

RELIGION, SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN A CHANGING TURKEY

Ali Çarkoğlu - Binnaz Toprak

Translated by: Çigdem Aksoy Fromm

Edited by: Jenny Sanders

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Ali Çarkođlu-Binnaz Toprak

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Foreword to the English Edition

During the period from 1999 to 2004, Turkey's path toward European Union accession promoted important advances in the consolidation of democracy and respect for human rights. Turkey's long-standing democratization problems -- such as the treatment of minorities, the lack of democratic oversight of the security sector, and the failure to resolve the Kurdish question, the Armenian question and the headscarf issue -- have come to surface and been widely discussed. Yet pro-status quo groups, including political parties, some "civil society" organizations, and governmental institutions have harshly reacted to the public discussion of these issues. Since 2004, the momentum of the democratization process has slowed down, and 2007 brought to the Turkish agenda a critical debate over presidential elections. According to the pro-status quo, elitist groups the chair of the presidency is representation of the modern Turkish republic, and the government party's candidate will not have the capability of representing the Turkish Republic with a first lady with headscarf. Since May 2007, the discussions over the presidential relations and the candidacy of a deputy from the Justice and Development Party (AKP) have dominated the political agenda in Turkey. While the tension is represented as between religious people and secularism, in fact, this tension is more accurately one between the possibility of departing from the status quo, through democratization efforts, and thus confronting the deep-rooted democratization problems of Turkey.

While all the discussions seem to be on the axis of religiosity and secularism, during the general election process, most of the opposition parties claimed that Turkey was under threat from internal and external enemies -- whether Shari'a, Kurds, Armenians trying to divide and weaken it, or foreign powers like the EU and USA seeking Turkey's economic subordination -- and that the AKP was to blame. The opposition parties also blamed the AKP for the presidential election crisis, due to the fact that the AKP had not sought a consensus candidate.

At this moment, the results of the elections show that approximately one-half of the country supports the AKP government and the majority of the people are opposed to any military intervention in the country's democratic life. Although the prospective presidency of Mr. Gül should be evaluated through the lens of citizenship and even though Mr. Gül meets the requirements for being President, his candidacy has still been discussed in terms of the capacity of a man whose wife wears a headscarf -- which is seen as a symbol of the so-called "threat to the secular regime" -- to represent Turkey.

Because the aforementioned agenda is very related to the problematic nature of Religion-State-Society Relations in Turkey, TESEV's Democratization Program has been working on the issue since 1999. The project on Religion-State-Society relations, through research, publication, outreach, and advocacy, aims to contribute to the understanding of the changing dynamics between religion, state, and society in today's world and specifically in the Turkish context. In addition, the project aspires to create dialogue and to increase mutual understanding between groups in Turkish society who have increasingly become polarized around the issues of secularism and religiosity.

Religion, Society and Politics in a Changing Turkey, by Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak, is an output of a survey of 1492 voting-age individuals that was carried out in rural and urban areas between May 6th and June 11th 2006. The survey report observes and compares the changing nature of Turkish people's attitudes towards issues such as religion, democracy, terrorism and minorities. The Turkish-language edition of the study was received with high interest by the public and the media in November 2006. The study provoked an engaging debate as it was published during the controversy around the fact that presidential candidate Abdullah Gül's wife wears a headscarf. TESEV hopes that the English version of the report will contribute to the debates over Turkey's practice of Islam, people's preferences to identify themselves, understanding of democracy and multi-culturalism in Turkey, and the political and sociological stance towards the headscarf controversy.

Derya Demirler
TESEV Democratization Program
August, 2007

Foreword to the Turkish Edition

The most significant handicap of Turkey, a country that has defined modernization as its national mission since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, is that it has perceived modernism by means of rigid models. Whilst this approach, which has prevailed up to the present day, pushed certain modes of existence deemed inappropriate for modernization to the margins of the public sphere, it also deepened the gap between state and society.

Consequently, in Turkey, a society emerged where different modes of living were transformed into segregated communities, amongst which an inevitable estrangement was continuously harbored. On the other hand, secularism, which should be an institution that performs the role of arbitrator, resulted in the definition of religiosity in legal terms by the state.

The most grievous consequence of this situation was that lifestyles different from “ours” were reduced to simple patterns and often condemned as “pre-modern/anachronistic/archaic”. Thus, while different segments of society had fewer opportunities to know and understand each other, the public sphere began to be perceived as an environment laden with conflicts.

Cognizant of the aforementioned danger, in 1999 TESEV presented the public with its first field study that aimed to produce a comprehensive research of religiously devout people. While the study, conducted by Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak, initiated the removal of much misapprehension and bias through its findings, it also realistically displayed the relationship between religion and politics.

Seven years after the study mentioned above, TESEV approaches the same subject once again with the same academics. During the time between the two studies, Turkey has undergone important changes. We live in an intellectual environment where identities have acquired self-confidence, and where public participation has come to be perceived as an indispensable citizenship right. Without doubt, the standpoint of the people of Turkey in respect to these disclosures, its perception of religion and religiosity, and the relationships it establishes between beliefs and values, is of vital importance for the democratic requirements of the present day.

In addition to giving us the opportunity to take a closer look at ourselves and confront our walls of prejudice, we also hope that this study will constitute a valuable contribution to social harmony that Turkey direly needs, through enabling us to better understand ways of living different from ours.

Etyen Mahçupyan
TESEV Democratization Program
November, 2006

Summary

This research is a follow-up of a study we conducted in 1999 about religion, society and politics in Turkey. The 1999 study, also supported by TESEV, was based on a survey of a nationwide representative sample of the Turkish population at voting-age. During the seven years between 1999 and 2006, Turkey underwent important changes. The most significant of these changes was the recovery from economic crisis that peaked in February 2001, resulting in massive unemployment and high rates of inflation. During the last two years, the economy has shown high rates of growth and inflation has been reduced from rates in excess of 50% to less than 10%. At the same time, a one-party government came to power in 2002 for the first time in decades, which put an end to unstable coalition governments. Between 1999-2002 and thereafter, a series of reform packages that aimed to comply with the EU's Copenhagen criteria moved Turkish democracy towards greater consolidation. As a result, Turkey started membership negotiations with the EU at the end of 2005.

Despite these positive changes, at the time we conducted this study in May 2006, there were already signs of an increasing polarization between what one might call the "secularists" and the "Islamists." The fact that the governing party, AKP, has its roots in the Islamist *Milli Görüş* movement made it suspect in the eyes of both the military and the secular establishment. Although this polarization has increased since May 2006, we nevertheless felt that its level was not as high as it had been in 1999, when the now-banned *Refah Partisi* had divided the country into two camps. Hence, what we wanted to find out in this study were the changes in the attitudes and preferences of the people of Turkey concerning secularism, Islam, and politics.

One of the major findings of our study is that religiosity is increasing in Turkey. Between 1999 and 2006 the percentage of people who consider themselves "very religious" and those who define their identity primarily as Muslim has increased from 6% to 13% and from 36% to 46%, respectively. Although the percentage of people who approve of religious parties has also increased, this cannot lead to the conclusion that the support for a secular system is on the decline. Both our 1999 and 2006 surveys show that Turkish people do not perceive secularism to be under threat and do not think that there is a real possibility of a Shari'ah-based religious regime in Turkey. Moreover, there is no finding in our study that indicates a rising support for a religious state. On the contrary, when specifically asked if they are in favor of a Shari'ah state, the number of those who gave an affirmative answer has declined from 21% in 1999 down to 9% in 2006.

Nevertheless, there is significant tension around the issue of secularism or laicism in the country. When asked to place themselves on a hypothetical continuum that has Islamists on one side and secularists on the other, 20% placed themselves closer to the secularist end, while 49% placed themselves closer to the Islamist side, leaving about 23% in the middle. Evaluating the recent political developments in the country, about 32% indicated that religious fundamentalism that is supportive of a religious state is on the rise, while 23% thought that there is a major threat to secularism in the country. Cross-tabular analysis suggests that a bi-polar distribution defines these evaluations. Those who are relatively well-off, better educated and live in urban areas tend to be on the secularist end.

On the other hand, reactions to strict secularist policies have also declined. Those who indicate that religious people are subject to state repression declined significantly, from about 43% to 17%. However, the findings show that 8% to 11% of secularists, depending on the question asked, believe that religious people threaten their lifestyles. These findings show that the kind of tension mentioned above is similarly felt in the daily lives of common people.

Related to the above, 77% of Turkish people believe that democracy is the best form of government, and that secularism can be protected by democratic means (54%). The military is not given a primary and indispensable role for this task. Nevertheless, the military is seen to have a special role, and the view that the military can criticize civilian governments is supported by 59% of respondents. In all these evaluations, about 20 to 25% of the respondents give support to military

intervention in the affairs of civilian governments. It is worthy of note that those who are critical of the role of the military in Turkish politics, and thus support full control of the executive branch by civilians, are densely found not amongst the conservative, religious masses of lower socio-economic status, but rather amongst the left-leaning, socio-economically better off and well-educated groups. Those of Kurdish descent least support a role for the military in politics.

There is very little support amongst the respondents for terrorist activities, even under conditions of resistance to an occupying military force. Suicide bombings against occupiers or against civilians are equally condemned. Even when specific references to Iraqi resistance forces or to Palestinians are given, this finding does not change, even though it is widely known that the people of Turkey are sympathetic to the cause of both these groups. 81% of Turkish voters think that such violence is contrary to the teachings of Islam.

In accordance with rising religiosity, we also observed rising tension between Sunni and Alevi groups. Inter-sectarian marriages are opposed at a significantly higher level compared to seven years ago. Equally importantly, Alevis and Sunnis remain at opposing positions on all significant policy issues. Alevi preferences are closer to positions taken by voters who are relatively better educated, have higher socio-economic status, ideologically lean towards the left, do not consider themselves to be very religious, and define themselves as secularist.

Another important observation is that a multi-cultural and pluralist democratic understanding is not well-rooted. Issues of importance to citizens of Sunni Muslim faith and of ethnic Turkish background, such as *İmam Hatip* High Schools or the headscarf ban in universities, are evaluated as part of basic human rights; but when asked about issues of relevance to Alevis, non-Muslim Turkish citizens or citizens of Kurdish origin, the same sensitivity to their basic rights is not shown. Sensitivity to any kind of minority rights is severely lacking. Such an overall approach provides ample ground for hampering the reforms that aim to consolidate democratic rule of law in the country.

In tune with this sectarian and parochial approach to basic rights, one could also talk about an underlying conception of “us” versus “the other”. Such a distinction between citizens of different religious beliefs or cultural and ethnic backgrounds is a reflection of an inward-looking general mindset in society, and provides the most important basis for resistance to developing a multi-cultural and tolerant political milieu in the country. “Us” in this context refers to Turk-Muslim-Sunni, and “other” refers to Kurd-Alevi-non-Muslim. Such a perspective creates a distorted view of the outside world, in which only citizens of Muslim countries are seen as friends, whereas many of Turkey’s long-time allies in the international arena, or neighboring countries rank lower on the “friendship” scale. Not surprisingly, restrictions on Christian missionary activities and Jewish business interests are approved. Such a background provides fertile ground for xenophobia, and there exists a rising Muslim communitarian approach to business activities.

Another important finding of our research is that there is a gap between commonly held views about the covering of women and the actual reality. Public impressions to the contrary, the percentage of women who cover themselves is not on the increase but is, in fact, declining. In addition, the covering of women is not a priority issue for the layman. Economic issues top the mass public agenda, and women’s covering is prioritized only when included together with other identity issues such as the rights of Alevi and Kurdish minorities. Uncovered women are more likely to be found amongst the urban, relatively better off and better educated segments with a left ideological leaning. As income increases the likelihood of being covered significantly declines. The veil is increasingly marginalized (those who wear the veil are only 1% of the population) and is almost never preferred amongst the younger generation.

Covered women argue that the most important reason why they cover is because Islam demands it. Neither parental/spousal pressure, nor identity issues, are given as reasons for covering. Covering as a sign of participation in a political movement, often put forth as a major reason for covering by secularists, is also not perceived as such by these women. Nevertheless, covered women admit that they would be pressured primarily by their close relatives to cover up if they were to remove their head cover. Yet, when asked if they would remove their head cover if most women around them were to do the same, nearly all say that they would not.

Slightly more than two-thirds of our sample is supportive of lifting the headscarf ban in universities and public employment. Although the level of support has declined since 1999, the majority still express that they would not feel “uneasy” about, for example, a covered judge or a covered primary school teacher.

A significant finding that surfaces at all critical junctures in our research is that Turkish society has a clear dual structure. Similar to arguments about a “center-periphery” cleavage, we found that two clearly distinguishable groups oppose one another on almost all important issues. On the one side, we have urban dwellers of better socio-economic status and education, who do not feel bound by the Sunni religious belief system. On the other side, we have religiously devout people of lower education and socio-economic status, who feel closer to the Islamists than the secularists. These

distinct groups could merge with urbanization, economic development, and modernization. However, given that these cleavages have deepened over the last century despite remarkable economic development and urbanization, it may be unrealistic to assume that economic growth and urbanization on their own will automatically lead to the closing of the gap between these two groups. In other words, the exact kind of economic development and urbanization that would foster such rapprochement between the two ends of this cleavage needs to be diagnosed and implemented.

We would like to emphasize that many of the issues that define the deepening of this cleavage revolves around educational policy. All research that we know of indicates that additional years spent in school not only increases the likelihood of support for liberal democratic values, but also integrates individuals to a larger commonly-held view of a multi-cultural national identity. Increased resources and attention to the content of the curriculum is key to further human capital development, as well as to the deepening of the roots of a democratic system in the country.

1. Introduction

Social life in Turkey is rapidly being transformed. Economic and social changes, rooted in the Westernization movement of Ottoman society in the 19th century, have strengthened each other since then but have also brought along their own internal conflicts. After the Turkish Republic was established, the gradual momentum of Turkey's Western oriented transformation sharpened these conflicts. This process incited a controversy between the advocates of Western-style modernization and the movements of reaction against it, which has prevailed up to the present day. Formed around the themes of secularism and radical Islamic fundamentalism, this controversy continued incessantly during the history of the Republic. Since its foundation, the Republic has always felt itself to be under the threat of a reactionary religious opposition.

This perceived threat gradually came to dominate the political discourse following the transition to multi-party democracy, and constituted the base of the controversy from 1950 to 1960 between the governing *Demokrat Parti* (Democratic Party, DP) and the *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Republican People's Party, CHP), the party of the elite that established the Turkish Republic but that was in the opposition during this period. Between 1960 and 1980, the shift of politics to the left-right axis pushed the secularism discourse into the background. The CHP established a coalition government in 1973 with *Milli Selamet Partisi* (National Salvation Party, MSP), which at the time seemed closer to the left compared to other parties due to its discourse that underscored poverty. The issue of secularism took its place on the agenda once again after 1980. The *Milli Görüş* (National Outlook) movement that developed under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan from 1970 on, was reorganized around *Refah Partisi* (Welfare Party, RP)¹ after the military coup in 1980. As the party that received the highest percentage of votes in the 1994 elections, *Refah* succeeded in making a party with an Islamic reference the strongest party in the Turkish political system.

The *Milli Selamet/Milli Görüş* tradition became highly supported by voters and in turn expedited the process of perceiving political Islam as a threat in the country. RP, the successor of MSP, which was supported by a marginal societal segment in the 1970s, led an active party organization and filled the gap created by the leftist movement that had become unattractive to lower urban classes. This movement, which was traditionally supported by the small peripheral communities in Anatolia, also gained the support of the urbanized electoral base, as well as the peripheral capital holders that developed in opposition to the central capital circles. This movement enabled the emergence of a "counter-elite" that seemed to have united around Islamic symbols and a conservative, moral framework. Using Şerif Mardin's terminology, this transformation enabled the marginal Islamic movements of the "periphery" to be more fully integrated in public life that was under the control of the "center".

During the tenure of RP as the stronger partner of the coalition government established after the 1995 election, the political polarization in the country gravely increased. This polarization eventually dragged the country into the "February 28th" period and resulted in the banning of the *Refah Partisi* by the Constitutional Court. *Fazilet Partisi* (Virtue Party, FP) was then established to replace RP, but this party was also closed down. The outlawing of *Fazilet* prompted the division of the *Milli Görüş* movement. The cadres that had united around 'Milli Görüş' took their place in the newly established *Saadet Partisi* (Felicity Party, SP) whereas the 'reformist' wing of the Islamic movement established the *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (Justice and Development Party, AKP). The latter came to power alone in the 2002 elections by winning an overwhelming majority of seats in parliament.

¹ In 1972, Necmettin Erbakan founded *Milli Selamet Partisi* (the National Salvation Party - MSP), which became the third largest party in parliament in 1973. The MSP openly supported a religious political agenda calling for the restoration of traditional "morals and virtues" - widely interpreted as meaning Islamic morals and behavior - and a reduction of economic ties to the "Christian" countries of Western Europe. Following the 1980 coup, the military not only dissolved the MSP, along with other political parties, but also prosecuted Erbakan and other MSP leaders for violating a law forbidding the use of religion for political purposes. When new political parties were authorized in 1983, Erbakan founded the Welfare Party on a platform stressing themes similar to those espoused by the defunct MSP.

The *Milli Görüş* movement emerged with the establishment of the *Milli Nizam Partisi* in the 1970s, under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. Following the closing down of this party by the Constitutional Court after a year, successive political parties, based on a similar Islamic ideology, were founded under the same movement. These parties strongly separated themselves from other parties that Erbakan referred to as the “Western Club”. AKP followed a different path. Unlike the parties of the *Milli Görüş* movement, it based both its program and its policies on the integration of Turkey with the Western world. Described as “conservative democratic” by its leaders, AKP emerged as a party that is devoted to Islamic tradition and that advocates conservative values, but that nevertheless exerts its authority in favor of Western style modernism in the controversy between “Western style Modernism vs. Return to Islamic Past” that has divided Turkey since the 19th century.

As we have stated below, this study was completed in a period when we witnessed the transformation of Political Islam in parallel to the changes Turkey has undergone. This research, based on surveys, was supported by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), and used a nationwide representative sampling in May 2006. It is a follow-up of a study we conducted in 1999, also executed with the support of TESEV². Our initial study, which we had conducted shortly after the *Refahyol* (coalition of the *Refah* and *Doğru Yol* parties) government was dissolved and immediately before the elections in March 1999, garnered great interest from the public and proved that the “Secular vs. Islamist” conflict that seemed to gradually deepen during that period did not have an equivalent reflection in Turkish society.

The “Islam factor”, which has been widely discussed in Turkey throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, and the assertion that it constitutes a serious threat against the secular state, was generally based on impressions at the time we publicized the results of our study in 1999. Until then, there was no significant research, based on surveys, available on the issue. Presented to the public as a “first” example of its kind, our study expressly stated that the majority of the public was religious, but that this religiosity included a great tolerance towards individuals who have adopted different lifestyles; that the Republican reforms were supported; that the public believed that these reforms had enabled the country to progress; that the people of Turkey did not favor a Shari’ah-based religious regime; that people were not supportive of using religion for political motives; that, in this context, political parties based on religion were not favored; and that people were against the mixing of state and religion. For instance, 85% of Turkish people accepted that a woman, even if she does not cover, should be considered a Muslim if she believes in Allah and the Prophet Mohammad; nevertheless, 75% believed that university students should be allowed to cover if they chose to. On the other hand, people who supported *Refah Partisi*’s “turban” policy made up a lower percentage of 46%.

The answers that were given to questions we asked about *Refah Partisi* in 1999 were indicative of the “Islamist vs. Secular” cleavage among Turkish people in that period. For example, the rate of people who thought that *Refah Partisi* had separated the public into two groups - as “believers” versus “non-believers” - and the rate of people who did not agree with this opinion were almost equal, at 37% and 40% respectively. Similarly, 37% of the public approved the closing down of *Refah Partisi*, while 39% were against it. The most significant proof of the fact that this kind of tension was not approved by the public was that those who believed that religion-based parties should not be a part of the Turkish political party system formed a majority of 61%. Advocates of the opposing viewpoint constituted only 25%, which was proportionate to the votes received by *Refah Partisi* in that period. In general, 79% of the adult population of Turkey believed that the Republican reforms enabled the progress of the country. The percentage of those who were against this viewpoint constituted only a small minority, at 8%.

The transformation that Political Islam has undergone after *Refah Partisi* was outlawed, especially the policies *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* pursued after the 2002 elections, its moderate style towards reconciliation on issues such as the “adultery crisis” and “turban issue” - towards which the secular circles were highly sensitive - as well as the serious efforts it put into Turkey’s integration with the European Union (EU), alleviated to a great degree the tension around secularism, which had mounted in Turkey starting from the second half of the 1980s and had reached its peak in the 1990s. When compared to *Refah Partisi*, which had approached democracy and liberal values only through addressing the problems of its own followers but seemed indifferent when the rights of other sectors were violated - and, therefore was believed to use the method known as “takiyye” i.e., hiding one’s true intentions, - AKP looked more like a party that had absorbed liberal democracy.

The aim of this study was to find out whether the viewpoint of the people of Turkey had gone through a change in the seven years since 1999 when we had conducted our first study, and what the people of Turkey thought about some of the more recent items on the public agenda. During these seven years, Turkey has undergone significant changes. The chronic economic crises of the 1990s were replaced by a stable and growing economic structure. For the first time since

2 Ali Çarkoğlu & Binnaz Toprak, *Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset*, İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2000.

1980, inflation in Turkey dropped to a single figure in May 2006, when we conducted our research. Similarly, a party was able to obtain enough seats to establish a government for the first time, after decades of coalition governments; thus, a single-party government that could secure political stability was established. Due to the policies of both the governments that ruled the country between 1999-2002, and of the AKP government after 2002, important legal changes took place towards liberalizing Turkish democracy, enabling it to attain a more civilian character. The prospect of Turkey's membership to the EU gained ground after the decision to initiate the negotiation process in December 2005.

On the other hand, in May 2006, when we conducted our research, the changes that took place in Turkey had begun to cause reactions from certain sectors of society. Identity politics that surfaced during the process of harmonization with the EU and which particularly revolved around Kurdish and Alevi citizens; the issue of minorities; the new strategy Turkey adopted in solving the Cyprus crisis; Armenian "genocide" allegations that were voiced in various European countries; and the developments in the Middle East, caused both "leftist" and "rightist" circles to fear that national sovereignty was being lost and that the country could be divided. In this context, numerous theses claimed that Turkey was once again open to foreign invasion, that the conditions of the Treaty of Sèvres were being put into effect again, and that the public would gradually be Christianized through the activities of foreign missionaries. The expansion of the Turkish economy to global markets began to be considered within the scope of a new imperialism, while foreign investments and real estate purchases by foreigners caused skepticism.

The debate about "Radical Fundamentalism" that flared up again – and that was voiced among the highest ranks of the state starting from September-October 2006 – was not yet on the agenda at the time the study was conducted. However worries that were expressed, especially concerning "clientelism", the headscarf and the election of the president, were harbingers of a new crisis on the issue of secularism. Despite the fact that the skeptical approach of secular circles towards the AKP government continued, in May 2006, when we conducted our research, the "Secular versus Islamist" tension in Turkey seemed to have moderated in comparison to the 1990s. On the other hand, among circles that considered the successful completion of the EU process to be of utmost importance, worries that the AKP government no longer gave full weight to this issue as they had in the period before 2005, and that this caused the process of harmonization with the EU to slow down, began to emerge.

We conducted our study at a time when these and similar disputes gradually picked up speed. In light of the changes Turkey has undergone from February 1999 when we conducted the first research, to May 2006, as well as the social reactions that were formed parallel to these changes; we tried to reveal the ideas of the people of Turkey about these issues. Questions on many of the issues stated above were included in our survey. Instead of collecting personal impressions based on individual worldviews, we aimed to put forth a study that directly asked the public what they thought about these issues and that interpreted the obtained results by applying statistical analyses. We then hoped to present this study for public debate.

Just like in our previous study, instead of focusing on impressions presented by certain sectors to the public as facts, our decisive goal here was to cast a new light on the different viewpoints of the public based on data, as part of a process designed to solve the problems of the country.

Doubtlessly, similar to all research based on a survey, our study aims to determine general, nationwide inclinations. Other than these general inclinations, the viewpoints, beliefs, fears, feelings, etc., of the various sectors of society can only be determined through in-depth interviews. Our research targets the voting age population and therefore some groups that are influential in society because of their position, economical influence or their roles as opinion leaders, can only be represented to an extent proportionate to their size within the population. As the number of representatives of such groups in our sample is more or less proportionate to their percentage in the voting age population, the sample numbers for some of them are relatively low. Therefore, generalizing about the subgroups in our sample is, in this respect, more difficult, and even impossible for groups that are very small compared to the general population. For instance, the female-male ratio in the voting age population in Turkey, as well as in our sample has an approximate 50%-50% proportion. However, since the sample magnitude of male voters and female voters each constitutes half of our total sample, the statistical significance of what we can state with regard to these two groups is lower than the validity of the entire sample. Similarly, as voters of Kurdish ethnic origin, voters for "x" party or Alevi citizens also constitute only a subgroup of the entire sample, the significance of what we can say about each of these groups is lower than that of the entire sample.

As we have stated above, survey studies are neither suitable for asking questions on any subject in depth, nor for further questioning with regard to the nuances of any of the initial questions. Because nationwide surveys are oriented towards the general population, they cannot provide a profound analysis of the viewpoints of social groups. However, when

the answers given to particular questions are compared to the other characteristics of the individuals, they can give us statistical clues about the groups. In survey studies, varied inquiries that can be carried out according to the answers provided by respondents are rather limited in number. Moreover, an evaluation based on a reciprocal procedure of asking and answering questions, that could shed light on the feelings and the mindset of individual respondents while focusing on the nuances in their answers, is not possible. A person interviewed during a survey is a passive respondent, and utmost care must be shown to make sure that he or she has the minimum possible interaction with the interviewer. To this end, the questions must be as clear as possible, requiring as few explanations by the interviewer as possible.

Through this type of survey, for example, whether the people who support the ban on wearing a headscarf in universities are more likely to be in the older or the younger population group, or how these people are distributed concerning gender/settlement type/party preference/ethnic-religious origin etc., can be determined by applying statistical methods. Such findings are included in our study. However, these findings are obtained through questions which are designed towards this aim and are assumed to be understood by everyone in the same way within the format of multiple-choice and close-ended questions. In this type of a study, inquiries are made within a simple framework, which assumes that the feelings and evaluations of individuals are comparable. The data are not collected in a mutual conversation that can put forth the character and sense of each personal experience. Thus, an analysis framework that is directed towards determining only the highest macro level inclinations is formed.

One issue often discussed concerning the survey work performed in our country is about how representative the achieved results are. Researchers who conduct this type of study often face criticism from people who do not see a match between their personal observations and the study results. As can be understood from the research method that we explain in detail below, statistical studies certainly include a margin of error. However, the magnitude of this margin is clearly mentioned in the study, which is comparably low and therefore acceptable.

The fieldwork of this research was led by *Frekans Araştırma Şirketi*, which had also assisted us in our 1999 study. Before the employees and interviewers of *Frekans* went to the field, we informed them about the research and trained them in the methods of asking questions and on other subjects, such as the procedure to be followed when they were unable to find the people whose names and addresses that were initially determined. *Frekans* checked whether the interviewers who were sent to different regions of Turkey actually went to the exact addresses they were assigned to visit; and both we, as the researchers, and our assistants outside the survey company took part in this verification procedure. We have full confidence that all appropriate procedures were followed at all stages of the fieldwork by this organization.

One other uncertainty that emerges among the public about this kind of research is whether the respondents who take the survey tell the truth or not. It is, naturally, impossible for any researcher to be truly certain about this. As a matter of fact, the method of dealing with this sort of problem is one of the most important subjects discussed in research methods circles. However, there are numerous ways of minimizing this concern. Asking the same question in a different way; making sure that the question does not guide the individual; paying attention to not listing the questions related to the same subject in succession; checking if the results derived from questions with definite answers are true; and comparing the obtained results with other research findings that were conducted in the same time period, are some of these methods. For instance, if there is a significant difference between the percentage of people who said "I voted for x party" and the actual votes that the party received in the election, or if a respondent who chose the "I am very religious" option in one question states that he had never fasted in another one, the researcher can have an idea about the reliability of the answers provided by that specific respondent. Moreover, even if we assume that respondents gave a certain answer because they thought the correct answer is "x", this is still considered a finding that meaningful and significant. For example, if in a study that took up the issue of women in Turkey³, 92% of the public thinks that working increases a woman's self-respect, then, even if we believe that most respondents who gave this answer did not actually believe this and that they did not approach this question in all fairness, the 92% figure is still meaningful. To say the least, it indicates that the people of Turkey are aware as to what the correct answer to this question must be. And even if this kind of awareness has not yet materialized in real life, it shows that modern values are widespread in the country. If we suppose that the same question was asked in a nationwide survey that included villages in rural areas in the 1920s, '30s or '40s, we believe that the answer would not reveal a rate of 92%.

Finally, we would like to state that this study was supported by TESEV, but the questions included in the survey, the research method, the selection of the research company, and the writing of this report reflect our interpretations and were entirely left to our own choice. As the researchers, we have consulted both TESEV employees and members of academic and intellectual circles concerning the selection and formation of the issues we added to our survey. However, it was ourselves who made the conclusive decisions on these issues.

3 Ersin Kalaycıođlu ve Binnaz Toprak, *İş Yaşamı, Üst Yönetim ve Siyasette Kadın*, Tesev Yayınları, 2004.

2. Method of the Study: Selection of the Sample and Design of the Survey

2.1. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SAMPLING LOGIC

Our study is based on surveys that were carried out with 1492 voting age individuals who are representative of the people of Turkey who live in urban and rural areas. The interviews were conducted face to face in the homes of the respondents, from May 6 to June 11, 2006.

One of the questions often directed after this type of study by various people, including academics, is how the percentages presented in the study and the generalizations derived from these percentages can represent the entire population when they are limited to a sample of 1000-1500 respondents. In other words, can the preferences and ideas based on interviews conducted with 1000-1500 individuals in a population of approximately 70 million citizens reflect the viewpoint of the people of Turkey as a whole? In this context, another question is put forth by people who think that the results do not match their personal opinion and therefore adopt a questioning approach: why do the study results not verify their ideas, even though they have been at many different places in Turkey, led a close relationship with common people on the street and “chatted with cab drivers”? To express this attitude in a different manner, if the conclusions of a research are different from the general observations of individuals, does this not mar the validity of that research?

Let us give two simple examples in order to answer the first question. When we get a blood test, not all the blood in our veins has to be pumped out and tested in order to obtain pathological findings. Similarly, we do not check the amount of salt in the soup we cook by eating all of the soup in the pot. Naturally, selecting samples is a more intricate process than cooking. However, the fundamental principles of sampling require the same criteria that we apply to testing blood or cooking. Essentially, sampling is the gathering of information about a target group and drawing conclusions through a limited number of observations.

Our most significant problem is what a “random” sample is. A random sample is not a “coincidental” sample. In a random sampling, each member of the target group about whom information is collected has an equal and known probability to be selected and included in the survey. However, in this case, a prediction within the scope of calculable error margins related to the characteristics of the target group is possible. One of the most important problems here is the need to set a clear and definite, categorical limit. Target groups are usually quite extensive.

For example, if we wanted to check whether bread baked in a bakery shop is in line with standards, inspecting each loaf of bread one-by-one would, in practice, be impossible. Although we would expect the loaves of bread produced in the bakery to be more or less similar, we would also expect, for instance, that the loaves that come out of the oven first would be less baked when compared to the ones that come out the last. Likewise, there could be differences in both the quality of the dough and the hygiene of the environment. In order to detect such differences in a bakery-full of bread, we would need a physical representation system that corresponded to the entire production. For a small bakery shop, this could be the list of baskets the bread is placed into. For example, if the bakery produces 1000 loaves of bread, and if the bread is distributed in baskets that contain 20 loaves each, this means that there will be 50 baskets holding the entire production of the bakery. If these baskets are numbered, our job will naturally be easier. In that case, it would be sufficient to look at baskets whose numbers were picked randomly. Most often, baskets do not have numbered labels, and all baskets are kept in a room, a storage place or are transported by trucks. Then, we have a physical place that we can use as a sampling framework, and we select the samples within that place in accordance with a system designed for that purpose.

If we consider the issue of representing the whole of Turkey at this point, it can clearly be said that, similar to the blood

test and bakery analogies, the voting population in Turkey does not have a homogeneous structure. We can suppose that we have a list of all voters, but practically, such a list is neither obtainable nor utilizable. If it were, then we could arrange a sampling through a simple, coincidental selection of samples. However, even in that case, we would probably not want to carry out this particular procedure since 1500 people who are selected randomly from a list of more than 40 million voters could happen to live in 1500 totally different addresses. Going to a mountain village in Artvin for just a single interview and then going to a rural village in Adiyaman, Kahta for one interview is practically very difficult and expensive. These voters can be separated into relatively more homogenous and broader groups; consequently, the same information can be obtained, and a more practical and inexpensive sampling becomes possible through selection within these groups.

Therefore, what we have to do is to establish a framework that will allow the physical representation of the votes, similar to a storage place in a bakery or to a transport truck. For instance, a suitable framework for our research is the geographical map of Turkey. As we have explained below, voters are distributed to administrative provinces, and provinces to territories through the use of this map, and then, provinces that represent the voters are selected by taking those territories into consideration. The size of the sampling is distributed to each territory according to its population, and the representative provinces from each territory are selected in proportion to their percentage in that territory's population. In this way, each and every voter in the population that live in these territories is given an equal possibility of being included in our sampling. Thus, this is the main criterium of alignment with the random sampling principle.

In each administrative province, voters are separated to address blocks of the same size; in this way, blocks and voters, again, have an equal amount of probability to be selected. After a required number of blocks are randomly selected, the houses in each block and the people who are going to be interviewed from amongst each household are also selected randomly.

What is the probability of the viewpoint of any particular individual to be included into a sample of 1000-1500 respondents when using this type of method? Can an individual's observation be more reliable than the information obtained through this kind of sampling, or can an individual make a precise enough observation that relates to the whole country and that reflects the average viewpoint of all individuals? As these questions form the basis of the sceptical attitude against sampling-based studies that is prevalent among certain groups that are occupied with monitoring the course of events in the country, we are obliged to provide an answer, even if a brief one.

If we know in how many different ways the sample from an adult population of 1500 people who are 18 or older can be selected from a total of more than 40 million voters, we can also determine the probability of ourselves being included in this kind of sampling. Although not zero, this probability is very close to zero because different samples of 1500 people can be arranged in a huge number of ways. Therefore, no one can have a rational reason to doubt the sampling method just because he or she is not included in any of the samples. Furthermore, we believe that any given individual has not a more acute observation capability and a better capacity to collect data than the systematic data collection method described below. The findings here are the averages not of a certain individual or group, but of a sample that includes all voters in the country; thus, they should be evaluated within those constraints.

But can samplings of this size represent big countries? If there is a possibility of including every individual in the target group into the sampling on an equal basis, then information that is quite reliable concerning the entire target group, on condition that the predetermined margin of error remains invariable, can be obtained. It should not be forgotten that the behaviors, preferences and attitudes of individuals are like a puzzle that is difficult to solve. However, if individuals are set aside, but the groups they constitute, as well as the averages of these groups are taken into consideration, then estimation becomes easier. Even if individuals change, the averages will remain more or less constant. Hence, in the following analysis, we will discuss not individuals, but groups and group averages.

2.2. SAMPLE USED FOR THE 2006 STUDY

Although the design logic we have adopted in selecting the sample did not change, when compared to the study we conducted in February 1999, it has acquired a form that is closer to the logic of random sampling. As we have done in the past, our research universe consisted again of household members who are 18 or older, excluding public residence venues such as prisons, hospitals and student dormitories. Administrative provinces have again been considered as the primary sampling unit. However, in the next step, these provinces were determined in accordance with the Classification of Statistical Regional Units (*İstatistikî Bölge Birimleri Sınıflandırması - IBBS*) established by the Turkish Statistical Institute (*Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu - TÜİK*). This nomenclature, which was put into effect in 2002, was defined according to the NUTS criteria, the territorial nomenclature of the EU, in order to produce data comparable to that

of the European Union (EU) and to create possible solutions for the developmental differences between the various regions of the country. IBBS consists of three phases: “In the first phase, 81 administrative provinces were defined as territorial regions at Level 3. By forming groups – through taking into consideration the provinces that resemble each other regarding economical, social, cultural, and geographical aspects, as well as the magnitude of their population – 26 territorial units were defined at Level 2. In addition, 12 territorial units at Level 1 were defined by grouping the 2nd level territorial units according to the same criterium.”¹

We have based our study primarily on the number of registered voters in 12 territories at Level 1. Table 2.1 shows the percentage of registered voters in these territories. A sample of a total of 1500 respondents in rural and urban territories was distributed to the rural and urban areas in each territory. After that, two provinces were selected in each territory by taking into consideration their shares in the population of that region (*probability proportionate to size*). The number of interviews to be carried out in the rural and urban settlement areas of each province was determined according to the rural-urban population ratio of those provinces in their territory. Up to this point, this study is not different from our 1999 study, except for the method of selecting samples and the definition of the territories. However, after this stage, we asked TUIK to choose blocks that included 150 households each. The total number of blocks was determined to enable 10 interviews in each block. 10 addresses in each block were randomly visited, and if no interview took place in each address after a minimum of two trials, a substitute address, selected also randomly, was visited in order to complete the required number of interviews. Within each household, after the members of the household at voting age were determined, one of them was randomly selected for an interview.

No. of Territory	Name of Territory	Sample Share (%)	Rural (%)	Urban (%)	Total no. of Surveys	No. of surveys in rural territory	No. of surveys in urban territory
1	Istanbul	17%	9%	91%	260	23	237
2	Aegean	14%	36%	64%	216	78	137
3	Mediterranean	12%	41%	59%	186	76	110
4	Southeastern Anatolia	7%	39%	61%	109	43	66
5	Western Anatolia	10%	19%	81%	143	28	115
6	Eastern Marmara	9%	32%	68%	142	46	97
7	Western Black Sea	8%	52%	48%	114	59	55
8	Central Anatolia	6%	44%	56%	85	37	48
9	Central Eastern Anatolia	4%	46%	54%	63	29	34
10	Eastern Black Sea	4%	54%	46%	63	34	29
11	Western Marmara	5%	46%	54%	74	34	40
12	Northeastern Anatolia	3%	52%	48%	44	23	21
				Total	1.500	510	990

In rural areas, villages with more than 200 residents at the age of voting were visited, and 10 people at voting age from 10 randomly selected households were asked to participate in an interview. In comparison with the previous study, there is no significant diversification in the interviews led in rural territories. However, when the interviews in urban territories are compared to the method applied in 1999, it can be said that this time we have come nearer to the principle of keeping the probability of including each person at the age of voting into the sampling equal, through selecting addresses from blocks. When the simple random sampling method is used, a sample of 1492 respondents has an error margin of maximum $\pm 3.3\%$ (2.5%) with confidence level 99% (95%). As we have noted above, these error margins are valid for the entire sample, and they are expected to be higher for the subgroups.

¹ This nomenclature was put into effect in line with the Decree of the Council of Ministers dated 28 August 2002 and with no. 2002/4720. Detailed information is available on TUIK’s web site: (<http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/DIESS/SiniflamaSurumDetayAction.do?surumId=164&turId=7&turAdi=%205.%20Coğrafî%20Siniflamalar>)

Territory no	Name of Territory	Selected Provinces	Number of Planned Surveys		Number of Realized Surveys	
			Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban
1	İstanbul	34-İstanbul 1	23	237	32	231
2	Aegean	20-Denizli	33	16	23	25
		35-İzmir	46	122	48	112
3	Mediterranean	01-Adana	32	66	33	67
		07-Antalya	44	44	54	34
4	Southeastern Anatolia	21-Diyarbakır	25	28	26	28
		27-Gaziantep	17	39	19	40
5	Western Anatolia	06-Ankara	11	90	18	89
		42-Konya	16	26	17	27
6	Eastern Marmara	11-Bilecik	6	6	5	10
		16-Bursa	40	91	40	87
7	Western Black Sea	55-Samsun	39	3	42	12
		67-Zonguldak	16	2	26	23
8	Central Anatolia	38-Kayseri	24	39	24	36
		68-Aksaray	14	9	14	6
9	Central Eastern Anatolia	44-Malatya	15	20	15	18
		65-Van	13	15	23	7
10	Eastern Black Sea	53-Rize	10	9	10	7
		61-Trabzon	24	20	26	21
11	Western Marmara	10-Balikesir	24	25	19	26
		59-Tekirdağ	10	16	13	14
12	Northeastern Anatolia	25-Erzurum	15	16	15	17
		36-Kars	8	5	8	5
		Total	506	941	550	942

On the other hand, these margins are only due to sampling errors. There are certainly other causes of error, which are harder to control. In order to keep these errors, most of which could originate from the fieldwork, at a minimum level, great care was taken to train and inspect the interviewers. All interviews in the provinces where few interviews (30 or fewer) were carried out, and 30% of all interviews in other provinces, were checked through calling or revisiting the house, in order to make sure that the interviews really took place and that the requested style and sequence of asking questions were employed. During these inspections, at least 2 or 3 surveys carried out by each interviewer were checked. In this way, whenever a disconformity was determined concerning the manner any interviewer adopted when introducing himself/herself or the research to any household, when selecting the respondent amongst the household members, or when asking the survey questions in line with the designated sequence and style, all the interviews led by that interviewer were cancelled, a new household was selected and a new interview was carried out.

Another important reason that might have broadened the error margin is the measurement mistakes related to the design of the survey questionnaire. We took care to keep as many questions in common with our 1999 study as possible in order to have the opportunity to make a comparison. However, many questions that were intensely discussed at that time were either unimportant or noncurrent at the time this study was made. For example, subjects such as *Refah Partisi* (Welfare Party), *Fazilet Partisi* (Virtue Party), 8-year compulsory education, and obligatory donation of the skin of animals sacrificed during the religious Feast of Sacrifice were not included in the scope of this research. We also decided not to ask questions about worship practice, which was taken up in detail by our study in 1999. Questions designed to measure various attitudes described below in detail, and questions related to wearing a turban or headcover, were

also asked during this research, and thus a comparison with the 1999 study became possible. In addition, many new questions were designed about various issues that were on the public agenda in May 2006.

We consulted many specialized academics in Turkey and abroad and took their views and advice into consideration while designing our questionnaire. After that, pilot interviews were carried out with 35 people in various provinces, and consequently, the mistakes and complications in some questions were ironed out. The final version of the survey questionnaire was handed in to the company *Frekans* at the beginning of May, and two assistants from outside the company acted as observers during the inspection procedure of the fieldwork. As the researchers, we also participated in the research by talking to many interviewers randomly and observing the inspection procedure during the fieldwork.

The distribution of realized samples is presented in Table 2.2. As a precaution against possible wastage that could emerge during the inspections, the number of people who were interviewed was 10% more than originally planned. Yet still, fewer interviews than originally planned were conducted in some of the provinces during the field study. On the other hand, more interviews than the planned number took place in some other provinces. Taking these results into consideration, the study conclusions will be presented according to weighted results with an emphasis on the rural and urban observation plan for each province. The fact that weighted results are not dissimilar to the results obtained without a weighted calculation, except for a few minor changes in some of the questions, can be considered as a marked observation, proving the applicability of this sampling.

3. General Findings of the Study

3.1. THE “TURBAN” ISSUE

One of the most significant findings of our study consists of a series of answers given to the question about the issue of “turban”, or “tesettür”, that has been fervently discussed by the public during the last few decades. As stated above, the study we conducted in 1999 included many questions on this subject. However, we tried to take up this matter in more depth in this new study. The results display a picture that is very different than many common public evaluations.

Both “secular” and “Islamist” sectors have deemed the “turban” issue as one of the most serious problems Turkey has ever encountered. The secular sector has asserted that the turban is not a type of traditional covering but a political symbol; that this issue was carried into the country’s agenda by Islamist parties; that the covering of women reflects the longing of political Islam for a Shari’ah state; and that all of these developments have resulted in an increase in the number of women wearing a turban. Conversely, the Islamist sector claims that covering is related to one’s religious belief and/or identity; that it is not used as a political symbol; that banning covered students from obtaining higher education is a breach of human rights; and that finding a solution to this issue is one of the most significant problems of Turkey. We must state at once that here we use the phrases “secular sector” and “Islamist sector” as they are often used by the public, and we are not suggesting any other references to their meanings. These sectors, without doubt, include other groups. For example, we can say that there is another group in society who define themselves as secular but who approach the issue of the turban from a liberal and democratic perspective. In order to simplify the subject here, we have used a dual contrast often referred to in public debates.

One conclusion we have reached through our research is that, contrary to the assertions of both the “secular” and the “Islamist” sectors, the turban issue is not on the agenda of the people of Turkey. Various studies conducted in recent years have reached the same result. The answers given within the scope of our survey indicate that Turkey’s five most significant problems are unemployment (38.2%), inflation/cost of living (12.1%), terrorism/national security/southeastern Turkey/Kurdish issue (13.8%), education (10.2%), and economical instability/crisis (6.5%). Only 3.7% of the respondents pointed out ‘headscarf/turban’ as an important issue. The answers given to the same question during a research conducted by Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu shortly before the 2002 elections had shown that less than 1% of the public considered the headscarf issue significant.¹ Therefore, the rate of people who deem it important has multiplied by approximately 3.5 in May 2006 – in other words, after three-and-a-half years with the AKP government. However, the answers given to such questions may rapidly alter in accordance with the current public agenda. While the perceived importance of some problems becomes greater subsequent to certain events, others begin to be perceived as less important. What needs to be emphasized here is that the headscarf and related issues do not have a position of priority on the current agenda of the country. This issue may hold great importance for the country’s intellectuals, but the representation of intellectuals in the general public is very low. In general, people do not seem to consider this issue significant.

The aforementioned question, that required respondents to state Turkey’s most important problem, was an open-ended question. In other words, we did not provide respondents with multiple-choice answers, and we categorized the given answers ourselves. However, in another question, five problems Turkey faces were listed and respondents were asked to state which of these should be solved *before all else*. We determined these issues beforehand, as unemployment, southeastern Turkey/Kurdish issue, the ban on women wearing headscarves in universities, issues related to education, and health problems. The response rates were 70.3%, 12.1%, 5.7%, 7.9%, and 2.7% respectively, while 0.5% of the public

¹ A. Çarkoğlu ve E. Kalaycıoğlu, 2006. *Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, Protest and Stability in an Islamic Society*, I.B.Tauris.

chose the “none” option. As indicated by these answers, the headscarf issue was again not prioritized amongst the predetermined problems and was not in the first three in ranking order.

However, compared with other “identity” issues related to Kurdish or Alevi citizens, the problems of the Sunni Islam social segment seem to stand at the forefront. In a third question, issues concerning the economy and education were excluded, and respondents were asked which of the policies relating to four identity issues the government should implement *before all else*. These policies were stated as allowing people of Kurdish origin to learn their mother tongue in state schools, lifting the ban on university students who wear a headscarf, enabling graduates of *İmam Hatip* high schools to be assessed with the same scoring system applied to normal high schools, and the financial assistance of the state to Cem Houses (Alevi houses of worship). The response rates came out as 11.4%, 43%, 17.6%, and 5.3% respectively, and 22.8% of the respondents did not answer this question. As can be observed from the answers, when a direct question about identity was asked, finding a solution to the turban issue was prioritized by a large group of 43%, while the second largest group of 17.6% saw the *İmam Hatip* issue as the biggest problem. However, we must also state that a large group of 22.9% chose not to give an answer to this question – only very few questions in our survey were left unanswered by a such a large group of respondents. When we observe that the response rates to two other questions about people of Kurdish and Alevi origin are also low compared to overall response rates, we are forced to think that many people, concerned about possible unfavorable consequences, might have deliberately refrained from answering this question.

The point that has to be emphasized here is that when the turban issue – which appears to be less important when compared to economic issues – is examined with other, similar identity issues, a significant part of the public deems it an important problem that requires a solution; then and only then is it highlighted. It is noteworthy that the turban issue, when discussed in terms of identity issues, becomes subject to more attention in comparison to Kurdish or Alevi issues of identity. This finding can be interpreted as an indicator of the fact that the turban issue can be more easily and extensively discussed within society, especially considering it is in the interest of a larger group in society and it is more visible in the political agenda. Thus, it must be emphasized that the headscarf issue is structurally different from other identity issues, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Relating to this question, respondents were also asked whether they thought that graduates of *İmam Hatip* high schools should be allowed to enter university departments of their choosing upon obtaining the required score at the university entrance exam, and whether this had drawbacks. 82.1% stated that “they should”, while 15.4% said that allowing them to enter some departments was unfavorable. As can be seen, when solely considering the identity issue, the public is relatively more sensitive to the turban issue and *İmam Hatip* high schools.

Another significant finding about covering we have reached through our research is that, contrary to general impressions, the percentage of women who cover has dropped compared to 1999. For example, 25% of the respondents who were asked whether there has been an increase in the number of covered women in the last decade said that was a significant increase, while 39.1% said that this number slightly increased. In other words, 64% of the people of Turkey is of the opinion that the number of women who cover has risen. 21.8% said that there was no increase, while the percentage of respondents who had no idea or who did not answer this question was 14.1%. Our research has not verified these views, which we believe are based on impressions. On the contrary, the percentage of women who stated that they do not cover when going out was 27.3% in 1999, while this rate is 36.5% in our 2006 survey. When compared to the 1999 study, in 2006, the percentage of women who wear a headcover/headscarf/*yemeni* dropped from 53.4% to 48.8%, the rate of women who wear a *çarşaf* dropped from 3.4% to 1.1%, and the percentage of women who wear a turban dropped from 15.7% to 11.4%.

If we compare the study we conducted in 1999 to our current study, we can make more observations in addition to the finding that the number of women who cover in Turkey has decreased. When the figures in the related table are examined, by and large we see that the rate of women who do not cover when going out has increased, both in rural and urban regions, when a comparison is made with the situation in 1999.

The number of women who wear a headcover/headscarf/*yemeni* has increased in rural areas, and decreased in cities. The number of women who wear a turban or a *çarşaf* has decreased both in rural and urban regions. The most important change observed regarding settlement units is that the percentage of uncovered women has risen from 33.4% to 46% with an increase of 12.6% in cities. The 8.4% decrease in the rate of women in cities who wear a headscarf/headcover/*yemeni*, from 49% to 40.6%, is the next noteworthy change. Evaluating these figures, we can suggest that as the rate of urbanization in Turkey picks up, there will be fewer women who cover.

When we separate women who do not cover into age groups, we see that the most significant change that has occurred since 1999 is the rise in the 25-39 age group: from 28% to 41.5%, an increase of 13.5%. What follows is a 10.2% increase in the rate of people in the 18-24 age group who state that they do not cover, from 40.5% to 50.7%. The most significant change within the category of people who use a headscarf/headcover/*yemeni* is observed for the age group 25-39; with a decrease of 10.4%, from 53.3% to 42.9%. Women in the 18-24 age group who say that they wear a “turban” follow with a decrease of 9.3%, from 20.6% to 11.3%.

On the other hand, the most significant decrease in the number of women who wear a turban was observed in the younger age group of 18-24 and not in the group 25-39, which was the case above. While 20.6% of women who belong to this group said that they wore a turban in 1999, this rate has dropped to 11.3%, a decrease of 9.3%. In our 2006 study, we have not come across anybody who said that they wore a *çarşaf* in 1999 in either of these groups. In other words, women in the 18-39 age group almost never wear a *çarşaf*. This observation, without doubt, does not mean that no one in that age group wears a *çarşaf*; it only indicates that such people do not add up to a percentage that can be represented statistically in the general population.

These changes can be explained by two reasons. Compared to women in the 18-24 age group, women in the 25-39 age group perhaps feel less pressured to cover by their families; and since these older women are probably married, their spouses, who are perhaps younger than the head of the family, do not raise an objection when they do not cover. Single men were asked during our research whether they would want their future wives to cover; 56% said they would not, while 44% stated that they would. 69.6% of the single men in the latter group would like their future wives to wear a headscarf/headcover/*yemeni*, while 30.9% prefer the turban.

The fact that the highest decrease amongst women who wear a turban is observed in the age group of 18-24 has made us think that the women in this group may have chosen to uncover in order to pursue their higher education. A finding that could support this view is the answer given to a question directed to everyone included in the sample. When people were asked if they had a covered daughter at university age, and if so, whether they would approve of her uncovering in order to attend university, 64.9% said that they would.

Finally, another observation that can be made is that the number of covered women decreases in direct relation to increase in income. While no change is observed between 1999 and 2006 in the rate of uncovered women in the lower income group, this rate has risen in the medium-level income group by 10%, from 27.2% to 37.2% and it has risen more notably in the higher-level income group; by 17%, from 54.2% to 71.2%. Similarly, while the rate of women who wear a headcover/headscarf/*yemeni* in the lower income group has risen from 65.1% in 1999 to 69.4% in 2006, this rate in the medium-level income group has dropped from 54.7% to 49.1%. The most significant decrease is seen in the higher income group by 13.2% - from 33.8% in 1999 to 20.6% in 2006. The number of people who wear a turban has decreased in all income groups, with the most substantial decrease of 6% in the higher income group, from 10.8% to 4.8%.

We can only explain the reasons related to such a decrease in the rate of women who cover through speculation. It could be that urbanization enables women to more actively participate in social life, allowing them to become relatively more independent individuals who can take part in society without covering. The fact that the education of young girls has become part of the public agenda through the work of various campaigns that were launched in recent years could have also been indirectly effective. As a result of the ban on covered students after the “February 28” period, which prevented them from entering universities, some students may have preferred to pursue their education instead of insisting on remaining covered. The polarization and “dispute” over the headscarf issue during the same period may have eased when AKP came in to power. However, all of these explanations are only plausible hypotheses.

Our study includes some findings that could support such views. For example, the percentage of respondents who think that religious people are under pressure was 42.4% in 1999, while it has dropped to 17% in 2006. Likewise, in 1999, 63.8% of those who were asked whether religious people in Turkey were able to freely exercise Islam’s required practices said “no”, while 30.9% held the opposite opinion. In a study that was conducted just before the 2002 elections, the rate of people who had said “yes” remained unchanged, while the rate of people who answered “no” had significantly decreased; furthermore, fewer people preferred not to answer this question.² However, the rate of people who answered the same question by saying “yes” has risen to 81.9% in our current study, while the rate of those of the opposite opinion has dropped to 14.3%. Another question requesting respondents to compare the period of the AKP government with that of the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government before 2002, showed that the rate of respondents who think that the attitude of society towards religious people has changed is 49%, with 60% of those thinking that this change is for the better.

We can conclude from these questions that in May 2006, when we conducted our research, religious people felt generally more at ease in society and that the tension in 1999 has remarkably lessened. However, as we have also stated above, we cannot say whether the results would come out differently if we conducted the same study again today – in a political atmosphere which in the last few months appears to have become tenser once more over the issue of secularism. We must stress that the aforementioned tension is essentially a reflection of the struggle amongst the elite. When a comparison with the situation in 1999 is made, it is not possible to say that the general social atmosphere throughout the country is more tense in 2006. But without doubt, the attitude of leaders has a significant role on changes in the attitude of the public. Even though a rising tension throughout society does not exist, the messages and signals given by the elite may cause groups of people to form various opinions. What we were able to find here is the average inclinations of the people of Turkey. Thus, the study reflects the concerns and views of the elite only in equal ratio to the extent these views are spread amongst society.

A third finding in our research about the issue of covering is that, contrary to the views of the “secularist” sector that claim that the turban is a political symbol and of some “Islamist” or liberal sectors who claim that this is an issue of identity, a great majority of women who wear a headscarf have stated that they cover because Islam commands it. When asked why they cover, 71.5% of covered women say that they do so because Islam commands it, and a group of 7.6% say that they have to cover because everyone around them does. The rate of women who say that they cover because doing so is an integral part of their identity, and that they would feel “naked” in society if they did not do so, is only 3.9%. The rate of women who consider covering as a requisite of being an honorable woman is very low, at 3.4%.³

Neither the people of Turkey nor covered women associate the headscarf with honor, although this connection is occasionally made by the Islamic sector. When men were asked why their wives or fiancées cover, 59.3% answered by saying “because Islam commands it”, while 7.8% said that it is “because everyone else around is covered”. Only 1.5% of these men said that their wives or fiancées consider covering because it is a sign of being an honorable woman. Similarly, when men who want their wives or fiancées to be covered were asked why, 51.6% said “because Islam commands it”, 7.8% said “because of our circle of friends and acquaintances” and 4% said “because of honor”.

As can also be observed by looking at these percentages, it is obvious that the public does not associate the covering of women with honor. In a study that was conducted in July 2003 that also took up the issue of women through a sample representing the Turkish population, Ersin Kalaycıoğlu and Binnaz Toprak concluded that “honor” is not considered an issue regarding the participation of women in education or business life; and that neither uneducated and/or unemployed women, nor the majority of the people of Turkey, have interpreted not participating in education or business life as “the requisite of being a honorable woman”.⁴ In this context, it is quite pleasing that the majority of the public does not associate the participation in education or business life with the lack of honor for a woman wearing a headscarf.

The fourth finding of our study with regard to the issue of the covering of women is that the views that are proposed as the general conviction of society and that claim women cover because of family pressure have not been verified. Only 0.9% of covered women have said that they cover because their husbands or fiancées want them to, and the rate of women who cover because of their family – and not their husband or fiancée – is only 0.2%. Very few men amongst the ones whose wives or fiancées are covered or who want their future wives or fiancées to cover mentioned pressure by family as a reason.

However, although it looks as if the decision to be covered does not originate from family pressure, women who cover think that their family and/or circle of friends and acquaintances would pressure them if they decided to uncover. When covered women were asked, assuming they uncovered, whether they would be forced to cover again by their family or someone from their immediate environment, 45.5% said that they would face objections, whereas 54.5% did not. 89.7% of women who said that they would face objections believe that these would originate from their family.

The fact that a total of only 1.1% of covered women have said that they cover because of their spouses, fiancées or family, but that 46% think that people would object to them if they uncovered, is utterly paradoxical. This is, indeed, a very difficult finding to interpret. One interpretation could be that the women who say that they cover “because Islam commands it” are not telling the truth and that they cover because their families insist that they do.

As we have stated in the section about methodology, it is very difficult to verify in this kind of study whether the respondents are telling the truth. Therefore, the truth may have been concealed in this question. However, if we assume

3 This finding completely overlaps with the results of a study conducted by Ali Bayramoğlu. In this study, which is based on detailed interviews with covered women, Bayramoğlu has shown that no association is made between covering and honor. Ali Bayramoğlu, *Çağdaşlık Hurafe Kaldırılmaz: Demokratikleşme Sürecinde Dindarlar ve Laikler*, TESEV Publications, 2006.

4 Kalaycıoğlu and Toprak, 2004.

that the truth has not been told, then we must also think about the possible reasons for such behavior. The only reason that comes to mind is that the respondents were, for some reason, hesitant to tell the truth. But if this is a factor, then one would also expect them to be hesitant about admitting that they would face objections if they uncovered. On the contrary, in that question, almost 46% of covered women have openly said that their families would object if they uncovered. This compels us to come up with a different explanation from the “lying” factor.

Another possible explanation could be that the senior members of families impose on young women the idea that Islam commands that women cover. In this case, even if women adopt the belief that covering is a command of Islam, this idea that is imposed on them by their family as an unquestionable belief could conceal the pressure or could even prevent it from being examined. Without doubt, the conclusion that women cover by free will cannot be extracted from explanations such as “command of Islam” or “immediate environment”. Clearly, a devout Muslim feels obliged to adapt to a condition which he or she sees as a “command of Islam”. In the end, this means submitting to an order. What is important here is whether this command is accepted after a process of debate, and to what extent it was truly internalized after this particular process. In many arenas, people accept and internalize restrictions which are seen as commands, laws or moral rules even after they embark on questioning them. However, it is not clear whether this kind of an internalization exists in terms of the covering of women. It might also be true that covering is externally imposed on individuals against their wills. In this study, we did not ask questions to help us distinguish between these possibilities. For example, covered women could be asked how they reached the conclusion that covering is commanded by Islam, or through which circles or institutions they have attained information about Islam – without doubt, people can also reach the conclusion that they should cover in pursuit of Islam’s requirements through their own discretion. Had these questions been asked, and the existence of an authority being accepted without questioning was mentioned, we could have had more convincing proof that women cover because of external pressure. We did not ask people we interviewed such detailed questions about this subject. This point can be studied and exposed not by a survey, but through in-depth interviews. Unfortunately, such questions must be asked by another study that employs different methods.⁵

At this stage, accepting covered women’s own explanations and interpreting their conflicting answers by considering their inner worlds seems more reasonable to us. As we have stated above, a great majority of covered women have stated that they cover “because Islam commands it”, and a small minority said that they cover because everyone around them covers as well. These two reasons are the two most important factors in the covering of women. We can assume that those amongst the family and the close environment of women who cover for these reasons are in a similar position – in other words, the families, friends and acquaintances of women who cover because of religious concerns have probably adopted the same kind of reasoning. Women who cover because of religious belief may think that if they uncovered their heads – in fact, whether they wanted to uncover was not a part of this question – their families would think that they are acting against the orders of religion; thus, based upon this assumption, they may have said that their families would raise an objection. They may also personally believe that uncovering is acting against the commands of religion; and if they actually cover in order to abide by the order of their religion, then uncovering will definitely mean acting against Islam’s command. Likewise, when asked “if women in your family or amongst your friends or acquaintances uncovered, would you also do the same?”, 94.1% of women wearing a turban answered by saying “no”.

The last observation we can reach through our study is related to the question of whether two totally different groups exist in society in regard to the covering of women. When we study the relationships between women who cover their heads by wearing a headscarf or by using traditional ways of covering and women who do not cover, we see that these two groups do not lead a segregated life. There is no clear-cut separation in the family and friendship relations of uncovered women and women who wear a headcover/headscarf/*yemeni*. According to what we have been told during our survey, women who wear a headscarf or *çarşaf* and women who cover in the traditional way come together in one-to-one meetings and with their families. Two separated groups who avoid meeting each other or who abstain from any kind of contact do not, in practice, exist. The striking conclusion we reach here is that although the views and religious practices of covered and uncovered women are different from each other, they are not segregated in social life.

3.2. APPROACHES TO THE ISSUE OF IDENTITY

We have stated above that contrary to the discussions amongst Turkish intellectuals, the public does not deem the “turban” issue important when compared to economical and social issues; and that it gains importance only when it is

5 In addition to Ali Bayramoğlu’s study mentioned in Footnote 3, the first extensive study based on in-depth interviews with covered women was conducted by Nilüfer Gole and presented in her book titled “Modern Mahrem [The Forbidden Modern]”, İstanbul, Metis Yayınları, 1991). The latest study on this issue is the book titled *Rethinking Islam and Liberal Democracy: Islamist Women in Turkish Politics* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2005) written by Yeşim Arat as a result of her interviews conducted with people in the Women Committees of *Refah Partisi* (Welfare Party). None of the findings in any of the three studies do not verify the assertion that covered women covered themselves because they consider covering as being involved in a political movement.

defined as an identity issue. However, it is also important to note that a certain sensitivity concerning the covering of women exists in this context.

Whether this sensitivity reflects a general democratic reaction concerning the rights of each sector of society is disputable. The fact that a society which consists of a Sunni Muslim majority is sensitive about the issue of the turban and *İmam Hatip* high schools, but that does not resort to the same democratic norms when it comes to minority ethnic or religious groups, is indeed hard to explain by liberal values. This situation could indicate that the majority of the people of Turkey adopts a “sectarian” approach to democracy rather than adopting democratic norms fully. In other words, the rights of people who belong to “us” are defended, whereas the same sensitivity concerning the rights of “others” is not shown.

As we have mentioned above, concerning our question related to identity, 11.4% supported education in Kurdish for citizens of Kurdish origin and only 5.3% supported the financial contribution of the state to Alevi Cem houses. 43% gave support to lifting the ban on covered students for university entrance, and 17.6% supported measures that would make it easier for graduates of *İmam Hatip* high schools to enter university. In addition to these two questions related to citizens of Kurdish or Alevi origin, our survey also brings out this “sectarian” approach through other questions pertaining to the issue of identity. For example, when questioning the types of criteria used during voting, the option of a party “that considers protecting the Alevi identity and the rights of Alevi people” was the least preferred amongst ten different options, while a party “that shows an effort to protect the Kurdish identity” was the second least preferred.

Similarly, the rate of people who support the reinstatement of properties previously owned by non-Muslim foundations and later sequestered by the state was 28.1%, while the rate of people of the opposite opinion comprised a high rate of 47.1%. In another question that asked respondents to answer by using a scale where “0” meant “I do not agree at all”, and “10” meant “I totally agree” on a scale of 1-10, only 3.9% agreed to the re-opening of the seminary in Heybeliada for the education of Christian Orthodox clergymen and this issue placed last on the list. In another question, respondents were asked which religious group should govern Jerusalem, taking into consideration that the city is considered sacred by Muslims, Christians and Jews. 66.8% chose Muslims, while only 29.4% chose the option that favored an international administration consisting of representatives of all three religions.⁶ This is another indicator of the “sectarian” approach we have previously mentioned.

A similar question was asked using a list of people from 12 different countries, ranging from Japan to Brazil., including our close neighbors. Respondents were asked whether they consider these nations as “friends” or “enemies” and where they would place them on a scale of 1 to 10 (with “0” meaning “definitely an enemy” and “10” meaning “definitely a friend”). This resulted in only the people of three Muslim countries (Palestinians, Saudi Arabians and Iranians) being voted higher than a 5 on the list, with scale points of 5.3, 5.1 and 5.1 respectively, while other nations were given points under 5, with the lowest being Armenians with a level of 2.3.

In social and private life, approaches towards “others” seem to be more complicated. For example, similar to our study in 1999, the rate of people who are against their daughters or sons marrying someone from another religion is again very high, at around 67-70% in our current study. Although not as high, the number of people who say that they would oppose an inter-sectarian marriage form approximately half of the public. The striking point here is that while the rate of opposition against the marriage of a daughter or a son with a non-Muslim has dropped by 3% to 5% when compared to the situation in 1999, the rate of opposition against an inter-sectarian marriage has increased by 10%. On the other hand, except for the approach towards homosexuals, the rate of people who have said that they do not object to being neighbors with Jewish, Armenian, Kurdish or Greek people, people who belong to another Muslim sect, or who do not believe in any religion, is higher than the rate of people who raise an objection regarding each category. However, the percentage of people who raised an objection concerning marriage with a non-Muslim is around 40% – a figure that cannot be underestimated. The rate of people who stated that they would not raise an objection against any of the seven different neighbor categories is 27%, while the rate of people who would not want any of the seven categorized neighbors is around 17%.

Respondents were asked with what type of people they would like to work with; 33.7% said that they would prefer their fellow countrymen, while 25% said that they would prefer working with “devout Muslims”. The rate of people who stated that they would prefer working with individuals who foster the same world view is lower, at 37.9%. However, concerning preferences about colleagues, when people were asked which type of people they would *especially* want to work with as a partner if they established a business, the structure of the answers changed; and since business partnership is a

6 We extend our thanks to 7th Grade student Can Çarkoğlu for this question.

risky issue, the great majority of respondents (61.5%) preferred to work with an honest person, 13.3% preferred a person with previous business experience, 11% preferred someone with good education and only 9% preferred to work with a “devout Muslim”.

Without doubt, the “us syndrome” is a matter of concern in terms of Turkish democracy. In social life, individuals may have closer relationships with “others”, although they define two different groups as “we” and “others”. However, the formation of a modern democratic culture requires being sensitive towards the rights of “others”. Even though it is not easy to make a generalization about this issue without conducting a more detailed study, the above-mentioned data are unfortunately not promising enough for us to think that Turkey has become sensitive about these issues as yet.

As we have previously mentioned, 22.8% of the respondents did not answer the questions pertaining to the problems of Kurdish and Alevi citizens – perhaps because they are somewhat concerned about revealing their views on such sensitive issues, even though we mentioned that the names of the respondents are not written in the survey booklets. This situation can be considered as a problem often met during research all over the world. In fact, ordinary citizens may not have their own opinions about certain issues that can be defined as “sensitive”. When we take into consideration that the education level of ordinary Turkish citizens is lower than 8th grade, it might be difficult for many people to develop a personal opinion related to “sensitive” issues on which official views are heard more and more in public; similarly, even if an individual has his personal opinion, he might be reluctant to express it to an interviewer questioning him. Regarding such an attitude as normal, we are pleased that people have expressed their views on many different subjects despite such concerns. The real problem here is to what extent these views were stated in order to have us hear the official viewpoint, what part of the official viewpoint was genuinely internalized and how much the answers reflected the real opinions of individuals. Answering such questions is truly difficult within the scope of this type of study.

We would like to stress that these findings indicate another problem related to democracy in Turkey. The fact that people have a hard time answering questions about sensitive issues in such surveys may be linked to the presence of articles and actual circumstances in the Turkish jurisprudence system and legal practices that prevent the free expression of thought or to the social bias against minority groups. As a matter of fact, asking direct questions in any survey in order to determine the percentage of Kurdish or Alevi citizens is not helpful, and these percentages are determined through indirect questions. However, the answers received may give the impression that the size of these groups in society is smaller than their real percentage. For example, when we directed the question “Are you an Alevi?” during our survey, 6.1% said that they were Alevi; on the other hand, the rate of people who said that they had a picture of the “Twelve Imams” was 6.6%, the rate of people who said that they had a picture of Ali was 7.4%, the rate of people who considered Ali or Hacı Bektaş Veli *the most important* religious personages according to their beliefs (in a list that also included Ebubekir, Ömer and Osman) was 14.3%. The rate of people who directly said that they were not Sunni Muslim but Alevi, or who said that they have the picture of the Twelve Imams or Imam Ali in their home, was 11.4%. When we consider that the rate of people who directly stated that they were Alevi was 6.1% in our 2006 study, when this rate was only 3.9% in our 1999 study, we can say that today people declare their identities with a little more ease.

Two questions were indirectly asked within the survey to determine Kurdish ethnic origin. The first one was an open-ended question that inquired in which language the respondents communicated with their parents in their childhood, while the other, a close-ended question, inquired whether they knew different languages or dialects well enough to speak them in daily life. The rate of people who indicated Kurdish or Zazaki as the language spoken with parents was 13.2%. When asked whether they know Kurdish, Zazaki or Kirmanc, the rate of people who said that they speak these languages is 15.6%. We must emphasize that these percentages have significantly risen in recent years.

3.3. “ISLAMIST-SECULARIST” POLARIZATION

As we stated in the introduction of our study, the secularist approach and practices of the Turkish Republic has caused disputes since it was first established, and even gave way to uprisings during its first years. After the transition to the multi-party regime, sectors that wanted Islam to be more visible in public life pushed this motive to be a part of the public agenda by means of political parties. Since the initial years of the Republic, and even since the Reform Period of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish society has faced a separation of two wings that are defined as “Islamist” and “Secularist”. This cleavage left its imprint on the last few decades and became the focal point of public debate after the Islamist sector began to gain power around the “*Milli Görüş* [National Outlook]” movement, which started in the 1970s.

In the study we conducted in 1999, we tried to comprehend whether this cleavage, which was widely discussed amongst the elite, the print and broadcast media members, during that period, also existed within society. The answers given to many questions in our survey did not point to such a cleavage in regards to a significant majority of society – the

majority of the people seemed tolerant regarding different lifestyles they came across in the course of daily life. For example, it did not matter to them if women in the districts where they lived or in restaurants they visited covered or wore mini-skirts. Similarly, a great majority of people said that there could be good people amongst people from a different religion or people who did not have any religious belief; that if someone believes in God or a prophet, he could still be considered a Muslim even if he did not perform the ritual prayer (*namaz*), did not fast, consumed alcohol or in the case of a woman did not cover; that they did not approve of political parties that base their policy on religion; that they did not want the secular jurisprudence system to change; and that they did not favor the mixing of religion and state.

We decided not to analyze most of the aforementioned questions once again in our current study. We do not think that Turkish people have become less tolerant concerning these issues in the seven years that have passed since our previous study. In this study, instead of such questions, we used other modes of inquiry that could provide us with some hints in terms of the “Islamist-Secularist” cleavage. If we have to generalize the answers we have received, we can say that approximately one-third of the public is sensitive about secularism, and that two-thirds have not displayed any sign of such sensitivity. After being told that the terms “Islamists” and “Secularists” were often used in Turkey and that “0” means “secular” and “10” means “Islamist” on a scale of 0-10, 20.3% of respondents defined themselves as “secular”, 48.5% as “Islamist” and 23.4% placed themselves in the center of these two extremes. However, as shown by the answers given to some of our questions, the wing that we can describe as “secular” consists of almost 30% of the people, which enables us to distinguish between the “secularists” and “Islamists”.

For example, the question which analyzed whether secularism is under threat in Turkey was answered positively by 22.6%, while 72.6% said that no such threat exists. When we asked people if they agreed with the claim that religious fundamentalism, which aims to establish an Islamic society and state in Turkey, has been on the rise in the last 10-15 years, 32.6% said that they agreed, whereas 61.3% did not. When the people who agreed with this viewpoint were asked what they based their opinion on, 34.6% of the 32.6% pointed out the increase in the number of covered women. When asked whether they would feel disturbed if elementary school teachers or judges were allowed to wear a turban, 29.2% and 28.2% respectively answered that they would, while the rates of people who were of the opposite opinion were 70.4% and 71.5% respectively. The rate of people who considered the publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper as an inevitable consequence of democracy and freedom of thought was 15.1%, while 73% stated that such publications should be prevented. As will be explained below, the answers given to each question are closely related with how religious people think they are and with their self-placement on the “Islamist-Secularist” scale.

In the study we conducted in 1999, we asked people whether they supported the existence of religion-based political parties in the Turkish political system. At that time, 60.6% said that such parties should not exist in the Turkish political system, while 24.6% thought that they should. In our current study, the same question yielded a decrease of 7% in the rate of people who thought such parties should not be a part of the Turkish political system (53.6%), while the rate of people supporting the opposite viewpoint was 41.4%, with an increase of 16.8%. Although this finding appears at first to be a matter of concern for people who think that secularism is under threat, this question does not aim to analyze what is understood by the concept of “religion-based politics”. Similarly, the rate of people who defined themselves as “primarily Muslim”, when directed a question as to how they define themselves, was 35.7% in 1999, which has risen to 44.6% in 2006. The rate of people who defined themselves as “very religious” was 6% in 1999, while it is 12.8% in our 2006 study. However, such views do not necessarily mean that the number of people who want a religious state has increased.

In fact, through examining another question we can see that such a conclusion cannot be drawn. 21% of the respondents gave an affirmative answer to a question we asked in 1999, inquiring whether they would want a Shari’ah state to be established in Turkey. This percentage, which was rather high, decreased almost by half in all of the questions asking whether they thought Shari’ah laws should replace the Turkish Civil Code, after we provided a comparative explanation of both Shari’ah laws and the Civil Code. In some questions (for instance, concerning the implementation of Shari’ah laws about adultery) the rate dropped to 1%. We did not include questions that compared these two jurisprudence systems into our current study. However, in our direct question with which we inquired whether respondents favored the establishment of a Shari’ah state, the rate of positive response of 21% in our 1999 study dropped to 8.9% in 2006. It should not be forgotten that at the time we conducted our study in 1999, the answer given to this question asked directly in all research conducted was around 20%.

Another favorable conclusion that can be drawn from our study is that a majority of the people included in both groups do not think that the opposing group pressures them. As we have stated above, most of the public is not of the opinion that the secularist sector pressures religious people. People who defend the countering viewpoint are only represented

by 17%. Moreover, only 8.1% of respondents said that religious circles pressure secular people. Likewise, the rate of people who think that secularists are unable to live free from the pressure of religious circles is only 11.3%.

A great majority of both covered and uncovered women stated that they do not feel pressured to either uncover or cover by strangers. 89.4% of women who wear a headscarf said that they were not disturbed by strangers because they cover. Another question directed to the same group of women, asking if anyone in their immediate environment or from their family was forcing them to uncover, yielded a percentage of 93% saying that no one pressured them. On the other hand, 90.1% of uncovered women stated that they did not feel pressured by anyone to cover. The rate of covered women who said that they were disturbed by strangers because they are covered was 3.7%, while the rate of uncovered women who said that they felt pressured to cover came out at 9.9%. Despite this slight difference between the two groups, in general we can say that a significant majority of women in both groups is not under social pressure.

When families who had at least one daughter who does not cover were asked how they would react if their daughter decided to cover one day, 15.2% said that they would feel upset and try to convince her to uncover, 28.2% said that although they would feel sad they would respect her free decision, and 54.3% said that they would feel pleased and support her. However, the total rate of people who said that they would be upset was 43.4%. As mentioned above, the same question was directed to covered women, resulting in 46% saying that their families would force them to cover again if they uncovered, while 54% said that no one would raise an objection against their decision.

One of the issues often expressed with regard to the “Islamist-Secularist” cleavage was that the military played an important role in safeguarding secularism, and that the threats cast against the secular state would become stronger if the military factor did not exist. Whether this idea corresponds to real facts is the subject of another discussion. For example, although the “February 28th” period was considered a “post-modern coup” by certain groups, when we look at the process that led to “February 28th”, we believe that the fall of the *Refah Partisi* (Welfare Party) from power was also closely related to the reaction of a significant portion of the public against the policies of the party. In other words, the reaction of voters, as well as democratic processes, was as effective on the advent of “February 28th” as the military factor. Thus, 53.7% of the public has stated that secularism can be safeguarded and maintained in Turkey without the support of the military. However, 58.6% of the public finds it normal that military forces can occasionally express their views against elected governments concerning certain subjects. Since what these subjects were was not asked, people who approved of the military expressing its views concerning security issues that is of direct concern, might have given an affirmative answer to this question. Even so, when interpreted together with this question, it is not possible to draw the conclusion that a relation between the military’s expression of its opinions and the protection of secularism is established. In other words, even if the military states its opinion or not, the majority of the people believe that secularism can be protected without the military’s support. On the other hand, when we listed ten different sectors and asked to what extent these social groups supported the reforms for eliminating the infringement of human rights, expanding the rights of citizens and enabling constitutional institutions to work better and be closer to the public, the rate of people who said that the military supported such reforms was significantly high, at 54.5%. The rate of people who think that the military is against these reforms was only 20.9%.

Similarly, another interesting finding we have reached in this context is related to the presidential elections that have recently become the symbol of the “Islamist-Secularist” cleavage in Turkey. In a question that examined the required characteristics of the president, the rate of people who think that the president must be a “devout Muslim” was 74.3%, while the rate of people who considered “protecting secularism” important was slightly higher at 75.2%. However, 85.9% deemed “being an example to modern Turkey through his lifestyle” important. 50.8% thought that if the president is “a man and if he is married his wife must be uncovered”. In the open-ended question which asked who respondents would support as candidate for the presidential elections in 2007, no names stood out, with the most supported candidate at only 14.9%. However, the total rate of people who did not answer this question or who did not mention a name was 52.9%.

3.4. OPINIONS CONCERNING AKP AND THE AKP GOVERNMENT

The diagnosis that a very serious process of change is in place when compared to the previous DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government is considerably noteworthy in terms of the evaluations made about the AKP government. People who think that this change is for the better comprise a larger group than people who think it is for the worse. However, it is not possible to say that AKP’s performance in governance has been found satisfactory in all areas. The party’s policies concerning Kurdish and Alevi identity, particularly, are thought to be far from satisfactory. The party is also criticized concerning its policy in reducing the rate of unemployment. Similarly, the performance of AKP with regard to issues such

as the headscarf issue and the problems *İmam Hatip* graduates face, which are deemed important by the party's voters, is found to be rather inadequate. The general evaluation of AKP displays a two-sided picture. The more conservative group of rural voters who see themselves closer to the religious and Islamist sector and who have a relatively lower socio-economic status have a more positive approach, whereas the opposing group of urban voters, who ideologically see themselves closer to the leftist and secular sector and who have a relatively higher socio-economic status, generally assess AKP negatively. However, we can say that AKP has a better position in these evaluations when compared to RP's position in the 1999 study. Still, as a result of this evaluation, which reflects the general dual structure of society, we can say that AKP stands out as a government that receives positive feedback from a certain social segment while it becomes the target of another that opposes its policies.

3.5. ISSUE OF "ISLAM AND TERRORISM"

One of the most frequently discussed issues worldwide since September 11 is whether there is a link between Islam and terrorism. The suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks by Muslim terrorists, that first began during the Palestinian conflict and then took place in different parts of the world as well as in Turkey, have gradually caused Western societies to establish a link between Islam and terrorism, and the September 11 attack has intensified this prejudice. Without doubt, terrorist attacks are not methods employed solely by Muslims, and many people belonging to other religions have participated in such terrorist attacks in various countries all over the world. However, it is an obvious fact that many of the terrorist attacks that have taken place in the last decade were either administered and/or carried out by Muslim organizations. As a result, "Islamophobia" has begun to emerge in the West, and although responsible politicians and intellectuals stress that Islam does not condone such terrorist acts and that the actions of terrorists cannot be attributed to all Muslims, it is a fact that prejudice against Muslims continuously gains strength in Western societies.

In this study, we have tried to examine this issue and to find out the viewpoint of the people of Turkey, consisting mostly of Muslims, concerning terrorism. One of the five questions we asked about this subject inquired whether suicide bombings could be deemed acceptable if the country was occupied. 65.5% answered this question by saying that suicide bombings are unacceptable even if the country was occupied. The rate of people who thought such attacks were acceptable was only 20.2%. When a more concrete example was given and people were asked whether they approved of the suicide bombings by the resistance fighters in Iraq, 72.8% said that they did not approve, while the ones who gave approval made up a small group of 17.5%. The percentage of people who did not approve of such bombings increased if such attacks were directed against civilians. The rate of people who would approve of suicide bombings against civilians in the case of an occupation was 8%, while the great majority of people, 84.4%, said that they do not find such actions acceptable. When the question was more concretized and people were asked whether they approved of the Palestinian suicide bombings against Israeli civilians, 82.8% said that they did not while only 8.3% said that they did. Finally, when people were asked whether such attacks were acceptable under Islamic principles, 81.4% said that they were not, while only 8.1% said that they were. The rate of people who chose to answer these five questions by saying "I have no idea" or who did not give an answer at all ranged between 10% and 15%, which is significant. This attitude could be a reflection of their worry about openly voicing their support to an action that is a crime, or could be a sign that they have not really pondered upon this issue before.

The picture that appears with relation to these conclusions shows that the majority of people do not associate Islam with terrorism, that the people of Turkey do not support terrorist activities even in extreme situations such as the occupation of the country, and that they are strongly against such attacks especially if they are directed towards civilians.

4. Main Demographic Characteristics of the Sample, the Problematic of Identity and Political Leanings

4.1. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESEARCH SAMPLE

When we look at Table 4.1, which gives information about the distribution of some of the basic indicators in our sample, we see that the rate of female respondents in our sample is higher by approximately 2%.¹ When these figures are evaluated, the fact that no quota has been used in selecting our sample must be kept in mind. All demographical values have been obtained through applying the random selection method, except for designing the urban and rural interviews in accordance with the actual values of the voting population. The weight that we used to correct certain regional rural-urban deviations that emerged during the interviews has caused minor changes in sizes calculated without weight in some of the other demographical indicators. When we compared the results of the 2006 research with that of the one conducted in 1999, we observed that the sample displayed a differentiation by at most 3-4 percentage points. For example, a lower percentage of our 2006 samples are married (74.5% in 1999, and 70.4% in 2006). The size of an average household is smaller (4.6% in 1999, and 4.2% in 2006). The rate of literate people is higher by almost 1 percent (91.1% in 1999, and 92.2% in 2006). In the 2006 research, the percentage of voters in the urban population is 65%, a reflection of the immigration to urban areas (63.3% in 1999). We should also bear in mind that an important number of these changes are the natural consequences of a transformation period of seven years.

Rate of female population (%)	51.8
Rate of married population (%)	70.4
Size of average household (person)	4.2
Rate of population under the age of 30 (%)	33.9
Average age (year)	38.8
Rate of literate people (%)	92.2
Rate of urban population (%)	65.1

The rate of the population under the age of 30, shown in Table 4.1, is almost at the same level with that of the 1999 study. However, when the details in Table 4.2 are taken into consideration, it can be seen that the sample of the 2006 research is slightly older in comparison to the 1999 study. The population at age 39 and under was 56.9% in 2006, while this figure was 59.7% in 1999. This decrease in the percentage of the younger population has caused an increase, even if slightly, in the percentage of the population at 40 and over. It must be emphasized that this increase is partially caused by the natural aging of the Turkish population, as well as the effect of family planning.

¹ As we have stated above, the results we present here have been reported by maintaining the rural-urban percentage based on TUIK's nomenclature of units for territorial statistics. We could have also used a coefficient to set the female-male ratio in each territory in addition to presenting the observed rates on the basis of territories. However, we were not able to determine a ratio of female-male voters that displays a difference, even if a slight one. When we used a coefficient to determine the female-male ratio in the general population of voters in the country, we were not able to reach meaningful differentiations. Therefore, a coefficient was calculated to determine the standard territorial rural-urban ratio, and we have observed that this type of an applied correction did not cause substantial differentiations when compared to the results obtained without the application of a coefficient with regard to various questions.

Table 4.2 Age Groups		(%)
18-24		18.7
25-39		38.2
40-54		26.0
55-69		13.0
70 +		3.6
N/A		0.6
Total		100

4.1.1. Education

When we look at the education level of the people in our sample, we see that we have a more educated sample in comparison to 1999. For instance, the number of people who said that they are not literate is less in comparison to the 1999 study (8.8% in 1999, and 6.9% in 2006). While the percentage of people who said that they graduated from middle school has remained the same, after the enactment of the law for eight-years of compulsory education, the percentage of high school graduates is found to be 24.4% in the 2006 sample (in 1999, this rate was 21.7%). The percentage of people who graduated from a university or had higher education has slightly increased (8.4% in 1999, and 9.2% in 2006).

Table 4.3 Education		(%)
Illiterate		6.9
Literate		4.9
Primary school		42.3
Middle school		11.5
Technical high-school		4.5
Anatolian high-school		0.8
Super high-school		0.7
İmam Hatip high-school		0.5
Other normal high-schools		17.8
University and higher education		9.2
No opinion/no answer		0.9
Total		100

4.1.2. Ethnic Origin

We asked two questions to determine the size of the Kurdish population. The first question was an open-ended one that inquired about the communication language of respondents with their parents during their childhood. The second was a close-ended question that asked whether they knew different languages or dialects well enough to talk to others in day-to-day conversation. Table 4.4 summarizes the answers given to those two questions. As a small group stated in the open-ended answers that they spoke in more than one language with their parents, the total of all answers exceeds 100%. In this question, the percentage of people who said that they spoke Kurdish or Zazaki is 12.6%.

In the close-ended question, the percentage of people who said that they spoke Kurdish, Zazaki or Kirmanc is higher than the percentage of people who said that they communicated with their parents through these languages or dialects (15.6 %). One of the causes of this situation might be that people who can only speak a few sentences in another language represented themselves as speaking these languages and dialects. When compared to people who stated that they had spoken with their parents in these languages as a child, some people said that they spoke to their parents in these languages and dialects in the past, while others said that they were able to speak these languages and dialects now although they could not in their childhood – in a way that implies that they have acquired these skills afterwards. The percentage of the second group – in other words, the group that said that they learned these languages after they

grew up (3.5%) – is significantly higher than the group who said that they knew these languages as a child but have now forgotten them (0.6%) (Table 4.5). Of the people who stated that they used to speak to their parents in these languages and dialects, people who said that they no longer have these skills formed a small group of 4.4%.

Table 4.4 shows the group of people who speak Kurdish determined by combining the answers to these two questions. As can be seen, the total percentage of people who say that they used to speak these languages and dialects, or that they speak them now, is 16.1%.

Table 4.4 Kurdish Ethnic Origin		
Which language or languages did you speak as a child with your mother or father in daily life?		
	Rate according to all answers (%)	Rate according to the number of people who responded (%)
Turkish	85.9	91.1
Kurdish	11.5	12.1
Zaza language (Zazaki)	1.0	1.1
Other	0.7	0.7
Laz language (Lazuri)	0.5	0.6
Arabic	0.4	0.4
	100	106
Is your (Kurdish/Kirmanc/Zazaki) good enough to speak it with others in daily life?		
Yes, it is	15.6	
No, it is not	81.8	
N/A	2.6	
	100	
Speaks Kurdish today or used to speak Kurdish with their parents during childhood years		
Does not speak Kurdish, did not speak Kurdish in the past either	83.9	
Speaks or used to speak Kurdish	16.1	
	100	

Table 4.5 Changing use of the Kurdish language in the course of time				
		People who used to speak Kurdish-Zazaki with their parents during their childhood		
		Did not speak (%)	Used to speak Kurdish-Zazaki with his/her parents (%)	Total (%)
Now Kurdish/Kirmanc/Zazaki	Yes, I know	3.5	12.1	15.6
	No, I do not know	81.3	0.6	81.8
	N/A	2.6	0.0	2.6
	Total	87.4	12.6	100
Now Kurdish/Kirmanc/Zazaki	Yes, I know	22.2	77.8	100
	No, I do not know	99.3	0.7	100
	N/A	100.0	0.0	100
	Total	87.4	12.6	100
Now Kurdish/Kirmanc/Zazaki	Yes, I know	4.0	95.6	15.5
	No, I do not know	93.0	4.4	81.8
	N/A	3.0	0.0	2.6
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

4.1.3. Ownership and Income

In our country, where the declaration of ownership is met with suspicion especially because people are worried about the possible legal consequences of declaring their property, indirect questions in addition to direct questions can be helpful in determining the income distribution of the respondents. However, the important task to accomplish in this type of study is to determine the socio-economic status of the interviewed people in a comparative way. One of the questions we have asked to this end aimed to determine what these people owned, in other words, their accumulated property. Table 4.6, shown below, gives the ownership rates of ten different properties. These rates are based on the information provided directly by the respondents. However, when a sample of this size and a property list of this variety are compared to each other, they are expected to clearly represent the relative status of people.

The percentage of distribution that emerges when we create a total ownership index ranging from 0 to 10, by assuming that each item on our list has the same value, is shown in Table 4.7. People who stated that they owned 30% or less of these items form approximately 37% of the total sample. People who stated that they own half or less than half of these items form approximately 71% of the entire group. People who stated that they own 80% or more of these items form approximately 7% of the total sample.

	Owns (%)	Does not own (%)	No answer (%)	Total (%)
House	29.8	67.4	2.8	100
Automobile	69.7	30.0	0.3	100
Home telephone	28.1	71.4	0.5	100
Dishwasher	71.3	28.5	0.2	100
Automatic washing machine	13.4	86.3	0.3	100
Computer	79.0	20.7	0.3	100
Plasma/LCD television	89.2	10.2	0.5	100
Summer house	93.7	5.7	0.6	100
Cell phone	23.9	74.9	1.2	100
Credit card	68.9	30.6	0.5	100

When a cluster analysis is made on the total ownership index scores, three groups are obtained. When “high”, “medium” and “low” level ownership clusters are formed, the average ownership scores constitute 36.8%, 45.3% and 12.8% of the sample, respectively (Table 4.7).

Ownership Index	%	Ownership Groups	%
0	0.4	Low-level proprietorship	36.8
10	3.4	Medium-level proprietorship	45.3
20	12.4	High-level proprietorship	12.8
30	20.6	N/A	5.0
40	20.8		
50	13.2		
60	11.3		
70	6.2		
80	3.6		
90	2.5		
100	0.5		
CY	5.0		

People who were interviewed in order to determine the income of the household were asked to provide information about the salaries, rent income, pension pay, etc., of all the members of the household by taking into consideration the last six months. Clearly, the obtained answers cannot be expected to reflect the facts fully, but still, we are of the opinion that these figures can be used as a sufficient measure for comparing the people included in the sample. Table 4.8 shows the household income levels of these three groups.

Table 4.8 Income Groups	%
Under 450 YTL	26.6
Between 450-1000 YTL	47.2
Over 1000 YTL	19.0
N/A	7.2
Total	100

4.1.4. Positions on the Left-right Ideological Platform

A finding we had emphasized in the study we conducted in 1999 was that Turkish voters were shifting to the right of the center on the ideological platform. Although this shift towards the right has lost speed, it still continues, and according to the obtained results, the right side of the center seems to be more than twice the size of the left side of the center. We have formed a group of three, since we will use the positions on the left-right axis as a descriptive variable, and have summarized the results in Table 4.9.

Table 4.9 Left-right Groups (Placing on the 0-10 scale)	%
Left (0-4)	15.7
Center (5)	30.0
Right (6-10)	37.2
N/A	17.1
Total	100

4.1.5. Alevi Origin

The Alevi-Sunni cleavage in Turkey is very important in order to comprehend different reflections of religiosity and the influence of political Islam on the public. In the study we conducted in 1999, we had tried to discuss this matter only with regard to primary identity and religious sects and the details of this inquiry are presented below. However, we had attained percentages which were not satisfactory. Clearly, it is unusual for Alevi citizens in Turkey to openly talk about their identity in public. Therefore, different methods of questioning have been developed and used within the scope of various studies, and the results of these efforts have been published in detail.² We have employed a similar method here in order to determine whether the interviewed people were Alevi or not.

To this end, people were asked if they professed faith in a religion, and the people who responded by saying that they were Muslim were asked whether they were "Sunni Muslim". People who stated that they were not Sunni Muslims were directly asked whether they were Alevi or not. (Table 4.10). 6.1% of the 9.2% of respondents, who said that they were not Sunni Muslims, stated that they are Alevi.

All of the people interviewed were also asked if they had any picture of the 12 Imams or Imam Ali in their homes, through two different questions. 7.4% of the respondents stated that they have a picture of Imam Ali, and 6.6% stated they have a picture of the 12 Imams in their home. The people who responded to all three of the questions by saying that they are Alevi or that they have a picture of Imam Ali or the 12 Imams in their home were assumed to be of Alevi origin, and consequently, a simple index has been formed. According to this criterium, 11.4% of our sample consists of Alevi citizens.

² Çarkoğlu, A. 2005. "Political Preferences of the Turkish Electorate: Reflections of an Alevi-Sunni Cleavage", Turkish Studies special issue, *Religion and Politics in Turkey*, Vol. 6 No. 2, June; A. Çarkoğlu ve E. Kalaycıoğlu, 2006.

People were directed two questions that inquired how religious they were and where they placed themselves on the “Islamist-Secularist” cleavage. As we will use their answers as descriptive variables in some of the analyses below, we would like to provide a detailed presentation here.

Table 4.10 Alevi Origin					
	No, I do not profess faith in any religion %	Yes, I am Muslim %			
Do you profess faith in a religion?	1.6	98.4	100		
To the ones who say “Yes, I am Muslim”					
	Yes, I am a Sunni Muslim (%)	No, I am not Sunni Muslim (%)	N/A (%)	System (%)	
Are you a Sunni Muslim?	87.4	9.2	1.8	1.6	100
To the ones who say “no, I am not a Sunni Muslim”					
	Yes, I am an Alevi (%)	No, I am not an Alevi (%)	N/A (%)	System (%)	
Then, are you an Alevi?	6.1	1.9	1.3	90.8	100
Do you have in your home a picture of any of the religious personages or sites I will mention now?					
	Yes, there is (%)	No, there is not (%)	N/A (%)	System (%)	
12 İmams	6.6	90.1	1.8	1.6	100
Imam Ali	7.4	88.7	2.3	1.6	100
Respondents who say that he/she is not a Sunni Muslim and that he/she is an Alevi, or those who say that the picture of the 12 İmams or Imam Ali is in their home					
Not Alevi	88.6				
Alevi	11.4				
	100				

The detailed presentations on a scale of 1-10, related to the questions we have asked in 2006 in accordance with the form used in the 1999 study, are summarized in Table 4.11. When the evaluations of people on the level of their own religiosity are examined, it can be said that throughout the country, people see themselves as more religious in comparison to 1999. When we exclude the ones who said “I am not religious at all” or “I am not very religious”, a group of 86% was obtained in 1999, while this number was 93.2% in 2006. People consider themselves more religious when compared to 1999.

When we interpret the results by also taking into consideration two other questions we have not asked earlier, we see that people perceive their mothers to be more religious than them, while they consider their father only as religious as themselves. As an indication of whether women have a privileged role in transferring religiosity from generation to generation, this finding must be underscored.

Table 4.11 Religiosity of people according to their self-evaluation				
	Respondent 1999 (%)	Respondent 2006 (%)	Respondent’s Mother 2006 (%)	Respondent’s Father 2006 (%)
I am not religious at all (0)	2.7	0.9	0.3	0.8
I am not very religious (1-3)	9.4	3.6	1.3	2.3
I can be considered religious (4-6)	55.0	33.9	23.8	25.4
I am very religious (7-9)	25.0	46.5	46.3	43.0
I am extremely religious (10)	6.0	12.8	25.5	24.4
No idea/No answer	1.7	2.3	2.7	4.1

Figure 4.1 below shows how people position themselves in the “Islamist-Secularist” cleavage. Obviously, it is not clear what is being understood from the expressions “Islamist” or “Secularist”. However, if we assume that people who have not understood what these two expressions mean at all, or people who have preferred to conceal their real position, have not answered this question, it is rather noteworthy that this group is not very large. In other words, regardless of what these two expressions mean to people, most of them seem to have placed themselves towards the “Islamist” side of this scale. This is clear from the figures, as people who see themselves closer to the “Secularist” end total 20.3%, whereas the people who see themselves closer to the “Islamist” end of the scale add up to 48.5%, which is more than double the percentage of the other group. In the analyses from this point on, the term “Islamists” will be used to refer to the group of 48.5%, “center” to the group of 23.4% which ranks as a 5 on the 0-10 scale and “Secularists” to the group of 20.3%, making up the 0-4 range on the scale.




Table 4.12 displays the positions on the 0-10 scale based on the subgroups in the answers given to these three questions. For example, while respondents place themselves at 6.9 in terms of their religiosity; they place their mothers at 7.7 and place their fathers at 7.5 on this scale. On the other hand, the average position on the “Secularist-Islamist” scale is at 5.7, which is closer to the “Islamist” end on the scale. The most significant finding here is that people who speak in Kurdish with their parents are closer to the “Islamist” end on the scale when they evaluate the level of religiosity of both themselves and their parents in comparison to the average findings throughout the country. In other words, we can say that evaluations of Kurdish origin and religiosity are synonymous to the “Islamist” end on the scale. On the other hand, being of Alevi origin means proximity to the “Secularist” end, displaying a relatively less strong religiosity. Rural settlement areas, low income and inadequate education correlate to the “Islamist” end and a higher level of religiosity. Similarly, voters for AKP are closer to the “Islamist-religious” end within the Turkey average, while voters for CHP are, in contrast, closer to the “Secularist” and relatively less religious end.

4.2. TURKISH VOTERS AND ETHNIC RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

The comparative and detailed presentation of the question on primary identity, which was also asked within the scope of our study in 1999, is given in Figure 4.2. As can be observed in this figure, the relative weight of identity options in the sample has not changed in the last seven years. People who define themselves primarily as Muslim constitute the majority group in 2006, as was the case in 1999. However, while this option is followed by the option of “a citizen of the Turkish Republic” in 1999, in 2006, the gap between the two options seems to have grown to the advantage of the

definition of Muslim identity. While Muslim identity was chosen as an option by 35.7% of the respondents in 1999, this rate has increased to 44.6% in 2006. The option that can be described as ethnic-based Turkish identity was favored by approximately 20% of the voters, which is followed by Kurdish and Alevi identities that are preferred by a much smaller group. As we have emphasized before, Turkish voters who consider themselves religious also prefer the Muslim identity when it comes to selecting a definition of identity.


Table 4.12 Religiosity and the Islamist-Secularist cleavage according to individuals' self-evaluation					
		Secularist-Islamist (%)	Religiosity		
			Respondent (%)	Respondent's Mother (%)	Respondent's Father (%)
Gender	Female	5.9	7.1	7.7	7.5
	Male	5.6	6.8	7.7	7.5
Settlement type	Rural	6.4	7.4	8.1	8.0
	Urban	5.4	6.6	7.5	7.3
Ethnic origin	Did not speak Kurdish/Zazaki with his/her parents	5.6	6.8	7.5	7.4
	Used to speak Kurdish/Zazaki with his/her parents	6.9	7.7	8.8	8.5
Age groups	18-24	5.5	6.5	7.7	7.4
	25-39	5.6	6.7	7.7	7.4
	40-54	6.0	7.1	7.7	7.7
	55-69	5.9	7.5	7.8	7.8
	70 +	5.7	7.6	8.0	8.0
Income groups	Under 450 YTL	7.0	7.6	8.2	8.1
	Between 450 –1000 YTL	5.7	6.8	7.5	7.4
	Over 1000 YTL	4.4	6.2	7.3	7.0
Party preferences	AKP	7.1	7.6	8.2	8.0
	ANAP-DYP-GP	5.1	6.3	7.2	7.0
	MHP-BBP	5.4	6.7	7.5	7.2
	CHP	2.8	5.7	6.8	6.5
	DEHAP	5.7	7.1	8.6	7.8
	Other	3.9	6.0	7.8	7.2
	Undecided	5.1	6.7	7.5	7.3
Left-right groups	Leftist	3.6	5.9	7.2	6.7
	Center	5.5	6.8	7.6	7.5
	Rightist	6.9	7.5	8.0	7.9
Alevi origin	Not an Alevi	5.9	7.1	7.8	7.6
	Alevi	4.3	5.6	7.0	6.7
Education	Illiterate	7.0	8.0	8.2	8.0
	Literate without a diploma	6.7	7.7	8.3	8.1
	Primary/ middle school graduate	6.3	7.2	7.9	7.7
	High school graduate	4.6	6.1	7.2	7.0
	University+ graduate	3.9	6.1	7.2	7.0
	Turkey average	5.7	6.9	7.7	7.5

* Although DEHAP is outlawed, a small number of voters still see it as an option amongst political parties. In this study, we will refer to this rate as DEHAP/DTP.

When primary preferences are considered in terms of the subgroups of the sample, we come across interesting patterns. For instance, women seem to prefer the Muslim identity much more than men. While the preference of the Muslim

identity by women is at 51%, this rate is only at 37.7% for men. Women, seem to be more religious in societies where they have more limited opportunity to participate in social life and where they are less educated than men. Likewise, studies that were conducted in the 1960s and 70s, when the difference in the status of women and men was greater, indicate that religiosity plays an important role on the voting behavior of women.

In the same way, the Muslim identity was selected in rural areas by 51.2% of the respondents, while the preference of people in urban areas indicated a rate of 41%. 57.4% of the people who stated that they used to speak in Kurdish with their parents as a child have chosen the Muslim identity as their primary identity, while people who did not speak Kurdish add up to 42.7%. Older age displays a similar preference pattern, and as income level increases, being a citizen of the Turkish Republic or being Turkish seems to be given preference as an option.



When we look at party preferences, we can detect a serious cleavage between the voters of AKP and CHP, similar to the cleavages observed in Turkish politics. For example, 46.1% of CHP voters define themselves primarily as “citizens of the Turkish Republic”, while this rate drops to 23.1% amongst the voters of AKP. On the other hand, AKP voters who define themselves primarily as “Muslim” form a group of 60%, which is quite high in comparison to the preferences of the voters for all other parties, while only 20.9% of CHP voters have chosen this option. Neither CHP nor AKP voters define themselves primarily as Kurdish. People who define themselves primarily as Alevi are largely amongst the voters of DEHAP/DTP (11.1%). The people in this group who prefer CHP are represented by only 2.7%, while none are voters for AKP. As can be expected, 57% of the people who define themselves primarily as Kurdish vote for DEHAP/DTP.

Ethnic Turkish identity, surprisingly, comes after the Muslim and citizenship identities among the voters of MHP-BBP. On the other hand, the preferences for all three identity definitions have almost equal weight amongst the voters for ANAP-DYP-GP, and no respondents in this group have indicated another definition.

The relationship between the socio-economic status of voters and their identity definitions also presents interesting results. For example, the higher the education level, the higher the percentage of people who define themselves primarily as citizens of the Turkish Republic and, the lower the percentage of people who define themselves primarily as Muslim. People who define themselves primarily as citizens of the Turkish Republic mainly belong to the groups who consider themselves as “secular” and “not very religious” and who have higher education and a high level of ownership. Those who consider themselves primarily as Muslim mostly belong to households with a monthly income of less than 450 YTL and they usually live in rural areas, are women, and are illiterate. At the same time, the percentage of respondents who primarily define themselves as Muslim rises in parallel to the increase in age, and the highest rate is seen in the 70+ age group.

On the other hand, when we look at people who define their identity mainly as Kurdish, we can say that there are more men than women in this group. There is no such difference in this group in terms of the rural-urban split; however, when the “Secularist-Islamist” cleavage and religiosity are taken into consideration, we can say that when we draw nearer to the “Islamists” end in the first and “religious” end in the latter, Kurdish identity begins to stand out. When the education level of the people in this group is examined, we observe that people who emphasize the Kurdish identity more strongly are people who are literate and who do not have a diploma. At the same time, as the ideological preference of the people in this group leans towards the right, and when their income and age increase, the percentage of people who underscore the Kurdish identity drops.

In contrast, Alevi identity is more strongly emphasized as income level increases, and is less emphasized closer to the “Islamist” and religious end. Similar to the people in the first group, the ones in this group are mostly men; and again, similar to the first group, the rate of people who underscore their Alevi identity decreases as they get older and as their ideological preference leans towards the right.

Table 4.13 When asked, would you primarily describe yourself as Turkish, Muslim, a citizen of the Turkish Republic, Kurdish, or Alevi?-I

		I describe myself primarily as Turkish (%)	I describe myself primarily as Muslim (%)	I describe myself primarily as a citizen of the Turkish Republic (%)	I describe myself primarily as Kurdish (%)	I describe myself primarily as an Alevi (%)	Other, I describe myself in another way (%)	No idea/ No answer (%)	
Gender	Female	17.9	51.0	26.6	1.5	0.5	1.6	1.1	100
	Male	21.1	37.7	33.4	4.1	1.8	1.0	0.9	100
Settlement type	Rural	17.8	51.2	25.9	2.9	0.7	0.2	1.4	100
	Urban	20.3	41.0	32.0	2.6	1.3	2.0	0.8	100
Ethnic descent	Did not speak Kurdish/Zazaki with his/her parents	21.7	42.7	32.1	0.3	0.9	1.4	1.0	100
	Used to speak Kurdish/Zazaki with his/her parents	3.7	57.4	14.8	19.8	2.7	0.6	1.1	100
Age groups	18-24	17.6	38.6	32.7	5.1	2.6	1.9	1.5	100
	25-39	19.0	44.4	30.6	3.3	0.6	1.3	0.7	100
	40-54	21.3	46.4	26.8	1.7	1.2	1.5	1.1	100
	55-69	19.7	46.9	31.8	0.5		0.6	0.6	100
	70 +	21.7	49.4	27.1				1.8	100
Income groups	Under 450 YTL	13.4	56.0	24.8	3.7	0.6	0.3	1.3	100
	Between 450 –1000 YTL	19.1	44.8	31.5	2.0	0.7	1.1	0.7	100
	Over 1000 YTL	28.5	31.0	32.2	2.8	2.2	2.7	0.8	100
Party preferences	AKP	14.6	60.0	23.1	0.9			1.4	100
	ANAP-DYP-GP	34.8	32.9	32.3					100
	MHP-BBP	28.9	35.6	35.5					100
	CHP	27.7	20.9	46.1		2.7	1.9	0.7	100
	DEHAP	4.8	20.4	4.4	57.0	11.1	2.2		100
	Other	8.1	31.6	34.7	10.8	3.7	8.3	2.7	100
	Undecided	20.2	43.5	31.1		0.8	4.4		100

If we summarize these results, we can talk about two different alignments concerning Muslim, Kurdish and Alevi identities. In the first group, we can point out the distinction of the people who emphasize their Muslim identity in contrast to the commonalities found among those who emphasize their Kurdish or Alevi identities; whereas in the second

group, we can point out the distinction of people who emphasize their Alevi identity in contrast to the commonalities found among those who emphasize their Muslim or Kurdish identity. When this type of a distinction is made, the group of individuals who define themselves primarily as Kurdish or Alevi consist of young people and men, while people who define themselves primarily as Muslim consist of old people and women. Conversely, the people who define themselves primarily as Muslim or Kurdish consist of more religious people with lower income and less education; whereas the group that defines itself primarily as Alevi consists of people with higher income and who are not very religious. It is also observable that level of education does not play a significant role on the formation of the Alevi identity.

Table 4.13 When asked, would you primarily describe yourself as Turkish, Muslim, a citizen of the Turkish Republic, Kurdish, or Alevi? -II

		I describe myself primarily as Turkish (%)	I describe myself primarily as Muslim (%)	I describe myself primarily as a citizen of the Turkish Republic (%)	I describe myself primarily as Kurdish (%)	I describe myself primarily as an Alevi (%)	Other, I describe myself in another way (%)	No idea/ No answer (%)	
Left-right groups	Leftist	27.1	19.7	35.6	8.8	5.2	3.6		100
	Center	19.5	43.3	32.4	2.4	0.5	1.1	0.9	100
	Rightist	15.3	58.2	23.4	1.7			1.5	100
Alevi origin	Not an Alevi	19.3	46.1	29.7	2.4	0.3	1.3	0.9	100
	Alevi	19.9	32.5	31.6	5.4	7.5	1.2	1.9	100
Islamist-Secular groups	Secular	27.2	17.8	44.1	1.3	4.4	3.9	1.4	100
	Center	21.6	33.3	39.3	3.2		1.4	1.2	100
	Islamist	15.0	60.7	19.5	3.5	0.3	0.2	0.9	100
Religiosity groups	Not religious	26.6	8.3	52.8	2.1	3.3	5.8	1.1	100
	Center	24.2	28.9	39.0	2.7	3.2	0.8	1.2	100
	Religious	18.1	52.5	25.0	2.8	0.3	0.5	0.8	100
Ownership	Medium-level ownership	19.7	43.1	32.5	1.3	1.1	1.5	0.8	100
	Low-level ownership	16.0	52.6	23.4	5.2	0.8	0.7	1.3	100
	High-level ownership	27.8	24.9	42.3	1.0	1.7	1.7	0.6	100
Education	Illiterate	9.1	76.8	8.0	5.1			1.0	100
	Literate without a diploma	11.6	64.7	13.8	8.3		1.5		100
	Primary/ middle school graduate	18.7	49.1	28.2	1.6	1.1	0.3	1.0	100
	High school graduate	23.5	29.0	37.7	4.3	1.9	3.0	0.6	100
	University+ graduate	25.1	24.0	44.3		0.8	4.1	1.6	100
Total		19.4	44.6	29.9	2.7	1.1	1.3	1.0	100

5. Religious, Social and Political Relations in Turkey from the Viewpoint of the Study

5.1. TURKEY'S AGENDA

The question “In your opinion, what is Turkey’s most important problem?” has often been asked in similar surveys in order to determine the issues that shape the public agenda.¹ We have used the same question in our study, and the answers are summarized in Table 5.1. For the purposes of the survey, it is of significant importance that this question was posed in an open-ended format. In other words, different answer options were not predetermined and respondents were left free to answer however they wanted to. After that, they were asked what the second most important issue was, again by an open-ended question. All answers were recorded exactly as they were stated, and were included in our data file. During the analysis stage, we decided under what headings all these answers could be categorized, and consequently reached the breakdown in Table 5.1. Clearly, not everyone can provide two answers for this question. Therefore, we also indicated what percentage of the total number of answers was made up by answer categories that we predetermined, considering them independent from the frequency of responses for each category.

Unemployment and its related issues came first. People who see unemployment as Turkey’s biggest problem comprise the largest group (73%), and this figure is the equivalent of 38% of all answers given. The high cost of living - inflation/terror/national security – which were very close in percentage – and education followed unemployment as other problems Turkey faces. These three problems were considered important by groups of 23%, 21% and 20% respectively. In general, problems not related to economic instability or economic crisis were mentioned by less than 20% of the respondents.

Issues put forth relating to the headscarf came from only 7% of the people interviewed, and accounted for only 3.7% of the answers given. The answers given to the same question asked during a study conducted by Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu shortly before the 2002 elections revealed that less than 1% of the public considered the headscarf as an important issue at the time. In short, in May 2006, three-and-a-half years after the formation of the AKP government, the rate of people who consider this issue important multiplied by 3.5. However, stating that the public deems this issue important is not possible. When not reminded, the respondents did not point out the “turban” or the headscarf as a significant problem on the public agenda. Clearly, the approach of the public towards this issue does not overlap with that of the elites, politicians or bureaucrats in the country, or with the agenda of the media.

In another question, we employed a different technique. We listed the five broad categories of problems Turkey faces that we predetermined ourselves before the interviews and we asked respondents which one of them should be prioritized in forming a solution. The problems we stated were unemployment; the Southeastern/Kurdish issue; the inability of students wearing headscarves to attend university; educational issues; and health issues. In this question, we aimed to observe to what extent the two significant problems, namely ethnic and religious identity issues are brought to the foreground in comparison to economic or educational/health problems.

¹ We did not try to determine the role of the headscarf issue in the public agenda in the study we conducted in 1999. However, the headscarf issue was not put forth as one of the most significant problems of the country in similar research conducted during the same period (see Adaman, F., A. Çarkoğlu and B. Şenatalar, 2001. *Hanehalkı Gözünden Türkiye’de Yolsuzluğun Nedenleri ve Önlenmesine İlişkin Öneriler*, TESEV Publications). However, the questions asked during these studies were close ended questions, and the issues related to the headscarf were classified under the “others” column if respondents mentioned them. A group significant in size did not include the headscarf in the “others” category. However, the same open-ended question model we use here had been used in research that was conducted before the 2002 elections, and the headscarf issue had been identified by less than 1% of the respondents as one of the problems on the public agenda that needed to be solved urgently. For this study, see Çarkoğlu, A. and E. Kalaycıoğlu, 2006. *Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, Protest and Stability in an Islamic Society*, I.B.Tauris. Similar conclusions were also present in the Kalaycıoğlu and Toprak study from 2004.

Table 5.1. What do you think Turkey's most significant problem is? What is the second most important one?		
	Percentage in overall answers	Referral rate amongst respondents*
Unemployment	38.2	73.4
Inflation/High cost of living	12.1	23.2
Terrorism/National security	11.1	21.2
Education	10.2	19.7
Economic instability/economic crisis	6.5	12.5
Headscarf/turban issue	3.7	7.2
Health/Social security	3.4	6.5
Crime/Snatch-and-run thefts	3.1	5.9
Southeastern/Kurdish issue	2.7	5.2
Bribery/unlawfulness	1.8	3.4
Political uncertainty/instability	1.0	1.9
Democracy	0.8	1.6
Lack of an opposition, lack of an alternative to the government	0.6	1.2
Human rights	0.5	1.0
Agricultural problems	0.5	0.9
Religion	0.4	0.8
Foreign politics	0.3	0.6
Other	3.0	5.8
Total	100	192.0

* The total sum is not 100% since the respondents were allowed to give either one or two answers.

Unemployment comprised a figure of 70.3%, while the other problems mentioned remained relatively insignificant (see Table 5.2). The ethnicity-based Southeastern/Kurdish issue was mentioned by a group of 12.1%, which was almost twice as big as the group of 5.7% who mentioned the problem encountered by students who wear headscarves. Another interesting observation was that the headscarf problem ranked fourth on the list of the most important five problems. Health issues came last.

Table 5.2 Which problem do you think must be solved first?	
Unemployment	70.3
Southeastern/Kurdish issue	12.1
Problem of not being able to attend university for students who wear headscarf/turban	5.7
Educational issues	7.9
Health issues	2.7
None of them	0.5
No answer	0.9
Total	100

In a third question, we left out issues such as the economy, education and health and questioned what policies the government should implement *before all else* concerning four problems related to identity (Table 5.3). The policies presented for respondents' evaluation were; giving Kurdish people the opportunity to learn their mother tongue in state schools; allowing students who wear headscarves to attend universities; enabling the graduates of *İmam Hatip* high

schools to be assessed through the same grading system applied for graduates of normal high schools in the university entrance exam; and having the state give financial assistance to Cem houses. Students wearing headscarves and the problems of *İmam Hatip* graduates, issues emphasized by the Sunni majority, were prioritized in the answers. Another notable result here was the size of the group, at 11-12%, that preferred the Kurdish identity issue above all else. However, a notably large group of 22.8% chose not to answer this question.

The headscarf issue, which was deemed less important than economic problems in the answers given to the aforementioned questions, was prioritized by an important proportion of the public as an issue that has to be resolved when it was listed with similar identity issues. An evaluation that is made on three levels, similar to what we have done here, displays the presence of a hierarchy of problems, which indicates that comparing the current problems on the public agenda is quite difficult. In a country like Turkey, where Sunni citizens who are not of Kurdish origin comprise the majority, it is not surprising that topics concerning Kurdish and Alevi citizens are not emphasized by the general public. It must be remembered that none of these problems stand out as the most urgent issues when economic problems are considered.

Allowing students who wear a headscarf/turban to attend universities	43.0
Enabling graduates of <i>İmam Hatip</i> high schools to be assessed through the same grading system applied to graduates of normal high schools in the university entrance exam	17.6
Giving Kurdish people the opportunity to learn their mother tongue in state schools, if they wish	11.4
State financial assistance to Cem houses	5.3
No answer	22.8
Total	100

After categorizing current public issues under two headings, ‘economic’ and ‘identity’ problems, we can begin discussing our findings concerning social tolerance, which we have questioned through a variety of methods in our research.


5.2. SOCIAL TOLERANCE

Without doubt, social tolerance is closely related to social harmony and peace in the country. Intolerance can be linked to numerous issues, such as the lack of trust amongst people in social life, the functioning of democracy, and the dynamism of economic life. In this study, we tried to ask questions about different subjects related to social intolerance through various methods. First, we used a question that has been asked in many similar studies, and inquired about what kind of neighbors people wish to have. However, in these questions, we excluded the kind of neighbors who would naturally bring to mind the possibility of having to face legal problems. Since ‘problem’ is almost included in the definition of neighbors who are “criminals”, “excessive drinkers”, “mentally unbalanced people” or “drug users”, it is clear that interviewed people cannot be described as intolerant when they do not prefer to live with such neighbors.

Our aim in this study was to find out whether the people of Turkey would like to have members of minority groups as their neighbors, and a few very interesting patterns were revealed through the results summarized in Figure 5.1. The most unwanted neighbors were gay couples. This finding, which has also come out in various other studies, is perhaps not surprising. However, although respondents were not specifically reminded of special conditions or problems that could be associated with this type of neighbor, it is thought provoking that two-thirds of ordinary citizens – who may not even realize that their neighbors are gay – stated that they would oppose having a gay couple as neighbors. Likewise, the fact that one out of four citizens stated that they would object to having neighbors from a different Islamic sect, even if they did not know which sect such neighbors belonged to, paints a pessimistic picture.

Clearly, we face a typical example of bigotry. When we consider that the answers do not reflect the personal experiences of respondents, and that almost all evaluations are based on assumptions, these conclusions provoke even more thought. The possibility of an ordinary citizen having Greek, Jewish or Armenian families as neighbors in Turkey is quite low. The generation we talked to (the average age of our sample is approximately 39) has almost no opportunity to establish neighborly relationships with the aforementioned minority groups. Thus, the prejudice reflected here is, in one way or another, a “learned” view. In addition, we must also emphasize that a group of about 28% opposed having a Kurdish family as neighbors.

In all of these evaluations, we obtained a total opposition – or, in a way, intolerance – score by giving one point to the neighbor whom a respondent defined as “unwanted”. After that, we calculated how many points out of seven a respondent totaled, which was the highest score that would come out if a respondent said that he or she would “not want” any of the categories as neighbors. We then converted this score to a percentage. From this point onwards, we will present this type of an index in order to provide a comparison. The distribution of these intolerance indices points at a bi-polar distribution (Figure 5.2). However, although the rate of people who said that they would not object to having any type of neighbor is not very high, at 27%, this finding is still hope inspiring since these people comprise the largest group. The rate of those who objected to all listed options is 17 %.



A more detailed analysis supports this optimistic observation. The tolerance points of respondents were separated into three different groups through a grouping analysis. As can be seen in Table 5.4, the group that can be described as having a “high level of intolerance”, receiving 6.1 points on a scale of 0-7, is only the second-biggest group. The biggest group is the “low level of intolerance” group, forming approximately 45% of the sample, which received 0.4 on a scale of 0-7. In other words, according to our intolerance index – which has been formed by the personal statements of individual respondents – one-third of the voting population, a large figure, appears to be “highly intolerant”, while a little less than half of the voting population seems to be considerably tolerant.

Table 5.4 Tolerance Groups		
	Average Tolerance Degree (Between 0-7)	%
High level of intolerance	6.1	36.9
Medium	2.7	16.6
Low level of intolerance	0.4	45.1
NA		1.4
Total		100

When we consider the relationship between tolerance groups and fundamental demographic and geographical variables, we come across interesting patterns (see Table 5.5). There are no significant differences in tolerance indicators for women and men. While the intolerance level in rural areas is higher in comparison to that of the general average in the country, it appears to be lower in urban settlement areas. The intolerance level of relatively older people and people with lower income levels is higher than the country average. This relation between income level and intolerance is also observed for ownership and education clusters. The higher the income level or ownership and education level, the higher the tolerance level. To summarize, citizens who live in rural areas and who are relatively older are less tolerant than people who live in urban areas and who are relatively younger. People who are young, urban with relatively higher income and education seem to be more tolerant than people who have the opposite characteristics.

Table 5.5 Fundamental Variables and Tolerance Groups-1

	Intolerance	High	Medium	Low	NA	Total
Gender	Female	38.0	16.2	44.1	1.6	100
	Male	35.7	17.0	46.2	1.1	100
Rural-Urban	Rural	48.6	15.1	34.0	2.3	100
	Urban	30.7	17.4	51.1	0.9	100
Age groups	Age 18-24	31.1	25.0	43.2	0.7	100
	Age 25-39	32.2	15.8	51.1	0.9	100
	Age 40-54	43.5	13.6	41.3	1.7	100
	Age 55-69	45.9	12.6	39.1	2.4	100
	Age 70 +	31.8	19.9	46.5	1.8	100
Income groups	Less than 450 YTL	47.0	16.7	34.9	1.3	100
	Between 450-1000 YTL	36.7	17.9	44.3	1.2	100
	Over 1000 YTL	22.2	14.6	62.5	0.7	100
Ownership groups	Low-level ownership	42.5	18.4	37.9	1.2	100
	Medium-level ownership	35.7	16.6	46.3	1.3	100
	High-level ownership	25.7	13.7	59.0	1.6	100
Education level	Illiterate	50.9	13.0	32.5	3.6	100
	Literate without a diploma	40.2	17.1	41.4	1.3	100
	Primary school graduate	42.7	17.1	39.0	1.3	100
	High school graduate	26.3	17.5	54.8	1.5	100
	University+ graduate	20.3	14.1	65.6	0.1	100
Ethnic identity (Speaks Kurdish, Zazaki with parents...)	Did not speak	37.7	16.4	44.4	1.5	100
	Used to speak	31.7	18.1	50.2		100
Alevi identity	Not Alevi	38.2	16.5	43.9	1.3	100
	Alevi	26.9	17.0	54.5	1.6	100
Provincial clusters	Coastal cities	43.1	19.8	33.3	3.7	100
	Central Aegean and some of the Black Sea	38.9	23.1	36.1	1.9	100
	Metropolitan cities	34.4	15.0	49.9	0.6	100
	Eastern, Southeastern cities	30.3	18.5	51.2		100
	Central Anatolia and the western cities of Eastern Anatolia	44.2	14.8	38.4	2.6	100
	Turkey average	36.9	16.6	45.1	1.4	100

When we consider ethnic and sectarian identities, we come across an interesting finding, which shows that those who stated that they spoke Kurdish with their parents appear to be more tolerant than the rest of the population. We can reach the same finding for the Alevi minority. Consequently, the tolerance indicator is higher in metropolitan cities and in cities in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey.

Table 5.5 Fundamental Variables and Tolerance Groups -2						
	Intolerance	High	Medium	Low	NA	Total
Party preferences	AKP	43.9	18.9	35.8	1.3	100
	ANAP-DYP-GP	43.6	4.7	50.1	1.5	100
	MHP-BBP	45.3	23.7	28.4	2.6	100
	CHP	20.9	10.7	68.4		100
	DEHAP/DTP	11.5	12.8	75.8		100
	Other	10.6	39.6	49.8		100
	Undecided	23.8	21.5	52.8	2.0	100
Left-right groups	Leftist	18.2	12.8	68.6	0.4	100
	Center	37.2	16.8	44.3	1.7	100
	Rightist	46.5	17.6	34.8	1.0	100
Islamist/Secularist groups	Secular	17.5	16.3	65.6	0.6	100
	Center	38.7	15.8	44.4	1.1	100
	Islamist	45.4	17.7	35.6	1.3	100
Religiosity groups	Not religious	25.2	9.0	65.7		100
	Center	26.9	16.5	54.5	2.2	100
	Religious	41.0	17.7	40.1	1.3	100
Women ...	No, I do not cover	20.9	15.3	62.7	1.1	100
Do you cover when going outside?	Yes, I wear a headscarf/headcover/yemeni	50.2	17.3	30.5	2.0	100
	Yes, I wear a turban	41.3	14.8	41.7	2.2	100
	Yes, I wear a <i>çarşaf</i>	50.1	12.8	37.0		100
	No idea/No answer	39.6	11.6	48.7		100
	Men ...	Not covered and he would not want her to cover	21.5	15.0	63.2	0.4
His wish concerning headcover/turban	He would like her to cover; she covers or used to cover	42.1	17.1	40.2	0.6	100
	He would want her to wear a <i>çarşaf</i> ; she wears or used to wear one	63.9		26.1	10.0	100
	He would want his wife to cover/she covers but he is not sure how he would prefer her to do so	37.6	20.8	39.6	2.1	100
	He would want her to wear a turban; she wears or used to wear one	46.2	20.6	29.6	3.7	100
	No answer	31.0	17.9	51.1		100
	Total	Turkey average	36.9	16.6	45.1	1.4

Voters of AKP (Justice and Development Party) and MHP (Nationalist Movement Party)-BBP (Big Union Party) are less tolerant than the country average, and voters in the center-left appear to be more tolerant than the country average. A similar pattern emerges in the clusters formed according to the way people position themselves on the Left-right scale. While the left is more tolerant, the rightist voters appear to be more intolerant. On the Secularist-Islamist scale, the secular segment displays a “high level of tolerance”, whereas the tolerance level of the Islamist segment is lower than the country average. Similarly, people who stated that they were religious are less tolerant than the country average, while people who stated that they were not religious appear to be more tolerant. In summary, those who vote for parties in the center-right, who define themselves as “Islamist” or who are in the right of the political spectrum, as well as people who are more religious, display a lower level of tolerance. However, voters for parties in the center-left and people who place themselves in the left of the political spectrum, as well as people who are less religious, are more tolerant.

Table 5.6 Do you think that the repeated publication of the cartoons of Prophet Mohammad by a Danish newspaper, despite strong opposition from the Islamic world, is an inevitable consequence of democracy and the freedom of thought?

		Yes, such publications are an inevitable result of democracy and the freedom of thought	Such publications must be prevented	NA
Education level	Illiterate	8.8	74.3	16.9
	Literate without a diploma	5.5	86.2	8.3
	Primary school graduate	13.8	74.4	11.8
	High school graduate	20.1	67.6	12.3
	University+ graduate	20.4	72.7	6.8
Income groups	Less than 450 YTL	10.4	74.3	15.3
	Between 450-1000 YTL	14.5	74.4	11.2
	Over 1000 YTL	24.3	66.9	8.8
Party preferences	AKP	7.5	82.2	10.3
	ANAP-DYP-GP	14.2	78.3	7.5
	MHP-BBP	16.8	75.3	7.9
	CHP	30.1	60.2	9.7
	DEHAP/DTP	6.5	82.7	10.8
	Other	11.8	81.1	7.1
	Undecided	11.8	73.0	15.2
Left-right groups	Leftist	27.2	64.0	8.8
	Center	19.2	63.7	17.1
	Rightist	7.8	82.4	9.8
Alevi identity	Not Alevi	14.1	74.6	11.3
	Alevi	23.3	60.8	15.9
Islamist/Secularist groups	Secular	22.4	66.3	11.3
	Center	24.5	61.1	14.4
	Islamist	7.9	81.6	10.4
Religiosity groups	Not religious	36.1	52.5	11.4
	Center	22.0	59.0	19.0
	Religious	10.7	79.2	10.2
Do you cover when going outside?	No, I do not cover	21.1	64.5	14.4
	Yes, I wear a headscarf/headcover/yemeni	11.8	73.0	15.2
	Yes, I wear a turban	5.8	72.7	21.6
	Yes, I wear a <i>çarşaf</i>		87.6	12.4
	No idea/No answer	31.3	62.9	5.8
His wish concerning headscarf/turban	She does not cover/he would not want her to cover	26.0	68.5	5.5
	He would like her to cover; she covers or used to cover	11.6	81.3	7.2
	He would want her to wear a carsaf; she wears or used to wear one		100.0	
	He would want his wife to cover/she covers but he is not sure how he would want her to do so	13.9	75.0	11.1
	He would want her to wear a turban; she wears or used to wear one	7.1	82.5	10.3
	No answer	14.9	68.6	16.6
Provincial clusters	Coastal cities	9.9	78.6	11.5
	Central Aegean and some of Black Sea	3.9	91.3	4.8
	Metropolitan cities	22.3	66.2	11.6
	Eastern, Southeastern cities	1.0	95.8	3.1
	Central Anatolia and the western cities of Eastern Anatolia	3.7	73.6	22.7
	Turkey average	15.1	73.0	11.8


Women who do not cover appear to be more tolerant than the country average, whereas women who cover seem to be less tolerant. The interesting thing is that when compared to women who wear a *çarşaf* or who cover with a headcover/headscarf/*yemeni*, the women who said that they wore a turban turned out to be more tolerant. A similar picture emerged concerning men whose views were asked about the covering of their wives. Men who did not want their wives to cover made up the most tolerant group. Men who preferred their wives to cover responded to our questions similarly to covered women. We observed that the wish or demand to cover does not increase tolerance. In short, women who do not cover and men who do not want their wives to cover are more tolerant, whereas women who cover and men who want their wives to cover appear to be less tolerant. However, amongst women who cover, women who cover with the turban are more tolerant compared to women who cover with other methods.

In this context, an evaluation was made with regard to the cartoons in a Danish newspaper depicting the Prophet Mohammad. As can be seen in Table 5.6 above, a group of only 15% supported the proposition “such publications are an inevitable result of the freedom of thought and expression”, while 73% stated that such publications should be prevented. The cross-tabular analyses show in which of the sub-groups the tolerant approach evaluating the cartoon crisis is more prevalent. Amongst people who have high school or university education, this approach is taken by a group of 20%. Similarly, 24% of the respondents in the higher-level income group perceived the cartoons as a manifestation of the freedom of expression. This viewpoint is expressed more often amongst people who do not deem themselves religious, who are ideologically on the left, who are of Alevi origin, who do not cover, who do not want their wives to cover, or who live in a big city.

5.3. DEMOCRATIC VALUES

In order to assess democratic values, which are closely related to social tolerance, we asked the respondents their opinions on a given set of statements. We asked them to what extent they agreed with our propositions by specifying a position on a scale of 0-10, with 0 meaning “I do not agree at all” and 10 meaning “I totally agree”. Figure 5.3 summarizes the answers, where the interval 0-4 means “I do not agree”, 5 means “I am undecided”, and 6-10 means “I agree”.


When examined individually, a tendency to agree with statements that could be considered as reflective of democratic values can be observed, however statements implying that these values are not internalized are also frequently supported.



For instance, a person who deems democratic values important is expected to object to the statement, “Turkey’s problems can be solved not by elected governments but by a military regime”. Approximately 55% of our respondents objected, whereas 27% agreed with it. However, in a statement that involves an intolerant approach towards views that are against the views of the majority – a statement that implies an intolerant approach towards minorities – the view contradicting democratic values was supported. The picture that appears in our study through this and similar answers shows that in Turkey, an approach to democracy overbalanced by the majority exists, as opposed to an approach based on protecting the rights of minorities. A similar example can be observed concerning publications that are against the interests of the country. In this case, the rate of people who felt sympathy for the view that advocated preventing publications that are against the interests of the country was high, at 36%.

We created an index for democratic values, similar to what we did above for intolerance. First we inversely coded the 1st and 3rd statements in Figure 5.3 and evaluated the agreement level concerning all statements so that it correlated with behavior appropriate to democratic values. Then we summed up all nine indices, divided the sum by 90 (which was the highest possible value), multiplied it by hundred and showed what percentage of the total statements included answers that reflected democratic values. Figure 5.4 displays our indices for democratic values and intolerance. A negative correlation of 22% was observed between these two indices, which were calculated through two similar methods. The group that did not object to any type of neighbor and that displayed a high level of tolerance accounted for 45%, while there was almost no individual who did not agree with views reflecting democratic values or placed at zero level concerning democratic values. As can be expected, the higher the tolerance level gets, the more evaluations in favor of democratic values are made.

As seen in Figure 5.3, liberal views are supported by a significant majority regarding other issues related to democratic values. Civil liberties such as freedom of expression, right to use the mother tongue, freedom of belief and demonstration/marching were advocated; torture was reviled; and democracy was defined as the best regime. The rate of people who adopted all of these views was never lower than 62% and was sometimes above 75%, almost reaching 80% concerning some issues.



5.4. INTER-FAITH RELATIONS AND TOLERANCE

In our 1999 study, we had questioned hypothetically how respondents would react to the marriage of their children to someone from another religion or Islamic sect. The results obtained in 2006 are shown in comparison in Table 5.6 below. In 1999, a non-Muslim daughter-in-law was associated with relatively more problems than a non-Muslim son-in-law. In 2006, the same pattern was observed; however, in both cases the opposition decreased by 4-5 points. Conversely, opposition against marriage with “a Muslim belonging to another Islamic sect” increased by 10 points

	1999			2006		
	I do not agree	I cannot decide	I agree	I do not agree	I cannot decide	I agree
I would oppose my daughter marrying a non-Muslim	18.3	5.2	75.5	22.1	7.2	69.8
I would oppose my son marrying a non-Muslim	22.2	6.1	70.7	25.1	7.5	66.6
I would oppose my daughter or my son marrying a Muslim from another sect	46.1	10.2	41.7	37.6	11.1	50.5

The answers given to this question, which can be seen as a sign of the general approach to inter-sectarian rapport and coexistence, indicate rather destroyed and weak relationships between different sects; thus, they are thought-provoking. Which segments of society support the cleavage between sects? When we look at the social base of this question, the picture presented in Table 5.7 emerges. The answer “I would oppose my daughter or my son marrying a Muslim from another sect” is given an above-average number of times by relatively older people with a lower socio-economic status, who live in rural areas and who are less educated.

		Does not agree	Undecided	Agrees	NA
Gender	Female	35.8	11.1	51.9	1.2
	Male	39.5	11.1	48.9	0.5
Rural-Urban	Rural	28.4	10.7	60.6	0.4
	Urban	42.5	11.4	45.1	1.1
Education level	Illiterate	24.7	12.7	60.8	1.7
	Literate without a diploma	26.0	8.4	64.2	1.4
	Primary school graduate	30.7	11.4	57.4	0.5
	High school graduate	51.4	11.2	36.2	1.2
	University+ graduate	57.4	9.1	32.6	0.8
Age groups	Age 18-24	49.4	10.4	39.1	1.1
	Age 25-39	40.0	11.0	48.0	0.9
	Age 40-54	31.4	12.1	56.0	0.5
	Age 55-69	24.4	10.7	63.9	1.0
	Age 70 +	39.9	8.9	51.2	
Ownership groups	Low-level ownership	32.3	9.9	56.6	1.1
	Medium-level ownership	37.4	12.3	49.6	0.6
	High-level ownership	50.5	10.6	38.3	0.6
Income groups	Less than 450 YTL	29.3	7.1	63.2	0.4
	Between 450-1000 YTL	36.0	14.3	49.0	0.6
	Over 1000 YTL	53.3	9.8	35.8	1.2
	Turkey average	37.6	11.1	50.5	0.8

The observations for people of Kurdish and/or Alevi origin are not differentiated significantly when compared to the country average. When considered in terms of party preferences, an approach against inter-sectarian marriages greater than the Turkey average is observed among parties in the center-right (i.e. AKP, MHP, BBP). This inclination is above the country average for groups who ideologically position themselves in the center and the right and who do not feel any sympathy towards secularism, and who define themselves as religious.

Although the status of Jerusalem has limited place in Turkey’s current agenda, we included a question on the evaluation of this issue, as it is still a sensitive subject for Muslim communities.² We asked respondents to state their opinion on what the governance structure of Jerusalem should be by taking into consideration the complex nature of the city as it is deemed holy for all three monotheistic religions. Despite the emphasis on this unique condition, almost two-thirds of the respondents supported the argument that the city had to be governed solely by Muslims. When we study the people who adopt this view, we can see that the same pattern that emerged in the previous analyses was repeated in this study as well (the details of this cross-tabular analysis are not presented here). In comparison to the country average, people who supported this view were mostly above 55 years of age, with a relatively lower socio-economic status and a low level of education, who lived in rural areas, who ideologically placed to the right, who felt closer to the Islamist sector, and who stated that they considered themselves religious. When voting behavior is taken into consideration, we can say that this view is supported with a percentage above the country average only amongst people who stated that they would vote for AKP.

Table 5.8 I Would Not Allow My Daughter Or Son To Marry Someone From A Different Sect – Independent Variables – 2

		Does not agree	Undecided	Agrees	NA
Ethnic identity (Used to speak Kurdish, Zazaki with parents...)	Did not speak	37.0	11.5	50.6	0.9
	Used to speak	41.5	8.5	49.5	0.6
Alevi identity	Not Alevi	36.8	11.1	51.3	0.7
	Alevi	43.1	11.2	43.8	1.9
Party preferences	AKP	30.1	10.5	58.9	0.5
	ANAP-DYP-GP	41.1	14.2	44.8	
	MHP-BBP	33.4	12.3	54.3	
	CHP	59.4	8.5	30.8	1.3
	DEHAP/DTP	57.7	15.0	27.3	
	Other	56.6	8.1	35.3	
	Undecided	43.4	12.8	41.9	1.9
Left-right groups	Leftist	61.3	10.0	28.7	
	Center	28.3	12.2	57.9	1.6
	Rightist	33.9	11.4	54.1	0.6
Islamist/Secularist groups	Secular	61.1	10.0	27.9	1.0
	Center	29.4	13.6	56.1	1.0
	Islamist	32.7	10.9	55.9	0.5
Religiosity groups	Not religious	63.9	7.5	28.7	
	Center	41.3	15.2	41.6	2.0
	Religious	32.8	10.8	55.8	0.6
		37.6	11.1	50.5	0.8

Table 5.9 Jerusalem is a sacred city for Muslims, Christians and Jews. Which of the following do you think should govern the city?

Christians	Jews	Muslims	International – including representatives of different religious communities	NI/NA
0.3	0.8	66.8	29.4	2.7

² We extend our thanks to 7th Grade student Can Çarkoğlu for this question.

5.5. COMPULSORY RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

Religious education and *İmam Hatip* high schools are significant topics with regard to the religion-politics relationship in Turkey. The basic breakdown of the different questions we asked about this subject is presented in Table 5.9. The table indicates that a significant majority, 82% of people at voting age, supported compulsory religious education in public schools. In this section, respondents were also asked about their opinions on religions other than Islam being taught in religion classes. 60% approved of teaching about other religions. Almost 86% thought that worship practices should also be included in the curriculum. When people were asked whether they supported the idea of teaching about Alevism in religious education classes along with Sunnism, 62% supported it, while 34% objected to the idea.

Most people who were against compulsory religious education lived in urban settlement areas, were ideologically inclined to the left, were amongst the voters of CHP and DEHAP/DTP, and had a relatively higher socio-economic status. 35% of the group with Alevi origin, 41% of the respondents who ideologically placed themselves on the left, and 52% of the people who felt closer to the “I am not religious” option were against compulsory religious education in public schools.

The characteristics of the group who advocated the teaching of only Islam within compulsory religious education (38%) displayed a similar pattern to those that have emerged in the previous analyses (the details of this cross-tabular analysis have not been presented here.) The people who supported this view were more prevalent among those who lived in rural areas, who were over 40, who had a relatively lower socio-economic status, who were less educated, who ideologically placed on the right, who felt closer to the Islamist sector, and who considered themselves religious in comparison to the Turkey average. Amongst people who said that they used to speak Kurdish with their parents in childhood, this rate was about 45%. Regarding voters for political parties, the percentage of people who supported solely Islam being taught in compulsory religious classes was higher than the country average only amongst respondents who stated that they would vote for AKP (42%). A similar picture was observed in all other questions. When we evaluated the social role of religion by taking these results into consideration, we observed that the group who defined themselves as Sunni Muslim and religious, who lived in rural areas, who were less educated, who defined themselves as “rightist” on the right-left spectrum, and who represented segments with a lower socio-economic status clashed with a minority group who had a relatively better socio-economic status, who were better educated and who lived in urban areas, and also included individuals of Alevi identity.

Clearly, the theory of evolution is a contentious subject within the scope of the educational system. Setting out from the assumption that ordinary citizens who were interviewed would not know what the ‘theory of evolution’ meant, we formed a question that included an explanation of the theory. After that, we asked the respondents whether the theory of evolution or the view that “God created humans” sounded more convincing. It is important to note here that approximately 54% of our sample consisted of people who have elementary school level or lower education, and about 45% had received middle school level or higher education. However, the rate of people who found the theory of evolution more convincing was only 11%. Furthermore, a group of 41.5% stated that teaching only Creationism in high school science classes would be sufficient. When this question is analyzed in terms of various independent variables, it can be seen that people who supported Creationism instead of the theory of evolution were from rural areas, had relatively lower education and a lower socio-economic status, ideologically placed on the right, and defined themselves as religious, as was the case concerning many other questions. Regarding voting for political parties, the percentage of people who supported Creationism was higher than the country average only amongst people who voted for AKP and DEHAP/DTP. In short, we can say that a dominant Sunni Muslim conservative group of voters prefers a restrictive and conservative educational policy, in contrast to a minority group that also includes Alevis. Within the framework of these results it can be clearly seen that society has the potential for polarization concerning this issue and similar ones.

Table 5.10 Evaluation of religion classes at school and İmam Hatip high schools

Do you think that compulsory religious education should be given in public schools?	Yes, it should. 82.1	No, it should not. 15.4		NA 2.5
Are you in favor of teaching about religions other than Islam?	Yes, I think students must be informed about religions other than Islam. 59.6	No, students must not be taught about religions other than Islam. 37.8		NA 2.6
Do you think that worship practices such as ritual ablution and <i>namaz</i> should also be taught as part of the general teaching of Islam?	Yes, it should. 85.5	No, it should not. 11.1		NA 3.5
Should information be given about Alevism in addition to Sunni Islam?	Yes, it should. 61.5	No, it should not. 33.9		NA 4.6
I will describe the two different theories about the creation of human beings. Which one do you think is more convincing?	According to evolution theory, living species evolved in order to adapt to their environment. 10.7	Human beings were created by Allah. 87.4		NA 1.9
Do you think the theory of evolution should be taught in science classes starting from high school, or do you think discussing Creationism is enough? Or do you think both theories should be taught at the same time?	The theory of evolution should be taught in schools starting from high school level. 11.3	Discussing Creationism is enough. 41.5	Both approaches to creation should be taught at the same time. 43.0	NA 4.2
Do you think that graduates of <i>İmam Hatip</i> high schools should have the opportunity to enter faculties of their own choice after taking the university entrance exam?	Graduates of <i>İmam Hatip</i> high schools should be able to enter the faculty of their choice. 82.4	Allowing the graduates of <i>İmam Hatip</i> high schools to enter some faculties has drawbacks. 14.5		NA 3.1

In relation to this question, we also asked people whether graduates of *İmam Hatip* high schools should be allowed to enter the schools or departments of universities of their choice – provided that they received enough points in the university entrance exam – and whether they thought allowing them to enter certain schools or departments had any drawbacks. 82.4% believed that they should be allowed into schools of their choice, while 14.5% stated that allowing them this opportunity had drawbacks. People who believed that allowing *İmam Hatip* graduates to enter certain schools or departments had drawbacks were asked which specific departments they had in mind. (Table 5.10). Approximately 34% of this group did not give an answer, while 23% said that *İmam Hatip* graduates should not have the opportunity to go to any university. People who believed that restrictions existed for specific schools or departments primarily highlighted the faculties of law and political science departments. This was followed by faculties of education and military schools. Evidently, the possibility of *İmam Hatip* graduates receiving higher education in fields such as natural sciences, mathematics, medicine or engineering was not considered as a situation that involved specific drawbacks. However, the objection to *İmam Hatip* graduates entering faculties of law, political science departments, and faculties of education, as well as military schools, which would enable them to have occupations that provide more power over the social and political future of the country, is an indicator of the sensitivity of at least a section of this group towards the issue of secularism.

Table 5.11 You have said that the entry of graduates of İmam Hatip High Schools to certain faculties has drawbacks. Which faculties are those?

Military Schools	3.5
Law Schools	19.8
Schools of Political Science	7.4
Schools of Education	4.7
They should not be able to enter any faculty.	22.9
Other	7.5
No answer	34.3

5.6. BUSINESS, WEALTH AND RELIGION

In this section, we will try to study the relationship between the business world, entrepreneurship and religious views. How Islamic thought and practice are conjoined with economic activities is amongst subjects that have not yet been studied in detail. It is, however, publicly known that along with the *Milli Görüş* movement, a new entrepreneur group of more religious businessmen who faithfully follow traditions and who are described as “Muslim entrepreneurs” or the “Anatolian Tigers” has emerged; and that this movement is organized by the agency of the Association of Individual Industrialists and Businessmen (MÜSİAD) and the Association of Industrialists and Businessmen (SİAD). In this context, setting out from a recent study conducted by the *European Stability Initiative* in Kayseri³, the thesis of “Islamic Calvinists” has become a subject of public discussion in Turkey. Claims were exerted about the recent emergence of a new kind of businessman profile – especially in Central Anatolian cities – who supports the development of the city as well as educational institutions in the city, who leads a morally upright life and who adopts conservative values. However, research on this group is considerably limited.⁴

The study we conducted is not sufficient to provide detailed information about this group. It is obvious that this information cannot be obtained through public opinion polls. However, we tried here to see how the public views this issue. For example, if an ordinary citizen established a business, and if we assume that he or she did not have sufficient experience or money for this business, with what type of a partner would he or she want to collaborate? (Table 5.12) Out of the options we presented for an evaluation here, the option “an honest person” was by far the most preferred (61.5%). This was followed by “an experienced person” (13%) and “an educated person” (11%), while the option “a devout Muslim” was only chosen by a group of 9%.

When asked with what type of people they wanted to work with in their business life, priority was given to people “with a similar world view” (37.9%), and then to fellow countrymen from the same region (33.7%). Devout Muslims were preferred by one out of every four respondents, making it the third most preferred choice. What attracted our attention here was that all three options could, in fact, be stating almost the same thing. People wish to collaborate in business with like-minded individuals and appear to have expressed this wish in different ways. It is not surprising for people from the same region to adopt a similar worldview.

However, preferring a devout Muslim will be possible only if the respondent gives the same degree of importance to the religion factor. When we study the cross-tabular analyses, we see that our hypothesis is supported. It is so that, those who considered themselves closer to the Islamist sector concerning the “Islamist-Secularist” conflict and who defined themselves as religious, had a higher preference rate for a “devout Muslim” colleague. In the first question, 9% of all people preferred a devout Muslim, while it was around 12% when these groups were concerned. Yet the rate for people who displayed a low level of religiosity and who saw themselves closer to the secularist end was around 1%. Clearly, while being a devout Muslim becomes an attraction for one group, it is deemed unimportant by another. In the second question, the preference of a devout Muslim – with a country average of 25% – was 38% in the Islamist group and 31% in the religious group. On the other hand, only 4% of the secular sector preferred the option of a “devout Muslim”, while the rate of preference for the group who did not consider themselves religious was only around 12%. What needs to be emphasized here is that, although religious fraternity may suggest being like-minded, it does not act as a primary social binder in the business community. Quite the contrary, it can be stated that it has created a significant cleavage between people who consider themselves religious and close to the Islamist sector and people who do not. One of the conclusions that can be drawn here is that a bi-polar structure exists in the business sector.

We asked our respondents to state their views on wealth. Once again, a bi-polar structure similar to the previous findings was observed in the answers given to the question: “Do you think that wealth, in other words, having a house, a summer house, a car and possessing more money than the amount that would allow for a comfortable life, is the result of one’s own work and efforts or is it a God-given blessing?” The group who deemed wealth as the consequence of one’s own work and effort (56.5%) was notably larger than the group who thought wealth was a blessing (36.4). In these two groups, a cleavage is clearly observed between the representatives of the “periphery” consisting of religious, rural, less-educated individuals with a lower socio-economic status and the opposing group which represents more educated, urban, less religious individuals in the “center” with a higher socio-economic status.

When a simple question such as “What should one do to become wealthy?” was asked, being a devout Muslim was clearly not one of the underscored options. Although a structure that can be defined as a bi-polar center-periphery

3 See *Islamic Calvinists, Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia*, European Stability Initiative, September 2005.

4 For such a study see: Ayşe Buğra, *Siyasal İslam ve Ekonomik Örgütlenmesi*, 1999.

reflection is observed within the scope of religiosity and Islamism, we can say that creating wealth through business did not correlate with “being devout” in terms of Islam or fulfilling the requirements of Islam. Thus, only about 7.6% thought that being a devout Muslim was a prerequisite for becoming wealthy. More respondents supported reason-based approaches. For example, people who thought one’s social environment was very important for becoming wealthy formed half of the sample. When this group was asked what kind of a social environment had a positive effect on accumulating wealth, having close connections with the government and close relations with wealthy business circles was preferred much more than interacting with devout circles.

	An honest person	An educated person	Someone who has business experience	Someone who has strong financial resources	A devout Muslim	Other	NI/NA
If you established a business, assuming that you do not have enough experience or money to do so, with what type of partner would you prefer to work with before all others?	61.5	11.0	13.3	2.7	9.0	0.6	1.9
With whom would you like to work with?	With my fellow countrymen 33.7	With devout Muslims 25.0	With people who have the same world view 37.9			Other 0.5	NI/NA 2.8
Do you think that wealth is the result of one’s own work and efforts, or a blessing?	Wealth is primarily the result of one’s own work and efforts 56.5	Wealth is primarily a blessing by Allah 36.4	Both 0.9			Other 0.9	NI/NA 5.3
What is required before all else to become wealthy?	Being diligent 63.1	Being an entrepreneur 18.9	Having a good education 7.0	Being a devout Muslim 7.6	Stealing/Theft/Fraud 0.5	Being honest 0.2	NI/NA 2.8
Do you think that one’s immediate environment is important in rising to wealth?	Yes, I do 50.3	No, I do not 48.1	NA 1.6				
What kind of people should this environment consist of?	People who have close connections with the government 17.6	Influential business people 25.7	People who are devout Muslims 5.6				NI/NA 1.4

5.7. HEADSCARF, YEMENİ, TURBAN, AND ÇARŞAF

Since the establishment of the AKP government, women and their covering have become issues that frequently engage the public agenda. In our first study conducted in 1999, we had tried to determine the percentage of women who cover. In our current study, we employed the same questioning framework to find out whether any changes had occurred in the percentage of covering women during the seven years that have passed. In addition, we took care to study this issue more in depth. The results of our study indicate that the picture that emerges is different than general public perceptions. As we have emphasized before, contrary to the assertions of both the “secularist” and “Islamist” sectors, the headscarf issue does not currently have a place in Turkey’s public agenda. The public does not consider the headscarf issue as more important than economic problems and national security issues.

In order to prevent terminological discrepancies during the inquiries related to this issue, the statement below was first read to all those who were interviewed in our study conducted in 1999 as well as in the current one:

“Those women in our country who choose to cover, either because of their religious beliefs or traditions, do so in three different ways.. One of these methods is the ÇARŞAF, which covers the entire body from head to toe except for the eyes.

Another is the HEADCOVER, which comes in different forms such as *yemenis*, headscarves and similar covers that are used to cover only the head, leaving some hair visible. The third one is the TURBAN, which leaves the face bare but covers all the head including the neck and the shoulders with no hair seen.

By providing this explanation, we aimed to eliminate any confusion that could arise in the interviewing process when we asked questions that included the terms headcover, *yemeni*, turban or *çarşaf*. This explanatory text was read to both women and men since similar questions were asked to both groups.

Table 5.13 Do women cover outside the home; if yes, how do they cover?							
		Do you cover when going outside?				NI/NA	Total
		No, I do not	Yes, I wear a headscarf/headcover/yemeni	Yes, I wear a turban	Yes, I wear a çarşaf		
1999	Rural	12.4	64.6	17.1	5.9		100
	Urban	33.4	49.0	14.9	2.3	0.3	100
2006	Rural	15.1	67.2	12.0	2.2	3.5	100
	Urban	46.0	40.6	11.1	0.6	1.7	100
1999	Age 18-24	40.5	36.1	20.6	2.3	0.5	100
	Age 25-39	28.0	53.3	15.6	2.9	0.2	100
	Age 40-54	22.9	61.1	12.5	3.2	0.3	100
	Age 55-69	14.1	65.5	13.7	6.7		100
	Age 70 +	17.4	69.0	8.3	5.3		100
2006	Age 18-24	50.7	34.0	11.3		4.0	100
	Age 25-39	41.5	42.9	13.1		2.5	100
	Age 40-54	28.3	58.5	9.1	3.1	1.1	100
	Age 55-69	13.7	70.0	12.3	2.6	1.4	100
	Age 70 +	12.7	80.6	6.7			100
1999	Low-level ownership	10.5	65.1	19.0	5.4		100
	Medium-level ownership	27.2	54.7	14.9	3.2	0.1	100
	High-level ownership	54.2	33.8	10.8	0.4	0.7	100
2006	Less than 450 YTL	10.5	69.4	14.6	2.5	3.0	100
	Between 450-1000 YTL	37.2	49.1	11.1	0.6	2.1	100
	Over 1000 YTL	71.2	20.6	4.8	0.8	2.5	100
Turkey average 1999		27.3	53.4	15.7	3.4	0.3	100
Turkey average 2006		36.5	48.8	11.4	1.1	2.2	100

Table 5.14 Do you think the number of women who cover has increased in the last 10 years?

		Yes, there has been a substantial increase	Yes, it slightly increased	No, there has been no increase	NA
Gender	Female	26.5	38.9	18.9	15.8
	Male	23.5	39.3	24.9	12.4
Rural-Urban	Rural	24.2	34.5	26.6	14.7
	Urban	25.5	41.5	19.2	13.8
Ethnic identity (Used to speak Kurdish, Zazaki with parents...)	Did not speak	26.8	37.4	21.9	13.9
	Used to speak	12.9	50.5	20.7	15.9
Age groups	Age 18-24	22.1	40.9	22.1	14.9
	Age 25-39	26.4	36.8	22.1	14.7
	Age 40-54	24.4	41.4	21.7	12.4
	Age 55-69	27.9	38.8	17.8	15.5
	Age 70 +	21.9	37.0	34.3	6.8
Income Groups	Less than 450 YTL	22.1	37.2	22.8	17.9
	Between 450-1000 YTL	24.4	39.8	23.5	12.3
	Over 1000 YTL	31.3	39.5	17.7	11.5
Ownership groups	Low-level ownership	21.7	40.4	22.6	15.3
	Medium-level ownership	25.6	37.2	22.9	14.3
	High-level ownership	31.4	43.7	14.5	10.4
Education level	Illiterate	18.5	41.4	15.6	24.5
	Literate without a diploma	16.9	35.8	28.3	18.9
	Primary school graduate	26.2	38.0	23.2	12.6
	High school graduate	25.7	40.5	20.5	13.3
	University+ graduate	26.9	41.1	17.3	14.7
Party preferences	AKP	22.0	41.5	19.4	17.1
	ANAP-DYP-GP	23.4	37.1	29.7	9.8
	MHP-BBP	20.0	29.2	39.5	11.3
	CHP	44.3	34.2	14.8	6.7
	DEHAP/DTP	22.7	54.8	14.0	8.5
	Other	28.7	44.2	21.4	5.6
	Undecided	16.9	40.0	27.3	15.7
Left-right groups	Leftist	37.9	41.3	12.9	7.9
	Center	26.5	35.1	24.5	13.8
	Rightist	18.1	41.9	23.0	17.0
Alevi identity	Not Alevi	23.7	38.2	23.8	14.3
	Alevi	35.4	45.7	6.0	12.9
Islamist/Secularist groups	Secular	34.6	38.5	17.8	9.1
	Center	27.6	36.8	23.1	12.5
	Islamist	20.6	40.6	23.0	15.8
Religiosity groups	Not religious	37.0	32.7	18.8	11.5
	Center	33.1	36.7	13.8	16.4
	Religious	21.4	40.6	24.3	13.7
	Turkey average	25.0	39.1	21.8	14.1

We directed the question “Do you cover when going outside? If yes, do you wear a *çarşaf*, turban, headcover, headscarf, or *yemeni*?” to women only. The answers given to this question in 1999 and 2006 are presented in Table 5.13, comparatively for both general distributions in the country and the major subgroups.

The most striking finding in this table is that, contrary to general belief, the rate of covered women in 2006 decreased in comparison to the rate in 1999. In order to discover the general impressions on this subject, we asked respondents during our research whether “the number of covering women has increased in the last ten years”. 25% said that there was a substantial increase, while 39.2% said that there was a slight increase (Table 5.13). In other words, 64% of the public was of the opinion that the number of covering women had increased. The rate of people who said that there was no increase was 21.8%, while 14.1% did not answer this question. When we analyze these evaluations through cross-tabular analyses, we can say that men, people living in rural areas, people over 70, people who are literate but who do not have a diploma, voters from the right wing except for those of AKP, people who are undecided, and people who define themselves as religious believe that there had been no increase in the number of covering women in the last ten years, representing a percentage over the country average. On the other hand, people who said that “there has been a substantial increase” and who represented a rate above the country average are mainly those between 55 and 69, who have a high level income and ownership, who vote for parties other than AKP, who ideologically place on the left and the center, who are of Alevi origin, who feel closer to the secularist end and who place in the middle on the “Secularist-Islamist” scale. In other words, the representatives of the “periphery” who are conservative, religious and who have a lower socio-economic status, and the secular representatives of the “center” who are relatively more educated, and have a higher socio-economic status, seem to hold opposing positions in their evaluation concerning the increase in the number of covering women.

However, our study did not verify these views based on impressions. On the contrary, the rate of women who said in 1999 that they did not cover when going outside was 27.3%, whereas this rate rose to 36.5% in the study we conducted in 2006. The rate of women wearing a headscarf/headcover/*yemeni*, which was 53.4% in 1999, decreased to 48.8% in 2006. The rate of women who wore a *çarşaf* was 3.4% in 1999, but it decreased to 1.1% in 2006. Likewise, the rate of women wearing a turban dropped from 15.7% in 1999 to 11.4% in 2006.

When the two studies are compared through cross-tabular analyses, it is possible to frame a more detailed analysis based on the findings rather than solely asserting the fact that the number of covering women in Turkey has decreased. We can observe that the rate of women who go outside without covering has increased since 1999 in both rural and urban areas. The rate of women who wear a headscarf/headcover/*yemeni* when going outside has increased in rural areas but decreased in cities. The rate of women who wear a turban or *çarşaf* has decreased both in rural and urban areas. The most important change observed with regards to types of settlement is the increase in the number of women in urban areas who do not cover, from 33.4% to 46%. Another significant change is the decrease in the rate of women in cities who wear a headcover/headscarf/*yemeni* from 49.0% to 40.6%. Taking these figures into consideration, we can assert that the faster the rate of urbanization in Turkey, the fewer the women who cover.

When we group uncovered women in accordance with age groups, the most significant change that we can observe is the increase in the rate for the 25-39 age group since 1999, from 28.0% to 41.5%. This is followed by a rise in the 18-24 age group to 41.5%, an increase of 10.2%. Similarly, the biggest change in the group of women who wear a headscarf/headcover/*yemeni* is the decrease in the 25-39 age group from 53.3% to 42.9%, a drop of 10.4%. This is followed by the 18-24 age group, with a decrease of 9.3% to 11.3%. However, the most significant decrease in the group of women who wear a turban is not seen in the 25-39 group but the younger, 18-24, age group. In 2006, in neither of these two groups, did we come across the small minority of people who had said in 1999 that they wore a *çarşaf*. In other words, women in the 18-39 age group almost never wear a *çarşaf*.

As seen in Table 5.13, parallel to the increase in income, the number of women who cover decreases. When studies conducted in 1999 and 2006 were compared, no change was observed in the rate of women from the lower-income group who did not cover when going outside, this rate increased from 27.2% to 37.2% in the medium-income group, and from 54.2% to 71.2% in the higher-income group. The percentage of women wearing a headscarf/headcover/*yemeni* in the lower-income group was 65.1% in 1999, but rose to 69.4% in 2006. In the medium-level income group, this level dropped from 54.7% to 49.1%, whereas the greatest decrease occurred in the higher-income group with a decrease from 33.8% in 1999 to 20.6% in 2006 – a drop of 13.2%. On the other hand, in all income groups a decrease was observed in the rate of women who wore a turban, with the most significant change in the higher-income groups – a drop of 6% from 10.8% to 4.8%. In short, the number of women wearing a turban in the higher-income group has decreased in the last seven years.

Table 5.15 If you have or had a daughter who wears a turban, would you approve of her removing it in order to attend university?

		Yes, I would	No, I would not	NI/NA
Gender	Female	65.5	24.8	9.7
	Male	64.8	24.3	10.9
Rural-Urban	Rural	58.4	31.5	10.0
	Urban	68.8	20.8	10.4
Ethnic identity (Used to speak Kurdish, Zazaki with parents...)	Did not speak	67.1	22.9	10.0
	Used to speak	51.7	36.0	12.4
Age groups	Age 18-24	69.9	22.2	7.9
	Age 25-39	64.1	24.3	11.6
	Age 40-54	65.3	25.2	9.5
	Age 55-69	62.6	27.0	10.5
	Age 70 +	64.8	23.5	11.7
Education	Illiterate	45.6	44.2	10.2
	Literate without a diploma	47.5	41.4	11.2
	Primary school graduate	63.0	27.0	10.0
	High school graduate	74.6	14.5	10.9
	University+ graduate	77.6	11.6	10.9
Income groups	Less than 450 YTL	53.3	36.7	10.0
	Between 450-1000 YTL	66.7	22.7	10.6
	Over 1000 YTL	77.4	13.4	9.2
Proprietorship groups	Low-level ownership	67.0	21.9	11.1
	Medium-level ownership	58.1	33.0	8.8
	High-level ownership	79.1	12.2	8.6
Party preferences	AKP	55.1	34.1	10.8
	ANAP-DYP-GP	86.4	13.6	
	MHP-BBP	73.7	18.2	8.1
	CHP	82.8	9.7	7.4
	DEHAP/DTP	70.1	8.5	21.4
	Other	73.4	18.5	8.2
	Undecided	70.6	22.6	6.9
Left-right groups	Leftist	79.3	13.0	7.8
	Center	70.0	19.7	10.3
	Rightist	55.1	34.8	10.1
Alevi identity	Not Alevi	65.0	24.6	10.4
	Alevi	66.5	23.9	9.7
Islamist/Secularist groups	Secular	81.5	9.1	9.4
	Center	68.7	20.4	11.0
	Islamist	57.3	32.8	9.9
Religiosity groups	Not religious	81.3	7.1	11.6
	Center	76.3	14.0	9.7
	Religious	60.4	29.0	10.6
	Turkey average	65.2	24.5	10.3

65.2% gave an affirmative answer when we asked whether they would approve of their covered daughter uncovering in order to attend university, whereas only 24.5% answered by saying that they would not approve. If, in a way, the answers given to this question indicate to what extent the headscarf ban in universities was accepted or adopted, studying the type of pattern that is exposed when these answers are subjected to cross-tabular analyses through the use of independent variables will be a worthwhile practice. The related cross-tabular analysis is presented in Table 5.15. The groups who ranked above country average with their rate of inapproval for their daughters to uncover in order to pursue their university education included those who lived in rural areas, who were in the 55-69 age group, who had a lower level of education, income and ownership, who ideologically placed to the right, who felt closer to the Islamist sector, and who defined themselves as religious. Among the voters of political parties, only the voters for AKP belonged to this group.

In short, it was observed that the AKP voters – conservative people with a lower socio-economic status – have not adopted the ban on headscarves in principle. Certainly, sending their covered daughters to university might be an idea that is difficult to imagine for this sector of society. Therefore, since our question was based on an assumption, these people might have more easily said that they would not give their approval. Evidently, the people in this group did not approve of their daughters uncovering even if this would leave them bereft of education. It is clear that these parents are opposed to their daughters uncovering, even if this means that they would be bereft of an education. This level of opposition points to a high level of sensitivity among these groups concerning the issue of covering.

Another question asked women why they choose to cover. We tried to investigate this issue by asking a simple, close-ended question: “What are the primary reasons for you to cover?” Table 5.16 shows the answers we received to this question, grouped according to women who cover, men whose wives or fiancées cover and women who do not cover. An important finding these tables represent is that, contrary to the views of the “secularist” sector who claim that the “turban” is a political symbol, and some sections of the “Islamist” or liberal sectors who claim that the “turban/headscarf” is related to the issue of identity, most women who cover said that they cover because covering is “commanded by Islam”. When asked why they cover, 71.5% of covered women said that they cover because it is Islam’s command, and 7.6% said that they had to cover because all women around them also cover. The only group in which this option was selected by less than 7% was the one that consisted of women who did not cover or men whose wives did not cover. The rate of people who said that covering was an integral part of their identity was very low, at 3.9%. Similarly, the rate of people who saw covering as the requisite of being an honorable woman is only 3.4%. Being part of a political movement was a reason that was almost never mentioned by covered women, although 8.7% of uncovered women and men whose wives did not cover opted for this answer.

Women who cover		Married or widowed/divorced men whose wives or fiancées cover	
Because everyone else around me covers, I must also cover	7.6	Because everyone else around us covers	7.8
Because I see the headcover as a requisite of being an honorable woman	3.4	Because I see the headcover as a requisite of being an honorable woman	1.5
Because Islam commands that women cover	71.5	Because I consider covering as a command of Islam	59.3
I did not use to cover when I was young, but now I cover because I am old	1.7	Because I think that older women should cover	0.7
For me, this is being a part of a political movement	0.4		
Because my husband/fiancée wants me to cover	0.9		
Because my family (mother, father, siblings – except for husband/fiancée) wanted me to cover	0.2	Because our family wants it	2.4
I cover not because my family wants me to cover but so that I can go around in public more comfortably	1.2	So that she can go around in public more comfortably	0.6
Because covering is an integral part of my identity	3.9	Because covering is an integral part of women’s identity	1.6
		For traditional reasons	1.9
Other	1.1		
NI/NA	8.2	NI/NA	24.1
Total	100		100

When men whose wives, fiancées or ex-wives cover were asked why their wives or fiancées do so, 59.3% said “because Islam commands it”, while 7.8% said “because everyone else around us covers.” Only 1.5% of these men stated that their wives or fiancées covered because they considered covering as a requisite of being an honorable woman. Similarly, when single men who wanted their prospective wives or fiancées to cover were asked to state the reason, 51.6% said “because Islam commands it”, while 7.8% stated “their immediate environment”, and 4% “honor” as a reason.

Women who do not cover and men whose wives or fiancées do not cover		Single or married men who want their wives or fiancées to cover	
They must also cover because everyone else around them covers	4.2	Because everyone’s wife around me covers	7.8
Because they see the headscarf as a requisite of being an honorable woman	5.2	Because I see the headscarf as a requisite of being an honorable woman	4.0
Because they consider covering as a command of Islam	43.6	Because I consider covering as a command of Islam	51.6
Even though they do not cover when they are young, they cover when they become older	3.5		
Because for them, this means being a part of a political movement	8.7		
Because their families (mother, father, siblings or fiancé and husband) want them to cover	4.3	Because our family wants it	1.4
They cover not because their families want them to cover but so that they can go around in public more comfortably	1.4	So that she can go around in public more comfortably	2.3
Because covering is an integral part of their identity	2.8	Because covering is an integral part of women’s identity	0.7
Due to traditions	2.8	Due to traditions	1.1
NI/NA	23.4	NI/NA	31.1
Total	100		100

When we study these answers, we see that the rate of covered women who did not answer or were unable to answer the question about their reason for covering was approximately 8%, while this rate in the other groups ranged from 23% to 31%. In other words, we observed that uncovered women and men who support the idea that women should not cover experience a difficulty in expressing their thoughts as to why women cover, whereas covered women and men who support the idea that women should cover produce answers more easily concerning the reasons for the covering of women.

Another interesting pattern that can be seen in Table 5.16 is that the view that women cover because of family pressure – another general public impression – was not verified. Only 0.9% of covering women stated that they covered because their husbands or fiancées wanted them to cover whereas only 0.2% said that they covered because other members of their families wanted them to. Family pressure was stated in very low proportions amongst men whose wives or fiancées covered and single men who wanted their fiancées or future wives to cover. Clearly, saying that women cover because of family or spousal pressure was not an answer that these respondents, who were family members or spouses of the women in question, could easily express. Therefore, the answers given by this group is not surprising. However, even if the decision to cover does not appear to have been caused by family pressure, we must emphasize that covered women think that if they uncovered, they would be pressured by their families or the people in their close environment. When covering women were asked whether someone in their family or close environment would object to their decision, if they uncovered and whether they would be compelled to cover again, 45.5% said that people would object to their decision while 54.5% claimed the opposite. When we then asked the group who said that people would oppose them, as to who specifically would object to their decision to uncover, 89.7% of this group of 45.5% said that “their family” would. In other words, almost 40% of covering women believe that even if they uncovered, they would have to cover again because of pressure from their family. Although this is a hypothetical situation, covering women obviously feel pressured to remain covered. In order to go beyond hypothetical analyses here, the extent to which covering women have internalized the act of covering and the question of whether they are happy to be covered must be studied.

Table 5.17 allows us to observe whether or not the reasons for covering are significantly different for women who use different methods of doing so. The reason that “Islam commands covering” was given less by the group who wore

a headscarf/headcover/*yemeni* in comparison to both the country average and to the percentage observed for other groups who employed other methods of covering. However, the answer “because Islam commands it” was the dominant explanation in this group too. Although the fact that other women in their environment also cover was more important for this group, only 9% placed emphasis on this reason. The number of women who wore a *çarşaf* and who left the question “do you cover” unanswered was too small to allow meaningful evaluations concerning this group. When we studied women wearing a turban, we observed that the answer “because Islam commands it” was given by a higher percentage in this group (79% among women wearing a turban, and 73% in the entire country). Thus, the answer “because Islam commands it” was clearly more important for the group wearing a turban.

Table 5.17 Which of the following is the main reason you use a headcover?

Do you cover when going outside?		Everyone else around me covers, I must also cover	I see the headcover as a requisite of being an honorable woman	I cover because Islam commands that women cover	I did not use to cover when I was young, but now I cover because I am old	For me, this is being a part of a political movement	Because my husband/ fiancé wants me to cover	Because my family (mother, father, siblings – except for husband/ fiancé) wanted me to cover	I cover not because my family wants me to cover but so that I can go around in public more comfortably	Because covering is an integral part of my identity	Other	NI
Do you cover when going outside?	Yes, I wear a headscarf/headcover/ <i>yemeni</i>	9.0	3.8	69.4	1.9	0.5	0.8	0.3	1.1	3.0	1.1	9.0
	Yes, I wear a turban	2.4	1.2	78.8	1.2	0.0	1.2	0.0	2.4	7.1	1.2	4.7
	Yes, I wear a <i>çarşaf</i> [*]	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	NI/NA [*]	0.0	20.0	40.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	0.0	20.0
	Turkey average	7.5	3.4	71.3	1.7	0.4	0.9	0.2	1.3	3.9	1.1	8.2

* The total number of observations is less than 30.

On the other hand, 94.1% of covered women stated that they would not uncover even if most women in their family or close environment uncovered. (Table 5.18). This rate was a little lower among women who used more traditional methods to cover such as the headscarf, headcover or *yemeni*. However, it is clear that for both groups there is no direct correlation between the abandonment of covering and the elimination of societal pressure.

Table 5.18 If women around you decided to uncover, what would you do?

Do you cover when going outside?		If most women in your immediate environment uncovered, would you uncover too?			
		Yes, in that case, I would also uncover	No, I would still remain covered	NI	Total
Do you cover when going outside?	Yes, I wear a headscarf/headcover/ <i>yemeni</i>	3.6	87.7	8.8	100
	Yes, I wear a turban	1.2	94.1	4.7	100
	Yes, I wear a <i>çarşaf</i> [*]	0.0	100.0	0.0	100
	NI/NA [*]	0.0	20.0	80.0	100
	Turkey average	3.0	86.9	10.1	100

* The total number of observations is less than 30.

5.7.1. Experiences of Covered Women

Within the scope of our study, we asked a series of questions in order to shed light on the experiences of covered women in the course of daily life and to determine what aspects of public life women who cover and who do not cover lead differently. The answers given to the question asking if covered women were made uncomfortable in public places are presented in Table 5.19. As can be seen in this table, the rate of women who wear a turban or a headscarf/headcover/*yemeni* and who feel uncomfortable in public because of doing so is only 5%. Although this rate is higher amongst women who wear a *çarşaf*, because the number of people in this group who responded to our question was very small, the rate of 12.5% does not represent all the women included in this category. These results show that the public does not adversely react to the covering of women.

		Has a stranger ever bothered you for wearing a headscarf?			
		Yes	No	NA	Total
Do you cover when going outside?	Yes, I wear a headscarf/headcover/ <i>yemeni</i>	5.2	86.6	8.2	100
	Yes, I wear a turban	5.9	89.4	4.7	100
	Yes, I wear a <i>çarşaf</i> *	12.5	87.5	0.0	100
	NI/NA*	0.0	20.0	80.0	100
		5.3	85.0	9.7	100

* The total number of observations is less than 30.

We used the question below to reveal the life experiences of covered and uncovered women:

“It is often claimed that there are differences between the daily life experiences of covered and uncovered women in society. Below are some observations concerning daily life. Can you please compare covered and uncovered women in regard to each of these? Here, we are not interested in knowing whether you approve or disapprove of the examples. What we would like to know is the most common experiences of covered and uncovered women.”

Perhaps the most striking result summarized in Table 5.20 is that society does not consider covered women as having a more advantageous position in any circumstance in comparison to uncovered women. However, another similarly striking result is that the opinion expressing that there is no difference between covered and uncovered women is the dominant answer. In other words, people who stated that they saw no difference between covered and uncovered women in any of the hypothetical questions constitute the majority. More importantly and contrary to expectations, the number of people who said that there was no difference between covered or uncovered women with regards to the issues of establishing a good marriage and traveling in the city constituted the majority. In short, only a small minority stated that the covering of women caused a meaningful differentiation in terms of travelling in public, working life and marital relationships.

	Covered women	Uncovered women	No differences between the two groups of women	NA	Total
They can travel more frequently in the city on their own	4.6	22.6	72.6	0.3	100
They can travel more frequently between cities on their own	4.1	27.4	68.2	0.3	100
They can eat in a restaurant on their own	4.0	30.5	65.1	0.4	100
They have a higher possibility of getting a job with a salary	4.4	37.2	57.9	0.5	100
They have a higher possibility of having a boyfriend before they get married	4.0	36.6	59.1	0.3	100
They can establish a better marriage in a shorter time	11.6	17.3	70.8	0.4	100
They have a higher possibility of choosing the man they will marry	4.4	28.8	65.2	1.5	100

Are the results achieved through the sampling also valid for covered women? The results in Table 5.21 show that women who wear a turban display a meaningful differentiation concerning only a single subject when compared to the answers that represent the entire country, and that subject is “choosing one’s spouse”. Women who wear a turban believe, with a rate much higher than the country average, that there is a better possibility of covered women choosing the man they will marry compared to uncovered women. Other than that, differentiation throughout the country was observed between the evaluations of uncovered women and women who wear a headscarf/headcover/*yemeni* instead of the turban or *çarşaf*. Uncovered women stated in higher rates that there was no difference between covered and uncovered women concerning traveling within the city, having a boyfriend before getting married or establishing a good marriage in a shorter time. Furthermore, the rate of uncovered women who thought that covered women had a lower possibility of having a boyfriend before getting married (1.6%) was lower than the country average (4%).

Table 5.21 Everyday Experiences According to the Type of Cover – 1							
Do you cover when going outside?							
		No, I do not	Yes, I wear a headscarf/headcover/ <i>yemeni</i>	Yes, I wear a turban	Yes, I wear a <i>çarşaf</i>	NI/NA	
They can travel more frequently in the city on their own	Covered women	2.7	6.4	4.6			4.6
	Uncovered women	22.2	21.4	22.1	49.9	26.5	22.6
	No differences between the two groups of women	75.1	71.5	73.3	50.1	73.5	72.6
	NA		0.7				0.3
		100	100	100	100	100	100
They can travel more frequently between cities on their own	Covered women	2.2	6.3	3.3			4.1
	Uncovered women	28.6	26.2	28.0	49.9	24.6	27.4
	No differences between the two groups of women	69.2	66.6	68.6	50.1	75.4	68.2
	NA		0.9				0.3
		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100
They can eat in a restaurant on their own	Covered women	3.5	4.9	3.4			4.0
	Uncovered women	30.0	30.0	31.4	62.5	44.6	30.5
	No differences between the two groups of women	66.6	64.5	65.2	37.5	55.4	65.1
	NA		0.7				0.4
		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100
They have a higher possibility of getting a job with a salary	Covered women	3.1	5.8	3.4			4.4
	Uncovered women	36.7	35.6	34.0	62.7	31.2	37.2
	No differences between the two groups of women	59.8	58.0	62.6	37.3	68.8	57.9
	NA	0.4	0.6				0.5
Total		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100

The rate of women who wore a headscarf and who said that uncovered women had a higher possibility of having a boyfriend before getting married when compared to covered women (%39.2) was higher than the country average (36.6%) and the rate of uncovered women (31.2%). With regard to establishing a good marriage in a shorter time, women who wore a headscarf thought that covered women (15.3%) had a greater advantage in comparison to uncovered women (12.5%).

In summary, women who wore a turban did not perceive themselves as different from the general public in any way and said that there were no differences between covered and uncovered women in terms of daily life experiences. On the other hand, uncovered women and women who wore a headscarf/headcover/*yemeni* believed that covered women had different experiences, especially concerning choosing one’s spouse and establishing a marriage. The rate of uncovered women who stated that they did not note any difference between the two groups of women was higher, whereas women

who wore the traditional headscarf said that covered women could have boyfriends but that they could neither choose their husband more freely nor achieve more success in establishing a good marriage.

Table 5.21 Everyday Experiences According to the Type of Cover – 2							
Do you cover when going outside?							
		No, I do not	Yes, I wear a headscarf/ headcover/yemeni	Yes, I wear a turban	Yes, I wear a çarşaf	NI/NA	
They have a higher possibility of having a boyfriend before they get married	Covered women	1.6	5.9	3.4			4.0
	Uncovered women	31.2	39.2	36.3	62.5	46.4	36.6
	No differences between the two groups of women	67.1	54.4	60.4	37.5	53.6	59.1
	NA		0.4				0.3
		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100
They can establish a better marriage in a shorter time	Covered women	6.4	15.3	13.0	37.8		11.6
	Uncovered women	19.6	12.5	16.6	24.7	18.9	17.3
	No differences between the two groups of women	74.0	71.8	70.5	37.5	81.1	70.8
	NA	0.0	0.4				0.4
		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100
They have a higher possibility of choosing the man they will marry	Covered women	3.2	5.4	7.1			4.4
	Uncovered women	30.2	26.2	23.7	49.9	18.9	28.8
	No differences between the two groups of women	66.0	65.3	69.2	50.1	81.1	65.2
	NA	0.6	3.1				1.5
Total		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100

5.7.2. Marriage and the Covering of Women

We asked a few additional questions concerning marriage and the selection of one's spouse. The findings that are presented in Table 5.22 indicate that a modern practice, which involves young people meeting and getting to know each other before getting married was notably supported. The people we interviewed said that this was practiced in their own social environment, and that they would support it even more concerning the marriage of their own children. The rate of people who said that it was easier for young people around them to meet on their own and get married was 70%, while the rate of people who supported the same idea concerning their own children was 72%. However, the rate of people who stated that marriages arranged between families were easier to establish in the social environment they lived in and who also said that they were in favor of supporting such arranged marriages for their own children was around 20%. Although it is difficult to predict the extent to which these views are reflected in real actions, it is even harder to assume that such clearly-expressed thoughts do not correspond to reality.

Table 5.22 What type of marriage?			
When you consider the young men and women around you at the age of marriage, do you think that it would be easier for them to marry someone whom they meet and get to know on their own or to establish an arranged marriage with someone their families picked?	It would be easier for them to marry someone whom they meet and get to know on their own 70.0	It would be easier for them to establish an arranged marriage with someone their family picked 22.1	NA 7.9
If you have or if you had any daughters or sons at the age of marriage, would you find it more appropriate if they married someone whom they meet and get to know on their own or if they established an arranged marriage with someone their family picked?	I think it is more appropriate for them to marry someone whom they meet and get to know on their own 72.2	I think it is more appropriate for them to establish a marriage arranged between families 21.3	6.5
What about the young men around you who are at the age of marriage? Do you think that they prefer to marry women who cover or women who do not cover?	They prefer women who do not cover 32.8	They prefer women who cover 33.2	NA 34.0

Table 5.23 What type of marriage – Cross-tabular analysis – 1

		When you consider the young men and women around you at the age of marriage, do you think that it would be easier for them to marry someone whom they meet and get to know on their own or to establish an arranged marriage with someone their families picked?			If you have or if you had any daughters or sons at the age of marriage, would you find it more appropriate if they married someone whom they meet and get to know on their own or if they established an arranged marriage with someone their family picked?		
		It would be easier for them to marry someone whom they meet and get to know on their own	It would be easier for them to establish an arranged marriage with someone their family picked	NA	I think it is more appropriate for them to marry someone whom they meet and get to know on their own	I think it is more appropriate for them to establish a marriage arranged between families	NA
Gender	Female	69.4	21.2	9.4	71.0	20.8	8.3
	Male	70.7	23.1	6.2	73.6	21.9	4.5
Rural-Urban	Rural	65.4	28.3	6.3	68.5	26.9	4.6
	Urban	72.5	18.8	8.8	74.2	18.3	7.5
Ethnic identity (Used to speak Kurdish, Zazaki with parents...)	Did not speak	70.7	21.5	7.9	73.2	20.6	6.2
	Used to speak	65.7	26.2	8.2	65.3	26.5	8.2
Age groups	Age 18-24	75.8	16.2	8.0	77.7	15.4	6.9
	Age 25-39	72.6	19.6	7.8	74.2	18.7	7.1
	Age 40-54	66.2	25.4	8.4	68.9	25.2	5.9
	Age 55-69	63.0	30.8	6.2	66.8	28.1	5.1
	Age 70 +	70.3	24.6	5.1	70.3	26.1	3.5
Income groups	Less than 450 YTL	61.0	28.5	10.4	62.8	28.4	8.8
	Between 450-1000 YTL	70.0	23.2	6.8	71.9	22.0	6.1
	Over 1000 YTL	81.3	11.5	7.2	83.9	11.1	4.9
Ownership groups	Low-level ownership	70.6	21.5	7.9	71.8	21.6	6.6
	Medium-level ownership	66.4	24.5	9.1	69.2	22.9	7.9
	High-level ownership	82.3	13.8	3.9	86.4	11.2	2.4
Education	Illiterate	53.7	35.8	10.5	56.2	33.4	10.5
	Literate without a diploma	62.1	34.9	3.1	66.8	30.1	3.0
	Primary school graduate	66.6	24.8	8.6	69.0	24.4	6.5
	High school graduate	79.3	12.8	7.9	81.3	12.7	6.0
	University+ graduate	82.9	12.5	4.6	82.1	11.0	6.9
Party preferences	AKP	61.9	31.4	6.6	63.4	30.9	5.6
	ANAP-DYP-GP	75.6	21.1	3.3	75.8	20.9	3.3
	MHP-BBP	63.2	24.0	12.8	72.4	20.5	7.1
	CHP	86.4	10.0	3.6	89.8	6.5	3.7
	DEHAP/DTP	84.0	9.6	6.3	79.7	11.9	8.4
	Other	89.9	10.1		89.9	10.1	
	Undecided	78.1	12.3	9.5	81.5	11.2	7.3
Left-right groups	Leftist	86.7	8.6	4.7	87.6	9.5	2.8
	Center	73.6	14.8	11.6	77.2	12.8	10.0
	Rightist	57.6	35.1	7.3	59.6	34.3	6.1
Alevi identity	Not Alevi	69.0	23.0	8.0	71.0	22.6	6.4
	Alevi	77.9	14.6	7.5	81.5	11.6	6.9
Islamist/Secularist groups	Secular	89.6	4.9	5.5	92.8	3.1	4.1
	Center	75.0	16.3	8.7	76.9	15.7	7.3
	Islamist	59.4	32.6	8.0	61.2	32.2	6.6
Religiosity groups	Not religious	83.6	8.8	7.6	89.6	5.0	5.3
	Center	80.6	10.7	8.7	82.2	9.4	8.3
	Religious	65.8	26.4	7.9	67.8	26.0	6.2
	Turkey average	70.0	22.1	7.9	72.2	21.3	6.5

When we study the cross-tabular analyses, we see that people who live in rural areas support a marriage arranged by families for their own children at a rate higher than the country average (Table 5.23). However, no matter how high these rates are in rural areas, they are always under 30%. People who stated that they were of Kurdish ethnic origin had preferences similar to those of people in rural areas. Amongst this group, the rate of people who said that marriages arranged between families were easier to establish and that they found such marriages more appropriate for their own children was higher than the country average. A generation gap was observed concerning this subject as well, as people over the age of 55 supported the idea of arranged marriages more strongly. People belonging to this generation stated that arranged marriages were very common in their own environment where they lived. When the level of education, income and ownership increases, the level of support for arranged marriages decreases. When political preferences are studied, it is observed that the support for arranged marriages is only above country average for voters of AKP. People who ideologically placed on the right, who felt closer to the Islamist end on the “Secularist-Islamist” scale and who defined themselves as religious practiced arranged marriages more often in comparison to the country average.

More striking results appear in these cross-tabular analyses when the practice of covering is taken into consideration. Only 6.9% of uncovered women stated that marriages arranged by families were common in the environment where they lived in and 6.3% said that they would approve of such marriages for their own children. The rate of uncovered women who supported individuals meeting each other on their own and marrying was 87%, whereas among women who said they wore a turban, this rate dropped to almost 68%. Interestingly, 61% of the women who said they wore a turban stated that marriages established freely between individuals was an easier practice to follow in the environment where they lived, while 68% of these women said that they would approve of such marriages for their own children.

Table 5.23 What type of marriage – Cross-tabular analysis -2

		When you consider the young men and women around you at the age of marriage, do you think that it would be easier for them to marry someone whom they meet and get to know on their own or to establish an arranged marriage with someone their families picked?			If you have or if you had any daughters or sons at the age of marriage, would you find it more appropriate if they married someone whom they meet and get to know on their own or if they established an arranged marriage with someone their family picked?		
		It would be easier for them to marry someone whom they meet and get to know on their own	It would be easier for them to establish an arranged marriage with someone their family picked	NA	I think it is more appropriate for them to marry someone whom they meet and get to know on their own	I think it is more appropriate for them to establish a marriage arranged between families	NA
(Women) Do you cover when going outside?	No, I do not cover	87.3	6.9	5.8	87.8	6.3	5.9
	Yes, I wear a headscarf/headcover/yemeni	58.9	30.4	10.7	60.0	29.9	10.1
	Yes, I wear a turban	61.2	22.6	16.2	67.5	24.4	8.1
	Yes, I wear a <i>çarşaf</i>	37.3	62.7		37.3	62.7	
	NI/NA	54.9	32.3	12.7	61.1	26.8	12.0
(Men) What would he want?	She is not covered or he would not want her to cover	87.0	7.1	5.8	90.3	5.0	4.7
	He would want her to cover or she covers or used to cover	65.5	28.2	6.3	66.6	28.8	4.6
	He would want her to wear a <i>çarşaf</i> or she wears or used to wear a <i>çarşaf</i>	38.0	62.0		38.0	62.0	
	He wants his wife to cover but he is not sure about the method of covering	53.1	36.5	10.4	61.7	32.4	5.9
	He would want her to wear a turban or she wears or used to wear a turban	61.9	33.4	4.7	66.0	29.4	4.6
	No answer	71.2	21.0	7.8	76.9	20.1	3.1
Turkey average		70.0	22.1	7.9	72.2	21.3	6.5

Concerning men, those whose wives or fiancées are uncovered and who do not want them to cover, support individuals getting married after they meet on their own by a rate of 87-90%, which is considerably higher than the country average and similar to the rate for uncovered women. Similar to the views of women who wear a turban, men whose wives wear a turban or who want their wives to wear one seem to be less willing for their own children to establish arranged marriages compared to what they observe in their own social environment. Marriage, based on free will, is preferred by all groups, regardless of the practice of covering. Concerning the group of women wearing a *çarşaf*, we are unable to make a comment as the number of observations was not sufficient.

5.7.3. Relationships Between Covered and Uncovered Women

We asked each respondent whether they had any close friends and relatives who did not cover or who covered using a *çarşaf*, turban or headscarf/headcover/*yemeni*, in order to determine if covered and uncovered women as well as their families interacted in daily life.

The cross-tabular analyses of this question in relation to covering are presented in Table 5.24. As each respondent was able to say that there were both uncovered and covered women who wear a *çarşaf*, turban or headcover among their close friends, each row can have a total over 100. When studying the table it is important to keep this point in mind; as an example, a correct interpretation of the data would be “66.9% of women who said they did not cover stated that they had uncovered friends.” When we employ this method, we can say that approximately 28% of uncovered women said that they had friends who wore a turban (a rate under the country average, which is 32.7%), whereas almost 66% of women who stated that they wore a turban said that they had close friends who did not cover (slightly above the country average). Among those who wore a headscarf/headcover/*yemeni*, the rate of having close friends who did not cover was 8% less than women who wore a turban. The rate of women in this group who had friends who wore a turban was higher than the rate of women who wore a turban and who were friends with other women who also wore a turban. Concerning women who wore a turban, 31% had close friendships with other women who wore a turban, whereas for women who wore a headcover, this rate was 36.7%. The noteworthy thing here is that the rate of women who wore a turban and who stated that they had close friends who also wore a turban was not the highest. Another striking finding is that the rate of women who wore a turban and who stated that they had close friends in the other two groups was higher than the rate of other groups who said that they had close friendships with women who wore a turban.

When close friends in the family circle were considered, we observed that both covered and uncovered women primarily interacted with families similar to themselves in this particular sense. For example, 80% of women who wore a turban stated that as a family they met other families, which had some members who wore a turban; this rate was only 47% among women who did not cover. Only 28% of uncovered women stated that as a family they met other families which had members who wore a turban, while approximately 77% of this group said that they got together with families whose members did not cover. However, it must be emphasized here that a clear-cut point of separation in relations between families of uncovered women and women who wear a turban or headscarf/headcover/*yemeni* does not exist, similar to relationships with friends, and that at least some of the people from both groups get together as families. These groups do not lead isolated or separated family lives. As far as we could understand from what people told us, these groups maintain social contact individually and within family groups. Two separated groups who exclude each other or who do not have any social interaction do not exist in practice. Although their social views and religious practices differ, these groups still interact.

Table 5.24 Relationships of Covered and Uncovered Women						
Could you please indicate if women who wear a ÇARŞAF, YEMENİ/HEADCOVER or TURBAN or WHO DO NOT COVER exist within the groups I will list now?*						
Among close friends						
		Uncovered	Çarşaf	Yemeni/Headcover	Turban	
Do you cover when going outside?	No, I do not cover	66,9	6,3	62,1	27,9	
	Yes, I wear a headscarf/headcover/yemeni	57,5	7,2	73,1	36,7	
	Yes, I wear a turban	65,5	2,4	67,9	31,0	
	Yes, I wear a çarşaf ^{ft}	83,3	16,7	50,0	16,7	
	NI/NA**	41,2	5,9	58,8	41,2	
		61,8	6,4	67,9	32,7	
Among close friends or relatives often met in family gatherings						
		Uncovered	Çarşaf	Yemeni/Headcover	Turban	
Do you cover when going outside?	Hayır örtmüyorum	76,5	4,0	63,6	28,3	
	Yes, I wear a headscarf/headcover/yemeni	39,4	6,3	91,2	32,8	
	Yes, I wear a turban	47,1	28,2	68,2	80,0	
	Yes, I wear a çarşaf ^{ft}	37,5	87,5	62,5	50,0	
	NI/NA**	58,8	5,9	76,5	29,4	
		54,1	8,9	77,7	36,5	100

* More than one answer is possible. ** The total number of observations is less than 30.

5.7.4. Evaluations on the "Turban"

Both in the 1999 study and in this one, we used the same question format when we asked respondents about their evaluations of different statements concerning the "turban" (Table 5.25). The most striking finding here was that the rate of people who agreed with the proposition "female university students should be allowed to cover if they wish to" was 76% in 1999, whereas this rate decreased to 71% in 2006. A similar but more significant decrease was observed in the rate of people who agreed with the proposition "female civil servants should be allowed to cover if they wish to". This rate was 74% in 1999 but dropped to 68% in 2006. Although these results indicate that the polarization observed in 1999, which emerged as a result of the headscarf ban and possible changes in opinions, decreased slightly, an obvious majority have not internalized the headscarf ban even after seven years and support the view opposing the ban.

Table 5.25 Evaluations on the turban				
	Disagrees	Undecided	Agrees	NA
If a woman believes in Allah and the Prophet she is considered a Muslim even if she does not cover-2006	12.1	6.7	79.9	1.3
If a woman believes in Allah and the Prophet she is considered a Muslim even if she does not cover -1999	8.3	6.9	84.8	1.3
Female civil servants should be allowed to cover if they wish to-2006	22.3	9.1	67.9	0.7
Female civil servants should be allowed to cover if they wish to-1999	17.4	5.8	74.2	2.5
Female university students should be allowed to cover if they wish to-2006	19.4	8.9	71.1	0.6
Female university students should be allowed to cover if they wish to-1999	16.0	5.6	76.1	2.3
A woman wearing a turban should not smoke in public – 2006	39.2	10.4	49.1	1.3
A woman wearing a turban should not wear make up in public – 2006	40.8	11.4	46.5	1.3
Women who cover by wearing a turban, headscarf or other types of covers are more honorable than women who do not cover – 2006	65.8	10.2	22.2	1.7

In some other questions, which we did not ask in 1999 but used in 2006, we aimed to collect evaluations concerning the public behavior of women wearing a turban and how they were perceived by the public in general. For example, people who were against women who wore a turban “smoking in public” or “wearing make-up” made up a significant group, with rates of 47% and 49% respectively. However, the rate of people who opposed this view was also high at 40%. Another interesting finding was that 66% disagreed with the idea that covered women were more honorable than ones who did not cover. The group who agreed with this statement with a rate above the country average was made up of respondents who lived in rural areas, who had lower levels of education and socio-economic status, who were relatively older, who felt closer to the Islamist end, and who defined themselves as religious and ideologically on the right - similar to what we observed in preceding questions.

		Disagrees	Undecided	Agrees	NA
(Women) Do you cover when going outside?	No, I do not cover	84.2	5.1	10.1	0.6
	Yes, I wear a headscarf/headcover/yemeni	57.0	13.2	27.6	2.3
	Yes, I wear a turban	51.7	11.5	33.1	3.6
	Yes, I wear a <i>çarşaf</i>	25.2	24.7	37.8	12.4
	NI/NA	60.8		32.7	6.5
(Men) What would he want?	She is not covered or he would not want her to cover	82.2	8.1	9.2	0.5
	He would want her to cover or she covers or used to cover	63.5	11.9	23.1	1.6
	He would want her to wear a <i>çarşaf</i> or she wears or used to wear a <i>çarşaf</i>	23.1		76.9	
	He wants his wife to cover but he is not sure about the method of covering	44.4	7.4	48.2	
	He would want her to wear a turban or she wears or used to wear a turban	46.2	13.1	39.5	1.2
	No answer	65.8	10.9	17.7	5.6
Turkey average		65.8	10.2	22.2	1.7

Table 5.27 If the headscarf ban was lifted, which situation would disturb him/her?

		Elementary school teacher*			Judge **		
		Yes, it would	No, it would not	NA	Yes, it would	No, it would not	NA
Rural-Urban	Rural	27.6	72.1	0.4	25.8	74.0	0.2
	Urban	30.1	69.5	0.4	29.5	70.2	0.3
Ethnic identity (Used to speak Kurdish, Zazaki with parents...)	Did not speak	32.2	67.4	0.4	31.1	68.6	0.3
	Used to speak	8.7	90.8	0.5	8.4	91.6	
Age groups	Age 18-24	25.4	74.2	0.4	26.3	73.7	
	Age 25-39	27.0	72.2	0.7	26.2	73.2	0.5
	Age 40-54	31.2	68.8		29.1	70.6	0.3
	Age 55-69	34.6	64.9	0.5	32.7	67.3	
	Age 70 +	40.2	59.8		36.5	63.5	
Ownership groups	Low-level ownership	23.0	76.3	0.7	21.8	77.6	0.6
	Medium-level ownership	29.8	70.1	0.2	29.3	70.5	0.2
	High-level ownership	46.6	52.9	0.6	43.3	56.7	
Education	Illiterate	16.8	82.2	1.0	10.7	89.3	
	Literate without a diploma	16.5	82.2	1.3	14.8	83.9	1.3
	Primary school graduate	27.7	72.0	0.3	25.2	74.6	0.3
	High school graduate	33.5	66.2	0.3	35.0	65.0	
	University+ graduate	43.0	56.1	0.8	47.8	51.4	0.8
Party preferences	AKP	20.0	79.9	0.2	19.1	80.5	0.3
	ANAP-DYP-GP	41.8	58.2		46.0	54.0	
	MHP-BBP	29.2	70.8		23.7	76.3	
	CHP	58.6	41.4		59.7	40.3	
	DEHAP/DTP	10.7	87.1	2.1	11.6	88.4	
	Other	40.6	56.8	2.6	48.6	48.8	2.6
	Undecided	37.4	61.2	1.4	40.0	60.0	
Left-right groups	Leftist	44.8	54.7	0.4	45.4	54.6	
	Center	27.5	71.6	0.9	23.4	76.2	0.4
	Rightist	22.0	77.8	0.2	22.9	76.9	0.2
Alevi identity	Not Alevi	28.6	71.0	0.4	27.4	72.3	0.3
	Alevi	34.0	65.4	0.6	35.0	65.0	
Islamist/Secularist groups	Secular	51.1	47.9	1.0	54.3	45.3	0.3
	Center	23.4	76.0	0.6	20.7	78.7	0.6
	Islamist	23.1	76.9		21.9	78.1	
Religiosity groups	Not religious	43.2	56.8		45.1	54.9	
	Center	39.2	59.6	1.2	35.9	63.7	0.4
	Religious	24.6	75.1	0.3	23.9	75.8	0.3
Turkey average		29.2	70.4	0.4	28.2	71.5	0.3

* If we assume that female elementary school teachers were allowed to wear a turban, would you be disturbed if a teacher wearing a turban taught your child at school?

** If we assume that female judges were allowed to wear a turban, would you be disturbed if a female judge with a turban presided over your hearing in the court room?

Concerning party preferences, only the rate of voters for AKP who agreed with this statement (30%) is above the country average. (The relevant cross-tabular analyses are not presented here.)

The rate of women who cover and men whose wives or fiancées cover or who want their wives or fiancées to cover who consider covered women as more honorable in comparison to uncovered women was higher than the country average. In other words, those who cover see themselves as more honorable than the ones who do not. However, we must stress here that even in these subgroups, the rate of people who consider women who cover to be more honorable than women who do not is never higher than 35-40%.

We shall conclude the series of questions on the headscarf ban in public places with two hypothetical evaluations. The respondents were asked in two separate questions whether they would feel disturbed if the headscarf ban was lifted and if their child’s teacher at elementary school or a female judge in a courtroom wore a turban. Though surprising, the results were coherent with the previously obtained results. A group of approximately 70% throughout the country stated that such a situation would not disturb them.

We can see through the cross-tabular analyses that the rate of people who stated that they would not be disturbed by receiving public service from civil servants who covered was higher among people who lived in rural areas, who indicated that they were of Kurdish origin, who had a relatively lower level of income and ownership, who were less educated, who ideologically placed on the center and the right, and who felt closer to the religious and Islamist sectors (Table 5.27). The most striking result was that the rate of people in the age group 18-24 who stated that they would not be disturbed by such a situation was 74% - a rate higher than the country average, which was 70%. Concerning party preferences, voters for AKP and DEHAP/DTP who stated that such a situation would not disturb them displayed higher rates than others. The rate of Alevis, 34%, who said that they would be disturbed by these situations was above the country average, at approximately 29%. Clearly, Alevis would be relatively more disturbed if women wearing turbans worked as civil servants. However, the groups who would be disturbed by such a situation displayed the highest rates among people who were relatively more educated (43% in the group with university or higher education), who ideologically placed on the left (45%) and who considered themselves closer to the secularist end on the “Secularist-Islamist” scale (51%).

The picture that appears in relation to these results shows that if the headscarf ban was lifted, a minority that is too big to disregard would feel disturbed even if the majority of the people supported such a decision. Moreover, the fact that 45% of people with university or higher education stated that they would be disturbed by these conditions is thought-provoking considering that the people in this group hold important positions in society. It is not possible to predict the consequences of such discomfort through this type of a study. However, the fact that a group of almost 30% stated that they would be disturbed by the existence of civil servants who wore a turban suggests that finding a solution to this problem is not easy.

5.8. IS RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM A RISING TREND?

In recent months when views suggesting the rise of reactionary Islam were expressed, some insisted that this was not true. Clearly, views on this issue will change according to individuals’ interpretations based on their world view, observations and knowledge. In this study, we aimed to determine how ordinary citizens consider this issue as of May 2006. At the time we asked these questions to respondents of our field study, the political statements and counter-statements that gradually polarized the public and raised the tension in the country in fall 2006 were not yet on the public agenda.

When asked the question, “Some people claim that a religious fundamentalist movement which aims to establish a radical Islamic society and a state in Turkey has been on the rise in the last 10-15 years; do you agree?”, 33% said that they agreed that Islamic religious fundamentalism was on the rise (Table 5.28).

Table 5.28 Some people claim that a religious fundamentalist movement which aims to establish an Islamic society and state in Turkey has been on the rise in the last 10-15 years; do you agree?

Yes, I agree	No, I do not agree	NA
32.6	61.3	6.1

Above, we gave a breakdown of the question that studied whether the number of covering women had increased. Naturally, evaluations concerning the increase in the number of covering women are expected to have influenced

evaluations about the rise of religious fundamentalism. As seen in Table 5.29 below, almost 33% of the public thought that religious fundamentalism was indeed on the rise, and this rate went up to 53% in the group who believed that the number of covering women had increased. Furthermore, people who stated that religious fundamentalism was on the rise were asked on what they based their view. Their answers indicate that the basis for the view that religious Islamic fundamentalism has grown stronger was the perception that the number of covering women had increased. We showed earlier that, contrary to this perception, the number of covering women has, in fact, decreased. In spite of this fact, the view that religious fundamentalism and reactionary Islam has gained power in the country was enhanced because facts and perceptions were not in accord.

Table 5.29 Some people claim that a religious fundamentalist movement which aims to establish an Islamic society and state in Turkey has been on the rise in the last 10-15 years; do you agree?

		Yes, I agree	No, I do not agree	NA	
Do you think the number of covering women has increased in the last 10 years?	Yes, there has been a substantial increase	53.2	41.2	5.6	100
	Yes, it slightly increased	30.7	64.6	4.7	100
	No, there has been no increase	21.2	75.2	3.7	100
	NA	18.5	66.7	14.8	100
	Turkey average	32.6	61.3	6.1	100

Other findings obtained by this question format, which allowed respondents to give multiple answers, are also interesting. For example, almost 30% of the respondents stated that the fact that “Islamists have become more powerful in politics” over the last 10-15 years was the main reason for the recent rise of religious fundamentalism (Table 5.30). On the other hand, almost 25% gave an affirmative answer to the question “Should political parties that base their policies on religion exist in Turkey?” in 1999, while this rose to 41% in 2006 (Table 5.31). When these two questions are compared, it can be observed that the number of people who thought that political parties with policies based on religion should be a part of the political system increased while another group regarded “the increase in the power of Islamists in politics” as proof of the rise of religious fundamentalism.


Table 5.30 What is the main reason that makes you think that a religious fundamentalist movement which aims to establish an Islamic society and state in Turkey has been on the rise in the last 10-15 years?

	Share among the answers	Share among the respondents
The increase in the number of covering women	20.6	34.6
The increase in the number of people who favor the Shari’ah	13.5	22.7
The increase in the power of religious sects	13.9	23.3
The increase in the number of religious publications	8.8	14.8
The increase in the activities of Islamic terror organizations	8.2	13.7
The increase in Islamist views among university students	5.3	8.8
The increase in the activity of Islamist newspapers and television channels	8.9	14.9
The increase in the power of Islamists in politics	17.5	29.4
Other	1.3	2.2
NI/NA	2.0	3.3
	100	167.8

Table 5.31 Do you think political parties that base their policies on religion should be a part of the Turkish political party system?

	1999	2006
Yes, they should	24.6	41.4
No, they shouldn't	60.6	53.6
NA	14.8	5.0
	100	100

Figure 5.5 Would you want a Shari'ah-based religious regime to be established in Turkey?



* TÜSES Foundation (1995), Türkiye’de Siyasi Partilerin Seçmenleri ve Sosyal Demokrasinin Toplumsal Tabanı, Ankara, TÜSES (1996), Türkiye’de Siyasi Partilerin Seçmenlerinin Nitelikleri, Kimlikleri ve Eğilimleri, Ankara, TÜSES (1999), Türkiye’de Siyasi Partilerin Seçmenleri ve Toplum Düzeni, Ankara.

** Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2006)

Similarly, 23% of the people who thought that religious fundamentalism was on the rise in the country claimed that the increase in the number of people who wanted a Shari’ah-based regime was the proof of this increase. As was the case in the issues of religious fundamentalism and headscarf, whether this view coincides with the truth must be studied further. We will be able to monitor the answer to this question in the course of time. The figure above was created by putting together the results of the studies conducted by TÜSES between 1995-1998, the studies we conducted in 1999 and 2002 and our current study. The most important result obtained through this figure is that since our study in 1999 the number of people who wanted a Shari’ah-based regime gradually decreased. However, the above-mentioned group of 23% claimed exactly the opposite. According to this group, more people want a regime based on Shari’ah. Representing approximately one out of every four people in the country, this group saw the claim that the number of people who wanted a Shari’ah based regime in Turkey had increased as proof of the rise of religious fundamentalism. Yet the data obtained indicate that the support given to a Shari’ah-based regime did not increase but instead decreased. In short, the paradoxical situation we observe in this perception, as well as in the opinions that differentiate according to this perception, can also be observed in this question (Figure 5.5).

A striking example of this bi-polar perception and the different opinions based on this perception is the view that secularism is under threat in Turkey – a view also occasionally stated by top government officials. Almost four months before fall 2006, when this issue became part of the public agenda, we shared this view with ordinary citizens at voting

Table 5.32 Do you think secularism is under threat in Turkey?

		Yes, it is	No, it is not	NA
Gender	Female	20.0	73.3	6.7
	Male	24.3	72.8	2.9
Rural-Urban	Rural	19.5	72.9	7.6
	Urban	23.5	73.2	3.3
Ethnic identity (Used to speak Kurdish, Zazaki with parents...)	Used to speak	23.7	72.1	4.2
	Did not speak	10.8	80.2	9.1
Age groups	Age 18-24	24.1	72.1	3.8
	Age 25-39	23.0	72.5	4.5
	Age 40-54	21.5	72.3	6.1
	Age 55-69	17.5	79.6	2.9
	Age 70 +	24.0	68.9	7.1
Income groups	Less than 450 YTL	11.5	77.5	11.0
	Between 450-1000 YTL	21.5	75.8	2.7
	Over 1000 YTL	38.5	60.5	1.0
Ownership groups	Low-level ownership	22.0	73.5	4.5
	Medium-level ownership	17.0	76.1	6.9
	High-level ownership	35.2	63.3	1.5
Education	Illiterate	10.2	70.1	19.7
	Literate without a diploma	13.3	74.4	12.3
	Primary school graduate	17.5	78.2	4.3
	High school graduate	29.4	68.9	1.7
	University+ graduate	43.6	55.6	0.8
Party preferences	AKP	12.0	81.2	6.7
	ANAP-DYP-GP	32.2	64.4	3.4
	MHP-BBP	20.5	78.2	1.3
	CHP	49.1	50.9	
	DEHAP/DTP	21.5	69.9	8.6
	Other	47.7	52.3	
	Undecided	24.5	72.1	3.4
Left-right groups	Leftist	42.5	56.2	1.3
	Center	18.9	76.9	4.3
	Rightist	14.4	80.8	4.8
Alevi identity	Not Alevi	20.5	74.5	4.9
	Alevi	34.1	61.7	4.2
Islamist/Secularist groups	Secular	50.4	49.0	0.7
	Center	17.6	78.5	4.0
	Islamist	12.2	81.4	6.4
Religiosity groups	Not religious	35.9	62.0	2.1
	Center	31.2	65.5	3.3
	Religious	17.1	77.5	5.4
	Turkey average	22.1	73.1	4.8

age in our sample by asking the question: “Do you think that secularism is under threat in Turkey?” A group of 22% stated that they thought secularism was under threat. A group of almost 5% did not give an answer. When we study the cross-tabular analyses, we see that people who felt closer to the secularist end in the “Islamist-Secularist” cleavage displayed a higher rate, around 50%, of thinking that secularism was under threat. Likewise, this rate was 44% for people who had university or higher education, 39% and 35% respectively for people who had a higher level of income and ownership, 36% for people who did not consider themselves religious, and approximately 43% for people who ideologically placed themselves on the left. When we take a look at voting patterns, 49% of CHP voters regarded secularism to be under threat, while this rate was 32% in the group of voters for ANAP-DYP-GP, but only 12% among the voters for AKP. Clearly, whether secularism is under threat or not directly varies according to different political views, and this diversification is significantly parallel to the social and cultural cleavage observed.

5.9. ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN POLITICS AND IN CONFRONTING THE THREAT OF “RADICAL FUNDAMENTALISM”

We would like to conclude the issue of the threat of radical fundamentalism, rising religious fundamentalism and the view that secularism is compromised, as perceived by groups whose breakdown we presented above, by discussing the role of the military in politics and the threat of radical fundamentalism as perceived by the public. Many reliable field studies conducted in Turkey up to the present day have shown that the military is regarded as the most reliable institution in Turkey. In this study, we did not embark upon inquiring about the same issue to obtain the same result. Instead, we asked a few different questions in order to understand the view of ordinary citizens concerning what the role of the military should be in politics. We presented the results of one of these questions when we previously discussed the issue of democratic values. Here, we would like to discuss the same question once again but on a larger scale.

The people we interviewed were asked to evaluate the statements in Table 5.33 below on a scale of 0-10, “0” meaning “I do not agree at all” and “10” meaning “I totally agree”. People who did not agree with the first statement but who agreed with the second and the third constituted the majority. The fact that the majority did not agree with the statement “Not elected governments but a military regime can solve Turkey’s problems” can be interpreted as saying that a military regime does not find the support of the public; but on the other hand, the fact that a group of almost 27% agreed with this statement can also allow us to infer that democracy has not yet been firmly established in Turkey. A group of almost 59% agreed with the statement “It is natural for the military to occasionally voice their opinion against an elected government”. It can be said that the people who agreed with this view do not want a military regime but that they approve of a special role for the military in the unique context of Turkey. Finally, almost 54% agreed with the statement “Turkish people can safeguard secularism without the support of the military”. This view perhaps indicates that the majority of the public has enough self-confidence to be able to state that secularism can be protected without the support of the military. However, the fact that a significant group of 25% stated that the support of the military was crucial points at the sensitivity of the people of Turkey concerning secularism – while also showing that the public does not have much trust in the democratic mechanisms in Turkey.

In short, although the majority of the public does not agree with the idea that only a military regime can solve Turkey’s problems, it is also clear that the public supports a unique role for the military in the context of Turkish politics.

	Does not agree	Undecided	Agrees	NA
Turkey’s problems can be solved not by elected governments but by a military regime	54.7	14.3	26.8	4.2
It is natural for the military to occasionally voice their opinion against an elected government	18.4	18.8	58.6	4.2
Turkish people can safeguard secularism without the support of the military	24.8	17.7	53.7	3.9

Can we identify the groups who supported the unique role of the military in Turkey concerning these sensitive issues and those who opposed it? Cross-tabular analyses enable us to determine which groups included more people who stated views against the existence of a civil authority, which is one of the fundamental principles of democracy, and people who supported the opposite view (Table 5.34). For example, when we consider the first statement, we observe that men, more than women, opposed the view that Turkey’s problems could be solved not by elected governments but by a military regime.

Table 5.34 Role of the military in Turkish politics

		Turkey's problems can be solved not by elected governments but by a military regime				It is natural for the military to occasionally voice their opinion against an elected government				Turkish people can safeguard secularism without the support of the military			
		Does not agree	Undecided	Agrees	NA	Does not agree	Undecided	Agrees	NA	Does not agree	Undecided	Agrees	NA
Gender	Female	50.7	14.5	27.4	7.5	15.5	21.0	56.3	7.3	24.1	18.0	51.2	6.8
	Male	58.9	14.2	26.2	0.7	21.6	16.5	61.1	0.8	25.5	17.3	56.3	0.8
Rural-Urban	Rural	51.1	11.0	31.4	6.6	14.4	16.2	61.9	7.5	18.8	16.7	57.1	7.5
	Urban	56.6	16.2	24.3	2.9	20.6	20.2	56.8	2.4	28.0	18.2	51.8	2.0
Ethnic identity (Used to speak Kurdish, Zazaki with parents...)	Did not speak	52.3	15.2	28.6	3.8	17.0	18.3	61.2	3.5	26.1	17.8	52.7	3.4
	Used to speak	71.0	8.3	14.1	6.7	28.5	22.2	40.5	8.8	15.4	16.9	60.6	7.2
Education	Illiterate	39.1	20.4	20.7	19.9	14.3	17.4	47.5	20.8	12.8	11.6	56.0	19.6
	Literate without a diploma	54.8	20.8	23.5	0.9	16.9	15.1	59.9	8.1	20.7	16.1	55.1	8.1
	Primary school graduate	53.4	12.3	30.3	4.0	18.2	18.5	59.9	3.4	23.0	18.9	54.7	3.3
	High school graduate	58.9	15.0	24.6	1.4	18.6	20.7	58.9	1.8	30.8	16.8	51.2	1.2
	University+ graduate	63.4	16.5	18.0	2.1	25.0	19.9	55.1		30.1	18.9	50.9	0.1
Income groups	Less than 450 YTL	51.0	17.3	25.1	6.6	19.1	23.2	49.6	8.0	20.2	21.6	51.3	6.9
	Between 450-1000 YTL	55.4	13.3	28.8	2.5	19.2	18.2	60.4	2.2	24.7	17.8	55.1	2.4
	Over 1000 YTL	62.5	13.7	22.2	1.6	17.1	18.6	62.9	1.4	27.1	14.1	58.0	0.7
Party preferences	AKP	50.3	14.7	30.3	4.7	16.8	17.4	60.4	5.4	17.8	17.2	60.3	4.7
	ANAP-DYP-GP	48.8	15.9	32.8	2.5	8.9	13.3	75.3	2.5	25.4	13.4	58.7	2.5
	MHP-BBP	50.8	14.5	33.3	1.4	17.4	12.8	69.8		30.9	27.0	42.1	
	CHP	61.0	11.9	24.1	3.0	15.1	14.3	70.0	0.6	32.8	16.8	49.8	0.6
	DEHAP/DTP	74.4	13.1	12.4		47.2	19.6	26.9	6.3	15.3	15.1	65.3	4.3
	Other	66.0	16.3	14.6	3.0	21.4	17.7	58.2	2.7	33.8	16.8	49.4	
	Undecided	47.6	17.4	29.5	5.5	16.1	22.7	57.0	4.3	34.6	12.0	48.0	5.4
Left-right groups	Leftist	67.7	9.9	18.8	3.6	20.3	18.9	59.1	1.7	32.6	12.9	53.7	0.9
	Center	54.3	15.6	27.2	3.0	21.8	25.2	49.9	3.1	29.8	22.3	44.3	3.6
	Rightist	49.9	15.2	30.3	4.6	17.1	15.9	62.6	4.4	16.9	16.2	62.7	4.2
Alevi identity	Not Alevi	54.6	14.4	26.9	4.1	18.7	18.5	58.4	4.3	24.7	17.7	53.6	4.0
	Alevi	55.0	13.8	26.2	4.9	16.3	21.2	59.8	2.8	25.0	17.5	54.1	3.4
Islamist/Secularist groups	Secular	66.3	11.0	19.9	2.7	16.6	14.7	67.6	1.0	38.4	13.8	47.2	0.7
	Center	60.8	15.3	20.5	3.3	19.7	25.7	50.1	4.5	27.5	26.3	42.6	3.5
	Islamist	48.0	15.0	32.7	4.3	18.7	16.5	59.8	5.0	16.2	14.8	63.9	5.1
Religiosity groups	Not religious	65.6	12.8	18.5	3.1	19.5	16.7	61.7	2.1	36.3	13.8	46.8	3.1
	Center	55.7	15.2	23.7	5.4	18.4	23.0	55.0	3.7	30.0	20.5	46.0	3.5
	Religious	52.8	14.6	28.5	4.1	18.1	18.0	59.3	4.6	22.1	17.5	56.2	4.2
	Turkey average	54.7	14.3	26.8	4.2	18.4	18.8	58.6	4.2	24.8	17.7	53.7	3.9

The results that emerge when we analyze this statement in more detail are quite interesting. People with Kurdish origin opposed a military regime at a rate of 71%, which is almost 18% above the country average. People who are relatively more educated (i.e. people with high school or higher education) and who have a higher level of ownership – although this is not presented in the related table – were against a military regime with a rate higher than the country average. The rate of opposition to a military regime was also above the country average for groups who did not consider themselves religious and who felt closer to the secularist end on the “Islamist-Secularist” scale – a result consistent with the other results above.

People who ideologically placed on the left and voters for CHP and DEHAP/DTP, as well as relatively smaller parties, also displayed their disapproval of a military regime. On the other hand, the voters for AKP and parties in the center right opposed a military regime with a rate lower than the country average. This last finding concerning AKP voters was rather interesting and also unexpected. We are not sure as to how we should interpret this finding. We could say that the voters for AKP were uneasy about this issue and were reluctant to openly express their views. On the other hand, the fact that CHP voters were significantly against a military regime is a finding that the CHP administration must study carefully.

A similar pattern appears when we study the cross-tabular analyses of the second statement. However, what provokes thought here is that the rate of people who did not agree with the statement “It is natural for the military to occasionally voice their opinion against an elected government” did not exceed 47% in any of the subgroups, except for the voters for DEHAP/DTP. This rate was only 29% for the group of people who stated that they spoke Kurdish with their parents. The fact that the opposing view found support of around only 20% in the other subgroups could be regarded as proof that the view in favor of the role of the military unique to Turkey is quite prevalent throughout the country.

Finally, we come across a similar picture when we take a look at the cross-tabular analyses concerning the statement “Turkish people can safeguard secularism without the support of the military”. However, this time, DEHAP/DTP voters displayed the highest rate of 65% in agreeing with this statement, which can be seen as an expression of the self-confidence of the civil will in safeguarding secularism. This rate was 60% among the voters for AKP, but was still above the country average (54%). The above-mentioned fact indicating that AKP voters were unable to express their views against a military regime as strongly as “leftist” voters did not emerge in this question. The belief that secularism can be protected without the support of the military was stronger than the country average among people who defined themselves as religious and ideologically to the right, and who felt closer to the Islamist end of the “Islamist-Secularist” cleavage. Similar to the results in the previous examples, the rate of people with a higher level of income who said that secularism could be protected without the support of the military was higher than the country average.

According to the picture formed from these analyses, the more religious groups in society who voted for AKP and who could be defined as the “Islamist sector” stated that secularism could be safeguarded without the support of the military. However, even this sector did not adopt a definite position concerning the issue of the military voicing their opinions against civil authority. Therefore, a coherent frame for views concerning civil initiative and the absolute power of civil authority, which has democratic legitimacy, cannot be created. Any attempt to do so must take into account the fervently supported special role for the military as a unique necessity of the Turkish political context by all segments of society.

5.10. IS RELIGION-BASED CONSERVATISM ON THE RISE?

In order to examine this issue, we reused some of the statements from 1999 or made some minor alterations to them. The results presented in Table 5.35 below indicate that except one, all attitudes formed through religious motives lost strength from 1999 to 2006. When the possible reactions of people to events they could face in daily life are predicted through interpreting the religious motifs that could be identified in these statements, we can say that the religion-based conservative attitude has not become stronger in comparison to the situation in 1999, and that on the contrary, it has weakened. However, there are also observations that could indicate the opposite view. For example, the rate of people who said in 1999 that there could be good people among the believers of other religions was 89%, whereas it decreased to 72% in 2006. Perhaps we can come up with a more meaningful explanation if we conjoin this result with the results concerning the skeptic attitude towards “foreigners”.

Table 5.35 Attitudes that assess religion-based conservatism

	Does not agree	Undecided	Agrees	NA	
If I had an apartment to rent out, I would try to ensure that my tenant was a devout Muslim – 2006	30.2	17.6	50.9	1.3	100
If I had an apartment to rent out, I would try to ensure that my tenant was a devout Muslim – 1999	40.2	5.9	51.9	1.9	100
If I looked for an apartment to rent, I would take care that my neighbors were devout Muslims – 2006	32.1	16.8	50.0	1.1	100
If I looked for an apartment to rent, I would take care that my neighbors were devout Muslims – 1999	37.1	6.6	54.3	2	100
If I had two grocers in my neighborhood who asked for the same price for their goods, I would prefer to shop from the one who is known to be a devout Muslim – 2006	32.6	16.8	49.6	1.0	100
If I had two grocers in my neighborhood who asked for the same price for their goods, I would prefer to shop from the one who is known to be a devout Muslim – 1999	39	9.5	49.3	2.2	100
It is important that my friends are devout Muslims – 2006	29.4	19.2	50.5	0.8	100
It is important that my friends are devout Muslims– 1999	30.9	6.4	61.1	1.7	100
In business, devout Muslims are more honest and trustworthy than people who are not devout Muslims – 2006	35.2	20.1	42.8	1.9	100
In business, devout Muslims are more honest and trustworthy than people who are not devout Muslims – 1999	37.4	10.8	48.8	3	100
I believe that there may be good people among the believers of other religions – 2006	12.4	14.2	72.2	1.2	100
I believe that there may be good people among the believers of other religions – 1999	4.7	3.0	89.2	3.1	100
An ideal Muslim society should be established after the example of the era of the Prophet Mohammad – 2006	20.0	21.7	51.4	6.9	100
The most important responsibility of Muslim people is to work to enhance and promote the Islamic way of living	24.1	18.5	55.5	1.8	100

For example, almost 59% agreed with the statement “the activities of missionaries who try to promote religions other than Islam must be restricted” (Table 5.36). Although not a very large group, almost 56% agreed with the statement “the most important responsibility of Muslim people is to work to enhance and promote the Islamic way of living”. On the other hand, the rate of people who were against the re-opening of the Clergy School in Heybeliada was about 49%. 53-55% agreed with conspiracy theories that claim that the world economy is controlled by the Jews and that some influential circles who serve the interests of this group also exist in Turkey. This intolerant approach towards “others” who are “different” can also be observed in the answers given to our question designed to find out what kind of neighbor people want to have.

These serial observations indicate that large groups among the people of Turkey have a sceptical, distant and even hostile attitude towards groups they describe as “others” or “foreigners” as opposed to “us”. Another similar observation is that a sectarian and excluding approach exists towards non-Muslim citizens, who make up a very small number anyway, and towards people who have a different ethnic origin or who belong to another religious sect. Moreover, as stated above, this approach causes a lack of sensitivity in advocating the rights of “others”, although in general, democratic rights are supported. Such a sectarian, excluding and sceptical attitude occasionally impedes the democratic system in the country.

Table 5.36 Skeptical attitudes towards foreigners

	Does not agree	Undecided	Agrees	NA	
The September 11 attacks against the US can in no way be justified according to Islamic belief	22.1	16.1	56.4	5.5	100
The activities of missionaries who work to promote religions other than Islam must be restricted	21.3	16.5	58.6	3.6	100
The clergy school in Heybeliada, which is currently closed, should be re-opened so that Christian Orthodox clergymen can be educated there	48.9	18.4	26.6	6.1	100
The Jews are in control of the world economy	19.6	17.8	54.8	7.8	100
In Turkey, some influential circles serve the interests of the Jews	17.5	21.3	52.9	8.3	100

The need to reform Sunni Islam in Turkey has been regularly debated since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. The rate of agreement with the reformist statements, which is documented in Table 5.37 below is higher than that for the options advocating the current situation, except for the issue of approving women to perform the funeral prayer. For instance, the rates of those in favor of supporting the Presidency of Religious Affairs through the voluntary contribution of the public, the state’s financial support to Cem houses and the implementation of case law in Islam are higher than those of opposing views. The support for the re-interpretation of Islam within the modern context was the same as in 1999 (34.8% in 1999 and 34.6% in 2006), while the rate of people against this view remained the same in both studies with 49.8%. This is the only finding that was exactly the same in both of the studies we conducted. On the other hand, the rate of support for state subsidies for Cem houses was 69.2% in 1999, but it dropped to 43.5% in 2006. This decrease is an example of the cleavage among sects, which we emphasized in different sections of our study. Allowing women to perform the funeral prayer received the support of only 25.0% in 1999, whereas it rose to 35.4% in 2006, and the rate of people who were against this practice decreased to 44.6% in 2006 from a rate of 63.9% in 1999.

	Does not agree	Undecided	Agrees	NA	
In Turkey, the Presidency of Religious Affairs should not be supported by the state but through the voluntary contributions of the public	25.4	21.0	49.3	4.3	100
The state must give financial support to Cem houses in order to fulfill the needs of Alevi citizens	31.7	20.6	43.5	4.1	100
Women can perform prayers in mosques together with the community in an area assigned to them	20.2	16.8	60.5	2.4	100
Women should be allowed to perform the funeral prayer	44.6	16.6	35.4	3.3	100
Islam needs to be reorganized in line with case law, namely, many of its parts must be re-interpreted within the modern context	27.7	19.4	42.6	10.3	100
Islam needs be re-interpreted according to the modern context	49.8	8.8	34.6	6.7	100


5.11. EVALUATING RELIGION AND THE PERFORMANCE OF THE GOVERNING JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY (AKP)

When AKP (Justice and Development Party) won a majority of the votes in the 2002 elections, it became the fifth party with a reference to Islam to come into power since 1946 – the date Turkey implemented the multiparty system. Moreover, AKP did not need to establish a coalition but established a government as a single party. After 1973, the CHP-MSP coalition was formed, which was followed by the Welfare Party’s (*Refah Partisi* – RP) participation in coalitions of the Nationalist Front (*Milliyetçi Cephe*). Consequently, RP got the highest votes in the 1995 elections and RP and True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi* – DYP) established the Refahyol coalition. However, this coalition did not last long and came to an end because of the February 28 period. The discourse of the Welfare Party had caused both the elites and the public at large to polarize, while the February 28 period deepened this cleavage. In the study we conducted in 1999, we examined how the public evaluated the Welfare Party (RP) and its successor, the Virtue Party (FP) in this process, and reached significant findings about the progression of political Islam into the political party system in Turkey. For example, the voting population did not know Recai Kutan, who was the president of FP at the time, and the people we interviewed stated that if FP wanted to succeed in the election, it had to change its leader. The people who stated that a change was needed were asked whom they wanted to see as the leader of the party, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was the name that stood out by far in the answers. In the evaluations about RP, 60% of the respondents had been against the party’s policies, while a group of 40% had given them some support. In spite of a group of 37% who approved of the abolishment of RP, a group of 38% was of the opposite opinion. The support given to RP by respondents who had said that they spoke Kurdish had displayed a rate of 47%, which was higher in comparison to all other groups.

After the elections in April 1999, a short-lasting contention for the presidency of FP took place, and consequently, a relatively “younger” group from the MSP-RP-FP wing of the *Milli Görüş* movement broke away and established AKP, which came to power after the 2002 elections. We believe that it is important to present a comparative analysis of AKP’s historical background and its four and a half year performance together with our evaluations at hand of RP.

We would like to begin this discussion with the question we asked respondents to find out what factors were prioritized when they voted for a party. As can be seen in Figure 5.6 below, among ten propositions, the belief that influenced the behavior of voters the most was “believing that the party would fight against bribery and corruption”, with a rate of 92.6%. The following most important factors were the conviction that a party would “protect human rights and

Figure 5.6 What factors affect party selection during elections and to what extent?



freedom” (91.5%), that it would “improve the economy” (90.8%) and that it would “pursue a foreign policy that befits our national pride and identity” (87.2%). Finally, 84.2% considered “protecting secular republican values” as important for a party. These five factors formed the most dominant group of factors in the analysis that was applied to the evaluations and accounted for 30.5% of the total variance. We named these factors as the “Issues on which consensus has been reached”.

Table 5.38 What factors hold the greatest importance for voting? – Factor Analysis Results

	Issues on which consensus has been reached	Minority rights	Islamic values and the EU
Because I believe they will fight against bribery and corruption	0.82	0.07	0.14
Because I believe they will protect human rights and freedom	0.80	0.10	0.14
Because their foreign policy befits our national pride and identity	0.75	-0.03	0.17
Because they protect secular republican values	0.72	0.05	0.03
Because I have trust that they will improve the economy	0.72	0.00	0.22
Because it is a party that is more predisposed to the protection of the identity and rights of Alevi citizens	0.03	0.93	0.02
Because they show an effort to protect the cultural identity of Kurdish people	0.06	0.91	0.12
Because they protect Islamic values	0.10	0.05	0.81
Because I approve of the leader of the party	0.14	0.00	0.76
Because they support the process of Turkey's membership to the EU	0.30	0.21	0.42
Explained total variance (%)	30.5	17.7	15.4

Factor inference method: Principle component analysis, rotation method: varimax, through Kaiser normalization.

The three factors that formed the second group of most important factors were “upholding Islamic values”, “supporting the process of Turkey’s membership to the EU”, and “approving the leader of the party”, which were all rated at a range of 71% to 78%. We named this group “Islamic Values and the EU”. The third group consisted of the issue of minority rights, which we expressed as “showing an effort to protect the cultural identity of Kurdish people and Alevi citizens”. We named this third dimension “Minority Rights”. The subject groups of “Minority Rights” and “Islamic Values and the EU” can account for a total variance of 17.7% and 15.4% respectively in factor analysis. The fact that important issues related to voting can be divided into three clear-cut dimensions is remarkable.

We used this factor analysis to obtain factor scores, which are in fact the weighted average of the answers each person gave for all of the questions. These scores were normalized; in other words, they were created as a series with an average of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Therefore, when the average for a subgroup approached zero, that subgroup tended to bear resemblance to the country average, while the positive averages displayed a weighted average score of importance above the country average, and the negative average factor scores corresponded to a weighted average score of importance under the country average.

When we used the cross-tabular analyses to analyze these factor scores and the average values of the subgroups, we saw that women and men did not display a differentiated picture concerning the three dimensions (Table 5.39). However, we observed that minority rights were considered less important by people who live in rural areas compared to those who live in urban areas. The latter group deemed Islamic values and the EU as less important compared to people who live in rural areas. Respondents who stated that they were of Kurdish origin gave more importance to minority rights, Islamic values and the EU than the rest of the sample.

Concerning age groups, only the group of people who were 70 or older considered minority rights as less important, and the issue of Islamic values and the EU more important than the country average. When business was taken into consideration, a meaningful differentiation related to the “Most Important Factors” was observed. Self-employed people, unemployed people and students considered the issues in this group more important, displaying a rate above the country average, while paid workers and unpaid family workers considered them less important than the country average. Students and paid full-time workers considered minority issues important, while retired people displayed a rate under the country average regarding these issues. Workers did not find the issues of Islamic values and the EU very important, whereas self-employed people and family workers considered these issues very important, displaying a rate above the country average. Students deemed Islamic values and the issue of the EU as less important, with a rate under the country average. Finally, we observed that as education levels increased, the importance given to such issues decreased.

When we consider the situation from the viewpoint of party voters, we see that the voters for AKP constituted the only group that made up a percentage under the average regarding the issues mentioned in the first group. AKP voters who considered these issues less important when compared to the general public displayed higher rates concerning issues such as Islamic values and the EU. Concerning minority issues, CHP voters held a similar position with AKP voters regarding minority rights and stood close to the general public opinion on the issue. However, contrary to AKP voters, they considered the issues in the first group more important than the general public and the issues of Islamic values and the EU less important than the country average. It is not surprising that the voters for two different parties held such converse positions with regard to the issues they deemed as important in terms of selecting the party they vote for. DEHAP/DTP voters considered all issues more important than the country average and paid special attention to minority issues. Alevis considered minority issues more important and the issues of Islamic values and the EU less important than the general public. Concerning the “Islamist-Secularist” cleavage and the religiosity of people according to their self-evaluation, only people who do not consider themselves religious deem minority rights more important than the country average, and no other cleavage exists, which is surprising. People who considered themselves as “religious” or as “Islamist” did not appear to regard “Minority Rights” as important. However, that the Islamist sector – which provided answers coherent with the cross-tabular analyses according to party preferences – did not consider the “Issues on Which Consensus Has Been Reached” important is quite astonishing.

Table 5.39 Important issues related to voting – Cross-tabular analysis 1

		Issues on which consensus has been reached	Minority rights	Islamic values and the EU
Gender	Female	-0.02	0.01	0.01
	Male	0.02	-0.01	-0.01
Rural-Urban	Rural	0.10	-0.20	0.20
	Urban	-0.05	0.10	-0.10
Ethnic identity (Used to speak Kurdish, Zazaki with parents...)	Did not speak	-0.01	-0.07	-0.05
	Used to speak	0.07	0.52	0.36
Age groups	Age 18-24	0.02	0.03	-0.02
	Age 25-39	0.03	0.03	0.00
	Age 40-54	0.00	-0.03	-0.05
	Age 55-69	-0.08	0.01	0.08
	Age 70 +	-0.01	-0.30	0.24
Working status	Wage-earning/with salary and on full-time basis	-0.10	0.17	-0.22
	Wage-earning / with salary and on part-time basis	-0.21	-0.14	-0.14
	Self-employed	0.12	-0.08	0.16
	Unpaid family worker	-0.48	-0.02	0.30
	Retired	0.03	-0.10	0.00
	Housewife	-0.04	-0.04	0.11
	Student	0.20	0.16	-0.28
	Looking for a job and wants to works if he/she finds one	0.28	-0.06	-0.08
Income groups	Unemployed; subsists on income such as rental or interest income	-0.19	-0.06	-0.17
	Less than 450 YTL	0.03	0.02	0.27
	Between 450-1000 YTL	-0.07	-0.06	-0.04
	Over 1000 YTL	0.04	0.11	-0.22
Education	Illiterate	0.00	0.07	0.48
	Literate without a diploma	0.03	-0.12	0.36
	Primary school graduate	-0.05	-0.02	0.08
	High school graduate	0.05	0.09	-0.21
	University+ graduate	0.15	-0.10	-0.39
	Turkey average	0.00	0.00	0.00


Table 5.39 Important issues related to voting – Cross-tabular analysis 2				
		Issues on which consensus has been reached	Minority rights	Islamic values and the EU
Party preferences	AKP	-0.12	0.01	0.31
	ANAP-DYP-GP	0.12	-0.32	0.05
	MHP-BBP	0.03	-0.38	0.03
	CHP	0.30	0.08	-0.59
	DEHAP/DTP	0.15	0.85	0.25
	Other	0.15	0.18	-1.00
	Undecided	-0.10	-0.04	-0.18
Left-right groups	Leftist	0.14	0.20	-0.46
	Center	0.13	-0.07	-0.06
	Rightist	-0.16	0.01	0.30
Alevi identity	Not Alevi	0.01	-0.07	0.05
	Alevi	-0.07	0.53	-0.38
Islamist/Secularist groups	Secular	0.29	-0.02	-0.56
	Center	0.21	-0.03	-0.08
	Islamist	-0.22	0.07	0.26
Religiosity groups	Not religious	0.06	0.21	-0.50
	Center	0.14	0.03	-0.15
	Religious	-0.06	-0.04	0.11
	Turkey average	0.00	0.00	0.00

In order to measure AKP's performance in government, we first tried to determine what things had changed in different areas when compared to the previous DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government; and studied whether these changes, if any, were for the better or for the worse. At least 44% and at most 57% of the respondents stated that certain things had changed during the AKP government when a comparison with the previous government was made (Figure 5.7). The rate of people who thought that the existing change was for the better was at least 55% and at most 67%. A group of at least 20% and at most 30% believed that there had not been any change in any of the mentioned areas. Evidently, the AKP government underwent significant changes in comparison to the previous period, and most of these changes were for the better. Most importantly, a group of 33% stated that some change had taken place in terms of the economy (57% who said that "change had occurred", subtracting 24% who said that "there had been no change" = net 33% who said that "change had occurred"), and 67% claimed that this change was for the better. The rate of people who said that "a noticeable change took place" in the EU process, in internal politics and in relationships with the US was 39%, 33% and 31% respectively.

In order to find out how satisfactory AKP's policies were considered to be, we asked respondents to evaluate the party's policies in 16 different areas. As can be seen in Figure 5.8 below, in five of these areas the rate of people who did not find the policies satisfactory was higher than that of those who found them satisfactory. Thus, the overall satisfaction appears to be negative. Although the public recently developed certain doubts concerning membership of the EU, in May 2006 when our study was conducted, AKP's performance since November 2002 concerning EU membership was regarded as generally satisfactory. People who found the party's performance satisfactory displayed additional net points of 31% in comparison to the people who were of the opposite opinion. The rate of people who found AKP's policies satisfactory in terms of improvement in the economy was approximately 25%, while this rate was 22% concerning the fight against bribery and corruption and around 24% in terms of bringing solutions to health care issues.


Negative net satisfaction points mean that the number of people who were not satisfied was higher than the ones who were satisfied. The first noteworthy indicator here was that the biggest group, of 10%, consisted of people who were not satisfied concerning the work done to decrease unemployment. The subsequent areas where the party's policies

were found unsatisfactory were related to the issue of identity. A group of almost 30% found the policies satisfactory in meeting the expectations of Kurdish and Alevi citizens, whereas a group that was 4.5% larger did not find the policies regarding minority issues satisfactory. The issue of restricting the immunity of members of parliament was next on the list with a negative net value of satisfaction.



Another expectation which the AKP government had difficulty meeting was related to resolving the turban and headcover issue – another area with a negative net value of satisfaction. When we look at the cross-tabular analyses of this question, we can see that the people who did not find the party’s policies satisfactory in solving this issue belonged to the group who had a higher socio-economic status and who also had higher education (Table 5.40). Respondents who ideologically placed on the left, who identify themselves as Alevi, who did not consider themselves religious, who felt closer to the secularist end on the “Islamist-Secularist” scale deemed AKP’s policies for solving the turban issue

unsatisfactory, with a rate above the country average. However, the rate of AKP voters who also found the related policies unsatisfactory is lower than the country average. We would like to mention here without delving into much detail that the percentages of covered women, and men who wanted their wives to cover, who did not find AKP's policies concerning the turban issue satisfactory were below the country average, with 31% and 34% respectively.



In short, the performance evaluations of some of the issues that were important for AKP displayed results far from being satisfactory. Especially regarding the issue of decreasing unemployment, the number of people who were dissatisfied was higher than those who were satisfied. The expectations of Alevi and Kurdish people from the Turkish state also seem to not have been amply met during the AKP government. In addition, it can be clearly seen that the AKP government did not pursue satisfactory policies in solving the issues of *İmam Hatip* schools and people wearing a turban – two important expectations stressed when AKP came to power. However, it is quite interesting that the dissatisfied group mainly consisted of people who were relatively less religious, who felt closer to the secularist end, who placed themselves to the left, and who had a relatively better socio-economic status, instead of people in favor of covering, who are relatively more religious, and who expect policies from and also support AKP concerning these issues. Perhaps this result shows that the question was interpreted in different ways by different groups. In other words, the dissatisfaction of the secular sector with AKP cannot result from the fact that AKP had been unable to lift the ban on turbans. We are not able to infer through our study what this sector expects from AKP concerning the turban issue. How AKP will succeed in pleasing this sector with regard to the turban issue remains a question that is difficult to answer.

In our study, we also got some general evaluations about certain subjects related to AKP. In the answers given to these questions, summarized in Figure 5.9 below, the evaluations concerning almost all subjects displayed a bi-polar structure. For example, while 42% of the respondents did not agree with the statement “AKP aims to reverse the rights women were able to acquire with the establishment of the Turkish Republic”, a group of 37% did. A similar difference of opinion was also observed in all other evaluations.




Table 5.40 Are AKP's policies in solving the turban (headscarf) issue satisfactory? – Cross-tabular analysis				
		Not satisfactory	Undecided	Satisfactory
Gender	Female	38.2	21.3	40.5
	Male	43.9	16.3	39.7
Rural-Urban	Rural	38.9	20.0	41.2
	Urban	42.1	18.3	39.6
Ethnic identity (Used to speak Kurdish, Zazaki with parents...)	Did not speak	41.1	19.5	39.3
	Used to speak	39.9	14.7	45.5
Age groups	Age 18-24	42.2	19.8	38.0
	Age 25-39	42.6	18.0	39.4
	Age 40-54	39.8	20.9	39.3
	Age 55-69	37.1	18.3	44.6
	Age 70 +	37.4	13.8	48.8
Income groups	Less than 450 YTL	33.9	22.8	43.3
	Between 450-1000 YTL	38.9	17.5	43.6
	Over 1000 YTL	53.8	17.6	28.6
Ownership groups	Low-level ownership	42.6	17.9	39.5
	Medium-level ownership	35.2	21.2	43.5
	High-level ownership	49.9	18.0	32.1
Education	Illiterate	25.1	29.7	45.2
	Literate without a diploma	35.1	15.6	49.3
	Primary school graduate	35.8	20.1	44.2
	High school graduate	52.6	15.3	32.1
	University+ graduate	55.9	16.8	27.3
Party preferences	AKP	26.2	19.0	54.8
	ANAP-DYP-GP	45.3	18.6	36.0
	MHP-BBP	50.7	19.9	29.5
	CHP	65.5	18.3	16.2
	DEHAP	51.9	6.4	41.7
	Other	67.2	9.5	23.3
	Undecided	58.1	12.5	29.4
Left-right groups	Leftist	55.1	17.1	27.8
	Center	37.3	24.9	37.8
	Rightist	35.9	15.7	48.3
Alevi identity	Not Alevi	39.9	18.9	41.2
	Alevi	49.2	18.9	31.9
Islamist/Secularist groups	Secular	62.6	17.1	20.3
	Center	41.3	24.5	34.2
	Islamist	31.2	17.4	51.4
Religiosity groups	Not religious	63.4	19.6	17.0
	Center	49.0	22.5	28.5
	Religious	36.2	18.3	45.5
	Turkey average	41.0	18.9	40.1

Table 5.41 AKP is a party that is committed to democracy

		Does not agree	Undecided	Agrees	NA
Gender	Female	24.7	18.3	52.0	5.0
	Male	27.2	16.0	55.5	1.2
Rural-Urban	Rural	18.6	14.5	62.1	4.8
	Urban	29.9	18.6	49.2	2.3
Ethnic identity (Used to speak Kurdish, Zazaki with parents...)	Did not speak	26.1	17.2	53.8	2.9
	Used to speak	24.8	16.9	52.8	5.5
Age groups	Age 18-24	26.5	21.2	49.3	3.0
	Age 25-39	29.4	14.8	53.1	2.7
	Age 40-54	23.6	17.3	55.7	3.4
	Age 55-69	18.5	20.1	59.0	2.5
	Age 70 +	28.0	13.3	53.5	5.2
Income groups	Less than 450 YTL	16.0	18.6	58.5	7.0
	Between 450-1000 YTL	23.6	17.2	57.5	1.7
	Over 1000 YTL	42.7	16.1	40.8	0.4
Ownership groups	Low-level ownership	20.6	20.1	53.7	5.6
	Medium-level ownership	24.9	16.0	56.9	2.2
	High-level ownership	45.2	16.6	38.2	
Education	Illiterate	12.2	20.6	54.4	12.8
	Literate without a diploma	17.9	19.5	57.1	5.4
	Primary school graduate	18.8	17.3	61.0	2.9
	High school graduate	40.3	17.0	41.0	1.7
	University+ graduate	43.6	15.0	41.4	0.1
Party preferences	AKP	7.5	11.1	78.1	3.3
	ANAP-DYP-GP	38.3	10.3	49.8	1.6
	MHP-BBP	27.5	22.1	50.5	
	CHP	66.1	11.4	21.8	0.6
	DEHAP	52.5	28.2	19.3	
	Other	58.1	13.2	25.8	2.9
	Undecided	33.2	23.0	38.7	5.0
Left-right groups	Leftist	57.3	15.9	26.7	0.0
	Center	24.0	26.3	47.0	2.7
	Rightist	12.7	13.1	71.3	3.0
Alevi identity	Not Alevi	23.3	18.0	55.5	3.2
	Alevi	46.6	10.6	39.4	3.3
Islamist/Secularist groups	Secular	59.1	14.7	25.1	1.1
	Center	23.8	27.4	46.3	2.4
	Islamist	11.7	13.8	70.7	3.8
Religiosity groups	Not religious	62.0	11.0	22.7	4.3
	Center	38.7	21.4	37.2	2.7
	Religious	18.0	17.0	61.7	3.2
	Turkey average	25.9	17.2	53.7	3.2

We reach interesting results here when we examine the two questions we had also asked about RP in the study we conducted in 1999. For example, the people who disagreed with the statement “AKP is a party that believes in democracy” with a rate above the country average consisted of people who lived in urban areas, who had a relatively higher socio-economic status, who had high school or higher education, who ideologically placed on the left, who felt closer to the secularist end in the “Islamist-Secularist” cleavage and who identified themselves as Alevi (Table 5.41). AKP voters who disagreed with this statement only accounted for 8%, whereas voters for MHP-BBP constituted a rate of 27.5% and those of CHP, 66%. Clearly, the evaluations about AKP display a completely incongruous structure between the followers of AKP and those of opposing parties, even concerning a question about the commitment of AKP to democracy. For example, 18% of those who defined themselves as religious stated that AKP was a party that believed in democracy, while 66% of people who did not define themselves as religious supported the opposite view.

However, when the answers given to a similar question that was asked about RP in 1999 are examined, we see that back in 1999, those who did not agree with the opinion that RP was a party that was committed to democracy comprised a rate of 42%, whereas this rate for AKP in 2006 was 25.9%. In other words, when compared to RP, less polarization was observed in the evaluations of AKP. Another indicator of the significant support given to AKP is that in 1999, 43% agreed with the statement “RP helps its followers in solving their problems more than other parties do”, whereas the same question that was asked about AKP in 2006 yielded an agreement rate of around 54%. It can be observed that people strongly believe that during its service in government as a single party, AKP had helped its followers more than RP helped its supporters in the past. If this “help” is interpreted as “favoritism”, we can infer that this act of favoritism harboured the fragmentation in the evaluations about AKP.

However, providing opportunities for its followers can also be interpreted positively. Drawing into the system the sectors that had been marginalized by the Republic as a result of their sensitivity concerning religion can be seen as a contribution to the institutionalization of Turkish democracy. When considered from this perspective, we have some data that suggest that religious people have been leading a more comfortable life during the AKP government (Table 5.42). For example, the rate of those who thought that religious people were under oppression was 42.4% in 1999, but it decreased to 17.0% in 2006. Before the 2002 elections, the rate of people who believed that religious people were under oppression had decreased slightly, but a significant increase in the rate of people who said that there was no oppression had been observed.⁵ In 2006, the rate of people who argued that oppression existed decreased to a level that equalled 40% of the rate in 1999.

Similarly, 63.8% gave an affirmative answer to the question asking whether religious people in Turkey were able to freely practice their belief – a question we also asked in 1999 – while 30.9% were of the opposite opinion. A study conducted before the 2002 elections had displayed a significant decrease in the rate of people who said “no”, although the rate of people who said “yes” had remained the same; in addition, there were fewer people who did not provide an answer. However, the rate of those who gave the answer “yes” to this question in this study increased to almost 82.0%, while the rate of those who answered negatively dropped to 14.3%.

Table 5.42 Freedom of worship and the perceived pressure on religious people

Are people able to freely worship and follow the fundamental Islamic practices?			
	Yes	No	NI/NA
2006	81.9	14.3	3.8
2002	63.3	33.8	2.9
1999	63.8	30.9	5.3
Are religious people under oppression in Turkey?			
	Yes	No	NI/NA
2006	17.0	77.1	5.8
2002	4.0	55.6	4.4
1999	42.4	50.2	7.4
Examples of oppression:			
	2006-May	2002	1999
Turban-Headcover oppression	65.1	67.7	53.7
Obstruction of the freedom to worship	10.9	7.3	2.2
The status of <i>İmam Hatip</i> high schools	2.6	4.6	5
Oppression originating from the military	1.7		
Discrimination exists	6.4		
Other	6.3		
NA	7.1		
Total	100		

Respondents who believed that religious people were oppressed in Turkey were given the opportunity to come up with their own examples, and after that, these answers were assembled into similar categories in each of the three studies. After 1999, the turban/headcover ban was stated more often as an example of oppression, and this rate, which was 53.7% at that time, had risen to approximately 68% during the election period in 2002. After AKP came to power, this rate did not rise but slightly decreased, and remained around 65%. We observed through the examples given by the respondents that the opinion that the freedom of worship was restricted had become stronger since 1999. However, as 11% of the group of 17% who thought in 2006 that religious people were oppressed used this example, it can be seen that less than 2% of the entire sample suggested the restriction of worship as an example of oppression. On the other hand, oppression originating from the military was neither found in the answers of the respondents in the study conducted in 1999 nor in the current study. are scorned”, “religious people are called conservative and reactionary”, “religious people are oppressed”, “religious people are cast out from society”, “religious people are looked down on” and “religious people are treated as if they are terrorists”, which had not been observed before, were observed in the open answers given in the 2006 study.

In short, we have observed that in May 2006, at the time we conducted our study, religious people were more at ease in society, and that the tension that had reached its peak as a result of the February 28 period had receded significantly. We do not know whether the developments that took place after our study was conducted affected this atmosphere adversely, causing augmented tension. However, we must emphasize here that care must be taken to determine to what extent this tension has spread among the elite as well as among the general public. Through this study, we were only able to detect the views and attitudes adopted by the public in general and those that were shared with us. When considered from this point of view, the atmosphere has not become tenser in 2006 compared to 1999.

In another question that asked respondents to compare the period when AKP was in power with the period before the 2002 elections when the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition was in government, almost 50% thought that the way religious people are treated in society had changed (Table 5.43). 60% of this group thought that this change was for the better. Similarly, the rate of people who believed that a change existed concerning the practice of religious belief was 50%, with 62% of this group thinking that this change was for the better. 44% thought that the way religious people were treated in public offices underwent a change, and 55% of this group thought that this change was for the better. The rate of people who answered all questions by saying that “there has been no change” was only about 26%, whereas the

people who said that things have become worse represented a small group of 29%. However, the perception of change was observed not only related to the social status of religious people but also related to that of secular people. The rate of people who said that the attitude secular people faced in society had changed was 44%, with 55% thinking that this change was for the better. 44% stated that the treatment of secular people in public offices had changed, and 55% of this group thought that this change was for the better. In summary, we have ample data to say that both the secular and the religious sectors seem to experience a more comfortable atmosphere within society and in public offices. This level of comfort and ease has certainly brought along an optimistic perspective to people's views when evaluating whether religious practices and religious freedom is restricted.

Table 5.43 Taking into consideration the following, please compare the period during which AKP was in power with the period before the 2002 elections when the DPS-MHP-ANAP coalition government was in power

	No change	Undecided	Has changed	For the better	For the worse	NA
The way people worship	26.0	19.6	50.2	61.7	17.9	20.3
The way religious people are treated in society	26.2	19.1	49.5	59.6	20.0	20.4
The way secular people are treated in society	27.3	22.5	43.6	55.0	22.7	22.3
The way religious people are treated in public offices	26.9	20.1	48.1	59.8	21.3	18.9
The way secular people are treated in public offices	29.9	19.4	43.7	55.0	22.5	22.5

5.12. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

The presidential elections that will be held in May 2007 have recently engaged the public agenda, and the AKP government faces certain objections and criticism concerning this issue. We took up this subject through two simple questions. In the first question, we asked people “what characteristics the Turkish President should have in order to fulfill his/her duties assigned within the Turkish political system”. In the second question, which was open-ended, we asked respondents whom they wanted elected as President. As can be seen in Table 5.44 below, “having insight about the public” received the highest rate for the former question, with 88.6%. This was followed by “being knowledgeable and experienced about foreign affairs” (86.8%), “setting an example to modern Turkey with his/her lifestyle” (85.9%) and “being educated in the field of law” (82.6%). Having a political background, protecting secularism and being a devout Muslim were also desired characteristics of the Turkish President, at a rate of approximately 75%. The President’s wife being uncovered held less importance than other desired characteristics, assuming that the claims made at the end of 2006 that the President will not be a woman will hold true (50.8%).

Table 5.44 Characteristics expected of a President

	Unimportant	Undecided	Important	NI/NA	
Has insight about the public	5.1	4.9	88.6	1.3	100
Is knowledgeable and experienced about foreign affairs	4.7	6.8	86.8	1.7	100
Sets an example to modern Turkey with his/her lifestyle	5.2	7.4	85.9	1.6	100
Is educated in the field of law	7.3	9.0	82.6	1.2	100
Has a political background	10.0	10.9	77.4	1.7	100
Protects secularism	8.0	9.9	75.2	6.8	100
Is a devout Muslim	11.9	13.0	74.3	0.8	100
If male and married, his wife does not cover	30.8	17.3	50.8	1.1	100

When we examined the answer about “protecting secularism” through cross-tabular analyses, the people who considered this characteristic important appeared to be those who voted for leftist and center-right parties other than AKP, who had a relatively higher socio-economic status, who felt closer to the secularist end on the “Islamist-Secularist” scale, who stated that they were not religious, and who belonged to the group of uncovered women, or men who did not want their wives to cover. The idea that the President should be the protector of secularism in Turkey can be considered widespread in the country.

Similarly, the group who deemed it important that the President's wife should be uncovered consisted of people who voted for CHP, who had a relatively higher socio-economic status, who felt closer to the secularist end on the "Islamist-Secularist" scale, who stated that they were not religious, and who belonged to the group of uncovered women, or men who did not want their wives to cover. In short, once again, voters for the party in government and voters for the opposition have very different preferences concerning presidential elections.

The most significant result that stood out in the answers given to the open-ended question "Who would you want to see as the President?" was that almost 53% of the respondents were unable to give a name. One reason for this could be that at the time this study was conducted, the majority of the public had not been acquainted with any of the candidates, while another reason could be that a candidate that duly fulfills all the expectations of the public had not yet emerged. Another important finding is that the people we interviewed mentioned the names of four important AKP leaders. These four people were altogether preferred only by a group of 28.5% and the most opted for person among them received 14.6% at most.

These results must be carefully assessed. At the time we conducted this study, the candidates for the presidential elections had not yet been declared. Therefore, it is normal that the respondents were unable to specify any names. However, it seems unlikely that AKP would have someone from its leading team elected as the president with the support of the public. If we bear in mind that a bi-polar structure emerged concerning public opinion in each and every stage of our study, reaching public consensus around a name proposed by AKP is obviously very difficult. In conclusion, "having insight about the public" and "setting an example to modern Turkey with his/her lifestyle" are the most important characteristics expected of the Turkish President. In addition, if a candidate is also knowledgeable and experienced in the fields of foreign affairs and law, he or she could receive significant support from the public.

5.13. SUICIDE BOMBINGS AND TERRORISM

The process of associating global terrorism with the Islamic movement gained speed after the September 11 attacks. In this context, the approach of the people of Turkey towards suicide bombings, terrorism and the Islamic movement is closely related to the level of tolerance in the country. We tried to investigate these relations by using a few, simple questions. Table 5.45 below shows that when asked whether suicide bombings could be considered legitimate when used against occupational forces, 20% answered by saying that they could. However, a group of almost 66% stated that such bombings were unacceptable even if the country was occupied. Only 8% deemed attacks against civilians acceptable in the case of an occupation. Even when the question was concretized and respondents were asked to evaluate the attacks by Palestinians against Israeli civilians, there was very little support given to such attacks. In summary, suicide bombings against civilians do not have the support of the people of Turkey. When respondents were asked if they approved of suicide bombings by Iraqi resistance fighters, without mentioning civilian casualties, the rate of approval increased to a level of approximately 18%. However, when respondents were reminded that such attacks were organized in the name of Islam and were asked whether they were acceptable according to Islamic principles, only a very small group of 8% approved of such attacks. In summary, the people of Turkey slightly approve resistance against occupational forces but is largely against any attacks against civilians. Likewise, the people of Turkey are strongly against such attacks being legitimized by making a reference to Islam.

Table 5.45 Suicide bombings, terrorism and the Islamic movement

Some people claim that in certain situations, for example if the country is occupied by foreign forces, suicide bombings against the occupational forces are acceptable. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion?	Yes, I agree 20.2	No, I do not agree 65.5	NI/NA 14.3
Would you approve of suicide bombings by resistance forces against civilians in the case of an occupation?	Yes, I would 8.0	No, I would not 84.4	NI/NA 7.6
Do you approve of the suicide bombings performed by Palestinians against Israeli civilians?	Yes, I approve 8.3	No, I do not approve 82.8	NI/NA 8.9
Do you approve of the suicide bombings by the Iraqi resistance fighters?	Yes, I approve 17.5	No, I do not approve 72.8	NI/NA 9.7
Most of these attacks are claimed to have been organized in the name of the Islamic movement. Do you think that such attacks are acceptable according to Islam?	Yes, they are 8.1	No, they are not 81.4	NI/NA 10.5

General Conclusions

In this last chapter, we would like to touch upon the general conclusions that can be drawn from our research about the “Islamist-Secularist” cleavage that has been discussed in Turkey for a long time. Hoping that our results will be assessed by the public, we believe that our study will enable the discussions on this subject to be based on reliable data and will contribute to the solution of the problems shaped around this issue.

One of the conclusions we reached in our study is that the people of Turkey are gradually becoming more religious. In comparison to our study conducted in 1999, we observed that the percentage of people who stated that they are “very religious” and who defined themselves primarily as “Muslim” has increased remarkably in 2006. The rate of people who defined themselves as “very religious” was 6% in 1999, a figure which has risen to 13% at the time we conducted this study in 2006. Similarly, the rate of people who defined their identity primarily as Muslim was 36% in 1999, while in 2006 this rate is 45%, with an increase of almost 10%.

Along with an increasing level of religiosity, the number of people who advocate that parties can lead religion-based politics has also increased. This figure, which was 25% in 1999, has risen to 41% in 2006.

Without doubt, reaching a conclusion that the growing religiosity in any society will cause the state to wither away from secular principles is not possible. Such a connection between religiosity and secularism does not exist in Turkey. The overall picture we see when we consider the conclusions of both our 1999 study and our current study is that the majority of the public does not have the perception that secularism is under threat, nor does it support the establishment of a theocratic state in Turkey. Perceptions aside, we do not even have any findings indicating that the majority of the public would support a theocratic state. On the contrary, the rate of people who support the idea of a Shari’ah state has dropped significantly. For example, in research that was conducted in the 1990s, the rate of people supporting the idea of a Shari’ah state was around 20%. Although this rate has come out as 21% in our 1999 study in consistency with other research, we have shown in that study, through asking questions comparing the laws of a Shari’ah state and the Turkish Civil Code, that public support for a theocratic state has decreased by half – and that it even zeroed in the case of the Shari’ah law punishment for adultery. We have not delved into such details in our current study. However, the rate of an affirmative response given to the question “Are you in favor of the establishment of a Shari’ah state in Turkey?”, which was always asked in the same way within the scope of all studies, has decreased from 21% to 9% since 1999.

The answers given to questions related to secularism display that there is remarkable tension around this issue in Turkey. In our research, respondents were asked to position themselves on a scale of 1-10 that we defined to extend from “Islamist” to “Secularist”. 20% positioned themselves as secular, 49% as Islamist, and 23% in the center of the scale. However, it is observed that a group larger than only 20% who define themselves as secularist is sensitive to the issue of secularism. From related questions, we can infer that a group of 25-30%, in other words one-third of the public, is apprehensive about issues such as the rising trend of religious fundamentalism, the threat on secularism and the establishment of a Shari’ah state. For example, 32% of the public believe that religious fundamentalist groups that aim to establish an Islamic society and a Shari’ah state in Turkey is on the rise; whereas 23% believe that secularism is under threat. The cross-tabular analyses on which we based our conclusions have shown that people who share this view are people living in cities, who are better educated and who have a relatively higher socio-economic status.

On the other hand, it can also be said that the strict reactions of people who define themselves as more religious against secular practices have mellowed. For example, the perception that religious people are oppressed in Turkey has declined. While this rate was 42% in 1999, it has decreased to 17% in our current study. Similarly, while 31% of

respondents believed that religious people were not able to freely exercise the required practices of Islam in 1999, this rate has dropped to 14% in 2006. Another question indicates that this moderation in public opinion is related to the existence of the AKP government. Responding to the question of whether social attitudes towards religious people has altered, when the periods before and after 2002 were taken into consideration, 50% of the public stated that it has, and 60% of them said that this change was for the better. However, our study has also shown that 8% of the public thinks that religious circles exert pressure on secularists. In another question, we observed that the rate of people who do not believe that secular citizens are able to lead their lives free from the pressure of the religious sector of society has increased to 11%. By taking into consideration all of these results, we can state that even if not very wide-spread, the kind of social tension mentioned above is, in some way or another, reflected in the daily lives of ordinary people in both “Islamist” and “Secularist” circles.

In connection with this issue, the democratic mode of governance is supported by the majority, and 77% of the public believes that democracy is the best regime. At the same time, people believe that secularism can be safeguarded through democratic means, and the support of the military is not given priority. 54% of the public argue that secularism can be protected without the support of the military, while the opposing group of 25% represents only a quarter of the voters. Likewise, the majority of people is not of the opinion that a military regime, instead of civil governments, can solve Turkey’s problems. However, the opposing viewpoint, represented by 27%, cannot be undermined. Conversely, the Turkish Armed Forces seems to have a special position in the public’s view – a situation that is unique to Turkey – and the viewpoint that members of the military can criticize civil governments when necessary is supported by 59% of the public, while the opposing view is represented by only 18%. The priority given to civil politics in Turkey is, without doubt, of utmost importance for the institutionalization of democracy. However, the fact that opposing views, which can be interpreted as an expression of distrust in civil governments and democratic processes, is represented by a group of 18-27% is thought-provoking. According to the table based on our cross-tabular analyses, the sector which opposes the military’s role in civil matters is not the religious circles, but urban and better-educated people who think they are not religious, who define themselves as secular and closer to leftist politics and who have a higher socio-economic status. As can be expected, citizens of Kurdish ethnic origin are the ones who most fervently oppose military involvement in politics.

Another important finding of our study is that the viewpoint that links Muslim people and terrorism – a popular approach that has found much support in the global community in recent years – cannot be adopted for Muslims in Turkey. Our research has indicated that the majority of the people of Turkey do not support terrorism for any cause. Furthermore, terrorist acts, even in the case of occupation of the country, are favored only by a small group of 20%, while 65% of the people are against it. When such terrorist acts are directed towards civilians, the rate of people who say they would give support to such an act decreases even further, to 8%. Even when the subject is more concretized and the people of Palestine or Iraq, who could be perceived as “victims” are given as examples, the percentages of people who say they would not be against suicide bombings are 8% and 17% concerning Palestine and Iraq respectively. 81% of the public is of the opinion that such acts of terrorism are unacceptable from the viewpoint of Islam.

In addition to the rise of religiosity, which we have referred to above, the Sunni-Alevi cleavage also appears to be growing. Although the issue of religious sects has not been taken up in detail, either in the study we conducted in 1999 or the one in 2006, the aforementioned increase can be observed in a specific question we have asked in both studies. In comparison to our 1999 study, the percentage of people who stated that they would oppose their daughters or sons marrying someone from a different sect has increased in 2006. The cross-tabular analyses indicate that people who are against marrying someone from a different sect are not mostly amongst Alevis, but Sunnis and those who see themselves closer to the “Islamist” end on the “Secularist-Islamist” scale. In almost all of our questions, Alevis have stated an opposing view to that of the conservative wing of the Sunni sector that is formed by people who define themselves primarily as Muslim, and who state that they feel closer to the “Islamist” circles. In this context, the preferences stated by Alevis overlap with the group of Sunnis who live in urban areas, who are well-educated people with a higher socio-economic status and who see themselves as ideologically closer to the left and to secular circles.

Another significant observation we have made is that Turkish voters favor sectarian democracy. In Turkey, where a significant majority is Sunni Muslim, issues often emphasized by the religious Sunni sector such as the covering of women, *İmam Hatip* high schools and religion classes in state schools, are evaluated within the scope of fundamental rights and freedom; however, the demands of groups from different religious sects or ethnic descents for rights are not met with the same sensitivity. The approaches we have presented in our study, with concrete examples concerning the various problems of Kurdish, Alevi and non-Muslim citizens in Turkey, clearly expose this sectarian attitude. In all

of these questions, the rate of people who are sensitive about the rights of minorities is lower than the other groups. This approach, without doubt, poses a problem in expanding and implementing human rights and freedom within the democratization process of Turkey.

In relation to the above-mentioned issue, we can talk about the presence of a social cleavage that revolves around the distinction of “us” and “others”. This cleavage is an indicator of the introverted character of the people of Turkey. People do not seem to be enthusiastic about developing shared values within a multi-cultural society. Here, “us” as a term refers to individuals who are “Turkish-Muslim-Sunni” and “others” refers to Kurdish, Alevi and non-Muslim people. A great majority of people do not have a positive opinion of “incongruous” individuals who do not comply with social values and norms. For example, homosexual individuals are the most unwanted neighbors. A distant attitude towards people who are different from the norm is also observed with regard to evaluations about foreign countries. Muslim nations such as Palestine, Iran and Saudi Arabia are the nations that were described as “friends” with the highest rates amongst a total of 12 different nations – including Turkey’s close neighbors, as well as Japanese, Brazilian and European peoples. The nation that received the lowest percentage on this list was Armenia, followed by Israel and the USA with the same rates, and Greece. Similarly, the percentage of people who think that there can be good individuals among followers of other religions has decreased to 72% in 2006, from a rate of 89% in 1999. An attitude that reflects xenophobic tendencies has been observed related to many subjects, from limiting missionary activities to controlling the economical activities of Jewish people, while an inclination to form communities in economical activities has also been seen.

Another important finding of our study includes a set of new data regarding the “turban” issue, which has been discussed in Turkey for many years. The first finding that stands out related to this issue – which has appeared previously in a few other studies – is that the “turban” issue does not receive the same attention from society as it does during public debate. While this issue appears as if it is “the most important” problem of Turkey in discussions led by the press and the media, it is almost never included in the public’s most important agenda items. The open-ended question which asked respondents to indicate Turkey’s two most important problems yielded answers suggesting that unemployment (38%), terrorism/national security/Southeastern/Kurdish issue (14%), inflation/cost of living (12%), education (10%), and economic instability/crisis (7%) were the five most important problems Turkey had to deal with. The headcover/turban issue was mentioned only by 4% of the public. In another question, respondents were asked to rank five problems of Turkey that were listed by us in order to show their preference as to which one should be given priority. This time, unemployment – which was the only economic problem mentioned – was the main priority of 70% of the people, and it was followed by the Southeastern/Kurdish issue (12%) and education (8%). The headscarf ban on university students (6%) was considered just a little more important than health (3%), the last problem on this list. “Turban” appears to be important only when it is included in a list that is made up of other identity issues and that excludes issues related to the economy, education and terrorism. On this type of list, the “turban” issue becomes the prioritized item (43%), followed by the entry of *İmam Hatip* graduates to university (18%), the issue of education in Kurdish (11%) and financial assistance given to Alevi Cem houses (5%). These conclusions can be considered as examples of the sectarian approach we have mentioned before.

Another conclusion we have reached through our study is that contrary to the general impression prevalent in the public, **the percentage** of women who cover has decreased. When we asked people whether **the number** of women who cover has increased in the last decade, 25% of the public said that there has been a significant increase, while 39% said that there was a slight increase. These two figures add up to 64%. However, the rate of women who say that they cover in different ways, from the *çarşaf* to *yemeni* and turban has decreased throughout the general population. The most remarkable change in comparison with the results of our 1999 study is that the rate of women who had said that they covered at that time was 73%, while this figure has dropped to 61% in 2006. A decrease of 5% in the rate of women who wear a headscarf/headcover/*yemeni*, 2% in women who wear a *çarşaf* and 4% in women who wear a turban has been observed. The rate of women who wear a headscarf/headcover/*yemeni* is 53%, women who wear a *çarşaf* is 1% and women who wear a turban is 11% when the total number of women is taken into consideration. As can be seen from these numbers, most women who cover in Turkey prefer traditional types of covering. Moreover, the use of the *çarşaf* has almost disappeared.

According to the conclusions we have drawn from our cross-tabular analyses, this decrease in the rate of women who cover is higher in cities than in rural areas, as can be expected. While the rate of women throughout Turkey who do not cover is 37%, this rate is 46% in city centers. The covering of women also varies according to level of income. In other words, as income levels increase, the percentage of women who cover decreases. When we grouped uncovered women in accordance with age groups, we observed the most significant change since 1999 in the 25-39 age group.

The percentage of uncovered women in this age group has risen to 42%, from 28% in 1999. In summary, we can predict that the percentage of women who cover will gradually decrease as urbanization gains speed, as income per capita rises and as the younger generation replaces the older citizens.

We have observed that most covered women do so because of their religious beliefs. When they were asked why they covered, 72% said “because Islam commands us to cover”. This group was followed by a group of 8% that consisted of women who said they covered because all other women around them did. Contrary to assertions, the covering of women seems to be related neither to political aims nor to identity. The rate of women who said that they covered because covering is an “essential part of their identity” was only 4%. The rate of people who considered covering as a requirement of being honorable is, again, very low, at 4%. The claim that women and young girls were forced by their families to cover was denied by the majority of covered women. The rate of women who gave this as a reason was around 4%. However, 46% of covered women believe that they would be forced to cover again if they decided to uncover. These statements, which appear to be contradictory, can be interpreted in different ways. We must state here that 87% of covered women whom we asked “whether they would uncover if many women in their family or among their acquaintances uncovered” answered by saying “no”. On the other hand, when we asked parents who had at least one daughter who did not cover how they would react if their daughter decided to cover one day, 42% said that they would feel sad, while 55% said that they would be pleased and support her.

Similar to our first study, a significant majority of the people in our recent study said that they supported female students going to university even if they covered. The rate of people who are of this opinion was 76% in 1999, whereas in our current study the rate has decreased to 71%. Similarly, people who support female civil servants who want to cover has decreased to 68% in 2006 from 74% in 1999. During the seven years that have since passed, the support given to students who wear a turban has dropped a little, but an important majority still say that the headscarf ban must be lifted.

The point that is noteworthy here is that people do not fundamentally discriminate between people who give public service and those who receive it. However, another important finding of our study indicates that if the headscarf ban for civil servants such as teachers and judges was lifted, a group of 30%, which is not insignificant, said that they would feel disturbed.

Our final finding related to this issue is that a social gap does not exist in society between women who cover and the ones who do not, even though the women in these two groups have different social views and a different way of practicing their beliefs. Most covered and uncovered women state that they have both covered and uncovered women amongst their family, close friends and acquaintances. Men who have wives who cover, and those who do not, have made the same remark. These two groups do not seem to lead isolated or secluded lives. On the contrary, they are in close contact and interaction.

The most essential finding of our study is the presence of two different social structures, consisting of people who have different values, cultures, worldviews, and political preferences.¹ Turkey seems to harbor two widely divergent societies that are clearly separated from each other. On one side are urban, better-educated people with a relatively high income level who do not feel extremely committed to religious values and who define themselves as secular; and on the other side are rural, less-educated people with a relatively low income level and who define themselves as Islamist and religious. Consequently, we can say that if the economy develops, urbanization gains momentum and educational opportunities become widespread, these two sectors will begin to converge. However, saying that, this dual structure – which has survived and has even become more entrenched in society despite the economic development and immigration to urban areas – will be spontaneously resolved through economic prosperity and urbanization can be seen as an overly simplistic approach. Therefore, educational policies become even more important as a possible way of dissolving this dual structure and enabling both sides to grow closer.

As many studies have done so before us, we would like to stress the importance of education. In almost all studies that are carried out, significant differences in commitment to democratic and liberal values are observed between people with higher and lower levels of education. Moreover, there is a significant correlation between each successive level of education and commitment to democracy. In other words, as the level of education rises, the support and commitment to democracy also increases. Therefore as educational opportunities are improved and the content of education is enriched in Turkey, solving problems related to economic development and democratization, as well as the conflict between religion and politics, will gradually become easier.

1 A similar view was first pointed out by Şerif Mardin, who mentioned the “center-periphery dilemma” and was analyzed by many people from different viewpoints. Mardin, Ş. 1973. “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?”, *Deadalus*, Winter, 169-190.

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Prof. Dr. Binnaz Toprak graduated from Hunter College, City University of New York in 1965 with a B.A. and completed her PhD at City University of New York Graduate Center in 1976. Since 1976, she has been Professor, and since 2006, Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Boğaziçi University. B. Toprak has published many articles, papers and studies about secularism and political Islam in Turkey. These include *Islam and Political Development in Turkey* (E. J. Brill, 1981), *Religion, Society and Politics in Turkey* (TESEV, 2000) co-authored with Ali Çarkoğlu, and *The Participation of Women in Turkey in Business, Top Administration and Politics* (TESEV, 2004) co-authored with Ersin Kalaycıoğlu. Her most recent publication is an article titled "Islam and Democracy in Turkey", which was published in the journal *Turkish Studies* in June 2005 (pp. 167-186).

Religion, Society and Politics in a Changing Turkey

The most significant handicap of Turkey, a country that has defined modernization as its national mission since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, is that it has perceived modernism by means of rigid models. Whilst this approach, which has prevailed up to the present day, pushed certain modes of existence deemed inappropriate for modernization to the margins of the public sphere, it also deepened the gap between state and society.

Consequently, in Turkey, a society emerged where different modes of living were transformed into segregated communities, amongst which an inevitable estrangement was continuously harbored. On the other hand, secularism, which should be an institution that performs the role of arbitrator, resulted in the definition of religiosity in legal terms by the state.

Today, we live in an intellectual environment where identities have acquired self-confidence, and where public participation has come to be perceived as an indispensable citizenship right. Without doubt, the standpoint of the people of Turkey in respect to these disclosures, its perception of religion and religiosity, and the relationships it establishes between beliefs and values, is of vital importance for the democratic requirements of the present day.

Religion, Society and Politics in a Changing Turkey, by Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak, is an output of a survey of 1492 voting-age individuals that was carried out in rural and urban areas between May 6th and June 11th 2006. The survey report observes and compares the changing nature of Turkish people's attitudes towards issues such as religion, democracy, terrorism and minorities. The Turkish-language edition of the study was received with high interest by the public and the media in November 2006. The study provoked an engaging debate as it was published during the controversy around the presidential elections. TESEV hopes that the English version of the report will contribute to the debates over Turkey's practice of Islam, people's preferences to identify themselves, understanding of democracy and multiculturalism in Turkey, and the political and sociological stance towards the headscarf controversy.

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