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THE CLOSING DOWN OF INSTITUTIONS:
NEW STRATEGIES IN YOUTH SERVICES

A Case Study of the Massachusetts Experience

A Dissertation Presented

by

Yitzhak Bakal

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

May, 1973

Education

THE CLOSING DOWN OF INSTITUTIONS:
NEW STRATEGIES IN YOUTH SERVICES


A Case Study of the Massachusetts Experience

A Dissertation


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
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
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
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
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May, 1973

The Closing Down of Institutions:
New Strategies in Youth Services
A Case Study of the Massachusetts Experience
(May 1973)

Yitzhak Bakal, B.S.W., Hebrew University, Jerusalem
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Directed by: Dr. Daniel C. Jordan

A major concern of this descriptive case study is the amount and type of planning that went into the radical restructuring of the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services (DYS), under the commissionership of Jerome G. Miller between 1969 and 1973. A complete transformation in the nature and quality of service delivery took place during that period, and the role of the department changed from that of custodian to that of advocate. Large training schools ("reform schools") were closed, and the community became the site for the processes necessary for effective rehabilitation. Services were increased in number, nature, and quality, while costs were actually reduced.

The investigator described the change processes that occurred in DHS in that period, including a historical review of the pressure for change. He also identified and conceptualized the different strategies used to bring about the change.

Several sources of data were utilized by the author. This included documents, studies and investigative reports prepared within and outside DHS. Also newspaper accounts, data and studies gathered by the Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, and evaluative reports of DHS programs and the new alternatives, conducted under the supervision of the investigator. The author also had access to much inside information through his position as Assistant Commissioner in DHS from September, 1970 to February, 1973.

The closing of institutions was a decision that went further than most people anticipated and it came much sooner than anyone would have expected. By closing institutions DYS forced its alternatives to occur, resulting in a massive immediate change rather than a gradual and prolonged one. Once the institutions were closed, alternative programs began to develop. The potential for these new programs had already been created as a result of the entire change process which the department had gone through; i.e., opening the system to many outside groups, building bridges to universities and colleges, and introducing volunteers into the system. Also, the department's constant search for alternatives within the institutions prior to their closing, and its flexibility and readiness to take advantage of any options available were a foreshadowing of this rapid development of programs later. The new alternatives are non-custodial in nature; they provide a variety of residential and non-residential community-based programs, privately run and regionally supported by the department through its regional offices.

Strategies for change used by DYS leaders were unique and innovative and are replicable elsewhere. These strategies increased the department's autonomy by opening the system to the public, the media, the youngsters in its care, thus creating a power base of support and lobby. Miller as an outsider to the system acted as a change agent and was able to use existing support within the system and at the same time infuse new ideas, approaches and groups into it. The changes introduced in DYS were the product of emergent rather than planned approach.

Strategies for change identified in this study were: flexible agenda, shotgun approach, avoidance of conflict, "change for change's sake," and the use of outside support.

These strategies created opportunities within the department to achieve massive changes. Also, the fundamental approach to change-- the constant forcing of options, rather than waiting for alternatives to emerge-- created an agency with an aggressive image that discouraged opposition by throwing opponents off balance and gaining public recognition and confidence.

Despite the cost to staff, and the administrative and financial problems created by this approach, the investigator points out that the Massachusetts experiment exhibits an important and refreshing breakthrough in juvenile corrections and emerges as a meaningful new model for state human service agencies.

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C H A P T E R I

OVERVIEW

The Queen: There's the King's Messenger. He's in prison now, being punished, and the trial doesn't even begin 'till next Wednesday. And of course the crime comes last of all.

Alice: Suppose he never commits the crime?
--Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland

Introduction

A radical transformation in the nature and quality of service delivery has taken place in the Department of Youth Services (DYS) of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Between 1969-1972 the role of the department has changed from that of custodian to that of advocate. Large training schools ("reform schools") were closed, and the community became the site for the processes necessary for effective rehabilitation. Services were increased in number, nature, and quality, while costs were actually reduced.

Among the several states attempting new approaches to juvenile corrections, without doubt the most rapid and dramatic reorganization is occurring in Massachusetts. As the most comprehensive demonstration to date of a "deinstitutionalized" approach to the care of delinquent and troubled youth, the Massachusetts experience has elicited praise, criticism, and above all curiosity among human-service

professionals across the country. It has been hailed as the harbinger of a new and better day for youthful offenders, attacked as a threat to society, and dismissed as a well-intentioned but superficial liberal reform.

The reorganization of DYS is still very much in progress. In the group homes and halfway houses, the keystone of the new system, staff and youth together are working out their individual programs. The same may be said of the many non-residential programs--probation, parole, foster homes, court liaison, youth advocacy--sponsored by DYS. In the department's central and regional offices, staffs are adjusting to new management roles and responsibilities, including systematic collection and analysis of data on costs, recidivism, educational and vocational achievement, as well as other measures needed to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of a noninstitutional system.

Thus it is too early to assess completely the impact of the new services on the youths who are receiving them, and as yet a responsible verdict on the experiment cannot be delivered. The investigator, however, is of the opinion that the Massachusetts experiment already exhibits an important and refreshing breakthrough in juvenile corrections, and emerges as a meaningful new model for state human service agencies.

Background

The large correctional institution has failed to achieve

its purposes. Placing people who do not follow the established rules of our society--especially the young--into environments set apart and distinct from society has served neither the public nor the person confined. Whether the intent has been to punish or to rehabilitate, the experience of over a hundred years has shown that institutionalization is not the answer. The learning process has been expensive, not only in monetary terms but in human cost as well.

Even as larger institutions for confinement are being built, more and more professionals in youth services, mental health, and the correctional field in general have come to believe that society can be better served by alternatives that include a setting within the society to which the person in trouble must ultimately return.

The significance of this move away from institutionalization can be best illustrated by briefly reviewing the four stages that the institutionalization of young people has undergone. The first stage was based on a belief in the value of placing offenders or disturbed young people in a wholesome setting, away from the negative influences of their home and community environments. The plan was to cultivate proper values, attitudes, and behaviors through a regimen of discipline and inspirational character-building. To that end, the first public reform school in the United States, the Lyman School for Boys, was established in Massachusetts in 1846. The next stage was the introduction of clinical services within existing institutions, providing individualized attention to motivational

and psychological aspects of the residents. The third stage involved the introduction of therapeutic community concepts into the large institution. Groups of doctors, social workers, attendants, and inmates openly discussed their problems and grievances. This was intended to create a more responsive climate for the joint working out of differences. The fourth stage developed when many practitioners in the corrections field began to see that rehabilitation consists not of therapists "curing" offenders, but rather of worker and resident creating an atmosphere of trust and problem-solving where all grow, or regress, together. It was quickly found that this type of treatment simply could not be successfully administered in institutions that were cut off from society, having a tradition of custodial or punitive (rather than rehabilitative) treatment, and generally staffed with people tied directly to an entrenched bureaucracy having a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.

Research and decades of experience in youth services also demonstrate why correctional programs involving institutional confinement are not only ineffective, but are all too often destructive.¹ Training schools are described--often quite accurately--as poorhouses for neglected children. They are essentially custodial in nature, and if they teach anything, it is crime. They tend to increase the alienation and

¹This point is repeatedly documented in the careful and objective studies by the research teams of the California Department of Corrections and the California Youth Authority, listed in the Bibliography.

crystalize the criminal self-concept of the committed offender.² Upon his or her release, the readjustment to society is extremely difficult,³ and recidivism rates range as high as 86percent (see Appendix D). This rate tends to increase, furthermore, in proportion to the length of confinement in an institution.⁴ The youthful offender who has experienced failure in his school and his community thus faces yet another failure when he is exposed to such an inept and destructive system. This system reinforces the stigma of the delinquent, deprives the youth of a legitimate identity, and perpetuates the cycle of failure.⁵

Life in the closed institutionalized setting is prey to powerful influence of peer-group processes on residents and staff members as well. At the level of the basic living unit, untrained, underpaid, immobile personnel are isolated from the administrators and professionals in charge of the institution. They make deals with residents, with whom they have to find some kind of underground modus vivendi. In this way the whole institutional enterprise becomes manipulative,

²Clifford R. Shaw, The Natural History of a Delinquent Career; see also studies on prison socialization and experiences of inmates, in Donald R. Cressey, ed., The Prison.

³Reuben S. Horlick, "Inmate Perception of Obstacles to Readjustment in the Community," pp. 200-205.

⁴David A. Ward, "Evaluations of Correctional Treatment: Some Implications of Negative Findings," p. 205.

⁵Don C. Gibbons, Society, Crime and Criminal Career.

encouraging self-serving anti-system behavior.⁶

Public bureaucracies administering youth programs lack the autonomy to give adequate service delivery for youth. A department of youth services is usually controlled by many groups, which exert strong pressures to resist change. First, within state governments there is the legislature, which controls the budget, and the governor's executive office, which exerts bureaucratic controls. There are also other agencies of the criminal justice system: the police, the courts, and probation. Internally a department is comprised of staff who can exert controls through their unions or political influences. Because a public bureaucracy is essentially dependent on maintaining the status quo (in this case, the system of institutions) for its very existence, change is exceedingly difficult. Even some of the most high-minded administrators and professionals may succumb to a rationale of "that innovation is a good idea, but...." In this way progressive solutions are stillborn, and the punitive system of institutionalization of troubled young people perpetuates itself. This was the situation in Massachusetts in 1969, when a new commissioner of DYS, Jerome G. Miller, was appointed.

Statement of the Problem

The concern of this case study is to assess the amount

⁶For a thorough study of this subject see Howard Polsky, Cottage Six: The Social System of Delinquent Boys in Residential Treatment.

and type of planning that went into the changes from institutions to community based programs initiated by Commissioner Miller and his staff, present the rationale for this action, and examine the strategies utilized. In Massachusetts, the shift from custodial state institutions to state-managed or state-purchased services, from old and inadequate facilities to a broad range of group homes, preventive programs, intensive therapeutic environments, and humane treatment centers, was not a matter of managing the dynamics of planned change. The process also involved many ad hoc decisions, based on intuition, luck, manipulation of information, and the ability to learn from mistakes and to capitalize quickly on new developments.

This study, then, examines planned and unplanned change strategies employed by DYS leadership, and their interim impacts.

Design of the Study

This investigation is designed to achieve several purposes:

1. To identify and describe the change processes that occurred in the Massachusetts Department of Youth Service in the period from September, 1969 to January, 1973. This includes an historical review of the period preceding the change, and identification of the pressures on the system that facilitated the change. It also includes a description of the new programs that have emerged.

especially those that are unique and innovative. Finally, this descriptive analysis will also examine the new service-delivery model under which DYS is presently operating.

2. Through an analysis of the data collected, the investigation will:
 - a. identify key change strategies employed by the commissioner and by DYS during the three-year change period;
 - b. assess the impact of these strategies and the extent to which they achieved the desired goals;
 - c. analyze the degree of replicability of these strategies in other states and other human-service agencies;
 - d. analyze those change strategies used in DYS that are most pertinent to the theory and practice of organizational change;
 - e. analyze those aspects of the Massachusetts experience that are most pertinent to the theory and practice of youth correctional reform.

The descriptive study approach was used in analyzing the process of change in DYS. Several sources of data were utilized:

1. Documents, studies, and various investigative reports written about DYS.

2. Extensive newspaper stories and accounts covering the period before the Reorganization Act through the period of change.
3. Internal reports, documents, and letters written by DYS officials. This includes the commissioner, assistant commissioners, and other staff members.
4. Data and reports prepared by the Harvard Center for Criminal Justice. This center is conducting an extensive study on the process of change in DYS, and is compiling data to assess success or failure of the emerging program alternatives.
5. Data collected by evaluation teams supervised by the investigator.

Besides the sources of data described above, there was first-hand information available to the author by virtue of his position as assistant commissioner in charge of institutions at DYS, and later in charge of training, evaluation and research, during the period from September, 1970 to March, 1973. These positions entailed planning, making or influencing decisions, as well as implementing many of the changes described in this study, thus providing the investigation with the unique advantage of a participant-observer, knowing the inside story and having a close-up view of the process of change and what is behind it.

Limitations

Amid the richness of first-hand information available

to the author, however, lie certain hazards. First, he had always to judge what was relevant to the study. He had to remind himself constantly of the main purpose of the study, namely, to describe and analyze the change process that occurred in DYS, and identify the key strategies involved in bringing about the change. Second, the period of change in DYS was so rapid that there was a perpetual sense of crisis and chaos in the department. Also, the complexities created by the change were so enormous that one could easily be sidetracked, lose focus, and find it difficult to identify what goal, strategy, or direction the department was espousing. Third, the strategies used by DYS were characterized by their extreme flexibility, and determined in great part by luck, opportunity, and the personal style of the commissioner, rather than by an explicit and coherent plan. It is thus extremely difficult to identify patterns or keep track of the direction being pursued from day to day. In this connection, the investigator spent many hours checking basic assumptions with various people in and out of DYS, thus redefining and reconstructing the basic pattern of the study.

The study is limited to discussing the change strategies, and will not deal with the quality and impact of these new programs on the youth in their care. It is also limited in its objectivity because: (1) The investigator has been an administrator in DYS and might be biased in his observation; (2) the investigator is a firm believer in the need to bring about reform in youth corrections, and so might be biased in

judging certain strategies for their outcome rather than for their overall merit.

Definition of Terms

In order to provide a degree of consistency of terminology, it is necessary to define some of the terms used in the study that are essential to the investigator's interpretations.

Department of Youth Services: Here referred to as DYS, it is the state agency charged with the responsibility of maintaining custody of all youths between the ages of seven and sixteen who have been charged with committing an act of delinquency in the Commonwealth.

Institutions: The large training schools operated by DYS, designed to hold children between the ages of seven and sixteen who have been adjudicated delinquent by a court.

Delinquent child: A child between the ages of seven and sixteen who has been adjudicated delinquent by a court for committing an offense.

Public bureaucracy: A government agency that employs a considerable number of public servants organized to carry out activities of a public nature, exposed to public scrutiny, concerned with the public interest, and paid out of public monies.

Planned change: Bennis defines planned change as a "deliberate and collaborative process involving a change agent and a client-system which are brought together to solve

a problem or, more generally, to plan and attain an improved state of functioning in the client-system by utilizing and applying valid knowledge."⁷ Thus, Bennis speaks of clearly stated goals for change, accepted by both the change agent and the client system. In this study, planned change means a well-thought-out plan of action, with clearly defined policies and goals, as well as strategies to attain these goals.

Emergent change: This refers to the kind of change introduced into a system that defines goals in only general terms, leaving strategies and the plan of action to emerge.

Significance of the Study

A preliminary case study of the reorganization of the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services can serve three useful functions. Both within and outside the human services professions (e.g., legislators, community leaders, parents, minorities), there is a demand for information about the virtually unique bureaucratic and administrative changes that occurred in Massachusetts, a state noted for its extraordinary sensitivity to civil service, and having the longest tradition of institutionalized care for delinquent youth. Second, under Commissioner Miller the DYS leadership demonstrated an unusual set of change strategies, which resulted in impressive successes as well as some near-disastrous failures. Their strategies for institutional change included a developing set

⁷Warren G. Bennis, Changing Organizations, p. 91.

of political tactics by which issues and opponents could be isolated, understood, and overcome. For state personnel in similar positions these strategies may prove replicable, and the mistakes avoidable, since many of the issues, and the sources of Miller's support and opposition, are the same in other social service agencies.

Finally, an analysis of the formative results of the changes themselves may provide some clue to the range of impacts achieved in DYS and other Massachusetts agencies, even though final judgments must be withheld. Certainly the costs to DYS staff and leadership were enormous. For human service professionals in other areas, the key issue is the degree to which those costs were matched by benefits to the agencies and institutions involved, to the state and its taxpayers, but most of all to the children in the care of the department.

Organization of the Dissertation

In Chapter I of this dissertation, a description of the problem, design, limitations, terminology, and significance has been set forth. Chapter II is a review of the literature and related research. Chapter III describes the methodology used in this study. Chapter IV establishes the context for change and introduces the major themes in the change process, after an historical review of DYS. Chapter V provides an assessment of the different strategies utilized by Commissioner Miller to change the system. Chapter VI includes the summary, conclusions and implications.

C H A P T E R I I

RELATED LITERATURE AND RESEARCH

We must be aware of the dangers which lie in our most generous wishes. Some paradox of our nature leads us, when once we have made our fellow men the objects of our enlightened interest, to go on to make them the object of our pity, then of our wisdom--ultimately of our coercion.

--Lionel Trilling, The Liberal Imagination

As stated earlier, the objective of this case study is to describe the change that occurred in the Massachusetts DYS under the leadership of Commissioner Miller, and to identify strategies utilized to effect this change. There are three areas that are relevant to explore in relation to this topic:

1. Theory and research about delinquency in youth. Here the purpose is a description of the youth who are adjudicated delinquent and referred to the Department of Youth Services. How do they get there, and why?
2. Theories and research concerning institutionalization, specifically a look at the result of institutionalization on youth.
3. Theories and research in the field of organizational change. More specifically, a look at human service organizations, public bureaucracies, strategies for

change, and leadership is in order.

Delinquency in Youth

The causes of youth crime continue to elude theoreticians, researchers and policy-makers. Over the past decade, both the nature and dimension of the juvenile delinquency problem in the United States and around the world have been changing rapidly. Crime and recidivism rates have been rising alarmingly, especially among juveniles. The public concern that developed over this problem resulted in greater expenditures of money and resources both in the area of prevention and rehabilitation. But this did not achieve the desired effect, and illegal behavior by young people has grown more extensive. While a large percentage of youth continue to be involved in petty theft, truancy, and in some instances vandalism, there has now been added to these familiar forms of delinquency such violations as massive drug abuse, planned violence against established institutions, and offenses against property and persons.

Recent literature in crime and delinquency is making headway in explaining delinquency. The first question in this study is, "Who are delinquent youth and what are their characteristics?" First, some basic statistical information. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice reports that "rough estimates by the Children's Bureau, supported by independent studies, indicate that one in every nine youths--one in every six male youths--will be

referred to juvenile court in connection with a delinquent act (excluding traffic offenses) before his 18th birthday."¹ M. Wolfgang, in a recent detailed cohort study covering all boys who were born in Philadelphia in 1945, reports that approximately 35 percent of these boys had at least one recorded police contact.²

In Massachusetts one out of five children who were brought before the courts were referred for detention.³ In 1972 this figure was 6,200; so of those detained, approximately 1,260 were adjudicated delinquent. Until January, 1972, such youths were sent to one of the training schools operated by DYS. This study is concerned with those children who are court-acquainted, especially those who would normally be incarcerated in detention centers or institutions.

Profile of the Court-Acquainted, Detained, or Adjudicated Youth

More than two decades of longitudinal, biographic and demographic research presents a similar picture of the delinquent youth.

He is likely to be male rather than female: only 20-25 percent of the total juvenile court cases in the United

¹President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, p. 55.

²Marvin Wolfgang, Robert Figlio, and Thorsten Sellin, Delinquency in a Birth Cohort, p. 245.

³This information was furnished to me on February 1, 1973, by William Madaus, assistant commissioner in charge of clinical services, DYS.

States involve girls.⁴

He is likely to be of adolescent age: delinquency is very rare before the onset of adolescence; it reaches a peak at the age of sixteen, and declines rapidly after the age of seventeen. Criminal acts are proportionately much lower among adults than among adolescents.⁵

He is likely to come from a poor urban slum: The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice describes the delinquent child and his background as follows:

...the delinquent child is a child of the slums, from a neighborhood that is low on the social economic scale of the community and harsh in many ways for those who live there. He is generally 14 to 16 years old, one of numerous children (perhaps representing several different fathers) who live with their mother in a home that the sociologists call "female centered". It may be broken; he may never have had a resident father; he may have a nominal male head who is often drunk or in jail or in and out of the house.⁶

A survey of over a thousand juvenile court case files discloses that the typical offender referred to the court is the product of a broken home, has done poorly in school, or is a dropout. Most frequently he commits the offense in his own neighborhood. Of those children committed to institutions, 88 percent were from homes with an annual income of less than

⁴President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Challenge of Crime, p. 56.

⁵Barbara Wooton, Social Science and Social Pathology, pp. 152-172; Wolfgang et al., Delinquency in a Birth Cohort, p. 252. This recent study confirms previous findings.

⁶President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Challenge of Crime, p. 60.

\$5,000, with 75 percent from homes receiving an annual income of less than \$3,000; 66 percent were from broken homes.⁷

Similarly, DYS-detained and -committed children come from broken homes and low-income families. Over half of the parents have been divorced, separated, or deserted; 79 percent of the families are on welfare or have welfare-level income.⁸

He is likely to be unemployed: A very significant longitudinal study conducted by B. Fleisher examined 74 Chicago communities, 45 suburban Chicago communities, and 101 cities upon which the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports are based, together with relevant data on income and unemployment.⁹ This analysis was also supported by unemployment and delinquency rates in Boston, Cincinnati and Chicago, as well as by corresponding national data for the period from 1932-1961. Fleisher's analysis discloses that a 1 percent increase in unemployment is associated on the average with an approximately 0.15 percent increase in the rate of delinquency.¹⁰ These findings are similar to findings in Great Britain.¹¹ Thus Fleisher suggests that the high rate of delinquency at the age of sixteen can be attributed to the fact that many youths quit school at this

⁷Patricia M. Wald, "Poverty and Criminal Justice," p. 291.

⁸See Background information on the Department of Youth Services (Internal, unpublished document prepared by the planning department, 1972).

⁹B. Fleisher, The Economics of Delinquency.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 68.

¹¹Ibid., p. 84.

age, and faced with unemployment, are unable to find a legitimate role for themselves in society.¹²

How Does One Become Delinquent?

There is a growing awareness based on increasing evidence in research that the process whereby one youth is called a delinquent while another escapes the label is based not only on the behavior of the youth, but on many other circumstances beyond his control. Some research indicates that there is a process of exclusion, scapegoating, and forcing of deviant behavior on children by communities, institutions, and especially public school systems. Public schools tolerate little deviant behavior, resulting in many truant youth who find themselves without any legitimate activity or affiliation.¹³ Once a child has failed at school, his chances of becoming involved in delinquent behavior are much greater.

According to Empey, his study supports other findings that

...known delinquents do not possess the requisite cognitive nor social skills to cope with the school environment. They tend to score lower on intelligence tests when social class is held constant, and their organizational skills are less than nondelinquents. Thus, very early in their lives, they are sidetracked from the major institutional avenues leading from childhood to adulthood. They find themselves without the institutional activities that provide the kinds of supports that make conventional activities more highly appealing than deviant ones. They are socially

¹²Ibid., p. 83.

¹³Larry Dye, "Juvenile Junkyards: A Descriptive Case Study of the Organization and Philosophy of the County Training Schools in Massachusetts," pp. 2-6.

"defrocked," as it were.¹⁴

The concept of "delinquency" as opposed to "criminality" involves, in many cases, the passing of moral judgment. Actions which for adults are not considered illegal are treated as such for juveniles.¹⁵ For example, truancy, smoking, and disobeying parents are often treated as crimes. "PINS" (person in need of supervision), or children without a guardian, usually end up in a detention home.¹⁶

Also, parents, schools, teachers, police or neighbors can and do to a significant degree contribute to the decision by the court to label a child delinquent. Parents may take their children to a court and ask it to commit him to an institution for his "incurability" and for their inability to control him. As a U.S. District Court judge describes it,

Tired and apathetic ones [parents] readily abdicate their parental roles....Frequently, when a child runs away from home and is picked up by the police, his parents refuse to take him home, instead filing a beyond control complaint. In such cases the child may be held for weeks and months pending hearing on the complaint.¹⁷

Once a child comes in contact with the law, evidence shows that the criminal justice system is not only unable to provide justice for the youngster, but all too often it is

¹⁴Lamar Empey, Steven G. Lubeck, Ronald LaPorte, Explaining Delinquency, p. 164.

¹⁵The dividing line between juvenile and adult is age 21, 18, or 17, depending on the state.

¹⁶New York's classification of children without supervision.

¹⁷Judge David L. Brazelton, Beyond Control of the Juvenile Court, p. 2.

stigmatizing, destructive, and discriminatory in its treatment of lower-class youths as opposed to middle- or upper-class youths.

Police treatment of youths seems to vary according to the socioeconomic level of the community. Goldman, in his study of Pennsylvania communities, reports that the community with the highest socioeconomic level also had the highest arrest rate, but the lowest rate of court referrals.¹⁸ While the community with the lowest arrest rate, which had a low socioeconomic level, had the highest rate of court referrals.¹⁹ Thus, a poor youth, once he is arrested, is more likely to be sent to court.

Once referred to court, a lower-class youth is also more likely to be incarcerated in a detention center because of his inability to make bail: "It clearly appears that one of the factors least taken into account is the defendant's financial ability to make bail in the amount contemplated. For those who can make bond only in a smaller amount, bail thus becomes a vehicle, not to permit release, but to insure detention."²⁰ The authors further state that "since no determined effort has been made to make systematic use of alternatives to bail, it is not surprising to find that...many defendants are denied release because they are too poor to

¹⁸ Nathan Goldman, "The Differential Selection of Juvenile Offenders for Court Appearance," pp. 264-290.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Charles E. Ares, Anne Rankin, and Herbert Sturz, "The Manhattan Bail Project," p. 160.

buy their freedom."²¹

The child who is poor is also shortchanged because he does not possess "alternative child care systems which largely eliminate the need for intervention of the juvenile justice system. By definition, the poor and the minorities have no such assets, or if they do, are seldom in a position to have them accepted by officials as suitable alternatives to official care."²²

Patricia Wald offers an excellent case study that illustrates this process.²³ The following are some excerpts from this case:

Defendant D, a 17-year-old Negro male, unemployed and a school dropout, is stopped by a Youth Division Officer at 12:30 a.m. on a street corner while loitering with a noisy gang. There is a 10 p.m. curfew in effect for juveniles. The officer tells the gang to disperse and go home; D retorts that he doesn't have to and "no...cop can make me." The officer takes him in custody, frisks him for weapons, marches him to the precinct station, and calls his home. A man answers the phone, but is either intoxicated or unable to understand what the officer says. D is taken to the juvenile detention center for the night....

The morning following defendant D's apprehension, the arresting officer finds he has a record of prior juvenile offenses, minor thefts, truancy, gang activity. Several years ago he was put on juvenile probation, and completed the period without further incident. The officer goes to see his parents and finds the mother, unmarried with several younger children, working a 3:00 to 12:00 shift in a bar. The home consists of two rooms in a dilapidated, overcrowded tenement. The mother reacts to the news by bitterly

²¹Ibid.

²²John M. Martin, "The Creation of a New Network of Services for Troublesome Youth," p. 11.

²³Patricia Wald, "Poverty and Criminal Justice."

complaining of the boy, the company he keeps, the troubles he has already caused her, and the miseries yet to come. Based on the interview and D's past record, the officer decides to petition to juvenile court....

As soon as the petition involving defendant D is filed in juvenile court, the court's intake worker decides whether to proceed with the case. If she thinks the family can control the boy and he is likely to avoid trouble again, she can dismiss the case or place him on informal probation for a few months. To make the decision she has to assess the child himself, his home situation, his school, and police record.

In D's case, the lack of home supervision, his mother's self-admitted defeat in holding him in line, and his record of one previous probation rule out dismissal. The decision is made to charge him with violation of the curfew and disorderly conduct and bring him before the juvenile court that afternoon. (Had the offense been more serious, he might have been waived to an adult court for a full-scale criminal trial.) In a few jurisdictions, the child and parent will be asked if they want a lawyer when a decision to petition the case is made; if they have no money, counsel will be assigned. In most jurisdictions, however, there is no procedure for assignment of counsel before hearing.²⁴

At his first hearing defendant D waived counsel because of lack of funds, admitted his offense, and was sent to a detention center to await disposition of his case while a social study was done on him by the court. The outcome was that defendant D was later adjudicated delinquent and sent to a training school, "for an indeterminate period, not to exceed his twenty-first year."²⁵

This case demonstrates clearly how policies and procedures that have been established to help or protect people, in effect discriminate against the poor. This case

²⁴Ibid., pp. 272-282.

²⁵Ibid., p. 291.

could have been closed at almost any point along the way if the boy had an adequate home to return to. Either the police, the court intake worker, or the judge could have used their discretion to dismiss the case. Throughout the process, either advocacy or resources could have prevented defendant D from being sent to the institution. Instead, as a result of his poverty, he received the maximum sentence.

Causes of Delinquency

Theories and research explaining delinquency cover a wide spectrum. First are the theories that question society's norms, and its definition of what is legal and illegal.

Theories dealing with the function that deviance or criminal behavior serve society: George H. Mead suggests that the criminal basically does not challenge the cohesiveness of society. On the contrary, he contributes to that unity by uniting its members against him.²⁶ Chapman, the British sociologist, arrives at the same conclusion with a different explanation:

The designation and social isolation of a relatively small group of victims permit the guilt of others to be symbolically discharged; the identification of the criminal class and its social ostracism permit the reduction of social-class hostility by deflecting aggression that could otherwise be directed towards those with status, power, reward, and property. A special part of the ideology functions to prevent the designated criminal from escaping from his sacrificial role, and institutional record keeping maintains his identity.²⁷

²⁶George H. Mead, "The Psychology of Punitive Justice."

²⁷Dennis Chapman, Sociology and the Stereotype of the Criminal, p. 4.

Legal norms: Legal norms are important to the explanation of delinquency. Becker makes the following argument: "Social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infractions constitute deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and labelling them as outsiders."²⁸ Platt supports Becker, and uses the court as an example of a conservative middle class institution which rejects lower class values and tends to scapegoat the poor.²⁹

Adolescence: The high rate of delinquency in adolescence demands explanation. Erikson explains this phenomenon as being a result of a loss of identity suffered by adolescents, "where historical and technological developments severely encroach upon deeply rooted or strongly emerging identities...."³⁰

It is important to note that most writers who discuss the adolescent period and its universality point out that youth delinquency stems mainly from the adolescent's exclusions from full societal participation.³¹

Failure of Socializing Institutions

Research dealing with the failure of socializing institutions illustrates the community's limitations to

²⁸Howard S. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviates, p. 9.

²⁹Anthony Platt, "The Rise of the Child Saving Movement," pp. 21-38.

³⁰Erik H. Erikson, Insight and Responsibility, p. 93.

³¹See R.D. Hess and I. Goldblatt, "The Status of Adolescents in American Society: A Problem in Social Identity," pp. 459-468.

provide adequate legitimate opportunities for lower-class children, thus reinforcing delinquent behavior.³² Also, living in a lower class community, there is pressure on lower class youngsters to achieve according to middle class standards. This pressure needs an outlet, and sometimes this outlet is found through the creation of delinquent gang activities.³³

Other institutions, such as the family, receive elaborate treatment in the literature. Many studies show strong correlations between delinquency and broken homes.³⁴ Other researchers, such as Jackson Toby, found broken homes to have a differential effect on the children. Girls and young children are found to be more affected than older boys.³⁵

Research also suggests that being a member of the lower class limits the family's ability to maintain external controls over the children.³⁶ Frequent family tensions, disharmony, and lack of affection due to pressure imposed by deprived circumstances prevent families from using childrearing

³²Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin, Delinquency and Opportunity; see also Robert K. Morton, Social Theory and Social Structure.

³³Albert K. Cohen, Delinquent Boys.

³⁴Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, "Are Broken Homes a Causative Factor in Juvenile Delinquency?"; Eleanor and Sheldon Glueck, Family Environment and Delinquency; Walter Slocum and Carol L. Stone, "Family Culture Patterns and Delinquent-Type Behavior."

³⁵Jackson Toby, "The Differential Impact of Family Disorganization."

³⁶Martin Gold, Status Forces in Delinquent Boys.

techniques that involve the child rather than alienate him.³⁷

Lamar T. Empey focuses on the school as the institution that is most closely related to the causes of delinquency. The following three paragraphs contain a summary of statements he made at a workshop he conducted at a conference in Boston in June, 1972.

Dr. Empey began the workshop by explaining the connection between delinquency and failure in school. Failure in school leads to strain and alienation. Juveniles who are doing badly in school acquire a peer and official identification as delinquents, which in turn causes stigma. This leads to feedback which reinforces the strain and alienation they are feeling and continues on. If this labelling theory is correct, their problems lead to further identification as delinquents and this forces the juveniles to live up to certain roles to keep the image--thus a circular process.

In any neighborhood in one of our urban centers, or even in some of our rural areas, there are four major structures that affect juvenile behavior: the system of formal norms--the rules that define who is delinquent and who is not; the policies and practices of the police and the courts; socializing institutions--family, church, school, and the neighborhood itself; illegitimate institutions; finally, social control--police. The socializing institutions in the ghetto tend to be intimately related with illegitimate institutions. There is only one institution that cuts across all neighborhood differences: the school system.

Thus, problems in the school are the prime contributors to delinquency rather than the larger stratification system, social classes and so on, which are imposed upon the school. This is important because youth on the college track are rarely involved in deviance, while the ones on the vocational track are more highly involved. Those who begin to fail start to identify with people who aren't in the system, and yet they still look with admiration on those who succeed. For schools are where the action is; even dropouts congregate around schools. There is no

³⁷ Ivan F. Nye, Family Relationships and Delinquent Behavior.

acceptable social role for a youth, not in school or at least in a school atmosphere.³⁸

To sum up at this point, evidence shows that what the law defines as a delinquent child is usually an adolescent youth who comes from the slums where his opportunities to provide for himself through legitimate means are limited. There is also a process of exclusion, defining, stigmatizing and labelling done by the social institutions. This process is done to the greatest degree by those institutions which are supposed to help him, that is, the court, the school, and the training school. The procedures that were developed to help the youth in effect discriminate against him, stigmatize him, and rob him of a legitimate identify. Theories explaining delinquency, although they disagree on the cause, arrive at the same conclusions: (1) there is a need to involve the youth in accepted and legitimate social roles that provide him with "a sense of competence...a sense of usefulness...a sense of belongingness...[and] a sense of power or potency";³⁹ (2) there is a need to increase opportunities for lower-class youth; (3) there is a need to combat the negative stigma attached to the delinquent youth at the school level; and (4) there is a need to divert most youths from the criminal

³⁸Lamar T. Empey, "The Group Home and the Local School System," unpublished workshop delivered at a conference entitled "The Closing Down of Institutions: New Strategies in Youth Services," under the auspices of DYS and Fordham University, at Boston College, June 27, 1972.

³⁹Department of Health, Education and Welfare (hereafter cited as HEW), Delinquency Prevention through Youth Development,

justice process.

Youth Correctional Facilities -- Review of Literature

I live in a house called torture and pain,
It's made of materials called sorrow and shame.
It's a lonely place in which to dwell,
There's a horrid room there, and they call it
Hell.

From the faucets run tears that I've cried all
these years,
And it's heated by my heart made of stone.
But the worst part to face is
I'll die in this place—
And when I die I'll die all alone.⁴⁰

The National Center for Social Statistics reported that "almost 500,000 children are living in public institutions for delinquent children in the United States on June 30, 1970. There were an estimated 100,000 admissions to these institutions during the year, and about an equal number of discharges."⁴¹ Every year, according to the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD), "over 100,000 children from seven to seventeen inclusive are held in jails or jail-like places of detention."⁴²

These training schools and detention centers are large. Of the 325 institutions reporting to the National Center for

⁴⁰A poem written by a girl in an institution, from Gisela Konopka, The Adolescent Girl in Conflict, p. 107.

⁴¹U.S., HEW, Statistics on Public Institutions for Delinquent Children, 1970, pp. 3-4.

⁴²National Center on Crime and Delinquency (hereafter cited as NCCD), Standards and Guides for Detention of Children and Youth, p. xx1.

Social Statistics in 1970, over half had more than 100 children, and 55 had 300 or more. They are usually overcrowded:

"because of indiscriminate use, detention homes are often dangerously overcrowded to the degree that an adequate program is impossible to achieve."⁴³

Few institutions or detention centers provide counseling, psychiatric, or health services. Most training schools have part-time psychiatrists who can do little more than diagnose new admissions or respond to emergency situations.⁴⁴ High-quality educational or vocational programs are almost nonexistent in these institutions.⁴⁵

Children are confined for an average of 8.4 months in a training school.⁴⁶ Many of the children do not need to be either in detention or in a training school. NCCD suggests that only 10 percent of the total number of children who are picked up by the police for juvenile offenses actually require detention.⁴⁷ Also, the Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration (YDDPA) has stated that "mildly delinquent

⁴³U.S., HEW, State Responsibility for Juvenile Detention Care, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁴Chief Justice Warren Burger, "No Man is an Island," speech given in February, 1970, as quoted in The Journal of the American Bar Association, (April, 1970), p. 58.

⁴⁵Frederick Thacher, "Effecting Changes in a Training School for Girls," p. 82.

⁴⁶U.S., HEW, Statistics on Public Institutions, p. 6.

⁴⁷NCCD, Standard and Guides for Detention, p. 18.

youth or neglected children are being detained unnecessarily, and harmfully in close association with sophisticated delinquents."⁴⁸

Strict discipline and brutality prevail in these training schools. Joseph Rowan, executive director of the John Howard Association in Illinois stated in a public hearing before an Illinois Senate Subcommittee that he had seen more brutality in juvenile correctional facilities than in adult correctional facilities. According to him, "In one training school most of the teachers and group supervisors were using brutality in the form of hitting boys, banging their heads against lockers....and taking boys off to 'side rooms' to work them over.... Sitting at attention for several hours, holding shoes out until their hands dropped, standing for up to five hours looking at the wall...have been less brutalizing but very damaging practices."⁴⁹ This brutality occurs mainly because of the frustrations of the staff who are untrained and underpaid, and often represent different ethnic, cultural, and racial groups from the juveniles. Similarly, Howard James found five boys in training schools who had punctured eardrums as a result of beatings by guards.⁵⁰

Training schools are expensive. The cost per capita in

⁴⁸ U.S., HEW, State Responsibility for Juvenile Detention Care, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁹ Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, Hearings, p. 5142.

⁵⁰ Howard James, Children in Trouble, pp. 105-107.

public institutions for delinquents in 1970 was \$5,700 per year, with an average of \$8,760 in the North Pacific Region.⁵¹ A committee in New York recently found that the cost of operating New York State training schools in 1970 ranged from \$8,137 to \$17,046, with a median cost of \$10,008.⁵²

Institutional confinement inflicts a process of degradation and results in a loss of self-respect. In detention there is a status-degradation ceremony: "The juvenile is photographed, fingerprinted, weighed, searched thoroughly... given a shower and new set of clothes...."⁵³ He has "to adjust to the low status accorded him and to accept the attitudes of others toward him."⁵⁴ Children are stripped of their self-respect during confinement. In Lancaster Industrial School, girls had to strip before a matron and a male security guard before entering solitary confinement, where they were sometimes allowed to wear a nightgown, and sometimes forced to remain naked (see Appendix C).

Treatment through institutional confinement has proved to be ineffective and destructive. The recidivism rates are high (see Appendix D). The institutional environment tends to increase alienation and criminalization of the young

⁵¹U.S., HEW, Statistics on Public Institutions, p. 7.

⁵²NCCD, Juvenile Justice Confounded, p. 37.

⁵³U.S., HEW, The Handling of Juveniles from Offense to Disposition, p. 198.

⁵⁴Ibid.

offender and foster in him the development of a criminal self-concept. Correctional facilities thus crystallize the criminal identity by further stigmatizing and labelling the child. The literature dealing with the socialization of inmates offers excellent descriptions of this process. Most specific are studies carried out by the Institute of Juvenile Research in Chicago.⁵⁵

Perhaps the strongest indictment against the training schools found in research are those numerous studies that show that early commitment to a juvenile training school is a key forerunner to an adult career of crime. McKay's findings of a follow-up study of boys committed to the Illinois Training School for Boys are convincing. His data show that 60.5 percent of these boys discharged from the training school were found later to have been committed to a penal institution; 68.5 percent were found to have been convicted, while 76.1 percent were found to have been arrested.⁵⁶

Research studies also consistently show extremely high rates of recidivism among those who have been committed to juvenile training schools. McKay concludes that "behavior of significant numbers of boys who become involved in criminal activity is not redirected toward conventional activity by the institutions created for that purpose."⁵⁷

⁵⁵See, for example, Clifford R. Shaw, The Natural History of a Delinquent Career.

⁵⁶Henry McKay, Report on the Criminal Careers of Male Delinquents in Chicago, pp. 107-113.

⁵⁷Ibid.

A major conclusion of these studies, as well as Wolfgang, is that offenders who start at a young age and continue into adult life account for a major part of the crime problem. Lack of early prevention undoubtedly costs the society large sums of money each year.⁵⁸

The reasons for the failure of these large training schools and detention centers are multiple. David Street, Robert D. Vinter, and Charles Perrow, in their comparative studies of institutions for the delinquent, describe the organizational conflicts that develop in these institutions because of their multiple goals (i.e., custodial objectives vs. therapeutic objectives). Even in institutions where treatment goals are dominant, the conflicts between the different disciplines can lead to inconsistent treatment. In this way, therapeutic gains become insignificant.⁵⁹

There is no doubt that these organizational conflicts stem from society's confused and ambivalent attitude toward the lawbreaker. The paradox of attempted justice is well articulated in the following statement by sociologist George H. Mead shortly after the turn of the century.

It is quite impossible psychologically to hate the sin and love the sinner. We are very much given to cheating ourselves in this regard. We assume we can detect, pursue, indict, prosecute and punish

⁵⁸Wolfgang et al., Delinquency in a Birth Cohort, pp. 243-255.

⁵⁹See Mayer N. Zald, "Power Balance and Staff Conflict in Correctional Institutions," pp. 22-49; and David Street, Robert D. Vinter, and Charles B. Perrow, Organization for Treatment.

the criminal and still retain toward him the attitude of reinstating him in the community as soon as he indicates a change of social attitude in himself, that we can at the same time overwhelm the offender and comprehend the situation out of which the offense grows. But the two attitudes, that of control of crime by the hostile procedure of law and that of control through comprehension of⁶⁰ social and psychological conditions, cannot be combined.

Another significant problem that contributes to the failure of the correctional institutions is their overpopulation. Overpopulation leads to organizational problems, and the custody and control of the institution becomes more important than rehabilitation and programming. Custodial staff bargains with the inmate and delegates power to the deviant, thus reinforcing the criminal subculture. Inmate role models are antisocial and the institutional environment reinforces these roles. Such a system increases the dependency of the inmate, making him vulnerable to re-institutionalization after release.

Finally, review of the research and literature dealing with correctional programs involving institutional confinement raises an important question. Why are these institutions and training schools still open? Why is the process of change so slow? There is little in the literature that addresses itself to this question. Several factors, however, are emerging:

1. The knowledge of organizational change both in theory and practice as it pertains to correctional reform seems to be very scarce. (A review of this

⁶⁰George H. Mead, "The Psychology of Punitive Justice," pp. 876-886.

literature will follow in this chapter.)

2. Several theoreticians, especially Chapman, Miller, and R.D. Laing suggest that the criminologist and social-science worker help maintain the system by providing the scientific rationale for it.⁶¹

Chapman put it as follows, "The social sciences attempt to provide rational scientific explanations in competition with magical and quasi-magical explanations of the priesthood and of some parts of the medical profession."⁶²

3. Resistance on the part of those groups with vested interest, i.e., staff at the institutions, the criminal justice system, and the local officials and socializing agencies who have a stake in keeping the delinquent outside of the system.

Organizational Change in Corrections

Literature dealing with organizational change is very extensive. The objective in this section is to discuss key concepts most pertinent to organizational change in correctional agencies. Most important, the purpose of this section is to develop a conceptual framework that helps to analyze the change processes in DYS.

⁶¹Dennis Chapman, Sociology and the Stereotype of the Criminal; Jerome G. Miller, "The Latent Social Functions of Psychiatric Diagnosis"; R.D. Laing, The Politics of the Family.

⁶²Chapman, Sociology and the Stereotype, p. 15.

Public bureaucracies work within the context of interest groups, which exert a variety of pressures, some of them in support of, and some of them contrary to, change. Interest groups include the media, the public, the consumer, the legislature, and other arms of the government. Lloyd Ohlin, in analyzing interest groups in correctional agencies, states that "interest groups constitute the basic institutional structure which gives form and content to correctional activities."⁶³ He further explains that there is a dynamic interplay between these interest groups and the internal shifts and changes within the setting. Interest groups can thus become concerned with what happens within a department when changes occur. Incidents such as mass runaways or staff conflicts over issues of control vs. treatment may gain public attention: "When there is much at stake and the power of conflicting interests is relatively balanced, an issue may become public."⁶⁴ Once this occurs there is a crisis, and a new balance or equilibrium is achieved. This dynamic interaction between the balance of forces in the organization is conceptually framed by Kurt Lewin:

A successful change includes three aspects:
unfreezing the present level, moving to a new level
and freezing group life on the new level. Since
any level is determined by a force field, permanency

⁶³Lloyd E. Ohlin, "Conflicting Interests in Correctional Objectives," p. 126.

⁶⁴Ibid.

implies that the new force field is made relatively secure against change.⁶⁵

Lewin's conceptual schema is also helpful to analyze the internal changes that occur in an organization. This schema suggests that after every level of "unfreezing" there is a new equilibrium of power established in which the forces driving for change and the forces restraining change reach another level of compromise. The balance between the two sets of forces, which defines the established level of production, Lewin called a "quasi-stationary equilibrium."⁶⁶

Kurt Lewin's model also explains why public bureaucracies alternate between relative periods of calm, during which the agency receives little public attention, and periods of crisis and concern, and with it, high public visibility. Ohlin observes that changes do not occur without considerable conflict. During these periods of crisis the role of the agency's administrator is crucial in determining the outcome. The administrator, who is in a position to capture public attention, has a chance to explain his point of view, thus he might win public support. In this way the public, the media and other interest groups are included in the decision-making process.

⁶⁵Kurt Lewin, "Frontiers of Group Dynamics," p. 35.

⁶⁶Kenneth Benne and Max Birnbaum, "Principles of Changing," p. 329.

Processes of Internal Change

Cyril Sofer, in his recent book, Organization in Theory and Practice, offers an interesting interpretation of Kurt Lewin's theory. He suggests that if one looks at the internal change of the agency "in terms of the continuation of flexibility, 'unfreezing' precedes a shift towards greater adaptability and 'freezing' is a return towards a more rigid system to ensure some degree of stability for the new system."⁶⁷

Studying the objective of organizational change in terms of increasing an agency's flexibility seems to be very pertinent in analyzing public bureaucracies. Such agencies are usually stultified by outmoded practices and rigid internal and external bureaucratic controls. Thus the intent of the change is often to loosen up the structures. Sofer also draws a distinction between two processes that is meaningful in this discussion:

We should distinguish between "decentralization" and "debureaucratization," between a shift towards greater flexibility. It is true that changes of both sorts have occurred in recent years as a reaction against what have come to be considered outmoded forms of organization and as means of improving morale and efficiency. It is also true that there is a tendency for organizations to revert to a more bureaucratic form and also to a more centralized form after either type of change. But the two processes are substantially different; and are treated⁶⁸ here as two distinct types of organizational change.

Correctional agencies undergoing change might have as

⁶⁷Cyril Sofer, Organizations in Theory and Practice, p. 295.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 297.

their major goal debureaucratization. This process might necessitate the centralization of the operations. A shift from centralization to decentralization might also be an important strategy in bringing about change. The central administration might have to divest institutions of their autonomy before they create the new structures to whom the new authority and responsibility is delegated.

Communication Patterns

Richard McCleery made a very important observation concerning the strong link between the power structure of an organization and its line of communication. McCleery made these observations after analyzing the changeover in a prison from a traditional authoritarian maximum-security institution to one with treatment orientation and inmate self-government. The warden who introduced these changes altered the power structure of the institution by changing the lines of communication.

McCleery also shows how the changes in the prison created a polarization between the old guard and the management. The crisis was resolved after it received public attention and the new system began to take hold. McCleery points out that the changes

...required a major expansion of communication of information plus the policy of open discussion with the inmates. None of the participants fully recognized the extent to which open communication has anarchic consequences for an authoritarian power structure. None of the liberals, at least, realized

the extent to which control was institutionalized, in the social structure of the inmate community.⁶⁹

In analyzing the processes of change in DYS, the changes in the patterns of communications and the new actors that became involved will be examined. Finally, the shift in power base achieved through changes in the communication pattern will be analyzed.

Leadership

Change in corrections often means introducing change from the top down. It is very often a system that has failed to achieve its goals. When the crisis in a system becomes a public concern, the mandate and support for reform becomes strong and real. The newly appointed administrator naturally becomes a key actor in the process of change. To a great extent, his philosophy, his strategies, and his leadership style and quality become crucial to understand the change. Alex Bavelas states that "...organizational leadership consists of uncertainty reduction. The actual behavior through which this reduction is accomplished is the making of choices."⁷⁰ In other words, "...leadership consists of the continuous choice-making process that permits the organization as a whole to proceed toward its objectives despite all sort of internal and external perturbations."⁷¹ This definition of leadership

⁶⁹Richard McCleery, "Communication Patterns as Bases of Systems of Authority and Power," p. 71.

⁷⁰Alex Bavelas, "Leadership, Man and Function," p. 506.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 507.

is relevant to the understanding of correctional reform. With all the uncertainty about which choice to make, a commissioner in the process of introducing reform has to be able to make a decision. Bavelas goes on to say that "it is in situations of this kind that many of the popular traits attributed to leaders find their justification: quickness of decision, the courage to take risks, coolness under stress, intuition, and, even, luck."⁷² Correctional reform differs from other organizational change; it is characterized by constant crises and constant unexpected turbulence. Thus, a leader with a capacity to make daring decisions, and who depends on luck and intuition, is very valuable.

Other attributes of such a leader include his ability to work with groups, with the public, and manage to gather support and followers for his approach. He has to be able to divest himself of the need to maintain and build power and administration, because "...energies of a man or administration may be absorbed in simply maintaining vested interests. Similarly, great size requires 'system,' and system, once established, may easily become an end in itself."⁷³

An administrator of a correctional agency is caught in the dilemma of punishment vs. rehabilitation that society thrusts upon him due to its ambivalent attitude toward the delinquent. He is torn between many opposing forces. Miller

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid., p. 508.

suggests that many administrators try to solve this dilemma by relating "...to the mechanisms of the bureaucracy and keep it smooth running with virtually no feeling of moral dissonance provided one keeps ignorant of his population."⁷⁴

However, the administrator who identifies with the humanity of his clients "...faces the problem of maintaining his integrity and not believing or internalizing the roles he is forced to play."⁷⁵ Miller further states that the administrator involved in reform has to have "...a sense of process and a capacity for informed loneliness."⁷⁶ He also says that the best defense against what he sees as the co-opting influence of the system was to remain naive: "To fight naively is perhaps the best after all--if one can survive."⁷⁷ This acknowledgement of the dilemma--Miller's own dilemma--a man in the system seeking to destroy it--is an acknowledgement which can set the change agent of a correctional agency apart, and makes him lonely.

In conclusion, youth correctional reform is a complex phenomenon, because it must deal with not only the delinquent and his needs, the correctional institutions and their interest in the status quo, but it also must relate to society's basic

⁷⁴Jerome G. Miller, "Corrections: Reform or Retrenchment," unpublished paper (1972), p. 4.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Ibid.

moral and social stance. Any administrator of a correctional agency involved in change becomes the central figure balancing those forces supporting change and those opposing it.

C H A P T E R I I I

METHODOLOGY

In speaking of substantive reform in corrections, there are serious problems in dealing with the realities of the situation since people often prefer to hear myths -- and the truth in this area reflects so deeply in ourselves. There is no such thing as objectivity in talking of "treatment" of the offender -- since any such treatment rebounds immediately to one's own personal self-concept -- and ultimately affects (the) fabric of cohesion in the society.

--Jerome G. Miller

As stated in Chapter I, the intent of the study is to describe the process of change in the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services, and analyze the strategies used during the changeover from institutions to community-based alternatives.

This chapter will describe methods and procedures and will detail sources of data employed in writing this descriptive case study. The primary method used by the investigator was that of a participant-observer. During three years of the changeover process described herein, the investigator held the position of assistant commissioner at DYS. This involved long-range as well as day-to-day

decision-making, overseeing the evaluation of the various programs, and generally functioning near the top of a bureaucracy as it went through radical reorganization.

This is not to say that this investigation is based on purely experiential data. A grasp of the theoretical material, as described in Chapter II, was a prerequisite to understanding and performing the tasks required by the position of assistant commissioner, and it provides the theoretical framework for this descriptive study.

This investigator also recognizes the limitations imposed by his position, as described in Chapter I. In order to gain objective perspective on the problems under study, the author made: (1) an extensive search of the literature dealing with the subject being studied, as presented in Chapter II; (2) carried out on-going discussions and consultations with many professionals and academics in the youth corrections field; and (3) organized a national conference on the closing down of institutions and the exploration of new alternatives.¹ These actions broadened the author's understanding of DYS processes of change and

¹See Proceedings of the Conference, The Commonwealth of Massachusetts: The Closing down of Institutions and New Strategies for Youth Services, June 1972.

gave him a base and framework for gathering and analyzing the data.

Data were gathered from several basic sources:

- A. Investigative documents and reports written about DYS's operations by outside groups or agencies.
- B. Internal reports and documents written by the department. This includes the department's annual reports, reorganizational plans, evaluation reports written by DYS staff and by consultants hired by the department, and the department's projected five-year plan.
- C. Reports and documents written by the Harvard Center for Criminal Justice. This center has been studying the reorganization of the department and the impact of new policies and programs introduced by Commissioner Miller. Their documents include annual reports as well as articles analyzing the process of deinstitutionalization and its impact.
- D. Newspaper articles, accounts and editorials covering the period prior to the reorganization as well as extensive reporting of the period

throughout and after the change (see Appendix A and Appendix F).

- E. Observations made by the investigator. The position held by the investigator allowed him to gather data through numerous visits to these institutions, participating in regular meetings held in the department's administrative offices, and receiving regular verbal accounts from staff and consultants operating in the field.

By holding the position of assistant commissioner in DYS, the investigator was privy to much inside information. The investigator began working in the department in September 1970, and was in charge of institutions until their closing early in 1972. After that, he was involved in developing an intensive-security unit (Andros) in Roslindale (see Appendix I). After Andros was developed, the investigator assumed the responsibility for training, evaluation, and research. He developed a detailed outline and trained staff to investigate institutional alternatives developed by DYS (see Appendix I). Thus the investigator was in a key position to gather information and collect data dealing with processes of change in DYS.

Procedures used by the investigator were as follows:

- A. Visits to the institutions, detention centers, and group homes on a regular basis.
- B. Monthly meetings of all the superintendents, which were held throughout 1970 until the institutions were closed. These meetings were chaired by the investigator.
- C. The investigator hired consultants throughout the period 1971-1972. These consultants were involved in three basic functions: program assessment, training, and technical assistance (see D).
- D. The investigator hired and trained a staff for the purpose of providing program assessment and evaluation. The data gathered by the staff were extremely valuable. The written reports and accounts were as follows:
 1. report of the processes of change in Lancaster Training School, recorded by Frederick J. Thacher;²
 2. observational accounts of the cottages and group homes established on the institutional

² See Frederick J. Thacher, "Implementing Changes in a Training School for Girls".

grounds in Shirley, Lancaster, and Lyman Schools. These observational reports were written by Alexandra Thacher, an experienced social worker, and they covered the period from June to August 1971 (see Appendix H).

3. Systematic evaluation of all new programs at DYS and purchase-of-care alternatives begun under the investigator's supervision in September 1972. The evaluation teams conducted more than 15 evaluations by February 15, 1973, submitting written and verbal reports (see Appendix G).

Being in the midst of putting theory into practice, and then writing about it in a formal manner, had certain drawbacks. The richness of the data available made it imperative for the investigator to develop a rigorous conceptual framework by which he could assess and discriminate between information relevant to the study and extraneous data. The investigator had to weigh the material carefully against the study's objective of analyzing the departmental strategies inducive to change.

But by combining the two elements -- theory and experience -- it is hoped that the final product is rendered

more meaningful to those who want to investigate how one bureaucracy was radically altered.

The findings of this study are presented in Chapters IV and V. Chapter VI will summarize these findings with conclusions and implications to follow.

CHAPTER IV

THE CHANGE PROCESSES IN DYS, 1969-1973

What is possible in a certain hour and what is impossible cannot be adequately ascertained by any foreknowledge.... One must start at any given time from the nature of the situation in so far as it is at all recognizable. But one does not learn the nature and limit of what is attainable in a desired direction otherwise than through going in this direction. The forces of the soul allow themselves to be measured only through ones using them.

--Martin Buber, Pointing the Way

Introduction

This chapter deals with the processes of change introduced into DYS under the leadership of Commissioner Miller. To establish the context for change and to introduce the major themes in the change process, the chapter begins with an historical review of DYS. Following sections will discuss in detail the successive phases of department development: the pressure for change; trial changes; the closing of institutions; and the creation of alternatives. The chapter will close by reviewing current status and future directions.

Historical Review

The Youth Service Board (YSB) was created in 1948 by a legislative act, as a quasi-judicial tribunal with responsibilities of classifying, placing, training, and

supervising adjudicated delinquents committed to the board by the courts.¹ This act removed the authority for sentencing a youth from the presiding judge and placed the case in the hands of YSB. In 1952 another legislative act changed YSB into the Division of Youth Services, under the direction of the State Department of Education, but not subject to its control. The director of the division, John Coughlin, was responsible for making all decisions pertaining to the treatment, custody, and parole of youthful offenders.

While these legislative acts provided a mandate for change, no reform followed. Instead, the various studies and investigative commissions that reviewed the division's operation described the agency as stultified by the rigid enforcement of outmoded practices, and one which lagged far behind other states in establishing progressive programs for the youth in its care.

Three important studies were conducted during 1965-1967 that gave a detailed analysis of DYS's operation.² These studies criticized the administrative structure of the division for investing too much authority and responsibility

¹This historical review is based primarily on Edwin Powers, The Basic Structure of the Administration of Criminal Justice in Massachusetts; and U.S., Department of Health, Education and Welfare (hereafter cited as HEW), A Study of the Division of Youth Services and Youth Service Board.

²U.S., HEW, A Study of the Division of Youth Services; Massachusetts Committee on Children and Youth: Report and Recommendations of the Massachusetts Committee on Children and Youth; Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Report of the Special Committee of the Senate to make an Investigation and Study of the Division of Youth Services.

in one man. The previous director had failed to delegate responsibility to his staff in the central office, yet at the same time had allowed the different institutions and detention centers to become relatively autonomous. They were free to do their own hiring and firing, and to develop their own programs without the direct supervision of the central administration. Even budget appropriations were made on an institution-by-institution basis.³

In 1969 the division operated five large training schools, the Lyman School for Boys (ages 12-15), the Shirley Industrial School for Boys (ages 15-17), the Oakdale Residential Treatment Unit for Boys (ages 9-11), the Lancaster Industrial School for Girls (all ages), and the Bridgewater Guidance Center, a maximum-security unit. The division also operated four regional detention centers: two in the Boston area, one for girls at South Huntington Avenue and one for boys in Roslindale; the third was a co-educational center in Worcester; and the fourth was in the western part of the state, Westfield (see Appendix B).

These facilities, with the exception of the two detention centers, Worcester and Westfield, operated on a custodial, training-school model for the treatment of the children in their custody. They were mostly outmoded, uncoordinated, with idiosyncratic management and only sporadic links to

³U.S., HEW, A Study of the Division of Youth Services, Part I, p. 5.

other social services. Their communication with the division at large was almost nonexistent. The institutions themselves were hidden either in suburban or rural locations and were isolated from outsiders, and very often were subject to the influences of local patronage.

Programs in the institutions were poor.⁴ There were no certified academic or educational programs, and vocational training was limited, offering youths outmoded skills that would provide little opportunity for future employment.⁵ Clinical services were also almost nonexistent because of the lack of professional staff.⁶ Those who were hired as clinicians spent their time producing reports at the reception centers, which were unlikely to be used for classification or treatment, since the children were assigned to the different institutions according to age rather than their needs. In addition, staff members were untrained, unskilled, and unlikely to learn because they ranged in age between 40 and 60 years old (see Appendix B).

The treatment of youths inside the institutions was at best custodial and at worst punitive and repressive. Marching, shaved heads, and enforced periods of long silence were regular occurrences. Punitive staff used force; they made recalcitrant children drink water from toilets, or scrub

⁴Ibid., Part IV, pp. 46-52.

⁵Ibid., Part IV, p. 47.

⁶Ibid., Part IV, pp. 34-38.

floors on their hands and knees for hours on end. Solitary confinement was also used extensively and rationalized as a mode of treatment for those who needed it (see Appendix C). It must be noted that the children who happened to be sent to the Worcester or Westfield Detention Centers were treated more humanely and were involved in much richer programs.

The communication between the various offices of the division was almost nil. The offices of parole, after-care, clinical services, educational services, and so on, each operated autonomously, with no coordination and with little knowledge of what was going on in other parts of the system. The most disjointed and incoherent part was the parole system, which lacked accountability and supervision and, by and large, operated as a police model rather than as an advocate for the youths.

This system, with its retributive and custodial orientation, produced many angry youngsters whose attempts to strike back at the system by stealing cars, theft, or running away brought them further trouble with the law. A high percentage of the division's children started their career as truants, runaways, or on "stubborn child" charges, and ended up a few years later diagnosed and labelled as "habitual runners," "assaultive," "violent," or "hard-core." They thus became the victims of a vicious spiral, ending up in adult correctional institutions.⁷

⁷ (See Recidivism Study Appendix D)

The department's image in the eyes of professionals, judges, the press, and the youths in its care was associated with repression and punishment. The image was most vividly described in a cartoon by SZEP in the Boston Globe (April 21, 1967) showing the previous director, holding chains and handcuffs, complaining, "They're breaking up that old gang of mine," referring to Buryl Cohen's critical report following an investigation of the Division of Youth Services (see Appendix A).

Pressure for Change

From the mid-1960's on, the Division of Youth Services was subjected to increasing pressure for change by the legislature, the public, the media, and professional and civic associations. This external pressure led directly to the legislative reorganization of the division and to Jerome Miller's appointment as commissioner, and contributed in no small measure to the accomplishments of his administration. Since widespread support for reform, and Miller's skillful use of that support, played so important a role in the DYS change process, this section is devoted to an examination of its sources, forms, and influence.

In Massachusetts as elsewhere, the training schools have been a deservedly popular target for the reform-minded since the mid-nineteenth century. But they have also demonstrated the bureaucracy's renowned ability to close ranks and weather passing storms of criticism. What seems

to have made the difference in Massachusetts was that by the sixties, conditions in the system had deteriorated to an almost pathological state. Once a leader in youth services, Massachusetts had evolved one of the worst systems in the country.

The most telling measure of effectiveness--recidivism--was estimated to have reached 86 percent,⁸ corruption was widely suspected and frequently proven. In the state's three large training schools and other facilities with no academic, vocational, or even recreational programs, discipline became the watchword. Punishment for offenses against discipline ranged from denial of privileges, to solitary confinement in the "lock-up," to brutal beatings by guards. The ratio of custodial to professional staff in the department was 22 to 1, most of whom were protected from review, promotion, or demotion by civil service or political cronyism.⁹ The institutions had almost universally hostile relations with surrounding communities, in part because they were obvious "warehouses" for the children of the poor.¹⁰

These and other weaknesses of the system were documented by a series of reports, investigations, and exposes, coming with increasing frequency and effectiveness. The most

⁸There are no exact official estimates. See Appendix D.

⁹U.S., HEW, Study of the Division of Youth Services, Part VI, p. 18.

¹⁰Planning Unit, DYS, Programs and Policies of the Department of Youth Services, pp. 5-6.

comprehensive report was done by HEW at Governor John Volpe's request.¹¹ In 1965, the Children's Bureau of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the division for the governor's office.¹²

The scathing findings and recommendations of the HEW study were withheld for almost a year until discovered and exposed by the Boston Globe in 1967.¹³ The disclosure of the HEW report prompted a new wave of studies both by public bodies, e.g., the Massachusetts Committee on Crime and Youth and by private groups such as the Friends of Youth Association and the Parent Teachers Association (see Appendix A). The Massachusetts Legislature conducted hearings to review the policies of the division and to consider new legislation; the Governor appointed a blue-ribbon panel to review all aspects of the HEW report and to conduct a definitive investigation of the division.

During this period the press also lent its support to the campaign for change through numerous editorials and reports, including several "undercover" stories written by reporters who had gained positions in various institutions. The keynote of the media case for reform was the simple and

¹¹U.S., HEW, Study of the Division of Youth Services.

¹²For a summary of this report see Appendix B.

¹³Boston Globe, July 15, 1967.

dramatic issue of humane treatment. "Simply 'caging children,' as Governor Sargent so aptly put it, 'is not the way of an enlightened society.'"¹⁴ Less visible but certainly present in the popularization of the reform movement were the various other charges of the division's critics, such as civil service formalization and protection of political appointees; centralized and undelegated power in the hands of the director; poor coordination among institutions, and a developing autonomy and lack of control within institutions; lack of effective therapeutic and educational programs at the institutions, and very few qualified professionals to staff them.¹⁵

Naturally the division's senior staff defended the system against the growing pressure for change, but the division's critics were apparently correct in citing a breakdown in leadership as a serious problem. While it is difficult to single out a particular event as the one that catalyzed the reform movement into legislative action, certainly the most likely candidate was an internal division dispute. Institutional superintendents enjoyed considerable authority over their own staff, and autonomy from other institutions and the central office. Each institution had its own state-appropriated budget and personnel, and did its own hiring and purchasing. Few institutional decisions were

¹⁴Ibid., March 27, 1969; see Appendix A.

¹⁵U.S., HEW, Study of the Division of Youth Services.

beyond the personal control of a superintendent. At the Bridgewater Juvenile Guidance Institute, a conflict developed between the superintendent and assistant superintendent, which involved the reform of the installation's maximum-security practices. Supported by the director of the division, John Coughlin, the superintendent brought charges against the assistant, who appealed to the Civil Service Board. In a much-publicized hearing, the assistant successfully defended his case and was reinstated. Responding to the public outcry against the division's leadership, Governor Sargent pressured Coughlin to resign, Coughlin submitted his resignation in March 1969, effective in May.

While the political battle over reorganization did not end with Coughlin's resignation, the Bridgewater incident and its aftermath did seem to mark a turning point for the reform cause. In May a panel established by the Massachusetts Conference on Social Welfare called for still more resignations of senior staff members and the closing of several facilities. Governor Sargent appointed a former professor of the Boston University School of Social Work, Frank Maloney, as acting director of the division, and lent his support to a reorganization bill pending in the legislature. While reorganization had been debated in legislature since the 1967 HEW report and a succeeding senate committee investigation, the bill now moved easily through the senate and house.¹⁶

¹⁶Massachusetts General Laws, Volume 2A, Chapters 13-28; Department of Youth Services, Chapter 18A, as Amended by Chapter 838 of the Acts of 1969.

Opposition was based principally on the argument that "decision-making powers" would be taken "away from a trained and experienced board and given to 'clinicians.'"¹⁷ A preliminary House vote of 211 to 5 in early July, however, demonstrated the weakness of the opposition. Throughout July, Boston newspapers maintained the momentum of the reform movement. For example, the Globe described the institutions as a "mess," "antiquated," "old," and "dreary," all under the headline "There's No Lobby for the Outcasts."¹⁸ When the Governor signed the Reorganization Act in August, it was in much the same form as presented by the Massachusetts Committee on Crime and Youth several months before.

The Reorganization Act had several impacts, some of them subtle and not foreseen at the time of its enactment. First of all, the bill's very passage increased the credibility and visibility of the reform movement. Second, the Act elevated the division to the full status of a department, and moved it from the Department of Education to a superagency, consisting of Welfare, Health, Mental Health, and Corrections. The new department (DYS) was to be headed by a commissioner and four assistant commissioners of his choosing. Third, the Act set a new professional tone for the agency, using key words such as therapy, prevention, community services, purchase of services, and research. Finally, the

¹⁷Boston Herald-Traveler, June 4, 1969.

¹⁸Boston Globe, July 14, 1969.

Act broadly empowered the new department to establish necessary facilities for detention, diagnosis, treatment and training of its charges, including post-release care. While these powers in themselves did not mark a major new thrust, the language of the Act later proved sufficient grounds for Commissioner Miller and his assistants to implement a noninstitutional system.

The intent of the Act was clearly reflected in the search for a director. The search panel consisted chiefly of professionals such as Lloyd Ohlin, head of the Harvard Center for Criminal Justice. They in turn looked for a fellow professional capable of upgrading the department. While the panel officially did not rule out the possibility of choosing a new director from within the ranks of the department, it was expected that an outsider would be selected. Three months after the reorganization bill had passed, Jerome Miller was the leading candidate. His training at the Ohio State University School of Social Work and his experience in the military, developing a youth services agency for Air Force dependents, met both academic and pragmatic criteria. Governor Sargent confirmed Miller as the first commissioner of the department of Youth Services on October 28, 1969.

To sum up, the movement for reform of the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services was prompted by outrage at the high human and financial costs of operating an almost pathologically ineffective system. The movement was external; it had little support among DYS staff, and next to none among

the leadership, who did not succeed in defending the system against change. In fact, a leadership breakdown was the catalyst for legislative reorganization of DYS and a search for a new director.

The thrust of the campaign for change was more humane treatment for children, not a set of specific reforms. This thrust was sustained in the Reorganization Act, which broadly charged the department with improving services to youth, and in the composition and activities of the search panel, which sought a commissioner qualified to upgrade the department. The role of the commissioner, then, was all but explicitly defined as that of an outside change agent who would reform the department from the top down. The mandate of the new commissioner and his assistants, however, was not necessarily to close institutions and to develop radically new systems for the prevention and treatment of delinquency, but simply to better the quality of services to youth committed to the department.

Trial Changes

When Miller came to DYS in 1969, he found an agency in turmoil, divided internally by critical reports and external political conflicts. He found massive public support from reform groups and professional organizations, and encountered high expectations from the press and the legislature for a professional upgrading of the system. Miller, however, found no funds for experimentation, training, or research, and

political appointees were still in command of the institutions.

During his first year in office, Miller attempted to prepare the system for change by hiring consultants to provide staff training and to introduce new concepts. He was supported in his efforts by many of the younger staff in the department. His aim was to introduce therapeutic community concepts within the institutions. He invited Dr. Maxwell Jones, a British expert on the therapeutic model, to start a pilot training program at the Shirley Industrial School for Boys. Jones' therapeutic community concepts are intended to alter the traditional passive role of the "inmate" or "client" through a process of active resocialization, in which roles are broken down and relationships become more equalized among staff and between staff and residents.

The therapeutic community approach also intends to promote a close and trusting relationship between staff and the youths in order to promote growth and a process of self-actualization in both residents and staff.¹⁹

Introducing these concepts in the Shirley structure brought immediate polarization, created staff tensions, and resulted in mass escapes. The older staff, who were by-and-large unskilled, found these new concepts a threat, and a challenge to their authority. The new staff had difficulty integrating these concepts into the daily operations of the

¹⁹Maxwell Jones, Social Psychiatry: A Study of Therapeutic Communities; Beyond the Therapeutic Community: Social Learning and Social Psychiatry.

institution without further training and support. This resulted in a number of legislative investigations and further staff entrenchment;²⁰ hence Miller's initial effort was unsuccessful. He would later become aware that he had to change the system "without blowing it."²¹ In mid-1971 he decided to slowly phase out the Shirley facility. This decision was made with the support of his assistant commissioners and was accomplished by moving several of the cottage residents to other institutions and by using staff housing to operate group homes.

The Maxwell Jones training sessions provoked further resistance. They symbolized the beginning of a strong and visible staff alienation, which created additional pressures on the system. Some of this resistance became overt, as in the writing to state legislators and the press, as well as covert sabotage, such as inducing runaways, work stoppages, misuse of sick leaves, and early retirements. However, these staff confrontations had a limited negative impact on the department, because they were skillfully used by Miller to justify setbacks and program failures. Thus, they elicited sympathetic support from the press and reform groups (see Appendix F).

Lacking resources and middle-management personnel,

²⁰The Commonwealth of Massachusetts: Report of the Special House Committee to Investigate and Study the Number, Causes and Prevention of Runaways from the Industrial School for Boys at Shirley, House No. 6152 (Aug., 1970).

²¹Boston Globe, March 8, 1970.

Miller's first year, despite its chaos, was effective in three different ways. First, he provided the rhetoric and the tone for later reform through his public appearances, press releases, and lectures around the state (see Appendix E). During his lectures, Miller was very often accompanied by youngsters from the institutions, who described their experiences and attacked the system they had been a part of.

Second, he used his administrative power to change and to rotate top administrators in the different institutions. Shirley's administrators were changed several times, as were those at Bridgewater and Lyman. These changes broke staff opposition and kept the process of change on the move.

Third, he introduced humanizing effects into the system through administrative orders. He prohibited staff from striking children, from the excessive use of lock-ups, haircuts, marching, or imposing silences.²² Despite staff resentment, these measures had a certain degree of success, especially in those institutions where changes in administrations had taken place. Lastly, Miller closed down the maximum-security unit at Bridgewater in the late spring of 1970.

Even though this was expected, the action was extremely significant in several ways. There was no alternative institution available to take its place, and Miller actively began to advocate that there was no need for one to take its

²²Barry C. Feld, "Variations of Inmate Subcultures in Juvenile Correctional Institutions," (unpublished paper), Center for Criminal Justice, Harvard Law School.

place. Bridgewater had been the "end of the line" for juvenile offenders and had always been used as the ultimate threat by the other facilities in DYS. Without this threat, institutions were forced to find better solutions and to operate more effectively and independently. Most importantly, this decision provided a direction for the "new" department. Miller discovered the strategy he was to use in the future, and that the closing down of an institution can work without insurmountable problems.

On the program level, Miller had few community-based innovative successes to show for his first year in office. The Mary Knoll facility at Topsfield, which was to be used as a teach-in center, faced so much community opposition that it did not get off the ground. Therapeutic community concepts had also created staff turmoil, and funding for parole volunteers and other community-based programs did not materialize.

Incremental Changes and Innovations

With the appointment of four professionally trained assistant commissioners, each in charge of his respective bureau, the department moved into the second year, which was to see major innovations and program changes. The highlights are as follows:

1. On the institutional level, several structural changes were introduced, all geared to create a decentralized cottage-based system, and to promote

staff and youth involvement in the decision-making process.²³

2. Oakdale, a custodial-oriented institution for the youngest youths (aging from 9 to 11) was closed in March, 1971. After half the children had been placed in private residences, the remainder were transferred to the Lancaster School for Girls, where they became involved in a unique program designed for them by the staff and girls at the school. The young boys' presence at the school created a number of program alternatives for the school, and mutual involvement of the girls in working with the boys' program (see Appendix H).
3. With the availability of a federal grant, a staff training program began. Several teams, which included both the old and young staff, received training in counseling and operating a group home. The training sessions also prepared the staff to work with the hard-core youngster in the care of the department.
4. Extensive group home experimentation began in early 1971. Hyde Park House, a self-help center, opened in Roslindale, housing nine youngsters. Six group

²³Barry C. Feld, "Subcultures of Selected Boys' Cottages in Massachusetts Department of Youth Services Institutions in 1971," unpublished paper, Center for Criminal Justice, Harvard Law School, October 1972.

homes were started on institutional grounds using available staff housing. Group homes such as "Mary Lamb" and "I Belong" were extremely successful in producing good programs, and served as an example for additional programs in the department.

5. A parole volunteer program was funded, giving the parole operation a much needed boost.
6. Western Massachusetts received a strong impetus toward the creation of program alternatives from the involvement of the University of Massachusetts, which provided the Westfield Detention Center with on-going consultation, student volunteers, and increased staff training.²⁴
7. Regionalization began to take hold. Nine regional directors were hired, and reorganizing staff to man the regional offices was in process.

The Closing Down of Institutions

Despite these changes, Miller and the department were under increasing pressure from different directions. The hiring of new and young staff at the institutions increased polarization, with the "old guard" building up more and more opposition. Institutional staff opposed to the new approach became demoralized, restive, and fearful about losing their

²⁴For a detailed description of programs originated at the University of Massachusetts in collaboration with DYS, see: Lary L. Dye, "The University's Role in Public Service to the Department of Youth Services."

jobs. Most important, the youngsters themselves were caught in the middle between dying institutions and alternatives yet unborn. Services to them suffered accordingly. Staff continued to be underpaid, and most lost hope for advancement when the department decided to pursue purchase-of-care services from outside, private groups. Changes at the institutional level increased runaways, and with them increased opposition from the local communities and pressure from the legislature. In addition, there was a growing bureaucratic force exerted on the department from the Administration and Finance Office because it regarded the changes in youth services as chaotic and administratively lax.

The decision to close the institutions was made amid all these pressures, and despite the havoc it initially created, the shutdown was extremely successful in defusing the bigger threat, that of staff unrest, of political opposition, and of local community resistance.

The department abandoned gradualism, for it only provided causes and more time for political opposition to form in the legislature. During the January 1972 legislative recess, Miller used his commissioner's discretionary powers to officially close the institutions. Youngsters who could not be immediately paroled, placed, or referred to community programs were housed temporarily on the campus of the University of Massachusetts.

This operation was called the JOE II conference, and was essentially planned and executed by a core group of the

university's volunteers and regional DYS staff. The operation, in spite of many administrative problems, was successful, in that it made the closing of the largest and oldest institution, the Lyman School for Boys, relatively painless for the youngsters involved, since this method eliminated staff opposition and sabotage. The 100 youths, who stayed for about a month on the university campus, were matched with youth advocates while arrangements were made for them to be placed in community-based programs, preferably in their home regions.²⁵

The closing of institutions was an act that overshadowed all other accomplishments and incremental changes. It had a very important psychological impact. First, it set the tone and clearly defined the task for the year 1972. After initial staff bewilderment and surprise, energies were released toward the creation of alternatives. Groups began to develop proposals; resources were found; and children filled these placements at an accelerated rate. There was a new goal, a new task, and a new hope. Second, it gave Miller and the department national recognition. Numerous newspaper articles and several television networks covered the series of events, and the department was described by them as a bold, action-oriented agency willing to take risks to ameliorate the deplorable conditions of training schools for youth offenders (see Appendix F). In professional circles,

²⁵Robert B. Coates, Alden D. Miller and Lloyd E. Ohlin, "A Strategic Innovation in the Process of Deinstitutionalization."

this action was described as a new breakthrough in providing services for youth in trouble. Third, the drama involved in the closing of the oldest training school in the country, Lyman, effectively attracted public attention and brought about much public debate and edification. Finally, the closing of Lyman symbolized the end of punitive and repressive institutions even though other facilities in the state remained open, waiting to be phased out in the near future. It was as if all the institutions had been closed.

In retrospect, this move succeeded for several reasons:

1. The University of Massachusetts and the western region of the DYS provided a good cushion to absorb youngsters, and moreover proved to be a rich resource for program alternatives.²⁶
2. Forestry camps and Outward Bound type programs were very effective in handling and providing programs for DYS youths.²⁷
3. Detention centers were still available to accommodate youngsters who were awaiting placements or were in need of them.²⁸

²⁶Larry L. Dye, "The University's Role in Public Service to the Department of Youth Services."

²⁷These programs expanded since Miller became the DYS Commissioner. For a report see Jerome G. Miller: "Report to the Governor and General Court, for period 1 November, 1969 to November, 1970."

²⁸Roslindale, Worcester and Westfield detention centers were open and overpopulated. William Madaus, Assistant Commissioner for clinical services estimates that detention centers' population more than doubled with the closing of institutions.

4. An intensive-care unit, Andros, was immediately opened at Roslindale. This unit, which later was staffed primarily by ex-offenders, was able to work effectively with hard-core youngsters, and thus gave the court the assurance that the dangerous youngsters were not in the streets (see Appendix I).
5. The publicity that the closing of institutions generated caught the attention of many groups who proved to be resources for the department and the developers of its alternatives (see Appendix G).

The closing of institutions, however, did not lack critics from outside and inside the department. Opponents of reform talked about an increase in the crime rate and the loss of community protection. The old guard was concerned with job security and other vested interests. Supporters of reform were afraid of a possible backlash over critical incidents that might set reform backward. There were others within the agency who doubted the department's administrative capabilities to withstand such a change and feared further bureaucratic entanglements.

Creation of New Alternatives

Within twelve months after the department's catalyzing decision, the new approach of DYS was generally functioning quite well. The approach has three major thrusts: (1) Therapeutic and humane homes rather than custodial and punitive institutions; (2) small community-based residential

and non-residential programs instead of the large institutions; (3) purchase of services from private community groups rather than state operation of all programs.

What evolved is a network of projects that are publicly supported and supervised, but privately operated and coordinated on a regional basis through the department's regional offices. Approximately 1200 youths are committed each year to the care of the department. This figure fluctuates, and is declining in the face of increased court referrals (referrals put the child in the temporary care of the court, but do not result in the stigmatizing "criminal record" attached to commitment). Presently, department-committed and -referred youth occupy the following placements: 500 are in group homes; 190 are in foster homes; 150 are in specialized residential placements (private schools, private psychiatric hospitals, etc.); 600 participate in some day-care program, which may be educational, recreational, or involve individual or family counseling.²⁹

The department contends that few more than 5 percent of the youths placed in its care require security surroundings. For those youths who do require high security, the department purchases services from a private organization that occupies one of the old detention buildings owned by the state. This program treats approximately 35-40 youths at any one time (see Appendix I).

²⁹See Appendix G and DYS Annual Report, 1971-72, p. 40.

In detention (youths awaiting trial), the department has greatly reduced populations within closed facilities, and aims to eliminate closed detention for all but the most severely disturbed. The department has developed shelter-care detention facilities, structured much like small group homes, which support detained youths pending trial and assist in pre-trial casework investigations. Neighborhood YMCA facilities have been used to establish local detention programs. And foster homes have been rented to provide spaces for a certain percentage of detained youths. All these services have been established regionally according to need, and may be expanded in the future. As of January 1973, the department operates ten shelter-care detention facilities, cooperates with five local YMCA programs, and uses twenty-one foster placements for detention. It should be noted that with the cooperation of the courts and the court liaison personnel, some youths are sent home as an alternative to what in the past would have been to closed detention.³⁰

For those youths who need residential care, possibilities include short-term group homes (3-4 months), long-term group homes (1-2 years), drug halfway houses, foster homes, private boarding schools, and intensive private psychiatric hospitals. Many youths do not need residential programs, and can function successfully with day-care counseling and support. Others

³⁰DYS Annual Report 1971-72, pp. 23-30.

need only jobs or job training, or special educational help.³¹

Group homes provide the largest share of residential treatment. With few exceptions, they offer group and individual therapy, and a limited number supply family and casework therapy. All group homes offer an educational program in some form. A large portion operate their own on-grounds schools with private tutorial assistance. The remainder utilize existing schools in the community with or without providing private tutorial assistance. Vocational training and employment is emphasized in some (see Appendix G).

The thirteen LEAA-funded group homes comprise a separate category of short-term care. All have some form of group, individual, or family therapy. All emphasize education and provide individualized tutorial assistance. While some operate schools on their own grounds, others use local schools. All provide some form of recreational program.³²

Group homes often specialize in particular problems, and are contracted accordingly for particular children. Twenty-seven group facilities specialize in emotionally disturbed youths across a wide range, from mild disturbances to severe emotional disturbances and character disorders. Seven group homes specialize in mentally retarded youngsters, and fourteen specialize in drug rehabilitation. In the latter category, treatment modalities range from the Synanon

³¹See Appendix G and DYS Annual Report 1971-72, p. 39.

³²DYS Annual Report, 1971-72, p. 42.

treatment model to primal scream therapy. Nearly all the drug therapy programs either provide individual, group, or family therapy. Fourteen residential schools and academies are used for the specially academically talented youths in the care of the department. Three homes provide services for girls whose needs may include support during pregnancy, and placements are arranged with the American School for the Deaf and the Devereaux School for the handicapped and multihandicapped (see Appendix G).

From May 1972 to October 1972, the number of foster-home placements used by the department more than doubled, from 85 to 189 homes.³³ This increase reflected not only the department's overall intention to expand foster placements, but was partly a function of several new uses of foster-care treatment. Under the Equal Employment Act (federal funding), the department hired eighteen people to make their homes available, with foster care, for both committed and detained youths. And twenty-one foster homes have been developed for youths awaiting trial, as an alternative to closed detention (see Appendix I).

Non-residential placements, as of October 1972, served 616 youths across the state.³⁴ These services vary from community-college educational programs to intensive counseling, and may occupy from a few hours to an entire day, one or more

³³DYS Annual Report, 1971-72, p. 46.

³⁴See Appendix G and Ibid., p. 47.

days per week. Some of the programs are intensive summer programs, which provide followup work once the children are back in the regular public school session. Examples of the programs utilized include Neighborhood Youth Corps, Catholic Charities, local drug councils, and others. One of the most successful programs purchased by the department in this area is the Community Aftercare Program, a private nonprofit corporation that provides counseling and activities directed by university student volunteers. This program is particularly active in the metropolitan areas where there is a large resource of university students, and many needy urban children that will benefit from their services (see Appendix G).

Current Status and Future Directions

The DYS has now successfully captured the national spotlight. Its image has improved radically. It has also moved from a secretive and inward-looking department to an open and visible agency. The new role the department has written for itself is one of an advocate for its youths. There are many new groups, both professional and para-professional, working with the department and thereby improving its professional image. The purchase-of-care arrangement forced the department to totally restructure its role and function. It moved away from service delivery as its major function to assume the role of a monitor and evaluator of the services being provided.

The role of the youngster in the department's care has

also changed radically, moving from the role of "inmate"--the passive recipient of rules and "treatments"--to a legitimate role as a client in a system, with rights and partnership. Placement decisions now involve the youths. Their constant presence in the central and regional offices is indicative of this new involvement, and thus they have become an active part in the decision-making process.

The department's planning unit anticipates that the number of youths committed to the department in 1973 will remain at about the same level, approximately 1,200 youths, primarily as a result of DYS efforts to divert youths through court liaison officers, using LEAA "impact funds" to implement court-based diversion and referral. The department projects that the number of youths referred to DYS will increase from about 350 in 1972 to 900 in 1973.³⁵

The number of youths discharged from DYS is projected to remain about the same as in 1972, reflecting the new department policy to keep youths on an inactive list, rather than discharging them. (This retains departmental jurisdiction over a youth to the age of 21.)³⁶

The current "mix" of placement resources faces expansion in the area of intensive, foster, and day-care programs; secure detention and group-care resources are expected to be

³⁵DYS Planning Unit, "Department of Youth Services Comprehensive Plan: 1972-1976," p. 24.

³⁶Ibid., p. 25.

decreased, and forestry, shelter-care and foster-care detention will remain at their current levels. The program mix (see Table 1) will broaden the types of services available, but stay within the fiscal constraints imposed by the state (the department's projected budget, 1973, for purchased services, totals \$8,347,000.)

Table 1

Shift In Available Treatment Slots, 1972-73 Planned

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
Foster Care	200	500
Intensive Care	36	70
Group Care	500	200
Day Care	600	1000
Secure Detention	95	45
Forestry	30	30
Shelter Care	125	125
Foster Care	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Totals	1,686 slots	2,070 slots

It is important to note from the figures in Table 1 the drastic shift in focus away from the institutional system. The reform school, in effect, forced "intensive" treatment on all the children, though the effects more closely approached intensive mistreatment. Now, more than 50 percent of the children under the department's care at any one time will be receiving day care. Nearly 25 percent will receive foster care, and only approximately 5 percent will receive intensive, confined treatment. By limiting closed detention, the department forces expedient placement of youth. By

limiting intensive treatment alternatives, the department forces courts and placement personnel to seek treatment plans across the spectrum of possibilities before incarceration is considered. And by more than doubling foster care the department makes more available the most individual and personalized placement alternative.

To sum up, the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services represents an impressive breakthrough in Juvenile Corrections, because it has radically departed from traditional approaches in two significant ways. It was the first state in the nation to close down its institutions for delinquent youth without any major repercussions, and it has developed many innovative and promising programs for its troubled youth without major increases in its budget or personnel.

If this department can survive the test of time and prove to be effective in delinquency control, there is no doubt that Massachusetts will bring an immense amount of pressure on other states to follow in its path.

CHAPTER V

STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE

For the immediate future, the basic problem is not one of finding alternative or new technical approaches to the treatment and rehabilitation of the offender.... The problem is whether society has evolved to a point where it is able to tolerate defining delinquents and criminals in terms other than those which call for the exclusion and isolation from society as the primary embodiment of public safety and the basic tool of rehabilitation. Until the ideology underlying the definitions is questioned, it matters little to the slave who runs away whether he is called "spiteful" or suffering from drapetomania (a 19th century medical diagnosis for runaway slaves). It matters little to the person locked alone in a stripped cell whether it is called the "hole" or the "adjustment center."

--Jerome G. Miller

In this chapter the investigator will describe and analyze strategies used by DYS under the leadership of Commissioner Miller to bring about the changes identified in Chapter IV. Two sets of strategies were used. The first set of strategies was geared to open the system. The second set of strategies was geared to change the system. An assessment of the relative success or limitation of each of these strategies will be included.

Opening the System

Miller's first year in office is noted for his effort to "open" the system--loosening up the existing rigid structure in order to make it more amenable to change.

In approaching this task, Miller had several liabilities and obstacles:

1. He was an outsider to the system and lacked support within DYS.
2. His resources were limited by lack of funds.
3. Years of institutional autonomy almost precluded any central authority's public relations intervention.

Several important strategies were employed. The following discussion will explore and assess these strategies.

Altering Communication Patterns: An important strategy used for opening the system was to increase public relations through the use of the mass media. During this early period Miller made many local television and radio broadcasts and was interviewed often by the press. He continually cast himself in the role of the outside change agent. He exposed and criticized the wrongs of the system explicitly: "We must eliminate the little totalitarian societies which dominated the juvenile institutions in the past. Most of the units were set up so that their successful kids could only function in a dictatorship."¹ At the same time he was vague about the changes he was planning to implement. In this way he gathered support for himself while depriving his opponents of a focus for opposition, keeping himself on the offensive. His image

¹Boston Globe, March 8, 1970.

developed as one of a reformer and a sensitive advocate for the needs of youth. He also exposed the internal conflicts and the staff sabotage to the press and public. He made the inner workings of the department publicly visible, and let the press and the public know that he was as concerned as they were about exposing the problems that existed.²

The result of this continuing dialogue with the public through the media was a general increase in understanding and support of Miller and his philosophy. It helped to make the public more aware of the department and its functions, and improved immensely the image of the department in the public mind. It also changed somewhat the image of a juvenile delinquent from a criminal to a victim. By exposing the injustices and brutality, more people became aware of these institutions, more people were made aware that children were being victimized instead of rehabilitated. He made the public feel responsible for allowing this sort of treatment to exist.

You can control runaways, you can produce model institutional kids by brute force and fear if that's what you want, to reassure legislators, the police or the communities. Lock doors, handcuff kids to their beds and you'll have no runs. But they will react³ when they get out; they have learned to con the adults.

Thus, a new voice came to be heard at DYS, the voice of the concerned public. Once Miller exposed the injustices of the system, he was obligated to correct them. He had the support of the public in doing this.

²For other samples of Miller's quotations in the press see Appendix F.

³Lowell Sun, June 7, 1970.

Whereas the institutions were previously autonomous, now they were becoming accountable to the central administration. Miller began to ask for written reports of any cases involving force or brutality.⁴ In the Boston Sunday Globe of March 8, 1970, he complained of the existing system: "A staff member alone was often judge, jury and prosecutor in regard to particular incidents, with facts often grossly distorted to protect the staff. From now on, I will ask for state police investigations in cases of obvious brutality." Using his authority, more intermediaries became involved in the transaction between the staff and the youth. It was no longer a closed and arbitrary system (see Appendix E).

Youth Involvement: Another useful strategy employed was the involvement of the youths in decisions affecting their lives. He toured the institutions, often appearing unexpectedly. He went directly to the young people and listened to their grievances. He found out what was really going on rather than what the staff wanted him to know. And he gave youngsters the feeling that they had an important advocate, encouraging them to call him or come to his office. Institutionalized youngsters became an important source of information to him and his staff. By making himself accessible to the resident of the institution, he was in fact

⁴Barry C. Feld, "Variations of Inmate Subcultures in Juvenile Correctional Institutions," unpublished paper, Center for Criminal Justice, Harvard Law School, p. 10.

breaking down the institutional hierarchy. The youngsters began to realize they had some recourse if they were mistreated, while the staff realized they were accountable for their actions.

One of the costs of this change was the insecurity it wrought among the staff. They were robbed of their former means of discipline without any feeling of support from the administration. This at times caused conflict, resistance, and even sabotage.⁵ It also presented problems to the middle-management personnel who had to deal with the disgruntled staff at the institutions, and whose responsibility it was to implement all the new policies. So in terms of staff unrest, the cost of this change was great (see Appendix H).

However, all of these strategies--the use of public relations, divesting the institutions of their autonomy, the breakdown of the hierarchy, and listening to the grievances of the young people, had the result of opening up the system. The staff at the institutions were now accountable to many segments of the population--the young people, the public, and the central administration.

New Concepts: Miller's attempts to open the system by introducing innovative therapeutic methods were less successful. The training sessions administered by Dr. Maxwell

⁵For a description of staff reaction to change, see the write-up in Lowell Sun by Eric Best, Appendix F.

Jones, discussed in Chapter IV, created staff polarization and resulted in mass runaways. It is important to note that these concepts proved to have many limitations for application to antiquated institutions that lacked programs, resources, and progressive young staff members.

A few months later, in mid-1970, another attempt to change was made at Shirley School. The "guided group interaction" approach was introduced by Harry Vorrath.⁶ This is a modified version of the Maxwell Jones approach, though more structured and geared to institutional settings. This approach was adopted by a group of staff from Shirley School, and was used in running an intensive-security unit at Oakdale.

Another approach that was tried, in collaboration with Dr. Mathew Dumont from the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health, was the self-help groups.⁷ The department explored these self-help programs as an alternative that would provide massive changes inside the institutions. The idea was to turn over several institutions to existing self-help groups which needed space for their own operations. They would in turn accept DYS youngsters into their programs. These groups held high promise for radically altering service delivery practices in the department for several reasons: (1) They

⁶Harry H. Vorrath, "Positive Peer Culture: Content, Structure and Process"; Guided Group Interaction: Theory and Method."

⁷For a detailed description of the self-help programs, their underlying assumptions, successes and limitations see: David Sternberg, "Synanon House."

have a high degree of success in terms of their acceptance by the community, the public, and the legislature because they are clean and well structured; (2) they provide a therapeutic environment for those residents interested in introspection and change; (3) and they maintain themselves on a minimal budget because of the strong demands exerted on the residents.

Despite these high hopes, however, the outcome actually proved to be very limited for DYS for two reasons. First, all of these groups were able to work with only a limited number of DYS youngsters. They have high expectations and exert tremendous pressure on the residents. In order to continue they had to work with motivated children, and thus the attrition rate was very high. Second, these programs have an authoritarian approach, which proved to be at odds with the department's emerging philosophy of humanism, permissiveness, and equalitarianism.

Because of the high visibility of the department and its many opponents, it was difficult to support new programs before they proved themselves viable. Although all of these new programs had only limited practical success, they were useful inasmuch as they challenged the old system and demonstrated that many possibilities exist in the treatment of youth.

New People: A final means that Miller employed in order to open the system was the introduction of new people into the

system. As mentioned earlier, the young people in the institutions began to play a new, more vocal role in the system. More democratic settings developed after the institutions were closed, and youngsters are now consulted before they are placed into a program. A joint decision is made between the youth and a program, with DYS acting as an agent. These young people now clearly affect the workings of the department, and thus their own lives. Miller believes that "the ideology of correction will not change until those labelled by it have some say in that defining process."⁸ He further states:

If we can stay in community settings for a generation, then the beginning of a democratic process within corrections may guarantee some elements of enduring reform because the clientele, the residents, will be a part of the body politic.

To some extent, the youths have already begun to operate as a source of support. Many of them have gone to lectures and spoken of their experiences in the institutions and attended community meetings of all kinds. Their stories of brutality presented a very convincing case against the old system.

Other groups of people, both interested in and capable of helping in the DYS reform movement, began to emerge (see also Chapter IV). Most notable among these are the groups of ex-offenders. Since the closing of the institutions, several groups of ex-offenders have become involved in

⁸Jerome G. Miller, "The Politics of Change: Correctional Reform," p. 6.

⁹Jerome G. Miller, "Corrections: Reform or Retrenchment," unpublished paper, September 18, 1972, p. 7.

providing services for DYS youngsters. First among these is Libra Inc., a self-help group, which was given a contract by the department. Andros, a program geared to deal with the hard-core delinquent, is primarily staffed with ex-offenders. It has been in operation for over a year and has proved to be very successful in working with the most violent and aggressive youths in the department's care.

Two other groups, Self-Development Group Inc. and the Medfield Norfolk Project, have worked very closely with the department, whose policy has been to encourage these groups to provide leadership. The association has proven to be mutually beneficial. The groups have provided good services because of their prior experience and their ability to relate to the youths. The benefits for the groups have included the opportunity to prove their ability, and the opening of a new job market for ex-offenders. This policy has extended to DYS graduates, who have been hired by the department for a variety of roles and are providing meaningful insight and a concrete help for the department.

Self-help drug groups have come to assume a more important role since the closing of the institutions. Presently, two programs, Transition House and Spectrum House, are operating on DYS grounds. Many more self-self groups have been receiving financial support from the department by the placement of DYS youngsters in their programs.

Another segment of the public that has become actively interested in DYS are colleges and college students. Several

universities and colleges have developed associations with this department. First and foremost is the University of Massachusetts School of Education, which has developed three different programs: JOE I, JOE II, and MARY.¹⁰ These programs have involved many students as volunteers, work-study students, and hired department personnel. North Shore Community College, American International College, Springfield College, and others have developed non-residential summer programs for the department's youth. In this way, students have been instrumental in developing innovative programs for the youngsters, while creating new roles for themselves (see Appendix G).

Several of the residential and non-residential programs affiliated with the department are using work-study students as well as student volunteers; most notable among these is CAP (Community Aftercare Program), which uses mainly students for their operation (see Appendix G). Various students are using DYS as a field assignment. Most recent is the use of student volunteers to evaluate programs from which the department is purchasing care.

Among the traditional agencies, some have been willing and able to revise their practices and develop new intake policies in order to accept placements from DYS while others have not. The Family Service Agency and YMCA, for example,

¹⁰Larry L. Dye, "The University's Role in Public Service to the Department of Youth Services."

have traditionally excluded DYS juveniles from their intake on the grounds that they are "unworkable," "psychopaths," or "in need of institutional confinement." However, recently their need for funds and their willingness to experiment have resulted in a change in that policy.¹¹

Some traditional programs such as McClean Hospital (a private psychiatric hospital in Belmont, Mass.) and the Judge Baker Clinic (a child-guidance clinic in Boston) have been unable to work out an agreement with the department because their traditional approaches and practices stood in the way. They were also turned away by DYS's lack of professional standards. On the other hand, HRI (Human Resource Institute, Inc.), a new and aggressive private psychiatric hospital, was able to change its practices in order to accommodate the department's needs, and thus have developed a working relationship with the department. In opening its system, the department has helped others to open up theirs.

Another way that new people have been introduced to the department is through a tremendous turnover of staff. A recent look at the staff statistics shows that 60 percent of the current staff members have been hired since Miller took office.¹² Many of the older employees left the department

¹¹See description of the new alternatives in Chapter IV and Appendix G.

¹²These statistics were furnished to me by Mr. Harold Kramer, DYS Planning Department, in January, 1973.

because the old machinery or opposition had no hold and no power to resist the changes being introduced. The new staff members generally were attracted to the department because they were interested in its liberal outlook, thus they tend to agree with the central administration. The process of change has attracted more progressive people who will tend to continue this process. Thus the new staff is both a result of, and eventually will be a continuing source of, change, rather than resisting it as the old staff had done.

In summary, Miller's first year in office was used mainly to "loosen up" the system by introducing new concepts, practices and people. Therapeutic community concepts had limited impact because of staff polarization. More impressive were the results of introducing and involving new people with the department, which seeded more intensive program collaboration for the future.

Miller used the press very effectively in exposing the old system, legitimizing children's role in the new one, and breaking down institutional isolation and autonomy. Other strategies such as breaking down the hierarchy by going directly to the youths, the creative use of his role as outsider to the system, the show of humane authority by introducing changes in "form" (no haircuts, no lock-up, etc.) rather than "content," proved to be effective tools and could be replicable elsewhere.

Changing the System

Introducing new concepts, ideas, and people into DYS caused the loosening of its rigid structures and the creation of a more favorable environment for change. However, "opening the system" alone could not account for the massive deinstitutionalization and the creation of new and humane alternatives in the three years since the Reorganization Act. One has to conceptualize the different processes and strategies that brought about the changes in the system. The following discussion will attempt to isolate these elements, realizing that this study is only a beginning to the deeper analysis that these processes require and warrant, and hopefully will receive in the future.

The changes that have been introduced in DYS have been massive and dramatic, and especially unusual for a state bureaucracy, even considering the many elements present that made such a change possible, i.e., the mandate for change as expressed in the Reorganization Act,¹³ support of local interested groups,¹⁴ and the definite commitment of a governor who expressed his support frequently (see Appendix F). As noted in Chapter II, a department of youth services is usually controlled by many groups, which exert strong pressures to resist change. First, within the state government there is

¹³Massachusetts General Laws, Volume 2A, Chapters 13 to 28; Department of Youth Services, Chapter 18A, as amended by Chapter 838 of the Acts of 1969.

¹⁴For a list of groups who supported DYS, see Appendix A.

the legislature, which controls the budget, and the governor's executive office, which exerts bureaucratic controls. There are also other agencies of the criminal justice system: the police, the courts and probation. Internally the department is comprised of staff who can exert controls through their unions or political influences. And finally there is the general public, the communities, and the press.

All of these pressures manifest themselves as drawbacks; they can, however, become assets if properly informed. It is these alignments and realignments that determine the degree of flexibility and support available to the commissioner in his efforts toward change.¹⁵ These forces, when they are exerted to maintain the system, work to deprive the commissioner of his authority, thus making any action for reform extremely difficult. This was not allowed to happen at DYS. Opponents of reform were put into a defensive position, and forced to explain unjustifiable situations. On the other hand, the department continually broadened its base of support, thus moving into a less defensive, more powerful offensive position. This power was gained by depriving staff and institutions of their autonomy, cutting into the power of the bureaucracy and patronage systems of the government, and building upon the growing relationships with outside forces. Similar strategies were also used with

¹⁵For a conceptual framework explaining this process, see Lloyd E. Ohlin, "Reform of Correctional Services for Youth: A Research Proposal," unpublished paper, Center for Criminal Justice, Harvard Law School, 1970.

the police, the courts, and the communities. This realignment meant involvement of youngsters, staff, new groups, and private groups from whom the department was purchasing care.

The question that needs to be answered here is how this happened--what were the different strategies used by Miller and his staff to bring about this process? The following is an analysis of the strategies and approaches employed by Miller and his associates in order to effect change.

Flexible Agenda: It is more accurate to describe the change process in the department during the past three years as emergent, rather than planned.¹⁶ These changes were often determined by chance, imagination, opportunity, and personal style, primarily the commissioner's. The strategies used depended largely upon options and solutions that arose spontaneously, and which the department was flexible enough to try. These options increased with the opening of the system and the introduction of new actors into it.

Frequently the department would adopt a new approach as soon as it proved useful or successful. In the same way, if a program was attempted and proved infeasible it was immediately abandoned or modified. Two examples will illustrate this matter:

1. There was an early policy decision to open group homes, which would be run by the department.

¹⁶For a definition of emergent vs. planned change see Chapter I of this study.

However, in the process of establishing these homes it became evident that the department's flexibility would be enhanced by contracting these services, rather than operating them directly through the department, and thus the policy was changed. This change from the department's traditional role of providing services exempted DYS from bureaucratic entanglement and the intricacies of staff training and retraining. Although this change in policy created some staff alienation, it ensured quick and efficient movement toward meaningful alternatives.

2. Another example of the department's flexibility is the case of the CAP program, a private non-residential aftercare program, CAP began as a small operation when institutions were closed, and proved to be extremely successful in working with groups of youngsters in storefront operations in the community by providing jobs and counseling, and opening recreational activities. The success of the program encouraged DYS to increase the number of referrals from 20 to 175 in only one year (see Appendix G).

Shotgun Approach to Change: Another approach used by Miller was to invite a multitude of programs and ideas into the department in the hope that some projects would be successful. Such a shotgun approach to change gave the department the flexibility to try out a number of options

(in many different directions) and experiment, with a limited amount of resources. This approach was also consistent with Miller's oft-stated belief that the old system was destructive and "insane" and that any new alternative would be better than what the training schools had to offer (see Appendix E).

Thus, the department's lack of a plan proved to be helpful, in that it made it flexible enough to find opportunities and use them when they arose. Different approaches were tried, each with limited success. When the therapeutic community concept¹⁷ failed, "guided group interaction"¹⁸ was tried. When this method showed a limited success, the department introduced the "self-help group" concept into the institutions. Cottages were closed when the occasion arose and staff were constantly rotated, some for the purpose of training and others for the purpose of starting new programs or assuming new responsibilities. Programs that proved themselves were claimed as new and innovative; and those that did not work were terminated.¹⁹ In this manner,

¹⁷See discussion of these concepts earlier in this chapter, and Chapter IV.

¹⁸For a detailed description of these techniques, see Harry H. Vorrath, "Positive Peer Culture: Content, Structure and Process."

¹⁹For example, out of the three group homes introduced on the Shirley grounds in mid-1971, two were closed a few months later ("We Care," and "Green Acres") because they had operational difficulties such as staff conflicts, runaways, and lack of leadership. On the other hand, "I Belong" house, which proved to be successful, continued operation and moved to Lancaster School for Girls even after the institutions were closed.

there were always a few good programs that met the criteria of being humane and effective. These are the ones the department could point to as successful.

This shotgun method also explains to a great extent the diversity of the new alternatives. The programs covered a broad scope, and were developed by a wide range of agencies, traditional and non-traditional, as well as educational institutions, and even recreational organizations such as the YMCA.²⁰

This approach posed difficulties for the opposition, because the changes in the department were so constant that it was impossible for them to focus an attack on any particular program. However, it also posed difficulties for the department. Much of the older staff were alienated because they felt unsupported, and could not understand the department's changing direction. There was also a considerable amount of confusion and wasted effort in the central office, because many of the changes were made without enough staff involvement, especially those decisions made unilaterally by Miller.²¹

Some of the younger staff saw this movement strictly as opportunism, lacking any real commitment to programs for

²⁰For description of these alternatives see Chapter IV and Appendix G.

²¹In a statement to a senate subcommittee investigating correction made in October 4, 1972, Miller stated that correctional reform cannot happen by consensus, "although once done and sustained, a consensus will begin to form."

youth. Changing directions sometimes meant abandoning programs run by new staff who supported Miller. The most striking example of this situation occurred when the decision was made to close the institutions. Several good programs that were being run by the department within the institution had to be disbanded in favor of contracting with outside groups, which resulted in some new staff antagonism and anxiety.

Despite the turmoil and staff anxiety caused by this course, the shotgun method was effective and necessary, given the limitations of a public bureaucracy.

Avoidance of Conflict: By espousing a direction rather than a program, Miller was able to avoid confrontations on specific issues with staff, communities, and the legislature. Thus he could find followers and maintain the department's visibility to the press, the rest of the bureaucracy, and the public, without directly confronting the most rigid and intractable forces in the system. By denouncing in general terms the institutional failures, Miller was never forced to explain specifically his plans to ameliorate these conditions; neither was he compelled to specify the cost of these changes to staff and other vested interest groups.

In effect, Miller's ability to articulate institutional failures forced the defenders of the old system into an impotent position. Who could argue, for example, with a call to "open up" institutions and "make them responsive to new

ideas."²² Who could attack Miller's practice of visiting institutions spontaneously and talking with youngsters? Or how could anyone counter the following argument: "If you continue to turn out more criminals after treatment, something is obviously wrong."²³ By placing himself in the side of justice and humaneness, he made it difficult for detractors to criticize him publicly for fear of placing themselves on the side of injustice and inhumanity.²⁴

Within the department, at the institutions, similar strategies were used. Staff were promised a place in the system without being told specifically what that place would be. After isolating several key personnel who were resistant to change in the institutions, Miller promoted a few staff members who showed by their commitment or rhetoric that they were willing to support him.²⁵ These promotions created a feeling among the staff that the system was open to them, and promotions were possible. This new sense of security among some of the older staff made it possible for some

²²Christian Science Monitor, February 2, 1970.

²³Boston Globe, May 14, 1970.

²⁴Most newspaper accounts describe Miller as a reformer fighting an important cause (See Appendix F).

²⁵Those who were promoted from within the system are Paul Dickhaut who assumed the administration of Shirley and Frank Macherelli who became the superintendent of Roslindale Detention Center. Both promotions were unusually high since these individuals were "Principal Juvenile Supervisors" in their institutions and had little hope of becoming superintendents.

alliances which were necessary in order to work out compromises, and thus achieve specific objectives. Also, several of the newly promoted staff members proved instrumental in dealing with local community conflicts. They were able to present and defend new programs to communities and legislators in a manner that made them more acceptable. All of these personnel maneuvers had the temporary effect of dispelling conflict.

However, conflict could not be postponed indefinitely. Staff became increasingly resentful because the promotions they hoped for did not materialize; constant changes were occurring, and there was a lack of communication and support from the central office. Despite all of Miller's strategies to avoid conflict with the staff, the personnel in the field were becoming increasingly alienated. This set the stage for increased opposition and conflict, which could probably have eventually erupted. However, the cataclysmic step of closing the institutions scattered the opposition and irrevocably committed the department to a new approach that was more than experimental; it was definite, permanent, and all-encompassing. Thus the staff were forced to come to terms with it or leave; they could not fight it, and they could not escape it and still remain within the department. Their brewing conflicts over promotions or changes in policy were suddenly rendered meaningless in light of this new change. This is how Miller was able to avoid conflict over relatively minor issues long enough to effect a change that was so radical and extensive that it practically defied opposition.

Support from Outside: The lobby for change was present even before Miller came to the department. It consisted of the media, professional associations, the legislature, and other interest groups.²⁶

Lacking control over these institutions, Miller's first efforts were to broaden the base of decision-making by bringing the public and the press into the debate. An example is Miller's policy decision to eliminate "lock-up."

Miller recognized that a memo to this effect would not make the change. So he publicized the decision at a series of press conferences. Shortly thereafter, in surprise visits to the institutions, he discovered that lock-ups were still used. A series of discussions and negotiations with individual superintendents at the institutions produced a modified policy statement: lock-up would be used only in extreme cases, and then only with the expressed permission of the commissioner. Thus the policy was clarified, modified, centralized, and adjusted, but became clearly the responsibility of the central office.

The press was also used to document the failures of the institutions and to dramatize the changes introduced in the department. For example, long after Bridgewater was closed, the physical facility was used as a showplace for the media, to dramatize the plight of the youngsters who had been incarcerated there (see Appendix F).

²⁶The groups who supported the change are listed in Appendix A.

When Shirley School had already ceased to be used as an institution, the press and the public were invited to a ceremony to destroy the "tombs" or solitary confinement cells, which were a symbol of the old, punitive system. But most dramatic was the closing of Lyman. Attention was drawn to the fact that Lyman was the first training school in the country to open and the first to close.²⁷ The impressive scene of moving out all the youngsters in one day hid the fact that several programs continued on the institution's grounds for many more months, that Lancaster School for Girls was still in operation six months later, and that other institutions had been phased out prior to Lyman. (Oakdale was closed in March, 1971 and Shirley was almost completely phased out by January 1972.)

The practice of dramatizing the changes served several purposes. It maintained the momentum for internal changes, and it attracted outside resources to make the change possible. But foremost, the drama kept the press interested and thus the public informed. These dramatic actions created in the public mind the image of an aggressive, active, forward-moving public agency, and showed the closing of institutions to be consistent with success and progress.²⁸

Outside groups, such as ex-offenders, universities, and

²⁷This fact is repeated in almost every report issued by DYS since the closing of institutions and used as a public relations device.

²⁸For selected newspaper accounts and editorials concerning the closing of institutions see Appendix F.

child welfare agencies, proved indispensable in the development of new alternatives, because they had no stake in maintaining the old system. These groups were willing and able to make decisions and take actions that DYS staff were unable and unwilling to make because of their vested interests. A perfect example is the University of Massachusetts' involvement through the JOE II program, which made possible the closing of the Lyman School.²⁹ DYS staff, and especially workers from Lyman, were incapable of making a commitment to close the institution in which they were working. They were preoccupied with developing a rationale for keeping the school open, holding onto their jobs, and thus maintaining the status quo.

It is important to note that the University of Massachusetts and other agencies provided the temporary structures necessary for the changeover from institutions to community-based programs. On the regional front, many groups, some new private as well as some public agencies became a vital resource for the department's new community-based operations. Most of these agencies needed this new venture partly because of their dwindling resources and partly because of their desire to become involved in a new field. The department ultimately signed contracts with only a small portion of the agencies that submitted proposals. However,

²⁹Larry L. Dye, "The University's Role in Public Service to the Department of Youth Services."

the interaction with these agencies served to orient them to the functions and needs of the department, and to significantly increase the consideration given to the problems of youth in trouble throughout the state.

Change for Change's Sake: The philosophy that was espoused and acted upon by Miller was that change is an end in itself, and that chaos and turmoil are an unavoidable by-product of social change.³⁰ He believes that a firmly entrenched bureaucracy "can chew up reform much faster than reformers can dream up new ones."³¹ This is why constant change itself is as relevant as the direct consequences of that change. The idea was that significant change can only occur within a system after the destruction of the foundation of that system. Thus, destroying a system before creating alternatives to it was a characteristic mode of action for the department. For example, Miller undertook immediately the destruction of the internal control system of the institutions, leaving the system vulnerable, confused, and searching for new controls.

The most dramatic example of the effect of this change was when the decision was made to close the institutions. Despite the confusion that this decision wrought within the bureaucracy, it did force the staff, the regional offices

³⁰Jerome G. Miller, "Corrections: Reform or Retrenchment," p. 15.

³¹New York Times, January 20, 1972.

and the communities to develop immediate alternatives. Thus this action shifted the responsibility from the department into the community.

This strategy of "change for change's sake" allowed DYS to accomplish rapid and massive alterations, but the costs were high. Within the staff, many committed and experienced people were unable to cope with the changes. Some left, and the turnover has been costly. The quality of new services has been affected by this strategy. Some of the programs appeared overnight, without time for careful planning. Other existing programs with no prior experience in dealing with DYS youth had to suddenly accommodate themselves to these youngsters. The lack of management and administrative and technical expertise within the department, furthermore, left many programs to improvise and find solutions on their own.

The shift involved in moving away from institutional fiscal management to a flexible purchase-of-care arrangement caused the administration to lag behind the services. As a consequence, newly founded programs with limited financial resources often did not receive payment for weeks. This impaired their functioning and the delivery of services.³²

Despite the problems created by this "planned-unplanned" approach, based on its overall effectiveness and its innovativeness, it warrants merit and further study. This is especially true since the "planned change" approach has

³²Sunday Herald Traveler, March 18, 1973, p. 46.

long proven ineffective in dealing with entrenched bureaucracies.

Institutionalizing the Changes: Miller's main fear was always that a series of critical incidents, radical change in the political climate, or a temporary loss of public support could negate the changes the department had accomplished. To ensure that a succeeding administration could not retreat into the old institutional pattern, several steps were taken to block this regression. Some institutional properties were made available to the departments of corrections, mental health, and to private groups. Most of them, however, were still under DYS's administrative control. Miller also attempted to organize the private sector that is now providing care for DYS youth into an aggressive advocacy lobby for children. The danger exists, however, that this lobby can also become self-serving and too involved in maintaining their status quo.

The department's future plan also called for converting a large number of staff positions into monies for the purchase of care, a step that would ensure adequate staffing for the maintenance of large institutions.

Despite these efforts, little attention was paid by Miller to establishing the administrative mechanisms needed to insure that the new system functions as desired. As a consequence, DYS may be headed for an administrative crisis. Lacking adequate fiscal controls, department spending is

estimated to be much higher than the budget permits, and at the same time many services rendered could not be paid in time, due to numerous bureaucratic entanglements caused by the changeover. These and other problems in the system, such as lack of role definition, accountability, and delineation of responsibilities in the main and regional offices, is hurting new programs and making the quality of these new services to youth not what they could be.³³

Finally, the question the most reform-minded people are concerned with is whether the changes in DYS are here to stay, and if so, whether the process of experimentation and change in the department will continue, even on a less dramatic scale.

It is too early to answer these questions. Miller's departure in January, 1973, before the changes have taken hold, especially while DYS is still struggling with fiscal and administrative problems, could definitely force the department to a defensive posture, rendering it unable to maintain an advocacy role for the youth in its charge.

³³The findings of systematic evaluations of fifteen new programs conducted under the supervision of this investigator show that many programs have fiscal and budgetary problems caused by DYS. They complain of lack of support from the regional offices and thus the services to the children in their care suffer. For a sample of programs which have been evaluated see Appendix I.

C H A P T E R V I

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Finally, the problem of reform in corrections relates to the ability of the field to move toward democratic participation in those areas which would not threaten too deeply the order and safety of the larger society. Until the advent of the inmate movement, reform had to wait for the aristocrat (John Howard), or the benevolent reformer (Dorothea Dix). We must know that true reform cannot ultimately reside either in the hands of philanthropists or professional elitists (the psychiatric profession). The future of corrections will be set by its ability to use the best structures rather than the worst impulses of our society. If this can be allowed, not only will we see basic reform, but we will possess a correctional system which enhances our own humanity.

--Jerome G. Miller

A major concern of this descriptive study is the amount and type of planning that went into the radical restructuring of the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services, under the commissionership of Jerome G. Miller between 1969 and 1973. First the investigator identified and described the change processes that occurred in DYS in that period, including an historical review of the pressure for change. Second, the investigator identified and conceptualized the different strategies used to bring about the change.

Several sources of data were utilized. This included documents, studies, and investigative reports prepared within and outside DYS. Newspaper accounts, data and studies

gathered by the Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, and evaluative reports of DYS programs and the new alternatives conducted under the supervision of the investigator, were also consulted. Probably the most important source of information resulted from the investigator's position as assistant commissioner at DYS between September 1970 and February 1973. Being an active participant and decision-maker during this period of change provided the investigator with the unique advantage of knowing the inside story, its ramifications, and the rationale behind it.

Summary

The sudden closing down of institutions by the Department of Youth Services was an almost totally unforeseeable event. It was not a gradual process that was planned over a period of years. It was rather the climax of a series of events, which continued to broaden the base of support for change while narrowing the number of possible alternatives. The climate for change began to develop in the 1960s when the quality of care in the institutions had reached an all-time low. The system had been failing children for many years. Many staff, lacking professional skill, had turned to excessive use of punishment in order to control youths. This situation was brought to the attention of the public through the media; criticism and attack came to a boiling point with the release of several investigative reports, especially the thorough study made by HEW. The public and the legislature

became alarmed, and thus the time was ripe for the governor and the legislature to act.

Governor Sargent put pressure on the director of the division and he resigned in 1969. The legislature passed a reorganization bill elevating the status of the Division of Youth Services into a full-fledged department; the Reorganization Act provided for the appointment of a new commissioner and four assistant commissioners of his choosing. The act set a new professional tone for the agency using key words such as therapy, prevention, community services, purchase of services, and research. Finally, the Act broadly empowered the new department to establish necessary facilities for detention, diagnosis, treatment and training of its charges, including post-release care. While these powers in themselves did not mark a major new thrust, the language of the Act later proved sufficient grounds for Commissioner Miller and his assistants to implement a non-institutional system (although this was not the overt intention of the legislation).

The intent of the Act was clearly reflected in the search for a director. The search panel consisted chiefly of well-reputed professionals such as Dr. Lloyd Ohlin of the Harvard Center for Criminal Justice and Dr. Harold Demone, Director of Mass Bay United Fund. Dr. Jerome Miller was chosen because of his training at the Ohio State University School of Social Work and his experience in the military, developing a youth services agency for Air Force dependents. He had experience in both theory and practice of youth service operation.

The appointment of Miller in turn led to a further upgrading of the staff of the department. The personnel and ideological changes in the department, coupled with the continued publicity in the media, and the growing public concern over the quality of care of children, increased and reinforced the climate for change that had begun to develop in the 1960s.

During his first two years as commissioner, Miller and his assistants tried many new programs within the existing system. There was increased staff training, made possible by federal funds. One institution was closed, others were decentralized into a cottage-based system. Some group homes began to develop as alternative placements for youth. A productive liaison was established between the University of Massachusetts and the Westfield Detention Center. And the process of regionalization within the state began.

The gains made by implementing these changes were at first outweighed, however, by the problems caused by them. The institutional system was so deeply entrenched that any change had to be massive in order for its effects to be significantly felt. So on one hand, the changes were not great enough. But on the other hand, every new measure that was introduced was resisted by the older staff, who were justifiably fearful of their positions or of changing their long-accepted roles. So for them the changes were too great. There was also a certain degree of loss of control caused by the newness of the programs. Runaways temporarily increased,

causing a reaction from local communities and the legislature. Thus all of the changes brought about opposition from the staff, the legislature and the public while only minimally improving the services rendered by the Department.

The climate had been ripe for change. Many changes and alternatives were tried within the system, which were not successful in a very meaningful way. There were no alternatives left. The closing of institutions was a decision that went further than most people anticipated and it came much sooner than anyone expected.

Once the institutions were closed, alternative programs began to develop; however, it would be erroneous to assume that these alternatives developed automatically merely as a result of this closing. In actuality the potential for these new programs was created as a result of the entire change process the department had gone through, i.e., opening the system to many outside groups, building bridges to universities and colleges, and introducing volunteers into the system. Also, the department's constant search for alternatives within the institutions prior to their closing, and its flexibility and readiness to take advantage of any options available were a foreshadowing of the rapid development of programs later.

Thus the elements had been present for quite a while; the closing of institutions served as a catalyst to trigger off this reaction. This catalyzing factor is what makes the Massachusetts experience unique and innovative as a

social-change phenomenon. By closing its correctional institutions, DYS forced its alternatives to occur, resulting in a massive immediate change rather than a gradual and prolonged one.

It is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the new alternatives. But they certainly cover a wide range of programs, involving many more people and approaches. They are non-custodial in nature; they provide a variety of residential and non-residential community-based programs privately run and regionally supported by the department through its regional offices.

Conclusions and Implications

The Massachusetts experience suggests new approaches to change in public bureaucracies. These agencies, which are characterized by a lack of autonomy, invite timidity among their staff, thus setting the stage for their exploitation by other government groups such as the legislature and in turn to exploitation of their charges by the department. Such agencies must develop strategies that allow them to establish freedom and control over their operations. One way to increase this autonomy is by negotiating with legislators and other branches of government. DYS's leaders increased its autonomy by opening the system to the public, the media, and the youngsters in its care, thus creating its own power base of support and lobby. Miller as an outsider to the system acted as a change agent and was able to use existing support

within the system, and at the same time infuse new ideas, approaches, and groups into it.

The changes introduced in DYS were the product of an emergent rather than a planned approach. Strategies outlined earlier--flexible agenda, shotgun approach, avoidance of conflict, change for change's sake--created opportunities within the department to achieve massive changes. Also a fundamental approach to change, the constant forcing of options rather than waiting for alternatives to emerge, created an agency with an aggressive image that discouraged opposition by throwing opponents off balance and gaining public recognition and confidence.

The cost to staff created by these strategies was enormous, however, and the department's fiscal and management operations were constantly lagging behind programs, creating the possibility of administrative crisis. The three years of changes thrust the department into turmoil, with a continuous sense of crisis and the possibility of a complete setback always imminent.

The Massachusetts experience also has far-reaching implications for the theory and practice pertaining to juvenile corrections. First, it politicizes the problem of delinquency.¹ This process is clearly articulated by Miller, who stated that "social and political considerations are

¹See Brian Segal, "Politicalization of Deviance."

basic to any discussion of correctional reform."² This is because "the very nature of labelling youth as 'delinquents, wayward, or stubborn' is related to the power of the definers and the powerlessness of the defined."³ Thus, once you define the problem of delinquency in political terms, the obvious conclusion is to develop a set of strategies geared towards changing society's view of the delinquent as an outsider, and breaking the cycle of anger, violence, hurt and punishment that characterizes society's and its official representatives' relationships with the delinquent and bring about institutional and structural changes.

Attacking the large training schools and finally closing them is another logical outcome of this conceptualization. Since institutions isolate "the individual from the community in a 'society of captives' they have to be disposed of because if they are there, they will be used."⁴ Similarly, the closing of institutions was perceived by many theoreticians as a new "social movement." Joseph Fitzpatrick, in his opening remarks at a recent conference at Boston College, stated in reference to the closing of institutions: "Indeed, we may be at the threshold of a new social movement, of tremendous significance not only to youth services but to

²Jerome G. Miller, "The Politics of Change: Correctional Reform," p. 3.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 4

the whole realm of human services." As with the problem of poverty, once it became politicalized it demanded new sets of professional roles from the helping profession. Thus, social therapy was replaced by social action and the advocate role was introduced and talked about frequently in social-work literature.⁵ New professional roles in corrections are the expected outcome.

Despite their possible negative results, strategies used in DYS hold a promise of replicability in most other human service agencies. Common problems demand common solutions. The Departments of Mental Health, Corrections, and Welfare suffer from the same excessive bureaucracies and inflexible operations, which stigmatize their clients and render them passive and helpless. As with DYS these agencies need to de-bureaucratize and humanize their operations. However, this has to be done within a growing climate of unwillingness on the part of both the public and the legislature to invest more funds in these departments. DYS is providing a model for achieving changes through management rather than commitment of new resources, and instead of investing more monies in traditional professional and custodial groups, it legitimized its client's role and brought in volunteers, students, and other new groups to help change the system.

⁵George A. Brager, "Advocacy and Political Behavior," pp. 8-13.

Finally, the DYS reorganization held the promise, if it has not yet achieved the result, of exposing the double standard that society set up in dealing with the less advantaged and less powerful, thus increasing their democratic participation in the decision-making process. The reforms resulting from the reorganization have not come from an elite group of professionals or philanthropists, but from those who have the most to gain from reform. The reorganization has produced change by redefining and redistributing power in a way which allows growth in people and enhances their humanity.

A P P E N D I X E S

APPENDIX A


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'They're Breakin' Up That Old Gang of Mine'



"T'is the season to be jolly"



The Boston Globe
S. F. P.

Abused delinquents

Allegations by psychiatrists, sociologists and others concerning conditions at the Massachusetts Youth Service's Institute for Juvenile Guidance in Bridgewater are nothing short of stomach-turning — children placed in solitary confinement for 30 days and longer, although state law prohibits such punishment for adults; gang homosexual assaults on young boys; an atmosphere of fear, brutal punishment, filth and inadequate heating; rats; no adequate program of education or rehabilitation or even any proper evaluation of a boy's progress.

The charges, certainly serious enough to call for action by the attorney general and possibly a grand jury investigation, are a repeat of earlier charges by a team of experts from the United States Children's Bureau, a special blue ribbon commission appointed by Gov. Volpe, a voluminous report filed a year ago by Sen. Beryl Cohen (D-Brookline) and shelved by the Legislature. All have called forth from successive attorneys general, including Sen. Edward W. Brooke and his special advisory

committee, pious demands for "sweeping reforms" — which have never been made.

Sen. Cohen now has filed a bill to transfer juvenile detention centers to the Department of Education, which is probably where they properly belong. But he correctly states that neither he nor anyone else will make any progress at all toward rehabilitating detention centers, especially the one at Bridgewater, until the opinion of a seemingly apathetic public is aroused.

The creation of widespread citizens' groups similar to the Youth in Trouble group organized by Rev. David Hollenbeck would be helpful. So, too, might be an unannounced visit to Bridgewater by Gov.-elect Sargent. The League of Women Voters should interest themselves again as they did a year ago, although to no avail at that time.

Certainly, inaction and indifference no longer will do. The state's delinquents will be equipped either for good citizenship or a life of adult crime. Right now, because its citizens do not seem to care, the state is making criminals of them.

The Boston Globe

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THURSDAY, MARCH 27, 1969

Uncaging our children

The failure of the Division of Youth Service to deal effectively with delinquent children placed under its care is illuminated in the public statements of experts who have been personally involved in the division's work.

Dr. Theodore Lindauer, director of the Walden Mental Health Clinic in Concord and former psychiatric consultant at the division's Lyman School for Boys, has stated that most of the division's institutions are "places of cruel and inhuman punishment for children of all kinds."

Dr. Shepard Ginandes, who resigned early this year as chief psychiatric consultant to the division, has charged that its administrative structure "prevents the effective use of most of the therapeutic talent and experience within the division" and has declared that he was unable to find top-level support for changes such as greater freedom for clinicians from administrative duties, better use and understanding of clinicians' and consultants' recommendations, and greater attention to community and preventive aspects of the job.

These men, along with many other competent professionals familiar with the division, support the pending bill (Senate 1001) to establish a new, independent Department of Youth Services with authority for providing a comprehensive, high quality, treatment-oriented program of delinquency prevention and control.

They are backed in this stand by Gov. Sargent, Senate Pres. Maurice Donahue, House Speaker David Bartley, Atty. Gen. Robert Quinn, many individual members of the Legislature, and some 40 social service organizations.

The bill would mean some added costs for the taxpayers, although the exact amount will not be known until Gov. Sargent has submitted several proposed amendments aimed at keeping the costs to a minimum consistent with the purposes of the bill's proponents. But whatever the final price-tag, it should be paid. Economy at the expense of defenseless children is indefensible. Simply "caging children," as Gov. Sargent so aptly put it, "is not the way of an enlightened society."

Sears on Way Out At Bridgewater

By CAROL LISTON
Staff Writer

William Sears, director of the state's institution for juvenile guidance at Bridgewater, is expected to be removed shortly and transferred to another job within the Youth Service Division, a YSD source said.

The move planned for Sears comes after nearly two weeks of disturbances at the institution, where 66 of the division's most difficult youngsters are routinely jailed.

The disorders coincided roughly with two events—first the return this month of Pasquale L. Prencipe as assistant superintendent and second, the governor's temporary appointment of Frank A. Maloney of Boston College School of Social Work as director of the YSD. Maloney assumed his position May 14, shortly after the departure of John D. Coughlan, who quit as director under pressure from the governor.

Prencipe and Sears have opposed views on handling discipline and rehabilitation of delinquents. Sears favors

strict discipline and tough educational programs. Prencipe, who began as a division musical therapist, favors intensive therapy programs.

Coughlan brought dismissal charges last year against Prencipe and dismissed him. The Civil Service Commission ordered Prencipe reinstated.

Since returning to Bridgewater, defenders of Prencipe say he has been harassed by Sears's associates. Sears's supporters say he believes that Prencipe wants to ruin his career and drive him out of Bridgewater.

Sears's exact job status in the YSD is unclear. Coughlan appointed him last year temporarily. According to present state records, the appointment expires June 28.

Several House Democrats went to Sargent Tuesday, asking that he intervene to see that Sears was not fired. They understood, they said that Maloney intended to fire Sears. This Sears contingent included Reps. John J. McGlynn (D-Medford), chairman of the State Administration Committee; John Buckley (D-Abington), chairman of the Public Service Committee, and George L. Sacco (D-Medford), vice chairman of the Ways and Means Committee.

Sargent said he would look into the matter, but sources close to Maloney said he believes he has the governor's support, should he move Sears out.

The Democratic legislators said they did not think a temporary director, like Maloney, should make such important personnel decisions as removing someone like Sears.

BOSTON HERALD TRAVELER

THURSDAY, JULY 3, 1969

C

PAGE TWELVE

Youth Services: Fresh Concern And a New Approach

For years, the Commonwealth's Division of Youth Services has been in trouble. But at last the accumulation of all that has happened—the critical reports from official bodies, the protests of private groups, the controversy involving Director John Coughlan and his subsequent resignation — seems to be moving the legislature to act.

By an overwhelming vote (221 to 5) the House of Representatives this week approved a complete reorganization of the youth services program. Now the Senate will have a chance to show an equal concern for the welfare of Massachusetts young people.

If the reform legislation is adopted, the prospects are good that the program can be extricated from its trouble—and therefore can be of more help to young people who are in trouble.

Essentially the reorganization would shift the program's emphasis from institutionalization toward prevention, community-based treatment and rehabilitation. The three-member Youth Service Board, a frequent target of criticism, would be abolished. Instead there would be a single commissioner on whom would clearly rest the authority (and the responsibility) necessary to get the job done. There would still be an advisory committee, but one hopes it would not be cast in the mold of the present advisory board, which has seemed less in-

terested in advising than in rubber-stamping the programs and policies of past administrators.

Under the commissioner would be four bureaus, and the breakdown of their functions indicates the approach of the reorganized program. Only one would be concerned with the state's institutions for delinquents. The others would concentrate on physical, psychiatric and social care of the children, vocational and academic training, and follow-up programs for youths discharged from state institutions. Throughout there would be emphasis on utilizing the alternatives to institutionalization —foster homes, camps, half-way houses.

One provision of the reorganization deserves further scrutiny, and the Senate can supply it. House members disagreed over whether a provision of the legislation as now drawn "freezes" a present official of the youth program into his position. Governor Sargent is reportedly concerned over this portion of the measure.

The potential of the proposed reforms, of course, will be realized only if there is strong and qualified leadership. Governor Sargent is now searching for someone to head the youth services program, since Coughlan's successor is serving only on a temporary basis. Attracting the best talent available for this post should be made easier when the reorganization receives the legislature's final stamp of approval.



C.F.P.
The Boston Globe

'A little politics never hurt nobody'

THE BOSTON GLOBE

August 26, 1969

Politics as usual

While the Legislature distinguished itself in enacting a sweeping reform of the Youth Service Division, it reverted to the old and discredited mold in amending the bill to give the Executive Council power of confirmation over the governor's appointment of the youth services commissioner.

The amendment was quietly inserted in the House during the prorogation rush, was approved by the Senate after spirited debate, and retained by the two branches despite Gov. Sargent's request for its removal and an informal opinion by Atty. Gen. Quinn that it was unconstitutional.

The vote in each branch was pretty much along party lines, with the Democrats supporting the amendment and the Republicans opposing

it. Significantly, the Executive Council is 8-1 Democratic in its present membership.

What especially taints the amendment (aside from its dubious legality) is that it flies in the face of the 2-1 referendum vote of the people in 1964 in favor of stripping the Executive Council of its statutory powers. There is not the slightest indication that the public's esteem for the council has risen since this vote was taken. Indeed, respect for the Council has surely been further diminished by the Council's recent intransigent refusal to go along with Gov. Sargent's appointment of former Asst. Atty. Gen. Walter J. Skinner to the Superior Court. The amendment to the Youth Service bill was a most undeserved vote of confidence.

Rating the Legislature

The 1969 Legislature has completed its work, its record a blend of the occasionally distinguished with the sometimes disappointing. The latest session of the General Court achieves a rating of better than average, but distinctly less than outstanding.

Rep. David M. Bartley (D-Holyoke), in his first year as House Speaker, described the session as a "people-productive year," and to some extent he is right.

Certainly an important piece of legislation in this area is the "anti-snob zoning bill," which provides for the construction of low and middle income housing in suburban communities by eliminating restrictive zoning in up to 1.5 percent of a city or town's land.

Further, tenants have gained protection against eviction or rent-raising by landlords seeking to retaliate against tenants who report violations of housing codes.

The Legislature also deserves credit for passing several bills designed to protect the consumer, including a measure requiring businesses to reimburse individuals able to prove they have been cheated by mendacious business practices.

In the field of youth justice, detention, and rehabilitation, bills were passed effecting a much-needed reorganization of the Youth Service Division, and establishing two specialized juvenile courts in Worcester and Springfield.

Perhaps the greatest long-range accomplishment of the legislative session was the approval of the streamlining of state government, effective in 1971, by creation of a nine-member cabinet, eliminating the present system under which more than 300 agencies report to the governor.

On the negative side of the ledger is the failure to pass a reform of the Civil Service system, ending the unfairly high preference to veterans.

The defeat of the proposed \$6800 minimum pay for teachers in Massachusetts also does not reflect favorably on the Legislature. And the people of the state certainly are not protected by the killing of the proposal to raise the inspection standards of state slaughterhouses to Federal levels.

Defeated also was the best proposal thus far to build a sports stadium in Greater Boston, but the Legislature's share of the blame in this is minimal compared to the roles played by Boston's Mayor White and the Boston Red Sox management.

Much of the progressive legislation approved by the Legislature can be attributed to the threat of reducing the House membership to 160, a proposed constitutional amendment to which Speaker Bartley has been vehemently opposed. While the streamlining of the House is a needed reform, Speaker Bartley's position nonetheless made it easier for him to win the support of House colleagues in pushing through much desirable legislation.

State Youth Board Dies, New Head Takes Over

By HOWARD WHITE

MT State House Reporter

With a stroke of his pen, Jerome G. Miller yesterday abolished the Youth Service Board and became commissioner of a new redepartment that will take its place.

But major changes in the top ranks of The Department of Youth Service, the state's juvenile delinquency control agency, are probably two months away, the 37-year-old Miller said after he assumed the new \$25,000 a year post.

The Youth Service Board and the old division went out of business at 11:55 a.m. yesterday when Miller signed the big book putting himself on the state payroll. But the three members of the board will be staying on indefinitely in newly created posts as "executive assistants," Miller said after he was sworn in by Gov. Sargent.

THEY ARE Frank A. Maloney, who has been board chairman and director since May; Joseph W. Zabriskie and Mrs. Cecelia McGovern Field. Carmen S. Pizzuto, chief of the educational counseling service, will stay on in a fourth executive assistantship. All will stay on at their old salaries.

Meanwhile, Miller said he hasn't yet decided who will fill the five top posts under his control: a deputy commissioner and four assistant commissioners



DR. JEROME MILLER

who will head bureaus in the new department.

"I hope to have enough time to get to know the department well, and the people there, get to know the state well, and make my decision a bit later," he said.


Besides, he noted, the Legislature neither set the salaries nor provided the funds to pay the new officials — a problem that may have to wait until lawmakers return in January.

MALONEY, A BOSTON College teacher who has headed the division since Gov. Sargent demanded and got the resignation of Dr. John D. Coughlan, will work at least temporarily as Miller's deputy.

The new commissioner had been an associate professor of social work at Ohio State University. Before that he spent more than 10 years in the Air Force, the last three heading a program to deal with delinquency among dependent children on air bases.

Miller, who said he hopes to build "community support" for the new department, acknowledged that the job could be a political hot seat.

"But this can be a desirable thing, as well," he added.



IN SUPPORT OF S. 1001 (H. 2870)

Citizens for Participation Politics is a politically-oriented, grass-roots organization concerned with issues at all levels of government. One issue which is of particular concern to us is what happens to our "children in trouble" in Massachusetts. After examining the existing structure in Massachusetts for delinquency preventions and services to youthful offenders, and after reviewing the several investigative studies with their criticisms and recommendations, we wish to express support of S. 1001 (H. 2870) which calls for radical re-organization of the Youth Service Division.

The public has lost confidence in the Massachusetts Division of Youth Service because it has failed in its most important responsibility -- the rehabilitation of youthful offenders and their successful re-integration into society.

The re-commitment of so many children, averaging 50%, to the Youth Service Board institutions, coupled with the history of confinement in Youth Service Board institutions of a large proportion of adult inmates of our Massachusetts state prisons, clearly indicates failure by the Division to provide adequate rehabilitative treatment.

All of the investigative studies of the Youth Service Division in the last several years indicate that the functioning of the Division and its institutions is essentially custodial and punitive and that the fault lies basically not in the Division's philosophy nor in the limitations of its personnel, but in the very structure of the Division itself.

As it presently exists the Division lacks a clear separation of executive and policy-making authority; lines of responsibility are not clearly defined or organized into a comprehensive, coordinated program of delinquency prevention and services to youthful offenders. Moreover, qualifications for the various positions are not well delineated, nor are the positions protected from political interference by inclusion under Civil Service. The Division is particularly flawed in that a non-clinically-professional three-man Board with combined quasi-judicial, clinical and administrative functions has absolute authority for classification, transfer, treatment, parole, and final discharge of children committed to the Division. Decisions of this nature which clearly influence the success or failure of rehabilitation should be made by clinical personnel, through the chief administrator. Clinical personnel must have the authority which is now lacking to develop an effective treatment program.

Such authority is firmly established in S. 1001 (H. 2870). This well-structured plan corrects the obvious inadequacies of the present system which

has the responsibility for the "care, custody and rehabilitation of the state's delinquent children, ages 7 through 16", but not the proper structure to achieve it. Under this bill, radical re-organization will permit a shift in emphasis from custodial and punitive care to a treatment-oriented program with movement away from institutional settings to community based programs.

This bill also is designed to correct such present abuses as prolonged detention and the lumping together of delinquent children with those who are primarily neglected, retarded, or suffering from particular physical or emotional problems. In urging this bill's passage by the Legislature, however, Citizens for Participation Politics is most concerned that what results is not merely a paper re-organization.

If the legislation is to become viable, adequate funds must be provided for implementation of its provisions.

In the past, welfare re-organization and mental health programs and, indeed, Youth Service Division programs have been frustrated by failure of the state to provide the necessary resources to attract high-calibre personnel. We urge the establishment of salaries commensurate with the responsibility and the qualifications of the various positions, particularly those of the Commissioner and Assistant Commissioners of clinical and educational services, and the adequate funding of recommended programs. Without adequate funding, re-organization will be rendered meaningless.

The need for reform is urgent. Massachusetts cannot afford to procrastinate any longer or to short-change its youthful offenders if they are to be returned to society to live as productive human beings. From 1962 to 1968 juvenile delinquency in Massachusetts jumped 73% in the 7 to 17 age group. Concern for the well-being of both the individual offender and society makes it imperative that S. 1001 (H. 2870) be passed and implemented now.

Citizens for Participation Politics, 12th C. D.
 Youth Service Division Study Group,
 Gloria Corbett (Marshfield), Chairman
 Elizabeth Delaney (Hingham)
 Sylvie O'Donnell (Cohasset)
 James Petcoff (Duxbury)
 Frances Reilly (Weymouth)

Eva Marx (Hingham), C. P. P. State Committee
 Representative from the 12th C. D.

March, 1969

STATEMENT OF SUPPORT
FOR BILL S-1001
BY
ROXBURY MULTI-SERVICE CENTER

The Roxbury Multi-Service Center wishes to go on record as supporting, wholeheartedly, the thrust of total reorganization of the Division of Youth Services. We feel that Bill S-1001 is in that spirit, as demonstrated by its major features and guidelines.

The present system is long overdue for total reform, as indicated by the increasing rate of recidivism. In essence, the system does little more than produce graduates in delinquent behavior. Most of these children are convinced at an early age of society's rejection. The experiences of young people while in the care of the Youth Service Board system exposes them to unqualified personnel, often in short supply. As a result of overcrowded conditions, the youth are shifted around to facilities such as Bridgewater, an institution to which no human being should be subjected, particularly not children in need of rehabilitative treatment. This kind of situation, if allowed to continue, will escalate the present 50% rate of recidivism and compound the local communities' problem to deal with increased delinquency and youth crime.

Our Center's workers, in their contacts on behalf of youth with the Juvenile Court and Youth Service Board, as substantiated by our records, have often found that their recommendations to the Youth Service Board have not been implemented, even in cases where our two agencies were in agreement. Adequate testing, diagnostic work-ups and counseling services are not adequately provided because of lack of facilities and qualified personnel to perform these services. We feel that the Youth Service Board all too often ignores the legal rights of committed youth while following a practice of punitive custodial care rather than rehabilitation of young offenders.

For this reason, we are concerned that Bill S-1001 does not provide adequate legal protections for youth under the Division of Youth Services. We are not completely comfortable with a review panel mechanism which may allow clinical judgments to possibly disregard legal rights. We suggest that an appeal mechanism be established which allows youth and their parents to legally challenge review panel decisions which may be questionable.

To the legislators of the Commonwealth, we say that reform of the archaic and inhuman Youth Service Board system is long overdue. The new public awareness of the conditions that exist at the Youth Service Board provides you with the

unusual opportunity to move toward sweeping changes in the system. Bill S-1001 provides some important recommendations in the direction of needed changes. We congratulate the Massachusetts Committee for Children and Youth for their leadership in this matter. You are properly challenged to protect the interest of young people in desperate need of help. Now is the time!

/soh
3/24/69

ORGANIZATIONS THAT HAVE SHOWN PARTICULAR SUPPORT
FOR THE REFORM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES

American Academy of Pediatrics, Massachusetts Chapter
c/o Boston Hospital for Women
221 Longwood, Boston, MA 02115
William D. Cochran, Chairman

Children's Friend and Family Service Society of the
North Shore, Inc.
48 Bridge Street, Salem, MA 01970
Hollis S. French, President

Family Service Association of Greater Boston
34½ Beacon Street, Boston, MA 02108
Franklin T. Hammond, Jr., President

Family Service Association of Greater Lawrence
430 North Canal Street, Lawrence, MA 01840
Kenneth Kopel, Executive Director

Greater Boston Section of the National Council of
Jewish Women
c/o Mrs. Bernard Olshansky
115 Dawson Drive, Needham, MA 02192

Legal Services for Cape Cod and Islands, Inc.
138 Winter Street, Hyannis, MA 02601
Donald H. Barnes, Staff Attorney

The Massachusetts Foster Parent Association
P.O. Box 371, Wellesley, MA 02181
Ann Himmelberger, Secretary

Mass. Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
Norfolk-South Shore District Office
1245 Hancock Street, Quincy, MA 02169
Barbara G. Walsh, District Executive

Massachusetts Sociological Association
c/o Dept. of Sociology and Anthropology, Boston University
232 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215
Louis P. Howe, President

Massachusetts State Federation of Women's Clubs
c/o Mrs. Henry Grebenstein, Corresponding Secretary
15 California Road, Reading, MA 01867

National Association of Social Workers
14 Beacon Street, Boston, MA 02108
Carol Brill, Executive Director

National Conference of Christians and Jews, Inc.
73 Tremont Street, Boston, MA 02108
Richard D. Rand, Executive Director

New England Council of Child Psychiatry
15 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215
Donald S. Gair, M.D., President

The New England Regional Group of the American Association
of Psychiatric Services for Children
c/o Mrs. Netha Bosler
Worcester Youth Guidance Center
275 Tremont Street, Worcester, MA 01604

Northern New England Psychiatric Society, Inc.
6 Beacon Street, Boston, MA 02108
Fred H. Frankel, M.D., President

Worcester Youth Guidance Center
275 Belmont Street, Worcester, MA 01604
John F. Scott, Director

APPENDIX B

THE HEW REPORT ON DYS AND YSB,
1966: A SUMMARY

1. Administrative Organization of the
Division of Youth Service 141
2. Profile of Institutions in Massa-
chusetts, 1966 145

Administrative Organization of the Division of Youth Service

The Youth Service Act of 1948 created the Youth Service Board as one state agency in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to administer institutional and after-care services for youthful and adult offenders sentenced by the courts. In 1952, the Division of Youth Service was created as an administrative unit within the Massachusetts Department of Education amending the Youth Service Act of 1948. The Division of Youth Service was established as a state agency for the treatment and prevention of juvenile delinquency, subject to Chapters 6 and 20 of the General Laws of Massachusetts. Selected topics are being discussed in this essay concerning the agency's structure and its functions.

The director, the Youth Service Board and the Advisory Committee on Services to Youth comprised the main governing bodies of the Division of Youth Service (DYS). The division director and the chairman of the Youth Service Board were the two positions emphasized by the Legislature. Two problems arose: tendency of the director to retain rather than delegate duties and the lack of properly trained personnel. Furthermore, the roles of the director, the

This material was summarized by the author from HEW report, "A study of DYS and YSB, Commonwealth of Massachusetts," August 1966.

Youth Service Board and the Advisory Committee were somewhat confused.

The director, a professional educator who has been in the correctional field for fifteen years, was appointed by the Governor for a six year term. He was chairman of the Youth Service Board and served "at the pleasure of the Governor" (p.15). He was responsible for the daily management of the Division and enjoyed the threefold U.S. governmental role of executive, judicial and legislative proceedings, consulting with the Governor and the Legislature. The director acted as the liaison between the functions of the central offices and those of the institutions. He also dealt with fiscal matters.

Active in public relations, particularly via mass media, the director was involved in all decisions regarding child care from the courts to the Board. Political favoritism pressured the director to appoint certain applicants and caused him to spend too much time in personal matters.

The Youth Service Board was comprised of three members (one female) appointed by the Governor for six year terms. The law stipulated that two members function as deputy directors. It was discovered that these two members had limited roles in administrative matters. They were not consulted about major policies, fiscal and program matters.

By law the Youth Service Board was responsible for the annual inspection of the three county training schools in Essex, Middlesex and Hampden. In addition to delinquent children the Board must accept "wayward" children between seven and seventeen years of age. Any matters concerning the youth's placement, transfer or discharge from custody was administered by the Board in the form of written orders. If the child's parents wished to appeal the Board's order, the central offices of DYS arranged a hearing. It was found that the Youth Service Board's treatment decisions were not consistent with the state agency's release, transfer and after-care decisions.

The Advisory Committee on Service to Youth consisted of fifteen members also appointed by the Governor for six year terms with approval by the Executive Council. The Advisory Committee's duties included: election of chairman; meeting at least six times yearly; recommending candidates to the Governor for appointments to the Youth Service Board; public communication of DYS's programs; preparing recommendations concerning youths' welfare to the director and other officials, and a yearly report concerning youths' problems for the Legislature and the Governor.

Annually DYS presented statistical reports to the Children's Bureau determining youth occupancy in and out of

institutions and into after-care status. Sometimes lack of consistency between institutions and central offices existed when reporting the same statistics. One reason concerned conflicting definitions as to what constituted a commitment or a release.

The absence of a long range plan was the major obstacle to the future development of an effective state program for delinquent children in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. DYS's administrative organizational structure and function contributed to this problem.

Profile of Institutions in Massachusetts, 1966

Physical Plant

- I. Location: in suburbs
- II. Buildings: old, unsafe, inadequate
- III. Population:
 - A. Size:
 - 1. 73-225 (Lyman in recent years more than 400)
 - 2. Exception - Forestry Camp - 30
 - B. Sex: all male except Industrial School for Girls
 - C. Age:
 - 1. 7-17
 - 2. One - just elementary children
 - 3. Three - adolescents
 - 4. Two - all ages

Staff and Organizational Structure

- I. General
 - A. Conflict between administrative, supervisory, clinical and cottage staff
 - 1. Conflict between professional and non-professional staff
 - 2. Little mutual understanding of roles
 - B. Oligarchy
 - 1. Supervisor (head of staff) responsible for all activities of program, particularly admission, release and transfer of youths
 - 2. Staff committee consists of following: superintendent, assistant superintendent, institute psychologist, head of education and training
 - 3. Strong role in institution decision-making for youths
 - C. Chairman-Director of Youth Service Board at DYS carries leadership; superintendent relates directly to Chairman-Director
 - D. Serious staff vacancies in all institutions
- II. Clinical Staff
 - A. Too limited; not included in staff meetings concerning the former's clients
 - B. Counseling oriented to immediate daily problems of youth

1. Diagnostic treatment is limited
2. Main function: to release youth into community; youth's adjustment into institution less important

III. Cottage Staff

- A. Largest single staff group
 1. Least understanding of youth's problems
 2. Average age is over 40; Industrial Schools for Boys and Girls - 52 to 57 years old
- B. Problem
 1. Hardworking but ignorant to dynamics of adolescent
 2. Regimentation and control main objective
 3. Lack of understanding youth's problems causes staff to utilize punitive measures
- C. Conflict between cottage and clinical staff causes confusion to youth

IV. Understaffed

- A. No orientation for new staff; learn thru traditional methods of observing established cottages and experienced staff
- B. Administration has large degree of discipline; staff goes to them with problems

Program: not enough contact and collaboration with DYS

I. Treatment Services: admission, release, after-care

- A. Admission
 1. Superintendent, assistant superintendent, institute psychologist, or supervisor of training and education interviews initially
 2. Counselor assignment is made
 3. Principal: school and cottage placement (specifications: age, maturity level and available space)
 4. Evaluations (written) done either daily, weekly, monthly or bi-yearly
- B. Release
 1. Main function of counseling service
 - *2. Youth Service Board administrates all release referrals sent by superintendent or assistant superintendent
 3. Staff committee meets periodically to review each case and determine readiness for release
 4. Juvenile parole agent assigned to each youth;

upon release acts as intermediary between institution and after-care program; keeps institution informed of youth's progress

C. After-care

1. DYS must make necessary arrangements either to return to community or to foster care; often foster care youths must wait long time until place is found

II. Educational Program: more institutional convenience than place to learn

A. Academic and Vocational

1. Most youths in vocational
2. Biggest problem: curriculum not relevant for job placement after release

B. Academic

1. Limited remedial work: some volunteer work in some institutions
2. Most do not have special classes for mentally retarded; exception: Industrial School for Girls
3. Some have libraries

III. Food

A. Served cafeteria style

1. Prison-like, hurried, impersonal on the whole
2. Separation of staff and youth - some exceptions

B. Quality and quantity varies in each institution

C. Industrial School for Girls grows many of its own vegetables

1. Girls helped pick and harvest - positive experience

IV. Clothing

A. Uniform, little variation

B. Exceptions: Juvenile Guidance and Forestry Camp stress individuality

1. Boys can furnish some of their own clothing

V. Religious

A. All institutions have either full or part-time Protestant and Catholic chaplains

B. Religious services and counseling encouraged

VI. Medical Care

A. Medical and dental services provided either on campus or from local community

B. Industrial School for Girls

1. Pregnant girls live in separate (near hospital) institution until seventh month

2. Transferred to State Hospital
3. After delivery returned to institution

VII. Visiting

- A. Encouraged by all institutions
 1. More frequent and liberal at certain institutions, i.e., Forestry Camp
 2. Parents or relatives can visit at any time
- B. Letter correspondence encouraged at all institutions

VIII. Volunteers

- A. Limited; cannot work at all institutions due to limited staff to supervise
- B. Exist at following places: Forestry Camp, Industrial School for Girls

IX. Financial and Business

- A. Limited funds cause inadequate staff and facilities

X. Discipline

- A. Punitive in nature
 1. Exception: Forestry Camp where prevention is stressed
- B. Relates directly to cottage staff's emphasis of regimentation and control

XI. Public Relations

- A. Limited in most institutions
- B. Exception: Forestry Camp
 1. Functions between camp and community exist
 - a. Youth attend movies, patriotic activities, patronize local stores
 - b. Arrangement with Massachusetts Department of Resources in which boys work in conservation programs five days a week

XII. Recreational

- A. Strength of program varies in different institutions
- B. Limited facilities
 1. Indoor - T.V., radio, ping pong tables, some have lounges
 2. Outdoor - baseball, softball, swimming
 3. Forestry Camp - hiking, nature trips, fishing, boating
- C. Local community utilized by some institutions

APPENDIX C

THE USE OF SECURE ROOMS:
SELECTED DOCUMENTS

Secure Rooms at Industrial Schools for Girls	150
Visit to Industrial School for Girls, Lancaster	163

SECURE ROOMS AT INDUSTRIAL SCHOOLS FOR GIRLS

(Information given by Miss Bode and
Observation by Mrs. Collins, Sept., 1959)

PHILOSOPHY OF USE AND ESTIMATE OF EFFECTIVENESS

Secure rooms are used when the behavior of a girl is so far out of control that she is dangerous to herself, to others, and to property. They are used as a preventive measure if it is believed that a girl is planning to run away. Miss Bode regards the rooms both as a necessary resource for separating the girl from the group and holding her safely, and as a method of punishment which will, by being sufficiently unpleasant, impress upon the girl the need for avoiding placement there in the future.

Miss Bode feels that the program is successful since at no time has there been more than 10% of the population of the school in secure rooms at one time. She cites the figures that in a six-month period of use of the secure unit (this does not include other secure rooms), 61 placements were made of 41 girls. Of these, 26 needed no second placement to keep them from repeating the experience or the poor behavior that brought them there; 9 girls were in the unit twice; and 6 girls more than twice.

PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENTS

Each of the five cottages in use at Lancaster has two secure rooms and there are also two such rooms in use at Fay Cottage, which is otherwise closed. These rooms contain only a built-in wooden bunk. They have a heavily screened window and steel reinforced door in which there is no observation window. There is no heat in these rooms. The rooms seen had not been redecorated as recently as the rest of the cottage.

There are five rooms in the secure unit built into the basement level of Campbell cottage. These rooms are constructed of cement block, are painted yellow with a barred window painted in black. There is indirect heat and ventilation, a built-in bunk, and an observation window in the door. There is a bathroom which serves these rooms.

The hospital has two secure rooms similar to those in the cottages. Six to eight girls live in the hospital unit at all times. These are girls whose sexual behavior or inability to maintain themselves in the larger cottage groups makes a more restricted program necessary. They live in a more controlled program in the hospital, and the secure rooms there are used chiefly for these girls when they become out of control in the hospital unit.

PHYSICAL CARE IN THE SECURE ROOMS

Clothing - For minor infractions, in the cottage secure rooms, girls are usually in their pajamas. In the secure unit, for the most part, girls are naked. Blankets are supplied, these being heavy coverings made of a number of thicknesses of flannel cross-stitched to prevent tearing.

Toileting - Girls are permitted to go to the bathroom at mealtimes and usually once between meals.

Supervision - Girls are fed three times a day and are seen by the matron in charge at that time. They are visited once between mealtimes, either by the nurse, the superintendent, or the assistant superintendent. All such visits to the secure unit are recorded on day sheets kept there. No such records are kept in the cottage secure rooms. At night, girls are checked at intervals of every two hours. More frequently if girl is disturbed.

In Fay cottage, where the two secure rooms are the only rooms occupied, the nurse checks on the girls during the day and the cottage is continuously staffed at night by Assistant Cottage Supervisors, specially assigned.

In instances where it is felt that girls may prove intractable, two men of the regular grounds personnel are called to assist in placing the girl in a room. If the girl goes at the request of the woman staff member, the men walk

along. If not, the men take her to the room forcibly. Due to some recent difficulties, it is now a policy that no man will go after a runaway girl unless accompanied by a woman staff member.

When the girl is placed in a secure room, the men wait outside with the door open, but out of sight, until the girl has undressed so that if she should attack the staff member, the man may be called in to help.

Food - Girls are given a light breakfast, a full dinner without dessert, and sandwiches and milk for supper. In the secure unit, paper utensils are used.

Counseling - Girls may be seen by their counselors while they are in secure rooms, but this is not done regularly or routinely.

Mail, Visitors - Permitted at the discretion of the superintendent--who may refuse either or both if she feels that the girl will profit by this punishment.

No reading matter or any other pastime is permitted in the room.

OFFENSES REQUIRING PLACEMENT IN SECURE ROOMS

Girls are placed in secure rooms following attempted or actual runaway; for disturbances in the cottage, including assaults on other girls or on personnel; for refusal

to conform to rules or direction from cottage personnel or schoolteachers. No hard and fast rules exist as to the penalty for these offenses in length of stay or degree of security. Each case is dealt with individually by the superintendent or the assistant superintendent.

Returnees from parole usually spend three or four days locked in rooms, but these are usually not secure rooms and this penalty may be waived in certain cases. It is regarded as a health measure, to prevent the possibility of contagion.

DEGREE OF SECURITY

This depends on the judgment of the superintendent or assistant superintendent--no other member of the staff may place a girl in a secure room. Some girls may be placed in a cottage secure room or in the secure unit for a few hours or overnight if it is felt that they are contemplating runaway or are on the verge of loss of control. The length of stay varies from a matter of hours to three days. Whether a girl remains in the cottage or goes to the secure unit or to Fay or the hospital is individually determined by the superintendent on the basis of the severity of her offense and her need for restraint or punishment.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON PRESENT USE OF SECURE ROOMS

A visit was made to the I.S. Girls on February , and secure rooms in a cottage visited, as well as those in the secure unit in Campbell. The day book in Campbell was reviewed, only sheets for the past two days being seen. The use of the rooms was discussed with Miss Bode and she gave me the report of a study she had had made of the use of the secure unit and of runaways for the past six months.

While the study submitted by Miss Bode has some interest, especially in the listing of offenses for which girls were sent to the secure unit, it is not accurate as a gauge of the use of security. It does not list the use of cottage secure rooms so that it is not possible to tell how many days were spent by the girls in secure rooms but only in the secure unit. The study was made for the six-month period ending on February 16, 1959 which, of course, includes girls who are currently at the School and who may still go to the unit. Three girls were actually in the unit at the time the study ends. Since the study was for six months only, it is impossible to know how many times during her full stay at the School any one girl was in a secure room.

Miss Bode stated that no girl is kept in a secure room more than three days, yet reading the figures as sub-

mitted in the report, it would appear that girls do stay for periods up to five days.

It would appear that if girls are to be placed in secure rooms, certain safeguards must be instituted. These are discussed below.

REPORT TO BOSTON OFFICE

In the monthly report should be included the number of girls placed in secure rooms during the month and the duration of such placement. This should include all the secure rooms on the grounds.

PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENT OF ROOMS

It appears to be adequate in that there are nineteen such rooms available. If the figure of 10% of the population under penalty at one time is accepted as permissible, then this number should suffice even if the population were to increase considerably. Whether or not this is, in fact, a figure accepted by training school authorities, I do not know, and have not seen it so stated.

PHYSICAL CARE IN THE SECURE ROOMS

Clothing - For the most part, it would appear advisable that girls be placed in secure rooms adequately and decently dressed. If it is felt necessary for a girl to be stripped to assure absence of any weapons or other tools with which

she might hurt others or herself, then this can be done and she be provided with adequate fresh clothing. The argument in favor of placing girls in secure rooms naked is that they can then not use their clothes as means for self-destruction. In most enlightened mental hospitals, such a practice is no longer followed and a girl bent on self-destruction could readily accomplish this by jumping from the bunk into the sharp projection of the wall in the secure unit. If proper supervision is maintained, the chance of this is minimized. If it is felt that a girl is seriously self-destructive, she should not be kept in the School, since isolation will only intensify this problem.

It would appear that stripping the girls is chiefly used as a way of punishing them, since it is a well-known practice in old style prisons and is seen as humiliating and corrective because of its effect. It would appear that it is not appropriate when used for young girls. Nor would it stand public scrutiny as a practice in a modern training school. It is strongly recommended that this practice be abandoned.

Toileting - Seems to be adequately managed, as far as it was possible to observe. There have been reports that girls soiled themselves and that the rooms had an unpleasant odor. Whether this is deliberate, or unintentional on the part of

very disturbed children, or the result of poor attention to toileting, cannot be determined at this time. No odor was present when I was there.

Supervision - Appears to be inadequate and not sufficiently carefully controlled. There appears to be no set time either for meals or for checking in the daytime. The day book showed that dinner was served at 2 o'clock on several days.

While the state law (see appendix) has been rewritten and the section which applies to juveniles omitted (no doubt because it was not appropriately included under adult corrections), yet it reflects the general feeling of the legislature and citizens concerning supervision of secure rooms and it would seem that the School should comply at least with its minimum requirements. Day sheets should be kept for cottage secure rooms, too, and visits regularly scheduled at intervals of one hour and so recorded.

Aside from the legal aspects, it is well to remember that illness can be acute and sudden. If the girl who recently suffered from an ectopic pregnancy had been in a secure room in Fay cottage or the unit, she might well have bled to death before anyone had known of it.

It is self-evident that for any system of efficient checking, there must be observation windows in every room, not only in those in the secure unit.

It appears necessary to have men assist in placing girls in secure rooms since many matrons are unable to do so and should not be required to do so. It is important to bear in mind that many of these girls have had such difficulties with men that they are not rational in their feelings toward them. For this reason, it would seem something of a risk to have a young man used in this situation although it is agreed that it is difficult at times for the older men to control the girls. It would appear that if this is necessary, the administration must be prepared for the wild stories that will be told to parents and other members of the public. (One wonders why an able bodied young man should choose to work at the training school.)

Heat - The secure rooms in the cottages are not heated as there is no heat supplied to any of the cottage bedrooms. However, the other rooms get heat from the halls when their doors are open, and since the secure rooms are on the corners of the building and closed, they get very cold. If this condition cannot be remedied, attention should be given to supplying the girls with warmer clothing and with more comfortable blankets than the stiff, hard ones now used. State hospitals have blankets which could be imitated. As the girls are chiefly inactive in the rooms, it is important that they have some adequate means of keeping warm.

Food - In the day book, sandwiches and milk were recorded for both dinner and supper. The superintendent said this had been recently changed to allow a hot dinner, but without dessert. In some cottages, it appeared that girls were kept on sandwiches and milk in the secure rooms. The best training school practice calls for supplying normal meals at all times. Sandwiches were argued on a basis of practicality but it is in fact as easy to place a plate of food that is currently being served on a tray as to make sandwiches. Meals should be served on time and regularly.

Counseling - It is considered that with delinquents, counseling is often especially successful in times of crisis and stress. For this reason counselors should be required to see their counselees in secure rooms daily. This can also be valuable to administration in judging the emotional condition of the girl. Counselors should make brief reports of their findings to the superintendent daily.

Bedding - No mattresses are at present supplied, although, on the permission of the superintendent, a girl may sometimes take her own mattress into a secure room if placed there for a minor infraction. Mattresses should be supplied for every secure room. Such mattresses exist and are not prohibitively expensive. They are supplied to mental hospitals and are durable, cannot be mutilated, and are easy to keep

clean. There would seem to be no reason for having girls lie all day and night on wooden bunks. One cannot overlook the impressions of YSB methods that would be gained by an investigator who found naked girls of 13 and 14 lying on bare bunks in unheated locked rooms.

OFFENSES REQUIRING PLACEMENT IN SECURE ROOMS

While the superintendent states that there are no set penalties for the use of the secure rooms, there is considerable feeling among the girls that certain acts like runaways will result in placement in a secure room. One girl, it is seen from the institution report, even used this knowledge to avoid a visit home that she dreaded. It is important that placement in a secure room not be seen as a cure-all punishment.

Parole visitors report a high degree of anxiety on the part of returnees concerning placement in isolation. There appears to be no validity in the practice of keeping some parolees in secure rooms because of the danger of contagion. This practice is not pursued at all YSB institutions and it would appear to have no effect on the fate of disease in the institution. If isolation is prescribed medically, of course, it must be carried out. Otherwise, since a girl is already being penalized for poor behavior in the community by being returned, she should not be fur-

ther penalized by isolation. In the cases where girls are returned because their failure was due to inadequate families and poor supervision, it is obviously unfair to penalize them further.

August 2, 1960

VISIT TO INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL FOR GIRLS,
LANCASTER

On Tuesday morning, August 2, 1960, I visited Campbell Cottage, the Security Unit at the Industrial School for Girls.

I walked in--front door unlocked and went downstairs where two (2) girls were in secure cells - no matron was present. Went up to second floor--found Mrs. Johnstone, who was supervising 20 girls on the second floor, and asked her to come back downstairs with me and open up locked cells. She did this and I talked with two girls, one Patricia Danjou, who was clothed in nightdress and said she was in punishment for being the leader in a group of four girls at Fay cottage that had screamed out vile language after 10 P.M. out of their cottage windows.

The other girl, Donna Stickney, was naked except for a single security blanket draped partially about her. Mrs. Johnstone explained she had jumped out a second story window and was unmanageable and had been placed by force in the cell the previous Friday. She was four days in the cell without clothing.

I then went to the Administration building and discussed the whole matter with Miss Bode.

Miss Bode admitted that she had a letter dated April, 1959 from Mr. Coughlan, the Director of the Division and Chairman of the Board, to the effect that pajamas or night clothes would be supplied every girl regardless of behavior. However, she said she felt she was only using the same measures which they do in mental hospitals when she gave the orders to have Donna stripped of her clothing. I asked if a man was present while this was done and she admitted that a workman had helped Mrs. Murray, the matron in charge of the hospital and Security Unit, but that the man was outside the room while the girl was undressing.

I did see a workman, Mr. Cobb, with Mrs. Murray as I was leaving the Security Unit and they were coming over for Donna Stickney. Clothes were given Donna by Mrs. Murray and Mr. Cobb waited outside the cell. Donna was then removed from the Security Unit and brought by Mrs. Murray and Mr. Cobb to the Hospital Unit.

Miss Bode further stated, in defense of her actions of directly violating an administrative order of the Director of the Division, that the Board Members would have to provide more help to keep a matron on duty outside the security cells if nightclothing was mandatory and would also have to share the responsibility of whatever would result.

I said I would report this to the Director but I knew his strong feelings were that all girls would be given night clothing and that no girls would be stripped in the presence of men.

I then asked Miss Bode to accompany me to all the cottages where I examined the secure cells. There was one girl in security in the hospital. There were no girls in secure cells in the cottages but there were three (3) girls in punishment, locked in their own rooms in Fay cottage. I asked to speak to each of these three girls. There was considerable difficulty opening the doors and Miss Bode had to send for the matron and another set of keys. I pointed out the serious fire hazard and Miss Bode agreed and said further she did not think the \$5,000 appropriation should be used to fix Fay cottage--it is too old and too far gone. The doors on the rooms are narrow and hard to replace.

Miss Bode felt that the general behavior in the school was very good and she mentioned that it is generally considered good when less than 10% of the population is in punishment. She was well within this limit.

em:les

Cecelia McGovern, Ph.D.

APPENDIX D

RECIDIVISM STUDY, 1972

Data compiled

by

William Bazzy

of the

Department of Youth Services

under the Direction of the Investigator,

September 1972 166

Analysis 172

TO: Yitzhak Bakal, Assistant Commissioner for
Evaluation Training and Research

FROM: William Bazzy

DATE: September 1972

RECIDIVISM STUDY

Data from the 1969-1971 time period shows a decline in recidivism. The following figures are based on every boy from the Boston area (Region VI) paroled from Lyman School during this time span. They measure the boys' performance in the first 12 months after parole. Recidivism is broken down into 2 categories--recommitment and arrest while on parole with no recommitment:

1969	recommitted 72%)	Total 86% Recidivism Rate
	rearrested 14%)	
1970	recommitted 71%)	Total 84% Recidivism Rate
	rearrested 13%)	
1971	recommitted 42%)	Total 72% Recidivism Rate
	rearrested 30%)	

The most significant aspect of this data is the drop-in recommitments. Increasing numbers of parolees who were arrested by police were not returned to institutions. There arises a strong implication that not only were DYS policy and program changes responsible for improvements, but that other elements of the juvenile justice system, courts and police, for example, have begun to respond to new approaches and attitudes of the department.

Supplementing the basic recidivism statistics are a series of correlations (age, race, length of confinement, etc.) which can begin to give us some idea of what the data

means. These are not intended to be explanations of cause,
but they are a start in that direction.

Area	% of total from this area	Number Recom- mitted	Number Rearrested Only	Number with no re- cidivism	Recommitment Rate	Recommitment rate plus rearrest rate
Brighton	2%	0	0	3	0	0
Roslindale	1%	0	0	1	0	0
Dorchester - Mattapan	33%	32	12	9	60%	83%
Roxbury	29%	26	8	10	59%	77%
South Boston	7%	8	1	1	80%	90%
Jamaica Plain	7%	8	1	2	72%	81%
Chelsea	9%	12	0	1	93%	93%
Charlestown	3%	4	0	0	100%	100%
West Roxbury	1%	0	1	0	0	100%
Revere	4%	4	1	0	80%	100%
Hyde Park	2%	1	1	0	50%	100%
Everett	1%	0	1	0	0	100%

Table D-1 RECIDIVISM BREAKDOWN, REGION VI, 1969-1971

Race	% of total	Number Re- committed	Number Rearrest- ed Only	Number with no Recidivism	Recommitment Rate	Recommitment Rate plus Rearrest rate	% Arrested that are Recommitted
Black	54%	51	16	16	61%	81%	76.1
White	46%	$\frac{43}{94}$	$\frac{13}{29}$	$\frac{13}{29}$	62%	81%	76.8

Table D-2 RECIDIVISM BREAKDOWN, BY RACE, 1969-1971

Age	% in this age group	Number Recommitted	Number Re-arrested only	Number with no Recidivism	Recommitment Rate	Recommitment Rate plus Rearrest Rate
12	2%	1	1	1	33%	67%
13	9%	13	0	1	93%	93%
14	33%	39	5	7	76%	86%
15	34%	35	8	10	66%	81%
16	21%	13	10	10	40%	70%
17	1%	1	0	1	50%	50%

Table D-3 RECIDIVISM BREAKDOWN, BY AGE, 1969-1971

ANALYSIS OF DATA PREPARED BY
BILL BAZZY, BY THE INVESTIGATOR, 1972

Every boy from the Boston Area* paroled from Lyman School during the years 1969-1971 inclusive was followed up for a twelve-month period following parole. A total of 152 boys were involved in the recidivism study ranging in ages from 12 to 17. Eighty-three (83) boys were black and sixty-nine (69) boys were white. Recidivism data was broken down into three main categories: (1) no recidivism, (2) arrest with no recommitment, and (3) arrest and recommitment; and further broken down as follows: by age, prior parole cycles; months at Lyman before parole; offenses leading to recommitment; number of months between parole and arrest without recommitment; number of months between parole and recommitment dates; offenses leading to arrest without recommitment; offenses leading to arrest and recommitment.

The major findings of the study are as follows:

- Boys paroled in 1969 and 1970 showed comparable recommitment and arrest without recommitment rates totaling 86 and 84 percent respectively. Boys paroled in 1971, however, showed a drop in recommitments and arrests without recommitments to 72 percent. The recommitment rate among 1971 parolees also dropped from about 71 percent to 42 percent, while the arrests without recommit-

* Region VI of DYS covering Boston and Everett.

ment increased in 1971 to 30 percent as compared with about 13 percent among 1969-1970 parolees. Thus, fewer boys paroled in 1971 were rearrested in the subsequent 12 months compared with boys paroled in 1969-1970, and a larger percentage of those rearrested were not recommitted and returned to institutions. The data suggests the first signs of the impact of new DYS policies and programs, but also changes in court disposition practices.

- The percentage of boys paroled in 1969-1971 that are recommitted after arrest is high--76 percent-- which is the same for black and white youth. Likewise, the number arrested with or without recommitment is high--81 percent; in other words, only 19 percent did not recidivate, which did not vary by race. Boys paroled from Lyman in 1969-1971 were likely to be (re)arrested in the 12 months following release and, when arrested, their chances of recommitment to DYS were 3:1, regardless of race. Based on population, however, a disproportionate number of blacks in Region VI were likely to be arrested, institutionalized, rearrested and reinstitutionalized. Furthermore, the numbers recidivating from Dorchester, Mattapan and Roxbury constitute over 60 percent of the total released from Lyman and recidivating. However, the percentage with no recidivism and arrested without recommitment from these three areas is about the average of Region VI as a whole.
- The age group with the largest number of arrests and commitments were 14 and 15-year-olds. However, 13-year-old boys showed the highest rate of recommitment. In fact, every 13-year-old rearrested was recommitted. The older the youth, the lower the recidivism rate. Almost half of the recidivists were 14 or under.
- Over one-third of the boys had been in DYS institutions only once, at Lyman, and had never been on parole before. The rearrest rate did not vary significantly by the number of times previously institutionalized and paroled. About half of the boys had been at Lyman for 3-6 months. There was no clear statistical correlation between recidivism and length of stay at Lyman. Less than 10 percent

of the group studied was at Lyman longer than 6 months. However, the majority of those paroled who did not recidivate were at Lyman 4-6 months; 80 percent of those boys who did not recidivate were at Lyman 6 months or less. Almost the majority of boys arrested and recommitted within 12 months after release violated their parole within 4 months after leaving Lyman. For boys arrested but not recommitted, almost the majority also were arrested within 4 months of leaving Lyman.

APPENDIX E

MILLER AND THE MEDIA:
SELECTED QUOTATIONS, 1969-1973

The Christian Science Monitor
Worcester Telegram
Boston Globe
Allston-Brighton Citizen Item
Lowell Sun
Worcester Gazette
Malden News
Salem News
North Adams Transcript
Recorder Gazette
Boston Herald Traveler
Amesbury News
Boston After Dark
Fort Lauderdale News
Waltham News Tribune
Beverly Times
Springfield News

The Christian Science Monitor November 10, 1969

"The best treatment for a child might be a close relationship with the institution's groundskeeper. This idea is often verbalized, in a romantic sort of way, but it's not often meant. I mean it".

"Kids also can help each other a great deal within an institution. Since there is interaction among them, we must be aware of it and try to see what goes on".

"If you start with the premise that a child is vicious, a wild dog, an animal, chances are very good that this is how he'll come through for you. We've all been guilty of this. Even professional clinicians who latch onto words like 'psychopath' and 'sociopath', words which give sanction to brutalize someone".

"In a wide way my orientation is that of a humanist. I do not believe, for instance, in using children as confined guinea pigs to test new drugs. The ethics of this are very questionable, since one never really has a volunteer in a prison, no matter what they call themselves".

"Nor do I believe in manipulating kids by means aimed solely at control without interest in true understanding".

"Controlling young people is often society's way of avoiding looking at itself. It is always easy to pick out a kid and then either punish him or recondition him to conform -- and never look at what might be rational in even the seemingly most violent, horrifying, despicable behavior".

"When discipline becomes punitive, retributive, it is not effective as character training. True discipline is".

"The original meaning of the word discipulus involved identification with someone loved or respected. Control should come from this type of discipline from identification with institution staff members as models".

DR. MILLER'S PHILOSOPHY ON THE TREATMENT OF JUVENILES

Worcester Telegram February 6, 1970

"I'm all for respect and discipline, but ultimately there are other ways to control kids than brute force".

"One wouldn't punish one's own 16-year-old by taking away his clothes and shutting him in a closet".

Boston Globe March 8, 1970

"The best treatment for a particular boy or girl may be the opportunity to work with the cook or the maintenance man".

"Most of the boys and girls who end up with us made their first mistake by being born to parents who are poor, disenfranchised, and have no voice in the political structure".

"Once you cut a boy's hair and put him in a uniform, labeling him as a criminal, he feels that from that moment on he is a criminal".

Allston-Brighton Citizen Item May 14, 1970

"In this type of a model (therapeutic community approach), we involve the kids and the staff closely. We want our boys to achieve a different kind of self-control -- discipline through peer group pressure".

"The human ethics of the situation have to teach us how to treat delinquents. We have to begin to take responsibility for the products of our society and for the treatment we mete out".

"If we define a youth as delinquent, chances are he will grow into that role. We do a disservice to those in institutions.

Lowell Sun June 7, 1970

"You can take a boy with long hair and cut it off, even if you have to handcuff him. But if long dirty hair is described as outlandish and weird by a peer group, pretty soon the boy will go on his own and have it trimmed".

DR. MILLER'S PHILOSOPHY ON THE TREATMENT OF JUVENILES

Lowell Sun June 7, 1970

"It's a dangerous period, though. Youngsters can misuse this freedom to express his feelings. If he's used to saying what he thinks you want him to say, it's a big step to be really honest. But in the long run, he will stop 'conning' you and begin to be truthful".

Worcester Gazette January 5, 1972

"It is easy for us to say we should lock up these youths (recidivists) and throw away the key, but over 99 percent of these youths will be released into our society again. Under our present system, many are more dangerous when they are released than when they were sent to our institutions".

Malden News March 31, 1972

"You can't lock them up forever, and locking them up for a great length of time leads to their inability to function in society".

"If you treat kids decently, there's no need to lock them up".

Salem News December 4, 1972

"The whole theory of isolation and then restoring a youth to the community doesn't work. The youth is changed but in the wrong way".

Transcript (North Adams) January 4, 1973

"I think some kids who commit murder should walk the streets with supervision".

Recorder Gazette January 5, 1973

"Reform of institutions is impossible. Prison reform is a contradiction in terms".

"If there are people you have to lock up, you've got to be sure that you lock them up for a very long time. It's problematical if you can say of any kid that he's salvageable".

DR. MILLER'S PHILOSOPHY ON THE TREATMENT OF JUVENILES

Recorder Gazette January 5, 1973

"Institutions of their nature are violent. They create violence. There'll always be an argument about the truly dangerous, and who is dangerous. But 90-95 percent of the kids who come to us have nothing to do with violence".

"Four or five of the 2,200 kids we have are in for murder or manslaughter, and a couple of dozen for assault".

"But that doesn't relate to the thousands and thousands of kids who are harmed by being institutionalized".

"So long as you have the dumping grounds, the community is unwilling to provide alternatives. You almost have to get rid of them first".

Boston Globe January 14, 1973

"Some judges think that as soon as they put on a robe they become experts on delinquency".

"It's a political self-deception game based on old wives tales that have nothing to do with the facts. Many kids are victimized by this, particularly black kids and particularly by the Boston Juvenile Court. Kids are much more likely to be defined as dangerous if they're black. Sure, there are some marvelous judges and probation officers, but they're the exception. Too many people are toying with the lives of disenfranchised youngsters and their impoverished families and an awful lot of kids are criminalized by this process. Some courts, frankly, are quite racist. In Boston Juvenile Court, a black youngster has a much more difficult time than a white youngster".

DR. MILLER'S PHILOSOPHY ON INSTITUTIONS

The Christian Science Monitor November 10, 1969

"The hole (solitary confinement) is the ultimate threat which holds together a violent, punitive institution. I don't plan to have any in the system. If there are any now, I'll get rid of them".

"This will separate the men from the boys -- that is, the professionals from the others -- among the staff of a therapeutic institution".

"Few inmates really need maximum security, and those who do, don't need it all the time".

"Wardens seldom talk about recidivism. The return rate. They'll discuss their budgets, staff morale, frequency of incidents among inmates. But all these things are irrelevant to the basic task of cutting down on delinquency, of making people less prone to get in trouble".

"If institutions do not fulfill this task, they have no reason for being -- unless one plans to keep people there forever".

"I think one can be very human and run an institution in which the experience is helpful, self-realizing, self-actualizing -- and still give society its protection from those persons who are in fact dangerous".

"A really good therapeutic community can have within it certain innovative elements which should be of interest to the community at large. It can be warm and humanizing in ways that are often lost in contemporary society".

"I would not be particularly disturbed if now and then a kid ran away from his community to get into one of our institutions".

"We must bring community factors into the clinical discussion. Ideally, the institution should be small and located as close to the community as possible. All the research about large institutions away from home shows that they do more harm than good".

DR. MILLER'S PHILOSOPHY ON INSTITUTIONS

The Christian Science Monitor November 10, 1969

"There's no reason to close people out of an institution. In fact, to the degree that an institution is closed to the community, to that degree it's in trouble".

"Prison walls, supposedly there to protect the community, often serve to protect the organization staff from scrutiny".

The Christian Science Monitor February 2, 1970

"Who could argue, for example, with a call to 'open up' institutions and 'make them more responsive to new ideas'".

"If our programs are not related to the world as it is, they do a disservice to the kids and to the communities from which they come".

"Many kids in our facilities are trained to live in totalitarian societies; when they're released, they don't know how to handle their freedom. This is what we must change".

Boston Globe February 4, 1970

"Generally, our correctional institutions have produced more criminals than they have prevented".

Institutions must "first be debrutalized, then de-institutionalized, made smaller and in some cases eliminated".

Boston Globe March 8, 1970

"We must eliminate the little totalitarian societies which dominated the juvenile institutions in the past. Most of the units were set up so that their successful kids could only function in a dictatorship".

DR. MILLER'S PHILOSOPHY ON INSTITUTIONS

Boston Globe March 8, 1970

"Frequent use of solitary confinement is more often a sign of management failure than a treatment technique".

"The hallmark of our institutions should be doors that swing in, at least, to the community, and bring volunteers, visitors, and families of the kids to see them".

"A staff member alone was often judge, jury and prosecutor in regard to particular incidents, with facts grossly distorted to protect the staff. From now on, I will ask for state police investigation in cases of obvious brutality".

Boston Globe March 11, 1970

"It would be better to start with innovative educational programs and specialized tutoring within the institutions. We should not continue to copy methods of schools which have already failed these children".

Allston-Brighton Citizen Item May 14, 1970

"The repeater rate for our boys is from between 65 and 85 percent. The younger a boy comes to an institution, the greater are his chances for a return trip. If you continue to turn out more criminals after treatment, something is obviously wrong".

"The ones who made it in our system fail on the outside and vice versa. Once the boy who obeys our orders is out, he often retaliates against society. We must take the responsibility for our own actions. Right now we're basically an insane institution".

Lowell Sun June 6, 1970

"You can control runaways. You can produce model institutional kids by brute force and fear if that's what you want to reassure legislators, the police or the community. Lock doors, handcuff kids to their beds and you'll have no runs. But they will get out; they have learned to con the adults".

DR. MILLER'S PHILOSOPHY ON INSTITUTIONS

Lowell Sun June 7, 1970

"The average delinquent youngster in Massachusetts would really be better off if he never sees the inside of our detention institutions".

"These institutions do more positive harm than good. We run crime school instead of rehabilitation centers, as the situation is today".

"I believe that it is because of the treatment they receive in the institutions that kids get into deeper trouble".

"The cold fact is that the institutional approach is punitive; it is such a failure that it increases the crime rate".

"It costs more to keep a boy at Bridgewater than it does to send him to Harvard".

"The Mansons of our time are the logical outcome of institutional treatment, yet only now are people waking up to the need for something new".

"While we continue to protect the community, we must also make the 'institutions' that exist more humane".

"The time is a dead loss educationally, to say nothing of the wrong kind of criminal instruction he picks up from association with the older boys". (Dr. Miller on training schools.)

Amesbury News February 3, 1972

"These (county training) schools are so terribly destructive that almost any alternative for the treatment of truants is preferable to their continued institutionalization".

Dr. Miller suggested that truancy "has very little to do with education but is often a symptom of serious family-related problems or problems with the youngster's peer group. In no instance does it seem to me that training schools are the answer".

DR. MILLER'S PHILOSOPHY ON INSTITUTIONS

Boston After Dark February 8, 1972

Commenting on Cottage 9 at Shirley: "If you have to resort to isolation, you're admitting that your system doesn't work".

"The trouble with most prison systems is that they take their best bets, guys who are going to make it anyway, and pour them into decent programs. I don't believe in isolating the so-called hardcore. It's a cop out".

"It doesn't take long to give a baldy haircut, or to rap a kid's head against a wall, or to lock him in isolation. If I win, my successor won't be able to do these things. It will be too late".

"We've got to prove that there are better ways than Shirley and Lyman. Society says it wants rehabilitation. We're calling society's bluff".

"I do not want machine-like institutions. I want spontaneity, openness to ideas from outsiders".

"We're going to win it".

Fort Lauderdale News February 9, 1972

"We made a basic decision after I took this job two years ago that it would do no good to pump more money and more programs into the existing system because the system can chew up reforms faster than you can dream up new ones. It is a sick system that destroys the best efforts of everyone in it and we decided to look for alternatives".

"Whatever the arrangement, the thrust is the same -- to get the kid out of an impersonal institution and into a more personal situation where he or she can be worked with more intensively".

Boston Globe March 24, 1972

"We are reaping the results of this 100-year-old system. Some 75 to 100 lifers in Walpole Prison are graduates of youth training schools".

DR. MILLER'S PHILOSOPHY ON INSTITUTIONS

Boston Herald Traveler March 24, 1972

"The bureaucratic structure insures violence and we shouldn't be surprised when the violence breaks out" (in prison).

In the past, Miller said, "We have given a professional blessing to the mishandling of prison inmate problems".

News Tribune (Waltham) March 24, 1972

"The real danger is the institutions where it is possible for the officials to tell a youngster they will take his clothes away and lock him in a closet, and really do it".

Malden News March 31, 1972

"We're trying to come up with alternatives to the marching, the silence, the repression, and the other insane systems of the training schools which have never done much good".

"You may have achieved public safety while they're in there, but watch out when they open the doors!"

"When I asked how many of them (74 'lifers' at Walpole State Prison) had spent time in training schools, nearly everyone in the room raised their hands. In view of this the correctional administration should ask of themselves what did we do to create this situation".

Dr. Miller charged that training schools "teach people how to hate, ostracize them, and giving them no social skills".

Beverly Times December 4, 1972

"The system, in its 100-year-old history, has been based on isolation of the young social deviant between seven and seventeen years of age. This system did nothing to educate, or to rehabilitate the young offender, but it has come back to haunt us as a society; many of the prisoners involved in violence in recent months at the prisons or who have escaped or have murdered, first came

DR. MILLER'S PHILOSOPHY ON INSTITUTIONS

under the Department as youthful offenders of 12 and 14 years of age for such minor crimes as 'stealing a candy bar'. Today boys are held for breaking and entering, stealing cars, etc., and the girls are held as 'stubborn children' usually under complaint from their mothers, or as runaways -- neither of which would be a crime if they were adults".

Springfield News January 6, 1973

"Institutionalization is the backbone of the existing system. Until it is dealt with, no reform will be effective or long lived".

"Large institutions should be closed as soon as possible. They should be bulldozed. If institutions are there, they will be used and if they are defined for the use of a 'type' of criminal, enough of that type will be created to assure the life of the institution".

APPENDIX F

THE MEDIA'S REACTION TO REFORM:
SELECTED EXAMPLES, 1970-1973

Lowell Sun
Boston Globe
Boston Sunday Advertiser
U.S. News and World Report
Taunton Gazette
Worcester Gazette
Boston Herald Traveler and Record American
Patriot Ledger
Lawrence Eagle Tribune

Shirley school changes

Monday
Nov. 30, 1970

The Lowell Sun, in response to growing public interest in the changes of theory and method effected at the Shirley Industrial School since the installation of Dr. Jerome Miller as head of Youth Services in Massachusetts, sent a staff reporter to the school to study the situation. The following is the first in a series of five articles.

"Kids all want to be a success. Unfortunately, on the streets our models have been athletes and singers. We really didn't see the doctors and lawyers, and when you looked at your best friends, they were hustling."

Arnold Kemp
Black poet and Novelist
Harvard, Ph.D

(Kemp spent 1960-67 in State prison for armed robbery)

By ERIC BEST
Sun Staff Reporter

SHIRLEY — The boy sighs and turns his dark eyes towards the grey and yellow stone buildings of the Shirley Industrial School. The afternoon sky has dropped a greyness over the grounds and his reflection stares back at him from the car window. It is a vision of himself he cannot escape.

"It's a strange world we live in here," he says, resignedly. His mouth makes a clicking noise and he shakes his head. "Yeah, man, when you're bored you want to run, and if you run you have to come back and be bored longer."

The Shirley Industrial School is suffering through the trauma of change. For 61 years, since the state took the school from the Shakers to use as a detention school for juveniles, the school has been founded on the same archaic precepts of regimented incarceration.

For 61 years the boys were taught to farm or learn trades. For 61 years they were marched about the grounds in mandatory groups, regimented in silence. The rules were stringent and the punishment quick and severe.

Now, under Dr. Jerome Miller, new head of Youth Services under which Massachusetts delinquents are sent to the school, the theory and practice of the institution has undergone an about-face.

Change sudden

To the staff, the boys, and the community of Shirley the shock of change has been sudden and extreme. The change has brought confusion to the boys, fear to the community, and conflict to the new and old staff.

But the new system is bringing hope where before there was despair. It is searching out solutions to problems that the old system only contained. It is an area to which Massachusetts may look and see that mankind is displaying the courage of its conscience.

The boy is sitting in a visitor's car. When asked why he wants to sit there he says he doesn't know, but it is clear from his fondling of the vinyl seats and repeated testing of the roll-down window that the car represents something to him.

It is the forbidden object of the school, unspoken but clearly out of reach. It is speed, freedom, determinism, financial success and independence.

It is the endpoint achievement of going through school, working at a successful job and receiving consistent paychecks. From his life on the streets it is one of life's few benefits he believes in.

This boy might be where he is for one or more of many reasons. He could be a stubborn child whose difficult behavior became too much for his

parents. He might have stolen a car or skipped school repeatedly, been convicted of using drugs or a variety of other offenses. The causes of the transgressions are too numerous and complex to attempt explaining.

The Shirley Industrial School is faced with the task of uncovering the background and effecting rehabilitation.

New rehabilitation idea

The school has recently begun application of a new idea in delinquency rehabilitation, Miller says. Modeled after techniques used at the Highfield School in New Jersey and a similar school in Redwing, Minnesota, the central idea of the new technique is "guided group interaction." The boys are directed to accept each other as they are, without putting on the various defenses that often constitute delinquent behavior on the outside, according to Paul DeMuro, Shirley School psychologist.

Most of Shirley's students have at one time or other felt either rejected, unimportant, unwanted, or not counted as human beings. As members of the "street community," often in ghetto areas, they have learned the value of the "con," the smooth persuader who exploits others and somehow gains the advantage in a disadvantaged life.

A sense of guilt and unimportance palls their experience. They stop seeing any reason to care about others, to care even about themselves.

"Kids here hate themselves and take it out on the outside world, or on themselves," one boy concedes. They begin to suspect that nothing makes any difference.

So delinquency ceases to be a crime or even a wrong. It is a ticket to recognition within their peer group. A stolen car or the cash snatched from an unclutched purse provides them with activity, popularity, distinctiveness. The positive value system that society extolls is replaced by a negative system. And in their terms it works.

Impatience on all sides is the great complicator. The Shirley people are frantic to have the escapes stopped. The boys are impatient to be freed. Even the legal system is impatient. Judge Arthur Williams of the Third District Court in Ayer, in the Gunn case, said he "had a duty to the people in Shirley and the district . . . and if the treatment will not be successful, maybe the punishment will be."

If Judge Williams imagined that the boy would go to prison thinking "I'm never going to go wrong again," he was being patently naive. Punishment for running is hardly going to replace treatment to prevent running. Running on the part of a boy means that impatience within him has overtaken teaching from without. And the teaching takes time.

Runs from the school have been overblown, misconstrued to be more serious and numerous than they are in a practical sense, and they have been politicized. Public reports are that between Jan. 1 and Oct. 16, 325 escapes have taken place from the Shirley Industrial School.

Report false

This selection of part of the truth leads the public to believe that 325 different individuals have escaped from the school. This is false. The statistic also leads people to believe that the boys are seldom returned and never of their own volition. This is also false.

In point of fact, of the 325 reported runs, 151 of the boys who ran are repeaters. That is to say, they have run at least twice, if not more. The number of separate individuals who have run is 174, approximately 54 per cent of the number suggested in news statistics.

Clearly, if public conclusions lead to public pressure, and the public conclusions are based on deceptive figures, then the result of the public pressure will be consistent neither with the truth of the matter nor with the effectiveness of the rehabilitative system which, in fact, exists.

The analysis can be carried further with even more significance. Of the 174 individuals who have run between January 1 and October 16, Robert Bernier, Head of Cottage 9, estimates that close to 100 have run only once. This means that a mere 75, or 23 per cent of the staggering 325 number, are really responsible for inflating the statistic and throwing the citizens of Shirley, among others, into a state of near panic.

In the face of any counterargument against allowing these boys an opportunity to escape, it remains that simple incarceration is not the answer. Bernier, who has had no escapes since he took over the direction of the security cottage, says that he could make it escape-proof if it was required of him. But, he says, the result of this knowledge to the boys who are obsessed with running would be to drive them out of their minds. His point appears well taken when he says, "We're here to help them deal with their problems, not to make their problems a source of their destruction."

To be continued tomorrow

Two basic forces

The therapeutic community hopes to put two basic forces to work. The assumption is made that people like to be themselves, free from any obligation to put on an act. And that beyond that, they will get a sense of satisfaction out of helping another human being. Ideally these forces work on each other and becomes the drive that leads boys away from delinquent behavior. Through the establishment of the drive the boys will gain a new self-concept.

In theoretical terms, the system is both clear and simple. But on individual terms it is infinitely more complex, depending on the boy and the problems he has faced before coming to the school. A boy whose IQ level forces him to react before he thinks is a very different rehabilitative problem from a more intelligent boy whose ghetto culture has taught him that there is no future or success in the "straight" life.

If the boys coming to the school can learn to know themselves, accept and respect each other, if they can learn that they don't have to perform as they have been, then the behavioral changes the school effects have a very good chance of continuing on the outside.

Of course, the only changes in a boy that count, DeMuro points out, are the ones that do work on the outside. Stopping a boy from being violent while he is at the school carries no guarantee that he will avoid violence when released. This is reflected in the attitude of the Shirley Citizen's Committee.

So fixated is the committee on stopping the runs from the school, and so willing to see fences built and old punitive practices reinstated, that they overlook the error of their hopes. They see no further than "Good fences make good prisoners."

Fear justified

The Shirley Citizen's Committee demand that "all runaways be immediately stopped" apparently

represents the triumph of hope over experience. In the past, forced containment has neither guaranteed rehabilitation nor measurably reduced recidivism, Dr. Miller explains. Understandably, the citizens fear that their cars may be stolen and their houses broken into, and from their experience in individual cases the fear is justified.

But whether or not their fear justifies a demand for legislation that impedes successful rehabilitation is another question altogether. Locking a boy up with the feelings that got him into trouble, then sending him off after those feelings have been given time to ferment is begging the bottle to explode.

Work at own speed

A boy works at his own speed. The courses are set up to assure him that he can not only pass but score well. In his educational history he has probably never received an 80 or 90 on a test. Now he is doing it with regularity on various topics, and, most importantly, feels he is directing himself. He makes his own corrections, which are confirmed by a teacher, and moves forward in proportion to his desire.

"We're doing this on our own," one boy says. "We keep going because we know it will help us. It's not like school where you have to do it."

He has said more than he realizes. "Not like school where you have to do it". He remembers being forced, feeling trapped and hemmed in. Now he is being given the chance to make choices and measure the fruits of his choice. If he tires or rejects the pressure of one set of problems, he can go downstairs to the gym and shoot baskets, sweat out his frustration, and then return to his math or history or poetry.

The test booklets are designed to give the impression of high speed. He works on only the right hand pages, then turns the booklet over and works through again. On his progress chart, which he fills out, he can see the completed boxes and the remaining boxes separating him from the "completion" square. Analogous to games like Parcheesi, he senses that no box is unreachable. Thus AGEPE motivates while it teaches.

Tuck Amery, a STEP teacher, commented, "We don't like the image of the teacher standing at the front of the room pretending to command total knowledge any more than the kids do. We're trying to excite their interest and respond to them. When we've sent kids back to school they've gone back with a big jump."

Two boys sit in a corner at adjacent desks, hunched over their notebooks. A door slams and two boys clatter into the room, dripping with sweat from the basketball court. One hoots with

By ERIC BEST
Sun Staff Reporter

SHIRLEY — For most of the boys, their experience with school has been negative. Teaching, for them, has meant forced listening to droning recitation, the same subject for an hour at a time, recrimination for not doing well, bad marks, punishment at home for underachievement, etc. The list goes on. Structure and order do not stand as part of the boy's value system. School is a trap, and it takes too much of it to get anywhere. Things have to happen now.

The S.T.E.P. (Student Tutorial Education Project) program is coming to grips with the negative vision of school entertained by the boys. The teachers are young, imaginative, tolerant, and resilient. They make no demands for silence in the classroom, nor for such examples of order as parallel and orderly chair arrangements.

The AGEP (Advanced General Education Program) is the Industrial school's substitute for normal classroom education normally conducted in public schools. The program is set up in progressive blocks. A boy who volunteers for it begins his courses with a screening test to determine his competence on general topics. On the screening test he must score an 80 per cent or better, and because the tests are deliberately low level to begin with, he usually does. He then begins a series of "unit tests" on specific subjects.

Tuesday
Dec. 1, 1970

laughter and the sound reverberates in the small room. He tells Tuck that the shooting match is over and he is back. Tuck smiles and nods.

In the corner, neither of the boys working raises his head.

Tuck gestures towards the two. "You see that? That's concentration, and all voluntary. In a regimented class a year ago, those two would have concentrated on nothing but the end of the day. Now they know they can advance as much as a grade or more. They don't feel uncomfortable about caring."

Blacks seek "identity"

In one classroom the black students have been given the bulletin board to post what interests them.

The photos are in color and describe more of what the boys want than they would accomplish in several hours of talking.

"Identity" looms in large print at the top of the board. They know they are black in a school where white teachers and administrators have always predominated and still do, despite the percentage of black students sent there. The ghetto has taught them that the power structure is balanced against them, and in this environment trust comes slowly. Identity is the first step.

"Which way, Black America?" demands another sign. Instinctively they are asking for direction, and their presence in the class reflects their tentative search.

A black girl looks up at a man and there is love in her eyes. He is aloof in his stance, but their bodies are touching. "Cool ain't cold" reads the caption. Now they are thinking about respect, not

the respect afforded the con man for his smoothness or the pusher for his wares, but of one human being for another.

All of them are younger than 17, but sex and where babies come from is shrouded in no myth or deception. "Ninety per cent of all people are caused by accidents" the caption reminds them, looking down from high on the board. Later the same day, the head of Cottage 9, the disciplinary cottage, will probe a 15-year-old black boy on his feelings for the girl at home who carries his baby while he struggles to complete his sentence.

Cottage Nine

Of all the cottages there is one reserved for disciplinary detention. Cottage 9.

Speak its name to the boys in the open school and they shudder. They would have you believe it is the school center for man's inhumanity to man, deception, a haven for the unjust authoritarian.

In years past, before the advent of some enlightenment in juvenile penology, it may have been just that. The present staff admits that in the school's history boys placed there were beaten, deprived of clothing and sleep for minor offenses and often served as defenseless outlets for discontented staff. It was the "silent cottage" where boys were beaten for speaking or moving their chairs. Boys in Cottage 9 were expected to be catatonic in their behavior. They were to learn control of their feelings by exhibiting none of them. They were to show respect through blind obedience.

The cottage has perpetuated its own threatening reputation, but it is myth now. Robert Bernier, the cottage master, is a jowly, solid man with

heavy lidded, baleful eyes. But his appearance belies his nature, for it is sure that no past master of "9" has ever treated its inmates with more understanding, strength of character and compassion.

Bernier does not trust the boys there because they ask him to. He demands that they earn trust with all the consistency they are capable. Bernier has the power to give them responsibility and take it away, and he does it with remarkable wisdom. For some of them, being trusted means making promises to him and breaking them as quickly. He has trusted runners and helped them re-enter the open school only to see them run again immediately.

Invokes penalties

He invokes penalties without hesitation, and for each successive offense on the part of a boy, the penalty is more severe. One week of detention for the first run, two for the second, three for the third and so on.

Boys are sent to him for various offenses: running from the open school, fighting, striking a teacher or counselors, and others. Heavy duty security screens block all the windows. There is one main room downstairs where the boys sit to read magazines, write letters and talk during the day except for the brief times when they are released into the high fenced back yard.

They sleep in the same locked dormitory room on mattresses set on the floor. The heavy bed frames were removed after an attempted night time break when the beds were dismantled in the dark and used as battering rams against the screens.

There are three isolation rooms on the second floor, six by eight feet in dimension and bare except for a mattress. These rooms are used for offenses within the cottage — fights, attempted breaks, and potential emotional eruptions. The general confinement within "9" often raises tensions not only in the boys but in the staff who must sit with them day after day.

Recently, one of the Cottage 9 staff members struck one of the boys and the boy complained in his group meeting after he was released from maximum security. Bernier listened to the complaint and promised that something would be done.

After an investigation, the staff member was suspended for three days. The boy's mother said that the suspension penalty was adequate punishment provided that a recurrence would result in the man's dismissal.

Such incidents have brought scrutiny of Civil Service which puts men in such a position over juveniles. The problem is being met as evidenced by the recommendation made in the Special House Committee report on the Shirley School.

Recommendation One under "Department Administration" reads: "The Department shall consider promulgating higher qualifications and standards for all custodial, treatment and administrative staff with commensurately higher salaries whenever a position is vacated by a resignation, firing for cause, or retirement of an employee and whenever warranted or necessary to attract personnel with proper qualifications."

Under the old, stringent system, the boys' experience with violent, punitive measures at the hands of the staff served only to engender fear and mistrust in the boys. It takes no great exercise of logic to see that an escapee from an institution where punishment is feared is a more dangerous escapee when caught than one who knows his urge to flee will be met with understanding. Dr. Jerome Miller comments that since the introduction of the new philosophy, while runs have increased, the violent tendencies of the runners have appreciably decreased.

Wednesday
Dec. 2, 1970

By ERIC BEST
Sun Staff Reporter

SHIRLEY — One of the boys in Cottage Nine has made a drawing.

He has included two crossed hypodermic needles, and the unlucky 13, a twisted peace sign, a fecal image, and a numerical sexual allusion.

The handwriting is painfully undeveloped and "generation" is misspelled.

It is more than a drawing or absent design. The artist was in Cottage 9 and he has put most of what he thinks on paper.

Drugs are not criminal to him. They are a way to escape mentally and he couldn't care less whether they can potentially harm him.

Whether or not he has caused himself difficulty in the past is irrelevant. He puts it down to bad luck and a war between himself and authority that never stops making demands, most of which seem out of his reach.

He is as lost within himself as he is in some parts of society, giving himself up with no more struggle. His resignation leads him to delinquency as society's resignation in the past has led him into maximum security jails with no hope for cure. The cure would ultimately be an escape from the himself he doesn't like, but the odds are stacked depressingly against him.

On the other side of the paper he has written "I love you."

Dr. Miller, the Head of Massachusetts Youth Services, suggests that the issue of the Shirley School has been politicized, that is, discussed more in terms of legislation and the effect it has on surrounding citizens, than in terms of the boys, their problems and their rehabilitation.

To some degree, this has been the case at the Shirley school. Reacting to pressure from the Shirley Citizens' Committee and the suggestions of the Shattuck Report, Youth Services and the administration of the school have had to do some shuffling of positions and changing of policy that have left the boys confused and unsure of who and what to trust.

Some rules and policies seem to change overnight. Some boys feel they can't be sure of probation requirements, weekend leave rules, or how long they must be in the open school without incident to prove themselves. This is a malady that is by nature concurrent with massive reorganization, Robert Bernier, in charge of Cottage 9 feels, but it has left many of the boys off balance and afraid they are being manipulated and victimized.

The school is making a deliberate and constant effort to be fair and consistent despite necessary changes in rules. But the situation is more complex than what appears on paper.

Old staff resents change

As the theory requires change, so do the behavior and attitude of the staff. Many of the old staff are resentful of innovation, either secretly or outspokenly. They remember, for example, when they could invoke immediate punishment for disrespectful language. Now the boys are encouraged to speak their feelings, and some of the old staff find themselves listening to a host of unpleasantries from the boys.

"They've lost respect for us. They used to respect us and now they throw four letter insults at us whenever we tell them to do something. There's no respect anymore," commented a shop teacher who knew and liked the old system.

His vision of the change is narrow and naive, for he misinterprets silence for respect. He was content with the old forced silence. His fantasy

about being respected because they system worked is more pleasant to live with than the responsibility of commanding rather than demanding respect.

The boys respect honesty more than anything. They are quick to feel themselves victims, quick to call a changed decision or policy the proof of a lie that they expected from the beginning. Their first concern is when they are to be released. As the system now rests, Bernier indicated, this preoccupation inhibits their rehabilitation as much as administrative inconsistency or old staff resistance to change.

The hope of the new system is to make the boys as concerned with the elimination of their delinquent tendencies as outside society. For the moment, most of them are counting days, "doing their time."

As the old system restricted and counted days, the new system hopes to reduce restrictive practices and not accept simply "doing time" as proof of a successful sentence.

Many of the boys are expert game players. Once they define in their own minds how the game is played, what is necessary to be freed, they turn on their "con" abilities and act. According to the STEP teachers, one of the greatest difficulties in working with the boys is seeing through their confidence tricks. Many of them operate on several levels. One boy who is achieving beautifully in school is implicated in breaking into his cottage mates' lockers. These are the patterns of negative value behavior that the teachers and counselors hope to correct.

Faces speak for boys

The boys faces often speak for them. At present, in the long and often idle afternoons, one reads boredom in their eyes and restlessness in their movements. Boredom is perhaps the greatest enemy and most common purveyor of running and general discontent.

The administration says that with little more time the afternoons will be filled with elective courses in school, intra-cottage athletics and a diversity of cottage activities. But for the moment, the boys feel that when the morning ends there is nothing to do but sit.

They are beginning now to see self-control as a valuable challenge. One black boy, the recently elected president of one of the cottages, recognizes the temptation to run as a problem over which he must triumph. He thinks about it often and is willing to talk about it. He has found that by discussing it he can enjoy it vicariously and restrain himself until the urge passes.

In two weeks he will appear in court to find that the state has changed his lawyer. The judge will refuse to lower the amount of his bail. He will wait until he gets back to the school, then he will run. He wants some time to breathe. Then he will turn himself in, knowing he must spend mandatory time in "9" and more in the open school.

One reason the new method of treatment is gaining acceptance painfully is that a therapeutic community requires much more subtlety and intelligence to run than a strictly regimented silent school where collective silence and group marching constitutes the backbone of treatment.

Mentally spar with boys

The teachers and new administrators, among them Paul Dickhaut, Paul DeMuro, Robert Bernier, the STEP teachers, who understand and can handle the therapeutic idea, are masterful at mentally sparring with the boys. They respond to questions from the boys not with rebuffs, or simple "yes" or "no" but with explanations of reason and searching counter-questions. The boys try to play

teachers off against each other, or a teacher against an administrator, trying to force an inconsistency that will be to the boy's advantage. This particular con game from the boys has been recognized as a consistent technique and forced certain changes.

Decisions about boys, their probations and penalties for offenses within the school are to be posted in the Central Building and the cottages to prevent cloaked deception. There are frequent cases of a boy asking an opinion of a teacher, then misquoting it to another, hoping to profit from the resulting confusion. The boys are very quick to recognize the exploitable. While on the one hand they may suffer from the confusion of program reorganization, they are as quick to use the same confusion to their own advantage.

The new system, rather than punishing them directly for this behavior, attempts to make the boys see that in deceiving others they are deceiving themselves ... Essentially such confrontations are a conflict between the idealism of the new rehabilitation method and the exploitative realism of the boys. They make extreme demands hoping that the man they are asking is a soft touch. They have learned how to pretend affection and friendship if by riding on a relationship, however temporary from their point of view, they stand something to gain. In their experience with exploitation in the streets, betrayal is neither new nor necessarily wrong. Promises are more a means to an end than a personal act connected to the intangible the straight world calls honesty. It is with this floating value system that the teachers, counselors and administrators, that is, the whole rehabilitation team, must deal with. The attempt to deal with it with the new system is both a courageous and reassuring hope.

By ERIC BEST
Sun Staff Reporter

SHIRLEY — The cottage is bare and worn from use and misuse. There are no decorations. The furniture is stark and functional, wooden straight backed chairs and deeply scratched round tables in the main room. The meals are sent down from the main cafeteria kitchen in large, square cooking pans and cool quickly on the way. The food is only partially reheated in small ovens but there is a rush for it when the boys dish it out. Meals and four cigarettes a day provide the only breaks in an unpleasant monotony.

The boys are supposed to be thinking while they wait to reenter the open school. But they make mistakes.

Bernier talks with the boys all together in the early afternoon every day, then opens his office door at 3:30 for a specific complaint session. He knows there will be a myraid of questions about duration of penalties, changes in probation possibilities with recent offenses or newly changed policies. Mr. Bernier waits for them to come to him. He knows that they depend on him because they must, and he has kept a careful file on each boy.

He listens patiently while the first boy begins asking questions. "When will I get out of here?"

Three weeks, he is told.

"Why three weeks. That isn't fair. I've been good. Three weeks is too long."

Bernier explains. It was the boy's third run.

Says he'll run again

"I'm going to run again the first chance I get," the boy declares. "The second I hit the open school. I'm going to be known around here. This whole school is going to know who I am." His voice has risen and there is a stammer creeping into his speech.

Bernier nods. "Maybe. But you'll be back here for four weeks."

He is answered by a smile. The boy shifts on the chair and looks out the window reflectively.

"Why can't we have more than four cigarettes?" he demands incongruously.

"That's the rule. Four, and only four."

The smile flickers again. "What if we was to, ah, say we know something about a break out of here. You'd like to know about that, wouldn't you?"

Bernier lights a cigarette and puffs silently. He is watching the boy's face and forces the younger eyes away.

"You should tell me about it," Bernier says simply.

The boy shrugs. "I don't know nothin'."

Bernier nods. "Sure you don't. You were just supposin'."

"That's right," comes the quick answer. "But I was thinking more about a cigarette."

Thursday
Dec. 3, 1970

Reveals someone has key

Bernier prods for several minutes. The boy enjoys his sudden importance and plays with his answers, hinting and denying, squirming in his chair with satisfaction. "I'm no fink," he insists, then reveals that someone has a wire key, crudely fashioned to open the security windows upstairs. He grins at Bernier's reaction. He knows that the key makes the stakes higher.

"Finking isn't what you're doing," Bernier explains. "You have to protect the kids who'll go along and who would never go on their own. They have to be protected from themselves. You have to do that."

The boy reveals a name and collects his extra cigarette. He smokes it hungrily.

Bernier calls in the suspect later and his manner changes. He is no longer warm and persuasive. There is a hardness and anger in his voice. He

tells the boy that if he doesn't produce the key himself and one is found there will be no leniency.

Bernier calls in the suspect later and his manner changes. He is no longer warm and persuasive. There is a hardness and anger in his voice. He tells the boy that if he doesn't produce the key himself and one is found there will be no leniency.

The boy insists there is no key. "You're always after me," he cries, and after a staff member takes him into an anteroom and forces him to remove his clothes for a search, he is weeping with great, puffy sobs. Still no key has been found.

"See," he shouts, "no key. It's not fair, coming after me all the time."

"Just remember," Bernier reminds him unsympathetically, "the key better not show up through someone else's hands."

The boy has rubbed his eyes red and swollen. He slouches from the room.

Minutes later he is back. His hands press into his pockets and his shoulders look collapsed.

"Nothing will happen if I turn it in?"

Bernier nods. He has been waiting.



Cottage Nine

The exterior of Cottage Nine is typical of all the cottages. This cottage however, is designed for security.

The fenced-in area behind the building is for the boys' outdoor hours.



The common room

Much of the time in Cottage 9 is spent in the common room, where boys are free to play cards or write letters. The letters in and out are censored, for reasons explained in another section of this series.

Turns in key

A hand rises from the boy's pocket and a crude elbow of wire clatters down on the desk.

"Thank you," Bernier says, and opens a drawer beside him. Into a tangle of other keys goes the new acquisition.

"You see", Bernier reflects, "I've stopped a kid from running and hurt no one."

He is pleased and it shows in his face. "It's all because these kids live by a code and behave accordingly. It's all in understanding the code. And they can be helped to protect themselves."

He spends half an hour talking to a 15 year old black boy about his pregnant girl friend. The boy is near tears and sits motionless, staring at his sneakers. His feet rub each other nervously. He had been taken home as a favor and ran away. He wants to get married but he doesn't know what he can do for work. He lives in the ghetto and knows that "straight" employment is hard to find.

The boy who swears he will make himself known waits for two weeks and requests that he be allowed to see his girl who is two months away from bearing his child. He wants to make plans with her, decide on possible names for the child, reassure her of his intentions.

Bernier relays the request to the head of the cottage masters, who writes the girl.

She replies that on a given Friday she will be home after school and will await the boy.

The boy explains he has no transportation, and persuades Bernier to drive 80 miles to her house. On the way, Bernier learns that the boy has \$3, which he has fast-talked out of his shop teacher and the priest. Bernier stops at a store where the boy buys cigarettes.

"It won't look good to my girl," the boy has explained, and so he travels in his own clothes, not the blue denim shirt and khaki pants of the school, and he is without handeuffs.

They arrive at the girl's "house", which is a small, rundown trailer that has the unkempt appearance of a shanty.

Girl not pregnant

The girl is not pregnant and she wants nothing to do with the boy. Her father has warned her that he is a troublemaker. A half hour passes with nothing accomplished, and Bernier finally tells the boy it is time to go back.

With rain beginning to fall and the girl retreating into her house, the boy looks briefly into Bernier's car, slams the door, and runs down an alley.

There is a sense of pride in his fleeting steps. He has worked his con perfectly.

"It's part of our job," Bernier says later, "to be conned and manipulated. But you hate to see a kid consistently throwing away the chances he is given."

Worry on several faces

A look of worry settles on several faces.

One of the black boys sits in a small group meeting. He is not paying attention to the discussion. He is lost in a book called "The Pimp," written in street rhetoric by a black writer. It is language that the boy understands perfectly and it describes what he thinks is a solution to his quandary.

"What are you going to do when you get out?" he is asked suddenly, and his head comes up abruptly.

He is to be released in two days and the shrug of his shoulders indicates he has not thought about it.

"I don't know," he says. "Take some dope, find a job. Hustle some. Maybe I'll be a mustler."

His eyes flick down to the book in his hand and he smiles slightly. "I think maybe I'll pimp some, too."

The STEP teacher who asked him the question nods thoughtfully and he scans the other boys in the room.

"Who thinks he will make it on the outside with those plans?" he asks.

Another black, the closest friend of the first boy, speaks up and his voice is loud and sharp. "You're out of your mind," he accuses. "I don't think you can make it. That's crazy talk man, crazy talk is all it is. Everybody thinks he can be a hustler and make it. But look where you are, man, look where hustling got you the first time."

He pauses, confident of his argument and watches the fading smirk of his compatriot.

The teacher interrupts. "You don't think, maybe, that he is ready yet, then, if he wants to hustle."

"That's what I think," the boy confirms. "He ain't learned yet that hustlers end up back in jail or dead of an O.D. (drug overdose) in some alley. He's just plain stupid, he is."

Must make decision

A silence falls on the room from the challenge, and the hopeful hustler ponders. From a new quarter he sees his parole threatened. His bravado is getting him into trouble. Retracting his suggestion will hurt his pride, but not retracting it threatens his freedom. It is in these moments of insight that the boys are being forced to give up their search for peer group admiration and concede to more solid ambitions. This is the heart of the new therapy.

Stumbling block

One stumbling block of the group interaction method is that many of the boys are reticent to speak and air their feelings where their ideas may fall under attack from their peers. Many of the boys are used to being jumped on for what they say at home. They are accustomed to a hostile atmosphere wherever they are under the control of a system. It is with this realization that the cottage counselors and cottage masters constantly encourage the boys to make judgments, offer ideas, and stand behind their own thoughts.

They can be brutally honest with their mates. They know their own elusive methods for avoiding self-honesty, see through each others excuses and do not tolerate evasiveness. They have the power to vote whether or not someone is ready for parole, and although their vote is only one in the long process of consideration that includes the teachers and counselors and administration before any final judgment is reached, a consciousness is growing within the cottages that sincere and compatible behavior within the cottage is as necessary for release now as the old, simple rule-following was in the past.

"Playing the game isn't good enough for me," one STEP teacher tells them in a general meeting. "This is only my opinion, but just because one of you guys stays out of trouble and follows all the rules doesn't mean you can handle yourself."

Friday
Dec. 4, 1970

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By **ERIC BEST**
Sun Staff Reporter

SHIRLEY — Under Paul DeMuro, new head of Shirley since Paul Dickhaut's instatement as head of both Shirley and the Lancaster School for Girls, a policy called "Levels of Freedom" has been instituted.

The purpose of the levels of freedom is to provide each boy with the opportunity to work his way towards a position of responsibility and trust in the school, a way for each boy to earn freedom by proving he can handle them.

There are four levels of freedom. The fourth level consists of confinement to Cottage 9, the discipline cottage. The third level consists of rules which all new boys must abide by and which all boys unready to handle additional freedoms must abide by. Level two is for boys who have proved themselves capable of handling level three freedoms. Level one is for boys who have proved themselves responsible and are ready to be responsible for their own actions and movements.

Level three boys must wear state clothes, move about the grounds only under staff supervision, arrange their programs with the aid of staff, show they can handle relationships with staff and other boys, abide by the rules of the school and cottage, and may receive visitors only on the school grounds.

If, after two weeks, he has met these requirements, he may bring himself up before his cottage community for approval to move up to level two.

Level two boys must continue to wear state clothes, be in the company of staff or a level one boy of his own group, not take off-ground visits, continue to handle relationships with staff and other boys, and show that he can handle the added freedom of level two.

In level one, a boy may wear his own clothes, move about under his own supervision, though he is still obliged to seek permission of staff when he wants to go somewhere, and he may make full use of the student areas in the school. He may have off-ground visiting privileges on approved visiting days, after his sixth week he is eligible for a weekend, and after three months he may bring himself up for parole.

Citizens opposed

Opposed to this hopeful trend is the Shirley Citizens' Committee. Their initial resolution as a collected body was to "stop any actions that may be harmful." Willard Wilson, head of the committee, contended that the air of tension in Shirley due to the escapes had forced some rational action before vigilante committees formed on their own. A petition was drawn up and taken before Gov. Frances Sargent, who promised something would be done to relieve the tension.

One thing learned during this period was that some boys sent to the school were more violent or dangerous than the school was equipped to handle.

"There's no sense sending a kid there who's going to "run," Wilson commented in September.


The impulse to run is as important for the boy to learn to control as any other type of delinquent behavior. "Many of these boys want to run no matter where they are, in school, in the street, at home, anywhere," Bernier has commented.

Restriction and containment typify the kind of theory that supported the old silent school. Boys should be kept silent because if they are allowed to talk they will be disrespectful. Instead of treating a problem, Wilson's attitude displays a desire to simply contain the problem, not to solve it.

Boys in the same cottage not only live together, they attend the same classes, follow some together, they attend the same classes, follow some of the same interests and have the opportunity to share the experience of the school with each other, not in spite of each other. Boys who want to study radio and electronics will share one cottage, boys who want to study carpentry will share another, and so on.

Within one cottage, general group meetings with all the boys present encourage them to discuss their problems and air their discontents before


their mates. Smaller group sessions, run by the counselors and with their teachers present, boys are treated individually in what amounts to therapy sessions. Through these sessions, the boys come to a closer understanding of themselves and those around them, and are affecting their own cures.



Mattresses on floor

The mattresses are without bedframes now in Cottage Nine, the Security Cottage, since the frames were used in an attempted break. The boys sleep in this

one dormitory room, behind locked doors and a security guard is able to see them from a window above.



Cottage Nine tomb

This is a view of the exterior on one of Cottage Nine's tombs, where boys are placed in solitary confinement only after a serious offense or when, in the judgment

of the cottage master or others, they have become a physical threat to themselves, or those around them.

POLITICAL CIRCUIT
BY CAROL LISTON

Dissent slows youth service

Dissension and division still run rampant in the Department of Youth Service, where politics continues to play a more important role than the rehabilitation of delinquent youngsters.

The state's youth service system was reorganized by the Legislature nearly a year and a half ago. Fourteen months ago the governor appointed Dr. Jerome Miller, a psychologist from Ohio, to be the new commissioner.

Miller is not very politically oriented. But almost everyone else in the department is well versed in how to use politics to advantage. Even some of Miller's closest advisers have undermined his work behind his back.

When Miller took office he agreed (with some encouragement from the governor's office) to take Frank A. Maloney as his deputy commissioner. Maloney, an administrator at Boston College School of Social Work, served as interim director of youth service, before Miller's appointment.

Miller took over the so-called reorganized department with only Maloney as a new top-level administrator. The reorganization carefully provided posts for four assistant commissioners—so that the department would be better run. But these posts were not funded by the Legislature until the end of this August.

Virtually alone, Miller spent a year running a holding action and trying to develop new programs for the department.

No reorganization could change the personnel problems. Most of the department's 900 employees got their jobs through political connections.

The transition to Miller's leadership was much

more than just a switch in top management. Miller brought to his job a whole new approach to handling delinquent youths.

His approaches are far from unique. In fact, they are accepted, established methods in countries such as England, Belgium and Japan, where social problems get more priority than they do in the United States.

But, for the majority of youth service employees, Miller's attitudes have been unacceptable. These employees have spent most of their years viewing all delinquents as hardened criminal types. It was all right to use physical brutality, as long as you didn't get caught. Long-term solitary confinement was a regular method of discipline, although it was officially prohibited.

There was no real rehabilitation for kids in the old youth service system. And the recidivism rate reflected it.

When Miller arrived he called on the staff to be more involved, to take an interest in youngsters. He developed training seminars to help employees understand some of the problems and attitudes of the young people they supervised.


Some employees supported Miller. But the vast majority, including men in high posts, began to undermine him.

So far, Miller has not proved to be a very good administrator. He has been slow to get programs active. But to a considerably degree this has not been his fault—as much as the result of lack of new top level staff and limited funding. He just recently filled the top posts. And he is now getting Federal funds for some programs and staffing.

Miller holds his post until 1975 (by law). With new funding and new top staff he claims he will be able to make the state's youth service system the best in the nation.

In January House Speaker David M. Bartley will name an investigating committee to study the Youth Service Department. The Legislature's long history of manipulating the youth service system could make this investigation another witch hunt.

However, Bartley has indicated by past actions that he is interested in making the system work and not in picking up headlines for easy political profit. The committee could be very helpful, in spotting the weak links in Miller's administration. It could also be useful in revealing the extent of employee efforts to undermine progress and slow Miller's efforts to bring change.



DR. JEROME MILLER

Friendly Persuasion

MANY have become unnecessarily alarmed at the unique experiment undertaken by the state last week in an effort to find a new — and positive — way to banish youthful delinquency.

Lyman, Shirley and Lancaster training schools have been closed; and with the approval of Gov. Sargent, Youth Service Board Director Dr. Jerome Miller has placed 100 of their youth residents, both boys and girls, in foster homes and under the daily supervision and companionship of students at UMass and Hampton College.

The county training schools—Middlesex, Essex and Hampton—which critics describe as “dehumanizing and sterile” breeding grounds for “jails, reformatories and penitentiaries,” could be next.

Of course, it is possibly risky. But consider this: it costs \$10,000 a year to keep each of Massachusetts' delinquent youths institutionalized. For half that amount, the state could finance their residence and education at Harvard. The new system will cost \$7000 a child. From the viewpoint of financial savings alone, the risk seems worth taking. But more importantly, it offers ever greater rewards.

The old way hasn't worked. The so-called reform schools have had an abject record of failure. The winning of rebellious children is hard to come by in a jail-like atmosphere which emphasizes custody over rehabilitation. The theory that friendly persuasion and sympathetic companionship open the way to the hearts of a lonely and perhaps rejected child deserves a chance.

If, in the end, this fails too, it was worth the effort. It could blow up in everyone's face, of course, with the alarmists' worst fears of undisciplined youngsters set loose on the public coming true. But if it succeeds, a whole new world opens up for thousands of troubled kids. That is the challenge of breaking away from the past and charting a new path. The greater the risk, the more rewarding the result.

Youth services on the mat

Since the appointment of Dr. Jerome Miller in 1969 there has been a major change in the approach to youth services in this state. The program, which has become a model for other states, has won an initial grant of \$230,000 from the US Justice Department. It will make Massachusetts the first state in the nation to deal with juvenile offenders on a flexible community-oriented basis instead of in depersonalized and depersonalizing institutions, and deserves support and praise at home. Instead it has become the target of unparalleled legislative scrutiny.

No less than four committees of varying energy and commitment are studying the Department of Youth Services. And a few weeks ago Senate President Kevin Harrington and House Speaker David Bartley called for the establishment of a fifth group, in the form of a blue ribbon commission to study all the state's youth services to determine whether they could be combined under a single cabinet-level office, and to make an initial report this June.

The reason for all this uproar is that, in two years, Comr. Miller has succeeded in closing three of the state's five reform schools, transforming another into a reception center for some 30 boys on their way to court and reducing the population at the fifth, the Lancaster School for Girls, from 150 to about 60. The Youth Services Board's three Detention Centers in Westfield, Worcester and Roslindale have become more flexible and humane.

The alternatives to the old monster institutions are varied. A small coeducational center has just opened in Framingham. There are already some 45 group homes for juvenile offenders in the state. Ten more group homes, to be built with Federal money, were announced recently. Other arrangements include the use of foster homes, YMCA's, forestry camps and voluntary community su-

pervision. And early reports indicate that the rate of return by young offenders may have dropped from the old standard of 70 to 80 percent to an all time low of 12 percent.

As schools for young criminals, these alternatives are clearly a bust. But change comes hard and oldtimers tend to compare the outwardly messy and chaotic detention centers unfavorably with the Hampden, Middlesex and Essex County Training Schools where young people, shut up indefinitely for such crimes as truancy and school-related offenses, walk silently in military step across floors that are clean enough to eat off because young people are sometimes made to eat off them.

The three county-administered training schools which would be abolished under legislation filed by Gov. Sargent, cost the state \$2 million each year and have an "enrollment" of somewhere around 200 youngsters. The best private school education would be cheaper. But a large staff is costly and the large staff of one now-defunct reform school includes 22 night watchmen and 11 boiler room attendants who are actively lobbying at the State House for the old hard line concepts of punishment in an institutional setting.

In that light, the recent charges by Rep. Robert J. McGinn of Westfield that Comr. Miller is "working much too fast" and being "far too permissive" are true, and good for the commissioner. Concern, evaluation and constructive criticism, such as that offered over the past year by the Joint Committee on State Administration's investigating team, is a good and necessary accompaniment to reform. A witch hunt such as that being conducted by Rep. McGinn is an impediment to progress. And, in ending an archaic system that creates young criminals by its inhumanity, we argue that the Youth Services Board Commissioner cannot move fast enough.

END OF REFORM SCHOOLS? NEW TREND IN TREATING DELINQUENTS

Shutdown of youth prisons in Massachusetts and elsewhere points up an important trend toward community treatment to reduce juvenile crime.

BOSTON

Nationwide, strong doubts are rising about the old-time reform school as a cure for juvenile delinquency. Nowhere are doubts stronger than in Massachusetts.

This State is taking the unprecedented, controversial step of abolishing entirely an institution it gave to the world years ago in a spirit of uplift.

Not long ago, up to 1,200 youths were serving time on any given day in Massachusetts' reform schools—four for boys and two for girls.

Today, only one of these six institutions is still being used as a juvenile institution—and it is to close this summer. The institution has shut down entirely, and the others are being used temporarily for reformation centers and other purposes, and are to become a day center for troubled girls.

Head of Massachusetts' Department of Youth Services is to reduce the number of delinquency commitments, eventually, perhaps 50 "hard core" psychotic or otherwise dangerous offenders who will be placed in maximum-security facilities—public or private.

Remaining delinquents already are being funneled—on probation or parole—to foster homes or to a wide variety of community-based programs for rehabilitation.

Massachusetts is the national leader of a nationwide move away from reform schools.

California, young offenders—like those—benefit from a State-subsidized build-up of community-based programs for parolees and probationers. Last year, the population of juvenile prisons has dropped from 6,500 to 4,500 in 1965. California has stopped building new institutions, has closed one boys' school and will close another at year's

end. Florida, State and U.S. funds are financing small "halfway homes" for housing and counseling of delinquents. Five of a projected 26 such homes already are in operation, and probation

services for youth are being expanded. In Minnesota, all 87 counties have developed their own departments of probation—with stepped-up State subsidies in most cases. Consolidation of juvenile prisons in the next few years is foreseen as their population declines.

Moral training, too. It was in 1846, at the village of Westboro, that Massachusetts unveiled the world's first public-run reform school—Lyman School for boys—offering vocational as well as moral training for wayward youths.

Before long, officials from other States and from Europe were beating a path to the institution's door, and returning to copy an idea that promised humane treatment of delinquents by upright and kindly adults.

Over the years, these institutions have changed their names in most places—from reform school to "industrial school" to "training school." Changing even more drastically was the esteem in which they once were held.

Charges of corruption and brutality have racked such schools in one State after another. In various States they have come to be viewed simply as prisons in which youngsters serve time for trivial offenses—as in Massachusetts, where more than half of those in reform school have been labeled truants or "stubborn children."

It was against that background that the Massachusetts legislature, in 1969, concluded a long investigation by reorganizing its system of youth corrections.

Authority was centered in the Department of Youth Services, which was given a free hand to prescribe treatment for all youthful offenders referred from juvenile courts—in effect, all except those sent to adult courts or committed to county-run training schools.

Import from Ohio. To direct this new approach, the State-imported Dr. Jerome G. Miller, a hard-driving associate professor of social work at Ohio State University.

What he found on arrival was a juvenile-prison population where almost

90 per cent of the youngsters came from families living in poverty. Sixty per cent were from homes where alcoholism or narcotics was a serious problem. Only 40 per cent came from intact homes.

Said Dr. Miller:

"These institutions had developed into a kind of 'warehousing' for children nobody knew what else to do with. As a result, you got 'institutionalized' kids whose personalities became modeled on the institution—they were well-behaved



Reform school in earlier days aimed at offering moral uplift and vocational training to errant youth.

behind walls but troublemakers in the community when released."

Each of such youngsters, furthermore, was found to be costing about \$10,000 to \$12,000 a year while in prison.

Investigators were showered with stories of brutality at the six juvenile institutions. Solitary confinement for days was found to be commonplace for "stubborn" cases.

Recalcitrant youngsters were forced to drink water from toilets as one punishment. Another was to make them scrub floors on hands and knees in unison or sit rigidly on hard-backed chairs hour after hour, watching television—excused only as a group to go to the bathroom or to lunch. At one institution, some years ago, runaways were punished by having a finger bent back until it broke.

Highly regimented. "This sort of thing can develop under a cloak of so-

al respectability," Dr. Miller
"Solitary confinement becomes a
mechanism" and what is in fact
mented prison becomes an 'educa-
nit.'

ere you have institutions like
forming them is difficult because
re based on political patronage
e institution becomes more im-
than the child."

achusetts closed down the first
six State-run reform schools in
nd others since.

egislative action, one county-run
on for delinquents also has been
to close. A hot debate is develop-
r the fate of Massachusetts' two
ounty-run schools.

t Massachusetts is turning to is
n geared largely to publicly assist-



Homelike setting and a voice in decision-making are offered delinquents living in "group homes" such as Libra-House in Cambridge, not far from Harvard Square.



prisons in Massachusetts are be-
tied after years of complaints.

privately operated programs for
nts.

e past two years, a few delin-
have been sent to boarding
including well-known ones such
ps Exeter Academy. Result, so
e successes, some failures.

s are being channeled into es-
l, privately run children's
hich once catered, for the most
redelinquents.

released from training school, for
now account for most of those
t Edward Everett Home for Girls
unit of the century-old New
Home for Little Wanderers. Di-
dith McCarthy observes:

State-committed kids don't look
from the others. Eighty per cent
ed as a 'stubborn child,' runa-
quant."

(continued on next page)



Child-welfare centers of long standing, such as Edward Everett Home for Girls, are taking in parolees from reformatories, as well as neighborhood predelinquents.



Community Aftercare Program, manned by college students, offers counseling and recreation to parolees who need aid in finding a place in the community at large.

-USN&WR Photos

REFORM SCHOOLS

(continued from preceding page)

Residential care also is offered at "halfway houses" which stress group living of a more informal type under the direction of youthful counselors. Some were established independently of the youth-services program, while 15 of them are being developed with State and federal aid. At halfway houses, youngsters are free to come and go. Some run away, but most truants come back or ask for placement elsewhere.

One of the new halfway houses is Libra House in Cambridge, near Harvard. Four of the six young adults supervising the nine juveniles are themselves former offenders, and belong to Libra, a Cambridge group which helps parolees find a place in the community. Says the center's director, 23-year-old Edmund Kelly:

"I've been where these kids are—and even graduated from training school to prison before I got help in straightening myself out."

Five youngsters at Libra House now are being tutored by Harvard students and hope to pass tests for high-school diplomas. One is working in a bakery, and a 14-year-old nicknamed "Sonny" has developed a car-polishing business.

Youth now trusted. What these youngsters are experiencing for the first time, they say, is a feeling of being trusted with responsibilities and a voice in decisions.

They are allowed to "fix up" their own rooms, and are helping remodel the house—including installation of a photographic darkroom, carpentry shop and leather-making equipment.

For parolees and some probationers living with their own or foster parents, residential help comes from the Community Aftercare Program.

This operation was started last summer by Scott Wolfe, a prelaw student at Harvard, who directs a staff of about 10 college students—some paid in work-study programs, others serving as unpaid volunteers—in helping delinquent young men and women in Worcester and metropolitan Boston.

In this venture, soon to become State-financed, counselors meet with their assigned juveniles at least twice during the week and a full day on Saturday. Occasionally a juvenile with severe troubles at home will move in with the counselor until a permanent solution is found.

To provide work for jobless parolees, CAP has just opened two ice-cream parlors. A "drop-in center" at Worcester offers facilities for basketball, pool and table tennis with such success that another is being developed in Boston's



—USN&WR Photo

Dr. Jerome G. Miller leads new program in Massachusetts for delinquents.

Roxbury district. On week-ends, there is camping, boating and swimming at a New Hampshire estate leased by the organization.

Drastically fewer rearrests. Of the 200 juveniles who have passed through this program in the past 12 months, fewer than 10 per cent have been rearrested so far. Attendance at weekly "rap" sessions is close to 100 per cent—partly because of the \$5 given weekly to those with good attendance records but also, as Parole Officer John Granara in East Boston puts it:

"Each client feels that he is an integral part of the program, each feels he is needed—and for many it is the first time they have been able to feel they are needed by anyone."

Financing these ventures has put a severe strain on the Department of Youth Services budget.

The department's payroll is swollen by 300 institutional employes who do not fit into the new program—among them the livestock supervisor at Lyman still known by his traditional title, "Chief of the Swine Herd."

Declining costs. Even so, Dr. Miller contends that operational costs per child are declining sharply from the \$250 to \$300 weekly that prevailed in institutions. He estimates that two thirds of all delinquents can live with their own or with foster parents, at a weekly cost to the State of \$30 to \$50—including com-

munity services—for each child. At the other end of the scale, perhaps 10 per cent would require intensive treatment or maximum security, where costs might range upward to \$300 a week—and, in a few cases, more than that.

Also foreseen by enthusiasts are major slashes in "repeater" rates.

In Massachusetts juvenile institutions, recidivism averaged 60 to 80 per cent. At one institution, for boys aged 12 and under, it came to virtually 100 per cent. These rates, Dr. Miller hopes, can be reduced to somewhere between 15 and 20 per cent.

Despite strong support from Governor Francis W. Sargent, a Republican, and House Speaker David Bartley, a Democrat, the overhaul of youth corrections is meeting pockets of strong resistance.

"Mollycoddling" charges. There have been loud complaints in some neighborhoods when a halfway house for delinquents turns up.

Jobless employes of emptied institutions have come to the legislature to denounce the new "mollycoddling" of youthful offenders.

Critics cite incidents such as the temporary closing of a coeducational halfway house at Topsfield, where a collapse of leadership led to sexual promiscuity and drug usage. The most stringent criticism comes from State Representative Robert J. McGinn, a western Massachusetts Democrat, who says:

"The Department of Youth Services isn't screening the children properly, and it's putting hard-core offenders into the community. We've found foster parents who weren't married, who had criminal records or who were taking money for children no longer with them. We found homes not fit for human habitation, providing little or no supervision and definitely no education.

"Sending kids back to their neighborhoods sounds fine, but often you're sending them back to the drug pushers and other criminal elements. Dr. Miller's program would have value if he moved at a slower pace. The legislature will have to slow him down."

Dr. Miller insists that the new approach has not yet suffered a major scandal, but he concedes that the road ahead could become bumpy. A note of caution appears in a department brochure which underlines the complexity of the delinquency problem as follows:

"We do not know that community-based programs for prevention and treatment of juvenile delinquency will solve the current problem of youth crime or related family breakdown. . . . The strategy is to ameliorate existing conditions in the most humane ways possible at the most economical level of financial cost."

(END)

Correction Systems Seen Breeding, Training Dangerous Criminals

BOSTON (AP) — Inmate Walter Elliott, whose one-man uprising at Norfolk state prison led to four deaths including his own was a "classic example" of how correction systems breed and train more dangerous criminals, a legislative committee was told Wednesday.

Youth Services Commissioner Dr. Jerome G. Miller described Elliott's history in testimony before a special Senate committee investigating prisons, headed by Sen. David H. Locke, R-Wellesley. The committee was appointed following

the July 31 Norfolk incident.

Miller, an advocate of community-based alternatives to locking up offenders in large institutions, asked the committee to consider major changes in the correction system that would involve elimination of the existing large prisons.

"I think that the institutional system is the backbone of the correction system," Miller said, "and until it is dealt with other reforms will be shortlived."

"Every 10 to 15 years there is a major riot and killings, which produces a call for reform, and more money is poured into the

system, but when you look at it later" little has changed.

"Walter Elliott," he said, "is a classic example of what the system has done."

The commissioner said Elliott was referred to the Youth Services Board, later eliminated by creation of the Youth Services Department, for stealing candy at age 12.

The youth was committed to a state-run training school, Miller said, and escaped a number of times. Eventually he was confined but escaped again on several occasions.

In the cottage, Miller said, "runaways were handled by breaking a finger when they were caught. They say you don't have to break many fingers to keep the others in line."

In the course of his early handling by the system, the commissioner said, Elliott "finally became intractable."

He went on to commit more crimes and serve terms at Bridgewater, Concord and Walpole state prisons, Miller said.

"When he was returned to the streets in his middle 20's he was obviously a dangerous man," said Miller. "But I ask the committee to consider how

much it was the system that made him dangerous."

"The large institutions must be closed as quickly as possible, bulldozed or given to organizations who will lobby to keep them away from correction use," the commissioner said.

Miller agreed with Locke's statement, however, that "there are in society certainly

individuals who might be described as asocial or psychopaths, that society has to be protected against."

"These people are small in number," Miller said. "They don't make up the bulk of the people in the system."

He proposed placing such people in "very small, very secure" institutions staffed by highly trained psychiatric staffs. Such institutions if the existing large prisons were replaced with community-based correction program.

Miller was the final witness at what Locke said would probably be the last hearing of the special three-man committee.

Also testifying Wednesday were state Secretary of Human Services Peter C. Goldmark, Correction Commissioner John O. Boone, and Walter F. Williams, acting superintendent at the Concord prison.

Locke said the committee would produce a report, or possibly an interim report, on its two-month investigation before the end of the year.

Closing of Institutions for Juvenile Offenders Hit as 'Premature'

WESTBORO — William I. Tashjian, an assistant chief juvenile probation officer of southern Worcester County, has criticized the shutdown of the state's juvenile correctional institutions as being premature.

Tashjian, a Westboro native, spoke to the Westboro Women's Club at the First Methodist Church.

Tashjian's probation area includes five courts (Dudley, Uxbridge, East Brookfield, Milford and Westboro) and 31 towns. With the recent addition of four new probation officers, Tashjian said he now works mostly out of the Westboro court.

The speaker said that when Dr. Jerome Miller was appointed head of the Department of Youth Services three years ago, the new commissioner felt institutionalizing youths did more harm than good.

Half-Way Houses

"Dr. Miller is all for half-way houses, and so am I, provided they're well organized,"

Tashjian said. "But it's a long, slow job to get these houses started in communities. Look how long it's taking in Westboro. Meanwhile, we have very few options as to what to do for juvenile offenders. Many are sent back to home situations that caused the trouble in the first place."

Hard-core offenders need a place where there is security and supervision which Lyman School used to offer, he said.

The forestry camp, "Outward Bound," on Cape Cod, detention centers, and the An-


dros program at Roslindale are about the only options open now, Tashjian said. These are all limited. For example, there are seven Youth Service board regions in the state, but only five boys from each region can be accepted in the Andros program.

Need for Supervision

Many young offenders are sent to Lyman School on the day of their commitment, the speaker said. If the offense is not serious and there is no other place to send them, such as a foster-care home, they are paroled home.

"There may be no responsible parent there," Tashjian said, "and so the youth generally gets into trouble again. Dr. Miller says 'there are no bad boys.' That may be true in one way, but there are still boys who need supervision."

The luncheon meeting was attended by about 55 persons. Mrs. Alden Jefts, president, conducted a business meeting and Mrs. Ernest Pero, who had taught Tashjian at Westboro High School, introduced the speaker.



Jerome G. Miller

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EDITORIALS

MILLER'S DEPARTURE

Dr. Jerome Miller, state youth services commissioner, leaves Massachusetts having accomplished much of what he set out to do.

In his three-year tenure, Dr. Miller implemented a program of reform based on abolishing big institutional facilities and replacing them with small, community-based

His efforts won him national attention and a job offer from the state of Illinois with a \$5,000 salary increase which he has accepted.

At the same time, Dr. Miller's efforts also won him a number of enemies in the state legislature and much of his three years was spent in the heat of political battles.

Such controversy was inevitable given Dr. Miller's desire to make major changes in the youth services program. However, now that his program is on the way to realization, it is well that the department be turned over to someone whose talents lie in administration.

Dr. Miller has acknowledged that administration was one of his problems, although he added that "cumulatively they (the mistakes) don't add up to the accomplishments."

The state, he said, had been the first in the nation to move 90 per

cent of its youngsters out of big institutions. Dr. Miller closed down the Lyman, Bridgewater, Shirley, Lancaster and West Boylston state schools, and says initial studies show a reduction in the recidivism rate as a result of the changes.

Youth programs are the most important part of the corrections reform effort. The young offender is more likely to be reached than the older criminal, and this was one of Dr. Miller's major goals. If potential criminals can be deterred, society will profit from the commissioner's reforms.

Ironically, it has proven to be less expensive to treat youths humanely, in community, homelike settings, than to jail them. Dr. Miller said the youth services department tripled its caseload during his tenure while trimming its budget by \$2 million.

The commissioner made a beginning towards a more sensible youth program, turning from a system that has been a failure and reorganizing a department that was in disrepair. The task ahead is to carry through on his innovations.

The governor should take great care to select a new commissioner who can build on Dr. Miller's beginning.

Larger field for Miller

Jerome G. Miller is a foe of institutions as places in which delinquent children can be reformed. During his three years in Massachusetts he closed five institutions to which children were committed for one kind of delinquency or another. Community rather than state treatment for these children was his goal. He sought it through halfway house, YMCA prep schools and foster homes.

His work was controversial. Some legislators applauded it as an enlightened means of dealing with the delinquent. Others opposed it as the loosing on the community of dangerous youths. His principal failure was the Essex County Training School, which he tried in vain to close. But the outlook is that it will not long endure.

His complaint against it and other training schools was that these institutions do not reform the boys committed to them. We don't know the justice of his opinion. We have never seen any statistics that reported what happened to boys after they left the school. To the best of our knowledge, there was no comprehensive follow-up to learn what happened. But we have met boys who recalled that the school had transformed them from bad to good boys.

As a general rule, however, penal institutions have proved delinquent as places for reform of either juvenile or adult. We know people who have survived years of life in them and emerged to places of honor and usefulness in society. Others, we know, live from one term to another. Undoubtedly, some innately decent people are

transformed into enemies of society by institutional experience.

Miller's ideas have not been in effect long enough to provide a measure of them, whether they make a bad matter worse or better.

Miller will go to Illinois, which will provide a harder test of his theories. Illinois handles 35,000 children any given day and spends \$120 million a year on its juvenile program, ten times as much as the Bay State spends. While he labors there, his policies probably will be continued in Massachusetts. In another three years, we should have a clear idea of their effectiveness.

No policy can attain the ideal in regeneration. Any that shows improvement in any degree is warmly welcome. Miller's may be such a policy.

APPENDIX G

ALTERNATIVES TO THE INSTITUTIONS, 1972:
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PROGRAM DESCRIPTION: RESIDENTIAL ALTERNATIVES*

The Department of Youth Services purchases from over 200 private, residential agencies and approximately 30 non-residential service agencies.

Group homes providing a therapeutic community comprise the largest share of the services purchased. With few exceptions, the group homes provide group and individual therapy (and a limited number offer family casework and therapy). All group homes offer an education program in some form. (Some like LONGVIEW FARMS emphasize education). A large portion operate their own on-grounds school with private tutorial assistance. The remainder utilize existing schools in the community with or without providing private tutorial assistance. Vocational training and employment is emphasized in the programs of CONNECTICUT JR. REPUBLIC, INTERFAITH HOUSE, LIBERTY ST. ASSOCIATES, LYNN COMMUNITY RESIDENTIAL CENTER, PROTESTANT YOUTH CENTER, SOUTH 40 ALTERNATIVES and TAYLOR HILL HOUSE.

* Data collected is based on the proposals submitted to DYS and impressions made by workers in the field. Prepared by Yitzhak Bakal, Assistant Commissioner, Department of Youth Services, November 12, 1972.

In a separate category are the thirteen group homes federally funded under a grant from The Law Enforcement Assistance Act (L.E.A.A.). With the exception of GROUPWAYS and ADVOCATES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN POTENTIAL, all have some form of counseling or therapy (either group, individual, or family therapy. EVERETT HOUSE offers group and individual therapy, as well as psychodrama). All programs emphasize education and provide individualized tutorial assistance. While some L.E.A.A. group homes operate schools on their own grounds, others utilize public schools in the community. Recreational activities are included in the programs of five of the homes. One, THE HOLYOKE BOYS CLUB group home, offers a drug counseling program.

Twenty-seven residential group care facilities specialize in the treatment of emotionally disturbed youth. Each facility in this category focuses on providing therapy for youth exhibiting emotional disturbance within a wide range. The spectrum extends from mild disturbance (CARDINAL CUSHING SCHOOL) to moderate (ST. VINCENT'S HOME) to severe emotional disturbance and character disorders (ANDROS, CLARA BARTON, RFK ACTION CORPS, and BRISTOL ACRES). With the exception of facilities for the mildly disturbed which utilize an educationally oriented model of therapy solely, nearly all utilize either an intensive psychiatrically

supervised treatment, group or individual therapy or behavior modification in conjunction with a special education program.

Of the seven residential group homes for the mentally retarded, six offer psychiatric and psychological counseling in some form. Six of the group homes offer special education programs. (WOODS LANE concentrates on group and individual therapy and recreation in the place of an educational program.) The educational program of the CRYSTAL RUN CAMP and SCHOOL specializes in teaching vocational and occupational skills. At the MENTAL HEALTH REHABILITATION CENTER at Rutland, the focus of the education program is on social rehabilitation prevocational training and industrial arts.

For a youth committed to the Department, placement is made in one of the fourteen group homes specializing in drug rehabilitation. The emphasis of all these programs is therapy - group or individual. Group homes such as PILGRIM HOUSE and PHOENIX EAST include the youth's family in the therapeutic process. MASS TRANSITION, modeled after the SYNONOM and DAYTOP programs for adults who have been labeled drug offenders, provides a therapeutic community subscribing to the group sensitivity and reality therapy approach to drug rehabilitation. Nearly all drug rehabilitation pro-

grams either operate educational programs or utilize existing schools in the community and support such programs with tutorial assistance.

Research indicates that failure in school leads to strain and alienation. Juveniles performing poorly in school acquire the label delinquent. A large portion of juvenile offenders, particularly school offenders, are youths with learning difficulties (perceptual and motor disabilities). The Department purchases services from ten group homes specializing in the treatment of children with learning difficulties. All offer a specialized educational program; the majority also provide a combination of psychiatric therapy, individual, group therapy or family therapy. Four of the schools have an ongoing recreational program.

For the academically talented youth in need of a residential placement, the Department purchases from fourteen residential schools and academies. All offer intensive academically oriented educational programs. In addition, eight provide psychological or guidance service, and the ninth provides a drug counseling program.

A small proportion of girls committed to the Department are pregnant. Three homes, BOOTH MEMORIAL, CRITTENDON HASTINGS, and MARRILAC MANOR, provide counseling and other

services for these girls.

To meet the needs of the handicapped and multihandicapped youths committed to the Department, placements are arranged with the AMERICAN SCHOOL FOR DEAF and the DEVERAUX SCHOOL. Both schools provide individual counseling, as well as education.

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION: NON-RESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS *

The Department purchases service from approximately thirty private agencies accommodating more than 600 youths on parole. The brief description below categorizes these non-residential programs into the following:

- (1) Day schools
- (2) University affiliated programs
- (3) Programs specializing in vocational training
- (4) Programs specializing in counseling

Ten non-residential day schools in the Commonwealth service DYS youths. Two schools, BOSTON COLLEGE HIGH SCHOOL and NEWMAN PREPARATORY SCHOOL, offer traditional academic courses. Both schools seek youths with potential and motivation who can contend with the standard high school college preparatory curriculum. THE APPLEWOOD TUTORING and GUIDANCE CENTER, THE BRANDON SCHOOL, FARR ACADEMY, and THE ROBERT W. WHITE SCHOOL all offer traditional academic programs for children with normal intelligence who have emotional disorders. THE APPLEWOOD TUTORING and GUIDANCE CENTER and THE ROBERT W. WHITE SCHOOL use an educationally oriented model of therapy. THE APPLEWOOD curriculum is devoted to higher education and the preparation of its students for a professional career. At THE ROBERT W. WHITE SCHOOL, the

* Based on proposals submitted to DYS by these programs, and also on impressions of DYS workers in the field. Prepared by Yitzhak Bakal, Assistant Commissioner of DYS, November 15, 1972.

standard high school curriculum is supplemented with courses designed to promote greater competence in interpersonal relations and personal expression, self-esteem and greater artistic and technical competence. Such courses include improvisational drama, social graces, skin diving, underwater swimming, music and poetry. THE BRANDON SCHOOL and FARR ACADEMY offer academic programs in conjunction with group and individual therapy. (THE BRANDON SCHOOL is an elementary school, grades 1-8, while FARR ACADEMY is a secondary school). The remaining schools in this category, THE CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION, THE GROUP SCHOOL, HABITAT SCHOOL and THE FULL CIRCLE SCHOOL are alternative schools. These schools specialize in providing an academic program for those who cannot function in a traditional school setting. Of these, two are unique. THE FULL CIRCLE SCHOOL and the HABITAT SCHOOL. THE FULL CIRCLE SCHOOL utilizes a core curriculum supplemented by courses tailored to meet individual needs. At the HABITAT SCHOOL, students study real problems (usually environmental) and work half their time in environmental community service.

A number of universities sponsor programs for parole status youths. Although these programs are diverse, their goals are basically the same; i.e.,

- (1) To assist in the youths' struggle for a sense of self-worth
- (2) To redirect the youths' energies into productive activities
- (3) To promote behavior patterns to assure the youths' successful entry into the community.

Some programs such as PROJECT UPTURN, sponsored by the MASSACHUSETTS MARITIME ACADEMY, are basically recreational. Others, like the FRANKLIN COUNTY YOUTH VOLUNTEER SERVICE, sponsored by GREENFIELD COMMUNITY COLLEGE, are educational. The program offered by the AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE includes individual counseling, job counseling, and employment. LOWELL TECHNICAL sponsors the KING EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES program, offering cultural, educational, and recreational experiences.

Three programs specialize in vocational training-- THE NEIGHBORHOOD YOUTH CORPS (N.Y.C.), located in various locations throughout the State, EASTERN MIDDLESEX OPPORTUNITIES COUNCIL (E.M.O.C.), and LIBERTY AUTO SALES.

Basically, the goals of these programs are:

- (1) To provide youth with marketable skills
- (2) To help youth develop a more positive self-image and self-confidence; thus, promoting the youth's social and economic reintegration into society.

All three programs offer vocational training. N.Y.C. and E.M.O.C. also provide counseling. In addition, N.Y.C. offers remedial education and G.E.D. preparation.

Eighteen private agencies have contracts with the Department to provide counseling services with youth on parole. The focus of many of the agencies is to provide family interaction and to help develop healthy patterns within the family of dealing with each other. These agencies include HILL, INC.; OUR HOUSE: CHILDREN'S PROTECTIVE SERVICES; THE FAMILY COUNSELING AND GUIDANCE CENTERS; WORCESTER CHILDREN'S FRIEND SOCIETY; CHILDREN'S FRIEND AND FAMILY SERVICE; THE WAY; CHILDREN IN CRISES; SELF-DEVELOPMENT GROUP; NEW BEDFORD CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICE; and CATHOLIC CHARITIES. In addition to psychological counseling, HILL, INC., OUR HOUSE, CATHOLIC CHARITIES, and SELF-DEVELOPMENT GROUP offer either vocational counseling, assistance, or training. Some programs are primarily recreation oriented, such as PROJECT FISHERMAN, and the COMMUNITY AFTER-CARE PROGRAM; while most programs offer a recreational program on an informal basis. Of all the agencies, only MASS TRANSITION and SELF-DEVELOPMENT GROUP specialize in the rehabilitation of drug offenders.

DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES

PLACEMENT INVENTORY

REGION I

ADVOCACY ASSOCIATES

51 East Mountain Road
Westfield, Ma.
Larry Dye, (413) 545-0873

CHILDREN'S STUDY HOME

44 Sherman Street
Springfield, Ma.
737-3549

COMMUNITY RESIDENTIAL YOUTH CENTER

418 Plainfield Street
Springfield, Ma.
Carol Upshur

COMMUNITY RESIDENTIAL YOUTH CENTER

(GENESIS II)
57 Bowdin Street
Springfield, Ma.
William Clinton, 734-2441

DOWNEYSIDE, INC.

1532 Bay Street
Springfield, Ma. 01109
Fr. Paul Engel, (413) 781-2123

EPIC

42 Russell Street
Pittsfield, Ma.
Curtis Belton, 442-9602

EXCHANGE HOUSE

(GENESIS II PROGRAM)
87 Ingersoll Grove
Springfield, Ma.
Douglass Trottier, 737-0325

GENESIS II (DYS Group Home)
Dartmouth Terrace
Springfield, Ma.
Carl Townsend, 737-8519

HILLTOP CHILDREN'S SERVICES
145 State Street
Springfield, Ma.
Linda Ferinni, (413) 733-2934

HOLYOKE BOYS' CLUB
224 Elm Street
Holyoke, Ma.
Nicholas Cosmos, 534-3536

LEXIA SCHOOL
P. O. Box 250
Lee, Ma. 02138
Dub Johnson

OUR LADY OF PROVIDENCE
2112 Riverdale Street
West Springfield, Ma.
Sr. Dorothy Boland, 788-7366

ROCKWOOD ACADEMY
Lenox, Ma. 01240
Richard J. Herber, (413) 637-3466

SOUTH 40 ALTERNATIVES
P. O. Box 983
North Adams, Ma.
Wendy Germain, (413) 663-7457

TAYLOR HILL HOUSE
Taylor Hill Road
Montague, Ma. 01351
Barbara & Brian McColgan, 367-9557

WINDSOR MOUNTAIN SCHOOL
45 West Street
Lenox, Ma. 01240
Mr. Bondy, (413) 637-1020

REGION II

BRANDON AT PETERSHAM
North Main Street
Petersham, Ma.
724-6629

CLARA BARTON (RFK Action Corps)
Lancaster School
Lancaster, Ma.
Earl Stuck, Phillip Johnston
723-5570

COME ALIVE, INC.
18 Channing Street
Worcester, Ma.
Fr. Jos. Fredette
757-9460

CUSHING ACADEMY
Ashburnham, Ma.
Robert Klarsch
827-5911

DEVEREUX SCHOOL
2 Miles Road
Rutland, Ma.
Mr. Hervey
886-4746

EAGLE HILL SCHOOL
Boverty Hill, Route 32A
Hardwick, Ma.
Mr. McDonald
(413) 477-6000

ESTERHOUSE, INC.
30 Edwards Street
Worcester, Ma. 01605
Sr. Aloysius
753-1957

THE LEDGES
35 Adin Street
Hopedale, Ma.
473-6520

LUTHERAN COUNCIL OF CENTRAL MASS.
Box 183
West Boylston, Ma. 01583
David Stacy
829-5252

MARILLAC MANOR
2 Granite Street
Worcester, Ma. 01605
798-8709

MC AULEY NAZARETH HOME FOR BOYS
77 Mulberry Street
Leicester, Ma.
Fr. Tinsley
892-4886

MENTAL HEALTH REHAB., RUTLAND
Maple Avenue
Rutland, Ma.
Edwin Hastbacka
886-6156

MERRIFIELD CENTER
(Worcester Children's Friends Society)
158 Holden Street
Worcester, Ma. 01606
Carolyn Williams
753-5425

MOUNT ST. ANNE'S
133 Granite Street
Worcester, Ma. 01604
David Mulrooney
753-3084

PROTESTANT YOUTH CENTER
Box 23
Baldwinsville, Ma. 01436
Leighton Cheney
936-8254

ST. JOSEPH'S HOME
52 High Street
Worcester, Ma. 01608
Sr. Antonious
755-7707

STETSON HOME
Barre, Ma.
Ms. Robinson
355-4541

VALLEY VIEW FARMS
P. O. Box 338
North Brookfield, Ma.
Dr. Phillip Spiva
867-6505

WORCESTER CHILDREN'S FRIENDS SOCIETY
21 Cedar Street
Worcester, Ma.
Jean Griesheimer

WYCOFF CONSULTANTS, INC.
24 High Street
Winchendon, Ma.
William Frazitta

REGION III

ACADEMIX

14 Arrow Street (office)
Cambridge, Ma.
Marcia Flood
461-6530

ERNEST L. HERMAN SCHOOL

475 Varnum Avenue
Lowell, Ma.
Mr. Herman
454-4234

THE GROUP SCHOOL

74 Mt. Auburn St. (Office)
38 Kirkland Street (School)
Cambridge, Ma.
Neil W. Didriksen
547-5524

LIBRA, INC.

1145 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Ma.
Edmund Reilly
661-1966

LOW HILLS SCHOOL

21 Central Street
Acton, Ma. 01720
Mr. Puffner
783-4273

MASS. RESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS, INC.

775 Trapelo Road
Waltham, Ma. 02154
Marsha Cunningham
893-9652

SHARE

215 Appleton Street
Lowell, Ma. (Office)
Anabasin House
814 Merrimac
Lowell, Ma.
Louis Bookeronie, 459-2761

SHARE (DYS Group Home)
215 Appleton Street
Lowell, Ma.
Dr. Paul Strudle
459-2306

UNITED HOMES FOR CHILDREN
Randolph, Hull, Weymouth, Tewksbury, Burlington
Patrick Thorne
963-6943

REGION IV

A.C.I.C. (Adolescent Coun. In Dev.)
170 Pleasant Street
Malden, Ma. 02148
Jack Sarmanian
324-2218

CHALLENGE HOUSE
East Street
Methuen, Ma.
Ray Tague
685-9141

LANDMARK SCHOOL
Prides Crossing, Ma. 01965
Mr. Whynot
927-4440

LEDGEWOOD
100 Harvard Street
Mattapan, Ma.
Dr. Allen Siegle
296-6800

LIBERTY STREET ASSOCIATES
78 Liberty Street
Danvers, Ma. 01923
Robert Leaver
774-8700

LYNN COMMUNITY RESIDENTIAL CENTER
86 Lafayette Street
Lynn, Ma.
Jack Graves
595-3252

MASS TRANSITION HOUSE
Boston Street
Topsfield, Ma.
Ken Newall
887-8523

NEW ENGLAND MILITARY ACADEMY
Byfield, Ma. 01922
Mjr. P. A. Munier
465-5809

PHOENIX EAST
Box 844 (Mailing)
20 Newton Street (House)
Haverhill, Ma.
373-3318

PLUMMER HOME FOR BOYS
37 Winter Road
Salem, Ma. 01979
John J. McCarthy
744-1099

PRODIGAL HOUSE (Mission Church)
7 Richmond Street
Haverhill, Ma. (Mailing)
Facilities located in Andover, Ma.
Clifford James
373-1541

SACRED HEART SCHOOL
Andover, Ma.
Br. Frederick Bouchard
475-1443

ST. ANN'S HOME
100A Haverhill Street
Methuen, Ma.
Larry Larsen
682-5276

ST. JOHN'S PREPARATORY SCHOOL
Danvers, Ma.
774-1050

THETA CORP.
62 School Street
Manchester, Ma.
Michael White
526-7270

WELLINGTON HALL (RFK Action Corps)
75 Dearborn Street
Salem, Ma. 01970
Phillip Johnston
723-5570

REGION V

CARDINAL CUSHING SCHOOL
Washington Street
Hanover, Ma.
Sr. Shawn
471-4664

CUSHING HALL, INC.
279 Tilden Road
Scituate, Ma. 02166
Father Atwater

DARE, INC.
36 Perkins Street (Exec. Office)
Jamaica Plain, Ma.
Gerald Wright, Exec. Dir.
524-7070

DONNER HOUSE
Hancock Street
Quincy, Ma.
Mr. Taylor
773-1360

HILLSIDE SCHOOL
Marlborough, Ma.
Mr. Whitmore
485-2824

LONGVIEW FARMS (HEHLW)
Walpole, Ma.
Mr. Westercamp
668-7703

MADONNA HALL
Cushing Hill Drive
Marlborough, Ma.
Sr. Mary William
485-8610

PILGRIM HOUSE (Youth Resources)
100 River Street
Braintree, Ma.
Frank Wilhelm

REGENESIS (Elan I, Naples, ME)
7 Harvard Square
Brookline, Ma. 02146
David Goldberg
969-4698

ROCKLAND SCHOOL FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN
233 Market Street
Rockland, Ma.
Robert Cummings
878-3025

WALKER HOME FOR CHILDREN
1968 Central Avenue
Needham, Ma.
Dr. Albert Treishman

REGION VI

ANDROS (Human Resource Institute)
227 Babcock Street
Brookline, Ma.
Dr. Sheldon Zigelbaum
734-5930

BOOTH MEMORIAL HOME
332 Jamaicaway
Jamaica Plain, Ma.
Ruth Lindberg
524-3220

BOSTON CHILDREN'S SERVICES
3 Walnut Street
Boston, Ma. 02108
227-3800

BROOKFARM HOME
670 Baker Street
West Roxbury, Ma.

CHILDREN IN CRISES
591 Morton Street
Dorchester, Ma. 02124
Nathaniel Royston
282-1970

CRITTENDEN HASTINGS HOUSE
10 Perthshire Street
Boston, Ma.
Phyllis Cosand
782-7600

EDITH FOX HOMES
45 Parley Avenue
Jamaica Plain, Ma.
James McCroham, 524-2223
Ellen Burns, 522-3042

EVERETT HOUSE (NEHLW)
232 Denter Street
Dorchester, Ma.
Judy McCarthy
282-9161

FIRST, INC.
781 Tremont Street
Boston, Ma.
176 Blue Hill Center
Roxbury, Ma.
Nathaniel Wade
536-2724

GROUPWAYS
55 Worcester Street
Boston, Ma. 02118
Lynn Thompson
266-0142

HAYDEN GOODWILL INN
21 Queen Street
Dorchester, Ma.
Norm LeDoux
288-1500

HOME FOR ITALIAN CHILDREN
Central Street
Jamaica Plain, Ma.
Sr. Mary Sheila
524-3116

INTERFAITH YOUNG ADULT MINISTRIES
490 Beacon Street
Boston, Ma. 02215
George Whitehouse
261-8280

MANVILLE RESIDENCE
(Judge Baker Clinic)
295 Longwood Avenue
Roxbury, Ma.
Mr. Merson
232-8390

MERIDIAN HOUSE
(East Boston Drug Action Council)
408 Meridian Street
East Boston, Ma.
569-5390

NAZARETH CHILD CARE CENTER
420 Pond Street
Jamaica Plain, Ma.
Sr. Mary Patricia
522-4040

NEW ENGLAND HOME FOR LITTLE WANDERERS
Child Care Center
161 Huntington Avenue
Jamaica Plain, Ma.
Joseph Collins
232-8600

PROJECT CONCERN
252 Dudley Street
Roxbury, Ma.
George Bryce
445-1650

ROBESON HOUSE (RFK Action Corps)
11 Robeson Street
Jamaica Plain, Ma.
Barbara Reynolds
523-4206

ROXBURY MEDICAL-TECHNICAL INSTITUTE, INC.
60 Vernon Street
Roxbury, Ma.

THIRD NAIL, INC.
1170 Columbus Avenue
Roxbury Crossing, Ma.
DeWitt Stewart
445-6142

THE THIRTEENTH YEAR SCHOOL
420 Boylston Street
Boston, Ma. 02116
Mr. Sherman
261-3313

THOMPSON ACADEMY
Thompson Island
South Boston, Ma.
George Wright
472-2884

REGION VII

ALPHA HOUSE

550 North Main Street
Attleboro, Ma.
Wendy and Bill Mathis
222-6361

BRISTOL ACRES

158 Williams Street
Taunton, Ma. 02780
Jack Van Vliet
822-5396

CHILDREN'S HOME OF FALL RIVER

P. O. Box 767 (Mailing)
Fall River, Ma.
427 Robeson Street (Residence)
Fall River, Ma. 02722
Mr. Warren Sterns
677-9622

CREDENCE HOUSE

1618 Rock Street
Fall River, Ma.
Bill Dougherty
672-9502

DEACONESS HOMES

309 French Street
Fall River, Ma. 02720
John Kennon
674-6476

PROSPECT HALL

603 Rock Street
Fall River, Ma.

RESIDENTIAL REHABILITATION CENTERS

(Boxwood-by-the-Sea)

Route 6A
Brewster, Ma.
896-5986

RESIDENTIAL REHABILITATION CENTERS

(Latham Elms)

Route 6A

Brewster, Ma.

896-5466

ROCKLAND SCHOOL FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN

(DYS Group Home)

233 Market Street (Administration)

Rockland, Ma.

Robert Cummings

878-3025

ST. VINCENT'S HOME

2860 North Main Street

Fall River, Ma.

672-5223

FRANK S. STEVENS HOME FOR BOYS

24 Main Street

P. O. Box 222

Swansea, Ma. 02777

677-9091

OUT OF STATE

AMERICAN SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF
139 North Main Street
West Hartford, Conn.
Mona McCubbin
236-5891

AUSTIN CATE ACADEMY
Center Strafford, N.H.
Nelson McClean
664-5555

BAILEY HALL
Katona, N.Y.
Mr. Roberts
(914) 232-3070

JOSEPHINE BAIRD CHILDREN'S CENTER
1110 Pine Street
Brattleboro, Vt.

CONN. JR. REPUBLIC
P. O. Box 161
Litchfield, Conn.
William Friscia
567-9423

CRYSTAL RUN CAMP AND SCHOOL
R.D. #2
Middletown, N.Y.
James Fogelman
692-4444

DUBLIN SCHOOL
Dublin, N.H.
Michael Cornog
563-3331

EMMA PENDLETON BRADLEY HOSPITAL
1100 Veterans Memorial Parkway
Riverside, R.I. 02915
Mrs. McLean
434-3400

GEORGE JUNIOR REPUBLIC
Freeville, N.Y.
(607) 844-8613

GREENSHIRE
P.O. Box 172
Cheshire, Conn.
(203) 272-7195

THE HARBOR SCHOOL AT E. BOOTHBAY, ME.
East Boothbay, Me.
633-2594

HORIZON'S EDGE COUNTRY HOME AND SCHOOL
RIVENDALE SCHOOL
Canterbury, N.H.
(603) 783-4388

KINSMAN HALL
Jackson, Me.
Dean Hepper
(207) 668-7757/2031

KURN HATTIN HOMES
Westminster, Vt.
John Watson
(802) 722-3646

MOUNT ST. JOHN'S
Deep River, Conn.
Jay Ashe
(203) 526-5291

PINE RIDGE SCHOOL
Williston, Vt.
Howard Delino
(802) 434-2161

THE RHINEBECK COUNTRY SCHOOL
Rhinebeck, N.Y.
Mr. Zenimers
(914) 876-7061

SAINT ANDREWS SCHOOL
West Barrington, R.I. 20890
Steven Waters
(401) 246-1230

SPALDING YOUTH CENTER
Tilten, N.H.
John Pangburn
(603) 286-8646

SPURWINK SCHOOL
899 Riverside Street
Portland, Me.
(207) 797-3444

STONEGATE SCHOOL, INC.
Wallingford Road
Durham, Conn.
James J. Feeney
(203) 349-3467

WATERFORD COUNTRY SCHOOL
Fire Street
Waterford, Conn.
(203) 422-9454

WOODS LANE SCHOOL
Colchester, Conn. 06415
Manuel Rezendes
(203) 859-1900

APPENDIX H

DOCUMENTS EVALUATING
SELECTED INSTITUTIONAL PROGRAMS
DURING THE PERIOD OF CHANGE, 1971

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Present Situation at Shirley Industrial School
for Boys

DATE: June 15, 1971

FROM: Barry Dym, Consultant

TO: Yitzhak Bakal, Assistant Commissioner in charge of
Institutions

On Thursday, June 3, I visited Shirley with the intention of helping to develop and establish a behavioral modification program for those boys who still remain in conventional cottage programs. After speaking with several people, I concluded that this was not the appropriate time to institute a behavioral modification program, primarily because of the almost blatant chaos which now exists at the school.

Aside from the program itself, which consists of a consistent reinforcement schedule, behavioral modification, to be successful, requires a number of organizational characteristics which are not now present.

1. A Stable Environment

Although you hoped that the behavioral modification program might help to stabilize the environment, such a program needs at least a minimum of stability and order to get started. That kind of stability does not exist. Virtually everyone seems to be on tenderhooks, awaiting the next

The Present Situation at Shirley Industrial School for Boys
Page 2
June 15, 1971

move from Boston. Several people described the stage of the cottages as a "jungle". It would be difficult to quickly break such a "jungle" or "street" culture.

2. Leadership

The establishment of any program in an institution requires consistent and strong leadership. The leadership pattern now seems diffused and sometimes non-existent. For example, several people claimed that it was hard to tell whether Ed McCarthy or Paul Dickhaut was the real leader. Within the cottages the pattern is even vaguer. I am not at all convinced that Paul would presently have the ability to establish a program, that it would not seem to be an imposition from a leader slightly lacking in support in creditability, and therefore to be resisted.

3. Staff Organization

A behavioral modification program can only work with a staff that is cohesive enough to give the students consistent messages, which are the heart of such a program. At present, staffing patterns are irregular and disorganized. As you probably know, the two cottage directors, Darwin Barnes and Dave MacMillan have been removed from their positions. From what I understand, any staff member who happens to be on duty is then in charge. As a result there can be no consistency of style, treatment theory and practice, or reinforcement messages.

4. Institutional Credibility

The "jungle" atmosphere apparently stems from the belief on the part of the kids that no one gives a damn about them. They don't believe that the staff is trying to help them, and, from what I understand, most staff people have consciously

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stopped trying to be of much help. The kids (I spoke to several) feel like they are doing time, and have no faith in the staff -- this situation was badly exacerbated by the removal of Barnes and MacMillan, whom the kids trusted. The general distrust, which can be seen graphically in the increases in "runs", would be very difficult to break down.

Consequently, the establishment of a behavioral modification system at Shirley would be very difficult to achieve, and since both present difficulties (e.g., with the Union) and the promise of new plans in the near future, suggest that the program would not be long lived or highly valued, I think that we should abandon the idea of trying to institute behavior modification at Shirley.

I would like to call to your attention, in a more general way, some of the disturbing trends now developing at Shirley. Perhaps you are well aware of them in which case you can ignore this part of the memorandum. But I feel duty-bound to inform you.

1. Few people who are well qualified or talented in working with kids are now doing so. That MacMillan and Barnes are simply biding time is a tragic waste. Other staff members are either so inept or so little trusted, that many kids still seek help from MacMillan and Barnes, who do not feel in a good position to give it.

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2. Staff morale is generally at its lowest ebb ever. Many are seriously thinking of quitting. And I am not talking about do nothings or old-line people who would quit because they don't like the direction of the department. I am talking about the most valuable and hardest working people at Shirley.

3. There seems to be very little faith in the leadership. Paul, for example, seems to be in a very difficult position with everyone; e.g., Union people for one set of reasons, and young, idealistic staff members, for others.

4. There is little or no organization. The kids "jungle" is little more than a reflection of the staff disorganization.

5. Student morale is lower than I have ever seen it. I did not speak to one boy who felt he was getting anything beneficial out of Shirley, who did not feel pushed around and held in.

6. Sloth has set in. Students and staff can be seen walking around aimlessly or just sitting in some bored posture. The cottages are now dirty, and even the old-line staff, who express much caring for cleanliness, are loath to push the boys into any real activity around keeping their environment clean and neat.

7. Racism is a potentially explosive issue. This is because the kids are not held well under control, or kept busy, but also because, of the 48 staff members who were not in their graded positions, only Darwin Barnes and Dave MacMillan seem to have been singled out for removal.

At the risk of pompously repeating something which you certainly know very well, I would like to give you some feedback. Programs and organizations are only as

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good as the people who work in them. And effective leadership requires legitimacy and support. I think that the present system is geared to get the worst from staff, not the best. And this is because leadership is losing the legitimacy, credibility and support of its staff. If, in the future, you must build on the talents and good will of the present staff (or primarily of the present staff), the present disorganization and hassles are going to make things much more difficult. The Boston office is building higher obstacles to the achievement of their goals. I think that you must move decisively and soon to regain your credibility and your support.

Barry Dym

BD:ps

John Augustus Hall Oakdale
Tom Lyons, Director

John Augustus Hall, more commonly known as Oakdale, is one large modern institutional looking (like a public school) building. It currently contains sixteen boys, with plans to increase to twenty, and perhaps more. There are three noteworthy parts of the program which are becoming highly developed. They are: community meetings, Vorath-style group therapy, and education. Although the staff is divided into teachers, line staff and counselors, there seems to be some effort to blur the lines of role definitions, keeping the staff more egalitarian. In my two visits to Oakdale I sensed that the key therapeutic decisions were not being made by the director, but that Dean, the assistant director, handled these areas of responsibility.

Community meetings are held daily. There is a very specific procedure by which these meetings are run. A student chairman and secretary are in charge. They are elected by staff and students for an indeterminate term in office. At the beginning of each meeting, which are run with the strictest parliamentary procedure imaginable, the secretary reads off the log book, the minutes of the preceding meeting, and any other matters that have been tabled in

earlier discussions. Any member of the staff may write in the log; a student must ask the chairman to write his comments down for him. The community discusses each entry with care and deliberation. These meetings often resemble a "wild west" roughshod form of democracy. Justice does not always seem to be carried out, as some decisions are made at the whim of the gavel-wielding chairman (who occasionally suffers from touches of megalomania). The staff is involved in that they too can have the floor to talk, but they do not intervene in the decision-making. All decisions which require a vote are determined by a complicated proportion of voters. (That is, two-thirds of the staff is needed, as well as two-thirds of the boys, but some motions can be carried if the staff is unanimous.) Some decisions do not require voting as there is an elaborate system of "non-negotiable" rules with specified punishments. Sometimes boys are accused of breaking rules, or causing trouble, etc.; if these infractions are not subject to an immediate level drop, there is usually an extensive courtroom-like procedure that occurs. Although responses to boys are not entirely consistent, a certain process takes place which is fascinating to watch. The accused boy essentially becomes his own lawyer, with all the skills defense would require. The boys seem to be quite proficient in exploring evidence, finding

witnesses and making countercharges. These meetings are by no means therapeutic in a feelings way. Rather they are tribunals, with the chips falling where they may. Occasionally, the meetings get carried away and a kind of kangaroo-type process mingles with the law and order approach. Yet they seem valuable because the boys are forced to think, articulate, and make decisions. These sessions are lively, stirring up a variety of aggressive talking, but all is channeled within a legalistic framework.

After the discussions and the decisions are made, boys are allowed to ask for level raises. The community discusses the progress a boy has made and votes on whether he should be granted his request. The five-level system is used here, as in other cottages, as a punishment and reward system. Each level raise brings along added privileges, such as having your own room, going on a weekend, etc. The one unusual use of a level is that of level one. When a boy is on level one he must wear pajamas and slippers (this is in part to discourage runaways) and is kept under close watch of the staff. If he misbehaves or causes any further trouble he can be sent to the discipline cottage in Lyman or Shirley. I sometimes feel that the discipline cottages of other institutions are used too freely. Two reasons come to mind. First, a program really should have a means

of handling its own punishments within its own program. Oakdale staff feel that they can keep any boy in their program, and will only use discipline as a temporary solution. A boy is rarely, if ever, permanently removed from the program. However, discipline outside of the cottage used to strengthen a program, raises some questions about the program itself. The second problem in using a discipline cottage at Lyman is that it gives the staff at that institution a sense of being the last resort for forceful containment. (Some people at Lyman have complained that they feel like the dumping ground of the DYS.) I would not suggest that this policy be changed, but that it might be explored for some other alternatives.

In general, the community meetings serve an excellent purpose in that they are democratic, the peer culture is given an opportunity to strengthen itself, and the boys seem to be satisfied with the relative justice they receive. I think the staff might intervene a bit more when the process gets too caught up in the skill of the "lawyer" rather than the merits of the situation. One other minor change would be in fixing a term for the chairman. As it is now, the chairman is somewhat unpopular with the boys because of his lack of humility. For the chairman to change, he would have to break a rule himself, be dropped a

level, and then no longer be eligible to continue. One would think that if the pressures of being an arbiter are too great, and the chairman was losing his friends, he might elect to act out in order to be relieved of his burden. This obviously can be a negative system for the boy and the community. Fixing a term would avoid many of these problems.

After the community meeting each boy attends a Vorath-style group therapy meeting which is to be held strictly confidential and cannot be shared with any resident outside of the group. I do not know exactly what the Vorath structure is, except that it seems to be a system where boys are encouraged to talk about themselves. In Oakdale the group I attended had eight boys and two counselors. The meeting began with each boy telling in turn any "news" that happened to him in the last 24 hours. After that each boy shares any "incidents" that occurred. Supposedly, after sharing this information, the group elects which boy should "get the meeting", that is, be the focus of attention and questions. Of the two meetings I attended, one focused on a new boy whom nobody knew, and the other did not focus on anyone (this was the first meeting I was at and I felt my presence might have hampered the usual process). I don't consider either of the meetings I observed to be very good

examples of therapy or use of group dynamics. I felt that the Vorath system sort of takes the heat off of true group interaction. One boy gets chosen to be the center of attention; however, if the group doesn't invest in him by asking questions and comforting him, it just becomes a monologue, or an interaction with the leader. In a way this system encourages individual treatment within a group of people. Group therapy itself makes much more use of the whole group working together on each other's problems. The Vorathian model is good in that it encourages each boy to participate on some level at the beginning of the meeting, but that involvement is not supported throughout the session. (Again, I want to make it clear that these interpretations were based on two relatively poor sessions, and may be too critical.) I wondered if the leaders had only been trained to do Vorath-style leadership, rather than having been given a bit more eclectic approach to group treatment. Somehow this process alone seems too sterile in relation to all that might be done with adolescent boys.

As I understand it, Oakdale is going to be taking more hard-core boys into its program. I think the staff could definitely profit from some increased supervision, training or support than they are now getting. Apparently, Tom Lyons is a good administrator but does not know enough about pro-

grams or treatment to be an asset to the staff. I know there are some administrative changes going on and would recommend that a person sensitive to treatment issues be available for staff.

Again, Oakdale, as so many of the other DYS placements, complains about not receiving enough straight information from the Boston office concerning its future. Staff is worried about the number of boys coming, the nature of their problems, etc. They could certainly benefit from some support and information. I feel that basically this staff is doing a good job. The facility they are using is much too institutional, but they don't seem to care about it that much. The staff seems together, although there are the usual conflicts about consistency between the line staff and the counselors. I think the staff in general, or maybe just the counselors, could use either some supervision or a chance to talk about themselves in relation to the program and each other. This staff has a tendency to band together against the outside world. However, in so doing, they cover up some of the tensions and problems which could divide them. Interestingly enough, they were given this opportunity some weeks ago, to work with Bob Ginn or Barry Dym, and turned it down.

Alexandra Thacher
November 15, 1971

Overlook Cottage Lyman
Frank Ciuffreda, Cottage Director

Overlook was recently established to be a program for first offenders of non-violent crimes, who would remain within the cottage for a six to eight-week period prior to parole. Ostensibly, this program was to provide some kind of deterrent so that boys would not want to get into criminal activities which might return them to an institution. The mandate for this program also included the notion that separating new offenders from boys with a longer history of institutionalization would help prevent the development of a delinquent sub-culture, and all the inevitable passing on of information concerning antisocial acts. The program has three major components: education, through use of an extensive tutoring program; experience, Outward Bound approach and some group meetings; and activities. Woven through this is an elaborate level system which predicts and controls the rate of advancement and eventual parole.

I will begin to explain the program by describing the step system. Each boy enters on step one. No boys are interviewed prior to acceptance. (I will discuss the problems related to this later.) On a weekly basis each boy is re-evaluated in relation to attitude, adjustment and behavior. Assuming a boy is adjusting well and progresses to a

new step each week, he will be eligible for parole in the six to eight-week period. Boys are rarely, if ever, demoted a step, although they may be held at a certain level until their behavior warrants increased responsibility and freedom. Level changes are determined by the staff by vote. If there were a tie vote the boys would be asked to break the tie. The first three steps have the same basic privileges to wear your own clothes, be with the group, seven cigarets per day, etc. Each raise in level signifies progress toward parole, although a step two boy has no more or less freedom than a step one or three boy. On step four a boy is allowed the additional privilege of walking around the grounds with his parents when they visit. Boys on the remaining levels five, six and seven are active candidates for parole. They have an extra responsibility to orient new boys coming into the program. Boys who are on step seven, and are awaiting the next parole board meeting, may be given permission with parent approval, to go home and find a job which they can begin when they are officially released from the cottage. In a sense, the step system is almost a purely reward approach, in that it is not really used for punishment. If a boy is not doing as well as a level raise would indicate, he is held at the same place without losing anything except a week's time in his pursuit of parole.

However, there are other "negative" punishments employed. The most obvious one is running the risk of crossing the director, Frank Ciuffreda, who runs the program with an iron hand. Frank's punishments seem to be mostly in the form of heavy verbal confrontation and attack. Frank might not ever hit a boy, but one does not doubt that when provoked he might easily succumb to brute force. A rather common punishment is having a boy change into state pants and sit in a corner, or be socially isolated. This restriction is more of a humiliation than anything else. Another control is used by some members of the staff; although Frank personally disapproves of it, he feels forced to accept it for the sake of preserving the program. Some of the older line staff will restrict a boy's cigarets if he misbehaves. They will also require boys to remain sitting in one seat while watching television. (I will discuss staff conflicts later as they are pertinent to the management of the program.) As the atmosphere of the cottage has a disciplined/militaristic tone, there are not many serious infractions of rules to contend with.

The educational component of Overlook is important to the function of the program. Almost all of the learning takes place in one-to-one tutorial sessions. There are a few classes held in drugs and sex education, and plans for

a personal hygiene class are underway. Each boy has his own tutor, with whom he meets several times per week. The schedule allows time for study periods wherein boys can complete their tutorial assignments. The educational director coordinates the tutors, and is available for their assistance, although he does not actively supervise them. Most of the tutors are volunteers from the local community and some are from nearby colleges. The coordinator, John McGinn, is also responsible for making some diagnostic assessments of the educational level a boy is on. As a new boy comes in he is tested and assigned a tutor. The tutor is responsible for writing regular reports on the progress of the student.

The treatment program should more properly be described as a kind of experience, rather than as a therapeutic process. Paul Calberg is the counselor for the cottage, and is responsible for the individual needs of the 31 residents. Obviously, Paul is unable to cover these needs in any comprehensive or consistent manner. Most of his time is spent in preliminary after-care arrangements, some meetings with families, and some meetings with boys. The boys attend a group meeting every day, but it is really for the establishment of rules, steps and decisions concerning recreational plans. It is not a feelings meeting. (I do not think the staff would understand the usefulness of feelings meetings

as they are suspicious of their value. Some other cottages at Lyman are using Vorath-style groups, and the Overlook staff think their programs are deteriorating. I am afraid that Frank might be threatened by groups if they were not explained and used well. However, Frank himself could probably be trained and become an excellent group leader.) I believe there are some kinds of elected student representatives, but they only speak for the other boys. Frank added one meeting per week in order to help bring staff and students closer together. On Sunday nights he meets with all the boys, without any other staff present. The boys are free at this time to register all their complaints about rules, staff and the program. Frank keeps a record of all these grievances. Later in the week he meets with the staff and gives them the same right. At a third meeting, he invites staff and students to present and resolve the issues he has been told during the week.

Another part of the treatment experience is the involvement of families. As a new boy enters the program his parents are sent a very strong letter urging them to participate in the treatment of their son. Frank informs them that they are allowed unlimited visits at any time, as long as they request permission before arriving at Lyman. The letter of introduction also makes clear that if parents are

not involved in regular and frequent contact with the cottage their boy might be transferred to another program. The staff estimates that more than 60 percent of the parents are coming to see their sons many times a month. The counselor and the director try to meet with families whenever they are available, and are doing specific work with a few families as time allows.

One theme of the program is the development of a "team" approach with the boys. The cottage makes daily use of a rope course and the gym facilities. The rope course is part of the OverLanders program (which is similar to Outward Bound). The physical activities all stress teamwork and the need for self-confidence. I would suspect that whatever personal growth occurs is largely influenced by these activities.

As the Overlook program is only five or six weeks old, it is hard to determine the after-care success. The major concern of the staff is that parole, the courts and the police will not accept the beneficial aspects of a six to eight-week program. The counselor is contemplating some massive public relations campaign to give the program some meaningful exposure. It would help if the central administration could give this program more support, especially because it is attempting an experiment, the results of which

may be very useful to long-term departmental plans.

As I have mentioned before, this is a highly structured, disciplined program. Frank is a very strong, demanding, confrontative man. His word is law, although when approached reasonably, I think he can be flexible and understanding. Frank has worked for Lyman (in security) for the last two years. Previous to that he worked in construction. He is a powerful, wholly unpretentious person who is straightforward and honest in his dealings with the boys. He has certainly hit boys in the past (that was one reason why he was hited for the security cottage), but I am convinced that he can operate a program without using brutality. Frank is a tough guy who commands respect and could really benefit from some support and more training. He has never met an Assistant Commissioner, or anyone else from Boston. He feels little if any support from Lyman administration, while having to contend with an antiquated hierarchy of power which he views as oppressive middlemen. As Frank is a Grade 8, and the men above him (Senior Juvenile Supervisors) are tens, he is forced to go through them for any decisions and assistance he needs. Although he was not complaining about the salary, the lack of authority over his program was a major area of contention. He apparently has no direct channel of communication to anyone in author-

ity who is sensitive to program needs. I feel he is being treated by others higher than him as if he were line staff, rather than a cottage director. This probably has to do with his lack of seniority and importance. It is unfortunate that such obstacles have been left in his way, while other cottage directors in other institutions (like Lancaster) who are on a similar pay grade have much more respect and freedom of action. Whether it is his personality or some weakness in the system which causes these problems, I am not sure. Yet he has felt it necessary to boycott cottage directors meetings because of the lack of support he receives. I think this man should be cultivated, as I believe he has some innate abilities to run programs and deal with youthful offenders.

There are some more major and serious problems this program has to contend with. According to Frank, there was a mandate given to him to open a program for first commitment boys who did not commit certain violent acts. In the original group of eight (which he was not allowed to interview, but would like to assume that responsibility), the mandate was adhered to. However, now the program has 31 boys, of which a sizable proportion are neither first commitments nor have they been charged with less aggressive crimes. Some of the boys have been involved in crimes

which would require the special parole board's approval before they could be released. Obviously, these boys will not be eligible for parole in the six to eight-week period. The different status of these two groups creates a considerable amount of understandable tension. It also requires the use of two sets of rules. The step system is irrelevant for boys who will have to stay in the program beyond eight weeks. Because Lyman is so concerned about runaways, Overlook staff must take much more caution in handling the boys with an eye for security. This means that boys must be lined up several times a day to use the toilet. As they can't necessarily be trusted not to run, such precautions are mandatory. However, were the population more uniform, as it originally was, the need for toilet lines would be non-existent and not employed. It is clear that in spite of the problems of overcrowding in Lyman, either this program must be able to return its mandate or Frank will quit, or the cottage will have to abandon its goals. The system cannot continue as it is.

Should it be determined that the program should continue according to the original plan, some things must be clarified. For example: the degree of autonomy Overlook has within the confines of Lyman must be delineated. At the present time Lyman has several non-negotiable rules.

Boys are universally not allowed to carry their own cigarettes, nor are they allowed to come to the cafeteria in any other form than a line. (Apparently boys must be accompanied by two staff when they eat. The day I met with Frank we talked past lunch time. The boys went to the cafeteria with one staff member. Frank received a phone call shortly after lunch from one of the Senior Juvenile Supervisors reprimanding him for his absence. Frank was so angry he refused to go to his cottage directors meeting.) These kinds of rigid and unimportant rules are repressive for even slightly creative programming.

Autonomy is desperately needed so Frank can run a cottage with some consistency and his own self-respect. Frank finds it necessary to play off the four Senior Juvenile Supervisors in order to get any room for his ideas. This program could probably develop its own rules, its own intake and accountability, and its own staffing pattern and people. The staff inconsistency is another huge problem. There are times when only one man is in charge of the group. If that man is not in agreement with the cottage rules, he makes his own; i.e., restricting cigarettes or movement. I read a section of the log where a staff member wrote down that he did not care who ran the cottage, or what Frank instituted, but when he was on he would do as he

saw fit! This man has since been removed to another cottage, but there seem to be others of the same caliber who remain. There is no reason to keep a recalcitrant staff together if they will be destructive to a program. One positive aspect of the staffing is that two young ex-DYS boys are splitting a Grade 6 position and doing quite well. Surely if this program can experiment with the very ideas so often talked about in the main office, it deserves some say in who works in higher positions.

Finally, there are some dehumanizing elements in the program which I think could be eliminated. Thirty-one boys sleep in a dorm designed for no more than 15. There is an open toilet in that room without any enclosure. All the boys must sleep in the same dorm because there are not enough staff to cover two rooms. While the concern about runaways is so high, it seems necessary to place the one night man as near the boys as possible. Again, the use of lines for the toilet, the cafeteria, the smoking rules, etc., are leftovers from an older mode of institutionalization which the department can no longer condone. I must agree that Frank himself may embody some attitudes which can be questioned. However, I would not want to evaluate this man without giving him an opportunity to demonstrate his effectiveness and humanity in a program of his own. I think he would be amenable to train-

ing and would profit from the experience of broadening his knowledge.

I have three major suggestions:

1. Return to the mandate on population including only first commitments of certain non-violent acts. If possible, allow Overlook to do its own selection.
2. Re-evaluate the pattern and quality of the staff. Support the use of hiring department parolees.
3. Decide on the relationship between Lyman and Overlook. Allow Overlook as much autonomy as possible. Support this program with training opportunities and administrative interest.

Were these suggestions implemented, I believe Overlook might be a very successful experiment in short-term placement.

Alexandra Thacher
November 9, 1971

APPENDIX I

EVALUATING THE ALTERNATIVES: EXAMPLES

December 1972 - January 1973

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TO: Yitzhak Bakal, Assistant Commissioner for
Training Evaluation and Research

FROM: Deborah Brickley, Program Evaluator

DATE: December 15, 1972

A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF FOSTER CARE PROGRAMS

IN THE DEPARTMENT

FOSTER CARE PROGRAM

Introduction:

For some youths in the Department of Youth Services, it is impossible to provide adequate supervision and services while they are in their own homes. In the past, these youths would have been committed to an isolated, repressive institution to "serve out" their time. Now, however, various alternatives have been developed, most of which are based in the community to help troubled youths and to give them the attention they need. Among these new options is foster care.

Experience has proved that it is difficult to work with youthful offenders, but experience has also proved that almost any alternative is better than the detrimental and dehumanizing effects of institutions and training schools. Foster children usually have confused and negative feelings about their natural parents; they may have difficulty in school, or getting along in their community because of their unacceptable behavior. Thus, foster families can serve a great need and help youngsters work out some of their problems. They are in demand at present in the Department.

The Foster Care Program:

The Department has approximately 250-300 youths in foster care. At present, these placements consist of five

types of foster care families. They fall into the following categories:

1. A "regular" foster home is used for youths committed to the Department or on parole from the Department on a long-term or short-term basis. These youths do not require any intensive or specialized care.
2. A detention foster home is used for youths awaiting a court appearance (short-term) or for a youth placed on long-term detention rather than being committed to the Department.
3. A contracted foster home is used for youths in the "regular" or "detention" category of foster care. It differs only in that these homes are constructed by the Department on a purchase-of-service basis from private agencies which then supervise and train the prospective foster family.
4. A state-employed foster home is a placement whose foster parent is a state employee, most often a former institutional staff member, who now cares for youth(s) in his own home.
5. A youth advocate foster home (sponsored under the Emergency Employment Act - EEA) awards a foster parent a straight salary for taking care of a youth in his home. These are young, often single, parents whose full-time responsibility and full-time job is to care for a foster child placed in their custody.

How are These Five Types of Foster Homes Recruited?

While the method of finding foster homes differs in each region, the following sources are used in all the regions:

1. Relatives: The most common foster care and often sought-after placement is with the relatives of a youth whose own family is not workable. Thus, when the search for a foster care home begins, the

parole agent will first inquire whether a relative is willing to take the child into his own home.

2. DYS Contacts: A second method of locating potential foster families is through already existing sources in the region. These include former foster parents, friends of foster parents, telephone inquiries, church groups, etc.
3. Personal Contacts of Youths: A third and very successful source is often the youth himself. He is quite resourceful in locating an acceptable family through his friends, and their families sometimes are willing to take the youth into their home as a foster child.
4. Agencies, Division of Child Guardianship and the Courts: DCG and the courts occasionally refer foster parents to the Department. While DYS has no formal lines of communication with DCG, if a brother or sister of a DYS youth is already in a DCG foster home, this Department often requests that the DYS youth might also be placed with his sibling. Various regional offices are also working with other local agencies, especially if the youth's family is on Welfare, there are a number of supportive services available. Private groups are also approached to help find foster families.
5. Contracted Services: The Department has made agreements with the following agencies to provide foster care services for youths in the Department who are both on a detention or long-term status. Payment to these agencies includes fees for recruitment of homes and holding them, training for foster parents, cost per child in the home, and administrative and supportive services required by the youth or parent during the placement period.

Here follows the list of agencies with whom the Department has arranged for services:

I. Foster Home Placements

1. Boston Children's Services, 3 Walnut Street, Boston, Mass. 02108 (serves Region 6)

2. North Shore Catholic Charities, 31 Broad Street, Salem, Mass. 01970 (serves Region 4)
3. Advocates for the Development of Human Potential, School of Education, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass. 01002 (serves Region 1)
4. United Homes for Children, Randolph, Hull, Weymouth, Burlington, and Tewksbury (serves Region 7)

II. Detained Youth Advocate Foster Home Placements

1. Catholic Charitable Bureau of Boston, Inc., 10 Derne Street, Boston, Mass. (serves Region 6)
2. The Center for the Study of Institutional Alternatives, Suite 443, 31 Elm Street, Springfield, Mass. 01103 (serves Region 1)
3. Worcester Children's Friend Society, 21 Cedar Street, Worcester, Mass. (serves Region 2)

In addition, the Department currently is encouraging a new co-operative effort between the Department of Youth Services and the Massachusetts Foster Parent Association to encourage DYS foster parents to work with this group and to use their supportive services.

Who is Responsible for the Recruitment of the Foster Home?

The Department's regional offices are actively involved in finding acceptable foster homes for youths in their own regions. Even if a youth is placed in another region, they maintain contact with the case. The regional staff are attempting to restrict their efforts to the local communities of the youths when possible. Depending on the

region, the burden of finding the home is placed either and most often on the parole agent or worker or on the placement staff, who all work directly with the Regional Director in this search. Because some regions have as few as four youths in foster care and because some regions have as many as 100, the emphasis on recruiting foster care families varies significantly.

Who are Foster Parents?

Foster parents run the gamut from young, single students to older, retired couples. Some foster parents are on Welfare, some have no children of their own, some have other natural or foster children (in one case as many as nine) in their home. Most of them are from lower-socio-economic backgrounds which apparently has worked out best for the kind of youths DYS places. Some are "in it" for the money or as an additional supplement to the family's income; however, the rates certainly are not very lucrative, if sufficient, to cover all the costs which are involved in supporting and providing for a foster child.

Who Investigates and Approves the Foster Home?

Parole workers (case workers, titles vary in each region) carry out the preliminary home investigation. There is no official form; neither are there any DYS requirements, or written guidelines in order to approve these

homes. The system operates primarily on the judgment of the individual DYS worker who assesses the acceptability of the prospective foster home. On the one hand, strict regulations might eliminate some very good families in the selection process while, on the other hand, a more structured method would clearly provide a better screening process than is operating at the present.

In general, the cleanliness and the "home" atmosphere of the potential placement are considered as two key criteria. The presence of children, natural or foster, is an additional factor, as well as a brief investigation of the parent's history. Thus, the parole agent does not, nor is he equipped in most cases, to evaluate the family dynamics and whether the family will really be able to handle the kinds of problems fostering a DYS child can present. Thus, the home investigation is more often a conjecture than an in-depth appraisal of the home.

The decision to approve the foster family is thus based on the parole worker's impressions of the home. He then submits a written report to the Regional Director who makes the next approval, who in turn gets the final approval from the Bureau of After-Care. However, these reports seem to be only formalities, and the parole worker or his immediate supervisor are really the decision-makers in this

selection process.

Most of these workers who were interviewed felt that the selection procedure was not rigid enough. Here are two examples of how this process was abused as told by a counselor working with a foster care youth and by a foster parent. In one case, a counselor was supervising a youth - an unwed mother and her baby who had been placed in her grandmother's home. The grandmother was very old, bed-ridden and had difficulty taking care of herself, let alone a young girl and her child. A foster parent also agreed that the selection process was not effective. In his own 8-month experience of being a foster parent, his home was never investigated from the start; neither did the parole agent ever "step foot into my house". While these are isolated examples, they do illustrate the leeway which the present system has allowed. A more careful, in-depth approach would certainly provide and insure better placements for the Department's clients.

The fear of tightening up the requirements lies in the difficulty of finding homes, regardless of regulations or not. And hence, there is a danger of instituting stricter qualifications which is real, in that it might become even more difficult to attract and to locate foster placements.

How is the Final Placement Made and Who Supervises the Placement in the Foster Home?

The final decision on placing a youth in the home is made by the youth, parole agent, and any other DYS staff involved in the case. Regions differ in their approach to the final placement; i.e., some youths have a number of trial visits in a home, while others are placed from day one on. In most cases, the workers agreed that a youth was kept in the foster home at all possible costs unless the family orders the child's removal.

The parole agent then supervises the placement, unless one of the contracted agencies has assumed the case, or if the parole agent has another DYS worker, like a CAP counselor overseeing the youth's placement. Supervision means something different to almost every youth worker. Most said that they would visit the youth twice a month or when a problem arose more on a crisis intervention basis than on a regular schedule. One parole agent said that he did not even visit as much as twice a month unless there were problems, for he did not want to pressure the youngster and preferred to make phone contact, yet still remain available to him at all times. Thus, you can see that each worker and youth have had different experiences with "supervision".

Written quarterly reports are required of all parole workers who are monitoring youths in foster placements.

These are of a factual nature, explaining if the youth is in school, how well he is doing in school or on a job; but it does not seem to include an evaluation of his personal development beyond a very superficial appraisal. Thus, the overall clinical aspect of the youth's growth is not really dealt with, and this huge responsibility is left with the foster parent, who receives no training other than his own experience to help youngsters with a lot of problems.

Are Foster Families Provided with Training or Other Supportive Services?

As just mentioned, the foster parent receives little or no training, unless they are those arranged through a contracted service. Thus, it is often difficult and understandably so, for foster families to deal with the kinds of problems DYS youths present and get into. This is an ironic misconception on the part of those who promote DYS's foster care program. It would seem that a foster family would receive the most possible attention when in fact they are consistently left on their own. While some homes seem to manage in spite of all the problems which arise, training and additional counseling for these families would surely insure not only that the placements would work more effectively, but that they really would help the youth solve some of his long-range problems beyond giving him a nice home experience.

Supportive services to date have consisted of the basic foster care fee which is reimbursement for room, board, education, clothing, health care, (see the rate-setting section for a more specific breakdown of fees). In addition, a staff member is assigned to be readily available to work closely with the youth, his or her natural family, and the foster family in a team effort. This "availability" of the DYS staff member is suspect. It depends on the individual worker and his accountability. If he is not doing his job, the foster family is left pretty much on its own. Professional agencies used by the Department are available to the foster family if a serious problem arises. In each region, the Department has on-going consulting contacts which provide counseling and other diagnostic services for the family.

How Does the Foster Care Budget Work - Rate Setting and Payment?

Foster care families are paid on a weekly basis according to rates set by the State Rate Setting Commission. The following rates were approved in December, 1972, for foster care placements:

1. Basic Rate: \$25.00 per week per youth

This rate is for a child who can easily adjust to this environment and requires minimum supervision.

2. Disability Rate: \$35.00 per week per youth

This rate is for a child with a physical dis-

ability or special medical problem.

3. Instability Rate: \$45.00 per week per youth

This rate is for a child with emotional problems requiring referral arrangements to other supportive services and requires 24-hour supervision.

4. Detained Youth Rate: \$50.00 per week per youth

This rate is for short-term foster care for a child after arraignment and requires consultation and evaluation of further youth disposition in coordination with the child, the foster care family, social service agencies, the courts, and the Department of Youth Services.

These rates are determined according to the child and the discretion of the parole agent and Regional Director. According to various Regional Directors, this system is very flexible in that if a family needs more money than the category in which the youth fits, they have been able to place him in a higher bracket in order to accommodate the foster care family's needs. On the other hand, one Regional Director felt that these categories did not apply to our youths; i.e., "disability" rate when few if any of our youths are physically handicapped. In addition, most people agreed, especially foster parents, that the payments were not adequate and they always had to absorb all the additional costs incurred in fostering a child without any means of compensation. Furthermore, many complained of delayed payments and in fact some claim to be awaiting payment for

months dating back to Summer of 1972.

The parole agent from DYS allegedly reports to the regional office in most cases to notify them of a placement, so to insure the payment of the home. They are on top of the youths in foster homes, and it is through them that most communication is managed. In any event, it is very difficult to find out what happens in each case or region when such things as a child who leaves in the middle of a week - how is that paid, etc.

PART II - The Foster Care Program as it is Currently Operating in the Regions.

This information was obtained through interviews with Regional Directors, parole workers, placement staff, foster parents and about anyone who could be contacted or who was involved in foster care. It was very difficult to track down all the key people in the foster care programs in each of the Department's regions. In fact, many important people were not able to be reached due to the relatively short period of time this study spent, and most importantly on the dependence on the telephone to search out much of this information. It was difficult to interview people over the phone and not be able to meet with them and travel to the various regional offices to attend their meetings and to

talk with more staff actively involved with foster care.

In spite of these set-backs, information was gathered, and the following sketches by region highlight a few of the problems or methods of foster care operating in that area.

TO: Yitzhak Bakal, Assistant Commissioner for
Training Evaluation and Research

FROM: Leslie Brown, Eric Best, and Michael Radon,
Program Evaluation Team

DATE: December 27, 1972

SYNOPSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Dare School
Mashpee, Massachusetts

SYNOPSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Dare is a co-educational/residential community on 14 acres in Mashpee, Massachusetts, presently designed to deliver educational and counselling services to a population of 10-12 youths. Initially designed as a group home, operating on an \$89,000 flat grant from the Department of Youth Services, the program will become, as of January 31, 1973, a purchase-of-service resource for the Department.

The Dare School has a great deal of potential for becoming a constructive and innovative group home. The staff are creative and talented in a variety of ways. They possess skills in many areas and are young and energetic. Educational options include a variety of "hands on" craft work, in addition to daily opportunity for voluntary project creation. Furthermore, weekly students are also encouraged to participate in evening educational programs in the community.

Dare, in its initial proposal to the Department of Youth Services characterized its goals as follows: "The therapeutic community itself is a humane, democratic system in which the residents and staff mutually participate in organizing and running the group home, which allows the

resident to offer his assistance in maintaining the group home, and gives him the opportunity to take responsibility in a positive and healthy manner."

Whereas, all the elements necessary to achieve this goal presently exist in some form at the Dare School, a major structural problem--the lack of adequate accountability for both staff and residents--gives rise to other programmatic and behavioral problems within the community. An additional serious problem exists in the lack of a well-structured and well-implemented clinical component.

The staff has attempted to realize the democratic participation by involving the students in all major decision making including the selection of new students and new staff, for invoking of disciplinary actions, and the establishment of general and specific rules governing behavior. While the concept of student involvement and the principle of the "therapeutic community" are desirable goals, they cannot be achieved instantaneously and will not be achieved if the demands placed on the students are too extensive and come too soon. Whereas, expectations need to be high, they must not be unrealistic. The present student group does not demonstrate by its actions the maturity or "togetherness" to handle its responsibilities. This suggests that the staff, for the time being, must meet these decision-making respon-

sibilities.

The problems of accountability and structure make themselves felt in the clinical area, and in a cyclical sense, the lack of a well-established clinical program adds to problems of accountability and structure. For instance, there is no one staff designated "clinical director", so to speak, to whom advocates are accountable. The amount of clinical staff-student contact is largely left up to individual staff members. There are only two clinically oriented group meetings, both of which are held only once per week. For these and other reasons, the quantity and quality of the clinical program is felt to be inadequate.

The system presently operating will encourage the future acceptance of less troubled youth, and discourage the selection of more troubled or "hard core" youth. This indicates that the program will not, by its nature, meet future needs of the Department. It is further our opinion that the majority of present residents do not represent what we have come to term "hard core youth."

A lack of written, established guidelines concerning behavior, rules, educational expectations, results in both covert and overt acting out, as well as lessening the efficiency of limit setting and controls. This takes on greater importance given the physical geography of the

setting.

The present system reduces staff awareness of where the students are and what they are doing, both emotionally and physically.

We realize that the implementation of the following recommendations will involve time, adjustment, and conflict, for staff and residents alike, and that the task of structuring and operating a coed residential unit for adolescents is a monumental one. It is our hope that the following recommendations will be of help.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Advocates should be held accountable and supervised by one clinically trained staff member.
2. All advocates should be responsible for interviewing students on a formal basis at least once a week. The content of the interview and the movement and impressions of the student should be recorded.
3. A log should be created for purposes of recording day-to-day events, students interpersonal relationships, staff response to situations, and impressions. Staff should be required to read the log daily and record daily.
4. Records should be maintained and include progress notes on students, short and long-term treatment goals and plans, and content and analysis of family meetings.
5. Family meetings or "community meetings" should be held at least three times per week.

6. Small group therapy meetings should be organized and conducted on a regular basis.
7. The family worker should be "freed up" if possible to devote the majority of his time toward organizing and implementing a meaningful family program component.
8. If new staff are hired, much consideration should be given to acquiring someone possessing clinical skills in the areas of family therapy, group therapy, and individual counselling.
9. Once a positive student subculture has been established, more "hard-core" students should be accepted into the program.
10. Treatment and educational responsibilities for staff should be clearly defined and written. A system of staff accountability should be created to assure that the stated responsibilities are being met.
11. In view of the January 31 move to purchase of service, a meeting should be held with Jim McGuinness and/or Paul DeMuro to establish selection procedures which clarify both the Department's needs and Dare's treatment capabilities.
12. House rules should be written and given to incoming residents.
13. If possible, a certain afternoon should be set aside for medical appointments, errands, etc.
14. Since the facilities size and "maze-like" quality leaves much room for covert acting-out, a system should be developed to hold residents accountable to certain areas of the facility at certain times.
15. Expectations regarding behavior in the house and outside in the community should be made more consistent.

16. More emphasis should be placed on involving and supporting residents within their community systems; i.e., public schools, jobs, vocational training.
17. The present degree of decision making afforded the students should be reviewed, with probable reduction in student involvement until a stable and responsible student subculture is established and operating effectively.

TO: Yitzhak Bakal, Assistant Commissioner for
Training Evaluation and Research

FROM: Mannie White, Alice White, and Michael Radon,
Program Evaluation Team

DATE: January 15, 1973

SYNOPSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Holyoke Boys' Club Group Home
Holyoke, Massachusetts

SYNOPSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Holyoke Boys' Club Group Home is a residential treatment unit for low to moderate risk adolescent boys primarily from the Holyoke area. The group home is contracted by the Department through a one year L.E.A.A. block grant and accommodates 10-12 boys at any given time. As of April 1, 1973, the contractual agreement will be converted to a purchase-of-service arrangement.

The physical structure of the facility was found to be quite conducive to the development of a family environment and, improved by extensive renovations, provides a comfortable, relaxed setting for DYS residents.

The thrust of the overall program is educational and vocational placement within the Holyoke community. Because of its affiliation with the long-established and well-respected Boys' Club, the program is excellent in seeking out such placements and utilizing community resources with maximum results.

While the group home's relationship with the community is its overriding strength, several other aspects of the program are deficient in their responsiveness to residents' needs.

While staff seemed to be committed to the program and sensitive to residents' personal needs, there is a general lack of clinical skills and expertise in dealing with issues involving personal, group and family problems. Staff displayed reluctance in confronting residents on behavior or encouraging confrontation among the resident group. Internal controls are minimal, primarily involving light restrictions regardless of the rule violation. As a result, much negative behavior is not responded to adequately and when residents do act out seriously, they are either returned to Westfield Detention Center or threatened with expulsion from the program.

There is also a noticeable lack of in-house programming, leaving residents with a great deal of unsupervised free time during evenings and weekends. As a result, there seemed to be little positive identification with the program on the part of residents, who spend most of their time disassociated from it.

Rather than concentrating on the deficiencies mentioned above and attempting to find solutions, the program is moving in the direction of limiting intake to those residents who need a minimal amount of guidance and who can handle large amounts of independent free time. As a result, it is meeting the needs of a very limited group of young-

sters who come under the Department's care. It is conceivable that many boys who fall within this group could benefit as well from non-residential programs or specialized foster care.

The after-care component, while quite adequate in terms of school placement and employment opportunities, does not effectively deal with those residents who eventually return home, since no family counseling is done.

In conclusion, it seems that the group home and the present staff have the potential to effectively upgrade the overall program and eventually gain the expertise needed to deal with more difficult youngsters. A necessary component in such a change in direction would be the addition of regular, rather intensive staff training sessions. Such training should focus on group dynamics and group leadership skills, family dynamics, mechanisms for internal controls and in-house programming for residents. If the program continues in its present direction, however, it is questionable whether service to such a limited population of boys is worth continued financial support from DYS.

TO: Yitzhak Bakal, Assistant Commissioner for
Training Evaluation and Research

FROM: Deborah Brickley, Alice White, Suzan Chuckers,
and Lennie Copeland, Evaluation Team

DATE: January 20, 1973

SYNOPSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

"Andros": Intensive Secure Unit
Roslindale, Massachusetts

Andros: Intensive Secure Unit in Roslindale

Andros is a program designed to handle the hard-core, severe charge cases of the Department. From its inception, Andros has committed itself to the treatment of juveniles whom all other programs will not accept or cannot handle. It is virtually the "last chance" for many youths in the Department before entering into the adult correctional system.

Andros occupies two floors of a wing at the Roslindale Detention Center. The building itself is a large, jail-like structure with tight metal grating over all the windows; however, Andros has attempted to break up the oppressing monotony of this facility by painting bright graphic designs on the walls and by not locking up its residents in the cell-like rooms.

The administration and staff, in spite of a number of management and communication problems, appear to work well as a unit. While the staff seemed to need a clearer picture of job responsibilities, program guidelines, and often support, their personal investment and high commitment in working with young offenders is striking. It is apparent in the close interaction and tight relationship of staff with residents.

The program is struggling to prevent any of the "old system" from operating at Andros. A recent decision to combine the two units at Andros was to eliminate the disciplinary, more institutionalized part of the program. There is a strong need for more scheduled recreational, educational, and cultural activities both on and off the unit. This would relax the potential explosiveness of a maximum security unit and would also decrease the amount of resident dependency on staff. The majority of staff appear to be highly sensitive, though often unarticulated, to the needs of the residents. Their value system encourages honesty, confrontation, and non-violence which also is the operating value system of the residents. In light of the fact that Andros does not have the option to "kick kids out" as other programs do, the staff appears to be doing extremely well in keeping the program together and are genuinely concerned with providing internal controls without maintaining a jail-like institution.

The clinical services provided to residents appear adequate. The staff's dedication to and interest in the welfare of the residents characterizes the individual, informal, intensive nature of the counseling component; however, there is a need for additional structure and supervision in this area. This would alleviate some the unde-

fined expectations of staff and improve the quality of services being offered to residents.

Being a program which is unique in many respects, Andros has no models to serve as a reference point. Thus, it has been evolving out of a system of trial and error, which on the one hand needs to be internally strong, and on the other, seeks to be non-institutional. It has already undergone a series of radical changes within its short history. This "struggle" seems to stem from an aversion, a movement away from the "old system" toward a system of individualized attention and concern. The program seems to be surviving this process due to the staff's high degree of commitment and the inclination of most residents to support them in their efforts. While certain factors are working against Andros's growth (lack of programming, staff supervision, etc.), Andros has met a challenge which other programs have ignored, and appears to be struggling to actualize its given potential.

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