Three Levels of Language Use:
The Anarchic, Civil and Structural Spheres
# of Knowledge

Kee Beng Ooi

Abstract

Many modern strands of thought since Wittgenstein have turned traditional western philosophy "against itself", so to speak. Continuing this intriguing impulse to study language, not as a transparent and neutral medium of thought, but as an integral part of human beingness, this article introduces a model whereby human existence can be considered within three conjoined spheres, configured by and expressed through language use. These are the anarchic, civil and structural spheres. The inspiration for this did not merely come from Wittgenstein. Instead it developed just as much from philosophical studies and physico-meditative practices within the Chinese tradition. Therefore, it is an expression of inter-civilizational dialogics and requires the patience and curiosity of the reader. Traditional Chinese ideation built on three relations to language, here symbolised by qi, li and fa. In each life, these involve a cycle of skills to be mastered.

Introduction

This paper presents human existence in three spheres expressed as separate levels of language use. The adopted approach is holistic in that it tries by definition to encompass all conceivable language use, and thus invites further development and categorisation by the reader. The assumptions and aims involved are meant to stimulate further thought more than argue a case. First, language use is perceived as a collection of separate skills. Second, these skills relate to each other in an ascending fashion. Third, most individuals master the skills to significantly differing degrees. And fourth, language is seen to be external to man despite man possessing an inherent ability to use language. In that sense, relativism is the essence of language. Given this way of thought, whatever absolute values we seek must be sought outside language.

I postulate that language ability, meaning both habits of expression and techniques of thought, can be divided into three basically different language *skills*. A skill is defined as an ability that requires time and opportunity to master, and although it might become second nature to us, it must nevertheless be maintained. Thus, when one exercises (does one's exercise; trains), or when one exercises (one's ability), the same term is used: one is training one's skill, or one is putting one's ability to use.

To a question about someone's language ability of the type "How good is X in English?" one would normally answer either that X is orally fluent, meaning that he/she uses phrases easily and rather spontaneously and seems conscious of the fluidity of contexts, or one may say that he reads well or writes interestingly, or not, as the case may be, or that X, though obviously a native speaker, has a poor vocabulary. Or one may most probably state a combination of the above. The simple question is obviously too simple, since no simple answer can be given. In fact, it errs in assuming that X is either good at a language or he/she is not. We need therefore to deconstruct the matter, as it were. Mastery of language appears to be a more complicated process than one is led to assume, given the general understanding that the human faculty for language is as naturally given as breathing is. Indeed, the comparison can be extended: the process of breathing is developed quite differently among different people. We have thus every reason to see language use more as a complex skill than a naturally given gift of expression.

I conceive of language mastery as the attainment of three separate skills. I thus call my model the *Three Levels of Language Use*. I shall first present the general line of thought and then discuss its possible consequences. Furthermore, varying tensions between the three levels can help describe relationships between philosophical and ideological trends within a single cultural tradition. My cleaving method is the following. First, I separate written language from spoken language. The phenomenon of script introduces aspects into language, which essentially changes it into a much more complex thing capable of enormous applicability, and capable of generating creative (and illusory) thought. Benedict Anderson's influential book *Imagined Communities*, for example, argues convincingly about the decisive importance of printing to modern nationalism (Anderson, 1983).

The next step is to divide spoken language into two: civil language and individual language. Two relevant points to be made at this stage about the learning of language are: First, we learn spoken language before we take on written language, and second, the socialisation of the individual child is essentially different from its expressiveness as a living organism, even if socialisation structures and makes that expressiveness potentially communicative. However, after the socialisation of this original expressiveness, this communicativeness must still be understood as a phenomenon separate from the organism's expressiveness (Wittgenstein, 1953 §244). This in no way supposes a private language, a notion Ludwig Wittgenstein has shown to be erroneous (see Wittgenstein 1953, §243 ff.). A private language seeks to communicate, while this expressiveness does not. In fact, I suggest it is when language behaviour, which is communicative, is confused with expressiveness which has a potentially communicative form that one entertains the notion of private language.** What I am instead denoted here is the individual being's expressive behaviour that, though potentially communicative or comprehensible, is largely unidirectional and willful in the primal sense. An audience may not necessarily be needed despite the expression's social potential. This is the First Level of Language Use, which I title *The Anarchic Level*. An alternative term would be *The Existential Level.* Singing would be an activity that characterises well what I am defining here. Shouting for the sake of shouting would be another such behaviour, having somewhat the same status as the behaviour of a cat stretching itself.

The Second Level of Language Use involves the socialisation process and subsequent complex conventions, rituals, roles and ceremonies. Here, society at large makes itself evident, and immediate communicativeness between two parties is the main criterion. I name this *The Civil Level*. We are dealing with the language of social intercourse in a narrow and situational sense here. Language fulfils its role as a central aspect of social behaviour. There are however different levels of what we classify as social behaviour. While it may be true, as Fairclough (1989, p.23) points out that "linguistic phenomena *are* social phenomena of a special sort, and social phenomena *are* (in part) linguistic phenomena", especially when the term "social" is used very broadly, essential social differences do exist to configure linguistic phenomena. The above-mentioned *Anarchic Level* involves social aspects to the extent that what I would call "primal" behaviour has adopted linguistic forms with social origins, and furthermore, there is always a potential social significance involved in that a response from the social surrounding can be expected. *The Civil Level* deals with linguistic phenomena that are either situationally communicative or ritualistic.

**Wittgenstein's argument, as summarised by Saul A. Kripke, states: To the extent that I rely on my own impressions or memories of what I meant by various sensation signs for support, I have no way of quelling these doubts. Only others, who recognize the correctness of my identification through my external behaviour, can provide an appropriate check (Kripke,1982, p. 60).

Through man's invention of the written language, many sciences became possible: Logic, Mathematics, the Natural Sciences, Law, and Linguistics, just to name a few of the major ones. Incidentally, the ancient Chinese term for script, *wen*, also meant culture/civilisation. Expressions and thoughts based on, and sustaining, the regularity and relative unchangeability allowed by written language are phenomena of *The Structural Level.* Grammar, which at the civil level would be descriptive, becomes normative at this higher level. It becomes its own goal. The "sociality" of linguistic phenomena at this level differs from the two lower levels in that they are results of generative language processes previously formalised. They are in short "applications" of methods of thought, characterised by categorical thought and by the lack of social spontaneity. This may be grammatical, logical or mathematical.

Schematically, my line of thought can be depicted thus:

Speculations

Written Language	Structural Level	The Collective
Spoken Language	Civil Level	
	Anarchic Level	The Individual

Impressions

Model 1: The Three Levels of Language Use

In a concrete case, it might not always be immediately obvious which level a linguistic utterance belongs to. However, if enough consideration is given to the conditions prevailing during its use, most ambiguous cases can be properly identified. The three levels can again be sorted into *The Sphere of the Individual* in contradistinction to *The Sphere to the Collective* that in its turn is made up of the Structural and the Civil levels.

If a mother says to a child, "Don't do that, Ahmad," the level in question is quite clear. The mother, *as an individual*, is trying to stop an action she disapproves of. The child will have to deal with her *as an individual* if he disobeys. But if she were instead to say something deceptively similar like "It is not right to do that, Ahmad," she would, although still seeking a superficially similar result as in the first case, no longer be speaking merely as an individual, but more as an advocate of some rule belonging to a higher level of language use. She applies, and in the process teaches, a rule in the latter instance, while in the former instance, she was merely expressing a personal displeasure at an impending state of affairs. She is, in the latter case, referring to an authority from The Collective Level. If the "right" she refers to is of an ethical nature – a rule of acceptable daily conduct – then she is propagating a rule from the Civil Level. But if she is referring to a legal ruling, then the higher authority called upon is from the Structural Level. Of course, in the former instance, after saying "Don't do that, Ahmad," she may continue with "someone might see you". This would reveal to the child that its mother does not place her whole authority behind the admonition, but is to an extent only transferring a regulation belonging to an external power. In all events, the context decides at which level a linguistic event occurs.

Rules of behaviour, given their specific purposes, are presumably formulated comprehensively for maximal acceptability, communicability and, most of all, applicability. We see that on the Collective Level, there are two ways in which this can be fulfilled. At the Structural Level, there are *laws, understood as judicial, mathematical or natural, written down as consistently and as mutually compatibly as possible*. Unacceptable and deviant acts are recognised as different forms of felonies and misdemeanours. At the Civil Level, rules of conduct are passed on, or down, not through the written word, but as maxims and principles that live on through word of mouth and through *regular behaviour observed, sanctioned and imitated*. Language use at the Anarchic Level expresses *the living organism's spontaneity*. The stability of textual regulatory practices relies strongly on continuity in authoritative interpretation, and on literacy. We are here decidedly not merely considering laws of a judicial or an obviously contractual nature but even rules of logic and mathematics, which are widely considered naturally given structures. In short, all rules dependent on textualisation belong to this category. Rules of conventions, on the other hand, are stable insofar as human behaviour is habitual, although their propagation and practice tend to differ in line with subjective differences and evolving contexts. Mastering the Structural Level of Language Use is reflected, in short, in *the ability to digitise and to deduce*. Skills in Civil Level Language Use involve practical knowledge of socially acceptable behaviour, and amount to *the ability to conduct social intercourse and to perform social rituals*. Needless to say, this relies greatly on sharing daily rituals and linguistic habits, on knowing the fears and favours of fellow beings, and on understanding their thinking techniques and psychological tendencies, not to mention more demanding discursive commonalities (Fairclough, 1989; Ooi, 2000).

The "order of discourse" (Foucault, 1986), the "meaning system" (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 93-97), the "language game" (Wittgenstein, 1974,1953), or model, consisting of these three levels of language use provides a means for analysis of a single general term in three parallel contexts. General meanings will differ depending on which level the word is used at. To take a quick example, "knowledge" understood at the Structural Level involves statements made within natural and social sciences. However, language phenomena which do not try to make regularities relevant, but which instead merely try to express *and stimulate* individual experiences (Swedish: *upplevelser*), like most poetry, make no claim to knowledge. They do not strictly belong to the Structural Level even if they are in written form. Such literature would be more correctly conceived as the written form of spoken language, so to speak. When not positively making scientific or ethical claims, it can be considered anarchic language in written form. When rhetorical in nature, it becomes a part of civil language. Circulars of political speeches would often be examples of the latter.

Where social acceptability is given consideration, anarchic language phenomena become civil language phenomena. Individual language has been defined as *the ability for self-expression*, the self here understood as a physical living organism. The writing of a poem merely to express experiences and for the sake of the activity itself is an instance of Language Use of the Anarchic Level, while the incidental reading of that poem is a more or less Civil Level phenomenon. The systematic discussion of the poem occurs at the Structural Level.

In the same way, when I say Language Phenomena of the Structural Level, I do not merely mean texts as such, but include even spoken statements that express thoughts that originate from, are made possible and are generated by, written language. A discussion in jurisdiction, logic, mathematics, *though oral*, will nevertheless belong to the third level as long as the subjects involved play a decisive role. Musical phenomena make a good analogy here. Music can be directly expressive of the musician, making it an anarchic experience; it can be socially functional for creating modes, which makes it a civil level phenomenon; or it can be a complex construction made possible through creative applications of rules of music, which makes it an animal of the structural level.

Generally, going back to the first question posed in this paper, if someone is said to be good in language, it would be presumptuous to think that it means that the person is generally good in language. One can always imagine all sorts of context and language phenomena at which he/she does not excel. More strictly put, the inquirer will be better served by an answer that informs him/her about which levels of language use the queried person is trained in, and which he/she is not well trained in, in that particular language.

Someone skilled at the Structural Level will be good at abstract thought, a necessary talent in the realm of logic and mathematics. Someone good at the Civil Level will probably do well in dialogue, possessing intuitive knowledge about behavioural habits and psychology. Someone well trained (more rightly, uncoerced) at the Individual Level of Language Use will not only be rather unhampered in expressing his/her own feelings, but will more characteristically behave with immediacy and spontaneity. I venture that it is essentially at this basic level that individual freedom is experienced and expressed. Freedom becomes not a formal freedom but a skill in immediate expression that most of us had as children but have lost through socialisation and education. Freedom at the Civil Level can be expressed in terms of duties, while at the Structural Level, one may perhaps talk of rights.

At the Anarchic Level, all things happen with the physical subject as the most important ingredient. Physical presence becomes less and less necessary as one ascends the Hierarchy of Language Use. Subjectivity gives way to objectivity, particularity to generality, the individual to the collective, the concrete to the abstract, anarchism to coercion.

Distinguishing Levels of Meaning
The aforementioned consequence of the division of language use into three essentially separate abilities seems to offer conceptual space for understanding different terms.

Terms as commonly used as "Knowledge", "Freedom of Expression", even "Right and Wrong" and "Justice" and "Fairness" can be shown to differ along the dimension of language use presented here. "Knowledge" at the Third Level has to fulfill criteria of coherence, correspondence or comprehensibility. At the Second Level, knowledge of propriety forms the standard. At the first level, knowledge becomes the same thing as the act or the experiencing itself. It is similar to the world of dreams in that social checks on the correctness of the descriptions are redundant, or simply impossible. Incidentally, the Ming philosopher, Wang

Yangming (1472-1529), who, in line with the Confucian tendency towards holistic thought, and tempered by Chan (Zen) Buddhism's eagerness to dissolve abstractions, professed that "Knowledge and Action are One" (*zhixing he yi*)(Wang, 1963, Part I). In effect, one could say that Wang's activistic enlightenment resides in the individual who has succeeded in integrating all three levels of language use. All the barriers between them are dismantled: The enlightened individual is thus spontaneous, yet morally and logically rational at the same time. Disciplined spontaneity might be a good term for describing this state of being. One may see this existential evolution either as the attainment of a realisation that individuality and collective identity are not separate entities, or as a total appropriation of one by the other – a synthesis, as it were, of rationality, morality and physicality.

There is only one mind. Before it is mixed with selfish human desires, it is called the moral mind, and after it is mixed with human desires contrary to its natural state, it is called the human mind. When the human mind is rectified it is call the moral mind and when the moral mind loses its correctness, it is called the human mind. There were not two minds to start with (Wang, 1963, pp. 16-17).

Incidentally, it may prove informative at this point to consider the three levels of ethics found in Foucault's later writings such as *The History of Sexuality, Volume Two* (French original 1984). Wang Yangming's way to enlightenment, which is generally concerned with the seamless integration of individual dignity and freedom with morally correct behaviour, is about the journey of the mature adult struggling to solve the conflict between his adult (and adulterated) opinions and the natural spontaneity of his physical being. A similar direction is assumed in Foucault's construction. If we compare Foucault's levels with the three levels presented in this article, and if we recognise the dynamics of development of Foucault's system to be a movement in the opposite direction to mine, a circular motion becomes apparent where a struggle against the belief that language is neutrally depictive takes place, enhancing an existential movement from the mature to the primal from where one once came. Foucault's levels consist of "moral codes" "moral behaviour" and "self-practices" (Fink-Eitel, 1992, p. 69; Foucault, 1988). The first denotes prescriptions for how the individual is to live, the second expresses the individual's level of integration into this system of codes, and the third involves the individual's degree of her/his own experience of being a free agent. In Wang Yangming's Idealistic School (Xinxue), the struggle ends in total victory for the individual, with the inner tension finally dissolved.

"Right and Wrong" is not really applicable at the Anarchic Level since all language acts there are *per definition* pre-social despite the fact that most forms of primal expression are "languaged", i.e. clothed in sounds potentially comprehensible to others. At the Civil Level, "correct and incorrect" is a more appropriate dualism than "right and wrong". What is involved is a balancing between inherited notions of appropriateness. At the Third Level, "right and wrong" strives towards absolute truths in extreme cases, and towards lucid differentiation between a positive and a negative condition. The notion of "justice", when considered at the Structural Level, imitates mathematics and becomes a matter of weights and measures. At the Civil Level, terms like propriety, fairness, honour and cultured behaviour are more applicable. No terms besides emotive ones expressing freedom seem appropriate at the Anarchic Level.

"Freedom of expression" at the Anarchic Level merely denotes the state of being unhindered by others. Freedom at the Second Level is a freedom to associate with others, a right to take part in social games. At the Structural Level, Freedom becomes the right to follow the conclusions of one's inductive and deductive powers.

At the Anarchic Level, independence would mark of *The Free Individual.* At the Civil Level, tolerance would characterise *The Cultivated Person*; while at the Structural Level, inductive and deductive ability would be the skill of *The Rational Person.* The free person would consider the rational person *abstract* and the cultivated person *weak*, the cultivated person would dislike the free person for being *irresponsible* and *egoistic* and the rational person for being *stiff* and possibly *inhumane*, while the rational person would probably call the cultivated person *diffuse* and *vague* and the free person *primitive*.

These are but a few examples of how a single term can be viewed as three essentially different notions through the use of the Three Levels of Language Use. Seeing essentially three meanings to every central term, based on the divisions of language use, will discourage a search for one essential meaning to every abstraction.

Now, since we consider human existence to occupy three spheres of language use, it is suggested that the ideal situation is for an individual to be capable at all three levels. However, this will not be the case in the majority of cases. One would expect someone not well trained at any of the levels to develop techniques to handle that weakness. I can think of two ways this can be done. First, there is the avoidance of situations where unmastered language levels come into play. This is a common enough strategy. Second, language and behaviour belonging to the mastered level can be used to serve, however clumsily, at some unmastered level. This must prove insufficient and must lead to misunderstandings. For example, what is considered hooliganism may be understood as Anarchic Level behaviour being pressed into service at the Civil Level.

It might be helpful, for those who know the languages, to qualify the terminology with Malay and Chinese terms. The Anarchic, the Civil and the Structural may be respectively be termed *nafsu* (passion), *adat* (customs) and *akal* (reason) in Malay, or *qi* (energy), *li* (rituals) and *fa* (law) in Chinese. Within Chinese philosophical traditions, the three main schools of thought were Legalism, Confucianism and Daoism. The first believed that peace was only possible if all obeyed legislative principles of behaviour where punishments were comprehensive and predictable. Confucians, on the other hand, and in contradistinction to the legalists, were generally convinced that ritualised behaviour in the widest sense of the term generated magnanimity in the human heart, and so the only way in which harmony could be attained was through the cultivation of the human spirit. The Daoists opposed all such complexities and preferred a life both simple and spontaneous (Graham, 1989; Creel, 1954). These three modes of thought, interestingly, show a respective correlation to each of the three spheres of human existence expressed through the levels of language use. The Daoist seeks to develop his own *qi* and to express his natural state through unhampered energy flow, the Confucian loves social training and his art is to perfect social behaviour, while the legalist reduces social life into a function of the stable state.

Interestingly, while the Chinese word *fa* is generally translated either as "method" or "law", a similar distinction is captured by the two commonly used Malay philosophical terms, *akal* (reason) and *hukum* (law). While the latter deals with laws and sanctions, the former is more generic in that denotes application of some mode of reasoning, be it philosophical, religious, ideological, pragmatic, utilitarian, logical or mathematical.

Upbringing and Language Learning
Some points about upbringing are given salience by the model. The learning of language and the contexts in which the process occurs come in stages. In place of the stages in Freudian psychology, one could substitute the Anarchic stage of language learning, the Anarchic-Civil stage of language learning, the Civil stage of Anarchic learning, the Civil-Structural stage of language learning and finally, the Structural stage of language learning.

One further thing to keep in mind is that skills learned are not learned forever or at least that all skills grow dull and must every now and then be sharpened. This makes it necessary for the individual to sustain a balance between his different language abilities throughout the course of his life.

The model gives support to the standpoint that one can be too hasty in teaching abstractions and complicated discourses to a child. A balance has probably to be kept between "feelings seeking expression", and "expressions seeking feelings". Overly abstract teaching techniques might disturb a child's language development from the Anarchic Level through the Civil Level to the Structural Level, and possibly successively alienate him from his language.

The method suggested by the model is that a child should as far as possible learn appropriate language within the actual existential contexts that give the words and phrases meaning. I venture that there is imbalance when a child of three or four, for example, discusses environmental problems. The phrasing may be correct, but there is the danger that the child's language is being distanced from his experiencing. There is a time for each skill.

It is a common complaint against intellectuals, for example, that though able to deduce and define very well, they are unable to express their innermost feelings, or be social. This could very well be the price paid for becoming too good at only one level of language use. Keeping a growing child balanced involves teaching him/her new language uses, but with as little loss as possible to his lower level language use, and with as strong a connection as possible to the skills he has already acquired. There is then a direction in language learning. The base, the anarchic level, must be strongly laid even as other levels are being built upon it. In acquiring higher levels, however, there is a real danger that earlier skills are easily lost, through lack of practice and through society's prejudice in favour of the higher levels.

The struggle between the three levels can lead to dramatic behaviour in that all aspects of human life is subjected and made subordinate to the favoured level. When the Structural Level is favoured, one effect could be a belief in the possibility of perfect knowledge through the creation, or discovery, of a perfect language that nullifies separated fields of human existence (Russell, 1980,1912). When the Civil Level is favoured, religious cults and rituals whose social contents are all encompassing, will encourage collective spontaneity or morals (Kropotkin, 1914; Ridley, 1997). If skills from these two levels are instead refuted in favour of the Anarchic Level, a worship of the immediate, the physical and the concrete might take over. One may have the quietism of the Daoist, or the vehement and uncompromising egoism of Max Stirner (Stirner, 1845, 1982).

The Anarchic Level is where the individual being experiences his/her own abilities. The Civil Level is where humans meet, and it is there that love and hate occur. Power and knowledge belong at the Structural Level. One may then expect a tension between which level should have priority in giving meaning to words, and to life. The Structural Level may favour meaning informed by some essentialism, as in the case of revealed religions and ideologies, while the Civil Level may define existential meaning through ethics. The Anarchic Level may claim that interaction of wills defines meaning. One good only at the First Level tends to see will, or energy, forming the world. One most comfortable at the Civic Level will probably see propriety and morality as the fibre of existence. The structurally able tends to objectify and, like the scientific method that is its most advanced form, minimise subjective experience. Moving from the Anarchic Level upward across the Civil Level to the Structural Level, there is a change from Subject-orientation to Object-orientation.

What is the picture like when someone is good at only two of the three levels? Let us consider this further. One who is good at the first two levels, that is to say, one who is handicapped at the third level, not mastering subjectless thought, may value duties. One lacking Civil Level skills, and not feeling at home with flexible meanings, may value rights and justice. The person good only at the second and third levels, not being able to command physical presence, may value truth seeking.

What of the person unskilled at all levels? What of him/her who has mastered all three levels? We may technically call the first an idiot and the second a sage, with most of the rest of us inhabiting the space in between. Our "ontological security", i.e. our feeling of feeling at home in our daily life, is thus a function of our ability, or our lack of it, to manage in all three spheres (Laing, 1961, p. 51).

Conclusions

Through dividing language use into three dynamically connected stages, it is hoped that new ways of studying socio-psychological and socio-political phenomena can be evolved. For example, a direct connection can easily be made between the three levels of language use and the three different political philosophies of traditional China: Legalism, Confucianism and Daoism. Schematically, this can be presented in the following fashion:

Model 2: A, B and C: Three Ideal States

Model 2A represents a legalistic system where rule of law has priority over order through conventions and where anarchic expressions are not encouraged. Model 2B, the Confucian view, has conventions as the mainstay of a civilised and humane society, while the Daoistic preference for spontaneity and simplicity is marked by an avoidance of central control.

This article, having the individual as physical being as the starting point, claims that language, though definitely social in origin and content, functions very differently in three spheres of existence. The learner and user of language possesses raw physical power which language and social rituals reform into civilised behaviour. However, this evolution cannot be complete, which means that language use, moving from the physical being to the socialised personality, expands from expressions that have little social content to discourses comprehensible to ever-larger groups of individuals. With the appearance of writing, thought was no longer limited by rituals and the availability of dialogue partners. One could now think alone, with the help of pen and paper or similar tools. The awe that this new discovery had historically is testified to by the religious contexts within which they developed.

Thus, most of us humans today live in societies structured by three spheres of language use, which he/she would do well to master. Admittedly, there is a bias here that it is preferable for a person to master all three skills than to be comfortable only in one or two of these spheres. Since we do live in a world where writing is ubiquitous, and since sociability is normally considered a desirable trait, and since we usually consider spontaneous behaviour liberating, I do not consider this preference too esoteric or unreasonable.

The crucial question asked, to which this article is a tentative answer, is really this: What are the mechanisms involved in forming a person at home in himself, in his society and in the universe?

References
Anderson, B. (1983). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London & New York: Verso. (1991).

Creel, H. G. (1954). *Chinese thought*. University Paperbacks. London: Methuen & Co.

Fairclough, N. (1989). *Language and power*. London & New York: Longman.

Fink-Eitel, H. (1992). *Foucault: An introduction*. Trans. Edward Dixon. Philadelphia: Pennbridge.

Foucault, M. (1986). *The order of thing:. An archeology of the human sciences*. Trans. & ed. R. D. Laing. London & New York: Tavistock.

Foucault, M. (1988). *History of sexuality, Vol. 2: The use of pleasure*. Middlesex: Penguin Books.

Graham, A.C. (1989). *Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical argument in ancient China*. Illinois: Open Court.

Kripke, S. A. (1982). *Wittgenstein on rules and private language*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Kropotkin, P. (1914). *Mutual aid: A factor of evolution*. Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers.

Laing, R. D. (1961). *Self and others*. Great Britain & USA: Pelican Books. (1971).

Ooi, K. B. (2001). The State and its Changdao: Sufficient discursive commonality in nation renewal, with Malaysia as case study. *Chinese Culture Studies No. 1*. Department of Chinese Studies, Institution of Oriental Languages, Stockholm University.

Ridley, M. (1997). *The origins of virtue*. Penguin Books.

Russell, B. (1912). *The problems of philosophy*. Oxford, New York, Toronto & Melbourne: Oxford University Press. (1980).

Schwartz, B. I. (1996). *China and other matters*. Cambridge Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press.

Stirner, M. (1845). *The ego & its own: The case of the individual against authority*. London: Rebel Press. (1982).

Wang, Y. (1963). "For practical living". In *For practical living and other Neo-Confucian writings by Wang Yang-Ming*. Translation with notes, by Wing-Tsit Chan. New York & London: Columbia University Press.

Wittgenstein, L. (1953). *Philosophical investigations*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (1974).