

UNIVERSITÀ DI BOLOGNA - FACOLTÀ DI ECONOMIA**LAUREA MAGISTRALIS IN ECONOMICS****Corporate Governance (Finance I.C.)****Area: Finance & Economics****Academic Year 2012-2013****Instructor: Marco Bigelli****Office: Dipartimento di Scienze Aziendali**

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Phone: 051 2098060**Email: marco.bigelli@unibo.it****Web: <http://www2.sa.unibo.it/docenti/marco.bigelli/didattica.html>****<http://www.unibo.it/SitoWebDocente/default.htm?UPN=marco.bigelli%40unibo.it>****Office hours: please, check my web site at:****<http://www.unibo.it/SitoWebDocente/default.htm?NRMODE=Published&TabControl1=TabAvvisi&upn=marco.bigelli%40unibo.it&news=5970>****Required knowledge**

Basic financial knowledge of financial instruments, present values of cash flows, organization of financial markets and corporations.

Objectives

The course tries to cover in a comparative way the main models of corporate governance and their specific problems. It focuses also on shareholders protection and expropriation and on some EU directives aimed to integrate European Financial Markets.

Program (and relative reading material)

1. Course introduction: International corporate governance models: Bank oriented (Japan, Germany, continental Europe) versus market oriented (US, UK). The anglosaxon model and the "public company". Agency costs from separation of ownership and control in a public company. External solutions: market for products, market for managers, market for corporate control. (Slides 1, REQ1, REQ2)
2. Agency costs from separation of ownership and control in a public company. Internal solutions: board of directors, debt, monitoring by institutional investors, incentive schemes. (Slides 2, REQ1, REQ2)
3. The US Enron scandal and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Slides 3, OPT1)

4. The Continental European Model: ownership-control separation through “legal devices”. Major effects of Ownership/Control separation through legal devices. (Slides 4, OPT2)
5. Investors’ protection around the world. The Law and Finance approach and its critics. Legal and non-legal tools for shareholder protection. (Slides 5, OPT-REQ1, OPT-REQ2, REQ3)
6. Corporate governance reforms and investors’ protection in Italy. Self-expropriation in dual class-voting: a case study approach. (Slides 6, REQ4, REQ5)
7. The value of the voting right in dual class firms: theory and evidence (Slides 7, OPT-REQ3)
8. The Financial Services Action Plan and major EU directives. Economics of Insider trading and the EU Market Abuse directive (Slides 8, OPT3)
9. Economics of Takeovers and the EU takeover directive (Slides 9, REQ6, OPT4).
10. The Nabisco takeover and the movie "Barbarians at the gates"

Reading material availability

All reading material and pdf copies of the slides are available and free downloadable at the following URL:

<http://www2.sa.unibo.it/docenti/marco.bigelli/didattica.html>

Required reading material (REQ)

- All Slides used in class (numbered according to the lectures’ numbers)
- REQ1: Denis D. K. and J.J. McConnell, 2003, “International corporate governance”, *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, 38, 1-36.
- REQ2: Schleifer and R. W. Vishny, 1997, “A Survey of Corporate Governance”, *Journal of Finance* 52, 737-783.
- REQ3: Enriques L. and P. Volpin, 2007, “Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe”, *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 21, 117-140.
- REQ4: Barbi M., M. Bigelli, S. Mengoli, “Italian Corporate Governance”, in “The Handbook of International Corporate Governance: A Definitive Guide”, 2nd edition May 2009, The Institute of Directors, Kogan Page, London.
- REQ5: M. Bigelli, S. Mengoli (2011), Self-expropriations versus self-interests in dual class voting”, *Financial Management* 40, 677-699.
- REQ6: Burkart M. and F. Panunzi, 2006, Takeovers, ECGI Working paper n. 118-2006.

Extra required reading material for non-attending students taking the exam in the official exam sessions (January-February and September) rather than at the end of the course (OPT-REQ)

- OPT-REQ1: La porta et al. (1998), “Law and Finance”, *Journal of Political Economy*, 106, 1113-1155.
- OPT-REQ2: Rajan R. G. and L. Zingales (2003), “The great reversals: the politics of financial developments in the twentieth century”, *Journal of Financial Economics* 69, 5-50.
- OPT-REQ3 Adams, R., and D. Ferreira, 2008, “One share, one vote: The empirical evidence”, *Review of Finance*, 12, 51-91.

Optional reading material (OPT) –Not required but helpful to expand some topics -

- OPT1: Sarbanes-Oxley Act

- OPT2: Bigelli M., V. Mehrotra and R. Rau, 2012, “Why are shareholders not paid to give up their voting privileges? Unique evidence from Italy”, forthcoming on *Journal of Corporate Finance*.
- OPT3: Enriques L. and M. Gatti (2006), EC Reforms of Corporate Governance and Capital Markets Law: Do they Tackle Insiders’ Opportunism?, working paper.
- OPT4: EU Takeover directive

Class attendance

Students are strongly advised to attend all the lectures. The course is designed to stimulate class interaction and discussion. Most of the insights will emerge during class rather than from reading the required teaching material. A deep understanding of the slides and suggested papers can only be achieved through the class participation.

Final exam and grading for attending students

Final exam

The evaluation of attending students will be made by a final exam at the end of the course. The exam will be indicatively made of 20 multiple choices (20/30 points) and some small exercises (for a total of 10/30 points) and will last 1 hour.

Re-take exams

Re-take exams will take place during the official sessions of June and September, at the end of the integrated course. The corporate governance re-take exam will be made of three open questions and students will have to study also the following study material:

- OPT-REQ1: La porta et al. (1998), “Law and Finance”, *Journal of Political Economy*, 106, 1113-1155.
- OPT-REQ2: Rajan R. G. and L. Zingales (2003), “The great reversals: the politics of financial developments in the twentieth century”, *Journal of Financial Economics* 69, 5-50.
- OPT-REQ3 Adams, R., and D. Ferreira, 2008, “One share, one vote: The empirical evidence”, *Review of Finance*, 12, 51-91.

Exam registration policy for the whole integrated exam of Corporate Finance

- The final grade for the integrated course (Corporate finance) will be computed as an arithmetic average of the two separate modules.
- All positive grades of the integrated course will be automatically registered within two weeks from grading unless students ask not to proceed.