at a slower speed than the original speed of photography and finally reduced to freeze-frames. (O'Pray: 1989, 173) The scene of sleeping might evoke a sense that nothing happens or might make someone think the film was paused. Rather, there is a temporal flow, which does not mark the passage of time and make it visible in the representation of the events. In *Eat* 1963), Warhol shoots Robert Indiana eating a mushroom for 25 minutes. The notion of eating makes sense because something tastes good, because one is hungry. Therefore, eating becomes an agent for the satisfaction, which indicates a direction for an end, while *Eat* (1963) emphasises the process of eating rather than an end. In this sense, The eating scene makes one think about the contribution of the whole body in the act of eating. *Eat* (1963) is similar to Bergson's notion of process mentioned in the example of sugar dissolving in water. He states that " I must wait until the sugar dissolves." Bergson's formulation is that "My own duration serves to reveal other durations that beat to other rhythms, that differ in kind from mine." (Deleuze: 1988, 32) In this sense, not only the result of seeing the sugar dissolved but also the process of dissolving becomes important. One waits and experiences the change in the state of sugar as the succession of two different bodies enduring in time.

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[51] O'Pray, Michael, 'Warhol's Early Films', *Andy Warhol Film Factory*, ed. Michael O'Pray, (London: British Film Institute, 1989) 170-8.

Counter-Encounter

The time- image represents a shift from an understanding of being to becoming, from time to duration, from reason to intuition, from a fixed notion of "perceptual identity"[52] to that which gains a nomadic character. Therefore, identity is not considered as the register for things that are grounded in space. Deleuze's notion of difference is important in considering the time-image free from binary oppositions. The time-image is concerned with the notion of differentiation in the image that is between the virtual and the actual. According to Deleuze's account of image, which considers differentiation and non-differentiation, the time-image becomes released from the arbitrary relationship of difference between the thought and image, real and the unreal. The main shift, in Deleuzian sense, is the questioning of reality in the factors of differentiation between the virtual and the actual. At this point, Deleuze leaves no place for the consideration of the virtual as the unreal and the actual as the real. The relation of the virtual to duration is the relationship of duration to pure memory. Duration introduces "the passive memory as recollection, virtual and inactive" as well as a temporal move from the virtual memory into memory images in the course of becoming actual. [53] Memory is able to coexist in the actualisation of perception. The move from the virtual to actual has the notion of "translation, contradiction, rotation and orientation." (Deleuze: 1988, 64) Translation is not an outcome of something new that replaces the old. Dorothe Olkowski considers such mobility as a notion of Deleuzian virtual memory:

> The problem is not space since space is a representation, a mental diagram; the problem is
> creating a conception of duration that recognises its multiple rhythms, the many virtual
> memories, each of which reflects the whole, each of which when actualised in a perception
> has greater tension or relaxation.(Olkowski: 1999, 166)

In this sense, perception is not constituted as original to consciousness, since it has roots in the unactualised virtual memories. Space contributes to the actualisation of the virtual. Such an attitude refers to Deleuze's criticism of ground, the principle of which would be

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[52] The term, which Alan Bass uses with reference to Freud's conception of perception, and its obligation to operate with reference to a mode of identity privileged by the conscious perception.
[53] Olkowski, Dorothe, *Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999) 177.

the representational space. Deleuze rejects the notion of temporality, which has become the means of space. Modern art can be said to provoke dualities within space, where the thing itself is sacrificed for the sake of "meaning", while art after modernist tradition is not for homogeneity and specific meaning. Contrary to search of such a meaning, Warhol's films introduce slow motion, which makes a passage possible between the virtual and the actual. It is even closer to the virtual since it refers more to the psychic states of temporality, which addresses to past and delays present to some other "time". Duration has to do more with the intervals then the specification of time to perception. Interval introduces a conception of temporality that is concerned with duration, which is irreducible to spatial formations. In its irreducibility to any state of consciousness, duration is the imperceptible, the location of which is impossible. Warhol's films go beyond the limits of empirical solutions, while believing "the true function of film as not to produce and maintain a new art form, but to provide a super-investigation of mere physical reality". [54] Neither the moving image, which does not display a visible action, nor the spectator is passive during the course of becoming. Parker Tyler calls such a time "psychedelic time". Tyler regards *Empire* (1965) as an endurance test for the spectator, while the sun is allowed to take all of eight hours to go down and come up. (Tyler: 1989, 98) The condition that images are still captured in the apparatus, obviously leads to a different kind of encounter no matter how much it seems close to the real or beyond the real. Perception is not enough to get a sense of encounter, while the spectator does not meet a constant object. In the course of becoming, a sense of grasp of the thing and thinking about an ending, which refers to a tense such as "has become" may not be a concern for the encounter with the image.

The Problem with the presence and the present

Derrida is critical about self-consciousness. He objects to the knowing subject and deconstructs the ideal self-presence and temporal presentness. Self presence is a reference to "stability, fixity and the eternal now as the godly attitude". (Genevieve: 1993, 4)

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[54]Tyler, Parker, 'Dragtime and Drugtime', *Andy Warhol: film factory*, ed. Michael O'Pray, (London: British Film Institute, 1989) 98.

Derrida's important remark about consciousness is that he ragards consciousness as the property of noone. (Genevieve:1993, 4) Having rejected that consciousness is the condition for perception, a notion of self-perception also proves impossible. The notion of Freudian "perceptual identity" becomes an illusion when one tries to understand with reference to perception, which is the outcome of consciousness. The problem seems to be both on the side of "perception" and "identity" as long as they are conceived as the fixed paradigms of the subject. According to such a notion, self -preserved identity, and the conception of the self and the other are guaranteed by the separate beings on different sides. Such a conception suggests that the difference is regarded as the outcome of the separation of a unique being which is separated into object and subject.

Perception does not grasp the thing as it is, because of the notion of "different/ciation" according to Deleuze, and because of "différance" according to Derrida. There is a notion of différance, which is at work in perception that breaks the unity and immediacy of perception. Perception is not an object and does not objectify things in its immediacy. At this point, Deleuze argues that "Perception is not the object plus something but the object minus something, minus everything that does not interest us." (Deleuze: 1988, 25) Although Deleuze's notion of the subject is the perceiving subject, he says that we do not add something to that, but we perceive less than the thing. No matter how much the body is close to the object of perception, there is always something left as the not present. This is through the constitution of time unbound to a sense of immediacy. However, the imperceptible does not consider a sense of loss. The sense of delay does not constitute a notion of ending to the perception of object. It is that which is already in delay. Such an articulation of perception is beyond the perceptual identity, since it does not address to phenomenological relationship as that which is between the subject and object.

According to the phenomenologist conception of perception and the relation to the other, there is a necessity for the operation of identity for absolute consciousness. In this sense, Jeffrey A. Bell in his article 'Phenomenology, Poststructuralism, and the Cinema of Time' refers to the Husserlian method of perception where "the other is understood in terms of a fundamental identity".[55] Bell is critical of Husserl since Husserl's guiding is conditioned to the emergence of identity. Identity is an articulation of a notion of a subject, which privileges self-consciousness. Accordingly, such a conception connection between

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[55] Jeffrey, Bell, 'Phenomenology, Poststructuralism, and the Cinema of Time', www.hanover.edu/philos/film/vol_2/bell.html.

the real subject and the ideal truth ends up in the discovery of a pure transcendental ego. (Bell, 2) Contrary to Husserl and Ponty, Deleuze's criticism of presence and his notion of difference are free from the foundation of identity. Deleuze's difference is based on differentiation itself of which Bell claims "there is from the start difference and incommensurability, where difference is not between already identified entities."(Bell, 7) Since Deleuze rejects difference in relation to identity, difference gets a nomadic character which is not situated inside space while considering space as "any space wherever". It contradicts a method of perception, where "the other is understood in terms of a fundamental identity", which reduces difference to identity.

Deleuze's conception of the time-image introduces a relation between image and thought that is based on the notion of differentiation. D.N. Rodowick states that Deleuze is concerned with the categories of movement and temporality in relation to visualisation or imaging. Accordingly, Deleuze is critical of the notion of identity which "thought is considered to possess", which is based on "logical representations."[56]. Deleuze is critical of a notion of representation that has the implications of outside and inside. Rather he brings into consideration the "fluid ordering of representational elements." (Rodowick: 1997, 3) The notion of fluidity here refers to difference in kind, which the object is in so far as it changes in the flow of duration. Rodowick's statement that the transformation from the movement-image to the time-image is also the transformation in the nature of signs and images referring to a change in the "cultural image of thought." (Rodowick: 1997, 3)

Warhol's conception of image does not seem to be concerned with ideology. Rather the image and culture relationship in Warhol is the way in which images have been effective in culture and cultural changes have influenced images. Therefore, we can assume culture as part of an image producing mechanism, also culture as an image taking its place in other images. How does such a reflective thought effect the temporal motives of things? At this point, time becomes a culturally produced issue while language is the basis of it. On the other hand, there is the time-image, which is considered in the Deleuzian sense of the virtual and the actual and then the thought-image, which also deals with the notion of "difference in kind". The main aspect of difference in kind is the "presence" which is replaced by a   "tendency to develop". Deleuze says that "tendency is not

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[56] Rodowick, D.N., 'A Short History of Cinema', http://www.mailbase.ac.uk/lists/film-philosophy/files/ www.rochester.edu/College/FS/Publications/Time Machine/Short/History.html, from [*Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, Duke University Press, 1997.]

primarily related to object, but it is in relation to the causes of these products in time." [57] Separating itself from an anchorage both on the side of the object and subject, tendency is the difference in kind which occurs as the interval. In his critique of difference in degree, Deleuze's argument is similar to Bergsonian theories since both of them objects to the privilege of perception considering it is a determination. Determinate being is comprehended as the outcome of resemblances that is replaced by difference in the conception of difference in kind. Deleuze suggests in *Bergsonism*, difference in kind is not between two tendencies since 'tendency' is an aspect of the virtual as the only condition for different/ciation to function as a process of actualisation. The time-image is the virtual image but it is also the "direct representation of time" as Rodowick argues referring to Deleuze's *Cinema2 : The time-image*. Warhol's films may be an example of an achievement of this directness because there is no need for another agency to interrupt a sense of continuity or discontinuity other than what the image represents.

Duration and Rhythm

Duration's relation to time and a conception of duration do not seem to give a sense of belonging, which marks a specification inside the proper bodies of subjects. Rather it is that which emerges in affection with the other. Thus the otherness of the other is realised and rhythm might be considered as a way of making sense of duration in its actualisation. In such an articulation of the rhythm-duration relationship, neither of the rhythms follows the other to unite with the other's duration. Rather there is a third rhythm emerging from the communication of two rhythms, belonging to none of the sides. Movement in relation to rhythm does not place itself on the side of the real object. There is again a notion of the virtual, which considers the relationship between movement and rhythm as a matter of affection. In this sense, such relationship becomes independent from a measured time by virtue of its difference in kind. It presupposes the existence of rhythm as the foundation of

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[57] Deleuze, Gilles, "Bergson's Conception of Difference", *The New Bergson*, ed. John Mullarkey, (Manchester: Manchester Uni. Press, 1999) 45.

becoming. Rhythm is also that which has virtual characteristics, which does require a realisation by the other.

Paul Douglass says that Bergson is for the "indivisibility of motion" and he sees it as the illusion of cinema.[58] Bergson's argument about cinematic image is the criticism of this illusion, which is also the illusion in the search for an ideal 'being'. Movement is also idealised by being conceptualised for a teleological end. Bergson establishes a notion of facts on tendencies and intuitions behind the real and material facts. In cinema, according to Bergson, tendency functions for understanding the framed images which have gaps between them. Through tendency the images would be perceived as flowing, continuing and changing. Bergson is critical about an analytical approach to cinema because of its tendency to line up the images in a "linear past, present and future" as the result of "single perception." (Douglass: 1999, 213) Having accepted the criticism of linearity in Bergson, Douglass does not agree with Bergson's attitude towards cinema for he constitutes the cinematic image with reference to gap. In addition to Douglass's argument about the 'gap' it might be the 'interval' which could replace the notion of gaps. In another way, the notion of gap should not be conceived as the absent and lost space, which breaks the reality of the image. This is also Bergson himself, who has stated the importance of the interval, which is seen Deleuze's articulation of Bergson's philosophy. (Olkowski: 1999, 166)

A conception of interval in a cinematic image functions in both sides: on the side of the film apparatus and on the side of the spectator. However, this is not the destruction of reality, rather a tolerance given to the difference in kind. It also introduces the possibility of trace in Derrida's attitude towards time. In its ability to vitalise the interval and difference, cinema remains a useful example for the conception of duration and the kind of encounter between the spectator and the moving image. It is also because of the operation of the time-image, which is supportive for the consideration of cinema as having its own reality.

Deleuze does not seem to regard any possible articulation for a clear distinction between the real and the unreal. Since the image and thought are not distinct from themselves in quantitative methods, the image-thought relation is also considered as the thought-image. Such an opening to the third being, which is self-referential, is the way in which Deleuze understands the perception and memory relationship. In this sense, there is again a different articulation of perception and consciousness. Similarly, Douglass says

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[58] Douglass, Paul, 'Bergson and Cinema', *The New Bergson*, ed. John Mullarkey, Manchester: Manchester Uni. Press, 1999.

that Bergson's conception of the self is in a sense, perfectly reflected in the cinema's floating consciousness and quotes from Bergson's *Creative Evolution* who says that

> You may say that my body is matter, or that it is an image: the word is of
> no importance…Itself an image, the body can't store up images, since it forms
> a part of the images. (quoted in Douglass: 1999, 202)

Deleuze asks a similar question in *Cinema 1* concerning his articulation of body and image relationship, "how could my brain contain images since it is one image among others?" In this sense, images may not be referred to the unreal and considered as non-images. However, the differentiation between the image and the non-image is a change between the images of a kind. The time-image, is a notion in cinema, no matter how much it relates to "direct representation of reality." Then, it is real as long as the cinematic representation is considered to have and create its own reality free from having been signified by and signify something outside itself. The time-image achieves it not by being unrelated to things outside cinema but letting things develop in their tendency to endure rather than being captured by the time of a plot.

In Warhol's films, temporal flow introduces a possibility of an emergence of a fourth dimension, which is not a part of time-space-action closure. Accordingly, such a temporal flow conveys the possibility of affection between the spectator and the spectacle. Walter Benjamin has mentioned that cinematic experience enforces alienation and distraction.[59] However, Warhol's films go beyond a conception of a cinematic experience, which constitutes itself by being distant to the spectator by telling us the story of the others. Benjamin's concern about alienation and distraction is focused on the consideration that film is an outcome of a "mechanical reproduction". On the contrary, Warhol's films stand out by being on the border of fiction and non-fiction. These films do not agree with a narrative aspect of cinematic representation. An opening of a conception of temporality to the unconscious introduces a different understanding of film. The emphasis on duration rather than spatial relationships allows the spectator to experience these films as part of one's duration rather than creating an experience indifferent to the subjective time. In *Eat* (1963)*,* the action of eating the mushroom is motivated by the passage of time rather than trying to make sense of eating as a dialectical action. An emphasis on the process of eating becomes more important than means and ends of eating. What operates here is temporal

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[59] Benjamin, Walter, 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt and trans. Harry Zohn**,** London : Fontana, 1992.

flow free from being an object for the other. Rather it can only be actualised as long as the otherness of the other is considered. That is why patience is needed, since the other is not just a position but it is in affection with temporality of different substances. In this sense, none of the parts can be said to take the other's place and be the other's point of reference, where duration is left uncited. In such an articulation of the encounter with the other, there is not a means of a central mechanism and the concern for an activity or passivity of the mediums.

Rhythms of Encounter

Warhol and Nauman's approaches to temporality are close to each other. Both of them oppose the cinematic narration in their works, and there is a tendency to present rather than represent in their use of slow motion. What differentiates them is that their works refer to different media; Warhol's to film, Nauman's to video and installations. Both of them use the material of film as the limit as the characteristics of their works. These works also give different sense of temporalities. In a way, duration contributes these films as the subject of the films. Warhol and Nauman make films in a similar way but the works invoke different kind of participation because of the different spatial formations. The fact that Nauman uses camera but he is not concerned with making film and Warhol's films are not considered as video installation brings the conception of different temporalities.

In 'The Time of the King' Derrida is critical about a material conception of time, which is conceived as a thing. Impossible as a thing, time can neither be given nor taken. The first lines of 'The time of the king' where Madame de Maintenon says "The King takes all my time; I give the rest to Saint-Cyr, to whom I would like to give all" demonstrates a state of giving and taking about which Derrida is critical. In this sense, Derrida states that the implication of taking and giving indicates that Madame de Maintenon is talking about a time that belongs to her and Derrida asks "how can a time belong?". Such a thing is not possible, because contrary to the matter of giving and taking, time is not a thing, then it does not belong and not be given and taken. Derrida's notion of time is similar to the problematic of the gift and the economy of giving and taking. Both time and the gift "give nothing to see" which declares the impossibility of any sense of visibility of time. Derrida seems to indicate that time is invisible because it is not a being in itself. Then, such an articulation brings the emergence of time in its non-being, when time emerges in its forgottenness as a gift. "Forgetting and gift would therefore be each in the condition of the other." (Derrida: 1992, 18) To "give time", Derrida says "something other than time but something other than that is measured by time as by its element." (Derrida: 1992, 29) "The time of the king" then can be said to constitute a time that is not possible of a self-sufficient temporality that belongs to time itself.

Accordingly, it does not seem possible to give an articulation of time as a being. Then it is also not possible to get a sense of comprehension of time itself. When Derrida says that time is not a thing, he means time is not an object but is objectified. It does not

exist as a being, while it can be seen as the trace of things and becoming. However, the relationship between time and things appears as a matter of economy of time, which is reduced to exchange matter. On the other hand, this relation is not exterior to time as that which declares space as a condition for space. The time-image rejects existing as a condition of narrative space, which Deleuze calls such image "direct-representation of time". Becoming is regarded as existing in time and is the mode of things unfolding in time, in a flow of duration without space interrupting time as if the space is an external reality.

In Warhol's early films and Nauman's video performances it can be said that there is an attempt to allow time to become and things unfold in time which are not marked by a sense of teleology. Despite the control of time through the apparatus and space, both of the artists have introduced the moving image operating in a non-narrative sequence. In this sense, the unified structure of a narrative is broken, since a unity of time, space and action is broken. There are not fictional characters represented in the ideal space and time, rather the films represent what the things are outside the frame of the camera. The events can be said to be left in their becoming.

In *Playing a Note on the Violin While I Walk Around the Studio*, a video performance of 1968, the duration of the film is not predetermined according to a plot. In this sense there are a lot of things contributing to duration. The duration of the film is determined as the outcome of multiple continuities. The choice of the violin as an instrument, the act of playing that instrument, which Nauman does not know how to play before the performance is recorded, spatial aspects of the gallery, sound and the duration of the film stock are the factors that determine the duration of the film. The film ends when Nauman can no longer play the violin, while he does not play out of a notation or a specific song and he has not exercised with this instrument before.[60] Coosje Van Bruggen quotes from an interview with Nauman and says that his original intention

> was to play two notes very close together so that you could hear the beats
> in the harmonics…The camera was set up near the centre of the studio facing one wall,
> but I walked all around the studio, so often there was no one in the picture, just the studio
> wall and the sound of the footsteps and the violin.(Bruggen: 1988, 230)

Bruggen brings this sense of appearing and disappearing close to what Cage refers to the impossibility of empty space and time in which there is always something to see.(Bruggen: 1988, 230) In this sight is not limited to the existence of the object remaining in the spectator's point of view. What Cage suggests by means of seeing seems to constitute a temporal and spatial field within which the things and actions do not have to be manifest by means of their visibility. Bruggen states that Nauman's video performance are the breaking of "the involvement of the spectator with the performance", but he seems to bind the relation and the encounter with the event only to the capacity of sense. If there is a kind of break mentioned in this encounter, it can be related to the break with the sensory motor links. Deleuze states that the time-image is a break with the sensory motor links. Such a break may bring a temporal shift from an anticipation of a presence of a motion in the film, to spectator leaving himself to the flow of duration.

In another work, *Bouncing Two Balls Between the Floor and Ceiling with Changing Rhythms* Nauman tries to get a rhythm going with the balls, bouncing one off the floor and ceiling and then catching it, or bouncing it twice off the floor and once off the ceiling.(Bruggen: 1988, 230) In an interview with Nauman with Willoughby Sharp, which

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[60] Coosje Van Bruggen, *Bruce Nauman*, (New York: Rizzolli Int., 1988) 230.

Bruggen quotes in his book, Nauman says that in the *Bouncing Two Balls Between the Floor and Ceiling with Changing Rhythms:*

> Finally I lost the track of both…I was trying to keep the rhythm going to have the balls bounce on the floor and once on the ceiling then catch them… There was a rhythm going on and when I lost it that ended the film.

According to Bruggen, Nauman allows the chance effect to develop the action once he has invented certain rules, letting " chance to come along to change those rules, and when it does he allows the unexpected to take over." (Bruggen: 1988, 231) *Clown Torture* (1987) has a similar effect in its relation to the filmic object, for the tape stops when the clown, - this time the performer is not Nauman - falls. In these works, it does not look as if Nauman is controlling the action by means of determination of a beginning or ending but he allows action to develop in time.

Slo-Mo films consists of four silent films, taken with 16 mm. camera, able to take from a thousand up to four thousand frames per second. The duration of the film is based on the duration of the film reel, which is about ten minutes.(Bruggen: 1988, 233) One of these films is *Bouncing Balls* where Nauman's films his testicles in close up and slow motion. In *Black Balls* he puts black make-up on his testicles. In *Pulling Mouth* (1969) and *Gauze* (1969) he starts out with about five or six yards of gauze in his mouth which he then pulls out and let fall on the floor. (Bruggen: 1988, 233) Bruggen mentions that in *Bouncing Balls* and *Black Balls* the images move so slowly that they become static images. Although there is a movement, the image is between moving and non-moving.

A sense of pause in the film interrupts a conception of the movement-image. The *Slo-Mo* films are not similar to the narrative films that have a story to tell enclosed in fictional space, time and action. What do these films try to say if not meaning anything about a story? They do not evoke a suspension of belief or disbelief and they are not documentaries that aim to keep the record of performances. One of the intentions might be to manipulate the action by the camera through forcing the limits of action until the images look like as if they are not moving.

In *Rhythm: on the work, translation and psychoanalysis* Nicolas Abraham gives a phenomenological account of rhythm. He argues that rhythm is a matter of realisation on the side of the subject. "Rhythmizing consciousness" perceives the rhythm and constitutes a "rhythm object". Therefore, rhythm is takes its place by being present as the object of perception. Abraham says that " the perception of a rhythm object is in a sense, possession, but to possess also means to be possessed by that object and there is an emergence of an "intentional pole."[61] The notion of an "intentional pole" is that which has the danger of limiting a conception of rhythm by making it exist in a state of consciousness. However, such conception of rhythm neglects the unconscious. How does rhythm operate without being situated in the locales of mind?

Deleuze regards rhythm as having a sense of duration. Given that duration is virtual, then rhythm would be that which is not actualised but not unreal, it can only be that

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[61] Abraham, Nicholas, *Rhythms: on the work, translation and psychoanalysis*, (California: Stanford Uni. Press, 1995) 47.

which has not been considered as thing, as an aspect of duration. In *Bergsonism* Deleuze's conception of duration as virtual takes duration away from a necessity of consciousness. (Deleuze: 1988, 64) Rhythm is possible to be considered as that which neither has to be distinguishable and possessed by beings nor is itself a being: through constituting a continuity which does not have to be embodied in things. Rhythm has a nomadic characteristic while space and the objects of rhythm are the tools for recurrence of rhythm.

Freud's articulation of the fort/da game may be conceptualised as that which gives an aspect of rhythmizing-consciousness that causes an emergence of rhythm-object. Freud's statement about the game of fort/da is based on the location of the object, and the tension raising aspect of the object's having gone and being "there." Isn't it also the way Freud seems to conceive rhythm as such, a kind of oscillation that comes to the same place, which evokes the same sense of loss and each time articulates a sense of the recurrence of the same. In this sense, Freud sees the repeating object as that which evokes an anxiety in its loss which is based on the pleasure/unpleasure principle together with the constitution of a sense of "compulsion to repeat." The problem does not seem to be in the act of repetition but in the ways repetition is taken as a motive for habit formation. Concerning this Dorothe Olkowski writes:

> To fall into the trap laid by habits is to find ourselves in an endless repetition in which each new situation forgoes its novelty and is merely repeated on the model of a previous habit. (Olkowski: 1999, 151)

In this sense, Olkowski gives an account of repetition which is a synthesis of passive and active synthesis; her account of the passive and active seems to differ from Freud since he takes these issues as the succession of consciousness over the memories left and actions repressed in the unconscious. Unlike Freud, Olkowski writes that Deleuze's argument of passive and active synthesis as the true object of the repetition of the game would be to raise the passive synthesis to a qualification of the mind.(Olkowski: 1999, 152) Olkowski, referring to Deleuze states that the concern is not an end to repetition but a notion of repetition that has to continue to repeat rather than stopping the repetition, which situates repetition before the law. Thus, Olkowski states that Deleuze rejects a notion of repetition that is understood as that which has a relation to the notion of repression and a teleological formation. Rather, Deleuze's notion of pleasure and unpleasure is not based on a principle but the operation of the relation of the virtual memory to duration that is not concerned with the real as object or the object as real.

Changing of time and the continuation of flow of duration does not let things come to the same place, the sameness of which is property of space. In Nauman's work *Bouncing Two Balls Between the Floor and Ceiling with Changing Rhythms,* the changing rhythm Nauman says, causes the "loss of track", but there was not a track in the beginning. The balls, which lose the track and go to different directions, destroy a certain repetitive action. Then it becomes difficult to hold a rhythm. In this sense, does the movement of the balls cause destruction of a constant rhythm, or does it something else that destroys the rhythm?

If the sequence of rhythm hangs on to a conception of external element such as self-consciousness, the issue of rhythm gains a teleological aspect. In a teleological conception of the rhythm, the means of oscillation is expected to stop. In this sense, rhythm is taken for granted as a step to a sense of unity and a stable being. In 'Freud and the scene

of writing' Derrida states that Freud understands fort/da game as an external teleology. In this Derrida says Freud is not concerned with the means of the game, but the result of the game. As a consequence Freud reaches a synthesis separating the physical and the psychical. Psychical emerges out of the physical. The game is not described within itself, but as if it were a symbol, which represents a psychic realm.

Freud's account of pleasure principle is based on the loss of the object and the absence that creates anxiety, which eases when the object comes to "its place." On the other hand, the virtual characteristic of rhythm does not give a chance to consider rhythm inside an object as if it was an object of perception. In its reality, which is the virtual but not an object, consciousness of rhythm in the embodied sides of communication is an illusion of presence.

Nauman generally choses to display his films in loops. In this sense, the repetitive display of the films do not allow the spectator to get a sense of beginning and ending or ending which marks an experience of watching. In addition to this, the film does not remain unchanged since it contributes to the flow of duration. Although in some of the films or video performances of Nauman, there are not unified meaning and action, the loop provides a sense of continuity, which also does not propose an end. The spectator may see the film when the previous film has not finished and the following has not started. In this sense, it becomes impossible to get a notion of duration specific to the film time. Rather it depends on spectator's duration as long as he or she stays and watches the film.

Referring to Warhol's films, Nauman says that since they have no "beginning or end, you can walk in any time, leave and come back again and the figure was a still asleep. You don't have to make a story." (Walker Art Centre: 1994, 45) In the repetitive characteristics of the image in a continuous shot in such films like *Empire* (1965), it does not seem possible to talk about a sudden impact or shock effect. Rather the experience of watching a film seems most likely to turn into an act of performance where the spectator participates in the rhythm of a film. It is not a matter of considering *Empire* (1965) as a "movie" experience since the duration of the *Empire* (1965) exceeds the duration of a normal feature film. In this sense, these films may be considered to introduce a different kind of encounter and film experience on the side of the spectator. In its destruction of the characteristics of a feature film, which has a linear narrative structure, these films might not give a sense of a beginning, climax and a resolution. In the movement-image, the spectator has to focus his or her attention in the film not to miss a scene in the story. Therefore, the film constitutes a pacifying and limiting effect on the spectator. In Warhol's films, the characteristics of duration change. The spectator is no longer the passive one responsible for paying all his attention to the film. For example, *Empire* (1965) is not a film for sitting and understanding the scenes. Its participation to the overall duration is not a matter of attention one should keep throughout the film. These films also change the temporal mode of the film experience; one does not have to remember the previous scenes and get a synthesis through the development of the film. There is nothing to conclude about the film.

The psychic aspect of rhythm is not the cause of the physical. The physical is also not something that could help explain the psychical. Rather, rhythm is the activation of the psychical in the physical without considering the disappearance of the psychical. Such a notion of being both addresses to the impossibility of being and conveys 'becoming' for the sake of creation and progression of duration. Nothing is identified or indicated by the other, rather the relationship with the self and the other is the relation to what is not. It is not a notion of reproduction, representation but a differentiation. This is the point where the cinematic image becomes one of the kinds of other images. It also addresses to the economy of the virtual and the actual. As mentioned before, the virtual is not the lesser

sense of the actual, rather the virtual can be said to be constituted in having been different/ciated from the actual, which Deleuze regards as difference in kind. In this sense, the degree of reality is not something to be compared with its "original."

In *Bergsonism*, Deleuze addresses the importance of the question. The problematic of the question is more important than the answer. Therefore, Deleuze says that the problem always gets solution it deserves in terms of the way in which it is stated. (Deleuze: 1988, 16) The problematic of solution lies in the way in which the problem is stated. He mentions the danger of false problematisation. An important type of the false problem is that "the more is mistaken for the less" where "negation is not added to what it denies but also indicates a weakness in the person who denies." (Deleuze: 1988, 19) Such an approach does not follow the condition of consciousness and perception since perception is not only connected to what something is, but also what is not. Such an articulation of problematisation does not indicate a direction from the questioner and the questioned. Rejection of such hierarchies between the subject of question and the object of question, becomes the matter of "how" rather than "who". Deleuze is concerned with the emergence of false problematisation. Deleuze is critical of the question, which causes the emergence of the knowing subject and self-consciousness. Similarly, Derrida has been critical about the ways in which problems are taken and questions are asked. It looks as if the problematisation of being begins by means of the questions asked which are indicative of the knowing subject. Derrida also states the question of "who" as erroneous for it might centralise the subject. In 'Eating Well' Derrida is critical of the liquidation of the knowing subject and the notion of self-consciousness. The notion of liquidation of the subject deals with the idea of decentring. He is critical of Lacan, Freud, Foucault and Heiddeger who problematised liquidation as if it were "from the position of the law" since such an approach causes the "re-interpretation" of the subject.[62] This is also the problematic of language, which designates law and situates the subjective formation in the domain of language. The question of "who" is relevant as long as it leads to another "who" which stands in relation to the untranslatable, and that which goes beyond language. It has no relation to law. Derrida deconstructs the question itself, the who and the subject through the "transcendental idealism" where the question does not have a relation with what Derrida calls "egological subjectivity." A considering of the alter-ego in the ego releases the question from being subject centred. "The ego is marked, without being able to have the originary and presentative experience of it, by the non-ego and the alter ego." (Derrida:

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[62] Derrida, Jacques, 'Eating Well', *Points*, trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981) 256.

1981, 256) Therefore, 'Eating Well' is a criticism of the ways in which the subject is constituted in the emergence of the ego out of nothing, having no trace and difference in its relation to itself and to the others. Rather, what Derrida suggests is the subject with its object. It is also an articulation of trace and difference concerning perception and it goes beyond a dialectical conception of sending and reception. Derrida states that:

> The aim is not to reconstruct a discourse around a subject that would no longer be
> pre-deconstructive, around a subject that would no longer include the figure of mastery
> of self, of adequation to self, center and origin of the world, but which would define
> the subject rather as the finite experience of non-identity to self, as the underivable
> interpellation in as much as it comes from the other, from the trace of the other,
> which is being before the law. (Derrida: 1981, 266)

Thus, a singular becomes that which is divided into multiplicities in itself. Derrida explains "the singularity of the who", which is not " identity" but "a singularity that dislocates and divides itself in gathering itself together to an answer to the other." (Derrida: 1981, 266)

The relation of the "question" with time is a significant issue of the relation between duration and memory. Memory has to be decentralised in the operation of time, which means the rejection of the consideration of memory's place as the unconscious. This is where Derrida and Deleuze-Bergson are critical about psychoanalysis, which Freud has built his psychoanalytic theories on the conception of "reserves and stockings"[63] and he gives an articulation of specific places to id, ego and superego. Rhythm, while differing from itself, and having a temporal characteristic does not refer to the innovation of something in its repetitive aspect. Rhythm is not that which is reducible to the reproduction of an original rhythm before itself. Rather, rhythm declares its place as uncited and unspecified.

Among these arguments about space and time, Derrida brings the notion of trace. Trace is not determined according to spatial reserve, and it does not refer to conscious state and perception to occur. What Derrida rejects is the perceptive mechanism of conscious and consciousness itself as the manifestation of being. Then, trace becomes the major

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[63] Laplanche is also critical about Freud's specification of memory in preserved and closed, and undiscoverable parts of the psychic life, in "Time and the Other*", Essays on Otherness*, ed. John Fletcher, (London: Routledge, 1999) 234-60.

factor in the constitution of temporality, while it does not refer to or produce time as a matter of consciousness.

There is a way in which time and space relationship may not be considered according to binary oppositions. Space becomes that which does not have a tyranny over time and cannot be thought as isolated and totally separated from the temporal. Nevertheless, there is a possibility for images to be saved from the spatial ties, which are representation bound. Then, such a conception would allow for an ongoing creation, an origin or an ending of which is not the issue, but their development and flux in temporal flux. Deleuze states that perception is things minus, then it is not something added to beings while a sense of rhythmising consciousness seems like an external effect added on to the rhythm. Then, why one would need an articulation of perception as if perception is coming out of nothing but consciousness?

Deleuzian articulation of time and moving image does not only seem to be an articulation of an image but has a reference to the experience in some specific places like galleries, cinema, which addresses to the architectonics of experience.

Through their concerns with duration, or references to duration, Nauman's and Warhol's works address the operation of time as time. Time is not an element of fictional space. This is also not the only way to get a sense of the moving image. Rather, different substances can have different characteristics of duration, and contribute to temporality without being demonstrated by the temporality of fiction. Rather, the contribution of body or bodies (living or non-living) to the action creates an open field for time to develop through the interaction of the elements in space. It is important to note that neither these elements are marked by space nor they are marked without it since space is not void, but something that gives a sense of duration.

CHAPTER III

WITH ME

> A woman is lying on a bed. Her double is stretched out next to her and she
> slowly turns to caress it, to kiss and lick it before the two cuddle up to
> each other and the scene darkens…
>
> Isabella Reicher [64]

With Me is a film by Austrian artist Kerstin Cmelka. In the International Short
Film Festival in İstanbul (2002) Cmelka held a workshop on experimental short films.
There she showed her 16 mm. films. *Smoke and drink tea* (1998), *Johannes* (1998),
Neurodermitis (1998), *Portrait* (1999), *Monolog* (1999), *With Me* (2000), *I am also in
Arcadia* (2000) and *Camera* (2000).

Her films are distinctive in the sense that they do not follow a linear plot and they
are shot from a single angle, like Warhol's, without moving the camera or making pans
and close ups. In this sense, it can be said that she does not allow the camera to be a
"wandering eye" travelling from one space to another. The films also do not have a
beginning or ending. She says that these films could give a different understanding of
picture and may even be called moving pictures rather than film. There is not a movement
from one picture plane to another. It might be said there is a temporal movement that
breaks an understanding of a single space. In some of her films - *Et In Arcadia Ego*
(2000), *With Me* (2000) - she shoots twice on the same film stock. This attitude changes
the characteristics of space, which gives space a temporal dimension. She does not move
the camera in the second take on the same film stock. What seems to appear in these films
is the division of space into different temporalities, which are displayed at the same time.
In addition to this, she is the one who performs in these films. Because of the double
exposure on the same film stock in *With Me,* it appears that two women are copulating
with eachother. Cmelka has performed one woman lying in her bed making love in one of
the takes and the other woman as if she is the partner of this woman making love in the

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[64] This description was printed as the handout material during the workshop. Printed by the distributing
agency *sixpax film.*

same bed in the other take. The scene of copulation is between two women whose appearance is the same. The film is titled *With Me*.

Why is the subject who is identified and indicated "me"? Could it have been someone else or "us"? If there is the person who is copulating with her double, is it "me" who is making love with me? There are two women, the appearance of whom is same as the other. In this sense, it may be said that there appears to be a homosexual relationship between these two women. However, this scene is not even performed between two women. This is an outcome of one woman being in different positions at different times, and displayed as if it is one scene which is taken at the same time. The film does not follow a linear narrative. In this sense, unlike conventional feature films which most of the film theory is concerned with, *With Me* introduces a different notion of "identification". In relation to *With Me,* the Lacanian "mirror image" which is regarded as resulting in the emergence of the "specular" subject can be rethought in relation to narcissism and the relationship with the other. In addition to this, we can talk about a homosexual relationship between these two women. However, it is ambiguous and more close to give a sense of autoeroticism since we can also identify this as two of the same women. *With Me* is an introduction of subject that passes beyond the conception of ego, and object that passes through the emergence of a subject in itself. Out of the double exposure, the second scene made on the second film is seen as less clear than the first exposure. Thus, one of the bodies appears translucent and ghost-like. In this sense, there emerges two representations of the same person one of which can be seen more clearly than the other can. The scene of copulation with a translucent being gives a sense of dream-state.

Lacan's conception of mirror phase is based on vision and recognition of the self on the condition that one sees oneself in the mirror. However, *With Me* goes beyond being a matter of seeing or not seeing that operates as the formation of the self. There is also not indication of an anchorage of vision in the domain of the other. It is not a constitution of an identity, which is dealing with a matter of doubling of the image as conceived in the mirror stage. Lacan articulates the realisation of "I" in the mirror as an illusion of a desire to incorporate the other. On the other hand, *With Me* is not concerned with a sense of recognition since it is not clear who recognises who or what is recognised. What is recognition? Is it a work of cogito functioning for the realisation of what once has been perceived? In another way, is it a reproduction of mind that replaces reality with unreality?

In *With Me* the difficulty of situating the subject leads to decontruction of the positions of the subject and the object. Out of it emerges the phantasmatic object. In this sense, I will argue that fantasy can be seen as the succession of becoming over being. The conception of desire is considered as a matter of fantasy that shifts from its location in the domain of the other and is no longer concerned with a causal relationship with drive. In this sense there is a problematic of identification concerning multiple kinds of identification such as:

-The spectator's identification with the filmic apparatus. Movement of the camera indicates a destination towards the object and displays what it selects to frame. This is a way in which the spectator takes the position of the authority relevant to the theory of gaze.

-The spectator's identification with the screen as the outcome of identification with the other, and screen conceived as the other.

-Spectator's identification with the characters in the film, where identification is with the character traits. Accordingly there is a depiction of two women, character(s) in a narcissistic relationship between woman and a woman, which lays a questionable relation with the other in *With Me.*

Topographies of Desire

Laplanche gives an account of narcissism that is inseparable from a concept of identification. Laplanche introduces a Kleinian conception of the "projective identification" that is with the traits of the other, rather than the position of the other. He is critical about Freud's conception of narcissism, which is built upon the notion of ego and regarded as the property of the subject. Freud's conception of narcissism is criticised also for its being based on the notion of lack. There is a demonstration of the loss of the object of desire disavowed by the objects of substitution in Freud. In 'The Ego and Narcissism'[65] Laplanche argues that ego is able to pass through the subject and object. Laplanche's conception of ego is not built upon the subject as a desiring body. Freud has announced ego not as a total subject, since he has separated desire and drive according to different states of being such as the unconscious and consciousness. On the other hand Laplanche announces ego as "neither the subject of perception and consciousness, nor the subject of wishing and desire." It is regarded as "an internal object cathected by the energy of the apparatus." This internal object says Laplanche "is capable of action entering into conflicts as a participant by virtue of its double function". In this sense in the articulation of ego not as a subject Laplanche states that:

> No sooner have we presented the thesis that the ego is not a subject than we have
> to withdraw it: the ego is indeed an object, but a kind of relay object capable of passing
> itself off, in a more or less deceptive and usurpatory manner, as a desiring and
> wishing subject. (Laplanche: 1976, 66)

Laplanche's notions of subject and object are of that which is able to pass through a distanced and spatialised notion of subject and object. Derrida's notion of trace and différance as well as the Deleuzian virtual also constitute beings that are able to pass through the notion of subject and object. Deleuze and Derrida argue similarly in the sense that they consider the self as that which is constituted in a continuous differentiation. Such a notion of differentiation is not conditioned on a notion of the other separated in the other place and distanced from the subject. Rather, Deleuze considers separation in a continuous division, which is not based on a notion of lack. The notion of split in psychoanalysis is concerned with the 'idea' of loss of a sense of unity, which is 'there' in the beginning and is lost. On the other hand, in a continuous division, there is not a concern of original whole that loses its unity. In psychoanalysis the loss of the wholeness is disavowed by a choice of an object that would take the place of this loss. On the other hand, Derrida does not regard this split as that which has a beginning in that which is not split. In this sense in psychoanalysis a 'split' is dependent on a sense of loss of a part of a body and the replacement of this loss by another object that is fetishised. Such a notion of replacement is an act of differentiation, which divides between the real and the unreal. Alan Bass argues that the "primary split" in psychoanalysis is caused by a sense of "concreteness in general". (Bass: 2000, 32) He states that the split in psychoanalysis both concerns the split between perception and memory and the split that causes the emergence of sexual difference. On the other hand, there is always a defence against this differentiation. In the former, this occurs as "the elimination between perception and memory through negative hallucination", in the latter there is an emergence of a fetish object that "eliminates sexual difference through fantasy of phallic monism." (Bass: 2000, 32) Defence against the

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[65] Laplanche, Jean, 'The Ego and Narcissism', *Life and Death in psychoanalysis,* trans. Jeffrey Mehlman,

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.

unconscious memories brings the theory of repression that keeps psyche away from the 'unpleasant' memories of childhood. There is always a tension raising mechanism of the unconscious and the function of perception in the conscious. Bass regards this situation also as an operation of temporality between the unconscious and the conscious, which indicates "process" as an essential character. "In the last discussion of disavowal, Freud began to discuss 'the splitting of the ego in a process of defence'"

> As a defence, concreteness makes it clear that there is no such possible relief
> from the tension of differentiation. Every new moment renews the threat for the
> simple reason that time itself implies possible change. Thus, the fetishist for
> and the concrete patient in general lead one to think about the process of defence
> directed against what can be called the processive aspect of reality. (Bass: 2000, 34)

The temporal relation between the tension raising mechanism of the unconscious and defensive part of conscious emerges in an immediacy of perception, which replaces memories. It can be said that the immediate and the sense of replacement functions not only for the fetishisation of sexuality but also regards time as the fetish object of perception since time is made a concrete object of perception. The psychic differentiation sorted out by psychoanalysis results in the spatialisation of sexual difference in the objects and in the topographies of psyche. Accordingly, the relation with the other is asserted as that which fulfils a sense of loss, which is not there in the beginning. The originary split is not regarded as a split that splits and differentiates in itself. Rather there is a 'before' of a split that is 'constituted' and imagined as the complete being.

Contrary to a conception of an originary being complete from the beginning, Derrida and Deleuze are against a beginning that is external to split. In this sense, there is nothing to replace that would take the place of the 'lost part'. In addition to this, the subject and object are not constituted as the separate objects located in different places. Melanie Klein's psychoanalytic theories which have the traits of "self destruction" that lies at the base of the ego formation gives a sense of this continuous differentiation in the subject. Such conceptions of ego, self and subject do not require a formation of subject that is destined to have an identity. Identity is a matter of recognition but there is also nothing to be recognised in this process of self-division. In Alan Bass' reading of Klein, there is a closeness to deconstructionist theories of subject. One of the reasons for that is the conception of a self-destructive subject in the sense that Klein seems to suggest a different/ciation or "différance" in the subjective formation while considering destruction as "one's own sadism."

The sense of self-destruction seems to turn into deconstruction in Derrida's and Deleuze's accounts, which is based on a motivation of a temporal change rather than a spatial substantiality. Klein's conception of the relation of the partial object to the whole object gives a sense of a temporal passage in Alan Bass' account of Kleinian self-destruction. He states that in Klein, "the move from part to whole object is the move from fantasy to reality". (Bass: 2000, 174) In this sense, the difference of fantasy from reality is a matter of temporal differentiation since the differentiation between the part and the whole object is not a spatial one. Rather there is a temporal move passing from a part object into whole object.

Derrida opposes Freud's psychoanalytic conception of psyche as considered within the terms of the real and the unreal. Similarly, Deleuze's conception of the virtual and the actual denies a conception of reality as an element that causes such differentiation. In this sense, these concepts are non-localisable and introduce a psychic realm, which is mobile and fuses with the physical. In this sense, these terms are neither matters nor forms of

being but fluid mechanisms that both have the aspect of the virtual and the actual. Considering that they gain mobile characteristics, which activates the temporal field as well as the spatial, there is an impossibility of things emerging in a fixed notion of presence.

Derrida says "desire is the desire for presence." It is not because he rejects desire, but he is critical of the way desire is seen as the outcome of a loss. Derrida is critical about the articulation of desire in a causal relationship with drive. Laplanche explains desire as a correlation of drive-source relationship. In this sense, both Derrida and Laplanche have a similar attitude and they do not regard one of them as the cause of the other.

In 'The Order of Life', Laplanche states that Freud has two types of drives in mind, which sexuality is related to one of them as the biological drive. Instinct as "the pair of drive" is the "performed behavioural pattern, it is determined hereditarily and is repeated according to modalities relatively adapted to a certain kind of object." (Laplanche: 1976, 10) Such an obsession with drive is depended on a specific model that emphasises the significance of essence in everything. Freud sees the essence of drives in their "ability to exercise pressure." The emergence of conscious acts as behaviours is regarded as the outcome of the repression of the unconscious drives. Drive is defined as the "amount of the measure of the demand." (Laplanche: 1976, 10) In this sense, Freud privileges quantities over qualities in considering the relationship between drive and desire. According to Laplanche, it is ambiguous whether the source and drives are also the source of desires. In this sense, it is unclear whether biological being or psychological being is the impetus for drives. Thus, the contrary would introduce cyclical relationship between drive and desire, which denies a teleological aim. Laplanche asks why is something specific in itself, and represents a final aim? The detachment from a sense of teleology introduces a difference that is based on a temporal flow which is unmarked by a beginning or end. The separation of physical and the psychical is concerned with the lack of the real thing in the psychical and leads to substitution of this lack through the physical. The mother's breast is taken in this way both on the level of symbolic and the real which are directed to different aims that will be explained in the following passages.

With a Little Love From the Phantasmatic

With Me introduces Laplanche's conception of the other in a relationship with the enigma of the other as the phantasmatic object. Laplanche states that the phantasmatic object goes beyond the identification with the object of desire as it is understood in a Freudian sense. The phantasmatic object is neither an object nor a subject by itself. It is between the virtual and the actual. In this sense there is not a clear-cut definition if one tries to distinguish the object or the fantasy from each other. On the other hand, fantasy is not subordinate to end up in organ pleasure and such a characteristisation carries fantasy beyond an anchorage in an object or subject.

Laplanche is concerned with the "enigmatic signifier" as discussed by John Fletcher in the 'Introduction' to *Essays on Otherness*. Fletcher refers to Laplanche's definition of the enigmatic signifier in *New Foundations* as that which is based on "the possibility that the signifier may be de-signified, or lose what it signifies, without thereby losing its power to signify to." In this sense, Laplanche is critical of Freud's differentiation of fantasy into two scenes of different realities of the unconscious as the "primal" and "original" cores of being. In 'Time and the Other' Laplanche gives an account of enigma, which has a relation to his conception of "enigmatic signifier". He states that "the enigma

leads back to the otherness of the other, and the otherness of the other is his response to unconsciousness, that is to say his otherness to himself."[66]

Thus Laplanche argues that Freud sees the other divided between "der Andere" which is the other as "the other person"; "das Andere", the other in the psychic formation as "the other thing." Laplanche's argument is that Freud regards "the other thing" as the unconscious, which is structured upon all kinds of negations. It can be said the relationship between consciousness and unconsciousness introduces a quantitative account of negation and a theory of repression of unconscious events by the reality of the consciousness. Denying the reality of the unconscious, consciousness also denies a conception of time in the unconscious. Consciousness then, is focused on the 'facts', which are kept by the perceiving subject. On the other hand, according to the conception of the enigma of the other as the otherness of the other, there is a temporal formation rather than focalisation on the external and the internal objects. The unconscious is seen as "the loss of referentiality", or the de-signification of the signifier. In the unconscious there is also not a 'fact' to be sorted out as the subject or the object. In addition to this, the relationship with the other is not a matter of consciousness. The other as the enigma of the other introduces a loss of referentiality, so there is not an implication of the subject and object division in the physical ground.

In *With Me* the copulation scene, which is performed by a woman whose image is doubled, both refers to 'loss of referentiality' as well as an introduction of ambiguity by means of recognition. There is not a specific signifier to signify something; there is nothing to be recognised by the other in the sense that the signifier becomes the signified. Then the difference between the two bodies and two images becomes a matter of temporal differentiation that also oscillates between the subject and object. Then the relationship with the enigma of the other is nothing else but delay, in its act of temporalising the possibility of which is not dependent on the "original desire".

Freud has been criticised mostly because of that his theories of psychoanalysis are based on a theory of repression. The unconsciousness is regarded as that which is the storehouse of memories of childhood, which Freud associates with "the scenes" of childhood. The childhood scenes are regarded as the bad parts of memory, which should be replaced by the operation of perception conscious system. In this sense, as Alan Bass states Freud regards time as only operating in the consciousness as the desire for present and presentness. Time is regarded as an object that raises the tension of the childhood memories in the unconscious and represses them from the conscious.

There is an aspect of delay which "is replaced by the temporal immediacy of the dream-state in consciousness" functioning as "defence against the tension of unconscious time". Alan Bass in *Difference and Disavowal* describes Freud's conception of time as described in relation to the pleasure principle. As discussed in previous chapters above, Freud's notion of the unconscious sees the unconscious as a mental process, which is timeless. Time then is seen as a work of perception-conscious system the condition of which is thought. Bass states that this is a conception of time, which Kant also shares with Freud, regarding time as "the necessary form of thought." Bass argues such conception as nothing but the "Newtonian time as the objective time of the infinite series of now points as well as objective space coordinating with it." (Bass: 2000, 85) Considering the unconscious as timeless and conscious time as the proper time is seen as the "autoerotic decontextualisation of unconscious time." In this sense, Bass gives an account of Freudian time that has become the fetish object, which is constituted upon points as now. This is also the way in which time is structured as a thing. The notion of "now" refers to the

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[66] Laplanche, Jean, *Essays on Otherness*, ed. John Fletcher, London: Routledge, 1999.

plurality of events as scenes while the traumas of childhood are replaced by the "immediacy of wish fulfilment." *With Me* introduces a contrary example to a Freudian conception of the unconscious as timeless. Considered according to the narrative temporal structure of *With Me,* there is no sense of time that is destined to be a part of a whole narrative. The film does not begin with a specific event and end with a resolution. On the other hand, *With Me* can be considered as a scene itself, as a cut out from life, but not part of a plot. So there is nothing left of anticipation directed towards a future event. On the other hand, time is multiplied in that scene, which opens other scenes and other times at the same time that do not follow a spatial time in a horizontal line. The copulation scene that is the outcome of bringing together of two scenes that are not taken at the same time but displayed in another time. This time is neither the object of a specific space of any of these two scenes nor it is totally detached from any of these scenes. This time is the emergence of an interval that is between the virtual and the actual, between the subject and the object. Accordingly the copulation scene is also deprived of any object or subject specified in the bodies. The two women appear to be copulating with the appearance of each other, which is the image of themselves at the same time. However, this image is not reducible to the unreal since it is not possible to indicate an original of the image outside itself. Rather, it might be considered as that which oscillates between the reality of a dream state and the reality of a physical experience. It is also not possible to consider this scene as an autoerotic one. Autoeroticism is regarded as emerging in the primary narcissism as an introjective identification with one's body. The autoerotic object of desire is internalised in one's own body parts but is still regarded as differentiated from the self. On the other hand, in *With Me* the other is not an object in a definite sense as opposed to the self. There are not "sex roles" defined in relation to the other and the other is not objectified as the fulfilment of erotic fantasy. Rather the ambiguity of keeping a spatial point and a centre for the self leads to the sense of breaking up with a hierarchical distribution of roles in sexual intercourse. Bodies are introduced as if they are fragmented while there is not an origin of this fragmentation. In this sense *With Me* represents a phantasmatic relation that goes beyond a sense of incorporation between two sexes, as well as two bodies differentiated as the subject and the object. The impossibility of situating the object and subject eliminates a spatial distance between these bodies. It is not possible to have a relation between the other or at least the otherness is not determined according to spatial coordination such as "there" and "here." The intercourse in *With Me* appears in a temporal differentiation rather than a differentiation of things in space so the relation with the other is not only the relation with the unconscious understood as the affection between temporal and atemporal.

In *With Me* there is a delay, which operates in two ways: one of the aspect of delay is introduced in the film apparatus that succeeds in providing the viewer with seeing the doubling of the bodies. Another aspect of delay detaches the "position" of the copulating bodies and interrupts a notion of object and subject but provides a sense of difference as well. In this sense delay and differentiation operate as a means of representation of the copulation of two bodies as the subject of film. In addition to this, delay functions as that which enables the viewer to get these two images at the same time as the outcome of two exposures on the same film stock. In this sense, the truth of the 'same time' is the 'truth' lying in the operation of delay.

Delay introduces translation free from the theory of repression, which does not keep a reserve for memory in the unconscious. In this sense, delay becomes that which operates as a relationship with the otherness of the other in the self. The film not only destroys a sense of autoerotic relationship but any conception of intercourse, which is seen as a relationship with the other in 'me'. The 'me' is not a presence in space but is that which has been delayed. The relationship between this delayed notion of identity - the

recognition of which is not possible - and the other is that of an unrecognised and unstable relationship with the enigma of the other. It also prevents a relationship in which the subject is motivated through an object of desire, which the other has. Rather it is différance that is delayed in itself as the otherness of the other.

Desire and Language

> Before any experience, before any individual deduction, even before those collective experiences that may be related only to social needs are inscribed init,something organises this field, inscribes its initial lines of
force.(Lacan:1973,20)

Lacan states that the unconscious is structured like a language.(Lacan: 1973, 20) He argues that the place of language is before the formation of the subject. Language has a structure, which is dependent on the closure of the chain of signification by the articulation of the signifier. In this sense Lacan declares that the unconscious in the symbolic law of language is an operation of signs and symbols that have taken the place of the real. According to him subject is split between the linguistic and the visible. The linguistic and the visible are divided between themselves in according to spatial dichotomies such as here and there. In her article 'The subject'[67], Kaja Silverman asserts that Lacanian theory of the subject is like a classical narrative. As it happens in a classical narrative, subject develops in a linear order of time. Subject is formed through the mirror stage, access to language and the Oedipus complex. The last two of these events belong to the symbolic order, and they mark the subject's coming of age within culture. (Silverman:1983, 135) Silverman argues that desire is formed in the symbolic level through the "loss of the real" while language isolates the subject from the real through the introduction of the symbolic. This is also the phase in which the subject gains a sexual identity. Lacanian notion of identity is formed in a zone, which is constituted by a neverending loss of the real that is replaced by the symbolic signifiers such as phallus signifying penis. After the symbolic, the real father is not able to "conform to the epic proportions of the symbolic father." (Silverman: 1983, 135) Silverman states that Lacan insists upon the idea that the penis is not the phallus, but "the male subject 'pays' for his symbolic privileges with a currency not available to the female."

Silverman's argument about the Lacanian subject is an account of the formation of desire within the realm of the symbolic. The realisation of the subject in the symbolic is regarded as an outcome of fiction since the symbolic realm is unreal. On the other hand, the conception of the enigma of the other may be understood as the motive for desire rather than being under the rubric of the laws in the symbolic. A conception of a relationship with the other as the enigma of the other would neither be in the symbolic nor in the real. In this sense, desire does not have to be directed to the position of the other. The consideration that desire is not bound with the "law" frees desire from being fixed to the object of the other. In this sense, there is not an object of desire that belongs to the other. Fantasy could be the word that stands out of the order of an object. Both the object and the subject of fantasy are introduced in the virtual that is also out of the order of law of language. It is that which has not been actualised and has never belonged to a conception of an object. It is also not less than real, but differs from the actual reality from its not having been objectified.

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[67] Silverman, Kaja, 'The Subject', *The Subject of Semiotics,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) 126-193.

In *With Me* the copulation scene evokes a sense of fantasy while neither of the characters can be attributed a notion of subject or object. However it is difficult to make a statement about to which side this fantasy belongs to. Whose fantasy it is? Is what we see two women emerging out of one's division into two or the doubling of the same? The consideration of "double" as the multiplication would refer to a sense of fixation of the object on the level of sight, which desires its other as the object. This object is regarded as homogenous for the look to fix itself. Rodowick states that in Lyotard's distinction between the figural and the discourse, discourse is usually bound by representation in the spatial dynamics constituting it in the domain of language.[68] On the contrary, the figural is nonlinguistic. Lyotard argues that discourse has its space, which gives its object as image also having a sense of space and is introduced in the domain of language. Thus, the figural is that which is non-linguistic but it can be found in the linguistic space of discourse. Accordingly, Rodowick states, referring to Lyotard, that "discourse is crossed by, and crosses between, two spaces or dimensions", and these dimensions are "subject and the system." (Rodowick: 2001, 9) The figural brings differences to the order of language. Rodowick in this sense gives Lyotard's account of this difference, which makes language non-linguistic and that displaces the chain of signification in representation. Then subject is constituted away from the realm of language. Lyotard explains the notion of "spacing or separation" not as "the two terms placed on the same plane". It is "rather the relation of two heterogenous "states" that are, however, juxtaposed in an irreversible anachrony." When subject is not in the discursive field of representation which is characterised in language, the figural subject, which can also be the virtual and heterogenous, gains a temporal characteristic. So the relation between the figural and discourse allows the figural to unfold towards the discourse without a sequential order that dislocates the figural. The kind of doubling in *With Me* seems to be that of a figural notion similar to Rodowick's articulation of difference between two heterogenous bodies. According to him, desire operates in the figural "in its relation to primal fantasy and the unconscious desire." (Rodowick: 2001, 9) Accordingly, there is nothing primary about the primal fantasy. In this sense, the figural is not reduced to a conception of simple difference or indifference in its relation to discourse.

The bodies in *With Me* could not only be seen as the objects of fantasy of a subject indicating the dream of a person. The copulation scene looks as if it is a dream of someone, but it is not clear who is dreaming about whom. There is a relationship with the desire of the other. However, this desire does not have its cause, which is embodied in someone's body. It floats between the object and the subject that are both embodied in themselves and also is revealed outside as the 'loss of the referentiality' in the chain of signification. In this sense, there is not a clear indication of the dreaming subject and its dream.

The sense of doubling of the same body in the film is not constituted as a representation of the body that is made identical to an original. Instead two of these bodies have been originated from themselves, and differ from and between each other as if they represent a coexistence of the virtual and the actual. It is still not defined which one is the virtual and which one is the actual. Nevertheless, it seems possible to differentiate these two bodies by referring to their opaqueness and translucency. The second exposure on the same film stock causes the body to appear translucent while in the first take the body appears opaque. In this sense, if we were to consider the translucent body as less real than the opaque one, and associate the translucent with the virtual, then we would have to accept the cyclical relationship between the virtual and the actual. That is to say, the virtual appears not as a simulation of the actual but is as real as the actual body is. There is also

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[68] Rodowick, D.N., *Reading the Figural*, (Duke University Press: 2001) 7.

not a linear order that would situate one before or after the other. However, such an articulation is valid unless we take the time of production as the law of our understanding of the work. In this sense, there appears a delay, which both introduces a passage of time between these two bodies and enables these two bodies to coexist in one scene.

It is also an ambiguous question for the spectator whether to consider the scene of copulation as really performed or not. Such ambiguity could be resolved by thinking that one body performs two different roles at two different times. In this sense, we can talk about a performance of these roles in the non-presence of the other. However, what appears in the film is neither the absence nor the presence of two bodies at the same time. One of the reasons for that is the appearance of the same as doubled which represents a scene of copulation. Another reason is the oscillation between the phantasmatic and the real since there emerges two bodies. One of the bodies appears more opaque than the other while and the other is translucent. In this sense, the doubling of the bodies cause two separate identities while it is not possible to consider these two identities as conveying a sense of self identity.

In 'Gender is Burning'[69] Judith Butler argues that, according to Althusser identity is based on recognition by the other. She refers to Althusser's "notion of interpellation" in his example of the "socially reconstituted subject." Butler argues that Althusser's example of the formation of the subject is dependent on the recognition by the other as "the law". In Althusser's example "there is the policeman, the one who not only represents the law but whose address "Hey you!" has the effect of binding the law to the one who is hailed." (Butler: 1998, 448) Butler addresses the Lacanian formation of the subject under the law, which is dependent on the naming of language. "The use of language is obedient to name and it is situated within discourse." (Butler: 1998, 448) The condition of the formation of "I" is the production through "the accumulation of calls" by an exterior power. Butler argues that the condition of the subject according to Althusser, who follows the Lacanian notion of subject formation, "the 'me' cannot be an object opposed to me, which is not me, but only what others have made of me." (Butler: 1998, 449) Butler does not argue against a formation of subject in the condition of opposition, but she is against an external agency of power, which makes the subject realise its subjecthood. Such an operation is based on the formation of the subject under the law, and this law is patriarchal law that constitutes the subject according to the symbolic law determined by the "phallus." What is the relationship between the phallus and the subject formation? In the Lacanian mirror stage, the ego is produced in a fictional direction and this notion of "directionality is arrested and immobilised through the emergence of a symbolic order that legitimates sexually differentiated fictions as 'positions.'" (Butler: 1998, 460) Language is significant in the notion of the fixation of "positions" in the sense that it enounces the mirror stage as the domain of "signifiable and the intelligible" since the fixation of the – sexed - positions depends on the fixity of the symbolic domain itself. The phallus also is the representation of keeping the notion of differentiation according to the fixation of the symbolic positions. Phallus becomes the agent of signifier, which is subjected to the "Law of the Father" introducing the differentiation between the sexes according to "having" and "being." Butler argues against such an articulation of subject formation in Lacan, since the ego is constituted in the subject according to the fixation and stabilisation in the symbolic level. Language in this sense introduces the subject as long as the subject is realised by the other who signifies the sexual and social position of the subject.

Lacan's articulation of the subject is constituted on the level of identification with the sexual position of the other, which is dictated by the phallus. However, such an

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[69] Butler, Judith, 'Gender is Burning', *The Visual Culture Reader*, ed. Nicholas Mirzoeff, (New York: Routledge, 1998) 448-63.

argument introduces the subject on the condition of an adoption of a heterosexual matrix. In this sense, one is subjected as long as one desires one what "does not have" and the other has. Accordingly, this is always the woman who is associated with the one who "does not have" since the lack is the lack of what man has. As women do not have an access to phallus, they do not have an access to language either. If the subject has to have a formation of language to be subjectified, then women are constrained to have the desire for language and the phallus which they can never have all through their lives. Hence, they can never have ego and self-identity since they are not able to go beyond the symbolic and the imaginary, which means they are not able to be real.

Lacan gives a limited account of the subject in the sense that he binds formation of the subject on "the law", the phallus, the positions as well as dictating the 'place' of these as the imaginary position of man as phallus. The differentiation of sexual positions is localised in the phallus as the signifier. Instead of all these formulations, the breaking up with the heterosexual matrix goes beyond the rules of fixation according to "the law". Law introduces a formal constitution of the subject. Rather a conception of identification free from a sexual differentiation, which is dependent on a desire for the "position" of the other, introduces other possibilities of identification. In this sense, the desire is not anchored to the desire of the other "there" to make it "here". *With Me* enables us to get a sense of other possible conceptions of the subject other than an identification with and for a single, fixed position. Considering that *With Me* represents a scene of copulation between the same sexes, the film destabilises the ground or position for identification to emerge.

There are various ways in which identification is noticed in film theory. Camera movements, shooting techniques, montage, the kind of narrative, sound are some of the factors that establish different aspect of identification in motion. However, there is one thing which film theory is especially concerned in the conception of identification and that is the gaze and its relation to the cinematic apparatus. Film theory deals with the gaze which psychoanalysis regards as perverted and sexualised.

Paul Willemen in 'Voyeurism, the look, and Dwoskin'[70] refers to Laura Mulvey's article 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema' which divides "the look" into three parts giving three principles of identification. One of them is the "camera's look that records the pro-filmic event", the other is the look of the audience at the image, and the last one is "the look of the character' exchange with the diegesis." Willemen says "the look cast by the spectator has two types one of which refers to the scopophilic contact with and object of desire and the other is viewer's possession of the object of desire through identifying with the ideal ego and this bears a narcissistic identification with the spectacle." (Willemen: 1995, 212) Willemen states that generally the kind of identification film theory introduces is on the side of the spectator who identifies with the female character as the object of desire. The gaze towards the spectacle is considered to evoke scopophilic instincts. This is the perverted gaze, which is associated with autoerotic relation with one's body. In this sense, following Mulvey's account of scopophilia, Willemen argues, this is the notion of identification in autoeroticism, which is with the sexually like. The scopophilic gaze in cinema is declared in two ways that coexist together. The gaze is both separate from the subject and objectifies the subject and also that which belongs to the subject. In this sense the scopophilic gaze has internalised its object of desire as it happened in autoeroticism. It does not look for the other sexually differentiated from the self. Rather it is separated in a single body, which is asserted as a "repression of homosexuality." This is the condition in which patriarchy situates the object of the gaze as female. Then the internalised gaze is regarded as that which has the tendency to copulate with one's self. Whether gaze is

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[70] Willemen, Paul, 'Voyeurism, The Look and Dwoskin', *Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology,* ed. Philip Rosen, (New York: Colombia University Press, 1995) 210-9.

regarded as a patriarchal symbol or not, in *With Me* there is a homosexual relationship between two bodies. If there is a sense of desire, it does not have its object as the female other. Accordingly, the female is not in the position in which her desire is the others desire.

Mulvey's argument seems to consider identification with the apparatus to be valid only when it is formulated according to the discourse within which patriarchy is concerned. It is because of the consideration that film apparatus is associated with the active male subject as the omnipotent subject and the control mechanism. Camera is an omnipotent apparatus, what Christian Metz describes as "the all-seeing" subject. In this sense, the eye, having taken the position of camera is regarded as the active part while the object looked at is passive. Therefore the gaze is considered as the male gaze. The 'truth' of the male gaze is that it is associated with the phallic symbol, which is active and has a passivising effect on the female. The male gaze is focused on the female body since it desires the body of the other. Such relationship is based on the notion of demand and desire. In this sense, the physical needs in the childhood turns into psychic activities when one gets mature. For instance, the mother's breast, which is for nourishment in the infant turns into the object of male desire. Nevertheless, this is the way Freud conceives desire and drive. There is a causal relationship between need and demand, the drive and the desire. On the other hand, there is not a proof of any of the activities to be regarded as the cause of the other. In this sense, there is not a hierarchical causal structure between the need for nourishment and the desire for the mother's breast. The need does not turn into a desired object in the future, which is away from a teleological aim so that the object of desire could emerge. The gaze is associated with corporeal organ, which is sexualised in the other's body. In film theory it is hard to situate whether the look symbolises the act of devouring the object or it is perverted. The conception of scopopholia is regarded as perversion. Considering the gaze as the evidence of perversion in film theory would be a too general articulation of the gaze, which is concerned with identification. However identification is not bound by a unique conception which regards the audience as male and associates the male gaze with the filmic apparatus. There is more to do with the architectonics of space where the film is seen and the ways in which the camera, light, sound etc. operate. Considering that the other factors are influential in film theory, identification becomes a slippy term in the articulation of a relationship between the spectator and the spectacle. The subject and object do not have 'positions' distanced and spatially determined as the one identifying with the object in the mirror. Rather the subject and object positions become transcendental, which leaves no room for getting a conclusive meaning on the side of the sexuality of the gaze. In *With Me* the gaze also becomes transient between the spectator and the two persons in the film. The gaze in *With Me* could be said to turn the spectator's gaze back to him or herself without a choice of an object of desire. Unfamiliar, the film gives an aspect of a different imagined space not only by means of the setting, but also because of the physical impossibility of division while one is able to copulate with oneself. There is fantasy at play that is visualised in this film without an object and without a subject who fantasises.

The notion that identification is with the male gaze since it is regarded as 'active' just as the camera is mobile and travels from one place to another, does not work here in *With Me*. This is because that the position of the camera is unchanged throughout the film and there is also not a movement of the focal lens of the camera. The only movement is the movement of the copulating bodies. If mobility is necessary for identification, it does not always have to be the apparatus that is mobile. Another moving thing that is not a 'medium' of identification is the continuous movement of the frames in the film stock. As *With Me* is shot with a double exposure on the same film stock, the movement is introduced as the ability of emergence of a temporal factor, which does not consider the

ability of the camera to move from place to place. Rather the film is 'written' twice on the same space in different times. The film emerges in the coexistence of these two times and it does not represent a specific time which totally belongs to any of these shots. The time of the film is both and none of these times as well as spaces.

In 'A Note on the Mystic Writing Pad' Freud considers time as the object of perception and consciousness. The relation of time with psychoanalysis is through the notion of historicisation. The consciousness functions for shifting the childhood memories with the reality in the consciousness and does it through repressing memories. In this sense, the conscious functions to eliminate the tension raising mechanism of the unconscious. 'The Writing Pad' is an apparatus, which Freud theorises in the operation of time. Mary Ann Doane explains the working of this apparatus below[71]:

> The mystic writing pad is a multilevel system, and its three layers are constituted by a wax slab, a thin sheet of translucent waxed paper and a transparent piece of celluloid. When written on, the wax slab permanently retains the traces of that writing,
>
> but when two upper sheets are raised, the writing is erased from them and they are free to receive new impressions.(Doane: 1996, 318)

In this sense the upper sheets represent the perception-consciousness system, and the wax slab is the unconscious. Freud gives an articulation of how memory works through the inscription of trace. However, the memory traces are to be resisted in the perception-consciousness system since they are regarded as the unpleasant memories of childhood. They are kept in the unconscious to be changed by perception in the consciousness. Freud in 'A Note on the Mystic Writing Pad' gives an account of a topographical apparatus, where he locates memory, perception and consciousness in different places. In this sense, Freud is said to give the privilege to the present since he regards memory as that which no longer recurs in consciousness and which is replaced by the immediacy of perception. On the other hand, his theory is ambiguous because he mentions "traces" in psyche as well.

Derrida's approach to the unconscious is against excluding the unconscious in an isolated, unreachable space. He argues that the unconscious is the "masked consciousness". The time of the unconscious then, is not timeless, but is "a past which has never been present and never will be, whose future to come will never be a production or a reproduction in the form of presence." As long as there is movement and alterity there is no presence, since there is a "historical and ontological unfolding of being."[72] Relationship of trace to presence says Derrida, may be towards a "simulacrum of presence" which is the constitution of "dislocation and displacement" of trace in itself. Nevertheless, presence can only be the trace of presence that passes, defers and differentiates from itself. In *With Me* the image which is 'written' on the film stock is there in the second exposure, which does not exclude the traces of the former. Rather the film is the combination of both exposures. In this sense, this time, the film stock can be said to keep the traces of the former, which then makes it possible for the emergence of a representation of copulation of two persons. Unlike the denying and erasing mechanism of "the mystic writing pad" where no writing is traceable in the other part of the pad, it is possible to trace the image in the first exposure after the second is done. Moreover the image in the first exposure is more

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[71] Doane, Mary Ann, 'Temporality, storage, legibility: Freud, Marey and the cinema', Critical Inquiry, (Winter 96, Vol. 22, no. 2) 313-44.
[72] Derrida, Jacques, *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1982) 21.

"visible" than the second one, which is translucent. Jean Louis Baudry has a similar argument in which he adopts the temporal mode of the "mystic writing pad" into the operation of the film stock.[73] According to him, the inscription of the images on the film stock introduces two places for the subject according to the principle of the "mystic writing pad" which acknowledges one in consciousness and the other in unconsciousness. (Baudry: 1986, 290) Baudry states that in Freud's conception of the apparatus, the waxy substance, which is associated with the perception consciousness system, prevents the emergence of the memories in the unconscious from causing a "historical accident." On the other hand film stock is able to display the traces both in its inscription of the events while a film is only able to watch as long as it continues to run through the track. *With Me* introduces two modes of repetition as doubling and trace; one of them is the repetitive sequence of the frames and the other is the doubling of the bodies at the same time. In addition to this, there is a manipulation of the speed of the film in a different way than the normal speed, which consists of the flow of 24 frames per second. The action is performed very slowly, and the film is shot at hight speed. When it is projected there is a sense of pause between the frames as if there was an animated image that cuts the perception of a coherent movement. In this sense there is an oscillation between the real and the unreal while the film is between the physical and the quasi-physical mode of dream-state. According to Melanie Klein the object is separated from itself and is made a "part object". Laplanche calls it "objectality" of the object as the "phantasmatic object." In *With Me* there is not an object nor there is a subject which is sited in bodies. In this sense, there is something beyond a sense of objectification and narcissism based on the love object. Accordingly, the notion of satisfaction is in a continuous delay the possibility of which is left for fantasising being.

As a consequence, *With Me* is realised in the act of delay. The delaying mechanism of the apparatus as well as the scene of copulation enabled by delay turn the film into fantasy. This is the fantasy in which the subject and object of fantasy are ambiguous in the sense that it does not seem possible to argue that one of the couples is 'recognised' as the 'other' sex identified through differentiation between these two. An ambiguity of such characterisation in the film also creates an ambiguity when the identification is set between the spectator and the means of this film. The notion of fantasy also introduces a loss of a sensible physical spatial realm in which the plot could be situated. The spectator's position becomes ambiguous in the sense that the identification with the unidentified realm of film is problematic. *With Me* introduces an unstable sense of subject and object in the unstable plot and such ambiguity presents a sense of oscillation between the physical and the psychical both of which are able to exist in the other. The film is significant in the sense that it introduces the difference between the real and the phantasmatic in a temporal unfolding rather than a sense of fixation to spatial positions.

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[73] Baudry, Jean-Louis, 'The Apparatus: Metapsychological Approches to the Impression of Reality in Cinema', *Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology*, ed. Philip Rossen, (New York: Columbia Uni. Press, 1986) 286-99.

CONCLUSION

This thesis is not about time but is about the possibilities of existence of silent to present different temporalities. I consider that things without failing to communicate senses of presence.There is not a necessity for an observable mobility for change to occur. Mobility does not have to have a forward or backward movement. There is a sense of movement, which leaves its part in moving. Movement does not have to be from one place to another. It is also that which allows an alteration to occur in itself, maybe an imperceptible one. When the manifestation of time becomes space, movement has to follow one way; that occurs through different places in a single space. That space is measured and it becomes a measurement of time. Space is not a burden for time nor is time for space. However, a sense of anchoring in a single spatial plane reifies a sense of becoming reducing it to being. The problematic of being is because of a conceptualisation of an exclusion of non-being from being, which is its other. The otherness is what becomes a parameter for the constitution of a knowing subject. There is more to add to a self and to the other. I do not think the problem is in the way things are, but the way things are conceptualised according to other things by comparing or rather, by considering a hierarchical relationship between the other and the self.

The thesis is concerned about some ways of representation in art that do not aim to have a place according to a linear art historical basis. However, these works do not have their existences and histories; they contribute history by being critical of a sense of inclusion to a history that is external to them; that is the history reduced to specific historical discourse. In these works, I tried to explain that a sense of denial of art history does not make something distinguished from its contemporaries. On the other hand, these works are distinguished from some of their contemporaries since they constitute different spatial and temporal relationships.

As I mentioned a conception of movement is an important element that contributes an emergence of multiplication of space. Temporal flow takes the place of a conception of a totalising and unifying aspect of space. There is also not a denial of space, but an

introduction of a fragmented space. I consider these works to be examples by which we can get a sense of temporality, which introduce a sense of difference in sameness. In this sense, I take the notion of the subject, the ego, the look, objective and subjective space and time, which are possible to communicate when they become heterogenous. A sense of heterogeneity does not mean to push the limits of things to a loss of referentiality. I do not aim to give a sense of art that is based on a notion of fragmentation since I do not think that fragmentation, heterogeneity and multiplication are the concepts specific to visual art and objects of visual representation. In this sense, I consider that the examples I chose address a sense of art that is not indifferent to what can be considered as non-artistic activity. Rather, they introduce the possibility of other emerging in the same. In this sense, these works both question a notion of singularity and authenticity, which are considered as the implications of spatial formations. These works introduce the possible multiplications of a spatial and temporal experience.

As I had mentioned in the beginning of this road, time is not a thing. Temporality is that which is traceable but not an object of observation. Temporal unfolding does not belong to a space that considers time external to it. Rather, temporal unfolding introduces a world of discontinuities and multiplicities. Art contributes to this scene not as a distanced and enclosed substance in space but as that which makes the fragments stronger that have been silenced by spatial differentiation.

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
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
Figure 1.

Figure 2.

Figure 3.

Figure 4.

APPENDIX II

CD [see mpg]

Track 1 Cmelka Kerstin, *With Me* Vienne: Sixpack films.
2000. (3 minutes)

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